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The POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. VII. NO. 2

APRIL-JUNE, 1936

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THE EVOLUTION OF POPULAR MONARCHY

By KINGSLEY MARTIN

REPUBLICANISM was last a live issue in British politics 65 years ago. It was then assumed by both sides in the controversy that all countries were gradually becoming rational democracies; the problem was merely whether the ceremonial functions, which were thought to be all that remained to the British Crown, would be performed better and more cheaply by a President.

We cannot imagine such an argument to-day. The monarchy is seldom criticised or defended; it is accepted, and during the last few years it would almost be true to say that it was worshipped. We do not, it is true, speak of the King as Hitler and Mussolini are sometimes spoken of, as Saviours bearing the sufferings and sins of the people, and there remains an assumption underlying all deification of the British monarchy that we only pay respect to the royal family because it deserves it. We may regard as exceptional the Scottish cleric who suggested that a boy who walked on crutches and learnt to walk without them might have been cured by the "Royal touch," and we smile at the quite common belief in the "King's weather" in 1935. (It was fine for the Jubilee and fine for the Funeral, though it had not been fine for His Majesty on the day in 1928 when he caught the cold which began the illness from which he never completely recovered his strength). But leaving aside such surprising manifestations of superstition we must admit that a new and irrational attitude towards monarchy is now common; it was, for instance, considered the worst of bad taste even to suggest that the B.B.C. and the Press exaggerated the importance of the death of King George V and were unnecessarily morbid in dwelling on details of his last illness and funeral.

There are two ways in which a democrat of today can justify the new cult of Monarchy. The first is a practical one. If we drop the trappings of Monarchy in the gutter, as one Radical put it the other day, Germany has taught us that

some gutter-snipe (or house-painter) may pick them up. (Was the King of Italy any better safeguard of liberty than President Hindenburg?) The second justification is based on modern psychological knowledge. No one who watched the emotion which people expressed on the death of the King, could fail to notice its curiously personal character. The death of one king and the accession of another does not in these days threaten the fabric of Church and State, or even, as far as material things go, affect the lives of most people in any susceptible degree. Nor is the grief that is felt to be explained by any textbook theory that the King is the bond of Empire or the symbol of national unity. There seem to be thousands of men and women who think of the Royal Family as an ideal extension of their own families; they feel, as a woman behind a counter characteristically remarked on the day of the King's death, that "he was a father to us all." Perhaps a hint of the process whereby this identification takes place can be found in the admirable description which Mr. H. G. Wells gives in his *Autobiography* of his mother, who followed every event in the life of Queen Victoria with a passionate loyalty, seeing in her a "compensating personality," an ideal example of the sort of mother that she herself would have liked the chance of being. To such people the Royal Family provides a colour and splendour which their own family lives too often lack, but which they none the less feel to be part of their own romance. Thus the King's death is regarded not so much an external, public event, as a personal loss.

This phrase about the king being the father of his people provides the clue. In the best discussion I have yet seen on the psychology of constitutional monarchy,¹ Dr. Ernest Jones pointed out that the problem of government has always been made difficult by "man's constantly doubled attitude towards it." He has "very deep motives for wishing to be ruled." Feeling unequal to the task of controlling either his own or his neighbours' "impulses" he looks to an outside authority to shoulder the responsibility. But as soon as

¹ "The Psychology of Constitutional Monarchy," by Dr. Ernest Jones, *New Statesman & Nation*, Feb. 1, 1936. Several passages in these pages are taken from the *New Statesman & Nation*, Jan. 25 and Feb. 1.

the "restrictions of authority are felt to be oppressive, he is impelled to protest and clamours for freedom." This internal conflict is most obviously expressed in relation to a father figure. It needs no deep analysis to discover that in adult life men unconsciously regard their rulers as they have regarded their fathers in childhood. They see them as more benevolent or more cruel or more magically powerful than they in fact ever are, and they feel towards them sometimes an irrational adoration and sometimes an exaggerated hate. Dr. Jones points to the remarkable strength of constitutional monarchies which have survived, while Tsars and Kaisers and Sultans, who were supposed to be secure in the adoration of their subjects, have passed almost unnoticed away. He attributes this partly to the fact that under a constitutional monarchy we are continuously provided with an outlet for both adoration and parricide. We can safely adore the King as sacrosanct and above criticism, because we can at the same time attack his Ministers and throw them out of office when we please.

Any study of the history of monarchy in England at once reveals that as long as the King was identified with the Executive he was always subject to attack from every radical element in society. It is only since the death of Prince Albert seventy-five years ago that people have ceased to fear royal interference and have therefore ceased to attack the Crown and gradually allowed themselves to give full rein to their natural tendency to look for a figure above the political struggle whom they can adore without reserve. This adoration of the Crown could never have grown to its present astonishing proportions had not the last three ruling sovereigns fitted so well the popular conception of what a monarch should be. In Queen Victoria people were able to picture the perfect model of English motherhood. In Edward VII they saw a man who had outlived the follies of youth before he came to the throne (and he had been publicly hissed as Prince of Wales) and had become, they believed, the most genial type of sporting English gentleman. As for George V he was, as a homely commentator put it, "a good living man," and his family life a model of what Puritan England regards as the best. His recreations were

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those of a country gentleman, his qualities, tastes and pursuits just those which the mass of his subjects approved. A French commentator called him "The Crowned Bourgeois"—the unostentatious but dignified and self-effacing public servant, much less of an institution than his grandmother but increasingly thought of as a fine old gentleman whom we could all trust and venerate, the King who never interfered in our politics, but whom we could safely adore as the father of his people.

On this interpretation the conditions of stable and popular Monarchy are that the King does not interfere in politics and that his character is such that it is possible to respect him. As we shall see from the historical summary that follows, these have been precisely the conditions demanded by the British public from the Monarchy, and wherever they have been violated, the Crown has been unsparingly criticised. But a new factor has come into play. Modern organs of propaganda weaken the safeguards of democracy. If the character of George V had been like that of George IV, would the B.B.C. and the Press have told us so? Is it not reasonable to fear that if a King were to listen, as some wished him to, during the Ulster struggle in 1914, to a political group, which wished him to lend his incomparable prestige to the purposes of a political manœuvre, he might be followed, for the moment, by a wave of irrational loyalty, which might destroy our Constitution and our liberties? The public might discover too late that they had surrendered their rights, not to the King whom they trusted as a magical figure above the battle, but to politicians whom they had themselves elected and whom they would never for a moment have entrusted with unchecked authority.

THE UNPOPULAR MONARCHY

Nothing could more simply illustrate the change in the popular attitude to monarchy than the contrast between the tone and the sentiments expressed when George V died and those expressed at the death of George IV a century earlier. The mourning bands of *The Times* of June 28th, 1830, were as black and as conspicuous as those of January 20th, 1936. But the tribute of black edges in 1830 was not found

THE EVOLUTION OF POPULAR MONARCHY

incompatible with the realistic description of the King's amours, an outspoken condemnation of his behaviour to his wife who had found her place taken at court by a "fashionable strumpet" or with the remark that "the fact that he existed so long might, considering the habits of his earlier life, be looked upon as an extraordinary proof of the original vigour of his constitution." On the day of his funeral the "leader" in *The Times*, which was still in deep mourning, said that:

"There never was an individual less regretted by his fellow-creatures than this deceased king. What eye has wept for him? What heart has heaved one sob of unmercenary sorrow?... Has not his successor gained more upon the English tastes and prepossessions of his subjects by the blunt and unaffected—even should it be grotesque—cordiality of his demeanour, within a few short weeks than George IV—that Leviathan of *haut ton*—ever did during the sixty years of his existence? If George IV ever had a friend—a devoted friend in any rank of life—we protest that the name of him or her never reached us. An inveterate voluptuary, especially if he be an artificial person, is of all known beings the most selfish. Selfishness is the true repellent of human sympathy. Selfishness feels no attachment, and invites none.

"Nothing more remains to be done or said about George IV but to pay—as pay we must—for his profusion: and to turn his bad conduct to some account by tying up the hands of those who come after him in what concerns the public money. At all events we shall always to the utmost of our power do our duty—and we think we are unlikely to do it flinchingly."¹

The Times, which had always championed Queen Caroline against the King, was particularly severe, but it would be easy to parallel its comments from other contemporary sources. 1830 indeed marks the nadir of English Monarchy;

¹ Several things are remarkable in this comment. It is not only that we cannot today imagine *The Times* indulging in such phraseology in regard to a member of the Royal family, even if one today should deserve as little reticence as George IV. It is not only that monarchy has regained its divinity, but that we have all become squeamish and less vigorous critics. In 1929 Lord Snowden created an international crisis by the use of the word "grotesque": in 1830 *The Times* inserts it as a parenthetical comment upon the manners of a monarch who had been only on the throne a fortnight. Of course, the adjective was apposite; Greville tells us how during the first ceremonies, William IV, pleasant and jovial contrast as he was to his late brother, and capable on occasion of presiding "very decently" and looking like a "respectable old admiral" frequently caused so much embarrassment by his odd behaviour and extraordinary utterances that Ministers would beat a retreat, hide themselves or cover their faces with their hands when he opened his mouth. His most amiable utterances were sometimes disconcerting: in reply to a deputation of freemasons who came to offer their loyal obedience, William said: "Gentlemen, if my love for you equalled my ignorance of everything about you, it would be boundless."

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for the republican and democratic sentiment—the two in those days seemed synonymous—which had swept through middle-class England after the French revolution were re-emerging from the repression of the Napoleonic wars at a moment when the Royal family was politically and personally disreputable. The outburst of enthusiasm which made a heroine of Queen Caroline, was due not so much to love of the Queen, as to hatred of the King. And the public was right in detesting, not merely George IV but all the sons of George III. It would not have minded their sordid private lives, if they had not continuously asked the House of Commons to pay their debts; it would have tolerated the fantastic Toryism of the one-eyed Duke of Cumberland, if it had not known that he worked on George IV to resist Catholic emancipation, and it would merely have laughed at William IV if he had not thrown in his lot with the peers in obstructing the Reform Bill and, a little later, dismissed a Ministry, while it still commanded a majority of the House of Commons. To the followers of Paine and Godwin Kings were the very symbol of tyranny and corruption. To overthrow the King seemed the first step in the recovery of the natural rights of man. Shelley spoke for insurgent England when he wrote: "Oh, that the free would stamp the impious name of King into the dust." And Thelwall epitomised a common sentiment when he blew the froth from his beer and said: "So would I treat all kings." The more sober disciples of Bentham who reached almost equally democratic conclusions by more laborious steps of argument concluded that monarchy was an indefensible anomaly. If the greatest happiness of the greatest number was the criterion of government, then a majority decision must always be better than a minority one. All secret influences, all minorities in privileged positions were "sinister," and the least defensible and most sinister of all was the influence of a single man wielding a final veto and an incalculable influence over political decisions.

It is often, but wrongly, assumed that the disappearance of the disreputable Georges and the accession of a girl-queen were enough to end attacks on the monarchy. In fact, Republicanism remained part of the accepted creed

THE EVOLUTION OF POPULAR MONARCHY

of the radical middle and working class until the middle of Queen Victoria's reign. It is often forgotten that the Reform Bill of 1832 was regarded merely as the beginning of revolution which would lead on not only to universal suffrage but also to the disestablishment of the Church and the abolition of all hereditary institutions, including the House of Lords and the monarchy. The Chartist movement, already well under way when the Queen came to the throne, did not include the abolition of the monarchy in the six points of the Charter only because it assumed that monarchy, like other medieval relics, would disappear when the working class attained political power. Working class newspapers such as *Reynolds* were outspokenly republican, and their anti-monarchic sentiment was echoed in other papers whenever there was the least hint that the Crown was taking a hand in government. The affection shown to the Queen at her accession did not prevent people calling "Mrs. Melbourne" after her when she appeared in public during her struggle with Sir Robert Peel over the Bed Chamber Question,¹ nor did it not prevent the most vehement attacks on her husband, when he was believed, as a foreigner, to be interfering with the supposedly liberal policy of Lord Palmerston. When he resigned from the Government on

¹ cf. the following from *Punch*, November, 1841, during the first pregnancy of the Queen. The future King Edward was born on November 9th.

THE LORD MAYOR AND THE QUEEN

The interesting condition of Her Majesty is a source of the most agonising suspense to the Lord Mayors of London and Dublin, who, if a Prince of Wales is not born before their office expires, will lose the chance of being created baronets.

According to rumour, the baby—we beg pardon, the scion of the House of Brunswick, was to have been born—we must apologise again, we should say was to have been added to the illustrious stock of the reigning family of Great Britain—some day last month, and, of course, the present Lord Mayors had comfortably made up their minds that they should be entitled to the dignity it is customary to confer on such occasions as that which the nation now ardently anticipates. But here we are at the beginning of November and no Prince of Wales. We have reason to know that the Lord Mayor of London has not slept a wink since Saturday, and his Lady has not smiled, according to an authority on which we are accustomed to rely, since Thursday fortnight. Some say it is done on purpose, because the present official is Tory; and others insinuate that the Prince of Wales is postponed in order that there may be an opportunity of making Daniel O'Connell a baronet. Others suggest that there will be twins presented to the nation, one on the night of November 8, the other on the morning of the 9th, so as to conciliate both parties, but we are not at present disposed to pronounce a decided opinion on this part of the question. We know that politics have been carried most indelicately into the very heart of the Royal household. But we hope, for the honour of all parties, that the confinement of the Queen is not made a matter of political arrangement.

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the eve of the Crimean War, it was almost universally believed that he had been again dismissed by the Crown (as he had been in 1851), so violent was the outcry in the Press that the Queen, outraged by daily accusations that her husband was a traitor in league with foreign governments, wrote long letters to the Prime Minister, threatening in words, even more undisciplined and heavily underlined than usual, to abdicate the throne and abandon her ungrateful people.¹

The vehement radicalism which had been stirred up by the revolutions of 1848 and turned into passionate indignation against all tyrants and despots in the reaction of 1849, gathered itself ironically enough round that persistent whig Lord Palmerston and worked itself out in futility in the Crimean War. But it remained the dominant creed of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie in the sixties. It was kept alive in the struggle for Italian independence by the popular hatred of tyrants like Bomba, when Gladstone protested against the horrors of Neapolitan prisons, and by the presence in England of men like Mazzini, Kossuth and Garibaldi. Sometimes it was the Tsar who appeared as the personification of reactionary tyranny, sometimes the Emperor Napoleon III. When Simon Bernard was tried for complicity in Orsini's attempt to murder Napoleon III he was triumphantly acquitted by a Middlesex jury, although all the evidence pointed to his guilt. Every popular rising on the Continent was enthusiastically welcomed. Delane's *Times* was almost as fierce in denouncing despots as the cheaper and less respectable press. When Garibaldi came to England in 1864 he was received as if he were a British, instead of an Italian, national hero, and he had to be hurried out of the country for fear of international complications.

It was the fall of Napoleon III after Sedan that gave for the moment political importance to English republicanism. Young men like Charles Dilke, John Morley and Frederick Harrison, not long down from Oxford, had associated themselves closely with the intellectuals who led the struggle against tyranny on the Continent. And they regarded the

¹ The full story of this incident, with an examination of the Press throughout, is to be found in my *Triumph of Lord Palmerston*. (Allen & Unwin. 1924.)

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establishment of the Third Republic in France as a suitable moment for a declaration of republicanism at home. The Prince of Wales, whose private life was an open subject of comment, seemed to them as well as to many more cautious radicals quite unsuited to succeed his mother. And with the political philosophy of the day generally conforming to the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, it seemed a natural enough assumption that when the Queen died—an event which was expected before very long—this country would follow the French example and peacefully declare itself a republic. The first move in the campaign was to set up republican clubs, mainly of a working-class character, in important centres throughout Great Britain. The first club was established in February 1871 in Birmingham, and by the spring of 1873 more than fifty clubs had been set up in such places as Aberdeen, Plymouth, Norwich and Cardiff. They were particularly strong in Yorkshire, Lancashire and Northumberland. The veteran working-class leader, George Odger, joined hands with Bradlaugh to organise public meetings. Bradlaugh, who had just published an attack on the British Monarchy, entitled "An impeachment of the House of Brunswick," was carrying on a vigorous campaign throughout the country. Capital was naturally made out of Disraeli's unfortunate defence of the Queen on the ground that she was "physically and morally incapacitated from performing her duties." And Bradlaugh added that it was his "earnest desire that the present Prince of Wales should never dishonour this country by becoming its King." With five years education, he believed that England would be ready for a republic.

In November 1871 Sir Charles Dilke entered the lists with a speech at Newcastle, where Joseph Cowen already had a large republican following. Dilke argued that England was now to all intents and purposes herself a republic. "Have we not," he asked, "republican virtues and republican spirit? Have we not the practice of self-government? Are we not gaining general education? Well, if you can show me a fair chance that a republic here will be free from the political corruption that hangs about the monarchy, I say, for my part—and I believe the middle classes in general

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will say—let it come.” In this speech, as he himself admitted afterwards, Dilke made one mistake. Referring to the Queen’s enormous wealth and the large income which the State gave her, although she no longer performed even ceremonial functions, Sir Charles asserted that she paid no income tax—a statement which gave Mr. Gladstone an effective debating answer when the matter was discussed in the House of Commons a few months later. Sir Charles’ speech was severely criticised in the Press. If the Crown, said *The Times*, were again to show a disposition to meddlesome obstructiveness like that of George III, or if the private life of the monarch resembled that of George IV the establishment of a republic would be a contingency to be faced. In the absence of such a contingency (which God forbid should ever arise) “it was recklessness bordering on criminality” to raise the question. Sir Charles Dilke must either openly declare for a republic (which he did not do) or refrain from vilifying the monarchy. It was, of course, possible that a republic might come, and it was regrettable that the Queen was unable to discharge her duties and retired to Balmoral or Osborne when she was most needed in or near London. Of course she made every effort to work. But “we have pointed out before and we point out again that no feeling of loyalty, however fervent, can be proof for ever against such a strain.” If Dilke wanted to raise the question of the civil list, he was entitled to do so in the House of Commons; it was wicked to do so before an audience of working men.

Dilke was by no means abashed, while colleagues in the campaign wrote and congratulated him. Chamberlain wrote, “the republic must come and at the rate at which we are moving it will come in our generation. The greater is the necessity for discussing its conditions beforehand and for a clear recognition of what we may lose as well as what we should gain.”

Morley, who had become editor of the *Fortnightly Review*—and in those days the political thinking of England was done in such periodicals—wrote to Frederick Harrison for a long article setting forth the argument for a British republic. In the event two articles appeared. They stand as the peak

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of republican thought in the nineteenth century. They rebuked Disraeli for trying to elevate the throne and for introducing “intentional unction into the accepted language of homage.” In a sentence which reads ironically enough to-day, when we know the part that the Queen really played in government, Harrison wrote that “the sovereign is as much bound to keep his feelings to himself as any well-bred young lady. In consequence the influence of the throne, whatever it may be socially is nothing politically.....” Disraeli was attempting “to inscribe ‘The Throne’ as a new watchword on the banner of his party.....the formation of a genuine Beefeater-party whose political mission is to rally round the throne, is certainly a new feature in party history.” The task of a republican was “to lift the subject from the cataract of cant in which it had been drowned. In the truest sense of the word, this country is and has long been a republic, though an imperfect republic it must be allowedEngland is now an aristocratic republic, with a democratic machinery and an hereditary grandmaster of the ceremonies. For a republic is that State the principle of which is not privilege but merit, where all public power is a free gift and is freely entrusted to those who seem able to use it best.” Monarchy in England had merely become a survival, an “otiose tail,” a rudimentary organ atrophied for want of use. “The most silent member of Parliament has more legislative power than the Crown.” The Crown had some appearance of power at a change of ministry, but the actual control was in the hands of the outgoing prime minister. “In extreme cases a venerable peer—a sort of family lawyer—is confidentially called in.” If the Crown were “to insist on personally nominating a minister...the very lawn of the bishops would ruffle in wrath...we may, however, be perfectly tranquil, no sovereign is likely to attempt any gambles with the constitution any more than the Queen’s coloured horses are likely to kick to pieces the ginger-bread coach. Are we poor people not to laugh?”

By the time these words appeared in print, the little wave of republicanism had fallen back into the eternal ocean of sentimentality. The effect of Dilke’s speech was more than counteracted by the long and dangerous illness of the Prince

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of Wales at the end of 1871. The position of the Queen again evoked widespread sympathy and there was a general rally in the press to the side of the throne. The more extreme radical papers were not, it is true, much affected. *Reynolds* spoke of "the mean, toadying, craven spirit of so-called loyalty." They objected "to the great epidemic of typhoid loyalty." The Prince was supposed to have caught infection from the drains; ordinary people died daily from such infection and no one noticed it. They hoped that if the Prince recovered, he would spend the ability that he had so far shown at Hurlingham in getting a pure water supply for the people. So far, "he has been weighed in the balance by the large majority of the people and found sadly wanting."

Encouraged by his reception from working-class audiences, Dilke continued his campaign. On November 23rd he held a great meeting at Leeds, in which he declared that his main object was to defend the right of free speech even in relation to the Crown. On December 6th, at a meeting in the Birmingham Town Hall, with Joseph Chamberlain as mayor in the chair, several hundred interruptors had to be turned out by the police. From the time of the Prince of Wales' illness, the tide flowed steadily against the republican group.

The issue was debated in March 1872, when Dilke defended his attack on the civil list. His idea was, he said, to make his speech, "solid and full of matter but studiously dull." He was seconded by Auberon Herbert, a charming and unusual figure in politics, an aristocrat, philosopher and artist. The debate was constantly interrupted. Attempts were made to count out the motion three times. Strangers were "spied" and the galleries cleared. Henry Fawcett, who had founded a republican club in Cambridge, refused to support Dilke, because he was determined, "in the most emphatic way possible to protest against the question of republicanism being raised upon a miserable haggle over a few pounds." Gladstone replied with great vehemence and sarcasm, paid compliments to the Queen, denied Dilke's allegations about income-tax, and asked whether it was decent "to reopen a life-bargain with the sovereign."

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This was not the end of English republicanism. In 1873 a republican conference met at Birmingham and entrusted Bradlaugh with a message of congratulation to the new republican government in Spain. The opposition to parliamentary grants to members of the Royal Family on obtaining their majority or on marrying, continued, and was supported in the House of Commons by a considerable group of members. It should be remembered that at this time the annual budget only amounted to some seventy millions, and that the cost of the Royal Family was about a million a year. A number of special royal expenses were not included in the civil list and appeared under other items in the estimates. The attack was never a socialist one; on the financial side it was the logical extension of Gladstonian finance. The object was to reduce taxation at a time of depression when people were actually dying of starvation. The more courageous radicals hoped to improve prosperity by reducing an item of public expenditure which amounted to one-seventieth of the whole budget. It must be remembered too, that these intermittent attacks upon increased grants to members of the Royal Family were one expression of the last stand against the growth of imperialism. Radicals watched with dismay while Disraeli brought the Queen from her retirement and made her Empress of India. They did not know how far his flattery went, they certainly never guessed that she was being told every day that she was the real ruler of England, and they had no conception to what length of obstruction, and indeed of unconstitutionality, she was prepared to go when a Liberal ministry, which she hated, was substituted for the government of her beloved Lord Beaconsfield. But they protested, and on this issue had some of the Tories with them, against the Royal Titles Bill, and they did what they could by rallying behind Gladstone to check Disraeli's autocratic conduct of foreign policy. Parliament was studiously neglected while Beaconsfield, acting on behalf of the Queen, made a treaty with Russia, summoned Indian troops to Malta, and bought the shares that gave Britain control of the Suez Canal. In 1879 the House of Commons actually debated the dangerous growth of the power of the Crown. On the economic side

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the demand for the reduction of the civil list continued until 1885, when Bradlaugh took his seat and reinforced the republican group in the House. Gladstone, who could have recreated republicanism by telling a tithe of what he suffered from the Queen, was a devout royalist and an unusually scrupulous politician. He held his tongue, and Disraeli's brilliant manœuvre, when he brought the Queen from her retirement, and in a single speech identified imperialism with conservatism and associated them both with loyalty to the monarchy, was allowed to succeed. Only a few years ago he had himself spoken of the "wretched colonies" as a "millstone round our necks." He accepted the general view of Conservative as well as Liberal politicians and officials, that as colonies grew up, they would necessarily break with the Mother-country. It was his peculiar genius to see in 1872 that the new imperialist movement which had been growing in the sixties in the minds of federalists like Froude, Sir George Grey and W. G. Foster might be made into an asset for the Conservative Party.

We must not, of course, attribute too much to Disraeli. Republicanism would have failed and the new imperialism won in any case. Many things conspired together to check the growth of the republican creed. As the golden age of Victorian prosperity waned and the influence of German thought after the triumph of Bismarck gained ground, the modified Hegelianism of T. H. Green began to take the place of the Utilitarianism of Mill at Oxford, while Socialism won its way as the working-class creed in the place of the old-fashioned radicalism. We may detect deep economic causes behind these developments; it is easy to see why British manufacturers and merchants, whose virtual monopoly of the raw materials and markets of the world was now challenged by the competition of Germany, America and Japan, were likely to turn to a creed that made for the consolidation and extension of the British Empire. Economic historians choose 1870 as a convenient date to mark the second industrial revolution. With the home market satiated, British capitalism turned to undeveloped Africa. Politically we see the change epitomised in the transference of the

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middle-class vote of Birmingham from the pacifist free trade Little Englandism of Bright to the protectionist imperialism of Joseph Chamberlain. There were strong forces at work; the last anti-imperialistic government of England, Gladstone's second ministry, failed, not because of Gordon or the Irish or the Queen, but because Liberalism had no policy with which to meet the new Empire problems which arose in South Africa and the Soudan. And when Liberalism was again returned with a triumphant majority twenty years later, it was led by men who had learnt the new imperialistic philosophy at Oxford and whose ideas were as remote from those of Gladstone and Mill as from the republicanism which had seemed to Dilke and Chamberlain at the beginning of their careers to be the inevitable creed of the future. Nevertheless, Disraeli's part in 1872 was important. What Disraeli did in his Crystal Palace speech was to blend into one vast imperial whole the problem of the white Dominions, the problem of Ireland, the problem of the Near East, the problem of India, and finally by a stroke of genius, the problem of the Queen's relationship to her subjects. Henceforward it was impossible to induce anyone to think clearly and coolly about any of these issues. It became impossible to hint at the necessity of Home Rule in Ireland or to demand better government in India, or to discuss the ethics of British occupation of Egypt, without being charged with disloyalty to the Queen. To turn an intelligent imperialist movement into a popular jingoism, which bore fruit in the Boer War, was the immediate result of Disraeli's exploitation of the Crown.

THE FUNCTIONS AND PRACTICE OF MONARCHY

Writing on the English Constitution in 1866, Walter Bagehot said that there was "no authentic, explicit information as to what the Queen can do, any more than what she does," and he summarised all that we did know of the functions of our monarchy as "the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to warn." It is only in the last decade, since the publication of Queen Victoria's letters, that the British public has had a chance of learning

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how widely the Queen interpreted these functions.¹ She had learnt while Albert was still alive, how essential it was for her to avoid anything in the nature of a public quarrel with her ministers. But her own naturally dominating temperament, encouraged by Disraeli's flattery, prompted her to use her position to impede as far as she could all radical and progressive tendencies. Conservative governments she let off lightly, though her insistence on seeing everything and being informed about everything, even when at Osborne or Balmoral, was in those days of slower communications, a sufficient aggravation even to Conservative Prime Ministers. When Mr. Gladstone became Premier in 1880, in spite of a determined effort on her part to find another Liberal leader, she frankly set out to make his life a burden. It was not only that she opposed his Cabinet appointments and even tried to interfere with his nominations for minor government posts, which, as Mr. Gladstone pointed out to a colleague, were only submitted to her by courtesy. The nearest approach he ever made to a rebuke to the Queen herself, was to remind her that the "powerful circles in which your Majesty has active or personal intercourse," contained hardly any persons who understood the point of view of the majority of her subjects who had recently returned him to office. During the long controversy over the Soudan, she expostulated day and night, and when Gordon was killed, almost compelled Gladstone to resign by telegraphing her anger *en clair*. Her conduct on several occasions showed that she had no scruples about violating the constitution when she was sufficiently roused and felt safe from exposure. She wrote privately to Lady Wolsey advising Lord Wolsey, then in command of her forces in the Soudan, to coerce the government by threatening to resign if he did not obtain the free hand he demanded. And in order to make sure that she should not be found out, she instructed Lady Wolsey to burn her letter. And in December 1885, the Queen suggested to Harcourt (while Gladstone still had a majority) that a moderate Whig Conservative coalition should be formed, in order to defeat

¹ Owing to lack of space I have only here quoted a few examples of the Queen's use of her functions. A full account is to be found in *The Political Influence of Queen Victoria*, by F. Hardie. (Oxford Press, 1935.)

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Home Rule. Shortly afterwards, when the fall of Lord Salisbury's first government seemed probable, she appealed to Goschen to arrange an alliance between the Liberal Unionists and Conservatives against Mr. Gladstone and Home Rule. In this remarkable letter, we see her surreptitiously and without the advice of her Prime Minister, attempting to promote a "loyal" and "constitutional" National Government, in order to defeat the Liberal Party. Other examples of clearly unconstitutional behaviour on the Queen's part could be cited on the indubitable evidence of her own correspondence. She was the least "impartial" of monarchs; her prejudices were fierce and her treatment of ministers whom she disliked frequently unscrupulous.

Enough has been said to show that the Queen interpreted the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to warn as the right to obstruct, the right to bully and the right to go behind her ministers' backs when their policies were displeasing to her. Exactly how her son and grandson have interpreted their constitutional functions we do not yet know, since the documents have not yet been published. About the reign of Edward VII we are still inadequately informed, in spite of the voluminous biography by Sir Sidney Lee, and a number of useful hints in the memoirs and correspondence of statesmen. But we know enough to be sure that neither King Edward nor King George ever abused their position as the Queen did. We know enough today to smile at the myth that King Edward played an important part in foreign affairs. If we must give a meaning to the title, "King Edward the Peacemaker," we should have to say that his detestation of his nephew, the Emperor of Germany, and his love of France (which has sometimes been confused with his appreciation of the entertainments of the Moulin Rouge) helped to cement the Triple Entente and aggravate our relations with Germany. For the rest it is clear that he contrived to be on excellent terms with Ministers of both parties, showed remarkable gifts of tact in dealing with labour leaders, interested himself in social work as well as in racing, and fulfilled the ceremonial functions of his office with grace and even with distinction. The first important constitutional crisis of his reign occurred

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only shortly before his death. It occurred when it became clear in 1909 that the House of Lords intended to throw out Mr. Lloyd George's Land Budget and that Mr. Asquith was equally determined to force the House of Lords to give way and, if necessary, permanently to curtail its powers. In this instance we are fortunately in the position to know what went on behind the scenes. The *Letters of Lord Esher* are among the most illuminating documents that exist for understanding the government of England. Lord Esher, whose main concern was to build up the Committee of Imperial Defence, was an intimate friend of King Edward and of the leading Conservative ministers, as well as of all the important people in the Services. He also made it his business to make friends with key persons like Haldane and Morley when the Liberal government of 1906 came into power. Lord Esher was a far-seeing man and held with the King that it would be most dangerous and unwise for the Lords to throw out the Budget. But when it was suggested that in that event, Mr. Asquith might ask the King for a promise to create peers if the Lords did throw out the Budget, Lord Esher characterised the suggestion as monstrous and the King appears to have taken the same point of view.

It was assumed by all parties, through the House of Lords' crisis, that it was the King's business to seek an accommodation between the two Houses and there were ample precedents during Queen Victoria's reign for the Monarch seeing Opposition Leaders in the course of negotiations, provided that the Prime Minister knew that he was doing so and was informed of the substance of the conversations. On one critical occasion, however, when the King wished to see the Tory leaders, Mr. Asquith only reluctantly agreed, after sending the King a memorandum drawing the distinction between "seeking advice" and "desiring knowledge" from the Opposition. The King accepted the distinction and did not attempt to act as arbiter. As it turned out Asquith was justified in his fear that an attempt would be made at this interview to divert the issue and weaken the King's resolution. But the King seems fully to have realised that the only safe and constitutional course

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was for him on all occasions to make it clear that he would follow his Prime Minister's advice.¹

Lord Esher's advice to His Majesty was that if the Government were to ask the King to promise to create peers before a general election, His Majesty "should meet them with a firm refusal." He thought that if the Government resigned before the election because of the King's refusal, the King would be supported "by this country and all over the Empire." In an illuminating passage in a letter to his son Lord Esher wrote: "About February 10th the Prime Minister will be asking the King for a promise to create peers. That is *certain*. If the King says yes, he mortally offends the whole Tory Party to which he is naturally bound. If he says no, he lets loose all the radical gutter Press at his position as Sovereign and his person as man. A charming dilemma, full of revolutionary possibilities. We have never been nearer a revolution since 1688....."²

After the temporary truce which followed King Edward's death King George V insisted on an election before creating peers. As Mr. Lloyd George and other statesmen have recently revealed, the bias of the King was so heavily in favour of the Tory Party that Liberal ministers were by no means sure that he would agree without a struggle, even if the election gave them a substantial majority. Lord Rosebery, who was in a position to know, seems to have held that if Mr. Asquith had been returned at the second election with a majority of even five less than he had had at the first election, the royal prerogative would not have been exercised in his favour. But we have no knowledge of the inner history after the death of King Edward and the end of Esher's published letters. All that we can say is that the King behaved constitutionally in the event and that the result was to strengthen and not weaken the monarchy.

Lord Esher's advice throughout the dispute and his remark about the King's natural leaning towards the Tory Party certainly support the contention that monarchy, even at its most constitutional, is always liable to be a handicap to progressive forces, and that there are always influences round

¹ *Life of Lord Oxford*, by J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, Vol. I pp. 305-307.

² *Esher II*, 433-4.

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the King urging him discreetly to fight on the side of conservatism. It is incidents of this kind which explain Sir Stafford Cripp's much discussed reference to obstructive influences in Buckingham Palace circles. The full danger can most readily be understood by a study of the incident of the Curragh mutiny in 1914. During the Ulster crisis responsible conservative leaders like Lord Halsbury and Bonar Law not only supported the treasonable utterances of Lord Carson, F. E. Smith and Joynson-Hicks, but actually committed themselves to the dangerous proposition that the King still had a veto and should use it. The Diaries of Sir Henry Wilson show that there were soldiers recklessly ready to promote a civil war and that they hoped that the army would follow them on the plea that they were obeying the personal wishes of His Majesty against those of His Government. It was natural in these circumstances that Liberal politicians and Liberal newspapers should have even regarded with suspicion the King's sensible decision to try to settle matters at a Buckingham Palace Conference. The European war ended the crisis and nothing yet published suggests that the King either behaved unconstitutionally or was prepared to do so. But the incident remains as a warning that unscrupulous persons may appeal to the personal loyalty of soldiers and sailors to the Crown against the Government which represents the electorate whose servants, the King, the Government, and the armed forces alike must be.

In trying to understand what specific functions the King of England still possesses three other incidents in the reign of the late King are obviously of importance.

The King was undoubtedly exercising his constitutional rights when he decided to entrust the formation of the Government to Mr. Baldwin rather than to Lord Curzon. Where there is any doubt in whose hands lies the leadership of the party with the largest parliamentary representation the choice between the rival leaders belongs to the Crown. Queen Victoria's decision to summon Lord Rosebery in 1896 was her own decision and so was King George's in 1923.

A more interesting question rose in 1924 when Mr. Asquith, as leader of the Liberal Party in the House of

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Commons, urged that in the conditions of minority government, the King had the right to refuse a dissolution to a defeated Prime Minister and to call upon leaders of other parties to attempt to form a government. An interesting constitutional discussion ensued. Here it is enough to say, that if the King had in fact refused Mr. Macdonald a dissolution and called on Mr. Asquith to form a government, it would indeed have been better for the Labour Party, but disastrous for the monarchy. The inevitable result would have been to proclaim the King as a partisan and to bring the Crown into the arena of party politics.

About the third incident, the part played by the monarchy in arranging the National Government in 1931, we still know too little. It is undoubtedly a serious innovation, as Professor Laski and others have pointed out, that a Prime Minister, who must hold his position in virtue of the fact that he is the leader of the largest party in the House of Commons, should form a new government without the consent, or even the knowledge, of his own party. We know to-day that manœuvres for forming a National Government had been proceeding for months before the actual crisis in August, 1931. And we cannot doubt that the King played an important part in the final arrangements. But the King has the right to advise, and even if in fact the arrangement that brought together Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Baldwin and Sir Herbert Samuel was actually managed by the King or members of his immediate entourage, I can scarcely see that he was behaving unconstitutionally. I can see danger in such manœuvres, but I do not see that the King can be held responsible. Constitutionally, he must be presumed to have been taking his Prime Minister's advice.

CONCLUSION

Until sixty years ago the ordinary Englishman's attitude to the monarchy remained, as we have seen, comparatively rational. The King was to reign, but not to rule. Any hint of direct interference in politics led to an outcry. Liberals and radicals well understood that the Crown would certainly be conservative; they regarded it as an obstructive influence only less dangerous than the House of Lords, because less

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powerful. And, with the closing of the ranks of the upper classes in face of a growing socialism amongst the working classes, Liberals were also ready to join in the game of deifying the monarchy. Circumstances have combined to increase the desire of all the propertied elements in society to use the royal prestige to unify on a magical and irrational basis the conflicting emotions of the masses. The constitutional bonds of Empire had been snapped; the Statute of Westminster, a masterpiece of deliberately vague phraseology, concocted by Mr. Balfour to avoid defining the relations between the Dominions and the Mother Country, made Canada, Australia, South Africa and the Irish Free State equals with Great Britain. Today, the only remaining constitutional link is joint loyalty to the King Emperor, and the Prime Ministers of the Dominions are as much the King's Ministers as Mr. Baldwin. They negotiate with this country on important issues through the Foreign Office: the Dominions Office has become, as one official put it, merely a post office. No wonder that every effort is made to popularise monarchy in the Empire overseas; no wonder that the present King spent much of his time as Prince of Wales in touring the Empire; no wonder that the chance of direct communication over the radio was seized upon, so that the King's own voice might be heard through the length and breadth of the Empire.

We have seen that it is possible to explain the immense increase in the popularity of the Crown by pointing to its strictly constitutional behaviour, to its exemplary character and to men's instinctive desire to find a father figure to trust in days of perplexity, danger or depression. But no one who has watched this development could doubt that the opportunity had been deliberately and cleverly exploited. According to the thesis of democracy the mass of the electorate might, if properly educated, learn to take an intelligent interest and to exercise an increasingly rational judgment about public affairs. The existence of a King, if he is understood to be a symbol and a figure head, and if his constitutional position is carefully defined, is not incompatible with an increasingly rational attitude towards public affairs. It is not irrational to honour the head of a state; in so doing we are honouring

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ourselves, and expressing our affection for the country we live in. If we realise that monarchy is a symbol, the King may serve our turn with less inconvenience than a President. But the danger of monarchy lies in its magic, in the ease with which, once it is believed that the King is not a partisan, the deep-seated tendency to substitute worship for respect, to substitute personal homage for rational acceptance of a symbol, may be utilised for class or party purposes. In *Quack Quack* Mr. Leonard Woolf put the matter bluntly when he said that there was a danger that we might become civilized, that we might learn to love our country as Pericles loved Athens "because of its physical beauty and its traditions of justice, liberty, intelligence, and culture." In that case "the country, the King and the people would all be civilized. It was against this danger that the ruling classes and the people reacted vigorously." The public attitude to the monarchy, as Mr. Woolf says, has changed "because an intense propaganda by public men, in the Press, and in the cinema, has been carried on day after day for years in order to establish in the people a superstitious 'loyalty' towards the Royal Family." As a result an irrational feeling about the whole Royal Family has been substituted for a rational respect for the chief civil servant. Everything is done to decrease the element of rational understanding and to increase the tendency towards magic and worship. And a state of mind is created which makes a rational attitude towards political and social problems of every kind increasingly rare and difficult. If our Morris car does not start, we do not expect, as Mr. Woolf puts it, to make it go by waving flags and muttering incantations over the engine. "But we teach the children in elementary schools that they cannot be good and loyal Englishmen, unless they approach the more important political questions in the flag waving, incantation, medicine man frame of mind." And Mr. Woolf adds a very significant point: the very people who are responsible for inculcating this irrational attitude to Royalty amongst the populace, are cynical about the Royal Family in private, delighting to retail any bit of scandal they can find about it, while condemning any failure to conform to the magic ritual in public as bad taste and lack of patriotism. "This cynicism and

contempt in private among ruling classes, for beliefs and feelings for which they profess the highest reverence in public, are frequent symptoms in history of the breakdown of a civilisation and the degradation of society."

I believe this judgment to be correct. The new cultivation of irrationality towards monarchy is only one manifestation of the struggle that is going on throughout society. At the root of that struggle is the question whether the mass of mankind are to be allowed to share with the privileged few the wealth that is now kept from it by an antique and inefficient system of private ownership. And with that problem goes the question whether they should share the heritage of knowledge and culture which has hitherto been, to a very large extent, restricted to the few. In their desperate efforts to preserve their power and their privilege, those who rule are turning their backs on the whole thesis of democracy. In countries where the struggle has been most bitter and most profound we find a total repudiation, as the leaders for instance of Nazi Germany have put it, of all the "false principles of humanity," all these ideas of liberty, equality, and human progress which seemed to triumph in Europe with the French Revolution. In England the process has gone very much less far. But it would be cowardly, as well as stupid, not to call attention to-day to the significance of the deification of Royalty as a symptom of the same effort to turn back the clock of history, and to re-establish a state of things in which only the few are supposed to understand, while the majority is taught to be content with bread and circuses. In modern England monarchy provides the finest

THE PUBLIC SERVICE

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON

I.

THE public service as it exists today is almost entirely the work of the last eighty years; and most of its essential features have taken shape during the past half-century. The Trevelyan-Nothcote Report of 1853, the Superannuation Act 1859, the Orders in Council of 1870 and 1920—these are the decisive landmarks so far as the Civil Service is concerned. But the public service includes much more than the Civil Service, although it is an expression which has no precise content. An attempt will be made in this article to survey the public service from the widest point of view, including for that purpose the civil service, the municipal service, the personnel of the socialised services and the various boards and commissions which lie on the periphery of our system of public administration.

The civil servant and the municipal officer of today are new kinds of men, just as the engineer is a new type of man. Their nearest counterpart in the days prior to the nineteenth century was the Public Officer, such as the coroner, the constable, the surveyor of highways, the overseer of the poor, the justice of the peace and the sheriff. But these "subordinate magistrates," as Blackstone called them, were appointed and known individually by name; they held office either for a fixed term or during good behaviour; and their duties were mostly imposed upon them directly by the law and enforced by the Courts. They were utterly different from the armies of anonymous officials who now carry on administration under the orders of a responsible minister or an elected local authority. The modern official is, indeed, one of the outstanding creations of Victorian capitalist

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democracy; and without the civil and municipal services political democracy as we know it would be impossible.

The key to understanding the public service lies in a study of the conditions of employment the official is offered and the code of conduct he is required to observe, which together constitute a vocational way of life as distinct and definite as that laid down for soldiers or clergymen or doctors.

The principal conditions of service¹ include recruitment by open competition, by nomination plus a qualifying examination, by competitive interview or by a combination of these methods; age limits for entry and retirement; classification into recognised classes or grades; fixed salary scales of modest dimensions with regular increments; security of tenure subject to good behaviour; pension rights, accompanied by sickness benefits to provide against disaster; promotion from within the service, partly at least by seniority; definite and increasing vacations on a generous scale. These conditions are to be found most fully applied in the civil service; a great effort is being made by N.A.L.G.O. and other associations to obtain them throughout the municipal service, and their establishment is doubtless only a matter of time. As one leaves the regular departments of central and local government and arrives at the more nebulous organs on the outer ring of public administration, these conditions tend to be found in less and less degree.

The code of conduct is less explicit but more far-reaching in its influence. There are the Corrupt Practices Acts and the Official Secrets Acts to prevent graft and the betrayal of trust by means of heavy criminal penalties. There are legislative provisions to prohibit politicians from holding paid offices under the Crown and elected councillors from being employed by the local authority. There are regulations which forbid

¹ An excellent summary is contained in N. E. Mustoe: *The Law and Organization of the British Civil Service*.

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civil servants from offering themselves as candidates or prospective candidates for Parliament until they have resigned or retired.¹ There are departmental orders which restrict participation in municipal elections. There is a Treasury instruction which lays it down that a civil servant is not to indulge in political or party controversy, enjoins him to maintain a reserve in political matters and not to put himself forward prominently on one side or the other. There are stringent regulations forbidding officials to take part in the management of commercial or industrial undertakings between the hours of 10 a.m. and 6 p.m.; and this minimum rule has been supplemented by departmental additions making further inroads on subsidiary activities during leisure hours. The Report of the Board of Enquiry² instituted after the disagreeable Ironmonger case has once and for all set the seal of official disapproval firmly on "transactions of a wholly speculative character." The mere suspicion of a conflict between interest and duty makes such transactions on the part of a state official "not only undesirable or inexpedient, but wrong." The Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act 1927 placed a further limitation on the freedom of officials by prohibiting established civil servants from belonging to trade unions or professional associations, except those whose membership is confined to persons employed by the Crown, and which are not affiliated to unions containing other persons. The objects of civil service trade unions may not include political purposes, and they may not be directly or indirectly associated with any political party or organisation. This law compelled such bodies as the Union of Post Office Workers to sever their connection with the Trades Union Congress.

There are, in addition, certain other obligations of a less definite kind which relate to sexual relations. There are, so far as I know, no universal rules on this subject;

¹ Mustoe: *op cit. passim*.

² Cmd. 3307/1928. para. 56.

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but civil servants and municipal officers of both sexes are certainly expected to observe the conventional proprieties and to avoid conduct which might find its way into the newspapers and there be described as "scandalous." Until recently sexual relations between men and women officers of the Post Office were punishable with immediate dismissal of both parties; and one gathers that civil servants who are cited as co-respondents in divorce petitions are unlikely to make further headway in their official careers if the matter receives "undesirable publicity." The problem of avoiding newspaper publicity is a fairly easy one to solve so far as Court proceedings are concerned; but official restriction extends further so as to prevent women civil servants (who usually have to resign on marriage) from cohabiting openly with men if they desire to do so. The matter, therefore, takes on a different complexion.

II.

These conditions of employment and this code of conduct have been the formative influences in moulding our public service. It is generally recognised that the development of an honest and efficient service is one of the great achievements of this country. The English public service is held in high esteem, both at home and abroad, and is rightly regarded as an outstanding success. We do not have the political pressure which the French civil service exerts on the government; nor the corruption which frequently exists in American state and city administration. We are fortunate in possessing in the Administrative Class a corps of highly trained permanent officers of unusual ability, the lack of which is the chief weakness of the Federal service in U.S.A. The Brains Trust is essentially an attempt to fill the aching void in Washington; but the ablest students of the American situation know that a hurriedly assembled collection of professors and professional men is no substitute for a career service of high quality.

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But when full tribute has been paid to the excellence and devotion to duty of our public officials, closer reflection suggests that the time for gratulation has passed and the moment arrived for taking stock of the situation.

III.

We might begin by considering the assumptions on which our system is based. The most obvious one is that the service should be divided into categories which reflect, if they do not reproduce, the social structure and economic inequalities of our society. The Diplomatic and Foreign Office staff, for which nomination is required, contains scarcely anyone who is not related to, or patronised by, either the aristocracy or the narrow circle of high society. The Administrative Class, which occupies all the controlling positions in the Home Civil Service, consists to an overwhelming extent of the fortunate few who can manage to get to Oxford and Cambridge; and the entrance examination has always been expressly designed for that purpose. The chief officers of local authorities are normally required to be doctors, lawyers, engineers and so forth, and the appointments are in consequence reserved for the sons of those who can afford the time and money to acquire expensive professional qualifications. There are other compartments lower down in the scale carefully reserved for those who can attend secondary or public schools until they are 17 or 18 years of age, as compared with the mass of the population who leave school at 14-16 years.

This system has worked well in the past because it produced men at the top of the administrative machine whose educational and social background was similar to that of the Ministers and Councillors whom they served. The Foreign Secretary and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State could spend a week-end together on terms of essential equality; the Lord Mayor and the Town Clerk could both belong to the

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same club. All this has made for that tacit understanding based on common feelings, which is far more valuable than verbal explanations as an aid to co-operation.

The emerging trends in our society suggest, however, that this system has served its purpose and will prove definitely obstructive unless it is severely modified. To begin with, it is intolerable that the universities of London and of the provincial towns should find their students (who are drawn largely from lower social strata) virtually debarred, or at least seriously handicapped, from entry into the highest grades of the service, especially when one considers the relative importance of the work these universities are doing in the social sciences. Second, there is a manifest anomaly between the widened political opportunity which enables men and women of working class origin and experience to secure the highest positions of political power at the centre and in the localities, and the arrangements which require the leading officials to be drawn from narrow strata in the upper levels of society. Recruitment from the universities for the highest public positions is indispensable on grounds of efficiency; but it is consistent with political democracy only if access to the universities is really open to every child of sufficient ability, instead of, as at present, to an infinitesimal fraction of the educationally submerged masses. If we do not recognise the need for adjustment in this matter we are likely to witness a notable dwindling in the degree of confidence, understanding, and co-operation between political chief and professional officer, simply because the distinction of class and education will become insuperable. There were numerous instances where members of the Labour Governments of 1924 and 1929 felt intimidated and overshadowed by the superior training and manners of their chief officials. It is a short step from intimidation to resentment.

This brings us to a much more difficult problem. We

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assume that the public service in all its branches is perfectly neutral from a political point of view, the utterly loyal and obedient instrument of whatever party may be in power. Here again, we shall have to re-examine our assumptions in the coming years, not because there is any reason whatever to doubt the honest and genuine desire of the official to serve his political master to the fullest possible extent, but because there is some question as to his ability to do so in certain circumstances owing to causes of which he is not aware.

In the past, the greater part of our public administration consisted of regulatory services: that is, services in which departments were required to control the conduct of individuals and corporate bodies in accordance with carefully enacted legal provisions. A typical example of this is the Factory Acts. Today, however, the most important part of our public administration consists of service functions, i.e., those in which a service is provided, such as housing, transport, education and so forth. In these service functions the official is less concerned to administer law than to promote energetic and far-reaching projects based on plans which he must himself create. The question is whether this kind of constructive work can be performed successfully by merely obedient officials who are indifferent to the social purposes involved. The late Sir Robert Morant was a great administrator because he believed passionately in education and public health. Is it possible to get enough steam up in a department or a local authority if the chief officials are not moved by something stronger than a mere desire to obey the minister or the dominant party? Is a discreet *diplomat de carrière* sent as Ambassador to Washington or Moscow really able to achieve the fullest possible degree of understanding of, and co-operation with, the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. if he does not share a profound belief that such a policy is essential to the good of mankind? Observation of recent

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tendencies and events at the Foreign Office, Ministry of Health, the Treasury, the Post Office and the Ministry of Transport offers both negative and positive evidence to support these doubts.

What, then, are we to do? It is not, of course, suggested that the chief officials should be replaced with every change of political control. That would be a deliberate move in the direction of the totalitarian state—a step which all civilised persons desire to avoid. In Germany and Italy the officials are impregnated through and through with Nazi or Fascist doctrine; and we should certainly avoid at all costs making our own public servants into politicians.

There is, however, an alternative. Although it is highly desirable to keep the official out of party politics we should nevertheless aim at securing a more constructive type of individual in the various services, so that when a go-ahead policy is ordered, it will not meet with the unconscious obstruction caused by the sort of official who, with the best will in the world, can see only the difficulties and dangers of the situation rather than its possibilities and opportunities. In certain critical fields of public administration, such as those dealing with foreign affairs, territorial planning, housing, unemployment, public utilities, public works, the depressed areas, education and child welfare, the absence of such an outlook is, and has been an immense handicap; its presence would be an incalculable advantage. The established tradition of official loyalty can be relied upon to respond promptly to an order to slow down the work of a department or even to close it down completely; but mere obedience is not sufficient by itself to set in motion a policy requiring imagination and what is called in the United States aggressive action.

IV.

How can we get men and women of more constructive ability and imagination into the public service? The answer

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is a comparatively simple one. It would be quite as easy to utilise the existing methods of competitive examination or competitive interview to discover the qualities of mind and character and temperament that we require as it is to select candidates possessing the requisite standards of education and mental ability. I am sure that I could devise a series of examination tests which would distinguish the cautious, negative, obstructive type of individual from the positive, constructive, problem-solving, planning type for whom there is so great a need at present.

It may be contended that the sort of man whom I am describing is unlikely to go into the public service; that he is almost certain to aim at the larger field of opportunity offered by private enterprise. I believe this to be an entirely mistaken view. Public enterprise today offers unrivalled chances of doing really important work on the largest scale, and on this ground alone it can offer superior attractions to private business. The public service motive is, moreover, becoming increasingly powerful as an incentive, whereas the desire for great personal wealth appears to be on the decline in this country. One of the least noticed but most hopeful signs of progress in recent decades seems to be the change in ambition among the younger generation, from a desire to make as much money as possible to a desire to do work which is both interesting in itself and informed by a definite social purpose, provided, of course, that a reasonable standard of living is attached thereto.

Nevertheless, the public service does at present suffer from being too far removed from the market-place and the forum; it is pervaded by the atmosphere of a vocational preserve, carefully guarded from the risks and hazards to which the ordinary citizen is exposed. The departmental official, remarks Mr. H. G. Wells, is in the same tradition of honour and devotion as the priestly persona. "He has put adventures

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in gain behind him . . . The chief accusation against the public functionary throughout the ages has also been the chief grievances against priesthoods, conservatism; he is over-disposed, it is said, to follow precedents and refuse risks."¹ Sir William Beveridge himself for many years a civil servant, writes that the relative permanence of office tends to make the civil service something of a special caste.² Mr. Sharp, a careful student of the French civil service, observes that "the promiscuous conferring of decorations upon upper-grade officials [in France] suggests to many, the notion of a privileged caste."³ There is a striking similarity in the opinions expressed by these three diverse writers. If the diagnosis is substantially correct, as I think it is, it indicates the need for greater flexibility within the service and also greater mobility between the service and the outside world.

Internal flexibility depends largely on unity of organisation. At present we have not one public service but rather a number of separate services: the home civil service, the colonial service, the diplomatic and consular services, the local government service, the services of the socialised undertakings such as the B.B.C., the London Passenger Transport Board, the Central Electricity Board and so forth. Each one of these is organised as a separate service; there are immense disparities in the salaries and conditions of employment; and there is hardly any interchange. If we desire to widen the experience of our officials in order to give them a broader outlook, every effort must be made to encourage and facilitate transfer. But transfer is possible as a general practice only if the public service in all its branches is unified. This does not mean that uniform conditions must be applied throughout, or that every official must be recruited through the Civil Service Commission. But it does imply a much

¹ *The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind*, p. 380.

² *The Public Service in War and Peace*.

³ *The French Civil Service*, p. 437.

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greater degree of consistency than now exists in service conditions; an elimination of the anomalies by which the clerk to a county council receives £7,500 a year while the permanent secretaries of the great departments in Whitehall receive £3,000, or which results in the principal executives of the London Passenger Transport Board or the Central Electricity Board being paid three or four times as much as the secretary to the Treasury, who is the permanent head of the whole civil service.

In the second place, mobility demands that, although a large measure of autonomy is permissible in the various branches, service in one branch of official employment shall be recognised for purposes of admission to or promotion in another branch. This would be possible only if all organs of public administration were to impose standards of qualification and methods of recruitment as rigorous and above board as those employed for the civil service. Thirdly, superannuation would have to be universal, uniform and interchangeable.

It would help to break down the caste spirit in Whitehall if officials in, for example, the Ministry of Health were sent to serve with local authorities in the provincial towns or the rural counties for a few years—and vice versa. The Post Office has recently introduced an excellent rule whereby young men coming into the administrative class are compelled to serve in the provinces for several years before going to headquarters. It would help to disperse the traditional narrowness of the Treasury attitude towards expenditure on the social services and public works if some of their men had worked in socialised undertakings where large capital expenditure is freely embarked upon without a latent sense of sin. And if a still more ambitious step were taken whereby exchanges could be arranged between the Dominion services and the English services, complaints about the cloistered

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atmosphere in the Government offices might tend to be more uncommon.

V.

There remains the question of greater mobility between official employment and the world outside. There are a few instances where men of outstanding ability, such as Sir Josiah Stamp, the late Sir Basil Blachett, Sir Arthur Salter or Sir Otto Niemeyer, have gone out of the public service into other work outside. But the cases are rare; and it is still more infrequent to find an instance of a man who has made his mark in business or a professional career being asked to accept an official position. On the whole a greater amount of movement would be desirable. The public service must remain predominantly a whole-life occupation; but there should be greater facility for shedding inefficient or unsuitable officials and for acquiring outside individuals of exceptional ability. This depends largely on salary and superannuation policy. At present, if a man leaves the service before serving his time, or is dismissed, he has to sacrifice all his pension rights—a sacrifice so great that only a few bold or ruthless spirits are prepared to accept it for themselves or inflict it on their subordinates. If pension rights accrued with each year of service and had a definite surrender value, those who wished to leave the service, and the inefficient members who ought not to be allowed to remain in it, would be able to pass out freely with advantage to themselves and the nation. If, again, higher salary scales without pension rights, or with lump-sum gratuities, were established for people of proved ability coming in from outside, between say the ages of thirty and forty-five, we should attract a number of individuals whose work might be of incalculable value; and we should infuse official life with a continuous stream of stimulating ideas derived from unofficial sources.

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This line of advance will be highly distasteful to the orthodox view which clings to a rigid dichotomy of society into official and non-official categories. But it is nevertheless in consonance with tendencies which are actually operating in our society. The dividing line between official organs and unofficial institutions is becoming less and less distinct. Bodies like the Agricultural Marketing Boards, the Milk Marketing Board, the Racecourse Betting Control Board (which operates the totalisator), the Wheat Commission—are these “official” or “unofficial” bodies; and are the people working in them public servants or private employees? The answer in both cases is that they are neither the one nor the other, but a mixture of the two which is highly characteristic of the present transitional state of our economic life. The increasing intervention of Government in economic affairs makes it probable that, whether we move in the direction of socialism or towards state-supported capitalism, a large increase will occur in the number of these miscellaneous bodies set up for particular purposes and manned chiefly by persons with experience in the industry or occupation concerned. These bodies have, and will no doubt continue to have, a statutory basis; but no one is responsible to Parliament for their day-to-day activities; their finance is independent of the National Exchequer and they draw their revenue from sources which are outside the ordinary forms of taxation. They are as different from a department in Whitehall as chalk from cheese. The staffs they employ diverge from the traditional pattern of public officials in almost every particular. Yet we cannot ignore them in any conspectus of the public service, for they are exercising some of the most vital forms of public power.

An interesting example of another tendency in the same direction is provided by the Area Traffic Commissioners, set up under the Road Traffic Act 1930. These Commissioners

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control the entire system of public service motor-buses and motor coaches run for profit throughout the country by means of an elaborate system of licensing which gives them vast and undefined discretions at almost every point.

The chairman of the Traffic Commission in each area is appointed by the Minister of Transport, and is a full-time salaried officer appointed for a fixed term of years. Outside London there are on each Commission two other members appointed from persons nominated by the County Councils and Urban Authorities respectively. All are removable for inability or misbehaviour; and the statute directs that the Commissions shall act under "the general directions of the Minister." When the Bill was considered in Committee in the Commons, Colonel Ashley, a former Minister of Transport moved the omission of the word "general" in this clause. He urged that it was essential for the Minister to have complete control over the Commissioners. Otherwise trouble might arise between the Minister and a cantankerous Commissioner who refused to accept his orders. Mr. Herbert Morrison, the Minister of Transport who framed the Bill, resisted the amendment on the ground that it involved a misapprehension of what was intended. He explained that he had no intention as Minister of attempting to direct the Commissioners on every point of their duty. It appeared to have been assumed that he was to be answerable in Parliament for the specific actions of the Commissioners. That, however, was not the case. He could only answer for the general actions of the Commissioners, not for whether they had done right or wrong in any particular case.

VI.

We are, it would seem, drifting towards something not far removed from what may be called "Government by Commission," and the men in charge of these Commissions may come to resemble the Public Officers of Blackstone's

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day more closely in some respects than they do the army of anonymous civil servants in Whitehall. The success or failure of this new tendency will depend ultimately on whether we can evoke the same degree of devotion to duty, public spirit, integrity and competence from persons engaged in public administration without the spur or menace of Ministerial Control as we have managed to secure by means of it. Let us remember, however, that an honest and efficient public service is a rare phenomenon in the world and something of a novelty even in England. All these new and complicated economic functions of the state no doubt make Ministerial responsibility obstructive and cumbersome. But we shall have bought flexibility and freedom at too great a price if they bring a return to the nepotism, low standards, and corruptibility of the eighteenth century. I am not prophesying disaster. It may be that the ideal and the tradition of disinterested service for the common good have penetrated so deeply into the fabric of our public life that the safeguards devised in the nineteenth century can be removed without danger. It is nevertheless important that we should recognise that they have been removed in a number of cases; and it is still more important that we should realise the issues which are now at stake.

Above all, if we are to take risks in certain directions, let us take steps to ensure so far as possible that we shall profit in other directions—in the vigour and vitality of our officials, in their ability to grasp the immense opportunities open to them in a bold and imaginative way, in so moulding their education and training as to make it relevant to the essential needs of the day, in so widening the social strata from which they are drawn as to make it coterminous with the entire community, in providing a real *carrière ouverte aux talents*. These should be the aims of a democracy in the second quarter of the twentieth century.

THE HOME CIVIL SERVICE

The Administrative Class

By PROFESSOR ERNEST BARKER

I.

THE number of the civil servants of the Crown is over 400,000. Our present concern is with a small fraction of this number—the 1,200 who form the administrative group or class of the home civil service. It is a body recruited at the rate of about 30 new entrants in each year.¹ Its total number is less than that of the members of the two Houses of Parliament, which is now about 1,400. But its importance in the political system of the country cannot be measured in terms of numbers. Subject to the Government and under the control of the Ministers of the Crown, who in their turn are responsible to Parliament, it ensures the daily life of the state by discharging the current duties of the central public services which are required for the maintenance of that life. There is a sense in which we may say that it is a partner, though a subordinate and silent partner, in the running of the state. When we have mentioned the legislative, the executive and the judicature—Parliament, the Cabinet and the Courts of Law—we have not exhausted the whole of the partnership. The Cabinet could not conduct the executive government of the country without the services of an administrative body which not only carries instructions into effect, but will also tend, and indeed is bound, to suggest the nature of those instructions. Parliament, under the conditions of modern life, could not conduct the work of legislation unless it were able to remit to Ministers, and there-

¹ In the eight years from 1925 to 1932 (inclusive) the total number of new entrants was 218. Of these, 152 (or 19 in each year, on the average) were recruited by open competition, and 66 (or an average of about eight in each year) by promotion from subordinate groups or classes.

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by to the administrative staff whose services they command, the supplementary duty of issuing the detailed regulations which amplify the general terms of statutes. Even in the sphere of jurisdiction, and in the province which might seem to belong exclusively to the Courts of Law, the members of the administrative staff have come to be charged with duties and responsibilities. Mainly in social matters—matters of housing, insurance and the like—they have to render judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. It is not a matter of bureaucratic invasion or administrative arrogance. By the authority of Parliament, and under the compulsion of the needs of the political community, they have been drawn into new activities. Not their own motion, but the general motion of politics, has enlarged their duties and widened their powers.

The duties of the administrative class were defined in 1920 as "those concerned with the formation of policy, with the co-ordination and improvement of government machinery, and with the general administration and control of the departments of the Public Service." This is a formal definition, concerned with the methods of administrative activity rather than with the substance or material on which such activity is employed. If we look at that substance or material, we cannot but note, during the course of the present century, not only a great and notable increase of its volume, but also a change of its character. Administration has come to be deeply immersed in what may be called social matters. Each stage of social progress, when it has been registered in a parliamentary statute, has led to an extension of the Public Service for the purpose of fulfilling the intention of the statute; and each extension of the Public Service has led to a change in the duties and character of the administrative class. The Education Act of 1902 and its successors have altered the volume and the nature of the educational service of the state. Trade Board Acts, Pensions Acts, Insurance Acts and

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Housing Acts have introduced a large variety of other social services. It has been calculated that in 1913-14 the expenditure of national funds on education and the other social services was about £38,000,000. In 1933-34 it was just over £200,000,000. The new administration needed for the control of this new expenditure is a feature of our times. New ministries have been created, such as the Ministry of Labour in 1916. Old ministries have been reorganised: the old Local Government Board, for example, became in 1919 the Ministry of Health, and was radically changed by the addition of new duties transferred to it from the Insurance Commissioners, from the Board of Education and from the Home Office. This is not all. Beginning about 1910, the state has delved down deep into the foundations of our economic life, and has appointed a number of "boards," "commissions" and "departments" to aid its activity. By the end of the war we had the Development Commission (1910) and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (1916). By the year 1927, we had acquired the Forestry Commission, the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Central Electricity Board. Not to speak of the Coal Mines Reorganisation Commission of 1930, we added between 1931 and 1935 four Marketing Boards, a Wheat Commission, a London Passenger Transport Board, an Import Duties Advisory Committee and an Unemployment Assistance Board. These commissions and boards are not, in any strict sense, departments of government, though they are intimately connected with the regular departments; nor are their officials members of the administrative group or class with which we are here concerned. But we cannot understand the present position of that class, or the new scope of its duties, unless we remember the existence and the influence of those new growths by which it is now surrounded. In itself, and in its immediate work, the administrative group has been plunged more and more

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into social and economic duties. Around it, and affecting its outlook and its activities, stands a new body of public servants, primarily and essentially concerned with the discharge of social and economic functions.

It is true that there are a number of departments which are not, except indirectly, concerned with social and economic affairs. There is the Foreign Office: there are the offices for the Dominions, the Colonies and India; there is the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry. But it may justly be said that the bulk of administration, and the main effort of the administrative class, is directed to such affairs. Not to speak of the Treasury and the Home Office, there is the Ministry of Health, with all its many activities; there is the Ministry of Labour; there is the Board of Trade, with its Mines Department and its Department of Overseas Trade; there is the Post Office, with all its ramifications, and the Ministry of Transport; there is the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Pensions, and last (but far from least) the Education Office. The staffs of all these ministries affect the national life at a multitude of points. When we reflect on this cardinal fact, two grave questions rise naturally to our minds. Are the members of these staffs, by their previous education and social experience, equipped in advance for their great duties? Are they enabled, by their subsequent training, and by the enjoyment of opportunities for widening their social experience in after years, to perfect the equipment with which they start? The first question raises the problem of recruitment. The second raises the problem of office-training and field-work.

II.

It is perhaps excusable, before attempting to deal with these problems, to indulge in some preliminary observations. There can be no doubt of the high standard of intellectual ability in the members of the administrative class of the Home

Civil Service. The writer of this paper, who was an undergraduate with some and has since been the teacher of many more, can certify from personal experience to that simple and indubitable fact. There can equally be no doubt of their high standard of personal integrity, their genuine devotion to professional duty, and their unswerving loyalty to the Ministers (of whatever party or complexion) under whom they serve. The day of *The Three Clerks* has gone; and the "professional code," if it may so be called, of the administrative group is at least as high as that of any of the regular professions which have enunciated "ethical rules" or a "code of professional practice." Nor is this all. Professions sometimes impose rigorous conditions of entry. Entry to the administrative group of the civil service is open to every British citizen, man or woman,¹ who can pay the requisite examination fee and answer the examination papers with the requisite ability. Since the principle of open competitive examination was finally introduced in 1870 we have acted on the sixth article of the *Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* of 1789—that "all citizens, being equal in the eyes of the law, are equally admissible to all public employments, according to their capacity." This principle of equality has also another, and no less important, application. Under an old rule of our Constitution, the official is responsible for his acts, equally with the ordinary citizen, to the ordinary courts of law. That rule still stands. So long as it stands, we cannot properly speak of *Beamtentum* or bureaucracy as existing among us. The tentacles of the administrator may stretch widely; but he is still under the common law—a citizen among other citizens. In actual fact, apart from legal theory, it is the experience of most of us who live our lives in universities that the civil servant, educated in our universities along with future teachers, lawyers, doctors and business

¹ With the exception of the Foreign Office and the consular service.

men, remains in touch with his contemporaries and with his university. An American writer has spoken of him as "passing from the cloistered life of the university into the similarly cloistered life of the civil service." It is permissible to doubt whether either life is "cloistered," and whether the civil servant really "passes" away from the one life when he enters into the other.

None the less, there is a point, which it would be foolish to ignore, in the criticism which is here suggested. It is not enough to have had contact with others in the university, or to maintain and cherish contact afterwards both with them and the university. So far as that goes, it means a widening of the professional circle; but the circle still remains professional. In his daily work, and in the discharge of his administrative duties, the civil servant will be concerned with problems which affect the lives of some 45,000,000 of his fellow citizens. The question therefore arises whether, by his previous education and in the course of his subsequent period of training, he is brought into genuine contact and an understanding sympathy with the general community. Does he know, as a living part and not as an outside spectator, "the business world," "the world of labour," and all the other "worlds" (if we may use that hard-worked and tarnished word) which move in the social universe? Our critics are dubious about the answer. The American writer who has already been cited¹ detects a "lack of knowledge and appreciation, on the part of administrators, of the affairs of the outside world, except in so far as they pertain to their work." He does not stop at this. He also detects two other defects. One is a "lack of knowledge of the activities and policies of the departments of government, other than those in which they serve." The other is a "failure to consider public administration as a science," or, in other words, to realise that

¹ Professor Harvey Walker, *Training Public Employees in Great Britain*, pp. 13-17.

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administration is a scientific technique with its own fundamental principles, and not a pragmatic mystery to be learned by rote and practised by rule of thumb.

III.

The recruitment of the administrative group proceeds on two main principles. The first is that of the open competitive examination. It is to be hoped that this principle will never be abandoned or even modified. Whatever may be said against examinations (more especially by those who have conducted "an examination of examinations"), there can be no real doubt that the one way of trying out candidates—of testing not only their intelligence, but also their grit and stamina—is the way of examination. In the long run and on the whole, the mills of examination grind with an amazing fairness. That word "fairness" suggests a further and more fundamental consideration. Whatever may be said in favour of discreet and intelligent selection, and whatever may be said against the judging of candidates by the mere amassing of marks, the competitive examination remains the one thing which stands above fear and favour. Even if its results were crude, they save us from personal nepotism and the unconscious but ineluctable prejudices of party. We may cherish the conviction of our political incorruptibility. But just because we cherish it, we are bound to take every precaution against the possibility of corruption.

The second principle—subordinate to the first, but none the less important—is the principle of allowing candidates to offer themselves for examination in any group of subjects, or any combination of subjects, which they may choose. We do not, like many European countries, and like the U.S.A., require candidates for the public service to be examined in one particular group of studies (for example, law and economics) which is held to be particularly suited to the requirements of the service and to form a proper preparation for its

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duties. We allow them to be examined in groups, such as mathematics or classics, natural science or history, modern languages or economics, or in any individual mixture or combination drawn from these (and other) groups of subjects. There is this to be said for our procedure, that it widens the range of the candidates from which the state can draw; that it leaves the balance of studies in the universities undisturbed by any extrinsic bias; and that it does not encourage students to embark on special study which may be useless if they are not successful in the competition for a post. In any case our procedure is not likely to be changed in any essential respect. Minor adjustments will necessarily be made, from time to time, to bring the examination into proper relation with the progress of studies in the universities. The group of economic subjects, which has made great progress in our universities, is at present inadequately recognised in the examination; and we have the paradox that a group of subjects which should, if anything, be specially encouraged is specially rebuffed. This can, and should, be corrected; but the correction will not alter the essential scheme.

The examination for the administrative group includes, however, more than the "optional subjects" which have been hitherto mentioned. A candidate may attain a maximum of 1,000 marks in these subjects. But he may also attain a further maximum of 700 marks in five other subjects or tests, which he must *necessarily* take. Four of these subjects (each giving a maximum of 100 marks) are an essay, a paper on the use of English, a paper entitled "Present Day" (and including questions on contemporary subjects, social, economic, political and scientific), and a paper in an auxiliary language. The fifth subject or test is a *viva voce*, or oral interview, in which a candidate may attain a maximum of 300 marks. The idea naturally occurs, particularly in view of the criticism that our administrators show a "lack of knowledge.....of

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the affairs of the outside world," that the paper entitled "Present Day" should carry a higher maximum of marks. The difficulty which confronts such an idea is that this paper seems particularly to lead to "cramming," and to be of little service in the differentiation of candidates. To increase its difficulty and the number of marks which it carries may only prove to be an increase of cramming. More important is the oral interview. Of this it may safely be said that, properly conducted, it serves to discover those candidates who have social interests and social experience; and if these candidates have the other requisite gifts (which are not, it may be said in passing, mere gifts of manners and address and *aplomb*, though it would be foolish not to assign some value to these gifts), they will find their reward.

But it may still be asked whether after all, and when all is said, this system is successful in discovering recruits who are really and truly suitable to the character and scope of the functions of the central administration today, immersed as it is in the general daily concerns of the general community. In seeking to answer that question, we have to reflect on the simple facts that recruits are drawn almost wholly from the British universities. We are thus driven to inquire whether the life of our universities is such that students are likely to acquire, in the course of their student days, some width of social outlook. The opportunity of gaining that width does not depend so much on the curriculum of the university—though it may be increased and made more favourable (or the reverse) by the direction of the curriculum as on student clubs, student fashions and the bent of student interest. On this matter, different critics will have different opinions. But one who has lived and worked in three different universities since the year 1893 cannot but record his opinion that students generally (not only students of economics, but also history students, classical students, mathematical

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students and, indeed, *all* sorts of students) have a true and real interest in the affairs of the outside world; have a true and real sympathy with other sorts and conditions of men—not only in their own country, but also outside it; and are ready, when they can seize the chance, to explore the affairs of the outside world for themselves and to gain actual experience of them. The modern university is not the place of a cloistered life. It may even be said that it is not as much cloistered as, in the interest of learning and study, it ought to be.

Still, however much undergraduates may discuss the affairs of the outside world in their clubs, or wander out into it in their vacations, their opportunities are but brief, and their observation cannot be very searching. Some recruitment for the administrative class might well be made from men and women of an older growth, who, after completing their university course, have spent some years in social work and social service, or in a course of social study mixed with social work (such as is provided by some of our universities, and notably by the university of Liverpool), or in some field of practical experience in some business or profession. It is possible to imagine an alternative form of competition, with a higher age limit (say from the age of 24 to that of 28), for persons who could produce a record of such work, or study, or experience: it is possible to imagine an alternative form of examination, in which the oral interview might be longer and more searching, the papers might be different and non-specialised, and (conceivably but perhaps improbably) some written account of investigations or surveys might even be allowed to count. The universities have a technique of testing what is called post-graduate work. The Civil Service Commission could readily elaborate a similar technique; and they could afford, at any rate experimentally, to allocate some proportion of the places filled by competition to can-

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didates of the post-graduate type. There would, of course, arise questions of the initial grading, the subsequent course of promotion, and the ultimate pensions of recruits who entered at a later age; but such questions could be solved. Ultimately, if the alternative system of post-graduate entry commended itself in experience, it might be possible to select freely the best men from the two parallel examinations, without assigning a fixed proportion of places to either. That may seem a difficult and dubious proposition; but the experience of the universities shows that propositions no less difficult can be faced, and faced successfully.

There would be a number of advantages in such an alternative examination. The state would gain by enjoying a greater range of choice, and by securing what might prove to be a material specially suitable to the new developments of its work. The type of student who does not wish to rush into immediate occupation as soon as he has taken his degree, but to acquire further experience and larger qualifications, would be recognised. (One reflects, for example, on the Commonwealth Fund Fellows, who have spent two years in the U.S.A.; but they are only one specimen.) Women candidates, in particular, might benefit. It is only a very small proportion of women students who succeed in the present open competition: indeed very few compete. On the alternative system here suggested it is possible, and indeed probable, that a much larger proportion of women would be candidates. Women have a genius and a capacity for social work and service. The alternative form of competition would give them a chance of showing that genius and that capacity. It might give them a new incentive to compete for entry into the administrative service of the state, in which their gifts and their presence are needed.

There is one consideration, apparently irrelevant but really germane, which may be added at this point. If, as has

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here been argued, the departments of government need the services of men and women with genuine social experience for the proper discharge of their present functions, it is only fair to add that the members of the administrative staffs of these departments cannot be expected to supply the whole of the social experience which is needed. Social experience must be brought into the service *by* them; but it must also be brought *to* them when they are in the service. This is the function of consultative committees, attached to the various departments, and representing the world outside which is particularly interested, and particularly versed, in the type of work belonging to the scope of the several departments. Some experience of the work of the consultative committee of the Board of Education, during which it prepared what is nowadays called "the Hadow Report," suggests the value of a general system of consultative committees, applied to each and every department. If, as it is stated in the definition of 1920, the duties of the administrative group are "those concerned with the formation of policy," a consultative committee may well be of singular service to it in the discharge of those duties. The reference on which the Hadow Report is based was suggested by the committee itself, and readily accepted by the Minister and his permanent officials. The policy formed and submitted by the committee has definitely proved its value in the ten years which have elapsed since 1926.

IV.

There remains for consideration the theme of the training of recruits after they have entered the service. Various methods are possible. One is the method of "tutorial" training of the new officer by a senior officer, who seeks to acquaint him with the work and the duties primarily of his particular branch, but secondarily also of the office at large. Another is the method of field-work, practised in some of the offices (the Ministry of Labour, the Colonial and the Domin-

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ions Office, and, more especially, the Post Office), under which the new recruit is trained not only at headquarters, but also in the actual field of the operations of his office. A third method, not yet developed, would add to "tutorial" training and to field-work a further and more general training designed to give both a knowledge of the activities and policies of the various departments of the government in their connections and inter-relations, and a grasp of the fundamental principles of the science (if it may properly be called a science) of public administration.

These are matters on which an outsider will be mainly silent, and, if he speaks at all, will only speak with a tentative and disarming caution. Our American critics, accustomed to the profession and practice of a science of public administration in their own universities, and remarking its lack in ours, will tell us that the Treasury, *faute de mieux*, ought to erect a training college for civil servants, in which this science should be inculcated by lectures and assignments of text books. Most of us will murmur to ourselves, *Di meliora*; but after that murmur we may go on to admit that, whether by the Treasury or by some combination of departments, or by the universities, something of the sort, in some sort of way, might well be attempted. More important than that, however, and more congruous with the whole line of the argument of this paper, is the matter of field-work. If the officials who are recruited by the great "departments of the interior" are to get down to the roots of the problems with which they will be called upon to deal, there is nothing which would seem to be more imperatively needed than experience in the field. The Post Office is unique, or at any rate exceptional, in the provision which it has recently made for the field training of its officers. It is natural, though it may also be erroneous, to connect the recent remarkable advance of the Post Office—its readiness to make new experiments,

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and its responsiveness to social needs—with this provision. The more field training is extended through all the departments of the interior, the greater is likely to be their alertness and their efficiency. There are many ways in which such training can be attempted. The departments which have provincial offices can send their recruits for a period of service and experience in those offices. The departments which maintain a staff of inspectors, such as the Ministry of Health and the Board of Education, can attempt some interchange between the inspectorate and the administrative staffs. It is even possible to imagine some interchange between the central administrative staff and the administrative staffs of some of our larger cities and counties—or, at any rate, some system by which members of the central administrative staff are temporarily seconded for the purpose of gaining experience of the work of local authorities.

No doubt there are difficulties which stand in the way of such measures. They may involve some increase of staff, which is always a bug-bear to the taxpayer: they may also involve some dislocation of administrative routine, and some postponement of the time at which the recruit becomes familiar with his actual duties and efficient in their immediate performance. But it would seem, at any rate to an outsider, that the price might well be paid. Just as there is an argument for a later recruitment of some of the members of the administrative staff, in order that Government may secure the services of men and women who have already gained a larger social experience, so there is also an argument for giving an opportunity to those who have been recruited early to gain similar experience in their initial years. Not that the opportunity of field-work can, or should, be confined to one class of recruits. It will be needed, in some measure, by all alike. But it will be particularly needed, in greater measure and for a longer time, by those who come straight to the public service from their undergraduate course.

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By HAROLD NICOLSON

I

"DIPLOMACY," wrote Sir Ernest Satow, "is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the Governments of independent States." How comes it that this definition, adequate though it was when written, strikes us today as but a nonchalant evasion of those professional duties which modern democracy demands from its Foreign Service? Was it merely the catastrophe of the war which forced modern democracy to insist that diplomacy should become both more representative and more efficient? Did the errors of the post-war period (which incidentally were due to the politician rather than to the diplomatist) suddenly arouse public opinion to a greater awareness of foreign policy and the methods by which that policy is executed? Or is the present discontent with the functioning of our Foreign Service an endemic rather than an epidemic affliction, a mere continuance in a long process of adjustment between the sovereign and his servants? Such are the questions which suggest themselves at the outset of our enquiry. Nor, even as rhetorical questions, are they wholly otiose. For in fact that confusion of thought which arises from such phrases as "Old and New Diplomacy," "Open versus Secret Diplomacy" is perpetuated largely owing to the fact that such questions remain unanswered. There are thus many people who believe that some sudden gulf sunders the conception of diplomacy as it existed before or after the war, and that President Wilson was able to impose upon the world an ethical conception, not merely different from, but actually opposed to, the political conception of diplomacy which existed in pre-war Europe. No such sudden conversion

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did in fact take place. The whole history of diplomacy, as of the Foreign Service, shows that in this country at least there has been a continuous if slow progress towards greater representation and greater efficiency. Nor is it possible to discuss the present or the future without examining how that progress has developed in the last hundred years.

II

It must be remembered in the first place that the British Foreign Service is of comparatively recent growth, and that no recognised diplomatic profession existed in Great Britain until after the Congress of Vienna. "When I entered the service," remarked Stratford de Redcliffe, "there was, so to speak, no such thing at all." True it was, of course, that the old dual Secretariates—the Northern and Southern Departments of the eighteenth century—were not entirely unstaffed. Pitt had two Under Secretaries and nine clerks attached to his office. Yet these officials did not deal exclusively with foreign affairs, but dabbled in what we should now call Home Office questions or even in the affairs of Ireland. Even when in 1782 the Northern Department became the "Foreign Department" under the exciting rule of Charles James Fox no special staff was created. It was not till 1790, when the Foreign Department moved from the Whitehall Cockpit to Downing Street, that the rudiments of a Foreign Office staff were evolved. In those congested quarters—"a thorough picture of disorder, penury and meanness"—a Permanent Under Secretary was housed with a salary of £1,500 a year, assisted by a chief clerk, two senior clerks, nine junior clerks, a Latin Secretary, and a "Decipherer of Letters" who drew what seems a disproportionate salary of £500 a year. This staff was increased in 1822 and at the same time some rudimentary provision was made for a diplomatic service of paid officials.

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Until then it had been the custom of Ambassadors to recruit their staff from among the more elegant of their nephews or the more ambitious of the young men about town. These gilded youths were, it is true, housed at the expense of the Ambassador, formed part of his "household" or "family," fed at his table, and were occasionally granted expense allowances from the Ambassador's private purse. Obviously such a system was highly invidious, expensive and inefficient. It was not till 1822 however that any serious attempt was made to create a salaried service responsible, not to the person of the Ambassador, but to the state itself. It should be noted however that the personal connection, and indeed much of the original theory, remained until quite recently. In the first place the idea persisted that the members of an Ambassador's staff or "family" should be of the same class as himself. In the second place it was for long (until 1919 to be exact) assumed that so great was the privilege, so vast the opportunity, accorded to a young man by being attached to an Embassy or Legation that the state was, at first, under no obligation to pay him a salary. Even in Victorian times it was quite usual for an attaché to work without pay and on a purely voluntary basis for the first sixteen years of his service. So late as 1918 a young man entering the Diplomatic Service was obliged to guarantee that for the first two years he would support himself, at a rate of not less than £400 a year, entirely on his own resources. Even in the later stages of his career his pay was wholly inadequate. In the year 1918, when I was myself doing responsible work at the Paris Peace Conference the amount of salary which I received from the Government was (when income tax had been deducted) no more than £86 a year. Thus one of the most important reforms introduced, in pursuance of the recommendations of the Macdonnell Committee of 1914, was that of a general raising

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of all salaries. This reform became effective in 1920 and, by its abolition of the former property qualification, went far to place the Foreign Service upon a more democratic basis.

A similar process of democratisation can be traced in the actual conditions of entry and recruitment for the Foreign Service. Originally a nomination as an attaché rested entirely in the hands of the Secretary of State, nor was any qualifying test demanded beyond a two months' probation in the Foreign Department. It was not till 1856 that Lord Clarendon introduced a qualifying entrance examination with a high standard for French and hand-writing. A competitive, rather than a qualifying, examination was subsequently imposed by Lord Granville. A Select Committee in 1871 recommended that an Oxford or Cambridge degree should exempt a candidate from any test other than a hand-writing test and that the probation period of an attaché should be reduced from four to two years. This recommendation was at the time ignored and similar opposition was shown (by the Treasury rather than by the Foreign Office itself) to the recommendation of the Ridley Committee of 1890 urging even at that early date that all income qualifications should be abolished. In 1905 Lord Lansdowne decreed that candidates for the Diplomatic Service or the Foreign Office should take the ordinary Civil Service Examination plus a high qualifying standard in French and German. In 1907 Sir Edward Grey entrusted the "vetting" of candidates for nomination (a task which had until then been vested in himself acting through his Private Secretaries) to a "Selection Board" on which outside bodies should have representation. And in July, 1918, Lord Robert Cecil had the, to him, extreme pleasure of announcing to the House of Commons that the two services were in future to be fused into one service, to be known as "The Foreign Service" and that the old property qualifications were to be abolished.

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So much for the main landmarks in that slow process by which the Foreign Service has been rendered more representative of the Sovereign People. It remains to examine, under this heading, how far the caste system still remains in the Service, how far it should remain, and what prospects there are of it being wholly abolished.

III

The considerations which underlay Lord Lansdowne's reform of 1905, by which the examination for the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service was fused with that of the general Civil Service, do not appear from the documents which record that alteration. Lord Lansdowne's real motives in inaugurating this reform were rather to secure greater efficiency than to ensure greater representation. The point is of some interest since it has a bearing upon future reform. I shall thus deal with it in some detail.

Under the Clarendon system a candidate for either of the two branches of the Foreign Service had first to obtain a nomination from the Secretary of State. He had then to pass a qualifying examination and was thereafter admitted as an attaché or "on probation." This system had certain merits. In the first place the Secretary of State, before granting a nomination, took pains to ascertain whether the youth in question was really suitable for a diplomatic career. The frame of mind in which he approached the problem was not one of ill-considered nepotism or patronage, but akin rather to the attitude of the Colonel of a crack regiment selecting subalterns. He had the interests of the service itself primarily at heart. The qualifying examination was not, except in regard to foreign languages, a very serious ordeal, whereas the probation period was exacting and effective. Only a small proportion of the probationary attachés were granted commissions and it was thus possible, without

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offence, to exclude many young men who, in actual practice, had proved unfitted to that particular career. It was from such a harvest that was garnered the great Chateau vintages of the later Victorian epoch, those excellent Ambassadors of 1880 to 1910.

Lord Granville's introduction of the competitive system was not in fact an improvement on the former method. The nomination standard remained, but the examination was stiffened in a most ill-considered manner. The standard in French, German, Italian, Spanish and, above all, geography, was exacting to a degree. It became essential for candidates on leaving school to spend some four years in foreign countries interspersed with cramming geography at Scoones'. The product of this wholly unintelligent system was not the sort of product which the state desired. It furnished a crop of young men who from the age of seventeen or eighteen had spent their time in foreign pensions and who had thereby acquired a mastery of foreign languages but little knowledge of anything else. In insisting upon the general Civil Service standard, and in raising the age limit to twenty-two, Lord Lansdowne was catering for an entirely different type of young man. From 1906 onwards it became difficult for any man to enter the service unless he had obtained a good honours' degree at the University, fortified by one or two subsequent years abroad. From that moment a far more national, and far less international, type of person was produced.

In recent years, indeed, the standard has become a trifle too exclusive. With increasing competition, it has become almost impossible for any young man who has not obtained first-class honours to hope for success. A complaint has thus arisen that the Foreign Service is over-intellectualised and schemes are on foot to reduce the age limit and slightly to lower the qualifying standard in languages.

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The problem of nomination still remains. A candidate who wishes to enter the Foreign Service is still obliged to appear before a Selection Board before he can even enter the examination. This Board is not, as some believe, composed exclusively of elderly officials of the Foreign Office; it is fortified by Members of Parliament from all parties, by a representative of the Civil Service Commission, and by one representative of the fighting services. Nor are its decisions guided purely by social considerations. Social status is certainly taken into account, and of recent years many young men have been rejected for excessive elegance, and many young men for excessive lack of elegance. The Board aims at striking a happy mean. But in principle they take no account of birth, accent, education or income; they are supposed to consider only character and suitability.

Is that principle maintained in practice? In so far as the decisions of the Board are concerned, I should answer that question in the affirmative. Yet the very existence of the Board, the ordeal of such an examination, does in fact deter many young men from submitting their candidature from fear of such social disqualification. So long as the Board exists, the theory will (and not without cause) persist that no person can hope for nomination unless he has been educated at a good public school and unless he possesses some social qualifications.

This brings me to a further consideration, namely, "Are such social qualifications necessary to an efficient Foreign Service?" In pre-war days a certain level of social elegance was in fact essential. It was, for instance, of distinct disadvantage to an Ambassador at such places as Vienna, Petersburg, Berlin, Rome and even Paris to have upon his staff secretaries or attachés who were socially incompetent or crude. The important people in those capitals were either members of, or sensitive to, a social caste. Special social

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glamour was always expected of a British Embassy and of British attachés. There is no use denying the fact that it was more useful to an Ambassador if one of his secretaries played bridge with Iswolsky or tennis with Berchtold than if he knew the sub-editor of the *Novoe Vremya* or Dr. Auer of the Social Democratic group. It will be contended that such snobbish considerations cannot apply today. I do not wholly support that contention. Yet I can qualify it in certain ways.

In the pre-war period it was observable that a secretary who came from the more exclusive sections of British society was not of very much social value abroad. He was apt to be bored by the social conventions of foreign capitals and to retire into his own rooms where he would read Henri de Regnier or Barrès in a dressing gown. The type of man who took real trouble to go to tea parties was the type of man who, in Mayfair, would not be asked to tea parties. The outstanding social successes achieved by British attachés in foreign capitals were achieved generally by men who were regarded by their patrician colleagues as slightly second-rate.

On the other hand it must be admitted that in foreign capitals, even in the Washington and Moscow of today, a certain prestige does still attach to Savile Row. Commissars and Senators may laugh at such things, but in fact they are slightly offended if a Secretary of the British Embassy fails to live up to type. It would be inaccurate to contend that social considerations play no part in modern diplomacy; I believe that they still do and above all in so far as regards our own Diplomatic Service. The problem is really of another nature. It is this. "Does the advantage of retaining the public-school type in the Foreign Service outweigh the disadvantage of such retention diminishing confidence at home?" Is it worth, in other words, impressing foreigners by a system which diminishes the confidence of the British

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electorate? I do not think so, and my solution of the riddle lies in the fusion of the Foreign Service with the Consular Service which I suggest at the end of this article.

IV

The above account of the gradual democratisation of the Foreign Service suggests that with the abolition of the income and the nomination tests the Service could be rendered as "open," let us say, as the Post Office. It must be remembered, however, that the Foreign Service in these days attracts the best minds in the country, and that the present exacting standard of the examination excludes all those who have been unable, either by scholarships or wealth, to afford a full university education plus at least one year abroad learning foreign languages. This, in itself, constitutes a sieve through which only the rich can easily pass.

Yet it is not democratisation alone which the Foreign Service needs, it is also modernisation and rationalisation; not only should the Service become more representative of the sovereign people, but it should also correspond more effectively to modern needs. I shall approach this aspect of my discussion under two headings, namely, The Foreign Service and Public Opinion and The Foreign Service and Commerce.

It will generally be admitted that the disadvantage of democratic control over foreign policy is that it leads to slowness and irresponsibility. There is always a time-lag between the thoughts of the statesman or diplomatist and the moment when those thoughts are accepted by public opinion. There is also a tendency for a democracy to repudiate engagements into which it has entered. For instance, it took many years before the British public came to agree with the realisation of the Treasury and the Foreign Office that the whole Reparation scheme was economically

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impracticable. During that interval both those Departments of State were accused by public opinion of being "pro-German." Consider again the irresponsible attitude adopted by public opinion towards the Locarno Treaties. The British public ignored the fact that these Treaties had been openly negotiated, had been ratified by both Houses of Parliament, and had at the time of their conclusion been universally welcomed. The moment that these Treaties came to entail some obligation on the part of their signatories, the British public were anxious to disavow them. It never seemed to occur to them that you cannot control policy without assuming responsibility, or that a collective breach of faith would be committed by the disavowal of Treaties publicly entered into and ratified.

Clearly this time-lag places democratic diplomacy at a grave disadvantage in dealing with autocracies, even as the unreliability of democratic good-faith depreciates the value of international contract. Any expansion or reform of the Foreign Service must take account of these two disadvantages and endeavour, both for purposes of representation and efficiency, to mitigate them. How is this to be done?

I have already suggested that the present caste-system diminishes public confidence and should thus, whatever its other advantages, be abolished. Much can and has been done by education and publicity to render our democracy more alert and responsible in regard to foreign affairs. An important lesson to inculcate is that of the distinction between foreign policy and "diplomacy" or the methods by which that policy is exercised. Were the public once to become assured that policy would never be secret—in the sense that the country could never be committed without their knowledge and consent to a course of action liable to lead either to war or to the breaking of a pledge—then they might be more ready to leave the execution of that policy to con-

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fidential handling by experts. It is this problem of public education which must thus be envisaged.

The critics of the Foreign Office do not always understand the difficulty of finding a reasonable basis for the relations between the Department and the Press. The principle adopted in Downing Street is to avoid following the example of foreign Ministries and having "favourites" among the various newspapers. The Foreign Office, within obvious limits, try to give the same information to all the newspapers irrespective of party or attitude. This system has many advantages, but it has this disadvantage that the news put out by the Foreign Office, in that it is reduced to the lowest common factor, is scarcely news at all. The more popular newspapers tend therefore to ignore the Foreign Office completely and to obtain from minor Embassies or Legations items of coloured information which, although less accurate, are more sensational.

For the purposes of public education I should therefore wish to see an extension of a practice, adopted with great success in regard to the American Debt, of publishing from time to time the text of Notes or Memoranda setting out the British point of view. Such publication would not merely provide the public with considered information, but would show them with what lucidity and calm the Foreign Office approach the problems with which they have to deal. Confidence, by such methods, would be enhanced.

V

A further area of expansion and improvement is that of Commercial services and information. Great progress has been made during the last few years in bringing the Foreign Service into closer contact with commercial interests. So long as this tendency develops on the lines of justifiable support for reputable commercial enterprises, and of th

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provision of full trade statistics and information, nothing but good will result. The institution by the British Government of the Directorate of Overseas Trade, as the analogous creation by the United States Government of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, are important steps in a right direction. On the other hand a tendency has arisen in certain states to expect from their representatives abroad a greater measure of commercial activity and intervention than is consonant either with their political interests or with the maintenance of harmonious relations with other competing countries.

The international status acquired since 1918 by the British self-governing Dominions creates another problem which, in any schemes for the reform of the Foreign Service, will have to be taken carefully into account. This issue has not as yet been dealt with in a very uniform or careful manner. Some progress has been made, especially in Australia, in providing the Dominion prime ministers with the nucleus of a trained diplomatic staff. It would be an excellent thing if young men from the Dominions could be more regularly attached to the Foreign Office and leading Embassies. Already the Dominion Legations abroad are providing valuable experience. Yet for all essential purposes of Imperial co-ordination the main channels of discussion and information are the High Commissioners in London, who are not in every case fully competent for such specialised duties. This problem is one, however, which is settling itself. Already the Dominion of Canada has the nucleus of a gifted and trained staff of diplomatic experts. Other Dominions will follow suit. It may confidently be predicted that within a few years an almost perfected system of Commonwealth diplomacy will have been achieved.

The innovations introduced into the actual practice of diplomacy since the war have not been successful and are

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now slightly discredited. People are beginning to find that diplomacy essentially is the art of negotiating and signing documents in a ratifiable and dependable form. There is a tendency also, both in Great Britain and the United States, to distrust the amateur diplomatist and to revert to the older method of negotiation through professional Ambassadors acting under instructions from their Governments. The increased facilities for communication may well modify but will certainly not diminish the value of experience and personality in diplomatic representatives abroad; and the appointment to important Embassies of men devoid of professional experience is not a practice which, as the United States Government have discovered, always contributes to efficiency. Equally dangerous is the system of diplomacy by Conference, which has, since 1915, become so frequent a feature of international intercourse. If the Concert of Europe is ever re-established it will be found that these dramatic meetings will be abandoned and that personal contact between Foreign Ministers (a practice which, if not exaggerated, is sometimes useful) will be maintained at the periodic meetings of the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations.

VI

In what directions, therefore, should the Foreign Service be improved? There can be no question but that in integrity, in public spirit, and in general level of intelligence the British Foreign Service is second to none. Were it still further democratized it would acquire that full public confidence which its great merits deserve. But in rendering it more representative cannot we also render it even more efficient than it is? I think a great improvement could be effected by reforms effected in regard to promotion and personnel.

I am no fanatical advocate of promotion by merit versus promotion by seniority. How is permanent, as distinct from

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occasional, merit to be assessed? How are we to make certain that promotion by merit only would not lead to that scramble for self-advancement which discredits and disables the Foreign Services of so many continental countries? Moreover, it is always possible to reward the meritorious, not by actual advancement, but by increasing the responsibility and interest of their work. On the other hand there is no doubt that promotion by seniority, if effected upon a rigorous queue system, does lead to discouragement and lassitude in the middle stages. A certain stagnation seems to descend upon the men of the Counsellor or junior Minister rank and all too often those who retain their energy are apt at that phase in their career to resign from the service, whereas those who remain are frequently tired and disillusioned men. It is a question, not so much of increased promotion or salary, as of increased opportunities.

The comparative immovability of the Civil Servant, admirable as the principle is, tends in the Foreign Service to maintain a type who "stays on doing nothing." Such people concentrate rather on the avoidance of mistakes than on the furtherance of the national interest. They aim only at a soft Legation and an eventual pension. They take no risks and their very presence is both a bar and a bad example to the energy of others.

I see but only one solution to these problems, and that is the fusion of the Foreign Service with the Consular Service. I am well aware that such fusion would create grave fiscal disputes with the Treasury and would in some respects injure vested interests. At the same time it would provide great advantages. It would, in the first place, democratize the Service by removing that foolish class-barrier between the Diplomatic and the Consular establishment. It would increase opportunity for the young, since any bright youth would learn and do more as Vice Consul at Konia or Aleppo

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than as third secretary in Brussels. It would provide convenient dumping grounds for the ineffectual elderly diplomatist who could be offered the alternatives of the Algiers Consulate General or retirement. It would relieve the congestion which stultifies both services. It would attract to the Consular Service an even better type of man. And it would increase the supply of ability without lessening the demand.

I am aware, of course, that under any such fusion a service would be created so large that all personal contact would be lost. A young man might be sent to Düsseldorf and have no chance for years of making himself felt. This disadvantage could be surmounted by a device which would in itself constitute a valuable innovation. A Staff College could be created on the analogy of Camberley in which diplomatists and consular officers of a certain seniority would undergo a course of training in finance and economics, thereby increasing their knowledge and utility. The entrance into and exit from this College would be subject to a severe competitive examination and only those who had passed through the College would, in general circumstances, be eligible for the higher appointments. Such a scheme would, I well know, be warmly welcomed by the existing members both of the Foreign Service itself and of the Consular Services. It is only upon lines such as these that the maximum of representation could be combined with the maximum of efficiency.

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By SIR ERNEST SIMON

THE Hadow report, published in 1934, dealt fully with the "qualifications, recruitment, training and promotion of local government officers." It is an admirable report, and an invaluable guide to those wishing to study the problems of the local government civil service. It is much to be regretted that no action has yet been taken to implement any of its important recommendations.

In view of the existence of this authoritative and recent report, there would be no advantage in attempting to cover the whole of the problems of the local government civil service in this article. I propose therefore, to use the space available for the discussion of one vital aspect of the problem, the position and qualifications of the head officials. I am firmly convinced that the future of local government depends more than anything else on this one factor: if the right men are appointed to the chief posts and given proper support and responsibility, it may be taken as a certainty that the city will be well governed; if, on the other hand, the chief officials are not men of the right personality and qualifications, no other reforms in connection with the appointment, training, promotion, etc., of the remaining staff will save the city from disaster.

I propose to discuss this problem from the point of view of my own experience as a member of the Manchester City Council, and as director for many years of various private companies. I shall, therefore, confine myself to the problem of the large county borough; the conclusions will, I think, to a considerable extent, be applicable to the civil service in other forms of local government.

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In the first place, it must be remembered that almost the whole of the work of the City Council is carried out by committees, each of which deals with a particular section of the work. Each committee has a chief official, with the necessary staff under him. The official is, or should be, responsible for advising the committee on the whole range of its work, from the widest questions of policy down to the smallest details; the committee then takes its decisions, paying as much or as little regard to the advice as it chooses, and the official should then be responsible for the execution of the committee's decisions, though the members of the committee may, if they desire, take an active part in the execution of some of the work.

This organisation and division of responsibility is exactly the same as in the normal limited company carrying on any business, where the directors and the general manager correspond to the committee and the head official. The chairman may in either case take over a part of the duties of the head official. But the essential tasks of the committee are to appoint the official, to settle policy, to supervise its execution, and then to interpret and defend the policy to the public. Given the right type of committee members, and the right head official, experience shows this to be the best possible organisation.

The qualifications and experience needed to control the work of different committees vary over a wide range. Let us therefore consider them in the case of a few typical committees.

THE EDUCATION COMMITTEE

The director of education¹ in a large town has a job of the utmost interest and importance. In Manchester he is responsible for the education of over 100,000 children in the ele-

¹ The present town clerk, medical officer of health and director of education were none of them appointed when I left the Council. Nothing in this article in any way relates to individual officials of the Manchester City Council.

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mentary schools and 30,000 students in secondary schools and institutions for further education; for the buildings and equipment of some 250 schools and other establishments; for the appointment and control of over 4,000 teachers and for a budget of over £1½ millions a year; for the control of a considerable business undertaking in the matter of organising and purchasing supplies from pianos to pins and the hundred and one materials required in the schools, foodstuffs and their cooking to feed some 10,000 children every school day, the making of contracts of a wide variety from the erection of new schools to the washing of towels. It is an immense administrative task. And in addition he has real responsibility for the quality of the education given to all these children and young people; he must study the whole of education up to the end of the secondary school, and beyond. In fact, the position is one of fascinating interest, offering the fullest scope to all the qualities of intellect and character of the highest type of administrator.

For the appointment of a director it is usual today to insist on three qualifications:

- (a) experience in teaching; preferably both in elementary and secondary schools.
- (b) experience in administration in an education department.
- (c) a university degree. This is interesting and important since it is the only administrative post in local government for which a university degree is generally held to be necessary, apart from the cases where a professional qualification, which can only be obtained through a university, is required (e.g. medical officer of health).

We believe these to be the right qualifications for the position, with one proviso: the university degree should

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not be too rigidly insisted on. There are many aspects of administrative ability which cannot be taught in the university and must be partly inborn and partly learnt by actual experience. An exceptional man who has missed the university may have so educated himself as to make a first-class director of education.

Educational administration is beginning to be recognised as a desirable career for university graduates. The graduate takes his fourth year in a training department, then about a year each teaching in an elementary and a secondary school, then applies for some post in an education department, either in the office or as an inspector. He next endeavours to get experience in various aspects of educational administration, and probably in various towns; and hopes ultimately to become a director.

It seems likely that in future most directors will be appointed from among men of this type. In fact, these men are gradually forming something like an administrative class of education officers, roughly equivalent to the administrative class of the national civil service.

The salaries rise to about £2,000 in a large town, the scale is probably lower than the national civil service; much higher than in most forms of teaching, on the whole, perhaps higher than in academic life. The work is intensely interesting and important. The only drawback is that the director may have to work under an incompetent, perhaps jealous, perhaps suspicious or bullying, committee. But this is relatively rare; in any case a man should not go into municipal administration unless he is fairly tough, and ready to stand up to a difficult or unpleasant chairman. But taken all in all, the work is attractive, and adequately paid. The class of applicant is steadily improving; and it seems likely that a really good service will emerge.

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THE PUBLIC HEALTH COMMITTEE

The head official of the Public Health Committee has a task as important, as interesting, and at least as varied as that of the director of education; a task requiring the highest administrative qualities. How is he selected?

The medical officer of health, who has certain statutory duties, must by statute be a qualified doctor. Generally, local authorities also insist on a D.P.H. (Diploma in Public Health). And the medical officer of health is, I believe, invariably the administrative head of the Public Health Department. This means that the head administrator spends six years at the university studying medicine. Then another two or three years getting hospital experience, and his D.P.H. Then he gets a public health job, and begins to get administrative experience; but still probably does a good deal of medical work, and may continue to do so for many years.

Now neither medical training nor medical experience, apart from general mental training for what it may be worth, give any of the kinds of knowledge or skill or experience needed for administration. At the age of 30 the young doctor in the public health service is quite inexperienced and uneducated as an administrator. His whole training, and probably his interests, lie in a different direction; he has almost certainly become largely set in his habits, interests, and outlook. Surely he is *much* less likely to become a competent administrator than a man who has made administration his aim and interest from the age of 18, and has spent much the greater part of his time and energy in acquiring the right knowledge and experience.

One further point: able young men, with scholarships and doctorates, are choosing the career of educational administration, and devoting themselves wholeheartedly to it. There are hardly any scholarships to the universities for medicine; its study is therefore confined to the few who have

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money behind them. Then after graduation, the best of the medicals are said to tend to go into consulting work, where the rewards may be much greater than in public health.

It would seem clear, therefore, that to confine the headship of a Public Health Committee to a doctor is greatly to limit the field of choice, and to insist on training and experience definitely unsuitable to administration. This is confirmed by the almost universal opinion I have found among competent judges, that in general public health committees are markedly inferior in the quality of their administration to education committees.

If this be correct, the remedy is clear. The appointment of head administrator should be given by the Public Health Committee to the best available man with the best administrative training. The medical officer of health must, of course, carry out his statutory duties, and must be head of the purely medical work. But the immense administrative task of controlling the hospitals, sanatoria, clinics, the infant welfare centres and so on, should be entrusted to the best administrator. The permanent secretary of the Ministry of Health is a layman; the doctors work under him for administrative purposes. There is no reason why they should not do the same in local government. Such an arrangement, if wisely carried out, would set the doctors free to deal with the medical work for which they are trained and fitted, and would in most cases certainly make the whole work of the department both cheaper and more efficient.

THE TOWN CLERK

We now come to the weakest spot in English local government: the control of the work of the Council as a whole, the provision of leadership on the broad aspects of the government and development of the city. It is true that owing to the great variety of functions undertaken by the City Council,

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most of the work must be done by committees, each of which becomes expert on its own particular task. But all the committees are contributing to the one great object of governing the city in such a way that it shall be a pleasant, convenient, healthy and cheap place to live in. However efficient the work of the individual committees may be, the result cannot be successful unless there is a directing brain at the top constantly examining the efficiency and the co-ordination of the work of the different committees; constantly looking ahead and studying the big questions of policy. If it is to be well done, the responsibility for this work must be definitely laid on a small committee, and ultimately on one or two individuals.

The main weakness of British city government is, I believe, due to the fact that there is no statutory provision for effective control. This lack of provision for leadership is a feature unique to British cities among great business organisations of the world. Nearly all foreign cities have powerful leaders—Burgomasters, Maires, City Managers, who are held responsible for the good government of their city as a whole. All governments have a Prime Minister or a "Leader." All government departments have a Minister at their head, under him a permanent secretary; the former responsible for policy, the latter for its efficient execution. Every private business in the world has a recognised and responsible head; big corporations normally have a board with a chairman, responsible for policy, and a staff under a general manager, to carry out the policy. The principle of defined personal responsibility for leadership is universal throughout the world in business undertakings, including the committees of our City Councils, with one and only one outstanding exception: the government of our British cities.

It is, of course, true that in many cases leadership is improvised, in some cases very successfully. This is often done through the dominant party; in London and in Birmingham

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the party in control takes full responsibility both for policy and for efficiency ; in Birmingham, this is done through the Conservative party caucus ; in London it is at present done through the Labour Party caucus, and the officially recognised leader of the Council, Mr. Morrison. In Liverpool there was for many years a strong leadership through the personal domination of Sir Archibald Salvidge. In other cases, leadership may be provided through a General Purposes Committee, which usually would represent all parties and the principal committees : but generally speaking, this method does not seem to be effective. In other cases, by sheer personality, the Town Clerk has been able to attain such a position that his advice has become a dominating influence in the Council. The late Sir Robert Fox of Leeds, and Sir Lewis Beard of Blackburn, were outstanding examples.

But this improvisation of leadership is, I believe, the exception. In the large majority of cases it may fairly be said that there is no effective machinery for central control : the Lord Mayor is loaded with ceremonial duties, and is usually appointed for a single year only, so that he can never get to know his job. As a leader of the business of the Council he is almost useless. The town clerk is usually appointed primarily as legal adviser ; he has inevitably many other duties but few of the responsibilities of a general manager. The Finance Committee, with the advice of the City Treasurer, is responsible for reporting on all financial proposals of the committees, but has nothing to do with general policy. There is sometimes a General Purposes Committee, but it rarely has any real power. And there is usually nothing else.

This lack of central control is a most serious weakness ; if a committee is inefficient, even if its work is notoriously badly done, it is nobody's business. But even more serious is the fact that there is no co-ordination of the work of the committees, no central planning. It is nobody's business

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to think and plan the good government and development of the city as a whole. And therefore this vital work is not done ; the kind of planning by which the Burgomasters have made the German towns what they are has simply not been done in England ; because it has been nobody's business to think about it.

THE REMEDY

The remedy is simple : it is only necessary to appoint the town clerk as chief official, with the following responsibilities :—

- (1) to advise the Council on all matters, including policy ;
- (2) to see that all their decisions are carried out, and that the whole work of the Council is efficiently performed ;
- (3) to advise on the appointment of the whole of the staff.

These are responsibilities which should always be given to the head official of any business concern, and equally in the case of a City Council. They reserve to the City Council all decisions ; the town clerk has full responsibility to advise on matters of every kind ; he then awaits the decision of the Council, and having received it is fully responsible to see that it is promptly and effectively carried out.

The work of a City Council is much more varied than that of any ordinary business ; the work of the separate committees needs such a wide variety of technical knowledge that the town clerk cannot attempt to understand it all. He will inevitably delegate almost the whole of his authority inside the field of work of any single committee to the head official of that committee. But he should keep in close enough touch to know that the work is being well done. And there is an immense amount of co-ordination for which he must be directly responsible, as well as the whole of the broad problems of advising on the policy of the city government.

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How should the town clerk be trained? He should, of course, be the head of the administrative staff of the City Council, that is to say, he should be the ablest and most experienced administrator on the whole staff of the city. Should he be a lawyer? The practice has grown up of making the legal adviser the head official. There has been much controversy as to whether this is a suitable qualification or not. The Hadow Report states that "The essential qualification of the clerk is administrative ability. He should be a person of broad and constructive outlook, interested in the wider issues of local government, skilled in negotiation . . . Insistence on a legal qualification has the disadvantage that it excludes from the principal positions in local government persons of high administrative ability, whose experience has been gained in other work. This disadvantage is, to our mind, serious, for high administrative ability is not plentiful. We cannot agree, therefore, that a legal qualification should always be a condition of appointment as clerk to a local authority, particularly to a large local authority."

There are two further reasons against confining the head post in local government to lawyers: firstly a legal training is by no means a specially good one for administration, rather the reverse, as it tends to produce a wrong mental outlook; secondly a man can only become a solicitor by an apprenticeship costing about £300, so that all who cannot afford this are automatically excluded. It is, of course, clear that local authorities require competent legal advice, and in small authorities it may be desirable, for reasons of economy, that a solicitor should be the clerk. In large cities where there is full time work for one or more solicitors this argument loses its importance. In such cases it seems to us quite clear that the best available administrator should be appointed as town clerk. It is a very rare thing for a lawyer to be appointed managing director of a great company. On the whole, the

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experience and qualifications of lawyers are not suitable for such a post. It is equally clear that they are not suitable for the post of head of a local government civil service. The natural field of selection would be a man who had grown up in city administration, either in the town clerk's department, or a specially good head of any other department. The recent appointment by the L.C.C. of their director of education to be Clerk to the Council is an example of the right kind of appointment of a very experienced and able administrator who is not a lawyer; it is generally agreed to have been a wise and successful appointment.

We regard it as of the utmost importance that the habit of confining the head administrative position to lawyers should be abolished.

PROFESSIONAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE HEADS?

The custom of appointing men with professional qualifications as heads is widespread among city councils. It applies not only to the medical officer of health and town clerk, the head official of the Electricity Committee is normally an electrical engineer; equivalent posts are held by gas engineers, water engineers, civil engineers (roads and drainage), gardeners (parks), surveyors, architects. Each head has his own professional qualifications.

Now it is interesting and curious that in the national civil service, the practice as regards the head posts (the administrative class) is the exact opposite. Membership is recruited by competitive examination from the very ablest university graduates; alternatively to some extent by promotion from lower grades of administration. But the heads are always administrators; all executive power is in their hands; the professional members, doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects, are *always* under the control of the administrators.

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Administration is regarded as the most important of all professions. And it must be remembered that our civil service is widely held to be the best in the world

It is possible that our national service lays too much stress on the profession of administration. It is possible also that the profession of administration may be less important in local than in national affairs. But, making all allowances, it seems quite clear that our city fathers seriously underrate the importance of the art or science of administration.

During recent years a change has begun. We have shown that the director of education is appointed with regard almost entirely to his administrative qualities. We have endeavoured to show, by considering certain typical cases, that the insistence on professional qualifications is doing serious harm, both in limiting the field of selection and in giving the wrong training. We believe it to be of the first importance that city councils should change their policy in this matter, and should deliberately set to work to build up an administrative civil service, selected from among the best men available, and trained along the best lines as administrators.

This conclusion is supported by the authority of the Hadow Report, from which we may quote as follows: "It is a fair generalisation that in the largest authorities the functions of any chief officer of one of the major departments are mainly administrative.....The technical qualification is of secondary importance.....A chief officer who has been trained to look all round every question that arises is likely to run a department at substantially less cost than one whose main concern has always been with the purely technical issues.....Add to this the undeniable fact that specialisation is apt to give just that bias to the mind which the administrator must always be at pains to avoid, and the case against insisting on a technical qualification becomes very strong."

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UNIVERSITY TRAINING FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The professional heads of the various committees, doctors, lawyers, engineers, are in many cases drawn from the universities, but local administrators, who have no professional qualifications, are hardly ever admitted into the service after the age of about sixteen. Those of the ablest children who continue their education up to the ages of eighteen or twenty-two are at present excluded from the administrative local government service. This is clearly wrong; as the Hadow Report says: "It is a complete contradiction to spend money on higher education and to refuse employment to boys and girls who profit by it." The report continues: "The value of a university education as a preparation for administrative work cannot be denied. Advanced study supplies a background of knowledge, develops powers of judgment, accustoms the student to handling documentary material, trains him in the presentation of cases. These are all necessary qualities in a public office, and make an excellent foundation on which to build the practice of administration." They conclude: "We recommend that the larger local authorities should make arrangements for introducing graduates with no technical qualifications into the ordinary staff of the office. We think it neither necessary nor desirable that they should be placed on a privileged grade. They must, however, have a reasonable opportunity of rising to the highest positions if they prove suitable."

There are, of course, difficulties in fitting these older recruits into an existing local government service, just as there are in business. How they are to be fitted in, how fair opportunities are to be given to those recruited at all ages, are problems of some difficulty, but obviously capable of satisfactory solution.

The London County Council is setting a good example by taking on a few university graduates each year (selected

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from the national civil service examination list) to train for administrative posts. It is to be hoped that this admirable example will be widely followed among the larger local authorities.

Assuming that recruits for administrative posts are to be drawn from the universities, let us consider how far the particular course taken at the university is of importance. Is it true, as was once widely believed, that any university course gives the mind so good an all-round training that it can in after life apply itself easily and effectively to any task? Is it true that a man who can write good Latin verse has gone through such fine "mental gymnastic" that he is almost sure to make a good administrator? Or that the scientist is sure to reason well in all fields of life? The national civil service is recruited on that principle today; a student of classics or mathematics is assumed to be as likely to make a good administrator as a student of public administration. On the other hand, this doctrine of the "transfer of training" is decisively rejected in theory by the psychologist, and in practice by most of the professions. Nobody suggests that archaeology is the best training for a doctor. Admission to medical practice depends on passing a number of special examinations, all directly bearing on the medical profession and involving concentrated work for about six years at a university. Only in this way is it held that the student can acquire the necessary knowledge and skill to justify him in practising as a doctor.

It is natural to ask whether there are any special kinds of knowledge and skill which the administrator requires, which cannot be acquired by studying other subjects, but can be given by a suitable special course at a university.

Of course there are. To take one example only: the proper use of statistics. The habit of scientific quantitative thinking is the essential basis of most wise action in social

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affairs, and is woefully lacking in many of our local rulers. Let us examine a concrete problem—the sort of evidence that should be given to show that a proposed slum clearance area is unhealthy. One thing that is generally done is this: statistics are given showing the infant death rate in the area, and comparing it with the rate in some better area. The death rate is shown to be, say, 50 per cent. greater in the slum area; and this is offered as evidence that the area should be condemned as unhealthy.

But to anybody who knows something about the conditions of life in cities, and also knows the elements of the science of statistics, such evidence is quite unscientific and inconclusive. There are all sorts of other factors to be considered, which may be far more important than the housing conditions in the slum. Take only one of these: poverty. The people in the slum are almost always poorer, on the average, than those in the better area; and this is likely to be a major factor in determining the infant death rate. A man trained in statistics would at once see this, and would make his comparison in such a way as to eliminate the poverty factor. It would, of course, be a far more difficult task. He would have to ascertain the total income of each family, the number of dependents, the rent, and many other factors; then to grade them into classes of varying degrees of poverty; and finally to make a comparison of the average infant death rate among the very poor, the less poor, and the other classes he had determined. Even this would not give a scientific result till it had been further adjusted to allow for overcrowding. There are three major factors, statistically measurable, which affect the infant death rate in an area: the healthiness of the houses as situated in the area, poverty, and overcrowding. It is only when the second and third variables have been eliminated, that any statistical conclusion can be validly made as to the condition of the houses.

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And yet the astonishing fact remains that it is the general custom for medical officers of health to present statistics in connection with slum clearance schemes, which ignore poverty and overcrowding. What is even more startling is that this unsound evidence is as a rule apparently accepted as correct by the public, by the Ministry of Health inspector who holds the inquiry, and even by the landlords whose houses are to be condemned and by the barristers who represent them!

This can be due to one thing only: bad education, or rather wrong education. Good statistical thinking is not an inborn characteristic; it can be acquired only by hard study and experience. A university course in Latin, or even a severe scientific course, such as a medical student takes, has no relation to statistics and does little to train the power of scientific quantitative thinking in social affairs. Many men who have graduated from the university with the highest distinction, and have gone into public administration, have remained all their lives frightened of a row of figures.

Housing policy is determined in this country by city councillors and Members of Parliament, on the advice of medical officers of health and civil servants in the Ministry of Health. My belief is that major mistakes have been made owing to lack of the proper use of statistics; that the policy pursued during the last four years of pressing ahead with slum clearance first, and deferring the question of dealing with overcrowding till after the slums have been cleared is almost certainly wrong. Whether this is so or not depends on the relative damage done by bad houses on the one hand, and by overcrowding on the other. This can only be shown statistically. But no such statistics exist. No medical officer of health has (so far as I know) taken the trouble to prepare them; no Minister of Health has ever asked for them.

Why not? Because we are not a statistically minded nation. We prefer, in our traditional way, to muddle through.

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And the reason for our contempt for statistics must be our educational system.

A proper understanding of the use of statistics is perhaps the outstanding need for a local administrator, which a university course in other subjects cannot provide. But there are many others. He ought to have a wide knowledge of the modern world; the power to pick out from books and reports what is relevant, and to prepare clear memoranda; to be interested in the work of the Burgomaster in Germany, the Maire in France, the City Manager in America, and to learn what he can from each, to know something of how the poor live, what their needs are, of the problems of poverty and ill-health and unemployment; in short, he should have a general knowledge and be keenly interested in the problems of the world in which he is to live and work. The universities are only beginning to make a serious effort to supply such an education; in the London School of Economics, Modern Greats at Oxford, Economics at Cambridge, courses in Commerce and Public Administration at other universities.

The Social Science departments of our universities are deplorably weak in comparison with the older and more respectable departments of languages and pure science, and with the great professional schools. Weak, not in the quality of their teachers, but in mere numbers; and in the fact that the best students do not go into them. If our local civil service is to administer wisely, it must be statistically and socially trained. Our universities must greatly strengthen their Social Science departments, specially their courses in Public Administration; our prospective directors of education and medical officers of health must at some stage take such courses. The medical officer of health must either be a statistician himself, or, if this is too much to ask, he must at least know enough to use an expert statistician wisely. The task of the officials would be simplified if councillors

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and Members of Parliament were compelled to pass an elementary examination in social statistics ; but that is no doubt too much to ask !

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we believe that the most important reform in local government would be to build up a first-class civil service, the selection and promotion of the staff being based solely on administrative ability and experience. In the largest authorities every committee should have a trained administrator as one of its high officials ; in some cases it may still prove desirable to have a professional man as head, but it will probably be found that every committee should have a trained administrator either as head or as second in command. The administrator should be given opportunities, specially while young, of gaining experience in different committees, and it should be made easy by a common superannuation scheme, and in other ways, to widen their experience by moving from city to city. There are many things which will have to be worked out as experience increases, but the essential aim is clear, to build up a civil service of men selected and promoted with a single eye to the highest degree of administrative ability : a civil service of a different outlook and experience, but comparable in quality with the administrative grade of the national civil service.

THE PERSONNEL OF THE SEMI-PUBLIC SERVICES

By HERMAN FINER

THE last few years have witnessed the rise and development of the so-called " semi-public corporations." These constitute a type of enterprise with public responsibilities, but so formed as to preserve certain of the qualities of private business. The public service, as embodied in the Civil Service, has a purpose defined for it in some detail from the outside. An almost rigid " establishment," and certain standards of employment, have been rigorously fixed. The new intermediate bodies like the Central Electricity Board, the Electricity Commissioners, the London Passenger Transport Board, the Port of London Authority and the B.B.C. have been established to operate with more flexibility and a more subtle adaptation of all the factors of production to the character of their enterprise. One factor in this flexibility is their personnel, the principal subject of this study.

The peculiar form of these corporations was chosen because it was thought that the necessary sense of enterprise and continuous inventiveness could not be given by Civil Service organisation as we have hitherto known it. Some mid-way arrangement was sought between complete establishment and public control, between complete freedom and public answerability. It is important that neither they nor the community should forget the implications of their public character. This was well put in the Memorandum which the Docks and Harbours Authorities Association put before the Royal Commission on Transport of 1930 : " These Trusts do not work for profit and have no private interests to serve. They carry on their undertakings solely for the benefit of the trade of the country." If they are semi-public

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the inference is that they are also semi-private: but if they are semi-private they are not altogether private as some aspects of their personnel policy seem to assume. For instance, they ought not to regard *bona fide* criticism based on public service standards as "hostile," a tendency we have observed.

Two points of importance must be made at the outset. Since these services have a relatively recent origin, there has been and there still continues to be a great deal of experiment in personnel matters. It is difficult for the outside observer to judge whether this is efficient elasticity or feckless fumbling. Nor is the length of experience yet sufficient for final views to be taken, whether favourable or unfavourable. It is possible, of course, to pass an *a priori* judgment on abstract types of industry, but that is a different matter. Yet because of the very novelty of these enterprises, questions ought to be raised.

Secondly, it must be confessed that in the course of the investigation which preceded the making of this report, I found considerable reticence on the part of the authorities. I was promptly given an interview. But some gave the impression that they grudged giving information, that there was something to fear in making disclosures. Did they fear rivals, or Press criticism, or their superior officers or Boards of Management? Or were they simply afraid? In one case I had to submit my questions in writing, with a very scanty harvest. In another case I was asked not to put my questions (innocent enough, in all conscience) systematically, but to listen to a monologue without taking notes. I was not entirely repressible. In every case where I took notes I was asked to show what I had written before publication, and after no conspicuous haste, significant amendments were proffered. No comprehensive information is obtainable in either private or public documents. In the former case there was reluctance (with complete refusal in the matter of salaries) to offer it;

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and in the latter the laws establishing the corporations do not demand a detailed account of salaries and staffs, such as are a matter of routine in the Estimates of the Civil Service Departments. Nor can we go to the evidence of findings and Royal Commissions. This is profoundly unsatisfactory, even in the interests of the corporations themselves, for in the past, it has (notably, though perhaps unjustifiably, in the case of the B.B.C.) caused a great deal of gossip about unwarranted appointments, dismissals and the size of salaries.

THE CENTRAL ELECTRICITY BOARD

The C.E.B. came into existence as the result of the Electricity (Supply) Act 1926. It has a staff of about 1300, of which roughly one-half are manual workers. Since the object of the Board is the formation of the national "grid" system and the supply in bulk of electricity to retailers, the larger part of its servants are technicians. It has only a small number of people in the administrative and clerical ranks. Some of the administrative staff were taken over from the Ministry of Transport, while technicians were taken from electricity undertakings throughout the country. The problem of recruiting the latter offers no great difficulty, since the qualifications are specific and are provided for in the few great schools, University and other, of science and technology. If the layman can offer no opinion on the special qualifications, he can ask whether the Civil Service principle of open competition might not have been adopted. It is possible, of course, to get good employees by the C.E.B.'s method of private search and recommendation. It picks out the best men from wherever its eye happens to light. But the question is, whether the eye of the Board roves with sufficient scope to get not merely good men, but the best available anywhere. It is true that the construction of the Grid and the formation of the Board have been given the widest publicity, with the result that the Board has been

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inundated by applications for employment, and that subsequently employment may be offered to those on the waiting list. But this has not all the virtues of *open* competition. Open competition was established in the Civil Service (and what we have to say here on this subject should be applied not only to the case of the C.E.B., but to all the semi-public corporations) because (a) it excludes suspicions of favouritism, (b) unqualified competition produces an automatic standard of efficiency set, not by the person appointing, but by the merits of the candidates, and (c) every citizen has the opportunity of a career open to the talents. If the Board or anyone else should believe that open competition necessarily implies a written examination, and that it is not possible to devise such for their employees because the functions and requirements are so special, then the reply is that the Civil Service recruits to scores of special situations every year by open competitive interview. The emphasis is on the word *open*.

The case is similar in the administrative and clerical staffs of the Board. Appointments are made through private recommendations and applications, and in the case of young entrants the Staff Controller is in touch with such bodies as the Headmistresses' Association. Whether, when, and on what terms, a person is appointed depends upon the need of the moment. All jobs, technical and otherwise, are individual jobs. There are no classes or grades.

The relationship is between the Board and each individual person, so that both conditions and prospects are determined by the necessities of the Board and the individual ability of the employee. It is possible for the head of the department, without much formality, to secure a rise in salary irrespective of time or seniority. And there is no doubt of the force of this incentive and its value to the work of the Board. There is no published record of salaries. We only know that

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Sir Archibald Page, Chairman of the Board, receives £7,000 a year, and the other members, who are occupied only occasionally, £750 each. The standards of the City have been applied to the Chairman, who is a very distinguished consultant electrician formerly in municipal and private employ. Other salaries are not published, nor are the employees informed of each other's. It is urged that no comparison of salaries is possible as between the different members of the staff, in view of the special nature of the majority of the appointments. Yet have the public no legitimate interest in knowing what salaries are, in fact, paid? And, if discussion and comparison were to arise within the service, jealousy or misunderstanding could be stopped by frank discussion or the due remedy. It was not possible to get any statement of salaries, although my impression is that the average level is slightly, and in some cases considerably, above that of the Civil Service. But, then, the Civil Service basis may be too low. The higher standard of remuneration is defended on the grounds that it conduces to loyalty and intense effort, that there is not quite the same security of tenure as in the Civil Service, and that the latter enjoy a non-contributory pension. One other reason may be adduced: the Board started not with young people, but with engineers, economists, statisticians and research workers, who, in the senior ranks, were in the age-group of over forty.

New employees may be placed on probation for a specific period. The entrant is watched very carefully, but there is no deliberate training. Dismissal does not necessarily follow upon unsuitability. The penalty for that is to be kept on less important duties or to be transferred to duties more within the capacity of the employee. Employment is on a weekly or monthly basis. There is not diffused the convention of a life-career. There is no certainty of an automatic line of promotion or even of regular increments. One may go by

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promotion to the very top, or stay in a lowly paid rut for years. Since the staff is small, it is possible for the superior officers and the staff controller to be in direct contact with them: This means a very intense *esprit de corps*. The junior officials have the right to approach, and even, in some cases, to advise, the head of the department directly and this tends to produce a certain identification of the object of the enterprise with the egoism of the employee. The result is (it is said) happy staff relationships and a keen incentive to zealous work. Incidental to smallness of staff is the fact that promotion forms and reports on the work of the employees are unnecessary.

The Board is not ungenerous regarding holidays and sick leave. It has recently solved the problem of establishing a superannuation scheme. Like all those in the semi-public corporations it differs from the Civil Service in being contributory. The argument generally advanced in its favour is that since the employee is able to take his contributions with him upon resignation, the pension scheme is no special obstacle if he should wish to leave, and, that if he wishes to leave for any reason, it is good that he should not continue in the corporation's service. The Civil Service arrangement is rather designed to keep people in a life-long career: and further, since it is withdrawable at the discretion of the Treasury, it acts as a factor in discipline. It was observed that since the Board raises its capital by loans in the open market, the efficiency of its personnel is a matter of continuous concern to the Board and to the superior officers. Altogether the impression given by the C.E.B. is one of extreme plasticity of growth; but it is difficult to be quite sure whether this is inherent in the nature of a semi-public enterprise or due to some special experimentalism in the character of the C.E.B.

THE LONDON PASSENGER TRANSPORT BOARD

This body, responsible for the railways, buses, coaches,

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trams and trolleybuses in the London area, carries about 10,000,000 passengers a day. It has a wages staff of about 72,000 and an administrative and clerical staff of 5,000. The Board consists of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman who is the Chief Executive Officer, and five other members appointed by a body known as the Appointing Trustees named in the London Passenger Transport Act of 1933. The Board's general duties are to secure the provision of an adequate and properly co-ordinated system of passenger transport for the London Passenger Transport Area, and for that purpose, while avoiding the provision of unnecessary and wasteful competitive services, to take from time to time such steps as they consider necessary for extending and improving the facilities for passenger transport in that area in such manner as to provide most efficiently and conveniently for the needs thereof. The salaries of the members of the Board are fixed by the Minister of Transport in consultation with the Appointing Trustees and with the consent of the Treasury. They have not been mean. Lord Ashfield is paid £12,500, Mr. Frank Pick £10,000. The part-time members (there are fortnightly meetings) receive £750 a year.

The London Passenger Transport Board, although a new organisation founded in July, 1933, actually continued the businesses of the then existing railways, tramways, buses and coaches of the Underground Group of Companies, the London County Council and other Local and Municipal Authorities and privately-owned Companies. There was considerable variation in the rates of remuneration and conditions of employment of the administrative and clerical staffs of these various undertakings. As a result of the protection conferred on the staff by the Act these cannot be worsened. Consequently staff transferred to the Board from the London County Council are maintained at the scales of salary appertaining to that service, which generally

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are more favourable than those applicable to the staff transferred from the Underground Group of Companies and other undertakings. The staffs transferred to the Board from the Underground Group of Companies are generally subject to the National Agreements, entered into between the Main Line Railway General Managers acting on behalf of the Ministry of Transport, the National Union of Railwaymen, and the Railway Clerks' Association, at the conclusion of the war. Differently from the other semi-public corporations, except the P.L.A., the L.P.T.B. has a regular classification for its clerical employees, and is not unwilling to disclose the salary ranges.

So far, the problem of recruitment has been no more than the simple problem of meeting the natural attrition by clerks who are redundant. There has not been a great deal of entry into the first stages of the service, but where it has, the Board has proceeded by private applications and recommendations at the ages of 16 and 18. It sets no competitive examination but chooses on the basis of headmasters' reports and examination certificates, such as Matriculation or General Schools with five credits.

Probation is for 12 months and is seriously applied. Those who can survive 12 months have proved themselves; the rest are usually given marching orders within the first one or two months when their incompetence is discovered. An extremely interesting and laudable scheme is being experimented with whereby the most promising employees between the ages of 18 and 28 are given an all-round training in one department after another lasting for three years. They are designed for special duties and responsibilities and have the opportunity of rising very high in the service of the Board.

The Board consciously regards the idea of the accessibility of the highest positions in the service to anybody, however menial the position in which they commence, as being a

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fundamental incentive to zealous service. Consequently, anybody may apply for *advertised* vacancies in any grade, without the necessity of passing through all the intermediate grades. There are no formal promotion reports; there are no formal confidential reports; this was considered but definitely rejected because of all the problems that it raises, a point dealt with in relation to the B.B.C. presently. The non-existence of a report on paper does not exclude the fact that there is a secret report in the mind of the supervising officer. The Establishments Officer is responsible for the continuous consideration of the claims of the staff to promotion. Departmental heads have a say, and usually the last word in the actual choice among the final short list. There is some difference of opinion whether the judgment of a Supervising Officer outside the Department is better or worse than that of the Departmental Head. Naturally in the L.P.T.B. system merit is prior to seniority.

This might change in the future should the organisation of the Board harden and set into a definite establishment, and when a new kind of collegueship takes the place of the competitive element which was brought in from the bus and underground organisations.

So far all the men who are in what might be called the high administrative ranks, including the Establishment Officers, are those who have come up from the ranks. The most recent example is that of Mr. T. E. Thomas who has become General Manager of Road Transport.

The problem raised in recent years in connection with municipal authorities, whether, as in the Civil Service, there is a place for University graduates, has exercised the minds of the Board also. There are already a score or so of University graduates employed, mainly the bequest of the old organisations. Some time ago, the Board tried to introduce more from the outside but found that they were a little academic

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and unadaptable. They all seemed to have the same answer for the questions that were put to them in the interview, and this fact seemed to savour of abstract learning. This may be so, but I am sure that the graduate would reply that if the answer were correct, it was a very good thing that everybody gave it, and that some perseverance and a little extra training might, in the long run, prove of tremendous significance to the Board. The Board ought to have perpetually in mind Mr. Pick's address to the Institute of Transport, in 1933, in the course of which he declared: "something more humane and liberal (than the professional spirit) is required, and to secure such a spirit calls for a humane and liberal education." One consideration was emphasised, that the inside staff would be discouraged if picked positions were available for those outside. There is a great deal in this view. I have referred to it before in regard to other bodies. The solution is, surely, to reserve certain posts for those inside the Service, giving marks for length of service, and extending the age limit within which people may be promoted. But the Board intends to open a limited number of posts to the Universities.

Employees can be dismissed for misconduct but they are not often dismissed for inefficiency, that has its own penalty in that there is no promotion. There are Staff Councils established on the same basis as the Whitley Councils in the Civil Service and there is an appeal against dismissal to the principal officer. There are quite generous arrangements regarding sick leave, holidays, overtime, Sunday duty, and there are many vigorous and flourishing social activities carried on by the members of the staff and encouraged by the superior officers. There is a contributory Pensions Scheme and a Benevolent Fund to which all, from manual workers up to Lord Ashfield, may belong.

Compared with a small private firm the Board is less

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given to favouritism, and cares more for the welfare of its employees. Compared with the Civil Service, its salient feature is the possibility of advancement from the lowest grade to the highest. The Establishment Officers have a continuous relationship with those branches of the Civil Service connected with their work and interested in the same kind of personnel questions, such as the Post Office, and they acknowledge freely their very great keenness.

THE PORT OF LONDON AUTHORITY

The Port of London Authority, established by the Port of London Act of 1908 for the co-ordination of the docks administration of the Thames, has a total employment of about 10,000, including labourers. About 4,500 are administrative, clerical, technical and supervisory. Of these 1,400 are in the Upper Division, and the rest in the Lower Division, the latter including railwaymen, foremen, lockmen, police, etc.

The technical officers are recruited by advertisement and competition in their credentials. The clerical staff are recruited from Public and Secondary schoolboys, largely, but not exclusively through the Headmasters' Conference. They are accepted only as the result of a qualifying examination conducted for the Authority by the London Chamber of Commerce. This latter provision is sensible, and makes for efficiency more than the mere comparison of headmasters' or headmistresses' reports as practised by the C.E.B. or the B.B.C. It may be wondered whether the net of the Authority is thrown sufficiently wide to attract all the available talent and to give all who want it a chance of competing.

The kind of people who apply are, it is said, those who seek for security and a life-career, rather than one of business adventure with probably less security but more chance of making a larger income than the Authority can offer. The staff is graded, the salaries take with them certain prescribed

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increments, but these are not automatic, depending upon a certificate of merit given by the supervising officer. The Authority is apparently too small for the institution of efficiency ratings or promotion reports, but each supervising officer is very strictly answerable for proposing promotions, and his judgment is regarded as much a reflection upon himself as upon the person he recommends. The new employee in the clerical grade has a serious 6 months' probation, but is regarded as a trainee for two years, and is then required to pass a further examination before he can be placed on the permanent staff. He then proceeds through the regular grades by promotion.

It is not the practice to recruit University men for the higher branches of the work, because, apparently, the work is not so differentiated that it cannot be learned in the course of experience by the younger men. The outside observer is not in the position to say whether this is an actual fact. But what does strike one in examining all these semi-public utilities, is that apart from the General Manager, and two or three immediate assistants, the Administrative Class, as we find it in the Civil Service, seems not to exist: its work is accomplished by the Board of Management or Governors and the heads of the technical divisions. There are analogies here with the municipal authorities and certain departments of the Civil Service in which the highest class of Civil Servant is only in the Executive Class. The Port of London Authority thinks that to recruit from the outside for the higher positions would show that the original selection or the subsequent training was deficient. For the rest, this method of preserving the higher positions for those already employed is regarded as a good way to keep the employees interested, keen, self-developing and loyal. For those who already have served for some time, a special training scheme is in operation, and the system of careful selection for this purpose makes it possible to choose those who will benefit themselves and the

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Authority by it. It is pointed out as being the sign of a sound employment policy, that even in flourishing times, the resignations are negligible, even though the employees come into contact with the business world which might offer better positions.

The Authority may dismiss at short notice, but if there is a discharge of a person on the permanent staff for anything but misconduct, the law requires that a pension is due after ten years' service. There is an appeal against dismissal to the Staff Committee which is composed of members of the Authority, but apparently does not include representatives of the staff. In comparing employment by the Authority with that in a private business, the main differences are that the former offers greater security of office, is more considerate for the welfare of the staff in the matter of sick leave and holidays, provides definite scales of salary with known increments, and does not manage its employees dictatorially. For these reasons it is thought that the employees are able to, and do, identify their own interests with those of the Authority, and feeling that they are part of a society do not fret over every monetary trifle. No salaries are published.

THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

It has not been possible to discover how the total staff of the B.B.C., approximating to 2,000, is divided into technical, clerical, administrative, manipulative, messengers, charwomen and the rest. The work and conditions of the whole organisation are under the supreme control of the Board of Governors, numbering five, appointed by the Prime Minister and the Postmaster-General for a term of up to five years in the discretion of the Postmaster-General. The Chairman has a salary of £3,000, the Vice-chairman £1,000, and the members £700 per annum. Besides laying down the main lines of policy at their fortnightly meetings, reinforced by more frequent and continuous attention by the Chairman, the Board appoints the officers and staff and fixes the remuneration.

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It is by now no secret that the Director-General, Sir John Reith, who has been the chief executive since 1923, when the Corporation was a private concern, has determined the policy of the Corporation in even more than the principal matters. Immediately under the Director-General is the Deputy Director-General, and then the organisation comes under the control of (1) the Controller of Administration, (2) the Controller of Engineering, (3) the Controller of Programmes, and (4) the Controller of Public Relations. There are then six Regional organisations, with technical and clerical staff and the rest under their immediate control.

Recruitment for all divisions of the service follows two general lines, public advertisement, and private applications and recommendations. The former is a more recent and far rarer practice than the latter. As for the minor and intermediate clerical vacancies they appear to be filled without any widespread announcement; likely applicants are interviewed and registers of them kept in view of future vacancies. For the positions above these, which are regarded as requiring special qualifications, the University Appointments Boards are used as a source (there are many *casual* sources), and an extremely high set of interview hurdles must be successfully jumped before an applicant is successful. I was tempted to say that the applicant must pass through a thorough interview test, but no one is entitled to say this until the casual rumours which reach one regarding the occult (though perhaps well-merited) influence that is alleged to be required to get a job are dispelled by complete publicity. Further, if the public is not absolutely without anxiety as to appointment and promotions to the higher and decisive posts, it is difficult to believe that the interview tests can be conducted on the right lines. In any case, what is obviously excluded, with very rare exceptions, is open competition. The B.B.C. would do well to go to considerable lengths to still public anxiety regarding favour-

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itism. It should remember the dictum: "It is not merely necessary that justice should be done, but that it should be seen to be done."

There is no classification of staffs as in the Civil Service, in the real sense of the word, which means a classification by the nature of the job, followed by a fixed rate of pay, for all jobs of a likeness. Here again, one hears the same vindication as in the other semi-public corporations, that the jobs are special or "creative." But this may be merely the result of a lack of plan. Contracts of services are particular to each individual; the weekly staff may be turned off at a week's notice, those above this rank and earning less than £500 at a month's notice, and those above £500 at three months' notice. The Corporation may terminate the contract at any time without stated reason if it considers it undesirable to retain an employee. This is rather drastic, and it is only partially palliated by the right to see the Establishment Officer on matters arising out of such a termination, and the right of appeal to the Director-General, but through the head of the appellant's department and the Establishment Officer. I see no trace of Whitley Councils as in the Civil Service, or any Board of Review such as the Royal Commission on the Civil Service of 1931 reported as being a reasonable arrangement where an adverse report had been made upon a Civil Servant. And it does not yet apparently form part of the methods of the Corporation that a representative of the aggrieved officer should, again according to the Royal Commission's Report, form part of such a Board of Review.

Salaries and wages are individually related to the presumed value of the work performed, seniority, and age. In the higher ranks they are above the Whitehall standards. They are adjusted annually but not automatically, and increments vary with merit. There are confidential reports made out in the first quarter of each year about each individual servant. Upon these depend the subsequent adjustment of salaries,

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which are revised by the staff department and sanctioned by the Controller of the Administration Division, the Director-General and the Board of Governors. These confidential reports are therefore of very great importance. It is thus remarkable to find that the B.B.C. adhere to the principle of secrecy of these reports, when decades of experience of the most enlightened Civil Services have produced the rule that adverse reports shall be open to the scrutiny and challenge of the servant: this is the case in the British Civil Service, the French Civil Service, the London County Council, and it was the case in Germany until the advent of the Nazi Regime, when the Nazis went back to secret reports on the ground that German Civil Servants were to be "soldiers, but not in uniform." Is the B.B.C. practice an inherent and necessary part of the efficiency of a semi-public corporation? And why is the Corporation so insistent that salaries and wages should not be unofficially discussed?

There is a contributory pensions scheme, with generous provisions where, after a few years' continuous service, voluntary retirement occurs. The Corporation is kind to women servants who get married: at least, they must ask permission if they want to remain in the Service, and if it is given, they are treated to honeymoon leave and a wedding present. Holidays and sick leave are generous, but occasional unpaid overtime is expected. There is a strict vigilance of extra-official duties, where such activities might affect the efficiency, general reputation, or political neutrality of the Corporation, and, of course, very strict rules regarding the confidential character of the information obtained in the course of employment.

The two things that are most disturbing about the policy of the B.B.C. are its abnormal secrecy, and its search for the so-called "B.B.C. type." If it persists in the latter, although I do not know who invented the phrase, it is likely to limit its search for talent in the same way that the Foreign Office

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has limited its search for young diplomats, and to lay itself open to the same kind of suspicions that have so often been voiced in relation to the *viva voce* part of the Administrative Grade Examination for the Civil Service. This, in the case of a service like Broadcasting, is to play with fire. It must be remembered that any bias in the appointments and promotion of the permanent higher staff, any cold-shouldering, must have its reflection in the subordinate staffs, and what is more important, the programmes and those who are invited to give talks or perform. Here, above all, the principles of publicity, and open competition openly administered, should be regarded as the only certain long-term safeguards from the attentions of political partisans.

OBSERVATIONS

Since I have suggested the main lines of criticism, no formal recapitulation is necessary. But some additional observations are pertinent.

It seems to me that some less formal and more realistic arrangements for public criticism ought to be made. It is not enough that the C.E.B., the Electricity Commission, the P.L.A., and the L.P.T.B., have to report annually to the Ministry of Transport, and that this Ministry has the power to lay down the lines of the report and the annual accounts, and to audit the latter, or that a somewhat similar control is exercised by the Postmaster-General over the B.B.C. It is already a remarkably large concession that they are free from Parliamentary question and criticism, and any effective control on the part of their consumers. If they are to escape real answerability to an administrative Department also, where is the public control except in name? Their accounts ought to be as detailed in regard to staff as the estimates of any Civil Service Department. They are now not subject to anything like that retrospective survey which the Committee on Public Accounts makes of the Accounts put before it by the Comptroller and Auditor General, or the Treasury

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Minutes which follow. Even if detailed accounts were rendered annually, the semi-public corporations should be brought before a Royal Commission every five years, and their evidence ought not to be kept secret as in the case of the Ullswater Commission on the Broadcasting Corporation. For if no standards of personnel administration have been imposed upon them, they ought at least to declare what standards they have invented. Publicity is the corrective of favouritism. At the same time it is essential to a comparison between standards in the Civil Service and comparable employments in the semi-public corporations. The comparison recently instituted between the cost of education, street cleaning and sewage disposal, in English municipal authorities, have been of remarkable effect.

Secondly, as these services are as much public as private, the public is entitled to demand that there shall be the maximum quality with the minimum of expense. I know quite well that the Corporation administrators feel that they are in a philanthropic relationship to the public, and feel like saying, "Leave it to me! I can be trusted!"; but that is precisely the feeling which causes them to be testy when they are asked to give an account of their stewardship. It was shown, for example, before the Royal Commission on Transport of 1930 (Questions 12056-9) that though in its career the Port of London Authority had been troubled only four times by people who regarded its charges as unreasonable, and that even when the complainants had not pressed the matter to the point of appealing to the Ministry of Transport, that the Authority found the mere existence of the right to complain irksome! The relationship between the corporations and the community ought not to be philanthropic, for they are giving nothing to the public *ex gratia*; they ought, in the words of the judgment in the *Rex v. Roberts* audit case, to be "in fiduciary relationship" with the public. The public has the right to insist that not a farthing shall

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be spent that does not make for efficiency. We are now at the beginning of planned enterprise. It is important in the highest degree that the notion of Measurement by a publicly stated and publicly controlled standard should be developed at once. Otherwise future development will be stultified by an appeal to precedents which have not yet been justified. To argue, as I have heard some argue, that the amounts in immediate question cannot be more than some scores of thousands in enterprises which are administering millions, is to demoralise all public economy, and to establish a principle of condonation which people will eagerly apply.

Thirdly, since the service is public, sheltered and secure in a monopoly granted and guaranteed by the community, all members of the public of whatever class or area of residence ought to have the career open to their talents. It is uninventive in the highest degree to have fallen back on the private firm's method, with its suspicions of patronage. Perhaps the Civil Service Commission's competitions might help. Nor can I see the need for salaries above that which Sir Warren Fisher obtains as the Head of the entire British Civil Service (£3,500), in services which having a legal monopoly, no longer have to compete for customers, consumers and profits. And the rest of the salaries should be in scale.

Finally, it ought to be remembered that the Service is neither the private property nor the hobby of the whole body of the producers, and still less that of the few who happen to be on the governing boards or in the higher administration. Jobs, promotions, leave, and remuneration are not private gifts to be used in any degree for their private satisfaction. Any favouritism is an unwarranted tax on the public. There ought to be no attempt to seek refuge from the effect of this maxim by an appeal that the Corporation, if semi-public, is also semi-private. For the only reason that it has been allowed to remain semi-private is that it shall the better serve the public.

LABOUR'S VICTORY IN NEW ZEALAND

By R. F. PADDOCK

IN all probability the result of the New Zealand elections of November 27th attracted only slight attention in Great Britain. The distance and the ever-present menace of the Italian challenge to the League no doubt served to prevent the average observer from doing anything more than note the bare fact that Labour had succeeded in displacing a National Government in at least one portion of the Empire.

In actual fact the political situation in this country is more interesting at present than at any period since the days of Seddon's experiments, while, as regards the election itself, even its most superficial aspects are of interest. There is, for example, the greatly increased Labour representation in the Lower House. In the old Parliament, the National Federation, as the conservative faction was called, was strongly entrenched: out of a total muster of eighty, forty-six M.P.'s supported the administration of Messrs. Coates and Forbes. The Labour Party, then the official Opposition, held only twenty-four seats, the remaining ten being held by Independents of one sort or another. Today, Labour is not merely in power, but has some justification for being regarded as, numerically, the strongest administration this country has ever known. Fifty-five seats are now held by its representatives, the Nationalists being reduced to a meagre nineteen. There are, moreover, other sources of strength, for of the six Independents who have been returned, four owe their success to Labour support, and all but one, being strong monetary reformers, are likely to vote with the new Government.

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Even granting that the new Parliamentary representation rather exaggerates Labour's strength—365,127 and 266,678 are the provisional figures for the party vote of Labour and the Nationalists respectively—the fact remains that the Labour Party has succeeded in gaining the support of a large section, not merely of the city middle classes, but also of the farmers. This is, in itself, most significant, for the New Zealand small farmers, the "cow cockies" as they are generally termed, were formerly the staunch supporters of Massey and firm upholders of the conservative tradition to which his regime gave birth. Equally significant, however, was the type of support gained by Labour in other quarters. Surprising as it may seem to Englishmen, the New Zealand Labour Party was materially aided in its campaign by the influence of many clergymen whose support, indeed, proved so effective that one candidate was moved to vehement protest against the belief that the policy of the Labour Party was the only one that could be described as Christian. Some months before the election a group of clergymen organised a mass meeting at which Archbishop Averill, the Primate of the Anglican Church in New Zealand, put to the audience a resolution calling upon the National Government to resign. No alternative to it was mentioned, but as the Labour Party was then the only effective opposition, the effect of the resolution can easily be imagined. Again, the radio proved to be a strong anti-Government force. Controversial discussion of all sorts was barred, and the Nationalists loyally adhered to their own prohibition, and did not attempt to broadcast their election speeches. On the other hand, Mr. Scrimgeour, a radio preacher of the Father Coughlin or Aberhart type, and like them a Douglasite, had for long been emphasising the paradox of poverty amidst plenty, while succeeding in avoiding controversial references. His local influence was, and is, very great, and as the Labour Party candidates were

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also preaching the gospel of plenty, they naturally gained the benefit of his propaganda.

The National Federation, indeed, although recognised by all as being composed of well-meaning men, had been unrelenting in its application of the policy its principles rendered inevitable. Formed in 1931, the original Coalition of the Reform and United parties had come into being as a result of the belief of the members of those organisations that the depression must be met with measures of stringent economy. These were accordingly carried out. In 1933, when 16 per cent. of our total adult male population was receiving unemployment relief, the sustenance payment for a childless couple was only 11/6 per week. Nor was the low benefit the only regrettable feature of this economising policy. Inspired by the memory of the pioneering days the Nationalists made the granting of relief contingent upon the performance of manual labour. The consequence was that men of University attainments were set to chipping weeds on the roads, and cripples and men without fingers were certified as being fit for navvying work. Malnutrition was so prevalent as to inspire the great clergy protest already referred to. The Government, in fact, won for itself a great deal of unpopularity as a result of its devotion to its theories, and, although the economy campaign was somewhat relaxed during the present year, very many of our citizens had come to dread the possibility of its resumption. Labour, in the meantime, was gaining support. At first condemning the economy measures from a class standpoint rather than for any other reason, it gradually developed a programme admirably calculated to appeal to all who had suffered from the depression, a programme that was based on the idea that no sacrifices at all were called for.

The chief reason for Labour's triumph is undoubtedly to be found in the remarkable changes its immediate programme

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has undergone during the last few years. As its candidates have been strenuously maintaining of late, Labour is not a class party: it claims to stand for the nation as a whole and its philosophy is now perfectly adapted to the psychological requirements of such a middle-class community as New Zealand is. A review of the changes in its immediate programme over the last three elections makes interesting reading. In 1928, as one Labour candidate put it, "the most important feature of the Labour Party's policy was the proposal to encourage closer land settlement by the application of a steeply graduated income tax." Only occasional reference was then made to the evils of overseas borrowing and to the possibility that New Zealand's needs might be supplied by internal loans. By the election of 1931, however, the land question is no longer considered very important, while this very moderate monetary reform has now become the chief plank in the Labour platform. Overseas borrowing is strongly condemned, and the assertion is freely made that the existing banking laws would permit of a loan of £25,000,000 being raised locally. More use, it is claimed, should also be made by the Government of the lending facilities provided by the Public Trust, the Post Office and the Savings Banks.

But by 1935 no sort of loan, internal or external, is given a moment's thought, for the new theory of Social Credit now reigns triumphant in the councils of the party. The revelation has been made that the banks in advancing loans create credit out of nothing, and from this premise it is held to follow naturally that the people should have the right to determine what amount shall be created. Labour candidates strongly repudiate the belief that inflation must necessarily follow from a tampering with the monetary system and reiterate the possibility of, at one and the same time, reducing taxation and abolishing unemployment. Above all, moreover, the new theory has shown a way to capture the farmers' votes. The

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primary producer has become bankrupt through the disastrous fall in world prices. Then let there be guaranteed to him a definite fixed price for his produce, the difference between this sum and the price at which he sells his goods in open market being made up from specially created credits! It was this now famous "guaranteed prices" promise which enabled Labour to conquer the rural electorates.

There, as in the cities, the way had been made easy by the intensive propaganda of the Douglas Creditors, and it is to the influence of the Douglas Movement in this country that the change in Labour policy from gradualist socialism to immediate Social Credit has been mainly due. In New Zealand the Douglas Movement has all the energy and enthusiasm of youth. Prior to 1931, only a few scattered individuals had even heard of the theories of the Major, but with the deepening of the depression his ideas acquired such sudden and widespread popularity that at the recent elections the Douglasite organisations were able to play a very important part. In most electorates they wholeheartedly supported the Labour candidate and sent their questioners to badger the Nationalist and Democrat politicians with arguments upon the theory of Social Credit. Nor had they much reason to do otherwise, for the Labour Party has proved as responsive to their propaganda as its opponents have been resolute in their loyalty to the principle of sound finance. One trace of gradualist socialism, indeed, remains: at the head of each Labour Party policy leaflet stands the time-honoured objective, "The Nationalisation of the Means of Production, Distribution and Exchange." This, in any case, could hardly have been deleted, for our miners and watersiders still recall with pride the heroic days of their pre-war syndicalism. More significant, perhaps, is the fact that Labour has given no sign of having abandoned its belief that the wage-increases it desired should be paid, not, as the

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Douglasites recommend, by the State, but by individual employers to their employees.

Certain landmarks stand out in this journey of New Zealand labour in the direction of Douglasism, and one of the most prominent is undoubtedly the Minority Report of the Monetary Inquiry Committee of 1934. In response to Douglasite agitation the National Government agreed to set up a non-party committee of investigation into alternatives to the present monetary system. Many witnesses, including Major Douglas, gave evidence before it, but its members proved unable to agree. The majority, all Nationalists, favoured the present system of finance; the minority, mainly Labour men, strongly denounced it. In view of the fact that the report of the minority later received the endorsement of the Executive of the Labour Party, the Douglasite tone of one of its recommendations should be noted. "In so far as the physical resources of the Dominion will provide," said the minority, "we recommend that money and financial credit should be created by the State for the purpose of closing the existing gap between production and consumption which arises through the insufficiency of purchasing-power in the hands of consumers under the present system."

Other statements of great significance have been made since the election. A few days after his victory, Mr. Savage, the new Premier, expressed the hope that it would be possible for the new Government to co-operate with the Reserve Bank as it is at present constituted, but, since then, his attitude has hardened and he has recently declared that it is now "fairly definite" that the Government will buy out the private shareholdings in the bank. In short, although Mr. Savage announced his intention of starting where Richard John Seddon and his colleagues left off, the experimenting of the new Government is likely to be of a novel character. In Mr. Aberhart of Alberta, our Prime Minister has, at present, his only competitor.

SURVEYS

VITAL STATISTICS:
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL'S STATISTICAL REVIEW OF ENGLAND
AND WALES FOR 1933.

AN exact knowledge of the nature and composition of the population is a necessary basis for social legislation, and the official returns of the Registrar General are now so detailed and so well arranged that they can be used not only to check and adjust theory to reality, but also to suggest the subjects to which the social conscience should be directed.

The Statistical Review for 1933 appeared at the end of 1935, and gives a bird's-eye view of the people of England and Wales. There were then 40,350,000 of them, 149,000 more than the year before, and 389,000 more than at the time of the census (1931). This increase is not wholly due to the birth of infants. It represents partly a greater expectation of life, and consequently a higher average age in the population (which was 32.2 for males and 33.9 for females, nearly five months older than in 1931) and partly the change over of emigration from this country to immigration to it, which has been operative since 1930. Excluding this factor the rate of natural increase of the population is now 2.1 per thousand (a decline from 10 per 1,000 in the years before 1914), and it is expected that a diminishing increase may still be expected for some years, though the maximum population and subsequent decline are to be expected before very long.

The rising average age of the population is, of course, related to the death rate, which when "standardised," i.e., corrected for age and sex differences, averages 9.8 per 1,000. At all ages under 73, except 12-13 and the early 30's, women's chances of life are markedly better than men's, and this, of course, increases their mortality rate in old age. Of the 110 centenarians who died in 1933, 91 were women. The causes of death are analysed in detail, and show a new low rate for tuberculosis (though still high at 804 per million), and a new high rate for cancer (1,004 per million). In both cases, the analysis by locality shows that urbanisation increases the mortality.

Detailed figures are given for births, infant life and maternal mortality. The birth rate, at 14.4 per 1,000 of the population is the lowest yet recorded, and is lower than that of any other country, except Austria and Sweden. This figure is, of course, governed to some extent by the alteration in the age grouping of the population. If, however, the birth rate is calculated in relation to the actual number of married women of reproductive ages, it is found to be even lower. We are thus not only producing fewer children than in previous years, but also fewer per potential mother.

These birth rates are calculated upon the basis of live births. There were also in 1933, 25,084 still births (41 per cent of the total births) and this proportion shows a tendency to rise. Like all the mortality figures, the rate is higher in urban than in rural areas.

Figures relating to abortion and miscarriage are not included (and are, in fact, not known), though the maternal deaths resulting from these causes are given as 47 per million women (age 15-45). The actual figure of maternal deaths due to or associated with pregnancy (including criminal abortion) was 3,531. The death rate in childbirth has been calculated in various ways, i.e., as percentages of all deaths of women, of live births, and of live and still births together, and for purposes of comparison with other years, these calculations are useful. They show that a rate (per 1,000 births and still births) which was 4.12 in 1932 had risen to 4.32 in 1933, an increase which is definitely disquieting. For a true estimate of the risks of childbirth however, the calculation should be on the total number of *pregnancies*; but for this, as yet the facts are unrecorded. In regard to abortion, the Registrar General states that "there is no reason to suppose that the number of abortions has been falling in recent years in proportion to the number of births." The fact that, in spite of the known decrease of the fertility rate, the actual number of deaths from post-abortion sepsis per million women living has not declined, seems to show that abortion is actually increasing. The more closely the maternal death rate figures are studied, the clearer it becomes that we do not yet know all the essential facts of the problem.

The infant mortality figures, on the other hand, are both

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clear and encouraging. The risk of dying within the first year of life has fallen by 38 per cent since 1912, and is now 64 per 1,000. The risk of dying before the age of five has fallen by 52 per cent in the same period. It is still true that these risks are greatest in the towns, and are very much heavier for illegitimate than for legitimate children; but the improvement is maintained over the whole field and appears to be continuing.

The mortality rate for infants has been calculated both according to the latitude and according to the proportion of population living in overcrowded conditions, and it is noticeable not only that housing density increases mortality, but also that northerliness has the same effect. The highest rate of all, which is 86.3 per 1,000 live births, is found in towns in the latitude 55°, where 15 per cent. and more of the population are living more than two in a room.

These figures relate the mortality of infants under one year, and this rate has been analysed further into the mortality within the first half-hour of life and within the first day. In this also the sequence is from North to South, and these figures also bring out the familiar fact that the very early mortality occurs mainly among illegitimate children. Actually where 59 legitimate children die from violence or lack of care within the first half-hour of life, 6,376 illegitimate children die from these causes. These are figures which might well suggest measures of social reform.

At ages under 5, the mortality rate of children was less in 1932 than in the previous year, but between 5 and 10 and also between 10 and 15, it was slightly higher. The mortality of children under 5 undoubtedly depends largely upon environment. But at the later ages of childhood, the fluctuations are governed by such factors as influenza epidemics, measles, etc.

Taken as a whole, figures for the mortality of infants and small children show a steady decline since 1911, with an even more rapid drop in the years following infancy than in the first year of life itself. The close analysis of the urban statistics shows that we have by no means reached the best attainable figures, and this—like every detail in the Registrar General's report—points to the need for further extension of measures for hygiene and health.

RAY STRACHEY.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAWS

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAWS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ADMINISTRATION:

FRANCE—BELGIUM—SPAIN

OF the recent legislative and administrative measures passed since the publication of my last survey the most important are the laws passed by the French Parliament. The agitation carried on by several groups compelled that Parliament to pass measures which have, as will be remembered, been for some years the subject of bitter controversy in the press. Two of the three laws, the text of which will be found in the *Journal Officiel* of January 12, 1936, are given below:

LAW REGARDING MILITARY FORMATIONS AND PRIVATE FORCES

Art. 1. By decree signed by the President of the Republic in Council there will be dissolved all those associations or groups:

- (1) Which provoke armed demonstrations in the streets;
- (2) Or which, apart from such associations for military training as are approved by the Government, or associations for physical training and sport, possess by their form and military organisation the character of military formations or private forces;
- (3) Or which have as aim injury to the national territory or a *coup d'état* against the Republican form of government.

The Council of State if appealed to for annulment of the decree envisaged in para. 1, must make decision a matter of urgency.

Art. 2. Any person participating in the maintenance or the reconstitution, direct or indirect, of an association or group as defined in Art. 1, will be liable to a term of imprisonment of from six months to two years and to a fine of from 16 to 5,000 francs. In addition, the penalties laid down in Art. 42 of the Penal Code may also be inflicted by the court.

If the person found guilty is a foreigner, the court will also banish him from the territory of France.

Art. 3. The uniforms, badges and emblems of associations and groups so maintained or reconstituted will be confiscated as well as all arms or material used or intended to be used by the aforementioned associations and groups.

The property, personal and real of the said associations and groups will be liquidated as provided for in Art. 18 of the Law of July 1, 1901.

Art. 4. The present law is applicable to Algeria and to the colonies.

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LAW ON THE CARRYING OF PROHIBITED WEAPONS

Art. 1. Anyone who in the course of a demonstration or on the occasion of a demonstration, in the course of a meeting or on the occasion of a meeting, will be found to have carried openly or concealed any weapon or contrivance dangerous to the public safety will be liable to a term of imprisonment of from three months to two years and to a fine of from 100 to 1,000 francs without prejudice to his being liable to the severer penalties laid down by the law of June 7, 1848.

Art. 2. The court will always sentence any foreigner found guilty of the offence defined in Art. 1 to be banished from French territory.

Art. 3. In case of a repetition of the offence, the guilty person may be sentenced to loss of permission to reside and of the rights mentioned in Art. 42 of the Penal Code for a minimum period of five years and a maximum period of ten years.

Art. 4. The present law is applicable to Algeria and the colonies. These laws restrict very forcibly the activity of the reactionary leagues and only a short time ago, as a result of the assault on the Socialist leader, Léon Blum, the Government applied them to dissolve the *Action française*.

II.

Among recent important legislative and administrative events one must not omit the new Rules of Procedure of the Belgian House of Representatives. The rules which were drawn up in 1831 have been extensively amended during the last hundred years. Last year, the Belgian Chamber proceeded to revise these rules completely and the new Rules entered into force on January 1, 1936. They are an interesting document and are an attempt to secure a better functioning of Parliament.

In our times when so many criticisms are levied against the imperfections of parliamentary technique this attempt to rationalise procedure deserves very close study. Naturally I have not space to analyse the entire document and must confine myself simply to the examination of certain sections which are particularly interesting and which indicate that the Belgian Parliament has found very modern and ingenious methods of improving parliamentary technique.

The new rules, for instance, define the procedure for questions and interpellations:

Art. 28. (1) Members who desire to put a question to the Government must submit a written text to the President of the

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Chamber. The text must not be signed by more than three members. It must be reduced to the minimum consistent with precision stating without commentary the object of the question. The President will then pass it on to the minister concerned.

(2) The reply is sent to the President at the latest within fifteen days.

If, however, in agreement with the Minister, the Chamber decides that it is a matter of urgency the answer will be given at once.

(3) The question and the reply are printed in an appendix to the official report of the debates in the Chamber for the Tuesday following receipt of the reply.

(4) If the reply does not reach the President within the period laid down in the present article, the question is published apart from its republication when the reply is given.

(5) No debate can take place on the reply.

Art. 29. (1) Any member proposing to interpellate the Government must make known to the President the subject of the interpellation by a written declaration accompanied by a note explaining precisely the question or the circumstances on which explanation is sought as well as the chief considerations which the interpellator proposes to develop.

(2) The President reads out the written declaration.

(3) Except in accord with what is laid down in the following paras. 5 and 6, the interpellation is put on the order of the day for the following Tuesday at 4-30 p.m. and after any other interpellations which may already have been placed on the order of the day.

(4) The interpellator's speech in explanation must not last more than half an hour.

After the explanation given by the Government only four other members may speak and for ten minutes only. The interpellator himself is included among these four. He has the right of priority.

If the competent minister does not at once reply, the matter is closed and only the interpellator himself is permitted to speak for a maximum of fifteen minutes.

(5) On the demand of one-fifth of the members of the Chamber the interpellation may be taken earlier or, if the Government consents, on the same day as it is handed in.

In this case there is no question of limits.

(6) Any interpellation concerning a ministry whose budget has not yet been discussed by the Chamber is added to the budget debate.

In that case only the interpellator himself may speak for a maximum of thirty minutes.

(7) The discussion of any interpellation must finish on the day when such discussion begins.

(8) The right to speak as interpellator is personal (amended Dec. 5, 1935).

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Section Six is devoted to bills and proposals for bills.

Art. 40. (1) Bills presented to the Chamber by the king and by the Senate are printed in French and in Flemish as well as such explanations as accompany them.

(2) Bills emanating from the Government and those transmitted by the Senate are, after the text in both languages has been distributed, sent to the appropriate permanent commissions. Similarly with motions due to parliamentary initiative when they come up for consideration.

(3) The only exception to this rule is for bills and motions of general or political interest. These are remitted to the sections and to the permanent competent commission. If there is any remission to the sections and to one of the commissions the reporters of the sections are added to the aforesaid commission to form with it a special commission which appoints its own reporter.

(4) The President decides as to remission.

He can, however, consult the Assembly on this point.

On a demand by one-fifth of the members of the Chamber, consultation becomes necessary.

(5) Decisions as to remission cannot form the subject of a debate or of a division.

(6) When a motion of urgency is tabled, the distribution of the text of motions as provided for in para. 1, can be dispensed with (Amended Dec. 5, 1935).

Art. 43. (1) A member desiring to table a motion must sign it and leave it with the clerk of the House either in both languages or in the language of the prospective mover's choice. In the latter case, the clerk will have it translated.

(2) If the President considers that the motion ought to be proceeded with, it will be printed in both languages and distributed with an account of any subsequent proceedings.

Otherwise the motion will be transmitted in both languages to the section of the Chamber.

If one section at least agrees that the motion ought to be proceeded with it will be printed—in both languages—and distributed with an account of any subsequent proceedings.

(3) The mover will name a date for debating whether the matter shall be proceeded with.

(4) If after one month from the date on which the motion was tabled subsequent proceedings have not been reported to the clerk, the motion will be considered as null and not moved (Amended Dec. 5, 1935).

Art. 5. On the date fixed by the Chamber, if the motion is supported by five members or more, the debate will be opened and the President will consult the Chamber to ascertain whether it wishes to consider the motion tabled, if it wishes to postpone it or if it declares that debate is not desirable.

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Section 6 of the new rules deals with the important question of the commissions. The part played by the commissions of Parliament is one of the problems which has particularly attracted the attention of specialists in political science. The Belgian rules indicate the general lines of organisation for such commissions:

Art. 72. After the election of a new Chamber, the Chamber forms as many commissions as there are ministerial departments. The functions and names of the permanent commissions are fixed by the President of the Chamber according to the functions of the ministerial departments (Amended Dec. 5, 1935).

Art. 73. These commissions are each composed of twenty-one members. Candidates will be presented at least three days before the date fixed for nominations.

No member can be a member of more than two permanent commissions.

Art. 74. The members of each commission are appointed by roll call and by ballot and are elected by absolute majority conformably to the provisions by Art. 6.

Art. 75. The permanent commissions have as function, each in the subject indicated by its name:

- (1) To give the Chamber all information which it demands that they shall give on any proposition.
- (2) To examine proposals sent them by the Chamber, to report on and present reasoned conclusions on the matter submitted.
- (3) To prepare motions if required on petitions important enough for the Chamber to have sent them to a commission (Amended Dec. 5, 1935).

Art. 76. Independently of the permanent commissions, and the commission on petitions and of any sub-commissions which it may be found expedient by the commissions to set up, a commission may be formed for the examination of one or several proposals either by roll call by an absolute or relative majority or by ballot, or if the Chamber requests it, by the President.

Art. 87 of the rules deals with the special body which is charged with examining the state of parliamentary business, and establishes the programme of work for it, etc. This body is called "The Committee for the Work of Parliament." Its functions are as follows:

Art. 87. (1) After every general election a committee is set up which is charged with the duty of examining the state of work of the Chamber and of drawing up a programme of work indicating how the work is to be got through and the conditions under which it will be got through.

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(2) This body is called "the Committee for the work of Parliament." It is composed of a president and vice-presidents, of six members of the Chamber according to its political composition and of such ex-Premiers as are Members of the Chamber.

(3) The Government, specially informed by the President of the Chamber of the day and hour of the Committee's meeting, can be present and state its opinion.

(4) The proposals of the Committee are submitted for approval to the Chamber.

(5) If these proposals give rise to a debate not more than five members may speak for a maximum of ten minutes.

(6) The limitations provided for in the foregoing para. are not applicable if the demand to set them aside is made by one-fifth of the members of the Chamber.

(7) The programme of work decided by the Committee is printed and distributed, and set up in the Chamber.

(8) It can be amended only by a vote initiated either by the President of the Chamber or by the Committee for the Work of Parliament or by the Government or by a vote resulting from a motion formulated in writing and supported by one-third of the Members of the Chamber.

In that case the limitations regarding the number of speeches and their duration provided for in para. 5 of the present Art. are applicable (Passed Dec. 5, 1935).

III.

In my writings devoted to the connection between international and internal law,¹ I have on more than one occasion expressed the profound conviction that it is necessary to reinforce the organisation of international peace by *internal guarantees*. I have shown that peace can be assured by two juridical methods which are parallel to each other; on the one hand by means of treaties and pacts which are part of international law and on the other by means of internal legislation which completes and reinforces international laws.

For the first time in history the French Revolution formulated the constitutional renunciation of war in the celebrated decree of the Constituent Assembly of May 22, 1790, which proclaimed "that the French nation renounces any war whose aim is one of conquest and that it will never use force against the liberty of any nation." The Spanish Republic, in its constitution of December 9, 1931, published a new formula for such a renunciation of war.²

¹ v. my *Droit constitutionnel international*, Paris, 1933.

² On the proposal of Senor de Madariaga Art. 6 of the Spanish constitution laid down: "Spain renounces war as an instrument of national policy."

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Now there exists today a profound discrepancy between the rules imposed on States members of the League of Nations by the Covenant and the provisions of national constitutions. A *harmonising* of the Covenant of the League of Nations with constitutional law is a political necessity of contemporary international life. In our days, if it is desired to remain in the realm of reality, it must be recognised that internal responsibility is more concrete and more immediate, than international responsibility. It is of supreme importance that the establishment of harmony between constitutional law and international treaties should create definite internal responsibilities in states where the international conscience is not yet developed, where the governments are hostile to the international spirit and where the old formulæ of the *raison d'Etat* take precedence over the more elevated sentiment of international responsibility.

When, for instance, in virtue of Art. 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations a state collaborates against an aggressor, the acts of the said state may be incompatible with its constitution which for such acts lays down conditions different from those laid down in the Covenant. There is a contradiction between the procedure envisaged by Art. 16 of the Covenant and the constitutional provisions regarding the declaration of war, mobilisation, military operations, etc.

At Geneva quite recently, on the occasion of the discussion on sanctions against Italy in October last, the statesmen were compelled to admit the principal importance of the necessity of establishing this harmony between internal law and the Covenant of the League of Nations. In discussing the various measures which states members of the League of Nations could and ought to take in carrying out the obligations under Art. 16 of the Covenant several delegates appealed to their own internal law; was it necessary to apply automatically sanctions voted at Geneva or was it necessary, in accordance with the spirit of more than one constitution, to submit the question of application of such sanctions to the legislative assemblies?

The Spanish constitution has created this harmony between the Covenant of the League of Nations and internal law. Art. 77 of that document gets rid of the antinomy

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which still exists between the Covenant and various state constitutions as far as the maintenance of peace is concerned :

The President of the Republic can sign no declaration of war except in the conditions foreseen by the Covenant of the League of Nations and then only after every means other than those having the character of acts of war have been exhausted, including the juridical procedures of conciliation and arbitration laid down in international treaties of which Spain is a signatory and which have been registered with the League of Nations.

When the nation is bound to other countries by particular treaties of conciliation and arbitration, these treaties will apply wherever they are not in contradiction to the general treaties.

If these conditions are fulfilled, the President of the Republic will be authorised by a law to sign the declaration of war.

But the harmonising of the Covenant with internal law does not mean simply that the Covenant enters into the constitutional texts, but also that it enters into internal law with a view to the establishment of *internal sanctions* against international aggression. How can internal penal sanctions be enforced against those who commit an aggression ?

The new Spanish legislation contains a very interesting solution of the problem which deserves study. The Spanish legislators sought to add penalties to Art. 22 of the Constitution by extending the Penal Code, and so in the new Penal Code we find an article (129) which lays down :

A President of the Republic will be liable to the punishment of solitary confinement if, in violation of Art. 77 of the constitution, he signs a decree

- (1) declaring war when the conditions laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations have not been fulfilled and without first of all exhausting all those defensive measures which are not of a military character and the procedures laid down in the international conventions to which Spain may have adhered ;
- (2) declaring war without having been authorised to do so by a law. The ministers who countersign the decree are liable to the same penalty.

Thus the Spanish constitution by Art. 6 excludes any war of aggression, by Art. 77 makes it constitutionally impossible to undertake a war in contradiction to the principles and procedure laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and, finally, by Art. 129 of the Penal Code formulates definite sanctions applicable to the President

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of the Republic and the ministers in any case of violation by them of Art. 78 of the Constitution.

Here, then, we see the development of juridical logic tending to the creation of complete harmony between Spanish public law and the Covenant of the League of Nations. For the first time, the Spanish Penal Code establishes penal responsibility in cases of violation of that Covenant. Thus there is not only international responsibility and constitutional responsibility ; there is also *penal* responsibility. Art. 129 of the Spanish Penal Code creates penal sanctions against disturbers of the peace.

One day we may hope to see the world reach such a stage of evolution that the international responsibility will be as strong, as concrete, as immediate as penal internal sanctions. But that day has not come yet. Yet at the present moment an internal repressive organisation with its apparatus of prisons and police can be a valuable reinforcement to international responsibility. Art. 129 of the Spanish Penal Code is not only an interesting theoretical novelty, but is a formula of practical pacifism, a formula whose importance is confirmed by recent international events.

Prof. B. MIRKINE-GUETZEVITCH

General Secretary of the International Institute of Public Law.

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SOME FOREIGN BOOKS

LUDENDORFF'S latest work, *Der totale Krieg* (Ludendorffs Verlag, Munich: pp. 120), is spoiled by the intrusion of its author's own pet heresies—there is the usual abuse of Christianity—and the “philosophy” is unworthy of an undergraduate. The “total” war is not a theory, but an unpleasant reality only too familiar, and the general's conception of waging it will interest—though it may irritate—only technicians. But what is interesting is his conclusions from his own experience of the conduct of policy. That was all very well while governments waged war; now that peoples wage it, policy is an instrument of war. That means that the “leader,” the commander-in-chief, the wielder of the weapon of armed force, must be really omnipotent. He must be omnipotent to forge it, to secure an organization of what is called falsely civilian life which will enable him to keep it the trenchant blade it ought to be, to declare war when he thinks fit. Wars will not now begin with formal declarations after diplomatic tension. They will happen at the dictator's decree. The cause will not be external but internal, the preparedness of the nation. The argument leaves no doubt that the doctrine is derived from his experiences as a dictator *manque*.

It is instructive to turn from “total” war to “total” pacifism. *Pour Vaincre sans Violence* by the Dutch pacifist, B. de Ligt (Mignolet et Storz: pp. 256) is a breviary of non-resistance. The author speaks as a socialist citizen of a small nation who feels violence even in defence to be useless, and who considers that violence has rarely achieved anything. He is particularly scornful of those “romantics” like Marx and Lenin who thought revolutions should be made by violence whereas violence, as is proved by the case of Russia, ruins any revolution. The book sets out the non-resister's case excellently; its logic, once the premises are granted, is impeccable and it is full of wise sayings. But the premises are derived from history and history is a much more complex thing than the author thinks. There was indeed one “Aventine secession” that succeeded; there was another

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that was a bloody fiasco. One feels that the problem is reduced to an unreal simplicity and that the solution is altogether too easy, a feeling not removed by any admissions of the author's complete sincerity.

M. de Ligt's final chapter deals with Hitler and the threat of National Socialism to Holland. O. Scheid does not believe in any Nazi threat. In his *L'Esprit du troisième Reich* (Perrin: pp. xii, 258) he sets out only to see the best and to recommend it to France. Unfortunately, his studies appear to have been literary rather than political, and, as far as contemporary literature is concerned, rather limited. National Socialism to him is a new religion which has found something *new*. It opposes the idea of the nation to internationalism, the idea of the people to the class war, and the “mystique” of labour to materialist capitalism. All this is “myth” and the great “myth” is the race myth. These “myths” created the movement, whereas to most people they were created by the party for the movement, that is, in so far as they are “myths.” They are phenomena not of mythopoea but of propaganda. Scheid is incurably naive—the only valuable parts of the book are the summaries of certain Nazi books—and he would be well advised to study a book in which there is no naivety, Louis Rougier's *Les Mystiques politiques contemporains* (Sirey: pp. 124). “Mystique” the author defines as “a complex of beliefs which cannot be justified by reason nor proved by experience but which are blindly accepted from irrational motives.” A political “mystique” is *created* to solve “the supreme political problem, i.e., the legitimacy of the power exercised in any given society by the ruler.” As such it is needed more than ever by régimes which have been established against the course of political evolution. Rougier analyses them one by one after an illuminating introduction—Bolshevism, Fascism, corporativism, totalitarianism and the like, their common characteristic of destroying the distinction between the temporal and the spiritual, their actual effect on European politics and on the individual. The criticism is very hostile but fair, and the result is a wise and timely book.

M. Rougier is the professor; M. Jacques Bainville—now alas, the late M. Bainville—is the politician, and his *Les*

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Dictateurs (Denoel et Steele: pp. 300) is a brilliant political study. Dictatorships are good or bad, but they happen only because of circumstances and the peoples have no alternative in the circumstances but to submit. He surveys dictators in this light from the Greek tyrants to Hitler, and comes to the conclusion that the peoples ought so to manage circumstances as never to come to the point when they can do more than submit. If there are times when M. Bainville's wit is too much for his history, the wit itself has historical value, especially where he seeks to deduce a reason for dictators and finds it everywhere in the weakness of the preceding governments. A dictator is always a violent remedy and may be worse than the disease; so M. Bainville advises the peoples: "Don't get ill."

Partly connected with the myth are three brochures by Heinrich Roszbacher—*Politische und wissenschaftliche Methode, Wie weit folgt Thomas Abbt der wissenschaftlichen und der politischen Methode?* and *Methodenlehre des politisch-wissenschaftlichen Schrifttums* (Doelle, Heidelberg: pp. 104, 56, 40). The main purpose seems to be to defend Rosenberg against his critics. The argument is confused but, so far as it follows, distinguishes between the scientific and political methods of writing history. The political method exists to accomplish a political end; if it does so, it is good writing although scientifically it may be hopeless balderdash. The answer to the scientific historian need not be either historical or scientific; if it tries to be, it will be ineffective. The political method, i.e., the method of Rosenberg and H. S. Chamberlain, has superseded the historical, and any attack on it as inaccurate, superficial, unscientific or mendacious is just irrelevant. The political aim is the highest of all and these writers, although unprofessional from an orthodox point of view, were professional in their own sphere, for they realised the political aim they set.

Der gelbe Fleck (Carrefour, Paris: pp. 288), which has as sub-title *Die Ausrottung von 500,000 deutschen Juden* and is prefaced by Lion Feuchtwanger is a painful, heavily documented account of pogromist Germany. Though highly coloured, it constitutes, even when one discounts the sensationalism, as crushing an indictment as ever has been

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published against a state calling itself civilized. Very interesting is the demonstration that anti-Semitism is still not a sentiment of the masses, but a policy dictated by a minority party. Bernard Pier's *Rassenbiologische Betrachtungen der Geschichte Englands* (Diesterweg, Frankfurt: pp. 55) would be funny were its author not so deadly serious. He is completely ignorant of history in any sense; of his biological accomplishments I am not competent to speak. The union of 1604 (sic!) signalled the union of the German tribes of Britain and the victory of the German Imperial idea! English law (and Scottish?) derives from the old German military code! Mr. Baldwin's slogan, "England's frontiers are on the Rhine," expresses this country's decision to form a solid *bloc* with the Continent against the United States! The Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 successfully ended a "race war"! England's is, in fact, a "race" history, and the unfortunate Englishman, did he but know it, is really a superior sort of German.

From this sort of thing it is a relief to turn to Waldemar Gurian's latest book, *Der Kampf um die Kirche im dritten Reich* (Nova Verlag, Lucerne: pp. 120). This is a very careful, almost objective account of the conflict between Church and State in Germany with an attempt to trace its historical and sociological origins. He regards it as a fight by the Church for her very substance. But it is more; it is a struggle of the human mind against a uniforming Statism. Priests and parsons are fighting the old battle of individual freedom while they fight for religious freedom, and in that fight they have not only renewed the life of the Church but they have created a new sense of Christian solidarity against *Vergottung* of the national life, and placed the issue of liberty again before the nation. The events and issues are set forth in a moving story which is well worth study by the student of politics. The battle, it is true, is not, as the Nazis assert, a political one, but its result will have far-reaching political consequences.

Two other books are worth noting. The first is Alexander Choulguine's *L'Ukraine contre Moscou* (Alcan: pp. xii, 220). The author was a prominent member of the Ukrainian Nationalist Party which succeeded in creating an independent

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state separate from Russia. After a general sketch of Ukrainian history and aspirations he describes the events of the revolution, how after the fall of Czardom the Central Rada was set up, how the Provisional Government rejected its demands, how the battle was waged against Kerensky and how Ukrainian independence was proclaimed after the Bolshevik revolution. He describes the activities of the new régime in Kiev, the recognition of independence by France and Britain and then the struggle against the Bolshevik invasion which culminated in the fall of Kiev and massacre. The story stops here, for this is a record of *choses vusées*. As such it is valuable material for history and a splendid story in itself. The second is Wolfgang Hallgarten's *Vorkriegsimperialismus* (Carrefour: pp. 336). This is an attempt to set forth the "sociological bases" of the various foreign policies of the chief states in Europe before the war. Bismarkism is seen as the expression of the will of capitalism and feudalism, the policies of France and England as dictated by their capitalists, and the whole pre-war period as a puppet show directed by predatory economic organisations. The thesis is familiar but this demonstration of it is well worked out, partly with the aid of new material.

Much of it is an indictment of the armament rings, for it is one of the curiosities of pre-war capitalism that its wars were always civil wars in which there were never any losers, and it is the armament rings which once again come under the lash in Richard Lewisohn's *Les Profits de Guerre à travers les Siècles* (Payot: pp. 292). This is a comprehensive popular survey of the classes who make profits from war—generals, speculators, contractors, armament makers and the like. It is very readable but often superficial and occasionally less than accurate. But it contains some astonishing figures and some little known facts. Naturally it is particularly full on the most recent period. Here Herr Lewinsohn is an authority, and his documentation will supply the anti-war profits school with ample ammunition. He adds a very interesting chapter on the efforts now being made to regulate war profits.

Prof. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, whose *Les Nouvelles Tendances du Droit constitutionnel* (Librairie générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence: pp. x, 218) has just gone into a second

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edition, is concerned as one of the directors of the "Centre d'Etudes de la Révolution française" at the Sorbonne in two interesting periodicals of which the reader may be interested to know. One is the *Cahiers de la Révolution française* of which each number contains a series of longish essays—e.g., in No. 3 colonial questions are dealt with, "La Doctrine coloniale de la France en 1789" by Gaston Martin, and "Les Colonies pendant la Révolution" by Paul Roussier, with a bibliographical note. The other is *La Révolution française*, a quarterly review, each number containing articles on various topics, all original research work. The latest number I have seen contains, for instance, an examination of the charge of theft against Marat à propos an article in the "English Historical Review," a life of Lezay-Marnesia and the text of the constitution which Rigas drew up in 1797 for the Greece which he hoped to recreate in the insurrection of 1821. Both periodicals, which are published by Sirey, can be warmly recommended to students of the period. Finally, may I just mention another of the professor's excellent studies, the brief *Régime parlementaire d'Après-Guerre* (p. 22), which appeared in the *Mélanges Paul Negulesco* and is published by the Imprimerie nationale in Bucarest?

[In my Oct.-Dec. survey I noted an addition to Prof. Carl Schnut's series *Der Deutsche Staat des Gegenwart*, which I approved as showing a distinctly higher conception of law than its predecessors. I now learn that the book was not issued by the publishers whose name appears on the title page, the Hanseatische Verlagsgesellschaft. I quote from one letter I received: "Please state the facts in case readers of the *Political Quarterly* get the impression that any possibility of free-expression of opinion has been restored to Germany." Who produced the work, I am still unable to say.]

R. T. CLARK

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RUSSIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM. By W. B. REDDAWAY.
(Macmillan, 1936, pp. X and 106. Price 15s.)

THIS unassuming sketch, which was awarded a prize by the University of Cambridge, purports to describe the currency and banking systems of the U.S.S.R. It has the merit of clarity of language, and also that of accuracy of description, so far as it goes. Where the description fails in conveying an intelligible picture of Soviet Communism is in a lack of comprehension of the social organisation as a whole, without which an account of any one part of it may be merely misleading.

The author naturally starts with the assumption that the vast complications of currency and banking practice in Great Britain and other Capitalist countries represent what is normal, if not, indeed, inevitable. He finds all these complications absent in the Soviet Union, which is simply unaware of the mysteries and magic about which Mr. Keynes and Professor Pigou, with nearly all their economic colleagues, are locked in controversy. Mr. Reddaway has the insight and the candour (p. 8) to notice that the role of currency in Soviet Communism, including that of bank credits, "is definitely that of servant and not of master." It exercises no dynamic influence either on the volume of saving or on that of investment, upon the aggregate amount of production or upon what kinds of commodities shall be produced; none on imports or exports and consequently none on unemployment; and most paradoxical of all, none on internal prices, so far as concerns the great majority of things or services that are paid for by the consumers.

Mr. Reddaway seems to have been chiefly struck (in 1934) by the temporary co-existence of two sets of retail shops, with markedly different prices for the same articles. He was apparently unable to learn the reason why several thousands (out of a total of 45,000) co-operative societies were, in 1930-2, made "closed societies," confined to particular sets of workers who were enabled to buy limited quantities of necessities

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at low prices. Nor did he discover why these and other co-operative societies in the cities were increasingly supplemented by government shops, charging higher prices for unrationed commodities. Most of Mr. Reddaway's book is devoted to a theoretical analysis of the effects upon "real wages" of this strange duality of price levels. He may be excused if he feels a little vexation at its complete disappearance in 1935-6, on new arrangements being made for the abolition of all rationing.

Money in the U.S.S.R. is, as he properly says, only a "unit of account" and a "medium of exchange"; giving accuracy of bookkeeping to those in charge of production; and ensuring freedom of choice to the would-be consumer. The quantity of money in circulation is of no more economic importance than the number and face-value of the postage stamps issued by the tens of thousands of post offices. The quantity is increased in the one case as in the other, for all sorts of reasons, many of them "uneconomic." If any inconvenience is caused either by momentary excess or defect, this is promptly corrected in one or other way, without prices being changed. In the U.S.S.R. money is not a "store of value," though it may become such by conversion into a savings bank deposit or into government loan stock. As for gold, it is nothing but a raw product, convenient to export to countries foolish enough to esteem it more highly than manganese or timber—just as Birmingham manufactures idols and sham jewellery for export to unsophisticated African tribes. The banks in the U.S.S.R., instead of being potentates with the power of increasing or diminishing at will the aggregate volume of the "currency" of the nation, are merely agencies to enable the innumerable separate enterprises easily to settle, by bookkeeping devices, their transactions with each other and with the equally innumerable organs of local and central government; and also to pay out the monthly paper roubles to the armies of employees—all in accordance with the annually adjusted "General Plan." The banks, like the currency, are, as Mr. Reddaway gradually realised, the servants, not the masters; the robots by means of which the community accomplishes its dominant purpose, not the dictators either of the purpose or of its course.

SIDNEY WEBB.

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MAGNA BRITANNIA. By J. COATMAN, C.I.E. (*Jonathan Cape*. 10s. 6d.)

PROFESSOR COATMAN describes his book as "the first attempt on a very ambitious undertaking." This is nothing less than to provide a philosophical account of the British Empire as "an entirely new form of political organisation." "The true value and meaning of the Empire," he tells us, consist in the fact that it "is a world-commonwealth wherein artificial or forced relations between its component parts are all the time being changed into ties of mutual co-operation, consciously and freely accepted by all concerned."

This great theme—for it is a great theme—could have been treated in any one of three ways, or in a combination of all three. Mr. Coatman might have given us a work of political philosophy, showing how this new system of co-operation between independent (if not sovereign) political communities has undermined the theoretical basis of the traditional "political science," and compels us to think out anew what we mean by "the state." This is the kind of enquiry which Mr. Coatman must have in mind when he speaks of "the need for a new adaptation of political and economic thought to the new conditions of life," similar to that which arose in the fourth century B.C., when the Greek city-state had outlived its usefulness. Or he might have written a book analysing the present condition of the commonwealth and showing how far, in actual fact, the relations between its component parts are "artificial or forced," and how far they correspond to his ideal standard. This would have involved an enquiry into what may be called the "sense of the commonwealth," in the various Dominions, including the Irish Free State, and some account of the policies actually in operation in different parts of the Empire at the present time. Such a book would have told us, for instance, not simply that Northern Rhodesia has important copper resources but also what is being done there for native education, and would have explained the social background of the recent riots. Finally, there was a third book to be written on the question how, *assuming* that the peoples of the Commonwealth

were in fact animated by a desire for a greater measure of organised co-operation, such co-operation might actually be worked out in the concrete.

The weakness of Mr. Coatman's very interesting and readable volume is that it does not deal adequately with any one of these three themes. The new political philosophy proclaimed in the earlier pages is not worked out with reference to earlier thinkers and systems. No attempt at all is made to deal with the second theme. Thus a reader ignorant of the facts might jump to the conclusion that the Empire was already, so far as its inner or spiritual unity was concerned, all that Mr. Coatman so ardently desires that it should become—and a more sophisticated reader might even imagine that he himself wished to convey this suggestion. By far the greater part of the book is devoted to the third theme. Here, Mr. Coatman is on his own ground and he has a number of practical suggestions to bring forward. It would take too long to enumerate them all, for he has a fertile and inventive mind, but space must be found for one line of thought which may be of special interest to readers of *The Political Quarterly*.

Mr. Coatman fixes on the Public Utility Corporation as a type of organisation peculiarly suited to "the British temperament." This leads him on to the idea that "the more widely the economic activities of the different British countries are based on the principles of public utility, the easier and the sooner we shall attain the co-operation which we are seeking." In other words, he suggests that vested interests are a disintegrating force and that socialism is a natural bond of Empire. And this leads him on to an account, highly interesting despite its brevity, of recent socialistic experiments in different parts of the Commonwealth.

It would be tempting to follow the author down some of the other avenues that he opens up. As regards the control of investment, for instance, he is prepared to go considerably further than the well-known Orange Book Proposals of 1928. He would not only institute a general control over all private investment, by means of an authority armed "with statutory powers and working in close touch with the Bank of England and the Treasury," but he would also make use of this control for purposes of bargaining in

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commercial treaties. "The intensified demand for that portion of our investible surplus available for foreign countries," he remarks, in a passage calculated to make Mr. Litvinov's mouth water, "would give us additional advantages in the bargaining by means of bi-lateral commercial treaties which is now the accepted technique of international commercial intercourse."

Here are new possibilities of economic imperialism. Whether these and some of Mr. Coatman's other suggestions can be harmonised with his desire to eliminate "artificial or forced relations" *within* the Empire must be left to the reader to determine. Enough has been said to indicate that, though the author does not quite fulfil the promise of his title, he has produced a most thought-provoking volume.

ALFRED ZIMMERN.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1934. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, assisted by V. M. BOULTER. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Oxford University Press & Milford. 28s.)

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1918-1935. By ALFRED ZIMMERN. (Macmillan. 12s. 6d.)

INTERNATIONAL LAW. By L. OPPENHEIM. Vol. II. DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY. Fifth edition. Edited by H. LAUTERPACHT. (Longmans 45s.)

THE ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN. By S. H. BAILEY. (King. 12s.)

AN intelligent historian in 2036 A.D., reading these four books would possess an extraordinarily complete knowledge of international affairs and their psychological causes a hundred years before his own date. He would note the remarkable fact that, if he or we look back to the year 1836, nothing comparable to any of these books was, or could have been, written in that year. The change which has come over international relations during the last century may indeed be observed in the differences between the fifth edition of Oppenheim's standard text-book, admirably edited by Dr. Lauterpacht, and the first. Meditation on this fact and on its implications might have led Sir Alfred Zimmermann to modify the arguments in a characteristically

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brilliant and superficial chapter on international law in his new book. But the real nature of the struggle between the old and the new in international society—a struggle, still undecided, upon which the future of our civilisation depends—only became fully apparent after the war. It is fully apparent to those who have eyes to see in the books of Professor Toynbee, Sir Alfred Zimmermann, and Mr. Bailey.

Professor Toynbee's Survey is historical. The author every year produces an object lesson in the art of writing contemporary history. The product is a masterpiece of its kind because the narrative of events contains always both an objective statement of those events and a historical interpretation or criticism, and the two are never confused. In this, Professor Toynbee's method is the exact opposite of Sir Alfred Zimmermann's; in consequence, however much one may disagree with any of Professor Toynbee's conclusions, one feels that he gives even the most ignorant reader all the necessary material for arriving at the right conclusion. This is particularly evident in two crucial series of events dealt with in this volume and intimately connected with the thesis in Sir Alfred Zimmermann's book. The first is the history of Iraq and the attitude of the British Government to international society and national obligations as revealed in the events leading up to the acceptance of Iraq as a member of the League. The second is Professor Toynbee's brilliant and profound analysis of the motives and policies which brought the U.S.S.R. into the League.

Sir Alfred Zimmermann has written an extraordinarily clever and brilliant book, but one can only hope that he was, in writing it, completely unaware of the effect that it must have upon the reader. It is full of good things recklessly or, to use a favourite word with reviewers, provocatively expressed. To anyone who knows something about his subject, what he says is often salutary and illuminating, as is so often the case with violently enunciated half-truths. But for the student who has not the knowledge and experience necessary for detecting and correcting the author's slap-dash statements and distorting bias, the book is dangerously misleading. Its main object seems to be to prove that the League has been a failure, that it was bound to be so, and that anyone who

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"believes in" or "supports" it is one of a "discordant congregation" of impossible "idealists." No reasonable person will deny that there is ample room for criticism of the League as it is and as it appears in the vision of many of its supporters. But Sir Alfred Zimmern's attack is so confused and inconsistent that it defeats itself.

The book is vitiated by a fundamental confusion of thought and a fundamental inconsistency. The confusion consists in the assumption that there is something more real in violence and power and force, and in societies regulated by them, than there is in law, justice, order and in societies regulated by them. The belief is a delusion based on muddled thinking. Sir Alfred Zimmern has reached the stage of civilisation and mental clarity at which he sees quite clearly that a society based upon the physical strength of exceptionally strong murderers or on gangsters armed with machine guns does not take more account of "realities" than one based upon the acceptance by both the physically strong and the physically weak of rules of law and even the "ideals" of liberty and equality. When Sir Alfred Zimmern on a dark night in the streets of Oxford meets a six-foot anti-social murderer, both of them are aware that Sir Alfred is the realist and the murderer the idealist—but only in the sense that Sir Alfred's ideal has been accepted and the murderer's rejected by Oxford society. But when Sir Alfred travels from Oxford to Geneva, he forgets this simple truth. "Power politics" of the "Great Powers" now appear to him to be "real," and anyone who proposes to apply the principles of Oxford society to the society of states is dismissed as belonging to the "discordant congregation" of "idealists." And the League has failed, not because its members are animated by the motives and dominated by the psychology of the anti-social Oxford murderer, but because it did not turn itself, on the advice of Mr. MacDonald and Sir Alfred Zimmern, into a concert of the Great Powers, the only possessors of force and therefore of "reality" in international society.

The book's inconsistency is even more remarkable than its confusion of thought. One quarter of it flatly contradicts the other three-quarters. Sir Alfred, when his eyes are not

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blinkered by bias, is much too clever a man not to see the fallacy in this belief that force or power is the only "reality" in society or politics. He knows that unless the Great States exchange their power policies for a system of international law and order in which war is no longer tolerated as an instrument of national policy and disputes between states are settled without violence, international society, as we know it, and with it civilisation will be destroyed. In other words it is the ideal of power policy, not of the League, which is self-destructive and unreal. Every now and then Sir Alfred Zimmern sees and says this, thereby making mincemeat of nearly everything which he sees and says elsewhere. What he never sees is that the failure of the League and the unimaginable horror which its failure will bring down upon the world are not due to the utopianism of cranks or the visions of idealists, but to the muddled visions of statesmen who prefer to pursue some *ignis fatuus* which they call power-policy over the brink of the precipice rather than settle down to the humdrum task of using the League as an instrument of preventing war.

It is a relief to return from the spectacle of statesmen and professors pirouetting into the abyss to the sober sight of Mr. Bailey examining an example of international government, the control of drugs. This is the best account of the anti-drug campaign and of the attempts to apply the principles of international regulation to the sale of dangerous drugs which has so far appeared. It will be invaluable to every serious student of internationalism.

LEONARD WOOLF.

MERSEYSIDE: CO-ORDINATION OF PASSENGER TRANSPORT SERVICES. By T. S. SIMEY and C. D. CAMPBELL. (*The University Press of Liverpool.* 1s.)

This is one of a series of reports which have been published with a view to supplementing and keeping up-to-date some of the more important material contained in the Social Survey of Merseyside. The authors start by stressing the

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close connexion which exists between the development of transport and that of working-class housing. They then give us an admirable description of the various passenger transport undertakings concerned, whether municipally or privately owned. In this, particular attention is given to the extent to which these various undertakings have either come to terms with one another with regard to fares and fields of operation, or alternatively remain in a competitive relationship. Recent developments, notably the setting up of the Traffic Commissioners under the Road Traffic Act of 1930, and the granting to the railways of the right to acquire an interest in road transport undertakings, have greatly fostered mutual agreements and the means by which one facility may be protected against the uncontrolled competition of another.

The adequacy of the services provided, both with regard to present and future requirements, is then reviewed, specific alleged shortcomings being given. And the solution? Almost before these inadequacies have been recorded the authors disclose the direction in which they would advocate change. For having referred to "the efforts of the Traffic Commissioners to prevent wasteful competition," and "the care that the railway companies take to stop the road services they control from competing to any large extent with their railway services," they say, "...beyond this, little attempt is made to weld the services of the different undertakings together into one homogeneous whole, which is what the travelling public needs." (p. 21.) Whilst they do not advocate the immediate welding together of all the transport services in the area concerned, the last chapter is devoted to examining alternative methods by which some form of unified control may ultimately be reached.

In so short a brochure (40 pages in all) it would be unfair to expect a complete and unanswerable case to be made out in favour of any one line of action. That is clearly not attempted. But as a realistic study of the situation as it exists today, and as a serious contribution towards the solution of a difficult problem, the work deserves high praise.

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THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY. By J. M. KEYNES. (*Macmillan & Co., London*, 1936. Pp. xii.+403. 5s.)

ECONOMIC theory, as developed by the great English classical school of Adam Smith and his successors and further refined more recently by English speaking and continental writers, has been thought to justify, and in a considerable degree does justify, the system of free competition. It shows that within that system efficiency may be expected to be advanced, and that through the agency of markets and the "pricing process" consumers may be expected to secure the goods which they most desire, having regard to the cost of producing them. The system is open to criticism because it has produced and of its nature tends to produce a very unequal distribution of wealth and income. Reform has been directed to mitigating these results; socialists have argued that no reform, that is practicable within the limits of the system, can reduce the inequalities sufficiently to render them tolerable, and that the system itself must be swept away.

Another kind of criticism has also been made by socialists and others, attacking the system on the ground of its inefficiency and claiming that the processes of private enterprise and free exchange have some inherent flaws in them, productive of crisis and unemployment and ultimately of disruption. Some of these critics have concerned themselves with the general theory of value, others, the monetary cranks, have confined themselves to ferreting out some defect in the monetary mechanism. The argumentations of both alike have on the whole been so deplorably muddle-headed and have contrasted so lamentably with the brilliant lucidity of the orthodox school, that those who put implicit faith in clear and honest thinking and instinctively distrust the easily recognizable croak of the charlatan, have been content to believe, even if reluctantly, that the defence has had right on its side. Concessions might be made to the pleas of sentiment and to the political arguments of the egalitarian school; but their economics has, on the whole with justice, not been taken too seriously.

Mr. Keynes claims to have discovered a radical defect in the free system. His diagnosis, like those of the monetary enthusiasts, points to the possibility of remedy within the limits of the system, albeit probably involving far-reaching changes; but his analysis, unlike theirs, is concerned with the fundamental theory of value and exchange.

Mr. Keynes brings to his task an endowment very different from that of the critics already mentioned. His analytic and constructive powers are probably as distinguished as those of any writer who has ever devoted himself to the study of economics. His knowledge of the development of economic doctrine is far-reaching; he is well acquainted with the ground occupied by his adversaries, not merely with the form which their agreements usually take, but with the foundations on which they rest. And he is capable of matchless lucidity. The present work is a difficult one and its arguments cannot be mastered without considerable effort. But the effort is worth while. The reader may fear at first that all attempts to extricate himself from the maze of argumentation, in which he finds himself set, will be unavailing. He may take courage and rest assured that if he takes sufficient trouble, in the end he will see the reasoning as a unity. The underlying structure of thought has a beautiful simplicity; the apparent complexity is due to the fact that at every turn existing doctrines have to be dealt with, not always demolished, often merely re-sorted and allotted to their proper place in the general structure of theory.

This is not the place to undertake an examination of Mr. Keynes' substantive doctrines. As he himself claims, the matter must be argued out by the body of professional economists using their own weapons. The most essential point may, however, be set forth. It has usually been held that supply creates its own demand, that a particular commodity may be produced in excess, but that, since every increment of production entails an increment of demand on the part of those responsible for this extra production, there cannot be an excessive supply of commodities in general. Mr. Keynes seeks to make a breach in this doctrine by reference to saving. Here it is usually pointed out that

income saved also gives rise to a demand for goods, namely, for capital goods. The people who actually do the saving, however, are not the same as those who give orders for capital goods. The latter are concerned with the prospect of demand for the products of capital goods in the coming time.

Suppose that we ask the question whether in the event of the current output of consumable goods being increased to the extent of £100 worth, a sufficient demand for them may be expected. If £100 of extra income is distributed to the various parties responsible for the production of the extra goods, the demand for consumable goods will be directly increased by the amount that those parties spend on consumable goods, say, by £80. £20 is saved. If at the same time future prospects are such that business men feel encouraged to add to their holding of capital goods to the extent of £20 worth, the income of those set to work to make the capital goods, being £20, will if expended and added to the £80 of expenditure on consumption aforementioned, make up a total extra demand for consumable goods of £100 and so justify the increase of output of consumable goods. But if prospects do not justify the extra capital construction, the demand for consumable goods will be £20 short, and those responsible for the production of consumable goods will restrict output at the next round. So long as people tend to save any part of their income the producers of consumable goods will only find sufficient purchasing power to justify them in their act of production, if those responsible for looking after the future feel disposed to make capital goods equal in value to the amount of saving which the community is choosing at the moment to make. If the demand for consumable goods proves deficient, those responsible for making them will restrict output on the next round, there will be less activity and less earning of income, and this restriction will proceed, until the amount of saving that people do is, by reason of their diminished income, reduced, so that it is no greater than the value of the capital goods currently being produced; for only so can the gap between the demand deemed sufficient to justify the production of consumable goods and the actual demand for them be eliminated. Thus the production of the com-

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munity may be held far below its potential capacity simply because its members tend, in regard for their own personal requirements, to save more than industry deems it wise to use in the production of capital goods.

The orthodox view of the matter is that such a deficiency of demand will tend to be righted not by a slump of income and activity and consequent unemployment, but by a fall in the rate of interest which stimulates the production of capital goods. Mr. Keynes denies that this will necessarily or even probably happen. The rate of interest depends on how people value capital assets of which the yield is expected to be so and so much. Unfortunately the future yield is never exactly known. If a man chooses to hold any given capital asset he is involving himself in a measure of uncertainty; this is true even of assets on which there is a fixed contracted rate of interest. For the market value even of these assets may vary in future, as the rate of interest varies, and the holder of them may find himself involved in a loss if he wants to realise the assets and obtain cash. The rate of interest must be such as to make it worth while for a sufficient number of people to involve themselves in uncertainty of this nature. Such a rate of interest may be higher than that rate of interest which would so stimulate the production of capital goods that there would be a vent for all the saving people tend to make when the community is making money as fast as possible. If it is, there will be a deficiency of purchasing power, activity will run down, the community will not be allowed to make money as fast as possible and there will be unemployment. The productive system will not be used at its full capacity. The greater that capacity and the higher the national income would be if only it were fully used, the greater the danger that it will not be fully used; for people tend to save a large amount out of a large income. The menace of unemployment is a growing one.

Severe slump and crisis and widespread unemployment give point to socialist criticism of the existing system. Its defenders are filled with fear and alarm, and, in the absence of an adequate diagnosis, are at their wits end to know what to do. They attempt piece-meal remedies, tinkering with

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this industry and that, quite in vain so far as the general situation is concerned, and seek refuge in protectionism or autarky. The atmosphere of extreme depression is thundery; there is severe suffering, and fierce indignation; drastic action is demanded. The last slump produced revolution everywhere; who can predict the outcome of another severe recession in this country?

Some socialists welcome an atmosphere of tension, desiring a quick and drastic change of system. The greater part would prefer to avoid a sharp head-on conflict of interests, and to secure change by the gradual process of conciliation and conversion. In the head-on conflict other precious things might be lost—liberty and democracy. And in the present state of the world few would view with equanimity the weakening of this country which serious civil dissension must entail. The recurrence of a great slump, coming perhaps when the amount of unemployment was still large at the outset, would tend to strengthen the extremists. And even if a socialist party led by extremists were quickly routed and suppressed, this would be a grave political loss not only from the point of view of the socialists, but from that of all who cherish our free constitution.

Mr. Keynes' book is of supreme political interest because it offers an exact and intelligible diagnosis of the evil of unemployment. If the diagnosis is accepted, the quest for immediate remedies may be begun. Mr. Keynes provides a precise criterion by which proposed remedies may be tested. The present volume is concerned with the main structure of theory and not with the details of its application. This much may be said now, however, that the remedies would certainly be concerned with the operation of the banking and financial system, the volume of investment and public finance. They would entail collaboration between the government and the institutions concerned with these economic processes. How much government control or "socialization" would be necessitated, would depend on the degree to which loyal co-operation could be secured.

If Mr. Keynes' diagnosis is right and if it is possible to obtain general agreement about it, the prospect is opened before us of keeping the existing system running without

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any drastic upheaval. Thus we should be afforded a breathing space, within which large social changes could be encompassed with mutual goodwill. If effective remedies could be applied along his lines, an atmosphere of comparative calm could be maintained, in which alone progress is possible in a free constitution. His proposals are hardly likely to resolve the fundamental conflict of interests between rich and poor. They would merely set the scene, in which that conflict might be resolved in a peaceful way without violent passion and disruption.

One point may be mentioned, however, which does bear upon the fundamental conflict. If his views are correct, our system ought so to be managed that the rate of interest falls to a very low level. This suggests that the present position of the rentier class might be gradually and peacefully liquidated—great profits might still be made but they could no longer form the basis for the maintenance of permanent economic predominance. And existing vested interests would in a community of growing income become of diminishing relative importance even if they were maintained, and in any case would be subject to the process of ordinary wear and tear, so that a more equitable distribution would eventuate without the nasty conflicts involved in expropriation.

It is to be hoped that Mr. Keynes, having got thus far in his work of construction, will apply his unique powers to giving a more popular exposition of these views, that are of such vital concern to the democracy.

R. F. HARROD.

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ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. Editor-in-Chief: EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN. Associate Editor: ALVIN S. JOHNSON. Vols. XII to XV. (*Macmillan & Co.* 37s. 6d. each.)

WITH the publication of Volume XV, this great undertaking is brought to a close, so far as the editors and contributors are concerned. From the point of view of the public, the life of the Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences can only now be said to have really commenced; for a work of reference of this kind is not properly available until all its volumes are complete.

It is now possible to consider some of the larger aspects which emerge from a broad contemplation of these fifteen sturdy volumes.¹ One feels tempted to calculate the numbers of pages and words which they contain; the number of articles and contributors who have co-operated; the cost involved, and other quantitative data. The figures would be impressive, for in mere magnitude the Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences occupies an important place in the hierarchy of encyclopædias. But the quantitative aspect is obviously of such subordinate significance that it is not worth pursuing.

The most striking single fact about the work is that it marks the first occasion on which the social sciences have been considered worthy of being subjected to encyclopædic treatment in the grand manner. They are placed on the map in a new and irrevocable sense. If any superior physicist or chemist asks contemptuously, "What are the social sciences anyway?" one can now point to the serried row of volumes with confident pride and tell him to read those and find out. If the aspiring daughter who desires to study the social disciplines is asked by a Philistine father what is the nature of these ill-famed mysteries, she can now cow him with a few volumes. The process of becoming encyclopædic is, in short, a measure of the status and degree of development reached by a department of human knowledge.

At the same time, those who are closely acquainted with social studies may well feel that on almost every other page of the Encyclopædia there is an implied and perhaps unconscious criticism of the present state of the social sciences. One of the great merits of the work is that it is more directly related to life itself than to academic categories. And if one looks at the titles of the contents one finds that a very large number of the topics are either not dealt with normally by the various departments

¹ Review notices of previous volumes of the *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences* have appeared in *The Political Quarterly* for July–September 1930, July–September 1931, January–March 1933, and October–December 1934.

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of social science or that they cut right across these departments. Take, for example, such subjects as city and town planning, housing, smuggling, racketeering, agricultural credit, pawnbroking, consumer protection, youth movements, perjury, suicide, civic education, motion pictures—one could go on indefinitely. These are all matters of substantial interest and worthy of careful study. Yet they are not normally studied in departments of economics, politics, law, sociology and so forth. The truth is that the "subjects" into which the social sciences are at present divided are utterly false and antiquated. This is a matter of great importance, for the categories of thought in which he has been trained are to an intellectual worker what his weapons are to a hunter. If the weapons are inadequate, the huntsman's bag will be limited in character no less than in quantity. It is to be hoped, therefore, that this Encyclopaedia will exercise a much-needed influence in the direction of re-orientating the social sciences in a new and more promising direction. The freshness and vitality of the editors' approach merits the highest praise; and so, too, does the success with which they have managed to cover the ground in an intelligible and comprehensive manner.

Another feature which commends itself is the high degree of readability of the Encyclopaedia. Technical jargon and obscurity have been avoided, with the result that the work is informative in the best sense. The body of new or hitherto not easily accessible factual knowledge which is contained in many of the articles is incomparably greater than has ever been assembled before at a single stroke, at any rate in the sphere of the social sciences.

Every civilised human being, every citizen of the world, should rejoice at the sight of these fifteen volumes, for they represent a substantial expenditure of resources, material and intellectual, in the promotion of rational thought about social life. Here we have a monument to the life of reason in its application to that vast department of life in which, in the Fascist countries, all rational thought has been banished and its place taken by a monstrous collection of fantastic dogmas, grotesque myths and absurd legends. The danger to civilisation from these perversions and abnegations of the human reason is manifest; this Encyclopaedia is at once a protest against those who have renounced the voice of reason in the ordering of the life of mankind and a source from which those who follow the rational path may drink and refresh themselves, strengthened for the fray.

In conclusion, we should pay tribute to the editorial staff and the board of directors, to the publishers and the Rockefeller foundation, to

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the learned societies of U.S.A. and the Social Science Research Council, for the respective parts they have played in bringing the enterprise to fruition. Above all, homage should be paid to Alvin Johnson, the associate editor, on whom the chief responsibility for the initiation and execution of the Encyclopaedia has lain to a far greater extent than on any other individual. Only those who know Dr. Johnson can appreciate how much the success of the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences owes to his energy, imagination, liberal outlook, thoroughness and inspiration.

WILLIAM A. ROBERTS

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THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE RENEGADE KAUTSKY
By V. I. LENIN. (Lawrence 1s. 6d.)
IN DEFENCE OF TERRORISM. By L. TROTSKY. (Allen & Unwin. 3s. 6d.)

THE Berne Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party convened in May 1913 defined the attitude of the future Third International to the social-democratic "centre," led by Kautsky, in terms of uncompromising hostility. Many even of the Russian socialists had lined up behind Axelrod and were putting forward theoretical defences of patriotism coupled, as often as not, with passive professions of internationalism. These were roundly attacked in a series of pamphlets by Lenin, who developed, in the course of their composition, a rich commentary on Marx's theory of the state. The Marxian theory of state was becoming practical politics. A misunderstanding of its implications had, in Lenin's view, betrayed the proletariat into taking part in a war of veiled imperialist rivalries, as the "defence of the state" as such was no part of a scientific socialism which taught that the state was an organ of class-domination. Kautsky's position was less flagrantly anti-Marxist than that of the British Labour-leaders, for he theoretically accepted the view that class antagonisms were irreconcilable. At the same time he failed to stress a theory developed fully by Marx and Engels after the fall of the Paris Commune—the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. To Lenin, and to the whole Third International, the relation of proletarian revolution to the state was the key-question of Socialist politics in the 1917-21 period. This relation expressed itself after the October revolution in the slogan "All power to the Soviets," and in the practical definition of the Russian dictatorship of the proletariat, explained, excused and defended in these two books.

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The sharp exchange of political polemics on this subject—which includes Lenin's *State and Revolution* and Kautsky's *Dictatorship of the Proletariat*—is of major importance in the history of Socialist theory. This group of writings defines not only the Communist and Social-Democratic views on revolutionary method, but the attitude of both parties towards democracy, towards freedom, and towards the use of physical force. Lenin's *State and Revolution*, his *Proletarian Revolution*, and Trotsky's *In Defence of Terrorism* are the basis of the Communist apologia for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kautsky's *Dictatorship of the Proletariat* and his *Terrorism and Communism* are the modern defence of the Social-Democratic ideal of the "people's free state," a formula put forward by Bebel as far back as 1875 in his pamphlet *Unsere Ziele*. In fact, the fundamental ethics of two essentially hostile political systems are discussed, in this public correspondence, in a practical and absorbing way.

"The antithesis between the two socialist trends," says Lenin, "is the antithesis between two radically different methods: the democratic and the dictatorial." Social-democratic thinkers, and Liberal thinkers too for that matter, regard the conquest of power by any class in the state at present as a conquest of the majority of votes in an electoral campaign. The dictatorship of the proletariat is naturally regarded as the tyranny of the minority over the majority. Consequently, the Bolsheviks' repudiation of the Constituent Assembly—distrusted by Lenin from the beginning—has been seriously attacked by Liberals and Socialists in other countries and by Kautsky in the name of the Second International. The Socialist-Liberal attack on Bolshevik dictatorial methods, on the conception of the state as the proletariat organised in a dictatorship, and on the terrorism exercised by a revolutionary class on its enemies, springs ultimately from an idea of freedom that has nothing in common with the theories of Marx. The kind of liberty conceived by "progressive" politicians—a negative conception of freedom as the absence from restraint of the individual within the boundaries of common interest—is militantly rejected by Lenin in his *Proletarian Revolution*, which emphasises once and for all, in terms of freedom, the necessary differences between Marxian revolutionary socialism and evolutionary democracy. "Hegel," says Engels in his *Anti-Dühring*, "was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To him, freedom is the appreciation of necessity." This position, which from a purely rational point of view is as questionable as the Liberal position, nevertheless carried an immense emotional weight, and Lenin was able to invest it with

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reality by linking it, in his arguments, with the more solid doctrine of the class-war. Further, he continues, the conceptions of the liberty of the individual, and of "pure" democracy, are valueless if they are considered apart from their social content. Individuals are free only in relation to environment; democracies are this or that in relation to their historical significance. And here is another crux in the Liberal-Marxist conflict. For the Liberal, democracy here-and-now represents a historical state in the continuous development of man's political consciousness. To the Marxist, it is merely a phase in the unconscious tactic of capitalism.

The Communist's attitude to present society in non-Facist countries is based, not on an essential distrust of majorities and parliamentary democracies, but on a conviction that democracy can only be illusory under capitalist conditions. While men have no alternative but to sell their labour to the highest bidder, and while police, press, wireless and cinema are controlled by capitalist elements, they cannot control effectively the kind of life they wish to lead, nor the order of society they wish to introduce. And since democracy is a type of state, and, as such, based on authority, democracy can only be expressed in terms of class-power within society. Complete political freedom, in fact, cannot be achieved inside any state. Class-freedom, on the other hand, can only exist inside a state.

The degree of freedom which exists in the transitional state of communism—the dictatorship of the proletariat anterior to the establishment of a classless society—can only be expressed in terms of historical necessity which, to the Communist, is the necessity of establishing a proletarian state on a basis of force. In so far as a workers' dictatorship represents the wishes of a greater majority of the population than a capitalist democracy, this transitional period may increase political freedom quantitatively. But freedom for one class implies absence of freedom for another. Hence terrorism—Lenin is careful to distinguish between revolutionary terrorism in support of the proletarian dictatorship and stray acts of violence performed without relevance to the "objective situation"—is defended as a legitimate method of gaining and preserving power.

It is no exaggeration to say that Lenin's *Proletarian Revolution* is an essential document to the student of Communist theory. Trotsky's wittier and more splenetic pamphlet is considerably weaker in argument, and its main interest lies in the chapter defending the militarisation of Russian labour during the civil war.

SALLY GRAVES.

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ENGLISH RADICALISM, 1832-1852. By S. MACCoby. (*Allen & Unwin*. 462 pp. 16s.)

TO the student of English political and social history of the first part of the nineteenth century this book should be of very great service. Mr. Maccoby in his preface points out that both Whig and Tory Governments in the twenty years which followed the Reform Act were subjected to "a constant and active pressure from without" (to quote Earl Grey), the object of which was to obtain further political and, through political, social reforms. This pressure came from the Radicals and Ultra-Radicals, the Chartists, the Free Traders and Anti-Corn Law Leaguers, the Dissenters, and the Trade Unionists. His book is a detailed and documented analysis of the several currents in this Radical movement, its relation to the machine of politics, its failures and its successes. The book does not perhaps throw quite so new a light upon the period as the reader might be led to expect from the preface, for no one who has given any study to it can have failed to see in broad outline the reasons why the reformed parliament rapidly disappointed the hopes of all real reformers. What Mr. Maccoby really does is to fill in this broad outline with a mass of important and interesting detail. He has carefully studied contemporary documents and from them he shows us exactly what the several sects of reformers and Radicals were thinking, saying, demanding, and doing during the 20 years between 1832 and 1852. His first part, in which he conducts his analysis chronologically, is admirable, a veritable gold mine of facts. His second part, in which he considers such subjects as "Radicals and the Empire," "Radicals and Foreign Affairs," and "The World of Labour," is not quite so successful. The reason is that the subjects are too big for the space which he has allowed himself; the attempt, for instance, to deal with the world of labour in 14 pages is almost ludicrous when compared with the scale of treatment in Part One, and necessarily gives the reader a feeling of skimpiness and perfunctoriness. But this does not impair the real value of the book as a whole.

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THE SINO-JAPANESE CONTROVERSY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY. (*Johns Hopkins Press: Humphrey Milford*. 733 pp. 22s. 6d.)

THE author of this massive book has acted on various occasions as technical adviser to the Chinese Government, and was adviser to the Chinese delegation in Geneva and Paris during the first months of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Since then he has been technical counsel to the Chinese Embassy in Washington. Naturally, it must be extremely difficult for a writer in such circumstances to "present the views of the Chinese and Japanese Governments in an objective, impartial manner and with equal adequacy"; and Mr. Willoughby says frankly that his personal sympathies have been strongly with the Chinese. But the record does appear to be remarkably fair and balanced: the Japanese case, as well as the Chinese, is given without excessive condensation, without paraphrase, and without running criticism. Indeed, such comments as the author allows himself in the last chapters of the book are so extremely restrained that the reader is more likely to find them insipid than partisan. Hardly a hint of anger or protest ruffles the calm of this diplomatic recording of a shameful story of Imperialist plundering and betrayal.

The greater part of the book is given to an account of the controversy as handled by the League, from September 18th, 1931, when the Mukden incident was staged, till February 24th, 1933, when the Assembly's Report condemning Japan was adopted. The author claims that within the field which it comes, this account is so full that only the very special student would need to supplement it by referring to the League's records: and the text is so liberally furnished with quotations that this claim is likely to be found justified. Certainly, the record is very clear and thorough so far as it goes. It does not attempt to give an adequate picture of the background of the struggle: that must be looked for elsewhere (e.g., in the six studies published by the Geneva Research Centre). Among the parts of the story which need to be filled in, we may mention the significant struggle between the Japanese militarists and Baron Shidehara during the weeks before the Mukden incidents in September, 1931: and the imposition by the British Government, for a fortnight from February 27th, 1933, of an isolated, indiscriminating embargo upon certain arms (not including those already contracted for) to both Japan and China.

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The second part of the book consists of discussions of various controversial points arising out of the long negotiations. These include the anarchic claims to a self-judged right of self-defence; the Monroe Doctrine and its British and Japanese adaptations; and the interpretation of Article X of the Covenant. The author discloses (p. 37) that "persons of high standing in League circles" and members of the Secretariat told the Chinese delegation that no action whatever, even by way of advice, could be taken by the Council under Article X unless there were a unanimous vote, *including Japan's*. Did Sir Eric Drummond interpret the article thus? It is to be hoped that this interpretation, which the Council unfortunately acted upon, will be disavowed, for it really makes nonsense of the Council's quasi-judicial function under Article X.

In a concluding chapter the author says that "the League failed to secure any substantive results whatever, either by way of conciliation or restraint. . . . As for restraint, one can say that it is impossible to discern a single instance, unless it be at Shanghai, in which it would appear that Japan, because of pressure exerted by the League, refrained from further aggressive action in and against China." He attributes the main responsibility for this failure, of course, to the British and French Governments: he endorses Prof. Rappard's verdict that "at no time had one the impression that British policy was determined essentially by the will to uphold the Covenant and to protect China." He says frankly that Sir John Simon's speech of December 10th, 1932, in which the famous lawyer spent his art on whitewash for the Japanese, was "hardly a respectable one." He insists on the loyalty of the efforts made in China's name to maintain the essential rules of the collective peace system. He underestimates the injury that resulted from the United States not being a member of the League, though he duly emphasises the value of the American lead and support on certain occasions.

The book is a valuable and reliable contribution, within its limits. And the story it records is no minor episode: it is the story of a failure, a betrayal, and a miscalculation of risks, which has done much to alienate China from the League, to bring Japan nearer to war with Soviet Russia, to exacerbate naval competition, and to discredit the collective peace system in the West as well as in the East. We are now only at the beginning of the disastrous consequences of letting those "international anarchists" have their head. As the Chinese Ambassador said lately, "Today the sky is positively darkened with chickens coming home to roost."

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER

BOOK REVIEWS

CONSPIRACY AT MEERUT. By LESTER HUTCHINSON. (*George Allen & Unwin. 3s.*)

ONE reason why the English are accused of hypocrisy is that we have such remarkably short memories for the scandals which occur periodically in various parts of the Empire. No foreigner will believe that this is chiefly due to sheer ignorance. Jallianwallabagh, Denahawi, and Meerut are merely uncouth names, suggesting some forgotten "unpleasantness." An Englishman is surprised and hurt to find that in some quarter of the globe a number of human beings hold him personally responsible for a miscarriage of justice, or the brutal repression of a popular movement. Most of our countrymen have a child-like faith in the integrity of our judicial system, which they believe ensures that any wrong done in any part of the Empire can speedily be rectified. To cast doubt upon this belief is to be classed instantly as a crank. This idea is confirmed in the common mind because it is, in practice, impossible to obtain any publicity for an imperial scandal except through the help of one or two newspapers and publishers of a definitely "left wing" persuasion. Our Law Courts, with their absurdly high costs and strong racial bias, have also made the law of libel into an effective censorship upon all who may wish to ventilate the grievances of "coloured" races.

Here is a case in point. The Meerut trial was a major scandal, certainly comparable with the Sacco-Vanzetti case in America. In 1928 and 1929 the Government of India was being severely harassed by various nationalist activities. They wanted to take further powers, but found no support in the Legislative Assembly. It was an obvious time to raise the "Communist" bogey with the idea of frightening some of the middle-class nationalists into a more sympathetic attitude. There had been a series of "Conspiracy cases" but always against nationalists, accused of waging war against the King, and so a "Communist conspiracy case" was carefully staged. Some thirty Indians and three Englishmen were rounded up in Calcutta and Bombay. Some had been taking a more or less active part in a series of mill strikes, which were probably as justified as any strikes of the last twenty years. The evidence of any conspiracy, or of any intention of taking overt action against the Government, was of the flimsiest nature, and any of the individuals could have been dealt with locally. One, Mr. Spratt, had already been tried and acquitted in Bombay.

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It is an indelible blot upon the administration of Lord Halifax (then Lord Irwin) that he allowed his senior officials to initiate a "conspiracy case," with its cumbrous and slow procedure, its venue a thousand miles from the scene of the alleged offences, and its one-sided powers. Lord Irwin, at any rate, knew something of post-war politics in Europe. He knew that a belief in "the nationalisation of the means of production, distribution, and exchange," which was the gravamen of the charge against one of the Indians, does not necessarily imply any very direct connection with Moscow. He might have insisted upon some real proof of foreign connections, or of a conspiracy, before allowing this terrible legal machine to be set in motion. If he had merely read the committal charge, drawn up a year after the accused had been arrested, he might have suspected a case which would certainly have brought Mr. Lansbury and almost certainly Mr. Ramsay MacDonald into the "conspiracy." After the committal charge the case dragged on for some three years before a special Judge, who finally sentenced the unfortunate Mr. Spratt to twelve years' imprisonment, and Mr. Hutchinson, the author of this book, to four years' rigorous imprisonment.

Fortunately the promulgation of sentences caused an uproar, and an appeal was allowed. The High Court, under an Indian Judge, allowed most of the appeals, and drastically reduced all the sentences on the remainder. But the Government of India has never had to make any restitution for the wrong it did. Now we have Mr. Hutchinson's own account. It is remarkably free from bitterness, though written after such an appalling experience; few Englishmen have suffered four years' incarceration in the plains. The book is not only intensely interesting, but extremely readable and full of humour. It is a side of India and of Indian administration which few Englishmen ever see, and it should be read by every Indian Civilian, as well as by Englishmen who believe that they can get justice in India as they do in their country. Yet the reviewer is painfully aware from his own experience that it is almost impossible to get anyone in England to take an interest in this business. Even Indian politicians were luke-warm, and Mr. Hutchinson has a quite justifiable tilt at Mr. Gandhi, who might have included the Meerut prisoners in his "pact" with the Viceroy.

G. T. GARRATT

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

MODERN GOVERNMENT. By ERNEST J. P. BENN. 245 pp. (*Allen & Unwin*. 6s.)

A discussion of government in general from the individualist point of view.

FREEDOM. By SIR ERNEST BENN and others. 149 pp. (*Allen & Unwin*. 4s. 6d.)

A re-publication of a series of broadcast talks.

THE REFUGEES FROM GERMANY. By NORMAN BENTWICH. *With a foreword by* VISCOUNT CECIL. 288 pp. (*Allen & Unwin*. 6s.)

An account of the work done for the refugees by voluntary action and by the League from April, 1933, to the end of 1935.

THE FATE OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES. By ALEC BROWN. 288 pp. (*Gollancz*. 6s.)

A discussion of the future of his class by a middle-class writer.

I LIVED IN A SLUM. By MRS. CECIL CHESTERTON. 288 pp. (*Gollancz*. 6s.)

A description of slum life from personal experience.

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THE NEW JOHN BULL

By NORMAN ANGELL

THE most significant change in the sphere of international politics which has occurred during the last thirty years is psychological; a change in the nature of underlying motive; a shift in that scale of fundamental values which determines the conduct of nations. It has already produced in the case of Great Britain results in policy which would have been regarded as utterly inexplicable before the war; a line of conduct for which her history shows no precedent; and has already profoundly modified the distribution of power throughout the world and begun to reshape it politically along new lines.

Without some explanation of this change of motive no calculation as to the future course of policy, or as to the relative feasibility of one course as against another, is possible. Yet the change has provoked astonishingly little comment. Only here and there does one see a casual reference to it; while those who see international events as still shaped by the motives of the past, seem to deny that there has been any change at all.

The first decisive sign of this particular change was given at the time of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

Recall for a moment just what that involved.

For many years, long before the war indeed, the Great Powers of the West (which in this matter included Russia) had regarded the future position of China as decisive in determining the future relationship of East and West, alike politically and economically; decisive particularly in determining the future of the British Empire, affecting vitally the defence of India and Australia. With her four hundred million of thrifty, maniacally industrious, intelligent people,

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living upon a soil whose mineral resources were still largely unexploited, her communications still undeveloped, China represented the greatest potential market as well as the greatest potential field of capital investment in the world: as well as the greatest potential source of political and military power.

The rise of Japan as a first-class naval and military power after her victory over Tsarist Russia had been followed by a rapid rise as a first-class manufacturing nation. Her competition in the markets of the Far East, as in India, has created something like a panic in commercial and industrial circles in Great Britain, with visions of five shilling bicycles, twenty pound motor cars and sixpenny silk stockings.

The pre-occupation of the Western nations had been expressed in a whole series of Treaties designed to protect the naval, political and economic interests of the signatories in China. Britain's interest in the matter was generally accepted as primordial, owing to the fact that she is still by far the greatest Asiatic Empire in the world, defending in India a position gravely shaken by internal agitation and in Africa a position which, resting upon the prestige of a tiny white minority, may be made impossible by any similar agitation of the native races.

Such was the background of the events of 1931. Starting with the conquest of Manchuria, Japan proceeds to proclaim, in the teeth of all the chief Western nations, an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine to the general effect that the whole of China is henceforth to be regarded as a Japanese sphere of influence, economically and politically; that the elaborate arrangements for maintenance of equality of economic opportunity in China are rescinded, that the Open Door is closed and barred. All this was achieved by a series of steps rapidly taken, so that by 1934 the Japanese government was able formally to give notice to the world that "Japan reserved to herself a special position" in China; that she would oppose energetically any move

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towards interference in or assistance given to that country by the Western Powers; that in effect, the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine would be applied in full by Japan in her relations with the Asiatic mainland. On the occasion of Japan's formal withdrawal from the League Mr. Matsuoka informed the press that "anyone will recognise that no power on earth can check our advance. The sooner it is realised and the world Powers recognise it, the better it will be for the welfare of the world."

A year later, a high official in Tokio sums up the position:

"Europe and America possess no more political interests in East Asia than we possess in the European or American continents." The policy throughout has been marked by a directness and brutality of challenge that Germany would never have dared to employ in her pre-war relations with her neighbours. The Japanese ambassador in Washington stated in December 1934 that "Japan hopes that Great Britain and the United States will understand her policy" but that "if, however, the United States and Britain failed to understand and attempted forcibly to swerve us from our course, then Japan would be forced to fight." In that connection, it was interesting to note that a month or two previously the Japanese Navy had been conducting manoeuvres based on the assumption that Japan was at war with both Britain and the United States; and a Japanese admiral, writing on the lessons of the manoeuvres, had expressed the opinion that if opposed by both powers at sea, Japan's fundamental strategic position would remain secure provided she held firmly in her hands Manchuria, Mongolia and North China. (Since then the Admiral's lesson seem to have been taken to heart for Japan is already master of Chahar and is extending her influence rapidly over the other two neighbouring provinces.)

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In considering the significance of British acquiescence in all this, a series of steps far more challenging of the rights of other states and far more contemptuous of "scraps of paper" than any pre-war act of Germany's, it is well to note Britain's economic position at the time.

British capitalism was encountering difficulties greater than any it had ever encountered in its history. International trade had shrunk appallingly; unemployment had risen to proportions never before known; the economic chaos had been followed by financial and monetary chaos and capitalism was turning to all the devices of economic nationalism to save itself if only for a time. The established order was faced by challenge and unrest of every kind, and war would have afforded a most useful diversion for governments harassed by internal dissension. All the conditions which, before 1914, would have been regarded as indicating the imminence of war were present.

By most of the accepted theories concerning the part which economic imperialism plays in the causation of war, Britain and America should have fought Japan for the economic possession of China many times over, had it been necessary. Capitalism, it is alleged, can only save itself by ever increasing extent of foreign markets, and if ever capitalism needed "saving," alike in Britain and America, it was in the years following the war, and particularly after 1931.

Moreover, the balance of power in any final sense at least was enormously on the side of the Western powers. On the one side was Japan whose economic and financial position was precarious and uncertain. On the other side, possessing a common interest in opposing Japanese designs, were nations making a combination so powerful as to be irresistible. British interest in that particular circumstance happened to coincide not only with the interests of the United States,

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Australia, Canada, but with those of Russia and China herself, in a political and strategic as well as economic sense; and in an economic sense with the interests of the great capitalist power of continental Europe. If such a combination was not in a position to defend extensive economic interests against the challenge of one Asiatic state, when can military power ever be said to be in a position to defend interests?

If there was ever a case in which by the commonly accepted theories "the fight for markets" demanded military action by the threatened states, it was then. By all the favourite generalisations, Western Capitalism had then to fight or go under.

But it did not fight. The one desire manifested by the capitalist governments then, particularly the government of Great Britain, was to keep out of war. Not only did British Imperialists not resist Japan, they applauded, in a sense aided. "I am for Japan," says a member of the House of Commons in a debate on the crisis. Imperialist papers called upon us to witness, admire and rejoice at the virility and energy of "our old and faithful ally." Strategic weakness might explain the failure to act; it could hardly explain the jubilation.

It is true there was division of opinion. On one side were those who, taking the view that since the potential forces of the nations threatened by Japanese aggression were immensely superior to Japanese forces, there should in the interests of respect for treaties, world order, future peace, the rights of the weak, be bold resistance to the aggression, even at the cost of temporary risk. On the other side, however, the view was taken that the matter hardly concerned us; was "a distant dispute," as one eminent public personage put it; that our naval position was hopeless; that at all costs we ought to avoid a quarrel with Japan who had been an old

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and valued ally. It would be fair to describe this latter group as anti-war, against anything which might provoke conflict, and some of it as definitely pro-Japanese.

But note how the roles were distributed.

It was the Right in both the political and economic sense, the old guard of imperialism, the Cheltenham colonels, the Jingo Press (notably the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Express*) the City, the Federation of British Industries who took the Pacifist position, resented not only the formulation of any policy or resistance but complained bitterly of any criticism of Japan by the League Assembly. At the very moment that Japan was bolting and barring the Open Door over large areas of China, proclaiming monopolies which rigidly excluded British traders, representatives of the Federation of British Industries were cooing most gently, and suggesting that the time had perhaps come to revive the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

The demand for resistance to Japanese aggression came from the Left, from sections of the Labour Party, from organisations supporting the League of Nations and certain other peace bodies.

II

Now if one had forecast such a situation in the years preceding the war, it would have seemed to any student of politics utterly meaningless. It would have been rejected as nonsensical alike by the Marxist and the Imperialist. The Imperialist has always insisted that to yield in any such situation as that described is simply to throw up the imperial sponge; the Marxist that the tap root of war in the modern world is the struggle of rival capitalist powers for trade, markets, new fields for investments and concessions. Numberless Marxist writers have explained how by forces which go beyond the will of individuals this rivalry of economic interest pushes to war. All this the actual event disregarded.

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If the Japanese case had been an isolated one, standing quite by itself, it would still have been significant and, in terms of the old doctrines, inexplicable; or explicable only on grounds of strategic difficulties.

But it was soon proved to be by no means an isolated case. The Japanese aggression was swiftly followed by the descent of Italy upon Abyssinia (the Italian dictator explicitly citing the immunity which Japan had enjoyed as one of the reasons why it was "outrageous" for the League to attempt to restrain him) while the Italian adventure was swiftly followed by the Hitlerite militarisation of the Rhineland in violation, not alone of the Treaty of Versailles but of agreements entered into freely by post-war German governments, and ratified by the Hitlerite government itself. And in both cases there was revealed the same strange manifestation of British opinion: British Imperialists applauding a foreign, rival and hostile imperialism, despite its plain menace to British interests and British security. Demands for resistance to these foreign aggressions came mainly not from the Right, but from the Left.

In some respects the Italian case was more striking than the Japanese. Britain does, after all possess the strategic keys to the Mediterranean, dominates the approaches to the Suez Canal. Thus to command the route to India has always been deemed as vital to the defence of the Empire. Never, have imperialists on a thousand occasions declared during the last half century, could Britain tolerate for one moment a threat to that life line. But during the last twelve months Imperialists, in arguing against effective sanctions, have declared again and again that we could not incur risk of naval action by Italy because we were utterly unable to defend our position there—against Italy! Even with the use of French dockyards and at least no opposition from France,

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and the acquiescence of some fifty states in any action we might take, "Italy could make it impossible for us." This has been stated again and again by the erstwhile Jingo, in public, in the press. And, there can hardly be any doubt, the Italian dictator has duly noted it. It is common talk in Italy, in the Italian Embassies and Legations of the Continent, that the Abyssinian war has exposed unsuspected weaknesses in the British Empire; that though Ethiopia may not provide any very considerable outlet for an Italian peasant population it may well provide a very considerable black army to do what the Askari conscripts have done—furnish the means for further conquest in Africa. Not only does Italy now straddle the Suez Canal, but she is in a strategic position to create a land diversion should she find herself facing British naval power in the Mediterranean; to throw black armies into Egypt, even into Palestine; to instigate anti-British movements in both countries; to supply agitators and terrorists with money and ammunition. That such a policy has already been pursued, that, for instance, the Arab terrorists in Palestine have been receiving very large Italian subventions, no one really doubts.

And none of all this raises the slightest protest on the part of a popular jingo press or the old watch dogs of Imperialism.

It is unnecessary to follow the details of this same strange manifestation in the case of every move by which Hitler proceeds to increase the power of Germany which less than twenty years ago we were giving our all to destroy. Before 1914 Germany could not send a cruiser to Africa or design a submarine without the thing becoming an European incident, a menace to the Empire. For her to dominate Europe meant the end of us. In 1936 Hitler, with every gesture of defiance and provocation, tears up treaties, disregards his undertakings, proceeds step by step to re-establish the German

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hegemony of Europe.....and Germany becomes more popular than she has been since the beginning of the century.

But this is by no means the end of the story.

III

Perhaps the most serious sacrifice of British security made or welcomed by the Right, in the events of the last year or two remains to be noted.

In the last war, Britain and her allies had from the outset the enormous advantage of the economic alliance or support of the United States. A vast flood, not only of the raw material of war, but of fully manufactured ammunition began to pour from America into the Allied lines from the very outset of hostilities. The quantity was so enormous that the whole industrial organisation of the Eastern Seaboard of the United States was transformed. It was financed as we know by great loans.

The material help so given, coupled with the fact that it was denied to the German side, had of course a decisive effect upon the final outcome. Britain owed this incalculably great advantage to three things: command of the sea, the American view of neutrality and British credit. The American interpretation of neutrality at the outset of the war was that America would sell anything to whichever of the belligerents could come and fetch the goods and could pay for them.

It took the combined naval force of four (and at the end five) great naval powers, plus such pressure on the lesser neutrals as almost to force them into war, to maintain the blockade of Germany; but in the end the effect was overwhelming.

Britain can never again hope to duplicate that situation so favourable (and as events showed, so indispensable) to

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her defence, unless it be through some league policy, "closing the seas" to a state declared an aggressor by general consent creating a situation of "blockade by embargo." Such a situation would have arisen, and its future feasibility as an effective substitute for British sea power been demonstrated, if the policy of sanctions against Italy had been effectively applied. But, again, the British Imperialists, almost to a man, strenuously opposed that application, although, as one British Admiral declared, it was "a heaven sent opportunity to make British sea law world law." That foreign policy which, if successful, would have secured for Britain, in the event of attack upon her, the co-operation of the world in the maintenance of her old "sea rights" was deliberately rejected.

Note what the result will be in the event of any future war in which Britain, assuming the virtual disappearance of any idea of "League" action, will be engaged. First, she will no longer have the economic alliance of the United States. The supply of munitions and materials of war to either belligerent will be forbidden; loans to belligerents will be forbidden and would in any case be impracticable in view of the non-payment of loans contracted in the last war. This will alter the situation radically to the advantage of Britain's enemy. It deprives sea power of one half, and probably by far the more important half, of its coercive force. In 1914, we still had unquestioned command of the sea, when the sea was still the determining factor of world-wide struggle; it enabled us to cripple our enemy economically and to secure the United States as an economic ally. But our navy is no longer supreme in the sense that it was, owing to the growth of other navies, and command of the sea will no longer achieve what it did as late as 1914. The aeroplane has rendered Mahan's thesis out of date; ultimate decision has

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been transferred largely from the sea to the air, in which element Britain has few if any of the special advantages which enabled her for at least a century to be supreme at sea. And, as the economic factor, which so operated in 1914-18 as to keep the Allies supplied while throttling Germany, that has altered radically to the advantage of Germany, owing, first to the nature of the peace which we made (not so much in the territorial as in the economic clauses), and secondly, to our failure to recognise that only through the League could Britain secure for herself the advantages which the economic pressure of sea command gave her heretofore. Add to this the fact that there is a strong disposition to confine engagements of any kind to France and Belgium leaving Germany free to deal separately with Russia.

What would have been the chances of the Western Allies in the last war if, firstly, they had been forbidden the economic resources of the United States; secondly, if Germany had not had to face an enemy on her East as well as on her West; thirdly, if Japan had been an enemy; fourthly, if America had never entered the war at all?

And that, of course, will be the position of Britain now, if Germany and Japan choose to challenge her.

Yet, the more powerful do those states become, the more challenging their attitudes, the greater seems to be the disposition of that new John Bull, whom the old John Bull would not have recognised at all, to accept it all with complacency, and to resent any attempt to restrain them, to check their potential power of aggression.

IV

So much does all this conflict with commonly accepted explanations of British policy, that some foreign observers simply refuse to face the facts. When in September of

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last year it seemed momentarily that Britain was at last to give a real lead at Geneva in resistance to Italy, certain foreign socialist commentators, notably certain American commentators of Left tendencies, took the line that British opposition to Italy was dictated simply by British Imperialism. At least two eminent American publicists explained that collision between Britain and Italy in the Mediterranean had been inevitable for some time, that Britain, with her usual shrewdness and cunning had chosen a "moral" issue ("once more Britain as the plumed knight is setting out to defend the little state," as one Editor put it). It was entirely natural and in keeping with all we know of British method and Imperialist technique, we were told, for Britons suddenly to discover that it was their duty to support the League. The League had become a mere instrument of British Imperialism.

Week after week in American newspapers this diagnosis was set forth. This present writer, who happened to be in America at the time, tried to point out that such an interpretation ignored nearly all the facts; very significant facts well worth the attention of objective sociologists. He reminded certain of these commentators that the most characteristically Imperialist elements in Britain, all the Jingo newspapers, all the most reactionary of Imperialist politicians like those who were against the granting of self-government to India, certain Imperialist members in the Cabinet itself, bitterly opposed the government's policy in Geneva and quite openly supported and approved Italy's; just as these same elements had supported Japan when she invaded Manchuria; that Eden's policy got its most active support from the Liberals, the states of our Party, the Communists, from the lesser European states (like the Scandinavian) including the Irish Free State (particularly from Mr. de Valera personally), and from Russia; that it really would not do to ask us to believe that a policy which got its main support from Socialists, Communists,

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the vast majority of the small and weak states of the world, from men like Mr. de Valera, and from Russia, and got its main opposition from British Imperialists and Jingoists, was just pure, or nearly pure, British Imperialism.

This caveat, incidentally, had extremely little effect: the old generalisations kept on being repeated. The Radical and Revolutionary can be as traditional and conventional as anyone else.

The amazing upside-downness of the situation has been revealed by the weekly articles of such erstwhile Imperialists as Mr. J. L. Garvin. That a publicist, in attempting to weigh realistically a situation, should testify to the growing power of a rival Imperialism, is understandable enough. But, as Mr. Kingsley Martin has pointed out, it is not this which Mr. Garvin has been doing week after week. He has sung hymns of praise for Italian victories, gloated over the massacres of the Ethiopian victims, eulogised Italian generals because they have defeated with all the resources of gas and tank and aeroplane an almost unarmed people defending their homes, just as though they were British victories, victories adding to the strength and area of the British Empire.

V

It has been necessary to examine this situation at some length as an indispensable prelude to any coherent notion of the motive forces with which we shall have to deal; to knowing to what ends and purposes the country is arming; the things we are prepared to take risks for, and the things for which we are prepared to take no risks at all. Until that much is fairly clear, it is impossible usefully to discuss policy at all.

In order to prevent complete misapprehension of the purposes of the analysis this must be added: If the motive behind the policy of receding before aggression had been that of

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absolute pacifism, a deliberate determination not to defend the empire, to adopt non-resistance as a policy, there would certainly be, in the view of the present writer, a great deal to be said for it. It would mark a change at which we might perhaps rejoice. But the Conservative elements in Britain which are so pacifist when they are asked to support international action, a League or a Collective System, are still as violently militarist as ever when it comes to national action for defence, defence as the nation itself shall define the term. Those of the Right who have been so bitterly critical of the "bloodthirsty Pacifists"; the "Genevafists" (an effort of the Rothermere Press) clamour as insistently as ever for immense armaments "for defence." And on that plea receive abundant popular support.

For all parties (like all nations) stand for a policy of defence by one means or another. The maintenance of arms, the voting of military and naval credits (even by Labour governments) is proof thereof.

It is plainly relevant, therefore, to point out that the policy of the Right these last few years has betrayed this purpose of effective national defence.

VI

How, then, in the last analysis do we explain the conduct of the Capitalist, Conservative order in Great Britain, the British Right, in receding so supinely before the Japanese, German and Italian challenge? If ever economic interests which are supposed to push Capitalist states to war were involved they were involved in the case of the Japanese aggression. Yet war, or any line which might lead to war, has been refused in the Japanese as in the other cases.

In all interpretations of motive and purpose in politics there must be some element of guess (especially as the sub-conscious, imponderable, operates in political even more

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than in personal action). But the following conclusions are not likely to be far wrong:

- (1) In so far as a General Will of Capitalism can be said to exist, it is at present plainly afraid of war. In view of the experience of the last war there is quite unmistakably a general feeling that another world war would see the end of Capitalism as we know it. Even Socialist writers like Mr. Cole agree that this would be the almost inevitable result; and that outcome is not unnaturally disliked by the Capitalist. There is no reason to suppose that the fear of war expressed by our Lords Beaverbrooks and Rothermeres is in the least insincere. It is almost certainly real and sincere.
- (2) There is also some fear of what would result to the present order if Fascist states were involved in difficulties and brought down as the result of measures short of war; of what would have happened inside Italy if economic sanctions, or some measure like the corking of the Suez Canal, had brought about the defeat of Mussolini's venture.

This means that there is a co-operation, only partially conscious at present, across frontiers, irrespective of national divisions, between Fascists throughout the world; a sub-conscious co-operation perhaps of world capitalism: that it is ceasing to be nationalist when it comes to facing the common enemy of Communism. It is the "class war" in a form not quite that of the Marxian forecast. Incidentally, the situation in France seems to confirm this. There is now, at long last, a tendency towards Franco-German reconciliation, even alliance. But the movement does not come from the Socialists, nor from the Communists, nor from those workers whom the

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Communist manifesto called upon to unite. It is indeed opposed by the Left generally. The movement has its roots in the extreme Right, originating among the Chauvinists, the Nationalists, the Militarists, the Fascists. It is, however, at present a movement nascent and hesitating.

- (3) The conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact, even under a Laval government indicates, in any case, that the fear of Sovietism in France is less acute than the fear of German power; that politico-military pre-occupations over-ride the more properly economic. And this, of course, is true on both sides: Russia is prepared to enter into arrangements with a Capitalist Government for the defence of Communist Russia.
- (4) In the case of Britain, Conservative distrust and dislike of the League has been definitely stronger than fears for Imperial security. Rather than add to the force of internationalism in the world, accept a resounding success for the League—which the defeat of Italian aggression upon Abyssinia would have involved—Conservatives have preferred to see a hostile Imperialism straddling the route to India.

There is nothing in the least new, of course, in the fact that motives of prejudice and fanaticism should over-ride motives of interest. When we assume that motives of "interest," which usually mean economic advantage, are the determining motives of conduct, it implies that the advantage is recognised, that interest is correctly interpreted and that such factors as temper and fanaticism do not sway judgment of interest, of material advantage. But we know from daily observation of those about us that this is simply not so; that men are repeatedly mistaken in the interpretation of their interest. The same allowance must be made to an even greater extent—a much greater extent indeed—in

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the case of the conduct of groups. In more senses than one is it true to say, as an historian once said, that every war is a religious war; that when men can be persuaded to die, they have responded to appeals other than those of interest.

It is certainly quite safe to say that had the kind of challenge to British interests which Japan and Italy have issued this last year or two been issued before 1914, their policy would have been resisted at the risk of war. If it is not so resisted today it is because, apart from the considerations just outlined, the challenge has not presented itself as a challenge to Britain, but as a challenge to the League, and we know that "the League" is commonly conceived, particularly by its critics, not as a group of states pursuing a common policy in common, but as an entity apart from its members. It is an entity for which very many Conservatives have an intense dislike. These opponents have never thought of the League as an instrument of defence for its members; only as an alien body interfering with our national freedom of action. And for that they refused to fight, or to take risks to enhance its power, a power which might conceivably embarrass us in our future dealings with lesser tribes.

The fact is of first-class importance. It means that military action on behalf of the League would be quite unlikely to arouse the passions which gave us the Treaty of Versailles. Plainly if we had to fight for the League, it would be *contre coeur*. Many critics of the League have indeed based their opposition on that very fact, on the allegation that you will never get men to fight for it at all. If that is true, and to the extent to which it is true, it surely gives us a lead.

If the League now breaks down; or if it is "reformed" so as to eliminate the guarantee and mutual assistance clauses and to divorce the forces of its constituent states from its policies, activities and constitution, those forces will still remain, as purely national instruments. They will revert

THE IDEAL OF THE LEAGUE REMAINS

By LEONARD WOOLF

THERE seem to be moments—lasting over many years or even centuries—recurring at intervals throughout history, at which a blind, irresistible suicidal impulse sweeps over the human race. The result is the suicide of a civilization. At such times the only forces within states and society which are directed with energy and consistency are those which make for barbarism, unreason, and illusions. Sane and civilized people may still be able to see quite clearly the abyss into which they are plunging and the way in which herds of human swine might be prevented from rushing down to destruction. But at such times a kind of creeping paralysis affects the sane and the civilized; the more clearly they see disaster and destruction, the more impotent they feel to prevent them. The iron wheels of history are turning, turning relentlessly in the direction of unreason, ignorance, and savagery—how can a feeble voice crying in a wilderness stop the turning of an iron wheel?

The student of human history may study such suicidal periods in the Athens of Demosthenes, the break up of the Roman Empire, and the Germany of the wars of religion. But he could do the same more conveniently by reading the correspondence and the leading articles on the middle page of *The Times* newspaper during the month of May, 1936. For he would see, if he had not become aware of it before, that he himself is living through just such a period of communal suicide. There he will see the abyss; the forces marshalled with energy and consistency which will hurl us all into it; the things which might be done to keep us out of it; the wavering impotence which prevents our doing

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them. Let us examine this curious and terrifying phenomenon, even though we are fully aware that the wheels of history turn in the pages of *The Times* and cannot be stopped by a voice crying in those of *The Political Quarterly*.

Some months ago, in an article in these pages, I drew attention to the fact that the "British National Government and most people in this country are now, at the present stage, agreed that we are engaged in a test case, probably the final test, in case of failure, of the League of Nations and of what is called a system of collective security." The words were written five months ago; the case was the Italian attack upon Abyssinia; the test was the ability and determination of the League to resist that aggression and to ensure security to Abyssinia, a member of the League, by collective action. Today, the whole of Abyssinia is in the hands of Italy; the Ethiopian Empire has been annexed as an Italian colony; the Emperor of Abyssinia, after being welcomed at Waterloo Station by Lord Allen of Hurtwood, Sir Norman Angell, Miss Sylvia Pankhurst, and an enthusiastic crowd, has found what *The Times* euphemistically described as his "new home" in Princes Gate, Kensington.

One might with some reason have expected that the British Government, *The Times*, and those distinguished persons whose letters appear in large type on its central page would have received a severe jolt by these extraordinary results of a system of collective security as interpreted and operated by themselves, a jolt sufficiently severe to make them face at last the unpleasant fact that during the last five years we have been shepherded like sheep or the Ethiopians to the slaughter and like swine into the abyss. But there is no evidence of any such psychological reaction. The Prime Minister has publicly admitted that he feels humiliated. The Foreign Secretary has again asked for a free hand at Geneva. The League Council has again adjourned without taking

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any decision to do or not to do anything. Signor Mussolini has again stated that he does not propose to destroy the British Empire, but only the Ethiopian Empire. *The Times* leading articles and *The Times* distinguished correspondents are again stating that it only shows the necessity of making the League a reality, the only question in dispute being whether this can best be attained by weakening or strengthening it. And everyone is at any rate agreed that we must spend millions of pounds on arming or rearming ourselves as a preliminary to universal disarmament and perpetual peace.

If it was true that the Italian aggression in Ethiopia was a test case of the League and its system of collective security, then the entry of the Emperor into his "new home" in Princes Gate is a proof that the League and its system of collective security have failed. The first thing to consider is what these words mean, the second why the League failed. The creeping paralysis infecting civilized people in this country can be seen in this simple fact that no member of the present Government (Mr. Eden included), no leader-writer in *The Times*, not two per cent. of the persons who have taken part in *The Times* correspondence attach any precise or consistent meaning to the words "collective security" or to the obligations which this country accepted when it became a member of the League and upon the performance of which the collective security system of the League depended. Yet there can, in fact, be no real doubt or dispute on these points. The system of collective security was established and enshrined in the articles of the Covenant at the end of the war after public debate and explanation by the representatives of all the Allied Nations; the obligations which each member of the League had to meet in order to guarantee all members against aggression are explicitly stated in the Covenant. "The League" has failed and the aggression against Abyssinia has succeeded, not because

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there is a flaw here or a flaw there in the articles of the Covenant, not because the League "has tried to do too much," but because the statesmen and governments representing the Members of the League at Geneva never complied with their obligations. It is not really true that the League system of collective security failed; it did not fail; the governments of Great Britain and France prevented it from ever being put into operation.

For the sake of clarity it is necessary to repeat once more what has been said before in these columns with regard to the nature of an international collective security system and of the League as means for preventing war. A system of collective security is simply a method of organizing states alternative to that which existed before the war. Under the pre-war system war was recognized as a legitimate instrument of national policy. States and statesmen had to expect and provide for the possibility, indeed the probability and certainty, of being sooner or later involved in an offensive or defensive (the words are almost interchangeable) war. In such circumstances states and statesmen had therefore to provide for what is called national security—an, in fact, insoluble problem. The insoluble problem was solved by the ingenious and ingenuous idea that every Great Power could make itself stronger than every other Great Power by continually increasing its own and its allies' armaments. Under this dispensation our own security depended in particular upon having a fleet bigger than any other fleet, and the British Navy, as all admirals and many statesmen assured us and still assure us, became a guarantee of the peace not alone of ourselves but of the whole world. The guarantee ended in the war which lasted from 1914 to 1918.

In 1918 four years of war had painfully taught millions of people the following simple lessons:

(a) That war is a horrible and barbarous business.

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- (b) That the objects for which millions are induced to fight and die are not attained by war.
- (c) That science has made modern methods of warfare so destructive and so bestial that civilization and war are now incompatible.
- (d) That under the anarchic system which allows states to be judges in their own disputes and use war as an instrument of policy war is inevitable, and national security is impossible because it involves the necessity—which is an impossibility—that every state or group of states shall be stronger than every other state or group.

Under the impact of these lessons, which in 1918 were self-evident truths, the world's statesmen were induced to create, in place of the pre-war system of war and national armaments, a system of peace resting on collective security. The League system for preventing war is as definite and simple as the lessons about war which the world had learned in 1918. It depends for its efficacy upon the undertaking and carrying out of certain national obligations, namely,

- (a) The governments and statesmen of states members of the League renounce the right to settle disputes by making war.
- (b) The governments and statesmen of states members of the League bind themselves to regard any act of war by any state in breach of this primary obligation as an act of war against themselves and to come to the assistance of the victim of the aggression.

I apologize for having to repeat and repeat again these simple, self-evident facts, but it is absolutely necessary, because in the controversy now proceeding they are continually lost sight of, with fatal results, by many of our most eminent statesmen and most learned publicists. The League, I repeat, is or was intended to be an organization of existing

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states for peace through collective security. Collective security depends upon the undertaking and the carrying out of the obligations described in (b) above. And words mean exactly what they say. Security is to be not national, not to be attained by national armaments, by each being stronger than each; it is to be "collective," guaranteed by all nations in the League. And the guarantee is the obligation that an act of war against one shall be treated as an act of war against all, together with the obverse of that obligation, the knowledge of a government or state contemplating war or aggression that it will be declaring war against not one state, but all the other members of the League.

Now you may not like such a system, either because you are a fascist or a nationalist or a realist or a 100 per cent. pacifist, but that is what a system of collective security means and is. It is a system in which security is aimed at by collective, not national defence, by collective instead of national armament. (That is why if established it would lead to national disarmament instead of competition in rearmament.) And the gist, the kernel, the pivot of it is, and must be, the obligation that an act of war against one is an act of war against all. Otherwise there is nothing which is collective, there is no security, and no collective security. The Covenant of the League is perfectly clear, absolutely explicit on this. Article 16 begins with these words:

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the

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prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a Member of the League or not.

Those are the terms of an obligation which, as I have said, no member of the present Government appears to have read and which not two per cent. of those now discussing "collective security" seem to be aware of. Yet unless such an obligation exists and is honoured, there can be no "collective security" at all; we are left with two meaningless words which can only be used to keep simple voters quiet until the next election or the next war.

The League failed because this obligation of Article 16, upon which the whole system of collective security must always depend, was never honoured, and because from the outset the governments of Great Britain and France made it clear to Italy, both before and after the aggression, that they had no intention of honouring it. The British Prime Minister had publicly stated only about six months before Italy began to prepare for war that in his view a collective peace system was "perfectly impracticable" and "hardly worth considering." Naturally when Italy invaded Abyssinia, the government of Mr. Baldwin, holding such views, was not prepared to carry out its obligations under the Covenant, to honour its guarantee of collective security to Abyssinia, and to treat Italy's act of war against Ethiopia as "*ipso facto* an act of war against" the British Empire. There was no attempt to put Article 16 into operation and when, under pressure of public opinion, there seemed to be some danger of a beginning being made and effective sanctions imposed against the aggressor, the British and French Governments, by the Hoare-Laval proposals, effectively sabotaged any League action. It is true that public opinion made the carrying out of those proposals impossible, but they had

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already done their work; they had made the "perfectly impracticable" collective security system perfectly impracticable.

Some people may say that this raking over of old history is useless and that it would be better to let the past bury its dead, especially since they are only Abyssinians. But in this country we are primarily concerned with British policy, and it is impossible to decide what that policy shall be in the immediate future, unless we clearly understand exactly how British policy in the last 12 months has contributed to bringing us and all Europe to the present sorry pass. The existing League, as an instrument and organization for collective security, has been killed, and it has been killed because the governments of the two Great Powers upon whom its action primarily depended, contrary to the wishes of a large majority of their subjects, refused to carry out their obligations and make the collective security system "perfectly practicable." This statement will, of course, be regarded as "defeatism" by many supporters of the League and of collective security. I have always "supported" the League so long as the existing League remained a possibly effective organization for collective security. But an effective security system depends partly upon organization and partly upon psychology. The organization of the League still exists centred in Geneva; the psychology upon which its working depends has been destroyed primarily by the British and French Governments, first in the Manchurian and finally in the Abyssinian affairs. The psychological foundations required for a collective security system are these:

- (a) A general belief that under normal circumstances international obligations will be carried out.
- (b) A general belief that governments will not unprovoked resort to war and will not use war as an instrument of policy.

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- (c) A general belief among pacific peoples and governments that, if there is an unprovoked resort to war or an act of aggression, the victim of aggression can rely upon the aid of all the other members of the security system and that the act of war against one will be treated as *ipso facto* an act of war against all.
- (d) A general belief among any people or government contemplating aggression that an act of aggression against one state will be treated as an act of war against all.

The psychological foundations referred to in (a) and (b) above have been seriously shaken during the last 10 years. In Italy, Germany, and Japan there are governments which have openly declared that they do not hold themselves bound by international obligations, which have shown that they are prepared to use war as an instrument of policy, and which have deliberately dissociated themselves even from the collective peace system of the League. But a statesman who really wished to establish a collective security system would instantly see this: that the more reason there was to expect from some particular quarter the tearing up of treaties and unprovoked aggression, the more essential it was to strengthen the psychological foundations described in (c) and (d) above; in such circumstances the only hope of preventing war is to ensure both to the possible victim and the would-be aggressor the practical certainty that an act of war against one will be treated *ipso facto* as an act of war against all. The governments of Britain and France have taken precisely the opposite course; in face of the growing threats of war from Japan, Italy, and Germany, they have ensured certainty to the victims, the aggressors, and ultimately to themselves that the obligations upon which a collective security system depends will not be carried out. In other words no one now believes that an act of war will be treated

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as an act of war by any member of the League except the aggressor and the victim. Mr. Baldwin would, therefore, be right if he now said that he had helped to make the collective security system of the existing League perfectly impracticable. We have returned to the pre-war state of anarchy, and that is why the government is helplessly trying to make itself stronger in armaments than its neighbours, hopelessly waiting for the next war.

There is probably a deeper and more widely-spread hatred of war among the peoples of every European country, including Germany and Italy, than there has ever been in the world before. The governments of France, Britain, and the other League members share that hatred. I do not believe that the governments of Hitler and Mussolini "want" war any more than did those of the Kaiser, the Tsar, and poor old Francis-Joseph. Nor is it any good blaming it on the wickedness of Nazis, Fascists, or the cat. Nazis and Fascists are no wickedder than our own Cabinet, the members of the Labour Party Executive, or the most pacific socialist. History is made, civilizations destroyed, and misery sown broadcast over the earth not by wickedness, not by what people want, but by stupidity and impotence, by what people think and do. If a million men are stupid enough to believe what some hundreds of years ago they believed about *cujus regio ejus religio*, they turn Germany into a desert of blood and barbarism; if today millions of men believe what Hitler believes about race and nationalism and millions of others believe what Mr. Baldwin believes about the League of Nations, they will do the same with Europe.

For examine the cold, bleak facts. In Germany and Italy, you have nations and governments far more nationalist and militarist, far more heavily armed and heavily arming than any of those which precipitated us into the war of 1914; the governments are military despotisms; they are govern-

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ments with a grievance, breaking openly any treaty when it seems to suit them, preaching hourly to their subjects the duty of complete obedience and the glory of giving their lives in war. Every member of the National Government openly admits the danger of this situation, the inevitability of a European war if it goes on for a few more years. And they all agree that, if there is such a war, modern aircraft and gas will do for Europeans what they did for the Abyssinians. To meet these facts there are only three national policies which might conceivably prevent or postpone war :

1. Complete resignation and pacific capitulation to the threat of the Fascist states.
2. An alliance of France, Britain and Russia against Germany, Japan, and probably Italy.
3. The establishment of a real system of collective security, open to all states, but with the definite assurance to all that an act of war against anyone will be treated as an act of war against all.

Our government and, I should guess, at least 90 per cent. of the population reject the first alternative. As I have shown, the government have just helped to destroy at Geneva the assurance upon which any system of collective security must rest ; they have, therefore, destroyed the possibility of the third alternative. The terrifying impotence of the government and most of the government's critics is shown by their reaction to this situation. If we are not prepared to undertake the obligations of collective security and are not prepared to become complete pacifists and let the Fascist states do what they will, the only alternative left to us is that of an alliance. But government and opposition alike refuse to face the facts or the alternative. That is the impotence of the civilized which is so terrifying. Let us examine briefly some of its manifestations.

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The government's policy is one of mixing up all three alternatives, trying to get a bit of everything ; the result is that no one knows where Britain stands and what she will do in any international crisis, complete loss of any good which one of these lines of policy pursued consistently might produce, muddled thinking and inconsistent spasms of action by the government (Mr. Eden running sanctions and Sir Samuel Hoare the Hoare-Laval proposals at the same moment !), hopeless confusion of mind and perplexity in the public. Take the case of the continuance of sanctions. The continuance of sanctions is a stupid farce unless the government and the country are determined to make the League a reality, re-establish the collective security system, and compel Italy to return to the *status quo* with Abyssinia an independent state, a member of the League. Does any sane person believe for one instant that the government contemplates any such thing ? If it does not, it is doing precisely what it did before, drifting without any real policy into another impossible position in which Italy will call its bluff and leave Mr. Baldwin feeling humiliated, preserving at Geneva the shell of a sham League to salve its conscience and keep electors quiet. For such an empty shell, a collective security system which every member state knows well will never be used collectively or give him any more security than it gave Abyssinia, can serve only one useful purpose ; it can prevent us from thinking and facing facts ; it may keep us happy until the bombs begin to fall upon our heads.

Meanwhile, the only active policy of the government is to rearm. No one knows why we should rearm except that everyone else is arming. In moments of history when peoples and governments are sane, the amount of armaments is determined by policy and a nation's policy is determined by what nation or nations it might reasonably expect possibly to fight against. Today, there is no such policy ; we are

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arming ourselves in a vacuum. As there is an arms competition going on, it is assumed that we had better take part in it. Whether the amount of our armaments is to be determined by Germany's or Italy's, or by the amount required by the shell of a collective security system to defend a non-existent Abyssinia, is only known to the Committee of Imperial Defence. But the country accepts the fact complacently and even the trade unions are apparently being induced to "do their bit" in this extraordinary game. The only thing certain is that such competition in arming by Great Powers always has, and always will, lead to war between them.

The correspondence and leading articles in *The Times*, and the speeches of Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, seem to indicate the actual course which the government is inclined to select as the best for wobbling along into the abyss. We must, said Mr. Eden at a Conservative fête, "maintain our determination" to "keep the League in existence" and at the same time consider "any modifications that may be necessary in its structure." "We must attempt to remedy, in a spirit of candid realism, the defects" of the League. "The British Government still maintains its confidence in the League as the best instrument available to mankind for the preservation of peace." Mr. Eden then remarked that the following statement of the Archbishop of Canterbury was, in his opinion, profoundly true: "We could not abandon or even whittle down the ideal for which the League of Nations stood.¹ The actual circumstances of the time may seem to have discredited it, but the ideal remains." In other words the League is to be kept at Geneva "as an ideal," but certain alterations in its structure must be made as a concession to reality and Mussolini. Some of the dis-

¹Is the past tense a slip of the tongue? Even profound truths within profound truths occasionally slip out unconsciously.

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tinguished people who write to *The Times* urge that the alterations shall be the elimination from the Covenant of all "sanctions," the simplest possible plan for reducing a collective security system to nonsense, which is another word for ideal. Whether Mr. Eden and the Government will go quite so far in idealizing the League as that, is not clear, but there are indications in Mr. Eden's speech, in *The Times* leaders, and in other quarters that another plan may be adopted for maintaining the League as an ideal and combining it with a spirit of candid realism. This plan is to regionalize the League, or, as *The Times* puts it, to delegate "the responsibility of keeping the peace region by region." It is significant that Mr. Harold Nicolson, one of the cleverest and best instructed supporters of the government, in an article in the *Spectator*, favours the same idea; he recommends the establishment of authority in the international world by limiting our commitments as regards peace to certain areas, i.e. we should agree to defend our own territory and possessions from attack, to contribute a portion of our forces to the defence of small countries which border our lines of communication, because they must be included in "British rights and interests," and apparently so far as the rest of the world goes "let it rip."

Can any one doubt what this really means? It means the end of the League of Nations as an effective instrument for preventing war, an abandonment of the system of collective security. The appearance of a Left Government in France does not alter this fact, for Mr. Baldwin is Prime Minister and Mr. Eden Foreign Secretary in Great Britain. The idea that you can prevent war by maintaining the League as an ideal and regionalizing British interests and security is an idea of good, civilized men impotently turning their eyes up to heaven in order to save themselves from seeing the abyss into which they are sliding. To tell the German Government

or the Italian Government that an invasion of Belgium or Egypt will be regarded by Britain as a *casus belli*, but that the Ukraine, Lithuania, Yugoslavia are not within the sphere of British interests will not prevent a European war and will not keep this country out of it. To do that is to return, as we have returned, to the pre-war international situation in which aggressive war is recognized and expected, and in which the whole of Europe is dominated by force and by fear. In such conditions it is pure delusion to believe that you can regionalize interests or security. In the 20 years before 1914 we had the most dangerous conflicts of "interests" at one moment with France, at another with Russia, and at another with Germany, and half a dozen times we were on the brink of war with each of these Great Powers. The interests of Herr Hitler and Mussolini in 1936 may conflict with those of Abyssinia, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, and Russia, and not with "British rights and interests," but what possible assurance is there that they will not conflict with "British rights and interests" in 1938? And if war is once more recognized as the ultimate determinant of "interests," we shall be involved in the war of 1938 just as we were in that of 1914. Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Eden, *The Times*, and Mr. Nicolson all know this, though they will not admit it to us or even perhaps to themselves. But they admit it by their actions. They are all in favour of rearmament, and they are in favour of rearmament because they are afraid of an armed Hitler and an armed Mussolini. They know that, now that the League and collective security are merely ideals, now that war has been reinstated as the recognized method of determining the relations between European states, the turn of the British Empire may come at any moment to cross the path of some "dissatisfied" power. And like good, civilized, impotent men, they do what has always been done in such circumstances; they set to work to build up armaments, to

make Britain so strong that not even Hitler or Mussolini will attack us. A dream which the whole of history proves to be a suicidal delusion.

A great statesman of the Gladstonian type in this country and France might perhaps even now be able to rouse their own peoples and through them the rest of the world to the realities of the situation, the choice between suicide and civilization. He might at the thirteenth hour be able to recreate a real League and the organization and psychology of collective security. But he does not exist. And since he does not exist, it is probable that the League will be emasculated, but retained as an ideal at Geneva in order to keep cannonfodder quiet until the day when it is required. Meanwhile, the competition in armaments will be intensified, and the manoeuvring for allies, which has already begun, will continue. The people of this country will then be faced with two alternatives, though each may be disguised in the shell of an empty League or under a sham "collective security" system. The one alternative is a kind of pseudo-isolation, the other is an alliance (disguised, of course, to some extent) either with Germany or with Russia and France. The risks of war under any of these alternatives are terrifying; my prejudices make me think that they are perhaps slightly less in an alliance with France and Russia than in the other two alternatives. So we must find what comfort we can in that profound truth discovered by the Archbishop and Mr. Eden: "the ideal remains."

“ SOVIET COMMUNISM ”

By SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE

THE Greek critic Longinus, in comparing the Iliad and the Odyssey, discerns in the latter, signs of the poet's declining powers: less profusion and variety, more lapses from the sublime, a greater love of telling stories. The Odyssey, he says, is like the setting sun, having the greatness without the overpowering strength of the sun at noonday; it is a work of old age, though the old age be Homer's. Of the latest contribution by the Webbs to the study of human society it is enough to say that in this respect it is no Odyssey. In sweep of broad views and control of infinite detail, in freshness of writing, in force and subtlety of argument, the survey and panegyric of Soviet Communism now presented to us, is the Webbs at the top of their form. The moving apology with which the preface closes, for this work of supererogation, rendered as its authors near the close of their eighth decade, though not for worlds would we have the apology omitted, is in no sense needed. The fear of waning powers is belied by the stately epilogue and by the 1100 pages that lie between epilogue and preface.

But if *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?* is not an Odyssey of genius in decline, in another sense it is an Odyssey indeed. It is a record of exploration. Visiting the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in person and in spirit, the Webbs have seen signs and wonders, have talked with one-eyed monsters and heard Siren voices, have watched Circe re-making man—into something else. They have found a source of fresh inspiration in a new subject.

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THE FIVE REVOLUTIONS

Nor are all the 1150 pages of their two volumes more than adequate to their theme. For what they have to describe is not a single revolution, but projects or achievements of revolutionary change in five separate fields at least, affecting one-sixth of the habitable globe and 160,000,000 human beings. These five revolutions may be named as Technical, Economic, Political, Religious, Domestic.

The phrase “ Technical Revolution ” is used here to cover a wide and varied range of activities. There is in progress in the Soviet Republics an Industrial Revolution: the transformation of the people of these countries into a mining and manufacturing community, in place of an agricultural community; urbanisation, capitalisation, mechanisation in every field, including agriculture, are the familiar symptoms of this change. There is in progress an Educational Revolution—a headlong development of schools and teaching at all stages. There is in progress a revolution in the use of medicine, and the application of hygiene. These and other activities have been grouped here under the term “ technical.” From another angle, they may be described as the modernisation of Russia, as the application to a backward people of arts long practised by other nations. This is very important to Russia but not important as an example outside Russia. Tractors, Hydro-electric Stations, Sanitation, Hospitals, Schools, Scientific Research bulk largely in travellers' descriptions and in Soviet publicity. But they are not new things in the world. The excitement displayed in Russian films and broadcasts about a turbine or a subway appears naive to inhabitants of London or New York. Russia may do some of these things on a larger scale than others, and may or may not be going in due course to do some of them better. But, broadly speaking, they amount to bringing Russia up to date, from being centuries behind.

This does not mean that the Technical Revolution in Russia is not deserving of study by outsiders. The Russian attempt to bring about in one or two decades changes which elsewhere have been spread over one or two centuries is an experiment of great importance. But the interest of it is social rather than technical. It will be a long time before American and British engineers go to Russia to learn engineering, if ever they do so. But administrators and sociologists may go now to enquire how soon and by what methods it is possible to change the aptitudes and ways of thought and living of a population, to turn peasants by masses into craftsmen or machine men, to turn talkers into the punctual servants of co-operative enterprise. For, if we are to believe their novelists and playwrights, the Russians are or used to be talkers above all things.

The Economic Revolution consists in essence of what I have described elsewhere¹ as the performance on the economic system of the Marxian operation. This is the excision from the body economic both of "exploitation"—the employment for wages of one person by another person to make articles or render services for sale to a third person—and of "speculation," the buying of articles by one person for re-sale to others. From the point of view of the Soviet leaders this is no more than the cutting out of a gangrene. From the point of the student of economics it is a major operation; it is the removal of an essential organ of the system by which over the greater part of the world, for several centuries, men have sought to provide for their material wants; it eliminates the pricing mechanism as an automatic guide to production. Whether or not this organ today is functioning properly, whether or not the health of the patient would on balance be improved by cutting it away, there is no doubt that, if it is removed, something must be substituted for it. The

¹ *Planning under Socialism and other Addresses*, p. 24. (Longmans, 1936).

functions which the pricing mechanism was meant to perform must be performed in some other way, if the patient is to live at all. In their Economic Revolution, accordingly, the Soviet leaders are not just bringing Russia up to date, using the example of other countries. They are departing from example and breaking new ground. Their measures and the new problems which they have to solve in applying these measures are a subject of study which cannot be paralleled elsewhere.

The Political Revolution means those changes in the forms and powers of government which have made possible the other revolutions: have furnished means for that swift translation of ideas into action which is one of the features of the Soviet Republics. Here, also, the Soviet leaders have broken new ground—in the discarding of parliamentary democracy, in the grouping of men in three ascending series of association for their capacities as citizens, as producers, and as consumers, and, above all, in the organisation of the Communist Party. At least the ground was unbroken when the Soviet Republics began: now they have imitators in Italy and Germany and aspirant mimics elsewhere.

The Religious Revolution is negative: a movement against all that men have called religion hitherto. It is the emergence as a creed "common to the Soviet Government and a large and apparently a steadily increasing proportion of the whole population," of an aggressively dogmatic atheism. The rulers of Russia deny "the existence and the possibility of the existence of anything supernatural behind or beyond what science can apprehend or demonstrate" (p. 1134). They do not punish individuals who hold, or within their households teach, a different creed. But they prohibit absolutely the teaching of religion in schools or institutions of any kind and the public propaganda of religion, while they permit and encourage anti-religious propaganda.

The priests are allowed to live, but only as members of the deprived classes; they "are allowed to do nothing beyond holding services for worship, and performing religious rites connected with births, marriages and funerals at the request and expense of the family concerned" (p. 1011). Whether, in the event, atheism or agnosticism will become universal and permanent in Russia is a question for the future. The point of interest to note here is how atheism and the proscription of religious teaching hang together with other portions of Soviet ideology. Atheism is the obverse of passionate belief in natural science (p. 699). Proscription of organised religion is part of intolerance of competition for leadership.

The Domestic Revolution is the drastic reconstruction of family relations and narrowing of family functions which was foreshadowed by Lenin in 1920. The Communist Programme, he then declared, includes "the transference of the economic and educational functions of the separate household to society," and the consequent freeing of woman "from the old household drudgery and dependence on man" (p. 815). In accord with this programme there is, not only a formally equal right for women to engage in any paid work of which they are capable, but provision for enabling them to retain that work in spite of child-bearing—by leave of absence for six or eight weeks before and after birth, by free treatment in maternity, by a widespread organisation of public crèches and nurseries. With this programme, as natural to it, though not perhaps necessarily involved in it, has come a policy of complete freedom of divorce as of marriage: subject only to provision for any children, the relations of men and women have been treated as matters for their personal decisions. Provision for the children, however, is made financially, not by any system of children's allowances but by placing the responsibility equally on both parents, whether their union has been officially registered or not.

That is to say, in spite of the Communist Programme, the economic burden of children is not transferred from the household to society; it is left with the individuals who have brought the children into the world. How far in other respects the programme announced by Lenin in 1920 is likely to be carried out in practice, it is impossible to say. Here, as with the anti-religious movement, it is of interest to note that the emancipation of women, though not essential to communism or socialism in the economic sphere, fits naturally into Soviet ideology. It is part of that universalism and passion for social equality of all human beings, which, operating in another direction, has yielded the discarding of racial prejudice—at least on the part of the leaders. This is one of the best features of the Soviet system.

None of these five revolutions—Technical, Economic, Political, Religious, Domestic—can be left out in any survey of the Soviet Union. In themselves they are of different orders of positive importance and achievement. The Religious Revolution, as stated, is essentially negative, and the Domestic Revolution is the least complete; in both these fields—touching most nearly the individual man or woman, change is likely to be slow and uncertain. In both fields there are signs of recoil from the original objective. In spite of formal equality between sexes, relatively few women as yet play important parts in the Soviet System. In spite of crèches and nurseries, the care of childhood is for the most part a domestic and not a professional affair. The Technical Revolution is undoubtedly proceeding apace, but it is only in mid-career.

In the political field, formal change from the past is complete. The new institutions involved in the Political Revolution rightly occupy many pages in the volumes under review. But political institutions—unlike the human individual—are subject to sudden changes, not least in Russia. Even as

the Webbs were perfecting their account, the Soviet leaders decreed abolition of what seemed the most characteristic new feature of their system—indirect open election by meetings is to be replaced by direct voting by ballot. But, as is rightly emphasised by the Webbs, the central feature in the Soviet scheme of government is not any of those changeable institutions; the central feature is the Communist Party—the steel framework that sustains the whole.

"In the Soviet Union," writes Stalin, "no important political or organisational problem is ever decided by our Soviets and other mass organisations without directives from our Party. In this sense, we may say that the dictatorship of the proletariat is, substantially, the dictatorship of the Party which effectively guides the proletariat."¹ It was a "momentous Party decision" (p. 562) which, after two years of debate within the Party, decreed the liquidation of the Kulaks that is to say, the ruin of about 1,000,000 peasant families with or without exile for their principal members.

The differences between the Communist Party and its analogues in Germany and Italy are substantial. In Russia there is no leader to whom fealty is sworn; the fealty is to a party and the chief personality has been found in a different post at different times, though in each case he has been equally deified by all the resources of propaganda. In Russia the Communist Party, unlike the Fascist Party of Italy, is formally outside the constitution. In Russia the Communist Party though large—about 3,000,000—is by no means open to all who profess loyalty to the leaders; its membership is selective by ability as well as loyalty. But these differences between Russia and other "one party" states are less important than the similarity. Unquestioning submission to authority, and intolerance of any germ of rivalry in leadership are common to all. Whether these principles will

¹ Cited on p. 370 from *Leninism*, by J. Stalin (1928).

endure and spread, and what human society will become if they do, are among the most fundamental issues raised by the Soviet experiment. The "Vocation of Leadership" as it is eloquently described by the Webbs has in it seeds of great good for the human race—and of almost infinite evil. Which of these seeds will come to maturity is past guessing.

Here, that issue and many others must be left on one side. It is impossible to review the whole of an Odyssey. I must be content to describe more fully a few aspects only of one of the five revolutions—that which has been named Economic.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION: NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE

The central fact about the Economic Revolution in Russia is that it has not taken exactly the course which most of its early critics and many of its supporters expected. "Soviet Communism" is a new form of social organisation not exactly corresponding to any theories of the past. It is not socialism, as Socialism is or used to be understood by the British Labour Party. It is not Communism, as Communism has recently been defined by Stalin. Paradoxical as it may appear to those who think of the Russian system as based on academic theories regardless of human nature, the dominant characteristic of Soviet leadership today is its realism. And the most general feature of Russian economic institutions is their bewildering multiformity. They can be explained most simply by beginning with a series of negatives.

First, the Marxian operation as carried out in Russia does not involve the nationalisation of all the means of production, distribution, and exchange, or the employment of everybody by the State. "There is in the U.S.S.R.....not a single employer, but instead hundreds of thousands of managements seeking to enrol recruits" (p. 1024). There are enterprises—predominantly those in transport and heavy industry—

directly controlled by the State. There are other concerns which are municipal rather than national in character. More numerous than either of those are the enterprises controlled by organisations of consumers. There are still more which are co-operative associations of producers. The bulk of this third group is in agriculture—the 222,500 collective farms (kolkhosi) enormously outnumbering the 5,000 state farms—but there are also 20,000 or more co-operative associations (artels) in industry. There are millions of independent craftsmen, peasants, fishermen working on their own account, owning and themselves using means of production. It is possible, indeed, for an individual not a member of such a co-operative association of producers to be employed by the association at wages; this is a departure from the strict principle of no exploitation and mars the completeness of the Marxian operation. But it appears to be tolerated for practical reasons in the engagement of seasonal workers, of technicians, and perhaps of others. (p. 175 n.).

Second, the Marxian operation in Russia does not involve workers' control of industry. That device was rejected in 1918 after less than a year's trial. "It had.....been discovered by painful experience that 'liquidation of the employer' necessarily involved the governmental planning of production" (p. 609). The Webbs insist again and again that control of industry is now in the hands of consumers, not of producers (pp. 662, 688). It can be questioned whether control is in any important sense in the hands of consumers—rather than in those of the Soviet Dictators—but it is certainly not in the hands of the producers.

Third, the Marxian operation in Russia does not involve equality of incomes. The Webbs quote (p. 702) a notable speech by Stalin in 1934 denouncing the "leftist blockheads" who "think that socialism calls for equality, for levelling the requirements and the personal lives of the members of

society." In this speech Stalin draws a distinction between *socialist* society, marked by "the equal duty of all to work according to their ability, and the equal right of all toilers to receive according to the amount of work they have done," and *communist* society, marked by "the equal duty of all to work according to their ability and the equal right of all toilers to receive according to their requirements." By these definitions socialism and communism alike exclude equality of incomes. And by this definition, as has been stated, "Soviet Communism" today is not communism but socialism and shows no sign of moving towards the former. Communism, as defined by Stalin, can have no truck with piece-rates, with grading of incomes by individual achievement, with rewards for special skill or for "social value." Yet these are the main principles of the Soviet wage system, by which the incomes of a large part of the population are determined.

THE SOVIET WAGE SYSTEM

As seen by the Webbs, the Soviet wage system is based on collective bargaining between the State Planning Commission and trade unions. In a constantly recurring phrase, all employment in Russia is "at trade union rates of wages." But it may be doubted whether for British readers this phrase is the clearest way of describing what happens in Russia.

In the first place, the Russian trade unions bear little resemblance to British trade unions. They have nothing to do with a particular trade or craft; their basis is not occupation but industry. "All the tens of thousands of establishments in the U.S.S.R. are grouped together for trade union purposes according to their several predominant products.....All the wage-earners in each establishment..... belong to the particular trade union in which the establishment is included" (p. 174). The "wage-earners" include every person employed from top to bottom: the manager

and his departmental heads, technicians, foremen, clerks, accountants, skilled workmen and labourers of every type. Membership of the employment unions—to give them their most appropriate title—is voluntary; some workmen at least do not join them. But the unions themselves are far more part of the machinery of government under centralised control than is the case elsewhere: no section of workmen can set out to form a union of their own or have any choice as to the union they will join. The rules of admission to all the unions are uniform—laid down by order of the “All-Union Congress of Trade Unions” (p. 175 *n.*). The whole system was re-organised by central decree in 1934 and the 47 unions split at one stroke into 154 unions. The functions of all of them can be changed at any moment in the same way, as was done in 1933, in abolishing the Commissariat of Labour and transferring to the unions the duties of social insurance, labour exchanges and factory inspection.

In the second place, the actual wage system of Russia would be equally surprising to most British trade unionists looking for “trade union wages.” Its fundamental principles are piece-work, individual inequalities and no demarcation of occupations.

The piece-rates (which appear to apply almost universally) are based on time-rates graded by the class of the worker; that is to say, they are fixed so as to enable the workers to make weekly earnings varying with their class. Among metal-workers, for instance, there are eight classes with different time-rates, the highest being nearly three times the lowest. This is more than the normal difference between skilled and unskilled workmen in Britain, so that in this respect inequality of income is greater in Russia than here. On the other hand, it is less than the difference between managerial salaries and unskilled wages; as the scale applies to all classes, inequality of income is in this respect less in Russia than here. The

gradation of time-rates takes account both of “social value” and of individual merit. If there are not enough coppersmiths, they are said to have “social value” and their work is given a high rate to encourage the supply. But an individual also can move from grade to grade. He may, it is said, at any time claim to prove his ability to move into a higher grade; conversely, he has no claim to stick to any grade or type of work to which he has once attained. All workers are at all times required to take any work offered them or to live without an income. The stopping of unemployment benefit in 1930 was accompanied by instructions to all Labour offices “to take the necessary steps to despatch the unemployed to places of work”; they were to be assigned “not only.....to such works as are indicated by their special qualifications, but when necessary also to other occupations not requiring any specialised skill.” “No reasons for refusing to accept employment must be accepted, except that of illness, which must be supported by a medical certificate.”

Piece-rates based on graded time-rates govern the relative remuneration of different classes of workers and of individuals. What determines the general level of wages? Substantially, it seems clear that the function of the unions is to say how a given wage fund shall be divided, after the amount of the fund has been settled, that is to say, after decisions have been taken by the Planning Commission and by other central authorities as to how much shall be retained for investment, and for defence, health, education and other common services of the nation. The amount of these prior allocations is to some extent indirectly a matter of consultation between the Planning Commission (Gosplan) on the one hand and the Central Committee of the Unions on the other hand, in so far as it affects the general level of money wages to be fixed, but there can be little doubt where the decision rests. In any case, whatever the money wage may be, the Soviet Government,

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controlling currency, can make the real wage to suit itself. The general level of real wages is determined when it has been decided how many new factories or schools shall be built, how much productive power shall be absorbed in the Red Army, the police and other central services: what is left of the productive power of the country after these allocations, is available for making goods for consumption. The proportion of these prior allocations to total income is remarkably high in Russia—probably 30 to 40 per cent. for investment alone, apart from what goes for defence and other national services. There need be no doubt as to the capacity of a socialist state built on Russian lines to secure adequate saving and investment. It may be added that the wage fund itself is distributed in two ways: as payments to the individual for working and as “social wage”—a term covering sickness and accident benefit and many related social services.

This brief account of the Soviet wage system illustrates the difficulty of applying British terms like “trade union” or “collective bargaining” to a fundamentally different system. To do so is to ignore the Marxian operation; there is no place and no need for a trade union on the British lines because there is no “enemy” employer to deal with. The employment unions of the U.S.S.R. are not societies formed by the workers for their protection against individual injustice or exploitation. They are organs of a highly centralised state for certain social services and for securing the maximum of output from each worker.

It is impossible to imagine the Russian Metal-Workers' Union organising a strike and melancholy to think what would happen to groups of workmen who organised one for themselves. It is impossible also to imagine Sir Walter Citrine telling the British Trade Union Congress that “the trade unions should completely re-organise the wage-system with a view to abolishing all absence of personal responsibility

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and all wage levelling; and to giving each individual worker a material incentive to raise his qualification and increase the productivity of his labour” and that “the piece-work system must be adopted to the maximum degree, and skilled workers, especially those whose qualifications are much in demand, must not be allowed to drift from enterprise to enterprise” (pp. 713-714). Yet these are the words of Shvernik, the Russian opposite number to Sir Walter Citrine, if the Russian unions are trade unions.

IN PLACE OF PROFIT

It is difficult to describe a new world in the language of an old world. The Marxian operation, as we have seen, does not mean all that various critics and friends expected of it; it does not involve employment of every one by the state, or workers' control of industry, or equalisation of incomes. But it does mean that there is no profit-seeking individual as the employer of others. Some of the changes that flow from this revolution are described in chapter IX under the heading: “In Place of Profit.” This is a vivid account of the various incentives to greater output applied to workmen, and to a less extent to the managers of factories. In addition to piece-work and grading of wages, the methods described include better meals and dining rooms for those who render good service, “socialist competition,” “patronage,” “shock brigades,” “cost accounting brigades,” public honours and public disgrace. Undoubtedly the picture presented by the Webbs of workmen collectively organised to maximise production, with no hint of “ca' canny,” of demarcation disputes, or of standardised wages irrespective of service, is impressive. It must make the mouth of many a capitalist employer water. But it depends on there being no capitalist employers.

This chapter is one of the most brilliant in the whole work. Whether the title "In Place of Profit," which the Webbs have borrowed for it from another writer, conveniently describes the contents, is another question. Some British or American employers might be inclined to suggest as an alternative: "In Place of Trade Unionism." Academic economists might suggest that the title chosen by the Webbs involves too narrow a view of the function of profit in the economic system. The incentives described in chapter IX are all incentives to managers and workmen to make the most of the resources of production entrusted to them, in lines of production settled for them. They are no contribution to the problem of deciding which lines of production will give most satisfaction to consumers. They are very little of a contribution to deciding even the simpler question of which factories or processes are most suitable in any given line; the "socialist competition" and "cost accounting brigades" do not amount to any systematic comparison of methods and results.

In describing incentives to output as a substitute for profit, the Webbs are treating profit ("that vision of wealth beyond the dreams of avarice," p. 697) simply as a goad to action. But under the capitalist system, profit—or the absence of profit—is also a guide to action.

Substantially, the Soviet leaders as described by the Webbs, ignore the economic problem as it is understood by professional economists. Economics as a social science arises only when men in society, seeking the satisfaction of their material wants, adopt the devices of specialisation and exchange. These devices call for the adjustment of the activities of individual specialists, and economics is a study of the methods adopted in various times and places to bring about this adjustment, with a view to obtaining from the available resources the maximum of satisfaction. Under

capitalism the measure and test of adjustment is the making of profit by individual owners of means of production, under competition and with free spending by consumers. Profit-making by owners of capital goods is not simply an incentive to production; the making of profit or the reverse is also a test of the degree to which production has been adjusted to the desires of consumers.

In this aspect, the place of profit has to be taken not by the incentives of chapter IX (nearly all addressed to the workman rather than the management) but by the planning described in chapter VIII. The descriptions of planning in chapter VIII and elsewhere make it clear that the Soviet leaders have not begun to come to grips with this issue. They are still in the pioneering stage of arbitrary decisions, determining the location of factories by considerations of defence or desire to spread them widely, copying the technical methods of other countries without economic control of their results in Russia. The minimum that would be required in planning as a substitute for the pricing mechanism, would be a gigantic detached system of audit of all productive institutions and a continuous consumers' referendum by spending. As yet there is nothing of the sort in the Soviet system. Universal independent audit is suggested by the Webbs on pp. 1078 *et seq.* as something that ought to be done but is not now being done. The Soviet leaders, as presented in these volumes make no systematic use of consumers' expenditure as a guide to production. Yet clearly this, and not occasional consultation with a representative Consumers' Council is necessary if the consumers are really to call the tune.

It is in accord with the nature of Soviet planning, as seen by the Webbs, that discussion of financial problems and organisation plays so small a part in their long account of Soviet institutions. Questions of currency are dismissed

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with scant reference, substantially on the ground that currency and the use made of it by the consumers are not important as an influence on production or distribution. There is nothing to show whether the economic system is being doped by perpetual inflation or not. There is nothing about pricing policy, or of how the free markets allowed for some purposes (p. 695) are related to the rest of the socialist system: all that is clear is the readiness of the Government to interfere with the market when for any reason this seems good to them.

Up to the present, the Soviet experiment has shown at most that it is possible to direct production and distribution from a centre without actual breakdowns. So much was shown for the nation's food supply in war by the British experiment of Food Control. But the decisions of the Soviet planners are still in the stage of being arbitrary and dictated largely by considerations other than economic. They have not got down to fine measurements. In its present stage, their experiment throws little light on the technique of planning. It throws even less light on the possibility of approaching or exceeding by central planning the efficiency of the pricing mechanism, as an adjuster of economic activities.

To say this is not to deny that the standard of life in the Soviet Republics is probably rising and is likely to rise still further. Herein lies the significance of the measures described above as the Technical Revolution. These measures can hardly fail to make the standard of life in Russia higher than the standard would have been without them. The material advantages to be won by substituting machines for human labour, by indirect methods of production, and by applied science and technology are obvious and extensive. The likelihood of improving the health of the people by gigantic expenditure on training doctors, building hospitals, teaching hygiene is equally obvious: the room for improvement from

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the past of Russia was almost unlimited. The same applies to education; with millions of new teachers, the Russian people can hardly continue as illiterate as they were. The surprising thing would be, not if the standard of living and health and education should rise in Russia above its former levels, but if, in spite of all this expenditure on well established lines, it failed to rise substantially.

It is probably fair to say also, that the Technical Revolution could hardly have occurred in anything like its present extent, without the Political Revolution. It is true that industrialisation, chiefly by use of foreign capital, had already begun and made some headway before the Great War. But the war stopped that, and the breakdown of foreign investment would have continued to hold it up indefinitely after the war. The Soviet Dictatorship has made possible a rate of saving and investment and mechanisation that was most unlikely without dictatorship.

In view of these considerations it is likely enough that the Soviet system now enjoys, as the Webbs report, the general support of the population. The Technical Revolution alone must in due course bring its advantages, and in Russia might not have brought them so soon without the other revolutions. But this leaves the desirability of the Economic Revolution for other communities which already know the material gains of machinery, sanitation and education a completely open question.

The Webbs, though they have their view on that question, are not concerned in these volumes to prove their view by statistics. The purpose that they have set before them is the description of Soviet institutions and aims and not a strict evaluation of results in human welfare. There is nothing in their two volumes to show what is the standard of life of any appreciable proportion of Soviet citizens; no statistics of money wages or real wages or their movements from year

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to year, of output in total or per head, of consumption of necessities or comforts, of housing accommodation and the like. This is not an omission of which it is reasonable to make complaint. Apart from any doubts that might arise as to the trustworthiness of the abundant statistics that are produced in Russia, the facts themselves are changing too rapidly for judgment. It is hardly profitable to measure the results of a revolution while the revolution is in active progress. It is bad scientific technique to try to get the results of an experiment before the experiment is ready to give them. Judgment must be suspended. One can guess only at probabilities by looking at tendencies. From this standpoint, however, it may be worth while even at this stage to examine one of the claims made for the Soviet system in the economic sphere—that it has substantially abolished unemployment.

ABOLITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT

“There is no unemployment in the land of the Soviets,” wrote *Trud*, the union journal in October, 1930. In the same month payment of unemployment benefit, which even before then had been meagre in scale, was stopped completely and has not been resumed.

The first thing to be said of this claim to have no unemployment, is that the claim would carry more conviction, if, instead of abolishing unemployment insurance, the Soviet Government had kept it on and were able to show that no benefits were being paid. Some at least of the factors that cause unemployment in other countries, such as seasonal fluctuation and the decline of work in a particular job, operate in Russia as elsewhere: big construction works come to an end or whole factories are closed down for inefficiency.

The Webbs put the claim more modestly than *Trud*: there is no “mass unemployment” like that of capitalist countries. In this form, though we are still compelled to

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estimate probabilities, rather than to judge by recorded facts, the claim may well be justified. Obviously, with the absence of craft distinctions, there is likely to be less frictional unemployment in Russia than elsewhere. With a system in which wages are fixed ultimately by central decree at what the Planning Commission can afford and with no restriction on the issue of money there can be no wage unemployment. Without the peculiar structure of credit and enterprise in capitalist countries one would hardly expect to find cyclical unemployment. With the persistence of subsistence farming, the incidence even of seasonal and “interval” unemployment is likely to be much diminished; self-employment in agriculture provides a reservoir to meet fluctuations of demand for industrial workers. Over and above all this, the Soviet Government stands by with an unlimited perpetual demand—unchecked by comparisons of cost and proceeds—for the capital re-construction of the country and preparedness in war. The Webbs attribute the freedom from mass unemployment which they claim for the Soviet system to the universal distribution of “effective demand” among consumers. It may be suggested that the demand which today is most effective in sweeping up unemployment in Russia is that of the state, for investment and defence. By an unlimited Government demand for labour unchecked by considerations of cost, mass unemployment can be abolished even in capitalist countries—as it is in time of war. It is abolished by giving up the attempt through economic calculus and pricing to discover the most advantageous use of the productive powers of the country.

In this sense the Soviet leaders solve the problem of unemployment, by losing it in the larger problem of the most efficient use of resources. The strongest argument for them in this matter of unemployment is probably to be found not by looking at what is done in Russia, but by considering

what is not done in Britain. The ruin of our depressed areas since the Great War and its aftermath cannot be attributed to capitalism, except by those to whom capitalism is indistinguishable from King Charles' head. But the paralysis of successive British governments during the past ten years, in face of the problem presented by these areas, is the strongest argument for Socialism or Soviet Communism that has been presented in our time. It is as if all those in charge of our affairs had set out to underline the lesson of the war—that private enterprise is a ship for fair weather alone—had set out to show the impotence of capitalism in crisis. For this paralysis represents in the last resort an inhibition; the central government which alone has power to do something real for these areas has felt, rightly or wrongly, that it could not do anything real, for fear either of benefitting individual owners of property or of disturbing private enterprise. Release from this inhibition is one of the two most persuasive features of Soviet Communism as described by the Webbs. Release from the workman's inhibition on output—springing from fear of unemployment for himself or his fellows and unwillingness to enrich an employer—is the other.

Is it possible to obtain release from such inhibitions, without the Marxian operation? If this is not possible, can the gains of such release outweigh the losses and the dangers of the operation itself? These, on the economic side, are the two vital issues raised by the Webbs' description of Soviet Communism. They transcend in importance all disagreement on minor matters. Many readers of the two volumes under review will wish at one point or other to register a protest, as Professor Pigou has done in friendly fashion, in denial of the views attributed to "academic economists." For the Webbs are not detached observers of the capitalist society in which they have lived and worked. Its inequalities and apparent disorder fill them with irrepress-

sible resentment. Many even of those who sympathise with that resentment will feel that these two volumes would have been strengthened if particular passages had been left out—in defence or half-hearted condemnation of the OGPU, in echoing the epithets of "criminal" or "wrecker" applied by the Soviet leaders to their victims, in disregard of the liberties that have been won for us by many martyrdoms, in derogation of what has been achieved in progress to the good life under systems other than Soviet Communism. But to dwell mainly on such passages, as some reviewers have done, is to lose proportion. They are beside the main issue. The Soviet leaders have presented the world with the first large scale experiment in substantially completed socialism and the Webbs have given us the first large scale description of that experiment. The experiment cannot be neglected nor its description put on one side because it has features which to most people in Britain will appear indefensible.

The Webbs, I think, have made out the case for their title "Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?" but not for leaving off the question mark at the end of it. That, time alone can show. They have made out the case also for regarding systematic study of this new order and of the five revolutions—Technical, Economic, Political, Religious Domestic—that are involved in it as one of the most important tasks of social science today. If the Soviet leaders would seek to understand the economic structure and functioning of capitalist societies and if detached economists from other countries were in a position objectively and comprehensively to study the working and in due course estimate the results of the Soviet system—a long step forward would have been taken towards solution of their common problem.

THE DILEMMA OF CHURCH AND STATE

By A. L. ROWSE

"It is a fundamental principle that the church, that is, the Bishops, together with the Clergy and Laity, must in the last resort, when its mind has been fully ascertained, retain its inalienable right, in loyalty to our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, to formulate its faith in Him and to arrange the expression of that Holy Faith in its form of worship."—Archbishop Davidson's declaration on behalf of the Bishops, July 2, 1928.

"The difficulty has always been, and still is, to reconcile their claims to spiritual independence with an Establishment over which the authority of the Crown is, in the last resort, supreme."—*The Times*, on the Bishop of Lincoln's case, April 1889.

THESE two quotations indicate very precisely the nature of the dilemma which has underlain the relations between Church and State in the past fifty years or so: ever since, in fact,—as the Bishop of Durham as a historian has been quick to see, or at least quicker than others to express—the social and political conditions which made the Establishment a reality have disappeared.¹ Now, with the disappearance of those conditions, as he has recently expressed it in the debate in the Church Assembly on the Report of the Archbishops' Commission on Church and State, "the Church of England lingers on the scene as practically the solitary survivor of the Established Church, a link with something that was once universal, but in modern conditions has been found impossible in country after country." It may indeed be thought remarkable that the Establishment should have survived the shocks and conflicts of this century, in which in one country after the other, beginning with France in 1906 and going on to the Weimar

¹ cf his article, "Ought the Establishment to be Maintained?" *Political Quarterly*, September, 1930; and his *Disestablishment*, 1929.

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Republic in Germany and Spain in 1931, the special relation of one church to the state has been brought to an end. It is not only to the extraordinary institutional conservatism of this country that this is due, but in a special sense, to the general damping down of all such latent issues which has come about with the strengthening of Conservatism after the war, and more particularly after 1924. *Quieta non movere* is very much the motto of this period we have almost lived through: the Baldwinian epoch as it will be regarded by the future historian.

Nevertheless, that it is not possible to damp down the issue to extinction with general forbearance and good will (all in the interest of the existing order: that is assumed) is evident. True, we have had nothing like the bitter conflict with the church such as France has had to go through, nor such as Spain and Germany are now experiencing in their respective forms. Yet in a number of ways the latent issue bursts through the complacent surface, the quieter circumstances of this country's politics. The tithe question is a serious one in some districts: it has even necessitated a Royal Commission. The disputes over the Revised Prayer Book occupied the forefront of public attention in 1927 and 1928. There is a party conflict in being within the church itself which from time to time breaks out overtly into politics, though the division is not on party lines in Parliament. The appointment by the Archbishops of this Commission to go into the question of the relations between church and state was directly due to the rejection of the Revised Prayer Book by Parliament, and was motivated by the desire to find some way out of the dilemma of which that rejection was a forceful and startling reminder.¹

The Bishops had not the courage to take the responsibility

¹ *Church and State*: Report of the Archbishops' Commission on the Relations between Church and State. Vol. I: Report; Vol. II: Evidence.—(The Church Assembly.)

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for going into the *whole* question of church and state; the Commission when appointed was directed "to inquire into the present relations of church and state, and particularly how far the principle, stated above (i.e., by Archbishop Davidson), is able to receive effective application *in present circumstances* in the Church of England, and what legal and constitutional changes, if any, are needed in order to maintain or to secure its effective application." That is to say, the Commission is chiefly concerned with how to improve the position from the point of view of the church, on the basis of the existing Establishment. That fact in itself was enough to disinterest from its proceedings a number of churchmen, headed by the Bishop of Durham, who feel that there is no remedy to be obtained within the Establishment. As Dr. Henson says in his letter to the Commission: "If I seemed to allow that an adequate reform of the existing Establishment is really within the sphere of practical politics, I should be gravely misleading English churchmen. In the circumstances of our modern world, I do not think that the maintenance of the Establishment is a legitimate object of Anglican effort. The resolution of the Church Assembly which states the purpose of the Commission and provides its 'reference' assumes that the present relations of church and state may be found on inquiry to be consistent with the autonomy of the Church of England as a spiritual society; and that, even if not, they may be made so by some 'legal and constitutional changes.' The first assumption appears to me to be apparently and confessedly false: the second, to be so remote from practical value as to be deeply mischievous." Allowing for the exaggerations of ecclesiastical rhetoric, it is evident how deep the rift is here; and that the findings of the Commission can have no value for the large and growing body of opinion within the church which looks to Disestablishment to free its life as "a spiritual society."

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This body of opinion, which was in any case strong among Anglo-Catholics, received a large accession of strength among other sections of church opinion as the result of the Prayer Book rejection. To them it was a signal reminder that the church was not free to order its spiritual and doctrinal life as it thought good; that Parliament was legally and constitutionally the ultimate authority in these matters no less than over the church's property, and that it was intolerable that the forms of service upon which the highest authorities in the church had been at work for twenty years, which had been passed by overwhelming majorities in the House of Bishops and in the House of Clergy, and by large majorities in the House of Laity and by practically all the Diocesan Conferences, should be rejected by a House of Commons in which Jews, unbelievers, Nonconformists and Catholics—and a solitary Parsee, to the great scandal of the devout Lord Birkenhead—voted equally with Anglicans. "Had they acted on strictly secular grounds," says Lord Hugh Cecil, "they would not have exceeded their rightful jurisdiction. But the rejection was mainly prompted by purely religious considerations, relating to the doctrine of the Eucharist and to changes in the service for celebrating it, and to the permission of the reservation of the consecrated Sacrament. These were purely spiritual matters which the church had jurisdiction from Christ to order, but the state had none."¹ It is not for us here to point out the historical inaccuracy of Lord Hugh Cecil's position, though the fact is that the religious position of the Church of England was as much determined by the secular authority as its forms and externals. It was laid down by Henry VIII and Elizabeth; such as it was made by them, the Church of England has substantially remained—and the Cecils had a considerable hand in shaping it. It might be added that history affords no backing whatever for the High

¹ *Report*. Vol. II, Evidence: p. 3.

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Church party's reading of the Church of England's past; it completely substantiates *per contra* both the Low Church and the Roman view that the Church of England was shaped and determined by secular authority.¹

The rejection of the new Prayer Book upon which the hopes of the restoration of order within the church were based, left the position still more confused. All clergymen at their ordination swear that they will abide by the Prayer Book of 1662, and all bishops at their consecration that they will administer it. Yet it is safe to say that there is hardly a church in England where the Prayer Book is adhered to without some deviation, either by way of addition or subtraction; while for the bishops to administer such a situation according to the letter of the law, is manifestly impossible. A strict interpretation of the law would undoubtedly say that the whole clergy of the Church of England were guilty of breaking their oaths of obedience—far more clearly than the clergy under Henry VIII were guilty in accepting Wolsey's legatine authority, for which they were fined enormous sums and forced to make submission, the step by which the Reformation was set in train.² The Commission, while recognising the rigidity of the law of public worship applying to the church, describes the situation in grave terms: "No one obeys the law so construed. Not the clergy, since there is

¹ cf. Sir Lewis Dibdin: *Establishment in England*, pp. 4-5. "How entirely the hierarchy were overruled and the Christian Laity of England asserted itself is best shown by what happened in the first year of Elizabeth. The Canterbury Lower Convocation, truly representing the mind of the clergy passed resolutions in favour of the Mass and the Pope's jurisdiction, and declaring that laymen could not properly meddle with questions of faith, sacraments or ecclesiastical discipline, which were for the clergy. These resolutions were taken to the bishops, and Bonner presented the Resolutions to the Lord Keeper, by whom they were graciously received and then laid aside. Meanwhile Parliament passed the two Acts, 1 Eliz. ch. 1 (Supremacy) and 1 Eliz. ch. 2 (Uniformity). To quote Professor Gwatkin: "The Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity and the injunctions form the transition from the old law to the new; and they were all the work of the Laity. Convocation was not even coerced into formal acquiescence, as in Henry's time, but simply ignored." In other words, the Reformation was accomplished, and the Church of England created, against the representative will of the clergy by the state.

² cf. J. R. Tanner: *Tudor Constitutional Documents*, pp. 16-20.

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scarcely one of them who makes no change in the authorised forms of service. Not the bishops, who are charged to see that this impossible law is carried out. Worse still, by the Declaration, as interpreted by the Courts, every priest solemnly undertakes to do that which in fact none of them actually perform. No wonder discipline has suffered. No wonder the laity are uneasy. It is difficult to find temperate words to apply to such a state of things. The situation can only be described as deeply insincere."¹ We question how far, grammatically, a "situation" may be described as "insincere."

As again, when the Commission particularises: "To accept an office on certain terms and then to refuse to carry out those terms, but nevertheless to retain the office, shocks the public conscience, and it seems clear that a situation which drives such men to such action is indefensible," a more exact attention to logic would seem to indicate that it is the *action* which is indefensible, and not the situation. And that is exactly what the Protestant party in the church concludes, as Sir Thomas Inskip in his evidence says bluntly: "I do not understand the position of those who complain of the fetters of the state and yet depend on endowments which rightly or wrongly belong to the Church of England by virtue of parliamentary and political action. The church cannot face both ways, as its bishops and clergy—generally speaking—appear to be doing at present."² In fact, if it were not for

¹ *Report*. Vol. I, p. 85.

² And for the bishops, Sir Thomas Inskip says: "All the bishops on the Bench, and very many of the Cathedral Clergy, have accepted their commissions from the state. I do not suggest for a moment that they did not believe the state to be divinely guided in these appointments, but I cannot for myself see the distinction between, on the one hand, asking Parliament to express its views on the Book of Common Prayer, so as not to alter the Book without Parliament's concurrence, and on the other hand, accepting the Prime Minister or the Lord Chancellor as the authority to appoint the bishops. I know one bishop who was an ardent critic of the action of the House of Commons, but who, on more than one occasion, solicited the help of his Member of Parliament in persuading the Prime Minister to make him a bishop."—(*Report*. Vol. II: Evidence, p. 102.

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the forbearance of the state, its tacit connivance at the breach of the law by the whole Church of England since the rejection of 1928, the position could not continue. There certainly was reason enough for the appointment of the Commission; whether its recommendations meet the situation or provide a remedy is what we have to inquire.

The present position is, broadly, that after the rejection, the Bishops met and determined to continue as if the Revised Prayer Book had been passed. More exactly, after hearing Archbishop Davidson's solemn declaration of the spiritual independence of the church, the bishops proposed resolutions to the Convocations stating that they felt bound not to interfere with clergy whose deviations from the Prayer Book were within the limits which the Revised Prayer Book would have sanctioned. As the result of the bishops' protection, the Revised Prayer Book is in operation in practically every diocese in the country—but without statutory sanction, so that the bishops' own position is extremely insecure. Nevertheless, it is only fair to admit that the bishops have secured a far greater measure of obedience on this basis than might have been expected—even if the basis is an illegal one. This in itself is a pointer to where the solution really lies—to the day when the bishops will be the ultimate authority responsible for order in the church, and not Parliament. Still the position remains an illegal one, and, as the Report says: "So far from solving the problem, it conspicuously illustrated a legal, and indeed a moral, situation with which it neither was nor is possible or right to rest content. For even apart from the legal obligations imposed by the Acts of Uniformity, every bishop, priest and deacon, at his admission to his Order, and to any benefice or legally recognised position in which to exercise the functions of that Order, solemnly declares that in public prayer and administration of the Sacraments he will use the form in the Book of Common

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Prayer prescribed and none other, except so far as shall be ordered by lawful authority."¹ The mere recommendations of the bishops without the sanction of Parliament, so long as the church remains established, are not lawful authority.

The Report begins with a historical introduction leading up to the present state of the controversy between church and state, of which one can only say that it well illustrates the impossibility of history being written by a committee, for it is both confused, and, in a curious way, ultramontane. It does not so much matter that the Commission should say, "The distinguishing mark of the Church of England has always been its close connection with the territorial state"—though in fact, it is not more true of the Middle Ages in England than, say, in France or Spain. Nor does it much matter that there is a tendency in the Report to write the history of the medieval church in England backwards from the modern State Church independent of Rome; to suggest the independence of the English church in the Middle Ages, almost as if Maitland had never written. The Report omits to notice the *Suprema Potestas* of the Pope, and the fact that the English church was rather more under the wing of the Pope than in most parts; as it omits also to mention that Henry VIII did interfere in doctrinal matters—he virtually determined what the doctrinal position of the State Church was, and what it was not—and received the obsequious thanks of the clergy for his rare theological wisdom. Again, there is no point in the Report saying that under the Tudors, "There was no abandonment by the church of its claim to spiritual independence. In strict theory, Parliament had no concern with matters of doctrine or ritual." This is merely disingenuous; for, in fact, Elizabeth and Parliament did determine the issue of doctrine and ritual in 1558, with her the Royal Supremacy was continuously active and Parliament is

¹ *Report*. Vol. I, pp. 39-40.

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the heir to the powers of the Royal Supremacy. These are historical matters, and they affect the perspective in which the whole issue is seen.

But it may be of greater practical importance to observe the totalitarian character of the claims put forward for the church by these eminent Commissioners: it is in the best ultramontane tradition. "Christian faith claims to control, after its own manner, the whole of life. And vital Christianity refuses to be regarded as a department of civilised society. If only it could consider religion, in the popular phrase, as 'a private affair between a man and his Maker,' the church could acquiesce in regarding itself, and being regarded, as a devotional club which those who are so disposed are at liberty to join. But it cannot acquiesce in such a view of its nature and function without repudiating its trust. For it believes that it is more than a voluntary society. It is the Body of Christ, the organ of the will of the divine Lord."¹ Which body? we may well ask; for it is noticeable that each particular sect regards itself as "the church," and refers to itself as such. In the body of this Report and in the evidence, the Church of England is described as "the Church"; the Church of Scotland is also "the Church"; indeed in the Articles to which the Church of Scotland Act 1921, gave statutory authority it describes itself as "part of the Holy Catholic and Universal Church." No doubt the Wesleyans and the Particular Baptists also regard themselves as "the Church." But it is regrettable to observe that the one body which has a historic claim to speak for Christianity, the Catholic Church, recognises none of these claims. Yet the Report asserts, "the Church of England continued, as it still continues, to represent the Christian faith of the nation as a whole," a claim which it is safe to say, neither Catholics nor Non-conformists would allow. It is not to be wondered at that the

¹ *Report*. Vol I, p. 7.

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Report should state, "the distinction between secular and spiritual interests in the life of the community becomes also increasingly unreal," though the Bishop of Durham, a more acute observer of the signs of the times, could tell them that the whole tendency is the opposite, towards the delimiting and disentangling of church matters from the state. The Commission's recommendations are themselves evidence of the trend. All we need say, in conclusion on this point, is that if this high-flying line represents the attitude of the church, it is difficult to see how a direct collision with the state is avoidable, as direct in this country as in France, or Spain, or Germany. For there is no solution on the lines laid down by the Commission. "There is no department of the common life of the citizens of a community into which both church and state do not claim to penetrate, and which they do not seek to direct or influence." The conflict is "inherent in the very nature of church and state," they say. Of course it is—on their conception of the nature of church and state. They reject the conception of the church as a voluntary society, contemptuously, as 'a devotional club.' But all churches must be regarded as voluntary societies by the state, if only for the simple reason that the claims of religious sects are divided and mutually conflict. (We do not need to state other reasons, such as that the claims themselves are untrue.) It is the state's function to stand neutral amid the clamour of them all; and therefore is it said by the political philosopher, "It is an incongruity on the part of the state to endow one of several religions professed by its citizens, still more to identify itself with such a religion."¹

So much for the political philosophy underlying the Report; to come to its proposals. These may best be described as an attempt to carry the degree of freedom as regards the legislation of the church which was attained by the Enabling

¹ R. M. MacIver: *The Modern State*, p. 20.

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Act (1919) a stage further. It is the freeing of the church's legislative process, so that the measures it agrees upon may be carried into law, that is the crux; the rest, discipline and the reform of the ecclesiastical courts, are subsidiary, in a sense even, consequential. The freedom that was conferred by the Enabling Act was only a limited freedom. Briefly, it enabled the measures of the Church Assembly, after coming before the Ecclesiastical Committee consisting of 15 members of the House of Lords and 15 of the Commons, to be laid before Parliament; and upon each House passing a resolution that the measure shall be presented for the Royal Assent, it thereupon has the force of an Act of Parliament. That is to say, the Parliamentary process is short-circuited for church measures; they may be rejected, but not amended. On the whole, for the usual routine measures of the church, this process has worked well; on the other hand, on the Revised Prayer Book, whose passage it was designed to facilitate, it broke down: the measure was rejected by a majority in the Commons.¹ If the Measure could have been amended, it would doubtless have passed; but in that case it would never, without the permission for Reservation and the new Order for Holy Communion, have been agreed to by the Anglo-Catholic party in the church. Such is the dilemma.

The Report now proposes a distinction between ordinary administrative measures of the church, which should go through the present procedure under the Enabling Act, and spiritual or doctrinal measures dealing with the formularies and ritual of the church, for which they propose a special procedure. They propose that a Committee of the two Archbishops, the Lord Chancellor and the Speaker should grant a certificate to measures which "relate substantially to the spiritual concerns of the Church of England," and

¹ For the working of the Enabling Act, cf. Lord Hugh Cecil: *The Church and the Realm*. (1932.)

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certifying that "any civil or secular interests affected thereby may be regarded as negligible"; upon the granting of such certificate, such measures, provided that they have passed the three Houses of the Church Assembly separately and been twice approved by the Diocesan Conferences of three-quarters of the English dioceses, may go direct for the Royal Assent and pass into law. That is to say, the Parliamentary stage is now not merely short-circuited, it is omitted altogether. It is an ingenious device for getting the Revised Prayer Book made the law of the realm—for bringing home to port that much buffeted vessel of the bishops still at sea. But is there the slightest likelihood that Parliament will consent to this abrogation of its statutory powers, one might add, so long as the Establishment remains, its statutory duties? One cannot think so. Professor Ernest Barker, in a letter to *The Times* (Feb. 5, 1936), states the fundamental objection to this proposal from a constitutional point of view. "The effect of this proposal.....is that a measure which has not gone through the King-in-Parliament, but only through what I may call the King-in-Vacuo, has none the less the force of an Act of Parliament." He notes the superficial analogy of the proposal with the procedure under the Parliament Act by which the speaker certifies Money Bills; and proceeds, "But under the Parliament Act the House of Lords has at any rate the opportunity of consenting; and—what is far more important—the House of Commons certainly acts, and the Act is at least an Act of the King in a House of Parliament. A measure with the force of an Act of Parliament, which had never been before either House of Parliament, would be a constitutional novelty, as well as an oxymoron." He notes further the difficulty there would be in distinguishing between "spiritual" and "secular" measures, since all "spiritual" measures must affect secular interests, and the Commission's own words earlier that the distinction "becomes increasingly

unreal.....there is no clear dividing line in the sphere of practice." He suggests that the Royal Assent in these circumstances would inevitably mean the assent of the Cabinet; and why should the Cabinet "have powers in spiritual concerns which are denied to Parliament? Could it have such powers, and would it not be responsible to Parliament? If it were, as surely it must be, then Parliament, expelled by an illusory pitchfork, quietly returns." Nor is *The Times* any more convinced than the Professor; its leader on the debate in the Church Assembly (Feb. 8) states: "It is indeed a strange feature of the Report that, having stated the case against disestablishment with admirable clarity, it should then make proposals which must almost certainly be preliminary steps to disestablishment."

The main feature in the debate in the Church Assembly, according to *The Times*, was the categorical statement of the Archbishop of York—whose speech was greeted with great applause—that "if Parliament, as seems almost certain, should refuse to accept this proposal, then the church should demand disestablishment." The Bishop of Durham, in a notable speech, thought also "that there was not the remotest possibility of securing the assent of Parliament." He went further and broached the topic of disestablishment itself: "The risks of disestablishment were greatly exaggerated. It might fairly be assumed that Parliament would be greatly influenced by its own precedents in Ireland, Wales and India. Parliament was not an inequitable assembly, and due consideration would be given to every legitimate desire and interest of the church. As regards fabrics, the great cathedrals and parish churches were not only houses of God, but the most precious national memorials, and it was reasonable to think that Parliament would hold a watching brief over them for the nation."¹ It is clear that the submission of these pro-

¹ *The Church Times*, February 7, 1936.

posals is most likely to accelerate the movement for disestablishment from within the church. That being so, it is surprising that the Commission should not have realised that disestablishment is the logical conclusion of their Report, though, of course, they were precluded from recommending it. They state their conviction, however, that an agreement among all parties within the church upon Reservation and a new Office of Holy Communion, is a *sine qua non* of their proposals. They realise that it was disagreement within the church which caused the Revised Prayer Book to be rejected, and they state that their "legislative proposals are made on the assumption that a sufficient measure of agreement has been reached within the church on these two vital questions." It is a large assumption, and one that is unlikely to be fulfilled. If that is so, what is the alternative? Only disestablishment remains as the way out.

The Commission is conscious of this. It says: "One method of escape from the entanglements of the whole situation is disestablishment, by which we understand a complete official dissociation of the state from the church. Its attractions are great and obvious, although.....the practical consequences involved would depend upon the form which disestablishment might take. Disestablishment, it may be urged, could provide a solution of all the difficulties that arise from the conflict of authorities in spiritual matters. It could give the church freedom to determine its own law of worship, and the methods of securing obedience to that law. It could remove the difficulties inherent in any Final Court of Appeal in ecclesiastical cases which owes its character and authority to the civil power. It could set the church completely free to lay down its own rules with regard to the appointment of bishops and in respect to the marriage of its members."¹ After such a generous, and—who can doubt?

¹ *Report I*, p. 48.

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—true statement of the advantages to be derived from disestablishment by the church in living its own free spiritual life, it seems difficult to see why the objections to it have such weight with the Commission. Most of the objections appear so trivial: for instance, “no one can be sure,” it says, “that the state would not claim to exercise control over our ancient cathedrals and parish churches, or (to take one obvious case) over Westminster Abbey.” It is clear that the fabric of these buildings would be at least as well off under the Office of Works, as under their respective deans and chapters. The Bishop of Durham, as we have seen, would welcome it. The state could afford to be generous: to maintain the fabric of these buildings in repair, while allowing their use to the church for its services—following the model of the French law of 1906—would be a concession of no small value to the religious body which enjoyed it.

But can it be that there is some other, less “spiritual” a reason for rejecting the solution of disestablishment? The Commission says: “We are bound to recognise that Parliament might insist on some measure, at least, of disendowment as the concomitant of disestablishment. We do not think that there is any necessary connection between disestablishment and disendowment. Nor do we think that the fear of disendowment should be allowed to play any great part in shaping the policy of the church.” These are brave words; but it does not appear incorrect to suppose that this is precisely the consideration which does shape the policy of the church, that if it were not for the fear of disendowment, the bishops and clergy would opt for disestablishment at no distant date. Such appears to be the view of the Church Association, which roundly contradicts the Commission’s complacency on this point: “Some dream of disestablishment without disendowment. It is only a dream. The English Church will never be disestablished without *drastic* disendow-

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ment. The Irish and Welsh churches escaped lightly because they were disestablished simply on the politicians’ plea that ‘the people’ willed it. If the Church of England ever be disestablished, it will be because the ecclesiastical rulers have become so dissatisfied with the formularies they have repeatedly of their own free will declared to be agreeable to the Word of God, that they will force even a rupture with Parliament rather than leave church people in peaceable possession of the Prayer Book bequeathed to them by the Protestant Martyrs. Disestablishment would then come as a *punitive* enactment; and an unfaithful church cannot expect satisfactory alimony. Those who imagine that disestablishment means that unfaithful clergymen will be freed from state control and will yet continue to hold the emoluments they possess, are living in a fool’s paradise.”¹ There speaks the rude voice of the Church Association. But Sir Thomas Inskip is of the same opinion: “If the church feels it (the present position) is a sufficiently great evil to be intolerable, the church is perfectly free, provided it is sufficiently united and insistent, to assert its independence. It is quite true that it cannot carry its property with it if it chooses to take that course.”² It is curious the way these Low Churchmen have of insisting upon these low considerations; but there is the dilemma. The dilemma in the relations between church and state appears to be a dilemma within the church itself; and it is for the church to make the first move.

In studying history one becomes used to watching the way in which movements and events prepare the way for their own fruition, while the actors in them remain hardly conscious, if at all of their trend and direction. One cannot study the history of the Church of England in the past twenty years without observing its steady, if slow, march towards dis-

¹ *Report II*, pp. 56-7.

² *ibid*, p. 103.

establishment. All its main measures and developments in those years have been steps towards it, so that when the time is ripe the way will have been prepared and made easy. The formation of representative institutions for itself in the Church Assembly, the compiling of an electoral-roll of its own communicants, the self-confession that the church is no longer coterminous with the nation;¹ the Enabling Act and its shortening of the legislative process for church measures, the Revision of the Prayer Book and the fact that the bishops are now administering it in their dioceses as the law of the church, upon their own authority and without the authority of the state: what are they all, but steps towards ultimately freeing the church from the bondage of the Establishment? The development of what an enthusiastic, if Erastian, college chaplain called the "bureaucracy of Lambeth" means that when the moment of departure comes, there will be no great wrench, for all the instruments will be there for running the church when the supremacy of Parliament has gone. These events have their logic; and in their movement towards their end, the Archbishops' Commission and its Report, taken with its reception and the effects of it, form yet another significant step on the way.

¹ cf. H. H. Henson: *Disestablishment*, pp. 42-3. "Out of a total population which exceeded 36,000,000, no more than 3,686,422 persons above the age of eighteen registered themselves in 1927 as members of the National Church, and of these only 2,528,391 were communicants... How petty a proportion of the English people is included in the membership of the English Church! When due allowance has been made for those communicants who are under age, it may be doubted whether more than one in thirteen of the parliamentary electors is a communicant Anglican." The position since 1927, it need hardly be said, has not improved.

AFTER THE FRENCH ELECTIONS

By PROFESSOR PAUL VAUCHER

AT the time of writing it is obviously not yet possible to foresee what the Left parties in France will be able to undertake. With the prospect of a devaluation taking place at short notice, with drastic social and financial experiments contemplated, dangerous strikes spreading over many factories, above all with Europe standing in the most confusing state of bewilderment, one cannot venture to guess the future. But it may already prove helpful to describe with some precision the problem which France's new Government has to face.

The coalition of Left parties—communist, socialist and radical—known as the *Front Populaire* was formed in January of the present year in order to fight Fascism. The need for it was felt immediately after the riots of February 1934 had revealed the dangerous unpopularity of the parliamentary regime. Yet the attempt made to form such a coalition in 1934 led to no result. The radicals, although they opposed M. Doumergue's plan of constitutional reform, found it necessary to support the *Union Nationale*. The socialists could not yet believe that the communist offer of co-operation was sincere.

The communists had been the first to propose a common action for liberty and peace. But the socialists well remembered how the communists had for years declared that French democracy remained the humble servant of capitalism and that a dictatorship of the proletariat must be established. They were surprised to find the communists now strongly advocating a programme common to the industrial workers, the peasantry and the lower middle-class.

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The socialists had for long known that social conditions in France did not allow a party relying only on the support of the proletariat to attain power. They had endeavoured to win the vote of the farmers and the small bourgeois. It was very troublesome to find the communists now competing with them in that field. If they succeeded in persuading many citizens who suffered from the economic depression to vote communist in order to express in the strongest possible way their discontent, they might also later on take advantage of the unpopularity of Parliament to enforce their original doctrine.

The scepticism of the Socialist Party was increased by the negotiations that took place in 1934 between the two Trade-Unions Councils. The Communist Council once more approached the C.G.T. with an offer of reconciliation. But again the C.G.T. satisfied itself that its rival had not given up the fight. The communists proposed that one single union (*syndicat unique*) be formed for each trade, but, as their own unions had by far the smallest membership, they wanted to have first a joint committee elected on which the two sections would have an equal representation. Such a procedure would lead to the creation of a new Trade-Unions Council which would not comply with the rules always maintained by the C.G.T. Indeed the communists had not abandoned the hope of turning French syndicalism into a political movement closely linked with Soviet Russia.

The socialists, who witnessed the discussion, remembered that in much the same way they also had repeatedly been asked by the communists to form one single front (*front unique*). Was the proposal now made for a Front Populaire at all more sincere?

Thus in 1934, while joint demonstrations were from time to time organized, no real coalition could be formed. Yet in January 1936 a common programme was accepted by the

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three Left parties. At the same time the Communist Trade-Unions submitted to the rules of the C.G.T. How can we account for the change?

Indeed, the approaching general elections left no time for further discussion. But above all the Laval policy made a common action on the part of the Opposition necessary.

M. Laval, using the exceptional powers granted to him by Parliament, had followed a severe policy of deflation in order to balance the budget and reduce the cost of living. But no substantial reduction had been obtained, no way out of the economic crisis was still in sight. The Left parties were given a splendid opportunity to win over the vote of many discontented electors. All were equally eager to seize it.

On the other hand, M. Laval's foreign policy also strengthened the Opposition. The Franco-Soviet alliance made the French Communists more conciliatory, while the attacks which the French Conservatives launched against the treaty, its criticism by Germany, finally Mr. Laval's reluctance to have it ratified by Parliament, all contributed to make the Left parties support it.

The Abyssinian crisis turned the radicals against the Cabinet. As soon as the Budget Bill had been passed, their leader, M. Herriot, resigned, leaving his party to join the Opposition. The socialists, with the support of the radicals, were less reluctant to co-operate with the communists. These, in turn, made profession of ardent patriotism. They stood in the line of the Revolutionary France who had fought the battle against Reactionary Europe.

The programme now accepted by the three parties enumerated the reforms that should be immediately accomplished in order "to defend democratic liberties, to provide bread for the workers, employment for youth and give to the world the great human peace." These were divided into

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three chapters dealing with liberty, peace and economic problems.

Liberty should be safeguarded by maintaining freedom of thought in the schools, by reforming the press, by dissolving and disarming the Fascist Leagues. Peace should be preserved by the League of Nations, by disarmament and collective security with automatic sanctions and regional pacts.

On economic problems the programme dwelt at much greater length. The new government would oppose a policy of deflation, and undertake to increase the buying capacity of the consumers. In trade and industry unemployment could be reduced by shortening the length of the working day, raising the age limit in schools, granting pensions to old workers; above all, by launching a wide plan of public works. Also a national insurance fund would be formed. A moratorium would reduce the heavy burden of debts and mortgages that now make peasants miserable, while co-operatives and rural banks would be extended, national selling agencies for wheat and chemical products organized. Last, but not least, the cuts made in salaries and pensions would, as far as possible, be restored.

How then would such an increase in expenditure be met? As regards fiscal problems the programme only indicates that the income tax and the death duties would be made more progressive, while such industrial combines that enjoy the monopoly of the market could be heavily taxed. Neither a capital levy nor a possible devaluation are mentioned.

One is therefore thrown back on the last items on the list in which the attitude of the Left parties towards capitalism is defined. Three proposals are made: (a) the nationalization of armament industries, (b) a reform of the board of directors of limited societies with the object of allowing shareholders to exercise a real control over such boards, (c) a reform of the Bank of France. The small body of "*régents*," who are

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nominally elected by the two hundred larger shareholders, but are really chosen by co-option, would be replaced by a board on which representatives of the state and of the main professional groups existing in the country would serve.

The Left parties avoided any pronouncement about a devaluation as the industrial workers feared that it would reduce the standard of wages, the "*fonctionnaires*," the "*rentiers*" and the farmers the value of their salaries and savings. But they struck a popular note in declaring against deflation and giving generous pledges to a large number of citizens.

On the whole the Left parties did not support a socialist policy. They did not advocate a direct approach towards socialism. But they declared war on capitalism. Many electors who would not have approved of steps leading to a capital levy or to extended nationalization, were eager to fight the new capitalist aristocracy. They were led to believe that even the admitted feebleness of the parliamentary regime could be ascribed to the demoralizing influence which the moneyed interest was allowed to exercise over the elected representatives of an honest and hardworking people.

When a weekly illustrated, the *Crapouillot*, produced a description of the "200 families" that ruled the country, it immediately made a strong appeal to the electorate. Frenchmen better understood the great changes which have occurred in the social conditions of France in recent years. The income tax statistics indeed show that wealth is still distributed among a much larger number of the population than in other countries. But shareholders have no real power, and concentration in industry and finance has much increased. Large combines have gone far to acquire a monopoly on the market, and the firms to which the "*régents*" of the Bank of France belong possess between themselves an enormous influence. A policy which tends to deprive such aristocrats

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of their privileges was bound to be extremely popular. Thus, in raising the banner of French democracy and forming an anti-fascist coalition, the Left parties were also pledged to attack the economic forces which endangered the independence of the democratic state.

Let us now briefly describe the main difficulties which stand in the way of the new French Government.

Social difficulties already threaten to have an overwhelming force. The significance of the many stay-in strikes which have occurred is not yet clear. Workers in the engineering factories have been the first to revolt because of the large profits that their firms are said to make out of the present rearmament. But the movement has quickly spread to other industries. The workers were eager to obtain without delay the fulfilment of the pledges given by the Front Populaire and were asking for an increase in wages and a 40-hour week. The discipline maintained by the strikers and the resolution showed by the government enabled the working class to record an extraordinary success. But the lasting consequences of the movement remain to be seen. It is not yet possible to know how far the movement was spontaneous, produced by the psychological effect that the electoral victories of the Socialist and Communist Parties had on the working class, or whether on the contrary the communist influence active in the Trade-Unions was responsible for the outbreak. In either case it is putting the alliance of socialists and communists to a hard test. The latter cannot fail to use the opportunity to increase their popularity with the workers while the confidence of the former in the sincerity of the communists, which was never very strong, may now be shaken. The refusal of the Communist Party to take responsibility in the new Cabinet has made a bad impression. Their proposal to form in the constituencies joint committees of the members of both parties with a view

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to prepare ultimately their reunion has aroused much suspicion in the ranks of the socialists.

The socialist ministers will have difficulty in resisting the attempts made by outsiders to control their policy. Not only do the communists contemplate organizing so to speak local Soviets, but the trade-unionists nourish a similar ambition and the C.G.T., which also refused seats in the Cabinet, offers to form committees to prepare and perhaps dictate the economic reforms contemplated by the government. The Congress and the Executive of the Socialist Party are anxious to follow at close quarters the action of their representatives in the Ministry.

The financial situation which the new government inherited from its predecessors is indeed dangerous, the more so as it has pledged itself to maintain the present parity of gold. Even assuming that a devaluation would be successfully accomplished, any attempt made by the Left parties to enforce their programme and attack capitalism appears very difficult.

Frenchmen well know the weakness of any government which find a Treasury empty and a large floating debt. It is, so to speak, dependent on two different bodies of electors, and those who record their votes in the form of a subscription are more powerful than those who only possess a political vote. During the present depression France has again allowed a large floating debt to develop. The position of the government is not improved by the fact that bankers now hold a large amount of Treasury bonds and that the Bank of France, in order to support the credit of the state, has undertaken to accept the bonds for rediscount.

It is important here to remember the changes which have taken place in the structure of banking in France since the war. The "big four" *établissements de crédit* have much extended their activities by absorbing many local banks.

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Yet some private banks—the oldest ones—have by no means lost power. On the contrary their influence on the *banques d'affaires* and on the Bank of France where they dominate the Board of *régents*, remains unhampered. The government is not made more independent by the extraordinary progress of the large nationalized bank known as *Caisse des Dépôts*. Not only has it centralized the deposits of all saving banks, but the higher rate of interest which it pays on deposits and the continuous fall of securities on the Stock Market have persuaded many small capitalists to leave their funds liquid at the bank. The *Caisse* now disposes of some 80 milliards, holds a large proportion of the state's loans and constantly helps the government by its action on the Stock Market. But the state could not at present rely on it to accept new loans, and must be very careful in dealing with a fund which after all constitutes the savings of the country. In order to obtain more credit the government, which is at present outlining several ingenious schemes, may therefore still be dependent on the private banks.

Although the ordinary budget has now been balanced, the Treasury is clearly unable to cover the deficit on railways and meet the expense of increased armaments. The social reforms of the Popular Front will still further enlarge its liabilities, and it is hard to see how it could dispense with the support of the great capitalists. Resistance to a devaluation has made the position of the new government still more uncertain. With a strong majority in Parliament it can take bold steps to prevent a raid on gold or an export of capital; it may even nationalize the Bank of France. But it cannot avoid a crisis in which many electors who voted for the Left parties, would also be caught in the panic.

As regards the international outlook, although the Left parties were much against M. Laval's policy, present conditions make it hard to foresee how far their accession to

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power will lead to a definite change in the foreign policy of France.

Curiously enough by far the greatest difficulty encountered by the new government is to be found in the profound pacifist spirit of the French people. Foreigners seldom realize to what extent Frenchmen are willing to maintain peace at all costs. Fear and horror of war act as a paralysing influence and would prevent any government from taking steps that might involve the remotest risk of leading to a new conflict.

Pacifism and fear are of course produced by the increasing danger of war, but they are also the result of past failures. The economic depression lasting for several years has affected the public spirit. But scepticism has been above all created by the growing feeling that France's policy had been persistently misunderstood abroad.

Many Frenchmen no longer approve of all the steps taken by their government after the war, such as the Ruhr policy or again our refusal in 1934 to seek an agreement with Germany on disarmament, but they all genuinely believe that France's continental policy has all the time endeavoured to safeguard the peace of Europe, and much resented the fact that it has been so widely described as an egoistic effort to safeguard our own security by preventing Germany's recovery. The British policy of always endeavouring to act as mediator on the Continent, yet, except for the Locarno Treaties, avoiding all commitments, has been regarded by the French people both as selfish and shortsighted. Frenchmen were therefore not altogether surprised to see Britain, who feared France's excessive ambition and worked to increase the power of Germany and Italy, compelled to face the consequences of her long efforts. The Anglo-German naval agreement was the last straw, and its tragic coincidence

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with the opening of the Abyssinian crisis had lamentable results.

The majority of Frenchmen were thus not in a position to understand the whole moral and general significance of the case raised by Italy's aggression. They had been told for generations in all French schools that Britain's main interests lie in the Near East (the road to India and the Nile's sources). They simply could not believe that her new policy was dictated by disinterested motives. Moreover, it was bound to lead either to a European war or to a complete failure.

The French military experts were convinced that the resistance of Ethiopia could not last for long and France was not confident that the League would prove equal to the part it was asked to perform, as the British policy had so far prevented it from obtaining the necessary strength. It would surely not dare to resist an aggression committed by Germany, and many countries who now accepted sanctions against Italy, would not be likely to apply them to Germany. The French people, therefore, when asked to take sides with Britain, were very reluctant to face the danger of a war on the Alps and on their Southern Coast. After Hitler's move on March 7th they refused in the same way to run the risk of entering the Rhineland. But the British reaction much increased their scepticism. It was all very well to say that the Germans were entitled to invade their own territory, but why did the British people not understand that such a test of force could not be allowed to succeed? Why did they hail Hitler's peace plans with such enthusiasm?

Meanwhile France had finally pledged herself to support Britain if the Home Fleet was attacked by Italy and, as statistics show, she honestly applied all the sanctions agreed at Geneva. The deplorable failure of the greater number of Parisian newspapers to keep the public properly informed

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left the country quite unaware of the fatal result that France's delays and resistance in taking such steps were bound to have.

Thus, at the time of the general elections, few Frenchmen realized how much they had estranged Britain's friendship and were responsible for the dangerous position of Europe.

The mood of realism prevailing in the country made us simply wonder what exactly was the value of the support that we might expect from Britain in case of war. Although we still believed that Britain had it in its power to prevent war by making her attitude known beforehand, we doubted whether the small army that might cross the Channel would prove very helpful before a decision was reached. The disclosures made of the weakness of Britain's military forces increased our pessimism. Italy, on the contrary, had built up a strong army and her neutrality would at least have the great advantage of making both South-Eastern France and North Africa secure.

It was very convenient to find Italy pledged to defend Austria and oppose the German imperialism in Central Europe. As many Frenchmen quite failed to estimate the importance of the conflict which opposed Britain to Italy, they continued to regard the maintenance of the "Stresa front" as the principle that must dictate France's foreign policy.

Such, I believe, were the motives inspiring France's policy for the last months. Their influence in France at present is still great. But, of course, the new government well understands that the public is partly mistaken or short-sighted. It is anxious by all means to open a new course and make a new attempt to avert the danger of war by a strong League and real disarmament. It surely sees that the policy which tends to avoid taking risks at all costs leads to increased dangers. But how far will it be able to shake the passivity and scepticism of the public?

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Problems of foreign policy played but a small part in the electoral campaign. Probably the situation was regarded as too puzzling for candidates and electors to express definite views. But recent events have already made a noticeable impression on the public. The success of Italy has brought its dangerous consequences to full light. It is a menace to France's power in the Mediterranean and in her colonial empire. Also, the results of Italian policy in Central Europe are slowly discovered. France could not see with indifference Yugoslavia dragged towards Germany and the collapse of the Little Entente.

Some Frenchmen begin to suspect that Mussolini after all may not be able to prevent the *Anschluss* and may, therefore, seek a "*rapprochement*" with Hitler. They, of course, fear that the continuance of sanctions will increase the danger of such a diplomatic revolution taking place. The new government will therefore find it hard to maintain them. Nevertheless, the memories of the long period during which the trend of Italian diplomacy was always opposed to that of France appear to be slowly coming back to the mind of Frenchmen. On the other side by far the greater number of them well know that the only real hope for peace lies in an understanding with Britain. Notwithstanding all differences and bitter disagreements separating the two countries, they have no alternative open to them.

As the danger of war in Central Europe increases, the feeling grows that, however unwillingly, France would be dragged into the conflict. Her pacifism, her scepticism would not allow her to stand aloof. If Britain and France were contented with staying on the defensive, leaving Germany a free hand elsewhere, what a terrific effort of armaments would become inevitable in the near future?

Finally the latter phase of the Abyssinian crisis has undoubtedly shocked many Frenchmen. The use of gas and

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the utter destruction of a weak country could not meet with their approval, and they also feel that it is impossible to accept that the League be defeated in that way.

Thus the new government will perhaps find it less difficult than it fears to carry with it public opinion, if it makes a strong appeal for a League policy, disarmament, collective security and respect for the rules of international law. France would thus turn back to the traditional line of policy which, on the whole, she endeavoured to follow after the war. Her present mood of scepticism, which her disagreement with Britain has created, would not survive a *rapprochement* of the two democratic western countries.

In brief, the so-called anti-fascist elections showed that Democratic France was resolved to defend her existence. The success of the Left parties cannot be ascribed only to the vote of discontented electors. Yet these parties were given an exceptional opportunity to form a coalition. The communists acted less on the belief that France's parliamentary system had a permanent value than because they feared the victory of the dictatorships in Central Europe. The radicals, who form the most democratic of all French parties, but have never yet decided how far they can agree with the socialists, were easily brought to support a programme which conceives a policy of social reform as a fight against a new aristocracy. The socialists profited from such exceptional circumstances. But they now have to face its dangers.

The present strikes are dangerous to them even if they are but an expression of the popular grievances and expectations, still more if they are part of a communist manoeuvre. They may compel the government to bring forward at an early stage socialist reforms that radicals would be unable to accept or make the Socialist Party lose the communist support. Any move on the part of the communists might possibly lead to a fascist reaction. Indeed, Frenchmen have

no longer the mentality they had in February 1934. The most violent and Fascist Leagues have lost much prestige and even the spectacular success of the *Croix de Feu* movement during the last year was due to the fact that it did not advocate violence, but on the contrary the reconciliation of all parties. Yet undoubtedly all the Leagues are prepared, if necessary, to fight the communists and would seize an opportunity to strike.

This they expect a financial crisis will provide. The new government may be held responsible for a financial situation which it has not created; it will be much more open to attack if it undertakes to carry on its anti-capitalist programme. The present condition of economic forces in France makes it impossible for the government to do so unless it controls the Bank of France. How far can that be done without a financial panic?

It is true that the government leads a strong majority which will be the more inclined to maintain discipline in proportion as a fascist danger is more to be feared. If Parliament shows resolution and strength, the country, which so much criticised its weakness, will be very favourably impressed. Moreover, France suffers from her inability to find a way out of her present difficulties at home and abroad. She deeply feels the need for a clear policy and might be easily persuaded to follow a government which had decided to work for social justice and international order.

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By H. R. G. GREAVES

THE constitution of 1931 began with the proud assertion: Spain is a Republic of Workers. Five years after the Revolution no description of that country could be more fitting. For the moment the workers' organisations come very near to holding the destiny of Spain in their hands, and it is a striking evidence of their strength that discussion should now revolve so largely around the problem of the state structure through which Spanish socialism is likely to express itself and the exact method by which this may be achieved. But, flushed as they are with their remarkable victory at the polls, it may be that the parties of the left are over-confident and are indulging in too extravagant hopes. What then are the realities underlying these recent and interesting developments?

About the strength of the revolutionary left there can be no question. Proof of it is available on all sides. Spontaneous demonstration of their new-found self-confidence bursts from the various working-class movements at the slightest opportunity, and is not without some embarrassing effects on their leaders. One-day general strikes occur at the rate of about two a month in Madrid, and they are not to be lightly regarded for they imply a complete and awe-inspiring standstill of the life of the capital, when such a bourgeois relic as the private car-owner thinks it wiser not to venture on to the streets.

The remarkable electoral success of the Popular Front on February 16 is the chief explanation of subsequent proletarian assertiveness. It came as a complete surprise to the supporters of the Right, whose hopes of victory had grown as the campaign proceeded. To what was it due?

It would be foolish to overlook the lack of inspiration

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and of leadership in the Ceda, the confederation of right-wing parties. After two years of government there was no achievement to which they could point. Their record was in marked contrast with the noteworthy activity of the first Azana government. In any case, their concrete and constructive objectives were hard to discover. They had succeeded in reinstating many of the officers and officials displaced by the first revolutionary government; they had stopped agricultural and educational reform; they had continued the state subvention to the clergy and handed back expropriated land to *grandees*; but for the future their plans were restricted mainly to a revocation of Article 26 of the Constitution, which expelled the Jesuits and forbade commerce or teaching to other religious orders. However much this last might appeal to Catholic sentiment, no attempt had been made to carry it into effect, one of the difficulties being the need for a two-thirds majority of the Cortes. There was also some vague talk of establishing a senate, but this again had not been given concrete shape. In effect the Ceda was republican without faith in the republic, angling for anti-republican support, and as such they were naturally suspect both to monarchists and to all those, whatever their party, for whom preservation of the new regime mattered. There was never any doubt that these last formed the great majority of Spaniards. While the Radicals, who called themselves "*conservadores de la republica*" were in sole power the essentials of the Constitution seemed fairly safe, but as soon as the followers of Gil Robles entered the cabinet fear broke into open revolt in Asturias and Catalonia. The disappearance of Lerroux, discredited by financial scandals, might have provided an opportunity for those whom the Left did not hesitate to call "*fascist*." With the Left parties disorganised and their leaders in prison, could they not take power and keep it? But in their way stood President Zamora and, still more serious

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as a result of the growing anger at the methods adopted in repressing the revolt, the knowledge that such illegality would be met by armed resistance possibly precipitating the very events they most wished to avoid.

The part played by the revolt of October 1934 in influencing the election is one of the most interesting questions that face the student of recent political developments in Spain. The relation between the two events has not yet been sufficiently stressed. Undoubtedly one of the chief factors in determining the people's attitude to the right-wing Government was the methods it adopted in suppressing this revolt. Use of the foreign legion to defeat Spanish citizens in their own country was a tactical blunder so grave that one can only conclude from it that the Government was unable to rely on its own home troops. By this action Spanish pride was keenly mortified, and the heroic tale of ill-armed workers in victory and in defeat was set against an ignoble background of Moorish barbarism. Incarceration of 30,000 citizens for political offences, many of them without trial, implied a harshness that lent point to the left-wing accusations of fascist tendencies. Well-documented stories of prison atrocities could not be kept from the public by the strictest censorship, and they were given widespread publicity during the election campaign. The arrest and detention of Senor Azana, followed by his exoneration from blame, did not improve the Government's case. On the other hand, his imprisonment and that of socialist leaders simply gave them the claims of all who suffer for a cause in which they believe.

Probably more was done to weld together the working-class through this effort and martyrdom than was or could be achieved by all the negotiations for compromise that left-wing organisers have undertaken for so long. It meant that the united front answered an emotional need felt far and wide and was by no means a temporary arrangement between

party bosses for party purposes. There is evidence in plenty of how deep this feeling went. Leaders and their personal rivalries have sometimes stood in the way of agreement, but the spontaneous demand of their followers made the united front a reality. It is thus that to ascribe the Popular Front's victory to their agreement on a ten-point policy is in some degree superficial. That agreement is of great importance, but so are the conditions which made it possible, if not inevitable.

In the same way the decision of the syndicalists to vote where in 1933 they had abstained, while it contributed largely to the Left's electoral success, was itself determined by the previous course of events. The hatred and fear of fascism has gradually penetrated the European trade-union movement. In Spain the vigour given to it by Italian, German and Austrian persecutions was enhanced by experience nearer home.

An interesting analogy can be drawn between these developments and the unsuccessful revolt of December 1930, which provided its martyrs and its exiles and prepared the way for the calm assumption of power by the revolutionaries four months later. Sorel should be a popular philosopher of the Spanish republic. Between 1930 and 1936 the whole trend of Spanish political movement has shifted fundamentally to the Left.

II

The Popular Front's ten-point programme is a continuation of the policy of the first Azana government. It is not socialistic, and the socialists are not joining the government, being content to support it and, if necessary, to bring pressure to bear upon it, from outside. They regard it as a valuable preparation for future action. Senor Azana promised that this agreement would be carried out to the smallest detail, and his successor, Senor Casares Quiroga, may be expected

to redeem this pledge to the full, for unless he does so and acts with evident energy and conviction he will precipitate revolt.

The programme includes an amnesty for all political prisoners, the reinstatement of all officials removed by the reactionary government, and the carrying out of the original Land Reform law. The first has been completed under impulsion from below, the second and third are being done as opportunity occurs and with considerable rapidity. Fulfilment of the advanced educational programme set out by Marcelino Domingo and Fernando de los Rios in the first year of the Republic is another important item of the policy. On April 14, eight new schools in Madrid were opened by the former, once again minister of public instruction. The programme is being proceeded with energetically, and already the most impressive building in many of the villages of Spain is the new state school. Laicism and co-education are the principles on which organisation is based.

Other aspects of the policy are the application of Article 26 and the placing of the Bank of Spain under ministerial supervision. In general it may be said that the policy is one of defending and applying the republican constitution in its entirety, and extending the social service activity of the first two and a half years.

Land reform is likely to prove both the most important and the most contentious feature of the Government's programme. It is here more especially that the Left has already shown its power and that the syndicalists in particular have forced the pace. In one month 70,000 *junteros* or peasant ploughmen were given land. In fact, the gift was more in the nature of a legalisation of a defiant occupation. The socialists emphasise two factors bearing on it. First, they point out, the land is not given absolutely but conditionally, the state remaining the owner. Then, they add, it is a very inadequate indication both of the intentions behind the Land Reform

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Act of 1932 and of the necessities which will govern agricultural reform. In many places the peasants will be unable to render the land productive without state help. Such assistance will be forthcoming through collectivisation and irrigation. In other words, circumstances favour socialism; failure to apply it will bring discontent. Irrigation schemes in particular, begun some years ago, must now be pushed ahead.

III

What, then, are the prospects for Spain? The dominant fact is the present strength of the extreme Left. How long will they be satisfied with the work of the Popular Front Government? Some think a year, some two years—but what then? For the moment the socialists may use the Government to take the preliminary steps while the way for the social revolution is prepared. It has, for instance, suppressed the fascist movement, and the course through which this was brought about is significant. Fascist students and local sectors of that party publicly declared a vendetta against the socialist leaders, warning them that two would be killed for every one fascist who died. Attempts on the lives of Caballero and Jimenez de Asua were unsuccessful, although police were killed. This campaign culminated in the murder of a magistrate, who had condemned several fascists to long terms of imprisonment, and in further deaths during processions. The syndicalists seized upon this to declare a general strike in protest. The Government thereupon agreed in consultation with the extremist leaders to suppress the fascist party, arresting many of the local leaders throughout the country. As a result it is reckoned that a thousand were imprisoned. Senor Azana also used these violent attacks to pass a law depriving retired officers of their pensions and privileges if they took part in the anti-republican activities. The victory went to the Left, but it is interesting that it was,

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or appeared to be, at the behest of those who were ready to declare a general strike.

Again, the very completeness of the general strike when it comes, is evidence of left-wing strength. An office or shop that opens does so at its peril. A man who carries a sack may be ordered to throw it down. The same determination to maintain working-class solidarity is seen in a mere procession of the united front. The citizen who fails to doff his hat to the red banner is as much a subject of general disapproval as is his counterpart in England when "God Save the King" is played.

The peasants who pegged out their claims to land and then called on the municipal authorities to provide them with the deeds are a further example of the same tendency to direct action. So are the workers in mines, breweries and transport and other undertakings who, after a stay-in strike, have from time to time elected their own management committee which then ran the enterprise on its own responsibility. Although these industrial experiments have been short-lived, they have always served both to procure some measure of capitulation on the part of the owners and to suggest the capacity of the workers to control their own workshops.

In the same way, the burning of churches has added to the self-confidence of the workers. The civil guards have been faced with a *fait accompli*, which evidently met with the approval of local leaders of opinion, and to take action in such circumstances is not easy. When it was indicated recently that a religious order's school would shortly be burned, the Government took the opportunity to seize it and convert it to the uses of state education. The attitude of the Government is, its enemies assert, one of weakness if not connivance, but it is at least realistic. Senor Azana himself has best expressed it. Law must be and shall be enforced, he said in effect, but we must remember the terrible suffering the

poverty-stricken Spanish people have had to undergo during this time of reaction and oppression. Law, it might be added in this last case, makes it unconstitutional for a religious order to keep a school, and it is typical of present-day proletarian strategy that the most determined activity is in compliance with the spirit of the law, aiming chiefly at hastening its application.

The decision recently taken at the Saragossa conference of syndicalists to set up local soviets throughout Spain is a further indication of the same self-reliance and determination. But it is more. It means that regionalist and separatist feeling, always powerful in Spain, will tend to unite still further with anarcho-syndicalism, the Spanish form of communism. It means too that the syndicalists have now entered the political field more definitely even than when they co-operated with the socialists at the election. That being so, the very fact which has been their weakness in the past, the absence of central leadership and the reliance instead upon an intensely realistic direct action in each locality, may now prove to be their strength, if they effectively ally with the socialists. In such an alliance they would supply much of the local zeal, fearlessness and initiative, while the socialists would take the lead at the centre and in co-ordination.

Much has to be done before such an alliance can materialise, but the tendencies towards it are very strong. Underlying them all is the demand of the rank and file among whom the idea of solidarity has penetrated to a highly interesting degree. The farewell shouted to some of the delegates as they left for the conference was typical of the present feeling—"Bring back an alliance."

On the socialist side the position is more complicated. Prieto and Caballero have moved apart since the days when they were colleagues in the first Azana government. Prieto is more ready to co-operate with capitalist democracy. Cabal-

lero is an open advocate of alliance with the syndicalists for the purposes of social revolution, and the present tendency of the party is with him. His view triumphed in fixing the venue of the forthcoming socialist conference in Madrid rather than in Asturias, and again in postponing the conference from June until the autumn. Moreover, the socialist ideal of state supervision of economic organisation combined with regional control of particular undertakings is fundamentally in harmony with the anarcho-syndicalist ideal of *comunismo libertario*, a system of separate works and area control councils federated under central committees of the Iberian Confederation of Autonomous Communes (Cica).

The Spanish workers' movement is superficially divided, with its C.I.C.A. and Confederacion Nacional de Trabajadores (C.N.T.), with its socialist Union General de Trabajo (U.G.T.), and its communist Union de Hermanos Proletarios (U.H.P.), but there was never a time at which both ideologically and in practical programme it was more united. Against a conflict of personalities can be set a spontaneous cry for unity from an oppressed working class, which in its poverty and its dynamic ideals has much in common with Russia.

LIBERALISM IN RETREAT : A CENTURY OF NATIVE POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA

By MARGARET BALLINGER

OF all the fields into which the protagonists of early nineteenth-century liberalism adventured in the cause of black humanity, probably none afforded more varied scope for their endeavours than the Cape Colony. Certainly in none were their principles more strongly opposed nor their intrusion resented in so emphatic a manner. However, with the Cape governed as it then was from Downing Street, their victory was never seriously in doubt. But the price was a high one. It involved not merely a division of the people but a division of the country which was to entrench in new states the inequality of race uprooted in the old. From these new strongholds it was destined to raise its head again, to acquire a new vigour until once more the issue had been joined. In the new battle the victory is as little in doubt as it was on the old field a century ago but this time the liberals will be the vanquished.

It is just a hundred years ago since there began that strange episode in imperial history known as the Great Trek. It was the exodus of a small but important because determined section of the old Dutch population of the new British colony of the Cape who, unwilling to endure British idea and British method embodied in government, set out to make new homes for themselves beyond the reach of any alien overlordship.

Much of the irritation and discontent which found its climax in this exodus was no doubt due simply to the racial difference between the government and the governed. But the climax was itself immediately the product of three incidents, each of which was a victory for the humanitarian spirit at the expense of the established practice of the colonists. It suggested therefore that, between the old population and the new government, there existed a funda-

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mental incompatibility based on essentially divergent conceptions of the claims and rights of the black races within the Colony and on its frontiers. The suggestion was the more important in that it gave a particular and contrary direction to the policy of those who trekked as they again came into contact with black men, and the more unfortunate in that it founded a tradition of difference which has only gathered strength with the passage of time until today it has attained a psychological force that seems beyond the reach of reason.

The first of these incidents was the emancipation of the Hottentots from the position of legal inferiority in which Dutch East India Company rule had left them and which in the beginning, British rule had more or less accepted. The outstanding features of this position were inability to purchase land, a pass law which reduced the unwary Native to the position of a vagrant when he might be hired out by the public authorities to any farmer who would take him at any wage the farmer was willing to pay, and a system of domestic punishment imposed on the mere word of the employer. By the 50th Ordinance of 1828, the pass laws and the system of domestic correction were alike abolished as incompatible with the rudest justice and as detrimental to the material advance of the people; the inability to buy land was declared invalid; and the Hottentot was granted the status of any other person before the courts of the land.

The emancipation of the slaves in 1833 aggravated the irritation roused by the 50th Ordinance, not primarily by its contribution to the insecurity of the labour market, since few of those who subsequently trekked were slave owners, nor on account of the much attacked compensation arrangements, but for the added emphasis which it laid on the claims of black men to be regarded as having human rights.

The Great Trek is an interesting episode in the history of a people, throwing much light on the making of a nation and on the influences which go to mould the character of a race. Those who were discontented with the Government's attitude to Natives in the Cape Colony a century ago were by no means all of Dutch extraction. Anti-Native feeling was, and still is, much more the product of particular

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circumstances, economic and political, than of basic racial antipathy than is commonly allowed. It was, at this time, partly the result of "frontier" conflicts between two races, each virile, and each impelled by a passionate land hunger which could not be satisfied by either save at the expense of the other; and partly it was the natural outcome of the labour difficulties which always beset a young country, and the temptations to the European colonist inherent in the tradition of slavery and the proximity of large undeveloped Native tribes. These influences mould the attitude of men irrespective of their racial origin and it is significant that Dr. John Philip, the protagonist of Native rights, relates that only in Grahamstown, the predominantly English town of the Colony and the centre of English settlement, was he in real danger of personal attack. But all those who carried their grievances beyond the frontier belonged to the older racial element in the country, a fact which illumines an interesting contrast between British and Boer conceptions of free government.

For a century and a half the Boer, who had found in a commercial government merely an exploiter, even though an inefficient one, had moved farther and farther from Cape Town, the administrative centre of the Colony, abandoning the comforts of a moderate civilisation for the peace of solitude, asking nothing of government but to be left alone. Thus the Boer early learnt to regard his government as something external and inimical, concerned primarily with the interests of its shareholders to whom colonists simply represented assets or liabilities; and he developed a passion for freedom, which was absence of government rather than participation in its functions and a control of its policy. In the circumstances, it is easy to understand the tendency of discontent to express itself in movement beyond the effective limits of governmental control which is the major characteristic of the history of the Cape Colony in the eighteenth century.

The tradition of the British colonist differed fundamentally. For him the long history of parliamentary government had inculcated a different idea and a different conception of the functions of government. Even in the

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face of the obvious contradiction inherent in the existence of a democratic theory of government and the practical foundation of government in a narrow franchise which represented property rather than people, the English people had come to regard government as essentially part of themselves. Grievances, no matter how bitter, admitted, at least in theory, of a constitutional redress; and the advantage even of an aristocratic party system was that there was always an opposition prepared to listen to what might reflect on the conduct of government by those in power. Thus while the Boer trekked, the Briton remained to demand a government more in keeping with his sentiments or, as happened, to yield to the greater force arrayed against him.

The outcome of the Trek, since the British Government refused to follow its recalcitrant subjects, was the division of South Africa into a number of States, whose racial differences were reinforced by the adoption of diametrically opposed policies in regard to the Native people. In the republics which the Trekkers set up north of the Orange River, the conditions which had prevailed in pre-emancipation days in the Cape were re-established. Pass laws were again enforced, with penalties for vagrancy; rights in regard to land were restricted, and the doctrine of "no equality" present or future was either explicitly stated or implied.

In the meantime, in the Cape, with the departure of the intransigents, the humanitarian spirit derived from Exeter Hall which had fought and won the battle of legal and political emancipation, became more and more deeply entrenched, gradually absorbing the remaining opposition; and in 1852, when the Colony was at last accorded representative government, the Constitution Act under which the rights of voters were defined recognised no colour bar. The franchise was accorded to both European and non-European males on the common basis of a property qualification sufficiently low to make the attainment by some at least of the non-European people a practical possibility; and this in spite of a great increase in the colour element in the Colony through the extension of the frontier from the Fish to the Keiskama River to take in thousands of Bantu who, in 1836, had still been "foreigners" beyond the

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jurisdiction of the Cape Colonial Government. At this time, indeed, the people of colour in the Colony already outnumbered the white by two to one. Later, in 1872, when representative government made way for responsible government, after twenty years' experience of the common franchise, no attempt was made to alter the position even though a further extension of the Colony had enormously increased the disparity in numbers between white and black.

The division of the country which the Trek had created, however, had no foundation in natural characteristic and was against the best interests of all concerned. It is not surprising, therefore, that the central feature of later nineteenth century development is towards a reintegration of the parts. The process, however, was not a simple one; and that the obstacles were mainly emotional and psychological only rendered them more formidable. The most thorny if not the most fundamental of these obstacles was the difference between the Cape and the rest of South Africa in the matter of Native policy.

The discovery of diamonds and gold naturally strengthened the forces making for unity. On the one hand the development of the gold mining industry required capital which the young South African republic could not supply, while the trade contingent upon development accentuated the weakness of the land-locked nature of the inland states and the consequent dependence of these states on their neighbours. The Transvaal in particular, however, cared less for progress than for independence and it was known that every obstacle would be raised to closer union. In the circumstances, from those of its own citizens who desired union above all else as the immediate advantages to be gained loomed ever larger, pressure was increasingly brought to bear on the Cape to modify its Native policy as the price of unity. In 1886, an attempt was made to establish a special franchise for Natives in the Cape with a very high property qualification and a separate representation for specially Native areas, like the Transkei. By this time, however, the principle of equality had experience and tradition alike behind it and the attempt failed to secure the support of the House of Assembly, where the champions of Native rights

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poured scorn on the idea of "fancy franchises." In 1892, however, thanks to Rhodes, the existing franchise was revised; the occupational qualification was raised from £25 to £75, the wage qualification was raised to £50, and an educational qualification was added, necessitating ability on the part of the voter to write his name, address and occupation. The significant fact, however, is that the modification applied to all voters alike.

The principle of a common franchise for black and white was maintained in the Cape, and when the issue of Union became practical politics in the years after the Boer War, the open door to common citizenship continued to be the foundation of Cape Native policy. But as had been anticipated, this did constitute an important focus of trouble in the Convention to which was entrusted the making of Union. The northern provinces would have nothing to do with a system of common citizen rights; the Cape would not abandon the principle and feared even a compromise based on the mutual recognition of divergent policies. The Cape members of the Convention, having failed to obtain the extension of the Cape Native franchise to the North, and having had forced upon them a realisation of the antagonism of the North and of Natal to the doctrine of common citizenship, had to be content with the condition that the Cape Native franchise should not be altered save by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of the new Parliament sitting together.

Thus Union was established without that agreement that had been regarded as its sole condition, and only the future could reveal how long the unstable equilibrium could be maintained and with what party the victory should ultimately lie.

This is 1936; a century since the Trek began, and just over a quarter of a century since Union. And already the compromise is resolved. The answer to the riddle of which side should win is writ large on our statute book and has received its crowning affirmation this year.

The story begins as far back and as soon after Union as 1913, with the Native Land Act which deprived the Natives of the country of the right to purchase land in any

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but specially designated areas—with the exception of the Cape Native whose equal franchise rights have saved him from the operation of discriminatory legislation of this kind. It speaks for itself that the required supplementary legislation defining the areas of Native purchase is still, over twenty years later, merely in its initial stages.

The Land Act was followed by the creation of special administrative machinery for Natives, consisting of local Councils for Native areas, special courts for the trial of Native cases according to tribal law and custom, and a Native Conference, supposedly representative but not elective, to be summoned from time to time by Government to express its views on matters specially affecting Natives. Such machinery, on the surface, has apparently much to recommend it. Its virtue, however, cannot be judged by appearances. For instance, the proposed institution of local Councils has to be related to the failure of Parliament to define the territorial bases of the policy of separation. It was easy to get a Union House of Assembly to agree to take away the rights of Natives to buy land in all but special areas; it has not so far been possible to induce it to define the areas in which the remaining limited rights of the Native people should operate, though another attempt to do so is to be made this year.

Further, a separate local government for Natives does not exempt the Native from the heavy burden of direct taxation which already falls on him for national revenue purposes. In this connection, it is worth remembering that our law makes Native males taxable at 18 years of age as against the 21 years' qualification for Europeans, and it imposes on every such Native male, no matter what his means, a tax of £1 per year. In addition to this, he must find the cost of maintaining his local Council and, in the circumstances, it is not surprising that he has not shown much enthusiasm for that institution. Finally, the principle on which the local Council is based is the maintenance of tribal unity. But tribal unity has everywhere in this country been largely disintegrated by the Native's need to work in towns for Europeans, and it is as difficult for the Native as for any other man to serve two masters.

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In the operation of special Native Courts, a similar anomaly arises. The Natives of South Africa have now for so long been in contact with European conditions of life and the need to conform thereto that traditional law has largely been forgotten, while European contacts have created numerous relationships for which there is no tribal parallel, and hence no tribal law.

Finally, the Native Conference, the only official channel by which Natives of the northern provinces and Natal can make their wishes known to Parliament, is entirely dependent for its existence on the will of the government, and, significantly enough, it has not been summoned since 1930 when it rejected emphatically the programme of Native legislation which General Hertzog has been planning to impose upon the country ever since his accession to power in 1924. All through the depression years, when drought aggravated all the disasters of world-wide economic dislocation, the Government, taxed to the uttermost in ingenuity and means to alleviate the sufferings of the European population, found no need to hear what the poorest section of the people had to say of its needs and its sufferings.

This policy of territorial and administrative segregation of black and white was originated by the South African Party. It was sponsored in particular by General Smuts. Its pace was enormously accelerated after the accession to power in 1924 of the Nationalist Party (predominantly Dutch) in alliance with organised Labour (mainly English) in the Pact which brought General Hertzog into office as Prime Minister.

This co-operation of English and Dutch has historical interest as well as practical importance. It affords evidence that the foundations of colour prejudice are not racial. That they are in fact primarily economic derives considerable support from a consideration of the course and the results for the Native population of the co-operation.

In the years since Union, South Africa has undergone an industrial revolution. In the process, practically all the adult man power of the Bantu population of 4½ million people has been absorbed into the industrial machinery, either as permanent workers, as in the case of the growing permanent Native town population which today numbers

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something over three-quarters of a million, or as periodic workers, like the men from both Native reserves and European farms who come in to earn the tax money which their rural occupation does not produce. In the process of absorption, these people have shown themselves amazingly adaptable and essentially suitable for the mass-production methods of the new industrial age in which we live. The evidence of their powers of progress, however, has not led to encouragement and new opportunities. In fact the reverse has happened and an English-speaking urban Labour Party threw in its lot with an Afrikaans-speaking rural Nationalist Party in order to secure legislative barriers to a progress which its members regarded as detrimental to their own high standards established in the days when all white labour was highly skilled and highly paid because all unskilled labour was black and paid on the very low level made possible by an uncivilised standard of living.

The first notable achievement of the Pact Government was, then, an Act popularly known as the Colour Bar Act, by which Natives are legislatively prohibited from the exercise of skilled trades on mines and public works. Already an Apprenticeship Act, although marked by no explicit colour bar, had implicitly but none the less effectively closed the door to the industrial advancement of Natives by the ordinary channels by imposing an educational qualification for apprentices which is practically unattainable by non-Europeans, in view of the limited nature of the educational facilities provided for them.

The Colour Bar Act, designed to meet the desires of the urban Labour Party, had its counterpart in the Native Service Contract Act designed to satisfy the demands of the farming community from which Nationalist support was mainly derived. This Act re-introduced the main features of an eighteenth-century system abolished by the Cape Liberals with the pass laws and other restrictions on the freedom of non-Europeans a century ago as retrogressive. It empowers Native parents to "apprentice," really to indenture, their children to the farmer on whose land they seek employment, the girls until their 16th year, the boys until their 18th year. As the apprenticeship is the only condition on which the parents can secure a place to live, the power is to all intents

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and purposes a compulsion. Thus does the farmer secure a new, or rather revive an old, control over his labour supply, and incidentally over its cost.

It is inevitable that these legislative barriers to progress should produce a sense of grievance on the part of a Native people who, in spite of every obstacle to advance, are through their enforced employment under Europeans, constantly in contact with new ideas and new processes, both material and spiritual, and whose mental activity is therefore steadily stimulated. This situation was foreseen and attempts to restrict and confine its effects have not been neglected. From the operation of machinery designed to provide constitutional means for the redress of economic grievances, Conciliation Boards and Wage Boards, pass-bearing Natives are expressly excluded, while the Masters' & Servants' Acts of all the four provinces of the Union make the use of the strike weapon a criminal offence for Native employees, because it involves a breach of contract. The crown of the edifice, however, is the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1930. Under this Act, any free public expression of grievances is subject to the criminal law which makes statements that "create ill-feeling between black and white" an offence punishable by banishment from one area to another for Natives and from the country for Europeans not of South African birth. The Act provides an effective weapon against organisational propaganda and, since its inception, has been used with telling effect against Native "agitators," with little publicity to attract attention.

From the operation of much, although not all, of this differential legislation, the Natives of the Cape have been saved by their legal status as potential citizens, as for example in respect of the Land Act mentioned above. This exemption has, however, been extremely irksome and annoying to the later promoters of the policy of separation who see in it a challenge to their general contention that Natives should not be regarded as having any claims to equal citizenship. And, in spite of the promises, implied or explicit, in the making of Union, the essential point of their policy has consistently been the abolition of the Cape franchise and the uniform subjection of the whole Native population of the country to differential treatment. In the

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past, direct attacks on the franchise position have failed, thanks to the operation of a two-party system in which the opposition fulfilled its essential function of opposing. But indirect attacks never dreamed of by the Cape representatives at the making of Union have been more successful. In 1930, all European women were given the right to vote at the age of twenty-one. In 1931, the European males in the Cape Province and in Natal were relieved from the property and other conditions of their franchise. (In the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, European manhood suffrage already existed.) The effect of this sudden great increase in the European electorate was not only to destroy the principle of equality for which the Cape position was supposed to stand but to reduce to negligible proportions the value of the Native vote which remained. Here it is worth noting that, in spite of much propaganda on the subject of the danger to European supremacy of the numerical strength of the Native population, the Native voters today number little more than some 10,000 out of a total electorate of over 900,000.

The opponents of Native rights, however, were still not content. Every shadow of equality must go. Nothing would satisfy them but the complete removal of Natives from the common voters' roll. And ever since the Coalition between the South African and Nationalist Parties in 1933 with its loss of that healthy balance which alone provides some guarantee for the maintenance of the democratic principle, the Cape Native franchise was doomed. From this session of Parliament onwards, the existence of "fancy franchises" will not disguise the fact that the Native in the Cape is no longer a partner nor even a prospective partner in the State to which he belongs. In the debate from which, in 1887, that term was derived, it was maintained that "once the liberty of a man was tampered with because his skin was black, the result would soon be that he would be possessed of no rights or privileges at all." He who cares to note what everyone may see every day in Johannesburg, groups of young Native men led handcuffed through the streets to the jail, most of them for no worse an offence than failure to produce a pass or the receipt for a tax they may have paid, may judge for himself whether the prognostication was exaggerated.

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It is too early to guess what other results may accrue from the determination of a numerically weaker race with a monopoly of political power to keep subject people in subjection. There are, however, two interesting facts to notice. The first of these is that the present policy of the Government has not only not got the support of the Native people; it goes forward expressly against their will.

Throughout the history of the struggle over Native rights since Union, it has been increasingly maintained, even by the advocates of separation, that the ultimate definition of Native status must carry with it the consent of the majority of the Natives themselves. This is a curious concession to the democratic principle which the whole trend of post-Union Native policy has been to deny. Nor has it ever been clear how it was hoped to attain this consent. Not that the advantages of separation have not been extensively canvassed. The failure has been on the side of practical demonstration. No doubt such demonstration is difficult to give in a country where the policy of segregation has never included the provision of sufficient land to give it a semblance of reality. How could it in a country of 2,000,000 Europeans whose farmers alone employ as many Natives and claim that they are not adequately served, and whose gold mining industry will not satisfy its demands next year with less than 400,000 black workers?

At any rate, the consent has not been forthcoming. In 1930, when the last Native Conference met at the invitation of the Government, it expressly repudiated the suggestion then before the country that the Cape Native franchise should be abolished in favour of a communal franchise by which all the Natives of the Union should return seven members to the House of Assembly, and the establishment of a Native Council with consultative powers only. More and more as legislative pressure against them has increased, Natives of all parts of the Union have come to treasure the rights of their Cape fellows, seeing in their claims to citizenship the one hope for their own future, the one guarantee that they have not irretrievably lost their rights in their own land. Last year when the Bills were once more brought before the country, the franchise Bill offered not even the communal franchise in place of the Cape vote but merely proposed to

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establish a consultative Council of 22, of whom six should be European officials, four nominated Natives and the remaining twelve the indirectly elected representatives of the Native people; the Council to sit under the chairmanship of the Secretary for Native Affairs. The Government again consulted Native opinion, this time sectionally, in regional conferences also constituted by invitation. The result was the same as before. With one exception they were unanimously against the acceptance of any substitute for the Cape franchise. The exception was the Zulus, whose Chief spoke for them and whose opinion was subsequently repudiated by the other Natives of Natal. A self-constituted "All-African" Convention, representative of all Native organisations, met at Bloemfontein in December and reiterated the refusal to endorse the policy of the Bills. In spite of this, the Prime Minister carried them at the joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament by the necessary two-thirds majority. He was, however, compelled to offer a compromise on the franchise position whereby the Cape Natives who are qualified under the present terms of the franchise are to be allowed to elect three European members, but no more, to the House of Assembly on a communal basis. This, which is a modified form of the earlier proposals, has carried a good deal of wavering European opinion, but it has not moved Native opinion. That opinion has stood solidly against compromise as it stood against the original proposals. In spite of that, and the publicity which has attended negotiations designed to induce the Natives to agree, the President of the "All-African" Convention has had to write to the Press denying the Prime Minister's statement that the Natives had themselves asked for this compromise.

The second point of great significance in the present situation is the solidarity of the Native people. The Natives of South Africa have been for years notoriously divided. Tribal jealousies, personal ambitions, local and sectional animosities, have destroyed every effort at organised opposition to a policy of oppression, or any organised policy of self help. Today, the Natives suddenly stand united. The policy of the Government has at last done what nothing else apparently could do.

SURVEYS

CURRENT SOCIAL STATISTICS: VITAL STATISTICS OF GERMANY

FIFTY years ago, fertility and mortality in Germany were higher than in any other country of Western and Northern Europe. In 1933, fertility in Germany was lower than in any other country of Western and Northern Europe, and mortality was lower than, for example, in England or France. The following table shows the changes in mortality, fertility and the balance of births and deaths:

Years	Mean Expectation of Life—years	Gross Reproduction Rate	Net Reproduction Rate
1881-1890	38.67	2.5	1.5
1891-1900	42.23	2.4	1.5
1901-1910	46.53	2.1	1.5
1924-1926	57.35	1.1	0.9
1933	61.14	0.8	0.7

The mean expectation of life of a newly-born child increased from 38 years and 8 months in the 1880's to 61 years and 2 months in 1933. The gross reproduction rate, which shows the average number of girls born to a woman who lives through child-bearing age, decreased from 2.5 to 0.8. The net reproduction rate, which shows (on the basis of current fertility and mortality) the average number of girls born to a newly-born girl, was 1.5 in each of the decades 1881-90, 1891-1900, and 1901-1910 (because the decrease of fertility was offset by the decrease of mortality); in 1933 it was 0.7.

While in many other countries fertility continued its downward path in 1934 and 1935, births have increased very much in Germany. But this is not the only conspicuous change shown in German vital statistics. Marriages and divorces have likewise increased very much. A final appraisal of all these events is not yet possible because the full statistical

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reports have not yet been published and because a period of two or three years is too short to allow the drawing of definite conclusions. We must, therefore, at this stage confine ourselves to a preliminary survey.

Marriages. The number of marriages in Germany (including the Saar Territory) was as follows :

1922	690,944	1929	597,014
1923	588,069	1930	570,241
1924	446,445	1931	522,881
1925	489,084	1932	516,793
1926	489,685	1933	638,573
1927	545,381	1934	739,449
1928	594,631	1935	650,851

In August 1933, a system of marriage loans was put into operation. The following table shows the number of unassisted and of assisted marriages (excluding the Saar Territory) :

Year	First Quarter	Second Quarter	Third Quarter	Fourth Quarter	Total
Unassisted Marriages					
1932	99,935	135,545	119,804	154,313	509,597
1933	94,878	158,453	133,032	103,230	489,593
1934	86,543	113,088	135,093	172,088	506,812
1935	92,260	150,496	111,487	134,110	488,353
Assisted Marriages					
1933	—	—	24,849	116,710	141,559
1934	51,895	83,044	43,545	46,135	224,619
1935	34,559	39,237	37,541	42,800	154,137
Total Marriages					
1932	99,935	135,545	119,804	154,313	509,597
1933	94,878	158,453	157,881	219,940	631,152
1934	138,438	196,132	178,638	218,223	731,431
1935	126,819	189,733	149,028	176,910	642,490

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The most outstanding facts are :

1. Marriages began to increase before marriage loans were granted. (There were 100,393 marriages in June-July 1933, as against 77,375 in June-July 1932.)

2. The increase of marriages was much intensified when marriage loans were granted.

3. In the latter part of 1935, the number of marriages began to decrease very much in spite of the grant of marriage loans. (This decrease seems to have gone on. In the 57 cities with over 100,000 inhabitants the number of marriages in the first quarter of 1936 was 38,562 as against 43,912 in the first quarter of 1935.)

It would be wrong, to be sure, to look for economic reasons as an explanation of these changes in the frequency of marriages. Economic conditions in June-July 1933 were apparently not better than in June-July 1932, and economic conditions in the second half of 1935 were apparently not worse than in the second half of 1934. The spontaneous rise in the number of marriages in June-July 1933 was probably due to the unwillingness of many couples, who for economic reasons had refrained from marrying, to postpone their marriage any longer. In view of the excessive number of young unmarried adults, marriages probably would have been more frequent in 1933 than in 1932 even if no marriage loans had been granted, and the same probably would have been true of 1934 and 1935. But the granting of marriage loans led not only to the conclusion of marriages which had been postponed, but evidently also induced many couples to marry earlier than they would have done otherwise. This anticipation of marriages necessarily reduced the stock of marriageable persons and caused the recent drop in the number of marriages.

Since the spring of 1935 the frequency of marriages has been normal in spite of the grant of numerous marriage loans. Is it to be supposed that this level will be maintained? The experiment of marriage loans has shown that even in a country like Germany, where anyway about 90 per cent. of all girls marry sooner or later, the number of marriages may be raised considerably for a certain time. But in such a country the number of marriages in the long run is deter-

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mined almost exclusively by the number of unmarried females between twenty and thirty. This number is now below normal owing to the anticipation of future marriages in 1933-1935, and it is bound to decrease still further because it is the very small number of girls born in 1915-1919 who now and in the next few years enter the twenties. The conclusion thus seems inescapable that before long the number of marriages will drop below the level even of 1932.

Divorces. The number of divorces in the present territory of Germany (excluding the Saar Territory) was as follows :

1913	16,657	1932	42,202
1929	39,424	1933	42,485
1930	40,722	1934	54,402
1931	39,971	1935	50,000

Divorces which always had been extraordinarily frequent in Germany have become still more numerous since 1933 (1934 in Germany 54,402, in England and Wales 4,287). The increase affected both recent marriages and those of older date, but was most conspicuous for the most recent marriages. The general increase was probably due to disharmonies created by a revaluation of fundamental ideas. The special increase for the most recent marriages—1,713 couples who had married in 1933 and 209 who had married in 1934 divorced in 1934—was perhaps due to a lesser stability of assisted early marriages.

Births. The number of births in Germany (including the Saar Territory) was as follows :

1922	1,424,763	1929	1,164,062
1923	1,318,489	1930	1,144,151
1924	1,290,764	1931	1,047,775
1925	1,311,259	1932	993,126
1926	1,245,471	1933	971,174
1927	1,178,892	1934	1,198,344
1928	1,199,998	1935	1,261,273

The following table shows the number of births excluding those to assisted marriages, and the number of births to assisted marriages (without the Saar Territory) :

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Year	First Quarter	Second Quarter	Third Quarter	Fourth Quarter	Total
Births excl. those to Assisted Marriages					
1932	262,868	250,135	237,370	227,837	978,210
1933	246,915	243,425	237,184	215,781	943,305
1934	251,526	264,638	265,061	269,993	1,051,218
1935	289,923	287,088	263,828	248,640	1,089,479
Births to Assisted Marriages					
1933	—	—	536	13,074	13,610
1934	29,498	31,181	34,606	34,676	129,961
1935	38,904	38,343	39,415	37,800	154,462
Total Births					
1932	262,868	250,135	237,370	227,837	978,210
1933	246,915	243,425	237,720	228,855	956,915
1934	281,024	295,819	299,667	304,669	1,181,179
1935	328,827	325,431	303,243	286,440	1,243,941

The most outstanding facts are :

1. Births began to increase about six months after marriages began to increase.

2. Births all through 1934 and 1935 were more numerous than in 1933 even if births to assisted marriages are left out of consideration.

3. In the latter part of 1935, births were less numerous than in the latter part of 1934 in spite of the increase of young married couples. (Retrogression seems to have continued. In the 57 cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, the birth rate in January-April 1936 was 15.8 as against 16.2 in January-April 1935.)

For 1934, the German Statistical Office published some advance results of a comprehensive study of legitimate births, taking account of the year of marriage, the order of birth, etc. (see *Wirtschaft und Statistik* 1936, pp. 255-258). Since the underlying data have been published so far only in part we shall confine ourselves to summarising briefly the facts established by the Office :

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1. First births were more numerous in 1934 than in 1933 by 31.2 per cent., second births by 29.6 per cent., third births by 26.0 per cent., fourth and further births by 15.2 per cent.

2. Births in 1934 to marriages concluded in 1933 and 1934 were by 10.4 per cent. more numerous than they would have been if the low fertility of 1933 had been maintained. There was an increase of 78.7 per cent. in the case of assisted marriages, and a decrease of 13.1 per cent. in the case of unassisted marriages.

3. Births in 1934 to marriages concluded before 1933 were by 15 per cent. more numerous than they would have been if the low fertility of 1933 had been maintained.

4. The net reproduction rate in 1934 was 0.820 as compared with 0.714 in 1933.

In order to appraise correctly the trend of births, four facts should be borne in mind: (1) In Germany, as in all other countries of Western Civilisation for which births are classified by duration of marriages, statistics show that a large proportion of first legitimate births are conceived before marriage; (2) procuring of abortion which was a particularly widespread means of birth control in Germany has become more difficult under the new regime; (3) marriage loans are granted only when the woman to be married has been employed for at least nine months in the previous two years and forgoes employment after her marriage; (4) the debt incurred through the loan is reduced by one-fourth for each child born.

That births began to increase before post-nuptial conceptions in the case of marriages concluded since May 1933 could lead to births, was probably due mainly to the increasing difficulty of procuring abortion.

That of the marriages concluded in 1933-34 assisted marriages proved particularly fertile while unassisted marriages were in 1934 less fertile even than average marriages in 1933, was probably due mainly to the stronger inclination to apply for a marriage loan on the part of couples who expected to have one or more children, either because the bride was pregnant or because they did not intend to practise birth control in the near future. (Since the births to assisted

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marriages are not classified according to the months of duration of marriage it is impossible to state the total number of ante-nuptial conceptions followed by births to assisted marriages; but since no marriage loan was granted before August 1933, and only 5,356 in August 1933, it is evident that the 54,047 children born to assisted marriages before May 1934 were practically all conceived before marriage, and it is most likely that also a large proportion of the 243,986 children born to assisted marriages from May 1934 to December 1935 were conceived before marriage. As for the readiness to forgo birth control after marriage it probably was promoted less by the prospect of a reduction of the loan debt than by the fact that the bride after her marriage was forbidden to work as an employee.)

That marriages concluded before 1933 proved more fertile in 1934 than was to be expected on the basis of former experience, was probably due mainly to the increasing difficulty of procuring abortion and to the fact that many married women were thrown out of employment for good.

The question why the number of births has ceased to increase in spite of an ever increasing number of couples married, say, within the last five years, cannot be answered on the basis of the scanty data available for 1935. The lull may be only temporary; it is possible, also, that birth control devices other than abortion have gained ground.

Insofar as births have increased through an increase of marriages the effect can only be temporary since the stock of marriageable people has been depleted in 1933-35, and since it is the very small number of girls born in 1915-1919 who now and in the next few years become marriageable. Insofar as births have increased through the reduction of female labour, the effect may be permanent, but it hardly will be numerically very important. Insofar as births have increased through other legal measures (penalties for criminal abortion, etc., slight financial favours to parents with children), the permanent effect, according to all previous experience, will be negligible. The crucial question, therefore, is: is there proof of a spontaneous desire on the part of the majority of German couples to raise more children?

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In answering this question, one must be careful, first of all, not to minimise the effects of the present German population policy. Germany has succeeded in increasing the fertility not only of recent marriages but also of couples who had married before 1933. The German Government thus has been successful in an attempt which so far has failed whenever and wherever other governments tried to reach the same goal. On the other hand, one must be careful not to exaggerate the effects of the German population policy. Even in the early part of 1935 fertility in Germany was not higher than ten years before and only half as high as forty years ago. Even in the early part of 1935 the net reproduction rate was below unity. Three-fourths of the women married for less than 15 years have borne no child either in 1934 or 1935. There is then no proof of a spontaneous desire on the part of the majority of German couples to raise more children. Fertility may continue to be higher than in 1933, but the trend of births does not indicate that Germany will succeed in raising her net reproduction rate to unity, that is, to increase the average size of the family sufficiently to ensure a stable population.

ROBERT R. KUCZYNSKI.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAWS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ADMINISTRATION:

ESTHONIA — BELGIUM — YUGOSLAVIA — SPAIN — POLAND

WITHIN the domain of social legislation there have recently been some interesting developments in the sphere of insurance against old age, death and unemployment. The first piece of legislation which I shall examine in this survey is the legislation concerning accidents to agricultural workers in Esthonia.

By a decree-law dated February 5, 1936,¹ and in force as from May 1, Esthonia instituted a system of compensation for agricultural hired workers. The department for labour and social insurance in the Ministry of Transport is the body charged with the management of the new insurance regulations. A Pensions Committee to adjudicate on claims made

¹ *Informations sociales*, Apr. 20, 1936, pp. 62 sqq.

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as a result of accidents is appointed to assist the labour inspectors. The expenses incurred in paying compensation are met by the state but the employer has to pay the costs of medical treatment and also the daily allowances which are granted for the fortnight after the accident.

New regulations have appeared for unemployment insurance in Belgium. A Royal decree dated February 1, 1936,¹ amending the decree of May 31, 1933, has considerably modified the former practice in respect of eligibility for insurance, compensation paid, etc.

Under the new decree all workers are eligible who, being in employment at the time when they came under the insurance scheme, have been with the same employer for sixty working days in the course of the four months previous to their request to come under the scheme. These insured workers can claim compensation and allowances only after having furnished proof that they have been actually employed in an insurable occupation for three hundred days at least in the course of the three years prior to their first claim for compensation. For dockers the period is lowered to two hundred days.

In Yugoslavia, too, new unemployment insurance regulations have been issued. These were promulgated on December 15, 1935, and came into force on January 1, 1936.² By these unemployment insurance is placed under the Central Employment Office, which through local labour exchanges seeks to find employment for workers and distributes relief funds. The Central Office is empowered to set up a special organ to study social questions and unemployment. Special organisations will be set up for seamen, for miners and for workers in the heavy industries. Allowances according to need may be paid in kind, especially in the case of women and children.

* * *

Among other recent developments in the domain of social legislation mention may be made of the decree promulgated by the President of the Spanish Republic on

¹ *Ib.*, Mar. 16, 1936, pp. 315-316.

² *Ib.*, Feb. 17, 1936, pp. 187-190.

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March 28, 1936, on the means whereby landed property may be declared to be "of social utility."

By this decree it is permissible to expropriate any property in a district where private property is highly concentrated, or where the density of the rural population is considerable, and where cultivable land is restricted in proportion to the number of cultivators. The decree provides for arbitration when proprietors appeal against expropriation. The purpose of the decree is "to secure a more equitable distribution of land" and to come to the aid of the agricultural labourer.

II

In previous surveys I have shown how the constitutional régimes in the Baltic States has been profoundly modified during the last few years. I have discussed the constitutional revision of the constitution in Esthonia¹ which substituted for the parliamentary system a presidential system which, in practice, meant the institution of authoritarianism. Now we are faced with the prospect of still more drastic revision. It may interest readers to have the results of the plebiscite at the end of last February which laid the bases for the future constitution of Esthonia:²

The people of Esthonia representing the supreme power of the state has, by the plebiscite of February 23, 24 and 25, 1936, decided:

1. To authorise the Head of the State to convoke a National Assembly to which will be entrusted the task of reforming the constitution of the Republic of Esthonia or if necessary to draft and vote on a new constitution.

2. The National Assembly in its task of reforming the existing constitution or passing a new one, will be guided by the conception that Esthonia remains a republic based on the sovereignty of the people, the supreme power being in the hands of the people, and that the Republic of Esthonia is governed by an elected State Head who collaborates within defined limits with a government called by him to power and with a popular representation, organised in two Houses.

3. To authorise the National Assembly to vote the laws necessary for the carrying out of the constitutional law.

4. To lay down the following rules for the composition of the National Assembly and for its proceedings:

¹ *Political Quarterly*, 1934, pp. 262 sqq.

² L. Boissier and B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch *Informations constitutionnelles et parlementaires*, 1935, pp. 72 sqq.

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The National Assembly will be composed of two Houses.

The Lower House of the Assembly will contain eighty members elected under a law to be issued by decree of the President of the Republic based on the system of personal, universal, secret, direct and equal suffrage.

The Upper House will contain forty members, representing the courts, the autonomous institutions, economic and corporative, those concerned with the cultural work of the national minorities, the university, the defence force and the churches, on a basis fixed by the President and of ten members nominated by the President, who have the knowledge and experience necessary for the drafting of a constitution.

The two Houses will work separately. If there is a difference of opinion, and this is not composed by the means of conciliation provided for in the standing orders, the two Houses will meet in plenary session and settle the matter by a majority vote.

The National Assembly will finish its task within six months from the date of its convocation.

The members of the Assembly will receive no salary. Expenses incurred as a result of attendance will, however, be repaid.¹

The Esthonian people thus has authorised the President to convoke a Constituent Assembly and has given that assembly instructions for its work. The general character of the new constitution will, however, be settled by the conditions of liberty or otherwise under which the elections to it are held.

III

The problem of national finance is a burning one for every regime and every parliament. An interesting law has recently been promulgated in Poland, dealing with the control by parliament of state indebtedness.

I have already analysed the new Polish constitution of 1935 and shown the individual nature of its provisions.² The new Polish constitution and its electoral law have given the regime in Poland an authoritarian character. Now it is constantly said in the reactionary newspapers in every country that the authoritarian regime is better fitted to cope with economic and financial difficulties than are democratic regimes. But the new Polish law of January 2, 1936 shows that, in spite of the modest—one might even say, illusory—

¹ *Journal officiel*, Mar. 12, 1936.

² *Political Quarterly*, 1935, pp. 405 sqq.

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rôle which the Polish Parliament is condemned to play, the executive none the less seeks to have its collaboration in the control of finance. The law lays down :

Art. 1. A Commission of Control of the Public Debt will be set up. The duty of the Commission is to control the state indebtedness.

Art. 2. (1) The Commission of Control of the Public Debt is composed of a president and eight members.

(2) Within one month from the day on which the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies reassemble, the two Houses will elect, each from its own members, four members of the Commission and four substitute members.

(3) The members of the Commission will elect as their president a member of either house who is not a member of the Commission.

Art. 3. The president and members of the Commission retain their posts for duration of their mandate as deputy or senator. . . .

Art. 9. The Minister of Finance or authorities and offices designated by him are under obligation to provide the Commission of Control of the Public Debt with all the information and explanation which they require to perform their duties.

Art. 10. The control exercised by the Commission extends to—

(1) Loan issues by the State.

(2) Borrowings on loans contracted by the State as a result of treaties with other states and of engagements with individual creditors.

(3) Financial guarantees.

(4) Issue of banknotes by the State.

Art. 11. The Commission of Control of the Public Debt investigates :

(1) If the debt was contracted and the guarantee accepted in legal fashion.

(2) If the issue of banknotes was made conformably to the law.

(3) If the debts and guarantees have been duly registered.

Art. 12. The Minister of Finance must inform the Commission of debts contracted by the State and the guarantees given by him during the second six months of the budgetary year.

Art. 13. (1) The Commission of Control of the Public Debt draws up a statement showing the amount of the Public Debt and the guarantees accepted by the Treasury as these stand on the first day of the each six-monthly period of the budgetary year.

(2) The Commission of Control of the Public Debt draws up this statement in the course of the first two months of the next six-monthly period of the budgetary year. If the date of the publication of this statement occurs in the period which follows the dissolution of the Senate and the Chamber and before the constitution of the Commission, the latter must draw up a statement of the debt position in the month following its constitution.

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Art. 14. The Commission of Control of the Public Debt must present at least once a year a detailed statement of its work. . . .

Here we find ourselves confronted with an interesting state of things. On the one hand, the new constitution has broken with the principle of democratic control, and, on the other, particularly in the realm of finance, the executive seeks to be controlled in the administration of finance.

IV

The problem of the finances under the parliamentary system has attracted the attention of every parliament. The Inter-Parliamentary Council, which is entrusted with the task of arranging the forthcoming Inter-Parliamentary Conference, gave particular attention during its last session to this problem of good financial administration in a modern state.

After a long debate which, despite its interest, I cannot for lack of space report fully here, the sub-committee and the committee for the study of political questions of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in the sessions of April 11 and 13, 1936, laid down fundamental principles for the parliamentary control of public finance. The draft resolution prepared by this committee of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (an organisation which includes all the Parliaments of the world) is worth close study and the principles which it lays down for good financial administration under the representative system should interest not merely the politician but also the student of public law.

This draft resolution deals first with the question of the parliamentary initiative and condemns the practice at present in vogue in several states :

declares that the right of initiative of Parliament in the matter of expenditure cannot be contested without thereby restricting the rights of the representatives of the people, but that such initiative, far from being given a free course, should be subject to certain limitations which would ensure the smooth working of the régime whilst preserving the balance between the executive and the legislative powers.

It is ready to accept and to recommend such limitations as have secured these two advantages in the Parliaments which have made the experiment ;

it quotes, as examples, the measure which stipulates that before

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any proposal is made for expenditure as a result of parliamentary initiative, there shall first be agreement between the authors of the proposal, and

in some countries, with the executive power,

in other countries, a section of the assembly which shall comprise a minimum number of members, to be fixed by the standing orders ;

—or the measure which would compel authors of any proposal entailing fresh expenditure to suggest the financial means of meeting that expenditure, either by supplementary revenue or by a reduction in an existing appropriation, not merely for the current year, but also for the following years in cases where such expenditure might entail successive increases in expenditure.

declares that the rights of investigation, examination and control of Finance Committees, whatever their title, should in no wise be impaired ;

that it is evidently desirable that Finance Committees should not hinder the work of Parliament by exceeding their duties and by abnormally increasing their attributions, and thereby be a permanent cause of regrettable delay in the decisions to be taken ;

but that the work of Finance Committees is indispensable previous to the discussion of the budget, in order that such discussion may be efficacious and thorough, the executive power placing at the disposal of such committees all means in its possession to enable them to accomplish their task independently and with full knowledge of the facts.

Part of the resolution is devoted to the delicate question of the rejection of the budget and the methods of avoiding the danger to the state which is inherent in such rejection :

declares that, according to the rule of the representative system, the rejection of the budget by Parliament must be considered as a vote of censure against the executive power, which would then take the consequences provided for by the constitution of each country ;

but that, since the life of the nation cannot be held up, the budget of the preceding year should be renewed for the current year in cases where it has been impossible to reach an agreement on the budget of that year—subject to the reservation that the principle which establishes the annual character of the budget shall not be affected by that exceptional measure which must expire at a given date.

In addition, the draft resolution contains the following solutions and recommendations :

declares that control of the budget by Parliament will remain delusive if the year in which it is applied is separated by a long interval from the year in which it is submitted to the House for verification ;

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that exactitude and rapidity are equally indispensable ;

that, consequently, it is advisable to draw up the final accounts as quickly as possible, to simplify the rules of public accountancy and to adopt methods which will enable the legislative power to effectuate the control entrusted to it definitely, rapidly and (without impeding the normal working of the executive power) constantly...

declares that the inconveniences involved in voting a budget for two years are so grave from the point of view of the efficacy of Parliamentary control that they render necessary the annual character of budgetary authorisation.¹

This resolution which deals with so many important questions—the principle of the yearly budget, the method of parliamentary control, etc.—will probably be accepted by the forthcoming Inter-Parliamentary Conference. Its interest lies in the nature of the tendencies it reveals in the matter of the financial needs of the modern state and in the fact that it comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. That Union is an international organisation devoted to the development of new methods for the work of parliament. Now that the parliamentary regime is in a state of crisis, when indeed democracy itself is in a state of crisis, the solutions worked out by this organisation of international parliamentaryism are of particular interest. Certainly the control of the financial administration—that difficult problem in parliamentary technique—can be effective only if the political regime itself is based on the principles of liberty. The parliaments, which are parliaments only in name, which are not freely elected by the citizens, can never be competent to play the important part of financial controller. All they can do is to assent to the decisions of the executive without being able to bring to bear either moral support or effective control.

B. MIRKINE-GUETZEVITCH,
General Secretary of the International
Institute of Public Law.

¹ *Bulletin interparlementaire*, 1936, No. 3, pp. 78 *sqq.*

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SOME FOREIGN BOOKS

STUDENTS will find a vast mass of interesting detail in the new volumes of Russian documents (*Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus*. VIII Band: 1 Halbband 24 Mai bis 4 August, 1915: pp. xviii, 426; 2 Halbband 5 August bis 16 October, 1915: pp. xviii, 427-850), although there is not so much of general interest as in the two preceding sections. The great issue of Italy has been settled and that country has entered the war on the Allied side. The new issue is the Balkans and particularly Bulgaria. Of the 929 documents printed in these two volumes—buttressed as usual with footnotes and appendices—no fewer than 825 have not been previously published, and they supply a record fuller than can be obtained elsewhere of the tortuous course of Allied diplomacy. That diplomacy which had obtained a success which on a long view was doubtful by the adhesion of Italy was now to suffer a disastrous defeat by the complete failure in Bulgaria which, in the autumn of 1915, entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, a failure which delayed the adhesion of Roumania and completed the confusion in Greece. It will take the reader all his time to decide what the Allied policy was. Its object was plain, but the policy to attain that object was neither consistent nor intelligent.

It is interesting to note that having come to terms with Italy, the Allies found her in many ways an unsatisfactory ally. The documents are full of complaints which seem to find an echo in what certain French papers are already saying about the Italian ally of 1936. The Abyssinian question is entering its second phase as was the Adriatic question in these volumes, and it may be that its first phase is hardly worth studying now. But there are one or two books which have something of permanent value in them—even Italian ones. *L'Africa orientale* (Zanichelli, Bologna: pp. xii, 408) is a collection of essays published under the auspices of the Royal Italian Geographical Society, and is a storehouse of information under headings such as physical geography, peoples, languages and religions, climate, economic conditions and politics. The last section by

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Corrado Zoli makes no bones about Italian claims but it is moderate, and from the point of view of an Italian colonialist of pre-war vintage fair. Much less scientific is Gilberto Bernasconi's *La Guerre e la Politica dell' "Italia nell' Africa orientale"* (La Prora, Milan: pp. 208). Half of it is all about Adowa and a score of minor engagements, with Italian valour duly commemorated; the other half consists of a summary account of Abyssinia under its last emperor and then a quite useful section on Italian Somaliland, where was the theatre of the original frontier troubles. The military half is the better, for the author has only a nodding acquaintance with political history. Of much more weight is the bigger book of Mario Pigli, *L'Etiopia nella politica Europea* (3rd edition revised by O. Migliaio; Cedam, Padua: pp. xxiv, 286). The vagaries of Italian policy are detailed here with sidelights on the French at Fashoda and the German intrigue with Lij Yasu, up to the time of the admission of Abyssinia to the League of Nations. This, the author regards, as a triumph for Italian policy and the history of the subsequent years, including the British-Italian interchange of letters regarding spheres of influence and the Italo-Abyssinian treaty of friendship, is treated as the history of "the supreme attempt at collaboration on the part of Italy." Those who want a moderate enough statement of the Italian case against a "hostile" Abyssinia will find it well put here though they may cavil at the relish with which the author and the reviser regard an out-and-out imperialist solution as not only the most suitable but as the most moral.

British opinion on the crisis is analysed in an interesting little French pamphlet, *L'Opinion britannique, La Société des Nations et la Guerre italo-éthiopienne*, by two French authors who know their England—Professor Paul Vaucher and M. Paul-Henri Siriex (Hartmann, Paris: pp. 98). The book is addressed to Frenchmen and is an endeavour to show that when the average Briton condemns the Italian aggression and wants League action he is perfectly sincere, but that he is equally sincere in regarding action as a League, not a national, concern. The explanation of the familiar "moral indignation" of the Briton is particularly well done.

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Hitler gegen Christus by "Miles Ecclesiae" (Société des Editions europeennes: pp. 194) is addressed primarily to Roman Catholics, but it is worth the attention of all students of the German situation, although it is written in an excess of religious indignation. It details the treatment of the Church by the Hitler regime, bitterly attacking the new heathenism and the repudiation of the central dogmas of Christianity by the "national Bolsheviks." Of more importance is the evidence here piled up of the lines which the new *Kulturkampf* is taking, of individual persecution for offences against the state such as currency, smuggling and individual acts of immorality in one form or another, of the banning of periodicals, the dissolution of associations and the general circumscription in the name of the state of that elementary right to the translation of religious principle into public and even private action. The details of certain cases make painful reading and they leave no doubt of the deliberate adoption of a policy of exasperation which is much more difficult to encounter than a frontal attack on dogma and religious liberty.

Wenzel Jansch's *Volk und Arbeiter* (Prager, Bratislava: pp. 138) is a well-reasoned attempt to show that an armed Germany will always be isolated in Europe. Her armaments threaten so many states that it is impossible for her to find allies and unless her policy in armaments changes she is condemned to be banned from any sort of community with other nations. The armaments push is the result of an exasperated nationalism which characterises not only military officers but wide strata of the nation. The problem is to "socialise" that nationalism, for a genuine national socialism will make Germany "fit in" to the European framework. Because that nationalism is not socialist it is imperialist and, as the writer argues, German imperialism is too late. It can achieve nothing but self-destruction, though it will destroy much else in the process. There is a somewhat similar argument in the far more fundamental book by Otto Bauer, *Zwischen zwei Weltkriegen* (Prager, Bratislava: pp. 356). The Austrian Socialist leader addresses his book to Marxists, and much of it is highly technical while the formulæ in the appendix are almost unintelligible to those ignorant of what looks like the higher mathematics. The analysis

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is critical and abounds in quotations from Marx and Lenin and goes over much past history. Briefly, it sees the role of the socialist *émigrés* as one of mediation in the effort to induce the workers' movement, which has aims of its own, and "reformism," which is a necessary stage in development, to admit the necessity of a united front. He lays stress on the fact that unity must not be made a fetish as so many are inclined to make it, for unity must take different forms in different countries. He takes for granted that a European war is certain. When that comes the duty of the Socialist parties of all colours in the "fascist" countries will be to sabotage the efforts of their governments while in the "non-fascist" countries they must support the war effort, but at the same time endeavour to gain power so that, when peace comes, socialism will be in power on both sides of the trenches and a socialist peace be made.

It is more difficult to pass judgment on the anonymous *Ich kann nicht schweigen* (Europa Europa, Zurich: pp. 210). The author declares—and there seems no reason at all to doubt him—that he was for long a member of the National Socialist Party and had close connections with the Reichswehr. He was under suspicion at the time of the great clean up in 1934, and as a result of his treatment then and of the treatment of others he went into exile. The book is uneven and badly arranged, consisting sometimes of narrative and sometimes of "open letters." It concerns chiefly the Reichstag fire and the 1934 purge, and on both throws considerable light. The Reichstag fire was, of course, the work of Goering and Co. and the "purge" was a purge of men who knew too much. The fact that a man like Helldorf who was up to the neck in the Reichstag fire plot escaped the "purge," is said to be due to the circumstance that, unlike the unfortunate Ernst, he *told* his masters that he had left a full statement abroad of the truth. When one remembers the little effect the publication of the Ernst memorandum had, it is not easy to see why mercy is continued. Particularly interesting is the comparison of the official statements on the fire and on the "purge." They are practically the same down to astonishing verbal resemblances, and the suggestion is that they are equally false and the work of the same and not very original stylist.

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Mr. C. D. Herisson's *Les Nations anglo-saxonnes et la Paix* (Sirey: pp. 204) is an attempt to explain the British and American attitude to the international situation. It is based on a sort of dogmatic repugnance to war, partly intellectual, partly emotional. The consequences of that attitude for the moment interest Mr. Herisson less than the exposition of it, which he does by a series of well-chosen quotations linked by some description of the circumstances. The result is a very suggestive book.

Silvio Trentin's *La Crise du Droit et de l'Etat* (Alcan: pp. 498) probably contains more lessons for the political student than for the legal. Much of it is historical for the analysis of such a "crisis" involves investigation into its origins. The "crisis of law" is a corollary of the social crisis. Existing law was created to deal with a set of facts which no longer exist; the inevitable "time-lag" of law is here so great as almost to divorce much of law from reality. The attempt of fascism to create a new sort of law is not a sequence but a retrogression; it is a mere attempt to erect some sort of structure in the interests of a society in dissolution. Prof. Trentin epitomises the crisis as the apparent victory of force over law and he sees no other solution but a revolutionary one, a social palingenesis.

The 1935 edition of the *Annuaire de l'Institut du Droit public* edited by Prof. Mirkine-Guetzévitch (Sirey: pp. xvi, 946) reprints in full or in summary all the important constitutional documents of the year. As before it also contains several excellent essays—one on the nature of a party dictatorship by Prof. Kelsen, one by Prof. Scelle on the theory of international government and a set of three short studies on the discretionary power of governments by Professors Laun, Laski and Gaston y Marin. The *Annuaire* is as readable and as indispensable as ever.

R. T. CLARK

BOOK REVIEWS

RANDALL DAVIDSON, ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY. By G. K. A. BELL, Bishop of Chichester. (*Oxford University Press*. 2 vols. 38s.)

EPISCOPAL biographies of the later nineteenth century often throw light into the lobbies, the backstairs and, not infrequently, the front-halls of the politics of their time. And in fact, what with Davidson's own life of Tait, A. C. Benson's life of his father, and Mrs. Creighton's of her husband, we have a very illuminating and informative series of them. Now comes Dr. Bell's official Life of Archbishop Davidson, which keeps up the standard in every way; it is no less voluminous than they (1428 pp.!), it is even better written and it contains a vast amount of new information, not only about the Church in Davidson's time but about contemporary political figures, particularly Queen Victoria whose favourite ecclesiastic he was, a whole series of Prime Ministers from Gladstone to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, and about a number of constitutional and social issues which agitated the time. Davidson's Life is virtually the history of the Church of England from the 1860's to 1930; but so many were his contacts at home and abroad, in Society and politics no less than with the churches, that it almost becomes a history of the times.

A distinguished cleric has opined that the book might well be advertised as "The Statesman's Indispensable *Vademecum*: Showing how to address Kings, Queens, Prime Ministers, Archbishops, Bishops, Cabinet Ministers, etc., upon all occasions and in all contingencies: No one in public life can afford to be without it." Certainly there is this side to the book, as there was to Davidson; and Dr. Bell might almost be said to recognise it when he quotes as a chapter-heading a sentence of Archbishop Parker's to Burghley: "Though I have a dull head yet I see, partly by myself and partly by others, how the game goeth." The Archbishop was assuredly a wily old thing, as his letters to a wounded Queen (hurt in her most sensitive spot—her literary vanity), to cantankerous Nonconformists and sabba-

tarian fanatics show. His letter to a radical Cabinet Minister, trying to get clergy on to the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor is a masterpiece of its kind: "People are writing to me about it, I suppose because of my known identification, speaking generally, with liberal principles and policy..... I want to see one or two clergy on such a Commission, not sitting *qua* clergy but *qua* citizens.....who have had absolutely unique opportunities," etc. etc. But the overwhelming impression one is left with in reading this book is not that of a merely astute politician, but of a really wise statesman, none the less wily for being sincere, and in a sense simple, single-minded. The odd fact about his writing as above to Bryce, making the most of his opportunity, was that it was true: he was, "speaking generally," a liberal. Then, too, he had great loyalty and discretion, and a singular disinterestedness; in a world of clerics striving for position, he does not seem to have been ambitious. True, he had great advantages—the Queen's ear, and he had been at the centre of things, at Lambeth, from so early. But the very way by which he came to the notice of the Queen—a story which I have on good authority, though it is not mentioned by Dr. Bell, is that when he went for his famous first interview with the Queen on Archbishop Tait's death, she asked him out of the blue, what he thought of some one for a certain appointment; and Davidson, startled out of himself by such a request, said "Oh! no, that wouldn't do at all." It was his very candour, rather than his extreme discretion which recommended him to the Queen; and from that moment he became her private adviser on ecclesiastical appointments. When one tries to sort out the curious amalgam of qualities which made him the Archbishop and the man he was, one comes to see in the end that the chief of them were, for the one, an appreciation of the plain man's, the layman's, point of view, and for the other, a wise judgment. If Mr. Baldwin, one feels, had chosen the Church for his vocation, this is the sort of Archbishop he would have made.

As chaplain to Archbishop Tait, confidential adviser to Queen Victoria, a sort of *Éminence grise* to Benson, and Archbishop himself (1903-28), Davidson was at the very centre of Church affairs for half a century. It is not to be

wondered at that he should have left such an impress of his character upon the Church. One wonders equally how far his character as Archbishop was not also a function of the changing situation of the Church. He certainly witnessed in his long span of life a profound change in its position in our society: at the beginning of his time it still bore a national character, and it was the exception not to come within its sphere of influence; now nobody can claim truthfully that the Church of England has a national character: it is but one sect among others. Davidson's life witnessed the change; whether he observed it is another matter. Throughout his time there were people who wanted him to give a more active, a more definite lead, on the left or on the right; but it seems that his character and method were perfectly adapted to the situation of a declining, a somewhat ramshackle institution. Anything more vigorous, or decisive, might easily have upset the bus, or have led to secessions such as were threatened throughout his primacy. It is clear to anyone interested in watching how official positions tend to develop their own official character (*e.g.* the Prime Minister; or for the *President du Conseil*, cf. Prevost's *Histoire de France depuis la Guerre*) that the conduct of the Primacy, whoever the Primate may be, must follow Davidson's lines now, so long as these conditions last.

But Davidson's contacts with politics and secular affairs were wider and more important than those of any succeeding Archbishop are likely to be; partly for the reason that the House of Lords has lost a good deal of its former importance, and Davidson was as sedulous in attendance upon the House, as at the Athenæum or Grillions. It is in this sphere that Dr. Bell has much important new information to offer us. We have Davidson's estimate of Queen Victoria, which strikes one as more sympathetic and intimate, and at the same time more just and convincing than any that we have ever had. There is a very interesting episode during the great controversy over Birrell's Education Bill in 1906, when Edward VII intervened with the Liberal Prime Minister to get him to make concessions to the Church and *ipso facto* Conservative, point of view. There is an important letter of Dr. Scott Lidgett's (pp. 600-2) expressing the standpoint of

political Nonconformity, so important in those years. In the chapter on the controversy over the Parliament Act, there is some new material. We learn that the Archbishop thought that undue pressure was brought upon the King for the creation of peers; but Davidson was quite wrong in thinking that the demand itself was unconstitutional and unprecedented: it followed precisely the precedent of 1832. It is pathetic to note how wise and how right the Archbishop was in his protests against the treatment of Casement, against the terms of the Peace Treaties, against the coal-owners' attitude on the Coal Mines question—and how much in vain. He was no less courageous, liberal and wise—though again in vain—in his stand for an agreed peace at the time of the General Strike; and this chapter (LXXX) contains some valuable new information with regard to the B.B.C. at that juncture. The Archbishop found that he was not permitted to broadcast his appeal, though backed by all the churches, to the nation. Sir John Reith said that it "would run counter to his tacit arrangement with the Government about such things." The Archbishop said: "Then you have had a hint from Downing Street not to accept the Appeal for broadcast?" Sir John Reith replied: "No, Downing Street knows nothing about it. I am speaking entirely on my own responsibility." Next day the Archbishop wrote for categorical information; and in an interview was assured that while Birkenhead and Churchill wanted the Government to commandeer the B.B.C., "Baldwin had resisted it because of his confidence in the power shown by Reith and his friends of managing the matter wisely" (pp. 1308-10). Very interesting to the student of politics.

In the long-range view, the whole of Davidson's primacy was dominated by the dilemma in the relations between Church and State. It confronted him at the outset with the Royal Commission on the Discipline of the Clergy, and at the end with the defeat in Parliament of the Revised Prayer Book: a complex of difficult issues all springing from the unsatisfactory situation since the change in the position of the Church, for which there was no solution now except Disestablishment. But this Davidson was unwilling to recognise. No wonder he had (according to Sir Edward Grey) such a puzzled face. But a great man all the same.

The Bishop of Chichester's *Life of Davidson* is worthy of its subject, which is saying a great deal: it is admirable in every way. In all its length (1428 pp.!), I have only noticed two mistakes; his account of mediæval appointments to bishoprics being practically at the disposal of the Crown (p. 162), is too Anglican to be entirely true. It depended upon the relative strength of the King and the Pope: sometimes the one prevailed, sometimes the other. And the Pope who is referred to on p. 1096 is obviously not Benedict XIV but Benedict XV.

A. L. ROWSE

WE EUROPEANS. By JULIAN S. HUXLEY and A. C. HADDON with a chapter on Europe Overseas by A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS. (*Jonathan Cape*. 8s. 6d.)

THERE is little doubt that, of all human emotions hate and fear are those to which politicians can appeal with the greatest confidence. Such an appeal may of course, be made with a laudable object. In Moscow in 1928 I saw an appeal to liquidate illiteracy in order to overcome Sir Austen Chamberlain. Unfortunately the victims of hate propaganda are generally more accessible than Sir Austen. At the present moment Europeans are being urged to hate one another because they belong to different races, while certain theories about race have long been used to justify social inequality in colonies and in the United States.

The book before us examines the notion of race with special reference to Europe. The authors are well qualified for their task. Dr. Haddon spent many years of his life in studying the tangled racial problems of Melanesia, where as a European, he could be entirely impartial as between Polynesians, Papuans, and Australian blacks. Dr. Huxley has made equally impartial studies of the race problem in fresh-water shrimps, where experiment is possible, as it is not with man.

On the whole they have done their job well. "Race" emerges as a term very hard to define and never accurately defined by the apostles of racial purity. Further, as between different Europeans, it is a statistical conception entirely inapplicable to individuals.

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Where two human groups differ as regards a physical characteristic so completely that there is no overlap, they may fairly be regarded as of different races. Thus the lightest West African has a darker skin than the darkest European. On the other hand the darkest Swede has darker hair and eyes than the fairest Sicilian. We can only define the innate characters of Swedes and Sicilians by averages. We cannot be sure that any given individual belongs to one group rather than the other. The authors have provided a most entertaining parlour game by giving a series of sixteen photographs to be assigned to various nationalities, which illustrate this point very well.

Nor is there any evidence that the present variability is due to the mixture of originally pure races. We cannot observe the pigmentation of our ancestors, but we can measure their skulls, and the work of Dr. Morant, which the authors rather unaccountably do not cite, shows that skull shape was just as variable in prehistoric Europeans as it is today. Perhaps a consideration of his work might have induced the authors to modify the views expressed by them on p. 137. And I think that a study of the geographical races of ladybirds, and of the records of fertile unions between monkeys assigned to different genera might have disclosed a closer parallelism between human and animal variation than they have been willing to admit on pages 99 and 138.

There are a few other questionable biological statements, for example the "classical" but mythical case of the Chinese Primrose cited on p. 89, but on the whole the statement of modern knowledge about the interaction of heredity and environment can be highly recommended.

To many readers Chapter VII, which deals with the ethnic composition of the various European peoples, will be the most interesting in the book. Among other things it will serve to dispel the beliefs that there is a German race, and that the Germans are predominantly Nordic. The claim that all German-speaking peoples should be politically united has been supported by a wholly mythical biological theory. It would be possible to divide Europe into its existing number of twenty-seven states so as to make each include as physically homogeneous a population as possible. Germany

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would not be one of them. The north-western Germans would be included with the Danes, the broad-headed Bavarians with most of the Austrians and Swiss. Such a division, one may add, would cut across existing political, cultural, and economic boundaries in such a way as to make the Treaty of Versailles appear a monument of justice and common sense. The fundamental divisions of Europe are not on a racial basis.

By confining their attention to Europe and the overseas peoples of European origin, the authors have avoided the most important of racial problems. In Europe racial and cultural frontiers do not coincide. In the world as a whole, they do so to a considerable extent. It is a great deal more plausible that the peculiarities of negro or Central American cultures are largely determined by innate characters than that those of Germany or Italy are so. But it is by no means certain.

Personally, I am inclined to doubt it. In view of the very marked differential birth-rates within a nation which modern eugenical research has disclosed, it seems likely that the innate characteristics of a people may change fairly rapidly through selection of the types which are fittest in the Darwinian sense (i.e., breed most rapidly) in the existing culture. If this is so culture may determine race rather than conversely. If the innate psychological characters of negroes are found to differ significantly from those of Europeans (and this is not yet proved to be the case) these characters may turn out to be the product of their tribal systems rather than conversely.

The fact is that we know extremely little about racial characteristics. It is only in the last few decades that our knowledge of genetics and psychology has so far developed that we can even ask the right questions. Very few of them have yet been answered. Some readers will find this book unexciting because it does not tell a clear story. Unfortunately, there is no clear story to be told. But the authors have done a real service by collecting the known facts and by exposing a number of fallacies which are generally believed.

J. B. S. HALDANE.

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FRIEDRICH ENGELS. By GUSTAV MAYER. (*Chapman & Hall*. 15s.)

IT is an astonishing thing that no adequate study of the life of Engels has been available until lately. A couple of years ago the Professor of Social-Democratic History in the University of Berlin published the two-volume biography in German upon which this life in English is based. The German edition had to be published at the Hague, and its author is no longer occupying his professorial chair at Berlin. Social-Democratic History has ceased to be a professable subject in Germany, and it has, oddly enough, never become one here. No one, therefore, has hitherto made it his academic duty and interest to discover how the early industrialism of this country, in which Engels, like his *alter ego*, spent the greater part of his adult life, conditioned the development of his thought. That theme makes a considerable part of this volume—which, let it be noted, is, and, we British being what we are, has to be much shorter and simpler than its German predecessor. As Professor Mayer says, his book “deals especially with the man and the politician, and leaves the theorist in the background.” Fortunately, Professor Mayer has not been too austere about the background, so that the reader gets a most illuminating account of the interests and antagonisms that occupied Engels in the years of apprenticeship which prepared him for his life-long partnership with Marx, and of that partnership itself.

Dr. Mayer's intimate study of Engels has outstanding merits. The theme is fresh; the learning is massive; the temper is tolerant. Engels is written of as an actual human being, and his thought is analysed not as the dead theories of a departed prophet but as the living endeavours of a scholarly, sensitive and enquiring man to understand his own experience, relate it to the thought and experience of others earlier and contemporary, and build it into a system. Professor Mayer describes with enviable insight the very varied factors which contributed to the final shaping of Engels's creed. In his period of intellectual apprenticeship he observed the class-conflicts of *bourgeois* Bremen, the developing antagonisms of Restoration France and Chartist England, the transforming processes of industrialism at its

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metropolis in Manchester. He learnt from business experience in the family mill: his Irish proletarian friend, Mary Burns, showed him the cellar-dwellings of the Irish poor in Manchester—Chadwick's *Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population* (1842) adds confirmatory detail to Engels's *Condition of the Working Classes* (1845): James Leach, the Chartist, doubtless showed him visually the evidence he used in his now forgotten and anonymous *Stubborn Facts from the Factories* (1844): the processes of social differentiation, class conflict, political and economic change were witnessed, analysed and explained. The things that impelled Disraeli to New England Toryism drove Engels to question all his inherited beliefs. His intellectual heritage was soon widened. His reading included Hegel and Heine, Feuerbach and Hess, Eugène Sue, Georges Sand and Charles Dickens, the apologists of Christianity and the agnostics. The philosophers, historians, poets heightened his sensitiveness. There was no divorce between real life and the life of the mind. Hence, when in 1844 Engels left Manchester, he was fully equipped for his great constructive partnership with Marx.

The story of that partnership is told in this admirable biography with a care and understanding that win the reader's respect. There is no hero-worship and no belittlement of either Engels or Marx. There is public history as well as personal and the connexions between them are not lost sight of. What makes Engels so real and attractive a figure in this book is the skill and tenacity with which Professor Mayer keeps him, so to speak, in this world: here Engels lives and moves not in a world of rarified ideological unreality but in one which is full of strife and confusion and fatality, one which required interpretation and leadership, one in which a history that is more than past politics is being made. The curiosity, liveliness and insight of Engels are continually surprising. To see the familiar events of English history as well as the events of Europe and America as Engels saw them is extremely illuminating—or, rather, as Engels and Marx saw them, for the partnership is never lost sight of. “If we put ourselves in the place of these two men,” Professor Mayer writes, “and realise how, in the

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conviction that they possessed more correct historical standards than their contemporaries, they strove towards their goal without power and without a party worthy of the name, we can understand that they could retain a belief in themselves only by shutting themselves up in their own faith..... No stranger could see what right they had to claim infallibility for their beliefs." No stranger can now. But no intelligent stranger can fail to be deeply impressed by the quality of their comment on events whose character is, or seems to be, familiar. To Marxians and non-Marxians Professor Mayer's biography of Engels will be intriguing. It will be read gladly, even greedily, by those who share the faith of Marx and Engels. But it should be read also, and particularly, by those who think Marx and Engels unimportant purveyors of exploded heresies. English scholarship has been singularly insular in its attitude to them, unless it be that that neglect of them has arisen from studied policy. Professor Mayer provides, as it were, a chance to escape from the consequences of that neglect, a short cut to the Marx-Engels point-of-view about the events of their lifetime and their interpretation of them.

It would be easy to write at length of this book. It must be said that it is always interesting to read, but it is far more than just that. It has the quality of the good biography that is most important—its subject lives for us as much as for his contemporaries. And that is because of the universality of the conflicts in which Engels played his part. Politicians used to be "educated" in political biography and history. Perhaps that sort of specialisation was good enough half a century ago. It most certainly is not now. To widen it, the study of the lives of such figures as Engels may be most confidently recommended. It would be difficult to name a biography of recent years that equals this in "significance" or "cogency," that is, in aptness to the understanding of our own times. Professor Mayer has performed an extremely difficult task in a most modest and masterly way. His book deserves the careful study of a very wide public. It is far more than a contribution to Marxist studies. It is essential to the student of history whatever his predilections, and to the student of contemporary society. H. L. BEALES.

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REPORT ON THE BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY. (*Political and Economic Planning*. 7s. 6d. paper boards, 10s. 6d. cloth.)

THE COAL SCUTTLE. By JOSEPH JONES. (*Faber*. 5s.)

THE MINER'S TWO BOB. Edited by W. H. WILLIAMS. (*Martin Lawrence*. 2s. 6d.)

MINERS, OWNERS AND MYSTERIES. (*Waterlow*. 6d.)

STAY DOWN MINER. By MONTAGU SLATER. (*Martin Lawrence*. 2s. 6d.)

SOUTH WALES NEEDS A PLAN. By H. A. MARQUAND. Assisted by GWYNNE MEARA. (*Allen & Unwin*. 7s. 6d.)

THE last few months have been prolific in books about coal, its past, present and future. Of these the 100,000-word report by the Industries Group of Political and Economic Planning stands out from the rest. P.E.P. represents what is generally known as planned capitalism, and that standpoint is faithfully reflected in this volume. The *milieu* in which the writers live and move imposes certain limitations on their thought which are consciously, or unconsciously, accepted; but their blind spots are insignificant compared with the vigour with which they tackle the bowling sent down to them by this most intractable of industries. This is the best book written on the coal industry for many a year.

It deals systematically with six broad aspects of the industry: (1) coal production; (2) structure and organisation of the coal-mining industry; (3) coal consumption; (4) distribution, prices and transport; (5) exports; (6) labour and employment. Out of the vast mass of statistics, which are admirably collated and charted, two great facts stare the reader in the face. One is the rapid increase in mechanisation in the last few years. The percentage of coal cut by machine rose from 28 in 1929 to 47 in 1934 and probably stands now at over 50. This means that nothing short of an Industrial Revolution is going on inside the industry. Mechanisation, as in other industries, increases overhead costs but displaces labour, and has accounted for a fall in production costs of 7d. a ton between 1929 and 1934; labour costs fell by 6½d. a ton and as there was no general reduction in wage rates the decrease is clearly due to the displacement of man by the machine. P.E.P. marshals such facts as these in an arresting

way ; but a word about the machine's revolutionary influence on the miner's life would not have been amiss. The tale is one not only of greater average output, decreased costs and displaced labour but of greater strain, loss of freedom and increased danger.

The other great fact is the influence of Part I of the Coal Mines Act in delaying that reorganisation of the industry which every informed observer knows to be urgently necessary, but is stubbornly resisted by those in control of the industry. Parts I and II of the 1930 Act were complementary, but unfortunately the Coal Mines Reorganisation Commission has been thwarted in its task at every turn, and only now is to be endowed with the powers which Parliament intended it should have. In default of the working of Part II of the Act, Part I has tended to arrest even that degree of reorganisation which in a free industry might have taken place under the play of economic forces. Under the Act each pit has been given a new asset—the right to produce a certain quota of coal or to sell that quota to others. The transference of quotas has to some extent led to a desirable concentration of production, but only at the expense of keeping open pits which on economic grounds ought to be closed. If anyone doubts that there are large numbers of pits which should be closed, let him digest the authoritative figures given in the report: there is in the British coal industry a surplus productive capacity of some 80 million tons a year, and the increase in costs due to working below capacity may be as much as 2s. a ton, or even 3s. 6d. a ton for a fully mechanised mine. The fact has to be faced, and is faced by P.E.P., that concentration of production, like mechanisation, will be followed, at least temporarily, by a displacement of labour. In the eyes of P.E.P. this is a burden which the national shoulders should be prepared to receive, and they suggest such methods as pensions, the raising of the school-leaving age, and transference of workers.

It is not possible even to indicate the remaining contents of this comprehensive and lucid report. Let this only be said that it deserves to be read, marked, learned and inwardly digested by all who have the interests of this great industry at heart.

The conclusions of the report are often reinforced by a valuable work from the President of the Mine Workers' Federation. Mr. Joseph Jones (who is also a member of the Reorganization Commission) agrees that Part I of the 1930 Act is not working satisfactorily and cannot in itself provide a solution of the industry's difficulties. He examines with some care the unemployment among miners, which he traces to diminished demand, development of foreign coal-fields, and mechanisation. He pins his faith to the development of coal processing, to the unification of the coal-mining industry under public ownership and to the integration of coal with other power and fuel industries.

Mr. Jones introduces an important subject which the P.E.P. report touches, but only for a moment. This is the miner's charge that the quarterly ascertainments by which wages are determined do not give a true picture of the industry's profits or losses owing to the practice by which colliery owners sell coal to subsidiary or associated undertakings at prices below what it would fetch in the open market; it is a matter of indifference whether they make their profit at the end or the beginning, and by making it at the end, miners' wages are kept down to the minimum. This charge is more fully examined in a book edited from the Labour Research Department under a title which links the present with the days of the Sankey Commission. "The Miner's Two Bob" sets out the case for the increase in the wage-rates which the miners began to demand last summer and which has now been partly granted. It gives useful examples of a large number of composite undertakings.

A pamphlet written by "an observer who is neither coal-owner nor miner but close to both" made a useful contribution to the recent dispute. One of the points at issue was whether agreements should be on a national basis (as the workers desired) or on district bases (as the owners contended). The anonymous writer, from a close experience of the conciliation machinery in the engineering industry, makes a convincing case that the complexity of the coal-mining industry is no bar to national negotiations; for the engineering industry is infinitely more complex and yet negotiations have long been carried out nationally with

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conspicuous success. He also pleads, like Mr. Joseph Jones, for the integration of the fuel industries and, like P.E.P., for an effective reorganisation of the coal-mining industry itself.

The recent wages dispute has also brought forth a story of the "stay-down" strikes which took place last year in South Wales. For those strikes were an attempt, in view of the coming struggle, to reassert the authority of the Miners' Federation in places where it was challenged by the "non-political" Industrial Union. Mr. Slater does not give a connected sequence of events—his volume is "Number One of a series of Reportage(!) books"—but the mingled humour and grim reality of that spontaneous outburst of feeling in the Welsh valleys live again in spite of his style.

For a wider study of Welsh problems the reader will turn with advantage to Professor Marquand's, "South Wales Needs a Plan." Professor Marquand, a rising economist who holds the chair of Industrial Relations at Cardiff, brilliantly analyses the past history and present state of South Wales, and suggests many sound schemes by which the industrial position may be improved. South Wales is a victim of the wave of economic nationalism which has swept the world. By its exports of coal, iron and steel, and tinplates, it obtained the means to purchase the food, clothes and other commodities needed by its people. When the outside world began to refuse its exports, it could no longer maintain so large a population, and in ten years a quarter of a million people left the area: nor could it support so high a standard of life for the remainder. A new threat came from home when it was proposed to remove part of the tinplate industry to Lincolnshire, and though in the event the new works are to be placed at Ebbw Vale that does not improve the prospect before West Wales. As economic nationalism is likely to continue, it is necessary to start in South Wales new industries dependent on the three big exporting industries, but catering mainly for the home markets. Professor Marquand has some admirable suggestions on these lines; and, what is no less important, he suggests means by which the capital may be found.

IVOR THOMAS.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RISE OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM. By Harold J. Laski.
(Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

PROFESSOR LASKI calls his book "an essay in interpretation" and he suggests in his preface that the word "essay" covers apologetically the sin of historical inadequacy. In a sense the apology is justified. Like everything which he writes, this essay is extraordinarily stimulating to thought; every paragraph sparkles with ideas and with the suggestion of or for profound thought. Professor Laski's historical "omnicompetence"—to use a favourite word of his own—is staggering and he wears his immense learning and uses his omnivorousness so gaily and lightly that in reading him one is tempted to say that if the author of *The Anatomy of Melancholy* rewrote Karl Marx in the style of Mr. Max Beerbohm, he would remind us of Professor Laski. These rare and valuable intellectual qualities make him an exceptional teacher, and his writings at their best have the same effect upon the reader as he has upon his pupils—they stimulate him to study and to think. On the other hand, the method and its excellences have their definite limitations. This kind of stimulation relies for its effect upon a rapid and kaleidoscopic throwing of images and ideas upon the screen of our minds. That does not mean, of course, that the ideas themselves must necessarily be superficial or unimportant, but the profounder interconnections between them, the subtler depths in which reservations and contradictions turn half-truths into whole truths, are not easily reached or reconciled by this method. This explains why Professor Laski is right in calling his book an essay, and why, with all our admiration for it, we wish it had been something more. The quality of his thought is such that we could wish that he would retire into the wilderness and meditate—as so many great men have done—for some years, for we feel certain that he would then bring us back that something more, something well worth having.

Meanwhile we are not ungrateful for the essay. It is an essay in the Marxian interpretation of history. It traces the rise and fall of European liberalism from the end of the Middle

Ages to the emergence of fascism, and it interprets liberalism as the social philosophy of the middle classes secreted by them in terms of power and politics as the inevitable integument of their economic dominance. No socialist—indeed, very few non-socialists—today will deny that there is an immense amount of truth in this interpretation. Almost every page of the book contains some illuminating example of the relation between the postulates of liberalism and the economic implications of the capitalist system. To take only one instance, we may refer to the theme, constantly recurring, of poverty and the attitude towards it which gradually changed and crystallized from the seventeenth century (p. 155) through Burke (p. 202) to Arthur Young (p. 210) who summed it up—his own and our funeral—in the pregnant sentence; “Everyone but an idiot knows that the lower classes must be kept poor, or they will never be industrious.”

No one will deny the funeral. The coffin is there and every one, including Professor Laski, is hard at work driving nails into it. Indeed, no one has driven more or larger nails into it than he has. And what about the corpse? One sometimes wonders whether in the enthusiasm for nailing down the coffin they have not forgotten to put in the corpse. The assumption that the corpse is dead is universal, and we are no believers in political miracles and resurrections. But we would put in a plea for the proper identification of corpses, including that of liberalism, before burial. And it is here that we hope that Professor Laski will go on to a more thorough identification than the space and design of a Marxian essay allows him. If he does, he will probably find that a purely economic interpretation of liberalism is a great deal, but not the whole, of the truth, and that there is a considerable difference between a coffin and a corpse. For instance, there is the question of the relation of the individual to society, the question whether we should organise the state on the assumption that society is for the individual or on the assumption that the individual is for society. A question, transcending economics, which is intimately connected with liberalism and will, we venture to prophesy, not be buried in its grave.

LEONARD WOOLF.

WARNING FROM THE WEST INDIES. By W. M. MACMILLAN.
(Faber & Faber. 8s. 6d.)

THIS book sets out to shake complacency especially in New Africa by showing the state of our oldest colonies. But the author does not indulge in highly-coloured writing. After a lengthy visit to the West Indies he records in unassuming prose certain facts and suggestions.

The theme of poverty runs through the book, and the curse of the 2,000,000 folk concerned is the vicious circle of expensive needs which cannot be financed. Health is at a low standard, so is food. Houses of the majority are one or two-roomed cabins and they are overcrowded. Sanitation is bad; medical services are better. Population is dense, in Barbados over 1,000 per square mile. The standard of living is low. Unemployment and under-employment are rife and agricultural wages vary from five to about twelve shillings a week, save in Jamaica.

The chief source of wealth is agriculture which is at a low ebb. The only great industry is sugar production and it is in extremis. There is a large landless proletariat in dire distress. Landowners in debt to banks, and millowners often cannot pay wages and share crops with tenant workers. Ninety per cent. of the people are descendants of African negro slaves. Seventy per cent. of the children are illegitimate. The author does not deal with the population problem, which is an appalling difficulty all over the tropics. Resources must be developed, he says, with the help of outside capital given with due financial checks. He considers that the Executive is everywhere weak owing to divided control between the Government and representatives elected on a narrow franchise or nominated, who have not executive power.

It seems that the policy of leaving agriculture to individualist amateurs has broken down, with its corollary cheap labour. So has the policy of a weak Executive and cheese-paring economies necessitated by state poverty.

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Surely, in these fertile islands and mainland territories Britain must tackle her task by comprehensive state planning and action rather than by palliatives, loans, grants, subsidies and the like. A preliminary necessity would be a workable constitution combining power and responsibility.

T. REID

EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS. (*Oxford University Press*, 1936.)

IF free institutions are to survive, two tasks have to be faced: first, we must submit parliamentary machinery to drastic revision, and, secondly, we must combat the popular indifference to public affairs. There is unfortunately little sign that the democracies are yet ready to undertake the first of these tasks. In the fundamental matter of political education, however, we are beginning to awaken. Teachers and publicists have been urging the need to relate school life to social responsibility, and more and more schools have been experimenting in this direction. The Association for Education in Citizenship is now in being to assist this movement by advice and propaganda. The important volume under review represents its opening effort.

Education for citizenship, as here envisaged, is something of far wider import than what used to be called "civics." It does not depend on the introduction into the school course of one or two new subjects such as politics or economics: it implies the development of a clear social purpose in the teaching as a whole. Of course, the demand that education shall produce not merely the good man but the good citizen of a democracy brings us up against certain basic queries. What qualities do we require in the citizen of a free community? To what extent are the mental aptitudes developed by academic discipline transferred to other departments of intellectual activity? What of the teacher's bias in political and economic affairs? To what extent is dogma admissible in the inculcation of democratic principles? These questions are honestly faced in the admirable introductory chapters contributed by Sir Ernest Simon and Mrs. Eva M. Hubback.

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When such general considerations have been disposed of, we come to practical matters of the class-room. Articles either written by, or based on the work of, practising teachers show how the ordinary subjects of the curriculum can help to provide the background of knowledge and the attitude of mind essential for effective membership of a free community. These chapters, reinforced as they are by specimen schemes of work, are full of sound advice.

It was no doubt inevitable that this pioneer volume should take for granted the framework of the conventional curriculum, and that each specialist contributor should consider his "subject" in isolation. It is clear, however, as indeed Mr. F. C. Happold suggests in his interesting paper on "Grouped" Courses, that the matter cannot be left here. The schools have too long been struggling with an overcrowded and aimless curriculum, taking comfort from the fallacious belief that this or that subject will at any rate "train the mind," however vague its relation to modern life. If the school course is to be given the desired central purpose, modification of detail will not be enough: it must be reshaped in main outline. How this can best be done is a problem that the Association for Education in Citizenship will doubtless tackle in due course.

M. ALDERTON PINK.

PARETO. By FRANZ BORKENAU. (*Chapman & Hall*. 6s.)

THIS is the second volume in a series of short biographies of modern sociologists, edited by Professor Ginsberg and Alexander Farquharson. The purpose of the series is more accurately described by the words of the editorial note, which speaks of "studies of modern sociology." Biography is of secondary importance, and Dr. Borkenau may be criticised for having stressed too much the derivation of Pareto's sociology from his family life and his political prejudices. This type of causation is always difficult to prove, and the argument is a two-edged weapon which is liable to wound the biographer as well as his subject. In any case the important thing, in this series, is to explain to the interested reader what sociology means, and to do

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this not so much by defining it as a subject, as by showing it as a point of view and a method of study. We want to be told what particular problems interested these thinkers and how they tackled them, and in what respects their approach differs from that of historians, economists and political scientists. What they achieved is less significant than what they attempted, for we know that the social riddle has not been solved. The recent past must be studied as a source of guidance for the future.

Dr. Borkenau has met this need, but in a rather curious way. He begins with an exposition of Pareto's theory, which is difficult, highly technical and devastatingly destructive. No reader could feel happy in accepting the word of so merciless a prosecuting counsel without hearing the accused speak in his own defence. The book is not a substitute for reading Pareto, but a richly suggestive guide for the student who has time to go to the original. When we reach the constructive part of the study, we find that it consists mainly, not of the valuable and helpful ideas found in Pareto, but of Dr. Borkenau's ideas as to what Pareto ought to have said.

In spite of the hypercritical tone of the early chapters, the general assessment of Pareto is not unfair. He certainly failed to produce a general sociology. His insistence on the rôle of sentiments in determining social behaviour had value, although it was not original and was not sufficiently supported by psychological knowledge. The immense advances made by psychology since Pareto wrote have rendered his analysis out of date. His most helpful contribution is the theory of the circulation of élites, which, although fallacious in many points of detail, serves to expose the superficiality of some egalitarian ideas. But his main defect all through lies in his failure to incorporate his analysis of individual types in a study of those social customs and institutions which govern individual and group behaviour. He imagined that the problem of domination could be studied in terms of persons only, whereas in reality it is primarily a problem of the tasks to be done and the machinery available for doing them. To all this we can subscribe, and the lesson it teaches is that

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sociology is something more than social psychology, since it includes the dynamic analysis of social structure. A very clever book, and as stimulating as a wasp on a summer afternoon.

T. H. MARSHALL

THE SOCIALISATION OF IRON AND STEEL. By "INGOT."
(Gollancz, 5s.)

THE Labour Party and the T.U.C. have so far given us only an outline of the system of control which they would apply to the iron and steel industry. The great value of this book is that it goes further and explains what the socialist controllers of the industry might do with their power, why those things ought to be done, and why the present controllers of the industry will be unable to do them. The author is not content with socialisation for socialisation's sake. He sees clearly that the really difficult problems will arise after socialisation has taken place.

Two thirds of the book are devoted to an admirably clear account of the existing structure and organisation of the industry. The author writes with such expert knowledge that he must surely have spent many years in a responsible position within the industry. I liked particularly his concise account of the structure of the industry in South Wales, though I am inclined to think that he overestimates the present efficiency of the tinplate industry and the skill of its workers. His style is simple and forceful; and the non-expert reader will find him easy to read and to understand.

He shows clearly that a structure adapted to Free Trade must become considerably modified under Protection. At the same time he is fully aware of the imminence of over-expansion, over-capitalisation and inflation, if the industry is permitted to continue in its present state—safeguarded externally by tariffs and cartel agreements, but with the loosest possible co-ordination at home. He perceives too that the engineer's ideal of very large productive units, despite their low costs of production when working at capacity, does not necessarily yield the maximum economic gain over a long period. The British industry cannot afford to imitate the "gigantism" of the Russian.

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The temptation to over-invest in steel plants during boom periods is irresistible under private ownership; and the amalgamations that take place are too often made for financial rather than technical reasons. The consequent instability of a basic industry has far-reaching repercussions. Private owners almost ignore the necessity for planning the transfer of labour to new industries as the efficiency of the old increases. National economic planning is almost impossible without control over this most important of "capital-goods" industries. Briefly, these are the main arguments in favour of socialisation.

In the author's opinion, the independence of such a body as the Central Electricity Board is as undesirable as the bureaucracy of a state department. He therefore proposes that the industry should be run by a Steel Combine as a sub-department of a Ministry of Heavy Industry, free from detailed Treasury control. Before it is taken over, a preliminary survey by a Commission authorised to inspect all establishments and their books is essential. The author is remarkably well informed, and his book is distinguished by understanding and judgment.

H. A. MARQUAND.

AN AMERICAN EXPERIMENT. By E. M. HUGH-JONES and E. A. RADICE. (*Oxford University Press*. 6s.)

THIS volume deserves the widest possible circulation in this country, for neither in America nor here has a better short book on the New Deal been published.

It is clear, it is precise, and, so far as is possible in these matters, it is without bias. Written, moreover, by men who have learned in a real way to know America from within, it conveys something of the magnitude of the issues that are being debated and decided there. To most Englishmen, the American scene is so complicated and confused that ignorance of its momentousness is widespread. Messrs. Hugh-Jones and Radice have been at pains to make an admirable blue print of the significant experiment they have surveyed. To read it is at least to have some sense of the scale upon which the experiment is proceeding.

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What is the outcome of their survey? In any brief but comprehensive way, it is difficult to make an adequate judgment. It is clear enough that, compared with the grim picture of 1933, when President Roosevelt took over the reins of power, there are real advances to record. The Tennessee Valley experiment, the Securities Act, the Public Utilities Act, these are real achievements. There is a good deal, also, on the positive side in the legislation on unemployment insurance and old age pensions; it is also probable that there has been a gain in the release from the thralldom of the gold standard. Much has been done to help the farmer; something of the defeatist mood of organised labour has disappeared; and there is a general business recovery of significant proportions. The fact that the President's re-election is, short of a miracle, to be taken for granted is sufficient evidence that he has made a contribution of importance to American well-being.

But there are things of importance also on the other side. Nira has gone; and it has gone unbewailed even by those who were distressed at the attitude of the Supreme Court. So, also, has A.A.A.; and the Court has struck a grave blow at the New Deal by "its decisions" in the main cases concerning the Guffey Act and the powers of the Securities Commission. What is emerging from the experience of the New Deal is (i) the profound need of constitutional revision, (ii) of a really adequate civil service, (iii) of a politically conscious labour movement, and (iv) of an American business community capable of making up its mind that the epoch of the positive state has arrived. On any comprehensive scale, the experience of the last three years appears to indicate that there has been no possibility of effective planning under capitalism and that neither the business men nor the present majority of the Supreme Court will permit it if they can. There is, further, an immense amount of latent Fascist feeling in America which may easily assume dangerous proportions. Louisiana, Arkansas, California, Mississippi, Georgia, are not very far removed from Fascist states. Scepticism about democracy is widespread. Men like Father Coughlin win a support for their fantastic nostrums that is disquieting. There is a good deal of the same ignorant anti-semitism as that upon which Hitler battered in the years of his struggle

towards power. Let recovery be long delayed, let Wall Street make up its mind that political democracy is a threat to its empire (not as yet seriously challenged) and the next decade might see an end of historic America.

All this, I think, the observant reader will infer from the illuminating pages of this book. There are, perhaps, considerations its authors do not emphasise which are worth noting. The great shift to the Left in the climate of intellectual opinion is important; there is not one significant writer on the side of traditional business in America today. The awakening of young America (not least in the colleges) is also of importance. So, too, is the rift within the Federation of Labour; the movement towards industrial unionism, the drive to a farmer-labour party, are both of them hopeful signs. The real problem is one of time. If there is opportunity to build a consolidated Left before it is too late, America may still be retained for democracy in its classic form. That is the real importance of President Roosevelt. He has no Left opinions. But he is too profoundly aware of the Right's inadequacies not to move Left if, while he is in office, a Left opinion secures powerful support in the country. His next four years are the Left's opportunity; after 1940, they may be too late. Those years are going to show as in no other country what vitality is left in the normal principles of representative government in the epoch of capitalism in decline. That constitutes the importance of America for Western civilisation. For the country in which liberal doctrine might most easily be saved will be given the supreme opportunity of proving its adaptability in the face of crises. America has the chance of showing that there is a genuine alternative to fascism and communism. It will be interesting to watch the effort to fulfil its opportunity.

HAROLD J. LASKI.

REFORM OF THE LEAGUE

By SIR ARTHUR SALTER, K.C.B.

THE purpose of this article is to discuss certain specific proposals which have been made for the amendment of the Covenant. It is essential, however, to preface any such discussion by some general observations without which it may lead to grave misunderstanding. This danger is perhaps best illustrated by the famous "1900 Club" dinner speech of Mr. Neville Chamberlain on June 10. "I would like," he said, "to make a few observations upon events of the last 12 months and their effect upon the League of Nations and the policy of collective security to which we have given such wholehearted support with such disappointing results. The policy of collective security seemed to us.....an attractive alternative to the old system of alliances. The circumstances in which the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia began appeared to offer an opportunity for the exercise of that policy which could hardly be more favourable for its success. The aggression was patent and flagrant, and there was hardly any country upon which it appeared that a policy of sanctions could be exercised with a greater chance of success than upon Italy. The fact remains that the policy of collective security based on sanctions has been tried out.....it has failed to prevent war, failed to stop war, failed to save the victim of the aggression. I am not blaming anyone for the failure..... Surely it is time that the nations should decide so to limit the functions of the League in future that they may accord with its real powers.....Is it not apparent that the policy of sanctions involves, I do not say war, but a risk of war,.....Is it not also apparent from what has happened that in the presence of such a risk

nations cannot be relied upon to proceed to the last extremity of war unless their vital interests are threatened?"

Mr. Chamberlain, it will be seen, considered that the British Government had done all that it could under the League mechanism as it exists; that it is the League system itself which is at fault, for he "blames no one"; that the unwillingness to take risks for the collective system must be accepted as an unchangeable fact, and that League obligations must be adjusted to that fact. It follows naturally from these opinions that the object in amending the Covenant should not be to strengthen its powers, but to reduce our commitments under it; and what he proposed in substance is that the League should be reduced from being a system of collective defence to a machinery of conciliation without real powers of enforcement.

The point of view from which the present article is written is in every respect precisely the opposite. The provisions of the Covenant and the League's mechanism and methods were in no respect whatever the cause of failure in the Abyssinian case. This will appear clearly as we review the different proposals for change which have been made. There is only one sense in which any change in the provisions of the Covenant could have prevented a failure. If there had been no obligation to intervene, or to impose sanctions, League members would perhaps have not even attempted what they did in fact attempt without success. Granting the attempt, the failure was due to one cause and one only, the unwillingness of the principal countries in the League in the international situation of the time, to pay the political price, and to accept the risks that must be involved in any attempt to restrain the will of a great country determined upon aggression. At Stresa, in April 1935, before Italy had made invasion inevitable by the dispatch of a large army south, France and Great Britain did nothing to restrain her

because they were not at that time prepared to risk losing her co-operation against the German menace. No possible change in the League Covenant would have made any difference to this attitude or, without it, have made it possible to induce Mussolini to abandon his projects. Later, in September, when an army of 250,000 had been sent south, invasion was inevitable. All that remained was to stop it and render it unsuccessful by sanctions. That was, however, impossible on the assumption that no risk whatever of war must be taken. It is foolish to think that, in any serious case, sanctions can be at once strong enough to break the will of an aggressor and yet so mild that they will not provoke him to resist if he thinks himself strong enough. Sanctions must always have behind them a collective preponderance of strength, and a determination if necessary to use it; and the knowledge that both exist is the only safeguard against a hostile reaction by the aggressor against the sanctions intended to defeat his purpose. The fundamental causes of failure were the unwillingness of France to sacrifice Italian friendship in view of the German danger and the unwillingness of Great Britain, in Sir John Simon's illuminating phrase, to "risk a ship in defence of Abyssinia"—which was also of course, the defence of the whole collective system.

If, therefore, the League is to be restored as a system of collective defence, the real task is to re-establish the political conditions under which it can work, not to tinker with details of the League machinery. The essential condition of such a system is a collective preponderance of strength of those who are loyal to it over those who may assail it, and a willingness to take risks in supporting it comparable to those which the constituent nations are prepared to take in defence of their own national interests.

The reasons for believing that such a collective system is essential, that in a world with seven great powers neither

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we nor other countries can without it achieve security against a hostile combination, are familiar and need not now be repeated. The reason why so many who have hitherto been supporters of the League are now abandoning it, or recommending changes which would reduce it to impotence, is not that they consider that an alternative policy can give satisfactory security, but that they believe the essential political conditions of a true collective system to be incapable of realisation; and hold (rightly indeed on that hypothesis) that a return to the kind of policy we were pursuing before the war would be less dangerous than commitments to a League system, which would break down in a real emergency and thus entangle us without providing an effective safeguard against war coming or defence if it comes.

This is therefore the real crux of the present political problem. I believe myself that it is still possible to rebuild a true collective system, if diplomacy is directed consistently and with determination to that end. This is an opinion which I cannot defend within the limits of space available in this article. I must be content now merely to state it as indicating the point of view from which proposals for amendment of the Covenant will be discussed. The main objective of policy should, in my view, be the re-establishment of the fundamental conditions on which alone a system of collective defence is possible. Changes in the League Covenant machinery are altogether subordinate in importance to this; they are conditional upon it; and their object should be not to reduce our commitments, but to strengthen the League's powers for its primary and most important functions.

The articles which need special consideration are X (which relates to the preservation of territorial integrity), XI (the "preventive" article), XVI (which deals with sanctions), and XIX (the "peaceful change" article). These will be discussed in each case from the point of view just indicated.

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Art. X reads as follows:—

"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

This is an ambiguous article, and has had an unfortunate history. It may be read, and has often—perhaps usually—been read as if it is a self-contained and absolute engagement, independent of the procedure and the limitations prescribed in later articles. As such it would seem to guarantee the territorial *status quo* in perpetuity and to impose an unconditional obligation, with discretion only as to means, upon all League members to combine to preserve it in all circumstances. So interpreted, it obviously promises the impossible, and it is natural that the opponents of ratification in America made the most of it. President Wilson's answers to the attack were inconsistent and left the position more obscure than before, and it would be very desirable for the ambiguity to be cleared up.

Personally I have always believed that the Article could, and should, be interpreted as only one part of a series of provisions which must be read as a whole. It lays down a principle of territorial integrity; but as to the procedure which is to be followed in case of threat, and the precise obligations which fall upon the guaranteeing States, we must look to the following articles. This would mean, *inter alia*, that if, in case of dispute, the Council failed to make a unanimous report (excluding the disputants) League members would not be under a legal obligation to impose sanctions; and that Art. X must be regarded as subordinated to, and not as overriding, any measures taken under Art. XIX to change the *status quo*. I realise that there are difficulties in this

interpretation (as in any alternative one), and am not confident that the text of the Covenant, if regarded as a rigid constitution, would be so interpreted by a judicial authority. But, taking the Covenant as a whole, I think it reasonable to believe that its supreme political authorities, the Council and the Assembly, were intended to have interpretative powers involving a substantial element of "case law." I should therefore advocate an interpretation by Resolution along the lines suggested above. In that case the provision in Art. X that the Council shall advise "as to the means" would be understood as applying to an immediate emergency and to the action that might be desirable while the procedure of the later Articles was running its course. If this proposal were adopted no formal amendment of Art. X would be required. Historically, it is interesting to note that, in the earlier drafts, the "change" provisions, ultimately postponed, in a diluted form, to Art. XIX, were directly associated with the provisions of Art. X.

The next Article, XI, is the one designed to secure appropriate *preventive* action, when war is threatened and before it has occurred or become inevitable.

The Article provides that "Any war, or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations."

This is a "conciliation" article and it is clearly contemplated that the disputants shall take part in the deliberations. Moreover, Art. V requires unanimity except where otherwise expressly provided and Art. XI does not, like Art. XV, exclude the disputants' votes. It was therefore urged by Japan in the Manchurian case that the Council could take no action under this article unless

Japan herself agreed. It has indeed been urged that the general principle of law that "no one can be judge in his own case" should be regarded as applying. This is doubtful, however, and it must be expected that the objection made by Japan would be repeated in any similar case. Many of those who desire to strengthen the League's means of action have therefore urged that an amendment to make action no longer dependent on complete unanimity of the Council or Assembly is necessary; and Lord Halifax suggested that this would be among the Government's proposals.

Now there can be no doubt that one of the chief weaknesses of the League in the past has been its failure to take action early enough and the absence of any pre-arranged procedure to make its influence in arresting a drift to war effective before an actual resort to war has taken place. The increase of the League's preventive powers is beyond question one of the principal improvements required.

I doubt, however, whether a formal amendment of the Covenant is necessary and whether if made it would have the importance that is often imagined, though it might be desirable if it could be obtained without difficulty.

The "action" contemplated by Art. XI must, in the general context of the Covenant, be understood as comprising only such action as is legally permissible without the specific legalisation given to measures of sanction under Art. XVI when there has been resort to war. It would not be permissible, for example, under Art. XI, and before there has been resort to war, to institute a blockade. This limitation still leaves a wide range of measures available by which loyal members can indicate unmistakably to the potential aggressor, before he has taken the inevitable step, that they are determined if he does so to combine against him. They can, for example, withdraw their ambassadors, send observers to the scene

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of conflict, make declarations as to the precise action they will take if aggression occurs and so on. Now all this is legally permissible without formal legalisation by the League. If therefore a resolution proposed under Art. XI is approved by all except one or both of the disputants, the action contemplated can be taken by the other countries whether or not the resolution is formally registered as a resolution of the League. Granting the will to act, measures can be taken without amendment of the Covenant. Even if carried through successfully therefore, it would not make the position substantially different from what it is at present; and there is some danger that a proposal for amendment, which is in any case a long and difficult process, will divert attention from what is most needed.

It would, I suggest, be preferable that effort should be directed mainly along another line. The first necessity is that the principal League members should be ready to initiate consultation at an early stage in any menacing situation, should be willing themselves, and should make their willingness apparent to others, to combine in the full use of the League Covenant as it stands. Failure in this respect was the fatal mistake in the Abyssinian case. No possible amendment in Art. XI, nor any legal obligation under Treaty, would have removed the causes of the fatal procrastination which allowed war preparations to proceed without serious remonstrance until war became inevitable. Nevertheless, though a change in legal obligation cannot ensure a readiness to act promptly, it may increase the chances. I believe, however, that for this purpose an amendment on the point of unanimity in Art. XI would be much less valuable than the conclusion of suitable supplementary Conventions, prescribing the action which the contracting powers engage themselves to undertake in the event of a threat of war. The Conventions are ready to hand. There is first the "General Convention

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to improve the Means of Preventing War," signed on September 26, 1931, by 22 countries (including France and Germany, but not Great Britain), and the Convention on Financial Assistance of 1930, signed by Great Britain and other countries but not ratified. The first of these provides for a number of conservatory measures, such as the dispatch of League commissioners to the area of danger and action to secure the withdrawal of the respective forces behind prescribed lines, and the conditions under which the contracting countries undertake to put into operation these different measures. The latter provides for financial assistance to a country which has either suffered, or is threatened by aggression. Together they would be a much more effective encouragement to loyal members to take early and adequate action to restrain the aggressor than any amendment of Art. XI. But, it is well to emphasise again, no legal provision can be of any value without a real will to act on the part of loyal members; and with that will, it can be made effective under the Covenant as it stands without either amendment or addition. Mussolini could have been warned at Stresa; Abyssinia could have been assisted with arms and money by France and Great Britain, or even by the latter alone. It is the will that needs to be revived—with it additional provisions will be a help, but they are no substitute.

The other principal respect in which the League needs to be strengthened is in its means of securing peaceful change. We need therefore to consider what should be done to make Art. XIX really operative. "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of Treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

The text is obviously weak and tentative in its terms and it has, in fact, been notoriously a dead letter. It is impossible

to exaggerate the importance of the question. The most serious blunder in the policy of the countries in whose hands power was left after the war, especially France, was an excessive clinging to the *status quo* as prescribed in the Treaties and a refusal to agree to even the most necessary changes until too late and under the menace of force. This attitude is reflected alike in the text of the Covenant and in the actual operation of the League. By far the best justified charge against the League scheme as devised at Paris is that it makes no adequate provision for change; that it scarcely indeed even contemplates it; and that by its machinery of restraint it has actually impeded change that would otherwise have been made earlier and peacefully. It is at the same time obvious that no system of collective defence by itself, no mere machinery of restraint, can ever be permanently successful. World conditions are always changing; nations rise and fall; corresponding changes in frontiers and political rights are inevitable; war has been the instrument of change in the past, and concessions have very rarely been made, especially as regards frontiers, except through war or the threat of war. If, therefore, both war and the fear of war are to be eliminated, there must be an alternative, and adequate, method of securing change, and securing it in time. Otherwise the strains to which any system of defence are subjected will sooner or later prove too great for it and it will break down.

These arguments are familiar, and need no further development. But the difficulties are no less obvious. Sovereign States cling to their existing rights, whether reasonable or not. They cannot be induced to forego them if they feel strong enough to resist, either by means of their national forces or any system of collective protection. They may indeed become doubtful of the efficacy of such a system of protection, but their doubts are scarcely greater in regard to rights which have become unreasonable than to others.

At the same time other states, great powers in particular, are unwilling to extend their commitments to enforce sanctions, above all where what is asked is not protection against war but pressure upon a country to abandon its existing legal rights. Nor will powerful countries be prepared to yield existing rights to weaker countries as a result of a majority vote of other unconcerned, or perhaps jealous, states.

The real crux of this problem is, I believe, not the precise procedure for examining claims and making recommendations for change, but the form of pressure which is to be exercised to secure the acceptance of change by the country of which concessions are required if change is recommended. I have elsewhere (in the *New Outlook* of June 10) put forward a proposal which I have no space now to elaborate and defend. Its essential feature is that the ultimate sanction to secure acceptance of a recommended change should not be economic, still less military, pressure, but simply the denial of collective support to a country in a war that might arise from a refusal to comply. I recommend that the Assembly should pass a Resolution (following the precedent as regards procedure of the resolutions of 1921) to the effect that they will regard their obligations under Art. XVI as not applying in such a case.

On such a basis I think it might be just possible to secure the adoption of a procedure for change upon the following lines. First a request by any member State for consideration by the League of a change in the *status quo* should be proceeded with if, but only if, the Assembly and the Council so decide by a two-thirds majority, including at least a bare majority of the "permanent members," i.e., the great powers. Secondly, an appropriate commission should then be appointed, usually of persons of high standing and experience but not holding political office at the time (such as the Lytton Commission), this body to report by a bare majority. Thirdly, the Report

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so made should be considered by the Assembly and Council, and, if approved by the same majorities as those prescribed for the first acceptance for consideration, should become a formal League recommendation and as such communicated to the parties. Thereafter the form of pressure already indicated would operate. Such a provision leaves a "gap" in the peace system, as the present Covenant does. It may even be said that it would encourage a country to use or threaten force to secure a concession which had been recommended by the League, but refused by the country asked to make it. This is true, but I believe that, in the case of a claim so investigated and recommended, the risk of war would in fact be less than it is at present. For a discussion of this and other criticisms, however, I must refer the reader to the article in the *New Outlook* already referred to.

This, then, I believe to be the most practicable line of progress. Here again, however, it is well to point out that the main difficulty is not to be found in any defects in the League mechanism, and cannot be removed by any amendment. The League is already equipped to investigate a claim, and need not act under Art. XIX, as the Lytton Commission proved. The real trouble is the unwillingness of countries desiring change to refrain from the use of force until there has been an investigation, or to be content with any third-party award; and of other countries to agree to an investigation except under the visible threat of force. It should also be pointed out that no possible procedure for securing change would by itself have prevented the invasion of Abyssinia, for it is scarcely conceivable that any international tribunal could have awarded more than was in fact offered to, and refused by, Italy.

There remains the crucial question of Art. XVI. The proposals put forward are usually for either (a) the elimination or (b) the "regionalisation" of sanctions, or (c) for making

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them "permissive" I must briefly summarise my opinions on these proposals. To eliminate sanctions altogether would be to make the League impotent. It is a complete delusion to think of conciliation, or moral influence, as the alternative to the possession of the means of enforcement. In international as in domestic affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes depends upon the existence of machinery of enforcement in the background. The "regionalisation" of sanctions is more plausible, and it has, of course, been recognised in Annex F of the Locarno Treaties that the contribution of different countries to sanctions must vary with geographical and other considerations. It would, I believe, be a serious mistake to go farther and to exempt countries from the obligation to impose economic sanctions except where their national interests are directly affected. To do so would, in effect, be to break up the collective system of defence into separate military alliances. Lastly, to make all sanctions "permissive" is obviously to make them uncertain, and therefore to defeat their primary purpose of operating as a deterrent to a country contemplating aggression. An aggressor who doubts whether sanctions will in fact be applied against him will take a gamble. I believe, therefore, that it would be fatal to amend Art. XVI so as to leave countries free at the time of actual war to decide whether they would impose sanctions or not.

At the same time, as experience has shown, the mere existence of a legal obligation does not give the required certainty and does not necessarily act as a deterrent. An obligation which it is not believed will be observed, and in fact is not likely to be, is worse than useless. And in present circumstances it is necessary to face the fact that, in certain cases, the obligations of Art. XVI would not, and could not, be discharged. This, it may be hoped, is a temporary situation, and it would be better to meet it by Resolutions rather than

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by amendment of the text of the Covenant. I should be in favour of a Resolution by the Assembly recognising that in present circumstances the obligations to impose sanctions must in two cases be conditional. First the prevention of intercourse by blockade may be made impossible by the attitude of non-League states. And, secondly, there are regions in the world outside Europe, in which for the present it may be impossible to secure such a collective preponderance in strength of co-operating countries as to make sanctions practicable. I think that these actual limitations should be recognised but that the main powers of Art. XVI should be retained and efforts directed, not to reducing them, but to securing that they will be certain in their operation. It is well to add that the failure of sanctions to achieve their purpose in the Abyssinia case was not due to defects in the League mechanism. The sanctions which League members were prepared to authorise were efficiently applied, with a surprisingly small proportion of leakage and evasion. The more drastic sanctions contemplated, and indeed prescribed, by Art. XVI, would certainly have been effective. They were not authorised because they were thought to involve a risk of war with Italy. In this, as in other respects, the cause of failure is to be found outside the provisions of the Covenant or the machinery of the League.

It remains, in conclusion, to summarise the theme of this Article. By far the most important task of constructive policy, in the present period, is to restore the conditions under which a collective system can work. The essential foundation of such a system is a collective preponderance in strength of those who may be relied on to be loyal to it over those likely to assail it. By comparison with this essential objective, all amendments in the League mechanism are of secondary importance. If it is not realised, the League system cannot work; if it is, the League system would work

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even without change. There are, however, some improvements that might be made which would add to the League's efficiency. Actual amendments of the Covenant are scarcely necessary; and in present circumstances they are both difficult and dangerous. They are slow and may be obstructed by a small minority. Moreover, in a period of disillusionment, the procedure of amendment once started is likely to result in proposals which would aim at reducing commitments to the League system, and so weakening it, rather than at adding to its powers. Formal amendments, if resorted to at all, should therefore be limited to such changes as would improve the working efficiency of the League as a permanent instrument with its membership universal and predominantly reliable. Changes required because of present, and it may be hoped temporary, difficulties should be dealt with otherwise. In the first place much can be done by building up a procedure, and preparing programmes of action for various emergencies, within the framework of the League as it stands. These may in some cases take the form of supplementary conventions, while in other cases the mere approval of plans by the Council and Assembly may be adequate. So far as the existing legal obligations of the Covenant need either clarification, or in some cases modification, to correspond with the particular circumstances of the present period, the need should be met by Assembly Resolutions (upon the precedent of 1921), either interpretative or declaratory of policy. The principal provisions which need consideration are those which relate to the guarantee of territorial integrity and, in close association with this, those which deal with peaceful change (Arts. X and XIX); the "preventive" machinery (Art. XI) and the "enforcement" measures (Art. XVI). It is recommended that Art. X should be declared by Resolution to be understood as laying down a principle, the precise application of which is to be found in the rest of the Covenant; that a procedure

for investigating claims for changes in the *status quo* should be laid down, and countries which refuse to agree to changes recommended by the League, by appropriate majorities, should be denied the benefit of collective defence in any consequent conflict. Simultaneously the League's preventive procedure should be reinforced by the ratification of the relevant conventions already adopted; and lastly the sanctions of Art. XVI should be retained (subject to the provisions of the 1921 resolutions and the interpretations given in Annex F of the Locarno Treaties), except that it should be recognised that, in the two specific cases mentioned, they must for the time being be only conditionally operative.

In outline I believe this to represent the most hopeful line of progress towards the reconstruction of a true collective system. If we can make such a system effective in Europe, it will be possible to supplement it by sufficient co-operation with other countries, like the U.S.A.; and the renewal of the kind of development that was in fact taking place between 1925 and 1929 would at no distant date result in a world peace system, effective for its main purposes. The difficulties are obvious, and no one can prophesy success with certainty. They are not, however, insuperable and there is, in my view, no alternative to the rebuilding of the collective system which can, even at the best, offer a prospect of more than a temporary and precarious peace, combined with the loss, even while peace lasts, of the best part of the heritage of Western Civilisation.

THE "POPULAR FRONT"

By HUGH DALTON, M.P.

"POPULAR FRONT" is a phrase imported into our political vocabulary from France and Spain. In each of these countries it has a definite meaning:— it denotes a political combination which exists. In this country it denotes an aspiration, the current discussion of which is not free from ambiguities and loose thinking. I begin, therefore, by asking those who advocate a British Popular Front three questions. Whom is it to include? How is it to work? What, if it wins power, is it to do?

These questions may usefully be approached through a study of events in France. There the Popular Front includes three large parties, the Socialists, the Radicals and the Communists, together with the smaller and less coherent group known as the Socialist Union. It worked through an electoral understanding. At the First Ballots there was a fight of all against all. But it was agreed between the parties that at the Second Ballots only one Popular Front candidate should run in each constituency—generally it was to be the candidate who had polled best at the First Ballot, but there was a loophole for special arrangements—and that all the Popular Front parties should support that candidate. An examination of the French election results in detail shows that this agreement was wonderfully effective. The supporters of Popular Front candidates who fell out at the Second Ballot voted, in very high proportions, for the candidate who stayed in. The parties of the Left, from Radicals to Communists, wheeled at those Second Ballots like troops on parade, with an impressive and surprising precision.

The most powerful motive behind the formation of the Popular Front in France was the internal threat of Fascism.

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It was a domestic, not an international, motive. The programme of the Popular Front was drawn up just before the election. It was a rather short programme, including only a small instalment of socialisation—the Bank of France and the armament industry—and the dissolution of the Fascist Leagues.

Now compare the British political situation. In France there was substantial parity of strength between the three principal parties. Each, therefore, had much to offer the others, a heavy mass of voting power to bargain with. But in this country the Labour Party quite overshadows all other political forces in opposition to the government.

It is worth while, in view of large claims and vague estimates made in some quarters, to recall the results of last autumn's general election.

	Candidates	Members	Total Vote (to nearest 10,000)
National Government	Conservatives ..	515	387
	Liberals ..	45	33
	MacDonaldites..	20	8
	National ..	6	3
Labour Party ..	..	553	154
Opposition Liberals ..	..	161	21
I.L.P. ..	..	16	4
Communists ..	..	2	1
Others ..	..	30	4
			270,000

As between the Government and the Labour Party, a turnover of 1,750,000 votes, or less than 15 per cent. of the total government vote, would put Labour in front and probably return a clear Labour majority to Westminster. I say "probably" because the exact result, in terms of seats, would vary with the distribution of the turnover between constituencies. But, taking the results constituency by constituency, I find that a uniform turnover of only 5 per cent. of the government vote would give exactly 50 more seats,

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and a uniform turnover of 10 per cent. exactly 100 more seats, to the Labour Party. So sensitive is our electoral system to small shifts in voting strength.

In view of these facts I reject the conclusion lightly drawn *in vacuo* by some advocates of the Popular Front, that a Labour victory is outside the bounds of practical politics. It is well within those bounds.

Visibly divided counsels and last minute changes in the leadership were severe handicaps last time. And Sir Samuel Hoare, by seeming to steal our international clothes, duped large numbers of the Peace Balloteers. None the less, as compared with 1931, we increased our total vote by two millions, or by more than 30 per cent., while the Conservative vote fell by a million and a half, or by more than 12 per cent. The total Labour vote in 1935 went back to its 1929 level, though we won only 154 seats as compared with 287 in 1929. But this was because the anti-Labour vote was much more concentrated in 1935 than in 1929, when three-cornered contests were far more numerous. In 1929 we won 130 seats on a minority vote. Today we hold only a small handful of our seats on this precarious tenure.

I have dwelt on these electoral facts, because they bring out some important considerations, and some important differences between French and British conditions. A clear majority in Parliament, without electoral alliances with other parties, which for French Socialists was impossible, for British Socialists is possible, though I do not underestimate the magnitude and difficulty of the task, and the qualities, of clarity, courage and shrewdness, which our Party must consistently show in order to achieve it.

But there are other differences also. No Popular Front here could work as it worked in France. Like the French we have single member constituencies. But we have no Second Ballot. Therefore in this country it would be

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necessary, as some advocates of the Popular Front propose, to arrange that particular constituencies should be allotted to particular parties or persons, and that all the parties of the Popular Front in each constituency should unite in support of a single candidate.

I do not believe that either of these things could be arranged. It is the settled policy of the Labour Party, steadily pursued since 1918, to fight every seat where we have a constituency organisation that desires a contest. And we seek to have such an organisation in every constituency. Only by fighting, again and again, in constituencies which at one time seemed hopeless, have we built up our strength. By decisions of our Annual Party Conferences we are committed, as I think rightly, to a continuance of this policy, and against electoral compacts, except in the special case of the Co-operative Party, which in electoral and Parliamentary practice, if not in theory, is so closely linked with the Labour Party as to be hardly distinguishable from it. Therefore we are not free to barter constituencies with other political parties. Last year we put forward candidates for 553 seats out of 615, and it is no part of our present intentions to put forward fewer next time. Rather should we prefer to increase the number.

In whose favour, moreover, should we be invited, by advocates of the Popular Front, to withdraw Labour candidates? This brings us to the first of the three questions which I raised above. Whom, in addition to the Labour Party, is a British Popular Front to include?

The answers vary. Communists? I.L.P.? Liberals? "Democratic Tories"? More or less eminent persons, who are disinclined to join any existing political party, but are prepared to collaborate with others in writing joint letters to the Press and in such organisations as the Next Five Years' Group? Let us take these in order.

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The Communists? Their relation to the Labour Party is to be debated at our Annual Conference in October. If the proposal for their affiliation is accepted, they will simply become part of the Labour Party, just like the Fabian Society or the Socialist League. No question of electoral compacts or joint programme would then arise. If the proposal for affiliation is rejected, it may be taken for granted that equally, though for other reasons, no such questions would arise. Personally, I am opposed to Communist affiliation. Communist strength in this country is very small, and I believe that, even assuming Communist *bona fides* in seeking affiliation, their re-entry into the Labour Party would repel more support than it would bring, and that, in fact, their *bona fides* is doubtful and that they are more likely, if admitted, to make trouble than to help.

The I.L.P.? Outside the four constituencies which they hold in Glasgow, their strength is negligible, even less than the Communists'. They left the Labour Party by their own choice, on a trivial pretext concerning our Standing Orders in Parliament. But few of us who see them in action at Westminster, where they fight the Labour Party harder than they fight the Government, have any keen desire for closer relations with their Parliamentary representatives.

The Liberals? Which Liberals? Liberal supporters of the present Government are indistinguishable from Conservatives. They owe their seats to Tory votes. Many of these seats, if Tory candidates opposed the sitting members, Labour would certainly win. These Liberals are not available for any Popular anti-government Front.

Opposition Liberals? This is a more serious proposition. It is their paper, the *News-Chronicle*, which has made the running for the Popular Front. But in Parliament they have less than two dozen members. More often than not, they speak against the Government and vote with the Labour

Party. But the Government still has a majority of 250, on a three-line-whip.

But what of Opposition Liberal voters in the country? They counted nearly a million and a half at the last election. If this vote could be added to the Labour vote, and polled solidly, should we not have advanced a long stage towards defeating the Government? This is the most plausible electoral argument, following the French analogy, in favour of a British Popular Front. But, on closer inspection, the French analogy breaks down. British Liberals, unlike French Radicals, cannot be mobilised in mass in support of Socialist candidates. As in their political philosophy, so in their political performance, they are individualists, each following his own bent, responding very raggedly to appeals, even from the highest quarters in their own party, to vote this way or that. There is much electoral evidence of this. Even if constituency compacts were possible—and at present they are not—even if a joint programme were possible—and I shall deal with this in a moment—the Opposition Liberal leaders could not deliver the Opposition Liberal vote to Labour candidates. They could most nearly deliver it in constituencies where it would be least use, where Labour and Liberals are both weak and Tories almost sure to win, even against a really effective Popular Front. But in constituencies where Labour grows strong, Liberals have a habit, fatal for Popular Front theory, of entering into compacts with Conservatives, primarily for Local Government elections, to “keep Labour out.” And we know from experience that local Liberal leaders cannot easily break this habit. It is broadly true that, where Labour is strong, a Liberal candidate in a three-cornered contest splits the anti-Labour vote and, only where Labour is weak, splits the anti-Tory vote. On a short view, taking the country as a whole, three-cornered fights help the Labour Party, as compared with straight

fights. But, with the progressive decline in Liberal strength since the war, this consideration grows less important. Liberal candidates, in most constituencies today, would poll so poorly as to lose their deposits. And this is why in most constituencies no Liberal runs. In 1935 Liberal Nationals ran in only 45, Opposition Liberals in only 161, constituencies.

There is, no doubt, a substantial number of Liberal electors who detest the Government and have no serious disagreement with the Labour Party. Their most effective course is to join the Labour Party, as many Liberals have done before them.

“Democratic Tories”? These surely are a mythical reinforcement for a Popular Front against the present Government. If they are Tories they belong where they are. And, indeed, the chief use of a democratic Tory is to combat anti-democratic tendencies within the Tory Party rather than to combat the Tory Party itself.

More or less eminent persons who cannot make up their minds to join any existing Party? These are found in Next Five Year Groups and kindred undertakings. But they are like officers without rank and file, better known to each other than to the general public, moving in select and narrow circles, carrying almost no electoral weight. I see no reason why some of them, judged by their writings and their public addresses, should not be in the Labour Party. There they could both teach and learn.

This survey of possible elements available for a British Popular Front is not encouraging. And I have not yet touched the question of a programme. There is much to be said for a short programme, but the best time to make it is, as the French Popular Front well knew, when an election is very near. For a short programme means dropping cherished ballast overboard. And some members of the crew will kick at this, except they face a crisis in a storm. But we are

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now still dismally near the last general election. This Parliament has four more years of legal life. The Government has a very large majority and, not even if a Popular Front were formed and clamoured loudly for a new election, is there any reason to suppose that the Government would oblige its opponents.

But even a short programme, if all other difficulties in the way of a Popular Front had been surmounted, to satisfy the Labour Party must contain a substantial measure of socialisation, enough to occupy usefully a Parliament five years long. The Bank of England and the armaments industry, as in the French programme, would not, in my opinion, be enough. We should, I think, need to add coal, and some at least of its by-products, and electric power, and a large part of transport, and to provide for a rapid increase in the public ownership of land and for effective economic planning, including public control of new investment and the volume of credit. Would Liberal partners in a Popular Front accept all this? Socialists could not claim less and still hope to deal with unemployment.

And what of foreign affairs? It is here that the Government's record, ever since 1931, is blackest, and the danger greatest of catastrophe both sheer and soon. Almost any day now, civilisation may be shot at dawn. Fascism and dictatorship, as an external menace to this and other countries, are, I believe, a much grimmer and more urgent business than many, including some of my own political friends, yet understand. But would Liberal partners in a Popular Front—Mr. Lloyd George ingrainedly anti-French, Lord Lothian, the apologist of Nazi Germany—I mention no others—help make a foreign policy to face ugly realities and keep the peace? I have no hope they would.

Fascism as an internal menace, in France itself, was the compelling force behind the French Popular Front. Is there

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such an internal menace here? Some think so, and it is an easy theme for those who use words loosely. I have heard Marketing Boards called Fascism! And the arch-priest of the Popular Front, Mr. A. J. Cummings, is afraid of a "British boiled-shirt Fascism," which will destroy our liberties. The price of these is still eternal vigilance. But let it be vigilance clear-headed and clear-eyed, not mistaking one thing for another. I do not believe that Fascism is today an internal menace in this country. If it were, or if it should become so tomorrow, we should need to re-examine, in quite new conditions, the project of a Popular Front. But I see another menace very clearly, and for this a Popular Front, even if practicable, would be no remedy. But a Labour Government, supported by a Parliamentary majority, if we can get it in time, still might be.

A BRITISH PEOPLE'S FRONT: WHY, AND HOW?

By G. D. H. COLE

IF the world barometer were set fair for peace and prosperity, I for one should not be talking about a People's Front for Great Britain. I should be concentrating my energies on socialist propaganda, trying as hard as I could to persuade everybody I could meet that socialism ought to come, and caring very little who governed the country for the time being, provided I could feel sure that the mass of socialist opinion was growing at a reasonable rate.

But, as everyone must admit, the world barometer points not to peace and prosperity, but to storm and rain. We are all—those of us who think at all—thinking about the next world war, and when it is likely to break out, or at the best wondering whether there is any possibility of averting it. In such a situation, I maintain that it is sheer folly and obscurantism to go on behaving as if we could manage our own affairs without reference to the rest of the world's, or achieve socialism in Great Britain by a process of gradual persuasion of the electorate by means of a purely domestic appeal.

If the world situation promised peace, we socialists could afford to wait until our propaganda had been given time to win over enough people to our side—aided as it would be, under such conditions, by the sheer logic of economic growth. We could be confident, in a peaceful world, that there would arise no force powerful enough to disturb our advance, and no counter-appeal seductive enough to draw our potential supporters away, or at the least to weaken their resistance to new anti-social gospels. But in a world full of the thirst of

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war, we cannot afford this complacency. It matters very much, to us as well as to the peoples of other countries, what government holds office in Great Britain during the next few years, and what part Great Britain, as a world-power, plays in international affairs today and tomorrow. British action, even in the next few months, may make all the difference to Europe's future, or even to the whole world's. We cannot afford to fondle our pure socialist faith, if the effect of our nonchalance is to be the strengthening of the anti-social forces which are threatening to destroy our whole civilisation.

I believe, firmly, that the first need today is to oust the vacillating Baldwin and his divided colleagues, and put in their place a government of the "Left"—by which I mean a government which will take sides openly with the *Front Populaire* in France, with the progressive governments of the Scandinavian countries, and with Soviet Russia, against the Powers which are openly and exultingly threatening world peace. I believe that British vacillation, which is interpreted on the Continent, half rightly and half wrongly, as positive sympathy with Hitler and the Nazis, is the chief cause of the growing confidence shown by the Fascist Governments in Europe and by Japan in flouting international obligations and in preaching to the whole world that brute force is the only argument that counts. Our vacillation, our half-sympathy with Fascism against the so-called "Reds," our refusal to give effective support either to the League of Nations or to the Blum Government in France—to say nothing of the Liberal Government of Spain which has been fighting for its life against armed insurrection subsidised by Fascist agents—has paralysed the forces making for peace and collective security in distracted Europe. It has encouraged Hitler and Mussolini to believe that they have only to grab, and everything shall be added unto them; and it

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has caused a lamentable dismay and affright in all the smaller countries that would gladly play their parts in a pact of mutual security really and whole-heartedly backed by France and Great Britain acting together.

The reason for desiring a People's Front in Great Britain is to be found abroad, and not mainly at home. British Fascism, even including the variety that is to be discovered in Downing Street as well as the more theatrical type sponsored by Sir Oswald Mosley, would be quite harmless if world conditions were tranquil and world peace assured. They are far from harmless, just because we may at any moment be confronted with a world crisis that will sweep reaction into unchallengeable authority in Great Britain, and even line us up as a nation not on the democratic and progressive, but on the Fascist side.

In these circumstances, there are certain urgent needs which transcend all others in the sphere of immediate policy. First and foremost, the need to do all we can to rescue Western Civilisation by preventing war. There is, of course, more than one view about the right way of doing this. One group, headed by Mr. Lansbury, bases its policy on a personal appeal to the peoples of all countries to outlaw war in all its forms; while another group appears to hold that the best way of preventing war is to let Hitler and Mussolini have everything they want without it. I wish I could agree with Mr. Lansbury, but I cannot; the appeal to eschew all violence is too one-sided, when it cannot be made openly in the countries which are the present disturbers of world peace. As for those who would simply let the Nazis and Fascists overrun the world to their hearts' content, at all events as long as they keep their hands off the territories under British control, I cannot agree with them either; for I feel sure the Fascist appetite grows with what it feeds on, and concession after concession now will only strengthen their hands for still more devastating

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war later on. I mean therefore by the rallying of all our forces for the prevention of war the creation of a powerful "Left" bloc committed to common action with the other threatened and peace-seeking countries against aggression and for mutual defence. This involves, to my mind, a triple pact between Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R., open to all countries which agree to its terms and to a pooling of their forces for mutual defence, and designed especially to include the smaller democratic states of Western and Central Europe.

But we cannot have a Left Bloc or People's Front for foreign affairs alone, even if our principal object is to achieve a united foreign policy for the defence of peace and liberty. If the Left is to act together in foreign affairs, it must come to terms about the home policy which is to be followed when it has ousted the "Nationals," and is called upon to accept the responsibility of governing the country. Now, I do not believe, and I suppose no socialist believes, that a *long-run* home policy can be worked out on agreed lines between socialists and anti-socialists who are also on the "Left" in foreign affairs, even if the home policy of these anti-socialists is "progressive" after the fashion of the Next Five Years Group. At some point, it will have to be settled whether Britain is to become a socialist country or not; and when that choice has to be taken, there is bound to be a new alignment of forces and opinions.

But I do not believe that choice has to be taken now. For the moment, the most urgent task is not to make Britain socialist, but to check the world advance of the powers of slavery and destruction—to save a Britain capable of choosing between socialism and capitalism, and a Europe in which British freedom will be a political possibility. Accordingly, our immediate home policy should be, primarily, not a socialist policy *as such*, but a policy of immediate social advancement and economic prosperity. Such a policy will doubtless

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include many "socialistic" measures ; and that it should do so is all to the good. But its direct aim will be, not to build a new economic and social order, but to rally support behind it by the immediately beneficent results which it yields.

The essentials of such a policy in home affairs, as far as they can be compressed into a few paragraphs, seem to me to be these :—

(1) An immediate improvement in the treatment of the unemployed and their dependents, up to a standard which will at least guarantee the means of fully adequate nutrition for both children and adults, with a reasonable surplus left over for inevitable wastages and moderate enjoyments.

(2) A real attempt to develop industries and means of useful employment in the depressed areas, involving a real attempt at regional economic planning and an effective public control over the localisation and development of new industrial enterprises.

(3) An effective assurance, through the reform of the Bank of England and of the banking system as a whole, that the credit structure will be administered with a view to internal economic needs, and in harmony with the requirements of an economic plan devised under public control.

(4) A policy of production aiming at the expansion of output and consumption, and not at restriction in order to maintain profits. This involves effective public control over the working of trusts and combines, and over the price-spreads at various stages of production and distribution. More fundamentally, it involves a complete reversal of the attitude towards production now officially endorsed, so as to make the consumer, and not the profit-maker, the pivot of the system.

(5) In relation to foreign trade, a policy of steadily lowering barriers against imports, especially by means of

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bi-lateral low tariff, or no tariff, bargains ; and therewith the reconstitution of the Import Duties Advisory Committee with a different personnel, and in close relationship to a new authority to be established for the supervision of a general economic plan.

(6) The effective raising of the school-leaving age at once to fifteen, with adequate grants for maintenance ; and, at the least, the institution of a *voluntary* system of retiring pensions on an adequate living scale for all workers, insured or uninsured, who can prove that they have been unemployed for more than, say, two years out of the past six.

(7) The reintroduction of Public Works as a means of increasing economic activity ; and especially (a) a new housing drive designed to provide houses to let within the means of the poorer families ; (b) a big drive towards an improved public health service, through better water-supply, public hospital and other medical accommodation, and the extension of medical benefits to the dependents of the insured population ; (c) better provision under public auspices of playing fields, parks and open spaces, and social and recreational centres both on new housing estates and in other urban areas.

(8) The development and extension of the minimum wage system so as to make unlawful the employment of any person in any occupation at less than an approved legal minimum wage ; and the extension to the wage-fixing authorities of the power to regulate hours of labour, with an over-riding maximum of 44 hours at most, and a recommendation to apply the 40-hour week over the widest practicable field.

(9) The compulsory re-organisation of certain basic industries under the control of publicly appointed Commissions responsible to Parliament, and endowed with power to acquire, subject to reasonable compensation on a basis

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of prospective net revenue, any or all of the properties in these industries now in private hands. This power should extend at least to the following industries:—armament-making, steel, coal, electricity, rail and road transport, shipping, docks, cotton, the manufacture and import of essential foodstuffs, building. This does not mean that all these industries would be “nationalised” out and out, but that each would at the least be brought under the control of a supervising public authority acting in conformity with the general directives of the central economic plan.

(10) An agreement to take all necessary steps to abolish the House of Lords on the first attempt by that body to obstruct the execution of the agreed programme.

(11) An electoral agreement between the People’s Front groups to conduct, wherever possible, a trial ballot among their combined supporters before the General Election, on the understanding that the successful candidate at this trial ballot will receive the united support of the People’s Front at the General Election itself.

(12) Last but not least, the suppression of political uniforms and private armies of all sorts, an effective guarantee of the rights of free speech and public meeting through the action of a reformed and democratised police, a revision of the laws relating to public assembly, libel and slander, and other matters affecting personal and political freedom; the repeal of the Trade Union Act of 1927; and a reform of the electoral system so as to reduce permissible expenditure, abolish the use of motor-vehicles for carrying voters to the poll, and institute the second ballot.

The last but one of these points raises, of course, by far the most difficult issue. The Labour Party has been hoping, ever since 1918, to win a clear majority for itself in the House of Commons. The extermination of liberalism as a parliamentary force has seemed to it a necessary step towards that end. But though parliamentary liberalism, by its own

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internal divisions, has done its best to commit suicide, the liberal electorate, though much reduced, firmly refuses to disappear, and there remain enough Liberal candidates (apart from Simonites) and liberal abstentionist voters to affect the issue in many constituencies which ought to return a “Left” M.P.

My unhesitating opinion is that, apart from quite unforeseen circumstances, the Labour Party is unlikely to win a clear majority either at the next election or at the next but one, and that, in the absence of a People’s Front, its failure to do so is likely to leave Britain to be governed by forces hostile to the liberty and progress of the world, and incapable of preventing European war. I believe the Labour Party would gain the possibility of a clear socialist majority by allying itself, for the time being, with all other groups prepared to accept something like the programme outlined above. But there are certain reservations.

(a) I am *not* proposing a Labour-Liberal alliance. I do not believe that the Liberal Party, as a party, can be regarded as belonging to the “Left,” though many of its members can. The alliance must therefore be not with the Liberal Party *as such*, but between the Labour Party and a Liberal group prepared to accept the common programme.

(b) Among non-socialists, the People’s Front must not be confined to liberals. It must be open to “left-wing” conservatives, to non-party supporters of the League of Nations Union—in fact, to any group that is prepared to come in on the basis of the agreed programme.

(c) It is out of the question to create a People’s Front without including the Communist Party. The Communist Party is very small at present, but it includes many generous-hearted supporters of the cause of real democracy and freedom, especially among the younger men and women. It has far more working-class sympathy and support than its membership reveals. Finally, the effect of an extension

of the Labour Front to the right, without a parallel extension to the left, would be to drive many more active socialists out of the labour ranks, into the C.P. or the I.L.P.—or perhaps merely to sulk in their tents, and abandon the struggle.

(d) But the admission of the communists can be best secured, not by making the C.P.G.B. an independent member of the People's Front, but by accepting its proffered affiliation to the Labour Party, on a basis of acceptance of the Labour Party's rules and constitution.

I hope I have made it clear that the reason for putting forward these proposals lies in the international situation, which has made home affairs necessarily, for the time being, secondary to the following of a correct democratic foreign policy for the maintenance of peace and freedom. I hope too I have made it clear that I am *not* in favour of an alliance between the Labour Party and the Liberal Party as such, or indeed of any People's Front that is not solidly based on working-class unity, which requires the acceptance of the C.P. into the Labour Party's ranks. I hope I have made it clear that I am not abating one jot of my socialist faith, but only showing reasonable common-sense in being prepared to wait awhile for socialism (which we cannot get in fact any sooner by any means) in order that we may do our best to stave off the threat which is now being directed by fascism against all liberty, all human decency in social and international relationships, all democracy and, in short, against the very survival of civilisation in Western Europe. The course of socialism will be not advanced, but lost, if socialists lack the elementary common-sense to call all hands to the pumps in order to save the sinking ship, instead of proclaiming proudly that they are navigating the vessel with the best seamanship, and that all will be well when they have got into port. If I remember rightly, the boy who stood on the burning deck did not live to go to sea another day.

WORKING-CLASS UNITY AND A POPULAR FRONT

by "A SOCIALIST"

IN this country, as was the case in France, there is a growing demand for a united front between Socialists and Communists as the first step to a Popular Front against Fascism and war.

The National Council of Labour has urged the rejection of this demand on four grounds. In the first place it says the Communists are not sincere. They are merely attempting in a different form to capture the Labour Movement by "boring from within" and discrediting and ultimately dispossessing its present leadership. Secondly, Communists believe in violence, revolution and dictatorship, whereas we are democratic. Thirdly, they are under the orders of and financed by the Communist International. Fourthly and finally, Communist affiliation would in these circumstances furnish a standing "Red Letter" argument to Labour's opponents, and lose Labour more votes than it would gain, as well as cause dissension in the Movement.

Let us examine these arguments in a spirit of sober realism. As regards the first it is somewhat remarkable that the National Council does not touch upon the changes in the U.S.S.R. that are the determining factor in the Komintern's conversion to co-operation with Socialists and Radicals in the defence of democracy and peace. For the decisively important fact is that the Komintern is dominated by the Russian Communist Party and that the latter is no longer more than faintly interested in promoting revolution in other countries, but ardently concerned to protect the Soviet Union from Fascist attack. It is this which has brought the U.S.S.R. into the League and into alliance with France

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and Czechoslovakia, and which has brought about the new policy of the Komintern. Ever since Stalin's policy of "Socialism in one country" defeated Trotsky's doctrinaire internationalism, Russian interest in promoting world revolution has ebbed, and the Russian desire to co-operate in preserving world peace has grown. The driving force behind the new Communist policy of establishing Popular Fronts is not the international ambitions of the Komintern but the national necessities of the Soviet Union. In other words, the new attitude of the Komintern marks a *de facto* retreat from the claim to capture the world proletariat for Communism and lead them to world revolution, and a *de facto* recognition that Socialists are friends, not enemies, are powerful, not negligible, and that bourgeois democracy is worth defending against Fascism.

As regards the National Council's second argument, it is really time we of the Labour movement understood the Communist attitude to democracy. That attitude is not ours, but it is intelligible, and it certainly does not consist in belief in violent revolution and dictatorship for their own sakes. Marx believed that in most countries the plutocracy would resort to violence and destroy democracy if ever an attempt were made by a constitutionally elected socialist government to take over private property. He also believed that the army, navy, police force and civil service would side with the illegal violence of the bourgeoisie rather than carry out the orders of a lawful socialist government. Therefore he thought that a period of proletarian dictatorship—the dictatorship of a large majority against a small minority—and a recasting of the armed forces and of the civil service would be necessary as a temporary transitional stage between bourgeois democracy and social democracy. But he never pretended to like this prospect, which he regarded as a disagreeable necessity that would be imposed by bourgeois

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intransigence. And he hoped and believed that in some of the most advanced western democracies, and notably in England, the greater wisdom and readiness to make concessions of the governing class would make it possible to dispense with this transitional stage altogether, and to effect the change-over from capitalism to socialism by wholly constitutional and democratic means. Nor should we forget that Lenin (in *The State and Revolution*) said that a democratic republic was the best form of state for the proletariat under capitalism, although it must be remembered that even in the most advanced bourgeois democracy wage-slavery was still the lot of the workers. In a recent interview with Roy Howard, of the Scripps-Howard press, Stalin said that revolution was not an article of export but was a matter that the workers in each country had to settle for themselves in the light of their own circumstances. In view of these facts it should not be difficult to get agreement between Labour and the Communists on the view that (1) Even our present imperfect democracy is something worth cherishing and defending; (2) The claim of our Tories to constitute a "National" and "above-party" Government is essentially Fascist, and their sympathy with and connivance at Fascist and imperialist aggression in the Far East, in Abyssinia, and in Spain warrant the deepest suspicion of the genuineness of their devotion to democracy; (3) Nevertheless, we can and will obtain power by democratic and constitutional means, and once in power will govern with whatever degree of resoluteness is required to carry out the policy for which the electorate had given us a mandate.

The third objection of the National Council to affiliation is the argument of "dual allegiance." This objection is valid. Whether the allegiance of the Communist Party is, as the National Council believe, to the vaulting ambitions of the Komintern, or, as is contended above, through the

somewhat threadbare camouflage of the Komintern to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, is immaterial in this connection. The main point is that the dual allegiance exists, and that its existence constitutes a weighty objection to affiliation.

Indeed, so long as it exists, the final objection of the National Council probably is valid, namely, that Communist affiliation would lose us more support in the country than it would gain, and would create more dissension than unity in the Labour Movement.

The practical conclusion would seem to be that the National Council is probably right in rejecting affiliation in present circumstances, but that the matter cannot end there. The weakness of the National Council's position is that it is purely negative—it rejects affiliation but suggests no alternative except to continue as we are. And there is increasing dissatisfaction with the present situation because the reasons for working-class unity and a Popular Front against Fascism and war are becoming plainer and more urgent every day.

It is therefore necessary to produce a constructive policy which can satisfy the demand for unity in other and better ways, even if affiliation in present circumstances be rejected, and which would indicate the next step to be taken even if affiliation were accepted by the Annual Conference. Such a policy is possible, and might well unite both affiliationists and anti-affiliationists on a constructive course of action. It would place the emphasis where it rightly belonged, namely, on restoring the *international* unity of the working class, and would solve the problem of the relation between British Communists and the Labour Party as a “function” of this wider settlement—with something on account to promote a favourable atmosphere at home while the wider settlement was being negotiated.

Let the Labour Party decide upon immediately proposing

negotiations between the Second and Third Internationals, with a view to fusing the two into a single Workers' International. The new International would be based on international solidarity and national autonomy. In it each country would be represented by a single Party, which should be formed according to the will of the majority of the politically organised workers in the country concerned. National autonomy would mean that in the new International the right of each Party to manage its own affairs, and notably to decide how to effect the transition from capitalism to socialism, would be fully recognised. Party democracy would mean that the Russian workers would be represented in the new International by the Russian Communist Party; in France, where the Socialist and Communist Parties are equally strong, there would be fusion on a fifty-fifty basis; in the nationalist dictatorships where Socialists and Communists are for the most part already working together in an underground revolutionary movement they would unite *de jure* as well as *de facto*; in Great Britain, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, where the Communists are a tiny minority, they would simply be absorbed by their respective Labour and Socialist Parties. In form, the proposal is one for fusion of the Second and Third Internationals on the basis of equal rights. In fact, it would mean practically the “liquidation” of the Komintern and of all Communist Parties outside the U.S.S.R., and the entry of the Russian Communist Party into an enlarged and rejuvenated Socialist International. The Russian emigrés, who represent nothing, would be dropped, and other emigré parties would have only a consultative voice except where their own countries were concerned.

The French and Spanish Socialists have long demanded this policy of fusion, which they call “organic unity,” as

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distinguished from the "united front." There is reason to believe that the Polish Socialist Party would welcome this policy. The Belgians, Czechs, Dutch, and Scandinavians would hardly resist a strong British Labour Party lead on these lines. The Norwegians, who have hitherto held aloof, would almost certainly join the new International. The Austrian, Balkan, and most of the German Socialists would welcome this policy.

The heads of the Komintern would at first almost certainly reject the idea of fusion, for it would mean political extinction for most of them. But the Russian Communist Party dominates the Komintern and would hardly be insensible to the solid advantages of this policy to the U.S.S.R. For it would offer the U.S.S.R. the rare opportunity of making the best of both worlds: The Komintern has long been regarded in the Kremlin as more of a liability than an asset, and this would open a way to getting rid of the Komintern under the face-saving guise of "fusion." In doing so the U.S.S.R. would at one stroke improve its standing with bourgeois governments and strengthen its connections with the Labour and Socialist movement in all countries. There is nothing in this policy contrary to the doctrines of Marx. Lenin it is true founded the Third International, but that was because he broke with Social Democrats on the issue of war. Since the U.S.S.R. entered the League that breach has been healed. The proposed policy is in entire accord with Stalin's recent dictum, quoted above, as to national autonomy for Socialist movements. It is in harmony with the whole development of Soviet policy in the last couple of years and with the growing desire in many countries for national and international unity in face of the growing menace of Fascism and war.

There is therefore a good chance of Moscow in the end accepting the proposed policy. In any case, if the Labour

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Party took the initiative in making such an offer, the responsibility for obstructing working-class unity and making Communist affiliation impossible would rest on whoever rejected the offer.

In view of the urgency of the situation the Conference might instruct the Executive to endeavour to complete the international negotiations in time for a report to the next Annual Conference. And in order to create a favourable atmosphere for these negotiations the Conference might further raise the ban on co-operation with Communists, I.L.P.'ers, Liberals, and non-Party organisations for such specific purposes and on such conditions as might from time to time be approved by the Executive.

On some such lines a wide measure of agreement might be achieved within the Labour Movement. Moreover the Labour Party would attract much Liberal and "Popular Front" opinion by ending the bogey of a Russian-controlled revolutionary movement in the country, and by pledging all foreign Socialist and Communist Parties to respect the Labour Party's belief in democracy and its right to manage its own affairs as seems to it best suited to the genius and traditions of the British people. Finally, all who are in earnest about international co-operation in order to save peace by rebuilding the collective system on new and bolder lines, would be greatly attracted by the fact that through the Labour Party they could become part of an international Popular Front animated by a common faith and pledged to a common policy. For one of the prime objects of the new International would be to crystallise the wide measure of agreement that already exists between Communist, Socialist, and Radical Parties as to the need for forming within the League of Nations a peace and pooled defence group of states, with common economic and colonial policies.

On these lines, it may be suggested, the Labour Party

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could not only take the initiative in restoring the national and international unity of the workers, but also open the door to forming a wider Popular Front, including all such Radicals and Liberals as were really in earnest about peace. On its positive side this policy would include the policy of a "new start with the League" to which the Labour Party is committed and which has won approval far outside its ranks. This policy includes and is based on a home policy of public ownership and control of banking, war industries, and transport (to which, for purely practical and domestic reasons, would no doubt have to be added mining, power, and the land). But the acid test of a Popular Front movement and the spiritual basis on which it might be built up is the readiness to challenge decisively our reactionary and hypocritical Tory Government, that has broken its election pledges, defaulted on its treaty obligations, betrayed and well-nigh destroyed the League, connived at Fascist aggression, and is as a result of this accumulation of crimes and blunders drifting straight to war—and moving toward Fascism in the process.

Labour's world peace loyalty, which forms an integral part of Labour's official policy, would seem to pledge the Labour Party, in the circumstances of today as they have been officially recognised by the Party, to organise a nationwide refusal to work, or fight, or pay taxes in case of war, unless and until the Government give adequate guarantees as to the nature of their foreign policy. The New Fabian Research Bureau pamphlet "Labour and War Resistance" shows how this could be done. The proposals of the pamphlet have been well received on the extreme Left. They were given a good reception in the *News Chronicle* of July 20. They were given general approval by Mr. Herbert Morrison, Mr. George Hicks and other Labour M.P.'s in interviews in the *News Chronicle* of July 24. Mr. Edward Thompson,

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in his address to the Liberal Summer School at Oxford, urged strong support by all Liberals for the essentials of the policy proposed in the pamphlet. Mr. Geoffrey Mander, M.P., in speeches in the House and letters to the press has adopted a position closely similar to that of the pamphlet. In short, there is abundant evidence to indicate that the policy of war-resistance to ensure the Government either applying a constructive peace policy or resigning would rally a wide Popular Front, going from the extreme Left well into the ranks of the Liberal Party, the League of Nations Union and the non-Socialist supporters of the Peace Ballot. It would be a Popular Front composed of those who really mean what they say when they declare that they are willing to fight in support of our share of collective defence in a genuine collective system, but will never fight again in a nationalist and imperialist war, on any pretext. It would also be composed of those who believe the Labour Movement meant what it said when it adopted its world peace loyalty. In short, it would be composed of free men, and not of sheep and cannon fodder.

Mr. Duff Cooper, the War Minister, has amiably declared it to be the duty of every person in authority to frighten the British people out of their wits. It would not take much for a resolute Popular Front to frighten this "eminently squeezable" (as Sir Walter Layton has called them) Government out of office. That is the first step to peace.

The prime object of a Popular Front and the spirit and sense of urgency by which it should be animated, were admirably stated by Mr. Edward Thompson, in his lecture to the Liberal Summer School on "What Shall We Fight For?" referred to above. We cannot do better than to quote, and to express our hearty agreement with, the concluding passages:

"We are now in the stages just before an issue comes

plainly into the open. It will come there very quickly... . If the course advocated in the pamphlet just issued by the New Fabian Research Bureau, *Labour and War Resistance*, is officially adopted by the Labour Party at its annual Conference, as is proposed, then one section of our nation is going to confront the Government with a plain ultimatum, failing acceptance of which the next war will see us a nation split from top to bottom. . . .

"The Liberal Party will perhaps not support that proposal in all its phrases and details. But I hope most earnestly that it will reinforce in essentials the pressure this Resolution envisages. From an Empire standpoint as well as that of our own island prestige and safety, we have the most dangerous Government this country has had since the time of the American Revolution, and it has to be treated as a rogue elephant is treated. It must be put between two sane elephants, who will guarantee its good behaviour. It must be given the firmest and most unmistakable assistance in doing what it cannot do for itself, in making up its mind.

"The Government got back last autumn, we all remember how—on a mandate to stand for collective security. We remember its leaders' indignant speeches when anyone suggested that they were not whole-hearted for collective security. And now nothing but a miracle can save us from being presented with a war, and plaintively asked what is to be done about it. By the Government's own continual admission the situation is alarming beyond precedent. They have four whole years in which to ruin us and bring down half the world as well. Put it how you will, according to your own particular brand of progressive belief: You have got to do something—to save civilisation, to save this country, to save the Empire, to save our own sons from slaughter and maiming which need never have come upon them. Here is the work for our Popular Front."

PALESTINE BEFORE THE COMMISSION

By G. T. GARRATT

IN view of the present situation in Europe, no Englishman, however sympathetic with the Zionist movement, can object to the appointment of a Commission to reconsider our policy. The Balfour declaration was produced at a time when no one foresaw the intense and narrow nationalism which was to develop during the next fifteen years. It is a tragedy that the first great Zionist experiment should have been undertaken during this period, but the immediate task is to find some workable solution in the face of these altered circumstances, and it will be far better to start again with the position as it is in 1936 without too much thought of the hopes and promises of 1920. The Jewish National Home was part of a reconstruction policy, much of which was ill-advised, and all of which is rapidly breaking down. Recriminations and accusations of bad faith are merely beating the air, and will certainly have not the slightest effect on English public opinion. Many will regret the personnel of the Commission which will consider the future of Palestine, or may distrust the statesmanship of the Government which will probably decide upon our policy, but there will be little disposition to regard declarations of policy made immediately after the war as binding, or even as very important.

Amongst the many factors in the problem which were not fully allowed for in the original scheme, there are three which seem the most important. The first is the collapse of democracy throughout Europe, and the feebleness of the League of Nations. The settlement of Jews in Palestine was certainly considered as an international enterprise, in

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which Jewry throughout the world would take their share through their own governments. Nothing of the sort has occurred. Russia was, from the first, hostile to Zionism, and developed a rival colony. America never joined the League and though her Jews are vocal and highly critical of the English, their country has no desire for any commitments or responsibilities in the Near East. Apart from these two countries the Jews of the Diaspora live mostly in totalitarian states, with governments which are either anti-semitic or are merely interested in Palestine as a strategic point. Britain has, therefore, to carry on her Mandate without any real co-operation from outside, and there is no longer any European "public opinion" of real weight in which the Jewish leaders could make their influence felt. The early non-Jewish promoters of the scheme undoubtedly visualised a world in which the civilized governments would be friendly, and would have their interest stimulated by their Jewish nationals.

The second factor has been the growth of nationalist feeling since the war. Looking through the early pronouncements and publications connected with the foundation of the Jewish National Home, a striking feature is the small consideration given to the local Moslems, and their probable reactions to the scheme. There is an occasional mention of the "non-Jewish communities" who will remain in the country, but no suggestion that the Moslems, freed from Turkish rule, might develop nationalist ambitions of their own, or would be profoundly affected by the Pan-Arab ideas, which received such an impetus from the final stages of the war and from the subsequent events in Syria, Iraq, Arabia, and Transjordan. There was also a curious blindness to the difficulties which must always exist when two communities of different race, religion, and standards of living, attempt to exist and work side by side. The English ought to have had enough experi-

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ence of nationalist movements, and the Jews of racial divisions, to have expected trouble from the Moslems, but both seem to have decided that the Palestinian "native" was rather a poor fish, and the implications of the scheme were never worked out in that mood of rather cynical pessimism which is so necessary today.

The third miscalculation was in connection with land. This was the least excusable. Few people could have seen the growth of Fascism or the forms which it would take, and it was hardly inevitable that the Moslem inhabitants of the area carved out to form Palestine should have developed a nationalist movement so rapidly. But the elements of the land problem were apparent from the first. Unfortunately townsmen, especially politicians, always go wrong over agricultural questions. They are convinced that all land is productive, and that it is only ignorance or laziness which stops every farmer from intensive cultivation. They usually have exaggerated ideas about the value of farm crops and produce. The same English politicians who talked about some rather second rate barley-growing land in Iraq as the future wheat granary of the world were not unlikely to make mistakes over Palestine. The Jewish leaders were equally ignorant, and had every temptation to be even more optimistic.

Let us first consider the site of the Jewish National Home in 1922. "Palestine," as demarcated, is about the size of Wales, and like Wales has a core of bare hilly country. There is evidence that these hills were once wooded, and more valuable, but most of the soil has been washed away and would take centuries to restore. There were valuable areas of fertile soil, especially in the North, and these were cultivated according to ordinary eastern standards, by a rather lowly class of Moslem peasant, used to pretty drastic Turkish rule, and much imposed upon by a landlord and money-lending class of their own co-religionists. This is a sufficiently

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familiar type of rural economy in the East. In 1922 it was certainly not at its best, after a war and the collapse of the Turkish Government. Along the sea coast there is a belt of varying width, much of which is suitable for citrus-growing under irrigation. This belt had been patchily developed, e.g., round Jaffa, but was obviously capable of extension if capital and markets were available. There were few industries, but there was a resident Jewish and Christian population, living mostly by trade or on subsidies from abroad, which they received for various kinds of religious services. The country supported a population of 757,000 of whom 84,000 were Jews. A few of the latter were immigrants working in the old Zionist colonies, founded under Turkish rule.

Nobody in 1922 had any very clear idea about what the National Home would look like in twenty years time, still less after half a century. "Respite finem" should have been written up over every Government office and Zionist committee room. The British Official probably envisaged a small scale experiment in settling Jews on the land, coupled with a number of cultural developments, such as a University, which would make Palestine into a nominal centre for the Jews of the Diaspora. It was not expected that immigration would be on a large enough scale to make any serious difference to the millions of Jews in Germany and Eastern Europe, nor did the English foresee the great wave of anti-Semitism which was to make the question of immigration into Palestine so urgent and bitter. The first immigrants arrived, all picked enthusiasts, well provided with money and very independent in outlook. The local officials thought the new-comers could look after themselves, and confined their attentions to the Moslems, whose standards of intelligence and civilisation were more suited to our ordinary colonial administration.

Scattered about England are various agricultural estates,

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now semi-derelict, which mark the passing of some wealthy business man, who took a fancy for large-scale model farming. The villager will tell you sadly of the magnificent crops he grew, the fine stock he kept, the large staff he employed. International Jewry similarly looked upon Palestine as an estate. Wealthy business men, long divorced from the land, were quite prepared to lose money over its development, and they fully expected the local inhabitants to be duly grateful. In the thirteen years which followed 1922, the Palestine Foundation Fund and the Jewish National Fund spent about £10,000,000 on land purchase and the settlement of immigrants, while private investments by Jews amounted to about £80,000,000. During this period some 250,000 Jews from Europe or the Yemen came to Palestine. The settlement has therefore been at the rate of about £40 a head of public money, of which most must be written off as irrecoverable—drainage of swamps, industrial experiments, and health services. Besides that there has been a private investment of about £320 a head, much of which is probably uneconomic.

The local Moslems have certainly benefitted by much of this expenditure; to a small extent directly, by such operations as draining malarial marshes; but much more indirectly, by the employment given through industrial and other developments, and by the revenue which Zionism has provided for the Government. The demand for labour has drawn in Moslems from outside the country, especially from Transjordan. Between 1922 and 1935 the non-Jewish population has increased by 39.7 per cent., a rise which must be partly due to immigration. During the same period the Palestinian revenue has trebled, the budgeted income rising from £1,800,000 to nearly £5,500,000. International Jewry could claim that they have acted as enlightened and admirable landlords for their new estate, but they have failed to win

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the least gratitude or even respect from the original inhabitants.

There are several reasons for this failure. The benefits which the Moslem community owe directly to the Zionists are comparatively small, and those which have accrued through the Government would not be ascribed to the newcomers. Also the Government, owing to the peculiar nature of the population, is expensive and over-staffed for the size of the country. Taking a long view, it would have been an economy if some portion of the millions poured into the country could have been spent in such a way as to produce some visible and undeniable benefit to the old inhabitants. But the Zionists had to show immediate results. The spread of anti-semitism after the war was an added incentive to press for larger quotas from countries like Poland, and later from Germany. It became a point of honour amongst settlers with capital to employ Jewish labour, and though the total volume of employment increased sufficiently to improve Moslem chances of getting work, the poorer classes would hardly be expected to bless the Jews for the new factories, any more than the Bengali coolie thanks the Scotsmen who introduced the jute industry. In both countries the peasant accepts the higher wages and urban conditions only under duress.

If the Zionists had gone in for agriculture chiefly as landlords or proprietors, this side of their activities would have aroused little opposition. Before the war there were some Jewish wine-producers living on the most friendly terms with their neighbours. But the new Zionism entailed putting Jews directly on to the land, a much more delicate operation, even in a country which is not fully developed. The fellah was well used to landlords, money-lenders, and other capitalists who take their "rake-off" from farming. He has no fondness for these gentry, who were as rapacious and as unsatisfactory

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as most of their kind in the East. The early "Benjamite" Zionists came and bought up vineyards and orange groves, and modernised them. The fellah, who merely changed his master, was better off and knew it. But when a colony was founded in the ordinary arable parts after the war, and the land was not only bought but worked by immigrants then the fellah, even if he got a bit of compensation was upset. He had to find a new bit of land which was difficult, or find a new master, either on a farm or in some other job. There were possibilities of a grievance, even if not a very serious one.

The Zionist estates are roughly of three kinds. There are the citrus plantations in the coastal belt, the mixed farming settlements in the plains, mostly in Esdraelon, and a few odd properties in the hilly country. The first have done the Arab no harm, and the country much good. The land which grows oranges is sandy and of little value for any other purpose. Orange cultivation requires capital for irrigation, preparation marketing, and for the long waiting period. The displacement of Moslems was negligible, and far more than compensated for by the simultaneous development of Arab citrus-growing helped by the opening up of new markets for "Jaffa" oranges, and by the prosperity brought to the belt. In 1922 some 7,500 acres were planted, of which a third belonged to Jews. By 1935 the citrus area had increased to 70,000. Of this rather over 30,000 belonged to Arabs, and the rest to Jews. This orange growing is more like factory development, taking up a comparatively small acreage and bringing great prosperity. If Zionist agriculture had been confined to the narrow coastal belt, no difficulties would have arisen.

Apart from the citrus-growing land there are about 2½ million acres which are classed as "cultivable," though much of it rather poor. This is about a tenth of the arable and pasture area of England. The Mandate stated that the

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Administration "shall encourage.....close settlement by Jews of the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes," but in Palestine as in India there was little cultivable land over which no one had any claim. Even the swamps, like the Huleh, had claimants with rights which had been granted by the Turks. In practice, Jewish settlement has been entirely by purchase, and the total area in Jewish possession is now about 310,000 acres, of which 40,000 are in the citrus belt. The Jews have thus obtained about an eighth of the cultivable land. A quarter of the holdings are under the Fund, the rest are private. In them the cultivation is done almost entirely by Jews, and though of a higher standard than that of the surrounding country it is, apart from orange-growing, not of a nature to bring any material benefit to the neighbouring Arabs. It is the extension of the mixed farming settlements which is considered by the Moslems as a danger.

The Jews, of course, paid extremely heavily for their estate. They bought bare land in poor condition at rates usually above those of English farm land *plus* buildings, etc. £40 to £50 an acre was quite common, and in theory the dispossessed owner, investing the money at the current local rate would have got more in interest than he ever got off the land. Unfortunately it seldom worked that way. The cultivator was usually either a tenant, or was virtually a tenant because he was in the hands of a moneylender. As in India, compensation for acquired land mostly goes into the pockets of the landlord *cum* moneylender combine. The cultivator is stranded with a small amount of ready cash, of which he seldom knows how to make any good use, and which he certainly will not invest to advantage. He probably lives on the money for a bit, then goes to get work. The landlord invests his cash, possibly outside the country, and probably outside the industry. The Zionist movement

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has therefore tended to produce a class of rentiers, ripe for political intrigue, and to turn a certain number of tenants or freeholders into labourers. Our land revenue settlement in Bengal had the same effect, and with the same result.

Indian experience during the last century suggests that two communities, of different religion, race, and habits can live together peacefully enough, but they are likely to quarrel when certain conditions are present, and that once they start quarrelling then it becomes a bitter and hopeless religious feud. The conditions are—(1) an economic clash of interests, especially over land, as in the Punjab; (2) different standards of living, and rates of wages for similar work; (3) the possibility of obtaining future control of the administration, as in those Provinces like Bengal where the voting strength is fairly equal; (4) the existence of leisured classes, such as landlords or priests, with time to agitate. Now all these conditions exist in Palestine. The agricultural economic clash has been touched upon. In the towns the European Jewish labourer or factory worker is on about a three to four shilling a day standard as against the Moslem one shilling to two shillings. The proposal for a Legislative Council has quickened up political activity, just as the introduction of the new Constitution has done in India. There is a natural tendency for each group to peg out its claims in advance, and in doing so to magnify as much as possible its importance and capability of giving trouble if thwarted. Finally, in Palestine there is another factor which has recently begun to make itself felt in Northern India. For some years vague ideas of a great Moslem Empire have been floating round the Punjab, appealing chiefly to the educated young men. They picture a Moslem bloc, stretching from the Sutlej, north-westwards through Afghanistan, Persia and somewhere into the beyond. In Palestine the Pan-Arab movement has a similarly disturbing effect. Young men of the rentier

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class like to dream dreams, and in the present state of the world, who knows what new patterns may not be shaken in the kaleidoscope of the Middle East.

In these circumstances it would be foolish to imagine that the feud, having once started, is likely to be easily or speedily settled, or that we can afford to be pedantic over "rights" and "wrongs." The Palestine business is a real tragedy, a conflict between right and right. The first essential is to cut down the element of uncertainty. The Moslem seeing no end to the rapid increase of the Jewish population, is genuinely afraid of being swamped under the rising flood, and of his co-religionists becoming a second-rate people living under Jewish masters. Before the war they might have accepted such a fate, but for reasons sufficiently obvious to anyone who has spent any time in the East, they are not likely to do so now. Within a comparatively short time any form of democratic government, weighted in favour of wealth and education, would be liable to give the Jews control of the Government. The political as well as the economic objections to further Zionist immigration are clear enough, and however much one may despise the Palestinian equivalent of the Indian *zemindar* it would be a mistake to underestimate his potentialities for making trouble.

Returning to the Commission and its tasks, its main duty will be to remove or mitigate the underlying conditions which experience in other parts of the East suggest are likely to lead to communal trouble. Obviously Palestine, owing to its size and existing population, was not a very suitable future "Home" for the Jews. A larger and less occupied area would have been better, but presumably the Commission will not discuss a possible extension of boundaries. Within the present limits, the only hope will be to lay down a long-term political and economic programme, so that both sides will know where they stand. Agitation flourishes in uncertainty.

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The second need is one not likely to be popular amongst "men of good will," but the writer believes that it is necessary in the present state of the world. It is a policy of partial segregation. The realist Turk, in his intransigent mood after the war, decided that he could not have a communal problem in his country, and expelled the Greeks. It was a summary and brutal proceeding, but by no means unsuccessful. It is not at all certain that "the more people see of each other the better they will like each other." It may be true of people prepared to marry, feed and worship together, but not otherwise. Palestine is perhaps too small a country to be "cantonized," but something could be done in that direction to ease the situation. We must assume that the Palestinian Moslems are not going to dwindle away like the Red Indian, be absorbed or converted, like the Jews in England, accept an inferior political and social position, like the Negroes in the Southern States, or consent to be expelled *en masse* like the Greeks from Turkey. They have to live somewhere, and it would be best if Jews and Arabs had certain areas which were predominantly Jewish or Arab, in their standards of living, local government, and general arrangements. There must be other parts common to both, for Palestine is a small country but some segregation would help. The Moslem who does not like the sight of Polish women working next door to him in blue "shorts," or would be miserable in Tel-Aviv, should have areas where he could be amongst his own kind. His son may be more broad-minded, but there is an intermediate period when the two civilisations, in their more extreme forms, had better be kept apart.

I should therefore suggest that the long term policy should demarcate limits for the Jewish settlements, allowing them most of the coastal belt, but not much further development in the fertile arable land. Certain towns, notably Tel-Aviv, should be recognised as entirely Jewish, and a considerable

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claim might be made for Haifa. I have often felt that it would have led to clearer thinking, and saved a lot of trouble if the "Jewish National Home" had originally been defined as a comparatively small part of Palestine, in which the immigrant Jews could have established themselves rapidly as the overwhelmingly predominant race. Their extension into surrounding countries, such as Transjordan, could have taken place quietly through ordinary economic processes, without raising immediate political difficulties. Jew and Arab could have come to terms, if left to bargain on equal terms, but trouble was bound to follow the claim of the whole of Palestine as a National Home, and the idea of the early settlers that they represented a vast undefined group of Jews scattered throughout the world. This implied that any Jew could go to Palestine as a "right," and though in practice the Zionists had to recognise the claim of the Mandatory power to control immigration, the threat of wholesale immigration is an important factor in Moslem discontent. A long term policy might define carefully the extent of immigration into certain areas of Palestine, while allowing a far more elastic policy with regard to the predominantly Jewish parts. The growth of Tel-Aviv or of some industrial centres seems to be a matter for Jews only, but the spread of Zionist plantations southwards towards Nablus is of undoubted interest to the Moslems.

The future of the central Government might also be made easier by some process of demarcation. At present we are in the difficult position of denying the right of the majority to self-government in a mandated country, which borders on Syria and Egypt, both of which have just received very full measures of autonomy. The Moslem object is to gain control of the Government, and with it of the emigration laws, while they still have a clear majority of well over two to one. (The Jews are just under 30 per cent. of a population

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which now amounts to some 1,315,000.) The only possible way out of this dilemma, a dilemma which time will not cure, is that any democratic central government must be more like a Federation, leaving very large powers to two or three local governments, of which one must be definitely Jewish. The fact that the whole problem is on such a tiny scale only adds to the difficulty, but it is noteworthy that in Syria the French are breaking up the country into small autonomous units, and it is far better to create an Ulster than to leave unsettled a hopeless unending squabble.

THE B.B.C.

By H. L. BEALES

PERHAPS the world would have been a better place to live in without the internal combustion engine and communication by wireless. No one denies the importance of these great inventions, and the days before their advent seem now as remote as the Age of Reason. No one denies that the former offers immense advantages to the elderly, the obese, the adventurous, indeed to all who value speed of transit, especially speed without personal effort: no one denies that the latter has contributed to the liveliness of the young, the bored, the mentally immobile and the mystically situated. Nevertheless, these and all other necessary allowances having been made, what remains to be said in their favour? No one is going to take the motor fan's or the wireless fan's evaluations as a final social estimate of the worth-while-ness of these dubious amenities of our civilisation. Indeed that civilisation, and all the others which inescapably incur the processes of assimilation to it, are nearer to ruin on account of them than ever before. We may no longer contemplate either our cultural or our political heritage with equanimity. Threatened with disruption from the air, by wireless or aeroplane, or the dictator's combination of both, civilisation faces the task of discovering the technique of social control that will transform these things from actual or potential pests into agencies of communal welfare—or that will deliver them to us wholly and not just partially bound to the public good.

Cut out the jaundice and exaggeration from all such scepticism and a case remains for the reconsideration of the present value of more than these among the latter-day triumphs of our cumulative and irreversible technology.

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Let a candid assessment be made of the uses to which broadcasting has been and is being put—in Goebbels's Germany and Queipo de Llano's Spain, in Soviet Russia and Christian England—and complacency will be shaken. It has been shaken to some little extent and momentarily here in England. The impending renewal of the charter under which the British Broadcasting Corporation exercises its monopoly gave occasion for a recent stock-taking, but that process is so far from exhaustive that there is still room for extended discussion. This article represents an outsider's view of the present position, or some aspects of it by British Broadcasting. An outsider's view, necessarily. Officers of the B.B.C. are not free to speak their minds, any more than civil servants or the employees of banks, about the conduct of the organisation which employs them: inside information is not much available, therefore, though many folk pretend to have it. The Ullswater Committee did not penetrate the smoke-screen which enveloped all its deliberations—there are no revelations from it such as a Royal Commission turns up from time to time. Still, more facts are now known about the B.B.C. than ever before, dressed up though many of them are in the yellowest journalese in the unlikeliest "newspapers." In the two parliamentary debates, of April 29 and July 6, important new material was made public, and far-reaching suggestions of public policy were made. Captain Sir Ian Fraser, it is true, discounted the newspaper talk. "As soon as it (B.B.C. news) is considered sufficiently important to give it on the front page," he said, "one can be certain that it relates to some trivial matter. But the day-to-day criticism of the professional critics is enlightening, and it ought to be, and I hope is, of the greatest assistance to the broadcasting authorities." The facts surely are that the B.B.C. as an organisation is "news"—that is, exceptional events in connection with it are news—while the

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professional criticism of the newspapers is little more than programme comment and has some critical but almost no circulation value. The front-page matter that has appeared in the newspapers recently about the B.B.C. has definitely not been trivial, but its manner has had the usual features of quasi-American newspaper work, now so popular in this country. What has actually had intrinsic importance has been given the appearance of a mere *chronique scandaleuse*. It is necessary to sift it and use it: it cannot be merely brushed aside.

Broadly, popular judgment of the B.B.C., as reflected in the House of Commons, could be summarised in three phrases. "British broadcasting is the best in the world" is one: "The indispensable Sir John Reith" is a second: the third is "the B.B.C. is not a happy ship." The sum of these makes an inadequate and misleading judgment. If British broadcasting is the best in the world, there must be some sorry stuff about. British broadcasting has its virtues and they are not inconsiderable. But it has its weaknesses and some of its programmes latterly have had a dreariness beyond belief out of England. Who will ever forget its orgies over the death of the late King, and who does not shrink from its coronation plans? Its summer-time monotonies, its Sunday melancholia, its fanatical reverence for military bands, its British broadcasting may be the most grandmotherly in the world, but surely we are not going to boast about it. And Sir John Reith? Everybody knows that the history of British broadcasting cannot be written without its tribute to his remarkable work—as Major Attlee put it in the House of Commons, "he has put up a splendid resistance to vested interests of all kinds he has set high standards." But he should not on that account be again named in the Charter: he is definitely not the only conceivable head of Broadcasting House. It

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is, indeed, likely enough that his best work has been done—that he is better at building up an organisation than maintaining it over a long period; that his personality is too dynamic for so dictatorial a position as the present constitution of the broadcasting service accords him. Anyhow, there are plenty of other spheres of the public service where his great gifts could be most effectively and profitably employed. What a magnificent controller, for example, of a national or nationalised munitions industry he would make. As for the ship whose unhappiness is often laid at his door, let it be remembered that no organisation so big as Broadcasting House can be void of intrigues and strains and stresses, and let it be remembered, also, that the B.B.C. carried the heaviest crew of isolated intellectuals of any vessel in British waters. If the angel Gabriel were to take over the Director-General's job, even he would have his work cut out to keep his ship anything like happy. Abuse of Sir John Reith is not called for—nor is the legend of indispensability reasonable. Nor is the unhappiness of the ship the sort of fact which, in isolation, has great public importance. It is the combination of these things in new proportions which matters.

It is a truism often neglected that broadcasting is primarily a consumer's, not a producer's or a politician's, service. Sir John Reith once shocked folk by bluntly declaring that his job was to give people what was good for them. The antithesis between people's wants and their supposed needs is often made by superior people but it is not very helpful. Is there, it may be asked, any country, fascist or communist or democratic, in which people's wants could be allowed to determine their broadcast programmes? The trouble is that there is no means of discovering what people do want. The B.B.C. mail is carefully analysed, but no critically minded person can believe that it offers any real guide to public

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preferences. The last time I broadcast I received a letter of abuse to which the author refused to append his name because on a previous occasion when he had done so his dog was poisoned. On another occasion Sidney Webb told me I had been "dull" and George Lansbury that my talk was "admirable." Only a census of listening could reveal the listener's preferences: at present he is unknown. When a growing volume of criticism, as of our astonishing Sunday programmes, achieves the quality of continuous pressure, the B.B.C. has had to take notice of it. What can be said confidently is that the B.B.C. has not been very successful in devising means by which the continuous consultation of the consumer is assured. The discussions in the House of Commons were punctuated by expressions of praise of the Director General alternating with criticism of the neglect of the listener. The criticism took two forms. One was of the type of persons selected as governors; the other of a lack of imagination regarding what Sir P. Hannon called "the listener or the man in the street." He demanded "wide respect" for "the general feeling of the public" and suggested that very great care should be taken in the composition of advisory committees. The Crawford Committee in 1925 had recommended the appointment of such committees "in consultation with appropriate societies and organisations" and the Ullswater Committee confirmed that recommendation. "We are anxious," says the Ullswater Committee, "to secure representation of the views of the general public as well as of experts in each category of Broadcast subject." That anxiety is not misplaced. The B.B.C. has not made a success of this part of its work.

There is one B.B.C. department which is to some degree an exception to this statement. The schools broadcasting section has been conspicuously successful in maintaining a high quality of service. That success is due both to the

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enthusiasm and sense of responsibility of those in charge of it and to the effective work put in by the schools advisory committee. To broadcast to schools is no mere job of putting words on paper and reading them aloud—the matter and the manner are disciplined with unquestionable skill, and talks fit into series carefully planned at both ends, so to speak, of the microphone. The oversight may be a little fussy. An undue sensitiveness once demanded of me that the adjective "bug-ridden" should precede the noun "houses" in a description of the physical scene at Moscow, and my poor manuscript was bruised and battered and pruned and mauled before it finally passed its censors. But I was told how to do the microphone part of the work with admirable persistence. School broadcasting is, however, a special case. Its audience is visible, regulated, calculable and articulate. It is not so with talks for adults. Play used to be made with stories of unexpected listeners—the errand boy whistling an air from an opera, the night watchman discussing Desmond McCarthy's criticisms of books. But no exact information was available, and the B.B.C. now seems to be throwing up the sponge in regard to adult education. It has had an Adult Education Council, composed of active representatives of the various organisations working in that field. It is no secret that the internal B.B.C. opinion of that body was not high, and it may be not altogether unjustifiably so. The adult educationists perhaps never gave the B.B.C. the same sort of help that was available in connection with schools. Equally, there was never any very obvious sign that the "higher-ups" (that is a familiar term in Broadcasting House) of the B.B.C. either understood or believed in adult education. Indeed it seemed to embarrass them. It demanded talks of an adult stature, controversy and all, just as it had them in university tutorial classes and other adult educational units. It disliked the feeble grandmotherliness that fought shy of full-blooded

adult education. All the same, progress was being made and programmes were becoming attractive. The *Listener* is sometimes dismissed as a dreary periodical, a sarcophagus of dead verbiage, but to look through a file is an interesting experience. It shows a curve of steady improvement and latterly a flop of sheer exhaustion. Not only has there been a serious falling-away in the quality of the adult educational service of the B.B.C., there has been no considerable success in developing the listening groups. In adult education the wireless listening group, given effective leadership, can be a stimulating educational agency. The B.B.C. was willing to foster this development until lately. Now it seems anxious to pass it on—to the British Institute of Adult Education, or to the adult educationists themselves. This confession of failure is regrettable because the failure was not necessary. It reflects an unwillingness really to co-operate with the established bodies in adult education. That unwillingness is the B.B.C.'s own fault, and it reflects a change of policy and attitude of recent growth. Can any observant person doubt that the present regime at Broadcasting House is primarily concerned with "safety" in its talks programme?

The most conspicuous failure of the B.B.C. in its service to listeners has not been in education merely. It has been in its conception of the functions of the Regional stations. Why is it necessary for Wales at this late date in broadcasting history to complain that it has no distinctive service? "It is very galling to us," said Mr. Ernest Evans in the House of Commons, "to find such a large proportion of the programmes which are available to the Welsh people contributed in the English language." That is a somewhat parochial way of putting a very real point, and a point relevant to all the regions. The blunt truth is that the regional policy of the B.B.C. is sheer paternalism. Starved of finance, of programme time, of initiative and responsibility, the Regions are

reduced to mere shadows of what they ought to be. They ought to be centres and agents of the rich local cultures of the country. They ought to be able to provide real alternatives to the national programme. They are cribbed, cabined and confined within the monopoly of Broadcasting House. The Ullswater Committee failed adequately to get to grips with this problem of the Regional stations. Fobbed off with financial or administrative negatives, they failed to realise fully either the extent of the Corporation's failure in this field, or the opportunity of broadcasting progress that the encouragement of Regional development would bring, or the possibilities of pruning the monopoly of some of its more doubtful features, which the enlargement of Regional autonomy would ensure. Doubtless Broadcasting House could put forward the brightest-sounding reasons why Regional independence would be disastrous. Nothing ever looks so logical and tidy and economical as centralisation! But those reasons would fade out into nothing more than the special pleading of bureaucrats if Broadcasting were regarded as a cultural service primarily. It is the fear of the unexpected—especially the politically unexpected—that makes some people boggle at the idea of Regional autonomy. There is, perhaps, an unstated major premiss behind the Ullswater Committee's failure to get this problem into true perspective. Let the validity of that major premiss be admitted, even if only for the sake of argument—let it be granted that reasons of state demand a unified control of broadcast stations. That does not necessitate, all the same, a complete centralisation of administration and direction. The necessary unification could be effected through a special minister for broadcasting, or through some sort of federal constitution, or in other ways. But the case for a vastly enlarged responsibility and an effective autonomy in the Regional stations is written large in the programme deficiencies inseparable from the

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present system of centralisation. It is satisfactory that reform in this field is promised by the Government, though Major Tryon's very careful statement was altogether too deferential to the Corporation. "I am glad to say" he reported, "that the B.B.C. agree with the recommendations of the Ullswater Committee that the present policy of decentralisation and of including a good proportion of regional programme material should be continued."

It is impossible to discuss the present and future of the broadcasting service without reference to the producer's problems. Programme builders have a difficult job, a far more difficult job than the engineers whose problems admit of exact statement. They have to function creatively as units in a vast machine. It requires little exercise of the imagination to realise that all Sir John Reith's genius will be required to fashion an administrative machine in which creative impulses can have anything like free play. Actually the inner life of the B.B.C. has been shrouded in mystery till lately, but more has been heard of it in the last six months than in the whole of its previous history. There are people who say that what goes on inside Broadcasting House is not of public concern. That is a narrow view. Sir Stafford Cripps made a very trenchant and impressive exposure of the Reith system on April 9, and Mr. Lees-Smith followed that up with a most moderately phrased but very emphatic criticism on July 6. The facts brought forward, and those unstated, led Mr. Lees-Smith to raise the whole question of the relationship of Parliament to the B.B.C. There is very real importance in his recalling the contingent powers of Parliament—"this House has very wide powers over the Corporation if it wishes to exercise them"—and his reminder that the self-denying ordinance, deliberately imposed upon themselves by the Government and the House of Commons, carries corresponding obligations upon the Corporation.

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Among those obligations are some that are inherent though not necessarily written in any constitution. The gravamen of the parliamentary and the press criticism of the present system of administration in the B.B.C. is that it is tyrannical, and in being tyrannical paralyses creativeness and impairs the quality of the broadcasting service.

The fullest consideration should be given to the facts adduced in Parliament about the staff problems of the B.B.C. Mr. Lees-Smith, in between the first debate and the second, made a prolonged private examination of the problems of staff administration. The qualities that made him so admirable a choice for membership of the Savidge Tribunal a few years ago were available to guarantee the integrity of his methods and his judgment. He reported that "the difficulties and a large part of the unhappiness of the institution—I can assure the Postmaster-General that the B.B.C. is not what I call a happy ship—arises from the conditions of the more purely administrative technical staff who can reasonably ask to be put on other terms . . . It is insecurity of tenure which leads to so much effort being wasted in wire-pulling and intrigue You do not get efficiency from men who live in fear." Add to this the equally well-grounded and careful statements of Mr. Attlee, like Mr. Lees-Smith a former Postmaster-General and therefore an especially sensitive critic, and additionally qualified to speak with authority in that he had made vital reservations to the Ullswater Report on the conditions under which the B.B.C. staff does its work. The Director-General of the B.B.C. "is a very remarkable man," he said. "Sir John Reith has done immense service for the B.B.C. He is a man of very great strength but I think he has some defects of his qualities I think that he tends to be dictatorial and a little impatient of criticism. Like many men of his great ability, he rather likes to be surrounded by 'yes' men. I think that he tends to rule a

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little by fear, and this inevitably kills creative work. The danger of an organisation like the B.B.C. is that it may sink into a level of respectable and gentle dulness, and get too much the imprint of one personality . . . I am sure that at the present moment it is not a happy staff. It is not a staff that is doing its best, because the members of it do not feel free to develop their personalities and express themselves. They are held down by a very strong personality."

It is not to attack Sir John Reith that attention is drawn to these statements. The intention is to show the connection between the administrative system of the B.B.C. and its primary function of delivering to the public a good broadcasting service. As with all large organisations, administration has become an end in itself and a sort of megalomania has taken its abode among the "higher-ups" of the B.B.C. The epidemic of "resignations," including high-salaried officers and those of lower grading, and the probability of more to come, have more than a personal and more than an administrative significance. They affect broadcasting. So far the B.B.C. has managed to get away with the slogan, "British Broadcasting the best in the world." Or it asks folk to remember how much worse it might be. But the creative staff of the B.B.C. are concerned with how much better British broadcasting could be—only they must never say so! It is possible, in a general sort of way, to label the deficiency in our broadcast service which results from the existing system of paternalism. It is that it is out-of-step with libertarian democracy. It was not so to the same extent four or five years ago: it is so now. Staff uneasiness is a symptom of this, for ability and servility will not always march together, and the onset of an authoritarian regime is bound to cause personal troubles. The older architects of broadcasting have gone or are going—only the Director-General remains, and his is almost the only name that the

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public now knows. The training scheme recently described in the press, through the operation of which the Corporation will have a duplicate personnel available for key positions was dressed up in military terminology. That was revealing. So is the "disciplinary" quality of a system that asks a man to work under the permanent threat of immediate replacement. Duplicate personnel spells ease of dismissal.

It is not difficult to substantiate the charge that the B.B.C. does not conceive its function in democratic terms. It was a decision of the responsible B.B.C. officials, for example, to have neither fixed times nor fixed days for their adult education talks. Thus the group-listening movement, which is the Corporation's own contribution to adult education, would be severely handicapped. Only the undeviating opposition of the Archbishop of York and the Adult Education Advisory Committee, of which he acted as chairman, checkmated this decision. It is said that the relevant controller refused to attend the decisive meeting of this body and remarked that he did not understand what the adult education movement is. The story may well be apocryphal, but it is revealing all the same. Another instance may be taken from school broadcasting. Earlier in this article appreciation was expressed of the work of this branch of the B.B.C. That praise may be qualified by a recognition that the schools department increasingly arrogates to itself a centralising function which is in direct opposition to the broad principle of decentralisation upon which English education has its foundation. The B.B.C. has announced lately that it is considering the extension of its functions by Saturday talks to teachers on their subjects and their methods of work. The B.B.C. claims that it supplements but does not supplant the teacher. But is this claim true? There is evidence, witness the Carnegie report, that it is not. Consider, too, the method of programme building adopted in the

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B.B.C. A group of men, mostly of the same experience and background, spin ideas out of their own interests and attitudes. They are guided by no listener-research and their system of advisory councils is admittedly rudimentary. The controlling officials pose themselves, it is true, as "the custodians of English culture." Theirs is necessarily a hit-or-miss method. They are doubtless admirable people, but they function within a framework of paternalism which is alien to the central tradition of English culture. That tradition is libertarian. It functions admirably through its toleration of criticism, its throwing up voluntary bodies for all sorts of purposes, its capacity to use the committee method, its willingness to allow things to grow. It does not like paternalism. Paternalism acting on the B.B.C. programmes means the impoverishment of the broadcast service.

The B.B.C., in summary, has become a problem, and a problem of very great importance to those who care about the maintenance or enlargement of the libertarian tradition of English civilisation. Consider, for example, its behaviour over the report of the Ullswater Committee. That report was published in mid-March: simultaneously there was issued from Broadcasting House a printed white paper containing the observations of the Board of Governors on the Report. Was this mere tactlessness or was it arrogance? The Report was a report to Parliament, yet Sir John Reith and his associates had had a few weeks in which to digest it before it reached Parliament. How was that done? Is it true that one of the officials of the Corporation spent a couple of months in the early part of the year drafting and re-drafting passages till they became acceptable to the B.B.C.? Again, what witnesses did the Ullswater Committee call? Was Gladstone Murray called, for example? His name had, unfortunately perhaps, been suggested as a possible successor to Sir John Reith and he had had a dozen years in the Cor-

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poration. Was Mr. Roger Eckersley called, or Mr. V. H. Goldsmith, two of the pre-Charter officials? The programme division was represented by Colonel Dawney, popularly regarded as no more than the cleaner-up of B.B.C. radicalism and otherwise a most surprising appointment as Controller of Programmes. No woman and no junior official was called. Did the Ullswater Committee examine the corporation's Provident Fund to see whether it really gave fair treatment to departing officers, and did they observe the composition of its Board of Trustees? Did they scrutinise closely the forms of contract of service which employees must sign? Did they discover anything important about the relations of the Governors to the Director-General, or the equipping of studios so badly planned that they had to be abandoned, or the appropriateness to an expanding Corporation of the island site on which Broadcasting House stands? Did they discover why Radio Luxembourg and the rest are so popular in England? Did they discover the unrest in the programmes department that was prevalent all the time their sessions were in progress—an unrest that sprang from administrative ineptitude, amateurism and harsh conditions of work to which the various departments, music, variety, talks and the rest, were being subjected? Did they discover, to take an example, why Toscanini refused to broadcast a few months ago? Dozens of other questions to which inadequate answers are available suggest themselves, and the fact that there are so many of them throws light on the difficulties of devising the new charter for the B.B.C. Those difficulties are increased by the extent of the B.B.C. "patronage" and by the activities of its Public Relations Department. How much the B.B.C. had to pay for the purchase of the personnel of that department may only be guessed at, but its effectiveness may be seriously challenged—its effectiveness as measured by its handling

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of the Lambert case, and its necessity to an organisation that commands its own press as well as a monopoly of broadcasting. But that is only one example of many of the lavish administrative equipment of the B.B.C.

In any future constitution of the B.B.C. certain outlines are easily indicated. Parliamentary discussion has made that clear.

First, the office and personality of the Director-General must not be sacrosanct. Premature canonisation of anyone is inadvisable. The D.-G. must have a responsibility to parliament and his governors must be real and effective governors. Like the Colonial Office in days gone by, the B.B.C. has had, as it were, outworn general officers of the Horse Guards quartered upon it. Effective independence can be guaranteed by the avoidance of inquisitorial parliamentary questioning, but the annual debate has become a necessity and fuller accounts must be presented so that that debate can be real. Second, the position of the governors must be defined: their relationship to the Director-General must be known publicly and they must have controlled and regularised functions. The day of easy money for them must be over. One of them, or more, ought to be available for any staff associations that are formed as a sort of arbitrator or appeal court. Third, the expenditure of the income of the B.B.C. ought to be made public at regular intervals—not its mass of detail but its general outlines. Some sort of Treasury audit might be devised that did not handicap the B.B.C. but kept it up to scratch. Fourth, some sort of revision of conditions of employment in the B.B.C. is imperative. Paternalism calls for rigid limitation and effective safeguards can be introduced at this point. Fifth, there should be freedom of association. The value in this kind of organisation of staff associations may easily be exaggerated. The elements of healthy trade unionism are simply not known in the

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B.B.C., and it is probable that company or house organs would do more harm than good. But the constitutional right to combine should be guaranteed. Sixth, the full rights of citizenship should be specifically guaranteed to permanent employees of the B.B.C. The withdrawal under pressure of what might be called victimisation, as for example, of the right of access to the courts, should be permanently impossible.

Above all, a new inquiry into the B.B.C. is called for. It should be rapid, fearless and comprehensive. It should be secret. Present and former employees should be invited to give evidence under complete guarantees of immunity, and it should be carried on independently of the administration of the B.B.C. The partial uncovering in parliament of some undesirable features of the present system in the B.B.C. is most disturbing. Perhaps less than justice has been done to the Corporation. In the interests of everyone, consumers and producers, things should be straightened out. Only thus can confidence be generally felt that the new lease of life to be granted to the B.B.C. is wisely conditioned.

THE UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE BOARD

By A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS

THE mention of the Unemployment Assistance Board calls to mind controversies relating to the means test and to scales of allowances for the unemployed. No one would deny that these issues are of the first importance. This article is concerned, however, not so much with these topics as with the more fundamental questions which are raised by the extraordinary events of the last eighteen months. Within three weeks of its first appearance in public the operations of the Board led to the greatest fiasco in the whole history of social administration in this country. The existence of the government of the day was manifestly endangered by the working of the machine which it had created, although it had been said that one of the advantages of the scheme would be that it would take the question of payments to the unemployed out of politics. It is clearly worth while making some inquiry into the origin, powers and duties of an organisation which has had so unforeseen and so lively a career.

To do so it is necessary to recall the more important changes made in the provision for the unemployed since the war. Events before 1931 need not occupy much space. As a result of the increase in the scope of unemployment insurance in 1920, we found ourselves with a two-decker system of assistance for the able-bodied unemployed. Most workers became compulsorily insurable, and it was anticipated that they would, when unemployed, seldom have to resort to the poor law which remained as the second line of defence. From 1921 onwards, however, owing to industrial depression, a large proportion of the insurable unemployed were unable to qualify for benefit. In other words many of those falling

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within the insurance scheme soon ceased to be covered by the first line of defence. Had something not been done they would have been compelled to seek assistance from the poor law. But public opinion had undergone profound changes since before the war; a higher standard of provision for those in need was demanded, and in particular it was held that an able-bodied man in need, because he could not find work, was more deserving than other men in need, than those, for example, who could not work because of sickness. This is clear from the fact that public opinion was not disturbed by the payment to an unemployed sick man of a lower rate of benefit than to an unemployed fit man who in addition could claim allowances for his dependents. Further the poor law was still regarded with aversion quite apart from the amount of assistance available from that source. In view of the state of public opinion successive governments took measures whereby those who had lost their statutory right to benefit could nevertheless obtain assistance from the unemployment insurance fund under the title, first of extended, and later of transitional benefit. Another form of treatment for able-bodied unemployed was thus permitted to come into existence, but its existence was disguised; for in addition to those drawing benefit by right and to those receiving poor law relief on proof of need, there were added those who, as a concession, were granted benefit without proof of need but were kept nominally within the insurance scheme.

This is no place to dwell upon the pitiful lack of courage shown by successive governments which authorised borrowing to pay allowances to those who had fallen out of the insurance scheme, and maintained a sham two-decker arrangement in being when it was in reality three-decker. We pass to the setting up in December, 1930 of the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance which, it was

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hoped, would find a way out of a position that had become intolerable. The Commission issued an interim report in June, 1931, which dealt mostly with minor matters. This report was eclipsed by that of the May Committee on National Expenditure which was appointed in the spring of 1931. Working rapidly, the Committee made recommendations which were published in July, including, among other things, certain fundamental changes in the insurance scheme. These changes were made in October by the National Government by Orders in Council authorised by the National Economy Act. Of these changes all that need be said is that full recognition was given to the three-decker system by putting an end to the support from the insurance fund of those who were not entitled to statutory benefit. We had in consequence three classes of able-bodied unemployed, those in receipt of benefit, those in receipt of transitional payments on proof of need, and those in receipt of public assistance—the latter term having been substituted for poor relief in 1929.

This was a gain in the sense that it was no longer possible to ignore the existence of three separate kinds of treatment for the able-bodied unemployed. But in no quarter was there support for the continuance of this cumbrous arrangement which merely solved the immediate financial problem. The Royal Commission, which had not been able to exercise any effective influence upon the course of events during the first ten months of its existence, now found its opportunity; for it was agreed that no permanent reorganisation should be attempted until it had reported. Its final report, issued in November, 1932, is an admirable survey of the problem which well repays study. The Commission was required to make recommendations regarding (a) the future of the insurance scheme and (b) the arrangements which should be made outside the scheme for the able-bodied unemployed. The Commission observed that, in constructing a plan,

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there were three alternatives; the provision might take the form of (1) a payment on proof of unemployment without proof of need, (2) a payment conditional upon proof of need, or (3) a combination of insurance with a system of payments conditional upon proof of need. They rejected the first plan mainly on the ground that, in a society in which the State only employs a small fraction of the population, it is impossible to place upon the State the duty of providing a compensatory payment for all those who lose their employment in private industry. It is difficult to dispute the strength of this contention. The Commission also rejected the second plan, which, like the first, would have substituted a single scheme for a tripartite arrangement, on the grounds that it would compel all unemployed persons to prove need which was unnecessary since, if insurance was retained, a large proportion of the unemployed would not have to prove need before obtaining benefit. Therefore they accepted the third alternative. Though the first type of plan still has its supporters, the type recommended by the Commission is now very widely approved. The difficulty is to construct a satisfactory method of putting the plan into operation.

We need not concern ourselves with the problems of the insurance scheme; they are in process of being solved by the institution of the Statutory Committee which, under the chairmanship of Sir William Beveridge, is steering the scheme into smooth waters. Among the problems relating to the methods of assisting those without the scheme we need not concern ourselves either with the means test or with the actual scales of allowances. That the troubles which arise in connection with the first matter are not inherent in the existence of a means test may be seen from the fact that it is now widely applied in the operation of several social services, university scholarships and otherwise, and causes little difficulty in these cases. It is true that the fixing of scales of

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allowances must always be a troublesome matter ; but the fundamental question is upon whom shall be put the duty of assessing means and of making scales and not how means shall be assessed and what the scales shall be.

Some of the problems which arise, when deciding upon a plan, hardly admit of controversy. It is common ground that in the main the cost of the allowances must be borne by the central government and that the administration must be linked with the employment exchanges ; the former is necessary because unemployment is a national concern, and the latter is necessary because, unless the recipients of allowances register at an exchange, there are no means of testing their availability for work. In view of the fact that there are these fixed points which must appear in any plan, the suggestion arises that the Ministry of Labour should administer the discretionary payments through the exchanges. The chief objection which the Commission found to this proposal was that the Minister of Labour ought not to bear the direct responsibility for every decision. This is a powerful argument ; it is not desirable that a cabinet minister should become the chief relieving officer for the country and that Parliament should be reduced to the position of a Board of Guardians for the nation. For, however strictly unemployment allowances are kept apart from public assistance, the task of allotting them raises just the same problems and difficulties as faced the Guardians and now face public assistance committees. On the other hand, as the Commission very wisely remarked, " there is no way by which this question can be taken out of politics " ; as we shall see, of the two evils they preferred that it should remain in local politics. Meanwhile let us note that there is another objection to this solution quite as strong as, and perhaps stronger than, that which led the Commission to reject it. Within the present century there has been constructed a network of social ser-

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vices, relating to pre-natal, maternity and post-natal requirements, to the health, recreation and education of children, to child guidance, vocational guidance and choice of employment, to tuberculosis, venereal and infectious disease, to mental defect and mental disorder, for example. These services are administered by local authorities. The present condition of these services should not be represented in too rosy colours, but it remains true that we have laid the most promising foundations of a complex organisation whereby the very diverse needs of our people can be met by local authorities acting under central guidance. The strong point about these arrangements is that, because these needs are dealt with by one authority, the supply of the various treatments can be co-ordinated. Not only may the various members of a family have different needs, but the same person may have more than one kind of need at any given time ; and it is generally, if not always the case that, if the treatments are to be satisfactory, the various requirements must receive attention in relation one to the other. If the father is out of work, run down in health and losing his skill, the mother expecting an addition to the family, one child proving difficult at school and another showing signs of tuberculosis, it would be the height of absurdity that un-co-ordinated organisations, however efficient as specialist bodies, should each have a finger in the family troubles, make separate investigations into means and attempt to treat symptoms singly without reference to the rest of the family situation. But if the need of an able-bodied man arising through lack of work is treated by the central government, and his other needs and those of his family left to the local authority, there is lack of just that co-ordination which is essential to success. Further, to draw a sharp line between the needs of the able-bodied unemployed and of other persons is to create an unreal distinction ; not only may the former have subsidiary needs

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possibly related to lack of employment, but they may also become sick and so pass for a time into another category which is treated by another authority. Therefore, if an attempt is made to treat the unemployed separately, their subsidiary needs may be neglected, and there will be frequent transfers from the care of the central government to that of the local authority and back again. Let us not be misled by the fact that the insurance scheme is centrally administered and that this causes no difficulty. For insurance benefit is claimed as of right and not only when need has arisen; in actual fact it is probable that the majority of those claiming benefit could not prove need.

On these grounds, as well as on the grounds stressed by the Commission, the plan of placing the duty of making discretionary payments upon the Minister of Labour should be rejected. The next plan to be considered is that of placing the duty upon the local authorities. This solution commends itself at once on the ground that it would place the treatment of the needs of the unemployed in line with the treatment of other needs, and would render co-ordination possible. The Commission in fact recommended this solution, and advised the setting up of unemployment assistance committees by local authorities; since these new committees would be in the same position as the existing committees for education, health and other services, they would be free from any poor law taint. The obvious objection is that since the local authorities would only be finding at the most a small part of the money spent by these committees on making grants to able-bodied unemployed, they could not be left with full freedom as to how much in all they should spend. The Commission devoted very careful attention to this very important point. They recommended the allocation to local authorities, by the government through the Ministry of Labour, of grants proportional to the local burden of

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unemployment. They further recommended that the Minister of Labour should "be responsible for the general standard of administration," and should have power to reduce the grant to an authority which failed to maintain standards of good administration. The intention was to leave the local authorities complete freedom with regard to individual grants, but to maintain control over the total amount of government expenditure and to put a weapon into the hands of the Minister of Labour to be applied against authorities who in his opinion failed in their duties. So far as taking the question out of politics, the Commission was never under the delusion that it was possible to do this. Their plan left this question where it has always been, in local politics.

Admittedly it is no easy matter to devise a workable scheme under which, while the government finds the money, the local authorities possess real discretion as to the amounts which shall be granted to individual applicants. But the Commission believed that it could be done, and when a Bill was introduced which proposed a wholly different plan, it was not alleged by the government spokesman that the Commission's scheme was unworkable on these grounds. Why then did the government reject this solution? No clear answer is to be found in the speeches which recommended the scheme to the House, but it is probable that the authors of the government scheme believed that the local authorities could not be trusted to carry out so troublesome a task with efficiency. They may have been impressed by the occurrence of some scandals in connection with the administration of public assistance. But when a dispassionate survey is made of the manner in which the local authorities carried out their very heavy and difficult duties in relation to public assistance during the post-war period, the verdict must be that on the whole they acquitted themselves remarkably well. It is also clear that the authors of the government plan

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believed that the matter could be taken out of politics altogether. Lord Rushcliffe (then Sir Henry Betterton) said, during the debate on the second reading, that to make payments to the unemployed, who were outside the insurance scheme, the duty of the Minister of Labour, would be to transfer "the whole question of discretionary payments into national politics in a most acute fashion." So he rejected this solution. But he was not willing to leave the matter in local politics; he produced a scheme which it was hoped would relieve politicians, local and national, from responsibility for this duty.

What was this plan? If we neglect the small number of able-bodied unemployed who remain the responsibility of the local authorities, it transfers all persons of this class, who are not eligible for benefit, to the care of the Unemployment Assistance Board. Thus, like the plan put forward by the Commission, it substitutes a two-decker for a three-decker system. The novel part of the scheme is to be found in the constitution and powers of the Board. They are apparently modelled on the precedent of those public utility corporations which have proved to be able to run to the public satisfaction such services as docks, central electricity and broadcasting. Thus the Board has a large measure of independence, appoints its own staff and makes its own regulations which Parliament can reject but cannot amend. But the relative success of existing public utility organisations does not in fact provide any grounds for supposing that a similar organisation is appropriate for the purpose with which we are concerned. Passing over the not unimportant fact that existing public utility corporations derive their revenues from charges in the shape of dues, licences and so on, and have to make both ends meet from the funds so provided, we find that they were set up to perform services of a more or less technical kind. In the day to day running of docks and of electrical generation social and political questions

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do not enter. Therefore, in handing over such tasks to corporations of this kind, Parliament merely leaves to others the responsibility for duties which it is not itself well fitted to perform, but does not divest itself of the responsibility for any social or political problems. Broadcasting, however, is not altogether a technical service; from time to time it raises social and political issues of interest to everyone, and it is very pertinent to the present discussion to note that on this account it has been questioned whether a public utility corporation is altogether an appropriate instrument for this purpose. It will be remembered that the Royal Commission, which has recently reported, desired that there should be a greater opportunity than exists at present for discussion in Parliament of the problems of general interest which arise in the running of the broadcasting service.

In other words the transfer of broadcasting to a public utility corporation does not work without difficulty because the corporation has to decide on issues in which Parliament must continue to interest itself. When we come to the granting of discretionary payments to the unemployed, we find that it is not at any point an expert matter; it is not a task which, like the management of docks or electrical generation, requires the service of highly trained men belonging to a specialised profession. It is a straightforward job which, however, raises social and political issues that are of immediate and continuous interest to the community at large. They are precisely the kind of issue which in a democratic country the elected representatives of the people must themselves face and determine. Any attempt to shuffle out of this responsibility is doomed to failure; for no one is going to believe that Parliament is not responsible for the actions of a Board which it has set up and could at any time destroy. The question is whether this task of apportioning allowances which, though in one sense very troublesome, is within the

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comprehension of all, is to be assigned to Parliament or to the local authorities. If we adopt the latter course, that is if we follow our traditions, the matter remains, it is true, in local politics, but with the beneficial consequence that controversies are fought out in dozens of different areas by persons having special knowledge of the standards and requirements of the residents in those areas. To centralise the service, whether by making the Ministry of Labour responsible or by placing the duty upon a Board which all believe is merely a creature of the government of the day, is to canalise the controversies and to direct all the dissatisfaction upon Parliament which is likely to become the scene of periodical dog fights. The making of the question of allowances into a matter of national controversy exposes a tender point in the social structure to the draughts of parliamentary debate which is likely to turn it into a permanently running sore. Further, since this canalisation, by uniting small streams of discontent into a torrent, both increases the force and improves the aim of the malcontents, it is certain that the result will be to stimulate the making of objections, many of which may take their origin merely in a desire to embarrass the government of the day. In other words it creates a magnificent opportunity for trouble makers.

Thus nothing is gained by setting up a semi-independent board ; since there is nothing expert about its functions, it cannot perform its task better than other persons, and to the claim that the Board will provide uniformity of treatment it may be replied that, in view of the variations in social conditions and traditions throughout the country, it is latitude and not uniformity that is wanted. The fiasco of January, 1935, may be attributed to the attempt to fit all the clients of the Board with a suit of standard pattern and to the magnificent opportunity which was given for objecting to the process. On the other hand, as we have seen, the scheme has

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certain very unfortunate results of which one demands some further examination. It involves, as has already been mentioned, the arbitrary separation of the able-bodied unemployed from others in need, and the attempt to treat one kind of need in isolation from the other needs of these persons and their families. The result is an absurd duplication, the Board investigating and giving cash allowances to those out of work, and the local authorities investigating and treating persons, often belonging to the families of the unemployed, having other kinds of need ; this is accompanied by a continual see-saw of persons who one day are clients of the Board and another day fall sick and become the clients of the local authorities. It has been suggested that, in order to lessen the amount of see-saw, the Board should be given further powers to enable it, for instance, to care for its clients who fall sick. But this would only widen the field where duplication exists and would result in two forms of public medical service. It is clear enough that, if the powers of the Board were considerably enlarged, an intolerable situation would in time be reached, to escape from which either the Board must go on and assume all those functions which the local authorities now undertake in relation to the social services, or it must retreat. To let it go on would be in effect to destroy our system of local government ; for it would leave to local authorities little more than routine functions such as scavenging and the like. However much the reform of local government may be needed, no one desires its virtual destruction. But how can the Board be got to retreat ?

There are strong vested interests working for the preservation of the Board, and the prestige of the Government would be damaged if it had to strangle its baby. Could it not therefore undergo some metamorphosis ? The very title, Unemployment Assistance Board, is suggestive. For where does unemployment mostly require assistance ? The

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answer is of course in the special areas. These areas contain a very large proportion of the clients of the Board. Even the most dilatory government will be obliged before long to set up some effective organisation to deal in a comprehensive manner with the problems which these areas present. Why then should the Board not become the authority which is so badly wanted if the problems of these areas are to be solved?

What is required is the setting up, except in the special areas, of unemployment assistance committees of the local authorities acting under the Minister of Labour. These committees, financed by the central government, would be responsible for the able-bodied unemployed who had no claim to benefit and would have discretion as to the amount of the allowance to be granted. The Board, armed with enlarged powers, would function only in the special areas where the problem of unemployment is so vast that it cannot be solved by local effort and requires treatment by some authority backed by wide powers and national funds. There is here a field of most beneficial activity for the Board. At present it is a clumsy piece of machinery forced into the delicate and complicated organisation of the social services with which it can never form organic and harmonious relations. Unless it can be removed or transformed, it will endanger further progress in the building up, along the existing promising lines, of closely related and mutually adapted social services administered by local authorities. The laying of the foundations of the social services has been the outstanding achievement of the present century; it would be a catastrophe if, now that we are trying to build on them, they were destroyed by this inept invention which, without any adequate reason having been given, has been substituted for the machinery suggested by the Royal Commission.

FIVE YEARS IN THE UNIVERSITIES

By ISABEL BISSON

SINCE the constitution of the University Grants Committee in 1919 the publication of its quinquennial Reports has served as a periodic stock-taking for the Universities of this country. Those who have not been in close contact with University affairs since the War can hardly realise the admirable work of this Committee during the sixteen years of its existence. Appointed to act in an expert advisory capacity between the Treasury and the University institutions—sixteen Universities, three independent University Colleges and two Technical Colleges—in receipt of the annual Treasury grant, it has discharged its important and difficult function with remarkable tact and understanding, never forgetting its responsibility for the spending of a substantial sum of public money, yet always keeping a watchful and sympathetic eye on the developing activities and growing needs of the recipients. A fact mentioned in the present Report gives some indication of the Committee's sense of its dual responsibility. In 1930-31 the Treasury approved an increase of a quarter of a million in the annual grant to the Universities, an increase which, in the crisis of 1931, the Committee on National Expenditure proposed to discontinue. But the representations of the Grants Committee were so convincing and, in the words of the Report, "deemed to be so reasonable" that no cut was made in the annual grant, the Committee showing its appreciation of this concession by surrendering its accumulated reserve of £150,000 which would normally have been expended in non-recurrent grants to the Universities. At a time when public opinion was infected by a general sense of panic, this was a signal proof of the Treasury's confidence

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in the judgment of the Committee ; and, on the other side, it is common knowledge in the Universities that their interests could not be in better hands. That it can report "a very satisfactory measure of progress" during the past five years is in very large measure due to the wisdom of the Committee itself.

In considering the Report and its possible bearing on University policy it is well to keep two important points in mind. In 1934-35, the last year for which figures are given, the Treasury grants to the Universities accounted for nearly £2,000,000 out of their total income of just over six millions ; when other Parliamentary grants are added to this sum it amounts to £2,058,914 or 33.9 per cent. of annual income. It is a substantial amount, the right expenditure of which is a public responsibility ; and the work of the Grants Committee is a singularly happy solution of what might have proved a difficult relationship between the Universities and the State. Recent events in other countries have served to remind us here that the price of intellectual freedom is eternal vigilance, and few will question that the Universities are right in guarding their autonomy as jealously as they do. In the newer civic Universities any danger to such autonomy—and there is certainly some—comes rather from the pressure of local feeling than from a policy of Government control, the possibility of which, in the present state of public opinion, is very remote. It is therefore important to realise just how far the powers of the Grants Committee extend. The success of its survey depends on the willing co-operation of the University authorities, who supply statistics, reports, statements of affairs, and also arrange for the quinquennial visit of the Committee. The importance and extent of these visits is made clear by the fact that they occupied the time of the Committee between November, 1933 and May, 1935. In all 59 visits were paid, including each of the constituent

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units of such a University as London. "In the normal course of our visits," runs the Report, "we examined sites, buildings and equipment, we met the Governing Bodies and interviewed representatives of the professorial and non-professorial staffs, and we also met representatives of the students. In a word, we had full opportunities of discussing the position of each institution both at formal and informal meetings." On the knowledge thus variously acquired the Committee recommends the allocation of a proportion of the total Treasury Grant to each of the recipient institutions. While it is therefore true that these "visits are in no sense inspections," and in their give and take points of practice and policy are revealed and discussed far more freely than they could possibly be if everyone connected with the University felt that both they and their institution were on trial, there is at the same time a natural desire, even a compulsion, to seek the good opinion of the Committee and respect the findings of its published Report. It would be a bold University which pursued a policy running clean counter to the publicly expressed opinions of this most tactful of Committees.

University teachers, who are accustomed to speak with some authority on their own subject, do not always willingly accept the judgment of other people, even their colleagues, on the conduct of academic affairs. The composition of the Grants Committee is therefore of the first importance. Its nine members—eight men and one woman—have all had long and varied experience in higher education. It is enough merely to recall the names of its successive Chairmen : Sir William McCormick, Sir Walter Riddell, and now Sir Walter Moberly, once a don at Oxford, then Professor at Birmingham, Principal of a University College, and Vice-Chancellor of the largest modern English University outside London. Every one who has had any dealings with the Committee must share in its eloquent tribute in this Report

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to the tradition of magnificent work handed on by his two predecessors in office, and no less devotedly by Alan Kidd, the Secretary of the Committee from 1922 till his death in 1933. With so much collective experience among its members, removed as they now are from the daily and often confusing routine of academic work, the Committee is in an unequalled position to survey the whole field of University education. From their own knowledge they can follow the course of its historic development in modern times, from first-hand observation they can compare one institution or system with another; on every score their judgment is likely to be more fully-informed and more independent than that of University teachers and administrators who are primarily concerned with the detail of their own University and work. But it can hardly have the same intimate knowledge of actual working conditions, and it would be a poor compliment to this interesting Report to accept all its conclusions and suggestions without question.

About the facts set out in its opening section and the tables of statistics at the end there can be little difference of opinion. The picture they present is one of growth in every direction since the close of the previous quinquennium: five thousand more students; an additional five University institutions qualified to be put on the Treasury list; total annual income up by £898,000; a capital increase for endowments of £2,280,000; a sum of more than five millions expended on buildings and the acquisition of sites; an increase of 13 per cent. in the numbers of staff, including the founding of 83 new full-time Chairs, 33 of them wholly or partly endowed; a much needed rise of £50,000 in the annual expenditure on Libraries. The period has not been notable for constitutional changes, except the work of the Royal Commission on the University of Durham, whose recommendations for very considerable reforms are now being embodied in the necessary

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Statutes. Here, too, may be reckoned the creation, in 1929, of the central Court of the University of London, to which the Grants Committee has handed over the task of allocating to the various colleges their appropriate share of the University's block grant from the Treasury, and whose work in co-ordinating activities on the Bloomsbury site is perhaps the most remarkable development going on at the present moment. It is inevitable that the more spectacular features in the picture of University life should bulk largest in the public eye—the new Library and Laboratories at Cambridge, the Bloomsbury buildings, the great new Brotherton Library at Leeds. But every University in the country is feeling this ceaseless need for growth, and is keeping pace with it to a degree which is astonishing. The Report therefore does well to record how much is due to those generous private benefactors who make development possible. Five and a quarter million pounds is the munificent total of their benefactions in the present quinquennium, nearly half of which took the form of endowments. Everybody will endorse the Committee's opinion that "a University's general endowment fund is the surest foundation upon which to build its independence and stability," and fortunately there is no sign of any break in the long succession of those who have been willing to devote some part of their riches to secure this end. But the Committee suggests that it is not only the rich who might be asked and expected to help. There are obvious difficulties of organisation, and few professional men and women would welcome an increase in the number of societies and causes which claim their loyalty and their subscriptions; but it is no doubt true that more use might be made of the affection and gratitude of many graduates for their old University.

When the Committee turns to the "Needs and Problems" of the Universities, it gives by far the largest space to the

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consideration of the student population. There are few experienced University teachers or administrators who would quarrel with that proportioning of attention at the present moment. Since the beginning of the century the number of full-time students in England, Wales and Scotland has risen from 20,249 to 50,638, a figure which represents, in comparison with the total population of each country, in England 1 in 1,013, in Wales 1 in 741, in Scotland 1 in 473 : as a whole, 1 in 885. It is notoriously difficult to make any exact comparison with other countries, where the term University student bears varying meanings often different from ours. But approximate figures are given as : Italy, 1 in 808 ; Germany, 1 in 604 ; France, 1 in 480. Even allowing for a liberal margin of error, Great Britain as a whole, and England especially, come badly out of the comparison, and it looks as if there were a pressing need for increased facilities for University education. But it would be unwise to accept the obvious conclusion too readily. The delegates from the English Association to the International Conference of University Teachers held in June of last year at Grenoble could not fail to be impressed by the anxiety of the French and German delegates about the unemployment of their graduates. In this connection it is a significant fact, mentioned by the Grants Committee, that "in 1934 only some 16,000 students from secondary schools in Germany were allowed to enter the German institutions of higher learning as compared with something like 30,000 students in 1932." In this country the problem of the graduate who cannot find suitable employment has never been so pressing as on the Continent ; but it is worth noting that it is least serious in England, and that it has been and still is extremely serious in Wales, where, with a diminishing population, the number of students rose by nearly a thousand in the decade 1925-35 (1 in 1,005 to 1 in 741). In Scotland, with its long tradition of bringing

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University education within reach of all who can profit by it, and proportionately a larger outlet for University graduates in the professions, the great difficulty in finding employment in recent years has reacted on the number of students, which has fallen by 701 since 1928-29.

Other facts emerge which are clearly connected with this problem of future employment. While the total number of students has risen by five thousand, the number of women students has fallen by 864, almost entirely in Scotland ; and there has been a radical change in the distribution of students according to Faculties. Pure Science shows a rise of 1,315 ; Medicine one of 2,769 as against a *fall* of 2,610 in the preceding quinquennium ; while Arts, though still containing nearly half the total student population, rose by only 162, as compared with 4,644 between 1924 and 1929. The Report further notes, with approval, that the number of full-time advanced students has grown from 2,082 to 2,813, an increase of 35 per cent. in the period under review. It would indeed be surprising if, even with their increased numbers, the Universities had discovered 731 additional students capable of doing advanced work of such a kind that its pursuit is wholly justified by its intrinsic excellence. In fact, every University teacher knows that the numbers of advanced students have been artificially swollen by the unwillingness of those newly-graduated to join the ranks of the unemployed before they need, and that many have welcomed the opportunity of putting in a post-graduate year in the hope that their prospects would improve. The Universities may yet have to guard against the tendency of young men and women to hang on after taking their first Degree, collecting further paper qualifications but sometimes, in the process, becoming less and not more employable, if only because they are older. By that time, too, they often expect a better post than their abilities warrant, and set an entirely wrong value

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on the kind of "advanced" work they have been doing. There are, of course, many students who benefit immeasurably from a post-graduate year or years, even when they are never going to become experts and scholars in their subject. But the Committee's method of measuring this "important element in University progress" by counting heads must awake misgiving in those who know just how much—and how little—these heads may hold. Certainly no encouragement should be given to the production of bad Research, of which there is already more than enough in the Universities. It is only fair to the Committee to say that elsewhere in their Report they show themselves fully aware of this.

The new distribution over the various Faculties seems, on the whole, a healthy feature, though it remains to be seen how far the doctors and scientists now in training can be absorbed in their respective professions. It is significant that some Medical Schools are already inclined to limit the number of entrants, and many people will agree with the Committee's suggestion that each University should seriously ask itself what is the largest number of students it can effectively teach. University authorities have been known to refer to the "marginal student," which apparently means the last in number whom it pays that University to teach; and in their franker moments Colleges at Oxford and Cambridge admit that they have to fill their rooms with whatever entrants are available in order to keep the College going. But financial considerations, though of course they enter into the question, are not the sole or the right standard of measurement. It is at least open to question whether, in number of students, the Universities have not reached, or gone beyond, their maximum effective capacity for the moment. We are at last beginning to doubt whether the sensational development in a very academic kind of secondary education since the beginning of this century is in itself necessarily a good

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thing. It is often forgotten, except by those actively engaged in teaching, how many young people drift into and through the secondary schools without much purpose or interest, and having satisfied the modest requirements of school-leaving examinations equally drift into the Universities, with no intellectual vocation, and merely in search of a qualification for a job. How often has the weary University teacher heard the average and less than average student say that he "supposes he will have to teach"; and unfortunately, in spite of the laudable efforts of University Appointments Committees to open up new fields of graduate employment, the great majority do teach. And so the vicious circle goes on.

There are signs that the number of students may tend to stabilise itself about the present figure, but those 50,000 have to be reckoned with, and in asking whether they are receiving all that a University education should imply the Report puts a question which all University teachers are in practice forced to ask themselves every day. It is impossible, at present, to be satisfied with the answer; and although most is heard on this score about the Scottish and the modern English Universities it would be wrong to assume that Oxford and Cambridge are beyond help or criticism. In the last resort what a student gets from his University must depend on what he brings to it, and a disquieting number of those who enter our Universities are not ready or able to make the most of the opportunities offered them. It is naturally in the newer Universities that these opportunities leave most room for improvement, but conditions at Oxford and Cambridge have changed profoundly since the war, and an increasing proportion of their undergraduates are not very different intellectually or in social experience from their fellow undergraduates elsewhere. Broadly speaking, teachers are agreed in deploring the premature specialisation which has grown up in the higher school forms, partly owing

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to University Scholarship demands. The very best pupils thrive on it as they will thrive on almost any intellectual discipline, but the vast majority of those who enter the Universities are below that level. A large number of them are already tired, knowing a good many facts, often at second-hand and inaccurately, and without the slightest intellectual curiosity or real taste for the subjects they elect to study. In all the Universities the growth of Honour Schools has thrown the broader curriculum of the Pass Degree completely into the shade, and University teachers, themselves, it must be remembered, specialists in their subject, are being slowly brought to recognise that for many undergraduates, including some of parts and ability, a specialist training is far from being the best. Already several Universities are experimenting with carefully arranged combinations of subjects, designed to provide a more general education and allow full opportunity for distinguished work of a real University character.

In Scotland and the newer English Universities the last decade has seen a great development in social conditions and the training they may be expected to give their students as what this Report calls "a member of society and a human being." Though much remains to be done, Students' Unions, Common Rooms, Refectories, Playing Fields have been provided on a scale which is often splendid. A small beginning has been made with general health services, the need for which cannot be overestimated and on which a useful Report, showing the importance attached to this question by students themselves, was issued by the National Union of Students in 1933. University authorities, usually remembering their own Oxford and Cambridge days, have pushed on with a policy of building Halls of Residence, until there are now over 6,000 students housed in these. It is a system which the Grants Committee has always commended with force and eloquence, and nobody would deny that it has some of the

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advantages, real or potential, which its enthusiasts claim. But a Hall of Residence can never be a miniature Oxford or Cambridge College transported to the conditions of a modern industrial town, and, while it provides opportunities for the humanising intercourse which is rightly regarded as important, it also encourages a good deal of wasted social energy. A man or woman at Oxford or Cambridge can largely select occasions for contact with his fellows and enjoy privacy when he wants it. In a modern Hall of Residence, with its greater promiscuity, its fixed routine, its public meals and corridors of study bedrooms, the individual tends to become merged in the crowd and its activities. The effect can be the very reverse of that intended, and advocates of the policy of Halls of Residence should not consider those students merely unreasonable or unsociable who prefer even indifferent lodgings because of the greater privacy and independence they offer. Besides, the policy does not touch that half of the student population who live in their own homes, often travelling considerable distances daily to and from the University, some of them living under home conditions conducive neither to good work nor to a full social life. Yet among their number in every University are to be found some of the best all-round students of their generation.

However important the provision of social facilities, they obviously lose much of their value without a stimulating intellectual and personal contact between students and their teachers. Opportunities of meeting outside "working hours" are increasingly welcomed on both sides; but University opinion at the moment is focussing rather on the relative merits of a lecturing and a tutorial system. In the modern Universities lectures undoubtedly occupy too large a place, and there are grim legends of their being given in relays in Scottish lecture-rooms packed to capacity with a couple of hundred students. The pros and cons of the two

systems are set out in the Report with considerable fairness, but it seems to beg most of the questions it has raised when it concludes that "in most Universities, owing to the very great expenditure entailed, anything like a complete tutorial system is an ideal." All this discussion at present tends to make too much of the tutorial and too little of the lecture. Of course it is true that lectures should be good when given at all, that they should have—as they obviously can have—a real educational purpose and value, that not all good University teachers have the gift of lecturing. But there is some tendency to assume that the man who cannot lecture will be better in tutorial work, and that the quality of the teaching will inevitably improve if lectures are cut down to give him scope. There is, however, little danger that lectures will be abandoned as an integral part of the teaching system, but the compulsory lecture has fewer defenders, and this seems at least partly due to a misunderstanding of its commonest though not its only function. In every field of study there is a body of knowledge and criticism which all students must take into account and which can be most economically and effectively dealt with in lectures, however far they may pursue and supplement it in private tutorials. A "*complete* tutorial system" would be a sheer waste of time and energy, for teachers as well as students. With an *elite* of able and interested students it has admirable possibilities; under existing circumstances, it would involve much wearisome drudgery, endless repetition and spoon-feeding, devastating to the teacher and with no very clear advantage to the student. As a lively French observer remarked about the daily routine of some Oxford dons: "C'est un travail de femme de chambre."

The success of University education is likely to depend on the quality of its teachers more than on any other single factor, and in the last resort, though there will always be many

who choose this work in preference to anything else, the Universities must pay adequate salaries if they are to secure the right talent. It is therefore satisfactory to find a gradual rise in the status of University teachers and what the Report calls "a definite if modest improvement" in average salary. But University teachers may well hold that the position of the staff generally is less satisfactory than the Report might suggest to the outside reader. It notes, for example, an average increase of £16 in the salaries of lecturers since 1929: £455 to £471. It should be remembered that the vast majority of the lecturers of 1934-5 are those of 1928-9, grown five years older and on an average £16 a year richer. This grade of men and women, who have been anything from six years upwards in University teaching, admittedly offers the greatest problems in salary and status. Though the number of higher and better-paid posts shows a satisfactory rise, it is obvious that they must remain few in comparison to the large and increasing middle-grade, and the suggestion in the Report for meeting this position of stale-mate is not one that greatly commends itself to University teachers. It emphasises the benefits of a practice already in operation in some Universities, of fixing the size or proportionate size of this permanent lecturing staff, and only promoting from the probationary grade of young University teachers when a vacancy occurs or in cases of exceptional merit. Other "probationers," on this system, must leave at the end of three years' trial—in practice the period is often longer—while they are still of an age to find other employment, for instance in secondary schools. Without asking whether the secondary schools wish to become asylums for disappointed aspirants to University posts, there are other drawbacks. The majority of young men and women engage in post-graduate study before becoming lecturers, so that they tend to start about the age of 25 or over. At 28, still more at 30, it is growing

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late to change, especially when they have incurred responsibilities. It is common knowledge, also, that the policy of dismissal, failing the vacancy which seldom occurs just when it is wanted, involves a serious leakage of real ability and valuable experience. In the end this irreparable loss to the Universities must inevitably be increased by the unwillingness of young people to embark on a career which promises them no security for honest and able work.

All those who have first-hand knowledge of the Universities must share the opinion, so strongly conveyed in this Report, that under conditions of extreme difficulty they are doing admirable work of which the country has deep and urgent need. It seems likely that in the immediate future their task will be less to increase their size or number or multiply the subjects they profess than to strengthen their existing work and develop its usefulness with all the power they can command. It is therefore good to learn that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is making provision in the Estimates for an increase of £270,000 in the Universities vote, thus raising it to £2,100,000; and that the Treasury proposes to restore the reserve of £150,000 surrendered in 1931. No grant of public money is likely to be more carefully or more usefully spent.

SURVEYS

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAWS, CONSTITUTIONS AND
ADMINISTRATION:

ESTHONIA—COLOMBIA—ECUADOR—PORTUGAL—RUSSIA.

IN the sphere of social legislation we may begin by noting the creation of a "Chamber of Agricultural Workers and small Farmers" in Esthonia. The chamber was created by a degree promulgated on April 17 last and its task is defined as helping to ameliorate the position of small agricultural holdings and representing the interests of agricultural workers and small farmers. It is empowered to determine the conditions—general and local—of the agricultural labourer and the small farmer, to advise the competent authorities on the state of the agricultural property market, on the position of labourers and small farmers, and on legislation protecting their interests, to represent labourers and small farmers on public bodies, to develop agricultural technical education and the organisation of small holders, to create and direct bodies set up to serve their interests, to assist in the development of social assurance and to lend its aid in the solution of disputes.¹

The organs of this chamber are the general assembly, the executive and the committee of control. The chamber is composed of thirty-six members elected for a three-year period. The right to vote for thirty-two of these is given to all agricultural labourers and small farmers. On the other hand, four members who have the same rights as elected members are appointed by the Minister of Agriculture. The whole activity of the chamber is controlled by the Ministry.

In the Republic of Colombia a law regulating compulsory savings enters into force on January 1, 1937. This law affects all workers and salaried employees in the Republic's territory. The management of the compulsory savings system will be entrusted to a special section of "savings and social thrift," which will be created at the Savings Bank of Colombia. Representatives of employees and workers will be appointed

¹ *Informations sociales*, 1936, p. 498.

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by the government on the recommendation of trade unions and professional associations. The Bank is allowed to absorb existing insurance, superannuation and pensions funds, whether public or private, whose object is the levying of contributions; the Savings Bank of Colombia is now to take over their functions. The funds of the bank will be constituted by obligatory individual contributions and collective levies and contributions, that is to say, with the participation of employers. Workers will pay three per cent. of their wages and salaried employees two per cent. of their salaries. The state is under obligation to defray the expenses incurred in organising this savings system.¹

I may also call attention to the decree by which Ecuador has also established a national insurance organisation. Its composition is as follows: The executive committee of the new institution is composed of the manager of the pensions office, the general manager of the Labour Office, the head of the central Public Assistance Committee and six members appointed by the government. The committee is charged with drawing up a constitution for the new institution and to submit this to the government for approval before June 5 next.²

The Government of Portugal has recently set up a "Technical Corporative Council for Trade and Industry." The task of this council is to direct and control the work of the corporative organisations, to study and manage that side of the work of the corporative institutions which concerns trade and industry, to advise on all questions of a corporative economic nature which are submitted to it by the Minister for Trade and Industry and to carry out on the demand of the Minister any investigation necessary for the direction of Portugal's commercial activities. The Minister for Trade and Industry directs the work of the Technical Corporative Council. It is composed of ten members appointed by the Minister. Eight of these are chosen from the Government delegates on the various corporative organisations and two of them represent the Department of Corporations and of State Insurance.

¹ *op. cit.*, 1936, pp. 280-281.

² *op. cit.*, 1936, p. 282.

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2

In the sphere of constitutional legislation the most important event of recent months has been the publication of the draft of the new constitution for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the press of foreign countries the draft constitution has been represented as the beginning of a new political era in Russia and the installation of a democratic regime. The analysis of it and the commentaries given by Soviet officials when it was published hardly permit one to accept this view. The draft constitution is none the less an extremely interesting document, for it modifies in certain important particulars the working of the constitution in Russia. The draft is too big a document to be reproduced textually here. It includes several sections which are from the point of view of administration, important enough to merit special attention, although I cannot do more than indicate some of the more important contents from the political point of view.

Has there been any real change of regime? Has there been a radical transformation of the Soviet system? Are there any democratic elements in the new constitution?

Art. 1 gives a general definition of the regime:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Arts. 2, 3 and 4 complete the definition and one finds in them the traditional elements of revolutionary Marxism.

Art. 2. The political foundation of the U.S.S.R. is formed by the soviets of workers' deputies which have grown and become strong as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists and the conquests of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Art. 3. All power in the U.S.S.R. belongs to the workers of the town and village in the form of soviets of workers' deputies.

Art. 4. The economic foundation of the U.S.S.R. consists in the socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production firmly established as a result of the liquidation of the capitalist system of economy, the abolition of the private ownership of the instruments and means of production and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man.

As a result of the evolution of the Soviet Union during recent years a certain concession is made to the principles of private property in Arts. 9 and 10, which define the place which private property may hold in a Communist state:

Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy which is the

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dominant form of economy in the U.S.S.R. the law allows the small private economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen working at home based on individual labour and excluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

Art. 10. The personal ownership by citizens of their income from work and savings, home and auxiliary household economy, of objects of domestic and household economy as well as objects of personal use and comfort is protected by law.

The supreme organ of the U.S.S.R. is now the Supreme Council, a Parliament composed of two houses :

Art. 30. The supreme organ of state power of the U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R.

In the interval between the two annual sessions of the Parliament supreme power is exercised by the Presidium :

Art. 48. The Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. elects at a meeting of both chambers the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. composed of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R., four vice-chairmen, the Secretary of the Presidium and thirty-one members of the Presidium.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. is accountable to the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. in all its activities.

Art. 49 lays down :

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. :

- (a) convenes sessions of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. ;
- (b) interprets laws in operation by issuing appropriate instructions ;
- (c) dissolves the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. on the basis of Art. 47 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and fixes new elections ;
- (d) conducts a referendum on its own initiative or on the demand of one of the Union republics ;
- (e) rescinds decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissaries of the U.S.S.R. and the Councils of People's Commissaries of the republics in cases where such decisions and orders are not in accordance with the law ;
- (f) between sessions of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. relieves of their duties and appoints the various People's Commissaries of the U.S.S.R. at the instance of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissaries of the U.S.S.R. to be later submitted for confirmation by the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. ;
- (g) awards decorations of the U.S.S.R. ;
- (h) exercises the right of pardon ;
- (i) appoints and replaces the supreme command of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. ;
- (j) between sessions of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. declares a state of war in the event of aggression on the U.S.S.R. ;
- (k) declares general or partial mobilisation ;

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(l) ratifies international treaties ;

(m) appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the U.S.S.R. to foreign states ;

(n) accepts the credentials of diplomatic representatives of foreign states.

The chief interest of the student must, however, be the definition in the new constitution of the rights of the individual, the electoral law and the part allotted to the Communist Party in the Soviet state. The draft enumerates certain rights of the citizen :

Art. 118. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to work—the right to receive guaranteed work with payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organisation of national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of soviet society, the absence of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment.

Art. 119. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to leisure.

The right to leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working day to seven hours for the overwhelming majority of the workers, establishment of annual vacations with pay for workers and employees and provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest-homes and clubs for the accommodation of the workers.

Art. 120. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to material security in old age as well as in the event of sickness and loss of capacity to work.

This right is ensured by the wide development of social insurance of workers and employees at the expense of the state, free medical aid, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the workers.

Art. 121. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have a right to education.

This right is ensured by universal compulsory elementary education, by free education, including higher education, by the system of state subsidies for the overwhelming majority of students in higher schools, by instruction in schools in the native language and by the organisation of free industrial, technical and agronomic education for the workers at the factories, state farms, machine and tractor stations and collective farms.

Art. 122. Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men in all fields of economic, state, cultural, social and political life.

The possibility of realising these rights of women is ensured by affording women equally with men the right to work, payment for work, leisure, social insurance and education, state protection of the interests of mother and child, the granting of pregnancy leave with pay and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

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Art. 123. The equality of the rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R. irrespective of their nationality or race, in all fields of economic, state, cultural, social and political life is an irrevocable law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of these rights or, conversely, the establishment of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on account of the race or nationality to which they belong, as well as any propaganda for racial or national exceptionalism or to stir up hatred or contempt is punishable by law.

Art. 124. To ensure to citizens freedom of conscience the church of the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state and the school from the church. Freedom to perform religious rites and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognised for all citizens.

Art. 125 speaks of the "liberty" of the press, of assembly and association:

In accordance with the interests of the workers for the purpose of strengthening the socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed:

- (a) Freedom of speech.
- (b) Freedom of the press.
- (c) Freedom of assembly and meetings.
- (d) Freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These rights of the citizens are ensured by placing at the disposal of the workers and their organisations printing presses, supplies of paper, public buildings, streets, means of communication and other material conditions necessary for their realisation.

As one can see, there is no question here of the *liberty* of the press or of assembly in the sense understood by the constitutional laws of democratic states. It is not an individual right: it is a right which belongs to the Soviet state, and there is here no question of permitting the free expression of thought, but simply of an obligation on the part of the state to provide those material things necessary for the propagation of its own doctrines.

Besides, this "liberty" does not even go so far as to afford a pretext for the existence of a legal opposition, or of anti-government opinion. Art. 126 emphasises and defines the special position of Russia's citizens by indicating that now, as before, the Communist Party is the sole possessor and wielder of power, and that no political—or even literary and ideological—opposition can be tolerated under the Communist regime:

Art. 126. In accordance with the interests of the workers and for the purpose of developing the organisational self-expression and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the

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U.S.S.R. are ensured the right of combining in public organisations, trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organisations, sport and defence organisations, cultural, technical and scientific societies and for the most active and conscientious citizens from the ranks of the working class and other strata of the workers of uniting in the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. which is the vanguard of the workers in their struggle for strengthening and developing the socialist system and which represents the means of control of all organisations of the workers both public and state.

Stalin himself last March declared to an American journalist that there could be no question of admitting the existence of any other political party than the Communist party. He added that various political parties could exist in a capitalist state, but that in a socialist regime there were no classes and as a result no parties. In the Moscow *Isvestia* Bukharin, the leading theorist of Bolshevism, indicated clearly why there could be no political opposition:

The constitution admits no other political parties. It proceeds on the principle that the question of knowing whither one is going—backward to capitalism or forward to communism—is not one that permits of discussion. The partisans of the classes hostile to the workers and now liquidated, classes which were organised in parties, do not exist among us and could not be allowed to.

As a result, the greatest innovation in the draft constitution, universal suffrage, introduced by Art. 134 has no great reality.

Universal suffrage can change nothing for, from the point of view of political technique, although the electoral body is greatly enlarged, the problem of eligibility remains as it was, that is to say, only official candidates can be elected. The sole difference between the old system and the new is in the number of persons who can vote. The political results of the elections will suffer no change, for it will still be the same people who will be elected. They will be elected by a greater number of votes. That is all the difference. Besides, under such conditions, there is bound to be, as in all Soviet elections, a considerable number of abstentions, for the elections have no political reality and are nothing but a gesture symbolic of the approval of official candidates.

The new constitution, therefore, introduces nothing new either in the domain of electoral law or in the definition of the position of the citizen. None the less the draft consti-

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tution is a very interesting document, for it indicates a tendency which is not without interest for the understanding of the political history of Soviet Russia.

In spite of certain equivocal phrases, in spite of the adoption of the principle of universal suffrage, this new constitution leaves very little more liberty to the Soviet citizens than before. But as far as the organisation of the central power, the distribution of competence and administration is concerned the new constitution does indicate *technical* progress. As I have said before in my books on Soviet law, the system in present-day Russia presents two definite characteristics. On the one hand, Soviet law is only the expression of a dictatorship which completely excludes those guarantees laid down in a democratic system and, on the other, written law has no social reality. The *real* life does not abide by the written codes, the laws and the constitution. There is a gulf fixed between it and the legal texts, and these texts which are multiplied with an astonishing rapidity do not correspond to life as it is lived in Russia. This legal "inflation" produces almost the same effects as financial inflation which leads to the complete demonetisation of bank notes. Power and law work on two different planes.

The new Soviet constitution aims at introducing a more ordered distribution of competence. We find still the same dictatorship but it is better organised, with its parts better defined, its organs less fantastic, less unfamiliar, less impractical. It is here that we may see the historical and political significance of the constitutional reform in Russia. Its aim is *to improve the technique of the dictatorship* but it does not in any way increase the rights of the citizens.

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SPAIN AND BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION

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THE same, odd, alignment of British newspapers which developed during the Abyssinian war has been maintained during the civil war in Spain. Superficially, the papers of the Right have stood on both occasions for peace at any price—as far as England was concerned—while the further to the Left a newspaper's attitude, the more ready it has apparently been to run the risk of bringing England into a European war against the aggression of Fascist Powers. On the Spanish issue, however, it should be noted that the extreme Right papers have actually moved from non-intervention to a demand for British aid to the aggressor.

The militancy of the Left and the pacifism of the Right in the face of attacks that certainly affected British interests, would have been scarcely conceivable to the last generation. This reversal of roles is the result of new factors which have transformed Britain's position as a world power. Britain still exercises a very powerful influence. But the development of aerial warfare has deprived her of the unchallenged position that she maintained in days when a battleship was the index of power. Politicians both in the Government and Opposition are haunted by the thought of the defencelessness of London. English people of all parties really believe that another great war may mean, to use the hackneyed phrase, the end of civilization, and are unwilling to assume that this country must share in the general catastrophe. A good deal of the confusion of British thought arises from a hope that if there is another war on the Continent, England may manage by hook or by crook to keep out of it. This hope is cherished more on the Right than on the Left, since the philosophy of the Left, whether derived from Marx or from nineteenth century Liberalism, assumes the impossibility of isolation and the interdependence of world economic interests. Therefore the only isolationists on the Left are the complete pacifists of the Sheppard-Lansbury School. Crippsian Socialists who opposed sanctions against Italy are not isolationists at bottom, since they hold that an alliance or federation of Socialist States would be essential if Labour

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ruled England. Isolationism is, therefore, predominantly a Right-wing doctrine, but there are innumerable people on the Left who urgently desire to be isolationist, and who have only been prevented from being so first by the argument that a League of Nations might preserve world peace. Their pacifism has also been shaken by the singularly flagrant form which recent Fascist aggressions have taken. We may sum up this situation by saying that all political groups in England are afraid of war, alarmed at the strength and ruthlessness of Fascist methods, reluctant to enter into a new armaments race, and more or less weakened in their advocacy of support for any Power or group of Powers by a faint remaining hope that England may possibly avoid becoming again embroiled on the Continent.

The second development is the increasing clarity of the international choice between Fascism on the one hand and Socialism on the other. Again, most English people, whatever their Party, still hope to avoid a complete form of Fascism or Communism in this country. They sympathise in accordance with their class and philosophy more with Fascist States or more with Democratic or Socialist ones. But few are wholehearted on either side.

As the result of these new factors Conservatism is presented with a dilemma. It would prefer all foreign States to be weak democracies. It is confronted with the fact of one powerful Communist country, three increasingly powerful Fascist States and several democracies which may develop either towards Communism or Fascism. Of the two, Conservatives would choose Fascism. But the expansion of Germany and Italy menaces British interests and British control of trade routes and strategical positions. Therefore the policy of British capitalism, in so far as it has one, is to avoid as long as possible definite commitments while England still remains comparatively weak in the air, and to concentrate on rearmament and hope that we may still have the chance of an effective voice at a later stage. Unfortunately, for this policy, neither Germany nor Italy seem inclined to wait.

The Left is confronted with an even more embarrassing dilemma. The weakness of Liberal opinion in England has

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always been its failure to decide whether it wished actively to help oppressed peoples abroad with whom it sympathised. On innumerable occasions, progressive people in this country have roused opinion against foreign tyranny. Sometimes they have been able to help those who were rightly "struggling to be free"; more often they have stopped at sympathy, and bitterly disappointed those whom their attitude had encouraged to make a fight for independence. The League appeared to offer a solution of the dilemma created by the incompatibility of pacifism and the desire to help the oppressed. With the breakdown of the League, the choice has become inescapable. Either they must sponsor a policy which carries with it a threat of war or they must abandon any attempt to keep their word and to aid the victims of aggression. And they are conscious all the time that when the war does come they will probably be involved in it on an issue that seems far less worth fighting for. With many hesitations and disabling internal conflicts they are, in fact, forced into the former alternative of expressing a readiness to risk a war now for the sake of Socialism or Democracy, arguing that a strong stand by Great Britain may actually avert the war and that in any case it is better to fight now for issues they believe in rather than to wait for a purely imperialist war that they regard as inevitable if the Fascist Powers meet with no resistance. Thus the historical roles of the conservative and progressive parties are temporarily reversed. Both parties, as always, wish to avoid a European war, but it is now the progressives who argue that a strong policy with definite commitments is the best safeguard for peace and the Conservatives who fall back on the old Liberal plea that England should not take sides in continental disputes unless she is absolutely forced by an attack upon her vital interests.

The Spanish civil war took everyone in England by surprise. The best informed newspapers had already noted that the Liberal Republican Government (which contained no Communist, Socialist or Anarchist) was in a very weak position and likely to be upset within the next twelve months either by an army coup or by the increasing pressure of the Left. But even the least optimistic gave the Spanish Government

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another six months of uneasy power and the intimate relationship between the reactionary elements in Spain and Germany and Italian Fascism was quite unknown. Within a week of the outbreak of the rebellion it became clear that the *coup d'état* had failed, that the war would be savage and prolonged and that the Spanish Generals were receiving help from Germany and Italy. When it was definitely announced by competent correspondents like Sir Percival Phillips of the *Daily Telegraph* that Italian planes were carrying Moorish troops into Southern Spain and that the rebel cause was being aided by both German and Italian bombers and pilots, the danger of the Spanish war developing into a European war became obvious. The most curious feature of the news throughout almost the entire press was the absence of full reports from France where the rank and file of the *front populaire* held immense demonstrations demanding that aid should be given to the Spanish government. This demand was supported by important trade unions and political leaders both within and outside the Government. It was indeed a strange and disturbing experience to be present in Paris when hundreds of thousands and in some cases even millions of people were demonstrating in favour of French intervention, and then to arrive in England and see no reference in the press to events which were in their way as important as the rise of the Nazi movement in Germany. The place that the observer would have expected to see devoted to these demonstrations was occupied by accounts of the Olympic games in Berlin. In surveying the press and the course of policy during this period one must remember that the crisis came in August when all the leaders of the Opposition, most members of the Cabinet and many of the foreign correspondents were on holiday, and when newspapers had planned for their best reporters either to be in Germany or to be acting as war correspondents either with the rebels or with the democratic forces in Spain.

From the beginning, the news from Spain was curiously contradictory. The Government wireless from Madrid and Barcelona announced a continuous series of victories, and the rebels in Seville using the radio to announce an equally spectacular record of successes against the Govern-

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ment. The B.B.C. adopted the sensible policy of stating without comment that the news was contradictory and leaving listeners to form their own conclusion from its summaries of the rival broadcasts. The B.B.C. news has indeed avoided most of the pitfalls of reporting. In spite of increasing pressure, it has stuck to the legal position and continued to describe General Franco's forces as "rebel." Its accounts of the war have been genuinely impartial and its occasional Talks on Spain informative rather than propagandist.

The varying sympathies of British newspapers were immediately apparent. The difficulties of responsible papers like *The Times* were made immediately obvious by the use of a variety of adjectives and phrases to describe the two parties. There was no doubt that legality was on the side of the Government and that General Franco's coup was technically a rebellion. The press of the Left naturally made the most of having the law on its side for once, while the press of the Right insisted with Mr. Winston Churchill that the Spanish Government was too weak to be considered worthy of the usual support of a constitutionally elected Government, and that England was entitled to regard both sides as belligerents. The result in *The Times* was a strange confusion, amusingly analysed by Mr. Julian Huxley in a letter to the *New Statesman and Nation* of August 8th. Mr. Huxley showed how words like "revolt" or "mutiny," which *The Times* had used of General Franco's rising during its first days had increasingly given way to more favourably coloured words like "anti-Government," "Right," etc., while the reverse process had turned "loyal" Government forces (as they were called at the beginning) into "Proletarian," "Revolutionary," or "Communist" forces.

M. Blum's decision to press for a policy of non-intervention by all foreign powers was welcomed by the entire British press. It was a surprising decision for a *front populaire* Government since it involved the recognition of equality of belligerent rights to a body of reactionary rebels, and denied a legitimate democratic Government the support to which it was legally entitled. The *Daily Telegraph* which is today of all papers most closely in touch with the Foreign Office, significantly stated at the crisis that this decision by the

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French Government was the result of British pressure, and it is known that emissaries of the *front populaire* who approached the British Government to solicit support for a strong Franco-British declaration on support of the Spanish Government, met with an absolute rebuff from the Foreign Office. The truth is that this attitude of the British Government was only one of the reasons that induced M. Blum to accept the policy of non-intervention. He was influenced by the opposition of several members of his Cabinet, by fear of civil war in France if the French Government aided Madrid, and by the very real danger that intervention would lead to European war.

M. Blum's decision was welcomed as a proof of statesmanship throughout the Conservative British press and as an unfortunate necessity by the Radical and Socialist press. The struggle then entered upon a long phase in which Britain and France jointly pressed for non-intervention, while the attitude of the Fascist Powers remained ambiguous. The war in the meantime was fought with the utmost ruthlessness, reports increased daily of substantial help to the rebels from Italy, Germany and Portugal and signs began to appear that French patience would break down.

During this period the British press can be divided into five groups. First, on the extreme right, we must place all the Rothermere papers, the Catholic press and the *Observer*. In the second group is the purely isolationist press run by Lord Beaverbrook. The third group contains *The Times* and the *Telegraph*, and from the point of view of policy, the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Morning Post*. Fourthly, come the *Daily Herald* and the much more positive *News Chronicle*. On the extreme left was the *Daily Worker* which was developed during this crisis into something much more like a national newspaper than it has ever been before.

Even the gentle *Spectator* has been reduced to describing the attitude of the Rothermere press as something worse than outrageous. From the outset of the struggle all the Rothermere papers—the *Daily Mail*, *Evening News*, *Sunday Dispatch*, *Daily Dispatch* and numerous other papers—have discarded any attempt at fair reporting, described all anti-Fascist groups in Spain as Reds and Communists, and revived

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for propaganda purposes against the Spanish Government those lurid stories of atrocities which served against Germany during the war, were dug out for use against Russian Communists after the war and which now seem most likely to tell with conservative opinion against the Spanish population. It is difficult to choose any particular examples, since the bulk of the Spanish news is devoted every day to reports which either have no source at all or which vaguely come from Lisbon, but which seem in fact often to have been dug out of fertile imagination or from the more lurid martyrologies which were once given to children to read on Sundays in evangelical homes. The stories of nuns stripped, tortured and outraged, of 38 prisoners being crucified, of eyes gouged out and legs cut off (cp. the undiscovered child whose hands were cut off in 1914), have not, as far as we have been able to discover, any evidence to support them. Since anti-clericalism is one of the strongest passions in Spain, savage actions have no doubt taken place. A large number of churches and ecclesiastical buildings have undoubtedly been burnt, some, if we may judge from reports of eye-witnesses, because they have been used as convenient positions for rebel sharp-shooters, or for the storing of ammunition; some have no doubt been burnt simply because the Roman Church stands in the eyes of the Spanish proletariat as the symbol of everything reactionary—an impression intensified on this occasion by the fact that a large number of priests have been fighting side by side with the black troops from Morocco in General Franco's army. The peculiarity of the propaganda of the Rothermere press on this occasion has been the use made of this Catholic motif. It suggested that the time had come for British intervention in a crusade for Christianity against Bolshevism without apparently noticing that there were prominent Catholics in the Spanish Government, and that General Franco's success could only be accomplished by the massacre of a large part of the Spanish population at the hands of those Moors whom Christendom only turned out of Europe at the cost of long and terrible war.*

*At a later stage the Rothermere press has reverted to a non-interventional attitude, clearly as a result of a conviction that if Britain and France continued not to intervene, while Italy, Germany and Portugal went on sending supplies, General Franco would inevitably win in any case.

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On Monday, August 17, the *Daily Mail* devoted several pages to this theme, though the splash article on its leader page was headed "Holiday Girls go back to the Sun with Silk Shorts and Hula-Hula Skirts." Its "special correspondent with the anti-red forces in Badajoz" gave a long account of the capture of this city by "patriots," representing the Reds as running away as fast as they could, as having crucified and burnt to death prisoners before the town was taken by a brilliant feat of arms. Nothing was said about the shooting in cold blood of 1,200 to 2,000 defenders of the city. Another page was devoted to summaries of the diatribes against Spanish Bolsheviks delivered from sermons in Catholic churches. These priests had apparently all paid tribute to the *Daily Mail's* fearless exposure of the atrocities committed by the Bolshevik "mad dogs." An interesting side light on this apparently spontaneous Catholic interest in the *Daily Mail* was provided by a priest who wrote to the *New Statesman and Nation* of August 29. This priest described how a few weeks earlier he had received a pre-paid telegram from the *Daily Mail* asking for honest words which it could quote. He had sent the words in a sense unfavourable to the *Daily Mail* with the result that they appeared in so garbled a form that they carried an implication different from that intended by him. On the next day, followed further stories of men and women soaked in petrol and set on fire, of a priest with his feet cut off by a hatchet and violent attacks on Moscow for expressing sympathy and asking for money to help the Spanish Government. Similar stories continued in each issue of all the Rothermere newspapers, the issue of August being enlivened by a special article addressed to women in England. They were reminded that "when the Beast of Bolshevism bears his fangs, women are his victims" which repeated these entirely unsupported stories of torture of women. The sexual side of all such atrocity-mongering was always emphasised in the *Daily Mail's* columns. On August 21, it contained a leading article which declared that "so-called Madrid Government is nothing but a murderous anarchy, and it is doubtful if its armed forces have a legitimate claim to belligerent rights, since for the most part they are not commanded by responsible officers." The article

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continued to argue "that Germany and Italy have finally intimated very plainly through diplomatic channels that they will not permit a Red Government in Spain," that this attitude has the "full sympathy of the overwhelming majority of the British public," that M. Blum ought at once to recognise "the anti-red provisional government in Spain," and that the most disquieting feature of the situation was the manoeuvres of the French Reds to help the Spanish Reds which might lead to a "gigantic struggle for or against Communism." The statement that Germany and Italy had formally made it known that they would not allow the establishment of a Red Government in Spain was denied by *The Times* a few days later and rebuffed by the acceptance on the part of Italy and Germany of the non-intervention agreement. As a choice example of *Daily Mail* reporting I may quote a *Daily Mail's* special correspondent's account (August 22), ostensibly at least sent from Lisbon. Large headlines announced "*Red Beauty Queen Tortures 28 Nuns*." The story continued as follows:

A Red "beauty queen," as handsome as she was infamous, was the instigator of a series of revolting atrocities in the town of Moron, near Seville.

Known as "Miss Moron," to which title she was recently elected (says the special correspondent of the Portuguese newspaper *Seculo*), her charms enslaved and maddened her Communist followers.

One deed with which her name will be for ever linked was perpetrated at the convent of Santa Clara.

With her blood-drunk mob, she took possession of the place, ordered the panic-stricken nuns to be dragged from the chapel in which they had taken refuge, and had them placed in separate cells, "to receive visitors."

The nuns, 28 in all, were subjected to inconceivable tortures by relays of Red maniacs, while the infamous beauty passed from cell to cell jeering at them.

"Miss Moron's" word was law. Countless "executions" took place at her command. She led the Reds in an orgy of burning, looting and killing, and with her own hands insisted on decapitating an image of the Virgin.

By flattery, cajolery, and other feminine artifices she persuaded Red Civil guards who were in charge of 13 prisoners, to release them.

No sooner were these unfortunates in the street than "Miss Moron" and her infamous band shot them down, their bodies falling in a heap in the street.

One man, only slightly wounded, lay under the pile of corpses

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for hours. Feigning death he was thrown with the bodies into a cemetery to await burial, but crawled out at night and escaped.

When the anti-Reds took the town "Miss Moron" was captured, sentenced to death and was executed.

But her maniacal fury endured to the end.

Witnesses stated that as she faced the firing party she shook her clenched fist and shouted her favourite Marxist slogan "Children....no! Husbands....yes!"

The rifles cracked....and "Miss Moron" had paid the penalty for her foul deeds.

The four Catholic weeklies have enthusiastically followed the Pope's lead in denouncing the Spanish Government as the representation of anti-Christ and in espousing to the utmost the Christian Crusade of General Franco and his Moorish mercenaries. The *Tablet*, however, has adopted the moderate and argumentative tone befitting a sixpenny weekly. The *Catholic Herald* has been devoted to rallying Catholic opinion to the side of the rebels and has printed numerous imperfectly supported atrocity stories. But the *Catholic Herald* which has given careful explanations of the course of events in Spain, admitted that the "cold-blooded slaughter which followed it (the capture of Badajoz by the rebels) must disgrace the memory of the patriots' rising for all time," and printed a number of letters from witnesses who were unable to support atrocity stories which it had quoted in previous issues. It went so far on August 21 as to give prominence to the report of a Spanish "eye-witness" who, after describing tortures by the "Reds" went on:

"He is fully aware that the Church has brought this upon herself. He says that the social injustice was extreme and that the Church was, through her own fault, associated with the Reds. He does, however, insist that no atrocities committed by the rebels are comparable to those committed by the Government forces. He says that on the rebel side a conception of the dignity of the human body has always been preserved and the method of killing has been to shoot and not to torture and mutilate."

Of the *Catholic Times* and the *Universe* it is enough to say that they have closely followed the *Daily Mail*. Both papers have been devoted to the inculcation of hatred, and reports, on hearsay or on the sole evidence of Catholic papers abroad,

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of "Bishops being buried alive," "Nuns Butchered by Reds," and all the other stereotyped atrocities. The complicated issue is summarised by the *Universe*—much the more violent and irresponsible of the two—as "Communism versus Humanity."

The *Daily Express*, whose policy is so often similar to that of the *Daily Mail*, must on this issue be sharply differentiated. In the early stages of the struggle in Spain, the *Daily Express* also carried sensational stories of atrocities on the Government side. This soon stopped and the paper has since been distinguished by a noticeable impartiality about Spain. An article even appeared from a special correspondent who gave an objective survey of the position and described the wholesale murder of prisoners and other outrages by the rebels. In so far as Spain has been dealt with at all in leading articles, the sole object of the Beaverbrook press has been to support Sir Samuel Hoare's declaration that England must in no circumstances be involved in a Spanish struggle. Lord Beaverbrook is genuinely isolationist. Thus the *Daily Express* declared in its leading article on August 21, that Hitler's warning to the Madrid Government about the search of the Kamerun did not mean that he intended to intervene, but only that he might be forced to do so if his direct interests were jeopardised. This, the *Daily Express* held, should always be the British attitude to all continental struggles. The Beaverbrook press finally reached the stage of denouncing the Rothermere policy, which, it argued, amounted to a policy of intervention on the side of the rebels and was as dangerous as Socialist pressure to aid the Spanish Government.

Both *The Times* and the *Telegraph*, which began by making clear that their sympathies were on the side of the rebels, soon modified their attitude. The turning point was the massacre of Badajoz, which coincided with the realisation of the growing danger of international war. Since then their praise of M. Blum has been fervent and continuous. They realised how difficult it would be for him to restrain his followers from sending help to their Spanish comrades if the Fascist powers continued to help the rebels, and therefore became noticeably keener to persuade Italy and Germany

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to adhere to the proposed non-intervention agreement. Both papers have reported that cruelties have been committed on both sides ; neither have indulged in irresponsible reports of atrocities, and *The Times* reports, though Conservative and sympathetic to the rebel side, have been genuinely informative and have contained obvious efforts at impartiality. *The Times* first became seriously alarmed about the danger to Europe on August 20, when, referring to the natural impatience of the French public, it praised British initiative in imposing the embargo on the supply of civil aeroplanes to Spain, said that too much time had been lost and regretted German and Italian hesitation in accepting non-intervention. On the 22nd, *The Times* became more hopeful that Germany would agree to non-intervention and urged that the Kamerun incident, unfortunate though it was, should not be a barrier to Germany's acceptance. It naturally welcomed the adherence of the Fascist Powers when at length it was formally given.

The *Daily Telegraph* was perhaps less fair in its reporting, but took a substantially similar attitude. It violently attacked the report of the Trade Union Council, which referred to its contacts with underground movements in Fascist countries, and asked if this was not a dangerous form of intervention. On August 20, it referred to the rumour that the Spanish Government had threatened to use poison gas, but avoided the error, into which all the evening papers fell, of announcing it as a fact. It appears to have been quite untrue. Like *The Times*, the *Telegraph* became more troubled about the danger to British interests, and above all of the danger of an international war, if Germany continued to hesitate about non-intervention, and was quickly willing to accept at its face value the sudden decision of Italy to adhere. The attitude of the *Morning Post* followed much the same lines. Its reporting was responsible and it gave no countenance to the Rothermere atrocity campaign. It also attacked the T.U.C. and the "warlike pacifism" of the Left, but devoted few editorials to the subject, while praising the British effort to persuade Germany and Italy to agree to non-intervention. The *Manchester Guardian*, as always distinguished by admirably informative and unbiassed reporting took a line of its own on

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August 21, by suggesting that the time had come for an appeal "through the international conscience" for a cessation of the war.

We now come to consider the attitude of the Left press. The *Daily Herald* has from the beginning naturally been on the side of the Republican Government of Spain, and its reports have been mainly from the Government side and its emphasis naturally rather on the outrages of the rebels than on the fierce reprisals of the Left. On August 18, it reminded Mr. Baldwin that it was his duty to come back from his holiday and show that he had not been indulging in vain talk when he discussed the virtues of democracy and declared that democratic leaders could and must be as energetic as Dictators. It grew increasingly impatient with the prevarication of Italy and Germany, and featured with large headlines the interview between Mr. Eden and Mr. Arthur Greenwood, Sir Walter Citrine and others, and on August 21 it attacked atrocity-mongering, urged that France could not remain neutral for ever and at length got to the point of saying that, if the Fascist powers continued to delay, Britain and France must force them to answer by openly threatening to aid the Spanish Government. It asked in its leading article whether the Fascist powers would keep the non-intervention agreement if they made it, and pointed out that Germany had no right to complain of the Kamerun incident in view of the far worse breach of International law involved in supplying arms to the rebels.

The *News Chronicle* was bolder than the *Daily Herald*, having no political party nor Trade Union Movement which would be embarrassed by its adoption of a definite policy. On August 18 it declared that democracies would have to take their stand at some point and present a bold front to Fascism. It urged that France had already been patient and that Great Britain should support M. Blum in putting a definite time limit for the German and Italian replies. On the 19th it asked where the Labour leaders were and why they were not giving a lead to British democracy. In a leading article entitled "The Appalling Silence," it reminded the T.U.C. that it had declared against neutrality, asked why it did not act on this declaration and urged that the National

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Council of Labour should meet and demand that Parliament should be recalled. On the 20th, it urged that if Italy and Germany continued to prevaricate, Britain would have to raise the embargo on the export of arms and civil aeroplanes to the Spanish Government, and on the 21st it enjoyed itself in exposing one of the more shocking of the *Daily Mail* canards. According to the *Daily Mail*, British employees in the Rio Tinto works had been claimed as hostages by the Reds and were likely to be killed in the coming fighting. Actually, as these employees themselves explained in a press interview, that they were excellently treated by their friends the Spanish workers and had only been delayed for a few days in order that they might be safely escorted to a British battleship. On August 22, the *News Chronicle* referred at length to Mr. Morrison's speech on international Peace at Geneva and asked whether he would not favour the immediate formation of a Popular Front in Britain on the issue of Spanish war.

The attitude of the *Daily Worker* is especially interesting in view of the general belief that the policy of the Comintern and of international Communism is necessarily that of the Soviet Government in Moscow. The Russian Government, working in close alliance with the French Government, lost no time in accepting M. Blum's non-intervention agreement. But the Communist Party in France, which supported and still supports M. Blum, and the Communist Party in this country have strenuously urged that Britain and France should aid the Spanish Government with all the supplies it needs. As the extent of German and Italian help to the rebels became increasingly public, this pressure for similar aid for the Spanish workers has correspondingly increased and the support for this policy by Mr. Morrison in England and by M. Jouhaux and other trade unionists in France has been enthusiastically applauded.

Surveying the press as a whole, I should say that England has become less unsympathetic to the Spanish Government as the danger and methods of Fascist intervention have proved more apparent. General Franco's terrible declarations about not taking prisoners, about completely depopulating any district that held out against him, about grinding to powder

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the bones of his opponents—these coupled with the actual savagery of his methods, the massacres at Badajoz and elsewhere, have estranged British sympathy but not in any way changed British policy. The number of those who would be willing actively to help the Spanish Government is very small or confined to Left intellectuals and workers. Increasing sympathy is felt for any humanitarian movement to moderate the horror of the fighting. At the same time the predominant feeling is that the war must at all costs be confined to Spain and little account is taken on the Right of the genuine alarm, expressed on the Left, that a Fascist victory in Spain will mean civil war in France. England today increasingly fears Germany, but sees no reason for welcoming Russia as an ally. As a result, Great Britain has no foreign policy. Emotionally, the whole Right and much of the Left would like "isolation," but Lord Beaverbrook remains almost alone in thinking it practical politics.

KINGSLEY MARTIN.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE DANGERS OF BEING HUMAN. By EDWARD GLOVER.
(*Allen & Unwin*. 5s.)

THE RETREAT FROM REASON. By LANCELOT HOGBEN.
(*Watts*. 2s.)

THESE two books raise and attempt to answer an extremely important and interesting question: the relation of science and scientists to politics. Their authors are distinguished scientists. Dr. Glover is Director of Research in the London Institute of Psycho-analysis and is one of the leading practising psycho-analysts in this country. Professor Hogben is a biologist and Professor of Social Biology in London University. It is, therefore, not surprising that they assess very highly the contribution which science can make to politics. Indeed, both of them would agree that the political ills from which the world is suffering—and no one will deny their variety and enormity—are mainly due to the fact that politics and politicians ignore science and scientists. It is by taking the advice of the scientist, they would say, that we can find the only way for remedying those ills. When I began reading the two books, the thesis had my sympathy and I looked forward eagerly for enlightenment; at the end I was left with a feeling of disappointment and hopelessness. If this is the only political message which science can give us, then indeed the end of our civilisation must be very near.

In both books, as one would expect from the eminence of their authors, there is much of interest. It is either information connected with the subjects on which they are scientific authorities, or it is destructive criticism of policies and persons, things, theories and institutions which they do not agree with or dislike. Much of this is amusing and some of it is serious and valuable. The disappointment and hopelessness come in when one examines their constructive proposals, their positive contribution to the science of politics. Both of them put forward scientific truth as something objective, something obtained intellectually through

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the scientific method, investigation of fact, testing of evidence. It is something which they continually contrast favourably with the so-called knowledge of non-scientists, the economists, the politicians, the "idealists," that "knowledge" composed, as they no doubt rightly allege, of prejudices, superstitions, the phantoms of our desires, the ghosts of animal passions and savage fears lurking in our unconscious, upon which we build economic theories, political programmes, and social institutions. Looking round at the welter of political barbarism in which he lives, the non-scientist can up to this point only humbly agree with these two distinguished scientists. Surely nothing is more sorely needed in politics than scientific, objective knowledge and reason in the place of passion and prejudice—an ounce of science to sweeten our political imaginations.

When, however, one turns to what they have to say about politics and political problems, one finds that these two scientists are even less scrupulous about applying the scientific method to them than many of the degraded politicians and parties for which they have such deserved contempt. The first shock comes to one when one finds that the Professor of Social Biology maintains that it is only the truths of social biology, while the Director of Research in the Institute of Psycho-analysis maintains that it is only the truths of psycho-analysis, which can cure the political diseases of society. The Professor of Social Biology lumps psycho-analysts with amateur eugenisists, whole-time Plymouth Brethren, and Marxian socialists at the very bottom of his rag-bag of personal contempt. The Director of Psycho-analytical Research would retort that Professor Hogben's "social technology" springs from the self-satisfaction of an undisciplined idealist who is a heavy liability, not an asset, to society. One of these two scientists may be, both cannot be, right. But there is something more than that in it. One may legitimately suspect the objectivity and the scientific impartiality of the scientist who finds a panacea in the scientific "truths" and "knowledge" of his own little corner of knowledge and truth; a fortiori one can suspect two scientists who produce two incompatible panaceas out of two incompatible corners, as if they were two rival con-

jurors or magicians producing two incompatible rabbits out of two incompatible top hats.

The whole of history and particularly the history of science proves that panaceas do not exist either in medicine or in politics or in psycho-analysis or in biology or social biology. The belief in them by anyone other than himself would probably, and probably correctly, be ascribed by Dr. Glover to unconscious fear. They are short cuts to Utopia. It is therefore not perhaps astonishing that they have such a wide appeal even to scientists. I once had the misfortune to accompany a sick friend on a round of specialists in Harley Street and Wimpole Street; our quest was diagnosis of symptoms which had baffled the general practitioner. We visited seven or eight gentlemen at the head of their profession, ranging from heart specialists to specialists in tuberculosis. The heart specialist diagnosed inflammation of the heart (which should have been fatal in a few weeks, though the patient is still alive after several years), the tuberculosis specialist tuberculosis, the throat specialist infection of the throat, and so on. The experience diminished my respect, not for science, but for scientists. Here were the leading experts each diagnosing a disease as falling within his little circle of expert knowledge and five out of seven of them professing to be able to cure it by his particular panacea. Reading Professor Hogben and Dr. Glover recalled the experience; once more it diminished my respect, not for science, but for scientists.

But there is something still more disquieting in these two books than the overvaluation by the expert of his expert knowledge, the human foible or delusion which makes us all tend to think that our own tiny corner is commensurate with the universe. Some years ago Mr. Trotter wrote a book upon the subject of the effect of herd instinct upon politics. The first part in which he showed the effect upon other people contained much of interest; in the second part, written under the influence of war psychology, he showed that he himself was unconsciously suffering acutely from the perversions of that instinct in his judgment of Germany and the Germans. Professor Hogben and Dr. Glover are almost as sad or amusing examples of Pecksniffianism in science and politics

as was Mr. Trotter. When it comes to controversial political questions they are guilty of every crime of prejudice, irrationality, and unscientific method which they find so lamentable in the political thought and action of other people. Over and over again they break or ignore every elementary rule of scientific investigation. Let me give one or two examples.

It is an elementary duty of the scientist, both authors agree, faced with a problem, first of all to establish the facts impartially. If a patient comes to Dr. Glover, he sits for hours, days, weeks patiently listening to what the patient says, and he would consider it a scientific crime to invent opinions and thoughts and impute them to his patient. His object is first to establish the facts, exactly what the patient says, thinks, and does. But when Dr. Glover investigates the psychology of political persons and the functioning of political institutions, he does exactly the opposite. He seems to be almost completely ignorant of the history and of the structure and functions of the political machinery which he discusses. He has not taken the trouble to discover the most elementary facts about political opinions or practice. If he dislikes an institution, he describes it in the way that the *Daily Mail* Bolshevik talks of capitalism or the traditional Club colonel talks of socialism. If he dislikes a political opinion he reduces it to imbecility by misstatement or omission. This is most marked in his treatment of the League, pacifism, and socialism for which he seems to have a morbid fear or dislike. He seems to have no knowledge of the structure of the League or of the objects with which it was established or of its history during the last 17 years or of the political intentions and significance of the several parts of its machinery. He always ascribes to it a personality which it does not possess and his description is a travesty or a caricature. If he is not ignorant of the reasons which have been given by those whom he calls pacifists and idealists for thinking that a League or collective security system is necessary for the prevention of war, the cause of his misstatements and omissions must be even more unscientific than mere ignorance. He never states the fact that the League was a system of substituting pacific methods of settlement in international affairs for war by an agreement not to go to

war and at the same time to protect the victim of aggression, that it was a deliberate attempt to deal with fear by an assurance of collective defence against an aggressor. He twists this into an assertion that the League is an ethical Super-state designed to curb the bad impulses of naughty ego-centric nations and that people who thought that we should fulfil our obligations to Abyssinia under the Covenant did so for the reason that in their opinion it "was necessary to defend the League of Nations to the point of war": and then he laments that nothing has been done since 1914 to deal with the root causes of war and that only the psycho-analyst has realised the part which fear plays in international politics!

Take another instance. Dr. Glover ascribes to the League a form and functions which it has never had either in fact or in the mind of its most enthusiastic supporters; he imputes to those who have believed that League machinery and collective security might do something to prevent war statements, views, beliefs which they have never had and never expressed. Having set up this Aunt Sally of his own invention or imagination, he then triumphantly knocks it down. The Aunt Sally is an idealist League or moral super-State, and the views of pacifists and League supporters to which Dr. Glover so much objects are "idealist," a cover for the desire of the moral reformer to impose his will upon other people and to punish the naughty boy. Now turn to pages 178 and 179 of his book. Here the complaint against the League becomes for a moment the precise opposite of what it has been hitherto. "If anything is clear in this complicated world it is clear that the League is a convenient cover for the self-interest of all the nations concerned," says Dr. Glover. (It is noteworthy that Dr. Glover continually begins his sweeping misstatements with elaborate asseverations like "it is notorious that.....," "a moment's consideration will show that.....," and the one just quoted; as a scientist investigating a scientific problem, he would never write, "It is notorious that twice one is two"; I suggest that this insistence upon the clearness or notoriousness of statements is almost always a sign that the writer is unconsciously aware that his statement is inaccurate, disputed, and disputable.) The League is a convenient

cover for the self-interest of all the nations concerned, says Dr. Glover, because "a fry of small powers" (note the emotional tone of the language which this scientist uses to describe merely "small states") "have either joined the League in the hope of protecting their countries or of securing some hypothetical benefits." Here for a moment Dr. Glover sees that the object of the League was, not the vague idealism which he imputes to it, but a highly practical one, namely to prevent war and to protect the constituent states. Why exactly it should be so wicked for "the fry of small powers" to wish to protect themselves from war and to secure (what seems to me the by no means hypothetical) benefit of peace, I must confess not to understand, unless it is that this fact makes nonsense of a great deal of what Dr. Glover says in the remainder of his book. But according to Dr. Glover the really important powers, who are not "small fry," are just as bad as Belgium and Denmark in not being "idealist," for, as he says, "to return to the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, it is notorious that" (methinks, the Doctor doth protest too much) "despite all protestations to the contrary, the larger powers were less concerned with ideals of League control than with plain self-interest." What Dr. Glover means by the vague, unscientific phrase "ideals of League control," I do not know; it is one of many indications that he is ignorant not only of the objects and intentions of those who established the machinery of pacific settlement, but even of the provisions of the League Covenant.

It will be seen from the above that Dr. Glover does not attempt to discuss the political problem of peace or the prevention of war and the relation of a collective security system to it in a scientific spirit. But what is even more disquieting than the political bias of his politics is the evidence that he allows his political bias to distort his science. The scientific basis of his politics is largely an assertion that certain primitive processes which existed in the minds of man's "savage" ancestors thousands of years ago are still operative in his mind, in the unconscious part of his mind. As a layman, I am not competent to discuss or dispute the statements which Dr. Glover makes as a psycho-analyst about psycho-analysis and the functioning of the individual human mind.

Where he talks as an expert, I accept his evidence as expert evidence, and, with humility, fully aware that the layman's opinion is worth very little, I recognise that psycho-analysis has contributed enormously to an understanding of the mental processes of the individual. But when the psycho-analyst proceeds to draw inferences from the scientific facts which he presents us with and to apply them outside the immediate orbit of his technical knowledge, I am as competent as he to examine the nature of those facts and the inferences which he seeks to draw from them. When examined in this way, it can be shown that Dr. Glover frequently in this book contravenes elementary rules of scientific method even in dealing with the material of his own science, and I suggest that he does so because, unconsciously no doubt, his politics have distorted his science. He does this in different ways, but in a review I can only give one or two important instances. Perhaps the most frequent and most disastrous of his methods is to treat the hypothetical explanation of observed facts as if it was just as much an ascertained and scientific truth as the facts themselves. Take for instance, those "primitive processes" which existed in primitive man and which "are still active in modern civilised man." I fully accept the existence of the facts as stated by Dr. Glover and other psycho-analysts. There are, for example, unconscious fears in the mind of modern man which are undoubtedly similar to fears in the mind of primitive man, and those fears are *in some way* connected with emotions and beliefs, political or non-political, in the conscious part of the mind of modern man, though he may be himself totally unaware either of the existence of the unconscious fears or of their connection with his conscious emotions and beliefs. Those are the facts, but their relevance for politics depends upon our ability to establish scientifically and exactly the degree of similarity between the processes of the primitive savage and of the so-called civilised man, and in order to do that we have to know the exact way in which the conscious beliefs and emotions are related to what are called the unconscious emotions. Neither Dr. Glover nor any other psycho-analyst, as yet, possesses that knowledge; the interpretation of the facts is still almost purely hypothetical. But Dr. Glover continually writes as if he

knew, not only that there is some connection between conscious political beliefs and unconscious primitive fear, but also the exact nature of the connection. This allows him to find scientific support for his political prejudices, but it is unscientific. For instance, he repeatedly states that the primitive processes are the same as are the processes in the minds of modern men. That is to beg the whole question. Take the case of the primrose of Primrose Day. Dr. Glover says that the primrose is a totem flower, and that to the good Conservative duchess it represents ultimately the body of an ancestral object, in this case the body of Disraeli. The ascertained facts are only that there is some connection between the attitude of a duchess to Disraeli's primrose and the attitude of primitive man towards the actual body of his ancestor. But the explanation of the nature of the connection is purely hypothetical. For Dr. Glover's political purposes it has to be identical or as nearly identical as possible in the mind of the duchess and of the savage. There is no real evidence yet that this is or is not the true interpretation of the facts. It is possible, for instance, that the whole mental process of the duchess with regard to the primrose is entirely different from the mental process of the savage with regard to the totem, the only connection between the two being one of origin, i.e. that the duchess would not have the attitude which she does have towards the primrose unless her savage ancestor had had a certain attitude towards dead bodies of ancestors. If that be the case, three-quarters of what Dr. Glover says in this book falls to the ground. A man is not biologically a fish because he originates from fishes, passes through a stage embryonically which is akin to that of a fish, and retains even in his adult form vestiges of the fish stage of development. What would Dr. Glover say to the scientists who dogmatically asserted on this evidence that man is the same as a fish? Yet, though it is possible that the vestiges of primitive mentality with which he deals are similar to such biological vestiges, in that they indicate origin, he does not hesitate to say that the original and derived processes are "the same."

Now let us turn to Professor Hogben. On the whole he deals with political problems in a somewhat less unscientific

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method than Dr. Glover, but there is the same tendentious statement of political views with which he does not agree. I propose however to examine only one instance of his failure to treat politics scientifically because it shows a fundamental fallacy which both authors fall into with regard to the relation between science and politics. On pages 44 and 45 Professor Hogben argues that just as people require a biochemist to tell them what is a correct diet, so they must have a scientist to tell them what is psychologically and politically good for them. "Only the science of human nature can tell us what range of choice is compatible with the needs of human nature," he says. It is the scientist therefore who must tell us what are the needs of human nature, and it is only through the scientist's knowledge that we can be "happy and healthy." Everything else is "mere talk." The fallacy here is that Professor Hogben is using the word "needs" in different senses, whereas his argument requires that he should be using it in the same sense all the time. When the biochemist tells us what diet we need or the "correct" diet, he is telling us merely that if we want to produce result x upon our bodies, the constituents of our diet must be a plus b plus c ; if result y , constituents d plus e plus f ; and so on. He is in fact merely telling us about means, what means in the way of diet will lead to certain ends. The "correct" diet which the biochemist reveals to us is that diet which will produce the result which we wish to produce; but the biochemist is no more and no less competent to tell us what result we ought to wish to produce than the economist, the politician, or the ordinary man in the street. A judgment upon diets in this wider sense includes or depends upon judgments of the relative values of bodily satisfactions and mental states, and neither the biochemist nor any other scientist is peculiarly competent, because he is a scientist, to judge "correctly" about such relative values. Now when Professor Hogben talks about "the needs of human nature" and what is politically or psychologically good for us, he is talking not only about things which are good as means but also things which are good as ends. To judge correctly what is psychologically or politically good for us requires a correct judgment upon relative values of things which are to be valued for their own

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sake. There is no reason to believe that either a social biologist or a psycho-analyst is any more competent than an economist or a Conservative duchess to make such judgments. The contribution which science can make to politics is to show us dispassionately the facts revealed by the various departments of science which are relevant to political problems, to show what means are available for attaining different ends, and to show us by example how the discussion of those ends and their relative values may be carried on in a truly scientific spirit of humility, tolerance, and impartiality. What disquiets one in these two books is the assumption that science gives to the scientists something like absolute truth with regard to ultimate political and social values and the complete absence of tolerance and impartiality, let alone humility, in the discussion of political and social ends.

LEONARD WOOLF

GERMANY'S WAR MACHINE. By ALBERT MÜLLER (*translated by A. H. MARLOW*). (London: *Dent*. 11s. 6d.)

HITLER: THE PAWN. By RUDOLF OLDEN. (London: *Gollancz*. 12s. 6d.)

EUROPE UNDER THE TERROR. By JOHN L. SPIVAK. (London: *Gollancz*. 8s. 6d.)

THE NEW GERMANY. By FRITZ ERMARTH. (*Washington, D.C. American University Graduate School, Digest Press*. \$2.)

GOVERNMENT IN THE THIRD REICH. By F. M. MARX. (London: *McGraw-Hill Publishing Company*. 8s. 6d.)

THESE books all deal with various aspects of the German portent. They do nothing to lessen our bad dreams. German Rearmament is a monstrous and most menacing performance. We in this island think most, for grimly obvious reasons, of the German Air

Force. But Herr Müller discusses another branch of German armaments, hardly less disturbing to nations on the Continent, namely the "Motorized Army." He gives facts and figures, chiefly from official published sources, of the development of the German motor industry, in strict subservience to the programme of the Military High Command. Even in the technique of two-dimensional warfare science advances with more than Seven League Boots. Areas which in the old days of 1914-18 it would have taken a campaign at least of weeks to conquer, could today be overrun, by such a motorized Army as Germany is preparing, in a few hours. As with the air force, so with the land motor, high speed of action plus a terrific weight of attacking force sets a quite new type of problem for the defence. "If I were going to attack an opponent," said Hitler in an after-dinner speech during the Nuremberg Party Rally in 1935 to the delegates of the foreign branches of the "League of German Girls," "I should act quite differently from Mussolini. I shouldn't negotiate for months beforehand and make lengthy preparations, but—as I have always done throughout my life—I should suddenly, like a flash of lightning in the night, hurl myself upon the enemy." For this quotation, which is new to me, Herr Müller makes himself responsible. He has written a most moving book, full of well-authenticated particulars concerning tanks, cross-country cars, amphibian cars, racing cars adapted to military requirements, motor lorries, artillery tractors, autarchy in motor fuel and rubber, and new German super-highways leading to all her neighbours' frontiers. No use, in the presence of such facts, to turn our faces to the wall and doze again; no use to twitter of lost chances, dead diplomatic might-have-beens of yesterday. Better to choose, if there is yet time for sober choice, between collective security, collective surrender and individual indecision leading to collective suicide.

Herr Olden's book is more verbose, cloudier and less informing. It purports to be a personal history of Hitler, and an "interpretation," reducing him to the level of a mere pawn of the military leaders and the heavy industrialists. Evidently there is much truth in such an interpretation. But Herr Olden overdoes it, and at tedious length. Into the

Rhineland last March was more than a pawn's move. The Reichswehr were notoriously against it, before it happened. And the heavy industrialists were not even consulted. Herr Olden, however, has a dramatic, if over-simplified, theme. But it is ruined by diffuseness.

Mr. Spivak writes much better than Herr Olden. His book is only partly about Germany. He has also visited Italy, Austria, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, a sort of diminuendo of Terror ending in the politically free but economically destitute Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, where, though the people are starving, owing to the closing of the old markets for their timber, Communists may speak and vote almost without fear. Mr. Spivak is an American journalist, who pushed his way in everywhere he went, asked a lot of questions, and wrote down afterwards what everybody told him. I am afraid that he may have got some people into trouble, for some, who spoke freely to him, may be identifiable by the authorities, and some of what they said may be information useful to the Terror. He talked to officials, diplomats, bankers, peasants, workmen and members of underground organisations. Good journalism, with some very vivid patches.

Dr. Ermarth, a graduate of Heidelberg and Harvard, has written a distinguished and most objective study of the rise and significance of the Totalitarian State in Germany. It is difficult to judge whether he is for or against Hitler. Perhaps he dodges a decision by escaping through a determinist back door. He traces the process of disintegration of German Democracy, as expressed in the Weimar Constitution, to the rigidity of political parties, both in doctrine and organisation, within the multi-party system fatally fostered by proportional representation. "While a negative majority was ready at any moment during the last years of the Republic to bring about the downfall of the Cabinet in the Reichstag, a positive majority, necessary to form a new Cabinet, could be established only with great difficulty, or not at all." And the doom of German Democracy was sealed by the growth of anti-constitutional parties, Communists and Nazis, on the two wings, with "military party machines." Dr. Ermarth is, as I have already hinted, in large measure a

determinist and believes, looking backwards, that all this, culminating in the Nazi Revolution, was inevitable. After two admirable chapters, full but not too long, describing the constitutional structure of the Third Reich and the economic state which has been created in Germany, he passes to the future. For Germany, "two roads lie ahead; the one leading to social reorganisation and redistribution of wealth, the other towards economic and political expansion. The totalitarian state is a mechanism, a tool, which may be used for either purpose. . . . If the other European capitalist powers refuse to grant an expanding Germany her 'place in the sun,' the totalitarian state may transform itself into a gigantic war-mechanism." But, in spite of his Determinism, and though today "again the air is full of that state of tension which precedes great natural catastrophes," Dr. Ermarth has not resigned himself yet to the inevitability of a second World War.

Government in the Third Reich, by Dr. Marx, is highly praised by Professor W. Y. Elliott in his Preface. The author is a former civil servant of the City-State of Hamburg. This is a heavier book than Dr. Ermarth's, but covering much of the same ground, both in retrospect and in description of present arrangements. A specialist on Modern Germany should read them both.

HUGH DALTON.

COMMONS DEBATES 1621. Edited by WALLACE NOTESTEIN, FRANCES HELEN RELF and HARTLEY SIMPSON. In 7 volumes. (*New Haven, Yale University Press, London, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press.* 1935. £7.7.0).

THE Parliament of 1621 is better known than some others of the first two Stuarts. But the seven volumes of Commons Debates for that momentous year recently published by Professor Notestein, Miss F. H. Relf, and Mr. Hartley Simpson, quite throw into the shade not only the meagre jottings kept by the Clerk of the House, but the two volumes of debates which we owe to Nicholas.

Their back-bone consists of no less than nine diaries or journals kept by members, some it is true, extending over only a few months, but several covering the whole, or almost the whole period from January 30 to December 9. Reports of debates, however, do not tell their story to the unassisted reader, and, in addition to the diaries contained in volumes II to VI, there is much supplementary matter which is not less valuable. Volume I includes, together with the editors' introduction, a list of precedents cited—statutes, cases before the Courts and in Parliament, and relevant incidents—which must run into some thousands, and an index to the whole collection which is a model of its kind. The concluding volume consists of illustrative material. It contains some seventy odd bills introduced, with some papers elucidating them; nearly one hundred grants referred to in the debates, again with explanatory matter; and a miscellany of election proceedings, speeches, petitions and other documents. Some impression of the mere labour that has gone to make the book may be given by saying that none of the diaries, and few, if any, of the other documents, had previously been published. The editing is of an almost meticulous scrupulousness, which seems to have missed nothing. The form of the volumes is worthy of their contents. Altogether, they are one of the most magnificent records of parliamentary proceedings ever produced.

The editors have postponed a discussion of the personnel and proceedings of the House of Commons of 1621 to a subsequent volume or volumes, which will deal both with it and with the House of 1624. Their introduction is principally concerned, therefore, with a consideration of the authorship of the reports contained in the present volumes. Since the significance of a diary depends partly on who kept it, that question is of some importance. How exciting it can be is shown by the fact that, of those now published, one is ascribed, for reasons which appear convincing, to the redoubtable Pym; another—unfortunately a short one—to Wentworth; and a third to a man who, though not eminent as a politician, has charmed all readers of such of his voluminous works as posterity has thought worth publishing, John Smyth of Nibley, the author of *The Lives*

of the *Berkeleys*, and Member for Midhurst. Compared with the first two, the notes kept by the Barringtons, Belasyses, Riches, Hollands and Howards may be thought somewhat small beer, but such a view is superficial. Without the support of the politicians of the second flight, the leaders would have been impotent. If one is to grasp the development of the economic and political assumptions which were to rule for two centuries, and, in a different garb, are still a power, it is not to the theorists, but to heavy-footed agriculturalists and slim merchants—the latter, unfortunately do not seem to have left journals—that one ought first to turn.

They went into action in 1621 with a sober and pertinacious ruthlessness which makes the proceedings of most modern left-wing parties seem like a Sunday-school treat. Unlike that of 1614, and those of 1640, the Parliament of that year has been given no name. But it deserves one as much, and it might be called not unfairly the Business Parliament. It was the scene of the most searching arraignment of a system of economic policy to be found in English history; defined the economic attitude which later, for good or evil, was to be the characteristic English style; and made it clear on which side, should the ways divide, the business classes, especially in the provinces, would be found.

The political history of the forty years before the Civil War has been, perhaps, a little over-rationalised. In reality, constitutional issues took their significance from the practical realities of the moment, and are unintelligible when divorced from them. "All the grievances of the kingdom are but a trifle compared with the decay of trade"; "Our end and necessity to enable the subject the better to live.....the advancement of our home commodities and the increasing of our commerce between man and man"; "That which will content the country is not bills, but some ease of trade"—with such sentiments, to judge by the tone of speeches, most members would have agreed. The background of it all, particularly in 1621, was predominantly economic. The astonishing commercial expansion which had begun in 1604, with the restoration of peace between Spain and England, had suddenly ended—in London about 1616, in the provinces three or four years later. As a result partly of a stroke of

commercial policy of peculiar imbecility, partly of the general rush into rearmament and of the reaction on the central-European market, which took the bulk of English exports, of the rumblings which preceded the Thirty Years' War, partly of the over-development of the English textile industry and of the inevitable growth, during the brief lucid interval, of foreign competition, the boom was followed by a slump. International finance had been the first to take alarm. Money on call in London was hastily repatriated by Dutch and Italian bankers. Prices tumbled down. There was a wave of bankruptcies in London, and severe unemployment in the manufacturing districts. In 1624 it was said that the fall of wool prices alone had reduced the income of landowners by nearly £1,000,000 a year.

The situation, therefore, when Parliament assembled early in 1621, though not as bad as it was to become in the course of the year, was extremely serious. The mood of horrified astonishment in which members met, and which was heightened when they exchanged notes, was that of America in 1929. A long period of easy prosperity had suddenly ended. The shock was staggering; and the debates on particular questions—companies, patents, tariffs, taxation—are to be read in the light of it. On such matters, however, since the editors of the work now published have postponed a discussion of them, this is not the place to touch. It is sufficient to thank them for a valuable contribution to the study of a critical period, and to express the hope that their volumes on the parliament of 1624 will not long be delayed.

R. H. TAWNEY.

THE SOCIAL SERVICES: A HISTORICAL SURVEY. By W. H. WICKWAR. (*Cobden-Sanderson*, 1936. Pp.268. 10s. 6d.)

WHEN Mr. Wickwar says in his preface that, on looking for "a book which would explain what the British social services were, describe how they had come into being, and suggest what part they played in moulding our state and society" he found "a multiplicity of specialist studies" but no general treatment, he is over-generous towards the existing literature.

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There are, indeed, plenty of books which describe the legal framework and the administrative machinery of the social services, but very few of them can properly be called studies in the sense that they attempt any interpretation. Even the immediate statistical, administrative and economic problems have been very little explored, while the wider social and political issues have hardly been touched. Nevertheless, it is in the building up of these services that we see the most important constructive effort which has been made to re-fashion our society in our own times. The neglect to study our efforts and to reflect upon the results is all the more surprising since the operation of these services profoundly affects everyone in the community whether as taxpayers, ratepayers or beneficiaries.

Mr. Wickwar's approach is historical; after devoting a chapter to the genesis of the social services, he studies in successive chapters poor relief, education, public health, natural contingencies (old age, ill-health, and so on) and economic contingencies (unemployment and job finding). He concludes with two general chapters on the social service state and on the state and society. In a book of moderate length the treatment of so huge a theme can be no more than slight. In the hands of a less sensitive and less reflective author the historical approach might have led to the production of a series of commonplace summaries of fairly familiar facts. But it is not this that Mr. Wickwar has given us. He has written an interpretative study in which he has reduced the amount of factual material to that which is necessary to illustrate changes of policy and of opinion. Very wisely he has omitted all but the merest mention of statistics relating to finance and to persons benefiting. His attention is fixed upon the motives which have led to the building up of the social service state and to the new form of social relations and the new kind of social responsibilities which characterise it.

It is clear that Mr. Wickwar is very thoroughly acquainted with the details of the social services; this is apparent, not because he gives an exhaustive description, but because of the accuracy and aptness of his illustrations. He does not belong to that class of author who sets out

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to talk at large without an adequate knowledge of the minutiae. The quality of the book is shown by the illuminating comparisons and penetrating comments which he works in. For instance, there is his description of the situation in the arts faculties of the new universities on page 93, and the discussion on pages 248 to 251 of the qualities and training that are necessary if the personnel which has to run the new services is to do its work adequately. The least convincing part of the analysis is, perhaps, the attempt in the last chapter but one to classify the services. Is it not broadly true to say that we can distinguish between the salvage services, of which poor relief is the best example, the preventive services, exemplified by the insurance services, and the constructive services such as education? Housing creates a difficulty; perhaps it is best regarded as subsidised consumption.

This book will be of little use to the student who merely wants to regurgitate on examination day a string of facts; but it is a valuable addition to our literature for those who, having some knowledge of the situation, desire to understand it better. In particular it should be in the hands of all those students, now happily increasing in number, in social study courses whether within or without the university. For them, as well as for others, the treatment, which is not merely well-informed and dispassionate but also sensitive and sympathetic, should help towards an appreciation of the most significant aspect of recent social changes.

A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS.

WORLD POPULATION, PAST GROWTH AND PRESENT TRENDS.
By A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS. (*Clarendon Press.* 336 pp.
12s. 6d.)

THIS book is a most lucid analysis of international population statistics, problems, and policies. It begins by tracing the history of censuses and birth and death registration. It then shows the number of inhabitants for various countries since 1700, and for each continent since 1650; migration movements since the dis-

covery of America, in particular the inter-continental emigration from Europe since 1845; crude birth and death rates since 1700; the trend of the true death rate and the political, social, sanitary, and medical causes of its fall; the trend of specific fertility rates and their reduction through birth control; the spread of the small family system; and finally the balance of births and deaths. A particularly attractive feature of this section is the author's discerning and judicious method of dealing with estimates which at best are cautious guesses. He is, for instance, not at all impressed by the apparent consensus of opinion concerning the population of Europe in the seventeenth century. "All that can be said is that the figure of 100 millions for Europe in 1650 cannot be improved upon, that it is not incompatible with the rest of our knowledge of European population history, but that there is little substantial evidence for it."

In the second part of the book the author discusses population problems and policies of today. He analyses the present population situation in Europe; European continental migration, and emigration and immigration restrictions on the part of European governments; Europe overseas and the regulation of European overseas movements; the European migration problem; attempts to raise the birth-rate; the small family problem; conditions in Japan, India, China, Java, and Egypt, among the Pacific Islanders and among Africans; the experience of Palestine.

We must confine ourselves to summarizing a few of the many conclusions reached by the author. Fertility is in the main determined by birth-control. There is no connection between density of population or industrialisation and the spread of birth-control. Changing economic conditions may cause some fluctuations in the birth-rate, but they do not affect the general trend. There existed among primitive races a small family system; certain customs were extensively and regularly practised, which, whether by limiting conceptions through restrictions upon intercourse or by destroying the products of conception by abortion or infanticide, kept the number of living children small. The modern small family system is novel because it is voluntary; all previous restrictions upon the size of the family had to be forced

upon the parents because the only means by which limitation could be achieved were all, in one way or another, painful or repulsive. There is no reason to suppose that the decline in fertility has now come to an end or even that the end is in sight. The proportion of children who are not desired is still very large. But contraceptive methods are undergoing continual improvement, and the time is approaching when only wanted children will be born. If married couples are to have children, they must desire them; they cannot be bribed into parenthood. Palestinian Jews limit their families less than other Jews. "Those who are concerned about the fall of the birth-rate in this and certain other countries may perhaps discern a lesson in this fact and conclude that, if the reproduction rate is to become a replacement rate, people must be brought deliberately to found families as a contribution to a society in whose future they have confidence and in whose ideals they find inspiration."

There can be overpopulation without unemployment and unemployment without overpopulation. The industrialised countries of western Europe are not overpopulated; unemployment there is due to a recession of conditions leaving the population stranded. But Poland and Italy certainly, and possibly also south-east Europe to some slight extent, are overcrowded, and this overcrowding is not of a kind that can be relieved immediately by a resumption of world economic activity. Russia could no doubt hold a much larger population than it does at present. A denser population in the United States would be beneficial because it would tend to reduce the costs of production and of distribution. A much denser population will be necessary in Canada and Australia if their resources are to be fully employed. But the development of these countries cannot proceed beyond a certain speed; roads, railways and harbours must be built and land must be cleared. Their population increased at an average annual rate of about 2 per cent. for the sixty years ending in 1924. If the average rate should become again 2 per cent, these countries will still be lightly populated for several decades, but there will be no substance in the charge that the owners occupy territory that they do not use; for they will be making all due speed towards

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full exploitation. If it does not, the charge will lie. But the rate of natural increase is declining sharply in these Dominions; therefore, if growth at, or even approaching, an annual average of 2 per cent. is to be maintained, immigration must play a larger part in the future than in the past. However, the contribution which the home country can make to this growth will rapidly decline, and relatively to the needs of the Dominions for immigrants will in any case be small. If the populations of the Dominions are to continue to grow, they will have to look elsewhere for most of their recruits.

Many valuable studies of special population problems have recently appeared. In writing this volume, Professor Carr-Saunders wanted to fill a gap in the literature by giving a general survey of the world situation. He has succeeded admirably. But as he states himself in the Preface "the book is merely a brief introduction to a subject of enormous scope and complexity." What we now need is actually more. What we now need is a full-sized handbook, exactly along the lines of this textbook. And no demographer is better qualified to write such a handbook than Professor Carr-Saunders himself.

R. R. KUCZYNSKI.

THE CRIMEA. By HAROLD TEMPERLEY. (*Longmans.* 25s.)
LORD PALMERSTON. By HERBERT C. F. BELL. (*Longmans.* 2 vols. 42s.)

THE short title of Professor Temperley's book is a little misleading. It suggests that he is merely re-writing the history of the Crimean War. Actually, his enterprise is a much vaster one. It is "to narrate the history of England's relations with the Near East from the death of Canning until the day when Disraeli brought back 'peace with honour' from Berlin." That is, it will cover 1827-1878. The present instalment does not enter upon the Crimean War, but ends at its outbreak.

Professor Temperley has cast the net of his research wide. Besides the records of the Foreign Office and the Admiralty,

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he has for certain years drawn unpublished material from the Royal archives, the diplomatic records of Vienna and Paris, and those at the Hague. He has consulted the private papers of Lord John Russell, Lord Granville, Lord Blomfield, Lord Clarendon, Lord Aberdeen and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, besides Gladstone's and Disraeli's. More, he has been over much of the Near Eastern ground, before and since the war; and his narrative gains greatly in colour from his visual contact with oriental sites and scenes, as well as his special familiarity with Serb sources. His story begins well in advance of his period with the accession of the Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839), the extirpator of the janizaries; and in the first chapter he brilliantly sketches the career and reforms of that refounder of the Ottoman Empire. Thereafter we are launched on the full tide of European events, with the interest perpetually shifting to and fro between the European Chancelleries and the Turkish scene; that is, between a modern world of politics and diplomacy and an almost unbelievably primitive world, which over large areas had changed relatively little since the Middle Ages. It is the latter rather than the former which will make the popular appeal; for the author's sense of the picturesque is strong and infectious. It even overflows into the Notes, which, printed apart from the text and principally devoted to prosaic tasks of reference and authentication, will now and then (like those glorious jungles which Sir Walter Scott added to some of his books) branch out into fascinating side-lines—the records of time and distance achieved by Tartar despatch-riders, the doings of a famous pasha, the death penalty for apostacy under Mohammedan law, or the early gropings of British policy towards Zionism nearly a century ago. In the text itself there are many brilliant action-pictures; such as the bombardment and capture of Acre by the British fleet under Stopford, or the campaign of Omer Pasha against the Bosnian beys.

The whole period is, of course, extremely interesting on the diplomatic side. The eventual responsibilities for bringing about the tragically unnecessary Crimean War are examined by Professor Temperley with great care both in the main text and in an appendix. He does not endorse the

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censures often passed on Stratford de Redcliffe. He estimates that on the British side the Cabinet in London were more to blame than their ambassador in Constantinople. And in the Cabinet no individual contributed more to the catastrophe than its head, the pacific Aberdeen. He did so, because his personal attitude of non-resistance fatally misled the Tsar and his London representative Brunnow. They forgot that a British Prime Minister, unlike a Russian Tsar, had a Cabinet which he could not overrule, and behind that an independent public opinion; and so they committed themselves beyond recall to positions, which neither the Cabinet nor the public opinion of Great Britain would accept. They allowed too little, also, for the war psychology, which had been developing alike at Stambul, at Paris, at St. Petersburg, and at London for nearly a year.

A good deal of the diplomatic ground covered by Professor Temperley is also dealt with by Professor H. C. F. Bell in his two volume life of Palmerston. This, whether as a piece of research or as a composition, must be ranked among the most important contributions to British history or biography made by any American scholar. It has long been a felt hindrance to the teaching of nineteenth-century history in this country, that no satisfactory all-round biography of Palmerston has been available. To say that is not to disparage Mr. Guedalla's brilliant and suggestive study, for it hardly set out to be this particular thing. Professor Bell's book does; and he is to be heartily congratulated on the success with which he has carried so difficult a cargo into port.

Like Professor Temperley, he has researched widely and patiently among the MS. papers of the period—the Windsor archives, the papers of Earl Grey, Lord Clarendon, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Gladstone, in this country, besides important papers to be seen in America. He has mapped out his material skilfully in respect of scale and proportion; he shows a rather special gift in treating the psychological sides of his subject; and lastly his style, if not distinguished in the highest sense, is always spirited and readable, and equally free from the vices of dullness and of overcolouring. His volumes may well hold their place for a long time as the standard biography. They do not, of course, stand in the

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way of monographs on particular aspects of Palmerston, such as the study of his foreign policy which Professor C. K. Webster has undertaken; nor has Professor Bell ever yielded to the temptation of overloading biography with general history, or competing with a vast design like Professor Temperley's. But for the place which his work sets out to fill it will be invaluable; indeed, indispensable.

R. C. K. ENSOR.

TOWARD SOCIAL SECURITY. By EVELINE M. BURNS. (269 pp. *McGraw-Hill*. 10s.)

THE traditional system in the United States has been to leave the individual to face the chronic insecurity of the capitalist order, and to endure whatever private misery and disasters might befall him, with no help beyond the resources which he and his family might possess. This system had for long been inadequate, but in the calamitous years after 1929 it broke down completely. The most important single event which has occurred under the Roosevelt regime has been the abandonment of the practices and philosophy of the outlook which rejoiced in the name of rugged individualism. At one bound the Federal Government has attempted to make up the leeway of thirty years neglect by introducing the most elaborate pension and insurance scheme ever embodied in a single measure.

It is obvious that a comprehensive system of social security must be organised by the Federal Government if it is to be done at all—the feebleness of the efforts of the separate states in this direction is sufficient evidence of that. But it is at least doubtful whether the Social Security Act will successfully run the gauntlet of the Supreme Court, despite the efforts which it makes to use the states' governments as executive instruments of Federal policy to a very large extent. The Act is, indeed, framed in great part as a grant-in-aid or tax-remission measure, whereby financial inducements will be conferred on those states which establish social insurance and pension schemes fulfilling the national minimum standards laid down in Washington. The under-

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lying significance of the Act lies in the immense increase in the power and importance which it confers on the Federal Government. From now onwards the mass of the American nation will have a new and vital interest in the central administration; the consequences are likely to be far-reaching.

The Social Security Act is amazingly compendious. It introduces (1) old age annuities, payable to persons over 65 years of age. These are paid for out of contributions levied on employers and workers, and both the contributions and the annuity vary with the workers' wages; (2) non-contributory old age pensions payable by the states to persons who satisfy a needs test. These are financed out of general taxation; (3) a system of unemployment compensation financed by a 3 per cent. tax on the employer's payroll; (4) a subvention of \$10 millions a year to the states to be spent on preventive public health work; (5) medical assistance for mothers and young children who are sick or crippled; (6) pensions for the blind; (7) vocational rehabilitation for persons suffering from physical handicaps; (8) provision for dependent children who have lost one or both parents or who are homeless or neglected; (9) assistance for aged widows or widows with dependent children. There are a number of new ideas in the Act of considerable interest, but it is also full of the most glaring and serious defects. The difficulties of obtaining a satisfactory result by means of "indirect rule" through the states may turn out to be overwhelming; but the attempt is on a gigantic scale although the measure is in some respects conceived on anything but heroic lines.

Mrs. Burns has written a book which expounds the Social Security Act in a lucid, concise manner, and also criticises its provisions and discusses their probable effects. She has thoroughly mastered the material and is well informed both about American experience in the separate states and also about European activity in the same field. English students will find her book of distinct value.

WILLIAM A. ROBSON.

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FRANCE TODAY AND THE PEOPLE'S FRONT. By MAURICE THOREZ. Translated by EMILE BURNS. (Gollanz 5s.)

FRANCE FACES THE FUTURE. By RALPH FOX. (Lawrence & Wishart 2s. 6d.)

THERE are few things in present-day Europe of more vital and immediate interest than the formation of the *Front Populaire* in France. Nearly everywhere where Fascism has made a bid for power, it has triumphed. In France it has suffered a resounding defeat, with the result that France is, and will probably remain for a long time, the last stronghold of democratic government on the Continent. Some day it will be worth while examining closely the reasons why French Fascism has, so far, failed. Is it because France is, politically, an infinitely more educated country than, say, Germany and Italy; and a country in which the anti-Fascist forces became immediately aware of the menace when it first became apparent on February 6, 1934, and reacted promptly and sharply against it, and then, drawing together, proceeded to rouse public opinion against it? Or, again, is the tradition of liberty so strong in France that French "Fascism" (which would never call itself by that name) was constantly restrained not only by the fear of a counter-attack, but also by the feeling that Fascism (whatever its official name) would not "go down" in France, and perhaps also by the realisation that the serious disorders or internal paralysis following a Fascist coup would play into the hands of Germany and so endanger the very existence of the country? Even at seemingly propitious moments Colonel de La Rocque refused to "do" anything, and has been accused by more extreme Fascists of cowardice and indecision; but my own belief is that on all these occasions La Rocque weighed up the pros and cons and always found that the odds were overwhelmingly against him. No comparison with Spain can hold good; for in France the army is always "with the Government,"—whatever the government, whether Right or Left. It is an important factor that is often overlooked. On the whole, I think one may say that in France the anti-Fascist feeling was infinitely stronger than in Germany; but that, at the same time, the enemy had neither the grim determination nor the feeling

of righteousness, neither the organisation nor the popular support that the Nazis had between 1929 and 1933.

Does that mean that France could not have gone Fascist, even if there had been no Left reaction to the 6th of February, and if no *Front Populaire* had been built up? The chances are that it would have gone Fascist—in some form. For the most direct way to the establishment of a Fascist regime in France is not a Fascist coup, but the infiltration of Fascism into the Government;—with the result that the Fascists would have gained control over the police and the army. And there were at least two occasions in the last two years when such an infiltration might have succeeded but for the vigilance of the Left-Wing Parties (and special credit in this matter is due to Herriot). Doumergue, with his precious constitutional proposals, was the first of the pro-Fascist premiers; and Laval—though more cautiously and discreetly—also played with the notion of making the *Croix de Feu* the backbone of the Republic. And it was under the pressure of the Left-Wing parties and of Left-Wing opinion crystallised in the *Front Populaire* that both Doumergue and Laval were turned out; and in neither case did the *Croix de Feu* venture to react. The victory of the *Front Populaire* in the General Election was the natural reaction of the French people not only against the “Fascist coup” of February 6, but also against the sort of national government which threatened France with what E. M. Forster called “Fabio-Fascism”; which on occasion allowed the financial oligarchy and the press to blackmail parliament into obedience with the use of the “street,”—that is, the Fascist Leagues. For although France was never seriously menaced by a Fascist *putsch*, the “street” (and the forces behind it) constantly interfered with the normal working of parliamentary government. And this became particularly apparent after February 6.

Both M. Thoréz's book and Mr. Fox's book are simplified versions of what has been happening in France in the last two or three years. M. Thoréz, the General Secretary of the French Communist Party, and Mr. Fox both describe the process from the Communist angle, with rather too much about the part played by the Communists, and not nearly enough about the part played by the Socialists and particularly

by the Left Wing Radicals, without whose campaign in June and July, 1935, the *Front Populaire* would still be no more than the Front Commun. Both the accounts are also rather too full of rough-and-ready formulae. Thus, February 6 with its very complex psychological background, is simply called a “Fascist coup.” What they do not explain is why a Communist organisation like the A.R.A.C. took part in the “Fascist” riots; and why, on the following day, the *Humanité* treated Daladier and Frot as “assassins” and the Socialists (who, to defy the Fascist rioters outside the Chamber, had voted for the government) as the assassins' accomplices. Nevertheless, M. Thoréz's book is useful as a plain statement of the Communist case as it was presented to the electorate in the General Election. Since then a large number of new problems have arisen to which the book gives no answer.

As for Mr. Fox's book, it has not the value of being a “document” that Thoréz's book has. It is a curious mixture of facts, shrewd observation, unnecessary rhetoric, and numerous inaccuracies. He speaks of “the common blood bond” between Czechs, Hungarians and Germans; he calls Eugene Frot Camille Frot; he says that the Flandin government fell because it defied the Bank of France, whereas in reality it was overthrown by the Chamber for having surrendered to the Bank of France; he speaks of 10,000 franc notes, when there is no such thing; and he asks why every French politician begins his career on the extreme Left and ends up on the extreme Right. Why *every*? I also doubt the accuracy of his account of what took place at the French Cabinet meeting on the day of the Locarno coup. That Mandel wanted to mobilise is true enough; but it is hardly true that Marcel Déat, who of all Garraut's ministers was least keen on “strong action,” wanted to “send a force of French warplanes to make a ‘demonstration of protest,’ above the German troops as they marched in.” Apart from that, however, Mr. Fox's book is useful as a brief, if rather disjointed, summary of what has been happening in France. And it is, for the present, the only book of its kind we have in English.

ALEXANDER WERTH.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

CURRENT PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC POLICY. *Edited by* CHARLES A. BEARD.
With the collaboration of G. H. E. SMITH. 526 pp. (Macmillan.
12s. 6d.)

This is a collection of materials for the teacher and student of political science, produced by the American Political Science Association. The materials chosen are official papers in the field of government.

LOCARNO: A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS. *Edited by* DR. F. J. BERBER.
405 pp. (Hodge. 12s. 6d.)

The documents included are both official and unofficial. Herr von Ribbentrop contributes a short preface.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER. *By* J. F. BROWN. 529 pp.
(McGraw-Hill. 21s.)

The author is Associate Professor of Psychology at Kansas University.
THE AMERICAN IDEAL. *By* ARTHUR BRYANT. 259 pp. (Longmans
10s. 6d.)

Studies of Jefferson, Lincoln, Emerson, Whitman, Roosevelt, Page, Seeger, and Vachel Lindsay.

THE ALTERNATIVE TO WAR. *By* CHARLES RODEN BUXTON. 176 pp.
(Allen & Unwin. 4s. 6d.)

Suggests a wide, practical programme for statesmen directed to eliminate the causes of war.

ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE 15TH CENTURY. *By* S. B.
CHRIMES. 415 pp. (Cambridge Press. 21s.)

A re-examination of the constitutionalism of the Lancastrians.
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE. *By* STAFFORD CRIPPS. 287 pp. (Gollancz.
7s. 6d.)

A programme of first steps to peace and real collective security.
THE KING AND HIS DOMINION GOVERNORS. *By* H. VERE EVATT. 324 pp.
(Oxford Press & Milford. 15s.)

A study of the reserve powers of the Crown in Great Britain and the Dominions by a Judge of the High Court of Australia.

UNDER MOSCOW SKIES. *By* MAURICE HINDUS. 736 pp. (Gollancz.
10s. 6d.)

A novel, the setting of which is Russia in 1929-1930.
PACIFIC RELATIONS. *By* W. G. HOFFMAN. 539 pp. (MacGraw-Hill.
11s. 6d.)

A social science text-book dealing with the peoples of the Pacific and their problems.

SOVIET MONEY AND FINANCE. *By* L. E. HUBBARD. 339 pp. (Macmillan.
12s. 6d.)

A detailed study of Soviet banking, currency, credit theory and practice, currency planning, foreign trade, etc.

ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC. *By* W. H. HUTT. 377 pp. (Cape. 15s.)
A study of the competitive system by the Professor of Commerce in the University of Capetown.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

CHANGING MAN: THE SOVIET EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM. *By* BEATRICE
KING. 319 pp. (Gollancz. 10s. 6d.)

A detailed study of the educational system of the U.S.S.R.
WALLS HAVE MOUTHS. *By* W. F. R. Macartney. 440 pp. (Gollancz.
10s. 6d.)

An account of ten years' penal servitude with a prologue, epilogue and comments by Mr. Compton Mackenzie.

POVERTY AND PUBLIC HEALTH. *By* G. C. M. M'GONIGLE and J. KIRBY.
278 pp. (Gollancz. 6s.)

Based on investigations lasting over 15 years. A foreword by
PROFESSOR GOWLAND HOPKINS.

RUSSIA U.S.S.R. *Edited by* P. MALEVSKY-MALEVITCH. 814 pp. (Williams
& Norgate. 21s.)

An American "handbook" published in 1933.
THE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE GERMAN-POLISH BORDERLANDS. *By*
IAN F. D. MORROW and L. M. SIEVEKING. 558 pp. (Oxford
Press & Milford. 25s.)

A study of present day conditions in the pre-war Prussian provinces of East and West Prussia.

INDIA AND THE WORLD. *By* JAWAHARLAL NEHRU. 262 pp. (Allen &
Unwin. 5s.)

Addresses and essays on various subjects by the Indian leader.
COMMERCE AND SOCIETY. *By* W. F. OAKESHOTT. 418 pp. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press. 7s. 6d.)

A history of trade in its relation to the history of civilisation.
THE CAREER OF THÉOPHILE DELCASSÉ. *By* CHARLES W. PORTER. 356 pp.
(Oxford Press & Milford. 16s.)

A careful account of the life and political career of the French statesman by an American.

TSUSHIMA. *By* A. NOVIKOFF-PRIBOY. 407 pp. (Allen & Unwin. 16s.)

This book is translated from the Russian by Eden and Cedar Paul. The author was in the Russian navy and on one of Rozhdestvensky's battleships at the battle of Tsushima.

ON THE RIM OF THE ABYSS. *By* JAMES T. SHOTWELL. 400 pp. (Macmillan.
12s. 6d.)

A study of the international situation and the drift to war up to 1934 by the well-known American publicist.

THE LAW OF PEACE. *By* C. VAN Vollenhoven. 261 pp. (Macmillan.
10s. 6d.)

A historical study of the law of nations, translated by W. Horsfall Carter.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. *By* BENJAMIN H. WILLIAMS. 517 pp. (McGraw-Hill. 24s.)

A study of American foreign relations from the point of view of political science.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE TRAINING OF STAFF AND THE TECHNIQUE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

The Editor,

DEAR SIR,

In his article on the Home Civil Service, Professor Ernest Barker restricted his consideration of the training of Civil Servants to the distinguished group whose concern is policy. To the student of social administration it would be valuable to share his views also upon the training of the personnel of the centralised social services who exercise the technique of administrative discretion. Perhaps he will not disagree entirely with the following comments.

The isolation of domestic problems and their reference to separate Commissions or Boards created to devise practical standards of service enabled the State to grapple with these problems at the closest quarters and in the open. It is the man facing the public in an attempt to achieve something constructive who needs freedom for movement. His duty is neither comparable with that of checking another's completed work nor of securing compliance with the terms of a licence. This new technique is employed, for example, by the Area Traffic Commissioners and the Unemployment Assistance Board. Slum clearance seems to stand midway: the Minister of Health has discretion in issuing orders, but the Local Authorities remain in the firing line.

Assumption of direct responsibility by the State in a social matter has resulted usually from pressure by voluntary organisations and workers who originally diagnosed the ill and who continue to hold views of the correct remedy. In these circumstances, understanding between the amateur who led the attack and the professional public servant who is appointed subsequently to "mop up" the attacked, might be even readier if there was some authoritative channel through which the latter had to become familiar with the promptings of the thoughtful and organised opinion behind the encounter.

It is this duty of exercising individual judgment in the presence of an educated public which may be the justification for any case for special training, after appointment, for this class of officers.

The Area Officer of the Unemployment Assistance Board provides an example of the social significance of administrative discretion. Among his duties is that of assisting a client according to his need. Nothing would be farther from fact than to imagine that this meant only an automatic application of the scales of Unemployment Assistance. Two preliminaries may be noted. Firstly, a careful survey of the circumstances of the client. Secondly, a review of his circumstances in the light of all the public services through which assistance may be appropriate to the case. This is the opposite of passing on responsibility for, if public services are expressions of public forethought, it must be the intention that every citizen should derive from them the fullest benefit permissible. Need is not met therefore as a matter of destitution, or by a simple grant of money only, but by giving in addition such advice or making such contacts as will help the client to obtain the totality of assistance prescribed for him by social legislation. Bad housing conditions may mean merely a bad tenant, or ignorance of the rights and duties of occupier and Local Authority under the Public Health and Housing Acts, or ignorance of the uses of the Poor Man's Lawyer if the Mortgage and Rent (Restriction) Acts are applicable, or a clear case for exceptional assistance pending a removal to better accommodation. The purpose of the discretion is perhaps an instance of the growing recognition by the State of the social value of a full life for its members.

By this process of mental co-ordination the Area Officer focusses the whole range of assistance, professional and otherwise, upon each case before proceeding to a final assessment. The Area Officer's discretion looks like the social conscience in microcosm.

The instances of moral strength seen by the Area Officer each day in his dealings with his clients tends to make idealists out of officials, and from the responsibility for sound judgment may come a desire for special training.

It seems to be held generally that at present the Universities have not a great deal to offer to the mature official in the field who wishes to order his ideas on social matters. On the one hand, he needs a more detailed knowledge of

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certain statutes just off his own beaten track. Instances of this have been given already in considering the various aspects of need that may arise in a "bad housing" case. On the other hand, he needs a knowledge of broad principles from an authoritative source in political theory, social psychology and the understanding of social statistics. Although these subjects have hard names, they represent simple truths which should be readily appreciated by the average Civil Servant whose appointment to any established grade is a guarantee of a creditable standard of education. It is contended that the training required is a tying together of the loose ends of experience in the adult mind, rather than an attempt to train for learned degrees men and women who have passed the stage of life when mere absorption of knowledge has any attraction.

Yours faithfully,
C. H. W. M.

CORRECTIONS

The price of *The Russian Financial System* by W. B. Reddaway, reviewed in the April-June issue, was incorrectly given as 15s.; it should have been 5s.

The Socialisation of Iron and Steel by "Ingot," reviewed in the July-September issue, is published by Messrs. Gollancz under the auspices of the New Fabian Research Bureau.

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to being quite avowedly and without check, instruments of national policies; any international purpose will have been formally disavowed. But with the nationalist purpose will go the nationalist psychology. We should then once more have a situation in which Japan or Italy would be challenging, not what Conservatives regard as a cold and alien abstraction, "the League," but the British Empire, about which they feel very much more warmly and about which they would behave very differently from the way in which they have behaved over the League this last six years.

The principle that there shall be "No defence but Collective Defence, No War but a League War" does not, as some Pacifists imply, introduce an element of militarism into a sphere where heretofore it did not exist. It deprives "defence" of its emotional intoxication. Experience would seem to show that under any collective system of defence the romanticism so easily created around the figure of the soldier is replaced by the much more sober attitudes we adopt towards the policeman.

VII

Out of the wreck of things this coming few months must somehow be saved the collective system. It might be created afresh as a system by which the Socialist and democratic states formed themselves into an alliance differing from pre-war alliances in this respect; that it would be open to "the other side" to join on condition of subscribing to its principles. These principles should be broadly:

- (1) Members to submit disputes to peaceful settlement, arbitration, third party judgment in some form;
- (2) the member, fulfilling that condition if attacked by another state not so fulfilling it, to be defended by the power of the whole group;
- (3) membership open to all accepting these conditions.

THE NEW JOHN BULL

The case for such a system of collective defence as the only possible system of effective defence is so simple; and the method of individual defence, of everybody being stronger than anybody else, so impossible, that in the debates which lie before us the Left, if they remained consistent advocates of the former method, might well emerge as the real protagonists of national security, and the Right as the defeatists in this respect. It is not alone in Russia that Socialism is taking on more and more of nationalism. In France also we see some tendency for the Right and Left in some degree to change roles in this respect. And, so long as it is recognised that the price of preserving such nationalism as is not anti-social is a workable internationalism, the fact need not be regretted.

In any case a clearer recognition of the tendencies above outlined will help in the formulation by the British Left of policies acceptable to the nation as a whole.