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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JANUARY 1936.

THE GENERAL ELECTION AND AFTER.

I

THE situation of the Liberal Party after the General Election was not expected to be a happy one, but there have actually been returned to the House of Commons a rather larger contingent than was generally anticipated, including three gains. Furthermore, there is no longer any breach between the followers of Mr. Lloyd George and the rest of the party. It is impossible to pretend that with a representation of round about twenty Liberals the position is anything but thoroughly unsatisfactory. This representation is confined to certain Welsh and Western fringes, and a few isolated spots where tradition or personality enables the Liberal banner still to fly. It was, of course, the Coalition Government immediately succeeding the war which was mainly responsible for the present plight of the party. It has never been able to recover from the disastrous blow then received. Had it not been for this the Liberal Party might well have been able to maintain its pre-war position of superiority in numbers and influence in relation to the Labour Party. But it was not to be. The events of 1918 and afterwards drew large numbers of Radicals reluctantly out of the Liberal Party, and they have remained in the Labour Party ever since, without having undergone any great change of opinion. There is every electoral indication that the Left goodwill has indefinitely gone Labour.

It must be admitted that it is very difficult to see how the Liberal Party can again secure its dominating position in national affairs, though a fairer system of election by proportional representation would increase its numbers and influence to substantial and truly representative proportions. If there seemed before the end of this Parliament any likelihood of a return to power of the Labour Party in its rigidly Marxian mood, the National Government might seriously consider the advisability of passing such legislation.

If a General Election had taken place twelve months ago with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister and Sir John

Simon as Foreign Secretary, and if there had then been, as many sought to find, any form of alternative National Government of the Left, I believe the Government would have lost the Election. The inchoate leadership of the late Prime Minister and the lamentable failure of the late Foreign Secretary's policy had so alienated and exasperated great sections of opinion that they would not have voted for the Government if there had been any alternative other than an unmixed Labour administration. Efforts were made through various channels to see how far it might be possible for progressive-minded persons in all parties to co-operate in a National Government of the Left, but owing to the isolationist policy of the Labour Party, no arrangement could be made. The country was left with the memory of the Labour collapse of 1931 still fresh in its mind, with open threats of further crises made by some of its leading members, with a sharp division of opinion on foreign policy disclosed just before the Election, together with a marked unwillingness to have anything to do with anybody who was not a signed, sealed and delivered member of the Socialist Party. This in itself was sufficiently unattractive, but in addition a momentous change took place in the structure of the Government, which profoundly altered the situation. It had long been clear that the Conservative Party were not prepared to face the hustings again under MacDonald leadership, and the earliest opportunity was taken after the Jubilee celebrations to have a fairly thorough clean-up. The new combination of Mr. Baldwin, Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Eden in key positions has proved irresistible.

It is a remarkable fact that all the main constructive and progressive contributions in policy and administration in the National Government have been made by Conservatives, and that the non-Conservative elements, for whatever votes they may have been responsible in the country, have in the higher ranks been disappointing. Exceptions such as Mr. Hore-Belisha for the National Liberals and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald for National Labour may be quoted outside the Cabinet. The change of personnel in the Government came just in time to produce a miraculous recovery. An international crisis of first-class magnitude arose, and though nominally British policy was the same, its application was as different as chalk from cheese. After three and a half years of denial of League responsibilities it was difficult to realise that the League was

really being made in practice the fundamental basis of our policy, but it was so, and as soon as this became appreciated an immense accretion of strength was obtained by the Government. Apart from the change of personnel, no doubt this was very largely and properly produced by the success, unexpected even by its originators, of the National Peace Ballot. This disclosed what had always been suspected, that the collective system of the League of Nations is a very popular policy and makes a deep appeal to the practical idealism of the British mind. After endless hesitations the first indication of this was given to the Government by the general popularity of the Saar International Force, but that 97 per cent. of over eleven million people were actually persuaded to take the trouble to express their interest in and approval of the League of Nations was an astonishing and epoch-making event. It rightly made the Government feel that they had nothing to fear from public opinion in pursuing a policy of resolute support of the League. At a critical moment they stole their opponents' thunder, and in the absence of any real alternative greatly restored their own heavily damaged prestige.

It was the collective system that swept the Government into power once more. Furthermore, in many respects they could point to successes. Apart from the failure of the distressed areas, trade *was* better, employment *had* improved, cuts had been restored and taxation reduced. The sincerity and broadmindedness of the new leaders was liked and trusted by the British people. And so a majority which had been predicted by some of the Government's own experts at not more than 150 became 250. An issue which played a very considerable part in the Election and which had been expected to play a still greater one was the Means Test. In the ordinary course it would have played a substantial part in the destruction of the Government through the lamentable handling of the new Means Test Regulations in January last, but all past failures were swept aside. The Election itself was a striking contrast to that of 1931. At that time the electors thronged to meetings to hear the explanation of a new situation which puzzled them. This time they had not much difficulty in making up their minds, and attendance at meetings was comparatively poor, especially during the period when the nightly broadcasts were in operation.

To turn to the personal side of the new House, the Liberals have returned to Parliament deprived of their leader and their whips. The absence of Sir Herbert Samuel, Mr. Isaac Foot and Sir Robert Hamilton are losses to the House of Commons as a whole, as they spoke with an authority and ability that commanded general respect. In the case of Sir Herbert Samuel the nation is deprived of the services of a statesman of outstanding qualities, who was unsurpassed in his powers of reasoning and logical statement. He enjoyed the deep devotion of those who followed him. At the same time it must be admitted that for a man of his eminence to lead a party of twenty would have involved a certain lack of proportion, and his position would not have been too easy or dignified. In the circumstances that have arisen the party is singularly fortunate in having Sir Archibald Sinclair, a much younger man, with all the potential qualities of leadership and a short term of Cabinet office, to take his place. Assisted by the long Parliamentary experience and personal popularity of Sir Percy Harris as Chief Whip he will have no difficulty in maintaining his position with distinction.

The Labour Party has returned in unexpectedly small though trebled numbers. It is, however, divided both on policy and personalities, and will have a difficult task in presenting anything like a united front, in view of the width of the gap between the official view and that of Mr. Lansbury, who, with Sir Stafford Cripps beside him, has emphasised his detachment by retiring to the corner of the third bench below the gangway on the opposition side—a position occupied on the other side of the House by Sir Austen Chamberlain. Furthermore, the party is exposed to the constant raking fire of Mr. Maxton and his three able colleagues of the Independent Labour Party.

What is going to be the development of parties and policies during the next five years? There is more than one possibility. If the Government firmly maintains its pro-League attitude* in foreign affairs and introduces progressive legislation at home at the moment required, and not two or three years too late and under great pressure as in the last Parliament, it may be able, if faced with a divided and unco-ordinated opposition, to maintain the support of a majority of the country, and be returned once more at the General Election

* Since this was written the great betrayal has taken place.

of 1939 or 1940. If Mr. Baldwin remains and has his way this may well happen, but a change to a Neville Chamberlain premiership would materially alter the situation. And a good deal will depend on the personalities introduced into the Cabinet as vacancies occur. The bringing in of Mr. Churchill would be a definite set-back to the liberalising tendency, and could hardly fail to weaken the Government in the country. The first changes are hopeful. The graceful but reactionary figure of Lord Londonderry goes out, and the more forward-minded Mr. Duff-Cooper comes in. There are still four reactionaries in the Cabinet; time should reduce their numbers to two.

As against the possibility of the development of a moderate centre government commanding the support of the Left, as far as but excluding the Labour Party, with the unwilling and, at times, rebellious acquiescence of the Conservative Right Wing, there is the alternative possibility that other influences will be too strong, and that the Government will become definitely of the Right, as it has been at various times during the past four years. It may fail to live up to its League of Nations policy, and it may fail at home to show the advance in social legislation required by the times. This would mean that it would lose the still very large Liberal vote in the country, as well as that of progressive-minded Conservatives, and the practicability of a grouping of the Left elements in a government would once more arise.

There are at present two organisations round which such a gathering of forces might take place. Most in the public eye is Mr. Lloyd George's Council of Action. In its idea that efforts should be made for like-minded persons who have the same progressive programme to co-operate it is undoubtedly right, though the circumstances of the Election were such as to rob it of much effectiveness. A Parliamentary group of sixty-seven members who received its approval at the Election has now been formed, with officers and an executive committee. Its influence in this House of Commons obviously cannot be great, but it does establish in practice the working together for common objects of the members of three different parties.

Then there is "The Next Five Years" Group, whose policy, as explained in the recently published book signed by 152 persons of all parties and none, closely resembles that of

the Council of Action. It is a separate and distinct body with its own executive and organisation, and it does not undertake party political propaganda. The Group exists for research and exposition of its ideas, and is prepared to place its experience at the disposal of any organisation desiring assistance. The members of this body, by the distinction of their position, sincerity and seriousness, might be able to develop considerable influence. It is not interested in promoting the advancement of any party or person, but solely in securing the adoption in practice of certain policies at home and abroad. These it would seek to obtain through the best channel that seemed available.

One thing seems certain—that the Labour Party with its present outlook and ideas will never obtain a majority in the House of Commons. Many of them realise this but are powerless. The British people are essentially moderate and evolutionary. They are not afraid of radical reform, but it must not be catastrophic, and that is what the Labour Party are pretending to offer. There are probably large numbers of people who up till recently felt that the only alternative to the Conservative Party, if the Liberal Party ever ceased to be an effective instrument, was the Labour Party, who are now wondering whether this is so. If the National Government became extremely unpopular it is conceivable that a Labour Government might be given once more an opportunity of forming an alternative, but it would inevitably collapse as in 1924 and 1931 unless it showed a more genuine willingness to co-operate in the Cabinet itself with those of other parties who were perfectly willing to follow the same road together, at any rate for "the next five years."

There can be no doubt that liberalism in a broad sense is the policy desired by and the outlook of the great majority of the people of this country. It is for leaders and parties to translate this into practice. It will be the task of Liberals to see that they play as large a part as possible in such a movement.

GEOFFREY MANDER.

II

I have had the honour of being invited on some previous occasions after a general election to contribute an article

to the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW from the Conservative standpoint. On this occasion there are at least two circumstances, one general and one personal, which make the task somewhat different. In the first place, the Conservative outlook has become much more closely akin to that of the National Government than ever before, and is identified with the programme of that Government at the election as personified in Mr. Baldwin; and in the next place I can no longer write as a member for many years of the House of Commons, but only as an aider and abettor of the National Government in "another place" and a worker for it at the election.

Speaking as an old Conservative, I think it cannot be too vigorously stressed that, whether it be a question of financial policy at home and a revival of trade prosperity, or a question of foreign policy in the very difficult negotiations abroad, the National Government deserves to be broadly supported. Since it originally assumed office in 1931 after the financial disaster brought about by the then Labour Government, its work has been straightforward, business-like, diplomatic, practical and wise; not unduly showy with transparent efforts to play to the gallery or mislead voters, but steady with that quiet determination which creates confidence—the confidence which is so essential to national unity, co-operation and progress. Big decisions and accomplishments are in the making; it is well that the National Government which initiated them should have the chance of continuing along the road that it has mapped out to carry them through. Never was a moment in history when it was less desirable to swap horses while crossing the stream. If it be asked what these great achievements of the Government are—although it is hard to believe that many can be ignorant of them—the answers that, since 1931, they are the building of about a million more houses; the clearing since that date of very many slum houses and the erecting of well-constructed, low-rent substitutes at the rate of 80,000 a year; the reduction of the numbers of unemployed by about a million; the restoration of this country to the position of chief exporting nation; the placing of wages on an upward grade for the first time since 1927; the raising of farm-workers' wages higher than ever before; the balancing of the Budget with a sound credit surplus instead of a very large and dangerous deficit, which was a peril to our national stability and trade throughout the

world. And while all this counting-up does not exhaust the home list of progressive successes, it leaves still unreckoned the general efficiency, so far, of the National Government in our foreign policy.

In the international field of foreign politics to-day diplomatic guidance and action have indeed responsibility enough, and the Italo-Abyssinian war has enormously accentuated possible situations which were uneasily foreseen when the League of Nations was first formed. The mere mention of Japan and China, too, indicates what difficulties may ensue. Personally, I have always been an advocate of the League on the ground that it should be useful machinery for doing good and exercising a valuable influence in awkward problems, but from the beginning I have never flattered myself or any audience that I have addressed that it would solve all evils or evolve a complete Utopia. To secure that end you must change human nature, and a study of the thousands of years of the world's history does not, in my judgment, conjure up such a happy picture. Yet within inevitable limitations the National Government is trying its utmost to promote a more peaceful atmosphere everywhere. Collective action with other nations is essential. In this connection one result of the numerous votes given to the Government in the British general election needs particular notice. The decisive majority obtained has impressed foreign nations in a marked degree, and has added a weighty influence to British counsels and leadership in the conferences at Geneva. Perhaps some foreign countries may wish that their electorates showed equal determination and soundness of purpose on vital occasions. At any rate our Government will feel stronger in the knowledge that our country is firmly behind them; and other countries will be conscious that the British aim of peace, justice and increasing international disarmament is not likely to vacillate owing to political exigencies pressing it from within.

The preceding paragraphs are an attempt to sketch out briefly the close association of the Conservative standpoint with the programme and work of the National Government as endorsed at the general election. It remains to make some note or express some comment upon the occurrences, tactics or methods of the election itself as viewed through Conservative spectacles and applied to each of the chief parties. The weather was mainly wet; and under such conditions each

party, especially each unsuccessful party, is apt to argue that this handicap bore most heavily upon themselves and that the results would have been materially altered in their favour otherwise. This argument, used at many elections, may be a consolation to the losers. Another circumstance about this last election, which I am inclined to believe true after experience as successful candidate in nine Parliamentary contests, is that seldom was an electoral fight so devoid of side-tracking incidents. The issues were plain and few, and as far as I am aware not many erratic questions were put or prompted. This was certainly the case in the south of England and, I think, in the greater part of the Midlands. In the north there was more bitterness and vindictiveness.

It is unfortunately almost impossible to control methods and tactics at any election within strictly fair bounds and irreproachable statements, however broad and self-evident the dividing line between contending parties may be; and this election was no exception to the rule. In order to win votes some leaders cannot resist sometimes using mischievous and unduly overstated phrases which in calmer moments they would qualify. Yet the exaggeration is, now and then, so ludicrously overdrawn that it becomes the speaker's own undoing. For instance, Mr. Attlee as leader of the Labour Opposition discussed in his wireless broadcast speech the financial policy of the National Government, which took office in 1931 to face the deplorable Labour budget deficit of £74,000,000. In his eagerness to denounce his opponents he characterised their financial performances as the "economics of the madhouse." Could anything be more futile or self-condemnatory, bearing in mind that the National Government turned this deficit into a surplus of 7½ millions in 1934? It invited devastating criticism, and a defeat at the polls. Again, Mr. Lloyd George, as head of the Independent Liberals, referred to the achievements of the National Government between 1931 and 1935, already recounted above in this article, and called them "four years of doing practically nothing." Does this stigma really bring conviction in the face of patent facts? or does it merely raise a smile at the audacity of oratorical strategy?

More culpable electioneering methods than this also found their way into the recent struggle, and they ought to be classified as particularly reprehensible because they tend to blur

the truth in uninformed minds long after the election is over. Thus Socialists loudly proclaimed injustices under a "means" test before paying relief benefits, well aware that the discontent aroused by one ill-judged case will never be entirely appeased by twenty cases judged aright. Injustices must, of course, be remedied, but Socialist speakers carefully omitted to mention that the Labour Ministers in 1931 had definitely accepted the principle of a "means" test, which was the cardinal point involved. A graver misuse of electoral methods in the present situation was in relation to disarmament. What could be the meaning of two objectionable Socialist posters to be seen in north-east England of the crosses in the war cemeteries and the babies in gas masks? The unabashed inference apparently was that the National Government wallowed in war-mongering and fire-eating, reckless of human life; but the electoral result seems to prove that this contemptible procedure lost the Socialists many votes. It is utterly false to suggest that the National Government is provocatively arming afresh, when they had disarmed to danger-point in the hope that other nations would imitate their policy.

To their own party disadvantage this election has freely advertised that the Socialists are seriously divided among themselves on very fundamental questions. Two or three suffice by way of illustration. Is Great Britain to disarm altogether, or to keep up-to-date sufficient naval and military strength to protect ourselves adequately, according to expert opinion, if attacked? They are notoriously not in accord on this matter. Again, assuming a Socialist government came into office, would they start off with a financial revolution and upheaval such as Sir Stafford Cripps desires, with the inevitable downfall of trade and prosperity, or would they work for their supposed salvation with tentative caution? Thirdly, it is the experience of industrial areas that foremen are an essential part in the successful management of many businesses. Socialist maxims lay down that everybody is to be equal. In the Socialist state are foremen to be paid exactly the same wages as others, or are they not? I asked this question at an election meeting in my old constituency in Birmingham the other day where there was a little interruption. "Yes," came a shout from one corner of the hall, and "no" from another corner. It was easy to deal with the interrupters!

A few remarks are pertinent in a spirit of broad reflection and summary. I think it is true to claim that the election is evidence of a stride in education. Electors were not so lightly gulled by specious argument as formerly, and it appears that the system of broadcasting addresses by the various party leaders is a useful innovation. It is a help to many voters who describe themselves as unattached to any party, and enables them better to focus their attention on the whole panorama and not only a portion of it. When Mr. Herbert Morrison attacks the National Government of 1931-5 for having inflicted cuts in wages and ordered a halt in important housing and other schemes while studiously omitting any reference to the financial Labour chaos, it is but fair that Mr. Neville Chamberlain as Chancellor of the Exchequer should be able to follow on the wireless with a poignant and incisive reply. A converse case would be equally right so that listeners may judge. After the election was over, a French lady was commenting to her English friend on the soberness and good sense of the British democracy, and exclaimed "Had your country given any other verdict it would have been a disaster to Europe." As a nation we may justly feel proud of such praise.

ROCKLEY.

December 4th, 1935.

III

The Labour Party in the recent Election has climbed half-way back to the peak which it reached in 1929. The number of seats it holds now are up to the half-way line between the low level of the 1931 Election and the high level of the Election before. The chief cause which has prevented it from attaining its previous peak is that the crisis of 1931 intervened between that achievement and the present day. A large proportion of the public, with that crisis still in their minds, have voted "Safety First." This influence can be seen in the Liberal vote. In the immense number of constituencies where, for the first time, there was no Liberal candidate, the majority of the Liberals have gone Right rather than Left. Many of the highly political Liberals who listened to the broadcasts of Sir Herbert Samuel, Mr. Lloyd

George and Lord Snowden no doubt took the advice of their leaders and voted for Labour; but the mass of Liberals who hold their creed by tradition, without any strong political interests, voted for "Safety First" and the National Government.

The Council for Peace and Reconstruction does not seem to have won or lost any seat. No doubt it influenced a certain number of Liberal votes, but not enough to spell the difference between election and defeat. Most Labour candidates had no objection to its general programme, as its broad lines are already contained in the policy of the Labour Party. But it called upon them to give a pledge that they would join an independent parliamentary group to vote against any government which did not carry out the Council's programme. Such a promise would have been inconsistent with their obligations to their own party. Their election depended upon many thousands of Labour voters, and it would be dishonourable to them to abandon them on account of pledges given to obtain a dubious number of Liberal votes. We live under party government, and those who wish to form a new political group should do so by their own strength. The "new technique" of attempting to do this by undermining the loyalty of members of another party in return for a small number of votes will defeat itself: for even the Members who have given the pledge will, when they get to the House of Commons, find good reasons for remaining faithful to their own party. In addition to this error the Council for Peace and Reconstruction, which began as a spontaneous movement from within the Free Churches, has made a further mistake in allowing itself to be captured as the platform for Mr. Lloyd George's very small group.

Although the proportion of seats won by Labour did not reach the level of 1929 the proportion of votes cast for Labour is the highest recorded. The number reached nearly eight and one-half million. The transfer of two million cast for the National Government would have given Labour a comfortable majority. When it is remembered that even in its weakest hour in the Election of 1931, Labour secured nearly one-third of the electorate, the toughness of its fibre is evident.

The explanation is that its long-distance policy expresses the mind of the nation with profound insight. Amongst the middle class, as well as the working class, there is a yearning

for security and freedom from continual financial apprehension. The public mind is turning to large-scale schemes of social reconstruction. The spectacle of poverty in the midst of plenty—of herrings being thrown back into the sea—coffee being burnt, and corn ploughed into the land—has destroyed their unquestioned faith in capitalism. Each new marvel of science tells the people that want and worry are becoming anachronisms. Labour has been the first to say these things, and the nation is looking in the direction to which Labour has pointed the way. The word "socialism" has ceased to terrify even the middle class.

This has been revealed in the sharpest relief by the completely negative character of the National Government's policy. With the exception of the proposal to increase armaments it put forward no large-scale plans of any sort. Its domestic programme was made up of a series of belated selections from the Labour proposals for raising the school-leaving age, nursery schools, national development and so on. No party has ever come before the electorate with so empty a programme for the future, and it is difficult to see how the Government can fill five years of parliamentary time. The reason for this utter unconstructiveness is that the programme for the Conservative Party is exhausted. At previous elections its staple dishes were tariffs and imperial preference. They are both in operation and the Conservatives have very little further left to suggest.

Labour is nearer than the Conservative to the average man's outlook for the future. Its weakness is that the average man is not yet convinced of the competence of Labour to carry out its policy, or even successfully to conduct the day-to-day business of government. Its task for the next four years will be to secure public confidence. Fortunately the new House of Commons gives it the chance to do this, for most of its leaders are back, and one hundred and fifty supporters can reveal the potential quality of the party as well as two hundred. There is already evidence that they will form a lively Opposition.

The Labour Party has realised that the last Labour administration failed to win this public confidence, and it has spent the last four years in an intensive search for the cause of this failure. It was not any lack of conviction, industry or brains, but the simple fact that no detailed practical schemes had been worked out, with proper technical assistance. Labour

had been a propaganda party. It had ideals, principles and pamphlets, but it had not realised that these had to be filled out with uninspiring mental grind. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was largely responsible for this fatal omission, for his mind is not attracted to work of this kind. The result was that when Labour found itself in office it had to create a litter of committees and royal commissions to begin the work that ought to have been done years before. This weakness has been repaired. For the last four years the inner circles of the party have been most carefully elaborating its policy with regard to banking, investment, electricity, transport, agriculture, iron and steel, parliamentary procedure, foreign affairs and a variety of other subjects. It has had the assistance of some of the best brains in the country, both academic and technical. This turn to the practical has been supported by the rank and file of Labour throughout the country. Those who, during the last four years, have been addressing Labour conferences made up of the leading spirits of each area, have found that the old-fashioned evangelistic fervour is no longer required, but instead a hard discussion of ways and means, of "snags" and how to avoid them, is expected.

This new temper has been revealed in the conflict during the last four years between the official Labour Party and the Socialist League, a small group within the party who delighted in vague denunciations of Buckingham Palace and the armed forces, in threats of confiscation and a first-class financial crisis. The issue was never for a moment in doubt: the dominant element in Labour is made up of men of long experience in local administration, trade unions and Parliament, and their common sense has finally disposed of the doctrinaires. The last four years have been the most formative period in the history of Labour. It has reached maturity. It has developed the British capacity to face facts and its new temperament will be revealed in the present House of Commons.

As soon as Labour wins public confidence its future will be assured, for the forces of the time are pushing the nation forward in the direction in which Labour wishes to go. In both foreign and domestic policy it has been the pioneer of the ideas which are becoming generally accepted. In foreign policy it has supported the League of Nations through thick and thin, while tory Members in the House of Commons used to laugh

when it was mentioned. It gave its support to the Peace Ballot and thousands of its members helped to organise it, while tory Ministers were advising people to tear it up, and Mr. Stanley Baldwin was describing it as "party politics of the lowest character." The Labour Party definitely pronounced for Sanctions against Mussolini a month before the Government had made up its mind. It coupled its insistence on Sanctions with the proposal for the inquiry into access to the raw materials of the world, a combination which Sir Samuel Hoare repeated at Geneva some weeks afterwards. When the press published the rumours of the recent Hoare-Laval proposals for the dismemberment of Abyssinia the Labour Party led the attack upon them in the House of Commons the same day. In its foreign policy Labour has given the lead both to public opinion and to the Government.

This lead will almost certainly be needed in the years before us. Indecision and procrastination have been the curse of our foreign policy for the last four years. Because of them, the Government permitted Mussolini without due warning to commit himself to his criminal adventure in Abyssinia. The same two vices sapped the foundations of the Disarmament Conference, betrayed all the moderate forces in Germany, and in doing so helped to put Hitler where he is. If at the beginning of the Disarmament Conference Great Britain had put forward proposals going one-quarter of the length to which later we have been compelled to advance, we should not be discussing an increase in armaments now, and Hitler might never have won the day. When this country takes a clear line, Europe follows her, but when her policy is confused the European situation deteriorates. There is no reason to suppose that the temperament of the National Government has changed, and an Opposition which forces it to come to its decisions in time to make them effective can perform an immense national service.

In immediate domestic policy, Labour's educational programme is about to be carried with modifications by the Government, and its attacks upon the Means Test will lead to the family basis being profoundly modified. Even its long-distance programme is being accepted. Its denunciations of the competitive system which began thirty years ago are now being repeated by company chairmen, bankers, hard-boiled business men, Conservative speakers and Mr. Stanley

Baldwin. The present mining crisis is an example of this truth. Outside the ranks of the coal-owners it is now agreed by all that one of the curses of the mining industry is its individualism, which Labour was the first to attack. The forces of the time are fighting on Labour's side. Its task is to quicken the *tempo* of development and to formulate into concrete schemes the half-formed ideas which are in the public mind.

Labour's quiet preparation in the last four years will enable it to do this. In the coming five years of opposition it should produce a group of spokesmen who will be less picturesque, but more realistic, than its former leaders. It will probably develop a new technique for an Opposition. The doctrine that it is "the business of the Opposition to oppose" led to a factious type of parliamentary warfare suited to a time when politics were largely a game for the wealthy. But now we have a very responsible electorate who expect to see parliamentary leaders conduct themselves as responsible men. The Labour Party will do this, and by doing so will win the one thing it now needs—public confidence.

H. B. LEES-SMITH.

AMERICA REVISITED—THE OLD DEAL AND THE NEW.

MY sixth visit to the United States was favoured by an Indian summer of unusual warmth, which added not a little to the pleasures of country life among the woodlands of Connecticut, on the Hudson river, and in Virginia. One scene especially in early November I shall long remember. Standing on the grassy terrace of Monticello, Jefferson's "little mountain," I gazed over the wide Virginian plains and saw forty miles away the long range of the blue mountains transmuted into deep purple by the rays of the setting sun. Below me in the foreground lay the famous university which Jefferson founded and built. He chose for its motto the Gospel text: "Ye shall know the Truth, and the Truth shall make you free." Freedom and Truth were indeed the inspiring keynote of Jeffersonian democracy, and they are still active in the moral and intellectual life of America.

The lines of political demarcation in the United States since the Great War have been difficult to draw. The two-party system has failed to express new divisions of opinion; but though Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, and of the Virginian Statute for Religious Liberty, has been dead for more than a century, he is still a living power. His authority is still cited by both parties on the platform and in the Press. I have heard leading Republicans, as well as leading Democrats, acknowledge (or boast) that his influence on political thought is greater than that of all the other Presidents of the United States put together. The New Dealers can point to him as the champion of agriculture against manufactures and of consumers against the tariff. The Old Dealers can recall his scrupulous stewardship of public money and his dislike of centralisation and overgrown establishments when they denounce the enormous expenditure, the encroachments upon State rights and the mushroom growth of bureaucracy since 1932. These, we may be sure, would not have won Thomas Jefferson's approval, though they might have been acceptable to Andrew Jackson, who introduced the spoils system and liked to reward his followers by placing them on the Government pay roll.

My first visit to the States was in 1908. Then, as now, there
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was a Roosevelt in the White House; then, as now, the country was recovering from a panic which had closed the banks. But the depression of 1907-8 was as nothing in length or depth to that of 1930-4. Of this last depression I saw the beginning: for I happened to be in Washington and New York between October and December 1929, when the "New Era" bubble burst and a fictitious fabric of imaginary prosperity collapsed with a crash that shook the world.

Since the Civil War between North and South, the United States has suffered no such economic disaster. Enormous numbers of people were ruined; thousands of banks and insurance companies became insolvent; and even now, after the moderate recovery that has since taken place, it is unusual to meet anyone who is not still smarting from losses which only exceptional foresight and prudence could avert. Mr. Hoover was the political victim of that calamity, and President Roosevelt was the national hero who revived the drooping spirits of the people in the spring and summer of 1932. The unprecedented powers conferred by a grateful Congress made him an economic dictator, and even his bitterest critics admit that at first he acted with promptitude and success. He employed public money and public credit without stint to restore the banking situation, and his devaluation of the dollar was justified by considerations similar to those which justified our own retreat from the gold standard.

Only when Mr. Roosevelt embarked on the series of economic and social experiments that are known under the comprehensive title of the "New Deal" did opposition raise its head and divide the nation again into two opposing camps. The attempt to regulate industries by codes was on the whole a failure; for the task of fixing prices and wages proved beyond the capacity of General Johnson and his coadjutors. An adverse decision of the Supreme Court, which broke down the compulsory principle, was received with general relief; and even the trade unionists have shown little gratitude to the Administration for its well-meant efforts to introduce collective bargaining into the industrial life of the country.

Nevertheless the Codes have had their use; they have done something to get rid of child labour in the factories, and many of their best provisions have been maintained by voluntary agreement. More important and in a political sense far more

significant than the Codes has been the agricultural policy of the President, which has been carried out with great ability by his Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Henry Wallace. At Washington I had the good fortune to meet both Mr. Wallace and the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull; and by studying their speeches and writings I came to understand how their policies are co-ordinated and why they have been able to act in cordial co-operation.

To an intelligent Englishman who understands the economics of a small country like ours, which cannot profitably grow more than a fraction of its food supplies and is dependent for most of its raw materials on imports, it requires some amount of study and imagination to appreciate the tremendous impact of the American farmer on the industrial and political life of the United States. Quite a third of the people are directly dependent upon the soil. Consequently a depression of agriculture cannot be reconciled for long with the prosperity of manufacturing industry. With good reason the cotton cultivators in the South have always been opposed to a high tariff on imported manufactures, recognising that it is injurious to their foreign markets in Great Britain and on the continent of Europe. That helps to explain why the Democratic Party, with the solid South behind it, has usually stood for a revenue tariff. But the farmers of the Middle West (Republican by sentiment ever since the Civil War) have never allied themselves politically with the farmers of the South, though they were nearly captured by Mr. Bryan, the boy orator of Nebraska, when he dangled before them silver money as a means of raising agricultural prices—ignoring the fact that it would raise all prices alike and could not possibly create a fair equilibrium between the world prices at which the American farmer has to sell most of his products and the monopoly prices which he has to pay for most of the manufactured articles that he needs.

When the new era of prosperity evaporated and perished, the depression fell with frightful severity on the farmers, who had not participated, except as speculators on the Stock Exchange, in the fictitious profits of the boom. The Republicans could only propose by way of remedy another increase of Protection, and Mr. Hoover was driven to sign the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, which invited retaliation in foreign countries and accentuated the economic nationalism that was helping

to spread poverty and unemployment all over the world. The obvious remedy was freer trade, and Mr. Roosevelt obtained powers from Congress to reduce tariff rates by 50 per cent. But there was considerable delay before Mr. Cordell Hull could make a start with his reciprocity treaties, and the opportunity of a strong initiative in the direction of freer trade was not taken at the London Conference. Some alternative way had to be found to help the farmers and to relieve them and the country banks which were loaded with frozen mortgages. Here was an opportunity for a political expert, and Mr. Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture, entered the field. When the farmers' organisations were consulted, they asked unanimously for "a farmers' tariff" to compensate them for the "manufacturers' tariff"; but they did not mean Protection in the ordinary sense; for long experience had shown them that customs duties do not raise the prices of products whose surplus has to be exported. Before he took office, Mr. Wallace had edited an excellent farmers' paper, and he was in touch with live-stock growers, dairy farmers, wheat farmers, cotton cultivators, and agriculturists of all sorts and descriptions in all parts of the Union. Representative gatherings were held, and there was practical unanimity. The Government was asked in effect to create an equilibrium between the prices of farm products and the prices of manufactures. The problem for Mr. Wallace was how to devise measures and make administrative regulations for achieving this end.

The devaluation of the currency had eased the mortgage situation both in the country and in the towns; and most of the farmers' banks had been reopened. But the prices of most farm products remained unprofitably low. Accordingly during the last two years costly and uneconomic but not wholly unsuccessful efforts have been made to raise prices by restricting production and so preventing gluts. One of the chief instruments of this policy has been a levy on manufacturers in the shape of the so-called "Processing" Taxes. A Processing Tax on cotton or tobacco is really an excise; but the proceeds are used to pay compensation to farmers for restricting their acreage or reducing their livestock. Mr. Wallace has explained his policy in a brilliant pamphlet entitled *America must Choose*, and he has expounded it in many speeches and interviews. After a tour in the West

early in the autumn, Mr. Henry Wallace told some newspaper reporters that western farmers were becoming educated to the idea that the "processing" taxes and the benefit payments to growers, with which they are coupled, constitute "the farmer's tariff," adding:

The Middle West has always favoured high protective tariffs. I have never been enthusiastic for the idea, and have fought it for ten years. But throughout the West there is a growing conviction that the farmer is as much entitled to Protection as the industrialist. The farmer is getting that Protection now, in lieu of foreign markets for his products, in the form of the processing tax. If it is found that this method of bringing social justice to the farmer cannot be continued, he will begin immediately to look around for something else. If no other substitute can be found, he will probably seek a lowering of tariff rates, and therefore of prices, on the things he buys.

Here we have an inkling of Mr. Wallace's practical philosophy. He aims at a middle course. He wants to lower the protective tariff on imported manufactures and by artificial restrictions to remove or reduce gluts. He knows that in some parts—in Texas for example, where in normal times the greater part of the cotton crop is exported—the policy of restriction is a very poor compensation for the loss of foreign markets. Indeed in Texas a powerful agitation has been on foot for some time demanding that the tariff on manufactured goods should be lowered in order that Texas may resume its exports of cotton on the old scale. At the same time, the *Financial Chronicle* of New York, one of the most conservative periodicals in the United States, has underlined Mr. Wallace's warning to manufacturers. Hitherto the Supreme Court has never been asked to condemn as unconstitutional a prohibitive customs duty on the ground that it yields no revenue to the Treasury; but it is thought quite probable that it may condemn the processing taxes because they operate as a relief to a favoured class instead of being applied to general purposes. The *Financial Chronicle* agrees that "the farmer's tariff" is on all fours with the manufacturer's tariff, though it thinks that Mr. Wallace's method of obtaining monopoly prices for the farmers is even worse than the prohibitive tariff on imports which secures a monopoly of the home market for American manufacturers. "We should be much better pleased," it observed, if Mr. Wallace would admit

that "the processing tax-farm benefit system is even more iniquitous than our ultra-protectionism of the past decade or two." It summed up the matter in a sentence: "what is needed is that both should forthwith be abolished."

Two months later, on November 4th, it was announced from Washington that all restrictions on the production of pigs had been removed, and that the acreage under maize would be increased by about six million acres in order to provide more food for the pigs. This was the result of a rise in the price of bacon, which has been very unpopular with consumers all over the United States. It is an illustration of the difficulties (of which we have had experience at home) that always attend artificial limitations of livestock or crops. They aim at a moderate raising of prices so that the farmer may benefit without causing undue privation to consumers. The planner of a restriction may make a mistake, or his calculations may be upset by the weather. This year it was proposed to control the potato crop. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration had revealed a plan to divert part of a superfluously large potato crop from food to industrial uses, and another part to the relief of destitute families. But the expected glut was turned into a shortage by early frosts which injured the crop so much that in some districts the price doubled; and consequently it was announced in November that the money which was to have been spent in making potatoes dearer—about five million dollars—would probably be saved.

When an Englishman is inclined to criticise the payment of money to compensate farmers for growing less, he should remember that people who live in glass houses should not throw stones. If, for example, instead of spending six millions a year in bribing English farmers to grow unprofitable crops of sugar beet, we had paid them one million a year *not* to grow sugar beet, the British Treasury and the British taxpayers would have saved five millions a year, or probably, from first to last, about fifty millions sterling. On these lines a pretty good case could be made out for Mr. Wallace as against Mr. Elliot.

Let me now turn from the Agricultural Department to the State Department over which Mr. Cordell Hull presides. Neither in the universities, nor in business circles, could I find much political antagonism to the foreign policy of President

Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. There was everywhere keen interest in the Abyssinian problem, and I was asked innumerable questions on the subject. Could the Italian army conquer Abyssinia? Could the Italian navy and air fleet cut our communications with India? Could the British Government induce the League of Nations to impose effective sanctions? How long would Fascist Italy be able to stand the financial strain? It was evident from questions such as these and from private discussions that many intelligent Americans rated the military and naval strength of Italy more highly than we do. One felt that the risks of an extended war were being weighed and balanced against a general desire to support the action of the League as far as possible, without entering it or undertaking any warlike commitments. The policy of President Roosevelt and Mr. Cordell Hull thus far seems to interpret very accurately the prevalent opinion of those Americans who have arrived at a provisional judgment on the whole matter. There were suspicions, which I tried to dissipate, that British motives were not purely disinterested; but on the whole most of my American friends and acquaintances were inclined to admire the stand made by the British Government against Mussolini's aggression, and to hope that the League would gain credit and prestige thereby.*

Another recent development, which I could not fail to notice, was the growing sentiment in favour of freer trade, not only as a means of improving American commerce and reducing unemployment in the ports, but also of extending goodwill among the nations. Only a few cranks proclaim the advantages of autarchy. Public opinion has been impressed by the devastating effects of economic nationalism and of retaliation directed against American exports. Hence there is much less opposition than might have been expected to the reciprocity treaties which Mr. Cordell Hull has been negotiating. The Secretary of State is indeed the least criticised member of the Cabinet. His character is highly respected, and I did not hear a single word against him from the sharpest critics of the New Deal. After the treaty with Canada I was asked by people in authority why there should not be a low tariff union between the United States and the British Empire. It seems fair to conclude from this and other signs

* I was innocent enough to believe, and foolish enough to assert, that Mr. Baldwin's Government, if returned, would not swerve from the policy it had adopted.

that the reciprocity policy, which includes the most-favoured-nation clause, has made great headway.

In weighing the chances of the President's re-election next year, one should begin by recognising that during the last twelve or fifteen months a strong body of hostile opinion has grown up against the enormous expenditure of the Government and also against the enormous additions to the central bureaucracy at Washington which the grants of federal money for public works, agriculture, unemployment, etc., have necessitated. Most of the newspapers and many well-known writers, like Mr. Mark Sullivan and Mr. Frank Kent, are severely critical. The Press teems with examples of public waste and of payments which ought not to have been incurred. Mr. Lewis Douglas, who resigned his post as Director of the Budget because he thought the expenditure ought to be cut down, has made some damaging attacks on the Treasury; and Mr. Hoover has re-entered the field in a series of addresses which lay stress upon the inflationary dangers involved in the huge budget deficits and the rapid growth of the National Debt. At the same time Professor Kemmerer and other experts have directed powerful attacks on the monetary policy of the Administration.

On the other hand, there are many who agree with Mr. Harold Dodds, the President of Princeton University, that a greatly enlarged federal expenditure has come to stay, and that additional revenues as well as judicious economies will be required to balance the budget. In the view of this Benthamic school America's most urgent need is an efficient and independent Civil Service to supervise a well thought out system of grants in aid to the States and large cities. They want to ensure that federal money is well spent in raising the standard of public services, such as public health, education and police, especially in the poorer and more backward States.

At the moment the Republican Party is groping for a platform and a candidate. To decide the former a convention will be held very shortly and the nature of the programme will affect the choice of a candidate. Whether the nomination will fall upon ex-President Hoover or upon some less-known politician like Governor Landon of Kansas, no one can foresee. If conditions remain as they are at present, it is generally conceded that President Roosevelt will be re-elected, though of course with a much reduced majority. He still

commands a great popular following. His skill in political tactics extends to the larger strategy. Sometimes he guides, sometimes he follows, public opinion. He is accessible to new ideas and likes experiments; but he can also listen to criticism. Already he has given orders for large reductions of the Estimates. Those who attack his experimentalism have to admit that there is also a virtue in his political elasticity. A more obstinate mind would be less ready to withdraw from a venture that had failed, or to dispense with a guide who had led in the wrong direction. Everyone who has met him in an intimate way feels the force of that personal magnetism which he somehow contrives to impart to the public in his broadcasts. In social gifts, in table talk, in the art of entertainment, in geniality, wit and humour, he has few rivals among American or English statesmen. He puts everyone at his ease, exchanges jest for jest, caps one story with another and a better one, enlivens politics and history with apt illustrations, abounds in tales of adventure by land and sea, and knows how to make even the dismal science attractive to ordinary mortals. His enemies denounce him as an artful demagogue. His friends would represent him as a Liberal democrat of unquestioned courage, with fine qualities of leadership, and a sympathy as sincere as that of his wife with the hard lot of the poor and the unemployed. He has little in common with the steady Conservatism of a Cleveland; but he is quite free from the arrogance that wrecked Woodrow Wilson. Sometimes he seems to find inspiration in Thomas Jefferson, sometimes in Andrew Jackson. A doubting Democrat remarked the other day to a friend in New York: "I recognise the President's faults, but I shall go on supporting him because I know he has sympathy with the downtrodden and is trying to help them." He will prove a very difficult man to beat, unless Fortune turns her back upon him in the coming year.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

THE CRISIS OF THE FRANC.

ONCE more there has been an attack on the French franc. Gold losses this time were about 6 milliard francs and the bank rate is kept on a high level. Banking circles insist on the necessity for further measures to restore confidence. The Government hardly and miraculously escaped defeat on the thorny question of the Fascist Leagues, but already new difficulties loom ahead. The process is not unknown to the observer of monetary history. The last time it happened was in May. No one knows when it will recommence. It would be tedious indeed to belabour the point that the restoration not only of a superficial layer of confidence, postponing the final reckoning, but also of the fundamental economic equilibrium on the deflationary tack, is theoretically not inconceivable. The dose of deflation, however, that would be necessary in order to achieve it would have to be so strong and sudden as to be impracticable on account of its inevitable social and financial consequences. The partial measures in fact adopted, watered down as they are for political considerations, do not solve the problem, especially as other interventions keep prices up at a further cost to the state. The fundamental tendency is not only unaltered, but it is strengthened. *Entrepreneurs* expect further trouble, spending power is curtailed (though not sufficiently to restore profits), investment activity continues to dwindle away. It is sustained only by the deficits, public and private, and thus by a growing consumption of capital. The recovery in the sterling area and America, helpful as it is in all directions, can hardly alter the trend in France at an early date. Nor is it likely that confidence can internally be restored and business restarted.

The banking system, however liquid and relatively sound it was even last summer (the banks held about 17 milliards of bills and 5.7 milliards of cash even last August, against about 28.6 milliards of deposits), cannot stand for ever a continuous drain of deposits and a parallel deterioration of its assets and of the security behind its loans. And the drain since 1933 amounts to no less than 8 milliards. The Savings Banks are in the same position; this is especially important because their funds are invested in Government Securities which they have to sell in the teeth of a nervous market or to obtain advances from the Banque de France. Since last

summer the position has become much worse and the Central Bank had to increase its aid. On the other hand the deficit is not diminishing in any marked degree in spite of the continuous economic measures. The increase in the national debt in the last four years amounted to not less than 70 milliards (almost 1,000 million pounds). Nor can the estimates of a deficit of only 7,000 million francs for the next year be taken at their face value. A monthly 1,500 millions may describe the position better. At the same time important short-term operations will have to be accomplished by the Treasury, which has already used the credit of the Banque de France directly and indirectly to a degree which it does not care to admit. The cost of finance is increased by the high money rate. Truly a desperate position. Yet it would be unwise to anticipate too firmly an early crisis and solution. The French people are haunted by fears; they dread war, inflation, insecurity, physical or financial. The lack of detached economic thinking, the consistent hammering into the panic-stricken rentier class (and who is not a rentier or fixed-salaried employee in France?) by so-called experts that depreciation or devaluation is equivalent to and will cause inflation, a complex has been set up in France which is unparalleled in its intensity elsewhere. As the French use savings to a considerable extent to hoard banknotes, this complex, if not fought against, might indeed cause complications if the devaluation were not done in an orderly way, but forced upon the politicians. An orderly change in the currency policy would mean an acute political crisis, whereas by following the old system complications threaten only at a later date. In their present psychological state the French seem to be willing both in internal and international affairs to take almost any future risk for immediate, even though temporary, relief. No devaluation is possible without legislative action, and legislative action is hardly possible at the moment, except as part of an international stabilisation of all currencies to which this country is still opposed.

It is to be feared that the outcome, which is hardly doubtful, will be precipitated by a much more drastic change to the Left or Right, a much greater shock to the present social or political order than would be necessary if economic sanity could be re-established. The way will be prepared by further suffering. The outlook is not bright. Nevertheless it may

not be wholly useless to discuss what policies should be adopted by France and other leading countries respectively, in order to minimise possible unfavourable repercussions on the world economy if an abandonment of the present gold parities should be decided upon by, or forced on, the gold bloc, if no parallel stabilisation of the sterling and dollar could be agreed upon. What are the probable consequences of a depreciation of the franc?

Until 1931 the post-war inflations provided the only recent experience. The thesis that depreciation is identical with inflation and is followed by a proportionate rise in internal prices is founded on these examples. The English experience clearly demonstrates the fallaciousness of that conclusion. But a similar and no less unpleasant and untrue conviction arose and persists that the depreciation of any currency would necessarily exercise a general and *proportionate* deflationary pressure abroad. Further anxiety is caused by the conviction that the depreciation would lead to an immediate repatriation of an immense amount of French flight capital, and therefore to a wholesale liquidation of securities now in French possession. The memories of the liquidation of the French short-term balances abroad between 1928-33 only serve to increase the susceptibilities of all great markets.

There is in our view no necessity for either gloomy possibility to happen, if a reasonable monetary policy is adopted, though there will be some initial disturbances. When Great Britain abandoned the gold standard the world as a whole was suffering from an acute and cumulative deflation.

To-day the world scene is totally changed and the position of France in that picture is also completely different. There is a definite expansion in progress which is equally cumulative. It may well be that at a later date its force will have exhausted itself (and that is one of the strongest reasons to wish for an early devaluation in France), but at this stage a shock of considerable strength would be necessary to stop or reverse recovery. It is unreasonable to anticipate that a devaluation in the gold bloc could exert such influence. Foreign trade in France never—not even during periods of much freer trade and of a considerable undervaluation of her currency—amounted to more than a fraction of that of England. At the present moment most of her imports are rigid and fixed by quotas, not tariffs, and so regardless of price. It would

therefore be unjustified to expect a further sensible fall of French purchases abroad. Nor will her competition rise very quickly, with the present shackles on international trade and the dependence of exports on bargaining power.

The direct repercussions abroad would also be very much smaller. There is hardly any foreign money left in France. The losses suffered by its depreciation would therefore be negligible. The flight of French capital from France since 1933 on the other hand was on a much lesser scale than in the period before the 1927 stabilisation. The deficit régime, the lack of adequate capital accumulation prevented this. There is not the slightest trace of it in the balance of payments except in the successive waves of export of gold. This does not amount to more than 20 milliards at most and much of it was used to cover the deficit of the income balance of payment since 1931 (which in 1927, e.g. showed a surplus of 483 million gold dollars). The gold reserves of England and America are ample enough to stand the withdrawal of an even greater amount without serious internal repercussions. Moreover, the French have distrusted the monetary and economic policy of President Roosevelt very keenly, and have never evinced a great liking for English securities with the exception of gold shares. It is, therefore, very probable that an overwhelming part of their flight capital consists of gold hoards and bank balances. The fact that the private gold hoards in London have not diminished since the stabilisation of the dollar in anything like the proportion which would correspond to the vast accumulation of gold by America during the time of the depreciation of the dollar strengthens this opinion. The political outlook in Europe—even if we assume that the French internal political tensions will be speedily removed (a very optimistic assumption indeed)—is not such as to stimulate a sudden liquidation of all foreign assets in French possession. There is a further condition. The devaluation would have to be effected in a way which will re-establish confidence immediately in the future of the currency, and this is not at all certain. The speculative opportunities offered to foreign capital are thereby also limited and the danger of capital exports from England and U.S. is alleviated.

Thus in the present configuration of circumstances one need hardly fear a lasting shock, similar to the disturbance caused by the depreciation of the pound, for world recovery from the

change in the gold value of the French franc. It is most important to stress this point because even groundless fears may evoke very real, though quite unnecessary, bad effects on business, both here and in America. There can be no doubt, however, that the policies which have been followed will have an important bearing on the ultimate results, at least in the short run.

What methods can France adopt to achieve the abandonment of the present free gold parity?

- (1) Outright devaluation and an immediate re-establishment of the redemption of banknotes in gold on the basis of a lower gold content.
- (2) Devaluation and a provisional re-establishment of the redeemability of banknotes authorising the Government to alter this gold content in certain contingencies, within a given period and within certain limits.
- (3) Devaluation and the re-establishment of gold payments, whilst fixing a wide maximum margin between the buying and selling price of gold, which the Government is authorised to alter within the given limits.
- (4) An export tax on gold either fixed or variable within a maximum limit, with or without the suspension of the right of redemption of banknotes at home at the present parity.
- (5) Prohibition of capital movements, restriction of foreign exchange dealings.
- (6) Suspension of the redemption of banknotes in gold by the Banque de France.

It is obvious that exchange restrictions without a change in gold parity do not alter the fundamental position, but merely serve to prolong the agony. The Central European experience shows, moreover, that in order to make an embargo on capital exports effective, the whole economic life of the community has to be placed slowly but certainly under strict control. It is really too much to hope that these most unfavourable experiences will not be repeated.

The choice among the other methods should depend on how quickly they help to re-establish equilibrium at home and abroad. If (a) the French demand in terms of francs for foreign products increases with the depreciation of that unit in terms of other currencies, and (b) this increase does not result from a panic hoarding of commodities, but from an orderly increase in economic activity, following the present

equally unhealthy hoarding of money, the probable disturbance emanating from the change in the gold parity would be minimised. This can only be achieved if confidence is restored almost immediately. Otherwise there will be a further flight of capital which may lead to complete collapse of the currency. The resulting exchange dumping, however, would gravely disturb world recovery.

It should not be impossible—or even very difficult—to achieve these aims, especially after the experience of Belgium. Those quotas and tariffs which have been imposed merely as a result of the necessity for defence with a growing overvaluation of the franc, should almost immediately be reduced or their rigidity lessened. This would pave the way for a better balanced increase trade. No doubt the reappearance of France on the foreign markets would cause some dislocation, but if it were well handled it need not, at least after a short time, exert in the balance a deflationary pressure abroad. At the same time the dropping of the defence measures would prevent undue rise in prices in France, thereby alleviating any fears of inflation.

The total amount of the hoards is of course stupendous in France, and it is probable that some flight into “real” values will take place, especially as the rentier class has so steadily been fed by scaremongers. It is for this reason that the methods which do not somehow restore gold payments should not be considered. Some expansion in the active circulation of money is as desirable as it is inevitable. It would start recovery at home and lessen the deflationary shock abroad, which if violent is bound to react on France. The problem is how to direct the return of hoarded money into active circulation in such a way as to bring about a healthy gradual expansion of business and avoid panicky hoarding of commodities. Some “safety first” deflationary measures, such as were effected in England after September 1931, will be necessary, as, e.g. a high bank-rate and the strict supervision of the lending by private banks, and possibly even of foreign exchange transactions. The co-operation of big commercial and industrial organisations should be obtained as was done in Belgium. Though they would in the beginning sell at less than replacement prices, the reduction of their hitherto unsaleable stocks should be considered by them as adequate compensation. The loss of the community on imported materials

which have to be replaced at a higher price is more than offset by the beneficial psychological effect which this slowing down of the rise in prices would have. It is for this reason alone that one wishes that the abandonment of the gold standard would come at a time when the reserves are still ample and when a part can be used to ward off any further attacks on the currency, which after a revaluation should not be impossible. This is also important from the point of view of the Treasury, which would obtain the benefit instead of the private individual who is now busily exporting his capital and hoarding gold, thus intensifying the crisis. Financial grounds, moreover, favour a devaluation in preference to the possible other methods which would not liberate the profit arising out of the revaluation of the gold reserve.

Hitherto it has been impossible to reduce interest rates and restart investment, not so much because of the over-valuation of the franc—though that must have played a considerable rôle—but because of the uncertainty about the fate of the currency and about future profits intensified by the vagaries of the pound. If the devaluation removes this stumbling block, then the intermediate period of disturbance resulting from the conflicting influence of a flight into commodities and the deflationary measures is likely to take a far shorter time than in England, especially if all this happens before the present world recovery has come to an end. As in the case of Belgium, it will be found that the increase in prices will not be excessive and will not be overstimulating in spite of the acute fear complex about devaluation, as there is a substantial industrial excess capacity and an economy where deficit is the rule rather than the exception. The moderate rise in nominal prices, however, will not only remove the threat of wholesale dumping abroad, which would lead to a tariff and quota war, but it restores profits or at least diminishes losses at home. The arguments of the opponents of devaluation who consider that it has no effect after the “competitive advantage” is exhausted, fall into one of the most dangerous of economic fallacies. They completely forget that it removes the cause of *further shrinkage* and tends to cure the internal disequilibrium by removing the fears, the anticipation of a further fall in prices. This is far more important than the direct effects through the shifting in the international competitive position.

All arguments thus speak in favour of a more or less final measure. The question of confidence and the prime necessity of lowering interest rates, which depends on the return of hoarded banknotes and gold into the banking system, should exclude the method of depreciating the franc by a tax on the exports of gold without a virtual suspension of the redemption of banknotes. That expedient would certainly not stop internal hoarding, but rather accentuate it and lead to a complete disintegration of the banking structure. There are, however, some very cogent arguments against a procedure which would rigidly fix the new gold parity. First, there is the danger that the extent of necessary devaluation will be misjudged. Second, even if the original estimate were correct, it may well be that subsequent changes may take place; for example, the pound may depreciate again, or the dollar may be further devalued. Both incidents would make an originally right calculation incorrect. The experiences with more than one post-war stabilisation show the risks involved. It is therefore earnestly hoped that either by the method of allowing a free hand for later adjustments without further formalities, or by establishing a wide price for selling and buying gold, a safety margin will be reserved. Yet another slow process of deflationary attrition is too awful a prospect even to contemplate and must be one of the reasons why some otherwise reasonable Frenchmen refuse to contemplate devaluation without general stabilisation. At the same time it would seem to be essential that gold payments at *some*, even though flexible, price should immediately be resumed.

In comparison to the French anxieties the problems of the foreign countries appear small. The American recovery is well under way, and there seems to be little danger of a retaliation by further devaluation to the permitted fifty per cent., unless something very unexpected arises and ruins the present favourable prospects, or unless the pound should fall to such a low level as to create a political rather than an economic issue. Nor is England presented with insoluble problems, providing France adopts a reasonable policy and accomplishes the necessary changes without such delay as will cause them to fall into a period of already indifferent trade both here or in America. With the slow reactivation of the vast credit potentialities in America, the over-valuation of the pound in terms of competitive costs, even at the present level of the

exchange, tends to be slowly wiped out. Capital movements, of course, may upset the equilibrium, but they are increasingly neutralised by the greater volume of newly mined gold coming on to the market, which will be increased by the gradual dishoarding of gold.

There is no doubt that the pound will tend to be easier, especially if cheap money is not to be disturbed. Some withdrawals of French funds from London are inevitable. And the flight from the franc would cease. If the franc is fixed again on gold, the difficulty of a deliberate management of sterling to assist in the finding of a tolerable level should not be overwhelming. The Exchange Equalisation Account will be able to buy and sell francs and convert them into gold. Indeed, the position will be unchanged from the point of view of monetary management. It is more than probable that England has ample reserves to stand the withdrawal of flight money. These should be courageously used. Difficulties, however, would arise if gold payments in France, in spite of all cogent reasons, are not resumed immediately. This may happen, as the export tax would disguise the fact of devaluation at home, and would enable the politicians to put the blame on foreign countries, therefore it is politically very attractive. The American authorities then need not hand out gold against dollars, either to England or to France, as they are not on the gold standard.

The intervention of the British authorities, if no agreement is made which would be most desirable, will then have to be based on purchase and sale of dollars, as it may well be that operations based on the gold available in the London market, severed as it would be both from the American and French gold reserves, will not be sufficient to dominate fluctuations in sterling. It is to be hoped that the British authorities will take into due account that the risk involved in such operations, at least in terms of sterling, is negligible and will not refrain from intervention. They can always regulate sterling by this method in such a way as to keep the sterling value of the dollars in their possession stable. This policy would be the prudent one, unless they expect a price inflation in America of such magnitude that they would not want to keep pace with it—a most unlikely contingency. No such difficulties would be experienced if France were to establish a tax on the export of gold. It is more than likely that the franc would

immediately be depreciated to the full extent of the tax; therefore, the English authorities can always prevent an appreciation of the pound by buying gold against cheap francs, and paying the tax out of the difference between the London price of gold and the low selling-price of gold at the Banque de France.

All these problems and anxieties would be very much diminished if the authorities concerned would come to some agreement to help each other in minimising the extent of necessary monetary readjustments. The greatest dangers may arise if the change in the gold value of the franc leads to a competitive depreciation of the main currencies of the world, and a further enormous appreciation of the already redundant stocks of gold which forbid inflation. This is wholly unnecessary. The most important step to be taken, aside from ensuring technical facilities for the management of the currencies, e.g. the facility for the English Exchange Equalisation Fund to convert dollars into gold, is an understanding between this country and America to obviate by prudent management of sterling the possibility of a further devaluation of the dollar. France could be brought into line by threatening her with tariff war in case of excessive devaluation. In any case the isolation of French dumping is a lesser evil than an effort to keep pace with it. A further problem will be set by Germany. The repercussions of a German step to devalue must not be exaggerated. The mark is already depreciated and that at a flexible rate. Whilst a final general stabilisation in view of all these contingencies may be too early to contemplate, co-operation to minimise the monetary disturbances can and must be prepared immediately. Given the will to deal with them, the monetary problems raised by the possibility of an abandonment of the present free gold parity of the franc are not difficult to solve. There is no imminent necessity for such a step to have any lasting adverse effects on world recovery; it should, and could, provide a welcome and additional stimulus.

THOMAS BALOGH.

THE GENERAL ELECTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM.

“THE whole world,” declared Mr. Baldwin, in his final broadcast speech, “is watching this election, because democracy itself is on trial.” Of democracy, that system of government in which the solution of national problems is “worked out by the reasoning of a free people,” Mr. Baldwin has indeed made himself one of the foremost champions and exponents in Western Europe to-day. There have been too few replies from statesmen of the highest eminence to the attacks of dictators upon the liberal philosophy. To Signor Mussolini liberty is a decaying corpse. To Mr. Baldwin, liberty, justice, freedom, fair play for the individual, are fundamental conditions of the good life. “We have,” he said in his address to the Conservative Party Conference immediately prior to the election, “to guard certain spiritual values of infinitely more importance and value to mankind [than material advantages]—that love of freedom and that love of justice without which we could not survive.”

But democracy, Mr. Baldwin has also told us, must be actively and consciously exercised. It will fail “unless every man and woman take upon themselves their share of the responsibilities and burdens of democracy,” and the primary responsibility of the citizen at a general election is “the wise choice of a representative.” Let us examine the recent general election in the light of these declarations.

First, what were the conditions in which Parliament was dissolved. This took place when the dispute between Italy and the League of Nations was causing the gravest anxiety. Great Britain, supporting the League, was taking a responsible, even a leading part in the dispute, and the two Opposition parties, Labour and Liberal, had publicly expressed their approval of the Government’s policy, as declared at Geneva by Sir Samuel Hoare. In this matter all three political parties were behind His Majesty’s Government, a demonstration to the world of national unity. When shortly thereafter Parliament was suddenly dissolved, the Opposition leaders, Labour and Liberal, protested that the international situation was being used to create a party advantage. An extension of the life of the last parliament would have made it possible for the Prime Minister, while thanking the Opposition parties for

supporting the British Government in its League of Nations policy, to invite the three parties to pass, before a new election should fall due, a law that would enable the nation to elect a House of Commons under electoral conditions that would be fair to all. Such a pronouncement would have made it clear that Mr. Baldwin bore steadily in mind that fair play which he deems to be a condition of the survival of democracy.

The election illustrated afresh how little room there is under our present electoral system for generous action. A rumour gained currency in the Darwen division that Mr. Baldwin desired the return of Sir Herbert Samuel to the House of Commons. Pressed for a denial, Mr. Baldwin sent the message demanded by the party organisation that he desired the return of the Conservative candidate. It is difficult to believe that Mr. Baldwin would not have welcomed the return to the House of Commons of so able a parliamentarian as Sir Herbert Samuel, but the electoral system placed Mr. Baldwin in a dilemma. In a single-member constituency only one man, only one party, can win, and Mr. Baldwin, in accordance with the rules of the game, supported the nominee of his party. Similarly the rules of the game constrained Sir John Simon, Mr. Walter Runciman and Mr. Hore-Belisha, National Liberal members of the Government, to support Conservatives where these were standing in opposition to Mr. Isaac Foot and to other Opposition Liberal candidates, formerly their colleagues. This course caused much resentment. In Glasgow feeling rose high when the official Labour Party attacked the constituencies held by Mr. Maxton and his I.L.P. colleagues. In constituencies where Opposition Labour was opposed to National Labour, the contests were not only bitter, but were marked by a persistent suppression of speech. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. J. H. Thomas, and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald were on many occasions unable to make themselves heard.

Suppression of speech at election meetings is contrary to the spirit of democracy. But does not our electoral system lead to suppression of speech still more serious because enduring for a period of years? Large numbers of voters may for the lifetime of a Parliament have no one to present their views to the House of Commons. In the eleven southern counties of England, stretching from Kent to Cornwall, the

seventy-nine contested constituencies gave the following result :

Party	Votes	Seats
Government	2,068,323	77
Labour	836,573	0
Liberal	320,307	2

More than 800,000 Labour electors living in the south of England have no spokesmen in the House of Commons. On the other hand the eleven county divisions of Durham are held exclusively by Labour. It is often contended that the incomplete representation of the people in one part of the country is offset by incomplete representation elsewhere. But both Conservative and Labour voters in the south of England have a different experience of life from Conservative and Labour voters in Durham ; a truer view of the result is that representation in a full sense of the word is incomplete ; there is no real compensation in human values.

In point of mere numerical strength, the failure of the principle of compensating errors leaps to the eye in a comparison of the votes cast and the seats won in the country as a whole. The figures for the 575 contested seats in Great Britain and Ireland were as follows :

Party	Votes	Seats	No. of votes per seat obtained	Seats in proportion to votes
Government ...	11,789,575	405	29,000	308
Labour ...	8,325,446	141	59,000	217
Liberal ...	1,443,112	21	69,000	38
I.L.P. ...	139,517	4	35,000	4
Others ...	299,800	4	—	8

Every Member of Parliament on the Opposition benches represents on the average twice as many voters as every supporter of the Government. The electoral system reduced Labour representation by over seventy members. It reduced Liberal representation by nearly one-half (without taking into account the fact that the country was, as far as the Liberal party was concerned, only one-quarter contested). What would have happened under proportional representation ? There were forty uncontested seats, of which the Government held twenty-six. Including a liberal estimate of the voters

likely to support the successful party in each uncontested area, the Government's majority, instead of being some 250, would, on a strictly proportionate basis, have been less than sixty. When a proportional system operates in constituencies of rather limited size, the larger parties generally gain a little more than their proportionate share ; since the system of proportional representation proposed in this country is of this nature, we should expect that with that system in operation the Government's majority would have been in all probability from sixty to seventy. The strength of the Opposition would have been increased by nearly 100 members. Moreover, it would have been strengthened in its personnel. The leader of a party like Sir Herbert Samuel would have been elected. Prominent members of the Labour party, now defeated, would have been returned to Parliament.

A marked feature of the present system of election is the uncertainty of its working. It is irregular even in its irregularities. With the same mass of voters supporting the various parties, the election result might well have been very different from what it was, so much does the net result depend upon the way in which political forces are distributed. In southern England, the 836,000 Labour voters secured no representation because they were spread fairly uniformly over the whole of the area. In the West Riding of Yorkshire the same number of Labour voters, fortunate in possessing local majorities in certain areas, won twenty-four seats. In London a smaller number of Labour voters, namely 760,000, won twenty-two seats. If the voters of the different parties had been distributed uniformly over London, the Government could have won every London seat with a comfortable majority of 2,000. That would have been a triumph, perhaps, for the successful party, but not for democracy.

Mr. J. S. Middleton, Secretary of the Labour Party, speaking in London a few days after the election, made the following comparison of Labour successes in recent elections. "Ours is an extraordinary electoral system," he said. "In 1929, Labour, with 7,750,000 votes, had 300 seats ; in 1931, with 6,250,000 votes, it had forty-six seats ; whilst this year, with 8,250,000 votes, it secured 154 seats. I venture to say that there is no bigger gamble on earth than a British general election." The comment recalls some words of Mr. J. L. Garvin, who, in the *Observer*, described our electoral system as

being "one of the most discreditable electoral systems in the world." "We stake upon a gambler's chance," he said, "the control of the House of Commons, and the management of Imperial and Foreign affairs, as well as social."

Is it of consequence, some may ask, whether representation should be reasonably fair or not? One answer lies in the very nature of our constitution as a self-governing country. The franchise is the instrument of self-government. To deprive the franchise of an effective value, to multiply the power of the franchise of one section of the people at the expense of another section, is to deny or degrade a fundamental right of citizenship. Another answer may be drawn from the words quoted from Mr. Garvin. It is the composition of the House of Commons that shapes our history to-day, that determines decisions on vital national and international questions. The election result of 1935 will leave its mark. The future of the League of Nations was an issue in the election. The forces in this country that are under-represented in Parliament are those which are strongest in their attachment to the League of Nations. Suppose the majority of the Government had been but sixty instead of 250, and that the pro-League forces amongst the Conservatives, as well as among the Opposition parties, had been fully represented in numbers and in personnel. Would not this have had an influence—even a determining influence—on the attitude taken by the British Government in matters affecting the League? Would not a fairly representative Parliament have conveyed to foreign nations a truer picture of public opinion? Would it not have influenced the attitude of the Government in the negotiations with France and Italy which immediately followed the election?

A common objection to the fair representation of political forces in the House of Commons is that it would, or might, bring about a great increase in parties. The proposals recommended for Great Britain afford little, if any, ground for an objection of this kind. The constituencies will be self-contained units corresponding in many cases with natural and administrative divisions. Generally speaking, the constituencies will return from three to five members each. There will be no room for any group which does not command the support of a very considerable proportion of the voters in a

given area. Lord Ullswater, referring to these proposals in the House of Lords, said:

The Committee spent at least ten meetings over this, and at last a decision was taken. That resolution would to a considerable extent meet the grievances which the Conference had set out to try and overcome, namely, the gross under-representation of great bodies of citizens on whom the franchise had been conferred.

The resolution in question declared that any electoral reform should include proportional representation with the single transferable vote. The proposals are designed to meet substantial grievances in a practical way.

In the University elections, we have examples of proportional representation at work on a limited scale. For a long period prior to the introduction of proportional representation in 1918, all the Universities entitled to return members elected none but Conservatives. The majority monopolised the representation. The use of P.R. in 1929 enabled Miss Rathbone to be elected as one of the representatives for the Combined English Universities by virtue of the support of a large minority exceeding one-third of the whole. In the general election of 1935, Mr. A. P. Herbert was returned in spite of the fact that the Conservatives, who were in a majority, nominated two candidates; Mr. Herbert was returned, like Miss Rathbone, by virtue of the support of a number of voters exceeding one-third of the whole. The success of the transferable vote system in producing a more complete representation in the University constituencies is the more noteworthy in that there is little scope for proportionality when no more than two members are to be elected; there will be more scope in constituencies returning three, four or five members. But even in the latter constituencies a candidate, in order to be elected, will have to poll a very considerable number of votes.

What are the possibilities of proportional representation being adopted by this Parliament? In reply to questions on electoral reform addressed to him by electors in his constituency, Sir Kingsley Wood, Director of the Government Publicity Campaign during the election, stated:

The experience of the Ullswater Conference has shown that it is difficult to obtain agreement on proposals for electoral reform. If, however, it is decided that a change should be made in the present system of parliamentary election, I would consider favourably Proportional Representation in preference to any other change.

From the fact that other Conservatives replied in similar terms, it would appear that the statement was framed in an approved form. A number of Labour candidates indicated their agreement with the general proposition that their political opponents, as well as their political friends, were entitled to a fair share of representation, and were willing that an enquiry should be made. The Liberal Party supported proportional representation in their election manifesto.

To these favourable indications may be added the fact that other proposals for the reform of the electoral system are also being put forward. Since the election took place, Sir Samuel Hoare has suggested that the question of compulsory voting should be examined by representatives of all parties. The inequalities in the size of the existing constituencies—inequalities which will be still more marked before the close of this Parliament—have given rise to a demand for redistribution. Protests have been renewed as to the undue influence of wealth in elections, of which a particular example is the relative numbers of motor cars available for the conveyance of voters of different parties.

Of yet greater importance and insistence is the demand for House of Lords reform. In replying for the Government to a parliamentary question as to the Government's attitude on this subject, Lord Halifax, Lord Privy Seal, said: "As regards the larger question of reform of the procedure, composition, and powers of the House of Lords . . . His Majesty's Government recognises the immense importance of the issue. The question will certainly engage the attention of the Government." Already steps have been taken to re-establish the Conservative Committee which pressed for House of Lords Reform during the last Parliament. The chief ground on which is based the demand for a reformed and strengthened Second Chamber is the need of a safeguard against the acts of a House of Commons unrepresentative of the nation. Lord Reading, in the debates last year, well asked whether the true remedy does not lie in the reform of the House of Commons. It would be infinitely more easy, were our House of Commons assuredly representative, to determine what part the Second Chamber should play in our constitution and how it should be constituted. The nature of the representation in the House of Commons is the key to constitutional reform.

JOHN H. HUMPHREYS.

COLONIES AND MANDATES.

THERE is a growing body of opinion that Great Britain should offer to administer all her tropical colonies, which have not reached the stage of self-government, under an international mandate, with the corollary that the principle of equal opportunity for all peoples and the "Open Door" for commerce should be applied in these Crown Colonies, as it is in her mandated territories. It is opportune, then, to consider the origin and development of the mandate system, and the effect of its application to our colonial empire. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League introduced the conception of an international trust for the administration of the former German colonies in tropical Africa and Polynesia, and of certain territories in the Middle East detached from Turkey. A mandate is "a Trust written in Latin"; and the principle of the new system of government is that backward peoples, or "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world," should be placed under the tutelage of advanced nations who would exercise it as trustees on behalf of the League. Three main principles are laid down in the Article of the Covenant for the government of the backward peoples:

1. The wellbeing of the native inhabitants must be regarded as a sacred trust of the Administration.
2. There must be equal opportunity for the trade and enterprise of the subjects of all States of the League of Nations, and no preference or discrimination in favour of subjects of the Mandatory Power.
3. There is to be no establishment of military or naval bases, and no military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of the territory.

The execution of these principles is supervised by an international authority, the Council of the League of Nations, which entrusts to a permanent commission the examination of an annual report of the mandatory in every case of a mandate. The post-war mandate, it has been said; differs from the pre-war protectorate over native peoples in that the mandatory is a protector with a conscience, and with a keeper of his conscience.

Leaving aside the mandates for the countries separated from Turkey, the international machinery of mandates is at present

restricted in its employment to secure the wellbeing of the inhabitants of the former German colonies, and to open up the raw materials in those territories for the use of the world at large. Yet the principles laid down are in their nature applicable to all colonial possessions; and if it was right to prescribe them for the protection of the wellbeing of the natives in what had been German East Africa and German South-West Africa, and to ensure that the trade of those territories should be open without discrimination to all members of the League, it would seem to be right that the same principles should apply to the territories and the native peoples which adjoin them. It was easier, however, for the Allied Powers to see the failings of the colonial system and the virtues of the mandate system when applied to the former colonies of Germany, than to realise those failings and virtues with reference to their own colonies. A Lord Chancellor of the Victorian era suggested that the humble address of His Majesty's Judges to the Sovereign, which used to begin "Conscious as we are of our shortcomings," should be amended so as to read "Conscious as we are of each other's shortcomings." That heightened consciousness of the shortcomings of each other applies to nations as well as to His Majesty's Judges. But it is certain that the authors of the Covenant felt a distrust of the attitude of the colonial Powers generally towards the natives, which made it necessary to provide an international guarantee of the native wellbeing and constant international supervision.

On the principle that "to him that hath shall be given," Great Britain and the British Dominions received the lion's share of the mandatory responsibilities. In form, the King of England is the mandatory for the territories of Tanganyika, the Cameroons and Togoland, South-West Africa, New Guinea and Samoa, and a number of the Pacific Islands. But, save in the case of the first two territories, he exercises the mandate through the Government of a Dominion. The report of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference on Article 22 of the Covenant of the League pointed to an extension of the new system of government to the existing colonies. "It is to be hoped," it was said, "that the maintenance of a high level of administration in a mandated territory will have a reaction in any place where the administration is actually on a lower level, and that the principle of the mandate will show that it is capable of a large application." When, some years ago, a

Royal Commission examined the proposal of a closer union of the countries under British administration in East Africa, which included the Colonies of Kenya and Uganda, the Protectorate of Nyasaland and the Mandated Territory of Tanganyika, it observed that the specific principles laid down for the administration of the mandated territory must govern the administration of the natives in the whole East African complex. "The mission of Great Britain is to work continuously at the training and education of the natives towards a higher intellectual, moral and economic level than that which they had reached when the Crown assumed responsibility for the administration of the territory."

The mandate system has now been in operation for nearly fifteen years. And it is one of the activities of the League which, by general consent, has marked an achievement of international co-operation. The Assembly of the League in 1931, surveying the record of ten years of administration, declared that "the essentially humanitarian experiment instituted by Article 22 of the Covenant has been crowned with indisputable success." The government of native peoples under a mandate is no longer an internal or national concern, but one in which the governing power stands before the bar of the public opinion of the world. If there is serious trouble, as has occurred in South-West Africa and in Samoa—to say nothing of the troubles in the Middle-East mandates of Palestine and Syria—the matter is brought without delay before the notice of the Mandates Commission, which examines, with the representatives of the mandatory, the causes of the trouble, and offers its recommendation for their removal. International supervision, also, has induced the governing power to do more than it did under the old colonial system for raising the standard of life, both materially and intellectually, of the native peoples. It is notable that the expenditure on education in the territories under British Mandate was trebled in a few years.

It has been, indeed, the boast of Great Britain that we regard our colonies as a trust for the nations. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain said, years before the War, that our African Colonies were undeveloped states of Europe which Great Britain holds as trustees for civilisation. Before the War, too, the policy of complete free trade and the "Open Door" was applied in our Crown Colonies. In this sense, therefore,

the mandate principles were a generalisation of the principles of our Colonial Empire. Nevertheless, there are important differences of economic policy to-day in a colony and a mandated territory; and our colonial system rouses the resentment of the Powers which have not colonies. Lord Lugard, now a member of the Mandates Commission, who was Governor successively of several Crown Colonies, in his book on *The Dual Mandate*, which is a brilliant exposition of British colonial policy, explains that Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial class and of the native races; and Mr. Amery, when Secretary for the Colonies in 1926, defined the policy as one which recognises our trusteeship, both to the native population and to humanity at large, for the fullest development of the territories, "and towards those in particular of our own race who have undertaken the task of helping forward that development." It is implied in these statements, and it is illustrated in practice, that the benefit of the industrial classes of the governing Power, of the British settler, and the British investor of capital, is an important consideration in the government of a colony. While a general trust is recognised for the wellbeing of the native peoples, there is no outside body to see to the execution of that trust. It is true that vigilant members of Parliament may raise any complaint of injustice, and the Government must answer for its actions to Parliament. Nevertheless, the distinction is real between a responsibility of which account has to be given to an international expert body which receives all the relevant documents, and has powers of examining and cross-examining the representatives of Governments, and a responsibility which is self-imposed and self-judged. The question of the gold mines in Kenya, which agitated opinion some years ago, was solved in a way which would hardly have passed the scrutiny of the Mandates Commission.

As regards the obligation of the mandatory not to introduce military service of the native inhabitants, there is no serious difference of the British policy in a mandated territory and in a colony. But the third major obligation of the mandate system, equal opportunity for subjects of all states to trade, obtain resources, invest money, secure concessions and carry on a calling, has no binding application in a colony, and the difference in practice between colony and mandate has been marked in recent years. The extension of the Ottawa

Agreements to the Crown Colonies has induced the abandonment of the old principle of free trade in our tropical possessions, and the substitution for it of the system of imperial preference on the one hand and discriminating tariffs against foreign imports on the other. Moreover, England has retained, in practice if not in law, the field of capital investment in her Colonies for British investors.

The causes of unrest and resentment about our Colonial Empire, on the part of states without colonies, are many and various, and could not be entirely satisfied by any transformation of possessions of the Crown to mandates held by the Crown under the League. They are partly political and partly economic. The political grounds are that colonies give prestige, provide coaling stations or bases, and are outlets for surplus population. The last ground, so far as tropical territories inhabited by native peoples are concerned, is grossly exaggerated; but the intangible and military motives cannot be disposed of. On the other hand, the economic grounds of the "have-not" states for wanting colonies and resenting the vastness of the Colonial Empires of England, France, Belgium, Holland and Portugal, viz. that in present circumstances they cannot obtain raw materials which they need for their industry, they have no profitable outlets for the investment of their capital, they lack opportunities for the enterprise of some of their citizens, and cannot take their part in spreading civilisation in backward countries: these much advertised grievances, exaggerated though they may be, have a certain foundation, and could be removed by a genuine and thorough application of the principles of the mandate system to the colonies of England, France, and the rest.

Sir Samuel Hoare, at Geneva, indicated Great Britain's willingness to consider the first ground of grievance, the equal opportunity for the supply of raw materials from colonial territories. The problem, he said, was economic rather than territorial: "It is a fear of monopoly, of the withholding of essential colonial raw materials: the desire for a guarantee that the distribution of the materials will not be impeded." He suggested, indeed, that while there was no question of any colony withholding its raw materials from any prospective purchaser, the Government would be prepared to take a share in any collective attempt to deal in any fair and effective way with the problem of distribution that troubles peoples. That

declaration foreshadows a reconsideration of the economic position. The trouble, however, is caused not so much by impediments on the export of raw materials as by the restriction through tariffs of the trade of foreign countries with the colonies. Italy and Germany cannot have a fair chance of obtaining the products of our colonies unless they have a free opportunity of sending their exports to the colonies. International trade is not done on a cash basis, but by the exchange of goods.

There is a denial of the principle of the "Open Door" not only in the colonies but also in the territories for which the British self-governing dominions hold a mandate. By a compromise, which was indefensible, that principle was not laid down in what are called the "C" Mandates, over territories which are administered under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory. Professor Rappard of Geneva, the first Director of the Mandates Section of the League, observed that the system was "conceived in sin and born in repentance." And it is a grievance that, while Germany before the War practised free trade in her colonies, that are now mandated territories, she and every foreign state are now denied freedom of trade thereto.

The demand for an outlet for profitable investment of capital cannot be readily met, because large British capital is already invested in the colonies, and in the immediate future, anyhow, there is little likelihood of expansion. The extension, however, of the mandate principle which requires equal opportunity would give hope for the future; and a suggestion has been made for the establishment of an International Board of Colonial Investment which would sponsor the raising of loans for territories under mandate. In this respect, indeed, the practice of the mandates calls for some reform, so as to be more completely in accord with the principle. To-day, concessions for public works and government supplies are often reserved for subjects of the mandatory. The Permanent Mandates Commission has regarded the practice with some misgiving, but has not yet definitely pronounced against it. There may be special cases where the mandatory may rightly reserve supplies for firms of its own country, or carry out by direct government agency the concession for a public utility. Generally, however, the territory under mandate should obtain the supply and service in an open market.

The opening of the Civil Service and the professions in the colonies to the subjects of foreign countries would seem to be a more revolutionary change; and no doubt objection would be raised. The Mandates Commission, however, has urged unanimously that the medical service in mandated territories should be opened without distinction of nationality. The principle should be extended further, in the first place, to the technical services of the government, and gradually to the whole administration. While the highest positions in the government would be reserved for subjects of the mandatory Power, and the native inhabitants should be assisted steadfastly towards self-government, there should be an International Civil Service—a new form of I.C.S.—in tropical countries which are not self-governing. It might make administration at first harder than when the government service is more homogeneous; but it would, on the other hand, remove one of the deeper causes of jealousy on the part of states whose peoples are denied equal opportunity of service overseas; and that benefit is worth some sacrifice of easiness of administration.

The change from a colonial to a mandatory system of government does not mean that Great Britain would hand over her colonies to other countries; but that we would accept international supervision over the administration of our colonies, and apply as liberally as possible liberal principles to all tropical countries under our direct administration. The Crown Colonies, such as Ceylon and the West Indies, approaching full self-government, would properly remain under their present régime; but there are other colonies and protectorates, such as British Honduras, British Guiana and the Federated Malay States, where the principles of international supervision and the "Open Door" would be as appropriate as in the African territories. If England gave the lead in accepting definite trusts and responsibility in respect of her colonies, it may be hoped that her example would be followed by the other colonial Powers, France, Belgium, Holland and Portugal. The generalised acceptance of international supervision and freedom of trade in respect of any territory where European Powers govern native races would not, it is apprehended, remove all grievances and satisfy the aspirations of the states that to-day want empire. But it would take away the bitter grievance of the recent trend of economic

imperialism ; and at the same time give assurance to the native peoples that their wellbeing would be a foremost consideration, and that they would be helped towards self-government. The two most glaring evils of imperialism, the one in relation to the peoples governed, the other in relation to foreign states, would disappear. And the conception in the Covenant of the League that the government of backward peoples should be a trust of civilisation would be more nearly realised.

Together with the extension of the mandate principle there should be an improvement of the mandate machinery. The present system of supervision is that the Mandates Commission carries out annually the examination of the report of the mandatory, and supplements it by a *viva voce* examination of a representative of the mandatory. It receives continuous information of what is happening in the mandated territories through the Mandates Section of the League Secretariat, and finally it receives petitions from persons or associations in the territories under mandate who desire to submit any complaint or grievance to the League. That system has worked unexpectedly well. Nevertheless, weaknesses have been apparent for some time, and the Commission itself has on occasion recommended amendments. In the first place it has expressed the desire that members of the Commission should be entitled to visit officially any of the mandated territories, in order to get a clearer knowledge of conditions, whether in times of unrest or in normal times. There have been occasions of serious trouble in countries under mandate, e.g. in Syria (1925-6) and in Samoa in 1927-9, when the Commission felt that, in order to form a just opinion and to be able to give helpful advice, it would have been well if one or more of its members could have visited the spot. And more recently it has been uneasy about the action of the Japanese in extending the ports of the Pacific Islands, for which they still hold a mandate and render a report, although they are no longer members of the League. Members have been suspicious of a violation of the Article which prohibits fortification or the building of a naval base. But they are forced to be content with the soft answers of the Japanese. At the last meeting of the Assembly, the *Rapporteur* on mandates dealt with the suggestion that special funds should be at the disposal of the Commission to enable them to visit the mandated territories. He stated, however, that the delegates of France, Great

Britain and Belgium were, on financial grounds, averse to this suggestion. And there the matter at present rests.

Another amendment which has been suggested is that petitioners to the League, in cases recommended by the Commission, be entitled to attend and state their case in person. At present the representative of the mandatory can be, and regularly is, questioned about the matter of the petition. But the Commission has to content itself with his explanations, and with what it can glean from the documentation which is obtained from the Secretariat. It would not be desirable to turn the examination of petitions into a judicial process. But there have been cases where the matter would have been elucidated, and the judgment of the Commission would have been assisted, if the persons complaining had an opportunity of appearing.

The introduction of international supervision into any part of government runs counter to the prevalent, if obsolete, idea of national sovereignty, and tends to be whittled down as much as possible. Many Englishmen will instinctively dislike the notion of any international interference with the British colonies. But the price of peace in colonial as in other affairs must be paid ; and part of that price is the acceptance of international control, or rather, international co-operation in the administration of backward territories which are not yet ripe for self-government, with a view to secure, on the one hand, the contentment of the native peoples, and on the other, the feeling of foreign states that their subjects are not suffering from exclusion or discrimination in the access to material resources for which the governing Power is admittedly a trustee. During the nineteenth century we abandoned the old "mercantile theory" by which colonies were treated as a preserve for the enrichment of the Mother country. In this century we should go a step further, and accept for our own colonies, as the Allied statesmen prescribed for the former German colonies, the practice as well as the principle of trusteeship, and act on the maxim : "seek equality and avoid greed."

NORMAN BENTWICH.

IRAQ AND HER PROBLEMS.

THE struggle to live in "the land between the rivers" has been bitter and often marked by the conflict of tribal units which the character of the country, the scant nature of her products and factional traditions dictate. Control of this region is to-day in the hands of the Iraq government, so that when certain elements in Mesopotamia feel the searing touch of a fiery sword, wielded in this case by the air arm of Iraq Defence, they are left with crops and hard-earned wealth in flames and a sense of grievance which, it would seem, is the bane of tribal life in the desert. And the pity of it is that the recent armed revolt of the Rumaitha and sections of the Muntafiq tribes, now quelled at all points, including Suq-esh-Shuyukh, the centre, "by repeated bombing from the air," reflects as unfavourably on the quality of Iraq nationalism as on the unsavoury methods of Baghdad politicians, one faction of whom encouraged the tribes in the first place to armed resistance against the government.

The cause of the March and May trouble on the Middle Euphrates is closely linked with political developments since the untimely death of King Faisal I in September 1933, less than one year after Iraq was freed from mandatory control and admitted a member of the League of Nations. From the time of the formation of the present constitution (July 1925) until 1933 cabinets came and went at the King's pleasure. With the accession of twenty-one-year-old King Ghazi, who last May became father to an heir to the throne, such a course could not continue. Ali Jawdat, secretary to the late King, immediately procured the fall of the Ikha or Brotherhood Party, led by Yassin Pasha al-Hashimi. A new government was formed, and Jamil Madfai became Prime Minister. For the purposes of the December 1934 elections this post was relinquished by Jamil Madfai. Ali Jawdat took open control and brought to power the least representative government that Iraq has seen, one which was staffed by the friends, relations and, with no exaggeration, paid supporters of the Ali Jawdat-Jamil Madfai partnership. This gave rise to strong opposition and for the first time in the post-war history of Iraq a popular movement aiming to defeat a government, now independent of royal prerogative, was roused.

The opposition to Ali Jawdat's cabinet found expression in the Ikha Party, and Yassin Pasha and his supporters began to play on the grievances of the Middle Euphrates tribes to the south of Baghdad and the Kurdish element to the north to create a situation with which the existing cabinet would be unable to cope. During the first three months of this year widespread sparks of discontent, arising out of heavy taxation and lack of representatives among the ninety seats of the Iraq Parliament, were fanned. Early in March the trouble started in the south. Road and rail communications were interrupted, cars were held up, and as Ali Jawdat felt that he was in no position to use force, he resigned, handing over the government to his colleague, Jamil Madfai, in the hope that the disturbance would die down and he would be able to reinstate himself. Twelve days passed, the position grew out of hand, and King Ghazi called on Yassin Pasha to form a cabinet out of his Ikha Party supporters. This new government, formed in mid-March, retains power to-day.

But Yassin Pasha, accepted as a Premier of greater capability and staying power than any of his predecessors, has not escaped a taste of the same nasty medicine which he used to purge the country of Ali Jawdat. The second and more serious tribal rising which, owing to floods and a difficulty in concentrating an offensive, lasted throughout the whole of May, was directed against his new government. So the two revolts were of quite distinct origin and did not come of any united effort of the tribes to overthrow the constitution. Rather is the trouble to be accounted to opposing politicians jockeying themselves to power behind armed tribal vanguards. Apart, though, from incitement by scattered political elements robbed of lucrative office by Yassin Pasha, the second tribal rising is to be attributed to other causes.

The success of faction A, namely the supporters of Yassin Pasha in the March trouble, was encouragement to those groups, best defined as faction B, who in May seized the police posts in the Hammar Lake district, sacked and looted the little station of Ur of the Chaldees, cut all telegraph wires and for some days held a wide area between the desert towns of Suq-esh-Shuyukh and Nasiriyeh. The feeling of the tribal chiefs who rallied to the cause of faction B, who have since served sentences in different parts of Iraq, was that faction A, who were considered to have helped Yassin Pasha, would be

favoured at their expense during the period of office of the Ikha Party. Besides, if the Ali Jawdat government had collapsed without resistance why should not a similar failure result from a rising against Yassin Pasha's cabinet? Here, thought faction B, was a chance to rid themselves entirely of these Baghdadi *effendis*, who, if anything, were mostly of the Sunni branch of the Moslem faith. So B, who had accumulated large numbers of Shiahhs, many of them disillusioned supporters of the March revolt, were of more complex and fanatic character than A had been. Theirs, then, was something nearer to an opportunist religious outbreak which took the arrest of a minor Shiah divine at the beginning of May as the signal for a crusade against Yassin Pasha's government. For the Shiahhs, half a million greater in number than the million of Sunnis, regarded themselves as inadequately represented in government services compared with the more progressive Sunnis.

Such a rising was not to be quelled without armed force, particularly as every rebel had his rifle and stock of ammunition—a state of affairs which the French refused to allow among Syrian tribesmen very soon after they took over the mandate of Iraq's neighbouring state. So, in view of the greater seriousness of this second disturbance and the fact that the rebellious Diwaniyah *liwa* (province) was flooded, it is maintained that Yassin Pasha and Jafar Pasha al Askari, formerly minister in London and now in charge of his country's defence, acquitted themselves well in effectively subduing the revolt before the Muntafiq tribes became wholly disaffected and the port of Basrah isolated. Bombs were used and two Tigris steamers served as gunboats, but since it is seldom possible to get reliable information as to casualties in desert warfare the number of killed and wounded remains unknown. But it is fairly certain that, although leaflets were first dropped, less reluctance to mete out punishment was shown by the Iraqi Air Force on this occasion than by ourselves at the time of the occupation. It used to be the practice to drop time bombs in the vicinity of a watering-place, giving ample chance to everyone to escape to a safe watching distance. With possible justification such lenient methods are not now employed, and it is feared that sudden appearances of the Iraqi bombers over the rebel area have accounted for the loss of a considerable number of lives.

It was unfortunate that at the very outset of the May trouble a British R.A.F. aeroplane, engaged in aerial photography, was shot down by the rebels in the belief that it was an Iraqi bomber. Whether by bad luck or skilful shooting, Pilot Officer Newman was actually hit and he and his aircraftman were both killed in the subsequent crash. Neither this nor an accident which caused the death near Mosul of two other British airmen at about the same time was any indication of our participating in the suppression of the revolt, crushed, of course, by the Iraq forces wholly unaided by the three-bomber and one-bomber transport squadron still maintained by Great Britain in Iraq. This section of our air force is stationed at present at Hinaidi, seven miles from Baghdad, but, in accordance with the 1930 treaty defining Anglo-Iraqi relations for the twenty-five ensuing years, will shortly move to a new base at Lake Habbaniya, fifty miles into the western desert.

An immediate result of the civil conflict in Iraq has been the enforcement of the National Defence Law by royal *Irada*, or decree, on June 16th. On the advice of Jafar Pasha and by the approval of the Council of Ministers, conscription has come into force. It is difficult yet to judge public opinion on this matter, but it is not likely to be so enthusiastic as that of a muzzled and sycophant press which congratulates the government on "fulfilling its duty to the nation by providing a force capable of defending the frontiers of Iraq from foreign aggression and preserving internal peace and order." As in the time of Turkish domination, conscription must still be very difficult to enforce, and it will be interesting to see if the Mandæans, a Mesopotamian sect whose religious allegiance is half Christian and half Moslem, again escape military service on the plea that their daily baptismal rites necessitate running water, unobtainable in the desert.* From the sheikhs a quota of young men will probably be demanded. The youthful *effendis* of Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah, exchanging smart suits for uniforms, will have the depths of their national enthusiasm sounded. And since that nationalism comes partly of a jealous dislike of the

* Since the time of writing the Yezidis, an obscure devil-worshipping sect of some 35,000 adherents, have resisted military conscription in its application to their tribe, located in the Mosul province. The insurrection was suppressed by a detachment of armoured cars and units of the Iraq Army.

foreigner one result of compulsory service will be to pool this feeling, with possible irritant effect on the forces of foreign aggression complained of by the Iraqi press.

There can be little talk, though, of "foreign aggression" so far as Great Britain and her interests in Iraq are concerned. The early months of the summer were marked by a long succession of retirements and expiry of contracts of government advisers and political officers who have since returned to England. In May, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis left the Ministry of Interior. His successor, Mr. C. J. Edmonds, is at present combining his advisory duties with similar services to the Iraqi Foreign Office. Colonel Prescott, organiser of the police force, has also gone. Senior British officials, their ten-year contracts having terminated, have left administrative positions either to Iraqis or to younger recruits brought out from England at half their predecessors' salaries. The whole tendency of a country which has passed from mandate to that "self-determining" phase of the late President Wilson's post-war ideology is to shake off foreign influence and, say many British advisers, to pay very little heed to their counsel.

Meanwhile the largest item of national income from any single source is provided by the oil-fields, exploited under concessionary agreement between Iraq and ourselves. Royalties amounted to £1,000,000 last year, a figure over £400,000 in excess of the oil revenue for 1933-4. None of this money goes towards the Iraqi budget, balanced in April at approximately £3,800,000, £835,000 of which was spent on national defence. Instead, every dinar provided by the Iraq Petroleum Company (the dinar, conveniently divided into one thousand fils, is the exact equivalent of £1 sterling) is set aside for capital works, i.e. road and bridge construction—as yet Baghdad has nothing better than two light pontoon bridges—and irrigation schemes along the Tigris and Euphrates banks.

There is small reason, then, to grouse at foreign interference; and in so far as any resentment is still directed against Great Britain, it is a case of biting off the finger which points to the very rare tit-bits in the Mesopotamian pie. It comes of a lingering fallacy that Britain is an omnivorous power, and is a reminder of the traditionally suspicious oriental mentality which, in 1935 bottles, discredited the

death of Colonel Lawrence, naïvely preferring to believe that he should be enveloped in publicity before an intriguing Foreign Office smuggle him off to Abyssinia. Lawrence, one regretfully observes, is not the hero that his early sponsorship of King Faisal would seem to justify. As elsewhere the Middle Eastern states are resolving themselves into rigidly nationalist units and the pan-Arabian dreams of Lawrence lie very low on the horizon. This tendency, combined with an everlasting suspicion as to motives and an inability to understand the character which prefers reflected to direct power, leaves the Arab mind bewildered and at a loss to place the man. Also, the same considerations of pride which prevented King Faisal from mentioning Lawrence in later years are widespread among the Iraqis. But perhaps the most potent factor to-day operating against pan-Arabian ideals lies in the misinterpretation by Iraqi and Arab nationals of the unifying forces of western civilisation and culture. Iraq, with her holy cities of Kerbela and Najaf, is losing her Moslem character infinitely more slowly than Turkey or Iran. But just as the western world is feeling a challenge from within its own system, the Middle East is more conscious than ever of the challenge which she thinks she sees in the west. So she takes the power of the machine to heart, clothes herself in European style, and over wide areas, once closely knit by a common democratic faith, competes in raising the standard of wealth and power to something more nearly approaching a western level.

Progress in one direction or another may be said to be partly motivated by jealousy the world over, so that when a limit of internal expansion is reached envy calls upon freed physical energies and strikes outwards. At present there is no indication of any such development in Iraq, but it is of some significance that when in Turkey, an incomparably stronger state, the deputies subscribed a month's salary to air force expenses, as was announced in May, Iraq immediately asked for a similar voluntary contribution from her civil servants—again a move to counteract "foreign aggression," which, so far as Iraq's neighbouring states are concerned, has shown itself in a mild but irritating form since the mandate lapsed and Iran, or Persia as she was then known, felt the moment had come to fish for such rights as she has in the waters of the Shatt al Arab.

According to the Treaty of Erzerum, signed by the

Persians and the Turks, in whose Ottoman domains Basrah, the Iraqi outlet to the Persian Gulf, used to lie :

... les navires Persans auront le droit de naviguer en pleine liberté sur le Schatt ul Arab, depuis l'endroit où ce fleuve se jette dans la mer jusqu'au point de contact des frontières des deux parties.

And so, until a protocol of 1912 defined the frontier line from Fao to Ararat, attributing also the whole of the main stream of the Shatt to Turkey, the Persians enjoyed sixty-five years' freedom to navigate this river, an entrance to their port, Mohammerah, and the Karun river, the only really navigable stream in Persia.

In 1918 unilateral action by our Military Administration in Mesopotamia, based on the 1912 protocol and the fact that a succession state inherits treaty rights, put an end to a *modus vivendi* by which the Turks allowed the Persians a considerable degree of freedom in the Shatt. Thereafter Persia, who for a long time had been toying with the idea of a trans-Iranian railway linking Teheran in the north with the Persian Gulf, recognised that the presence of Britain in Iraq would leave her little chance of recapturing her Erzerum rights which her representatives had signed away at Constantinople in 1912. So Bandar-i-Shapur, at the head of Khor Musa, an inlet into Iranian territory a little to the north-east of the mouth of the Shatt, was chosen as the railhead. As such it has been developed despite great natural difficulties which have now led the Persians to look once more to Mohammerah, lying in their own territory fifteen miles north-west of the Anglo-Persian oil concession at Abadan, as their right and natural port, access to which can be gained only by the Shatt.

In practice Iranian shipping even now enjoys the use of the river, but before the Persians embark upon any constructional work in the hinterland of Mohammerah they want to turn what at present is a favour into a legal position. In short, Iran wants half sovereignty or equality of rights in the Shatt, a claim to which Iraq is naturally slow to surrender and which led her (Iraq) to bring the whole question before the League of Nations in the autumn of 1934. A most involved juridical issue was then raised, the suggestion was made that the matter should be referred to the Hague Court; Iraq accepted, while Iran, for her own reasons, refused. But there is every likelihood

that where legal arguments, set forth at a tribunal, would only embitter the disputants, an amicable agreement may soon be reached.

Such an agreement will, it is expected, take into consideration the tension which has arisen over several incidents along the Iraqi-Iranian frontier. This long eastern boundary of Iraq was demarcated by a commission consisting of Turkish and Persian representatives, assisted by British and Russian arbitrators, and was brought to a hurried settlement within a week of the outbreak in October 1914 of war between Turkey and the allied powers of Great Britain and Russia. Whether to back up her theory that these immediate pre-war agreements are not legally binding or owing to the zeal of local officials to establish suitably strategic police posts, irrespective of exact territorial limits, the frontier has in several cases been violated. Iraq has taken these acts as aggressive rather than careless. However that may be, their recurrence is improbable once the question of the Shatt al Arab is settled.

It is considered gratifying that the Assyrian problem, than which no more serious domestic affair has faced Iraq in recent years, is straightening itself out under the direction of M. Olivian and his committee of experts sent by the League of Nations to arrange the settlement of this refugee minority. The whole story of this unfortunate people has been amply treated by Lt.-Colonel R. S. Stafford, D.S.O., in his book, *The Tragedy of the Assyrians*, published last spring. It is no time to criticise either the exasperating attitude of the Assyrians or the revengeful methods of the Iraqi army, who were responsible for the massacre of August 1933, when, so far as Iraq is concerned, a settlement appears to be in sight. The arrangement is to send those Assyrians who agree to leaving their temporary abodes in northern Iraq to the Orontes Valley in the Gharb district of French Syria. At least 10,000 are expected to leave the country; the French, who, in accordance with the laws of their mandate, will doubtless prohibit the carrying of arms, a privilege of tribal subjects in Iraq, only accepting this new responsibility on payment of a sum of about £600,000, to be found in the ratio of 5:5:2 by Britain, Iraq and the League of Nations respectively. With this money it is expected that agricultural settlements may be started and that the Christian Assyrians may be as happy in the Orontes district as in their original home, the Hakkari.

highlands, from which they were driven after declaring war on the Turks twenty years ago last summer.

So the *liwa* of Mosul will be relieved of one of the many responsibilities which a mosaic of minorities, Nestorian Christian, Yezidi, Mandæan and other sects, entails. And with the prevailing lack of communications in northern Iraq this is perhaps as well. Efficient privately operated desert motor transport runs from Mosul to the oil-fields at Kirkuk, to the Russian railhead, only twelve hours distant by car, and up to Tel Kotchek, one hundred miles to the north-west. But Mosul, so short a distance from all these frayed ends, would like to join up with the line which follows the Tigris from Baghdad north to Baiji. Despite this complaint of virtual isolation, motor transport is taking large quantities of chickens and eggs from Mosul into the neighbouring gold standard French mandate, where high prices are obtained. Muslin (Fr., *mousseline*), which gave the town its name, is no longer made in Mosul, but an alternative source of revenue has been found in sheep's intestines, used as sausage skins. They are shipped down the Tigris to a ready market in Hamburg and New York. Other exports include cereals, animal hides, and dates, a valuable item in a land of 20,000,000 date palms. There is fair indication that these, and more especially oil, will contribute in increasing volume to the country's wealth. Indeed, external issues apart, Iraq, formerly a backward country, would seem to have every chance of enriching her subjects during the coming years.

All the time, though, there is growing a political consciousness among a people accustomed in the past to tyrannous suppression. A parallel emergence of acute political careerism is also to be observed. Whether these two factors will resolve themselves into a race between Parliamentary government, grafted on to the country by ourselves, and possible aspiring dictators does not rest on any single issue, such as economic prosperity, religious life, monarchy, Great Britain's influence or the bogey of "foreign aggression," but on a combination of all these on a mentality which, in its present transitional state, is no less inscrutable than the acceptedly difficult oriental mind in its deepest aspects.

Baghdad.

MICHAEL P. A. LANGLEY.

THE CHINESE EXHIBITION.

THE Far East has always presented a picture of great fascination to Western eyes. An ancient civilisation, strange customs and symbolism, fine taste and exquisite workmanship—these things, however vaguely understood, could not fail to attract our curiosity. Ever since the days of Marco Polo's memorable book of travels, China has seemed a land of mystery and charm, and when European traders finally established themselves on the confines of the Empire, the products they brought home greatly enhanced this belief. In the eighteenth century Chinese imports created a revolution in European taste. Tea-drinking, porcelain, lacquer, hand-painted wall-papers, embroideries, and all manner of knick-knacks became the craze, but these were the mere frills, the least significant aspects of Chinese art. It is only in the last half-century that the existence of a great school of Chinese painting came to our knowledge, and the discovery of Chinese sculpture is even more recent. In fact, the present Exhibition of Chinese Art at Burlington House is the first comprehensive collection of the more serious branches of Chinese art that has ever been brought together. The opportunity thus afforded of becoming acquainted with a great artistic tradition is probably unique.

There are two ways of approaching such an exhibition. It is possible to go, as the Art Critic of *The Times* recommends, with an innocent mind and open eyes, and be charmed with the beauty of Chinese art. But in that case æsthetic enjoyment will be the reward of those who are most gifted with a fine sensibility, and some may miss it altogether. The average visitor will probably find that a little preliminary acquaintance with the background of Chinese culture will help to arouse his interest, and once that is awakened, admiration for the finest works of art must surely follow. A number of books have been published to supply a short cut to such knowledge, as the really scholarly literature on Chinese art is both extensive and difficult of access, and the record attendance at lectures on the subject has proved the interest taken by the general public.

Nothing but praise is due to the organisers of the Exhibition for the lucid and tasteful arrangement of the exhibits, and our warmest thanks must be rendered to the Chinese Government

for the generosity of its loans, especially if it be remembered how much destruction and loot took place in the Chinese palaces through the agency of European troops in the past. But in viewing the collection it should be borne in mind that the idea of displaying works of art in hundreds and thousands would be altogether repugnant to a Chinese. The study of antiques has been a feature of cultured society in China for the last thousand years or more, but though large collections were formed and sumptuous catalogues issued, the Chinese art lover would never show all his possessions at once. The pictures were kept rolled up in silk cases, and would be hung out one by one for the delectation of an honoured guest. Sometimes a whole day might be spent in examining a single painting—only in such a way could its full significance be appreciated. Similarly many of the bronzes and fine pieces of porcelain were kept in beautifully made cases, to be brought out on special occasions. If such a method had been followed in arranging the Exhibition at Burlington House the British public would certainly not consider it was getting its money's worth; but we have to pay for our greed by finding many of the paintings hung so high that they are almost invisible, and a Chinese picture to be fully apprehended should be examined close to and in detail. And it must be admitted that the drab background, so restful and effective for the bronzes and porcelain, is not the ideal setting for the pictures, many of which are in monochrome. One comes with relief to the rich blue background of the last room. If a similar experiment in some other colour had been tried in one of the long vista of rooms devoted to paintings, the effect of monotony might have been lessened. In general, Chinese art has not the rich decorative splendour of Persian art; its character is reserved, its beauty reveals itself by slow degrees in the delicate gradation of tones in the early glazed porcelain; in the masterly brushwork of the paintings; and in the exquisite beauty of proportion and grace of form in all the plastic arts.

The earliest works of art found on Chinese soil, apart from some prehistoric pottery, are the ancient bronzes. A magnificent array of these strange and splendid vessels fills the first room in the Exhibition. One of the mysteries surrounding them is that no primitive ones have yet been discovered. They all show a degree of technical skill in execution, and a sophisticated type of design only possible after ages of experiment.

Probably the earliest bronzes reproduced ordinary pottery shapes, and gradually these shapes became heavier and more elaborate, with relief decorations representing monster masks and thunder patterns, until the very shapes assumed the semblance of birds or animals. This is perhaps where the creative genius of the Chinese appears most strikingly. No matter how remote the outward resemblance to a living creature, these ancient bronzes have an inner vitality, which makes them far more real than the carefully studied birds and animals of later ages, made of bronze, stone or clay. A comparison of the bronze elephant of the early Chou Dynasty (No. 318), dating perhaps from the second millennium B.C., with the cloisonné enamelled elephants of the eighteenth century A.D. (No. 2,328) will reveal the remarkable quality of the early work better than any words can do.

The bronzes are mostly sacrificial vessels used in the ancient Chinese ritual of ancestor worship, though some of them may have been intended for ordinary domestic purposes. One of the most important exhibits is the altar table with a complete set of sacrificial wine vessels found in 1901, and formerly in the Tuan Fang collection. One reason why ancient bronze vessels have been so highly prized by the Chinese is that many of them are inscribed with records of historical events or honours received. Rubbings of some of these inscriptions are exhibited in the gallery, and it may be that the practice of taking rubbings or squeezes of these inscriptions led to the early invention of printing in China. Many of the bronzes are elaborately inlaid with gold, silver, turquoise or malachite. Those of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) become simpler in shape with surface decoration rather than bold relief, and the animal forms become more naturalistic, sometimes even playful.

The circular mirrors, polished on one side and decorated with relief on the other, are particularly interesting for the light they throw on Chinese symbolism. No. 499 shows the most complete cosmic imagery with the twelve animals of the Chinese zodiac in the border, and the emblems of the four quarters in the centre. These are the black tortoise and snake for the North, the green dragon symbolising the rain-bringing clouds and consequent growth of vegetation (never the evil spirit as in Christian art) for the East, the red phoenix for the South, and the white tiger for the West. For the worship of

Heaven, Earth and the four quarters, ritual objects of jade were made in China from very ancient times. Many of these, discoloured from long burial, but still retaining their soft texture and fine polish, are included in the Exhibition. Jade was believed to have the property of creating harmony, and this quality is only communicated through the sense of touch. So the objects carved in jade are, for the most part, smooth and simple in shape, inviting the fingers to pass over them, and appeal to the sense of touch as much as to the eye. Indeed beauty of surface is found in all the plastic arts, in pottery as well as in sculpture.

After the accession of the Han Dynasty, Chinese art loses its purely indigenous character. Foreign influences can be traced through contacts with India, Persia and the Hellenistic world. The most important result of these relations is the rise of Chinese sculpture. Though Buddhist in inspiration, it soon became absolutely Chinese in feeling. The finest works date from the Wei, Sui and T'ang Dynasties (fifth to tenth centuries A.D.) and though isolated figures can never give an adequate idea of the great rock-cut temples filled with statues produced during this period, the collection of sculpture now at Burlington House is probably the finest that can ever be seen outside China. The figures naturally invite comparison with some of the greatest achievements of European sculpture, the Romanesque and Gothic figures of the French cathedral porches, but the Chinese character of calm contemplation as opposed to dramatic movement at once asserts itself. The benign seated figure in the centre of Gallery II and the groups of standing and seated Bodhisattvas in the Lecture Room are filled with a spiritual beauty expressed in a plastic form perfectly suited to convey the Buddhist ideal of enlightenment that transcends all human suffering. The figure lent by Mrs. Rockefeller (No. 2,498) with its impetuous twist of the body and muscular development strikes quite a foreign note in this assembly, and, though fine in quality, it is less typical of the Chinese idea of monumental sculpture than the colossal figure of Maitreya, which presides over the Exhibition in the Central Hall.

The first impression of the paintings at the Exhibition is somewhat disappointing as compared to the very fine collection at the British Museum. The important Chinese paintings from Japan and the Boston Museum have not been sent, and

the uneven levels at which the paintings are hung make it difficult to see them at a glance, as we have grown accustomed to look at modern European pictures. But they deserve careful study in a good light, and then their poetry will reveal itself. For painting in China is closely related to poetry and is essentially a literary pursuit. To be able to write the Chinese script with a brush requires such dexterity, that practically every well-educated person has sufficient technical ability at his disposal to become a painter if he wishes.

Two of the paintings are attributed to Li Lung-Mien, the most famous painter of the Sung Dynasty; whether by or after him they certainly show remarkable quality of line (Nos. 813 and 1,036). But the more spectacular paintings of landscapes, and the lovely studies of birds, fish, flowers and insects will no doubt prove to be the favourites in this country, where the Chinese love of landscape finds such close echoes. In China it was always held to be the noblest branch of art, and the name given it was "mountain and river picture," for these were the aspects of Nature which attracted the painter. He never represented the flat earth, as the Dutch landscape painter was so fond of doing; only the jagged mountain peaks appear above the mist, or the light gleams on the surface of the river between rising banks. And yet without any use of linear perspective, and without representing any shadows, the Chinese painter succeeds in evoking the atmosphere of a scene—the emotional as well as the physical atmosphere. The cold of the two winter scenes (Nos. 946 and 1,222) is positively contagious; the dreamy mistiness of Ma Yuan's picture (No. 996) invites us to participate with the moon-gazers in their contemplation; we can almost hear the buzz of the insects amid the sunny grasses of "Early Autumn" (No. 1,184). It has been suggested that Chinese scroll painting developed out of map-making; certainly the scroll by Hsia Kuei, thirty-eight feet long, representing a myriad miles of the Yangtze River, might have served as a geographical record. It was meant to be looked at in sections, from right to left, rolling up one end as the other is unrolled, and then the effect of progression from the waterfalls and rapids at the source to the wide stream below would be still more convincing.

With so much musing calm pervading the Exhibition, it is quite refreshing to come upon a little group of animation in the T'ang funerary statuettes, beautifully arranged on either

side of the great pottery Lohan in the Lecture Room. These clay figures of women, dancers, soldiers, and animals took the place of living sacrifices in the tombs of rulers. Made of the same material, though later in date, they have much the same charm as the Tanagra statuettes found in Greece, and, like the early bronzes, very much more vitality than the collection of ducks and parrots in porcelain arranged like a toy-shop in the centre of the Large Gallery.

The beauty of Sung porcelain, with its white, blue and celadon glazes, and low relief or crackled decoration cannot fail to exercise its charm, although the later ware of the Ming and K'ang Hsi periods has enjoyed a longer spell of popularity in Europe. Technically the blue and white and enamelled porcelain of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is perfect above anything ever fashioned by hands of men, but in form it is often angular, unceramic, and in decoration over fussy, so that artistically it cannot be ranked with some of the earlier products, or perhaps it is simply that it does not satisfy the taste of the moment. Two hundred years ago, when it first became the craze in Europe, it fitted into the style of the period perfectly. The same is true of all the other arts of eighteenth-century China. Cloisonné enamel, lacquer, embroidery, ivory carving can no longer produce the same rapture as the newly discovered arts of painting and sculpture.

Historically one of the most important exhibits is the collection of textiles discovered in a grave of the Han Dynasty by the Kozlov expedition and now lent by the Soviet Government (No. 2,525). Though faded in colour, these fragments show more skill in stitchery than the pictorial embroideries of more modern date. Yet when all is said and done, the Chinese must be given their due for having attained the last word of refinement and artistry in the *bibelots* they produced for their own court and for the European market in the eighteenth century, and for many visitors these will probably be the chief attraction of the Exhibition, partly perhaps because they have been familiar objects in our drawing-rooms for the last two hundred years. Meanwhile the art lover will concentrate on those aspects of the Exhibition which throw fresh light on the highest attainments of the Chinese genius, and are not so easy to match in our museums and private collections.

MARY CHAMOT.

LEADING FACTORS OF MODERN GERMAN HISTORY.

MODERN German history, usually considered as starting with the Reformation, is dominated by four leading tendencies: universalism, dualism, particularism, and a passion for philosophy. In our intellectual history philosophy has always implied an exaggeration, an excitement, a disturbance of that equilibrium of thought which is the necessary precursor of wise action. The result has been civil war and revolution, which, ever since the Reformation, have been so characteristic of German history: religious wars between Protestants and Catholics; a little later, civil war, in which the electors and other princes of the Reich, aided by France, Sweden or Poland, fought against the emperor in Vienna; civil war—I use the term in a special sense—again in the nineteenth century between the two great powers of Germany, Prussia and Austria. We Germans specialise in civil wars which have all the appearance of wars waged against a foreign enemy, adopting all the rules of military discipline and of the conduct of war between nations and thus assuming a certain garb of respectability, in spite of the odious fact that the continual struggle is one between Germans and Germans.

I. UNIVERSALISM. The idea of a Holy Roman Empire never died in Germany. On his entry into Frankfort after the battle of Leipzig, Emperor Francis of Austria was welcomed by the old captains of the town militia—they had been present at his coronation as Roman emperor twenty years before, and now they begged him upon their knees to resume the sacred and ancient crown. Stein dreamed of a North German emperor and of a South German emperor, of Germany's division into two parts and of a perpetual alliance between them—perhaps the most practical solution of the German problem. But Metternich preferred Austrian realities to German idealism. Romanticism systematically and doggedly unearthed records of the glories of the mediæval empire's unity and majesty. During the whole of the period following on the Napoleonic wars there was in poetry and history a rehabilitation of the Hohenstaufen and their heroic struggles and tragic fall. To open the doors of the Kyffhäuser, to deliver spellbound Emperor Frederick, in the imaginations of men destined to

lead later generations to a new German glory—that was a desire common to the whole of the nineteenth century. The Germans were taught by history that they had once ruled over Poles, Czechs, Slovenes, Hungarians; that the Empire had lost the Netherlands, Burgundy, Switzerland, Lorraine, Alsace, even the north of Italy; that the Germans had expelled the Turks from Hungary and Serbia, and that they had succeeded in winning back from Sweden the rule over the Baltic Sea. The idea of a great German empire which should include all German-speaking peoples and, perhaps, in the interests of security several neighbouring peoples on the different frontiers—this pan-German idea was never forgotten and persisted into modern times. And the transformation of the old imperial universalism, a catholic, tolerant, in some ways pacifist and cosmopolitan universalism, into modern pan-Germanism with its nationalist, exclusive, aggressive and oppressive characteristics is one of the most curious developments in our intellectual history.

II. DUALISM. Dualism seems to be our destiny and is the cause of the most disastrous of German events. France became compact: one will, one administration, one civilisation, one law. There were, indeed, many difficulties and drawbacks, but ultimately political unity was achieved. This was unknown in Germany. Vienna could boast of Prince Eugen, Maria Theresa, Metternich, Schwarzenberg; Austria became more and more Europe *en miniature*, German and non-German, ruling different nationalities through the medium of German civilisation, educating, stripping and ill-treating them. The revolution of '48 nearly destroyed the Kaiserstaat. The first outbreak of resolute "nationalistic" opposition would have made Hungary purely Hungarian, Venice and Milan Italian, Bohemia and Moravia Czechish and Slovakian, and German Austria, of course, a part of the great German Empire.

Prussia's assent was given in the face of all probability and in spite of certain very unfavourable factors—a striking proof against those popular doctrines of *Geopolitik* which tend to overestimate geographic and economic facts. The old Prussian duchy never belonged to the Holy Roman Empire or to the German Diet; it was incorporated only in 1848 and excluded again immediately after the revolution. Prussia did not wish to be merged in Germany, to "give her dark red

blood for a young German body." The electors of Brandenburg knew very well why they had set foot outside the German Empire; they raised Prussia to the rank of a European power, with more ambitions, perhaps, than material forces, yet capable through discipline and self-confidence of doing great things. Frederick the Great and Bismarck raised Prussia to a position equal to that of Austria. Already in 1848 strong tendencies were working to expel Austria from Germany. The tragic biography of Radowitz shows how necessary that became. The only possible way, the alliance between Prussia and the democratic and liberal forces of the time, was not taken by Frederick William IV. The classic year of dualism was 1866, a terrible year of treachery, violence, hypocrisy and bloodshed which has been too readily forgotten, the very complement of the idealistic year 1848.

III. PARTICULARISM. German Particularism has complicated every national action, especially since the Thirty Years' War. Sovereign rights were then conferred on eight electors, one hundred princes and fifty-one towns; we had knights, abbots, even villages of the Empire; this meant hopeless disintegration, for it implied not only the right to determine the religious confession of subjects but also the right to make alliances with foreign powers. The traditional alliances of the smaller German princes with France were now confirmed by international law. The House of Wittelsbach specialised in this policy, but it was also followed by that of Hohenzollern, Wettin and others. German history is not only the history of Austria and Prussia, it is the history of Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, Hanover, Baden, Hesse, Frankfurt, Hamburg and others. In 1848 we had not one revolution but thirty revolutions, each one with some characteristically German feature and a good many "particular" features born of innumerable and various interests, ambitions, antagonisms. A right conceded to Württemberg was immediately claimed by Baden, and Baden was obsessed by a feeling of rivalry towards Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau. Bremen worked against Hamburg; Hanover and Saxony showed the most sincere friendship towards Austria merely because of their own fear of Prussia's powerful neighbourhood.

But we must also remember that German towns became once again the home of a free citizen life marked by self-respect, authority, material well-being and culture. Leipzig,

Nürnberg, Hamburg, Frankfort—here are the homes of the best German virtues: a sense of liberty, self-government, civic rights, productive political, social and intellectual powers. The system of self-government introduced in Prussian towns by our great Stein evolved even in the midst of the Prussian absolutism of the nineteenth century a generation of councillors and mayors who progressed from the town hall to the ministry, from being heads of cities to heads of the state. In '48 this type is current, and it recurs in the Bismarckian Empire. The diplomatic service and the more representative ministerial posts were reserved for the aristocracy. For administration, for financial affairs, for commerce and industry, a new type of town gentry, of distinguished administrators of civic affairs, proved to be necessary. Even after the revolution of 1918, Particularism remained a very important factor; no longer was the jealousy and rivalry between princes and princelets but between "Länder" and towns. We experienced a different form of Particularism. Bismarck gave Leipzig the Reichsgericht, the Weimar Republic gave the Reichsfinanzhof to Munich, and the present government shows favour to Nürnberg, Cologne, Königsberg. Particularism remained Germany's affliction; only a wise decentralisation could mitigate it. The old local attachment to soil, family, historical tradition is to be considered as something extremely valuable; but, unfortunately, the principedoms were never identical with such natural and social groups. And, finally, there is always great antagonism between the local powers and something which is above all boundaries, a visionary conception of a greater Germany, of a German universal and eternal mission.

IV. WELTANSCHAUUNG. *Weltanschauung* is a very typical German word, not to be translated exactly. Philosophy is something more and something less, something scholastic, a systematic and rational method of thinking. *Weltanschauung* may be defined as a semi-philosophical vision of the universe, an artistic or religious feeling, sometimes expressed in an intoxication of sublime words, a holy fire of passion, most attractive to its admirers but a disaster, a catastrophe for those people who do not share the vision and upon whom its implications are imposed. This fanaticism and dogmatism of philosophy in Germany was perhaps born of the schism of Reformation days. In no other country were Protestants and

Roman Catholics so equally matched. The *corpus catholicorum* and the *corpus evangelicorum* at the Diet of Ratisbon may be held to symbolise this dissension dividing the whole life of the nation. Innumerable quarrels over the problems of theology filled the days and the minds of clergy and laymen. These men were all educated to contention, to controversy, to a dogged adherence to their own point of view, to intolerance. Erasmus, the first noble apostle of a humane and fair attitude towards enemies, was no antidote to the domination of the dark and passionately suffering soul of Luther. In more enlightened times Lessing preached the noble gospel of tolerance, but his preaching was not of much avail; a truly liberal conception of life, an unbiassed and humanistic interpretation of history and of thought remained in Germany the privilege of the happy few. The influence of Kant was overshadowed by that of Hegel, Goethe by Schiller—Goethe was never really popular in Germany, he was for a long time a legend, a mystery, a curious prophet of aristocratic paganism. Schopenhauer was superseded by Nietzsche, Ranke by Treitschke and H. S. Chamberlain.

Time and time again one realises the triumph of a passionate, subjective, excited and pretentious personality over the quiet, tempered, self-controlled, well-balanced, wise and just personality in political life. The striking development of our most noteworthy characteristic—a talent for philosophically inclined literature—derived directly from our preoccupation with dialectic discussion in Reformation days. Germany has contributed more to philosophical studies than any other nation since the Greeks of ancient times. Our passion for philosophy influences deeply the whole of our political, legal and economic life; we cannot build a school or a bridge, we cannot make a law on divorce or capital punishment without an enormous expenditure of abstract thinking. It is our national malady, this ever-present, latent tendency towards theorising and system-building. All our struggles are intensified and embittered by it. We hate compromise—no moderate party has had much chance in our history: both centres of the Frankfort Parliament, which numbered amongst them those who were without any doubt the most distinguished and rational people of the time, the National Liberals, the later Progressive Liberals, and, in our own time, Stresemann's party and the Democrats of the

Weimar Republic are cases in point. In England diplomatic and moderate men have succeeded, at least in the long run, but in Germany the majority have always preferred extremes and extremists, those who ruin and persecute their opponents, believing it imperative to be ruthless and bitter and sometimes with grim humour despising humane feeling as sentimentality. Metternich persecuted Liberals and Nationalists, Bismarck persecuted Catholics and Socialists.

This fanatical conviction of the rightness of one's own cause, with its inevitable consequence: the oppression of one's opponent, regardless of fair play, is to be discovered first in our learned controversies and was in some measure an inheritance from ancient theological disputes. Well might poor Melancthon have complained of *rabies theologorum*! In England the fury of the fanatic cleric was transformed by the excellent school of the Parliamentary system into rational debating. In Germany that fury has poisoned the endeavours of students' unions, of pamphlets and newspapers, of political parties, of social classes. In France and Italy one finds the driving impulse is an organic passion; in our country we are handicapped by intellectual fanaticism and by philosophical excitement.

There have, of course, been protests against this spirit. The *Weltbürger* of the eighteenth century protested against tyrants, the Nationalists and Liberals against Metternich, the lower middle classes against Bismarck and the capitalists. Absolutism was repudiated by a very vital and resolute democratic patriotism; the tutelage of governors, ministers, landlords, country gentlemen was counteracted by the system of self-government and by the institution of the old Germanic free estates; the exaggerated respect for militarism which impregnated the whole of civil life was strongly attacked by a very keen pacifism. All these counteracting movements, which had been growing in strength all through the nineteenth century, were themselves inclined to be dogmatic and resulted in a mass of theory. The antidote was the famous *Realpolitik*, a curious tautology and very typical of the political taste of the period following the failure of the revolution of '48, a catchword coined in a pamphlet by von Rochau. An analogy in intellectual and artistic life is offered by the three great movements for freedom within the last hundred years; early romanticism about the year 1800, the

Junge Deutschland group between 1830-40 and the naturalistic school of the 'eighties. The aims of these three groups of writers and artists were quite different, but they were moved by one common impulse which showed itself in a Bohemian independence, a repudiation of conventional morality, a genuine contempt for the old traditions of church, monarchy and bureaucracy which amounted at times to a kind of aristocratic anarchism. These ideas appeared intensely radical to the representatives of the old order, and thus radicalism increased in proportion as the pedantic hypocrisy of bureaucrats, policemen, schoolmasters and clergy grew more and more insupportable and ridiculous.

The passion for philosophy has impeded the growth of every form of corporation in our country—guilds, societies, "estates" and, finally, parliaments. At Frankfort it was stated after the first ten or eleven meetings in the Paulskirche that the mass of motions and amendments was already so enormous that three years of debate would be necessary to clear the ground. All representative bodies in Germany were harassed by differences which were not always and fundamentally of a practical nature, and the end has been that they have become so unproductive, so stagnant, that reaction was inevitable. In former times this reaction was called absolutism, now it is known as dictatorship or leadership. I have not the slightest wish to justify absolutism of any kind; our parliaments, above all the Reichstag, achieved much valuable work; but I wish to demonstrate once more that our typical vacillation from one extreme to another is a tendency which has been largely fostered by our love of abstract speculation.

VEIT VALENTIN.

THE GERMANY OF CONTARINI FLEMING.

WHEN Disraeli's novel *Contarini Fleming* was published, critics agreed in accentuating the "German" character of the work.* This idea is evoked by the type of the novel. In contrast to his first book *Vivian Grey*, which is written in the English or French style, full of intrigue and descriptions of society, he created in *Contarini Fleming* a work similar to the *Bildungsroman* portraying the development of a character. The *Wilhelm-Meister* theme† of the formation of a poetic mind was the task which he had set himself. In his preface of 1853, when a new edition of his novels was being prepared, he drew the reader's attention to what he owed to *Wilhelm Meister*. An allusion in the novel itself had already hinted at this quite clearly. When Contarini, filled with a restless spirit of adventure, leaves his school and sets out on his wanderings, he falls into the company of a travelling theatre party. We distinctly recognise, in the two light-hearted actresses who take the boy under their care, the traits of Philine and Aurelie; and, to dispel all doubt that we are really in Wilhelm Meister's company, he names one of their companions Friedrich and lets him pose as a count. Now, in *Wilhelm Meister*, Philine's lover was a count and was called Friedrich. This likeness in name and station cannot be merely a coincidence, especially as the whole episode seems to be forced rather than natural. Was it perhaps a form of thanks to Goethe for what Disraeli believed had been a favourable judgment on *Vivian Grey*?‡ Did he perhaps wish to dispel the impression of the somewhat disrespectful manner in which he had treated the "Baron von Goethe" in that novel?

The relationship to Goethe and to German literature is not confined to this allusion, however, nor to his making use of the *Wilhelm-Meister* theme in general. In reading *Contarini Fleming*, we are constantly reminded of scenes from German

* For the opinions of Milman and Heine, see Monypenny, *Life of Benjamin Disraeli*, I, 190, 192; and Lytton Bulwer's review in the *New Monthly Magazine*, 1832, where special attention is drawn to its connection with *Wilhelm Meister*.

† For the influence of *Wilhelm Meister* on English literature, see Susanne Howe, *Wilhelm Meister and his English Kinsmen*, New York, 1930; and Jean Marie Carré, *Goethe en Angleterre*, Paris, 1920. The latest and most complete list of works on the novelist Disraeli has been compiled by Hildegard Seikat, *Die Romankunst Disraelis*, Jena, 1930.

‡ See Monypenny, I, 176.

literature. Contarini, who, by his fantastic tales, becomes the ruler and leader of his schoolfellows, brings to our memory Goethe, as a boy, in *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, who charmed his comrades by his story-telling. Like Wilhelm Meister, Contarini, after his first visit to a theatre, carried away with him a never-to-be-forgotten impression which decisively influenced his artistic development. Borrowed, too, from the same source is the figure who, in decisive moments of Contarini's life, turns up and gives him guiding rules of life in cryptic form. Schiller's influence is to be found in another episode: like Friedrich Moor in the *Robbers* Contarini, tired of study and discipline and longing for a free and natural life, sets out with his companions for a lonely castle and becomes a "noble-minded" highwayman.

This list* shows that this novel which has been considered Disraeli's most personal work is in reality not simply autobiographical. For in order to describe the formation of a poetic mind, Disraeli does not confine himself to his own experiences, but interweaves with them those of great and true poets. In the novel, Contarini's father puts to his son the question: whether his poetic feeling was really "a creative faculty originating in a peculiar organisation," or "simply the consequence of a nervous susceptibility that is common to us all." This may have been the problem to which Disraeli himself was seeking a solution, and in order to solve it we find him comparing his own experiences with those of the German poets.

The use he makes of German literature involves another interesting problem, however. Disraeli would not have mentioned German literature so often had he not considered it an expression of the poetic in a particularly pure form, had he not especially appreciated the works of Goethe and Schiller. Such positive appreciation astonishes us in an author who, four years earlier, had written *Vivian Grey*, containing a full and rather unfriendly description of Germany. Of course, in *Vivian Grey* Disraeli is more interested in describing the political life than the intellectual, he delights in satirising the mediatised princes and their little principalities, but he also

* As far as can be seen there exists no relatively complete list of this kind: the most complete seems to be Carré, p. 220. I should like to draw attention to the fact that all the above-named works—*Wilhelm Meister*, *Wahrheit und Dichtung*, *Die Räuber*—were translated into English before *Contarini Fleming* was written.

gives glimpses of the intellectual activity which show little interest or good will. To him German philosophy seems to be out of touch with reality, Kant and Fichte find no favour in his eyes, even in Goethe he discovers some defects, and in general German literature exhausts itself in a bad imitation of Scott. Sievert, the only intellectual whom he portrays in a somewhat sympathetic manner, renounces all his principles and convictions when offered an influential post under Metternich. These views expressed in *Vivian Grey** seem to be in direct contrast to the attitude we observed in *Contarini Fleming*. When we find, in the later novel, Disraeli introducing a typical German intellectual, a professor, who is made to exercise a valuable and beneficent influence on Contarini's development, this contrast becomes still more distinct. The difference is so striking that we feel the need for studying this German episode of *Contarini Fleming* more closely in order to discover the reasons for his change of attitude.

The episode occurs while Contarini was at the university. There he was first more interested in pleasure than in work, but once by chance he attended a lecture on philology which affected him so strongly that he entirely changed his mode of life, became absorbed in study, an almost too hardworking student, and, at the end of the term, received the University Gold Medal. It was a German professor who had given this important lecture, and we find a detailed description of this German lecturer's appearance and personality: "His abstracted look, the massiveness of his skull, his large luminous eye, his long grey hair, his earnest and impassioned manner struck me." On nearer acquaintance Contarini finds that this man, so vivid and powerful in dealing with his special subject, was shy and unpolished in social life: "the meekest, the most modest and nervous being that ever trembled in society." This scarcely seems to be the description of an individual—even to-day a non-German novelist would describe the average German professor as obsessed by his own scientific work and in that work vital, but in daily life helpless and sometimes almost ridiculous. The detailed account which Disraeli gives of the professor's lecture seems to suggest,

* See E. Heuer, "Entstehungsgeschichte von Disraelis Erstlingsroman *Vivian Grey*," *Berliner Dissertation*, 1925, for a full statement of Disraeli's opinions on German literature as given in *Vivian Grey*.

however, that he may have intended not simply to portray a type, that he had someone in mind. He writes:

He discoursed on that early portion of Grecian history which is entirely unknown. I was astonished at the fulness of his knowledge. That which to a common student appears but inexplicable or barren tradition, became, in his magical mould, a record teeming with deep knowledge and picturesque interest. Hordes, who hitherto were only dimly distinguished wandering over the deserts of antiquity, now figured as great nations, multiplying in beautiful cities, and moving in the grand and progressive march of civilisation, and I listened to animated narratives of their creeds, their customs, their manners, their philosophy, and their arts. I was deeply impressed with this mystical creation of a critical spirit; I was charmed with the blended profundity and imagination. I revelled in the sagacious audacity of his revolutionary theories. I yielded to the full spell of his archaic eloquence. The curtain was removed from the sacred shrine of antique ages, and an inspired prophet, ministering in the sanctuary, expounded the mysteries which had perplexed the imperfect intelligence of their remote posterity.

Among the German classical scholars of the time Carl Otfried Müller was engaged in research into the little-known early period of Greek history and developed revolutionary theories which he had expressed in his work *Geschichten der Hellenischen Stämme und Städte*, so that one who knows something of the German philological literature of the period will involuntarily think of him in reading those lines. This idea that Müller was in Disraeli's mind is confirmed when, in reading further, we are told that in his enthusiasm Contarini is led to making research into the history of the Dorians. For Müller had been the first to devote himself to a more exact study of the Dorians, and a part of his work which is published separately was entitled *The Dorians*.*

Are we straying into speculative fields, or is there a substantial foundation for this hypothesis? Is it not possible that Disraeli was alluding to Müller, may he not have met him or at least have read his works? With regard to a personal acquaintance the possibility does exist. Müller spent some months in London in 1822, and from his letters† we know he

* The title of the English translation runs: *The History and Antiquities of the Doric Race*; the principal title (*Geschichten der Hellenischen Stämme und Städte*) was dropped on account of which the allusion becomes even clearer.

† C. O. Müller, *Lebensbild in Briefen an seine Eltern*, ed. O. and E. Kern, Berlin, 1908.

was especially in touch with the librarians of the British Museum whose society was also frequented by the elder d'Israeli. Or a connection may have been established by Ouseley, the English Persian-expert, who we know was in personal touch with Müller, and who had suggested to the elder d'Israeli his Persian novel *Mejnoun and Leila*. D'Israeli's name, however, does not occur in Müller's letters so that this remains a mere supposition. It is practically certain, however, that Müller's works were not unknown to Disraeli. For in the same year that Disraeli wrote his *Contarini Fleming* an English translation of Müller's *Dorians* appeared.* It is very probable that Disraeli, who already as a schoolboy had expressed his admiration for the German classical scholars Heyne and Herrmann, and who, about the time of *Contarini Fleming*, had made a journey to Greece, would read this masterpiece of well-known German philology as soon as it appeared. The coincidence of the publication of Müller's books in English and the allusions in *Contarini Fleming*, seems to make this a certainty.

There would be no need to stress this literary allusion had we found it in *Vivian Grey*. For in his first novel Disraeli took pleasure in showing off his learning and erudition by making literary allusions. *Contarini Fleming*, however, is a more consciously composed and more disciplined work, the allusion to Müller is so veiled that even in his own time few readers would have noticed it, and still Müller's personality is so interesting and stimulating that this identity of the professor cannot be unimportant.

Müller was one of the most brilliant figures of the German intellectual world of the last century. At the early age of twenty-one, as a result of the first volume of his *Geschichten der Hellenischen Stämme und Städte*, he was called to Göttingen to hold one of the most renowned classical chairs in Germany. There he soon became a leader of the younger philologues against the older, he was a pioneer of an historical and universal method of study as opposed to the purely grammatical

* With the above-mentioned title, published by John Murray, translated by Tufnell and George Cornwall Lewis. Lewis was a law student in London at the same time as Disraeli, he had a great knowledge of the Romance languages, and this may have been a source of mutual interest between Lewis and Disraeli, who had just been travelling in the Mediterranean. But I have not found out whether there was any acquaintance in their youth between these two men, who later in their lives became political opponents.

school. When he died in Athens, at the age of forty-four, he had succeeded in establishing his method of study, and the whole outlook of German philology was changed. The English historian of the *Historiography of the Nineteenth Century* called him the "Shelley of the modern Renaissance, the young Apollo in the historical Pantheon," and perhaps no better description could be given of the vivid and artistic qualities of his books, which strike us even to-day in reading his works. On the writings of Boeckh and Niebuhr, who were Müller's contemporaries and, during his lifetime, equals in German philology, lies the dust of the last century, to-day they are only of interest for the historian, while Müller's works still have immense force and vitality. The latest German study of Greek development, Berve's *History of Greece*, published in 1932, treats Greek history as the history of tribes, as Müller does, and also by certain romantic traits shows this influence, as Berve himself gratefully admits. What a deep impression Müller must have made on his contemporaries, if his works have such a lasting effect. The similarity of the title of Ranke's first work to that of Müller's masterpiece is not a thing of chance and may give some idea of the extent of the latter's influence on his contemporaries.

There is a certain fascination in being able to enlist also Disraeli among Müller's admirers. It is Müller's singular and original view of history, by which he became the founder of a new philological school and which made his works so attractive and evoked this wave of enthusiasm. In *Contarini Fleming* Disraeli calls the German professor's lecture "a mystical creation of a critical spirit," and this seems to be an excellent characterisation of the two decisive elements in Müller's historical writings. Greek history to him was not a uniform and continuously progressive development, it was constituted and based on the co-operation and counteraction of the different Greek tribes whose character he considered as something constant and unchanging. Thus the history of the Greek tribes became his special study. He saw an expression of their tribal character quite as much in their myths and gods as in the difference in political institutions and customs. He explains, therefore, their political institutions through their religion and myths, and at the same time makes use of their political institutions to throw light upon the mythical world of thought. This conception of the immutability of the tribal

therefore, should not be given hastily, and should be influenced by such values as are not limited by personal interests or contemporary fashion.

That duality or multiplicity is one of the distinguishing features of personality is obvious to any student of human nature. Some people are satisfied to acknowledge the phenomenon and to let it remain so. Life for them is quite happily compartmentalised. But whenever the whole man becomes actively purposive, in intellect, emotions and will, there is a tendency to unification of all his interests. Personality constantly seeks for fulfilment and self-expression, and will not be balked of this in the long run.

Many examples spring to the mind of men who have followed more than one calling, or who have expressed themselves in more than one medium. From Leonardo da Vinci, painter, mathematician, military engineer and inventor, and Michael Angelo, sculptor, painter, architect and poet, to such men as Sir William Herschel, studying the heavens by night and producing music by day, Sir Henry Taylor, administrative colonial reformer and poet-dramatist, and Lewis Carroll, the mathematician who wrote philosophical nonsense—they crowd the memory. In analysis these compound minds are really dual, being divided between the imaginative and the practical or constructive.

Some men, not finding in one particular art that complete expression of wholeness for which the mind of man is for ever compelled to search, have tried to achieve their quest by following another art as an additional means of self-expression; others have sought to find the balance of complete self-satisfaction through contrasting occupations, such as art and business, poetry and politics—as did Spenser, whose time was mostly spent in doing Governmental work in Ireland, but who left the *Faerie Queene* as an immortal legacy to the world. Obstacles may hinder a man in one direction and help him in another, so there may be succession instead of simultaneity in the two directions, producing duality of aim. Dante Gabriel Rossetti found that poetry was not lucrative, so at one time of his life he worked far more seriously at painting.

If the will and the imagination are both active but not completely unified, a man may seek compensation, whether as relief, balance, or attempt at integration, in following first one and then the other of the interests involved, though to

the world in general such a way of life may seem to be capricious. A. E. Russell, "in order to subdue his will," became cashier in a haberdasher's shop, only writing poetry at the week-ends or on holidays. The choice of a career has sometimes been decided by the advice of a friend. William Morris was persuaded by Rossetti to give up architecture and take to painting, for at that time Rossetti had become the slave of the brush, and declared that if a man had poetry in him he should paint it. Morris had probably considered that if a man had poetry in him it could be built in stone and wood—but he followed his friend.

Another may long to express himself in a certain medium, only to be prevented by some inherent weakness. Watts said he was by nature a poet but without the gift of expressing himself in any form of words, and so worked all his life to express himself in colour. Yet again another may find himself in an environment unfavourable to the development of that side of him which he feels to be linked to eternal values, and so urgent does the call of these values become that he finds it necessary to follow his vocation as well as his career. Sometimes these compound minds seem to be merely the result of chance circumstances. Mr. H. G. Wells acknowledges his indebtedness to "a singularly facetious Destiny which seemed to delight in bowling me over in order to roll me through, kicking and struggling, to some new and quite unexpected opportunity." Certainly, the boy who began life in a crockery shop, became a draper, and finally a journalist and author, would seem largely to be the puppet of chance. He adds that illness, an unsuccessful marriage, and an uncontrollable love affair all played their part in determining his career.

But even in such cases chance would hardly seem to be a sufficient explanation. It is true that determinism is dead, or at all events discredited, and the freedom of character pursuing self-fulfilment must be taken into consideration. Wherever there is this freedom there is always divine possibility. And yet in reading history and biography there is found to emerge something which suggests the influence of pattern upon life, so that it becomes possible to classify and group these multiple personalities, and from such grouping reasonable conclusions may be drawn. In concluding this brief and necessarily incomplete survey of the field of mental multiplicity two important groups may here be mentioned.

In reading biographies of great men one is struck by the frequency with which science and poetry come into partnership. One need only mention a few names at random: Henry Vaughan, Professor da C. Andrade, Goethe, Francis Darwin, Davy (of whom Coleridge said "If Davy had not been the first Chemist, he would have been the first Poet of his age"), Keats, Sir Ronald Ross, and Robert Bridges. Hugo, Tennyson, Browning and Swinburne were all poets deeply interested in science. Indeed, if one were to judge of life by such examples, one would come to believe that science and poetry together made up the complete man, the man who in at-one-ment of thought had come to himself. Is this so? Science is a rational enquiry, poetry according to Professor Mackail is "the highest expression of the truth of things." Science is concerned with a description and explanation of special departments under the limitations imposed by nature itself, and so can never become universal in its reach, while "the beauty of art is the beauty that is born—born again, that is—of the mind," says Hegel. Poetry is art, and all art is creation. To a certain extent poetry, like music, is its own language and meaning. It is far more than Plato's copy of a copy. It is not only an imitation of reality, it carries within itself its own reality. As in music there can be no such thing as a Moonlight Sonata, for no Sonata, or indeed any combination of notes, can possibly resemble or translate moonlight, except in this remote manner that the combination of notes may produce in the listener a reaction which in some degree resembles the reaction produced by the combination of light and shadow and sky and stars which are held in the mind as the idea of "moonlight." Or again, it may not. Things of the spirit cannot be interpreted fully in terms of intelligence or by material evidence; nor is it desirable that they should be. So poetry, like all art, cannot be explained in terms of science. As a well-known scientist has said: "You can't extract the square root of a sonnet." The partnership of poetry and science, although valuable, is incomplete as an expression of the whole personality.

A large number of multiple personalities appeared in the nineteenth century. Scott-James' accusation that it was an age in which "every artist excelled in his neighbour's field, but left his own unploughed," is not without foundation. Science had made rapid progress, and imagination and

morality were beginning to combine against this upstart, though later this antagonism was to become a partnership. One does not claim that the men of the Victorian era saw life steadily and saw it whole, but at all events it is clear that a vision of wholeness was growing, though it prompted men in various apparently eccentric ways. As Chesterton says, with exaggeration if with truth: "Painters were trying to be novelists, and novelists trying to be historians, and musicians doing the work of schoolmasters, and sculptors doing the work of curates." Men were arriving at wholeness by means of manifold self-expression. The nineteenth century gave us F. H. Bradley, whose idea of Spirit was "the unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased," and it is one of the strange paradoxes of existence that the "radiant heat imprisoned within" should externalise itself in division before it takes those divided elements and proceeds to make a wholeness of them. As a sculptor, who deliberately breaks up the clay he has fashioned, so that each portion of it may pass through the process of being fired, and only after that is accomplished is he able to reconstruct the complete figure and present it to the world. The white light of eternal truth becomes broken and scattered when it touches human finitude, and remains so until its scattered elements are reassembled and focused.

It is not surprising that the unity of poetry and philosophy was particularly noticeable in the nineteenth century. Goethe, Coleridge and Shelley may be mentioned as examples. Hegel had tried to teach his century that art and ethics were inseparable, and indeed the difference between poetry and philosophy is merely the difference between vision and argument, in essence they are in harmony. Coleridge held that "no man was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher," and Robert Bridges spoke truly when he said: "Pure Ethics is man's moral beauty, and can no more be dissociated from Art than any other kind of beauty," and again in speaking of Religion: "We find the best expression of it in poetry." D. H. Lawrence echoes the same truth in one of his letters: "One has to be so terribly religious to be an artist." "Intuition," says Santayana, "when it thoroughly dominates animal experience, transmutes it into pure flame, and renders it religious or poetical,

which is what is commonly meant by spiritual." "Religious or poetical"—a significant phrase.

Science and poetry, then, are gradually finding in each other a necessary and complementary quality, and philosophy and poetry, as has been suggested, have for a long time been united in happy partnership. If "two things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another," then it would seem possible for science and philosophy to find in poetry a common language, a common road, a common goal. Is it not through the kindly office of poetry that these apparent opposites are to be brought into fuller harmony, poetry thus becoming the "middle term of Reconciliation" of which Hegel speaks? Poetry—a *Poiesis*, or creation, which is the expression of a vision—is, like religion, dependent upon revelation. Sir Arthur Eddington reminds us that "as truly as the mystic, the scientist is following a light"—it is the "light that never was on land or sea." The poet, because his medium is that of words, is the voice of humanity, and thus becomes the natural resolving agent of all forms of division. So science must continually link up with philosophy and poetry, science supplying that which philosophy might overlook, and poetry with its radiance lighting the way for both, till those "endless mutual encirclements" mentioned by Mr. Walter de la Mare come to rest upon the unknown bourne of Reality and Truth.

From all this we begin to see, however dimly, that there is an initial element called polarity at work in the universe, resolving all contentious contradictions into harmonious oneness. Unity is confirmed rather than confuted by the many evidences of cleavage, strife and contention which influence alike the organism and the universe. Graham Wallas in *The Art of Thought* says that "the behaviour of the human organism tends towards integration, for otherwise the organism could not, as an organism, exist; but its integration is not complete, because its parts possess in varying degree a force of their own," implying inequality even where there is not actual division. So paradox is always at work. The law of gravitation is not disproved by the upward growth of trees. Gravitation is mastered by Life. Is not all creation, whether of nature or of art, the outcome of a relationship of contrary elements?

As with the Universe, so with the mind. Every man is at least two men, as I. A. Richards amusingly states: "Most

people in the same day are Bonaparte or Oblomov by turns. Before breakfast Diogenes, after dinner Petronius or Bishop Usher." So it is important to remember, as Dr. Inge says, that "the self of our immediate consciousness is not our whole or true self."

The happiest condition in which to meet life is that achieved by the man who has *come to himself* in fullness of at-one-ment. Strange things have happened to people who have come to themselves, and through them strange and significant things to the world around them. There was a fisherman once who came to himself and became a poet, and gave men the enlarged vision of a new heaven and a new earth. There was a tinker once who came to himself, and he who had been a pilgrim on England's rough roads began to make his pilgrimage to the Celestial City. What this mysterious Self really is, this Self which can be divided, lost, found, surpassed, developed and transformed, remains wrapped in obscurity. Watts-Dunton says that in order to produce poetry the soul must for the time being have reached a state of freedom from self-consciousness, and surely this is the condition of any form of vision, in which man touches truth, if for but one brief moment, afterwards to return

Back to this meadow of calamity,
This uncongenial place, this human life . . .
To see if we will now at last be true
To our own only true, deep buried selves,
Being one with which we are one with the whole world.

To sum up: Many personalities are dually or plurally active. Some are content to let it remain so, others seek further unification of personality and pursuit. But surely for all alike the vision of D. H. Lawrence is possible to achieve? He dreamt of "a great humanity, where the art was the final expression. . . . And some would end in artistic utterance, and some wouldn't. But each man would create the work of art, the living man, achieve that piece of supreme art, a man's life." And he who seeks to create "that piece of supreme art, a man's life," will find in his own natural expressions of philosophy, poetry and science the secret of such a creation; for personality only finds complete satisfaction in the full and undivided use of wisdom, vision and knowledge—a partnership which is a projection of the eternal partnership of Goodness, Beauty and Truth.

LORNA COLLARD.

THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN EDUCATION.

THE place of religion in the school life of this country is a subject which has been receiving increasing attention during recent years. Many thoughtful people who are concerned by the decline of organised religion consider that religious teaching in school might become a steadying influence which would prevent a rapid and widespread drift towards secularism. No doubt they are right, yet the problem which troubles them cannot be solved merely by ensuring that good Scripture syllabuses are used and teachers more satisfactorily trained. The situation requires careful analysis. Why has the Christian Church lost ground? What importance should we attach to inadequate religious teaching? Will the ground really be regained by more efficient and more devoted presentation of the traditional Christian faith? Questions such as these must be asked and answered if we are really concerned about the future place of the Christian religion in our common life.

The situation we are discussing has not developed within a few short decades. The ebb and flow of spiritual life tends to obscure the general trend, but broadly speaking it is probably true to say that the modern movement towards a secular view of life had its beginnings in the period of the Renaissance and has gained steadily in momentum with the advance of modern science and the growth of industrial civilisation. To the European of the Middle Ages life had a religious framework. The temporal life of man was but an episode in the unfolding of a divine plan which began when God created the heavens and the earth in six days and it had its consummation for the souls of the righteous in the bliss of the Heavenly City. This divine plan formed an ever-present background to men's daily life which no one could utterly ignore.

From the period of the Renaissance we find human thought and interest taking a new direction. The humanism of the Greeks was reborn and attention was concentrated more and more on man and his world. The atmosphere of the age is reflected in the famous speech of Hamlet:

What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty! In form and moving, how express and admirable! In action, how like an angel! In apprehension, how like a god!

This early glow of pride in human capacity and achievement has not been sustained throughout the three hundred and fifty years which followed, but the direction of interest has not changed. Human energy has been devoted more and more to exploration and exploitation of the natural world and the temporal life of man. In consequence the influences of modern life fill our days so largely with mundane interests that a real effort of will is needed to find time for the quiet reflection which feeds the life of the spirit. The world of space and time is constantly thrusting itself upon us and the unseen and eternal world of the spirit has become less and less real. Whether we profess religious faith or not we are all secularists to-day.

Signs are not wanting that this preoccupation with mundane interests is producing its own reaction. The war and its consequences destroyed man's confidence in his own powers and the blind nineteenth-century faith in material progress is shattered. "Modern man has become uncertain in his autonomy," as a recent continental writer has expressed it, and in consequence we have been passing through a period of criticism and uncertainty. "A generation aware of its predicament is at hand," says an American writer (Joseph Wood Krutch). "It has awakened to the fact that both the ends which its fathers proposed to themselves and the emotions from which they drew their strength seem irrelevant and remote." But this predicament is not due solely to decay of interest in the spiritual world. Man's conception of that world has been subjected to a long series of disintegrating shocks with the successive stages of scientific progress. The old religious framework of life, as men knew it in the Middle Ages, has gone and nothing has taken its place. In the Middle Ages religion dominated the whole realm of human thought. The teaching of the Christian Church provided a coherent world outlook, which was adequate to the knowledge and experience of medieval Europe. As scientific knowledge increased, this unified outlook became impossible and Christian thought was forced more and more into a defensive position until the struggle culminated in the nineteenth century in the dogmatic claim of science to be the sole avenue to truth and the true guide of human destiny.

That phase, too, has passed but the real problem still remains. The average man has always expected certainty of

belief and assured moral guidance from religion. So long as the Church provided him with a coherent philosophy of life and conduct, all was well. But the growth of scientific knowledge has destroyed many of the old certainties and successive adjustments of Christian teaching have proved unsettling as well as confusing. The authority of the Bible has proved an ambiguous substitute for the authority of the Church and the individual has been left to find his way unaided through the confusing maze of modern thought. The old religious framework of life is gone and nothing has taken its place.

There can be little doubt that much of the restlessness of our times and the disturbing prevalence of neurotic troubles is due at bottom to a craving for the old securities and satisfactions which religion used to provide. Evidence to this effect comes from so eminent a psychologist as Jung. In a recent book he has said :

Among all my patients in the second half of life—that is to say, over thirty-five—there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to say that everyone of them fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook.

Evidence of a hunger for some person or cause which is sufficiently definite and sufficiently appealing to command allegiance and provide an outlet for religious emotion is to be found in the appeal of modern "faiths" like Communism and National Socialism. It may be seen also in the influence of religious movements which possess contagious enthusiasm and have definite, if limited, convictions. But religious enthusiasm is not an adequate foundation for a lasting religious faith nor can movements whose horizons are limited by the bounds of space and time offer a permanent home for the human spirit. We are confronted to-day with a generation that wants a faith and does not know where to find it. That is the real dilemma of the modern mind. Men and women are starved spiritually by the concentration of human interest and energy on material concerns and the mechanism of living. Intellectually they are baffled by the task of reconciling religious faith with scientific knowledge, and traditional

Christian ethics with the practical problems of personal and social conduct which modern life forces upon them.

If this sketchy presentation of the situation is even partially true it has a very important bearing on the teaching of religion. In the first place it must force us to ask ourselves more frankly than we commonly do, whether we have a faith to teach which is adequate to modern needs. There can be no doubt of the importance of religion in any scheme of education. Religion is too intimate and essential an element in personality to be ignored or carelessly treated. But can religious faith and scientific knowledge be reconciled? Is a genuinely Christian outlook on life possible for the modern man?

The answer depends on what we mean by religious faith. Modernism is somewhat in disrepute nowadays in religious circles, and religious life is running more strongly in conservative channels. There are good and bad reasons for this reaction. Modernism has sometimes seemed ready to throw overboard treasures of religious truth whose significance is guaranteed by the experience of generations in the interests of an arid rationalism. But conservatism passes over rather easily into reactionary dogmatism. Dogmatism offers a comfortable refuge from the intellectual and spiritual tension of the modern dilemma, but it bears the mark of psychological and spiritual immaturity and it offers no lasting solution. It is a self-centred refusal to face reality, a demand that God Himself and the universe He has made shall conform to our untutored desires and childish imaginings. It is a form of irreligion.

Mr. Middleton Murry in an article on religion once wrote :

When we stand naked and alone, with the vast universe over against us, then is the beginning of religion. The knowledge that we do stand thus alone, with nothing but a frail imagination to shield us from the immensities—that knowledge, corroding and cauterising our secret souls, is religion."

Substantially the same truth is expressed more positively in the well-known words of Professor Whitehead :

Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness. It runs through three stages, if it evolves to its final satisfaction. It is the transition from God the void to God the enemy and from God the enemy to God the companion.

If we have never known God the void because we have been afraid to face that last utter loneliness of the human soul, then we can never truly know God the companion. Dogmatic adherence to the old "certainties" not only offers no prospect of a religious faith which can be reconciled with science—it offers no hope of a truly spiritual faith at all.

For those who are troubled by intellectual doubts the real solution lies in quite the opposite direction. It is open to those who are prepared to forsake all certainties and say with Job: "Though God slay me, yet will I trust Him." It may cost real agony of mind and loneliness of soul, but it is the only way forward to a mature religious faith. Such an attitude is similar to that of the scientist. Science is an adventure of the human mind seeking knowledge in a universe that is largely unknown. Religion is a comparable adventure. It is an age-long quest of the human spirit—a quest for the hidden reality at the heart of life. The scientist makes his venture in the faith that the universe is knowable. The quest of the religious man rests on the faith that God is and that "He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek after Him."

The real choice for the modern man is not between conservative dogmatism and rationalistic modernism, but between a mature and an immature religious faith. Both dogmatism and extreme modernism suffer from the same fundamental error. They over-emphasise the intellectual element in religion. Religion can offer no intellectual certainty. It can no longer provide the unified outlook on life which characterised the medieval period. It must leave to science the undisputed right of judgment in all matters of fact which properly fall within her province. Of course religion has its intellectual aspect. The affirmations of experience must be expressed in intellectual terms. Such efforts of interpretation must use the intellectual language of the age, but they can be nothing more than a fumbling effort to explain the inexplicable, to comprehend the incomprehensible. Man's doctrine of God can and must change with changing knowledge, but the spiritual vision of God grows richer and truer for all those who honestly and fearlessly follow the religious way of life. The real need of our times is not intellectual but spiritual. It is the need for a truly spiritual faith which will refuse to cling to any particular beliefs through fear or a desire for

comfort or security—a faith that is prepared for change and growth even at the cost of suffering.

One important cause of the present drift from organised religion undoubtedly lies in inadequate religious teaching. In an age when scientific knowledge is diffused more widely than ever before and the spirit of inquiry and criticism is active, only a small minority of individuals have had religious teaching beyond the Sunday school level. Many have drifted out of touch with religion altogether; some have retained a more or less conventional and sentimental allegiance to the Church; a few have clung firmly to the old beliefs and a very few have won a way through for themselves to a satisfying religious outlook. Sentiment and tradition are steadily losing their power: a generation is growing up that wants a religion but does not know where to find it because Christianity as they know it seems to most of them effete and meaningless.

If religion is to have any real place in school life to-day this whole situation must be honestly faced. The needs of our time cannot be met by providing a place in the time-table for Scripture teaching. If the note of reality is present the teacher of Scripture in the upper and middle school will inevitably be faced with questions of doctrine and with the most fundamental questions of philosophy. Religious education to-day must involve helping boys and girls to find a satisfying Christian philosophy of life or at least convincing them that it is possible to find one. That task is not primarily an intellectual one. Only the ablest boys and girls will really want to do much serious reading or thinking. The teacher who will help most will be the one who obviously combines genuine religious belief and spiritual conviction with a readiness to face every fact and every difficulty fearlessly and honestly—the teacher who has himself attained to a truly mature religious faith. Thus the question: "Have we a faith adequate to modern needs?" defines itself more clearly. It does not bear primarily on our intellectual grasp of Christianity. The real question is: "Is our Christian faith merely a way of escape from reality, our method of evading the problem of human destiny, or is it a mature spiritual faith? Is the strength of our religious convictions a measure of our fear of losing them or of the depth and maturity of our religious life?"

Normally the intellectual aspect of religion should probably be the school's main concern. It should be the business of the

teacher of religion to help the child's mind to grow in matters of religion in harmony with the general growth of knowledge and experience. In this way the school can help boys and girls to enter gradually into a deeper and more adequate intellectual understanding and spiritual apprehension of the religious tradition in which they have been nurtured. The special circumstances of our time make an adequate provision for intellectual understanding of Christianity especially important.

But the intellectual aspect of the situation is by no means the most serious one. Concentration of human interest and energy on material things and the disintegration of the old religious certainties have made the spiritual world less and less real. Consciously or unconsciously the modern man has evaded or ignored the central issues of human destiny. There are few people in our generation whose lives are lived in the setting of eternity. We are all secularists to-day. The deepest problem of our age and the root cause of our social failure lies in the consequent absence of direction and purpose in human living. There is a deep psychological wisdom as well as spiritual truth in the words of St. Augustine: "Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless until they find rest in Thee." Man no longer finds his rest in God because the life of the soul is atrophied and the vision of God has grown dim.

The responsibility of the school is thereby enormously increased. The school community of to-day reflects the secular trend of modern times. The school is dealing increasingly with a generation of boys and girls for whom the Christian tradition is a negligible factor in their early training. That does not necessarily mean that the religious feelings of boys and girls are weaker. But it does mean that these religious feelings have been quite undirected. Moreover the school has to counteract the secular influences of modern civilisation which constantly threaten to stifle the spiritual interests of man. The teacher of religion must therefore seek to deepen and direct the religious interests of boys and girls, and must help to strengthen their apprehension of the spiritual world.

The current interest in school worship is a healthy sign from this point of view. But opportunities for awakening spiritual interests are obviously not confined to school prayers nor to the Scripture period. Religion cannot be divorced from any

aspect of the common life or teaching of the school. Literature, history, science, music and art and the personal relationships of school life are all avenues of approach to the spiritual world. Religion can have no true place in education at all unless it permeates the whole of it. The specific needs of our age in particular can never be met within the confines of the Scripture lesson. Unless we can help boys and girls to find God in the whole of life they will never truly find Him at all.

The true function of religious education in school life should therefore be to help boys and girls to find eternal significance in the temporal world. It should impose no rigid dogma nor any ready-made code of morals for the individual or for society. Our own generation and future generations are being called to explore new ways in matters of belief and conduct. Religious education must obviously offer the necessary guidance and help: the intellectual aspect of religious teaching needs to be greatly strengthened. But the greatest need of our age is spiritual not intellectual. The supreme task of the teacher of religion is to help boys and girls to penetrate beyond the perplexities of modern knowledge and the distractions of modern life and come face to face with the Eternal God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

JAMES W. D. SMITH.

WE AND OUR HOME.

IN the course of the last fifteen years it is quite clear, although the fact is unrecognised by very many people, that a complete change in our whole way of living has taken place. In the first instance, on the purely outward side. That large percentage of the middle classes who before the war lived in houses of seven to twelve rooms are now occupying suburban "villas" of three bedrooms, or flats of from two to five rooms. This extremely interesting process, which is pursuing a similar course over the whole of Europe, is due to a number of causes. The change in the economic situation, alterations in the social structure with resultant lack of domestic servants, reduction in the number of children, the ever-growing mechanisation and at the same time simplification of the household routine—all this is a matter of everyday knowledge to us all. What is, however, often overlooked is our totally changed attitude to living and, consequently, to the house itself.

The well-known remark of the Paris architect, Le Corbusier, in which he referred to the house as a "machine to live in," has done a great deal of harm. It has presented the opponents of the new trend in architecture with an easy and trite argument for contrasting the traditional "individual" and "oh-so-cosy" homeliness with the "cold, mechanical standardisation" of the new style. "Living-machines" apart, our conception of our houses is to-day essentially changed. In appraising it now we start from ourselves, our own hygienic requirements—quite different from those of the last generation—changed social customs with their greater freedom and unconventionality in our social relations, and turning away from the mere keeping up of appearances. While at the end of the last and the beginning of our century the architect started from the façade in planning a house, that is to say began by deciding whether it should be in the Tudor style or the Georgian, whether it should wear an early-medieval mask or whether it should be a combination of all the three styles, to-day the process is exactly the reverse. The first consideration is given to the people who are to live in the house, to their economic needs and limitations. Man has become once more the measure of things: he is not to be forced to fit his life into the space provided for it, but the space—that is to say,

the house or the flat—has to form a compact but elastic framework, in which he can work out his own individual way of life.

The functions of the household have from the earliest times always been essentially the same: sleeping, cleaning, cooking, eating, and—living. Only, the emphasis is always shifting from one to the other. The kitchen has to-day shrunk to less than half its former dimensions. On the other hand the tiny washing vessels of the eighteenth century have expanded into the bath. And what has happened to the "best rooms"? The house is now made to the measure of those who live in it continually, and the things in it are used not merely on festive occasions but on 365 days in the year. This is indeed made necessary by the reduced number of the rooms. We therefore require that the available space shall not unduly hem us in, that it shall be adaptable and easily transformed at short notice, that it shall not impose itself upon us, but shall form a neutral background for our daily life.

The fact that one room in these days has to take the place of several has involved other and not less important matters. The question of interior equipment is of greater importance to-day than ever before. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries coquetted with the Orient, played with Japanese lacquer trinket-boxes, silk kimonos and paper fans, and filled full to bursting the already stuffy and overcrowded rooms. On the other hand, however, they overlooked completely the most important lesson to be learned from Japan by Western nations—the gift of "omission," of concentration on the necessary, of the right relation of each single object to the whole space. It is true that this is with them often carried to extremes which would be impossible for us; and as one single coloured paper lantern on the Japanese stage represents a hostelry, so the Japanese in wise renunciation loves to place a single flowering cherry branch in his airy, empty rooms, which to Western eyes sometimes have an air of unreality.

Furniture, as we all know, can be of two kinds: movable and immovable. One must not forget in this connection that built-in furniture is not a discovery of our own times—in old country houses it has long been in successful use. But to-day it is more definitely a part of the architecture of the rooms, and attempts to keep the cubic shape of the rooms as far as possible unbroken. Movable furniture, on the other hand, can

and should express the modern ideas of form. This is decisive, and here there can be no compromise. The conception of modern form has lately acquired a disagreeable flavour. Once the slogan of the small and courageous group which dared to break away from the crushing burden of tradition, it has to-day sunk to the level of an ingredient in the lurid advertisements of pushing furniture dealers, and for the uninitiated it is truly difficult to disentangle the modern from the modernistic.

Steel furniture has in this way become a synonym for modernity, and yet steel furniture can often be so hopelessly old-fashioned, in the worst sense of the word, and a piece of mahogany from the times of our grandfathers can be modern in feeling, that is, suitable to our time. Actually it is not of great consequence whether a table has four legs or only one, whether an armchair is covered with leather or with any other material. In either case it must be beautiful and completely fulfil the purpose for which it was created. And then furniture must, so to speak, "behave decently." Often it stands there as if, like badly brought-up young people, it wanted to draw everyone's attention to itself—"just look at me, how smart and interesting I am!" And if one does actually look more closely, one gets quite a shock, simply from the obtrusive wood grain and unrestful lines.

The wonderful development of technique in our time has put into our hands the means of producing relatively cheaply such objects as we need to-day, solidly built, simple and well-proportioned. The abundance of different kinds of wood which the use of veneers places at our disposal, with all their variety of colour, pattern, weight, substance and so on, makes it possible at the same time to avoid monotony. But monotony and standardisation are not synonymous. The latter is a problem which we all in these days have to tackle in a greater or lesser degree. The process of mechanisation is ceaselessly advancing and taking possession of ever new realms of industry. We can adopt whatever attitude we like to the matter—it is a fact with which one must reckon not only to-day but also for as far as one can see into the future. The time of the machine wreckers is finally past.

And what could be more significant of the present position of things than the great Exhibition at Burlington House, which took place in the early spring? It was the solemn

entrance of mass-production goods into the decorous rooms of the Royal Academy, so steeped in reverence for the things made with hands—the unique results of individual craftsmanship. This Exhibition signified much more than a representative display of the achievements of British industry and of the British designers who work in its service. It was an act of reconciliation between art and the machine, which for a century have stood in sharp opposition one to another.

Standardisation does not stand for dead level monotony. It sets a quite definite task, and presupposes the most careful study in all respects and the working out of the best possible methods for its fulfilment. As probably in the whole of England there are no two families which are completely alike in numbers, age, social position, habits, tastes, size of rooms they occupy, etc., there is no danger that the interior equipment of our houses, brought together from among the numerous standardised articles available, will be in the least monotonous. This reproach can with more justice be levelled at the "Complete suites of furniture." Their over-rich ornamentation cannot disguise the emptiness and sad lack of imagination, and instead of their stiff, rigidly laid down and symmetrical placing in our rooms, we have to-day the free, light and easily adaptable combination of the different furniture units.

As the decorative function of furniture is now subordinated to the consideration of usefulness, exactness, careful work and cheapness, it is not to handicraft, but to the machine that we must look for its production. And it is really a crime to compel the machine, instead of this, to turn out badly made, cheap-looking and not durable copies of Jacobean tables or Queen Anne armchairs, which themselves owed all their beauty to the fact that they were made by hand.

It is, however, not true that the new generation has no respect for tradition. On the contrary, it is reverence for the past which prevents them from continually plagiarising it. For it is plagiarism to copy the forms of the past, admirably suited to its time, and once full of vitality, but to-day only the expression of a bygone taste, and with the effect, in our generation, of museum pieces; and it is plagiarism to represent the results as products of our own day.

The modern standpoint is based on the wish to be surrounded with such things as really stand in some relation to

ourselves. One wants to feel at home, and not at a masquerade ball. The huge, richly carved tables of the seventeenth century, even on a reduced scale, are not suitable for our rooms. The thousand candles illuminated most effectively the gay company at the Court of Louis XIV at Versailles, but this is no excuse for imitating candlelight with the help of electric bulbs. We have full understanding for the heavy grandeur of the Stuart furniture, we love the cool elegance of the Adam tables and the gracious intimacy of Sheraton writing-desks. We know very well that we owe all our "wisdom," our artistic powers, to the countless generations who have lived before us. But it would be false sentimentality for us devoutly to take over their productions and imitate them uncritically, and so renounce our right to seek and find an expression of our own ideals.

The most vigorous generations and those specially rich in artistic vitality have never hesitated to push on one side, or into museums—according to temperament—all the art forms they have regarded as out of date, and thus to make room for those more adequate to express the new spirit of the time. Why should we, equipped with richer experience, have less courage to feel our way along new and untried paths? English masters in particular have always had a fine feeling for the quality of wood, and have known how to hold the balance in ornament. Our present-day modern furniture, in its clear simplicity, austere beauty and its honest determination not to be anything but itself, is a link, if often an unconscious one, with this high tradition.

William Morris once said: "Do not have anything in your house which you do not either know to be useful or believe to be beautiful." Beauty and usefulness are certainly in two different categories, and one cannot take the place of the other, but may it not be that their blending, a sign of ripeness in creative art and a new and perfect unfolding of creative strength, may prove to be the distinctive idea of our own time?

L. N. YAKOBSON.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MASARYK AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THOMAS GARRIGUE MASARYK resigned the Presidency of the Czechoslovak Republic on December 14th. He will be eighty-six next March. He will continue to live in Lany Castle, and his advice will still be available to his Czechoslovakia. One does not think of Masaryk except as the maker of Czechoslovakia, nor of Czechoslovakia except as the work of Masaryk. In human history there are few stories to compare with that of Masaryk's life and work. The essential details of what he has done are known to millions of people in every country on earth. He is one of the great men. As he gives up his formal office, the whole world respectfully, affectionately, salutes him. He urged his people to appoint as his successor his old friend and colleague, Dr. Benes, almost equally well known as Masaryk's pupil. The election had not taken place when these lines were written.

INCORRIGIBLE EUROPE.

Except to those, and there were many, whose emotions became deeply engaged on the one side or the other, the year 1935 afforded one more argument in support of those who believe that the problem of Europe is insoluble. The year 1934 had been bad enough; but it ended unexpectedly well. Memories are short, and European crises abound. At the beginning of 1934 men seriously talked of European war as an imminent possibility. Germany had given notice of secession from the League of Nations (October 14th, 1933); Russia had repudiated any intention of joining the League (December 5th, 1933); Italy had passed a Fascist Grand Council resolution (also December 5th, 1933) of her intention to secede from the League unless the Covenant were radically remodelled. When the year 1934 began the League of Nations seemed to be irretrievably moribund. Germany seemed to be heading for war. France, the Little Entente countries, Russia and at that time even Poland hardly tried to conceal their fear of Germany. On July 25th, 1934, Herr Dollfuss was murdered. On October 9th of that year M. Barthou and King Alexander of Yugoslavia were murdered. The Austrian

problem also seemed insoluble. But suddenly in the last two months of 1934 the sky cleared. The Saar plebiscite passed off in peace, as a result of good work done at Geneva, where France, Italy and Great Britain had staged a scene of almost competitive good will. M. Laval left Paris for Rome on January 3rd, 1935, to attempt what had been denied to M. Barthou; and that was the first occasion since the war on which Franco-Italian relations had been harmonious enough to enable a French Foreign Minister officially to visit Rome. Within three days of his reaching Rome the Pact of Rome was signed (January 7th, 1935). It constituted a far-reaching basis of Franco-Italian co-operation in the interests of European peace. One of its provisions—later to be invested with a depressing irony—was that Article 13 of the Treaty of London of 1915 should be fulfilled by frontier rectifications for Italy in Eritrea and Libya.

The psychological effect of the Rome Pact was such that a more general possibility of a European understanding, embracing Germany, was promptly canvassed. Sir John Simon took the initiative in sounding Berlin. On January 31st, 1935, a French delegation, headed by M. Flandin, Prime Minister, and M. Laval, Foreign Minister, arrived in London to discuss nothing less ambitious than a new attempt at the safeguarding of European security by juridical sanction. The main obstacle (in its turn destined to prove ironical) was the difficulty of inducing any British Government to commit itself to any precise sanction. Indeed, could irony go further than it has gone in 1935? The text of an actual agreement was published on February 3rd, 1935. It expressed an Anglo-French "hope that the encouraging progress thus achieved may now be continued by means of the direct and effective co-operation of Germany." Sir John Simon explained, in an address broadcast on February 3rd, that what in particular was contemplated was that the Western European Powers should guarantee each other against air attack, by a sort of Locarno agreement for mutual assistance. Germany was arming rapidly. The hope grew almost equally rapidly that the danger of war might be arrested. On February 6th Herr Hitler cancelled all the engagements he had made for the following ten days in order to consider the London proposal. Belgium accepted it (February 12th). Italy accepted it "in principle" (February 10th). Germany then suggested a

separate Anglo-German discussion (February 14th). It was therefore arranged that Sir John Simon should visit Berlin to discuss it, not, however, before the principle was agreed that the London proposals should be considered, not severally, but as a whole. There resulted something like a boom in diplomatic optimism.

Suddenly the old suspicions reasserted themselves. On March 4th a British White Paper (Cmd. 4827) was published "Relating to Defence." It announced the British Government's decision to rearm, conformably with the general process of rearmament then rampant. Sir John's visit to Berlin, which had been arranged for March 7th, was postponed, Herr Hitler having promptly developed, to that end, a "slight cold." The White Paper had been deliberately published before Sir John's visit to Berlin so that the interview should take place without any fear of Germany's misunderstanding Britain's policy. Germany in the event so completely misunderstood it that on March 16th Herr Hitler issued his now famous edict repudiating the military part (Part V) of the Treaty of Versailles. He thereby precipitated one of the worst of the recurring European crises, which directly led to the formation of what at the time was known by the somewhat bellicose name of the "Stresa front." At Stresa on April 14th an agreement was reached for the hardly disguised purpose of uniting the British, French, Italian, Little Entente, Polish, and Russian Governments against the hypothesis of German aggression in Europe. Only two days later (April 16th) the Council of the League of Nations duly translated the Stresa decisions by formally arraigning Germany on the score of her unilateral repudiation of the treaty. A committee was set up "to propose measures to render the Covenant more effective in the organisation of collective security." We witnessed the odd spectacle of Sir John Simon, M. Laval and Baron Aloisi collectively, unitedly, enthusiastically supporting that resolution.

But the diplomatic sky in Europe changes with bewildering rapidity. At the beginning of June—it was on June 2nd, only six weeks after the passing of the "Stresa" resolution at Geneva—a German naval delegation arrived in London. On June 18th the now famous Anglo-German naval agreement was concluded. During the course of the conference Sir Samuel Hoare supplanted Sir John Simon as British Foreign

Secretary. French opinion was outraged by that agreement. The "Stresa front" was smashed. Signor Mussolini abandoned himself to the preparation of his campaign in Ethiopia. Throughout the summer European thought was progressively diverted from the problem of Germany to the problem of Italy. By the early autumn Italy's adventure in Ethiopia had become a raging whirlwind of general controversy. From October 3rd, when Italian aircraft started the war by bombing Adigrat and Adowa, to December 8th, when Sir Samuel Hoare and M. Laval agreed on a proposal for ending the war, the diplomatic temperature remained at a feverish level. When the fact of an Anglo-French proposal became known on December 9th, that temperature, especially in Great Britain, was such that no thermometer could have measured it.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH PROPOSAL.

The first post-election pronouncement on the Government's foreign policy was made by Sir Samuel Hoare in the House of Commons on December 5th. Before the election his emphasis had been on Britain's resolve to take part in collective League resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression, the emphasis being clearly and regularly directed to the implications of the word "collective." When he spoke on December 5th, as there is now reason to believe, the principles of the later Anglo-French proposal had already been settled. What he said on December 5th therefore is all the more important to an understanding of his own part in it. He said: "I regard the whole basis of the League as collective action. Isolated action might be not only foolish and dangerous to the country that takes it, but actually injurious to the League itself, the basis of the League being that all members should share in the responsibilities and in the risks." He then recalled the twofold nature of the policy pursued at Geneva. His words, having regard to the charges later made against himself and the Government, ought in fairness to him to be remembered. He said: "All that I need do is to take up the story from the point at which it was left when the last Parliament came to an end. Since then we have consistently and steadily followed the double line that has time after time been approved by the League and by this House. On the one hand we have taken our full part in collective action under the Covenant, and on

the other hand we have continued our efforts for a peaceful settlement. When my Right Hon. friend the Minister for League of Nations Affairs and I attended the last meeting at Geneva towards the end of October it was clear to us that the League was solidly behind this two-fold programme. With scarcely an exception the member States showed themselves ready to take their share in collective economic action, even though that share meant loss and sacrifice to many of them. Nor was the agreement among them less remarkable when they gave a particular blessing to the efforts that France and we were making to find the basis of a peaceful settlement. Not a suggestion was made that France and we were going behind the back of the League. Indeed, it was obvious to anyone who was present at the meeting that the other States were most anxious that we should continue to take on their behalf this initiative for peace. Nothing could have been clearer than that the members of the League wished us to take this action: and nothing could have been made clearer by France and ourselves than that we were working within the framework of the League, and wished at the earliest possible moment to share our special responsibility with the other members of the League; and that proposals which might emerge from present or future discussions must be acceptable to the three parties to the dispute, the League, Italy, and Abyssinia."

He went on there and then to make his appeal for peace, speaking, as he was, three days before he reached his agreement with M. Laval. "It may be (he said) that we are engaged upon a hopeless task. It may be that it is impossible to reconcile the divergent aims of Italy, Abyssinia and the League. It may be that the atmosphere is so heated that the voice of reason cannot make itself heard. None the less, the French and we intend not only to go on trying but to redouble our efforts during the short period of time that is still open before the Geneva meeting. The world urgently needs peace. We and the French, acting on behalf of the League, and in the spirit of the League, are determined to make another great effort for peace. There is not a nation that is taking part in the collective action of the League that would not be delighted to see friendly relations restored between ourselves and Italy and sanctions ended. So long, however, as collective action is needed the League, including ourselves, is bound to proceed

under the Covenant. Nor is there any likelihood that the League will weaken, or the members fail to take their part. But one and all will desire the occasion that calls for collective action to cease to exist. That is the reason why I make this appeal for peace. The appeal is no sign of weakness: it is evidence solely of our desire to end as soon as possible a controversy that is embittering the world. I do not disguise from myself the great difficulty of the task of finding a reasonable settlement. I do not wish anyone in the House to think that the task is easy or that the road is smooth. While, however, we must all recognise the formidable character of the obstacles in our path, we must not despair of surmounting them, and we must make a particular effort to surmount them in the course of the next few days and the next few weeks. There are sufficient difficulties in the world without the added trouble and danger of the Abyssinian dispute. There is already too much inflammable material in Europe and the East for fresh powder to be added to it. The nations need a long period of rest and quiet if economic recovery is to be assured and permanent peace established. On all sides there are problems overdue for solution, problems which can only be solved if old feuds are forgotten, suspicions removed, if fears are allayed, and good will and common sense take the place of ill will and hysteria."

He was received with "loud cheers" as he made that appeal to reason and to persuasion, as distinct from war, as a League method. It was on December 5th that he made that speech. He left London on the following day on his way to the Swiss Alps for a holiday, breaking his journey in Paris for the very purpose he had so clearly announced on December 5th. He conversed with M. Laval in Paris on December 7th and 8th. On the evening of December 8th an official statement was issued in Paris, thus: "Animated by the same spirit of conciliation, and inspired by close Franco-British friendship, we have in the course of our long conversations of to-day and yesterday sought the formulas which might serve as a basis for a friendly settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute."

That statement was published in London and in Paris on the following morning, in Paris being accompanied by an unofficial disclosure of the "formulas" agreed. There was an immediate outcry from the parties of the Left in Paris, and of the Left and in some degree also of the Right in London,

on the ground that the League of Nations had been cynically sidetracked, Abyssinia betrayed, the British and French Governments proved to have broken their word, and Italy rewarded for her aggression. There was no doubt about the sincerity with which the charges were made. That sincerity made them all the more astonishing. Several emergency meetings of the British Cabinet were held in the following few days. A debate took place in the British House of Commons on December 10th, in which Mr. Eden answered the Government's critics by recalling some elementary facts of the precedent history. "I would remind the House (he said) that last November, when the Co-ordinating Committee of the League, that is to say, the body of fifty members who have been co-operating to carry out the sanctions which have been imposed, agreed upon certain sanctions which are now in force, it at the same time specifically approved of attempts to find a basis of discussion between the two parties. It particularly welcomed the suggestion that His Majesty's Government and the French Government should seek to find such a basis. I should like to quote one or two speeches then made in order that the House may understand the work upon which we have been engaged, and why we have been engaged on it. M. Laval then said: 'I shall therefore stubbornly pursue my attempts, from which nothing will deter me, to seek for elements that may still serve as a basis for negotiation. I have thus taken the initiative in the matter of conversations, without the slightest intention, however, of putting the results into final shape outside the League. It is only within the framework of the League that the proposals can be examined and decisions reached.' Again, our own Foreign Secretary said: 'It is common talk during the last few days that there have been conversations taking place between Rome, Paris and London on the possibilities of such a settlement. There is nothing mysterious or sinister about those discussions. It is the duty of all of us to explore the road of peace. That is what we have been doing, and that is what we shall continue to do. Up to the present the conversations have been nothing more than an exchange of tentative suggestions. They have had as yet no positive outcome. There is therefore nothing to report. If and when these suggestions take a more definite form we shall take the earliest opportunity to bring them before the Council in the

most appropriate manner.' The House will observe that that is entirely consistent with what Sir S. Hoare said the other day in this House during the debate on the Address: 'Nothing could have been made clearer by France and ourselves than that we were working within the framework of the League, that we wished at the earliest possible moment to share our special responsibility with the other members of the League, and that any proposals that might emerge from these or other discussions must be acceptable to the three parties of the dispute—the League, Italy, and Abyssinia.' I will not weary the House, but I could give extracts from other speeches which were made in that debate at Geneva approving the suggestions that the British and French Governments should undertake this unenviable responsibility. The Prime Minister of Belgium sponsored the suggestion that the Committee, these fifty nations as a whole, should show their approval, and the President, after that suggestion had been endorsed, wound up by saying that he felt sure he was speaking for the Committee in saying the members of the League assembled in that Committee noted the hope expressed by the first delegate of Belgium, and gave it their full approval."

On the same day Mr. Baldwin spoke in the gravest tone. He said: "I shall speak for but a short time. I have seldom spoken with greater regret, for my lips are not yet unsealed. Were these troubles over I would make a case—and I would guarantee that not a man would go into the lobby against us. Some people think of the League of Nations as though it were a kind of celestial institution with a mission of its own, and that it is always right, whereas it is a very human body of fallible nations represented by fallible statesmen trying to do what they can to build up the League so that it may do what it can for all those services of humanity that were agreed upon when the League was first founded. I do not propose to say anything about its constitution or its deficiencies in the absence of great nations, but I do want the House to remember that, much as they may criticise the Government, much as they may say what we ought to do, we cannot control the League of Nations. We go on and we have gone on in conjunction with other members of the League. So far as those other members would go, so far we go on together. Unilateral action we do not propose to take now any more than we have ever proposed to take it."

What clearly was in his mind, and in the mind of all informed people, was that if on December 12th the League of Nations had reached some definite commitment about the application of an oil sanction, and if an attempt were made to impose it, the inevitable result would be war. He knew that the French navy would not be ready to support the British navy, that it could not be made ready without a general mobilisation in France, such as French opinion would never have allowed. It would have been a British war. It was hardly surprising that a British Prime Minister hesitated to plunge his country into war.

The "Sanctionist" Committee of Eighteen duly met at Geneva on December 12th, and duly postponed its consideration of the proposed oil sanction. That day was undoubtedly a crisis of the virtual war between the League of Nations and Italy. The crisis was safely passed. After all, the main business of the League of Nations is not to produce, but to avert war. On December 12th Mr. Eden thus explained his Government's feelings at Geneva: "In the circumstances it seems to me that the best procedure to follow at the present time is to call together the Council at the earliest practicable moment in order that a full statement of the proposals should be made to it. It will be for that body to determine as and when it sees fit what course it would wish to pursue in the light of the situation thus created; and in advance I emphasise that so far as the British Government are concerned we will not only readily accept the judgment of our colleagues, but we will continue to use our best efforts to further the two objectives which have been constantly before us in this dispute—the restoration of peace and the maintenance of the authority of the League."

A British White Paper published on December 14th gave the text of the Paris proposals together with the text of telegrams sent by Sir Samuel Hoare to Rome and to Addis Ababa, urging those capitals to co-operate with the League of Nations in the search for an agreed settlement of the dispute. The main proposals provided for an "Exchange of Territories" and a "Zone of Economic Expansion and Settlement." The exchange of territories proposed was that Italy should receive Eastern Tigré (including Adowa, but not Aksum); the Danakil area, except for territory necessary to give Ethiopia a corridor to the sea; and territory in the

Ogaden; and that Ethiopia should receive a corridor to the port of Assab (in Eritrea). The suggested zone of economic expansion and settlement would cover Southern Ethiopia south of the eighth parallel, with the exception of a strip west of the thirty-fifth meridian; Italy would have exclusive economic rights in that zone, but Ethiopian sovereignty would be preserved; control of the Ethiopian administration in the zone would be exercised by the services of a scheme of assistance drawn up by the League, Italy to take a preponderating share of these services.

In transmitting those proposals to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, Mr. Eden and M. Laval wrote a joint letter, as follows: "Since the failure of the efforts undertaken by the League of Nations to find a peaceful solution to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, the desire has been expressed on several occasions, both in the Council and the Assembly, to see the conflict brought to an end by an agreed settlement as soon as possible. The Governments of the United Kingdom and France have worked out together, bearing in mind the deliberations of the Committee of Five, the bases of a settlement of this nature, and instructed their representatives at Rome and Addis Ababa on December 10th to lay before the Italian and Ethiopian Governments certain suggestions in this sense."

Two telegrams were sent by Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir Sidney Barton, British Minister in Addis Ababa, on December 10th. The first appealed to the Emperor "to arrange for the collaboration of the Ethiopian Government with the Committee of Five" at Geneva on the proposed Anglo-French basis. The second telegram still more urgently appealed to the Emperor "to give careful and favourable consideration to those proposals, and on no account lightly to reject them." Yet the Emperor virtually rejected them. On the same day a similar telegram was sent to Sir Eric Drummond at Rome, instructing him to urge Signor Mussolini for his part to co-operate with the Committee of Five at Geneva on the basis proposed. He was to explain to Signor Mussolini "the efforts already made at Geneva and the previous exchanges of views with the Italian Government, since they are anxious to take account of Italian aspirations in so far as these can be made compatible with the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations and respect for Ethiopian sovereignty."

The telegram ended thus: "They hope that the reply of the Italian Government may reach them within a period which, in view of the imminence of the meetings at Geneva, may be as short as possible. If, as they hope, this reply in principle is favourable, the French and United Kingdom Governments will immediately take the necessary steps in order that the Committee of Five may be called together on December 12th. In that case the meeting of the Committee might modify the object of the meeting of the Committee of Eighteen which is fixed for the same day. Sir Samuel Hoare and M. Laval attach the greatest importance to learning at the same time from Signor Mussolini whether he is ready to arrange for the collaboration of the Italian Government with the Committee of Five." For his part Signor Mussolini gave no answer before the Committee of Eighteen met at Geneva.

Of a truth, the path of the peacemaker is harder than that of the warmaker. In this case Mr. Baldwin and Sir Samuel Hoare, in union with M. Laval, attempted to stop the Italo-Abyssinian war and to avert the danger of a general European war. They received no help from Rome or from Addis Ababa. They were abused by the idealist ideologues in their own country, who vehemently stuck to the ideology that, by general war, aggression must this time be proved unprofitable to the aggressor. To the mind of the so-called idealist this was to be another war to end war. The interesting thing is that so soon after the indescribable horrors of the last great war—itsself waged by the same idealists as a war to end war—there should be those who were prepared to face still another war to end war. Endless war to end war is a grim conception. "For what can war (asked Milton) but endless war still breed?" It must surely be recorded unforgettably as one of the gaunt paradoxes of all history that in 1935 a peace proposal stirred the so-called pacifist feelings of many idealists to demand war instead. Can one avoid the conclusion that war is thereby proved to be an inevitable instrument of human chastisement, and that the Archbishops of Canterbury and of York, in joining the general clamour for war, were unconsciously, almost automatically and unthinkingly, expounding a divine truth? If so, can any charge lie against Germany in 1914, against Italy in 1935? Even the British sanctionists by that very argument must in 1935 be excused from war guilt, and be regarded simply as one of the

mysterious agencies used by Providence to ensure that war on earth shall persist for ever.

Yet the British Government's policy on more humdrum grounds seemed clear and simple enough. The French and British Governments were formally invited on November 2nd by Geneva to explore a basis of peace between Italy and Ethiopia. They acted upon that invitation by making a definite proposal, and it was for the League to approve it or to make an alternative suggestion. If the Anglo-French suggestion were repudiated by the League—an almost incredible contingency—the British and French fleets would clearly be absolved from any further precautionary duty in the Mediterranean, and the Dutch, Turkish and Scandinavian navies (so it seemed fair to deduce) would no doubt take their place.

But the Anglo-French proposals rested upon a much wider juridical basis than the commission given to the Governments by Geneva on November 2nd. The territorial adjustments that were suggested happen to constitute the first attempt made by the Allied Powers of 1914-18 to redeem a formal promise made to Italy to rectify the frontiers of her colonies in Africa. That promise was made in return for her throwing over the Triple Alliance and entering the war on the Allied side. Moreover, by the Anglo-Italian agreement reached in December 1925, the British Government is pledged to support an Italian claim for a sphere of economic interest in the outlying non-Amharic provinces of Abyssinia. On the ground therefore of Britain's pledged word there was something to be said for the Anglo-French proposal.

December 15th, 1935.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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BISHOP GORE.

Dr. G. L. Prestige is to be congratulated upon the distinguished success of his biography of Bishop Gore,* one of the most outstanding personalities in Church and State during the past half-century. The Life is presented with great fullness and lucidity, is amply documented, and while invariably eulogistic, is sufficiently frank in its disclosures to enable the reader to form a sound judgment both upon the hero himself and upon his public actions.

Dr. Gore enjoyed the advantages of aristocratic descent, of good education, and of early association with many people who were versed in public affairs. He went up to Oxford with fixed Christian faith and principles, which he held with unshaken confidence throughout his long life. At Oxford he came under the abiding influence of Pusey and Liddon, so far as his personal faith and his ecclesiastical outlook were concerned, while his social principles and philosophy were derived from the teaching of Professor Thomas Hill Green. The enlargement of the sympathies and the wide social interpretation of the Christian faith which have transformed the Anglo-Catholicism of the Tractarians into that of Gore, Scott Holland and Talbot, were due immediately to the

* *The Life of Charles Gore.* By G. L. Prestige, D.D. Heinemann. 18s.

influence of Green and more remotely to that of Frederick Denison Maurice.

Hence it came about that Gore entered upon the Christian ministry equipped with both the rigid ecclesiastical principles and the spirit of self-discipline inculcated by the Tractarians, and with the securely founded and wide embracing social principles of the later philosophic idealism. These influences moulded, stiffened and enriched a character remarkable for high courage, frank honesty, reliance upon reason coupled with shrinking from emotion, and a restless venturesomeness which overbore a deep-seated and growing pessimism. To all these qualities must be added Gore's genius of comradeship, which was exemplified in his intimate and lifelong friendship with Scott Holland and Bishop Talbot, in his ceaseless and successful efforts as a personal guide alike of Oxford undergraduates, clergy, and troubled souls, and, not least of all, in his power to enter into close, though restricted, fellowship with people of all sorts, from whom he differed profoundly in religious faith and social outlook.

The downrightness of Gore's personality and his anxiety to bring about concrete results made him practically the Founder, as the first Head, of the Pusey House in Oxford and the creator of the Community of the Resurrection. He was also a fearless thinker and teacher. Taking the Incarnation, as interpreted by the Catholic creeds, as his impregnable basis, he advanced to critical studies of the Old Testament, which led to the publication of *Lux Mundi*, with its acceptance of Higher Criticism, and, therefore, to a position which distressed Liddon, in his closing years, though it did not destroy the affectionate friendship which bound them together. His zest for teaching made Gore a prolific author, devoting himself to the spiritual needs of the times, but also to the exposition of a theology which combined catholicity and rationalism, as he understood them both. In regard to the latter, his most important works were written after he had resigned his episcopal office. While his three books on God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit and the Church are valuable and learned, it must be said that Gore just lacked the philosophical endowment which would, had he possessed it, have made them of first-class importance.

The story of Gore's episcopate is profoundly interesting and instructive. He established a strong hold upon the Church

and upon public life in Birmingham, but he was not so successful at Oxford. He "hated" administration, and in his impatience sometimes thought and said that he hated the Church of England. He thought poorly of the courage and outlook of his episcopal colleagues, and was exceedingly "troublesome" to Archbishop Davidson, though affectionate friendship subsisted between them. His versatile temperament found a welcome release when he resigned the Bishopric of Oxford, and the rest of his days were spent in multitudinous activities which both satisfied and exhausted him.

Bishop Gore was a great and saintly personality. His work and influence were of momentous importance both to the Church of England and to the public life of his times. While an Anglo-Catholic his unflinching loyalty to the Church of England exasperated the extreme section of the Anglo-Catholic party. His spiritual genius left him a man apart, whose thought and action isolated him from, rather than united him with, the ecclesiastical, political and social movements of his time. Yet all of these benefited immensely by his truly prophetic witness and absolutely devoted life.

Dr. Prestige's book must be carefully studied by all who seek to understand the history of our times. It is a worthy monument to a great man, whose memory and achievements should be preserved and will be preserved by this masterly account.

J. S. L.

A PLEA FOR LIBERTY.*

"Believing that liberty is the most precious of human possessions," writes Mr. Hirst, "and that a full and satisfying measure of personal freedom can only be enjoyed by a free citizen with a voice and a share in the government of his own country, I felt that the time had come for a reasoned defence of political and civil liberty." His readers will applaud his resolve, for in *Liberty and Tyranny* the task has been admirably performed. Englishmen are not very likely to surrender their cherished privileges; but in these crazy days, when half Europe is in the grip of dictators, it is good to be reminded of how much is at stake. History, literature and law are laid

* (1) *Liberty and Tyranny*. By Francis W. Hirst. Duckworth. 8s. 6d. (2) *Economic Freedom and Private Property*. By Francis W. Hirst. Duckworth. 4s. 6d.

under contribution in this arresting work. Our author carries the war into the enemy's camp. His argument is that ordered liberty is not only good in theory, but works best in practice. He is profoundly convinced that we are on the right path, and that it is our duty and our interest to keep straight on. That autocracies do good as well as harm is frankly recognised, for otherwise they could not survive. But the price they exact is out of all proportion to the benefits they confer. Material advantages are not to be despised; but if they are purchased by the spiritual degradation of the people they are doubtful blessings. The real test of a political system is not the strength of the state but the quality of the citizen.

Part I, which fills three-quarters of the book, is entitled "Political Liberty." "I have made an assumption, which is incapable of strict proof, that liberty of thought and action is an indispensable ingredient in the life of man if he is to attain a full measure of happiness." It cannot be proved, for many thinkers believe man to be incapable of using liberty wisely. The difference between authoritarians and libertarians derives from their contrasted views of human nature. If, as Carlyle said of his countrymen, men are "mostly fools," it is a plausible contention that they must be told what to do by someone presumably wiser than they. If, on the other hand, we hold the average citizen in a civilised community in higher respect, we shall claim for him a definite share of civic responsibility. Mr. Hirst thinks highly of the educated man. He repudiates the totalitarian philosophy of Hobbes and Hegel, and argues that the state is subordinate to the community, an indispensable organ of civilised society, but essentially a servant, not a master. That is the doctrine of Magna Charta, of Coke, of Locke, and of the main stream of English political thinking which is skilfully summarised in these pages. An irresponsible executive is certain to abuse its strength. Liberty, as Englishmen have learned long ago, means power cut up into little bits. When the rule of law is overthrown, hideous abuses such as torture reappear.

Mr. Hirst, unlike certain British publicists, is a consistent champion of liberty and therefore a foe of all its foes. We all know people who abhor the Bolsheviks and admire Hitler and Mussolini. We also know people who denounce the German and Italian Dictators, but utter no protest against the cruelties in Russia. Such casuistry stirs our author to

indignation. Tyranny is tyranny, cruelty is cruelty, whether it is practised in the name of the bourgeoisie or of Karl Marx. In his account of the Soviet experiment Mr. Hirst leans heavily on Chamberlin's recent work, *Russia's Iron Age*, which presents a picture of ruthless regimentation in which the individual is dwarfed by the omnipotent state.

The second part of the volume, dealing with "Freedom of Thought and Discussion," reminds us of our immeasurable debt to Milton and Mill, to Jefferson and Voltaire, and to other champions of political and intellectual liberty. Jefferson's motto for the University of Virginia, of which he was the founder, was chosen from the Fourth Gospel: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Political liberty, declares Mr. Hirst, without popular education and the higher learning, is but a poor stunted thing. Self-reliant citizens, with a mind and will of their own, are the best material both in war and peace. In the sternest conflict in history it was the autocratic empires which disappeared. Most of his readers will welcome the virile conclusion of a long and effective argument that no representative government should allow itself to be overthrown by violence. "It would be a betrayal of liberty not to defend it with all the power that free men possess."

The smaller of the two volumes published simultaneously, entitled *Economic Freedom and Private Property*, carries the argument into other fields. Mr. Hirst notes a reaction in favour of *laissez-faire* at the present time as strong as the recent world-wide reaction against it. So far from being out of date, he declares, the principle was never more desired and never more needed than to-day. Trade has been strangled by economic nationalism, as it was strangled by mercantilism in an earlier age. The economists point the way out, but the Governments continue to block the channels. This is all familiar enough, but in emphasising the importance of property he travels beyond the ordinary bounds of economic argument. "Property, liberty and security go together. Strip men of their property, and they are helpless against the tyranny of a bureaucratic state; for property is essential to that independence of character which creates and maintains equal laws and free institutions. . . . History and experience prove that in every country where personal liberty has existed, there has co-existed with it the right to hold property." There is least liberty in Russia, where private property has

gone. Our author is well aware that in capitalistic countries some have far too much property and millions none at all. Socialists maintain that this is inevitable where capitalism rules. Mr. Hirst, on the other hand, seeks the remedy not in the abolition of private property but in its maximum extension. To the complaint that there may not be enough to go round he replies that no individual should be allowed to possess more than a certain amount of land, since "land is a natural monopoly, and its wide distribution tends to promote the welfare, strength and liberty of society." Socialism and Protection, working together, are denounced as dangers to peace and liberty. Believing as he does that we learn from experience, Mr. Hirst summons his readers to hold fast the principles to the defence of which he has devoted a busy life.

G. P. G.

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THE LIBERAL EXPERIMENT*

Swiftly and splendidly Mr. Fisher has brought his three-volume *History of Europe* to a conclusion, and it at once takes rank as an authoritative interpretation of the annals of the greatest of the continents. In his third volume, as in his first and second, the sense of perspective is to be felt throughout, though it leaves us with the steady impression that its narrative is more carefully wrought together. Here is a work to which many of us will turn again and again for a view of the past, for a view of the present in the past, and for a view of the future in the present, which we shall not readily find elsewhere. Of the learning of the author there can be no question, and it were almost impertinent to praise it. Of his insight there cannot be a doubt. Time and again we stop to reflect on the point he had made. The young man reading history dreams that it is a straight line; later he knows it to be a circle in which the present presses on the future, the future on the past. Such is the feeling the book leaves on our mind.

The Whigs used to possess a monopoly of history, which they wrote almost unconsciously from the angle of their own school of thought. Mr. Fisher is a Liberal, and the title of his final volume is *The Liberal Experiment*. He explains that he uses this adjective to denote the system of civil, political and

* *A History of Europe*. By the Rt. Hon. H. A. L. Fisher. Vol. III. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 18s.

religious freedom now firmly established in Britain and the Dominions as well as among the French, the Dutch and the Scandinavian peoples. To this use of the term he faithfully adheres, and he reviews the course of history from the days of the first French—or rather European—revolution to the present moment. He has convinced us—if conviction were necessary—that it is possible to write the story of our generation in a detached manner, detached in the judgment manifested, though not detached in the sense that the author is simply recounting events. He cannot set down a fact without illuminating it by contrast and comparison, though much more often by comparison than by contrast. If he narrates the course of the Revolution of 1789, it is clear that he has also in mind the tiny revolution of 1830, the great revolution of 1848, and the no less great revolutions of our own day. Much as we admire the whole volume, we admire most the comparison of events and of the men who made them. Throughout these pages we are conscious of our intimacy with the men and women who deflect the course of history occasionally in the most extraordinary fashion. We are moved to envy at the way in which the scene is enlivened by portraits painted on a small panel, but painted in an unforgettable fashion.

Whether the author means it or not, much of his book is occupied with the gradual loss of liberty, and in this loss he lays stress on the share taken by the revolution of 1848 in general and by Bismarck in particular. He is not in the least inclined to agree with Gervinus, who deemed the career of the great German statesman as simply an episode. The bent towards dictatorship set in nearly ninety years ago, and our day has seen the working out of this tendency. Just as the Lancastrian experiment in constitutional government was premature, so perhaps was the nineteenth-century experiment. It was comparatively easy to copy our two Houses of Parliament, but was it easy to copy the spirit of compromise that has rendered their working so smooth? Besides, it is abundantly evident that the success of our Parliament mainly depends on the two-party system, and that if we had three parties our system might conceivably break down. What country abroad has the two-party system? Take the country nearest us, and look at the many parties in France and the many cabinets. Broadly speaking, there has been a cabinet a

year from 1871 to 1914, and since the war an even higher average. The last chapter on dictatorships and old democracies is full of thought: the reader must return to it repeatedly if he is to do it full justice. In the epilogue, Mr. Fisher gathers the ideas of his three volumes into a thread, and strings them together. Here is his conclusion:

"Europe, then, has reached a point at which it would seem, as never so clearly in past history, that two alternatives and sharply contrasted destinies await her. She may travel down the road to a new war, or, overcoming passion, prejudice and hysteria, work for a permanent organisation of peace. In either case the human spirit is armed with material power. The developing miracle of science is at our disposal to use or abuse, to make or to mar. With science we may lay civilisation in ruins or enter into a period of plenty and well-being, the like of which has never been experienced by mankind."

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

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THE LADY OF BLEEDING HEART YARD.*

Lady Elizabeth Hatton (1578-1646) is the true heroine, as her present biographer shows, of the legend attaching to Bleeding Heart Yard, Holborn, which the author of the *Ingoldsby Legends* transfers to a Lady Alice Hatton, making her the wife of Queen Elizabeth's dancing Lord Chancellor. He, in reality, was a bachelor, and the Lady Alice married his cousin and namesake, but never owned Hatton House. The sumptuous entertainments given there by Lady Elizabeth, and the charges of dealing with a fashionable sorcerer brought against her and her daughter by their enemies, supply the *motif* for the legend, culminating in its diabolic episode.

The Hatton Estate, and Corfe Castle, together with a very ample jointure, fell to the Lady Elizabeth on the death of her first husband, Sir William Hatton, with whom she had had a brief, happy married life. She continued to bear his name even after her family, the Cecils, had speedily remarried her to the Attorney-General, Sir Edward Coke. The famous lawyer-patriot's tyrannical and dishonest dealings with her property,

* *The Lady of Bleeding Heart Yard*. By Laura Norsworthy. John Murray. 1935. 10s. 6d.

herself and their younger daughter, make extraordinary reading. His biographers have traduced the lady, and this book is frankly a defence of her, based on a careful examination of contemporary records; it certainly enlists the reader's sympathy on her behalf. The tale of Sir Edward's "many discourteyses and unquiett proceedinges"; of his selling of her stepdaughter for £4,000; of his failure to pay her an allowance promised after he had stripped her of her first husband's estate, "besydes falsifieinge of Convayances and diveres wronges," must be read to be believed; we can scarcely wonder that for a time she refused to live with him. Impetuous, strong-willed, sometimes indiscreet, Lady Elizabeth made voluble protests against his injustice to herself; but, before and after he coerced her lovely and beloved fifteen-year-old daughter Frances into marriage with Sir John Villiers (afterwards Viscount Purbeck), she becomes a veritable tigress defending her young. She might have obtained more redress had her antagonists not been the Countess of Buckingham and her son, the infamous royal favourite, whom judges and bishops are here shown treating with the most servile complaisance.

Although her daughter's troubles were no doubt the chief preoccupation of Lady Elizabeth for many years, it must, we think, be admitted that the book suffers somewhat from a division of interest, Frances holding the stage at times while her mother is relegated to the wings. It would take too much space even to outline the younger lady's tragic story, and the truth about her conduct may, perhaps, never be fully established. We see Lady Elizabeth in her happier moments also, enjoying life at Court as the friend of James I's queen, with whom she figured in a masque. Later on the performers in another masque addressed complimentary verses, composed by Ben Jonson, to both Frances and her mother. The intrepid Lady Elizabeth fought no fewer than four Bishops of Ely over the possession of Hatton House, and was imprisoned in the Fleet by the fourth. She was released when the Civil War broke out, in which (as became the widow of the author of the Petition of Right) she sympathised with the Parliamentarians. She did not, happily, live to see the devastating effects of their artillery on Corfe Castle; it had, moreover, by then passed out of her possession.

Mrs. Norsworthy writes in vivacious, sometimes epigrammatic, style, and makes her scenes and characters live.

Kidnappings, flights in disguise, litigations, sudden arrests, fortune-telling ventures follow one another in breathless sequence; one is entertained here, made indignant there. But one is never bored.

E. G. S.

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THE PROGRESS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT.*

On September 9th, 1835, the Municipal Corporations Bill received the Royal Assent; and the centenary of its passage has provided the occasion for a survey of the progress of local government in *A Century of Municipal Progress*, published under the auspices of the National Association of Local Government Officers, and edited by Professor H. J. Laski, Dr. W. Ivor Jennings and Dr. W. A. Robson. "The essential purpose" of this book "is to depict the remarkable growth and development which have taken place in the sphere of local government during the past century, and to evaluate, in the light of that expansion, the work of our local authorities to-day." It is a composite work undertaken by seventeen contributors who are well-known specialists upon the particular branches of municipal activity with which they deal. There is considerable overlapping, and each chapter may be read as an independent monograph. In the result, however, this volume provides comprehensively an invaluable historical, analytical and critical survey of municipal enterprise.

"The history of local government," writes Dr. J. L. Hammond in his chapter on "The Social Background," "is traced through a series of great names, through the patient work of men behind the scenes rather than the splendid triumph of actors on the stage. It has no pitched battles leaving behind them heroic echoes." Yet the Municipal Corporations Act was a revolutionary measure and the necessary precedent to any such patient constructive work. The oligarchic, corrupt and private-minded corporations were replaced by public-spirited councils elected upon a basis more democratic than the Parliamentary franchise. If at first their powers were strictly

* *A Century of Municipal Progress*. Allen & Unwin. 21s. net.

confined, they steadily absorbed the bulk of the social services which the succeeding century provided in increasing quantity. Great credit for this elastic capacity must be given to the successful working of the committee system, discussed by Professor Laski, "due to that curious combination of amateur and expert which is characteristic of English self-government." The problem to be solved a century ago, and in a less degree to-day, is well conveyed by Engels' vivid description of conditions in a Manchester slum in 1844, quoted by Sir Ernest Simon in his admirable survey of "Housing and Civic Planning."

The cottages are old, dirty, and of the smallest sort, the streets uneven, fallen into ruts and in part without drains or pavement; masses of refuse, offal and sickening filth lie among standing pools in all directions; the atmosphere is poisoned by the effluvia from these, and laden and darkened by the smoke of a dozen tall factory chimneys. A horde of ragged women and children swarm about here, as filthy as the swine that thrive upon the garbage heaps and in the puddles. . . . The race that lives in these ruinous cottages, behind broken windows, mended with oilskin, sprung doors, and rotten door-posts, or in dark, wet cellars, in measureless filth and stench . . . must really have reached the lowest stage of humanity.

The work of regeneration proceeded slowly by piecemeal legislation and voluntary effort, impelled by a variety of motives. Fear, created by cholera epidemics and the Chartist movement, played its part. But the principal cause was the growing recognition of social responsibility. Sir George Newman, in his authoritative contribution on "The Health of the People," while discussing the advance of preventive medicine, concludes that advance in national health has "been dependent upon the social evolution of man more than upon the growing knowledge of science."

During the generation succeeding 1835, the elementary health services, such as public sanitation and the provision of water, were being established; and it was not until 1868 that the slum question was first touched upon by general legislation. As Sir Ernest Simon shows, the problem was not seriously attacked before the war. Moreover, although a quarter of the existing houses in the country have been built during the last fifteen years, the root evil of the slums must continue to persist while high rents prevail.

The future of municipal enterprise is discussed by Dr. Robson, who visualises an unlimited field of expansion. In particular he foresees, and would welcome, the growth of municipal industries and, what is less controversial, a greater cultural activity. Lord Snell complains, in his realistic sketch of a modern town council, that "no English city has so far established a municipal theatre," while Sir Frederic Kenyon, in dealing with municipal museums and art galleries, deplores their generally low standard. The truth is, he writes, that "until quite recently, local authorities, with a few praiseworthy exceptions, took very little interest in the museums for which they were responsible, and grudged expenditure upon them." The post-war development, however, of public libraries, treated by Mr. L. Stanley Jast, is more encouraging. Dr. Robson also maintains that local government areas have become inadequate in size and shape for efficient administration and that each area should be subject only to one authority. He foresees, particularly in relation to "planning," a greater co-ordination between the local authority and the central department. The methods of central control by Whitehall are discussed by Dr. Jennings, who shows no appreciation of the dangers of delegated legislation and dismisses its critics as mere defenders of property rights.

Among other contributions must be mentioned Mr. Herbert Morrison's chapter on "Highways and Transportation," Professor Frank Smith's account of educational development, the administration of the Poor Law, by Dr. Gilbert Slater, and Dr. H. Finer's article on "The Police and Public Safety." In his valuable sketch of financial development Sir Josiah Stamp can pay a tribute to "our fine system of local government finance."

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JANE ADDAMS.*

When Jane Addams of Chicago died in May last, a problem of great difficulty confronted the biographer to whom she had entrusted her papers a few years before the end. Was he to make a complete survey, covering the extraordinary range of Miss Addams's activities, presenting a full picture of Hull

* *Jane Addams: A Biography*. By James Weber Linn. Appleton-Century. 15s.

House Settlement and its influence on Chicago and the United States, and following the foundress along the many lines of her later work; or to content himself with a single volume, repeating as little as possible of the story which she herself had told in *Twenty Years at Hull House* and its sequel? Professor Linn has chosen the latter alternative and there is no doubt that his decision is wise. The full record of Jane Addams as pioneer and inspired architect of community will be a large task of social history. What we have is a portrait of the Abbess of Hull House, the great citizen, the beloved neighbour.

It is the life story of an American woman who seems, as we look back over the forty-five years since the foundation of her Settlement, to have been marvellously adapted to her place and time. Jane Addams left college in 1881, as ready in spirit for her appointed task as she was ignorant of the form that it would take. The direct inspiration for Hull House came from Barnett and Toynbee Hall, but the West Side of Chicago was and still is a region utterly unlike the East End of London, so that the maker of America's first social settlement had to mark out her own path and at every stage to combat difficulties that had no parallel in the cities of Europe. Jane Addams was an experimentalist who knew from the beginning that civic reform and social welfare are alike futile unless organically related to the needs and habits of men and women—or, as she would have preferred to put it, unless rooted in the folk-ways. No great initiator was ever less of a dogmatist. She was humble and full of good humour—a very simple person, as she always asserted. Hull House became a focus for Chicago, and a place of pilgrimage from all lands. It was Jane Addams's home-centre, and after the War the place from which she directed the manifold enterprises of peace and international effort to which latterly all her energies were devoted. Professor Linn, a near kinsman of the middle generation, has woven the essentials of the whole into a vivid picture, which is all the more effective because done with a fullness of personal knowledge that is never allowed to intrude. The book is easy and refreshing to read. It should reach an audience extending far beyond the ranks of those who are directly interested in the social conflict of our age or in the organisation of world peace.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Dr. Percy Dearmer discusses the basis, character and future of Christian churches, and in particular the Church of England, in his stirring book on *Our National Church*.* It will doubtless arouse adverse criticism among the extremes of Church opinion, but with equal certainty it will be welcomed by that great body of laity which views with dismay the continuation of religious separatism and exclusiveness. Dr. Dearmer lays his emphasis upon the corporate fellowship of Christianity "not swollen by accretions or clouded by clashing theologies." The creeds are "in the main safeguards against theological aberration. They are not the Gospel," and "for the flesh and blood of the Christian religion we must go to the New Testament." Dr. Dearmer does not ask for dogmatic unity, but rather welcomes diversity. There is no exclusive road to truth, and diversity of approach by particular groups or sects brings lasting strength and fullness to the corporate whole. "It is only their separatedness that is evil." Upon this broad basis of comprehension may be included not only the extremes of Anglican opinion but the great Nonconformist communities and the churches overseas. Upon the question of home reunion, Dr. Dearmer is pessimistic of any strictly legal unification. "Independent Churches exist, and their existence seems to be inevitable in this free country." In the international sphere the movement for closer collaboration, for unity without uniformity, steadily proceeds, in particular among the National Churches as exemplified in the Lambeth Conferences and in the close relations between the Protestant Episcopal Churches and the Orthodox Church. The Lausanne Conference of 1927 bears promise of even more extensive fellowship. Only the Roman Catholic Church remains aloof and unresponsive to the call for unity. Dr. Dearmer gives, on the whole, an encouraging picture of the future, in which, by their positive collaboration, the Churches can gain for Christian morality a growing influence in a cynical and erring world.

India and Britain: a Moral Challenge,† by C. F. Andrews, is written for students, and is in the form of a series of conversations between students, British and Indian, led by the author. All speak very frankly and the questions in their different aspects are faced courageously. Reduced to simple broad principles for fresh minds who have not the background of use and wont in India, the right way seems plain enough; essential complications are barely discussed, and large parts of the Indian problem are not brought into the picture. The moral evil of foreign rule is discussed in an early chapter round a quotation from Sir John Seeley: "Subjection for a long time to a foreign yoke is one of the most potent causes of national deterioration." From this comes the general tone of the book, that most of the troubles of India are due

* Nisbet. 6s. net.

† Student Christian Movement Press. 5s.

to the British Government. This is recognised and corrected from time to time. Perhaps the most valuable discussion is on the Colour Bar, especially in South Africa and East Africa. Many instances are given, but we need to take heed to the lesson much nearer home. The fact that an ordinary Indian gentleman cannot get a room in an ordinary English hotel, as is largely the case in London, points to a tremendous prejudice on the part of the ordinary, quite ordinary, English public. As one of the students says: "If only this hateful racial stumbling-block, in all its different forms—religious as well as political—were removed, and we were ready to treat one another as simple human beings requiring sympathy, it would revolutionise the whole world."

The book is dedicated: "To the new generation of men and women in India and Britain." It will only be by their fresh, open minds and single resolve that this colour feeling can be slowly subdued.

The purpose of *A History of Abyssinia*,* by Mr. A. H. M. Jones and Miss Elizabeth Monroe, "is to present to the general public an accurate and comprehensive account of the history of Abyssinia within moderate compass." In the result this little book provides a careful historical sketch of an ancient race and an admirable background to the Italian dispute. Mr. A. H. M. Jones is responsible for two-thirds of the volume. Writing in language learned and lucid, he discusses the origin of the early kingdom, in particular the legendary descent of the dynasty from Solomon and the authentic conversion to Christianity by a disciple of Athanasius in the fourth century. He goes on to deal with the periods of isolation and menace which characterise Abyssinian history. Modern European interference and the internal consolidation of the Empire in the late nineteenth century are dealt with by Miss Monroe, who outlines the course of events up to the Italian invasion last autumn. As an historical synopsis, this excellent little volume makes no claim to comprehension and "much has perforce been omitted, and a certain dogmatism on obscure points . . . has been inevitable."

The volume upon Education† in the *In My Time* Series has been contributed by Mr. J. Howard Whitehouse, whose high reputation as an educationalist renders this book of particular interest. He combines a concise outline of the English educational system with his own views upon its principal features and the direction in which progress and reform should move. Much of his comment will receive a wide measure of acceptance, such as his plea for raising the school age and the general provision of secondary education. The present system "is a ladder. It should be a highway." On the other hand his attack upon the mildest form of school fagging and his condemnation of the O.T.C. as, *inter alia*, rearing boys "to believe that warfare still remains the normal means for national progress" are examples of more provocative

* Oxford University Press. 6s. net.

† Rich and Cowan. 6s. net.

views. The main theme which dominates this little book is the need for a wider cultural basis in the curriculum and life of the school. At Bembridge School, where Mr. Whitehouse is the Warden, instruction in arts and crafts, discussion of topical questions, and encouragement of both communal work and individual initiative claim a large share of the school life. Mr. Whitehouse is inclined to minimise the place of such activities in public and other secondary schools where the production of the good citizen, fitted both to appreciate and increase the fruits of civilisation, is being steadily promoted.

* * * * *

Dr. Henry W. Clark's book, *A Short History of the British Empire*,* will be found useful by the student and general reader who look for an informative account of the social and political history of the Empire. In the first hundred pages imperial development is discussed as a whole, "growing by accretion from its small beginnings to the length and breadth it possesses to-day." The remaining two-thirds of the volume is devoted to the history of each constituent part. A work of this size is not intended to be exhaustive. No mention, for example, is made of the concession, last February, of the Dindings in the Straits Settlements to the Federated Malay State of Perak. Brevity, however, should not lead to confusion, as in the statement that "the Simon Report recommended a Federal Constitution for the whole of India, British India and independent States alike, with many reservations and safeguards." The recommendations were limited, of course, to British India, although the Commission envisaged an all-India Federation as the ultimate constitutional goal. This solution was made subsequently possible by the consent of the Princes and embodied in the new Government of India Act to which Dr. Clark is unable to refer. The author, however, has collected together a quantity of historical information which, in particular connection with the history of the Crown colonies, is frequently difficult of access.

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Mr. H. J. Massingham in his recent book *Through the Wilderness*† aims at showing what is wrong with country life (and so the basis of national life), through the medium of his own experience. He builds a house and garden and with deliberate care and judgment fits the whole into the landscape. He deals with the relationship "between man and nature in our own country, its fruitfulness and the disastrous consequences of disturbing it." The theme takes him back to early civilisation and to certain of the emblems which have endured throughout the ages. He thus deplores the absorption of the countryside by the urban vandal and discusses the danger in larger spheres of the break with Nature which contemporary progress has enforced. The book is full of the charm of the real country and contains also many descriptions of bird life.

* Muller. 7s. 6d.

† Cobden-Sanderson. 15s. net.

THE DEATH OF HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE V.

ON behalf of those who are responsible for THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW and of those who contribute to its pages, we desire to express the deep grief which we share with all our fellow-subjects at the passing of our greatly beloved King, George V.

The twenty-five years of His Majesty's reign were marked by a succession of great crises and of far-reaching changes. He had hardly ascended the Throne when the constitutional issue of the House of Lords arose. Then followed the Great War, with its unprecedented dangers and unparalleled exertions. Then, after the War, the Statute of Westminster made such a vital alteration in the relations of the Dominions and Commonwealths with Great Britain that the Crown has become the link which holds them all together as a Commonwealth of free peoples.

King George played exactly and admirably the part that was demanded of him by all these searching calls. He did so both as a strictly Constitutional Sovereign and as a man whose patriotic devotion and deep sympathies allayed bitterness in politics, inspired steadfastness in effort, and made the link of Empire golden because it was forged by a deep and ever-growing affection between the King and his subjects throughout the world.

These events have been so momentous as to thrust other great emergencies and movements of the past reign into the background. In relation to them all it was the King's character, above all, that counted, with its courage, sincerity, good sense and good feeling. By the possession and exercise of these qualities King George won for himself an unequalled place in the hearts of all his subjects. The wonderful outburst of respect and love which marked the Jubilee of his reign is said to have surprised as well as enheartened the King, but it gave evidence of the way in which the British peoples respond to dutiful devotion, genuine sympathy and private virtues in those who rule over them.

Our deepest sympathy goes forth to Her Majesty the Queen—the ideal helpmeet of her husband both in private and in public life—and to the Royal Family in this time of sorrow. With loyalty and hope we salute King Edward VIII, and wish him a long and prosperous reign.

THE EDITORS.

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GREAT BRITAIN AND GENEVA.

THE escapade of Sir Samuel Hoare and M. Laval is at an end. M. Laval has been whitewashed by a small majority of the French Chamber. Sir Samuel has been jettisoned by his colleagues, the British House of Commons has authorised the Government to try again, and Geneva has returned to the consideration of sanctions. But though the flame has died down, the fire is not extinct, and since a second outbreak would not be so easily dealt with it is advisable to consider the circumstances which led up to the explosion.

On October 3rd the autocrat who rules Italy threw down a double challenge to international democracy assembled at Geneva. He had always been on uneasy terms with the League, alternately blessing and banning it, and a successful defiance of its power and obligations would call the attention of the world to the irresistible strength of Fascist Italy, and assert its ability to achieve *his* ends by any methods which he chose to accomplish that double purpose. He had some reasons for thinking he would be successful, and if those reasons have been forgotten by us, they were very present in the mind of himself and his advisers. In 1926 Great Britain agreed with Italy, both being members of the League and aware of the text and implications of the preamble to the Covenant, to assign to each other certain economic interests in Abyssinia, which was also by then a member of the League. Italy in accepting this delimitation of somebody else's property concluded by "trusting that this principle may be continually further extended for the development of British and Italian interests in Ethiopia." When Abyssinia informed the League of these goings on, Sir A. Chamberlain, then Foreign Secretary, hastened to assure Geneva that there was no intention to coerce Abyssinia, as it was merely a little "agreement in the interests of all three parties." Italy in explaining to the League her share in the matter was more cynical or more foresighted, and claimed that the British Government (Mr. Baldwin was then Prime Minister) "had recognised an exclusive sphere of Italian economic influence in

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certain parts of Abyssinia." Both British and Italian Ministers insisted that their arrangements were only valid as against each other. No doubt that was the British intention and view at the time, but since then there has somehow always been an admission by us that Italy is entitled to have "interests" in Ethiopia. With these recollections in mind Signor Mussolini was perhaps entitled to think himself on safe ground with Great Britain, despite certain warnings given to him in the spring by the British Ambassador, whom as a former General Secretary of the League he was inclined to discount. As for France, the only other member of the League with whom he must reckon, he could depend upon the "affectionate" personal regard of M. Laval, on the subsidised friendship of a large and influential section of the French Press, upon the fears and inclinations of the "Right" parties, and on the very efficient condition of the German army, as guarantees against any effective resistance to his plans from Paris. As far as the other European States members were concerned, none was strong enough to offer single-handed objection or to command a unified resistance. The way up till September must have seemed fairly clear. For six months Italy had armed, had sent troops and stores on a campaign scale to East Africa, and no State member of the League had exercised its "friendly right" to draw attention to potential disturbance. The only possible remonstrance which might have caused an experienced statesman some anxiety was the British peace ballot asserting an amazing public opinion: but then from the Mussolini viewpoint dictators were there to deal with opinion, domestic or foreign.

All this brings us to September 4th, when the Walwal arbitrators unanimously declared there was no cause of quarrel between Italy and Abyssinia. Next day, however, Italy produced her memorandum of complaints (largely faked as time has shown), and a week later Sir Samuel Hoare declared the attitude of Great Britain in terms which left no doubt that his country had resumed the moral leadership of Europe and the League. How great a difference this made to League policy was shown in the reaction to Italy's actual invasion of Abyssinia on October 3rd. The decision as to "aggression" was unanimous, and though three or four States refused to face the issue of sanctions, there could be no doubt that the shameless disregard of pledged word, of accepted obligations,

of every sentiment which connotes honour and gives validity to international undertakings had aroused the conscience of the world. The successive Committees of Five, of Six, of Thirteen, and later of Eighteen (from the Co-ordinating Committee) revealed a determination to put an end to such international brigandage. Sanctions, the authorised answer to aggression, were debated, agreed to and gradually extended and enforced.

During October the position of the French Prime Minister became increasingly difficult. With him and many of his supporters the first and main question was how to rescue Italy from the pit into which she had thrown herself. On the other hand he depended for the existence of his Government on the day-to-day votes of those who counted a whole-hearted compliance with League obligations as the chief bulwark of French safety. He set his sails to catch every breath of favouring opinion, and, while he declared in calculated language his devotion to the League, he emphasised the first duty to the League as demanding the reconciliation of Italy. On November 2nd, at the instance of Belgium, the Co-ordinating Committee nominated, or as M. Laval insists "encouraged," France and Britain for the mission of seeking a solution of peace. The Committee in accepting the proposal omitted to record it in formal terms. M. van Zeeland had said that efforts for conciliation should be under the auspices and within the framework of the League, "so why should not the League entrust the responsible leaders of the two great countries with the mission of seeking, under its auspices and control and in the spirit of the Covenant the elements of a solution" which the League, Italy and Ethiopia might accept?

Every word of this suggestion should have prevented the proposals, and the methods of M. Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare. Even so Señor Madariaga voiced the general uneasiness, and concluded by "supporting the desire expressed here that our negotiators may pursue their efforts with a view to preparing the drafts of plans which will come back here for discussion in the Council." Though the implication was clear that the mission of the negotiators was limited to drafts *ad referendum*, there was unluckily no formal resolution, and technically perhaps no transgression of instructions took place later. But unless the aims of M. Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare were *ab initio* identical in respect of Italy, the latter when charged

with this specific mission should have been doubly on his guard. He must have known that the wishes of the people of England as expressed in the peace ballot (a formidable political document), during the election, and thereat accepted by the Prime Minister, were not in truth reconcilable with the views quite openly expressed by M. Laval. If Sir Samuel had referred to the Co-ordinating Committee debate, he could have realised the anxiety there felt as to the possible nature of the negotiator's proposals. It is unfortunate that no one in the House of Commons debate dealt with this question of the instructions given to the negotiators, or even with the propriety of a British Cabinet Minister accepting a mandate—there is no other suitable word—from an international committee. The point is not so narrow as it looks, and had consideration been given to it Sir Samuel might still be Foreign Secretary.

Having been offered and having accepted this mission, the British and French Ministers appeared to have turned the matter over to their advisers, and immersed, the one in a General Election, and the other in a daily struggle for official existence, they seem to have waited for some opening which might justify their intervention. What the circumstances were which brought about the eventual meeting in Paris seem wrapt in quite unnecessary mystery. Sir Samuel Hoare's statement in Parliament does not at all tally with Mr. Neville Chamberlain's account given two days later at Birmingham, and this in turn partly agrees with and differs from M. Laval's statement in the French Chamber on December 28th. Sir Samuel told the House of Commons that he did not want to go to Paris, that he disliked the practice of the Foreign Minister conducting negotiations in a foreign capital, and that he was in urgent need of rest. But he was pressed on all sides to go, and in such a way as to make refusal impossible. He emphasised the necessity of his visit by saying that "the conversation began in an atmosphere of threatened war." In all this there is no element of a casual interruption of a journey. Moreover, M. Laval told the Chamber that Sir Samuel was accompanied by the Permanent Head of the Foreign Office and the Foreign Office expert. There must therefore have been some careful preparation for this meeting at the Quai D'Orsay. But another part of M. Laval's pronouncement suggests the casual nature of the interview—"Sir Samuel Hoare passed through Paris and we had conversations."

Nothing vital, nothing urgent, no atmosphere of war is present in this description.

Now turn to Mr. Neville Chamberlain. "Sir Samuel had to pass through Paris on his way to take a holiday, we thought he might do something first of all to elucidate this matter of whether other countries were prepared to take risks . . . and to help along discussions about the possibility of peace proposals. He went over on Saturday, was delayed by weather and didn't get through until much later than he was expected. He postponed his departure for Switzerland where he was going for a holiday the next night, and spent part of Sunday in discussion with the French Prime Minister and in the end came to an agreement." Here we get half-way back to the casual interview at which "something" might be done to "help along" discussions. But then what becomes of Sir Robert Vansittart and Mr. Petersen unless they, too, were casually interrupted on their holidays? It seems so futile to try to keep up a hush-hush mystery which does not and need not exist. The fact has emerged that there was a real difference of policy between the objects of France as understood and advanced by M. Laval, and the objects of the people of England as proclaimed at the election and accepted, as was supposed, by Mr. Baldwin. In this divergence of views Sir Samuel Hoare seems to have sympathised with M. Laval. He feared a general war in Europe, and a particular war between Italy and England. He hated what he called the "controversy" existing. Of the proposals themselves he said they were neither British nor French. Neither M. Laval nor he liked many parts of them, but they were the only basis on which it was even remotely likely to be able to start a peace discussion: at all events it was the minimum on which M. Laval was prepared to proceed (a significant admission). He then defended the proposals, not as being the minimum to which he had worked the French down—but as reasonable in themselves—indeed, he described them as "a basis of discussion." It is indeed lucky for Ethiopia, and League reputation that he will have no further opportunity for generosity so little acceptable to Great Britain herself. The discussion ended on Sunday night, the formulas—to use M. Laval's word—were agreed, and the next morning Sir Samuel woke up to find that a careful indiscretion had enabled the Press to publish the terms on which France and Great Britain, as deputies of the League, proposed to obtain peace.

We are told that the Cabinet were greeted on Monday morning, December 9th, with these peace terms, and that flabbergasted by them, and unwilling to let down an absent colleague, they accepted them, not realising their full import. Fortunate indeed for them was the French Press indiscretion. But for that manœuvre the communication to Rome (which there would have been easily time to stop), and to Abyssinia (in which they urged the Emperor to accept a defeat which had not yet occurred) would have been laid before the League as witness to the real verdict of England on the Italian aggression. But more fortunate still was the existence of an organised and informed public opinion, which in a few hours of spontaneous and genuine whirlwind indignation blew away the mists which obscured from their representatives and servants at the Foreign Office the wishes and intentions of their masters, the people of England.

Both the English and French Governments have survived a storm of exceptional character and force, and both have learned, it may be hoped, a lesson. If so, the unhappy task of imposing and enforcing sanctions will proceed with celerity and effect, all the more because France has plainly shown her disappointment at the cool rejection by the Italians of every conciliatory offer. Nothing could be more calculated than Mussolini's pronouncement on December 30th to the Italian Cabinet to harden French discontent. He is reported to have said that the provisional (Paris) proposals were very far from satisfying the minimum exigencies of Italy. Surely, unless he was ignorant, and the assumption is absurd, that these proposals had been unanimously turned down by the League only a few days previously, a more provocative remark could not have been made. It would almost seem as if he believed he could hack his way through to Addis Ababa despite Europe and Abyssinia, insolvency and privations, French hesitation and British firmness.

Meanwhile the war continues. It is not easy to estimate what has been the result of the three months' fighting. The latest statement by Mussolini to the Italian Cabinet is that their line is now consolidated one hundred miles from the original frontier. It would seem therefore that it has been pushed forward at the average rate of a mile a day for the three months, and this in respect of the easiest part of Abyssinia over which to advance. The cost of conquest at the

rate of expenditure admitted by the Italian Government, viz. £400,000 a day, must now amount to £40 million at least.* The cost in men is more problematical. The Suez Canal authorities report that 25,000 men have returned north out of 250,000 sent south. Workmen as well as soldiers are probably included in both totals. The numbers given as lost in fighting are small, and the majority of killed and wounded are stated to be Eritreans. But the number of serious engagements has been few, and if the Emperor Selassie's plan of avoiding them is continued, the number of actual battle casualties will give little indication of the real losses on either side. It is ominous that the percentage of killed to wounded is ten to one, and as the difficulty of the ground increases, that percentage is not likely to diminish. While the superiority of mechanical movement, artillery and stores is overwhelmingly with the Italians, it demands and causes an immense strain upon the man power and health of their forces. There can be no pleasure in contemplating the failure of European troops before African levies, however bad may be the cause in which the former are engaged. The potential racial results would be most serious. They would profoundly affect our own and the French colonial empire, and endanger the peace of the Union of South Africa. But it is impossible to underrate the combined effect of patriotism, climate, knowledge of the *terrain*, and local mobility in a conflict where the invaders have no motive for their campaign save obedience to orders, and no incentive to victory save personal safety. The recent activities of the Ethiopians show that their spirit and courage has not been broken, and in the hand-to-hand fighting there has been no shirking and little quarter. The change of Italian commanders was probably due to the military stalemate, and the necessity for moral and material reconditioning. It is certain that petrol requirements have exceeded estimates threefold, and the necessity for mechanical transport for everything and everybody was not sufficiently foreseen. Nor was the effect of high altitudes, even upon some of the Alpini, sufficiently allowed for. Such at least is the criticism heard, and since it corresponds as I know to French and Spanish experience in the Riff and the Atlas, there is much probability of its accuracy. I do not recall any other modern campaign in which at the end of three months the winning side demanded for

* £10,000,000 increase two days ago was added to the Italian estimates.

itself an "indispensable pause" for rest and refreshment.

From the military to the diplomatic front is a brief but necessary journey. The Council, as M. Laval has reminded us, does not meet till January 20th, and its principal duty will be to consider the working of existing sanctions and the imposition of new ones, especially as regards oil, iron, copper and coal. This is a meeting postponed at the request of M. Laval himself. But if he no longer asks for the postponement of the meeting, he has told the French Chamber pretty plainly that, if he can help it, the question of oil, "which is not immediate," should not arise; for if it did, the question of mobilisation, a question for the Deputies rather than the Government, would arise also. As for sanctions, France had enforced these and was ready to continue doing so. From other sources we learn that Switzerland has been limiting her trade with Italy, while the U.S.A., a neutral so far as the League is concerned, has been extending hers. In the case of oil indeed, the export of oil, crude and refined, has increased threefold. Since oil is the key to all Italian movement in Abyssinia, if the League wishes to stop hostilities it will be bound, despite M. Laval, to consider the question of stopping it. It would seem that the question put by Great Britain to Mediterranean Powers as to whether they would come to her assistance if attacked when carrying out League obligations is of great and subtle importance. As she is only likely to be so attacked when stopping oil, the Government of Britain must be considering the carrying out of that sanction at no distant date.

Reluctant as everyone in this country will be to participate in any act which may end in hostilities between the League and Italy, we are convinced that the Italian case is a test one, which, if not grappled with now, will reappear very soon in some even more serious form. Conciliation has been tried up to and beyond all reasonable limits. If recourse to arms is forced upon the League, and if through our commanding naval strength we become the target for the senseless anger of frustrated ambition, we must defend our common obligations to that system of mutual consultation and reliance which is embodied in the Covenant. It is not the master but the servant of a new international polity, which may indeed to many be still an ideal, but which, if it can survive the present assault, will to-morrow be the impregnable citadel of a new and wiser world order.

CHARLES E. HOBHOUSE.

FRANCE'S COMING ELECTIONS.

FRANCE has already entered on the electoral period. A few months hence the people will go to the polls, and in the interval every decision of Parliament will be influenced by the prospect of this popular appeal. Both from the domestic and the foreign viewpoint the fact may be unfortunate. In Great Britain there is some elasticity as to the date of the elections, and on a number of occasions it has proved to be excellent not only in the interest of a party, but also in the interest of good government, to choose the fitting moment on the predominating issue. But in France there is—speaking broadly—very little choice, since normally the elections must be held within the two months which precede the expiration of the powers of the four-year Chamber. It is not, of course, impossible to change the date—Clemenceau obtained the extension of the Chamber towards the end of the war—but in anything like ordinary circumstances the rule of four-year parliaments must be followed. For this reason there has been a great deal of talk recently of passing a law by which the Deputies will be elected for six instead of four years. It has even been suggested that the existing Chamber, in passing such a Bill, should make it applicable to itself. Many Deputies would rejoice in the prolongation of Parliament, but the objections are obvious. It would be regarded as a breach of faith with the electors. The proceeding would be of doubtful legality. Besides, in the ranks of the parties, the would-be Deputies whose voices carry weight would not lightly accept the postponement of their candidature.

On the other hand, the demand has frequently been heard for special elections before the expiration of the four years. The advantages of a brusque appeal to the people, particularly in times of crisis, have been pointed out. The long state of uncertainty, of intrigue, of political calculations, to which may be sacrificed the interests of the country, would thus be curtailed. It would be better to know precisely where we are at the earliest possible moment. But there, again, are considerable difficulties. The Constitution does not forbid the recourse to elections whenever they may be deemed necessary. On the contrary, it is specifically laid down that the President of the Republic, with the consent of the Senate, may dissolve the Chamber. In practice, however, the provision has on one

occasion only been put into operation, and the consequence was the condemnation of President MacMahon, who thereupon felt himself obliged to resign. His action, though fully justified by the texts, was regarded as equivalent to a *coup d'état*. The bogey of personal authority has since compelled Presidents to abandon the prerogative. Certainly the menace of dissolution of the Chamber has been employed, notably by the ex-President Doumergue when he was Prime Minister. It was reported that he carried in his pocket the decree of dissolution ready for use should the Chamber vote against him in circumstances which appeared to make government impossible. Whether this be so or not, whether President Lebrun was willing to run such a risk, nothing came of it, and the Doumergue Cabinet broke up in due season like any ordinary Cabinet. The same threat has been heard lately, but it has had little effect.

It is not easy to write of French politics except in general terms, for at any moment the situation may alter. Who knows whether Pierre Laval will be Prime Minister when this article is published? Who knows whether France will not be in the throes of a political crisis? Undoubtedly there are all the makings of a political crisis. In December M. Laval, by a remarkable speech in the Chamber on foreign affairs, won a victory that was unexpected in many quarters. Almost immediately afterwards Parliament, having voted the Budget for 1936, rose. It met again in the middle of January, when it was hoped by the adversaries of the Government to overthrow the Laval Cabinet. On the 20th of the month the fateful Council of the League of Nations was convoked at Geneva. But on the 19th of the month the Executive Committee of the Radical Party was called to elect its new President. It will be remembered that Edouard Herriot resigned from the Presidency of his party ostensibly on account of a trivial personal incident, but in reality because his position as President of the Radical Party, the majority of which is opposed to the policy of M. Laval, was becoming increasingly incompatible with his position as a member of the Laval Government. No man can serve two masters, and the strain on the loyalty of M. Herriot to his nominal chief, with whom he was plainly in disaccord, was reaching breaking point. At the same time, as head of the Parliamentary group, he could hardly continue to watch the bulk of his fellow Radicals casting their votes against the

Government. Especially was the contradiction hard to support in that his sympathies lay with the majority of his own party. His resignation from the Presidency already appeared to be the beginning of a split, not so much in the party as in the Cabinet. For the party had to find its unity before the elections, whereas the Government, composed of men belonging to different parties, seemed doomed to disunity some time before the elections. The dilemma that presented itself was, therefore, that if M. Herriot allowed himself to be re-elected President of the party, his resignation from the Government would be more or less obligatory, and if he was not re-elected President of the party, his membership of the Government would be a meaningless anomaly.

Sooner or later the problem of whether M. Laval should be permitted to remain in power until the elections, or should be replaced by a Radical who would "make" the elections, was bound to be posed in an acute form. There are more ways than one of destroying a Ministry in France. A straight vote which puts the Ministry in a minority is the simplest and the more usual method. But the resignation of a prominent Minister is equally effective, and on a number of occasions the Radicals who accept ministerial posts have resorted to this method with success.

Although there have been strenuous attacks on the Laval Cabinet, I have always believed, for my part, that it would survive until the present year. Nobody was anxious to take the place of the Prime Minister. It was foreseen that whatever Government was in office would have to shoulder responsibilities and take decisions that would be unpopular. Therefore the premature accession of a Left Government, which has always been arithmetically possible, would be tactically foolish. A prominent leader of the Left frankly explained to me last summer precisely why he was opposed to the defeat of M. Laval until the last moment. The Communists, the Socialists, and the Radicals were then endeavouring to construct a solid Front Populaire, and many of the members of these groups were clamouring for the speediest possible overthrow of the Government. But the wiser leader was engaged in holding back his troops. In the first place, as he pointed out to me, the Stavisky scandals and disturbances of February 1934 were not sufficiently forgotten. To take office too soon might provoke a popular reaction in which the Croix de Feu,

the Jeunesses Patriotes, and other organisations judged to be associated with the Right, would play a part. Serious social troubles in this case were not to be ruled out altogether; in any case, after the failure of the Left, a strong Government might be in power at the moment of the elections and carry the country with it. The whole art of political manœuvring consisted in letting the existing Government stay long enough to be the victim of popular disapproval, and to replace it at the right strategical hour.

It is notorious that the Left has been unfortunate in the matter of public finances. It may or may not be true that financial interests have deliberately worked against the Left; but it is certainly true that the appearance of the Left, or even the anticipation of the appearance of the Left, has been marked by financial difficulties. It was between 1924 and 1926 that the franc fell to its present level—or, to be more accurate, far below its present level—and that M. Poincaré had to be invited to save the franc. When the Left won the elections in 1932 the recurrent fears for the franc were again apparent. Several times since the resignation of M. Doumergue the Treasury has run dry and the principal rôle of M. Laval (though it has since been overshadowed by the Italo-Abyssinian question) was to restore, by a series of decree-laws, the French finances. He succeeded, though when the Chamber resumed its sittings in November there was, through fear of the Left, once more a drain on the gold resources of the country. But now the Budget has been passed, and the needs of the Treasury have been adequately supplied. Apprehension is still felt, for there is a persistent campaign in favour of devaluation. Nevertheless M. Laval has carried out his mission, and it is believed that the financial inconvenience of substituting a Left Government is far less than it would have been a month or so ago. Therefore the question of his successor can be safely envisaged. Should that successor be frankly a man of the Left—an expression which is admittedly nebulous, but which must serve—or would it be better that he should be a Moderate sufficiently complacent to enable the Left to conduct its electoral operations in propitious conditions? Indeed it would not be altogether paradoxical to ask whether M. Laval himself might not be supple enough to be his own successor as the hostage of the Left?

It would be absurd to make predictions which may already,

when this article appears, have been fulfilled or falsified. It is merely my intention, in indicating some of the elements of the situation, to show that electoral considerations must from now onwards dominate the political scene in France. Some of the counsellors of the Left have actually suggested that they should not openly take power before the elections have given them an unquestionable majority, and the problem is simply how that majority is to be obtained. The alliance of Communists, Socialists, and Radicals is not quite as satisfactory as was hoped. Between the Communists and the Socialists there are grave points of difference, not necessarily doctrinal but chiefly electoral. After all, they are rivals. As for the Radicals, though the sympathies of many of them extend far Leftwards, the real substance of the party remains bourgeois. It is possible that a common programme is superfluous, and that one need not examine too closely the points of contact of the different groups which are chiefly animated by a detestation of the extra-Parliamentary, and to some extent anti-Parliamentary, leagues which profess to be concerned with the problem of good government. Indeed, even on the electoral *terrain*, I have considerable doubts as to the unity of these strange bed-fellows. In the constituencies a Radical will not mind being elected by Communist votes, nor will a Communist protest if he receives Socialist votes. But wherever a Socialist, a Communist, or a Radical thinks he has the smallest chance of succeeding at the expense of another member of the Front Populaire, he will certainly fight that member. In the game of give-and-take, it is understood in advance that one takes all one can and gives as little as possible.

Thus, in practice, it would be well to discount very largely the working of the Front Populaire. Nor should the political importance of the so-called leagues, such as the Croix de Feu, be exaggerated. Most of them assert they have no specific political significance. In a negative sense, they exist only in opposition to the menace of Marxism in all its varieties, and to corruption and camaraderie in Parliament and in the administrative services. They declare themselves for clean government, the separation of powers, and the maintenance of order. Although they are defended by the Right, they disclaim any partisan motive. They would wish to be regarded as associations of vigilant citizens. Nor have they ostensibly any wish to seize power for themselves. To describe them as

Fascist may be effective, but it is not strictly true. Nevertheless, it is obvious that circumstances may force them to take up a more definite attitude. Were there social upheavals it is probable that they would become active. In the meantime, however, Colonel de la Rocque, the leader of the Croix de Feu, never ceases to affirm his reluctance to take the smallest initiative. Their *raison d'être*, according to their chiefs, is to wait and see. It is for me a perpetual subject of astonishment that any body of men can be so enthusiastically engaged in waiting and seeing.

The existence of these leagues, incomprehensible to the orthodox politicians, has sufficed to create something like a panic. It is not pleasant for the politicians to feel that they are being watched by a vast company of critics whose intentions are certainly not friendly. They would not object to a straight fight on the political battleground, according to political rules which they understand; but they are uneasy at the assumption, real or false, of a non-political purpose. There is nothing in Hoyle which can help them. Therefore they pressed the Government to pass a law by which, at a stroke of the pen, the extra-Parliamentary organisations, dubbed para-military leagues, can be disbanded. M. Laval had no alternative but to accept a law which is arguably illegal. It does not, however, follow that a responsible government will take it upon itself arbitrarily to dissolve organisations that have not been shown by juridical processes to be subversive. Nor does it follow that the organisations, even if condemned, will consent peacefully to their own extinction. Nor does it follow that if they acquiesce in their own demise they will not immediately be resurrected.

The most unhappy feature of the electoral period is the exploiting of the international difficulties by the various parties. Whatever views one holds about the Italo-Abysinian conflict, about the need of Franco-British friendship, about the possibility of a Franco-German *rapprochement*, about a virtual Franco-Russian alliance, about sanctions, about the League of Nations, about all the intricate problems that threaten the peace of the world, it is surely a pity that they should become counters in domestic politics. In Great Britain the consequences of bringing foreign affairs into the political arena have not been fortunate. Whatever may be said of democratic control, it can scarcely be denied that calm

judgment is required in the conduct of foreign affairs, and that if they are to be discussed on the hustings it is inevitable that condemnations will be pronounced and inconsiderate pledges given which must exacerbate international relations. The most terrible example is the General Election in Great Britain which preceded the peace-making in 1919. To it we owe the Versailles Treaty, which is the source of most of our woes to-day. More recently, the British elections of November 1935 unquestionably complicated the task of the statesmen. And now French thought is dominated by the coming elections at a time when the most cautious procedure is desirable. To please electors, to obtain a seat in Parliament, the most irreparable mistakes may be committed.

I have lately had exceptional opportunities of ascertaining the predominant sentiment of the French people. There can be no doubt whatever that the French public is opposed to the whole business of sanctions. What is said and done in Parliament is simply not evidence. The ordinary man and woman can see no reason why the country should run the risk of war with a neighbouring European nation for the sake of Abyssinia. The Frenchman, as distinct from the French politician, wants peace, and he believes that while Italy has doubtless blundered—and to commit a blunder is worse than to commit a crime—Italy remains a decisive factor in the preservation of European peace. Besides, he has a deep consciousness of blood brotherhood. He will not willingly fight against his allies of the Great War. With Great Britain and with Italy he may have many disputes, and against them he may use many hard words, but Great Britain and Italy, in spite of all, are sacrosanct. War with either of them is, to employ a much abused word, unthinkable.

Now sanctions, the French clearly perceive, logically mean war. They need not of course be pushed to their logical end, and therefore, on condition that they are carefully circumscribed, the Frenchman will reluctantly acquiesce in an agreed measure of sanctions. He sees the force of the argument that if France does not support Great Britain in the application of the Covenant against Italy, then he cannot expect Great Britain to support France in the application of the Covenant against Germany. Therefore he is prepared to go a certain way on this perilous path, though he intensely dislikes even the beginning of a procedure which may lead to

a catastrophic end. M. Laval has interpreted the opinion of the country better than any other French politician. If a complete refusal was impossible when Great Britain, for the first time, insisted on the validity of Article 16, at any rate co-operation must be hedged round with restrictions, both practical and mental. The disinterestedness of Great Britain—or at any rate of the British Government—is a proposition which is utterly rejected by the average Frenchman. Nothing is more difficult than for one country to believe in the genuineness of the moral indignation of another country, and the French are by nature particularly sceptical. They resented the dilemma in which they were placed by the British. It is true that their policy has been based on the League of Nations, but it is also true that they have conceived the League of Nations as the centre of their European alliances.

The truth, said Renan, lies in *nuances*; and it may properly be said that foreign policy is a question of *nuances*. To be bound by texts is to be at the mercy of unexpected events. A European war provoked by Germany or by any other country would call for the full mobilisation of French forces. But there are quarrels in which it would be folly to sacrifice the bones of a single grenadier. Nobody in Europe would have risked a conflagration for Bolivia or Paraguay—or, since there was no risk of a conflagration, would have seriously intervened on the American Continent. Neither France nor Great Britain was eager for complications when the Japanese invaded China. It is highly probable that Great Britain would be reluctant to move the League of Nations to defend the present status of Memel, and there is some doubt as to whether Great Britain would join in action for the independence of Austria. Why then should France range herself with a barbarous and slaveholding country like Abyssinia, against her ally and Latin sister? Logic pushed to extremes becomes illogical. Law which is applied in some cases and not in others becomes lawlessness. Peace which produces war, and war in the name of peace, become meaningless phrases. International morality which picks and chooses becomes immoral.

But it will be objected that France is also picking and choosing in showing apathy for the fate of Abyssinia and in directing her attention exclusively on Germany, her potential enemy. That is of course true; but it must be said that from the beginning and quite consistently, France has made no

pretence of working for any other object than the maintenance of European peace; and for the maintenance of European peace she has contracted alliances—some of them open to criticism—has made use of the machinery of the League of Nations, and has even endeavoured to come to terms with her hypothetical adversary. All the rest, for the average Frenchman, is pure ideology, and it might have been better, if we wished to avoid misunderstandings, that this should have been plainly stated long ago. As it is, the average Frenchman is distressed at the false position in which he has been put by Italy, but he is likewise profoundly resentful of the pressure put upon him by Great Britain.

That is a correct picture of the mind of the average Frenchman, but political considerations must now be introduced. Politically, Communists, Socialists, and Left-wing Radicals see an excellent opportunity of combating Fascism. Whatever may be the case in other countries, I have been unable to find any higher motive than this in the opposition in France to the policy of M. Laval. There are many lower personal motives, and it may be argued that anti-Fascism is itself a sufficiently high motive. Be it so. But do not let us deceive ourselves. The opposition in France, whether it may be described as pro-Russian or anti-Italian, whether it may be described as pro-British or anti-Fascist, whether it is for the Negus or against Mussolini, is essentially political and political only. The fight is on the doctrinal battlefield of politics. I am indeed inclined to believe that, as Mr. Roosevelt has implicitly declared, we are witnessing the beginning of a great and disastrous struggle in all countries between the conceptions of dictatorship and democracy, as they are loosely called. I say loosely, because democracy has been confused with parliamentarism, and dictatorship with anti-parliamentarism. If we defined our terms, we might well find that oligarchies and dictatorships are compatible with parliamentarism, and actually exist in many parliamentary countries; and that, on the other hand, dictatorships may be the fine flower and ultimate result of democracy. It is, however, not the place nor the moment to discuss these definitions. I must be content to suggest that it is on this ground that the French elections will partly be fought, and will be presided over by the Emperor of Abyssinia who has divided Europeans into two rival camps.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

AUSTRIA TO-DAY.

THE destiny of every country to-day depends entirely on the development of the rest of the world. There are no Islands of the Blest, and nobody can seclude himself from his fellows. The States of Europe must either hold together or perish together. Within the limits of this immutable law each State follows its own specific destiny, free to choose whatever way will lead, amidst European chaos, to the least imperfect methods of accomplishing its tasks. Austria's policy in 1935 cannot be understood unless its vital connection with the events of the past is made clear.

Two occurrences were decisive for Austria in particular: the events of February 1934 and the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss. The February defeat practically demolished the Social-Democrat Opposition, and thus paved the way for the abolition of democratically elected bodies and the conception of the authoritative corporative State. The murder of Dollfuss brought with it the greatest danger to Austrian independence since the formation of the State. It was at that moment that Mussolini gave "marching orders," and thereby took a step the importance of which compelled universal recognition. That prompt assistance perhaps succeeded in averting a world war; at all events it saved Austria from the most difficult and dangerous situation conceivable.

From the political standpoint, it might be said that 1935 brought moderating influences, a mitigation of the conditions bequeathed by the calamities of 1934. Not, indeed, that either National Socialism or Socialism could raise its head, or that agitators for one or the other were treated with greater gentleness. Nowhere is there the slightest sign of it. Nevertheless the most recent change in the Cabinet proves that the Government sets great value on the opinion of the workers, and in various ways goes even farther in that direction than is pleasing to the employers. Both Chancellor Schuschnigg and Prince Starhemberg have emphasised the social point of view. Laws are in preparation to impose penalties on the prohibition of collective contracts, and to encourage the settlement of disputes by arbitration. The shop stewards are again to be chosen. Prince Starhemberg and the new Minister of Social Welfare, Dobretsberger, have uttered warnings in very plain language to employers who deny the rights of

Labour, and who would rule with a heavy hand in their factories. The selection of Ministers possessing expert knowledge of the problems of workers and peasantry also points in this Left Wing direction, for which Dollfuss had already prepared the way. Whether the new course will bring about the success desired by the Government is, of course, a question of continuity and of efficiency.

In the same way, whilst the main drift of policy has remained unchanged in principle, a certain softening of tone may be observed as regards Germany. What Austria asks from that quarter is simply an unqualified recognition of her independence, non-intervention in her internal affairs, and the cessation of all acts of violence. In the positive sense these aims have not yet been achieved, but in the negative sense profound changes can be noted. War by wireless has ceased, the Austrian Legion in Germany is no longer of any importance, the whole campaign of crime, which could very easily have dealt a death-blow to tourist traffic, has come to an end. Political agitation, exploitation of local discontent, shady transactions in various districts—these things have remained; but the authorities are so well equipped and prepared to strike that no offensive could cause them real anxiety. In this case the Latin saying applies: "Let them hate, so long as they are afraid."

How can the strength of this Governmental front be estimated? How is the co-operation working out between the remnant of the Christian Socialist Party and the Home Defence Force which began under Dr. Seipel? The consolidation of this coalition is best proved by the fact that Ministerial changes on a broad basis could occur without in any way upsetting public opinion. Above all, at this juncture the Home Defence Force settled an internal dispute, namely the antagonism between Prince Starhemberg and the Minister Fey, which could only end with the fall of one or the other.

Minister Fey seemed to be intending to exploit certain currents of local feeling in order to oppose Prince Starhemberg, but this desire was prematurely disclosed. The latter summoned a section of the Lower Austrian Home Defence Force to Vienna, and the brief thunderstorm cleared the air. Similarly, a change of personnel was carried out in other important departments without visible discord. The well-known lawyer Dr. Draxler, who supports Starhemberg, took

over the Ministry of Finance in place of Dr. Buresch, and another Home Defence man, Baar von Baarenfels, formerly Minister of the Interior, took the Department of Public Safety. The Home Defence Force therefore has under its own flag the Vice-Chancellorship, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Finance Ministry, and the Ministry for Home Affairs and Public Safety. If there had been any risk of serious dissension, this must have become apparent during the Ministerial changes. Here is the proof that both groups are firmly resolved to pursue the policy of unity. The most delicate problem, and technically the hardest to solve, is that of combining the defence forces which exist side by side with the regular army. These are the Heimatsschutz (Home Defence Force), formerly called the Heimwehr (Home Protection Force), the East Mark Storm Troops (the Chancellor's special supporters), the Turnbund (Physical Training League), and the Freiheitsbund (League of Liberty). It was, of course, both politically and financially undesirable to allow these bodies to coexist, and, despite all efforts of the responsible leaders, rivalry, especially in the middle ranks, was sometimes unavoidable. Here, too, sharp edges are now to be smoothed down. A militia is to be organised on a unified basis which is to work parallel with the regular troops, but at the same time to keep in the closest contact with them.

We must face the very natural question that every foreigner puts to an Austrian: Is democracy really impossible in your country; could not free elections take place, together with a free development of public opinion? The writer, brought up in the traditions of Liberalism, will surely not be suspected of authoritative leanings or of friendliness towards dictatorship. If his answer to the question is nevertheless negative, it is given with regret. Let us take the questioner at his word for the moment and ask his permission to open the wallet of Æolus. Say the Austrian Government announces free elections to be held this day month, and that all agitation (provided it remains within the limit of the law) in the Press and in meetings, in speech and in writing, is permitted. The immediate result would be an influx of National-Socialist influence, a spark leaping across the frontier from Germany that would set fire in particular to the young people and all the ranks of discontent. Socialism would not, of course, remain behindhand in letting loose opposition to the Government,

and the Communists would not fail to exploit the poorest of the poor for their own ends. Bloodshed and murder would follow, even during the election campaign, a conflict of all against all, and a Parliament with absolutely no hope of survival. A tremendous cry for revenge would thunder through the country, and the end of it all would probably be yet another collapse of parliamentarism—such a serious discrediting of parliamentary institutions that the staunchest democrats would be forced to hide their heads.

The best proof of Austria's need of decisive leadership may be found in the spheres of foreign policy and finance. The Abyssinian conflict has confronted her with one of the most difficult decisions ever laid upon a small and impoverished State. She can point to only one really outstanding advantage in her commercial policy, namely the greatly increased export to Italy, which increased long before the emergence of the Abyssinian struggle. Unbiased observers estimate that about a hundred thousand workers have been thrown out of employment by Italy's belligerence. To this must be added the incident, previously mentioned, that followed the murder of the Chancellor, and the partnership with Hungary, cemented by the Roman treaties, which secured preferential treatment for Austria in both Italy and Hungary. On the other hand Austria is fully conscious of all that the League of Nations has done for the country, morally and materially. It has not merely bestowed—it has bestowed without humiliating, without *arrière-pensée* and ulterior motives. Sympathy with England, too, has never been silenced, and now the settlement of the so-called "Live Claims" problem of the Kreditanstalt has shown how ready is the British Government to help. Nevertheless the Austrian Government felt obliged, as explained through its representatives in Geneva, to detach itself from those States that demanded sanctions, because memories of Italy's services and exceptionally strong material interests won the day. That this policy does not mean narrowness of vision is proved by the Chancellor's intention, announced in December, to visit Prague. Favourable feelings will surely be awakened by such a visit, which, by dint of general goodwill, might materialise. Atmosphere is often more powerful than a written contract, and King Edward was not wrong when he said "Friendship is better than an alliance."

In the economic sphere, too, still more than in that of foreign policy, Austria is obliged to undertake rapid changes. Sometimes they are of such a painful and even dangerous nature that scarcely any Parliament could be prepared to enter upon them without the shock shaking the legislature to its foundations. The clearest proof was furnished when the new Finance Minister, Dr. Draxler, revised the newly prepared draft Budget. He discovered that the real deficit amounted not to twenty but to seventy millions. The difference had arisen because by the earlier system even current investments and renewals were to be covered by credit, whereas numerous experts were of the opinion that these sums ought to be raised from current revenue and in particular by economies. The new Finance Minister took up the latter idea, in agreement with the Director of the National Bank, Dr. Kienböck; and within the shortest time, by cutting down subventions and pursuing a policy of economy all along the line, he succeeded in producing a Budget requiring only a very little borrowing. In recent times internal credit in Austria, as in France, had been drawn upon nearly every year, and from the conditions of the market it was probably unavoidable—despite the quantity of ready money—to discontinue loans within the country for a certain period. This aim was more or less achieved, though not without sacrifices by certain classes of the community. But the occurrence proved again that even within the framework of the authoritative corporative State public opinion had preserved its efficacy, quite independently of the letter of the Constitution. The Finance Minister's original intention was to introduce at least a small amount of economy by stopping pensions to those in receipt of other earnings. Though the limits of minimum incomes were not ungenerous, opposition arose even amongst the members of the Diet, that is, the body appointed publicly to examine and to pass the Budget. The Government acted very wisely in taking this current of feeling into account. Not only was the decree toned down, but its inauguration was postponed for several months.

However clearly such incidents may prove the elasticity of Austria's financial system, they cannot absolve the Government from paying the most serious attention to the problem of increasing the purchasing power of the masses and the middle class. A rise in taxation will be impossible for some

time, and economies, except such as directly relieve a crisis, decrease the possibilities of economic expansion as effectually as higher taxes. At present the new system of the corporative State is of a more formal nature, and widespread regret has been awakened in particular by drastic changes in the Chamber of Commerce. A policy of positive production will therefore be necessary in order to remedy the evil of weak purchasing power. Above all it is possible to raise the real income of the masses by lowering the price of important articles of food. Certain measures have already been undertaken in this direction, whilst others are to follow, with the object of diminishing the difference between the cost of production and the price to the consumer in the town.

An improvement in commercial policy may also be expected, and more trade especially with the Succession States. The writer of this article has estimated that the total value of Austria's foreign trade—imports plus exports—for the years 1928-34 has dropped by 550 million gold dollars, or 3·8 milliards of schillings. In Czechoslovakia the loss amounts to 850 million dollars, in Hungary 225, in Yugoslavia 180, in Roumania 200, and in Poland 460. Considered as a whole, the crisis of the last years—which is the ultimate result of the shattering of Austria-Hungary—involves a loss of 2·5 milliard dollars or 17½ milliard schillings. Such catastrophic figures must surely provide food for thought in all countries, and bring the Central European problem in all its gravity into the political programme, which is, unfortunately, still dominated by quite different disputes.

However these questions are decided, the past year in Austria has shown distinct signs of stabilisation, in the economic as in the political sphere. The English public is aware that the Government has decreed a far-reaching amnesty, which will be to the advantage of Left as well as Right, and will exclude only the ringleaders or those who were directly concerned in the murder of the Chancellor. This magnanimous act is the expression of a sense of strength, and of the courage that feels able to take risks. From the economic standpoint the stability of the schilling amidst unprecedented currency chaos is of the greatest importance, and a considerable relief for foreign commerce. The increase of savings deposits to 120 millions, the decrease in unemployment, clean financial and industrial balance-sheets, favourable returns in

taxation—all these are matters which could guarantee tranquillity for Austria, if the peace which is indispensable to prosperity could be secured.

Even if the actual conflict were settled, Austria would always feel herself threatened so long as the extreme elements celebrate triumphs and mutual suspicion prevails. We should always have to live according to Bismarck's principle, *Toujours en vedette*—always on the watch, always anticipating open and secret attack; always ready, too, to defend the high cultural values whose refuge Austria has been hitherto. As regards her culture, indeed, during the past year Austria has kept faith with her ancient mission—a mission by no means opposed to the national mission. No measures of religious intolerance were undertaken, and nowhere has racial policy gained the upper hand. The Salzburg Festival and the new road over the Glockner have attracted a stream of visitors into the country. The Höhenstrasse in Vienna has opened up new beauty in the immediate vicinity of the city. Max Reinhardt is at work as hitherto for stage and film. And it is always a festival when the superb orchestra, inspired by Bruno Walter or Toscanini, rises to its highest achievements in the Vienna Opera House, or when Lotte Lehmann sings and Hubermann draws his bow.

It is obvious that the ruins of the two shattering revolutions of 1934 cannot be cleared out of the way in a day; that public opinion can only make itself felt again slowly and hesitatingly; that the State has to be rebuilt from the foundations after the excesses and confusion, the mistakes and exaggerations of the past. Now the pendulum must gradually swing back again, and the ancient Austrian arts of moderation, of balance, of sensitive disentanglement of even the most complicated problems, must once more come into play. A policy is required of relief from present burdens, both for schemes and for individual lives; progress is to be hoped for on the way back to a liberty which must be far removed from licence and from insolence. Such are the tendencies that might dominate Austria in 1936, if—if we only knew what this year is to signify for the great ones of the earth. To-day the Austrian still cries bravely "Never say die"—and surely in this respect his feelings coincide with those of millions in Great Britain.

ERNST BENEDIKT.

FROM MASARYK TO BENEŠ.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA is an oasis in a desert of dictatorships. To the English traveller in Central Europe, sick of censored newspapers, controlled telephones, the fear of spies, the freedom of Prague is as refreshing as its architectural loveliness. "All that glitters is not gold," whisper hostile voices. Yet when all the necessary qualifications are made, the Czechoslovak Republic deserves the Western praise Thomas Masaryk has brought to it. Now that he has left the stage what is the outlook for the country he created?

Czechoslovakia has complicated internal problems, each of which has external ramifications, making her position in Europe one of intricacy and danger. Her territory straggles an enormous distance from west to east, giving her a difficult problem of frontier defence. Her country consists of two portions clearly distinguishable in their uneven economic development. Some seven million Czechs and nearly three and a half million Germans were ruled from Vienna in pre-war days, and their standards of living and administration are definitely higher than those of the Slovaks, Hungarians and Ruthenes formerly ruled from Budapest. There is also the problem of the 80,000 Poles around Tešín. "Why on earth," one can hear the puzzled visitor from Mars exclaiming, "was so heterogeneous a state constructed at a moment when the heterogeneity of the Habsburg Empire had been so completely discredited?" "Well," one would be forced to stammer, "you see the German-speaking part and the little Polish piece were economically so valuable, and in the south the Danube east of Bratislava seemed a good frontier. As for Carpathian Ruthenia, the Ruthenes were not getting their own state anyway." Masaryk was the first to deplore some of the frontiers, but they were bound to be immensely difficult to draw since all the races around the Danube are geographically entangled, with alien enclaves where a district seems at first sight homogeneous. Moreover, full and generous minority rights were immediately incorporated in the Czechoslovak constitution; unfortunately rights of this kind will sometimes be distorted by local officials.

Economically the country is a satisfactory unit, with industry and agriculture nicely balanced. There is plenty of coal at Pilsen, Kladno and Ostrava, for instance, and lignite

around Brüx (Most), and there is a good deal of iron, though a certain amount needs to be imported. Industry in the Czech and German country was highly developed before the war. After 1918 it remained to build up the necessary financial machinery, since the Austro-Hungarian banking system had been centralised in Vienna. On the agricultural side the diversities of the countryside are fortunately complementary; in 1935, for instance, the harvest was so good in some places as to outbalance the effect of the drought in others. Czechoslovakia's nearness to self-sufficiency brought the world economic crisis slowly and late to her, but an improvement has now begun to set in.

Czech is like French democracy in the multiplicity of its political parties and the strength of its centralised bureaucracy. But I have heard a Frenchman describe it a little enviously as *une démocratie très ordonnée*, for hitherto the government of Czechoslovakia has been stable and continuous, thanks to a series of coalition cabinets. Though Masaryk and Beneš have always been associated with the Czech National Socialists,* the most powerful party in the country is undoubtedly that of the Agrarians. These owe much of their strength to the organising ability of Antonín Švehla, who, until his death in 1933, was their leader, and more often than not Prime Minister of the country. It is interesting to observe that the key ministries, the Presidency of the Council, Interior, Defence and now the Foreign Office, are in the hands of Agrarians, while many of the diplomats and all four governors of the provinces into which the country is divided support the Agrarian party. The Agrarians represent the democratic conservatism of the peasant point of view, and in a country where admitted fascism scarcely exists they must be regarded as the political Right.

In the present Chamber of Deputies there are forty-five Agrarians and twenty-eight National Socialists. The third important partner in the coalition of to-day is the Social Democratic Party (thirty-eight deputies) which in 1929 was won over from opposition. Since the treaty with the Soviet last year the Czechoslovak Communist Party, with its thirty

* This party was founded in 1896; it is democratic and socialistic but more nationalist than the Social Democrats; it should never be confused with the German Nazi Party. Equally surprising is the name of the chief Fascist group in Czechoslovakia—Dr. Kramář's National Democrats.

deputies, is half enlisted for the Government. It would be most misleading to suggest that the Left, from Beneš to the Communists, has surrendered unconditionally to the Right; on the contrary it keeps the Agrarians well up to the democratic mark.

The issues involved are, of course, the social question at home, and, roughly speaking, the choice between Berlin and Moscow abroad. The social question at home presents itself primarily as the question whether agricultural interests shall prevail or not. At present a Corn Monopoly keeps corn prices up, by which the interests of the consuming workman are sacrificed to those of the producing peasant. The issue is not altogether clear-cut, for the industrial worker is not anything like so completely divorced from the land as in Britain or Germany. Indeed the land reform which followed the war was specially designed to prevent such a thing, and to-day, for instance, two-thirds of the Ostrava workers are still attached to the soil; this does not, however, prevent their losing without gaining by the Corn Monopoly system. On the other hand it accounts for the relatively small number of Czechoslovak workers who are actually organised in trades unions; there is very little organisation among glass and porcelain workers, for instance, who largely work at home.

The Socialist parties, strong in the towns, tend thus to be out of touch with a considerable section of the working people. While Social Democratic and Communist political leaders appear to be on chilly terms, trades union organisation is usually cut up into at least three sections, representing the National Socialists, the Social Democrats and the Communists in each big industry. All this obviously makes for weakness, and efforts are being made to amalgamate the unions; in December the various leather workers, for example, declared for one unified union. Further, an extension of trades union organisation and negotiating power is being worked for, under the name of syndicalisation, by the National Socialists and Social Democrats. All the parties on the Left are pressing for more expenditure upon public works and for everything that will help the workmen, as distinct from the peasants, and especially for the increased export of industrial goods.

While the Right was able to insist upon the protective Corn Monopoly, the Left put through the treaty with the Soviet

last June. Though Dr. Beneš was careful to avoid any extra-European obligations, the Russian Treaty is a great bone of contention in Czechoslovakia. It may be objected that the Agrarians voted in favour of Dr. Beneš' foreign affairs exposé in November, and supported his candidature for the Presidency in the National Assembly on December 18th. These votings, however, were pre-arranged and conditional affairs, and cannot alter the fact that the Agrarians are strongly opposed to taking sides between Germany and Russia. They are afraid of Russian political influence, and since they believe in high tariffs they do not fear German industrial competition; the parties of the Left, on the other hand, look with horror upon Nazi principles and aims, and regard the Russian market for Czech machines as of great value. While the Agrarians wish to sit on the fence, the Left is eagerly in favour of the League Powers among whom Russia now plays an important part.

When the question of Masaryk's resignation arose, the quiet steady tug-of-war between the Agrarians and the Left became a little tenser. Beneš was the obvious person to succeed him, but the Agrarians would only agree to this at a price. They demanded as a preliminary that Dr. Hodža, who is probably Švehla's most competent heir, should be promoted to be Premier. This occurred in November. But if Beneš was to become President the vital question of who should be Foreign Minister was bound to arise. For weeks Masaryk had to remain because neither side would give way over this. At last on December 14th the old President withdrew, and four days later Dr. Beneš was elected to succeed him, whereupon the Foreign Office went temporarily to Dr. Hodža.

Dr. Hodža is a striking personality who has served at the Ministries of Education and Agriculture; possibly the most important thing about him is that he is a Slovak, and in the old days was a deputy in the Hungarian Parliament. The question of Slovakia is by no means negligible although there are only some two million Slovaks, scarcely two-thirds of the Germans in the country. According to Hungarians, the Czechs have oppressed the Slovaks as brutally as ever the Serbs oppressed the Croats. The first answer to make to this indictment is to point out that whereas the Croats are undeniably more civilised than the Serbs, the Slovaks are unquestionably more primitive than the Czechs. The Slovaks

complain that in the state which was supposed to be as much Slovak as Czech, the Czechs treated them like a dependent colony. No doubt many mistakes were made and the administration was too highly centralised in a Czech sense, but the Czechs could justifiably point out that Slovakia had not enough educated people to go round. The professional classes where they existed were considerably Magyarised, and a lurking suspicion of Magyar sympathies lies at the back of the Czech mind when Slovakia is under consideration. This explains—does it excuse?—a slightly differentiated democracy. In Slovakia political meetings* are more often forbidden than in Bohemia or Moravia, and certain economic disadvantages exist. Father Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Autonomist Party, has always denied any inclination to go back to Hungary, but Hungarians have naturally done all they could to exploit irritation caused by the high-handed actions of local Czech officials here and there. Though the extremers Slovakian Autonomists condemned them as renegades, many Slovaks nevertheless went into the service of the new Czechoslovak State. Dr. Hodža has certainly lost no ground by doing so, but he gave special satisfaction in Slovakia by making his first speech in Slovak† on becoming Prime Minister. Though there seems no real question of Slovakia receiving autonomy, Dr. Hodža is hoping to bring the Hlinka party into the Government by increasing Slovakian independence in educational matters. The recent *modus vivendi* between Prague and the Pope has brought reconciliation nearer between the rationalist Czechs and the devout Catholic Slovaks. Beyond Slovakia lies the much more primitive province of Carpathian Ruthenia, full of bears and illiterates, according to the café-goers of Prague. This province is certainly something of a burden. The illiteracy of the sparse but mixed population is being gradually overcome, but no reasonable critic blames the Czechs here for inevitable differentiations. The Peace Treaties laid down that Carpathian Ruthenia should have actual autonomy, but it is generally accepted that autonomy for the time being would merely spell nonsense.

Slovakia and Ruthenia raise questions in which Hungary

* It was interesting to find, by contrast with England, that during the ministerial deadlock before Masaryk resigned no newspaper whatever might discuss the impasse.
† Czechs and Slovaks understand one another, but there are slight differences between their languages.

and, in the case of Ruthenia, Roumania and Russia are also interested. No doubt the actual five per cent. Magyar minority in which Budapest interests itself so intensely is often shown that democracy can shut her eyes to injustice. On the whole it is impressive to find how extensively minority school and judicial protection are provided for the Hungarian, Polish and German minorities. But problems of this kind do not stop at the frontier as the quarrel with Poland very well shows. Since Poland's agreement with Germany, she has exploited the rights of the Poles around Tešín, while refusing all offers of arbitration, in such a way as to make an unpleasant international crisis inevitable.

It is, however, the big German minority, the *Sudetendeutschen*, who provide the Government of Prague with its most difficult problem to-day, a problem which no one really believes to be purely internal. Although Czech public opinion would make it difficult for him to admit it, Dr. Hodža is probably in favour of a more conciliatory policy towards the *Sudetendeutschen*. Indeed it is not unlikely that he would like to take their leaders into the Government, a course which in the eyes of some judges might yet turn the Sudeten gaze away from Berlin. These 3,300,000 German-speaking people live in a fringe encircling Bohemia and along the north of Czech Silesia, so that the possibility of giving them autonomy scarcely exists. The problem has economic roots, but racial foliage. In 1926 several German political leaders were taken into the Government, and it was hoped that friction had come to an end. But then came Hitler and the slump together. The *Sudetendeutschen* industries, apart from the lignite around Brüx, were glass, porcelain and textiles, all dependent on export; many of the workers worked at home unorganised and unprotected. The suffering was, and is to this day, terrible; indeed, about half the unemployment in all Czechoslovakia is here among the *Sudetendeutschen*.

In 1934 an attractive personality, that of Konrad Henlein, became prominent. He disclaimed Pan-Germanism, and declared that if the Czechs would play fair there would be more jobs for the Germans, and fair co-operation was all he desired. When elections were held in May 1935 his party scored a big success and came to the Chamber with only one seat less than the largest party, the Agrarians. What do the Czechs say to all this? They say the Germans have

been very well treated, but they cannot demand more posts at a moment when their loyalty is not unquestioned. They say Henlein himself may mean well and know little, but his followers are frankly more loyal to the Reich than to the Republic. Of this one must say there is plenty of evidence in ordinary conversation, in unofficial propaganda,* and in intercepted intrigues with the Reich; and the German wireless has the most unhesitating way of rushing to the rescue of Henlein. The Czech Left believes that Henleinism is an employers' manœuvre against the workers, and they are right that every employer in the Sudeten country is working for Henlein though some of the workers still hold out against him. To the Russophil and anti-fascist Czechs, it is particularly the *Sudetendeutsch* demand for a pro-German, in place of a pro-Russian orientation in foreign policy which seems intolerably arrogant and anti-national. And there is a corollary to this. The Henlein people complain bitterly that Czechoslovakia shelters anti-Nazi refugees who tell "atrocity" stories against Nazi Germany. If Henlein is really the democrat he professes to be, and if he pays no spiritual homage to the Reich, what case has he against the unfortunate *Emigranten* whose stories of the Nazis have only too often been true?

It is generally thought that the Agrarians, though they would not incur the odium of openly opposing Beneš, have welcomed the big Henlein group to the Chamber as a useful manœuvring threat. There is of course something to be said, in view of Austria's weakness, and in view of Germany's gigantic military strength as weighed against a divided France and a Russia threatened on two fronts, in favour of a Czechoslovak *rapprochement* with the German-Polish-Hungarian bloc. Such a step might prove to be the only alternative to partition at the hands of those same three Powers. The Czech Left indignantly repudiates such defeatism. The *rapprochement* could only be bought by territorial concessions which would open the door to partition, and either plan would lead to the obliteration of Czechoslovak democracy through direct or indirect pressure. If the Left can hold its ground Czechoslovakia will stand or fall with Geneva; she will risk all upon the principle of collective security and remain true to the traditions of Wilson and Masaryk.

* E.g. Czech Law forbids attacks on the Jews and Henlein disclaims anti-Semitism, but Jews are not admitted to his organisation.

But if the League of Nations survives the ordeals of to-day there is still an internal danger for Czechoslovakia. Experienced observers are afraid that if economic conditions deteriorate the Agrarians may some day follow fascist counsels and attempt to crush the parties on the Left. Here again it is difficult to weigh the chances of success. Big industrial and financial interests are nothing like so powerful nor so reactionary as they were in Germany. The Fascist leader, Dr. Kramař, is closely connected with the big Živnostenska Bank; he is said to stand quite well with Dr. Hodža, and might use the "Živno" to back the Agrarians, though the Agrarians have worked against the "Živno" so far. The powerful Škoda armaments people have many Agrarian connections; on the other hand Schneider-Creusot is very much involved with Škoda, and, unless a Franco-German reconciliation occurs, will push for the pro-Russian Beneš policy. The bureaucracy is predominantly Agrarian. In the Army one would surmise that the old democratic tradition of the Legionaries outbalances the influence of certain White Russian officers. As for the pseudo-militias which may play so large a part in political revolutions, it is said that the Agrarian peasant troopers would be more than a match for the Social Democratic gymnastic organisations. The Sokol formations, like the whole Czech portion of the country, have a very democratic tradition behind them, but the Sokol people might easily succumb to chauvinistic slogans.

In theory, of course, the last word would rest with President Beneš, but it is difficult to be certain how far his power would extend in actual fact. In his New Year broadcast he quoted the words of Masaryk that states maintain themselves through the ideas out of which they were born, and concluded with the wish that Czechoslovakia will remain "a brightly lit lighthouse of disciplined and mature democracy." At a distance one tends to shake one's head gloomily over the prospects of the Republic, but once within the country one has so strong an impression of vigour, of common sense and of a reasonable social equality as to make one believe that Masaryk's state may yet maintain itself without succumbing to reactionary pressure at home or abroad.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

MEMORIES OF MASARYK.

IN the summer of 1929 I spent my holiday at the Slovakian spa, Pystian. At a distance of only two hours by car stands the castle of Toppolcian, which the Czechoslovak Republic has placed at the disposal of its President. President Masaryk was staying there at the time I was in Pystian. I asked for an interview and soon after received an invitation. I had had enough time to think over what I wanted to discuss with him. The topic of nearly all the Germans who at that time came into contact with the founder and head of the polyglot State was the fate of the Germans in Czechoslovakia. Masaryk had frequently given expression to his point of view on this problem; he always avowed himself in favour of complete equality of status. Two years previously, when I was in Prague at Masaryk's re-election, I spoke with numerous Czech and German politicians on the subject. Not that I considered the matter unimportant. On the contrary. But as I was to have the good fortune to spend some hours in rustic quiet alone with the great and wise man, I thought it would be more profitable if we discussed a more comprehensive topic; so comprehensive, in fact, that it would include all other national questions. When I was shown into the spacious study of the President, I said to him that I only wished to put one question to him, namely: "Are we going to have another war?"

Masaryk had and still has a special significance for me and for those Germans whom I may call my political partisans, as we share the same convictions. It is not so easy to define these convictions. We called ourselves democrats, pacifists, also liberals or simply republicans. Party designations are really inadequate. What we wanted was a policy of reason, a policy which was based on the recognition of facts, and which furthered the ideals of western civilisation. For that reason this Professor, Member of Parliament, revolutionary, traitor to Austria-Hungary, founder and architect of a state, enjoyed our special esteem and devotion. Masaryk once called the two great Central Powers of Europe theocracies. That was just what we wished to free ourselves from. We abhorred the irrational methods of the past government. The deification of the Hohenzollerns, the generals, the *portépées*, and the steel-helmets filled us with horror. We were of opinion that

our defeat in the Great War had definitely shown that the legend of the Prussian God had led to absurdities, and that the German people had suffered enough for the nimbus that had been created round Frederick the Great and Wilhelm the Victorious. We thought—or at least we fervently hoped—that our people had dreamed their dream and were now awake—sufficiently awake to build up for themselves with their own hands and according to their own ideas a happy and contented present.

Masaryk was a national hero. But his genesis differed from that of most national heroes. The first serious battles he fought were against the legends of his own nation. A passionate Czech nationalist, wishing to prove how highly developed Czech culture had been from the earliest times, had "discovered" a document which expatiated at great length on the subject. The "Königinhofer manuscript" was a forgery, but the nation was exceedingly proud of it. It became a matter of violent controversy. Masaryk championed the truth. He refused to pander to national vanity by supporting a lie. At that time he was called a traitor to his country; the fanatics outlawed him; it seemed as if he would never again be able to take any part in the political life of his nation.

The second important occasion which caused him to come to the fore was a so-called ritual murder. A Jew, Hilsner by name, a poor fellow and almost a semi-imbecile, was supposed to have killed a little girl in order to use the child's blood for ritual purposes. Again Masaryk fought on the side of truth and reality and against romantic lies. The same national fanatics entered the lists against him. The windows of his house were broken, and he was prevented from giving his lectures at the University. At this juncture Masaryk thought seriously of leaving his country and emigrating to America, so violent was the hatred that had been stirred up against him and so great was his loathing of demagogic mendacity.

He gave the strongest proof of his unusual power of mind in 1915, when he, an isolated individual, unaided, armed with no other weapon than his discernment, declared war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Whilst everyone in Berlin and Vienna still believed in victory, he foresaw the impending fall of the Central Powers. He left the country in order to convince the Western Powers that the Czechs and Slovaks must become an independent state. In Paris and London

the carrying out of such plans was by no means considered inevitable, as they were still based on an extremely uncertain hypothesis. But for Professor Masaryk, who owed his information solely to his own insight, this "if" was sufficiently certain to make him risk his own and his family's future. I reminded President Masaryk of the fateful moment when he took this tremendous decision. I said that it was the amazing correctness of his foresight at that time which had brought me to him. Masaryk reflected a moment. Then he said: "Well, things might have turned out quite differently."

Masaryk is the least solemn of politicians. He pointed out to me that there had been no lack of fortunate coincidences in his life, some of which he related to me. It was for instance a lucky chance that at the outbreak of the War he was in possession of a passport which was valid for three years, as afterwards he would not have been given one; also that the frontier official let him pass without making any difficulties. Another such piece of luck was that he had at the last minute cancelled his journey from London to Paris, for the steamer by which he had intended to cross the Channel was sunk by the Germans; then, during the Russian Revolution, a bullet had whizzed past his head so close that he could feel the current of air it caused. But it was not these slight, though necessary, links in the continuity which I had meant. I was thinking of the high moral courage which had enabled Masaryk, in spite of the nebulous atmosphere in which he too had lived, to draw inexorable conclusions from facts that were as accessible to everyone else as to him. For this reason I had come to him with the portentous question: "Are we going to have a war?" Masaryk answered: "No! Not for the first fifty years after the last Great War. There is no money available. The nations are too poor. First they must save, before such colossal sums as a war requires are forthcoming." And fifty years are a long time. Long enough for institutions to be created and firmly established that will make a war, such as the one we have just gone through, impossible. We then had a lengthy discussion in which we compared the symptoms which spoke for and against this happy development. The rôle of the devil's advocate devolved on me; I had to enumerate all the facts which made the future appear as dark as possible.

It was late summer, 1929: no time since the end of the

War had seemed so promising. The Kellogg Pact, by which the nations unanimously condemned war as an instrument of policy, was ratified in this year by the signatory Powers. The Young Plan was made which fixed the German reparation payments. The evacuation of the occupied German territory was about to take place. An International Bank was to co-operate effectively in the liquidation of the War debts. The foundation stone of the new and splendid building of the League of Nations was laid with great solemnity. Preparations for the disarmament conference were being made. President Masaryk warned me not to forget the tremendous significance of the League of Nations. Even if all the members had not always the necessary goodwill, he said, the existence and the whole machinery of such an international institution was in itself a natural obstacle to any aggressive intentions. He told me that he had had news from which he could conclude that the prospects of an understanding between Briand and Stresemann were very hopeful. Furthermore an international bureaucracy was being evolved in Geneva, and the interests of a certain class of highly qualified and influential men were closely connected with the maintenance of peace.

Finally I was led to point out to the President the various currents of thought in the defeated countries which ran counter to the establishment of peace. I spoke of the reductions in German territory in so many parts of the Reich, and mentioned also the receptivity of the people for militaristic ideas, evoked by the injuries done to the body of the Reich. On hearing this Masaryk became more animated, almost excited. "Yes, that depends on the Germans; it is in their hands that the future lies. You are the great nation of Europe! How much do the French count? They are only a people of forty millions! But you! You are double as many! In the very heart of the Continent!" The President knew that a summary of our conversation would be published in the most widely read of our leading German papers. Yet he did not speak in the way customary at interviews, that is, with an eye on the interviewer or rather through him on the public. He was as unpretentious in his talk as in his whole personality. But now it may have occurred to him that his words would be read by all politically interested people in Germany. It sounded like a warning. To him it seemed to

be a matter of course that the Germans should occupy the first position in Europe. Their industry, their organising powers, their scientific knowledge—"how much have I myself learnt from you!" he exclaimed. It was by no means a mere compliment; I think Masaryk never made use of those methods of flattery which so many politicians employ. He emphasised the central position of the Reich in order to lay greater stress on the magnitude of the responsibility that rested with the German people. "It all depends on whether you behave honourably. If you are honourable in your politics, there will be no war. . . ."

It is now nearly seven years since this conversation took place, but the word "honourable" impressed itself on my memory. It recalled to me some of President Masaryk's experiences which had a far-reaching influence on his political career. When some South Slav members of the Opposition were being prosecuted by the Austrian Monarchy, evidence had been deduced from documents whose authenticity was disputed by the defendants. The accusation of high treason which otherwise could not be proved was to be based on these documents. Masaryk was one of those who exposed the forgery and traced its origin right up to the Foreign Office. It was forgeries of this sort, crooked ways in politics, and lack of straightforwardness which estranged him from the Monarchy. He had by no means always been a rebel. As a young man he had wished to enter the diplomatic service of his country, and later he had aimed at federal reform, not revolution. The right of the Czechs and the Slavs to self-government would never have driven him to high treason. Only a few years before the outbreak of the War he had offered his services as intermediary for the easing of the tension between Austria and Serbia. He was bent on avoiding war, although war alone could bring political independence to his country. Only when he saw that the governing clique had started a world conflagration because it had not the courage to attempt the solution of its home problems, did he pronounce its doom. The policy it followed was not "honourable."

Is Masaryk a Nationalist? According to the terminology of international socialism he certainly is. And the course that destiny mapped out for him made him the hero of the Nationalists. From the standpoint of the Nationalists ruling

in several European States to-day he is anything but a Nationalist. "That only is right which is of use to the German people." He would never have set up such a tenet for his people or even recognised its truth, although it seems to find acceptance in other countries besides Germany. His whole conduct, from the incident of the "Königinhofer manuscript," has proved this. He was never afraid of being spat upon as a "traitor" by fanatics, if it was a question of opposing a policy which was not honourable. In the confusion and perplexities of continental politics one must resign oneself to the fact that the fanatics, who are by no means to be found only on the right, i.e. on the national side, look upon reason and honour (the principles which guided Masaryk in the political part he played in the world) as nebulous conceptions, the reality of which they flatly deny. Actions based on these ideas appear to them treachery or fraud or at the best an illusion and self-deception. The attitude of mind to which he owed his position as head of the State might in slightly different circumstances have made a martyr of him.

In his farewell address to the departing President the Czechoslovak Prime Minister called Masaryk an intellectual leader of contemporary democracy. This he certainly was and ever will be for all those to whom democracy means more than a mere form of government, connected with plebiscites; for whom democracy has an ethic purport, evolved in the struggle against theocratic despotism. The way in which it retired from the stage when it felt it was no longer strong enough to hold office is a still more obvious manifestation of what we understand by democracy; it says more than a whole compendium on political law could ever do. ". . . States maintain themselves by those ideals which called them into being . . . a sound foreign policy and justice at home towards all citizens . . . if God wills, I shall look on awhile and see how you manage things."

Not long ago we saw how the President of another Republic remained in office long after he was unequal to his task, apparently from some kind of mystic idea of his divine vocation. The contrast between this and the humility and self-knowledge which prompted Masaryk to resign is overwhelming. No one who knows him can read the last words which he spoke as head of the State without being deeply

moved. The Czechoslovak Republic has issued a decree with the following purport: "Thomas Garrigue Masaryk has deserved well of his country." These are true and noble words! But he has done far more than that. He has given an example which will one day make its influence felt when the fanaticism of our time has cooled down and nations are obliged to construct a new community out of the depth of their depression.

As regards the prophecy for which I asked the philosopher Masaryk one summer day in the happier year 1929 at the castle of Toppolcian, his answer may appear incorrect if taken literally. We have already seen that lack of money is no absolute protection from war, and the time which Masaryk gave Europe for reflection will to-day be looked upon as an optimistic over-estimate. But the alternative he put before the Continent was full of supreme wisdom. A policy which once again threatened the world with destruction was most decidedly not "honourable," and could not be "honourable" in the sense in which the democrat Masaryk used the word.

RUDOLF OLDEN.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT.

IT is probably true to say that, since the War, more parliamentary time has been taken up by the question of unemployment than by any other single matter. This is entirely as it should be. The challenge of unemployment goes deep. It constitutes a formidable indictment of our whole way of ordering our affairs, economic, social and political—a fact which is very generally recognised to-day, not only by the victims of the scourge, but also by the great majority of thinking people, irrespective of political party and of social or economic position. Perhaps the most hopeful aspect of the whole sorry business is that the issue of unemployment is tending more and more to drop out of the arena of party politics and to be considered on its merits, or demerits. The approach indicated by Marshal Foch's immortal question, "*De quoi s'agit-il?*" is likely to lead us further on the road towards a better Britain than an attack on the capitalist position from the socialist trenches, or a bombardment of the socialist lines by the massed artillery of capitalism. Indeed, in many cases the political front lines are now so close together as to make this sort of activity as dangerous to the attacker as it is to the defender.

Fortunately, thanks to the statistics of the Ministry of Labour, we are in a better position to judge of the true position than we have ever been before in our history. Unemployment is no new phenomenon. There is good reason to suppose that, in the period following the Napoleonic Wars—the last occasion when our national economy was subjected to stresses and strains in any way comparable to those that it is undergoing to-day—the percentage of unemployment was as high, if not higher, than it is to-day, and the resulting suffering was certainly a great deal worse. But our ancestors lacked the figures to enable them to form a balanced judgment, and such efforts as they made to cope with this most intractable of problems were not conspicuously successful. We lack their excuse.

To-day we know that, at any given moment, of the thirteen odd millions of people constituting the "insured population," somewhere about two millions are registered on the books of the Employment Exchanges as out of a job. This is bad, but

it is only fair to add that, at the same time, the total number of people employed is higher than it has ever been. Further, two millions represents approximately the natural rise in our population between the census years 1921 and 1931, and the statisticians tell us that we are approaching the point where our population will cease to increase, and may even start diminishing. Another factor to bear in mind is that the stream of emigration which, in the years preceding the war, provided an outlet for something like 100,000 people annually, has now virtually dried up.

But the figure of two millions for the number of people unemployed at any given moment does not give the whole picture. The names on the books of the Exchanges are constantly changing and the total number of different names that find their way on to the Live Register in the course of twelve months is estimated at approximately five millions. This means that nearly forty per cent. of the insured population* find themselves unemployed at some time or other during the year. If we allow them two dependants apiece, which is a low estimate, this means that no less than fifteen millions of people have some direct personal contact with the unemployment regulations during the twelve months. This is a fact worth thinking over.

But all these people are not in the same boat or anything like it. Of those registered as unemployed on a given day about a million—half the total—have normally been out of work for a month or less, and $1\frac{1}{4}$ million for three months or less. At the other end of the scale there are 350,000 people who have been out of work for twelve months or more. The position of the man at one end is so different from that of his fellow at the other that one is tempted to suggest that the practice of lumping them all together under the heading "Unemployed" is positively misleading. The great majority of newspaper readers, who do not probe deeper than the global figures given in the official returns, and who are accustomed to form a rough estimate of whether we are doing well or badly according as to whether these are down or up on the previous month or year, certainly go away with an entirely wrong impression

* The two principal categories of workers not yet included in the insurance scheme are those in agriculture (700,000 workers) and private domestic service (1,350,000). It is the declared policy of the present Government to bring agriculture into the scheme as soon as possible, and steps are being taken to implement this decision.

of the real state of affairs. There are, in fact, two entirely separate problems, "unemployment" and "underemployment." They are interrelated and impinge upon one another at many points, but they are fundamentally different in nature and demand different treatment.

Let us examine first the problem of "unemployment," the heart-rending case of the men who get little or no work from one year's end to another. This is peculiarly the problem of the distressed areas. The essential facts are these. In 1923, our main group of exporting industries* were looked to as their source of livelihood by nearly thirty per cent. of the insured population, and close on $2\frac{3}{4}$ million people were actually employed in them. In 1932 they were employing a million fewer—only 17.5 per cent. of the insured population in employment. These industries are not dead, but they have in all probability suffered a permanent contraction. Their producing capacity was based on the requirements of the foreign markets all over the world, which were being opened up in the last century to British industry by the fertilising streams of British capital investment overseas. For good or ill we have to recognise that these days are over. The true state of affairs may now again be concealed for a time by a spate of armament orders, as it was in the days preceding 1914, but nothing can put back the hands of the clock. To-day, with every country old and new competing feverishly in the race for self-sufficiency, Britain can no longer hope to be the "Workshop of the World." The dictates of common sense and hard necessity may combine to modify the present tendency—it is devoutly to be hoped that they will—but it can only be regarded as highly improbable that the present trend will be reversed for many years to come.

What happens to the men who formerly looked to these industries for their living? The figures of the whole-time unemployed tell some of the tale. In some cases the extent of the tragedy is partly concealed by the device of permanent short-time, with its natural accompaniment of low wages. Then again there has all along been a trickle of men flowing to the relatively more prosperous South which, latterly, partly under the influence of official encouragement, has grown to a considerable stream. In the last six or seven years, the

* Coal mining, cotton, general engineering, iron and steel, shipbuilding and marine engineering, woollen and worsted.

Ministry of Labour have trained and placed in work certainly not less than 25,000 men from the distressed areas. These emigrants have, in the nature of things, included a high proportion of the younger men and of the element of light and leading amongst the population—it takes courage and initiative to pull out and start afresh in a strange land, and London is a strange and by no means always a friendly land for most of them. The writer once tried to smooth the path of some unfortunate Durham men who were being cold-shouldered in a London Occupational Club. He took the Londoners—mostly men he had known personally for two and three years—apart and discoursed for ten minutes on the sacred duty of hospitality. At the end one Cockney voiced the universal feeling. “Yus, that’s all very fine. But tell me one thing. Why is it Durham men are all such ‘orrible fellows?” This may be, and is, very unfair; but would Durham, or Wales, or for that matter Scotland, be any readier to welcome Londoners who came butting in on their odd-job market? The effect of the loss of this indispensable leavening element is reflected in the increased hopelessness of the outlook of those who are left behind.

Now let us glance at the other side of the medal. Simultaneously with the contraction of our old exporting industries, another group, consisting mainly of secondary industries and services and having their seat for the most part in the South, has been expanding: building, construction and repair of motor vehicles, cycles and aircraft, distributive trades, electrical trades, metal industries, metal industries miscellaneous, printing, publishing and bookbinding, public works contracting, road transport, silk and artificial silk, miscellaneous services. In 1923 they accounted for thirty-two per cent. of the insured population and gave work to just over three million people. By 1932 they were employing nearly 4½ million people, covering some forty-three per cent. of the insured population in work. Some of this increase will have been met out of the natural growth of the population of the South over these ten years, but a considerable proportion will undoubtedly consist of immigrants from the distressed areas.

The difference between the two areas and the types of industry that they represent is striking, and goes a long way towards accounting for the very different outlook of their

respective workers. The one contains, in the main, heavy industries: the other light. The one depends mainly on the export market: the other sells its products at home. The one is the ancestral home and stronghold of the trade union movement; the other is far less highly organised in this respect. Before the present contraction, with its accompaniment of unemployment, conditions of work in the one tended in the main to be regular: employment in the other normally tends to be intermittent, depending much on the seasons and on the fluctuations of popular taste, and it is the rule rather than the exception for labour to be constantly on the move from one industry, place of work or factory, to another. All these factors tend to reinforce the sense of local patriotism, always strong in this country, and many other ties and forces that tend towards keeping men in the place where they were born, to render the problem of transfer of labour about as difficult as it could well be.

With all these difficulties in the way of bringing the men to the place where industry is—difficulties inherent in any system of government by consent—it is satisfactory to see that the government proposes to take active steps to bring new industries to the places where the men are. If they are successful in bringing fresh life to the distressed areas, it is highly probable that many of those who have migrated South will want to return to their own place, if it is in any way possible for them to earn a living there. But they will not be returning to their old trades. It is much to be hoped that the new industrial North will resemble the South in one respect—in having a variety of industries in a given area. Thus and thus only can we hope to guard against the danger of some future shift in the alignment of our national economy reproducing the same phenomenon of a distressed area, with its appalling accompaniment of waste and human misery. It cannot be sound policy for all the employment eggs of a district to be in one industrial basket. In the past such matters have been left to the free play of “economic forces.” To-day, when unemployment is a charge on the taxpayer as well as on industry, and a standing menace and reproach to us all, there can be few who would seriously oppose the idea of some measure of co-ordination from above in the national interest. Given this, our first problem—that of whole-time “unemployment”—is not insoluble.

This brings us to our other problem. As we have seen, the total number of different names that find their way on to the Live Register at some time or other during the year is not less than five millions. Of this the whole-time "unemployed" account for 350,000 only, thus leaving the enormous total of 4,650,000 of the far larger army of what we have called the "underemployed." Some of these people suffer severely. To be unemployed for nine months in the year is only one degree less bad than to get no work at all. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that, of the two millions on the books of the Exchanges at any given moment, one million—half the total—have been out of a job for a month or less. One month in the year away from work would appear positively desirable to most people, if this leisure were presented in the form of a holiday. But, in the guise of unemployment, with its accompaniment of reduction of income, signing on at the Exchange every day, and general uncertainty, it assumes a very different aspect.

It is worth while examining more closely the nature of this second problem. In the first place, there is no getting away from the fact that, in this and in every other industrial country, there have always been and in all probability always will be, many jobs to be done that are necessarily of an intermittent nature and of uncertain duration. Port transport is an obvious example. Shipbuilding is another instance and so are, to varying extents, building, the distributive trades, road transport, many food industries and the hotel trade. Railway companies, and even the State itself take on extra hands at times of pressure. Some of these types of work, for instance docking and building, are actually paid by the half-day or the hour at rates designed to allow for a certain amount of off-time, due to weather, frost, tides and so on. Yet, if this off-time is declared at the Exchange and falls on the day of the count, it is classified as unemployment. In times past it would have been looked on by the people concerned as merely an incident in their calling.*

Then again, there are a large number of industries and trades in which employment is governed by the seasons, such as

* The Live Register is also inflated to some extent, very difficult to assess accurately, by the inclusion of people "stood off" for holidays of various kinds, such as "Wakes Week," Fair weeks, etc. Also, young people leaving school, and who have never had a job, are included until they find work.

agriculture, the building industry again, hotels and boarding-houses at the seaside, and the clothing trade. Jam-making and herring-curing are obvious examples of work that, in the nature of things, must be done at certain seasons. The effect of the seasonal element on unemployment is clearly brought out by the fact that the unemployment figures normally show a fall of a quarter of a million as between January and June in any year.

There is little doubt, too, that there is a growing tendency on the part of employers of labour in many trades and industries towards cutting down their permanent staffs to a nucleus of key men and applying to the Employment Exchange for additional hands as and when required. Of course, as anybody who has had the experience of running a factory knows, this practice has its inconveniences. The rhythm of an industrial plant and, in consequence, its efficiency is liable to be disturbed by any large influx of fresh labour. But in times of depression managers are forced to consider their costs, including labour, very carefully. Simultaneously, they are driven to overhaul their organisation and machine technique. It is obviously difficult to produce figures, but there is no doubt that one of the effects of the recent hard times has been to bring about a considerable increase in the technical and administrative efficiency of factories and plants, and that this has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the casualisation of labour. The only conclusion that one can draw is that a very considerable proportion of the working population of the country, perhaps as much as one-third, consists of people possessing no special skill or training and who are not attached by any well-defined ties to a particular employer, company or place of work. Many of them are not even attached to a particular industry. They constitute a pool of labour, which is drawn on by industry when required.

As signing on at the Employment Exchange is a condition of drawing unemployment insurance benefit, or even relief, we can take it that the Live Register gives a fairly complete picture of the labour unused and available throughout the country at any given moment. But although industry is making increasing use of the network of Employment Exchanges, and the Ministry of Labour can now claim that it is effecting the enormous total of two million odd placings each year, the fact remains that this only represents some

twenty-five per cent. of the total annual turnover of jobs. A high proportion of the Ministry's placings, too, consist of men in the skilled and semi-skilled categories. Unskilled labour still fends for itself to a great extent. It may be that some employers still prefer to pick their men from applicants presenting themselves at their gates, as, of course, they are perfectly entitled to do, but, from the wider point of view, there would appear to be no question that a more general use of the official job-placing agency would produce greater administrative efficiency and, in all probability, a more rapid turnover with a consequent lowering in the unemployment figures.

But even with the maximum attainable efficiency it seems inevitable that, for any foreseeable time to come, there will be hundreds of thousands of men who will have to spend varying spells of days, weeks and months between one job and the next. In an earlier age the ideal of a more leisurely society based on agriculture and handicrafts might have been "A place for everyone, and everyone in his place." To-day a considerable turnover of jobs even amongst skilled and semi-skilled workers, and something like a pool of labour containing the great bulk of the unskilled, appear to be inseparable adjuncts of our highly mechanised and rapidly changing industrial civilisation. Better trade conditions and an improvement in our Employment Exchange technique may speed up the turnover and reduce the size of the pool, but they will not eliminate either.

If the ultimate test of a civilisation is the extent to which it offers all its citizens the opportunity of living some kind of a life and of developing their faculties to the fullest possible extent—as some of us still persist in believing—then we must not be surprised to find that, from the point of view of many who find themselves in the pool of labour to-day, our civilisation is not proving itself an unqualified success. One has only to go amongst them and learn something of the conditions of their lives to see how "underemployment" hangs like a fog over them, blotting out the vision of any kind of opportunity. How to dispel that fog is one of the most pressing problems of our time.

B. T. REYNOLDS.

PAUL BOURGET: "LE GRAND CONVERTI."

THE death of Paul Bourget at the age of eighty-three takes those of us who are old enough to remember back into the nineties of the last century when Bourget, Loti and France stood head and shoulders above all other French writers of that day. They had all three been discovered, so she liked to say, by Juliette Adam, when in the early eighties she had founded her *Nouvelle Revue* with the object of discovering young writers and introducing them to the public. It was in the *Nouvelle Revue* that appeared Bourget's *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine*, afterwards published in volume form and constituting his highest title to fame in the opinion of many critics, among them Anatole France. It is possible that after Bourget's novels are dead people will still be reading these highly finished, acutely critical essays. Bourget published another volume of Essays shortly before the Great War, *Pages de Critique et de Doctrine*, and yet another soon afterwards, *Nouvelles Pages de Critique et de Doctrine*.

Looking back over his long and prolific literary career, there is no doubt that he excels, above all things, both in his novels and his essays, as a psychologist. He started life as a doctor. Then, forsaking surgery for literature, with a scalpel no less sharp and sure than that with which he had dissected material tissues, he probed the emotions and sentiments of the human heart. Human frailty and weakness in high places, in fashionable boudoirs and drawing-rooms, are the themes of his first novels. For example, *Cruelle Enigme* and *Mensonges*. Here, Parisian society of the eighties appears hardly less decadent than that of a hundred years earlier in the age of Louis XV. Hostile critics of these novels jeered at the son of a professor of mathematics in the Lycée of Clermont-Ferrand, at the medical student turned novelist, and called him a snob because, they said, he scorned the class from which he had sprung and occupied himself entirely with the gay and frivolous world, that he was never so happy as when with a gardenia in his buttonhole, dressed up to the eyes, he promenaded in the Bois or paid his respects to some fine lady. It is true that in Bourget's earliest novels there is no mention of any member of the class to which he belonged, nor of peasants or artisans. Later, after he had developed into a complete

traditionist, Bourget was to write: "*un écrivain tient toujours au milieu dont il sort, soit par une conformité d'idées et de sentiments avec ce milieu, soit par une réaction qui justifie le mot du philosophe allemand: 'Le moi s'oppose en s'opposant.'*"

In these early years of his literary career Bourget was in the phase of reacting against the *milieu* of his youth. But a time came when he ceased to derive his inspiration entirely from ballrooms and boudoirs, when he created a hero of his own class: the young tutor Robert Greslou in *Le Disciple* (1889), one of the most interesting of his novels from a psychological point of view. Greslou accepts with all his heart and soul the pessimist and determinist philosophy of a certain Adrien Sixte. He follows it implicitly, as he says in a confession addressed in his last hours to the master, and it has led him through negation and pessimism to catastrophe and death. This book, although Bourget was at that time still outside the Church, prepares the way for a coming change, for it is a severe indictment of the negative and materialistic attitude of the French youth after the 1870 war. Consequently, one is not surprised to find Bourget a few years later in the midst of "l'Affaire Dreyfus," numbered among "*les grands convertis*." Others who joined him and who were also influenced by "l'Affaire" were his old friend and editor, Juliette Adam, his schoolmate and, later, fellow-Academician, the critic Ferdinand Brunetière, and a much younger writer, Charles Péguy. In *La Chute des Anges*, Anatole France has described the rapid strides the Church was then making among the French intelligentsia. "L'Affaire" sundered many friendships, notably that which had united France and Bourget for many years. It has been said that his fear of encountering his former friend kept France away from the meetings of the French Academy.

How Bourget's return to Rome affected his entire attitude to life, to the State, to Society, as well as to the Church, may be seen in three novels which followed *Le Disciple*. *L'Étape* (1902), *Un Divorce* (1904), *L'Émigré* (1906). All these were essentially novels with a purpose. Now Bourget assumed that didactic attitude from which he was never able wholly to depart. It spoiled him for many of his early admirers who had been almost inclined to rank the author of *Une Cruelle Enigme* and *Mensonges* with Balzac and Stendhal. *L'Étape* describes the family of a Lycée professor which goes to pieces

on account of the atheistical opinions of the father. There is only one satisfactory member of the family; and he, realising what Bourget calls "*l'Erreur Française*," returns to the bosom of the Church. In *L'Émigré* he describes vividly the taking of the inventories of Church property which resulted from the Law of 1905 separating Church and State.

In *Un Divorce*, Bourget assumes the attitude of the Church towards the marriage bond—strictly indissoluble it must always be, in form at any rate and regardless of any infraction that may in reality be committed. "*La famille c'est d'abord le mariage. Hors du mariage, tout est désordre, scandale, hypocrisie, misère.*" Adultery itself, *la faute* as Bourget calls it, is a fault considerably less serious than marriage between two adulterers. This theme recurs constantly throughout his later novels. Seldom does he escape from this obsession to write a story, such as *L'Écuyère*, interesting for its own sake alone and without any dominating thesis.

In *Une Laborantine*, which appeared only a year before his death, we find him following a new career for women. For *la laborantine* is what we should call a woman bacteriologist. How the French love these descriptive words: *les laborantines* will soon become as well known as *les midinettes*. So the octogenarian author who had started by observing grand ladies in their salons and boudoirs, ends by watching a woman scientist at work in her laboratory. "*Il la voyait . . . penchée sur un enfant malade, allant chercher au fond de sa bouche, sur les amygdales, au moyen d'une tige métallique recouverte de coton, une parcelle de mucosité dont elle ensemençait des tubes de bouillon de culture qu'elle enfermait soigneusement dans une étuve pour que les microbes se développent et qu'elle puisse ensuite les identifier.*" Here again we find him regarding, almost with indulgence, illicit love, but with the severest disapproval marriage between the sinners when it has become possible. Sometimes it would almost appear as though he set traps for his characters, lest they possibly discover the road to ordinary human happiness.

Of these later novels *Le Démon de Midi* is much the most considerable. Published in 1914, it has all the interest of pre-war France, of a technique which is so impeccable as almost to make for unreality, and of an accidental power of characterisation which so often in his novels brings it about that we like best those who are not the heroes. It is not the hero of

Le Démon de Midi with whom we sympathise most, unless it be on account of the way in which Bourget has determined his fate from the first page. It is not even the idealistic son who gets shot for the sins of his father. Rather is it the big industrialist, Calvières, who is marvellously drawn and with a knowledge of psychology and a continuity which shows what Bourget can do when he is not obsessed by a theory. *Le Démon de Midi* is "the destruction that wasteth at noon-day" of the 91st Psalm, that is, the demon which lies in wait for the man of middle years who is rash enough to trust in his own powers, the demon which destroyed Napoleon I, Napoleon II and, perhaps, had Bourget written thirty years later he might have included another Latin much in evidence to-day. Bourget not only determines Savignan's downfall in his preface; he makes it doubly certain in the conversation of two priests, the Abbé Lartigue and Dom Bayle, in the first chapter, who are responsible for putting forward his candidature as deputy in the clerical interest. He is a man "*ayant vécu d'une manière et pensé d'une autre*." Dom Bayle has doubts. "*Celui qui a toujours été vainqueur s'habitue à s'appuyer sur soi uniquement, à croire qu'il porte en lui-même le principe de sa puissance. . . . C'est le péché des péchés le plus cruellement puni dès ici-bas.*" From henceforward we know that Savignan is destined by Bourget to come to grief with a certainty which, in these days, might almost be called sadistic. That is to say, situations will be ingeniously contrived, behaviour manipulated, in order to prove a thesis, at no matter what cost to the human being. It says much for Bourget's power that so many of the characters of the book are real and that he has done few things better than the descriptions of the countryside and of provincial people and their surroundings in and near the town of Clermont-Ferrand where he spent his childhood.

Savignan's candidacy is to be promoted by Calvières, who does not know that he was once madly in love with Mlle. de Soléac, now Calvières' wife. Savignan married subsequently, lost his wife and two children and now has the one son, Jacques, to whom he is devoted. While the renewal of his love for Geneviève savours of the machine, which Bourget knew so well how to manipulate, the provincial background, the vitality and shrewdness of Calvières are admirably drawn. When Savignan becomes Geneviève's lover, he has at the

same time to maintain his reputation of impeccability and the admiration he inspires in his son, Jacques, in order to protect the latter from the influence of another priest, l'Abbé Fauchon, who, says Bourget, has fallen a victim to "*l'illusion moderniste*." Calvières at length discovers the intrigue. He goes to the Abbé, who in the meantime has been excommunicated, has married the girl beloved by Jacques and is furious because of an attack on him by Savignan. He is to use letters which Calvières has brought him. Jacques comes to redeem them and gets shot. Geneviève goes back to Calvières; Fauchon to the Church; Savignan is unable to pray. Again the two priests discuss the situation. They speak of the "*admirable mort de Jacques*." Dom Bayle blames Fauchon less than Savignan since he was of "*bonne foi*" in his sin. Savignan sinned with his eyes open. One must live as one thinks, otherwise one ends by thinking as one lives.

What is the moral of this book? To what end are the sacrifices of Jacques and Thérèse? Why is Savignan brought to ruin? In the interests less surely of religion than of clericalism. Savignan must be wounded to the soul, because of the pitfalls set for him by the Dom Bayles, because of the manufacture almost of sins, which, it is taken for granted, the adult will commit, however pure he has been up to twenty-five. To the average person there is something distorted and wrong in an argument which invariably terminates in the theory that righteousness only exists through unnecessary misery. Is not the attack of the "*démon de midi*" one which may arise at any time? Is it not part of life, of everyone and not a kind of sorcery which almost demands black magic for its exorcism, and which makes it impossible for the majority to lead decent lives?

This attitude—this sense of sin and a dependence again, less on religion than on clericalism—is brought out time and again in later works of less worth than *Le Démon de Midi*. *La Rechute* has a curious faint echo in the *Forsyte Saga*, in which Jon is prevented from marriage with Fleur because her father once outraged his mother, and which does not entirely carry conviction to most of us. In *La Rechute* a young couple fall in love with apparently everything likely to make them happy. Because Cilette's mother twenty years previously had been the mistress of Pierre's father, the two feel that marriage is for them impossible. The young man flies off to

that America which is a refuge for more than one of Bourget's heroes and gets drowned on the way. Cilette settles down to good works. "*C'est le devoir des enfants de payer pour leurs parents. En le faisant, ils les rachètent.*" This is described as the severe and comforting truth formulated by Pierre to Cilette before Saint-François Xavier. "*Cilette avait sauvé sa mère coupable au prix de son bonheur.*" It is perhaps fortunate for the race that Cilette is the exception rather than the rule—at least if all parents are at all like those drawn so many times by Bourget.

In the short novel *La Vengeance de la Vie*, Lanthénax tells his young wife, a believer, on their wedding day what he might have communicated to her before, that he is no believer, and that if either of them at any time desired to end their union, they should be frank and confess this. Very soon Denise under his training gives up her religion. The moment comes when she deceives him. He discovers this and she confesses. He gives her her liberty, but with all the jealousy and anguish of the lover he has become. He plans to kill the man she loves, but desists. Finally, he sees the light and is helped by le Père de Foucauld who talks sadly of "*les vengeances de la vie.*" Years after Lanthénax finds his former wife has a villa near where he is staying. He sees her walking by the side of an invalid chair in which is seated his rival, now paralysed. And, says Bourget, "*La vie apporte à nos ressentiments les plus justifiés des vengeances, quelquefois si dures, que l'on aurait honte de s'en réjouir.*" That is to say almost that sickness is a punishment for something, otherwise it is a horrible injustice. It implies an almost primitive belief in the association of natural facts with human affairs and makes it difficult to believe that even Bourget could picture life in these terms.

Cœur pensif ne sait où il va is equally determined that no one shall escape what might almost be described as the wrath to come. Irène comes of a loveless and unsuitable marriage and is herself married to someone she does not love. Fortunately he dies and she is free; free to fall in love with a young workman-officer who is in her sister-in-law's hospital, and who for no convincing reason refuses to take chloroform for an operation. In spite of the opposition of her people they are to marry. But there has also been some question of marriage between him and his cousin, Marcelle, who has made shells and is a milliner. Lies are told. Irène is led to believe that he

has had a child by Marcelle. He lets her believe this, even as he refused chloroform, and adds another Bourget hero to the American population. Later, when Irène discovers that the charge is untrue, she does—nothing. Which is to say it is practically impossible for any ordinary, natural, loving human being to escape the labyrinth of traps set by Bourget, and to come out whole.

While the unhappy ending in these works is as inevitable as the happy ending in so many English novels, Bourget nevertheless has above all his other qualities the genuine power of story-telling, that is of movement and progression, the development of one incident out of another. Mrs. Humphry Ward, who also wrote novels with a purpose, had something of the same gift, which apart from anything else led the reader on from one page to the next. His novels are the most detailed exposition of the human soul—that part of the human soul, that is to say, which never laughs. Sometimes one has the impression that this life, in which he is obviously so passionately interested, must be made as unhappy, as much of a torment as possible, in order to make the next worth while. But at bottom how much of a moralist is he, who would cabin and confine the soul, both physically and mentally, lest it stray from the path, upon which he takes it for granted it cannot remain alone. And if the soul is thus, is it worth the pother or is it merely material for a great institution whose *raison d'être* would otherwise be destroyed?

With a sigh of relief one turns again from Bourget's thesis-ridden novels to his early work, for instance, to his psychological essays, and to his appreciation there of the services rendered to freedom of thought by Ernest Renan, of whom more than half a century ago he wrote admiringly: "Man of books, man of the library, with one stride he is in the very centre of our epoch, representing it in all its most remarkable aspects." And what were those remarkable aspects of French intellectual society in the eighties? Precisely those which Bourget in the next century was emphatically to denounce. "The mingling of various strains of thought, the battle between conflicting ideals, elaborated by diverse races. Just as the salons of that period were museums crowded with works of art of all ages and from all countries, so the men and women who met there to discuss every problem of religion, morals and art, represented different races, different classes,

different occupations, and divergent points of view. In this melting-pot of ideas Bourget describes Renan, the historian of events far remote, following boldly the masters of exegesis and the implications of his own thoughts. Kneeling at every altar, repeating the prayers of every liturgy, breathing the aroma of every kind of incense, he extracts from ritual and formula the true spirit of religion and tastes its sweetness. Bourget quotes with approval from Renan's *Questions Contemporaines*: "Every form of religion is imperfect; and yet religion cannot exist without form. . . . The wise man is he who, beholding everywhere prejudice, symbols and images, realises that prejudices, symbols and images are necessary, useful and true. Dogmatism is a presumption, for if among the very best of mankind who thought they possessed the truth, not one was completely right, how can we expect to be more fortunate?" This attitude towards all religions that they are, to quote Emerson, "the same wine in different coloured glasses," was Bourget's and, as he says, that of all the leaders of French thought at that time.

Comparing French intellectual society of the eighties with that of the earlier nineteenth century, Bourget observed that it was no longer bound together by agreement on fundamentals. It had ceased to be, to quote his own words, obsessed by *l'horrible manie de la certitude*. But this *manie de la certitude* was to possess Bourget himself. This was "*le démon de midi*" that lay in wait for him. Well nigh incredible it seems that he who had admired Renan for following so courageously the implications of his own thoughts should fall a victim to the tragedy of arrested development; that he should join the ranks of the dogmatists and of the fanatics (to be found, as he had rightly pointed out, among believers and unbelievers alike) whom he had once eloquently denounced.

There are certain French writers like Anatole France of the last generation, and Charles Maurras in the present, who are essentially Latin both in style and in outlook. The windows of their minds open on to the Plain of Latium, Rome is for them the centre of the Universe. Bourget was not one of these. A certain heaviness of style, a romantic idealism in dealing with life and its problems suggest that he, like Romain Rolland, had a Teutonic streak in his blood, inherited in Bourget's case from Alsatian forbears. He turned to the

north rather than to the south, though he has written some beautiful pages on Italy, *Sensations d'Italie*. Hence also his interest in England. His contact with English literature began very young when, as a tiny child in his home at Clermont-Ferrand, he was propped up to the table on two volumes of the works of William Shakespeare, because they happened to be the biggest books in the house. Later his interest in England brought him friendship with Henry James, whose influence may be discerned in certain of his novels. It also took him to Oxford, on which he has written some delightful passages in his *Études Anglaises* (1889). At Oxford he received an Honorary Degree.

Like most novelists Bourget aspired to success in drama. But this he never completely achieved, though his Play *Le Tribun* attracted considerable interest, partly owing to the superb acting of Lucien Guitry.

It was fitting that Bourget, monarchist and traditionalist, should have spent his last years as Curator of the splendid Museum founded at Chantilly by a Bourbon. There he took refuge from the hurly-burly of that democratic society he had come to loathe. "*La démocratie*," he wrote recently, "*n'est pas un fait nouveau, c'est une maladie qui réapparaît chaque fois qu'un peuple vieillit.*" Bourget died on Christmas Day in the atmosphere of the old France he loved. "*La Vieille France*," says Savignan, in *Le Démon de Midi*, "*c'est la monarchie, c'est le catholicisme.*"

WINIFRED STEPHENS WHALE.

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN GERMANY.

CHARACTERISTIC of the aggravated crisis in which the Hitler government closes its third year is the increase of German indebtedness contracted through the labour creation programme, rearmament, and maintenance of posts and sinecures in the swollen party machinery. It is a financial crisis which is fast becoming a widespread economic crisis, since with the exception of rearmament the purposes for which this indebtedness was incurred have not been achieved. By expansion of credit it was intended to diminish unemployment. As early as the beginning of this autumn it had to be recognised that official unemployment figures had increased by 130,000 during September and October. In the previous year a fall of 122,000 was recorded in these months. The unemployment situation has therefore worsened by a quarter of a million. Through artificial indebtedness it was intended to raise the purchasing power of the masses, but to-day people stand in queues at the grocers' shops in order to get butter, lard, or eggs. Prices of consumers' goods have risen much more than purchasing power. When maximum prices are fixed, back-door trade flourishes in spite of all prohibitions and threats. Official statistics admit that an increase of about a million in unemployment figures is to be expected during the winter. Unemployment increased in November and December by 680,000, despite the fact that 200,000 have been called to arms. Thus it amounted to 2½ million at the beginning of January. The increase is chiefly due to the precarious situation in the textile, the ready-made clothes and the food industries, as well as in the retail trade. All these are kinds of business not subject to the influences of the weather, which besides was very mild. The true reason of that unemployment increase is understood to be the decreasing purchasing power of the population. In January and February, when the seasonal dismissals in the building trade, in fresh-water navigation, etc., begin, the amount of additional unemployment estimated at "only" one million will doubtless be far surpassed. No financial tricks have succeeded in reviving foreign trade, neither the complicated system of various kinds of blocked marks, Registered marks, "Sperrmarks," "Auswanderersperrmarks," "Effektensperrmarks," nor the subsidies with which the

export trade was succoured. It is true that the foreign trade balance at last became active again; but this was only through a most severe restriction of imports which caused a shortage of raw materials and partly manufactured goods required for industry in addition to the shortage of food and fodder supplies. People are asking more insistently: "What will all this lead to?"

In view of the hopeless general outlook it is no wonder that the darkest fears are expressed inside as well as outside Germany. Deceptive manoeuvres which try to hide the full extent of Germany's indebtedness intensify a feeling of uncertainty in all German business circles. Discussions in the foreign Press as to the probable extent of German indebtedness mention exorbitant figures. For example the *Manchester Guardian* of August 22nd, 1935, basing its calculations on the sum derived from the bill-stamping tax, estimated the circulation of bills at the end of May 1935 at 20 milliards of marks, and the "*Neues Tagebuch*," on the same basis, even estimated as much as 26·8 milliards, an increase by about 18 milliards compared with March 1933. The recorded circulation at the time of the estimates was given as 11 milliards.

Such discussions are very inopportune for those responsible, especially at a time when the directors of the Reichsbank are endeavouring through various channels to raise foreign loans. They hasten to stress again and again that there is no "secret" debt. In their weekly report of November 13th, 1935, the "*Institut für Konjunkturforschung*" (Institute of Business Research) give an explanation. They admit a total public indebtedness of 25·8 milliards. Of this sum 13·2 milliards represent Reich debts. A further 5 milliards are accounted for by the circulation of Advance Tax Certificates, Employment Creation Bills and Special Bills. The allegation of a secret Reich debt is only refuted by a bare statement that there is no such debt. In a further denial, of which an extract is here quoted, the Institute proves rather than disproves the allegation:

The sum of the funded and unfunded Reich debt reveals the total recorded Reich indebtedness. There is no such thing as an additional "secret" Reich indebtedness—as often is assumed, especially abroad—but merely future short-term obligations of the Reich arising from the advance tax certificate transactions, from the interest subsidy transactions, from the short-term

financing of the employment creation programme. Reich automobile highway construction and rearmament—which formally are not yet recorded as Reich indebtedness because of the special form of financing . . . Since these short-term obligations of the Reich have not yet matured and will only be redeemed during the budget years up to 1938-39 . . . these obligations of the Reich will thus only be recorded under “Reich indebtedness” when the bills mature and are redeemed by the Reich. Until that time these credit papers either (1) circulate among those directly participating in the finance of the employment creation programme, i.e. between the “bearers” of employment creation (public bodies, etc.) or (2) they find their way as investment to the money market or (3) they are presented for rediscount at the Reichsbank . . . Therefore the Reich obligations not yet recorded in the statement of Reich indebtedness are not to be considered as “secret,” but are special forms of public obligations which have resulted from the very nature of the financing of the employment creation programme in Germany. The sum of the public indebtedness in June 30th, 1935, is recorded as nearly 26 milliard marks, and the total value of the circulation of advance tax certificates, employment creation bills and special bills is estimated at about 5 milliards.

So now we know that there is no debt which is not recorded ; there is “only” an obligation. Such a denial is mere hair-splitting. It is as if someone “contradicts” an allegation that he is a liar by saying that he only told an untruth. Moreover, book-keeping principles are revealed for which any ledger clerk would lose his job : these short-term debts—modestly called obligations—can only be “recorded as Reich debts” when the bills have matured and are redeemed by the Reich. One need not be a book-keeping specialist to know that when these bills are redeemed they will “pass out” of the Reich debt again—to use the terminology of the Institute of Business Research—and that a debt for a bill comes into existence when it is made, no matter how complicated a system of financial acrobatics and jugglery is used to hide the debt. What would happen to a firm which left out of its accounts all obligations which become due after the date of the balance ? In the language of commercial law this would be called falsification, and any law court dealing with such a case would conclude that the balance had been tampered with in order to conceal bankruptcy. According to the report of the “Institute of Business Research” unrecorded debts

totalled approximately 5 milliards. The careful reservation “according to the Reich Finance Minister” should be noted.* A footnote explains that in September 1935 he made this statement in an article. Neither the Institute nor the Finance Minister, Count Schwerin-Krosigk, give exact figures. They are satisfied with “approximately,” which is, as we have seen, a very elastic definition in this case.

The question, “What will all this lead to ?” is, therefore, not solved by the explanations put forward by the Institute. The answer which is heard from many quarters takes the form of yet another question : Will it be possible to avoid open devaluation of the mark ? Do those responsible wish to avoid devaluation ? These questions are quite openly answered in the negative in some semi-official circles in Germany, particularly strongly by those leading the campaign against Dr. Schacht. The full importance of this view is shown by a book recently published in Germany. The fact that this book could be published at all is even more significant than are its contents, though the German Press is not allowed to quote from it. Under the innocent title *Der Kampf um den auswärtigen Handel* (Berlin, 1935, Haude & Spencersche Buchhandlung) devaluation is demanded and elaborate reasons are given to support this demand. The author, Albrecht Forstmann, is one of the economic experts in the Central Party organisation under Rudolph Hess, the deputy leader. He speaks, therefore, as a person beyond all suspicion of being inimical to the State. Forstmann only says what any reasonable person in Germany or abroad has seen for a long time, namely (1) that the prosperity artificially kindled by the labour creation programme has not developed into a natural recovery of private industry, (2) that these measures are “in principle an inflationary means,” (3) that compared with other big industrial countries Germany has the highest price level, (4) that foreign trade has fallen behind that of other countries. The German situation is characterised not only by the fact that she cannot pay her debts, but by the fact that she has no means to finance the imports necessary for the maintenance of the productive apparatus. Contrary to his “Leader”

* On Dec. 11th, 1935, the official German News Agency (DNB) reported that in another speech the Minister had given a higher figure, namely 7 milliards. His Secretary of State, Mr. Reinhard, has pointed out that the given figure only comprises the costs of civil labour creation “and that the (unknown!) amount spent on rearmament would have to be added.”

Hitler, who recently told the other countries that Germany was going to produce all necessary raw materials synthetically, Forstmann does not believe that sufficient "Ersatz" (synthetic textiles, rubber, petrol, etc.) could be produced. Firstly, as he rightly remarks, because the organisation of such synthetic production would take many years, secondly, because immense capital investments would be required, and finally, because only a fraction of the demand could be satisfied in this way.

Just as he criticises the "*Pseudokonjunktur*," a sham prosperity, so he criticises the "Pseudo-stabilisation" of the mark as being "a pure fiction," which can only be maintained by an artificial system. He therefore demands open devaluation of the mark by 70 per cent., that is to 30 per cent. of its present value. He expects that this devaluation would restore purchasing power parity and make possible an expansion of credit. At the same time he demands the conversion by law of all obligations of German citizens, even if they are payable in gold or foreign currencies, into Reichsmark obligations, no matter whether the creditors are Germans or foreigners. It thus becomes obvious that a desperate attempt is to be made to break through the blind alley of unfulfilled hopes and promises. This is confirmed by the description which Forstmann gives of the social and economic consequences. He estimates that if his proposals are accepted, prices in Germany will rise by 100 per cent.—with one exception, the price of labour. As the purpose of these measures is to lower the costs of production, that is, a genuine currency dumping, he suggests that wages should only be increased by 50 per cent. To compensate the workers for the lower real wage rates, they shall be offered longer working hours. Thus, to avoid financial disadvantage, they would have to work about eleven hours per day instead of the average seven and a half hours they work at present.

The recommendation of this financial and social policy by a prominent party member discloses the fiasco of Nazi demagoguery and economics. National Socialism came to power on the wave of a movement which gave expression to the dissatisfaction of the middle classes, the artisans and the small shopkeepers. It posed as the ideology which promised salvation to these people. It meant for them security of property, of savings, and of life insurance policies. In order

to realise the significance of Forstmann's proposals it should be noted that savings accounts in the savings banks totalled over 15 milliards at the end of September and life insurance policies running valued 18 milliards. To the workers the National Socialist had promised the abolition of unemployment and a secure standard of living. But now they announce that unemployment will increase to three millions during the winter, and recommend desperate recipes for a social policy which will lower still further the standard of living of employees of all classes.

With all these warnings it is no wonder that those who can afford it try to obtain possession of real property, following a precedent of the 1922-23 inflation. The reports presented at the board meetings of big companies show the pessimism of their directors. Mr. Kloeckner, one of the leading men in heavy industry, stated that the boom was coming to an end, and also that the State railways had reduced their orders to one third. Press notices announcing the buying up of shares and the absorption of firms after the famous Stinnes-method are becoming more frequent. Companies are buying up firms in widely differing lines, obviously to invest free capital which they do not consider it advisable to put in their own undertakings as they do not wish to increase their capacity. Their main object is not to keep large bank balances. Thus the Henkel-works, the largest company manufacturing washing materials, such as Persil, have recently bought a textile firm. The big "Gesfürel" (*Gesellschaft für elektrische Unternehmungen*) have acquired the majority of the shares in the copper firm "Hirsch Kupfer." The "Gold-und Silberscheideanstalt" bought the "Auer Gasglühlicht" company from Jewish owners, and at the beginning of November 1935 the potash company, Salzdetfurth, obtained the majority of shares in the Mansfeld A.G. (copper mines).

Of special significance in this connection are the sales of Jewish businesses below value. Under pressure from the local party organisations Jews are forced to sell their businesses far below value to Aryan buyers who are thus enabled to invest their money profitably. German newspapers are full of advertisements seeking Aryan buyers for Jewish businesses. The Jewish owner only gets a fraction of the value of his business, and if he emigrates in order to find another living abroad he again only gets one-third to one-fifth of the sale

price as he is paid in devaluated blocked marks. An example of this type of transaction is the case of the Dillingberger Brothers in Berlin. As employees in the textile trade they joined the Nazi party in 1932. With the aid of party money they bought the Jewish firm "Hemdenmatz." For the seven branches of this firm, each of which was worth between 50 and 100 thousand marks, they paid a total of 100,000 marks. They then extended their business by buying shops in the provinces. This example also shows how the Nazis are acting contrary to their own programme and their promises. They vowed a ruthless fight against concentration of capital, especially in trade and banking, in order to help small-scale private enterprise. The Aryan "cleaning process," however, not only ruins Jewish business, but plays a large part in encouraging the concentration of capital. Another example of this was the purchase of the famous old Jewish banking house, Gebrüder Arnold, of Dresden, by the Dresdner Bank, one of Germany's Big Five.

What will happen next? Will the mark be allowed to depreciate? As we have seen, that would mean the economic ruin of the classes which once were the strength of the National Socialist movement. It would mean the destruction of the last illusions to which the employee class still clings. Even if these illusions were never accepted very fully by the so-called working people, office and bank clerks, shop assistants and others of this section of workers believed strongly in them. Moreover, it can hardly be expected that the positive results hoped for by Forstmann will be achieved. Plans for reviving foreign trade by currency devaluation have long been excellently counteracted. Forstmann's supporters can only put forward one rather disconsolate argument: What will happen if the mark maintains its value? The enormous sums of debts, invested mainly in economically unproductive schemes such as rearmament, road construction, etc., cannot be reduced in the normal way. None of the aims for which debts were contracted, the recovery of private enterprise, the abolition of unemployment, the raising of the standard of living of the masses, have been achieved. Vast expenditure has been ignominiously wasted. The question remains open: What will all this lead to?

HERMAN HERMES.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND AGRICULTURE.

AT the last Assembly of the League of Nations Mr. Bruce, the principal Australian delegate, proposed the marriage of Health and Agriculture. With the Italo-Abyssinian dispute occupying the whole foreground, it was not expected that more than a single session of the Second Committee of the Assembly would be devoted to the discussion. Actually the debate lasted for three days, since nineteen delegations insisted on speaking to the motion. Lord De la Warr, one of the British Government delegates, acted as *rapporteur* and produced an admirable report calling for an intensive study of both the health and economic aspects of the problem. This report was unanimously accepted by the Committee and the Plenary Meeting of the Assembly.

The interest aroused in Geneva and the subsequent evidence in the press, that the subject is really a live issue, are not wholly due to the growing interest in nutrition as a factor in public health. The delegations felt that after years of vain attempts to break the vicious circles in which world economic affairs have become entangled, this proposal did offer the possibilities of a way out. The London World Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933 was a dismal failure. As M. George Bonnet wittily put it in a speech at the recent Assembly, the protagonists of monetary stabilisation on the one hand and of trade barrier reduction on the other faced one another like the English and French Guards at Fontenoy without either side having the wit to exclaim, "The Gentlemen of the English Guards will fire first." The Gold Bloc countries would not consider reduction of trade barriers without stabilisation, while the other nations demanded efforts to encourage international trade before they were ready to embark upon serious monetary discussions.

On the two main issues of the Conference the deadlock was complete. The Conference did, however, achieve something negative. There was wide agreement as to the necessity for the restriction of production. Certain countries, including some of the Dominions, refused to believe that producing less could be the proper policy in a poverty-stricken world, but the general line of thought was somewhat as follows: "Science has greatly increased man's power to produce food and raw materials, the rate of population growth is diminishing and

will further decrease, we must regulate production." In 1933 it certainly was not difficult to hold such a view. The accumulation of apparently unsaleable stocks and the tremendous fall in the prices of agricultural products had led to the failure of purchasing power in the agricultural countries with consequent unemployment in the industrial countries. In short the depression had produced a depression mentality and the result was doctrines of restriction.

In 1934 and 1935 many countries have experienced some measure of recovery, and what is perhaps more important have adjusted their economy to lower price levels; as a result the depression mentality is passing and men are finding it once again possible to believe that our increased ability to produce should be translated into rising standards of living. It was wholly sound that the question of nutrition in relation to public health should be the starting-point of the post-depression move towards increased consumption. As Lord De la Warr's report to the Assembly stated: "Increased production gave to Governments the opportunity of taking another step forward in their attempt to build a healthier people."

The proposed marriage of Health and Agriculture is based on the advances which physiology and biochemistry have recently made possible in the science of nutrition. Until recent years dietary needs have been estimated in terms of the energy-producing foods: carbohydrates, fats and proteins. On that basis a nutritional survey of the world would have revealed gross under-nutrition in some countries, such as China, India, and in large parts of tropical Africa, but there would not have been any very clear statistical evidence of malnutrition in the countries of western civilisation. The realisation of the immense significance to health, indeed to life itself, of mineral salts such as calcium, phosphates, iron or iodine, and of the growing series of vitamins, has brought us to a position in which we know that calories are not enough. The foods rich in minerals and vitamins are now known as the "protective foods," and the possibilities of widespread improvement in public health as a result of their adequate consumption is beginning to be generally realised. A great deal of work on this subject has been carried out in this country, in the United States, in Scandinavia, and in other countries. Some idea of the volume of scientific work now being undertaken

which falls under the general heading of nutrition may be gauged from the pages of a scientific journal entitled *Nutrition Abstracts and Reviews*, which each quarter contains abstracts of some 1,200 original papers recently published on various aspects of nutrition.

The Health Organisation of the League of Nations has been studying nutrition in relation to public health since 1925, and in 1934 decided to survey the whole field. The work was entrusted to Drs. Burnet and Aykroyd, and proved a happy example of Franco-British co-operation. Their report was published in June 1935 and immediately aroused wide attention in scientific and medical circles. This report went further than merely to summarise the existing knowledge about the "protective foods" and their effects upon the deficiency diseases. It showed clearly that improved dietaries have already greatly diminished the incidence of such diseases as pellagra and beri-beri, and markedly decreased the incidence of rickets, but its general argument was that nutrition has now become one of the most important aspects of preventive medicine and that, in consequence, the economic policies of nations, their trade agreements and customs measures, ought to be related to the dietary needs of their populations.

During the discussion at the Assembly, an interesting parallel was drawn between the advances of science in relation to public health in the nineteenth century and the present position of nutrition. Owing to the work of Chadwick on sanitation and Pasteur and many other scientists on the causation of infectious diseases, public recognition of the importance of hygiene rapidly developed in country after country. Municipal authorities or the central government assumed control of drainage, water supply, and the isolation of infectious cases. To-day good drains, pure water and control of infection are taken for granted by the citizens of all civilised countries, and any government or municipality which flagrantly neglected these duties would be swept from office by the indignant voters or ratepayers.

In the second quarter of the twentieth century the new knowledge of nutrition may be expected to bring about improvements in public health as dramatic as those which followed sound sanitation and infectious disease control. There will, however, be this difference, that the achievements of the nineteenth century in public health were "preventive,"

whereas we may anticipate that the application of sound nutritional standards will not only reduce mortality from many diseases but enable us to build up an AI population in regard to health, stature, vigour and consequently, we may hope, mental attributes. The modern science of nutrition is young. It is, therefore, not to be expected that complete data should yet be available as to the relationship between nutrition and infantile or maternal mortality, or so widespread a scourge as tuberculosis. Most interesting correlations do, however, exist between diets and mortality from these causes. There are few countries where diet is more satisfactory and varied than in New Zealand and Australia. In New Zealand infantile mortality is the lowest in the world, being only some 31 per 1,000 live births, while the figure for Australia is about 41. These low figures can be compared with 65 in England and Wales, 86 in Scotland, 76 in France, and about 106 in Italy. No nutritionist would claim that food is the only or necessarily the main factor affecting infantile mortality. Obviously hygiene, housing, pre-natal and after-care must all be taken into account, but there is little doubt that nutrition is important. The evidence in regard to maternal mortality is still obscure, but there are indications that nutrition, and particularly certain vitamins, play a significant part.

The food shortages during the war provided a sombre object lesson as to the effects of malnutrition upon susceptibility to tuberculosis. In Germany, Austria and Hungary, during the decade preceding the war, there had been a steady decrease in the incidence of tuberculosis. No marked change occurred between 1914 and 1916, but when, owing to blockade, food supplies became scarcer, the ravages of the disease increased. So much was this the case that the death-rate from tuberculosis doubled in Vienna and Budapest and increased enormously in Prussia and Saxony. In Bavaria, however, where farming is the mainstay of the state, the increase in tuberculosis, while significant, did not assume anything like the alarming proportions that it did in the cities or in the highly industrialised districts of the Central Powers. It is of special interest to note that in England, while there was some general increase in tuberculosis, this was most marked in public institutions where the food rationing system could be enforced and where a minimum of other changes occurred in the lives of the inmates.

The significance of adequate nutrition to public health is, however, as already indicated, by no means confined to the lowering of the incidence of disease. It affects the "*mens sana in corpore sano*" of whole nations. The "protective foods": milk and milk products, eggs, green vegetables, fruit, fish and meat, are all relatively expensive when compared with the energy-producing foods such as bread, sugar and margarine. Such studies of family budgets as have been carried out in Great Britain, the United States of America, Germany and Scandinavia, all show that the utilisation of these "protective foods" is closely correlated with family incomes. There is little difference between the consumption of bread in the English family with ten shillings per week to spend on food and one where ten pounds would cause no inconvenience, but the differences in milk, green vegetables, eggs or fruit are of the order of from 100 per cent. to 400 per cent. Large-scale feeding experiments on school children carried out with funds provided by the Empire Marketing Board showed that additional milk caused an increase of height and weight of about 20 per cent. The average height of boys at an English public school is about 6 inches greater for age than of boys in publicly provided schools. The crowd watching the Inter-Varsity match at Twickenham is as many inches taller than a similar crowd watching the exploits of Manchester City playing Aston Villa. Height alone cannot be regarded as more than one significant factor, but when it is realised that the expectation of life in the poorer districts is definitely less than in the richer ones, and that physical wellbeing is undoubtedly related to mental attributes, the constructive possibilities of adequate nutrition will become apparent. There can be little doubt that proper feeding from the pre-natal period to the end of school age would result in a healthier and almost equally certainly a better population in every sense of the word.

The task which the last Assembly of the League of Nations has asked the Council to carry out is first to ascertain through consultation with the greatest experts in nutrition the dietary standards needed for optimum health, then to consider what the adoption of these standards would mean in terms of foodstuffs, the effect of the increased or changed demand upon national agricultures, the probable repercussions on world trade in agricultural products and the general bearing of the

whole subject upon world economic affairs. The first stage in the series of inquiries thus envisaged was completed when a Commission of world famous experts in physiology and nutrition met in London in the last week of last November. For the first time authorities from England and Scotland, the United States of America, France, Scandinavia, Austria and Russia met to consider optimum standard diets designed to ensure so far as possible the best health. This Commission was not called upon to consider economic factors, but, starting from the hypothesis that the world is now producing more than the markets appear able to handle and can produce far greater volumes of all the desirable foods, it was asked to determine what is desirable for children, pregnant and nursing mothers and ordinary adults.

The London meeting resulted in a report recently published by the Health Organisation of the League, entitled *The Physiological Bases of Nutrition*. This report makes history, and it has been welcomed in this sense by the medical and scientific press. It shows that deficiencies in modern diets mainly occur in the protective foods (foods rich in vitamins and mineral salts) and lays down standards for women and children which would involve an enormous but quite feasible increase in world production if they were to be commonly utilised. The recommendation about milk is that children up to the end of school age and pregnant or nursing mothers should receive 1 litre per head per day. A litre is 1·76 pints, and the consumption per head of the whole population of the United Kingdom is at present only about a third of a pint. *The Times* has interpreted this recommendation as meaning that the average *per caput* consumption should be raised to 1 pint per head per day, and has pointed out that to achieve this British agriculture would need to increase its dairy herds by 2,000,000 cows, or about 60 per cent. These figures give some indication of the demands which adequate use of the protective foods would make upon the dairy and poultry farmers, the fruit and vegetable growers of Great Britain and of the industrial countries of Europe.

A great expansion of demand for such perishable foods, for the production of which the soil and climate of England and of Central and Western Europe are eminently fitted, might be expected to lead to a welcome modification of agricultural policies. So far as this country is concerned, Lord Astor and

Mr. Seebohm Rowntree have, through the publication of *The Agricultural Dilemma*, drawn attention to the great difficulty of encouraging the home production of wheat, sugar and other products which Great Britain has in the past normally imported without endangering our vital trade interests with the Dominions and such good foreign customers as Scandinavia and South America. If the British farmer could concentrate upon milk, eggs, fruit and vegetables, this dilemma would be resolved. Very similar considerations affect the other predominantly industrial countries of Europe.

Nutrition in relation to public health is a subject of direct interest to the working classes and for this reason the International Labour Office is playing an important part in the Geneva inquiries. Last June, well in advance of the Assembly of the League, the subject was discussed at the annual International Labour Conference and a unanimous resolution was passed calling for a report by the Office to the next Conference. The League inquiries will thus be reinforced. The Assembly will also be asked that the International Institute of Agriculture, situated in Rome, should be consulted on the agricultural aspects of the problem.

The main task of preparing a comprehensive report on the health, agricultural and economic factors involved is being referred by the Council to an *ad hoc* committee, consisting of experts chosen from a number of countries. If this committee accepts the general lines of the discussion at the Assembly as affording some guidance in its formidable task, it will decide to concentrate, in the first instance, upon the problem as affecting the more advanced countries. Everyone knows that malnutrition, or rather under-nutrition and indeed stark starvation, is endemic in the Far East, but it is equally clear that remedial measures must depend on means being found to relieve the extreme poverty of the millions of China and India. No quick results can be hoped for in those countries. The delegations taking part in the Assembly discussions were in general agreement that the start should be made in countries whose national resources would admit of effective measures being taken. For such countries many suggestions were put forward and these will doubtless form some of the terms of reference of the Committee. A number of delegations referred to the large sum being spent by governments as subsidies to farmers in order to assist production and asked

whether more satisfactory results to both agriculture and health might not be achieved if the money were used in subsidies to increase consumption.

Methods of social provision were constantly mentioned, such as the desirability of special measures to provide milk and other protective foods for children both below and of school age, and mothers. There was a general feeling that problems of distribution required consideration and that in some countries the "spread" between wholesale and retail prices could be substantially reduced with beneficial effects on consumption. Most delegates hesitated to discuss one of the most important reasons why nutrition cannot easily be improved in many Continental countries where extremely high wholesale prices are maintained behind the tariffs and quotas erected to safeguard national agricultures. This is a subject on which many European countries are sensitive but the Argentine and Spanish delegates pointed bluntly to trade barriers as one of the main causes both of depression in the agricultural countries and malnutrition in the industrial nations.

The Committee can hardly be expected to complete its task before the Assembly meets again next September. It is more likely that, for a number of years to come, nutrition in relation to both public health and world agricultural problems will form part of the agenda of the Assemblies. As Sir Gowland Hopkins said in his final Presidential address to the Royal Society: ". . . This seems to be the very proper business of the League, and if discussion goes deep enough and is frank enough, it may well do no small service to the interests of peace itself." But the League's functions can only be advisory and informative. It is for the governments themselves to decide along what lines action can be taken. In countries where social services have been considerably developed, methods of social provision are likely to be utilised; in other countries the interest of the General Staffs in the physical fitness of conscript classes may lead to some concentration on the effects of scientifically sound nutrition for the defence forces. In others again the League inquiries may bring home the national cost of extreme agrarian protection and we may see a reduction of trade barriers brought about not by the force of unassailable economic reasons but through a humanitarian desire for the wellbeing of the rising generation.

Large results in the immediate future can hardly be expected, but if the basic premises of the whole idea that nutrition is of vital significance to public health is correct, then we may expect that just as to-day the public of no civilised country, whether democratic or ruled by a dictatorship, will tolerate bad drains, or impure water supply, so to-morrow national nutritional policies will be insisted upon with cheap and pure milk and other foods coming to be regarded as essential to national wellbeing, as water is to-day.

The consequences of all this to trade between nations, and therefore to the economic health of the world, may well be of the utmost importance. International trade remains at a low ebb because of a number of forces that are still at work to prevent its increase. While some of these are in the sphere of finance and currency, one set of causes lies undoubtedly in the difficulties experienced by the agricultural exporting countries of the world in selling their products overseas except at prices so low that farmers can live only by the aid of subsidies. General increases in the consumption of foodstuffs would affect not only agricultural communities catering for home markets, but also those specialising for export, and the revival of their purchasing power for manufactured imports would have direct repercussions on the prosperity of the industrial exporting countries of the world.

AGRECON.

ON THE USE OF THE WORD JEWISH.

IT is not intended in this brief article to deal with the adjective Jewish except in relation to religion. In the mouths of fiery anti-Semites the word may be employed to signify all the many bad things which they complacently attribute to all Jews. Thus the word can stand for cunning, meanness, cringing, malevolence, hatred (of the non-Jew), Bolshevism, love of money, materialism, and so on. The wrong-headed absurdity of such an indiscriminate use of the word is patent to every reasonable being who is not possessed, as Nazis and a few English Fascists seem to be, of a raging hatred of the Jews, bordering upon monomania. With such people there is no arguing.

More interesting and more worth discussing is the employment of the adjective to signify religious inferiority. Some fifty years ago a distinguished Jewish psychologist remarked: "What a useful word Jewish, or Judaic, is for some theologians, and what a wide connotation it can possess. For it may mean at will, 'particularist,' 'formal,' 'legal,' 'self-righteous,' 'narrow,' 'eudæmonist,' 'vengeful,' and even some other disagreeable conceptions." Things have somewhat changed in the half-century which has elapsed since these words were written, but there is still room for improvement.

The term "Jewish" is still often used as meaning "below the Christian level." We may compare this usage with the contrast constantly made between Old Testament and New Testament religion, or between Old Testament and New Testament morality. Old Testament religion and morality means everything or anything which seems at variance with New Testament teaching at its best, or with what the particular writer employing the phrase regards as most excellent in religion and most true. It is the fact that there are many sentences in the Old Testament which are truly opposed to New Testament teaching at its best; there are also many things in the Old Testament which imply a crude conception of God or a low standard of morality. Yet why are these things to be regarded as typical of Old Testament religion and Old Testament morality? Or so typical that every higher teaching may be ignored? Yet rarely do we see teachings or injunctions, such as: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, might and soul," or "Thou shalt love the resident alien

as thyself," or "I desire lovingkindness and not sacrifice," or "What does the Lord require of thee, but justice, love and humility?", or "My house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples" (and scores of others of a similar kind), cited as typical of Old Testament religion and Old Testament morality. Why not? The reason, I fancy, is because they are *not* opposed to New Testament teaching at its best, and because it is so delightful and so convenient to have a contrast and a foil.

And what can be a nicer or simpler contrast than Old and New, Old Testament and New Testament? Yet surely it is not scientific, because of the existence of the crude and bad passages, to make *them* typical rather than the others. Shakespeare has a number of commonplace, valueless lines and tags. Are they quoted as truly Shakespearean? Is *Titus Andronicus* more Shakespearean than *Hamlet*, or *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* than *Twelfth Night*? If, indeed, the enormous mass of the Old Testament consisted of the crude and the bad, and the noble and pure and sublime teachings were exceedingly sparse and few, then the good might, perhaps, be neglected, and the common contrast between Old and New might be justified, but no reasonable person can contend that this is the case. Therefore, even as the true Wordsworth is the poet, not at his feeblest but at his glorious best, so should it be with the Old Testament. We look to the man in his maturity; he, and not the immature boy, is the particular human being upon whose character we sit in judgment. And the man at his best, or, at the very least, as a whole, in which the best is the most important part of him, is the man at his truest. Is Jesus better represented—is he the more characteristic Jesus—when he says: "Ye serpents, ye offspring of vipers," and "Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire," and "Narrow is the gate which leads unto life, and few are they who find it," or when he says, "Love your enemies," and "Not that which enters into the mouth defiles a man," and "It is my will to give unto this last, even as unto thee"? The common use of Old Testament or Jewish to mean something inferior, cheap, of low religious and moral worth, seems to me as unscientific as it is unfair.

But I would venture to go further. I would venture to add something which will, I trust, appeal to the larger number of educated Englishmen and Americans. The use of the word

Jewish in this depreciatory religious sense is insulting to the members of a living religion. But to insult the members of any dissident religious community is the very last thing which the great mass of educated Englishmen or Americans would desire to do. Why "insulting"? Well, unless Jews accept and hold to the crude and "bad" things in the Old Testament, and make of them their religion, unless Judaism to-day is just a conglomerate of mere crude and bad things, it is surely illegitimate to employ the adjective Jewish to connote these things and these things alone. And if illegitimate, then insulting. So far as the Old Testament itself is concerned, it is the great things, the noble, the pure, the adorable things, which constitute its flower, its essence, its true characteristic, and if the Jews make of these good things their religion, if Judaism is a conglomerate of them, then "Jewish" should surely be employed in a sense drastically opposed to that in which we find it too often used even at the present hour.

For as Judaism is a living religion, of which the Jews are the adherents, the word Jewish is an adjective relating to the religion of the Jews to-day, just as the word Christian is an adjective relating to the religion of Christians to-day. That is the only way in which the words ought to be used. Now the religion of the Jews to-day has advanced a long way beyond the cruder, lower, and "immoral" passages in the Old Testament, even though Orthodox Jews, fundamentalists like Christian fundamentalists, shut their eyes to the crudities and immoralities, or deny them, or explain them away. What they cling to, live by, and really believe in, are only the great, mature and noble passages, such as those which I have quoted. Moreover—and this is a most important point—Judaism has added to and developed the Old Testament even at its best. It has advanced beyond it. In spite of its continued semi-deification of the Pentateuch, modern Orthodox Judaism, to omit Liberal Judaism altogether, is curiously and immensely different from the institutional religion of the Israelites at any of the Old Testament periods.

Here, again, the odd absurdity of using the word Jewish to signify all that you happen to dislike in religion may be aptly illustrated. You dislike sacerdotalism and priests: then Jewish means priestly. But there are no priests (in any ordinary sense) in Judaism to-day, and a more unsacerdotal religion than modern Judaism can hardly be imagined.

Animal sacrifice seems to you horrid and unthinkable as a mode of thanking or propitiating God. But Jewish should hardly mean "addicted to animal sacrifices," seeing that there are no such sacrifices in Judaism to-day, that there have been none for more than 1,800 years, and that, even though Orthodox Jews pray for their restoration after the advent of the Messiah, it is the truth to say that ninety-nine per cent. of such Jews would be aghast at their reappearance. These prayers are a mere formality, and it is, I think, only a certain timidity and unbending conservatism which causes a retention of them in the Prayer Book. It is still more odd that the use, not even yet wholly abandoned, of the "bad" imprecatory psalms in the services of the Anglican Church is called "Jewish." Thus Dr. Inge writes: "Our services are partly obsolete and much too Jewish" (*Evening Standard*, September 25th, 1934; cp. *Vale*, p. 38). He was thinking mainly of the "bad" psalms. But if we take up the Authorised Orthodox Jewish prayer book we shall find that only about seventy-three or seventy-four psalms are included in it out of the whole 150, and among these seventy-three or seventy-four such "bad" psalms as the 10th, the 35th, the 58th, the 59th, the 109th, the 137th, are absent. In this respect the Christian prayer book has for long been more "Jewish" than the prayer book of Orthodox Judaism. It is, doubtless, true, in one sense, that the more Old Testament passages and the fewer New Testament passages a given Christian liturgy contains, the more accurately that liturgy can be called Jewish, whereas the less of the Old Testament and the more of the New Testament it contains, the more rightly it can be called Christian. But this mere numerical proportion of passages does not give the full significance and sting of the antithesis. What it is really intended to convey is that the Old Testament or "Jewish" passages are, of necessity, religiously and morally, of a poor quality, and of necessity, therefore, greatly inferior to the passages from the New Testament.

More positively what I would love to get instilled into the minds of all sincere Christians in this country and in America is that in religion there is no clean cut opposition to be drawn to-day between "Jewish" and "Christian." Theological differences there are. There are certain doctrines which are obviously purely Christian; there are some which are specifically Jewish. But, at the present time, if the teachings

of the average Jewish Rabbi and of the average Christian parson about the nature of God, about the love of man for his fellow man and for God, about the relation of God to man and of man to God, were brought together, and laid on the table for careful inspection and comparison, it would be found that there were, indeed, differences of phraseology and of stress, but that in almost all the deepest and most religious teachings, if you strip them of their theological and historical dressings, there was little or no contrast, little or no contradiction, but only essential concord and agreement.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIANITY.

THE Right Honourable David Lloyd George expressed a hope that, after the Great War, England would become a land fit for heroes to live in. That hope, stated in a less spectacular way, and extended to cover the whole world, is common to most men : but sixteen years after the signing of the Peace Treaty at Versailles no one can safely predict that it will be realised within the next few hundreds of years. There is, and there always has been, a desire amongst men to be happy ; yet the world remains topsy-turvy. Happiness is a pearl of great price, the search for which has led to endless endeavour on the part of human beings to overcome obstacles to its discovery ; yet much of their labour seems to have been in vain. And what is the cause of this failure ? It is to be found in the fact that selfishness, the greatest of all barriers to the attainment of true happiness, is inherent in most of the attempts made to solve the problems of the world and of the individual.

Fellowship and individual freedom are twin principles upon which the life of humanity must be founded, if it is to progress towards perfection. Any attempt therefore to solve human problems which refuses or neglects to recognise this fact is bound to end in failure. These two fundamental principles must be held in tension in every man by the cohesive power of love. That is to say, a love which is entirely unselfish must be the dominating force in all human life. But such love is an ideal conception, and belongs to the moral and spiritual spheres ; it is understood in the light of the moral consciousness of man and of his spiritual aspirations. Thus peace and happiness can come into the world only when all selfish interests are overcome, only along the path of the moral and spiritual development of the human race. Man, therefore, cannot expect to find the gem which he seeks unless his life is shot through with an overpowering love born out of his contacts with spiritual influences. Such a love is to the whole personality of a man as the sun is to the world.

Life and religion are, therefore, inseparable ; for the spiritual environment is the concern of religion. Religion is the medium through which man is given spiritual and moral enlightenment leading him to live a life of love. There is no great human problem which has not a religious aspect, and

the great religious questions are essentially human questions. The faith of humanity expressing itself through the ages in the religions of the world, and in the "lights" of their several generations, directs man to a knowledge that his true end is not to seek his own satisfaction, but, by living in a fellowship of love with other men, to attain to the perfection of his character. Religion at its best is concerned with a love which must operate through the whole life of a man, and without which he can neither live in fellowship with other men, nor develop to perfection his own personality; it is concerned with a love which is the sanction for all human action, a love which, coming into the world from outside it, is free from all human selfishness, a love which is the very power and source of human life. And such a gift, it claims, is from God; for God is love. It is God who inspires men to pass along the path of spiritual understanding and moral progress to their perfection.

We have arrived, then, at a point where it is true to say that religion is an essential element in the life of the world because it is the means whereby man comes to know about God. And the faith of humanity, leading mankind along the road of spiritual understanding and moral progress, teaches us that God is love. The end towards which man moves is the perfection of the individual within the perfect fellowship of men; and the fulfilment of this purpose is only possible where a love, stronger than any human power, breaks down the strength of selfishness and becomes the motive force in all human affairs. On the basis of the foregoing argument we may now proceed to further conclusions. If the love of God is the ground for human love, it is reasonable to suppose that we shall learn what is the nature of God by taking an analogy from human life.

The idea of an ideal human fellowship consists in a recognition that all men, regardless of nationality, colour or creed, are members of the one great family of men. In such a family all must be united by a common bond of sympathy, for all in their several ways move towards the same end, the perfecting of the human race. But the building of society on family lines is possible only when the freedom of the conscience of each individual is respected, and when the power of love freely flows in and through him. Real fellowship exists because of the free choice of a collection of persons to live in harmony

one with another. The spirit of friendship, reaching out to enfold all men into one great family, can only flourish and become active in the hearts of individuals who by free choice accept the obligations which universal family life places upon them. But, on the other hand, the individual depends for the expression and development of his personality upon contacts made with other individuals. Thus love, which is the bond of family life, is only operative where persons freely choose to be in sympathetic contact with other persons. On this analogy if God is love, and if the love of God is the power and source of all human moral progress, then the faith of humanity bears witness to a God Who must be personal.

God, the objective personification of an ideal love, is real and personal; He is the fount of love, external to the world, Who makes possible the harmonisation of the claims both of the individual and of the group. By loving God we can become perfect; and because God loves us we learn to love our fellow men. In Him we visualise the world of men as one family, and by His power working in us we labour to make the vision real. "Glory to God in the highest"; our first duty is to worship God; "on earth peace among men of goodwill"; our worship enables God's love to flow in and through us for the service of other men. No moral or social reforms have ever been founded upon mere abstractions. Personal contacts must be between mutually responsive persons. If God, then, is personal it must be possible for men to know Him. God must reveal Himself to the world. Thus revelation is one of the most important factors in religion. In Christianity revelation is quite central. The Christian believes that the historic Christ is Himself the revelation of God; and it is actually through Christ that we know that God is love.

The future of Christianity is bound up with the future of civilisation. The significance and the content of the Christian revelation are recognised by the pure in heart; with the evolution of human, moral and spiritual perception, the meaning of the life and death and resurrection of Jesus Christ becomes apparent. The faith of humanity, then, inevitably dictates the forms in which the Christian religion must clothe itself in each succeeding generation. But if we are correct in the conclusions at which we have so far arrived, it is also true that there are certain elements in religion which must always survive, if the human development along the path of moral

progress to perfection is to continue ; and Christianity, if it is to have a future, must therefore in each successive age establish its claim to be the highest expression of the religious aspirations of humanity.

In this article I shall not attempt to act the prophet ; I shall not look into the future and make guesses, for example, at what will happen to the Christian churches in Germany or Russia. Rather I shall try to demonstrate, firstly, that the basic principles of human idealism at all times are best expressed and made actively powerful in life by Christianity ; and secondly, that Christianity is therefore too big to be fully expressed by the forms in which it is clothed in any particular age. That is to say, I shall endeavour to make it plain, on the one hand that the highest expression of the faith of humanity at any period of the evolution of human religious thought and practice is to be found in Christianity, in which the basic principles of moral and spiritual development are central ; and on the other hand that in order to survive the Christian religion must be enshrined in constantly changing forms.

We will consider, first, then, what are the essentials of Christianity, which must survive in the future if there is to be progress in the world towards the attainment of peace and happiness ; if, that is to say, love is to operate amongst men for the development in fellowship of individual perfection. The faith of humanity witnesses to the validity of our assumption that love is the basic principle of all moral and spiritual progress ; and that this love, which is the basis for all human action, is something greater than any specific expression of itself in individual men. In Christianity faith and revelation witness to a personal God Who is Himself love. But faith and revelation belong to other religions, and even the idea of a personal and loving God is not the unique contribution of Christianity to the world. What differentiates Christianity from all other religions is its claim that in Christ the revelation of God is final and complete ; through the life of Jesus the love of God in its fullness has flowed into the world and its nature has been manifested. The sacrifice of Jesus on the Cross reveals that love is selfless and, through faith in the resurrection of Christ, the self-giving love of God flows through the lives of men. This uniqueness of the Christian claim is expressed in the Fourth Gospel by the words, " I am the way,

the truth and the life" ; in dogmatic form it becomes, " Christ is the Son of God."

The unique gift of Christianity to the world lies, then, in its teaching that the historic Christ has revealed the God of human idealism, and in so doing has released His power of love amongst men. The importance of the historical element in this doctrine must be noted. The Christian believes that the basic principles of human idealism are expressed and made actively powerful in his religion because Jesus was the revelation of God, and because, through faith in the Risen Christ, the love of God flows into and through both the individual and the group.

What, then, do we mean when we insist on the historical element in Christianity ? The Mystery religions of the ancient world were evolved in the process of human history, and they expressed an idealism which was born of the faith of humanity ; but they failed to make a lasting appeal because they lacked the essential historical element which is found in the Christian Mystery, and which is the basis of its faith. Christianity, like all other religions, developed in the process of human history, it is understood in the light of the moral and spiritual revolutions and aspirations of humanity ; but it arose from an actual event in history, the birth of Jesus Christ into the world. The religious development of mankind and the highest idealism of humanity were concentered into an actual life. Faith, for the Christian, is centred on the person of Jesus Christ ; He, in His actual life, shows forth the love of God at work in the world.

The unique historical element in Christianity is the life of Christ. And that life, interpreted and understood in the light of the faith of Christians all down the ages, has led to the formulation of dogmas. These dogmas are rules of life and conduct ; they are based on eternal principles bound up with the Christian revelation ; the test of their historicity is to be found in their ability to adapt themselves to the moral and spiritual perceptions of men. Thus the Gospel records and the dogmas of the creeds can only be understood by faith, and they are historical in the sense that, being rooted in a unique event, they illuminate the way for the fulfilment in actual life of the highest ideals of humanity. Belief in the Resurrection of Christ, for example, is central to the Christian religion. It is a dogma of life and conduct. And it is not the Gospel records

which certify to the truth of the resurrection ; else it would be impossible that any man should refuse to believe in it as true. Yet, because the records do not certify to its truth, it would be untrue to say that the resurrection of Christ is not historical. The faith of humanity bears witness to the truth that by means of it the love of God has flowed through men ; and wherever it is held to be true there can be found in actual experience, and so in history, the evidence of its truth. The life of Christ, through faith in His name, releases both in the individual and in the group the love of God. That is to say, at the birth of Jesus an event took place which has issued in the church. And the church has interpreted the event by means of the formula " Jesus is the Son of God " ; for it has been seen by faith, that to be in Christ is for the individual to have perfect freedom and for the group to possess the love which alone can set free the spirit of fellowship.

The love of God flowing through the individual who is in Christ is manifested in his life. The Christian must live a life of worship and service, and therefore he must bring forth the fruits of the spirit. " By their fruits ye shall know them." Thus a Christianity which does not issue in worship and service is dead ; it must *live* in the history of humanity, it must touch the hearts of men. The church, or the fellowship of Christians, is an historical organisation which should be a means for giving the individual opportunity to work out his faith in expressive and concrete love both towards God and towards his neighbour. The ideal church, therefore, is a body in which the human ideal of fellowship may be actualised in history. And though the historical church has been in error in many respects, and though it has passed through periods in history when it is difficult to discern the love of God flowing through it, yet where faith in Christ has been strong there undoubtedly has been seen, in actuality, the working of the spirit of real fellowship. Thus the Christianity of the future must for ever reach out towards the ideal of a fellowship of Christians in which the love of God is continuously an active power, and by means of which every individual will actively express himself by worshipping God and by serving his fellow men.

Love, flowing into the world from a personal God and inspiring men to attain to personal perfection in a fellowship of love, is, we have seen, the supreme principle of life. Moral

progress of the human race is only possible when such love is the basic principle of human existence. And the presence of such love in the world is only possible when God reveals Himself to man ; it is only recognised when men actually live lives of worship and service. But Christ is the supreme revelation of love, He is the cohesive force both in the individual and in the group ; for the individual " in Christ " can become perfectly free, and the group " in Christ " can show forth the real meaning of fellowship as a living reality. Christianity alone is able to make real in history the highest ideals of humanity ; and it is these ideals, these eternal spiritual and moral principles, which must remain, concentered in life, in the Christianity of the future.

The essential feature of Christianity, which must survive, we have seen, in order that it may best be the expression of the highest ideals perceived through the faith of humanity, is its belief that Jesus is the unique revelation in history of God. Christian faith in the person of Christ is of paramount importance ; and this faith, if it is alive, must issue in worship and service and in fellowship. The Christian church is, therefore, the medium through which the spirit of the Risen Christ may actively express itself in love. So far we have spoken of the church as the fellowship of all those who have faith in Christ as the revelation of God. In actual fact there are many so-called Christian churches. And to-day, as in the past, there is a failure of much church life to set free the spirit of Christ in the world. The precept " Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father, which is in heaven " is often honoured more with the lips than with the heart.

In spite of the claims made by Christianity, it remains true that God's kingdom is not yet visibly established amongst men. The explanation of this fact is to be found in a consideration of the great Christian paradox : " the kingdom of God is within you," and yet the kingdom of God will come at some future time. Throughout the New Testament this particularly striking paradox exercises the minds of the writers. The work of Christ has broken down all barriers between man and God ; yet it remains true that Christians continue to be imperfect, and even the community of Christians does not fully express the spirit of fellowship. Here, indeed, is a great problem. To leave it unsolved is to fail to justify the claim

that Christianity is eternally valid as the means of making men perfect, and of introducing into the world the fellowship which arises from the operation of the love of God amongst men. A close study of the New Testament and of the writings of those Christians accounted to be "lights" in their several generations, gives the clue to the solution of the problem we have noted. Christ is a full and complete revelation of God. His life and death and resurrection have revealed the nature of God's love, working in an historical person. But God's love does not automatically flow through men by virtue of the Incarnation. It flows only through those who have faith in Christ. That is to say, potentially the work of Christ has drawn all men into a perfect fellowship of perfect individuals. But faith is generally a power in life which grows gradually into fullness of spiritual perception. Thus, to have faith in Christ is not necessarily to see the full significance of the Christian religion. We only arrive at perfection when we have grown "into the fullness of the stature of Christ." Christian faith, like Christian dogmas, is concerned with life; and we fully understand the meaning of the Christian gospel only when our faith has grown to its fullest, and when it brings the whole of our personalities into personal and responsive contact with the fullness of the life of Christ. "In Christ" potentially we are perfect, but actually we are *being made* perfect. The church of Christ is, therefore, as the body of the faithful, imperfectly a means of expressing the love of God in action.

A corollary of the foregoing solution of the problem raised by the great Christian paradox is that the ideal Christian church has yet to be. One of the principles of growth in the natural world is adaptability. So in spiritual matters, it is necessary for a spiritual organism to adapt itself to changing conditions. Thus the Christian churches, if they are to grow into an ideal organisation in which the love of God may freely operate, must adapt themselves to the changing spiritual and moral conditions brought about by the growth of spiritual perception in humanity. And the individual Christian as he grows in faith must of necessity influence the character of the *ethos* of the community to which he belongs. We come thus to the second point which we set out to demonstrate. Christianity is too big a thing to be confined within the limits of the forms in which it expresses itself in any particular age, that

s, until the time when all Christians have understood to the fullest extent possible the meaning of the revelation of God in Christ; it must therefore be enshrined in constantly changing forms, adapting itself in each successive age to the spiritual environment of the period.

The bearing of the above upon the future of Christianity is obviously great. Churches which are out of touch with the life and faith of humanity cannot survive. Creeds which fail to be rules of conduct in conformity with the highest moral conceptions of men are bound to become relics of bygone days. Christianity which looks back to the past and not forward to the future must suffer the fate of Lot's wife. This is not to suggest that the past and the present are of no importance in the future. It is to say that the future must continually reinterpret the past in the light of the developing faith of humanity. Thus while institutions and creeds, which should be servants of faith and not masters, change, the essential elements of Christianity must remain; and the forms in which these essentials have been embodied must inevitably influence the forms in which they will be embodied in the future; for the life of humanity is an evolving process in which the past, the present, and the future are inextricably interwoven.

The ideal church will become actual only when all Christians make real in their own living that which Christ has potentially effected in the world. Such a church may be unrecognisable from any of the churches of to-day in regard to its external forms of expression, its theology, its worship and its organisation. But it will have this in common with them all, that it will bear witness to the uniqueness of the revelation of God as love which is given in the person of Jesus Christ.

L. J. COLLINS.

DON JUAN IN LITERATURE AND MUSIC.

AMONGST the four great rebels of literature, Faust, Don Juan, Don Quixote and Hamlet, Don Juan has had the most chequered career. Grown out of an international legend, finally settled in Spain, embroidered with partly historical, partly mythical additions, this universal type has come to stay, existing under its original or any other name to-day as it will exist to-morrow. Repulsive to men—"Men never like him" is said of Lavedan's modern Don Juan—he always had a fatal fascination for women. In the original version a mere sensualist, he was gradually transformed under the influence of Goethe's *Faust* into a more complex personality. As in Goethe's drama, Faust's self-accusing exclamation: "Lustful desire drives me to enjoyment which leaves me perishing for new desire" finally yields to the redeeming words of the Chorus Mysticus: "The eternal Feminine leads us towards Heav'n."

In a similar way modern versions emphasise the spiritual side of the sensualist. Both Faust and Don Juan, the complements of man's nature, are the products of their surroundings: Faust the northern protestant doubter of traditional belief, Don Juan the southern antagonist of accepted morality, frequently interchanging their personalities in legend and literature. The story of Don Juan is generally assumed to be an autochthonous Spanish creation. Modern research has, however, overthrown this old popular belief. Arturo Farinelli, amongst others, has proved that there never lived an historical Don Juan with our hero's propensities, and that the legendary traits attached to the story belong to the international stock-in-trade of traditional folk-lore. Greek and Roman antiquity, Iceland, China, the Azores, France and, of course, Spain, have all contributed towards the common fund of the legend: a dissipated hero meets with punishment at the hands of the man or woman he had wronged. A skeleton, a skull, or mostly a statue intervene miraculously in his punishment. This latter motif is already found in an old Greek legend. In the island of Thasos the statue of a great athlete was insulted by a rival; he is killed by the statue.

A few examples from French and Spanish folk-lore will bring us still nearer to the treatment of this motif. A legend

from Picardy tells us of a peasant who invites a Death's Head to supper. One evening a skeleton calls upon the peasant, sups with him and disappears. A few days later the peasant meets the skeleton, which invites him to return the visit. They meet in the crypt of an old chapel. In the morning the peasant drags himself home and decides to become a monk. In another version (Burgos) a sacrilegious knight mocks a statue, pulling its beard and hair (a motif we find in Tirso's play): "Do you remember, great captain, your time of war? Now you are here, a mere block of marble! I invite you to sup in my house to-night." A last instance (from Menéndez Pidal's collection of *Romances de León*) is particularly interesting, its motifs being almost identical with those employed in the Spanish dramas and in Mozart's *Don Giovanni*: A youth went to church, but not to attend Mass, only to look at handsome women. He sees a skull which he kicks out of the way, inviting it to supper. Awaiting his guest he hears a knock at the door. The servant answers it; the skeleton enters, sits down, but refuses meat and drink. It invites its host to supper at midnight in a church. The youth accepts. Horrified at the sight of an open grave, he calls upon God and is thus saved from destruction.

Before discussing Tirso's play and its ramifications in international literature, a survey of Don Juan's personality and evolution may be of interest. Don Juan, as we know him, never existed. He is almost entirely an invention of the Spanish dramatist Fray Gabriel Tellez, who wrote under the pseudonym of Tirso de Molina (1571(?)–1648) and belongs to the brilliant galaxy of dramatists during the golden age of Spanish letters. "*El Burlador de Sevilla y Convidado de Piedra*" (The Scoffer of Seville and the Guest of Stone) was published in 1630, together with twelve plays by Lope de Vega and other dramatists, but is not included in the edition of Tirso's plays. This fact, taken with other considerations, has caused Professor Farinelli to doubt Tirso's authorship. But whether we accept Tirso as the author of the *Burlador*, or whether new discoveries will attribute the creation of Don Juan to another dramatist, the fact remains that the play represents an entirely original conception.

All the other stories current about the Don are subsequent to Tirso's play and have no historical foundation. No chronicle of Seville and none of the numerous romances speak about

the tradition that Don Juan had killed Don Gonzalo de Ulloa, that he had insulted the statue of the Comendador in the Convent of Saint Franciscus, and that the monks had lured Don Juan into the cloister, killing him there. No mention can be found of Ulloa's statue, a legend probably based on the effigy of a Roman knight which stood in the convent. The names Ulloa and Tenorio do occur in Spanish history, a Juan Tenorio having been a favourite of Pedro el Cruel (1350-69); but they show no connection with Tirso's hero.

The vivid character-study of the immortal rake drawn by Tirso may have induced public opinion to accept as historical what was partly legendary, partly the outcome of creative genius. But there was an historical character in the seventeenth century whose life resembled so strikingly that of Don Juan that it probably strengthened the general belief in a real Don Juan, Don Miguel de Mañara of Seville (born 1626). After a dissolute life, very much in Don Juan's style, he repented, founded the Hospital de la Caridad, and entered the Hermandad de la Caridad, dying there in the odour of sanctity. On his tomb can still be read: "Here lie the bones of the worst man who ever lived." His flamboyant career stirred popular imagination to such an extent that numerous anecdotes and legends crowded round his name. The story goes that he walked one day on the left bank of the Guadalquivir when he saw a stranger smoking a cigar on the opposite bank. Mañara asks him for a light, whereupon the mysterious person's arm reaches across the river offering him his cigar; it was the Devil! Another time he follows a girl who turns out to be a skeleton. Finally he witnesses his own burial in a street of Seville, still called *la calle del ataúd* (the street of the coffin).

In spite of the originality of his invention Tirso (still supposing him to be the author of the *Burlador*) was doubtless indebted for the general atmosphere of his play to the popular romances and perhaps to the dramas of other poets dealing with similar subject-matter. But in those plays the villains are vulgar ruffians, quite unlike the gentlemanly Don Juan. Tirso's play is a magnificent example of the Spanish drama of adventure. In technique and splendour of imagery it ranks with Shakespeare's grandest conceptions. What the modern reader admires most in its architectural design is the skill with which the author's genius breaks the monotony of the

subject; for after all Tirso's Don Juan is nothing but a professional seducer, without the admixture of spiritual longing added by later writers to the original subject-matter. His tastes, as in Mozart's opera, are thoroughly catholic: the Princess Isabel, Ana, the daughter of the Comendador Ulloa, the fisher maiden Tisbea, the peasant girl Aminta (the prototype of Mozart's Zerlina), all represent merely different stages in his amorous career. Highly interesting is the use Tirso makes of the *Leitmotif*: Don Juan's proud and scornful address to Destiny, "Long suffering indeed your patience is," and Tisbea's "Woe to her who trusts men's words!" with their variations and climax of almost Wagnerian significance. When death comes at last in the shape of the Comendador, he meets him as a fearless gentleman and Christian, almost redeeming by this final *beau geste* the vileness of his life. When reading Tirso's *Burlador*, let us not forget that, in the words of the eminent Spanish critic, Blanca de los Rios, "Don Juan embodied the opulent and corrupt Spain of the Renaissance, that tragic and restless Spain, struggling between pagan voluptuousness and ascetic terrors." Unless we bear this in mind, we are liable to be unjust to the author and his work.

Tirso's drama, which had never become really popular, exercised an amazing influence upon international literature. After several scurrilous adaptations in France and Italy, it inspired Molière to write his *Don Juan* (1665), in which he followed the general outlines of Tirso's play. But his Don Juan is a Frenchman of the seventeenth century, whose sin is not so much his immorality as the brazen attitude of the free-thinker with slight touches of eighteenth-century humanitarianism. He incites a beggar to blasphemy with the promise of a ducat, and upon the latter's refusal, he throws him the coin with the words: "I give it you for humanity's sake!" Shadwell's play *The Libertine* (1676) is a coarse version of the original and will only be remembered through Purcell's incidental music *Nymphs and Shepherds* and the chorus "In these delightful, fragrant groves." Byron's Don Juan has really nothing in common with the old legend, which only served the poet as a peg for his satire of hypocritical Society:

I want a Hero—
Every year and month send forth a new one—
I'll therefore take our ancient friend Don Juan.

We all have seen him in the pantomime
Sent to the Devil somewhat ere his time.

As to the scope of his poem, he wrote in 1821 to his publisher, Murray; "I want to create a Don Juan who shall be a *cavaliere serviente* in Italy, a cause for divorce in England, a sentimental figure in Germany, so as to ridicule all social customs. I do not yet know whether I shall have him punished in Hell or through an unhappy marriage. I am not sure which is worse." We already see how the old story assumes in Byron's version, which Goethe called "the work of a poet of unlimited genius," traits foreign to its original texture. A similar transposition of the general trend of Don Juan's character into the atmosphere of our own time occurs in Bernard Shaw's *Man and Superman*, in which Tanner stands for Tenorio, the third act supplying the local colour of Spain.

The romantic movement in Spain discovered amongst other treasures of its past, the legend of Don Juan. The first-fruit of this discovery was the *Don Juan Tenorio* by José Zorrilla, Spain's Victor Hugo. In this drama, which gained an immense popularity (it is performed every year on All Souls' Day) Zorrilla grafted two new motifs upon the original subject: a rival to Don Juan, Don Luis Mejía, an addition we already find in a work which obviously influenced Zorrilla: *La chute d'un ange*, by the elder Dumas, and the figure of Doña Inés de Ulloa, whose love saves the seducer from eternal perdition. Zorrilla's play, with its dazzling rhetoric and occasional flights into genuine poetry, is one of the masterpieces of Spanish literature.

Amongst modern plays Echegaray's brilliant *Don Juan's Son* is remarkable for three reasons. First of all it represents the ancient type in the shape of a contemporary. Secondly, it introduces him as a still cynical, but no more dangerous *paterfamilias* whose professional activities have come to an end. Lastly, his son, a gifted but neurotic boy who has inherited, if not his father's amorous propensities, at any rate a pathological mentality which finally wrecks his promising career, developing into insanity. The influence of Ibsen's *Ghosts* is so evident that we even meet with Oswald's words; "Mother, give me the Sun!" The motif of the ageing Don Juan has also attracted the exquisite poet-philosopher Campoamor, who introduces a new feature:

the only one of Don Juan's victims who really loved him renounces her own salvation in order to save her lover's soul. Junqueiro, Portugal's greatest philosophical poet, shows us Don Juan in utter degradation, old, penniless, starving; he dies in the gutter, but unrepentant: "Remorse? No! I am hungry!" Martinez Sierra's sparkling kaleidoscopic *Don Juan of Spain* might be effectively used as a film book.

Till now we have watched the evolution of the legend from its original straightforward representation till it gradually became imbued with certain side-issues, invented in order to make the character more complex and more "modern." Don Juan himself remains still a sensualist, only his *milieu* changes. The first to create the truly philosophical conception of a Don Juan in constant strife against his volitions was Christian Dietrich Grabbe (1801-36), himself a reversion to the type of eighteenth-century "*Kraft-genie*," who established clearly the relationship between Faust and Don Juan in his drama *Don Juan and Faust*. This Faust, like Goethe's hero, has a strong sexual complex. He, the magician of the old *Volksbuch*, carries Anna away to Mont Blanc, where he kills her for not responding to his passion. Don Juan, though still the sensualist of the legend, sees in Anna something beyond the grasp of his materialistic desires; for the first time in Don Juan literature the duality of Man's nature becomes expressed. As Grabbe's Devil puts it tersely:

I know, you two pursue the self-same goal,
And yet you jog along in different carts.

Considerations of space allow me only to mention Paul Heyse's *Don Juan's Ende*, Lenau's *Don Juan*, Musset's *Namouna*, Espronceda's *El Estudiante de Salamanca* and Alexis Tolstoy's *Don Juan*, an idealist who seeks in woman inspiration and finds only disillusion. When his ideal appears at last in Anna, it is too late. Like Goethe's Faust he is saved from damnation through striving after the ideal.

Perhaps the most subtle modern version is by Mirko Jelusich, an Austrian of Croat descent, one of the greatest masters of German style. Whilst keeping in general to the outlines of the legend, he introduces two new features. Technically his novel is built upon the principle of the triptych—his childhood, guided by his mother, the only

woman he ever really loved, his stormy life, his return to the feet of the Madonna, the symbol of mother-love. Further, he introduces female characters of a depth and fascination almost unequalled in the legend or the modern versions. Though under Don Juan's spell, they pitilessly analyse his emotional life. The modern versions show us a sublimation towards a more philosophical conception. In Lenau's words :

The joyful Don has left this world for good ;
The sad Don Juan has become his heir.

Amongst the innumerable operatic settings of the legend, Hérold's *Zampa ou la fiancée de marbre* being one of the best-known versions, and symphonic adaptations like Richard Strauss' *Don Juan*, there is only one composition which has fully expressed the glow of Tirso's play : Mozart's *Don Giovanni*, received enthusiastically in Prague in 1787. The libretto by Da Ponte follows closely the scenario of Gazzaniga's opera, toning down some clownish pranks of older Italian versions when, for instance, Leporello throws the list enumerating Don Juan's amours into the audience, inviting the men to look whether it contains their wives' names. Da Ponte's and Mozart's *Don Giovanni* is neither "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought," nor can he say with Goethe's Faust : "Two souls, alas, within my bosom dwell." He is, in words and music, the incarnation of the eternal *joie de vivre*. Goethe, who regretted that his Faust had not been composed by Mozart, gave us the most apposite appreciation of *Don Giovanni* in a conversation with Eckermann. "It is an intellectual creation where the details are merged into a perfect whole, vivified by the breath of life and where the artist did not tentatively piece together detached items. No, it was the demon of his genius who possessed him and whose commands he had to obey." And this genius wrought another miracle : it transfigured Don Juan's crude character through a sparkling and at times sinister music, cleansing it thus of all the dross of materialism, a Don Juan of Musset's dreams :

The wondrous symbol of man's earthly ways
Whose left raises the glass whilst with his right
He grasps the hand of threat'ning Destiny!

M. JOUBERT.

AN ORNITHOLOGIST'S NOTES.

THE watcher of birds in Britain cannot associate his findings with any hard-and-fast expectation, for even the most conservative of birds are apt at times to surprise one with their unusual actions ; wary birds may suddenly be met as tame as the tamest ; a rare bird may for a short season be unusually common ; a silent bird like the spotted flycatcher may one afternoon be in a glade of the wood flying about uttering quiet notes and being answered by other flycatchers in the shrubbery, as one has never heard them call before or since. So is the ornithologist ever adding to his notebook.

The usual heavy winter gales on the coast decided us to take the next train north and search the Lancashire coast for oiled birds cast up by the gale. Earlier in the season we had watched the first flock of scoter diving and taking short flights over the inshore waves, but it was impossible to get near them. There was a mile and a half of sand-dunes and slacks to traverse this afternoon before we reached the coast, and wading through the slacks my friend set up snipe and mallard, and I picked up the first dead bird, an oiled scaup which had come inland to die. Then a drake scoter tried to rise from the reeds, but flopped helplessly in the water with the weight of oiled wings, and finished its race to cover under water. We followed it up the slack a hundred yards, for the bird could not swim fast enough to evade us. Having arranged the camera and put a plate in it, John, with his usual patience, waded out into the deeper water to stalk the scoter for a close-up photograph. His camera was focused at ten yards, but the drake scoter was wild and dived every time he came near it. For half an hour he waded slowly after the bird, called it, fed it, and meanwhile a golden-eye with less oil on its wings got up between us and flew up the slack, while a duck scoter, browner in colour than the drake and with paler plumage on the lower part of her face, broke cover from the banks and swam swiftly away. At last the drake became tamer, took confidence in the endless patience of his pursuer, and two close-ups were taken, the scoter meanwhile swimming round and round with amusing curiosity.

Out on the sands thirty dead scoters, their plumage matted with oil, lay at the Point, and dead duck littered the tide-line

and lay at intervals on the sands. The gales had worked heavy havoc on the oiled birds at sea ; but there was a pool a short distance from the sea where a black duck swam round in circles. I put the glasses on it and saw a drake scoter, oiled slightly, but handicapped only in flight. At last the bird left the pool, waddled a short way on to the sands and flopped down. We walked up to it. I put my hand out to the scoter and it opened its orange-coloured beak to show its pale yellow tongue and mouth as it hissed in fear. But I stroked it and it settled down again. On the tide-line a great skua, which had taken advantage of the sickly birds, looked the densest of brown against the young herring-gulls and the two almost white sanderlings feeding with the crowd of knots, redshank, oyster-catchers and dunlin at the water's edge in an incessant flickering of wings. What a difference from the day's experience earlier in the season when the wind was running a gale and we could not get within a hundred yards of the scoters. John recalled the grey phalaropes on the coast when he went prepared for at least the half-hour stalk he took to photograph the black-tailed godwit, but found the two dainty pearl-grey and silver-white arctic visitors bobbing up and down on the waters like the whitest of gulls, oblivious of the passers-by on the promenade or watchers as near as six feet, as they swam in the pool, dipping their bills into the water and paddling fast with their legs, darting hither and thither on the waves.

I do not know why our bird-lovers should associate rare birds with wariness. The grey phalarope is by no means the only rare bird of almost suicidal tameness. On our city sewage farm, bordered by houses and a main road, I have sat in a hide with three ruffs feeding some ten feet away, and often stray birds of passage have taken no heed of me as I stood knee-deep in the water twenty yards away from their feeding-place, though all the snipe, redshank, plovers and teal had vacated at my appearance. The heaviest passage of ruff I ever watched on the mud-pans and lake occurred in the heat-wave during late summer when almost all other marshes and swamps had dried up, save these artificially-fed pools. My hide that day gave me full view of the water, the mud and the dykes that crossed in perfect pattern. Only the wagtails remained feeding before the look-out after I entered, but soon a dunlin joined their company—then two—then three. Next

I counted some sanderlings, and a solitary sandpiper scudded over the mud to add itself to the assembly. Beyond these a flock of forty moorhens fed amongst the marsh-ragworts, and a congregation of plover tumbled through the air over the yellow flag-irises to alarm a cock teal swimming below, whence came its "krink" of alarm.

The wagtails and dunlin had now passed on from my hide, and a large wader, reminding me first of a redshank, but flying more slowly and looking much larger, settled in their wake. He was shorter in the bill than a redshank, and showed white on each side of the tail, had greenish-yellow, not orange legs, and a buffish-chestnut tinge to his foreparts. The newcomer was a ruff, a wader that last nested in England in Lancashire in 1910 ; but it still occurs in many parts on migration, though rarely with the ornamental frill of its courting plumage from which it is named. When the rare visitor had passed on from my hide, I got out and began searching along the dyke, which made a convenient screen for my progress along the lake-side. I was not specially looking for ruffs, and was surprised to disturb three more birds immediately in front of me. These ruffs did not fly far, and following them I walked as close as I had been in my hide to the first ruff. Nervously and noisily the redshanks and snipe rose in alarm as I passed along, but the ruffs moved only when their feeding suggested movement : they were the tamest birds on the sewage farm in all that heavy migration. Thereafter I saw many ruffs during the late summer and autumn migration, and one evening I went up after a storm to find a dead ruff who had broken its shoulder hitting the overhead cable in flight. The three great and growing dangers to bird-life in Britain are waste oil at sea, overhead wires and main-road traffic inland, and electric railways. In the winter following the visits of so many ruffs we had an unusually abundant invasion of short-eared owls that fly and hunt for voles and mice by day, perching on the ground on our dunes, heaths and mosslands, instead of perching in trees like the commoner resident owls ; a fine "woodcock-owl" alighted on the electric railway line at a nearby station and was electrocuted. I was on a marsh that November when the migrating short-eared owls first arrived from across the North Sea, and one of the birds, in the broad daylight, was hunting the marsh for voles in the direction of my hide, which I had made in an old drain. He

flew low and swift, looking whiter than any other owl, until with a suddenness he came upon my hide and saw me, or the reflected light in my field-glasses. He hung on momentarily in mid-air, like a kite fixed on the end of its string, uttering a curious bark-like note of alarm, and after regarding me with big round eyes for half a minute without moving his position, he called again and turned swiftly to return the way he came.

There was a day in the drought, however, when the mud-pans ran dry and left only the hard-baked mud which was turned as grey as lichens on a fallen stump by the sun's power. A few ringed plover and wagtails were the only birds I could see, feeding on the gnats that still danced in shaded corners, and I was considering another bird-haunt as advisable when a couple of strange pipits, larger and more buff than any pipits I had seen before, ran out of the shelter of a tussock of grass on the dried mud-pan, feeding on the insects in the sunlight. I studied them for some time, lying down amongst the dead vegetation of a dried dyke, before I could place them with any bird name. Slowly I realised I must be watching the rarest of our visitors, tawny pipits, birds of North Africa and the arid Steppe regions. I spent the afternoon studying them, but these rare visitors were as wild and wary as could be, and I could not get any nearer. There were plenty of common pipits later in the afternoon for comparison, and our visitors looked much lighter in colour than these, almost golden as they turned into the sunlight. It was this sandy-buff and a lack of the bold streaky appearance of the common pipits, in addition to the slightly larger size, that most impressed me with the strangers, but I could not get near enough to see the white eye-stripe, and next day they had gone. Our white wagtails, greenshanks, green sandpipers, wood-sandpipers and skuas visit from time to time as the migrating birds pass through year after year, but the tawny pipit has never been seen at the farm again. Must we thank the summer drought or some chance accident for that unforgettable afternoon lying in a dyke and watching them when bird life elsewhere was so vacant?

The strangers visiting the park lake at Knowsley are never approachable within much distance owing to the many mallard who are up in the air quacking in alarm at the least suspicions of a watcher, but in the winter following the visit of a sclavonian grebe, which swam amongst the widgeon and

pochard like a stranger in a foreign race, I saw a drake smew, whiter than any gull, swimming in the bay which is usually the haunt of shovellers, and when at last he took wing, though only for a short distance, that glaringly white bird suddenly became black and white, looking an entirely different bird, so deceptive are the appearances of duck as a guide to the birds on the wing. There was a great crested grebe which nested on the edge of a small wood whose interior sheltered the snipe forced to nest in such uncommon surroundings because the drought had made its usual paddock haunt as hard as iron and the haunt of a multitude of vermin, from egg-thieving rooks and cuckoos to stoats and the plagues of field-mice that next autumn brought the short-eared owls to the fields. The crested grebe built its nest on a root of the last tree in the wood, just overhanging water, and because she always sat with her head to the wood I could approach within a few feet before she learned of me, and then she would watch me and not quit the nest until the last moment, though once off she would never return while I was in sight. Grebes are very curious. In Leicestershire I have seen a parent bird in alarm open her wings, to which the chicks swimming round her raced for safety, and after closing them she dived with the chicks and emerged many yards distant, the chicks coming forth from under her wings. But when a particularly interfering coot attacked the cock crested grebe on the nest, he could only hiss at it in alarm, and as soon as he was off the nest the coot returned and pulled it to pieces. Grebes are usually inoffensive birds, neither interfering with nor attacked by other birds, but where coots are too numerous the smaller birds drive off the crested grebes. It is said to be rare to see a crested grebe fly, but one afternoon in dull spring weather I had just arrived at the lake when I saw a great crested grebe rise out from a paddling of mallard and fly steadily over the water, low down, its heavy body and long neck resembling a cormorant's in flight, except for the difference in colour. A few weeks later I turned round to see a lapwing which had waded out amongst the floating persicaria which forms favourite food for the coots, suddenly launch itself on to the water and swim into the lake. For some days a visitor to the flock of Canada geese here, an uncommon albinistic specimen with a fawn instead of black neck, and of sandy instead of warm brown back, haunted the lake, and on another day my glasses

picked out amongst the mallard a very pale, sandy-brown duck, another unusual colour form. These colour forms in wild birds are a very interesting study. One spring afternoon near a local village I came upon a brood of young chaffinches just left the nest, and one of these was all black in plumage save for the trace of white on its shoulder and wing-bar. Shortly afterwards the black chaffinch was missing from the district.

The duck on the salt-water lakes and bathing pools are less easy to approach, for shelter is absent and one must rely on telescopes or good glasses. One dirty November afternoon I visited our local marine lake after a walk along the sands, amidst wild calls from herds of feeding curlew and the pretty pictures of great black-backed gulls standing on the sands, their snow-white underparts and jet-black upper parts adding the only bright colour to the drab winter shore. Two black duck that looked almost certainly common scoter swam on the lake. I walked round the promenade and they swam away. I tried for an hour to get them to take wing, and when at last they did so I clearly saw the white bar on the wing that proved they were the rare velvet scoters, duck which had only twice previously been recorded in Cheshire. The red-breasted mergansers are on the lake most winters fishing for flukes, but the gulls congregate above them and as soon as a merganser comes up from a dive, the crying gulls swoop down and if the duck does not drop its catch they will snatch it from its mouth. The long-tailed sea duck, handsomest of all British sea duck, is another winter visitor to the lake, day after day haunting the waters "just across the road" to those lucky folk living on the promenade.

ERIC HARDY.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE AND AFTER.

THE resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare on December 18th was an event interesting enough to put new life into the jaded, political philosopher. A British Foreign Secretary was hounded out of office by a furious public opinion in his own country. There are those—the present writer among them—who regard Sir Samuel Hoare as the best Foreign Secretary we have had since the war. He survived in office for only six months. When he succeeded Sir John Simon on June 7th the lines of his policy were already laid down. The Government had decided that the Covenant of the League of Nations should be its lodestar in the face of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. Sir Samuel Hoare, who had not before as the Minister responsible had to deal with the appalling confusions of European diplomacy, and whose mind by contrast had for several years been concentrated upon the wholly different problems of India, now found himself saddled with the responsibility of taking a definite line on a major European issue, under the condition that his clue was to be the League of Nations. Those who know what kind of man is Sir Samuel Hoare know that above all he is a realist. He takes immense pains to master his subject before he forms an opinion. In the present instance he knew that the League of Nations had been in operation since January 1920, and that the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government had since then been continuously based upon the League. One can imagine the grim seriousness with which he now re-read the Covenant. He happens to possess a logical and a practical mind. He knows something of finance. He knows the dangers of political emotion and appreciates the causes and the results of war. No practical man for one moment could seriously entertain the notion of a war to end war. All war is muddle, and the longer it lasts the greater the muddle. It is in practice nonsensical to conduct a war for idealist ends, for the chaos of conflicting emotions and purposes generated by the very course of a war makes any clearly defined purpose untenable. Now Sir Samuel Hoare was presented with the near prospect of an Italo-Abyssinian war. He was presented with a ready-made

machinery, that of the Covenant of the League, for averting it.

In the past the League had been talked of as an instrument of peace. It had never been put to the test as such. Sir Samuel not only decided that he would use the League machinery—he could have reached no other decision consistently with his having accepted office as British Foreign Secretary—but he determined that he would now prove on the severest practical ground whether the League of Nations could be relied on as an instrument of peace. He did his best in that sense, hoping and at first believing that the League of Nations could be made to work, despite the aloofness of certain essential Great Powers from its membership. Hence it was that in the several speeches he made as Foreign Secretary, both in the House of Commons and at Geneva, he emphasised and reiterated in almost identical, simple words the determination of the British Government to take its part in the collective system of security prescribed by the League, in particular to take its part in steady collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression. There is nothing woolly in Sir Samuel's thought, and little that is rhetorical in the expression of it. A clear logical mind is a rare thing among politicians. Having made up his mind to a certain course of action Sir Samuel plunged into it wholeheartedly, advertised his purpose in the simplest unequivocal words and exerted a drive such as was itself largely responsible for the surging public opinion which in the end undid him. Will any of his critics deny the unqualified, clear purpose expounded by him on July 11th in London and on September 11th in Geneva?

But it came to pass that the League of Nations did not avert the Italo-Abyssinian war. To the mind of such a man as Sir Samuel Hoare such a fact was both big and inescapable. He had done his best without any reserve or wavering to prevent that war by advertising Great Britain's determination to take her part in imposing the penalties decreed by the Covenant against an aggressor. The threat of the penalty had failed. Italy defied the League and invaded Abyssinia. From that moment there developed a radical change in Sir Samuel Hoare's outlook. Having threatened to use sanctions, having committed himself and his government to use sanctions, he had now no alternative, so at first it seemed to him, but to experiment with sanctions, even though his heart

was not in them. For it was obvious to any practical man that if the threat of sanctions could not prevent a war, the use of sanctions could not shorten it without indirectly leading to still worse catastrophes than that it was intended to prevent. Yet Sir Samuel Hoare grimly determined to see the thing through. He had proved to his own satisfaction that one part of his initial hope and belief had been belied, and now had to accept the fact that the League of Nations could not be relied on to prevent a war. He would now, albeit in a chastened spirit, go further and put the operation of sanctions to the practical test. Sanctions were duly decreed and put into operation by the League of Nations on November 18th. By the beginning of December Sir Samuel had formed the opinion that the operation of sanctions on the one hand could not be made effective as an instrument for shortening the war and on the other hand might be effective in producing a general European war. The moment he reached that conclusion, being a practical, realistic, honest man who also had the courage of his convictions, he threw over the whole machinery of the League of Nations and adopted forthwith as his new objective the stopping of the war at all costs. To his mind the averting of so grave a danger as a general European war was of infinitely greater moment than the theoretic prestige of the League of Nations.

He obtained the Cabinet's approval of his new objective. Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Anthony Eden were among the majority members of the Cabinet who approved it. The object so approved was to stop the war by suggesting peace terms based upon three main principles, namely international supervision for Abyssinia, territorial exchanges between Abyssinia and her neighbours, and provision for Italian expansion and settlement in the south of Abyssinia. If a man's mind be clear he works fast. Sir Samuel Hoare worked fast. His chain of thought was as obvious as it was inevitable. If the war in Abyssinia was to be stopped, there would have to be peace terms. If one accepted the argument that the dominant need was to stop the war—and that was Sir Samuel's argument—then it became necessary to suggest peace terms such as would ensure Italy's acceptance. Obviously it would not have served the immediate purpose equally well if terms had been suggested with the primary object of ensuring Abyssinia's acceptance, for if Italy had not accepted them

the war would have gone on; whereas acceptance by Italy would be decisive. It may be that there is such a thing as abstract right and abstract wrong. It may be that "imperialism" is all wrong. But the alternative possibility that "imperialism" may be right is not the main point in the present argument. The important point is that the whole world's affairs in their international aspect are in fact based upon imperialism in present practice, the leading imperialist country being Great Britain. If one looks at the map of Africa one sees that the whole of it—except, as yet, Abyssinia—has been conquered, annexed and divided among the conquerors. The greatest of those conquerors is Great Britain, who "owns" half of Africa. France comes next. Germany's share in Africa was added to Britain's share after the last big war to end war. Sir Samuel Hoare, being a practical man, saw that it would be unpractical to attempt the topsy-turvy experiment of featuring the black savages of Abyssinia as the conquerors of a European white race. The African races would thereby have ideas put into their heads which neither imperialist Britain nor imperialist France would wish them to receive. Therefore Italy must be featured—with all the conceivable tact in the world and at Geneva, be it conceded—as the victor.

Sir Samuel Hoare, having obtained the Cabinet's approval in principle, went to Paris on December 6th to apply that principle in practice. He and M. Laval vied with each other for two days in formulating an offer such as Signor Mussolini would accept. They drafted the suggested terms on December 8th. The details leaked out (as all details always leak out) in the Paris press forthwith. For a whole week British public opinion, which illogically and inconsistently sees nothing wrong in Britain's bottling up the whole Mediterranean by forcibly holding Gibraltar at one end and the Suez Canal at the other, but is horrified at the prospect of Italy trying to follow her example on a minor scale, and which regards the League of Nations as a preventive against the sort of imperialist adventure that Britain has indulged in to a greater extent than any other country in the world: British public opinion abandoned itself to a holy fever of indignation against Sir Samuel Hoare. The younger members of Mr. Baldwin's Cabinet, catching the fever, or already suffering from it, threatened to resign unless this monstrous thing were exorcised from their innocent midst. Mr. Baldwin,

who had just won a general election by a handsome margin and had just formed a Ministry on the strength of it, found himself in a painful dilemma. His particular job was to keep his Cabinet together. His particular reputation rested upon his simple bulldog loyalty to a pal, and upon his British commonsense. Which was he to choose—his Cabinet or his reputation? With true unselfishness (which was promptly misunderstood) he chose to sacrifice his reputation and to save his Cabinet. On December 18th he explained his dilemma to Sir Samuel Hoare and suggested that the only solution he could see would be for Sir Samuel to stand up in the House of Commons, to apologise for having done something he was now ashamed of, and to promise not to do it again. It was probably Mr. Baldwin, not Sir Samuel Hoare, who was tired and overwrought. He certainly misjudged Sir Samuel Hoare. Sir Samuel indignantly rejected the suggestion. If he were given—as he was in effect given—the alternatives of expressing regret for something he did not regret, or of resigning, he resigned, without hesitation. His resignation was accepted by a harassed Mr. Baldwin on the evening of December 18th. On the following day Sir Samuel Hoare made his personal statement to the House of Commons.

It is not often in the parliamentary history of any country that we witness so thrilling a spectacle as Sir Samuel Hoare's defence before the House of Commons. There was much more in it than the sympathy and generosity which are traditionally given by the House when it hears a Minister who has resigned. The cheers and approbation were the full measure of Sir Samuel's triumph. Many of his former critics asked why Mr. Baldwin had accepted his resignation before he had made that statement. There was something like a boom in the stock of Sir Samuel's prestige, and a slump in Mr. Baldwin's. It was an almost Biblical scene illustrative of the truth that "whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it." Mr. Baldwin, having decided to save himself (as the symbol of his Cabinet) lost his reputation; Sir Samuel Hoare, having decided to lose himself, saved and enhanced his reputation. "Hoare must come back, if not as Foreign Minister then as Prime Minister," was a general cry raised in the Conservative rank and file from the moment Sir Samuel sat down after making his speech. "Is this the man we have dropped [it

was asked] ? Why, he is the very leader we need." Sir Samuel is not an orator in the usual sense of that word. He does not produce his effect by qualities of voice and of phraseology after the manner of such orators as Mr. Lloyd George, Herr Hitler, Lord Balfour or Lord Curzon. His voice is high-pitched and thin. His delivery is poor. His presence is unimpressive. The impression he makes and in particular made on December 19th comes from the bedrock sincerity and good sense of what he says, and the simplicity with which he says it.

On December 19th he exposed his motives as if he were thinking aloud, without an audience. "Ever since I have been at the Foreign Office [he said] I have been obsessed with the urgency of two grave issues. Day in and day out I have been obsessed with the urgent necessity of doing everything in my power to prevent a European conflagration. Secondly, I have been no less obsessed with the urgent duty of doing everything in my power to avoid an isolated war between Great Britain and Italy." Two admirable motives in a Foreign Secretary. With equal frankness Sir Samuel explained the effect made upon him by the failure of the League to prevent the war. "When the election came to an end (he said) war had already been in progress some weeks. We had done our best to stop its outbreak. I myself had done everything within my power to mobilise world opinion against it at the Assembly at Geneva. In spite of our efforts the war had broken out, and every day that it continued it involved the world in greater and more dangerous problems. There was trouble in the East, there was trouble in Egypt, there was trouble brewing in more than one quarter of Europe, and not least there was the depressing fact that the war seemed to be compromising British relations with a large body of public opinion in France." At another point in his speech, while doubting whether anyone would charge him with any "hesitation" in pushing the "policy of sanctions and coercive action" both in London and Geneva, he stated: "I never allowed a day to pass without attempting by some means or another to find a peaceful settlement of this hateful controversy." He spoke of the double task imposed on him of prosecuting sanctions on the one hand and of seeking a pacific settlement on the other, and diagnosed the "turning point" to have been reached "a fortnight ago," that is about December 5th, the day on which he made his great appeal in

the House of Commons for the exercise of reason, as distinct from force, as a method of settling the dispute (see *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, January 1936, pp. 104-6). It was at the beginning of December that the question of an oil embargo loomed seriously on the horizon as an actual possibility. What Sir Samuel said about it on December 19th has been increasingly justified since he said it. "About a fortnight ago [he said] it was clear that a new situation was about to be created by the question of the oil embargo. It seemed clear that, supposing an oil embargo were to be imposed and that the non-member States took an effective part in it, the oil embargo might have such an effect upon the hostilities as to force their termination. Just because of the effectiveness of the oil sanction, provided that the non-member States had a full part in it, the situation immediately became more dangerous from the point of view of Italian resistance. From all sides we received reports that no responsible Government could disregard, that Italy would regard the oil embargo as a military sanction or act involving war against them."

It was at such a moment that Sir Samuel had gone to Paris. He left London on the day after his speech of December 5th. By December 8th he had reached his agreement with M. Laval. The urgency of the matter derived from the fact that December 12th was the appointed day for the League of Nations to consider the imposition of the oil sanction that had been agreed on in principle in November. Sir Samuel revealed his realist motive when on December 19th he made this confession: "Within five days the question of the oil embargo was to come up at Geneva, and I did not feel myself justified in proposing any postponement of the embargo unless it could be shown to the League that negotiations had actually started." In other words the urgent tactical motive of the British Foreign Secretary was to "postpone" consideration by the League of Nations of the putting into operation its own machinery. Could there be a clearer indication that in his view the League of Nations was itself a danger? And if a responsible British Foreign Secretary, one moreover who had acted in the belief that the League of Nations could be used as an instrument of peace and who had the most direct and fullest information at his disposal, was driven to such a conclusion, is it not thereby suggested to those many people in Great Britain who retain their original unconditional faith

in the League, that they should at least accept the argument for reconsidering their faith or qualifying it? There was another side to the problem in hand. "I have been terrified [said Sir Samuel] with the thought—I speak very frankly to the House—that we might lead Abyssinia on to think that the League could do more than it can do." But Sir Samuel's main point was that a negotiated peace was the only practical means of ending the war. "The fact is [he said] that there are only two ways of ending the war, either peace by negotiation or peace by surrender. If it is to be a peace by negotiation, I do not myself believe that when the time comes it will not be found that that peace will have to be made upon the three principles that I stated at the beginning of my speech. If hon. members have any other suggestions to make I hope they will make them in this debate. If it is to be a peace by surrender it will mean the complete collapse of one or other of the belligerents. My own view, and I state it frankly to the House, is that I believe the end of the war will come by a peace by negotiation. I believe that it will not come by a peace by complete surrender, either by one side or the other, and that when peace comes it will be found that the three principles that I have stated will be the basis of it."

His own and M. Laval's bid for a negotiated settlement having failed, Sir Samuel gave grave warning to the House that "a much more dangerous phase" of what was developing had now to be faced. The very nature of sanctions implied the possibility of supporting them with armed force or of resisting armed force that might be used against the sanctions. The theory of Geneva's system was that it should be "collective." What was its present practice? Sir Samuel thus described it: "We alone have taken these military precautions. There is the British Fleet in the Mediterranean, there are the British reinforcements in Egypt, in Malta and Aden. Not a ship, not a machine, not a man has been moved by any other member State." He added that without the active co-operation of members of the League "collective security is impossible and the League will dissolve." Acknowledging that the prevailing public opinion, including that of his own party, was against him he pointed his finger at the Conservative benches and declared: "Looking at the situation as I see it, looking back at the position in which I was placed a fortnight ago, I say to the House that I cannot honestly

recant, and I sincerely believe that the course I took was the only course that was possible in the circumstances."

The question that arises is how far has the subsequent experience justified or condemned Sir Samuel Hoare. In the first place he and M. Laval were in fact instrumental in postponing consideration of the oil sanction by the League of Nations when it met on December 12th. Thereby was postponed the most pressing danger of general war. So far as the League itself was concerned, the paradox was a little wayward. The League looked helplessly on while a peace proposal was abandoned, itself unable to make any proposal for peace.

It was inevitable that M. Laval's position in France should in its turn be strained after the fate that had overtaken Sir Samuel Hoare. M. Laval in his turn had to run the gauntlet of the French Chamber. He faced the Chamber on December 27th, when the most symbolic speech was that delivered by M. Paul Reynaud. M. Reynaud attacked M. Laval from what was virtually the Right. He had been to London to hear the Commons debate on December 19th. It was all the more remarkable therefore when he argued eight days later in the French Chamber that M. Laval "must choose between Italy and Britain." In the event, M. Laval narrowly survived. He was given by the Chamber a new lease of life, not only or this time even mainly because no one else was willing to accept his job as Prime Minister, but because of a certain revelation he made in his speech. What he said was that the French and British general staffs had now co-ordinated their plans to meet emergencies that might threaten either. The circumstances of that revelation were that the British Government as a result of Sir Samuel Hoare's brutal disclosure of the solitary nature of Great Britain's preparations for carrying out the "collective" obligations of the League Covenant, had invited certain States members of the League whether or not they were now disposed to honour paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant by undertaking to come to the help of the British fleet if and when that fleet were attacked by Italy. The States thus canvassed were France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Spain. The assurances desired were duly given by the first-named four of those States. France, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, formally and correctly undertook to honour their obligations. Of the four France

was by far the most important. It happens that from the beginning of the Italo-Abyssinian controversy French opinion has kept open a lively eye to the two-edged implications of Franco-British co-operation. The French general staff therefore engaged with some alacrity in conversation with the British general staff about the co-ordination of plans. When on December 27th M. Laval announced that the two staffs had co-ordinated their plans to meet emergencies, all French thought of Italy and the Mediterranean was submerged by the greater thought of Germany. The French Chamber ignored the immediate circumstances, and clung to the long-distance fact, of Franco-British mutual commitment for armed support. M. Laval was saved. As for the immediate circumstances, M. Laval could be relied on to ensure that the mutual commitment aforesaid would not be made operative by reason of any Italian contingency. Indeed it was known that the Italian fleet had received strict orders at all costs to avoid an "incident" with the British fleet. Even those British ships which carried arms to Abyssinia were grimly ignored. There was no longer much danger of an Italian attack in the Mediterranean. An Italian commentator neatly put it in this way, that Mr. Anthony Eden, the new British Foreign Secretary, whose appointment was announced on December 23rd, must himself make war upon Italy, if it was to be war, or must make peace upon Italy, if it was to be peace.

After Mr. Eden assumed his office, the general question asked in the European capitals was how and when the French and British Governments could make a second attempt to achieve what Sir Samuel Hoare had failed to achieve, because British public opinion prevented him from achieving it. The next danger point to be negotiated was the meeting arranged by the League of Nations for January 20th, when the oil sanction was again to be considered. The paradox, be it noticed, still continued that every meeting of the League of Nations was a danger point in the path of the peacemaker.

Fortunately on January 3rd Mr. Roosevelt delivered to the two Houses of Congress and broadcast throughout the United States a message on the neutrality policy of the United States. It was a message that, if carried into legislative effect, was bound to have a cardinal bearing on the question of an oil sanction. In that message he defined

America's purpose as that of a "good neighbour" and claimed that the United States had indeed carried that principle into an achieved fact, "active, present, pertinent and effective." When he looked by contrast upon the situation abroad, he discovered a condition "of growing ill-will, of marked trends towards aggression, of increasing armaments, of shortening tempers." He saw in it "many elements that lead to the tragedy of general war." That circumstance, he held, justified the reaffirmation of America's case for strict neutrality. The Neutrality Resolution then in force had been passed jointly by Congress on August 31st last. It is due to expire on February 29th next. It was one objective of Mr. Roosevelt's message to suggest for substitution a new and up-to-date machinery for dealing with the now clearer implications of the Italo-Abyssinian war. Mr. Roosevelt's motive, running clear and strong throughout the message, was at all costs to keep America out of war entanglements. That is as good doctrine in the mouth of an American President as of a British Foreign Secretary. To that end he outlined a strict neutrality which refused to distinguish between one belligerent and another, present or future. There was a special sting in that formula for British opinion. Mr. Roosevelt left no doubt of his meaning. He formulated two main principles. The first was that America should "decline" to supply "arms, ammunition, or implements of war" to any belligerent. The second was that America should "discourage" the use by belligerents of "any and all American products calculated to facilitate the prosecution of a war in quantities over and above our normal exports to them in times of peace." To British minds the questions raised were what constitutes a belligerent, and how the definition was affected by participation in Geneva's sanctions. Mr. Roosevelt's great gift to Europe is his firm and unequivocal warning that he will play no part, direct or indirect, in an oil sanction, or any sanction. The very theory of sanctions is to help one side to defeat the other. Even more than the existing sanctions, an oil sanction would in effect be an act of war. The new aspect of the danger that arose was that Britain might be ensnared into the status of belligerent and thus qualify as an object of America's neutrality policy.

The Neutrality Bill was amended on January 10th in such a way as to make still more clearly impossible any degree

of American co-operation with the League of Nations in the event of world peace being endangered. The spirit of Mr. Roosevelt's message to Congress, delivered a week before, was thus fully interpreted. It thereby became clear (and French opinion promptly recognised the fact) that Geneva's own conditions for the imposition of an oil embargo could not now be fulfilled, for the "negative co-operation" of the non-member states seemed now finally to be ruled out; and if an attempt were none the less made by Geneva on January 20th to persist in such an embargo, the only probable result would be merely to change the normal sources of supply, without depriving Italy of the supply itself. The really satisfactory thing to contemplate was the general manœuvre that took place in preparation for the meetings at Geneva on January 20th. The first meeting was to be that of the Committee of Thirteen, which had been instructed to explore whatever conciliatory avenues might still be open after the Hoare-Laval peace proposals had been wrecked by an indignant, and merely destructive, public opinion in Great Britain. It would make its report to the Committee of Eighteen, whose peculiar business by contrast was that of sanctions. Seldom in the history of the League of Nations have we witnessed so unpractical a scene. On the one hand there was a committee charged to suggest the means to peace. On the other hand there was a committee charged to suggest the means to further war. The personnel of the two committees was mostly the same. In November the League of Nations committed itself in principle to the application of an oil sanction if and when it could be made effective. Its effectiveness would depend, not mainly upon the member States (Britain, Russia, Rumania, Holland) which supply oil, but upon the non-member States, principally the United States and Germany. America had now made it clear beyond any doubt, even in the mind of the most incorrigible sanctionist, that she would not co-operate in any anti-Italian measures whatsoever. On the other hand nobody ever expected that Hamburg would refuse any of the trade that would be presented by the operation of an oil sanction against Italy. Sanctions attempted by a League that is less than half a League have broken on what ought to have been the obvious rock of the non-member States.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

January 15th, 1936.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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ALBERT OF BELGIUM.*

The most popular and the most attractive figure of the World War has found the ideal biographer in Professor Emile Cammaerts—poet, historian, patriot. Of King Albert it may be said without exaggeration that the truest story of his life is itself the highest praise. The more we hear about him the more we admire and love. Known to his own people before the war as a good man and a good king, he was revealed by the titanic conflict as one of the immortals. His place in history is secure. What Abraham Lincoln was to the North, Albert was to the Belgians at the crisis of their fate.

The book opens with a dramatic account of the night of August 2nd, 1914, when the German ultimatum fell like a thunderbolt on the cheerful and prosperous little country which believed itself secure behind its paper barrier of guaranteed neutrality. The emergency called forth qualities of leadership and heroism in the young ruler unsuspected by all but his closest friends. He had seen the catastrophe approaching, as we read in a valuable chapter entitled the Gathering of the Clouds (1904-14), and had striven as hard as his uncle to prepare the army for a sudden attack. "It was largely owing to his foresight and energy, during the first four years of his reign, that the Belgians could contemplate the forthcoming struggle with some hope of putting up a fight and

* *Albert of Belgium.* By Emile Cammaerts. Ivor Nicholson and Watson. 21s.
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making an effort worthy of their cause. It was entirely due to his military leadership and to the enthusiasm which it stirred in the army that this fight was prolonged to the end, and that Belgium, instead of becoming an object of pity, preserved through all her reverses the dignity of an unconquerable nation." That Belgium ever compromised her neutrality while the menace was approaching is warmly denied by the author, who reminds us that it was not till after nearly three months of fighting that the Belgians were cheered by the sight of French and British uniforms.

Though there is plenty of history in the book, as is inevitable in the life of a king, its main interest lies in the revelation of personality. Without possessing the commanding abilities of Leopold II, Albert was well above the average in general capacity, and he rose to the situation without an effort. Modest, thoughtful, kindly, simple in his tastes, wholly free from the volcanic hatreds of a Clemenceau or the touchiness of a Woodrow Wilson, he remained cool and steadfast throughout, finding consolation for the horrors of the struggle and the sufferings of his people in the justice of his cause and the certainty of ultimate victory. Professor Cammaerts, who writes with no less eloquence than affection, paints an arresting picture of his hero during the struggle. "Those who saw La Panne during the years of waiting will never forget the tall and austere figure standing on the last strip of Belgian shore, confronted with stormy clouds and foaming sea, watching with calm courage during that long vigil, with all the regal splendour stripped from his Court, and almost all his land torn from his friendly grasp, alone among the blind elements and the blinder injustice of man, with no comfort but his queen, brought as low as any sovereign can be brought by the forces of destiny and as high as any man can be raised by the conviction of his right and the faith in his cause."

The later chapters describe the joyful return and the unceasing labours of reconstruction during the fifteen years that remained. When the intoxication of victory was over the king, like other rulers, realised what a gigantic task they had to face. In addition to the world depression, from which no country could hope to escape, Belgium was distracted by internal feuds, of which the rivalry between Flemings and Walloons was the worst. The biographer speaks of his bitter

disappointments; yet he lived long enough to see the worst features of that old antagonism overcome. A penultimate chapter, entitled *The Man and the King*, introduces us to a perfect family life, to his religion, his political ideas, his wide intellectual interests. No ruler kept himself better informed by study and travel of what was going on in the world, and no monarch strove more diligently to keep up with the rapid march of ideas. When he fell from a rock on the evening of February 17th, 1934, at the age of 58, he was still young in mind and in body. The loss was irreparable, and the grief of his people was a measure of his services. When most of the statesmen and soldiers of the world war are forgotten, the name of King Albert, the Knight *sans peur et sans reproche*, will stand out as the symbol of duty nobly done.

G. P. G.

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THE CATHOLIC TRADITION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS.*

Mr. Eppstein's book is published under the auspices of the Catholic Council for International Relations and with the assistance of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and it bears the imprimatur of the Vicar-General of the archdiocese of Westminster. It may therefore be regarded as, in some sort, an authorised presentation for English-speaking readers of the Roman Catholic attitude towards the problems of international relations. Some such restatement was certainly called for, since it is now twenty years since the appearance of the excellent little work entitled *A Primer of Peace and War*, in which the regretted Father Plater set forth the principles of international morality for his co-religionists amid the early perplexities of the war. The later volume is on a more ambitious scale and is written with a firmer grasp of political realities, for not only has the experience of well-nigh a generation left its mark on Catholic thinking, but Mr. Eppstein himself, from his post of vantage at the League of Nations Union, has acquired a far greater insight into the actual conduct of international affairs than was vouchsafed to Father Plater.

* *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations*. By John Eppstein. Burns, Oates and Washbourne. 1935. 525 pp. 15s.

Nevertheless the two books proceed substantially along the same lines—the lines of the Catholic tradition as formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas, rejecting, on the one hand, the anarchism of the pacifist sects and, on the other, the immoralism of the diehards who appear and reappear in every age. As Mr. Eppstein puts it: “Christianity is not a social programme, and the establishment of external peace is not the direct object of the Christian revelation; rather is it the consequence of a Christian life. Political peace depends upon the observance of the Natural Law, which Christ came not to destroy but to fulfil.” Here we have the philosophical justification of the Catholic policy towards International Law (which, though no longer Christian Law, remains Natural Law) and of the perpetual new adjustments—well called concordats—between the Vatican and the Powers that be at any given moment.

In a changing world the emphasis of Catholic international morality will necessarily vary from age to age and from generation to generation. Father Plater was more concerned with the Catholic attitude towards war and military service and with the Catholic doctrine of the “just war.” Mr. Eppstein, for his part, has much that is interesting to say on this topic, as in his remark that Tertullian (A.D. 155-222) was the earliest known instance of “a Christian writer who condemns all military service on the authority of the Gospel.” But his most striking section is that entitled “The Place of Nationality in the Law of Nations.” Here Father Plater was groping his way in the dark and contented himself with laying it down that “these problems are fundamentally moral problems and must be judged on moral grounds,” whilst on the kindred issue of colonial policy he had practically nothing to say, beyond a bare condemnation of “conquest.” Mr. Eppstein, on the other hand, devotes three chapters respectively to “the rights and limits of nationality,” “the rights of national minorities” and “the rights of backward races.” Here he takes up the position set forth by Acton in his famous essay of 1862 as against the orthodox nineteenth-century Liberal view, which he characterises as a pursuit of a “will-o’-the-wisp.” It is indeed difficult, in retrospect, to understand how what Mr. Eppstein calls “the idolatry of the unitary nation-state” can have appealed to minds such as John Stuart Mill, Lord Durham, or, in the last

generation, Vinogradoff—not to speak of Woodrow Wilson. However, the wheel has now come full circle and one need not be a Roman Catholic to approve Mr. Eppstein’s exposition and the authoritative statements, such as that of the Catholic Union of International Studies, with which he backs it up.

As for the rights of backward peoples, the application of Christian principles is here too plain to be overlooked. It ought to be impossible in a Christian country for anyone to advocate, in the name of “justice” or morality, the handing over of African peoples from one European government to another in order to appease ill-feeling due to mistaken policies in Europe. Mr. Eppstein closes his chapter on this subject with a text which some of our vicarious altruists might meditate with advantage. “It were better for him that a millstone should be hanged about his neck and that he should be drowned in the depth of the sea.” “The Colonial Power has no mandate to transform the African or the Indian into an artificial European. It is its duty to respect the native language and every indigenous custom and tradition which is not in conflict with the moral law.” So writes Mr. Eppstein, treading in the footsteps of Vittoria, the great Dominican, to whom the Western world is indebted for the first exposition of the principle of trusteeship or mandate. It would be an offence equally against Africa and against the Covenant to place backward peoples, at this stage of the development of international relations, under the rule or guardianship of powers for whom the conception of trusteeship has no meaning.

One final observation is called for. It applies both to Mr. Eppstein’s book and to Father Plater’s. Both these writers, with their ability, their fair-mindedness, their command over their material, reveal what one might call the potentiality of creativeness. They might have written original books, books in which one would have felt the material being moulded at every point by a mind which has its own standards of truth or, as some would say, of artistic perfection. Thus it is that real books are written. In that sense, Mr. Eppstein’s book is not a real book. It is an exposition by a capable and dutiful disciple, eked out with an anthology of authoritative pronouncements from the first century A.D. to the latest declarations of the Holy See. It is not in this way that the greatest

of the Protestant books on these high themes have been written. No doubt they are less readable. But is not Mr. Eppstein's very readableness partly due to the fact that he has not wrestled with the fundamental issues himself but has taken the answers to them from others? So much was due in candour to the author of what will undoubtedly be an indispensable companion to students of international politics for many years to come.

ALFRED ZIMMERN.

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UNEMPLOYMENT.*

This Report, prepared by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute, is an important contribution to the understanding of the grave economic malady from which the world is suffering. Though international in its prime intent, it gives close attention to the differences of the causation and character of the depression in the several countries and supplies the fullest volume of available up-to-date statistics. It does not attempt to simplify a problem which is essentially complex, or to furnish a single solution. But it does effectively distinguish the long-term depression from the particular post-war disturbances which have so greatly aggravated it, and distinguish, so far as is possible, the economic, pecuniary and psychological factors, all of which have figured prominently as causes and effects.

By unquestionable evidence they show that in this country, Germany and America, when a period of post-war prosperity was acclaimed, a large amount of unemployment existed, chiefly attributable to rapid technological advances, and in Britain to a visible decline in the great exporting trades. It is to agriculture, mining and the standardised manufactures that we must look for the directly economic causation. For in them the growth of productivity has been continually advancing faster than their markets. Here, however, comes in the population question, the decline of the growth of most European peoples, and the inability of the great growing Asiatic populations to purchase the increased actual and potential supplies of foods and manufactured goods which

* *Unemployment: an International Problem.* By the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press. 25s. net.

the advanced white peoples could produce. On the top of these general economic movements came the post-war dislocations of frontiers, tariffs, credit, exchanges, internal and external indebtedness, upsetting the delicate play of finance and commerce, and bringing into the forefront of our problem the portent of an economic nationalism, carrying with it the political and military dangers which in their turn have injurious reactions upon the economic system.

Coming to remedies, the Report wishes statesmen and business men to explore all opportunities for getting back to a genuine internationalism of free trade, migration of labour and monetary stability. The grave difficulties of dispelling economic isolationism are admitted. But they must be overcome, unless civilisation with its increasing productivity and its pacific international relations is to collapse. The writers do not believe in a merely "natural" process of recovery, nor that the capitalist system can be resumed on a basis of freely competitive private enterprise. Centralisation, national and international, has a place in the new order, and each country must bring considered forethought to bear upon its standard industries. The intelligence of business men and trade unions in such a process will need the aid of public authorities, and these authorities will have to play a growing part, not merely in supporting the necessary margin of unemployed, but in the development of public works that lie outside the actual sphere of private enterprise.

But a national policy, however thoughtful, cannot suffice. "Generally speaking, the first requisite in framing a long-term employment policy is to know whether the scales are to come down on the side of political co-operation or on that of growing isolation. If there is to be permanent political co-operation there must be economic agreement, since no political co-operation is possible where economic conflict is recurrent."* While the incipient means for such economic agreement exists already in the International Labour Office and the economic activities of the League of Nations, the immediate application of these instruments is crippled by the persistence of that nationalist emotionalism which precludes governments and peoples from seeing clearly their true political and economic interests and pursuing them. If and when the different States come to recognise their true

* P. 438.

community of interests they may follow a policy of co-operation which will enable each country to utilise fully its resources of capital and labour.

J. A. HOBSON.

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SIR SAMUEL ROMILLY.*

The life of Sir Samuel Romilly, the great lawyer, Whig and reformer, has been curiously neglected by historians and Mr. C. G. Oakes has now sought to fulfil the need in his biography. His volume is somewhat laboriously written and occasionally the author lapses into obscure psycho-analytical language. Moreover the grammatical or printer's errors are unusually frequent. But in spite of such faults this work merits consideration because the author has clearly undertaken painstaking and extensive research into the sources of information, although he makes the surprising statement: "I cannot, with sincerity, thank officials of the British Museum in any respect whatever."

Mr. Oakes writes essentially as a lawyer and penologist intensely interested in the theory of punishment and in the life of a pioneer reformer who attacked the savage and ineffective severities of the English criminal law at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is, therefore, not altogether surprising that Mr. Oakes should fail to give an adequate and balanced picture of Romilly's place in the Whig party and especially of his long collaboration with "the Mountain" and in particular with Brougham against the "Philistines." Unfortunately, moreover, the author has committed a number of errors of fact such as that Lord Chatham commanded the fleet in the Walcheren expedition.

The principal interest in this volume lies in the full account of Romilly's sustained Parliamentary efforts in favour of law reform, which began after his entry into the House of Commons in 1806 as Solicitor-General. Born in 1757, of Huguenot parents, Romilly became deeply attracted by liberal writers, including Rousseau and Beccaria with his enlightened theory of punishment. He travelled widely and took more than an academic interest in the French Revolution; the excesses of which, however, turned his enthusiasm into

* *Sir Samuel Romilly, 1757-1818: "The Friend of the Oppressed."* By C. G. Oakes. Allen and Unwin. Illustrated. 18s. net.

disgust. It was probably Jeremy Bentham who exercised over him the most profound and lasting influence. Romilly, says Mr. Oakes, "sought with the knowledge that he had acquired, gradually to place the law on a scientific basis on principles laid down by Bentham." Although, however, their personal relations continued intimate, Bentham was eventually in 1818 to oppose Romilly as being "a friend only to moderate reform." Being essentially a realist, Romilly preferred progressive measures of alleviation to the total rejection of a revolutionary programme.

While Romilly took part, particularly along with Brougham, in urging measures of social reform, his main efforts were devoted to the reform of the criminal law. Over two hundred offences, many of a trivial nature, were punishable by death, on the theory that the possibility of such a penalty was essential as a deterrent. Yet crime was steadily increasing. Victims refused to prosecute, juries to convict, and in most cases the capital punishment was remitted. Absurdity was reached when a jury with "pious perjury" would value a ten-pound Bank of England note at thirty-nine shillings! Romilly presented some impressive figures when introducing in 1818 for the fifth time his Bill to abrogate the death penalty for privately stealing in a shop to the value of 5s. Between 1805-17, 655 persons had been indicted, 177 acquitted, 113 capitally convicted and not one executed. Similarly in thefts of over 40s., out of 1,097 persons sent for trial from 1808-15, 293 had been sentenced to death but none executed. In 1808 Romilly had succeeded in removing the death penalty against pickpockets, and the proportionate increase in convictions justified his now commonplace thesis that certainty of punishment is more effective than uncertainty of severity. His measures, however, were consistently baulked by the House of Lords, and in particular by Ellenborough and Eldon, over the latter of whom, paradoxically enough, Romilly had acquired a dominating influence in the Court of Chancery. If Romilly's immediate success was small, his persistent campaign opened the way for radical reform in the succeeding generation. It is, yet, a remarkable fact that Romilly who enjoyed an unrivalled reputation for disinterested conduct, uninfluenced by fear or favour, failed to appreciate the abuses of the Chancery Court and resolutely opposed the appointment of an additional judge.

The parts played by Romilly in the early proceedings against Princess Caroline and in the Byron affair provide Mr. Oakes with an opportunity to discuss these sensational *causes célèbres*. In 1805 Romilly was consulted by the Prince of Wales as to the charges against the Princess and he became subsequently secretary of "the Delicate Investigation" held by the Privy Council. Mr. Oakes argues with effect against the view of Sir Edward Parry in his *Queen Caroline* that Romilly was the official—and harsh—prosecutor and not simply an independent official to take down the depositions of the witnesses. In the Byron case in 1816, Romilly received a general retainer as counsel for Byron. Unfortunately by a culpable error on the part of his clerk, it was forgotten and not communicated to Romilly who proceeded to advise Lady Byron. The former admitted "that he had done a very incorrect thing in being consulted by Lady Byron," and it seems that there was some foundation for Byron's continuous and bitter invective against Romilly, although he was not personally to blame. Mr. Oakes, however, regards Byron's complaint as purely "technical," since he had "never required Romilly to implement the retainer."

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COWPER AND EVANGELICISM.*

Mr. Gilbert Thomas' book supplies a necessary corrective to recent biographers who have attributed Cowper's recurrent madness to his religious convictions. Evangelicism, says Mr. Fausset, was "the sword which wounded him beyond the hope of healing." Lord David Cecil in his brilliant and sympathetic study, *The Stricken Deer*, is more discerning. Evangelicism, he admits, by satisfying a need of the poet's nature at first brought relief but failed to cure him, contributing indeed to the permanence of his malady. Mr. Thomas suggests that such melancholic madness was after all "constitutional" and due to "a physical predisposition" which even modern psychology cannot probe. "Why," he asks, "this preoccupation with Cowper's madness?" During the greater part of his sixty-eight years he was quite sane, surrounded by devoted friends and enjoying "a reasonable

* *William Cowper and the Eighteenth Century*. By Gilbert Thomas. Ivor Nicholson and Watson, Ltd. 15s. net.

degree of happiness," as the result of "congenial environment and congenial occupation." The author's protest is that of informed common sense against the subtle diagnoses and penetrative insight of literary biographers, whose assumption he questions, maintaining that "the neat division of Cowper's life into periods will not stand the test of data, and that the attempt at such theoretic precision distorts our whole view of him and his work." He complains that they select the poet's "gloomiest utterances" and "make insufficient allowance for his merely habitual use of Calvinistic terminology." Although in his study of the poet and his environment he does not approach, or attempt to approach, their literary art, he reveals, as they do not, a personal knowledge of evangelicals. "Newton's influence," he admits, "was in some respects an unfortunate one for Cowper." Although he effectively vindicates Newton's memory, he regrets that Cowper was influenced by the evangelicism of Calvinists rather than that of Wesley, with his joyous assurance of salvation and conviction that "whatever it prove beside, no Scripture can prove predestination." Yet Calvinism, Mr. Thomas contends, proved indispensable to Cowper, as to other intellectuals of his age, because it provided a rationalistic basis of their faith; and was "on balance more of a blessing to Cowper than a curse." With this latter verdict it is difficult to agree. Granted all the extenuating circumstances, the terrible, recurring delusion of William Cowper that he was irretrievably damned hereafter remains linked with his Calvinism. That Cowper's faith, as Mr. Thomas argues, should inevitably colour the form of his madness, is natural; but the colour indicts the faith.

The author is on surer ground when he insists that the melancholy of a poet contains its own antidote; and quotes the wise words of Goldwin Smith on Cowper's *de profundis*, *The Castaway*:

the despair which finds this vent in verse is hardly despair. Poetry can never be the direct expression of emotion; it must be the product of reflexion combined with an exercise of the faculty of composition which in itself is pleasurable.

It is strange how literary biographers have failed to detect this obvious truth, which Cowper's women friends and all their counterparts to-day took and take for granted.

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Cowper, the author justly concludes, was not "a potentially creative poet whom evangelicism destroyed" but "the commentator" of the age he served so well, "the critic whom evangelicism moved to song and sometimes lifted above himself." The source of his poetic inspiration is thereby a blessing to us; but whether it was to him is less certain.

D. P. H.

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INTIMATE THINGS.*

Karel Čapek needs no introduction to English readers. In this delightful series of short essays he reveals himself to us much as Miss Rose Macaulay has done in her *Personal Pleasures*. With some of these experiences, foibles, likings, small misadventures, dreams and superstitions we feel on familiar ground—who does not know the "perpetual expectation" aroused by the postman's knock, or "the luxury of advising a neighbour"?—the slightly foreign flavour, however, adds zest to the description. The translator has been remarkably successful in her rendering of both literary and colloquial passages (one may instance, for the latter, the workmen's slang in "A Clean Job"), while her footnotes, explaining allusions and place-names, are invaluable. The book is full of happy phrases, of wit and irony, of a tolerant sympathy, an understanding of children, birds and beasts, and landscape. Nature and man are contrasted, "a Ministry does not fall as beautifully as the leaves of the hazelnut bushes."

The author's keen interest, dating from childhood, in the varied labours of men is summed up in the concluding lines of the first essay, where he hopes that his writing may express "all the lusty strength and skill which men of towering stature put into their work before the astonished and fascinated eyes of a child." Something of that marvelling gaze he still retains, as he looks on his world—on the phenomenon of the snow, to which he is as peculiarly sensitive as was Robert Bridges; on the earth's "bright and changing garment," as in the two exquisite, colourful essays, "Ploughland" and "Golden Earth": "Gold, scarlet, dappled brown. Lord God, I thank Thee for the lovely journey of the

* *Intimate Things*. By Karel Čapek. Translated by Dora Round. George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1935. 5s.

year." He feels the romance of the "last lamp on the edge of the town," the magic of maps and travel, the fascination of "little things." He discusses in illuminating fashion certain phrases in common use, as in "Fires," and can acutely depict physical misery, as in "The Cold." Himself a Dickens enthusiast, he reminds us at times of Elia, especially when disputing the truth of the aphorism "that women cannot keep a secret," or writing paradoxically "in praise of clumsy people." Several essays are devoted to the study of cats in their relation to men; one begins, "This is my Man. I am not afraid of him." But among such lighter pages are others that strike a philosophic note, as where Nature teaches "the eternal co-existence of life and death."

E. G. S.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Friedrich Engels,* by Gustav Mayer, is the first biography of the friend and collaborator of Marx, the joint founder of the Socialist movement in Europe. For those who have no time to read the author's two large volumes published in German in 1933, the shorter biography will be particularly welcome. At last full justice is done to one of the most influential figures of the nineteenth century. He will always be known, as he wished to be known, first and foremost as the friend of Marx. How much more he was, how independent a thinker, how productive a publicist, how able an organiser, we learn in detail for the first time from the indefatigable researches of Dr. Mayer. The author bears his learning lightly, and the story is told with spirit and skill. English readers should have a special interest in the man who came to us in 1842 at the age of 22 and spent the rest of his life in his adopted home. His first and most celebrated book, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, published in 1845, is still read, and is still worth reading. His experience of the cotton trade, in which he earned his living, led him to dedicate his life to the destruction of the *laissez-faire* capitalism which held the field. More famous and more effective was the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, in which he collaborated with Marx. The more we learn of one of the most celebrated friendships in history, the more attractive becomes the personality of Engels. Generous, sweet-tempered, modest, loyal, he made as many friends as the sour and quarrelsome Marx made enemies. Healthy, happy and prosperous, he was in love with life. He had nothing of the rebel and the conspirator except his creed. The crowning experience of his seventy-five

* Chapman and Hall. 15s.

years was the Congress at Zürich in 1893, when he was hailed as the Nestor of European Socialism. "We are a Great Power," he proudly declared. "That is my pride. We have not lived in vain." Dr. Mayer has performed his task with conspicuous success, and his story will be read with equal interest by those who hold and those who reject the Marxian faith.

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In *More Letters from Martha Wilmot: Impressions of Vienna, 1819-29*,* the Marchioness of Londonderry and Dr. H. M. Hyde have published a further selection from Martha Wilmot's remarkable diary and correspondence. The earlier volume, published in 1934, *The Russian Journals of Martha and Catherine Wilmot*, gave a striking picture of Russian society life from 1803-8, when Martha was the guest of the famous Princess Daschkaw. After her return, she married in 1812 one William Bradford, who had been an army chaplain in the Peninsular Campaign and had recited the "few short prayers" over the body of Sir John Moore at Corunna. In 1819 he was appointed chaplain to the British Embassy in Vienna and this volume covers the following decade during which Martha moved in the circles of a brilliant cosmopolitan society. Her letters, like her Russian journal, are full of vivacity, colour and detail, providing a vivid impression both of the world of luxury and glitter around her and of its leading figures. But if Martha joined in this life, she also retained a detached and critical outlook. She could stigmatise the "Vienna Saloon" as "an awful, proud, dull assemblage of well-fancied head dresses and well-flounced petticoats where one thought beyond rival rank or rival flounces never penetrates their *phlegmatic carcasses*," and expatiate "on the demoralised state" of Vienna, "on the system of espionage, the bribery, corruption, and galantry from high to low, the churlish inhospitality of the great nobless, and the jealousy or dislike of the English." This volume also contains Martha's record of a tour in Italy and the Tyrol. Lady Londonderry has written a necessary Introduction, dealing with the Wilmot family, and the text has been usefully annotated by Dr. Hyde with historical notes on many of the persons and events touched upon. The illustrations include a number of interesting drawings, made by William Bradford, of prominent contemporaries, such as Metternich and Esterhazy.

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Among the many passages in Holy Writ describing Nature, those relating to trees are not the least beautiful. Archdeacon Lonsdale Ragg, in his *Tree Lore in the Bible*,† discourses on them with a delightful enthusiasm and learning. These studies are mainly reprinted, with additions, from *The Tree Lover*, of which he is Editor; they are illustrated by some of his very delicate and accurate pencil sketches.

* Macmillan. 21s. net.

† S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

Biblical trees in their natural growth, the uses to which they are put, trees in parable and symbol, and the associations, some of them specially sacred to us, which they evoke—such is his theme. Very little, as the Archdeacon points out, is said in the Bible about forestry or tree cultivation, apart from that of fruit trees. In a future edition perhaps we might be told which trees probably furnished the "gopher wood" for the Ark of the Flood, and the "shittim wood" for the Ark of the Covenant.

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A valuable contribution to the study of the foundation of the short-lived Habsburg Empire of Mexico comes from Mr. Daniel Dawson in *The Mexican Adventure*.* His detailed narrative of the causes and events leading to the final acceptance of the throne in 1864 is based upon a close study of original material, in particular the documents in the Staats Archiv in Vienna. He confines to a short epilogue the tragic failure of the three-year reign, rendered inevitable by Napoleon's ruthless betrayal. Assumption of the throne had only become a practical possibility by French arms and Mr. Dawson argues that, at the very moment of success, Napoleon was most probably anxious to withdraw from an ill-judged and costly adventure. But forced to continue by the proclamation of the Mexican Empire through General Forey, Napoleon then "used every form of pressure to hasten Maximilian's acceptance, and so bring nearer the day when the new ruler should be able to dispense with outside help." Maximilian, on his side, becoming more and more involved in a scheme which touched his Habsburg pride and fancy and appealed to his consort Charlotte, conceived it a point of honour not to withdraw even at the prospect of no English guarantee. While continuing to show Napoleon "an appearance of absolute inflexibility," he "was, in reality, unwilling to do anything which might make it impossible for him eventually to abandon that condition whose fulfilment would constitute his strongest safeguard." It is clear that Maximilian's judgment was strongly influenced by his father-in-law, Leopold I of the Belgians. Mr. Dawson declares that in the question of renouncing his Austrian rights "as at every other moment of decision, the advice of King Leopold had weighed heavily, perhaps decisively, in the scale." It seems that the king's insistence upon sufficient support and guarantees steadily weakened as Maximilian's entanglement and Napoleon's pressure grew greater. The general public, as well as the student, should enjoy and profit from this new and scholarly account of a most dramatic episode in history, written in an attractive and straightforward style.

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M. Robert de Traz's thoughtful little book, *L'Esprit de Genève*, has been translated into English by Miss Fried-Ann Kindler in *The*

* Bell. 16s. net.

*Spirit of Geneva.** The author has for long been thoroughly acquainted with the international atmosphere at Geneva and in this volume he sets out to expose, explain and reflect upon the spirit which animates the work of the League of Nations and of the many international associations which have their centre in that city, with its great tradition of international consciousness. M. de Traz is optimistic of an increasing measure of goodwill and collaboration between nations in all fields. But though the League can provide the machinery for a new and more equitable international order, its prestige has so declined as to make it only "a clearing house for material forces" and a channel of negotiation. This book was written before the imposition of sanctions in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute and it may be that M. de Traz, like many others, is hopefully revising his opinion of the League's inefficacy. In his conclusion, the author looks to a "modern humanism" in Europe through which national loyalties may become subject to a common "European sense." Upon the outcome of the great test of collective action, now in issue, must largely depend the growth of an international loyalty which can embrace not only Europe but the world.

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Mrs. Mary S. Gretton's little book, *Rue and Rosemary*,† is a laudable piece of historical and imaginative writing, relating to early Tudor England. Through the life of a contemporary, Lady Katherine Gordon, who was the wife of Perkin Warbeck and first cousin of James IV of Scotland, Mrs. Gretton views a series of historical episodes, concluding with the death of Thomas More and the spoliation of the monasteries. She conveys the atmosphere of the age in a style which, if at times tortuous, is both rich and expressive. Apart from its intrinsic worth, the allocation of the profits of this book to the Scholarship Fund of Burford Grammar School provides worthy reason for its purchase.

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The Book World,‡ edited by Mr. John Hampden, is a delightful survey of the many aspects and problems which beset authors, publishers and booksellers. The writers of some dozen articles are all authorities on their subjects and include Mr. Stanley Unwin, Mr. Frank Swinnerton, Mr. Gerald Gould, Mr. Basil Blackwell, and Mr. J. Ainslie Thin. It is definitely a work suitable for the general reader who is interested in books themselves, dealing as it does with authorship, publishing, book production, reviewing and bookselling. The chapters on English Books Abroad, The Public Library, and The Circulating Library, give further proof of the vast and ever-growing reading public.

* Oxford University Press. 6s. net. † Hall, Oxford. 2s. 6d. net.
‡ Nelson. 6s. net.

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THE GERMAN PERIL.

IN the Reichstag speech which attracted so much attention last May, Hitler laid down the necessity of a clear distinction between the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League. The former, he declared, was built on the division of the nations into victors and vanquished; the latter must be based on the equality of estimation and the equality of rights of all its signatories. No one will dispute the truth that the close connection of the two treaties aroused misgivings. It necessarily aroused a belief that one of the chief aims of Geneva was to secure the fruits of victory to the Allied and Associated States and, especially in the first years after the war, this impression was revived often enough. Anxiety as to Germany's recovery of power led to the mistaken view that the discriminations laid down by Versailles might be made permanent with the help of the newly created machinery. This idea was fatal, not only because it underestimated the will and the power of resistance of a great State, but also because it failed to reckon with the possibility of a collapse in the strength of a group born out of a certain international situation.

Hitler was not the first to discover Germany's desire for equality of status. It was also voiced by the Weimar Republic. The difference is firstly that National Socialism places it at the heart of its foreign propaganda, secondly that it takes by dint of force what is not acceded to it out of friendship, and finally that its conception of equality of status is extremely elastic. The attitude of the victors is also partly to blame for this development. Their scanty understanding of the sore need of German democracy makes them partially responsible for the rise of the Third Reich; further, misconstruing the nature of the Dictatorship, they have frequently shown a forbearance towards it that was calculated to increase its demands and to heighten its arrogance. If such negligence had not occurred, the world would not have been startled by "accomplished facts," and the equality of status programme would have involved less danger.

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In the speech mentioned above the Chancellor declared that equality of status must be extended to all functions and all possessive rights in international life. The meaning of this is not clear on the face of it, and a request came from diplomatic sources for an explanation of the dark meaning. The request has not been satisfied. The obscurity remains and has certainly not been lifted by more recent utterances, according to which international justice presupposes a balance of power among the Powers. This is juggling with words, the meaning of which remains uncertain. Claims whose purport is unknown are concealed behind a principle justifiable in itself.

We must try to confirm their nature and extent by means of facts and of such utterances as are not intended first and foremost for foreign hearers, and are therefore less ambiguous in character. First, there are the tremendous armaments and, in connection with these, the reintroduction of universal service. The costs have reached a point from which the standard of living of the German nation suffers severely. The available means are used for the purchase of war material, to the detriment of the people's food supplies. Cannons and aeroplanes, the Government speakers announce to the needy and discontented, are more important than butter and pork. At the same time they never tire of proclaiming their peaceful intentions. Weapons are to serve solely for defence. We ask ourselves in vain from which quarter Germany is threatened by attack. No Power is raising its hand against Hitler's Reich. If the pace of military preparations in other countries has been livelier for some time, and if the idea of all-round limitation of armaments has been abandoned for the time being, the principal reason is Germany's bad example. The assertions of the rulers in Berlin, therefore, concerning the necessity of defence have no effect. They are strengthening their forces in order to realise plans based upon them, which have nothing to do with defending their present possessions.

Do they want war? At every opportunity that presents itself they answer this question with an indignant "No," and in this they are, in their way, honest. The question is not correctly put. It depends on whether their policy pursues aims that cannot be achieved without resorting to arms. When a country prepares for war it does not necessarily follow that it will make war. At first, it is out to cast the weight of its

armaments into the scale during negotiations. It seeks to force its neighbours to surrender by intimidation. Only in the event of failure does the danger of war become really acute. As far as present-day Germany is concerned, it cannot, also, be doubted that she could only be kept from decisions fraught with peril by the conviction that her plans are hopeless.

Let us take, for example, the demand—recently made with such special insistence—for colonies. In a speech of which, by the way, the tone and the contents have been watered down for foreigners, Goebbels says that the time is near in which the other Powers must recognise the German claim. Obviously, this is merely a matter of prestige. It was taken up by Hitler only after long hesitation, and after it had been made clear to him that the possession of overseas territories was a part of equality of status. However that may be, it does not look as if a voluntary ceding of colonies could be reckoned with for some time to come. What follows? A Government that continually holds out hopes of the fulfilment of some inevitable desire is obliged for its own sake eventually to risk any extremes in order to fulfil its pledges. That was the case with Mussolini. It will be the same with Hitler, who, moreover, is less bound by treaties, since Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations, than his Italian colleague.

It looks as though the colonial problem had driven into the background those demands which have reference to Europe. But we must not be deceived: the programme of Eastern and South-Eastern expansion has not been abandoned. Only the methods whereby it is to be achieved have changed. The principles suggested by the Führer in his book, *My Struggle*, remain valid. These aimed at the annexation of Austria and the acquisition of settlements in the East. Germany, it was maintained, had the moral right to conquer foreign soil. The task of National Socialism was to prepare the nation to march along the road to the new colony; but this road led to the East. "If we speak of new settlements in Europe to-day, we can think first and foremost of Russia and her subject States." The diplomats of the Berlin Foreign Office are making efforts to prove that these words, written thirteen years ago, have no practical significance to-day. These efforts are all the more fruitless since reasons of foreign policy do not exclusively determine the aggressive attitude

of Hitlerism towards Russia. Anti-Bolshevism is one of the most important principles of its home policy, and, next to the desire for conquest, it forms the most deep-rooted reason of enmity against the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is not only the utterances of leading personages, but the political actions of the Third Reich, that give the lie to the apostles of appeasement.

The acquisition of land in Europe is put forward continually as a necessity. Where else should it be found but where the German knights of the Middle Ages sought for it? And what is the reason of the friendly understanding with Poland, coupled with the present renunciation of lost territories? How can we explain the refusal to participate in a general Eastern Pact, and support of bi-lateral non-Aggression Pacts, which appear to secure isolation for the belligerents and a localisation of the area of war, but would in reality protect the aggressor from the intervention of a third party? It may be that there are circles in Germany that oppose the adventure. Perhaps these may even be found within the ranks of the Reichswehr—but the Abyssinian campaign was also started despite the misgivings of the General Staff. Where no possibility of an appeal to public opinion exists, the Dictator will always gain the mastery over the opposition of individual groups.

As the general aspiration to equality of status is not to be diverted from Europe, and a tendency exists to ascribe to Germany the role of a champion against Communism, the menace of culture, the question is how to avert the danger of intervention by the Western Powers. The idea originally laid down in *My Struggle* was that of an alliance with Great Britain and Italy in order to defeat and destroy France, on which Hitler poured out the full vials of his fanatical wrath. This was abandoned when its impossibility became evident, and from that moment policy swung over to showering offers of friendship on the "inexorable and deadly enemy." Understanding with Western neighbours became the chief theme of all announcements of foreign policy. To assume a basic change of policy from this turn of the rudder would be a great mistake. It is only a change of tactics. The aim—to liberate the Western flank in order to undertake Eastern and South-Eastern expansion—has remained unaltered, and if the French were taken in by the siren voices importuning them

from beyond the Rhine, they would be duped in the long run. They would purchase temporary safety by separating from their friends and allies only to face later on, more or less alone, a swastika increased in strength. The comparison occasionally put forward with the Prussian victory over Austria, which was succeeded by that over Napoleon III, is, in fact, apposite.

The aim of the German attempts at alliance is most clearly recognisable by the condition laid down for the guarantee of friendship. It runs: Renunciation of co-operation with the Soviet Union. The Treaty signed by Laval in May 1935, securing mutual support in case of attack, is obviously considered in Berlin as a stumbling-block in the path of Franco-German unity. In silent comradeship with that section of the French middle class that fears Bolshevik infection, the Nazi Press has endeavoured to thwart its ratification and, to heighten anxiety in Paris, is making use of the argument that it is not in harmony with the Locarno agreement. In these circumstances we may be sure that, after Parliament has signed the Russian Treaty, Germany's wooing of her former deadly enemy will lose very much of its ardour. There is equally little doubt that the agitation for occupying the demilitarised zones in the Rhineland will increase. The alleged breach of the Locarno decrees will play its part, and if some fine day a new "accomplished fact" is created, there will be as little lack of a pretext as when conscription was re-introduced. The world must finally become accustomed to the thought that the itch for action of Dictatorships will continue to disregard Treaty obligations so long as they do not encounter united resistance.

For years such unity of spirit has only appeared imperfectly, and Hitler has scored by exploiting differences of opinion amongst those who were in reality ready to preserve peace. His good luck was enhanced by Mussolini's African war. Here was one despot playing into another's hand. Italy's diversion from Europe and the collapse of the Stresa front have meant great relief for Germany. On the other hand, every new difference of opinion concerning the execution of measures against the aggressor, as provided by Article 16 of the Covenant, roused hopes in Berlin of dividing forces which, if united, might resist a breach of international law. Germany held, and holds, a middle position between the League and Italy. She maintains that she detests war and desires to let

no one profit from it, and at the same time she furnishes the aggressor with everything that she has and can spare. Always and everywhere attempts are made not to disoblige anybody just at present, and to keep every door open, in order to play off one against the other at the right moment. If Mussolini's undertaking turns out more or less successfully, a claim will arise on the Roman Dictator's gratitude; but at the same time there is to be no tearing asunder of the threads linking up with the sanctionist Powers, above all England.

Here and there the opinion is held that this game could best be hindered if Mussolini's return to the community of Europe were made easy by far-reaching advances at the cost of Abyssinia. This is a mistake, not only because for a long time after the end of the campaign Italy will cease to be a strong figure on the international chess-board, but also because every mark of weakness towards the disturber of the peace to-day will increase the assurance of National Socialism. If a breach of Treaty were condoned in any quarter, the restraining barriers which still stand in Germany would fall. Whither the liberated energies would lead first, whether to Austria, Lithuania or the Rhineland, is comparatively unimportant. That conflagration would not be extinguished by economic Sanctions. War would be practically inevitable.

There is only one means of preventing it, and that is the formation and consolidation of a defensive front by all the Powers who take the preservation of peace seriously. Such a union does not mean the encirclement of Germany, for it opposes every State that violates international obligations, and entry into the coalition is open to everyone who recognises the idea of co-operative support in case of attack. Hitler's State, like that of William II, encircles itself, so long as it rejects the principle of collective security. He who excludes himself from a community to give free rein to his egoism has no right to complain of isolation. The basis of every such partnership must of course be the Covenant. But the Governments will have to interpret it in such a way that intervention becomes a duty, not only on a breach of the peace, but whenever treaty obligations are violated. Further, judging from past experience, it would not be superfluous to confirm and to strengthen recognition of the Geneva statutes by clear statements of policy towards any country which incurs the suspicion of intending to default, and by the assurance that, in

case of need, adequate agreement will be forthcoming as to details of the steps to be undertaken at the given moment.

This would be the best way of smothering evil desires in embryo, and we may assume that the conferences held in London and Paris after King George's funeral, and not least the apparent Anglo-Russian *rapprochement*, have exercised a very beneficial influence on Berlin. It is better to make use of a cold douche than to drive matters to the use of arms. To the world at large, of course, the German rulers have acted as though the conversations mentioned above furnished fresh proofs of the enmity of foreign intentions. But it would be a great mistake to renew the attempt to allay this more or less artificial excitement by kindly reassurances. Disturbers of the peace must know where they stand, and what resistance their desire for expansion will encounter.

Naturally, lack of equality of status has been mentioned again in this connection. To this it must be replied that equality of status can be discussed after Germany has joined the comity of nations, who desire to see any mistakes in the international structure corrected, not by a breach of treaties, but solely by changes along the path of agreement. Equality of rights presupposes the assumption and fulfilment of equal duties. It is only to be feared that Hitlerism is not yet, and probably never will be, ripe for this recognition. The Fascist Dictatorships, with their overheated nationalism, their worship of the State, their fostering of racial arrogance, are by their very nature a constant source of danger; and the danger becomes more acute the less they are in a position to fulfil their political promises at home. For that reason a rampart ought to be erected which even the courage of despair must realise to be insurmountable.

RUDOLF BREITSCHIED.

FRANCE, GENEVA AND ABYSSINIA.

THE problem with which the various post-war Governments of France were most occupied was that of security for our frontiers. This anxiety was easy to understand on the part of a country that had suffered two invasions in less than half a century; nevertheless, it was a narrow-minded anxiety, which brought serious mistakes in its train. After Germany had been crushed, French security was, as a matter of fact, assured for many years. But Europe ought to have been reconstructed out of the chaos into which she had sunk, and the security of the future made real in terms of a general equilibrium throughout our continent. The search for immediate security against a German danger, which was non-existent at the moment, paralysed us in the work of reconstruction to which we were called as victors, and which was expected of us by Europe.

Our colonial destiny on the one hand, and the fact on the other hand that after the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine we had no more territorial claims on the east ought to have made us realise that a good understanding with Germany might form in the future the solid basis of our security on the Continent, just as the good understanding with England that has existed since 1905 has become the solid basis of our security at sea. To this primary security arising out of a Franco-German *rapprochement* (to create which we had ten to fifteen years after the Armistice) might be added the collective security resulting from the Covenant, which we signed and by which we are bound. The collective security which was being slowly organised at Geneva might at first seem insufficient. But, following upon the security we derived from Germany's complete impotence during the post-war years, and the security we might have built up during that interval on the basis of a Franco-German *rapprochement*, it would have given support to our other forms of security, and would have made Germany a solid part of the new system.

Inversely, except for the tentative efforts which Briand failed to follow up sufficiently, and because it is always easier to return to the old paths than to trace out new ones, we have seemed to renounce the definite security which it was possible to obtain from a good Franco-German understanding, and on the other hand we have underestimated

the security that we might have expected from the Covenant.

After the war—and this was excusable—French politicians were not clear as to the significance of a Pact drawn up by the League of Nations. Like the politicians of many other countries, they made use of the new international organism rather than considered how to serve it and to strengthen it with a view to reconstructing the world. They sought to turn French influence at Geneva to account by returning to the old system of alliances, the irremediable failure of which as a means of securing peace had been demonstrated by the outbreak of war in 1914. I believe, as a matter of fact, that there is good ground for a formal condemnation of defensive treaties. The Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria, Italy—was in principle a defensive alliance designed to maintain the European *status quo* and to guarantee security to Germany against a war of retaliation on the part of France. But to France it seemed a danger to her security, and our Governments sought a counter-alliance, which they found in Russia. The Franco-Russian Alliance was also defensive, designed to protect France and Russia against German ambition. As a matter of fact, these two defensive alliances ended, as the result of a Balkan conflict, by embroiling the whole of Europe in a war, the result of which was the general ruin of the Continent and its unmistakable decline in world affairs. Nowadays every defensive alliance provokes counter-alliances which are defensive in their turn—and in this way Europe ends by dividing into two camps, which is a great danger to peace.

It might have been thought that, if France had had greater confidence in Geneva, she would not have concluded the military alliances binding her to Czechoslovakia, to Jugoslavia, to Poland, and provided the Pact, already signed, is ratified by Parliament, to Russia. These alliances are a survival of pre-war ideas. At that time they were justified, for no other means of security was in existence. They no longer fit in with that true spirit of international collaboration which ought to be the spirit of Geneva. One objection arises immediately. Was it necessary for young nations to be left to themselves directly after the war whose political framework was scarcely formed, and who might very soon find themselves exposed to great external dangers? I do not think so. But it

is in the Geneva Pact, not in an alliance with Paris, that their guarantee ought to be found. The duty of the League is to indict the aggressor. The aggressor having been indicted, there is nothing to prevent France from intervening in favour of any countries for which she feels special sympathy or which it is in her interest to support. The same possibilities of action lie open to her as by virtue of a special alliance. But, furnished with an international mandate, she would not be exposed to the same troubles, and would be certain of the co-operation of the other countries represented at Geneva, or at any rate of their benevolent neutrality.

Until 1923, and almost unconsciously, France continued the war, and carried out a policy of force against Germany. The Ruhr campaign demonstrated the futility of such a policy and the risk of isolation involved in pursuing it. In 1924 a new spirit emerged in our policy, making possible the Locarno Pact in the following year. The Locarno Pact has none of the difficulties of the bilateral military Pacts that we have condemned. The combination of countries hitherto looked upon as probable foes arose from a principle that was the exact reverse of that of defensive Pacts, which are concluded between nations that have no common frontiers and are intended to intimidate the nation which they enclose. But at the very moment at which France returned to international co-operation and, very logically, was desirous of drawing the full conclusions of such a system, Great Britain, to the great regret of those of us who supported the Geneva idea, refused to sign the "Protocol for regulating international conflicts" which the League of Nations had just drawn up and adopted. It is odd to think that today it is the English Government that holds to the strict letter of the Pact, whenever certain hesitations on the part of French policy give rise for an instant to the idea that France might be tending to evade its obligations.

I am one of those who believe that there is no salvation for Europe and no lasting peace without the most solid organisation possible of "collective security." The general tendency of French policy hitherto has been firm in that direction, and the last statements by M. Laval, during the closing days of 1935, have completely reassured those in France who have been maintaining that the League is one of the surest safeguards for the security of every country. The great majority of the French people is of that opinion.

Our English friends will reply that if most Frenchmen are faithful to Geneva, nevertheless there is a fairly strong minority of dissidents. This is proved by the gestures of certain politicians, and the frequent violent polemics in certain sections of the Press. I owe it to my readers to attempt to explain the attitude of this minority, to which I do not belong, but whose point of view is far from negligible. In the first place, there is in France a reactionary Right which has never acknowledged the League nor its usefulness, even when Geneva's action has been entirely in accord with French interests. The men of this school are adherents of the most radical forms of national egotism, and they consider that every other State ought to be forbidden, as the collectivity of other States was hitherto forbidden, to intervene in what they call the particular affairs of their own country. Their actual attitude does not necessarily arise out of special sympathy for Italy; they merely consider it is a question of saving the principle of the absolute sovereignty of each State—a principle which is of value for Italy today, as tomorrow it may be for France. Absolute sovereignty involves the right of each nation to decide which are its vital interests, and whether those vital interests are worth the risk of war. For such men the League of Nations is a farce, an intolerable attack on the sovereignty of States, and ought to disappear.

These fierce enemies of the League are only a small minority. Far more numerous are the Frenchmen who accept the existence of the Covenant, but with reservations. According to these the League is useful because, thanks to it, opposing points of view may meet one another and a compromise be made possible. In this manner certain wars may be avoided and certain conflicts controlled. If war breaks out in spite of everything, Geneva's mission is no longer to intervene, but only to remain at the disposal of the belligerents against the day when conciliation can again be contemplated. By intervening Geneva risks an extension of the conflict if Sanctions are not admitted by the aggressor State, or a prolongation of the war if Sanctions, operating against the stronger State, aid the resistance of the weaker. It is obvious that such a theory is purely pragmatic, and has nothing in common with international morality. But many Frenchmen still think that the League has fulfilled its mission sufficiently by "pronouncing the right," and by condemning the aggressor,

as it has no suitable means at its disposal of insuring the triumph of right. Its essential mission is to avoid war. If war breaks out in spite of its efforts, it ought not to be a party to extending or lengthening the struggle.

A third category of Frenchmen, whilst sympathising with the institution of Geneva, are protesting as to the case in point from another motive. They consider that, as Sanctions have never been applied in the past, it might generally be supposed that they would not be applied in the future, and that it is very unfair to apply them for the first time when a great European nation is concerned. The rule, they say, ought to be the same for all. A kind of jurisprudence excluding Sanctions has, in fact, arisen. To withdraw today from laws that existed previously is contrary to that fundamental rule that the law ought to be the same for all. We know what reply may be given to these objections, and that the absence of the United States from Geneva made all application of Sanctions vain in such cases as that of Manchukuo or the struggle between Bolivia and Paraguay. Men of this school argue that the fact of applying Sanctions for the first time to Italy seems a lack of international fair play.

A still larger section of French public opinion is reacting against Sanctions for sentimental reasons. "The Italians," they say, "were our comrades during the Great War. They came over to our camp of their own free will. They shared our sufferings, our defeats, our victories. We cannot put this nation in the balance with a black nation from far-distant Africa, of whose very existence we hardly knew until now. The Italian Government may be in the wrong, but that is not sufficient justification for us to rise against our former brothers-in-arms. Add to that, that they belong to our race, belong, like ourselves, to Latin culture, that a certain number of Italians living in France have been the founders of good French families. We refuse to act against these men. Let us not, of course, help the aggressor—but let us remain neutral." To this group must also be added all those who, whether they sympathise with the Italian nation or not, extol neutrality above all else. If the attitude of certain combatants of the Right can be explained by Fascist sympathies, clear neutral tendencies may also be found amongst many combatants of the Left, who are fervent supporters of Geneva. It seems to me that such tendencies ought easily to be understood in

Great Britain, where for a long time neutrality was the official doctrine on all questions in which vital British interests were not involved. The wave of feeling that has arisen in Great Britain in favour of Geneva marks the development of a new spirit. The fact that the English nation allows its country to intervene in favour of a principle of organisation has deeply impressed a large number of Frenchmen. The progress of what I will call the international conscience amongst the Anglo-Saxon masses is full of significance, and justifies high hopes for the future. But the English nation, which, in the course of its history, was as a rule strictly neutral, ought to understand that reactions of this kind are normal among the French. It is certain that the neutrality of former brothers-in-arms, joined to the sympathy that many of them feel for their Italian comrades, has been able to carry weight in certain measures of French policy. "If Sanctions are to issue from the economic situation," the majority think, "let others apply them, but not ourselves!"

Again, some of my compatriots see things from the angle of immediate French security, without thinking sufficiently of the future. From the standpoint of the immediate present, and if we admit that Sanctions can provoke violent reactions on the part of Italy, it must be recognised that the situation of France is particularly dangerous. If the application of Sanctions drove Italy to military action, it is at our expense above all that it would be carried out. Our large cities, Nice, Toulon, Marseilles, Tunis, Bizerta, are situated, some a few minutes, others less than an hour, from Italian air-ports. The English public, which is objective by nature when brought face to face with realities, ought to realise that an inhabitant of Nice or of Marseilles cannot react to the idea of a military struggle in the same way as an inhabitant of London or Liverpool.

Finally, and always bearing immediate security in mind, the French who fear the possibility of this or that German initiative, that might imperil the peace of Europe, view with displeasure the moral and material weakening which might result for Italy from a too strict application of Sanctions. This is a point which our English friends should consider if they are to judge impartially the total reaction of French public opinion. It should be added, moreover, that certain men with a vision of the future of Europe and of the white

race would not, even if they condemn the spirit of conquest, desire to see a great European country put out of countenance by a coloured race. A certain sense of European solidarity and of the prestige of race holds them back from going the full length of what might be demanded by the logic of the spirit of Geneva. Many politicians, many colonials, tremble at the possibility of too extensive a military victory coming in addition to the moral victory carried off by Ethiopia from the Areopagus of the nations. One may not share such fears, but one must recognise their existence.

Adding up all these objections it will be seen that, in a democratic régime, the French Government has manifested a certain prudence. Whilst the greater part of public opinion in Great Britain, Conservative as well as Labour, supported the action of Geneva with all its possible consequences, French public opinion, for all the reasons which I have mentioned, was much more hesitant; and in a democracy it is fatal when the hesitation of public opinion is translated into hesitation on the part of the Government. Personally I am one of those who think that a certain reasonable idealism ought to inspire the policy of a great nation and, furthermore, that preoccupation for our future security ought to take precedence of our immediate security. From the moral point of view quite as much as from the material, France ought to desire the definite establishment at Geneva of a jurisprudence for the suppression of all aggression. Further, the interests of our own country as well as of European peace ought to make us desire a closer connection between the action of Great Britain and that of the League. Obviously, this means drawing English policy far more deeply than hitherto into the Continental policy of Europe, but I for my part consider this to be an inestimable advance. Without the effective and continual collaboration of Great Britain, without the certainty that she will take rapid and unwavering action against the aggressor, whoever it may be, it is impossible to lay the solid foundations of European peace. On the day, which I hope is not far distant, on which all Frenchmen understand that in any case Great Britain will not seek to elude the obligations of the Covenant, French policy will no longer display those hesitations which may sometimes have surprised our friends across the Channel.

REGIS DE VIBRAYE.

THE GREEK RESTORATION.

THREE months have elapsed since the return of King George II to Greece after nearly twelve years of exile, so that it is possible to form some opinion about the results of the Greek Restoration. Of its prospects it would still be unwise to prophesy; indeed, to prophesy about Greek politics is to court disaster; for changes are so rapid, and the hero of one year, like Trikoupes or Venizelos, may be the ostracised outcast of the next. So far the restored sovereign has done extraordinarily well. Recalled by a plebiscite, which provoked the smiles of observers on the spot, he would to-day be elected by a large majority of the voters at a free election. He has acted up to his determination to be the "King of *all* the Hellenes," not of a party, the umpire above parties, not the captain of a side.

To adopt this impartial attitude was extraordinarily difficult after the bitter struggles which have characterised Greek political life during the last twenty years. The task of our Charles II was easy compared with that of George II. The latter found in office as Premier and Regent the late General Kondyles, the "Thunderbolt" of Greece, a soldier risen from the ranks, who from being an ardent Republican, the "Cromwell" of Hellas, as he was called, had become, in his own phrase—for he dabbled in English history—"the General Monk of the Greek Restoration." General Kondyles doubtless expected that his resignation, formally tendered, would not be accepted. But the King thought otherwise. He bestowed upon the discharged Premier the Grand Cross of the Redeemer, the Greek equivalent of sending an inconvenient politician up to the House of Lords, and entrusted the formation of the new Government, a Service Cabinet, not a political administration, to M. Demertzès, a man of moderate opinions, who had been a Minister under M. Venizelos in 1913, and under M. Zaïmes in 1917, and who, in 1926, had been chosen as candidate of all the allied Republican parties for the Presidency of the Republic against General Pangalos. Since then he had been out of politics, occupied with legal studies. Thus, the Kondylist ideal of "a crowned dictatorship," with himself as the Greek Mussolini and George II as the Greek Victor Emmanuel III, was shattered at the outset. Historical parallels are rarely exact, and in this

case General Kondyles was scarcely a Mussolini, and George II has shown an independence lacking to the crowned numismatist who has had to face the Italian dictator.

The personal value of the men composing the Demertzês Cabinet was higher than that of many political administrations. M. Venizelos, far ahead of most statesmen in his judgment of international affairs, was not a good judge of men, and of some of his colleagues it might have been asked as of the "flies in amber," however did they get there? But M. Demertzês' Minister of Finance was an official of that Ministry and therefore an expert in that very technical subject; another of his colleagues was a big manufacturer, founder of the soap-works at Eleusis and other industrial companies, while M. Benakes, originator of the Cotton Institute and a warm supporter of athletics, will always be remembered in connection with the beautiful Benakes Museum, which his father bequeathed to his country. The Minister of War, General Papagos, was one of the three representatives of the armed forces who deposed M. Tsaldares, and was supposed to be a guarantee that, according to the familiar slogan of official communications to the Press, "the army is entirely devoted to its professional duties." This statement has not infrequently been the prelude to a fresh military "movement" on the principle of *qui s'excuse s'accuse*. If the army would really "mind its own business," the people could get on with its business in peace, and there is nothing which the Greek people, as distinct from those who have something to get out of political changes, desires so much, no matter under what form of Government, provided that it be stable.

The King, anxious to draw a veil over the past and provide for the future, insisted upon the grant of a general amnesty, to the disgust of the ultra-Royalists, one of whom returned the decoration conferred upon him by the sovereign, while a leading intransigent newspaper republished an article by Prince Andrew (for whose return it clamoured), in which the King's uncle declared the grant of an amnesty to be "an immoral act." But these Greek "Bourbons," like their historic predecessors after the French Restoration, "have learned nothing and forgotten nothing" during their years of exile. On the other hand, the Liberals, the old Venizelist party, whose leader is M. Sophoules, the veteran Samian politician, have supported the King's statesmanlike policy

of conciliation. Thus we have the curious phenomenon of Venizelists supporting the son of Constantine, and of anti-Venizelists and ardent Monarchists, *plus royalistes que le roi*, opposing the will of the Monarch, which is evidently also the will of the people. Such topsy-turvy situations might seem improbable if met in the pages of Ruritanian romance, but the history of South-Eastern Europe furnishes real events, which would be dismissed as fantastic if they occurred in the Balkan novels of Anthony Hope, Sydney Grier or George Birmingham.

As for M. Venizelos, he has sent his greetings to the King through his favourite correspondent, M. Rouphos, an ex-Foreign Minister, and has stated for the *n*th time that he has retired from active politics and merely observes them from a distance. No philosopher has discovered an occupation for ex-Premiers: Gladstone's Homeric studies interested him less than Bulgarian atrocities and Irish Home Rule; Pashich, who had not even literary diversions, was bored to death at Monte Carlo and returned to the party battles of Belgrade; Mr. Lloyd George prefers politics to poultry-farming. But if the Cretan statesman returns to Greek public life—and it is possible for him with his facile pen to be in public life without being a deputy—his name will be a banner, which will rally against it all the disconnected forces of his foes, whose sole bond of union is their common hatred of him, and whose only common article of faith is Anti-Venizelism. For Greek politics are largely questions of persons, not of principles, and this makes the King's position as umpire harder. Working many hours a day—for he is said to be the hardest-worked man in Athens—he has to hear the conflicting advice of one political leader after the other, listening attentively to each but expressing, at least publicly, no opinion. In that respect he resembles his predecessor at the Palace, President Zaimes, one of the few silent Greeks. Moreover, private political negotiations cannot be conducted in Athens without everyone learning the fact in the next special edition of one of the twenty-two daily newspapers. When the writer once had an interview with a Prime Minister, he found on his return home a reporter awaiting him to ask what the Premier had said to him about Cyprus! In nervous periods, such as we have lately traversed, the meeting of a couple of generals with a political leader is sufficient to launch the scare of an impending *pronunciamiento*, and we learn next day from telegrams from

Paris or Sofia that there has been a revolution at Athens, of which we on the spot were ignorant.

Another point at issue besides the amnesty was the dissolution of the National Assembly, elected on June 9th, which was not representative of all the Greeks owing to Republican abstentions. Here the new Premier was opposed by M. Tsaldares, who, as the leader of the largest party, desired the convocation of the Assembly, in which he would have had a majority. But, at the Premier's request, the King, after due consideration, signed a decree dissolving the Assembly and fixing the elections for the new Chamber on January 26th. The Liberals and the Moderate Republicans supported this exercise of the Royal prerogative, the ultra-Royalists, "the King's friends," to use a phrase of our eighteenth-century political history, questioned it! Indeed, one intransigent newspaper threatened "a counter-revolution," if such "a revolution" as the dissolution were effected. In order to soothe the bitterness of party strife, the election, the third since September 1932, was held on the proportional system. Greece was divided into thirty-eight constituencies, the separate Jewish and Muslim constituencies for Salonika and Western Thrace respectively being abolished, and the historic privilege of the three "nautical islands" of Hydra, Spetsai and Psara, granted to them in 1844 in consideration of their services in the War of Independence, having been cancelled before the previous election. The total number of members was fixed at 300, and every elector was entitled to express his preference by a cross for as many candidates as he desired on the list for which he voted. In order to secure an absolutely "free" election—the adjective in Greece has not always been superfluous—two measures were taken. The members of the Government adopted a self-denying ordinance, by which none of them was to be a candidate, and the conduct of the polling was placed under the supervision of judicial officials instead of the prefects, who, nineteen days before the election, were obliged to quit their posts temporarily until the successful candidates had been proclaimed. Thus there was no chance of a repetition of the eccentricities of the plebiscite.

But, the elaborate means taken to soothe party strife have produced an opposite result. As besides the two large parties, the "Liberals" and the "Popular" party of M. Tsaldares, there were ten other groups in the field, the result has been

that, as was expected, no single party obtained an absolute majority of the Chamber. But, as government must be carried on, the smaller groups, except the fifteen Communists, have shown a tendency to collaborate with one or other of the two larger parties, so that the 127 "Liberals" with their Allies have 142 seats and the "Popular" party, with the followers of the late General Kondyles, M. Theotokes and General Metaxâs and a small Macedonian group, has 143. In other words, the election has produced a dead heat, and the division of Greece into "Liberals" and Anti-Venizelists is perpetuated. The sudden death of General Kondyles, who had long suffered from chronic asthma, seemed to simplify this complicated situation, as he was the most vehement opponent of the "Liberals," and even went so far as to promise that, if returned to power, he would restore the old calendar, abolished in Greece in 1923 and in England in 1751! The cry of "give us back our thirteen days" pleased those nuns and obscurantists, upon whom the plastic Greek language has bestowed the name of *palαιοemerologítai*, just as the writer's great-grandfather used to say that "there had been no good apples in Scotland since the style was changed." But for a commercial country like Greece with business dealings in the big European capitals, such a step backward would have been disastrous.

In a country in which individualism was not so firmly implanted in every breast the obvious solution of this dead heat would be a coalition Government. There has been talk of what in the jargon of Greek politics is called an "Œcumenical" Government, that is a Cabinet of which the leaders of all the parties are members, a "Ministry of all the Talents," in fact. Such a Government Greece had in 1877 and 1926. Failing that, the next best solution would be a coalition Cabinet on a large basis, or at least a coalition of the two largest parties. But, as the Venetians used to say, *cinque Greci, cinque generali*. Every Greek wants to be first; collaboration is a virtue rare in this talented people. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to know from one day to another what exactly some of the party leaders want. Some of them are ready to follow, rather than guide, their nominal followers, and an incursion of deputies from the provinces into their chief's political office is apt to change the views which he had expressed shortly before their visit. To obviate

this and obtain a more serene atmosphere, it has been suggested that, after having summoned the party leaders separately, the King should preside over a meeting of all of them and hear their own views, which are probably more conciliatory than those of their respective followers, for each fold is more intransigent than its shepherd. One journal, the *Akrópolis*, advocated this gathering of leaders under his presidency in an open letter to the King, urging him to hear "their commonplaces," and then, in the name of the Greek people, remind them of the dangerous international situation and of the many pressing internal questions, and bid them patriotically to unite to save their country from the former and solve the latter.

Of internal questions one dominates all others and influences the entire position—that of the army. So long as the army interferes in politics, and it has done so intermittently since 1843 and almost continuously since 1909, there can be no peace. But the armed forces of Greece are after every revolution divided into two hostile camps, the *beati possidentes*, who, belonging to the victorious faction, have retained, and mean to retain, their rank and pay, and the adherents of the beaten party, who are deprived of their occupation, position and emoluments and mean, by another *pronunciamiento*, to recover them. In other words, the army tends to be a prætorian guard rather than a national force. Naturally, the political party in power, knowing that votes and paper constitutions are in Greece of less real value in a crisis than the support of the barracks, always preaches the sacred doctrine of the intangibility of the army as constituted at that moment, while the Opposition advises clemency for the discharged officers.

At the time of writing the solution suggested is that M. Demertzês should publish a decree authorising the Cabinet to judge the cases of the superior officers removed from the army, while the claims of the subordinate officers would be examined by a council of their superiors, nominated by the Cabinet. None of these subalterns, up to and including those of the rank of captain, would be restored to the army, if he had been condemned for participation in the revolution of last March. But an amnesty would be granted them, they would be placed in the reserve and no longer obliged to reside in certain places far from Athens. A higher pension than that of their rank would be given to officers whose return to the

army was found impossible. The advantage of this plan is that its execution would be confided to an impartial, non-political Government, so that professional capacity, not political sympathies, would be the criterion of reinstatement.

Another question likely to divide the nation into two opposite camps has been recently raised in a section of the Press. After the Asia Minor catastrophe of 1922 there entered Greece about 1,500,000 refugees, who formed almost one quarter of the total population at the last census of 1928. Thanks to the Refugees' Settlement Commission, presided over by Americans and Indian Civilians, these immigrants were established and have converted Macedonia from a desert into a productive province, which in time will enable Greece to dispense with large importations of foreign grain. But a polemic now aims at representing the refugees as unduly favoured at the expense of the native population, to which the refugees are replying. Possibly the fact that the refugees' vote largely contributed to the establishment of the Republic in 1924, and that Northern Greece, their principal residence, tends to be Liberal, whereas the Peloponnese has always been an anti-Venizelist stronghold, may account for this fresh attempt at division. The true policy is to weld "old" and "new" Greece together, not to have, as there was in Italy, a marked distinction between North and South. Here the King serves as a bond of union between Macedonia and the Morea, the Asiatic Greeks and the "earth-born." M. Sophoules has described him as "a perfect English gentleman," and Greeks know what that means better than most people. Possibly it implies the inability to grasp the "subtle tricks of internal politics."

If the intransigent opposition to the King's conciliatory policy should become intolerable and another *pronunciamiento* be threatened, the King has a trump card in his hand: the threat that he will return to his hotel in Jermyn Street. There is a precedent for such a course, the similar threat of his grandfather, George I, in 1864 to return to Denmark unless the National Assembly ended its interminable debates upon the new constitution within ten days. That ultimatum was immediately successful, for all dreaded the chaos which would have followed the King's departure. It is said that George II has thrown out similar hints, and laughingly told a Greek acquaintance who was going abroad for a time that

he hoped to be still in Greece on the latter's return. He is under no illusions, but is doing his duty to all his people, as far as they will allow him to do it. If he cannot have a fair trial but be thwarted by those extremists who want "to protect him from himself," it will be said, as was once remarked to the writer by an official of long experience, that no form of government suits Greece long. No other Royal personage would care to ascend so shaky a throne, while a second Republic would meet with opposition from those who overthrew the first, so that chaos would ensue. The vast majority of Greeks are probably neither Monarchists nor Republicans from principle, but simply decent, hard-working people who want a stable government.

The politicians, moreover, have been warned by public opinion that, while they are discussing internal questions, Europe may suddenly be ablaze with war, a war of which Greece would certainly feel the results, even if she were not involved. The nation which possesses such fine ports as Argostoli, Navarino, Suda Bay, and the Gulf of Volo, could scarcely escape the eyes of one or other of the belligerent parties, while the Greek Government has proclaimed its adhesion to the sanctions of Geneva. In the circumstances a strong Foreign Minister who can give all his time to that office—a work impossible for its present occupant, who is also Premier—and a united army are essential. There is in Greece at least one statesman who possesses the expert knowledge and experience for the direction of foreign affairs, but he is out of politics and has no party. Meanwhile the British, whose relations with Greece are historically friendly, save for one or two unfortunate incidents, will sympathise with the plucky monarch who, almost alone in his palace—for he has summoned, perhaps wisely, none of his relatives back to Greece, except his brother and heir, Prince Paul—is struggling to reunite the divided nation and to inaugurate a new era, in which there shall be neither Venizelists nor Anti-Venizelists, but only Greeks, all supporters of his throne because they believe that it represents the national will and the national unity.

WILLIAM MILLER.

Athens, February 7th.

A NEW PICTURE OF SOVIET RUSSIA.

ONE of the actors enjoying an improvised supper party was able to produce fireworks with his mouth. You had only to shut your eyes and you would believe rockets were bursting, squibs hissing. In a word, it was as effective as reality itself. This episode, from *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, one can visualise while reading the latest work of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism a New Civilisation?*, not only a work of fine craftsmanship but also a work of art.

A century ago the thirty-year-old Tocqueville produced his famous book on America. He bravely faced democracy as the inevitable trend of the coming epoch, and was eager to discover some safeguards against an all too logical application of the principle. The present work reads as if it were produced by one younger than Tocqueville. There is no apprehension that the principles applied in Soviet Communism are at all to be feared. Minor doubts occasionally occur, but on the whole the diet prescribed by the Moscow doctors seems to be the only reasonable one. The Moscow system is all for the good, for Russia definitely, for the rest of the world, in prospect at least, a useful experiment. Lord Lothian a few years ago at the London School of Economics admitted the possibility of a new Renaissance initiated by the abolition of private property. Many minds of distinction have gone farther, some in accepting the principles of Communism as taught by Moscow, some its methods. Bertrand Russell rejects the first but accepts the latter, which is an exceptional view to take. Other forms of eclecticism are general. There is so much in the Moscow system that reflects modern tendencies: the status of women, sex problems, anti-religious feeling, the abolition of property as power, etc., that one has no difficulty in understanding the Marxian magic even in its Moscow garment. Thus since 1919 the Moscow system from a Russian extravagance has grown in the minds and even in the hearts of non-Russian observers into a world event, watched more and more closely, with sympathy and admiration. That the Webbs, who repeatedly have traced with vision and accuracy processes of social germination and earned by their well-documented prescience a world-wide fame, should give their blessing to the Moscow system is a

momentous event. Even if it has been obtained surreptitiously—and who might not have been deceived by Moscow's incantations?—it still remains an event, a symptom of our time. About 1840 David Urquhart thought the Sultan's rule superior to the English constitution, and about 1915 Stephen Graham extolled Russia's religious mind. Both knew the peoples they were explaining to their countrymen, and yet their testimony was meaningless in a higher sense. But when the Webbs speak, even without pretending to know, something has happened.

The remark is not intended as a moralising one. Almost coincidentally with the recent Franco-Soviet Pact M. Paléologue, at a plenary session of the "Five Academies," gave an address on the drama of Ekaterinburg—the massacre of the Imperial family—and its text appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of November 15th, 1935. At a public function of the same importance a similar address in London seems unthinkable. Another comparison, not of place but of time. Prince Kropotkin seventeen years ago wrote to Lenin that the taking of hostages was desecrating Communism. Now Kropotkin in the book before us would be classified, along with others, as a "disgruntled" revolutionary, for Sidney and Beatrice Webb safely conclude from the common experience of mankind that a redistribution of wealth, when resisted by the old possessors, has always led to fighting, to more or less "terrorism" by those who prove to be stronger and who regard this as the only means of destroying or maintaining the social revolution that is occurring (p. 600). "Future generations," they write "will estimate the worthwhileness of national conquests or internal revolutions, not so much by the temporary misery they inevitably create, but largely according to the relative value, in each case, of the new order in comparison with the old. In the U.S.S.R.," the future generations continue, "the substantial completion of the liquidation of the landlord and the capitalist, together with the coincident abandonment by the western powers of their original project of armed intervention to suppress Soviet Communism, have not only made humanity to individuals at last socially safe, but have also witnessed a considerable building up of a new tissue, and a purposeful reorganisation of community life on a deliberate plan for the Remaking of Man" (p. 601). It is but consistent with this

judgment of posterity when Lenin and his successor are praised for their thoroughness. And where Lenin wrote "merciless," posterity writes "drastic." One can trace the curve along which mankind is advancing towards the new civilisation.

Yet posterity seems not entirely detached from the concepts of popularity, democracy, liberty and legality, which together with equality are required for the solidity of the new order. Hence the presence of these ingredients of a healthy social fabric has to be demonstrated, and the investigation is purposefully organised by the writers who during their visits to the U.S.S.R. obtained answers to their innumerable questions, and were allowed to go where they wished and to see what they liked. What has appeared in print in the western languages they have read, what they needed of Russian texts has been translated for them. Their admirable technique of social investigation is well known. What, in our opinion, appears as inadequate results from their goodwill, not devoid of an undercurrent of passion. There is also a manifest underestimate of Russia's achievements in the past, whereby some passages would fit in with ordinary Communist propaganda, regrettable in a work of such scope and quality.

Of the topics mentioned, popularity, we think, requires but one remark. "Popularity" of the leaders and the systems is with some unverifiable measure of truth claimed by Moscow, Berlin and Rome. Liberty of thought and expression being rigidly circumscribed and dissent being dangerous, argument about the popularity of this or that system seems futile. Of the three centres Moscow is undoubtedly more than any other in control of opinion. Its methods of exhibiting the popularity of men and measures, as well as its methods of manipulating mass democracy—Professor Mannheim's term*—are on the way to becoming classical.

This brings us to the other topic, democracy. The broad democratic basis of the "elusive," "pyramidal," "multiple" structure of the Soviet constitution would have been the only accompaniment to support the glorifying song, five hundred pages long, of Part I, "The Constitution," if it had not been for the word "dictatorship" so freely used by Moscow. The term, according to the writers, is a misnomer

* K. Mannheim, *The Crisis of Culture in the Era of Mass-Democracies*. 1935.

Moscow knows no dictator, neither individual nor collective; it more and more prospers under "democratic centralism." Marx knew why he thought the capitalists were dictators: because these spokesmen of liberal institutions would not concede to the workers representation in their workshops and a say in their management. It is interesting to watch how the case "democracy versus dictatorship" is presented by our authors. Space permits only a few representative quotations, some of them reflecting the metaphors of the machine epic. A few passages are italicised.

As we see it, the government centred in the Moscow Kremlin is the apex of half a dozen pyramidal structures covering the whole of the U.S.S.R., each of them based, according to a common pattern, upon a vast number of relatively small meetings of associated citizens for almost continuous discussions, and for the periodical direct election of primary representative councils . . . (p. 4).

The power needed for administration may be generated in the innumerable meetings of electors, of producers, of consumers, and of members of the Communist Party, which everywhere form the base of the constitutional structure. It is transmitted through the tiers of councils as by a mighty conducting cable working as it passes the machinery of government in village and city, district (rayon) and province (oblast) and republic.

It is this conception of an *upward stream* of continuously generated power, through multiform mass organisation, to be transformed at the apex into a downward stream of authoritative laws and decrees and "directives," that is indicated by its inventors by the term of "democratic centralism" (p. 7).

In describing, in separate chapters, the organisation in the U.S.S.R. of Man as Citizen, Man as Producer, Man as Consumer, and Man in the vocation of Leadership, we may have seemed sometimes to imply that all these separate parts . . . are equal of status, each exercising supreme authority in its own sphere. This is not so. The Central Executive Committee (Tsik) of the All-Union Congress of Soviets, representing the totality of the inhabitants in U.S.S.R. and not merely a fraction of them, stands *supreme over all ramifications* of the trade unions, the consumers' co-operative movement, and the various kinds of associations of owner producers (peasants), just as it does over tier upon tier of soviets (pp. 422-3).

The authors are careful to notice that one organisation, the only political organisation admitted, namely the

Communist Party, "is practically independent" of the Soviet authorities.

Since 1930 *all important decrees* of the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee or the Soviet of Commissars, whether *legislative* or *administrative*, have been issued over the signature not of their president (Kalinin or Molotov) alone, but also over that of Stalin, as Secretary of the Communist Party.

It is, moreover, significant that these *decisive* acts are in *all important cases* initiated by the Politbureau of the Communist Party, and they receive *in due course* the endorsement either of the Central Committee or the All-Union Congress of the Communist Party (p. 423).

What remained to be done, in order to ascertain the working of the democratic factor under an almighty Party organisation was to examine how far in *all the important decrees* public opinion was the real driving force. Obviously a very difficult task, which however has been attempted with regard to two measures, the one subsequent on Stalin's warning to the comrades to moderate their zeal in forcing the peasants into collective farms, the other regarding a readjustment of family law. Two points seem important, the one being that Stalin, in contradistinction to Mussolini, takes his decisions after consultation and in agreement with his colleagues of the Politbureau (consisting of nine members), and therefore cannot be deemed a dictator; the other that the decisions arrived at "have neither the promptitude nor the timeliness, nor yet the fearless obstinacy that have often been claimed as the merits of a dictatorship" (p. 435).

The problem: Democracy or Dictatorship, can perhaps not be solved in the case before us. Not only that both may coalesce for a time, not only that the utilisation of class war ferments may be popular among one side, so as to appear democratic from another angle, not only that overwhelming majorities can be engineered by methods of intimidation along with adequate propaganda, but the problem, formulated as it is in the book before us, requires an examination of the limits of sovereignty. If the power of the State is unlimited, and that power is practically exercised by one party whose power is overwhelming, when all that was once believed to be inviolable—the natural rights of the individual—has passed into dreamland, when the greatest crime is, as the authors endorse, the crime against such a State, we are indeed at the

turning-point where a "new civilisation" is in the making. To call the exponents of the all-embracing power in such a State dictators seems below the mark. However, posterity will understand that the alternative, Democracy or Dictatorship, in the context here discussed, is to be understood as a means of discriminating the Moscow system from National Socialism and Fascism. Both pretend to be popular and democratic in the true sense, but both are antisocial dictatorships. What is authoritarian in the Moscow system is all for the good, as the authors show in the Second Part: Social Trends in Soviet Communism.

It seems that the existence of a democratic machinery in the Moscow system cannot be denied. Its structure is admirably described, but its free functioning is limited to minor matters, some would say in complete abeyance, so thorough is the non-constitutional control over the soviets, trade unions, co-operative societies and all potentially democratic organisations. The term democracy implies the concept of liberty, which in the usual meaning has lapsed under the Moscow system. The authors have their reasons for believing in the new liberties of the Soviet worker, and therefore they are justified in rejoicing over the new democracy thereto attached, the more so as they believe in the excellency of the Party that exercises the "tutelage" over the Soviet authorities. What they have to say about the heroes and martyrs of the Party, as well as about the ordinary members, will convince posterity that we are living in a great age. They naturally accept what Pisarev, in 1865, almost in the very words used by Lenin, wrote about the militant, merciless and well-informed vanguard that would have to force the lazy masses through the vicissitudes of a social revolution.

One or two quotations may serve as an illustration. They refer to that "momentous Party decision—perhaps the most important since that of 1918 in favour of accepting the terms of peace dictated by the German Army . . . the 'liquidation' of the last remaining sector of individual capitalists" (p. 562). A few passages will help us to understand the queer peculiarities of Soviet liberty, democracy and legality, as well as the powers of the Party members and their chiefs.

Among the twenty-five million peasant families there were three recognised grades, the poor (*bedniaki*), the middle (*seredniaki*), and the relatively well-to-do (*kulaki*). Of these it was

assumed that the first could easily be persuaded to unite in the collective farms, that would offer them prospect of larger shares than their tiny holdings had yielded. The second grade could, it was supposed, for the most part be won over by demonstration of the success of the *Kolkhosi*. But it was foreseen that an uncertain proportion of the middle peasants, including both the more energetic and ambitious, and the more obstinate and prejudiced, would prove entirely recalcitrant. Finally, the relatively well-to-do peasant, who had managed to enlarge his holding . . . the much hated *kulak* would have to be liquidated as a class. . . . Strong must have been the faith of the men who in the interest of what seemed to them public good could take so momentous a decision (pp. 562-3).

It must be added that fear of a new rural bourgeois class, signalled first by Trotsky who however advocated different methods, was also among the motives of the Party. The description, though in the main correct, will be clearer if the following figures from the official statistical *Spravochnik* for 1928 are taken into account. After that year the publication containing interesting figures regarding the stratification of the rural community has been discontinued. In 1927 only 3 per cent. of all the households engaged in agriculture were employed on State farms and collective farms, i.e. in the "socialist sector." Of the remaining 97 per cent., 8 per cent., or 1,841,000 households with 7,255,000 persons, were proletarians dependent on employment on other people's farms. More numerous were the semi-proletarian class, amounting to 4,643,000 households, with 18,383,000 persons and forming 20.2 per cent. of the entire "individualist sector" of the rural community. They in addition to cottage and kitchen gardens had diminutive holdings, and were therefore as part-time labourers employed. Roughly speaking some 25,000,000 persons could gain from being brought into collective state-aided farms. The middle peasants, or family farmers who were producing for the market some surplus without employing hired labour, formed the majority of the rural population—14,914,000 households with no less than 81,096,000 persons, or 64.9 per cent. of the households engaged as individual farming units, 70.6 per cent. of the respective section of the population. The petty capitalist farmers employing whole-time or part-time labour under the Land Code of 1923 formed only 3.9 per cent. of the households engaged in agriculture.

Their number is given as 896,000 with 5,859,000 persons, termed, with a malignant intention, "kulaks," a term borrowed from pre-revolutionary times. It is obvious that in this post-revolutionary composition of the peasant class the Government or the Party still had the elements of a fruitful class war. From the legal point of view it was necessary to find a reason for repudiating Lenin's Land Code of 1923, which favoured the enclosed holding against the levelling tendencies of the land commune—in substance a revival of the Stolypin Acts of 1907. On the other hand Lenin's Land Code promised security of tenure to the individual holder so long as cultivation was not discontinued. It must also be remembered that the prevalence of the "middle" peasant was a result of the land-grabbing movement of 1917-18. This movement had two aspects. First the seizure by the *land communes* of the land owned by the large landowners (not landlords, since tenancy was quite exceptional), and the levelling redistribution of all the land, communal and grabbed, thus reasserting the supremacy of the commune over the individual holders and owners. Contrary to what the authors suppose, the Bolsheviks were supporting in 1917-18 this anti-individualist phase of the village class war, by which the peasant bourgeoisie were the losers no less than the large landowners. But some kind of security of tenure for the revival of cultivation had to be conceded, and this was done by the Land Code of 1923, together with a peculiar consolidation of the patriarchal family as a labour unit.

To give the collectivisation a semblance of legality, it was sufficient to state that the peasants were not only withholding their surplus from the market but were ceasing cultivation. The cultivating peasants indeed repeated what had been done during the world war, when they withdrew from the market, first because they thought the prices inadequate, and secondly because of the prohibition. They managed to distil at home what they wanted. Lenin after some time reverted to the vodka monopoly, but pricing and taxation became increasingly more predatory, and the lack of manufactured goods discouraged the peasants from producing more than they could consume. It was not only an economic struggle between town and country, it also meant a formation of a new rural bourgeoisie. Stalin knew that "the peasant is not socialistically inclined" (*Leninism*, p. 67). The

peasant would be called guilty of not providing the market with his produce. The ruling power, pressing for an exportable surplus, was above criticism in spite of the pyramidal structure of the constitution. Though the abandonment of cultivation was not complete, the forfeiture by the peasants of their right to the holdings was construed under the pressure of scarcity and in the desire to break the resistance of a non-socialistically minded mass of producers. Collectivisation became imperative for the inauguration of a new era, the reign of science, the good life, and for the remaking of man. Legality, popularity, democratic methods and liberty were obviously not the characteristic features of the change. Hunger helped. In the famine districts food, if at all, was provided for those who joined the collective farms. The authors must be excused for having misread the passage they quote to support the opposite view (p. 266). After all, in the collective farms the peasants took what they could get, loans, tax exemptions, etc., but would not part with their produce. They had to be brought to their senses. But we are interested in what our authors have to say. Here are some passages from the First Part.

What the Soviet Government was faced with, from 1929 onward, was in fact not a famine but a widespread *general strike of the peasantry*, in resistance to the policy of collectivisation, *fomented and encouraged by the disloyal elements of the population, not without incitement from the exiles at Paris and Prague*. Beginning with the calamitous slaughter of livestock in many areas in 1929-30, the recalcitrant peasants defeated during the years 1932-33 all efforts of the Soviet Government to get the land adequately cultivated. In *innumerable cases* . . . the men journeyed to the nearest big market, and (as there was no deficiency in the country as a whole) returned . . . with the requisite sacks of flour. In other cases . . . the destitute family itself moved away . . . in search of work, leaving its . . . dwelling empty and desolate, *to be quoted by some incautious observer* as proof of death by starvation. In an unknown number of cases—as it seems, to be counted by the hundred thousand—the families were forcibly taken from their holding which they had failed to cultivate.

The Soviet Government has been severely blamed for these deportations. The *irresponsible criticism* loses, however, much of its force by the inaccuracy with which the case is stated. It is for instance invariably taken for granted that the Soviet Government heartlessly refused to afford relief to the starving districts.

. . . The usual assumption . . . is that this exiling occurred through drastic action by a mystically omnipotent G.P.U. . . . it was done by the poor peasants and farmhands who listed those kulaks who "impede our collective farm by force and violence" (quoted from Anna Luisa Strong's article in the *American Mercury*).

The enforced expropriation of these peasants has seemed to *foreign critics* an extreme injustice . . . In fact the peasants in the U.S.S.R. . . . are merely occupants of nationalised land. . . . Any refusal to cultivate must inevitably be met by expropriation (pp. 266-8 and note).

Here we have the finding of the cautious and responsible observers and critics. However, the removal of the wreckers had to be supplemented by making the collectivised peasants do their duty. Only a "religious order like the Communists" could do that, and this episode is told in military language:

This throwing into the field all over the U.S.S.R. of a "hand-picked" and trustworthy army of some 25,000 members of the Communist Party . . . and . . . their organisation in some 3,000 Policy Sections was acclaimed as a master stroke of policy . . . (p. 256). . . . And now that the worst members of the collective farms have been drastically expelled, whilst the others have been actually shown how the work should be done . . . they may be expected to dispense with much of the hustling by which Kaganovich and his myrmidons in 1933 and 1934 pulled the U.S.S.R. through a dangerous crisis (pp. 271 and 272).

Some of the myrmidons were martyrs, their opponents are called sullen, suspicious, prejudiced, recalcitrant, disloyal, peace-breakers, etc., capable of misleading incautious observers by abandoning their homes. Are we who cannot appreciate this way of undoing history and making for progress fossilised? Yet even the authors have not entirely broken with the prejudices of the old civilisation, despite the observation that "some of the villages that had been among the most recalcitrant . . . in 1932 were among the most diligent in 1934," that "this peculiar stiffening of the local rural administration was . . . remarkably effective, and that the behaviour of the peasants greatly improved" (p. 271). In Part II occurs a relapse into obsolete views that sound more homely, almost resolutely against wholesale human sacrifices.

How many hundreds of thousands of families were thus, between 1930 and 1934, forcibly torn from their holdings, losing all they possessed, we are unable to estimate. . . . We have no

wish to minimise, still less to seek to justify, this ruthless expropriation and removal of the occupiers and cultivators who were stigmatised as kulaks, any more than we do the equally ruthless expulsion, little over a century ago, of the crofters. . . . It is indeed not so much the policy of removal that is open to criticism, as the manner in which it *appears* to have been carried out, and the unsatisfactory conditions into which the victims *seem* to have been, without judicial trial or any effective investigation, arbitrarily deported (p. 571).

This half-hearted condemnation does not tally with the preceding passages. Obviously even the most summary investigation of millions of cases would have nullified what constitutes the trick of telescoping into a minimum of time all revolutions past and yet to come for the "remaking of man."

There may be one or two other deviations from the general line of argument prevailing throughout the thousand pages. A certain uneasiness is noticeable when the persecution of the intellectuals is under discussion: they are at least spared the adjectives freely used with regard to the peasants, the clergy, the large landowners, the Monarch, and most of those of differing opinion, even when the latter, like Professor Haensel, are perforce better informed. The economists who do not believe in planning of course get their due. England fares not too well. And indeed why should a planned economy not be possible when a nation is being rationed both in regard of goods and ideas? The authors are not disturbed by the rationing, since in both respects the rations are likely to move upwards as the system consolidates. Nothing really valuable is being impeded. Most of the Second Part shows how, the ground having been cleared, everything good is carefully cultivated. Bad habits are being abandoned, to begin with acquisitiveness, the profit motive, inequality, Godism, etc., so as to "increase the number of those who think that there is something to be said for the paradoxical claim of Soviet Communism that it is, in morals as well as in economics and political science, actually leading the world" (p. 1134). The sentence is worded in a diplomatic and non-committal way.

An immense number of topics are briskly treated in the Second Part to show "the trends of Soviet Communism." The headings are in themselves impressive: "Planned

Production and Community Consumption." "In Place of Profit." "The Remaking of Man." "Science the Salvation of Mankind." "The Good Life." "A New Civilisation" (with a question mark). There is no question of discussing these subjects here. What might be desirable is a very brief excursion into the limitations inherent in the study of a field that is actually almost entirely closed to critical investigation.

We will take a comparatively simple case—the case of infant mortality.

Infant mortality rates, we are told (write Sidney and Beatrice Webb) by no less an authority than Sir Arthur Newsholme, "form a sensitive index of domestic sanitation, and of personal hygiene and care . . . In European Russia the infant mortality per 1,000 births in 1913 was 275; in 1927, 186; in 1930, 141 . . . which indicates a great improvement in personal hygiene since the Revolution (p. 656, and *Red Medicine*, 1933, pp. 202-3).

Sir Arthur is undoubtedly a great authority in his subject, but not in Russian, and even less so in Soviet statistics. "No statistics concerning the age distribution of mortality in the years preceding the war are available," writes Stanislas Kohn, formerly Assistant Director of the Russian Agricultural Census (*The Cost of the War*, New Haven, 1932, p. 105). This, however, is not an obstacle to giving figures, and Soviet statisticians are versed in the sample method. The Soviet *Statistical Spravochnik* for 1928 (Table 20) has 191 for 1927, where Sir Arthur Newsholme has 185, and for the pre-war years 1909-10 265, as against 275 for 1913. The general reader is in a difficult position when one authority has been bamboozled, and happens to re-bamboozle another one that inspires in its turn blind confidence. If the infant mortality statistics for the two capitals had been compared, the desired impression would have been obtained. Comparable figures are available both for St. Petersburg and Moscow. If our calculation and the available figures are correct, the infant death-rate compares as follows: St. Petersburg, in 1913, 230 per thousand births, in 1927, 170; Moscow, in 1910-14, 269 as against 130 in 1927. Both capitals are behind the independent peasant republics, formerly Russian; Finland (75), Estonia (100), Latvia (90), and, nearer to, Lithuania (154), and Poland (149). In their interesting paragraph on "self-employment" the authors exhibit distrust of peasant independence, although

they might have appreciated the way in which the large landowners and landlords were ousted west of the U.S.S.R., and wars were fought and Communist and other conspiracies handled, without going down to the Communist diet.

Sidney and Beatrice Webb are aware, as they declare in the foreword, of their bias. Are they aware—as I am—of the very thin ice on which they have decided to walk and to move about so freely? It is owing to this peculiar difficulty of the subject-matter, not to be overcome by the most industrious reading, that their latest work does not fit in with their life's work. True they regarded it more as an amusement, with nothing to gain or to lose (Preface). It is not easy to decide whether the philosophy underlying their finding is really quite the same as has inspired their previous achievements. Soviet Communism is judged according to the science as they see it, the science of to-day. It is, by the very nature of being regarded as the truth, endowed with omnipotence and infallibility, and consequently with the right to interfere regardless of any other limit save the one accepted by itself. The Government that acts in the name of that science can act more despotically than any other. This paramountcy of the "science," as understood to-day in Moscow and largely accepted by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, has not always been part of their socialist creed. Its present intensity may be an intelligible reaction against the paramountcy elsewhere of racial romanticism and other instincts. And yet, in one respect they seem in complete agreement with the view expressed once and for ever by Isocrates in a letter to Philip of Macedon: Barbarians can be compelled, Hellenes must be persuaded—which is also the view of Mussolini. It seems equally valid for framing the policy in internal difficulties. In their Preface the authors express the fear that their presumption will be ascribed to the recklessness of old age. I am afraid: "Too polite to contradict you," will be the obvious answer.

A. MEYENDORFF.

THE CONSTITUTION *VERSUS* THE NEW DEAL.

FEW decisions of the American Supreme Court have been more eagerly awaited than that in the *Hoosac Mills* case which was handed down in Washington on Monday, January 6th. The Court then decided, by a majority of six to three, that the processing tax on cotton was unconstitutional. This tax is one of several levied on the first processors, or dealers, in certain primary commodities, of which grain, cotton, tobacco and hogs are amongst the most important. The tax, which has been invariably passed on to the ultimate consumer, has gone to provide a fund out of which the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, one of the most important New Deal agencies, has paid bounties to farmers who have entered into contracts with the Administration to restrict production. The purpose of the tax, which is intended to equal the difference between the price of farm products in relation to factory ones to-day as compared with the average of the immediate pre-war years, is to give the farmer approximately the same relative purchasing power as he enjoyed in the years 1908-13. This purpose could not be achieved merely by taxing consumers and subsidising farmers. For in that event farmers might push down prices by increased production as fast as the Administration pushed them up by tax and subsidy. The subsidy was therefore payable only to farmers who entered into a programme of crop restriction.

The conservative majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts which had previously considered the case, and with the plaintiffs, in holding the tax illegal on the grounds that by it the Federal Government attempted to secure indirectly an object, the regulation of agriculture, which by the Constitution, and especially by the tenth amendment to it, is reserved to the forty-eight States. The liberal minority of the Court disagreed, holding: firstly, that the restriction of production, and consequent regulation of agriculture, though subsidised, was voluntary, and not imposed by the Federal Government; secondly, that such restriction was "for the general welfare," and therefore expressly within the constitutional competence of the Federal Government; and finally, that it was not the duty of the Supreme Court to inquire into the purpose with which the

Federal Government was exercising a power, such as that to raise taxes and make appropriations, which was expressly granted to it by the Constitution. Sympathetic though many people, and even lawyers of distinction, have been to the minority opinion, voiced by Justice Stone (who is incidentally a Republican), as against the majority one voiced by Justice Roberts (a Hoover nominee), the latter of course prevails. It deprives the Federal Government of the funds with which to maintain its agricultural policy.

The Roosevelt administration has therefore immediately terminated all contracts with farmers calling for subsidised restriction of production. It has asked Congress to provide from other sources funds in place of the now defunct processing tax out of which to pay to farmers sums owing on account of previous contracts up to the date of the decision. It had at one time seemed likely that it would attempt to defend its Agricultural Adjustment policy in one of the three ways apparently open to it, by the passing through the State legislatures of forty-eight little A.A.A.s, by providing funds for A.A.A. by some alternative method to that of the processing tax, or by amending the Constitution. It has now, it seems, given up such ideas, as being either legally or politically impossible or inexpedient. It has decided to ask Congress to provide authority and funds for a policy of restricting production and subsidising agriculture indirectly by buying or leasing sub-marginal lands (i.e. lands which are hardly worth cultivating, or should properly be used for afforestation or other similar purpose), and taking them out of cultivation. It hopes that this purpose will appeal even to conservatives on the Supreme Court as proper for the Federal Government, the excessive cultivation of sub-marginal lands having been largely responsible for the dust storms, the droughts, and the floods, from which the United States has been suffering in recent years. Since there will be no question either of regulations to impose or subsidies to induce agricultural readjustments, but merely the purchase or leasing by the Federal Government of lands needed for a soil conservation programme, such a policy should avoid the constitutional errors for which A.A.A. has been condemned. Since the money thus expended by the Federal Government, and the additional expenses of the soil conservation programme itself, will go chiefly to farmers particularly hard hit by the depression, this

new policy may achieve, by different methods, part at least of the objects of A.A.A.

There will, of course, be some danger under this new policy, if and when it be carried into effect, and much danger in the interim, with A.A.A. in a state of collapse and no substitute functioning, of such a spurt in production as may drive down agricultural prices towards the disastrous pre-A.A.A. level. In any case, all farmers who have joined in the A.A.A. scheme will lose the amount of the benefit payable during the present year, had the scheme been continued, since no new scheme can come quickly into effect. And many of them will lose such benefit in future years, because only a portion of them will profit from the purchase or leasing of sub-marginal lands, or from Federal expenditures upon them. It is hoped, however, that there will be no dangerous spurt in agricultural production, or decline in prices, in the near future, while in the longer future the taking of sub-marginal lands out of cultivation may tend to keep down production and keep up prices. Moreover, it is thought that the farmers who would have gained under A.A.A. and will not gain under the new scheme will be on the whole those least in need of help.

The calm with which the administration have accepted this A.A.A. decision, and the dignity with which they are setting about the difficult task of filling the vacant place in their programme and in the national life, contrast significantly with their attitude last year after the N.R.A. decision. Then, in spite of the fact that it was widely admitted that N.R.A. was unpopular, and in many respects unsuccessful, and almost universally admitted that it was unconstitutional, the Roosevelt administration expressed open annoyance at the decision, and talked about demanding a constitutional amendment. Now, when a widely popular and largely successful experiment, which many thought, and think, to be in fact constitutional, has been condemned, the administration shows little irritation, and no thought of constitutional amendment.

The explanation is, perhaps, threefold. Mr. Roosevelt discovered last year that openly expressed irritation with a Supreme Court decision was unpopular and impolitic, having the same effect on the public as criticism by a player of the umpire's decision. He has been advised, moreover, that it would be difficult to get a constitutional amendment, and poor tactics from an electoral point of view to demand one

now, and thus make the matter a campaign issue. Secondly, he and the country were surprised to find how little disturbance followed the collapse of N.R.A. Not merely the tide of recovery, but even to some extent the reforms, such as the prohibition of child labour, which had been sought through N.R.A., continued in spite of its legal destruction. While the collapse of A.A.A. may be expected to have graver consequences, no one, with the N.R.A. example in mind, expects catastrophic ones. Thirdly, the election campaign has really begun, and Mr. Roosevelt and his New Deal are therefore remitted to the verdict of the electorate. It seems in consequence absurd to waste time blocking gaps in a policy which may within the year be wholly swept aside.

This vastly important issue, which would a year ago have dominated the political scene for months, has therefore been relatively neglected. Other matters, foreign, such as King George's passing (by which Americans have been deeply stirred), and the Abyssinian war, and domestic, such as Mr. Roosevelt's broadcast address to Congress, or the passage over his veto of the Veterans' Bonus Act, have successfully competed with it for front-page publicity. It seems to be assumed that the New Deal as a whole has concluded its first stage, and will not enter its second, if it ever does, until after the elections. Decisions such as the present one, which would have destroyed it, checked recovery, and thrown the country into confusion a little while ago, when the New Deal was the main interest and chief hope of most Americans, seem almost academic now, when the country is entering upon its quadrennial party battle for the Presidency. Recovery, incomplete and artificial and therefore perhaps temporary as it may be, is continuing, and does not seem as yet to have been more affected by this A.A.A. decision than it was affected last year by the N.R.A. one. There has, therefore, been no compelling reason, and only such would suffice, to force President, Congress or public to turn from electoral manoeuvres to facing the implications and ultimate consequences of this third and most significant legal breach in the New Deal.

Actually these implications and consequences may prove to be far-reaching. The majority of the justices seem determined to restrict the Federal Government to the spheres of activity expressly provided for it in the Constitution. They will not allow the elastic taxing power to be used to secure

objects, such as the regulation of agriculture, which are strictly of state concern, any more than they would, in the N.R.A. case, allow the inter-state commerce, or emergency, sections of the Constitution, to be used to secure the regulation of industry. If they act upon the same principles in other cases, and many are likely to come up to them this session and next, there is very little of the New Deal which can survive. The Social Security Act, the Guffey Coal Act, even the Tennessee Valley Authority Act,* perhaps even the Federal relief work, at least in its present form, may be declared unconstitutional.

The majority decision records the fear of the judiciary, which is shared by large sections of American opinion, lest a broad construction of the Constitution, especially so far as the taxing clause is concerned, may make the United States in practice a unitary and not a federal state. Indeed, it is impossible to compare New Deal America with the America even of five years ago, without being struck by the enormous diminution in the authority and independence (in practice rather than in law) of the several States, and consequent increase in the authority, and range of activities, of the Federal Government. To-day the enormous financial resources of the Federal Government, and the extreme dependency upon them of almost every other agency, have in practice destroyed, at least temporarily, the old balance of the American constitutional system. Many people, including the minority members of the Supreme Court, think that this alteration of balance within the Constitution is inevitable if the major problems of the United States, in this age of economic interdependence, are to be faced. To them it is intolerable, and in consequence, as threatening the very existence of the United States, bad law, to interpret the Constitution so strictly as to refuse the Federal Government the power of economic planning without which it could not begin to cope with an emergency like that existing in 1932, and to some extent continuing to-day. For if the Federal Government is not allowed to regulate agriculture and industry, which now ignore the artificial state boundaries, no one can do so.

* The Court has after all spared this agency, though in terms which suggest that it might be critical of the more ambitious and contentious aspects of the experiment if they should be directly challenged, as they were not in the present case.

The majority justices reply that if this be so the Constitution should be amended, not broken. A growing body of American opinion is coming round to the same point of view. There is, however, still a vast section of opinion which venerates the Constitution without fully understanding it and is on principle prejudiced against its fundamental amendment. In addition, various sectional and often selfish groups, which recognise the urgency of amendment as a matter of theory, are opposed to it in practice because they themselves can shelter comfortably behind the present somewhat archaic document in a way that they perhaps could not shelter behind a Constitution fully adapted to twentieth-century needs. In any case, a small minority of the population can, by the manipulation of the legislative machinery of thirteen States, indefinitely block even amendments ardently desired by the majority of the population and of the States.

It will therefore take time to secure what surely will be secured before very long, a modernisation of the American system of government through far-reaching amendments of the Constitution. The fight over this issue, which may prove to be the cardinal one in American politics in the coming decades taken as a whole, will be bitter, and may destroy the existing party lines and machines. It is therefore one which American candidates and party organisers are wary of approaching, especially in an election year. For it is a tradition of American party politics not, if it can be helped, to fight Presidential elections on major national issues. This matter, so significant to the foreign observer, will therefore probably be relatively neglected in the United States itself this year. It is, however, for all that more deserving of the close attention of the foreign observer, interested in fundamental rather than surface currents in American affairs, than the Veterans' Bonus, or the Townshend Old Age Pensions, or even the Presidential primaries, conventions and contest, which are driving and will increasingly drive it off the front pages of American newspapers. For, while it probably will not hurt or even seriously affect Mr. Roosevelt's chances of re-election (which I believe, through the division and uncertainty of his opponents, to be still good), it will gravely affect throughout the years the problems with which America's Presidents will have to grapple once elected.

FRANK DARVALL.

PRESIDENT BENES.

EDWARD BENES, the newly elected President of the Czechoslovakian Republic, is a son of the soil and has never denied or forgotten it. Born in a lowly hut, tenth child of the small crofter Matthias Benes at Kozlany near Kralovice in Western Bohemia, the days of his childhood were marked by great privations, which were destined to leave an indelible stamp upon the man. He was an unusually intelligent lad and his eldest brother, Vojta Benes, who thanks to bursaries had become a school-teacher in Prague, took charge of his education and obtained for him a free place in a good middle school, to wit the Weinberger Gymnasium. Those were days when Authority frowned upon sport, and the pupils at respectable schools in Austria-Hungary were forbidden to join any sports clubs. Young Edward declined to obey the inhibition and in 1898, at the age of fourteen, he joined the Slavia Football Club. He was a puny youth but very alert and tough. Soon he was playing left wing for the Slavia's B team. Three years later, during a very redoubtable match, young Benes broke his leg. It was a trifle in its way, since the leg was set and nothing more serious than a permanent stiffness resulted, but it nevertheless became a matter of historical importance. In 1921, President Masaryk said publicly: "Without Benes, we could not have had the Czechoslovak Republic." And Benes would not have been available for the difficult and dangerous foundational spadework of that Republic had it not been for the fact that the stiffness of his leg, consequent upon that small football mishap, precluded him from being passed as fit for military service upon the outbreak of war. But I am anticipating. From school he went to Prague University.

One day as he passed down a corridor, he observed that one of the professors was unconsciously dropping certain sheets of paper. He picked them up and ran after their owner, who thanked him warmly. That professor was Thomas G. Masaryk, and that chance meeting was the beginning of an association between these two men out of which a new European State was to arise; an association which reached a wonderful culmination recently when Edward Benes by an overwhelming majority was elected to pursue as Chief of State the work which his old friend and teacher was no

longer able to perform. Masaryk, who occupied the chair of sociology, became Benes's teacher after that accidental encounter in the corridor. It was indeed on his advice that on leaving the class-room young Benes went to Paris, where at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques, the nursery of so many distinguished statesmen, he was nurtured in the spirit of 1789 and initiated into the principles of parliamentary democracy. There, too, he acquired that perfect command of the French language that in later years was to stand him in such good stead at Geneva.

"That Czech delegate," said Aristide Briand one day in the smoking-room of the Hotel des Bergues, "is the only foreigner in the League who has mastered the use of the subjunctive in French. To do that, a man must understand French mentality to the core. We can repose every confidence in Benes!" Apart from his mother tongue, Czech, and French, President Benes also speaks well and fluently: English, German, Russian, Italian and Slovak, and has a nodding and even working acquaintance with Hungarian and Serbian. From Paris he went to Dijon, where in 1906 he graduated as a Doctor of Law. Thereafter he spent four educational months in London and half a year in Berlin. Two years later he took the Ph.D. degree at Prague, and in the following year became Professor of Political Economy at the Prague Commercial Academy. About this time he entered the field of letters. His first attempt was a Czech translation of Zola's *L'Assommoir*. This was succeeded by a treatise on *The Nature of Political Parties* and a whole series of political and economic essays.

When the war broke out in 1914 it found Benes magnificently equipped, mentally and spiritually, for the immense struggle for his country's freedom. From the first day in that historic August he mapped out his course clearly and unerringly. He was convinced that the Czechs and Slovaks must not wait for time and the fortunes of war to bring them their liberation; they must act; they must themselves declare war on the Great Power of which they were part and to which they were shackled. With Masaryk he organised the so-called "Maffia"—a little group of journalists and politicians who met secretly in the apartment of Dr. Bouček, a Prague barrister. When Masaryk left for England, Benes remained as his deputy and led the "Maffia." With all the

arts of the conspirator he established a network of secret patriotic agents throughout the whole of Czechoslovakia; he unscrupulously sowed the seeds of disaffection against the monarchy in the Czech regiments; he urged and spurred the Czech population to dissatisfaction and passive resistance.

Thanks to a Czech official of the Austrian police, Dr. Olič, he succeeded in obtaining an Austro-Hungarian passport, and, having laid the basis of a revolutionary organisation, he left for Switzerland to confer with Masaryk. Thereupon they decided to divide their task and to split the Western world between them. Masaryk decided to undertake the task of educating British opinion in London, Benes French opinion in Paris. Fortunately they had some financial resources. The nucleus of the campaign fund was contributed by a wealthy aunt of Benes's wife, Hanna Vlčkova, a former fellow-student of his in Paris. Edward Benes's brother Vojta abandoned his post as a school-teacher and proceeded to America to raise more money there. But for all that the task seemed hopeless. No one in France knew much about the Czechs or the Slovaks, and no one seemed to care about them at all. Benes was unknown in Paris and as an Austro-Hungarian subject he was suspect. But he grappled with his task with undaunted courage. Through Professor Ernest Denis he made the acquaintance of a young minor official of the Quai d'Orsay, Albert Kammerer, who is to-day French Ambassador in Ankara. Kammerer brought Benes into touch with Philippe Berthelot, the strong man of the French Foreign Office and ultimately with the wily Briand, with the eternal cigarette hanging from his pendulous lip, who from the first moment appeared to be impressed with the young Czech's ability.

A trip to London at Christmas in 1915 to consult Masaryk led to Benes's arrest. Sir Basil Thomson, then sleuth-hound in chief in the fastness of Scotland Yard, seemed never to have heard of the Czechs. To him Benes was obviously and definitely an Austrian spy. He thereupon caused him in an excess of zeal to be imprisoned in Brixton gaol while awaiting trial for espionage at the Tower of London. Fortunately Benes's French friends came to his rescue. After a fortnight of earnest representations, Briand at length succeeded in conveying to the obtuse London authorities some idea that the Czechs were friends and not foes. Benes was released and went

back to Paris, where the Czechoslovak National Council had just been formed. He became its secretary. That Council was destined in time to become the first provisional government of Czechoslovakia. Intensive and unflagging work followed. Benes had to activate Czechoslovak refugees and emigrants all over the world, and to convince them that now was their chance to strike a blow for the freedom of their motherland. He had to arouse the interest of the Allied journalists and publicists as well as politicians in a people of whom they were mostly ignorant. He had to collect Czechoslovak volunteers, deserters and prisoners of war and out of them, battalion after battalion, brigade after brigade, to fashion a Czechoslovak army even before a Czechoslovak state existed at all.

His pamphlet, *Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie*, attracted world-wide attention. It was the first blow of the axe at the secular oak of the Hapsburg monarchy. Although almost distracted by difficulties of all kinds, alarmed by the news of his beloved wife's arrest in Austria, and unable to snatch more than three to four hours' sleep, he toiled on indefatigably and smilingly. His was the Homeric task, but he never for a second lost faith in victory. On October 24th, 1918, a few days before the collapse of the Central Powers, the Allied Governments recognised *de facto* the Republic of Czechoslovakia. Benes headed the delegation of his country at the Peace Conference. His work as a revolutionary leader was ended; his career as a statesman was to begin.

Statesmanship is a compound of imagination, courage and common sense. Benes possesses all three in a supreme degree. To describe his work as a statesman during the sixteen years he served uninterruptedly as Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia would be to write the history of Europe during that space of time. But the leading conceptions of his policy may be recalled. He had done more than most men to bring about the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But he knew that Austria-Hungary, economically and politically, represented an essential factor in the European balance of power. That factor must not be allowed to disappear. Europe cannot live with a vacuum at her centre. That elementary thought was at the root of his conception of the Little Entente. In 1920 he negotiated and signed a treaty of alliance with Yugoslavia and Roumania. In 1933 that treaty was replaced by an "organic statute" which turned the triple alliance into a

perpetual bond. Earlier than most men, Benes saw that out of the chaos of post-war Europe two gigantic constellations were evolving, the liberty-loving and democratic states of the West on the one side, and the group of Fascist states on the other. At the very outset he ranged his country with the former. Paris and London had helped him to create the new state of Czechoslovakia; to Paris and London he must turn and depend for future support. He laid down this policy irrevocably when, in 1924, he signed a treaty of alliance with France. He felt that the basis of the new grouping of states must be extended, and he saw the possibility of such an extension in two directions. The Balkans, long a source of potential trouble, must be brought within the orbit of political sanity. With his friend Titulesco he worked at the establishment of the Balkan Union until it became the complement of the Little Entente. Soviet Russia, he recognised, was rapidly becoming a power of the first magnitude, huge not only by reason of the vast numbers of its population, by the startling development of its industrial productivity, by the rapid growth of its military strength, but also great because, rightly or wrongly, it had become a sort of spiritual beacon to millions throughout the world. Benes, an unorthodox kind of socialist with no Marxian convictions, found himself devoid of any affinity with the rash and desperate communistic experiment. But he realised that Russia held the balance of European power in her hands and that, unless she could be roped into the democratic group and made to co-operate with it, there was grave danger that she might actively contribute towards its destruction. He convinced Barthou of the soundness of this view. The result was the Russo-Czechoslovak alliance, the entry of Soviet Russia into the League of Nations, and the Franco-Russian Convention.

Benes was little over thirty when he pushed his way into the limelight on the European stage. In a comparatively few years he has become one of its predominant and most notable actors. Geneva, where he attained the highest honours, where he fought brilliantly for disarmament and international understanding, where again and again he presided over the Council of the General Assembly, will know him no more. No more will his spare, trim figure, leather dispatch case under the arm, hustle through the lobbies. But his work and memory cannot be effaced; and whoever may be nominally

in charge of Czechoslovak affairs, it will be the Benes policy which will be pursued.

Only by a brief survey of the man's career can an impression of the man himself be given. For the career, in this case, is the man. But there is one trait that has always struck everyone who has had the privilege of coming into personal contact with him: it is his profoundly sincere democratic spirit. Born of the people, he has remained a man of the people, and no man in the purple was ever prouder of his lineage.

"My position," he said recently to an intimate friend, "has brought me into contact with the highest social spheres; palaces of kings, castles of noblemen have received me—the son of the poorest peasant—with open arms. But searching my conscience I can say that the favours and graciousness of the great have not altered my nature one whit. I could go back tomorrow to the lowly hut in which I was born and not feel in any way estranged or in the least out of place. I love the people of whom I am one. I am, as the English say, at one with my race and akin with my kind."

A humbly proud confession, but in spite of all a true one and a deeply sincere one. Benes has remained throughout his meteoric career almost pathetically and yet adorably simple-hearted. It is that primordial and fundamental simplicity of heart that has enabled him to avoid the pitfalls of political life, and to arrive at that genius for straightforward compromise which achieves its peaceful aim without the sacrifice of a shred of principle.

Amid the tempestuous parliamentary seas and the alarming diplomatic storms he has stood unmoved, strong as a rock. And it is significant of the moral strength of the man that during the whole of his career while he sat under that Grand Old Man, Thomas Masaryk, surnamed "The Wise Man of Prague," his intellectual qualities and his capacity for initiative were never obscured by the scintillating virtues of his great friend and teacher. Neither did Benes, as might and probably would have happened to a weaker and less resolute man, become a pale copy of his mentor and exemplar. These two men, animated by the same principles, dominated by the same burning convictions, consumed with a patriotic zeal and fervour tempered with a prudent sagacity, worked together in a harmony of which there are few, if any, similar instances in history.

True to the precepts of his life, Masaryk laid down the reins of office that he felt his hands could no longer hold. But he did so with dignity and wisdom, for he bade his friend and pupil take them up again. The work of Benes is not finished. Fate, that heedless arbiter of men's lives, has merely turned another page; and a new chapter in the story of a nation—and perhaps Europe—is opening. Whatever it may have in store for Benes himself, or for the young Republic he helped to create, or for the Europe that he has served with almost uncanny understanding, one thing at least is sure; this chapter also will be inspired by an unquenchable democratic faith. There will be no swerving aside from that narrow and nowadays thorny path. It is because the Czechoslovak people realise this that the news of his election as President of the Republic by the National Assembly evoked such unusual demonstrations of popular enthusiasm. In the streets of Prague, of Brünn, of Bratislava, huge crowds gathered to acclaim him. They sang with amazing impartiality the Czechoslovak National Hymn, the "Marseillaise," and the "Internationale." They shouted "Long live Benes!" "Down with Fascism!" "Up with the People!" In these crowds were all sorts and manner of men and women: Czechs and Slovaks, Sudetes and Hungarians, Ruthenes and Poles, rich and poor, bourgeois and workers, clericals and socialists, Christian democrats and communists. There could be no more pungent characterisation of the man Benes than this catholic and spontaneous tribute of popular and universal goodwill to one who is felt, even by his party opponents, to be truly the champion of his people.

W. WALTER CROTCH.

THE END OF THE LIBERAL EPOCH?

"When, therefore, you hear men ask if that which is called the future belongs to liberty, you must answer that liberty has still better, the eternal."—BENEDETTO CROCE.

A CIVILISATION is intolerable in which there is nothing to die for. It may be more important to live for an ideal, but the test is readiness to submit to the discipline, not only of living, but of dying for it. Much of the attraction of revolutionary Communism depends upon its recognition of this fact. It is, also, because of a recognition of it that the cult of war dies hard.

By a strange inversion, not pursuit of the ideal is made a test of the morality of force, but display of force is made the test of the value of the ideal. "A good war hallows any cause." Upstarts such as Mussolini and Hitler find expression for themselves in being their nation's bullies and trying to be the world's bullies. Huey Long was another of the type. This respect for force is characteristic of an age of liberal decadence when, mazed by philosophic doubt, men require a certain ostler brutality to save themselves from their misery of modest indecision. This mood is illustrated in the recent biography of Lord Knebworth, with its picture of a sensitive, if unanchored, mind bored by democratic hesitations and by liberties that are vulgarly made an excuse for low standards. He died, significantly enough, setting a standard of precise obedience to orders. The same mood gives vigour to the disillusionment, made savage, of Mr. Malcolm Muggeridge. It prepares the way for the Fascist temper, which is steadily gaining ground here as in that other homeland of liberal democracy, France.

What we are confronted with is the temper of Georges Sorel, who wrote *An Apology for Lenin*, and yet taught the young Mussolini the A B C of Fascism—the temper of Bernard Shaw, whose name is a household word in Russia and who yet is one of two authors (the other being Shakespeare) whose writings are not subject to embargo now in Italy. It is the temper of the *Reflections on Violence*, of which Sorel was the author. What answer can the liberal spirit give? Merely to echo the words Reason, Liberty, Progress, Democracy, is not enough.

Liberalism means two things. Let us sharply distinguish
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them. It means the Liberal Party. And it means a liberal philosophy. It is perhaps premature to say that the Liberal Party is dead. The answer depends upon the attitude of the country to a group, as distinct from a two-party, system. A party, however, which is unable to find a safe seat for its leader, such as is the present situation of the Liberal Party and Sir Herbert Samuel, may be resurrected a more glorious body, but that new body must be so different as not to be recognisably the same as the old. It is to the advantage of Liberalism itself to admit that an epoch in English history, an epoch marked by not inglorious passages in two hundred and fifty years of history, has definitely closed. Moreover, since England has here led Europe and America, a page has been turned over in the history of Western civilisation itself. The age of Shaftesbury, Fox and Gladstone is over, nor will the old ideas of Whig and Radical return to dominance in their original garb. What then next? It does not follow that the liberal philosophy is dead without progeny. It was a philosophy that enshrined many values immortal in any human civilisation.

The author of that philosophy was John Locke. In his belief in the power of reason he showed himself a father of the Enlightenment. His doctrine of natural rights has not yet been exhausted by those who talk of social justice and rightly allege that every human individual has indefeasible claims against any actual society, in the name of a moral ideal itself constructed in accordance with the psychological bases of man's nature. These claims, however, of John Locke and the Whigs for reason were not made to buttress any rounded and dogmatic construction of logic. There were, they held, neither innate ideas nor damnation inherited from Adam; but a free human nature, moulded by environment and instructed by experiment. In consonance with a deep-grained English tradition that traces back, before Locke, to Francis Bacon and even to Roger Bacon, Locke was an empiricist in his philosophy, a challenger of infallible pretensions and pretentious infallibilities. His entire doctrine of toleration, in so far as it is more than mere prejudice, rests upon this challenge.

At the present moment this tolerant philosophy of empiricism, which postulates an "open" world unclosed by final and dogmatic knowledge—this philosophy which has

the temper most congenial to scientific research and advance—must take the field against the dogmatic State-worship of the Fascists, idolaters of Leviathan, such as would have put Hobbes to shame. It must also take the field against an intolerant Marxism, founded upon Hegel's dogmatic idealism, with its grandiose dialectic of history, elaborated with Germanic rigidity against the background of a French training in violence. A philosophy, even of tolerance, is not merely a speculation. It is a statement about truth for which those who believe in it must be prepared to fight. The old fight of Puritan and Protestant—and of Catholic, also—against Cæsar-worship, is still incumbent upon us. The present generation demands a creed of sacrifice and discipline: for good or ill it abhors humanitarianism and sugar. The war-mood lasts, with its hard-learned sternness, sufficiently for this. A certain muscularity in reason is a possible matter for admiration. By "muscular reason," I mean that the régime of toleration of opinion will be defended, if necessary, by force. A progressive party is not called upon to be a pacifist party. It should not be a pacifist party. It should take the offensive with vigorous leadership.

What must be the policy of a movement that proposes to make alive whatever is of value in that attitude to life that once vitalised Liberalism; and how can that attitude be restated in the terms of the present age? A passage of Renan's enables us to give an answer to that question: "Liberty is definitely a creation of modern times. It follows from a conception which the ancient world did not have, of the State as protecting the most diverse kinds of human activity and remaining neutral in affairs of conscience, of taste and of sentiment." The precise opposite attitude to this will be found in the statement of Dr. Goebbels: "The principle of authoritative leadership will define the range within which the artist is to move. . . . As we, the National Socialists, are convinced that we are right, we cannot tolerate any other in our neighbourhood who also claims to be right" (*Times*, June 5th, 1934).

Belief in liberty does not exclude a passionate belief in discipline for those "comrades" who would forward the glory of humanity and raise higher the standards of human achievement. Political churches, if of the spirit, and political

Covenanters have their place. Liberty, no more than adventure, is a negation of discipline : each corrects the other in a balanced life. Each corresponds to a deep impulse of the spirit. But a belief in liberty is inconsistent with deference to the coercive powers of the State as good in themselves, and to all respect for the mass regulation of life, in its best gifts, by propaganda and force. That is idolatry—the conscious worship of inferior gods, man-made puppets, invented in party offices and not begotten of the ideal that is pursued in solitude and integrity of soul.

Sir Stafford Cripps has stated that freedom is a means. On the contrary, it is an end, a final value in life. Kant was right that far. In different mouths freedom has meant different things. For Pavlov and Adler the demand for it is a physical reflex or a psychological instinct. In the seventeenth century it meant freedom from arbitrary arrest ; in the nineteenth it meant equality before the ballot box ; in the twentieth century it means such economic equality as may make that electoral power real. But, above all, belief in freedom is a belief in the adventure of the creative spirit and a perception of the sacrilege of trammelling adventure—whether experiments of practice or adventure of the spirit—where the patent needs of society can suffer it to remain untrammelled. It is a belief in opportunity for the common man.

In the first *Fabian Essays* of 1889, Lord Olivier wrote : “ Socialism appears as the offspring of Individualism, as the outcome of Individualist struggle, and as the necessary condition for the approach to the Individualist ideal. The opposition commonly assumed in contrasting the two is an accident of the now habitual confusion between personality and personalty, between a man’s life and the abundance of things that he has. Socialism is merely Individualism rationalised, organised, clothed, and in its right mind.” Socialism believes in reward for effort ; in reward, not in accordance with the hazards of social position or the a-moral rules of success in profit-making, but in accordance with socially serviceable skill, and with the sacrifice and abstinence undergone to acquire it by the worker.

A policy of liberty is a policy of peace because it stands opposed to irrational force and all thuggery. “ Adventure ” does not spell Al Capone in an advancing world—it does not mean Al Capone as Duce in the comity of nations. But it is

a policy of peace in the sense in which we would speak of the domestic experiment of law as a policy of peace. It is a policy of peace by the mailed fist of international law, although perhaps of a revised international law that includes a wider concept of equity. Justice bears a sword and does not grovel before military gangsterdom. It is not any creditable charge that the spirit that roused itself against the slave trade, against the Armenian massacres, against Chinese indenture-slavery, is lost in confusion over the partition of Abyssinia. There is an alternative to M. Laval’s tepid co-operation ; it is Herr Hitler on the Brenner Pass—with sanctions if he crosses a frontier where the population does not welcome him. I do not presume that Englishmen will die to protect Austria from its manifest destiny ; but they might well do worse than die answering the challenge of Rome to our courage as a commonwealth. The only argument against dying for something noble is that one can live for something better, not something baser. The final argument for peace is that brains are needed to concert sacrifices for the advancement of knowledge, of science, of medicine, of the control of the human civilisation—not to increase profits in a world of slovenly corruption and of moral decay. Peace, however, to be established, also has its violent sacrifices and its costs that in duty must be paid.

Liberty, to be implemented in our own age, peculiarly implies measures for the increase of economic equality. The child who is physically stunted by under-nutrition and bad housing conditions ; the intelligent boys or girls who cannot avail themselves of schooling opportunities because the family cannot afford the necessary supplementary expenses ; the employee who lives in fear of being sacked from his job because of depressions and crises, due to mismanagement or conservatism in a business in which he has no say or lot ; the unemployed man who loses his *moral* in compulsory idleness—all are sufferers from a system where economic power is still exercised irresponsibly. The case against the political autocracy of Kaisers is, nearer home, by the closest analogy a case against the economic autocracy of business magnates, who too often are not even efficient in the intelligent running of their own industries. The intelligence, moreover, of the speculator has not the same interests or objectives as the intelligence of the worker or the working manager and organiser.

Berle and Means, in their admirable book *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, show how strikingly capitalist competition has, in the key positions, given way to capitalist monopoly. The moral argument for capitalism of the nineteenth-century economists supposed the initiative of the small business man. In the decisive fields of industry to-day capitalist trustification by central financing companies has replaced that competition. The fundamental issue is not initiative *versus* socialisation, but trust planning *versus* public planning, and the initiative of speculators *versus* the initiative of working managers in charge of public utility companies publicly controlled. The most recent I.L.O. reports point out that Britain, in order to retain efficiency, must increase production. Whatever else may be said of the Russian system, it is a most amazing speeding-up device, as even Sir Charles Trevelyan's little pamphlet shows. There will be neither Stakhanov policy, speeding up, increased efficiency nor increased production in Britain under the present system of speculative profit.

The enemy of Socialism is not capital—obviously even a communist society requires capital—but private capitalists in key positions, i.e. speculative capitalists usurping the sovereignty of the community speaking through Parliament. The enemy of Socialism is not private property. Socialism will immensely increase the holding of private property—private property in consumable goods. Its objection is to that particular private property, the private legal title to ownership of the means of key production, which is a control of *power* grossly contrary to the interests of *any* democratic society. Initiative and adventure must not only be exercised within society, but for it. That leaves scope enough for both. Common wealth must override considerations of private wealth.

Sir Stafford Cripps—for whom I have a high personal respect—has used, with approval, the phrase: "Every Man a King." It was the slogan of the Fascist, Huey Long. (For myself I am prepared to purloin also the other slogan: "Share the Wealth.") There cannot be, indeed, equality in adventure. The phrase yet expresses two truths. Every man is entitled—has a natural right, to use Locke's phrase—to be treated as an end in himself, to whom the conditions are due (if he chooses to avail himself of them) which render possible

a certain minimum of decent living and dignity; and every man is entitled to opportunity for venture if he has the gift to avail himself of that opportunity, and to the opportunity of an education fit to develop his gifts. The campaign to assure in this land that minimum, by the provision of nursery schools; adequate health services; adequate insurance, including accident insurance; and security in some kind of employment, not a dole, for those who will do work, is a campaign for social justice, for healthy bodies and healthy minds and for fair play for our fellow citizens, such as can give stability to many "Antony Knebworths" who are endeavouring to find worthwhileness in too pleasurable lives through discipline, sacrifice and work, and such as can give meaning to the lives of many others, less fortunate but certainly not less valuable.

Here, then, are the outlines for a new progressivism. It will not be difficult for the reader to see that I have, in fact, been outlining the programme of the Labour Party. That programme has, hitherto, sought its philosophy, not in the writings of Karl Marx, but in a tradition of thought English in origin and expressing itself in the socialism of Robert Owen, in the Co-operative Movement which he began, in Hodgskin and in the Trade Union Movement, rather than in the Germanising tendencies of Webb and Hyndman.

What is to be the attitude of those young men who have been brought up in Liberal homes, or in such predominantly Liberal institutions as the Free Churches, to this progressivism? At the present time they are being invited by Mr. Hore-Belisha to become Liberal-Unionists. He explained, at Manchester, that there are no points of principle upon which Liberals need differ from Tories. He added that the system of Tory-Liberal coalition, aided by the gentlemen of the Laboring segment whom Peter Howard malignly calls the Argentinos, is not intended, as was stated by the leaders in 1931 and again in 1935, merely to confront a crisis. This claim Mr. Belisha explains is quite fraudulent, as is the claim of the National Labourers to be Socialists. The object is to establish a party whom all but anti-nationalists (in the words used in Stanford's Election map) will support. In brief, the object is to establish in this country a one-party system repressive of Socialists, but whether or not of Socialism is controversial.

It is to be supposed that Sir Herbert Samuel (labelled on Stanford's map "anti-nationalist") will not be seduced by this argument. It is not relevant to argue here whether the country will tolerate the growth in this country of a "group-system" or three-party system. It is enough to point out that Mr. Hore-Belisha's one-party system is the end of parliamentary government as understood in this country, with its two-party suppositions. Against this I remain a constitutionalist. This country needs to be roused to a more adequate appreciation of the merits of its own institutions as bulwarks against reaction and dictatorship. I will not elaborate upon the bitter remark of Mr. Douglas Jerrold, that a certain politician "represented nothing but a debt of honour owed by the Conservative Central Office to Mr. Hore-Belisha for his services in splitting the Liberal Party in 1930." In fact Mr. Belisha is trying hard, for party advantage, to make the constitution itself an issue. That way lies the end of parliamentary democracy. First sapping the constitution himself and endeavouring, by pious hypocrisy about "none for a party and all for the State," to remove the party system upon which parliamentary democracy is based, Mr. Belisha endeavours to push the Opposition into taking up anti-constitutional ground. Mr. Baldwin, in his speech at Dundee, endeavoured more subtly to carry through the same manoeuvre—Mr. Baldwin, who has explained that this country will "tolerate no dictatorship of the Left," but did not add "nor of the Right either."

The Dundee speech is an attempt to saddle the philosophy of the expectation of violence upon the Labour Party. Mr. Baldwin referred to Professor Laski and Mr. Cole. Professor Laski, in his recent writings, has become increasingly an exponent of orthodox Marxism, but Mr. Cole (whatever may be thought of his *What Marx Really Meant*, in which he explains what Cole really means) has shown in his recent article in the *New Statesman* that he cannot be charged with responsibility as an oracle of this philosophy. No greater catastrophe could well be imagined for British Socialism than that any dogmatic philosophy, whether ascribed to Marx or attributed to Laski, should be accepted officially or in fact. Names, however, matter little. The direction of the attempt is clear and damaging. If the Leninist-Marxist tactic is valid here and now, then the British Labour Party had better shut

up shop. The proper place for its members is in the Communist Party. And, when one-third of Englishmen have become Communists, two-thirds will become Fascists. The "seventy years of Fascist dictatorship" will begin. If this last statement is preposterous, it is only so because one-third of the British people will not adopt—will not bother its head about—insurrectionary Marxism, let alone a majority of the electorate. Mr. Baldwin knows that. But, being a clever party tactician, he prefers to use against his opponents the weapon of suspicion.

If, however, younger men listen to Mr. Hore-Belisha's after-dinner pleading that they join the Tories, they can effectively contribute by their action to the growth of revolutionary Marxism and to a grave set-back to progressivism. Let them, therefore, consider well. It certainly will be a new day when those of Liberal traditions look to Toryism to lead the country on the road of progress and reform. This action will, however, have the further effect of leaving the Labour Party depleted; and hampered in resisting the advice of those who (like Mr. Baldwin) would scrap the two-party system but who, also, would substitute for it revolution. That is the final consequence of Mr. Baldwin's supremely dangerous tactic.

The epoch of *laissez-faire* is over. The part of courage is, with an unhesitating hand, firmly to turn over the page. The task of the young men is to aid in building for the future a strong party pledged to the causes of international order and radical change. It is the task of founding H.M. Opposition on this basis, so solidly laid that it may be expected to sustain the party when it becomes H.M. Government. Their task is to aid in carrying through concrete reforms, such as have been effected in other countries, including the Scandinavian (and we must not, for doctrinaire reasons, exclude Russia), where those reforms remain justifiable after dispassionate examination, by methods strictly analogous to those of 1832. This course alone seems calculated to restore an alignment in principle to British party politics, and the prospect of political power to the forces that historically have looked, and still look, to progress.

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN.

GREAT BRITAIN AND EGYPT.

FOR the seventh time since the Armistice an effort is being made to settle, by agreement, the questions outstanding between England and Egypt. In the light, however, of the history of previous negotiations and the events of the past year there is some doubt as to whether that object will be attained. A brief review of those negotiations and events may, perhaps, conduce to a better appreciation of the situation.

On the outbreak of hostilities with Turkey a Protectorate was proclaimed over Egypt, at that time vassal to the Sultan. After the Armistice leading Egyptians, alleging that the Protectorate had only been a war-measure, sought permission to go to London to discuss the future status of the country. This request was refused, and as a direct consequence there came into being a political organisation, the Wafd, which, adopting as its programme the complete independence of Egypt, has since dominated the situation.

In 1920 the Milner Mission advocated the recognition of Egypt as an independent sovereign state with certain safeguards, including the right to maintain a military force on Egyptian soil for the protection of Imperial communications, the appointment of British Financial and Judicial Advisers (the former to assume the powers of the Public Debt Commission), the transfer to the Mixed Courts of consular jurisdiction, and to Great Britain the rights exercised under the Capitulations by the Powers with a right of veto on legislation applicable to foreigners. Although Zaghlul Pasha, the leader of the Wafd, had virtually accepted these proposals, opposition in Cairo rendered agreement impossible. The next attempt was made in 1921 by a delegation led by the then Premier, Adly Yeghen Pasha. Again agreement fell through owing to intrigues in Egypt which, creating a troublous state of affairs, stiffened the British Government in its attitude.

Then on February 28th, 1922, the Protectorate was abolished and Egypt recognised as an independent sovereign state, subject to four reserved points, which remain in the absolute discretion of Great Britain pending an agreement in regard to them, viz. the safeguarding of imperial communications, the defence of Egypt against outside aggression, the protection of foreign interests and minorities, and the Sudan.

It has been towards a settlement of those four points that negotiations have ever since been directed. The third negotiations, conducted by Zaghlul Pasha as Premier in 1924, came to nothing because of his extravagant demands. In 1927 Abdel Khalek Sarwat Pasha, then Premier, reopened the question with the Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and appeared to have reached a satisfactory conclusion. But when he returned to Egypt his colleagues refused to accept the terms and the settlement fell through.

Two years later, when Mohamed Mahmud Pasha, the Liberal Premier, was in England on a private visit, the Labour Government seized the opportunity to discuss the possibility of a treaty. He was offered terms so favourable that he dared not refuse them, although he was not yet ready to deal with the new situation thus created. The offer was, however, subject to the ratification of the treaty by a freely elected Parliament. This Mohamed Mahmud Pasha could not ensure and so, although bearer of terms better than anyone had so far secured, he had to resign. Elections in due course gave the majority to the Wafd. Mustapha Nahas Pasha, who became leader of the Wafd on Zaghlul Pasha's death, insisted on discussing the treaty afresh in London. This sixth effort at settlement likewise failed—ostensibly over the Sudan clauses.

A comparison of the safeguards considered essential in the Milner Memorandum in 1920 with the White Papers covering subsequent negotiations reveal the distance we travelled during the intervening decade along the road to concession without securing any practical result. In the Sarwat draft Great Britain was to maintain upon Egyptian territory the armed forces necessary for the protection of Imperial communications. Ten years from the coming into force of the treaty the question where these forces should be stationed would be reconsidered. The British Government promised to use its influence with the Powers to obtain a modification of the Capitulations and to support Egypt's admission to the League.

Two years later the Mahmud proposals provided that responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners was to devolve upon the Egyptian Government, which would abolish the European Bureau dealing with public security in so far as it affected foreign interests, but undertook to

retain for at least five years a certain European element in the city police. A British mission was to replace the British personnel in the Egyptian Army. The British Government was authorised to maintain upon Egyptian territory in localities to the east of longitude 32 degrees the forces necessary to secure Imperial communications.

Finally, under the 1930 draft Egypt's right as an independent sovereign state to apply for membership of the League was recognised. Responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners devolved *exclusively* upon Egypt, who would abolish the European Bureau and dispense with one-fifth of the European police officers annually during the first five years, but would retain European commandants during that period. The clauses regarding the Capitulations and the Egyptian Army remained substantially the same. The British forces in Egypt were limited to 5,000 troops and 3,000 airmen, who would be stationed near Ismailia in a specified zone and at Port Fuad whither the R.A.F. depot at Abukir would be transferred. At the end of twenty years the League was to decide whether British forces were any longer necessary. Advisers were only to be retained for the remaining period of their contracts.

No one can justly sustain that in the interval Egypt had made such strides in defence and public security matters as to justify the radical concessions in the 1929 and 1930 proposals. The explanation of this amazing advance beyond the "utmost limit," which each preceding draft was declared by the then British Government to be, is that, always intent on showing that we wanted to give a square deal, we have never made allowance for oriental psychology. Each time the Egyptian negotiators, insisting that what had been offered previously was acquired, have "taken off" where their predecessors broke away. Each time we have assented and then have proceeded to make further concessions in the fond belief that this would persuade the other side to come to terms. But our eagerness only encouraged them to "ask for more" and we have gradually been led on until in 1930 our proposals exceeded what prudence, and our military experts, counselled. What complicates the present negotiations is that after the 1930 rupture the Foreign Secretary declared that the offer still stood available to Egypt. That is why the negotiators may find difficulty in accepting terms which will

inevitably fall short of those of six years ago. The events of the past few months tend to inspire a pessimistic view.

After the breakdown of the 1930 negotiations, the 1923 Constitution was abolished and replaced by one more in keeping with the needs of the country. Parliament became, however, a subservient body and what between the presence of a weak Premier and the illness of the King the administration gradually fell into the hands of palace officials. This was terminated in November 1934 by the intervention of the British Government. A new Cabinet was formed under Tewfik Nessim Pasha, who abolished the 1930 Constitution and proceeded to rule without Parliament. The Wafd, which had spent the five years in the wilderness, began to revive, for the Cabinet, having promised to govern constitutionally, looked to it, as the majority party, for moral support for its programme. Soon the Wafd received a further impetus in the form of a declaration by the King that the 1923 Constitution, which the Wafd regarded as its sheet-anchor, should return as soon as possible.

Then came the Italo-Ethiopian imbroglio and the British preparations at this end of the Mediterranean. In response to representations made by Nessim Pasha, the British Government, handsomely acknowledging the ready co-operation of the Egyptians, gave a public assurance that no military or naval measures would be taken on Egyptian soil without previous communication and discussion with the Egyptian Government.

The Liberals, who had been chafing at the Wafd's rehabilitation, regarded this as an opportunity to make a bid for position. Their leader, Mohamed Mahmud Pasha, held a mass meeting, at which he called for the resignation of the Nessim Cabinet, and then attacking the British Government for its military and naval measures, in particular its decision to make a naval base at Alexandria—since contradicted—he declared was an infringement of Egypt's sovereignty, he demanded the immediate conclusion of a treaty to regularise the position. The Wafd could not let this challenge to its position go unheeded. It replied by withdrawing its support from the Cabinet and by pressing for the immediate return of the 1923 Constitution. To this the Liberals rejoined that the treaty must come before the Constitution. Both sides encouraged the students to agitate and very serious

demonstrations resulting in several deaths occurred. The intervention of the students had one unexpected effect. It brought about a "United Front" of all parties, including the Wafd, which had hitherto refused to join with any other political element. The object of this union was to obtain the return of the 1923 Constitution and a treaty on the basis of the 1930 proposals, which are considered as still binding Great Britain.

Meanwhile the Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, in a speech at Guildhall had made a statement on the Egyptian situation, which was misconstrued to mean that Great Britain vetoed the 1923 Constitution. This had added to the agitation in Cairo. What he actually said was that, a constitutional country herself, England could not interfere with Egypt's choice of her own Constitution, but that, having been consulted about it, the British Government had replied that it liked neither the 1923 nor the 1930 version, and considered that Egypt had better study the question afresh and draft a Constitution more in keeping with the needs of the people. To clear the air, the Foreign Secretary made a further statement in the House. Far from this removing the misapprehension, the Prime Minister afterwards actually contemplated resignation because he sincerely believed the British Government would veto any attempt to bring back the 1923 Constitution for which all parties were now clamouring. Only at the eleventh hour was he made to understand that since the 1922 Declaration British "advice" was an order only applied to "reserved" matters, but that it did not affect the constitutional question and Egypt was perfectly free to choose her own Constitution. The 1923 Constitution was re-promulgated on December 13th, 1935. But to this day the majority of the people are convinced that the British Government waived its veto as the result of the students' agitation.

Meanwhile the "United Front" had presented a letter to Sir Miles Lampson, the High Commissioner, pressing for negotiations for a treaty on the basis of the 1930 proposals. Time passed. Mr. Eden succeeded Sir Samuel Hoare, whose resignation Egyptians frankly claimed was largely due to the agitation over his speeches. The delay in reply and the subsequent omission of any reference to Egypt in Mr. Eden's first public utterance caused further restlessness among the

students, acting under the encouragement of the politicians. Then on January 20th Sir Miles presented to King Fuad the British Government's reply to the appeal for a treaty. A settlement of the outstanding questions would be welcome, but the military clauses would first have to be settled. If Egypt agreed, there was no reason why negotiations for the other questions should not follow. The Sudan would have to be included in any settlement reached. The absence of any reference to negotiations "on the basis of 1930" indicates clearly that the British Government is not going to be bound by any previous proposals.

The King's first move was to order Nessim Pasha to resign. Then came the problem of a Cabinet to replace him. The British authorities having intimated that they would prefer to negotiate with a Government representing all parties, the King proposed to Nahas Pasha, as the leader of the majority, the formation of a Coalition Cabinet. Nahas Pasha insisted on a Wafdist Cabinet, while the minorities objected to the neutral ministry which later on the Wafd suggested. For ten days discussions went on. At times the conflict between the parties threatened a complete *impasse*. Finally Aly Maher Pasha, Director of the Royal Cabinet, to whom the King had entrusted the negotiations, secured a compromise: an entirely neutral Cabinet under himself and a delegation for negotiations under Nahas Pasha consisting of thirteen members, viz. seven Wafdists, the leaders of the Liberal, Shaab and Ittihad parties, two independents and a dissident Wafdist. Those ten days' conversations had, however, not improved party relations. They accentuated the incompatibility of temperament already existing between the various leaders. Even now that the treaty, which each had claimed to be vital to the country, is being negotiated the "United Front" is continually being menaced with disruption by the conflicting objectives of its members. It is to a delegation drawn from these heterogeneous elements that is being entrusted the task of negotiating with the British Government. Is it surprising that there are considerable misgivings as to the outcome? What increases this apprehension is that the decisions of the delegation must be unanimous, otherwise why have made such a point about negotiating with an all-party delegation?

The first question to be taken will be the military clauses.

The situation in the Mediterranean has completely changed from what it was when the previous negotiations were carried on. The Suez Canal is no longer suitable for the concentration of the troops necessary for the defence of Egypt against outside aggression, nor can their number be limited. The British authorities require full latitude to station and move their forces wherever they deem necessary. And to ensure proper co-operation the increased Egyptian Army will have to have British officers. Cairo and Alexandria will have to be retained as British military bases; others will probably have to be created, possibly in Upper Egypt. A glance at the map shows how inadequate the coastal belt with Mersa Matruh as centre is to guard the whole of the western frontier, which runs for a thousand miles into Central Africa.

Intimately linked with the military question is that of public security in the interior. Recent occurrences have shown that the police force cannot cope with serious situations without its British personnel. As the King, the Ministers and distinguished foreign visitors well know, these are the backbone of the force. No military commander could venture his troops in advanced positions unless he knew that in the hinterland there existed means for maintaining order among the heterogeneous elements composing the population and that he would not be called upon, possibly at the most inconvenient moment, to detail troops for the purpose. Preparation against danger from outside connotes not only adequate military dispositions but also adequate public security arrangements, without which, moreover, the Powers will never agree to any modification of the Capitulatory system. The position of the foreign communities has, indeed, to be considered. Their Governments would not be prepared to commit them to the dangers to which an inefficient police force would expose them. Since it would be on Great Britain's shoulders that in event of international incidents the burden would fall she naturally insists that the element which alone can make the police force efficient shall be retained in it.

Reduced to its simplest expression the military problem poses itself as follows: Egypt's position is an exceedingly vulnerable one. It must be adequately defended. Egypt can raise and maintain an army very considerably larger and better equipped than her present forces. While this will severely tax her budget it will also take some time to organise.

In any case it would never be adequate for her defence. Were it not for her geographical position and the menace to British Imperial interests which the presence of any foreign Power in Egypt would represent, we should not trouble ourselves much whether she was able or not to maintain her territorial integrity. But, given the vital link Egypt now constitutes, not only in the chain of Imperial communications but also in the maintenance of world peace and the balance of power in the Mediterranean, Great Britain cannot be indifferent to any threat to the existence of Egypt as an independent sovereign state. So much being admitted, there should be no inherent difficulty in finding a formula which, while respecting Egypt's rights and providing for co-operation with her forces, would enable Great Britain at all times to take all measures she may deem necessary in a matter in which Egypt herself has such a fundamental interest. Egyptians object that the presence of British troops in their cities and of a British element in their police infringes their independence. But it should be from the angle of the maintenance of world peace and her contribution thereto that Egypt should regard any concession which she may be called upon to make in regard to the aspirations she so legitimately cherishes.

Next in importance to the military question comes the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Since the 1924 troubles the Egyptian battalions and all Egyptian elements have been kept out of the country. The Egyptians claim that immigration should be permitted, that they must have a share in the administration including a Deputy Governor-Generalship, that the nomination of the Governor-General and the Cadi, in which Egypt's sovereignty is involved, should be effected according to the forms adopted before 1924, and that the military element should return there as symbol of Egypt's partnership in the country. There can be no objection to reverting to the procedure for the appointment of the Governor-General and Cadi followed up to twelve years ago. As to the Egyptian troops the moral effect which their return would have elsewhere in Africa makes it unwise to allow this. Unrestricted immigration and participation in the Government cannot be permitted because the Sudanese are beginning to be fitted to take a share in the administration and development of their country. Great Britain's task being that of trustee for the

coming generations, restriction on immigration must be enforced in order to preserve the Sudan for the Sudanese just as Egypt is being reserved for the Egyptians. On the other hand the country has to be developed and needs capital for such development. There is no reason why economic relations between these two neighbours should not be encouraged to their mutual advantage.

There are other thorny questions which will have to be discussed after the military clauses and the Sudan have been settled. Among these are the Capitulations, the Mixed Tribunals and Egypt's admission to the League of Nations. There would seem to be no valid objection to Egypt joining the League as soon as the treaty has been ratified. But in the matter of the Capitulations and the Mixed Tribunals—fiscal and legislative freedom and the transfer of penal consular jurisdiction—no decision can be reached without previous reference to the Capitulatory Powers and those who signed the Mixed Tribunal convention, who will require adequate guarantees as regards taxation and public security.

To sum up, Egypt is at the cross-roads. On the manner in which she meets the problems now confronting her will depend her future, especially her constitutional future. For if no treaty materialises the Constitution will most probably have to be again suspended. It is true that, whether agreement results or not, Egypt is assured that she will be defended against all danger from without. Other considerations far more important than merely her own personal fate are involved. But all friends of Egypt devoutly hope that such defence will be by mutual agreement and that, when they sit in the Council Chamber, her delegates will discard all considerations of personal feeling or ambition and think only of the interests of their own country. If they approach the questions as they come before them with a sincere desire to consider them on their merits then something really valuable for Egypt, Great Britain and the world in general will emerge from these negotiations. Hitherto, all discussions for a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian question have been conducted on the Egyptian side with an eye on the gallery. What Egypt wants to-day is a man who, instead of seeking popularity at the expense of his country, will have the courage to tell his countrymen openly what is in their real interest.

ARTHUR MERTON.

CHURCH AND STATE.

THE Church of England is older than the State of England. For our country became one ecclesiastically under Archbishop Theodore a century and a half before it became one politically under King Egbert. Clearly, no Act of Parliament established the Church, and indeed there is no known year when our Church began to be. The establishment was not built like a motor car, and built mechanically: it grew like a tree, and it grew organically. As the Church precedes the State in time, it would be closer to facts rather to declare that the Church created the State than that the State created the Church. Indeed, the Church was the State, the State in its spiritual attitude. As Archbishop Theodore passed away in 690, we are concerning ourselves with the history of an institution inextricably connected with the traditions of our race. The report of the Archbishops' Commission on the relations between Church and State clearly recognises this inextricable historical connection, and indeed with historians of the calibre of Sir Charles Grant Robertson and Professor E. F. Jacob sitting as members of this Commission we should expect nothing else. We recognise their hand in the statement that "The distinguishing mark of the Church of England has always been its close connection with the territorial State. This is a fact that dates not from the Reformation so much as from the Middle Ages, when Church (*sacerdotium*) and State (*regnum*) were thought to represent two sets of complementary authorities in the single *universitas* or community of Christendom. But while political thinkers might identify *sacerdotium* (the State ecclesiastical and spiritual) with the Church universal, personified by the Roman Pontiff, and *regnum* (the State civil) with the Holy Roman Empire, Englishmen tended to regard them as the local branch of the Church and the local nation. As has been well said, 'the nationalist flavour which thus permeated the identification of Church and realm in England was accentuated by the interest felt by all members of the commonwealth in resisting papal exactions and intrusions.'"

In addition to the two historians we have just mentioned the other Commissioners are Lord Cecil, the Chairman, Archbishop Temple, Bishop Williams, Bishop Bell, the Master of Sidney Sussex College, the Rev. G. A. Weekes, Archdeacon

Storr, Canon Hellins, Lord Selborne, Lord Hartington, Sir E. Bennett, Lady Bridgeman, Sir P. Baker-Wilbraham, and Mr. Vaisey, members representing very differing points of view with very differing modes of approach to those points of view, and what lends additional force to their recommendations is that they are unanimous. Not only is the report unanimous, but it breathes through this unanimity a lofty spirit of idealism blended with a realism that touches the needs of the moment and those of the not distant future. The members bring to their task the steady determination to see the relationship between Church and State steadily and to see it whole. The services of God and Cæsar are not disjoined. On the contrary, these services are so joined that while the Commissioners are ready to render to God the things that are God's, they are no less ready to render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. Though aware of the distinction commonly drawn between secular and spiritual, they hold that it tends to become increasingly unreal. They are not concerned for a moment with the departmental claims, but they are emphatically concerned with the common claims of Church and State, claims of the two organs of the community, "engaged in a common spiritual task." Their conception of the Church is that it is more than a mere voluntary society, for it is in truth the Body of Christ, the organ of the will of the divine Lord.

The Commissioners have not been content with a simple stumbling after precedent. They have been architects, and have sought to combine the stones of the evidence of the witnesses into an orderly and shapely building. They have been in a true sense philosophers, and have tried to subsume specific rules and attitudes of mind under a generic set of principles. This is the abiding glory of the report, and in accordance with this glory the Commissioners ask, and rightly ask, that their report should be read as a whole. The Church is to them an institution capable of growth and development. She is, in a word, a living Church, and not a dead branch. Such is the lofty conception they insist in setting before us, and who shall gainsay this conception? With this conception constantly in their minds, they plead for increased unity in the outlook within the Church herself. Naturally the Commissioners are not foolish enough to believe that the three schools, the Anglo-Catholic, the Evangelical, and the

Modernist, will entirely sink their differences. The Church is all the richer because of her diverse types, because of the Anglo-Catholic who relies mainly on tradition, because of the Evangelical who relies mainly on individualism, and because of the Modernist who relies mainly on reason. There is, we are glad to note, a strongly increasing tendency for these three parties to take each from the other two what is best in them, and the outcome is that, in spite of outward differences, there is to-day in the Church of England that growing unity of outlook that the Commissioners so warmly desiderate. Clearly this spirit of unity must continue to grow from more to more before some of the proposals set down come within the range of politics. The truth is that Anglicanism is a way of life controlled by a cohesive tradition of practice. It is impossible to exaggerate the influence of this tradition of practice, for the English people, during long periods, has acquired the habit of thought and action which is in the proper sense of the word practical, becoming also obstinately traditional, and the English people is the stuff of which the Church of England is composed. This will explain the failure of historians to understand the inability of this or that prominent Churchman, this or that powerful movement, to produce a permanent effect. It is that they have overlooked, or have not appreciated, the cohesive body of traditional acceptance and practice with which such influence invariably finds itself confronted. We may put it in another fashion. The Church of England, with her great historic past, is infinitely greater than any or all of the parties composing her, and upon all of them and upon all her members she bestows her ethos which they receive as they are able.

The report has not a little to say on the constitution of the Church Assembly, the passing of the Enabling Act in 1919 and its results, the rejection of the Prayer Book Measures of 1927 and 1928, and the action taken by the bishops in consequence of this rejection. Many of the bishops have permitted the use of this Deposited Prayer Book, with the exception of the suggested office of Holy Communion, and the Commissioners record their view that this action on the part of the bishops was "in the interests of order, inevitable." It looks as if the action of Parliament in rejecting the Prayer Book Measures of 1927 to 1928 had rendered it evident that the Church did not enjoy sufficient spiritual freedom, though we must by no

means overlook the possibility that the bulk of the laity were not in favour of these measures. The Commission defines a layman or laywoman positively by stating that he or she is a member of the Church of England, and negatively that he or she is not a member of any other religious body separated from it.

The Commission is clearly of the opinion that the way of salvation does not lie in the direction of disestablishment, and indeed two of the witnesses, Archbishop Gregg and Bishop Bidwell, announce that even with a disestablished Church the State still possesses more control than is generally recognised. What moves the Commissioners much more than this argument in rejecting disestablishment is that they realise the ancient connection between Church and State as of overwhelming importance and inextricability. Nor do they favour Scots precedents, for they obviously think that the historical circumstances of the two countries are so wholly different as to render any precedent of the one country of doubtful value to the other. Besides, the case of the Free Kirk in the 1904 appeal to our House of Lords attests the fact that a Church never established falls under the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. No doubt the Church of Scotland Act of 1921 seemingly renders the freedom of that Church assured, but it remains to be seen if that measure will bring all the benefits alleged on its behalf. One great factor in the life of the Church is her pursuit of truth, yet in Scotland the Free Church drove Robertson Smith from his chair simply because he wrote in a popularised form the assured results of the higher criticism of the Bible. So far as we can judge, it is still possible that another scholar of his type may lose his chair or his manse if he puts before the Church of Scotland results a generation ahead of the opinions commonly entertained by the average member of the Church Assembly. At any rate, the Church of Scotland Act has, so far, not been put to the test by the example of a man being tried under it.

Public attention will rightly fasten itself on the legislative proposals. On the legislative side the Commissioners draw a distinction between ordinary administrative measures, which they believe are dealt with satisfactorily under the procedure provided by the Enabling Act, and measures relating substantially to the spiritual concern of the Church of England. Accordingly, they propose that for measures certified

unanimously by the Lord Chancellor, the Speaker and the two Archbishops to be of this latter class a new procedure is to be set up. This procedure, while retaining the Royal Assent, will do away in effect with the necessity for Parliament control or approval. Any such measure, however, must not only be passed by all three Houses of the Church Assembly, but also approved by resolutions passed by the Convocations of Canterbury and York, and twice approved by resolutions passed by the Diocesan Conferences of not less than three-quarters of the English dioceses. Here is ample opportunity for the expression of lay opinion by way of approval or disapproval. In addition, the Archbishops must certify that in their opinion the proposed measure must not affect the fundamentals of the faith, for the measure is "neither contrary to nor indicative of any departure from the fundamental doctrines and principles of the Church of England," as set forth in the Thirty-nine Articles and the Book of Common Prayer.

It was the mark of a good mediæval judge to increase the jurisdiction of his Court, and the House of Commons still forms part of the High Court of Parliament. Is it probable, then, that Members of Parliament are likely to forego any of their powers to control even the spiritual affairs of the Church? We doubt it greatly *at this moment*. We italicise these words as we shall return to them presently. Besides, is it quite so easy to differentiate between the things we render to Cæsar and those we render to God? We may readily take concrete case after concrete case. For instance, from one angle, the European angle, marriage is a civil contract, while from another, the religious angle, the angle of the Church of England, it is a sacred rite in which its indissolubility is set out in the plainest of English. How can the Church tolerate increased freedom of divorce in view of the words "till death us do part"? Question after question suggests itself to the thoughtful reader, who can easily supply many more if he cares to exercise his ingenuity. On the other hand, the Commissioners beg us to study their report as a whole, and not unduly fasten our attention on particular proposals. In this spirit we study their proposals, and we are willing to admit that, if the Church were as united as they desire, it would be possible to carry any proposal through Parliament. We return to our three words, *at this moment*. For are we here

and now so united? We doubt it, in spite of the growing tendency to a more unified outlook we undoubtedly discern. At the same time we entertain no misgivings whatever that, if the Church were more united, there is almost nothing that Parliament would refuse to grant her, for Parliament is, after all, "engaged in a common spiritual task" with the Church. Recent changes in English life and character have undoubtedly impressed upon secular and spiritual leaders alike the growing necessity for bringing Christian forces together in a common effort for the welfare of the whole country. The rapid movement of the rural population to the industrial areas has created an over-supply of churches in some parts with a deficiency in others. The result has been the growth of a large class outside the influence of the Church. Once the most potent force in national life, the Church has been losing ground till lately. A United Church will be able to face these and similar problems with greater energy and confidence, and it will be then not only in name, but in fact, the National Church. We pass from the legislative proposals to the judicial. There is a careful account of the Ecclesiastical Courts in relation to questions of doctrine, ritual and ceremony. There is no marked divergence from the recommendations of the Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts which reported to the Church Assembly in 1926. The present Commissioners put forward the view that in cases involving matters of doctrine, ritual and ceremony, the bishop should have the right to sit personally with the Chancellor of the Diocese as his legal assessor, and that the Archbishop should exercise a similar right in the Provincial Court. It is hoped that thus there will be found a way to quiet the consciences of those clergy who are distressed by ecclesiastical cases being brought before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This report of 1935 differs in one grave respect from the report of 1926. For the Commissioners suggest the creation of a new Final Court of Appeal in ecclesiastical cases, appointed by the Crown from a list or panel nominated by the two Archbishops with the approval of the Convocations, and consisting partly of persons of high judicial experience, and partly of bishops and other people, whether clerical or lay, who possess special qualifications. The Court, for instance, to try any particular case, might be selected from this panel by the Lord Chancellor in rotation or otherwise, and might consist of two judges of the

first category and two of the second, sitting together under the presidency of a judge of the first category. This is also a reasonable proposal, designed to quiet the uneasy consciences of clergy who do not care for ecclesiastical cases being exclusively tried by secular judges.

The ethos of a Church is quite as important as her ethics, whether her ethics are or are not enforceable in a tribunal, lay or ecclesiastical. Accordingly, the Commissioners are bent on restoring authority in the Church, though they are perfectly aware of the fact that moral authority is at least as important as legal. They devote considerable attention to the position of the bishop, suggesting that in every diocese he should be enabled to hold a "pastoral" Court. Here he could deal administratively with questions of doctrine and ritual; with power of appeal to a tribunal of provincial bishops. In this Court the bishop should act as a father in God to his clergy, possessing in it no compulsory legal powers. His directions would come administratively, that is, by way of censure or monition. The Commissioners, we believe, are right in holding that in most cases the pastoral monition of the bishop, or of the provincial tribunal, would secure the desired obedience. If it does not, then the complainants can take proceedings in the ordinary courts without having recourse to episcopal sanction.

We have seldom read a report in which the transparent sincerity of the framers thereof was more conspicuous, and for this reason *inter alia* we have not cared to indulge in the cheap task of destructive criticism. The point that appears throughout is the urgent need of greater unity among the members of the Church of England, and on the realisation or the non-realisation of this unity depends the worth or the worthlessness of this report. For our own part we heartily believe that in spite of signs to the contrary there is a decided tendency towards this unity. The three parties remain in the Church, but they are showing increased and increasing toleration each to the other. "It would be easy to assess," such is the moving final paragraph, "it would be still more difficult to exaggerate the strength that the Church of the last hundred years has derived from its comprehensive power to retain, even when again 'contentions were at their highest float,' the loyal allegiance of men differing apparently so widely as Simeon and Keble, Pusey, Maurice, Kingsley, and Lightfoot,

Church, Gore, and Chavasse, Shaftesbury and Halifax—yet each and all acknowledging by their lives, their service and their witness, the higher and inner unity which was the bond of a common membership in our national Church, because it was the gift of one and the same Holy Spirit, working in all and through all who claimed to be the sons of that national Church. It is with that ideal and tradition in our minds that we have attempted to discharge the responsibility laid upon us by offering proposals for action. To this fostering of that unity of the Church, without which no proposals can be fruitful, we would, in our closing words, most earnestly invite the co-operation of all our fellow Churchmen.”

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

THE LABOUR VICTORY IN NEW ZEALAND.

THE triumph of Labour in the New Zealand elections of November 27th, which gave it, in a House of eighty, a majority of twenty-six, or of thirty if two sympathetic Maori members be reckoned in, probably surprised the electors themselves. But something like it happened once before in the history of New Zealand. In December 1890, after many years of depression, financial stringency, and unemployment, small farmers and land-hungry rural workers combined with the urban workers and a section of the middle classes to oust a Government which was thought to be under the influence of the big landowners, and to install a new party without much administrative experience but energetic, enthusiastic, willing to use the power and resources of the state to level out economic inequalities and promote the welfare of the small man. The analogy should not be pressed too far : but we can understand 1935 better if we remember 1890. New Zealand, so often thought conservative, once before gave evidence of an experimental temper, of a readiness in times of depression to think out its politics over again.

The liberals thus installed in office in 1890 remained in until 1912 and laid the foundations of modern New Zealand. They gave it an advanced code of labour legislation, including compulsory arbitration in industrial disputes, women's suffrage, an old-age pension system, free secondary education and other social reforms ; they extended state enterprise in various directions ; and by measures for compulsory repurchase of large estates, by state advances on mortgage, and by the educational activities of their Department of Agriculture, they gave assistance to the small farmer. But gradually, especially after the death of Seddon, Prime Minister from 1893 to 1906, the foundations of the Liberal Party began to crack. On the one hand, Labour was breaking away and forming a political organisation of its own. Pleased at first with the Arbitration Court, it later began to complain that its wage awards did not keep pace with the rising cost of living. The propaganda of class-conscious socialism began to make way, among the miners and waterside workers (dockers) particularly ; and the growth of the political Labour movement in Great Britain, and even more strikingly in Australia, also

had an effect. On the other hand the small farmers, as they became more prosperous, became less radical, and those among them who had been put on the land by the Liberal Government, on leasehold tenure, began to demand the freehold. Many, in the North Island particularly, turned to the rival Reform Party under Massey, which made freehold tenure the principal plank in its platform.

After an indecisive election Massey took office in 1912, and kept it until his death thirteen years later. In 1913 he defeated, with the active assistance of the farmers, a serious industrial challenge from Labour, in the shape of a great maritime strike. But although his party was the lineal descendant of the old conservative party, and was less sympathetic to state enterprise than the liberals, Massey was no reactionary. He had criticised the administration of the liberals and proceeded to subject the public service to the control of a commissioner; but for the most part he was content to build on their foundations. As early as 1915 one far-seeing member predicted a coalition; but although one was formed shortly afterwards for the purposes of the war, it broke up in 1919, and the old party battle was resumed. The chief political questions, however—marketing policy, rural credit, public works policy—were not really party issues. More than once a new coalition was proposed, but the Reform Governments showed no great anxiety to divide power with the declining liberals. Then in 1928 liberalism entered upon a short Indian summer. Ward, who had been Prime Minister from 1906 to 1912, reappeared in political life in the guise of an elder statesman: he criticised the finance of the Reform Government, and won sufficient votes by his energetic borrowing policy and his financial reputation to come back into office with Labour support. After his death in 1930 the onset of economic and financial depression produced a wide divergence of view between Labour and the Government and a *rap-prochement* between the Government and the Reform Opposition. The financial situation was too difficult for a minority Government. In September 1931 the coalition so long predicted came about.

Another change came about, less conspicuously, at the same time. In the government formed by Ward in 1928 the towns had been more numerously represented than in recent governments of the opposite party. But Ward had been succeeded

by a farmer Prime Minister, Mr. Forbes, and the Coalition Government was predominantly a farmers' government. One city member there was, Mr. Downie Stewart, the Minister of Finance, who had had much to do with bringing the coalition about and who enjoyed the confidence of the urban business interests. But in times of crisis divisions of economic interest are apt to be more nakedly revealed than in happier times. The farmers, on whom the full weight of the collapse in export prices fell, sought, not unjustifiably, to shift some of the almost intolerable burden on to other shoulders: encouraged by the majority report of an Economic Committee, taken into consultation by the Government in February 1932, they called upon the Government to "raise the exchange" on London—in other words to devalue the currency—with this object in view. Mr. Downie Stewart resisted the demand; Mr. Coates, the leader of the Reform section of the coalition, supported it, and in January 1933 got his way. The exchange premium was raised from 10 to 25 per cent.; Mr. Downie Stewart resigned, and Mr. Coates became Minister of Finance and the dominant figure in the Government.

The raising of the exchange was probably necessary to save New Zealand farming and financial institutions connected with it from a disaster which would have given a grave shock to confidence. But it was widely felt to be a sacrifice of city interests, and the Government lost ground there which, despite a vigorous and in many ways successful policy, it never regained. Nor did the Government's vigour, traceable to Mr. Coates rather than to the Prime Minister, always get the credit it deserved. Neither Mr. Forbes nor Mr. Coates had the hold on the country that Seddon and Massey, and to a less conspicuous extent Ward, possessed before them; if they told the country that certain measures were good for it, the country was not prepared simply to take those measures on trust. Mr. Forbes was not thought strong: Mr. Coates was suspected of a desire to domineer, and though he sought by pamphlets and newspaper articles to explain his measures to the public, his personality lacked that popular appeal which counts for more than argument. He converted the internal debt, it is true, by methods amounting to compulsion; he restored the national finances; he reorganised the credit and currency system by establishing a Reserve Bank; he set up a semi-public Mortgage Corporation to reorganise the finance

of farming, and an Executive Commission of Agriculture to deal with the problem of regulation of exports to the British market ; but he did not regain the favour of the electorate.

It was clear as long ago as 1933 that a political reorientation was in progress, though it was not so clear what the new direction would be. It could hardly express itself through the coalition parties. Neither of them was organised in the English sense, with live associations in the constituencies and annual party congresses. The party machinery grew rusty between elections, and even at elections was not well adapted to bringing new blood into the party. Various new parties attempted to exploit the public desire for change ; and one of them, the Democrats, supported by a few well-known public men and led by the Mayor of Wellington, nominated candidates for about two-thirds of the seats. But the organisation of a party is not the work of a few weeks or months. The Democrats did not elect a single member and the chief effect of their intervention was to increase the Labour majority.

The Labour Party had done much by hard work over a long period of years to make itself the natural rallying point for discontent. It was not until the later years of the war that the vague aspirations of earlier years crystallised out in the shape of an effective political party. Its first successes were naturally in the poorer city constituencies and in the coal-mining areas. Its first leader after the war, Holland, was an immigrant from Australia, where class feeling runs higher. He preached a Marxian socialist doctrine which was acceptable to such constituencies, but not so well calculated to win general support outside them. The typical working man, often owning his own house, is not very easily distinguished, except in conventional theory, from the less fortunate members of the middle classes. His children mix with theirs from the bottom of the educational system to the top. It is not true that he has nothing to lose but his chains. As the Labour Party acquired parliamentary experience and, one may suppose, as they found out what the people really wanted, their views moderated. Without shedding their socialism they became less doctrinaire, and without alienating their loyal working-class supporters they became more alive to the necessity of broadening their basis of support. In the election which followed the formation of the Coalition Government in 1931, aided no doubt by the serious unemployment that had

appeared during the year, they gained four seats and forty-five thousand votes. But there were not many more town seats they could hope to win ; and they had as yet made little impression on rural voters.

If the typical townsman in New Zealand is a *petit bourgeois*, the typical countryman is established on a farm of his own. The support of a substantial body of small farmers was necessary to any New Zealand party aspiring to power, the more so since representation is not precisely according to population but is weighted by a "country quota" of 28 per cent. In the end Labour has been able to outbid a farmers' government for the farmers' support and has thus opened up a new chapter in New Zealand's political history. The underlying factor in its success is that large numbers of the farmers, most of all perhaps in the province of Auckland, where Labour has done particularly well, are so heavily mortgaged that they have virtually ceased to be freeholders in anything but the name. The bottom has fallen out of their world. It is said that two-thirds or more of them have had to take advantage of the mortgagors' relief legislation which was passed. Many of them must now be, and have the prospect of remaining for some years, little more than managers for the new Mortgage Corporation and other lending institutions. There have been complaints that the exchange premium has gone not to them but to their creditors, whilst they have had to pay more for imported farming requisites such as fencing wire. It is natural in these circumstances that other experiments, and more particularly financial experiments, should find favour. If in 1890 it seemed to be the land that was "locked up," now it seemed to be the money. The "social credit" theories associated with Major Douglas made considerable headway, in Auckland particularly. But New Zealand did not go the way of Alberta. Major Douglas came and saw, and testified before a Monetary Committee of the House of Representatives, but he did not conquer. The real beneficiary of the monetary reform sentiment has been Labour, with its promise to "assume control of the public credit and establish a national credit authority whose duty it will be to provide a money service sufficient to give effect to the will of Parliament." This judicious vagueness was coupled with specific proposals eminently calculated to appeal to the farmers—guaranteed prices to "farmers and others

who are producing in accordance with the Dominion's requirements" and a readjustment of mortgages on the basis of these guaranteed prices. Labour seemed to promise them not only help in extricating themselves from their present difficulties but safeguards against such difficulties in future. There was nothing in the Labour programme to alarm them, and many Labour candidates were themselves farmers. Revolutionary socialism would not appeal to them, but no one dreamt of preaching it. The element of discipline in the completely socialist state might be irksome to them; but there seemed to be more of this in the powers of the Mortgage Corporation and the Executive Commission of Agriculture than in the programme of the Labour Party, which disapproved of the latter body at least as undemocratic. Mere *Étatisme* does not frighten the farmers, who are indeed accustomed to the use of the powers of the state for their benefit; and they have developed a highly organised co-operative movement. The Labour Party seemed to many of them to deserve at any rate a trial. It won about twenty wholly or largely rural seats, four of them seats in which it had never even run a candidate before. In the whole province of Auckland the Government retained only one rural seat. The total Labour vote increased from 240,000 to 390,000.

As remarkable as Labour's victory, perhaps, has been its reception in the country. The Press, which had been solidly against Labour, was critical, but disposed to give the new Government a fair chance. The business community generally refused to take alarm, and some at any rate of the manufacturers seemed definitely friendly. This is a tribute to the skill with which the Labour programme was drawn up: it held out hopes of a redress of the exchange grievance, and it undertook to provide "substantial protection for secondary industries which can be economically developed in the Dominion." But it is also a tribute to the Labour leadership and particularly to the new Prime Minister, Mr. M. J. Savage, and his Minister of Finance, Mr. Walter Nash. Mr. Holland died in 1933, within sight of the promised land; but his successor was perhaps better fitted to lead his people into it. His quiet, thoughtful, essentially moderate character did not excite but allayed antagonism. He was obviously, by temperament as well as by profession of faith, a builder rather than a destroyer: he publicly avowed, on the morrow of his victory, an intention to

"begin where Seddon left off." Mr. Nash, a well-read man of wide interests, was thought to be the soundest man in the party on financial matters, and no appointment could have been better calculated to win the co-operation of the business community, which Mr. Savage is anxious to have.

Though the Government has not yet had time to develop its programme, it is clear that Mr. Nash has the heaviest task. The election was largely decided by financial policy, and in any case financial policy must hold the central place in any progressive programme. Can the Government find a level of guaranteed prices which will be economically reasonable and at the same time acceptable to the farmers? The Government appears to realise that the farmers' prices must in one sense be determined by the prices in the British market, to which the bulk of their produce goes; but they hope to find, through the national credit, a buffer between the farmers and the ups and downs of the markets of the world. Whether this can be done without serious inflation clearly depends on the prices fixed, and as markets are now on the whole tending upwards circumstances are to that extent favourable. Nevertheless, to find and maintain a reasonable level will require not only good advice, but political courage. If the level is reasonable, it might conceivably be possible also to lower the exchange rate a little, for the New Zealand pound is said to be undervalued, but it would introduce a new element of uncertainty. Mr. Savage has already stated that the change must be made very gradually to cause the minimum of disturbance: the same line of thought may eventually lead him to the view that the absolute minimum of disturbance would be caused by making no change at all. The restoration of wage, salary, and pension cuts seems to present no great difficulty in view of the improvement in the national finances. More dubious is the proposal to resume public works on a larger scale. Some of these works, such as aerodromes, mentioned by the Minister of Public Works, who passes for one of the extreme members of the party, can be justified readily enough; and incidentally they testify to the realism of the Government in matters of defence. But public works, by consecrated usage, are apt in New Zealand to mean railways and yet more railways. They naturally bulk large in the eyes of the districts through which they pass; and much of the cost of their construction goes straight into the pockets of the labourers employed. They

form part of the traditional palliative to unemployment in New Zealand. But the idea that employment is beneficial to Labour in proportion to the amount that goes directly into wages is of course a fallacy ; and in a community already so much burdened with unremunerative railway lines as New Zealand, it may be a dangerous fallacy. It is to be hoped that the Government will face the financial facts and not allow its perceptions to be dulled by optimistic phrases about " opening up the country." The real question is what is to be produced in the country that is opened up.

In social matters such as health and education Labour's programme will cost money ; but those two portfolios are held by one of their ablest men, Mr. Peter Fraser, and more imaginative administration than there has been in recent years might well have a tonic effect on the country. Much of the attention of the new Minister will doubtless be taken up with elaborating a system of universal health insurance, for which some preparatory work has been done by a committee appointed by the previous Government. For all its moderation, Labour seems more likely to attempt too much than too little. But if it is not afraid to take good advice, honestly offered, if it looks at problems with the clear eyes of reason and not with the myopia of preconception, if at the same time it appeals to the imagination and not merely to the pockets of the electorate, it will not only give a new interest to New Zealand politics but may well be rewarded by many years of power.

W. P. MORRELL.

TEN YEARS OF REZA SHAH'S RULE.

ON October 31st, 1925, the Iranian Majliss dethroned Ahmed Shah and appointed Reza Shah, then Prime Minister, in his place. And during the ten years that Reza Shah has been on the throne he has transformed Iran from a sleepy, medieval country into a wideawake modern state. To realise the greatness of Reza Shah's achievement, it is necessary to cast a cursory glance at the state of the country under the Khajjars during the present century.

The Shahs of the Khajjar dynasty were indolent and incompetent rulers. Ahmed Shah, the last of them, preferred to enjoy himself in Paris and on the Riviera to living in Teheran and working for the good of his country. Most of his ministers were also pleasure-loving and placed their personal interests above those of their country. Men were selected for government posts not because they were qualified for them, but because they were related to or were the protégés of this or that minister. The Finance department was inefficient and powerless. Each ministry collected its own revenues and spent them in any way it liked without submitting accounts to the Finance department. Very little was paid to the Government in taxes. There was no budget, the expenditure was beyond the revenue, and there was an adverse balance of trade. The various sheikhs and tribes had become almost independent. The highways were deteriorating and the agricultural villages were in decay.

Ever since Reza Shah first came into power as Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Army in 1921, he has kept the following four ideals in view before him : (1) to make Iran fully independent ; (2) to destroy feudalism and unify the country ; (3) to rejuvenate it with Western ideas and institutions adapted to the needs of his people ; (4) to make his people take pride in their pre-Mahommedan past, when their country was one of the Great Powers of the world. To realise the first ideal he has bought over, cancelled, or modified in a manner favourable to his country all the concessions that had been granted to foreign nations under the previous régime. The taking over of the roads built by the British and Russians before the war, the modification of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's lease, and the cancellation of the right of printing currency notes which had been granted to the

Imperial Bank of Persia are among the steps taken to make the country fully independent.

To destroy feudalism and unify the country he subdued the Kurds, Lurs, and other tribes which had defied the Government, and forced the Sheikhs of Arabistan and Mohammerah to render allegiance to him. All the tribes and sheikhs have been now disarmed, deprived of their power, and dispossessed of their property. Some of the sheikhs have been appointed governors of districts or to high positions in the army. Everyone in Iran now pays taxes to the central government. The taxation system has been reorganised and old road-tolls, taxes at the gates and other vexatious items have been abolished. The Finance department has been reformed with the help of Doctor A. C. Millspaugh and his American assistants on modern lines. It receives accounts from all other departments regularly. The Budget has been balanced since Doctor Millspaugh's first year of office more than ten years ago and is now five times as great as it was in 1921. Men are selected for government service solely on the ground of their merit. Incompetent and corrupt officials are degraded or dismissed. The dismissal by the Shah of his once all-powerful Court Minister, Timur Tash, for corruption, is known to everyone.

Reza Shah does not like the mullahs because they are conservative and opposed to all his reforms. But because religion is a stronger force in Iran than it has ever been in Turkey, he has not declared open war against them as Mustapha Kemal Pasha has done in his country. All that he has done is to take education away from their hands and force them to qualify themselves for their work by passing certain theological tests. To impress upon his people that he is not irreligious, the Shah, then Prime Minister, went on a pilgrimage to Kerbela and Nejef at the end of 1924. The Shah at first employed Western experts in most departments of his government. But now that a good number of Iranians have been trained, they are replacing the Western experts. All the officials in the Finance department, banks, customs, and municipalities are now Iranians.

A great deal has been done to improve agriculture. Model farms and experimental stations have been established in various parts of the country and the farmers are taught the use of modern machinery and how to substitute and diversify

their crops. Loans of money are made to them to enable them to purchase seed, oxen, and implements. Steps are taken to destroy grasshoppers and other pests and the diseases of plants and cattle are combated. Ruined villages are being set up again. The irrigation canals, called *kanats*, which were destroyed during the war, have been reconstructed and plans for building dams in the Jargerood and the Karun are being considered. Rice, tea, and cotton are grown in ever-increasing quantities and the production of opium has steadily decreased. Formerly opium was grown in eighteen out of the twenty-six provinces, but now it is grown in six only. A law has been passed to prohibit the felling of industrial trees. The old industries of the country, such as carpets, silk, pottery, and silver and brass ware, are encouraged and improved, and a number of new industries, which include cotton and woollen textiles, leather goods, sugar-refining and matches, have been started. Large orders of machinery for the new cotton mills have been placed in Lancashire.

The work of building roads and railways has been taken seriously in hand. As we have already remarked, there were at the end of the war hardly any good roads in the country except those which had been made by the British and Russians. But now 4,000 miles of first-class and 6,000 miles of second-class roads have been constructed. And some of these roads are magnificent feats of engineering, such as the one which runs from Teheran through the Elburz mountains to Chalus on the Caspian. The Tabriz-Julfa railway, which was built by the Russians in pre-war days, but which had been ruined during the war, has now been restored. The work of building the Trans-Iranian railway is proceeding rapidly; 156 miles of this railway have been already built from Bunder Shapur to Salehabad in the south and 80 miles from Bunder Shah to Aliabad in the north. There is a bi-weekly service from Bunder Shah to Aliabad. Two ports at the two extremities of the railway, Bunder Shapur on the Persian Gulf and Bunder Shah on the Caspian, have been constructed. When the railway has been completed, which will probably be in 1939, the products of the fertile north will be sent to Europe not through Russia as heretofore but via the Persian Gulf.

At present motor-lorries and motor-cars are to a very great extent used for transporting goods and passengers. In 1902

there was only one motor-car in Iran, that belonging to the Shah; to-day there are about 5,000. It should not be supposed that travelling by motor-car is costly in Iran. On the contrary, it is cheaper than railway travelling is in Western countries, since only $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per mile is the rate charged. There is a bi-weekly motor service between Teheran and Khaniqin. The enormous change that the introduction of the motor-car has made in the life of the country can be seen from the fact that while in 1920 it took 40 days to go from Teheran to Bushire, to-day it takes only 3 days!

Schools have been established all over the country. In old days when there were few good Government schools, children used to go to the foreign schools: and in these foreign schools, on account of the kind of education that they received, they used to be denationalised. In order, therefore, to prevent such denationalisation, all Iranian children are now obliged to go to the Government schools till they are 13, and then only are they allowed to go to the foreign schools. The teaching of Persian has been made compulsory in all foreign schools. In the Government schools great stress is laid on moral education. Students are taught to love action, despise idleness, and a love of knowledge, of truth, and of their country is fostered in them. A new university with faculties of theology, philosophy, political economy, medicine, mathematics, and physics, has been founded in Teheran. The Government also sends students to Europe and America for higher studies. The progress that Iran has made in education since the coming of Reza Shah into power can be seen from the fact that while in 1921 there were 612 schools with 55,000 students, in 1933 there were 4,000 schools with 200,000 students. And the Government spends three times as much on education now as it did in 1921.

The position of women is changing for the better. In 1909 when a Westernised Iranian wrote an article on the emancipation of women in a Tabriz paper, the people of that city were so enraged that they would have killed the writer of that article had not the Government intervened and saved his life. But now things are different. In 1921 there were 3 girls who passed the primary school examinations, while in 1933 there were 1,455. All the girls in the Government schools learn French or English as a second language. Women are becoming qualified teachers, midwives, nurses, and bank clerks, and

some have even taken to shop-keeping. Those women who wear Western dress are not obliged to wear a veil. They can also go by themselves to theatres and cinemas, and ride in 'buses and tram-cars. The marriage age of girls has been raised from 9 to 16, and polygamy is likely to be abolished soon. Women's clubs, such as l'Union des Femmes Patriotes, are being established in Teheran and other big towns, and a women's paper called *Zehan* is published in the capital. Delegates from Iran went to the Pan-Asiatic Women's Congress which was held at Lahore in 1931, and in the following year an Oriental Women's Conference was called at Teheran.

Municipalities have been established in all towns and are doing very useful work. Teheran has been entirely replanned. Fine broad streets, lined with shady trees, run through the city now. The new Government buildings are all spacious and imposing. The city is lighted by electricity and its tramways and 'buses have also been electrified. Its population is increasing rapidly: its present population being nearly 400,000, that is about 50,000 more than in 1921.

Being a soldier, the Shah has naturally not neglected to improve the fighting forces of his country. The army has been completely reorganised on modern lines and is now a well-equipped, well-clothed, well-fed, and regularly-paid force of 80,000 men. It is used primarily to preserve law and order, and is consequently based on different cities. A compulsory enlistment act which obliges every Iranian to serve for two years with the colours has been passed. Formerly there were many foreign instructors in the Iranian army, but now there is not one. A small navy and an air force have also been formed. £200,000 worth of aeroplane orders were recently placed by the Iranian Government in England.

Other changes have been equally notable. The police and the road guards have been made more efficient and have practically exterminated banditry. Life and property are now fairly safe in Iran. The Government treats the Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians with justice and has given each of these three communities the right to send a representative to the Majliss. The number of post offices in the country is increasing rapidly and telephones, telegraphs, and wireless stations connecting Teheran with Europe via Tiflis and Beyrout have been extended or installed. The Civil, Criminal, and Commercial Codes, based on those of France and Switzerland, have been

substituted in place of the old, out-of-date laws. Hospitals, sanatoriums, and rest-houses are multiplying rapidly, and gambling- and public-houses have been closed. The problem of finding work for beggars is being gradually solved.

To realise his fourth ideal, that is to make his people take pride in their pre-Islamic past, Reza Shah has taken as his family name Pahlavi, the name of the old Iranian language which Omar Khayyam calls "divine, high-piping." He is also encouraging his people to give old Iranian names, such as Shapur, Sohrab, Feridun, etc., to their children in preference to Arabic names. The old Iranian solar year has been substituted for the Arabic lunar year. And one of the objects of the celebrations last year of the thousandth anniversary of the birth of Firdausi, whose great epic deals with the Zoroastrian period of Iranian history, was to make the modern Iranians realise that they are the descendants of those ancient Iranians whose empire extended from the Punjab to Greece. It must be admitted that these great changes have not always been introduced in a gentle manner, much less with the consent of the people. There is no liberty of speech or Press in Iran. The Majliss is composed of only one party, that which applauds and agrees to everything that the Shah says or does. The majority of people were quite unwilling to adopt Western dress, but they were forced to do so at the point of the bayonet, as it were. The meetings and assemblies of the Baha'is, the most progressive community in the country, are prohibited and their schools closed, because they want separate representation in the Majliss. The majority of people also do not like compulsory military service, and so, in order to escape it, thousands of them are fleeing to Afghanistan, Bahrein, and other neighbouring countries. And Western peoples are hated and social intercourse with them is not encouraged. The wisdom of building the Trans-Iranian railway might also be well questioned. The expenditure on the railway last year exceeded the revenue from the tea and sugar-tax which has been set aside for it. And after it has been built it is doubtful if it will help the foreign trade of the country, seeing that the products of the northern provinces will have to pay such heavy freight charges before they reach Europe that they will find it extremely difficult to compete with the same goods coming from countries like India.

VASUDEO B. METTA.

UNCLE SAM AND HIS ASIATIC WARDS.

TO one who has seen at various times the work of French, Dutch and British administrators in the East, there can be no more fascinating study than to compare their methods with those of America in Hawaii. A latecomer to the post of guardian, she should be able to avoid the mistakes of her predecessors and, in a more enlightened age, to practise abroad the noble principles proclaimed at home at the hour of her birth. Moreover, she did not come to Hawaii as a conqueror, but as a protector. Nor was it necessary to hold in subjection the teeming masses of an alien race, for the original Hawaiians were few in number and friendly in character and the inter-racial problems are not with them but between the dominant Whites and the large numbers of Orientals imported to work on the plantations.

The European Powers hold their Asiatic possessions by reason of their superiority in armament and organisation over their subject peoples: other factors may and do enter into it, sometimes tending to obscure the dominant one, but when a crisis arises—as has happened in the case of all three Powers within the last decade—it is, in the last resort, *force majeure* which decides it. The revival of Eastern prestige which has attended the rise of Japan, and the decline of that of the West due largely to the World War and the spread of motion pictures, together with a number of other modern tendencies, are undermining the security of tenure of the European Powers in their Asiatic possessions and it seems improbable that they can hold them much longer by force alone.

France, though she has done least of all for her subject peoples, is perhaps in a less precarious position than her fellow rulers. She draws no colour line, but is not greatly interested in the development of her Asiatic subjects, for most of her energies are absorbed by her North African Empire. England has vast possessions in the East which she must somehow hold, not only because of their great resources in raw material, but also because of their strategic value on the all-red route to Australasia. India simmers intermittently, but her kaleidoscope of nations and creeds prevents any united effort to overthrow her white overlords. Though Britain has benefited largely from her Asiatic holdings she has also conferred very great benefits in return. It is her

patronising attitude towards what Kipling calls "the lesser breeds within the Law" which will be her undoing. "The social problem, the fact that the civil servants are willing to work with the Indians but not to play with them, the fact that the 'boxwallah' will have nothing to do with them, has really brought the present political position upon us." Thus wrote E. S. Montague, a distinguished Englishman, on India. The fecund East Indies reflect the great organising ability and steady good sense of the Dutch. They have avoided the irritating superiority of the British and the harsh indifference of the French. They draw no colour line, but they stand no nonsense. There is no stigma for half-castes in Java—a great contrast to the British possessions—and they are received on equal terms by the European colonials. Indirect rule through native leaders is the usual Dutch practice. Nevertheless, with the rise of Japan the position of Holland in the East must become increasingly precarious, for she is no longer a Great Power and holds the Indies under the protecting ægis of the British Navy.

Has the United States avoided the errors and malpractices of her European sisters and taken full advantage of the great experiment provided by the racial melting-pot in Hawaii? Though the history of Redskin and Negro in America shows that its white inhabitants can be as cruel and tyrannical as the most bloodthirsty European "Imperialist," there can be no doubt that the American record in Hawaii is, on the whole, a singularly happy and enlightened one. In order to provide labour for the plantations, immigrants from a number of different countries have been imported during the present century and the latter half of the last century, so that the population has become an increasingly mixed one. In 1930 it was as follows :

Hawaiians	...	...	...	22,636
Caucasian-Hawaiians	...	...	...	15,632
Asiatic-Hawaiians	...	...	...	12,592
Portuguese	...	...	...	27,588
Porto-Ricans	...	...	...	6,671
Spanish	...	...	...	1,219
*"Other Caucasians"	...	...	...	44,895
Chinese	...	...	...	27,179

* Includes a military population of about 20,000.

Japanese	...	...	...	139,631
Koreans	...	...	...	6,461
Filipinos	...	...	...	63,052
All others	...	...	...	780
Total	...	...	...	368,336

These figures are taken from *The Peoples of Hawaii*, by Romanzo Adams, published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, in 1933. Since 1930 some of the Filipinos have been repatriated and it seems probable that in the next census the proportion they constitute of the population will be appreciably less. About one-third of the entire population are of Japanese ancestry, and this great element shows a somewhat more cohesive tendency than the rest and has a reputation for being clannish.

It will be noticed that nearly half the white population is made up of the military garrison. Hawaii is said to have the largest army post in the United States, and in addition, strong naval and air forces are stationed there, so that it must be agreed that Uncle Sam is taking no chances. Nevertheless military activities are not unduly obtrusive and play no part in the administration of the territory, and in view of the fact that the islands lie about one-third of the way between ambitious Japan and the western coast of the United States, and of the large element of Japanese ancestry in the Hawaiian population, no one can blame the American administration for its precautions.

The policy of the United States towards this jumble of races can be summed up in one word : Americanisation. From the cradle to the grave the ideals of American citizenship are held before them and this can be seen best in the schools. At an institution such as McKinley High School hundreds of children of varied racial parentage imbibe in common the culture of the United States, giving a practical demonstration that skin differences are artificial boundaries only. At this school I saw a performance of an English comic opera, *The Pirates of Penzance*. The hero was of Portuguese extraction, the heroine a Filipino and the minor characters were Korean, Chinese, Japanese, Hawaiian and Caucasian. The children are proud of this intermixing and racial antagonism is consequently almost non-existent.

The result is apparent in the increasing proportion of mixed marriages which, according to Adams (*op. cit.*) were thirteen per cent. in 1912-13 and thirty-two per cent. in 1931-2, an extraordinarily high figure. Public opinion in general supports marriages of this kind and there is of course no half-caste problem; in fact, some of the mixtures, in particular the Chinese-Hawaiian, have a very high reputation. The Hawaiians are probably more prone to mixed marriages than are the other elements of the population; the Japanese were originally averse to intermarriage, but more recently they have shown themselves less particular in this respect.

The policy of Americanisation is a shrewd one: it is of course greatly to the advantage of the United States that the heterogeneous population should feel themselves citizens of the Republic and that their interests are identical with those of their white rulers. But it is also the only sensible policy and one which benefits all concerned. Americanisation is not the exploitation of subject races by a pretence of the bestowal of equal rights and privileges; it is a sincere effort to weld a mixed population into the American mould, as has been done on the mainland with immigrant Swedes, Poles, Italians and Irish. This is the American theory. What of the American practice? In general the theory is honourably carried out in practice, but there are of course numerous exceptions so that it would not be difficult for a biased observer to accuse the white population of preaching equality but not practising it.

In the main, however, these exceptions are due to special circumstances or to matters of temperament. For instance, most of the higher positions are filled by Whites, but this is largely due to the fact that Orientals entered Hawaii at the bottom of the social scale as plantation labourers and have only advanced slowly in social and economic status, whereas the Whites started at or near the top of the ladder. A relic of this is that in certain cases Whites are said to be paid higher wages than Orientals for the same work, a cause of friction. During the recent slump, when economy was of heightened importance, certain business men hired oriental rather than white assistants in order to cut down costs: other Caucasians feared, perhaps groundlessly, that they would be replaced by lower-salaried, oriental substitutes. There can be no doubt that this made for temporary ill-feeling in many instances.

A further source of difficulty is as follows: A large proportion of the white population are not inhabitants of the islands. The *kamaaina* or old-timer appreciates the racial problems of the islands and the policy of the administration, but the newcomer, be he soldier, sailor, trader, planter, university lecturer or just a visitor, does not, and because of this trouble may arise. Here is a difficulty which is to some extent remediable: Hawaii should educate her visitors, especially those in positions of trust, to understand her problems.

Another far more subtle obstacle is differences of racial temperament. It is an extraordinary thing that whereas the American and the Chinese usually get on remarkably well together, too often the American and the Japanese do not. Not unusually the former does not understand the proud reserve of the latter, while the Oriental takes offence too easily where none is intended and resents the familiarity and lack of dignity of the American. The Japanese are secretive and clannish and resent the least hint of white superiority. You can't slap them on the back and "kid them along." Respect their racial prejudices and they make staunch friends. The other important oriental fractions of the population, namely the Chinese and the Filipinos, are easy to handle. As for the Hawaiians, only a churl could fail to get along with them.

The road to hell is said to be paved with good intentions; hence it is not surprising that certain acts intended to benefit their wards have brought ill-will to the guardians. The Orientals have seized with avidity the generous opportunities for learning offered them by the authorities, having an even more pathetic belief in the advantages of schooling than have mainland Americans. The result is that the University of Hawaii turns out annually a large number of graduates who expect positions commensurate with the sacrifices they and their families have made and where they will be able to use the knowledge they have gained. They are doomed to disappointment, for what Hawaii mainly needs is labour for the plantations. The number of local posts suitable for university-trained men is small, and most of these are filled with Whites from the various States in the Union. Furthermore, it is useless for the Oriental to try and secure a post on the mainland, for though accounted an American citizen in Hawaii, in neighbouring California he would be regarded as an Oriental and would not be welcomed. It is the hardworking and

ambitious young men of Japanese extraction who are the chief sufferers in this respect. I have discussed this matter with several of them and there can be no question of the bitterness and disillusion in their minds. Here is another problem which is largely remediable and should be treated as an urgent question.

All these are minor difficulties, which do not detract from the innate grandeur of this great American venture. Rather should they encourage its trustees to perfect their plans and technique. There can be no doubt that this sociological experiment is one of the most interesting the world has ever seen, and that if its results are successful, as there seems every reason to hope and believe they will be, it will be a happy omen for future race relations and the eventual complete harmony of mankind.

J. S. PHILLIPS.

THE REBUILDING OF ISTANBUL.

FEW agglomerations of human beings have passed through such multifarious vicissitudes as the "city of glittering minarets" on the Golden Horn, since the ancient town of Byzantium was transformed in A.D. 330 by a Roman Emperor, in whose honour it was rebaptised Constantinople, into the new capital of the Roman Empire, replacing in that capacity the Eternal City on the banks of the Tiber. To few has it been given to exercise so profound an influence on the destinies of European civilisation considered as coextensive with Christendom. For in this respect Constantinople has been surpassed only by Athens and Rome, Jerusalem and Paris. And, even of them, none has left a trace on history geographically so far-reaching as did the great gateway on the Bosphorus between West and East.

Gone, like a d'Annunzian *sogno d'un mattino di primavera* of opalescent transparency that evaporates in the keen summer sunlight, is the old picturesque Stamboul of bygone days, the bewitching Stamboul sung by Loti thirty years ago in *Les Désenchantées*, where the captives of luxuriously appointed harems, frail, fascinating humming-birds of variegated plumage hovering in golden cages, contemplated from behind latticed windows the gradually fading vision of the city in the gathering twilight, when "everything was continuously changing like unto a mirage, no details being any longer perceptible, neither ruins nor misery nor the hideousness of some modern buildings, nothing being left but a silhouette of deep violet bordered by gold, the colossal silhouette of a city of spires and cupolas—whilst in the air the same clear, celestial voices resounded as had been heard at noon, calling, for the fourth time in the day, the faithful to prayer at this hour of the setting sun."

But the venerable Stamboul so dear to Loti, so imposing in its serene and majestic beauty when viewed from without, from the Bosphorus, yet so full of decrepitude and sordidness when seen more closely from within, is undergoing a process of rapid transformation which in some notable respects is already complete to such an extent that the bard of *Aziyadé* and *Les Désenchantées* would certainly fail, could he return from the shadowy Styx, to recognise his erstwhile beloved haunts. The harems and the veiled women are henceforth

mere indistinct recollections of what seems a dim and distant past, the melodious voices of the muezzins have long since been silent, the name itself of the city has been changed as though to obliterate still more decisively all reminiscences of what has gone before. And now a scheme for the reconstruction of the entire city along modern lines has been approved by the Turkish Government, which has entrusted the execution of the scheme to the designer of the latter, the German architect and expert in town-planning, Professor Hermann Ehlgoetz.

At the close of the Great War Allied troops occupied Constantinople, whose inhabitants had suffered grievously in consequence of the blockade. But the most fragile of *Sèvres* china proved less so than the treaty dictated at that town—which thus appropriately gave its name to one of the most ephemeral peace pacts recorded in human annals—to Turkey by the Allies in 1920. Mustapha Kemal transferred the seat of government of the Turkish Empire to Angora, which was renamed Ankara. With the crushing defeat of the Greeks in Asia Minor in 1922 and the final conclusion, after two laborious conferences at Lausanne, of peace between Turkey and her past and present foes on July 24th, 1923, the occupation of Constantinople by the Allies, during which the city reached an unparalleled degree of material decay and moral degradation, came to an inglorious end in the autumn of the same year. Despite the removal of the government and administration of the Empire to Ankara, some hope that Constantinople would be able to retain at least part of its time-honoured dignity might possibly have been encouraged by the fact that the National Assembly at Angora had elected, on November 19th, 1922, a new Sultan-Caliph who continued to reside on the shores of the Golden Horn. But on March 3rd, 1924, by another vote of the Assembly, he was deposed and the Caliphate abolished. On the other hand the commercial life of the former Ottoman capital was adversely affected by the compulsory exodus of large numbers of Greeks who were repatriated conformably with the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. So many blows rained by a pitiless fate in such swift succession proved fatal for Constantinople. Trade, already in a sorry plight, diminished still further, the population sank from over a million to less than 700,000, and inevitable ruin would have confronted the venerable residence of

Emperors and Caliphs if Mustapha Kemal, aware of the tragedy presented by so woeful a spectacle, had not decided to intervene.

The result was an international competition organised with a view to obtaining a scheme for replanning and reconstructing the city of Constantine, now known, by virtue of a decree of the Ghazi, as Istanbul. Among the various schemes presented by some of the most distinguished town-planners and architects of Europe, the jury appointed by Mustapha Kemal Ataturk unanimously selected that of Prof. Ehlgoetz. Maybe this decision was in part inspired by the fact that a compatriot of Prof. Ehlgoetz's, Prof. Jansen, has already succeeded in satisfactorily solving the problem, which at first sight appeared insoluble, of transforming the ancient Turkish provincial town Angora into the up-to-date Turkish capital Ankara, in other words of substituting order and harmony for apparently inextricable chaos. Such a remarkable achievement could not fail to inspire justifiable confidence in the ability of German town-planners and architects in general. And in this connection it is appropriate to recall the outstanding rôle played in the organisation of the new University of Istanbul, the intellectual basis of contemporary progressive Turkey, by German scholars of repute under the able direction of the Swiss Professor Albert Malche. It is but natural that the Turkey of Mustapha Kemal should appreciate the debt she owes to the methodical and conscientious pioneer work accomplished by Germans.

Prof. Ehlgoetz's plan for reconstructing Istanbul is founded on the fundamental idea of adapting the city to the pressing needs of modern times, whilst carefully retaining all those admirable monuments bequeathed by past ages which give it its distinctive character and charm, embody its time-honoured traditions, and form so many landmarks that with incomparable eloquence tell of its long history, alternately glorious and chequered. Hence it is an eminently synthetic plan, aiming at a harmonious blending of old and new. Such a plan, if it is to be successful, imperatively demands rare broadmindedness in its conception and exceptional skill in its execution. Before evolving it, Prof. Ehlgoetz took the indispensable precaution of spending several weeks in Istanbul, with a view to studying conditions on the spot. For the difficulties to be overcome are many and varied, the

possibility of innumerable complications arising must be squarely faced, and it is necessary thoroughly to grasp the situation alike as a whole and in detail.

In its main lines the scheme is as follows: The entire district of Stamboul will be transformed from top to bottom, terrace-shaped streets with low houses being laid out. Houses in the principal streets will be three, those in the others only two, storeys high, since Prof. Ehlgoetz is convinced that the preference of the Turks for small houses for one or two families will tend to become always more strongly marked in the future. The chief thoroughfare will run from the Hagia Sophia to the Bayessid Square, whilst the creation of a "communal forum" is planned so as to obviate the inconvenience now caused by the excessive scattering of the various offices of the municipal administration throughout the length and breadth of Stamboul. The scheme likewise comprises the construction of settlements on the outskirts of the city; the laying out of parks and public gardens; the erection of hospitals, schools and theatres; the improvement of the port and of communications between Stamboul and Scutari, on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus; the building of a new airport on the banks of Lake Tchekmedie, to be linked up with Stamboul by a motor road along the seashore stretching as far as the Seraglio; and, last but assuredly not least, the building of an underground railway. It is calculated that fifty years will be required to carry out the entire ambitious project. The underground railway will run from the European quarter in Pera to Stamboul, and since it will not be possible, for technical reasons, to build a tunnel under the Golden Horn, which separates the two districts, Prof. Ehlgoetz has decided that the railway will cross that strip of water by means of a bridge of boats. Between two and six o'clock in the morning this bridge—like the two already existing bridges—will be opened to enable larger vessels to pass through.

A striking example of the careful attention paid by the learned German professor to the habits and wants of the population, in whose interest, first and foremost, the transformation of Istanbul will be undertaken, is furnished by the planning of long colonnades destined to border the more important business streets. The erection of such colonnades is justified by the peculiar fondness of the Turks for offering their goods for sale in the open air, and by the desire to afford

vendors and purchasers a certain amount of protection against the inclemencies of the weather. This sympathetic consideration shown for the needs of the inhabitants well illustrates the thoroughness with which German town-planners go about their work and which is characteristic of German endeavour in all domains. And such thoroughness explains the formidable strength of German competition, it supplies the clue to the triumphs obtained by German manufacturers and traders, German engineers and architects, German chemists and technologists throughout the world.

The task awaiting Prof. Ehlgoetz appears all the more tremendous when the conditions at present prevailing in Istanbul are borne in mind. The gleaming cupolas of countless mosques, and their slender and wonderfully graceful minarets that seem to betoken an invincible yearning for the infinite, often conceal within their shadows an indescribable medley of dilapidated and evil-smelling wooden shanties still serving as though by bitter irony the purpose of human habitation. The spacious courts of erstwhile caravanserais, now mere accumulations of vermin-infested ruins, still provide accommodation for swarms of wretched tatterdemalions. That which, seen from an airplane, resembles wide patches of green meadowland turns out to be in reality waste land where thousands of houses once stood, but which to-day is covered solely by weeds and undergrowth and rubbish, the houses having been reduced to ashes in the course of one or other of the great fires that devastated Constantinople periodically during the last half-century. Among the litter and the weeds bands of unkempt and malodorous gipsies, whose only known resources are begging and stealing, eke out a precarious and nebulous existence. And these scenes of desolation and squalor are situated, not in some remote or out-of-the-way region, but within the bounds of Stamboul itself, in full view of the narrow streets through which taxicabs are incessantly bumping along at breakneck speed, oblivious to considerations either of comfort or safety, and electric trams are threading their way to the shrill accompaniment of uninterrupted bell-finging amid leisurely and kaleidoscopic crowds.

In view of conditions like these, nothing short of a radical solution can be envisaged if the twofold aim is to be accomplished of adapting Istanbul to modern requirements, whilst

retaining those of its distinctive features which have imparted to the city enduring and in many respects unique beauty. It needed the courage and the energy of a Mustapha Kemal to contemplate such a solution. If the execution of the scheme responds to the grandeur of its conception, an achievement will be added to the proud records of Istanbul and the Turkish Empire equal to, if, indeed, not surpassing any in the city's long history, since the day that witnessed the completion of the architectural marvel known to the world as the Church of the Divine Wisdom.

GEORGES CHATTERTON-HILL.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE SUDAN AND THE SUEZ CANAL.

ANOTHER attempt is to be made to negotiate a treaty wherein shall be regularised the relationship between the Egyptian and British Governments in the matter of Egypt and the Sudan. Since 1930, when the last attempt was made, and failed, to reach such an agreement, the general atmosphere of high diplomacy has so much worsened that it is now difficult for the British Government to take up the threads exactly as they were left by Mr. Arthur Henderson. What Mr. Henderson offered to Nahas Pasha in 1930 about the competence of the British forces in Egypt takes on a somewhat improvident aspect when men's minds are concerned about the general insecurity in Europe.

It happens that the Suez Canal is of immense importance in a world to which war is an unfortunately familiar possibility. It is of international importance. Since the canal was opened in 1869 its international quality has been a matter of constant diplomatic concern. In 1882, during the emergency of Arabi Pasha's revolt against the Khedive, the canal was occupied by British military forces and closed for three days. On that occasion the expedition, which was commanded by Sir Garnet Wolseley, acted under the authorisation of the Khedive. That emergency forced the question of the status of the canal into the forefront of high diplomacy. It was discussed by the Powers for several years, with the result that on October 29th, 1888, the Suez Canal Convention was signed by nine European and Near Eastern Powers, namely Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Spain, the Netherlands, Russia and Turkey. The clear and simple purpose was expressed in the first sentence of Article I thus : "The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag." In the same article it was specifically provided that "The canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade." None the less during the Great War the British navy prevented enemy ships from approaching the canal from either end. At one period of the war when the Turkish forces threatened the safety of the canal by their advance upon Egypt, the British

forces wholly closed the canal. The only two occasions on which the canal has been blocked therefore resulted from the action of the British Government. The British Government's position indeed has always been distinguished from that of the other signatories to the Convention. The Convention was ratified at the end of 1888 by all the signatories except Great Britain, who postponed ratification for the period of the British occupation of Egypt. In 1904 Great Britain with one reservation, namely that the provision for the setting up in Egypt of an International Board of Supervision be suspended, agreed to respect the Convention.

The canal itself is administered by the Suez Canal Company, which has a board of thirty-two directors, twenty-one being French, ten British (three of them appointed by the Government and the others by the shipowning concerns) and one Dutch. The British Government holds forty-four per cent. of the shares (176,602 out of 400,000, bought from the Khedive in 1875 for £3,976,582). British interest in Egyptian affairs has been active ever since 1801, when British forces drove out the French and put an end to the French occupation. The position has been anomalous ever since. It was not till Sir Garnet Wolseley defeated Arabi in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir (September 13th, 1882) that the British occupation proper was imposed. When the Great War started the British Government roundly declared Egypt to be a "Protectorate" of its own.

The modern phase of the problem results from the difficult fact that Egypt has had the legal status of an independent sovereign state since 10 p.m. on March 16th, 1922, when the Sultan made a proclamation to that effect. Lord Allenby had returned to Egypt with new British proposals which involved the conferring of such a status on Egypt. At the same time the British Government sent out instructions to British representatives abroad authorising them formally to advise the Powers that Egypt has ceased to be a British Protectorate. It was explained to the Powers that the Protectorate, which had been declared on December 18th, 1914, had been a war measure, for which there was no longer any *raison d'être*; that Egypt was to have her own Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and that Egyptian subjects abroad were no longer to be protected by Great Britain, except in so far as the Egyptian Government so desired. At the same time,

however, it was pointed out that the safeguarding of British interests in Egypt was reserved for subsequent agreement between the British and Egyptian Governments, that pending such agreement the *status quo* remained, and that the relations between Egypt and other foreign Powers were in no way affected. In other words there was proclaimed a sort of Monroe Doctrine, to be applied jointly by Egypt and Great Britain, under which foreign Powers were excluded from interference in Egypt. Egypt's independence, it is true, was proclaimed in turbulent, even farcical, circumstances. Zaghloul Pasha was zealously inflaming Egyptian opinion against the British Government. On December 21st, 1921, Lord Allenby as High Commissioner prohibited Zaghloul from taking any further part in politics, and ordered him to retire to his country house. Zaghloul vehemently refused to comply with that request, describing it as a "tyrannical order." On December 23rd he issued an inflammatory appeal to the Egyptian people, and was thereupon arrested and sent to Suez. By this time serious disorders were breaking out in Egypt. It was after the arrest of Zaghloul that the real difficulties of the British authorities on the spot and of the Government at home became apparent. On March 1st, 1922, Zaghloul was taken from Aden on board H.M.S. *Clematis* to Mahe in the Seychelles. Now it was precisely a fortnight later (March 14th, 1922) that the British Government in the House of Commons declared the independence of Egypt, which independence took effect on the night of the 16th as a result of the Sultan's proclamation. It was stipulated on the British side that, "So soon as the Government of his Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on November 2nd, 1914, shall be withdrawn."

The anomaly, therefore, consisted in this: that Egypt had been declared "an independent sovereign State," and yet British martial law was maintained, and Zaghloul Pasha, one of the Egyptian Nationalist leaders, continued to be under arrest by virtue of such martial law. It is true that in the official British declaration there was a clause which reserved certain points "to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to

conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt." The points were (1) the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt; (2) the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect; (3) the protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities; (4) the Sudan. It was also true that pending the conclusion of such agreements the British Government regarded the *status quo* in those matters intact.

Those reserved points—reserved for "free discussion and friendly accommodation" have been the continuing bone of contention between Great Britain and Egypt since 1922 to the present time. Mr. MacDonald in 1924 failed to reach an agreement with Zaghloul Pasha. Mr. Arthur Henderson in 1930 failed to reach an agreement with Nahas Pasha.

The deadlock reached by Nahas Pasha and Mr. Henderson was merely the culmination of many years of failure. But the 1930 culmination was so forbiddingly serious that six years have elapsed before even the attempt at an agreement can be resumed. To understand what now faces Sir Miles Lampson when he meets Nahas Pasha in Cairo for the preliminary conversations it is necessary to recall clearly what happened at the last Anglo-Egyptian contact. In 1930 it was arguable that never before had the circumstances been propitious for a settlement. For five years Nahas Pasha, the leader of the Wafd, the majority party in Egypt, had wielded power over Egyptian opinion but had not held office. When, therefore, at last Nahas Pasha himself not only formed a Government, a Government that commanded both office and power, but came to London to negotiate, fully aware of the policy that would greet him, it seemed reasonable to hope that something would come of it.

The eastern provinces of British influence, however, were passing through a phase of emotional disturbance. Having been developed by British money and by British skill, and her youth educated at British universities, Egypt was now feeling a certain confidence in herself, unleavened by experience or by mature common sense. Egypt, having grown up under British guidance, had been offered full independence for herself: but she went on to demand, in the manner of commonplace extravagant nationalism, that she be allowed to annex the Sudan. That was absurd. It was an old question. The

Convention of 1899, signed by the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had worked well and had developed the Sudan on sound lines. In 1899 it was taken for granted by Egyptian opinion that the Sudan had nothing to do with Egypt. There was no difficulty in allowing British capital and British brains to do what no other agency could have done for the Sudan. In 1920 Lord Milner, writing (August 18th) to Adli Yeghen Pasha, argued the continuity of that position in one sentence: "No change in the political status of Egypt should be allowed to disturb the further development of the Sudan on a system (namely, the provisions of the Convention of 1899) which has been productive of such good results." In 1922, when independence was granted to Egypt, the reservation of the *status quo* in the Sudan was made in conformity with the Milner recommendations. In 1924 Zaghloul Pasha flew the first Egyptian kite over that particular reserved point. He demanded simply that Great Britain should remove herself from the Sudan, thus to leave free the entry of Egypt into the Sudan. Mr. MacDonald recorded his view of that matter in these words: "Since going there, they [the British people] have contracted heavy moral obligations by the creation of a good system of administration; they cannot allow that to be destroyed; they regard their responsibilities as a trust for the Sudan people; there can be no question of their abandoning the Sudan until their work is done." Zaghloul Pasha went home to Cairo to register the first failure in the post-1922 diplomacy of Egypt, for by making the Sudan a cardinal point in his policy, he sacrificed what he could otherwise have obtained for Egypt. In 1927, when Sarwat Pasha came to negotiate with Sir Austen Chamberlain, a provisional agreement was reached by which the Sudan was to be respected by Egypt. Sarwat Pasha, however, commanded only a minority of opinion in the Egyptian Parliament, and on his return to Cairo, his draft treaty was swiftly killed by Nahas Pasha, the leader of the Wafd party, the dominant party. In 1929 Mahmoud Pasha in his turn came to London and duly agreed with Mr. Henderson on another draft treaty, still excluding the Sudan from Egyptian interest, but conceding the fullest and most effective independence to Egypt. Nahas Pasha reserved his view of that treaty, and at the election that took place in December 1929 refrained from making the treaty a party issue. The Wafd, as was expected, won the election,

and Nahas Pasha was therefore free to adopt the Mahmoud draft as his own, if he so desired.

He apparently decided that he did so desire, for he came to London in the last week of March 1930 to renew the negotiation on the basis of the Mahmoud draft. The main points of that draft were: (1) That the military occupation of Egypt is terminated; (2) That an alliance is concluded between the two countries; (3) That Great Britain undertakes to support an Egyptian application for membership of the League of Nations; (4) That a quasi-Monroe doctrine in diplomacy is adopted by the two countries; (5) That Egypt is henceforth responsible for foreign security in Egypt; (6) That British forces protect the Suez Canal; (7) That Capitulations cease; (8) That Ambassadors be exchanged; (9) That the status of the Sudan remains what it was after the 1899 convention.

The official record of the 1930 failure was published in a White Paper, Egypt No. 1, 1930, Cmd. 3575. The discussions started promisingly enough on the basis of the 1929 draft treaty. The promise had been illustrated by King Fuad, who at the opening of the Egyptian Parliament on January 11th had referred to the draft treaty in these words: "His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has presented to the Egyptian Government proposals which are inspired by a spirit of friendship and conciliation. Our Government will be happy to submit these proposals to you and hopes to undertake negotiations with the British Government in a spirit of conciliation and friendship with a view to a firm and honourable agreement between the two countries." At an early stage of the conference it was established that the discussions now starting would centre mainly round Articles 8 to 13 of the 1929 draft treaty. Articles 8 and 10 were considered first. Their substance was that in so far as the Egyptian Government might choose to employ foreign military instructors, such instructors should be chosen from among British subjects (Article 8), and that in so far as the Egyptian Government might choose to engage the services of foreign officials in a non-military capacity, such officials should "as a rule" be British subjects (Article 10). The only qualification asked for by Nahas Pasha on those two Articles was that they should never be construed to imply any fresh obligation upon Egypt. The British answer to that request was that whereas the British Government did not join issue with the Egyptian

Government in its desire to Egyptianise its services, yet another issue did arise, and the British Government did demand an undertaking on the part of Cairo that in so far as British officials might be eliminated, they should not be replaced by other foreign officials; that is, that they should be replaced only by Egyptians.

It was Articles 9 and 13 dealing respectively with the protection of the Suez Canal and with the independence of the Sudan that at an early stage of the Conference defined themselves as the probably cardinal issues. The Sudan was the more serious of the two, but the question of the Suez Canal was not settled without prolonged and tiresome discussion. Nahas Pasha had clearly adopted the tactic of fighting inch by inch in the hope that he would wear down Mr. Henderson's resistance. It had been agreed between Mahmoud Pasha and Mr. Henderson that British forces should be maintained to the east of longitude 32° E. It followed almost automatically from Nahas's method that he should begin by demanding that the British forces be confined to one point on the east bank of the canal. He not only made that counter proposal, but specified first Port Fuad and next Kantara as the point proposed. Mr. Henderson resisted such arguments, and Nahas Pasha in the end accepted the concentration of British forces to the west of the Canal in the neighbourhood of Ismailia, receiving in compensation the concession that the period during which the treaty would be excluded from revision should be reduced from twenty-five to twenty years. No doubt Nahas Pasha had thereby achieved his purpose. He had no doubt aimed at the bigger thing in the sole expectation of obtaining the smaller: a not unfamiliar method of bargaining whether in the East or in the West.

It was on the ill-fated Article 13 that the Conference was destined to break down, the Article namely that treated of the Sudan. It ran in the 1929 text thus: "While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future modifying the conventions of 1899, the High Contracting Parties agree that the status of the Sudan shall be that resulting from the said conventions. Accordingly, the Governor-General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred upon him by the said conventions."

In the new draft treaty as discussed by Nahas Pasha and

Mr. Henderson before Easter of 1930, an attempt was made to satisfy the Egyptian claims by two concessions. The old Article 13 (which in the new draft became Article 11) was modified by the insertion of the words "without prejudice to Egypt's rights and material interests," the full new article reading thus: "While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future modifying the conventions of 1899, the High Contracting Parties agree that without prejudice to Egypt's rights and material interests the status of the Sudan shall be that resulting. . . ." That was the first concession. The second took the form of a new sentence inserted in the text of the "Draft Exchange of Notes" whereby it would be provided that there should be "no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and Egyptian nationals in matters of commerce and immigration or the possession of property." (Paragraph 14 of the Draft Note.) Nahas Pasha not being satisfied thereby, a still further effort was made to appease him by the proposed addition of an entirely new and general provision to the effect that either party might within the next twelve months reopen the discussion of any point arising out of the working of the treaty. The new proposed Article (No. 15 of 1930 draft) ran thus: "Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 13 [which stipulated that differences about the application or interpretation of the treaty which could not be directly settled should be dealt with according to the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations] the High Contracting Parties agree, if either of them should so request, to enter into friendly discussions within one year from the coming into force of the treaty with regard to any question arising out of the application of any article of the present treaty with respect to which any difficulty may have arisen."

It was at the stage produced by these new proposals that an agreed treaty seemed likely to result. A firm agreement had already been reached about the retention of the Financial and Judicial Advisers for the full period of their contracts; and a virtual agreement had been reached about the European element in the City Police. An agreement "in principle" had been reached about the military provisions, that is about the numbers of the British military and air forces which were to be accommodated, about their location and the disposal of the properties they would vacate on being transferred to the neighbourhood of the Canal.

The cup, in fact, was near the lip. Suddenly, on the morning of April 17th, Nahas Pasha informed Mr. Henderson that he could not accept the treaty because his claims in the Sudan had not been adequately met. He asked for a copy of the proposed treaty and notes in their latest form so that he could transmit them to Cairo for consultation. The conference was then adjourned till April 29th, when a further adjournment became necessary as a result of a pantomimic and deliberately staged interlude, when a messenger was supposed to have got lost for a whole week between Cairo and London.

When the conference did again meet, namely on May 5th, Nahas Pasha presented a changed front. The existing draft treaty and note were ignored by him and he submitted instead a new draft of his own making. Its main feature was the revival of two alternative proposals for the Sudan which had in fact already been made by Nahas and rejected by Mr. Henderson before April 17th. The technique of the conference became a little twisted, for the modifications introduced in the draft now put aside by Nahas had been made in the April 17th draft in collaboration with Nahas precisely because the new proposals now revived by him had been rejected. The two alternatives, rejected in April by Mr. Henderson and revived by Nahas in May, had the common object of shelving the question of the Sudan, whence it appeared that Nahas's object was to accept the treaty without committing himself to anything in regard to the Sudan. The formulæ of the two alternatives were (1) either that the question of the Sudan be reserved for future negotiation within one year from the ratification of the treaty, or (2) that it be reserved without time limit for future negotiation and that in the meantime the *de facto* position of the Sudan as obtaining before 1924 should be restored. Mr. Henderson now for the first time showed signs of an impaired serenity. Nahas Pasha was informed without ceremony that his alternatives were neither of them more acceptable now than they had been before April 17th; that in his new draft he had omitted all reference to the new general article (No. 15) that had been inserted in the draft before; and that he himself had now added a wholly new article providing that "any agreement or declaration or other bilateral or unilateral acts which are in opposition to the present treaty are null and devoid of effect."

The British delegation now adopted a clean-cut attitude.

Nahas Pasha was informed that unless he agreed to restore the British draft of Article II, the discussion must be broken off and the treaty abandoned. Egyptian delegations, however, find it hard to accept even the plainest speaking at its face value, for it is the Eastern style to say, and to expect others to say, much more than is meant. It was not surprising therefore that on the following day (May 6th) having slept no doubt unconcernedly on the matter, Nahas Pasha started what he probably expected would be a quiet process of nibbling at Mr. Henderson. He conceded that the Egyptian delegation would accept the Henderson draft with two "minor" amendments, and on condition that the British negotiators put into writing a certain statement of their view. The two "minor" emendations would have made Article II read as follows (the emendations are given here in italics): "While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future modifying the conventions of 1899 *and settling the question of the Sudan*, the High Contracting Parties agree that without prejudice to Egypt's rights and material interests the status of the Sudan shall be that resulting from the said conventions. Accordingly, *as one of the consequences*, the Governor-General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred upon him by the said conventions." The note which the Egyptian delegation proposed should be written was to the effect that the Sudan article did not in any way affect Egypt's right to sovereignty over the Sudan and the joint administration thereof by the two High Contracting Parties. Diplomacy of such a kind is a severe test of an equable temper on the other side of the table. What in effect Nahas Pasha proposed was that he should accept Article II as it stood, on the condition that it be radically altered. Mr. Henderson contented himself with the intimation that the Nahas counter-draft and the note combined were unacceptable.

Nahas's withers however were still unwrung. Unperturbed, on the afternoon of May 6th he announced that he was now prepared to accept the original wording of the British draft article, with a new condition, namely that the High Contracting Parties agreed, if either of them should so request, to enter into friendly discussions within twelve months of the coming into force of the present treaty with regard to the application of the 1899 Conventions. He added,

however, still another proposed modification of that passage of the note which provided that there should be no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and Egyptian nationals. What he now wanted was that it be made clear that no restriction would ever be placed on the immigration of Egyptians into the Sudan.

It is impossible for human beings to go on being angry over the same provocation indefinitely prolonged, especially when the provoking agency appears to be unaware that he is doing anything amiss. It appears, therefore, that Mr. Henderson decided to make one final patient attempt to explore whatever reasonableness might lie hidden in Nahas. The attempt was begun at the workmanlike hour of 8 a.m. on May 7th and was prolonged with short intervals till 3.30 a.m. on May 8th. It therefore lasted almost continuously for nineteen and a half hours. At the end of that time such progress had been made that the treaty was agreed, and the new difficulties about the notes almost all of them bridged, with the one vital exception that an agreement could not be reached about the Sudan. No formula that Mr. Henderson could offer would satisfy Nahas in his claim for the unrestricted immigration of Egyptians into the Sudan. When Mr. Henderson, for instance, suggested that the Governor-General should undertake not to exercise "unreasonably" the right which any Government must possess, namely to control immigration in the interests of its own nationals, Nahas grimly demanded the deletion of the word "unreasonably."

The time had therefore arisen for an ultimatum. The British delegation's ultimatum was that the treaty could now be saved only if the Egyptian delegation would accept the text of the Sudan article as drafted by the British delegation on April 17th with the difference that the British delegation would accept the two minor amendments proposed by Nahas, namely the addition of the words "and settling the Sudan question" after "the Conventions of 1899," and the omission of the word "Accordingly" at the beginning of the second sentence, which would run "The Governor-General shall, as one of the consequences of the 1899 Conventions, continue . . ."

That last offer was made early in the morning of May 8th. Nahas Pasha undertook to give his answer at eleven o'clock

that same morning. He returned with his delegation at the hour arranged and announced that he could not continue the negotiations unless the British negotiators modified their position. Mr. Henderson thereupon brought the conference to an end by stating that the British negotiators could not modify the proposals they had made in the early hours.

The position in 1936 is that the Henderson treaty is no longer open for Egyptian acceptance. Sir Miles Lampson is to discuss the reserved points with Nahas Pasha in the primitive form they were given in 1922. During the past winter the riots and disturbances in Egypt, especially on the part of student malcontents, have reached a serious pitch. Sir Samuel Hoare's Guildhall speech of November 9th, 1935, in which he declared on the one hand that Britain had no intention of making the Italo-Abyssinian situation a pretext for revising her attitude to Egypt, but on the other hand that the constitutions of 1923 and 1930 had been proved unworkable or unpopular, caused widespread rioting in Egypt. At the beginning of December the Wafd took the initiative in constituting a United Front of all parties. On December 10th such a Front was duly formed, it submitted a petition to the King for the restoration of the 1923 constitution and decided to send a Note to the British Government (which was duly delivered to Sir Miles Lampson on December 12th) to the effect that all parties had now decided to accept the 1930 draft treaty. On December 11th the Government of Nessim Pasha resigned, but withdrew its resignation the following day on being informed by Sir Miles Lampson that the British Government did not go so far as to veto the 1923 constitution. On the same day King Fuad signed a rescript for the restoration of the 1923 constitution. The British answer to the note of the United Front was delivered on January 20th, its chief purport being to assure Egypt that while the earliest possible settlement was desired of the points in issue, it would be another waste of time to attempt the negotiation of a treaty unless first an informal agreement were reached about the military problem and the problem of the Sudan. It was at the same time pointed out that the British responsibility for the defence of Egypt had been enlarged as a result of the Italo-Abyssinian war.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

February 15th, 1936.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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BEFORE THE WAR.*

Though divided into parts under the names of Lansdowne, Delcassé, Bülow, Iswolsky, Aehrenthal, this is not a work of biography. For the outline of the lives and for personal details about these statesmen, readers must go to other books. Dr. Gooch's book is strictly, one might almost say severely, scholarly. He has so much to say on particular aspects or events of high politics, and has to resort to so much compression in order to say it all, that he has no space for the interesting small talk of the period, for the diarists and the intimate biographers. His object is to make full use, in measurable compass, of the enormous output of first-rate material concerning the relations of the Great Powers and the decisions by which statesmen determined or influenced these relations in the period 1895-1914. Every Great Power, except Italy, has permitted scholars of high standing to inspect its pre-War diplomatic archives, and has authorised them to make large and representative selections for publication. The various series of official diplomatic documents, referring to the pre-War period, now comprise more than a hundred volumes. These consist almost wholly of confidential dispatches, reports, letters, minutes and commentaries, never intended for publication, and written under the assumption that they would never, except as ancient history, be seen by anyone outside the office to which they were sent

* *Before the War.* By G. P. Gooch. Longmans, Green and Co. 438 pp. 10s.
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or in which they were composed. Dr. Gooch is himself, with Professor Temperley, the editor of one of the greatest of these series; and there is, almost certainly, no other scholar who has so wide and accurate a knowledge of the foreign series of documents, and, in addition, of all the historical literature which has grown up around them. The habit of weighing evidence coming from all countries and various sources, combined with a strictly judicial temperament, has ensured that this reading of pre-War diplomatic history is as nearly "objective" as it seems possible for the human mind to be.

The only criticism in respect to this that I have to make is one which may be easily rebutted. It is that Dr. Gooch for the most part refrains from comment, particularly where there is any possibility that his own personal views or principles might seem to influence his judgment. I will try and give one instance of this. In a full, yet compressed and strictly impartial—also highly interesting—account of the Lansdowne-Delcassé negotiations which produced the Franco-British Entente of 1904, it is stated that the British Government was anxious to secure the future of its free-trade principles in regard to foreign protectorates. If Morocco was ultimately to go to France, it must be a Morocco with the commercial door open to all the world. King Edward VII minuted in one of the reports submitted to him that free trade in regard to Morocco was essential. Yet when the final arrangement was arrived at between France and England in 1904 it included a condition ensuring free trade for Morocco for a period of only thirty years. Dr. Gooch simply mentions this, although I am sure that he realises the lamentable result of this concession made by Lansdowne to the principle of colonial-monopoly. Lansdowne, in spite of this detached handling, is to Dr. Gooch—and deservedly—something of a hero. His four big negotiations: with Germany in 1901, with Japan 1902, with France 1904, and with the United States throughout all these years, form perhaps the most comprehensive system of foreign policy on which any British Secretary of State ever engaged; and they were all conducted with admirable prudence and complete honesty. If the obligations involved in the Franco-British Entente had been kept by his successor within the limits defined by Lansdowne, there would have been little scope for the criticism subsequently levelled against it.

Lord Lansdowne, the calm and straightforward aristocrat at the Foreign Office, is a hero to Dr. Gooch. M. Delcassé is not a hero, but the study devoted to this statesman is the most sympathetic and satisfactory that I have read anywhere on him. The account of the Fashoda affair is thoroughly fair and well-balanced. The account of the *rapprochement* of France and Italy in the two years before the renewal of the Triple Alliance (1902) elucidates skilfully an obscure and—judging by the year 1915—profoundly important episode in diplomatic history. In this chapter on Delcassé the outstanding feature is the exhaustive use made of the *Documents diplomatiques français* along with the *Grosse Politik*. The story of Delcassé's fall, as told in this volume, is extremely dramatic; and the truth of the precise extent of the obligation into which Lord Lansdowne was prepared to enter in the Franco-German dispute is made clear. Delcassé is rightly criticised for having, at the end of an otherwise masterly series of negotiations, mismanaged the German Government. "There is no real answer to the complaints of the unskilful handling of Germany." He had also made the cardinal blunder of pressing his diplomatic activity beyond the limit which France's military resources at that time could warrant. All this criticism of Delcassé is justified, and perhaps even a little more would be in place. M. Paléologue's *Grand Tournant*, which of course has not escaped Dr. Gooch, seems to indicate that Delcassé was, in intimate conversation, something of a firebrand, with a very definite inclination towards policies of *revanche*. Bülow was right in believing that Delcassé could not keep his eyes off the gap in the Vosges.

The Bülow chapter has the advantage of having been written after the publication of the *Bülow Memoirs*, as well as the *Grosse Politik* and *British Documents*. Garvin's *Life of Chamberlain* has also been used. The deterioration of Germany's international situation under Bülow is shown, and the impossibility of the German Government's pursuing two big aims with success: a forward policy in the Near East (Bagdad Railway) and the creation of a powerful navy. Bülow, during his tenure of the position of Secretary of State and Chancellor, was in the centre of, or actively related to, all the great diplomatic problems which the other statesmen described in this volume had to deal with. There is, accordingly, as Dr. Gooch explains in his preface, some overlapping,

the same episodes being told successively with first Lansdowne in the centre ; next Delcassé holding the stage ; next Bülow, Iswolsky, Aehrenthal. Overlapping is inevitable because the essays (or chapters) are not studies of the character of each statesman, but analyses of their foreign policies. And as they were all statesmen contemporary with each other and belonging to a closely related group of Great Powers, an analysis of their foreign policies is bound to treat the same themes and, so to speak, to use the same company of actors ; each statesman has one long turn as chief actor, in the centre of the great stage of high diplomacy, and then falls back to give his colleague the turn.

This method of writing the diplomatic history of some fifteen, or rather more, years of modern Europe is amply justified. It requires more space than a direct chronological exposition would need ; but it has the advantage of making each of the chief statesmen of the period stand forth clearly : it gives him and his people a chance to show what they were doing, and the why and the how. It is quite good for the reader to go over, for instance, the making of the Entente, as between Lansdowne and Delcassé, and then between Delcassé and Lansdowne ; or to see the Bosnian affair of 1908-9—which in retrospect has something of the look of a game of blind-man's-buff with a tragic ending—first as Iswolsky tried to direct it, then as Aehrenthal won it (for the ultimate destruction of his country), and as Bülow took over a directing influence towards the end.

The narrative is admirably balanced, lucid, and orderly. It avoids the besetting vice of many diplomatic histories of losing the reader in innumerable quotations and in an infinite series of greater or smaller steps and incidents.

R. B. MOWAT.

* * * * *

PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE WAR.*

Mr. Stannard Baker's official biography of Woodrow Wilson threatens to become as long as the *Life of Lincoln* by Nicolay and Hay ; but apart from the first two volumes, which ought to have been compressed into one, there is no

* *Woodrow Wilson : Life and Letters*. Vol. 5. By Ray Stannard Baker. Heinemann. 1935. 15s.

lack of interest. That Wilson was a great and good man is not in doubt, and his part in the World War will be studied as long as that colossal event remains in human memory. Mr. Baker is a skilful writer, combining personal knowledge of his hero with unrestricted access to the documentary material.

The present instalment, described in the sub-title as *Neutrality, 1914-15*, shows the President grappling with the problem of his country's attitude during the first year of the War, and we shall doubtless have one or even two more volumes on the period up to America's intervention. His first reaction, like that of the vast majority of his countrymen, was to keep out of the scrimmage. "The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name, during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial, in thought as well as in action." One of the reasons for this reserve was his shrewd recognition of the fact that a final judgment on war guilt was impossible with the information then at his disposal. This capacity to see both sides separated him increasingly from Walter Page, who watched the titanic struggle from beginning to end through British spectacles, and who reversed the ordinary task of an Ambassador by championing British claims and interests against the rights and doctrines of his own country. "Here is a matter of life and death for English-speaking civilisation," he wrote during the troublesome controversy on the rights of neutral commerce ; "it is not a happy time to raise controversies that can be avoided or postponed." What seemed to the Government at Washington and to American traders of capital importance appeared to Page a trifle in comparison with the urgent task of beating Germany. Mr. Baker, who writes of British statesmen and British policy with marked coolness, rejects this partisanship with impatience. "We find Page," he writes, "our most important representative on the firing line, actually taking the part of our chief diplomatic opponent, playing the game of the British." The climax was reached when the Ambassador, after communicating a protest against British treatment of neutral commerce, offered Grey his assistance in framing an answer. Page was an honourable and patriotic American ; but no Ambassador of recent times has shown so little regard for the Government which he was supposed to represent.

If the strictures on Page are justifiable by the normal canons of criticism, the systematic attempt to belittle the

personality, the influence and the achievements of Colonel House is a serious blot on the book. Readers of *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, edited by Professor Charles Seymour, will be able to form their own impression of this curious endeavour to diminish our admiration for the man whom Wilson described as his most trusted friend. Mr. Baker recognises, it is true, the goodwill and idealism of the man with whom, in an evil hour, his hero was later to break; but any such recognition is quickly qualified by open or covert blame. The President wrote to House in June 1914, during his so-called peace mission to Europe: "You have, I hope and believe, begun a great thing, and I rejoice with all my heart. You are doing it, too, in just the right way with your characteristic tact and quietness, and I wish you Godspeed in what follows. I could not have done the thing nearly so well." This tribute to House's tact and quietness, declares Mr. Baker, was well deserved. "It is a fact that House had no rough edges whatsoever. He was likely to convince those he met that he understood them perfectly: he rarely disagreed with anyone openly." The President, according to his biographer, was lavish in assurances of friendship, but took care not to commit himself politically. According to Mr. Baker, House took himself much too seriously as an emissary of the President, and he declares him to have been "used by the Allies as a pawn in their deliberate and most effective policy of delay." Among other misdemeanours he was guilty of falling a victim to the charm of Sir Edward Grey. The portrait of an ineffectual idealist bustling about Europe, achieving nothing, and falling blindly into the traps set for him by designing statesmen cleverer than himself, is utterly unconvincing. It will damage the biographer's reputation, not the object of his attacks.

The praises which, in some other books, go to Colonel House are transferred in the present volume to Bryan, the Secretary of State, who, according to Mr. Baker, "looms up as the statesman of largest calibre among Wilson's advisers. His views were not only broadest and most constructive, but most in accord with the President's own conception of America's rôle in the world." That Bryan was a passionate lover of peace has never been doubted; but he was hardly the man to guide the State Department at such a critical time. As one of his Cabinet colleagues remarked, he was too

good a Christian to run a naughty world. The legal work was done by Lansing, who succeeded him when a divergence of policy on the issue of Americans sailing in belligerent ships drove him to resign.

Though the *Lusitania* crisis did not bring America into the war, it brought her near enough to the brink for Bryan to draw back in horror and alarm. The two men, so different in training and temperament, had learned to like and trust each other, and the story of their parting is entirely honourable to both. Wilson knew that the American people as a whole desired to keep out of the War, but he was prepared to take risks in defence of American interests which Bryan declined to face. Moreover, during the latter half of 1915, the President's sympathies were moving towards the Allies, and as the volume closes the emphasis begins to shift from problems of neutrality to those of military and naval preparedness.

G. P. G.

RELIGION IN VIRGIL.*

A distinctive feature in recent Virgilian criticism has been preoccupation with the poet's religion. Dr. Bailey, while not differing in the main from deductions of certain predecessors, is more concerned with the religious ideas and practices that are found in the poems; and by "a rather more detailed examination" of these "than has perhaps hitherto been made," provides justification for his own conclusions. Such investigation by a distinguished Oxford scholar and lecturer is illuminating not only to those primarily interested in Virgil's text but to students of religious development, who rightly look to the poet as a supreme revealer of Roman religious feeling. The poet's impersonality is stressed by the author, who distrusts the confidence of those who affirm: "Here we have Virgil the historian and antiquarian, there we see Virgil the man of religious convictions." The opinions of Vergilius Maro at a particular stage in his career are certainly far less important than those which he has conveyed as a poet to many generations: and certain attempts to pierce the veil of his reserve have revealed the critic rather than Virgil; but there is a personality behind the veil, as there was for Dante, who guides the convictions of scholars.

* By Cyril Bailey. Oxford; Clarendon Press. 15s. net.

Commenting on the "one passion in Virgil's life of which we may feel certain," that for the Italian countryside and the farmer's life "in which religion plays a large and vital part," Dr. Bailey concludes:

Here we feel him as something more than an antiquarian; if it is not possible to say that he believed in the existence of all and every of these ancient deities, yet it may fairly be claimed that the sense of higher powers behind the outward occurrences of life, which is the essential of an animistic religion, was to Virgil a vivid reality.

In his examination of *pietas* that "ready obedience to the will of heaven, which was also the bond of the common life in the family and the State," the author notes:

There is, I believe, only one instance in Virgil in which it can be definitely said that *pius*, the adjective, expresses human relation between man and man and nothing more; Nisus was 'renowned for his pious affection for the boy' Euryalus.

Aeneid V 295 insignis . . . Nisus amore pio pueri.

He agrees with Mr. Warde Fowler that the developing *pietas* of Aeneas, the poet's ideal personification of his race, constitutes the religious plot of the whole *Aeneid*; and that it culminates in the hero's "whole-hearted acceptance of the position assigned to him as 'the man of destiny.'" In the picture of Juppiter *omnipotens* the author sees "Virgil's highest theological conception," that of "the ultimate divine power in the guidance of the events of the world." The relations of such divine control with the caprice of fate or the ruling of destiny, exercised the ancient mind as it does our own; and Dr. Bailey demonstrates in detail his conviction (which has been disputed) that to Virgil, influenced by Stoic theory, "the will of Juppiter is in fact identical with the Fates." The poet's conventional treatment of the State Cult and its Græco-Roman gods who are little more than puppets excepting the three great deities of the *Aeneid*, is yet shown to indicate the thought of his time and to convey the majesty of Rome and its divinely ordained Empire. His attitude to Cæsar worship (recently investigated by Professor Ross Taylor to whom the author pays a tribute) is analysed as reflecting "something of the history of popular enthusiasm and Augustus' own efforts at moderation."

Concerning the speech of Anchises at the close of *Aeneid VI*, with its "audacious welding of philosophy and mythology"

in portraying the soul's purgation and purification, Dr. Bailey comments before summarising his final conclusions:

Here if anywhere, we have Virgil's own belief as to the fate of the individual soul and the cycle of its existence. It is not a consistent philosophy, it is not a clear-cut mythological picture, but is not this blending of abstract thought and concrete picture characteristic at all times of the religious mind? It is trying to conceive things which are beyond the ken of its own experience, and is forced back into a kind of visualisation in the lines and colours which it knows.

But Virgil, as the author implies, is mainly a religious poet because he recognises "the spiritual value of things and events." His profound and reiterated sympathy with suffering and sorrow reveals not "merely a 'religion of humanity,' but a deep sense, such as Christianity later consecrated, that in suffering man reaches the depth of religious experience." To our medieval forefathers the Messianic fourth *Eclogue* and *Aeneid VI* seemed to contain predictions of the Christian faith; but to us moderns it is foreshadowed rather by the poet's realisation of "ultimate triumph coming through sacrifice and suffering," a conviction which sustained his confident faith in the future of his race and mankind.

D. P. H.

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TALLEYRAND.*

In biography sympathy is essential to success, but impartiality is also essential. The model biographer is not a judge with some preconceived code by which he judges and condemns (how can the smaller man judge the bigger?), still less a counsel for the defence. He is rather an assessor, or at most an arbitrator, content to explain when he cannot excuse, who, while indicating that the credit side exceeds the debit, gives a precise estimate of each item for everyone to judge for himself. This is the standpoint that M. le Comte de Saint-Aulaire has adopted in his masterly life of Talleyrand. He sets down nothing in malice, at the same time he extenuates nothing. The book has also many other qualities to recommend it. Just as there is not one but two Frances—the non-catholic and the catholic—so in everything French, even

* *Talleyrand*, par le Comte de Saint-Aulaire, ambassadeur de France. Danod. Paris. 15 francs.

down to the Red Cross and the Boy Scouts and in French literature, there are the two points of view. Bossuet, for instance, gains in some ways from being treated from the former standpoint, but something is undoubtedly lost if the subject is not treated also by a catholic pen. Talleyrand has probably suffered from this, though one could imagine at first sight no more difficult problem than the ex-Bishop of Autun for a catholic writer to wrestle with. This, however, M. Saint-Aulaire has successfully done. He has not whitewashed Talleyrand, but he has made his conduct intelligible. Still more important is the fact that M. Saint-Aulaire, former ambassador in England and brought up in the traditions of the French Foreign Office, writes as a diplomat on a diplomat.

The chapters on the Restoration, on Talleyrand, saviour of France, and Talleyrand, saviour of Europe, are veritable masterpieces of subtle yet clear analysis of one of the most controversial, complicated, and dangerous periods through which France and Europe have ever passed. The idea clearly emerges that here was even a greater than Richelieu, with, alas, many of the vices and especially the venality of his time, who undoubtedly saved France after the Napoleonic *débâcle*, established peace in Europe, carried through the treaty guaranteeing the independence of Belgium (at 80 years of age!) and laid the foundations of the *Entente Cordiale*. The whole book is indeed an eloquent, if indirect, plea for the maintenance of the *entente*, not only for the sake of the two countries but of Europe. M. Saint-Aulaire deals equally successfully with the complex character of Talleyrand. Talleyrand's vices were largely the vices of his time and his venality also. Moreover, most of his easy-gotten wealth was spent in the service of his country. He was the greatest entertainer who entertained with a purpose, and that long before the days of Government grants. As for his supposed "treacheries" to Napoleon they are easily matched and surpassed by those of his contemporaries. As in the days of William and Anne nearly every prominent person had a footing in each camp. It was a form of insurance. The difference was that, while they thought only of their own future, he also thought of the future of his country.

What is marvellous is that Talleyrand was always able to square his own personal advantages with those of his country. The utilitarian philosophies of the eighteenth century with

their doctrine of self-interest never had an apter pupil. His unfailing common sense and moderation were the product of the age of enlightenment in which he was bred, with a throw-back to the tolerant spirit of his countryman, Montaigne. His ancient lineage, coeval with that of the French kings, furnished him with a pride that made him indifferent to popularity and unpopularity. If he sought popularity, as in London, it was as a means to an end, never as an end in itself. It was his pride that enabled him to treat with the kings of the earth and treat them as his equals when he did not treat them as inferiors. A truly remarkable book, brimful of wit and wisdom and written in the most scintillating style.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

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SAMUEL PEPYS.*

The first volume of Mr. Arthur Bryant's brilliant biography of Samuel Pepys ended with the close of the great *Diary*, and the death of his wife in 1669. Mr. Bryant now turns in his second volume, *The Years of Peril*, to that aspect of his career which has been too little known and less appreciated. An eminent Pepysian scholar, Mr. R. G. Howarth, writing in 1932 in his valuable edition of the *Letters and Second Diary*, could state that "for us the *Diary* is his personal monument and life's work"; and in a "rapid summary of the events of Pepys's life as this would, with the *Diary* years reduced to their true proportions, present themselves to his biographer," no indication was given of Pepys's achievement at the Admiralty. It is the primary purpose of Mr. Bryant in this, and still more in the next, volume to disclose the outstanding value of his work, as the great administrator "who created the English naval machine." The contemporary material handed down by Pepys is immense, and Mr. Bryant has been obliged to enlarge his biography into three volumes. The value of this second volume may be judged from the fact that "the greater part of what appears here is based on manuscript material till now unknown," and drawn mainly from the collections in the Bodleian Library and Magdalene College, Cambridge. It covers some fourteen years, closing in 1683, three years after Pepys emerged safely from the snares

* *Samuel Pepys. Vol. II: The Years of Peril.* By Arthur Bryant. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

of the Popish Plot. The reader need fear no dreary record of administrative drudgery. Rather he will be stimulated by a learned and lively narrative of a great achievement, followed by a tale of plot and counterplot more thrilling and enthralling than any fiction.

While a junior member of the Navy Board, Pepys had by industry and force of character made himself the best-informed and most indispensable official in the Service. To him was entrusted in 1669 and subsequently, the defence of the naval administration against the repeated attacks of the parliamentary and anti-papist opposition. Following the Test Act in 1673 his patron, the Duke of York, resigned his office of Lord High Admiral, which was placed in commission, of which Pepys was appointed Secretary. Henceforth, with the King's support, he exercised a powerful ascendancy over the Service and commenced his task of expansion and reform. Mr. Bryant ascribes the utmost importance to his work. "By his precept and example Pepys was to transform an inchoate and ill-directed service into the most enduring, exact and potent instrument of force seen on this disorderly planet since the days of Imperial Rome." Although his most lasting achievements were accomplished after 1683, he made an important beginning during his first period of office. The navy had long been a byword for mismanagement, conducting itself "on a rough and ready method of living with as few rules as possible and of disregarding these whenever it could." It was Pepys's purpose to create order out of chaos, to replace corruption by a higher standard of probity, and to subject the Service to rigid control from Whitehall. To this end he drew up Service Regulations, enforced the rules of discipline, and endeavoured, though without success, to stop the common practice of captains carrying freight for their private profit. Few officers had any knowledge of seamanship, and the foundation in 1677 of an Establishment for Lieutenants was a reform of the first importance and necessity, and became an invaluable precedent. Moreover, the power of birth, patronage and wealth was greatly reduced by an examination test, though Pepys himself indignantly denied ever receiving a penny in bribes. It is quite clear, as Mr. Bryant continually stresses, that his level of probity was far above that of his age. But his continuous declarations in Parliament, before Commissions of Enquiry and individuals

of his absolute rectitude, "of flawless, and to more ordinary and frail mortals, of almost insulting integrity," carry less weight than more modest claims. The accumulation of a substantial fortune, in spite of these pretensions, has not been, and perhaps cannot be, adequately explained. It appears, however, that his opponents never succeeded in proving any of their many accusations.

It was almost inevitable that Pepys should be drawn into the vortex of the Popish Plot. As closely attached to the Duke of York, who continued to exercise great influence in naval affairs after his resignation, and as one who had attracted bitter antagonism by his reforms, Pepys was an obvious target for the Shaftesbury opposition in their campaign against James and the papists. On September 28th, 1678, Titus Oates laid his charges before the Privy Council. A fortnight later the Protestant magistrate, Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey, was found murdered in a ditch. On November 1st, Pepys's clerk, Samuel Atkins, was arrested for complicity and pressed to implicate Pepys as the instigator of the murder. Fortunately Atkins remained firm, and eventually in February 1679 he was acquitted upon evidence of an alibi which Pepys used all his energy to secure. But worse followed when in May Pepys himself was charged by the Commons with Piracy, Popery and Treachery and committed to the Tower, largely through the efforts of a Colonel John Scott, an adventurer of the lowest order, employed by Shaftesbury. Released on bail in July, Pepys set to work with all his indefatigable industry, meticulous care and foresight to prepare his defence and expose the character of his accuser. He kept a detailed record of his efforts, largely directed to the underworlds of London and Paris, which is preserved principally in two huge volumes of *Mornamont*, named after a fabulous castle to which Scott laid claim in his more intoxicated hours. Examination of this material enables Mr. Bryant to provide not only a particularly vivid and exciting narrative, but also a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the purpose and nature of the anti-papist agitation. With the accumulation of effective evidence by Pepys, the prosecution languished, and in June 1680 he was discharged on a writ of Habeas Corpus. Three years of retirement were followed by his departure on the Tangier Expedition in 1683, with which the third volume is due to open.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The Italian case against Abyssinia is vigorously put in a little volume called *Ethiopian Realities** by Major Polson Newman, who is convinced that a large section of the British public has been misled by "ignorance and prejudice" scarcely in keeping with its inherent "love of justice and fair dealing." This book, however, contains little more than the stock arguments already widely disseminated by sections of the Press and through Italian propaganda. After a short historical survey dating from the reign of Theodore in 1855, Major Polson Newman gives a picture of Abyssinian conditions, including frontier incidents, based upon his own experiences and, *inter alia*, the Italian memorandum to the League, which he fails to acknowledge. It should be noted that he gives as "a typical instance" of frontier raids a case where fourteen Italian subjects were killed, twelve wounded, seven captured as slaves and five children castrated. The Italians allege in their Memorandum more than sixty incidents of actual or threatened raiding from February 1923 to the end of May 1935. Apart from the Walwal clash, where each side has been adjudged free from blame, Major Polson Newman's "typical" example was only exceeded in the number of killed on one occasion. In more than twenty incidents no casualties are alleged at all, while in most of the remainder the casualties amount to several killed or wounded. A case of death by mutilation and one unsuccessful abduction are alleged. The author's argument is not assisted by such exaggeration. In addition to the outworn contention that Italy has to protect, by aggression, her African colonies from the aggressive Abyssinians who "have been arming themselves at an ever-increasing rate," Major Polson Newman argues the case on the basis of Italy's need for expansion. The August proposals for economic development under League supervision could not be made effective by the League. Armed conquest is a necessary condition and the needs of highly civilised Italy should take precedence over corrupt, barbaric and reactionary Ethiopia. Among other arguments the author maintains that Abyssinia has failed in her League obligations and that Italy was adjudged the aggressor on the "most irregular principle of silence"; he exploits the war scare over sanctions and makes also the extraordinary remark that the "humiliation of Italy would lead to the gravest dangers to the British Empire wherever native races come under British rule." This book, however, evades some of its facts and arguments may be, evades the fundamental reality of the dispute which involves the sanctity of international treaties and the rule of law and which provides the clearest case for the application of the League machinery.

* Allen and Unwin. 3s. 6d. net.

The valuable American survey of post-war dictatorships contained in *New Governments in Europe* has been followed by a useful volume of some six hundred pages dealing with the parliamentary democracies of England, France and Switzerland. This series, to be continued by a study of the presidential system in the United States, is designed as a whole to "serve the needs of classes in comparative government, whether American or European" and to enlighten the general reader. The section on "English Government and Politics" in *Democratic Governments in Europe** has been contributed by Professor Eugene P. Chase, who has produced an instructive analysis of the Constitution. It needs, however, to be implemented by the detail and more meticulous accuracy of Dicey's work. His able survey of recent political history and contemporary tendencies is unfortunately tinged with partisan bias, as exemplified in his accounts of the General Strike and the crisis of 1931. Professor Robert Valeur is responsible for a valuable general picture of French political organisation and present conditions. He concludes that "the immense majority of the French people remain deeply attached to the democratic ideal." While agreeing that the problem in France is one of strong government, he considers that the reforms in Parliament are less needed than "in the administrative organization of the country." M. Doumergue's recent proposal to give the Executive the power of dissolution "should be discarded as dangerously reactionary." Professor Raymond L. Buell has contributed an admirable summary of the Swiss democracy with its great achievement in combining cabinet stability with positive parliamentary control. The Swiss system, however, is entitled to far more consideration than is possible in fewer than thirty pages.

We Did not Fight† is a collection of essays by eighteen war resisters of 1914-18. A good part of them consists of reminiscences of their protests and endurances and sufferings, recorded after twenty years in a moderate tone and in no bitterness of spirit. The resisters range from members of the Society of Friends and pacifists pure to political opponents of the Government, socialists and communists, with two or three contributors from abroad. The one bond of union between these various writers was their opposition to the taking of life and their condemnation of the war. Only one of the eighteen, Sir Norman Angell, deals with the reasons which led to Great Britain going into the war, or considers at all what the nation as a whole should or should not have done. Lord Allen of Hurtwood advocates total unilateral disarmament. Some magnificent propaganda was done, but after these two first papers the whole matter is treated from the point of view of individual resistance. Several of the writers are pure individualists. *We Did not Fight* is a very readable book and there is one lighter

* Nelson. 10s. 6d. net.

† R. Cobden-Sanderson Ltd. 7s. 6d.

chapter on the Ford Peace Ship. The work of the Friends' Ambulance Service is movingly described; there are accounts of alternative service; the work and aims of the Union of Democratic Control and of the No Conscription Fellowship are set forth; and Mr. Harry Pollitt relates the story of the dockers' successful strike against the transport of ammunition to Poland.

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Dr. Ernest A. Baker in the fifth volume of his monumental work on *The History of the English Novel** discusses "the novel of sentiment and the Gothic romance" during the second half of the eighteenth century. His recent sixth volume is almost entirely confined to appreciations of Maria Edgeworth, Jane Austen and Sir Walter Scott, bound in spite of their obvious diversity by a common bond of realism. Though both the domestic novelists "were writing in the period of the Romantic movement . . . they were both untouched by it," while Scott retained a fundamental trait of realistic expression. "With all his romantic predilections, he could not help being a realist." The full tide of romanticism in English fiction was not reached till the time of the Brontës. Dr. Baker writes with his usual erudition and insight and has made valuable contributions to the study of the three novelists. The publication of the next volume, probably to end with Dickens and Thackeray, is eagerly awaited.

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Mr. F. H. Crossley's attractive volume on *The English Abbey*† will help to satisfy a popular need. It provides a general pictorial survey of our great heritage of monastic architecture in some 150 excellent photographs and sketches. As Mr. Ormsby-Gore says in his Foreword: "it will serve to bring home to many the vast extent and variety of monastic remains in England." Their full appreciation demands a knowledge of their historic *raison d'être*, and Mr. Crossley has compiled from existing authorities an able account of the daily life, work and characteristics of the medieval monasteries and "of the ideals which governed the monastic outlook and work." No references are given but an epilogue contains a short bibliography. In addition there are several ground plans of monasteries and a useful list of the more important remains of English and Welsh abbeys arranged under counties.

* Witherby. 16s. net each volume.

† Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

APRIL 1936.

THE OUTLOOK.

FOR the moment, the title of this article is a misnomer. As I write, on March 12th, thick fog obscures international vision. The keenest political sight can descry only moving objects in hazy outline. After the conference of the Locarno Powers, without Germany, and the extraordinary session of the League Council in London, the position, for worse or for better, may be clearer. To-day one can do little more than ask how that position arose, and try to answer.

Things have been working toward it for months and years, especially since Germany repudiated Part V—the disarmament clauses—of the Versailles Treaty on March 16th, 1935. The old wrangle over the moral obligation implied in the preamble to those clauses—whether Germany ever kept her undertaking "strictly to observe" them, or whether she was virtually released from it by the failure of other Powers to disarm—is dead as mutton and futile to boot. It was out of the question to keep a great, warlike people in the centre of Europe, a people with the tradition of the "Wars of Liberation" in its heart, permanently subject to unequal military restrictions. The only safe course would have been to make betimes by collective responsibility adequate provision for security against war, since on this basis alone could disarmament become practicable. Great Britain refused so long to take this course that we are by no means entitled to-day to see only the moles in the eyes of others. All talk of our having, by neglecting our own defences, "set an example" which foreign countries reprehensibly failed to follow is sanctimonious fudge. The truth is that we demobilised our minds concurrently with the demobilisation and reduction of our fighting forces—mainly in order to save our own pockets—and that peace can no more be ensued by demobilised minds than war can be waged with demobilised armies.

So, with sober and chastened eyes, let us see how things came to their present ugly pass. At the outset we must set down our refusal and that of France to stand firmly against Japanese aggression in Manchuria during the early autumn of

1931. It could have been done then without firing a shot, as I knew on high and conclusive Japanese authority. We and France lacked the vision, the courage and the will—and we had the reward we deserved. Had our policy been clear-sighted and firm Japan would not have left the League, her liberal elements would have curbed the military party, Germany would not have been encouraged to imitate the Japanese example, and Italy would not have drawn the natural conclusion that a strong League member could assail a weak member with impunity. In the circumstances, and given the nature of Fascism, Italy's behaviour could be foreseen, as it was foreseen and predicted a year ago by those who knew the facts.

Hitler's repudiation of Part V of the Versailles Treaty on March 16th, 1935, was the beginning of the writing on the European wall. We protested feebly, in the fond belief which our bemused Ministers shared and encouraged, that we still held a good margin of superiority over Germany in the air. Then, in Berlin at the end of March, the luckless Sir John Simon heard the brutal truth from Hitler's lips. Still, anxious to think well of all, we listened with glad ears to Hitler's undertaking on May 21st that Germany would scrupulously observe the freely negotiated Locarno Treaties and respect the Rhineland demilitarised zone. Even more attracted were we by his offer to be content with thirty-five per cent. of British naval strength. Conversations, announced as "exploratory," presently began in London. When Hitler's proposals turned out to be not "exploratory" at all, but a take it or leave it offer with an intimation that German demands would be higher in future, we signed the Naval Agreement without consulting France or the other signatories of the lacerated Versailles Treaty. We made Germany a present of the Baltic, overlooked the fact that the German thirty-five per cent. of our strength is in practice more nearly seventy per cent., and consented to an increase of German submarine tonnage up to one hundred per cent. of ours if "in the opinion of the German Government" this should be necessary.

Europe and the world rubbed their eyes. France tied a knot in her handkerchief. When it became plain at last that Mussolini meant to attack Abyssinia at all costs, and our Government, mindful of Lord Cecil's Peace Ballot and of the impending general election, sought to save the League from

final discredit and to restrain Italy, M. Laval gave reluctant lip-service to the French principle of collective security, which we had at length espoused, and willing hand-service to Mussolini with whom he had struck a military bargain. At the same time a storm of vituperation against us burst forth in organs of the French Press which M. Laval would not have been wholly unable to control, and the lives of the plucky French writers who withstood it were made a burden to them, not without M. Laval's approval. This time it was England who tied a knot in her handkerchief.

Hitler, far more astute than M. Laval, watched these things without tears. He maintained a careful show of "neutrality" lest he, too, offend us—and it has long been his policy to get and to keep Great Britain in his pocket. Inwardly he quaked lest League action succeed in curbing the aggression of a Fascist State, and his secret intercourse with Rome was not altogether in harmony with the public manifestations of German policy. Then came the egregious Hoare-Laval "Peace proposals," which did untold harm throughout Europe and in the United States. The emphatic repudiation of them by British public feeling helped to restore our moral credit in the eyes of the world without undoing all the evil. Between the publication of the "proposals" and their rejection the following little masterpiece of a telegram from Berlin appeared in *The Times* of December 14th. It ran :

From Our Own Correspondent.

Berlin, Dec. 13th.

Opinion here scarcely conceals its satisfaction with the turn of events in the Abyssinian dispute. For a country which is as anxious to cement permanent friendship with Great Britain as to avoid rejoining the League of Nations, things could hardly have turned out more happily. There are no reproaches directed against the British Government here.

German anxiety over the prestige which the League had gained as a result of vigorous British leadership has sensibly diminished. The latest international developments have revived high hopes, however short-lived they may be, among those influential Germans who, at heart, did not want to be compelled, by a success of the League policy, to consider returning even to a reformed League. They see the League system collapsing, Great Britain estranged from France and amenable to German overtures, yet, at the same time, no Mediterranean war and Italian Fascism saved, if weakened.

One would have thought that so clear an analysis of the German view—and so plain a warning—would have been heeded both in this country and in France. It is true that France, after much humming and hawing, hawing and wavering, did agree to stand by us in the Mediterranean should Italy make good her threats to attack us. It is also true that France sought to extract from us, in return for the fulfilment of an obligation to which she was clearly committed by the League Covenant, specific promises to requite like with like in other directions. Her action was comprehensible—and psychologically mistaken. She would have been better advised to insist that, in return for her promise, we should not waver in making League action against Italian aggression strong enough and firm enough to bring the Italo-Abyssinian war swiftly to an end with a triumph for collective security. Meanwhile Hitler was watching and waiting, not without misgivings. Germany's economic, financial, and industrial plight was daily growing more difficult. Even a rich country—and Germany is not rich—could not spend £1,500,000,000 upon rearmament in three years without feeling the strain. Dr. Schacht was hard pressed. Despite his invention of a bewildering variety of marks, and notwithstanding his intimation to Poland and Central European States that the, roughly, £100,000,000 which Germany owes them for goods received could only be paid for by their acceptance of German manufactures, the anxious feeling spread that sooner or later, perhaps sooner than later, something must crack somewhere.

Now Adolf Hitler is at his best when dealing with this sort of situation. He withdraws into his shell, weighs all the chances and then acts with that "somnambulistic sureness of decision" which his former mentor, Gottfried Feder, defined twelve years ago as the highest attribute of Nazi leadership. There was talk of a new "clean up." Dr. Schacht is not beloved of the Nazi extremists whom Hitler does not think it prudent altogether to estrange. The disadvantages of shooting them, or of letting them shoot Dr. Schacht, seemed to balance each other. This time, too, the Reichswehr might have a word to say, and say it with machine-gun and rifle as foreshadowed by Hitler's new "shoot at sight" decree, a document strangely like certain orders given by William II in his early days. Besides, another "clean up" might shake German

credit and cause Dr. Schacht's elaborate house of paper to collapse. For similar reasons the Jews were unsuitable objects of a real diversion. Julius Streicher and other of Hitler's special cronies would have welcomed a "hot" pogrom, seeing that their relentless "cold" pogrom was losing its spectacular virtue; but the obnoxious Schacht was inveighing even against the "cold" pogrom as damaging to German economic interests, and in any event so much life has already been beaten out of German Jewry that little more political capital could be looked for in that direction.

So Hitler felt he must choose his ground carefully this time. The prospective increases in British armaments for the purpose of upholding collective security made him wonder whether, after all, he had England quite in his pocket, and the treatment of the Heidelberg University celebrations by English universities, led by Oxford and Birmingham, intensified his doubts. True, he could count upon the zeal of his British dupes and "dopees," including several noble lords (with one ex-Minister) and some members of the faithful Commons, to work upon British opinion and deepen the impression in Germany that England favours Nazism. But this was not enough. He had to do something that would arouse German patriotic fervour, enable him to get another snap plebiscite, as after the Saar vote, and to do it in such a way as strongly to appeal to British idealistic, peace-loving sentiment.

Shrewdly did he choose his moment and method. Having worked up a measure of antecedent resentment in a campaign against "encirclement" by the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact, he ignored the French offer to submit the alleged incompatibility of that pact with Locarno to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague—as the Franco-German arbitration treaty bound him to do—sent troops into the demilitarised zone and tore up the Locarno Treaty on the morning of March 7th. It is said, on what should be good authority, that some of the Reichswehr leaders were aghast at his decision and that they awaited very anxiously the "reactions" of France and of England. Hitler is stated to have told them that he knew the English far better than they did. When he learned what the British Press was saying on the morning of Monday, March 9th, he may well have smiled a superior smile. It is too early to say whether he was right or wrong. Had it not been for the folly of France, under M.

Laval's guidance, in refusing to understand that the best way to curb Hitler would have been to back Great Britain and the League whole-heartedly in bringing Mussolini to book, he might swiftly have been proved to be wrong. In this sense it is true that, by occupying the demilitarised zone and tearing up the Locarno Treaty, Hitler presented France with the bill for M. Laval's breakages; and the question how far and in what way the "Locarno crisis" will react upon the Italo-Abyssinian conflict is still a major term of the international problem.

At bottom the whole position turns upon the validity of international engagements. This is why the British Government could not condone Hitler's violation of a treaty which a former German Government had proposed, helped to negotiate and voluntarily signed. To have condoned it would have been to admit that any and every treaty or agreement can be set aside with impunity as soon as one of the parties to it finds its obligations irksome or wishes to score a success in home politics by rejecting them. All treaties and agreements circumscribe sovereignty. Without these curtailments of sovereignty there can be no concerted rules of international conduct, let alone anything resembling a community of nations. No law-abiding community can allow any of its members to be a law unto himself; and no nation which, like ours, sets store by fidelity to international engagements or respects its plighted word can admit the German doctrine that a treaty-making nation is always entitled to be judge in its own case.

This doctrine is by no means new. Hegel laid it down clearly when he repudiated Kant's humanitarian proposal for a League of Peace and argued that, though States may make stipulations with each other, the State must at the same time stand above such stipulations and judge for itself what it will treat as a matter of honour, especially when, after a long period of peace, it has to seek an occasion for activity beyond its borders. It need not, Hegel taught, wait for any actual injury. The idea of a threatening danger is enough. Preventive or anticipatory wars are therefore justified. They need not be waged for any philanthropical purpose, since the State has to think of its own well-being, and its well-being is superior to that of any individual, within its own confines or without. Even Bismarck did not go quite the whole length with Hegel

in his famous speech of February 6th, 1888, after the publication of the Austro-German Treaty of Alliance, which had been concluded in 1879. Bismarck said:

I do not think we could not have made this treaty; had we not made it then we should have to make it to-day. It has the foremost virtue of an international treaty in that it is the expression of lasting reciprocal interests both on the Austrian side and on ours. In the long run no Great Power can stick to the letter of any treaty in contradiction to the interests of its own people; it is compelled at last to declare quite openly: times have changed, I can do this no longer—and before its own people and the other contracting party it must justify itself as best it can.

Hitler sought to justify himself as best he could by alleging the incompatibility of the Franco-Soviet pact with the Locarno Treaty—though he was careful not to mention the opening clause of Article I of the Franco-German arbitration treaty which was concluded at Locarno simultaneously with the main treaty or Western Security Pact. This Article runs:

All disputes of every kind between Germany and France with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down hereafter. It is agreed that the disputes referred to above include in particular those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

This mention of Article 13 of the League Covenant refers obviously to the salient clause of that Article which says:

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.

Not only did Hitler ignore Germany's obligations in this respect towards France but he ignored her identical obligations towards Belgium who is not a party to the Franco-Soviet Pact and cannot therefore be affected by it. Hitler marched his troops into the demilitarised zone along the Belgian frontier as unceremoniously as he sent them into the zone

contiguous with French territory. Clearly, if international engagements have any value at all, he has not a leg to stand upon. And even if it be argued that, after all, his action was only natural because Germany could not be expected indefinitely to tolerate the exclusion of her troops from a part of her soil, it is not easy to gainsay M. Sarraut's argument that "the existence of a demilitarised zone is not a disgrace; for sixty-seven years France knew the demilitarisation of Savoy. She released herself only by negotiation."

Thus it seems indispensable that Hitler's act should be formally condemned if he be unwilling to make amends by purging his contempt of Germany's plighted word. Unless he does this it is hard to see what good purpose there would be in taking up the more or less constructive proposals by which he sought to mitigate that contempt, or in imagining that Nazi Germany, as a self-convicted and impenitent treaty-breaker, could be an honoured member of the League of Nations. It may be true that "symbolic" abstention from fully militarising the demilitarised zone would not alter the fact that trained German troops, disguised as "Provincial Police," have for some time occupied the zone in large numbers; but it is the "symbolic" act that needs equally "symbolical" redress before Hitler's asseverations of peaceful intent and promises of future good behaviour, in the League and elsewhere, can be taken seriously. Otherwise many a shock may be in store for Europe, not least in Austria where Herr von Papen is busily promoting the return of the Archduke Otto to Tyrol, so that this manifestation of Hapsburg "legitimism" may be resented by Hitler as an act of intolerable defiance and be punished by German military intervention.

Upon the British Government and, even more, upon the exponents of British public opinion, heavy responsibility now rests. If they allow the impression to prevail in Germany, and especially among the millions of good and honourable Germans who loathe Nazism and its ways, that the people of this country care nothing for the freedom of other peoples, that they worship only the Colossus, Adolf Hitler, without perceiving his feet of clay, and are content with lip-service to international right, they may drive despairing Germans to place their hopes in revolutionary Communism and to turn their backs upon what have hitherto been regarded as the principles of Western civilisation. So great a betrayal of

everything which the name of England has meant to Europe would surely not go unavenged. If we want to see a free and peaceful community of European peoples arise one day, when present madresses shall be overpast, we have now a chance to help in laying its foundations.

But our time for decision may be short. Carlyle's version of Goethe's injunction was never more pregnant: "Choose well; your choice is brief, and yet endless."

WICKHAM STEED.

P.S.—March 17th. The outlook is still hazy, and may grow darker. German acceptance of the invitation to attend the League Council on an equal footing with France and Belgium is a point to the good, especially as it came after the intimation that "it is not for the Council to give to the German Government the assurances" that Herr Hitler's proposals would be dealt with *alsbald*, or "in due course."

This is something. It may not be much. The question indeed arises whether Great Britain ought not to underpin negotiations for future arrangements by pledging herself formally to fulfil her Locarno obligations towards France and Belgium in case of German attack. By his act Hitler transformed the main Locarno Treaty into an Anglo-Franco-Belgian defensive alliance. This position may need to be stabilised before France and Belgium are ready to enter into wider European pacts. And since, in the last resort, the position corresponds to the permanent British interest in the safety of North Western Europe, its maintenance might be both timely and wise.

More doubtful, and perhaps dangerous, is the French demand that, if and when The Hague Court affirms the compatibility of the Franco-Soviet Pact with the main Locarno Treaty, and if Germany fails to bow to such a sentence, guarantees shall be given for the enforcement of the sentence. That way serious Franco-British disagreement may lie, particularly in view of the idea that "sanctions" against Italian aggression should be called off as the price of Italian help in shoring up the Locarno principle. The hard facts are that Italy made war upon a League member in defiance of treaties and of the Covenant, whereas Germany tore up a treaty without making war. If the moral distinction between these facts be ignored, faith in the League may vanish.

W. S.

THE GOVERNMENT REARMAMENT PROGRAMME.

AT last the Government's long-awaited programme for rearmament has been given to the world in the form of a White Paper covering eighteen and a half pages. It is a very puny affair compared with the highly coloured anticipations which have been held out with regard to it for some months past: indeed, there is practically nothing in it that was not already known or anticipated.

Four years ago, when the then National Government was at the beginning of its career, the attention of the world was concentrated on quite another aspect of the armaments problem, viz. the Disarmament Conference. What a contrast to the position to-day! For this lamentable transformation the Government itself bears a very heavy measure of responsibility. If they had during all that period acted with the courage, vision, firmness and consistency displayed by Mr. Eden on so many occasions, the situation of the world would be vastly different. Other countries must, of course, bear their share, but we, as the natural leaders of Europe and the world, cannot escape heavy condemnation for the weakness, indecision and lack of clear policy displayed, first in dealing with the Manchurian crisis, and then in missing the various opportunities for decisive action which arose during the Disarmament Conference. Nothing has been more extraordinary than that, in spite of all this, the Government should have been returned to power at the General Election with an overwhelming mandate to pursue a vigorous League of Nations policy. At that moment the country believed that the past record was closed, and a new chapter opened. How speedy was their disillusionment the Hoare-Laval proposals showed. It is clear that, apart from the new Foreign Secretary's influence, fundamentally the position is not altered, and only the constant pressure of public opinion can hope to maintain an enlightened League policy.

The Government's statement relating to defence, as the White Paper is called, cannot be considered apart from policy. The two are entirely interdependent. Most people will feel, and it is perfectly true, that in a world that is rapidly rearming, and which possesses an almost self-designated aggressor in the person of Germany, rearming

more vigorously than all, it is necessary for this country not to be left behind in so deplorable a race, and that any contribution made by us to the maintenance of world order through the collective system must be worthy of, and on a scale consistent with, our great position. What is in doubt, however, is whether the Government have, apart from admirable verbiage, any real intention of taking any practical step to see that our increased forces are related to and co-ordinated with the contributions which other nations are prepared to make for the same object. It has been made clear that the Government have no intention of consulting other nations on this subject. This means that each country will remain the sole individual judge of what share it should take in the collective system. Such a situation is little more than the pre-war system of purely national rearmament. I do not believe that the people of this country will ever be prepared to enter into the old-fashioned, obsolete, all-against-all, war of the 1914 type, but I do believe they would respond and risk all if it were clear that they were making sacrifices for the organised maintenance of world peace through the League of Nations and that every alternative had been exhausted.

What causes one to doubt the sincerity of the Government is the fact that in the one practical test that has been available, the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, they have consistently repudiated with horror the suggestion that in any circumstances would they take action which might involve the use of the armed forces of the Crown. Such a risk must be taken if we really mean to make the League triumph over the aggressor now, and so go a very long way towards making certain that force on a vastly larger scale will not have to be used a few years hence. The White Paper states: "Taking risks for peace has not removed the dangers of war." But the Government have steadily refused to take such risks.

The only step that will show the sincerity of the Government and win them nation-wide support is that they should pursue a policy directed towards securing a halt in the arms race, and then as soon as possible a measure of disarmament, together with an attempt to work out the international co-ordination of defence, and that they should pursue these things as vigorously as the present programme of rearmament. They should invite the League of Nations immediately to tackle these problems, and conversations should be initiated,

for example, with the signatories to the Locarno Treaties by which their technical military staffs should be asked to work out plans for possible joint action against an aggressor, whether that aggressor be Great Britain, France, Germany or any other state. At the moment of writing the future of the Locarno treaties is in doubt, but the principle remains unaltered.

The second section of the White Paper deals with the actual proposals for the three different services. A good deal is said about the unsatisfactory state of our preparedness at the present time, lack of reserves of ammunition and stores, etc. This is surely a very grave reflection on the Government itself, for it has had responsibility in all these matters during the past four years. The present proposals might all have been predicted, as they are in line with traditional developments, and do not show any freshness of outlook or appreciation of the changed position through the development of aerial warfare. The Navy, for instance, has reverted to its seventy-cruiser programme in place of the fifty that recently has been considered sufficient by the Admiralty. The two new battleships arise naturally as part of a replacement programme. There is an increase in the strength of the Army by four new battalions of infantry, and the equipment is to be brought up to date. No information is given as to the duties of the British Army in the event of war, whether our contribution to the collective system will include the despatch immediately of an expeditionary force to the Continent as in 1914, or whether it will be limited to naval and aerial action, at any rate at the beginning. Surely the country is entitled to know just what will be expected of them, just as other countries must know. The assignment of specific duties, for instance, to the Territorial Army and the provision of modern armament and material should do much to encourage recruiting and restore interest therein.

There is to be an increase in the number of aeroplanes, bringing the first-line strength of the Royal Air Force up to 1,750 aircraft, excluding the Fleet Air Arm. It would, of course, be quite hopeless to rely on this alone for the protection of London, by far the greatest target in Europe. A one-power standard would not help us. It is essential that we should be able to rely on the aerial forces of other members of the collective team, and steps to secure this should be taken at once. It is interesting to note that in the case of the

Mutual Aid Pact between Russia and Czechoslovakia, Soviet air officers have been examining Czechoslovak ground organisation and supply arrangements, in case an attack on the latter country should demand the fulfilment of the pact. That is the way to make it a reality.

In the third section of the White Paper, the supremely important question of the control of the three services is dealt with. It is admitted that the old system by which the services were represented independently by three ministers in the Cabinet is extremely unsatisfactory. It usually meant that the one with the strongest personality obtained the larger share of what was available for distribution, and that the needs of the defence of the country as a whole were never considered on their merits. This has involved an enormous waste of money in past years. The conflict is, of course, mainly between the Navy and the Air Force, and it still rages.

It was recommended by the Salisbury Report of 1923 that a Cabinet Minister should act as Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on which the chiefs of the staff of the three services sit, and indeed in the first Labour Government in 1924 Lord Haldane acted effectively in such a position. The practice was unfortunately abandoned by the subsequent Conservative Government, and has never been restored. The vital point is that there should be a powerful and able minister devoting his whole time to these joint problems, acting as chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, able to insist that all the problems be faced and decisions taken and that where no agreement can be reached he himself should report to the Cabinet, by whom the decision would be made. He should further be supported by a competent personal staff recruited from officers who have passed through the Imperial Defence College, of whom there are now more than 150 available, many of them not effectively employed. This should place him in a position to advise the Cabinet ultimately as to how much money should be allocated to each of the three services. This would carry with it a reduction in the importance of the offices of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for Air.

Let us see how these points are met by the Government proposals as outlined by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on February 27th. The new minister is to be

Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence and of the Defence Policy and Requirements Committee, but it is not proposed that the meetings of chiefs of staff committee should normally take place under his presidency, and it is laid down that there shall be no weakening of the responsibility of individual service ministers; further, he is to be burdened with the immense detail of the principal supply officers committee as chairman. These are fundamentally unsatisfactory points. While it is clear that this appointment will represent an advance on the present position, it is far from making the changes that are necessary. Everything depends on the personality, prestige and drive of the Minister appointed, and it was a grave misfortune that his name was unknown during the debate. The Minister should be appointed first and the allocations for armaments made afterwards as part of his job. This process has been reversed. The appointment of Sir Thomas Inskip makes it evident that the Government do not intend the position to develop as indicated above in a major key. The late Attorney-General is one of the most admirable characters in politics, and can be trusted to carry out the task in the manner desired by the Prime Minister. But that is emphatically not what the situation demands. In short, it would appear that the service departments have conquered, and that resolute central control will not exist. Tradition and habit are still blocking the way towards efficiency and economy.

The White Paper does not clearly set forth the very powerful reasons that exist for a rearmament programme on a collective basis in the present state of the world. The real reason is, of course, the German menace, recently reinforced by the repudiation of Locarno, and the flagrant violation of the demilitarised zone. However much the ex-allied states may have contributed towards creating the present situation in Germany (and their responsibility is very great), none the less, the position as it is must be faced and dealt with. Germany is not ready for aggression at the moment. She will not have the one million reserves she needs until from three to five years have passed, but if her present mood persists she will then certainly use her overwhelming might unless, of course, she can get her unreasonable demands satisfied without resort to force. The only thing that can prevent a world war in such circumstances is the knowledge that there exists

through the League of Nations a body of states possessing such overwhelming military strength that it will be useless for Germany to think of resisting. If she at any time, altering her present policy, desires to enter the collective system as a loyal member, she will be heartily welcomed. No state is likely to figure for ever on the aggressor list. Those who from time to time inscribe their names there must be made to realise that they are adopting a course which will be no more tolerated in a civilised world than is street fighting in a civilised country.

The two days' debate in the House of Commons called forth some notable speeches, the most outstanding being those of Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Lloyd George. The former was in his best form, and made a far more effective defence of the White Paper than any Minister. The latter was on ground very familiar to him, and he was listened to with the deepest attention by a fascinated House.

That the Government failed to make good the case for the White Paper is best shown by the attitude taken up by the members of the Liberal Party. The position of the Government supporters and Labour Party was definitely fixed beforehand, but the Liberals were quite prepared to be convinced that the right course in the circumstances was to support the Government. In view, however, of the Government spokesmen's failure to make any adequate reply to the very able and effective speech and to the series of questions put by Sir Archibald Sinclair with regard to many of the points already referred to, they decided to vote against the White Paper policy, without prejudice, however, to a consideration on their merits of the actual estimates when they come forward. Much attention was paid by Labour speakers to the difficulties that will arise in connection with the Government's proposals for dealing with the labour problem in munition making, and much misgiving exists.

If the Government will fill out their one-sided and indefinite programme with a resolute call to the nation to support a policy which attacks the international situation at all angles with equal vigour simultaneously they may well obtain the whole-hearted support of the nation regardless of party. If they will not do so we shall as a nation be hampered by division, and there will be determined opposition to a policy which will be regarded in many circles as purely national.

GEOFFREY MANDER.

WAR NEED NOT COME.

IN his latest message to Congress President Roosevelt spoke of certain nations having "impatiently reverted to the old belief in the law of the sword." He remarked upon the "growing ill-will, the marked trends towards aggression, the increasing armaments, the shortening tempers—a situation which has in it many elements that lead to the tragedy of general war" (January 3rd, 1936). The situation envisaged by the American President is wider and far more serious than the conflict in Abyssinia or its repercussions in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Signor Mussolini threatens, it is true, that if further steps are taken in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations to preserve "the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of Abyssinia "against external aggression" from Italy, the result may be European war. If the League stops Italy's war and demonstrates that aggression does not pay, Signor Mussolini will no doubt have some difficulty in maintaining his position as Dictator of Italy. Rather than suffer a gradual diminution of his present power he may prefer to disappear altogether; and he may think that nothing less than a European holocaust will provide him with a worthy funeral pyre. This danger, such as it is, must be faced. But after Fascist Italy's slow progress against the Abyssinians, it is plain that the damage she could do to all Europe, united except for Germany, may easily be exaggerated.

The danger from Germany, while more remote, is far more formidable. The peace of Europe and of the world is gravely menaced by the state of mind of the German people and, although to a less extent, by the policy of the German Government. But Germany will not wish to launch a war in the air before her new armies have reached their full strength, and that will not be for another two or three years. Is it not possible to avert the danger before it becomes imminent? Certainly it is possible, unless all human affairs are nothing but the working out of a predestined plan. In that case we need trouble our heads no more about the future: let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. Such fatalism has, however, little place in the thought of the West. Putting it aside, we are compelled to recognise that the evolution of international affairs is something very different from those

astronomical phenomena which we may observe but cannot control. Whether there is to be war or peace in Europe wholly depends upon human foresight and human will. We can prevent war if we make up our minds to do so. In that case, we must, as Mr. Eden said the other day, keep firm hold of two essentials: "First, that aggression ought not to be allowed to succeed, and secondly that the members of the League, acting together, should be so strong and so united that they may bring it home to any aggressor, now or in the future, that peaceful negotiation, and not aggression, is not merely the best but the only successful way of removing discontent."*

In brief, the two essentials are peace and justice. On these twin pillars rests all that part of the Covenant which is concerned with the war-preventing functions of the League of Nations. Unfortunately national dictators are apt to be pre-occupied, like competitors at the rodeo, with the difficulty of remaining in the saddle. Where their mounts take them is a secondary consideration and they cannot be relied upon to guide their nations' feet into the ways of peace and justice. This evil is not confined to totalitarian states. The alternating governments of the great western democracies are also concerned to remain in power. They want, if possible, to win the next election. Left to themselves, these democratic governments cannot always be relied upon to pursue a consistent long-range policy based upon fundamental principles. In their case, however, a remedy lies to hand; and the same remedy, in so far as it can be applied in the Dictator states, must have its effect upon their policy also.

Twenty-five years' practical experience of international affairs, including the bitter lessons of 1914, led Lord Grey to insist that the remedy lies in an educated and organised public opinion.

"The popular repudiation," writes Lord Cecil, "of the Laval-Hoare concessions to Italy was not an isolated phenomenon. Its proximate cause was the fact that all but a handful of the newly elected Members of Parliament had pledged themselves in the General Election to support the principle of collective resistance to the aggressor. Why did all parties and almost all the candidates think it necessary to protest so vigorously their devotion to the League? Primarily, no doubt, because of the unmistakable verdict

* In a speech at Warwick on January 17th, 1936.

of the Peace Ballot in the early summer. But that striking judgment was itself the outcome of a process of popular education conducted for sixteen years by the League of Nations Union, as well as by the religious and political leaders, the schoolmasters and mistresses, the journalists and others who, each in their own way, responded to the stimulus which the Union has given. The majority of Local Education Authorities, too, have, thanks to the Union's initiative, provided a whole generation of boys and girls with objective teaching upon the principles and activities of the League of Nations."

It is, however, true that in most European countries the education and organisation of public opinion have made slower progress than in the United Kingdom.

Of Lord Grey's two essentials, educate and organise, the first process is in the long run (if there be a long run) by far the more important. If the peoples of the world are to be educated for world citizenship, if their intellects and their sentiments are to promote international co-operation instead of competitive nationalism, then all the forces tending to this end need to be focused and brought to bear upon the machinery of education, public and private, juvenile and adult, direct (in schools, colleges and universities) and indirect (by means of broadcasting, newspapers, lectures, meetings, cinemas, etc.). For this purpose every country needs to possess a single organisation or society *with a precise and limited objective*. Each of these societies should be as far as possible representative of all political parties and of every section of the population: employers and employed, teachers and preachers, science and letters, national parliament and local authorities. An example of such a society is the British League of Nations Union. But there are countries where some means other than a single society pledged to the support of the League of Nations are needed to organise the *ad hoc* co-operation of all friends of peace in each emergency as it arises. These organisations in their turn require to be linked up by a permanent co-ordinating centre or consultative group at Geneva to supplement the International Federation of League of Nations Societies.*

An educated and organised public opinion will supply the

* It would make for effective team-work if such a co-ordinating centre were to share the address of the Federation, whose offices adjoin the new building of the League of Nations.

war-preventing machinery of the League of Nations with driving power. It must not, however, wait indefinitely for the governments to pull the levers, open the cocks, or "step on the gas." It must be prepared, upon occasion, to take the initiative in starting up the peace machine. Indeed, it will have to declare itself from time to time upon the international problems of the day. Thus will governments and members of parliament be reminded of the public support on which they can rely for translating basic principles into practice. How then are the basic principles of preserving peace and providing justice to be translated into practice at the present moment?

In the first place, the world as a whole and Europe in particular must be overwhelmingly stronger than any state or group of states which threatens its peace. This overwhelming strength must not be confined to material things, such as armaments, industrial resources, finance or man-power. These things are necessary. The quantity of armaments needed to overwhelm any likely aggressor ought, however, to be agreed between loyal members of the League, and the burden of collective defence equitably shared between them.* And, as regards the quality of armaments, a determining factor should be the prospect that, as collective security becomes more reliable, the reduction and limitation of national armaments by international agreement will become increasingly practicable, while all-round disarmament, as it proceeds, will further increase security. In the light of this prospect, the building of large capital ships which will not be ready for sea until some three years hence must be viewed with greater hesitation than the multiplication of smaller vessels or the rapid expansion of air forces. More necessary, however, than overwhelming material power is that spiritual strength which Lord Balfour used to call a collective sentiment. If, for example, German patriotism were opposed to the more or less rival patriotisms of states members of the League, and if the collective will of these states were to be continually undermined by their isolationist newspapers, the one united nation might overcome the many disunited peoples in spite of an immense disparity in material resources.

* Unfortunately the British Government's latest *Statement relating to Defence* (Cmd. 5107), although presented as aiming at collective security and the eventual reduction and limitation of armaments, regards the increased forces of France, Belgium, and the U.S.S.R., no less than those of Italy, Germany and Japan, as necessitating further British armaments.

It is therefore of supreme importance that the development of world loyalty, focused in the League of Nations, should proceed apace in all states members of the League.

The development among these peoples of a loyalty to the whole world commonwealth must form part of the process of education in all these lands. This new loyalty is, of course, the ally and not the rival of national patriotisms. Its development in the United Kingdom is among the duties entrusted by its Charter to the League of Nations Union, at whose instance associations representing practically the whole teaching profession in Great Britain declared on June 8th, 1927 :

We are naturally averse from any sentimental appeal in school and from any obvious attempt to stir the emotions of the pupils. Yet we recognise that new knowledge alone, without some change of feeling and of purpose, will not suffice to make international co-operation the normal method of conducting world affairs. A sense of world citizenship has to be created. President Wilson told a committee at the Paris Peace Conference that "he looked forward to the time when men would be as ashamed of being disloyal to humanity as they were now of being disloyal to their country." For the Englishman, for the Briton, for any citizen of the British Commonwealth—itsself a model League of Nations—there can be no reason why the union of nations and the building of larger loyalties out of present patriotisms should not keep pace with the widening of individual human interests to cover the whole shrinking world. Disloyalty to the whole involves disloyalty to every part, including one's own state.

Along with the change of feeling towards this wider loyalty, we want to see a change of purpose ; a will to seek first the welfare of the world-wide society of mankind. . . .

This declaration of principles has guided the practice in an ever-increasing number of schools from that day onwards.

But overwhelming material strength, supported by a sufficiently powerful and well-organised public opinion, will not deter an aggressive state from challenging the collective might of members of the League unless the League can also provide a way of peacefully removing discontents. If war is to be prevented, the world commonwealth must, as we have seen, be not only strong but also just and merciful. What, then, are the discontents most likely to lead to a rupture at the present time ? They chiefly concern Germany, Japan and Italy ; and the most dangerous are those of German origin. If they can

be removed by peaceful change, the same methods can afterwards be applied to remove other international injustices whensoever they appear. Apart from troubles connected with the internal government of Germany—and we need not here compare the advantages with the disadvantages of the Nazi régime from this point of view—the German people to-day have two main grievances. The first concerns individual citizens and their families. The second concerns the nation as a whole. The first is the economic distress which the Germans share, although perhaps in an enhanced degree, with most of the western world. The second is the feeling that Germany deserves as high a place as any among the nations of the earth ; that nothing less than complete equality with the most favoured nations is compatible with her honour ; and that the last remaining indignities or implications of inferiority imposed upon her by the victorious powers at Versailles should now either be cancelled by the revision of that Treaty or else be, as far as possible, frustrated and contravened by her own unilateral action.

The economic ills of Germany can only be remedied by the same treatment as the World Economic Conference of 1927 prescribed for the whole world. If Germany will resume her place at Geneva and join with other members of the League in organising collective security and reducing armaments the prevailing fear of war will diminish. Nations will become less anxious to depend upon themselves alone for essential supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials. Economic nationalism will gradually disappear and be replaced by more liberal economic policies until the revival of world trade and the reopening of world markets gradually solve the problems of access to raw materials, of unemployment and of overpopulation. In no other way can the German masses, or the populations of other highly industrialised countries, hope to escape the evils of grinding poverty. No conceivable military victory can make Germany self-supporting or enable her to acquire a colonial empire that will render her economically independent of the rest of the world in peace and war. Such difficulties as Germany now experiences in obtaining raw materials from outside her own borders are mainly due to her inability to pay for them by exporting her own manufactures to foreign countries. With the reopening of world markets to German produce these difficulties would tend to disappear.

An open-door policy for all members of the League in one another's colonies would make a good beginning.

Again, no colonial empire, however large, will solve Germany's population problem so well as the revival of her export trade. Industrialisation, combined with free or freer markets, provides a better solvent of the population problem than any amount of territorial expansion. Between the years 1800 and 1880, for example, the development of her industries enabled the United Kingdom to increase her home population by 22 millions, while the number who left her shores during approximately the same period to settle in the British Empire was barely 3 millions.

Less difficult to remedy because less dependent upon hard physical facts, but more dangerous to the peace of the world, is the discontent of Germany concerning her prestige and her position in Europe and the world. Possessing, as she believes, a more able, vigorous and hard-working population than any other, Germany considers that she is entitled to a number of concessions from other countries, including a larger share of territory in Europe as well as a colonial empire comparable with those of England and of France. The present tendency of Germany's neighbours is to fear that she will take what she can get by force. They would therefore deny her everything in the forlorn hope of restricting, as far as possible, the increase of her military strength. So long, however, as Germany has no other hope of justice, so long will it become ever more probable that she will attempt to seize by force what she has no chance of obtaining by peaceful change.

If, then, the "tragedy of general war" is to be averted the German Government and the German people must be persuaded that the rest of the world, acting through the League of Nations, is willing to offer them justice, or at least what the greater part of the world regards as justice, which is as near as it is possible to get. After all, Article 19 of the Covenant* is an integral part of international law in most of the world to-day. As such, it indicates a growing consciousness of the need for having in reserve a power which, even if for the present it acts by persuasion, is in essence a legislative

* Article 19 of the Covenant provides that: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

power, to modify not merely existing international contractual obligations, but international conditions generally, in the interests not merely of the party seeking relief but of the whole international community.* Sir Samuel Hoare recognised the need for harnessing this power and making it effective when he declared in his speech to the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 11th, 1935, "that the possibility is open, through the machinery of the League, for the modification by consent and by peaceful means of international conditions whose continuance might be a danger to peace."

Action on these lines has been delayed until Italy's war should be stopped. Meanwhile (and since the preceding paragraphs were set up in type) Herr Hitler's patience has once more become exhausted and Germany's troops have occupied the demilitarised Rhineland. A flagrant violation this, not only of the Treaty of Versailles but also of the freely-negotiated Locarno Pact which Herr Hitler, in his speeches to the Reichstag on January 30th, 1934, and on May 21st, 1935, had undertaken to uphold and fulfil. But this outrageous and ostentatious breach of international law was accompanied by proposals for repairing the damage done to European security.

The German Government expects that in the course of a reasonable space of time, the problem of colonial equality of rights as well as that of separating the League's Covenant from its Versailles Treaty basis will be adjusted by amicable negotiations.

The League's Council is considering the situation while these words are being written. France is maintaining that Germany's unlawful action bars the way to any negotiations on the basis of Germany's proposals. Yet in 1933 and again in 1935 France and Britain consented to discuss disarmament with Japan after her flagrant aggression in China had been condemned by all the world. Neither Britain nor France is objecting to discussions with Italy, although her flagrant violation of the Covenant still continues and is aggravated by the slaughter of Abyssinians. France will perhaps reflect before it is too late that collective security in general, and the future security of her own eastern frontier in particular, will be far better served by League action putting a stop to Italian aggression and showing that it did not pay, than by

* Cf. Sir John Fischer Williams, *Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations* (Longmans, 1929), p. 109.

an attempt to impose upon Germany sanctions which, however justifiable in themselves, would be more likely to exasperate the Germans than to convince them of the sacredness of treaty obligations.

We conclude that "the tragedy of general war" may be averted by Governments pursuing a consistent long-range policy based upon fundamental principles, and by public opinion being educated and organised to expect and to demand such a policy as the only proper method of conducting world affairs. Applied to present circumstances, such a policy would provide an immediate programme somewhat as follows:

1. The war begun by Italy in defiance of her treaty obligations must be stopped by the organised collective action of the League of Nations.

2. This triumph of the Covenant must be repeated in the peace terms in order to show that aggression does not pay. Apart from some cession of Abyssinian territory in *bona fide* exchange for access to the sea in Eritrea, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of Abyssinia must be preserved.

3. The British Government must endeavour to persuade the League's Council to set to work, with the help of Germany and in the light of Herr Hitler's proposals, to rebuild the foundations of peace on the basis of the Covenant, having regard especially to the need for

- (a) strengthening collective security so that the League shall always be overwhelmingly stronger, spiritually as well as materially stronger, than any likely aggressor;
- (b) reducing and limiting armaments;
- (c) creating reliable machinery to remove discontents and remedy injustices by a process of peaceful change; and
- (d) European states becoming and remaining members of the League with equal rights.

4. If, however, Britain is unable to persuade the League to act as the British people think right, Britain must join in action which the League as a whole thinks right.

The fatal mistake at the present moment would be for Britain or any other country to use its vote upon the Council so as to prevent a unanimous decision to take whatever action the Council thinks will best safeguard the peace of nations and serve the interests of the whole world.

March 18th, 1936.

MAXWELL GARNETT.

THE SPANISH ELECTIONS.

I

THE "Black Legend" of which Spaniards so bitterly complain, and which represents them as a nation of ignorant, inquisitorial fanatics with no virtue but picturesqueness, is rapidly giving place, in this country at least, to a Red Legend, created by a section of the Press which thinks it has a right to expect the Spaniards to produce, at convenient intervals, a revolution. Three General Elections have been held in Spain in just over four years, and during each of them the conduct of the people, considering the momentous results which would ensue if any one party should gain a really decisive victory, has been nothing short of exemplary. But one would hardly think this from a survey of our popular Press. On Sunday, February 16th, Spain went once again to the polls, with the broadcast admonitions to peace and order of the then Prime Minister still ringing in its ears. Everything passed off quietly, but on the next day, as the results became known, there were some displays of local hooliganism, and the Government took the usual measure—a purely precautionary one—of declaring what certainly to British ears bears an unfortunate name—the "State of Alarm." On the Tuesday morning one of our newspapers conspicuous for its moderation declared that Spain "is in the throes of what promises to be a long-drawn-out revolution," while the placards of more sensational organs were aflame with "Martial law in Spain," "Wild scenes in Madrid," "Red riots in Spain," and finally "Spanish Government to resign"—the last piece of news, true enough in itself, being presented as though it were the outcome of "red riots" instead of being, as it is in the circumstances, normal constitutional procedure. However, Britain had its daily thrill, which was the main thing, while Spain, ruminating peacefully over its coffee and rolls, opened its *Sol*, and turning to Bagaria's inimitable cartoon, which invariably sums up the preceding day's events with deadly accuracy, observed that it was headed "Tranquillity," and represented two old gentlemen yawning at each other and indulging in the following political commentary:

"Well, nothing much seems to be happening . . ."
 "No. And there's going to be another Government . . ."
 "Yes, that's just what I said! Nothing happening . . ."

How far Bagaría appears to be taking us from the "red riots"! And yet we are in Madrid and ought to be in the middle of them! But the fact is that, leaving aside a few thousand amnestied prisoners and their relatives, and the usual mobs of political extremists, Spain's first reaction to the election results was precisely that of Bagaría's yawning commentator. There was a slight shock in the cafés when it was announced that Sr. Azaña, whose régime of "mud, blood and tears" is still fresh in the memory, was proposing to form a Government. But at that moment the total election figures were announced and the cafés breathed again. For what sort of a majority could Sr. Azaña count upon? Out of the 473 deputies who sit in the Cortes, the "Left" or "Popular Front" had 256, the "Centre" had 52, and the Traditionalists, or "Right," had 165.* This might sound well, on the assumption that all the Centre voted with the Left, or abstained, and that there was unanimity in the Left as to the acceptance of Sr. Azaña's leadership. But neither of these things seemed at all certain. Everyone who read the joint election address issued by the "Popular Front" saw numerous possibilities of cleavage between its component parties, and it should be noted that 233 of the 256 seats are neatly divided among the Socialists (87), the Republican Left (81), the Republican Union (35), and the Esquerra, or Catalanian Left (30). Further, it may be assumed that, if Sr. Azaña's public acts approach in arbitrariness and vindictiveness the most notorious acts of his previous Government, the Centre will combine, not with the Left, but with the Right, in which case the Left would have only a precarious majority of 39. It is true that, during a period of Left government, a certain number of Right deputies find it prudent to be out of the country—one of them, indeed, Sr. March, who headed the poll for Majorca, had anticipated the victory of his opponents, and, not wishing for another lengthy period of imprisonment, had crossed the frontier with his family at half past ten on the morning of polling day. Still, even allowing for such political absences, for imprisonments and for abstentions *en bloc* by

* These statistics, it should be observed for the sake of accuracy, are taken from the unofficial list issued by the Spanish Press and are based on the final results announced after the Second Ballot on March 1st, and not on the partial figures given by the Press on February 19th. The difference, however, is very slight, as Second Ballots had only to be held in six constituencies. The final official figures had not been issued when this article went to press.

small minority parties, there seems no case for supposing that the new Prime Minister can initiate and carry through an advanced programme, or even that, if he acts constitutionally, he has much chance of remaining long in office.

Let us look back upon the twenty-seven months of what may be euphemistically described as government by Centre parties which have elapsed since the last General Election. From a social standpoint, Spain has been happier and more prosperous than she was during the earlier Left régime, when every day added its quota to the number of revolutionary strikes which broke out spasmodically all over the country, accompanied only too frequently by violence, bloodshed, and loss of life. But politically the situation went from bad to worse. There were no less than eight governments, shared among four Prime Ministers, giving an average period in office of three and a half months for each government. The Right was by far the most numerous group: it had 207 deputies as against 167 belonging to the Centre and 99 of the Left. The balance of power obviously lay in the hands of the Centre, which had increased its representation by 30 from the preceding Cortes and included 104 Radicals. But the Centre could only govern by allying itself with parties from the Right, and it was in the course of these alliances and counter-alliances, which provoked dissensions in the Cabinet and disturbances—even rebellions—in the country, that the ineffectiveness of the system became manifest.

Can it be hoped that the return of the Left to power with so exiguous a majority will bring to an end that constant succession of governments which was beginning to resemble a little too closely for men's peace of mind the political situation under the Monarchy in the years immediately preceding the dictatorship? It seems certain that a stable coalition will have to be found if effect is to be given to a constructive programme. And it is unlikely that such a coalition can be brought into existence.

Not only so, but the conditions under which Sr. Azaña will now work are very different from those of his earlier experiment in government. Then, instead of 255 followers, he had 290. And these followers, during the greater part of his period in office, stood solidly behind him, all alike being inspired by an enthusiasm derived from the fall of the Monarchy and unlikely to be repeated. To-day, not only has the Prime

Minister's own party only a fraction of the strength of his group, but the group includes as large a number as 15 Communists, while the 87 Socialists will always be a potential menace. But this is not the worst. In the Cortes Constituyentes of 1931-3, the next strongest group to the Left had been the Centre, with 136 deputies, and the Right had only a miserable and almost negligible following of 42. But now it is the Centre party that has shrunk to the smallest dimensions and the Right have 165, or only 42 less than in the last Cortes. The influential C.E.D.A., with nearly 100 members, is the largest single party in the Cortes. The Monarchists, and those who may be trusted to unite with them, are a number to be reckoned with. Even Catalonia, still smarting under the temporary loss of her autonomy, has sent back 11 deputies to the Right party against 30 to the Left. Altogether, assuming only moderately competent leadership, the new Right group will be a formidable enemy.

Those, therefore, who look fearfully to the future need not expect any rash agrarian or anti-clerical programme to proceed unchecked for any length of time, for in each of the avenues which the Government has set itself to explore it will find numerous obstacles. One example of these must suffice—the Catalan question. Sr. Azaña has long been known as a firm friend of Catalonia and a supporter of her aspirations to autonomy, and, quite apart from the fact that the Republic partly owed its advent to the Catalan pact signed at San Sebastián, the enthusiasm with which he fired his followers sufficed to secure the passage of the Catalan Statute, already approved in Catalonia by a 200 to 1 majority, at the earliest possible moment. Yet, even with the almost negligible group of anti-Catalanists that existed in the Cortes Constituyentes, the articles of the Statute were challenged at every stage and some of them were modified so drastically that the Catalanian deputies walked out of the House in a body and there was grave danger that the Statute, when passed, would not be accepted by the Catalan people. If such was the case then, what will be the position now? Not only will the Opposition be very much stronger than in 1931, but many whose votes might have been caught during the debates will be even more strongly influenced by the facts of the Catalan revolt of October 1934, under the President of the Generalitat, Sr. Companys, who after the election, which returned him at the

head of the poll for Barcelona, was speedily released from the prison where he had been serving a so-called "life" sentence. Sr. Companys, by his actions in 1934, declared himself a militant federalist, and federalism is distinctly and specifically disowned by the 1931 Constitution. Who knows when he will not declare himself the same again? These and other problems await the new Government: and never was a Government less to be envied.

So Bagaría's commentator is right: nothing is happening in Spain. *The Times*, in a leading article of February 18th, described the electorate's latest evolution as a "left turn": a more exact description would be a "left incline." Nothing of importance, we may be convinced, is likely to be brought about by constitutional methods in Spain until some one group or party obtains a large enough majority to enable it to govern, unimpeded by crises, for two or three years. And nothing good can happen by such means until such a Government is content to check the ever-swinging pendulum, to disregard the threats of extremists and to pursue such a middle course as will satisfy the moderate and eminently realistic aspirations of the vast majority of ordinary Spaniards.

E. ALLISON PEERS.

II

There is an old Spanish proverb which says: "*El español piensa bien—pero tarde!*" (The Spaniard thinks intelligently, but tardily!) which suits admirably the situation arising from the recent elections. For the temper of the Right differs a great deal to-day from the mood of these forces in 1931. Sr. Gil Robles and his friends to-day offer Sr. Azaña their collaboration if he should need it in so far as his efforts are concentrated on the maintenance of public order or on the strengthening of the republican régime.

It was in 1931 obviously a question of touch-and-go as to whether at that late date a satisfactory and stable form of liberal state could be installed in Spain. If this were possible it could only have been on the basis of full support by Spain's upper classes for a programme of reform and reorganisation of the state, sacrificing many cherished ideals and even

economic considerations. But Spanish conservatives firmly declined to interpret the situation in these terms. Even when the Vatican, hardly to be suspected of liberal sympathies, urged Catholics to enter the Republic the advice was received with displeasure and distaste. Don Angel Herrera, president of Catholic Action, and the leading figure in the lay circles of clericalism, together with Mgr. Tedeschini, Papal Nuncio in Madrid, made great efforts to persuade Catholics to look upon the Republic as the future régime for Spain. But it is not easy to break in a few months the strong ties which have linked monarchy and catholicism through so many centuries. The best that could be obtained was that the clerical C.E.D.A. Party "accepted" the Republic, but it declined to call itself a republican party. If it had done so it would have lost wealthy contributors who give lavishly towards the heavy expenses of this organisation.

After the electoral triumph of 1933 which gave some 320 Centre-Right Deputies seats in a House of 475, the errors of the first two years were emphasised instead of being corrected. Third-rate men were elevated to posts for which they were unfitted. Wages were cut and social legislation was disregarded. Scandalous corruption went on quite openly. The Left forces were provoked into rebellion. It is a thoroughly degraded and tarnished Republic which has now been handed over to Sr. Azaña. When he left office in 1933 he abandoned a mild version of the French Republic. He returns to find himself faced with a potential Russia.

Don Manuel Azaña now tackles a situation infinitely more difficult than that of 1931 and with a much weaker team, for he is now without the collaboration in the Cabinet of the Socialist Party, the political organisation which up to the present has been the only mainstay Spain's second Republic has found. The absence of the socialists weakens the Government in two ways. Firstly it deprives Sr. Azaña of the assistance in responsible positions of the many capable figures of that party. Secondly a Cabinet which represents only 111 Deputies in a House of 475 is obviously at a great disadvantage. Instead of the Government being able to make rapid decisions regarding parliamentary labour, every minor point will have to be submitted for approval to its allies of whom the most important is the socialist-communist bloc with 105 Deputies.

Those in close touch with Sr. Azaña do not hesitate to assert that he regards the situation as exceptionally complicated and difficult. He has at least had the consolation of a large increase in the forces of his party, Izquierda Republicana, which has mounted from eleven Deputies in 1933 to seventy-nine. This latter figure, however, can hardly be taken as representing the exact strength of that organisation. The other parties of the Left made generous concessions in the arrangement of the joint candidatures in order that Sr. Azaña should have a strong group behind him. The real strength of his party would probably give a result of thirty or forty Deputies.

The fact is that Sr. Azaña and his group of friends which include Sres. Zulueta, Marcelino Domingo, Viñuales and Sanchez Albornoz are in a rather isolated position. They are not properly speaking "intellectuals." They represent the civil servants and university professors who hold positions from which it is relatively difficult to dislodge them and who can, therefore, allow themselves the luxury of expressing their opinions openly. They are sincere liberals. They believe in a state in which there is at once justice for the poor and respect for law and authority. They obviously can get very little done without support either from the conservatives who hold the economic reins or the proletarian masses. To-day the support from the labour forces is restricted and the tentative offers of assistance from the Right are of scant avail in view of the unpopularity the Cabinet would incur if it took help from those who treated the Republic so badly during their recent period in office.

The Government is also faced with the disillusionment of the masses regarding democratic rule as a result of the events of the last two years. The writer happened to be in the Puerta del Sol on April 14th, 1931, when a party of communists wearing red shirts arrived on the scene. The enormous crowd which was celebrating the proclamation of the new régime attacked and insulted the communists and they had to have police protection. The crowd then intimated that they would have no "Moscow agents" upsetting their new-born Republic. And to-day? To-day in the enormous demonstrations which have paraded the streets to celebrate the electoral victory the hammer and sickle and red flags have predominated everywhere. The bands have played the *Internationale*, but

not the republican *Himno de Riego*. During a recent demonstration in Madrid the writer saw a group which, as an exception, was carrying a huge republican tri-colour banner; he drew near in order to hear what they were shouting. They were chanting monotonously but obviously with gusto: "We want a government of workers and peasants!" None of the crowds watching seemed to see any humour in the incident.

Socialism has regained its strength with surprising vitality considering the gravity of the defeat of 1934. Indeed the socialist labour unions claim to have increased their strength from 1,000,000 in 1933 to 1,600,000 at the present time. It might have been expected that the revolutionary experiment of 1934 would leave Spanish socialism crippled for many years. But there are two factors to be taken into consideration. One is that the chief obstacle in the way of the advance of socialism has been the hostility of the illiterate masses of workers who labelled this force as weak and theoretical, and much preferred the violent diatribes of the leaders of the anarchist syndicates. The tendency of Spanish socialism towards violent methods has won it the disapproval of some of its supporters of the middle class, but it has given it much greater power and importance among the workers.

The second factor is that Spanish socialism has faced a fascist movement which was much milder than that existing in other European nations where similar conflicts have arisen. Spain had already gone through a dictatorial experiment of nearly seven years. The new movement which showed itself in 1934 was similar to that of Austria rather than to the fascism of Germany or Italy. It was a clerical semi-dictatorship which threatened. Some months ago the weekly review *Jap*, the organ of Juventud Accion Popular, a youth organisation attached to the clerical C.E.D.A. Party, published an interesting article explaining in some detail how it came about that they were unable to set up a corporate régime of dictatorial character after the collapse of the October revolt of 1934. In synthesis the review attributed the failure to the fact that during the first two years of the Republic so many persons of Left-wing convictions had been placed in responsible posts in civil and military administration, that it was impossible to make any attempt until there had been first a general "clean-up," with the consequent replacement of the

sympathisers with the Left by more trustworthy persons who would support the clericals.

Spanish socialism has, therefore, considerable strength to-day in most important cities with the notable exception of Barcelona where anarcho-syndicalism prevailed until it was crippled by the triumph of the Esquerra Party, the Left-wing Catalan organisation led by Sr. Companys which is liberal enough to attract considerable support from the better-paid classes of workers.

Opinions differ as to how far the socialists hold sway on the land. There has been some tendency to assume that because Spain is an agricultural land she retains in the countryside a conservative strength which makes experiments in socialism unlikely or even impossible. This tendency is seen not only among conservative thinkers but also in such an eminent and broad-minded authority as Don Salvador de Madariaga. In his book published last year entitled: *Outline of a Constitution for the Third Spanish Republic*, he opines that communism has more chance of success in industrial nations than in Spain, giving as his reason that the peasants would oppose any attempts by the city workers to instal a soviet régime. Nevertheless the recent election would indicate that Spaniards would do well not to lean too heavily on this theory. Socialist strength in almost all Andalusian provinces and in Estremadura was shown to be formidable. It is true, of course, that the peasants for the most part had little participation in the movement of 1934. But there had been a peasant strike in that summer during which there was much trouble and which left the peasant labour unions in no condition to renew the fight three months later.

The trend of Spanish politics in the near future cannot fail to be decisively influenced by the Socialist Party, not so much because of its eighty-nine Deputies in the Chamber as because of its new revolutionary tactics. Within the party itself there is much opposition to this development. The party congress which is to be held shortly should see a big internal struggle. On one hand is Sr. Largo Caballero who supports the view that liberal republicanism has little hope of solving Spain's problems, and that sooner or later will come a new decisive struggle against the conservative forces which the socialists must be prepared and ready to meet, and to gain the victory with a view to implanting a socialist republic.

The other wing is led by Don Indalecio Prieto, the Bilbao labour leader ; it differs on a tactical issue. It holds that by asserting the possibility of an early implantation of socialism in Spain, the party loses much support from its members of the "*petite bourgeoisie*," and also creates hostility on the part of middle-class people who if not definitely socialist at least sympathise warmly with a moderate, liberal republic. The masses are behind Sr. Largo Caballero, but if Sr. Azaña's government were to make unexpectedly good progress in resolving such problems as agrarian reform, the view supported by Sr. Prieto would be bound to gain much new support.

Meanwhile it is worth noting that the revolutionary organisation of the Socialist Party appears to remain intact, for virtually nothing is known about it. Despite all the lengthy trials of leaders, including Sr. Largo Caballero himself, practically nothing has been revealed as to the organisation of the revolt of 1934, which obviously had a carefully prepared mechanism. If one asked a small boy in the street who organised the revolt, he would certainly reply : " Sr. Largo Caballero ! " but the cleverest lawyers of the state were unable to prove anything against the former socialist minister. Of some sixty witnesses who appeared in court only three or four mentioned him as being the organiser of the movement. Even the detectives who had been following him for months before the outbreak could throw no light on his activities. Considering that many hundreds of people must have known a good deal about Sr. Largo Caballero's part in the affair, and also that the police used in many cases great brutality and cruelty in obtaining confessions—there are several cases of people who are crippled for life as a result—it is obvious that the revolutionary activities of the Socialist Party are in the hands of clever brains supported by an unflinching loyalty.

In the clerical C.E.D.A. Party which holds the same predominant situation on the Right that the socialists hold on the Left there is much confusion and uncertainty. Considerable sectors are now pressing hard for open recognition of a republican policy, basing their demands on the fact that with a clearly defined political banner the party would have greater cohesion and strength, even if some important members did go over to the camp of the monarchists. Sr. Gil Robles hesitates. He is a magnificent organiser but not a man with a

clear or certain vision in political matters. He depends too much for his ideas on what those around him think. Don Angel Herrera, who has been his chief adviser up to the present, is apparently a little disgusted with politics and more interested in his preparations for taking holy orders in some months time, for he has decided to become a priest despite his fifty years. With ninety-six Deputies Sr. Gil Robles will still lead the strongest single minority in Parliament and he can be relied on to get the utmost out of this situation.

HENRY BUCKLEY.

IS BRITISH LIBERALISM ALIVE OR DEAD?

AN American authoress once dedicated a book to "the Spirit of Liberty, comatose but not moribund"; and now another American, Mr. George Dangerfield, has published a volume entitled *The Strange Death of Liberal England*, which professes to be a contribution to contemporary history. But his impressions of the modern political history of England and of the characters of English statesmen are as a rule so fanciful, and so remote from the truth, that I pass them by as unworthy of serious attention. Dismissing Mr. Dangerfield, I address myself to the question whether British Liberalism is decadent or dying, a spent force or a vital influence. With that question and the answer to it I shall associate a brief inquiry into the present acknowledged weakness of the Liberal Party and its causes.

Shortly before his death in 1923, John (Viscount) Morley, the most philosophical of modern English statesmen, Mill's disciple, Cobden's biographer, ally of Joseph Chamberlain in his Radical days and then Gladstone's trusted colleague, was discussing with me the future of Liberalism and of the Liberal Party. "England," he said, "is the home and centre of Liberalism," and he was sure that it would remain so, unless the whole structure of British society were to perish in another cataclysm. About the Liberal Party, shaken and weakened as it then was by the Great War, by the two Coalitions, and by the discord between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Asquith, he was dubious. He had himself resigned when Mr. Asquith's Cabinet declared war on Germany, and he had never regretted his decision. The moral and economic consequences of that ghastly struggle had been at least as calamitous as he had foreseen, and the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles had wrecked hopes of a peaceful resettlement of Europe. It was not surprising that the Liberal Party had lost ground, or that some of its active politicians, eager for office, coalesced with the Tories, or attached themselves to the rising fortunes of the Labour Party. That Party, as it happened, had two outstanding leaders, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Philip Snowden, who had won respect by their stand against Mr. Lloyd George's policy of the "knock-out blow" and against the ruinous peace terms

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which he had helped to force upon Germany and its Allies.

Morley felt that Liberalism is so distinct from and so antagonistic to both Toryism and Socialism that, even if the Liberal Party as a political organisation crumbled away, another would have to be created. For Liberalism is a philosophy of government as well as a temper of mind. The pressure of enfranchised poverty calls urgently for a reapplication of Liberal principles to the social and economic needs of a great industrial and commercial country. A parallel may be drawn with the position a century ago, when unemployment was rife and trade was strangled by a protectionist system, combined with colonial preference, as oppressive and dangerous as that which now again exposes us to foreign ill-will and retaliation. In 1830 a violent revolution seemed inevitable; but the nation was saved by the conversion of the Whigs into a Reform Party through the influence of Jeremy Bentham, Richard Cobden and J. S. Mill.* I do not claim that the parallel is exact; but political and economic conditions in Europe sixteen years after the Peace of Versailles present many resemblances to those which existed sixteen years after the Congress of Vienna. There is as much of tyranny, turbulence, unemployment, insolvency, and revolutionary discontent now as then, and consequently as much need for the remedial processes of reform. Since my last talks with Morley about Liberalism twelve years have gone by, and we have passed through many crises at home and abroad. At the General Election of 1923, Mr. Baldwin went to the country on protection as the only cure for unemployment, and was badly defeated. In the new Parliament the Liberal Party held 158 seats; but the Labour Party had rather more, and Mr. Asquith intimated that they ought to take office with Liberal support. This policy was justified by Mr. Philip Snowden's free trade budget, but next year the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, got into difficulties and appealed to the country with disastrous results to himself and the Liberal Party. The Conservatives, with less than half the votes, secured a majority of 200, and the Liberal Parliamentary Party sank to 42. Mr. Asquith accepted a peerage,

* The name of the first is associated with constitutional, administrative and legal reforms, that of the second with free trade and economy, that of the third with the enfranchisement of women and minority representation.

and in 1926, after a bitter controversy with Mr. Lloyd George, resigned the leadership of the Liberal Party.

Mr. Baldwin's Cabinet introduced a few safeguarding duties, and committed the country to new obligations under the Locarno Pact. It failed to fulfil its promises of public economy, and was defeated at the General Election of 1929, which, like nearly all the elections since the War, exhibited the unfairness and absurdity of single-member constituencies. The Labour Party, which received fewer votes than the Conservatives, had 288 members; the Conservatives had 260; and the Liberals, though they obtained a quarter of the total votes cast, gained only one-tenth of the seats. Their 59 members, however, held the balance; and their leaders very foolishly kept the second Labour Government in office without making their support conditional on the introduction of a Proportional Representation Bill.

In 1931 came the Report of the May Committee, and the crisis which led to the formation of a National Government for the purpose of balancing the budget. That purpose was accomplished by economies and new taxation; but the Conservative Party used its predominance to force a General Election, and swept the country. Labour obtained only 54 seats, though under a fair electoral system they would have had at least 150. The Liberal Party, with a smaller poll, and fewer candidates, had 72 members. Mr. MacDonald's Labour group had 13 members. The Conservatives numbered 469. Nearly all of them proved to be protectionists; and though they had won the election on the issue of public economy versus socialist extravagance, they demanded and obtained a fiscal revolution. A general protective tariff was imposed, and by the Ottawa agreements it was made to discriminate against foreign countries. The Open Door in our Crown Colonies was closed, and the British Empire is now an object of economic envy and dislike. The Labour Party, realising that a socialist state must protect its monopolies from foreign competition, ostentatiously declined to interest itself in the fiscal controversy. Eventually all the Liberal leaders who preferred free trade to office crossed the floor of the House, and their action received the overwhelming approval of the National Liberal Federation.

As Chairman of the Liberal Party, Mr. Lloyd George had proposed an ambitious and costly programme of public works

as a means of "conquering unemployment," and at the General Election of 1929 he had financed his Plan out of the semi-private political fund which he accumulated as Coalition Premier after the War. Its reception in the country was disappointing, and before the crisis of 1931 he resigned the Chairmanship of the Parliamentary Party to Sir Herbert Samuel. When Sir Herbert and his colleagues joined the National Government, Mr. Lloyd George (who was not asked to join it) denounced them for so doing as a desertion of free trade, severed himself from the Party at the General Election, and advised Liberals where they had no candidates to vote socialist. But after protection was carried, he developed a New Deal of his own, which included a high tariff on food imports, a large loan expenditure on public works, and "ruthless retaliation" against foreign countries which refused fair or reasonable treatment to British goods. On this policy he made overtures to the Cabinet; but his schemes were rejected, nor would the Labour Party adopt them. His next move was to start a new organisation for "Peace and Reconstruction," which sought to gain support from candidates of all parties at the last general election. He has now apparently rejoined the Independent Liberal Party, which has elected Sir Archibald Sinclair as its leader in the House of Commons. But after his *volte face* on protection his political position is equivocal, and his support might prove embarrassing.

To understand the present position of the Independent Liberal Party, which has preferred principles to office, and is grossly under-represented in the new Parliament by its absurdly small contingent of 21 members,* it is necessary to say something about the General Election of 1935. Early in October politicians were preparing for an autumn campaign with a view to a General Election in the spring. When, towards the end of the month, Mr. Baldwin announced an

* The election returns show that 11,811,000 votes were recorded for the Parties supporting the Government, and 10,197,000 for the Opposition. The disproportion of seats to votes is glaring; for the Coalition Government has 431 supporters in the House of Commons and the Opposition only 184. The Government's supporters include thirty-three 'Dependent' or National Liberals, representing 866,000 voters—most of whom were probably Conservatives. The twenty-one Liberals represented 1,433,000 voters, but as the Party contested only 160 seats, it is certain that the real Liberal vote, or rather the potential Liberal vote, is much larger. Probably, of the electors who did not vote (9,650,000) at least one-third and possibly one-half were Liberals who had no Liberal candidate to vote for. The Labour Party is also under-represented, as its 8,316,000 votes only returned 154 members.

appeal to the country it came as a complete surprise to all except the Conservative organisation, which, thanks to patronage and a protective tariff, was amply supplied with funds, and well able to assist its National Liberal and National Labour allies. As Mr. Baldwin had already received the approval of the Labour Party's Executive and of the Liberal Opposition for his policy of supporting the League of Nations against Italian aggression, there was no reason why a General Election should be held save that a favourable opportunity presented itself for "downing" the Opposition Parties and obtaining a fresh lease of power for the Coalition. It was a clever electioneering move, and the moment chosen proved especially hard on the Independent Liberals, who had counted on an autumn campaign for providing funds and enlisting candidates. They had intended to contest 300 or 400 seats, but were only able to contest 160. The Labour Party had plenty of candidates and a powerful trade union organisation in all the industrial districts; but they suffered from two difficulties. Their official support of collective security, even at the risk of war, was opposed by a strong minority of pacifists, and had led to the resignation of their leaders in the House of Commons and the House of Lords—Mr. Lansbury, a popular personality, and Lord Ponsonby. This distraction, though serious, was less serious than the capture of Labour by a group of extreme socialists, inspired by Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr. Cole, Professor Laski and others, whose ultimate aims closely resembled those of the Russian communists. Sir Stafford Cripps had repeatedly declared that the formation of a Socialist Labour Government would involve a first-class crisis; and during the election campaign he inveighed vigorously against private capital and business. Unfortunately for Labour, the Socialist League had been able to insert most of its aims in the Labour Party's programme, which pledged all the candidates to the public ownership or control of what it calls "the primary or key industries," including banking, transport, coal, agriculture, iron and steel, shipping, shipbuilding, engineering, textiles, and chemicals. This programme had been adopted at the Labour Conference, and the Executive had announced that in the next Parliament, if they obtained a majority, they would "advance boldly and lay the foundation of a socialist commonwealth and sweep away obstructions wherever they may be found."

On the eve of the elections, the Labour Party issued a manifesto which stated: "Labour seeks a mandate to carry out its programme by constitutional and democratic means; and with this end in view seeks power to abolish the House of Lords and improve the procedure of the House of Commons. Labour asks the nation for a Parliamentary majority in order to promote socialism at home and peace abroad." The Manifesto proceeded to announce that socialism at home would mean the public ownership of land, and the nationalisation of the primary industries already referred to, as well as a great increase of expenditure on housing, unemployment and national development.

In a concise report, published last year by the Cobden Club, it was shown by ample quotations that the Labour Party's present programme is incompatible with economic liberty, free trade or national solvency. If Labour ruled, public economy would disappear altogether. In October 1931 Lord Snowden calculated that the cost of the Labour programme would be an addition of about one thousand millions sterling a year to the national expenditure. The indifference of the Labour Party to liberty, free trade, and to all considerations of national solvency is a sufficient proof that English Liberalism cannot be reconciled with English Socialism.

Until the Labour Party's Executive was captured by the Socialist League, many Liberal politicians favoured what they called a Progressive Front on social policy, and talked about an alliance between "the Parties of the Left." But progress is a vague term. The question is one of direction. Where are you going, and why? "Progress" may connote bad changes as well as good, foolish and extravagant as well as reasonable and useful expenditure. If, for example, the dole to the unemployed were raised to such a figure that unemployment would be more attractive to large sections of the population than employment, the results must be ruinous to society. If, again, a municipal body spends so much that rates and taxes become oppressive and the town becomes insolvent, the inhabitants will suffer far more than they gain. Of all public virtues, economy is now the least practised and the most needed. The strict Treasury control established by Gladstone was based on the principle that public money is a sacred trust, and public waste an abomination.

Leading Liberal thinkers and writers are now beginning to

realise that the Liberal Party must define what it means by Liberalism, how Liberalism differs from Toryism and Socialism, why the Party is resolutely opposed to protective tariffs or subsidies, what is its attitude towards the social services, why it favours lower taxes as a remedy for unemployment. Above all, it has to be made clear to public opinion that Liberalism is Libertarianism—that personal, civil, political and economic liberty are the indispensable basis of the Liberal faith; that academic freedom, freedom of discussion, freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, are fundamental.

Equality of opportunity is a maxim of Liberal policy; it is a good argument for improving popular education and public health or for supporting public libraries, baths, museums, recreation grounds, etc. Nor is it unreasonable to promote by graduated taxation a better distribution of property. But no Liberal wants the Government to embark on the task of equalising the rewards of industry and sloth, of thrift and extravagance, of talent and incapacity. He knows that these objectives of the Socialist State are contrary to nature and common sense. Private property, again, is not an evil thing of which the State should deprive its citizens, but a good thing—a guarantee of individual independence, a stimulus to industry—which should be more widely diffused. The institution of private property is bound up with liberty and civilised progress. Such rights as the right to compete freely in business, to buy in the cheapest market, to sell in the dearest, to move where one wishes, to choose one's occupation, to engage in business for profit and to own property, are essentials of liberty, independence and social welfare. Strip men of their private property, and they are helpless to resist the tyranny of a bureaucratic State.

Mill described the Tory Party as the stupid party; and there is still a great mass of entrenched wealth and unenlightened selfishness—to say nothing of the money that is being accumulated by the new tariff profiteers—to oil the wheels of the party machine. On the other side of the fence is another class party—the Labour Party—which has been taught by its trade union leaders to think of politics mainly as a means of raising wages or diminishing the hours of work. The Liberal Party cannot engage in bribery, either of the few or of the many, at the expense of the general public. Its

appeal is not to the rapacity of producers, but to the general interests of consumers and taxpayers. It is opposed to private and public monopoly. It has to fight the vested interests and at the same time to ward off the rule of the bureaucrat. These are the instincts of a vast body of Liberal opinion, which has not always found expression in the policy of the Liberal Party. The Liberal leaders will have to think less of catching votes and more of convincing opinion. In economics and finance they should be guided by prudence rather than emotion. Utilitarianism is the only right form of materialism. Enlightened selfishness is the best substitute in public policy for the private morality of the Sermon on the Mount. Every good Christian, if his brains are at all worthy of his heart, can see that in trading with other countries reciprocity is better than retaliation. And it should be equally easy to convince him that the abundance of nature is more to be desired than the artificial scarcity of economic nationalism.

Fortunately—whatever its backslidings since the War—the Independent Liberal Party has maintained through the National Liberal Federation an uncompromising fidelity to free trade and economic liberty. This alone would be enough to justify its existence, even if there were no other branches of policy to distinguish it from its two rivals, which at the present moment are admittedly larger and better organised. But the policy of free trade is only one aspect of the larger liberal cult inherited from Cobden and Gladstone—the cult of liberty, peace and goodwill among nations. If Mr. Dangerfield understood the England of which he writes, he would know that Englishmen are lovers of freedom. He would know that they have been and are deeply stirred by the spectacle of foreign tyranny. To the average Englishman the suppression of opinion by imprisonment, torture or death is equally repulsive, whether the seat of government is Moscow, Rome or Berlin. Now that socialists control the Labour Party, its spokesmen usually concentrate their attacks upon Fascism and Nazi-ism. The Conservative diehards—a fairly large section of the Party, backed by several newspapers—are equally sure that Russian communism is the real danger. They have a sneaking respect for Mussolini and Hitler as embodiments of militarism, imperialism and discipline. Only people of Liberal opinions can object impartially and

insistently to all invasions of freedom whether the invader tramples on it in the name of communism or of fascism.

This is the prevailing sentiment of Englishmen, and it was a general belief that Mr. Baldwin and Sir Samuel Hoare meant what they said at home and in Geneva that gave the National Government its victory at the polls last November. Everyone agrees that they would have been defeated if they had issued the Peace Terms of surrender to Mussolini before, instead of after, the election. When the terms were published, there was a veritable uprising of the nation. It was partly the feeling of political investors who saw that they had subscribed, by voting, to a false and fraudulent prospectus. But the wave of indignation that swept Sir Samuel Hoare from office and humbled a triumphant Prime Minister to the dust was in the main liberal or libertarian. Never since Gladstone's Midlothian campaign against the pro-Turkish policy of Disraeli has there been such a demonstration of public opinion. The previous policy has been restored, but Parliament cannot be re-elected. There is no means of reconstituting the Administration or of reforming the electoral law which has produced another parliamentary caricature of representative government. But I do not believe that a Coalition whose members have no principle in common except attachment to office can long survive the loss of public respect. Nor can I think that, when this Parliament expires, Englishmen will turn to socialism and ask it to restore prosperity by suppressing private enterprise and confiscating private property. The country is much more likely to vote for Liberals, if by that time they have restated their principles and reorganised their Party.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

MENTAL HYGIENE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.*

I CANNOT pretend to speak with any specialised or technical knowledge about this new branch of science, which is exploring the dark corridors of the human mind. But I can speak as a layman with some political experience, who has come to believe that it is the psychological factor which in these days will increasingly determine whether we are to pursue the policies that could prevent war. For twenty-five years I have been in the thick of the controversy as to what are the causes of war, and what might be the procedures which could lead to peace. I have at least learnt this lesson—that there is no one cause of war and no one road to peace. But I have also learnt that at different moments of time different causes of war become especially dominant, and therefore different contributions to peace are likely to be especially effective.

Throughout the centuries men have gone to war either because they needed food and wished to expand their trade, or because they desired to spread their religious beliefs, or from sheer vanity, pride and love of adventure. We have at other times plunged into war just because there was no machinery of peace to prevent the disaster. All of these reasons are still operating. On the other hand we are in these days fortunate in so far as there now appears to be one means which, if used, could do much to prevent war. I suggest that almost for the first time in history the exercise of imaginative will-power could give peace the victory, notwithstanding all the economic and other causes of war that still remain. In order to show why I think this is so let me contrast our present circumstances with past history.

Centuries ago men were comparatively ignorant of the material world. They were powerless to cope with the plagues, pestilences and famines which cut across their experience. They therefore often fought each other for life in the literal sense of the term. Later on—shall we say in 1914—this had become less true. Science had conferred the power of knowledge upon mankind, and this is even more the case to-day. There is now no physical reason why anyone in any part of the world, despite all the calamities of nature, should be

* From an Address to the Biennial Conference of the National Council for Mental Hygiene.

hungry, ill-clad or ill-housed. We can now command the earth and the fullness thereof, and need no longer fight like starving dogs for our share in the pittance.

But circumstances are even more hopeful than that. Although we had almost reached this position of potential good fortune on the eve of the Great War we still had no mechanism through which to reap its advantage. There was little then that we could interpose between ourselves and death. Hurriedly, at the last minute, statesmen sought to establish some means of contact. Improvised methods of arbitration were suggested by tired men by telegram. It was of no avail. That is now all changed. For the first time in the history of the world nearly sixty nations have not only renounced war as an instrument of national policy, but have possessed themselves of a permanent and continuing machinery of international communication and power. All this was unthought of twenty years ago. It provides men with the mechanism with which they can, if they so please, make effective that mastery over the narrowing world of nature which science has now placed in their hands. Thus, if we will, war need no longer overwhelm us for the economic reasons laid down by Karl Marx, or because we lack the mechanism of government. The question is to what extent are we prepared to use our new advantages? That is the challenge of our time. The problem is one of will-power. Is the mind of man going to prove equal to his opportunity?

It is no doubt true that during the last ten years there has been much evidence which suggests that men's minds are still inadequate. We have not during that time done those things which we had the power to do, nor pursued at the right moment policies which could have borne fruit. But if I am correct in describing this failure as due to lack of mental elasticity and will-power, then surely the problem is one deserving the consideration of those who are interested in mental health. The last obstacle which now stands between man and peace lies not in the poverty of the earth's soil, but in our minds and dispositions.

To illustrate this let me take but one issue in particular, which lurks beneath our present troubles and holds us back from grappling with the problem of war. I refer to the delicate subject of national sovereignty. Here is something which is psychological, a problem of mental habit, even perhaps of

prejudice. It is of course no easy subject. It cannot be approached carelessly. We all of us love our country. The simple words of our late King on Christmas Day kindled in us pride and devotion. That emotion of patriotism is very precious. It causes many of us to hope that in the great rivalry of new civilisations our country may prove itself most competent in achievement, and may draw the world back from a renewal of primitive cruelties. But are we and the other sixty nations to halt from advancing further in our new international companionship, because our minds are so rigid that we lay an out-of-date emphasis on national sovereignty? Are we capable of considering some mutual modification of that principle suitable to the twentieth century? To face such a momentous issue citizens must be mentally fit, capable of control and restraint, aware of the unconscious motives at the back of every human mind, on their guard against the old instinctive reactions, and quick to see the traps of their own nature. They must be able to observe dispassionately, be accomplished in the mind, gentle and yet resolute in spirit, eager for new forms of adventure, which may prove as enthralling as any of those through which we have gained our mastery in the past. It is here I think that the psychologist comes upon the scenes.

The present is without question a very critical time. At the very moment when science has made us capable of achieving welfare and peace, there confronts us a formidable choice between letting reason dominate political thought, or snapping back into the most primitive worship of tribal gods. We in this country are singularly fortunate. Experts in mental health who must now help us to become healthy-minded, will find the ground well prepared. Even before their own new mental science became ready for use, the mind of the public had already passed through its great revolution. Science has not only made us masters of the material world during the last centuries. It has in that very process caused us also to use our minds differently. Man, when he was helpless in the presence of nature, was fearful and therefore sought refuge in superstition. But when he became master of his environment, his mind became liberated and self-confident, for a mind that feels a mastery over nature begins to observe, to draw conclusions from evidence, to build opinions upon proof, by trial and error.

Even in the last few weeks, in the matter of the Abyssinian peace proposals, we have seen the public asserting itself because of this new mental self-confidence. In an age of dictatorship it was democracy that dictated. With all this preliminary advantage the expert can now set about the task of giving us mental good health, and thereby an understanding of the workings of our minds which might make us less the victims of the old tyranny of our instincts. There is little doubt that mental adjustment and control are especially necessary for the purpose of dealing with the world of affairs beyond the citizen's own shores. In this sphere we have to meet peculiar difficulties. To start with we are fettered by history itself. Long centuries of habit and the reading of history have hitherto caused most of us to think of foreign affairs in terms of power. The world-at-large is also the arena of the unknown. Its unfamiliarity can easily stir within us feelings of apprehension, tinged with terror. Any impact from something so vast and so strange can lead to swift impetuous reactions. The citizen then draws back into himself, seeks protection in what is familiar, and feels an instinctive desire to defend himself against the unknown.

To this must be added a further complication due simply to the nature of history itself. During almost the whole period of history, whenever men have looked beyond their tribal or national boundaries, it has been principally in order to satisfy some emotion of power and strength. Empires have been built and self-satisfaction gained. The external world has been the field in which groups of men have operated to express some of the emotions which are due to repression and vanity. In this way, it is true, civilisations of priceless value have been created; in this way also they have been destroyed. The record of all this cannot avoid being set down in our history books, however dispassionately they may be written. The result is that the child and the adolescent cannot shake off thinking of the world beyond their shores in terms of that history. Indeed this fact of history becomes especially dangerous when in our own contemporary age there emerges some grievance or even some pretext such as we have seen in Germany and Italy. The grievance of to-day then becomes welded on to the precedents of history, and the explosion occurs. Consequently, even though we know in our hearts that the circumstances of the modern world are

now very different, and its actual needs require that we should act in precisely the opposite fashion to our habits a thousand years ago, yet history throws a cloak of respectability over behaviour which ought now to be considered disreputable and is in fact no longer necessary. Psychologically history is dangerous in other ways, for it makes the world beyond our shores seem to be the field of adventure, romance and relief from tedious routine. We somehow feel we are entitled to do abroad in the name of adventure, justified by historical romance, things which we should be ashamed to do in our family, parish or nation.

It is, of course, clear that we are at the mercy of our emotions even in every-day personal and national life. Property, love and religion evoke tempestuous behaviour. But in so far as emotional outbursts occur in all realms of human experience, they are certainly most easily stirred in foreign affairs. And yet if you watch Signor Mussolini struggling to achieve his ends, or the victorious Allies refusing in the post-war years to give Germany her due, or frustrated Germany herself now pursuing unhappy policies, you will see in each case not some problem inherently difficult of solution, but statesmen showing signs of mental ill-health. Not one of these nations in recent years has been confronted by any difficulty which need have baffled them, like plagues and famines, causing them to fight for life. The means for discussing and remedying our grievances have been available. Modern nations have in fact been driven forward to policies, both unnecessary and evil, by nothing more nor less than bad mental health on the part of all concerned—the victorious and the vanquished. Any expert in the statistics of population, any trained economist could show that Italy is at present being impelled to some extent by what amounts to a mystical cult.

All this reveals a most urgent need. The mental health of the modern citizen should be attended to, especially where international affairs are concerned. We shall not be able to get rid of all this danger or take advantage of the economic good fortune of the modern world, unless parents and teachers co-operate to make our minds more competent for new responsibilities and new procedure. The citizen's mental well-being must be watched over from the very first with the same vigilance we have used in connection with his physical health.

Not disciplined and dragooned and moulded to some given pattern, for that would merely mean making us more fit than ever for either spiritual or physical death. On the contrary, the children of the future need wise help and liberation during their earliest years, so that they may find a more simple access to inner harmony and become able to use all their energy to form independent judgments instead of exhausting that energy in unconscious disharmony within themselves, struggling to give vent to suppressed, complicated and tense emotions.

I venture to risk only one illustration. The new citizen will need to know simply and sanely about the problems of sex so that he may become fit to understand Article 16 and Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It may seem a far call to say that we should behave more humanely in Abyssinia and read the history of the Middle Ages with more discretion, if children were more wisely instructed in this biological aspect of physical and mental well-being. And yet there may be here some element of truth. To know how to think sensibly and with a pure heart about our bodies, so that we love more generously and with more intelligent control, may help to save us from persecuting the Jews, invading Ethiopia or sending Black and Tans to Ireland. The evils of the Treaty of Versailles may perhaps have been due not only to what happened in the mirrored hall of a French palace, but to life in a nursery, ruled over by a tired nurse, visited by a preoccupied father or brooded over by a too-loving mother.

Fortunately we need not despair, for the prospect is now full of hope. Perhaps the most encouraging fact about our time is the speed with which we can change not human nature, but at least human conduct. We can now accomplish in fifty years as much as it took men centuries to achieve previously. The film, the wireless, the printed word, the modern school, the health clinic and swift means of transport contain no doubt incalculable powers for evil. And yet they are equally able to regenerate our bodies and minds within the short space of a comparatively few years. Indeed I believe the chief function of the politician should in these days be not so much to load the statute book with new laws as to keep open the doors of progress and make sure that they are not slammed in our faces in some foolish scuffle. For if

the road of progress can be kept open, then men's habits and civilisation itself will be changed by imperceptible forces which are already gathering momentum in the factory and science laboratory, in the health clinic, in the school and in the home, where children are winning a new respect from the adult and enjoying a more gracious companionship with their elders.

May I for a moment lay stress upon one way in which I believe much could be done to aid the young and lessen the troubles of the old? All this new knowledge is hard to come by and still harder to use. I would therefore that our nation could pay more attention to the psychological training of our administrators, teachers, doctors, prison warders, asylum attendants, labour exchange officers and those who staff our public assistance committees. They are struggling with great public spirit against difficult odds. They deserve our gratitude and we ought to help them still further. We must do far more than we have done to inform the hearts and stir the imagination of all these gallant public servants who control anything institutional, or who deal with adults and children in the mass. If this great multitude of administrators were equipped more than ever to understand the human material committed to their care, to see that it was as necessary to be sensitive to the human spirit as to keep correct account-books, then what a letting-down of angers, resentment and tension there would be. For it is an outbreak of gentleness we need in this age of power and knowledge. Compassion and friendliness are every bit as important to achievement as erudition and accumulated knowledge. A million pounds spent in training our administrators in the human aspect of their work would do more to rid citizens of the emotions that go into the explosiveness of war than ten times the amount expended upon assisting them to pass matriculation and learn how to run their institutions methodically.

Even this training for citizenship has of course its dangers, according to whether it is undertaken by dictators or by democrats. Certainly the dictators both of Left and Right are determined to use their formidable power to bend the human mind to their commands. Can we who are democrats be equally quick to give our citizens restraint of spirit, poise of judgment, sensitiveness and inner harmony? "Catch them young" is what we all say—whether we are democrats

or dictators. The question is which of us will achieve the best material results with the least spiritual damage. Will the liberated and harmonious mind prove more powerful than the enslaved spirit? Which will have greater staying power to face disappointment? Which prove more resolute and more alert to exploit new knowledge?

But training in citizenship in this sense depends for its success not upon tendentious political, religious or social instruction. It consists in giving the individual in his personal disposition qualities that make for poise and goodwill, and these will develop in so far as he is less and less the victim of inner strife. Children have already earned the right to think as well as to have access to knowledge. It is you experts who must help us laymen to give them controlled and spontaneous minds without the old complements of vengeance and suppressed hatred, or desires. Surely it is beyond dispute that a child will seek companionship with his elders more eagerly if he knows that they wish to make youth a partnership in discovery by young and old, rather than a period when the strong seek to impose their will upon the weak. The citizen who has thus discovered knowledge will use it better than one who has had it forced upon him.

But I doubt if we can leave the matter there. Even if we realise the importance of mental training and even if we should know how to set about it, we should still need to esteem highly some quality or other in the conduct which we hope would follow such training. Primarily the good qualities are of course internal harmony, courage that is not destructive, and the capacity for dispassionate observation. But these alone may prove insufficient. It is said that this takes us back into the region of dogma? And yet is it really so difficult and so dangerous to go on a little further and give praise to certain ethical qualities? Are we so much in doubt as to the spiritual character we should like to see in each individual and therefore in every nation? Has not religion in the past tended to over-elaborate rules of conduct and make too numerous the virtues we require? Is there not one quality which almost by itself would go a long way to solving most of our problems, domestic, national and international. It may be of course that even after we have all been freed and psycho-analysed, we shall only find ourselves back in a state of original sin. But I suspect we may hope for a more

universal capacity for elementary kindness and gentle treatment of our neighbours. This quality is surely the one most likely to develop out of that mental good-health which comes from a childhood, where tension has been released and dignity acknowledged.

If domestic law owed its origin to that poignant cry thousands of years ago, "Am I my brother's keeper?" international law requires it even more. All this elaborate and scientific study of how we may win mental good health really comes down in the end to our wish that we may find the way to cultivate good neighbourliness. We have always known we needed it at home; we now know we need it in the world of nations. For such a purpose we require mental good health, and this is within our reach. It is the expert in mental hygiene who can give us knowledge; the public has already shown itself vigilant and available to his guidance. It seems to me of no little significance that at a time when organised religion has lost something of its power, one basic religious truth should be emerging, upon which we all seem able to agree. Each one of us knows the answer to the question: How do you wish to be treated by your neighbour? I suspect that nearly all of us would answer the question in exactly the same way. In that event we must surely know how to fulfil the answering command, "Do then unto others as you would that they should do unto you."

Mental hygiene could enable us to translate this common knowledge into common practice.

ALLEN OF HURTWOOD.

THEISM: THE CHRISTIAN SOLUTION.

IN a recently published volume, entitled *Science and the Supernatural*, Mr. Arnold Lunn and Professor J. B. S. Haldane carry on a friendly controversy, the former endeavouring to set forth and press the claims of Christian theism, the latter making agnostic rejoinders. At the close of a somewhat unsatisfactory and certainly inconclusive discussion, Professor Haldane writes:

I should never have begun this correspondence had I not hoped that I would induce an intelligent Christian to tell me how a perfectly good and almighty Creator could have made a world containing so much evil, and how divine omniscience and omnipotence are to be reconciled with human free will.

This challenging enquiry revives two old problems and reminds the reader of the criticisms put forward, in the last century, by John Stuart Mill in his *Essays on Theism*. These problems are urgently moral as well as intellectual. In so far as they are intellectual, the difficulty arises, in part, owing to the rigidly abstract definitions in regard to the attributes of God, which are embodied in the formal theology of a bygone age, that knew little or nothing of evolution. The recognition and exploration of the universal process that goes by the name of evolution, however defined, has not only compelled a reconsideration of the old difficulties, but has led to an influentially held revision of the Idea of God and of His relations with the Universe. The main object of this article is to examine these variant doctrines of God, and to suggest that the solution of their differences must be sought and can be found in the full doctrine of God set forth in the Christian faith, though, for the most part, it is imperfectly presented by the Christian Church.

I.—It is necessary to begin by examining the Idea of God, which is the reasoned product of thought seeking to interpret the content of mature religious experience. To begin with, it must be claimed that the development of the Idea should be considered in the light of its final result, for this is organically related to the whole of the age-long process by which it has been eventually attained. This is the only satisfactory way of examining the nature and process of any living growths. The end of the development must cast light upon the

beginnings, and the Idea of God is the supreme example of living growth. The science of anthropology is ceaselessly active in investigating the primitive consciousness of mankind, and in discovering the materials for answering the question whether man at the outset was religious or not. If he was not, how did religion find entrance into human nature, which was originally destitute of it? If he was, what was the nature of his primeval belief? Divergent answers are given to this question, and where the phenomena are so diverse universal agreement is, as yet, beyond reach. This much may however be concluded. With the dawn of that early consciousness without which man could not be man, he was, of necessity, confronted by otherness, often terrifying, and yet by congeniality, which, in combination, gave rise to the sense of dependence. With the growth of personality, it was inevitable that man should project his self-consciousness into external nature for the interpretation of its activity, otherness, and congeniality. From this primitive beginning the ultimately dominant Idea of God has eventually emerged.

In a recently published and translated volume, entitled *Leaders, Dreamers, and Rebels*, Professor René Fülöp-Miller has advanced the hypothesis that the key to human history must be sought in dreams, by which the outlook both of leaders and of masses of men has been fashioned throughout the ages in regard both to their religious beliefs and their other concerns. First of all came the "fear-dream," with its supernatural horror, upon which reason got busy, converting it into the God of Justice, Who punishes and rewards in accordance with eternally valid moral laws. Then came the "wish-dream," which alternated with and corrected the "fear-dream" by the vision of a golden age in which man should be freed from all evils, natural and supernatural. This alteration has inspired all successive movements of thought and action down to the present time. Even Mussolini and Hitler are dealt with in the light of this hypothesis.

As to this a brief comment must be made. The influence of dreams upon the thought and life of mankind cannot be excluded. Yet dreams cannot be altogether severed from the whole experience of mankind. However exaggerated they are, yet they are conditioned by this experience and revised in its light. The fears and wishes of men spring out of the influence of environing nature, however they may distort it

by being taken out of the full context of reality. Though released from control, dreams are vitally connected with waking experience. They may even assist its interpretation, for the late Professor Poincaré, a great master of scientific method, declared that many of his most fruitful suggestions had come to him in the dreams that preceded his awaking. Hence any suggestion that dreams are, of necessity, devoid of reality, casual rather than caused by reasonable experience, is misleading. The problems of thought and life remain as they were, although dreams may help to fashion imagination and give impetus to impressions.

Whatever light may be thrown upon the dim and uncertain origins of religion, it remains true that the Idea of God must be studied in its final form and significance, that it has arisen out of and not been injected into human experience, and that it must be judged by its relevance to and coherence with the entire deliverances of the human spirit, by its correspondence with the essential faith and needs of men as organic with the universe.

The Idea of God, as it is held, questioned or rejected throughout the civilised peoples of the West, has been furnished by the prophetic writings of the Old Testament, with the secondary influence of Greek philosophy and the subsequent reasoning of the more philosophic religious thinkers. The way in which it emerged, slowly and with setbacks, from the originally tribal doctrine of Jahveh, as "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob" is one of the most fascinating as well as important subjects of research. Making a controversial yet majestic progress, in which it overcame the conflicting and competing conceptions embodied in the worship of Baal and Moloch, on the one hand, and of Baalim, on the other, it gradually attained the sublimity of Isaiah vi and xl, which may be treated as the culminating revelation of the Old Testament, and the assured starting-point of the New. The Idea of God, thus attained, may be briefly summarised as follows. He is the living God, personal, ceaselessly active, eternal. His otherness is seen as holiness, making Him the object of awe, deepening and rising into reverence. He is worshipped, not because dread of His power compels submission, but because the apprehension of His spiritual and moral perfection makes Him adorable and attractive, trustworthy and inspiring.

God does not abide in the eternal blessedness of His perfection, but goes forth in Self-giving, as Creator, Sustainer, Sovereign; He is the end as well as the source of creation. To use later language, He is the First Cause and the Sufficient Reason of the Universe. If the sense of His transcendence holds back, for the time being, the sense of His immanence, yet this latter is approached by the recognition of His immediate and universal presence and by the conviction that His Law is not merely imposed upon but is the life of His creatures and, above all, of man. God is, therefore, above all, the source of the supreme spiritual values, in which His Nature is not only revealed but imparted to the making and remaking of men. Hence God seeks to bestow upon men fellowship with Himself, through His grace, which is His Love in action. His transcendent otherness is seen as the sovereign kinship, which justifies and inspires the profound simplicity of the Lord's Prayer, "Our Father, which art in heaven" and the sense that "in Him we live, and move, and have our being." As the Author and End He is the Home of our being.

This Idea of God underlies and pervades the corresponding sense of man's dependence in a world that awakens and responds to his reason, stirs his aspirations, compels the moral ordering of his life, substitutes faith for fear, constrains him to enter into an eternal commonwealth which both exalts him above and makes him at home in his world, and develops his personality by opening to him divine fellowship, through the initiative of God. The Idea of God is, therefore, a spiritual fact and not a merely intellectual construction devised for the explanation of the universe. It does explain and satisfy, because it does so much more. It illuminates because it nurtures all those who receive it.

II.—Yet the world is obviously imperfect. It is afflicted by suffering, by sin, and by the manifold maladjustments which are, for the most part, brought about by the process of evolution as this affects the developing personalities and societies of mankind. The burden of evil becomes intolerable in proportion as sensitiveness and sympathy become prevalent. In regard to this it should be noted that hardness and callousness prevailed in the past when mankind was powerless. The burden of evil has become heavier just as the resources of mankind for challenging and overcoming it have

been multiplied and made available. Theists find in this associated rise of sensitive sympathy and remedial power a manifest sign of the beneficent providence of God. Yet, for the moment, the pressure of evil has led some distinguished thinkers to exchange the Idea for what may be termed the Ideal of God. To some of these a finite God appears as a combatant, struggling with a refractory and quasi-independent universe, and summoning men as "Lord of Hosts" to partnership with Himself in redeeming and completing an imperfect world. By some others, as notably by Professor Alexander, God is conceived as the Ideal, only coming to Self-realisation as the goal and product of the spiritual evolution of mankind. For Professor Whitehead, God and the universe are involved in a reciprocal process, each advancing towards final perfection in ceaseless interaction with the other.

III.—Does not acceptance of the Christian faith in its fullness furnish—with needful enlargement of the Idea and correction of the Ideal of God—the means of harmonising these conflicting views? To the present writer it does. The Apostolic and Catholic belief of the Christian Church affirms three eternal distinctions in the Godhead, of which for the immediate purpose of this article the distinction between the Father and the Son, Who became incarnate in our Lord Jesus Christ, is of outstanding importance. It is important to note that this faith was entertained and formulated, not only as homage due to our Lord as Saviour, but as the indispensable means of world-explanation. "Through Him"—the Son—"and unto Him have all things been created: and He is before all things and in Him all things hold together," says St. Paul (Col. 1, 16-17). This belief, as its significance was developed, was the result of the combination of spiritual experience and metaphysical influence. So far as spiritual experience is concerned, the belief is due to the unique consciousness, character and influence of Jesus Christ, Who becoming manifest as the Son, gave to those "who received Him the rightful power to become children of God" (John 1, 12). The philosophical influence arose from the confluence of Jewish thought, which came to personify the Wisdom and the Word of God, with the Alexandrian platonism, which propounded the doctrine of the *Logos Prophorikos*, as the filial mediator of the creative activity of God. Hence for

Christian thought and doctrine the Son is the ground, the law, the consummation of the universe, which in and through Him proceeds from and returns to God, as its Author and End. The Son by His Incarnation entered into this process as Redeemer and "Quickening Spirit," overcoming the alienation of apartness from God, in so far as this is sinful estrangement, and carrying forward a spiritual process by which eventually all things will be "summed up" in Christ. Of this consummation, conversion with its consequent "newness of life" is the earnest and, therefore, the prophecy. Thus the Son appears, not indeed as struggling, but as the informing and energetic principle of regenerated life, as the transcendent yet immanent Spirit of a reconciliation and fulfilment through which God shall finally be "all in all." The method of this transcendent immanence as it underlies and penetrates the Being-for-self of phenomenal existence as a whole, with the limited autonomy which prevails throughout the process of evolution, is and must remain mysterious. Yet there is an analogous mystery as to the mode in which human personality with its purposive activity stands related to the body, with the subordinate freedom and frequent disorganisation of its cellular constitution and of its diversified organs. Yet the fact, though mysterious, is real.

This analogy suggests that in the universe there exists a limited freedom of evolution, with its shortcomings and out-breaks, which is not, in the last resort, incompatible with the existence of a purposive direction that dominates the whole, and will ultimately bring it to complete wholeness with God as Father, through the Son as Lord. This affords an explanation of the way in which finite personalities and spiritual values emerge from and enter into such reciprocal relations with their material environment as advance them to the slowly growing ascendancy which marks the spiritual progress of mankind. What other explanation is there of the coherence of the material with the spiritual, of the way in which the supreme values are both given and yet achieved?

It is in the light of this belief that Christians regard the problem of evil, whether physical or spiritual. In the first place, the rough-and-ready application of the conceptions of omnipotence and omniscience to the criticism of this process is gravely misleading. After all, these attributions to God are abstractions of human thought, invaluable in themselves,

but to be interpreted as elements of a complex Divine Whole and in the light of the concrete reality of the universe as it unfolds itself to human apprehension. They must not be torn from their context, either in God or in the universe, and arbitrarily made to test them. Even almighty power must be construed in the light of the divine purpose, and a world of personalities and spiritual values cannot be mechanically controlled from outside, even if from outside be from above. The world is as Keats has said, the "Vale of Soul-making." Such a world must be governed by appropriate methods. It must be based upon freedom and evoke it, must stimulate progress, must call forth and cement friendship, must awaken aspiration by arousing divine discontent. From this point of view the insensibility of man's material environment is essential. Were it not, within limits, an independent order, even clashing from time to time with the well-being of mankind, personalities would be immersed in it, instead of emerging from and becoming differentiated from it and by it that they may make use of it. Only God can be "the Father of our spirits." Any fatherhood of material nature would overlay and stifle them.

From this standpoint the problem of suffering and even of sin must be considered. Naturally the existence of suffering staggers the materialist, who is inevitably a Hedonist. From time to time it wellnigh overwhelms the sensitively sympathetic, even though they be not consciously materialist. All such magnify the sufferings of the animal world by projecting their own consciousness, with its imagination and apprehension, into animals and by overlooking the many elements of beneficence by which suffering serves the vitality and promotes the efficiency of the animal, and indeed the human, world. But the whole problem is transformed when it is surveyed from the Christian standpoint, or even from that of Keats. Insistence upon the fruitfulness of sufferings arises from experience. "Let us also rejoice in our tribulations," writes St. Paul, "knowing that tribulation worketh patience, and patience probation (testing), and probation hope, and hope putteth not to shame, because the love of God hath been shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which was given to us." Moreover, our Lord partook of these sufferings, being "made perfect" through them. In his Cross He converted sufferings into a triumphant

achievement. And all this notwithstanding and even because of the fact that sufferings set to mankind the secular task of eliminating or, at all events, alleviating them by efforts, both collective and individual, which call out the highest qualities of human nature.

The same general considerations are applicable even to the problem of moral evil, of sin, so that St. Augustine could exclaim in view of all the facts, "*Felix culpa*." To "soul-making" freedom, with all its risks, is essential. We see not yet the end of the process in what St. Paul terms "the restitution of all things." But we do find ourselves implicated in a compensatory system, with its checks and counter-checks, through which the gradual elimination of evil and the eventual ascendancy of good are being painfully wrought out.

Space prevents the development of this theme. All that can be said, in conclusion, is that, while mystery remains, yet that the demand that men should remain as they are, but that the world to which they belong should be different, is at once impossible, irrational and undesirable.

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

REACTIONS IN MANCHOUKUO.

WHAT do Chinese living in Manchoukuo think of the new Japanese-supported State to which they perforce belong? In the long run this may prove more important than the question of what the Western Powers think about it. For the future of Manchoukuo will be determined by its thirty million Chinese inhabitants rather than by Japan. This Japan well knows, but Japanese statesmen believe that self-interest and propaganda will mould the future according to their wishes. For the mass of the inhabitants "Manchoukuo" does not mean the State. It means the land on which the people live, the towns and the villages, the fields and the hills. It means the land regarded in a new and generally unacceptable light, but still the same land. The name of the State may be regarded as a myth, but the land remains. And for those who live on it, it is the only land they know—their country, on which their livelihood depends. To the Chinese peasant the land has always meant more than the nation. His intellectual and social leaders may place nationalism first and prefer to flee when nationalism is defeated. But the peasant cannot. He is tied by his livelihood. Preference for certain rulers is a luxury he must forego. He is stoically indifferent because he knows that he has in his possession what constitutes the foundation of the nation. He is roused only when the land is taken from him.

In the past political environment has meant very little to the average Chinese. And to this day the Chinese peasant does not think of his country as a nation or a political organisation. He thinks of it as the land and the people: the land on which he lives and the people who are of the same tradition as he. He does not ask: "When did you come to this country?" but "When did you come to this place?" He thinks and speaks in terms of topography, not of political geography. He thinks of his family as belonging to a place. He lives his life in terms of the soil. Land, he perceives, is the most profitable and constant possession. It is probable that this lack of a political sense has been the means of preserving Chinese culture intact through the centuries. There has never been a social or political organisation to be destroyed. Conquerors came and went; but what would have destroyed a nation in the West could not destroy what it hardly affected—a culture

based on the family and the land. China and Japan have abandoned that cultural ideal, but it survives strong in the mind of the peasant. And in Manchuria there are two factors which encourage this conservative tendency.

First of all, the people have had to surrender their sense of belonging to China politically. The new sense of nationalism which was widely instilled in the people's minds in the years just prior to 1931 and was gradually winning a place in their thought has had to go. They hate the new nationalism that is being forced upon them, though they may, of necessity, give it lip service. Falling back on the thought of the land and the culture, they speak even less than before in terms of the political unit and more in terms of locality. For the land has not changed; it is still theirs. They think of their culture not especially as something linking them with China, but as something that links them with their past and shows them what, despite all appearances, they really are. When the distinction between Chinese and foreigner has to be made they avoid using the terms "Manchoukuo jen" and, fearing to write "Chinese," employ the vague term "hua," which indicates the Chinese culture without mentioning the name of the State.

The second factor is Japanese encouragement of a return to the old ways in opposition to the advanced teaching of the Chinese republic and in sympathy with the conception of a restored empire. The Chinese classics are back in the school curriculum. All the old religions are fostered. New groups for the promotion of the old ideas are encouraged, and more than encouraged. All this is part of the "Wang Tao," or Kingly Way. Most people treat it with derision, but it cannot be without effect.

What does the organisation of the new State mean to the Chinese inhabitant? The answer needs to be given under three heads, for the situation differs radically in the cities, in the smaller towns, and in the villages. In the cities, and generally along the main railways, Manchoukuo means the power of Japan. The Japanese army obviously is in supreme command. No one can fail to be conscious of it. It is an authority that has unquestioned power, that can get things done and that, within certain limits, acts intelligibly. And life gains the security of certainty. After the alarms and excursions of a troublous three years the cities have attained

a regular mode of life. In the smaller towns, where the power of Japan is not so directly visible, the new Government seems little different from the old. Officials act under the same titles as before. Many are local people, while some have come from inside the Wall. Work seems to be done in much the same way as before, though under Japanese supervision there is a greater outward efficiency. Here the real power of Japan is better disguised than in the cities. There are Japanese advisers, indeed, but they try to remain behind the scenes. The magistrate ostensibly is the first man in the place and the Japanese adviser politely bows him in to dinner. But it is to the Japanese adviser you go if you want anything done. To the millions of peasants living in the villages which make up most of Manchuria, Manchoukuo is only a name, except in those large tracts of country where chaos still reigns. There Manchoukuo means Japanese force. Elsewhere, especially in the south-west, you may travel for miles without meeting a Japanese, soldier or civilian, and without noting any outward indication that a change has occurred in the government of the country.

That is what the people see. But what is their attitude to the new State? Here again the three divisions hold. It is in the cities that the greatest change in the life of the people is seen. In Mukden the old leaders have all gone, and their places have not been filled. The life of Mukden now centres round the Japanese section. The Chinese city is merely a collection of homes, where people are trying to live their own lives in quietness. There are Chinese officials, but they have no freedom and so cannot lead. It is the educated classes who feel the position most acutely. They can see the direction in which all is tending—how propaganda and the lack of communications with China is developing a new Manchurian attitude and is helping the formation of a new nation. They see that the country can never be the same again. The years cannot roll back. They see how the lack of leadership is threatening the life of the people. They see that the refusal to take any part in public life is leading only to greater evil in that the uneducated are left at the mercy of those who would exploit them. So there is growing up the feeling that those who have the ability should do something. There is a renewed interest in social work. And social work cannot be done without the cognisance of the authorities. A school must be

conducted with the approval of the Government and according to its rules.

Among the officials and among private individuals there are many enlightened Japanese who are keen on social work, especially for the young. So the educated, who feel the position much more keenly than the uneducated, are forced because of their sensitiveness to come to some kind of terms. There is little trace of non-co-operation. It is the practical question that forces action. But, of course, when it comes to acclaiming Manchoukuo they go just as far as they have to, and with their tongues in their cheeks—an action bad for the heart. There comes, naturally, with this renewed work and the satisfaction of getting some things accomplished a sense of interest in the place which might possibly grow into pride and love. This is almost inevitable. A man always grows to take some sort of pride in the place in which he lives, even though it is not of his own choosing.

In a few of the towns, such as Chinchow, the number of Japanese has increased greatly, but in the majority of places the increase has not been remarkable. There are, of course, Japanese soldiers and advisers with their families, and generally a few Japanese teachers and a few more shops to cater for them; but, on the whole, there is no large influx of Japanese. That was probably what the townspeople dreaded most. They saw themselves exploited and the town no longer theirs. But the town still seems much the same, so they do not worry about the possibility of exploitation. Then, too, the attitude of the Japanese has changed. In 1932 one was conscious of a sense of achievement among the Japanese and an almost jubilant expectation of welcome. Now they have relapsed into living their own lives among their own people, but in a greatly extended environment.

Three years ago a Japanese dentist opened his office on the main street of a town not far from Mukden. The people were filled with dread. An ornamented mouth is quite the fashion, but the townsfolk were filled with rumours of compulsory dental attention. It was said that first all the school children were to attend the Japanese dentist and then that all the adults would have their turn. But nothing happened. The chair in the dentist's window was seldom occupied—much to the sorrow of passers-by. And then the office closed and the dentist moved off to more hopeful pastures. The townspeople

realised that every Japanese was not an official, and the dentist learned that nothing but pain would force the citizen of Manchoukuo to get his tooth out.

The people of the towns have now grown accustomed to the Japanese soldiers, the Manchoukuo flag, the school holidays and track meets. They do not believe the news in the papers, and often they pine for news. Their latent feelings have been revealed by nothing more than by the widespread dread that Japan will extend her rule to North China. That they should be thus reunited with the people inside the Wall is not a thought that they ever seem to welcome. The reopening of postal communications has brought closer touch with China, but the great thing that keeps interest alive is the number of friends and relatives who live inside the Wall. It is rare to meet a family, in town or country, that has not some close relative living inside the Wall, and in most cases there is much coming and going. Most officials, even in their offices and more so when met privately, will ask eagerly for reliable news from a foreign source. They never seek to disguise where their sympathies lie. They look round stealthily and speak in a low voice, and assure you that they will not repeat what you say. You do not believe that, but you know that it does not matter.

In the country places the people think mainly of what they see and they do not see Manchoukuo. They see the advertisements in the railway stations and they know that their buying and selling, their weights and their measures are all ordered for them. They know that conditions are worse than they have ever known. And, as they have ever done, with unthinking certitude they blame the powers that be. And they hate the Japanese, mainly because the Japanese that they most frequently see is the seller of narcotics, and generally a poor specimen of his race. It is the invincible belief of the peasant that every Japanese, except the soldier, be he engineer or shopkeeper or what you will, is engaged in this lucrative trade. It is a wrong belief, but nothing will persuade the countryman otherwise. The unrestricted sale of narcotics is the most noticeable change in the life of the country people since 1931. In the cities the effects are probably as bad, but are not quite so visible where new streets and fine buildings and other obvious marks of progress distract attention. In the country there is nothing, except banditry, to distract

attention. The trade is carried on in two ways: shops and peddlers. In all the towns and larger villages there are shops. In one village with a total of perhaps 1,500 inhabitants near my home there are six shops. In the towns there will be from twenty to forty shops, invariably owned by Japanese or Koreans. Some are pawnshops and some display other goods for sale, but always they clearly indicate that they sell narcotics, mainly morphine and heroin. Opium is, of course, easily procurable everywhere. The usual price of a dose of morphine or heroin is ten Chinese cents, but it rises as the customer becomes an addict.

It must be remembered that this trade existed before 1931. The traders then hid behind the defence of extra-territoriality, but the business was the cause of much trouble. At that time it was restricted to those places where Japanese felt safe to live, i.e. where there was a Japanese consul. After 1931 all Manchuria was open to the trade. The Japanese or Korean dealer in narcotics took advantage of his ability to travel anywhere under the protection of the military. Thousands of Japanese of questionable character came over from Japan. Shops were opened in all towns and large villages. And now a second method is used. Peddlers go round to smaller villages and farms selling their wares. They pose as medicine sellers and introduce narcotics as a special medicine, so that many buy, not knowing what it is. These peddlers are often Koreans, but sometimes Chinese, usually accompanied by a Korean or Japanese.

The authorities do not encourage the trade in morphine and heroin, though there is a Government monopoly of opium, but they do nothing to prevent it. They allow organisations such as the Christian Church to make demonstrations and carry on propaganda against the use of narcotics. But in cases of trouble the Japanese officials tend naturally to defend their own subjects. There seem to be indications that the authorities are becoming concerned—possibly owing to reports that some Japanese are becoming addicts. It is difficult to imagine the full effect of this trade on the life of the people. The addict, emaciated, clad in rags of sack, clutching a tin can, oblivious of his surroundings, is a common sight everywhere. In the larger places the people are quite accustomed to seeing dead bodies lying in the streets in the morning. The people shun the addict as if he were already

dead and they keep a careful watch on their possessions. Theft has tremendously increased, for the addict will resort to any means to get his dose. Homes are broken up and families ruined. It is no wonder that the common people look on the new order without any love. Here Japan has made a big mistake. The peasant was willing to accept, if not to welcome, anyone who would give him assurance of peace, but the free sale of narcotics rather than the failure to suppress bandits has raised a contempt of the Japanese which may produce greater obstacles to the fruition of Japan's schemes than fear would ever do.

On what is the new State relying to overcome this prejudice and engender a new patriotism? Education is the first thing. Primary education is encouraged. There are many public schools and encouragement and sometimes financial aid are given to private schools. But higher education, in senior middle schools and in colleges, is not encouraged. Rather the attempt is made to direct youth into practical work and into teaching in primary schools. The teaching is directed to the production of a definite type, physically strong but not intellectually curious. Great emphasis is laid on physical training and now increasingly on technical training. Japanese is compulsory and English rather discouraged. History and geography are taught from a distinctly national point of view. Those who want higher education can go to Japanese colleges in Mukden, or to Japan. So far nothing has been done to prevent students going into China to study, or to prevent their coming back.

Much is made of holidays and track meets and the welcoming and farewelling of important visitors and officials. And all such occasions are made to express the worship of the State. But the tendency to rub in the saving work of Japan has been a little toned down. The authorities seem to realise that their most powerful weapon is the slow assimilation of the new environment by the infant mind. The children in primary school do not remember any other country than Manchoukuo, and it might perhaps be the wisest thing for the authorities to leave it at that. Though they would do well to realise how strong is still the pro-Chinese feeling in the homes of the people and in the not too private thoughts of the teachers. Great use is made of posters, mainly to advertise the railways and to encourage among the people a feeling of

responsibility towards the railway. These posters, with their bright colours and their obvious imagery, must have an effect on the illiterate peasant. They all help him to take his fate for granted.

Among the better educated classes encouragement is given to all organisations that help to promote a local spirit. There are numerous societies, some of which seem to exist solely to provide the secretary with a job. Others have a more definite aim, social or educational. The Confucian society has offices and schools everywhere in the towns, and seems to attract many pupils. Then there are Buddhist societies and charitable societies and ethical societies. These are probably not directly financed by the authorities, but they are all encouraged. The authorities are seeking to use the Christian Church in the same way. Religion and education both come under the control of the Wen Chiao Pu (Department of Instruction), and the Wen Chiao Pu gathers information from all religions equally. Its attitude to the Christian Church is friendly because it sees in a Church, be it Christian or Buddhist, a useful means to help the creation of a local spirit. The only thing that causes suspicion is the possible connection with similar institutions in China. And so it does all it can, directly and indirectly, to mould a national Church. Invitations are extended to leaders to visit Japan, scholarships are offered to students, requests are made for co-operation with Japanese Christian organisations, Japanese Christian missions to the people of Manchoukuo are encouraged.

All these are fairly powerful agencies and all have their effect. But against them is set the freedom of the peasant's mind from all political thought and his strong attachment to the land and to his culture. His acquiescence is only the measure of his obstinacy. And in the end it may be that the nation she is labouring to create may be the very enemy of all Japan's hopes.

T. R. DOUGLAS.

HISTORY AND ART.

N EARLY seven hundred years ago, on the occasion of a memorable ceremony in the abbey church of Westminster, there met, though not for the first time, two famous men. Both of them were interested in art, both of them in history. The one, seated in state upon his throne, was crowned with the circlet known as "the garland," and robed in costly cloth from Bagdad. The other, a humble spectator, wore the black habit of a Benedictine monk. The one was King Henry III; the other Matthew Paris, artist and historian. Of Henry III's love of the beautiful contemporaries never tired of speaking. How truly they spoke we are learning increasingly with every year that passes, as a partnership develops between the student of art and the student of history, and revelations in the field of art advance side by side with revelations in the field of archives. Year by year such workers as Professor Tristram or Professor Borenius search out for us, and sometimes bring literally to light, fresh treasures of medieval art, many of them dating from King Henry's days. Year by year, under the ægis of the Public Record Office, appear those stout quartos which contain in full or summary shape the enrolments of Henry's chancery. The artistic evidence, impressive though it is, comes down to us mutilated and diminished by the changes and chances of the passing centuries. It is to the record evidence that we have to turn if we are to recover the art of the age in its pristine range and splendour, and are to learn how intimate and direct was Henry's personal influence upon it.

Take, for example, two London residences where Henry often stayed, the Tower and the Palace of Westminster. As long ago as the sixteenth century fire destroyed the medieval church, dedicated to St. Peter *ad Vincula*, which stood on Tower Green, and started in the medieval palace at Westminster damage to be completed by a more modern conflagration. Yet from the chancery enrolments we can recover in the minutest detail the appearance of both as Henry saw them. We have his order to the keepers of works at the Tower to "refresh with good colours" the stalls and images in St. Peter's; to paint or to make images of the Virgin, of St. Peter in the garb of an archbishop, of St. Christopher carrying Jesus; to set forth on tablets the stories

of St. Nicholas and St. Katherine; and, most pleasing instruction of all, to see that the cherubim set on either side of the great cross shall be of "cheerful and jocund countenance." As to the palace at Westminster, the orders issued at different times are far too numerous and too detailed to be fully quoted here. But one may be chosen for mention, because it brings Henry in a very human way into relation with the long line of mortals who have known how to value, by contrast, man's ingenuity in securing his own comfort against wind and weather. Like W. T. Arnold's friend, who in bed at night on the east coast of Scotland, with the wind whining round the house, "found himself laughing with glee at the very idea of a house with its cunning snugness," so Henry and his queen, sitting beside the blazing logs on the hearth of the queen's chamber at Westminster, may have hugged themselves with pleasure in warmth and safety as they looked at the picture painted upon the chimney by the king's command. For this was to be a figure of Winter, and "made the more like Winter by its sad countenance and the miserable contortions of its body."

The double approach to knowledge of the past, by direct observation combined with the study of historical record, would have won Henry III's warmest approbation. Let us return to the meeting in Westminster Abbey, and call Matthew Paris himself to witness.

Now as the king was sitting on his throne, he caught sight of him who is writing these words, and called him to him, and bade him remain on the step between the throne and the floor of the church. And he said to him, "Have you watched all this, and impressed what you have seen firmly upon your mind?" And he answered "In truth I have, sire, for what has been done here on this glorious day is well worthy of remembrance." . . . "I beg you," continued the king, "nay, I command you, to write down in full detail all this, and to commit it imperishably to a book, so that it may not be destroyed hereafter by loss of memory."

If our knowledge of the past is to be enlarged to its utmost fulness we must aim at the correlation of artistic and historical discoveries. What can be done, more than is done already, to pool the experience of the art historians on the one hand and on the other, of historians concerned with other aspects of man's activity through the ages? The former, as the Director of the Courtauld Institute recently reminded the Fellows of

the Royal Historical Society, must always find his main material in the works of art themselves, treating record and literary sources as merely auxiliary and subsidiary. The latter, on the other hand, who for his own purpose reverses that order of merit, may often find in his own material evidence of primary interest to the art historian, or may wish to draw from a work of art inferences of a general historical character.

Wherever pooling of experience has taken place, it has been to the advantage of both sides ; and of recent years there have been several notable efforts in this direction. The Medieval Academy of America, for example, was described by Professor Coffman at the time of its foundation in 1925 as "a co-ordinating office, a national and international clearing-house for all matters medieval." Among elements needful for its success he included "the co-operation and the creative energy of students of art." In the ensuing ten years, *Speculum*, the organ of the Academy, has mirrored varied interests with admirable catholicity. Moreover among the six major projects of research sponsored by the Academy, there has stood side by side with administrative, linguistic, ecclesiastical and other investigations, that comprehensive architectural study of the remains of the abbey church at Cluny which is still in progress, under the direction of Professor Conant. Those of us who have visited Cluny, who have seen the lovely, isolated fragment of the great transept towering above its ugly neighbours, a machine shop and a government *baras*, or who have wandered from church to church through the Brionnais, finding at every turn the influence and inspiration of the Cluny masons, will be among the first to rejoice that the work of Professor Conant and his helpers has been made possible. Already for students of both political and ecclesiastical history Cluny stood out as a centre of unique importance. The architectural approach is emphasising that in a new way, and giving, as its promoters said, "a vision of the ampler lost horizon."

On this side of the Atlantic, the British Society of Franciscan studies has in hand a heroic enterprise which is an equally good example of the interweaving of historical and artistic interest. It is proposed to publish two volumes, illustrated as copiously as finances allow. One will contain plans and descriptions of every Franciscan house in England and Wales of which records or remains survive. The other

will give lists of every possible sort of artistic material relating to English Franciscan history. It will include Franciscan subjects in illuminated manuscripts and illuminated manuscripts made or owned by English Franciscans ; representations of St. Francis himself or of other Franciscan saints on screens, stained glass, walls, or panels ; and also such miscellaneous material as tiles, effigies, altar frontals and possibly seals. The titles of these volumes strike a new note in the list of the Society's publications ; but it is a note entirely in harmony with our growing sense of the services which can be rendered by history to art and art to history.

The interlacing of interests is perhaps commoner than we always remember. Its possibility was borne in upon the present writer by a recent experience, which may be quoted in illustration. Not long ago certain accounts of the Chamberlain of Chester, covering a period of eight months in the year 1301, were transferred from private custody to deposit in the National Library of Wales. At once they attracted the attention of various persons, for various reasons. Those primarily interested in the local history of Cheshire rejoiced to have secured at last the missing link in a long series of accounts, which were otherwise complete all the way from 1301 to 1360 and had been printed. The present writer, however, was concerned less with Cheshire than with the young man to whom in this year were given the earldom of Chester and the conquered principality of Wales—Edward of Carnarvon, the future King Edward II. It was on April 21st, 1301, so said an account in the Public Record Office, that young Edward "passed over the bridge at Chester towards Wales," on his way to revisit the land of his birth, unseen since babyhood. As the newly available document covered the months between February and September, it seemed possible that it might contain references of interest in connection with his doings or his orders during that visit. So a journey was made to Aberystwyth to inspect the manuscript. From the searcher's immediate standpoint, this resulted in little addition to what was already known ; but from the standpoint of an historian of art it proved astonishingly fruitful. Many of the entries, as might be expected, dealt with repairs and reconstructions in the three castles of Chester, Flint and Rhuddlan. The exact wording was now copied of an entry to which Mr. Stewart-Brown had called attention

when writing to *The Times Literary Supplement* concerning this manuscript. It ran as follows: "To William of Northampton, painter, painting a figure of blessed Thomas the martyr with the four knights who slew the same martyr, in the smaller chapel of the castle of Chester near the great hall, by the ordinance and command of the lord Edward." When this information was handed on to Professor Borenius, who in his long study of the subject had of course collected examples of such representations of the martyrdom from many countries and many centuries, it transpired that, so far, this was the only medieval record discovered of the execution of such a painting.

It is not every day of course that new sources come to light after this fashion. But even among records already well known the general historian comes from time to time upon information of more direct interest to the historian of art than to himself. Take, for example, those two famous volumes known as the Black Book of the Exchequer, originally compiled by the officers of that department for their own convenience and now preserved in the Public Record Office. The contents of the first volume, which is predominantly medieval, are of the most miscellaneous kind. Among them are an exchequer calendar, a table for chronological reckoning, another for calculating salaries, specimens of the forms for official oaths, a copy of the famous twelfth-century Dialogue concerning the Exchequer, and other less solemn matters, such as rhymes and idle scribblings. Interposed, however, are several pages filled with medieval drawings. There are the emblems of the four Evangelists; there is a Crucifixion and a picture of the Virgin and Child; and there are pictures of various saints, among them St. Thomas Becket. This last belongs to the least interesting iconographically of such representations, for it shows the single figure of the saint, without emblems of martyrdom or accompanying murderers. He wears the pallium, raises his right hand in blessing, and rests the other upon his archiepiscopal staff surmounted by its cross. One more example, it seems, of a well-known type of Becket representation is to be found in a source more likely to be examined by the political or administrative historian than by the historian of art.

The prospects of co-operation between historians of different kinds are brighter to-day than they have ever been before.

The existence in one and the same city of three such institutions as the Courtauld Institute of Art, the Warburg Institute, and the Institute of Historical Research, is in itself an asset. International and other conferences between historians are becoming regular features of historical activity. Bibliography, if unable entirely to keep pace with the tremendous and many-sided literary output, is at any rate fully alive to its obligations and striving to guide searchers on their way. Personal and literary contacts between different historical interests are thus becoming easier and commoner. Recognition of mutual needs is the first step towards their satisfaction.

Hitherto in such co-operation the general historian has perhaps played a little too much the rôle of a sleeping partner. This was due neither to arrogance nor to laziness. He viewed with respect both the works of art themselves and those experts who made them intelligible to him. But he felt himself to be unfamiliar with the technique essential to a full understanding of the artistic material, and may at times have had an uneasy sense that too close a consideration of the artistic evidence might dislocate the labels and the chronological divisions produced by the study of political history. He could not fail to notice, for example, that the political historian and the historian of art, applying different criteria to the same person or the same period, might reach very different conclusions. Henry III's agreed incapacity for statesmanship need be of little moment to an observer whose gaze was concentrated upon him as "the first king of highly educated taste since Alfred of Wessex." A recent writer on George IV has found a new explanation for the King's character and policy in the fact that he was blessed or cursed with the artistic temperament. No doubt the information given in the past by historians of art has often served as supplement or as corrective to the impressions conveyed by a study of political history alone. So far, however, the general historian has taken rather than given, and may have failed fully to realise what lies within his power to give. Perhaps the time is coming when he will take as his motto one of the precepts given to the Apostles; "*Gratis accepistis, gratis date.*"

HILDA JOHNSTONE.

COMMERCE IN SECONDARY AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

COMMERCIAL education has been one of the slowest things to develop in this country if one compares its progress with that made by technical education, yet it is a very live subject at the present time. Last year we had a very important report on the language side by the British Association for Commercial and Industrial Education, followed by a three-day conference on various sides of the question of the Association itself, and still more recently by another commercial conference at Hastings. There were also two international congresses, one in London on Scientific Management and another at Prague. The subject has also formed the staple of several prize-giving speeches. At Cheltenham the headmaster described the successful start of a section of the VI Form to study business conditions, economics, etc.; at Uppingham the headmaster spoke of similar developments; Mill Hill has also instituted a kind of Business Sixth on more general lines; again at the Leys School Lord Trent pointed out the great gulf that had existed in the past between the public school and business and emphasised the fact that in business to-day the public school boy would find just as big an opportunity of serving the community as in other branches of the national services, but he warned his audience that it was no longer necessary to have been at a public school or university in order to rise to the top of the tree. The main thing was to be able to make oneself master of one's job. If I may put the thing in a nutshell: it is the man behind the counter who counts.

One of the chief reasons for the comparatively slow development of commercial education in this country compared with (say) France and Germany has been the lack of clearness of aim in the early advocates of this important element in national education. They spoke about it in a vague and general way without considering whether their remarks were applicable to pupils of 14, 16, 18 or 21, or concerned the day or evening student, while the business world was equally at sea in formulating what they exactly needed, or if they did they made perfectly impossible proposals. Yet as far back as 1897 Mr. Sidney Webb pointed out at a conference on the subject that the term commerce covered a whole

multitude of things—in fact a vast number of distinct callings from that of the typist and shorthand writer to that of the bank clerk, the insurance clerk, and the chartered accountant—ranging in fact from the elementary stage up to the university. Yet this need of differentiating the various types was far from being immediately grasped. At a congress at Antwerp two years later an English commercial programme was solemnly presented, so encyclopædic in character that it was calculated the student would have to put in eight to ten years to get through it.

The establishment of commercial sides in the newly constituted central schools in 1912 helped to stratify one stage of the subject. On the other hand it undoubtedly retarded the study of commercial subjects in secondary schools. The much needed extension of this important element in education in the majority of secondary schools was sternly opposed by the academic purists in power who thought there was no room for such “bread and butter subjects” in these schools, although the greater number of their pupils ultimately went into the black-coated professions or, if girls, became typists and shorthand clerks. There were, of course, a few outstanding exceptions, like the City of London College, which prepared for the different grades of commerce, while some purely secondary schools like Holloway and Hackney Downs in London, and Bradford Grammar School in the provinces, had excellent commercial sides, and also a few girls' schools like the Camden School for Girls. However, the force of facts finally proved too strong for these academic theorists and to-day commercial classes, whether for the weaker pupils who have given up working for the school certificate, or for those who have passed it, are now an accepted fact in many secondary schools. It is seen to be a necessary development of the principle that is everywhere gaining ground that some preparation is advisable for the future career which the pupil is likely to take up, with the corollary that the better the pupil the later should such specialisation be undertaken.

In the public schools the movement has been naturally far slower, as the prejudice against any sort of work of this kind is naturally greater in the homes of classical learning, in spite of the existence of modern sides, and there have been reasons for it in the past. A large number of the sons of business men have gone to the public schools. They have

learnt there the extremely valuable lessons of responsibility and the power to manage their fellows, but in the great majority of cases they have not received any training for their future career. Being, however, what the French call "*fils à papa*" they have in many instances gone straight into the family business and generally made good in the long run. But things are changing. The increased conversion of old-established firms into joint-stock enterprises in which, through their parents' connection with the company, they can still get a berth, no longer ensures that security of tenure which they enjoyed when the family business was a freehold. And, as Lord Trent has pointed out, they come up against the ever-increasing competition of the secondary pupil, also trained to command and accept responsibility, and not only keen on succeeding, but also probably already partially equipped in the technique of the particular business concerned, whether it be a commercial knowledge of geography, languages, or economic history. The ordinary public school boy therefore often starts at a disadvantage. Involuntarily one asks why not an O.T.C. for commerce?

The appointment of Career Masters has no doubt brought this home to many schools and headmasters and the creation of commercial sections like that at Cheltenham and elsewhere are all moves in the right direction. Nevertheless, there is still a strong feeling that more is necessary, which found expression in the meeting of the Conference of Head Masters in December. A suggestion has actually been made for creating a special business college in London mainly for public school boys, but not excluding pupils from other schools, who have passed the school certificate and desire to enter business in a year or maybe two years. From the purely technical side there is a certain amount to be said for it. It would, or should, possess a certain element of concreteness and reality which the public school cannot give, and its staff would naturally consist of experts; possibly a selection from the vast list of classes at the School of Economics might provide a second alternative, unless the classes were of too general a type.

On the other hand, I still think that if the public schools rise to the occasion and create, when they have not already done so, post-certificate classes or sections, as efficient as (say) their Army classes, it would be better for the average

boy to stay on at the public school to the mutual profit of himself and the school. But the classes will have to be thoroughly efficient and run by thoroughly qualified teachers. Anything savouring of an educational siding into which the classical misfits or other *fruits secs* were automatically shunted would be fatal. In fact one would expect a certain number of the classical side whose ultimate aim was business to transfer to the section. This would not rule out the starting of a commercial finishing college. Some boys do really make a new start when faced with reality. But such a college should not be started till the whole thing had been thrashed out with those members of the business world who have a clear idea of what exactly they want and what can be reasonably expected from the entrant to this particular business. The great stores need one type of person, the banks and Stock Exchange another, the exporters to the colonies another, the exporters to foreign countries another, and so on. A certain number of pupils would probably already have a definite type of job in view. Others would be classed according to their linguistic or other abilities, a minority might follow a more generalised course. But, where possible, each pupil should have his special time-table drawn up in view of the type of business he proposed to enter. Some classes (say in commercial geography) would naturally be common to pupils of more than one type. But, broadly speaking, the college would be an educational restaurant where the bulk of the students would not be allowed to feed *à la carte* but would each have a special menu drawn up for him.

Such intense specialisation would neither be possible nor desirable in the commercial section of the public schools. But I doubt, from reading the abbreviated report of the discussion at the Conference already alluded to on the work of public school boys intending to enter commerce, whether the bias that it is proposed to give to this post-certificate course is really sufficiently definite. For instance, commercial history and commercial geography, if not given by a specialist in commercial history and commercial geography, can be just as deadly dull and unfruitful as the so-called commercial French or German. I think there must be a definite inclusion of such subjects as economics, to instance the example of Cheltenham, and here I would quote in support Mr. John Benn, who went into business after a public school and university career. In

his excellent and amusing book *Tradesman's Entrance* he stresses the vital importance of a study of economics. At the same time the emphasis laid by the Conference on the teaching of good English is excellent, and also on the need of discovering the boy's real bent, linguistic or other.

It might be well to give these business pupils, whether remaining in the public schools or attending the suggested college, a leaving examination to work for as an objective, as is indeed done in some secondary schools which prepare their commercial pupils for the Inter B.A., though personally I think a diploma given on an examination conducted by the college itself would be preferable as far as its own students are concerned. Possibly the new post-certificate in commerce established for Commercial Institutes might be suitable or adapted to it. There are, indeed, a large number of public school boys who are entering business who would be all the better to have some sort of definite examination to prepare for. It is true that the committee of the Conference on a post-school-certificate course declared against the establishment of an examination at the end of the course. Their opinion is naturally deserving of the greatest respect, but if I have understood their proposals aright, it would be difficult to arrange for one examination to test the teaching suggested; whereas if a more definite syllabus were adopted, like that at Cheltenham, an examination would be quite possible. If such a one were instituted, I should prefer it to be conducted in conjunction with the staff of the school itself. This would prevent both cramping the syllabus and cramming the pupils.

Even for those who have already entered business, the establishment of a commercial institute devoted to the after-career of such pupils might render very valuable service. And in this connection I have come across a very interesting project of a young friend of mine, a public school boy who has already been in business about five years and therefore knows where the shoe pinches. Having himself experienced great difficulties at the outset, he is just starting a Public Schools Business Society which, as it has secured the blessing of one of the directors of Selfridge's, may be considered, in spite of its idealism, as being of some practical value.

Briefly, it proposes to try and find places for boys whom their schools have been unable to place. Secondly, it will try

to put boys in touch with others following the same course, and thus minimise by comradeship the inevitable loneliness in which the boy who has just entered business often finds himself. And thirdly, it will attempt to organise meetings and discussions on broad commercial topics by men well known in business life.*

Anything that will help boys to tide over the drudgery of the early years in business is of great psychological importance. Nothing is more convincing than to be assured by those who have been through the mill of the necessity and value of acquiring the mere routine of business. Nothing is more helpful to the young worker than to realise, even if he seems a mere cog in the machine, the value of his work to the machine as a whole, and this again is what those who are in authority can bear witness to. The real curse of much modern work is not so much that it is *monotonous* as that it is *meaningless*. If one feels (*crede experto*) that, however humble the "chores" one is appointed to perform, they produce some useful result, one comes near that happiness (I would rather say that satisfaction) which Aristotle asserted to be the result of the profitable expenditure of our natural energy and of which George Herbert has shown the deep spiritual significance.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

* Those who wish to hear more of the Society, whether parents or boys, should write to the Hon. Organising Secretary, Kenneth Hare-Scott, 12 Cranley Gardens, London, S.W.7.

ARABS AND JEWS IN PALESTINE.

THE surface of life in Palestine reveals nothing of the Jewish-Arab conflict. Arabs go unconcernedly about their business among the Jews in the Jewish towns, and Jews move undisturbed among the Arabs in the Arab towns. Respectful of each other they sit side by side in the cafés, the cinemas, the railway carriages. Fellaheen pay friendly visits to Jewish villages. Arab and Jew work peacefully together in the plantations and factories. Jewish trade unions direct and finance strikes by Arab workers, and Arab workers take part in the May demonstrations of Jewish socialists. On a higher social level Arab capital joins with Jewish, and both with British, all sections of the population striving to bring in the harvest of prosperity undisturbed by national conflicts. But beneath this surface smoulder the glowing embers of discord. Will these embers not burst into flame if the seven prosperous years are followed by long years of economic crisis? Or if some event in world politics weakens the force of Great Britain's policy in Palestine, or compels some deflection in that policy? It is this anxiety that darkens the radiant sky of Palestine's prosperity.

No reasonable Arab would dispute that the country's astonishing prosperity has been produced by the influx of Jewish labour and Jewish capital. The facts speak for themselves. Syria and Egypt, neighbouring countries, are suffering severely from the general economic crisis, severely from the agricultural crisis. Since the fall in the price of grain in 1929, Palestine too has passed through an agrarian crisis; it is by no means completely overcome yet. But the effects have been substantially alleviated by the country's general prosperity. During this period the price of land rose by several hundred per cent.; the price of butter, eggs, vegetables, sold by Arab agriculturists in the markets of the rapidly growing Jewish towns, rose too; so also did the wages of Arab workers on the plantations and the new works under construction. To-day their wages are five times as high as wages in Egypt and twice as high as in Syria. The emigration of Palestine Arabs has practically ceased, while on the other hand Arabs in no inconsiderable numbers are flocking into Palestine from Syria, Transjordan and even Egypt.

The country prospers. Thanks to a flourishing economy the

Government of Palestine was able in 1931 to reduce the tithe by a half, to free the fellaheen in large districts from the ground tax, to lighten further the burden of taxation on the land by the amalgamation of two taxes, to build up a reserve fund of £6,000,000 in a full budget year and, at the same time, to cover the country with a network of good roads, and build the Haifa harbour, which is the second biggest in the Mediterranean and five times the size of that at Beirut. Those are assets of the whole country. In the predominantly Arab harbour of Jaffa sea-borne trade has increased from 130,000 tons in 1930 to half a million tons in 1934. In the latter year the Government provided £54,000 for the enlargement of this harbour. These productive public works are made possible by the rich revenue from taxation.

Palestine is, or rather was, a malarial country. Malaria laid siege to Jew and Arab alike. With an outlay of £325,000 the Jews have drained and freed from the plague of fever some 96,000 acres of swamp land, and they are in process of draining a further 13,000 acres in the Hule Plain. A sum of £280,000 has been collected for it. A third of the land thus reclaimed is made available to the Arabs. Those are gains for both Arabs and Jews. The contribution of the Government to land reclamation is substantially smaller. It provided £50,000 for this purpose in Arab regions, and at the present time a large area in Birket Ramadan is being drained by public funds. The Government devotes only 6.2 per cent. of its expenditure to education. But of this more than seven times as much goes to the Arab schools as to the Jewish schools, although the contribution of the Jews to the country's taxation revenue is more than 60 per cent. The value of Jewish immigration to the Arabs is thus self-evident.

How could it be otherwise? Since the Balfour Declaration the Jews have brought more than £50,000,000 into the country. In the past year alone they brought £10,000,000. And this to a country with, at the present day, not more than 1,200,000 inhabitants. This stream of gold has divided up into thousands of rivulets and has fertilised the economy of the whole country. Certainly it was in the first instance to the benefit of the Jews, but it also profited the Arabs. Above all the effendi, the Arab landlords, profit from the fantastically rapid rise in the price of flat land. The capital which they acquire from the sale of land enables them to change over

from unprofitable corn growing to highly profitable orange growing. They profit from the increased value of land in the town-settlement regions. As capitalists they profit from the development of trade and industry. Despite this it is precisely the effendi who make the loudest outcry against the Jewish immigration. They are the main supporters of the Arab nationalist movement.

The Arab nationalists say: Certainly the Jewish immigration has been of service to the welfare of the whole country. But it is changing Palestine from an Arab land into a Jewish one. Twenty years ago the Jews did not amount to 10 per cent. of the population of Palestine. Ten years ago they were about 15 per cent. Now they are in the neighbourhood of 30 per cent., and in another decade, if the immigration goes on uninterrupted, they will amount to half the total population. Further, they obtain possession of the best land; they drive the fellaheen from the soil; they have grasped the natural wealth of the country for themselves—the mineral riches of the Dead Sea, the water-power of the Jordan; the influx of Jewish capital has brought with it a process of social differentiation which is dissolving the ancient social constitution of the country. The Jews are Europeanising the country. But we, the Arabs say, want Palestine to remain oriental. Arabia has awakened. In every Arab country a spirit of independence is abroad—in Egypt, in Syria, in Iraq. Is Palestine always to remain a British colony? Jewish immigration and Jewish prosperity have intensified the authority of British imperialism in Palestine. But we do not desire any foreign domination. Rather Arab poverty than Jewish prosperity. Better the plague of malaria than a plague of Jews!

The Jews reply: Palestine and Transjordan have still room for hundreds of thousands of people. Hundreds of thousands of Jews throughout the world have no home. Why should a home be denied to the Jews, when they open it up with their own strength? The country was dead. Jewish labour and Jewish capital have brought it new life. Not one Arab has become poorer through the Jewish immigration. All have gained by it. The land on which the Jews have settled is now perhaps the best. But it was for the most part swamp or untouched steppe, a pasturage for cattle, sparsely inhabited before they worked on it. Only through Jewish

labour did the 150,000 acres of Emek, Sharon, Haifa—the many thousand acres of the coastal plain—become “the best land in the country.” Desert and swamp have been transformed into flourishing gardens by us.

Whom have the Jews driven from the land? In whose hands was the land before the Jews bought it? In the hands of the effendi or the fellaheen? Of the land 88·5 per cent. has been obtained from the big landlords and only 9·5 per cent from the fellaheen. Since these figures were established, that is since 1931, one of the biggest purchases of land by the Jews was made: that of the 13,000 acres of the Hule Plain. It belonged to two Syrian effendi. Wild boar and wild buffalo trampled the marshes. In a short while they will be drained by Jewish workers with Jewish capital. A third of the reclaimed land will be put at the disposal of the Arab fellaheen. In a district where to-day hardly 11,000 Arab shepherds wrest a pitiful existence, 12,000 fellaheen and 15,000 Jews will live in comfort. It is not the Jews who drive the Arabs from the soil.

On the cultivated land of the effendi live their tenants. There are no laws to protect them. The tenant's lease runs, as a rule, for a year. If it is not renewed by the landlord, the tenants must move. There is no law giving them a claim to compensation. The Jews, however, without being legally compelled, have compensated the tenant farmers. They pay them for each *feddan* (3·7 acres) of cultivated land from £20·513 to £46·154, according to the productive value of the land, or else they take them over on land which has been reclaimed. But the number of landless fellaheen runs into tens of thousands. Sir John Hope Simpson estimates them at 29·4 per cent. of the fellaheen class. Who has driven them from the soil? In the Johnson-Crosbie report the social structure of 104 Arab villages is described. In it 6,940 is the number given of landless farm labourers in those villages. But in the same villages 78,255 dunam (19,330 acres) of land lay fallow, and 245,275 dunam (60,580 acres) were owned by absentee landlords. Palestine does in fact possess huge reserves of land. About 5,500,000 dunam (1,360,000 acres) of cultivable land still lie fallow, and of them 3,000,000 (740,000 acres) are in Arab hands. In addition there is the immense reserve of land in Transjordan, a country of more than 15,400 square miles, one and a half times as big

as Palestine, about a third bigger than Belgium, but inhabited by only 300,000 people. The cultivable but at present fallow land of Transjordan is estimated at 10,000,000 duram (2,470,000 acres). There is thus ample space in this country for Arabs and Jews. There is no need for any Arab to leave the soil. Who then has proletarianised the Arabs?

Two or three decades ago Palestine was a country cut off from the world-wide capitalist stream; it was a half-Bedouin half-feudal country. For centuries methods of working, social life, religious thought had remained unchanged. The Arab village remained economically a "closed household economy." There was no interchange of goods to speak of, no trade for cash. Modern capitalism which came with the Jewish immigration burst the medieval encrustation. The country was drawn into the money market, into the circle of world trade. So long as the village had no need of ready cash, so long did it produce nothing for sale, remaining untouched by the agricultural development of the rest of the world. Now, however, the powerful technical revolution in the world wheat centres determined its destiny. The yield and price of Canadian and New Zealand wheat were decisive as regards changes of ownership in the Palestine village. Canadian wheat fields have a yield of from 12 to 13 metric quintals per hectare (65-70 cwt. per acre); the Arab wheat fields in Palestine yield only 5.9 quintals per hectare (32 cwt. per acre). Canadian agriculture employs the tractor and the combine; by this means work is accomplished in three-quarters of an hour which would take the Arab thirty-five hours. How could the Palestine fellaheen compete with Canadian wheat? For Palestine wheat the wholesale price in 1928 was £13.9 per ton; in 1930 only £7.6. The price of wheat sank by nearly half. Within two years the fellaheen's cash income was halved.

The Arab peasant got into debt. The average indebtedness of each family was estimated at £27—that is, far more than double the average year's income of a fellaheen. There is no cheap credit for Arab agriculture. The normal interest in the villages is 30 and often 50 per cent. for three months. The fellaheen who falls into the hands of the village money-lender is lost. The debt grows from year to year, swallows up a man's whole possessions. The land goes out of the hands of the fellaheen into those of the effendi. The landless

fellaheen becomes a tenant. Thirty-two per cent. of cultivable land is tenant farmed. The usual rent in Palestine is 30 per cent. of the gross produce, 50 per cent. of the nett. The tenancy is short, seldom more than a year. The income is consequently extremely small, far below a living minimum. The Simpson report estimates a year's income of an independent fellaheen family with 25 acres at £11.8, and that of a tenant farmer at £3.6—and this is for a whole family! The low yield, low prices, the high rate of interest, high rents and short tenancies forbid any improvements, any investment in means of production. The situation of the Arab grain farmer is extremely serious—as it is throughout the Near East. The introduction of capitalist economy into the Near East has everywhere destroyed the peasant middle-class, has converted its land into latifundia. More than half the agricultural population of Egypt—50.4 per cent.—are landless workers and farm labourers. Half the Egyptian peasants own less than half a *feddan* (1.8 acres). It is a dwarf economy. Everywhere in the Near East latifundia ownership leads to the laying fallow of huge areas. The cultivable land of Syria amounts to 7,554,000 acres, but approximately only a third, 2,940,000 acres, is cultivated. Two-thirds lie fallow. Everywhere in the Near East the penetration of capitalism has revolutionised ownership relations—in Egypt it is British capital, in Syria, French, in Palestine, Jewish.

The destruction of the foundation of oriental society spreads throughout the whole body. The inflowing Jewish capital has been invested in a large way; it has to a considerable extent warded off the effects of the agrarian crisis caused by the expropriation of the fellaheen by the agricultural revolution. Big cities have been erected on the steppe land; harbours, roads, aqueducts, factories have been built; the labour market thirstily absorbs the proletarianised fellaheen. The demand for workmen is greater than the supply. Wages rise. The wage index figure rose, as the official Commercial Bulletin (Nov., 1929) shows, from 100 in 1913 to 390 in 1928. The Government Wage Commission in May 1928 ascertained the average wage as follows: Unskilled Arab land workers, 12 to 15 piastres (2s. 5d. to 3s.) per day; unskilled Arab town workers, 14 to 17 piastres (2s. 10d. to 3s. 5d.) per day. Since then the wages of Arab farm workers have risen only slightly, whereas those of the town workers

have increased by about 50 per cent. In neighbouring Syria the effendi pay their land workers only 6 to 7 piastres, in Egypt only 3 piastres per day. It is the effendi of Palestine who are annoyed by Jewish prosperity.

A daily wage of 12 piastres in the plantations is more than £41 a year. But the yearly income of an independent fellaheen with 25 acres amounts to only £12. In the town, the daily wage is 20 piastres, that is £62 a year. But the tenant farmer with 25 acres is left with only £3·6. It is more profitable for the peasant or the tenant farmer to let the land lie fallow, or to have merely the most necessary things done by the women, and to work in the town, or alternatively, out of the difference between town wages and land wages, between wages in the Jewish plantations and the substantially smaller rewards of Arab economy, to pay hired labourers to work the land and seek the higher-paid work himself.

The Arab landlord faces the far superior competition of the world wheat centres; he faces far higher wages than in neighbouring Syria and Egypt, a flight from the land of his tenants and labourers, and above all a complete revolution in the conditions of work. The working day in the East begins with dawn and ends at night-fall. Thus it was in Palestine until the immigration of the Jews. The excellently organised Jewish workers brought the eight-hour day into the country. It has spread not only in the Jewish economic sphere. At the beginning of last year the High Commissioner introduced the 48-hour week in technical Government concerns and on the railways. Piece by piece the oriental organisation of society is breaking up; Europe is pressing in; Europe—but in Palestine that means the Jews.

The effendi is revered in the village as a sheik. Like an early medieval feudal lord, he rules over peasants, tenants, labourers. He grants loans, distributes the tenant land, employs the labourers—the whole village owes him tribute. He is its political master. But his position of authority is being undermined by the Europeanisation of Palestine. The extension of communications, splendid roads, good omnibus services have brought the village quite near the town. The fellaheen come to the town, work there, learn European conditions of work, get to know the power of organisation, organise themselves, strike, win for themselves better labour conditions, become self-conscious—the word of the effend

in the village is no longer absolute law. Arab education is certainly still very backward. The official investigation of 1931 showed that among 770,000 Mohammedan and Christian Arabs were 667,000 who could neither read nor write. But education is being improved from year to year. The fellaheen is gradually learning to read, write—and think. Thus from the cultural front also, Europe is penetrating the oriental despotism of the effendi.

Europeanisation has however also developed Arab capitalism. The effendi have in part changed over from unprofitable corn farming to profitable orange growing; they are engaged in industry, they take part on a large scale in wholesale trade, as also in real estate; they direct banks. There is already in existence a class, still small, of modern Arab capitalists. Considerably bigger is the class of the Arab petty bourgeoisie. In Palestine there are more than 80,000 Arab Christians. They belong predominantly to this middle-class. They are business people, manual workers, commercial employees, clerks, officials in the Government offices, in the railway and post offices, teachers, doctors, lawyers, journalists. They participate most in the prosperity caused by the immigrations of the Jews, and in the developing Europeanisation of the country. At the same time they feel more sharply the opposition to the Jewish world: to the superiority of Jewish capital, to the competition of Jewish industry, Jewish trade, Jewish organisation, Jewish technique. This superiority is the superiority of Europe over the East. They hate Europe because they are driven back in the struggle with the superior powers of Europe; they hate the Jews because it is precisely in them that they encounter Europe.

Throughout the East Europe is penetrating by means of its capital. The Europeans who accompany and direct the capital constitute everywhere only a very thin upper layer. They let the land be opened up by the natives, they exploit the wealth of the land by the labour of the natives. Different is the history of the colonisation of Palestine. Thither came first the Jewish workers, then Jewish capital and with it the Jewish workers' right. The Jews in Palestine are not an upper stratum exploiting the labour of the natives; on the contrary they refuse to allow the Arabs to colonise the land; they colonise it themselves. Their destiny in history has driven the Jews from the soil, has closed manual work to

them, has crowded them to the peak of the social pyramid in trade, finance, and the intellectual callings. The peasant foundation is lacking, and what in all nations is an industrial proletariat is in Jewry often only a pauper proletariat. The body of the Jewish nation was maimed by history. The renaissance of Jewry is the astonishing attempt to erect again by the national will what history has destroyed, to become a *whole* people, with all its natural parts, a people, that is, which tills with its own hands its own fields, builds its own dwellings, creates its own goods.

Arab labour is incomparably cheaper than Jewish. Capital, whether it be in Jewish or English hands, seeks the highest possible return, and therefore prefers Arab to Jewish labour. Opposed to this is the passionate struggle of Jewish workers and the Jewish intelligentsia. For if Jewish labour were not protected, would not employment be closed to the Jewish workers? Would not the Jews be once more crowded into the peak of the pyramid, become once more a ruling people living from the labour of another nation? And would not the reconstruction of the Jewish nation then be in vain? Further, Palestine will become a home of the Jews if the Jews immigrate in such large numbers that their settlement there becomes an irrevocable historical fact. But if the lower steps of the economic pyramid are occupied by Arabs, then at once limits are set to Jewish immigration. Finally, the Arabs will settle down with the Jews in Palestine, will seek for a *modus vivendi* on the basis of the equal rights of both nations, if the Jews have an overpoweringly strong position in the total population. In 1929 when the Jews were only 17 per cent. of the population, the Arab nationalists still thought they could drive them from the country by force, simply push them into the sea! To-day the Jews are 30 per cent. of the population: the inclination towards a forceful solution of the Jewish-Arab question has disappeared. But once the Jews constitute half the population, then the Arabs will come to an understanding. Thus the Jewish nationalists argue, and jealously defend the opposition of Jewish labour in the Jewish economic sphere to Arab labour. Jewish workers against Arab workers: the national conflict cuts right to the bottom of the social system, touches the Arab nationalist movement even in the Arab proletariat.

JULIUS BRAUNTHAL.

THE TEACHING FILM.

IT is three years since *The Film in National Life* was published as a Report by the Commission on Educational and Cultural Films. These three years have witnessed a slow but steady advance along the lines sketched out by the Commission. They have seen the formation of the British Film Institute, and of a growing number of branches throughout the Kingdom. Great Britain had lagged badly behind other countries in the use and development of the cinema as a cultural medium. Now the gap is closing. The enormous potentialities of the cinema film are being realised over a widening field. It was for a time a fair charge against the education authorities that they were slow to appreciate the value of the medium, that they were often obstinately unhelpful in their attitude towards the pioneers, too often ready to condemn without investigation; but that time has passed. The authorities have taken to heart words uttered by the King, then Prince of Wales, some years ago, when he said: "It is well worth the British nation's while to take the film industry seriously, and to develop it to its utmost as a national industry." More schools and colleges are using the cinema this session than ever before.

We are now producing the best educational films in the world. The claim may seem a bold one, but I think it will pass without serious challenge. Much credit must go to the British Film Institute, whose efforts have been steadfastly directed to bridging the gap which existed between the producers and users; and the film-producing companies have risen to the occasion. At least two big British companies now have well-equipped, ably-staffed educational sections which are fast turning out more of the kind of films that teachers want. True, there is still much work to do. I should be giving the lay reader a wrong impression if I suggested, as these remarks might seem to do, that the way is clear, that all that is needed now is a speeding-up of production: both the technique and subject-matter of educational films generally are open to vast improvement before the system of teaching by cinema can be universally adopted. The important thing is that the education authorities have become film-conscious, that the film producers no longer look with indifference upon the educational and cultural market, and

that a national body exists capable, as it has shown itself to be, of bringing the two together for the common good.

Already we have received ample evidence that the film as an aid to education and instruction is welcomed by the pupils, and that it greatly increases their grasp of a lesson. Experience has proved that the film more quickly arouses interest, promotes keener discussion and leaves a deeper impression on the young mind than any non-visual method of teaching. Beyond that, it enlarges the whole mental background of the pupil. Yet in some quarters there is still misunderstanding as to the avowed function of the teaching film. It cannot be stated too strongly that there is no design on the part either of the producers or the promoters of the use of educational films to supplant the teacher. The main use of the film is, and must always be, to supplement the teacher's work. It should be regarded as an "agency of illumination." Its limitations have often been defined. The film is an aid to education, and nothing more. Its uses in that direction are many and various, and as time goes on and its possibilities are more fully explored it will become an aid which no school or college will do without.

In effect, teaching by film is little more than an extension of the blackboard method. The film lesson may be and should be accompanied and followed by verbal explanations by the teacher. The commentary of the teacher, indeed, is often very much better than a sound-track commentary, and it is agreed by all who have practised and studied the use of teaching by film that in a lesson of from forty to forty-five minutes, the film should not run for more than ten or twelve, or, at the very most, fifteen minutes. Again, it is agreed that genuine teaching films, as distinct from general knowledge films, should not be shown to more than one class of pupil at a time, and that, as a rule (which may sometimes be broken by the expert teacher), not more than one film should be shown during a lesson. The new educational films can be stopped at any point to facilitate explanations by the teacher, and it has often been found that a repetition of the showing of certain parts of the film is effective in driving home points of special interest or importance.

By teaching films one means films capable of illustrating what is being taught—as distinct from ordinary general knowledge films such as one often sees in the ordinary picture

house. Into this class come many kinds of geographical film. "I only wish I had been taught geography with the help of the moving picture," declared Mr. H. Ramsbotham, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education, after a demonstration. Many of us echo his regret! Let me give a few examples of the sort of film that is now being used.

Two good recent British productions are *The Fruitlands of Kent* and *So This is Lancashire*, both sound films. The first illustrates its subject with beautiful photography supported by maps. It runs for eleven minutes and is a very useful little film for senior pupils. The second tells the story of the development of Lancashire's industries. It covers the ground well, and makes an excellent study for pupils of fourteen or over. For American geography the film, *Central America*, is a good example of a silent teaching film. It shows many of the economic activities of the continent, including the production of cocoa and coffee. It runs for fifteen minutes and is specially designed for pupils of thirteen and upwards. *The Star of the South* offers a fine description of South African activities, and, unlike a number of other sound films, it has an admirable commentary. As a background film for seniors it is a first-rate production, but as a film generally suitable for use in the schools it is open to criticism on the ground that forty minutes is far too long.

History, obviously, provides a no less suitable subject for the teaching film. Progress has been slow, but now that the producers enjoy expert advice as to what teachers require we may expect a steady advance in the near future. It has been found that films best serve their purpose when they portray descriptive episodes rather than complete stories. Primarily—as in other subjects—they should be no more than aids to the ordinary lesson. For this reason, such fine British productions as *Domesday Book* and *Europe To-day* are open to criticism. Both attempt to cover too much ground, the first surveying life in Norman England, the other, which enjoys a commentary by Mr. Vernon Bartlett, ranging over the dozen or so years of trouble and political unrest following the Peace Treaties. As general instructional films they gain full marks. As films of the kind history teachers want to illustrate their lessons, they leave much to be desired.

Nature films have fewer difficulties to overcome. Here the moving photographic art has had full scope, and the results

are seen in a host of excellent films. The growth of flowers and plants and the habits of animals, birds and insects offer subjects of which the best use is being made. An American film, *Beavers*, depicting the life and habits of the creatures on land and in the water, is a good example of what can be done in this sphere. This is a very informative classroom film, particularly suitable for children up to thirteen years of age, and as it lasts no more than fifteen minutes it is not too long for the teacher's purpose. *Microscopic Animal Life*, also an American production, is an example of a good supplementary film suitable for older pupils. *How Plants Feed* is a good specimen of the British film art. It is an almost ideal length, running for only ten minutes. It shows the plant as a living thing, and must be of great educational value to pupils who are lucky enough to see it.

As an aid to the teaching of literature the film is in its infancy, but several good Shakespearean productions are available to teachers. *Stratford-on-Avon* is a silent film with many fine views of places with Shakespearean associations which affords a good historical introduction to the study of the poet by children of from ten to fourteen years of age.

The teaching of science is likely to be revolutionised by the cinema. Biology and zoology are subjects in which films can be most helpful. *The Private Life of the Gannets* can be safely acclaimed as an early classic. This is a brilliant study of bird life, with a first-rate commentary by Professor Julian Huxley. The film runs for only fifteen minutes, and has some interesting slow-motion sequences which give a very good idea of the potentialities of the film as an instructional medium. *At Home with Wild Animals* is a fine South African production, spoiled for the teacher's purpose only by excessive length. *The Behaviour of Light* is a bold and, on the whole, a successful American essay in teaching a physics lesson, useful primarily as a background classroom film.

Medical films, also in their infancy, promise to develop quickly. Already they have been used effectively to demonstrate surgical operations, the correct diagnosis of disease and troubles of the nervous system. They can be shown "close-up" to many students at the same time. The more delicate manipulations of an operation can be shown in slow-motion, and the film can be stopped at any stage for special study. The recent story of a film which was rushed by air to a British

colony to enable a surgeon to perform an intricate operation and save the life of his patient gave the lay public some idea of the part medical films are likely to play in the future. Social hygiene, too, can be more effectively taught with film aid, and many industrial, engineering and other processes can be clearly demonstrated.

In no sphere, perhaps, can the film serve a better purpose than in the fostering of friendly international relations—a duty most of our schools have sadly neglected in the past, doubtless due in great measure to the inability of teachers to make the subject a live one. The film comes to their timely assistance. *The World War and After*, a League of Nations production, gives us a good idea of the possibilities. Quite frankly peace propaganda, this film demonstrates the economic interdependence of the nations. Such films should be widely shown, and most of us could well go back to school for a time to learn something we were not taught when we were young. The new generation is more fortunate. One hopes that there will be no new conflagration to destroy the seeds of peace before they have had time to bear fruit.

It is one of the difficulties of film education at this stage that few teachers have themselves enjoyed tuition by the aid of the film. A special technique has to be acquired, and, as I have noticed, educational opinion was slow to apprehend the great potentialities of the new medium. Other difficulties were the lack of standardisation of films and film apparatus, and the expense of buying and hiring. Happily these obstacles are now being overcome, and the future of the teaching film is assured.

RANALD M. FINDLAY.

MEDITERRANEAN GARDENS.

NOONDAY in early May on the Isthmus of Corinth. Beneath a ledge of grey limestone a ribbon of mauve shadow stretches across the narrow beach to a sapphire sea. A stiff breeze from the Hellespont tips the Aegean waves with curling crests, sucks up the moisture from the lucid air, and sends the limestone dust swirling down the white road. The sun burns face and hands as if its rays came through a lens, while the alkaline dust makes the eyes and skin smart. I creep for refuge into the purple shade beneath the ledge, blessing this "Shadow of a great rock in a thirsty land," to eat my Homeric lunch of bread and wine, goat's cheese and figs.

Climate goes far towards explaining those lovely pleasure gardens widely distributed in the ancient Mediterranean lands and still persisting in many places with their traditional features of confining wall or hedge, their seclusion and shade, their flower-beds and ornamental fruit trees, their fountains and central pool, their sunken paths, marble seats, and colonnades, statuary and shrubbery, and the vine-grown pergola for the outdoor repast. When the thirsty winds swept down from the north, or the sirocco from Africa, only the garden kept moist and green and fresh. Eyes tired by a relentless sun and its reflection from the limestone roads rested gratefully upon the dark foliage of laurel or oleander.

But other factors, social and economic, contributed to the development of these ancient gardens: early concentration of population in cities, expansion of trade and the accumulation of wealth, growth of a cultured leisured class, with its concern for the amenities and luxuries of life. A more potent factor still was the rapid advance of agriculture till it attained the æsthetic stage, crowning evidence of its intensive character. Ornamental gardening became a feature of ancient Mediterranean civilisation. It began at the eastern end of the basin at an early period, and advanced westward in the wake of trade and colonisation. It grew out of the widespread fruit, flower, and herb culture, which in greater or less degree depended upon summer irrigation. The pleasure gardens originated in walled orchards and vineyards, in plantations of flowering pomegranates, quinces, plums, and apricots, in groves of stately date palms, all with their irrigation pools.

The spaces between the rows of trees, for the more economic use of the soil, were often planted with flowers at once useful and beautiful, like the saffron-yielding crocus, or the edible poppy, or "the henna flowers in the vineyards of Engedi," or the violets, irises, and roses of Bœotia, Cyrenaica, and other lands, for the manufacture of perfumes and unguents.

In point of size the ancient gardens varied from the ample palace grounds and parks of kings to the private garden, whose size depended on its location and on the means of the owner. In the size of gardens one seems to detect everywhere a certain restraint, probably due to the high cost of land and of irrigation. Water theft from the public aqueducts was a common offence among Athenians and even the wealthy landed gentry of the Roman suburbs. The typical private garden was small, even diminutive. It lay near the house and formed an outdoor extension of it; here much of the family life was led. Resting on a marble bench, or walking beneath a colonnade, one could command a view of the whole. Its small size encouraged complete cultivation and ample use of water, and did not necessarily lessen its beauty. A little garden dedicated to Eros is made to speak for itself in an anonymous Greek poem: "I am not great among gardens, but I am full of charm." This small scale was yet further reduced in the exquisite miniature gardens planted in the peristyles of Greek and Roman houses before the Christian era. The peristyle garden still survives in the Spanish patio with its arcades, central fountain, myrtles, pomegranates, jasmines, and palms growing in earthen jars. In the eastern Mediterranean it survives also in the spacious court of the typical Damascene residence, whose tessellated floor is broken in the centre by water basin and fountain, surrounded by flowering plants. The summer drought dictated the introduction of water as an unfailing feature of the garden. It was handled as an artistic motif in countless ways. It was conducted about in stone, cement, or tiled runlets; it emerged from some decorative opening in a terrace wall or issued in jets from a statue; it was collected in fishpond or lotus pool. Moreover the modern oriental garden always seems dominated by the irrigation scheme on which its life depends. In the exquisite Indian gardens seen about Jaipur and Amritsar the water conduits dictate the basic lines of flower beds, tree

plots, and pools, just as they do in the garden plans depicted on Egyptian tombs.

So much for the general conclusions. A survey of the ancient Mediterranean gardens according to countries will demonstrate the truth of these conclusions and show the types that developed in various regions, owing to local differences of geographic, economic, and social conditions. Paradise, that garden which "the Lord God planted eastward in Eden," was modelled upon the gardens found in all irrigated lands from Persia to Palestine; and it became a prototype of the flowery retreats of Mediterranean civilisation from Damascus, Jerusalem, and Antioch in the East to Spain and Granada in the West. The river that watered Paradise was divided into several channels, after the manner of the Oxus, the Nile, and other irrigation streams. The garden contained "every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food." The desert Arabs, who skirted the high rim of the Mediterranean Basin from Moab to Hermon, and looked down on the irrigated gardens of Damascus and Ramoth-Gilead, pictured their paradise as a pleasure-garden abounding in fountains of pure water. It was the Garden of Resort in the Koran, the Garden of Eden, the Garden of the Most High, with everything to satisfy the taste and delight the eye.

The oriental models found apt imitators in Palestine, Philistia, Phœnicia, and northern Syria, where geographic conditions encouraged their introduction and development. King Solomon had his pleasure park near Jerusalem, whither he was wont to go in the morning, Josephus tells us. The Bible in figurative language indicates the beauties of these gardens, specifies their trees and flowers, and suggests their wide prevalence. In the city of Jerusalem the royal rose garden alone was allowed, because no dung might be brought within the walls. Practical considerations probably dominated. Under Greek and Roman rule, when peace brought plenty, the environs of Jerusalem blossomed with gardens, orchards and olive groves. A wide stretch of these north of the Wall of Agrippa was destroyed by Titus in A.D. 71 during the siege of the city.

The Phœnicians were commercial nurserymen in Homeric times. Their cargoes included plants and trees, useful and ornamental, which were disseminated over the whole Mediterranean from their native habitats in the East, and early

became commodities of general international trade. It is possible to follow the introduction of the peach from Persia into Egypt, thence into Rhodes where the tree long sulked and refused to bear, and finally into Greece and Rome. Phœnicia and Palestine, through centuries of commercial and political affiliation with Egypt, drew suggestions for their horticulture also from the Nile Valley. Formal gardens existed in Egypt in the Fourth Dynasty (2800 B.C.). In the Eighteenth Dynasty garden technique was fully developed and beautified the houses of the wealthy. A garden of this period, depicted at Thebes, shows a walled enclosure laid out in eight sections. The middle section is occupied by a long grape arbour shading a path to the dwelling. Flowers were used profusely in the social and religious life of the ancient Egyptians. At banquets they decked both table and guests. Garlands festooned the wine-jars. Bouquets were offered to the gods; wreaths encircled the necks of sacrificial bulls, and covered the mummy cases on their way to the tomb.

In contrast with the explicit testimony on æsthetic gardens left by Egyptian tombs and papyri, evidence of development of private gardens in Greece is fragmentary and meagre till Hellenic culture has passed its zenith; then the references become abundant. The Greeks, like the Hebrews, show a love of gardens in their mythology. As companion piece to the Garden of Eden they give us the Garden of the Hesperides, located in a fabled island of the far west. The garden of Alcinous, minutely described, though planted for practical purposes, reveals a sense of horticultural beauty. The architecture of the Greek dwelling with its open peristyle court suggested the interior garden as a natural accessory; and the remains at Herculaneum and Pompeii reveal the perfect development of the peristyle garden in Greco-Roman houses of the first and second centuries before the Christian era. Vitruvius describes the Greek drawing-room in the Cyzicene style of house as facing north upon gardens in the rear and having windows like folding doors, so that the garden view might be unobstructed. To this and later periods belonged the perfected house garden of the widespread Greek cities. These were small and exquisite, rigidly symmetrical, and adorned with statuary.

The practical Romans, for centuries a race of farmers, reveal the slow evolution of æsthetic horticulture from the

merely economic. In ancient Latium, as in Greece, the garden was part of every farm. Cato the Elder states that every farm garden should contain flower-beds and ornamental trees like the nuptial myrtle, the Delphic and Cyprian laurel, and that it should be laid out near the house. The detailed description left by the younger Pliny of his suburban villa at Laurentium and his country estate in Tuscany reveal the leading features of ancient Roman pleasure gardens. A part of the typically Roman garden was planned for leisurely strolls. Called the *Ambulatio* it consisted of shaded walks for use when the sun was hot. Another section was the *gestatio* where the master took his airing on horseback, or carried in a litter.

Gardens were not the monopoly of the rich in ancient Italy. The remains of Pompeii show them attached to the average town residence. Pompeii lay in a region of ancient Greek colonies and had a considerable Greek element in its population, as indicated by numerous family names. Hence the Greco-Roman peristyle type was established here in the second century before Christ. The peristyle court was adorned with flower-beds, vases of growing plants, water-basins, and statuary. All were arranged with studied symmetry, as the visitor sees them to-day in the great peristyle of the House of Vettii, which has been restored and replanted according to the original plan. As population increased in Rome the little gardens were crowded out, but in their stead window-boxes were introduced, "to pasture the eyes on," Pliny says. Roof gardens crowned the city buildings with shrubs, grape arbours, fruit and shade trees.

The Roman type of garden may have been transplanted to Carthage on the conquest of Africa in 146 B.C., or the conquerors may have occupied unaltered the fine villas that surrounded the Punic capital with their gardens and orchards from early times. In 310 B.C. when Agathocles of Sicily marched on Carthage he passed through a cultivated and irrigated region, Diodorus tells us, occupied by the landed estates of the Carthaginian nobles, "which they improved for their delight and pleasure." Centuries later, parks of surpassing beauty still persisted. Aesthetic gardening was a natural development for a people who inherited the principles of Phœnician horticulture, who produced an authority on tillage like Mago, and who had a rich and privileged class.

ARTHUR HASLAM.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

HERR HITLER TAKES A TURN.

THIS chronicle is to see the light on April 1st. Its content might do credit to a joker's fancy, but happens to be the sober truth. The steps taken by Herr Hitler on March 7th last had the only apparent effect of reducing to an absurdity the whole network of diplomatic activity as manifested during the past twelve months. Seldom in living memory has the name of statesmanship, even in Europe, sunk so low. Serious people, who hitherto had clung to causes or to the hope that the leading politicians of the several leading countries would yet reveal some quality of collective common sense, were at last driven to the conviction that something nearer to buffoonery than to statesmanship was the business of those who conduct the affairs of Europe.

On March 7th Herr Hitler addressed the Reichstag. He outlined a series of proposals for generally settling European diplomatic quarrels and for putting an end to the long series of quickly recurring crises. And even as he spoke, he made it as certain as any human being could make it that his proposals—excellent as they were in many respects—would not, could not, be accepted by France. And French acceptance from his point of view, assuming him to be sincere, was the first postulate of his own success. M. Daladier once wisely observed in reference to a similar matter (October 17th, 1933): "If one sincerely wishes for understanding, why begin with rupture?" With dramatic perversity Herr Hitler sent his battalions goose-stepping into the Rhineland zone at the very moment when words of peace fell from his lips in Berlin. He could have postponed that particular ritual for a short time, to give his proposals a chance of being calmly discussed. Instead, he drove French opinion into such a frenzy of mixed indignation and fear that his proposals were not even looked at.

It was not easy to answer the cynics who maintained that Herr Hitler's main object was to drive a wedge between France and Britain. It was equally obvious that France's main resultant object was to seize the occasion to tie up Britain irrevocably for action with France against Germany. The French argument was even a good one. For six months

against her will and against her judgment she had consented to be dragged by Britain into participation in sanctions against Italy, and had lost no occasion to point out that she did so for the candid reason that thereby Britain would be committed to participate with France in sanctions against Germany, should that alternative need arise. In the event France lost Italy's friendship; the hypothetic occasion for sanctions against Germany, in the French judgment, duly arose; and Britain thereupon hesitated to dance to the French tune, no matter how patiently France had danced to the British tune. Not that France actually demanded sanctions against Germany. In her view a solid front would be enough. There was something to be said for the French gibe that Britain had been prepared to co-operate in the Geneva system of collective security so long as the objective victim of collective action was as weak as Italy was supposed to be, but had no stomach for such a proceeding when the objective was as strong as Germany was known to be.

There followed one of those crazy crises of diplomacy by conference such as Europe knows only too well. In twelve months the diplomatic kaleidoscope had changed with bewildering rapidity. On February 3rd, 1935, France and Britain issued a certain now-famous proposal for the pacification of Europe. Their motive was the sense of unsettlement that resulted from Germany's secession from the League of Nations and from the disarmament conference, and the knowledge that Germany had begun her process of defiant rearmament. On March 16th, 1935, Herr Hitler symbolically, ceremoniously and provocatively repudiated the Treaty of Versailles in its military clauses and announced the reintroduction in Germany of universal compulsory military service. On April 14th the non-German Western Powers, Britain, France and Italy, met at Stresa and constituted themselves into what became known as the "Stresa front," which had a clear anti-German bias.

Within six months that front in its turn was broken because Italy plunged into an adventure of colonial conquest such as roused all the professional resentment of the world's record-holder in such conquest, namely Great Britain. Between October 2nd, 1935, when Italy started the war in Abyssinia, and March 7th, 1936, when Herr Hitler distracted all further attention from it, there was a continuous state of tension

between France and Britain. The tension resulted from the circumstance that France was disinclined to invoke the collective system against Italy, who was a friend, in favour of Abyssinia, who mattered not at all; but she could not refuse to associate herself with Britain because she would thereby be providing Great Britain with the classic excuse, available for ever after, not to support France against Germany.

In the course of one short year we have seen France and Britain bound harmoniously together (February 1935) and bitterly estranged (March 1936); Britain and Germany estranged (March 1935) and united (June 1935); Britain and Italy united (April 1935) and divided to the very brink of war (October 1935-March 1936); Italy and Germany estranged (April 1935) and reunited unintentionally by the League of Nations (October 1935-March 1936). In that period we have seen the Treaty of Versailles finally torn up by Germany, leaving only the Covenant of the League of Nations extant; and we have seen the Covenant of the League of Nations itself proved in practice to be not only ineffective as a safeguard of the peace, but itself a danger to the peace. There are those who are depressed, others amused, by such a medley of perversities: others again who argue that such indeed is life in its collective aspect, and need neither depress, nor amuse nor exhilarate the truly philosophical. It was at any rate difficult to see how a war could emerge from forces so unstable in their direction. After all, thunderstorms break in an atmosphere of settled calm. Explosions occur when there is no other outlet for pent-up force. It is at any rate possible that when the European Governments pop off like squibs one after the other they act as an unconscious safety-valve against the greater disturbance.

In one sense the Hitler proposals of March 7th, 1936, reverted to the situation as presented on February 3rd, 1935. There is some harmless interest attaching to the recapitulation of the main items in the troubled history which spans those two events. It was on January 31st, 1935, that a French delegation headed by M. Flandin, Prime Minister, and M. Laval, Foreign Minister, came to London to discuss with Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Baldwin and Sir John Simon a method of dealing tactfully with the situation produced by Germany's *de facto* violation of the Treaty of Versailles in the matter of armaments. They

telegraphed their resultant proposals to Berlin, Rome and Brussels on February 3rd. The passage of that document now chiefly interesting read thus: "The French and British Ministers are further agreed that nothing would contribute more to the restoration of confidence and the prospects of peace among nations than a general settlement freely negotiated between Germany and the other Powers. This general settlement would make provision for the organisation of security in Europe, particularly by means of the conclusion of pacts, freely negotiated between all the interested parties, and ensuring mutual assistance in Eastern Europe and the system foreshadowed in the Rome *procès-verbal* for Central Europe. Simultaneously, and in conformity with the terms of the Declaration of December 11th, 1932, regarding equality of rights in a system of security, this settlement would establish agreements regarding armaments generally which, in the case of Germany, would replace the provisions of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles at present limiting the arms and armed forces of Germany. It would also be part of the general settlement that Germany should resume her place in the League of Nations with a view to active membership."

Next, on March 4th, 1935, the British Government published its White Paper (Cmd. 4827) "Relating to Defence." That document announced the British intention to rearm as an answer to Germany's having rearmed in contravention of the Treaty of Versailles. It was followed by a statement made by M. Flandin's Government to the French Chamber of Deputies and to the Senate (March 15th, 1935) to the effect that measures would forthwith be taken to restore the balance of the French armed forces which had been destroyed by the fallen birth-rate. It was not an increase in armed strength that M. Flandin foreshadowed, but an extension of the period of service.

Then, on the very following day (March 16th) Herr Hitler threw down his famous challenge. He issued a proclamation repudiating the military part (Part V) of the Treaty of Versailles, instituting immediate compulsory service, and increasing the regular army to thirty-six divisions, say 550,000 men. Immediate panic was created throughout Europe. Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden made a tour of the chief European capitals. The Stresa Conference met on April 11th, finished its business by April 14th, and then virtually transferred itself

to Geneva, where on April 16th, Sir John Simon, M. Laval and Baron Aloisi submitted a joint resolution to the Council of the League, which duly adopted it.

Its three essential clauses read thus: The Council "(1) Declares that Germany has failed in the duty which lies upon all members of the international community to respect the undertakings which they have contracted, and condemns any unilateral repudiation of international obligations; (2) Invites the Governments which took the initiative in the plan of February 3rd, 1935, or which gave their approval to it, to continue the negotiations so initiated, and in particular to frame the conclusion, within the framework of the League of Nations, of the agreements which may appear necessary to attain the objects defined in this plan, due account being taken of the obligations of the Covenant, with a view to assuring the maintenance of peace; (3) Considering that the unilateral repudiation of international obligations may endanger the very existence of the League of Nations as an organisation for maintaining peace and promoting security, (a) Decides that such repudiation, without prejudice to the application of measures already provided in international agreements, should, in the event of its having relation to undertakings concerning the security of peoples, and the maintenance of peace in Europe, call into play all appropriate measures on the part of members of the League and within the framework of the Covenant; (b) Requests a committee composed of . . . [names left blank] . . . to propose for this purpose measures to render the Covenant more effective in the organisation of collective security, and to define in particular the economic and financial measures which might be applied should, in the future, a State, whether a member of the League of Nations or not, endanger peace by unilateral repudiation of its international obligations."

In short, the early summer of 1935 was dominated by a general European fear of Germany. A distraction was created by the conclusion of an Anglo-German naval agreement (June 18th, 1935), one of the practical effects of which was to impair the Stresa front. The next landmark was reached on May 21st, 1935, when Herr Hitler delivered a three-hour speech to the Reichstag in which he submitted thirteen points. Two of those points are of particular interest now. In his second point he promised not to "revise" any

more of the Treaty of Versailles except "by means of peaceable understandings." In number 3 he said he would respect the Locarno Treaty conditionally upon the other parties respecting it.

The rest of the year was absorbed by the implications of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, as treated from Geneva. The main present element of interest deriving therefrom is its effect upon the French and the British attitude to the German problem. When Sir Samuel Hoare spoke in the British House of Commons on July 11th and in the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 11th, he used a phrase, deliberately as we now know, which did generalise the British willingness to take sanctions against any aggressor. He spoke of "steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression." There were several backdoors in that formula, it is true; for instance, the two adjectives "collective" and "unprovoked," which in an emergency could be used to prove anything or nothing.

But on September 11th, 1935, the very day when Sir Samuel Hoare spoke in the League Assembly at Geneva, M. Corbin, the French Ambassador in London, called at the Foreign Office and asked whether the British readiness to resist aggression, as proclaimed that day by Sir Samuel Hoare, applied to Central Europe (i.e. to Austria) as well as to Africa. In other words, even before the Italo-Abyssinian war began, France put on record her assumption that sanctions against Italy would constitute a precedent for sanctions against Germany. The British answer (written) to M. Corbin's question of September 11th was published on September 30th.

The wording used by Sir Samuel in that answer is of importance in February 1936. It was a long document, for the most part cautious and even temporising, but it did contain this passage: "In conformity with its precise and explicit obligations I pointed out, and I re-emphasise, that the League stands, and this country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, *and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression.* I would draw your Excellency's particular attention to this last sentence. Your Excellency will observe that I spoke, as I am now writing, of all acts of unprovoked aggression. Each word in that sentence must have its full value."

Indirectly but clearly the answer was "yes," though Germany was not mentioned by name. It is true that when Sir Samuel Hoare made his "resignation" speech in the House of Commons on December 19th he virtually accused France of having failed in her promise to support Great Britain in the policy of sanctions and its implications, including the danger of war with Italy which emerged in November over the Geneva threat of an oil sanction. Sir Samuel said: "We alone have taken these military precautions. There is the British Fleet in the Mediterranean, there are the British reinforcements in Egypt, in Malta and Aden. Not a ship, not a machine, not a man has been moved by any other member State." The imposition of an oil sanction, the threat of which constituted the real danger to the general peace, had been decided in principle by the League on November 6th. The League was to meet on December 12th to impose it in practice. The Hoare-Laval peace proposal of December 8th effectively prevented the danger, for on December 12th and at every succeeding meeting at Geneva the further pursuit of the oil proposal has been postponed.

The climax of the Franco-British issue over Italy was reached in the last week of February of this year. On February 24th, Mr. Eden made his first statement in the House of Commons as Secretary of State. On the subject of sanctions he was non-committal, to the dismay of those who still believed in the practicability or the wisdom of attempting League sanctions against Italy. Two days later (February 26th) the British Cabinet met to formulate Mr. Eden's instructions for the League meeting which had been arranged to take place at Geneva on March 2nd. The instructions were understood to be that Mr. Eden should be strictly passive; that he should not propose an oil sanction himself and should neither encourage nor oppose a proposal in that sense if made by any other member State. M. Corbin, the French Ambassador, called at the Foreign Office on February 28th and saw Mr. Eden. He was then informed by Mr. Eden of the British intention as described above.

When, however, Mr. Eden reached Geneva on March 2nd, the first thing he did was to propose the imposition of an oil sanction on Italy. M. Flandin was astounded, and indignantly resisted the proposal. He suggested that in the first instance another attempt should be made to explore peace by

peaceful methods. France in fact (so far as Italy was the case in point) interpreted Geneva as a pacific instrument. Mr. Eden thereupon suggested that a forty-eight hours' ultimatum be sent to Signor Mussolini, threatening that if Italy by then refused to negotiate with Abyssinia, the oil sanction would be imposed. So unpractical a method of seeking peace with a pistol was overruled, and it was decided to invite Rome and Addis Ababa within seven days to say whether they would be willing to discuss peace terms.

On March 4th M. Flandin at Geneva asked Mr. Eden for a specific assurance that if the oil sanction were in fact imposed, and if as a result Italy were to denounce the Locarno Treaty and the Franco-Italian military agreement of January 1935, Great Britain would equally help France against a German menace. No answer was given. French opinion thereupon became hotly inflamed against British "perfidy."

The seven days were due to expire on March 10th. Before they expired and before any British answer was given to the French request of March 4th, Herr Hitler intervened. He addressed the Reichstag on March 7th. He made peace proposals. He sent his troops into the Rhineland. He repudiated the Locarno Treaty on the ground that the Franco-Russian Pact had already violated it. The first effect of Herr Hitler was to precipitate a first-rate Franco-British diplomatic quarrel.

On March 8th France, as announced by M. Sarraut in a broadcast address, rejected the German proposals and appealed to the League of Nations. It was arranged that the Council should meet on March 13th, which was a Friday. A debate took place in the British House of Commons on March 9th in which Mr. Eden spoke colourlessly about the emergency, and Mr. Baldwin announced the British rôle as an attempt "to bring France and Germany together in a friendship with ourselves." The British Government in short was concerned mainly to gain time without committing itself.

Mr. Eden, accompanied this time by Lord Halifax, the Lord Privy Seal, left London for Paris on the same evening to attend a meeting on the following day of the Locarno Powers, less Germany, namely Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. Lord Halifax's appointment as chaperone to Mr. Eden caused no surprise in view of Mr. Eden's clear transgression of his

instructions at the meeting of the League of Nations on March 2nd and of Mr. Eden's well-known capacity for light-hearted enthusiasm, unchecked and unguided by caution or by an appreciation of its practical consequences.

The non-German Locarno Powers duly met in Paris on March 10th, with the result that could have been expected that France hotly demanded that Britain should now fulfil her part of her bargain with France by offering to Germany as "collective" a front as she had offered, and demanded that France also should offer, to Italy. Mr. Eden, on instructions, refused to do so. There was a Franco-British deadlock. It was therefore decided at the end of a long and painful day that the meeting of the non-German Locarno Powers should be transferred to London, so that presumably Mr. Eden should the more readily be able to consult his Government. The adjourned meeting was duly held in London on March 12th and the Council of the League of Nations, which had been called for March 13th, but was postponed till the following day, also met in London as a matter of obvious convenience. The result of those perturbed conferences had not transpired when this paper had to be written.

What then exactly did Herr Hitler say and do on March 7th? In the first place his reoccupation of the Rhineland zone, timed to coincide with his speech, after the dramatic manner of dictators, whose foremost need is to bluster before the eyes of their admiring people, was something more than a "symbolic" act. Nineteen battalions of infantry, thirteen brigades of artillery, complete with tanks, aeroplanes, anti-aircraft guns and searchlights constituted a fighting force. His spoken proposals were duplicated in the form of a written memorandum presented to the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium (i.e. the other signatories of the Locarno Treaties). The memorandum ended thus: "In order to prevent any doubt as to their intentions, and to make clear the purely defensive character of this measure, as well as to give expression to their lasting desire for the true pacification of Europe between nations of equal rights and mutual respect, the German Government declare themselves prepared to negotiate new agreements for the establishment of a system of European security on the basis of the following proposals:

1. The German Government declare themselves prepared to negotiate with France and Belgium for the establishment

of a bilateral demilitarised zone and to assent to other proposals with regard to the extent and effects of such a zone, under the stipulation of complete parity.

2. In order to assure the inviolability and integrity of the frontiers in the West, the German Government propose the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany, France and Belgium with duration which they are prepared to fix at twenty-five years.

3. The German Government desire to invite Great Britain and Italy to sign this treaty as guarantor Powers.

4. The German Government are willing to include the Government of the Netherlands in this treaty system should the Government of the Netherlands desire it, and the other treaty partners approve.

5. For the further strengthening of these security arrangements between the Western Powers, the German Government are prepared to conclude an air pact which shall be designed automatically and effectively to prevent the danger of sudden attacks from the air.

6. The German Government repeat their offer to conclude with States bordering on Germany in the East non-aggression pacts similar to that concluded with Poland. Since the attitude of the Lithuanian Government has undergone a certain modification as regards Memel, the German Government withdraw the exception which they once had to make with regard to Lithuania, and declare themselves ready to sign a non-aggression pact with Lithuania also, under the stipulation of an effective organisation of the guaranteed autonomy of the Memel territory.

7. With the achievement, at last, of Germany's equality of rights and the restoration of full sovereignty over the whole territory of the German Reich, the German Government regard the chief reason for their withdrawal from the League of Nations as eliminated. Germany is therefore prepared to enter the League of Nations again. In so saying, she expresses at the same time her expectation that, in the course of a reasonable space of time the problem of colonial equality of rights as well as of the separation of the League Covenant from its Versailles Treaty base will be clarified in the course of friendly negotiations."

By the provocative, arrogant manner of his reoccupation of the Rhineland he destroyed much of the sympathy that would

otherwise have been given him in so apparently fair a thesis. His proposal of an Italo-British joint guarantee of Franco-German peace, delivered in the ironic background of Italo-British tension over Abyssinia, was none the less a serious conception. It was first conceived at Locarno in 1925 and later stultified by the League's sanctions against Italy. It is one of the many paradoxes of the present time that in the name of collective security the Geneva Powers undermined European security by driving out an essential party to it.

The immediate cause of controversy was Herr Hitler's unilateral repudiation of the Treaty of Locarno. When he repudiated the Treaty of Versailles on March 16th, 1935, he made the point that that treaty had been imposed upon Germany against her will and therefore was not in honour binding upon her. When he spoke in the Reichstag on May 21st, 1935, he made the clear differentiation between a treaty imposed by force and a treaty voluntarily signed. He said: "The German Government . . . will scrupulously observe every treaty voluntarily concluded even if it was drawn up before their assumption of power and office. In particular they will hold to and fulfil all obligations arising out of the Treaty of Locarno, so long as the other partners are ready to stand by that treaty. The German Government regard the observance of the demilitarised zone as a contribution towards the appeasement of Europe of an unheard-of hardness for a sovereign State."

He now tore up the Treaty of Locarno on the ground that it had already been torn up by the Franco-Russian Pact signed by M. Laval last year, and that therefore his own proviso "so long as the other partners are ready to stand by that treaty" did not hold. The question therefore was, did the Franco-Russian Pact violate Locarno? The "Pact of Mutual Assistance" was signed by the French and Russian Governments on May 2nd of last year. Article 2 provided that the two countries should immediately come to each other's assistance if either, "under the circumstances specified in Article 15, section 7 of the League Covenant" were subjected to an unprovoked aggression on the part of any European State. Article 3 stated that, as under Article 16 of the Covenant any member of the League having recourse to war contrary to the pledges given in Articles 12, 13 or 15 was *ipso facto* considered as having

committed an act of war against all the other members, the two countries agreed in the event of one of them being subjected, under these conditions, to an unprovoked aggression by a European State "immediately to lend each other aid and assistance in application of Article 16 of the Covenant."

It was obvious therefore that as a result of the Franco-Russian Pact France might be compelled to take warlike action against Germany and would therefore bring the Locarno Treaty into operation against herself; but such a contingency could arise only as a result of German aggression against Russia. It is true that the old "snag," the definition of an aggressor, again thereby comes into play; but would it not have been more pacific on Germany's part to submit the question to The Hague Court rather than to tear up another treaty, signed voluntarily by Germany? Moreover, if France, acting under the Franco-Russian Pact had taken action against Germany, the Locarno Treaty would have provided Germany's redress. The truth of course is that dictators can and almost must tear up treaties, whether voluntarily signed or imposed, but cannot accept anything so derogatory to their square jaws as arbitration or judicial settlement.

For her part France contended that the unilateral reoccupation of the Rhineland was itself a violation of the Locarno Pact. That was clearly true. Article 4 of the Security Pact embodied in the Locarno Treaty prescribed that a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by Germany would constitute an unprovoked act of aggression and as such would bring the guarantees into operation. Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles are those which stipulate the demilitarisation of the Rhineland zone. But the wording of Article 4 of the Locarno Treaty, as of the whole Treaty, is so encumbered with reservations and conditions that it almost passes the wit of man to assess what in practice it does mean.

The depressing resultant spectacle was that Britain, having demanded French support of sanctions against Italy, hesitated to support France in resisting Germany, although France demanded, not sanctions, but diplomatic solidarity. After the Italian experience, no government was eager to embark again upon sanctions.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1918-35.*

"A study of the League of Nations," Sir Alfred Zimmern tells his readers in the opening words of his preface, "must of necessity be a study both of form and of forces." His profoundly interesting book fulfils the promise implied in these opening words, but, as might be expected, devotes more attention to forces than to forms. Indeed, for a slavish following of forms he has no little contempt. The book is divided into three parts, each successive part being rather longer than its predecessor—"The Pre-War System," "The Elements of the Covenant," and "The Working of the League." In each part there is much new matter and vigorous and critical thinking on the new, as on older, matter. If anything is to be taken for special mention it should be the skilful presentation and analysis of the raw material of the Covenant contained in the Second Part; so far as this writer knows, the striking Foreign Office Memorandum of November 1918 has not previously been given the importance which it deserves. Nor has contemporary history fully realised the weight of the striking speech which that great lawyer—great not by knowledge of the law only but by wide general culture,

* By Alfred Zimmern. Macmillan. London, 1936. Pp. 527. 12s. 6d.

learning and sympathies—Lord Parker of Waddington delivered in March 1918 in the House of Lords. Professor Zimmern finds in this speech the suggestion of the organisation of the “hue and cry” against war, the thought that in later years gave rise to the “Outlawry of War” doctrine in the United States; but such an organisation demands for its creation the existence of a civilised conscience and a development of governing opinion to which the world of the present day has hardly attained.

A book so full of thought provokes comment and discussion on almost every page. If an attempt must be made to disengage the essentials of its doctrine, perhaps they are to be found in the definition of the League as “an instrument of co-operation . . . a standing agency facilitating common action by States animated by the co-operative spirit.” The League is not a “super-state,” nor is it an “alliance.” Whether it is an “international person” and, if so, what sort of person, is probably in Professor Zimmern’s view a matter of small importance. For he is an Aristotelian; when he asks himself the question “What is the League of Nations?” he finds the answer in the thought that the essence of the League is in its work, its “energy”; its success or failure will be the result of the prevalence or diminution of the co-operative spirit without which it is so much dead matter.

This guiding thought leads the author to some definite conclusions on practical points which may cause surprise to some of his readers but not, perhaps, to sober students of international affairs. He has small respect for the “General Act” of 1928, which the British Labour Party precipitately endorsed and to which the Labour Government subsequently adhered with some very far-reaching reservations. The Geneva Protocol, though “a brave and consistent attempt to bring down to earth the ideal of Peace through Law,” was a “Super-Covenant” not based on the system of co-operation which is the life and meaning of the Covenant. That Protocol, indeed, had the fatal defect that it provided no remedy for an unsatisfactory existing legal situation. It ignored that vital necessity of any stable international organisation: the provision of a method of peaceful change. Indeed, it is one of the paradoxes of contemporary history that progressive opinion should have rallied to the support of the Protocol, and that its rejection by the British Government should have been

treated as a betrayal of the cause of international peace. The Protocol is in direct opposition to the ideas which inspired Sir Samuel Hoare’s speech of last September at Geneva—ideas in whose development alone lies a possibility of international security. These long, elaborate, subtle and hastily constructed documents are indeed—in Professor Zimmern’s phrase—“spiders’ webs,” and spiders’ webs are well enough for flies but hardly adequate for the restraint of tigers. Such documents are not the legitimate offspring of the co-operation of nations, but the products of ingenious brains working apart from the facts. International co-operation realises itself in actions, not in elaborate constructions preparatory of or preliminary to actions which may never become energised *in rerum natura*. This is not to say that international co-operation does not need a document on which to base itself; the merit of the Covenant is that it does supply such a base, and, if taken with the Pact of Paris, an adequate base. The base, as Professor Zimmern shows, is made of more than one material, and it may well be that the materials have not all been harmonised so scientifically that the finished work is all in one style. But this, after all, may not be a defect. Some of the most beautiful and permanent works of architecture are the result of many different hands and make their appeal by their very absence of uniformity.

Professor Zimmern’s insistence, express or implied, on the spirit of co-operation as the one thing wanted—and often the one thing wanting—makes a reader wonder sometimes why the words “The Rule of Law” form part of the title of his book. Though in one place he seems to approve the view that there is no distinction between the justiciable (or “legal”) and the non-justiciable dispute—a view which extends the authority of the lawyer over all international matters—he is very far from favouring the standpoint of those whom he would himself describe as “legalists” or even as “attorneys.” Indeed, the chapter in the book which is likely to cause most controversy is that in which he very briefly discusses the pre-war “international law”—the inverted commas are his own. We are told that “for any one trained in the British tradition . . . ‘international law’ . . . ‘comes dangerously near to being an imposture, a *simulacrum* of law, an attorney’s mantle artfully displayed on the shoulders of arbitrary power.” But would not much that is best in the history and

the thought of this country—Montrose from the Highlands in the seventeenth century and Westlake from Land's End in the nineteenth—join in the rejection of such a suggestion?—they might almost add a "*vade retro*"? Austin is not now on this topic in undisputed command of the British mind.

But perhaps if a wider sense be given to the words "Rule of Law," if they are understood not in an "attorney's" sense ("attorney" by the way is not now the title of any branch of the legal profession), the appropriateness of the title for a book devoted to the League becomes apparent. For a society implies law, law implies a rule of law, and a system of co-operation can only exist in a society. The French version of "League of Nations," *Société des Nations*, has the advantage here over the English phrase; it was not always an advantage to the League that President Wilson was so deeply inspired by the memories of his covenanting ancestry.

It would be tempting—but considerations of space forbid—to discuss many of the important points of interpretation and otherwise which Professor Zimmern raises—notably as to the use of Article XI of the Covenant and the influence on it of the rule or principle of unanimity. Let one final reflection alone be added: the book records with faithfulness many errors, many disappointments, many miscalculations. But in spite of one or two allusions, made necessarily at the eleventh hour, the book was written before the Italo-Abyssinian dispute had reached its most acute phase and produced the reaction which we know. The ultimate outcome of that dispute and of that reaction must inevitably complete and possibly modify the views of all students and practitioners of international politics on the significance and authority of the League.

O.

BRADLEY'S ESSAYS.

For many readers the chief interest of these essays,* chronologically arranged, the majority of which have appeared before, will lie in the indications of very gradual modifications in certain positions which on the whole Bradley maintained through a long life of thought on the highest

* *Collected Essays*. By F. H. Bradley, O.M., LL.D., Hon. F.B.A. Oxford; Clarendon Press. Humphrey Milford. Two vols., 708 pp. 36s.

speculative altitudes. There are in his later writings no concessions to those who feel the central doctrine of his metaphysics too hard. This is especially evident in the last unfinished work he was preparing on the subject of *Relations*, the materials for which have been arranged by Professor Joachim. He himself said of this (in a letter): "It contains nothing new." It does not bring us nearer to a solution of the problem whether Bradley's view of the status of relational experience compels a mystical position in metaphysics: of the "perfect experience which is absolute truth" he writes, it is "feeling, will, sense and understanding in one" (Note).

It is in the psychological and the shorter ethical essays that slight changes of standpoint are revealed. Those for whom Bradley has always been the Bradley of the *Logic* and *Appearance and Reality*, are reminded here how much of his attention was devoted to psychological problems. The paradoxical conclusions of his well-known view of the hard separation that must be maintained between psychology and philosophy appear with startling clearness in the *Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology*. Hypotheses must be welcomed for explanation in psychology, which are rejected as fictions and false in philosophy. Is it possible to have knowledge of the self without reference to first principles? Bradley held that it was and that from this standpoint metaphysical controversy could be expelled from psychology. The various essays on the Problems of Will, Desire, etc. (1886 to 1903), are invaluable in their complete presentation of his doctrine of volition, and its implications. "The passage of an idea into existence we found is the essence of will." In his total rejection of "Activity" in the self as fundamental to will, he came into sharp conflict with James Ward. In view of his vehement objection to the notion of activity as immediately experienced, it is impressive to find that in 1902 he recognised the fact of "experienced activity" admitting some degree of departure from the earlier view* (1886).

The searching criticism of Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics* is perhaps of less importance to-day than it was in 1887, but it will be of great assistance to students. Bradley here emphasises his own view of ethics as "not a practical but a

* Active Attention.

purely speculative science." In the essay on *Punishment* (1894) he asserts that there is little of what he urged years ago (*Ethical Studies*, 1876) that he would scruple to repeat. Yet the growing influence of Darwinism has effected one or two changes vital for practice. The decreasing emphasis on the end as "self-realisation," with increasing insistence on the right of the "moral organism" to "dispose of its members," seems to have serious practical corollaries. The retributive view of punishment, passionately supported in *Ethical Studies* is not rejected. But it is found to be not enough. Infliction of punishment must be subject to the general welfare. Also the difficulty of drawing the line between "wilful badness, and unmerited disease" is admitted. In this essay and in that on *National Self-sacrifice*,* a somewhat bitter opposition to Christian Ethics, not traceable in *Ethical Studies* and I venture to think not permanent, finds expression. Much present-day interest attaches to the opinion that "If international law is ever to be real it must have an executive, with force to compel refractory states, and force between nations is war."

The *Presuppositions of Critical History*, Bradley's earliest work, shows a grasp of the essential problem of historical knowledge, which arouses keen regret for the larger treatment of the presuppositions of history which he once contemplated. The question here dealt with is the essentials of critical history. In spite of his profound sense of the progressiveness of the subject-matter, and of the mind of the historical witness, and the author, his main thesis is that nothing can be accepted on testimony which is without analogy from our own experience. His view of the criteria of testimony shows a striking advance upon Hume in subtlety, as, for instance, in the insistence that we must be able to identify the standpoint of the witness with our own. We must be certain "that the men can see for us, because we know that they are able to think for us." Thus "everything depends upon personal experience." It is interesting to speculate whether a longer devotion to the problem of history, of which he here speaks as involving the "most difficult problem which philosophy can solve or discuss" would have in any way modified the central tendencies of Bradley's philosophy.

H. D. O.

* Written 1878 or 1879.

MY GUIDED LIFE.*

When others seem glad of any pretext that will justify their reminiscences, Dr. Lidgett, despite the pressure of friends, has been very reluctant to publish his. Only the inability of the present generation to realise the improvements in social conditions during the last fifty years has induced him to find time for the task. In recording his career and the unsought honours which have crowned it, he rules out "trivialities" and the "violation of sanctities." "Many piquant incidents cannot be recounted without either violating confidences or doing injury to the living or departed." His testimony to the Divine Guidance which has controlled his amazingly active life reveals a Methodist—and Catholic—conviction that is being emphasised by the Group Movement; but as a preface to his moving confession he states the essential nature of such guidance, which "is prepared for by the previous conditions of individual lives," and given "to active and responsible personalities, endowed, though imperfectly, with reason, wisdom and understanding." The founding of the Bermondsey Settlement through "the powerful influence of Dr. Moulton" was a lonely venture at first in which Dr. Lidgett encountered obstacles that would have daunted most pioneers. But it led ultimately to his leadership of the Progressive Party in the London County Council and his Vice-Chancellorship of London University. Until 1902 he "held somewhat aloof from ecclesiastical affairs," but with the death of Hugh Price Hughes :

There came upon me an overwhelming sense that I must henceforth undertake fresh responsibilities and play my part in ecclesiastical affairs. Months afterwards I set out for the Wesleyan Conference with a strange sense of vocation . . . a momentous afflatus came upon me that established my position in the Conference and brought me immediately into the running for the Presidency, which came to me in 1908, and was preceded in 1906 by my presidency of the National Council of the Evangelical Free Churches, an unexpected appointment, to which the events of the Wesleyan Conference predestinated me.

Anxious for educational improvement, he did not share the hostility of many Free Churchmen to rate aid for

* By Dr. J. Scott Lidgett, C.H. Methuen & Co. 10s. 6d. net.

denominational schools; and throughout that bitter controversy—now happily quenched—he was a moderating influence. Methodist Union in 1932 owed much to his statesmanship and he became the first President of the reunited churches. The wider endeavours for unity between the Anglican and Free Churches brought him into close contact with Archbishop Davidson, whose intimate friendship he enjoyed. On the apparent fruitlessness of the Lambeth proposals in 1920 he comments:

The fact that far-reaching agreement obtains between influential leaders both of the Anglican and of the Free Churches is only, after all, a preliminary step, very important in itself, but yet insufficient. Before reunion is accomplished, all the Communions concerned must become convinced that God wills it, and must make a concerted demand for its achievement. This result, however, is, as yet, far from having been attained. The existing and still prevalent denominationalism is, in all the Churches, an amalgam of particular loyalties, habits and prejudices.

Despite Dr. Lidgett's preoccupation with philosophy and theology the reader is left wondering how he possibly found time to write *The Fatherhood of God* and other theological treatises. The answer apparently lies in his conception of a holiday as freedom to pursue such studies. He frequently pauses to relate the characteristics and labours of diverse friends who strove with him "to build Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land." (A poetic vision that he implies but does not quote.) Many of them are no longer in the flesh. In deeply impressive chapters the author depicts the men and women from whom he sprang and the relatives who influenced his youth and early manhood. On him was poured the treasure of their affection and religious conviction; the infection of their intellectual and artistic interests and their concern for fellow citizens and the world. Only John Wesley's parish was big enough for them. Dr. Lidgett's only son, John Cuthbert, was his father's right hand before he gave his life for his country in the Great War. "To the self-sacrifice and invaluable help" of his late wife, Dr. Lidgett reiterates that he owes "an unspeakable debt." "Without her aid my work could not have been done."

D. P. H.

MODERN JAPAN.*

Mr. Ernest H. Pickering's sympathetic interpretation of modern Japan is of particular interest at a moment when that nation has withdrawn from the London Naval Conference, is showing renewed activity in North China and has just experienced a fresh outburst of political murders by military zealots. The author is well qualified to write on the Japanese problem. After residing for four years from 1927-31 in Japan as a university teacher in English, he returned as a Liberal Member of Parliament to that country in the autumn of 1934 for a six months' visit, studying political and economic conditions and meeting many of the leading figures in public life. He visited also Manchukuo, interviewing there prominent Japanese and Chinese officials, in addition to the Emperor. His purpose in this book is to show "something of the real nature of the Japanese character and the needs and interests of Japan in relation to the rest of the world." While retaining an independent attitude, Mr. Pickering is evidently much impressed by the professed Japanese outlook and aspirations. Indeed it is in its sympathetic presentation of the Japanese case that the usefulness and importance of this volume lies.

Mr. Pickering deals at some length with Japanese industry and provides a vigorous defence of her competition in the textile trade. He cites as her legitimate advantages the acquisition of new markets during and after the war, the depreciation of the yen, low labour costs and a policy of rationalisation. Mr. Pickering is anxious to answer the charge of sweated workers. "The wages they receive are quite as adequate as those paid to our workers for the purpose of furnishing them with the necessities of life." The Japanese normally enjoys a lower standard of life, and has few distractions, so that long hours are no great deprivation. Moreover their money wages are doubled at least in value by the free social services provided in the great factories. Eighty-five per cent. of the workers are girls, mostly aged from 14-18, who are drawn for a few years from the rural areas and are readily reabsorbed by their families on leaving employment. There are few effective trade unions. Employers

* *Japan's Place in the Modern World.* By Ernest H. Pickering. Harrap. 10s. 6d. net.

are thus largely unaffected by the question of unemployment or the rate of wages and can undertake without restriction increases of technical efficiency and reduction of labour costs. For example, in 1926 1,277,000,000 yards of piece-goods were produced by 240,000 workers; while in 1933 the output had increased to 1,673,000,000 and the number of employed decreased to 164,000. Rationalisation, however, is now leading to fresh employment. Mr. Pickering rather lightly argues for an analogous policy in this country. "In the interests of the workers themselves, Lancashire must make it her aim to outclass Japan in its efficiency of production, no matter how much displacement of labour results." This should eventually lead to a partial reabsorption of labour, and meanwhile the Government is to provide generous emergency treatment. But Mr. Pickering agrees that ultimately "the difference in wage-rates may prove to be decisive." He urges the industry to reach an agreement regarding specialisation in qualities and spheres of activity while the Japanese are still willing.

The grave uncertain factor in Japanese foreign policy is found mainly in the continuous struggle for control between the army and the Diet. Politicians in Japan bear some resemblance to the political bosses of America and are widely suspected and distrusted as tools of great self-seeking financiers and industrialists. The armed forces, however, who derive their authority direct from the Emperor and are not subject to immediate Cabinet control, are highly popular among the poorer classes, from whom they are largely recruited. There is "a strong inclination towards National-Socialism or Fascism in the army, which regards itself as the champion of the people, not only against foreign attack, but also against Communism on the one hand, and all Capitalists and Financiers on the other." Mr. Pickering is yet confident of a return to an enlightened parliamentary régime, owing to the influence of the elder statesman, Prince Saionji, and the growing burden of military expenditure. "The army is indeed retiring, albeit not quite gracefully, from its adventures into politics and economics." Unfortunately recent events appear to contradict this view.

Mr. Pickering can only discuss generally and inconclusively Japan's admittedly expansionist foreign policy. He accepts the view that her claim for naval parity is mainly influenced

by the wish "to exercise a controlling power in the development in the East." But the author is equally convinced of no general demand for territorial acquisition but simply for outlets to satisfy economic and defensive needs. He justifies the subjection of Manchuria as necessary to safeguard Japanese interests, and describes as an "afterthought" the creation of Manchukuo which is now being rapidly developed as an independent state. He has no doubt, however, that it exists for the benefit of Japan and will be subject always to her sway. Mr. Pickering urges official recognition, if only for reasons of trade. "It looks as if there cannot well be any Open Door into Manchuria without the recognition of Manchukuo." Obligations under the Nine Power Pact and formerly under the League Covenant receive scant and unsatisfactory attention. He sees a growing *rapprochement* with China where Japanese assistance in her economic development is being preferred to that of Western Powers. By reason of her vital needs, and in the interests of peace, Japan should not be thwarted by Britain or the United States, who themselves have much to gain by her expansion. However, he admits that British and American interests will be affected and lamely concludes that the "three powers must somehow succeed in reconciling their interests and aspirations," and that the responsibility for this lies in Great Britain.

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LAND AND UNEMPLOYMENT.

This collection of essays,* all converging towards Henry George's doctrines and commending the exclusive taxation of land values as the only source of public revenue, is a volume of pleadings by an extremely skilful and conscientious advocate. It does not try to develop fully the case against the single-taxer's doctrine, but it pleads in an extremely fair manner. Though the passion with which the author adhered to this idea becomes clear enough to the attentive reader, its expression is toned down to the utterances of a mature, experienced, kindly man who wishes to make a real and dispassionate contribution to a question which, though it

* *Land and Unemployment*. By James F. Muirhead. (With an introductory note edited by Garnet Smith and a foreword by Sir A. P. Wilson.) Humphrey Milford. 7s. 6d.

touches many interests, vested as well as neglected, in raw spots, requires a cool head and exact logical proceedings if one wants to reach a happy solution. The author, fundamentally a conservative man, gives us the ideas of Henry George not only as a piece of work aimed at superseding socialism as the great hope of the working classes by a greater measure of economic and social equality: it is understood that George's own idea of his policy has always been that. But Mr. Muirhead combines with that economic protectionism a deep craving to restore as much as possible of agricultural self-sufficiency in this country. He even tries to demonstrate that the protectionist strand in his own thought goes very well together with Henry George's personal opinions. I am not persuaded, but I feel very deeply interested in this interpretation.

The book is a fragment, and it shows distinct traces of the unfortunate fact that its author died while he was still at work on it. It therefore lacks systematic treatment in some important directions. This probably explains why a man who translated one of the most difficult modern German poets, Carl Spitteler, and had, accordingly, a masterly knowledge of German, does not mention both the most important German authors on his subject (Franz Oppenheimer and Adolf Damaschke), but only Walther Rathenau, who was, after all, a minor authority on the subject. In the same way his review of the world for traces of Georgeist legislation leaves out the taxation of unearned increment which was in force in democratic Germany for many a year; to the reviewer, who had to assess it for many years and found himself rather disappointed with its results, it would have been extremely interesting to know the author's opinion.

Everybody will understand that the editor limited his interference with Mr. Muirhead's text as much as he could. But it is a pity that such obvious slips of the pen were allowed to stand as the statement that the whole taxable value of land in New York—apart from improvements—was only one and a half millions, and that that value for Copenhagen came only to the 138th part of the whole of Denmark. Another curious fact is that Mr. Muirhead ignores completely the most eminent theoretical economist he has on his side, namely Léon Walras of Lausanne, author of *La paix par la justice sociale et le libre échange*, in which *justice sociale*

simply means the single tax. Not sharing the author's fundamental belief I cannot accept many of his conclusions. But I must confess that I felt very strongly, reading this dignified book, that all pleading in crucial questions of social and economic life should be done in this fine manner. The world would be a better place if the author's methods of controversy became a normal pattern. It would teach people to adhere to their faiths without infringing the inalienable rights of the heretic.

PENSIEROSO.

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THROUGH EIGHTY YEARS.*

Lady Barrington's pleasant volume of reminiscences may hold its own with others of a similar type that have recently appeared. We are becoming, perhaps, a trifle too familiar with the home life and social engagements of the Victorian mother and hostess, her round of country-house visits, her Continental travels, her circle of more or less distinguished friends. All this we find here, together with gentle reflections on the contrast between past and present, or on the Great War and its effects. Some passages seem, one might suggest, of more interest to family and friends than to the general reader; the style is unpretending, and there are far too many exclamation marks. But the book reveals a gracious and evidently well-loved personality, one of whose aims throughout life was to give happiness to those of every rank with whom she came into contact. The most distinctive and attractive pages are those describing the author's happy girlhood in Hampton Court Palace, and her successful efforts, after her second marriage, to revive rural life in Berkshire, and to found homes for disabled ex-service men at Shrivenham. The extent of the accommodation in Hampton Court Palace may come as a surprise to some; Lady Barrington's grandmother was allotted a suite of "nineteen good rooms," and there were forty-five families in residence at the time. It is strange that the date of her first marriage is not given, and that her first husband's name is only learnt through a reference to his father's estate. The record of two visits to South Africa just

**Through Eighty Years, 1855-1935*. By Charlotte, Viscountess Barrington. John Murray, 1936. 10s. 6d. net.

before and after the Boer War, and the reminiscences of Eton in connection with her sons and with Lord Barrington, make interesting reading. Lady Barrington gave valuable personal service and direction to a branch of the Sailors' and Soldiers' Families Association during the war. But her most lasting memorial will be the Shrivenham Settlement, in the founding of which she showed her sympathetic understanding of village folk and ex-service men and their needs, and much practical generosity. The beneficial effects of the Settlement have been already proved, and it might well be a model for similar efforts elsewhere.

E. G. S.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Gladstone's Foreign Policy,* by Paul Knaplund, is an admirable sketch of a large subject. The author's earlier book on Gladstone's colonial policy led his readers to hope for further work of high quality in the same field, and we are not disappointed. He has used the great collection of Gladstone papers now in the British Museum, the papers of Granville at the Record Office, and other new material. Gladstone's stock has been rising steadily during the last few years, and this admirable volume will accelerate the process.

"In his conduct of foreign affairs," writes Professor Knaplund in a striking passage, "he has generally been considered a dismal failure, especially when his efforts in that field have been compared with those of Bismarck. But the war of 1914, the collapse of empires, the inconclusive peace, and the depression in our own time, are the results of principles which Bismarck applied and extolled. Bismarck left a legacy of distrust, of haunting fear, of disregard for justice, of a Europe armed to the teeth, of hostile combinations, all of which Gladstone strove to avoid. He fought in vain, and his reputation has suffered thereby. But in this age of uncertainty, distrust, depression and war scares, it may be well to study how he hoped to lead mankind in the path of justice and peace."

Bismarck, in fact, was a good German, Gladstone a good European, and we are now learning at the cost of bitter experience that Europe can only be saved by good Europeans. The larger and most valuable part of the book is devoted to the 1880-5 Premiership, and it contains a good deal which is not to be found in Morley's official biography.

* Harper. 10s. 6d.

Potsdam and Doorn,* by Brigadier-General Waters, contains further treasures from the storehouse of a long and eventful life. In previous writings the author has spoken in a kindly way of Germany and her last Emperor, and he now comes out boldly as a champion of the fallen ruler. The memories of pre-war times are necessarily less valuable and less intimate than the later chapters; for the pageantry of Potsdam left less time for conversation than the dullness of Doorn. The picture of the old man in exile, who is described as a delightful companion, is painted in warm colours. "His Majesty bears his trials with a fortitude and cheerfulness which could not be excelled." It is interesting to learn that the Empress Augusta Victoria hoped that Princess Hermine would become the Kaiser's second wife. The argument of this pleasantly written little book is that William II was more sinned against than sinning. Nobody now imagines that he desired the world war, though his responsibility for helping to bring it about is rather minimised in these pages.

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So much has been written by eminent historians upon the political and social unrest in the second quarter of the nineteenth century that some ground must be shown for a fresh treatment. The sound justification of Dr. S. Maccoby's *English Radicalism, 1832-1852*,† lies in the need for a full appraisal of the English radicals "among the constructive historical forces of the period." Dr. Maccoby has embraced the whole field of radical outlook and enterprise, though laying particular stress upon the so-called ultra-radicals. In the course of a closely reasoned, heavily documented and at times a little laborious study, he assesses the nature and influence of the radical "pressure from without" upon government and legislation. His work makes clear the wide divergence of outlook and aims among the radical forces, divided into classes and many contradictory groups. After 1832, there was hardly a measure upon which all sections were united, though their continued pressure of discontent was instrumental in forcing reforming legislation. In Parliament itself, as Dr. Maccoby says, "the Radical membership of 1835 and long afterwards was singularly unhomogeneous, singularly hard to unite on any practical course, and singularly given to riding individual hobby-horses." In the case of Parliamentary reform, upon which extreme radicals were most agreed, had Cobden led a crusade in 1847, "the aspect of British politics might have been changed surprisingly fast." It is this absence of solidarity which makes a history of radicalism so difficult and some lack of cohesion inevitable. Dr. Maccoby has put into his book an immense amount of research and labour. His work upon the ultra-radical press is particularly valuable. Students of the period will for long gratefully draw upon this learned and important work.

* John Murray. 7s. 6d.

† Allen and Unwin. 16s. net.

Education for Citizenship in Secondary Schools,* published under the auspices of the Association for Education in Citizenship, will be welcomed as a most important contribution to the vital work of seeing that the individual is fit to discharge his public responsibilities. There is a widespread recognition, as Mr. Oliver Stanley says in his Foreword, of the need of direct education in citizenship in the schools, though opinions diverge widely upon its feasibility and nature. This volume, addressed to all responsible for secondary education, seeks to solve this problem by developing, in Sir Henry Hadow's words, "a coherent scheme based on axioms and on statements of current agreement." Sir Ernest Simon and Mrs. Eva M. Hubback discuss briefly the theory and aims of citizenship, which include a social conscience for the freedom and welfare of others and a capacity to appreciate the main problems of politics. The bulk of the book has been contributed by independent specialists who show how the main subjects in the school curriculum may be treated to impart this training. Among the contributors are Dr. G. P. Gooch, who writes a Foreword to the section on history by Miss Phyllis Doyle. Sir Arthur Salter introduces the chapter on Economics by Professor N. F. Hall. The value of a classical training is stressed by Professor Gilbert Murray, Mr. J. E. Barton and Professor T. B. L. Webster. Sir Percy Nunn has dealt with the importance of mathematics and Professor Doris L. Mackinnon discusses science with special reference to biology. Mr. Barton also writes on the place of art in the school and Dr. Elsa M. Sinclair is responsible for modern languages. Mr. Michael Stewart deals with the controversial topic of classes on "politics or public affairs," preceded by a Foreword from Professor Ernest Barker. Two valuable contributions on clear and accurate thinking come respectively from Professor G. C. Field and Dr. R. H. Thouless. The relation of broadcasting and the teaching of citizenship is dealt with by Dr. W. W. Vaughan.

A new edition of the late Dr. T. A. Walker's learned history of *Peterhouse*† will be generally welcomed by all interested in the history of Cambridge and in particular by members of the College. Originally published in 1906 the book has long been out of print and almost inaccessible. Before his death, Dr. Walker was able, fortunately, to revise his work and add a new chapter dealing with the last generation. Additional illustrations are also included. The Foreword by Sir Hubert Sams contains a short appreciation of the author's career.

* Oxford University Press. 4s. 6d. net. † Heffer. 7s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MAY 1936.

INTERNATIONAL DISORDER.

IT is a long time since European problems have been in such a tangle as they unhappily are in at the present moment. In one country political emotions are enhanced by electoral requirements and uncertainties, in others patriotism has been flogged into a vicious enthusiasm, while modern science forces on millions of listeners the unceasing and uncriticised rhetoric of the national despot. Let us glance at the map. Germans have quite recently given their Leader all the constitutional approval that he desires and permits. The French Government, constituted merely to tide over an electoral period, is in no such fortunate position. Partly from fear, and partly from conviction, it trusts to a recrudescence of national animosity and alarm to avert an otherwise certain swing to the Left. This would bring new personalities into the foreground of French politics, and perhaps permit as much understanding of each other's difficulties as French and German character allows, and of some real accommodation between them. The true sympathies of Russians are screened from us by the form of the government which so absolutely controls them, but it is clear that an eastward moving Russia fears and has prepared for any action by a westward urged Japan. The size and quality of her preparations has dispersed all German recollection of the Rapallo convention, and the present genuine alarm of Germany corresponds to the former precautions of Bismarck, and the fears of his successors. Spain is in the throes of a social revolution, whose contagious properties may have considerable repercussions in France. Poland has lost her guiding spirit, and unlike Czechoslovakia finds no real substitute for the national hero who from the background directed and decided her policy. Austria has re-adopted conscription, and if this further infraction of Versailles is imitated by Bulgaria or Hungary, who now is prepared to carry objection to the point of force? The Little Entente, the countries chiefly to be affected by such rearmament, must be well aware that military movements in the Balkans could not be confined thereto. Especially is this true

if a Habsburg restoration followed on the restoration of an Austrian army. Italy has mobilised two million men, one-half of whom are stationed near the Austrian frontier, and a very large part of the remainder are or have been in Ethiopia. From her campaign there she will emerge victorious and jubilant, and though insolvent will always have to be reckoned with, and never relied upon. Her latest exploit the treaties with Albania, which if the Serbian account of them is accurate, turn the Adriatic into an Italian lake, is certain to extend and prolong the general suspicion. No desire for appeasement is anywhere visible, and it is into this turmoil of suspicion, fear, domestic upheaval and external alarm that Herr Hitler has thrown down his final challenge to the folly of Versailles and the truculence of the late M. Poincaré, to whose obstinate and short-sighted policy we can trace most of the present troubles.

Whatever may be said by critics of the past in respect of either personal or national mistakes, of French brutality in the Ruhr, of British indecision over Japan and China, of German deception in rearming, and so forth, there is little help for the future in raking up forgotten speeches, inoperative treaties, and inauspicious diplomacy. All these things may be the proper tools and machinery of statesmen in ordinary times. They are the natural weapons of an era of cynical international immorality when Governments repudiate treaties and loans wholesale without any sentiment of shame. But never do they, nor can they, lead to that comprehension or reconciliation of national interests, which alone will restore peace to a civilisation apparently intent on suicide. Let the dead past therefore bury itself. Our problem is to inquire how best can England steer her course through the political cyclone with safety and with honour to herself, and how best can she exploit her advantages of commercial and budgetary solvency, of stable though popular government, of comparative geographical isolation, for the appeasement of countries who have deliberately stripped themselves of most of the essentials of a peaceful national existence.

I will attempt to state the European problem from the English standpoint impartially and briefly. Germany has broken treaty obligations, but the breach has been forced on her by French fears and stupidity. It is not, however, the first time that Germany has unilaterally discarded a treaty when it has become convenient or possible for her to do so. She has

claimed, moreover, for herself the right to decide, in superiority to all international law or opinion, on the morality of her actions, whether they affect her nationals alone, or react on other nations. Her ruler, nominally autocratic and confirmed in power by a plebiscite quotable as unanimous, must yet pay serious attention to the bankrupt condition of German finance and commerce, to the divergence and conflict of Nationalism and Socialism, to the growing power and reputation of the Reichswehr, and to the exasperation of Catholic and Protestant alike against State interference in religious questions. Germany thus disturbed within, is best distracted by external affairs. Her army, though as yet incomplete in equipment and number, is one of the most powerful in Europe, and is perhaps the only one to be relied on to undertake an offensive campaign. She has genuine political grievances, which in England at least have received sympathetic recognition. She has owing to the intransigence of French governments been treated, as we actually said at the time, illegally in the matter of the Ruhr, stupidly in respect of her first proposal for rearmament, unfairly and unwisely in respect of international disarmament. She has served a bitter sentence of servitude to France, our share in which we recall with misgiving and regret. (For the personal dissent of myself and others from that policy I shall be always glad.) But it must equally be borne in mind that other countries, such as Roumania, Poland and Bohemia, have good reason to rejoice in freedom from German domination and tyranny, and that what she herself has suffered for twenty years she has inflicted for 200 years on others. While such remembrance may properly engage our attention, it should not sway overmuch our judgment. It should make us cautious, but not partial.

France has done much to destroy her case against Germany, which in many respects is a strong one. Twice in the lifetime of any elderly man of to-day her towns have been occupied, her manhood slain, her commerce plundered, and her territory ravaged by a neighbour, Germany, more numerous, better educated and better disciplined than herself. Once she has been conquered and forced to buy freedom. Once she, as she asserts and thinks, gained her freedom by her own valour and sacrifices. She sees her enemy growing in stature day by day. She sees that enemy repudiate obligation after obligation with a high hand. Reparations are dead and forgotten, the German

navy is being rebuilt, the German army has developed from an effective of 100,000 partially armed and equipped men to an army of at least seven times that strength admirably equipped with every military requirement, and boasting that given three years more of time and they will fear no encounter. France sees a Germany, disciplined, united, confident, laying down the conditions of international association to an incredulous, disunited, and disgruntled Europe.

The case of Belgium is less often, and less clearly before British thought, whereas in truth it deserves, both for its own sake and for our own interests, the most careful and sympathetic examination. She had in 1914 no quarrel of any sort with Germany, she was indeed under special, if joint, guarantee by Germany. Nevertheless, she was invaded, ravaged, and for four years occupied by Germany who only retreated when driven out by force. In the present circumstances, Germany has not, and does not pretend to have any cause of complaint against Belgium—who has neither fortified her frontier nor joined in the Franco-Soviet Pact. Though she took part in the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 she gave no cause of local or occupational hatred. She is a party to Locarno and entitled under the Treaty to arbitral consideration of any dispute with Germany. Yet because she is weak her rights are thrust aside, and she is without security, other than that which we are bound from her geographical position relative to London and the British coast to afford her. Neither justice nor our own safety can allow us to disregard her plea for protection and assistance.

Our own duty, alike in the interest of Europe, of our own country and of the civilisation which unquestionably is in danger should war break out, is to use our power which is admitted by all, and our influence which is generally accepted as decisive, to examine all proposals with the single object of finding a path to peace. On March 7th when the Germans made known their entry into the Rhineland zone, the peace of Europe hung on a thread. Many Frenchmen now regret that their troops did not move across the frontier. As they did not, delay has allowed consultation to take place between the Locarno Powers, and proposals for the adjustment of future relations between all European nations have been put forward. I need not dwell upon the difficulty of getting any Government at the present moment to be reasonable from the

standpoint of the other side. Germany reasonably wants equality. France reasonably feels the danger of accepting German assurances. Belgium reasonably regrets the slender security of the demilitarised zone as withdrawn. Great Britain reasonably desires peace, and fears lest she should be forced into acting on her guarantees. An unhappy situation indeed, the ways out of which are as dark, and almost as dangerous as the roads which led up to it.

Germany in her note of March 7th, 1936, after stating the reasons why in her opinion the Franco-Soviet Pact invalidated the provisions of the Locarno (Rhineland) Pact, made certain proposals. In order to establish, she said, the purely defensive nature of her re-occupation of the demilitarised zone, and "her longing for a real pacification of Europe," she declared herself ready to enter into negotiations with France and Belgium for a zone demilitarised on both sides, and for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the three countries to last for twenty-five years. Great Britain and Italy were invited to guarantee such an agreement. Germany professed herself also ready to conclude an Air Pact with the Western Powers which would prevent the danger of sudden air attacks. She was also willing to enter into pacts with her Eastern neighbours similar to the one made by her with Poland. Finally, having re-established her political equality, she expressed her willingness to re-enter the League of Nations. On March 12th, Herr Hitler laid emphasis on the re-occupation of the Rhine as merely "symbolical," and was ready to permit no further alteration of this if France and Belgium remained stationary.

To her act and to these proposals the League Council replied by declaring the reoccupation of the Rhine zone to be a breach of the Treaty of Versailles—but invited, at their meeting in London, Germany to take part in the examination by the Council of the complaint, submitted to it by France and Belgium, of the violation of the Rhine zone. On March 17th, largely as the result of Mr. Eden's insistence with Germany, she agreed to attend the meetings in London. On March 19th the Locarno Powers addressed counter proposals to Germany. They declared that scrupulous observation of treaty obligations was essential to international life and peace, that their own obligations under Locarno subsisted in their entirety, and that their General Staffs were instructed to

arrange technical conditions in case of any unprovoked aggression. Later on explicit assurances of the most definite character were given by Mr. Eden that France and Belgium had accepted the condition that Staff consultation carried no political implications whatever and were to be limited to the consideration of the present Emergency. Germany was asked to submit to The Hague her interpretation of the Franco-Soviet Pact, to suspend the movement of troops to the zone if France and Belgium did likewise, and to cease fortification. The Powers proposed to police with an international force a zone twenty miles inside the German border, and to press for a new unfortified zone. They further declared themselves ready to call international conferences to organise collective security, to limit armaments effectively, to extend economic relations and to organise international commerce.

To these proposals the German Government replied on April 1st. They reiterated their wish and their hope of European pacification, and regretted the absence of a fruitful and serviceable basis in the draft suggestions of the Locarno Powers. Germans were determined to preserve their freedom, their independence, and their equality. They could not submit their estimate of the Franco-Soviet Treaty to a body (The Hague Court) which could only appreciate its legal and not its political aspect. Such a reference would interfere with the sovereign rights of a State. The other Allied proposals were all one-sided and discriminatory against Germany and must therefore be declined. They could only participate in efforts to achieve at all costs really constructive and lasting peace. They therefore proposed a limit of four months for the signature of non-aggression pacts, during which no troops should be moved in or to the Rhine zone. (Germany subsequently refused to give any pledge as to fortifications.) They were willing* on terms of complete reciprocity to military limitation of the German Western frontier, and repeated and expanded the suggestions for a twenty-five years' peace for non-aggression pacts with their Eastern neighbours, and for British and Italian guarantees. They added proposals for the better education of the German and French youth in ideas of friendship and understanding, and suggested a plebiscite in France and Germany as sign of a sacred pledge of agreement. Thus Germany could again enter the League where in due time

* See art. 9 of para. 22, German "Peace Plan."

colonial equality of rights and the separation of the Covenant from the League could be discussed.

In conclusion, Germany proposed an international Court of Arbitration whose decisions should be binding, a reduction of armaments by a series of Conferences on each category of guns and bombs and gases, and economic discussions for the restoration of commercial prosperity.

There is so much of wisdom and usefulness in all this that it is greatly to be regretted that the little more which would have really helped is omitted. Two days before the reply reached London the French Foreign Minister asked Germany several pertinent and not unreasonable questions. Herr Hitler, he said, had re-affirmed Locarno after the Saar settlement, and now "in the name of the eternal morality and the vital rights of Germany" had repudiated both Locarno and arbitration. Again, while Herr Hitler was advocating European peace and understanding, Nazi propaganda for the absorption of present Danish, Czechoslovakian, Austrian and Polish territory was redoubled. Was this to be declared as a domestic issue, in which only Germans were interested? What guarantee could Herr Hitler give that Germany would respect and submit to the new international authority when he had repudiated The Hague Court? Why was the fortification of the Rhine zone hurried on if peace was Germany's real object? What was the meaning of "Colonies," did they include Rosenberg "Colonisation" in South Russia?

These questions, though put by a French Minister from the platform, raise serious, important, and inescapable issues. They must be met, and surely can easily be met by anyone earnestly desirous of appeasement, and as much master of his own Germany as Herr Hitler claims to be. Compliance entails no limitation of equality, independence, or freedom for Germany. Indeed, it would be greatly to German advantage if her Leader were as frankly aware of our doubts as he is of his own hesitation. It is not so much "Ought Germany to be asked for more?" as it is "Will Germany keep her word?", and "Will Germany accept now and repudiate later?" She has forced disbelief in her integrity of purpose and word on her neighbours before, during and after the war. She is not unlike the Stewart Kings of England, whose divine appointment justified all chicanery. Still, it is clear that not for her sake, but for that of Europe, we must assume German good

faith and intention, while keeping our powder dry. There is no good purpose to be served by the ridiculous proposal to police the *German* frontier. It was probably a sedative for M. Sarraut. On the other hand, unless the mutual security promised by Locarno is organised beforehand, the aggressor, who certainly will have prepared his own staff plans in advance, will be at great advantage compared with the separately organised defenders. I can personally say that Staff conversations before August 1914 between France and Britain had no influence on political decisions, and on the declaration of war. Safeguarded as these conversations now are by the triple assurances of Belgium, France and England, they are necessary military precautions without any element of political danger.

It seems to me completely superfluous to ask Germany to submit her action in the Rhine zone to The Hague Court. Neither she nor the Locarno Powers can be in doubt as to the verdict, already anticipated, as she notes, by the League Council. It could add nothing indeed to the pacification of Europe, though affording some solace to the outraged dignity of the League. On the other hand a mutual standstill in the Rhine zone is essential and the German refusal to cease fortifying their positions is sinister and unwise. Considerable argument could be developed round the mutual suggestions for the meeting of Conferences, for the expansion of commerce, for the non-aggression pacts, for the restriction of armaments, and so forth. But the form and the letter of all these is subject to the answer to simple questions such as, "Do you really mean business?" "Is there really good will?" "Can there really be confidence?" If the spirit can truly say yes to these inquiries, the format in which the invitation is tendered and accepted need take no long time to arrive at. I am convinced that no leader of opinion in Europe really wants war. Each no doubt has his national ambition, his desire to see the old glories revived, or the new ones confirmed. But the danger from a general blaze is too recent, the certainty, that as there is collective security so also there is collective peril, is too precise to allow of any Government precipitating a quarrel from words into blows. Time, as Mr. Eden reminded the House of Commons, permits tempers to cool, and reflection develops prudence and wisdom. Whatever France thought on the afternoon of March 7th,

to-day we learn that her Government see clearly that Germany must be treated as an equal, and that while the French are entitled to ask for evidence that agreements freely negotiated will be fully respected, and that during negotiations her security will be assured, France must herself give proof of a constructive and helpful mind. In particular she must meet the German demand for security through non-aggression pacts with some proposal of her own which takes account of opinion beyond the borders of France. The greatest contribution she can make to peace is by way of international disarmament. She has been very difficult over this question in the past, and her alarm is to be understood, if it is not to be justified. Is there no way round the mountain of suspicion? If Russia could reach an understanding with Japan which left China intact (and this is a very large if), Russia could largely disarm. Thus German fears would disappear, and she and France led by England (a leadership recommended and accepted in advance by Herr Hitler) could come to terms. Such a solution is difficult, but not fanciful. It would provide peace for the East and for Central Europe also. But it depends upon the creation of a mutual confidence which does not now exist. The experience of the dreadful danger through which Europe has passed in these last few weeks, and which is yet not wholly at an end, may however bring wisdom to all Governments and teach them the necessity of buying peace by mutual concessions.

CHARLES E. HOBHOUSE.

FRANCE FACES GERMANY.

WHOEVER seeks to explain the opinion of any country, especially in matters of foreign policy, must draw distinctions and insist on definitions. I do not know what the Schools of Journalism have to say on this point; but I am frequently driven to believe, when I read the sweeping generalisations of the Press, that accounts of public opinion abroad may be divided into two categories. In the largest category may be placed the more or less officially inspired comments of those who are in close contact with governmental persons. The organisation of opinion has reached tremendous proportions. In Germany and in Italy it is efficient and undisguised. In France there are other means of bringing the principal newspapers into line. In Great Britain, too, the system of official spokesmen whose business it is to meet the diplomatic correspondents, in London itself, or in Paris, or in Geneva, or wherever leading British delegates may be, has been carried to lengths which some of us find excessive, since it tends to stifle individual thinking and criticism, and to standardise reporting on a most vital subject.

There exists side by side with this method of spoon-feeding of the Press—the method of what the Americans, in their expressive journalistic jargon, call “dope”—a certain corrective in the form of personal appreciations which pretend to be the reflection of national opinion. They would be excellent if they were frankly put forward as personal appreciations; but time after time I read in newspapers statements which I should welcome as the views of the writer, but which unfortunately masquerade as the views of the masses. The technique is simple. The writer—or his newspaper—has specific reactions, but instead of saying “I think” or “We think,” the phrase “France thinks” or “Great Britain thinks” is used.

With a growing consciousness of the danger of this general acceptance of manufactured public opinion, which is, in fact, either Ministerial opinion or personal opinion, I find it not altogether easy to set down the French view of Herr Hitler's remilitarisation of Rhineland in defiance of the Versailles and Locarno treaties, and the propositions of peace with which he accompanied his *coup de force*. How is one to distinguish the

governmental view from the popular view—or even from one's own view? And, to make matters harder, there can be no doubt that there are extremely varied views among the French public, influenced as it is by political sympathies and antipathies. It would be too much to ask convinced Socialists to approve of any Nazi manifestations, though there has been, on the Left, some propaganda in favour of a Franco-German *rapprochement*. It would be too much to ask a convinced Conservative to close his eyes to Communist activities in France, even if he reluctantly accepts the military necessity of a Franco-Russian alliance. Never were there so many cross-currents of political and doctrinal prejudices and passions. Frenchmen are pulled in different directions. To assert that such and such is French opinion—or even a particular Frenchman's opinion—would be unduly dogmatic. There is considerable confusion of thought; and the average Frenchman (if such a mythical being exists) is full of contradictions. For this reason he would support that policy; and for that reason he would advocate this policy.

Yet if something concrete must be said, and one must escape from a network of verbal precautions and reservations, I am bound, as an old observer of French opinion, to throw doubt on the presumption that M. Sarraut, the Prime Minister, and M. Flandin, the Foreign Minister, accurately expressed the sentiments of the French people when they immediately denounced Herr Hitler's offers as unacceptable, and declared they would not negotiate while Strasbourg lay under the menace of German cannon. I venture to affirm that the purely negative attitude of refusing to enter into negotiations until Germany had done what it obviously could not do—namely, withdraw its troops from Rhineland, pledge itself not to construct fortifications, submit the Franco-Russian Pact to The Hague Court, permit British and Italian or other foreign troops to be stationed on its territory—found no overwhelming endorsement in the French mind. On the contrary, I am persuaded that the majority of the French judged such a refusal severely, and regarded it not as a proof of statesmanship but as evidence of an utter lack of statesmanship. At the beginning the newspapers were incredulous, and the man in the street, with vigorous common sense, exclaimed, “Not talk? Of course we must talk!”

Most carefully have I listened to the observations of all

classes of Frenchmen in this grave crisis of European relations. There have been different degrees in scepticism regarding Germany's ultimate intentions, but rarely, except among the professional exponents of policy, has there been genuine dissent from the proposition of the desirability of conversations, of a conference, of amicable arrangements for the preservation of peace if peace be still possible. Apparently the Government itself became aware of the untenability of its first positions, and proceeded to shift its ground. Proper allowance must be made for the need of diplomatic tactics; it can justifiably be argued that the business of diplomacy is to begin by saying No, and then to retreat to Perhaps, before allowing itself to be driven back to Yes. Nevertheless the public is becoming impatient of the *finesse* of diplomacy. It saw that there was a psychological advantage, whatever orthodox diplomacy might hold, in responding Yes right away, if Yes, or some variant of Yes, must finally be the response. Rightly or wrongly, the French people, left to themselves, do not attach great importance to the efforts to keep Germany under unilateral disabilities. They cannot, at this hour, understand why Germany should not be as free to do what it pleases on its own territory as are the French on their territory. If things had been conducted differently from 1919 onwards, doubtless the French would have been pleased to maintain Germany in perpetual subjection. But, as it is, there seems no sense in continuing to treat Germany as a beaten enemy. Of two things, one: either the war with Germany should be renewed without delay, while there is still a chance of defeating Germany; or the opportunity, however illusory it may turn out to be, of coming to terms with Germany must be accepted.

The prospect of a so-called preventive war may be ruled out at once. Theoretically a preventive war was possible three years ago. It was, in fact, discussed, as an intellectual pastime, in circles to which I was admitted; but the moment it was placed on the practical *terrain*, its advocates recoiled. The French are essentially pacific. They have nothing, as a people, to demand from Germany, and therefore are not in the least disposed to pick a quarrel with Germany. Indeed, only the other day I heard a diplomatic personage push paradox so far as to argue that precisely because France had nothing to demand from Germany, nor Germany from France,

there was no common ground on which they could meet. That alas! is still orthodox diplomacy—an affair of bargaining. According to this conception, countries which have no potential quarrels cannot, diplomatically speaking, ever be friendly with each other. But diplomacy is full of resources, and if France and Germany have nothing to quarrel about on their own territories, the quarrel can be shifted on to some other territory—that of Russia, for example. The public, happily or unhappily, remains somewhat refractory to these diplomatic ingenuities.

On the other hand, if the public is not prepared to fight for the maintenance of the arbitrary provisions of the Versailles Treaty in so far as they affect German sovereignty, it cannot forget that France has indeed been invaded. It is apprehensive. It knows that Germany is intensively militarised. It is afraid that the great military machine may some day be directed against France. Bismarck himself, after 1870, entertained fears of a French *revanche*. It is the fate of victorious countries on the Continent to be alarmed at the thought of a turning of the tables. The ordinary Frenchman is, in the nature of the case, distrustful of German designs. He cannot make up his mind to nip them in the bud, but he watches their development with misgiving. It would be a miracle were he to believe in the fine words of Herr Hitler—just as great a miracle as it would have been had the Germans believed in the fine words of M. Briand. Unquestionably he is uneasy at the growing might of Germany. He is sorry that last year Germany reintroduced conscription; and he is sorry that this year Germany has advanced its troops to the French frontier. But what can he do about it? The process is inevitable. He remembers that his rulers declined Germany's offer to limit its army and its air forces, with the sole result that Germany withdrew its offer of limitation. He perceives that the British, wisely or unwisely, seized on Germany's offer to limit its navy, and without procrastination signed a pact with Germany. The tragedy of the after-war years has been a series of No's followed by *faits-accomplis*. Is it not time to conclude this sterile series of No's, and to undertake a more constructive and comprehensive examination of the Franco-German situation?

In short, there is a widespread wish to escape from the legal references to the texts of articles of treaties, and to face the

realities. Everybody—including the British—has torn up some international contract or other since the war, and the foundations of confidence are shaken. To restore confidence, would it not be well to complete the tearing-up of obsolete and inapplicable pacts; and to enter into voluntarily accepted agreements, demonstrably compatible with actual circumstances, and capable of being faithfully observed—this time on the strict understanding that promises will be rigorously adhered to, and will be consented to as international law? In national life nothing is so subversive of law as laws which cannot possess any binding moral force on the average citizen. Prohibitions which are not generally accepted lead to the breaking not only of the particular law in which they are embodied, but of the whole conception of the law. There must be a fresh start.

The problem would therefore be simple were it merely a Franco-German problem. But it has long ago become a European problem. As between France and Germany there could be peace to-morrow. The question is complicated by the ideas which have been assiduously promulgated of "collective security" and of "peace indivisible." Before these phrases became fashionable, France had already taken engagements in Central and Eastern Europe. The Little Entente, insistent on the *status quo*, turned to France, and France on its side was eager to increase its influence even at the expense of additional risk. In the past few years Russia has come to occupy a predominant place in the European picture. The principal author of the Franco-Russian Treaty, which, despite its technical phraseology, may undoubtedly operate as a Franco-Russian military alliance, was M. Barthou. It is to be noted that M. Barthou had not the smallest leanings towards Bolshevism. The hazards of French politics sometimes placed him in Leftish cabinets, but fundamentally M. Barthou could be properly described as a man of the Right. It was then out of no love for Russia, but out of antagonism to Germany, that the Franco-Russian Treaty, in spite of its obvious objections, was conceived. M. Barthou was a representative of the generation which was most intensely anti-German. He was certainly a representative of the pre-League diplomacy. Naturally, the promoters of the Franco-Russian alliance—or rather of a revival of the old fatal Franco-Russian alliance—were helped by the Communist

mysticism which has spread in all sections of French life. Public opinion is hopelessly divided on the implications of the alliance. On the whole, among the Nationalists who are usually regarded as more or less military-minded, the pact is unpopular on ideological grounds, and its value to France in the event of war is discredited. It is criticised as a liability instead of an asset from the military viewpoint, while from the social viewpoint it is unquestionably dangerous for France to be linked up with Russia. The sympathisers with Communism—and they far transcend the Communist party—who have hitherto been regarded as anti-militarist, and even, in the eyes of the Conservatives, anti-national, profess themselves, on the other hand, delighted. In their zeal against Dictatorship (of the Hitler and Mussolini type) they exalt the size and efficiency of the Russian army and air forces. The erstwhile pacifists, suspected by their opponents of a lack of patriotism, are converted, in their love of Russia, mother of the new civilisation, herald of the new social order, into ardent militarists.

How is one to disentangle these contradictions? Politics, like adversity, makes strange bed-fellows. The main point is that France has been placed by the diplomatists in a position in which it cannot deal with the Franco-German problem as one which involves only those two countries. No matter whether France is safe enough from German aggression. That is no longer the issue. The issue is whether Russia is safe from German aggression. France is committed to Russia. Of course the treaty is carefully worded. There are plenty of loopholes. Were it referred to The Hague Court, it would doubtless be found impeccable, and merely an instrument to implement the Covenant of the League in a special case. But the virtue of a treaty lies in its interpretation, and while the Russian mysticism persists, and especially in the event of a victory of the Left in France, French diplomacy must consider the Russian frontiers as its own. France is the friend of Russia, and Germany is the enemy of Russia. The possibilities of European war in which France will be ranged against Germany are largely increased. The possibilities of European peace in which France and Germany will be reconciled are greatly decreased, inasmuch as a Franco-German *rapprochement* would seem to imply a preliminary Russo-German *rapprochement*.

From the official point of view the real gravity of the present crisis lies in the threat of a German fortification of Rhineland. It is not a direct threat to France; it is a threat to Russia—which France has chosen to regard as a threat against itself. Fortifications are necessarily immobile and defensive. Without minimising their significance as a jumping-off place, it may rightly be said that the French fortifications—known as the Maginot line—and the eventual German fortifications, will neutralise each other. If the Maginot line is as strong as it is claimed to be, Germany will find it difficult to invade France. But a demilitarised Rhineland would have permitted France to carry out its duties to Russia by invading Germany. A remilitarised Rhineland means that France will be confined to its own territory. It will be “contained.” It can no longer effectively go to the assistance of Russia. The Franco-Russian Treaty is singularly diminished in military value. Here is the key to the perturbation caused by the remilitarisation of Rhineland. The unlimited reconstruction of the German army last year was in itself a much more formidable move than the remilitarisation of Rhineland this year. Yet, last year, Germany’s military freedom was received calmly, though from the French standpoint it might well have been looked upon as an immense offensive decision. This year the refortification of Rhineland, which is chiefly defensive, provoked the most strenuous official protests and brought us perilously near to disaster. That is because it shatters the whole basis of recent diplomatic action; it renders French assistance to Czechoslovakia and other Danubian states, as well as to Russia, much more difficult; it destroys the French system of alliances, and may determine, with the decline of French prestige, an altogether different re-alignment of powers in Europe.

From the hotch-potch of proposals and counter-proposals that diplomatists, working overtime, quickly concocted—British plans, German plans, French plans—there emerges only one point of real importance from the French angle—the consultations of the military staffs. Everything has been done on the British side to whittle it away, to circumscribe it in time and in purpose—but everything will be done on the French side to keep it in existence, to tend it carefully, to warm it and to water it, and to cause it to grow into such an understanding as precipitated Great Britain into the

European conflict of 1914. The Locarno engagements, although they professed to hold the balance even between France and Germany, were fraught with peril, and only commended themselves because they gave a breathing-space to Europe which might have been used—but which was not used—to bring about a reconciliation. A military understanding between France and Great Britain definitely directed against Germany would be fraught with even greater peril, but the risk might nevertheless be worth running were France free in other directions. What should be unthinkable, on the British side, is a virtual alliance with France now that France has a virtual alliance with Russia, with Czechoslovakia, and with other nations, so that automatically the area of engagements widens and widens. It may or may not be true that war in any part of Europe is bound to spread to the rest of Europe; but, true or not, there is no reason why the statesmen should make the assurance of “collective suicide” doubly sure by pledging themselves (or rather their peoples) to get into any fight for any object in any part of Europe. The lightly accepted thesis of “peace indivisible”—which means “war indivisible”—has assumed the aspect of ineluctable fatality. It has been proclaimed by the pacifists in France and Great Britain with the lunatic cheerfulness of the Gadarene swine rushing down a steep place to destruction.

The French remark that the German scheme of bilateral pacts of non-aggression merely means that every nation, thus immobilised, must stand aside while Germany attacks one of their number. They oppose the principle of comprehensive mutual assistance pacts which will insure a coalition against Germany. The difference in the conceptions is vital; and the French conception is reinforced by the old hankering after an international army which would convert the League of Nations from a peace organisation into a war organisation. This has been the consistent French desire from the days of the Paris Conference. More than a year ago, some of France’s friends formed at Geneva a more or less secret society to arrange a series of little diplomatic triumphs for Mr. Eden, with a view to inveigling British policy to the active support—and indeed leadership—of the most dangerous application of the Covenant—an application altogether unimaginative and unintelligent, since it completely ignores the scale of values. British “prestige” was temporarily enhanced at a

terrific price, as all students of political realities might have foreseen. The ultimate result will be catastrophic unless there is a speedy reversal of direction.

French opinion is inclined to judge Great Britain harshly. It is taken for granted that, either in pursuance of British interests or British prestige, Great Britain deliberately smashed the Stresa front, which might have held Germany in check, by insisting, for the first time, on sanctions against Italy; and then, when other nations at the behest of Britain had made economic sacrifices, and given Mediterranean pledges of mutual assistance, declined to proceed resolutely to the execution of the terms of the Locarno Pact and of the Covenant itself (see Article XI) against Germany. Good diplomacy, they urge (and by "they" I mean the bulk of the French people) would have settled the Abyssinian affair without fighting, or at any rate after a comparatively harmless military parade. Without condoning Italy, the average Frenchman fails to understand why Europe was divided, at a moment when unity was indispensable, in face of the German menace, for the sake of Abyssinia. The ill-timed and ill-advised experiment in ineffective sanctions which have prolonged and intensified the Abyssinian strife, has already come near to wrecking Europe. Apart from fanatical anti-Fascists, there is an almost unanimous belief in France that Great Britain must share the responsibility with Italy for providing Herr Hitler with his opportunity of challenging the victors of the Great War and of preparing the next war.

For my part, I should wish to make it clear that I do not accept this view in so far as it implies a policy of despair. It is surely better not to anticipate as inevitable a German aggression either in the East or the West. It is surely better to seize every chance of removing Germany's legitimate grievances and of entering into negotiations which may avert the war which many people in diplomatic circles now predict for the end of 1937 or the early part of 1938. Nothing could be more fatuous than to behave like Gribouille. It is, however, my function, irrespective of my personal opinion, to indicate plainly the French opinion, which is that Great Britain has done Europe an immense disservice in invoking sanctions against Italy and in treating Germany with excessive indulgence.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

AUSTRIA—BELOW GROUND AND ABOVE.

THE condition of Austria was usefully illuminated by the law establishing universal national service "under arms or without arms" introduced by Dr. Schuschnigg, the Chancellor, on April 1st, to the nominated Diet (*Bundestag*) and obediently passed by it without discussion. The Constitution, in fact, does not allow these nominees of the dictatorship to discuss any measure put before them, but it does not forbid cheering or singing. Having silently risen in their seats to signify approval of the new measure, the members availed themselves of the privilege of cheering, and lifted up in melody the voices forbidden to be heard in reason to sing the national anthem. The new law established the principle of conscription, but left its practice to be decreed by the Chancellor, who was specifically empowered to that end. The most significant feature was the phrase "with or without arms." It is obvious that the Government could not give arms and military training to the able-bodied male population as a whole. The Socialists, when last elections permitted a check up on their strength, were forty-four per cent. of the population, and there is no sign that any considerable proportion have undergone a change of heart, except in so far as they have gone over to the Communists. The Nazis are variously estimated at between twenty-five and thirty per cent., and are the more dangerous because of their strength among the police and the official classes. To arm these two hostile groups would be to hasten, first, a revolution against the present system and, secondly, civil war between these two groups in a struggle for the mastery.

It is not certain that this will not after all be the final result of the new measure when it is put into full force. The Government has for two years applied the severest economic and moral pressure to drive its opponents into the Fatherland Front, the Fascist single Trade Union, and the Catholic Church, but many a red-white-red Fatherland Front ribbon is worn above a heart from which the white is entirely lacking. While the Socialist parole has been to resist Government pressure to the last, the Communists have propagated the slogan "Everyone into the Fatherland Front and the Fascist Union and turn them into revolutionary bodies." Nazi

tactics are similar. What guarantee can the Government have that many of its new military conscripts will not prove to have learned too well the lesson of the Trojan horse? Faced with the knowledge that a part of the population would support a Nazi invasion, open or camouflaged, the Government must realise that only a working-class *levée en masse* could save Austria's independence. Unfortunately there is not the faintest indication that the necessary lesson will be drawn, and the great Socialist movement be legalised again.

The Left movements opposed to the Government fall under four main heads: the Communists, the Revolutionary Socialists, the Illegal Trades Unions, and the *Schutzbund* (Republican Defence Corps). The illegal party of the Revolutionary Socialists is the successor to the former Social Democratic Party. Probably the only persons who would call themselves Social Democrats to-day are the leaders of the former party, such as Herr Karl Seitz, the Mayor of Vienna. Even the emigrant leaders, like Dr. Otto Bauer, call themselves "Austrian Socialists," reluctantly dropping the "Democrat" although hesitant, so strong is the tradition of legality and parliamentarism which the present Government destroyed, to adopt the "revolutionary" label. Inspired Austrian statements try to represent Dr. Otto Bauer, Dr. Julius Deutsch and other emigrés as the forces keeping alive Socialist resentment, which otherwise would die down. This is not the truth. The Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialists is in Austria, and the policy of the movement is decided and carried out here. The leaders are young men, partly intellectuals, partly manual workers, and carry their liberty if not their lives, in their hands. Unlike the former parliamentary leadership, the illegal leadership includes very few Jews. The former party leaders have nothing to do with the movement. They are all under police supervision to an extent which would mean the immediate arrest of themselves and the new leaders if there were any contact between the two. As for "Brünn" (Brünn, in Czechoslovakia, is the headquarters of the emigrés and the place where the former Austrian party organ, the *Arbeiterzeitung*, is edited, published and then smuggled as an illegal newspaper into Austria), it is considered and considers itself as only on the lines of communication in the political war. Dr. Bauer and his colleagues forward what printed ammunition they can, receive the

"casualties" of the fighting force as these come under police suspicion and if possible escape prison by emigration, but "G.H.Q.," the battle front and the "troops" are all in Austria. "Casualties" are heavy. The Government recently admitted that some two thousand Socialists and Communists, mostly untried, were in the two Central prisons of Vienna alone. They are mostly rank-and-file men, suspected of such activities as scattering anti-Fascist slogans printed on minute pieces of red paper, painting Socialist insignia on the walls, delivering the *Arbeiterzeitung* or another of the legion of illegal newspapers and broadsheets secretly printed or mimeographed in Austria. Here and there more important captures are made, and have sometimes included members of the Central Committee itself; their actual position has sometimes been known, more often not, to their captors. But whether important or insignificant in the movement, their places are promptly filled when the prison gates close behind them. The supply of "privates" seems inexhaustible, that of potential leaders sufficient to meet all likely demands for many years to come, but the movement appears weaker in "N.C.O.s" than that of the Communists. Despite their title, the Revolutionary Socialists do not see a bloody revolution as inevitable. Many were brought up in Social Democratic traditions, and these would prefer to see the moderate Clericals dissociate themselves from the Heimwehr-Fascists and the adherents of Clerical dictatorship, in order to restore democracy.

Between Socialists and Communists there is a gentleman's agreement to refrain from attacking one another's politics in print and in the political discussions which are still held in secret, and to secure *ad hoc* co-operation in "actions" on special occasions such as Socialist and Communist anniversaries. A real united front, despite negotiations which have been in progress for months and are still going on, has not been completely achieved. The Communists (K.P.O. *Kommunistische Partei Oesterreichs*) have to thank the Fascist dictatorship for promotion from a ludicrous handful of earnest-souled theoreticians and a loose following of unemployed, to a mass movement rivalling in importance that of the Revolutionary Socialists. It is, of course, quite impossible to ascertain figures for either of these underground movements. The Communists are probably better supplied with intellectual

leaders, largely Jewish, and middle-grade functionaries than the Socialists, and have also a big rank-and-file following recruited from Socialists who have lost faith in the possibility of democratic progress through the counter-revolution; they have won over a number of ex-Nazis, who have seen through Hitlerism's pretence of anti-capitalism, and of disgruntled and disillusioned ex-Heimwehremen. That the Communist cells have made progress in the army is proved from time to time by the arrest and imprisonment of soldiers on charges of Communism. The fact that the Austrian Press published at the beginning of April the statement that 70,000 copies of a single edition of the *Arbeiterzeitung* were distributed is some indication of the large circulation of this illegal organ. It has to be remembered that possession of a single copy means prison.

Membership (of both Communists and Socialists) running to nearly 100,000 is claimed for the illegal Trades Unions. (The political police have put the figure at 300,000.) They collect their dues secretly, run their own illegal weekly papers, and keep up a steady pressure on the Government and on employers to restore legality to the trades union movement. In March they even carried through strikes in the motor industry, in the Fiat and Sauer factories, which were eventually broken by the police. Agitation is carried on openly by the secret leaders of the movement speaking in perfectly legal meetings of the Fascist union, presided over by Government nominees.

The *Illegale Schutzbund*, the successor to the former Socialist Party guard which was formed and armed openly to meet the menace of the armed Fascist bands, is the smallest movement of all. Although both Socialists and Communists are in its ranks, it is frowned upon by the Revolutionary Socialist leadership, both because the fighting of February 1934 taught that the mass of the workers had come to rely on it to fight their battles while they looked on, and because the Communists have acquired predominating influence therein. The Revolutionary Socialists would like to see it dissolved altogether. It claims in Vienna alone a membership of 5,000. It has secret arms depots, but probably insufficient for its needs, runs its own news-sheets and holds occasional secret parades in the Vienna Forest. The Press is not allowed even to admit its existence, and its members when arrested are never

charged with *Schutzbund*, but with Socialist or Communist activity.

It is a strange shadow-world in which all these people live their political lives, a world where no names except pseudonyms are used, where telephones are avoided like poison for fear of tapping, where the glance wanders constantly over the shoulder to detect a shadower, where voices are always hushed for fear of the informer. It is a world where the strains of a jazz band in a smart dancing resort often form the best cover for the conversation of men and women, who have perhaps never danced in their lives, while they discuss the next edition of a newspaper, the distributing of which is good for five years' imprisonment, or where the cheers of a great football crowd cover the decisions of a secret Party Committee sitting unsuspected in its midst.

The underground battle of the Nazis is very different. Liable also, of course, to arrest, they yet know that a lucky chance may always bring them a *Parteigenosse* as shadower, who will close his eyes as long as he can, or if the worst happens, as jailer, who will see to it that little luxuries provided by the *Partei* and even its illegal newspapers find their way regularly into his cell. And how often, too, it is a *Parteigenosse* who prosecutes, and another who sentences him. Thus one gets such contrasting sentences as the following: Charged with participation in the February 1934 fighting, the Socialists Kutschera, Fritz, Heuzer and Friedrich, on returning from emigration in hopes of amnesty have just been given five years' imprisonment each. The Nazi Schiller, who played a prominent part in the Nazi revolt of July 1934 and returned from exile without expectation of amnesty, got fifteen months. The Socialist Anna Stoller, aged 67, got two and a half years' imprisonment for being found in possession of a quantity of Socialist newspapers. The Nazi Dr. Sonnleitner, a police commissar, employed in confidential work in the cipher and Sureté sections, got the same sentence for betraying official secrets to Nazi headquarters in Munich. The Nazi Marie Hoffman distributed money to the families of political prisoners and got four weeks' imprisonment. The Socialist Stwarnig for the same offence got five years. The recent outburst of anti-Semitic agitation in Government circles has at last opened the eyes of the long-blinded "*Dollfuss-Juden*" to the fact that they have no friends in the present Austrian régime.

The light sentences in the recent mass trial of Revolutionary Socialist leaders charged with high treason stand by themselves and were probably due to the great interest taken in the trial abroad. A week later much heavier sentences (comparatively) were imposed on three Socialists accused of the much lighter offence of assisting to distribute illegal literature in a case which did not interest the Press. But one month earlier the terrible sentences of ten and five years' penal servitude respectively were passed on Holowaty and Steindl, two former trades union functionaries, for having re-established underground the timber workers' union. And a week after the mass trial, comparatively far heavier sentences were passed on three Socialists accused of the minor offence of being connected with the distribution of illegal literature. As to the treatment of prisoners, Roman Felleis, one of the principal accused in the mass trial, told the Court of the wounds he had seen on many fellow prisoners, who had been beaten by the police on arrest. The Court was not interested; indeed, such complaints of torture to the Austrian Courts by prisoners are regularly passed over as unimportant. A recent Socialist illegal broadsheet says as to this: "The women are insulted with such terms as 'red whore,' the men as 'red swine' and 'red dogs.' In many cases the prisoners are brutally ill-treated to extract information, beaten with truncheons, kicked, ear twisted, dragged by the hair." There is the specific case of 118 employees of the Bally Shoe Factory, whose brutal ill-treatment by the police commissars, Dr. Auinger and Dr. Paul, is cited as having finally forced the Government to start an investigation into the former's conduct. The underground organisations have long lists of names of badly mishandled persons, still in prison, but not afraid to speak out. When Mr. Phillips Price, M.P., and Madame Vandervelde asked in Vienna last month for permission to visit the prisons (in accordance with Dr. Schuschnigg's offer to let foreigners with a legitimate interest do so at any time) the Government flatly refused. It is only fair to add that the allegations of torturing political prisoners cover only the period of police detention. Once that ordeal—which may last months—is over, the prisoners seem to be as humanely treated in the Central prisons as the severe regulations allow, although there are many complaints of extremely inadequate feeding and consequent semi-starvation,

of badly overcrowded cells and insanitary conditions. The accuracy of the last charge is officially admitted.

After the police examination comes the police "administrative punishment," against which an appeal is usually impossible. Under this system, adopted from Czarist Russia, a police commissar can dictate up to twelve months' imprisonment. But by separate sentences for having Socialist and Communist leaflets, this can be increased up to twenty-two months. Prisoners have to pay part of the costs of detention. These sentences served, comes the trial for the same offences before the Courts; most political offences are treated as high treason. First there is usually months of detention awaiting trial, then sentence served in a convict prison. Even after that the prisoner is not free: he is handed over to the police who at their option may release him, or send him to a concentration camp, either for periods up to six months, which can be later prolonged, or indefinitely. The ever increasing number of persons revolutionised by passing through this slow-grinding mill, which convinces them that they can no longer expect justice even under the existing repressive laws, is a serious menace to Austria's stability; there is even the danger against which the leaders of the Left fight incessantly, of the Socialist elements in their blind despair supporting a Nazi rising, such is the hatred inspired by the present system. Nobody knows better than the leaders of the Left that a Nazi triumph over even the present system would mean chastisement with scorpions instead of whips; but dangerous prison friendships are increasing among the Socialist and Nazi rank and file which, at a given moment, might have unexpected results. The arrests and punishments occur in an atmosphere of denunciation, espionage and petty persecution by Clerical and Heimwehr elements which have led the Cardinal Archbishop of Vienna, a sworn foe of the Socialists, to protest against

decisions taken in certain branches of the public administration, which might give the impression that they are inspired by influences which deliberately and consciously seek to arouse bitterness in the population by unnecessary vexations and over-heavy punishments. The same may also be said of many sentences of the judges. . . . The principle of justice must be upheld.

And on this a non-political, influential and legal Austrian publication comments that :

All classes of the population will agree with the Cardinal. That wrong decisions are taken . . . is often seen. . . . The public should know more of the bitter complaints of the officials about their conditions of work, the political favouritism, the neglect of the laws. When officials, doing their duty correctly, are terrorised by political denunciations, there is great danger to the public administration as a whole. It is to be hoped that the Government will pay attention to the warnings of the Cardinal.

Every well wisher of the Austrian people who have passed through one tragedy after another since 1914 must be gravely concerned over prevailing conditions and their almost inevitable consequences. What hope can this present régime have of presenting a solid front to the next act of aggression from Herr Hitler? The answer of responsible Government representatives in private (not in public) is : " We cannot afford to slacken this iron system ; there are too many forces against us, and chaos would result." It is true that as long as Austria remains dependent on Italian Fascism there can be no relaxation of persecution, and no restoration of liberties. For the sad state of Austria to-day British and French policy bears a large share of responsibility, for refusing effective guarantees of Austria's independence, which should have been coupled with an iron insistence that this should be conditional on the maintenance of Democracy. This could not truthfully be construed as interference with Austria's internal affairs, for there is no " independence " for any people which is not independent to govern itself in accordance with the decisions of the majority. Instead, Britain and France shirked the issue, and allowed the Duce to assume the role of protector over Austria, whereby he naturally insisted on payment of the price—suppression by Dr. Dollfuss of his Socialist enemies and the instalment in power of the Heimwehr whom he had armed and financed to that end. The new Protocols of Rome, combined with the subjection of Albania to the Italian yoke in the new Tirana agreements, have dangerously increased Italian imperial power in Europe, and brought nearer the attack on Yugoslavia which is now encircled by Italy, Austria, Hungary and Albania. The " Italian course " of the Austrian Government only increases its unpopularity in Austria. Tyrol is bitter over Vienna's friendship with the forces which

annexed and tyrannise South Tyrol. Educated middle-class youth is exasperated by Catholic tyranny. What a field for Nazi propaganda is here!—and it is not neglected. On the other hand, there are Herr Hitler's spectacular triumphs, mesmerising the peasant and the anti-Socialist petty bourgeois.

Is it too late for Great Britain especially, but also France, to grasp what is at stake? Dr. Schuschnigg's tentative advance towards friendship with the Little Entente was promptly checked by the summons to Rome, and the new protocols which enable the Duce to block progress in Danubian rapprochement. Prince Starhemberg was promptly called to heel for having flirted with the same ideas during his brief visit to London and Paris. There are even strange stories afloat that the manner in which the financial plight of the Austrian Phoenix Life Insurance Company (known to the Government for years), which it had been arranged on British advice to correct quietly and discreetly, was violently broadcast to the world during Dr. Schuschnigg's absence in Rome, was due to a Heimwehr plot to discredit him and the Clericals, to get rid of them, and enable the Heimwehr-Fascists to rule alone. The motive is said again to be Italian resentment at the advances to Prague. The counter-stroke, Chancellor Schuschnigg's conscription measure, brushed aside Prince Starhemberg's Fascist militia, and Prince Starhemberg boycotted the celebration parades in consequence.

There is only one way in which Great Britain can really help the Austrian people, and it will cost something. It means the assumption of binding treaties, obligations to defend the independence of a free and democratic Austria, this key position to block German domination of the Balkans and thus of the Suez Canal and our road to the East. It may also cost yet more British money. But, like the Duce, we should be equally entitled to our price for help. That should be nothing less than the complete exclusion of Italian influence, the prompt abandonment of government by the repressive measures summarised above, and the restoration by gradual but rapidly successive stages of democracy and full self-government to the Austrian people, which alone can turn them into a solid block by giving them something worth living for, defending, and in the last resort dying for—liberty.

G. E. R. GEDYE.

PEACE TERMS FOR ABYSSINIA.

THE Italo-Abyssinian conflict has been conducted to an accompaniment of peace-proposals. This was natural enough in a dispute where one side offered peaceful settlement before an international tribunal, and the other refused it, for nine months before the outbreak of war. The various plans must be called "peace-proposals" not "plans of settlement," even when they preceded the Italian invasion. For the earlier schemes were attempts to preserve the peace at the cost of the victim. They were not devised in relation to the merits of the dispute.

The Italian case, produced for the first time on September 4th, 1935, was vast and flimsy. Its grievances against Abyssinia's conduct towards Italy were, almost without exception, obvious falsifications of history. It relied mainly, however, upon descriptions of Ethiopian barbarism. In sober fact it failed entirely to prove any serious ground of complaint against Abyssinia as an African neighbour by African standards. Italy's claim is really expressed in the slogan to which the Duce has debased his people's will. "*A qui Abyssinia? A noi!*"

Italy is quite frankly out on the grab. If any conceivable tribunal of serious people could have believed her case she might have been willing to produce it earlier. The League Council, however, although it has elements of impartiality in some of the smaller, non-interested states, is no tribunal of justice. It is a highly political body of men whose policy is subject to all manner of stresses. Back-scratching on the grand scale is its too-frequent method. As in this dispute. "You scratch my back over the Austrian frontier, and I'll scratch yours over Abyssinia," said M. Laval to Signor Mussolini, in effect. Thus when in August the Council, at last, insisted upon attempting a settlement, it chose a very peculiar method. Britain, France and Italy conferred in Paris. Ethiopia, whose existence was at stake, was not made a party to the negotiations. The arrangement could scarcely have been more pre-Covenant; nor the result a more typical example of the old diplomacy. Mr. Eden described it to the Council on September 4th. France and Britain had proposed that Ethiopia should ask the League for help in reforms. This should be given by France, Britain and Italy, either under a

direct mission of the Council or by a treaty between them and Ethiopia approved by the Council. The reorganisation was to have extended to the whole life of Ethiopia, including economic development, foreign settlement, administration, police, and anti-slavery measures. The assistance, though collective, would have taken particular account of the "special interests of Italy." Territorial adjustments were not examined, but were not excluded. That is, Italy was to rule Abyssinia, with France and Britain as sleeping partners, and the League was to be asked to throw its cloak over annexation in all but name. Italy refused this handsome offer, thus saving Ethiopia the trouble.

That first peace-plan, however, shattered the trust of the League states in the Great Powers as mediators. When the Council on September 6th set up a Committee of Five to seek for a pacific settlement, the idea was received with small liking. The committee was lop-sided. For of its members France, Spain and Poland were pro-Italian, and neither Britain nor Turkey was considered to be judicially-minded. The doings of the Five were systematically "leaked" by its own members. The more leaked out, the uneasier grew the Assembly. Seven of the smaller states alluded to it (though not by name) in the General Assembly debate. Mr. Sandler of Sweden pronounced a warning against injustice and "the danger of sacrificing, in order to secure peace, the legitimate rights of small countries." Portugal observed: "There is one thing I loathe more than war, and that is spoliation by procedure."

On September 24th, under the toppling crest of the wave, the Committee of Five published its report. It was an ingenious scheme, aimed, so it said, at respecting the independence of states members, and at ensuring good neighbourly relations. Ethiopia was to accept voluntarily a Charter of Assistance. Under this, a mission of foreign specialists was to organise the country. (a) A corps of gendarmerie would be responsible for suppressing slavery, regulating the carrying of arms, policing centres in which Europeans resided, "ensuring security in agricultural areas where Europeans may be numerous," and keeping order on the frontiers. The police were to share in the administration. (b) Then the specialists were to organise the possibility for foreigners to take part in economic development—land tenure, mining, commerce, and

industry, to ensure the Open Door, and to arrange public works, communications and posts. (c) They were to control the budget and expenditure, taxes, fiscal monopolies, loans, and also (d) justice, both "mixed courts" and native justice, education, and public health. The specialists were to consist of four principal advisers at the heads of the grouped services given above. A League delegate was to act as their chief. These head advisers were to be appointed by the Council with the consent of the Negus; the rest by the Negus on the nomination of the League delegate. There was to be an annual report by the chief delegate to the League Council, and the whole position was to be reviewed in five years. France and Britain in an annex offered to facilitate territorial adjustments by giving Abyssinia a corridor to the sea, and to recognise a special economic interest of Italy in Ethiopia.

Italy refused the scheme with contumely. It was totally inadequate. The solution should have been to put the racially Amharic state in a position where it could not injure its neighbours, and to rescue its subject races from its rule. An extension of the principle of mandate might have served, but League supervision must be useless in regard to a state which Italy regarded as "her special and most dangerous enemy." A corridor to the sea through the colonies of other states would turn Ethiopia into a "maritime Power," Italy refused it. The Five had not attended to her right, under the 1906 Treaties, to a "territorial junction" through the plateau between Eritrea and Somaliland. Ethiopia accepted the report as a basis of discussion, provided that it respected her integrity and independence, and that the assistance of the League would be "collective and impartial." This was, in fact, just as much a refusal as that of Italy. For the scheme did not respect the independence of Ethiopia. It proposed to subject every department of social and political life—even religion, since education is the affair of the church—to foreign rule. The only shred of self-government left to Abyssinia was the veto of the Negus on the chief advisers. He could, that meant, refuse the first Italian offered him, and the second and the third. But finally he would be forced to accept one. And it was manifest that it would be Italians who would be appointed to all the key positions. The stipulation for "disinterested" aid was thus a complete obstacle. All that Ethiopia agreed to was a discussion of the plan.

The League was not willing even to discuss it—apart from the members of the Committee of Five. The states were as deeply shocked as Britain was later by the Hoare-Laval proposals. It was necessary to be at Geneva to realise this, for the Report, drawn up like an algebraic formula and couched in "officialese," made almost no impression upon the world public. Besides, it was refused before it was published—the Italian and Ethiopian comments were annexed to it. But League delegates are versed in "officialese," and within half an hour of its publication they were saying that this was a plan to dismember Ethiopia, to destroy her independence, and to force her to accept Italian domination. The most pointed criticisms struck the economic clauses, which were designed not to protect the country from European capitalist exploitation, but to further it; and to the phrase about agricultural areas "where European residents may be numerous." That meant Italian colonisation; for there are almost no agricultural European residents to-day. And Italian colonisation meant Italian annexation in ten years, as everybody with the faintest knowledge of African history was aware. A little incident, arranged with the aid of the local gendarmerie, also, no doubt, Italian-officered, and in would march the troops from Eritrea.

The normal procedure would have been for the Council to accept the Report of the Committee of Five, as a statement of principles of settlement, even after the refusal of Italy. But this was impossible. The Council, acting under Article XV, had to be unanimous save for the disputants. And not even the influence of France and Britain could assure that unanimity. Russia and Roumania let it be known that they would vote against the report in Council. So on September 26th Señor de Madariaga read it to the Council, which took no decision on it whatever. A few words of regret that the negotiations had failed, and the plan was buried without flowers. The Council decided to draft a report on the history of the dispute, which was made by its whole membership, and when it came out a week later had a very different tone.

The next peace scheme was the Hoare-Laval proposals. These were no surprise to the world, except, it seems, to Mr. Baldwin. For the "moral mandate" to France and Britain, jumped upon a reluctant Committee of Eighteen by M. van Zeeland of Belgium, was always suspected of covering sinister

designs. Sir Samuel Hoare's phrase about "a settlement satisfactory to Italy, Ethiopia and the League" produced a blasting effect upon the reasonable Continental mind. M. Laval, moreover, published his ideas of a settlement on October 16th in an interview with M. Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador at Paris, and they were substantially the same as the Hoare-Laval plan of December. There is little need to dwell on this plan, so vividly is it branded upon the public memory. Italy was to annex Tigre, the North of the Danakil Plain, most of Ogaden. An Italian chartered company was to rule and exploit the southern uplands of the Empire. The remainder (about a quarter) was to be ruled under a League scheme with special regard to Italian interests. Ethiopia was to be given a corridor to the sea at Assab—with no railway, as it transpired. *The Times*, in a famous leader, called it "The Corridor for Camels."

The storm of protest from the British public was an important historic fact, for it proved that the old Foreign Office supremacy over treaty-making was gone. It ended in the debate in the House of Commons of December 19th when Sir Samuel Hoare was forced by feeling on the Government side to resign, and the Government repudiated the proposals. On the same day, Mr. Eden presented them to the League Council in a speech which as good as begged for their rejection. It was granted with alacrity—attended only by M. Laval's sardonic voice murmuring "Messieurs, un moment de silence!" Two things should, however, be noted in relation to this discreditable episode. It achieved what was M. Laval's main end, the defeat for the time of the oil sanction. Secondly, Sir Samuel Hoare was entirely justified in telling the House that the Italian predominance of the Hoare-Laval proposals was "clearly foreseen in the Charter of Assistance drawn up by the Committee of Five." The Hoare-Laval proposals, in fact, were no worse in kind, but only in degree, than the peace plans which preceded them. And this is a most serious thing. For Mr. Eden, on February 24th, 1936, told the House that the principles of the Report of the Committee of Five, and the machinery of the Committee, must be the basis for any future peace negotiations. Nobody was quick enough or knowledgeable enough to protest, except Sir Archibald Sinclair.

The next development was the Committee of Thirteen, of March 3rd, when Mr. Eden announced that Britain was in

favour of the oil sanction. M. Flandin interposed a plea that the League should once more appeal to the belligerents to make peace. The Committee felt it impossible to refuse, although it was entirely aware that this was one more French move to postpone the oil embargo. For the Committee itself did not offer peace terms, it only asked the combatants if they would accept them. Ethiopia replied yes, if they were within the framework of the Covenant, meaning if they preserved her integrity. Italy replied "Yes, in principle," and continued her invasion with increased ferocity, breaking every law of war, as in beginning it she broke every law of peace. It was understood that M. Flandin had agreed with Signor Mussolini that Italy should put forward extreme claims. The League was bound to reject them, and during negotiations which could be indefinitely prolonged the war could continue and the oil sanction would not materialise.

Herr Hitler, with the Rhineland re-occupation, provided a new and powerful deterrent to settlement. For in order to gain Italian support in vindication of Locarno, French opinion, even that Left opinion which broke Laval largely on the December peace-proposals, demanded the dropping of all sanctions, and the abandonment of Abyssinia to Italy. It is difficult to decide whether such a course would be more morally degraded or politically imbecile. Nothing could hearten Hitler more, in his foraying against treaties, than the spectacle of the Duce getting away with the violation of the Covenant; nor anything impress Germany more with the power of the collective system than the imposition of effective sanctions on an aggressor. But it is ill reasoning with people in a panic. Even the British Government, during the Rhineland crisis, seemed to lose its grip on the Italo-Abyssinian conflict.

It is clear, looking back on the African tragedy, that the League and Britain have had periods of effective power, alternating with periods of nullity. The moments of influence have been those of the policy of collective security and sanctions. The times of ineptitude for the League and discredit for Britain have been those of the peace proposals. The key to these alternations seems to be this—the British Government is genuinely alive, at last, to the need to mobilise collective action against aggression. But it has shown no interest whatever in justice. Its one anxiety has been to

prevent the war, or later, to stop it. If this could be achieved by handing Abyssinia over to Italy, so let it be. The diplomats who have drafted the peace plans do not seem even to have read a book about Africa. They are still imbued with the old predatory agreements between Britain, France and Italy, which planned to divide Abyssinia into "spheres of influence." The Covenant which cancels those agreements and turns us into a guarantor of Ethiopian independence has not moulded the shape of their thought. And when they purport, as in the preamble to the Committee of Five's report, to design the future independence of Ethiopia and her internal reform, what they produce is a plan for her subjection to Italy. So every peace-plan has to be combated by the smaller states, who in Ethiopia see themselves being thrown piecemeal to an aggressor, or by the spontaneous sense of justice of the people.

After all, had the British Government really meant to secure Ethiopian independence, what would have been its first action? Surely, to ask the advice of African experts. There are men like Lord Lugard and Sir Donald Cameron who have grasped and applied the administrative principles which result in healthy development of African peoples. They should have been the British representatives on the Committee of Five, and their instructions should have been to draw up a plan which would have immunised Ethiopia against pressure from without and penetration within. To postulate that the safeguards we make for our own best-governed territories and mandates should be applied to an independent state is a reasonable minimum.

The Negus has stated that he is willing to consider territorial readjustments. This might be done by giving Italy part of Ogaden in exchange for the badly needed port. The territory given to Italy should be held under a mandate from the League. The League should offer, and Abyssinia appoint, expert advisers on police, economics and public health. The police expert should organise order with a view to preventing slavery and slave-raiding, and to regulating the carrying of arms. Economic policy should be aimed at the development of native prosperity in agriculture and commerce, and at preventing European exploitation of the sort which has done so much harm to African peoples elsewhere. With this end in view, alienation of land to non-Africans, or to their agents,

should be forbidden. So should colonisation, in the sense of alien settlement on the land. The sale of natural resources such as lakes, rivers, mines, forests, to aliens should be prohibited, and, if leases are granted for their exploitation, they should be short-term (say twenty-five years), and should reserve the freehold, royalties and a controlling number of shares to the Ethiopian state. The Nile from its source to the Delta should be set under international control, like the Danube or the Rhine.

The League scheme of assistance should be transitory and subject to review each five years. The chief adviser should report to the Permanent Mandates Commission—the League Council is a body peculiarly unfitted to supervise administration. It cannot rid itself of politics, and administration should be examined as a technical, not as a political problem. The League experts should none of them be British, French, or Italian. This is important.

Justice is at stake in this conflict as well as collective security. Indeed, the two are indivisible. If Mussolini is to receive rewards for aggression from the League, at the expense of his victim, the collective system will be proved a failure. Potential aggressors, and particularly the Nazis, will be encouraged to attack their weaker neighbours. More, the idea of subjecting the Ethiopians to the rule of a nation which has tortured their fellows to death with poison gas is too horrible for contemplation.

There is another principle, nearly as vital, in the balance. Ethiopia is the only truly independent African state to-day; for Liberia is mortgaged to American capital. It is essential that one African country should remain free, to grow according to its own genius, without the distortion and inferiority which is inevitably forced upon a race subject to men of different colour, civilisation and stage of development. With all its defects, Ethiopia is an ancient empire, and its sins, such as brutal imprisonment and slave trade, are the sins we practised ourselves scarcely a century ago. Our rule in Africa, in our best administrations, aims at the development of the institutions of the Africans, with a view to their eventual emancipation. If it does not mean this, it means nothing. And it is as a nucleus for free Africa, as well as an earnest of international order, that it is essential that Ethiopia should be given a just settlement.

FREDA WHITE.

THE PACT THAT DISRUPTED PEACE.

THE Franco-Soviet Pact which supplied Herr Hitler with the pretext and the excuse for the repudiation of the Locarno Treaty and brought a trembling Europe once more to the brink of war, is actually very imperfectly understood, either in England, in France or in Germany. The Pact itself is a paradox; the contorted negotiations which preceded its birth and delayed its ratification, while nation after nation completed a *volte face* and others found their foreign policy in a state of topsyturvydom, require to be rescued from the labyrinthine maze, and considered calmly and carefully.

That the Pact should have received ratification in the French Senate is not, in the final analysis, at all surprising. That almost unanimous vote was accorded as a striking and dramatic answer to Herr Hitler's unjustified act of defiance. But for the German occupation of the demilitarised Rhineland zone on March 7th, in flagrant contravention of treaty obligations, it is doubtful whether the French Upper Assembly would have confirmed the Chamber of Deputies' authoritative vote of February 28th. For it must be remembered that quite apart from the strong anti-Soviet feeling among masses of middle-class Frenchmen, who will never forget or forgive what they deem to be Russia's act of treachery at a moment when the French nation and its allies were fighting for their existence, there are thousands of small investors who still bitterly resent that they should have lost in Russia at least 15 billions of gold francs, or the equivalent of 75 milliards of paper francs, without taking into consideration the properties and estates confiscated by the Bolsheviks when they resolved upon their great and spectacular adventure to destroy the world's commercial civilisation.

It is certain that the Soviets themselves never imagined that this Pact would readily gain the approval of the populace. In the small and thrifty towns and villages of France the memory of repudiated debts continues to rankle. The Bolshevik leaders agreed with M. Laval's astute policy of taking time and allowing the idea to sink in and grow and ripen; the idea that a reconciliation with an almost despised Soviet Russia would not merely contribute to the national defence, but would provide a new avenue for the return, within the

next fifteen years perchance, of the vanished millions of public savings. That idea they fostered for two years by an assiduous propaganda on the part of Moscow's paid advocates and agents in France.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has had to sink many prejudices, many intense and ardently held political antipathies, in order to acquiesce in this scheme for an alliance which the fecund brain of M. Herriot conceived, which the brilliant intellect of the late M. Barthou developed and which M. Laval nursed and nurtured until he was thrown out of office. For such a reconciliation implied and enacted an accord with the Bolsheviks' detested foes, the capitalist states of Europe, of whom France was the head and the front of the offending, inasmuch as she had provided sanctuary for the White Russians; had permitted them to plot and conspire against the Union upon her territory; had sent one of her distinguished soldiers, General Weygand, to aid Poland in her defence against Russian aggression; in a word had shown herself still in heart and mind and soul the embodiment of a narrow bourgeois nationalism and the avowed adversary of that anti-capitalist cosmopolitanism which was to liberate the entire world.

Many things had to happen; the wheel of her political destiny had to make a full turn before this deep hostility between the Soviets and the French could be appeased. Since the fateful days of 1918 when, at the little Polish town of Brest-Litovsk on the river Bug, the shameful treaty between Germany and Bolshevik Russia was signed, in the very theatre, so to speak, that three years before had witnessed a sanguinary struggle between these two national signatories, the breach with France had appeared not only to be unbridgeable but actually to grow wider. The Polish-Soviet war of 1920 certainly contributed to that end; the schism grew more transparently obvious in 1922, when, by the Treaty of Rapallo, there was concluded what the French regarded as an unholy alliance between Soviet Russia and a revolutionary Germany. It was especially and particularly offensive to the French people because it was concluded with almost Pecksniffian hypocrisy. It became necessary for Russia to excuse herself in the eyes of the rest of the world, and it became doubly so for Germany to find a justification for a pact historically and traditionally abhorrent.

What was Germany's plea? It is laden with intense interest in view of her more recent attitude to the Franco-Soviet Pact. Stresemann, driven into a position of self-defence by the torrent of criticism which swept and swirled around him, both at home and abroad, deemed it prudent to "broadcast" a justification—or what was conceived as one—in which he avowed that it was Germany's passionate desire to renew "a tradition of friendship, notwithstanding the complete upheaval and reversal of Russian policy and its economic organisation, diametrically opposed to our own." In order to silence his adversaries, Stresemann added: "if the ideas of revolutionary Russia should invade our country, our Government will fight them with the last ounce of its strength. . . . But a difference of opinion as to principles has never compromised the relations of friendly states. Each nation has its own beliefs, its own faiths, its own Credo!" Few people were convinced by this specious and merely timely theorising, France least of all.

Parenthetically it may be remarked that it is somewhat extraordinary to find Herr Hitler objecting to-day to the Franco-Soviet Pact because Moscow and not Paris will determine the condition of its observance. To the average man it seems that France is merely following in 1935-6 the example which Germany set her some years previously. All that, however, is by the way. The outstanding fact is that the "innocuous" Rapallo Treaty, while evoking no open protest from France, enhanced the differences between her and the Soviets. For ten years the antagonism prevailed in more or less degree, on both sides. France watched with ever-anxious eyes as she saw Germany providing money and credits—which should have gone to make reparations in French war-devastated areas—being unceasingly devoted to the realisation of the Bolshevik ideal of industrial reorganisation, to the recruiting and training by Germans of a Red army, to the equipment of technical engineers under German tutelage, to the manning of an air-fleet with German pilots on a grandiose scale and, what is still more important, to a sometimes sullen and sometimes insolent joint resistance to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, distasteful to the German Social Democrats because it was a barrier to the hereditary German lust for territorial trespass, and hateful to the Bolsheviks because it was an effective dam against their

scheme for the overthrow of capitalism among all the other civilised nations of the world. The more closely Socialist-Germany and Soviet Russia cemented their friendship, the more acutely was France antagonised. She witnessed Russia's overt encouragement to Germany in every revisionist and expansionist demand; she watched the united effort of both to sow discord among France's allies and friends. On the part of Russia it was obviously a policy of deliberate provocation. Without making a single gesture to Paris, Moscow resumed her diplomatic relations with Rome. Still ignoring her, she commenced pourparlers with London, and began openly to flirt with Warsaw from whose very doors the Red Army had been driven back ignominiously some years before. When a reconciliation eventually took place between these old and bitter enemies of 1920, the Quai d'Orsay frowned with grave disapproval. So year after year the Franco-Soviet estrangement continued, and appeared likely to continue, had not Fate, which overrules all mutinous accidents, suddenly indulged in a freak, which sent the sworn Socialist and Soviet allies reeling apart, and presaged a *rapprochement* between Bourgeois and Bolshevik.

From the moment that Hitler appeared upon the scene in any degree of magisterial power, the Russo-German friendship evaporated. Hitlerism and Bolshevism were opposite magnetic and electric poles. The contact of their emanations meant an immediately dazzling and dangerous flash. Hitler was and is the arch-enemy of Communism; it is a creed, a tenet, a faith which he loathes, lock, stock and barrel, as he would loathe the devil. On the other hand to the Soviets he is the arch-fiend of oppression; the white-heated anti-Hebraic fanatic, the instigator of pogroms and dreadful persecutions; the assailant of human and racial liberties, the arch-priest of tyranny and the propagandist of a pan-Germanism which will take the smiling and abundant plains of the Ukraine in a stride of possessive aggression.

Thus there came to Moscow a swift realisation that the idyll was at an end. The romance was finished and, as frequently happens in human life, old-time affection had turned to direct hate. And curiously enough the Soviet Union had evolved internally in such a way and with such paradoxical processes that it had become particularly receptive to new influences. It had become less blatantly intransigent in its

relations with other powers ; it had evolved a civic consciousness and a quite definite national pride. The Republics it has built, it claims, are a monument to proletarian sagacity, while the industrial system it has created it believes to be the last word in constructive human organisation. What had thus laboriously been erected was now in danger of destruction. It felt itself assailed on every hand ; threatened in the East, threatened in the West. Nazi Germany had become and remains its implacable foe ; the reconciliation she made some time ago with Poland showed that unmistakably. The abandonment of the Corridor and the making of that accord was another evidence of hostility to Russia. "It was the prologue," said an eminent French diplomat, "of a veritable crusade in which the Soviets are condemned to play the rôle of infidels to European civilisation." Japan on the other hand is both anxious and wishful to come to deadly grips with Russia, and while using Korea and Manchuria as her bases, to go on relentlessly forcing the Red armies back from the Pacific coast, to go on chasing them pitilessly out of Mongolia and to cast them finally into the Siberian wastes.

The danger of war was encircling Soviet Russia and, as was well pointed out recently by a competent international observer, war is Russia's especial curse. It has been a scourge to nearly all the nations of the earth, but it has been a particular and abysmal catastrophe for the ruling power in Russia throughout her history. The Napoleonic wars led to the Decembrist movement which at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I in 1825 plotted to establish a constitutional régime. The historic battles of Alma, Balaclava, Inkermann, the siege of Sebastopol and all the rest of the so-called Crimean Wars imposed dreaded reforms on Alexander II. The disastrous war with Japan had a series of sequels in Bloody Sunday and the other fierce riots of 1905-6. The war of 1914 marked the end of the dynasty. In short, if without a semblance of superstition one traces the history of even successful wars, they have all been dogged by disasters for the prevailing régimes in Russia. The certitude of this fatality in war is inbred in the Russian people. Thus menaced right and left, the Soviet Republics deemed that the hour had come to build a bastion between Russia and her intimidating foes.

To whom could she turn if not to the one country whose policy seemed most likely to afford her the protection she

needed ? France had steadily set her face against any revision of frontiers, against any acts of aggression or invasion calculated to remove the boundary lines fixed at Versailles. To gain her co-operation would mean that there would be no recasting of the map of Europe ; she would prove a bulwark against the threatening "freedom in the East," which had already become a slogan with the Nazi fervents, she would discourage any joint adventure between Germany, Poland and Japan to ensure the failure of the experiment to which the Soviets had given so much of their lives. No matter which way it looked the Soviet Union came to the conclusion that a reconciliation with France was not only desirable but a matter of imperative importance. How was it to be effected ?

The first step was taken when M. Herriot, the leader of the French Radical Party, was invited to Russia in 1932. The seeds of the new Pact were sown during that trip. While not contemplating any return to the pre-war Russian alliance, M. Herriot was quick to perceive that a new accord would have many more widespread advantages for France than a mere augmentation of military strength. On his return he set to work assiduously to convince first his party, then the populace, of the desirability of a new understanding with the Soviets. Some months later, M. Cot, the French Air Minister, paid an aerial visit to the Bolshevist "paradise," and returned deeply impressed with the political potentialities of a renewed friendship. The French Government was not at all averse. A pact would remove the perpetual nightmare of a separate Russo-German alliance, tending to the disruption of Poland and the most positive discomfiture to France's friends of the Little Entente.

Thus hands were mutually extended and clasped across the chasm. The Soviets were anxious for an immediate agreement of amity. They wanted to go further in this direction than the Quai d'Orsay had even contemplated ; they were so insistent that they almost induced the then Foreign Minister, M. Paul-Boncour, to give his assent to a great and comprehensive alliance, with heavy commitments for France. Happily he applied the brake in time. Already, at the very contemplation of a *rapprochement* the journals of the Right and indignant deputies had commenced to scream aloud the enormities of the Red Terror, the perfidy of the Communist betrayal, and the danger of a Red contagion. Instead of

rushing heedlessly forward with the project, France's Minister of Foreign Affairs proceeded to lay the foundations of the Pact, and to indicate that Russia's best and quickest course to attain her goal would be *via* the League of Nations.

The latter suggestion was strongly emphasised by M. Barthou, when he succeeded M. Paul-Boncour at the Quai d'Orsay; for he had a great and startling ambition, that of welding a chain of amity which should start at London, take in Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade, Bucarest and others in its span and finish at Moscow—all within the framework of the League. The links in this golden chain were to be defensive or mutual assistance pacts between nations designed to afford mutual guarantees against aggressions, and the maintenance of frontiers. M. Barthou held that any attempt to readjust boundary lines would lead to insensate quarrels. "You cannot dispossess a country of territory which has been ceded to her without evoking the passion out of which worse wars spring," he said. Thus his chain of pacts which he called "The Eastern Locarno" was essentially intended to maintain the *status quo*. It was to be made as comprehensive and as far-flung as possible. It was to embrace all nations and men of goodwill. Thus the inclusion of the three Baltic States, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, meant that Soviet Russia would need to say adieu permanently to any ideas of expansion in the direction of the Baltic, and that Germany's little annexation schemes along the same road would need to be definitely abandoned. Similarly the too ardent Polish desires to embrace an unwilling Ukraine would have been nipped in the bud. Czechoslovakian unity would have been ratified; the Treaty of Riga would have become sacrosanct for Russia, and a Franco-German peace would have been assured. That was the Barthou dream: a collective plan in which every nation in the world could have co-operated on terms of complete equality. The peace of Europe, as he envisaged it, was to be secured by two splendid watchdogs: the Eastern Locarno and the Western Locarno.

Unhappily the Barthou idea was never carried to fulfilment, but he was at least spared the unhappy sight of seeing one of the guarantors of peace, the Western Locarno, so violated as to be rendered inefficient for all subsequent work. He lived long enough to realise vividly two important things: that neither Germany (nor Poland under the latter's influence)

was prepared to come into the Pact, but that Russia and the Little Entente states were to provide the means of giving the pacific idea its greatest momentum.

From the moment that M. Laval stepped into the shoes of the murdered Minister, he attempted to emulate his policy. He saw that, while a reconciliation with Soviet Russia would be an entirely different thing from the friendship of 1892 and from the Russian alliance as it existed up till 1917, because geographical conditions had altered, there were very plain advantages to be derived from it. True, now that there was no longer any common frontier between Germany and Russia, and that Poland was the buffer between them, the military assistance which Russia could offer in the case of a combat with Germany would be less than it might have been in 1892. But there still remained the definite asset of having available a powerful auxiliary air-force capable of long-distance flying, and of having as an ally a country capable of enormous effort in providing munitions. Besides on the strategic side there are other advantages that France and her allies would have if Russia was called to come to the common rescue.

The Pact ratified recently by both Chambers did not assail the Locarno Pact. On the contrary it extended the same excellent principles of mutual assistance to the East. It provided a wide-open door and a cordial invitation to Germany to come in and share the warm shelter which the Pact afforded. It was tentatively signed on May 2nd, 1935. Twenty-one days later the German Chancellor declined that invitation, in a speech to the Reichstag. "The Government of the Reich will sign no treaty which appears to it unexecutable, but every treaty freely concluded, even had it been signed before my advent to power, will be observed. Consequently I will respect all the obligations of the Locarno Treaty as much as the other signatories to that Pact." It was obvious, therefore, that twenty-one days after the Laval-Potemkine pact binding France and Russia was concluded, Herr Hitler saw no objection to it and solemnly renewed his pledges of fealty to the contractual engagements of Locarno.

One is regretfully driven to the conclusion that, determined to launch his *coup de force* as a spectacular internal distraction and as a dramatic reassertion of his country's rights in the teeth of ever-increasing external difficulties, the Chancellor seized upon the Pact as a pretext, just as he might have seized

upon any other that would have served his purpose as well. The arbitrament of the High Court of The Hague was always available to sustain the validity of Germany's claim, had he honestly believed that she had any sound grounds for the contention that Locarno had been violated. Indeed, that very provision was one upon which both Luther and Stresemann at different times in the Locarno negotiations had strenuously insisted. But once more Herr Hitler preferred to act first and to argue over the justice or otherwise of the act afterwards. Thus the Pact intended, rightly or wrongly, by the French statesmen who have followed the regretted Briand the Peacemaker at the Quai d'Orsay, to supplement and implement the security which Locarno was supposed to give to a fatigued and well-nigh exhausted Europe, has proved the instrument through which another unfortunate disruption of the peace can come at any moment.

W. WALTER CROTCH.

JAPAN'S NEW CABINET AND THE TOKYO MURDERS.

SO peculiarly fortified is the position of the Japanese Army that the assassinations of February 26th won it further ground in its contest with the forces of moderation. In dictating the composition of the new Cabinet the military authorities reaped their profit from the outrage committed by the junior officers they failed to hold in check. Undoubtedly the outlay was heavy. Five of the seven War Councillors, including Generals Araki, Masaki and Hayashi, were forced to resign; the brigade and regimental commanders of the units which took part in the rising were retired; many other resignations were handed in, and both War Office and General Staff were subjected to sweeping changes of personnel. But the attitude of the Army to domestic and foreign affairs remains what it was, while the new Cabinet is more in accord with the official military views than the old.

Mr. Koki Hirota, the new Prime Minister, has won respect abroad, first as Ambassador to The Hague and Moscow, and then as Foreign Minister in the Saito and Okada Cabinets. Though he shares the faith of practically all his countrymen in Japan's great imperial future, the motto he avows is *festina lente*. He might have been expected to have incurred the wrath of the impetuous jingoes. But he was not apparently among those marked down for death. His association with such patriotic organisations as the Black Sea Society and the Society of the Foundations of the State has created for him a reputation for patriotic zeal which has not been seriously marred by his necessarily slow labours as a diplomat. Though his negotiations with the U.S.S.R. have been distinguished by moderation, he made pronouncements while at the Foreign Office not displeasing to those ardent advocates of what is called "positivism" in Japan, who continued to protest under the Saito and Okada ministries that their country was still tamely submitting to the bullying of the other Powers. Far more than his less vigorous predecessor in the Premiership, Admiral Okada, he appeals to those who clamour for "action." Significantly enough, in an interview given to foreign newspaper correspondents on March 25th, while emphasising his pacific intentions, he referred to Japan's "great mission to stabilise East Asia" and described the new

Cabinet's foreign policy as expeditious, positive and independent.

Mr. Hirota, naturally, is not everything the Army might have desired. To them a general would have been the most acceptable Prime Minister, but it would have been too much to ask of Prince Saionji to recommend to the Emperor a member of the body responsible for the late Cabinet's violent end. In constructing his Cabinet Mr. Hirota at once showed the extent of his divergence from the military leaders. For the post of Foreign Minister he proposed to recommend Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, former Ambassador to Italy. Mr. Takukichi, a Minseito leader, and Mr. Ohara, Education Minister and Minister of Justice respectively in the Okada Government, he proposed to recommend for reappointment. Also to be included in the Cabinet were Mr. Shimomura, Vice-President of the *Asahi* office, and one or two other party men. None of these proposed appointments was to the Army's taste: Mr. Yoshida was suspected of lack of sympathy with the Army's desire for a "positive" policy; Mr. Takukichi was a party man and a member of the more liberal party at that; Mr. Shimomura, as a high official of the newspaper office the mutineers had tried to wreck, was likewise identified with liberalism; and Mr. Ohara, the Minister of Justice, had been lax in the military attack last year on Dr. Minobe, whose theory of the Constitution, stressing the strictly legal character of the Emperor's powers, was officially condemned as heretical though its author was allowed to go unpunished for the *lèse-majesté* the military men claimed he had committed. Accordingly, the Army brandished the powerful weapon the great military *Genro*, Prince Yamagata, had forged for them in the law of 1894; since the Minister of War is always a soldier on the active list, by withholding him until their wishes are fulfilled they can destroy an embryo Cabinet. General Terauchi, the prospective War Minister, refused to accept office unless the Cabinet were altered to meet the Army's requirements. Mr. Hirota had no course open but to decline the Premiership or to acquiesce. He acquiesced. With Dr. Hayashi at the Ministry of Justice, the Home Office headed by a non-party man, Dr. Ushio, and the Foreign and Education portfolios temporarily in the keeping of Mr. Hirota himself and the Home Minister, the Army consented to the formation of the new Cabinet. Later, after Mr. Hirota had

conducted a search among candidates for office who might meet with military approval, Mr. Hachisaburo Hirao was appointed Minister of Education and Mr. Hachiro Arita Foreign Minister. In the remaining key-position in the Cabinet Dr. Eiichi Baba, Minister of Finance, is committed to a break with Takahashi's alleged parsimony, but has tried to reassure the financiers that there will be no break with his sound money policy; increased revenue will be found to provide for further expansion of the fighting services, almost certainly by increased taxation.

The new Cabinet may be expected to take steps, therefore, towards meeting the four points in the Army's programme:

1. Vindication of the national polity.
2. Stabilisation of the livelihood of the nation.
3. Strengthening of the national defence.
4. Reform of foreign policy.

The nebulous terms in which this policy is couched, however, will create new problems; further friction between civil and military authorities must sooner or later arise over its interpretation. Is it possible for Japan's foreign policy to become even more "positive and independent" than it has already been without the most serious danger of war? What will be the extent of the Army's demands for national defence, and will even Dr. Baba be prepared to meet them? How far is the present economic order to be reformed to alleviate the agricultural distress? Only the first point seems unambiguous. "Vindication of the national polity" means, first, the extirpation of the Minobe theory and similar "liberal heresies," and, secondly, the promotion of patriotic mysticism based on the identification of State with Emperor. Thus the assault against what the Army regard as pernicious Western doctrines will now be undertaken by the State itself.

To this extent the young officers did not sacrifice themselves for their cause in vain. If the mutiny fell somewhat short of achieving the ambitious object proclaimed in the manifesto of "rooting out the traitors destroying the national structure" and many moderate men, such as Admiral Okada and Prince Saionji, were fortunately spared, it at least succeeded in jolting Government policy into a direction facing the officers' grievances, which during the last few months had assumed an exceptionally acute form. The winter had, as

usual, intensified the distress in the agricultural districts. About eighty per cent. of the Japanese Army being recruited from the farming classes, the young officers were naturally disgruntled by the Government's inability in providing relief, the more so since the celebrated Army pamphlet of October 1934 suggested a radical reorganisation of the national economy. The failure of the Government, again, to maintain the glory of the Manchurian adventure by lustrous successes in North China and Mongolia left a feeling of frustration that not only demanded a protest but prompted violent expression. Further, the victory of the Minseito, the more moderate party, at the recent General Election confirmed the Government in power and promised a continuation of a policy that was "positive" only in Mr. Takahashi's annual battles with the War and Navy Ministers over the Budget.

Most urgent and immediate of the causes of the outbreak, however, was the trial of Lieut.-Colonel Aizawa for the murder last August of Lieut.-General Nagata, Inspector-General of Military Education. Colonel Aizawa had confessed to the murder but pleaded in defence that the previous Inspector-General, General Masaki, had been forced to give way to Nagata through the influence of civilians with no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Army. The case gave rise to excitement verging on hysteria, particularly among young officers indignant at the alleged usurpation of the Imperial prerogative and sympathetic with the defendant's motive. Publicity was given to the rift in military circles between two main groups: the moderates, led by such men as Generals Hayashi and Watanabe, and the more radical Araki-Masaki-Doihara group which, standing much closer to the young officers' movement, appeared to be losing its grip on affairs. On February 26th General Masaki was summoned to appear before the Court Martial and left it in high dudgeon, apparently on the ground that the Imperial sanction was necessary before he could give evidence. Within twenty-four hours the mutiny broke out, and Lieut.-General Watanabe, Nagata's successor as Inspector-General and heir to his policy, was assassinated. So efficient was the execution of the plot and so many troops did it involve that it must have been planned well beforehand, but that it occurred precisely when it did was no mere coincidence in time.

Even the determination of the young officers to hit back at

opponents both within the Army and without, whom they considered to be frustrating their dearest aspirations, does not suffice to explain the vehemence of the reply. Nor does it explain the fantastic nature of the manifesto. Linked up with the more material reasons for the patriotic assassinations that have so heavily punctuated Japan's recent history are ideological reasons too deep for the redress of material grievances to remove. Political assassination flourishes in Japan not because of repression—the Communists, who are the most repressed of the extreme groups, are the least addicted to the practice—but because the ultra-patriots believe it is honourable, because they meet with indulgence and evoke widespread sympathy even from normal law-abiding citizens.

This outlook is, in essence, a survival of the feudal era. Faced after 1854, through the impact of the Western Powers, with the urgent necessity of welding the discrete feudal units into a homogeneous nation, Japan destroyed her feudal structure practically at a blow. In 1871 the clans and castes were declared abolished and in 1889 the construction of the modern nation-state was consummated by the promulgation of the present Constitution. So rapid a change was not to be accomplished without the payment of a price—the lag of thought behind the new political machinery. Legislation could abolish the medieval order, but not the medieval code; the Constitution could not of itself breed constitutional habits. And so far from vainly attempting to sweep away the warriors' ethic, *Bushido*, the educationists of the Meiji Era took it over and through the compulsory schools and conscript Army used it to indoctrinate the new citizen body.

Admirable as are many of *Bushido's* precepts in the abstract, its vices, judged by modern standards, are only with difficulty separable from its virtues; in the feudal stories through which it is propagated loyalty is almost invariably expressed through private feuds and bloodshed, and the ideal of the noble life too often tends to assume a character irreconcilable with modern constitutional government. Best known among these stories is the *Chushingura*, the tale of the forty-seven Ronin who, having sworn to avenge their dead lord, after years of patient preparation and hardship fulfilled their object, and thereupon, having satisfied their honour, satisfied the law by committing *seppuku*. To-day in the cinemas, on

the stage, in popular magazines and novels, this *chambara* theme of slaughter enjoys the widest of appeals.

A second legacy from Japan's Middle Ages, related to and greater than *Bushido*, has even more profoundly affected the thinking of the nation—*Shinto*. For centuries the tradition of the Emperor's sacred character had been fostered and the religious devotion of the people centred in his person. This devotion, which has proved the inspiration of the modern nation, has not ceased to provide its simple-minded fanatics. There are still some to-day who would justify the assassination of the Education Minister, Arinori Mori, on the very day the Constitution was proclaimed because he had lifted a curtain at the sacred shrine of Ise to look into a room forbidden to all save the Emperor.

Already held in such deep reverence, the Emperor attracted after the destruction of the feudal organisation the samurai's loyalty to his clan-lord. Clan-loyalty expanded into national loyalty, merging with the older, vaguer patriotism and endowing it with virility and substance. The feudal idea of *personal* service was not lost, for service to an abstract State was beyond the understanding of those who knew only the meaning of service to a physical individual. Hence the new State was from the first identified with the Emperor and patriotism continued to mean loyalty to the Imperial person. As governments in the past had usurped the Imperial powers, it has proved no easy task to combat the feeling especially prevalent among young military officers, who deem themselves *par excellence* the inheritors of the samurai tradition and the personal followers of the Emperor, that a Government nominally but freely appointed by him as a constitutional monarch is usurping his powers now.

With the continuance of this feeling the stories of the great "loyalists" of the past suggest an unfortunate medium of expression. Of all heroes in Japanese history, Takamori Saigo is the most cherished and admired. One of the leaders of the Meiji Restoration of 1867, he was responsible ten years later for the last of the great clan rebellions against the Government to vindicate, as he claimed, the true interests of the Emperor. Being defeated, he committed *seppuku*. His undiminished appeal even to the younger intelligentsia most closely in contact with Western thought is evidenced by the answers to the questionnaire given to students of the Tokyo

Imperial University last summer. Saigo emerged easily the most popular figure, receiving nearly twice as many votes as his runner-up, who was, strangely enough, Goethe. Still better an illustration, perhaps, of the power of his example over the present generation was given immediately after the February assassinations by several primary school teachers who, when asked by their pupils whether the rebels were in the right, were unable to give an answer.

Within such a circumscribing wall of indigenous Japanese ideals a select few in direct contact with Western thought have laboured courageously to sow the seed of Western liberalism. Bearing in mind the strength of the forces against them, what should have been surprising was the apparent success of their efforts after the Great War. What also should have been surprising was not that the murders of their leaders were so many, but that they were so few. The comparative peacefulness of the transition to party government augured well—until the Manchurian incident of September 18th, 1931. War and the necessity of national unity rallied the forces of reaction. The murders of Dan, Inouye and Inukai were but the prelude to an epidemic of attempts at assassination. After the Manchurian campaign was over the Army prolonged the feeling of national danger by its propaganda on the coming crisis of 1935-6. Last year, as the tension was relaxing, the attack on Dr. Minobe once more stirred the zealots and the impetus thereby given to the revival of the reactionary doctrine of the national structure was directly behind the February mutiny. The task of the new Government is therefore beset with difficulties; it cannot remove the roots of violence though it may appease the ultra-patriots by satisfying the Army's demands; on the extent to which it finds itself able to do so depends largely the internal peace of Japan. Let us hope that that peace can be maintained without jeopardising the peace of the world.

JOHN W. PALMER.

Note.—April 20th. Since the above was set up in the press I have received a number of letters expressing the horror the murders have aroused even in those sections of the Japanese public which had warmly sympathised with the motives of Inukai's assassins. If extremists will in future be less confident of public acclamation the murders will have had one salutary effect; but it is an unpleasant reflection that only through such catastrophes are lessons taught.

MAPS FOR POLITICIANS.

TO view the international crisis from successive countries reveals it to be, not merely a conflict of interests, but a conflict of doctrines. Men are divided, not merely by facts, but by the different ways they look at facts. The different nations have, as it were, different maps of historical reality, and they see in historical events as they occur just what they have been accustomed to look for in their maps. It would be a good thing if there were a vigorous international exchange in these maps. England, as one might expect, allows freer import of them than most other countries do. Whereas, for example, there are in England some enthusiastic salesmen of the Italian map, nobody in Italy could traffic in the English map except at his peril. The Italians are taught to look upon the world of nations as a world of conflicting wills and forces in which the "younger" and more vigorous peoples make their future at the expense of the decadent and barbarous. Nobody in Italy seems to look at international politics except from the angle of conflict, courage, and *raison d'état*. To return from Italy to England is to re-enter a different world. The English air is thick with juristic and ethical discussion. What follows from a breach of the Covenant? Do sanctions mean war, or are they police action? Is the use of force morally justifiable? When is it justifiable? These questions rend the leadership of the Labour Party. Archbishops pronounce upon them. Canons give answer. Public meetings support one side or another, and sometimes both sides at once. An Italian would conclude that England was mad. He would be wrong. England is merely mediæval.

The English are mediæval because of their intense pre-occupation with justice. Mr. Lansbury leads off like Tertullian. "Shall the son of peace take part in battle," asks Tertullian, "when it does not even become him to sue at law?" Mr. Lansbury does not go quite so far as this. He does not repudiate the *civitas terrena* in its every aspect, for he accepts the judicial and police power of the organised state. This makes his position difficult to maintain in logic, as recent discussions in the Labour Party have shown. The history of the Christian Church showed centuries ago that Tertullian's position, although more satisfactory in logic, can hardly be

maintained in life. All Christians agreed that God was sovereign in the universe, and that the law of God and of Nature was the fundamental law of human society, revealed to man by God-implanted reason and conscience. But man had been tempted by the devil. Man had fallen. The law of God and of Nature no longer ruled the world in unblemished perfection. What should the Christian do about it? Tertullian would have him separate himself from the world. A more positive and realistic and militant Christianity, like St. Augustine's, insisted that he must play his part in redeeming the world to God's purposes. Instead of renouncing the world, he must attempt an organic transformation of the world. He must struggle to make the law of God *lex animata in terris*. He must accept the stern necessities of practical life and give them a deeper significance by subduing them to the dictates of the moral reason. Government and property were necessary *propter lapsum*. So was war. A society seeking to guide itself by divine and natural law could not permit power to flout justice. Justice must arm itself with power. St. Augustine therefore set himself to the task of defining *bellum justum*. The fathers of the Church followed his lead. The glossators commented on the fathers. Thus there arose an impressive body of moral and juristic definition. A "Roman" war, a war of Christians against infidels, was just. A "judicial" war, a war of Christians fighting with the authority of a judge against other Christians, was just. A war of Christians against Christians without the authority of a judge was "presumptuous." A war of Christians against Christians in defiance of the law was "temerarious." A war of Christians fighting unwillingly in their own defence was "necessary," and therefore just. And so on.

Underlying all these definitions and distinctions was the assumption that human society was a unity which reflected the unity of God, and that all earthly power, so far from constituting its own law, was *sub deo et lege*. Justice was supreme over princes. But who would judge between princes? The Papacy failed to make good the extreme claims of certain Popes. Philip the Fair of France asserted that he was emperor in his own kingdom. Modern states emerged, building their power on the new economy of money exchange between city and country, between city and city. They found themselves in conflict with one another. In the schools,

doctors and masters continued to classify and label. Reality was escaping their definitions. Somebody has compared late mediæval political and juristic doctrine to the *mappa mundi* in Hereford Cathedral. It is a beautiful map, a comprehensive and confident statement of geographical theory: unfortunately, it is not very much concerned with the actual shapes of land and sea. The practical Italian sailors who were ushering in the new age of discovery had no use for maps of this kind. They made their own *portolani*—exact charts of real coasts, compiled from their own observation and experience. Italian political thinkers acted like Italian navigators. Machiavelli and Guicciardini ignored the political map-making of the theologians and canonists. It was meaningless to them. In order to find their way through historical circumstances they drew plans of a different kind. These are the plans which the Italians are using to-day. Mussolini has more than once confessed himself a student of Machiavelli. But it is not necessary to imagine that Mussolini has crammed his head with book-learning and by painful study mastered Machiavelli's rules. There was no necessity. Quite naturally, he sees the world in the same way. It is a map of renaissance draftsmanship which guides him as he beats or threads his way through the thickets of actual politics.

Of course, Mussolini is not the only statesman and the Italians are not the only people who use Machiavelli's map. Historians as diverse as Acton and Sorel have asserted that no student of modern history can do without it. No more can any modern statesman do without it. It is an astonishingly clear and accurate statement of what we now call "power politics." Machiavelli's immediate purpose was to provide a guide for the politics of his own day; but since he held the opinion that human nature and circumstance undergo no essential change, he naturally believed that his guide possessed more than a local and temporary interest. The experience of the last four centuries has proved him right. At no time during this period has it been possible to roll up Machiavelli's map. In all essentials it reveals the structure of international politics during the last hundred years no less faithfully than it illuminated the politics of Renaissance Italy. Security, competitive armament, balance of power, subsidiary alliance, preventive war, intervention, compensation—all these familiar landmarks of modern diplomatic history were noted by

Machiavelli. The most remarkable thing of all in Machiavelli's map is the ease with which it receives new detail. Machiavelli himself expected new discovery. He took it for granted that nothing in this world could stand still. He would not have been surprised by the military time-table of the pre-war years, or the air time-table which is beginning to appear to-day; he would have recognised that the scale of his map had altered, but that its essential design remained unchanged. The economic content of power politics would have been equally intelligible to him. Already in the sixteenth century he knew about population pressure as a cause of wars; he would not have found it hard to understand the scramble for raw materials and markets, and competitive foreign lending, and all the other "economic aspects of sovereignty."

What is it that makes Machiavelli's map so extraordinarily useful? Are there any limits to its usefulness? Both questions need to be asked; but the second may be postponed a little. Machiavelli himself has given the answer to the first. What he tried to do, as he repeatedly asserted, was to expel the word "ought" from the vocabulary of political science. This is what Bacon praised him for doing. Let us be thankful to Machiavelli and writers of this kind, said Bacon, who explain to us not what men ought to do, but what they actually do. Machiavelli tried to found politics upon experience; he wanted, as he said in the Prince, to write something of practical use. In his view, the notion of moral obligation was completely useless. It did not in fact determine the actions of rulers. The theologians could keep on saying, as they had said for centuries, that princes ought to keep faith. No doubt the theologians were right from their point of view. But their point of view had nothing to do with the world as it was. "There's a certain prince of our time," said Machiavelli, "whom it's best not to name; he preaches incessantly peace and good faith, and he's the arch-enemy of both; and if he had kept either it would have cost him his reputation and his kingdom." A man who wished to be good had better keep out of politics; he had best enter a monastery. Princes should learn how not to be good. Why? Because God's justice did not rule the world. This was the central assumption of Machiavelli's thought. He never expounded it systematically, but it was present on almost every page of his multitudinous writings. His iconoclasm was all the more

terrific because it was so matter-of-fact. He did not defy God. He did not dethrone justice. He simply took it for granted that God was absent, that the seat of justice was empty. He had his own pagan deities. *Necessità* was supreme ruler of the world; she fixed the limits of human achievement, she set the actual problems which men had to tackle. *Virtù*, the courage and cunning and will of man, made history under the pressure and lash of necessity. *Fortuna* played her constant and incalculable part. Luck was half the story of human action.

What sort of map was Machiavelli making now? Was it still the precise and detailed chart of the capes and promontories and rocks and currents of historical circumstance? Surely his cartography had got a little wild. While he was charting a current, it had swept him all unawares out to sea. He had projected his small-scale observations across eternity. He too had composed a *mappa mundi*. For a universe ruled by the moral reason he had substituted a universe ruled by capricious power. Despite all his attempts at realism he showed himself at last (like all the *realpolitikers* who followed him) a doctrinaire. After all, one has to have doctrines. One sees nothing without a point of view. Machiavelli's point of view was no whit less arbitrary than that of his predecessors whom he despised. The word "ought" crept back into his histories and treatises. A prince ought to break faith. A prince ought to be ruthless. A prince ought to be a hypocrite. Machiavelli did not succeed in separating ethics from politics; he simply changed the ethics. He did not succeed in substituting the method of experience for the method of abstraction; he read experience differently. He called a new world into being to redress the balance of the old; but he overweighted the balance and lost himself in a fantastic universe. After all, a universe without rational purpose is plain crazy. Machiavelli's reckless universalising of actual historical lawlessness projected this craziness back even into his own limited field of detailed observation. For example: he observed that a free commonwealth founded upon justice was more powerful than an arbitrary despotism: witness republican Rome, whose virtues he ardently desired to recreate in his own Italy. Yet, according to his philosophy, power was reality, justice illusion. How could he possibly found a reality upon an illusion? All that he could in consistency

offer was his puerility about "seeming good"—in modern terms, pretence and propaganda. This did not satisfy his fundamentally honest mind. He knew in his heart that Roman duty and devotion were real. So he threw consistency to the winds, and called in as founders of his ideal commonwealths legendary benefactors miraculously endowed with real goodness. He went outside his own map.

In general, it is probably true to say that the mediæval view of reality persisted among philosophers and poets and common people (witness the trouncing of a caricatured Machiavelli on the Elizabethan stage) whereas the renaissance view was accepted, often unconsciously, by statesmen and historians. But the renaissance view also made conquests among moralists and lawyers. Its progress may be traced by the decline of the doctrine of *bellum justum*. The Catholic jurist Suarez, writing in the sixteenth century, still denounced as a pagan error the idea that the rights of states rested on the force of arms. If power sufficed to justify war, he argued, then any state could engage in war according to its judgment of expediency, and all wars would be lawful on both sides; which was absurd. A contemporary of Suarez, Molina, no longer saw the absurdity. There was "excusable" ignorance. There was "probable" justice. This was enough for the disciples of Machiavelli. I have ordered my troops to march, said Frederick; the question of justice is a matter for my ministers. All that now remained of the mediæval idea of a law above princes was a collision of tendentious legalisms, each power asserting the justice of its own will and impugning the good faith of its opponent. The prince must still "seem good." But there was no standard of goodness. *Bellum justum* disappeared in the war of everyman against everyman where nothing could be unjust. The international lawyers, after Grotius, put up a pitifully weak resistance. Machiavelli's doctrine crept into their science. Their doctrine of sovereignty, in its extreme perversions, was nothing other than Machiavelli's Prince translated into a legal concept. It detached law from justice and deduced it entirely from commanding power. It therefore removed, with a completeness which no mental wriggling could conceal, the very foundation of a law between nations. "In the last resort," affirmed the English lawyer Hall, "almost the whole of the duties of states are subordinated to the right of self-preservation." Here is an

admirably concise statement of Machiavelli's thesis. Another English jurist has thus commented on it. "Such statements would destroy the imperative character of any system of law of which they were true, for they make all obligation to observe the law merely conditional; and there is hardly any act of international lawlessness which, taken literally, they would not excuse." *

Machiavelli, the last sentence suggests, has not had everything his own way. Of late years, particularly in America and Great Britain and the northern countries of Europe, moralists and jurists and even statesmen have unrolled the mediæval map again. A popular cry among English and American writers is "Back to Grotius." Grotius stood between two worlds of thought, between mediæval idealism and modern empiricism: he understood the new political forces but he attempted to control them by the old standard of natural justice. Contemporary lawyers who similarly wish to recognise actual circumstance, yet without surrendering the notion of obligation, sometimes express this twofold aim in the phrase, "Natural law with a varying content." This current of legal philosophy runs in the same direction as the popular aspiration and political contrivance which made the League of Nations. It cannot be dismissed as "unreal." Manifestly it is a rational way of regarding history and is a force capable of affecting the direction of history. Its danger lies in its tendency to abstract intellectualism and formal legalistic morality. It tends to be too readily satisfied with logical disputations upon problems which press upon men with urgent intensity in life. This was the fatal flaw which provoked the Machiavellian reaction against mediæval morality grown abstract and arid. Contemporary idealism is challenged to live up to its own profession and give full weight to the "varying content" of historical circumstance to which it pays lip-service.

It is not yet possible to dispense with either map, the mediæval map or the renaissance one. One can of course imagine the perfect rational society where everything fits neatly into a single rational design. That society would be a

* J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations* (Oxford, 1929), p. 159. Brierly quotes *Rex v. Dudley and Stephens*, 1884 (a case against two shipwrecked mariners who had eaten the cabin-boy) to show that English law does not admit an absolute right of self-preservation.

federation of nations living peacefully under a universally accepted rule of law which never found itself in jarring discord with justice. Mediæval thinkers charted the outline of such a society. This was not an unpractical thing to do. The Christian fathers and canonists contributed a standard, an idea of purpose and direction which humanity dare not surrender. Their *mappa mundi*, despite its intimidating appearance of lofty vastness, has a habit of becoming relevant at important turning-points in man's journey through history. It is relevant now, more relevant than Machiavelli's *portolano*, to the actual historical development of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is not entirely useless for the history of the concert of Europe. It is necessary for an understanding of the League. But Machiavelli's map is also necessary. There are power politics at Geneva as well as in other places. Men fought with "the methods of beasts," not so long ago, even in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Mediæval moralists saw chiefly the rational purposes of men; Machiavelli saw the pressures which drive them. The good statesman has to see both. This means that he must trust God and keep his powder dry. . . . Well, perhaps it is not wise to introduce at the end of this essay a new metaphor, particularly one which is likely to frighten tender consciences with its smell of brimstone. So let all politicians, both professional and amateur, set out with both maps, the one chiefly for general direction, the other chiefly for the precipices and avalanches and raging torrents which may sweep them to destruction. And let them not forget that maps are a necessary aid to a journey but that they are not the journey itself.

W. K. HANCOCK.

THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF THE STATE.

PEOPLE with an awakened sense for the trend of events, and the man in the street, realised as far back as 1918 that the moulds in which life had been cast in the pre-war period were scrapped and done with, that the social and economic order inaccurately and misleadingly called "Capitalism" was going to collapse, and that the world would have to find its way to socialism, or rather to some form of socialism. The boom period which history has shown to follow every war concealed the actual trend of development from cursory view for a few short years. Impressed by America's prosperity, many people in Europe believed in the possibility of re-establishing the hegemony of private interest in the economic sphere. It is a notable fact that it was precisely the best of the French economic thinkers who remained distrustful of the American system even in the time of its greatest success, and who were the first, after its collapse in 1929, to demand the revision of our conception of normal economic conditions; the boom of 1925 to 1929 would never recur, still less the pre-war prosperity, and we should have to adjust ourselves to a much lower standard of living than that regarded as normal for the future—thus Frenchmen, the recognised guardians of individualist traditions. Apart from the short period of self-deception covered by the post-war boom, the history of the last decade and a half has been that of the struggle of socialisms of all kinds against the liberal-individualistic economic conceptions prevailing among the older generation and more particularly in commercial and industrial circles, and of the struggle between the different forms of socialism.

Socialism as Economic Senility or Rejuvenation. The reasons for the world-wide transition from an economic system based on private initiative to a system based on more or less overt public control are numerous, the most important and most relentless of these being the compulsory cessation of the previous expansion. Just as, in contrast to the days of the discoverers, we now have to reckon with fixed boundaries, so also can we only reckon with relatively limited markets when calling new productive plant into being. And to this the further fact must be added, that the war brought about

a displacement of the world's production, and that the earlier privileges of the white races in the matter of the technique of production have ceased to exist. Not only the gigantic economic development of Japan which we are witnessing at the present time, but also the economic crises and problems which have arisen within the British Empire, prove that Europe and America no longer hold a monopoly of modern production. There are, of course, still almost endless possibilities for the development of the world's markets, and for raising the level of civilisation and with it the consuming capacity of whole regions of the earth with their vast populations. But at the same time the example of red Russia shows us that the peoples which embark on such development are inclined and able to do so independently of our production, with their own labour and their own resources. And this brings us at once to a further reason for the tendency to shift the economic centre of gravity from the private to the public sphere, and that is that it is precisely in the war of technical equipment that the peoples of the world have come to realise the importance of economic factors for their military and political power; they now know that both self-sufficiency as to agricultural products and raw materials and also the possession of up-to-date industries are indispensable to them if they are to have any voice at all in world politics. It is recognition of this fact which has led the small states of Europe, and more particularly those comprised in the basin of the Danube, to do what is admittedly irrational economically and to set up their own industrial machinery of production instead of co-operating with the neighbouring industrial countries on the principle of division of labour.

Thus we have already passed the end of the period of wild expansion in which a capable manufacturer could start producing wherever he chose, and would keep on finding a market for what he produced. This fact, together with the natural tendency for capital to accumulate and to become concentrated at certain points, calls of necessity for the concentration and planning of economic effort, if fruitless and wasteful capital expenditure implying constant destruction of capital is to be avoided. This tendency towards overcoming what Karl Marx called "the anarchy in the capitalist system" means a tendency towards socialism, or rather towards some form of socialism.

The last century was already dominated by the so-called "social question." Philosophy and politics were conscious of the injustice of the economic system as it then existed, and strove in all kinds of ways to arrive at more satisfactory conditions. The principle of class war, which grew up from the soil of inhuman conditions among large sections of the working classes and of their practically defenceless exposure to the effects of the workings of the ruthless mechanism of trade cycles, had divided humanity into two camps, the owners and the disowned, of which only the former were citizens in the full sense of the term, as illustrated particularly clearly by the property qualification embodied in the franchise of many countries. Then came the overwhelming experience of the Great War, which was capable, as hardly any other event could have been, of overthrowing the social prejudices, thought and feelings of each individual participant. In that great outburst of national feeling, but equally in the dumb round of life in the trenches, man came to know man, across the line that had been drawn in pre-war days between owners and disowned, between upper and lower classes. We in Central Europe also parted with the last traces of caste-consciousness in those long years in which we experienced for the first time conscription become fact. In circumstances in which human life had become, so to speak, devoid of value there yet awoke the consciousness of the equal value of every soldier hero's death for his country, and every one of us became daily aware that, in spite of the hideous mechanisation, it was man and his character that were the deciding factors, both up at headquarters and down in the trenches.

Thus, however paradoxical it may sound, the war became a resurrection of humanity and a lively source of revolt against blind and senseless mechanisation. The wave of social feeling and socialist thought which we can now see sweeping victoriously through the world took its rise in the experience of the war, as also the realisation of the fact that man is not merely the object but the bearer of the economic and productive system. It was when the *entrepreneur* ceased to direct his attention solely and exclusively to the commodities for the production of which human labour is required, and began to take account of the worker, the conditions under which he lived, and his mental and physical well-being, that socialist thinking found a footing in the economic sphere. It

was soon discovered that the contented worker does more and better work than the discontented, and then it was but a short step to a home market control policy, to the tendency to encourage home consumption by high wages. The halt called to the European-American economic system by the restriction of its ungoverned thirst for expansion, could easily lead to fossilising and to senility of our economic system, since fusioning, planning, and the tendency to let every one have a say in the distribution of the cake which now no longer multiplies in a pleasant and obliging manner, are a very serious danger to personal initiative on which our economic progress has hitherto been based. On the other hand, the efforts being made to make the worker the subject instead of the object of the economic system and to turn modern slavery into the joyful co-operation of citizens possessed of equal rights are capable of awakening tremendous forces, the rejuvenating and renewing effect of which upon the economic life of Europe cannot even be conceived at present.

The Various Forms of Socialism. Russia worked out the idea of class war to the bitter end, murdered or deported the members of the sparsely distributed class of proprietors, and gave the worker the feeling of supreme command, while subjecting him to unspeakable hardships. State socialism, with all its absurdities of organisation, its costly bureaucracy, and its tendency to tie life down to a Procrustean bed of theories and committee-meeting decisions can only hold its own in Russia, in spite of its frequent and obvious mistakes, for the reason that Russia is rich in natural resources and that Marxism has become a belief, a kind of atheistic religion, if not to the Russian people as a whole, at least to the all-powerful communist party. Extreme materialism is there the reaction against a confusedly metaphysical wool-gathering era, and on the Russian habits of thought, which are abhorrent of the here and now, it acts as a kind of strait-waistcoat, in which it is required to march, at the goose-step, to the goal of perfect technical equipment. In spite of manifold opposition both as regards tactics and principles, the socialist and communist parties in Europe have on the whole set out to achieve the goal reached by Russia—socialisation of the means of production, state socialism dominated by the workers' political machinery, or a coalition of workers and peasants directed against the upper classes.

This socialism of the Marxist revolution has been successfully opposed by the socialism of the counter-revolution. A distinction must be made at this stage between central continental Europe, which is poor in capital and raw materials, on the one hand, and the countries of Western Europe bordering on the Atlantic, America, and the British Empire, which are rich in capital and raw materials, on the other hand. The new forms of counter-revolutionary socialism can be traced most clearly in the countries of Central Europe which lie nearest to Russia, and which constitute so to speak the bridge between Russia and the highly developed capitalist countries of the West. While the change-over in Italy was more political, that in industrial Central Europe and in agricultural Eastern Europe was conditioned also by the facts of economic structure. For in these regions after the year 1918 victorious Marxism had eaten its way deep into the economic system, and successfully undermined the political power of the owning class, which had already been brought to the brink of ruin by the destruction of capital due to the war. Then came the hypertrophy of the state budgets due to the victory of democracy, which stood in the way of any fresh formation of capital through the channels of normal profits to the *entrepreneur*.

From a fundamental and long-sighted point of view, it was definitely a question in these countries of who was to control the economic system in the future—the officials of the state and of the community in the Marxian form of state socialism or, as hitherto, the private individual in his capacity as an economic factor. The fascist-national-socialist counter-revolution, based on the war-time experience of community of folk, has now succeeded in these poorer countries in which, with the exception of a few short-lived profiteers, there no longer exist any appreciable numbers of rich people, or at all events any rich classes, in restricting class war to its natural extent and in making the conscious experience of nationality the centre of political action. The doctrine of the primacy of the common weal over the interests of the individual, of the individual in the service of all, means socialism, without any preceding operative interference with the economic mechanism: property becomes duty, and the economically acting individual becomes so to speak a mandatory of the community at a certain point in the economic organism; the right of the community to interfere where the interests of individuals

offend against the common interest is recognised, and a living foundation thereby provided for the state's right of control over the economic system in all its ramifications.

Within the framework of the necessary common ties and obligations private initiative is still to be retained as the carrier of the economic structure, no longer based on the one-sided rights of property, but on the balance of rights and duties of each individual consciously bound up with and forming part of the communal entity. It is this type of personalism also which has become the leading theory of the anti-Marxist revolutionary youth in the Western countries rich in capital and raw materials, it being very natural that the form of socialism developing in those countries is directed above all against the no longer ethically tolerable hegemony of money. The fight which Roosevelt is leading against the plutocratic wire-pullers in America is probably more likely to inspire emulation in the younger generation of these countries than the fascist-national-socialist revolution in central continental Europe, for the very reason that their social and political structure is more like that of America.

It is a fact of profound significance in this connection that Pope Pius XI, in his great encyclical letter "*Quadragesimo anno*," while being clearly opposed to Marxist socialism, but also to liberalism, in addition to many other requirements pointing a way into the future, elaborates a conception of property which is in accord with the basic facts of modern personalism. In the papal letter the following words are to be found, *inter alia*:

"Two dangerous one-sided tendencies are therefore to be carefully avoided: on the one hand the negation or weakening of the social function of the rights of property leads to individualism or at least to the vicinity thereof; on the other hand, misunderstanding or undermining of its individual function drives in the direction of collectivism or at least dangerously close to this standpoint. If this be disregarded, things will take a headlong course on the downward path leading to that moral, juridical, and social Modernism to which we referred with warning in the encyclical letter issued at the commencement of Our pontificate." And later on: "That in the use of property thought should be had not only of one's own advantage, but also of the common weal, follows directly from the already emphasised double-sidedness of property with its individual and social function. It is a matter for the power of the state to define in detail the duties here concerned,

where there is need thereof and they are not already adequately determined by natural law. The state can therefore—always within the limits set by natural and divine law—having regard for the true requirements of the common weal appoint in greater detail what the owners of property may do as regards the use of their property, and what they may not do.”

Socialism in Practice. One of the most successful and eminent economic leaders in post-war Europe, the late President Mayrisch, of Luxemburg, once said: “Politically I consider Bolshevism to be nonsense, but within ten years at the latest we shall all have to take over from the Russians the institution of the foreign trade monopoly.” The ten years of which he spoke have not yet elapsed, and on every hand in Europe, but more particularly in the countries of central Europe, which are weak in capital resources, there has arisen the necessity for state intervention in the conduct of foreign trade. Scarcity of foreign exchange, and the breakdown of most-favoured-nation treatment, compel the states to dictate to the individual business man how much he shall export and where to, and from whom he may import. The shifting of the control of foreign trade from the private to the public sphere, and the foreign trade monopoly is now only a question of organisation and of name.

Socialism may be said to have won its way politically, inasmuch as in the countries in which the one-party system and limited freedom of the press have become established the influence of wealth on the shaping of political destiny and of public opinion has been decisively diminished. In the democratic parliamentary multiple-party system the vote-seeking political groups were compelled, in order to keep party funds stocked, to see to it that they had adequate economic backing, and they were consequently also compelled, in their practical policy, to take account of the wishes and interests of their patrons. This applied not only to the parties which were naturally friendly or well-disposed towards the propertied classes, but also equally to the social-democratic parties, and this fact, coupled with the progressive tendency for the well-paid workers to take on bourgeois character, was one of the reasons for their willingness to come to compromises. In the one-party state this possibility of the influence of money on politics is eliminated, since the omnipotence of the ruling party renders all such compromise with the state superfluous

—with the exception of cases of pure corruption. Every individual who has an economic part to play and the once-powerful industrial and commercial federations are under public control, and private backing for political aim ceases to be possible. Limitation of the freedom of the Press is bringing about much the same result as regards the influencing of public opinion through the medium of the newspapers.

How irresistibly events are driving towards socialism was most clearly shown by the bank crises in Vienna and Berlin, and the analogous occurrences in Eastern Europe. The historians of this period will hardly be able to maintain that either the Federal Chancellor, Dr. Ender, or the Reichs Chancellor Brüning were convinced socialists. And yet they were compelled to take the banks under state control, and thus to transfer the most important parts of the economic organism, namely its financial system, from the private into the public sphere.

The peoples of Europe are artificially maintaining their agriculture for vital social and military reasons. If we had free trade on a world-wide scale, “Europe the factory” would be sustained by the products of the American farmers. Since this must be avoided for imperative considerations of national and social interest, we are living in a world which as regards price and wage policy is shaped not by the so-called economic laws, but almost wholly by political forces. For in everything we are bound by and wish to take account of the existence of that section of the population which produces the means of livelihood, that is to say of agriculture. In these circumstances, the decade-long dispute as to the desirability or undesirability of manipulated economy appears almost naïve.

The Question at Issue. The question has thus, in fact, long ceased to be whether we are in favour of socialism or not, and we are now faced with the necessity of deciding to which of the many possible forms of socialism we are to give our allegiance. This point reached, a picture of Europe as a whole takes shape from the fusing together of the postulates of Western European counter-revolutionary movements, the practical results of the new economic structures in Central Europe, and the essentially agrarian developments in the countries of Eastern Europe. As far as fundamentals are

concerned, this picture can be outlined in the following statements: (1) In the authoritatively governed one-party state the contrast between the state and the economic system, as also between the state and society, ceases to exist. (2) Economic activity is a public matter. The individual in his economic function does public service in the interests of the common weal. (3) Private property remains the foundation of the economic system, but is overshadowed by the state and is no longer regarded as absolute; interference with property is admissible when socially justified. (4) The state is itself economic subject only in those branches of the economic system in which this is required for reasons of a national or social nature; but it has sovereign power to watch over, and if necessary to interfere with, the entire economic system. Economic responsibility is thus in the hands not of public servants, as in the case of state socialism, but of those who have borne it hitherto; these latter, however, tend to pass over more and more from the private into the public sphere. (5) All conflicts between employers and employed are likewise a public matter. (6) Manipulated economy ("*économie dirigée*") follows inevitably from the necessity of maintaining national agriculture, and of state management of foreign trade. To what extent this manipulation can be effected on an international basis will depend essentially upon the political securing of peace, for only peoples which do not feel themselves to be threatened by their neighbours will consent to do without an economic organisation directed by military policy, and be able to follow the principle of division of labour on an international scale with its promise of renewed material prosperity. (7) The more or less conservative policy of these neo-socialisms aiming at the maintenance or abolition of the family and cultural traditions of individual classes of society will take expression, first and foremost, in placing the burden of taxation upon either property or turnover. Adolf Hitler's saying, "To drive a mill go not to the source but to the lower reaches of the stream," gives an indication of the general tendency in Germany, just as many measures adopted by the fascist régime betray a certain conservative tendency in cultural and social policy in Italy.

For in the end the most real and vital question with which the newly arising socialist world is faced is this: are we to retain our historical inheritance in race and tradition, or are

we to start afresh with a clean slate, as in Russia? Is the family sense to maintain its economic foundation in the right of inheritance, or is each young individual to start afresh without any privileges or advantages, as required by the American Puritans; are power and wealth to be opposite poles, as the envy-inspired democratic age wished? Should political power be wielded solely by ascetics, untrammelled with the goods of this world (which is the profoundest thesis of Bolshevism), or on the other hand, as was the case in feudal times giving rise to 99 per cent. of all titled property, should great public service find its expression in material wealth?

The decisions taken in these questions, which may well amount to the decision of whether European culture is to wither or to flourish, will depend very largely on how far the counter-revolutionary national socialisms of various types prove capable of outliving or overcoming the anti-historical character of their materialistic and mechanistic hostile brother, Marxism, in the experience of national folk-community, and thus of becoming wholly and entirely carriers of the historical inheritance of their nations and, therefore, also of European culture.

KARL ANTON PRINCE ROHAN.

THE BROADCASTING REPORT.

The outstanding feature of radio telephony is that it enables a single voice to reach innumerable ears. It can carry speech and melody into every home. It can bring isolated towns and villages into close touch with the great centres of population and thereby alleviate one of the severest drawbacks to rural life. Already many thousands of people in all parts of the country are enjoying these facilities and responding in greater or less degree to these influences. It may be that broadcasting holds social and political possibilities as great as any technical attainment of our generation.—*Report of Broadcasting Committee, 1923.**

THE above passage is contained in paragraph 4 of the Report of the Broadcasting Committee, appointed under the Chairmanship of Sir Frederick Sykes, dated April 24th, 1923. A second Committee appointed in 1925, under the Chairmanship of the Earl of Crawford, recommended "that the broadcasting service should be conducted by a public corporation acting as Trustee for the national interest, and that its status and duties should correspond with those of a public service." The third Committee, which has now made its Report,† was appointed in April 1935 :

to consider the constitution, control and finance of the broadcasting service in this country, and advise generally on the conditions under which the service, including broadcasting to the Empire, television broadcasting, and the system of wireless exchange, should be conducted after December 31st, 1936.

But before dealing with its Report, and in aid of its better comprehension, the following survey is offered.

At the time of the Report of 1923 the British Broadcasting Company, incorporated in 1922, was working a broadcasting service under licence from the Postmaster-General, issued under the provisions of the Telegraph Acts 1863 to 1922, and the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1904. This licence commenced as from November 1st, 1922, and endured until January 1st, 1926. Under it the Company was empowered to broadcast matter, which was defined as meaning "concerts, lectures, educational matter, speeches, weather reports, theatrical entertainments, and any other matter (including news and other information) from time to time approved by the Postmaster-General."

* Cmd. 1951.

† Cmd. 5091.

The Committee of 1923 in its Report reviewed, so far as it could at that early stage, the merits of the then system, and its commercial aspects. It expressed the opinion (para. 18) that the Company had shown enterprise and ability of a high order in carrying out its undertaking, and had done much valuable pioneer work in face of many difficulties. Further, that it had shown a readiness to accept suggestions and advice in regard to its programmes, which had won and merited widespread approval. That (para. 21) broadcasting might be expected to become of great national importance as a medium for the performance of valuable public services, and that it was essential therefore that transmission should be subject to public authority. That the ultimate control of broadcasting must therefore rest with a Minister responsible to Parliament, presumably the Postmaster-General. And that the objections to State operation of the service outweighed its advantages, but at the same time Government control (as distinct from operation) should be definite in character, and should continue to be secured through the licence which under existing law must be obtained from the Postmaster-General for the establishment of a wireless station. The Committee (para. 70) deprecated any system of censorship, but thought that it would be of great help to the Postmaster-General to have a Broadcasting Board who would advise him, and who would be free from any suspicion of political bias.

The outcome of this Report and of the subsequent Report in 1925 of the Crawford Committee was the substitution for the then Broadcasting Company of the present British Broadcasting Corporation, which was incorporated by Royal Charter dated December 20th, 1926. The Charter recited that in view of the widespread interest taken by Our People in the broadcasting service and of the great value of the service as a means of education and entertainment, His Majesty the King deemed it desirable that the service should be developed and exploited to the best advantage and in the national interest. Certain persons therein named, being then five in number, with the Earl of Clarendon as Chairman (to be called "Governors") were appointed and constituted a body corporate by the name of "The British Broadcasting Corporation," for the term of ten years from January 1st, 1927. It was to acquire from His Majesty's Postmaster-General for the time being a licence or licences for the erection,

establishment and maintenance and operation within Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, of stations, as a public utility service, for broadcasting to the public any matter which might be permitted by or be within the scope or ambit of the licence. Mr. John Charles Walsham Reith, now Sir John Reith, G.B.E., a man of remarkable personality and of outstanding ability, who had been the General Manager of the British Broadcasting Company, was under the terms of the Charter to be the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, to be styled the Director-General. He was not one of the Governors. The first Governors were to be entitled to remain in office for five years. Their number might from time to time be increased by His Majesty in Council. Vacancies and reappointments were to be filled at His Majesty's will and pleasure in Council. The Charter contained powers to raise money and various financial provisions and provided for Annual Reports and Statements and audit.

The licence dated January 1st, 1927, was granted by the Postmaster-General to the Corporation for the term of ten years, and permitted the Corporation to establish stations, to send broadcasting matter by means of the stations and to receive messages by means of the stations. It should be noted that "transmission" and "reception" of what are termed "messages" are distinct, but the Corporation received a licence both to transmit and to receive. The members of the public who listen to broadcast matter must hold what are called "receiving licences," and their "stations" for receiving are the places at which they may use their apparatus. The licence made certain reservations regarding the powers and functions of the Military, Naval and Air Force Departments of the State, and also reserved power to the Postmaster-General, Clause 4 (3), from time to time by notice in writing, to require the Corporation to refrain from sending any broadcast matter either particular or general as specified in such notice, to be from time to time revoked or varied by the Postmaster-General. But the Corporation was, under Clause 4 (1), to send efficiently (unless prevented by circumstances beyond its control), on every day (including Sundays) programmes of broadcast matter, and (2) *whenever so requested by any Department of His Majesty's Government, send from all or any of its stations any matter which such Department might require to be broadcast.*

The Corporation was thus given a free hand, subject to such request and subject also to the veto of the Postmaster-General. It may be asked why the Postmaster-General has the primary control of the broadcasting service. The answer is found in the history of wireless telephony. The Postmaster-General has the monopoly of the postal service of the country, as also of the Inland Telegraph system. When telephony was first introduced the National Telephone Company and the London & Globe Telephone Company installed telephone systems, and the Postmaster-General objected thereto; on account of his statutory monopoly. Litigation ensued, and as a consequence the Postmaster-General acquired from these companies their telephone services. The Postmaster-General's monopoly rested on the basis of telephonic communications being "messages or communications in the nature of messages." When wireless telegraphy and telephony were invented and came into vogue, and broadcasting resulted, many individuals, although they were not prepared to dispute that according to the Court decisions telephony came under the same category as telegraphy, yet argued that broadcast transmissions (and receptions) and especially concerts were not messages or communications in the nature of messages, and claimed to operate unlicensed stations for the reception of broadcast matter. Prosecutions by the Postmaster-General ensued and resulted in convictions by magistrates. Thus the position has been for some time accepted by the general public that no unlicensed individual can either transmit or receive by listening broadcast programmes or matter of any kind. The revenue of the Corporation is obtained mainly by means of payments by the Postmaster-General to the Corporation of percentages on all sums received by him in respect of the receiving licences obtained from him by the public.

The Committee of 1935 which now has made its Report, was appointed, as its terms of reference indicate, to advise as to the future, consequent on the expiration on December 31st, 1936, of the Corporation's Charter and Licence. In the course of its labours it had to deal with an immense variety of considerations, not merely affecting the Constitution of the Corporation and the Extension of its Charter, and the question of control, but also its working, scope and efficiency, and its value, as conducted, to the public as a means of

education, culture, and entertainment. Its impartiality, its appointments to its staff, and their discipline and control were all dealt with, as well as its revenue and finance. To summarise the main recommendations of the Committee, to which many reservations were made by various members of the Committee, it recommended :

1. That in view of the widespread approval of the broadcasting service in this country, in which the Committee fully concurred, the Charter should be extended for a further ten years, with seven governors to be nominated by the Crown, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.
2. That the major staff vacancies should be advertised, and appointments made on the recommendation of a specially constituted selection board. That the programme staff should abstain from any prominent part in public controversy, and their private lives in other respects be free from control by the B.B.C.
3. That the General Advisory Council should continue.
4. That minor issues, measures of domestic policy, and matters of day-to-day management should be left to the free judgment of the Corporation.
5. Appointment of a selected Cabinet Minister in the House of Commons, free from heavy Departmental responsibility and preferably a senior member of the Government ; with a right of veto over programmes. Technical control to remain with the Postmaster-General.
6. That the B.B.C. should have the right to state when it is broadcasting an announcement at the request of a Government Department ; direct Government control in case of national emergency to be maintained.
7. Certain alterations as regards finance arrangements, but licences to remain at ten shillings.
8. As regards political broadcasting, Parliament to be the natural centre, and that the B.B.C. should regularly consult the Parliamentary parties on major political issues.
9. Light music to be of first class quality, and directed to the improvement of public taste.

The existence and growth, too, of what are termed " Relay Exchanges," came also under its review. These last are referred to in paragraphs 130 to 136 of the Report, at the date of which there were in existence as many as 340 Exchanges, with more than 200,000 subscribers, all having to take out Receiving Licences. The subscribers were

provided with selections from the Broadcasting Corporation's programmes. All that was necessary was a loudspeaker, with no trouble or expense of a wireless set. They paid about 1s. 6d. per week subscription for their entertainment, but could not pick or choose it. The Relay Exchanges operated under licence from the Postmaster-General. The Report of the Committee recommends that the ownership and operation of Relay Exchanges should be undertaken by the Post Office, and the control of their programmes by the Corporation.

Space does not permit reproduction or notice of all the recommendations of the Committee and members' reservations or its proposals as regards the development of television, nor of full details of its extremely comprehensive survey. But of cardinal importance are its recommendations as to the future position of the Corporation, and of the extent of its control, whether by Government or Parliament. At present the Broadcasting Corporation stands apart from the ordinary machinery of the State, or Government, yet is National in character, and occupies a position of a quasi-Trusteeship for the community. It takes no side in politics, but gives a fair hearing to all points of view.

In reference to its relations to the Government, the Committee, in paragraph 47, says :

Set up by the State, it is yet different in kind from the Government Departments which transact the State's business. Subject by Charter and Licence to the same potentialities of supervision as the Company which it succeeds, and held liable to State Control, both positive and negative, the Corporation has exercised in practice a high degree of independence.

No one can reasonably dispute that politically, and particularly during the recent General Election, the B.B.C. has exercised strict impartiality in political matters, and independence. Any shackles or control going beyond those under the existing Charter and Licence would not be in the true interest of the community, and would ultimately inevitably destroy its value and usefulness. The Committee when stating in paragraph 51 of its Report that " the constitutional independence of the B.B.C. brings advantages to the general public and to listeners which could not otherwise be secured," would appear to recognise this. It is strange, therefore, that it should, in paragraph 53, recommend that

responsibility for the cultural side of broadcasting should be with a Cabinet Minister in the House of Commons, preferably a senior member of the Government. That (para. 143) he should have the right of veto over programmes, and that the Prime Minister should select a suitable Minister for the purpose. It is presumably in accordance with and furtherance of this policy that instead of the Governors (recommended by the Report to be increased to seven in number) being as at present appointed by Royal Charter, and vacancies filled by His Majesty in Council, they should in future be nominated by the Crown, *on the recommendation* of the Prime Minister. This, combined with there being a Minister of Broadcasting, a senior member of the Government in the House of Commons, seems to be dangerously near to introducing party government into the Broadcasting Corporation, and also likely to render its services the plaything of debate, even party debate, in the House of Commons. It is likely to make the task of the Director-General more difficult, and bring him in probably frequent conflict with the Government for the time being. Questions, too, in the House of Commons, and debates, serious and frivolous, would no doubt add to the entertainment of the House of Commons, but would consume time which could be more usefully employed.

Seeing that the Committee bestowed unstinted encomiums on the manner in which the B.B.C. has for the past nine years continued to discharge its task, and has recommended renewals of the Charter and Licence for a further period of ten years, together with additional contributions to its working revenue out of the moneys provided by listeners, why hamper its work with untried and debatable measures of control? That the B.B.C. is impeccable would be too much to assume, but public opinion has a way of asserting itself, and criticism by listeners in and outside the Press furnishes sufficient corrective and stimulant to a body which has shown itself hitherto particularly watchful and appreciative both of suggestions and criticism. The reception of the Report by the public has, on the whole, been favourable but somewhat indifferent. This is not surprising in view of the far more vital international questions before the country.

W. H. STOKER.

NIETZSCHE: A PROPHET OF DICTATORSHIP.

TO make music the basis of the State, as was demanded by Nietzsche the Wagner devotee, in his *Untimely Opinions*, seemed to be a mere travesty of sound common sense; yet we have seen this absurdity translated into reality before our very eyes. For Adolf Hitler has realised that the decisions of King Demos are determined more easily through music and fireworks than through logic and facts, and what Hitler considers right is turned into practice with ruthless consistency. It is neither possible nor necessary to convince the masses by instruction, but it is possible to intoxicate them; and so long as the chemists do not discover a gas or a perfume which can perform that service, music remains the best instrument of political mass suggestion. In this matter of technique National Socialism has had the advantage of its opponents from the outset, for the latter had no equivalent for the popular melodies of patriotic songs and marches. The stirring tune of *Deutschland über Alles* drowned not only the commonplace text of a wretched piece of occasional verse. It also drowned all the paragraphs of the Constitution, and the Horst Wessel song proved stronger than the purpose of Hindenburg. Hitler the Wagner devotee would have to confess, if he cared to think over the connection, that Wagner's Siegfried and Hagen stood godfather at the birth of the Third Reich. Its leaders could step, almost unchanged, out of Wagner's operas on to the political stage, for they show the same taste for pomp, music and resounding words. If Shakespeare's dramas are a prophecy of England's world-dominion, Hitler's Reich must reckon Wagner and Nietzsche among its spiritual founders.

Nietzsche too? The anti-Hitler intellectuals of Germany hear with flaming indignation that National Socialism has adopted Nietzsche, the good European, as its philosopher and prophet. How can the Brown barbarians be so impudent as to claim the man who spoke so much of culture? How can those who destroyed the freedom of the Press appeal to the writer who exploited liberty of the Press to the farthest limits? How could a cosmopolitan mind feel at ease within the confines of the narrowest nationalism? His apostles, it is true, have justified, almost without exception, the

philosopher's psychological penetration when he confessed of himself: "We should not allow ourselves to be burned for our convictions; we are none too sure of them." But, if the German intellectuals have experienced the pain of seeing nearly all their leaders bowing the knee to the Brown Baal, they have nevertheless retained the consolation that all the dead would have acted otherwise, and that even Nietzsche would have hurled a steadfast "No" at the blandishments of the Third Reich. Their conviction remains unshaken that National Socialism is endeavouring to drag the famous knight of the spirit on to their side, as energetically as the pacifist and democratic intellectuals are trying to drag him on to theirs. Hitler goes on pilgrimage to the Nietzsche Archives as to a national shrine, accepts the philosopher's walking-stick from his sister, and has the great thinker's fame officially proclaimed to the people from all the German wireless stations. National Socialism declares Nietzsche's world of thought to be its own special domain, and one of its apostles, Erich Giese, has written a book to prove that the Third Reich is only the fulfilment of the poet-philosopher's dream.

Both sides are right, without knowing why, for Nietzsche's own nature was contradictory. It is true that he was a psychological genius, but he held too firmly to the principle that in psychology the reverse is also true, and therefore, more than any other thinker, he has two different opinions on every subject. The German patriot can rejoice in the declaration that "Germany displays more manly virtues than any other country in Europe"; the anti-German can refer to the terse utterance: "The Germans are riff-raff." Champions of the Semite recall that it was a delight to Nietzsche to meet a Jew; the anti-Semite can invoke the philosopher's verdict, twice uttered, that "the Jews are the worst people in the world." The pacifist can record with satisfaction that he desired to see the sword broken and the tree of military glory laid low by a stroke of lightning; the man of war can quote countless sayings that praise war above green pastures. The revolutionary can slay the conservative and the conservative the revolutionary with quotations, the freethinker can lead on the believer *ad absurdum*, and the believer the freethinker. It is difficult to discover any subject for which Nietzsche's words do not supply at once the fullest

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vindication and the most brilliant refutation. "This thinker needs no one to refute him—he does it himself," cried the philosopher in one of his earliest books.

German scholarship has thus been unable to discover, after thirty years' effort, how far Nietzsche was in earnest, whether his works are the utterances of a prophet or of a literary swindler. Was the writer who "would rather be a clown than a saint" only a Harlequin dressed up as a philosopher? Or has the world been mocked by the books of a madman without realising it? At bottom he took nothing seriously, yet he was a prophet. No ingenuity has yet fathomed his purpose: his mission time has long revealed. His teaching of the Will to Power has changed the course of history more radically than any previous philosophical argument. This effect has not, of course, been produced by the special depth or scientific value of his ideas. Scientifically considered, they form the flattest freak of fancy ever hacked out by a metaphysician—aimless, meaningless tautology. Every will expresses itself in terms of strength, or, in more elevated language, as power. To speak of a will to power is a similar discovery to that of children who speak of a grinding-mill or a write-letter. But the effect produced by this idea arose not from the sense of the words, but from their sound. "Will to Power" sounded self-confident, threatening, swaggering, like the Kaiser's speeches about shining armour and the mailed fist. Thus Nietzsche supplied the theoretical basis for the Wilhelminian age and policy. The German has a dangerous penchant for what William I called "the usual German brag," and this German swagger caught fire as never before from the high-sounding words.

Before Nietzsche, the phrases Will to Power and Policy of Power were unknown. Even Bismarck, in his last great speech in the Reichstag on February 6th, 1888, uttered a warning against "a policy of prestige and power." But Nietzsche proved stronger than Bismarck, or at all events the wind of the day blew more strongly in his sails. The more popular his books became, the more the swaggering phrases rustled through the leading articles of Nationalist newspapers—"Will to Power, Policy of Power, Growth of Power, Means of Power, Position of Power, Demands of Power"—and the more it became a habit among German patriots to speak of the Germans as a "Sovereign Race." The philosopher

of the Superman, who abused the Germans as "riff-raff, barbarians and oxen," nevertheless became the declared favourite of pre-war Pan-Germans, who allowed no book, no pamphlet, scarcely even a newspaper article, to appear without calling on Nietzsche as their sworn ally.

Only those German intellectuals for whom truth must always square with their own wishes can consider it coincidence and misunderstanding that Nietzsche's philosophy has remained, through all the vicissitudes of fate, the gospel of the wildest type of nationalism. As a matter of fact, a straight line leads from Nietzsche, through the Pan-Germans and Spengler, to National Socialism. Every page of Hitler's book and speeches betrays the fact that not the weakest link of spiritual relationship connects him with Kant, Schiller or Goethe, and that on the contrary he has his spiritual home in the modern worship of Power. It is unnecessary to quote the many passages in his book in which he recognises unreservedly the policy of power and scornfully rejects consideration for the rights of other nations. It is needless to furnish proofs that National Socialism is resuscitated Pan-Germanism, which has only put on some new social drapery and shed a few of the external errors of Pan-Germanism (such as its fanatical Anglophobia), without any real change of heart. National Socialism would be obliged to recognise Nietzsche, even against its will, for no other philosopher can take his place. It is from the central idea of his philosophy, namely the Will to Power, that the Pan-German policy of power and the reign of terror of National Socialism have inevitably developed. For power can only rule through intimidation and terror. The doctrine of the Will to Power is the spiritual basis of concentration camps and mass executions. The supermen prophesied by Nietzsche, who were to rule the great masses as slaves stripped of their rights, have arrived. In Italy they wear the black shirt, in Germany the S.A. and S.S. uniform, in Russia, as followers of the Communist Party, the soviet star. They have hurled themselves upon the state like "some herd of blonde beasts of prey, a race of conquerors and rulers, which organise for war, and, through the power of organisation, plunge their terrible talons into a population which, even if enormously superior in numbers, is still utterly unorganised." Many other sayings of Nietzsche read, in the light of current events, like the prophecies of a seer.

Could it be otherwise? Actions spring from ideas; as ideas have been in the past, actions will follow in the future. Would it be possible for National Socialism to escape contact with the thoughts that have hypnotised cultured Germany to the limits of fanaticism for decades? If the Germans were not the worst psychologists in the world, it would not be necessary for anyone to tell them that Nietzsche is Hitler's spiritual grandsire. The similarity, both spiritual and physical, between them is too great. Both are of non-German descent. Their Slavonic ancestry is still visible in their faces, and can be felt in the tone and language of their writings and speeches. Both are distinguished by an hysterical ambition, which enforces suggestion by domineering gestures. Moreover, the parvenu spirit is as unmistakable in National Socialism as in Nietzsche and Wagner—that spirit which is obliged to find vent in swagger and in offering up incense to itself.

With Nietzsche's systematic duplicity of language it is, of course, easy to select quotations that are as opposed to National Socialism as fire to water; but even in this game the Hitlerites hold the trump cards. Nietzsche, it is true, wished to have nothing to do with people who took part in "the lying race-swindle"; yet the National Socialists can compile their recipes for the purification of the German race out of quotations from Nietzsche. For one of the few ideas to which he held consistently was that the highest task of culture is to breed a higher race of men. And how can this be achieved save by the selection and segregation of those who consider themselves to be that higher race? Has not he already declared that "peasant blood is the best blood in Germany," and that there is no finer race than that of the peasants? What better foundation can the National Socialists desire for their plan of breeding a new aristocracy from "blood and soil"?

Racial mania is an expression of the parvenu spirit, for nobody is in such urgent need of vouching for noble descent as the parvenu. For this reason the philosopher ascribed to himself an ancestry dating back to a legendary Polish count, and National Socialism has invented a Nordic genealogical tree that raises it above the other plebeian nations. The philosopher, however, had this advantage, that everybody accepted his printer's ink at its face value and believed him to be the most elect of aristocrats. The literary critics of

Germany agreed with the schoolgirls that his flowing eloquence on aristocracy and noble birth was a conclusive proof of his aristocratic spirit. Those who know human nature better than literature feel that his very fluency concerning these matters makes it difficult for us to believe him.

The National Socialists were, of course, obliged to part company with Nietzsche the publicist, who desired to dispose of the labour problem by writing down the working man as a pariah after the Hindu pattern, or as a sort of "European Chinese." He speaks ironically of "the blessing of work" and "the dignity of work"; and he held it to be "an aristocratic feeling that work degrades." His philosophy can never be squared with the National Socialist slogan: "There is only one nobility, the nobility of Labour," especially as this section of his doctrine cannot be balanced, like so many others with contrary statements. Throughout his life he remained consistent in despising manual labour. He cared more, of course, about emphasising his questionable superiority of birth through this deliberate exhibition of haughtiness, than about proclaiming a serious social programme. Oddly enough, so far neither National nor international Socialism has taken serious offence at his contempt for the workman. His ideas seem to have been thought merely academic, though fanatical Pan-Germans such as Franz Haiser have been seduced into recommending the restoration of slavery. Perhaps it is a mistake not to take these things seriously; perhaps Nietzsche proves himself, here too, to be a prophet, and the restoration of slavery in a modernised form may emerge as the inevitable result of the intellectual atmosphere of the European nations. Socialism has won all along the line, and the root idea of socialism is that the State should care for its citizens as the father for his children. The State can only do this if the citizens again become minors. Marx and Engels recognised ninety years ago that socialism cannot be realised without dictatorship. On this point National Socialism has shown itself a wiser pupil of Marx than most Marxists, who yoked Marxism with liberal and democratic conceptions without perceiving that such ideas can never get on well with socialism.

It is not a paradox but a fact that National Socialism misunderstands Nietzsche, and yet is right in claiming him as its prophet. His glorification of harshness, force and cruelty

in rulers fits in perfectly with the rubbish of National Socialism. His demand for the raising of humanity by a system of Spartan severity reads like a prophecy of the Third Reich, which seeks to redeem the German nation from all defects by an equally Draconian, pedantic multiplicity of rules. Yet the real Nietzsche longs for exactly the reverse of this omnipotence of the state, namely, the break-up of all state power—anarchy. On no subject does he speak with fiercer hatred and more scathing contempt than on the State, and if such utterances failed to prove his anarchical spirit, it would be proved in abundance by his roaming life. A man who cannot endure a settled place of residence is also unable to endure state ordinances. Naturally, the ever-paradoxical Nietzsche solved the problem of being a wild anarchist in theory and an obedient subject in practice. Despite his disgust at the state that "has stolen everything that he had," he lived on a state pension.

It was a prophecy after his own heart when Nietzsche in his *Will to Power* foretold anarchy as the future form of life for society. His philosophy indeed is the theory of anarchy. It contains no sentence that is not contradicted, shattered by another sentence; it formulates no logical or ethical principle which the author would accept for himself as binding. "Nothing is true, everything is permissible," is the inevitable conclusion of this philosophy, whose labyrinthine paths lead straight to chaos. In a country where such a philosophy gained the mastery it was inevitable that, sooner or later, traditional authority must break down, and a new authority could only be based on the right of the strongest.

It is only an apparent paradox that Nietzsche the anarchist also comes forward as the prophet of dictatorship. It is, in truth, one more proof of the uncanny foresight of this strange being, hypersensitive and hysterical, who had the power of sensing the ultimate issue of the modern mind decades ahead. Political anarchy arises from the mingling of politics and morals; this intermixture was the cardinal mistake of modern thought, and the chief tenet of his philosophy. It was no mere accident that, simultaneously with that philosophy, a revival of Machiavellianism should have occurred which, particularly in Germany, raised Machiavelli to be the most admired of all political theorists. For Machiavellianism is nothing else but a systematic confusion of politics and

morals. That great foe of nationalism, Marxism, also turns ethics into a mere function of economic need: in plain English, into money-making. It was inevitable that political anarchy should follow on such a conviction, and after anarchy dictatorship.

For anarchy, even if it is merely a lawlessness hidden beneath a powerless constitution, can only be endured for a short time by a civilised European nation. If the authority of conscience no longer compels men to recognise the necessities of the common good, an external force must be brought into play. The masses in Germany, Russia, Italy, thus flee to dictatorship, which at all events preserves outward order. Of course, dictatorship means only an external conquest of anarchy. For it is precisely dictatorship which, more than any other form of government, is obliged to identify politics and ethics, to declare blind submission to its will to be the highest of all virtues, and to stamp out all opposition as an inextinguishable crime. Dictatorship thus turns right into wrong and wrong into right, punishes the reading of opposition newspapers, treats the changing of its paper money into foreign currency as perjury and fraud, and therefore makes denunciation and servility the duty of good citizens.

Does dictatorship lead to that Promised Land of world dominion which is the secret dream of German ambition? Is it possible that the idea of the policy of power, on which the Third Reich is based, can only operate at home, and can transform itself abroad into reconciliation and love of peace? Or will the Reich that has been all too forcibly unified break up in an explosion before National Socialism has time to turn the doctrine of a German hegemony into reality? Will, indeed, its ideology leave any other choice than collapse or war? As long as the policy of Germany is based on the Will to Power, only blind confidence can trust her.

GUSTAV BÜSCHER.

A CHAFFINCH BUILDS HER NEST.

UNLESS it be a lizard basking in the sun, I do not think I have seen an animal that looked happier than the hen chaffinch I watched recently building a nest of felted moss. Watching her every movement hour after hour at very close range, I grew to love her placid little face and thought I saw in it an expression of complete contentment. Just to look at her was to feel rested and to forget the world of men and women struggling now with bungalows, now with bombs, to achieve a happiness which is but the birthright of every living creature. Before, however, my little bird reached this idyllic state many things had happened. In the first place her mate, resplendent in a deep glowing pink waistcoat, with a slate-blue crown and other fineries, had chosen the approximate site of their future home. Earlier in the spring, in his bachelor days, he had claimed a certain area or territory as his own, by driving away others of his kind, and singing or calling from the most conspicuous positions available. On all sides other cock chaffinches, from similar points of vantage, proclaimed, one presumes, not only their sovereignty over a small piece of ground, but their willingness to enroll as husbands and as fathers—for a season.

Towards the end of February or the beginning of March not more than a few hours a day are usually occupied in self-advertisement, the rest being spent in the communal winter flock, where perhaps rival males will feed amicably side by side after engaging in quite bitter territorial skirmishes. But as the season advances less and less time is spent on neutral ground, more and more in the isolation befitting one whose aim it is to become lord and master of all he surveys. When he has achieved this exalted ambition, the cock bird is, according to our standards, in rather a humiliating position, for he must now wait until a hen comes along and actually chooses him as a mate! I wonder how many splendid male birds my little hen passed over before choosing one to her heart's content. Once having made her choice she was naturally free to visit the communal feeding ground while the cock remained on duty in the territory, for the latter, as the very centre of their universe, now became the link that kept the two together. If they paired quite early in the season, before the territory engaged the cock bird's whole

attention, the chances are that they wandered the countryside together and fed with the remnants of the old winter flock—two little souls bound together by invisible threads.

Towards the end of this honeymoon period it is certain that my demure little lady turned her attention increasingly to the requirements of her coming family. If you had been present you would probably have seen her inspecting the materials for a nest, now picking up a beakful of moss here, now dropping a beakful there, for all the world like her human counterpart choosing patterns. She may even have started a nest or two in different places before finally settling down to build one day in April the little home I spent so many hours watching. But before describing the construction of the nest in detail, and the cock bird's increasing interest in domestic affairs, it would be as well to consider the matter of birds' nests in general, their nature and possible origin; or at least sufficient of the matter to give my chaffinch's nesting activities greater significance.

Primarily a bird's nest is simply a hollow in which the eggs are laid. It may be nothing more than a scrape in the ground, the merest impression of a bird's body, or it may be an elaborate woven structure swinging from the tip of a slender branch. Bearing this in mind, it is interesting to learn that green plover, or lapwing, commonly make, during the frenzy of courtship, just such hollows in the ground as their eggs are eventually laid in. Both sexes, stooping, press and roll their breasts into the ground, while the male, according to Coward, also "scrapes and sits in imaginary nests, turning in them as he scratches the hollow in frenzied haste, or bending forward, breast to ground, raises and exhibits" his chestnut coverts and banded tail. The hollows are chiefly made by a rolling bird—that is by one that looks as if it is trying to stand on its breast. Selous has repeatedly seen lapwing, during spasms of rolling, tear up grass or other nesting material. Some of this naturally falls into and more or less lines the little circular hollows made by the birds. The hen, after a spell of love-making, has therefore several nests at her disposal! She sometimes adds to the nest, while brooding, such grass or other materials as are within her reach, and on occasions there is a definite if feeble attempt at what we may call, in a popular sense, a true nest.

Is it likely that the scrape of a nest in which the eggs are

laid is produced in another way—in cold blood, rather than almost by accident in the stress and strain of an admittedly extravagant courtship? It would be strange indeed if it were. Assuming that here is the making of the primitive hollow and a start, at any rate, towards the assembly of material, need one believe that nest-building arose from the strange and often grotesque posturings of a courting bird? The emotions of a bird are notoriously fluid. Is it not more likely that some of the nest-building movements "escape" prematurely in suggestive actions during courtship? However this may be, Selous brings forward a fact in support of his theory of the sexual origin of nest building which cannot be overlooked. When a lapwing stoops to press its breast upon the ground, "the whole body inclining sharply up from it, the wings project like two horns from each side of the tail, which is bent down between them in a nervous, virile manner." Suddenly "a spasm or wave of energy seems to pass through the bird," and the tail is bent still more forcibly down and moved energetically from side to side exactly as during the generative act. What possible connection can this have with nest building? In the lapwing presumably none, but had the bird been standing in an ordinary cup-shaped nest, the tail would have pressed down upon and helped to consolidate the growing rim. Watch a blackbird and you will see that it uses its tail in much this way. In other words, a movement still quite obviously sexual in the lapwing has perhaps developed into one which in the blackbird is concerned only with the shaping of the nest.

In the meantime, whether or not one believes in the sexual origin of nest building, it is probable that the first step in the construction of many nests is an attempt on the bird's part to make a primitive scrape or nesting hollow. It seems likely, indeed, that many a bird will turn round and round upon a branch, pressing down with its breast, before bringing material to line its imaginary hollow in solid English oak! In support of this, I noticed that a great tit made a neat circular impression in the thin layer of dust and debris on the hard wooden floor of a nesting-box, just as though it had been trying to press out a hollow in the way I have suggested. Not until twenty-four hours later did it bring any nesting material. Again, I watched a missel-thrush building, not indeed at such an early stage, but when the nest was as yet barely a platform

of dead grasses, and so strong were the "hollowing" movements that at times much of the scanty foundations were actually dislodged. The bird repeatedly pressed down with the upper part of its breast, and repeatedly turned round and round. To counteract these movements, which can only be called destructive, it reached down for the nesting material it had dislodged, for some of this festooned the surrounding briars, pulling it back on to the nest with its beak. Here then was a case in which a bird's efforts to produce the primitive hollow actually impeded the progress of the nest. The missel-thrush's nest is at the best of times rather an untidy affair. Let us now return to my little chaffinch and see how she managed to put together a perfect gem of a nest.

Where the main trunk of a large buddleia divided into three stout branches to form a convenient crook, she had already placed about two thimblefuls of moss before her secret was discovered. I therefore missed the preceding stage, if there was one—namely her efforts to make a little hollow. However, from the moment she was seen flying into the bush carrying a beakful of moss at 2.30 p.m. (B.S.T.) on April 28th, she was kept under fairly close observation. I do not think she can have been at work many minutes before I was in a position to watch her every action on the nest. The first few beakfuls I saw her bring were placed on the site, after which the little bird deliberately stepped upon them, stood still a moment, sank into a sitting position for another moment, and then quietly stepped off and flew away. The laying of these foundations was so evidently an advance on the cruder methods of the missel-thrush that I settled down to watch with no little excitement for evidence of developing technique. In a day-to-day and minute-to-minute diary of events there is obviously much repetition. It will only be possible to describe here exactly what happened on a few representative occasions.

On the second day the nest began to take form, so that on the third, when my little hen returned to build (again at 2.30 p.m.), she came to a broken ring of moss—just the rim of a nest whose floor was still the trunk of the buddleia. During the afternoon the nest became more and more cup-shaped as the result of six visits by the hen, but when she stopped working for the day it was still only a very shallow cup with a hole at the bottom. During one or two of her desultory visits she brought no new material, but spent her time on the nest,

usually about two minutes, shaping and consolidating the growing rim. Sitting on her breast with her tail pointing almost vertically skywards, she had little spasms of treading or perhaps, as Howard puts it, of working her feet to turn the eggs that are not yet there. But to me this action seemed more akin to the lapwing's frenzied scratching, already described—in which case can we perhaps assume that one evolves into the other as the season advances? For the chaffinch's treading or kicking movements, as far as I could see, pushed and firmed the nest on one side while inevitably forcing the bird's neck and breast against the opposite wall. In this way the nest was automatically consolidated in two places at once. So violent were these treading movements that on occasions the bird was forced to her feet. Sometimes these spasms of intense activity, lasting only a moment, ended in a sudden and momentary depression of the tail over the side of the nest. As the bird faced now in one direction, now in another, the nest inevitably became circular.

Of course these spasms of activity, concerned with the fashioning of the inside of the cup, occupied only a fraction of each visit, the rest and far greater portion being spent on the arranging of the outside. This is to me the most wonderful part of a chaffinch's nest, for in a perfect example it looks just as firm, just as smooth and regular as the inside, almost indeed as though it had been machine-turned. If the concave inner surface is smoothed and moulded by the bird's own body, how is this striking regularity produced? The bird's every visit made this abundantly clear. If she arrived with a beakful of moss, it was divided up and added to the rim of the nest in three or four places. Then—or if she arrived without material—she settled down on the nest in the curious position already described and, craning her neck over the side, reached down for any untidy or loose pieces of moss that caught her eye. These, usually mere threads, were added to the rim of the nest. In this way she spent the greater part of each visit, removing even the slightest projections. In other words, the outside is trimmed to shape as it grows. Sometimes, craning for untidy strands and finding none, she deliberately pressed down the edge of the nest with her neck, so that to a certain extent the outside also is smoothed and shaped by the bird's body.

In the next few days the nest grew steadily during the

afternoons. As the rim mounted up the bird began to sit in a more normal position, and during the momentary spasms of treading or kicking pressed her chin hard on the rising walls of her little home. This pressure aided and abetted the effect of the tail movements, of which I saw very little, and indeed in this case I think that the chin was almost as important as the tail. Perhaps the chaffinch is gradually dropping these old tail movements in favour of relatively modern methods better adapted to a nest made with such meticulous care.

On May 5th building began for the first time in the morning, at a quarter to seven. In the afternoon the chaffinch was still at work. At three o'clock I watched her arrive without nesting material, saw her tidying up and, during her brief visit, treading the nest three times, each spasm ending in the depressing of the tail over the edge of the nest. A few minutes later the cock chaffinch appeared—almost the first time I had seen him anywhere near the nest. The hen was away, but on her return she flew straight to her mate and solicited his attentions with fluttering wings. He responded and then wandered off, while she returned to the nest. For three or four minutes—double the usual time—she tidied the nest and, which I think is significant, not once during all this time did she tread the nest with her feet. Perhaps this was simply due to exhaustion. If not, then, taken in conjunction with the repeated tail movements, followed by pairing, I think it rather illuminating. Evidently the nesting bird is in a state of considerable emotional tension, normally released in the process of shaping and building the nest. If, however, it is side-tracked in pairing, certain elements in the nesting activities automatically wane—that at least is a provisional interpretation of what I saw.

Six days later, that is on May 11th, the first egg was laid. In the afternoon I waited for an hour before seeing a chaffinch, and then to my surprise the cock flew into the branches of a willow overlooking the nest. Five minutes later the hen appeared and flew straight down to brood her solitary egg. As though now quite satisfied, the cock flew away. For sixteen minutes the hen sat on her nest, usually quite still, but occasionally pecking at a stray piece of moss. Twice she raised herself slightly and peered down at the egg, perhaps touching it with her bill, and twice she worked her feet slightly, as though turning her egg. This treading was quite distinct from

the spasmodical whirring of legs I had seen in nest building. Once or twice she turned right round to face in the opposite direction. After fourteen minutes she became restless, looking up and around as if in search of her mate. Two minutes of this—and off she flew! No doubt her active little body found inactivity irksome. That she stayed so long suggests that the weary hours of brooding that lay ahead would not be entered upon without preparation, for she had stayed eight times longer than usual. Presently the cock appeared again and actually flew on to the buddleia, in this way showing an increasing interest in family affairs. But he did not this time await the hen's return—they missed one another by a couple of minutes. However, she settled down to brood once more, but remained only ten minutes. Her desire to tidy the nest was growing very feeble, nothing was really moved, only pulled and sometimes only touched. Once she yawned, and I thought she was going to sleep. That night she slept on the nest.

Before leaving our chaffinch couple to live "happily ever after," I must describe the laying of one of her eggs. On the morning of May 13th I reached the nest soon after five and found the hen on her nest, where of course she had slept. Whether she had already been off at all I do not know. Anyhow at half-past five she left for a quarter of an hour, which gave me an opportunity of counting the eggs. There were still two, as on the previous day, so that I had only to wait to be present during the laying of the third. The sun, like a huge red ball, was just appearing over the distant hills, while above me the sky was blue and cloudless. As I waited I was nearly deafened by the passionate singing of a golden-crested wren. Its almost desultory song during the day can give little idea of the vehemence of this early morning outburst. How the tiny body manages to create and maintain such a shattering volume of sound almost passes understanding. Farther away a great tit and a marsh tit were rending the air with their constantly repeated calls. In the distance a blackbird sang. When the golden-crested wren had finished, a chiff-chaff murmured softly overhead, and I heard again the gentle passage of water between mossy boulders.

On her return the hen sat for nearly forty minutes. Most of the time she sat absolutely still, but once or twice she

raised herself up and peered down into the nest. Was she staring at two or at three eggs? I did not know! Occasionally she worked her feet gently as though turning eggs. Meanwhile the cock chaffinch was heard calling on and off, but he did not put in an appearance. Suddenly the hen uttered the usual chaffinch note, *pink! pink!*—the first time I had heard her making a sound on the nest—and immediately flew off, revealing three eggs. Within ten minutes she returned, accompanied by the cock. While she flew down to the nest, he watched from the overhanging willow. At last his interest was thoroughly aroused, and a moment later he followed her to the nest. While the demure little hen sat perfectly motionless on her three speckled eggs, the cock bird broke out into excited chatter as he stared and stared at the nest and at all that was his. Then he flew away. He had done his best—what more could a cock chaffinch do?

G. B. GOOCH.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE FALL.

THE problem of the Fall in Christian theology balances the Christian doctrine of redemption. It would, however, be more exact to say that the redemption was a movement on the part of God as a result of the Fall of Man; and that, but for the Fall, the redemption would be less an unnecessary act of God than it would a logical impossibility. For you cannot redeem something that has not fallen away; and the modern position of defending the redemption while calling the Fall in question is logically indefensible and is bound to bring Christianity into disrepute. St. Paul would not have recognised it as Christianity at all. The only wonder is that this has not been made the rallying point for a general attack upon Christianity; but I venture to think that there are already signs in the air that the citadel is going to be attacked in this weak spot before long; and we had better look to the fortress and either abandon the citadel outright or reform it to meet the attack.

There are, it is true, a few hazy ideas about as to what actually constitutes the Fall; but these ideas seldom take account of anything more than the human race. For, while it is generally admitted that the theory of evolution has utterly exploded the idea of Man as a special creation, we are told that this does not explode the theory of the Fall. This school of thought, in so far as a theory which has barely felt its way into existence among individuals may be called a school of thought, teaches that when the creation reached the stage of Man it did not go on steadily evolving upwards (as though it ever had evolved steadily upwards) but used its free will to abuse its privileges. Now such a theory of the Fall of Man might account for a vital conflict with evil in the heart of Man; but it leaves the whole phenomena of Nature out. It solves one small problem while increasing a multitude of other problems; and if we adjust our minds to the problem in the universe which has given rise to the belief in a fall, I think we shall see that this theory leaves the greater part of it unsolved—as does the notion of a “fall upwards” of which Hegel was the chief exponent.

Man, from his earliest thought, has been conscious of this vital conflict in the heart of nature; and the growth of our ideas about God have steadily increased the sense of this

conflict. As philosophers have come to realise the moral perfection of God, the forces in the universe which He created have grown darker and darker against the increasing light of His Being, as we have come to regard Him. We do well to think of such a God as the source of life and light, the painter of the sunset and the inspirer of poets and musicians; but everyone who has wrestled with the problem must be terribly and poignantly aware of the other side of the picture. "Did He Who made the lamb make thee?" cried Blake, as he contemplated the tiger; and this one question puts into a single cry the problem which has beset the minds of men ever since they have begun to think. The sunset, the maternal instinct and the world's great artistic achievements may speak to us of a God of Goodness, Truth and Beauty; but what about the tiger? What about the cobra and the diphtheritic germ, earthquakes, tidal waves and nature "red in tooth and claw"?

Long before the race of men began its appalling history of incredible lusts and incredible cruelties, those lusts and those cruelties were ravaging the world. Aëons before the first men emerged from their caves in their eternal quest for blood, little but that quest for blood was abroad in the universe. There may have been gorgeous sunrises and sunsets over those primeval deserts and jungles, and there were undoubtedly some beautiful creatures to be seen; but day and night the whole earth and the whole sea must have echoed with that hungry search for blood. Millions of years before the first prophets had their vision of a loving God, or Socrates found order and purpose in the Mind behind the universe, that hunt for blood with its attendant orgy of pain, disease and death, was the one potent factor in the universe; and this was before those early strivings found vent in the long history of the martyrdom of Man.

Now there is probably nobody who, viewing this spectacle of nature and history—viewing, in fact, that congealed mass of fears and suffering to which everyone who is born in the flesh is heir, can fail to see that this is utterly incompatible with a God of Beauty, Truth and Goodness. Somehow or other ugliness, falsehood and sin have got into the world which He created; and this sense of vital conflict has given rise to the doctrine of the Fall. It appears, in some guise, in all religions and is one of the foundations of Christianity;

but any theory which puts the whole of its weight upon Man must ignore the whole scale upon which it existed before the emergence of Man. That terrible catastrophe, the most appalling catastrophe in the whole history of the universe, must have happened millions of ages before the emergence of the human race if we are to account for all the facts; and so a doctrine of the Fall that does not take the whole phenomena of nature into account cannot possibly be said to solve the problem in any but a partial sense.

In order to reach the origin of this catastrophe we shall have to look deeply into the heart of nature for its cause; and this will be found, I think, to lead at once to certain deeply interesting conclusions. For the more we look into the material universe the more conscious we must become of the fact that matter is tainted at its source with this element, while spirit is striving against it wherever it is manifesting itself. Pain in its destructive sense, disease and death, are all physical in their operation—a fact which has led Plato, Augustine and Buddha, to regard the body as in a sense inherently evil; and which gave rise to the Manichæan heresy. Moreover, apart from its physical manifestations in life, matter is everywhere slowly disintegrating; and all the while it is being built up into various shapes of beauty or practical purpose, it is slowly rotting away. At the same time minds grow ever more and more powerful as they are utilised. Far from becoming exhausted, the spirit of Man takes on an ever more enduring aspect as it is used up in service; and minds become tougher and more subtle by those very uses which destroy matter.

We come nearest to this problem when we study the individual in the two aspects by which he discloses himself—body and mind. For as the mind grows it tends to become more stable and powerful, and the phases through which it passes are less changes than processes of development in which each stage is used up to better service in the next stage; but the body undergoes a very different fate. In spite of its physical growth it is running down the whole time. *The body is actually dying before birth.* From the moment of its conception it is dying; and the duel with death continues throughout its life—each new stage rendering it more vulnerable to the enemy which was conceived, born and grown with it, and which must ultimately overtake and defeat it. This amazing

paradox which so obsessed the mind of the poet Donne among others, is not limited to human life ; but can be seen in every corner of the universe. The whole creation is slowly dying and must, whatever turn it takes, end in wholesale material destruction.

It is not enough for us to see and admit the universal disintegration of matter unless we realise also that the spirit of Man is everywhere striving against this universal doom as something that is alien and does not harmonise with its nature. Death is not natural to man. Children are surprised when first they hear of it, or shocked when first they come upon it ; and the minds of men have ever striven, and with partial success, against the ravages of disease and pain. Moreover there are elements in his favour within nature herself. In spite of the toll which she takes of life and the means by which she spreads disease and pain, there are elements within herself that make for healing and the preservation of life—as though the forces at work for her destruction were alien to her own being. The problem at this point becomes acute ; but, at the same time, begins to yield up its secret. For it is only by the exercise of his mental faculties that Man can fully realise and utilise these forces ; and so defeat nature by nature. Wherever matter exists without mind there is a tendency for it to relapse into inertia and to disintegrate.

Now if we are to trace this disharmony in the universe to its source we shall have to admit outright that the catastrophe must have ante-dated the creation of the material universe. There is, however, no need to put the Fall back behind the creation of matter, but there must have been a fall in the spiritual world which resulted in the creation of matter since the only kind of universe that could have existed before the creation of a material universe must have been a spiritual one. We must argue, once the moral perfection of God is admitted, that such a universe existed before the material universe because the material universe is full of the taint which we have already seen is antagonistic to the purpose of God. There must therefore have been some pre-mundane catastrophe which resulted in a fall of spirit to a material level. It need not have involved the whole spiritual creation and it may have affected other parts of the spiritual universe in other ways ; but, if the nature of God be that of

a loving Father, then the nature of matter is incompatible with His nature ; it could not have been created *just as such* by Him. It must be a diseased and vitiated form of something which He had already created ; and it is not unreasonable therefore to speak of matter as fallen spirit.

Before going any further with the argument it is necessary to point out that matter is not evil on this account. It is, on the contrary, good in itself, because it was originally the creation of God ; but it is a corrupted and fallen edition of that creation—destined to pass through many trials before it can regain its former status—standing in need of redemption. How that Fall came about and how matter must reascend to its former spiritual nature it will be the purpose of this article to disclose as far as human language can disclose it ; but it would be a fundamental error to suggest that matter was of itself evil. The most that can be said is that it was the nature which spirit was bound to assume as the result of its rebellion against God. The theory is by no means entirely new ; but has appeared, from time to time, under various guises during the history of theology. Origen was the first to entertain the notion of a pre-mundane Fall ; and the idea has come up again since the theory of evolution and modern Biblical scholarship rendered the story of Eden an allegory. A whisper has come down the ages that a collective Fall in Time, approximating to the fall of the angels as disclosed in Genesis vi, occurred before the creation of a material universe ; and even the story of the Fallen Angels shared an equal prestige with that of the Eden myth until the theology of St. Paul established the latter theory in Christian theology and the angel story began to lose its significance. Some such pre-mundane fall may actually claim to be a part of the Christian Revelation—since our Lord spoke of a fall of Satan which can hardly be supposed to have happened after the creation of the worlds.

The theory of a fall from spirit into matter, by the creation's own will is, I think, the only theory of the pre-mundane Fall that entirely acquits God of responsibility for the taint that is in matter ; and it has the double advantage of disclosing God as the Creator of one universe—in which perfect Beauty, perfect Truth and perfect Goodness must once have flourished. There could have been no pain, disease or death in such a state ; because it was a perfectly spiritual creation—an

angelic creation. That is the state which we call Heaven ; and which would, but for the abuse of free will, have been the lot of the sons of God for all eternity. Man has from the dawn of mind been conscious of a realm of spirits higher than himself ; and at all times he has been conscious of an animal nature lower than himself. Is it not possible to see in this amphibious nature the two origins at war within a single personality, the original universe to which his soul belongs and the fallen universe of matter that his body has inherited ?

The ultimate Fall from spirit to matter must remain a mystery so long as the spiritual universe is outside the region of visible experience ; but at least it is a mystery that sheds a wealth of light upon other mysteries. For if matter be fallen spirit, as the outcome of some great pre-mundane catastrophe in the spiritual world, we can see how it has been slowly and painfully returning to that state throughout the story of the universe. God made Man originally in His own image—a spiritual body fit to exercise His perfect will ; and after his fall from that state man has been slowly making himself in the image of God. Of course God never lost him, and we can see the spirit of God working through the hideous panorama of evolution ; but the creation lost its vision of God at the Fall, and the career upon which it entered as a material state was one of slowly feeling its way back to Him. At last, after millions of ages spent in blindness and pain and groping and death, the material universe has worked its way up to a spiritual state once more and the fallen angels have emerged in the separate minds of man ; but that shroud of matter in which we wound ourselves at the Fall still hides the vision of God from us and none but those who have the gift of living entirely in the spirit can see God until death.

The vital difficulty of belief in a pre-mundane Fall of a spiritual universe of living beings to a material potentiality without apparent life is obvious. For the pre-mundane Fall, if it inaugurated the material universe, must have been a fall from collective life to what I must roughly describe as a lump of matter. For the primeval gases out of which our universe evolved to its present state of complexity was apparently devoid of all intelligence and life ; and certainly possessed no individuality. The Fall of the angels must therefore have been a complete and total collapse of life which involved a temporary loss of individuality ; and matter cannot, in such

circumstances, be described better than by terming it “dead spirit.” Moreover their environment must have been included in the Fall.

At the same time it must be remembered that life could not have been extinct at the inauguration of the material universe since the primeval vapours possessed the potentialities of the universe into which it was to evolve ; but life was certainly dormant at the beginning of its career, so evolution assumes a different character at once. So we realise that, if it was a slow awakening, or unpacking of what was already inherent within matter from the beginning, life did not become extinct at the Fall ; but had to fight its way into maturity again through the material form which it had assumed. Moreover it is not possible to say that angels possess personality in the sense that men do since they are created perfect and do not have to go through that school of education by suffering and frustration that is the anvil on which personality is forged. So a fall of angels into the mass of material potentiality which originated our universe is not so unreasonable as might appear at first sight.

The story of evolution is the history of the fallen race's slow and often terrible pilgrimage back to the glories of the spirituality which once it lost. Having lost the vision of God it had to be done in darkness and blind ignorance for many thousands of ages. In all those æons of time, before the dawn of intelligence, the evil results of the Fall were manifested in the blind struggle for existence ; and the dawning of the material consciousness was attended by the sensualities and hungers of the nature which the fallen angels had assumed. At last the creatures groped their way into the light of intelligence, but the waste had been appalling ; and even then there were to be millions of years more of blunderings, strivings, deaths and agonies, before these creatures even attained the cruel and wicked little minds of the first men. Since then the story has not been unlike an eternal tragedy. Kingdoms have grown and flourished upon incredible cruelties and incredible lusts—only to be shattered either by those who have achieved a great material splendour or by those whose crudity and barbarism have given them the advantage. In all the most splendid achievements of men—in the plays of Shakespeare, the histories of Thucydides, the symphonies of Beethoven and the heart of the great Bible itself, that

overwhelming sense of Man's martyrdom to the forces of evil is displayed; and the greater the mind the more vitally conscious has it always been of this poignant paradox in the universe. The only answer to this question, written in blood and flame over the whole page of history, is that God did not create these forces. He created a Heaven of eternal happiness and goodwill; but His creatures, or some of them, turned from Him and rebelled against Him; and plunged themselves into a darkness and blindness which only His love has saved them from eternally.

For here we come to the crux of the whole problem; and can see how the Christian can solve this problem of the love of God in the face of so much evil—once he admits the Fall. God has permitted the Fall rather than deny His creation the possibility of falling; but in His eternal foreknowledge He must have envisaged the appalling consequences of such an act, and here comes in the possibility of redemption. There was one thing that God could do that would reunite the fallen universe with Himself. That universe had shut Him out by the material shape which it had assumed; and the only redemptive movement that God could make was to enter the material world and bring into it the light of the spiritual.

Now this is not the place for a disquisition on the theology or the merits of our Lord's death upon the cross; but the point I want to drive home goes like a wedge through my whole argument. God could not reconcile the world to Himself unless He met the world upon its own ground; and, in order to do this *He had to assume the fallen shape and enter matter*. For there is no sin in matter—although matter was the shape that the creatures who first sinned assumed because of their sin. Perhaps St. Paul had something of this in mind when he spoke of God as having "become sin for our sake." There are certainly passages in his epistles which seem to regard matter as the least common multiple into which both God and sin will go. Moreover such a view of the incarnation enormously amplifies our view of the redemption; and we can think of that act of God as not merely achieved for Man alone, but for the whole material creation.

ASHLEY SAMPSON.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

VENISELOS.

ELEFTHERIOS VENISELOS died after a short illness on March 18th. What he did had been largely undone before he died. What he was, was understood by only a few intimate friends. Ronald Burrows died sixteen years ago; else the obituary notices that appeared in the British Press on March 19th last might have included at least one contribution by a man who understood Veniselos. Veniselos was not easy to understand. Certainly the average Greek did not understand him. In his public aspect he was an imperialist who brilliantly achieved his objects by skilful diplomacy and personal charm (which are two aspects of one single thing) but who could not win and keep the confidence of his own people. No one ever did, or ever will, win and keep the confidence of the Greek people. What the Greek people want more than any other blessing on earth, is something new, a change from present dispensations to something else, whatever it may be.

If the Greek people did not understand Veniselos, neither did he understand them. In his mind he cherished an ideal of the Greek people and, as it were, obstinately refused to believe that the Greek people were other than he idealised them to be. After the normal manner of simple people, Veniselos was a bad judge of character. Throughout his life he was victimised by "friends" and colleagues who to any eyes except his own were obvious frauds. Veniselos seemed to be incapable of suspecting duplicity, disloyalty, or other such defects of character in those around him, because those defects lay so far outside the range of his own possibilities that he seemed not to be conscious of them. Nor, in that respect, did he ever learn any lesson. In 1920 he emptied the gaols of his political enemies, so that they might vote against him; and was surprised and hurt when they did vote against him. In consequence, he was exiled from Greece: he who by the result of the war had been proved right in his conduct in 1916 when he set up his provisional government at Salonika and insisted, against the King, on Greece's fighting, not against, but on the side of, the Allies; he who after the war had raised Greek diplomatic prestige

so high that no single essential Greek claim had been denied by the Great Powers sitting in Paris. The truth is that Veniselos was not a typical Greek. The restless desire to plunge from one new thing to another he never understood. When the people he served not only voted against him at the polls, but turned against him such a fury that he had to flee the country for his life, his heart was broken, and he announced his withdrawal from politics for the rest of his life. Yet within three years, when the Veniselist Treaty of Sèvres, no longer tenable because Veniselos was not there to defend it, duly came to be revised at the Lausanne conference, he did not hesitate to accept the post of Greek delegate at that conference. He was still an exile; it was clearly understood that he must not again set foot on Greek soil. Yet he had been proved to be a good diplomatist, one who might again wrest from the Powers what Greece wanted, and Greece, therefore, asked him again to serve her while still accepting the status of exile. Fortunately Veniselos himself had little sense of humour. He was desperately sincere in his devotion to Greece. When in November 1922 Athens condemned to death certain Cabinet Ministers for losing the war in Anatolia, Veniselos resisted the pressure put upon him by Lord Curzon to advise Athens against the executions. Veniselos said it was not his business, as indeed it was not, except in so far as the indignation caused thereby at Lausanne might damage Veniselos's chance of successfully upholding Greek interests. What he did, therefore, was to telegraph to Athens asking them to have in readiness an alternative to himself as Greek representative in the event aforesaid; and he did at the same time point out the possible serious consequences that might follow the carrying out of the executions. What is interesting is that he never wavered in his determination to serve Greece except in so far as he thought someone else might do it better.

The two outstanding features of his character were his patriotism and the objectivity of his ambition. His patriotism was of the quaint old-fashioned type that makes a man measure his country's glory by the extent of her military conquests. His ambition was so objectively centred upon his country, rather than upon himself, that he failed to recognise the dangers directed against himself. His sense of loyalty to his friends was such that a year before he died he allowed himself to be dragged into an adventure of which he could

never have approved and which was so obvious a mistake that it cost him the friendship of many who before had admired him.

He was one of the most unusual men we are likely to know in our time. A born leader of men and a man of action; a shrewd diplomatist, always asking less than he ultimately expected to get and thus getting it bit by bit; yet a man of singularly gentle charm and courtesy. He started his active life as a rebel in the Cretan hills, shouldering his rifle even in his early teens. By his fanatic belief in the qualities of the Greek people he led that people away from the King at a crisis in the country's fortunes and thereby saved his country from the disaster of fighting on the wrong side in the Great War; he drove out the dynasty itself; and after the war he miraculously persuaded the Paris conference to give him Smyrna. He could have made a success of Smyrna, though Greece without him could not. Having won Smyrna by diplomatic means, and Greece having lost it again by military means, Veniselos yet lived to achieve in 1930 his greatest triumph, namely the closing of the chronic Greco-Turkish feud. On October 30th, 1930, Veniselos visited Angora to sign with Ismet Pasha a treaty of friendship, a convention for the stabilisation of the Greek and Turkish fleets, a trade agreement and subsidiary agreements such as together did indeed inaugurate a new phase of Near Eastern relationships. That part of his work has not been destroyed.

GERMANY AND EUROPE.

The action taken by Herr Hitler on March 7th, when he made certain proposals for safeguarding the peace of Europe and at the same time sent his troops goose-stepping into the Rhine zone and tore up the *Treaty of Locarno*, was the precursor of an astonishingly muddled series of conferences in London, Paris and Geneva. Within twenty-four hours of Herr Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhine zone the French Government formally appealed to the League of Nations and M. Sarraut broadcast an uncompromising opposition to the whole recent body of Herr Hitler's works (March 8th). On March 10th a hurried meeting took place in Paris of the non-German Locarno signatories: namely of Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. Mr. Eden attended that meeting

on behalf of the British Government. He was accompanied by Lord Halifax. The moment he met M. Flandin face to face Mr. Eden recognised that his self-imposed rôle of mediator between France and Germany was going to be more difficult than he had expected. M. Flandin showed an intransigent front, and flatly refused to discuss the Hitler proposals until the Hitler action in reoccupying the Rhineland zone and tearing up the Locarno Treaty had been undone. Mr. Eden was so impressed with M. Flandin's rigidity that he put to him what he thought might be a question such as would force M. Flandin himself to ponder the logic of his attitude. "Would you," asked Mr. Eden, "go to the length of military sanctions to resist this thing of Herr Hitler's?" M. Flandin stood terse and tense, and after only a moment's dramatic hesitation hissed out the single word "*Oui!*" Mr. Eden thereupon rushed to the telephone for instructions from London. London being quite incapable of giving instructions—the Cabinet being so much at sixes and sevens that it was incapable of defining any policy on any subject—Mr. Eden suggested that the meeting of the non-German Locarno Powers should be transferred from Paris to London. He was the more anxious to gain time and to be nearer home because M. Van Zeeland, the Belgian Prime Minister, at the Paris meeting had also made an impressive argument. Before the war, he said, Belgium had been "guaranteed" her neutrality. The guarantee was proved in 1914 to be worthless as a protection. After the war, in 1925, she was given another form of protection, namely that of the Locarno Treaty. In its turn that guarantee of Belgian integrity had been destroyed. Herr Hitler had made the excuse that the Locarno Treaty had already been in effect destroyed by the Franco-Russian Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Yet Belgium had not made any pact with Russia.

The adjourned meeting reassembled in London on March 12th. It presented such a spectacle as the diplomatists of the now prevailing quality can apparently contemplate with equanimity, although it violates every dictate of common sense. The essence of the situation was that Germany had by now recovered her position as the strongest military power in Europe. She therefore repudiated such clauses of the Treaty of Versailles as prescribed to Germany an unequal status: Articles 42 and 43, for example, which provided for the

demilitarisation of the Rhineland zone on the German side of the frontier. Inasmuch as those Versailles clauses had been incorporated as an integral part of the Treaty of Locarno, Germany rejected also the Treaty of Locarno. Quite simply Germany threw down a challenge to the Versailles Powers, rejected every diplomatic instrument which limited German sovereignty over German territory, and defied the Versailles Powers to do their worst. Faced with such a situation the Versailles Powers took refuge in the lamest and most academic of juridical arguments.

On March 14th the League Council, which also sat in London, sent an invitation to the German Government to be represented at the further Council meetings which were to be held about the Franco-Belgian submission. The invitation was sent not by virtue of Article 17 of the Covenant (whereby Germany would be invested temporarily with the full status of a League member) but of Article 4 of the Locarno Treaty.

The distinction meant that if Germany accepted the Council's invitation she would attend as a non-League State for the exclusive purpose of answering the Franco-Belgian charge that she had violated the Locarno Treaty.

There followed a week of intense muddle. On Sunday, March 15th, Herr Hitler telegraphed to M. Avenol, the Secretary-General of the League, his acceptance of the League's proposal, on two conditions: (a) that Germany be assured of a status of equality in the proceedings of the Council; (b) that she be given a clear assurance that Herr Hitler's proposals of March 7th would be discussed as an integral whole and *alsbald*. (*Alsald*, short for *alsobald*, is a literal equivalent of the French *aussitôt*, there being no exact English equivalent. It means "as soon as may be." It was at first translated "forthwith," but the storm abated on the compromise translation "in due course.")

On Monday, March 16th, the League Council answered that it could promise equality of status, but was not competent to promise anything about the Hitler proposals. M. Flandin submitted to the Council a joint Franco-Belgian resolution that the German Government by reoccupying the Rhineland had violated Article 43 of the Versailles Treaty and also the Locarno Treaty. Mr. Eden telegraphed to Berlin an assurance that he would do his best to promote a settlement by discussion of the Hitler and other proposals "at the proper time."

On March 18th Herr von Ribbentrop arrived in London by air. On March 19th a long and heavy day's work included Herr von Ribbentrop's defence before the League Council of Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland. His case was that as the Franco-Russian Pact of Mutual Assistance violated the Locarno Treaty, that Treaty was thereby "terminated" by France, and therefore the Locarno obligation to honour Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles no longer held. The Council thereupon registered its formal finding that Germany had violated both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Locarno. The non-German Locarno signatories decided to submit Germany's argument about the Franco-Russian Pact to the World Court. They further drafted the Four-Power Proposals to Germany. Mr. Eden presented them to Herr von Ribbentrop that night.

The main proposals were (a) that the juridical issue between Germany and France be submitted to the World Court, Germany to undertake to "accept" its decision, France being bound, should the decision go against her, to denounce the Franco-Russian Pact; (b) that immediate discussion should take place between the five Locarno signatories on Herr Hitler's proposals of March 7th, and other proposals made by the Four Powers; (c) that for the interim period of those discussions an international force should occupy a strip of German territory along the French and Belgian frontiers; (d) that if the first conference thus proposed should succeed, there should be convened a world conference on armaments, economic collaboration and pacts of mutual assistance; (e) that in the interim period the general staffs of the Four Powers should consult about interim precautions against aggression, and that in the event of the failure of the first conference those general staffs should consult about permanent measures in that sense.

On March 21st, Herr von Ribbentrop flew to Berlin to consult his Government. He flew back to London on March 24th. That evening he presented to Mr. Eden a written "preliminary" answer to the proposals of March 19th. Preliminary, because he intimated that the "definitive" answer would not be given till the elections in Germany had taken place. The document of March 24th reiterated the German view that the Franco-Russian Pact had destroyed the basis of the Locarno Treaty; that the Rhineland had been

reoccupied to vindicate Germany's equality of status; that the proposed new Rhine zone could not be accepted, for the same reason; but that Germany would make an alternative contribution to pacific diplomacy.

British diplomacy was debated in the House of Commons on March 26th. Some surprise was caused in German, and relief in French, quarters by the general feeling then expressed that it was not enough for Germany to reject "unequal" proposals. Mr. Eden emphasised the need of a "constructive contribution" from Germany. He represented it to be a "vital interest" of Britain that no enemy should cross the Belgian or French frontier. He reiterated the British commitment to resist such aggression. The general debate had the cumulative effect of distinguishing sharply between German sovereignty on German soil and Germany's joint responsibility for safeguarding the peace outside.

Herr von Ribbentrop and Herr Dieckhoff on March 27th had a further conversation with Mr. Eden and Lord Cranborne before flying to Berlin. This time the German envoys showed an even stiffer front. They gave no encouragement to Mr. Eden's hope that Germany would help on the negotiations by a conciliatory gesture. The suggested gesture was that Germany should refrain at least from building fortifications in the reoccupied zone for the short period of the first conference proposed by the Four Powers. Such a gesture would be easy, because anyhow Germany could not build the fortifications in the time. But it unfortunately encroached upon the symbolic principle of German sovereignty.

The German elections duly took place on March 29th, and Herr Hitler duly received his 100 per cent., less one per cent. due to spoilt papers. The single-candidate election thus proved how simple life can be. On March 31st, Herr von Ribbentrop flew to London. On April 1st he presented to Mr. Eden the German answer to the Four-Power proposals of March 19th. Those proposals themselves were rejected. In their place Herr Hitler submitted a new set of proposals in a long and comprehensive document. He proposed a progression from an initial diplomatic armistice to the negotiation of security pacts and thence to wider negotiation for disarmament and economic co-operation.

The Four Powers had suggested two stages, one for the negotiation of immediate pacts, the other for a wider

settlement. Herr Hitler proposed three. But the three were not clearly defined. He described them himself as (1) a period of calm; (2) "actual negotiations for securing the peace of Europe"; and (3) a later period of indeterminate scope to include discussion of armaments and economics. But he then went on in his own document to refer to his own second period as the first.

Herr Hitler proposed that the "first" period up to the "signature of the non-aggression pacts and thus covering a guaranteed European peace" should be limited to four months. During that time he suggested a standstill in the Rhine zone, supervised by Britain and Italy as guarantors of a new "Locarno" treaty to be concurrently negotiated. But the supervising Commission was to include also a "disinterested third neutral Power," and moreover Germany, Belgium and France should send a representative. Holland was suggested as a party to the new "Locarno" treaty. Parallel treaties in Central, South-Eastern, and Eastern Europe were proposed. Germany was willing to re-enter the League of Nations during or after this period, but added that she "expects" the Covenant to be detached from the Treaty of Versailles and "colonial equality of rights" to be "cleared up."

After the accomplishment of that big programme Germany suggested the still bigger conference for limiting armaments and removing the obstacles to international trade. She was vague about trade. About armaments she made certain precise suggestions, such as the prohibition of poison gas or bombs, of the bombing of cities outside the battle zone, of heavy tanks, of heavy artillery.

Mr. Eden announced to the House on April 3rd that he had delivered to the French and Belgian Governments the letter agreed on in the Four-Power proposals. That letter gave an undertaking, in the event of a failure to reach agreement with Germany, to embark upon the staff talks prescribed. The despatch of the letter was accompanied by three provisos: that it did not imply the failure of conciliation; that it implied no new commitment; that the talks should take place in London.

In the very middle of so unsatisfactory a course of diplomatic activity, Leopold von Hoesch, the German Ambassador, suddenly died. He died on April 10th, at the untimely

age of fifty-five. No diplomatist of our time had a harder thing to do than fell to him. He did it, and he did it well. Quiet, accomplished and suave, he was the very man to soothe the raw and angry temper that crossed the Rhine from both sides. He went to Paris at the worst phase of Franco-German ill feeling in 1921. It was in large measure due to his historic good sense and good feeling that the atmosphere changed from that of the Ruhr occupation in 1923 to the signature of the Locarno Treaty in 1925. The Stresemann-Briand spirit owed much to him. It is our common tragedy that in his last years so good an influence was smothered. He took no part in the London diplomatic talks that were in progress at the time of his death. There is something almost symbolic in that fact.

A further week of increased confusion was ushered in by still another House of Commons' debate on British foreign policy. What was the Government's foreign policy? On April 6th, when he spoke, Mr. Eden had the German proposals in front of him and knew that French proposals were about to be made. He knew that Italy had ceased to meet any opposition in Abyssinia. He knew that Italy was an indispensable party to the "Locarno" talks in London and in Geneva. Yet in his speech he reverted to his old emphasis upon the Covenant of the League and "collective security."

Paris published its memorandum on April 8th. In Part I it reviewed events since March 7th, and combated the German argument about Locarno and the Rhine zone. Part II outlined a system of peace in Europe for twenty-five years. Europe was therein deemed to be "a characteristic regional unit." The central purpose of the proposal was the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* for twenty-five years, secured by the sort of machinery first proposed in the Geneva Protocol of 1924. The whole was framed within the League. Mutual assistance against aggression, specified in detail by a military commitment, was the main machinery proposed. German opinion gave as prompt as and as whole-hearted a disapproval to the French proposals as French opinion gave to the German proposals exactly a week before.

The League's Committee of Thirteen met in Geneva on April 8th. It did one good thing. France had demanded a formal meeting of the non-German Locarno Powers to "establish" Germany's default. Britain had resisted that

demand on the main ground that it invited trouble. Instead, the Committee of Thirteen gave the opportunity for an informal meeting of the Locarno Powers at Geneva. The distinction on this occasion between formal and informal talks had its importance. It left the doors open. The Locarno Powers decided to put questions to Germany about her memorandum, France reserving her discretion on the question of Germany's Rhine fortifications.

At that point a diversion was caused by Mr. Eden's obsession with the Italo-Abyssinian war. In the doctrine according to Mr. Eden oil again belied its proverbial use for troubled waters. On April 8th the Committee of Thirteen, whose theoretic business it was to encourage the belligerents in Abyssinia to make peace, began speculating upon the chance of an armistice. An armistice was the first step towards peace. An invitation was to be sent to Rome in that sense and an answer invited—by when? April 21st was favoured by France. That day happened to be the anniversary of the foundation of Rome. A good date for the purpose. Alas! Mr. Eden fought M. Flandin and contrived to have the date altered to April 16th. Mr. Eden also contrived to make some threat about further sanctions. Where finesse was needed, the old crude issue was again emphasised: whether to parade the failure of Geneva's collective system, or to invite war in the Mediterranean?

When Mr. Eden returned to London from Geneva on April 11th, the position was that the step next to be taken in the search for formulæ on which might be based an understanding in Western Europe must be taken by him. The non-German Locarno Powers had set themselves the task of "exploring all the opportunities of conciliation" by the method in the first instance of seeking an "elucidation of a certain number of points contained in the German memorandum"; and the representatives of the British Government were for that purpose commissioned by France, Italy, and Belgium to "get into touch with the German Government." In the terms of that commission the specific points of the German memorandum that required elucidation were those which related to Germany's offer not to increase her present strength in the Rhineland.

A delicate essay in diplomatic finesse thus fell to Mr. Eden's lot. Its delicacy was due, not only to the obstinate

nature of the issue in principle between Germany and France, which had brought the talks to a virtual deadlock, but to the formal reservation made in advance by France and the increased Italian resentment against Mr. Eden's exposition of the British case at Geneva.

Even without what was generally regarded as the unnecessary complication of Italian resentment, the problem in hand was forbidding enough; for before Mr. Eden left Geneva he was given a formal French warning that if the fortification of the Rhineland was begun by Germany in the period between then and the May meeting of the League Council, the "coercive measures" prescribed for the contingency of a failure to reach conciliation would forthwith in the French view be applicable.

An old question, often asked in the past by those who study the part played by Great Britain in European diplomacy, was again being asked. The question was this: Why does not the British Government take a definite stand, and make a definite commitment to take action in the event of German aggression in Central or Eastern Europe, as distinct from Western Europe?

At the present time both Russian and French opinion show less interest in Herr Hitler's proposals about Western Europe than in their implications about Central Europe. The countries of Central Europe—Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania in particular—are deeply concerned in the matter. To make clear what is the attitude of British opinion it is necessary first of all to state the case as seen from Paris and Moscow. Those two centres argue in this way: The internal financial and economic position of Germany is so bad that it is indispensable, if Herr Hitler is to maintain his position, that he should continue to score spectacular "successes" abroad. His reoccupation of the Rhineland served its purpose on March 29th, when the election took place. What next? It is necessary, in Herr Hitler's personal interests, that Germany should expand, should obtain new territories for raw materials and for markets. It is unlikely that Russia will be his immediate objective, because Russia is enormously strong in a military sense and because there is a vast and powerful Slav bloc between Germany and Russia. In the west, there is Holland, with her important colonial possessions. But in the west also there is the certainty that

any German aggression would be met by prompt action on the part of Great Britain. It is therefore considered likely that Herr Hitler's main present thought is concentrated on the old dream of *Mittleuropa*; and that therefore his next objective will be Austria. Supposing, for the sake of the argument, that he succeeds, by the method of the internal nazification of Austria, in virtually annexing that country, and no action is taken by Great Britain? What then will be the position of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania? Would not the opportunity afforded by the Henlein party in Czechoslovakia provide him with his next temptation? And would not the oil-fields of Rumania be an added temptation? The treaty relationship between Czechoslovakia, France and Russia would no doubt lead to French and Russian action against Germany in such a contingency. And would not such a contingency have the inevitable indirect effect of implicating Great Britain? If so, why does not the British Government give a specific undertaking to meet the contingency? The crowning point of the Franco-Russian argument is that if a united French, British and Russian undertaking could be announced to the effect that a German aggression in Central Europe would be promptly met by armed resistance on the part of those three Powers, then it is reasonably certain that Germany would never commit any such aggression.

Such is the argument. It is met by silence on the part of the British Government and of British opinion alike. It is true that the British Government's commitment under the Covenant of the League of Nations would by itself, if strictly carried out, provide all the commitment desired by French and Russian diplomacy. But it is a well-known fact that in present circumstances the Covenant of the League of Nations cannot be regarded by the potential victims of aggression as a reliable safeguard. What then is the true explanation of British reluctance to take the firm stand demanded by France and Russia? There are two main reasons for it: (1) that the anti-German combination was successful in the field of battle in 1918, when Japan, Italy and the United States of America were parties to it; yet the military victory of 1918 has not eliminated the German problem in 1936; and (2) that no British Government could make a commitment about Central or Eastern Europe and survive the storm of public disapproval that would thereby be aroused.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

April 15th, 1936.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE CAUSES OF THE CRIMEA.*

This is the first instalment of Professor Temperley's proposed history of British relations with the Near East from Canning's death to the Berlin Treaty. The author is admirably qualified for his work. He has written an excellent *History of Serbia*, one important element in the problem; he has published three articles on Stratford de Redcliffe; and is personally familiar with Montenegro, Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Unlike a certain British Foreign Secretary, of whom it was said to the reviewer by a Russian diplomatist that "he thought niggers began at Calais," this historian shows that he knows the psychology of the peoples of whom he writes, and realises that in the Near East "the improbable happens." Moreover, his work rests upon the impregnable rock of documentary evidence, not upon the accounts of "Europeans," each certain to have a pet nationality under his enlightened protection. He has ransacked the records of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, of Vienna, Paris and The Hague, and has supplied the omissions from the British Blue Books, which so disingenuously prevented the public from knowing the whole truth, in international questions usually different from the official version. He realises the fact, to which every

* *England and the Near East. The Crimea.* By Harold Temperley, F.B.A. Longmans, Green & Co. 1936. 548 pp. 25s.

foreign correspondent can testify, that "the best contemporary comment on the action of Great Powers usually comes from the diplomats of a small neutral state." They see a wider circle of people, not merely their *chers collègues* and high officials, they know the business men and are more likely to know the language of the country, instead of obtaining information through the dubious medium of "diplomatic French."

Salisbury said long afterwards that in the Crimean War we "put our money on the wrong horse," and did his best to make amends by supporting the Balkan States. But in the period covered by this volume from the reforms of Mahmud II to the outbreak of the Crimean War everyone was either pro-Turk or pro-Russian, and the Christian nationalities of the Near East were only considered in so far as they furthered or hindered the traditional policy of this or that Great Power. Even Stratford, who knew the Turks, cherished the hope that they would reform in fact as on paper, whereas under the feeble Abdul Medjid Turkey was "that worst of all governments, a despotism without a despot." Yet even Othonian Greece, despite her narrow limits, made more progress than "reformed" Turkey, which had not then made the recent discovery that Constantinople as a capital was a source of weakness because accessible by sea alike to Russia and the Western Powers, if the paper guarantees regarding the Straits were disregarded. The author gives an enlightening account of the struggle between Turkey and Egypt, and of the Revolt in the Lebanon, where France had historic ties with the Maronites, whose "church became political without the Maronite state becoming religious"—a common phase of ecclesiastical organisation in the Near East, where the reviewer has seen a bishop with a rifle heading an insurrection and a Metropolitan conducting political propaganda.

The Bosnian insurrection is shown to have been an indirect cause of the Crimean War, and thus justifies the author in giving a graphic sketch of Bosnian feudal society with extracts from Serb ballads. He points out that Jellačić created "the first really Yugoslav movement," and that a restive Herzegovina and a free Montenegro were dangers to Turkey alike in 1853 and in 1875. Thus, by the middle of the century various causes had accumulated to provoke a Turco-Russian crisis, of which the last and most virulent was

the dispute about the Holy Places, largely fostered by Napoleon's desire to secure Catholic support for his political ends. Thus, as in former days "the difference of a single diphthong" convulsed the church, so the possession of a key disturbed the chanceries, and a quarrel of monks at Jerusalem helped to set armies and fleets in motion.

In an appendix the author sums up judiciously the responsibilities. He blames the Turks for the failure of their reforms, for duplicity in the award about the keys and for Omer's invasion of Montenegro; he censures France for her share in the dispute at Jerusalem, for sending a squadron to Tripoli and her Mediterranean fleet to Salamis, but rejects "Kinglake's theory that Napoleon deliberately promoted or desired war." As for Great Britain she "had two policies." As in those days Ambassadors were not yet, in Bismarck's phrase, merely "highly-paid postmen," Stratford at Constantinople could and did have a policy of his own. The author is more lenient to him than previous writers. He admits that "this imperious man used smooth language to Russia in public and violently denounced her in private," but contends that what he wanted was the internal reform of Turkey, not war. But the "Great Ambassador's" majestic brow might convey to a Turkish Minister more than his spoken words or official instructions, and he had no cause to love Nicholas, while his predecessor, Ponsonby, was "more anti-Russian than Palmerston," the advocate, with Russell, of strong measures, as Aberdeen of "peace at any price," and Clarendon of moderation. The Czar's intention to create war out of the Menšikov mission is considered improbable, but his envoy exceeded his instructions and was a bigot. The invasion of the Principalities above all led to war, but the "massacre of Sinope" is pronounced "a perfectly legitimate operation."

The conclusion is that peace and war depended upon seemingly "trivial questions," and that Great Britain "drifted into war." The newspapers, as usual, inflamed public opinion, and "the cabinet is often unhappy in its decisions on foreign affairs," of which, to quote Salisbury, its "members are usually ignorant and seldom united in their views." So they entered on the most futile war of the Victorian era. The volume is illustrated by three maps and a portrait of "the Voice of England in the East," while the notes contain much valuable material on the Turkish Press,

Urquhart, Mehemet Ali, the British connection with the Druses, the Illyrian movement, French religious protection and the Greek orthodox and Russian claims.

WILLIAM MILLER.

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THE TYRANNY OF GREECE OVER GERMANY.*

"German literature," says Walter Pater, "transformed as we see it in Goethe, reckons Winckelmann among its initiators." He quotes Goethe's judgment: "One learns nothing, but one becomes something." Concerning Winckelmann there are two facts with which Miss Butler struggles and which she strongly rejects: the early conversion of the great pagan to catholicism and Winckelmann's refusal to go to Greece in his later days. Let us compare Walter Pater's treatment of this question. "It is clear," he says, "that Winckelmann intended to deceive no one by his disguise . . . on the other hand he may have had a sense of a certain antique, and as it were, pagan grandeur in the Roman Catholic religion." Miss Butler is deeply disappointed that Winckelmann, instead of taking the opportunity of seeing his beloved Greece, returned to foggy Germany and consequently became the victim of an infamous murder. On the other hand Walter Pater celebrates Winckelmann's last destiny with the following sentence: "It seems as if the gods in reward for his devotion to them had given him a death which for its swiftness and its opportunity he might well have desired."

Miss Butler does not analyse the fundamental history of antique art, which is the main work of Winckelmann. His illuminated sayings on Greek sculpture, which enabled him to divine the temperament of the antique world and which gave him the intuition of its ideas and beauty, Miss Butler considers as "sybilline utterance, obscure at times, obviously made in a state of clairvoyance and not the result of observation. . . ." The same lack of understanding Miss Butler shows in her treatment of Winckelmann's marvellous gift of friendship. Since the days of antiquity there has not been a greater lover than Winckelmann, and it is Pater again who

* By E. M. Butler. Cambridge University Press. 15s.

has still the right judgment of this phenomenon. "These friendships," he says, "perfected his reconciliation with the spirit of Greek sculpture." Miss Butler on the other hand discovers in Winckelmann's letters of friendship but "torrid words and phrases," which "can be blown away like dry little grains of sand, and leave no trace." These quotations may be sufficient to show how far literary criticism has declined since the days of Walter Pater.

The following chapters of Miss Butler's book are fortunately more on a level with her subject. Goethe and Schiller, Heine and Hoelderlin are shown in their creative relation to the Greek ideal. But I cannot help feeling that the desire to find a place for her thorough study on Heine has disturbed the proportion of her work. German classicism, derived from Winckelmann, deepened and amplified by Hoelderlin, reaches its climax when Friedrich Nietzsche in *The Birth of the Tragedy* denied "that a people who had produced Greek tragedy could ever have been sunny or serene." He put forth "the Dionysian vision of a tragic universe which underlay and accompanied the Apolline beauty." Miss Butler has true feeling for the greatness and loneliness of Nietzsche's vision. She knows also that Nietzsche's conception is influenced by Richard Wagner's musical drama. But there is one point in Miss Butler's thesis with which critics cannot possibly agree: the belief that Nietzsche's great and creative conception of a tragic Dionysian world is due to Heine's description in *The Gods in Exile*. Apart from this Miss Butler's study on Nietzsche is of objective value and importance. It is to be regretted that with the Nietzsche chapter the book is not concluded. Beyond this sphere historical judgment grows necessarily vague. Miss Butler nevertheless deals with Carl Spitteler, the Swiss poet, whose "boisterous" and "grotesque" epic, *The Olympic Springtime*, is fortunately forgotten in countries of German language. Her chapter on Stefan George reveals only a non-German's difficulty in approaching this austere and enigmatic poet, whose destiny and whose power of expression lie beyond the realms of even an outstanding literary critic.

Amazing is the final conclusion at which Miss Butler arrives. Her opinion that Goethe and Schiller, Nietzsche and George lost more than they gained by modelling themselves on the Greeks is absurd to everybody who has the

faintest idea of the fatal and irresistible longing of the German genius for Italy and for Greece where he finds his natural accomplishment. Goethe confessed that during the last years before he went to Italy he could not even touch a Latin or Italian book without suffering the heaviest pain. Miss Butler on her side will "cheerfully" exchange the whole achievement of Goethe's classical period for his early youthful poetry, which the master himself almost rejected and strongly retouched in his later days. But considering the tragic end of Winckelmann, Nietzsche and Hölderlin, Miss Butler mercifully regrets that this German classical movement was ever born. She is unwilling to admit that the personal tragedies are justified transcendently because they resulted in great art. Neither the Greeks nor the Germans nor even "Pallas Athene," to whom this book is fancifully dedicated, could really teach the author the truth of her own saying on Nietzsche: that a people intimately aware of the terrible nature of the world they lived in created a glorious Apolline art as a corrective of reality.

GR.

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PLATO'S THOUGHT.

Professor Grube has written a very careful and competent account of Plato's thought in his volume recently published.* His book will be very useful, as a summary, to students, and will be invaluable to those who desire to become adequately acquainted with the characteristic teachings of the most widely influential thinker of all the Greek philosophers. To both these classes of readers this volume can be confidently recommended.

Professor Grube has wisely chosen to deal with his great theme by subjects, and not by dialogues. At the same time his exposition is at every point made useful by detailed references to the Dialogues, accompanied by footnotes, in "which quotations are given on all the important doctrines, both in Greek and in translations" for English readers who are unacquainted with the Greek language. The book deals in successive chapters with the Theory of Ideas, Pleasure, Eros, the Nature of the Soul, The Gods, Art, Education, and Statecraft, so that the entire body of Plato's thought is

* *Plato's Thought*. By G. M. A. Grube. Methuen. 12s. 6d. net.

covered and carefully expounded. The student is also helped by an appendix and by indexes, with useful references and explanations.

While thorough and accurate, Professor Grube's exposition is both lucid and luminous. At every point his judgment is well-balanced and discriminating. In particular this quality is exhibited in his treatment of the controversial subjects of the Platonic Socrates and of the relation of the Theory of Ideas to the work of Socrates in regard to accurate definition and sound generalisation. While appreciative of the work of Burnet and Professor A. E. Taylor, the author is unable to follow them in treating Socrates as the author of the Theory of Ideas as set forth by Plato. Professor Grube also points out very usefully how in the *Parmenides* Plato showed himself well aware of most of the objections to the theory, which were afterwards pressed home by the criticism of Aristotle. For the purpose he has in view, Professor Grube has wisely limited himself to an account and elucidation of the thought of Plato as it stands, without confusing his readers by dealing with the contributory sources of his philosophy or with the subsequent modification and development which it underwent. Thus this volume should be warmly welcomed and extensively used as a most valuable handbook and summary of the characteristic teaching of the great thinker, whose influence is permanent and pervasive, because he was not only philosopher, but poet and seer.

J. S. L.

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RELIGION AND LEARNING.*

The more one works at the history of our religious past, the more one realises the necessity of detailed work of the fine nature Miss Griffiths has given us in her able examination of English Presbyterian thought from 1662 to the foundation of the Unitarian movement. As a restoration is often a revolution, and the restoration of 1660 was undoubtedly a revolution, we feel grateful to her for outlining the situation in 1662 on the eve of the fatal St. Bartholomew's Day that witnessed the expulsion of so many ministers from the fold of the Church of England. It is possible that she is so sympathetic to the nonconformists that she represents their case

* *Religion and Learning*. By Olive M. Griffiths. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

in too favourable a light. The Church of England had suffered grievously at the hands of Oliver Cromwell, and now she was in possession. *Les absents ont toujours tort*. Imbued by this attitude Miss Griffiths seeks to persuade us that *les absents ont toujours droit*. She certainly redresses the balance, and in the process she sets us thinking. The strength of her volume lies in the methodical fashion in which she interprets the course of Presbyterian theological thought from the middle of the seventeenth century to the opening decades of the nineteenth. She naturally employs the comparative method, and by her skilful use of this method she adds to the worth of her work. Broadly speaking, she is concerned with the breakdown of Aristotelianism in England; the relations between the will and the intellect conceived in Holland; the place of reason in the moral life, according to the views of Scots philosophers, materialism in contemporary psychology; and in the last part of her book she investigates the rise and growth of Arminianism, Arianism, blending later with Socinianism and Unitarianism in the early nineteenth century. The obvious difficulty in handling so much diverse material is that the author is tempted to select what suits her angle of approach and ignore the rest. We checked her information occasionally, and in every instance we found that she had presented her case with due care and consideration of its manifold aspects. One reflection occurs to us, and that is the weakness of ecclesiastical bodies without creeds recited regularly in the course of worship. Not a few of the tendencies Miss Griffiths detects in Presbyterianism we have in the Church of England, though in the latter they were unable to obtain a permanent home, and this was mainly due to the fact that the recitation of the creeds nipped the nascent Arianism in the bud.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

ENGLAND BEFORE THE WAR.*

The second volume to be published of the new Oxford History of England has been contributed by Mr. R. C. K. Ensor in a brilliant account of the momentous years from 1870 until the outbreak of the Great War. For the history of this period there is no dearth of material, and the author has

* *England, 1870-1914*. By R. C. K. Ensor. Oxford, The Clarendon Press. 15s. net.

made clearly extensive use of the recent authoritative biographies in addition to the official *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, edited by Dr. G. P. Gooch and Professor H. Temperley. The task of the historian lies in sifting and correlating the vast quantity of material with a view to a scientific narrative, proportioned to the fundamental characteristics and movements of the time. In this Mr. Ensor has shown a remarkable degree of insight and detachment, although in the growing perspective of time the weighing of events must always be liable to revision. For the purposes of treatment the author divides his forty-four years into three divisions. The first from 1870-86 is dominated by Gladstone, Disraeli and Parnell. In the second from 1886 to the death of Queen Victoria the figures of Salisbury and Chamberlain predominate, while the pre-war years are labelled simply Edwardian. In each division economic, social and cultural questions receive special treatment. The result is a lucid and comprehensive history covering the whole field of national endeavour.

Mr. Ensor sets out five principal features which characterise the period. It witnessed the vast expansion of our colonial empire and the emergence of the dominions as self-governing units. The author properly devotes considerable space to colonial questions, then so pregnant in their repercussions upon foreign and internal policy. At home, agriculture collapsed, while British industrial supremacy was threatened by the rise of foreign competition and the erection of tariff walls. Above all, this period saw the conversion of British government into a democracy, accompanied by the advancement of national education. In view of post-war development, the political and social history of the period must be treated essentially in the light of this fundamental transformation. After 1832 a great beginning had been made in social reform, but it was not until the extension of the franchise in 1867 that the flood-gates of democracy began to open. In 1870 the first scheme of national education was passed, and in 1872 the Ballot Act was enacted. Thenceforth there followed a series of democratising measures, such as the rural franchise extension in 1884, the County Councils Act of 1888, and the great Education Act of 1902, culminating in the Parliament Act of 1911. Parliamentary control of the prerogative was almost completed when the Commander-in-Chief became

responsible to the Secretary of State, and the Commons sanctioned the cession of British territory. Trade Unions received in the seventies full recognition, and in 1906 a high degree of privilege. In 1893 the Independent Labour Party was founded, described by Lord Snowden as "the most important political event of the nineteenth century." Social reform, however, had not kept pace with this devolution of political power. Disraeli, at heart a reformer, had done much. In 1875, his "*annus mirabilis* of social reform," the great Public Health Act was passed. But if Disraeli expressed an exceptional interest in sanitation, Gladstone "showed none at all. Indeed the blind eye, which he consistently turned towards the importance of local government, explains some of the gravest gaps in his statesmanship." Chamberlain was the ardent advocate and worker for reform, as exemplified in his transformation of Birmingham and his scheme of Workmen's Compensation. "Had there been no home rule split," says Mr. Ensor, "and had he succeeded Gladstone as liberal premier, social reform might have come to England nearly twenty years sooner than it did. In that case the labour party—at least in the form which it actually took—might never have been born."

Mr. Ensor keeps to the fore of his narrative the continuous, if wavering, thread of foreign policy. At the Congress of Berlin, in the first strong drawing together of Germany and Austria at the expense of Russia "originated, under Lord Beaconsfield's manipulation, the grouping from which the World War resulted." He is critical of the humane liberal Gladstone, "who never really studied or understood the subtler realities of foreign affairs and the relationships of the Powers," and who went into Egypt "half-heartedly and without forethought," on the wrong terms and "prevented Great Britain right down to 1914 from ever exerting a free and completely detached influence on the groupings of the other Powers. This was a real factor in the eventual Armageddon."

Mr. Ensor deals with Chamberlain's approaches for an Anglo-German agreement, but curiously omits the part played by Lansdowne throughout 1901. In dealing with the formation of the Entente, he describes as "a great feat" the visit to Paris in May 1903 of King Edward, who "eventually . . . won French mass-opinion over." He repeats the now

accepted view that the King's influence on the formation of policy was nil, and remarks "how comparatively crude his views on foreign policy were, how little he read, and of what naïve indiscretions he was capable." In January 1906 the Anglo-French military conversations, as to the form of possible co-operation, commenced and continued up till 1914. Both sides expressly agreed that no pledge of future co-operation was implied. "This step," declares Mr. Ensor, "made explicit a momentous transformation of the Entente," which had begun as a restoration of goodwill and was now approaching to a committal against fighting in opposite camps. The author dismisses a view, still widely held, that war would have been avoided had Grey made a prompt declaration to defend Belgian neutrality. The dominant German military staff, who possessed only the Schlieffen Plan through Belgium, had foreseen the certainty of British intervention and discounted its effect. Moreover, in any event, Grey "could not have announced such a policy down to 2 August, because something like half the cabinet were opposed to it."

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LETTERS FROM INDIA. 1829-1832.*

This book of letters, so well translated and arranged, will justly revive British interest in a man whose reputation seems well assured in his own country. Just over a century ago the young French botanist, Victor Jacquemont, undertook his travels in India on behalf of the Jardin des Plantes. His valuable contributions to science were cut short by an early death at the age of thirty-one but his few working years spring again to life in his letters, revealing an admirable wit and a gallant personality.

Interest both personal and historic is aroused. For here are very personal impressions and subjective musings which at the same time light up an important period in the history of John Company and provoke a poignant historical interest. The more conventional romantic themes of Indian memoirs are left out. Agra is passed without a dream in marble and even Kashmir is described with the barest references to snow-capped mountains. The writer was predominantly concerned

* Being a Selection from the Correspondence of Victor Jacquemont. Translated with an Introduction by Catherine Alison Phillips. Macmillan. 21s.

with personal and living questions, with the people he met, both English and Indian, and their mutual relationship. He obtained free entry into the best Anglo-Indian society of the day from Lord William Bentinck downwards and his enjoyment and criticism of this society are equally interesting. He was astonished and gratified by a generous welcome, and he discovered how the English reserve breaks down in the presence of an affable foreigner. "I do not know how I inspire such confidence in these people; but they pour out their hearts to me at once quite frankly about things which they are afraid to say to one another after an acquaintanceship of many years." On the other hand he found much that was uncongenial both from a French and from an individual standpoint. Their conception of friendship was cold, so also their much-talked-of "home" consisting of "springy chairs, sofas, the material things in their houses." They were stupidly unrestrained in their drinking of heavy Spanish wines and also in their mode of exercise, galloping "aimlessly for an hour like automatons." Yet combined with their exhibition of manliness was a love of unnecessary comforts. Jacquemont repeatedly expresses scorn at "these cumbrous and sumptuous refinements," the changes of clothes, the glass and china. And here perhaps the individual adventurer who is speaking would find as much response from individual Englishmen as from his own compatriots.

But for the results of British rule considerable admiration is expressed, however much personal criticism may be levied against the rulers. "I do not think their system conducive to individual happiness; but it is very conducive to the power and strength of the nation." One letter to the Governor of French-India is a particularly interesting eulogy of British administration in contrast with the French. His radical theories give way before the practical benefits of orderly government and he even defends the continuance of Company rule as involving less corruption than any possible alternative. In writing of the Governor-General, his praise becomes more heartfelt and unqualified: "when I thought of the vast power wielded by this excellent man, I rejoiced for the cause of humanity."

Regarding the real native India he claims to steep himself in its life instead of merely dipping the tip of his finger as he says is the habit of many Englishmen. It must be added,

however, that he always retained his European outlook and critical faculty, as when he gave the Rajah of Sirmur "a little lecture on morality and political economy." Moreover he denied the value of Sanskrit study with very western prejudice and in other ways showed much of the western exasperation at the inconsistencies of Indian character. But such human prejudice sharpens rather than blunts his kindly and inquisitive enjoyment of all fresh experience. The account of his interviews with Ranjit Singh is particularly illuminating, and the whole chronicle of his lonely journeys catches an atmosphere of the Indian plain and hills. No selected quotations can do justice to the rich variety of his comments with his peculiarly penetrative turn of phrase. He should be read by all who want fresh light on British India and also by the wider company who enjoy good letters for their own sake.

E. W. E.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The Refugees from Germany, 1933-1935*, by Dr. Norman Bentwich, tells the story of what Lord Cecil's Foreword rightly describes as one of the greatest national crimes that has ever been committed, and of the efforts in other countries to deal with the innocent victims of Nazi intolerance. The exodus began soon after Hitler's accession to power in January 1933, and is still going on, the Nuremberg Decrees of 1935 having filled up the cup of tribulation. The author, writing with inside knowledge, describes the reception and distribution of the sufferers, the appointment of a High Commissioner by the League to deal with the situation, the relief organisations, the retraining for other work, the placing of hundreds of scholars in universities, the settlement of thousands in hospitable Palestine. The book closes with an account of the non-Jewish refugees and a plea for even greater efforts. For the majority of German Jews are still in Germany, where their lot becomes steadily worse. While the blight of Nazi rule still rests on that unhappy country, Germany is no place for Jews and their children. The whole book is instructive, but the most eloquent pages are those of the appendix in which Mr. James McDonald's letter of resignation of his office of High Commissioner in December 1935 is reprinted. Long after the Nazi régime has passed away, this measured indictment by a distinguished American citizen will be read with the same feelings of astonishment and indignation as it inspires in us to-day.

* Allen & Unwin. 6s.

The Twilight of Treaties,* by Y. M. Goblet, is a translation from the French original published last year. M. Goblet is one of the most distinguished of French publicists, and his geographical approach to international problems gives a marked originality to his work. His thesis is expressed in the title. That no treaties are eternal is a commonplace, and Bismarck, who made many, used to say that every treaty contained the unwritten words *rebus sic stantibus*. Never have they proved more brittle than in the last few years, when the dictated settlements which ended the world war have begun to lose their authority. Geography is the mother of history, and while the relations of victors to vanquished are continually changing, the facts of geography remain. The author is no cynical apologist for the breaking and the breakers of treaties; but he forces us to look beyond purely legalistic conceptions to the economic needs of men. This suggestive little book discusses the Saar, Slesvig, Austria, Danzig, Japan, the overseas possessions of the United States, the quarrelsome continent of South America, the Polar regions, illustrated by useful maps. The closing chapter summarises the lessons of political geography and ends on an optimistic note. "The twilight of treaties heralds but a short night. Then will break the dawn of new conceptions of international intercourse; the issue of fresh title-deeds, which the human race will respect all the more because they will be based, not on old parchments, registering victories by force or fraud, but on real, concrete facts." No more cogent plea for the application of Article 19 of the Covenant has ever been written.

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The international situation lends particular point to Major-General J. H. Marshall-Cornwall's important book on *Geographic Disarmament*,† published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. After an historical survey of the conception of demilitarised areas and the forms they have taken, as distinct from neutral and "buffer" states, the author concludes that regional disarmament, by hampering the range of hostilities in international danger zones, can make the outbreak of war more difficult and clearly wrong. General Marshall-Cornwall's most effective argument, however, is that such demilitarisation will induce psychologically a greater sense of mutual security and friendship, as exemplified by the North American Lakes agreement in 1817 and the Karlstad Convention of 1905 between Sweden and Norway. For the success of regional disarmament the author postulates the essential requirements of relative reciprocity and mutual consents. He discusses, in particular, the demilitarisation of the Thracian frontier, the Ægean Islands, and the Straits under the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which "touches the high-water mark of progress as regards regional disarmament." Since this book was

* G. Bell & Sons. 7s. 6d.

† Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

published, however, Turkey has raised the whole question of refortifying the Straits. General Marshall-Cornwall, writing before Hitler's *coup*, condemns the demilitarisation of the Rhineland, in respect of which "its authors completely and deliberately ignored all idea of reciprocity." He spoils his argument, however, by describing it as "a purely unilateral servitude imposed on Germany." The suggestion is made that Alsace-Lorraine should be included with the Rhineland in a scheme of reciprocal demilitarisation and immunisation from hostilities, to be guaranteed by "all the other Powers concerned." General Marshall-Cornwall deplores the absence of interest taken by the League in regional disarmament during recent years, considering that "this is due to the influence of the Locarno Treaty which . . . committed the principal Powers to sanctify the unilateral demilitarisation of the Rhineland." Apart from its argument, this volume contains a quantity of material which the student of the subject will gladly appreciate.

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The Last of the Empresses,* together with the passing from the Old China to the New, is an account of Yehonala, the Manchu Empress of China, later known as Tzu-Hsi, or in "affectionate terms" The Great Ancestor, or The Old Buddha. It is written by the Italian diplomat, Daniele Varé, who was stationed at Peking in the latter part of her reign. With a light touch he describes the youth and fascination of the lady who developed so much character as time went on. "Chinese children are attractive little people, with impassive faces and sparkling black eyes. They seldom laugh or cry, and seem to bring to the problems of life a characteristic wisdom beyond their years." As Yehonala advanced at the Court she gave proof of possessing a "bureaucratic mind." She became the most influential person in the Forbidden City. Unfortunately she had not the knowledge required for a correct judgment, and although she persuaded the Emperor, her husband, to good effect in combating the Taiping Rebellion, she was not so fortunate when dealing with "foreign devils." The history of the efforts of envoys of the Foreign Powers to hold parley with the Court of China is briefly told, with a mixture of picturesque details and stories of Court intrigue and of horrors perpetrated. The looting and burning of the Summer Palace at the orders of an English General after the Court had fled to Jehol is one of the early incidents, quoted from a letter of "Chinese Gordon" to his mother. Later on, as regent, Tzu-Hsi built a new Summer Palace of great beauty and magnificence. She was extravagant in dress and ornaments as well as in building for her pleasure, and thought nothing of the poor outside or of the advancement of her country. At the time of the Boxer Rebellion, there were many awful cruelties. The siege of the Legations is described in

* Murray. 15s.

vivid fashion. When relief had at last come and the foreign armies advanced into Peking, there were further scenes of looting and destruction. Later the Court returned to Peking and on the way in, to their astonishment, the Empress acknowledged the presence of the foreigners, "looking up at us," she "lifted her closed hands under her chin, and made a series of little bows." She afterwards had her portrait painted by Miss Carl. A photograph of it is reproduced in the book.

Throughout the story, Jung Lu, a cousin to whom Yehonala had been betrothed before she was chosen for the Imperial Harem, seems to have been her good angel. His wise advice, his respectful service, his watching over her at times of danger, point to a love-romance in the background. The book is full of good stories and is pleasantly written; the difficulty of the Chinese names is well surmounted by the eager reader.

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*The Constitutional Year Book** for 1936 well maintains the reputation of its predecessors as a comprehensive and reliable handbook of political information. Full particulars of the new Parliament, including notices of its members, are given. Changes consequent upon the accession of Edward VIII were too late to be recorded, though pages of addenda mention the death of George V and contain other matters up to the end of January. In addition to sections on election law, the Empire and local government, the Year Book provides a quantity of useful statistics on current industrial and financial questions. Another valuable handbook of statistics will be found in *The Home Market*,† prepared by Major G. Harrison, Mr. F. C. Mitchell and the statistical staff of the London Press Exchange. Though designed primarily to provide basic marketing data for the use of industry and trade, the tables of statistics give the ordinary reader a significant picture, easily assimilated by the use of pictorial symbols, of the principal geographic, economic and, particularly, social factors in our national life. The years for which figures are given vary mainly from 1931 to 1934. It is noticeable, for instance, that the rates given of wages earned in the principal industries are those for October 1931.

* Harrison & Sons Ltd. 5s. net.

† Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JUNE 1936.

WHAT NEXT?

THIS is written on a day of shame for Britain. The headlines of the paper announce Mussolini's statements to the mobilised Italian nation, "Abyssinia is for ever Italian" and "We are ready to defend our smashing victories." Other headlines present our natural reaction: "Italy must not benefit" and "Sanctions must continue." Does this mean disaster to all the high hopes of a better ordering of world affairs, and, if so, what is the extent of that disaster and can anything be done to retrieve it?

How unexpected the disaster is can be illustrated from the pages of this REVIEW. In November last Professor Alfred Zimmern showed us that there were great hopes that the success of economic pressure would modify our future conception of the importance of the soldier, and concluded, "it is surely unthinkable that the peoples of Western Europe, having at last within their grasp the solution of the problem of security, will fail to join their forces in making it effective." Sir Charles Hobhouse, commenting on the position in February, wrote of Mussolini, "It would almost seem as if he believed that he would hack his way through to Addis Ababa despite Europe and Abyssinia, insolvency and privations, French hesitation and British firmness," and seemed justified in assuming that the Government of Britain must be considering the carrying out of the oil sanction at no distant date. In April, Dr. Maxwell Garnett wrote that we must face the danger that Mussolini may think that nothing less than a European holocaust will provide him with a worthy funeral pyre "if the League stops Italy's war and demonstrates that aggression does not pay." And even in the May number of the REVIEW, Freda White writes hopefully of giving Italy part of Ogaden to be held under a mandate from the League in exchange for a port, and declares that the idea of subjecting the Ethiopians to the rule of a nation which has tortured their fellows to death with poison gas is too horrible for contemplation. And now we have Mussolini's grim words, "Abyssinia is Italian by right, because occupied by the sword of Rome

and the civilisation which triumphed over barbarism." It is horrible, almost incredible. In truth, if we had been told last September that seven months later Mussolini, after destroying their Red Cross units and bombing their open towns, would terrify the Abyssinians into complete surrender with poison gas, without any effective action being taken by the European powers, no one could have believed it.

The consequences of the disaster, apart from its effect on the League, it is difficult to realise at the moment. But they are undoubtedly serious. They must, for instance, be felt among every native race from one end of Africa to the other. White civilisation will be to them a mockery—for a native race which trusted the white people to defend it has been barbarously mishandled. If this only holds back for years the good work now being done by administrators and missionaries we shall get off lightly. But it will obviously take generations before there can again be any trust in a European nation's pledged word. For the contrast between the pledges given to Abyssinia as a member of the League under the Covenant and her present position is too glaring to be easily explained away or quickly forgotten. Again, the British position in the Mediterranean is entirely altered, and for the worse. Italy has always plotted against us in Egypt, and clearly intends to dominate the Mediterranean and North Africa. What this will mean in reshaping European alliances, and in additional armament liabilities to us, we cannot yet tell. But the British Imperialists who encouraged Japan in Manchuria and derided the League must wonder (if they think at all) whether perhaps the friends of the League were not right when they argued that the League system was the only practical way of preserving British interests. Thirdly, we have to realise that the use of mustard gas dropped in liquid form from aeroplanes, if it goes without punishment, gives an industrial state with efficient engineering and chemical works, and any lack of petrol made good by America and Great Britain, terrible power over any smaller agricultural neighbour. Such countries, in the absence of collective security, will be more easily drawn within the ambit and subjected to the will of their more powerful neighbours.

The first question to be considered is whether it is now of any use to pretend that anything can be done to prevent or modify the complete annexation of Abyssinia by Italy. Is it

practical to say that "Italy must not benefit" and that "sanctions must continue"? Would it not be better to realise the completeness of our failure, and to try either to rebuild a League which will be effective against aggression in future, or to build peace on some other basis than the League, if such a basis can be found?

Can anything now be done for Abyssinia, for if the answer is no, to continue trying to put pressure on Italy may only add ignominy and futility to disgrace. The key to the position now as before is the attitude of our Government and that of France. If our Government had, or had any chance of having, any coherent plan there would be a good chance, if not of saving some trace of Abyssinian independence, of bringing the settlement within the League system. It could, for instance, be insisted that the principles of mandates should be applied, that the natives should not be expropriated from their land, that they should not be forced to serve as soldiers outside their country, and that the League should report regularly on Italian administration. But our Government has dug itself in on the lines that they were always willing to go as far as anyone else would, which is true only in the sense that the Government which takes the lead as we did in September is naturally regarded as setting the pace; that no one would have been willing to go any farther or faster, which is untrue; and, thirdly, that the General Election showed that our people were willing to act with the League if it did not come to fighting, which if true was the result of the Government's cowardice in presenting the issue.*

And the position of our Government will reflect itself in the actions of other Governments. Lacking the lead which we might give, one fears that they will now do nothing to stiffen up sanctions. Why should they? Up to the time of the Hoare-Laval agreement, backing a League policy was for them a mixture of idealism and self-interest, a very powerful mixture. They would willingly have applied oil sanctions, and if it had come to war would have backed us up to the best of their ability. But the Hoare-Laval agreement changed the

* It may be noted that in the Peace Ballot there were to the last question about military sanctions six and three-quarter million affirmative answers against two and a quarter million negative and two and a quarter million abstentions. The Government therefore had fairly favourable ground if they had decided at the election to face up to the obligations of Article 16 of the Covenant fairly and fully, namely that its support might mean a collective war if the aggressor attacked.

picture completely for them. Up to that time it seemed to them (in spite of the weakness with which sanctions were started) that Great Britain meant business, and that we should act to the utmost of our power in the defence of each one of them if threatened with aggression, and that therefore to back the League, as well as being right and in accordance with their pledges, gave them greatly increased security. The Hoare-Laval agreement shattered that trust. If England and France were willing to make an agreement with Italy behind the back of the League there was no security in the League system. Since then, though they have continued economic sanctions it has been without either faith or hope, and faced with a *fait accompli* they will sooner rather than later withdraw them. To expect any strengthening of sanctions from nations which we have so fatally let down seems absurd.

Of course the Government's determination that there must be no risk of war will work in the same direction. For if Mussolini finds that there is any inconvenient delay in the lifting of sanctions that may seriously inconvenience his country, he has only to threaten war and we should give way. In fact the electoral advantage to the Government of allowing full trade with Italy, particularly when other nations allow it, will surely soon be greater than the electoral advantage of pretending that sanctions against Italy can be effective. Our Government will welcome the discontinuance of sanctions by other countries as a justification for following their example. And the prophecy may be risked that all sanctions will be withdrawn, probably during the summer holidays, if not sooner.

As to France, it does not appear wise to put much faith in the new Government of the Left. Were it to be true that just as we were dropping sanctions the new French Government was willing to increase them, it would be a tragedy indeed. But the French are realists and see only one thing at a time, however warped their vision may be. To them the idea of war suggests complete mobilisation which they hate, for it breaks up every family. And they can think only of one war at a time, and it is war with Germany that they are thinking of, not with Italy. And they will still concentrate their gaze on the ten divisions freed for action on the German frontier as long as they keep on good terms with Italy. They have under previous Governments ignored the fact that a triumphant League would have been worth far more to France in

keeping Germany in order than ten free divisions with the League system in ruins. And there seems no clear indication that the new Government will in the face of the Italian annexation of Abyssinia reverse previous policy, though election declarations which gave some hope of this may echo a little until they can be conveniently forgotten.

To return to the home position, the argument has been heard that whatever the weakness in our defence system which Mr. Baldwin may have had in mind when he said that if his lips were unsealed we should all support the Hoare-Laval proposals, must have been put right by now, and that therefore we should be more willing to face the risk of war with Italy. To which the reply seems inescapable that what would have been a risk of war if the League nations had been firm in December becomes a certainty now that (as Sir Austen Chamberlain said) the dog's mouth is full of butter. And that the tide in the affairs of men which might have led on to fortune, even if there had been an initial disaster in December, will not flow again. What a tragedy it is that the sheer imbecility of the Government in failing to realise that Sir Samuel Hoare's speech in September entailed thorough and immediate defence of our mid-Mediterranean base has probably changed the future of the world!

All this leads up to the suggestion, a suggestion made with great diffidence in a position still dark, and amid contrary counsels from men of great authority, that with the Government that we have it is better to realise the fullness of the disaster and to try to build up again, even though painfully and laboriously, than to pretend that any outcome of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute can be obtained which will be creditable to the League. It may well be that the better building may have to be done by some other Government; but may not the new building be stronger if it is realised how badly shaken its foundations now are, and how much must be cleared away by very hard and clear thinking before an abiding structure can be erected?

As to the present Government we are in some ways unfortunate. We have a Prime Minister rapidly being pushed, as his predecessor was, into retirement, and naturally wishing to avoid taking dangerous decisions during the remainder of his term of office. He has of recent years always been willing to take any amount of trouble to avoid the trouble of coming

to a definite decision and seeing that its consequences were realised and acted upon. He believes in the League, but will contentedly and hopefully run a League policy and one of heavy rearmament in double harness. His probable successor the present Chancellor of the Exchequer disbelieves in the League, but will do the same. Their colleagues may have the virtues but they certainly have the vices of a coalition government—they agree on formulæ which they use either with different meanings or with none. The worst of them, which they use on every possible occasion, is that our armaments are “a contribution to pooled security”—where there is clearly no contribution, no pool, and very little security. It reminds one of the official well known to the British Constitution, the Judge Advocate General, who is neither a Judge nor an Advocate nor a General. One looks round among them in vain for any prospect of realisation of the magnitude of the disaster, and for courageous discussion of the alternatives with which we are now faced, leading to the selection of the best and to consistent adherence to it. Even Mr. Eden, in whom many of us still trust, can on occasion be a master of the diplomatic art of saying nothing in many words. In the recent debate on Foreign Office estimates, when he had an admirable opportunity to set us thinking, which is the essential prelude to clear action, he uttered only resounding vagueness. On the vital questions of our attitude to the League and to reform of the articles of the Covenant dealing with aggression, and whether we favour a general European pact of mutual assistance, or regional defensive alliances backed by a descending scale of sanctions, Mr. Eden could only say that we must not be afraid to learn the lessons that must be drawn from our experience of the past seven months, and that having decided on our course in the light of events we must tell the world the course we propose to follow. In a burst of explicitness he added that each member of the League must carefully consider the position, make known its views to the League, and that body as a whole must decide on its future course of action. It is no wonder that among some of the sincerest lovers of peace there are sighs for Winston Churchill, who at any rate sees and speaks clearly. Speaking on April 6th, he foresaw the breakdown of the League over Abyssinia, and that Germany would refortify her Western frontier, and pointed out how entirely this would

change the position of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and other countries—“making them balance in deep perplexity their future course, whether to stand by the League or make the best terms they can with Germany.” It is of course precisely because of this question that it is so desirable to think and act clearly rather than to drift. If Britain is seen to have still a definite policy based on the League several countries may take heart. But a condition of uncertainty gives Hitler his chance, and being a past master in all the arts of intimidation from peaceful persuasion to murder he will take advantage of it.

The only hope for re-establishing a sense of security in Europe is to see that, in the coming negotiations with France, Germany gets fair treatment and a real chance of starting again on a new basis. The last traces of the position of inferiority which was imposed in the peace treaties must be cleared away, and though it will not be possible at the time of the negotiations to settle economic and colonial problems, it must be made clear that these may be opened up by common agreement later, or by Germany under Article 19 of the Covenant. Any idea of punishment for the Rhineland occupation must be dropped, for though one can punish a small boy for a fault, and carry on at once on a friendly basis if the punishment is seen to be just, with a nation one cannot at the same time punish and give a new start on generous and friendly lines. Therefore, if Germany gives satisfactory answers to the questions which have recently been put to her, we should help her to make a fresh beginning without any suggestion of subsequent bad faith on her part. But, this established, it is surely essential to show Hitler that unless, when he is on the new basis, he really means peace, as he says he does, the consequences will be definite, immediate and as unpleasant as the whole of Europe can make them. From this point of view it is suggested that an uncertain policy in this country based nominally on the League, but actually on armaments and alliances, is of all possible courses the worst. But judging by present indications it is the most likely to be followed.

It is extremely disquieting, as one meets different people and different audiences in the country, to find how little we seem to have remembered the obvious lessons of the Great War. We seemed at its conclusion to have killed for ever the

old principle "Si vis pacem, para bellum" and to have substituted for good and all the better principle "Ni vis bellum, para pacem." But now the country seems to be divided between those who think our being heavily armed is in itself a general security for peace, and those who think we can impose peace without having an organised peace system in which there must be a combined will and power to fight if this is necessary to stop aggression. And of these two sets of fallationists (if a word may be coined) the former are in a majority. The fallacy of peace by armaments is being dealt with in Mr. Arnold-Forster's article in this REVIEW. But many will remember how small were the things which finally made Germany decide on war in 1914 in a world which depended for its equilibrium on a balance of alliances and armaments, and which was restless under heavy armament expenditure.

Germany's final decision, for instance, to back Austria, after Sarajevo, was influenced by three quite small things, the threat of completion of military roads and railways by Russia up to her side of the common frontier with Germany; the recent expenditure by Germany of an extra hundred millions on armaments to which France's reply of an extra year's military service had not had time to be effective; and the result of the recent Balkan wars in which it seemed that the Powers engaged had fought themselves so nearly to a standstill and with such mutual hatred that there was unlikely to be any combination of them which would prevent Austria from holding Russia in check by invasion until Germany had settled with France. In fact a balance of armaments is always unstable. This can only be questioned if one group of Powers can always keep an overwhelming superiority of strength, which hardly seems possible now with Germany and Japan in the same scale, and Italy fairly obviously up for auction as in the Great War.

In this position it seems clear that Britain ought to build up again on the basis of the League, the whole League, and nothing but the League. "*La Société des Nations est morte, vive la Société des Nations*" seems to be the only safe watchword. If it was a true word that peace is indivisible, it is because war is indivisible. Regional pacts, therefore, in which we may only reach the stage, in carrying out sanctions, of stopping non-essential imports in seven months, will give no

security. If as has been suggested the only hope is to treat Germany well and then hold her firmly, this cannot be done by a system of decreasing scales of intervention on our part according to the distance of the threatened neighbour. This was clearly indicated in the House of Commons debate on April 6th by Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Winston Churchill. The former said:

I believe that if you can follow up the League of Nations system, it is the best guarantee that the world can have against war, but you cannot develop that system in the very imperfect state of the League without all the members of the League taking great risks and perhaps suffering great losses for causes which are not immediately their own, though they are the causes of common security. . . . The whole question of the League does not lie in whether an oil sanction is imposed, or in whether the ships of Italy are forbidden our ports. . . . It lies in the question which each country has to answer: if aggression is proved and declared by the League of Nations, are we willing to put our resources, military and naval, at the service of the League force?

And Winston Churchill put the same point even more clearly and concisely:

We cannot undo the past, but we are bound to pass it in review in order to draw from it such lessons as may be applicable to the future, and surely the conclusion from this story is that we should not intervene in these matters unless we are in earnest and prepared to carry our intervention to all necessary lengths.

The suggestion here is all or none, not limited liability. It is fully realised that the plans that have been suggested for an international police force are full of real difficulty. To many they seem impracticable; but is it not better to make the impracticable practical than to drift into alternatives which are inevitably disastrous? On the military side it is objected that the force which would be necessary in different parts of the world would differ; but does that matter if in each part of the world we are ready to do our best, and willing to define as clearly as we can what we can do? And from the general home point of view there is the argument that we should never be willing to fight in a case of aggression unless some immediate interest of ours were involved. This must be met—and surely it can be—for it is very serious. On the Left there is a strong body of opinion that we should interfere

everywhere and disarm, on the Right that we should interfere nowhere and arm. But is it chimerical to believe that firmness and courage in facing the difficulties would overcome them? We have all been badly shaken, but that is the time for reconstruction. Abroad, however much prestige we have lost over the Italian triumph in Abyssinia, we still should count for a very great deal if we would give a lead. This cannot be done by letting each country think over the disaster and then bringing them into conference at Geneva, for this will lead only to a least common denominator of lip-service and eyewash.

And at home have we not still the strongest Government of modern times, still fresh from an election, and with plenty of time before the next to persuade the country of the necessities of a new and terribly serious position? If the Government would think clearly, and face clearly towards the safest course—with all its dangers. If . . .

FRANCIS D. ACLAND.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S FIFTH BUDGET: TAXATION FOR DEFENCE.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S chances of succeeding Mr. Baldwin in the near future may still be good; but they have not been improved by his fifth Budget, which displeased and disappointed the motley crowd of die-hard Tories, ding-dong Protectionists, moderate Conservatives, would-be Socialists and uneasy Liberals, who constitute the rank and file of the Coalition Government's supporters. To judge from the Budget debates, their criticisms and complaints are as diverse as their principles and prejudices. But they all feel that the unexpected imposition of additional taxes is likely to make them unpopular in their constituencies. Hardly any of them have ventured to say that the enormous increase in our expenditure on armaments may be in whole or in part unnecessary or wasteful. Some wish that the Chancellor had stopped the still-rising expenditure on what are called "the social services," and applied his savings to rearmament. Others think he should have been more optimistic about his revenue, and have raised his estimated yield of taxes high enough to cover his estimated expenditure. Others again, like Major Hills and Sir William Davison, argue that the Chancellor ought to have raised the tariff instead of raising the income tax and the tea duty. Mr. Chamberlain's reply to this criticism shows that he has at last learnt the principle which Sir Robert Peel discovered, and applied, ninety years before our new Birmingham Tariff was established:

I will not deal with the question of raising the tariff because hon. Members will easily see that, if you want to get more revenue out of the tariff, very often that object is best attained by lowering rather than by raising the tariff.

To the numerous band of supporters, who grieved because rearmament has not been financed by a national defence loan, his reply was equally good:

I do not think it would have been desirable to take the easier, and perhaps the more popular course, of deciding that the whole defence expenditure should be borne by loan rather than by taxation. I do not believe that it would be right to allow the people of this country to suppose that they can spend hundreds of millions of pounds upon Defence, or upon anything else, and pay nothing for it.

In praising Mr. Chamberlain for his courage, we need not exaggerate. The only sacrifice which he has imposed on the nation at large is an additional twopence per pound on tea, which will only cost a family a few shillings a year if they maintain their present consumption and decline to buy a cheaper grade than that to which they have been accustomed. The addition to the income tax affects a minority composed of bachelors, maiden ladies and rich people; for the Chancellor of the Exchequer takes credit for having made such remissions to married people that a large majority of income-tax payers will actually be better off than they were before. There is nothing in his financial proposals to compare with the general sacrifices which were imposed by Mr. Snowden in 1931 in order to balance the Budget. Another drawback to the theory that this is a very courageous Budget is supplied by a further motive which actuated the Chancellor: "I felt that, only if we submitted to some of the sacrifices now, could we come with a clear conscience in the future, and borrow, and start with a series of unbalanced Budgets."

So this tiny twopence per pound on tea is the only serious hardship, the only general sacrifice, of the Budget; and no doubt, as Mr. Chamberlain added: "In a very short time it will be forgotten, and in the rise in price due to the tax [note the admission that a customs duty raises prices] everybody will feel that they have the satisfaction of making their little contribution to the necessities of the country," or, as I should prefer to say, to the extravagance of their Chancellor of the Exchequer. And, alas for Mr. Chamberlain's financial rectitude and clarity of conscience, this little contribution is only a prelude to borrowing next year and to a series of unbalanced Budgets!

But it is time to turn to the actual figures of expenditure, which are as simple as they are ominous and alarming. Assuming that industrial profits continue to expand under the influence of the new armaments boom, which will stimulate a number of trades, Mr. Chamberlain estimated that on the existing basis of taxation his revenue in the financial year which ends on March 31st next would be £776,606,000, as against an estimated revenue last year of £734,470,000 and an actual revenue of £752,920,000. Unhappily for taxpayers, his estimated expenditure in last year's Budget of £733,970,000 was enormously increased by supplementary estimates,

mainly for armaments; and the actual or realised expenditure amounted to £749,979,000. But the estimates for this year are much higher than the realised expenditure of last year. Compared with last year's estimates, those for the Army have risen by nearly six millions, for the Navy by nearly ten millions, for the Air Force by over eighteen millions, and for the civil or social services by over twelve millions. Even this was not enough; for the Chancellor allowed another seventeen millions (for which no estimates have been submitted) as the first year's instalment of the vast additional rearmament programme foreshadowed in the White Paper. Consequently, the total estimated expenditure for the year comes to £797,897,000, against a total estimated expenditure of £733,970,000 in his last Budget. That is an addition of nearly sixty-four millions in one year to the level of national expenditure; and as compared with the expenditure of £697 millions in 1933 it involves an increase of a hundred millions sterling in three years—the equivalent of nearly two shillings on the income tax.

Sir Archibald Sinclair, in a powerful speech delivered during the Budget debates, pointed out that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has raised the national expenditure to the crisis level of 1931, though the taxpayer is now supplying immense sums which were being borrowed for unemployment by the last Labour Government. The leader of the Independent Liberal Party compared Mr. Chamberlain to "a man lost in some financial Sahara, wandering round in a circle, and returning in expenditure and taxation to the point from which he started." Mr. Chamberlain expressed a pious hope that so far as the taxpayer is concerned the point will prove a peak; but if the armaments programme is carried out, this year will certainly not be the peak of expenditure. The only hope for the taxpayer seems to be that Sir Archibald Sinclair and other leading men in both the Liberal and Conservative Parties will put themselves at the head of a national movement for economy and for a complete revision of our foreign policy.

Indeed, nothing has been more striking in the Budget debates, and in the platform defences of rearmament finance made by Ministers and their supporters, than the confession that they have let down our national defences in a vain effort to persuade the other great military powers to take part in a general reduction of armaments. From this statement they

have proceeded to the conclusion that an immense capital expenditure on rearmament is now necessary for the double purpose of playing our part as a contributor to what is called "collective security" and of defending our own country and the British Empire against aggression. These steps in their political argument towards the appalling addition to our burden of armaments embodied in the Budget and the White Paper will require the most careful scrutiny, and its implications ought to be tabulated and explained to all classes of taxpayers, and especially to the younger generation, who may be called upon to pay, not only with their lives and fortunes, but with their liberties under military and industrial conscription if, under the guidance of the Foreign Office and in subservience to French diplomacy, this country is again entangled in continental wars.

The first question to be examined is whether our expenditure on armaments during the last few years has been well applied, and whether the nation has got full value for its money. The second is whether German rearmament has been on anything like the scale alleged by Mr. Churchill and others. The third is whether the policy of a new military entente with France, and consequently (owing to the Franco-Russian military pact) with Russia also, can be reconciled either with European peace or with a true conception of the League of Nations. The fourth is whether the League of Nations should be regarded as a fighting organisation, and if so, whether Great Britain should act as its chief fighting agent. The fifth question—and this is of immediate concern to all young men of military age—is whether Mr. Duff Cooper and the War Office should be allowed to prepare the territorial force for service abroad. The idea that this force, instead of being for home defence, is to be employed again to fight for France, while we are also to be as strong as any other Power in the air, maintain a predominant Navy and exhaust our remaining financial resources in loans to allies which will never be repaid, is an idea which will not be tolerated by any sensible patriot who objects to national suicide.

It is true that Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Eden constantly profess that they are aiming at peace and are always willing to discuss disarmament. But their subservience to French diplomacy, their readiness to enter into military conversations with French Generals, their proposal to join with

Mussolini in policing the German frontier, and their establishment of a customs tariff discriminating against foreign countries, not only at home, but in the Crown Colonies, all exhibit a spirit and a policy that run counter to their profession, and make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Coalition, without a change of heart or of method, to take the initiative in restoring peace and goodwill between nations.

In his Financial Statement, Mr. Chamberlain claimed that the Birmingham Tariff is one of the two pillars of British prosperity—the other being cheap money, artificially fostered by his own Treasury restrictions, but mainly due to lack of trade bills. But what sort of a prosperity is that which starves our shipping industry and injures our export trades, creating distressed areas and a great mass of unemployment and pauperism? And what if these protective and preferential tariffs, backed by quotas, subsidies, monopolies and restrictions upon free markets at home, are also proving a potent cause of unrest and ill-feeling among foreign nations? Does not the dispute about raw materials make it clear that the Ottawa Agreements have exposed the British Empire to the envy of less fortunate powers, and that the abandonment of Free Trade has removed a security which was worth many battleships and many divisions? Here we have at least one explanation of the new outcry for more armaments to protect us from these new dangers, which are largely of our own making. If we want to repair the mischief, we must begin by restoring the Open Door in our Crown Colonies. That point was pressed home by Sir Archibald Sinclair, who quoted a triumphant statement made by the late Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Bennett, Chairman of the Ottawa Conference: "In future nobody will be able to trade with the British Empire except on payment of tribute." Unfortunately for this country, we are losing far more than we gain. We are paying for Ottawa, not only in lost trade, but in swollen estimates for armaments and increased risk of war.

Here I would like to point out that the current talk about Britain having disarmed, while other countries have been arming to the teeth, is nonsense so far as expenditure is concerned. During the race for armaments which preceded the Great War, our expenditure on Defence rose to £77 millions. The lowest corresponding figure under the Coalition Government was £102 millions in 1932. Since then it has risen

rapidly, and this year it is proposed to spend £178 millions. If, as I have remarked elsewhere, our defence services have been let down to a state of decay and inefficiency, it is the fault, not of the electors, but of the Government, not of the taxpayers, but of the Spending Departments. If the country is to be taxed to the uttermost farthing, and we are to add year after year in peace time to our enormous dead weight debt, economists are surely entitled to insist that henceforth we should get value for our money, and that a searching inquiry should be instituted into all forms of public waste and extravagance, not only in respect of armaments, but of social services and subsidies. Waste is waste, wherever it occurs. It is just as bad to pay an excessive sum for building a bridge or a school as to pay more for a battleship or an aerodrome than it ought to cost. The habit of squandering public money grows with what it feeds on. After the War, the Geddes Committee found that the superfluities of our spending departments ran into hundreds of millions. A pruning knife to-day might be worth a shilling on the income tax if only we could have a Gladstonian Chancellor of the Exchequer; and after the operations—if they were skilfully performed—efficiency would, as usual, follow in the wake of economy.

But no hint of this kind is to be found in the speeches of Labour leaders. Dr. Dalton, for example, who has written a book to show how the Socialist State will absorb the City and take over private industries, was solely concerned with taxation; and like his colleagues and supporters, he wants all the new expenditure, both on armaments and social services, to be abstracted from a small minority of the population. Instead of going to the general body of income tax payers, he said, the Chancellor of the Exchequer "should rather have made additional provision by scaling up the rates both of surtax and estate duties." Next year he should bring down the surtax limit from two thousand a year to fifteen hundred a year. Thereby, according to Dr. Dalton's estimate, at least seventy millions more of income per year would be surtaxed, and forty thousand more people (whom the Labour Party denounces as capitalists) would have to pay more than they do now. And yet, as Mr. Churchill pointed out, the present supertax, though the scale is more severe than it was then—and though ten per cent. has been added—yields less than it did in 1929. It is to be hoped that this Budget and the Budget

discussions will teach the Conservative Party the value and necessity of public economy; for it is clear that, unless they reverse the engines of taxation, the incomes and estates of their supporters will be taxed out of existence, whether the great war for which they are preparing comes about or not. One of them, Mr. M. Beaumont, acknowledged that the financial situation is one of great gravity, and said: "I have enough Liberal left in me to agree with Mr. Gladstone that money is best left to fructify in the pockets of the people." The Labour Party is now controlled by Socialists who want to draw more and more money from the pockets of rich people in order that it may fructify in the hands of state bureaucrats. They are delighted with what Mr. Elliot is doing; and they will extend his Milk Boards and his Pig Boards, his Poultry Boards and his Potato Boards, to cover all the industries of the country.

Mr. Churchill's point of view is quite different. He accepts with a shrug of the shoulders the reversal of all the financial and fiscal policies, which, "as a convinced Free Trader," and "the last orthodox Chancellor of the Victorian Era," he always believed in. He has only changed, like the Vicar of Bray, because the times have altered. Even now he is not quite sure that all is for the best:

Unemployment has doubled; our foreign trade is halved; our carrying trade, shipping and shipbuilding, is woefully reduced. Lancashire is broken; the cotton trade to India, once the glory of our exports as a whole, has fallen to a quarter of what it was in 1929—only yesterday. The dark cloud of economic privation envelops the once brilliant North. The income from foreign investments, that steady flow which yielded such a nourishment to our revenue that it was a noticeable feature in supporting our incomparable social services, has shrunk by more than 25 per cent.

From these comments on the tariff-created "prosperity" of which we hear so much, Mr. Churchill, after some pretty compliments to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, passed on to the "grave and startling statements" which he has been making for months past about Germany's expenditure on war-like preparations. "I obtained my information originally from a source which I cannot divulge"; but he tried to support them from official publications of the German Government. These show an increase in the public debt of a thousand millions sterling "at the official rate of exchange."

Then he made the wild assumption that all this money (including, to crown his absurdity, the expenditure on roads) has been spent on armaments! What should we think of Herr Hitler if he added the expenditure on our motor roads to the Army Estimates? In addition to this, Mr. Churchill referred to the German expenditure on capital account, and argued that the recent increase in the German national income is another ominous sign, because wages have not risen (he did not mention a large decrease of unemployment); and *therefore* the increase must have gone into constructional work, "the bulk of which is represented directly or indirectly, I am led to believe, by armaments."

Mr. Churchill arrived somehow at a total of nearly twenty thousand million reichsmarks for the expenditure on German rearmament since Hitler came into power, and professes to believe that more than half was spent last year. I will only observe, first, that it is ridiculous to convert marks into pounds at the official rate of exchange, which, as everyone knows, does not represent the internal value of the mark. The pegged exchange value of the mark has nothing to do with the internal value or purchasing power in Germany of the paper mark; and this, of course, is what counts when the Government is paying wages or buying goods for rearmament. Travellers in Germany have long been able to get from 21 to 24 marks to the pound, and on this head alone Mr. Churchill's figures should be cut down by nearly half. An expenditure of four hundred millions is a good deal less alarming than an expenditure of eight hundred millions; and if of this smaller sum a hundred millions has been spent on roads, that brings down the expenditure of Germany on rearmament to three hundred millions in 1935. I wonder how much has gone to the support of the secret police and to the various costly extravagances of the Nazi Party which Dr. Schacht is now endeavouring to curtail.

It seems to me also rather significant that our Government, while acting on Mr. Churchill's panic figures, has not adopted them or answered any questions on the subject. My own belief is that the Nazi Government has been over-spending on armaments and many other things, partly for the purpose of reducing unemployment and creating an appearance of fictitious prosperity, and that it has thereby strained the finances of Germany almost to breaking point and weakened

the real strength of the nation. If so, we need not assume that Hitler's professions of a desire for peace and disarmament are altogether insincere and hypocritical.

In any case, this Defence Budget, with its prodigious additions to unproductive expenditure and its failure to restore a Sinking Fund, must be closely related to our foreign and fiscal policy. Is it not a paradox that our Foreign Office should be planning a new military alliance with France, while we have been engaged for the last four years in fiscal warfare of tariffs and quotas with our French neighbours and customers? When Napoleon the Third was envisaged by our Foreign Office and War Office as the dangerous Dictator of Europe, who was planning an invasion of England, Lord Palmerston insisted on a Fortification Loan; but Mr. Gladstone, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, tried another way, and at the suggestion of Cobden the free trade Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce was negotiated and incorporated in the Budget of 1860. That put a happy end to the naval competition and ill-feeling between France and Great Britain. A better precedent could not be found at the present time. Our Coalition Government would deserve the name of "National" if it could forget the Birmingham Tariff and the Ottawa Agreements and substitute for the race in armaments a profitable rivalry in commerce which would enrich the nations on both sides of the Channel and of the North Sea, and initiate a new era of friendly intercourse and goodwill.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

AFTER THE FRENCH GENERAL ELECTION.

ONCE more, as in 1932 and in 1924, France has elected a Chamber of Deputies strongly leaning to the Left. Will the Chamber produce a stable Government? Will the majority hold together? Or shall we see, in accordance with recent precedents, an "unmanageable" Chamber drifting fatally towards government by fortuitous coalitions, or submitting uneasily to what is called National Union? Before an attempt is made to discuss these questions it is necessary to glance at the particular circumstances in which this year's election was fought.

Two clear inferences may be drawn from the result. The majority vote was an expression of discontent, mainly economic discontent. It was also a decisive rejection of Fascism and a reaffirmation of the popular attachment to Parliamentarism. Nobody can reasonably doubt either of these conclusions. The proof of the discontent may be found in the "push" towards the extreme Left, and particularly in the striking increase in the Communist poll. The revolt against Fascist tendencies explains the singularly effective concentration of the vote in favour of the Popular Front at the second ballot.

The electorate showed its own mind. It has often been made a reproach against the second ballot that, owing to the multiplicity of parties, it still tends to result in the election of a large number of "minority members." On this occasion, when there were no fewer than 4,800 candidates for 618 seats at the first ballot, it might have been expected that the reproach would be more than usually merited. In fact, however, the organised withdrawal of candidates on either side reduced the issue in the great bulk of constituencies to its simplest form. The rule of mutual support at the second ballot was almost generally observed by the candidates of the Popular Front, and in most cases by their opponents. The concentration of forces to Right and Left was such that the elected Deputies who failed to get an absolute majority of the votes cast did not number more than fifty. There was therefore a genuine rally of opinion among the people. Recommendations of leaders enjoining support of a single candidate at the second ballot would not have been so

generally followed if they had not been approved by the rank and file of the parties concerned.

There is no doubt that the quasi-Fascist agitations which began after the Paris riots of February 1934, helped to drive Radical-Socialists, Socialists and Communists into the same camp. The disciplined parades of the Croix de Feu, the "mobilisations," the pretentious threats of Colonel de la Rocque to "sweep away Parliamentarism," his repeated announcements of the "zero hour" for some unmentioned date which was never reached, ended by rousing popular opinion on the other side. The menace and the reaction which it provoked facilitated the union of the parties of the Left. It would be easy to find Conservatives who, since the election, think that the most certain achievement of the Croix de Feu was the creation of the Popular Front.

As a political force the Croix de Feu seems to have been taken more seriously abroad than in France. Behind the demonstrations of February 1934, there was, no doubt, a certain amount of spontaneous indignation, but the later agitations encouraged the suspicion that the real emotion prevailing at the time was being exploited by factions for their own ends. There was no convincing sign that the Croix de Feu had obtained an assured and steady hold of opinion in the mass of the nation. Their programme of reforms, thrown together from several contradictory schools of doctrine, is such that it is hard to conceive of any organised body of opinion accepting the whole of it. In effect, as the election approached, they drifted towards the ordinary parties of the Right. At the general election Colonel de la Rocque and his lieutenants seem to have issued voting orders to their adherents, but they did not themselves put up their own candidates. Out of opportunism some regular Nationalist and Conservative forces coquetted with the Croix de Feu, as the reactionary parties coquetted with Boulanger half a century ago. The issue of the contest leaves it doubtful whether they gained by the connection.

Important as this conflict of Fascist and anti-Fascist tendencies certainly was, electors were necessarily concerned to express their economic grievances. France is economically stagnant. There is scarcely any branch of activity which is not suffering. A prolonged agricultural crisis; depression in industry, somewhat mitigated by Government orders for

military purposes ; a slump in export trades ; a collapse of the highly profitable tourist traffic ; high retail prices, high cost of borrowing for industry, high cost of production—these conditions, with their train of unemployment and short-time working and a lower standard of living, were in the minds of voters. The decree-laws of the Laval Government, devoted in the first instance to the restoration of the State finances, added further classes to the discontented : civil servants, war veterans, small rente holders. Sacrifices under the decree-laws were unequally distributed, and there were many persons whose contribution to the salvation of the franc took the pleasing form of a reduction in their house-rent.

Behind all these grievances was a widespread conviction that the stern deflation of the last two years had failed in its ultimate purpose. The Laval policy was to balance the Budget by reducing expenditure, restore public credit, revive confidence and cheapen money, and so, in the end, lead to a renewal of economic activity. Whether this heroic method was feasible or not, it met with serious reverses. Events both at home and abroad were unfavourable to the growth of confidence. It was not even certain that the Budget, if all expenditure properly belonging to it were included, would escape a deficit. Money remained as dear as ever. Public confidence was so far from being restored that there were repeated flights from the franc. Such symptoms of trade revival as showed themselves were timid as compared with those visible in many other countries, except in industries which benefited by orders for military and defensive equipment.

There has been an obvious tendency among foreign observers to consider this situation as a consequence of an over-valuation of the franc. It was not directly from this point of view that the French electors regarded it. Indeed, parties, as well as commercial and industrial organisations of all kinds, declared their opposition to devaluation, and M. Léon Blum, the Socialist leader, did so after the election. During all this period of depression few people liked the idea of a second devaluation following on that of 1926-8. While the downright devaluationists failed to convince, however, the impression certainly spread that a depreciation of the currency might become inevitable, and there have been signs this year that large commercial and industrial interests have

exported capital by various devices to cover themselves against the risk. But the line of approach to the financial problem chosen by the parties constituting the Popular Front was to set a policy of productive expenditure against the policy of strict deflation. It was, of course, argued by their adversaries that this reversal of policy, along with other projected measures likely to alarm the investor or the large industrial interests, would endanger the balance of the Budget and lead necessarily to devaluation. But devaluation was not plainly an issue at the election. If it had already been accomplished it would, no doubt, have facilitated the task of the new Government.

Such were the conditions in which the new Chamber was elected. At first sight it might appear to resemble that of 1924, with the Popular Front substituted for the old Cartel des Gauches. In reality there are marked differences between the two. There is first the difference in personnel. This year's election has brought in a large number of "new men." There are no fewer than 277 Deputies who did not sit in the last Chamber. It must be remembered, too, that the youngest electors were born in 1915. The post-war generation is beginning to make its voice heard. Finally, the crisis has provoked a vast and bewildering movement of ideas. During the last two years, in particular, there has been an enormous crop of plans of reform covering the whole area of government. These have come, not merely from the regular political parties, but from the most diverse organisations. Many of these schemes are, no doubt, pathetically amateurish and of little practical consequence, but their existence bears witness to the stirring of ideas.

The Popular Front is itself very different in composition from the former Cartel des Gauches. It includes the Communists, who now become a serious Parliamentary force of seventy-two members. The progress of the Communists is the most significant single result of the election. It would be imprudent to take it as a proof of widespread conversion to the full Soviet doctrine. At this election they received nearly 1,500,000 votes, but already in 1928 they had received more than 1,000,000. Their electoral strength has varied greatly on different occasions. They present themselves as a party of the discontented, and as such were very favourably placed for this year's contest. They have, however, established a

firm hold in certain regions, and especially in the Paris area. Of their seventy-two Deputies thirty-two were elected in Paris and the suburbs, and nine more in the outer suburbs of the Seine-et-Oise.

In one important respect the election confounded the prophets. It made the Socialists, with 146 Deputies as compared with the 116 of the Radical-Socialists, the strongest group. The Socialists had promised in advance their participation in a Popular Front Ministry, in which it had been generally thought that the Radical-Socialists would be the predominant element. On the day following the election M. Léon Blum claimed for his party the right of initiative in forming the new Government, and that fact stamps a new character on the whole combination. The Cartel Ministries were nearly always formed by the Radical-Socialists, with the Socialists as part of the majority, but not contributing any members to the Cabinet. In the new Chamber, the first in which the Socialists have ever, in their history, agreed to share in the responsibilities of government, they spring at once into the position of the leading party, and, therefore, assume the chief post of management. Before the election the Communists announced that they would not actually participate in the Government. The fact that the Socialists, their nearest allies, decided to form the Government, and the fact that the Communist group proved to be so large—both unexpected circumstances—were promptly, but vainly, urged by M. Léon Blum as furnishing good reasons for Communist participation.

Assuming that the whole of their members remain faithful the groups constituting the Popular Front together number 381 Deputies, so that if all the rest of the Chamber were against them the Opposition would number no more than 237. The apparent majority is therefore ample. It has a special source of strength—always supposing fidelity—in the fact that it need not depend on the support of centre groups, on which the former Cartel Governments usually relied in some degree. Parliamentarily, the Popular Front also has the advantage of having published as far back as last January the outlines of its programme of action, to which the constituent groups, or at least their executives, officially subscribed. This diminishes, if it does not entirely remove, one of the difficulties which have previously faced Governmental

combinations, compelled to negotiate, after the election, with the groups which had been their allies at the polls. It is known, however, that a section of the Radical-Socialists is lukewarm, if not positively antagonistic, towards the programme. M. Daladier, the President of the party, was one of the promoters of the Popular Front, and the executive approved the programme. M. Herriot, however, who retains a good deal of influence, has been reserved about the programme, and it is probable that a number of right-wing Radicals dislike or distrust some proposed measures, such as the projected reorganisation of the Bank of France. It is difficult to estimate how many right-wing Radical-Socialists have come back to the Chamber, for this section suffered severely at the polls. About twenty-six Radicals were elected without being dependent on Socialist or Communist votes, and some of these declared their detachment from the Popular Front.

In any case the verdict of the polls assures the Popular Front of a governing majority. It comes from the country with the full right to govern which is conferred by a decisive victory. The real problem before the new Government will not be a problem of men, but of measures. This became abundantly apparent in the week following the election, when there were universal signs of a flight from the franc. The panicky withdrawals of bank deposits, the purchase of gold and sterling, the export of capital in various ways were undoubtedly accentuated as a result of the election. Not that these movements were new. Most fair observers have probably arrived at the conclusion that the existing lack of confidence is composed of many elements. Discouragement in face of economic difficulties, anxiety about international affairs, doubt whether the franc could finally hold out against the pressure of a world of depreciated currencies—all these factors were discernible for months before the election. At the approach of the election, and after the election, uneasiness increased. Probably the prospect of a majority so largely dependent on support from the extremists, apart from the actual measures in the programme of the Popular Front, caused this brusque movement of anxiety among investors.

The outline programme of the Popular Front was bold, but could hardly, in these unorthodox times, be described as startling. Some items in it seem to have raised doubts as to

their possible consequences. The proposal to abolish the Council of Regents of the Bank of France and to enlarge the powers of the Governor, under the control of a committee representing the Government, Parliament and economic interests, with alterations in the form of the capital of the Bank, would involve, of course, a considerable innovation, but the nationalisation of banks of issue has supporters in various countries who are not necessarily revolutionaries. The fiscal measures in the programme include a steepening of the scale of income tax on incomes exceeding 75,000 francs, which need not be more drastic than the system of taxation already in force in England. The suppression of tax-evasion by stock-holders and the control of the export of capital may disturb certain classes of investors, but the former of these measures has already been approved by Parliament, though not brought into actual operation. Other parts of the programme related to the carrying-out of public works, the setting up of a national unemployment fund, and other measures to reduce unemployment. As for the decree-laws, it was proposed to restore the "cuts" in wages and salaries in the case of the lower-paid civil servants and State employees generally, "pending the complete abolition of all the injustices which the decree-laws involve." The last phrase suggests the prudence of a political combination which foresees that, if it reaches office, it may have to be prudent in managing the resources of the Treasury.

This is the first election in recent history at which an outline of policy, approved by a coalition seeking office, has been proclaimed in advance. It may be doubted how far it was discussed in detail in the constituencies, for French electors usually discuss men and tendencies rather than measures. The existence of a plan is an aid to agreement on action. It is not, of course, a guarantee against disputes between the partners in the governing majority. Differences may well arise concerning the application of the plan, and there must be many problems *hors programme* which will present themselves. Unfriendly observers of the Popular Front majority may think it has a suspicious appearance of repeating, with variations, the weak features of the old Cartel. Each of the groups may be represented as having made one step to the Right. The Radical-Socialists would thus be a moderating "fringe" as the old Left-Centre groups

used to be; the Socialists take the former post of the Radicals as the active centre of the combination; the Communists, who used to be against any and every Government, are now substituted for the Socialists as the left wing of the majority, not represented in the Cabinet, but offering a watchful and perhaps dangerously critical support. Those who take this view of the situation would not find it too difficult to imagine some cartoonist one day drawing a picture of the Government mail-coach with a Socialist in the driver's seat, a Communist postilion applying the spur and a Radical-Socialist throwing all his weight on the brake.

Against such anticipations must be set the fact that the situation calls for action, and that the public, while far from being adventurous or revolutionary, is prepared to consider new solutions of the economic problem. The only Government which corresponds to the result of the elections is a Popular Front Government. The Chamber of Deputies is so constituted, indeed, that it would probably prove to be more difficult to find an alternative majority than has been the case in previous legislatures. The Centre is weakened and, as far as can be seen, its groups will not have more than 115 Deputies altogether. The Right is rather stronger, with 122. If the whole of the 116 Radical-Socialists were to leave the *Front Populaire* and join with the forces of the Right and Centre—a highly improbable contingency—the coalition thus formed would number about 350 Deputies. In view of the engagements of the Radical party and the mutual obligations of members of the groups of the Popular Front to each other in return for electoral support received, it would clearly be difficult to form a working majority on any other basis.

After the *expérience* Laval, then, the *expérience* Blum. M. Blum's essential aim is to set the economic machine working again. But if the economic situation is difficult, so is the financial situation, and each situation constantly reacts on the other. It is precisely this double nature of the problem which has brought previous Governments to grief. As M. Blum has declared against devaluation of the franc it will presumably be part of his purpose to reassure investors, large and small. Success in both the economic and the financial spheres is necessary—and there lies the risk.

W. L. MIDDLETON.

Paris.

THE ARMAMENTS RACE.

WHAT does the "armaments race" now amount to, and what chance remains of checking it before it leads to an explosion? The international competition in killing-power has become so frantic in pace, so colossal in cost, and so dangerous in character that it can hardly continue unchecked beyond, say, 1940, without leading to some kind of explosion—war or revolution or both. That is not just an alarmist statement, devoid of foundation: it is an estimate, which Mr. Churchill is not alone in making, based upon facts too little realised. A review of these facts should serve to shock us, however sick we may be of the word "disarmament," however numbed by the current defeatism, into making a renewed effort to stop the arms race before too late.

Consider first the pace and extent of the present increase in expenditure on armaments. Never in history, except during the Great War itself, has there been an increase in the world's armament expenditure, or in the British expenditure, which approaches, either in speed or in amount, the increase since the end of 1933. If you draw a graph of the world's armament expenditure, and of our own, during the past seventy years, you will find that the lines were remarkably level and steady for about forty years. Our own expenditure stood at £28 millions, £31 millions, £33 millions, till the cost of the Boer War made a large bump in the line. In 1900, when the first German Navy Law was introduced, the line for the world begins to slope upwards; after the Dreadnought scare, and the second German Navy Law, the rise becomes steeper. Those were the six fateful years between 1908 and 1914 in which, as Lord Grey declared, the intensified armament competition proved to be not only a symptom but also a cause of the situation out of which the Great War came. During the War years the line rockets up, of course, far above the top of your graph-paper: and after the War it remains at a high level (not easy to compare with the pre-War level owing to changes in wholesale and retail price-levels, increases in pay and pensions, etc.). In 1925 the estimated total stood at about £700 millions, despite the drastic disarmament of Germany and three other Powers. By 1929 this had risen to about £890 millions; and when the Disarmament Conference began in 1932, the amount officially recorded as being spent

directly on armaments (not including indirect military expenditure) was between £900 millions and £1,000 millions.

By the end of 1933 Britain and France had shirked paying the price of a real beginning of agreed disarmament and had failed to do business about "equality" and "security" whilst conditions were comparatively favourable: and Hitler had been presented by Sir John Simon and his French colleagues with a good pretext for withdrawing, as he wanted to do, from the Conference and from the League, and for whipping up fresh exasperation in his country and a fresh resolve to rearm. In the spring of 1934 the last chances of agreement were blindly thrown away. The reactionary French Government could plead in excuse that it had been driven to the conclusion that it could expect no definite assurances as to collective security from the British Government: the vacillating and reactionary British Government capitulated to the demands of Lord Londonderry and the other enthusiasts for armament expansion, on the fallacious plea that we had "cut our armaments to the bone," "disarmed to the edge of risk," set an example that others had refused to follow, and must, therefore, "rearm" forthwith. And so, despite the continued economic depression, the world's armament expenditure began to rise in 1934: and finally, in 1935 and 1936, the line on our graph shoots up more vertically than ever before, except during the Great War itself. Few people seem to realise yet what is already happening. Fears are commonly expressed lest an armament race may begin: but the race is in full course now. And in comparison with this race the notorious race before the War was a leisurely progression. Look at the figures. By the end of the six years, 1908-14, the world had increased its total annual expenditure on armaments by about £187 millions—an average rise of about £31 millions a year. Bad enough. But in the one year, 1935, on a conservative estimate, the world spent *double* the sum spent so lately as 1932, when the Disarmament Conference began! Indeed, the best estimates I have been able to get show an increase in 1935, over the already enormous total for 1934, of between £900 millions and £1,000 millions for the seven Great Powers alone. This includes an estimate of the huge German expenditure in 1935, which was, of course, not comparable to a normal outlay. It includes also an abnormal figure in the Italian case, viz. part

of the estimated cost of the Abyssinian war. The Russian expenditure for 1935-6 was officially given as 8,200 million roubles (about £290 millions), which is nearly five times the official estimate for 1934.

And now we are promised still larger increases in 1936. The Russian estimate for 1936-7 is officially put at about £590 millions, more than double the colossal figure for 1935. Think what this must mean as a handicap upon her vast enterprise of economic and social reconstruction. The British total is to be £178 millions; and this, we are warned, is only a prelude to further increases. The United States is to spend £240 millions. Germany and Italy, with their tottering finances, have mortgaged their future in order to pile up armaments as quickly as possible. The mercury in the thermometer recording the world's temperature has rushed up to 104: it is rising now, more quickly still, to 105. After that—what course will the fever take?

Do not be misled by the blessed euphemism, "Rearmament," into supposing that present expenditure represents a return to "normal" standards. Fifty years ago Lord Randolph Churchill resigned from the Chancellorship of the Exchequer because a total British expenditure of £31 millions on the (two) fighting services "is very greatly in excess of what I can consent to." Nineteen years later Mr. Winston Churchill, in his brilliant biography of his father, was asking, "How would he [Lord Randolph] have regarded a naval and military expenditure of £70 millions in time of peace?" To-day that same Mr. Churchill, looking out for the second time in his life upon Germany arming, is condemning, as most dangerously inadequate, a British armament expenditure on the (three) fighting services of £178 millions! The British *increase* between 1935 and 1936 far exceeds the total armament budget which Lord Randolph had to deal with: the British naval estimates for 1936 (£80½ millions) are double the naval expenditure of the whole world forty years ago, and that British total is to be greatly increased in later years. Even when every allowance has been made for the large increase in pay and pensions since the War, and for some change in price levels, wholesale and retail, this increase remains enormous.

This country is richer than it was fifty years ago, the expenditure on social services has been stupendously increased

—but war debt charges have also been increased stupendously, and the present cost of our armaments will put an unprecedented burden upon our tax-free resources in peace-time. If that increase is maintained, social services, whose expansion is desperately needed, will be prevented from expanding and may soon have to be curtailed. It must be remembered, too, that the mere charges on the national budgets indicate only a part of the real burden and waste involved in the arms race. Those charges represent not merely so much money spent on ships and bombing planes, but also the labour of millions of men, the locking up of millions of tons of raw materials.

Moreover, the redirection of the national effort involves the creation of vast new vested interests in preparation for war. How is a capitalist society going to reverse these engines? How can a Hitler or a Mussolini, or a Baldwin either, face the prospect of demobilisation—the demobilisation of Italian armies now in Africa, of conscript armies in Germany, of industries that have been developed for armament production in England and elsewhere? Mr. Baldwin, as the head of an anti-socialist Government, with a millstone of unemployment round its neck, may sometimes catch a nightmarish glimpse of the problem of reabsorption of labour which he will presently be leaving as a legacy to his successors: but the crazy logic of the argument that armament expansion means reduction of unemployment, means increased consumption, and so means "prosperity," helps to take the heart out of any effort to achieve agreement on limitation and reduction of armaments.

But the pace and magnitude of the increase in armament expenditure is not the gravest of the warning facts we have to reckon with. Far more important is the increase in killing-power, especially the increase in power to strike a sudden smashing blow at long range. Yes, we have all got sick of hearing that said. It has ceased, perhaps, to make any impression upon your imagination, even though it is the most serious of all the new facts which urban mankind has to take into account. Just try, then, the effect of this dose for your imagination, as if it were electric treatment for a wasted muscle. Go to the Science Museum and look at that spidery contraption, the aeroplane in which, *only thirty-three years ago*, the Wright brothers first "conquered the air" in a heavier-than-air machine by rising from the ground for twelve seconds. And then go on to the models of aeroplanes which your

young son will enjoy—the primitive Vickers “gun-bus” of 1914, and the swiftly-changing sequence of types that followed. Look at the pictures and figures in Jane’s *All the World’s Aircraft*. And then, remembering what aircraft did, and could have done, by the end of the Great War, when aviation was only fifteen years old, imagine what aviation the destroyer will be able to do by the time it is a hundred years old if it survives as a national weapon. Seven years after the War ended, our Air Minister, Sir Samuel Hoare, warned us that “Air Forces to-day could drop almost the same weight [of bombs] in the first twenty-four hours of war” as the Germans dropped in this country during the whole of the last war, and could “continue this scale of attack indefinitely.” That statement was based on a report by the British Air staff about the French Air Force of that day. Ten years have passed since then: the calculation has become obsolete, through the creation of a vast German air force and the increase by many fold of the range and speed and striking-power of the world’s air forces. In April 1935 the French Air Minister announced that, by the end of that year, the French air force would be trebled and its range doubled: our own Air Ministry made similar claims in May 1935, and again this spring: and no doubt the German Air Ministry has been doing its bit. If it was true in Lord Randolph Churchill’s day that, as he said in his letter of resignation, “the possession of a very sharp sword offers a temptation, which becomes irresistible, to demonstrate the efficiency of the weapon in a practical manner,” what must be the danger to-day when a Mussolini and a Goering possess a means of attack so sudden, so shattering, and so potent against defence?

These increases in cost and striking-power have been accompanied by such a breakdown of restrictions upon armament competition that 1930 seems in retrospect like a golden age. Back in 1930 the four Powers whose armaments had been drastically limited by the Peace Treaties were still substantially disarmed down to those limits, though no doubt there were considerable evasions. To-day all four are re-arming, and Germany is one of the greatest armed Powers in the world, free from any restrictions except those imposed by the deplorable Anglo-German naval agreement.

Back in 1930 the Japanese militarists had not yet been given their head; the League’s collective peace system had

not yet been discredited by the betrayal of China; Sir John Simon had not yet become Foreign Secretary or declared that, “however we handle the matter, I do not intend my own country to get into trouble about it”; and Japan had not yet withdrawn from the League or denounced the Washington Treaty.

Back in 1930 the British Government stood for the non-replacement of capital ships, declaring its desire to see them “disappear in due course from the fleets of the world”; the long holiday from the building of such ships had not yet been broken, as it was broken in 1932, after the National Government had rejected the relevant part of the Hoover plan and other proposals; the Admiralty’s spokesman had not yet been allowed to declare at Geneva that capital ships “are more precious than rubies to those States which possess them.” To-day the Government insist that, since eight new battleships are now being built in Europe, they must have Parliamentary authorisation for initial expenditure on two new capital ships, whilst at the same time they sanction an enquiry as to whether such ships are worth building in a country which has no anchorage beyond the effective bombing range of a continental enemy.

In 1930 we still had the great political and technical agreement of Washington, which had effected not only a partial limitation of naval armaments of the greatest naval Powers, but even a large reduction of ships built and building. We still had the London Treaty of 1930, extending the limitation. To-day Japan has withdrawn altogether, and there will soon be no limitations whatever upon the *quantities* of naval armaments, except in so far as Germany’s fleet will be restricted through the Anglo-German agreement, and in so far as the British and American fleets may be affected by the Anglo-American “gentleman’s agreement” on parity. The London Naval Treaty of 1936 will maintain, precariously and conditionally, certain restrictions upon sizes of warships and calibre of guns; but “quantitative disarmament” has gone overboard, and the qualitative restrictions are such that they are not likely to restrain the naval architects from doing anything that seems good to them for technical and financial reasons. The maximum size of the capital ship will still be 35,000 tons: no one wants to build bigger ones. The maximum calibre of naval guns will be reduced from 16 inches to

14 if improbable conditions are fulfilled ; this 14-inch gun has, it is said, been so developed that it can now do what the other did. The aircraft carrier will have a maximum tonnage of 22,000 instead of 27,000 tons, only because nobody wants the very big ones : and further 10,000-ton cruisers will not be built, at least for the present, since a lot have been built already and the type is not technically successful. The 2,000-ton limit for submarines is very high, though not high enough to allow of future building of such huge craft as the French *Surcouf*. The agreement will do no more than add a slight reinforcement to the banks of the canal along which the naval arms race would flow of its own accord if there were no agreement. As a contribution to the reduction of armaments, or to the stopping of the arms race, the new London Treaty is virtually worthless : the best that can be said of it is that it may serve indirectly to promote Anglo-American co-operation and goodwill, especially in the Far East.

Back in 1930 the Disarmament Conference was still ahead, and the British Government were still basing their policy upon the so-called "Ten-year rule," still assuming that during the next ten years the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war. But in 1932, the very year in which the Disarmament Conference began, the National Government took the lead in abandoning the collective peace system in the Far East, and abandoned the ten-year rule. As Sir John Simon disclosed on March 10th last, "When the realities were examined in 1932, the ten-years rule was abandoned. . . . This National Government was not prepared to take the responsibility of rejecting the warning which they received in 1932." Perhaps this helps to explain that Government's failure to give any adequate lead to the Disarmament Conference ; its insistence on the retention and replacement of capital ships, on retention of tanks up to 20 tons, and retention of bombing from the air in "outlying regions" unspecified ; its rejection of the bulk of a Hoover plan in 1932, its wholly negative and unhelpful attitude, based on the Air Ministry's unavowed hostility, to the French proposals in February-March 1933 for drastic air disarmament and the control of civil aviation ; its fateful neglect of the Roosevelt-Hitler offer in May 1933 ; its neglect of the plans for limiting total expenditure on armaments, to which the French and others attached great importance ; its leadership in wrecking the

American plan for control of the arms trade, in February 1934 ; and many other items in its disastrous record.

Back in 1930 the Germany we had to deal with still stood—sincerely, I believe—for drastic disarmament all round. Time after time during the Disarmament Conference in 1932 I heard the Germany of Brüning pleading for a fair deal at last, and offering to accept as a volunteer all the restrictions of Versailles and more, provided only that the other Powers would restrict their own armaments likewise : the Germans offered, even, to scrap their famous pocket-battleship, *Deutschland*, and forgo the right to build any more, if only the others would level down likewise. In the summer of 1932 the British were in a strong position, provided that they would offer unequivocal assurances about sanctions, for forcing the French to concede some satisfaction for Germany's claim to equality of treatment. But Sir John Simon would not, could not, pay the price : the chance was blindly let slip. Even the German offer about air disarmament in May 1933, Hitler's proposals of October 6th, 1933, and the very moderate and conciliatory compromise offered on April 16th, 1934, were left undiscussed. In 1932 Germany had a weak and shaky Government, but her public opinion was still able to some extent to bring a free and informed contribution to the peace movement of the world. To-day that Germany, betrayed largely through the errors of British and French policy, is silenced, imprisoned, done to death, whilst the new Germany, half-crazed with militant nationalism, is being led towards a precipice by a somnambulist. To-day, after seeing so many of her proposals for real disarmament, coupled with a measure of supervision, ignored and rejected, this Germany is a great armed Power, and her proposals for "disarmament" are little better than worthless. There was a time, not long ago, when Germany was pressing for abolition of all air forces, and promising far-reaching concessions on the control of civil aviation as a means to that end. Even in April 1934 Hitler was offering to accept for five years (pending an attempt to agree on total abolition) "a defensive air force of short-range machines, not including bombing-planes, from the beginning of the Convention, the numerical strength of which would not exceed 30 per cent. of the combined air forces of Germany's neighbours or 50 per cent. of the military aircraft of France . . . whichever figure is the less." But the

Hitler of April 1936 hardly goes beyond the proposal of rules, unworkable rules, for the polite conduct of war. The most important task, he now says, is "to bring aerial warfare into the moral and human atmosphere of the protection afforded to non-combatants or the wounded. Just as the killing of defenceless wounded, or prisoners, or the use of dum-dum bullets, or the waging of submarine warfare without warning, have been either forbidden or regulated by international conventions, so it must be possible for civilised humanity to prevent the senseless abuse of new types of weapons without running counter to the object for which war is waged." While those words were being written, Mussolini's aeroplanes were supplying their scathing commentary. The Hitler of 1936 goes on to urge "the prohibition of the dropping of gas, poisonous or incendiary bombs." Such an agreement would represent not a step forward but a great step backward from the rule of war by which the nations, including Germany, are at present bound. The Poison Gas Convention of 1925 prohibits not only the dropping of gas from the air but also its use on the ground. Hitler's proposal would in effect restore permission for everything that Germany did with her gas-cylinders at Ypres. The rest of the new German proposals on disarmament are little better than that. As a means of stopping the arms race they are not even a pretentious fraud.

What chance is there that the arms race, now so perilous, will be stopped before Europe blows up? And where is the chance to come from? I see no sign of the emergence, in the present British Government, of any determination to take the lead in stopping the race. The arms race is being pursued with fifty times more energy and resource than were ever put into the National Government's contribution to the Disarmament Conference. If there is a re-formed National Government, it will probably be even worse in this respect than the present Cabinet: worse not only about disarmament but also about its corollaries, collective security and peaceful change. The forces that contended for international agreement on limitation, reduction and supervision of armaments are in utter disarray: and the militarists have succeeded in putting across their erroneous claim that this country has vainly given a devoted lead, and must now "rearm as a contribution to collective security." Many of the men who claim this are those who have done most to blast the growth

of confidence in British acceptance of a fair share of collective security against aggression and against proven breaches of a disarmament agreement. They are the very men who have been least ready to regard the armaments of our partners in the collective system as contributions to our own security, and who have been most complacent in assuming that our self-judged increases of armaments will be universally welcomed as a contribution to the world's security.

But it remains true that preponderant power must be enlisted on the side of "the collective peace system," i.e. on the side of those States which are most likely to prove loyal in respecting and preserving the agreed rules of peace. It may be that, in present conditions, an increased contribution of some kind, agreed upon with our partners, may be required from this or that country. It is certain that the forces which stand outside the collective peace system are now enormously powerful; apparently they are not growing relatively weaker. This, too, is certain: if the arms race continues as at present for a few more years, something will happen to blow up the dynamite which we have been storing in our cellar. And this also is certain: Governments for a while can perform miracles in the way of inducing their peoples to burden themselves and mortgage their future for the sake of "security": the old slogan "Arm for King and Country" can for a while be twisted, to suit the fashion, into the new slogan: "Rearm for Collective Security": the truth that armament expansion can put unemployment temporarily to sleep can be twisted for a while, in a gambling capitalist society, into the murderous lie that "armament expansion is good for trade": but the truth that each cannot be stronger than the other, and that neither supremacy nor "parity" in national killing-power (especially in the air) can bring true security, will remain truth. It will continue to be impossible to dodge the rules of arithmetic. And there is an England, in large part under-fed, under-housed, under-educated, but potentially powerful and capable of wakening to the fact that it is being stampeded, by leaders who do not really accept the implications of a collective peace system, into the old race down the Gadarene cliff. At last France is waking. May England waken soon.

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER.

BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY.

IT is already axiomatic to point out that the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland broke the strategic link between France and the Danubian countries; now if the Germans should come into conflict with Czechs or Austrians, France cannot reply by sending her troops into Western Germany. But though the *coup* of March 7th was a threat to Prague and to Vienna rather than to cities—like Strasbourg and Basle—on the Rhine, its repercussions in the Franco-German border country are not without interest.

I do not here propose to go into the circumstances of Belgium and Holland, but all the way from Luxembourg to the source of the Rhine in the Alps certain common characteristics are striking, and certain common reactions have taken place this spring. Right down to the Italian linguistic frontier of the Ticino, the dialect of the people here, even perhaps including the eastern fringe of Lorraine, is a German dialect with a few French decorations; of course French is often spoken as well. All the way one finds the passive anti-Semitism of pre-Hitler Germany. In Alsace, it should perhaps be mentioned, the Jewish problem is just as present as it was in Weimar Germany, for the westward wandering of Eastern Jews since 1914 had affected Alsace to much the same extent, and one sees the Galician type there quite frequently.

It might therefore have been supposed that, when subjected to the violent impact of National Socialist propaganda with its tremendous dynamic vitality, these frontier people would have been disturbingly affected. They read German rather than French, and the authorities of Luxembourg, Lorraine, Alsace and Switzerland, with few infractions of the free press principle, allow the German papers to come in. While Nazi propaganda is based upon racialistic assumptions, the old Fichtean glorification of the German language and its users is woven in as weft into the warp. Though people of mixed race, especially those with Slavonic names, seem often to fall hungrily upon the offer of a Nordic lineage which the Nazis so generously hold out to them, here, along the Franco-German frontier, nothing of the kind occurs. In Luxembourg, in Alsace, in German Switzerland, the deepest suspicion of Hitler and Hitlerism has shown itself. The Rhineland *coup* of March 7th justified the fears of the past

and created new ones of the future. Among politically minded people it is true to say that the general reaction was to regard the remilitarisation of Western Germany as perhaps natural and inevitable, but to regard the eagerness of British public opinion to accept Hitler's self-styled pacifism as catastrophically *naïf*. In Luxembourg "*Der Deutscher ist falsch*" is a popular saying, and people in authority there will say to one a little pityingly, "We can feel the rhythm of Germany's rearmament here—it is something colossally gigantic. Your people do not seem to know." There are only 300,000 Luxembourgish, but nearly two million people in Alsace and Lorraine have dark suspicions of Germany's intentions, and most of four million Swiss regard her declarations with scepticism.

Why do these frontier people, unlike the Saarlanders, reject the threats and blandishments of Nazi Germany? Why is that frontier, which gives the Saar to Germany, so exact? The Saarlanders, perhaps more bitterly than other Germans in the Reich, are groaning to-day over high prices, low wages and the rest, but the majority of them had no real political principle to oppose to that of nationalism at the time of their plebiscite. The men of Luxembourg, of Alsace-Lorraine and Switzerland, however, are essentially men of 1789; it is that, it seems, which fundamentally defends them against the principles of 1933.

It may be answered that the great French Revolution was born of a clash between conflicting ideas, and that it led to the triumph of an *Étatisme* which might be regarded as the herald of the German State of to-day. But though the 1793 leaders ignored them for a time, the French Revolution was based upon the conception of the Rights of Man. Its permanent contribution to civilisation has consisted in its emphasis upon the importance of the individual and upon the value of a rationalistic resistance to the claims of the ever-hungry State. These elements are entirely absent from Hitler's creed, and it is impossible to see where the deification of the Racial State will allow them to re-emerge. The tremendous local feeling of the Alsatians, or of the citizens of the separate Swiss cantons, is based upon an eagerness to defend individual quality against the claims of a standardising State. And it is undoubted that they fear and dislike the highly centralised Germany of to-day ten times

more vehemently than they rejected the semi-federal Weimar Republic. It might be argued that the German-speaking people who lie beyond her western frontier reject the German mission partly on religious grounds, which can in no way be linked with the Erastian and anti-Christian ideology of 1789. It is unquestionable that the clergy of Luxembourg, and of Alsace (where Church and State have still the Concordat connection), exert an important anti-Nazi influence. The Zwinglians of German Switzerland oppose the claims of a totalitarian State with indignation at least as great. But the Christian opposition to *Etatisme* is in no way incompatible with the 1789 demands, that men should be free to read, to write, and to think as they wish, and that law should be capable of defending individuals against the State. In German Switzerland, certainly, Nazi principles gained adherents before June 30th, 1934, but since that sinister week-end the Swiss Nazi movement seems to have lost its attraction, except for some of the officers. Even among the students of Zürich, Basle or Strasbourg—itself in many ways so Swiss—racial and militarist ideas have no noticeable success. In Austria one constantly hears from young men that they are in favour of the *Anschluss* because they want to be the subjects of a Great Power State, and they want to serve in its military or para-military formations. But the glories of the Great Power do not appeal to the Swiss, and they are sufficiently proud of their own historic achievements on many of the battlefields of Europe. Even in Luxembourg, which is completely disarmed, young people do not seem to yearn for uniforms, discipline, or national glory; they are proud of Luxembourg's democracy and they despise the military castes, whether aristocratic as they used to be or party-bureaucratic as they now are, which dominate Germany. They are suspicious of Belgium's designs upon the integrity of Luxembourg; if they were compelled to lose their independence, they would choose to join France.

For Lorraine there was at no time much question, but for Alsace since 1933 there is no doubt that she prefers to be French. There is a pro-German "autonomist" group of considerable dimensions; with this the dissident Communists of Strasbourg flirt, but its weakness has just been revealed in the French elections. Real autonomist feeling is pretty strong, although, since the survival of the Concordat has been certain, and the special educational system with up to four hours a

week of German lessons in the elementary schools, has been worked out, it is to some extent mollified. Some Alsations still complain that Paris allows them no local legislature, but they are bound to admit that they had little more freedom with a Chamber of their own in the days of living within the autocratic framework of Hohenzollern Germany. The Alsations are the reverse of anti-militarist, but they realise that in pacifist forty-million France they have far more military openings than in militarist sixty-seven-million Germany; indeed, it is easy to observe how often Alsatian names appear on lists of higher officers in France.* The Alsations complain in general of French administrative inefficiency, and there was considerable friction in the early years after the war, when French officials crowded into the restored provinces; French lawyers were especially out of place where they were unable to understand the dialect spoken by most of the inhabitants, or the legal system which remained partially German; even to this day the mortgage law, for example, has not been assimilated into the code of France. While the Alsations grumble, however, they have more bitter memories of German rule; they regard National Socialism as not so very new, but they are well aware that the yoke of Hitler would be much more oppressive than that of Wilhelm II. It is true, then, to say that the whole of this bilingual frontier territory rejects the Pan-German claim which its inhabitants nevertheless seriously fear. It is difficult to find anyone in Alsace, for instance, who is anything but perfectly sceptical with regard to Hitler's announcements in interviews and speeches to the effect that he renounces Alsace and Lorraine. It must be admitted that National Socialist Party declarations are magnificently ambiguous on the point. In the 1934 Party programme, it is stated that the Nazis do not think of using force to unite to Germany those Germans who live under Danish, Polish, Czech, Italian or French sovereignty; in the school-books the Alsations are described as forever German; and it should always be remembered that the German Government claimed to have had nothing to do with the *Putzsch* in Austria when Dollfuss was murdered.

Everyone from Luxembourg to Basle thinks in terms of imminent war to be initiated only by the Germans. In the

* E.g. General Schweisguth represented the French Army at the Staff conversations in London in April.

first few days after March 7th there was a fairly bad panic in Strasbourg and Metz, and buying in shops and hotel business practically ceased for a week. The Luxembourg peasants, I was told, sniffed the air with the caution of experts, but then announced it would not be war this time! French morale varies according to each person's faith in the Maginot defences, which in a sense defend Luxembourg from her rear since she has become a cul-de-sac from the German point of view. But the authorities in Luxembourg are anxious about possible danger from the air, and it is particularly difficult in a disarmed country to take protective steps without inducing panic. Their nervousness has increased since they have found Hitler offering non-aggression pacts to all their neighbours, but not to Luxembourg; it is even rumoured that the Grand Duchy must now take her place within the Franco-Belgian defensive system. War in this Middle Kingdom country is not the gruesome legend that it is for us: it is a matter of death or ruin for everyone, women and children not excepted. Of course, in the future, air-war may mean something more appalling for London than for Strasbourg or Metz, but it is the past which creates the conceptions of the present. Some of the Strasbourg people regard the Maginot line, which, curiously enough, was partly the work of German labour, as invulnerable, but that does not alter the fact that Strasbourg would need to be completely evacuated in case of war. Even in Basle people now think in terms of evacuation, for it is generally considered to-day that the Maginot defences make an invasion of Switzerland likely, and Basle lies on the road to the Belfort gap south of the Vosges. In Eastern Switzerland no immediate panic was felt in the days that followed March 7th, but there is a far greater sense of insecurity than before. The Swiss are taking steps to strengthen their own defences, but they know that they could only hold up a German army for a time.

Clausewitz once said that a state that went to war was simply continuing its policy by employing different methods. Most of the neighbours of Germany believe that, although a change of method may soon come about; Hitler is meanwhile attempting to win world domination by the very same means by which he conquered Germany. This involves intensive large-scale hypnotising propaganda punctuated by theatrical *coups*, and an ability to shelve accepted obligations by specious subterfuges

which appear to the Dictator himself as expressions of the highest moral principles. Perhaps the most indispensable link in the chain which Hitler so engagingly holds out to humanity is the exploitation of economic conditions. Nazi propaganda is always linked with economic pressure, such as the 1,000-mark visa to Austria, or insistence with Germany's creditors upon their own interest in helping Germany to pay her debts. A favourite method is to import large quantities of goods from some country, and then, by refusing cash payment, to insist upon the creditor country importing German goods which it may not require, but through which it becomes a dumping-ground, not only for goods but also for propaganda.

Now the whole of the area I have been discussing combines with Western Germany to constitute a tremendously important economic unit. The struggle between France and Germany, since the Industrial Revolution, may be economically expressed as the struggle for the domination of the combined coal and iron supplies of Western Europe. In 1919 France made a bid for the coal-mines of the Saar. Germany is short of iron if all Lorraine is French and while Styria remains outside the Reich; as a matter of fact Röchling of Völklingen in the Saar now claims to be working new supplies of ore from South Baden, but how far this experiment will give Germany what might be termed the ferrous autarchy she desires is not yet certain. Germany's economic relations with Alsace and Lorraine do not actually give her as great possibilities of economic blackmail as her economic relations in most other directions, though she is hungry, of course, for the potash of Mulhouse. The textile industries of southern Alsace are in great distress, but they were ambitiously extended after the war, so that there is not much scope for talk about the good old German days there. The port of Strasbourg is much better off under France, since the Germans used Mannheim at the expense of Strasbourg. Vested interests built up since 1919 now bind the restored provinces economically to France. When the Saar was reincorporated in Germany on March 1st, 1935, it was arranged that a certain amount of agricultural produce from Alsace and Lorraine should still be imported in return for German manufactured goods. The Germans used this agreement to dump, and the French in consequence refused last October to continue it. This has meant a serious

loss to the farmers of Alsace-Lorraine, but their complaints are not very easily exploited by Germany. It is obvious that de Wendel's, and the other iron concerns of Lorraine, have an interest in German rearmament, but though their production has gone up of late, they are far from working up to their full capacity.

The National Socialist conception of the State postulates a basis of racial homogeneity, but also a foundation of economic independence; states which could not exist economically without their neighbours are, the Nazis hold, anomalous, and the sooner they disappear the better. Here is a fresh veto, from another angle, upon the continued existence of both Luxembourg and Switzerland. In both these countries raw materials from abroad are imported, worked up into manufactured goods, and mostly once more sent abroad. Luxembourg is in a sense the particular child of the International Steel Cartel, to which its great iron people, of course, belong. For Luxembourg works up French ore with German coal and coke—the great A.R.B.E.D. iron concern imports some 80 per cent. of its ore from Lorraine, finding only 20 per cent. within the Grand Duchy itself. While Luxembourg feeling is all against Hitler, it should be observed that Luxembourg's interest is to a large extent with him. The Grand Duchy is admittedly ruled by the big industrialists. Since Hitler has been Chancellor, Germany has bought more steel. Since the Saar has been reincorporated in the Reich the Burbach works there, which belong to A.R.B.E.D., have increased their output by some 30 per cent. Luxembourg's representative in Berlin is M. Nickel, well known as a leading A.R.B.E.D. man. Since she is united in a Customs Union with Belgium, Luxembourg naturally exchanges goods most intensively with that country. In 1934, 23.2 per cent. of her exports went to Belgium; 20 per cent., however, went to Germany, while Luxembourg received substantially more from Germany than she sent to the Reich. To France she only sent 4.5 per cent. of her exports.

Germany has the same kind of grip upon Switzerland, running counter to Swiss anti-Nazi sentiment. She is easily Switzerland's biggest customer, and she sends about twice as much into Switzerland as she takes out, while holding up the balancing payments on Swiss capital invested in Germany. Where Luxembourg could more or less solve her

slump problems by sending home foreign workmen, Switzerland is still in the throes of the crisis and all the more anxious that Germany shall be prosperous. On Swiss sheets of statistics France comes next to Germany in both exports and imports, but in 1935, for instance, where 26.4 per cent. of Swiss imports came from Germany and 20.6 per cent. of exports went to Germany, the figures for France were only 16.2 per cent. and 14.8 per cent. respectively; every other country came far behind.

The picture of the bully is complete. All along the border-country German conceptions are rejected, but Germany's economic hold is strong and her military power is dreaded. If one crosses the frontier, following the Rhine down its course from Strasbourg to Mainz and Cologne, one is struck by the apathy of the people and the bitterness of their struggle to live, by contrast with the fear of invasion in the country west of the German frontier. This in itself substantiates the expectation of a war going westwards. Nazi propaganda has tried to create a legend of danger for the German Rhineland before French aggression, but this carries little conviction except among that strangely large portion of the British public which still seems to live in the period before the 1924 elections in France. Pro-German propagandists, for example the people who publish the paper called *Elz** in Alsace, try to convey that France by attempting to encircle Germany again is willing to turn Alsace into a battlefield, but most Alsations regard this as the latest form of German intimidation, a phenomenon with which they boast some fifty years' intimacy.

If the apathy of many Germans is apparent, there can be no question that the remilitarisation of the Rhineland is generally regarded as right in Germany. Yet, with all its faults, the Versailles Treaty made a real contribution to peace in its Rhineland clauses. Even if Germany had not lost the war, it would not have been unreasonable to have initiated "geographic disarmament" in this way, since the Rhine itself, "along whose banks spreads the most perfect strategic railway system in the world, gave the initiative to the invader" of France. As General Marshall-Cornwall has said: "Every kilometre on the French side represents a much greater area on the German one, since the belt of country offering possibilities of defence is narrow," and then there is

* Elsass-Lothringische Zeitung.

open country and Paris unprotected. "Western Germany, on the other hand, offers a magnificent series of natural barriers to an invader from across the Rhine; even should he succeed in breaking through the wooded ranges of the Westerwald, Taunus, Odenwald and Black Forest, he would still be faced with the semi-circle of the Thüringer Wald, the Franconian Jura and the Swabian Alb." We shall never be sure of peace until the nations agree to sacrifice progressive fractions of their sovereignty, but, unfortunately, while the Western States show intermittent signs of comprehension in the matter, Germany, reminded daily by her present rulers of the "unworthy" sacrifices demanded from her in 1648 and in 1919, has been lashed into intransigence. In Mainz there stands a great monument to Gustav Stresemann, who freed the Rhineland; now the soldiers are back and that is called freeing the Rhineland too. "Kindliness *à la* Stresemann," as written in the Nazi Party programme of 1934, "towards foreign countries must stop, and then we shall suddenly see that foreign countries will have a quite different respect for a strong representation of German interests, and instead of kicks and blows German wishes will receive consideration and care."

Wandering through the ancient streets of Strasbourg* or of Basle, one asks oneself why, if French and German civilisation could blend so gloriously in the stones of these cities, is Franco-German co-operation so far to seek. Watching in the A.R.B.E.D. rolling mills at Esch (near Luxembourg) the iron of France smelted with the coke of Germany, the same question in another form rises in one's mind. Listening to the German Swiss speak of their western cantons, or the French Swiss speak of Zürich or of Basle, one learns that people can very comfortably despise the different habits of their neighbours and be content, nevertheless, to be citizens of the same state. Yet to-day the Franco-German frontier country throbs with the vibration of German rearmament; the Basler, the Alsatian, the Luxembourgeois is filled with apprehension, and it is always towards the east that he looks with fear.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

* Metz, where the Wilhelmine station and residential villas are grotesquely incongruous, is quite another story.

KITCHENER AT THE WAR OFFICE.

WHEN on August 6th, 1914, Kitchener was called to the War Office he found an army organised for a short, sharp war, in which reserve armies would not and could not be utilised. Lord Haldane, a very clever man, but not a "personality," had worked well with the soldiers, but lacked the capacity to act as a corrective when they were wrong. They were wrong; hopelessly so. They directed all their thought to putting an army of four to six divisions on the French left within ten to fourteen days; to this end everything else was sacrificed. Among the opening "moves" of mobilisation, planned years before, the Regular adjutants and instructors attached to Territorial units were withdrawn and sent to France; the Army Schools of Flying, Musketry, even of Cookery, were closed down; the General Staff abdicated its functions; went off to France; leaving Kitchener with a War Office staffed with elderly, infirm, or out-of-date generals, and a country bled white of means for raising an army. Most tragic of all, the Munitions Supply had been based on the Mowatt Report, providing for four big battles, after which, supposedly, the war would be over. This Report, drawn up before the days of quickfiring, was utterly inadequate, even on the basis taken. The blame, as for so many things with which he had nothing to do, was cast on Kitchener's shoulders.

Haldane announced himself as "bolting and barring the door against conscription"; described the Territorial Force as:

... a citizen army which is retained at home for local defence, for resisting raids and anything which can slip past the navy, and which contains a section, now considerable, of those who are willing to go abroad for active service if occasion should require.*

This was all the Force was really meant to do. There was no idea of using the Territorial system as a framework for a national army, of expanding the Force, or of sending it to fight abroad in its own divisions. On August 2nd, 1914, the Military Correspondent of *The Times*, who was in close touch with the General Staff, wrote: "If war breaks out we may see thousands of Volunteers flocking to the Colours. But we need every man we can get for our general service army, and

* Imperial Conference, 1911.

masses of untrained Volunteers in the Territorial Force will be rather an encumbrance than an aid." Kitchener proclaimed the "short, sharp war" doctrine to be fallacious; predicted a conflict lasting many years; to be decided by the "last million" of men Britain could put into the field. His views and proposals for the New Armies roused a tempest of laughter and execration. On August 11th the Military Correspondent of *The Times* declared:

... it will take months to form such an army, and more months for it to become efficient. ... It will not be advisable in any way to diminish the value of our Reserve or Territorial formations for the benefit of a force which will take so long to create. The critical stage of the war is during the next few weeks, and we cannot afford to be caught swopping horses whilst crossing a stream.

On September 15th Wilson wrote:

K.'s "shadow armies," for shadow campaigns at unknown and distant dates, prevent a lot of good officers and N.C.O.s from coming out. It is a scandalous thing. ... What we want and *what we must have* is for our little force here to be kept to full strength with the very best of everything. Nothing else is any good.

This is only what was being said at the time by the whole General Staff, including Robertson and Haig. A General Staff is no panacea against "error" in war. It is a military corporation; like corporations in general it lacks a soul.

The new War Minister had "rough-hewn" in his mind:

... the idea of creating such a force as would enable us continuously to reinforce our troops in the field by fresh divisions. ... By these means we planned to work on the up-grade, while our Allies' forces decreased, so that at the conclusive period of the war we should have the maximum trained army this country could produce.*

Kitchener had to raise his armies in the midst of fighting the most titanic war known to history. He could not know in 1914 all that we know to-day, nor solve his problems in the calm of a professorial armchair. The essential thing was to raise his armies in a manner which would not upset existing arrangements, and which would have the elasticity to stand up

* Kitchener's own words. Speech to Members of House of Commons just before his death.

to violent shocks and unexpected happenings. There was an Expeditionary Force to fight in France, Special Reserves to feed this with drafts, Territorials to provide for Home Defence. Every unit had its assigned place in the general scheme and could not be taken from it without leaving a gap.

The Territorials, enlisted only for Home Defence, were very much under strength: 250,000 men instead of 314,000, they were armed with obsolescent guns and rifles. The officers were very sketchily trained, the men almost untrained. To have turned on to this Force all the vast streams of recruits which went to make the New Armies would have been the same thing as watering a young and tender plant by turning a hosepipe on it. One would have washed the whole thing away, roots and all. A Territorial unit cannot expand and train itself simultaneously. Consider the 46th Division (Territorials). This Division mobilised with an average of 600 men per battalion; recruited quickly to full strength. There were enough guns, rifles, uniforms, to go round, even if of obsolescent pattern. The Division could go into camp and start a programme of intensive training while the New Armies were mere agglomerations of recruits *sans* uniform; "armed" with dummy guns and wooden rifles. It was able to go abroad in seven months, and was a first reserve for Sir John French's army. Where would have been the sense of dividing up staffs, uniforms, arms, etc., barely sufficient for the needs of the 46th Division, evenly with the 18th and 12th Divisions (New Armies)? The only result would have been three divisions in an equal state of poverty and disorganisation. What would have happened had the enemy attempted a raid on our shores or had there developed a new crisis in France? The Territorials, under Kitchener's scheme, performed great and valuable services. Three divisions, sent abroad, were the means of releasing four divisions of Regular troops for burning points of the fighting; the remainder acted as a covering force for the New Armies, and were the first reserve for France. They could not have performed these services had Kitchener started by pulling them to pieces.

As touching the larger aspects of this question, the Territorial scheme was utterly unsuited for providing a national army. It worked by counties, and one county, London, had a population of 4,521,685, another, Rutland, had 20,346, and

between these extremes came counties such as Yorkshire, with 3,979,964, and Northampton with 348,515. Whatever organisation was adopted, it was necessary to break up the counties into recruiting blocks. This was what Kitchener did; Robertson, after Kitchener's death, and with the powerful aid of conscription at his elbow, was forced to go even farther.*

It is absurd to believe it possible to raise an army on a basis of small "packets" of troops, scattered all over the country. Kitchener's system of raising the first three New Armies direct by the War Office had both advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages were only temporary; the advantages permanent and increasing. The most important of these was the institution of great standing camps in which divisions could be concentrated *en bloc*, and put through a programme of intensive training. At first it led to tremendous overcrowding and actual suffering to the men, for no preparations had been made beforehand for dealing with such great masses. But these disadvantages were remedied with amazing speed, and it was possible to exercise something like general supervision and control; to make the best use of the small number of trained officers and N.C.O.s available. Thus the first three New Armies, eighteen divisions, went to the front within ten to twelve months after embodiment. The fourth and fifth New Armies, and Second Line Territorials, were raised territorially, by individuals or committees. These looked well after their men in the matter of rations and quarters. But the units thus raised were kept for months training in isolated encampments; it was impossible to exercise a general supervision over the training; local influences predominated in the appointment of officers, with results sometimes ludicrous, sometimes tragic. Take the 34th Division (fourth New Army.) It was raised virtually on a territorial system, one of its units was raised by the Cambridgeshire and Isle of Ely Territorial Force Association. But although most of its battalions were raised in September, October, or November 1914, they were not concentrated in brigades till March and June 1915; it was not until the end

* In July 1917 he dropped Territorial titles altogether; in October of the same year he reintroduced them, but in entire disregard of the origins of battalions. Thus the 258th, originally the 11th (Reserve) Battalion, North Staffordshire, became the 51st (Graduated) Battalion, Durham Light Infantry.

of September that the division could be concentrated for intensive training at Sutton Veney. By the time it went abroad some of its units had had sixteen months' training, and even then it was necessary to import several senior officers from France to furbish them up.

It was the machinery of great standing camps set up by Kitchener that alone rendered it possible to raise a national army. After the first three New Armies had vacated these, the various "pals" units were collected into the fourth and fifth New Armies, and concentrated for intensive training in their turn. When they had gone a fresh batch of divisions was created from the Second Line Territorials, trained in like manner, and shipped abroad.

Kitchener is often charged with having stopped recruiting for Territorials to favour the New Armies. But this only happened where the territorial units concerned were, in any case, over strength. When the Territorials were under strength he was just as ready to help them out. Thus the 59th Division (Territorials) received a draft of 10,000 men from the New Armies, and there were innumerable other instances. In fact, most of the Second Line Territorial Divisions were made up of recruits surplus to the New Armies. The truth was that Kitchener, a practical soldier, was forced to take the all-round view. He could not favour New Armies at the expense of Territorials, or *vice versa*. He wanted, and needed, both. He has been very loosely criticised in these matters, and with more in the way of malice than of knowledge. His great difficulties in raising the New Armies were due to the lack not of men but of arms, uniforms, camps, quarters, trained officers and instructors. These were matters in which the Territorial Associations could give little real help; problems to be solved successfully by nothing less than a centralised institution such as the War Office, controlling national resources. These difficulties, moreover, would have been experienced equally by whoever had tried to raise these armies, and whatever the organisation adopted.

It was not until the defeats of Russia . . . in the autumn of 1915 that . . . the General Staff realised that armies would be needed on a vaster scale. . . . Can anyone imagine Mr. Asquith's Cabinet countenancing sweeping schemes for the expansion of the Territorial Force against the judgment of their most trusted military advisers? . . . If Kitchener, setting to work with Herculean

energy, on the very day he entered the War Office, . . . firing the whole country, . . . needed close on two years to get his armies into full working order . . . what chance would the General Staff have had of solving the same problem, starting a year later, bringing . . . rusty generals, a strictly official mind, and . . . the country swept bare? (*The Kitchener Armies*, pp. 217-18.)

Had the effort made been less, France would have been smashed at Verdun. Where would have been the chance for "British traditional methods" with Germany dominant in Europe, free to turn on us her undivided energies; the resources of a whole continent?

It is instructive to compare the results gained by the Americans in raising their armies with the work done by Kitchener:

The Americans are a proud and patriotic people who had, moreover, a tradition of conscription. On coming into the war, they at once passed a law for compulsory military service, under which, between May 18th, 1917, and November 1st, 1918, from a population of 91,972,266, and in a period of eighteen months, they raised a grand total of 3,483,444 men. Excluding the Dominions and India, Great Britain raised between August 4th, 1914, and January 1st, 1916, an equal period, from a population of 41,126,040, 2,632,682 men. . . . The strain of military service fell principally upon England, Scotland, Wales and Ulster, a population of 39,000,000 . . . in proportion to population nearly three times as many men volunteered in Great Britain as were conscripted in the United States. . . . Up to January 1st, 1916, we put into the field, excluding Dominion and native troops, fifty divisions, . . . the United States—able to profit from all the "mistakes" made by us . . . to draw upon the highly developed munition industries of Great Britain and France to arm and equip her new levies . . . could not put into the field more than twenty-four. Moreover, the average British division was in a far higher state of efficiency. To write in this fashion is not meant to belittle or disparage . . . America, but to illuminate the tremendous energy which went to create the New Armies. (*The Kitchener Armies*, p. 172.)

To parallel Kitchener's results the Americans would have needed to raise 7,650,000 men instead of 3,483,444; to have put into the field 125 divisions instead of twenty-four. Yet there are people who tell us Kitchener was "no organiser."

I will deal very briefly with the Dardanelles.* On March

* See also *The Tragedy of Winston Churchill*, by the present writer. Hurst and Blackett. 12s. 6d. net.

6th, 1915, Mr. Churchill was warned by General Birdwood, "am doubtful if the fleet can force the passage"; on March 11th, by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson: "To advance further with a rush over unswept mine-fields . . . must involve serious losses in ships and men, and *will not* achieve the object. . . ." Mr. Churchill disregarded these warnings. He knew perfectly well that there were no troops available to support the fleet. Neither were the Bulgarian and Greek armies, on which at the time he was also counting, "mobilised." He was cocksure that the fleet was going to beat the forts, ordered the attack, and when it failed—the failure had been predicted—proceeded to throw the blame on everybody else's shoulders.

Kitchener no "scientific" soldier? Consider his warning to Haig:

The war is not against the men immediately opposed to you, it is against the German nation. The Allied Armies must press against the German line, and strike it hard and repeatedly. Some day the front will waver and bend, but never let me hear from anyone in France any mention even of the words, "piercing the line."

It was a prediction fulfilled to the very letter. The German line was never "broken" in the popular sense of the word. But at the time the words fell on deaf ears. In the Battle of the Somme cavalry were brought up not once but many times to exploit the "break-through" which never materialised. Men's lives were thrown away like water by ordering infantry to rush strongly held fortifications in defiance of the divisional commanders' desperate plea for an observed bombardment, and in obedience to a meticulously worked-out time-table for a "break-through" battle. Cavalry were repeatedly ordered to charge unbroken infantry. The historian of *The Rifle Brigade* sums it up: "In the tasks they were ordered to perform, no human beings could have been successful."

Kitchener "could not decentralise"? Read this:

On the Staff in France changing for dinner, while others were waist-deep in mud, or dying on patrol, was *de rigueur*. Sinking everything, corps, etiquette, tradition, personalities, and all the rest, in order to achieve a grand transcending surprise in attack—that was not considered necessary. Operations, Intelligence, Adjutant-General's branch, Signals, and "Q" all had their own axes to grind, their own spheres to swell in, and refused to get together lest an amalgamation should curb their powers, and infringe their departmental rights. No one branch of the Staff

would suffer itself to be dictated to by another branch, and the person who should have dictated to the whole lot in this vital matter did not do so.*

It is a truthful picture of Haig's headquarters after three years of the bloodiest warfare known to man. The War Office, when Kitchener took it over, was even worse. But for his "disorganising" methods we should never have raised an army. Can any sane civilian hold it to his discredit that he would not tolerate methods which led to the holocaust of our own men?

Kitchener "could not work with the General Staff"? Can anyone think of any occasion on which the General Staff was right? Here is some more evidence. From Hindenburg:† "Never before had two great powers such as Germany and Austria found themselves so much at the mercy . . . of a country with scarcely one-twentieth the population." It refers to Roumania. Think of the ghastly muddle made of the Roumanian campaign in 1916 by all the shining lights of the General Staffs in England and France. Think, too, of the crowning agony and humiliation of 1918. Witness this from Winston Churchill:

I was about to go to bed when a long cipher telegram arrived from the Prime Minister. Mr. Lloyd George repeated the message he had that day sent to President Wilson, appealing for the despatch of American troops on the largest possible scale, whether formed in divisions, or in the smallest formations, or even as drafts to British units.

This was two years after Kitchener's death, two years during which those who had criticised him had had an absolutely free hand to display their own superior wisdom. The practical result was that the British army went reeling back from the greatest and most humiliating disaster known to our history, the Prime Minister of England was down on his hands and knees to America, begging for help against the consequences of his own blunders, our principal commander in the field was offering to serve under the orders of a Frenchman, in sheer despair at the incapacity of his own Government, and as the only apparent means of saving his army from destruction. Not exactly an inspiring picture.

Our impressions of the war are still coloured by the lingering

* Tuohy, *The Secret Corps*, p. 219.

† *Out of My Life*, p. 199.

effects of propaganda, nationalist propaganda, and propaganda in favour of individuals. But when all impressions are sorted out, there are three figures which, from the military standpoint, are truly great—Kitchener, Ludendorff, and Foch. Each contributed to the war something which was creative, and individual to himself. Kitchener contributed the New Armies and laid the foundations of the national military organisation which enabled Great Britain to step into the breach and hold the foe in play while France was exhausted, Russia in collapse, and America not yet ready. Ludendorff pulled Germany together when, in 1916, she seemed about to go to pieces, prolonged her resistance for two years, faced a world in arms, and came within an ace of beating it. Foch took command of armies shaken by a succession of disasters, steadied them, instituted the grand concerted offensive by all the Allied armies which laid Germany prostrate. Of these three men of genius Kitchener, however, was perhaps the greatest, for he alone and from the outset measured events in their true perspective; foresaw the prolonged war. It was his work carried on in the dreariest and most arduous period of the war which laid the foundation for the triumph of Foch.

The drum-fire of journalism, the whizz-bangs of propaganda, can exalt the mediocrity and belittle the genius, but such a judgment will not stand. Poet or peasant, soldier or priest, it is by a man's work his life is judged, by his services to his fellow men. The final verdict on Kitchener will always run that with many to scoff and few to aid, with nothing but his own genius and the love and trust of his countrymen, he achieved a task that the soldiers of all countries proclaimed to be impossible, and which would have been impossible had anyone lesser than he attempted its solution. When he died the New Armies were ready; the foundations of victory well and truly laid. His last words before leaving London for his fateful journey to Russia were: "I have no fears as to our winning the war, but I fear very much we shall make a bad peace."

VICTOR WALLACE GERMAINS.

THE CHILD AND THE LAW.

THE passage into law of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 marked a very real advance in that most important branch of legislation which deals with children and adolescents. The Act set up and provided for special rules to be made as to the composition and procedure of juvenile courts all over England and Wales, on lines similar to those which had been already in existence in London and certain other centres. These children's courts have, therefore, been in operation for nearly three years in country districts. Taken as a whole they have done good work. But the difficulties incidental to the institution of a novel practice and procedure have, in some rural areas, caused the Act to be misapplied and misunderstood. The result has been missed opportunities of helping those boys and girls who appear before these courts, and a tendency amongst some magistrates to regard the Act and its procedure as no more than a fad foisted upon practical men by the theorists of Whitehall. It is for these reasons that an account of the working of such a court based upon personal experience may be found of general interest.

A juvenile court consists of not more than three justices chosen from the panel of magistrates appointed for this work. At the outset, therefore, benches are faced with a duty of selecting individuals for this panel. The best results will never be attained if this duty is not conscientiously performed. The Home Office circular letter to justices, issued before the Act came into operation, gave valuable advice on this point. The panel was to be composed of justices specially qualified to deal with juvenile cases: men and women were to be chosen of sympathetic understanding of young people, and experience of dealing with them in social work. No rigid provision was made as to disqualification on account of age. This was left to the good sense of benches, but it was carefully pointed out that this was work likely to be best carried out by the younger magistrates. The advice thus given by the Home Office has been authoritatively endorsed on many occasions since that date, only recently, indeed, by the Lord Chief Justice of England, in his address on the treatment of juvenile delinquency delivered to the members of the Clarke Hall Fellowship. Lord Hewart emphasised that justices should be

appointed who were fathers and not grandfathers, too liable as are the latter, through inability to look through the mental eyes of childhood, towards excessive severity or undue laxity.

Where the Act is not being applied to the fullest advantage this is probably due to a neglect of this primary duty of selection for the juvenile panel. In an attempt to avoid an invidious choice of individuals, some benches have elected to the panel the whole of the bench *en bloc*. In other cases magistrates have insisted upon seats on the panel by right of seniority, or as a matter of pride. Where the importance has not been realised and the duty of discrimination not properly performed, it has been inevitable, therefore, that an almost insuperable barrier to the best results has been erected at the very outset. Children have appeared before magistrates who, however well intentioned, suffer from the defects of irascibility, of lack of knowledge, and sympathy with children, and of that handicap of deafness which, in itself, is almost fatal to success in dealing with a frightened child. It is probable that in a considerable number of benches up and down the country the panel of juvenile magistrates has been inadequately or carelessly selected. It is suggested with the utmost seriousness that every individual justice should re-examine in the light of the considerations above the panel of the bench of which he is a member. If he find that there are those upon it whom the authority of the judicature and the experience of the Home Office deem unsuitable, it will surely be his duty no longer weakly to acquiesce in what he knows to be wrong. Nor will the excuse be valid that a particular bench has only a few children's cases, and those of a trivial nature, in the course of a year. Such a state of things may be changed at any moment, or as the duties of the local authority, particularly the local education authority, and the police, under the "care and protection" sections of the Act, become more fully realised. And even if a particular bench is fortunate enough to have little serious juvenile delinquency, nevertheless the difference between a single mistried, or unwisely treated, child and between ten such children, is a difference only of degree and not of kind. The leadership of a good chairman, inspired at once by an enthusiasm for the Act and by a love of children, is almost all-important. There should, if possible, be a woman member of the court, and if such be available it may be wise to complete the court by the

addition of a justice of the working classes, whose more intimate knowledge of the lives and habits of those who mainly come before the panel is frequently of the greatest value.

As regards the place of sitting, it is forbidden by the Act to hold a juvenile court in the ordinary court room on the same day as the adult court. In large towns accommodation is often provided, as it should be, in a different building altogether. This is not always possible in a small market town, desirable as it is, and the magistrate's room provides a common and convenient compromise. The essential is that there should be no association with adult offenders. The juvenile court ought not to be regarded as solely or even primarily a criminal court at all. Everything possible should be provided in the way of surroundings which may tend to drive home the lesson that the Act aims not at the punishment of children, but at their reclamation. It is for this reason that section 59 provides that the words "conviction" and "sentence" shall no longer be used in connection with children and young persons dealt with summarily. The whole conception of the young offender is altered. Whereas formerly he was merely a young criminal, he has become, in its more charitable and discerning view, rather a child in trouble and therefore in need of help. Nothing should be wanting which would help to substitute for the cold formality of a police court the atmosphere of an inquiry in his study by an understanding father.

It is important, for example, that the nature of the proceedings should be clearly understood, both by the boy or girl and by the parent, who is almost always present. There should, therefore, be a minimum opportunity for distraction, and for this reason it is advisable to have as few persons in the room as possible. Witnesses should be kept outside the room until they are called in to give evidence. In the majority of cases of any importance at all the defendant is ill at ease in the presence of strangers, and it is a wise practice to require witnesses who have given their evidence to leave the room after they have been cross-examined and re-examined. There is thus no possibility of a room gradually filling up with persons who remain for no useful purpose, with the resulting embarrassment and distraction to a lad who should be at his best.

It is at once kind and wise to commence the hearing of each case with the absolute assumption that the particular child

before the court is deserving of a great deal of trouble and understanding, and that he will, moreover, respond to the sympathy that is shown him by doing his best to understand and answer questions, and, at the end of the case, to follow the advice given him by the bench. This mental assumption is not always easy to make in the case of a stupid, frightened, or unprepossessing child. But if the child is to do himself justice, it is a very necessary one. It is remarkable how responsive is the least pleasing child to the feeling that he is about to be treated not only with justice, but with human interest for his own good as well. So long as a child remains sullen or afraid, so long will he remain unreceptive of advice or warning, and so long will it be infinitely more difficult for the court to come to any final conclusion as to the treatment best suited to his case. An invincible patience, and a determination that there are attractive traits in this child's character which will presently disclose themselves, will be rewarded, as, gradually, his appearance gains in alertness and intelligence, and his former look of sullen defiance disappears. Moreover, with such offenders as remain obdurate and defiant despite all sympathy and consideration, the chairman may subsequently use all such severity as the occasion may warrant. Cases, of course, come before a court where real severity is the sole instrument of any value, the only argument which a particular child can understand. Then it must be used. The plea here is only that it be not employed prematurely, but only when all else is seen to fail.

Scarcely ever does it happen that a boy or girl defendant has the wit to make any effective cross-examination of the witnesses against him. The same is true also of his father or mother. Yet a discerning chairman can frequently discover without much difficulty that there are questions which the defendant would like put. In such cases it is not only permissible, it is a duty for the chairman himself to put them to the witness, if, as is almost invariably the case, the boy or girl is not professionally represented. Not only does it happen on occasion that a fact in this way emerges which alters the entire aspect of the case, but, even when no material evidence is disclosed, there is no more certain method than this patient and serious cross-examination on a boy's behalf to convince him, and his parent, that the boy has had a completely fair trial, and to gain their confidence and trust in whatever may

be the ultimate decision of the court. Conversely, if the boy is himself subjected to cross-examination it is the duty of the chairman to protect him from questions or methods to which a professional advocate would be entitled to object, and to see that he understands such questions as are put to him. Here, again, the boy and his parent are able to appreciate the impartiality of the court, and on occasion to change their whole attitude in consequence.

In the same way much may be done with a boy by tactful handling when he comes to tell his own story. It is obvious, for example, that he will not readily make accusations against his father, however well founded, in the man's presence. Clearly, in a case where there is any possibility of the presence of an individual being the cause of a child's refusal to speak, it is necessary to send that individual out of the room. But there are cases where a child will stand obstinately mute, determined, to all appearance, to say nothing; roughness or a threat will have no effect save to make the child still more utterly dumb. But not seldom the same child, two minutes later, will burst into a flood of revealing talk, disclosing the very evidence for which the court has been vainly searching, if everybody be sent out of the room but the magistrates themselves, and if one of them brings him gently forward, so close that the least whisper can be heard, and, with a hand on his shoulder, says quietly, "Now, Tommy, there is nothing to be afraid of. We only want to help you. Tell us all about it."

Where a child is brought before the court on a serious charge, it is sometimes painful to see the distress of the father or mother. A great deal can be done here, too, by common sense to alleviate the pain of the moment and to create a more hopeful atmosphere for the future. Mrs. Smith, standing tight-lipped, in an agony of pride and fear, against the wall, may be melted in a moment from her attitude of frozen resentment against fate by the kindly offer of a chair at the table where the magistrates are seated. "Now, Mrs. Smith, we all understand what an anxiety this has been to you. Let us talk it over together and see how we can help you." Mr. Jones ceases to repeat over and over again how respectable his family has always kept itself, and how difficult it is for him to understand why this trouble has come upon him, when the chairman sits him by his side, and tells him how well they realise that there is a lot of good in his boy, Jim, and how

anxious they all are to set a lad of so much promise on the right path in life. These are the moments when it is of importance that whoever talks to the father or mother should not be ignorant of the lives led in working-class homes. Advice as to the treatment of an erring boy or girl, fantastically unpractical, which the parents cannot carry out, is not only useless, but alienates much of the goodwill which the most careful hearing of the case has just created. It is, on the contrary, of the greatest importance that the chairman should know at least enough to make intelligent suggestions as to such Boys' Clubs, Girl Guides, Boy Scouts, or similar organisations which may exist locally.

It is almost always the wisest course at the conclusion of a case to speak to the parent of the child alone. He will more readily accept counsel or rebuke if it is given in complete privacy. Especially is this the case where the court are of opinion that the parents' misconduct or laziness has contributed to the boy's trouble. In such a case no greater mistake could be made than to convey this opinion to the parent in the presence of the child. Whether a child, on the other hand, should be spoken to in the presence of his father or mother at the conclusion of a case must depend on particular circumstances, and especially upon the characters and disposition of the parents. But if the court desire to make a real impression on the child's mind they will have as few others in the room as possible. A troublesome child should be given no opportunity of regarding himself as the centre of attraction to an audience of witnesses or reporters but, in a room with little to distract his wandering attention, he should be spoken to seriously, quietly, and in words which he can understand.

The most difficult, as it is the most important, duty of a children's court is to decide on the best treatment of a child after he has been found guilty of an offence. A generous use of probation, never for less than one year, has almost everything to be said in its favour. But there are pitfalls to be avoided in this connection. A court need not be afraid to put a child on probation merely because he appears at the moment to be defiant. Anxiety, fear, a desire to show a brave front, pride—all these may combine in the child's mind to produce an outward appearance which is not a true reflection of his feelings. But it is not only useless in the case of an individual child, but harmful to the whole probation system, to put on probation,

through misplaced clemency, or from reluctance to use sterner measures, a child on whom the court realises such treatment will be utterly ineffective. If probation is used too frequently in the case of a child who is really an annoyance or trouble to neighbours, there is a real risk of the system being brought into contempt and dislike, and of the idea being fostered that a child can, within the jurisdiction of that court, break the law with impunity. But it need not be a matter for undue disappointment if a child who has been once on probation finds himself again in trouble. The child was presumably a naughty one, or he would not have been before the court. And no intermittent supervision by the wisest probation officer can be guaranteed in a year to eradicate original sin. It is hardly necessary to point out that the results achieved depend mainly upon the probation officer. Magistrates can do much to encourage and assist him by taking a personal interest in his problems, and by talking over, with sympathy and understanding, his successes and his failures.

It is extremely important that a child should not be allowed to have the impression when put on probation that he has "got off." The perfunctory reading by the clerk of a statutory admonition, couched in legal phraseology which the child cannot understand, is an absurdity. A few simple words explaining to the child his new obligations, with a warning as to the possible consequences of failure to observe them, are sufficient. It is a most useful plan in suitable cases to make it a formal condition of probation that the child does not associate in future with a particular person or playmate. Such a condition is not only valuable in itself, as helping to keep the child out of bad company, but it is an ever-present reminder that the child needs to be careful. The punishment of whipping is retained by the Act. It is not feeble sentimentality, but the results of actual experience, which show that it is a power which should be exercised so sparingly as to make it in practice scarcely to be considered. The analogy of the public schoolboy is quite false. Figures show that the most certain method of ensuring that a child found guilty of an offence should again appear before the court is to whip him. It is surely obvious that, in practice, a police whipping cannot be sufficiently severe as to act as a deterrent through sheer terror. It can be no more than a temporary smart. It is a point of honour, therefore, with any lad of spirit to show

his companions, by an immediate resumption of defiant wrong-doing, that his manly spirit has not been broken by so paltry a device.

There is much that the conscientious justice who is a member of a juvenile panel can do to fit himself for his work. He can go over a Home Office Approved School and see its possibilities for good. He can visit a Remand Home, and consider if, on occasion, a short period on remand may not be sufficient to bring a rebellious child into a better frame of mind. He may sit as a learner in some juvenile court especially successful and well managed in London or elsewhere. Everything is possible if only he abandon for ever the idea that the work is less interesting, or less important, in the juvenile than in the adult court. The work can never be easy: never safe from failure and disappointment. But the children's magistrate may remember in compensation that his may be the privilege—perhaps the greatest granted to any who sit on any bench—to save a young child from a life of crime.

LEO PAGE.

TRUSTEES OF EMPIRE.

AS all accepted beliefs and conventions are being challenged in these troubled days, it is not surprising that the right of the British Empire or Commonwealth of nations to exist should be questioned by some of our own people. It is not merely the extreme politicians of the Left who object, out of a theoretical dislike of the words "Empire" and "Imperialism." Some moderate persons who are in no sense socialists have begun to wonder whether, as they put it, we do not control, directly or indirectly, rather more than our fair share of the earth's surface. They hear and read much of the unsatisfied colonial ambitions of other Powers and of the perils to which such ambitions may expose the world. They are led on, by a philanthropy which is genuine if not well thought out, to speculate on the possibility of ensuing eternal peace by a redistribution of colonial territories in which the British Empire, as the largest of all, might give a leading example of self-denying benevolence. The British Government's recent offer of a strip of our Somaliland Protectorate to facilitate a possible compromise between Abyssinia and Italy has been widely taken to imply that the giving away of territory can be easily arranged. The cession of Jubaland to Italy in 1924, as part of the post-war rearrangements, is cited in the same connection.

Philanthropy in individuals is to be admired. The Rockefellers and Carnegies, the Harknesses and Leverhulmes and other men who give away their millions command respect. But before a state begins to imitate them by ceding this place or that, it should be made clear that the state has a right to do so. The first question to be faced is why and on what terms Great Britain holds the various British lands overseas. The Dominions must be ruled out. We have no more right nor power to cede a strip of Australia than we have to cede Bavaria or Provence. India, now well on the way to become a self-governing Federation, is obviously not for disposal. The Colonies are, strictly speaking, under the control of the British Government, which might conceivably claim the right to give them away if it so desired. But most of these Colonies have been under British rule for generations—some of them for centuries, like Jamaica and Barbados or the Bermudas—and the inhabitants would have a good deal to say if it were

proposed to place them under an alien government. Moreover, most of the Colonies have representative institutions, on which the Governors, on behalf of the Colonial Office, keep watchful eyes, but with which they seldom interfere save in emergencies. Such Colonies may not be fully self-governing in a legal sense, but they do in fact manage their own affairs with a minimum of control from Whitehall. It is certain that they would all protest most violently if there were any suggestion that they might be handed over to foreign Powers, and their protests would surely not go unheard in Great Britain. There remain the large Protectorates, almost all situated in Africa except the Federated Malay States and North Borneo, and the Mandated Territories. It is these alone which could possibly be regarded as suitable for distribution, if Parliament and the British people were ever obsessed by the desire to give away our possessions to lessen our responsibilities.

To detail the circumstances in which vast areas in East, West, Central and South Africa have come under British supervision within the last half-century must not be attempted here. But it may be said with confidence that no British Ministry took over these Protectorates without reluctance if not with extreme distaste. There was never any enthusiasm in Whitehall for "painting the map red." Whitehall knew too well that increase of African territory under the British flag meant increase of administrative troubles and a rising expenditure for the British taxpayer. The call for expansion came partly from our traders, working from the old settlements on the African shores, but more loudly from our philanthropists who were distressed by what they heard from our missionaries and explorers of the horrors of the African slave-trade which was depopulating entire regions and could not be checked from the coast. Livingstone's famous journeys did more than any other cause to compel unwilling British Governments to assume a vague control of large portions of savage Central Africa, primarily to put down slave raiding, as in Nyasaland. The colonising ambitions of European Powers did not seriously concern us until, as an outcome of Stanley's great journey across Africa, the Congo Free State came into being and the Powers in conclave felt obliged to parcel out the rest of Central Africa into their respective spheres of influence—French, German, Portuguese and British. We had

no option but to guard our own commercial and political interests by securing the territories with which we were specially concerned—Nigeria as the hinterland of the Oil Rivers, Uganda and Kenya as commanding the upper waters of the Nile and ensuring the safety of Egypt's water-supply, Northern Rhodesia as rounding off the natural sphere of influence of the South African colonies, and so on. The interior was gradually explored and the frontiers were demarcated, and each Power settled down to its immense task of improving the lot of the native peoples within its territory. There can be no doubt—at least from the European standpoint—that, whatever mistakes have been made, the lot of the average African is far happier than it was in the days before Europe took a hand in his affairs. Slave trading has been suppressed, except in Abyssinia. Slavery, even as a domestic institution, is virtually extinct in the European Protectorates. Good government and modern means of communication have brought peace and wealth to vast regions which were once harassed and poor. And in this great work the British Empire may fairly claim to have taken a leading part.

It is our national habit to criticise those in authority here and oversea. But no one can honestly find much fault with our African administrators. For many years past they have been taught to regard themselves as trustees for the native peoples under their care, and the Colonial Office has steadfastly supported them in enforcing that principle. Where there has been serious controversy, as in Kenya or in the South African Protectorates of Bechuanaland and Basutoland, it has arisen largely out of a feeling that the natives have been unduly favoured at the expense of the white settlers. Complaints that the Protectorates were not developing fast enough have usually been met by the very pertinent objection that rapid development means higher taxes which the natives must not be required to bear. In many cases the home Government has given subsidies or guaranteed loans to assist the Protectorates rather than consent to the imposition of heavier burdens on its native wards. Great Britain has taken the most serious view of the responsibilities of its African trusteeship. So far are we from looking upon the Protectorates as possessions to be exploited for gain that we have incurred no small expense in developing their resources

for the benefit, primarily, of their native inhabitants. While we are naturally desirous of increasing our trade with them, we have adhered to the old agreement under which the same modest tariffs apply to all goods imported into the various Central African Protectorates of the several Powers, French, Belgian and British.

There is no British trade monopoly: on the contrary, Japanese goods enter on the same terms as our own and are, as is well known, underselling our wares. In brief, we are governing the African Protectorates for the good of their peoples, and not for selfish purposes of our own. Is it likely that the transfer of these territories to other Powers would be to the advantage of the natives? And if not, or even if there is any doubt about the answer, have we any moral right to abandon the task and leave it to other Powers? Surely no Englishman who believes in the honesty and intelligence of his own countrymen in the Colonial Service can fail to answer such questions in the negative.

There remain the Mandated territories, formerly German colonies, which by the Peace of Versailles were transferred to the Allies to be held hereafter on trust, under the supervision of the League of Nations. Tanganyika, the most important of these, is administered by British officials on the same lines as its neighbours, Kenya, Uganda and Northern Rhodesia, while South-West Africa is administered by officials of the Union of South Africa in much the same way as the provinces of the Union. It cannot truthfully be said that we coveted these regions before the war. But when in 1914 it became evident that the German colonies were, like Western Europe, to be the scene of military operations, their acquisition became necessary to free Central and South Africa from any repetition of such an experience. The natives have assuredly lost nothing by the change of rulers: we may fairly contend, indeed, that they have gained, inasmuch as the actions of their British and South African administrators are closely watched by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations which examines the officials yearly on the subject of their reports. As there is no longer any fear of Africa south of the Sahara being involved in European disputes, the expenditure on defence is very slight and the administrators can give their whole attention to social and economic matters. It would surely be tempting Providence to effect any change

in the Mandates that would reintroduce foreign rule amid the British Protectorates, with all the complications and anxieties that might follow. Those who lightly talk of abandoning our Mandates have never thought out the consequences of such an action on the peace of the African continent.

It must be remembered that tropical Africa is not, except in parts of Kenya and Tanganyika, suitable for European settlement on any large scale. Traders, technical experts and officials compose the bulk of the European population, which is very small compared to the native population. Colonies in the ordinary sense can never be established there by any white people. Central Africa has great potentialities for trade and agriculture, but all the manual labour will always be provided by the natives. Any surplus population that European countries may have can find no outlet in Central Africa, but must go to more temperate regions. All that can fairly be expected of us by foreign nations is that we should not monopolise the commercial opportunities which our Protectorates afford. Nor have we done so. Traders and technical men of all nationalities are free to establish themselves in British African territories; British commerce enjoys no special privileges, while the tariffs are low.

We pay for all the African produce that we import, just as other countries have to do. We do not exploit the resources of our Protectorates for our own benefit at their expense, as the loose talk about the need for sharing the economic profits from tropical colonies might seem to suggest. In fine, if other nations do not merely want colonies to gratify their patriotic vanity, they have no sound reason to envy us our position as a Colonial Power. Nor have we any moral right to divest ourselves of the great responsibilities which we have assumed, until that future day, perhaps far distant, when the Protectorates like the Colonies will have learned to govern themselves, under British guidance.

"We recognise that we have definite obligations to the people who inhabit the Mandated territories," said the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House of Commons on April 6th, while at the same time he repudiated all idea of handing over either these territories or any colonies to another Power. The time has long gone by when we could think of colonies as plantations rather than as a sacred trust.

EDWARD G. HAWKE.

HUGO VON HOFMANNSTHAL.

IF it be possible to name any Austrian poet as the most typical representative of that country, then surely the poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal has first claim to such a place. And if one should wish to award the laurels for perfection in poetry to a poet of Hofmannsthal's Austria, which to-day no longer exists, then one can scarcely find any worthier than he, who in life and work most vividly represented the atmosphere and music of that land.

Hofmannsthal was born in Vienna in the year 1874, shortly after the Austrian financial crash which robbed his father of almost his complete fortune. Exactly half a century later the poet's whole savings were to be wiped out by the great inflation of 1923, so that at fifty years of age he had literally to begin again from the beginning. These two catastrophes were no mere accidents in the poet's life. They are both related and important, because they show up clearly the path of his earthly pilgrimage, which even to-day people still suppose to have been strewn with roses. Hofmannsthal, ennobled and well-loved son of the Muses though he was, had to fight long and doggedly with material cares. Yet only a few were aware of it, for the poet strove to conceal from the multitude this circumstance, which, to him, was more painful than oppressive.

The poet came of a well-to-do Jewish patrician family, to whom throughout his life he remained bound by love and gratitude. Already at eighteen he was enjoying European fame. Yet during his journeys through France and Italy he wrote regularly to his mother, keeping her accurately informed of the state of his clothes and recounting all sorts of details. Nothing was ever unimportant or strange to him. Intuitively he seemed to grasp the circumstances of everyone who came near him, and he liked to converse with them in their own language. Wassermann, one of his closest friends, tells us how amazed and concerned he was when on several occasions Hofmannsthal showed complete familiarity with the dialects and manners of every Austrian class. Nor is this trait unimportant towards an understanding of Hofmannsthal's personality, which for so long and so unjustly was blackened with the reproach of aloofness and pride. He was not a man about town, nor did he feature in the newspapers; but his reticence in this was shared by other poets of his time.

The literary productions of his first youthful period, which we may reckon as reaching to the turn of the century, bear the stamp of genius. To-day, after wars and revolutions, many works of this period appear too anæmic, too formal. It is still difficult for us to transplant ourselves back into a time when literary style was set by professors of history. To us the names of Dahn, Ebers, Freytag, Lauff, Wildenbruch are but memories of a pompous age whose style was hollow, superficial and ridiculous. This period of commissioned art was freed from naturalism. Stefan George was its very antithesis. And it was under the shadow of this already mythical personality that Hugo von Hofmannsthal produced his first work. In consequence he was for a long time labelled an æsthete, as belonging to the art-for-art school. This label the poet always felt as a mountainous oppression; yet even in later life he could never quite escape it.

At this time literary questions were far more concerned with battles of the schools than with problems of style. For German literature was then for the first time seeking to free itself from the dominating influence of the classics, and to go its own way. Hofmannsthal, too, who with some justice may be regarded as a conservative and tradition-bound poet, struggled to follow a similar individual path. His whole work, from the renaissance efforts of his youth to his last mystery plays, is an attempt to keep and preserve the old, and yet out of it to perceive and fashion something new.

Hofmannsthal has often and readily been dubbed a mere copyist, a man who was content to reshape and rework old material. This accusation was not only supported with reference to his poetic work, which reproduced all periods in literature from Sophocles to Goethe. His essays in literary criticism, his commemoration speeches and his collections—the method of selection as well as the manner of commentary—show also, again and again, that for him the conception of a world literature was no mere catchword, but a vivid undying reality. There are many proofs of this, both in the fifty living works, and in the hundreds of almost forgotten essays. Hofmannsthal was truly in this respect an *arbiter mundi*, or perhaps more correctly a *Præceptor Germaniæ*. For this Viennese whose home became, poetically, the greatest experience of his life and work, thought, wrote and suffered always for a larger world. He was a gardener in the great park

of world literature, who tended the beds and shrubs entrusted to him with loving care, ever conscious of his responsibility. It is this feeling of artistic responsibility which is one of the strongest traits of his rich and noble character.

It is time here to say a few words in explanation of a misunderstanding from which even the poet in his lifetime could not defend himself, and which to-day, after his death, still burdens him. Hofmannsthal was, and is still, called a librettist. The reference is to those of his poetic productions created for the theatrical manager Reinhardt, and for the composer Richard Strauss. The vast baroque vitality of the dramatic artist Max Reinhardt, to-day still in its unbroken strength one of the outstanding phenomena of our time, darkened for a while the poetic genius of Hofmannsthal. It suffices here to name the dramatic marvels of *Everyman* and of *Œdipus*, which indeed for a vast number of our contemporaries became one of the most vivid artistic experiences of their lives. What Reinhardt and the late Alexander Moissi, that noble and princely actor, had here presented in spectacle, caused the poet, who had created both words and spectacle, to be too often and easily forgotten. The same applies to his collaboration with the composer Richard Strauss. The latter's gifted eclecticism often buried the poet's words too deep beneath the tumult of a cleverly conducted and instrumented orchestra. But there will again come a time, of that we are certain, when we shall render unto the poet that which is the poet's, and unto the composer that which is the composer's. For the word, the magic word, as Novalis has unforgettably called it, is not only in the beginning. As the poet's word it accompanies us, as Stendhal has put it, through the desert of life.

We have tried so far to free the poet from all confusing characteristics. Let us look at him now in the light of his most important works; for there are unfortunately but few who are privileged to master a poet's whole work. Linguistic difficulty, lack of time, the very transitoriness of many works of art, the demands of the present day, all bring that inevitably in their train. Indeed, whoever has mastered the whole of Goethe, or the whole of Shakespeare, need never again refer to any commentary, no matter what the subject or epoch of their study. But he who likes to have a poet's whole work by him, as it were, in one volume, that it may light and

rejoice him through the night of life, will at times perhaps feel grateful to be given a key to the garden which would otherwise be for ever closed to him.

After years of study of the poet's work and with a feeling of deepest artistic responsibility, I can name four works which form the nuclei around which the rest of his works revolve. In the spacious co-ordinated system which we thus construct, with Hofmannsthal as its spiritual centre, the *Mine at Falun* as point of departure, and the *Tower* as finishing point, appear as the two outstanding poles in the two-dimensional plane. In three-dimensional space, on the other hand, the two mystical pieces, *The Little World Theatre* and *The Great Salzburg World Theatre*, appear as the antipodes. In the first pair we can discern the poet's artistic lineage. In the second is traced the course of his moral life. Many may condemn such a classification and review as arbitrary. Yet such accusation may willingly be borne if by the analysis a better understanding of the poet is made possible. It is not by chance that the two first-named works have to do with the earth, the earth upon which and from which we live, which yields us up and in the end enfolds us again. The poet's path, man's *κατ' ἐξοχὴν* leads first into the bowels of the earth, that finally it may climb up towards heaven. Between the Prologue of the *Mine* and the Epilogue of the *Tower* lie full thirty years, a generation. The lad Elis loses the friend who loves him, because he loses himself to the earth, to the earth's great queen, her symbol. The lad Sigismund has to lose his life, because he loses himself to the world; in his life love had no place. But whether we love, or whether we are without love, the earth demands her portion of us. To her we are subject, in life and in death.

It is a great pity that the final setting of the *Mine*, buried in an extinct periodical, is to-day almost inaccessible. It is even more of a tragedy that apparently the *Tower* also, as we have it now, is not in the final form dreamed of by the poet. Yet despite this, it is obvious that even in its fragmentary setting the artist's striving after the eternal symbol of the earth has found its clearest and most vivid form. In an imaginary conversation the poet once put these words into Balzac's mouth: "There is no experience beyond the experience of your own being." What Hofmannsthal wanted to proclaim in these two stages of his pilgrimage, he formulated

thus: "To dreams I say: Keep close to me, stay near me: and to reality: Be a dream, vanish!"

The importance of the two ethical-religious keystones of his world, the "little" and the "great" World Theatres, is that they arise from an almost passionate trust in a heaven that we can never find. The nine characters of the *Little World Theatre*: the poet; the gardener, once ruler of the world; the young man, a dreamer; the stranger, an artist; the girl, but a child; the troubadour, already of the damned; the servant, a visionary; the doctor, a seer; and finally the madman, a radiant god, are enveloped in the divinity of a celestial summer evening, into which, one by one, they fade as into eternity.

In the *Great World Theatre* a threefold stage is erected. Upon the uppermost, unseen, reigns God, for whom the play is enacted. The second stage belongs to the world; the third and lowest to man, where he, again in ninefold change of scene, fulfils his earthly existence. The central figure of this play is the beggar who claims the poet's whole heart, as he rages in Promethean anger against his fate, till at last, in Faustian resignation, he follows death into the unknown. It is a symbol of deep portent that this play was the greatest German producer's last undertaking in a free Germany—what an experience Eugen Kloepper's *Beggar* was! Its profound wisdom lies more in what is veiled than in what is expressed. Here is the poet's farewell to the world: "The world is but a play. We know not whom it profits. We only know that good deeds will be rewarded, and bad deeds expiated. Above the world our fate sits enthroned, but none of us will behold it."

The life work of the poet Hofmannsthal ends in devout resignation. It is wonderfully expressed in words which he spoke in memory of Grillparzer, but which apply with far greater force to himself: "He complained and he censured; but he created and loved." In the beautiful memorial to his beloved friend, Jacob Wassermann says: "He lived his last ten years in fear." I know nothing of this fear, but I feel almost bodily that even Hofmannsthal's spiritual being was rent by it sharply and unequivocally. Then death came, not theatrically, as he had so often and so masterfully portrayed it in all his works, but sudden, tragic death. He died literally from a broken heart, which simply could not endure the grief

caused by the suicide of his eldest child, and which, paralysed by fear and horror, ceased to beat.

To-day, the farther we get away, the higher and more beautiful grows the tower of his works above his life. It is not the famous ivory tower of a self-complacent æstheticism, but a strong well-built fortress of fifty skilfully hewn blocks, his works, the immovable and indestructible marks of a being whom no memorial suits better than his own words written in memory of the first Austrian, Prince Eugene of Savoy; "He builds, he adorns, he ennobles, and he gives." The last Austrian is the poet, who leaves his lost home, poor and weary. He has no memorial. He never received the artist's laurel crown. But he was and will remain *Poeta Laureatus Austriae*.

FRITZ GROSS.

THE LONDON OF JANE AUSTEN.

THOUGH the greater part of Jane Austen's comparatively short life was spent in rural Hampshire, readers of her novels are made aware of her familiarity not only with Bath but with that portion of London comprised within the modern postal districts of W.1 and W.C.1; while when we turn to her letters, so ably edited by Mr. W. R. Chapman, we find that she was equally well acquainted with S.W.1 and W.C.2. Twelve of these letters, precisely dated, bear the addresses of three of her brother Henry's successive London homes. A thirteenth is merely headed: "CORK STREET, Tuesday Morn." Internal evidence enables us to place it in the August of 1796, and its writer in one of the two or three small hotels which had inserted themselves among the private residences of the street, architected by Richard Boyle, Earl of Arlington and Cork. One hopes the Austens were able to say what Gibbon had said three years earlier: "the Cork Street Hotel is clean, quiet, and convenient."

Jane was always a good traveller; and in spite of having started at 7 a.m. from Staines, where she had passed the night, she could inform Cassandra: "We are to be at *Astleys* to-night, which I am glad of." The wooden structure near Westminster Bridge where, in 1774, Philip Astley of General Eliot's Regiment began to display his inimitable horsemanship and handsome person, had more than once been rebuilt and beautified, and with each restoration an attempt was made to christen it afresh; but *Astleys* it remained for Jane's generation and to the end of its existence. To the original trick-riding, which had made Walpole declare that he no longer wondered that Caligula had made his horse a Consul, had been added a variety entertainment; and Jane doubtless saw the juggling, tumbling and Egyptian Pyramids which were the advertised attractions of Astley's Amphitheatre.

That Jane's halt in CORK STREET was not her first visit to London is evident from the merrily ironical opening of her letter: "Here I am *again* in this scene of dissipation and vice, and I begin already to find my morals corrupted." Would the preservation of an earlier letter have given us a glimpse of a country cousin's first impressions of the metropolis, and of her reactions to the wonder and strangeness of a great city?

One can be tolerably certain that it would not. Jane Austen was not prone to descriptions, synthetic reflexions and analysis of emotions. In none of her letters does she betray curiosity as to London's past history, or comment on the peculiarities of its life, configuration, climate and architecture. Its less pleasant features she accepted with equanimity, and grumbled neither at the Clerk of the Weather nor at the terrestrial powers that be. For example, she relates that, when driving with her sister-in-law to an evening party, the horses jibbed at Hyde Park Gate at a gravel heap, "which seemed like a hill to them." They were frightened, and so was Eliza Austen, who insisted on alighting, though thinly clad, while the coachman pacified his terrified pair. But the incident was placidly narrated as an explanation of Eliza's severe chest-cold, not as an illustration of a customary reprehensible and inefficacious mode of road-mending.

The ruts and mud of the main thoroughfares—Parliament Street, Pall Mall and part of the Strand being alone paved with freestone; the runnels filled with refuse on both sides of the streets; the pea-soup fogs, often lasting till April, the darkness of West End squares, lit only by dripping oil lamps fixed to the area railings;—these were characteristics of eighteenth-century London, observed by foreign visitors, but accepted in silence by Jane. Nor does she mention the new brilliant light, which made its début as part of the decorations in Pall Mall for the King's Birthday in 1802. Yet within the period of her visits to Henry Austen—1811 to 1815—the gas standards erected in rapidly increasing numbers at street corners completely metamorphosed the night life of the London that she knew.

In the spring of 1811 Jane Austen spent a fortnight with her brother Henry, who had recently bought a house on the fringe of S.W. London. SLOANE STREET, built two decades earlier, had been named after Sir Hans Sloane, father-in-law of the second Lord Cadogan, whose mansion, Chelsea House, rose hard by. North of it, the KNIGHTSBRIDGE ROAD ran westward between open fields. To the south the KING'S ROAD passed through open spaces where the Pensioners' Home and the ruins of Ranelagh Rotunda were landmarks. Eastwards were the FIVE FIELDS, intersected by reedy runlets—a damp but breezy space, over which, though not till Jane had been fourteen years in her grave, the fashionable

streets and squares of Belgravia would be built. Henry's house had a long strip of back garden, and was sufficiently commodious to satisfy the sprightly Mrs. Austen's penchant for entertaining. She was Henry's cousin, but he was her second husband. Her first, the Comte de la Feuillade, had been guillotined during the Terror, and in London she kept up with her French refugee acquaintances. Jane had thus an opportunity of seeing a society peculiar to the time, and one which might have furnished a novelist with excellent copy. It may be that her English shyness prevented her from making full use of her opportunities. When she informs Cassandra that "the old Comte d'Entraigues is an interesting man," and his house full of valuable paintings, she adds: "If he would only speak English I would take to him."

The *émigré* Count and his musical son had a house in QUEEN ANNE STREET—a centenarian street in a quarter formed by fits and starts of building. CAVENDISH SQUARE had been planned as early as 1715, MANCHESTER SQUARE was not begun till 1776, while PORTMAN SQUARE was completed in 1784. Jane knew the district well, for Henry Austen had lived in UPPER BERKELEY STREET. By what route did he ride every morning from Sloane Street to his bank in HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN? and how did Jane, accompanied by Mrs. Austen's French maid, "walk into Town" to her favourite linen-draper at Grafton House, GOLDEN SQUARE? Of this only are we certain: the brother did not trot through TRAFALGAR SQUARE, and the sister did not turn from PICCADILLY CIRCUS into REGENT STREET. Nash had not yet created the lovely curve and the plastered buildings of the latter; and on the space, cleared in 1829 for the former, were the King's Mews and a congeries of mean streets. Setting off "after breakfast"—a ten o'clock meal with the Austens—Jane reached Grafton House about half-past eleven. Doubtless she shortened the walk by cutting through the meadows stretching from SLOANE STREET to the row of modest houses which formed the GROSVENOR PLACE of her day. One other walk is noted in her 1811 letters. On a fine Sunday afternoon Henry and his partner, Mr. Tilson, took her to KENSINGTON GARDENS, which were then separated from HYDE PARK, though of course contiguous to it. Doubtless they rested and basked in one of the revolving shelters with which the gardens were supplied—a feature which invalids would

gladly see restored. Jane found "everything fresh and lovely," and noted, as Londoners note to-day, the forwardness of vegetation in the parks: "Your lilacs are in leaf," she wrote, "*ours* are in flower. The Horsechestnuts are quite out, and the Elms almost."

Two years passed before Jane found herself again in Sloane Street. Her brother was a recent widower, and was preparing to sell the house and live over the bank. He was not too disconsolate to take thought for his sister's amusement. If the *convenances* of mourning precluded an appearance at the theatre, he could conduct her to no fewer than three exhibitions of pictures. There was "the Spring Gardens Exhibition," i.e. the annual show of the Society of Artists in Oil and Water Colours, held since 1761 in a hall* erected on the site of those pleasure-grounds of Stuart times in which a clear spring of wholesome drinking water had been a vaunted feature. There was what Jane calls "The Great Exhibition"—the May Exhibition which the British Academy held annually in SOMERSET HOUSE; and there was a show of a hundred and thirty of Sir Joshua Reynolds' paintings, which the Managers of the British Institution had collected in their gallery in PALL MALL—a gallery demolished when the Institution was dissolved in 1867. Jane went to all three shows for Henry's pleasure. She did not care for pictures; but she derived amusement from the exhibitions by an ingenious attempt to discover portraits which would fit her conceptions of the heroines of *Pride and Prejudice*; and she found in SPRING GARDENS a perfect presentment of Mrs. Bingley "in white with green ornaments, which confirms my idea that green was her favourite colour."

By the autumn of the same year Henry Austen had moved to HENRIETTA STREET. Built in 1637 and named after the Queen of Charles I, it had been characterised by Hatton in 1708 as "a broad and pleasant street with fashionable inhabitants." By 1813 fashion had deserted it and a few shops had invaded it, but it was still respectably residential. Jane drew no disparaging contrasts between it and SLOANE STREET, and found the "upper part" above the bank sufficiently commodious for "Henry's present requirements." He could put up in it his sister and his three young nieces, though his brother Edward was obliged to seek "a bedroom in a hotel

* Now incorporated in the L.C.C. offices.

in the next street." The five travellers packed their three days' stay in London with a variety of engagements, including two painful visits to the dentist and two compensating evenings at the theatre. Some shopping could be got over before breakfast; for "Bedford House," i.e. Layton and Shears, the linen-drapers, was actually in the same street. Visits to the milliner, staymaker and dentist,* and to Wedgwoods in YORK STREET, ST. JAMES'S, to buy a dinner service, entailed a "driving about till half-past four at least." And then Fanny niece must needs purchase a supply of Irish linen at Newton's, in LEICESTER SQUARE, a dismal locality, where a few useful shops, some studios, lodging-houses, and cheap hotels, chiefly frequented by foreigners, had supplanted and effaced the vestiges of seventeenth-century stateliness and fashion. From the N.E. corner of the Square ran a paved passage for foot passengers, noted for its cheap and rather common millinery, so that "a CRANBOURNE ALLEY article" was a term of disparagement. Nevertheless Jane saw "a great many pretty caps in the windows." In 1843 one side of the passage was pulled down, and the widened ALLEY became CRANBOURNE STREET.

The following March Jane made a longer stay in Henrietta Street, and again had the company of her brother Edward and his daughter. A bitter spring was following a winter† of unusual severity. Sunday, March 6th, was, however, "bright and clear," and the party walked to Henry's parish church, ST. PAUL'S, COVENT GARDEN. Built by Inigo Jones, and restored at his own expense by Lord Burlington, it must have seemed to the Austens a very stately edifice by comparison with the new and bare BELGRAVE CHAPEL they had been wont to attend. In the afternoon Jane and her niece Fanny drove in HYDE PARK, and "were very much entertained." We can imagine the quizzical gaiety with which they surveyed the scene; the high-stepping, well-groomed horses; the variety of showy vehicles, barouches, phaetons, gigs, curricles, and the beaux of the Regency, who thought with Brummell that only with great economy could a man dress on less than seven hundred a year.

Perhaps Henry Austen's weak digestion suffered from lack

* Mr. Spence, of 17 Old Bond Street.

† Frost had held London in its grip for seventeen weeks. The Thames was frozen over, and on it was erected a street of booths daily thronged with hardy visitors.

of exercise, perhaps he found the fogs thicker in Covent Garden than in Sloane Street. Certainly he was back in his old neighbourhood in the summer of 1814. The houses of HANS PLACE, erected on an irregularly shaped plot of land west of Sloane Street, were ranged round a central public garden, and each had a private back garden of its own. That of No. 23 was enthusiastically described by Jane as "quite a love." Henry's sanctum gave on to it, and there she sat and wrote in "solitary coolness," hearing no sound save the occasional rumble of a market cart on the road which led to BROMPTON, a village surrounded by nursery gardens, which flourished in its soft salubrious air. Then to HANS PLACE came James Austen, bringing with him his eldest son. "Their business is teeth and wigs," wrote Jane; and for the latter they went off to TAVISTOCK STREET (COVENT GARDEN)—a fashionable and expensive shopping centre, always thronged with elegant equipages.

In November Jane returned to 23 Hans Place "to settle about a 2nd Edit. of M.P." (*Mansfield Park*). She drove out to HENDON—a rural village "which must be very pleasant in summer"—to visit the senior* of all her nieces, a recent bride; and looked up much younger nieces in that new district of well-built, well-planned streets and squares which had risen east of the TOTTENHAM ROAD upon Bedford property. RUSSELL SQUARE was already some ten years old, and in the adjacent KEPPEL STREET a former Attorney-General of Bermuda, Mr. Grove Palmer, had established himself. His daughter Frances had married one of Jane Austen's sailor brothers,† and dying at the Nore when her husband had the Guardship, had left three motherless children who were now deposited with their maternal grandparents.

In October 1815 Jane paid her last visit to London. She was seeing *Emma* through the press; but her chief occupation was the nursing of her brother Henry through a serious illness and a protracted convalescence. She was thus brought into close contact with his doctor, who was surgeon to the Prince Regent; and by this Mr. Haden she was introduced to the Rev. J. Stanier Clarke, Librarian to his Royal Highness. On

* Anna, daughter of James Austen by his first wife, Anne, d. of General and Lady Mathew. Anna had recently married Benjamin Lefroy, who subsequently took Holy Orders, and became Rector of Ashe, Hants.

† Charles Austen, subsequently Admiral. In 1820 he married his deceased wife's sister, Harriet Palmer.

November 13th, 1815, Jane went for an interview at Carlton House, which occupied the sites of Waterloo Place and the Athenæum and United Services Clubs; and we can picture her entrance through its Corinthian portico, since this addition by Henry Holland now forms the frontage of our National Gallery. The "kind attentions" she acknowledges doubtless included a view of the Gothic conservatory, the most notable of the additions to the originally unpretending residence; and one hopes that she was conducted over the beautiful garden, admired, but unfortunately not described, by her contemporaries. To the Prince Regent she was incited to dedicate *Emma*, then in the hands of the printers.

Though she was bored at picture shows and concerts, she delighted in good acting, and brother Henry was at pains to provide her with this pleasure. The subject of her play-going would, however, demand a separate article. Suffice it to say that the Austens took a hackney coach to the LYCEUM, built in 1763 and enlarged in 1809, where Mrs. Siddons was playing in 1811; that COVENT GARDEN THEATRE was so close to Henrietta Street that they could walk there, even on a snowy night; and that from Sloane Street they drove along the STRAND and up DRURY LANE to the oldest of London's theatres. Both it and Covent Garden had recently been destroyed by fire, and both had risen again with fresh commodiousness and splendour.

If Jane Austen's novels reflect her familiarity with certain portions of London, they also corroborate the evidence of her letters as to the limitations of her walks and drives. Somerset House is the farthest point east mentioned in her correspondence; and though she locates the worthy Gardiners of *Pride and Prejudice* in GRACECHURCH STREET and the vulgar Miss Steeles of *Sense and Sensibility* in BARTLETT'S BUILDINGS, HOLBORN, no touch of local colour suggests that she ever rolled down Cornhill in brother Henry's barouche,* or called at the little group of red-brick houses, named after the original ground landlord, and in Strype's day inhabited "by persons of good repute," which were already considered mean and remote by the luxurious inhabitants of "the New Squares."

And it is about the new squares and the older, but still fashionable, vicinity of Bond Street that the London life of

* She knew, however, that the London-Canterbury-Dover coach started from the Cross Keys, Gracechurch Street, for her brothers travelled by it on several occasions.

Sense and Sensibility revolves. Kind, wealthy, vulgar Mrs. Jennings lives in BERKELEY STREET, built over part of the garden of Berkeley House. Her elder daughter, Lady Middleton, has a house in CONDUIT STREET, where the meadows, leased by the City of London to the Earl of Clarendon for building purposes, had once been traversed by a clear stream or conduit. Her younger daughter, Mrs. Palmer, had a grander house in the great square which Strype saw coming into heterogeneous being—till the whole “was called in honour of his present Majesty [George I], HANOVER SQUARE.” OLD BOND STREET, erected by Sir Thomas Bond, Controller of Queen Henrietta Maria’s household, was still, as in its beginning, in spite of a few good shops, a residential street, as was also its NEW extension, begun in 1721; and from “Bond Street” Jane makes the faithless Willoughby indite his cruel letter to the love-lorn Marianne. In a stationer’s shop in PALL MALL Colonel Brandon hears by chance of the young man’s approaching marriage with a wealthy heiress. Eleanor Dashwood drives to Gray, the jeweller, at 41 SACKVILLE STREET, “to negotiate” (as perhaps the authoress herself had done) “for the exchange of a few old-fashioned jewels belonging to her mother.” Emerging from the well-known shop she runs across her parsimonious brother, Henry Dashwood, who is about to take, for the winter season, a furnished house in HARLEY STREET. No brass plates as yet glistened on its mahogany doors, or on those of the neighbouring WIMPOLE STREET, where Mr. Rushton and his bride, Miss Bertram of *Mansfield Park*, spent their brief and unhappy honeymoon.

In *Emma* the Churchills come up from Yorkshire to MANCHESTER STREET; from which Mrs. Churchill is removed to die in a villa in lovely Richmond. It was characterised a few years later by the French poet Lamartine as “the Tivoli of London”; but was it really healthier than the Bloomsbury district Jane knew so well? There is a conversation in *Emma* between Mr. Woodhouse and his daughter Isabella Knightley, in which perhaps we hear an echo of family disputes in reference to the abode of Charles Austen’s children with the Palmers in KEPPEL STREET. Mr. Woodhouse laments that his grandchildren should be obliged to live in London—“no one is healthy in London”; whereupon Isabella declares that an exception must be made in favour of

BRUNSWICK SQUARE. She would not like to live in any other part of London, but “the neighbourhood of BRUNSWICK SQUARE is so very airy.” And Isabella’s opinion, supported by that of her favourite apothecary, was well-founded. Not only was BRUNSWICK SQUARE built upon dry soil far from the river’s mists, not only did its garden cover a large area, but it was on the very fringe of healthy open country. The little Knightleys could pick buttercups, fly kites, watch haymakers, and look for birds’ nests as easily in London as in Hertfordshire; and the Donwell cows did not give them better milk than did the farmers in TOTTENHAM ROAD, whose rich grazing lands extended to the wooded heights on which rose the villages of HAMPSTEAD and HIGHGATE.

It was this proximity to the real country, especially on the north and west, which constituted the charm of the London of Jane Austen’s time, and compensated its inhabitants for discomforts, dangers and defects which from the standpoint of present conditions appear intolerable. A quarter of an hour’s ride, a half-hour’s jolting in one of the “short-stage” coaches, took them to downs, fields and forests. And on summer evenings—when their descendants are turning into heated picture houses—they betook themselves to rural villages, to drink a dish of tea in arbour’d pleasure grounds, to quaff a glass of wine at a renowned country tavern, to partake of syllabubs at the numerous dairy farms, advertising a dainty esteemed by rich and poor. Or again, were they determined to combine pleasure with “a cure,” they could sip glasses of mineral water drawn from the forgotten wells and hot springs which provided for the impecunious what the wealthy classes sought at Bath or Tunbridge Wells, and the modern Londoner procures from the vendors of patent medicines.

LAURA M. RAGG.

ISLAM IN EUROPE.

THE Moslem population in the countries of the West, though not very considerable in number, constitutes one of the most important minority problems in Europe. It is due, not to political reasons, but to cultural associations; for the traditional loyalty of one set of Moslems in any given region makes that unit citizens of the World of Islam. By far the largest number live in Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Roumania, Greece and Poland; and as the problems relating to Russia and Turkey are peculiar to their own environments, no attempt will be made to bring them within this fold.

Before the Great War those who are now called the Yugoslav Moslems, numbering 1,679,000, were scattered in Serbia, Montenegro and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Amongst these people many Albanians and the Turks have taken permanent residence in the southern portion of the country. Not till 1930, however, was an official Moslem organisation set up at Belgrade under a Raisul-Ulema, or Head Ecclesiast, with two Councils of the Clergy, one at Sarajevo, the other in Skoplje; the former for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the latter for the Moslems belonging to the old Turkish provinces of the Sanjak of Novipazar, Macedonia and Montenegro. Since the reorganisation much progress has been made, notably amongst the Bosniak as compared to the southern Serbians, both in religious and cultural education. Health conditions, too, have greatly improved, for the Majlis Ulemas of Western Yugoslavia report an increase of 54,764 in Moslem population over the last census taken in 1931. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there are 1,120 well-run mosques, staffed by 1,522 members of the clergy for a large congregation of the Hanafi School of Islam; although there is a sprinkling of Bektashis, and Sufis of Naqshbandi, Rifaeti, and Molavis Order.

The department of the Moslem Pious Foundations, known as Waqf, maintains 877 Maktabas, or Preliminary Schools, teaching the principles of Islamic theology; and even in vocational Government schools Moslem religious education is imparted. Moreover, there are 40 finishing colleges, the one called Madrasatul Muntaha opened in 1934 in Sarajevo being reserved for girls. At a mixed college at Zenica there are 30

girl students, who, like the boys, will graduate as religious instructors after a five years' course. In more outlandish regions of the country, summer schools for theological teaching are also organised. The people there are justly proud of Gutbey Medrassa in Sarajevo, founded 400 years ago.

An Academy of Islamic Science known as Sheriat Academy has recently been brought into being through the efforts of Dr. Mahmud Spaho, the Moslem Minister of Communications in the Yugoslav Government; the tolerant policy of which is largely due to the broadmindedness of its President, Dr. Milan Stojadinovitch. The Moslem Shariat Courts were limited before 1929 to the areas of large Moslem populations; but in virtue of an Amendment introduced along with a Financial Law in 1935-6 they have extended their sphere to all parts of Yugoslavia and thereby conferred great advantages on the entire body of the Moslems. It is by no means a matter of small congratulation for the Yugoslavian Moslems that, although they were practically ruined as a result of the Great War, they now possess 2,432 Pious Foundations, to the yield of which their Government adds a large annual subvention.

From this happy section of the Yugoslav Moslems we may turn to Albania, a region once part of the Turkish Empire, comprising Scutari, Jannina and parts of the Vilayets of Kossovo and Monastir. Islam was introduced by the great divine Sari Saltik in the thirteenth century. Under its able ruler, King Ahmed Zogu, the Albanian population, about two-thirds of which belongs to the Bektashi Sufi sect of Islam, is happy and contented. There is a well-established Moslem college at Tirana. In the country the Moslem majority is very amiably disposed towards the Christian minority, monogamy is the general rule, and women's status is very high. The capital, Tirana, with a population of 31,000, mostly Moslems, boasts of a beautiful mosque built by Sulaiman Pasha in the seventeenth century. Another important mosque is that of Adham Pasha, whilst the small town of Tepeline retains the memory of Ali Pasha's castle where he received Byron in 1809. The country is full of relics of Islam's past grandeur; but although the faithful are very devout, education, especially religious education, is not very advanced.

The Moslems in Hungary are Hungarian citizens, enjoying the same rights and privileges as their Christian

fellow-countrymen, and have full liberty of religious observances. A law of 1916 recognised the Islamic religion in Hungary; but its leaders improved their conditions as recently as 1931. For although there were as many as 3,000 Moslems in the country, more than 500 in Budapest alone, they did not possess a single centre of worship, nor any well-regulated schools for the religious instruction of their children.

The story of Islam in Greece is the story of Turkey's domination of 400 years. The Greeks had full religious liberty, and were treated on an equal footing with other subjects of the Turkish Empire. Many of them were reckoned amongst the pillars of the State; but in 1829 Greece gained independence, and in 1913 Crete was ceded to her. Out of a population of about 7 millions, the Moslems there are estimated at present at about 140,000, mostly of Turkish parentage, whilst others are of Bulgarian and Caucasian blood. They live almost exclusively in Eastern and Western Thrace, and although an Islamic Muftiate (ecclesiastical administration) is granted to them, they are represented in the Greek Parliament by only four members. In this area there are some seventy-five mosques, which employ nearly 250 Imams and Muezzins; but their religious schools do not number more than a hundred. Shortly before the Great War there were forty-three mosques in Salonika, but some of these are said to have been transformed into churches. I have also been informed that the beautiful mosque called Hamzah-Bay-Djama in the heart of Salonika was converted into a cinema, although the original style and decorations of that place of worship have not been disturbed. The social, cultural and economic condition of the Greek Moslems is very miserable. The number of Intellectuals is relatively very small, and they are seldom met with in Government services or in any good profession. The sum allotted to their education is 533,000 drachmas, which is said to provide not even one-tenth of what is needed. This intellectual poverty is chiefly responsible for the absence of cultural expression. They have only one newspaper, which is published in the old Turkish alphabet; and little effort has been made to study or reorganise their condition.

The population of Bulgaria is about $5\frac{1}{2}$ million, of which some eleven per cent. are of Turkish origin. According to the latest statistics (1926) the number of Moslems is about

750,000. The majority are Turks, and one-tenth consists of pure Bulgarians of the Tomak race. The Moslems live chiefly in the regions of Shumla, Razgrad, Widin, and Svichto-Roshtuk, and a considerable number are to be found in Sofia. They are mostly farmers, and illiteracy among them is very high. Little has been done by the Government to encourage their cultural and social aspirations. As an important minority they are represented in Parliament, but in a proportion too small to their total number, having had 10 seats out of 274. There is a Muftiate at the head of which is the Grand Mufti Hussain Ahmedov, who lives in Sofia. He controls religious affairs, appointing the Imams with the assistance of a Moslem Council. There are some twenty Islamic schools, on Turkish lines, scattered in the various towns inhabited by Moslems. Several Moslem daily newspapers and periodicals are published in Turkish, though they have ceased to appear, owing to the depression, with the exception of two or three survivors. Mosques are found in many cities and villages built in the Turkish style. The two most worthy of mention are the Benja-Bashi-Mosque in Sofia, and the beautiful Mesjid of Biok-Djami with its magnificent nine domes, finished in 1494. Several Moslem schools exist at Philippopolis, while a number of mosques from the Turkish age are to be found at Widin.

The population of Roumania is estimated at about 18 millions, the Moslems numbering 200,000, mainly of Turkish origin. The majority of them live in the Dobruja, the rest being scattered about Constanza, Tulchia, Dorstur and Ada-Kalaa Island. Some 500 live on that island, mainly fishermen and craftsmen. Remains of Turkish rule in the form of mosques, towers, citadels, are still to be seen there. During the early years of the Turkish conquest thousands of Anatolian Turks emigrated and settled down in the Dobruja, and started colonising the country and erecting a number of mosques and towers. Most of the Moslems work in the country as peasants and farmers. They are very loyal to their Government and, being true patriots, have gained the Government's confidence and support. Their social and cultural status is much more advanced than that of their Bulgarian brethren. They form a homogeneous portion of the Roumanian nation and enjoy religious autonomy. Thus they have their own Muftiates, Sheriat court and Quranic schools. There are in the civil and military service of the country a number of Moslems. In the army we

find several distinguished officers, and a large number of Moslem troops have their own Imam whose headquarters are at Constanza. One also meets with some Moslem doctors, lawyers, and engineers. Moslems are duly represented in the Parliament, and have three newspapers, two of which appear in Turkish at Silistria, the third at Bazajek. For religious instruction they have 290 Imams, 271 Khateebes (preachers), 250 Muezzins. The Governor of Cabadin is a Moslem, and the sub-Governor of Constanza was for a long time a Moslem.

The Dobruja province is dotted over with mosques. King Charl Mosque at Constanza, which is remarkably beautiful, was built by the Roumanian Government, and furnished by the Turkish Government of Sultan Abdul-Hamid. In 1879 an Islamic college was installed at Babadagh, but in 1901 it was transferred to Mejidieh, where a large Moslem community exists. A second college was founded by the Moslems in 1920 at Silistria, where courses are given in Islamic and modern sciences. In 1906 a mosque was built at Bucharest, the only one on the left bank of the Danube. A beautiful mausoleum, containing the tomb of the great Moslem preacher Sari Saltik, exists at Babadagh. The Roumanian Moslems seek every opportunity to get into close contact with the Moslem countries, as is evidenced by a delegation of Roumanian Ulemas who visited the Near East a few years ago.

The last region of domiciled Moslems in Europe is Poland, where before the Great War nearly 7,000 were under Russian domination. Their affairs were administered by the Muftiate of the Crimea. That great dignitary did not journey nearly 1,000 miles to attend to the needs of his co-religionists, which, quite naturally, gave dissatisfaction to his little northern flock. The Polish Imams received no salary from the Russian Government and, in consequence, were not satisfactorily instructed. The majority of the Tartars were employed in the military service or, as Civil Servants, were dispersed throughout Russia. Thus they could not receive any religious education, and their children were brought up in complete ignorance of the Islamic religion.

The World War had another detrimental effect on these people, who were driven out of their homes, as the majority of Moslem villages were situated on the Russo-German front. When the war was over they returned to their ruined homes, but only after great suffering, for many of them had perished

in Russia. When Poland was reborn, their first task was to rebuild, both materially and spiritually, in which the Government greatly assisted them financially. Muftis, Imams, and religious teachers were elected and paid by the Government, and Moslem religious schools were supported by the State. For places of worship the King of Egypt contributed five hundred pounds, and Tartar Moslem emigrants in America offered what they could collect. Generally speaking, the religious situation in the Moslem villages in Poland is satisfactory. Most of the inhabitants there are pious Moslems, fasting during the Ramadan, attending mosques, and keen to give proper Islamic education to their children. Economically, too, they are better off than their southern brethren, and there are very few mixed marriages.


IKBAL ALI SHAH.

THE END OF MUNICIPAL AUTONOMY IN GERMANY.

MUNICIPAL administration in Germany was, and still is, extremely complicated, much more so than even in Great Britain. With seventeen more or less autonomous States, and the largest of them Prussia, composed of parts with widely varying traditions, Germany breaks every British record in diversity. In a short article it is only possible to deal with Prussia, with its 40 million inhabitants, two-thirds of Germany in territory and population.

Democracy slowly developed in German politics from the middle of last century and became the prevailing method of expressing the will of the nation only in 1918. But it was of much older standing in the towns—if by democracy we mean (irrespective of voting qualifications) an organisation of communities, in which by the method of the vote the “will of the community” is distilled from the fermenting mass of individual desires. To govern themselves was for centuries the practice and to a certain extent the recognised right of the Imperial Cities. Their wholesale “mediatisation” in 1804 was followed quickly not only by the restitution of a large part of their autonomy, but by its extension to all other towns and the creation of autonomous rural municipal bodies, the “*Landkreise*.”

Between 1920 and 1925 the situation was roughly as follows. The whole State was divided up not only into administrative state districts of various kinds, but for certain purposes into municipal units, either villages or towns. The villages and some towns together formed a rural county. The bigger or more important towns were not parts of rural counties but were urban counties in their own right; we will call them “cities.” Berlin had a peculiar position. So we have two kinds of counties, rural and urban ones, or, let us say, counties and cities. They again formed unions: the provinces. This gives us the following hierarchy of autonomous administration:



In every one of these autonomous units there existed democratic legislation and administration. In the villages the whole adult population chose a council by proportional representation. This was the village legislative assembly. It elected (also by proportional representation) the board of aldermen and the mayor. The board of aldermen was the administrative body of the village and took its decisions by majority vote. The mayor was its executive chief, generally unpaid.

In the towns we had in principle the same organisation: council, board of aldermen, mayor. But here a more permanent and paid element appeared. Some aldermen were not elected proportionally, but individually by a majority vote, and not for four years, like the honorary functionaries, but for twelve. They were fully paid officials with right to a pension after their term if they were not re-elected. Otherwise they possessed the full rights of a member of the board. The mayor was generally the first paid and long-term official, a kind of semi-permanency, and with the growth of the towns other aldermen followed suit: a treasurer, a technician, a lawyer, a forest specialist, a director of works, etc. Even small towns had sometimes large economic activity. “Gas and water socialism” is much too narrow a term to describe the degree of “socialisation” of public utilities, of land, sometimes of other trades, in these towns. High professional qualification of the aldermen and at least a certain degree of permanency of their posts were deemed necessary.

The counties had the same organisation: a council, elected by proportional representation, a board of aldermen, elected proportionally by the council, but consisting entirely of unpaid members. The Chairman of the council (without a vote there) and of the board of aldermen (with a vote) was a State functionary, the “*Landrat*”—let us call him Lord Lieutenant—appointed by the Ministry after hearing the proposal of the county council, fully paid by the State and dividing his activities between State and municipal service. The cities had a council, electing a board of aldermen and a mayor in the same manner as the towns. The election of members of the councils was independent of State control. The aldermen and mayors had to be confirmed by a supervising State authority; but the confirmation could be refused only in rare cases clearly defined by law.

The prevailing principle was that every community might

regulate all public affairs in which it took an interest, as far as this was not either expressly forbidden or expressly reserved by law to State or municipal authorities. This made it impossible to declare any act of municipal legislation *ultra vires* except for the reasons mentioned. Likewise the municipality was free to administer its property and to raise means by taxation or loans, subject only to the same two qualifications. Besides this field of autonomous administration the State obliged the municipalities to transact certain business according to particular rules. The activity might be committed to the municipality either in very general or very detailed terms. In any case the decision as to further details, within the limits of the commissioning law, was in the discretion of the municipality. State control was limited to questions of legality and (with very few exceptions) had nothing to do with questions of opportunity and reasonableness. The idea was that the advantages of unhampered local initiative and civic responsibility were so great that the risk of local mistakes ought not to be shirked. This organisation was the basis of all that municipal activity in republican Germany which earned the ungrudging admiration of the world and of which we are still proud.

The fruitful principle in all this was the combination of tactful State supervision, independence and responsibility of the leading municipal officials, with democratic control. That this control was effective without becoming cumbersome was chiefly the consequence of the fact that the units were mostly comparatively small in area and population. The few very big cities were not so successful. Otherwise the system worked well, particularly as regards the purity of administration. It is true that the Nazis and, before them, other enemies of democracy tried to excite public opinion against municipal corruption. More than three years of Nazi rule have elapsed, and no stone has been left unturned to prove the corruption of the Weimar system. They have found no spectacular case in the whole of Germany. They caught only very small fishes, certainly much less than they admit to exist within their own organisations and the municipalities as they are now. The truth is that the achievements of the municipalities had been secured with a minimum of corruption.

This state of democratic organisation and of comparative independence of local government from central direction has

always been the subject of squabbles and differences of opinion. But up to 1930 legislation did not invade in any serious degree the independence of the municipalities. Only 1931 and 1932 showed a certain decay, when the slump forced the State to infringe municipal autonomy in some respects. German democracy died economically from attempting the impossible combination of two series of measures, each of which by itself is quite practicable: balancing the budget by deflation, and keeping up a high level of expenditure for social purposes. This policy was the more seductive for the central authorities as they were able to balance their budgets by withdrawing a large part of their subsidies to municipalities. But the central authorities kept up the social expenditure of the municipalities and increased them even by dumping the long-term unemployed on the municipal Poor Law authorities, making them literally bankrupt. At the end of the republican period the short-term debts of the towns, villages, counties, cities, and provinces amounted to £311.4 millions, mostly long overdue and inflicting dire hardships on their creditors. Bankruptcy leads to distraint. One must have lived through these three years in a responsible position to know what it meant, how all the work of the municipalities was hampered and finally brought into total disorder because from week to week it was even doubtful whether the cash for wages to municipal workers and doles to the unemployed would be in the till on Friday. Thus as a symptom of the general progressive decay of all public activity during the slump a certain invasion from the centre occurred, but only as an emergency measure. Even then the control of the State was limited to questions of legality, though legislation regulated the details of municipal activities much more than before. This characteristic of the independence of local government, the right to make mistakes on their own account, survived in Germany till the Nazis came into power, and in essence autonomy remained intact.

The whole system of this independent and democratic local government was, of course, impossible in the Nazi State. Their State is totalitarian in the sense that it does not believe in any one doing anything which does not fit in entirely with the "principles of national socialist conduct to the State." That it is tolerable and perhaps good if local affairs are regulated according not only to local particular

conditions, but to local tastes too, is a principle of democracy. The Nazi State believes in equality, not in the sense of an equal distribution of property and income and chances, but in the sense of monotony. The forms of local government, very different in the various parts of Germany and in their variety mostly well fitted to local conditions, became unbearable. And as the right to elect mayors, councillors, aldermen, etc., might have made it difficult to drive out the people holding the posts in local government and to substitute favourites of the Nazi organisations, the right of the inhabitants to elect their officials had to go also. The centralisation of appointments fitted in very well with the Nazi policy of abolishing voting not only for electorates but for boards, and erecting the principle of "leadership" even in the smallest of the 50,000 villages.

At first the new legislators tinkered only with the constitution of the municipalities. Innumerable haphazard and contradictory laws were made, overriden, and re-made. Then a second stage of legislation followed with the Prussian law of December 15th, 1933, introducing entirely new regulations for the whole of Prussia. Technically the changes are not all bad. Certain features of municipal law had been ripe for reform. The men now ruling found all the new features of this kind ready in the desks of the ministerial permanent officials whom they deprived of work and bread when they enthroned their favourites. As these points do not touch any political principle we omit them. In so far, however, as the law of 1933 is important in principle it is now, at least for the villages, towns and cities, superseded by the Reich law of January 30th, 1935, of which the most remarkable features are as follows. The administration and the power of making local by-laws is now vested in the mayor. He has at his side the local confidence man of the Nazi Party. He has a general deputy or vice-mayor, and one or more permanent deputies for special branches of the administration. These can work without pay, but are paid officials in the more important towns and in the cities. They are the mayor's subordinates. He may override their decisions and withdraw from them every single affair or case. Furthermore, he enjoys the advice of honorary aldermen, who do not form a board and who give their advice (which does not bind the mayor) individually. He can transfer current business of special

branches of the administration, such as gas-works, to committees, of which he or the vice-mayor or one of the aldermen is chairman. They too are advisory only. The principle in all this is that the mayor commands alone, with the exception of the plenipotentiary of the Party, and that his deputies act in his name and in every detail subject to his orders. He may have advice and is obliged, in certain cases, to hear it; but he is not obliged to follow it. He may even act against the opinion of all the aldermen and members of committees. This is the principle of "leadership." Under the big dictators in Germany 51,161 small dictators are created.

Do not imagine that the miniature dictator has an easy life. In many cases he can act only with the consent of the State's supervisory authority, which is to be exercised "in conformity with the laws and aims of the leadership of the State." Thus the supervising authority can interfere with every municipal affair or activity. The principle is destroyed that the State's supervision concerns only the legality of the acts of local governments. The local Olympus is by no means monotheistic, for the confidence man or plenipotentiary of the Party is the permanent controller of the Mayor. "To ensure harmony of the municipal administration with the Party the plenipotentiary of the N.S.D.A.P. co-operates in certain affairs," says the law. He has to propose the candidates for the posts of all salaried aldermen. He has to be invited to all conferences of the mayor with the aldermen; he can dismiss them "in harmony with the supervising authority." He knows all, criticises all, sees all he needs to know for spinning his intrigues against the Mayor. He is the man of the Nazis' O.G.P.U. in municipal affairs.

But this is not the end of the limits of the Mayor's authority. He is appointed by the State, like the vice-mayor and the aldermen; the candidates are proposed by the representative of the Party. The Mayor may be recalled by the State's supervising authority—in small towns and villages with the consent of the plenipotentiary of the Party—within the first year of his office. As his post is salaried and ends after twelve years, he must then be re-appointed; and this will again depend on whether the representative of the Party is good enough to propose him. Many mayors who managed to survive the several "purges" of 1933 and 1934 come up for re-appointment during the next few years. In such cases the

local representative of the Party is bound to become an absolute tyrant. A particularly nice point, characteristic of all that is going on in Germany, is that her despotic Government does not bind itself to its own legislative acts. Laws with retrospective force are a quite normal feature. Why not give this precious right to the municipality also? Why not, indeed? The Third Reich is not squeamish. Local by-laws may contain a clause giving them retrospective force.

It is too early to assess the results of the new régime in the German municipalities. It will have to stand comparison with the achievements of the democratic system, and this comparison will not be lenient. It seems that the omnipotence of the Nazi Party has indeed led to the appointment of incapable favourites in many a case. Some men appointed at first are already dead, though not by natural causes. Quite a number are in prison, convicted or accused of grave acts of corruption. Many have resigned their offices because they found it impossible to bear the incompetent interference of the local representative of the Party. Perhaps such difficulties are inevitable in a revolution. But so much is certain: the era of municipal democracy and autonomy in Germany is finished. Not even the glibest phraseology of Nazi propaganda can spare them the obligation either to achieve more than democracy and autonomy, or to go down to history for having destroyed the cleanest, most active, most humane and most popular form of public activity.

PENSIEROSO.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE NEW EPOCH.

DURING the past twelve months events in Europe have produced a series of diplomatic emergencies which have become progressively unpleasant and difficult to solve. Not many people would hazard a guess as to what will finally emerge from the chaos. This only seems to be clear, that Europe has embarked upon a new, uncharted phase of her history. The Great War and its diplomatic aftermath seem at last to have been added to the records of the dead past. For sixteen years the Paris treaties that followed the Great War constituted the juridical framework within which European diplomacy unfolded itself. The several defeated "enemies" were awarded their several dispensations: Germany, by the Treaty of Versailles; Austria, by that of Saint Germain; Hungary, by that of Trianon; Bulgaria, by that of Neuilly; Turkey, by that of Sèvres. The Covenant of the League of Nations was incorporated as an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles. When the League of Nations began to function on January 16th, 1920, the post-war treaty system came into operation. The Treaty of Sèvres proved to be the most brittle of the instruments in use. It broke within three years. A conference met in Lausanne in November 1922 to negotiate another treaty to take its place. That second treaty, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, has itself in 1936 virtually ceased to be effective.

What is left of the mass of treaty impositions? The reparation clauses of the treaties were never fulfilled, and have been tacitly abandoned. The obligation of disarmament imposed upon the conquered races has been rejected by those races. The demilitarisation of Germany's frontier in the Rhine zone and of Turkey's in the Straits zone has been violated by those states. The League of Nations, which was the great constructive ideal that emerged from the war's havoc, was crippled at the outset by the refusal of the United States to take her part in it. In effect it never became a true League of Nations: and for that historic fact the responsibility—one cannot say the "fault," because who is to apportion blame for the wayward manifestations of national politics?—must rest with the United States. Japan seceded from the League of Nations

when it suited her purpose to do so. No "sanction" could be applied against Japan because the United States was not a member of the League. Germany, having in 1926 as one result of the Treaty of Locarno been admitted to membership of the League, in her turn seceded from it when she failed to be given what she regarded as a fair and equal status. Her secession was the prelude to a series of open treaty violations. Again, however, there could not be, was not, any practical question of a sanction.

Italy was the third member of the League to go her own way in defiance of the collective principle of the League and in repudiation of the obligations she had incurred as a signatory of the Covenant. In her case, illogically and inconsistently, the remaining members of the League did decide to invoke the sanctions prescribed by the Covenant. The British Government and British public opinion were mostly responsible for what was attempted from Geneva in that sense. Italy ignored the threat of sanctions and went to war in Abyssinia last October. The resultant operation of sanctions, whose theory it was that having failed to prevent the war they now might shorten it and save Abyssinia, so far failed to substantiate its theory that it did not make impossible the complete military conquest of Abyssinia within seven months. If it shortened the war, as perhaps it did, it did so by the unintentional and paradoxical means of galvanising Italian support of Signor Mussolini to such a fervour of enthusiasm that the military campaign was consummated far more quickly than it would otherwise have been.

Is anything left of the peace treaties? Has the Italian experience conclusively proved that the League of Nations as now constituted is a failure, in the sense that it cannot prevent war? President Benesh, who is one of the great realists, made this statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czechoslovak Parliament on November 5th last, that is after the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian war: "The opponents of the League of Nations . . . contend that it is dangerous for our State to place over-great confidence in the League of Nations, since that institution cannot prevent the outbreak of wars, and if we relied upon it to protect us in case of a war breaking out we should suffer a terrible disillusionment. My reply is that we have never asserted that Geneva will prevent the outbreak of wars, and that we

have never intended to place our fate, in case of the outbreak of a warlike conflict, solely in the hands of the League of Nations. We only desire, should a conflict arise, to avail ourselves of the Geneva institutions to the utmost extent possible as at least a political and moral if not material support, for we ourselves shall never be aggressors. In addition to this, in order to supplement the guarantees of our security, we have always consistently pursued a policy of security pacts and alliance with those countries that were ready to pursue such a course in common with us. At the same time we have never diverged from the framework of the Covenant, subordinating our alliances to Geneva precisely for the reason that we do not desire to be, and never intend to be, an aggressor against anyone. Our alliance with France and with the countries of the Little Entente is subordinated to these principles, so also is our pact with the Soviet Union, and to these principles too the Eastern and Danubian pacts were to be subordinated. Finally, we have always emphasised the fact that the first condition upon which all this is based is our own military strength. Again and again it has been seen in the deliberations at Geneva, that a nation which has not defended itself against attack to the utmost of its powers has been in the end abandoned even by Geneva, even though truth and justice were fully on its side. We must never forget this for the future, and I add that any nation and State which does not persevere to the very end in defence of its independence and its territory could easily be sacrificed notwithstanding the support of the League of Nations."

It will perhaps be argued, especially by dogged sections of opinion in Great Britain, that the League of Nations has not "failed," in any decisive sense, and even that the further application of sanctions in the present case may yet drive Italy out of Abyssinia. It is doubtful if many normally realistic people will share such a view. If, then, the League of Nations in its present diminutive form—the United States, Germany, Japan and Italy in effect standing aside from it, whether they be formal members or not—has been proved abortive, what part of the 1919 treaties can still be said to hold good? The answer obviously is that the territorial settlements prescribed by the treaties are still intact. Reparation, disarmament, demilitarisation: these were matters which a government could repudiate out of its own sovereignty

within its own frontiers. By contrast any attempt to alter frontiers presupposes the transgression of existing frontiers. It seems obvious that such transgression could be effected only by force; in short, by "aggression." No frontier changes in Europe or elsewhere are likely ever to be brought about except by war. The position now reached in Europe, therefore, seems to be that everything except the Versailles, Saint Germain, Trianon, Neuilly and Lausanne frontiers has gone, and that those frontiers will be maintained, not by virtue of anything contained in those treaties, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, but by the comparative forces of self-defence available to the several countries concerned, whether singly or in combination. It seems on the whole a fair argument to say that the Versailles Europe has passed, and that a new Europe unknown and incalculable is in the making.

TURKEY AND THE STRAITS.

The latest act in the general process of treaty destruction took place on April 10th, when the Turkish Government communicated to the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty a formal request that the clauses of that treaty which forbade the fortification of the Straits zone should be modified by agreement. There was nothing surprising in the request nor in the reason given for it, namely that in 1923 when the treaty was signed, "the general situation of Europe from the political and military point of view presented an aspect totally different from that of to-day."

Indeed, it is three years since Turkey first hinted her discontent with a system that she had originally accepted on the strength of Geneva guarantees. In the early summer of 1934 the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, made it clear that Turkey could not much longer postpone the execution of a threat she had been making for the past twelve months to remilitarise one of the coastal zones, namely that of the Dardanelles. He did not hint that the scope of remilitarisation was to embrace either the northern coastal zone—that of the Bosphorus—or the inland sea on Turkey's Thracian frontier. He then demanded only that Turkey should be allowed to fortify the Dardanelles, and that the Straits Convention incorporated in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 should be emended in that sense. The secession of Japan from the

League, the failure of the Disarmament Conference, and the threatened secession of Germany from the League had created in the Turkish view a situation in which it was reasonable to ask that Turkey should now be allowed to defend her own territory by her own means rather than to be dependent upon the Geneva system of collective security. The issue between Italy and the League of Nations and the disturbed conditions of the Mediterranean throughout the last winter were the final considerations which led Turkey last month to make her formal demand. On April 16th the British Government in answering the Turkish Note commended the correctness of Turkey's method of raising the question (the tacitly suggested contrast clearly being that of the German method in the case of the demilitarised Rhine zone), agreed that the discussions proposed should be opened without delay, but made the proviso that the Dominions would have to be consulted before the British Government could formulate its final views. On the very day when the British Note was delivered in Angora it was reported that Turkey had revised the said method and had unilaterally reoccupied the Dardanelles zone. The report was stoutly denied in Angora, although the Turkish Ambassador in Athens officially informed the Greek Government of the accomplished fact.

The new conditions quoted by the Turkish Government as the reason for Turkey's request were these: the situation in the Mediterranean, the general process of rearmament (in which "the curve of increase has shown a swift upward turn"), the proved inadequacy of the machinery for collective security, and the failure of the Straits Convention to provide, in the contingency of a special or a general threat of war involving Turkey, for Turkish competence to take her own measures of legitimate defence. What, therefore, Turkey demanded was that an agreement be reached "for the regulation of the régime of the Straits under conditions of security which are indispensable for the inviolability of Turkey's territory." The Note was addressed to the League of Nations and to the British, Bulgarian, French, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Rumanian, Russian and Yugoslav Governments as signatories of the Straits Convention. A question was thus raised of vital importance to four Great Powers. The Sea of Marmora and its two passage-ways are a military factor of much wider than Turkish concern.

The issue, however, is clear. The relevant provisions of the "Convention relating to the régime of the Straits" were framed to secure (1) the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation by sea and by air in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, hereinafter comprised under the general term of the Straits [Article 1], and (2) that "The transit and navigation of commercial vessels and aircraft and of war vessels and aircraft in the Straits in time of peace and in time of war shall henceforth be regulated" in a manner that was stipulated in a long and involved annex. The essential stipulation was that the four shores of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, of the islands in the Sea of Marmora (except Emir Ali Adasi) and the islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, and Rabbit Island, in the Aegean Sea, should be "demilitarised" that is, except for special provisions to be applied to Constantinople, "there shall exist in the demilitarised zone and islands no fortifications, no permanent artillery organisation, no submarine engines of war other than submarine vessels, no military aerial organisation, and no naval base." [Article 6 of the annex.] It was further stipulated that there should be "no armed forces" stationed in the zones except police forces with limited small arms, although Turkey retained the right to transport troops through the zones, to traverse them by aeroplane, and to enter her fleet in the waters. The execution of the Convention was entrusted to an international commission composed of representatives of Turkey (chairman), France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Russia, and Jugoslavia.

Turkey's present dissatisfaction centres on Article 18 of the annex which, as the sanction for Turkey's own immunity from attack, merely provides that the high contracting parties in the event of "violation, attack, or other act of war or threat of war" will "meet" such contingencies "by all the means that the Council of the League of Nations may decide for this purpose."

ITALY ANNEXES ABYSSINIA.

A fortnight before the Emperor of Abyssinia fled from Addis Ababa the machinery of the League of Nations was already showing the signs of its final breakdown. Few episodes

in Geneva's history have caused more melancholy thought among students of politics. The Committee of Thirteen met in Geneva on April 16th. The practical result of that meeting was never in doubt, before or after it took place. The only doubt was the degree to which the Committee would confess its embarrassment. As if to ensure that the emphasis should be keyed up to its maximum, Mr. Anthony Eden had preceded the meeting with renewed vague threats against Italy. Yet he knew both that Italy would ignore his threats and that the threats could not in any case be carried out. The position then was that Abyssinian resistance had obviously broken down, that Italy had already in effect conquered Abyssinia, and that therefore "peace" in the technical sense was now inevitable. It was the exclusive business of the Committee of Thirteen to encourage peace. On April 16th it was placed in the position where it had to recognise that the war was coming to an end on military grounds. It therefore formally accepted the failure of its efforts to "bring together" the two combatants. It met again on April 18th to draft a report in that sense for submission to the League Council which was due to meet on April 20th: the Council consisting of the same people as the Committee.

The League's very hypothesis had been destroyed. The Italian forces had already occupied more of Abyssinia's territory than had been offered them, even as a sphere of influence, by the Hoare-Laval proposals. How could Geneva now offer Italy more than Sir Samuel Hoare and M. Laval had suggested? How on the humdrum ground of human nature could Signor Mussolini, having conquered Abyssinia despite the League, now consent to draw up his peace terms with the help of the League? He categorically rejected a Geneva request that he should negotiate with Abyssinia through the medium of the League. He refused to negotiate at Geneva. Grimly jesting, he did offer to negotiate with Abyssinia at Lausanne, thirty miles from Geneva. There was something depressingly symbolic in the person of Baron Aloisi as the medium of transmitting such messages to the League of Nations. It was the same Baron Aloisi who a year and a half before had presided over a League of Nations Committee which, sitting in Rome, had enabled the Germans and the French to reach an agreement about the compensation to be paid for the Saar mines in the event of the plebiscite

assigning the mines to Germany. An unpleasant problem, of potential danger to Europe, had thereby been removed. Italy now by contrast stood virtually outside the League.

Whatever be one's opinion about the reason for such a change, few people will dispute the argument that the cause of collective security itself was obviously stronger when pursued with Italy as a party to it rather than as an object of its "sanction." Both sides in the prevailing European argument will say "of course" to such a statement. Yet it seems reasonable to suppose that if the Hoare-Laval plan had been allowed to liquidate the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, Italy would have remained a willing partner in the system of collective security in Europe. What is cynicism? Is it cynical to wink at a violation of the Covenant in Africa to keep a European Great Power on the side of the pacific Powers in Europe? Is it cynical to sacrifice a minor for a greater good? Many British people think that British sovereignty imposed by military force over African and other peoples is a source of benefit to those peoples themselves. Is it wholly inconceivable, on the ground of that same British argument, that Italian sovereignty may not benefit the people of Abyssinia by abolishing slavery and other savage customs? It may be argued that both Italian and British colonial conquest is indefensible on grounds of high moral principle. Yet in a world where essentially the law of the jungle applies equally to human as to other animal affairs it is arguable that the very worst catastrophe, to be avoided at all costs, is a war in Europe. Certainly that must be the point of view of those people whose fate it is to live in Europe. Italy can conquer Abyssinia in seven months at a cost in human misery not to be compared to the merest fraction of the misery caused in Europe between 1914 and 1918. If the logic of Geneva's idealism be that in the last resort an Italian conquest of Abyssinia be resisted by war—and such necessarily is the logic of sanctions—would a British father or mother be willing that their British son should die in such a cause? In the world as it is, those people whose reason is severely realistic, must choose between one evil and a greater.

The Council of the League duly met in Geneva on April 20th. The British Foreign Secretary presided. As the British Government had taken the initiative all along the line in Geneva's attempt to divert Italy from Abyssinia by the operation of sanctions, it was to the British Government that

the "fifty odd" states members looked for the further initiative now. The Council duly received the report of the Committee of Thirteen, which stated that the League's attempt to "conciliate" Rome and Addis Ababa had failed. The Council thereupon spent a long and heated day discussing what was to be done about it. At the end of the discussion it passed a resolution. The resolution merely recorded the fact of failure, and addressed another "appeal" to Italy. But the British Foreign Secretary did not let the occasion pass without plunging into another essay in verbal threats. He announced as the solemn "policy" of the British Government a readiness to consider the collective imposition of still further sanctions against Italy. But at the same time he refrained from specifying or proposing any such further sanctions. He knew that France would not support him if he did make any such proposal. He knew that the existing sanctions were a proved failure in their own purpose. Men of affairs do not "bluff" so weakly. It was therefore hard to escape the conclusion that the representative of the British Government had deliberately made an "offer" to do something which he neither wished nor was able to do, in the security that the offer would not be accepted. The atmosphere of Geneva's politics had in so appalling a measure deteriorated.

Fortunately for Geneva the climax of the war itself was destined not long to be delayed. On May 2nd the Negus with his family left Addis Ababa by train for Jibuti, and the most serious disorder broke out in his abandoned capital. He reached Jibuti on May 3rd. The mob in Addis Ababa reduced the town to ruin by looting, rioting, shooting, and setting fire to buildings. On May 4th the Emperor sailed from Jibuti for Palestine in the British cruiser *Enterprise*. On May 5th Marshal Badoglio ceremonially entered Addis Ababa, and the disorder was arrested. On that day a national festival was celebrated throughout Italy. Signor Mussolini made a proclamation in the Piazza Venezia before an immense crowd. He read the telegram he had received from Marshal Badoglio announcing his entry into Addis Ababa and declared: "I announce to the Italian people and to the world that the war is finished. I announce to the Italian people and to the world that peace is re-established. . . . But it is strictly necessary that I should add that it is our peace, the Roman peace, which is expressed in this simple irrevocable, definitive

proposition: Abyssinia is Italian—Italian in fact because occupied by our victorious armies, Italian by right, because with the sword of Rome it is civilisation which triumphs over barbarism, justice which triumphs over the slavery of 1,000 years." He protested that he had no wish to disturb the peace of Europe, but went on: "I must immediately add that we are ready to defend our brilliant victory with the same intrepid and inexorable decision with which we have gained it. We feel that in this way we are interpreting the will of the combatants in Africa, of those who are dead. . . ."

On the following day (May 6th) a debate took place in the British House of Commons on the upshot of the Italo-Abyssinian war, in which Mr. Eden, who has a gift for debate worthy almost of Mr. Winston Churchill, made easy play of the Opposition inconsistencies. Mr. Dalton, for example, did not hesitate to breathe words of fire upon Italy and to demand vaguely bellicose action, ignoring his own inconsistent disapproval of Britain's possessing an adequate army, navy, and air force. In effect he demanded war by Britain and the disarmament of Britain at one and the same time. Mr. Eden easily demolished that particular argument, but gave no indication of the nature of his government's intentions. The Council of the League was due to meet on May 11th in its ordinary session. What would Mr. Eden do or say on that occasion? When he spoke on May 6th he made no revelation on that matter. He merely postulated that the League should collectively decide its own policy. By contrast Sir Austen Chamberlain realistically faced the logic of the situation by arguing that to persist in sanctions after the war was over would be both "futile" and "dangerous." By dangerous, he explained, he meant that it would produce the risk of war in Europe. Sir Austen's own record in the matter of sanctions is one of the oddities. In 1925 he rejected the Geneva Protocol on the ground that sanctions were unpractical. In 1935 he supported sanctions. In 1936 he has reverted to his view of eleven years ago.

The Fascist Grand Council met in Rome in the late evening of May 9th, and formally imposed Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia. Signor Mussolini made the announcement that night in words that vibrated with the madness of military patriotism such as afflicts all nations in greater or smaller degree. War derives so infallibly from this sort of patriotic

lunacy in human beings the world over that the question of war and peace is really a religious question. Signor Mussolini said: "Officers, N.C.O.s, soldiers of all the Armed Forces of the State in Africa and in Italy, Blackshirts of the revolution, Italian men and women in the fatherland and in the world, listen. With the decisions that you will learn within a few moments, decisions acclaimed by the Grand Council of Fascism, a great event is accomplished. The fate of Abyssinia is sealed to-day, May 9th, in the fourteenth year of the Fascist era. All knots were cut by our gleaming sword, and the African victory remains in the history of the fatherland entire and unsullied, a victory such as the legionaries that have fallen and those that survive dreamed of and willed. Italy has finally won her empire, a Fascist empire, because it bears the indestructible tokens of the will and of the power of the Roman lictors, because this is the goal towards which, during fourteen years, were spurred on the exuberant and disciplined energies of the young and dashing generations of Italy. An empire of peace, because Italy desires peace, for herself and for all men, and she decides upon war only when it is forced upon her by imperious, irrepressible necessities of life. An empire of civilisation and of humanity for all the populations of Abyssinia. That is in the tradition of Rome, who, after victory, associated the peoples with her own destiny. Here is the law, O Italians, which closes one period of our history and opens up another like a vast pass opening on all the possibilities of the future. (1) The territories and the peoples that belonged to the Empire of Abyssinia are placed under the full and entire sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy. (2) The title of Emperor has been assumed for himself and for his successors by the King of Italy. Officers, N.C.O.s, soldiers of all the Armed Forces of the State in Africa and in Italy, Blackshirts, Italian men and women! The Italian people has created the empire with its blood. It will fertilise it with its labour and will defend it against anybody whomsoever with its arms. In this supreme certainty, legionaries, raise up on high your insignia, your weapons, and your hearts, to salute after fifteen centuries the reappearance of the empire upon the fateful hills of Rome. Will you be worthy of it? (Tremendous shouts of 'Yes.') This answering cry is as a sacred oath that binds you before God and before men for life and for death. Blackshirts, legionaries, the salute to the King!"

THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO GERMANY.

One effect of the climax of the war in Abyssinia was to slow down the pace of the pursuit of an understanding with Germany. Germany made her proposals for a system of European peace on March 31st. France made her counter proposals on April 8th. On that day the non-German Locarno Powers met informally in Geneva, where formally they were concerned with the meeting of the League's Committee of Thirteen, and decided to gain time by commissioning the British Government to get into touch with the German Government in order to seek an elucidation of certain points contained in the German memorandum of March 31st. M. Corbin, the French Ambassador in London, called at the Foreign Office on April 21st to make an informal contribution to the work in hand. That work was pursued throughout the following fortnight. Rumour had it that the draft crossed Downing Street several times before it was approved on the north side. A Cabinet meeting held on April 30th demanded certain changes in the Foreign Office draft, and the new draft was approved by the Cabinet on May 4th. The final memorandum was presented by Sir Eric Phipps to Baron von Neurath on May 7th. It was published as a White Paper (Cmd. 5175) in London on the following day. It was a long document designed to elicit from the German Government a definite statement on such pointed questions as these: can Germany now make and honour "genuine treaties"; does she still honour any part of the Treaty of Versailles; does she respect the present territorial and political status in Europe; what exactly does she mean by "the separation of the Covenant of the League of Nations from its basis in the Treaty of Versailles setting"? And other such questions.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

May 15th, 1936.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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A NEW LIFE OF PALMERSTON.*

Students of English history owe an immense debt of gratitude to American scholars for the brilliant and illuminating work that they have recently done in the dark storehouses of British archives. Year after year, as summer comes round, those whose duties take them to the reading-room of the British Museum or to the research room of the Public Record Office observe with admiration the unobtrusive advent of these Trans-Atlantic savants who devote vacation after vacation to the laborious (and by no means inexpensive) task of crossing from America to carry on their skilled investigations into the origins of their great Republic. For, of course, most of their researches relate to those periods of British history that occurred while still the American colonies were under the jurisdiction of the Mother Country, or to those still more remote ages before colonisation began at all. For the source of American institutions has to be sought far back in those distant centuries when Angevins, Normans,

* *Lord Palmerston*. By Herbert C. F. Bell. 2 vols. Longmans, Green & Co. 42s.

Danes, and Anglo-Saxons were painfully and slowly developing their administrative systems. One has only to think of the writings of Professor G. B. Adams on Feudalism; Professor C. H. Haskins on the Normans; Professor W. A. Morris on the Sheriff; Professor J. F. Baldwin on the King's Council; Professor J. F. Willard on Mediæval Finance, and Professor E. R. Turner on the Cabinet—and these are only a few among many—to realise the magnitude and importance of American contributions to English historical knowledge.

Professor H. C. F. Bell, whose two portly volumes lie before us, has still further increased England's debt to American scholarship. For his massive biography of Lord Palmerston obviously represents the result of many years of wide reading and exhaustive research. And it is peculiar in that it treats of that more recent period of British history with which America was not so intimately concerned. For Palmerston was born in the year (1784) which followed the recognition by George III's Government of American independence. Nevertheless, his career was not wholly unrelated to America. For that long-lived minister was Secretary-at-War during the lamentable Anglo-American conflict of 1812-14, and, what is more important, he was Prime Minister during the whole course of the American Civil War. Some of the most interesting and instructive pages of Professor Bell's great work tell the story of how he, in conjunction with other friends of peace, managed to keep Great Britain from becoming involved in that unhappy struggle.

It is remarkable that the life of Palmerston has been so rarely written on the grand scale. For it was a life of quite primary importance, and its record is an epitome of nearly everything of significance in the sphere of international politics during the half-century that followed the Peace of Vienna of 1815. The old standard biography in five volumes, written soon after Palmerston's death, by Bulwer and Ashley, is a monument of unrelieved dullness and tendentious discrimination. Far better is the two-volumed work of Mr. Evelyn Ashley (1879), to whose independence and freshness Professor Bell does rather less than justice. The small manuals of Anthony Trollope (1882); Lloyd Sanders (1888); and Lord Lorne (1892) added little or nothing to common knowledge. Then, after a long interval, came Mr. Philip

Guedalla's sparkling monograph, entitled simply *Palmerston* (1926). It is a brilliant and indispensable study not merely of the man, but of his times. Not only does it show an amazingly intimate acquaintance with the social and political history of the period of Palmerston's life (1784-1865), but it draws for the first time upon the long-sealed but vitally important Broadland papers.

Professor Bell rightly and frankly admits his great obligations to Mr. Guedalla's pioneer work: but he is entirely justified when he contends that even Mr. Guedalla left vast fields still waiting to be explored. So far as one can gather, Professor Bell has not had access to the Broadlands papers which are guarded with excessive caution. That is unfortunate. It is, however, some compensation to find that he has been allowed to forage freely among the great collections of letters and other documents preserved at Windsor, at Bowood, and at Howick House; as well as among the Aberdeen, Clarendon, Stevenson, and Van Buren manuscripts, which have been placed in public keeping.

The result of Professor Bell's great and long-continued labour is, of course, not any sort of a new revelation concerning Palmerston. It is now over seventy years since the great man died. His character was never an obscure or a subtle one, and the verdict of history upon him has long been pronounced. Professor Bell, however, does succeed in a remarkable manner, by means of countless quotations from hitherto unpublished letters and memoranda, in illustrating and elucidating the general lines of his policy, both foreign and domestic. He concentrates his attention upon Palmerston's ideas. "What I wish to emphasise," he says, "is that I have not attempted to show what Palmerston did, so much as what he thought, and what he therefore wished to do." In this task he has succeeded most admirably and marvellously. And it must be confessed that Palmerston emerges amazingly well from this close inquisition into his motives and ideals. He is seen to have been a man of keen if narrow vision; singularly free from petty jealousies and small animosities; perpetually inspired by a passionate devotion to his country, and with a superb faith in the greatness of its destiny. Professor Bell's masterly work will probably remain for many years the standard authority upon its subject.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

A MODERNIST INDIAN LEADER.*

No book that can be compared with this has come out of India. The concrete autobiography uniting personal revelation with a record of public events is rarely written by a Hindu, and in any case Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru stands alone as political leader and Hindu modernist. His book is a formidable challenge to the great multitude of people, educated and other, who cling to the belief that the Oriental is a totally different being from the European. Pundit Jawaharlal is able and clear-sighted in the full European sense, a straight political and social thinker, and a master of English writing. His whole book, which was written in jail, is of absorbing interest.

The Nehrus are Kashmiri Brahmins, long resident in Allahabad. Jawaharlal is the son of Motilal Nehru (d. 1931), a lawyer-statesman of the first rank who was born too early for a governing position in India. He sent his son to Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge, and to the English Bar, and the son in return led the elder into political activity of a more radical sort than he would otherwise have approved. Jawaharlal became secretary of the National Congress, after it had adopted the Gandhist policy, and much against his own will was elected to the presidential chair in a critical year. It was he who led the movement which resulted in the abandonment of undefined Swaraj (own rule) and the declaration of Indian independence. He had joined Gandhi in the first civil-disobedience campaign, 1919, and after the death of C. R. Das six years later was the unchallenged leader of the younger Nationalists. He writes in an ironic tone of the hero-worship to which he was subjected, but his own direct narrative makes the reasons for this entirely clear. His personal sacrifice has had no reserves, he is a man of unflinching courage, and he has paid the price of devotion to the cause through seven terms of imprisonment, the last of which was ended, by grace of Lord Willingdon, on account of the mortal illness of his wife in the Black Forest.

From beginning to end of the civil-disobedience crusade Pundit Jawaharlal worked as the loyal lieutenant of Gandhi. He holds that the policy and the leadership were right. He has the highest admiration for the Mahatma, and gives an

* *Jawaharlal Nehru: An Autobiography*. John Lane. 15s.

interpretation of his character and significance which may be accepted as the most discerning to be found anywhere. Gandhi, he says, is "the quintessence of the conscious and subconscious will" of the Indian millions: a man of keen intellect, fine feeling, good taste, wide vision; thus "utterly unlike and beyond a peasant; and yet withal, a great peasant with a peasant's outlook on affairs and with a peasant's blindness to some aspects of life." But admiration here has nothing to do with acceptance. Mr. Nehru rejects the whole Gandhist conception of life—the rigorous limitation, the asceticism, the loathing of sex, the social philosophy which would retain both landlord and capitalist. He is essentially what the West knows as a secularist. He is a thoroughgoing adherent of the rationalist view of society and conduct; he holds that religion has been responsible for untold misery, especially in his own land. He is convinced that India no less than the West must undertake the stupendous task of rebuilding society from the base. He is freely labelled Communist, but says simply that Communism is not his creed. He is a Socialist, and as such he laid before the National Congress this year a resolution designed to commit the movement to a programme of revolution which involves a repudiation of Gandhism no less than of the political Swaraj of ten years ago. Indian Nationalism is still far from the Nehru position, but it is impossible to read the later chapters of this book without realising that the Pundit has seen the vision of a future India, while the Mahatma has spent his amazing energy of spirit in a region of fantasy. India will not go back to the Vedic Age.

The Autobiography should reach a world-wide audience. It is the product of an entirely sincere mind. It is brilliantly written. As personal confession it belongs to the finest of our time; as contemporary history and social philosophy it is of extraordinary value.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

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PLANNING UNDER SOCIALISM.*

The larger part of this little book consists of radio talks dealing with a great variety of economic topics and skilfully designed to inform and stimulate the mind of the ordinary

* By Sir William Beveridge. Longmans. 3s. 6d. net.

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intelligent listener. In several of these the problem of unemployment, upon which Sir William is an acknowledged authority, is discussed in its different forms and bearings—"seasonal fluctuation, interval unemployment, cyclical fluctuations, sudden changes of economic habits." No final solution of the major cyclical problem is given, though it is indicated to depend mainly upon the control of credit. Doubt is cast upon the argument that finds a cure of unemployment in higher wages, or more equality of incomes, because Sir William fears that too much spending and too little saving might ensue, and that the expansion of productivity might thus be checked. The real and great value of the book, however, lies in the long opening lecture which gives its name to the group. It is devoted to a closely thought-out comparison between the price system of a more or less competitive capitalism, such as prevails in most countries to-day, and a planned national socialism in which prices are determined by the calculations of State authorities. He discusses the apparent wastes and defects of this pricing system under capitalism, "liability to monetary disturbance, great inequalities of income and antagonism between partners in production" (p. 10). That this system (even with monetary stability) involves a good deal of waste is not denied, though some of this apparent waste may be rightly accounted as costs of progress. From the standpoint of human welfare and of ethics, the competitive method, unless corrected by taxation, social services and other qualifying conditions, is open to grave criticism. If a socialist system could be operated in accordance with its theoretical claims, without confiscation and with some allowances for personal gains, might it not prove a most desirable reform? Sir William concerns himself rightly with the difficulties, of motive and of administration, which such a large reform would encounter. For, if this socialism is to work, it must conserve some freedom of choice for the consumer in buying, and for the worker in the kind of work to which he sets himself: the central authority will have to determine the proportions between the current production of consumptive goods and capital goods to provide for future increasing needs, and, most difficult of all, to control the amounts of productive energy going into the different industries, all of which are more or less interdependent in their call upon raw materials, plant and power. This essay

should be closely studied by the leaders of our socialist movement, for it opens up some of the difficulties which enthusiastic reformers are slow to recognise. It also raises for discussion the issue of the feasibility of a partial State socialism confined to key and essential industries and leaving freedom of private enterprise to new and unstandardisable industries.

J. A. HOBSON.

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THE VICTORIAN AGE VINDICATED.*

Mr. Kellett has produced a brilliant and most entertaining book by recounting his personal experiences and handing on the stories of the preceding generation received from his elders. Its range is wide, for the author's experience has been extensive, his memory is tenacious and his temperament hospitable. So the fifteen chapters stretch his reminiscences, among other extremes, from evangelicism to games, from politics to a study of words, from the family through schools to the university, from business to hypocrisy. Each chapter is crowded by the narration of incidents skilfully and vividly told.

Mr. Kellett's avowed object is to rescue the Victorian Age from the discredit into which it has fallen. He vindicates it by describing it, and this not so much by recording its great achievements as by displaying its normal and many-sided life, with its ways of thought as so exemplified. His theme of Justice to Victorianism becomes a peg on which the author hangs a great variety of stories grave and gay. All are told with a kindly charitableness which often only half conceals a gentle irony. Yet the result is, on the whole, satisfactory, for Mr. Kellett *does* succeed in so exhibiting the last hundred years as to rehabilitate it for the ignorant (only the ignorant are prejudiced against it), and this not by polemic or argument, but by telling illuminating tales about it. It is impossible, within the limits of this brief review, to enter into details or to give illustrations. All that need be said is that the volume is packed with live interest, revives a half-forgotten age, and conveys its wealth of valuable information in a most entertaining way. Of this, the following illustration may, perhaps, be convincing evidence. On Easter Monday last the reviewer,

* *As I Remember*. By E. E. Kellett. Victor Gollancz. 16s. net.

being tired and at leisure, set before himself *Pickwick*, for a centenary perusal and *As I Remember* as an alternative for holiday reading. He chose the latter as the more entertaining! All should follow his example and read the book.

J. S. L.

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"DEAR MOLLY LEPELL."*

The affectionate adjective bestowed by Lord Chesterfield on a charming Maid of Honour would have been appropriate throughout her life, when passing years made Rowe's "laughing Chloe" no longer so. The lady whom Miss Stuart lovingly portrays endears herself to us too by her sprightly wit, her dignity in a difficult marriage relation, her genius for friendship—her circle comprised most of the celebrated men and women, English or French, of her day—her cheerful acceptance of physical pain. She stands revealed in her own correspondence, whether with Horace Walpole and others of the *beau monde*, or with the country parson, Edmund Morris, and in that of others, as in the letters from her father-in-law, Lord Bristol, which speak his attachment to her. Born in 1700, of a naturalised German father and English mother, Mary Lepell spent a few years at Court in the train of Caroline of Anspach, before marrying the foppish John Harvey; they had eight children, whose portraits, here reproduced, help us to visualise them. Her second son, Augustus, had a distinguished naval career, which she followed with close interest. Left a widow at forty-three, Lady Harvey was able to enjoy her wealth and position, her London and country houses, and visits to her beloved Paris, only troubled by disabling attacks of gout, until her death in 1768. Gibbon describes her house in St. James's Place, with its "very good Company and very good Conversation." One of Lady Harvey's sayings seems characteristic of her: "I do not like to look on the dark side of life, and shall always be thankful to those who turn the bright side of that lantern to me." Characteristic, too, are those white roses, grown in her Ickworth "rosery," and worn in Jacobite fervour. But the MS. "Character"—a supposed essay in self-delineation—is so glaringly unlike her in many respects that her biographer declines to consider it authentic.

* *Molly Lepell Lady Harvey*. By D. M. Stuart. Harrap. 1936. 15s.

Miss Stuart has collected from every source so much engaging material that pruning was evidently too painful a process, the consequence being that Molly Lepell, like a graceful birch-tree, tends to be swallowed up in encroaching thickets. The digressions on side themes and minor characters are distracting, to mention two only, those on "Mr. Mallet" and the yet unborn Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire. This book would have gained by such compression as was forced on its author in her contributions to the *Men of Letters* series. But, when all is said, we remain deeply indebted to her for a fascinating study of eighteenth-century life.

E. G. S.

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INDIAN GOVERNMENT.*

The creation of the new Indian constitution provides a most fitting opportunity for the publication of two works dealing with constitutional development. In *The Making of Federal India*, a distinguished Indian, Professor N. Gangulee, has produced a valuable and lucid historical survey, commencing with the Morley-Minto reforms. Although the reader may not always agree with the motives and purposes imputed by the author to British policy, he will be struck by the book's conciliatory tone, the absence of bitterness or recrimination, and its realisation that a vital responsibility for the success of the reforms rests upon the Indians themselves. *A Constitutional History of India*, by a famous authority on imperial constitutional law, Professor A. Berriedale Keith, is a more technical work and covers the whole period of development from the original charter of the East India Company. It will be particularly appreciated as an authoritative work on Indian history; while Professor Keith's views upon the new constitution merit the widest attention.

Professor Keith traces the course of administration by the Company, solely at first and later subject to control by the British Government, and finally by the Crown alone. He deals with the numerous and intricate constitutional problems which characterise the growth of British power, such as the position of the Crown over the Company's territories, the relations of

* (1) *The Making of Federal India*. By N. Gangulee. Nisbet. 12s. 6d. net. (2) *A Constitutional History of India*. By A. Berriedale Keith. Methuen. 15s. net.

the three Presidencies with each other and the rivalry between the Company's and the British courts. It is, of course, natural that the author should take sides in the controversies which have raged round certain episodes of Indian history. His treatment of Warren Hastings is, for a modern writer, particularly harsh. He describes the charges at the impeachment as "obviously . . . black, and his defence insolently assertive," and excuses the acquittals on grounds of out-of-date procedure, lack of interest, and "the general belief that so long a trial was adequate punishment." His verdict on Sir Elijah Impey, particularly in connection with the Nandakumar trial, would have roused the wrath of the late Sir James Stephen; though it is only fair to add that Professor Keith does not repeat Macaulay's accusation that Impey took a bribe from Hastings when accepting the presidency of the Company's appeal court and so ending the clash between the latter's courts and the Supreme Court. It is a pity that want of space has prevented Professor Keith from elaborating his case against Hastings.

In the early period there are less signs of democratic growth than of experiments in effecting the most efficient and equitable form of British supremacy. Professor Keith, however, has "necessarily concentrated attention on those matters which appeared to me of special significance as bearing on the evolution of self-government." It is thus inevitable that more than half the volume deals with the reforms of the last generation. The author reiterates his view that the Montague declaration of 1917 envisaging "the progressive realization of responsible government" connoted clearly the form of government existing in the Dominions, and that the admission of India to the League of Nations as an individual member virtually bound the Government to envisage a status equal to any that might be reached by the Dominions. "The justification for League membership was autonomy." This pledge has been frequently repeated, and Professor Keith is sympathetic of the resentment felt in India at the absence from the new Act of any mention of the goal of Dominion status. This omission, says Professor Gangulee, "is regarded by political India as a deliberate equivocation of the pledge given to her in the past."

The new Act contains some remarkable features for a federal constitution. For example, the upper and not the lower house is directly elected, the allocation of residuary power between the centre and the provinces rests with the governor-general

and the power of the federation over its units is not uniform. Professor Keith is pessimistic of a system in which the States were designed as a countercheck to the extremists of British India, while "the withholding of defence and external affairs from federal control, inevitable as the course is, renders the alleged concession of responsibility all but meaningless." If the federation succeeds, "it will probably be due to the virtual disappearance of responsibility and the assertion of the controlling power of the governor-general, backed by the conservative elements of the states and of British India." Professor Gangulee, however, considers that "it is an entirely wrong assumption that the Princes' support may be used to defeat Indian Nationalism and that they will not be influenced by a steady infiltration of democratic ideas." In the provinces, Professor Keith has equal fears. Governors will be forced to exercise their special powers to protect minorities and fatally compromise responsible government. Both authors agree that any success depends on the spirit and co-operation of the Indian leaders. Professor Keith is highly sceptical that this is compatible with the condition of Indian society, and Professor Gangulee makes a remarkable admission of the difficulties. "The religion of inequality" dominates the social outlook."

That outlook must change if India wants a democratic political state. The fissiparous tendency of the Hindu social system, the rigidity of social customs sanctioned by mediæval traditions, the poverty and ignorance of the bulk of the population, and the diversity of the claims of various minorities—all these circumstances make one doubtful of the practicability of setting up a democratic form of government in India. . . . Yet democracy offers India the best possible scope for harmonising the varied alignment of interests.

Professor Gangulee is convinced that through co-operation between Great Britain, the States and the Indian leaders, these age-long fissures may be healed and democracy achieved. It is with this opinion, rather than with matters of constitutional interpretation, that Professor Keith fundamentally disagrees.

In view of the recent claims of the Princes, it is most unfortunate that, through lack of space, Professor Keith is unable to expand his view of the overriding paramountcy of the Crown, "a completely sovereign power predominant over all others and claiming allegiance," as the successor of the Mogul emperor.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

A History of the German Republic, by Arthur Rosenberg (translated by Ian Morrow and L. M. Sieveking),* is a sequel to *The Birth of the German Republic, 1871-1918* (translated in 1931). The author, an ex-Professor of History at Berlin and an ex-Member of the Reichstag, writes from inside knowledge and has been able to use some valuable unpublished material. "I have imposed upon myself the task of writing the history of the Weimar Republic without prejudice or partiality," he tells us. It is assuredly a cool, critical, weighty narrative, and it might just as well bear the title "The Failure of the German Republic." For the picture here presented by an active member of the parties of the extreme Left is very dark, and a Nazi might well quote many of the judgments in defence of his claim that Hitler's accession to power was a national necessity. Like most of his fellow-Socialists and Communists, he complains that the representatives of the old régime in the army and the civil service were left at their posts instead of being swept away by the revolutionary broom. In other words, there was only a sham revolution and a sham republic, in which the parties of the Left were nominally in control, and which in reality prepared the ground for the recovery of power by the parties of the Right. Dr. Rosenberg's wrath is directed against his old comrades for being too tame, and against the great industrialists for being too selfish. Stresemann was a good man struggling with adversity, with no real following. An epilogue written for the English edition continues the story from 1930 to 1935 in the same critical and pessimistic vein.

An extremely valuable and informative publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs deals with the prominent question of *Raw Materials and Colonies*,† giving particular attention to the claims of the "dissatisfied" Powers, Germany, Italy and Japan. The pamphlet is limited necessarily to an impartial collection and analysis of facts, without any particular policy to further. It is, moreover, confined solely to the economic side, although fully recognising the great importance of prestige and strategic needs in the colonial issue. Indeed, the conclusion is that "from the strictly economic point of view, any colonial changes must be of limited efficacy." To an overwhelming extent raw materials are found in sovereign or self-governing States, although colonies and mandates yield a huge variety of products. Of Dr. Goebbels' six "basic materials of modern industrialism," namely, "coal, iron, oil, cotton, rubber . . . and copper," in only two do at least 20 per cent. of the world supply come from dependent territories.

* Methuen. 15s.

† Royal Institute of International Affairs, St. James's Square, S.W.1. 2s. 6d. net 68 pages, with tables of statistics.

British Malaya, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies produce 96 per cent. of rubber, while 21 per cent. of copper is derived from Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo. It is noticeable that "the one 'African' product is palm oil, the African dependencies accounting for 76.8 per cent. of the total supply." The paper deals with "the negligible significance of the resources of the mandated territories" apart from vanadium in South-West Africa, Tanganyika's sisal, potash in Palestine, and phosphates from Nauru. In 1911 Germany's imports from her colonies amounted to £2,105,000 compared with her total imports of raw materials, excluding foodstuffs, to the value of £270,000,000. As is pointed out, however, the importance of colonial resources is increased by a territory's proportionately small internal consumption; so that, in an extreme example, Northern Rhodesia, which produced in 1934 only 1.4 per cent. of the world's zinc, is a larger exporter of the product than the United States, which produced 28.4 per cent.

The second part of the publication deals with the question of access and especial stress is laid on foreign exchange difficulties rather than on direct colonial restrictions which "are not at present far-reaching or important." For example, the decline of Nigerian exports to Germany from £4,000,000 in 1930 to £1,000,000 in 1934 was injurious to the colony and neither her fault nor that of Great Britain. These indirect restrictions find their source in the prevailing state of world, rather than colonial, trade. The question of foodstuffs is only briefly dwelt upon, but sufficiently to point out that the "dissatisfied" Powers are all better off than Great Britain with her colonial empire. The problem of surplus population is also treated summarily in view of Professor Carr-Saunders' forthcoming work upon *World Population*. The conclusion, however, is that "in fact, the only lands which offer suitable space and climate for European immigrants are all sovereign States or self-governing territories."

*Tyrolean June** is another delightful travel book by Nina Murdoch, whose *She Travelled Alone in Spain* we noticed some months back. The ground is more familiar, more get-at-able and in many ways more attractive to the ordinary English traveller. It is the Austrian Tyrol which is the subject of this journey. Innsbrück with its beautiful old buildings, "medieval" Kitzbuhel where King Edward as Prince of Wales recently spent a holiday, are most fascinatingly described. The author notices so many little characteristics of people, animals, houses and scenery; she enters so sympathetically into all the human interests, the little tragedies and comedies, the jokes of the men and women she encounters by the way that the whole narrative presents a living picture. And truly the Tyrolese are very attractive people, "the only

* Harrap. 8s. 6d.

people who seem really to know the secret of weaving the philosophy of Christ into the fabric of everyday life. One feels in them serenity, brightness and strength—three splendid qualities but arid without a fourth, the lovely one of sensibility.” And again “In Tyrol I never heard a harshly raised voice nor saw a cross face, though I saw many weary ones.” “As individuals they remain innocently gay, quietly industrious, extraordinarily gentle, and at the same time independent, kind—amazingly kind.” All sorts of old customs are kept up. They have a passion play, *Christus*, which Miss Murdoch saw most movingly performed at Thiersee. There are many old stories connected with the mountains, the lakes and the little towns. The artistic sensibility is evident in all their old buildings, in their picturesque dress. Wrought ironwork has been a favoured craft in days gone by. Exquisite old signs are to be seen on the hotels and shops, and to encourage these “the Innsbrück electricity department agreed to supply light free for signs artistically worthy of Tyrol’s ancient reputation.” Miss Murdoch gives vivid descriptions of her visit to a salt mine, and also of a walk up to a glacier and a drenching thunderstorm. A good part of the book is devoted to the charms, the old history, of Innsbrück, and there is a particularly delightful account of the Goldene Dachl, set up by the Emperor Maximilian in the fourteenth century from which he could view the festivities arranged in his honour in the town. The illustrations are very charming, and the book is altogether pleasant.

In his new work upon the history of Chios, Mr. Philip Argenti deals with *The Occupation of Chios by the Venetians (1694)*.* As a partner in the Holy League against the Turks, the Republic despatched an expedition under Antonio Zeno to capture the island. It was occupied easily in September 1694. Mismanagement, however, and insufficient support from home, along with weak discipline and jealousy among the leaders, culminated in the defeat of the Venetian navy and withdrawal from the island after some five months of occupation. Mr. Argenti has published at length Zeno’s despatches and other relevant material, including reports on the situation from the British, French and Dutch Consuls. In a long introduction he describes the campaign upon the basis of this material and also discusses the subsequent inquiry into the expedition’s failure. This is a learned and original contribution to the history of an episode which marks a stage in the steady decline of the Venetian Republic.

Mr. Gerald Heard’s thesis upon *The Source of Civilisation*† is the third and concluding volume of his inquiry into the foundations of human society. In this volume he discusses the nature of the cohesive force which can unite society and the recognition of which is vital to

* The Bodley Head. 12s. 6d. net.

† Jonathan Cape. 12s. 6d. net.

the continuance of our civilisation. “We must . . . seek for some force deeper and less intentional than physical coercion and yet not so deep and blind as instinct to account for human society and its survival”; and the author finds it in a psychological technique. He grounds his argument upon the theory of awareness or sensitiveness of all animal life to circumstances. In the case of lower animals this adaptability has by its very success reduced the factor of awareness, and with it development. The advance of man is due to his retention of this receptiveness by continually rejecting the seductions of adaptation to circumstance and deliberately attacking new problems and fresh interests. His development, however, became lopsided. The growth of civilisation with its inventions and crafts has witnessed a specialisation of the objective mind, with the consequence of causing acute self-consciousness and a corresponding depression of the remaining area of consciousness to a point “inaccessible to the objective mind and to the individualised self-consciousness.” This degenerative process leads to a rule of violent dictatorship “because one master and some order seems better than many anarchs.” It is this process which Mr. Heard claims to read into human history and the climax of which is now rapidly approaching. Man, essentially by nature a peaceful and social creature and showing to-day a particular degree of humanitarian feeling, is yet succumbing to “the inevitable process whereby the sword of security becomes the weapon of suicide.” The only escape from destruction lies in a psychological advance to balance man’s physical advance, by his “adopting a technique which will develop that side of his consciousness which has been retarded and atrophied (while part hypertrophied) and so . . . recover the sanity of a whole psyche and continue to progress.” Mr. Heard’s argument is pressed with vigour and reiterated insistence and much could well have been condensed. Bold and controversial, his thesis will receive undoubtedly all the attention it rightly deserves.

Miss Mabel Cleverly Paine has completed her admirable *Story of the World for Young People** between the ages of nine and fifteen in two further volumes, which conclude with the Great War. The first carries the history from 1500 down to the Battle of Waterloo and also deals with the subsequent history of Africa, Canada, the United States and South America. The great bulk of nineteenth-century history is treated in Volume III, but for their full usefulness both should be studied together. The last volume also contains a long descriptive list of famous figures in art, science, exploration and other fields of human progress during the nineteenth century; it concludes with a short account of the League of Nations. In these volumes Miss Paine has continued her method of describing shortly and simply, perhaps too simply, great movements and events. Wars are relegated to a place of minor importance. Dates are omitted from the text and placed in the margin. Large

* Volumes II and III. Muller. 7s. 6d. net each.

tion should enable the child to grasp the thread of national history. The relation of them all in a world process. Mention should be made of the useful maps and particularly of the excellent reproductions of great masters. While the arrangement of topics is somewhat complicated, the actual narrative and the attractive appearance of the history should appeal successfully to the child mind.

Dr. C. A. Alington's interesting book of reminiscences, entitled *Things Ancient and Modern*, tells of long years of academic life and brings many famous people to the fore. School days at Marlborough and earlier, Oxford, successive posts at Marlborough, Eton and Shrewsbury, and finally his sixteen years' headship of Eton, bring a wealth of varied experiences. He has much to say on masters and their work of yesterday and to-day, especially with regard to classics, theology and English. In fact, the Dean of Durham might well have used this material for a valuable text-book on teaching methods. His deliberations on the life and work of these public schools show them to be places of vigorous growth and progressive movement. All interested in youth will find enjoyment in these admirably written memoirs.

British Periodicals Ltd. are publishing a number of small guide books, attractively produced and well illustrated, which will prove useful to the actual or potential holiday-maker. A general appreciation of the locality including a brief historical background, descriptions of places of particular interest and an account of local walks is given in narrative form by an author well acquainted with the area. In the guide to *The English Coast*,† Mr. C. Leslie Wood writes informally in the form of letters to a friend while on tour along the coast, of the resorts from Rye to Bognor Regis, and also briefly of places inland, including in particular Chichester. The guide to *The Isle of Wight*† contains a more orthodox but equally attractive account of the island by Mr. G. Gibbard Jackson. The volume on *Scarborough*† by Mr. Ernest E. Taylor is really quite an ambitious appreciation of "some of the most distinctive and beautiful scenery in East and North-East Yorkshire." This and the preceding volume have each a large map attached, which unfortunately is lacking in the guide to *The English Lakes*† by Mr. W. T. Palmer. It is, however, particularly well illustrated. The guides include a quantity of information on local amenities, including lists of selected hotels and shops. A list of local youth hostels might with advantage be included in future editions. A new style of guide book comes from Batsford, in their *Pictorial Guides*. The volume on *Hamburg*† contains an admirable collection of photographs depicting the architecture and life of the great Hanseatic port. Some useful information for the visitor completes the book.