


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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JULY 1935.

THE OLD AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

THE long anticipated change of government has now been adroitly and swiftly carried out. Certain square pegs have been extracted from round holes by transference or retirement, and attempts made to fill these up in a more fitting manner. Some of these changes have long been felt to be desirable, but owing to the peculiar nature of the government, with its balance of parties and the key positions held by their leaders, it was considered too dangerous to make any move which might bring the whole structure toppling to the ground. The retirement, however, of Mr. MacDonald from the premiership facilitated a sort of general post, and on the joint assumptions that so far as possible no new entrants were to be allowed—that the so-called three-party nature of the government must be maintained—that only those who had, or have had in the past, their feet upon the ladder of office should be allowed to climb higher, a worse job might have been made of it.

It is perfectly true that persistent health troubles have contributed very largely to the late Prime Minister's departure from his high office, but there is, of course, more in it than that. Mr. MacDonald never lived up to the great opportunity he had as leader of the first National Government of 1931. He too easily bowed before the tory hordes in Cabinet and Parliament, and made no attempt to exercise the real authority he possessed to give the government that vigorous leadership and national drive which lay within the scope of his authority. After obtaining his "doctor's mandate" he did little to influence the treatment of the patient beyond contributing a superb bedside manner. Mr. MacDonald is a distinguished and romantic figure possessed of a great personal charm, and he doubtless presided most successfully over Cabinet meetings and international conferences. On the other hand, he has never seemed at his ease in this House of Commons, has spoken little, and then not with great effect. In the early part of the year it must be admitted that his

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presence at the head of the government had become a grave embarrassment to the administration, and it was generally felt that the Conservative Party would not consent to meet the electors again under his leadership.

There has, of course, never been any question that his successor would be Mr. Baldwin, who has throughout this Parliament been the real leader of the House of Commons and master of the government. Gardiner says, in the final words of his book on Oliver Cromwell, that he was the greatest because the most typical of Englishmen. So, too, it may be said (putting political considerations aside) that the new Prime Minister is the greatest of Englishmen because he is so typical of all that is best in English life. There would be nothing much wrong with the conduct of affairs if the unadulterated Baldwin outlook permeated resolutely and thoroughly the administration of British policy, but this is not the case. It is so often checked, hampered and dissipated by having to work through smaller and narrower minds. There is no doubt that looked at purely from the point of view of the headship of the government an improvement has taken place, and one that puts it more definitely in touch with the realities of the situation.

Turning now to the extremely important post of Foreign Secretary, there has been a change of fundamental significance. No one man can combine in himself all the qualities, and when the fairies were making up the composition of Sir John Simon they must have considered that after conferring upon him supreme intellectual powers it was reasonable to withhold certain personal qualities. But these were essential to anyone responsible for the conduct of our foreign affairs, where human contacts with people of all races play so important a part. Nothing could exceed the extreme industry and great devotion to his task displayed by the late Foreign Secretary. He must certainly have desired a very different outcome to his efforts from that which has occurred, but without going into the history of international affairs in the last three years it is enough to say that British foreign policy under Sir John Simon has been disastrous in its consequences to this country and the world. All will wish him well in the difficult task he has now undertaken as Deputy Leader of the House of Commons. His duties at the Home Office he will carry in his stride with every possible efficiency and success.

There has been considerable controversy as to Sir John's successor at the Foreign Office, and many felt that the remarkable qualities of courage, sincerity and diplomatic skill displayed by Mr. Eden should carry him to that post. The best man we have had since Canning, as some experts say. Provided, however, that he has ample scope to carry on with more authority than before the splendid work he is doing in League of Nations' affairs, there is a good deal to be said for not exposing him alone without previous Cabinet experience to the chilling blasts of the crusted isolationists still within the Cabinet.

Sir Samuel Hoare gives every promise of providing, with the new Prime Minister and Mr. Eden, a strong pro-League combination, for he had personal experience after the war as High Commissioner for Refugees for the League of Nations, and has been a consistent supporter and sympathiser with its work. The new Foreign Secretary has a cool, moderate, balanced mind and great industry. He has shown remarkable gifts of statesmanship in the conduct of Indian affairs in the last **three** years in a situation that has presented innumerable opportunities for false steps and political blunders. But he committed none, and obtained the goodwill and confidence of the many different Indian representatives, from princes to peoples, with whom he had to negotiate. Such a foundation is the best evidence of his ability, particularly in co-operation with Mr. Eden, who possesses some of the personal qualities he lacks, to give a new and decisive direction to the conduct of our foreign affairs.

The control of our national finances remains in the competent hands of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, who will doubtless continue his sound, orthodox if unimaginative administration. Although the second figure in the Conservative Party after Mr. Baldwin, he does not possess those qualities which would have enabled him to assume the supreme direction of affairs, but within the limits of his vision and policy he is an efficient guardian of the Treasury.

It will doubtless be a great satisfaction to Lord Hailsham to find himself once again on the long-coveted Woolsack. His influence and that of the other service ministers has throughout been singularly unhelpful to any progress in disarmament and in the fulfilment of a resolute League of Nations policy. That the War Office should fall into the hands of one with so

different an outlook as Lord Halifax is interesting, though it would seem to be accidental and to have no necessary bearing on policy. Lord Halifax would appear to have gone there simply because it was the only place in the jig-saw puzzle of reconstruction into which he could be fitted at all elegantly.

One cannot help regretting the departure of Lord Sankey from the Office of Lord Chancellor. He introduced an outlook and influence definitely non-Conservative, and carried out his duties with dignity and ability. The part he played in the remarkable duel in the House of Lords between himself and the Lord Chief Justice will long be remembered by those who had the good fortune to be present. Lord Sankey was the winner on all points.

Returning to the question of the three service ministers, nothing is more singular in the new arrangement of offices than the suggestion that Mr. MacDonald, who is ostensibly retiring on grounds of health, should be given the highly important duty of co-ordinating them. In such circumstances this obviously cannot be carried very far, but if the idea is that the new Lord President of the Council should exercise his high qualities of genial chairmanship and conciliation—never shown to greater advantage than in the small Indian summer enjoyed at Stresa—then much good work may be accomplished, particularly as he has acted for the last six years as Chairman of the Committee of Imperial Defence. It is difficult, however, to believe that any very fundamental changes will be made. For one thing, there has been introduced into the now highly important position of Secretary of State for Air, in place of the mild and graceful Lord Londonderry, a man of the autocratic and aggressive temperament of Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister. These qualities have not endeared him to the House of Commons, but he possesses great industry and determination, and can certainly be counted upon to throw the utmost energy into the trebling of the Royal Air Force, a task fully to his taste. He would be much more effective if he could only bring himself to believe that a Member of Parliament can, without offence, hold a view contrary to his own!

The Admiralty remains in the nautically accomplished hands of Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell. His training and career have taught him to believe in the navy as the only sure shield of Britain, and he may be trusted to do his utmost at all times

for the senior service, without taking too great notice of the "international dream" of disarmament.

Surprisingly, Mr. J. H. Thomas is to remain at the Dominions Office. One cannot help wondering whether a change might not have been worth carrying out here, in order to see whether a different type of personality would have had greater success with the unusual type found in Mr. De Valera. Probably there exists somewhere just the personality that is required to bring off a deal with Mr. De Valera, but that individual does not seem to be the genial and irrepressible Mr. Thomas. Surely the War Office would have appreciated him.

In many ways one of the most interesting and important appointments is that of Mr. Ernest Brown to be Minister of Labour. The light of leadership that was beginning to shine on Mr. Oliver Stanley has been sadly dimmed by the collapse of the Unemployment Assistance Board's regulations last February. Whatever the real explanation may have been, the main responsibility must lie on Mr. Stanley's shoulders, nor would he seek to evade it. It was the gravest blunder committed by the government in home affairs. For a few days they appeared to be tottering under it, and the present standstill arrangement merely screens a very dangerous background. Apart from the original mistake, it is no credit to the government that they have been unwilling or unable to face the question of introducing new regulations during the past five months, a period much longer than anyone contemplated at the time. Suggestions have been made that the whole issue should be postponed in some ingenious manner until after the General Election, but it cannot be so avoided, and in placing Mr. Brown in charge the government have probably made as wise a selection as lay within their power. Mr. Brown is a master of the subject from a parliamentary, administrative and human point of view. He has shown great industry and ability in the offices he has held up to the present, and can be relied upon to make the best of a very bad job. What one likes particularly about this appointment is that it is an example of a man who without any adventitious advantages has been able to rise solely by his own natural gifts and parliamentary abilities.

Taken purely on its merits and without regard to claims of various kinds, the appointment of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald

to the Colonial Office is excellent. He is thoroughly competent for the position. The fact that he is only 33 years of age should be a great recommendation at a time when it is realised that youth must be given its share in government. Mr. MacDonald is liked on all sides. He is modest, able, persuasive, and has a clear, well-balanced mind. The only people who can really object to his appointment are those politicians more than 33 years old who feel that because they have lived longer, they have the right to take precedence. Not much sympathy need be wasted on those who take this view.

From the first formation of the National Government in 1931 it was obvious that Sir Kingsley Wood was worthy of a more important position than that of Postmaster-General, but he had to make way for the representatives of other parties. This has been most fortunate for the post office and those who make use of its many public services. His transference to the important position of Minister of Health will undoubtedly strengthen the government, for Sir Kingsley knows how to "put it over," whereas Sir Hilton Young, with all his admirable qualities, did not. It remains to be seen whether the new Minister of Health is to continue his work as Minister of Propaganda—a curious and dubious arrangement.

Lord Zetland is little known on the parliamentary stage, though he has won golden opinions in India, and has written a masterly life of Lord Curzon. He is one of that considerable number of members of both Houses who have sat through all the Round Table Conferences and the meetings of the Standing Joint Committee. He is, therefore, steeped in the subject, and being in full sympathy with the policy of the government would appear to be admirably equipped to carry on the Hoare tradition. Incidentally, it enables a Harrovian Prime Minister to add a third Harrovian to the government, the other being the new Foreign Secretary.

One of the most interesting appointments is that of Lord Eustace Percy as Minister without Portfolio. Lord Eustace is generally regarded as the leader of the Left Wing Conservatives in the House, of whom there are a considerable number amongst the younger members. They have advanced views on the subject of Planning, particularly for industry, and their outlook is in general so progressive that it would not be difficult for them to take part as the Right Wing of a

National Government of the Left. It was, therefore, an adroit move to attempt to attach this important body of opinion to the government. Furthermore, it might be represented as a very moderate approach towards the views of those who hold that there should always be a certain number of prominent ministers without departmental duties, whose task it would be to plan policy on a wide front.

It is also interesting to note those who are not in or not represented in the new government. The Labour Party is, of course, in complete opposition, and the Liberal Party under Sir Herbert Samuel, backed by all the Liberal organisations in the country, are not amongst its supporters. Mr. Lloyd George is not included, and this would appear to indicate definitely that his New Deal, after prolonged consideration by the government, is not going to be accepted on any adequate scale. This must mean that when the lists for the electoral battle are set the great prestige of Mr. Lloyd George, detached during the last few years and particularly the last few months from party strife, will be thrown in on the Left against the National Government. This is undoubtedly one of the most important elements that will tell against the government, for Mr. Lloyd George is in some degree a legendary figure, and has a hold on the imaginations of people in all parts of the country, dating from the war period, which nothing can destroy.

A factor which has tended of recent months to assist the government, contrary to all justice and reason, is the revival of the German menace, and the steps for aerial rearmament as a consequence. The fact that the government themselves are largely responsible for the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference, for the installation of the Nazi régime and for the present weakness of the League of Nations, is either not realised or forgotten in the urgencies of the moment, but unless the government are able to show that they are pursuing at least as energetically as their rearmament programme a policy of making a reality of collective security under the League, and so rendering possible disarmament, they will lose a very large body of supporters.

The national sentiment evoked by the Jubilee celebrations has undoubtedly assisted the government, but any attempt to make use of this feeling for electoral purposes would rapidly cause a damaging reaction. The Jubilee sentiment was that

of a free people, proud of their freedom and democratic institutions, above all proud of the hereditary president under the name of King who presides with such admirable impartiality over whatever type of government his subjects care to place in the House of Commons.

But the subject which seems likely to have the most considerable influence on the General Election is that of the Means Test. It will be impossible for the government to escape from the profound error of the regulations hastily abandoned earlier in the year. They affect the whole industrial population, employed or unemployed, and whatever concessions the new regulations contain they are not in the least likely to satisfy an electorate which "tasted blood" in February, and think that by mass agitation they caused the government to surrender. Assuming the regulations are based on the same principles as before, government candidates will be outbid everywhere by those who feel that more generous treatment is now reasonable, and indeed that a good case can be made out for the abolition of the household means test altogether. The effect of these regulations will fix the date of the election, and may postpone it till next May.

Summing up the new government, I would say that in several respects, such as the higher command at No. 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office and in the introduction of younger blood, it is obviously a great improvement. Furthermore, it might have contained Mr. Churchill. On the other hand, it must be remembered that there are still five powerful reactionaries in the Cabinet. They can be trusted to continue to place a fatal check and drag on every progressive movement at home and abroad. There will be many, therefore, who will feel that the best hope for the country at the present time would be a National Government devoid of these influences, relying upon the great mass of progressive opinion existing in the Liberal and Labour parties, and well represented, as has been indicated above, in the Conservative Party, too. If before the General Election some such grouping could be envisaged by the electorate, then the days of Mr. Baldwin's new administration are likely to be numbered.

GEORGE MANDER.

REARMAMENT: 1935.

IS it not appalling to think how the prospects for a general Disarmament Convention have worsened since 1932? Little more than three years ago, Italy was urging the all-round abolition of nearly all the kinds of armament that had been prohibited for Germany at Versailles. Brüning was still Chancellor of Germany, and was offering to accept, in respect of Germany's claim to equality of treatment, a programme which seems utopian now. And Hoover was proposing the reduction of the world's armaments by about one-third, including the abolition of all tanks and heavy mobile guns, all poison gas, all bombing planes, and from a third to a quarter of the warships of the Great Naval Powers.

1933.

Little more than two years ago, before the fatal adjournment of the Disarmament Conference on June 8th, 1933, the discussion of the British Draft Convention seemed to be proceeding well. The French accepted it as the basis of a convention, stipulating only that provisions must be included for the control of the arms trade and the limitation of expenditure. The Germans, who had previously been making difficulties about the control of civil aviation, declared on May 27th, 1933, that the abolition of all national air forces "must in no case be allowed to break down on the question of civil aviation. Germany for her part was prepared to go as far as possible to prevent the use of civil aircraft for military purposes." Spain had submitted twenty draft articles, on lines widely supported in the Conference, for the abolition of all military aviation and the development of civil flying as an international service. Mr. Eden had declared, on May 27th, that "If, as the U.K. delegation trusts, the Permanent Disarmament Commission can work out some such scheme as is outlined in the (British) draft for the effective supervision of civil aviation, then, before the next Disarmament Conference meets, the total abolition of naval and military aircraft can and will be realised under the terms of the Draft Convention as it now stands." As for the Americans, they had lately made a notable offer about consultation in time of crisis; they had also made their offer about putting no

of a free people institutions, the way of the League's sanctions in the event of the name, g satisfied that the Kellogg Pact was being violated ; tiality they had declared that " the ultimate objective should place reduce armaments approximately to the level established by the Peace Treaties ; that is, to bring armaments as soon as possible through successive stages down to the basis of a domestic police force. We are prepared to join other nations in abolishing weapons of an aggressive character." And President Roosevelt had emphasised that he regarded all " war planes " as falling within this category.

Two years ago!

1934.

Even one year ago, when Japan and Germany had already broken with the League and when the implacable Barthou was still Foreign Minister of France—even then the armament race had not become nearly so frantic as it is now. So lately as April 16th, 1934, Germany was offering to accept the deferment for five years of any levelling down of war material by the heavily armed Powers ; and, since the other Powers would not undertake, it seemed, to abolish all military aircraft within a fixed period, Germany claimed (without prejudice to the negotiations about general abolition proposed by Great Britain) a " defensive air force of short-range machines, not including bombing-planes, from the beginning of the Convention, the numerical strength of which would not exceed 30 per cent. of the combined air forces of Germany's neighbours, or 50 per cent. of the military aircraft of France . . . whichever figure was the less." And she called for the abolition of all bombers.

A year ago I discussed in this REVIEW the Resolution of June 8th, 1934, with which the General Commission of the Conference had lately ended a critical session. That Resolution declared the Conference's conviction " of the necessity of the Conference continuing its work with a view to arriving at a general convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments." It called, amongst other things, for the study of further " regional security agreements," for further work on the question of sanctions in the event of breach of the Disarmament Convention, and for further work on supervision, and on control of the arms traffic. In particular, it called on the

Air Commission to resume forthwith the study of the questions about air forces which had been mentioned in the notorious Resolution of July 23rd, 1932. Discussing the Resolution of June 1934, I suggested that it was better than nothing : " it does offer just a chance for the conclusion of a convention of some value as a beginning." But I saw no hope of such a convention " unless, amongst other things, the British Government amends its policy as regards collective security " ; unless dealings with Germany were conducted on the basis of real equality of treatment, " in a different temper from those of October 1933 " ; and unless France chose to pay the price of a convention tolerable to Germany instead of a policy of armed supremacy and exclusive alliances.

That was a year ago.

1935.

Since then, how few have been the victories of reason, how many more chances of recovering lost ground have been missed, how fearsomely the armaments race has been accelerated, and how reckless the challenge of Japanese and Italian imperialism has become, in face of the irresolution of the League's defenders.

On the credit side of the account for the year we may set the fact that an effort seems to have been made to avoid the worst features of the policy of Franco-Russian encirclement of Germany, towards which the late M. Barthou was heading. There is some hope, too, in the fact that Mr. Eden, backed now by such democratic education in this country as the Peace Ballot has afforded, has made some admirable declarations about collective security, and can now speak in the Cabinet. Sir John Simon has left the Foreign Office, and Lord Londonderry has left the Air Ministry, though whether their successors will be any better remains to be seen. Perhaps, too, we should reckon on the credit side the fact that Hitler's recent programme, though it claims an armament far greater than that which he offered to accept a year before, is not even more formidable. And perhaps we may conclude, from the way in which the British and German Governments have recently exchanged views, that at long last the British Government has made up its mind to treat Germany on a footing of real equality. So much for the credit side of the

from his contribution to the Air Commission's discussion—content to watch the foreigners break their teeth on the difficulties.

Now, in June 1934, Lord Londonderry had got his way. Instead of going to Geneva to press for an all-round reduction of air forces, he went to the House of Lords to announce an immediate increase of the British Air Force: and as if to make plain that the Air Commission need not trouble to meet, he declared that "we can no longer hope that an international convention will solve the problems which agitate the whole of Europe." He said that, remember, within three weeks of the endorsement by the British Government of the decision that the Air Commission must meet again forthwith, to press on with the conclusion of such an international convention for the reduction of armaments. In the enthusiasm of the moment Lord Londonderry let slip a revealing sentence: "The abolition of military air forces is not a matter that we are likely to see achieved in our lifetime, nor indeed in the time of many generations to come." But that avowal still seemed, perhaps, too flagrantly in contradiction to the declared policy of the Government: so the sentence was discreetly deleted from the record in Hansard.

Nearly a year passed. The wretched Air Commission had remained conveniently dead, the policy of abolition had been deeply buried, the air forces, in Britain and elsewhere, which were to have been reduced to 500 apiece, had been enormously increased, the German offer of April 1934 had given place to the much larger demand of a Germany that had now, avowedly, equipped herself despite the Versailles fetters with an immense aerial killing-power. Lord Londonderry spoke again in the Lords. No need now to delete such words from Hansard: he felt free to boast of his success in helping to wreck the effort to achieve the purpose of the British Draft Convention. "I had the utmost difficulty at that time"—i.e. in the early stages of the Disarmament Conference—"amid the public outcry, in preserving the use of the bombing aeroplane even on the frontiers of the Middle East and India, where it is only owing to the Air Force that we have controlled these territories without the old and heavy cost in blood and treasure. I felt certain that when the ideals of abolition were examined practically, they would be discovered to be inapplicable to the state of the world to-day. We could not put

the clock back." He went on to say that our new heavy bombers have an unladen weight nearly double the maximum tonnage proposed in the British Draft; and that, instead of the maximum of 500 first-line naval and military planes which we had proposed as the first stage in limitation, the numbers of the Air Force at home, irrespective of the Fleet air arm, will be 1,500 first-line machines.

I am not concerned here with the question whether this new British programme is too large or too small, having regard to the programmes of other Powers. I am not concerned to contest the claim that this country should have something called "parity" with the air force of Germany or France; our claim to parity is no worse and no better than Hitler's. (I believe, though, that "parity" will prove to be extremely difficult to calculate in this case. Mere equality of numbers of first-line machines will afford only the roughest of criteria.) But I do suggest that we have had no evidence yet that the Government is making any vigorous and resourceful effort to ensure that that parity shall be as low as possible. What we are told is that efforts are to be made to negotiate an Air Locarno, for immediate collective reprisals in the event of "unprovoked" aerial aggression: that in conjunction with this there is to be an attempt at "limitation" of air armaments; and that some rules are to be proposed for the "outlawry of indiscriminate bombing"—whatever that may mean. "We ought not to enter into an Air Pact," Sir John Simon said on June 1st, "... —we contemplate of course in certain events the deterrent of bombing—or to limit air strengths, without making an effort at the same time to arrive at some agreement among the Powers for the outlawry of indiscriminate bombing."

Discriminating bombing! Doesn't it seem a mocking phrase to apply to an operation conducted by a boy who is being shot at in an aeroplane at a height of ten or twenty thousand feet on a misty night? Must we really, after all those bitter lessons of the war, and after all those withering arguments at Geneva, revert to the attempt to prescribe laws for the way in which the supreme law-breaking is to be committed—"rules for the polite conduct of wholesale massacre"? Or will a wind of anger rise in this country to sweep away these cruel pretences?

ARMS TRADE CONTROL.

Turn now to one of the other issues which were to be tackled forthwith, according to the Resolution of June 8th, 1934. Take the question of control of the manufacture of and traffic in arms; and the related question of supervision by a Permanent Disarmament Commission. In May 1934 the American delegate at the conference made a notable declaration, in the name of "the American people and Government," calling for the control or elimination of "the production and traffic in engines of death and the profits resulting therefrom." Extraordinary importance was attached to this question in America as in France and as in this country. On June 30th, the American delegation submitted their first plan to the Arms Trade Committee. The intention was that this plan should form part of the General Disarmament Convention; so it included references to the limitations of armaments which that convention was to fix, and it assumed that the Permanent Disarmament Commission would be provided for elsewhere in the convention.

But at this stage the international situation worsened: and on November 20th, 1934, the Bureau of the conference decided to proceed with the Arms Trade Plan in the form of a limited convention which might be at once a useful contribution in itself and also a means of facilitating the conclusion of a general Disarmament Convention. So the Americans revised their plan, omitting all reference to limitations of armaments but including the provisions (already worked out elsewhere) for a Permanent Disarmament Commission. The American plan was widely welcomed, not least by the French. It was exceptionally important, for political and psychological reasons, to welcome this great American initiative, especially at a time when the disarmament effort had reached such a disheartening stage. The British Government, in particular, ought surely to have "leant over backwards" in the effort to secure acceptance of the plan without injury, both as an evidence that the conference was alive, and as a valuable contribution which could promptly be included in the general Disarmament Convention without substantial reconstruction.

Instead of this the British delegation took the lead in destroying the main features of the plan. The plan provided that the contracting States should assume entire responsibility

for the control of arms trade and manufacture in their territories. All manufacturers, and all exports and imports of the kinds listed in certain categories, would be subject to licence by the State. (A substantial measure of agreement has been reached about this, though it is still far from complete.) All armaments of the kinds listed, whether made in State or private factories, were to be subject to publicity, from the stage of ordering to the stage of delivery. Lastly, the whole system was to be subject, though with large exemptions, to periodic inspections on the spot on behalf of the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

The British, supported first by the Italians, then by the Japanese, and sometimes by the Poles, have been in opposition to the rest of the nations in objecting to three of the chief points of this plan, so that the First Reading text has emerged with almost every article in the shape of conflicting texts in parallel columns.

1. *Inspection on the Spot.* The first of the three points concerns inspection on the spot. The British Government refuses to accept the inclusion of any such provision in this convention (though it would do so in a general disarmament convention). One argument used in defence of their refusal is that, in the absence of any limitations of armaments, there would be nothing much to inspect. The supporters of the American plan reply that, if publicity for orders and amounts is included as they propose, there will be plenty to inspect. Lord Stanhope also argued that we must rely confidently upon the good faith of the governments which forward information to Geneva. The supporters of the plan reply, of course, that the core of the whole problem is precisely the fact that in some cases mutual confidence is unhappily lacking: to postulate that we must rely absolutely upon mutual confidence is to show incomprehension of the difficulty which the system of periodic supervision is designed to meet.

Of course international inspection on the spot would not be a hundred per cent. effective, even if voluntarily accepted at the outset. But we may expect it to be incomparably more effective than the unilateral system of inspection imposed on Germany after Versailles: Germany never accepted that voluntarily or felt that she had a partner's share in working it. Inspection by an international authority is indispensable, for psychological reasons if for no others. To reject it is to deal a

heavy blow at confidence and at the chances of acceptance of the plan.

2. *Publicity for orders.* The second main point of difference between the American plan and the British was that the American proposed publicity for all orders from whatever source: the British, on the contrary, were not willing even to inform Geneva of the particulars of licences issued. The Americans meant to show promptly when an abnormal armament demand is springing up: "they wanted to follow a cannon from its birth to its maturity." The British rejected this measure of publicity.

3. *Publicity for quantities.* Thirdly, the American plan, supported by the great majority of the Committee, provides for publicity as regards the *quantities* of armaments to be manufactured or purchased in the course of the year by the governments, with a description of the articles ordered. The British proposals provide only for annual statements of the *expenditure* on armaments which the governments intend to incur, and for quarterly returns, *by value only*, of production, exports and imports. Thus the American plan asks for information of definite value: the British plan asks for something quite indefinite. How is the "value" to be assessed? What is the use of such information when obtained? A government might, under the British plan, make a statement in January of the expenditure it intended to incur in the coming year, but that statement, honestly meant, might be stultified by the orders actually given in February.

The British case was supported only by Fascist Italy and militarist Japan. It knocks so destructive a hole through the American plan that there is little chance, I believe, of the poor residue being accepted by the United States or France at the second reading. I do not know, of course, the detailed arguments that went to the making of the British policy: I cannot even trace the full course of the defence of it at Geneva, since in this case most of the debate, unfortunately, was conducted in secret. But as an outsider who has been at pains to study all the minutes and other information available, I must express the conviction that the Government's policy, designed no doubt in all sincerity to make sure of a modest gain, has in fact imperilled much: it has had the effect of almost wrecking a most promising project, it has offended the Americans and helped to destroy what little remains of their hope that

anything can be salvaged from the work at Geneva, it has exacerbated French apprehension and suspicion, and has done much to destroy confidence in the Government's willingness to pay the price of a real control of the arms trade.

NAVAL REARMAMENT

I have not space in which to deal with naval disarmament—that problem which has been so disastrously aggravated by the failure to restrain Japan's aggression in Manchuria, and the subsequent break-away, at the instance of the triumphant Japanese war services, from the scheme of the Washington and London naval treaties. I will only recall, in this connection, how here too we have thrown away chance after chance. To-day the British and Germans are negotiating in private, leaving the French outside, the British being prepared apparently to endorse a German claim to have five battleships of 25,000 tons. Three years ago the British were negotiating in private with the French, leaving the Germans outside; and at that time the Germans were offering to scrap their famous pocket-battleship *Deutschland* and forgo the right to build any more, if only the other Powers would accept a similar limitation for themselves. That offer was not even discussed, and passed almost unnoticed by the English Press. A little later, in June 1932, the U.S. proposed abolition of one-third of the capital ships retained by Britain and the U.S. under the London Treaty; and the Americans were almost certainly ready for an agreement on non-replacement of the remaining capital ships. That offer we turned down, although two years before another British Government with the same Premier had declared its desire (February 1930) to see the battleship disappear in due course from the fleets of the world. At that time, in June 1932, the holiday from laying down large battleships had been unbroken for seven years, and neither Italy nor France had laid down a single capital ship since the war. But the chance was let slip: the holiday was broken: to-day France and Italy are building ships of 35,000 tons, and the British Government talks of early replacement of "the backbone of the Fleet." Doesn't it seem mad?

THE ARMAMENTS RACE

Whilst the case for general reduction, comprehensive limitation, and thorough supervision has been handled in this nerveless, defeatist fashion, the armaments race has been becoming more hectic. Those who can see no farther than the old belief that increased armaments for their own country spell "security" have been steadfastly pursuing their end, with great interests behind them, an easy popular appeal, and unprecedented success. The spectacle of Germany amassing air armaments rouses General Goering to enthusiasm: and Lord Londonderry, rejoicing at the spectacle of England similarly engaged, chooses for his peroration words that Milton meant for a very different England: "Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep and shaking her invincible locks. Methinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty youth and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam." (House of Lords, May 22nd, 1935.)

Each Minister, in defending the rearmament of his own country, piously includes a sentence or two about his desire for limitation and a reminder of the menacing activity of the foreigner. But the passion, the professional energy, is being devoted not to the effort to secure that limitation but to the increase of national armed power. "Each for himself and the devil take the hindmost." We admit in words that that is a demented policy, but in fact that is precisely the policy we are now pursuing. Instead of making a resolute and resourceful initiative to stop this armaments race now, instead of laying ourselves out to get agreement on limitation of military aircraft at a low figure forthwith, if we can't get abolition, we are plunging into rearmament, creating vast new vested interests, and for the rest simply hoping that something will turn up. Sir John Simon insists that this rearmament is a purely benevolent move on our part, to increase our power for negotiating afterwards. (June 1st, 1935.) That, of course, is exactly what they all say. The old unilateral fallacy.

And meanwhile the armament race is on. An armament race, too, of an unprecedented kind, not only wilder in pace than ever before, but much more dangerous in character.

Expenditure on armaments is increasing now much more steeply than it has ever done in any time of peace before, even

in the fateful years between 1908 and 1914. The United States alone, within the limits permitted by existing treaties, is expected to spend, under the appropriations for this year, over £200 millions. The British Government's expenditure this year, with supplementary estimates for the Air Force, will be much larger than we have ever spent in any year of peace before—probably more than £130 millions: and this total will be quickly augmented if we begin replacing battle-ships.

But the increase of cost is not what matters most: the most menacing fact is the increase of killing power, and especially the increase of power to strike a sudden blow. New types of tank, the incendiary bomb, the bombing plane—such weapons afford enormously greater means for penetrating defences than the belligerents possessed in 1914 or 1918. Still more important, the new weapons have made shorter than ever the precious interval between a crisis and a crash. The League Covenant tried to gain time in a crisis, during which reason might mobilise its forces: but this gain has been offset by the inventions which have transformed the military time-table and made possible the delivery of a blow at the heart within a few hours of the decision to strike.

Here indeed is the gravest new fact in the world. We have become so much at each other's mercy that the problem of stopping the armament race and of mastering our new powers of mutual destruction takes on a character unique in history. (Yes, that has been said a thousand times, but we still don't realise the force of it imaginatively.) In particular, we must reduce the danger of war by general abolition of those instruments which are indispensable for the sudden smashing blow. And besides that—perhaps before that—we shall have to show that we mean loyally and effectively to make the Covenant work.

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER.

THE NEW ORGANISATION OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

ON October 13th, 1928, the "OSAF," that is, the Commander-in-Chief of the Storm Troops, wrote to his subordinates: "We hold fast by the conception that the Storm Troops should be so trained and organised as to become the German army of the future, that they must slowly, but steadfastly and unflinchingly, become a state within the State." In the letters which were exchanged between the three young officers of the Reichswehr who, in the autumn of 1930, were condemned by the Leipzig court for conducting National Socialist agitation in the Reichswehr, occurs the bold sentence: "In the Third Reich we shall make the army list." That meant the repudiation of the despised "office generals" who had placed themselves at the service of the hated Republic. In the years just before the revolution, during which the party army rose to be many times the size of the Reichswehr, it was filled with the importance of its future task "to be the German army." Captain Roehm, its highly gifted organiser, had repeatedly and formally pledged and promised it that future. He went so far as to give the Storm Troop formations the numbers of the regiments of the old army according to their garrison quarters. Thus, and in despite of the Reichswehr, he took over the old traditions for the party force.

On June 30th, 1934, Roehm was murdered. Thereupon the Storm Troops were immediately "purged," greatly decreased and robbed of their former significance, Hitler declaring that the Reichswehr "was the only armed forces of the nation." Thus when the Defence Law which the new sovereign of Germany promulgated on May 21st, 1935, conferred this distinction on the Reichswehr it did not say anything new. The Law indeed only put the finishing touches to what was really happening behind the apparently revolutionary evolution, an evolution in whose revolutionary character every cool observer had for long ceased to believe. Here at least there is nothing remarkable about the Law. But if one reads it line by line one cannot but be astonished to see how completely the generals have succeeded in overcoming every other influence. No one who knows Prusso-German history will refuse admiration to the accomplishment

of the Prussian army in internal politics. But what it has now accomplished surpasses everything in the past.

Let us start with the clauses dealing with the conditions of command. In Clause 3 of the Defence Law it is said: "The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces is the Leader and Chancellor. Under him the Minister of War as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces has command over the armed forces." By that clause the Minister of War is given a position such as before him scarcely any general in Prussia-Germany ever had. On the day on which the Law was published, General von Blomberg laid wreaths on the graves of Scharnhorst and Boyen. This tribute had a deeper significance. Actually, Scharnhorst had intended to occupy just such a position as Blomberg has to-day. But Scharnhorst was the organiser of the army that beat Napoleon, the great liberator and restorer of shattered Prussia. And his sovereign was the feeble, apprehensive Friedrich Wilhelm III. After Scharnhorst's premature death, his pupil, the intelligent but rather weak-willed Boyen, became Minister of War. But Boyen was soon defeated by political enemies and dismissed. Actually, he never held any such position of omnipotence. And now began a fierce struggle for power that lasted for a century. The result was a catastrophic defeat of the Ministry of War. The Chief of the Great General Staff and also the Chief of the Royal Military Cabinet took their orders directly from the king in person. Soon they were much more powerful than the Minister of War. The various occupants of that post in vain sought to defend themselves against this curtailment of their power. But "the power of command" of the monarch eventually had a brilliant triumph over Scharnhorst's conception.

Let me quote a comment which the *Frankfurter Zeitung* dared to make on the new position with regard to the power of command. "That the War Minister as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, under the Leader and Chancellor as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, now holds power of command over the whole of the armed forces is one of the corner-stones of the new Law. From that it may be concluded that the experiences of the pre-war and the war periods have been carefully considered, for in those periods it is recognised that the Emperor as Supreme War Lord was not always in a position effectively to exercise his functions of surveying as a whole the military

and naval forces." Although the original phrasing is very carefully chosen, their meaning is unmistakable. The sovereign of to-day is compared to the sovereign of yesterday, the Leader Adolf Hitler to the weak, impulsive William II. And it is expressly stated that the hallowed institution of the "Supreme War Lord" is not to be re-established in the absolute State that exists to-day. No chief of staff, no commander of the fleet, and also no commander of the air force, is in future to have any chance to go directly to the sovereign. The Defence Law subordinates him plainly and bluntly to the possessor of the power of command, to the Minister of War. And if the Minister of War is strong enough as a personality, there is nothing more unthinkable than a struggle of such magnitude as Bismarck waged with the generals at Nikolsburg in 1866.

I may add a report which comes to me from a most excellent source and which, so far as I know, is here published for the first time. After the dismissal of General von Hammerstein-Equord from his position as chief of staff of the Reichswehr, the appointment to that post of General Baron von Fritsch caused a certain amount of surprise, for it was well known that very high officials of the National Socialist party had another candidate in mind. At that moment, however, a certain small group of generals at headquarters had—so the report says—agreed to nominate for the succession to the posts which they then held two successors, and by threat of a collective resignation prevent any departure from a promotion whose lines had been thus laid down. If the agreement continues and further if the text of the Defence Law lays down that only one general is directly subordinate to the Leader, and that general the Minister of War, the following interesting conclusions may be drawn.

1. Any individual intervention in the affairs of the army is in practice made impossible for the Chief of the State.
2. This is equally the case in peace-time and in war-time and also in the period of transition between peace and war.
3. So far as the army was concerned, the Leader must abandon the policy of *divide et impera* which he had so consistently used in other political circumstances.

It is true that these conditions do not altogether obtain so long as a politician and party leader is an officer on the active

list and commander of the air force. I mean the Air Chief General Goering. But it is very questionable whether he will be able to maintain his position. For Clause 23, section 1, of the Defence Law lays down: "Soldiers must not take part in politics," and according to Clause 21, section 2, the term "soldiers" includes "officers who are on the active list." Here there are the germs of an inevitable quarrel, and they deserve close study.

One of the fundamental principles of the Third Reich is complete intolerance of the so-called "non-Aryans," that is to say, of Jews and the descendants of Jews. Of that principle very complete account is taken in the Defence Law. But we must point out a very significant exception. In his book *Mein Kampf*, the Leader himself called the union of people of Jewish and non-Jewish blood a "*Rassenschande*." His trusted counsellor in this sphere, the Nuremberg leader Streicher, every week brands any such unions in the newspapers which he controls as dangerous to State and to people. It is a fact that in many cases the National Socialist State has actually punished with great severity people who have contracted such unions. One of the results of that has been that certain privileges are reserved to the Jews; they have, for instance, the right to have their own theatres, concerts and the like. No such ghetto privileges are conceded to half and quarter Jews. But the Defence Law concedes privileges to the products of "*Rassenschande*." The Secretary of State in the Ministry of War, General von Reichenau, has in explanation of Clause 15 laid down the lines on which "non-Aryans and persons who are married to non-Aryan women may be allowed to perform military service when they volunteer to do so, if they are found suitable on investigation of their previous activities, by the personal impression which they make, and after testing their political trustworthiness." That is a blow in the face to National Socialism. Here a reward is actually offered to Jews who marry "Aryan" women, that is to say, commit "*Rassenschande*." For that offence National Socialists, like Herr Streicher, who are true to their principles have persistently demanded penal servitude.

On the other hand, it is well known that such a practice, condemned though it is by National Socialism, is fully in accord with the traditions of the old army in which, although a professing Jew was never allowed to become even a lieutenant

in the reserve, non-Aryans of a defined type, that is to say people of Jewish descent who were completely assimilated and were good Conservatives, rose to high rank and in not a few cases became generals.

The Third Reich, at least in the beginning, claimed to be a "total state," a rigid pyramid in which everyone, from child to greybeard, was allotted his position and place. The life of the citizen, public and private, should be cast in one mould. The complete identification of party and State was the aim and meaning of the "national revolution." The Defence Law puts an end to the process of identification. In its place it establishes a dualism, an opposition of soldier to politician such as will be easily recognised by any student of Prussian history. As early as its second clause we read: "The army is the soldierly school of training for the German people." Who will not remember Moltke's claim that the Army was the schoolmaster of the nation? Where now are the claims of the Hitler Youth, of the Labour Service, of the Storm Troops, of the Labour Front, of the Labour Camps for Young Lawyers, of all the manifold party organisations? Did they, too, not claim to provide soldierly training? All the magniloquent pronouncements of the party leaders pale into insignificance before that lapidary sentence of the Defence Law.

Clause 4 of the Defence Law lays down that liability to service extends from the eighteenth to the forty-fifth year. But the Minister of War has conferred on him the extra power, the so-called *Kompetenz-Kompetenz*, to extend his own limits. Clause 6 empowers him in war-time, and also "in special cases of emergency," to extend "the class of German men who can be taken as fit to perform military service." In the event of war the Law makes him a dictator with unlimited power. Clause 1, section 3, declares that "every German man and every German woman is liable to military service." Clause 5, section 2, lays down: "The needs of the army in war-time take precedence of all other needs." Thereby an historic conflict is finally decided in favour of the soldier. Clausewitz and Bismarck, who taught the contrary doctrine, have been forgotten. Conflicts, like that between Bethmann and Ludendorff, are now decided in advance in favour of the soldier. The primacy of the military element is now legally established.

In peace-time, too, functions of extreme importance are

reserved to the Minister of War. According to Clause 13, section 1, those are declared "unworthy of service and therefore excluded from the duty of military service" who "have been punished by the law for activity against the State." And the second section of the same clause says: "The Minister of War can permit exceptions to this rule." Thus, as far as the political activity of those liable to service is concerned, the opinion of the soldier is not only given precedence of a party verdict, but also of a decision of the courts. In a young dictatorship this must be most important in the life of those it rules. Is a man loyal in the party sense? Can he be trusted? Or is he a Marxist, a democrat, a pacifist, and so an enemy of the State? Any detached observer of the party situation must agree that, unless it risks its own existence, the party cannot permit any other authority to pass judgment on the political opinions of the citizen. This is the very pulse, the very life-blood of the dictatorial system. And yet here the system makes itself subordinate to the soldier.

Think what that means and what it implies. In the days of illegal rearmament there was no lack of reports that the Reichswehr was ill-disposed to accept members of the Hitlerite organisations, but on the other hand accepted former Marxists without more ado. The practice is now made definitely the law of the land. The army can restore to good repute any whom the party, and on its request the courts, has branded with infamy. Indeed, "the enemy of the State" is not only rehabilitated but actually takes precedence of the loyal member of the party. Clause 32, one of the most remarkable in that document, says: "Soldiers who are honourably discharged after fulfilment of active service take precedence in the matter of appointment to Government posts over any other competitors whose qualifications are equal. In competition for posts in business, etc., which are not Government appointments their claims must be considered before those of other competitors. In every profession and occupation they are to have preferential treatment." An end is made to the superior claims of "the old party fighters," there is no benefit in having an early party number. The men who for years marched along singing the Horst Wessel song, who in every street fought for Hitler with the police and the "Reds," are deprived of their reward. The former Marxist who has

honourably-fulfilled his military duty will "in all spheres receive preferential treatment"! I lay no stress on the flooding of the public services with a wave of expectant ex-soldiers who, as in the old days, will colour the whole service and give it a specifically military character. I believe that what is far more pregnant with consequences is the moral blow which the rank and file of the party must suffer as a result of this preference to men who have served in the army.

Finally, the army has assured to itself the permanent control of the reserves. Clause 19, section 1, lays down: "All men liable to service are subject to military supervision. This will be exercised through the recruiting offices of the army in collaboration with the officials of the ordinary civil administration." That is a revival of the old system of the "district command," so well known to the older generation of Germans, which during the Empire possessed immense and often political power. Through it the army once again holds all ex-soldiers with ties that are elastic indeed but very strong. In addition, Clause 20 empowers the Minister of War at any time to call up reserves of all kinds for a period of military service and to issue "instructions for their further training." The local commander, the so-called control officer, last not least the local sergeant-major, have once again become factors in the ordinary life of Germany.

The most important innovation of all is the revival of the reserve officers' corps. Those who knew Germany before the war know that that institution had greater significance for the social and political life than any other, greater than church or parliament. Through it the connection of the middle class and the army was firmly established, through it the spirit of the officers' corps triumphed over civilian ideas. Here General von Blomberg cannot appeal either to Scharnhorst or Boyen when he revives the reserve officers' corps. These great soldiers refused to transmit the military spirit to the citizens: they sought to make the citizen himself the defender of the fatherland. Neither thought in any other terms than those of defence; they sought to create neither an instrument of, nor a will to, aggression. Their work in the military and political spheres was of the same character. That is why Boyen in the second period of his activity in the War Ministry from 1840 to 1848 passionately opposed the merging of army and Landwehr and kept the Landwehr, the citizen

army, by every means in his power separate from the army and its officers' corps. When the Minister of War now revives the reserve officers' corps, he must have thought of William I and his Minister of War, Roon, who destroyed the work of Scharnhorst, assimilated the Landwehr to the army, turned citizens into officers, and carried through the wars of conquest of 1864, 1866 and 1870-71. Their graves should not have been left unhonoured on May 21st, 1935!

The conditions for entry into "the officers' corps of those discharged from the army," as the expression used in the Law puts it, are laid down in a notice issued by the War Ministry. According to this there will be an enlargement of the cadet class such as the experience of the Great War had shown to be desirable. The so-called "scientific education" consisting of some years in a secondary school is set aside. Instead the corps is open to non-commissioned officers with twelve years' service. But actually this enlargement of the corps means very little. What does mean a great deal, however, is the selection of former "active and reserve officers of the old and new army" and of "persons with good military training who have already finished the education necessary for their profession and are in a position to keep themselves and, if necessary, their families." That is a tortuous way of expressing what in England is implied by the word "gentleman."

The following provisions are decisive: After the year of active service comes nomination to the rank of "reserve officer cadet," then reserve training, selection for and appointment to be "lieutenant of reserve." The selection is made by the officers' corps, the appointment by the army command. There is a provisional regulation which will meet the requirements in the first years of the new system. This lays down that men who have not served "in the years when they were 25 to 35," who are thus too young to have taken part in the war, can substitute two two-month training periods for the usual period of service. Thus once again the basis is erected on which "society," in the narrower sense of the term, the "upper classes," the university class, and the wealthy in business and agriculture are welded together, the basis on which the Prussian-German State was erected. No regulation is needed to prescribe preferential treatment for reserve officers when it is a question of appointment to the higher posts in the public service, in universities and hospitals, in banks and

industry. That was always the rule ; it was only partially broken and now it is completely restored. This preferential treatment will also apply to questions of club and association membership, in ordinary social intercourse, in marriage. The German middle class has never forgotten the origin of its old social standards and it will be very glad to have them back again. These standards will be laid down by the officers' corps. They are military standards by which once again the suitability, the social fitness, the merit and the worth of the citizen will be measured. Soon, if it has not already been re-established, we shall see the revival of the officers' court of honour, the highest worldly tribunal of the ruling class in Germany.

* * * * *

Farewell, old fighters, farewell party committeemen, farewell local leaders, commanders of storm troops, farewell to all of you who believed in the National Socialist revolution, in the integral revolution, in the conquest and acquisition of the State by the party, in a new German type, in a new warrior community! The old military State returns again. Farewell to all the true National Socialists, hot-hearted, fanatical in your faith! You have carried Herr Hitler to the seats of the mighty. And now farewell! Your time is over!

In the last year or two the complaint was often heard in military circles that General von Blomberg was too weak, too much of a toady, too much in the hands of the great men of the party. It was said disparagingly that he knuckled under to the Leader. To-day his critics have to apologise. It is true that Schleicher's death has not been revenged. But what a masterpiece have the Reichswehr and the Minister of War accomplished! He wrote once : "The army stands knit by the closest ties to the whole people . . . in manly discipline and loyalty ranged behind the leadership of the State, behind the Leader of the Reich Adolf Hitler who came out of its ranks and is for ever one of us." Prophetic words! They were published on June 29th, 1934. On June 30th, 1934, the most prominent leaders of the Storm Troops were murdered. Barely a year has passed and General von Blomberg's words have been proved true : "He is for ever one of us!"

RUDOLF OLDEN.

THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE NEW DEAL.

THE recent decision of the American Supreme Court has been widely regarded as a monkey-wrench thrown by a reactionary bench of judges into the smoothly working machinery of the New Deal. It would, in my opinion, be more correct to regard it as the chopping down by forest rangers of a diseased oak in the almost impenetrable jungle of Roosevelt measures. If it were a monkey-wrench thrown into a smoothly running machine it would produce absolute chaos where before there had been order. Being the mere chopping down of a diseased tree in a thick forest it may, while unfortunately stripping healthy branches from, and even felling, other trees, in the end help to open up and otherwise improve an at present over-thick uneven forest. For it is important to remember that the New Deal is not, despite the President's recent assertions, an integrated, smoothly running machine, fitted to serve a single well-defined purpose. It is a continually developing and altering tangle of measures, some well and others ill conceived, designed to serve many, and not always compatible, purposes. Of these many measures N.R.A. is only one, and in the opinion of many observers by no means the most important, even though it has been the best advertised.

Indeed, N.R.A. has recently been recognised widely to be in some respects the least successful, least thought out, least virile, least popular, of all the major New Deal measures, though it has, of course, had its good points, which are likely to become more obvious now that the whole experiment is suddenly threatened with destruction. No aspect of the whole Roosevelt programme has provoked more criticism, and none has seemed as likely to be an electoral handicap when the President faces the voters next year. No part of the New Deal has spent its first energy and exhausted the enthusiasm of its own personnel, as well as of the public, sooner than N.R.A. In no department more than in it is the contrast between the crusading spirit of 1933 and the confusion of 1935 more obvious.

Had N.R.A. not been suddenly ended, in its larger aspects, by this unanimous Supreme Court decision it would probably soon have been put slowly to sleep by Congress. That body,

despite tremendous Administration pressure, has been very, very slow to renew the National Industrial Recovery Act beyond the two years for which it was originally passed, which ended on June 16th, 1935. It had, before this decision, only with difficulty been brought to the point of extending it in a much modified form for ten months. And this extension was intended rather to give time for the gradual and orderly liquidation of the experiment, and the salvage of what was worth preserving from its wreck, than to express the sense of Congress that N.R.A. as a whole was a success, or worthy of permanent life. This unwillingness of Congress to extend the life of what had at one time been regarded as the key measure of the New Deal was not mainly due to the fact that it was widely expected that the Supreme Court would rule the measure unconstitutional. It was not even due to the rising tide of criticism of the New Deal, because of the slowness of recovery, or the irksomeness of the bureaucratic regulation it has involved. It was due more to the general sense, in and out of Congress, that while much good had been accomplished in the beginning, and some good throughout, by this great experiment, on the whole it had not achieved its objects, and was, in its present form, likely if continued to do more harm than good.

It was due also to the feeling, which was becoming daily more evident throughout the country, that even while it remained in legal force the N.R.A. was in fact dying a lingering death. The codes, and especially such clauses in them as tried to give expression to section 7a (the collective bargaining section) of the original statute, were never very effectively enforced. Great employers, such as Mr. Henry Ford, were almost from the beginning able to defy the authorities, and to laugh at General Johnson's threat "to crack down" upon them. Nor was there, after the beginning, much desire that they should be enforced. For first the economists, who had hoped that N.R.A. would lead to effective social planning; then the consumers, who had, as it proved justly, feared that their interests would be sacrificed under it; then labour, which soon learnt that N.R.A. provided it with no short cut towards its many-sided objects; then small business men, who found that the measure tended to penalise them, and to favour great combinations; then the more efficient business men, who found the codes tending to keep out of bankruptcy

their less efficient competitors; then liberals, who thought that N.R.A. was encouraging monopolistic practices; and finally even conservative business interests which had cleverly written into the codes much of what they wanted, and of what had previously been prohibited under the Anti-Trust Laws; began to discover the actual operation of the statute and the administration of its codes and code authorities disappointing.

The condemnation of N.R.A. as such would not, therefore, have been much of a surprise or disappointment to Americans in general. Even the President, though regretting the rebuke inherent in the condemnation of what had been at one time one of his pet measures, might secretly have welcomed the cutting of the Gordian knot. For even he must have been conscious that N.R.A. was dying, and that its decent burial might prove difficult, and might, stretching out as it would over the remaining years of his administration, and through the election campaign, prove a very distinct electoral handicap. It would have been easier for him to have N.R.A., in its more unpopular, unsuccessful aspects, quickly put beneath ground by the Supreme Court. This would have saved his face. It would have deprived his critics of their best target. It would have left him free to concentrate on those aspects of the New Deal which still have vitality, and which might be electoral assets, particularly the expenditure of public money through such bodies as the Federal Emergency Relief, the Public Works, the Tennessee Valley, and the Agricultural Adjustment Administrations. The trouble with this decision has been that it has gone farther even than opponents of N.R.A. hoped. As *The Times* correspondent in Washington has well said: "They prayed for rain and He sent them a cloudburst." It may therefore have destroyed a great deal more than the larger, unpopular aspects of N.R.A., a great deal more even than N.R.A. as a whole.

The Supreme Court has, in rendering this decision (actually an acquittal of the Schechter concern on the charge of violation of the Poultry Code), laid down three far-reaching propositions which may prove to have relevance to other New Deal measures besides N.R.A. Firstly, it has denied the Government's contention that emergency situations justify emergency powers. While it is true that the Constitution does allow for the assumption by the Federal Government, and especially by

the Federal Executive, of additional powers in time of emergency, particularly war, not even in an emergency can any branch of the Federal Government exercise powers not expressly provided for in the Constitution.

Secondly, the Court has insisted that Congress, in delegating powers to the Executive, shall only delegate executive powers. It must, in empowering the President, for instance, to draft codes regulating industry, specify in sufficient detail the form those codes are to take, as well as the objects they are to serve. It must not give the President so large and vague a mandate as to make him in effect a legislative authority. For the American Constitution definitely provides for the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers.

Thirdly, the Court has ruled that the Federal Government, even if acting properly (i.e. using the legislature to legislate), must restrict its action to the spheres provided for it in the Constitution. Intra-state commerce is not one of those spheres. Not even the argument, practically unanswerable though it may be, that modern developments have made all commerce in effect "in the current of inter-state commerce" and have therefore made the regulation of any part of that current really unfair and ineffective without similar regulation of the whole of it, can justify, while the Constitution remains unamended, federal regulation of intra-state commerce. Such regulation is the inherent concern of the forty-eight constituent, and still in some spheres sovereign, States of the American Union. Only a constitutional amendment can make it the concern of the Federal Government.

It is feared that these propositions, if rigidly applied in other cases, may involve the condemnation as unconstitutional of much else of the New Deal, past, present, or projected. The restriction of agricultural output; the regulation of the sale of securities, and of the stock and commodity exchanges; the establishment of systems of unemployment and old-age insurance; and other such things, which would require the Federal Government to reach into what Mr. Roosevelt has now called "America's forty-eight Little Empires"; may be impossible, at least along the present legal road, in the light of these three propositions. So may other New Deal projects, such as the President's tariff policy, which depends upon the power delegated to him by Congress to raise or lower rates by fifty per cent. If it should prove to be the case

that these, and that other, aspects of the New Deal, are caught in the falling branches of N.R.A. and brought down with it, and if it should prove to be impossible to write new legislation which would pass the Court, establishing them upon a new basis, then indeed this decision can be regarded as a monkey-wrench in the New Deal machinery, or worse. It is with this expectation that critics of the decision, including the President, hail it as the most significant since the Dred Scott case, which helped to precipitate the Civil War.

It is, however, in my opinion, by no means certain that this will be the case. The Gold Clause decisions of the Court in February, in which the New Deal was sustained, show how unwilling the judges are to run counter to the strong sentiment of the country, or to precipitate a crisis. The Court would not, in my opinion, at least would not unanimously, have given a decision against the Government in this N.R.A. case had they thought they would be running contrary to the strong sentiment of the country, or precipitating a dangerous or insoluble crisis. At the very least had they had to give a decision against the Government they would probably have done as they did in the Gold Clause case, have gone out of their way to suggest to the Government a legal way of escape from any disastrous practical consequences which might seem to flow from their decision. It has, I think, been because they knew that N.R.A. was unpopular, and because they suspected that its demise would be received without undue regret and without causing unreasonable dislocation, that the Supreme Court Justices felt free to condemn the statute without suggesting any way of avoiding the practical consequences of condemnation. I would still expect them, if asked to pass upon other aspects of the New Deal, to take the utmost pains to find some way of declaring legal whatever they felt to be sincerely and strongly wanted by, and vitally necessary to, the American Congress and people.

In any case, other aspects of the New Deal are grounded mostly upon other clauses of the constitution than the inter-state commerce one. The President's monetary and public works policy and much of his agricultural policy is, and almost all of it and of other measures of his such as his social security programme could be, based upon the sounder ground of the Federal Government's power to coin and regulate money and to raise revenue, and to provide for the general

welfare, rather than upon the dangerous ground of its power to regulate foreign and inter-state commerce.

It is true that to rest the New Deal as a whole on a legal basis which will clearly be above the high-water mark of the Supreme Court's constitutional orthodoxy may be difficult, and may involve a long, arduous, complicated re-writing of laws, and readjusting of administrative arrangements. It may even prove impossible, having regard to the usual rate of Congressional action, to salvage in this way all that is theoretically capable of being saved from the present wreck. For it is an unfortunate accident that many objects of the President, which might have been just as well pursued through other agencies, on the basis of other statutes, have in fact been pursued through N.R.A., and on the basis of that grant of power. It has been said that the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Alcohol Control Commission, the Securities Commission, the office of the President's Adviser on Foreign Trade and other bodies, have been felled along with N.R.A. If this is so it is, in most cases, only because such bodies were, metaphorically speaking, given space in the vast N.R.A. building, since at the moment of their origin the President was too short of time, energy, or money, to provide them with buildings of their own. Had they been given, as they so easily might have been, an independent legal existence, they would, many of them wholly and all of them to some extent, have avoided the fate of N.R.A. Indeed, if the President and Congress still care for them they can probably still be given before it is too late such independent legal existence. The only trouble is that the President and Congress, being faced with many anxieties at once, may lack the energy and ability and even inclination to save after their collision with the Supreme Court all of their policy that is theoretically capable of being saved.

There is already, unfortunately, some evidence to suggest that this will be the case. The President seems to be taking the most despondent view possible of the consequences of the decision. He can be forgiven a certain petulance. To have to keep his policy within the limits of a rigid, eighteenth-century document would drive any European President or Premier mad within a year. It is irritating in the extreme for a man of Mr. Roosevelt's temperament, after such a gallant, energetic attack on the depression, now to be told by nine elderly

gentlemen, who are entirely free from his or the ordinary man's worries, that he must "do his home-work again." It is tempting to give up the fight, so far as repairing the damage done by the decision is concerned, and to launch a campaign for a constitutional amendment which would void the decision.

It is, however, in my opinion, a pity that Mr. Roosevelt should take this view. He must know that it is unfair to suggest that all was orderly in his garden before this decision was rendered. It was not. It was, to almost as great an extent as now, chaotic. It is equally unfair to suggest that since this decision his garden has been desolated as by a long, severe frost, so that most of his plants are past saving. Some plants are killed, good ones, such as the abolition of child labour, as well as bad ones, like many of the attempts under N.R.A. at price fixation. Others are badly caught by the frost, such as the securities legislation, and may need careful attention if they are to live. Many will, perhaps, never be as strong and healthy as they might have been but for this frost. Some, however, remain unhurt, such as the five billion dollar public works and relief fund, and many are quite capable of being brought back by proper treatment into as good a state of healthy growth as ever. It would in my opinion be better statesmanship, though perhaps poorer politics, whether or not a constitutional amendment is to be sought, meanwhile to attempt to fit the New Deal into the limits of this and other legal decisions, rather than to accept the destruction, good and bad, inevitable and avoidable, consequent upon this decision, and to turn from the chaos in Washington to the more attractive task of preparing a good 1936 campaign.

This seems to me to be particularly true because much more would be involved in a campaign to amend the Constitution, to render impossible such decisions, than appears at first sight. It might be a risky thing, when American sentiment was already reacting against the centralisation and bureaucratisation inherent in much of the New Deal, and was beginning to seek, with peculiar inconsistency, both "a return to normalcy" and a more speedy, simple short cut to recovery, to make an election issue out of the Supreme Court's defence of "States rights," separation of powers, and other traditional principles of the American system.

FRANK DARVALL.

JANE ADDAMS OF CHICAGO.

WHEN a famous American of the last generation wished to praise a contemporary in the highest of terms he would say that such a man was American and nothing else. The noble citizen of the United States who died in Chicago on May 21st had qualities of greatness far transcending the limits of nationality. But she was altogether American: a product of the Middle West, and of that middle period of American trial and achievement, the generation following the Civil War. In matters of opinion concerning the major public issues, throughout her active career of forty-five years, Jane Addams was usually on the minority side, and not seldom with the most unpopular remnant in the field. Yet this persistent nonconformity did not affect her essential standing. Most truly and fully was she a representative American. She could have come to maturity in no other land than her own. And she belonged to that very small company of the elect—the men and women of social genius.

Jane Addams was born in 1860 at Cedarville, a village of Northern Illinois not far from the Wisconsin border. Although motherless in infancy, she was fortunate in her early surroundings and enjoyed a perfect relationship with her father. He was John H. Addams, a Quaker of the Hicksite persuasion, a prosperous owner of mills, a member of the Illinois Legislature, an intimate friend of Abraham Lincoln. The account of her girlhood in *Twenty Years at Hull House* is a delightful narrative, full of the charm which for many English readers is inseparable from the records of American pioneer life. Her health was delicate, with the additional handicap of a spinal curvature. She tells of her sense of shame in being so inadequate a daughter for a parent of splendid appearance and eminent standing in the community. He was wise and kind, and seems never to have made a mistake in his treatment of this gifted and sensitive child. He sent her at seventeen to Rockford Seminary, one of the earliest of the higher schools for girls in the Mississippi Valley. It was then attaining the status of a college, and Jane Addams had a place among its first batch of B.A.s.

The atmosphere of Rockford was an intense evangelicism, which meant, as graduation time approached, an increasing pressure towards enlistment in the mission field. To those

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who knew Jane Addams there is nothing surprising in her statement that the note of emotional pietism made no appeal to her at any time. With the quiet tenacity that was always hers she kept to her own path, and later came to see that "this passive resistance of mine, this clinging to an individual conviction," was a valuable part of the moral training provided by her school. She was twenty-five, and had already been to Europe, when she joined the Presbyterian Church of her native town. That decision was the natural affirmation of her religious faith in democracy: "Who was I," she argued, "not to identify myself with the institutional statement of this belief?" And in a small town of the American Middle West, what form of fellowship other than that of the Church was then to be found? In the whole of her life there was an unsurpassed consistency, a full spiritual integration, in which lay the sources of her strength. Hardly any earnest young soul in modern America can have been called upon to pass through so little of inward struggle. Jane Addams was one of the twice-born. From her earliest conscious years she had known what her place in the world was to be. She remembered as a child of seven having her first sight of city slums, and asking her father why people lived in such places instead of in houses such as his. He explained the fact of poverty to her, and she was instantly sure of what she must do when grown up. She would live in a large house, of course, but it would be built "right in the midst of horrid little houses like these." Long before she left college (in 1881) it was settled that she was to become a doctor and live among the poor. But her feeble health made the medical course impossible, so that another approach to her destined life-work had to be found.

The search occupied her for seven years. In 1883 she was in England. It was the year of *The Bitter Cry of Outcast London*, when Samuel Barnett was shaping the idea that was embodied a few months later in Toynbee Hall. She found London a place of wonderful stimulus, if also of terrifying misery. A second visit to Europe was protracted by a serious illness in France, and she began to feel that she was being caught in what Tolstoy called the snare of preparation—that is, a too long spell of study and travel. We may note as curiously characteristic the incident which led to her full awakening. In Madrid (1888) she found herself looking on

at a bullfight from which her companions had fled. To her own surprise and horror she realised that she had witnessed, with comparative indifference, the killing of five bulls and many more horses. What then, she asked herself, could be happening to her? "In deep chagrin I felt myself tried and condemned, not only by this disgusting experience, but by the entire moral situation which it revealed. . . I had fallen into the meanest type of self-deception, in making myself believe that all this was preparation for great things to come." Jane Addams's course in life was immediately set. Since her first inquiries in London she had been brooding over a plan of action, and on the morrow of the bullfight she outlined it to her friend, Ellen Gates Starr, who was to be with her henceforward until a few years before the end.

Her plan was the resultant of many influences. There was first, as we have seen, a deep instinctive knowledge of her vocation among the disinherited of a great city. There was a definite direction given by the social pioneers in East London. Before returning to America at the end of this long and decisive stay in Europe she had studied the new Toynbee Hall and the still newer People's Palace; she had been deeply impressed by Charles Booth's *Survey of Life and Labour* and attracted by the early Fabians and kindred groups. And she was carried on by a personal conviction in respect of the educated young American woman. The first generation of college women had "departed too suddenly from the active emotional life led by their grandmothers." For a good many of those, she felt, it should be possible to provide opportunities of service, among primitive needs, in which "young women who had been given over too exclusively to study might be given a balance of activity along traditional lines and learn of life from life itself." She was then at the end of her twenty-eighth year, with health restored and mind made up.

Jane Addams used to tell how her father, as a young pioneer, had pulled up at a spot in the midst of a swamp to the west of Chicago, had decided that it was a hopeless pitch and moved onwards to the north-west. Half a century later his daughter found the house which became Chicago's first social settlement, in the midst of an urban population of three millions. Hull House was a spacious mansion, which had been the home of a prominent Chicago citizen. It was easily adaptable to

the new purpose, and the generous owner, a Chicago woman, offered the new settlers a gift of the leasehold. Jane Addams and Ellen Starr made their start in the fall of 1889, thus entering upon a social adventure of incalculable significance to America.

Hull House stood and stands at the corner of Halsted and Polk Streets, in the heart of a vast slum region. Four years only after the opening of its first social settlement Chicago astonished the world with the Exhibition of 1893. But the Chicago of that day, twenty-two years only after the great fire, was not yet a city. The West Side, spreading out and beyond the Stockyards, was a raw industrial camp. Its population consisted of immigrants, speaking all the tongues of Europe, packed in ghastly tenements, living under appalling conditions of exploitation and fear. Jane Addams and her colleagues went into all this with little knowledge, but without fear and with no hampering theories. In the midst of a suspicious conglomerate multitude they set out to show that there was no human service that American women could not perform, and to demonstrate the virtue of unflinching neighbourliness.

The first organised undertaking of the Settlement was a kindergarten, and, not unnaturally, the earliest complete response to the residents came from the children and young people—a flood of abounding youth, springing from transplanted communities whose vitality could resist the harshest pressure of western industrialism. A gymnasium, classes and clubs, handicrafts, music and every kind of drama brought in swarms of young people, who found in Hull House unlimited encouragement and understanding.

The young being won over, the elders followed. The Settlement grew without delay. A men's house of residence and married quarters were added; a reading-room and coffee-house, a large hall. The residents formed the vanguard of a formidable new force, of social students and crusaders who knew all the facts. Housing and sanitation, baths and playgrounds, the schools, the sweatshops; the odious trinity of city government, police, and organised vice—these and many kindred concerns fell within the scope of Hull House. Miss Addams made a drive on the malodorous dumps, and the first public office to which she was appointed was the ward inspectorship of garbage. An Immigrants Protection League

and a Juvenile Protective Association, both formed in answer to the deepest need, were carried on with unintermittent vigour and success. Hull House was the first creative civic centre in America, and at the end of the first decade its Head had attained an incomparable position in the esteem of the American people.

It has often been said that for the first blow to her prestige Jane Addams was herself to blame, in that she became for a few months an active politician. This was in 1912, when Theodore Roosevelt plunged into the presidential contest as leader of a new Progressive party. Jane Addams no doubt made a mistake of judgment, but that is not difficult to explain. The presidency of the first Roosevelt was followed by a remarkable social stir in America. The Progressive convention of that summer was like a social reformers' camp-meeting. They had a candidate who knew their leaders and seemed to understand what they were driving at. They were accorded the amazing opportunity of putting social-reform planks into the platform. "I was there," Miss Addams wrote, "and I think the same was true of many others, because the platform expressed the social hopes so long ignored by the politicians." But the old political system was not to be broken, and she was distressfully aware of a fatal contradiction at the centre. Theodore Roosevelt was a militarist. He carried the big stick, and insisted upon linking his programme of social advance with military preparedness. That ought to have been enough for Miss Addams; but she allowed herself, for the only time in her life, to be persuaded into alliance with a public man to whom she was opposed upon a capital issue. Four years later, inevitably, she gave all her support to Woodrow Wilson. His international aims were hers; and not until the fateful decision of April 1917 could she realise the irony of having helped to re-elect the President on the ground that he had kept America out of war.

The forming of a Women's Peace Party was for Miss Addams and her associates an imperative step. In 1915 they organised a conference of delegates from neutral countries at The Hague. The findings of this gathering anticipated most of the proposals afterwards included by Wilson in his Fourteen Points. With a group of colleagues Jane Addams went after the conference on a tour of inquiry and suggestion through Europe. They visited fourteen capitals and talked with

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Premiers and Foreign Ministers. The mission, of course, could not be other than fruitless. It was a heart-breaking experience for the leader, who before the end of the year was lying desperately ill in America. I mention this circumstance for one particular reason. In November 1915 Henry Ford's peace ship set sail from New York for European ports. The statement has repeatedly been made that Miss Addams was on board. She was not: it was physically impossible for her to join. But she was officially committed to the cruise. It was during that same year that there came upon her a foretaste of the martyrdom that the war years were to bring. Richard Harding Davis, the famous war correspondent, then serving in France, wrote to the *New York Times* a letter in which he accused her of having asserted that the soldiers would not fight unless they had been intoxicated or drugged. "No charge, of course, in the wide world," Miss Addams wrote, "could have been better calculated to bring down upon me vials of wrath and righteous indignation." In a speech describing the delegates' experiences she had said, "We were told in several countries that stimulants were administered before a bayonet charge was ordered." That incidental reference to an ordinary fact of the battlefield, made on the assumption that a circumstance commonly talked of in Europe must be equally well known in America, was sufficient. The pro-war Press fell upon her as a traducer of the men at the Front. She had to meet a tempest of extraordinary fury, which, as she said, should have fortified her friends and herself in advance of the sterner ordeal which began for them when the United States had entered the war.

Jane Addams was the recognised leader of the peace party in America. It was impossible for her to further a war policy, but no less impossible was it to refrain from positive activity in war-time. She placed herself at the disposal of the Federal Food Administration under Mr. Herbert Hoover. She travelled widely and spoke steadily in its service, urging everywhere a single plain principle: that it was imperative for the agricultural countries to produce and save food, since otherwise the people of the war-stricken lands could not have the means of survival. Hull House was divided upon the war issue, but its residents acted as a unit during the poisoned period in defence of those American principles which were being so shockingly violated by various authorities under

stress of war madness and the subsequent anti-red hysteria. How could it have been otherwise when the majority of the victims were either aliens or naturalised immigrants, and when among the manifold agencies of the Settlement none was more thoroughly typical than the Immigrants Protection League?

What the years of war and the evil treaties held for Jane Addams in anguish of soul no one outside her intimate circle could have told. There was no American with a closer knowledge of the defects and failures of the American system; but also there was none who possessed a deeper pride in the American tradition and accomplishment. It seemed to her that under the supreme test of 1917-18 the dominant forces of the Republic had broken down. Jane Addams bore it all with a dignity and sweetness that never failed. She was equal to every demand. I can remember only one occasion when for a short spell she seemed to give way to a painful bewilderment. As the war was drawing to an end the grim facts about the starvation of the German people within the blockade began to leak out to the world. A group of representative German women turned to their sisters in America, and dispatched *en plein air* a message of appeal through the one American woman in whom they had perfect faith. I was at Hull House when the headline appeared in all the newspapers. Jane Addams was unable to make a reply of any kind. There were as yet no means of direct communication; the German people were behind the bars. She could do nothing but leave the matter to the President of the United States.

Her internationalism was no abstract or merely political doctrine. It was a conviction rooted in her life's experience. She saw the world problem of her time as a painful and continuously frustrated effort of the peoples to live together in a world becoming ever more conscious of itself. Her own daily task made that problem almost intolerably real. Hull House stood at a pivotal point. The nations in mutually hostile communities surged around her in Chicago. Irish and Italians, Germans, Russians, Poles, Hebrews—all were there, victims of one and the same system, each group dependent upon obscure vestiges of native tradition and folk-habit. Jane Addams knew the strength of primitive need and instinctive feeling. She believed in neighbourhood and in "the ancient kindness which sat beside the cradle of the

race." She had an unusual gift of words, and although her work was far too exacting to permit of its full cultivation, she was able to put much of her knowledge and insight into her books, especially into *Peace and Bread in Wartime* and the two volumes of reminiscence. Perhaps best of all as a revelation of her heart and understanding is the wonderful story of the Devil Baby of Hull House, which she included in *The Second Twenty Years*.

In 1919 the most widely fruitful stage of Jane Addams's career began, with a conference in Zürich. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom was formed, with herself as a matter of course at the head. Throughout the remaining fifteen years the League was her main concern and her service was indefatigable. She grieved over the American rejection of the League of Nations. That rejection she did not take to be final, and she declined to believe that the later reinforcement of the isolation policy could mean that the United States would remain outside a world collective system. It is good to record that while Jane Addams was still actively at work there came to her a full national acknowledgment. In the autumn of 1934 the semi-jubilee of the Women's International League was celebrated together with the opening of her own seventy-fifth year. This was one of the largest and most impressive assemblies of the kind ever known in Washington. All the best of America was represented, and the tributes of the world came over the air.

The memory of Jane Addams that must endure so long as any of her younger contemporaries remain to cherish it is the memory of Hull House as created and inspired by its beloved Head. During forty years it was a place of pilgrimage; and no traveller of consequence in America willingly passed it by. Everybody knew Jane Addams, and no man or woman connected with public work or living thought in any quarter of the globe seemed to need an introduction to her. Her acquaintance with men and affairs was astonishing; she was everywhere at home. She was never at a loss for a name. Her greeting was given to all alike with an exquisite cordiality and a marvellous personal touch. Her manner was the expression of a noble serenity, a lovely democracy of the spirit in which, as some of us believe, is contained the most precious gift of the New World to its chosen sons and daughters.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

YUGO-SLAVIA AND THE *ANSCHLUSS*.

IT is an accepted thesis in Central Europe to-day that the only practical alternative to the *Anschluss* is a Hapsburg restoration in Vienna. The Legitimists of Austria suppose that this strengthens their cause both at home and abroad; at home they are possibly right, but abroad exactly the reverse is true. Indeed, the very thought of the Hapsburgs, reinstated in Austria alone, has had the extraordinary effect of reconciling the Little Entente to the idea of the *Anschluss* without turning Hungary against it. For it might have been supposed that, in view of her quarrel with Yugo-Slavia since Marseilles, Hungary would have taken up with legitimism—now favoured by Italy—afresh. Exactly the opposite has occurred. The Hungarian Premier, General Gömbös, Swabian (i.e. Hungarian-German) on his mother's side and with admitted Nazi sympathies, engineered an election at the end of March, in order to strengthen his own position and end his dependence upon Count Bethlen. Except in the towns, voting in Hungary is open, and the Government is able to exert a great deal of pressure. The already large Government party not unnaturally increased its majority, while all anti-German parties, Social Democrats, Clericals, Legitimists, and Bethlen, maker of the Italian alliance, lost ground. No one expects that the reform programme will substantially materialise, but Gömbös and his foreign minister, Kanya, are strengthened in their pro-German inclinations, to the chagrin, perhaps, of more far-sighted Hungarians in the Buda-Pest Foreign Office and elsewhere.

Signor Mussolini had intended to hold a conference of the interested Powers at Rome early in June, to come to the long-projected agreement in the matter of Austria. Apart from his growing Abyssinian preoccupations, the preparation for this meeting apparently encountered insuperable difficulties; at the moment of writing, it has got no farther than the preliminary discussion at Venice over a month ago (May 4th to 6th), at which the Hungarians were willing to co-operate with the Italians and Austrians; it was a few days after the opening of the Hungarian Customs House at Fiume. In the middle of May, when M. Yevtitch should have met Signor Suvich, however, the Yugo-Slav Premier cancelled his journey. He had just returned from a conference of the Balkan Entente

at Bucharest, and it was said that the gravity of the situation at home, after the momentous election of May 5th, necessitated his remaining in Belgrade. Some said that the question of the rearmament of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria was the real obstacle in the preparations for Rome. In April, the Great Powers, helpless to arrest the rearmament of Germany, had advised the Little Entente to meet its neighbours halfway. Though this recommendation was received with some indignation, the powers of the Little Entente might have been content to accept the rearmament of Hungary at the cost of revisionism, though Hungary can never really abandon her claims. For the time being, however, no one insisted on this issue, and it was announced at Geneva on May 26th that Yugo-Slavia and Hungary had agreed to patch up their Marseilles quarrel. For neither rearmament nor revision is holding up the Rome Conference but—apart from Abyssinia—the Yugo-Slav attitude to the problem of Austria. Yugo-Slavia belongs both to the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, and is more closely concerned than Roumania with the future of Austria; and if the other small Powers follow Yugo-Slavia, her influence may yet prove decisive in the struggle between Italy and Germany for domination at Vienna.

While they regard Hungarian rearmament as a *fait accompli*, the Yugo-Slavs view conscription in Austria with favour, for they consider it as nothing but the enrolment of a few more conscripts for the future army of Germany. Thanks largely to German propagandists, the Yugo-Slavs exaggerate the strength of the Nazis in Austria, but this miscalculation forms an integral part of their standpoint. They nurse another misconception, which is indeed merely a different form of the first one, for in the Yugo-Slav mind no distinction between Austrians and Germans exists. The Hungarian often prefers the Germans of the Reich and despises Austrians as "soft"—flexible and facile in their treatment of the Slavs in the old days, while the Hungarians magyarised more crudely; the Hungarian, however, makes no confusion between the two. By the Southern Slavs, all pressure or influences other than Magyar which came from the north were indiscriminately called German.

This is one reason why the Yugo-Slavs await the *Anschluss* without fear; Italy is the other. In spite of the official

alliance with France, Belgrade would welcome the Germans to Trieste, since this would bring Italy a new rival in the Adriatic. Yugo-Slav fear and suspicion of Italy must, indeed, be encountered to be believed. They go far to explain the fanatically centralist policy of the Serbs, who regard any alternative conception as an Italian intrigue, and therefore persecute the federalists of Croatia. The hatred of Italy goes far, moreover, to explain the relative submission of Slovenia to Serbia, for to the Yugo-Slav Slovenes nothing is so important as the plight of the half-million Slovenes in Italy. For the hundred thousand or so in Austrian Styria and Carinthia they are almost as deeply concerned. Now the Nazis regard the Austrian Slovenes as both dangerous and despicable, and often speak of handing them over to Yugo-Slavia at a price.* But they have been clever enough to champion the Slovenes over flimsy grievances against the Schuschnigg Government; in this way another link has been forged between Yugo-Slavia and National Socialism.

To Yugo-Slavs the Schuschnigg Government seems bad enough, but the Hapsburg restoration would seem ten times worse. The Serbs seem to feel something like a blood feud against the Hapsburgs, perhaps since June 28th, 1914. What is worse in their eyes, the Restoration is—or such is their conviction—a Vatican plan, and they regard Roman Catholicism, not merely as the instrument of Italy, but also as an internationalist menace to their nationalist consolidation. Because they themselves are Orthodox, and the Croats and Slovenes are Catholics and ex-subjects of Francis Joseph, they cannot believe that the Croats and Slovenes can really be “solid” in the struggle against Italy. But, it may be asked, has not an Italo-Yugoslav *détente* been proclaimed since the arrival of the new Italian minister in Belgrade in March? Certainly a new era may then have been heralded, but while the Yugo-Slavs will make the most of the diplomatic advantage they have gained, it will be a long time yet before the Italians can lay their deep-rooted suspicion. It is only fair to add that Italian intrigues in the past have been unceasingly malevolent.

The political situation within Yugo-Slavia, however, does much to account for the nervous behaviour of her Government. King Alexander himself had become convinced that

* It is said, of course, that Germany has offered Yugo-Slavia territory here in return for Yugo-Slav support of the *Anschluss*.

his dictatorial system required modification, and it is known that he intended to act accordingly, had he ever returned from Marseilles. For it was increasingly felt in Serbia—not only in Croatia—that the administration had fallen into the hands of a disreputable clique, itself at the mercy of a terrorist police machine. After the King's murder, there was an attempt to turn over a new leaf, and it was hoped that Prince Paul would be able to curb the extremer Balkanism of some police officials. Last January the Skupshtina was dissolved and a “free” election ordered for May 5th. Thereupon the Serb opposition, including both the democrat and socialist whigs, asked Dr. Matchek to work with them, and on February 7th the leader of the Croat Peasants' Party agreed to head the united opposition list. Hitherto it had always been possible to deride the opposition as disunited, and to decry the adherents of Matchek as separatists with whom no decent Serb would have anything to do. People who have spent years in Yugo-Slavia studying its affairs consider that in a really free election the vote for the Government would be scarcely thirty per cent. of the whole. The fact that the Yugo-Slav authorities were forced to admit an opposition vote of over one million, to some 1,700,000 for the Government list, bears witness to the magnificent determination of the Serbo-Croat opposition in face of the police oppression to which they were subjected. The Hungarian Government may have less to fear, but it is only fair to add that, in the Hungarian election campaign, opposition candidates could hold meetings and find them tolerably reported in the Press, while in Yugo-Slavia neither of these things was allowed, and the electoral law forbade secret voting altogether. There was, of course, a great deal of spying, arresting and beating; any inquiring foreigner, by the way, is still at any time dogged by the Yugo-Slav police as if he were the agent of Mussolini himself!

Why is this tyranny allowed to continue? Partly because the police are out of control to such a degree that they are often described as an *imperium in imperio*. But the particular oppression of Croatia is largely due to a morbid fear of Croat intentions. The Croats, in fact, long only to be left to themselves within the framework of the Yugo-Slav state; their position on the Dalmatian Coast makes them more immediately the enemies of Italy than the Serbs, and they have never

contemplated Italian power with anything but abhorrence. Four million Croats among forty million Italians, they themselves point out, would be lost indeed. As for the Hapsburgs, long years of agitation against the Austro-Hungarian system has, until recently, made the thought of renewed allegiance to the old dynasty quite unthinkable. It is only now, when Belgrade methods have driven many Croats to desperation, that the idea of a restoration in Vienna has become remotely tempting. Before the War, Croatia-Slavonia was ruled from Buda-Pest, and Dalmatia and Slovenia from Vienna. To return to that system the Croats would in no circumstances consent, but if the whole of Croatia together with Dalmatia were offered autonomy by a Hapsburg the offer might now seem attractive. The Government of Belgrade regards, not only the out-and-out Legitimists of Austria with suspicious hatred, but, as I have suggested above, it is also intensely hostile to the Schuschnigg régime, which it considers, not unjustly, as the would-be herald of the Hapsburgs. Official Yugo-Slav enmity to official Austria is, of course, encouraged by Austria's dependence upon Italy, and by the 1934 agreement between Rome, Vienna and Buda-Pest. It is also known that the semi-official Austrian newspaper, the *Reichspost*, has had a good deal to do with Croat refugees.

In view of this, it is easy to understand that Nazi refugees from Austria have been welcomed by the Yugo-Slav authorities. This Nazi Yugo-Slav *liaison* is strengthened by Yugo-Slav sympathy for the would-be German-speaking minority in the Italian Tyrol. Here Nazi propagandists have long been busy, until last March the Duce committed the inexplicable folly of removing the statue of poor Walther von der Vogelweide from the market-place at Bolzano (Bozen). Normal friction was violently aggravated, and the Nazis in Austria made tremendous copy out of the whispered rumours which dictatorships inevitably foster. The *Casa di Fascio* had been burnt down, one heard, and machine-guns had been brought out by way of reply. (Though these things were untrue, a good many people, it is certain, had been unpleasantly knocked about.) Schuschnigg, himself Tyrolean, was a renegade, the Nazis said, who had countenanced this persecution of his brothers, and had sold the rest of Austria to the Italian oppressor; Hitler to the rescue! When the Austrian Chancellor returned from Florence in the middle of May with

Mussolini's confirmation of the right to take German lessons in South Tyrol, this was but a wretched sop to the Nazi Cerberus, and Hitler's speech some ten days later, though conciliatory in other directions, was far from helpful in the matter of Austria.

Now Yugo-Slavia is fed on Nazi rumours, and none could be more welcome than those which condemn Italy, though things in Zagreb* are much the same as things in Bozen; against Italy, as against the Hapsburgs, Austrian Nazis and Yugo-Slavs identify their cause. Although Rome has made very striking advances to Belgrade of late, commercial or minority concessions from Italy will not necessarily reconcile the Yugo-Slavs. They will make haste to avail themselves of the calling-off of Italian intrigues in the Balkans and, following up the success of King Alexander in Sofia, they will grasp a real Balkan hegemony as firmly as they can. The Little Entente has ceased to interest the Yugo-Slavs very much; they are only too glad to see its other members, Roumania and Czecho-Slovakia, looking to Moscow rather than to Belgrade. The more Titulescu is involved farther north, the less can he question Yugo-Slav supremacy in the Balkans.

The Balkan peninsula for Yugo-Slavia, Germany at Vienna and Trieste, and let Italy go to the devil or Africa if she can—that is, roughly speaking, the actual though not the official programme at Belgrade. Difficult though the internal problems of Yugo-Slavia may be, it is at any rate clear that her attitude constitutes something like an insuperable obstacle to the return of the Hapsburgs; the discontent of the Croats merely hardens her attitude. History is the record of lessons learnt too late. By the time the Hapsburgs had grasped the need for a Danubian Federation, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who might have carried this conception to fulfilment, was struck down by Prinzip at Sarajevo. With that, as Professor Seton-Watson has pointed out, the possibility of the non-Russian Slavs working out their salvation within the Austrian framework was probably destroyed for ever, and men like Masaryk, who had worked for this solution, from that time aimed only at the creation of independent racial states. The *Anschluss*, no doubt, is the logical conclusion of racialist doctrine, but, on a continent where races are

* Zagreb is the capital town of Croatia as Ljubljana of Slovenia.

group individuality of Czechs, Slovenes or Germans, with giving those peoples a certain community of cultural outlook. To be able to do this was to be Austrian, and it is this which, to my mind, distinguishes the Austrian from the German of the Reich. When Germany swallows up Austria, militant Prussian and militant Serb will be left face to face.

In Belgrade, opposite the royal palace, among a show of royal photographs, one is a little startled to find so many likenesses of Nicholas II of Russia among the Karageorgevitches, who became kings in Belgrade only a few years before the Romanoffs ceased to be Tsars. The Yugo-Slav Government is the last Government in this part of Europe to withhold recognition from the Soviet. But the peasant people of Yugo-Slavia care nothing about Whites and Reds. The politically conscious tend rather to have Green International leanings, a feeling for all the peasants of Slav race. The Russians are still their brothers. Just as Serb and Croat and Slovene are willing to-day to call in the Germans against the Italians, so everyone knows that all their hearts would beat for Russia in a fight between Germans and Russians. The militant Germanism of Hitler is uncompromisingly hostile to Russia. If the Poles are against Russia, the Southern Slavs in the future will certainly be for her. But hatred of Italy blinds Yugo-Slavia to the probable consequences of the *Anschluss*.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

SIR THOMAS MORE, 1478-1535.

IT was on July 6th, 1535, that the head of Sir Thomas More—a head so full of wisdom that he was regarded by the scholars of Europe as one of the glories of English literature—was struck from his body by order of Henry VIII. Such a method of dealing with such a man seems not only barbaric, but fantastic to the last degree; but the King's will was law, and opposers of it were inevitably swept out of his path.

Born in 1478, More was the son of Sir John More, a judge of the King's Bench; he received his early education at St. Anthony's School in Threadneedle Street, said by Stow to be the best school in London at that time. At the age of fifteen he was placed in the household of Archbishop Morton, and showed himself so able that Morton advised his father to exchange Lambeth for Oxford. He was only eighteen when he was called to the Bar, where he was immediately successful, and in 1504 he became a Member of Parliament. It was when Henry VIII succeeded his father in 1509 that the most brilliant period of More's career began; he was sent abroad on diplomatic business, was made a Privy Councillor, and was deputed to act as the spokesman of the King on several State occasions. He was present at the Field of the Cloth of Gold in 1520, was knighted the next year and given large grants of land. Appointments followed one another in rapid succession: he was made High Steward of Cambridge University, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Speaker of the House of Commons, and finally Lord Chancellor in the place of the fallen Wolsey. His life, so far, had been one uninterrupted success; his public work brought him honour; his writings gave him a European reputation; his family life was happy, he was devoted to his children, and his home in Chelsea was the admiration of all who saw it. Then came the turn of Fortune's wheel. He was doomed from the moment that Henry required him to denounce the Pope's authority and maintain the legality of his divorce from Catherine of Aragon; the result of his trial was a foregone conclusion, and though he was examined many times after his committal to the Tower in 1534, nothing could save him from the block, since he remained firm against both threats and persuasions, a firmness which received its recognition in his recent

canonisation by the Roman Church. In July 1535 he was beheaded and his daughter Margaret, the wife of William Roper, is said to have been allowed to take his head for burial to the Roper vault in St. Dunstan's, Canterbury. Such is the brief outline of his life, and had no more been known of him he would only be remembered as an able servant of the State and a victim of selfish tyranny. Able servants England has never lacked, victims of tyranny she has only too often seen; but More stands out from among the number, for Holbein's portrait and his son-in-law's vivid account of him make us know him in his habit as he lived, while his best known book has added an important word to the language.

William Roper was the son of Sir John Roper, a legal official in London who had a house in Canterbury, which still stands near St. Dunstan's church. The young couple lived with More in Chelsea during the sixteen years between their marriage and his execution, and it was this intimate association with him that induced Roper to write his *Life* :

I, William Roper, (thoughe most unworthie) his sonne in lawe by marriage withe his eldest daughter, knowinge noe one manne that of hime and of his doinges understood soe muche as myselfe, for that I was continually resident in his house by the space of sixteen yeares and more, thoughte it therfore my parte to sett forth such matters touchinge his lyfe as I could at this present call to remembraunce.

Roper's admiration for his father-in-law was unbounded; he was, he says,

A manne of singular vertue and of a clear unspotted conscience, (as witnesseth Erasmus) more pure and white then the whitest snow, and of such an angelicall witt, as England, he sayth, never had the like before, nor never shall againe.

His "witt" showed itself even in boyhood, for while in Archbishop Morton's house he would

at Christmas tyd sodenlye stepp in amonge the plaiers, and never studyinge for the matter, make a parte of his owne there presentlye amonge them, which made the lookers on more sporte then all the plaiers besid. In whose witt and towardness the Cardinall much delighting would often saye of him untoe the nobles which divers tymes stayed with him, "This childe here waytinge at the table, whosoever shall live to see it, will prove a marvellous man."

More's "witt" must have been equalled by his kindheartedness, for Roper gives the following quaint account of his courtship and marriage :

He resorted to the house of one Mr. Colte, a gentleman of Essex that had oft invited him thither, havinge three daughters whose honest conversation and verteous education provoked him there especially to sett his affection. And albeit his mynd most served him to the second daughter, for that he thought her the fayrest and best favored, yet when he considered that it would be both great greif and some shame also to the eldest to see her younger sister in marriage preferred before her, he then of a certyne pittie framed his fancie towardes her and soone after married her.

The marriages of Henry VIII have so largely filled the story of his reign that they leave place for little else in the popular memory, but he had other occupations for his time besides the wooing, wedding and slaughtering of fair ladies; he was a skilled statesman and an excellent scholar, and he delighted in the company of men of wit and learning. He soon discovered More's abilities and Roper describes the conversations that he held with him on such subjects as geometry, astronomy, or divinity; but flattering as such favours might be, More grudged the time that he spent away from his dearly loved home :

When he perceaved soe much in his talke to delighte that he could not once in a munnth gett leave to goe home to his wyf and children (whose companie hee most desired) and to be absent from the Courte 2 dayes together but that hee should bee thither sent for againe, hee much mislykinge this restraint of libertie, began thereupon somewhat to dissemble his nature and soe by little and little from his former mirth to disuse himself that he was of them from thencefurth no more soe ordinarielie sent for.

This device did not help him much in the long run, however, for the King made him Treasurer of the Exchequer and his new duties obliged him to be constantly at Court.

More's scholarship was not inferior to his statesmanship, but like all truly great men he was without pride in his gifts, regarding them as trusts from God to be used in His service. Roper gives a striking account of his devotions and of the way in which he associated his children with them. Whenever he

was at home he not only had private prayers with his family, but gathered his whole household in the chapel attached to his dwelling that together they might make intercession to God. To his children he would say : " It is now no maystrie for you children to goe to heaven ; for every bodie giveth you good counsell, every bodie giveth you good example. You see vertue rewarded and vice punished, soe that you are carried up to heaven even by the Chinnes. But if you live in the tyme that noe man shall give you good Counsell, nor no man will give you good Example, when ye shall see vertue punished and vice rewarded, if you will then stand fast and firmly sticke to God upon payne of lyfe, if you be but halfe good God will allow you for whole good."

It was not only by prayer and devotion that More fought the temptations against which he warned his children, for Roper says that although he always dressed in a manner becoming to his rank and station he wore a hair shirt under his clothes, and that also : " he used some tymes to punish his boddie with whippes, the cordes knotted, which was known onlie to my wyf, his eldest daughter, whome for her secresie above all other he specially trusted, caused her, as need required, to wash the same shirt of haire." His attention to his religious duties did not meet with the approval of all his friends : the Duke of Norfolk, coming to dine with him, found him in Chelsea church " singing in the quiere with a surplas on his backe ; to whome after service as they went home together arme in arme, the Duke said : ' God body, God body, my Lord Chauncellor, a parish clarke ! a parish clarke ! you dishonour the King and his office.' ' Nay,' quoth Sir Thomas More, smilinge upon the Duke, ' your Grace may not thinke that the King, your master and myne, will with me for serving God his master be offended, or thereby count his office dishonoured.' "

His Chancellor's devotions were no matter of concern to the King as long as they did not interfere with his duty to his earthly master, but the first sign of opposition was enough to turn favour into fury. The Act of Supremacy was designed to make Henry paramount in Church as well as in State so that he would have power to annul his own marriage, since the Pope refused to do it for him. More declined to have anything to do with such a proposal, and when threats and treaties alike failed to move him he was summoned to

Lambeth. On the morning of the appointed day he went to church, says Roper, according to his usual custom :

And whereas he used evermore before, at his departure from his house and children (whome he loved tenderly) to have them bringe him to his boat and there to kiss them all and bid them farewell, then would he suffer none of them foorth of the gate to followe him, butt pulled the wickett after him and shutt them all from him, and with a heavy harte (as by his countenance it appeared) with me and our foure servants, there tooke his boate towards Lambeth. Wherin still sittinge sadlie awhile, at the last he rounded me in the eare and sayd, " Sonne Roper, I thanke the Lord, the field is woonne." What he meant thereby, then I wist not ; yeate loath to seeme ignoraunte I answered, " Sir, I am thereof very gladd." But as I conjectured afterwards it was that the love he had to God wrought in him soe effectually that it conquered in him all his carnal affectations utterly.

It was not his love for his family that More had conquered, it was any inclination that he might have had to put his care for them before his duty to God ; Roper gives a touching account of his interview with his eldest daughter after he had been a month in the Tower :

My wyf, longing to see her father, by her earnest suite at last gat leave to go to him. At whose cominge (after the seaven psalmes and Litanye sayd, which whensoever she came to him, e're he fell in talke of any worldly matters, he used accustomed to say with her) among other communication he sayd unto her, " I beleeve, Megg, that they that have put me here, weene they have done me a high displeasure. But I assure you on my fayth, myne owne deare daughter, if it had not beene for my wife and you that be my children, whome I accounte the chiefe parte of my charge, I would not have fayled long e're this to have closed myselfe in as straight a Roome, and straighter too. But since I come hither without myne owne deserte, I trust that God of His goodnesse will discharge me of my care, and withe His gratiouse helpe supplie my want among you. I finde noe cause, I thanke God, Megg, to recon myselfe in woorse case here than in myne own house.

If threats could not move him, promises could not cheat him, and a visit from the King's Secretary with many plausible assurances gave him no comfort :

As soone as Mr. Sectrearie was gone, to expresse what comfort he conceaved of his wordes he wrot with a Cole (for ynke then he had none) these verses following—

Ey flattering fortune looke you never soe fayre,
 Nor never soe pleasantly begin to smile,
 As though thou wouldest my Ruines all repayre
 Dureing my life thou shalt not me beguyle,
 Trust I shall, God, to enter in a while
 Thye haven of heaven sure and uniforme,
 Ever after thie Calme looke I for noe storme.

A visit from his wife gave him even less of comfort. This was his second wife, for he had married again after the death of his first; "simple" and "worldlie" are Roper's epithets for her, and he might have added "shrewish" for she had no sympathy for her imprisoned husband:

"What the good yeare, Mr. Moore," quoth shee, "I marvell that you, that have beene allwayes hitherunto taken for soe wise a man, will now soe playe the foole to lye here in this close filthie prison and bee contente to be shutt upp amongst myse and ratts, when you might be abroad at your libertie and with the favour and good will bothe of the King and his Councell if you would but doe as all the Bishoppes and best learned of this Realme have done. And seeinge you have at Chelsey a right fayre house, your bookes, your gallerie, your garden, your orchards, and all other necessities soe handsomely about you, where you might in the company of mee, your wife, your children and household be merrie, I muse what a God's name you meane here still thus fondlye to tarry."

To this remonstrance More listened quietly and with "a cheerfull countenance," but it moved him not at all, and having told her that his own house was no nearer to heaven than his prison he let her go.

The final trial was short, for though many issues were raised the case really rested on one point alone—his consent to the Act of Supremacy. This he persistently refused to give, and it can have been no surprise to him when his sentence was pronounced. His nobility of mind was shown in his reception of it, for neither dismayed nor indignant, he told his judges that St. Paul consented to the death of Stephen, yet were they friends for ever in heaven, and in the same way, though they had condemned him on earth, he and they would hereafter "merrily all meete together to our everlastinge salvation." What his wife said when the news reached her we are not told, but Margaret Roper went to the Tower wharf and there waited till her father should be brought back from Westminster. As soon as she saw him, "shee, hasting towards,

without consideration of care of herselfe, pressinge in amongst the midst of the thronge and the Companie of the Guard, that with Holbards and Billes weare round about him, hastily ranne to him, and there openlie in the sight of them all embraced and tooke him aboute the necke and kissed him." Trusting in his beloved daughter to the last, More sent her "his shirt of hare, not willinge to have it secne," together with a letter, written with a coal, saying that he hoped the next would be his last, "for to-morrowe is St. Thomas even and the Utas (octave) of St. Peter, and therefore to-morrowe longe I to goe to God, that weare a daye verye meet and convenient for mee. And I never liked your manners better than when you kissed mee last. For I like when daughterlie love and deare Charitie hath noe leasure to looke to worldlie courtesie."

His wish was granted: early in the morning of the next day Sir Thomas Pope brought him a message from the Council that he must suffer "before nyne of the clock," a message which he hailed as good tidings. His demeanour was dignified and even cheerful as he was led to the block. He gave the headsman a gold angel and begged the lieutenant of the Tower to help him up the somewhat rickety scaffold: "I pray you, Mr. Lieutenant, see mee safe upp, and for my cominge down, lett mee shift for myselfe." Roper ends there; writing so soon after the event comment or criticism would have been too dangerous, and all that he does is to quote the remark of the Emperor Charles when he heard of More's death: "This will wee saye, that if wee had bine master of such a servant, of whose doinges ourselves have had these many years no small experience, wee would rather have lost the best cittie of our dominions than lost such a worthie counsellor."

From this story of a tragic death it is a relief to turn to the book that still lives. The second part of the *Utopia* was written in 1515, and the first part, which is an introduction to the second, in 1516. More had been in Antwerp on a diplomatic mission, and he says that he met there a returned mariner, named Raphael Hythloday, with whom he held much discourse. This mythical personage described many marvels encountered in his travels, and mentioned many things that he had noted in England as needing reform—lack of education and discipline among the young, savage penalties

for crime, eviction of husbandmen for the extension of sheep farms, the decay of tillage and of weaving, and the wretched state of those who are too old or too poor to work for themselves. All these ills, Hythloday went on to declare, were prevented by the laws of a country in which he had lived for five years, a country that he only left because he wished to make its fame known far and wide. The name of this wonderful country was Utopia, the Greek *Nowhere*, Samuel Butler's *Erewhon*. That both writers chose this name for their Ideal States shows how little hope they had of seeing them established, and we are certainly far from an ideal condition of things to-day, as far—some even lament—as the Greeks were when Plato mapped out his Republic.

The account of this favoured place so excited More's curiosity that he says he begged Hythloday to give him more details concerning it, and this leads to the second part of the book. It begins with a description of the agricultural methods of the Utopians, their corn, cattle, and husbandry in general. They were enlightened farmers, for they understood the rotation of crops and the use of incubators: "The henns doe not sytte upon the egges, but by keepinge them in a certayne equall heate they brynge lyfe into them and hatche them."

The cities of Utopia are built with wide streets and ample space for gardens; a market stands in the midst and all that is sold in it—meat, fish, fruit, bread, etc.—is washed in running water outside the walls before it may enter the city. Hospitals are of such large size that "the sycke, bee they never soe many in number should not lye too thronge or strayte." Separate accommodation is made for infectious cases, and here, as in many other particulars, More is surprisingly modern, even incredibly so when the conditions of hospitals in his day are called to mind. Mothers are to nurse their own children whenever it is possible, and nurseries are never to be without fires and clean water. No one, man or woman, is allowed to be idle, but though all must follow some useful occupation they are not to be wearied with continual work "like toylinge beastes." Eight hours are given to sleep, six to labour, and the remainder to recreation and the hearing of lectures. The shortness of the hours of work does not result in lack of commodities, for when there are no drones the sum of work done is the same. No extravagance in clothing is

allowed; the men wear suits of leather that last for years while they are at work, and when they go into the streets they put on cloaks of undyed wool or of linen cloth. Whether the women were equally content with unchanging fashions he does not say.

The teaching of virtue is very thorough: diligence, uprightness and benevolence are enjoined on all, but life is not to be made sour and dull; pleasure is right and laudable, but it must not be obtained at the expense of another man's pain—a golden rule, indeed! Voluntary death is allowable for the hopelessly diseased; divorce is granted in certain circumstances, but not until the Council "and theyr wyfs" have diligently examined the matter, while breakers of wedlock are "punysht with mooste grevous bondage." Warfare is abhorred, "as a thyng verye beastlie," but both men and women are instructed in the use of arms in case they should be called upon to defend their country. Every man is free to follow what religion he would, but there is to be no disputing with those who hold contrary beliefs and if anyone breaks this rule he is exiled from the country. One doctrine there is which is not to be called in question, and that is the immortality of the soul, for to deny it is to degrade man to the level of the beasts: this is the edict of the Sovereign, King Utopas, as More calls him. It is recognised that no man can make himself believe, but children are carefully instructed in religion by the priests, for what is taught to them while they are "tender and pliaunt" will stay with them through life. One regulation with regard to religion there is which many would like to see carried out in our own day—that from time to time all men, whatever their beliefs may be, should meet together for services of prayer and praise as an acknowledgment that all alike, from their several standpoints, worship one God.

To call Utopia a Commonwealth is no misnomer as it is in countries where men seek their own private gains; store-houses and barns are drawn upon according to need and goods are not distributed "after a nyggyshe sorte, neither is there any poore man or begger. And tho noe man have anye thinge yet every man is riche." The book ends with a scathing denunciation of lands where the rich grind the faces of the poor, snatching away their living so that they can make no provision for sickness or old age. This denunciation carries

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the more weight because it is not uttered by one of the oppressed class, but by one who has nothing to gain by it, a man of rank and position. Such a champion is rare in any age, and in More's day was practically unknown. That his words were not mere idle breath is shown by a letter of his to his wife when he returned from one of his diplomatic missions to France to find that some of his barns had been burned down: she is to take the children to church, he says, and there thank God for all that is left to them, and having done that to see if corn can be procured for sowing so as not to be forced to discharge the labourers for lack of work—if they can find other masters to hire them, well, "but I wold not that anye man were soddenlye sent away, he wot not whither."

It is this same humanity that runs like a keynote through the whole of the *Utopia*, and though it is familiar enough in our ears it was a strange doctrine then. That the book made an immediate mark, we know; it was published in Antwerp in 1516 by the assistance of Erasmus and other friends of More's; a second edition was published in Basle in 1518, and it was translated into German in 1524 and into French in 1530. No English translation was made until 1551, when it was translated by Ralph Robinson, Fellow of Corpus Christi, Oxford.

It is the modernity of More's views that impresses itself upon the reader to-day: town-planning, ventilation, cleanliness, care of the sick, education of the young, religious toleration, provision for old age, reformatory punishment, shortened hours of labour—all the improvements that are slowly and painfully being effected, are set forth in his pages. Yet, much as the book has been admired, it is a reflection upon our own age that the word *Utopian* has no touch of inspiration about it: to apply it to any projected scheme of improvement is to show that we consider the said scheme unpractical and, therefore, impracticable. That More himself regarded his Ideal State in that light we know from the last sentence of the book, in which he says that the conditions described are rather to be wished for than hoped after; but four hundred years have passed since his death and what worthier commemoration of him could we make than to change the significance of the word *Utopian* from—expedient, but impossible of achievement to—expedient and therefore to be done?

MARY BRADFORD WHITING.

THE THREATENED CHAOS IN THE LAW OF NATIONS.

IT is impossible to regard with excessive complacency the sessions of the International Law Association (Pesth) and the International Law Institute (Paris) in 1934. The eminent authorities who participated in these gatherings appeared to have their heads wholly in the clouds. In this age of intense nationalism, when even the time-honoured liberty to buy and sell abroad is threatened, these learned and important bodies devoted their energies entirely to arranging for the introduction of one foreign country into the sphere of authority of another. One can imagine no proceeding more calculated than such a mixture to promote friction, misunderstandings and quarrels.

The Institute's three subjects were, (1) the provision of regulations for reprisals, (2) the admission of nations to navigate the rivers of other nations, and (3) the setting up of an office for the regulation of the use of the sea. The discussion of the last-mentioned topic centred round an elaborate proposal presented by Dr. Strupp (who, we are glad to see, has accepted a Chair at Constantinople). Although the projected office is supposed to be invested with no coercive powers, it is certain that Great Britain is firmly opposed to accepting any international regulation of her use of the High Seas, and it cannot be thought that in the face of this attitude the interesting proposal of Professor Strupp can be anything but academic. Mr. Vallotton d'Erlach's proposed code for the navigation of "international" rivers embodied rules by which all states should have a formally recognised right of passing through their neighbour's territory. The mixture of jurisdictions which inevitably results from such a scheme is sure to provoke contention. This fact is well illustrated by the recent disputes between Roumania and the Danube Commission States, in which Roumania seemed to have the best of the argument, and certainly sustained a serious detraction from her territorial sovereignty. Further, the proposed code itself refers to the treatment of *bâtiments de guerre* in a strange state's rivers and it fails to exclude men-of-war from the liberty of navigation which it accords. Consequently it is arguable that a state may be compelled under the code to admit another nation's warships into its river waters, where

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they will be in a position to dominate its very heart. Also states might be compellable to disregard the obligations of neutrality and to allow warships to traverse their territory to attack their friends. Mr. Vallotton assured the assembly that the code was totally independent of questions affecting warships: but if so, why does it mention them? Nor is it apparent from its terms whether rivers are to be assimilated to ports and harbours, or to the maritime belt of sea. The Polish member of the Committee on this subject did not concur in the recommendation of the proposed code: and the present writer felt obliged to cast a vote against the overwhelming majority of the meeting.

Mr. Politis' proposed code for the regulation of reprisals, to the writer's intense astonishment, recognised and adopted the perfectly modern and perfectly unjuridical idea of "armed reprisals," such as the bombardment of Corfu by Italy. It is obvious that there are any amount of objections to the admission of such an idea into practice. The armed violation of the sacred soil of the country (except in self-defence) is and must be war. To rule that any violence can be committed without war, merely by proclaiming one's peaceful intentions, is inconsistent with the deep-rooted instincts of common sense. Such a doctrine is absurd, dangerous and unjust. It is absurd, because it obscures the dividing line between peace and war, which it is all-important to preserve, if only because neutrals are affected. It is dangerous, because it tempts nations to violence which may easily land them in war and because in most cases it must be doubtful whether the violence is justified, and whether the state attacked is or is not justified in repelling it. It is unjust, because only a strong state can exercise such violence—trading on the weakness of another, and on the calculation that it does not resist the insult.

No real instance of such "armed" reprisals exercised in the territory of a friendly state can be seen before the twentieth century. Authors ignored them. Roguin in an elaborate article in the *Journal de Droit International Publique* never mentions them. Lafarque, in a whole book devoted to reprisals, never mentions them. Heffler and Bluntschli each give careful catalogues of reprisals, and do not include them. There may have been a few cases of bombardments in savage countries, and places outside the territory of any civilised

state: but the decision of the jurists who were invoked by the League of Nations in the Corfu affair, to the effect that reprisals "might" be made outside the territory of the offended state and the High Seas, was surely most unfortunate. It was notable throughout that the British and American participants refrained in general from voting in most of the divisions. They seemed impressed by the way in which the whole proceedings were divorced from reality, and from the conditions of our time.

The International Law Association was brilliantly entertained in Hungary and Austria. The topics which it took up were: (1) International Courts for Civil Disputes, (2) The Briand-Kellogg Treaty. The scheme propounded by Professor Lapradelle seemed to present features which might be questionable. Thus the proposed Courts, in cases where the rules for the solution of conflicts of law are different in the countries concerned, are to be instructed to apply "the generally recognised rules for the solution of conflicts." As there are no such universal rules, but the French think there are, this would amount in practice to imposing in most cases the French rules on all other countries. For the arbitrators will frequently be imbued with the French theory. As to the Briand-Kellogg Treaty, the Association, under the vigorous leadership of Professor Hudson, swallowed the "Stimson doctrine," lock, stock and barrel. Rather absurdly, this was styled—not a logical deduction from the Treaty but, if you please—"a legal interpretation" of its terms.

It will be seen that both institutions dealt in ambitious proposals for imposing upon independent nations various systems of interference in one matter or another by others. It may well be asked what, in our nationalistic time, is the use of this? Every chancery in the world will make short work of these elaborate regulations, and the only consequence will be a demonstration of how far academic opinion is out of touch with reality.

What is really wanted is surely a movement for stabilising the Law of Nations. There is a certain content of that law which is undisputed, or is disputed only by academic wrangling. Whether the fact arises from a desire for ultra-refinement, from a pedantic devotion to some pet theory, or from less respectable motives, such as the desire to make a reputation by the easy road of questioning established doctrines, it is

very common to find in the academic world learned personages who are not content with exposition and research, but who devote themselves to challenge and unsettlement. A little of this goes a very long way. Especially in our time, when the authority and indeed the very existence of the Law of Nations is so widely questioned, is it unfortunate that the experts in that Law should show a divided front, and that they should seem rather to be concerned in demonstrating that no certain law exists than on securing respect for its dictates. In our day it is more important to rally to the steady maintenance and proclamation of the law as it was handed down through Scott and Story, through Wheaton and Phillimore, through Twiss and Dana, through Heffler, Celvo, Gessner, Fiore, Holland and Kleen—than to dispute about suggested refinements and to deny accepted principles.

Let us take only two or three instances of proceedings calculated to bring the Law of Nations into disrepute: the recent attacks on the principle of sovereignty; on the sanctity of national territory and on the safety of neutral commerce. The doctrine of sovereignty, quite apart from its goodness or badness, is obviously the framework of the whole system of international law. Yet some of the greatest figures in the academic world are busily engaged in destroying it, and in trying to substitute some undefined and undefinable notion of collectivity. Representing sovereignty as an absurd claim to omnipotence—which nobody ever supposed it to be—they knock down this scarecrow erected by their own imaginations, and replace it by a figment more pleasing to themselves. The result is to undermine and discredit the established doctrine, and to endanger, with it, the whole body of international law with which it is inseparably connected. As Professor Tachi of Tokio has shown, and as Leibnitz and Grotius understood, the idea of sovereignty is not a mathematical one but an artistic one. Sovereignty is not omnipotence: it is supremacy. It has seemed to generations of the greatest minds a good idea. But whether it is a good idea or not, it is fatal to international law and order, to flout it without putting something equally definite, equally acceptable, and more rational, in its place.

Then as to the sanctity of national territory. It was left to the twentieth century to deny this corner-stone of international law. If all nations may go crusading into their neighbours' territories, without necessarily incurring the risks

and responsibilities of war, it is evident that a state of international anarchy is immediately upon us. Up to the very end of the much-abused nineteenth century, this vital nerve of state life was respected with sedulous care. There were illegalities during the Napoleonic Wars, but these were universally recognised as illegalities, the errors of a lawless time, and not designed to coerce or to penalise the neutral.

Nothing did Napoleon more harm than the seizure of the Duke of Enghien in neutral territory. And thenceforward the sanctity of the nation's territory received a respect to which there were few, if any, exceptions. Such exceptions as can be counted were instances of French forwardness. There were cases in which France landed troops in Turkey (the Morea in 1827; the Lebanon in the middle of the century). In each case there was alleged a high moral motive—to put an end to intolerably painful slaughter. It was not to exact reparation, still less to impose penalties. These acts were comparable to the conduct of a humane person who takes from another a wild animal which he is cruelly abusing. They are acts illegal, but moral. We may put aside the few cases of bombardment by other powers of ports not in the occupation of any civilised or recognised power (such as Greytown) as irrelevant. Where there is no state territory there can be no violation of it. Andrew Jackson's outrageous proceedings in Florida were not intended as pressure or penalty: they were varnished over as self-defence in a remote region: while the Russian occupation of Bessarabia was simply the first act of the Crimean War.

But, quite at the end of the nineteenth century, France went further and occupied Siamese territory in 1893, simply as a means of putting pressure on Siam. In the same way, she had tried in 1885 to bombard and blockade Chinese ports, in order to put pressure upon China. But in that case the blockade gave Lord Granville the opportunity of officially declaring that the proceedings amounted to war: and Great Britain issued a proclamation of neutrality accordingly. Nevertheless, France proceeded to embark on the Siamese adventure, which was as indubitably war, marked by blood and slaughter: and the way was paved for her seizure of Mitylene, and for the invasion of Crete in 1896 by Six Powers, all protesting their friendship for Turkey. So far, Oriental Powers had alone been attacked in this "peaceful" fashion,

if we except the bloodless occupation of Ancona by France in 1832, as a counterpoise to Austrian force in the Papal States. Never had any Western state been subjected to measures of military violence apart from asserted self-defence, or candid and open war. But in 1925 Italian forces opened fire on peaceful and friendly Corfu, killing civilians and children. And a strong committee of jurists advised that such proceedings might be legitimate "reprisals"!

That an academic body of the highest distinction should unanimously accept a doctrine which leads straight to international anarchy is a disturbing sign of the times. "Reprisals" were frowned on by all the nineteenth-century authorities as a barbarous relic of antiquity. They were strictly limited to the exercise of force within the injured party's own territory, and on the High Seas. It was always strongly urged that a wholesale seizure of ships, not limited to satisfaction for a definite debt, was inadmissible—and that a "pacific" blockade was a contradiction in terms. But now all kinds of coercive violence are apparently admitted in the twentieth century, as innocent and "peaceful" reprisals: and the sanctity of the national soil vanishes to zero. It is doubtful whether so rapid a degeneration can be noted in any other department of human activity—with the possible exception of art. If "armed reprisals" were once to be considered as compatible with a state of peace, there would be nothing gained by abolishing war.

Lastly, let us glance at the attacks on neutral security. Again, whether rightly or wrongly is not the question, the security of neutral ships and neutral cargoes in war time was undisputed throughout the nineteenth century. The institutions of blockade and contraband were subject to narrow limitation and clear definition. The attempt of the American Courts in 1862 to introduce the dangerous test of "intention" was vigorously attacked by the British, and generally disclaimed by American writers themselves, with the exception of Beach Lawrence. But the general adoption in the last war of the test of intention revolutionised the position. The merchant, however lawful his voyage objectively regarded, became subject to a prolonged, expensive and difficult lawsuit, in which the belligerent was judge, jury, witness and advocate combined. No Great Power would ever submit in future to have its trade regulated by a belligerent minor

Power in the way in which neutral trade was regulated in 1914-16. Apart altogether from the question of whether the adoption of the continuous voyage theory, with its necessary consequence, the application of the test of intention, be abstractedly right or wrong, good or bad—the obvious fact remains that an attempt has been made to revolutionise the law. A stable and coherent system has been attacked in favour of a vague new system, whose limitations are unknown and whose tests are quite uncertain.

In all directions the simplicity and certainty which are the hall-marks of good law are threatened, if not destroyed. Is it not an imperative need of our time that international lawyers should unite in defence of the simple and certain established rules as they have been handed down throughout the centuries? It were good, says Bacon, that men in their innovations should imitate the example of Time, which innovates gradually, insensibly and without commotion. But the protagonists of international law, far from endeavouring to establish a united front, seem bent on upsetting the very foundations of their system, in the interests of a cloud cuckoo town of their own fanciful imagination.

T. BATY.

APSLEY HOUSE.

HYDE PARK CORNER should properly be called Wellington Corner, for on every side we are confronted with memorials of this dominating personality. There is the statue, tree-encircled, of the Duke, as he may be supposed to have faced Europe's enemy at Waterloo; there is the arch from which another statue of the hero was removed to Aldershot and whose place is taken by the Quadriga, emblem of victory; there is the astounding Achilles statue which the ladies of England (daringly anticipating the nudist movement) presented to one who was far from indifferent to the charms of the fair sex; and lastly there is the house which his one-time presence made the most famous in London, perhaps in all England. If ghosts walk by the glimpses of the moon, in hardly another spot in the metropolis can one be so insistent as here; whether it be seen mounting its horse, as crowds once waited to see its corporeal counterpart do, or whether it passes "in its blue frock-coat and spotless white duck trousers" as Pendennis saw it, with that commanding nose and the firm mouth, rather tight at the corners, and those blue eyes which for many were the outstanding feature—eyes not unlike, one thinks, those of the great Frederick, as he sits his horse forever in Carlyle's vivid phrase.

Apsley House, No. 1 London as a Frenchman is once said to have termed it—at a time when it really was at the beginning of London on the west—remains not greatly changed from what it was when the Duke lived there. Before the advent of the man who made it world-renowned it had had its annals, if less eventful ones. For in the days when the Park was entered by insignificant wooden gates and there was a turnpike close by, an apple-stall stood on the site cheek by jowl with the residence of the Ranger of the Park. The right to erect a stall in this commanding position, for its advantages close to the Park were obvious, is said to have been given by George II to an ex-soldier named Allen who had fought at Dettingen, and may possibly have been the man who stopped the king's runaway horse on that occasion. Allen and his wife evidently prospered, for they were able to educate their son to become an attorney, a fact that had results, for when on the death of Allen the ground was supposed to have reverted to the Crown and was leased to Henry,

Lord Apsley, afterwards 2nd Earl Bathurst, who proceeded to erect a house on it, Mr. Attorney Allen put in a claim on behalf of his mother for compensation on the grounds of unlawful ejectment. So successful was he that no less a sum than £450 a year was awarded. This was in 1771 when Bathurst had become Lord Chancellor, and there was a saying at the time that here was "a suit by one old woman against another, and the Chancellor has been beaten in his own court," the widow Allen being the protagonist in the case and her son her legal adviser.

Matters having thus been settled, Apsley House was proceeded with, the Adam brothers acting as architects. It was of red brick, as referred to by Thackeray in *Vanity Fair*, and occupied some eight years in building, the exact period during which Bathurst was Chancellor. It is said that he attempted that dangerous feat of being his own architect, with the usual result, in this case omitting a staircase from the second to the third floor. If this were so, it seems probable that the Adams were called in to rectify matters. A drawing dated 1800 shows what it originally looked like, and if not specially impressive, the excellence of its commanding site was undeniable. Lord Bathurst had died in 1794, five years after Queen Charlotte, and some of her daughters had come from Kew to stay here and see the illuminations on the occasion of George III's recovery.

In 1810 the 3rd Lord Bathurst sold the place to the Marquess Wellesley, and ten years later the latter resold it to his brother the Duke, who added the picture gallery, the portico and additional rooms and encased the whole in stone under the architectural supervision of Sir Geoffrey Wyattville. In 1830 the Duke purchased the Crown lease for £9,530; the Crown reserving the right to forbid the erection of any other house or houses on the site; a fact of interest in these days when so many of London's private palaces have been destroyed for the erection of hotels or blocks of flats.

It was just a year after this purchase that the mob, infuriated at the Duke's opposition to the Reform Bill, broke the windows of Apsley House, although the Duchess was at the time lying on her death-bed. Gleig, in his *Life of Wellington*, gives this account of the incident: "The Duke was not in his place in the House of Lords on that memorable day when the King went down to dissolve Parliament. He had

been in attendance for some time previously at the sick-bed of the Duchess, she expired (it was on April 24th) just as the Park guns began to fire. He was, therefore, ignorant of the state into which London had fallen, till a surging crowd swept up from Westminster to Piccadilly, shouting and yelling and offering violence to all whom they suspected of being Anti-Reformers. By and by volleys of stones came crashing through the windows of Apsley House, breaking them to pieces and doing injury to more than one valuable picture in the gallery. The Duke bore the outrage as well as he could, but determined never to run a similar risk again. He guarded his windows, as soon as quiet was restored, with iron shutters, and left them there to the day of his death, a standing memento of a nation's ingratitude." This goes a little too far; for it was not so much a nation's ingratitude as the senseless fury of an ignorant section of the London people. The Duke's own remark when it was suggested that he should remove the shutters is well known. "No," he said, "they shall remain where they are as a monument of the gullibility of the mob, and the worthlessness of that sort of popularity for which they who give it can assign no good reason. I don't blame the men who broke my windows. They only did what they were instigated to do by others who ought to have known better. But if anyone is disposed to grow giddy with popular applause, I think a glance towards these shutters will soon sober him." It was just twelve years later that an immense crowd followed him as he rode up Constitution Hill, cheering him as he went. He took no notice whatever, but calmly rode on until he came to Apsley House. There he dismounted, and then he turned towards the mob, made a mock bow, pointed to the windows and entered without a word. The whirligig of time had brought its revenge.

Under the Iron Duke's régime Apsley House, to which he is never known to have referred by this name, was as much an object *monstrari digito* as was the illustrious owner himself. We know from much evidence how people stopped to gaze at it, and if lucky to get a glimpse of the hero mounting or dismounting from his horse, a habit that became so tiresome to him that he caused the iron screen to be placed in front of the entrance, a screen which his witty son, the 2nd Duke, had removed (when the iron window shutters were also done

away with) in 1856, saying that he was sure nobody would stop to see him get on *his* horse.

The solid house must have seemed characteristic of the stable mind that inhabited it. Both became as much part and parcel of the people's life as did Queen Victoria. Many in those days, as in her case in ours, had never known the country without that sure rock of defence; that imperturbable spirit which had saved England, and indeed Europe, in earlier days, had still earlier consolidated our power in India, and which was there to meet any emergency with the dominant courage of a conqueror and concentrated wisdom of unlimited experience. When in 1856 that safeguard was suddenly removed, it must have seemed as if a rift in a dyke had been made for the waters of anarchy to flow in. But after all, such things do not happen in this country, and with that mighty passing, that full and splendid pageantry which some very old people can still remember, as they recall the easily evoked experiences of childhood; with the thunder of guns and the splendid lines of Tennyson, his body went solemnly from Apsley House to St. Paul's to rest by the side of the twin-hero beneath Wren's incomparable dome.

Those who are acquainted with the interior of Apsley House (Wellington House, many used to call it) know that it is a treasury of wonderful things. Magnificent objects and pictures presented by the rulers of the countries he had rescued from an alien servitude crowded the Duke's rooms, and remain to-day as evidence of his recognised greatness. Here may be seen, too, such personal belongings as the glasses through which those keen blue eyes surveyed so many stricken fields, and the cloak he wore during the Peninsular campaign, while of special interest is a sword which once belonged to his greatest rival; a "George" set in diamonds which Anne had given to Marlborough and which George IV in turn presented to the Duke; and that pathetic relic, another "George" which Charles I handed to Bishop Juxon a few minutes before his execution.

Some years ago Evelyn, Duchess of Wellington, the wife of the third Duke, compiled a *catalogue raisonné* of the collection of pictures in Apsley House. It consists of two large volumes and, together with an earlier one published by Mitchell of Bond Street, contains all there can be to say about an assemblage of works of art hardly second to any in London.

That among the pictures are examples of masters more highly thought of in the great Duke's day than they are now, is obvious. It was a period when Guido and Domenichino, the Carraccis and Carlo Dolce and Sassoferrato were considered of greater importance than many which Time and Fashion, and it may be added an enlarged conception of true art, now place far above them. At the same time it happened that the School of Velasquez and Murillo and Zurbaran was not only popular, but were works which Wellington's Peninsular campaign brought to him as presents from the grateful sovereign of that country, or by purchase. It was a time, too, when Dutch art (the fashion for which was largely increased by George IV's partiality, and Sir Robert Peel's taste) was in the ascendant, and in both schools the Apsley House collection is singularly rich, while many of the great Italian masters are represented by masterpieces.

It is thus that practically every reception room here is filled with such pictorial treasures, from the so-called Piccadilly Room, with its wealth of Dutch art, to the Waterloo Chamber whose walls are covered with some of the finest examples of the Italian masters, including the Correggio, once belonging to Joseph Bonaparte and found in his carriage after his flight from Vittoria. The Duke thought so much of this beautiful work that, as Gurwood once told Haydon, he always kept the key of the glass which covered it himself, and when the glass became dusty was accustomed to clean it with his silk handkerchief. Once Gurwood asked the Duke to let him have the key. "No, I won't," was the emphatic reply. It is, indeed, this Waterloo Chamber, where the yearly Waterloo Banquet used to be held, at which King William IV once made one of his rather erratic speeches, that is the sight of the house. Another room forms an antithesis to all this splendour. It is the Duke's bedroom, small and indifferently lighted, with the little iron bedstead, so tenuous that when someone once remarked to the Duke that there was no room to turn in it, the great man replied, "When I want to turn in bed I know it is time to turn out." These two rooms are characteristic of the two outstanding elements of Wellington's career: the innate simplicity of his private, and the splendour and magnificence of his public, life.

For evidences of the former we have innumerable records, Benjamin Robert Haydon's chief among them. In his

Autobiography we get glimpses of the Duke moving about in the artist's studio and suggesting a subject for a picture; "swinging the while back upon his chair and turning up his 'lively eye' to the painter"; or better still, we have him at Walmer, lighting his guest to bed with a candlestick, or sitting reading the paper from end to end, or playing with the children on the leads of the castle . . . or we have him reading to Landseer the chapter in Genesis in which dominion is given to Adam over the beasts of the field, when that artist was about to paint the portrait of the lion tamer, Van Amburgh, for his patron. All great men have a simple side to their character, like the rest of humanity; but when they have covered themselves with glory one has difficulty in conceiving them acting, even when off the public stage, like ordinary mortals. But Napoleon played at Blind Man's Buff in the relative seclusion of Malmaison, and when at last he passed his weary days at St. Helena he used to water the flowers in the grounds of Longwood as the Duke was accustomed to do in the garden of Apsley House.

If you look into *Doyle's Official Baronage* you will find five large pages filled with the titles which the Duke had won and the offices which he filled, and in one of the rooms of Apsley House are arranged those orders from the Garter and the Golden Fleece downwards with which his uniform glittered. Every country in Europe had combined in honouring the saviour of Europe; all the rulers had laid at his feet evidences of their admiration and gratitude; and here may be seen the tokens of their general esteem, which, beautiful and intrinsically costly as nearly all of them are, are still more notable as being the proofs of his indomitable courage and his great gifts.

When one gazes at the solid and impressive exterior of his London home, one is contemplating a shrine full of the memories of the man whose name stands among the outstanding ones of all time; the man who had, so to speak, collected glory in a hundred fights from Assaye to Waterloo; who was at the same time a Prime Minister and a Commander-in-Chief; one to whom all looked up as to a solid rock of defence; whose advice was sought by all, as all honoured and many loved him. In the library you may see the red morocco chair in which he sat and, as Lord Ellesmere records, so often slept amid a chaos of papers; or the desk at which he stood

to write those terse notes beginning with the inevitable "F.M. the Duke of Wellington presents his compliments," or those innumerable cheques with which he gladdened the hearts and relieved the needs of so many humble applicants. You may see, too, many of his portraits (for he was as much exposed to painters as he once said he was to authors): here in a Portuguese uniform, by a native artist; there, as an old man, by Count D'Orsay (both painter and sitter were dandies), among many others; and portraits of his companions-in-arms, of his special friends, the Arbuthnots; of his twin-hero Nelson (whom once and once only he met in Pitt's waiting-room); of Castlereagh who killed himself, and of Spencer Perceval who was murdered by Bellingham. Here, too, hang Napoleon and Josephine and all the sovereigns who gave to the man who had restored them to their thrones these counterfeit presentments of themselves. There they are, cheek by jowl, the conqueror and the conquered, in the rooms where the saviour of Europe lived, his sword put away and in his hand the pen that had erst written so many of those pregnant despatches recording so many victories, on the rough unpainted box, which now stands as perhaps the most emphatic evidence of this glory in what is called the Secretary's Room.

Can any house in the London which, in spite of so much demolition, is still full of them, equal in splendid memories this one-time home of personified greatness? Can more illustrious ghosts congregate in any other spot in the whole of the vast and haunted city than in Wellington's Corner? The Waterloo Bridge which was to perpetuate his last and greatest victory is passing, but beyond it on the East and on the West the memory of the conqueror is kept alive—in St. Paul's where his body lies beneath Alfred Stevens' splendid memorial, and at Apsley House where there is not a corner but recalls the varied facets of that amazing career.

E. BERESFORD CHANCELLOR.

GIAMBATTISTA VICO.

VICO has had a destiny almost unique in the history of letters in its combination of greatness and neglect. Among foreigners Goethe and Michelet, among his countrymen most of the leading minds, from the second generation after his death to the present day, have recognised him for what he was. But by the world he has not been enthroned. Yet he wrote one of the world's greatest books; ideas which he was the first to utter have played a dominant part in the evolution of modern thought; and the stamp of a rare personality, though not recognisable in all his work, is unmistakable in much of it.

His lot was cast in a period of Italian history, 1668 to 1744, which is commonly regarded as uninteresting. This judgment is in some degree due to Clio's preoccupation with politics. But both in the world of thought and in the world of politics it was an age much cumbered with the leavings of the past. It was easy to go wrong and be lost in the labour of overcoming difficulties in the paths of useless learning. Vico was perhaps very nearly lost. His own earliest teachers did little towards setting him upon the right way. He started life with scant promise. Son of the poorest and perhaps the most ignorant of Neapolitan booksellers, absent from school for three years through fracturing his skull at the age of seven, driven to despair and to months of idleness at about twelve or thirteen by an attempt to cross the lifeless aridity of scholasticism, threatened with consumption in early manhood, here at least, it might seem, was one fated to leave his bones in the wilderness.

His course of life was determined by a conversation which he happened to have with a bishop. It took place in a book-shop. Probably literary society was less exclusive then than later, when coffee-houses superseded book-shops as places of meeting. In any case the young genius made an impression on the bishop and was, in consequence, engaged as house-tutor in the family of a great landowner, who proved "a true Mæcnas." For at least a large part of every year for nine years Vico lived in the country, a scene of mountain and woodland three days' journey from Naples, the village and castle of Vatolla, with ample leisure for his own studies. To these nine years the world owes Vico. It was not that he found his

philosophy then, though the nine years ended in 1695 when he was twenty-seven years old. That came later. But he gained his intellectual independence. In more than one important life of that time—witness, for example, the autobiographies of Francesco d'Andrea and of Giannone—there comes in early manhood a definite breach with the scholasticism which still ruled the educational world of Italy. It dawned clearly upon each of them that the old discipline was more fruitful of disputes than of discoveries—they use almost the same words, the words of Francis Bacon—and that they were in danger of remaining lifelong strangers to the real world, past and present. No such moment came to Vico, but he detached himself as effectively from the Aristotelian tradition as any of them. Instead of continuing the effort to decide between logical systems that had lost their vitality through sheer elaboration, he became a humanist without ceasing to be a philosopher.

The deciding factor was that about the time of his engagement at Vatolla he was taking himself seriously as a poet, having for some time been in the habit of writing verses in the "conceited" style of the age. From the beginning he was impelled forward on two lines. Horace told him that moral philosophy is a source from which the poet may draw rich matter; so he studied Aristotle, until he realised that Plato was more congenial. Secondly, an obscure critic of metre had pointed the way to Virgil, who revolutionised his notions of what poetry should be. And then he planned and carried out a magnanimous course of private study in which he compared the great Latin and Italian writers—Virgil, Horace and Cicero, with Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio—reading them three times, for the general sense, the connection of parts and the felicities of expression. But these authors formed only a part of his reading during those years of preparation. His interest in them soon ceased to be merely literary and philological. He read a whole shelf of Italian philosophers—chiefly neo-Platonic—from Pico della Mirandola and Ficino to Francesco Patrizzi. At the same time he continued to study jurisprudence historically, and he wandered into theology in search of a satisfactory doctrine of divine grace and providence, one that should explain the vicissitudes of history. So on the one hand he gained a knowledge of the past as it was in itself, in its writers and its institutions, on

the other hand he sought a philosophy from which he demanded an explanation of that past. Such a synthetic effort was not likely to bear fruit easily or soon.

They were years of external quiet but probably of great inner tension and travail. They gave birth to the one poem which places him among the poets, a poem revealing a crisis of adolescent despair. The future was uncertain, the tenement of clay was o'er-informed, and though there is a certain romantic exaggeration which may be called Byronic—the anticipation is one of the miracles of Vico—the pessimism expressed here in fine and strong verse has a genuine root. The picture of the lost primitive rustic joys is beautiful. So is the allusion to the "dear light which makes souls illustrious." The poem shows, too, a preoccupation with the destinies of mankind which was to inspire the poet's most important writings and most profound speculations; nor did he ever reverse the judgment that he lived in an age of decline.

It was as a very unattached, almost unemployed, man of letters that Vico resumed permanent residence with his family in the Booksellers' Row of Naples. The intellectual life whose currents now enveloped him was rich and progressive. The first great age of the Neapolitan revival from the deadening tyranny of the Spanish reaction had reached its close. The academies had been restored, the ideals and principles of experimental science were beginning to gain ground, even in the University, against the men who feared to look at Nature lest they should see in her more than Aristotle had seen. Marchetti's translation of Lucretius was being handed round in manuscript and the *Provincial Letters* had a belated vogue in Italy. The philosophy of Gassendi had been fashionable before Vico first left Naples. At the time of his return Cartesianism was coming in like a flood. A double conflict was in progress between the enlightened class and the ecclesiastical authorities. There was the conflict of opinion, the Church inflicting long imprisonment preceded by public penances upon the persons described as atomists, atheists or Epicureans, and reputed to hold a strange medley of conflicting opinions. There was also the constitutional struggle of Neapolitan jurists against the claim of the Pope to exercise the specifically Roman form of the Inquisition by special delegates in the city.

It was more or less as the friend of some of these jurists and of their literary champions that Vico was at length, in 1699, elected to fill the chair of rhetoric in the University of Naples. Here he remained for the rest of his life, retiring only during his last illness, never sufficiently paid, supplementing his income by writing odes and inscriptions, but labouring intensely the while on the books which rank him among the great thinkers of all time, though in his own day they did not even bring him renown. His office involved the delivery of an inaugural lecture every year, and it is in these Latin orations, the first six of which have been preserved, that we trace the earlier stages of his thought. The influence of the neo-Platonic writers is here predominant. From the early days when he had preferred realism to nominalism his tendency towards some form of idealism had been clear. At Vatolla he had come to the conclusion that Aristotle regarded the divine power as working on the universe from without, fashioning it as a potter his clay; and he had rejected him for Plato, whom he credited with what was really a neo-Platonic conception of immanence. Like some other eminent thinkers of his time he seems at the period of his inaugural lectures (1699-1707) to have been both Platonist and Cartesian.

Some time before the publication of his treatise *de Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia* (1710) he came to reject the fundamental doctrines of Descartes, whose contempt for philosophical and historical studies was profoundly uncongenial to him. The mind's consciousness of itself in the act of thought was, he said, merely consciousness, and as such not even a sceptic could have any doubt of it. It was not knowledge. To know is to know by causes, to have the causes within oneself. To do that we must have been the makers of what we know. The formula in which this is summed up is that of the identity of *verum* and *factum*. The only science in which this test holds good is mathematics, in which all the propositions are evolved from fictitious entities, creations of the mind itself; the geometrical point and the arithmetical unit. Physical nature is something of which God alone, its creator, has true knowledge. In this intuition of the part played by the mind itself in constituting knowledge Vico was anticipating the work of Kant. It was an obscure anticipation, for its author put it forward in the guise of a primitive wisdom latent in the most ancient Latin, and perhaps originating with Zeno

of Elea, whose name he used, however, as he admitted afterwards, because he did not wish "to be without a guide in philosophy." Sponsored, then, by Zeno, and working on the analogy of geometrical points, he conceived an entity which he called the metaphysical point. As the geometrical point, though without magnitude, could, by being moved, give us the line, and so all the geometrical figures, so the metaphysical point becomes the medium by which the metaphysical, changeless, unmoved, eternal, divine essence gives existence to the moving, changing, physical world that is subject to time.

There is little record of the movement of Vico's thought between 1710 and 1720. His principal work was a life of Antonio Caraffa. This prolonged study of warfare and policy must certainly have delayed its author's progress upon the path of philosophical speculation, but it gave him a contact with the tissue of historical actuality by which the thinker did not fail to profit. The same work involved him in a study of Grotius. He had for years regarded Plato, Tacitus and Bacon as his three writers of daily reference. He now added Grotius, the creator of the jurisprudence of humanity. He was now moving towards the accomplishment of his own task, the application of philosophy to history. In the Latin treatise on jurisprudence which appeared in 1720, he started by deriving jurisprudence from the qualities of the divine nature. God is infinite knowledge, will and power; from knowledge comes the law of property, prudence being the qualification for managing property; from power comes the law of wardship and protection, whilst liberty arises from the temperate will. These three compose authority, which is at first the authority of the individual over himself, then of the head of a family or clan, and finally of the State. This system is linked with the philosophy of knowledge and certainty which he had developed ten years before in reaction from Descartes. Authority in its successive manifestations is a form of certainty, undoubting acceptance. But in process of time, as institutions approximate to reason, this certainty approximates to truth.

In this work of 1720 and two other Latin treatises, *de Constantia Philosophiæ* (1721) and *de Constantia Philologiæ* (1722), he arrived at some of his ultimate doctrines. By assuming the utter scattering and brutalisation of men after

the Deluge, he obtained the basis for a scientific theory of human development independent of Genesis or of any pre-diluvian universal civilisation. He introduced into history the conception of general laws of change. He believed that uniformities of culture are to be explained by the same laws working under similar conditions. He denied, therefore, that the Romans got the law of the Twelve Tables from Greece. He denied in general the spread of civilisation by transmission. Providence was leading men from brutish to rational modes of life by the operation of eternal law upon the common needs and desires of man.

Behind the laws of each age, first the obscure or savage, then the heroic, barbaric or feudal—he recognised the feudalism in Homer—and finally the third or rational and civil age, is a distinct mentality expressed in linguistic developments of which Vico now gave a new philosophy and history. Early man is passionate and imaginative. The expression of this nature is poetry. Poetry is now first discovered to be no artificial sweetening of the pill of truth, but the primitive language of man, with its vivid and emotional onomatopœia, its metaphors and other tropes to eke out the poverty of its vocabulary, its sublimity, from applying imaginative and concrete expressions to the highest objects. The fables of mythology are seen to be a symbolic language. If the chord meant any bond, the lyre meant the political community, the combination of all bonds. Hence the fables of Orpheus as the founder of cities.

The years till 1725 were years of intense activity. They culminated in the first *Scienza Nuova*, which gives in its clearest form what is most important in Vico's thought. He had taken the final step in the creation of the first systematic philosophy of history. He had applied, that is, his criterion of truth afresh, and had come to regard historical phenomena—language, government, religion, and customs—as no less the creations of the human mind than are the presuppositions of mathematics. History becomes an embodiment of mind in the successive stages of its unfolding. The anticipations of later theories regarding Homer and early Roman history, by which he astonished those who revived his memory in the nineteenth century, are the outcome of his general historical doctrine. The fables are resolved into an account of the achievements of the "heroic" age, whose language was of

the nature of poetry, and among the individuals who are seen to be types of whole generations is Homer himself. In later versions other aspects of the "new science" receive more prominence, in particular the doctrine that mediæval and modern history constitute a recurrence, with modifications, of the historic cycle through which the ancient world passed between Homer and Justinian.

The rest of Vico's life was for the most part taken up with the amplification of these theories in so far as he was not occupied with his professorial duties and with the private pupils and occasional writings with which he eked out his income. It was a life of intense intellectual labour, the later years of it darkened by a terrible disease. He is one of the heroes of culture, and one of the minds whose works and whose workings must always be interesting. The fact that he has been superseded by scholars better equipped because working at a later stage of the social and historical sciences which he founded has contributed to obscure the other aspects of his greatness—the poetry with which he invested the problems of remote history, the philosophy whose suggestiveness for the deepest problems gives it a perennial importance. These permanent things in Vico are so involved and intertwined with the obsolete scientific aspects of his work, and the mass of his difficult writing is so great, that to assimilate his cultural values requires a prolonged study. The man who first carried a torch among the catacombs of buried ages is forgotten by those who have established electric lighting there. But he was a poet and a philosopher and he has left on record in his "Sibylline writings," as Goethe called them, thoughts and emotions which will be of interest as long as humanism survives.

H. P. ADAMS.

THE SYREN LOVES THE SEA.

THE world, we know, is too full of living men, but usually we do not think of competition as pressing on the dead ; they have passed out of time and have no further claim on space. And yet we are wrong : as long as they are names, they will, they must, have local habitations. Place is an essential part of memory. The rights of the famous dead to earth-room should be in perpetuity ; but incorporeal though they are, they may be dispossessed and crowded out. It is not only two bodies that cannot occupy the same space at the same time ; two incompatible modes of life cannot occupy it, even at two different times. The modern Lido, and not the years and the waves, has effaced all memory of Byron's gallops along its strand near Venice, all memory, again, of Shelley's funeral pyre at Viareggio. The earth is peopled with imponderable presences, some of whom are historical and lived and died centuries ago, some of whom—real and vital for all that—have never lived except in imagination. But they, also, have territorial claims ; there is, or was, in England, the Lorna Doone country, the Brontë country, the Hardy country. When the Yorkshire moors are tamed and tenanted the tutelary spirits of Heathcliff and Catharine Earnshaw will be evicted ; when Egdon Heath is covered with bungalows all association with Wildeve and Eustacia Vye will have departed, for creations like these are our modern mythology, born of the union of human imagination with its natural background, and draw half their being from soil and scene. The people in Turgénev's stories are like natural emanations. Hardy's own mind had the uplift of a large, melancholy moor. To-day we have no background, either in life or in art.

And there is another immanent thing to be destroyed, another imponderable—the spirit of place. "There are places that resist us," D. H. Lawrence wrote, "that have the power to overthrow our psychic being . . . potent negative centres that refuse our living culture." But not where that culture is collective ; noise and numbers and positive vulgarity can drive away, or drive inward, the escape of earth's secret, puissant life. The spirit of centuries may be dislodged in a decade. In Mr. Norman Douglas's novel *South Wind* the spirit of place was the protagonist, and the action was that of

disturbing environmental influences on the characters to overthrow their psychic being ; but though unborn earthquakes still sleep in the womb of Ætna, and she spins webs of electrical magnetism round her, the day-excursionists chattering through the streets, the tourists who fill the hotels and *pensions* have prevailed at last against the ancient forces, and dissipated the atmosphere of Mr. Douglas's Taormina.

There are places which did not refuse the living culture of past centuries, but were so penetrated by it, that even now as we look at them they reflect back to us the old associations they had with beauty, the aspect they wore to other eyes—such an impression as we get, for instance, from the garden of Tiburlino's villa at Pompeii, looking toward the mountains. But in Sicily cultures and civilisations have cancelled each other out, for as all were alien, so all were transient. Names alone are left ; but in those names a power miraculously persists to move imagination in the very face of the incongruous present. The motor-horn has frightened Persephone's shade from the fields of Enna ; the lemon industry is busily packing and pulping down on the foreshore, where stood the shrine of golden Apollo, but there is that in the name of Enna which we cannot renounce : Naxos, between the lava fields and the tide, is a more homeless word—homeless as the wind, but like the wind, haunting that shore forever.

This power of the mere name to draw us long distances to far countries is an incalculable thing, for often we know in our hearts it is no more than an echo, and the airy tongues that syllable men's names are silent when we reach the spot. Dante, who went down into the shades to recover the lost names of his countrymen to the light, has given tongues to the stones, so that all over Northern Italy, in the narrow streets, and from the walls of ancient buildings, they call on the passers-by through some vivid fixation of his, like that poignant cry of Pia's for remembrance from the walls of the Tolomei palace in Siena. Their immortality lives in some dozen lines, sometimes in only four or five, but it sufficed to win the interest of posterity, which ever since has been engaged in amplifying their stories. The majority of names, however, are familiar only to a few scholars, and often one wonders what it is that brings tourists to wander without apparent interest or recognition through dilapidated old

palaces. What actuates them? The desire of all ages for human continuity, perpetuity—and the line is only traceable there in the past, there is no visible mark of it upon the future—the desire to acquire hereditary rights in history, and proprietary rights to the earth: the same feeling that makes a man so keen on looking up his *known* ancestors? History is every man's genealogy, every man's pride of descent; for under all its disguises and aberrations, the object of his quest is unconsciously the same—it is always himself.

"*Le Syren aime la mer, et j'aime le passé.*" History the syren, and the past the sea, and Rome more than any other living city has been strewn with their shipwrecks. It may sound paradoxical, but for the very reason that it was the oldest city it was the city that attracted youth. It is the young, before the present grips them inescapably, who feel the romantic allurements of the past. Especially those who have just been listening to the syren voices in the classics. And not since Imperial days, perhaps, has Rome been so full of youth as it is to-day. It beats once more as the heart calling into itself the young blood of the country, before expelling it again to the extremities. And the old, twofold, irreconcilable ambition of its dual nature, temporal and spiritual, still passes before one's eyes in the files of young soldiers and Fascists, the long queues of young priests—the unplaitable strands.

Young students, also, of the foreign schools, prowl among the baths and forums, and often some one of them has his private search, his personal allegiance in the antique world, like an English schoolboy, the winner of a scholarship, whose collection of coins boasts fourteen heads of the great Restorer. Rome is the rendezvous with his hero: a man dead nearly two thousand years has more reality for him, more personality, than contemporary Romans in the streets, with whom, though he may touch them and speak to them, he will never make contact. Time has strewn dust on the great Wanderer's footsteps, and scattered his own dust, of which not a pinch remains in the enormous tomb that was built to hold it, while the Villa Adriana, as the boy confesses, with its specimens of the world's assorted architecture, must have been the original Wembley. And yet the devotee has not gone unrewarded for coming: here and there he has found a fragment to build into his mental reconstructions; a face to set

in the Forum, an arch for a triumphant perspective, a cluster of cypresses even, to plume with their sombre pomp the mound once heaped over the vast mausoleum. That precisely is why, outside of museums, there should be no material reconstructions. Ruin is sad, reconstruction is merely depressing.

Another, a young sculptor, has come in reaction against the modernist tendencies of his art, the striving for new form which only deforms; the perverse operations upon stone which result in so many ugly abortions. All this imitation of brute force in negroid types, Cro-Magnon types, is the sign of weakness, an infantile impulse to return into the womb of Time. Gaudier-Brezska said that if stone is to have life it must have movement, because movement is characteristic of life; but movement goes beyond itself—the greatest of the Greek sculptors did something so perfect that it rests in its own perfection, its own completeness, godlike. It rests you to look at it; your spirit enters into its repose, and feels a sort of divine peace—you escape from life into art. . . . "There were more than two thousand statues in Rome. Lots of them were bad, of course, but those adorning the compital shrines—324 in all—formed a complete series of Greek plastic art. And they burned them to make lime, they smashed them and built walls of them, they knocked off their heads and played *bocce* with them. . . ."

He reads Lanciani and writhes. The loss is personal, irretrievable, as fresh as if it happened yesterday. Through the suggestive power of background it is present to him here, and not elsewhere. Things may be felt in their absence more powerfully than in their presence, for through the craving of absence presence is more imaginatively supplied, and that Attic population, that white race of divine aliens, vanishing, has left behind in Rome a memory, a vision that, whatever else may take its place, men will never again embody. They may never again make gods.

One also knows a boy who is learning to paint. He stretches himself at length—six feet two inches of length—on a bench in the Sistine Chapel studying the frescoes of the roof. "I feel," he says, "that Michael Angelo knew everything there is to know about the human heart." But I might never have understood what he meant if one morning a ray of spring sunshine, coming through the window, had not touched the

immense grim canvas of the Judgment with the finger of miracle, so that it stood forth a revelation of pity. Not divine pity; there is none in the denunciatory Christ before whom the Virgin cowers, but the heart of the human creator of all those tormented figures was wrung with it; with pity, above all, for the Man and the Woman who cling to each other, those types of mortal love, drawn down toward the Gulf from which Time rises, the grey spectre with the hour-glass. . . . Why should a little more light, bringing out a little more blue, a little more depth in the abyss, give one so piercing a perception that it brought tears to the eyes? Only, that sometimes when a man painted a picture, or made a thing, he so put himself into it that he and his meaning wait there ever after for the taking at some moment of particular communication. And it is that power of retention in things of a confided meaning which makes of matter a possible meeting-place, a point of encounter between the mind of the present and the mind of the past.

A great deal of the intermediate past, that was so picturesque, is disappearing. There is room only for the flesh-and-blood Fascist and the skeleton Imperial city, side by side. Rome has not the same pride in the Renaissance; it was not her creation. She imported its geniuses, she did not give them birth. Even in classical days she was an importer of made reputations, "*un grand albergo*," as Cesare Pascarelli said, in the course of a conversation recalled by Ugo Ojetti, citing in support of his assertion that nearly all famous Romans were born elsewhere, Cicero, who was from Arpino, Virgil from Mantua, Ovid from the Abruzzi, Horace from Apulia, Cato from Frascati (though that is near enough), Seneca, who was Spanish. He might have swelled the list with Pliny and Catullus, and other names. But one could make out as good a list for London, or Paris, or any other great city that sucks in talent.

The third term of Byron's apostrophe has ceased to apply: Rome is a grave no longer. The earth that centuries have heaped on her is being shovelled away to the last clod, and her dry bones, exhumed, scraped, assembled, line the *Via dell' Impero* and surround the Campidoglio like the exhibits of an anatomical museum. It was an ancient superstition that if you uncovered the bones you laid the restless ghost, and certainly the ghost is gone, even from the

Campagna; there is no feathery fleece of grasses for it to sigh among; the Campagna is covered with allotments, market gardens, and aviation grounds.

Yet there is one place where you can still be conscious of the past; it surges underfoot like a subterranean sea in the caverns of the Palatine. That is to say, in the part of the hill which is still unexcavated, saved by the Borghese gardens clinging like a basil plant to its hollow skull, that but for them would long since have been exposed. Sensing the thinness of the crust one trembles for the great oaks and ilexes that root in it, and for the cypresses standing on the edge, among which, in spring, the Judas trees suddenly shake out their pink skirts like an irruption of ballet girls into a seminary of young priests. For it is not only trees; imagination itself is rooted in that thin layer of covering soil, and of the ground for imagination Rome is rapidly being denuded. The Baths of Caracalla, where Shelley wrote *Prometheus Unbound*, are bare and tidy as a hotel bedroom, and about as conducive to inspiration—nothing unbound could be written there to-day! Dorothy Perkins rambler roses planted against the outer walls are poor compensation for the former wild luxuriance. Caius Cestius' pyramid, where Shelley listened to the whisper of the wind among the trees that overgrew it, does not offer hospitality to a blade of grass. And though it looked already as new and slaty as a roof in Brixton, when I was last there workmen's cradles were slung from the apex, and they were pointing up with mortar its Euclidian sides. It was the anniversary of Keats's death, and as I stooped to lay a few violets on his grave (in lieu of those Severn saw sheeting all the ground, that Keats could feel growing over him) I heard a voice behind me exclaim: "Here 'tis! Here 'tis!" The wall of the cemetery is pierced at intervals, and one slit looks directly on the grave, like the leper's squint on the altar. Some Americans had driven up in a taxi outside, and were reading aloud the inscription from their guide-books. "And now where's Shelley?" they demanded. For Caius Cestius, as Hardy said, lived and died,

That stones which bear his name
Should mark through Time, where two immortal
Shades abide.
It is an ample fame.

When Shelley wove one garland for himself and Keats in *Adonais* he did not dream how closely associated their names were to remain. And yet the whole poem was touched with prescience, almost with prophecy. Did the soul of *Adonais* do more than beckon? A copy of *Endymion* was turned back at the page Shelley was reading when out of a sunlit sea came that sudden storm, and passed taking with it Shelley's spirit, that may have been a white squall, or may have been—who knows?—John Keats.

What good can it do one to go and look at a grave? It is seldom one feels anything sincerely; one draws closer to Keats, recalling a verse of his when the musk rose is in bloom and the nightingale is singing in an English lane. But the old concrete beliefs are too strong for us; we want a haunted earth, we do not want it to lose its hold on those who have made it memorable, nor them to lose their hold on the place they once possessed. For, so often, it is only after death that men come into power and love. Walt Whitman praised the large, unconscious scenery of his native land, and both words are significant: Whitman was always impressed by size, and unconscious exactly conveys the lack, to a traveller from older countries, of Nature that speaks in her own untranslated tongue, but has no message left for us by human life. For where shall we find ourselves except in the past? The future does not exist—or so we assume—the present has no duration. We carry the germ of the future within us, but the future passes out of our bodies, while the past remains to the end in our brains, and our bones, and our blood. A man has no knowledge of his unborn descendants like that he has of his ancestors. To their presence, doubtless, he owes those half-glimpsed recognitions which unaccountably move him in strange places, as if some predecessor could not pass by them unawares; it may even be the unsuspected ghostly urgency of such an one that has brought one where one is.

Under the brow of Fiesole, just above the tram-stop of Regresso di Maiano, a quotation from Leonardo da Vinci is inscribed, and in the intervals between creaking trams, alone there, as one reads those words that strain like wings with his aspiration to soar "*come il cortone-uccello di rapina*" that he saw "*andando a Fiesole sopra il loco di barbica*," suddenly one may hear a humming sound, turn, and see, high over the valley of the Arno, between the city and the sun, something in

the shape of a great bird flying—Leonardo's dream realised. But so quickly has our wonder and exultation passed, that the famous bird which was to fill the world with its rumour is a mere matter of course. The Icarus impulse, still unsatisfied, takes men higher and higher; they have out-soared our day, passed through the azure ceiling-cloth of the sky into the greyness, the black-greyness of the stratosphere. They must travel upward and outward, for merely to travel round and round the smallness of this earth has lost its novelty. Even the greatest adventure—that which brought the rarest encounters—to travel backward in time, begins to be blocked by traffic. The old enduring relations with environment, the slow interpenetrations of place with spirit, and spirit with place, are interrupted. We do not stay long enough in one place to warm it with our occupancy. Nothing makes much impression, because the impressions are too numerous. The people are too numerous; there are no solitudes and silences in which to get away from them, or closer to them; we have become indifferent to one another, ground hard and smooth as stones in a river-bed, by ceaseless human contact. The value of human personality declines with numbers. There is not the old discovery and wonder and reverence for an unusual human being; the level is higher, emergence more general. We are all vocal, not to say vociferous, and when we listen it is not as on the terrace of a Cinquecento Italian villa to the intimate discussions and narratives that a Castiglione or a Boccaccio will record, or as in an olive grove near Athens, it is collectively, impersonally, to voices that die away with the last raucous vibrations of the loud-speaker—unless, as it is horrible to suppose, they go circling on and on without escape, though happily inaudible, in a great swirl of captive sound that scarfs our globe.

Amid all the clamour and confusion we make the old effort at preservation: we set up monuments and inscriptions with names and dates; we dedicate a house; we try to save the associations of a neighbourhood. It may seem a childish endeavour, but no other fixation is possible. Even the dead we cannot keep, except within this frame of sensory dimensions; whoever and whatever is not fitted into it, attached at points of space and time, passes away and is lost.

MARTHA KINROSS.

AN ITALIAN SHEPHERDESS'S SCRAP-BOOK.*

THE contents of this scrap-book are really the lyrical autobiography of Dina Ferri, the shepherd poetess of Siena. She gave the title: *Quaderno del Nulla* (like Keats' own epitaph: "Here lies one whose name is writ in water") to lyrics written in her school note-book. She handed her *opera omnia* as her testament to the Sister of Mercy who led her to the operating theatre. There, a few minutes later, "she snatched the sweet secret" in sleep, aged not yet twenty-two. June 18th, 1930, was the day of her death. "What has been my life until to-day? It consists only of a little book of four pages. . . . My existence has been of no advantage to my fellow creatures . . . often I have been a burden to others! Where are now my cherished hopes and plans? Nothing remains of them!"

This Dina Ferri said and thought, but many hungry souls, humbly conscious of the barrenness of their book-knowledge, now approach reverently the grave of this pure country-woman of the great Saint Catherine of Siena, who harmonised and expressed the messages that came to her through the voices of birds in the woods, flowers of the field, breezes and storms, light and darkness, sheep and cattle, above all through the contact of noble lives led by the simple folk on the hills, and in the cool vales of Ciciano.

Dina's home was a poor shepherd hut on the farm her father rented. It consisted of a low-ceiled kitchen with the usual large, hospitable fireplace, over a stable, and under two bedrooms and an attic. Here Dina lived with parents, two grandparents, brother and younger sister. From early childhood she shepherded flocks on the mountains. Her three years of school life were over by twelve years of age. But she had become a reader. She pondered over the great book *che per L'Universo si squaderna* (Dante) and listened to her own heart, and "the still sad music of humanity." And she

* There is a considerable literature on Dina Ferri in Italy. See its principal bibliography in the volume *Dina Ferri: Quaderno del Nulla* (a selection), edited with an introduction by Piero Misciatelli (Treves, Milano, 1931), to whose publisher I am indebted for permission to translate some poems and prose passages. I also acknowledge here my indebtedness for information and ideas to P. Misciatelli's introduction and to articles by F. M. Martini and Ada Negri (*Corriere della Sera*.) G.P.

tried to make up for want of books by keeping in touch with an old schoolfellow still at work.

She began to write down in school note-books the songs of her restless soul. To her, fields in the glowing sun, clouds in the blue sky, storms, murmuring brooks, sunrise and dawn, rustling leaves and bleating lambs, were all *lacrimæ rerum*, touched with joy and tears. Young Dina little dreamed of becoming a poetess. She thought it her duty to give practical help to her mother and become a clever needlewoman. But when sixteen, while mowing grass for her cattle, she accidentally cut off three of her fingers. By way of consolation her parents sent her to resume her studies at a primary school at Chiusdino, a market village five kilometres away, when shepherding was not in season. Here a school inspector read the nineteen note-books in which she had written her lyrical diary. Interested and impressed by her gifts of mind, he recommended her for a scholarship that she might be trained as a teacher in St. Catherine's College at Siena. Dina covered a four-year course in the next three years, 1927-9. Illness prevented her from going on to the upper course.

But her real life was lived when she returned to her Ciciano mountains at Christmas, Easter and in the long summer vacation, when she tended her flocks, helped her parents in field work, and felt again a queen in her own kingdom. She had discovered that books propounded more problems than they could answer. They had sharpened her sensibility to human suffering, saddened her. She found relief in verse and prose, in pouring out tenderness on all, especially the *vinti della vita*, who are crushed by life. She expressed the disillusionment of those who, expecting culture and science to solve for them the riddle of life, find they can only formulate it better. The following allegory is a page of autobiography.

A forgotten hut was then my nest. I loved it with a wild love: like that of a bird of prey for the caves of its mountain. I culled wild flowers from the ridge of precipices; I listened to the roaring of water-falls; I picked blackberries from the thorny bushes, and strawberries among the wild mountain-woods. Towards evening I summoned the scattered sheep, I drank the frothy aromatic milk from bowls full to the brim, and I wreathed flower baskets. I was content with my lot then, and I asked nothing of fortune. But one day among the crags and peaks I met with a strange wayfarer, whose hair and beard were of snowy hue: "Daughter of the

mountains," he said, "little have you learned up to this day. Follow me and I will teach you how to charm secrets from Creation, and how to tread on the verge of precipices without reeling." His charming words bewitched my soul. I forsook the bleating sheep, and down I went, following the strange wayfarer towards the unknown. The horizon grew wider and wider, while day after day and year after year on and on I went; till one day wearily I stopped, and asked my leader: "When will this path come to an end: and to what goal is it leading?" The old man's gaze rested on me more strangely than ever, as of one dismayed at my question, to which he replied with a quavering voice, as though hesitating before an awful mystery: "It is still a long, long way. Through all my life, for countless years, a pilgrim I have been. But at the end of this long, long way, the great secret which drives us on is to be read: there lies the key of the puzzling enigma and of the awful mystery." Then it was that I first realised that the mystery hidden in darkness is not to be read: and I felt a bitter disappointment. My former enchantment vanished, and the nostalgia for my early life rose up again within me. But back I dared not turn: never, perhaps, can I turn back; because on the top of the forsaken mountain the old man's words bewitched my soul. Along on my journey I go; wider and wider the horizon grows, but the mountain tops rising among my native fields are now hidden from my sight, because the very fate which draws me on and on has enveloped them with a never-fading haze.

The artistic symbolism of the wandering spiritual pilgrimage, which had allured Dante and Bunyan, kindled her imagination, as being the underlying interpretation of life's meaning.

When shall thy aimless wandering end?—Whence came you, whither go you?—What destiny traced for thee that goal, to thee unknown?—When shall end thy constant pain?—Something above human smiles on thy face;—thou gazest at the sky above. He goes on, goes on his way.—(*A Beggar.*)

Even the little baby: "For a long, long journey left, with the roses of May . . .—she left her pretty warm cradle,—and far into the silence fled."—(*She Left.*)

A pilgrim towards the evening of life is the old emigrant, too, looking in vain, amidst the new buildings of the modern village, for the old hamlet he had left when a boy, full of illusions. Every peasant at dusk turns his step homeward: on every board smokes the alluring soup: under a young linden sits the lonely old man: "his pain alone is at his side." Up the steep path the poor weary old man was seen to plod: "life now deserted him; faithful at

his side was still his pain." The voice of the church bell is the only friendly one from his old hamlet; it calls him to the church of his boyhood: past associations there revive, as fresh and powerful as when his mother sang the praises of God near her boy. Peace now finds its way to him, through tears.—(*La Pena; Era un vespro di Luglio.*)

The whole of Nature shares in man's sense of mystery: "I asked one day, of the far clouds,—When does the shadow end down here?—A voice near by answered, 'Never more!'—The blue sky stars, the dark cloaked night, asked I again timidly and softly,—to unravel the awful mystery,—Among the shadows I ask my way,—and dream again of the faded light.—Again and again the wonted voice repeats: 'Never more!'" (*The Shadow.*)

So far Dina Ferri only knew Latin and Italian classics through elementary school books and an anthology. She knew nothing of Carducci and D'Annunzio, while Pascoli's *Myrica* she read only later, in 1928. Of foreign literature she knew none. Strict college discipline had shut her off from the art treasures of Siena and from music. Only once from a mountain top had she caught a glimpse of the far distant, glimmering sea. And yet, in her secluded vale, the voice of the wide world reached and powerfully inspired her.

Her soul was to be revealed to her through physical and moral suffering. In August 1929 a mysterious illness laid her low. Her twenty years fought desperately for ten long months. Short respites gave hope of recovery from her disease, consumption of the intestines, but she lay on a bed of pain for six months before the end in June 1930. On February 14th she was carried into a common ward in Siena hospital. It was there her spiritual triumph was to come. After very human rebellion and disconcertment ("With a heart of twenty, dying seems folly; yet die one must. Courage! and on!") and reconciliation through a vision of peace beyond the grave, she ultimately finds refuge in her simple, inborn, intuitive faith, and abandons herself to a supreme goodness reaching men through darkness.

Here is a cry of nostalgic rebellion:

I would fly down through the dark night;
I'd lose me astray, through paths unknown,
Listening to wind, listening to storm,
Breathing my lay, singing my song.

On the deep vault I'd gaze again,
In the dark night at fixed stars;
As of old days, shudder once more,
Shudder I would with cold and fear.

I'd pass again through path unknown,
Fly across the valleys, rest in the eve,
While thou, proud youth, wailing the storm,
Returnest home calling the fold.

(*Vorrei.*)

Dina's craving for a smile and tears is laid bare in her last letter to her parents, as she dies in loneliness. After a crisis of depression, the burst of joy of a swarm of sparrows following a storm restores her sense of fellowship with Nature.

Those tiny restless creatures seemed to have stored in their frail bodies the songs of wind, the mysterious voices of Nature. A joy was there. . . . What message those voices conveyed to my soul, I couldn't tell; but now I felt and loved again the beautiful things of Nature, and a new page opened in my heart. . . .

Her lyre vibrates once more to notes of harmony and love as in this page, which may remind English readers of that noble fragment of Shelley's *On the Coliseum*, certainly unknown to Dina:

A mysterious voice has her echo in our soul: and we can but listen to it with a wondering heart. At moments that voice is so sweet, that we feel transformed, spiritually rapt far above human misery; transfused into something undefinable which flutters around our soul and purifies it into a divine love for all that is great and beautiful. It is then that we are good. But seldom we hear this poetry of the heart, which breathes the rhythm of life, and keeps our will fresh. . . . Only great souls constantly hear the voice of their hearts: because there is no real greatness without goodness, and goodness is the voice of the heart.

A few days later: "The last support of a man conquered by sorrow or adversity is the hope born of faith . . . which, though often slumbering, wakes again at the desperate appeal of a heart tortured in the face of the impossible. And the joy God has in store for us after pain is finer and truer."

Unfortunately, it is difficult to convey in a translation the crystalline Italian form of most of Dina Ferri's prose and poems, specially of the last and best, such as: "Trembled

the little star, as if dismayed at her loneliness"; and *Man-dolins*; *Murmur of Prayer*; *The Strange Country*. ("There is no such country, so fair and so strange, where violets and pomegranates bloom all the year round.") And the *Why*? (The desire of the heart, clouded by the pretence of reason, to know the why of things.)

A girl in the bed next to Dina, passing on a few days before her, breaks into song with a voice grown strange. Here is Dina's interpretation of that soul's estrangement:

Thou sang'st, in the death delirium,
A song with a voice grown strange:
Loud moaned the wind and roared, but thou
Wast lost in dreams, thy soul far straying.

Back to thy entranced spirit came
Thy prime of life's sweet dream of youth,
Sang'st to thy April again in bloom,
Thou drank'st again her sun's caress.

Visions of life rising again,
The fairy tale of laugh and love
Sang'st thou; the wound was then not felt,
That from the core sorely springs.

Death stealing nigh, in silence wrapt,
Hides in dark shade, cloaked in gloom.
Full charm of dawn thy morn enjoyed,
But evensong thou didst not hear.

Tired at noontide, seeking rest
'Neath thy plane-tree's flow'ry fanning,
Smiled all round the skies to thee,
Breathed around the Infinite.

But like sweet scent from violet,
Concealing life's great mystery,
From thee thy speech the wind has tched,
Along the lane thou sleep'st in peace.

Each sleepless night Dina reads the last prayer to God and Christ she had written into her scrap-book *Quaderno del Nulla*, the most precious pearl of the collection—*Per Crucem ad Lucem*. (Through the Cross, to Light.)

May 2nd, 1930. In the Hospital, Siena.

O Christ, my God, my Father, who out of the void drewest me forth to the wonders of Creation around, grant me light to see

and charity to understand, that I may live in Thee, in love for Thee. Give me strength to carry my Cross, and joy in suffering. Support me, Thou, when I falter, and lift me up again when I fall. In my agony, quench my thirsty spirit with a drop of Thy blood, and let me die with Thee, that I may rise to Thy glory. Strengthen my weakness with zeal, and push me steadily on towards the light that never fades. If I have trusted that way which Thou pointedst out to me, call me out and meet me at its end. My God, do not despise the scanty fruits I have gathered for Thee along my journey, and accept these few slender faded flowers that have reached here with me. Look kindly at them, Lord, that these my fruits shall multiply, and my flowers become fresh once more and blooming. A long, long journey has been mine, O Lord; one beset with stones and thorns. I looked for a shady rest from the scorching midday sun, but I was struck by its beams. I took shelter in caves when storms raged, but the wind still slapped my face. Now to Thee have I reached, O Lord, and I am knocking at Thy door. According to Thy promise it will surely open, and neither gusts of storm, nor the sun's stroke will reach me any more.

In this prayer of a Sienese shepherdess, comments F. M. Martini, quivers an echo of her sainted countrywoman's lofty words to God. One wonders how the simple peasant girl could arrive at poetry from her pastoral experience, and emulate, as it were, the soaring spirituality of the great Catherine; one can only conclude that the secret lies in the region which gave birth to both, Catherine and Dina Ferri.

GIOVANNI PIOLI.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

GERMANY'S NAVY.

ON June 2nd a German naval delegation, headed by Herr von Ribbentrop, the German "Special Commissioner for Disarmament," who had just been given by Herr Hitler the further office of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission, left Berlin for London, where two days later the delayed Anglo-German talks began. The origin of the talks was Herr Hitler's intimation, given to Sir John Simon when Sir John visited Berlin on March 26th, that Germany claimed the equivalent of from thirty-five per cent. to fifty per cent. of British naval tonnage. Sir John rejected the claim as being unacceptable to the British Government, but as a friendly gesture suggested that German delegates should come to London to explain the grounds on which the claim was based. The date first fixed for the talks was the second week in May, but the delay in Herr Hitler's Reichstag statement made it advisable also to postpone the naval talks.

The talks duly started on June 4th, Sir John Simon then being the British Foreign Secretary. They were adjourned for Whitsuntide on June 7th and resumed on June 14th, by which time it was Sir Samuel Hoare, the new British Foreign Secretary, who met Herr von Ribbentrop. When this paper was written no results had been officially announced, but there was ground for the belief that on June 14th Sir Samuel Hoare and Herr von Ribbentrop reached an agreement in principle. It remained for that agreement to be safely formulated in detail. To that end, meetings were being held of the experts of the two delegations.

The agreement in principle that was understood to have been reached was that the British Government committed itself to accept a German proposal whereby Germany's naval tonnage should be limited to thirty-five per cent. of the British tonnage, and that the limitation should be effected separately within each category of vessel. It remained for the experts to draft a form of agreement which should translate that principle into practice without altering in any step which was not as simple as it looked. There were ample, technical questions involved. If one assumed, however, to the

the German experts would be able to satisfy the British experts that Herr von Ribbentrop's proposal had been duly and correctly applied in the formulæ of the actual agreement, then the agreement would constitute a common Anglo-German policy in the wider naval negotiations then due.

There never was any doubt in London—and the personal change from Sir John Simon to Sir Samuel Hoare merely confirmed that fact—that the German proposal could not be refused if it could be construed to mean what it said. When Sir John Simon was in Berlin, Herr Hitler's claim had not only been placed vaguely between the wide limits of thirty-five per cent. and fifty per cent. of British tonnage, but was not qualified in any way to suggest that the comparative tonnages were to be anything but "global." The spontaneous offer of limitation by categories on the low figure of thirty-five per cent. made an immediate impression on the British Admiralty, because no one who was born before 1917 could forget the point about submarines.

It appeared to be the belief of British official quarters that a firm commitment by Germany to a limitation of strength in one branch of armaments might prove to be the beginning of new work on the whole problem of armaments limitation. Its value could only be that of a means to a more general end, because neither British nor German quarters were under any illusion that an exclusively bilateral agreement about armaments was practicable without reference to the other interested parties. There was, however, one aspect of the Anglo-German agreement which had an exclusively bilateral value. The fact was frankly faced in London that by accepting the German proposal the British Government would jointly with the German Government violate the Treaty of Versailles; but the fact itself was largely academic. The three-Power understanding reached at Stresa and put into operation at Geneva, in its bearing upon the hypothesis of a further violation of the treaty, was clearly based upon the assumption that Part V of the treaty had already lapsed. No doubt was felt in London that neither Paris nor Rome would challenge that assumption. In the British view, therefore, there was no inconsistency between the Stresa principle and the new Anglo-German understanding; and the German visitors to London given no excuse for misunderstanding the determination of the British Government to remain absolutely

loyal to the Stresa policy. On the contrary, the British Government believed that what had been done in London might prove to be the first step towards bringing Germany into that collective European system which it was Stresa's main purpose to achieve.

OTHER ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMACY.

The general contour of European diplomacy became a little ragged and uncertain during the month of May. On the one hand, Germany's refusal of the Anglo-French proposals of February 3rd and her alternative unilateral pronouncement about the extent to which her own strength in land, air and naval forces was to be carried had by now been accepted by the other Powers concerned as an established factor, indeed the central factor, in European high diplomacy. On the other hand, the united front established at Stresa and Geneva between Great Britain, France and Italy, as a result of Germany's isolated and defiant strength, was itself a little impaired by Italy's distraction in Ethiopia, by France's distraction in the financial and budgetary field at home, and by the Anglo-German naval conversations that took place in London.

The Italian complication was the more embarrassing because Ethiopian statesmanship fully recognised that it had a strong lever in Geneva. Geneva being the symbol of good European behaviour, as exemplified by Italy, France and Great Britain, an appeal on high moral grounds by a small state against a great state, especially when the great state happened to be Italy, caused satisfaction nowhere but in Berlin. The satisfaction caused in Berlin was not lessened by the emergence of still another first-class domestic crisis in Paris. There are those who are thereby fortified in the view that the main safeguard against actual mischief in diplomacy is that in the nature of things a given alignment of diplomatic forces can seldom last. The field is so big and the forces are so many that the most probable outcome is an undefined muddle.

In the present instance the action taken by Germany on March 16th was so decided, and caused such universal alarm, that something like a united encirclement of Germany appeared to have been produced. On March 21st, for example, the Italian Government sent a strongly worded protest to the

German Government, in particular declaring that "in any eventual future negotiations it will not be able simply to accept as ready-made situations of fact those which have been determined by unilateral decisions that annul engagements of an international character." By May 25th, Signor Mussolini was announcing that "nobody should hope to make out of Abyssinia a new pistol which is to be pointed continually against us and which, in case of European troubles, should make our position in East Africa untenable. Let everyone clearly grasp that when the safety of our territories and the lives of our soldiers are at stake, we are ready to assume all, even the supreme responsibilities."

HERR HITLER'S SPEECH.

The general result of the various distractions was that the European front against Germany became a little blurred. In some degree that circumstance explains some of the otherwise inexplicable features of Herr Hitler's great speech of May 21st.

For two months those men and women in Europe who had taken enough interest in European diplomacy to know that what Herr Hitler had done on March 16th had disturbed the European Foreign Offices, had been looking forward to that speech in the expectation that Herr Hitler would say something to resolve at any rate some of the existing uncertainties. Many people must have read the full report of that speech. It ran to about 17,000 words, and took about three hours to deliver. What Herr Hitler wanted to convey was not obvious. What he did convey, to many minds, was precisely nothing at all.

The interesting thing is that there are four Great Powers in Western Europe. Upon them mainly depends the peace of Europe. The politicians of those four countries are always talking about their desire for peace. They all apparently desire peace. Herr Hitler within the first 3,000 words of his speech affirmed that "present-day Germany supports peace." He gave two reasons for that affirmation. "National Socialist Germany wants peace [he said] because of her fundamental convictions on world problems." It is not obvious what that means. The second reason was less obscure. "She wants peace also [he said] because she recognises the simple primitive fact that no war would be calculated to eliminate our state of general distress in Europe, but probably

to increase it." Nearly every politician in the world at times says things like that. The average politician regards it as necessary for him not only to affirm that he wants peace, but to explain that he wants it because peace on its merits is a state of affairs that ought to be chosen rather than war.

Herr Hitler worked himself up to such a pitch of enthusiasm over the German recognition that peace on its merits is better than war that he proceeded for the space of about 9,000 words, or more than half of his speech, to discover more and more virtue in the German character and more and more cause for admiration in the German record. Had Germany unilaterally violated the treaty? On the contrary, it was the other Powers who had unilaterally violated it. Did Germany want war? On the contrary, it was the other Powers who wanted war. Had Germany increased her armaments? On the contrary, it was the other Powers, . . . etc.

His final verdict was, that so far as the honouring of treaties was concerned, the other Powers were so lacking in honour that it was impossible for Germany to enter into any contract whatever with them: "In opposition to the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles, not only did disarmament not follow, but, on the contrary, a constant increase and improvement of high-class weapons of war took place. . . . If that is not a glaring example of treaty violation, and indeed of unilateral treaty violation, after the other party [that is, Germany] had completely fulfilled his obligation, it will be difficult to see what can be the use of signing treaties at all in the future." By the end of the speech, the audience must have formed so high an opinion of Germany, and so low an opinion of the other Powers, that there arose the danger that Herr Hitler had perhaps defeated his originally peaceful object, after the manner of the famous golfer who decided to break his damned clubs rather than lose his damned temper.

The Bombing of Civilians.

Out of the drab story of high diplomacy in Europe, as it has been unfolded in its latest phase, there has at any rate emerged one clear but curious fact. The fact has had so much emphasis put upon it by the parties concerned that there is no excuse for anyone's missing it. On May 2nd last, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, speaking in the House of Commons, said: "We are seeking with the Powers named, including

Germany, a defensive combination against attack which will protect our civilian population in particular against the destruction which aerial warfare makes absolutely inevitable." On May 21st Herr Hitler said: "If it was once possible as a result of the Geneva Red Cross Convention gradually to prevent the killing of defenceless wounded or prisoners—a thing possible in itself—it must also be possible by means of an analogous convention to forbid the bombing of an equally defenceless civilian population and finally to bring it to an end altogether." On the following day, speaking in the House of Commons, Mr. Baldwin said: "There is one other matter to which His Majesty's Government attached the greatest importance. It seemed to us that the promotion of an air pact might be combined with an effort to safeguard the civil population against the danger of indiscriminate attacks from the air. There are passages in Herr Hitler's speech which seem to suggest that he shares that view."

Such quotations could be multiplied many times, and could be taken impartially from the mouths of the politicians of all countries. Now the interesting thing about this emphasis upon the need of defending the civilian population is that the politicians who make it are the same politicians who protest that their only object is to maintain the peace.

To the simple, unaffected minds of severely honest people it is not clear why there should be all this concern about the bombing of civilian populations. It is the common assumption in civilian and military quarters that if, and when, a war breaks out the aeroplanes will dash across frontiers and delete the civilian populations; that German bombs will destroy Whitehall and British bombs will destroy the Wilhelmstrasse. Could there be a better safeguard of peace than such a prospect? If the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Chancellor of Germany knew for a certainty that within three hours of an Anglo-German declaration of war they personally would probably be killed, there would be no declaration of war at all. If every Cabinet Minister, every civil servant in Whitehall, every man and woman in civil life, knew that when the next war started there would be no time to enlist for safety in the army before the bombers did their devastating work upon the civilian population, war would become a remote improbability. There seems to be something perverse in all this talk of making war as easy as possible by removing

from the civilian population any fear that they will be directly involved. "The laws of civilised warfare" are indeed one of history's grimmest jests. The anxiety that is displayed to the end that a convention be concluded which shall enable air warfare to be carried on without physical damage to the civilian population seems to be about as business-like as the anxiety displayed at more than one naval conference since the war to the end that a submarine be "humanised."

What is a "war area"?

When the French and British Governments on February 3rd made their famous proposal to Germany, they made it as an integral whole. When, therefore, Germany rejected it as an integral whole, but announced her willingness to discuss an air convention by itself, no business was done, because the British and French Foreign Offices confirmed their agreement that no business should be done on those terms. But four months passed, and with them a slight weakening of tactical positions. When Herr Hitler made his speech on May 21st he catalogued thirteen suggestions as representing what he alleged to be the practical, precise proposals of the German Government. The longest suggestion was that numbered 9. It was therein recorded that "The German Government are ready to take an active part in all endeavours which can result in a practical limitation of unbounded armaments. They regard a return to the order of ideas of the former Geneva Red Cross Convention as the sole possible way to achieve this. They believe that for the present the only way is the abolition and outlawry, step by step, of means and methods of warfare which, by their very nature, are at variance with the Geneva Red Cross Convention already in force.

"They believe in that connection that just as the use of dum-dum bullets was once forbidden, and thus to a large extent prevented in practice, so the use of certain other weapons should be forbidden and thus also prevented in practice. Among such weapons they include those which are principally designed less to bring death and destruction to the fighting soldiers than to the women and children who take no part in the fighting.

"The German Government regard the idea of abolishing aeroplanes, but leaving bombardment unrestricted as being mistaken and ineffective. They consider it, however, possible

to ban the use of certain weapons internationally as being contrary to international law, and to outlaw those nations which nevertheless employ such weapons as standing outside humanity and its rights and laws.

"They believe that here, too, progress step by step will soonest lead to success: in short, by the prohibition of gas, inflammable and explosive bombs outside an actual area of warfare. This limitation can be so extended as to result in a complete international prohibition of bomb-dropping. So long, however, as bomb-dropping as such is permitted, any limitation of the number of bombing planes is of doubtful value in view of the possibility of rapidly replacing losses.

"If bomb-dropping as such is branded as a barbarism contrary to international law, the construction of bombing planes will automatically soon cease, as being superfluous and pointless.

"Germany sees in such a fundamental conception of this problem greater appeasement and security for the nations than in all the pacts of mutual assistance and military conventions."

By the beginning of June it was understood to be the British Government's intention, as soon as the French domestic crisis was resolved, to suggest that the four Western Powers—France, Italy, Germany and Great Britain—should consult together about the practicability of an air convention. It had already been virtually agreed that such a consultation should take place, and the four Powers had already made known to each other their general ideas of what such a convention should consist of.

But the scope for ambiguity and misunderstanding was so great that in the British Government's view the first essential step was to eliminate as many as possible of the potential muddles. Where Herr Hitler suggested, for instance the "prohibition of gas, inflammable and explosive bombs, outside an actual area of warfare," it was first necessary to define what an actual area of warfare meant. Sir John Simon himself, on May 31st, postulated "the outlawry of indiscriminate bombing," and in his turn made no suggestion of what he meant by indiscriminate. The legal advisers of more than one Foreign Office in Western Europe have so far failed to formulate any view as to what does constitute an area of warfare. The expectation is growing, that a quite arbitrary

definition of a war area will have to be adopted before the discussions of an air pact can be carried further. In international law it is even arguable that in the event of a war between two countries the entire territories of those two countries automatically become the "area of warfare."

Nor was that the only difficulty about establishing the conditions on which an air pact could be discussed. Sir John Simon, for instance, took it for granted in his speech of May 31st, that it should be "an essential part of the air pact that we should have an agreement as to strengths." Now it has been one of the main stumbling-blocks in all the work that has been done, for instance, at Geneva, in this matter, that agreed limitation of air strength is inconceivable apart from international supervision and control, and that the convertibility of civil into military aeroplanes demands the extension of such control to civil aviation as well: and that is highly controversial ground.

Herr Hitler's Thirteen Points.

The meaning of Herr Hitler's thirteen points was the cause of earnest speculation to those who took European diplomacy seriously. The unimportant points were clear enough: item no. 1, in which Herr Hitler "rejected" the Geneva decision of March 17th; no. 2, in which he promised not to "revise" any more of the treaty except "by means of peaceable understandings"; no. 3, in which he said he would respect the Locarno Pact conditionally upon the other parties respecting it.

Point no. 4 was one of the difficult ones to understand. In it Herr Hitler said that the German Government "are ready at any time to take part in a system of collective co-operation to secure peace in Europe, but consider it necessary to give play to the law of continuous development by allowing for the possibility of the revision of treaties. They regard the possibility of a regulated development of treaties as an element for the securing of peace, but regard the suppression of any necessary changes as only too liable to result in an explosion in the future."

That point could be construed to mean that Germany was ready at any time to return to the League of Nations, provided the Covenant continued to retain its Article 19, which provides for the agreed revision of treaties which have become

inapplicable. As nobody has ever suggested that Article 19 be eliminated from the Covenant, there could be no conceivable fear that the condition attached to Point 4 might prove impracticable. But, apparently, nothing was farther from Herr Hitler's mind than to suggest that Germany should return to the League.

Point 5 did not contain much meaning. Point 6 was something of a puzzle. It read thus: "The German Government are ready on principle to conclude pacts of non-aggression with their various neighbouring states, and to supplement them by all provisions which aim at isolating the combatants and localising the war-makers. They are, in particular, prepared to undertake all obligations which may result therefrom with regard to the delivery of materials and arms in time of peace or war, and which are respected by all the parties concerned." What was meant by the condition that the obligations be respected by all the parties concerned? Obviously, the very hypothesis which brought into operation the sanction of a pact of non-aggression implied the violation of the obligations by one of the parties concerned.

Point 7 simply and straightforwardly offered an agreement to an air convention to supplement the Locarno Pact; but that was not new. Point 8 happened to be the matter of the greatest importance, and it happened to be self-contradictory. It read thus: "The German Government have made known the size of the new German army. Under no circumstances will they depart from this. They do not regard the fulfilment of their programme on land, in the air or at sea, as constituting any threat to another nation. They are, however, prepared at any time to limit their armaments to the extent which is also adopted by the other states. The German Government have already voluntarily made known certain limitations of their intentions. In this way they have done their best to show their goodwill to avoid an unrestricted world armaments race. Their limitation of the German air arm to a condition of parity with the various other Western Great Powers renders possible at any time the fixing of a maximum, which Germany will then undertake to observe scrupulously. The limitation of the German navy to thirty-five per cent. of the British navy is still fifteen per cent. below the total tonnage of the French fleet. As the various Press commentaries have voiced the opinion that this demand is only a beginning and

would be increased, especially with the possession of colonies, the German Government declare definitely that this is Germany's final and fixed demand. Germany neither intends nor regards it as necessary, nor is she in a position, to take part in any new naval rivalry. The German Government voluntarily recognise the supreme vital importance, and thus the justification, for a dominating protection of the British World Empire at sea, just as we ourselves, on the other hand, are determined to do everything necessary for the protection of our existence and freedom on the Continent. The German Government sincerely intend to do everything to bring about and maintain such relations with the British people and state as will for ever prevent a repetition of the only war which there has as yet been between the two nations."

How would it be possible for the German Government to "limit their armament to any extent which is also adopted by the other states" and yet "under no circumstances" depart from the size of the new German army as unilaterally prescribed by Germany herself?

A similar contradiction appeared in the body of Herr Hitler's speech, in a passage spoken just before the thirteen points were enumerated. The passage ran thus: "Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the domestic affairs of Austria or to attach that country to her. The German people and the German Government have, however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of the simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent, that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed not only to foreign nations, but to the German people everywhere."

What that passage must mean is that, while Germany has no intention of "annexing" Austria, she has every intention of accepting Austria if and when Austria of her own accord, like a ripe fruit, falls into her hands. Ever since Herr Hitler came into power, both energy and money have been unstintingly spent by the Nazi party in order precisely to ripen such a fruit. Inasmuch as the independence of Austria is regarded by the British, French and Italian Governments alike as a cardinal condition of European security, the ambiguity of what Herr Hitler said about Austria was a matter that demanded the most careful clarification.

Point 12 opened an alarming vista for speculation. It read thus: "The German Government are of opinion that all

attempts to achieve an effective alleviation of the certain items of tension between various states by means of international or multilateral agreements are doomed to failure unless suitable measures are successfully taken to prevent a poisoning of public opinion among the nations by irresponsible individuals in speech and in writing, on the film and in the theatre." Herr Hitler is himself a politician. He and his men have had some experience of controlling the Press in Germany; but it would not be equally easy for the French Government (for instance) to control the French Press or for the British Government to control the British Press.

It is already the case in Europe that governments control nearly everything. Trade, finance, consciences, morals, culture, are all in varying degrees the subject of governmental control. In addition, the British people submit to a government which prescribes the hours at which they may eat and drink. Freedom has been crushed out of Europe. For two years Mr. Roosevelt has been engaged in an attempt to crush freedom out of the United States, but is meeting more opposition from a people who have more spirit left in them than apparently have the peoples of Europe.

Herr Hitler is the very symbol of the modern slave-driver of whole peoples. He demands, and apparently is willingly given, full control over the lives, minds and spirits of the German people. It is therefore not surprising that he can utter in no doubt all sincerity a suggestion that "suitable measures" should be taken by governments the world over to "prevent" the expression of any opinion "in speech and in writing, on the film and in the theatre," which in the government's view might have the effect of "poisoning public opinion." Any normally healthy person will gasp at so grotesque a conception. But the number of normally healthy persons in Europe to-day is so small that the gasp will not be heard above the massed cheers of Europe's slaves. Herr Hitler was cheered to the echo by the German people for his speech of May 21st. Yet no despot in the history of the world has ever demanded from his subjects a greater degree of slavery than Herr Hitler has demanded from the German people.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

June 15th, 1935.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN CIVILISATION.*

The first of Mr. Fisher's contemplated three volumes carries the narrative down to the end of the Middle Ages, and if the second and third volumes fulfil the performance of the first it is plain that a rare treat is in store for us. For with range of learning the author combines grace of style, and what combination could be more attractive? There is only one criticism we have to offer, and that is that the book before us is more thoughts on the history of Europe than a history of Europe. For in the short compass of 414 pages how could anyone, even Mr. Fisher, cover the widely diverse annals of all the countries composing Europe during twenty-five centuries? For the book we entertain profound admiration for its thoughtful and thought-provoking qualities. He at once offers us his historical *confessio fidei*. "Men wiser and more learned than I," he sorrowfully owns, "have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a pre-determined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave, only one great fact on which, since it is unique, there can be no generalisations, only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognise

* H. A. L. Fisher: *History of Europe*. Eyre & Spottiswoode. 18s.

in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen. This is not a doctrine of cynicism and despair. The fact of progress is written plain and large on the page of history, but progress is not a law of nature. The ground gained in one generation may be lost in the next. The thoughts of men may flow into the channels which lead to disaster and barbarism." We are still suffering from the World War, and since many of us have witnessed a conflagration in which civilisation was burning, it is, alas! easy for us to hold that development includes retrogression. There are many side-currents as well as the main current in the stream of the evolution of mankind. On the other hand, Mr. Fisher enforces with impressiveness the continuity of history. It is impossible for a country, especially a medieval one, to effect an entire break with the past. Perhaps the greatest of all breaks with the past was the French Revolution; and yet for all its ideals it entertained a return to Roman republican virtue, or to the simplicity of the natural man. Unlike many contemporary historians, the Warden of New College never overlooks the spiritual forces acting upon men and women. How can anyone write the history of the thirteenth century, the greatest of all centuries A.D., and ignore, say, St. Francis and St. Dominic, not to speak of St. Thomas Aquinas? The author cannot commit this mistake, and the outcome is that when we have finished the book we are at least as familiar with the *idées-forces* that transform the course of history as with the generals and admirals who take their due share in the transformation. If we meet Alexander and Mohammed, we also meet Virgil and Dante. And the marvel is that all this is accomplished in so few pages. One of our deep regrets is that the author has not seen fit to give us six volumes, not three, and then he could have allowed himself far more liberty to discuss the many matters to which he can make no more than a bare reference, or which he is obliged to ignore.

Here is a specimen of Mr. Fisher's workmanship. "Time has dealt kindly with this dynasty of gifted pirates. Mosaics, the best which Greece could provide, still embellish the walls of the noble cathedral of Monreale, which looks down upon the flowers and orchards of Conco d'Oro. In that same earthly paradise an exquisite cloister still invites to repose, and the visitor, noting what he sees there of building and sculpture, of jewelry and decoration, must admire the splendours of the

Norman princes now sleeping in the tombs of dark porphyry, who in the twelfth century brought about so great an assemblage of the arts and crafts of their age. Very different was the Scandinavian scene from which the Vikings had sallied forth to slay, to burn, and to conquer. No Monreale, or Caen, or Durham rose in the solitary valleys of Norway. There the Viking aristocracy bled to death in civil war. . . . A rude unlettered peasantry extracted a sorry living from a barren soil." With all the repugnance of the humanist he stands somewhat aloof from the Vikings, yet he can see what they accomplished and can do justice to it. What he is most attracted to is the successive ideals that have governed the human race in the processes we call history. Greek genius, Roman order, barbarian strength, Christian ideals, all pass in review, though the quest of the ideal in the real is what stands out with most prominence in these singularly fascinating pages. If there is any meaning in the common heritage of Europe, it lies in the region of the ideal, and surely this ideal peeps out most clearly in the Christian religion. If we have read this volume aright, this is the conclusion of the author, and it is a conclusion which whets our eagerness to peruse its two successors.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

* * * * *

COUNT APPONYI.*

Visitors to the Geneva Assembly will recall the Grand Old Man of Hungary as by far the most distinguished-looking figure on that crowded stage, tall, vigorous, eloquent in six languages. In a touching Preface to his delightful Memoirs his widow tells us that in 1931, when he celebrated his eighty-fifth birthday, he received a national presentation and was commissioned to record his political recollections. This he did not live to do, for he died two years later. Though there are some interesting political passages in the present volume, there is more about other countries than his own. What we are offered is a selection from the experiences of the crowded, honourable and happy life of a great patriot and a good citizen of the world. The impression which emerges is

* *The Memoirs of Count Apponyi*. Heinemann. 16s.

extremely attractive. There is nothing of the iron will and unbending personality of Tisza or of the fiery radicalism of Count Michael Karolyi. Apponyi was a politician, not because he was born for the part but because it was the fashion for young Magyar aristocrats to enter Parliament. A large portion of his life was claimed by other interests, above all music. If he had been less versatile he would doubtless have played a larger part in the history of his time.

The first two chapters recall, not only the leading figures in Hungary in the 'sixties, but Paris under the Second Empire and Rome during the Vatican Council. The third chapter, on Liszt and Wagner, is the most delightful in the book. Both the great men, despite their failings, appear in a pleasant light, and their friendship was completely free from jealousy. "Music," writes the author, "has influenced my whole existence. I have been saved by music from being shallow." The two long chapters on Egypt and America fill nearly half the volume, and bring to life many famous people before and after the war, among whom Roosevelt claims the chief place. Of greater immediate interest is the enthusiastic tribute to "the tremendous personality" of Mussolini in the chapter entitled "Rome Yesterday and To-day." The Count had met so many celebrities that he cannot have been easily overawed; but he writes of the Fascist Dictator with an unbounded admiration accorded to no other actor on the political stage. "Every sentence is a thought, and every thought part of a great aim. You have an irresistible impression that this man is absolutely genuine and sincere; and more than this, he is good, actually kind, able to sympathise with his fellow men, and no harsher towards them than his great work commands, but then indeed pitiless." The latter phrase might no doubt be applied to other Dictators, for it is dangerously elastic. But perhaps Count Apponyi did not know so much of the cruelties of the Fascist régime as we do in England, and did not count among his friends any of the patriotic citizens who, after the suppression of liberty in 1922, were condemned to exile, imprisonment, or a humiliating silence.

The chapter entitled "How Peace was made after the Great War" is by far the most historically important, for the author represented his country in the dark hour of its defeat. Hungary had to take what she was given, for she had no

friends. What an experienced and eloquent patriot could do to mitigate the severity of the terms Count Apponyi did; but none of the defeated states was treated more harshly. We are presented with a poignant description of the hopes and fears of the Delegation which reached Paris and was kept waiting under close police surveillance for weeks. The author pleaded for his country first in French, then in English, and he describes how the grim face of Clemenceau, at first so hostile, gradually softened as he listened to the presentation of the Hungarian case. Great, therefore, was the disappointment when the Treaty of Trianon confirmed and indeed exceeded the worst apprehensions of the Delegation. The book ends with a brief discussion of the aims and work of the League, in which the author fervently believed. He had lived long enough to witness the bankruptcy of the old nationalism of the nineteenth century and the beginnings of an ambitious attempt to rebuild the world on a wider foundation. He died too soon to know whether that endeavour will meet with success. And we who read his book to-day can no more forecast the issue of the swaying struggle between the forces of anarchy and the crusade for organisation than when it was written.

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THE FRANCISCAN MESSAGE TO THE WORLD.*

If any doubt were felt as to the need for yet another book on Franciscanism, it would be dispelled by a glance at this important work by the Rector of the Catholic University of Milan. Its originality of treatment, the new or little-known ground covered in parts of its second section, and its practical applications give it exceptional value. It is a study of the authentic spirit and ideals of Franciscanism, as exemplified in its founder, and in some of his followers through the centuries, concluding with a discussion of the way in which these ideals may be beneficently related to the problems of our time. It does not set out to give a biography of the Saint or a history of the Order, though there is a wealth of historical matter in it. Dr. Gemelli writes with reverence and enthusiasm, but

* *The Franciscan Message to the World (Il Francescanesimo)*. By the Very Rev. Dr. Agostino Gemelli, O.F.M. Translated and adapted by Dr. H. L. Hughes. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 1934. 7s. 6d.

a refreshing absence of sentimentality. The translator would seem to have done his part admirably, one is hardly ever conscious of reading a translation; the original has been slightly abridged.

The book has three sections, the first, consisting of a few short chapters, clear, concise, and discerning, is on St. Francis himself; a knowledge of the facts of his life is assumed. A fresh insight is here gained into the familiar themes of his love for God and for all created things, his poverty, his prayers, his dealings with his immediate circle and with other men, his teaching on labour and on true joy. The second part devotes a chapter to each century from the thirteenth to the nineteenth, treating of "Franciscan spirituality" as manifested in persons and movements in each; among the well-known figures are others whose names and life-work will be new to the general reader. A number of important subjects are, of course, involved, such, for instance, as the spread of the Third Order and influence of the Tertiaries; the incredible labours and sufferings of the missionary-explorer friars, in China, Japan, Mexico, Palestine, and Africa; preaching missions at home, and social reforms such as the *Monti di Pietà*; the Universities and the Order, with its weighty contribution to theology and learning, mostly on Augustinian lines, marked by the great names of Bonaventura, Antony of Padua, Hales, Duns Scotus, Lull, Roger Bacon and others. The thorny question of the prolonged controversies within the Order on Joachimism and the strict observance of absolute poverty is handled fairly and frankly; the growth of new branches like the Observants and Capuchins is, it is maintained, a "sign of life" rather than a "symptom of weakness." During and after the Reformation period, the Friars Minor are shown to have been among Rome's most ardent and convincing advocates; their help was invoked, for instance, by St. Francis de Sales in combating Calvinism. They took a leading part in promulgating the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. The vast field of Franciscan literature also comes under survey here, from the early Legends, and writings of the "Spirituals," to the historical labours of the annalist Luke Wadding in the seventeenth century, and the fresh interest in St. Francis shown by the Romantics, by Manzoni, Ozanam, and others; this was followed by the widespread appreciation and scientific

research of recent years, largely inaugurated by Paul Sabatier, of whom Dr. Gemelli makes honourable mention.

The third section considers present-day difficulties, and shows how the true Franciscan spirit is "no anachronism," but "has a direct answer to give to some of the problems of modern life; namely, a spirit of restlessness in men's inner lives, the crisis of liberty, the craving for action and achievement and the quest of happiness." The "sanctification of action" is claimed as a special note introduced by Francis; it is based on devotion to the Incarnate Lord, and closely linked to the inner life. "It is, in fact, the Gospel put into practice." Liberty of soul, understanding, happiness follow on service and on detachment from worldly preoccupations. The author is convinced that the influence which was so vitalising in the Saint's own day may prove no less so in ours.

A few slight printing errors, mostly in foreign words, might be corrected in the next edition, e.g. (p. xvi) Fianma, (pp. 51, 78) Umbertino, (p. 87) Palouccio, (p. 139) Imaculate, (p. 223) at (for ac), (p. 246) Sergneur. And as the names Clare and Anthony appear in English dress why should not Giles and Sylvester?

E. G. S.

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POLITICS AND BUSINESS.

Two books* have lately appeared which, in their different ways, throw some light on a problem which grows in its importance as well as in its difficulty. Dr. Einzig is already well known for his rapid series of studies on financial and economic questions. He knows his France particularly well. The recurrent crises in French politics and their frequent derivation from a financial cause is a matter that many people want to have explained to them simply by someone who understands it. Dr. Einzig is such a man. His epigram in the present volume: "The French nation has to choose between the franc and France" has had its soundness again illustrated since the book was published. Exactly why a further devaluation is inevitable, and why deflation by taxation is in the

* *France's Crisis*. By Paul Einzig. Macmillan. 7s. 6d. net. *The New America*. By the Right Hon. Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, Bt., P.C., M.P. Macmillan. 10s. 6d. net.

alternative impracticable, emerges clearly from Dr. Einzig's brilliant analysis. It is a book of great present interest and value.

By contrast Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland's book is valuable only for the facts it records. The author had made a close and prolonged study of Mr. Roosevelt's "recovery" plans in the United States. What he relates of the actual practice of those plans is as good an account of the subject as one has seen. It looks now rather like an epitaph. What is less interesting is that Sir Arthur brings a politician's mind to a study of a politician's work, and therefore tends not to see the wood for the trees. He writes, for instance, on p. 208: "Capitalism is indeed on its trial. So, too, is the freedom of individual initiative. If this is destroyed, the chief responsibility will lie with those who professed to believe in it, but were too remiss to try and remedy the admitted shortcomings of the existing economic system. The old order must change. What is the new order to be?" Such a diagnosis of the position seems to the reviewer to be an exact reversal of the truth. It is the socialist politicians (and all politicians are socialist in a greater or smaller degree) who in our time have prevented capitalism and individualism from doing their work. What Sir Arthur calls "the freedom of individual initiative" was destroyed by Mr. Roosevelt in the United States as successive British Governments have destroyed it in Great Britain. It looks as if the United States is to be saved from Mr. Roosevelt by the oldest constitution in the world: whence it would appear, not for the first time, that the oldest things are the best.

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G. G.

THE AUGUSTAN EMPIRE.*

The ninth volume of the "Cambridge Ancient History" concluded with the murder of Julius Cæsar, and the new volume covers the foundation of the Principate and the growth of monarchical government as far as the death of Nero in A.D. 68 and ends with the fall of Jerusalem two years later. A brilliant

* (1) "Cambridge Ancient History," Vol. 10: *The Augustan Empire*, 44 B.C.-A.D. 70. Cambridge Univ. Press. 37s. 6d. net. (2) *Claudius the Emperor and his Achievement*, by Professor Arnaldo Momigliano, English translation by W. D. Hogarth. Oxford Univ. Press. 6s. net.

team of specialists is brought to the consideration of this momentous period. Without pretending that the views of all agree one with another, it is yet clear that their work exhibits a measure of unity not always apparent in composite undertakings. For the student, it is at once a repository of the conclusions of research and scholarship and a stepping-stone to further inquiry. The Cambridge histories are too frequently regarded as specialists' works solely for the specialist. The epoch-making events and consequent attraction of this period, discussed with clarity and for the most part in masterly style, make this volume of particular interest to the more general public. Indeed, it may act as a healthy corrective to the flashy and sensational portrayal of figures, such as Cleopatra or Nero, usually served up for popular digestion.

In the opening chapters, Dr. W. W. Tarn and Mr. M. P. Charlesworth provide an impressive picture, made all the more difficult by the paucity of reliable sources, of Philippi and the division of duties between Octavian and Antony, of the ambitions of Cleopatra and of the ultimate clash ending in the final award of Actium. The ideals of either side, for the reconciliation of East and West, were not, argues Dr. Tarn, so very far apart.

What were far apart were the actual possibilities. Past history had shown that if such ideals were ever to be realised, however imperfectly, it could only be done from the West, by a Roman through Romans; no one, Roman or Macedonian, could have done it from or through the East, for he could never have carried Rome with him. In that sense, but perhaps in that sense alone, the common verdict is just, that it was well for the world that Octavian conquered.

The Augustan settlement and the stable establishment of the *pax Romana* form naturally the core of this work. Under the first Princeps, "the Empire," says Professor F. E. Adcock aptly in his summing up of Augustus' achievement, "became a kernel of peace within a husk of war." His work was one of pacification in a world weary of strife and insecurity. Although Augustus could claim that he had extended the boundaries of every frontier province, his work of expansion, in the North dealt with by Mr. Ronald Syme and in the East by Professor J. G. C. Anderson, was

determined rather by the needs of consolidation and internal stability than the single aim of conquest. Thus was deferred the subjection of Britain until dictated to Claudius by the demands of frontier strategy and political expediency. In no sphere was Augustus' work more beneficial than in the quickening of industry and commerce. Within the *Zollverein* of a peaceful Roman civilisation was encouraged and emerged a flourishing economic system upon the basis of private enterprise. "The victory of Augustus and of the West meant," declares Professor F. Oertel in his survey of economic life and conditions which reflect some of our modern questions, "a repulse of the tendencies towards State capitalism and State socialism which might have come to fruition earlier, had Antony and Cleopatra been victorious, than was thus the case."

Recent discovery and research upon the actual documents of Claudius' reign have gone far to revise the depreciatory estimate of contemporary literature, and Mr. Charlesworth in his treatment of the Emperor discards the former hypothesis that Claudius' imperial policy was directed by his freedmen. His reign marks a visible, if not intentional, stage from the Augustan principate to the monarchical empire; and it is this which accounts for the contradictions of conservatism and innovation in the Claudian policy, so brilliantly discussed by Professor Momigliano in his *Claudius the Emperor and his Achievement*. It may be, as Mr. Charlesworth says, that "he had no intention of superseding the Senate or of making himself absolute master of it." But in practice, as the author recognises, this was the necessary tendency of Claudius' bid for its co-operation. As Professor Momigliano points out, "the Republican spirit could not be turned into a weapon for the destruction of the Republican system." In his valuable chapter on religious development, Professor A. D. Nock argues that the religious policy of the Emperor was a reversion to tradition. Professor Momigliano, on the other hand, sees here exemplified his contradictory aims. "The desire for preservation was no more than superficial" and was in conflict with Claudius' fundamental policy of religious tolerance in the interests of imperial unity. He cites fresh evidence in reference to Judaism, not apparently considered by Professor Nock, from the "Acts of Isidore and Lampon" and a rescript on tomb violation, probably found near

Nazareth, to show that tolerance of faith was offset by repression of

any religious movement that threatened the spirit of Roman religion. Yet he himself had already undermined that spirit by allowing Judaism, from which the new cult drew its proselytes, to expand freely under his protection.

This conflict, however, between the old republican ideal and the monarchic system was being steadily, if not deliberately, resolved in favour of the latter. The growing use of freedmen and knights in government, the centralisation of power under a civil service, subject to the Princeps, and the equal treatment of the provinces and Italy, to whose superiority Augustus had devoted so much of his social legislation, discussed by Mr. Hugh Last, express the new movement, to be continued and formally completed by Nero and his successors.

Dr. T. R. Glover is naturally at home in his learned appreciation of the Augustan age of letters; while the emergence of a distinctive Roman art and the restoration of Rome receive the authoritative treatment of Dr. Eugénie Strong. For an estimate of the early silver age of literature and the revival of art under Nero we have to wait for the succeeding volume. An account of the developments in Roman jurisprudence and private law has been deferred to a comprehensive treatment of law at the time of its classical maturity.

* * * * *

SPIRIDONOVA.

Spiridonova, Revolutionary Terrorist,* is a most remarkable woman. In spite of assassinating General Luzhenovsky, military commandant of her province of Tambov under the Tsarist régime at the age of 20, and enduring pitiless tortures after her arrest which ruined her health at the beginning of her career; in spite of long years spent in the prisons of Siberia under unspeakable conditions, release at the Revolution of 1917 which enabled her for some months to co-operate in the new Government, then opposition to Bolshevism which she fought so that she has been in prison on and off

* By I. Steinberg, Commissar for Justice in the First Soviet Cabinet, with an Introduction by Henry W. Nevins. Methuen. 12s. 6d.

ever since 1918, she has managed to keep her head on her shoulders and is living in detention in the Urals at this moment. Since the assassination she has known only sixteen months of freedom. Her survival seems to show that the best way to deal with autocracy and stupidity and the brutal force of oppression is by boldness and defiance, based on moral force and complete disinterestedness. Disinterestedness is a poor word to explain the act of assassination on the part of a sensitive, educated woman. Nothing but the cruel persecution of the peasants in her district could have nerved her to it. The peasants had been burning down the houses of their landowners. Punitive expeditions were organised.

As soon as an expedition arrived at a denounced village, the drums would be beaten to call all the peasants together. The immediate handing-over of the ringleaders would be demanded and at the same time a wholesale flogging would be begun. . . . Shots would be fired into the living mass. . . . Fire would be set to the village in various places. . . . Inhabitants of a village forewarned of the approach of one of these train-bands would attempt to divert the fury of their torturers by demonstrating their complete submission. . . . At the entrance to every cottage there would be peasants waiting on their knees, with propitiatory offerings of bread and salt. . . .

Shooting, whipping, and slow torturing to death did not exhaust Luzhenovsky's methods of restoring order. He would despoil the peasants of their grain, set fire to their villages and rape their women.

The account of life in the women's prison (Katorga) at Malzev in Siberia, far away from civilisation on the border of Mongolia, is a fine tribute to the energy and character of these Social Revolutionaries. They were allowed all books except politics and economics. They organised their day into periods of study. Some took up archæology, others mathematics; courses were held in foreign languages; they read Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, the Bible, Indian philosophy, history, literature, Tolstoi, "a few studied Karl Marx." "Only he has a right to call himself a convinced socialist and atheist whom no system of metaphysics can confute," wrote one. Of what other country could such a report be given of life in prison?

The main points of Maria Spiridonova's differences with Lenin at the beginning of the Bolshevik régime are contained in Part III. The first was the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. Lenin

wanted a "breathing-space" to achieve the revolution. Spiridonova wanted to continue the World War in the hope of spreading world revolution. Signs of it were beginning in Germany. Then the Germans, after the Treaty, pushed forward and occupied the Ukraine, cruelly despoiling the peasants. Russia starved for want of the bread that the Germans took. When the Germans had withdrawn, Lenin organised the forcible collection of produce, and punitive expeditions against the villages antagonised and embittered the rural population. The policy of "socialisation of the land" had been turned into state capitalism. In allying her party with the Bolsheviks, Spiridonova rallied her followers to their duty of "carrying over into this somewhat primitive movement the living spirit of religious inspiration. . . . Bolshevism has no inner inspiration. Everything in it is founded on hatred and bitterness. . . ." And again: "No need exists for a system of terrorism." And yet members of her party proceeded to outrages in order to alter the Soviet policy, the party came to an end, and Spiridonova went to prison in the Kremlin.

Mr. I. Steinberg has given us the history of the Social Revolutionaries from 1905 to the year 1922, and the stories of many of them are interwoven in the narrative. He has studied sources of information not hitherto available. The book makes painful reading, but is very interesting.

E. M. B.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Mr. Rolland A. Chaput, who is a French Canadian, educated in the United States, has written a useful book* about the part that is played in British foreign policy by the question of disarmament. He has an argument to make: namely, that the limitation and reduction of armaments is necessarily and always a feature of British foreign policy because it happens always to serve the unchanging purpose of that policy. But such an argument will neither surprise nor help any British reader. What makes the book valuable is that it gives a full history of the part played by British Governments since the war in the diplomacy, by conference and otherwise, about armaments. The complete facts are collected up to 1934, when the preliminary talks about

* *Disarmament in British Foreign Policy*. By Rolland A. Chaput. Allen and Unwin. 16s. net.

this year's projected naval conference were suspended. Mr. Chaput's work has been done carefully. He has taken the trouble to sift and verify his facts: a necessary drudgery without which the book would have been robbed of its value. The author's English is for the most part clear and therefore good. There are one or two quaint exceptions, such as "In the first place, the data considered were only those phenomena taking place in a time-space continuum which could be easily checked by independent critical observers." That quotation is not made in a carping spirit. The book is good and useful.

G. G.

In writing the first substantial biography of *George Tierney*,* Mr. H. K. Olphin has made a learned and necessary contribution to the history of the Whig party during its long years of opposition prior to the Great Reform Bill. Of mercantile origin and without influence, Tierney was elected to Parliament in the popular franchise of Southwark in 1797, as an independent Whig and ardent constitutional reformer. He refused to secede with Fox and remained in the House of Commons to conduct a brilliant and single-handed opposition to Pitt. After Fox's death in 1806 he joined the Addington ministry, and on being rejected by Southwark in 1807 for political apostasy he became henceforth dependent for his seat upon the patronage of the Whig aristocracy. Tierney was prompted as much by ambition as by detached reflection when he "decided that no great object could be achieved without party." Thereafter, under Ponsonby and as leader himself in 1817-21, Tierney strove for party cohesion against the diverging and disintegrating influences of Creevey, Burdett, Brougham and Hume. Of a narrow intellect, without a constant policy or magnetic influence, he inevitably failed; but, says Mr. Olphin, "during the darkest years of the history of the Whig party, Tierney more than anyone else preserved it from extinction in the House of Commons" and prepared the way for the Reform Bill. The author presents no enthusiastic eulogy. He is most sensible of Tierney's defects, his inconsistencies and breaches of political faith, his fatal indecision and lack of judgment. Mr. Olphin would appear to agree with Disraeli and others that Tierney could have overthrown Lord Liverpool in 1819. Whether the author's estimate be challenged here or there, he has clearly striven for a balanced judgment, based upon contemporary records, including in particular the hitherto unpublished Tierney correspondence.

The career of *Lady Hester Stanhope*† provides excellent material for popular biography and Miss Joan Haslip has made full use of her opportunity in this vivid and fascinating life. The grand-daughter of

* Allen & Unwin. 15s. 6d. net.

† Cobden-Sanderson. 15s. 6d. net.

the great Earl of Chatham, Lady Hester gained in English society a remarkable reputation for brilliant intellect, matched by an outspoken *hauteur* and utter disregard for social conventions. While acting as hostess for her uncle, the younger Pitt, she could dismiss Castlereagh as his "monotonous Lordship," while her retort to Lord Mulgrave, who remarked at breakfast that his egg-spoon was broken, is famous. "Haven't you noticed that Mr. Pitt uses very often slight and weak instruments to effect his ends?" On the death of Pitt she fell, without wealth and despised by society. In 1810 she left England for the Near East, and the author describes in rich colour the mystical reputation and authority she acquired among chieftain and arab by her pride and bearing and almost masculine daring. Eventually, in 1814, she settled down in a disused convent upon Mount Lebanon. Although eccentricity turned to mental derangement, and she dabbled in magic and necromancy, she retained something of her intellectual powers, expressed in relentless monologue, until her death in 1839. While Miss Haslip has drawn inevitably upon the *Memoirs* and *Travels* of Lady Hester's faithful doctor, Charles Meryon, she makes use of some hitherto unpublished material.

Few people have greater facility and power of expression in describing wild life than Miss Vivienne de Watteville. Her new book, *Speak to the Earth*,* contains a remarkable account of a five months' trip in Tanganyika where she aimed to study and photograph the fauna, especially elephants, and whence she only emerged after several hair-breadth escapes. This book, however, is more than a portrayal of animal life, for in it Miss de Watteville expresses her philosophy of community with nature, and the inherent friendliness of beast with man. This was exemplified in particular by her lonely vigil in an alpine hut on the heights of Mount Kenya. Here she sought the attention of animal and bird; and when a mountain fire made an oasis of her hut her dream of brotherhood came true, "not only to be surrounded by all these birds and beasts, but to know that they looked to me for sustenance."

Sixteen essays upon "themes susceptible to youth influence" and of "a wide significance" have been collected in *Growing Opinions*,† under the editorship of Mr. Alan Campbell Johnson. The writers are all under twenty-five and are mostly past or present university students. This volume is not, and indeed lays no claim to be, more representative of the general outlook of British youth than any other symposium composed by young intellectuals. The principle adopted in this collection has been "a balance between analysis and personal reaction," between the discernment of contemporary life and trends and

* Methuen. 15s. net.

† Methuen. 6s. net.

expressions of thought. The natural and inevitable discontent with the present receives wide attention, although the more difficult articulation of constructive ideas is by no means absent. Mention may be made of Mr. Harold Stovin's essay on education, which falls somewhere between "the primitive tribalism of the public schools" and the excessive individualism promoted by the so-called progressive schools. A despairing plea to youth for a higher standard of literary taste comes from the pen of Mr. David Huxley. The passing of Christian dogma and organised religion is the dogmatic contention of Mr. Neil Hutchison in the course of a superficial and extremely controversial article.

On the other hand a stimulating essay by Mr. Spencer Barrett argues for the youthfulness, simplicity and directness of the Greek tradition in art. The Editor's chapter on peace and war is symptomatic of the thoughtful youth's outlook. After toying with the various forms of pacifism, he finally acknowledges the collective system, taking in his view the form of an international police force, as the practical solution to the problem of peace.

The subject of youth and politics has been entrusted to Mr. Frank Hardie, a socialist, who discourses at length upon the radical tendency of Oxford undergraduate opinion. It may be added, however, that moderate Cambridge is probably more representative of English student politics than the extremities of Oxford opinion allow. Mr. Hardie fears, however, that the more general youth of the country "waiting to be absorbed into any positive movement with sufficiently seductive slogans" may be caught by the Fascists. Like many others, he exaggerates the interest taken in England in political causes by the very young, a section of whom is brilliantly depicted by Miss Angela Milne in her tiny sketch of middle class family life.

The case for unregulated industry is put by Mr. I. M. Horobin in his forceful and witty little book, *Pleasures of Planning*.^{*} He contends that there exists no problem of over-production as such. The apparent glut "is a falling off in demand which has not been met by the necessary fall in prices." The author proceeds to attack industrial regulations, particularly the marketing schemes and quotas, as impeding the only successful and automatic regulator, the law of supply and demand. The old-fashioned economics have been "outgrown" because "truth isn't as much fun as fairy tales." He exemplifies his argument in the failure of the Roosevelt experiment and makes a scathing attack upon the subsidised beet sugar industry. The true statesman must look "to the steady improvement of the voluntary and statutory social services, within a framework of free enterprise" and not to "fussy and ill-conceived attempts to freeze the liberty and corrupt the independence of employer and employee alike."

^{*} Macmillan. 4s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

AUGUST 1935.

ENGLAND AND EUROPE.

"IF only England will speak plainly, there will be no war." So one of the most intelligent Foreign Ministers in Europe lately told me. I have heard the same opinion in several foreign capitals recently, in Brussels, Copenhagen, Prague, Stockholm. I believe it to be true.

The chief danger of war in Europe in the next few years arises from the possibility that this country will not make perfectly clear its firm intention to do two things. First, through appropriate collective action to join in breaking any peace-breaker. Second, war being prohibited as a means of change, to join, again through appropriate collective action, in promoting peaceful change, wherever the case for such change can be established.

The greatest crime a British Foreign Minister could commit to-day—except, of course, the crime of an aggressive war waged by this country—would be to repeat, nearly a generation later, the mumbling incoherence of 1914, with far less excuse to-day than even Grey had then. War, in those far-off days, was no crime in the eyes of international law, but only a normal exercise of national sovereignty in the prevailing international anarchy. To-day war is a legal crime, renounced as an instrument of national policy by all the signatories of the Pact of Paris. And these are all the nations of the world, except a few South Americans. To-day there is a League of Nations giving, on paper, a system of Collective Security, while subsidiary engagements provide, on paper, predetermined peaceful procedures for the settlement of all international disputes. If scraps of paper signed by statesmen could give us peace, we should be as safe from war as a man in a snowstorm is safe from sunstroke. But the torrid sun—of nationalist passion, popular panic and economic greed—is always melting the snowfall of yesterday. And each day there are doubts about the international temperature and weather of to-morrow. But in the queer world of international politics, we can, if we will, lower the temperature and stabilise the weather.

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"If only England will speak plainly, there will be no war." England has spoken very plainly through the Peace Ballot. The results, announced on June 27th, show more than eleven and a half million votes, more than thirty-seven per cent. of the total population over eighteen years of age, and, since some districts could not be covered by the half-million volunteers who conducted the Ballot, more than fifty per cent. of those who had an opportunity to vote. More than 11,000,000 voted that Great Britain should remain a member of the League of Nations, less than 360,000, a negligible minority of cranks, against; more than 10,400,000 in favour of an all-round reduction of armaments by international agreement, less than 870,000 against; more than 9,500,000 for the abolition by international agreement of all national air forces, less than 1,700,000 against; more than 10,400,000 for the prohibition by international agreement of the manufacture and sale of arms for private profit, less than 780,000 against; more than 10,000,000 for joining in economic sanctions against an aggressor, less than 640,000 against; more than 6,750,000 for joining also, if necessary, in military sanctions against an aggressor, less than 2,360,000 against.

These are most remarkable results. A Government, supported by such majorities in the electorate, would rightly regard itself as holding an overwhelming popular mandate. But it is not clear that the British Government desires either to be furnished with such a mandate, or to try to execute it. The results of the Peace Ballot are a far truer representation of our national mind than are the hesitating evasions of our "National Government." "No commitments" has become a foolish and immoral parrot cry. The most fatal of all is a commitment to indecision and passivity.

"In respect of every forward policy in the last twelve years," said Mr. Arthur Henderson in 1931 in his Barge Memorial Lecture on *Consolidating World Peace*, "the public opinion of the nations has always been ahead of what the Governments were prepared to do. The Optional Clause, the General Act, the Pact of Paris—these are but steps towards what has been called the moral disarmament of the world. And as it has been with moral disarmament, so I am convinced, it will be with physical disarmament as well. The peoples are ready for all, and more than all, that the Governments will give."

The shameful fiasco of the Disarmament Conference since February 1932 is a tragic fulfilment of those words. Blame for this fiasco may, no doubt, be widely distributed. But no dispassionate study of the detail can fail to put more blame on London than on any other capital. Partly because the British Government has consistently refused, or obstructed, good proposals made by other Governments, but partly, too, because we have persistently refused to make clear declarations, such as the Peace Ballot has now authorised, in favour of Collective Security, and of our intention to play a straightforward part in its enforcement.

What is the purpose of Collective Security? Above all, at this moment, to gain precious time; to postpone, at least over the critical next few years, the imminent danger of war; to give an opportunity to the forces in support of peace to gather strength, and to the processes of peaceful settlement and peaceful change to prove themselves. Time, in some important particulars, is on the side of peace. Thus, with each year that passes, the Soviet Union consolidates its Planned Economy and thus grows stronger to repel attack, while more and more deeply absorbed in its vast task of internal development and Socialist construction. This Great Power harbours to-day no aggressive designs towards its neighbours, as Mr. Eden testified on his return from Moscow. No State is more devoted, for good and obvious reasons, to the principle of Collective Security, to the doctrine that "Peace is indivisible," and to the positive activities of the League of Nations, than its most recent member. With each year that passes, other States will count more carefully, and less hopefully, the costs of an aggression against the Soviet Union.

Again, we are also drawing close to a turning-point in the history of population. The "natural increase" of numbers will soon be replaced over an ever-widening area by a natural decrease. With the continuous decline in the number of births and the continuous increase in the number of elderly people, before long deaths will exceed births in most of the countries of Europe west of the Soviet frontiers. In Great Britain this turning-point will be reached in a few years from now. And in Germany, in spite of the great efforts of the present régime to postpone it, the turning-point is likely to be reached by about 1950.* In Italy, likewise, in spite of much propaganda

* In Germany the birth-rate fell from 25.6 per thousand in 1920 to 14.7 in 1933,

for large families, the annual number of births shows a downward tendency.

In France, in the Scandinavian countries, and in Austria the population is already practically stationary and on the verge of decline. Although the population of Western and Northern Europe, as a whole, has increased in the course of the last ninety years by almost eighty per cent., the absolute number of births is considerably lower than it was ninety years ago. Nor is this tendency confined to Europe. It has been estimated that the population of the United States will probably reach its maximum round about 1960, while the annual number of births, even in prolific Japan, is already tending to become stationary, herein repeating British experience with a time-lag of some thirty years. From a national standpoint there need be no regrets over these turning points of population. Because in any national area there may, before long, be fewer human beings, there need not, therefore, be less happiness, or health, or wealth. Rather the reverse is likely.

For the international politics of to-morrow the significance of these population movements is twofold. First, they will change the relative numerical weight of nations. A year or two ago Germany, Italy and Poland, with most unequal total populations of 65, 42 and 33 millions respectively, stood nearly equal as regards annual births, each just below a million. But second, and of more universal importance, these movements will discredit, in Europe at least, the historic humbug of a growing "pressure of population" as an excuse for war. That pressure in Europe, in terms of growth of numbers, is already rapidly relaxing. These movements

and from 1930 onwards was below the birth-rate of France. The number of births in Germany in 1913, 1923 and 1933 were 1,895,000, 1,351,000 and 957,000 respectively, as against 763,000, 760,000 and 720,000 in France, a rapidly narrowing gap. Nazi propaganda, aided by financial inducements, raised marriages in Germany from 510,000 in 1932 to 631,000 in 1933 and 740,000 in 1934, and births from 957,000 in 1933 to 1,170,000 in 1934. But, as Dr. Burgdörfer of the Reich Statistical Office has pointed out, this is only a flash in the pan. "The stock of marriageable young people will shrink very considerably after 1936, because at present the small generations born during the war are entering the marriageable age. The generations which now will become marriageable reach only fifty or sixty per cent. of the numerical strength of the young generations which at present furnish the bulk of those who get married. Since, also, after the world war the number of births has decreased extraordinarily, to less than one million as against two millions before the war, the subsequent marriageable generations cannot for a long time again reach the present strength." (Quoted by Dr. R. Kuczynski in a most illuminating article on "The Decrease of Fertility," in *Economica*, May 1935.)

discredit also the unpacific doctrine, prevalent especially under some dictatorships, of "dynamic nations," alleged to be "more virile" because increasing faster than their neighbours, and "destined," therefore, to expand at their expense. As the populations of these self-styled "dynamic" nations visibly become static, such rodomontade will lose its plausibility.

There will, indeed, remain an urgent need for raising standards of life, even for stationary or declining populations, through an abatement of that economic nationalism which is to-day impoverishing us all, and a legitimate claim, by all who find themselves excluded from a fair share of access to colonial markets, for a greater equality of economic opportunity. Given an effective system of collective security, these are among the most important problems of international co-operation and peaceful change which, in a world more neighbourly than now, because less terrified, we must seek to solve.

But their solution cannot hopefully be attempted until we have restored confidence in the Collective System. Most urgent of all our tasks is to check the present, and accelerating, race in armaments, which is both a clear sign and a contributory cause of a most dangerously rising temperature in international relations. As to disarmament, we are badly stuck at Geneva. How to get moving again is a practical question, not to be answered with an excess of theory. All Governments have missed the boat too often in the last three and a half years to be entitled to be unduly critical of each others' efforts. The method of collecting everybody in one place to discuss everything at once has, so far, led to nothing—save talk, withdrawals and rearmament. The responsibility for this failure rests heavier on the British Government than any other. But we cannot doom ourselves to stand like Lot's wife, ever looking back on the past, turned to a row of pillars of salt. A series of discussions in different places by a few people on specially important questions may succeed where the "all comprehensive" methods of discussion have failed. Therefore, the principal Governments of Europe should have taken Hitler promptly at his word, when he made certain definite offers in his speech of May 21st. Bilateral agreements of narrow scope may pave the way to wider agreements. The Anglo-German Naval Convention, limiting the German fleet to thirty-five per cent. of the British is not, at this stage,

wrong in principle. But it was clumsily handled at the British end, through failure to keep other interested Governments informed, and it is open to the objection that it will result in a net increase of naval armaments. It is, at best, only a trifling contribution to the general limitation of armaments, but, at worst, it is the first successful attempt to limit any form of armaments anywhere since the London Naval Treaty of 1930. Therefore, in a very small degree, it may help to restore confidence in the practical possibilities of limitation.

Hitler's other offers are still outstanding. His offer of air parity with the strongest Power in Western Europe should be snapped up at once. The only right solution is parity for all at zero, as demanded by the British people in the Peace Ballot, with an international air police force and an international service of civil aviation. But the egregious Lord Londonderry, speaking in the House of Lords the day after Hitler's speech, proposed a trebling of the British air force and boasted that in the early months of 1932 he had succeeded in preventing the acceptance by the Disarmament Conference of the abolition of all military air forces. Germany had no air force at that time! Failing abolition, an agreement for parity at a level lower than the present British level would be a first step in the right direction. Hitler's offer to agree to the general abolition of heavy guns and heavy tanks should likewise be accepted promptly. He is right in arguing that this would add much to the security of France behind her frontier fortifications.

We should have no illusions about Hitler or his régime. But we must negotiate with the Germany which now exists, and with its present ruler. And unless we can get Germany back to the Disarmament Conference and to continued membership of the League, it will be very difficult to organise either disarmament, or any wide international co-operation, or any orderly process of peaceful change. But all these things will be made much easier by a clear British declaration, on the lines indicated in the Peace Ballot, of our intention to throw all our weight behind Collective Security. There is much talk of "regional pacts." No "region" smaller than Europe, including the Soviet Union, has any real significance to-day. And we should bluntly say so. Let Hitler, on his side, be under no illusions. Let him not suppose that he can buy from us a "free hand in the East."

Let us, however, offer to him, as to all loyal members of the League, the opportunity of free discussion in an organised international forum, leading to the review, according to the weight of evidence, of any treaty, not merely those of 1919, and of any other international arrangements to which objection is taken. If international law is to be firmly enforced, it must be made susceptible to peaceful change. As to the modes of change, there are several possibilities, none of which has hitherto been seriously tried: Article 19 of the Covenant, or Article 15, or an extension of the powers of the Permanent Court of International Justice, or the creation of a new International Tribunal in Equity. The last of these four seems the least promising, but we should pledge ourselves seriously to examine them all and to make whichever is chosen a reality.

"Peaceful change" is often interpreted exclusively in terms of change in the frontiers drawn by the Treaties of 1919. But this is much too narrow an interpretation. If it is only of "national minorities" that we are thinking, the present map of Europe is much to be preferred to the pre-war map. West of the Soviet frontiers the number of persons belonging to national minorities is less than half the pre-war number. Many of the extreme claims for frontier revision, notably those of Hungary, are fantastic, and it would be well that they should be impartially examined and finally put aside. For it is of the essence of any procedure of peaceful change that a proposed change, which has been definitely rejected under this procedure, should not thereafter be proposed again, at least for a long time.

The revision of a frontier, moreover, is a very delicate operation, which should never be authorised unless it can be shown, first, that the change is desired by a substantial majority of those directly affected; second, that the gain to these is not inevitably offset by still more serious loss to those who are affected indirectly; and, third, that any minorities unwillingly transferred will be fairly treated. The application of the first of these principles will rule out many suggested revisions for which much propaganda has been made. The application of the second, which is no less reasonable, will still further narrow the field of possible change. So will the third.

I draw some illustrations from Czechoslovakia, the model

democracy of Central Europe, containing within its borders several "national minorities" which are better treated than most national minorities in Europe and better than large elements even of the national majorities in some neighbouring States. There is a considerable German population in the West, North-West, and South-West. In the recent elections—free elections are still held in this democratic oasis in Central Europe—two-thirds of the German vote went to the so-called Henlein Front, which has strong Nazi sympathies. A sixth went to the German Socialists. The remaining sixth to the German Agrarian and the Communist Parties. The German Socialists and German Agrarians continue to be represented, each by one Minister, in the Coalition Government, along with Czech Socialists and Czech Agrarians and a few minor parties, which assure the Government's parliamentary majority.

For many years before, and for a few years after, the Great War the racial and linguistic frontier between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia moved steadily in favour of the Czechs, more proletarian, more prolific and more migratory than the Germans. But now this frontier seems approximately stabilised. Except, however, in certain strips along the German and Austrian borders, the Czech and German populations are almost inextricably mingled. Assuming, therefore, that none of the Czechs in these mixed districts are for frontier revision and that about a third of the Germans are also against it, or at least doubtful, no case can be made here for the large-scale revision which some propagandists have demanded. None the less, it would not be impossible here and there to cut away the German rind from the Czech cheese and, if this were regarded as a final settlement, leading to good and neighbourly relations between Czechs and Germans, and accompanied by a diminution of trade barriers, there would be much to be said for it. Nor need Czechoslovakia, in such conditions, regret a substantial reduction in the number of her German minority which is, in more than one respect, an embarrassment to her. But these conditions are not yet within sight of fulfilment.

Hungarian revisionist claims in Slovakia stand on a different footing. Here there is, as yet, no stabilised racial and linguistic frontier. Slovaks, still a most prolific race, are moving southwards in large numbers and rapidly changing the character of towns once claimed by the Hungarians. The

population both of Bratislava and of Kosice has nearly doubled since before the war, and the new arrivals are practically all Slovaks. Moreover, of the Hungarian minority of three-quarters of a million in Slovakia, many desire no change. At Komarno, on the Danube, admittedly a Magyar town, I recently met the Mayor. He is a Magyar Socialist and Trade Unionist, for twenty years a worker on the water-side. He told me bluntly that neither he nor his Magyar fellow-socialists and trade unionists desire to be returned to Hungary, as she is to-day. "Nowhere in Hungary," he said, "should I, a Socialist, be allowed to hold office as Mayor. Nor would my fellow-workers have political freedom, nor a share, if they are peasants, in the distribution of the large estates, such as they have here. Here we have our own Magyar schools, our own Magyar newspapers, all our cultural rights. Here we prefer to remain."

Travelling through Central Europe lately I dreamed of a Hungary democratised, of an Austria redemocratised, of frontiers changed from barriers to bridges, of new social experiments succeeding, of prosperity coming, better late than never, to those most diverse, but, each after its own fashion, most gifted and attractive peoples. Fascism, I dreamed, is a phase that will pass, freedom a phase that will return. Between such dreams and the reality of to-day there is a great gulf fixed. But to despair of crossing it is to despair of Peace.

HUGH DALTON.

which had shown no foresight ? Besides, what had been done with the "full powers" enjoyed by M. Germain-Martin in the previous Government ? And was it not an insult to Parliament to affirm that only on the occasions it consented to abdicate could any useful measures be taken ? Be it remarked that the most dangerous anti-Parliamentarians are the Ministers who confess themselves unable to govern while Parliament exercises its prerogatives. Long before the present troubles, that remark has been heard. Men like Clemenceau, in difficult days, rode roughshod over Parliamentary rights. Poincaré, staunch Republican though he was, made no secret of his opinion that when there was real work to be done, it had to be done outside the Palais Bourbon. M. Tardieu pointed out that it was impossible to attend to the duties of a Ministry, and be continually defending himself in the Chamber and in the Commissions. M. Doumergue was frankly contemptuous of the Chamber's conception of its functions. The Socialist leader, M. Léon Blum, has avowed the need of a suspension of legal forms, and thus displays anti-Parliamentary tendencies ; while around the name of M. Daladier, the chief rival to M. Herriot in the leadership of the Radical party, there has crystallised a legend of extra-Parliamentary intentions. The attitude of the Communists calls for no commentary ; and there are panicky apprehensions of the future action of such new organisations as the Croix de Feu, and such older organisations as the Action Française.

So it was that when M. Ferdinand Bouisson, the President of the Chamber, was persuaded that he, after others, was the ultimate saviour, he announced that he, who more than any man should uphold Parliamentary control, would require a free hand ; nay, in a fit of breath-taking candour, he told the Chamber that he would at once close the session in order that he might get on with his job. There were several other causes which contributed to his defeat, but it may properly be taken that the deputies resented the intimation that they are in the way whenever the country is faced with problems calling for action. Yet the sterility of a Parliamentary system in which there is a multiplicity of parties and rarely a clear majority, in which the deputies are moved by parish pump, and personal, and group considerations, by complicities and animosities, in which the executive is confounded with the legislative

rôle, in which there is constant intrigue and struggle, this sterility has surely been amply demonstrated by experience.

The Laval Cabinet, formed after the speedy demise of the Bouisson Cabinet, is reckoned as the ninety-ninth of the Republic. I have not enquired from what date the counting begins, for it suffices to take it that the Republic is something over sixty years of age. The evidence of governmental instability is appalling, and if it is replied that it has always been so, it may be answered that the successive "crises" are now becoming more frequent and more alarming than in any previous period, and that though threatened institutions may live long, the necessity of serious reform is now admitted, in one form or another, on all hands. Nothing is more to be deprecated in this connection than the misuse of such words as "democracy." Those who employ them most are themselves always hinting at extreme steps ; and democracy apparently is to be defended by anti-democratic measures. One section regards Republicanism as its monopoly and would repress ruthlessly all rivals. At the present time the chief preoccupation of those who are most voluble in the cause of democracy is the prohibition of leagues and associations and the right of reunion of their adversaries. Naturally they are prepared to accept, and indeed will fight for, leagues and associations and the right of reunion of those who are with them. It would seem that, while still employing Parliament for tactical purposes, the true conflict is gradually being shifted on to an extra-Parliamentary plane ; and committees of public vigilance and of public safety, whether on the Left or the Right, are forming themselves.

In these circumstances, with Parliamentarians themselves weakening the citadel from the inside, by their divisions, by their infertility, by their imprudent admissions, and by their outside connections which seek to dominate the Parliamentary scene, the task of M. Pierre Laval is unenviable. It would seem that he accepted it with reluctance, because it was urged that nobody else, with the smallest chance of success, was available. He was obliged, like most French Premiers, to put in his Cabinet men who are bitterly challenged and whose presence may undo him. In his soft-footed manner, he managed to obtain the powers which had been refused to his predecessors ; and was careful not to close the parliamentary session too precipitately. Now one of the saving features of

governmental life in France is that every year, for several months in the summer, the Ministry is unhampered. This time the Daladier Radicals, the Socialists, and the Communists, have pledged themselves to watch narrowly the acts of the Government, and are understood to have the requisite signatures for an immediate convocation of the Chamber. Were this menace to be taken literally, it would mean that any step of the Government which offended the canons of the Left would be thwarted or would be the pretext for an extraordinary session. It is hard to see what M. Laval should do, in these circumstances, to find grace. The last hope—of a Parliament in vacation—may have to be abandoned. The justification of decree-laws has been that the deputies, without compromising their electoral prospects, may repudiate responsibility for unpopular but necessary redressments effected by the Government. If they now choose to stand watchfully over the Government, they obviously paralyse the Government.

It will be noted, as a new thing, that the "bourgeois" Radicals (or rather the Left wing of the party) not only link themselves with the Socialists—for M. Herriot tried with poor results to work with the Socialists—but that the Socialists on their side have built a common platform (doubtless for ill-defined though limited purposes) with the Communists. "No enemies on the Left," was the motto of the old-time Radicals, but they never dreamed that it would be applied so conscientiously. Naturally, there are many members of the party who protest against this alliance, stretching from Radicalism to Communism, and who feel that a grave mistake is being made. But the alternative is to link themselves with the Moderates, the so-called Reactionaries, and in doing so they would lay themselves open to the accusation of joining the Fascists. Fascism is a word which is now cast at anyone who is not ready to go the whole way with the Left. The combat is represented to be as between the Fascists and the anti-Fascists. It is permissible if one is anti-Fascist to threaten the Government, and to unite in extra-Parliamentary societies, and to organise more or less drilled and disciplined forces; because the object is no longer regarded as subversive or revolutionary—it is legitimate resistance to the other forces which are conveniently dubbed Fascist.

It is almost incredible that many of the anti-Fascists really

mean what they say; they are deceiving themselves with wild words, and would surely hesitate, even in the sacred name of democracy, to aid their more fanatical leaders in setting up a dictatorship of the Left which would suppress all liberties of the Right. It is equally impossible to believe that the so-called Fascists, in demanding the restoration of State authority, intend to suppress all liberties of the Left. One is sometimes tempted to think there is a good deal of play-acting in all this. They are surely engaged in a dangerous but artificial game. There is a confrontation of factions bandying abusive political terms which have lost their significance.

Nevertheless, the time seems to be rapidly approaching when the French Parliament will have to undertake its own reform or be swept aside. Jacques Bainville, in his latest book, has endeavoured to show that the Constitution of the Republic was framed for a Monarchy; but the Monarch is missing. The Republic has hitherto enjoyed good luck, but it will have to change its Constitution and mend its manners or put somebody with genuine power at the head of it. An English writer recently likened the French régime to a motor-car which has broken down; after a few repairs it will, he cheerfully asserts, run as well as ever. But there comes a point at which breakdowns cannot be cured by tinkering. If the necessary work is not done soon, it will be cheaper and more satisfactory to get a new car. Nor should such a conclusion imply the smallest condemnation of Parliamentarism or of Democracy, any more than the breakdown of a motor-car is a condemnation of motor-cars in general—or even of a particular motor-car. The trouble is, as M. Pierre Bernus observes, that many people begin to fear the consequences of touching the machine at all, and so prefer to put up with its defects. He adds: "If M. Laval does not succeed during the summer, he will fall lamentably in the autumn, like all his predecessors, and the menace of a rude shake-up will be the greater as the impossibility of an internal reconstruction appears more evident. It is to be trusted that the transformation, inevitable some day or other, will be made by men who have already exercised power, or at any rate will be made with their assistance; if not, there will arise a risk of civil war."

M. Laval, in his final declaration to Parliament before the holidays, remarked: "Recently, manifestations have been seen which suggest that our institutions are in danger. In

other days, our elders would not have asked for new texts ; it would have been sufficient to apply the laws. . . . Democracy can only defend itself by authority. . . . The Government alone possesses authority. . . . No individual, no group of citizens, can usurp sovereignty." M. Lucien Romier, in the *Figaro*, warns the Government, however, that to deny citizens the right of assembly would be the negation of Republicanism, and on the other hand, to submit the Government, regularly invested with executive power by a vote of the Chamber, to the arbitrary control of an irresponsible "vigilance committee" during the recess, would be contrary to the principles of Parliamentaryism.

What is the aim of the Croix de Feu, which excites the anger of the Communists, the Socialists, and some of the Radicals ? Many people reproach Colonel de La Roque, its chief, for his passivity ; they would have him throw his troops, without more ado, into battle, instead of ordering them to remain calm, holding them in reserve for some unknown emergency. But it is certain that if he or anyone else attempted an offensive, without the fullest justification, he would lose the benefit of his patient organisation. Colonel de La Roque repudiates all political partisanship. He says :

In normal times the Croix de Feu could not have an offensive purpose ; were it otherwise it would merely be trying to impose the will of a few persons on the country, and would sustain a check. If we would accomplish a useful and durable work we should rally round a few simple ideas the majority of active Frenchmen. In other words, we should try to reconcile men of good will now scattered among the parties, to bring to the tricolour all the malcontents who have been misled by the men of demagogic disorder, though they still maintain, like us, the cult of the family, the respect of labour, and a profound love of the country. In these conditions, an offensive *à priori* against the extreme groups would be the worst of blunders. To constitute an indisputable force, to organise it with precision, to hold it ready to come into action, to display it and thus pursue an indispensable propaganda, while avoiding conflict between Frenchmen—such is our method. Does this exclude the possibility of an offensive ? No, if one remembers that, even in military science, a defensive strategy does not exclude tactical offensives. No, if one realises that, in the event of Marxist Internationalism seizing power by surprise, we would not rest until we had driven them from a country where they are unnatural."

What would be the value of the Croix de Feu, its chief, and similar organisations, if they were forced to make good their pretensions, can only be matter for speculation. But to ask M. Laval, as does the Left, to disband them, is to place him in a dilemma. There are so many efforts to organise similar troops by Communists and Leftists, so much talk, well or ill founded, of the preparation of Leftist attacks, such uncertainty as to the future of Parliament, that the Croix de Feu, and the rest, may be required to fulfil a corrective function some day. It would be unwise to venture on the smallest prediction ; perhaps all these demonstrations will amount to nothing ; but the moral is clear, namely, that these extra-Parliamentary methods are encouraged by the inefficiency of Parliament and can only be rendered inoperative by the reform of Parliament.

The financial problem has many facets but it is no exaggeration to say that in so far as it is national, and not dependent on world conditions, it could be solved by Parliament were Parliament to apply itself whole-heartedly to the matter. There has been (as in many countries) a tendency to extravagance, an increase of expenditure which is not warranted by the national revenue. It will suffice to recall that the French budget was, in round figures, 5 milliard gold francs before the war. It rose to 40 milliards in 1926, to 44 milliards in 1928, and to 55 milliards in 1932. The co-efficient of the present franc is 5. Thus budgetary spendings have more than doubled, though recent compressions have brought down the total to about 48 milliards. Nor is this all. It would be improper to refer back to the pre-war public debt, for huge borrowings were necessary during and after the war. But from 1928 to 1935, according to the *Europe Nouvelle*, the public debt rose from 267 to 324 milliards. Now it seems clear that the normal taxable capacity of the country has been reached. Throughout the years of more or less fictitious prosperity liabilities were accumulated, in part at least owing to the mentality of deputies who find it hard to refuse or refrain from making any proposal to augment the outgoings of the Providential State. They should, in their own interest, rejoice in the existence of a Government which will relieve them of all responsibility for unpopular retrenchments. Excessive taxation has weighed heavily on industry. Salaries and prices in many cases were multiplied by more than the

coefficient of 5. To devalue the franc again would be unfair and would provoke indignation, since the small depositor and the rentier—who despite the fashionable outcry against him is a respectable person who saved up his money thriftily, as he was taught to do, for his old age—have already been robbed of four-fifths (in fact, considerably more) of their holdings. Yet it is obvious that bankruptcy must ultimately fall on a State as on an individual, if the simple, though scorned, rule of cutting the coat according to the cloth is ignored. Even a new depreciation of the franc would not remove the necessity of some deflation. A curious example of increased expenditure is furnished by the pensions list. It is estimated that 300,000 war victims, and 200,000 war widows, have died since 1918. The number should be constantly diminishing. Yet in 1928, when the franc was stabilised, something over 5 milliards were paid in war pensions. In 1934, according to official figures, over 7 milliards were paid. This augmentation is doubtless due in part to the *retraite du combattant* inaugurated in 1930.

Rightly or wrongly, public opinion demands a balanced budget, but who is to be sacrificed? Are public services to suffer? Are salaries to be cut down? There is agitation whenever specific reductions are suggested, though everybody agrees in theory that ten to twenty per cent. should be cut from the budget. M. Laval probably understates the case when he says the Treasury must cover a prospective deficit of 11 milliards. It is believed that devaluation is both too facile and too illusory. It is held that taxation has overshot the mark, and if raised will give lower returns. More milliards are to be thrown into the strengthening of the military forces. Borrowing is expensive and the service of the debt, which absorbs over forty per cent. of the budget, adds continually to the burden. Obviously, uncommon courage is called for if the solution is to be found on the lines now traced. And uncommon courage is scarcely an attribute of a Parliament which identifies itself with the Executive and is electorally minded.

It is certainly presenting the problem far too simply to insist merely on a reduction of expenditure. The high prices, the stagnation of trade, the obvious disadvantages of a currency which is apparently worth less abroad than at home, the spread of unemployment, are other aspects of the problem. Yet in the plethora of contradictory theories and unsuccessful

experiments preached and tried elsewhere, it is probably better to concentrate on a few plain financial truths. Above all, it should be emphasised that the essence of the French question is political, or, as M. Tardieu says, moral.

“For fifteen years,” he cried to the farmers of Blérancourt, “we have been preoccupied by our material interests. How has that helped us? In nothing. While you believe that life is made of your individual interests, of your cows and pigs and wheat and big sous, and do nothing to assure the spiritual and moral unity of the nation, you will lose your money, and it will serve you right. To defend your particular interests, you address yourselves to your councillors and deputies. Public education, fortified by example, has created the belief that the citizen has the right to expect everything from the State by the intermediary of elected persons. I, who for twenty years have been an elected person, say to you, Enough! I will never again defend particular interests, which indeed will always be compromised until you understand that the moral force of a nation is alone capable of assuring its prosperity and security. You must recover and accept the notion of sacrifice, which you have lost for fifteen years. The hour has come, if France is to live, to put spiritual values in the first place, and remember that we have very few rights in exchange for many duties.”

A strange speech for electors, and one which produced a remarkable impression. M. Tardieu has voluntarily renounced Ministerial rank which he was urged to retain; he has pronounced his *mea culpa*. The phenomenon is perhaps a sign of the times. The old political conceptions, the absence of a unifying spiritual purpose, make it difficult for France to enjoy good finances, good foreign policy, good government, and to take a positive attitude on any subject, to do more than submit to events in regard to which she has lost all initiative. Yet something is stirring under the surface of the confused manifestations which will perhaps bring back to France moral supremacy in Europe. She will not be content with a negative attitude, watching passively the dynamism of other nations; but will, possessed by an idea-force, again take her traditional leadership.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

ITALY AND ABYSSINIA.

BY the time this article appears there should be available the main lines of the Report of the Committee appointed to adjust what are called the differences between Italy and Abyssinia, and there will then be three weeks in which to consider League action. Peace is in jeopardy, not merely in Africa but in Europe, for issues are at stake of the most vital kind. There is still time to avoid disaster; but let there be no mistake, that disaster, if it comes, will be one of such magnitude that none would dare to depict its extent.

Not only is peace in jeopardy, but the issues arising from Signor Mussolini's attitude must spell life or death to the League of Nations. If Mussolini pursues to its logical conclusion his published intention and his programme of conquest, the League will be confronted with an act of aggression which violates not one but several articles of its Covenant. The best friends of the League recognise that it can hardly survive failure upon an issue so cynical in its challenge to the ideals and obligations of the Covenant.

What case can be made out for separate action by Signor Mussolini? Assuredly none, for the following reasons:

- (1) His own signature to the Covenant debars separate action.
- (2) His own treaties with Abyssinia forbid it.
- (3) Signor Mussolini has established no case against Abyssinia.
- (4) Abyssinia has agreed to any method of settling the dispute other than war.
- (5) Signor Mussolini up to the present appears to be insisting on no settlement other than war.

Could anything be more indefensible? It would seem that the Italian Dictator has allowed himself to become inspired with the example of Imperial Rome. Indeed, his speech at Whitsuntide points to this very fact, for he said in that speech that the monuments of Ancient Rome speak of a great Rome which "dominated the world by her arms and her laws." But this is not all. He went on to say: "There is nothing to prevent us from believing that what was our destiny yesterday, may still be our destiny to-morrow."

The known objectives of the Italian Dictator are in harmony with his speech on conquest:

(a) Abyssinia is a territory nearly twice the size of France, namely, just over 350,000 square miles. The major part of it is a vast mountain region, but between the mountain regions and the three coastal territories of Eritrea, British, and Italian Somaliland, there are wide stretches of sandy or mud plains to be crossed. Eritrea in the north is thus separated from Italian Somaliland in the south by French and British Somaliland. The distance between the two Italian Protectorates is over 1,000 miles. The first objective of Signor Mussolini is that of building a great trunk railway, starting from Eritrea in the north, taking a curve to the westward of the capital, Addis Abeba, and away south to Italian Somaliland. Still inspired with the example of Imperial Rome, Mussolini proposes to drive roadways through the country to feed the railway. The total length of the railway is estimated to be 1,500 miles. It would cut Abyssinia in half from north to south. That is the first objective.

(b) The second objective is a declaration of Italian trade monopoly throughout the regions west of the railway, and only bounded by the Sudan in the north and west, Uganda in the south-west, and Kenya Colony due south.

(c) The third objective, and the one that is bound to imperil European relationships, is for a "reasonable share" of the waters of Lake Tsana.

One of the tragic features of the situation is that, prior to the bellicose attitude adopted by Signor Mussolini, there was happily growing up a relationship with Ethiopia which would have permitted in due course a satisfactory arrangement with regard to Lake Tsana. This has now been rendered impossible, anyhow, for a longer time than one can foresee. No Abyssinian king would be allowed to remain on the throne, or indeed to live, if he now surrendered Abyssinian control of this sacred lake to the Italian Government. But more than one nation is vitally concerned in the control of the waters of this lake. Great Britain has repeatedly warned Mussolini that the control of this lake is a matter of "vital interest" to Great Britain. It is equally a matter of vital interest to Egypt and the Sudan. It is also a matter of interest to the United States of America.

This inland sea of Tsana is away 6,000 feet up in the mountains of Abyssinia, where it covers an area of 1,350 square miles, and is thus one of the greatest inland reservoirs of the world. There the Great Engineer of the universe has stored these waters for the benefit of man. Its surface is dotted with scores of islands, on some of which travellers tell us monasteries and churches exist which go back to medieval times. Not far away, somewhere between the lake and the ancient city of Axum, Abyssinians tell us, reposes the Ark of the Covenant, which the first Menelik took from Jerusalem when he went to see his father, King Solomon.

From the south-east corner of the lake there surges forth surplus water at the rate of 3,500 million cubic feet every year. It is in the lake that the "Blue" sister of the White Nile is born. The Blue Nile tumbles her way down from 6,000 feet over the rocky shelves of a great plateau into the chasm of Abbai, then by a series of waterfalls and ravines the Blue Nile flows almost due westward, then northward to Khartum, where she joins the White Nile. The two Niles then pool their creative elements, and pour forth the fertilising waters of the united Nile for the creation and maintenance of vast cotton plantations, and those cornfields of Egypt which throughout history have made Egypt the granary of the world. This lake is sacred to Abyssinians, essential to Egypt and the Sudan, coveted by Italy, of vital interest to Great Britain, and under treaty subject to American control.

Of what potential interest, it may be asked, is Lake Tsana to Italy? Can it be that, included in the dream of an Imperial Rome re-created in Africa, there is the conception of turning the bed of the Blue Nile east towards the Red Sea, and away from the White! Such a dream is far less "wild" than appears at first sight. The "pricking" of the lake is said to be quite a possible engineering feat; but if Signor Mussolini contemplates usurping the throne of Abyssinia, and then attempting to turn the Blue Nile, he would only be following in the footsteps of a former Emperor, for there was a time when the Abyssinians were bent upon this very feat themselves. King Lalibela, who ruled Abyssinia for forty years from 1173 B.C., actually attempted this work. Indeed, traces of the public works are still to be seen eastward of the Blue Nile. It is, of course, on record in official papers that Signor Mussolini intends to secure at least a part of the waters of

the Blue Nile. No doubt those who are advising Signor Mussolini on this matter have pointed out to him that a supply of water turned into the arid plains of an extended Eritrea would produce for the Italian cotton factories all the cotton that Italy would require, and thus save her from the onerous duty of shipping something over £2,000,000 worth of gold overseas each year to purchase raw cotton for the Italian factories.

British interest in Lake Tsana goes back before the conquest of the Sudan. The Emperor Menelik agreed with Great Britain "that there should be no interference with the waters of the Nile and Lake Tsana, except in consultation with His Majesty's Government and the Government of the Sudan. It was agreed at this time that Sir William Garston and his colleagues should report upon the cost of conserving the waters of Lake Tsana under a friendly arrangement with the Emperor of Ethiopia. The investigation, which took nearly five years, placed the control of Lake Tsana waters first in the point of urgency to Egypt; and estimated that the cost of the necessary dams, etc., would at that time be in the neighbourhood of £3,500,000. In fairness to Mussolini it must be admitted that nobody apparently would suffer any disability from conserving these valuable waters, while it is equally certain that millions of the human race would benefit by preventing what is to-day a criminal wastage. But the securing of this desirable end can never be justified by war, and what is a still greater consideration, could never be a practicable method.

The treaty position with regard to the so-called dispute is quite clear and emphatic. In 1906, Britain, France and Italy signed a treaty, the main clauses of which were an agreement to respect the integrity and independence of Abyssinia. In 1928, Italy signed a Treaty of Arbitration with Abyssinia. Clause 5 states:

Both Governments (Italy and Abyssinia) undertake to submit to a procedure of conciliation and arbitration disputes which may arise between them, and which it may not have been possible to settle by ordinary diplomatic methods without having recourse to armed force.

In addition to the foregoing, definite commitment to conciliation and arbitration is of course in the Covenant of the

League, to which again both Italy and Abyssinia are signatories.

Not the least amazing feature of this so-called dispute is its utter triviality, and at the same time the lack of any reliable evidence in justification of the Italian allegations. It is said, for example, that in November 1934 an Italian Consulate was attacked by some armed force. The Abyssinian Government immediately apologised. Then came the trouble at Walwal, which was alleged to be within the Italian boundary, but in the maps published by Italy up to 1925, and *The Times* Atlas of 1920, Walwal is placed where the Abyssinians have always asserted it to be, namely, over sixty miles inside the Abyssinian border. It is true, of course, that a conflict arose later about the wells of Walwal, but this took place in the presence of Europeans, all of whom have emphatically declared the Italians to have been the aggressors.

It was in these circumstances that Abyssinia appealed to the League. In May the Ethiopian Government sent three communications to the Council of the League, in which she called attention to the warlike preparations being made by Italy, in spite of the appointment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Commission. The Emperor of Ethiopia asked that the Council would take steps to ensure the execution of the Covenant, and that the League would stop Italian military preparations. Then, owing to the wise collaboration between Baron Aloisi and Mr. Anthony Eden, an arrangement was reached under which the arbitrators were appointed and instructed to report by July 25th; and if the appointment of the Commission does not lead to a settlement, the Council decided that it would meet to examine the whole situation on August 25th. This discussion by the League Council was notable not merely for the success of the work of Baron Aloisi, but for the formal declaration of M. Laval, who in his speech emphasised that whilst each State had a natural desire to ensure respect for its sovereignty, they must at the same time bear in mind that "the principles of the League of Nations must prevail."

What, it may be asked, will happen in the event of the Dictator in Italy refusing to accept the findings of the Commission of Arbitration and Conciliation? It can only lead to a war of conquest, unless of course the Powers under the League take action that is open to them. In the interests of

Mussolini himself and of the Italian people, and especially of the Italian soldiers, every effort must be made to dissuade Mussolini from embarking on a war in Ethiopia. Neither Abyssinia nor the Abyssinians will be conquered easily. No war could begin before October, and military activity by Europeans would be compelled to cease within six months. It is probable that the most important factor in the whole situation is water—water is the main cause of the difficulty, namely, Lake Tsana. Over-abundance of water (twenty inches in a month) makes Abyssinia impassable to anything but man, camels, donkeys and mules; then, when the rains are over, lack of water, which means that every cup of water must be carried by the army wherever it goes, makes travel again almost impossible. Thus water is the first great ally of the Abyssinians.

The next asset the Abyssinians possess is the spirit of the people, which amounts almost to a religion. Every Abyssinian is a warrior. At the head of the Abyssinian hosts the Emperor has always marched as Commander-in-Chief, under the proud title of "Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah." The Emperor will be surrounded by his kings, for he is literally a "King of Kings." The power of some of these kings may be gathered from the fact that Ras Kassa has already come to the aid of his Emperor with a powerful army which includes 70,000 cavalry. It is understood that the Emperor has now appointed him as Field-Marshal in charge of the Army of the North, which has its headquarters round Axum and Lake Tsana, and thus is across the path of the Italian invaders from Eritrea to Addis Abeba.

The third asset which the Emperor of Ethiopia possesses is the character of his country. None can feel anything but pity for the Italian boys who will have to cross the sandy wastes of Abyssinia, but worse awaits them in the mountains and defiles of the country. Upon the top of every mountain, hidden in every cave and behind every boulder will lurk death traps of every kind, manned by fleet-footed and hardy warriors, possessing the finest mountaineering animals in the world, capable of acting swiftly upon the lines of communication upon which everything depends. Terrible indeed from every point of view would be this war of conquest.

In addition to the foregoing, there is the historic background to which the Emperor is entitled to appeal. Every

boy and girl is taught almost from the cradle the victorious history of his country. The Abyssinian Army at the moment is believed to number 100,000 under the Emperor himself. These are partly European trained, and can be quickly increased in number. For example, the troops which were called up at very short notice at the time of the visit of the Duke of Abruzzi in 1927 numbered over 100,000. By tradition Abyssinians have never suffered defeat. Every soldier remembers how, in the sixteenth century, the country was overrun by hosts of Mohammedans, and then how the Emperor himself was defeated and hunted like a wild beast in the mountains; finally, how this Emperor—Lebna Dengal—swept down from the mountains, rallied the Abyssinians, and drove the Mohammedans helter-skelter out of Abyssinian territory and thereby established Christianity throughout the land. Later, the Egyptians attempted conquest in the north, and entered Abyssinia with an army under European officers. The Abyssinians pursued their usual tactics of "encircling the enemy." Then King John fell upon and practically annihilated the entire Egyptian Army, and only a handful of men reached Massawah to tell the tale. The crowning military triumph of Adowa is celebrated every year by the Abyssinians with great rejoicings and fervour in the capital of Addis Abeba. Then once again is told the epic story of 1896. It is repeated in every home in Abyssinia how in the Battle of Adowa the Emperor Menelik, the "conquering Lion" of the day, led his army against the Italians, which resulted in a great victory, for only 4,000 Italians survived the battle with whole skins.

It is true, of course, that King Theodore, although conducting his battle in a manner which won the highest admiration of the British officers, suffered at Magdala a defeat at the hands of Sir Robert Napier and his 30,000 British soldiers, but on that occasion the Emperor was alone, for none of the Rases would support him; indeed, more than one supported Great Britain in her action at that time.

Nobody who knows anything of Abyssinia would prophesy what would be the results of a conflict, beyond saying that if it takes place it will be one of the most terrible wars in history. The Abyssinians have always fought with great bravery, but unfortunately the most terrible cruelties have not only been suffered but inflicted. Italy would be well

advised to halt before it is too late. The Powers would be equally well advised to call a halt in the face of a disaster of which none can foresee the end. There is now twenty-five days—from August 1st to August 25th—during which State members of the League Council can formulate a policy. This policy should surely start from the basis that Signor Mussolini cannot without everlasting dishonour repudiate his fourfold treaty obligation to arbitrate; secondly, there is the practical consideration that, although the Italian armies should by all paper calculations conquer Abyssinia, it is by no means certain that they will succeed.

But rising supreme over all other factors is the outstanding one that if France, Great Britain and the U.S.A. intimate plainly that hostilities will not be permitted without prior arbitration and conciliation, there will then be peace, not war. Delay in a decision by Britain, France, and the U.S.A. to maintain peace would be a crime for which history will never forgive the present-day Governments of these countries.

JOHN HARRIS.

THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TANGIER.

AT the end of last May the then Foreign Secretary, replying to a question in the House of Commons, said he was aware that unless notice was given before November 24th, 1935, the existing Statute of Tangier would automatically be renewed for a further period of twelve years, but until the other Powers concerned had been consulted the British Government would reserve their decision as to the procedure to be adopted. He added, in answer to a further question, he was satisfied that the situation in Tangier was consistent with the principle of internationalisation and with our policy of a free passage through the Straits of Gibraltar. The ambiguity of the first part of the Foreign Secretary's answer and the satisfaction expressed in the second part demand examination of the situation in the town itself, and in the territory surrounding it.

The entrance to the Mediterranean from the Atlantic is so sharply defined by Nature that inevitably a fortress has evolved to dominate that entrance. Domination has never, however, been absolute, partly through lack of a harbour, partly because the Southern riparian Power has always been weak at sea, and partly because the Northern and Southern shores have almost invariably been held by different and usually hostile Powers. Modern science and modern diplomacy have, however, modified geography and military possibilities, and nowhere more strikingly so than at the spot where Europe and Africa draw together and where the sea-borne traffic of both continents supplies the requirements and provides the wealth of half the world. Hence the necessity for safeguarding the real neutrality, and a real international régime, at Tangier is urgent, and the opportunity which occurs of doing both must not be neglected nor lost. For the régime, in theory international, is dependent on the expressed agreement of a condominium of two of those Powers, and the neutrality is threatened by the ambition and the rivalry of the same two working for a common purpose with a divergent end. To make clear how these results have come about, and to understand why the Foreign Office answer is totally inadequate, I must give a brief narrative of the relations between Europe and Morocco during the last thirty years.

At German instigation, and as a counterpoise to the British position in Egypt, France developed an influence in Morocco which at the beginning of the century had been so consolidated that in 1904 an agreement was signed by Great Britain and France by which their respective spheres of influence and activity in Egypt and Morocco were delimited. This understanding between the British and French Governments necessitated arrangements being come to with Spain. Other conventions and agreements followed which need no detailed reference, but that at Algeciras in 1906, approved by thirteen of the chief European Powers, and the Franco-German treaty of 1911 confirmed the supremacy of France in the Sultanate of Morocco, recognised her as the intermediary between the Sultan and Europe, and thus assented to the subordination in Morocco of the interests of all the other signatory Powers. The Government of the United States remained aloof from all these commitments, preserved intact their relations with the Moroccan court, their consular jurisdiction, and the immunity of their citizens from the new authority.

Two questions of primary importance remained over for settlement. The first of these was the relation of Spain to Morocco, and in Moroccan affairs to France. For nearly 1,400 years Spain and Morocco have alternately been invader and invaded, victor and vanquished. At no time has Spain ruled over so much of Morocco as the latter has held for centuries of Spain. Only two years ago nothing seemed more probable than that Spain would renounce and withdraw from all enterprise in Morocco apart from Ceuta. While the vicissitudes of centuries of warfare had secured to her that port and its environs, she could barely maintain a slippery foothold at Tetuan and in the Riff. Spain, on account of historical conflict against Morocco, could claim special consideration of the future by virtue of the past, but that consideration was bound to take note of a very uneasy and tarnished present. The convention of 1904, already alluded to, and that of 1912 which jointly govern the present position of Spain in Morocco, reflect the misfortune and mistakes which have accompanied Spanish attempts to establish a colony, or an empire, in Northern Africa. Apart from her freehold at Ceuta, Spain is in Morocco only as a sub-tenant of France, obliged to maintain law and order in the leased territories which would

lapse to France if the conditions of the lease are not observed.

The second question, of even greater importance to Europe and especially to England, and not to be confused with any purely Moroccan issue, was the diplomatic and international status of Tangier. Owing to the configuration of the hills on the southern shores of the Mediterranean there was bound to be a fortress at this spot. Owing also to the narrowing of the sea into the straits, and the adverse winds which detained sailing vessels at the straits, trade forced the growth of a commercial depot fed partly from the sea and adjacent hinterland and partly from the Atlas. Trade and traders produced consuls, capitulations, consular courts and jurisdiction, and, in an oriental town where there was little security and no sanitation, finally a crude attempt at local government in the consular quarter. In 1880, the Madrid Convention procured diplomatic recognition of international local government for the City of Tangier, and this recognition was confirmed and amplified in 1906 by the Act of Algeciras, which employed the significant and decisive phrase of "International Sanitary Council." Again, the Convention of 1912 between France, Spain and Morocco, laid down that "The City of Tangier shall *retain* the special character it has been recognised as possessing, and which shall determine its municipal organisation," and that it "should be endowed with a special régime to be determined presently." And yet once again: The Franco-Spanish agreement of November 1912 designated the Tangier enclave as "the International Municipal Zone." All this was before the war, when Germany, Austria and Russia, with other signatories of the Act of Algeciras, had pronounced definite views about the international character of European interests at Tangier. But in 1918, and yet again in 1919, the French Government, forgetting all about the "special character" of "the international zone," proposed the abrogation of the Act of Algeciras and the merger of the Tangier Zone in the French Protectorate. The "Allied Governments" and the neutral signatories of the Act of Algeciras alike rejected these proposals. In 1923, however, the long continuing inefficiency of the local diplomats as a town authority drove France, Great Britain, and Spain into formulating that "special régime" for Tangier which events, external to the Zone, had too long delayed. Still these events flung their shadow athwart the new plan of administration. Though the

system existing for municipal government, based on the Sanitary Council, was notoriously and admittedly unsatisfactory to both residents and traders, and to the Diplomatic Corps, the three Governments decided to perpetuate the old traditions of the Sanitary Council in the new machinery of Government. By this decision they rendered their task, under any conditions by no means an easy one, still more difficult to accomplish satisfactorily, though perhaps some of the negotiators did not desire or intend a satisfactory conclusion if they could not obtain their own conclusion.

In 1923 the revenues of the Zone, though larger than they are to-day, were insufficient for anything but a most economical administration. The residents were mainly illiterate Moors, Jews, and Spaniards quite unaware of the requirements and methods of the most modest of Western civilisations, and unfitted by tradition and training to give adequate expression to their wishes. The Spanish zone, which encircled completely the international zone, was in a state of chaos. The Spaniards barely held the ground on which their troops stood, and the Government at Madrid were quite undecided whether to continue or abandon the campaign and its objectives. The trade of the town of Tangier was falling off, and three serious obstacles stood in the way of the revival of commerce. The two first of these were the rival desires of the French to divert trade from shipment at Tangier to Casablanca, and of the Spaniards to send it to Ceuta. The third obstacle was the brigandage of the Riff tribes, committed partly to provide for their own necessities, partly to embroil the Spaniards with the other nationalities. A more unpropitious time for smoothing out the tangle at Tangier could not have been chosen, but it was impossible longer to avoid or delay a settlement. The constitution, if so large a word can be applied to so small a subject, resulting from the discussions of the three Powers whose material interests were at the moment in inverse ratio to their political desires, illustrated all the difficulties which surrounded its birth.

By its stipulations Tangier was placed under a régime of "permanent neutrality." The native population, four-fifths of the whole, remained under the jurisdiction of the Sultan's representative, who is himself supervised and controlled by a specially appointed French official. An "International Assembly" (in fact the Municipal Council) was brought into

being, but its powers, responsibilities, and sense of duty were from the outset crippled and confined by the overriding Committee of Control. This body, manned from the Diplomatic Corps stationed at Tangier, supervised the activities of the Assembly, especially its expenditure, quite unashamedly in the interest of the European Power whose voice was dominant therein. The control of the Assembly itself was secured to France by the system of representation accepted by Great Britain and Spain, though this control had to be procured, and is maintained by indirect methods not provided against by the Statute. Judicial authority was entrusted to a mixed Court of Judges drawn from France, Britain and Spain. The code under which it administers justice is suited to the Latin rather than to the Anglo-Saxon conception of law (and no complaint of this has been made). The scale of salaries paid to the judges again is suited better to legal fees paid in Paris and Madrid than in London, and the legal status at home of some of the British judges sent out could advantageously have been higher. But no ability, legal knowledge or training, can work a judicial system where the judge of first instance to-day is the judge of appeal to-morrow, with no absolute certainty that in the latter capacity he may not be called to adjudicate upon his work in the former. To add to these Gilbertian possibilities no machinery was provided, or has subsequently been devised, to enforce the decisions of the Court should the police authorities take a different view of the verdict from that taken by the judge. Justice in Tangier was enmeshed in 1923 by the Statute in the nets of racial partiality, of judicial incompetence, and of police impotence. She is therefore sometimes denied and often evaded. These defects have, however, accomplished one miracle in Tangier. They have caused unanimity of desire for reform.

This Convention, ultimately and too carelessly ratified by the other recognised signatories of the Act of Algeciras, was signed on May 14th, 1924. It is valid for twelve years, and is automatically renewed for a similar period at the expiration of each twelve years unless, six months before the end of each such period, one of the contracting Powers demands its revision. In that event it remains in force while revision by common agreement is being effected. The Convention was not submitted to, and is therefore not officially approved by, the Central European Allies in the late war, nor by Russia

whose Government in 1924 was not recognised by France, Great Britain or Spain.

In 1928, Italy, perturbed as to her social status among the nations, and anxious to demonstrate the efficiency and foresight of Fascism, demanded, negotiated for and received equality of standing at Tangier to that of Great Britain. She has added thereby complexity, but not efficiency, to the Administration of the Zone, if at least one may judge from recent petitions presented by the various Chambers of Commerce, either jointly or separately, to their respective Consuls-General. The representations, made successively in 1929, in 1932, and in 1933, pointed out the excessive cost of administration, the necessity for redressing economic distress, the constant diminution of trade, and the urgency for action. The earliest of these combined protests, that of 1929, initiated by the British, was supported by the Spanish and International Chambers. The protest of 1932 issued equally from the British, French, Italian and Spanish communities, and differed only from its predecessor in the greater vehemence of its complaints and the unanimity with which they were made. The remonstrances of 1933 were of British origin, and were addressed to the British Foreign Office, who took no action, perhaps because until November 14th, 1935, nothing could be done.

I trust I have made clear two propositions. First, that a formal demand for revision of the international agreement under which Tangier is municipally administered ought to be made by the British Government. Second, that the method of administering Tangier is in no way part of any question as to France's position in Morocco. The latter is virtually a French protectorate in respect of which we have abandoned our one-time predominance and accepted and proclaimed French paramountcy. The former has been described, with no less formality and emphasis, as an international entity of a special character.

There is every obligation of honour and prudence, and foresight, to maintain the observance, in both the spirit and the letter, of both these principles by all the signatories of the 1923 Agreement. There is a real danger if vigilance is not exercised that concession on a large number of points, innocuous and disconnected in themselves, leads to a position in which surrender on vital issues becomes unavoidable. Thus

neglect of provision for our proper share in the various committees of management in the city government has led inevitably to the claim that we have no real interest in that government, and thus later on to the proposition that having no interest in drains or lights or markets, we have none in ports or railways or trade. The steps are imperceptible, trivial, almost ridiculous, but the advance is suddenly found to be formidable, and generally irretraceable. Let me give two examples. The first "Administrator" by the agreement of 1923 was a Frenchman. There was no more reason from the municipal standpoint that he should be French than that he should be English, Spanish or Italian. It was a diplomatic concession. This French official was an admirable administrator, so when his six years of service was up the French claimed, and successfully, to appoint his successor. Beyond doubt, on the strength of two precedents, they will claim a third. Similarly in 1928, the Spanish Zone leased from France (a never-to-be-forgotten fact) was in frightful disorder. Spain made that disorder a reason for claiming command of the municipal gendarmerie. The claim was conceded, not for internal police reasons but for external diplomatic exigencies, and is now the basis for a right of perpetual reversion.

There is an undoubted intention on the part of France and Spain to treat Tangier as if it was still part of the Sultan's dominions in Morocco. They deliberately forget that they themselves have recognised and admitted, explicitly or implicitly, in every negotiation that has concerned Europe and Morocco since 1880, Tangier to be in word and in fact plainly differentiated from Morocco, and international in everything but geographical location. In 1911, our own Government specifically raised this point in correspondence with the French on the general question of Morocco, and in 1918 and 1919, when the French Foreign Office raised the issue, the "Allied Governments" unanimously rejected the claim. Nevertheless the claim has never really been dropped. What cannot be achieved openly may be obtained by oblique methods. What will not be admitted in law may perhaps be accepted in practice. Accordingly the French authorities at Rabat who inspire usually, if they do not control invariably, the Moroccan policy of France, have concentrated on obtaining for themselves or for Spain, whom they regard half as rival half as subordinate, all the key posts in the municipal

government. The control of the police, of the customs, of the port, of the railway, are all utilised not so much for the benefit of Tangier as for that of the French or Spanish Zones in the first place, and ultimately, of course, for whichever of the two countries prevails over the other. It is obvious that if the status and régime at Tangier is to remain international, as Europe has twice at least in recent years declared that such was its intention, there must be such rectification of the Tangier Statute as will render the continuance of the present practices in Government there impossible. When giving notice of their intention to demand revision the British Government should, and can, make it unmistakably clear that they do so for the restoration and the maintenance of the international idea. The first step should be the appointment of a High Commissioner by the League of Nations. It is little matter what his nationality, but his loyalty must be to Geneva, and not to Paris, Madrid, or London. There should be a deputy, of different nationality, with knowledge of Mohammedan law. The representative character of the Assembly should be increased, not in numbers but in quality. This will not be easy. Nepotism now rampant must be checked. The Judicial system must be put in order, and decisions must be enforceable. The Appeal Court must be a reality and not a farce. The Port loan, control, and completion must be provided for as an international requirement. The Customs Service must cease all dependence on the French service at Rabat. The monopolies granted during the Sultan's rule should be reconsidered. There are many other minor reforms. The great need is that the only régime recognised even before the war by all the principal European Governments for their own safety as "permanently international" should be confirmed in that character and permanence by the post-war League of Nations making itself responsible for their continuance.

To make certain of this the British Government must act before November 24th of this year. I say the British Government, because some opinions hold that only France, Spain and Britain can demand revision, and that the other signatories are only accessories after the fact. If we take action revision is secure of discussion, and it ought only to be at Geneva.*

CHARLES E. HOBHOUSE.

* Since writing the above, Spain is said to have notified the Tangier administration of a revision giving her joint control with France of the Administration and Customs!

POLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY.

THE death of Marshal Pilsudski has produced no change in the methods or direction of Polish foreign policy. This result has been regarded in many circles outside Poland itself as a matter of surprise. In such circles it had been only too hastily assumed that the German-Polish Agreement of January 26th, 1934, was the temporary result of a sudden inspiration, and that there could be no lasting amity between two near neighbours who had differed so acutely since the Armistice on what were assumed to be vital questions of territory. Furthermore, Poland had been widely proclaimed as a satellite or appendage of France, though, latterly, it had perforce to be admitted that she was detaching herself from her ancient allegiance, and revealing to the world that she had a mind or will of her own. But what does Poland now represent in foreign affairs? Can she monopolise the ear of Europe in the earlier part of the twentieth century as she did until 1863 in the nineteenth century, when, to use the expressive words of the late Lord Acton, she was continually attracting attention as a "nation demanding to be united in a State, a soul, as it were, wandering in search of a body in which to begin life over again."

In order to answer these pertinent questions, it is necessary to connect present developments of Polish foreign policy with their roots in the more immediate past. It was the shock of Locarno that first caused Polish diplomacy to start explorations in a new direction. Locarno divided Europe into two parts—a more stable West, which Great Britain could safely guarantee, and a more uncertain East, where, according to the most approved authorities of the time, Great Britain could not safely undertake any fresh "commitments." In the correspondence between the French and British Foreign Offices which led up to the signing of this notable pact, France is shown as vainly striving to widen its eventual scope and purpose. There are veiled suggestions coming from the Quai d'Orsay that "the general guarantee of security necessary for the maintenance of peace cannot be effectively secured unless the agreements contemplated in the present note form an indivisible whole." But the British Foreign Office was obdurate. M. Briand yielded to the force of these objections and Poland was troubled to the heart.

Still Polish foreign policy continued to make progress on the even footpath of its way. In the earlier years after the Armistice M. Skirmunt had inaugurated a policy of keeping on good terms with his neighbours—especially the Baltic States, and the countries of the Little Entente, and of being continually faithful to the French Alliance. After the Pilsudski coup of 1926 when the Marshal again took a dominating interest in foreign affairs, M. August Zaleski assumed the reins of office, and there followed a period in the history of the Polish Foreign Office characterised by great sagacity and much solid achievement. Polish foreign stock stood high. Poland became a semi-permanent member of the Council of the League of Nations. There were only two serious drawbacks. In the first place the Germany of Stresemann, Brüning, and the Weimar Republic was uniformly hostile, and the insecurities of the Eastern front of Europe were continually paraded before the Chancelleries of the world. In the second place Lithuania continued to regard herself as in a "state of war" with Poland and thus a lasting pact embracing all the Baltic States was rendered for the time impossible.

Zaleski, however, made the fostering of the French Alliance a paramount aim of his policy, and so long as this Alliance functioned freely he continued his career of success. But in the latter years of M. Briand, and especially during the short period of office of M. Paul-Boncour, it was apparent that this Alliance was not beyond the reach of reproach. Marshal Pilsudski himself was particularly annoyed when, in one of the innumerable and abortive schemes for the limitation of armaments, the French proposed to allow Germany a certain measure of rearmament without any previous consultation of Poland. This led to the resignation of M. Zaleski and the starting of Polish foreign policy on that new path where it must be tracked to-day.

Yet it was the Four Power Pact in 1933 which intensified former bad impressions and most powerfully swayed the mind of Marshal Pilsudski just at the time when the present Foreign Secretary, Colonel Beck, was taking stock of the situation and asking himself how Polish policy could adapt itself to the serious change of circumstances. It is difficult to exaggerate the sinister impression which the conferences and speeches heralding the rather obscure promulgation of this

misguided Four Power Pact made on the mind of Poland. One speech especially delivered in the House of Commons by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald so influenced the resolution of the then Polish Ambassador, M. Skirmunt, that he seriously suggested his resignation as his most effective gesture of protest. France, too, was vehemently blamed in Poland for having acquiesced in such a project, which, to Polish eyes at least, seemed to recall the days of the old autocracies when certain Great Powers presumed to revise the Treaties and redraft the boundaries of Europe. Certainly, in the mind of Pilsudski the lesson that emerged was this, that Poland must be true to herself and provide by her own power the methods for her own safety. Her air force was well known to have been developed to a high pitch of excellence. What was the plan of foreign policy which could most powerfully consolidate her forces and ensure that effectual security which was absolutely necessary for the working out of elaborate schemes of social reconstitution and reconstruction?

In the days of Skirmunt and Zaleski, Poland was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of a universal system of collective security; and there was no other nation in Europe which more sincerely endorsed the Geneva Protocol of 1924. It would not be correct to-day to say that she has gone back entirely on her former beliefs, but it is certain that she no longer looks on the speedy attainment of collective security with the same full-blooded force of conviction. At a recent League meeting in Geneva Colonel Beck, referring to the schemes for European regional pacts, practically declared that it would be better for the League to live up to its present commitments before going out on a journey of discovery for more; and the spirit of this rather sombre commentary on some recent efforts and reprisals of the League of Nations has been an influential force in determining the present orientation of Polish foreign policy.

Collective security being then unattainable because, with the possible exception of France, none of the Great Powers remains enthusiastically in its favour, Poland felt herself obliged to provide for her security through bilateral agreement. This was largely suggested to her by the exigencies of her geographical situation in the great European plain. Her frontiers lay open on the east and on the west and therefore it was of paramount importance that she should be on good

terms with Russia and Germany. In the case of Russia she felt herself fairly secure owing to a non-aggression Convention which had been signed between that country and Poland in the July of 1933, and which had been followed in 1934 by a Convention realistically defining the aggressor. It had been difficult to bring about the signing of this Convention, because Poland insisted that a similar Convention should be offered to Roumania, and the memories of Bessarabia still rankled in the Russian breast. But at length the deed was done, and in the end it was even coupled with a conciliation Convention. Originally it had been thought possible to provide for an Arbitration Court in this and the other Soviet non-Aggression Treaties, but to this the Soviets were unalterably opposed. They did not feel at all confident that a cause in which they were interested should be in the hands of representatives of capitalist States. Even the Conciliation Clauses in the Polish-Russian Non-Aggression Convention were not carried very far, but this did not prevent the Polish Government feeling fairly confident of the security furnished by their bilateral arrangement on the Russian side of their borders.

But Germany was a different proposition. It has already been pointed out that during the Weimar stage of the history of the Reich, Poland and Germany had been separated by what appeared to be a perfectly unbridgeable gulf. The so-called Polish Corridor was everywhere regarded by the diplomatists of the West as the danger point of Europe, and Stresemann himself in a letter to the ex-Crown Prince of Germany, which has been since published in his *Memoirs*, explained that he only joined the League to use it as a means for obtaining a more speedy recovery of the lost and (as he thought) indispensable territories of the Reich which were now in the possession of Poland. M. Briand, too, in his latter years had undoubtedly a large measure of sympathy with this point of view, and Polish public opinion was excited by suggestions, which apparently came from high French sources, that the Corridor should be bartered against Memel, or, otherwise, that a district which was regarded by the Poles as so distinctively Polish, should be discussed without reference to the wishes of its present inhabitants. Hitler had by this time come into power and Pilsudski, in giving its present direction to Polish foreign policy, had to reckon with the new situation. If Stresemann desired to chasten the

Poles with whips, would not Hitler chastise them with scorpions?

Yet, despite all this, the seemingly impossible happened, and at the beginning of last year there was signed the momentous Polish-German agreement. It is not necessary here to enquire curiously as to the methods by which it was obtained. The story goes that Pilsudski, through his very capable Ambassador at Berlin, put the question to Hitler bluntly whether it was to be peace or war, just as, at a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, he had put the same question and just as bluntly to Waldemaras of Lithuania. If that was really the method, the question in both cases evoked the soft reply, although in Germany with results which have been of a much more lasting character than up till now it has evoked in Lithuania. For there can be no doubt that, since its inception, the Polish-German Agreement has been loyally observed by both sides to the bargain. Violent attacks by one nation on the other have ceased in the Press of each of the countries. It is clear that both have learnt to settle their differences by mutual negotiation, instead of by recriminations or even by appeals to the League of Nations. And though actually the Agreement is only made for the space of ten years, it was hinted by Hitler himself, in his famous broadcast speech of May 21st of the present year, that there might be an extension of it, at the end of the ten years, for a further additional period. Owing to the circumstances in which the broadcast speech, which was very long, was reported in this country, this part of it was generally left out and it may be as well to set forth in the very words of Hitler that

in defiance of past history, Germany signed an agreement with Poland outlawing the resort to force, and this is an agreement which constitutes a further and more than valuable contribution to European peace. Germany will not only whole-heartedly fulfil the obligations of this pact, but also she sincerely hopes that it will be continually renewed and that the friendly German-Polish relations resulting therefrom will become still more harmonious.

The success of these agreements safeguarding the Polish frontier, on both its German and its Russian side, has been responsible for a certain preference on the part of latter-day Polish diplomacy for the method of bilateral pacts. On that account Polish politicians looked with no large measure of

enthusiasm on the recent meeting of the Powers at Stresa. In the first place the subsequent declarations, issued as a result of that meeting, were founded on Locarno, and their reference to a possible Western Air Pact appeared again to crystallise that distinction between the East and the West which was the baleful result of the older Pact. And in the second place, and more decisively, it was a meeting of Powers designated by their own good pleasure, and was preceded and succeeded by conversations between these Powers conducted out of and apart from the regularised agencies of the League of Nations. Indeed, at the Council of the League held just subsequently at Stresa, where Poland supported the condemnation of any unilateral repudiation of treaties, Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, declared definitely that "as my Government had no part either in the negotiations outside the Conference or in the declarations which were the result of these negotiations, so in the present situation it sees no need of making any remarks on the subject."

Neither was there any decided measure of favourable feeling towards the Pact of Mutual Assistance signed on May 2nd between the French and Soviet Governments. This pact, so far as Poland was concerned, meant that if Germany attacked France, Russian troops might want to march through Poland and to a march of either Russian or German troops through her territories Poland was unalterably opposed. It was also revealed both to Mr. Eden and to M. Laval, when they paid their visit to Warsaw, that, for the same and other reasons, Poland would not join the project for a security agreement including all the countries of North-Eastern Europe and Czechoslovakia generally known as the Eastern Pact. To the Polish politicians, in this case likewise, it appeared that there are in the Europe of to-day two methods of attaining collective security which are severally struggling for expression, first the universal system where the power of all is decisively brought to bear in order to withstand a possible aggressor and, secondly, regional pacts of mutual assistance, along with a network of non-aggression pacts, where the participants pledge themselves to withhold any manner of aid to such aggressor. In the face of either of these, in the present circumstances of Europe, and with Germany and Russia at bitter cross-purposes with each other, Poland

in the relation of the German Minorities to the Polish population, so that, although the thorny questions which face Polish politicians are both numerous and difficult, there is no reason to anticipate that the Polish influence will be of a disquieting character in the Europe of the twentieth century. Reference has been made in previous parts of this discussion to Poland's relations with France. These, too, may not have appeared to be of the same cordial character; but despite temporary drawbacks, it may be confidently predicted that the influences that bind the two countries together can never be permanently impaired.

J. H. HARLEY.

SOUTH AFRICA: A VISITOR'S VIEW.

THERE are some who regret that most of the world has been explored. To be the first on the spot must always have its thrill, as Keats described Cortes,

When with eagle eyes
He stared at the Pacific, and all his men
Looked at each other with a wild surmise,
Silent upon a peak in Darien.

But the rôle of the first discoverers is apt to be idealised, and its pleasures are easy to exaggerate. Discovery after all is perennial. Every man can be his own Christopher Columbus: all he need do is to cross the Atlantic. He will then discover an America infinitely better worth discovering than ever Columbus dreamt of.

The first modern Europeans to reach the Cape, the Portuguese Bartholomeu Diaz and Vasco da Gama, found very little there besides scarcity, wild men and wild beasts, and they disliked the country. For generations the Cape was no more than a small and struggling port of call for ships sailing between Europe and the East Indies. There they refilled their water-casks, and bought fresh meat and vegetables, and posted their letters, though in no post office. Not the least moving relics in the coast-town museums of South Africa are the inscribed beach stones under which the captains used to bestow their letters in the hope that other captains sailing in the contrary direction would bring them on.

Fascinating as South Africa is to discover to-day, I felt that if I could have postponed my visit for a century I should have been ten times the discoverer I was. So much novelty, so much variety, so many problems and complications challenge the visitor to speculate on what Time the Shaper and the Destroyer will make of these materials. There are the political problem, the race problem, the native problem, the agrarian problem, the transport and marketing problem, the language problem, and others, and all of these problems overlap, and each of them is not one problem but several. The gold-mines, too, must be reckoned a problem. They are a wasting asset, even if the process of wasting should be fairly prolonged, and the problem is not so much the payment of dividends to far-away shareholders as the use of the

proceeds, in part at least, for such public works as will secure the more permanent interests of the country, that is, its agriculture in the broadest sense. The problem of problems, the agrarian, is, first, a problem of distribution: the whites have enormous tracts of land, while the natives, thrice as numerous, have comparatively little apart from holdings in the Protectorates of great extent but little value. It is also a problem of capital and scientific method, for the whites mostly lack the capital to make full use of their holdings, and the natives lack the holdings as well; while by European standards neither whites nor natives are up-to-date agriculturists, to say the least of it. It is a problem, again, of water-engineering. The heavy and violent rainfall drains off rapidly to the sea, eroding the soil at a formidable rate and leaving the farmer to his own devices against drought. The water problem and the political problem again overlap, for large-scale planning for the conservation and distribution of water pivots on what can be done in the highest catchment areas: and in such planning Basutoland, if geography were all, must play an all-important part. But Basutoland is a native enclave administered direct by the Crown, and independent of the Union of South Africa.

"The 'Native Problem' is a misnomer for an infinity of problems. It can be given a nominal unity as the problem of racial co-operation, or as the touchstone of responsibility in the whites. There is no one measure by which the needs and the aspirations of the natives can be met. The total evacuation of South Africa by its present white population would not serve: the world is not likely to let South Africa be a black man's country exclusively. Both natives and whites are comparatively recent immigrants, and are alike tied to the uneasy partnership in which they live. South Africa must be a white-and-black country, unless it should be yellow-and-black. Five millions of black mankind, gifted and formidable, patient and kindly and ambitious, are slowly striving upwards out of savagery, their eyes bent with desire on the white men's civilisation and comforts and necessities. That is the Native Problem. The native wants schooling, he needs religion, and but for the political good manners which white predominance imposes on him, he would be agitating for a better chance to make his living. The Native Problem, therefore, is a missionary problem. Whether the whites are

capable of carrying through this mission is the all-important question. The whites themselves, for one thing, are divided, the English disliking what is commonly supposed to be the harsher attitude of the Dutch, and the Dutch justifying their practice by the Old Testament. In the eyes of the Dutch the wanderings of the children of Israel were a prototype of their own colonisation of South Africa in defiance of dangers from the climate and the savages, not to mention snakes, lions, leopards, baboons, wild elephants, rhinoceroses, and other "superfluous" animals. It was natural, perhaps, for the Dutch voortrekkers, men of one book, the Bible, to think of the natives as the sons of Ham whom Providence intended to be drawers of water and hewers of wood for them. The strict Dutch view refused the natives equality in Church or State. At the pioneer stages the circumstances of colonising under white initiative and the social disparity between the races made any other view paradoxical: and in the countryside especially they still sustain it, though less strongly. In the oldest province, the Cape, for instance, a certain political equality is conceded by legislation to others than whites, if they fulfil the conditions in respect of education and means. This conditional equality, prized by the "subject" races, is endangered at present by the movement for uniformity of franchise throughout the provinces, a uniformity that would assimilate the Cape practice to that of the other provinces. The issue of this movement is obscure: some oppose it in the native interests and others in defence of provincial rights, while others regard it as by no means the only or the best way of protecting native rights. Public opinion about the natives, however, is on the move. Recent years have seen the growth of a friendly *bloc* of sociologists, anthropologists, reformers, humanists, and professional missionaries, who speak increasingly with one voice about native matters and who diffuse a spirit which without controlling state policy affects it fairly strongly.

Durban possesses a new Social Centre for natives, a commodious two-storey building which offers various facilities of the usual club sorts, from skittle-alley to library, from boxing to dramatics, each of them having plenty of devotees. The native wants to live, of course, like the white man, or more like him, in all respects of game-playing, choice of livelihood and standards of comfort, and occasionally studiousness. The

The country would never have settled down without." "Then you think the Boer War did good?" "Of course it did good. The country wouldn't have settled down without it. If it hadn't come then, it would have come later, and been much worse." He was equally decided about the new policy of Fusion between General Hertzog's Nationalist party and General Smuts' South African party. "Oh yes, I'm for Fusion. And high time for it. All these politicians, making trouble and keeping the people apart. Yes, I'm for Fusion, but, mind you, I was never captured."

The tension between the two races is qualified by certain reserves. There is the Englishman, for example, who has a Dutch wife or mother or grandmother, or all three. There are many English and still more Scotch who have become quite Dutch. Mixed feelings are also to be found on the Dutch side through descent, for example, or social connections. At St. Andrew's College, Grahamstown, there is preserved among the school relics an urgent telegram from a Dutch father at Pretoria in the opening days of the Boer War, asking that his son should on no account be sent away during the hostilities. The contradiction of South Africa hovers between being a quality and a defect. An amusing story is told of a veteran Boer officer in the fighting in German South West Africa during the Great War, who was thought to be somewhat lukewarm in the Cause until he learned that the Germans spoke of all General Botha's forces as "Englander." This fired him.

The contradiction of South Africa will tend in the long run to subside into amity. In the meantime it is drawn upon occasion both ways towards extremes, and the campaign for Fusion has provoked the extremists, both English and Dutch. Certain English stalwarts in Natal think that General Smuts has betrayed the South African party and the imperial tie to the enemy. Dr. Malan, on the other hand, and his followers think General Hertzog a traitor. Dr. Malan, who is a great power with popular audiences, asserts the right of South Africa to become a Republic—but not necessarily outside the British Empire. He is partial to the British Navy, as well he may be, for without the protection of the British Navy the liberties of South Africa would be at the mercy of any conquest by sea. Extremism may be allowed to have one merit, complete purity of doctrine—it this is really a merit. But

Dr. Malan's extremism, vehement for abstract rights while appreciative of the British Navy, has still a touch, or more than a touch of saving contradictiousness.

Dr. Malan bears a French name which is very common in South Africa. The French Huguenot influx in the seventeenth century has had a great influence on the Dutch, and especially in the professions and political life. The use of the French language ceased long ago, and many of the French patronymics have been corrupted in spelling and sound and are taken for Dutch—e.g., Dominy (Dumesnil), Botha* (Boutier), Viljoen (Villon). But the French mixture continues to work in the blood, and the better the blood the clearer and stronger the French qualities. It is not unreasonable to look on certain qualities shown by the leading Dutch stocks in political, military and professional life as partly French in origin. It is impossible not to admire the results of the frenchification: this crossing must be among the best in history. The matter, however, has another side. The English and the Dutch of Europe are closely akin and usually get on well together. Between the English and the French there is respect and admiration, but hardly congeniality. The infusion of French qualities has probably contributed more than is usually suspected to the tension between the English and the Dutch and, contrariwise, to the good terms which so easily spring up between the Scotch and the Dutch.

The rôle of the Scotch in South African life, in religion, education and business, has been remarkable. The Dutch Church being at a low ebb a century ago, a few young divines were brought out from Scotland, after a stay in Holland to learn the language, and succeeded so well in re-establishing the tradition of Calvinist doctrine and piety that their names are now household words among the Dutch. Among these divines there have been many Murrays, Andrews and Johns, and to my surprise I found my name as good as a passport. As for education, the Scotch have had it largely their own way. All the authentic marks of Scotch education—intensity, method, and bureaucratic control, are there, the merits and the demerits alike, the ardent belief in the larger issues and the insistence on examinations and passes and percentages.

No one can travel in South Africa without hearing often the rueful comment that there are too many small universities in

* Botha is genuine Dutch and assimilated French.

the country. There is little here to rue. The huge universities that strike the eye in Europe and still more in America are apt to lack the authentic qualities of university life. Many are situated in great cities: and while it is convenient for these cities to harbour universities, it is better for universities to be free from overshadowing influences and to live their own life. The modern age is committed to great city universities, and they in turn to great and urgent technological needs. For that very reason universities of the other type—smaller, relatively cultured, residential, set in peaceful and leisurely surroundings, and tuned to thinking and being and doing rather than to making are peculiarly necessary in this age and in every country. South Africa is fortunate in possessing a majority of institutions of this type in Stellenbosch, Pretoria, Grahamstown, Bloemfontein, and Pietermaritzburg, and the two exceptions—Cape Town and Johannesburg—are themselves far from being of the restricted city type.

The bone of contention between English and Dutch in South Africa has been, at bottom, unification. The local individualism of the Dutch long ago shook off the hold and the influence of Holland. Impatient of seeming a mere off-shoot of their own homeland and possessed of a land of their own and an authentic patriotism, they have disliked the instinct of the English to look on England as "Home." The spread of Dutch colonisation has illustrated the distaste for central control. A loose association of virtually independent communities, and sometimes the very loosest is the core of the traditional Dutch "republicanism," for which localism or regionalism would be a better name. Towards the end of President Kruger's reign there were those in his entourage who aimed at a unified Dutch South Africa. But the policy, if it can be called so, came too late under duress of the approaching crisis: that way of thinking was not in the blood and bones of the Dutch. Between then and now their old particularism has crumbled, and the English lesson of unification has been well learnt. Rooted convictions, ingrained methods and thoroughness are not the usual "notes" of a new country. South Africa has in large measure the psychology of an old country: its affinity is with Europe far more, for instance, than with America. This holds in the quality of its State power. The country expects decidedness, enterprise and assurance in its government. It is prepared to grant its bureaucracy very considerable scope and

authority. It appears to be entering on a period of strong leadership and long views, that is to say, of imperialism. The Union has its eyes on neighbour territories. It courts Rhodesia, but Rhodesia is coy. It has proscribed the Nazi agitation in its mandated territory, the former German South West. It is not that the Union is covetous or crudely ambitious, but rather that it has hopes, still only half-conscious, of creating a larger co-operative unit for politics and economic life. "Fusion" is the symbol of this development.

The emergence of Imperialism is a natural growth. Just as natural is the emergence of an antagonising force in Dr. Malan's party, in which the old Dutch Republicanism or Particularism is revived in a guise that English observers may well qualify as Liberalism. The more a country has of national egoism and ambition, the more it needs the check of self-criticism: the stronger the instincts of power, the greater the need to safeguard freedom and individuality, whether of persons or of regions. Vision and vigour are the making of good politics; but vigilance against misuse of power and exaggerations of policy is often the saving of them. Under Dr. Malan, a man of principle and party gifts and great eloquence, a salutary movement may take shape.

Of complexity and clashing South Africa has enough and more than enough, and on top of these a froth of contradictoryness. As the racial tension falls, the froth may be expected to sink into normal party spirit. The chief elements of the mixing, English, Dutch, French, Scotch and German, are gifted enough types, distinctive but fairly near akin—in short, a nap hand. Whether the qualities in fusion or the conditions under which the fusion is taking place are considered, the prospects are exceptional. A certain aristocratism pervades the minds of the whites, and in a measure braces and flavours manners and conduct. This undertone of dignity and obligation, the mark of the upper layers in an old country rather than of the entire population in a new, gives a certain definiteness to social feeling. In the unusual air of Africa the heirs of the diverse endowments of the five races should make before long an outstanding people. In such hands the destinies of the subcontinent should be safe.

JOHN MURRAY.

CONVICTIONS.

UNDER the title *Convictions* the Rev. Leonard Hodgson, M.A., Hon. D.D., D.C.L., Canon of Winchester Cathedral, has, with the assistance of the Very Rev. H. N. Bate, M.A., Dean of York, and Ralph W. Brown, formerly General Secretary to the Continuation Committee, brought together a Selection from the Responses of the Churches to the Report of the World Conference on Faith and Order, held at Lausanne in 1927.* As Deputy Chairman of that Conference I have read this volume with great interest, even although I had gone through all the responses in typescript as they came in; and I desire to express my appreciation of this service,† which Canon Hodgson, now Theological and General Secretary of the Continuation Committee, and those who have assisted him in this arduous and responsible enterprise have rendered to the cause of Christian Reunion. It is in the hope of assisting and encouraging this movement that I venture to offer, not a belated review of the book, but a consideration of some of the most important issues, to which its contents direct attention, an attention which must be given, if there is to be any progress recorded at the next Conference in 1937. While the editor is entirely justified in his choice of title, as the volume contains the *convictions* of many of the churches, a close searching scrutiny has led me, as it may lead many other readers, to raise the question whether much which is here recorded as such can in truth be so regarded and respected; whether tradition and custom do not often appear as *convictions*, and even prejudices as principles; whether the inheritance from the past is not often a hindrance to receiving the guidance of the Spirit in the present.

I

1. In one response it is quite frankly said that "a complete union of Christian churches is not within measurable distance or even desirable," that "the ideals of union will best be achieved by the joining together of those churches which are

* *Convictions*. Student Christian Movement Press. 1934. 8s. 6d. Only a few copies are now available for sale.

† This service has been greatly enhanced by the excellent analytical index which will facilitate the use of the volume.

most closely akin in order and doctrine," and that "the advancement of the Kingdom of God will best be served by friendly co-operation rather than by attempts at organic union" (p. 47). Four of the responses express the doubt whether it is desirable. "There is no widespread conviction among Baptists that the division of Christendom into churches or denominations is of itself to be deplored, nor that the organic union of all Christians is an object to be sought for its own sake" (p. 55). While in the mission field "an outward unity of organisation may be more pressing," such a unity at home must remain an open question (p. 147). A distinction should be made between unity and union, and yet the relation of the two deserves further consideration (p. 167). More frequently expressed is the conviction that organic unity is "the only satisfactory goal." Federation is not approved as "a substitute for organic union" (p. 77). "God wills unity. His people should make definite and sacrificial endeavours to bring about its realisation as speedily as possible" (p. 80). Federation may serve "to prepare and advance the highest form of organic unity" (p. 161). A conviction, greater than the convictions which have divided, is needed to secure organic union, and into that only the Spirit of God can lead (p. 221). The impression which the responses generally make upon my mind is that "that greater conviction" has not yet been adequately spread abroad among the churches. There is an amiable sentiment, not a compelling purpose. As one to whom that conviction has been given, the responses consequently are disappointing; and it is evident that patience will have to do her perfect work before "the satisfactory goal" will even come into clear vision. Indeed, in the last few years there has been on the Continent a theological reaction, and a reversion to the distinctive types of the Reformation Confessions; and these differences will be more prominent in 1937 than they were in 1927.

2. So deeply rooted in the past are the theological and ecclesiastical differences, and so secondary in comparison is the vision of the essential visible unity of the Christian Church, that it seems necessary to present the case for that unity from the standpoint, not of an ecclesiastic but of a theologian, if I may claim that honourable title and responsible function. (a) To me the unity of the Church visible to the world is essential, because it is rooted in the reality of

God Himself as revealed in Christ. I am an enthusiastic, some might even call me a fanatical monotheist; for me the ecclesiastical dogmas do not adequately express and safeguard the divine unity, and too easily lend themselves to the popular error of tritheism. But my conception of God is trinitarian, or rather tri-unitarian, as for my faith no less than my creed it is the sole and same God, whom Jesus has revealed as Father, who is confessed in Christ as Saviour and Lord, and who is experienced as Holy Spirit. The eternal reality of the love of God, the historical revelation of that love in the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the personal experience of that love through that grace in the common possession by all believers of the Holy Spirit as Life-giver are one divine manifestation and communication, the difference of which is over-asserted in the use of the term "person," and the unity of which is under-expressed in the use of the term "substance." For me Christ is God under human conditions, and the Spirit is God in human processes of thought and life more really than such a term as "consubstantial" can express; for to me the transcendent God is essentially immanent in incarnation and inspiration. The Christian Church is the community (*Koinonia*) of the Holy Spirit (2 Cor. xiii, 14), who is the other Paraclete (John xiv, 16; cf. 1 John ii, 1); the Church is also the body of Christ, the continuation of the Incarnation (Eph. i, 23); and as the Word made flesh was God's tabernacle on which rested God's glory (John i, 14), so this body of Christ is the temple of God (Eph. ii, 22). Can there be more than one community of the Spirit, one body of Christ, or one temple of God, if God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit be one?

(b) If it be argued, as it often is, that this unity is spiritual, and so invisible, and need be nothing more, for the practical people we can reply that the manifest unity is necessary to the full effectiveness of the Church in its witness and work, as expressed in John xvii, 21, "that they all may be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us: that the world may believe that thou didst send me." Whether the words are the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus or not, can their truth be doubted? How can a divided Church realise its essential unity in God, and how, failing and falling short in this, can it convince the world of the essential unity with God of Him whose name it claims as its distinctive mark?

To this I shall return, but let me now offer a less pragmatic answer.

(c) The separation of spirit and matter, soul and body, invisible and visible, is an altogether false one. Whatever God be in Himself as spirit, He is known to us, because He has been pleased to make Himself known as manifest in nature and history, man and Christ, the Incarnate Word. We as men are not, and I for one do not hope ever to be, a disembodied soul, a ghost—a conception which is a survival of pagan dualism. With Paul I dare to hope to be not unclothed, but clothed upon with the spiritual body (2 Cor. v, 2, 3), the complete human personality. The love of man and woman finds its consummation in the child. The poet gives to "airy nothing a local habitation and a name." The artist expresses his genius by an inner compulsion in sound, colour, shape. Christ gave to His Church the sacraments as well as the Gospel; and all religion expresses itself in some ritual forms. Spiritual reality became manifest in sensuous symbol. The symbol may become so extravagantly sensuous as to distract attention from the spiritual reality. There is a ritual obesity; and there is also a ritual scragginess; but there can be also a due proportion of the Word and the flesh. To be expressed and made fully effective the unity of the Church must become manifest—that seems to me an inner necessity of its nature, and not merely a practical expediency. Hence the division of the churches is a contradiction of the essential unity of the Church, a challenge to its effective witness and work.

(d) History affords abundant evidence of the loss and injury which disunion involves. The loss is incalculable; for we cannot conceive what the Church, if its unity had been preserved, might have been and have effected in the world. The injury is only too evident. When the Apostolic Church was threatened with disunion, what wisdom was shown in contrast to the unwisdom of later generations (Acts xv)! Had Peter and James insisted on the circumcision of the Gentile believers, or had Paul insisted on acting in the spirit of his *Epistle to the Galatians*, how different the issue would have been!* The schism between Western and Eastern Christianity made possible the triumphant progress of Islam, and the subjugation of the earliest homes of the Christian faith. The

* It is to me inconceivable that Paul could have written such a letter after the agreement at Jerusalem (Acts xv).

uncompromising attitude of Luther to Zwingli weakened the cause of the Reformation. Despite the common danger from neo-Paganism on the one hand, and the interference of the State on the other, the differences of Lutherans and Calvinists are being emphasised in Germany to-day. Did not the Church of England suffer loss, when it failed to allow room within its borders for John Wesley's Evangelical Revival? Is that Church made more attractive and efficient by its internal divisions of High, Low and Broad, even if these have not resulted in ecclesiastical separations? Has there been no loss to English Nonconformity and Scottish Presbyterianism in the wasteful competition instead of the helpful co-operation of the denominations? How any man can call our divisions anything but unhappy passes my comprehension.

II

Not only do the responses included in this volume give the impression that the vision of unity is not influencing the purpose and the prospect of the churches as it ought; but throughout there seems to me to run the assumption that the legitimacy and even the necessity of the divisions and their continuance needs no defence, that the spiritual ancestors of all those varied types of faith and order are to be commended for their fidelity to conscience, their courage in affirming their convictions, and that it would be ingratitude to their memory, disloyalty to them personally, to ask whether the divisions must continue. This is an assumption that needs to be subjected to very close scrutiny, as if it continues to prevail the prospects of reunion are very dark.

1. We must first of all distinguish what we may call the *contingent necessity* of facts and the *absolute necessity* of truth. In certain given circumstances, the principles and the methods of Church organisation being what they were, the convictions, dispositions, and even tempers of men being what they were, divisions may have been inevitable; the intolerant majority and the resistant minority may have been equally conscientious, and equally praiseworthy for their obedience to conscience; and they may still deserve our recognition that both were trying to know and do the right; and yet as we look back we may admit, without any adverse judgment on their morals or their religion, that they were mistaken,

probably not equally, as the one party may have possessed a discernment of truth and right lacking in equal measure to the other. We may now see that they were mistaken as regards the necessity for uniformity in creed, code, ritual, and polity, as regards the authority of the Holy Scriptures and the traditions and customs of the Church, as regards the capacity of the human mind to gain such a knowledge of the will of God as would justify intolerance towards, and separation from, all who might be otherwise minded. Whether the Lausanne Report is, or is not in agreement with the faith and order of the divided churches seems to me a less important question than this, whether there is any longer a justification for the continuance of all their divisions.

2. The mistakes just mentioned deserve a closer scrutiny. Let us frankly challenge the prevalent assumption that unity must be manifested in uniformity. Does a common faith, hope, love toward the Lord Jesus Christ, and a common witness, worship and work in His Spirit demand exactly and minutely the same creed, code, ritual, and polity? The unity of the Apostolic Age was preserved without uniformity. The Synoptic, Johannine and Pauline types of theology are not identical, if not inconsistent with one another. Jewish Christians maintained observances of the Jewish law, from which Gentile Christians were relieved. The local congregations had not the same organisation, but this was adapted to local conditions. It may be that greater uniformity for closer cohesion within, and stronger resistance without, was one of the contingent necessities of which mention has just been made in the centuries when persecution, heresy, and schism were threatening; but now that the Christian churches have through their past development reached a more stable character, and are not exposed to the same dangers from the world around, the question may well be raised whether the helps of the past may not be hindrances in the present. As long as what may be described as the Catholic view prevails, although Protestant churches have been, and some still are insistent on uniformity, this obstacle will appear insuperable. The differences which have led to divisions in the past will resist any insistence on uniformity. Although it is not easy to change habits of mind, this habit may be challenged on reasonable grounds. Unless it can be shown that either by divine command a fixed organisation belongs to the permanence and

the efficiency of the Christian Church for its functions in the redemptive purpose of God, or that such an organisation is so essentially related to these functions that the discharge of them depends on its preservation, the refusal even to contemplate the possibility of change must be challenged as unreasonable.

Scholars generally are agreed that no organisation is prescribed in the New Testament, and that the three main types of polity may find some justification there. To assume as a basis for any exclusive claim of validity unrecorded dominical instructions after the Resurrection is an irrelevance. Men have been saved and sanctified by the grace of God under and by means of many kinds of ecclesiastical organisations, and I have not yet met with any convincing demonstration of a necessary connection between *soteriological* function and *sociological* structure. The inquiry which is called for to-day is, what is the minimum of uniformity and the maximum of liberty which is consistent with the manifestation of the unity of the Church? There must be in my judgment a commonly preached Gospel, a commonly recognised ministry, and commonly accepted sacraments; and these in my judgment could be secured without any of the rigidity of the organisations of the past. Whatever is spiritually real and effective should be recognised as ecclesiastically valid and regular. I thus frankly state my conviction with due respect to those who would reject it.

3. In regard to the questions of reunion it seems to me that a widely changed attitude on the question of authority must be recognised. The principle of evolution as not a substitute for, but a method of, the divine activity in nature and history, has altered the conception of God and His relation to the world from a static to a dynamic, from substance to subject, from nature to purpose, from constant to progressive activity. This mode of thinking, which has proved its value in science and philosophy, has a legitimate place in theology. Our conception of the Bible is altered; it is not a textbook of inspired and infallible history, theology, ethics, but the record of a progressive revelation in which the divine communication of truth and grace is by human media. Hence the dogmatic method of handling the Scriptures is giving place to the historical. The full significance of the change is not recognised by many who profess to be modern in their outlook;

they still avow their adherence to creeds, the basis of which is this dogmatic use of the Scriptures; and they use the Holy Scriptures for the sanction of traditions and customs of the Church, as if they still held the theory of verbal inspiration. Should not this changed attitude to the Bible lead to a corresponding change of attitude towards the Church? Some, it is true, would take refuge from the perplexities and difficulties which the changed attitude to the Bible involves in the assurances of certainty and tranquillity which the absolute authority of the Church appears to offer; but there is a fallacy in their reasonings. There cannot be claimed for the Church an authority denied to the Bible. Its history, too, must be dealt with, not dogmatically, but historically, not as having in itself finality, but only as a changing organ in a changing world of a progressive purpose of God ever active. The conception of the Church should not be static but dynamic, as are now for most theologians the conceptions of God, revelation and the Bible; even if the eternal reality of divine truth and grace be there revealed, yet its human objects and organs are in time under the conditions of change and progress. Not even the Apostolic Age in its temporal forms, nor any number of early centuries, can carry final authority; the past must be respected as a tutor (Galatians iv, 2), but the present must not be enslaved to it as a master; its traditions and customs may be used as the steps of a ladder, but not hugged as the chains of a captive. The Church, too, must rise on stepping-stones of its dead self to higher things.

4. The recognition of these two facts, that uniformity is no essential condition of unity, but rather that the fulness of human thought and life in relation to God calls for variety within the unity, and that neither Bible nor Church apart from the divine revelation, which they declare and convey, can have final authority, because always humanly conditioned, can be related to a more general principle, the insufficiency of the human reason and conscience at any stage of their development to apprehend and appreciate fully the eternal reality of God and His dealings with men, and consequently their necessary progressiveness. To the *Critique of the Pure Reason* and the *Critique of the Practical Reason* there would need to be added the *Critique of the Spiritual Reason*. Paul, to whom surely was given an exceptional discernment of the things of God, an extraordinary participation

in the mind of Christ, confessed that he knew only in part, and that he saw as in a mirror, in a riddle (1 Corinthians xiii, 12). It would be well if dogmatists and ecclesiastics would learn from him a like humility, and would show a corresponding diffidence in the expression of their convictions. I should like to see a candid and courageous scrutiny by all the churches of what they call their convictions, the doctrines and practices by which they really live, and for which they would be willing to die. Such a scrutiny would surely enable them to rid themselves of a great deal of antique lumber, interesting and ornamental, but not living and working truth. That Christ is able to save to the uttermost all who come unto God through Him is a tried and proved conviction, a transfiguring reality in experience (Hebrew vii, 25); a plan of salvation or a theory of the atonement need not be, and falls rather into the sphere of opinion. That the Church is the body of Christ, which He vitalises and invigorates by His Spirit, and so uses as His complement, His organ of redeeming and reconciling activity is a conviction (Ephesians i, 23); that bishops, priests, and deacons are necessary as its ministers need not be, but may be regarded as an opinion. Unless some such distinction is recognised and applied there is but a dim prospect of the reunion of the churches; until they are prepared to apply as a standard of judgment to their differences what they are now discovering to be their agreements, there will be little progress towards reunion. To go on, as some seem to think is the permanent purpose and obligation of the Faith and Order movement, asserting and emphasising differences instead of trying to discover and confess their unimportance and subordination relative to the agreements, is a policy which will make the second Lausanne Conference of 1937, with more adequate grounds, a greater disappointment than to many ardent spirits the first Conference of 1927 proved. What was reasonable at the one would not have a like claim to reason at the other; the first will have been held in vain, if the second is only a copy of it. A serious responsibility will rest on those who bring about any such disaster. That 1937 will offer the solution of the problems of 1927 would be an unreasonable hope, but that it will record real advance towards the solution is a justifiable expectation. I am here expressing my personal judgment with no special authority.

III

1. What the responses to the Lausanne Report show is that the churches are not yet ready for such a drastic purge as is suggested above; they are still confusing, and will continue to confuse opinions, which without any loss can be abandoned, and convictions, which at any cost must be maintained. In more recent discussions three tendencies have appeared in the preparation for the 1937 Conference, which may be described as the American, which aims at speedy removal of the divisions; the English, which desires continued study of ecclesiastical differences; and the Continental, which is more concerned about creed than polity. If we had to wait till all conflicting "convictions," ecclesiastical and theological, were reconciled, the "hope" of reunion would indeed be "forlorn." But there seems to me to be a *via media*, a practical expedient. Let the churches resolve for the sake of their agreements to tolerate mutually their differences, and to modify their differences as far as may be necessary to give expression and effect to their agreements. The non-episcopalian may accept episcopacy without injury to his conscience, and the episcopalian may be loyal to truth as he apprehends it without insisting that his own theory of the episcopate must be accepted. All believers may have a common experience of the presence of Christ in His efficient grace in the sacrament, whether Lutheran, Zwinglian, Calvinist, Anglican, Roman, or Orthodox in theory about the metaphysics of that presence. To demand reordination from non-Anglicans, or to refuse communion to the unconfirmed, is, however, an intolerance in practice which can justify itself only by a dogmatism in theory which in my judgment the three considerations presented in the previous section do not justify. As a difference in practice, here lies the crucial difficulty in the way of reunion; and those who refuse to remove it by a conciliatory concession for a time at least bear a very heavy responsibility. The period of transition would present such difficulties; but once reunion were accomplished, a common ministry and common sacraments, then other "convictions" of doctrine or practice, unless as necessarily modified by the conditions of reunion, could continue. They should continue for this good reason. The only plausible and respectable plea for the divisions of the Church I know is that thereby the

wide range and the deep reach of Christ's grace and truth have found more adequate expression. A minority, when it separates, throws into bolder relief some neglected aspects of doctrine or practice; and thus Christianity has been more adequately presented in history than one Church could have done. If there was a contingent necessity for separation to secure this gain, there was surely no absolute necessity; it was only because uniformity was intolerantly insisted on that the variety of thought and life had to be thus displayed in separation. It is well then that the legitimate differences, for not all can make that claim, should be maintained until the gain of each part of the Church is once more restored to the whole. The less uniformity is insisted on in the beginning, the more will those differences which have in history proved their right to be, contribute by being shared in a common witness, worship, and work, to a wider Christianity, a richer faith, hope, and love in Christ.

Each sees one colour of Thy rainbow-light,
 Each looks upon one tint and calls it heaven;
 Thou art the fulness of our partial sight;
 We are not perfect till we find the seven;
 Gather us in.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

LORD FITZMAURICE, 1846-1935.

WHEN there passes away some personality who has lived through a long period of history and survived great development in politics and society, there is a tendency to say that we shall never see his like again. Fortunately the structure of English society is sufficiently stable to refute such an assertion. Types persist from age to age. There will, doubtless, be at all times in England citizens and statesmen like the subject of this essay, aristocrats, in the most comprehensive sense of the word, as well as other types which contribute to a rich and complex ancient society.

Lord Fitzmaurice was an aristocrat of the type which Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville admired, men of birth, education, and talent, devoted to the ideal of public service, but without the slightest trace of the "caste" point of view, the *hauteur* which was so obvious in the *noblesse* of the *ancien régime*. Fitzmaurice was by temperament as well as by birth and training a Whig, holding a political tradition developed from the Revolution of 1688 through the limited monarchy of the first two Georges, the American Revolution, the Reform Act of 1832, down to the great dividing line of 1886, Mr. Gladstone's First Home Rule Bill. After this point his Whig outlook, like that of nearly all the aristocrats who remained with Mr. Gladstone, became bolder and took on a certain degree of radicalism. This radicalism (always, it must be understood, restrained and moderate) illustrates the openness and variety of English aristocracy, which admits of developments in almost every political or social direction without becoming eccentric. I am not upholding this as an ideal, but merely trying to record an historical fact of English politics and society.

Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, the second son of the fourth Marquess of Lansdowne, and of the Marchioness who was a daughter of Comte de Flahaut, was born in 1846, in a social *milieu* which was still regarded as a "governing class." The male members of the "old" families expected to have a political career which would be exacting, although dignified, and would be practically entirely at their own charges. They had a very highly developed sense of private, or rather of family, property, yet a notion that in a manner they held their wealth as a public trust. Lansdowne House was a great

Adam mansion on Berkeley Square, with a big lawn and flower-beds : a town house which, although it existed until the other day, now in retrospect seems incredibly spacious and rural. There young Lord Edmond met not only the leading Whig statesmen, but men of letters too ; one of his boyish memories was Matthew Arnold, who liked walking about the garden of Lansdowne House, talking in his serious but sunny, friendly manner to the boys and girls as well as the seniors who were always in or about the house. Fitzmaurice was educated at school at Eton, and at college at Trinity, Cambridge. Arthur Balfour, whom he had known at Eton, was one of his friends at Trinity, a year junior to him. It was at Cambridge also that he formed his lifelong friendship with Charles Dilke, at that time at Trinity Hall, who was three years senior to him. Fitzmaurice impressed people by reason of his practical as well as intellectual ability, played Eton football at College with distinction, and was placed in the first class of the Classical Tripos in 1868. He was also president of the Cambridge Union.

While at Eton and Trinity, Fitzmaurice had been in the habit of spending much of his vacations at the house of his maternal grandfather, General Flahaut, at the Hôtel de Salm on the Quai d'Orsay, Paris. In this way he acquired his facility in the French tongue and his knowledge of European political society. He was in Paris in September 1870, when Flahaut died, and shortly before Paris was invested by the Germans. He remained until the funeral was over, and obtained a place in the last train that was able to leave Paris for Switzerland.

Fitzmaurice lived chiefly in London, at Lansdowne House or with a relation at No. 106 Piccadilly, now the St. James's Club ; and in later life, when invited to lunch or dinner there, he astonished members by casually remarking : " This was the room I slept in." He was called to the Bar. From 1869 to 1885 he sat as Member of Parliament for Calne, which even after the Reform Act was regarded as something of a Lansdowne family borough. But he never had, and did not expect to have, an easy seat in the House. He had to fight many elections, and he changed his constituency, though confining himself to Wiltshire. Always simple, friendly, and sincere, he was equally at home with the countrymen round Calne and Devizes, and with the railwaymen of Swindon. The Swindon

people still talk about him and one of them some time ago showed me a book, *The Life of Sir William Petty*, given to him and signed by Lord Fitzmaurice, who was the author. Fond of travelling, and brought up in the " European " atmosphere of the Hôtel de Salm, Fitzmaurice was not likely to confine himself to domestic politics, although he was active there. He was for a year private secretary to Robert Lowe in 1872-3, when Lowe was Home Secretary.

Tall, vigorous, athletic, he had to give up hunting after an accident in the field. This may have turned his already studious nature more to reading. His great opportunity in foreign politics came in 1880, when he was made one of the commissioners for executing the Treaty of Berlin in Turkey-in-Europe. Fitzmaurice's special sphere was to be a Commissioner for delimiting Eastern Rumelia, now Southern Bulgaria. In later life he was always pleased to remember that he discovered a very distinguished public servant in Lord D'Abernon, whom he took out to Bulgaria as his private secretary. Lord D'Abernon was then a lieutenant in the Coldstream Guards. Work at Constantinople and in Eastern Rumelia gave Fitzmaurice an intimate acquaintance with the personalities of the Sublime Porte, such as Carathéodory Pasha, of whom he held a high opinion. He was not so enthusiastic about the foreign adventurers (though they amused him) who held commissions in the Turkish Army and added to the picturesqueness of hotels and restaurants of Galata and Pera. After settling the Eastern Rumelian frontier and coming home, Fitzmaurice was made a member of a European Conference on the Danube, held at London in 1882. This subject of the Danube was one over which Sir Julian Pauncefote, Permanent Under-secretary of the Foreign Office, said that rivers of ink had continued to flow since the Treaty of Paris of 1856. The London Conference brought Fitzmaurice into association with Pauncefote, an association which became closer through Fitzmaurice's tenure of the position of Under-secretary of State for the Foreign Office from 1882 to 1885.

At the Foreign Office Fitzmaurice's interest, as indeed all through life, was predominantly in the Near East. He had two plans, both quite practicable, which, if adopted, would have averted many future troubles. One was to secure the establishing of local elected Councils in the European provinces of Turkey and from these to build up a central representative

Times quoted (not in the notice but in a subsequent letter) a good example. Fitzmaurice and the writer of the notice were talking about the question of Balfour's fagging. Fitzmaurice said: "Balfour was my fag at Eton, not my brother's"; he added just the one thing necessary to call up the youthful scene in all its vividness: "Balfour was rather an indolent fag." His memory right down to his last year was amazing. He could quote conversations of the year 1870, and recall the nineteenth-century scene. His favourite characters (for conversation) were Gortchakoff and Disraeli. He liked to tell how he stayed at the same hotel on the Rigi with Gortchakoff in the early 'eighties. The Russian Chancellor was weak on his legs, enjoyed the mountain scenery, but had a horror of an active inquisitive cow which browsed by the hotel path. Fitzmaurice, who was tall and broad and long-limbed, used to give an arm to the aged statesman and, grasping a stout stick, would lead him past the cow to the selected view point. Disraeli, he always maintained, was the ideal House of Commons man. As contrasted with Mr. Gladstone, who always liked to go home as soon as the House of Commons business was over, Disraeli would sit until any hour of the night or morning chatting with anyone who wanted to talk; and thus he steadily increased his popularity. The two contemporary Englishmen whom he put first in respect of knowledge of foreign affairs (at any rate after Lord Granville) were Dilke and (somewhat surprisingly) Campbell-Bannerman. Of Dilke he always spoke with affection and respect, and deeply regretted that Dilke had not gone for a year's trip round the world when the rumour of scandal descended upon him; then the whole thing would have blown over.

Campbell-Bannerman was not only an active House of Commons man. He travelled abroad and was with his wife a regular visitor at Marienbad, which, in King Edward's time, was the informal meeting-place of diplomatists of all nations and even a place where policy was shaped. Fitzmaurice always maintained that Campbell-Bannerman would have been an admirable Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and seemed to suggest that Campbell-Bannerman actually thought of this post as a possibility in 1905, but put the idea aside. As regards ambassadors, Fitzmaurice's friendship was chiefly for Sir Fairfax Cartwright, whose lively despatches are some

of the best reading in the volumes of *British Documents on the Origins of the War*.

To this large-minded public servant, man of affairs and scholar, history was politics and politics history. His written work is definitive: he has done *the* book on Shelburne and on Granville. Both are deeply interesting as narratives and studies of statesmanship; both are on the massive (but not enormous) scale and are fully documented. Shelburne, the progressive Whig, the peacemaker; and Granville, ideal combination of the diplomatic and political temperament, obviously satisfied his mind and heart; Fitzmaurice himself was something of both. Yet the book in which he took most pride was his brief life of Charles William Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick, hero of the Seven Years War and of the Napoleonic, of Crefeld and Jena; famous, too, for his failure at Valmy. This work, originally articles in the *Quarterly Review*, was made into a volume at the suggestion of Lord Rosebery. It is a *chef d'œuvre* of eighteenth-century history. The court, the camp, the little "benevolent" despots, the Great Frederick too, North Germany doing the "Enlightenment," all live in these deft pages. The book (published in 1901) has been for years out of print and should be re-issued.

Although he did not achieve distinctions such as those of his famous brother, who was Governor-General of Canada, Viceroy of India, and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Fitzmaurice was a notable public servant with a particularly long and useful career. His work in the Near East and at the Foreign Office is recorded in historical documents which have been published. He was twice Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the second term of service being in the period described by M. Paléologue as "a great turning-point" in the history of the world. His minutes on documents show the judicious adviser that he was. He could be humorous also, as well as incisive. After commenting in a minute on a monumental memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe concerning *The Present State of British Relations with France and Germany*, Fitzmaurice continues:

The only other remark I make on this most able and interesting Memo. is to suggest whether the restless and uncertain personal character of the Emperor William is sufficiently taken into account in the estimate of the present situation. There was at least method in Prince Bismarck's madness; but the Emperor is like a cat in a

cupboard. He may jump out anywhere. The whole situation would be changed in a moment if this personal factor were changed, and another Minister like General Caprivi also came into office in consequence (*British Documents on the Origins of the War*, III, 42c).

As the only survivor, in his latter years, of Gladstone's second Ministry, Fitzmaurice might have been a lonely figure. Yet, though he outlived all his contemporaries, he never lived in the past. He had the capacity for making friends to the very end. He kept abreast of current foreign and domestic politics, and he purchased and read all the important current historical books. The editors of the great collection, *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, have testified to his help given to them in their task. Many other historians, such as the American Alvoord, are indebted to him for suggestion and information. Alvoord was making important researches in Mississippi Valley history of the late eighteenth century and visiting England established touch with Lord Fitzmaurice with good results. All Fitzmaurice's documents, letters received and other papers, were kept by him in some system which enabled him to produce the right document when required. He was a punctual answerer of letters; any historian or public man who put an inquiry to him received an immediate answer and probably, also, if it would help, an invitation to Leigh. On arrival, he would find the appropriate document laid out on a table in the library, and Fitzmaurice ready to speak and to give further information about it. No visitor would ever forget the tall, bent figure of the retired statesman; the courteous, friendly, frank greeting; the easy conversation that ensued; the ripe judgments, the rare information.

Going out from city and university to the cool and serene atmosphere of Leigh, one could not help thinking of the home of the incomparable Lord Falkland, to whom Clarendon says the Fellows of Colleges rode out to visit in order to examine and refine their grosser propositions:

Who found such an immenseness of wit, and such a solidity of judgment in him, so infinite a fancy, bound by a most logical ratiocination, such a vast knowledge, that he was not ignorant in anything, yet such an excessive humility, as if he had known nothing, that they frequently resorted, and dwelt with him, as in a college situated in a purer air.

R. B. MOWAT.

BRITISH CULTURE ABROAD.

IT is a curious paradox that the English, who travel more widely than any other nation, should remain the greatest enigma to the rest of the world. The people of the "unknown island" continue to excite and baffle the curiosity of foreigners, who are left in puzzled admiration or resentful bewilderment. We ourselves read with interest the books that others write about us, and note with equal condescension their errors of fact or judgment or the shrewdness of their criticism; only rarely are we annoyed by either. We are perhaps dimly aware that our habits of thought and action are often extremely irritating to foreigners, but our equanimity is hardly ruffled when they show their irritation, and for that very reason we make little effort to correct its cause. For example, the criticisms of our foreign policy which appear in the newspapers of other countries are seldom answered in our own, no matter how malicious or misinformed we may consider them. As for taking positive steps to explain our aims and achievements, that we regard as undignified and unnecessary. Good wine, we optimistically feel, needs no bush.

The average Englishman, even though he may not admit it openly, is at heart rather proud of this attitude. He persuades himself that it springs from some superior quality peculiar to Britain, from a spirit of detachment which the circumstances of our history have developed more maturely here than elsewhere. He would be incredulous or even mildly shocked were he told that this attitude was due, at least in part, to mental indolence and lack of imagination, and only if he were fully convinced that it was materially damaging his interests would he take steps to correct it.

In 1914 this self-sufficiency suffered a violent shock, and when the war ended, the establishment of the League of Nations with the enthusiastic support of Great Britain seemed to many of us the outward and visible sign that we had ceased to be insular in our habits of thought and that we really desired to understand and to be understood by others. It is true that during the brief period of peace and apparent prosperity which followed, we cherished the comfortable illusion that through the League of Nations we could maintain European peace without involving ourselves in too many responsibilities. The last five years have rudely shattered

this dream and to-day we find ourselves forced to take an ever-increasing share in the worries and anxieties of the outer world.

Meanwhile, as Britain turns reluctantly to a more active partnership in the affairs of Europe and the world, the world is looking with increased urgency towards Britain. There is a widespread feeling that in an age of instability England alone is stable, and that the secret of this stability deserves careful study and attention. Never in our long history have our help and leadership been more earnestly sought, never has there been so great a curiosity and desire to know what we stand for. This being so, we are clearly bound not only to inform ourselves better about other countries, but equally to see that they are better informed about us. It is time that this nation of shopkeepers did a little stock-taking to see how far our contribution to civilisation is understood elsewhere and to decide how best we can satisfy this new demand for fuller information about almost every aspect of our national life, character and institutions. Incidentally, it will not be surprising if in this self-examination which is to enable us to explain our ways to others, we discover things about ourselves which in our previous indifference to the outer world had been hidden from us.

New means have to be found to discharge this new responsibility. Great Britain is still the most individualistic country in the world and the British Government is not by tradition forward in experiment. It prefers to leave the initiative to others, and only when their work has made solid progress will the Government step in and help to co-ordinate and strengthen the labours of the pioneers. It is therefore a notable sign of advance when the Government decides that an effort should be made to encourage a better appreciation of Great Britain abroad. Yet to-day this stage has been reached and a proposal has been laid before Parliament for the grant of £6,000 from public funds for the present financial year in support of the recently established British Council for Relations with Other Countries, a body created to serve this very need.

The contrast between what we are now beginning to do and what the governments of other countries such as France, Germany and Italy have been doing for a long time past is astonishing, and we shall do well to consider the nature and

results of their work in planning our own. The French effort may be taken as the classic example of "cultural propaganda" at its completest and best. A generation before the war the French laid their plans for furthering the study of the French language and French culture in other parts of the world. In 1883 the Alliance Française was founded with this object. To-day it has branches in nearly every country in the world and has a membership of over half a million. The Frenchman, though much less willing than the Englishman to quit his own country, is more alive to the advantages of spreading a knowledge of his own culture abroad: he tends also to take an idealistic view of his mission, which is foreign, and even repugnant, to most Englishmen. The Alliance Française, with its far-flung organisation and the steady support it receives from the French Government and public, has done great work in maintaining and extending a knowledge of the French language and of French culture. Further, with its network of schools and institutes for teaching French, its libraries and its lecturers, it has performed a task of great educational value and has thereby enhanced the prestige and reputation of France abroad. The French Government, for its part, even in times of financial difficulty has given strong support to all kinds of cultural propaganda likely to impress upon other countries the value of France's contribution to civilisation.

Many people are suspicious of the word propaganda, which they connect with the control and manufacture of information for political and military purposes during the war. Certainly the word in itself suggests the diffusion rather of what it is wished that others shall believe than of unbiased fact. Yet the French example shows that there is a legitimate form of propaganda, which benefits directly those who receive it and indirectly those who conduct it, and that this kind of propaganda is a most valuable contribution to international relations. The French have for long been supreme in this field. If we now decide to follow in their footsteps, it is certainly from no desire to obstruct their work or to deprive others of the benefits which it confers. We merely wish to add our own contribution. We ourselves must surely welcome what the French have done and are doing in our own country in spreading a knowledge of their language, their literature, and their culture, and the history of the British Institute at Paris is in

itself sufficient proof that we can be sure of an equal welcome for any similar activity of our own in France. The same is true of any other country which engages in such work.

If we now consider what lines we can most profitably pursue in promoting a knowledge of Great Britain in foreign countries, the first which suggests itself is that of increasing the knowledge of the English language. In spite of the lack of official encouragement given to the teaching of English, the English language has made steady progress in most parts of the world. There is, however, one exception to this general advance, and that in an area of particular importance to British interests. We have been in a special position in Egypt since 1882, but until comparatively recent times we have entirely neglected the cultural opportunities at our disposal for bringing ourselves into closer contact with the Egyptians. It is true that English is taught in Egyptian Government schools ; but so is French, though to a slightly lesser extent. So far as private education is concerned, the British schools in Egypt, admirable as they are, are at a lamentable disadvantage in numbers and resources compared with the heavily subsidised foreign schools, both religious and secular, and in particular those of France and Italy. So far have we fallen behind that our schools in Cairo and Alexandria are not yet in a position to supply a British education to the children of all British subjects resident there ; still less are they in a position to open their doors to all the Egyptians and to the residents from other countries who would gladly avail themselves of such opportunities as they could provide. An effort is being made during this Jubilee Year to raise funds locally to establish a new girls' school at Alexandria and to assist other schools already in existence at Cairo. The British Government has for some years past given financial assistance to the English school at Cairo and has expressed its willingness to contribute to the foundation of the Alexandria Girls' School, but our own public should also be prepared to assist these schools, whose work is of first-class importance to our position in Egypt and to our friendly relations with the Egyptians. The encouragement of English studies in Egypt is one of the most important tasks which the British Council for Relations with Other Countries will be called upon to undertake.

Before leaving this aspect of the subject, it may be useful

to add a general note upon the methods by which it is hoped to organise the spreading of English abroad. In most countries (Egypt is of course an exception) it would be futile to seek to establish English schools. Not only are they costly to found and to equip, but in some countries in these days of nationalism foreign schools are looked on askance. It will be far more useful to encourage the instruction of English already given in the national schools of the country, either by presenting prizes of English books to the best pupils or by assisting teachers of English to visit this country for one of the many summer courses for foreigners at our universities. The teaching of English in foreign universities also needs assistance. In many European universities there is as yet no Chair of English, although Chairs of French, German and Italian already exist. Bucharest is a case in point.

Besides the teaching of English, a second fruitful line of advance for British cultural propaganda abroad is through the formation or encouragement in foreign countries of societies with a special interest in Britain and British culture. There exist in this country many societies whose object is to establish closer relations with some foreign country, while in most cases there are corresponding societies abroad which keep up a connection with Great Britain. These societies, however, work almost entirely independently of one another. Abroad, for example, they depend for their support partly on the interest taken by the British diplomatic mission in the capital concerned, partly on the enthusiasm of a handful of individuals who are admirers of Great Britain. Hitherto no central body has existed in London to co-ordinate and strengthen these many activities, to establish direct contact with each of the Anglo-foreign societies abroad and to advise and help them in their work. The new British Council is the first attempt to remedy this state of affairs.

But apart from any assistance and encouragement which may be given to English studies at foreign schools and universities and to the promotion of anglophile societies abroad, there exists a third, ideal method of work which combines the advantages of both. This is the establishment of a special British Institute on the model of those already in existence at Florence, Paris and Buenos Aires. The oldest of these, the British Institute at Florence, has done admirable work since the war and is recognised as the principal centre

in Italy for English studies. With a well-equipped library and staff of teachers, it is turning out an ever-increasing number of Italians who are appointed as teachers of English all over the country and who keep up their connection with the Institute, thus linking it to the teaching of English in different parts of Italy. The Florence Institute has weathered many financial storms in the past and is at the moment in urgent need of further assistance. The British Council has done something to help already, but only when this central body in London has succeeded in focusing public interest on such work will the labours of the few pioneers who have been helping their country abroad bear full fruit.

In Paris another such centre has been established near the Sorbonne, and here, too, rapid progress is being made. Provision is made for teaching English pupils French, as well as French pupils English. One of the special features of the Institute has been a succession of English lecturers competent to speak on various aspects of English life. Their lectures have been well attended and have done much to interpret the English mind to our neighbours.

From experience of these two institutes it is clear that the ideal would be to extend the same system to other capitals. Such an institute is long overdue in Cairo, and it is hoped that before long money will be found to establish one. Warsaw, Prague, Stockholm and Madrid are other centres where in due course the same methods should be adopted. With the growth of such institutes we shall eventually have in the leading capitals an English centre which can play an extremely important rôle in interpreting our country abroad.

Briefly, then, the British Council has a twofold task to perform. It will have to examine the position of English studies in each country abroad, the teaching of English in foreign schools and universities, the needs of Anglo-foreign societies, the engagement of British lecturers, the provision of English books and the many other ways in which the demands for greater information about various aspects of our culture may be satisfied. It will also have to establish such contacts at home as will assist foreigners coming here to profit from their visit, and especially to help foreign students or foreign teachers of English to pursue some course of study at one of our universities.

During the six months of the Council's existence the

demands made upon it have been many and varied. Under the patronage of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and with Lord Tyrrell as Chairman, and a leading industrialist, Lord Riverdale, as Vice-Chairman, the British Council claims amongst its members Mr. H. A. L. Fisher and Mr. Masfield and representatives from six Government departments. A programme of work has already been submitted to them for promoting cultural relations with Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Egypt, while individual appeals for assistance have poured in from many other countries. In Northern Europe something has already been accomplished. With the help of the Council the Finnish-British Society in Helsingfors and the Swedish-British Society in Stockholm are being strengthened, prizes of English books for proficiency in English have been made to many schools in Sweden and Finland and arrangements are in hand to enable a few Finnish teachers of English and Norwegian students to pursue courses of study in England this summer. The British Council has also recently organised a visit of over 100 members of the Swedish Dendrological Society to England, where they were shown the Royal parks, the garden of the Royal Horticultural Society, several private parks and gardens in Sussex, and were escorted personally by the Prince of Wales over his garden at Fort Belvedere. The beauties of the English gardens, even in our recent inauspicious month of May, made a deep impression on our visitors.

The work which lies before the Council will take many years to accomplish and will require for its success the support of a public opinion at home which as yet realises neither the extent to which the interpretation of our country abroad has been neglected, nor the importance both politically and commercially of seeing that amends are made for this neglect.

R. A. LEEPER.

PANARABISM AND ZIONISM.

DOES Panarabism, or a danger of Panarabism, really exist as a political element worthy of realistic consideration? Undoubtedly, if one listened to half the things I heard last winter during many pleasant conversations with important Moslem Syrians in Damascus, one would conclude that there is going to be something serious in the near future. And probably the tales that inflamed talkers go on spreading in the cafés of the Syrian capital would be enough to make uncritical minds believe that Panarabism is one of the most formidable movements history has ever seen ripen.

It has been my good fortune to be able to discuss the Panarabic schemes and hopes not only in Damascus but with influential chiefs of the most important Bedouin tribes: the Sbaas, the Beni Kaled, the Fadel. . . . Strange to say, the romantic nomads who received me under their black tents were much more sensible and matter-of-fact than the French-speaking nationalistic leaders of Damascus. What the Bedouin chiefs admired most in the reports from distant Nedj was that the tribes of King Ibn Saud have settled down at last, have built important cities, have sown corn in the Djouf plains. . . . Never a word about Panarabism. By the way, there is at present only one problem which interests the Bedouin chiefs: how to give up being Bedouins, Ahn-Ibils (camel nomads), how to give up going on with their eternal migrations, with their fortune only in camels whose price has so terribly lowered since the appearance of motor-cars and lorries in the desert. Their only hope and ideal was to become Bakkara (cattle folk) instead of Ahn-Ibils.

Panarabism is little more than a propaganda word for nationalistic agitators in Damascus, Cairo, Geneva. Indeed, I should be inclined to advise such romantic minds as are tempted to people politics with phantoms of this kind to remember the rise and fall of Panislamism during the twenty-five years which preceded the fatal 1914. In those days, and with much better reason, a good many statesmen and diplomats believed in the irresistible driving force which the voice of the Caliph would have, summoning the faithful to Jihad (Holy War) against the Christians from the banks of the Bosphorus. I said, with much better reason, was there not

at the time a Sultan-Caliph reigning at Constantinople surrounded by the respect of all the Mohammedans of the world? And what did we see from 1914 to 1918? Mohammedans fighting everywhere with their whole heart for England, France, Italy, against other co-religionists dying side by side with the Austro-Germans. Just as, for that matter—do not let us forget it too soon—on both sides of the trenches soldiers and bishops and cardinals prayed during four years with the same faith to the same God of War. . . .

May I insert here a personal souvenir whose only merit is to be comical? I have probably been the one and only human being who, at that time, came near to seeing Panislamism in action. I was Italian Minister Plenipotentiary to China in 1911, and a few weeks after Italy had declared war on Turkey I had left Peking for a rest and had gone to Mongolia on a shooting-party. Some distant Mohammedan tribes, having learned of my coming, exaggerated the presence of an Italian camp on the Mongolian plains, and decided on an expedition against the ambassador of an "infidel" country which had dared to declare war on the Caliph of the Moslems. Of this danger I received warning at once from two sides: a brave, modest American missionary who rode two days in order to come and inform me; and from the south, from Peking, the Wai-chiau-pu (the Chinese Foreign Office), which frantically begged me to escape from the "risky danger" and come back at once to the capital. I thought it better not to alter my plans but to have at once sent to me twenty *carabinieri* from the Legation Guard and a machine-gun. This probably soon became, from mouth to mouth, an army; which induced the brave Moslems to turn back, not without looting a couple of dozen poor Chinese villages on their way, the which villages never guessed for a moment that they had fallen victims to the landing of the Italians at Tripoli, some ten thousand miles from the Yellow Sea. . . .

But let us come back to Panarabism. In order to have a beginning of Panarabism there should be an Arab Prince, victorious, rich and powerful. Possibly the part might have been played by Feisul, who, quite young still, died suddenly in Berne last year. Feisul (whom I knew well, and in whom I appreciated a rare mingling of East and West) held sway over the imaginations of the Near East by his high intelligence, his realistic sense of politics, his natural genius for this most

anti-Arab of political gifts : compromise. One might say of Feisul that he forced himself on his compatriots by dint of gifts which, in a certain sense, made him a stranger among them. After the premature loss of the first King of Irak, the partisans of Panarabism tried to find a new potential chief at Mecca in the person of King Ibn Saud, whose prestige had been enhanced by a recent if easy victory. But Ibn Saud is a practical man and has declined the offer.

The recent visits to London of the Emir Abdullah, youngest brother of Feisul and sovereign of the Trans-Jordan State, have given rise, quite lately, to other rumours—but of a more concrete and less romantic nature. The talk is of uniting Palestine and the Trans-Jordan State under the Emir, who would take the title of King. England, it is said, is interested in the realisation of this formula because she would have the new King sign a formal adhesion to the Balfour Declaration, which constitutes the fundamental charter of Jewish rights in Palestine, an adhesion which, as coming from a Mohammedan Prince, would at last endow Palestine with a final constitutional statute.

Partisans of the plan go on to explain (and I have been assured that the British High Commissioner in Palestine is amongst them) that the Arabs would find it entirely to their advantage to have a dynasty of their race and religion placed at the head of their enlarged country. The fact would constitute a permanent guarantee of their right, against the day, which does not seem so very far off, when the Zionists will rule the entire Palestinian situation from the economic point of view, a day when the Arabs run the risk of having become nothing more than an agricultural proletariat gathered for shelter in the mountains, or in the old quarters of the towns and around the Holy Places and mosques.

The Jews, besides a formal recognition by the Hachemite dynasty, descendants of the Prophet, of the Balfour Declaration and of their colonisation, would obtain the right to establish settlers on Trans-Jordanian territory. The country has fertile and arable regions which the local landowners greatly desire to sell to the Jews, much as they protest to the contrary as deputies of the Trans-Jordan State to the Assembly at Amman. For it must, indeed, be owned that there are hardly any vacant lands left between the Jordan and the sea, and the Arab landowners make use of this fact

to demand—and secure—ever more fantastic prices. It is also contended that a solution would thus be found to the problem of the landless people, that is to say the establishment in Palestine of the Arabs evicted by the sale of their lands to the Zionists ; one could, under the new plan, henceforward drive them back wholly or partly into the Trans-Jordan State, a thing which seems juridically impossible to-day. Personally, I consider that, though reduced in proportions, the whole of this plan will go the way of all such schemes elaborated in vain since 1919. One does not find every ten years a Feisul capable of bringing formulæ to life.

The Zionists, on their side, cannot but distrust a combination which would leave the prospective Trans-Jordanian Jewish colonies at the mercy of an ever possible anti-Jewish rising. The authority and the sympathies of the new King would always inevitably be on the side of those of his race, without which his dynasty would have no *raison-d'être*. Zionism as such, for that matter, is justified only on Palestinian territory.

But other forms of Jewish settlements are possible. In the surrounding countries—and not only in the Trans-Jordan State—Jewish immigration and colonisation may be usefully tried. Under certain forms and limitations—for instance a reasonable distance from the Palestinian frontier, in order to avoid incidents and discussions—some sort of Jewish immigration, even on a great scale, might be highly desirable for the welfare of Syria. This, at least, is my opinion. But it must be a question of free movements, or at least movements free in appearance, outside of any constitutional formula binding the State.

For instance, I see only advantages for Syria, and even for the Mandatory Power, France, in the realisation of a wide Jewish immigration directed towards certain central and eastern zones of Syria which have been abandoned for centuries and are far from all political frontiers. One of the most serious problems of the Syrian situation is the tragical want of proportion between the Mohammedan element, so highly preponderant, and the Christian element. The presence of a new third element, racially homogeneous with the other two, might deaden many shocks. When I was in Syria, quite recently, it was by high Syrian (Mohammedan) personalities that I heard the idea commended of having a few tens of

thousands of Jews from Central Europe emigrate to the Euphrates region (the Djeziree). It seems this region has the advantage of being depopulated and to answer all the moral and economic requisites of the Jewish immigrants, whose agents have already been on the spot.

Another fact—as new as it is strange—might promote Jewish immigration into Syria: the Bedouins, as I have said above, are weary of their everlasting migrations. If, by a wise policy, the Mandatory Power succeeded in making them settle, the extension of the territories needed for the Bedouins would be greatly reduced; and this fact might help the arrival of an important number of Jewish settlers. Another favourable factor, which would not be without importance, is that the Bedouins are the only Arabs completely indifferent religiously; not the slightest anti-Christian or anti-Jewish movement is to be feared from them if they are satisfied with their lot, even if Jews were to become their neighbours.

It would seem, therefore, that at present different possibilities converge which favour the realisation of a great idea: the winning back from the desert and from malaria—by imported Jews and by Arabs becoming sedentary—of the far too numerous Syrian regions to-day abandoned by man, which, in the days of Rome, were amongst the richest of Asia Minor. It is probably only in the Syrian and eastern plains that this great fact may some day become a reality: the reconciliation of Arabs and Jews united in the common task of reclaiming lands which were theirs when they had not yet divided into two hostile branches.

On that day the ideal might become truth which Feisul once described in a letter to Professor Frankfurter of Harvard University: "We feel that Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, have suffered similar oppressions. . . . We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. We are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements complete one another. . . . Indeed, I think that neither can be a real success without the other." I must add, however—not to appear too optimistic—that the Arab leaders to whom I quoted Feisul's beautiful letter appeared rather surprised, in spite of their inborn impassibility, that their famous king had gone so far.

SPORZA.

THE NEW PILGRIMAGE TO SAN MARINO.

IT was an old saying that England had always been the envy of other nations as the "haven of wealth" and the "abode of luxury." This prosperity is attributed to native enterprise as well as to the bounty of Nature in the later version of a sententious medieval pæan:

England hath store of bridges, hills and wool,
Of churches, streams and women beautiful.

From other sources we learn that, thanks to the intelligence and industry of Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman statesmen and scholars, and also to the religious zeal and feudal discipline which made this sheltered island a "paradise of clerks," England was equally noted as a "shrine of archives," though these were not yet recognised as a national treasure more precious than gold or silver, nor yet as one that moth and rust might easily corrupt.

In medieval England the custody of these baronial, manorial, ecclesiastical or civic muniments is associated with the wardrobe or counting-house of some castle or manor, the treasury or chest of some monastic or parish church, and more chests in guild-halls, warehouses and toll booths of towns or ports. Here we may still find judicial and administrative records and correspondence, with many subsidiary and miscellaneous documents. We should, however, find the original archives surviving in comparatively few cases, for the flight from the manor began many centuries ago under the pressure of feudal forfeitures and political proscriptions, and it continued under the impulse of pious benefactions and family alliances. These vicissitudes, however, left the majority of our local archives more or less intact down to the middle of the nineteenth century, as will appear from the Reports of Royal Commissions or Parliamentary Committees in the first half of the nineteenth century. But during the last fifty years the flight has become an exodus, through the London book mart, towards a Promised Land where the exactions of modern Pharaohs can be partly made good out of the inexhaustible purses of cultured millionaires. This movement is not going to stop, nor will all the inquisitorial power of the Crown, the persuasive authority of the present

Master of the Rolls or the learned zeal of the new British Records Association be able to set up the manorial archive again, for its pretension has had a great fall.

To the literary as well as to the pictorial artist it might indeed seem more appropriate that the background of English local history, represented by the parish and manor or by the cathedral, abbey and guild-hall, should be studied and reproduced on the spot; doubtless the historian and painter may derive deeper inspiration and a closer technique from the study of an historical subject in its original setting; but even when important sources are available, preference has usually been shown for intensive study in some central library, archive or museum, for the simple reason that a large proportion of the relative muniments has been transferred to or duplicated in central archives and public institutions owing to the inevitable vicissitudes of their custodians.

Unfortunately, too, our earlier historians and antiquarians did not make a judicious or adequate use of these unequalled sources, while modern research students have received much discouragement from various causes fully described in the Reports of recent Commissions and Committees. Those inquiries cover the whole of England, but their conclusions might be justified by the fate of the Kentish archives alone. Now Kent has played an important and perhaps a unique part in the history of England from the Norman Conquest onwards, but the records of Kentish cities and towns have disappeared or remained until recently unarranged, while some of the richest treasures of the neighbouring Weald have been dispersed and even sold abroad.

Much research and artistic illustration have been bestowed upon the problem of the "Pilgrims' Way" to Canterbury, hard beaten from the Norman Conquest to the Reformation by successive generations of high- or low-born saints and sinners. Further and less recognised research has put us in touch with the missions of countless envoys or couriers to and from royal, imperial or papal courts and with the more commonplace movements of convoys of produce and merchandise from manor farms or sea-ports to town markets or households. Here also we should find researchers engaged in missions more arduous than the cavalcade of Chaucer's pilgrims and perhaps more akin to the practical and scientific teaching of the Friars. But all roads alike now lead to London,

and other "Pilgrims' Ways," north or south, east or west, are equally rich in historical memorials which are being investigated by native and foreign researchers alike. As matters stand, despite goodwill and generous interest, the facilities available in local archives and institutions are inadequate and involve a large expenditure of time and money, while the further development of a deliberate transfer of archives has created a new and uncertain situation which has sometimes presented an anxious problem to English students.

The unparalleled migration of English local records to Southern California in recent years has raised the question of national advantage in relation to private expediency. There is, however, another question worth consideration, that of the international advantage of cultural facilities, especially between two nations which derive their law and literature from a common source; and when historians refer to North America they must include the needs of Canadian students. Now, may it not be wise to accept the accomplished fact in the case of these English manorial and family archives which have not hitherto been fully available for historical research, especially in respect of economic and social studies? There need be, as Sir William Beveridge has pointed out, no feeling in this country unfavourable to the acquisition of English archives by American universities, as the documents will now be properly arranged and made accessible to visitors, among whom English students are especially welcomed. More than this, the advice and even the assistance in these matters of English historians or archivists has been sought and requited with charming hospitality, and ample facilities can now be obtained, including a day of more than seven hours. Whether the results of researches made in the important collections of English manorial records now preserved in Harvard, Chicago and Southern California would justify a considerable expenditure of time and money is another matter, but scholars from the far Western universities of North America visit English provincial archives year after year without the slightest hesitation and with the utmost profit, otherwise students of history all the world over would have been the poorer. Again, just as our American visitors regard the adventure as a stimulating experience, so English students would surely benefit in many ways, apart from their harvest of notes and references.

In a dark age of European civilisation, the far-famed shrine of a hermit bridge-builder gave his name to the miniature Italian republic of San Marino on the Adriatic Coast. In the zenith of the development of Southern California, a self-made builder of railways founded the "Huntington Library and Art Gallery" on a Spanish-Mexican ranch of San Marino, overlooking the Pacific Ocean. Before his death in 1928, Henry E. Huntington endowed this foundation with many relics from Old World "shrines," and some of these have suggested the title of the present article. The writer, who had already been impressed by the opportunities for a preliminary training in historical research provided by the seminars and libraries of the great universities in the Eastern States, was recently privileged to inspect the contents of four manorial and family archives which, before their acquisition by the Huntington Library, were practically unknown to students of the economic and social history of this country.

It is true that the journey out by train across the North American continent was strenuous, but some interesting English family papers might be inspected by breaking the journey at Chicago, and the beauty of the oasis of Pasadena can be all the more appreciated by an approach across the Desert. If the return journey is made by way of the Panama Canal the voyage may seem otiose, but it is well worth while for the sake of seeing Havana and its fortress "Il Morro," memorable for its siege in 1762 by an English fleet under Admiral Pocock, some of whose despatches are now in the Huntington Library. To an English visitor arriving at Pasadena on the Eve of Christmas the bountiful insignia of an Old World Yule-tide were at least in keeping with the customs of the English medieval parish and manor, now recorded here. To complete the illusion there was a threat of pursuit by snow and frost, left behind on the Nevada hills, and local scientists busied themselves with meteorological data beyond the ken of medieval chroniclers.

A scholarly interest in the manuscript collections in the Huntington Library is shared by the staff of the local Institute of Technology, and with this scientific atmosphere it is not surprising that much attention has been already paid to the chemical reactions of parchment, paper, ink, wax, and bindings, which still show traces of the ravages of damp, vermin and insects. The repair of seals is especially desirable,

and in this connection there is the story of an English agent who, while negotiating a sale of family documents at a price enhanced by the value of the seals attached, became increasingly anxious about the safety of his charge as he felt the fierce heat of the Californian sun. On mentioning the matter, however, he was assured that the Library could "fix up" the seals all right if the vendor could "bring down" his price—and he did!

This, however, is an aspect of the subject which is not obtruded upon students who frequent the reading rooms, though they will eventually benefit by a scientific custody of documents which had been previously arranged and described, chiefly with an eye to biographical and topographical information. There are other benefits in store for them, such as increased facilities for obtaining photographic reproductions and even for restoring illegible passages in MSS.

Apart from these positive facilities for an intensive study of some new materials for the economic and social history of the English countryside, benefit to the health of mind and body is provided by a restful and attractive environment. A research student from Southern California visiting London would wish to explore the Tower or Hyde Park rather than the tropical houses at Kew or Regent's Park. An English research student at San Marino would find sufficient distraction and delight in passing and re-passing through the enchanting township of Pasadena where the charms of Nature have been artlessly displayed by the magic of wealth. The native ranche of San Marino was reserved and isolated as a centrepiece of the Huntington Estate, and here the late owner's residence, filled with antique furniture and objects of art, is preserved as a museum which supplies valuable illustrations for the study of manners and culture during the post-medieval period. The Library, with its choice *incunabula* and manuscripts, includes a scholarly reference library, actually acquired from an English visitor as a nucleus for bibliographical facilities.

The four manorial collections preserved here represent the muniments of the Egerton, Hastings, Grenville, and Montagu families formerly preserved at Ashby-de-la-Zouch, Bridgewater House, Stowe Park and Battle Abbey respectively. Besides these local records there are also many contemporary books and documents relating to the national histories of this

and other countries or to the doctrines and problems of civilisation at large. In these collections we might find materials for the constitutional and domestic history of hundreds of manors scattered over the whole country. There are also still richer materials for the constitutional evolution of judicial, legislative, administrative and diplomatic procedure as well as for the study of literary and linguistic problems.

A visitor permitted to examine these family archives will notice two features of special interest. In the first place there are many documents relating to the common history of the British and American nations. In the second place there are other documents of special value for the elucidation of British constitutional and institutional history, in the form of drafts, memoranda, vouchers, statistics and other subsidiary records which are not usually available. Those who might think that historians have got on very well without the assistance of these obscure formulas must admit that historical, literary and linguistic scholarship has profited by the evidence of ciphers, endorsements, marginalia and compilations in the form of year books, journals, diaries and glossaries wherein the "industrious murmur" of official scribes is borne to us across the seas and through the centuries. *Sic vos non vobis mellificatis apes* must be the grateful reflection of the modern student, who will not hesitate to avail himself of these new resources *per hookum vel per crookum*, as Sir George Savile used to say, with Quarter Sessions humour, in his generous appreciations of the requirements of progressive fellow subjects in America.

It is true that the labour of such research may be great and the harvest small, but the reward of all such enterprises is in proportion to the toil, and there is another point to be considered. The objects of statecraft are frequently obscure because its methods are necessarily secret, and the policy that is proclaimed or enrolled may owe much of its character to the initiative or discretion of the official draftsman. The fact that Thomas Egerton was for nearly forty years the law officer of the Crown, and not only keeper of the royal conscience and confidence but the confidant also of an inner circle of much perplexed and harassed ministers, has surely some significance in view of the specimens of routine drafts, drastically revised by him, which have survived. Some years ago a Royal

Commission attempted to discover what had happened to these Crown Office records and, as a result of this investigation, an emphatic remonstrance was submitted in their Second Report, too late to assist Shakespearian and other students, because that Report was published on August 4th, 1914! Chancellor Ellesmere retired, to the King's regret, in March 1617, and died soon after in an odour of official sanctity, being succeeded as Chancellor in turn by his *protégé* Francis Bacon and his former domestic chaplain John Williams, both of whom were admittedly indebted to the official archives of their great predecessor.

An Egerton, like a Hastings, was a masterful and an austere man, and although violent accusations might be brought against them, their reputations stood relatively high in the days when a courtly bishop or a learned judge could plentifully supply his larder or cellar from the gifts of expectant suitors: and when Egerton himself, as Master of the Rolls, could issue his own warrants to port officials to facilitate the supply of sea-fish and sea-coal to his household in London. In the ceaseless pursuit of lands these officials were not more fortunate or adroit than other courtiers, while they were assiduous in the management of their estates. Their enterprises extended beyond the limits of the English manors and embraced adventures in foreign plantations or factories. On the economic and social side, too, there are interesting lists here of household establishments, with intriguing calculations, laboriously made by needy courtiers and manor lords alike, to counteract the strain of stationary rents and decaying services in spite of a tantalising increase in the prices of commodities. These statistics also throw light on the old problem of "owner-occupiers"—how to employ servants without boarding them.

It is, however, beyond the scope of an introductory essay to describe the immense wealth of new or supplementary material that awaits the advent of belated research; while facilities and amenities will be increasingly available. Students who have been attached or commended to the university or institute might be fortunate enough to find quarters in the academic club and hostel (Athenæum), a building of singular beauty with its superb reception rooms, winter garden, balconies, terraces and courts, and with a very practical *ménage*. This, like so many other American institutions, is the

lavish endowment of local patriotism and plays an important part in the academic life of a cultured community. Here one may meet scholars of international repute who have been attracted by the famous Library and Observatory. If this opportunity has failed, good accommodation may be found outside the academic circle. The Huntington Estate has given its name to one of the most delightful hotels, even in a district which includes Los Angeles.

In any case there is the unfailing delight of the early morning walk from Pasadena to San Marino by various routes, but always for the most part through boulevards planted with cedars and citrus bushes or avenues of ilex and mimosa, with picturesque houses in the New Spanish, Old Colonial and many other styles standing in a deep background of shrubs and creepers, with a foreground of grass-plots intersected by hedges of cotoneaster or bamboo clumps, flanked by paved footpaths and conduits which become rivulets after rain-storms. And then, at San Marino, the stroll through shrubberies and rose gardens to luncheon in a pavilion café, rousing bevvies of quail to whirl like feathered cricket-balls across the lawns, and then some dalliance with a saucy jay or a volatile humming-bird bobbing like a cork in the spray of a fountain; and so back to work, and, after work, the homeward walk to tea, when the blaze of the poinsettias shows a deeper red in the cool shadows and the purple glory of sunset is reflected on the brown slopes and white snow-cap of "Old Baldy."

This notice of a new adventure must be concluded with an apology and a moral. No reference can be made here to numerous subjects of social and literary interest, such as William Shakespeare (1460) of Loughborough (*not* Loughborough Junction), Dugdale on county history, Old Chelsea, the Libri frauds, Repton School and Eton College. We learn from these documents that at the close of the seventeenth century Eton was a "ghastly" place in the opinion of a young nobleman sent there with the family tutor in attendance. This boy, when grown to man's estate, did not survive his third duel, leaving an heir who became a founder of the Society of Dilettanti—*Sic te servavit Apollo!* Enough has perhaps been said to show that the emigration of national elements may provide a new stimulus to international appreciations as the result of international researches.

HUBERT HALL.

CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY.

OF the three hundred seats in the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies the party of the Sudeten Germans, under Konrad Henlein, gymnastic instructor and satellite of Hitler, secured forty-four in the general elections of May 19th and 26th. But, important as Henlein's success has been, its significance alike in home and foreign policy has been over-estimated abroad. The fact that the Henlein party now holds about fifteen per cent. of the seats in the Chamber raises no problem of democracy or dictatorship; it represents no more than an important and perhaps far-reaching development in the position of the Sudeten Germans in this State. Even if Henlein's party were the strongest in Parliament, which it is not, that fact would not give it any constitutional claim to the leadership of the State. The Czechs and Slovaks are divided up into many parties, but they account with the other non-Germans for 77½ per cent. of the population.

The importance within the country of Henlein's success lies in the fact that the Czechs and Slovaks, for whom the coalition system represents the only possibility of common conduct of their State, come now into conflict with the authoritarian principle imported from Hitlerite Germany. The conflict is not purely on national lines. Henlein was not alone in employing his methods of propaganda at the elections; they were copied by the Czech Fascists. Henlein was obviously financed by Sudeten German industrialists and by the Third Reich in his expensive election campaign, but the big Czech capitalists made a similar attempt through the so-called National Union (*Narodni Sědnoceni*) to supplant democracy and set in its place authoritarian government on the German or Italian model. While, however, the Henlein party obtained no less than two-thirds of the Sudeten German seats (44 out of 66) the National Union, in spite of its huge expenditure on propaganda, secured only 17 of the 195 seats allocated to the Czechs and Slovaks (apart from the six seats of the *Fascistengemeinde*), or one less than at the last elections, in 1929.

Thus the result of the elections throws into strong contrast the national character of Czechs and Germans. The Czechoslovaks have shown once more that democracy and parliamentarism have become second nature to them; the majority

of the Germans in the country have gone over to the Führer principle. Undoubtedly, economic factors have played a considerable part in this. From the outset of the crisis unemployment has been much more serious in the German border of the country than elsewhere, since it is the German-speaking region that contains the export industries. Dr. Beneš had recognised the need for doing all that is possible to improve the situation of the Sudeten German export industries. But it would be a mistake to attach too much importance to these material considerations; of much more importance is the German inclination for authoritarian methods and faith in the healing virtues of dictatorship and the Führer system, while, as the elections showed, no amount of expenditure on mass meetings and processions and so on can shift the majority of the population of Czechoslovakia from its absolute faith in democracy. The majority of the Coalition Government is, in any case, assured.

Efforts are being made to strengthen the so-called "activist" parties, which have suffered through Henlein's success, and it is recognised that the best means to this end is to help the Sudeten German industries out of the crisis and so to reduce unemployment. Work will also be necessary in the cultural field, for instance by meeting the demand continually made by the Czech Left parties and the activist (governmental) Sudeten German parties for the erection of a German wireless transmitting station in order to give the population of the German-speaking border territories an alternative to the wireless programmes and propaganda of Hitlerite Germany.

But for all the success of the Henlein party it is plain that the Czech core of the nation, which took the lead in forming the Republic, remains its central pillar. In strong contrast to the neighbouring countries which have fallen under Fascist dictatorships, democracy in Czechoslovakia seems more secure than ever after these elections. The Communists, whose maintenance of their position by the retention of the whole of their thirty seats was one of the surprises of the elections, renounced all anti-militarist propaganda after the conclusion of the Russo-Czechoslovak treaty of mutual assistance, and declared that they would give the Government their full support against any sort of Fascist attack, so that the Czech Left now presents a united front against Fascism

from the Communists to the Beneš party. It has been plain to attentive observers of public opinion in the weeks since the elections that the striking increase in the strength of the Henlein party is not to be judged by the standards of what happened in Germany in 1932.

Still more erroneous conclusions have been drawn in some quarters abroad in regard to the effect of the elections on foreign policy. The Beneš policy of collective pacts is less likely than ever to be departed from. This applies particularly to Dr. Beneš's sincere desire to supplement the Little Entente by bringing Italian interests in Central Europe, which culminate especially in the nerve centre of Vienna, into closer association with Prague. There is thus no necessity to find the community of interests between Vienna and Prague merely in the statement that Bohemia is now threatened by Hitlerite Fascism almost as seriously as Austria is. It has already been shown that that is not the case, since Henlein still has the vast majority of the population of the Republic against him. This fact must be borne in mind in connection with certain German plans, aiming at getting control in some way of Czechoslovakia, establishing contact with Hungary, and settling the Austrian problem in accordance with Hitlerite-German ideas. The community of interests between Austria and Czechoslovakia to-day is, at all events, much too great to be destroyed by Prague picking a quarrel with Italy. Czechoslovak foreign policy still aims at achieving tolerable relations with Germany even under Hitler; on the other hand, the magnitude of the Hitlerite-German danger to the Central European situation is recognised just as clearly in Prague as in Rome, and this fact alone, even apart from the very important commercial and economic considerations, will continually tend to promote a *rapprochement* between Czechoslovakia and Italy in the interest of a political and economic reorganisation of crisis-stricken Central Europe.

It is obvious that this can only be achieved by the method of collective pacts, and it is no less obvious that it cannot possibly be achieved by bilateral agreements, which are constantly broken, and always will be, at the critical moment, if the interest of one partner or the other is considered to have changed. In this conviction of the absolute necessity of settling Central European questions and so solving the general problem of European peace by the method of

collective agreements, lies the kernel of Czechoslovak foreign policy. It is only on this basis of a collective system in Central and Eastern Europe (the necessity of which has been denied by Germany on exceedingly unsubstantial grounds) that the question of the rearmament of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and so on, can be rightly judged. In his speech on May 21st Herr Hitler contended that it made no difference at all who it was that possessed a bomb or a tank; all that mattered was the fact that a bomb was a bomb, and a tank a tank. It is impossible to accept this view. In Czechoslovakia, in the immediate neighbourhood of the Third Reich, it is as clearly realised as it is in almost all the Western countries that it makes a great deal of difference whether the bomb is in the hand of the dictator of Berlin or of a nation like Czechoslovakia, concerned only for the protection of its frontiers, and with its foreign policy in the hands of a man like Eduard Beneš. There are also scarcely any differences of moment between Rome and Prague on the question whether Austria is simply a German problem, as Herr Hitler maintains, or the most important of European problems, as the director of Czechoslovak foreign policy has continually emphasised; especially since the problem of Austrian armament is simplified by the fact that Vienna has repeatedly declared that the Austrian Government has no interest at all in the introduction of universal military service. Thus, in this exceedingly important Austrian problem, important also for Western Europe, there is no conflict of opinion between Rome and Prague or the Little Entente, so that Prague would be unlikely to object to Austrian rearmament within the framework of a great system of Central European pacts embracing Austria.

Hungarian rearmament is quite another question. Hungarian revisionism is much the most difficult, perhaps the only serious source of friction between the Little Entente and the States united in the Rome triple pact, Italy, Austria, and Hungary. It was defined by M. Gömbös, the Hungarian Premier, in his speech in Parliament on May 28th, in which he expressed the desire for the setting up of a united front embracing Warsaw, Budapest, Vienna and Rome, and for its extension to Berlin. It is quite impossible, needless to say, for Czechoslovakia, with her policy of the reorganisation of the peace of Central Europe, to make terms with such schemes.

On this occasion Gömbös, with many obeisances to Berlin, declared that the purpose of the policy pursued to-day in Europe was to strengthen the French system of associated Powers, in the interest of the stabilisation of "the injustices of the Peace Treaty." Such words are in violent conflict not only with the whole policy of the League of Nations, which is directed to the maintenance of peace, but in particular, of course, also to the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia. The extent to which present-day Hungarian policy is opposed to the real reorganisation of Central European economic relations and Central European peace was most clearly revealed by this sentence in the Premier's speech: "The Third Reich is a reality and has realised what was expected from it."

Here the standpoint of the Hungarian Government is surely opposed not only to that of the foreign policy of Prague, but to European policy in general, and it is scarcely necessary to say that, particularly from the Czechoslovak standpoint, the rearmament in opposition to the League of Nations and the peace treaties of a State whose present rulers adopt such an attitude would never be tolerated.

The recognition of Hungary's revisionist policy has, in point of fact, for a long time been the chief obstacle to the *rapprochement* desired both by Prague and Rome between the two Central European groups, a *rapprochement* which, if only for purely economic reasons, should be in the interest not only of all the Danube States but also, especially, of Italy, who could scarcely continue indefinitely to bear the whole of the heavy economic and financial burdens of the agreements concluded in Rome by subsidising Austria and Hungary. Hungarian revisionism in the form here plainly laid down by Gömbös could only be carried through by force of arms and by the destruction of the peace of all Europe, which remains an indivisible whole. The abandonment of this policy remains, as it always has been, the indispensable preliminary condition for the solution of the Central European problems. Any such solution will require agreement not only between Paris and Rome, but also between Prague and Rome; thus that abandonment must be recognised as the pivot of Central European, and accordingly also of Czechoslovak, foreign relations.

In the view of Prague this question has nothing to do with any minority problem, although the spokesmen of Hungary,

and especially Count Bethlen, the ex-Prime Minister, have again and again based Magyar revisionism above all on the allegation that the Slovaks, who are described as ex-Hungarian citizens, have an entirely inadequate share in the administration of the State. A very few figures will put that claim in proper perspective. In the administrative system taken over from Hungary by the Czechoslovak State there were in all 36 Slovak civil servants and one single Ruthene. In the Hungarian railway service there were 11,202 Magyars and 526 non-Magyars—Slovaks, Germans, Ruthenes, Roumanians, Yugoslavs, and so on. In the postal service there were 13,847 Magyar civil servants and 1,012 non-Magyars, only a few of the latter being Slovaks. To-day, in Slovakia, no fewer than 5,695 Slovaks are in the civil service. The President of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic is a Slovak. There are 4,264 Slovak clerks and officials in the postal service and 12,897 in the railway service in Slovakia.

It is not the minority problem that accounts for the Hungarian attitude towards Czechoslovakia and towards the Prague conception of Central European reconstruction and of European peace, but the attempt to prevent a *rapprochement* between Prague and Rome by bringing forward again and again the Hungarian revisionist idea. The interest served by this policy is not difficult to perceive after General Göring's visit to Budapest. Its success remains doubtful, since almost everything depends on whether Italian foreign policy will continue to carry the burden of Hungarian revisionism. In any case, it is clear that this is a problem that concerns the peace of Europe. It is no more a purely Czechoslovak problem than the Austrian question is a purely German problem.

The Little Entente represents the point of departure of Czechoslovak foreign policy; lately two courses have been pursued for the further establishment of peace in Central Europe. One is the *rapprochement* already mentioned between Prague and Rome, which should dispose of the Austrian question and should also relieve the Central European economic crisis by assisting the Danube States as a whole to emerge from the existing condition of over-industrialisation and from their agrarian difficulties, of which there has been little prospect so long as the struggle has continued between five or six economic systems, each aiming at self-sufficiency and the whole divided politically into opposing groups looking

either towards Paris or Rome. Prague is doing its best to continue along this line, and it will be due simply to the intransigence of Hungarian revisionism if this union of the two camps in Central Europe is further delayed.

The other course has now led to the conclusion of the Russo-Czechoslovak pact of mutual assistance. In order to appreciate the full effect of this treaty on Czechoslovak policy, it must be borne in mind that with the exception of her ally Roumania (with whom the only strategic connection is along a narrow strip of Carpathian Ruthenia) and the militarily weak Austria, Czechoslovakia is surrounded on all sides by States with alien forms of government and an extraordinarily hostile attitude towards Prague. In this Central European region of more or less fascistically governed States, Czechoslovakia has maintained the democratic principle that unites her closely with Western European parliamentarism. Neither the severe economic crisis nor the manifold influences proceeding from the neighbouring dictatorships, especially the Third Reich, on her minorities, have shaken her in her adherence to these democratic and parliamentary principles. On the other hand, in view of her distance from the democratic West, she was dependent in so high a degree on her own resources that the protection afforded by the treaty with Soviet Russia, following the conclusion of the Paris-Moscow treaty, represents a very considerable alleviation of her situation. Czech-Russian friendship is a tradition of long duration; it was interrupted for a time through the influence of the marked hostility to Russia of certain financial circles in the Republic, but the sentiment of friendship has endured throughout. When the National Democrats, now included in the "National Union," left the Government the way was clear for an approach to Moscow; Dr. Beneš was able, in common with the other States of the Little Entente, to effect this necessary defensive move, and it was warmly welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the population. The enthusiastic welcome given to Dr. Beneš during his visit to Russia in the middle of June is primarily accounted for by the fact, on which he laid clear stress in Moscow, that Czechoslovakia and Russia are among the countries of which nobody on the Continent honestly believes that they show the slightest sign of any desire for expansion, still less any readiness to involve themselves in any military adventure to that end.

In this common element in their foreign policy, a policy which is directed simply to the maintenance of peace, lies the principal basis of the treaty of mutual assistance and of its great popularity in both countries.

It must not be forgotten that this pact of mutual assistance is dependent on the treaty between Paris and Moscow, and is thus a consultative pact of a purely defensive nature; it does not in the least aim at taking any part in the forging of an iron ring round Germany. But as a defensive pact it relieves Czechoslovakia from a certain sense of isolation, and the new friendship with Moscow is popularly valued at least as highly as that with Paris. In face of Pan-German efforts at forcible domination of Central Europe and the whole Continent, it is of importance to Prague foreign policy to be on terms of friendship with the other European States, especially France, Britain, and Soviet Russia.

After this the principal tasks of Czechoslovak policy lie in the maintenance of peaceful conditions and the promotion of political and economic recovery in Central and South-Eastern Europe through the means of a steadily closer association between the States of the Little Entente and those of the Balkan Pact. The effort is being pursued, not only to consummate the approach to Italy but also to incorporate Hungary and Bulgaria in the Central European pact system, so far as this may prove possible through the removal of Hungarian revisionism in its present exceedingly aggressive form. Efforts are also being made to win Poland for a policy of peace. But the first condition for all this is that Germany shall be convinced, regardless of the particular form of government that she may have at any time, that imperialist expansion in Central Europe is an impossibility, since any attempt in this direction is bound to come to grief in face of the collective readiness to ward off any European war.

After the formation of the new Government, in which there were no changes of any great importance, the Czech Parliament was prorogued until the autumn; thus the important events of June and July in European politics were not debated, although they closely concerned Czechoslovakia. After the reassembly of Parliament in the autumn it is expected that there will be a reconstruction of the Cabinet, with the probable accession of the (Clerical-Democratic) Slovaks.

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WHERE stands the British Government, where the French, where the Italian, in contemporary European diplomacy? In July 1935 those questions were being asked, but could not be answered. Only three months before, when the Stresa Conference registered its findings (April 14th), the alignment of diplomatic feeling in Europe was unusually clear. The British, French and Italian Governments equally disapproved of Germany's unilateral and defiant policy. The fact that so clear a contour was so quickly blurred, and blurred beyond recognition, is curious enough to merit a closer inspection. The kaleidoscope of European diplomacy in these days tends to change so quickly that by the time these lines see the light it is possible there may have been another major change. Indeed, it was obvious from the excellent speech made in the House of Commons by Sir Samuel Hoare on July 11th that the British Government was bent upon regaining the confidence both of France and of Italy as a means to restarting negotiations on lines more recognisably like those which were pursued before the Anglo-German naval treaty was concluded. He said many things about the special and permanent nature of Anglo-French friendship, and about their common ideas of freedom; he made no criticism of Italy in the Abyssinian context. He did, indeed, contrive to please both French and Italian opinion.

The precise stages through which what may be called the Stresa spirit has been deflated are interesting not only in themselves as a curious episode in European history, but as something permanently symptomatic of diplomatic relations in Europe. The Stresa front was so firm that the representatives of the three Powers went straight to Geneva and proposed a now notorious resolution. It was submitted in the joint names of Sir John Simon, M. Laval and Baron Aloisi. The gaunt magnitude of what has happened since then cannot adequately be measured unless the exact words of that resolution, which was duly passed on April 17th, be recalled; for the subsequent flouting of their own resolution by those three Powers has an almost artistic verbal completeness. On April 17th then the Council "(1) Declares that Germany has

failed in the duty which lies upon all the members of the international community to respect the undertakings which they have contracted, and condemns any unilateral repudiation of international obligations. (2) Invites the Governments which took the initiative in the plan of February 3rd, 1935, or which gave their approval to it, to continue the negotiations so initiated, and in particular to frame the conclusion, within the framework of the League of Nations, of the agreements which may appear necessary to attain the objects defined in this plan, due account being taken of the obligations of the Covenant, with a view to assuring the maintenance of peace. (3) Considering that the unilateral repudiation of international obligations may endanger the very existence of the League of Nations as an organisation for maintaining peace and promoting security, (a) Decides that such repudiation, without prejudice to the application of measures already provided in international agreements should, in the event of its having relation to undertakings concerning the security of peoples, and the maintenance of peace in Europe, call into play all appropriate measures on the part of members of the League and within the framework of the Covenant; (b) Requests a committee composed of . . . (names left blank) . . . to propose for this purpose measures to render the Covenant more effective in the organisation of collective security, and to define in particular the economic and financial measures which might be applied should, in the future, a State, whether a member of the League of Nations or not, endanger peace by unilateral repudiation of its international obligations."

In itself it was an absurd resolution. On the one hand it subjected Germany to what Mr. Garvin called a mock trial, which was a preposterous thing to do. On the other hand, it set up a machinery for dealing with subsequent violations of the treaty, when every baby in diplomatic practice knew both that such subsequent violations were inevitable, were even made inevitable by the very nature of the original violation, and that the League of Nations could never deal with them when they did occur. But the interesting thing was that the unanimity of feeling between Great Britain, France and Italy was, at the time, strong enough to create the assurance which underlay the Geneva resolution. Before the end of April, Germany herself again contributed to the consolidation of that unanimity, for in the last few days of the month it became

known that she had already secretly violated the treaty in another respect. It became known that she had not only planned to build twelve submarines—submarines being totally forbidden to Germany by the treaty—but had nearly completed the building. The designs had been drawn up at the end of last year, the parts had been manufactured during the winter, and in the second week of April orders had been given for the work of assembly to begin. The Stresa spirit therefore waxed strong throughout the month of May. Herr Hitler's Reichstag speech of May 21st still further inflamed it, for beneath his pacific words there ran an equivocal meaning.

Now it had been arranged when Sir John Simon visited Berlin on March 26th, that a German naval delegation should come to London to explain informally to the British Government why exactly Herr Hitler demanded for the German navy a tonnage equivalent to between thirty-five per cent. and fifty per cent. of the British navy. It had been arranged that the delegation should come in the second week of May. But in May the Stresa feeling was so strong that no German delegation could visit any of the three capitals. By the beginning of June, however, Herr von Ribbentrop decided to face the adventure. He and his colleagues left Berlin on June 2nd. On June 4th he met Sir John Simon in London. From that day has to be dated the disintegration of the Stresa relationship between Great Britain, France and Italy. The drama developed quickly. The Anglo-German talks began on June 4th. On June 7th the British Government informed the French Government that the talks were exploratory only. On that day the talks themselves were adjourned for Whitsuntide. They were resumed on June 14th, Great Britain in the meantime having swapped horses, and Sir Samuel Hoare being the Foreign Secretary destined to clinch the agreement with Germany. In fact the agreement in principle was reached on that day. It was recorded in writing on June 18th, the form of record being an exchange of letters between Sir Samuel Hoare and Herr von Ribbentrop. The text of the letters was issued as a White Paper (Cmd. 4930). The French reply to the British Government's Note of June 7th had been received in London the night before, by which time the deed had been done. French opinion burst into indignation, not because of anything contained in the substance of the agreement itself, but because

of the method by which it had been achieved. Not only had France on June 7th been informed that the talks were to be only exploratory: she received no further communication from London before she was informed of the accomplished fact, and in innocent bliss had, in the meantime, written a Note in answer to the British first Note, only to discover that it reached London at the very moment when the original British Note was being belied.

What then did the Anglo-German naval agreement contain? Germany gave a "permanent and definite" undertaking not to exceed a ratio of 35:100 to British tonnage in each category of naval construction, except that of submarines. For submarines the figure forty-five per cent. was substituted, but Germany was given the right to build to parity with the British Empire in vague contingencies unspecified. In the event of such contingencies arising the additional German submarine tonnage was to be transferred from that of another category. It was not to constitute an increase in aggregate tonnage. In the House of Commons on June 21st Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty, explained the British motive. He made four points: first, that the agreement would help towards a more general agreement about naval armaments; second, that the elimination of naval competition from Anglo-German relations, independently of the naval strengths of other countries, was in itself a valuable achievement; third, that in fact Germany was already constructing naval armaments beyond the limits prescribed by the Treaty of Versailles, and that, therefore, the juridical argument was of only academic interest; fourth, that this was to be the first step in a renewed attempt upon the general problem of armaments, on the sea, on the land, in the air.

Of the substance of the agreement there was no French complaint. German submarines were of interest to Britain, not to France. Money spent by Germany on her fleet could not be spent on tanks and guns for use on the French frontier. The complaint was of the method. France was not only not consulted. She was misled. Subsequent reflection has not dimmed the surprise caused both at home and abroad by what took place. By whatever route the British Government tried to retrace its steps to Stresa, the blunder of the naval agreement itself could not be retrieved. It had

far-reaching effects. The arguments advanced by those who sought to justify it became weaker as the time passed. On the one hand they said that Part V of the Treaty of Versailles was already in effect dead, and that therefore the juridical allegation that Great Britain had joined Germany in a new violation of the treaty fell to the ground. On the other hand, they said that if the British Government had not accepted Germany's offer of stabilisation on a thirty-five per cent. basis the next offer would have been fifty per cent. and that in any case Germany would have gone on building. Both those arguments were hard even for the British people to understand. It was not easy to see what good could result from Great Britain's violating the treaty merely because it had already been violated: and if Germany anyhow would go on building, why give her an unnecessary British approval?

But the most curious aspect of the situation was that the naval agreement in its final form was nothing like it was in the form first proposed. The original proposal was for stabilisation on the level of thirty-five per cent. for Germany against one hundred per cent. for Great Britain. The British Admiralty was attracted to that proposal mainly because it would imply a stabilisation of Germany's submarines at that level. Great Britain happens to be more vulnerable to submarines than any country in the world. She is dependent for four-fifths of her food upon the merchant fleets. To restrict the number of Germany's submarines therefore was an attractive suggestion to the British Admiralty, whose duty it is to safeguard the overseas communications. Herr von Ribbentrop, having started the conference with an ultimatum to the effect that unless the 35:100 ratio were accepted at the beginning of the conference as the result to be achieved at the end of the conference, he would not talk at all, next proceeded, when the conference was actually at work on that basis, to alter that basis. He altered it in two stages. First he demanded that in the case of submarines the percentage figure should be forty-five per cent. instead of thirty-five per cent., and next he demanded that Germany be given the right to build submarines up to one hundred per cent.—not of Great Britain's strength, but of the British Empire, in contingencies unforeseen, but to be judged exclusively by Germany. The really amazing thing was that the British Government accepted such an agreement. The whole original attraction was that

Germany's submarines would be limited to thirty-five per cent. of Great Britain's total. The agreement actually accepted gave to Germany more than one hundred per cent. of Great Britain's total, and the only condition to be satisfied by Germany before building up to that maximum is that she shall first engage in "friendly discussion" with the British Government.

Wonders never cease. When, on February 3rd, the French and British Governments suggested to the German Government that negotiations should be started for a general system of security, Germany's answer was that she would negotiate only with each other Power separately. Great Britain then rejected the German tactic. She has now accepted it. When Sir John Simon was in Berlin he rejected Herr Hitler's offer to stabilise naval building on a thirty-five per cent. basis. The British Government has now given him more than he then asked for.

Lest it be thought that the above comments are unfair to the facts, the relevant passages of the agreement are here quoted. In section two of his letter to Herr von Ribbentrop, Sir Samuel Hoare wrote :

"(c) Germany will adhere to the ratio 35 : 100 in all circumstances, e.g. the ratio will not be affected by the construction of other Powers. If the general equilibrium of naval armaments, as normally maintained in the past, should be violently upset by any abnormal and exceptional construction by other Powers, the German Government reserve the right to invite His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to examine the new situation thus created.

"(d) The German Government favour, in the matter of limitation of naval armaments, that system which divides naval vessels into categories, fixing the maximum tonnage and/or armament for vessels in each category, and allocates the tonnage to be allowed to each Power by categories of vessels. Consequently, in principle, and subject to (f) below, the German Government are prepared to apply the thirty-five per cent. ratio to the tonnage of each category of vessel to be maintained, and to make any variation of this ratio in a particular category or categories dependent on the arrangements to this end that may be arrived at in a future general treaty on naval limitation, such arrangements being based on the principle that any increase in one category would be

compensated for by a corresponding reduction in others. If no general treaty on naval limitation should be concluded, or if the future general treaty should not contain provision creating limitation by categories, the manner and degree in which the German Government will have the right to vary the thirty-five per cent. ratio in one or more categories will be a matter for settlement by agreement between the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in the light of the naval situation then existing.

"(e) If, and for so long as, other important naval Powers retain a single category for cruisers and destroyers, Germany shall enjoy the right to have a single category for these two classes of vessels, although she would prefer to see these classes in two categories.

"(f) In the matter of submarines, however, Germany, while not exceeding the ratio of 35 : 100 in respect of total tonnage, shall have the right to possess a submarine tonnage equal to the total submarine tonnage possessed by the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government, however, undertake that, except in the circumstances indicated in the immediately following sentence, Germany's submarine tonnage shall not exceed forty-five per cent. of the total of that possessed by the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The German Government reserve the right, in the event of a situation arising which in their opinion makes it necessary for Germany to avail herself of her right, to a percentage of submarine tonnage exceeding the forty-five per cent. above mentioned, to give notice to this effect to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and agree that the matter shall be the subject of friendly discussion before the German Government exercise that right.

"(g) Since it is highly improbable that the calculation of the thirty-five per cent. ratio should give for each category of vessels tonnage figures exactly divisible by the maximum individual tonnage permitted for ships in that category, it may be necessary that adjustments should be made in order that Germany shall not be debarred from utilising her tonnage to the full. It has consequently been agreed that the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will settle by common accord what adjustments are necessary for this purpose, and it is understood that this

procedure shall not result in any substantial or permanent departure from the ratio 35 : 100 in respect of total strengths."

The British Government was so alarmed by its effect on France that Mr. Eden was promptly instructed to undertake another adventure, this time not quite so happily as before. He reached Paris on June 21st, Rome on June 24th, Paris again on June 27th. He landed at Croydon that same evening. In the first instance, the impression he necessarily created was defensive. In French eyes Britain had violated Versailles, Stresa, and Geneva at a stroke. In Italian eyes, Britain had demonstrated the tactical wisdom of Germany and Japan in leaving Geneva as the first step towards an agreed fulfilment of their objects. French disquiet was due to the new discovery that when Mr. Eden left Paris on June 23rd he said nothing about his fixed intention of discussing with Signor Mussolini the matter of Ethiopia, though that matter was of concern to France, a signatory of the 1906 tripartite treaty. The suggested railway, for instance, would run alongside the existing French railway.

The general burden of the British defence, as explained by Mr. Eden on his second visit to M. Laval, was that the Anglo-German naval agreement did not prejudice any other naval agreement, might encourage a general arms agreement, and on its merits prevented something worse. In the matter of Ethiopia, it was merely on the point of courtesy that the proposals were announced to Signor Mussolini first. M. Laval was assured that British policy had no intention of departing from the collective principles enunciated on February 3rd.

Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell on June 25th told the House of Commons that Germany had undertaken to agree to Part IV of the London Naval Treaty, whereby submarines are precluded from "unrestricted" warfare upon surface vessels. In other words, Germany offered not again to resort to the *Shrecklichkeit* we heard so much of during the last war. That offer was worth a good deal to those who derive amusement from high diplomacy. M. Tardieu's once famous plan for "humanising" a submarine was equally useful, in that sense.

The alarm caused by British diplomacy and the further complication of Italy's projected war in Abyssinia was not confined to the Great Powers. In the first week of July Mr. Titulescu came to London. It was a fair commentary on the prevailing nature of British foreign policy that some surprise

was apparently caused in official quarters by what Mr. Titulescu said to Mr. Baldwin and to Sir Samuel Hoare. Mr. Titulescu came to express the views of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente on the new European situation. The members of the British Government have in recent weeks been so concentrated upon the matter of the Anglo-German naval agreement and the Italo-Abyssinian dispute that they seem to have lost sight of some of the wider implications of those questions. Sir Samuel Hoare is understood to have explained to Mr. Titulescu that before Herr Ribbentrop left London, he was given the clearest warning against deducing that the conclusion of the Anglo-German naval agreement implied any change in major British policy in Europe. Sir Samuel went on to explain that Great Britain had no alternative but to conclude that agreement, but that it did not affect Britain's loyalty to the League of Nations or to the Stresa policy; that when, for example, the question of the air convention was discussed, it would be the firm policy of the British Government not to discuss it bilaterally with Germany. The practical effect of that policy would be that France would be able to withhold her consent to an air convention until she was convinced that the British Government was sincere in its protestation of loyalty to Stresa and Geneva. As regards the Abyssinian question, Mr. Titulescu was given to understand that the British Government regarded that question as precisely a test case both for the collective system and for the League of Nations: for if the collective system could not prevent an Italian aggression against a fellow member of the League of Nations, how could it hope to restrain German aggression against any of Germany's neighbours?

Mr. Titulescu's visit did an immense amount of good. Everybody knows that Germany—or at any rate many influential people in Germany—are merely waiting for Italy to be irrevocably involved in an Abyssinian war. If and when that happens, we shall hear a good deal about the *Anschluss*. The British Government, which has allowed it to be understood that the possibility of League sanctions in Abyssinia's behalf cannot be ruled out, has never shown any inclination to undertake a firm commitment to take action against a German annexation of Austria. It was in this respect that Mr. Titulescu's visit to London did good.

Austria's first line of defence against Germany is the combined power of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente. British and French interests are deeply involved in the maintenance of Austria's independence. Yet it is clearly impossible for the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente to constitute any convincing deterrent against a German repetition of what happened last summer so long as the British and French Governments are at variance.

That was one reason why Sir George Clerk, on July 4th, was instructed to consult M. Laval about the possibility of recapturing Anglo-French co-operation. It was not surprising that Sir George's initial reception was a little unpromising. French opinion was naturally disturbed by its cumulative experience of British methods in high diplomacy. When Mr. Eden passed through Paris on his way to Rome, and actually talked with M. Laval, he had the new proposals about Abyssinia in his pocket, yet refrained from taking M. Laval into his confidence. It makes no impression on French opinion to be told that the nature of those proposals could not be disclosed in Paris before they were disclosed in Rome. The British Government found that the price has to be paid for the adoption of such methods. Every attempt was made to recapture French confidence. It was not an easy thing to do. Not only by the treaty concluded last January between France and Italy was France committed to a disinterested attitude in Abyssinia outside the zone of the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway. There was the further melancholy fact that French opinion was so distrustful of British intentions that it was not disposed to sacrifice its friendly relations with Italy. It is a long time since European high diplomacy found itself in such a tangle.

It was clear that Signor Mussolini was concentrated on his Ethiopian adventure, and that neither Stresa nor Geneva meant much to him by contrast. To people of normal imagination and intelligence the idea that economic sanctions can in any circumstances be used by the League of Nations is so grotesque and unpractical as to lose its initial terror. Only a pure politician can conceive the notion of closing the Suez canal to Italian ships. Even if France agreed to such a step—a contingency remotely improbable both because France at the moment distrusts Great Britain more than she ever distrusted Italy, even in the post-war decade of Franco-

Italian tension, and because French realism would never lend itself to such folly—the blockade would have to be the business of the British navy. An Anglo-Italian naval war in the Mediterranean as a means to peace in Abyssinia is the sort of political nightmare that contemporary political thought so easily breeds. Common sense has deserted high diplomacy in Europe. The same voices that cry for sanctions cry also for disarmament.

Signor Mussolini is a dictator. He depends for his authority upon his success in persuading the Italian people that dictatorship is better for them than democracy. One of his earliest objects was Italian colonial development. He has indeed done good work in Italian Somaliland and in Eritrea. He has used Italian money for the development of agriculture, communications and buildings. He has tried to cultivate commercial relations with Abyssinia. In 1928 he negotiated a Treaty of Friendship with Abyssinia. But Addis Ababa has never welcomed his advances. He has not been allowed to develop communications between Italian Somaliland and Eritrea. The Abyssinians have never offered to him any equivalent benefit to the one they conferred on France by the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway, and they have rigorously excluded Italian goods in favour of Japanese goods, not wholly on economic grounds. His prestige since the Wal Wal incident has been engaged in gaining for Italy some guarantee that in the future Italy shall receive better treatment from Abyssinia. German agents have been active in Addis Ababa in the opposite sense. Gradually Signor Mussolini has reached the position where he is committed to conquer Abyssinia, with a view to political as well as economic ascendancy. The resultant situation has many ugly aspects. Abyssinia is a member of the League of Nations. But the precedents of Japan and Manchuria, of Germany and armaments, carry more weight with Signor Mussolini than does Italy's membership of the League of Nations. The British Government, having itself destroyed the Stresa Policy, which combined the French, Italian and British interests alike, and having thereby damped even French interest in the League of Nations, is now engaged in an attempt to mobilise the feeling of the League of Nations enthusiasts against one of the few remaining Great Power members of the League of Nations. What good can be expected from an Italian emulation of

Japanese and German tactics about the League of Nations is not clear. The League itself is at stake; but that is not the main cause at stake. There are not many students of affairs who would presume to suggest a solution. The immediate problem as diagnosed by the British Government by the middle of July was to recapture French confidence in British intentions with a view to a joint exploration of any opportunity for further mediation that might arise.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

July 15th, 1935.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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CHURCH AND STATE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.*

Leigh Hunt has a story that the strange, "stickit" clergyman, his own eccentric father, who could do nothing right in his own interest, once fell into hot debate with a bishop, possibly Louth. At last that prelate, perhaps surprised by the freedom of his antagonist, said: "Do you know who I am?" "Yes, my lord," replied Hunt, with a low bow, "dust and ashes." Admittedly that was not, in the eighteenth century, the way to treat a bishop. Perhaps even now it would not be healthy conduct in an unbeneficed cleric, nor wholly pious in a married one, since "he that provideth not for the people of his own house is worse than an infidel." But to-day it is as little likely that the question would be asked as that the answer would be given. In the eighteenth century the question was less improbable; for a bishop, even a "little bishop," was a great personage, rarely subject to challenging discussion from his inferiors. The emphasis was then stronger upon the bishop's lordship than upon the diocesan claims which to-day absorb him.

Professor Sykes in his valuable work does not minimise the temporal dignity of the episcopate; indeed, he enforces it.

* *Church and State in England in the Eighteenth Century.* By the Rev. Norman Sykes, M.A., D.Phil. Cambridge University Press, 1934.

But he also explains it. One of the most important parts of his book is devoted to an analysis of the political claims upon the Georgian bishops as legislators and counsellors in the State. Their duties as members of the House of Lords lay as heavy upon them as the calls of their dioceses, and explain, in part, the difficulties of diocesan supervision. A bishop was, in fact, required to ride two horses at once. As much a legislator as any peer of the realm, he must reside for months of the year in London, whilst the exigencies of time and distance, of bad roads and foul weather, made it impossible during the remainder of the year for the most conscientious prelate to do in his diocese all that he wished. Moreover, he could in many cases be "whipped" to a debate or to a division more readily than his lay colleagues. For the inequality of episcopal incomes gave ministers a constant hold over all but the greatest on the bench. The "little bishops" were ill paid by their sees, had often to be given pluralities of necessity if they were to have incomes sufficient to their obligations, and in some cases could hardly have been induced to accept the lesser sees unless these had carried with them the hope of "translation." It may be agreed that this "lively expectation of favours to come" was linked to the dangers of political subserviency, but Professor Sykes is able to show that the Georgian episcopate was neither as weak nor as time-serving as is sometimes supposed. Not only does he make a significant contribution to the constitutional history of the century by placing the political burdens of the episcopate in correct perspective, but he is also able to establish the fact that in the performance of diocesan duties they were more conscientious and zealous than their critics have allowed, and compared favourably in energy and devotion with their predecessors in the golden age of the Caroline Church. To the modern reader the record of their activity in confirmation, which Professor Sykes fully demonstrates by facts and figures, is little short of amazing when one calls to mind the difficulties of communication in some large dioceses, and remembers that these physical difficulties had to be overcome by men in general no longer young.

We have spoken mainly of the episcopate because it occupies a foremost place in any consideration of the Georgian Church. But Professor Sykes gives us the most comprehensive picture we have of the whole life of the Church from Anne to

the middle of the reign of George III. The life and work of the parochial clergy are described, from sound evidence, as carefully and skilfully as the character and functions of the bishops. Professor Sykes is not uncritical. Indeed, he finds much to deplore. But his criticism is criticism in perspective, not the facile condemnation of something just pictured out of drawing. In the upshot we learn of a surprising amount of good to be praised, as well as of evils to be condemned. He puts us in a position to judge upon evidence, at many points for the first time; and he is often content to state his case and to leave the reader to form an ultimate judgment for himself. His book is a first-rate piece of research, based to a very great extent upon a prolonged examination of ample, though scattered, manuscript sources. By his admirable scholarship no less than by his skilled exposition, Professor Sykes places his readers under great obligation, and enables them for the first time to judge the Georgian Church upon fact instead of prejudice.

G. S. VEITCH.

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KENYA CON AMORE.*

White Man's Country, by Mrs. Elspeth Huxley* appears over the sub-title *Lord Delamere and the making of Kenya*. It is a racy biography of this settler-politician who cut himself adrift from his ancestral estate in Cheshire and devoted the last forty years of his life to an eager participation in the farming and political fortunes of the East Africa Protectorate, which has since 1920 been Kenya Colony. He was the first resident to receive assistance on any considerable scale from the local Government. This took the form of a grant of 100,000 acres of land at a yearly rent of one halfpenny an acre. He then "cast himself for the rôle of capitalist experimenter" in the undertaking of "proving, on a spectacular scale, that the highlands were rich farming land, and, above all, a White Man's country." The first needed no proof, for an African population aggregating some two millions had maintained themselves in food, housing and clothing, solely off the soil and without any imports whatever for generations, and all travellers had vouched for the immense productivity of the region. As regards the latter problem Lord Delamere

* Two vols., xii + 315 and 333 pp., illustrations and maps. Macmillan & Co. 25s.

has come and toiled and passed to his fathers, and we are still far from any accepted proof for or against his thesis.

Mrs. Huxley is quite frank about her sources of information. Being entrusted by Lord Delamere's widow with the compilation of this lengthy memoir, it is scarcely remarkable that perfervid supporters of Lord Delamere's political dreams make up the bulk of the local authorities whose names she cites. Her account is one of forty years' happenings among folk who were for the most part "too preoccupied with pioneering to keep many records," while the central figure of her story "wrote no diaries and few letters," preferring to do his correspondence, when possible, by telegram. So at times she has been let down badly, with the result that her recital is at many points more piquant than reliable, and lengthier than it need have been. No eulogy from her local witnesses is too high for those in authority who helped movements towards increased political influence for the settler community, while those, from Secretaries of State and visiting Commissions of Enquiry down to junior officials, who had the temerity to question or counter the views of Lord Delamere's henchmen receive castigation which makes diverting reading. A less pleasing feature of this mass-collaboration is a certain impairment of good taste, as when the author of the most despicable Government circular throughout Kenya's restless history is referred to as having "like Cranmer, lighted a flame that burnt fiercely for years." The circular referred to was the infelicitous Labour Order of 1912 in which African "chiefs," who were, and still are, salaried Government personnel, were enjoined, under pain of official displeasure, to influence their tribesmen and women to work for settlers.

Throughout this jaunty couple of volumes the reader's attention, untroubled by much in the way of documentation, is carried along on a stream of engaging anecdote. The note of moral indignation nowhere obtrudes. Ordinarily its place is taken by the more entertaining device of epigrammatic abruptness—as when one reads of the finale of a punitive expedition against the Nandi tribe. "The chief *laibon*, who was supposed to have been at the bottom of all the trouble," having come to the British camp "to discuss terms," was, we are told, "shot in the heart with the officer's revolver as he shook hands, and the war was over."

If Kenya has more skeletons in her cupboard than any other of our smaller dependencies, the custodians of that collection have at least developed, under constant strictures from England, an unsurpassed technique for diverting public attention from their painful exhibit. No one reading this careful selection of anecdotes would gather that the male British resident between the ages of eighteen and fifty is automatically a conscript and that if he fails or refuses to enrol in a so-called Defence Force he shall, by law, "be deemed to have enrolled"; nor that in the white farming area any farmer or manager can, without a warrant, arrest anyone who has in his possession anything listed as "produce" if he elects to believe the produce to have been stolen, and that thereupon "such person shall be deemed to have stolen the same." It is recorded that Lord Delamere stoutly resisted proposals to tax Africans as a means of forcing them on to the wage market, but silence is maintained as to his preference for land theft from Africans for the same purpose. Giving evidence to a Labour Commission in 1912 he said:

If the policy was to be continued that every native was to be a landholder of a sufficient area on which to establish himself, then the question of a satisfactory labour supply would never be settled; . . . the soundest policy would be to curtail the Reserves, and though it might take a few years before the effect on the labour supply was apparent, the results would be permanent.

As this is perhaps the most widely quoted of all His Lordship's *obiter dicta*, its suppression here is noteworthy.

No one would gather from the book that a fan of branch railways built to develop blocks of white farms was run at an annual loss of over £200,000 for years together. Instances of *suppressio veri* on topics where the truth would be embarrassing could be multiplied easily to an extent of at least three times the length of this review. War-time days in Kenya are described with vigour and effect, but the position of British Indians in the Colony is treated with such prejudice and arrogance as to be merely unpleasant. Great play is made with pronouncements (of which the authors still appear to be proud) in disparagement of the Indian population which were at once so base and baseless that Lord Milner formally repudiated them at the time in the House of Lords on behalf of the British Government.

The writing reaches a refreshing level when it is Mrs. Huxley's sole production uninspired by her cohort of collaborators—notably in numerous passages descriptive of scenery and climate in a small patch of Africa topographically unique. The maps are good and the photographs are excellent—not least so the few that were taken by the author herself.

WM. MCGREGOR ROSS.

THE BRONTËS.*

"My dear young lady, I don't care to have those women mentioned at my table." Thus a mid-Victorian Canon to a guest expressing admiration of the Brontë sisters. Few women can have been more discussed at dinner-tables since. The incident is among those related at the close of Miss Delafield's fascinating compilation. She has surveyed the field of contemporary records very thoroughly, and, though much of the material it has yielded will necessarily be already familiar to Brontë students, it is a great convenience to have it brought together, arranged under stimulating headings. Among the items which may be new to some readers one may instance the Cowan Bridge School records of the sisters' juvenile attainments; the reminiscences contributed by Ellen Nussey to *Scribner's Magazine* in 1871; Catherine Winkworth's letter describing at some length a talk she had with Charlotte on her approaching marriage; Sir George Murray Smith's account of his first reading of the MS. of *Jane Eyre*, and of his interview with the unknown Currer and Acton Bell (the encounter so well known from *their* side); the allusions to *Jane Eyre* and *Shirley* in Mrs. Carlyle's letters, and the impression made by Charlotte on Millais, as reported by his daughter: "Her eyes were quite remarkable . . . (she) remained in appearance his idea of a woman of genius . . . (she) looked tired with her own brains." We appreciate having in full, or in very considerable portions, the reviews of the poems and novels, as e.g. in the *Spectator*, *Palladium*, *Edinburgh*, and *Quarterly*, tantalising references to which elsewhere have whetted our curiosity. We are glad also to see included Harriet Martineau's

* *The Brontës: Their Lives recorded by their Contemporaries. Compiled with an Introduction by E. M. Delafield.* The Hogarth Press, 1935. 8s. 6d.

tribute to Charlotte after her death, "grand and tender," as Mrs. Gaskell called it, and Charlotte's own biographical notice of Emily and Anne (preface to the 1850 edition of *Wuthering Heights*), where some passages are surely unsurpassed in poignant feeling and mastery of language. Charlotte's letters, the most revealing biography, are freely used here. Mrs. Gaskell's manipulation of her character, and suppression, unavoidable as it may then have been, of her letters to M. Héger, do, to quote the present Introduction, "throw the whole portrait of Charlotte slightly out of focus. So, too, does Mrs. Gaskell's determination to see her as the angel of the home—which she was not." (One sometimes wonders whether Mrs. Gaskell when in Brussels was shown more than extracts from those letters?) Miss Delafield makes the interesting suggestion that the "close relationship" between Emily and Anne was possible to Emily because it "was always kept on a childish level." She disbelieves in Branwell's part-authorship of *Wuthering Heights*, differing in this from Mr. E. F. Benson, whose *Charlotte Brontë* should be read alongside her book.

That and the other conundrums attaching to the family history remain unsolved, in spite of endless conjectures, some of them based on the flimsiest evidence. On other aspects of *Wuthering Heights*, however, light has recently been thrown by two writers. Lord David Cecil, in his *Early Victorian Novelists*, propounds an alluring theory on the motif running through it, while a good case is made out by Mrs. Harrison for its partial derivation from what at first sight seems a wildly improbable source, to wit, Methodism! In her able and attractive account of some immediate followers of Wesley* she has a chapter on "Reactions in Haworth Parsonage." After reminding us that "Aunt" came of a Cornish Methodist family, and that Charlotte speaks of acquaintance with "mad Methodist magazines" and their lurid contents, she argues that these last may have furnished Emily with suggestions for plots, while fear in any form, even fear of sin, was repugnant to her, so that "she loads her scorn on Joseph, the Methodist of *Wuthering Heights*, as scapegoat for all of his kind." More convincing, we think, is the likeness in name and certain particulars of Earnshaw to a former incumbent, Grimshaw, and of Jabez Branderham to the famous and forceful Methodist

* *Methodist Good Companions.* By G. Elsie Harrison. Epworth Press, 1935. 3s. 6d. The other chapters in this book will also be found full of interest.

leader, Jabez Bunting, some of whose actual words are put in the mouth of the fictitious preacher. But Mrs. Harrison pushes her theory too far by ignoring the local gossip of "Tabby" and Branwell as other undoubted sources, and by identifying the ecstasies of religion in the Methodists with those of human passion in the tale. Nor can Haworth Parsonage have been exactly "decorous" with Branwell in it! (Here one may perhaps add that, if Charlotte did show herself censorious towards him, he is coming in to-day for more than his due meed of sympathy and she of blame.)

The "two offers of marriage" of which Miss Delafield speaks should be three (before Mr. Nicholls'), and the "early visitor" (p. 40) was certainly Ellen Nussey herself.

E. G. S.

* * * * *

AS THE FOREIGNER SAW US.*

Thomas de Laune, in a prefatory poem to his little book on London (1681), asks the reader to "look through this little book as through a glass" in which to view the London panorama. Mr. Letts has used his foreign reporters in such a way: they are to "hold the mirror up to nature" for us. Two queries inevitably formulate themselves. Are we justified in thus gazing at our own poor image? If so, is the reflection in the mirror a true likeness? On the first point historians should prove reassuring in that they welcome every scrap of evidence as their solemn birthright, but the second is less easily resolved. One might lightly quibble on the absence of any absolute standard of true resemblance. An investigation of the sources will, however, prove more profitable than such flights into philosophy.

As to the value of these travellers' tales then: it is evident that the average tourist paying a flying visit here of some two months will find his scope restricted. Thus impressions are necessarily limited to the obvious sights, coloured by the effusions of oral guides, and padded with information out of guide-books. Some curious examples of repetition, coincidence and yarn occur to me. The fifteenth century reiterates the glories of the Becket tomb, "the very least of which is gold" (a recurrent formula in its praise); the sixteenth

* By Malcolm Letts. Methuen & Co. 8s. 6d.

century clings to the weird Scottish legend of the claikeese which grow on trees and which most travellers to Scotland religiously describe; a seventeenth-century diarist still repeats the worn-out tale of the parliament roof "vaulted with Irish wood, a species which harbours no spiders"; the eighteenth century creates the legend of the melancholy Englishman brooding on suicide and cemeteries. These are only a few of the recurrent features of each period. There is a striking similarity in the narrative of two diarists in 1584 and 1585; apart from general resemblance in style and programme, actually the same word ("weidsack") employed by both as a simile for the hoods worn at the Lord Mayor's Show, suggests a theory. Both diarists stayed at the "White Bear" and both joined a party to see the show. Was this the interpreter's expression to the German visitors each year? Which would account for many reiterations and obvious similarities in the statements immortalised by our foreign friends. As for the worthy guide's tall stories, well, Philip, Duke of Stettin, finds the following hard to swallow: the stags in Theobald's Park, says Master Leinvert, the guide, were brought to the forest (Orpheus-wise) from fifty German miles' distance by peasants playing flutes and other instruments!

Turning to Mr. Letts, amidst the chaff of all these foreign impressions there is much good corn to be found. This he has threshed out for our complete enjoyment. It is in the spontaneous remark, the personal note, that real value and information lie. Mr. Letts has skimmed the cream of the diaries for such delights as are buried in Busino or Gondola, von Uffenbach, Lichtenberg's letters, the effervescent Pückler-Muskau and many more famous and infamous—I refer here to Perlin or Andreas Riem!—regarding various aspects of English life, and he has given us a fascinating book.

One word of criticism: apart from omission of such interesting records as Nucius, Stettin, Zani, Mme du Bocage or Mme Roland, and still some others left behind them—though who can be complete where the field seems infinite?—a central theme might have lent force to Mr. Letts' narrative. That theme would prove an answer to the second question, for across the shifting scenes moves the symbol of continuity, John Bull. The independent, at once efficient and idle, pleasure-loving, work-shy Englishman, the port of London, the island people thriving on great commerce, London the Wen,

which caused Heine to exclaim in mingled awe and agony, "Send your philosopher to London but, by heaven, no poet!" are at the very core of every foreign narrative, be it Elizabethan, Stuart, Hanoverian, Regency. Mr. Letts merits our full appreciation for having at last replaced Rye's and Edward Smith's archaic works and for incorporating the researches of such as Ascoli, Bain, Jones, Kelly, also new editions of individual diaries which have recently appeared, with his own discoveries in such palatable form.

CLARE WILLIAMS.

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LABOUR AND NATIONAL LABOUR.*

With the approach of the General Election a series of booklets, entitled *Labour Shows the Way*, is being published by members of the Labour Party, under the editorship of Major Attlee, to explain "the main proposals of the policy for which the Party will seek the approval" of the electors. Meanwhile prominent members of the National Labour Group supporting the Government have contributed to a short volume, *Towards a National Policy*. Although "not intended as a piece of competitive programme making," this volume efficiently indicates the depth of disagreement with official Labour and shows the trend of our party system.

First formed to overcome the "short-term" crisis of 1931, the Government has turned to face the "long-term" crisis with a policy which may take decades to complete and which involves a fundamental political conception. As the Samuelite Liberals early discovered, membership of the Government ceased to be compatible with the holding of their own political views. There is, inevitably, within the sections of the Government a growing assimilation of political outlook. This becomes apparent in Lord Elton's chapter on "National Government as a Political Method."

"To grapple with the modern crisis," he writes, "a judicious selection from all the old programmes is required—and new ingredients into the bargain." Such a selection conceives a

* (1) *The Will and the Way to Socialism*, by Major C. R. Attlee. *Labour's Way to Control Finance*, by John Wilmot. *Labour's Way with the Commonwealth*, by George Lansbury. Methuen. 2s. 6d. net each. (2) *Towards a National Policy*, by Lord Elton and others. Longmans. 2s. 6d. net.

distinct policy with a specific following. It is not "national," as many would deceive themselves and others into believing, because such selection is rejected by the Labour Party, which polled in 1931 seven million votes and now represents a far larger poll. The present administration has become essentially a party Government with a label of great electoral value. This country is not leaving party behind but returning rather to the old system of bilateral alignment. It is not, therefore, surprising that the National Labour outlook diverges widely from that of the Socialists and approximates more to a section of Conservative thought.

While to-day it may be true, as Mr. Ramsay MacDonald says in his Preface, that

no Party will dispute the fact that varying degrees and methods of control for social and human ends are required by reason of the growing power of production and the ineffectiveness of the present organisation of society to enable consumption to be raised correspondingly,

the source and nature of control remains a vital point of contention. In the initial volume of the Labour series, *The Will and the Way to Socialism*, Major Attlee restates the familiar Socialist thesis that private capitalism is based upon scarcity and stipulates nationalisation of finance and industry as necessary to increase and equitably distribute purchasing power. Major Attlee is confined to generalisation and presumably the later volumes will explain in detail the proposals for "workers' control" of industry and the restriction of private trading in favour of co-operative organisations. The Socialist financial policy is dealt with by Mr. John Wilmot in *Labour's Way to Control Finance*, where he writes with little of the bitterness usually present in Socialist comments on finance, and with plausibility, always dangerous upon a subject so little understood by the average elector. He erects the main pillars of the Party's financial structure, a Government-controlled central bank, a National Banking Corporation and a National Investment Board. Although appeal is made on occasion to the public utility principle, Government direction is implicit in the Socialist plan. The assurance, for example, of "no political interference" with the working of the Banking Corporation is at once negated by the power to force it "to afford the necessary credit facilities" to an industry. The National Labour view

is discussed by Mr. Kenneth Lindsay, whose theory of industrial self-government accords with contemporary tendencies. He envisages the organisation and expansion by each industry of its markets and production, the fixing of prices and the regulation of labour conditions. The Government's function is "only for registering agreed schemes, where necessary protecting the consumer and preserving the national interest."

In foreign affairs there is also a deep divergence. The policy of official Labour, discussed at length by Mr. Arthur Henderson in *Labour's Way to Peace* and to be reviewed separately hereafter, supports the League and the creation of an international force as the beginning of a World Federation which it would delude the reader into believing a practical proposition. This super-state theory is diametrically opposed by Professor A. Zimmern, who regards the sole objective of the League and the collective system as "the maintenance of peace." He argues for a British-American combination, to be joined by the other free nations, which by its very character would take the lead in and apply the standards of international co-operation.

The Labour Party's imperial policy is discussed in a broad and inconclusive way by Mr. George Lansbury in *Labour's Way with the Commonwealth*. He would welcome closer co-operation with the Dominions while desiring to treat them as foreign states. He devotes a lengthy chapter to India, in which, after describing the vast percentage of illiterates, proceeds to castigate the Government for failing to honour an alleged undertaking to grant at once complete self-government. Mr. Lansbury evades the dilemma which is honestly put by Mr. Roden Buxton in his chapter on the Crown Colonies.

We have either to refuse to satisfy the new movement—at the risk of agitation and discontent—or to take the risk of the ignorant masses being oppressed by a minority of their own countrymen. Labour recognises that this risk must be taken. The remedy is not to refuse all advance, but to extend democracy so that the mass of the people can gradually assert their own rights.

It is clear that once the need for such safeguards is admitted they must be imposed by the paramount power. This admission, with the recognition of Indian backwardness, does much to destroy the Labour case against the India Bill.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The Struggle for Supremacy in Germany, 1859-1866,* by Heinrich Friedjung, is an abridged edition of the most famous of Austrian historical works, enriched by an admirable Introduction and notes by A. J. P. Taylor, one of the translators. The original, in two large volumes, was published in 1897, the tenth edition (the last in the author's lifetime) in 1916. A good deal of military detail has been omitted, and the complicated story of the diplomatic negotiations has been shortened. But the book retains its peculiar character as a lively, clear and impartial account of the struggle of brain and muscle which resulted in the expulsion of Austria from the German Confederation and the unification of North Germany under the leadership of Prussia. The Jewish author was an intensely patriotic Austrian; but he was at the same time a warm admirer of Bismarck, whose gigantic figure dominates the scene. Neither the young Emperor Francis Joseph nor the Ministers of his choice were a match for the wily and resolute Prussian, and the Austrian Generals were incapable of redressing the balance. The most tragic figure in the drama is that of Benedek, whose fame was won in Italy, and who, had he been left to fight the Italians as he desired, would doubtless have won the battle of Custoza in place of the Archduke Albrecht. He was totally ignorant of the *terrain* in Bohemia where he had to fight, and indeed he was psychologically beaten before the converging Prussian armies from Saxony and Silesia met and overwhelmed him at Königgrätz. Moltke was no doubt a fine strategist; but the vivid account of the campaign makes the reader feel that it cannot have been very difficult to beat such a second-rate soldier as the Austrian Commander-in-Chief. The Hapsburg Empire disappeared for ever in the fires of the World War. This fascinating work reminds us how weak were its foundations and how faulty its leadership when it was still one of the six Great Powers of Europe.

* Macmillan. 15s.
 † Cambridge University Press, 1935. 8s. 6d.

Studies in Anglo-French History during the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries† contains papers read by English and French historians at historical conferences in London and Paris in 1933 and 1934. The aim of the meetings, as explained by the editors, Professor Coville and Professor Temperley, was to widen the outlook of the participants by friendly discussion of problems illustrating the interaction of the two countries in the field of institutions and politics, diplomacy and finance. The lectures are of high quality, and Professor Coville is amply justified in his tribute to their impartiality. The first four deal with the eighteenth century, the remaining seven with the nineteenth and twentieth. Among those which will appeal to the general reader

* Macmillan. 15s.

† Cambridge University Press, 1935. 8s. 6d.

no less than to specialists may be mentioned Professor Halévy's Survey of British opinion on the French revolutions of 1830, 1848 and 1870; Professor Webster's picture of Palmerston at work in the Foreign Office during his memorable first decade; Mr. Bury's analysis of Gambetta's contacts with England, which makes the reader desire him to write the biography of the great French patriot that still awaits a competent hand; Professor Mantoux's account of the difficult début in London of Paul Cambon who arrived on the morrow of Fashoda; and Professor Renouvin's reconstruction of the relations between the British and French General Staffs before the war. This admirable volume embodies a good deal of new material and reveals the serenity of temper without which the study of recent history is a mere waste of time.

Mr. George Glasgow has now put on a permanent basis as an established book of reference* his well-known standard work on investment trust company finance. It was in 1930 that he published his first volume in this field, under the title *The English Investment Trust Companies*. *The Scottish Investment Trust Companies* followed two years later. Both works are now out of print. They were the only sources of information available to investors in this large and important subject (Mr. Glasgow informs us that the combined English and Scottish Investment Trusts control some £400,000,000 of invested funds). We therefore welcome his new volume, which we understand is now to be an annual publication, and which not only combines and brings up to date the information given in the two former volumes, but adds some fifty other companies to his list, so as to make the book complete as a book of reference in investment trust company finance. The tabular matter, which constitutes the greater part of the 500 pages before us, now embraces some 200 English and Scottish companies. The tables are arranged with a delightful simplicity, unencumbered with superfluous matter, to enable a busy solicitor, private investor, company manager or others interested in the investment of capital funds to discover at a glance the present position, past history, recent growth and probable future fortunes of each separate company. In these days exchange restrictions and tariffs on the one hand and the varying stages of egress from the great depression on the other, make it necessary for the investor to know the precise distribution of an investment trust company's investments. Mr. Glasgow has made an important addition to the information he gives by fully displaying both the geographical distribution of each company's investments and their distribution according to the various currencies; dollar, sterling, etc. The first part of the book, under the general heading "A Conspectus

* *Glasgow's Guide to Investment Trust Companies*, 1935. Eyre & Spottiswoode. 35s. net.

of Investment Trust Company Finance," gives in eleven condensed chapters a mass of information about the working of investment trust companies, including the very book-keeping methods in use, as well as about the principles of management, the secrets of success, the criteria that should be looked for by the shrewd investor in these companies' stocks, and many other highly important matters. It is a book that has already established itself as an invaluable guide for investors. Mr. Glasgow is known to readers of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for his study of diplomacy and international affairs. He is well known in the City as an authority on this specialised branch of finance. Those who have known him in both fields have had occasion to appreciate the close connection that obtains between international and pure finance.

The jubilee of Toynbee Hall provides fitting opportunity for Mr. J. A. R. Pimlott to write a history of the "Mother of Settlements" in *Toynbee Hall, Fifty Years of Social Progress, 1884-1934*.* The foundation of the Settlement in 1884 by Canon Barnett and his band of enthusiastic Oxford men was symptomatic of the growing national concern over social conditions. It was prompted by the will to bring to the poor something of university culture as well as material betterment, and to provide a centre for social research and propaganda. It has been associated, for example, with Charles Booth's famous survey, and also with the recent New Survey of London Life and Labour. The Settlement has attracted to its ranks great public figures, of whom Lord Milner was particularly conspicuous, and has a definite place in the history of social reform during the past half-century. Mr. Pimlott is quite justified in treating Toynbee Hall as something of a national institution. But it has retained its own particular work of education and social welfare in the East-end of London, although modified by those movements it was helping to develop. The increase of secondary education, the growth of the polytechnics and the Working Men's College, and the wider opportunities for higher education have rendered less vital Canon Barnett's ambition to make of Toynbee Hall a poor man's university. But the Settlement continues its essential work of radiating knowledge to those, especially the adult poor "who see in it means of great happiness to themselves and of service to their fellows." This book well describes, as the Archbishop of Canterbury puts it in his Preface, "the story of a great adventure of friendship," which has inspired the foundation of countless Settlements throughout the world.

A delightful book for holiday reading is Walter Wilkinson's *Puppets into Scotland*.† On this journey into the Border country and Galloway the barrow loaded up with the show equipage and the puppets was useful

* Dent. 8s. 6d. net.

† Geoffrey Bles. 5s.

as an introduction to the farmers and villagers on the way, but otherwise it seemed somewhat of a burden, up hill and down dale, a voluntary but severe limitation to a walking and camping tour. The showing of the puppets produced many lively scenes in barns and schoolrooms, and the artistry and dramatic power of the showman appealed at once to his rustic audiences. Much of the attraction of this book lies in the descriptions of scenery and in the human sympathy with Nature. In coming upon a ploughed field, with "one small man with his horse and drill in the centre of it," we read: "Here was an honest piece of craft work carried out in heroic proportions. . . . The red colour of it in all its variations was a picture in itself, and over it was spread a soft, intangible bloom like the lovely and entrancing cheek of a plum. It undulated up the hill-side to the high crest against the blue sky, catching the fluctuating light of sun and cloud shadow in a multitude of variations, until, as we stared, it assumed the character of a work of art, and played upon our emotions as a piece of music or a painted picture." Having entered Scotland from Berwick-on-Tweed, the Wilkinsons visited the Walter Scott country, the home of the Ettrick Shepherd, "All the way down to Moffat" with its Covenanting associations, the Burns country, Carlyle's house at Craigenputtock, and many other historic spots in wild Galloway, ending up with a lovely road overlooking the Solway Firth, and back into England by Gretna Green. They appear to have missed Annan, the home town of the famous preacher, Edward Irving.

The Economic and Financial Position of Italy,* issued by The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, St. James's Square, is No. 15 of the Information Department's Papers. The aim of this report, which presents the position at the beginning of 1935, is to give a set of facts from which readers can form their own views as to what the Italian Government is attempting in the economic and financial field, and how far it has succeeded or failed. In addition to *The Structure*, *The Process of Rationalisation* and a description of the position, there are a number of statistical tables.

* Price 2s.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

SEPTEMBER 1935.

THE PRESENT SITUATION.*

FASHIONS change, in politics as in other things. When we met a year ago dictatorships seemed still to be the vogue. They appeared to bring practical benefits to the peoples under their sway. The system was spreading over an ever larger area. Some of our public men told us that it was only in this country that political liberty still survived. Even here there was a Fascist movement which seemed to be gaining ground. The Rothermere Press had taken as its slogan, "Up the Blackshirts!" It was being seriously considered whether a new law was not necessary to prohibit the recruiting and drilling of "private armies."

To-day the scene is different. It never was true, of course, that freedom had disappeared everywhere but here. Democratic constitutions continued unimpaired in the United States and in all the British Dominions, in France, Switzerland, Belgium and Holland, in the Scandinavian states, Czechoslovakia, and a number of other countries. But it was certainly true that, taking the world as a whole, the tendency had been for some years, and still was, rather against democracy than for it. But now the tide is on the turn.

In all the countries I have named—in spite of stresses here and there, particularly in France—democracy remains firmly established. In Spain the dictatorship was overthrown some time ago, and an elective legislature has been reconstituted, though not without tribulation and turmoil. In Yugoslavia steps are being taken towards a more liberal régime. Even in Russia it is announced that representative bodies are to be set up. Meanwhile, in India the enlargement of free institutions continues according to plan. Our Parliament has passed a mighty statute which, in the scale of its application and the range of powers conferred, is by far the greatest extension of political liberty ever effected by a single measure in the whole course of history. At home Sir Oswald Mosley has faded away. The Rothermere Press has forgotten all about him. No one troubles any more about the "private armies."

* Inaugural address to the Liberal Summer School, Cambridge, August 1st, 1935.

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MUSSOLINI, THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND ABYSSINIA.

I

WE must do Mussolini the justice of recognising that he has never sought to disguise his responsibility in the Abyssinian affair. The Japanese in China follow the tactics of *faire sans dire*. Mussolini needs to have his name on the front page of all the papers of the world. Ever since he came to power he has threatened war right and left at recurrent intervals. After having for years courted British public opinion by a lavish expenditure on "propaganda," now, at the moment when he most would need it on his side for the Abyssinian adventure, he spurns it as a "ridiculous puppet." If the problem that he had at heart were the problem of Italian over-population he would never have placed a ban on Italian emigration in 1927, at a moment when France and South America still offered an outlet to Italian labour. He would not have bidden the Italian people to increase and multiply, to prepare for imperial expansion, while announcing to the rest of the world that an "explosion" was becoming inevitable by reason of the increase of population.

Abyssinia, which he claims as the promised land for Italian labour, consists half of barren desert. The other half is not virgin soil, but inhabited by about ten million natives. To make room for Italian labour this native population would have to be partly or wholly destroyed. Otherwise, for a more intensive culture of the soil, a vast expenditure of capital would be necessary, which, if it existed, might be much more profitably employed at home. Tropical lands are unsuited to Italian labour. The proof of this is that it has always fought shy both of the plateau of Asmara, which has for forty years been under Italian control, and of the late German colonies, which by the Peace Treaty were thrown open to immigrants of all countries. What Mussolini seeks in Abyssinia is not the solution of the Italian over-population problem, but political prestige and military success. He says he wants to build a railway through Abyssinia connecting Eritrea with Italian Somaliland. Such a railway would be three times the length of Italy and would pass through desert plain and mountainous country, the latter of volcanic, i.e. friable and treacherous,

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rock. In an undeveloped country capable of being rendered productive at best in the distant future, the construction and upkeep of the railway would engulf fabulous sums. He proposes this masterpiece of waste and lunacy at a moment when all over the world railways are struggling against the successful competition of road and air transport.

Mussolini bases his case against Abyssinia on the ground that it is a "barbarous" country in which slavery exists. But he threw away this argument in 1923 by becoming, together with France, the sponsor for its entry into the League of Nations, and in 1928 by signing a treaty of peace, friendship and arbitration with the Negus, on whom he conferred the Order of the Annunciata, making him cousin of the King of Italy. He discovered that Abyssinia is a barbarous and slave-owning country only in January 1935 after M. Laval's visit to Rome. He proposes to liberate the slaves of Abyssinia after having deprived the Italians of Italy, the Austrians of South Tyrol, the Slavs of Venetia Giulia, and the Greeks of the Dodecanese not only of political liberties but also of those personal rights which distinguish the free man from the slave. People are now saying in Italy: "Mussolini must protect himself against the danger that the Negus may invade Italy to free the Italian slaves." The command of the Italian troops in Somaliland has been entrusted to the notorious General Graziani, whose ruthless "pacification" of Cyrenaica has roused hostility against Italy both among the natives throughout Africa, and among the Musulmans of the Near East. No colonial war has ever been prepared by methods better calculated to steel the natives to desperate resistance.

All disinterested and reliable reports from Italy agree that the war is intensely unpopular with all classes, whatever the foreign correspondents may write to their papers about scenes of war-like enthusiasm. Mussolini's speech of July 8th, proclaiming: "Our decision is irrevocable; there can be no turning back; we are resolved to carry on the conflict to the bitter end," was not published in the Italian Press, because, according to the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, Mussolini "did not wish unduly to alarm the entire population before the moment for decisive action had come." Not until almost a month later was the Italian Press allowed to publish this speech, on August 3rd, and then it appeared shorn of the words "our decision is irrevocable; there can be no turning

back." It is a significant fact that, between September 1934 and May 1935, the Italian Special Tribunal for the Defence of the State sentenced 348 people to an aggregate of 1,167 years of imprisonment for activities hostile to the régime. In July a branch of the Special Tribunal was set up in Eritrea. As the troops are judged by military courts, it is clear that the Tribunal is meant to deal with civilians, i.e. with the workmen imported from Italy for road-making and other services behind the lines.

We must seek the reason for the Abyssinian adventure elsewhere than in an aggressive mood of the Italian people. After thirteen years of power, even among his old followers, Mussolini has lost much of his popularity. His prestige began to wane at the end of 1926 as a result of the economic crisis produced by the artificial revaluation of the lira. It has steadily declined during the past six years of world depression, which fell heavily on an Italy already weakened by three years' of internal crisis. Mussolini always claimed that only a dictatorship was capable of giving prosperity to Italy. "If they let us be for five or ten years," he said on October 25th, 1924, "Italy will be rich, contented and prosperous." Ten years have come and gone, and prosperity is as far away as ever. "There must be no expectation of miracles," declared the "unvanquished and invincible Duce" on November 10th, 1934. People in Italy are asking themselves what is the good of a dictatorship that is no better able to solve their difficulties than any democracy. Mussolini needs some spectacular success to restore his personal prestige.

He had promised Italy not only prosperity but greatness. "A party which demands and imposes the renunciation of liberty is in duty bound to bestow greatness on the country," he stated on June 22nd, 1925. In 1807, eight years after the 18 Brumaire, Napoleon dictated his will to Europe at Tilsit. In 1861, nine years after constituting his first Cabinet, Cavour transformed the petty kingdom of Sardinia into the Italian national state. In 1871, nine years after becoming Prussian Prime Minister, Bismarck proclaimed the new German empire at Versailles. In the thirteenth year of his power, Mussolini has still not created his much-heralded empire.

Still worse, after January 1933 Mussolini found himself ousted by his former protégé Hitler from the front page of the world Press. Taking advantage of the war-weariness of

France and Britain, Hitler, in two short years, has made a pact with Poland, quitted the League of Nations, slamming the door after him, torn up the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, is threatening Austria, Czechoslovakia and Russia, has defied France and Britain and has made a naval pact with the latter. To keep his end up, Mussolini is now imitating the German policy of bluff and blackmail. A Mussolini, a Hitler, cannot do otherwise than make war, and dare not postpone their war too long. Long-established régimes can play a waiting game. Upstart militarist dictators cannot afford to wait. They must win glory in their own lifetime. The wonder is that Mussolini has waited thirteen years. Why has he waited all this time? Because up to 1935 he had not yet secured the necessary complicity among European Powers.

II

The first step towards the fulfilment of his programme was his agreement of 1925 with Sir Austen Chamberlain. By this agreement the Italian Government was to support the British Government in securing from the Negus a concession for a dam on Lake Tsana and a motor road linking the lake with the Sudan. In return the British Government pledged itself to support the Italian Government to obtain the concession of the Trans-Abyssinian railway, and recognised Western Abyssinia and the territory to be traversed by the railway as an Italian zone of economic influence. Should only one of the two Governments obtain the desired concession, the successful Government would not "relax its wholehearted efforts to secure a corresponding satisfaction for the other Government concerned."

This apparently economic project had a sinister political implication. It can surely not have escaped the notice of the Foreign Office that Abyssinia would be reluctant to consent to the construction of such a railway, which would therefore lead to military occupation and some sort of political control. The 1925 agreement could only mean that the Foreign Office was giving Mussolini a free hand in a large portion of Abyssinia.

Without the consent of the French Government the 1925 agreement could not become operative, because by a treaty of

1906 London, Paris and Rome had constituted themselves guardians of Abyssinia to the exclusion of all other Powers, each being pledged not to take any action without the consent of the other two. In 1925 the Quai d'Orsay refused its consent. The ensuing ten years of anti-French policy on the part of Mussolini is largely explained by this refusal.

In January 1935 the German menace made it advisable for the Quai d'Orsay to conciliate Mussolini. The understanding arrived at in Rome between M. Laval and Mussolini is still wrapped in mystery, but one point emerges: Mussolini received the assurance that he would not meet with French opposition in the event of a conflict with the Negus. In commenting on this agreement, *The Times* of May 15th unanimously stated that "Great Britain could not disturb the arrangement without jeopardising those paramount interests of European appeasement which the Pact of Rome was designed to secure." The Foreign Office had indeed no reason to "disturb" an arrangement which, in eliminating the opposition of the Quai d'Orsay to the Trans-Abyssinian railway, also made the way free for the Tsana dam project, dear to its heart.

After the Franco-Italian agreement Mussolini had only one further obstacle to overcome—the *non possumus* of Negus Negesti. Against this obstacle he hurled himself with threatening yells, hoping by these tactics to cow the Abyssinians into submission. The first effect of his blustering was that on May 10th (the date was revealed by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons on July 9th) the Abyssinian Government invited the British and Egyptian Governments to open negotiations for the construction of the Tsana dam. On May 22nd the Cairo Press announced that agreement had been reached. Speaking in the House of Commons on June 26th, Sir Samuel Hoare stated that "no such concession had yet been granted by the Abyssinian Government"; and that "the conditions governing the construction of the barrage were still a matter of negotiation." These words seem to indicate that, as the *Daily Telegraph* of June 27th suggested, "agreement in principle had been reached," but "the final arrangements had only been delayed owing to the preoccupation of the Emperor with the Italian situation and by the reluctance of Great Britain to do anything further to complicate matters." In 1935 the strained relations between Abyssinia and

Mussolini pave the way for the Tsana dam concession in just the same way as Mussolini's bellicose speeches in 1926, which seemed to be aimed against Turkey, made Mustafa Kemal comply with the wish of the Foreign Office that Mosul with its oil fields should be incorporated in Iraq. "There is no doubt," explained the *Daily Telegraph* of June 27th, "that the approaching fulfilment of British aspirations in this part of Abyssinia has spurred the Italians to pursue their own plans." In other words, the moment had now arrived when the Foreign Office, by the 1925 agreement, was pledged to "secure a corresponding satisfaction" to Mussolini.

Unfortunately, Mussolini's threats against Abyssinia had a second and unforeseen effect. They roused a wave of protest in England and made it difficult for the Foreign Office to support him. The Negus made matters worse by appealing for the intervention of the League of Nations at the very moment when the Peace Ballot had revealed that eleven million people in England were calling on their Government to make the League a real force. The Foreign Office is in the hapless position of being answerable for its doings to a profoundly honest people, accustomed to having some say in the policy of the Government. A Cabinet which made itself the accomplice of Mussolini in attacking Abyssinia and giving the death blow to the League of Nations would risk losing heavily in the coming General Election.

On the other hand the Foreign Office, with the Tsana concession in sight, could not throw the 1925 agreement into the wastepaper basket. This would have broken the understanding which, for the last ten years, has kept Mussolini harnessed to the chariot of British policy in Europe. The semi-official *Giornale d'Italia* of July 9th let the cat out of the bag:

The concrete values and individual strengths of the European nations count more and will always count more than the League of Nations. England won the war with the collaboration and blood of other nations, not with any League of Nations. If England were dragged into another war, it would have to seek to augment its own national energy, not with the committees of Geneva, but with the volunteer readiness of other peoples to fight by its side. This basic European fact should be borne in mind. The British Empire must often need the benevolent neutrality and active help of strong and dynamic friends.—(Reproduced in the *Daily Telegraph*, July 10th.)

In this light we must regard Mr. Eden's offer to cede Zeila to the Negus, the Negus at the same time ceding the desert of Ogaden to Mussolini. If accepted, the offer would have served the double purpose of being part payment for the Tsana concession and giving Mussolini "a corresponding satisfaction," as stipulated by the 1925 agreement. The attempt failed. But the failure has not caused the "whole-hearted effort" to be relaxed. In the House of Commons on July 11th, Sir Samuel Hoare declared:

We have always well understood Italy's desire for overseas expansion. . . . Let no one in Italy suggest that we are unsympathetic to Italian aspirations. We admit the need for Italian expansion. We admit the justice of some of the criticisms that have been made against the Abyssinian Government.

III

Undoubtedly the Government would be enchanted if the Negus could be persuaded into yielding to Mussolini without war. It would thus carry out the 1925 pledge and be in a position to appear before the British electorate as the angel of peace, hitting two birds with one stone. But the Negus refuses to yield. Hence the British Government finds itself in a delicate situation. It must uphold the authority of the League, while doing its best to satisfy Mussolini. The way out of the *impasse* lies in the fact that, to have binding force, the decisions of the League must be carried with unanimity. "Our responsibility," stated Sir Samuel Hoare on July 8th, "is collective and not individual"; and on July 11th he reiterated: "When I say collective responsibility, I mean collective responsibility."

The body with which this collective responsibility rests is the Council of the League, i.e. the delegates of Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and of certain minor Powers which are either vassals of one of the Great Powers or have learnt by experience that it is no use for a small Power to have an independent opinion. Italy's opinion is Mussolini's opinion. Russia will go with France. Hence the decision lies with the delegates of France and Britain. "Paris holds the key," explained the *Daily Telegraph* of July 5th. Since the Franco-Italian understanding of 1935 the French delegate is unlikely to make proposals distasteful to Mussolini. Thus the principle

of collective responsibility, to which Sir Samuel Hoare declares allegiance, means neither more nor less than that Mussolini has nothing to fear from the Council of the League. When, in the summer of 1925, he occupied Corfu, the British Government did not await the formation of any "collective responsibility" at Geneva. A British fleet gathered at Malta, and he evacuated Corfu. In that case the Foreign Office deemed that a British interest was at stake and acted on its own initiative without consulting the Quai d'Orsay! In 1935 it invokes the doctrine of collective responsibility. This doctrine implies that consultations must take place between the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay in order to find a way out of the *impasse*. But before such consultations took place Sir Samuel Hoare declared, in the House of Commons on July 11th:

Let hon. Members dismiss from their minds the rumours, altogether without foundation, that we have asked the French Government to join in a blockade of Italy and that we ourselves are preparing some isolated form of coercion.

These words show that, so far as the Foreign Office is concerned, Mussolini can go to war if he pleases. Mr. Lloyd George's significant comment on them was: "The last chance has gone."

The alleged reason for this repugnance to apply coercion is that it would mean war. As a matter of fact, in the present case, the mere prospect that a decision of the Council might be backed by a joint demonstration of the British and French fleets, not to speak of what the United States might do under the Kellogg Pact, would oblige Mussolini to refrain from war. If the British and French Governments abstain from coercion the true reason is, not that they desire to avoid war, but that they are both pledged to give Mussolini a free hand for war. Speaking at Southampton on July 27th Lord Londonderry stated that the League "existed for the pacific settlement of international disputes, not for the abolition of war by means of war." If these words mean anything, they mean that the League of Nations exists to maintain peace only among those who want peace, but that, as soon as there is somebody who is determined to go to war and has secured the connivance of at least one Great Power, the League becomes inactive. Its covenant, the Kellogg Pact and all other pledges to

enforce peace by sanctions prove to be empty words. Europe reverts *de jure* to the law of the jungle.

Once this point has been made clear, there is no need to follow in detail the tortuous procedure by which the Council of the League will surrender to Mussolini. Already in his *exposé* of July 11th, Sir Samuel Hoare revealed the line along which it will develop. He stated that he hoped to avoid the calamity of war, "whether it be through the machinery of the 1906 Treaty or the machinery of the League, or both." By the 1906 Treaty, as already mentioned, Great Britain, France and Italy reserve to themselves the decision where the international status of Abyssinia is in question. Thus the machinery of 1906 has the precedence over the machinery of the League. The latter will only be called upon to act after the three privileged Powers have come to some agreement.

This is clear from the three official communiqués which appeared in the Press of August 5th, giving the results of the negotiations held at Geneva between M. Laval, Mr. Eden, and Baron Aloisi. The first of these communiqués announced that the three delegates had decided on August 1st, in the absence of the Abyssinian representative, that the right to negotiate a solution of the conflict by the machinery of the 1906 treaty was the province, not of the League of Nations, but only of the three signatory Powers of that treaty. According to the second communiqué, dated August 4th, the Council of the League accepted Mussolini's thesis that the Commission investigating the Wal Wal incident should not touch on the question whether Wal Wal lies in Abyssinian territory or not, but only which of the two parties was the aggressor. If the verdict goes against Abyssinia, all the better for Mussolini. But whatever the decision of the Commission, he has already repeatedly announced his intention of settling the whole problem of Italo-Abyssinian relations in his own way, and by war if necessary. The third communiqué, also of August 4th, stated that the Council would adjourn till September 4th, on which date they will examine the Italo-Abyssinian question. This means that in the interval the three privileged Powers will continue negotiations among themselves, and that the meeting of September 4th will simply be called upon to register their decisions. In short, the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay continue to give Mussolini the support to which he is entitled by the Anglo-Italian

agreement of December 1925 and the Franco-Italian understanding of January 1935. Should no accord be reached, Mussolini will start his war.

Mussolini's desires were revealed in July by the foreign Press affiliated to Fascist "propaganda." Great Britain and France are to concede to Italy some sort of protectorate over Abyssinia. If the Negus yields, he will be allowed to remain a member of the League with all the honours due to a descendant of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, while Mussolini will gallantly shoulder his share of the "white man's burden." This new status for Abyssinia was wittily described by the *News Chronicle* of July 17th as "comparative independence under an Italian mandate supervised by the League of Nations." If the Negus refuses to yield, Great Britain and France are expected to remember that Abyssinia has not yet abolished slavery and to be indignant that, by its obstinacy, it is bringing about a war.

It seems hardly likely that Mr. Eden and M. Laval will adopt this programme in its entirety. Probably the Council of the League will appoint a commission of impartial experts who will investigate the problem with every possible delay. Meanwhile, as soon as the rainy season is over, military operations will begin, and before the Commission issues its report one of the belligerents will have vanished into thin air. The *Daily Telegraph* of July 24th indicated the line along which peace may come: "It is not overlooked in London that this war may be easier to stop after it has started than to prevent from starting." However things turn out, the Foreign Office will compile a Blue Book showing the British electorate how the Government did its best to avert war, and failed because the Quai d'Orsay refused to take its share in the collective responsibility.

GAETANO SALVEMINI.

MOSCOW 1935.

I HAD heard and read so much of the bread queues and hunger in Moscow that it was an agreeable surprise to find the people looking well fed. I had not been there since 1913, and undoubtedly they are better nourished than in the past. Still more startling are the numberless improvements resulting from a proletarian régime. Among the new benefits of the worker in Moscow are public baths on a splendid scale, new parks well frequented, vast housing schemes, a short working day and a short working week, and an attempt to make the factory a place which is not sordid. The museums, at all events, uphold the ideal of "every factory in a garden," and even of palm trees in the workshop. How far the ideal is realised I am not qualified to say. Scattered about Moscow are institutes for working men and women, built on a grand scale. Another public benefit is cheap justice. There are four kinds of court, the friendly, the people's, the district and the supreme. We visited one of the people's courts, an informal affair. The presiding judge, a man of a certain training in law but elected for one year only, had on each side of him a people's representative as assessor, who is changed every six days. The assistance given with us at a settlement like Toynbee Hall to a small section of people is the public right of everybody in Moscow. I saw another symptom of care for the common man when I visited a hospital for railway workers. There was great pride in the equipment of the hospital, but what struck me as novel was the care for the comfort of the out-patients. The waiting-rooms were well-lighted and comfortably furnished, and magazines were provided on the tables.

It might be expected that a drag on progress existed in the vast expense of the army. But the army is held in honour because it is an educational school and represents the fellowship of socialist comrades. Even before the war there was something attractive to me about the workaday quality of the Russian soldier, with his disregard of pipeclay, and something of the same kind leads one to associate the cult of the army with the general concern for social progress. Megalomania, no doubt, has a share in producing this immense national interest in the Red Army. Military propaganda is an interesting feature. Posters calling attention to the glories of carrying a

rifle form both a boast and an appeal for support of public loans, and also for diligence in learning to shoot or to fly. Pictures of classes learning the parts of a rifle are provided in the schools and even the kindergartens. In a church which I entered unauthorised I found a school of musketry. Large factories have their own defence forces and their own corps of pilots. The electric works at Moscow have one hundred trained pilots among their twenty thousand workers. Parachuting is a popular sport, aimed at airmindedness, and the possession of a sharpshooter's badge is the ambition of both boys and girls. It seems to be assumed that everyone ought to feel enthusiasm for the army, and to regard it, not as a means of aggression, but as part of the natural defence of a political system. It is true that there is also a kind of nationalism which those who visited Russia a few years ago regard as indicating a great change of outlook. They are amazed at the advice given by Russia to the communists of France to support the French Army estimates. They would rather have expected a lecture enjoining them to carry on the class struggle and overthrow the Government.

As to military efficiency, foreign observers whom I met held that, if Russia fought Japan alone, she would win. Great difficulties, however, would arise from the monopolisation by the army of the best brains of the country, especially those of the OGPU. There is also always a doubt as to the survival of the Russian inefficiency of the past, causing some gigantic breakdown of plans. Something similar seems to have been responsible for the famine of two years ago, when the Ukraine was too drastically cleared of corn, and warnings of future shortage were disregarded till too late, with a kind of lethargy which foreigners regarded as characteristic of the Russian mind which has not yet learnt the new ideals. The popularity of the army is assisted by that of the War Minister, Voroshiloff. One can readily understand the public adoration of this man who, in conversation, gives the impression of ebullient enthusiasm, combined in an unusual manner with great personal charm, a sympathetic quality, and a youthful appearance. A well-informed Westerner, who knows him well, regards him as a kind of saint, of the type which combines a readiness to give one's own life with an equal readiness to sacrifice the lives of others.

Although no one credits Russia with making plans for

aggression, she can hardly expect that her vast preparation will not cause alarm in her neighbours. My visit coincided with the arrival of M. Beneš, which led to much talk of the agreement regarding air forces. The great reception given to him, which included the very unusual honour of M. Stalin's company at dinner, turned public attention to the utilisation by Russian aeroplanes of the aerodromes of Czechoslovakia. It was not surprising that the thought of Russian four-engine first-line planes within half an hour's flight of Dresden produced a shock in Germany.

One may readily feel that, if greater concern for public welfare is what we want to see, the Russians are setting us an interesting model, and a series of visits arranged by Intourist, or by the Society for Cultural Relations, with their splendid offices and admirable staffs, might send one away with an impression almost wholly favourable. But of course one's knowledge would be very incomplete unless one heard the views of residents whose outlook is Western and whose expression of opinion is free. We have been accustomed in England to violently hostile views of Bolshevik Russia. These views, when not vaguely emotional, have based themselves on four main charges against the Bolshevik régime, namely those affecting brutality, the attack on religion, the spoliation of the possessing classes, and the so-called attack on morals. It is desirable in this connection to distinguish between what is characteristically socialist and what is more strictly Russian. Great revolutionary changes have always been combined with severity, and in Russia, at all events, nothing else was to be expected. The Russian tradition has been one of callousness. Ideals of liberty or of humanity have been absent, and it will be a long time before the idea prevails that the individual is entitled to choice of life or to decent treatment. Readers of Mr. Chamberlin's recent book, *Russia's Iron Age*, cannot but deplore the survival of terrorism. Stalin lately said, as something very novel, that "we must begin to consider the human being." What a revelation of the previous outlook! Quite lately twenty thousand families were suddenly given notice to leave Moscow. There was, I was told, no system by which work or lodging was provided for them elsewhere, though in course of time each man would look to his union for employment in the normal way.

Since the murder of Kiroff there has been a general tightening-up, and what foreigners call the "oriental" school, associated with Stalin and Yagoda, has been strengthened. It is significant that when Stalin goes to his country house great precautions are taken for his safety. You see two large cars suddenly emerge from the gate of the Kremlin, the position of any individual in either car being concealed by curtains running the whole length of the car. The country house is surrounded by a vast, unclimbable wall.

Foreigners experience difficulty in securing servants, because, unless the approval of the authorities has been obtained, the servants may be made to suffer. The Government likes to have its own nominees in foreign service, reporting what is said and done. Within the governmental machine jealousies and feuds are, no doubt, active, and it was rumoured that the expulsion of Yenukidze, the Georgian Minister, by OGPU influence, might lead to a crisis, because Yenukidze's cause was being taken up by the powerful War Minister, Voroshiloff. Yenukidze was dismissed during my visit for "political dissoluteness," which meant that in his department freedom of comment on the Government was not ruthlessly suppressed.

The feeling against Russia in England has perhaps been mainly aroused by the attack on religion. The bitter atheism of the Bolsheviks is not part of the communist gospel as such: bitterness arose from the association of the Russian Church with a tyrannous Government, and with a form of ecclesiasticism which has little in common with religion as it is conceived by Protestants. The enthusiasm for public welfare prevalent in Moscow certainly struck me as having an aspect which we should call religious. Mr. Keynes, Lord Passfield and others have identified it as being markedly so. On the metaphysical side, as distinct from the moral, the reverence devoted to the memory of Lenin seems to me very likely to fill some of the mental vacuum left by the destruction of traditional religious forms. It is a widespread cult, perhaps as widespread as ancestor-worship in Japan. Every day, when Lenin's tomb is open to the public, a queue of many thousands extends southwards along the Red Square. Tourists with an Intourist guide are allowed to cut into the queue without waiting for their proper turn, and when we arrived

a full hour after the door was open, there was still a queue as far as one could see, waiting behind us. One descended slowly into the solemn atmosphere of an Etruscan tomb. In silence the procession moved round the glass coffin. Under a lamp made brilliant by the surrounding darkness lies the embalmed head with its short red beard, and the little figure in its military clothing. Passing the single sentry at the foot of the glass case, the crowd, containing people of all ages, and sometimes whole families, moved back into the brilliant light of the Square, maintaining silence for a period.

The so-called Anti-God Museum did not correspond with the descriptions we had seen in the English Press, depicting propaganda by grotesque figures and vulgar caricatures. That method of attack has been toned down, and the museum represents a serious attempt to induce the non-religious outlook by rousing interest in the scientific. On one side of the long hall were models, diagrams, portraits of Darwin, and statements giving the scientific history of the world. This led to what was in effect an anthropological collection of great merit. What was most interesting was that crowds of people, largely of the poorer sort, were eagerly studying the exhibition listening to the lectures of the guides. The other side of the hall displayed subjects illustrating the life of the Church, carefully selecting what was open to criticism. Much was made of the worship of relics, the immorality of priests, and the sinning stated to be given by the Church to war and to acts of aggression. It was odd to find selections of religious utterances which would not have struck us as likely to assist the anti-religious campaign, or to appear specially shocking to the scientific mind. St. Augustine's saying: "We learn more from God than from human wisdom," was paraded as something absurd. Near it was a quotation from the Epistle to the Corinthians seeming to decry "worldly wisdom." Pictures which with us might be used in the attack on imperialism—troops killing negroes, or planters flogging blacks—were here employed to damage the Church, with which it would not have occurred to Englishmen to associate these evils. A prominent object was a picture said to have been placed in a church after the risings of 1903. It displayed the leaders of the state, and the Czar himself, in a central group, above which stood the protecting figure of Christ. Around them insurgents fired revolvers and threw bombs with vain fury. In the

distance scenes of risings, slaughters and burnings illustrated the folly of opposing the Government.

Whether the Russian anti-religious movement will last is much debated among foreign observers in Russia. I heard the view expressed that the support given to Church processions last Easter was greater than before, especially by the young. The Government has lately circularised officials, enjoining a revival of anti-religious work, giving the ground that it has been deplorably neglected. This may be a proof of a religious revival. But I should estimate that at present the general drift is so far materialistic that anyone in a good post professing and practising Christianity would be taking a heroic risk. If the position in Russia endures, what will be the effect of a prolonged and general absence of belief in spiritual influences? Experience provides no answer. Possibly the majority of our own people are now in a similar state of mind, and it will be valuable if the reflection makes us as anxious about real religion in England as in Russia.

A more deliberate charge is made against Bolshevism in respect of its "attack on morality." The Bolsheviks rejected "bourgeois morality" with apparent lack of discrimination. They are now returning to what they rejected in various ways. In the moral life of Bolshevism we may note a tendency to puritanism. The creed of the Communist Party includes an ideal which is Spartan, and even outside the Party it is common to eschew alcohol and tobacco. The tourist finds, on the programme of visits to institutions, a district bureau of marriage and divorce. This, which one expected to resemble a registry office, was designed to be attractive. The rooms were provided with carpets and curtains, and the table with flowers. These embellishments were said to be part of the propaganda in favour of marriage. The room formed a strange setting for the dramas which were being enacted under the auspices of lady registration clerks. At one table, for instance, a couple came forward to be married. The five-minutes process of signing seemed to be decidedly lacking in emotional atmosphere. At another table a man was applying for his birth certificate, while by his side sat a woman waiting for the attention of the clerk to register her divorce. She had only to give her name and particulars of the marriage. It was unnecessary that the husband should attend, or even know

of the process unless there was a question of children. The registry undertook to notify him by postcard.

Whatever the demerits of the system, it is claimed that the scandals connected with the proof of grounds for divorce are avoided. Whoever is the counterpart of A. P. Herbert in Russia need not write a book like *Holy Deadlock*. If, as Professor Sidgwick said, the rational ground for marriage law is the interests of the children, the Russians are not behind-hand. Their chief aim is to establish the obligations of fatherhood, and payment is exacted, one is told, with great strictness, even when a man moves his work hundreds of miles away. The prime concern in regard to marriage and divorce is the allocation of the charge of the children. While divorce is legally easy, it is now markedly deprecated, and a man, after three divorces, runs a risk of being punished on the ground of dissolute disposition. Those who support the imposition by the state upon society in general of an ideal which is definitely Christian will naturally be disgusted by the Russian system. Those who think that the struggle to pretend that society is Christian has impeded real Christianity will be more sympathetic with the Russian experiment. Both parties will welcome the present Russian movement for encouraging monogamy, a movement which is one not of law but of propaganda, stimulating the social disapproval of anyone divorced several times. We were taken to a popular film, and found that, while it was an amusing depiction of the modern life of the educated young people, with their parachuting and swimming, it most decidedly contained a moral. The amusing and popular philanderer was confounded at the end by finding to his horror that both his lady friends had got married on the quiet.

To many of us a marked moral gain lies in the cult of enthusiasm for industrial production. It can be fostered because there is employment for all. The worker has no fear that if he works quickly, or makes an invention, or undertakes more looms, he will injure his fellows. The dignity of labour does not conflict with class loyalty. Our topsy-turvy economic outlook, in which labour-saving is an evil, and slacking is not condemned by one's fellows, is set in order. Socialists have often been charged with the risk of bringing about the slackening of work through public employment, and they have replied that, when the public owns the means of

production, and profits by efficiency, public opinion will favour hard work and make idleness difficult. Russia has provided a test and the result is a score for collectivism. Moreover the argument for "ca-canny" could not be banished without it.

While bourgeois ideals like truth-speaking are returning but slowly to recognition, there is another in which the Bolsheviks excel "par excellence." I refer to concern for public welfare at large, especially that of children. It may be true that, if the authority of Christian teaching is to be permanently discredited in Russia, this concern will become as dead as it was in the slave-owning and ruthless world before Christ. But for the present we must admit that Russia has developed a public spirit such as the Christian churches desire, and desire in vain, to see.

NOEL-BUXTON.

THE GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL PROGRAMMES.

THE feeling of the nation at the moment may be summed up in a phrase—a plethora of reports and a paucity of statesmen. Such a dictum can hardly satisfy the man who is deeply concerned with national recovery and national development. He knows that many of the suggestions that have been made in recent reports are extremely difficult to carry out. He knows also that there are many able men in the Government and that much good work has been done in the past few years. Nevertheless, there is a consensus of opinion in favour of making courageous experiments based upon the best information that is available. There seems no lack of such information, and the only criticism that one would make of these reports is that the generalisations for the most part would be accepted by everyone, but that when we face the task of putting forward definite schemes that will restore prosperity to the depressed areas and relieve the country of its burden of unemployed, the schemes are apt to be vague and ill-thought out.

Following on Mr. Lloyd George's *Organising Prosperity* we have Mr. P. M. Stewart's report as Commissioner for the Special Areas. The Government has published its reply to Mr. Lloyd George and on the same day was issued *The Next Five Years*, written by men of first-rate standing as economists, writers, and educational authorities. We cannot refuse to listen to such men as Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, Sir Arthur Salter and Sir Walter Layton and many others who, approaching the problem from different angles, yet find themselves in harmony on the main issues. Both Mr. Lloyd George and the authors of *The Next Five Years* are in agreement with regard to the necessity of some authority, not necessarily divorced from the Cabinet, free to give the time that over-worked Ministers can hardly spare, to the work of planning and reconstruction. The New Deal proposal is for a National Development Board charged with the duty of initiating and co-ordinating public works in accordance with the state of trade and finance. It would link with this a small inner Cabinet of Ministers free of departmental responsibility. The authors of *The Next Five Years* recommend the appointment of an Economic General Staff similar to the Committee of

Imperial Defence. Such a body of men would try to piece together the various sections of the Government's policy, fitting them into a consistent whole. There would be in fact both short-term and long-term planning. There is no doubt that some such policy would commend itself to the nation as a whole. It has gradually been borne in upon all thoughtful men that the complexity of the problems which we have to face do require that any proposals, whether of public works or of remedial measures, should be well considered, properly organised and co-ordinated.

Can a Government which can only co-ordinate measures of expansion by means of its Cabinet, which is always over-worked, initiate and carry out any of the far-reaching schemes that have been suggested? There is a strong case for this super-departmental body discharging the function of framing a policy and planning both for the present and for the future. The chairman of such a board, by whatever name it is called, should be a member of the Cabinet without portfolio, and such a man is ready to hand in the person of Lord Eustace Percy, who recently stated when speaking of the Tyneside area: "We can restore and revive this great north-eastern district, but we can do it only by looking facts in the face and thinking and planning hard." We ought not for one moment to admit that leadership and democracy are incompatible, but individual initiative must be linked with national control and a large measure of socialisation. "The real danger to democratic Government," to quote *The Next Five Years*, "consists to-day mainly in its inability to cope successfully with economic problems and to provide stability and continuity in its attempt to solve them."

One great difficulty about Mr. Lloyd George's New Deal, as it presents itself to the average man, is that he is not quite sure whether this linking-up of his proposals with an electoral campaign does not point to the fact that the political designs are uppermost. If this is a genuine and altruistic attempt to organise prosperity for this country, he would no doubt have many followers, but he is a leader who is not wholly trusted and political memories, although they are short, are not quite so short as this might seem to imply. The fact that he announces his intention of running 350 candidates unless his programme is accepted has already had a very disturbing effect on the minds of his Free Church followers. It may be

said: "Why not judge his proposals on their merits?" Doubtless they will be so judged and where they are in agreement with the proposals of men more stable in purpose there is every reason to give them support and carry them into effect wherever possible. He lays stress upon a programme which dates back to 1929, namely the work of making new roads, of rebuilding bridges, of improving our canal system, of electrifying the railways and a variety of improvements in the coal industry. These suggestions are now amplified in his pamphlet *Organising Prosperity*. About one thing he is quite definite, and that is that the Government should float a loan for £250,000,000 of new money in three per cents. at par, the money to be spent in two years and repaid in sixty years. With this money he would carry out the public works to which he alludes and would attempt to give a large amount of additional work by placing men upon the land and increasing our agricultural production.

The answer of the Government to Mr. Lloyd George's New Deal is that there is a lack of detail in the plans regarding expenditure on public works and misconceptions as to the quantity of undiscovered work that will give employment to large numbers of men. The Government reply also states that his methods would probably be slow, and all the slower because of his new machinery. It points out that since 1920 some £1,200,000,000 have been spent on State-aided or State-executed works of various kinds and that good schemes which can be quickly put in hand have been hard to find. There is a good deal of truth in this argument, for, as we all know, big schemes require a great deal of preparation beforehand and are liable to be dislocated by unexpected happenings. To say that nothing of importance has been accomplished by this Government is to forget the vast sums spent upon roads, bridges and housing, to forget all that has already been achieved in the clearance of slums and in the granting of a Government loan of over 35 millions for the electrification of certain suburban railways. In the matter of housing and re-housing we are making rapid headway. Over 1,000,000 houses have been built during the last four years and 327,000 houses were built last year up to the end of March. This is independent altogether of slum clearance and re-housing which is now being pursued throughout the country. Some housing reformers consider the pace is too rapid, remembering the big

gaps in control and the haphazard development of the country-side. Here there is a real need of more foresight and better planning, the lack of which on the arterial roads called forth the Act "Restricting Ribbon Development." It may be, as Sir Josiah Stamp says, that in some cases the landowners have suffered as the result of these arterial roads, but in the majority of cases we have to deplore the lack of any real power to claim the unearned increment.

In respect of the national remedies for unemployment and distress applying to the whole country and not only to the depressed areas, there is practical agreement in all these reports and discussions. There is agreement about the raising of the school-age, although recent correspondence in *The Times* lays stress upon the importance of associating with this method the encouragement of the Day Continuation Schools. The two methods do not necessarily clash and both should be encouraged. All the writers are agreed that a State-supported scheme for retiring allowances is important since it would take out of the labour market large numbers of older men and will give to younger men the opportunity which they at present lack. There is general agreement also upon what we may call measures of social justice, like the co-ordination of the existing social services and perhaps the abolition of the family Means Test. The authors of *The Next Five Years* are strongly in favour of an attempt to improve the standards of nutrition by a national food policy and advocate a five-million-pound grant for this purpose. The suggestion that shorter working hours should be applied wherever possible is a policy with which the Government would have full sympathy, and Mr. P. M. Stewart's suggestion of making a full week's holiday with pay compulsory for all workers who have been continuously in the same employment for a year is certainly an item in the programme of social justice which should not be overlooked. Referring to the raising of the school-age or other methods for taking the very young off the labour market it may be said with some assurance that the burden of maintaining adults in unemployment is almost, if not quite, equal to the cost of maintaining children longer at school, and there is the added boon of a better education for the younger generation.

The two items in all the programmes which are most fruitful of controversy are: First, the setting on foot of public

works by means of a National Development Board ; and secondly, the programme of Agricultural Development and Land Settlement. Various public works, more or less free from the condemnation of relief works, are indicated in every case. It is not purely a matter of money, for finance is available. The Government could quite easily float a large loan of £100,000,000 at a low rate of interest. The savings of the nation are available. Mr. Lloyd George estimates the idle balance at £200,000,000. His figures are not always impeccable and there is more than a touch of megalomania about some of his schemes, but that the Government could find the money for useful and productive measures is unquestioned. The answer of the Government is : " Show us in detail your schemes with the estimated cost and show us also that these schemes are likely to be productive of national well-being—in fact, schemes that will pay their way either directly or indirectly—and the Government is prepared to consider each and every scheme on its merits." Mr. Stewart mentions three such schemes to which he was debarred from giving assistance, such as the tunnel under the Thames near Purfleet, the construction of an orbital road round London, and a bridge over the Severn at Chepstow with the assistance of the Gloucestershire County Council. He urges that sympathetic consideration should be given to such undertakings and says that if national works are undertaken, priority should be given to schemes which most readily lend themselves to the absorption of the unemployed unskilled workers in the special areas and the obtaining of materials from those areas. He himself, with his limited powers, has set on foot works of public utility paid for by wages to the extent of £950,000. Money might be usefully spent also on land reclamation, afforestation and the protection of our coasts from erosion, but in each case expert advice is needed and should be forthcoming.

National works, however, cannot always be established in the special areas, and the relief to these areas is therefore indirect unless labour can be transferred to districts where the public works are being carried out. That is no easy task since we have to remember the reluctance of a population on any large scale to move from the locality in which they have lived all their lives. This would especially apply to Cumberland and to some districts of South Wales. But apart from this hindrance to transference, there is the problem of housing the

transferred workers. When the Kent coalfields were opened up, houses had to be built for a very large number of workers so transferred and this, even when the work offered is in one area, cannot easily be accomplished in a short space of time. If you can offer the individual man his railway fare for himself, his wife and children, a house in which to live together with a regular and permanent job at good wages, he will no doubt move. But this is exactly what all experience shows it is difficult to do when we are dealing with large numbers of men.

The writer's own suggestion so far as the depressed areas are concerned is that we should definitely encourage, if necessary by grants, such bodies as the Imperial Chemical Industries, to establish further hydrogenation plants in the coal areas. There is a growing and increasing demand for oil and petrol at present—we imported 2,065 million gallons in 1933—in both cases a rebate is offered by the Government, making it possible to compete with imported products. We have always to remember that the unemployed miners are a charge on the Unemployment Insurance Fund of about £15,000,000 a year. Something more might be done if we could make it easy for industrial enterprises to be established in the special areas by freeing them for a period of years from taxation. The rating question is more difficult, but since economic conditions are not favourable to the establishment of industries in these areas, we ought to imitate other countries and especially newer countries in making it worth while for them to take their industries to districts in which they have to encounter some disadvantages. The introduction of an industry that would give employment to even a thousand men in a district that is derelict would be of immense value, and the example once set, other industries might be persuaded to follow.

In the matter of agriculture Mr. Lloyd George prides himself on having special knowledge. He speaks with assurance of his own experience in this direction. He believes that we can greatly increase the production of home products, and if necessary he would strictly control the imports of all Dominion and foreign products, while there is still in his opinion so large a gap to be filled. He does not wish, of course, to increase the price of food at home, but it is difficult to see how, at any rate in a short space of time, this could be prevented. Over a long term of years no doubt a greatly increased production of

certain classes of food could be obtained, but if you are going drastically to curtail imports of food from other countries, you are running the risk of damaging your own trade and certainly dislocating your exports to the Dominions.

The authors of *The Next Five Years* lay down as a first condition that in our endeavour to encourage agriculture we must not raise the price of food or destroy our foreign trade. They would try to increase the food consumption of the poor by increasing the efficiency of the food-distributing industry and supplying the land with capital where necessary. It may be added that one method of helping agriculture, since the greatly extended production of wheat is clearly impossible, is to increase the consumption of milk, since dairy-farming in this country is perhaps the most suitable department of agriculture for the majority of farmers; but without the increased consumption of milk, which the Government should encourage by every means in its power, dairy-farming is presented with a perplexing problem. The supply of milk to school-children ought to be encouraged. In the most depressed areas it might be given free, and a further advance might be made along the present line of supplying it at very low cost both to school-children and to nursing mothers. In all the arguments that have been adduced by Mr. Lloyd George, we have not discovered any sufficiently substantial reasons for supposing that we can place 500,000 additional men on the land and give indirect employment to another 500,000. Those of us who are concerned with Land Settlement, know quite well that to make a smallholder self-supporting on the land will take at least two years and will cost £700. Moreover, every assistance is given in such cases by expert advice on the spot, by the transfer of wife and children with the husband, by co-operation both in buying and selling, by the establishment in groups of smallholders and finally by the production of exactly those articles of food which find a ready market at a good price. No expert who has written on the subject is quite so optimistic as the originator of the New Deal and no one would be more surprised or more gratified than the warm supporters of agricultural development if the New Deal policy could be made successful.

That the question of settlement on the land is not wholly ignored although admitted to be a matter to be considered with care and caution is shown by the fact that the

Commissioner has set aside out of his £2,000,000 no less than £800,000 for this purpose. The sum may not be commensurate with the need, but if the experiments that are now being made prove successful the Government is bound to assist specific proposals covering a much wider field.

It is difficult to sum up the results of all these reports. Many of the facts are undoubted. Finance is available for useful projects. The latest figures show that nearly two millions of men lack employment. Much land is lying idle which ought to be used. There are many schemes of public work which ought to be undertaken after full and careful consideration in each case. Surely our statesmen do not require any further stimulus than the knowledge that so many are suffering when they might be helped, that there is so much undeserved poverty and hardship side by side with great wealth, and finally that the incipient signs of returning prosperity might well be encouraged by a Government that has already done much to lay the foundations of that prosperity?

PERCY ALDEN.

THE NEW DEAL IN BELGIUM.

BELGIUM is a country in the hands of the young. Old men like Leopold II gave to the Congo its final form, or, like Emile Francqui, drove through the great financial and industrial deals which permitted the "*Société Générale*" to become one of the most powerful banks in Europe. Young men are now shaping new destinies for the "*métropole*," the colony, and the whole complicated economic structure of this small, powerful state, the history of which is so intimately involved in the great struggles engaged in between jealous neighbours, throughout the hundred and five years of its existence. The King is a youth who carries his thirty-odd years with dignity. His personal friend, the Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland, has recently attained the age of forty-two. The socialist, Henri de Man, whose *Plan du Travail* has won for him a place in the cabinet and an international hearing, is well on the right side of fifty. Stirred by years of study in the United States, in Great Britain, and in Russia, these young men are embarked upon the economic renovation of their country. The people's representatives have voted, and the King has signed, special powers which confer dictatorial privileges for one year upon Mr. van Zeeland's government. It was understood that a New Deal would be inaugurated in the field of finance and economics, but that political issues would be permitted to lie dormant, while foreign policy remained unchanged. Discord with France, discord with the Flemings, and discussions of the Air Pact have in part altered this programme.

Every vital issue in the life of the Belgians is linked with the policies of Great Britain, France, and Germany. For centuries Bruges, Ypres, and Ghent lived by the manufacture of textiles woven from the raw wool of English sheep. When Britain became in turn a manufacturing nation, and brought the mills home to the flocks, it was Antwerp which imported the cheaper British product and opposed the levy of protective tariffs, ruining the three proud cities of Flanders. To-day Belgium is one great harbour, its canals linking countless metropolitan districts each with its wharves, its factories, its warehouses, and its kitchen gardens. Belgian coal interests are injured when France accepts payment for the mines of the Saar in German coal. Belgian steel interests are resentful

when Great Britain raises the duty of worked iron from Belgian mills, where costs of production have been cheapened by the devaluation of the currency. Belgian chemical interests are affected by the nitrate production and prices of Chile, the potash of Alsace and Germany, the duty upon window glass imported into the United States of America. No problem can be so small as to centre in and confine itself to Belgium. The very misunderstandings of the Walloons and the Flemings take on serious international aspects when either party attempts to present or even to analyse for the benefit of the other the political aspirations of the linguistic cousin, France or Germany. The cost of the national currency, as in England, may dam all exports until drastic devaluation restores contact with world markets. And Belgium, like Britain, depends upon world markets.

It may be said that the example of Great Britain has in some respects had the greatest influence upon Belgium during the few months of the van Zeeland administration. German observers, who have through their passion for classification a tendency to over-simplify the Belgian situation, tend to group together post-war administrations in Belgium as either "francophile" or "anglophile." Postponing for the moment any consideration of the political tendencies which have caused Berlin editors to hail the present Government in Brussels as pro-British, the economic parallels are not far to seek. For the past three years there has been a growing party within Belgium, led not only by exporters and manufacturers, but also by university professors, who have maintained that Belgium should have followed the northern countries in remaining with the pound sterling when the pound sterling dropped. Eventually, for having held instead to the Gold Bloc led by the Bank of France, Belgian producers found that the mere fact that they had to estimate their costs and quote their prices in francs cut them off from about forty-nine important devaluating countries to which they had previously been able to export. Successive Governments tried by deflation to lower internal prices to such a point that Belgian products might still compete in world markets. All efforts were unavailing. As prices fell, business within the country sickened and fell off. Commerce slackened. Unemployment grew. Budget deficits lengthened. The Theunis Government took over the reins from that of Count de Broqueville only to

find that every attempt to restore budgetary equilibrium drove capital out of the country instead of restoring confidence: the country could only be given a new push forward through the employment of drastic stimulants. In mid-March 1935 a consultation was held in Paris, where French doctors and Belgian failed to agree. The Belgian statesmen returned home to meet a desperate situation. Exchange control was established. For a fortnight two separate sets of quotations, the domestic and the foreign rating of the belga, showed plainly that the inevitable was happening. Prime Minister Theunis, who had promised to maintain the Belgian franc intact, resigned voluntarily, his gesture indicating that neither he nor any other statesman could contend against economic law. Although the gold reserve of the Bank of Belgium amounted to more than sixty-five per cent. of the circulation, mere gold could not set going again the wheels of industry, nor restore faith in business prosperity when customers went elsewhere with their purchases. A new government came in and the belga was re-established on gold at a new rating which cut away more than one-fourth of its former value.

The character of the young King had been untried until this cabinet crisis. He had been crowned Leopold III for only about a year, and his people knew him only as a serious youth who was devoted to his charming family and dedicated to the welfare of his people. Before the war there had been rumours that the Belgians were outgrowing their dynasty. In spite of all that Leopold II had accomplished for the country by acquiring and shaping a colonial empire for them, his manners and methods had not made him popular, and his propensity for embittering relations with England at the time of the Congo revelations had made him even an embarrassing figure for his statesmen. To-day everyone in Belgium appreciates far more than was possible a generation ago the accomplishment of Leopold II. Albert, *le Roi-Chevalier*, is the idol, the cult, of his nation, who can hardly imagine that the man himself is dead, so vividly has his spirit taken hold of them. War and reconstruction, sacrifice and heroism, made the father of the present king the real leader of his people and endeared his family to them. Only a beloved dynasty can fulfil in Belgium the rôle which royalty is called upon to play, there as in Britain, in uniting folk of different race into one

people. Leopold III is popular. The manifestations of loyalty as he makes his "*Entrée joyeuse*" into Antwerp, into Liège, into one after another of his cities, are genuine, for the Belgians are a surly citizenry when their affections are not engaged by the rulers who attempt to guide them, and after centuries of apprenticeship to the hecklers of Burgundy and Austria and Spain, they know full well how to express their true sentiments and how to refrain from expressing affection which they do not feel. Leopold III is beginning his reign with the sympathy of his bilingual people.

From sympathy to respect is sometimes a long step. Fortunately for Belgium her king takes his task not only with due seriousness, but with the requisite tact. In the difficult days after Prime Minister Theunis had resigned, Leopold III impressed his statesmen by the firmness and energy, the resourcefulness and open mind, with which he met the crisis. When it became obvious that no purely partisan coalition might hope to put its programme into effect, he sought to form a Government above parties. He called in personalities from non-parliamentary circles, representing the universities, the trade unions, the agrarians, the banks, the business community. His independence and freshness of procedure, which broke through the established parliamentary formula, was aimed at the establishment of a Government of national union. What in the end he had to content himself with was a tripartite cabinet uniting six catholics, five socialists, and four liberals. The influence and example of the young monarch had so impressed his people, however, that during the crucial days of early April, following immediately upon the constitution of the van Zeeland cabinet, it was his spirit of eager patriotism which conciliated party differences and pointed the way to effective collaboration. During the mad March days when moneys were revalued, international friendships reappraised, and governments revamped, the king showed himself indeed the man whom his nation needed.

Prime Minister van Zeeland, young, handsome, well-spoken and travelled, is not a politician, but a financier. He gives the tone of economic rather than partisan preoccupation to his cabinet. After years of study in America, after writing a book on Russia, after acting as financial adviser in Egypt, after having come to a leading position in the National Bank of Belgium, he was known to have formulated a plan for the

reorganisation of many Belgian institutions even before the Ministry of Theunis took office. The King invited him to put this plan into execution. He was able to publish a ministerial declaration compact with detailed projects and incisive suggestions. He proposed devaluation, the establishment of a fund to protect the new rate of exchange, the balancing of the budget, tax reductions, bank control, gradual increases in wages and prices, the recognition of Soviet Russia with the object of improving commercial relations, and the extension of the régime of special powers. He concluded: "The Government will maintain its present foreign policy, which must be dictated now more than ever by the necessity of increasing our security guarantees and consolidating peace. On all other problems relating to internal policy, such as public education, army and language problems, we will maintain the *status quo* and party truce."

In many of its economic aspects the New Deal of van Zeeland resembles the New Deal of Roosevelt. Both leaders have taken into their council university professors as well as statesmen. Both men have incurred the disapproval of bankers by their attempts to make deposits safe for the depositor through curtailing the liberty of movement of the financier. The Belgian Government has accomplished a remarkable renovation, restored confidence, caused fugitive gold and hoarded money to flow back into the country and into circulation until banks which were threatened with bankruptcy have become once again liquid and money has become cheap enough to encourage industrialists to borrow once more and set the wheels of their idle factories moving. By a conversion operation similar to that which succeeded in Great Britain, the Government reduced the interest rates on its internal debt and established a new four per cent. Unified Rente which effects an annual economy of about 620,000,000 Belgian francs for the budget and makes it that much more possible to reduce taxes. Taxes and customs duties have already been reduced, while business recovers as a consequence of the rising prices brought about by devaluation, and during April and May tax receipts exceeded the preliminary estimates by 125,000,000 Belgian francs. The present budget, however, will possibly close with a deficit of about 450,000,000 Belgian francs, and it remains for the budget of 1936 to demonstrate the full effects of Prime Minister van Zeeland's programme.

July 1935 marked the beginning of a reaction against the Government by certain groups disaffected by the prospect of bank control. Financial circles which welcomed the new liquidity of resources made possible by the vigorous preliminary reforms, hesitated to support van Zeeland to the logical conclusions he desired. Quoting Théophile Gautier's remark that the "criticism of an adversary is more useful than the praise of a friend," the Prime Minister retorted at Antwerp, on July 2nd, that he had found the country at the depth of a crisis which had continued throughout many months; he had found credit abused, and the social, political, and moral limit reached by the deflation; he had found the country suspicious of its currency and finance in the grip of a banking crisis. He pointed out that these manifestations of disorder had passed. He showed that Belgium was importing more raw materials, a sign of renewed manufacturing activity, while exports had passed from an average of 1,460,000 tons a month during the first quarter to 1,500,000 in April and to 1,630,000 in May. In value, exports, which had averaged about 1,124 million Belgian francs during the first months of the year, reached 1,352 million Belgian francs in the month of May, the second after the devaluation. Having served the public interest thus far, he proposed to continue his task in establishing a technical commission for the control of banking activity. Independent of politics, independent of existing ministries, and quite independent of the treasury department, this commission would not be a "fiscal inquisition" making it possible for tax-gatherers to pry into the citizens' secrets. It would also contain no elements of nationalisation, since the charge of "*Étatisme*" had been made. The Prime Minister explained that the disputed measure would give to disinterested technicians necessary powers to advise stock exchanges against admitting suspected issues, to veto banks' plans for industrial financing if their projects appear unsound, and at all times to follow closely all movements of credit and to pursue all necessary investigations connected with this task. Undoubtedly this measure, thus elucidated, constitutes a large-bore cannon aimed at banking. The present Government will set it up, but will not load it heavily. What worries the conservative elements is that a socialist cabinet might put in a charge heavy enough to disrupt the country.

A certain socialist restiveness is supposed to be developing

within the cabinet, yet socialist discipline is strict, and few signs of dissatisfaction have become apparent. It was the socialist organ, *Le Peuple*, which accused bankers of attacking the new Rentes in order to discredit the Government and its policy of bank control as the quotations tumbled. Vander-velde himself, the great socialist leader, spoke from his place as Vice-Premier to minimise these charges. More serious, because representing a phenomenon which is also deeply social as well as linguistic, was the passage in early June of a Bill to make the use of Flemish compulsory in certain courts of law in Antwerp and other Flemish districts. This measure puts French-speaking Belgians in these regions under the same disadvantage which the Flemings suffered years ago. It dramatises the steady emergence of Flemish from the speech of an oppressed and scorned majority to the vigorous and at times oppressive and scornful utterance of a dominant partner. It is regrettable that Belgians cannot as yet reach that equanimity towards linguistic habits which characterises the Swiss. Only a few Walloons have such a sense of humour in the face of the stubborn Flemish demand for equal rights that they can imitate one of their representatives in the parliament, who, whenever a Fleming spoke in Flemish, rose to deliver a few remarks in his own local *patois*, and sat down happy in the realisation that, since only about half the gathering had understood him, the score was now even. Both Flemish and Walloon stocks constitute a sterling peasantry which is the true wealth of Belgium. This peasantry sends its sons to colonise the Congo, supplies workers for the mills and soldiers for the armies. The two races work together, yet neither will approve the other's language or seek the same political alliances. At the present moment, when budgetary expenses are great and most neighbouring countries have begun to add to the burden of military expenditure while Belgium refrains, this hesitancy in the face of international rivalries has its economic advantage.

Belgium owes its very existence to British insistence upon the maintenance of buffer states along the Channel. Aviation has made the rôle of the Low Countries even more vital to England than was the case a century ago, since the effectiveness of an air force operating from the Rhine or the Marne against London is not nearly so great, nor is the element of surprise so dangerous as that of a force operating from Ostend

or Zeebrugge. On the subject of the Air Pacts, as Foreign Minister Hymans stated on March 19th, the Belgian Government is in complete accord with the French, British and Italian Governments. The *Métropole*, a catholic organ of influence in Antwerp, said that "following upon the Franco-Italian agreements concluded in the beginning of January, the close understanding which has again been manifested between England and France is considered as an important factor in the country's security." The *Nation Belge* of Brussels would have preferred a definite alliance to "just another pact." It conceded, however, that "it has the advantage over preceding pacts that it provides for an immediate counter-attack by air."

Having been invaded and occupied times without number in its eventful history, Belgium has built up a definite and carefully cultivated distrust of Germany which is not least of the many factors to be reckoned with in establishing a peaceful tone throughout Western Europe. The great French poet and diplomat, Paul Claudel, was recently recalled from Brussels after having put himself in a most embarrassing position by belittling Belgian claims for commercial privileges in exchange for her aid in the military and geographic situation. The cutting of Belgian labourers' wages in the French borderland was not so serious an offence as this blow to Belgian pride as well as purse. A local campaign to increase the length of military service ended as abruptly as it had begun, and Belgium has not followed France, Britain, and Germany in voting new army or navy appropriations. So far as possible, the spirit of van Zeeland's declaration that his Government intended to put its house in order at home and avoid foreign complications has been followed. The young men are intent upon showing themselves to be even better builders than their elders.

WILLIAM LEON SMYSER.

THE JAPANESE AND THE WAR-MENTALITY.

MOST of us in this country are aware of the extraordinary fervour of Japanese patriotism. We have heard of its almost fanatical single-mindedness, of its intolerance to any motive for action other than duty, as imposed and interpreted by the bureaucrats, generals and admirals in authority. Probably most of us, vaguely conscious of the samurai tradition, believe the Japanese a warlike people, paying nothing more than lip-service to the cause of peace, waiting only for a favourable opportunity before throwing treaties on the rubbish heap again and embarking on another aggressive adventure.

Such a view is frequently expressed, yet rarely examined. First-hand investigation would show that it is not altogether accurate. It is nonsense to say that the Japanese people as a whole do not genuinely desire peace. Retired generals and admirals, it is true, breathe fire and brimstone, fascist societies and hotheads urge the Government to punish and destroy the Western nations, but neither the mass of the people nor their bureaucratic rulers quite share the avowed sentiments of Mussolini or the Nazis on the ultimate necessity and purging effects of war. They are behind Mr. Hirota when he voices Japan's pacific intentions. Of that there can be no doubt.

Why, then, are the Japanese considered warlike? Are we not confusing the actions of the militarists on the Asiatic continent with the feelings of the people at home? The answer is, that the two things, though obviously separate, cannot clearly be dissociated in practice. For the Japanese as a whole, though far from bellicose, are nevertheless militarist, if by "militarism" we mean the prevalence of the spirit characteristic of the professional soldier, with his habit of unquestioning obedience, and the tendency to regard military efficiency as the paramount interest of the State.

This distinction between bellicosity and militarism may seem to be splitting hairs, but it is an important one in the minds of the Japanese people. They can at one and the same time reject some of the candid brutality of Nazis and fascists and defer to the declaration of the War Office, made last October in a widely circulated pamphlet, that "war is the

father of creation and the mother of civilisation." The *Osaka Mainichi*, one of Japan's leading dailies, which (with its sister-journal in Tokyo) has a circulation of over two million and is not considered particularly chauvinistic, put the prevailing sentiment rather neatly in the recent Peace Promotion number of its English edition:

The Japanese are known for their martial inclinations and abroad, mistakenly but naturally, they are often considered warlike. These martial inclinations are far from being offensive and hostile. The spirit of the martial arts, in its highest form, should be expressive of all that is noble and graceful in human nature.

This statement, too naïve not to be sincere, may be taken without unfairness to express the whole body of effective public opinion. It represents an attitude of mind which psycho-analysts call "ambivalent," a harbouring of simultaneous but irreconcilable desires. The Japanese, it is held, do not believe in war; they believe in the spirit of peace—but they also believe in the spirit of war. Thus there is nothing hypocritical about the repeated expressions of their desire for peace. It is simply a desire which cannot be fulfilled so long as they continue to follow, obediently like soldiers, the dictates of the Supreme Command. For the Supreme Command, independent as it is of the civil government, and free from the control of the corrupt and discredited parties, has, since the Manchurian incident, discovered that "National Defence," over which by the law of the constitution it has complete and undisputed power, is an extraordinarily elastic term which, like the wording of foreign treaties, can be stretched to justify almost any action in politics, either foreign or domestic. And the Supreme Command has very definite views on the subject of Japan's "pacifying mission" in the Orient.

The Japanese, like the Germans and Italians, are far from satisfied with their present position in the world. Such dissatisfaction is perhaps only natural to a rapidly rising nation, expanding in population, industry, commerce, and political influence. Moreover, like the Germans chafing under the stigma of war-guilt, the Japanese, perhaps even more sensitive, are smarting under the accusation of race-inferiority levelled in the exclusive immigration laws of white countries like the U.S.A., Canada and Australia. And the military

enthusiastic over works such as Samuel Smiles's *Self-Help* and Lord Avebury's *Uses of Life*, while others took up rabbits and cock-fighting, few have emerged from the rigours of educational regimentation to think soberly and creatively along individual lines. Even at that, nothing could speak more highly of the innate capacities of the Japanese people than that these few have been able to survive their soul-maiming experience and have retained enough individuality to question, in their minds at least, the attitude and decisions of the authorities who determine the nature of a patriotic duty.

Other causes and agencies are not wanting which maintain and stimulate the mass-mind. The dominance of the family over the individual is not without its importance in restraining the younger people from breaking away from the orthodoxy of their elders. Numerous patriotic societies fix and whip up their national enthusiasm. It becomes more than a social blunder not to expose a Rising Sun flag on national holidays. Newspapers are strictly censored by the Government of anything which savours of "thought," and disturbing news is eliminated. Such extracts from foreign periodicals as are reprinted are carefully selected with a view to preserving the confidence of the people in the Government's foreign policy. The radio, again, furnishes an extremely valuable instrument of propaganda: generals and admirals not infrequently exhort the nation on the need for national defence and the righteousness of Japan's foreign policy; General Araki, though no longer in office, explains to listeners why Japan's present naval inferiority is unjust; but Professor Kisaburo Yokota, of the Tokyo Imperial University, who, by some oversight, was permitted to broadcast statements which some interpreted as upholding the naval treaties and regretting Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, opinions which the professor at once indignantly hastened to deny, incurred serious trouble with the Navy Office. Public lectures are delivered by navy and army men to well-filled houses; at Osaka on September 7th last, for instance, two naval officers told an audience of 5,000 that some of the Japanese submarines have a cruising radius of 15,000 miles, and that on the occasion of the Shanghai incident "a certain power was not able to do anything on account of the superiority of the Japanese navy." And such is the ambivalence in the Japanese

mind that the audience—and probably even the speakers themselves—did not see anything in the least inconsistent between these utterances and the claims, so adamantly put forward abroad, that submarines are mainly defensive, and that the present 5:5:3 ratio does not guarantee Japan security.

Yet the ardour now prevalent for the army and navy is, in its present form, something new. The military and navy parties were hardly so popular in 1930. Their endeavours had been baulked by the civilian politicians on several occasions during the present century, as in the celebrated case of the two divisions, which led to the fall of General Katsura's third ministry in 1913. Despite the previous success of the military organs in forcing the civilian Prince Saionji from office in 1912, the consent of the governed was lacking to a ministry run by the militarists themselves. Again, the Civil Government would not have dared to conclude the London Naval Treaty in 1930, in the teeth of fierce opposition from the naval leaders, had it been sure that public opinion supported the navy as actively as it does now.

How has this change come about? The Manchurian incident is almost the complete answer. Even when tolerating the attacks of the civilian politicians on the army and navy, their training and lack of genuine political education have rendered the Japanese, at bottom, sympathetic with the armed forces. At heart they have always been inclined to the khaki uniform and the sabre rather than to the frock-coat and the note-sheaf. Simplicity and authoritarianism have always appealed to them more than the complexities and personal responsibilities of parliamentary politics. It needed but a focus for their feelings, a bugle-call to action. The Manchurian incident provided it. "The State was in danger"—and the army at a premium. The navy, especially after the Shanghai incident, was invested with a halo after the same pattern.

Professional politicians in the Diet may attack, though indirectly, the domination of the Supreme Command as much as they choose. They may even, if they dare, pass a Japanese variant of Dunning's Resolution: "That in the opinion of this House the power of the Supreme Command has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished." But their thunder, heard though it may be, will pass despised. Even in the unimaginable event of the Budget, this year

allocating forty-eight per cent. of the national expenditure to the defence forces, being rejected, the Constitution provides that the Budget of the year before (1934—forty-five per cent.) be automatically renewed. Nor is Admiral Okada's Cabinet likely to be seriously threatened by party men with less claim to represent the solidity of the nation so long as *hijoji*, the crisis of 1935-6, looms ahead. Public opinion calls for unanimity so long as the State is threatened from outside. Public opinion, only recently extended from the ambit of the feudal unit, conceives of nothing greater than the nation-State; it does not accept the view that collective security involves the renunciation of some of a nation's sovereign rights; it has not come into contact with the doctrine that no nation should be judge in its own cause. Accordingly, the Japanese sincerely and devoutly believe that in their international problems—Manchukuo, the South Sea Mandates, the Washington and London Treaties, population, industrial and commercial expansion—so far from acting aggressively, they are on the defensive. And unanimity, therefore, is the basis of naval and military dictation. In truth, Japan hardly needs a fascist movement; with *Yamato Damashii*, the national spirit, as powerful as it is, fascism would be redundant. In essence it is there already, permeating the national consciousness, guiding the course of her politics.

JOHN W. PALMER.

LOPE DE VEGA: 1635-1935.

ON August 27th, 1635, died the most prolific genius that Spain, and perhaps Europe, has ever known—Fray Lope Félix de Vega Carpio, "phoenix of wits" and "prodigy of nature," to quote the epithets applied to him by his contemporaries, who for a generation and more outrivalled each other in paying him tributes of admiration, before an age of neo-classicism and decadence consigned him temporarily to something like oblivion. In this tercentenary year, which sees scholars and students all over the world, together with a hundred million people whose mother tongue is Spanish, paying him homage, it should be of interest to try to recapture something of the atmosphere of reverential awe with which his literary achievements were regarded in the Golden Age of Spain's greatness.

I am not alone in believing that Lope de Vega has the right to a place in that rare first rank of writers who share with him the attributes of universality, and outstanding among whom are Dante, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Milton, Calderón, Molière and Goethe. So great are all these writers that it would be an irreverence to attempt to place them in order of merit: when such attempts are made, the results reflect little but the character of the age that makes them. Some have been given their proud position by virtue of a single masterpiece; others, for their excellence in a single *genre*; others, because in every work, if not on every page they have written, there is the authentic stamp of the very highest genius. "There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon and another glory of the stars: for one star differeth from another star in glory."

Wherein lies the claim of Lope de Vega to be included in this first rank of modern writers? In the magnitude of his achievement combined with the high level of excellence which he attained in relation to its astounding size. At his best, no English dramatist but Shakespeare can be compared with him, and only one or two can even reach the average of his quality, yet his published full-length dramas alone are more than ten times the number of Shakespeare's. He could not, perhaps, either in dramatic or non-dramatic poetry, have fashioned one exquisite and perfect gem, though some may well see indications of potential perfection in the finest of the

Rimas Sacras. But he was not by profession a gem-cutter. He was the architect of a vast and beautiful city, which in places, it is true, overspreads the limits of wise planning, but stands firmly to-day as his imperishable monument and draws a constant stream of pilgrims from all over the world. He was the builder of a great cathedral, as immense as that of Seville and as lovely—a cathedral of which the detail may sometimes offend our sense of what is fitting and beautiful, in which we might welcome more restraint in the decoration, but in which we wander happily, and lose ourselves willingly, so ever-present is our sense of its dignity, majesty and greatness. In his own day it was chiefly the bulk of his output that impressed even the best judges—one of the happiest of his eulogists was Cervantes—but as time went on the enduring nature of his greatest works became manifest, the various elements in the vast corpus of his production fell into their proper places, and finally he himself, after being forced by generations of critics into a position of inferiority to some of his dramatic contemporaries, emerged a head and shoulders greater than they, and, as many believe, will so remain.

First and foremost, Lope de Vega is a dramatist, and within that field he was surely the most fertile inventor that ever lived. As we read the story of his life and note the rapidly mounting number of his plays, we have either to refuse credence to his own testimony or to marvel at his amazing industry and inventive genius. He had written over 130 plays before a single one of them was printed; by 1603, when but little over 40, he had completed 230; in 1609, the date of the *New Art of Making Plays* ("with one that I have finished this week"), 483; in 1618, 800; in 1620, after writing a fresh play weekly for two years, 900; in 1625, 1,070; in 1632, 1,500. Shortly after Lope's death, his friend Montalbán adds 300 more to the list and estimates the number of his one-act plays, which are not included in it, at 400. Exaggeration is not uncommon in these matters and, in the later estimates at least, may fairly safely be taken for granted. Some 450 of Lope's plays, however, are still extant, and it is likely that many were destroyed and others remain to be discovered.

So much for the rate at which he wrote, but what of the quality of the output? The reader who assumes that such rapid productiveness must spell carelessness will be surprised,

if he studies the best-known plays, and especially the latest in date, with some care, to find that they are as carefully constructed as those of Shakespeare. Lope is a master of illuminating exposition, of rapid action and of effective climax. Many of his dramas as a whole are excellently constructed, and though some of the less-known plays are, by contrast, almost thrown together, his average standard was probably higher than has frequently been taken for granted.

The vast number of Lope's plays gives them the attraction of great variety. His sources range over the widest areas of time and place—he goes back almost as far as the Creation, and goes forward down to his own day. He draws upon mythology, the Bible, Greek and Roman history, hagiology, the legends and traditions of his own country, the history of a dozen countries more, contemporary life as observed by himself or reported by others, idealistic (and occasionally realistic) fiction, fables, apologues and even proverbs, and, of course, his own imagination. But, although within a large proportion of those classes he has masterpieces, the majority of his best plays are concerned either with Spanish history or with Spanish customs. In both classes he is the dramatist *par excellence* of his age; in the former he not infrequently also transcends his age and makes a universal appeal.

Consider first the variety of treatment in the plays dealing with Spanish history. Here is *Los Prados de León*, with its freshness, liveliness and idyllic rusticity; a kind of Lopean *As You Like It*. But here also is *La Desdichada Estefanía*, Lope's *Othello*, with its tremendous third act which carries along the spectator in a rising tide of tragic horror. Here, in one play, is a mingling of tragic and comic; here, one of darker tragedy and milder comedy. *Peribáñez*, in the most realistic way, depicts actual rustic customs and presents genuine rustic characters, yet rises to great heights of passion. *Fuente Ovejuna*, another village play, has distilled one of Lope's favourite ideas into an essence so concentrated that its language has become proverbial. A similar theme inspired *El Mejor Alcalde, el Rey*, but how different the treatment of it in that even greater play, with its dim historical background, its Galician local colour and its clearly and convincingly drawn characters! Again, in the group of historical dramas, all strongly tinged with tragedy, which play on

the theme of vengeance, how much variety there is in atmosphere, construction, treatment of the theme and characterisation!

Equally characteristic of Lope de Vega, and perhaps on the whole more satisfying, are his comedies of manners. There are dramatists who probe so deeply that they wound, though the wound is health-bringing and purgative. There are others whose office is not to wound but to soothe, to induce not introspection but oblivion, to provide not problems but escapes from them. These dramatists, without penetrating beneath the surface, play upon that surface with such gaiety, brilliance and diversity of tone as to the ordinary man are hardly conceivable. Both may attain true greatness and with the ideals of both Lope has much in common. But he falls short of success more often in the first type of play than in the second. Never was his achievement in the comedy of manners more ably summed up than in the well-known words of Butler Clarke, applied by him, perhaps unfairly, to the whole corpus of Lope's drama. It is, he says, "animated and picturesque, gay and reckless, narrow in ideas but outspoken and chivalrous like the men for whom it was intended: it affords a picture of a restricted and more or less imaginary society, so lifelike and so minute as to be unrivalled."

Much could be said, did space allow, of the means by which Lope produced so excellent a composite achievement. There is the plot, so involved and capricious, running away from us with shouts of laughter and dragging us after it. There is the bold use of one conventional device upon another: there are coincidences, intrigues of the under-plot, disguises, reconciliations. There is the pictorial representation of life in the capital, in the provinces, in the village, and in the country. There is the whole gamut of characterisation, the wealth of partially individualised types, "not wholly in the busy world nor quite beyond it," whom we accept so readily on the stage, though in the study they may seem lifeless. In particular there are the grand variety of heroines, the peasants, so convincingly rustic, and the enterprising and gallant lovers.

And Lope de Vega has yet another claim to immortality as a dramatist: he is not only the creator of innumerable plays, and the inventor of scenes, climaxes, situations and characters, but he is the father, the "only begetter," of the Spanish *comedia* as it was when he left it, and as it remained for nearly

two centuries after his death. He was himself not hesitant in claiming this of himself, as in the *Eclogue to Claudius*, where he says that the *comedia* owed to him the art of its beginning. Yet all its individual elements already existed when he began to write: what he did was to combine them, use them with distinction and give them the impress of his individuality, attracting in the process so many disciples and imitators that long before his death he had assured himself of the continuity of the tradition which he had created. He touched nothing without transforming it, and that into something not merely consistent with his own personality, but in close harmony with the temperament of his own audiences and with the people of Spain both of his own day and of ours.

This, then, is Lope the dramatist: great in fecundity and productivity; great in resource and inventiveness; great in variety and range. Greater than all but a few in the universality of his appeal; greater than perhaps any in Spain for the brilliance of his dramatic canvases; greater than any without a doubt—unique, indeed—as the man who assured the Spanish *comedia* immortality.

Those who know Lope de Vega only as a dramatist will be astonished when they are shown the twenty-one volumes of non-dramatic work which he contrived also to produce, and will ask if there can possibly be anything here worth preserving. It is true that there are a number of poems which may safely be left in the decent obscurity to which the centuries have consigned them, and which none but students will have any desire to disturb. At the same time, Lope de Vega was always a true poet. The dullest and most arid pages have their redeeming passages, their vivid pictures, their arresting phrases. With these qualifications we may dismiss a number of minor works which would by common consent be left out from a brief enumeration. We cannot, however, omit the *Isidro*, a long poem which has certainly been badly treated by the critics. Granted that those not fortunate enough to be natives of Madrid may not feel Lope's interest in the canonised ploughman who is its patron saint, granted also that Lope's poem of homage to him has many wearisome passages, it remains under several aspects a work of considerable merit. He uses for his poem a short-lined stanza, "for I do not believe the long Italian line is any better than our own, which

some Italians envy and have tried to imitate." They might well envy a poet who could sustain this metre, over a work of some 10,000 lines, rhyming throughout, and could so consistently maintain an impression of lightness and gaiety—"der Eindruck eines selbstgefällig tänzelnden Schreitens," as Dr. Vossler so aptly terms it. Then one admires in the *Isidro* passages of real lyric grace and beauty, and others full of that humorous realism which so frequently recurs in Spanish literature and often where one least expects it. And one is delighted with the informality of the poem; the impossible ploughman might so easily have become revolting and repellent, whereas after a few pages we feel quite at home with him—he might almost have existed! Even if we may not see, in Lope's presentation of his hero, a touch of the universality of genius, we must allow that the *Isidro* deserves to be rescued from obscurity, to be sampled by the general reader and to be read with care and interest by the student.

This is even truer of the *Shepherds of Bethlehem* (*Pastores de Belén*), which is written in prose with verse intercalations. The prose narrative is hardly of interest to any save students, but the lyrics both charm and astonish the uninitiated reader by their diversity and their intrinsic beauty. Many of them should be translated into English, for all save one or two are quite unknown to the English-reading public. Even in their brief refrains there is a wealth of poetry to which no cursory survey can do justice. And not least attractive is the simple and touching dedication of the book to the author's son Carlos Félix, followed immediately by those majestic introductory tercets in which the sonority of the Spanish language has full play.

One of the practical results of this tercentenary, it may be hoped, will be the focusing of attention upon Lope de Vega as a lyric poet. Here we can only stay for a word on Lope's sonnets. By what perverse trick of genius, we may ask, was the very man whom we should have expected to be incapable of writing a single good sonnet enabled not infrequently to approach perfection in that difficult art? The sonnet requires intense concentration, adherence to a single idea, a great economy of language and an unusual talent for word-selection—all of these qualities rare in an extremely fertile writer. Yet Lope, though always prolific and often diffuse, is not as a rule verbose, and his sonnets, notably those in the *Rimas*

Sacras, though by no means always successful, are at their best of the very highest standard. There is ample gold in them for the lover of poetry who will leave aside the idea that Lope was simply a dramatist and hunt for his hidden treasure.

Lastly, we come to what is generally considered to be the first in merit of Lope's non-dramatic works, the *Dorotea*. In several ways this is an unusual production. Few books can have been begun, as this was, when their author was about twenty-five and only completed and published when he was just seventy, so that it bears signs both of youth and of old age. Few works, again, written in dramatic form, can fairly be described as "non-dramatic": Lope himself termed it an "action in prose" and it has five acts, divided into scenes and interspersed with lyric passages. But there is more talk in it than action and it is five times the length of an ordinary play: in its original form, in short, it is both unacted and unactable.

To Lope de Vega it was very dear—not only, we may suppose, because its somewhat languid plot thinly veils episodes of his own autobiography, but because he had kept it for so long in the precious intimacy with which an author always regards an unpublished manuscript which has cost him travail. We cannot doubt that, had he written nothing else than the *Dorotea*, Lope would still take a high place in Spanish literature. Two faults the book has, it is true: a plot almost devoid of intrinsic interest and the garrulity of an old wives' tale. At its best, nevertheless, the dialogue is vivid, animated, facile and diverting, "full of wise saws," like *Don Quixote*, and admirably revelatory of the characters which have chiefly been responsible for making it great. Even in this brief glance, a word must be devoted to the beauty of the lyrics intercalated in the book—not only lovely in themselves, with the loveliness now of the meadow-blossom, now of the china shepherdess, but also so admirably adapted to the old-world tale which they illumine.

Lope de Vega, who in his own day bestrode the Spanish world like a Colossus, and before his death already saw himself assured of a brilliant following, both at home and abroad, was not so well treated during the century and a half which followed the decline of the drama. "From the moment Voltaire discovered that Shakespeare was a drunken savage,"

it has been aptly said, "Shakespeare has stood as a monument of the gulf that divides the French and the English genius." And from the moment that the eighteenth century discovered that the great Lope de Vega was a mad barbarian with only occasional lucid moments, Lope de Vega's genius has represented the gulf dividing the eighteenth century in Spain from every other century, before it or since. He fell into almost universal disrepute: it would be ludicrous to reproduce the most violent judgments passed upon him by the most exaggerated neo-classicists. When the inevitable Romantic reaction came in favour of the Golden Age, it was Calderón who was raised to the skies, both in Spain and in Germany, rather than Lope. Only in the eighteen-fifties did Lope's work once more begin to take its due place in Spain and Lope's fame tend to rival that of Calderón. That tendency is now very much more marked than then, and this new tercentenary sees him more securely established in the judgments of Spanish and foreign critics and in the affections of the Spanish people than ever since the end of the Golden Age. We may hope that during this present year and hereafter he may not only be eulogised, but read, in which case we need not fear for his reputation as long as the language in which he wrote endures.

E. ALLISON PEERS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON FIFTY YEARS AGO.

NEXT year the University of London will celebrate the centenary of its birth. The occasion will be one of gratifying retrospection and sanguine anticipation. None of those who witnessed its rather stormy nativity can now testify to its amazing development, but there are some who can speak of the remarkable evolution which has taken place in the last half-century. When at the Graduation Dinner in 1931 at Drapers' Hall I was privileged to propose the health of the 3,000 new graduates I ventured to recall what the University was like in the 'seventies and 'eighties of last century. After dinner several of those present asked me to put together some of my reminiscences of those earlier days. On that occasion I said:

May I recall what the University of London was fifty years ago, or even forty years ago, when I was elected by my fellow graduates in Convocation to the Senate? What was the condition of things then? There was no such Presentation ceremony as we have witnessed to-day, no Graduation dinner or dance, no Abbey ceremony, no procession through the public streets, no ultra-violet illumination for those on the platform. There was no Foundation Dinner; indeed, I take some little credit for having, when I was Vice-Chancellor, rediscovered Foundation Day—November 28th, 1836, and having had the pleasure of giving the first two Foundation Dinners at my house. There were no constituent colleges, no internal degrees; there were no honorary degrees; there were no court, no officers' training corps, no Union. There were no soft options or substitutes for the Matriculation Examination. Convocation existed then, as it does now, as an interesting debating society, but it had then what it has not now—the power of accepting or rejecting any new or supplemental charter. This "mere Examining Board," as it was derisively called, endeavoured to realise the duty imposed on it by its first charter—to hold forth to all classes of Her Majesty's subjects an opportunity of pursuing a liberal course of education, and to reward proficiency by degrees. It maintained a high standard for its Pass Degrees, often the envy, and sometimes the despair, of older universities. It was the first university in the British Isles to admit women to its degrees. The Senate consisted only of Crown and Convocation nominees in the proportion of three to one. I remember when I first joined the Senate in 1892 I was overwhelmed by the importance of the *personnel* of that body. Sir

James Paget was the Vice-Chancellor. Amongst the Senators were Lord Acton, Lord Hannen, Arthur Balfour, Sir Edward Fry, Sir Julian Goldsmid, Sir John Lubbock, Professor Huxley, and Dr. Routh. There were giants in those days, and those men did not think it beneath their dignity to serve the interests of "the mere Examining Board."

Earl Granville, who succeeded the first Chancellor, the Duke of Devonshire, in 1856 held that office until his death in 1891. His was a very picturesque and gracious figure at the annual degree-givings in May at Burlington Gardens. During his reign women began to be presented for degrees, and at first were few in number; the Chancellor showed a nice consideration for the sex by rising to hand the parchment to each lady graduate, while he sat to confer degrees upon those of the unfair sex. His successor, the Earl of Derby, held office as Chancellor for only two years, 1891-3. On Presentation Day, 1892, he made a memorable speech in which he said:

Our freedom from special connections, and the absolute independence of our examiners, gives us a marked advantage in respect of the value of our degrees. People know that we are not auditing our own accounts. An Examiner whose duty requires him to pluck his own pupil thereby to some extent seems to condemn his own teaching.

Lord Derby was succeeded in 1893 by the first and only Chancellor who was himself a graduate of the University of London—Farrer, Lord Herschell. He had been a student at University College and took the B.A. degree with honours in Classics in 1857. He had been Solicitor-General and twice Lord Chancellor, and had the reputation of "prodigious powers of acquisition and application." He proved to be more regular in presiding at the Senate than some of his predecessors and successors in that office. Short of stature, of Semitic countenance, his dark brown eyes indicated the alertness and precision of his mind. It was during Lord Herschell's chancellorship, which continued until his untimely death in Washington in 1899, that reconstitution of the University became the subject of acute controversy. On Presentation Day, 1894, Lord Herschell said:

It ought to be a condition if any change is made in the constitution of this university, that it should not render it less fit and able to discharge the work which it has done so well for all these years;

and no enlargement of its sphere by the addition of was not functions should be allowed to impair the high standard ~~wke~~ ^{rise} in has hitherto exacted.

The Chancellor had learnt something from the overwhelming defeat he had sustained in Convocation on May 12th, 1891, when he moved the approval of a new charter which was rejected by 461 to 197 at the largest meeting of Convocation on record. After the lamented death of Lord Herschell, in 1899, the Whig tradition was maintained by the appointment of the Earl of Kimberley as Chancellor. He was reputed to have been "one of the cleverest boys at Eton" in his time, and had taken first class in the final classical schools at Oxford. He had held many offices under Gladstone, was a fluent speaker and discarded the use of notes.

By the Charter of 1858 and until the reconstitution of 1898 the Senate consisted of thirty-six Fellows exclusive of the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor; one-fourth of the number was to be chosen by the Crown from a list of three persons to be nominated by Convocation, the other three-fourths were appointed directly by the Crown under the Sign Manual. During those forty years nominations by Convocation were made by the whole body of Graduates, not voting in faculties as has been the case since 1898. The Crown never failed to appoint the candidate who had received the largest number of votes. I possess the warrant signed by Queen Victoria when I was appointed to the Senate in February 1893, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of "Our Right Trusty and well beloved Cousin and Councillor Robert Viscount Sherbrooke." The other Convocation nominations are recited in the warrant, viz. Henry Greenway Howse, M.S., M.B., and Alfred William Bennett, M.A., B.Sc. The voting on that occasion had been, Collins 855, Howse 642, Bennett 210.

Fifty years ago the Chairman of Convocation was Dr. John Storrar, M.D. He was the second incumbent of that office, the first having been Dr. Charles James Foster, LL.D. Dr. Storrar was a stout, portly person, who filled, rather than adorned, the Chair. He was not very alert or skilled in the conduct of a meeting. I remember on one occasion when the show of hands made it difficult to determine the result, the Chairman counted the hands inaudibly—and instead of satisfying our expectant curiosity convulsed us with laughter by saying, "Ah, I see the majority has it." He was succeeded

both of British and foreign nationality. The last time I saw him was a few days before his death. He requested me to call on him one Sunday morning. I found him very weak and pale and lying on a sofa. In his diary* under May 3rd, 1913, is this, the last entry made, "Saw Sir W. Collins on University of London business." He said that he wanted to tell me how entirely he agreed with an interview by me in the *Morning Post* (April 17th, 1913), severely criticising the Report of the Haldane Royal Commission on the University.

When Lubbock went to the Upper House as Lord Avebury in 1900, in the middle of the Boer War, Sir Edward Busk, who had been Chairman of Convocation for eight years and Parliamentary Agent to Lubbock, was promptly brought out as the Unionist candidate. The University Liberal Association insisted upon my standing as the Liberal candidate. Sir Michael Foster was thereupon induced by leading Conservative and academic graduates to enter the field as a second Unionist candidate opposed to Irish Home Rule and in cordial support of the Government policy in South Africa. The Ballot Act does not apply to university elections and we went through five days' tedious drudgery of open voting interspersed with reading and recording proxies. The final result was, Foster 1,271, Collins 863, Busk 586. In seconding the vote of thanks to the returning officer, Vice-Chancellor Roscoe, I cordially congratulated Sir Michael Foster on his victory, and added that I also congratulated the Government Whips on having caught a very remarkable biological specimen which I thought they would have some difficulty in classifying. When later on Sir Michael Foster faltered in his support of the Government, and contemplated crossing the floor of the House, F. C. Gould† took up my simile and represented Foster in academic cap as half bird and half reptile and as being much exercised as to which lobby he should enter and on which side of the House he should sit. When Sir Michael finally crossed the floor of the House he intimated that in accordance with precedent he would resign his seat, but he subsequently changed his mind and omitted to do so.

When I matriculated in 1876 Dr. W. B. Carpenter was Registrar of the University. He was a very learned but austere man, somewhat formidable to undergraduates when

* *Life of Sir John Lubbock, Lord Avebury*. H. G. Hutchinson. 1914. Vol. II, p. 218.

† See *Westminster Gazette*, Jan. 12th, 1905.

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they nervously tendered their fees for examinations. He been a lecturer at the London Hospital and University College and was a prolific author on scientific subjects. He belonged to the well-known Unitarian family and played the organ at the Hampstead Church. He acted as Registrar from 1856 to 1879. It was once my fate to oppose him in public debate, but, despite the disparity of our years, he bore no resentment at my audacity. He lived close to me and we often met at the post-box hard by late at night and entered into brief conversations as we walked to our respective homes. Dr. Carpenter was succeeded in the Registrarship in 1879 by Mr. Arthur Milman, M.A., who held office until 1896 and upon retirement was appointed by the Crown a Member of the Senate. Rather frigid and essentially official in manner he served the University well. He seemed to regard Convocation with some disdain and apprehension. Mr. T. Le Marchant Douse was for many years Clerk to the Senate and was succeeded by Mr. Alfred Milnes, M.A., who later became Registrar to the External Side of the University. In earlier days the examination papers were not printed but reproduced on the premises, in facsimile from the exquisite handwriting of Mr. Douse and Mr. Milnes.

It was during Sir Arthur Rücker's principalship in 1907 that, greatly to my surprise, he informed me that the Senate wished to elect me as Vice-Chancellor, a post which I held for three years. I ventured to secure the revision of the Standing Orders with a view to regularise procedure, and to rearrange the Senate room in the interest of what I may call the "mechanics of order." To this end I transferred the Vice-Chancellor's chair from the floor by the door to a raised dais of three tiers on the west side of the Senate room. The three Registrars facing the chair occupied the lowest tier, on the next to the right and left of the chair were the seats for the Chairman of Convocation and the principal officer. This rearrangement had the salutary effect of breaking up some of the coteries which had developed in the Senate. The Chancellor, Lord Rosebery, rarely attended, and on three Presentation days left me the embarrassing duty of giving the degrees and addressing the assembly.

I have briefly sketched some of the features of the University of London prior to either of the reconstitutions which it underwent in 1898 and 1926. Such it had been since it opened

its doors widely in 1858 in obedience to the principle advocated by Grote, viz. :

It is for the University of London to proclaim the comprehensive principle that while testing by strict examination the amount of acquired knowledge, and requiring reasonable evidence of antecedent continuous study, it will no more tie down the deserving student to a few privileged colleges than to a particular religious creed.

This "mere Examining Board" was commended in the report of Lord Selborne's Commission (1889) as having "done a great work and established for its degrees a high reputation," while even the Haldane Commission of 1913 could not forbear to testify to "the undoubted success which it achieved as an examining body, and the beneficial effects of the encouragement it gave to systematic study." Thus had the Senate of the unreconstituted University endeavoured for sixty years to carry out the mandate of its charter "to hold forth to all classes and denominations of our faithful subjects without any distinction whatsoever, an encouragement for pursuing a regular and liberal course of education."

WILLIAM J. COLLINS.

IS THERE A CONSENSUS PHILOSOPHORUM?

THE obvious fact of diversity and conflict of opinions among philosophers during the past two or three thousand years is a handy weapon for despatching the philosopher when he ventures to make any claim to speak with authority. And I have sometimes wondered whether it would not be possible to discover some measure of agreement, some common body of truth, in the diverse schools which have grown up during the period of reflection in the history of our civilisation. If tendencies making for unanimity could be found even among the greatest systems, such trends or currents might be brought into some kind of correlation, and thus serve to increase the volume of agreement which might advance with cumulative force in the direction of rationality.

There is a vague court of appeal to which thinkers occasionally resort known as the *consensus gentium*, the agreement of humanity, common or universal agreement regarding certain accepted notions. Although it would be difficult if not impossible to specify what these notions are about which everybody is supposed to be agreed, yet when the appeal is made by thoughtful writers, I think most of us would yield that they make the point which they wish to make. We do feel that there is a realm of universality or catholicity of judgment which enters into our common experience. An illustration which occurs to me at the moment is that by the *consensus gentium* the world of perceived objects seems to have a reality of its own independently of our perception of it; or, again, despite the extraordinary vividness of dreams, there is a difference between such images and our world of waking life, as when Hume rightly affirms that percepts differ from images "in the force or liveliness with which they strike the mind." The subject almost tempts one to dwell upon it, because it might well be maintained, I think, that this common consent of universal experience, implicitly or explicitly acknowledged, is the basis of all our science and philosophy, at least so far as the materials are concerned.*

* Cf. Wm. James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 289. "Taking human experience in a general way, the choosings of different men are to a great extent the same. The race as a whole largely agrees as to what it shall notice and name; and among the noticed parts we select in much the same way for accentuation and

Leaving such considerations aside, however, the main question before us arises naturally enough from reflection upon the common consent of mankind. Can we not look for a corpus of common agreement among philosophers? Or, if we cannot find such a general body of truth, to which, on a majority vote, the leading thinkers of all ages would give their approval, may we not at least inquire whether such an expectation is inherently reasonable, and within the order of reference of philosophy in its final function. Tennyson, who united in his genius much of the prophet and philosopher, gave an inkling of an affirmative answer to both these questions in his well-known lines of *Locksley Hall* on "the Vision of the world," "the march of mind," "the heir of all the ages, in the foremost files of time," and his clear declaration:

Yet I doubt not thro' the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns.

Such an "unearned increment" of knowledge, if not of wisdom, certainly presupposes permanence amid change, a spiritual "deposit" in the evolution of thought—a "deposit" which, like leaven, is quick with life in the "organism of truth."

One naturally passes from common sense to science. The claims to a consensus of scientists upon matters which fall within their several fields are certainly much more impressive at first sight than any which can be made on behalf of their philosophical brethren. And, further, the pragmatic test reinforces such claims beyond anything that can be asserted in the realm of more theoretical pronouncements. The astounding advances of applied science in our modern civilisation meet us on every hand. Whether the Newtonian physics has been superseded by recent hypotheses of relativity, the Quantum Theory, etc., or not, affords endless opportunities to discussions between the more philosophical physicists and mathematicians of the day; but no sensible person can deny that what science has elucidated enables us to travel with swiftness and accuracy on land and sea and in the air, and to speak and hear across the world by means of radio, and to use X-rays for therapeutic purposes—to give but a few illustrations.

preference, or subordination and dislike. . . . Each of us dichotomizes the Kosmos in a different place." This has some bearing upon the discussion of agreement between philosophers, notably Schiller's answer to the question at issue, and will come up later on.

Hence, we may and must readily admit that the faith of scientists in a considerable measure of acquired knowledge is proved by their works. But, apart from such achievements in discovery, invention and the genetic hypotheses of evolving life, there are innumerable differences of opinion and principle among scientists as to the *explanation* of the phenomena which are being elucidated and applied to the interests of human society. In other words, as science becomes more philosophical, as it is plainly and necessarily becoming, to an increasing extent in our own time, it is developing the symptoms of divergence which characterise the more pretentious efforts of philosophy. Even a "Science of Sciences" cannot cure the disposition towards disagreement. In addition to the myriad unsolved problems in each special science, there exist vast tracts of mystery with consequential diversities of theory, as to the relations between the units and the principles which exist in any one science and those which are employed in other sciences. Such a "Science of Sciences" could at best give us the material side of the universe (by "material" I mean the contents) and we should still need to turn to philosophy for the study of the relations, forms, categories and principles which are essential to a more adequate explanation of the universe, and which our rationality desiderates. And such a task belongs to metaphysics or philosophy in its ultimate sense. Even the cosmologies of pre-Socratic speculation failed to avoid this danger, for they became rival theories of the cosmos. It is true that from Thales to Anaxagoras we discern a kind of progress towards the Golden Age of Greek Philosophy in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle; but the fact remains evident that cosmology cannot in itself save us from the disagreements which seem to be implicit in philosophical speculation. And from that fact we may derive a suggestion which will not be without its value.

Let us now seek to recapitulate briefly the history of attempts which have been made to rise above the various philosophies with a view to their co-ordination in a larger system, a kind of critical and constructive Philosophy of Philosophies, in which a hypothetical *consensus philosophorum* would necessarily be implicit.

A religious motive for unification was present in the work of Philo, Plotinus, and the Neo-Platonists generally. The Hellenic and the Hebraic strains of thought were brought

together in a mystical doctrine of the Deity, conceived as filling the universe and manifesting Himself through intermediary powers, of which the Logos was the divine and chief Mediator between God and men. In the resulting systematisation of this school, the teachings of Moses and the Hebrew prophets were brought into relationship with the philosophies of the Greeks, particularly of Pythagoras and Plato. This mystical unification of preceding thought by comprehension and transcendence is typical of a process which is at work in the spiritual experience of many individual pilgrims of all ages. The place of the spiritual life is central and dominant. Throughout the early and medieval periods of Christian history, philosophy continued to be ruled by religion. The dogmatic function of the Church was thus exercised; and it was only a question of time when the free mind of man should break through the closed system of authority.

When the reaction set in, both religious belief and philosophy became intensely individualistic. Great importance was given to reason as against faith. Although a multiplicity of sects and schools sprang up, each had confidence in its own view of the rational and the true. Kant's *Critical Philosophy* deprived the world of this easy sense of security. He sharply delimited the sphere of the human understanding, and found the ultimate function of universal philosophy to consist in the practical direction of the Good Will and the supremacy of the values of life. This opened a new era and disclosed a richer vein in philosophy than the world had known since the time of Plato and Aristotle.

It was reserved for Hegel to make the most stupendous effort ever made in the direction of the organisation of the history of philosophy. Using the ancient Greek idea of Becoming, or, as we are accustomed to regard it, Evolution, Hegel applied ruthlessly his own rationalising logic to the successive stages of human reflection.

As Professor Hocking says: "The final truth at which he arrives is that the world is Spirit: understanding that it is the nature of the Spirit to express itself in these dialectical developments in the world of ideas, in nature, and in history. The universe is the living and progressive embodiment of an absolute thinking-process. And we, if we come upon the right dialectical connection of ideas, find there the essence of reality, and reproduce the scheme of the world in ourselves.

He achieves a world-view of vast empirical and historical richness without eclecticism."*

The reference to eclecticism brings forcibly before us other efforts to make a mosaic of philosophies without the deep underlying principles on which Hegel built his temple. Victor Cousin (1792-1867), a French philosopher and educator, followed a track that was more manifestly eclectic. On the basis of a fourfold division of systems into Idealism, Sensualism (or what the English school call Empiricism), Scepticism and Mysticism, Cousin sought to show that each school is not false but incomplete, "and that in reuniting all incomplete systems we should have a complete philosophy, adequate to the totality of consciousness." The obvious defects of such an attempt to pick and choose require little comment. And one may as well admit that, apart from some accepted principle of objective validity, all efforts at establishing a consensus of philosophers labour under the same disability. The bias of the collector of anthologies is apt to play its part.

The growth of the natural sciences during the modern period projected the matter and the method of science into philosophy and its manifold activities. Auguste Comte, another Frenchman (1798-1857), sought to organise all conceptions of our knowledge of man, society and the world under the theological, the metaphysical and the positive (or experimental) stages, of which three the positive is the chief and the most fruitful. Such a phase of investigation was bound to arise in the period of increasing scientific progress, and it was Comte's part to supply such a division of method. The elimination of the first two stages from the resultant Positivism, however, runs counter to the establishment of a system of the consensus of philosophers. It cuts the knot of the inquiry into first causes, and limits reasonable activity to the phenomenal data. In the sociological field, this method produced its greatest results. Neither the theological nor the metaphysical function can be totally discarded in the full gamut of man's intellectual orientation. Instead of crude, we need critical interpretations of experience, and the mystery of the universe will ever incline the human spirit to the recognition of what is beyond the things that are seen and temporal. And similarly, the forms, categories and essences of percipient reality will not

* W. E. Hocking, *Types of Philosophy*, pp. 433-4.

be laid as mere metaphysical ghosts. Doubtless, much of our contemporary thinking is still under the influence of Positivism, as we may see in the vogue of Behaviourism in Psychology. We scarcely need Comte's own final establishment of a religion of mankind as the Grandêtre, with its apparatus of worship and ceremonial, to remind us that "we are such stuff as dreams are made of," and that beneath the phenomenal lies the noumenal.

My time will not permit me to do more than mention Kuno Fischer's *History of Modern Philosophy*, or Renouvier's *Esquisse d'une Classification Systématique des Doctrines Philosophiques* (Paris, 1885), in which the principal doctrines of philosophical problems are gathered together in an instructive review by a great French realist. But I should like to refer to the vitalising work done by the late Rudolph Eucken in Germany, the Idealism of Italy, and the unifying tendencies displayed by Professor A. N. Whitehead. In a profound sense, Eucken's work is inspired by the intuition that a spiritual principle runs through the whole of philosophy. It is his conviction and task that this principle is implicit in human life, and that it represents—nay, more, that it *is*—the universal and divine value of universal experience in all ages, past, present and future. Philosophy is much more than a series of problems to which answers may be more or less tentatively proffered. It is infinitely more than the life of the individual or the epoch. It transcends all scientific discoveries and applications. It is that which brings into clear consciousness man's true and deep nature, in all its range and scope. Art, literature, morality, culture are but the outskirts of the ways of the Divine spirit, which finds in religion and philosophy its own nature and worth. The spiritual life is universal, and philosophy brings it into consciousness of itself. Eucken's reviews of the history of thought furnish a consistent yet ever-changing kaleidoscope of the deep work and demand of the spiritual life in which all values, worths and aspirations find their soil and growth, their flower, fruitage and seed. The work of Croce and Gentile in Italy illustrates also the neo-Hegelian Idealism as applied to history; as Ruggiero states their theme. "To-day the idea of the development of philosophical thought is beginning to take hold upon people's minds, and is inducing them to determine more precisely the exact position occupied by the

corner-stones of the philosophy of ancient and modern times."*

With Whitehead's *Philosophy of Organism* I cannot here deal; but his tendency towards a discovery of the universal in the particular systems of all the great philosophies is unmistakable. A few extracts from his *Process and Reality* must suffice. Speaking of the common criticism of the ill-success of philosophy, viz. that "European thought is represented as littered with metaphysical systems, abandoned and unreconciled," he replies: "Such an assertion tacitly fastens upon philosophy the old dogmatic test. The same criterion would fasten ill-success upon science. . . . At the very least, men do what they can in the way of systematisation, and in the event achieve something. The proper test is not that of finality, but of progress." "There may be rival schemes, inconsistent among themselves; each with its own merits and its own failures. It will then be the purpose of research to conciliate the differences."

Before proceeding to estimate briefly the possibility of establishing some kind of agreement among philosophers, I would like to refer to a symposium on the subject, *Must Philosophers Disagree?*, recorded in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume XII, 1933). Dr. F. C. S. Schiller led off with his accustomed brilliance in support of the contention, and he was followed by Mr. C. A. Mace and Professor J. L. Stocks, both of whom sought to maintain the opposite view. Dr. Schiller held that the fact of divergence is not only obvious but in harmony with the true nature of philosophy. "Here," he contends, "is precisely one of the points in which philosophy is *not* analogous with science." This is the glory of philosophy and not its shame, because therein it "transcends science and aims at a higher ideal."

Similarly, the particulars of experience are never adequately handled by science, which seeks for the universal, the common term, the law of nature. In consequence of these defects of science, "a new discipline, with a new method and a new aim, is needed to cope with the problem of the Whole." And that discipline is Philosophy. In the exercise of its synoptic mission, philosophy must avoid the abstractions which weaken the testimony of science. Philosophy must include

* Guido de Ruggiero, *Modern Philosophy*, p. 376.

personality and individuality, as well as all that is concrete and particular in the totality of being. The history of philosophy also must be told afresh in a lyrical or at least a romantic vein, in which the influence of the personality and temperament of the various philosophers will be acknowledged in the creativity of their genius.

Mr. C. A. Mace, who followed, maintained that "there is nothing in the nature of philosophy to necessitate that each of two incompatible hypotheses should be declared to be the *only* hypothesis which will explain the same facts." Further, "even granting 'the great fact of personality,' even granting that every experience and every case of knowing presents individual differences, it does not follow that two philosophers may not have before them the same datum. . . . In particular, they need not differ in respect of *what is known*." Philosophers will always differ to some extent; but Mr. Mace can see no reason why they must disagree as deeply as Dr. Schiller holds. Mr. Mace rightly, I think, points out that the proposal to set out a kind of natural history of philosophers, their psychological states and idiosyncrasies, would result in "an intolerable muddle."

Professor J. L. Stocks asserts that Dr. Schiller's position brings him perilously close to scepticism. "*Quot homines, tot veritates*," would be a fair rendering of some passages in his paper. But even Schiller admits "that many of the disagreements of philosophers are unnecessary, and he envisages the possibility of an ultimate unity in which the disagreements which remain will combine in 'free and flexible' association. Whether this unity is so flexible as to abrogate the Law of Contradiction, he does not say; but Professor Stocks considers that such a unity can hardly go as far as that. The relation between science and philosophy is carefully reviewed by Professor Stocks. He admits that science abstracts from concrete experience, and that this aspect is emphasised by growing specialisation. Philosophy aims at overcoming the sectionalising which results and also at the elimination of particularity. But he differs from Schiller in regard to 'the personal equation' which is a distortion for philosophy as for science. In neither field is it 'a condition of the attainment of truth.'" Professor Stocks then sets himself to answer two questions, viz. (1) in what respects will a treatment of the whole differ from the treatment of a part? and (2) in what

respects will the knowledge or understanding of the individual differ from the knowledge or understanding of the universal? The rest of his paper is devoted to settling these problems, and I have not space to deal with the manner in which, following Plato's lead, he does so. The main point is that science aims at exploring the parts with a view to the establishment of a system, i.e. a relative whole, whereas philosophy seeks to interpret the Whole, which includes all the smaller systems, and in this task, differences in the *Weltanschauung* are to be expected.

Such is the symposium. From it, I think, we may learn much as to the quality and the limitations of any attempted systematisation of the divergent views of philosophers in all ages. It seems to me that while Dr. Schiller has placed his finger upon a real distinction between science and philosophy, as between the "abstract" and the "concrete" elements in our knowledge, yet he has over-stated his case by emphasising too strongly the personal or individual features of philosophical interpretations of reality. Philosophy certainly seeks for the "concrete" in the Hegelian sense, as the estimation of the unity of the Whole in the clear and full recognition of its particulars and the richness of the manifold life of the Spirit. How can we best mediate between the relative truths of the various sciences on the one hand and the Absolute, living Truth which philosophy envisages, on the other? This is one of the perennial problems of all thinkers upon final reality. Yet, even Schiller grants a measure of co-operation, or—as he words it—"a tolerant and elastic synthesis" between the various types of philosophy. Personality must be recognised as a leading, possibly *the* leading concept, in such a synthesis, for, apart from metaphysics, no science can do justice to the values of personality. His suggestion of a wise jury to bring the common truth to the light by the "thorough and systematic discussion of the great questions in dispute" is surely worth keeping in mind, and offers ground for agreement on the major issue with Mr. Mace and Professor Stocks.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I maintain that the search for a "consensus" should be prosecuted with due regard to the proper understanding of philosophy and its history. We may at least say that such a consensus is possible, in other words, discoverable. Avoiding the dangers of mere eclecticism on the one hand and dogmatism on the other, we

may hope for a gathering together of the precious fruits of philosophy. We shall recognise that although novelty and contradiction are present in the long course of man's pre-occupation with the supreme task of interpreting the universe in ultimate terms, yet the progress of truth is more like a spiral than an ascending, straight road. Old expressions of philosophy reappear in ever new and enriching forms. Out of seeming opposition higher syntheses are constantly emerging and thus rival systems are brought into significant relations of part to whole, or member to organism, or body to spirit. Idealism may ultimately invest realism, empiricism and even materialism with truth and value subordinate to the Good. The spirit of Plato is not dead. As Whitehead, who is working toward this end, has put it: "The safest general characterisation of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."

Hellenism and Hebraism will, I believe, find their union and consummation in a mystical Idealism, not lacking in intellectual care for the least individual or particular in the vast universe of Spirit. The exquisite work of the human mind in logic, scientific method, ethics, æsthetics, dialectic, and the experiences of religion will eventually—if not within our day—be brought to fruition, and the great aspirations of the human spirit shall not fail in what William James described as "the great, the sacred law of partaking, the noiseless step of continuity."*

E. N. MERRINGTON.

* Wm. James, *On Some Hegelisms*.

THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT.

TO form an accurate opinion of the American governmental venture in the field of hydro-electric power it is necessary to appreciate the underlying causes which threaten to upset so typically American an institution as the gigantic chains of the public utility industry. Probably the most spectacular of these influences has been the revelation of utility abuses recently exposed as the climax of a six-year investigation by the Federal Trade Commission. This voluminous report unwound a story of fantastic profits based largely on the earnings of huge "watered" values. Attacking public interest from a different angle, yet equally effective as an impetus for change, has been the conspicuous example of the marked disparity in power rates between the States and Canada. In Ontario, for example, low rates have multiplied proportionate consumption to three times the volume in the States. Adding emphasis to this contrast there has been a steady flow of industrial migration north across the border to take advantage of this power economy.

Yet deeper still as a disturbing element responsible for extremes of threatening change is the conspicuous maladjustment of the fundamental balance between agriculture and industry. With this has come the overcrowding of the cities with unemployed recruits from the rural districts. It strikes at the root of an economic problem which the festering malignancy of prolonged depression has greatly emphasised. Its persistence in the face of heroic efforts to relieve the tension has stressed the need for an immediate broad co-ordinating plan of constructive national readjustment. As a likely step towards this, the generation of abundant hydro-electric power to be distributed to consumers at impressively low rates fired the popular imagination. It was a possible way out.

This disturbing lack of economic balance marks the climax of one of the largest shifts in population in the history of the world. Between 1920 and 1930 six million persons in the States who were formerly engaged in agricultural production migrated to the cities. This was not the result of dissatisfaction with the limitations, isolation, and the rigours that the farms impose. It was an economic movement in quest of earning opportunities. A great labour surplus had developed

on the farm. Industry at first absorbed it. Farmers bought what they had previously made. Whereas a fairly normal balance had kept an average of 180 men out of every thousand profitably employed in some branch of agriculture, this figure shrank to 88.

While a condition of this kind continues to exist, any measure of relief that is not directed to effect a basic re-alignment between these major fields of industry and agriculture serves but a temporary end. It would appear the natural course would be to herd a portion of this population back to the farms and small communities. It is a far simpler task to re-establish independence first where the costs of decent living are materially lower than in the crowded cities. Based on this reasoning the Government began to lay its plans for a general decentralisation of industry. Factories in increasing numbers have huddled in the cities regardless of the penalties of heavier taxation, higher rates for labour, and remoteness from their sources of raw supplies. This tendency has developed chiefly because the cities afforded the necessary supply of electric power. It would seem that power, then, is the first essential for the revived prosperity of the small community.

Receiving no encouraging co-operation from the privately owned utilities, the Government set its face toward a radical readjustment in the field of federal development of hydro-electric power. The Congress of the United States, at the request of President Roosevelt, created what is known as the Tennessee Valley Authority and appropriated for its operation an initial fund of \$75,000,000. This Authority consists of a board of three executives, already employing some 15,000 persons, given specific jurisdiction over the development and sale of electric power and the manufacture and distribution of low-cost fertiliser in the portions of seven States included in the drainage area of the Tennessee river.

The introduction of this programme automatically eliminates the privately-owned utilities that have served this section. This, at least, in theory. They ungraciously refuse to go, challenging the constitutionality of such high-handed federal practices and resorting to every possible obstruction which delays and technicalities can impose. They resent the Government's proposal that adequate compensation shall be made upon actual invested values in the taking over of their

properties. Yet they bewail their inability to compete with federal rates. The Government, on the other hand, insists that it must have complete control of power generation and distribution in the Valley for the purpose of experiment and for establishing positive standards for these services, which may be applied in the readjustment of the entire national power programme.

The success of this Government plan rests primarily upon two definite achievements: first the creation of abundant electric power at extremely low expense; second, the building of a market of sufficient volume to make this mass production, financially at least, self-liquidating. To create this market it is necessary both to electrify the industries in this experimental area and to increase their numbers greatly. It must also thread the rural sections with adequate service lines and stimulate the volume of consumption both through the tempting lure of inexpensive power and by the promotion of the use of electrical appliances on the farm and in the city homes, as the consumption of current for mere lighting purposes could not begin to absorb the increased supply.

This system arbitrarily reverses the economic set-up of the privately-owned utility. Protected by exclusive franchise these service companies have developed power adequate to a known demand and projected growth, adding their profits above the normal costs of production and based, at least ostensibly, upon the volume of invested capital. To slash rates now to fantastic minimums that depend upon a huge increase in use to justify a profit is understandingly not appealing. For it is recognised, by both private industry and the Government, that small rate reductions would defeat the effort. It requires a leap to an absolute minimum to give the necessary impetus to double and treble the volume of power to be consumed. Yet the soundness of this reasoning has been supported in each section of the Valley as rapidly as low federal rates are introduced. Consumption rises to unprecedented levels and a gigantic market for a wide assortment of electrical conveniences has developed. Applied to the national field this holds unlimited possibilities.

In making this low-cost power possible the Government benefits both by efficiencies and economies resulting from the co-ordinated planning of its system of dams and reservoirs which will serve the entire area. Each supplements the other,

empounding vast reserve supplies and using and re-using this reserve to maintain a constant, adequate supply and to divert surpluses according to need. There is also an economy in construction costs, as part of the expense of building these huge dams can be equitably charged to other federal services that they render, such as river navigation, national defence, and flood control. Economies of this character make it still more difficult for old utilities to compete with federal operation. There is, of course, the possibility of a counteracting extravagance and inefficiency which often creeps into governmental projects and destroys their worth.

In visualising this general programme President Roosevelt and Congress had far more in view than the production of cheap power and the decentralisation of industry. With the accomplishment of this as a first essential, it is designed to reach deep into the wells of social and economic life. The very wording of the act creating this Authority provides for the broad extension of its influence to build a new security among the people and materially advance the living standards that a cramped and distorted economic system has imposed. It is the ambitious hope to make this Tennessee Valley a perfect miniature, a sort of laboratory to test the virtue of mad plans of social dreamers, adapting what is good and stable and balancing federal aid with individual initiative, curbed by regulation only where acquisitive self-interest is injurious to common welfare. In this way it is hoped to develop more rapid progress and a sounder plan of economic security than could be realised through unrelated efforts.

Co-ordinate with the progress of industrial decentralisation goes the establishment of the network of rural power lines. Only 12 per cent. of the farms in America now have the advantages of electric power. At an approximate cost of \$1,200 a mile, serving a territory with not less than four service outlets within this distance, it is estimated that the same low rates can be given to the isolated sections without placing an appreciable burden upon urban power users. Supplying this need is considered as not merely a step toward advanced efficiency but an important stride toward the establishment of contentment, ending rural isolation and relieving many tasks of useless drudgery so that farm life will be more appealing.

Perhaps next in importance toward the re-establishment

of economic independence is the manufacturing of low-cost fertiliser. This is to be provided through electrical processes. It will first supply the imperative need for concentrated phosphates which can be delivered on the farms in quantities at a price that will permit of its liberal use. By developing this in concentrated form it may be shipped long distances at small expense and mixed with other necessary elements obtainable at low costs at the place of destination. Hand-in-hand with this also goes the development of other fertilisers, such as nitrogen, lime, and potash. There will be federal co-operation to direct their uses, the proper rotation of crops, advanced methods of cultivation, co-operative marketing, and the sowing of legumes as necessary cover crops.

Next in order goes an extensive programme to check disastrous soil erosion. The average farm in the Valley has fourteen untillable acres rendered useless by the unchecked washing away of valuable topsoil. Numerous corrective methods are being applied to curtail this waste. This includes the planting of millions of trees on the surrounding hillsides and the prevention of floods through the series of dams and storage reservoirs.

River navigation is still another major feature. A series of locks and channels will make the Tennessee a great water highway for the transportation of ores and other heavy goods produced in quantities in this region. With this there is a supplemental system of road construction. And with the building of each dam there are adjacent model towns designed primarily to afford adequate housing for workmen's families. But these are permanent communities, frank experiments in village planning. They are attractively landscaped and the architectural patterns of the houses are both pleasing and distinctly modern. They are equipped with electrical conveniences even to their heating systems. They permit no overcrowding and discourage squalor through the very inspiration of their perfection. There are recreation centres, schools, co-operative markets. They are rented to employees at from \$14 to \$40 a month. With the completion of construction on the dams the houses will be sold, but not until arrangements have been made to establish industrial employment for the inhabitants and a balance of agricultural activity to make each village self-supporting.

This industrial programme in the Valley is perhaps the

most ambitious. Three million horsepower of electric energy is soon to be available and plans must be made for its consumption. To this end experimental laboratories are developing new industrial processes and additional uses for the vast mineral and chemical wealth still unexploited in this region. The proposals divide into four chief fields. First, there are those industries directly associated with the agricultural products of the Valley. These include meat packing plants and canneries. Attention is to be given to the raising of flax and the creation of plants to utilise this output. Starch from sweet potatoes grown abundantly in this area provides another possibility. Second, the electro-chemical and electro-metallurgical fields are to be developed: coal chemistry, ceramics electrically fired, the production of mica, certain ferro alloys, and zinc come under this heading. Stainless steel is another. Third, provisions for the establishment of branch factories where economies of labour, nearness to raw materials or advantages in distribution offer special values. Fourth, craft industries; these are confined largely to the more isolated mountain sections where cash incomes are small and families may divide their labours between gardening and manufactures appropriate to their talents.

The programme lends itself to spectacular enlargements. There are numerous tentative plans that provide for huge co-operative systems which may later span the nation. One calls for the building of 500 dams. Another for the duplication of the Tennessee Authority in each of the great river basins from coast to coast. Important in this field of expanding planning is the proposal to stimulate the manufacture of low-priced electrical devices and their marketing through periods of long-term instalments with small monthly payments, so that they may be purchased by the poorer classes and thus extend the field of electric power consumption among those families that now consider these conveniences beyond attainment. Great strides have been made in this respect within the limits of the Valley where thousands of little gadgets from electric curling irons to refrigerators, ranges, and water-heaters are now in use.

But, as may be readily foreseen, this glamorous plan is not moving forward without encountering determined opposition. Its socialistic suggestiveness has been enough to unite the forces of those not easily swept into ecstasies of enthusiasm

by the glint of untried theories. The private power interest, one of the most potent influences in the field of American "big business," is fighting every inch of ground as it retreats. With it are aligned those other important factions whose invested millions may be threatened by the further progress of any kind of nationalisation. The constitutionality of the Valley programme has been challenged in the courts. The Government, retaliating, concentrates its forces on the annihilation of the so-called "power trust." "Unpractical Utopians!" on the one hand, "conservative reactionists!" on the other, are terms that are being flung about with the malignant inferences which emotional antagonisms impute. Before this article can appear in print the fate of the utility holding companies may have been decided by legislative action now in the throes of birth in Washington. But regardless of this outcome there is every indication that the fight will carry on until one principle or the other emerges definitely victorious.

Yet it is the contention of the administration that the purposes of this Valley experiment are not designed as an opening wedge for the introduction of socialistic doctrine in America. It is claimed on the contrary that, while the nationalisation of the nation's waterways may be an essential step toward the readjustment of an economic balance, the fundamental purpose is to re-establish in its finer essence the true democracy of American ideals. Mr. Roosevelt, in this, reverts in a sense to the unsuccessful theories of John Quincy Adams, who propounded as a basic nucleus extensive federal co-operation built around with true democratic independence, freedom for individual initiative to find expression, and a broader field of action than an unprotected freedom could afford. The outcome, very probably, will not lie in the hands of those who now direct its policies. Its practicability or its failure is for the future to decide. Whether it is an interesting adventure or a criminal absurdity depends largely upon one's personal outlook and, scarcely incidentally, upon its favourable or unfavourable reflection upon one's pocketbook.

PAUL SEVERANCE.

MODERN ANTI-SEMITISM.

AMID the intense discussion which has been proceeding for so long on Nazi intolerance, too little attention has been paid to certain of its historical origins. The serious student of modern anti-Semitism will, indeed, be found to need a wider historical equipment than a mere acquaintance with the racial ideas of Houston Stewart Chamberlain and the autobiographies of Hitler and other Nazi braves. He could hardly lay a better foundation for understanding modern National Socialism than by making a rapid review of the anti-Semitic forces in the old German and Austrian Empires. Already in the seventies he would find the beginning of many of the characteristic lines of thinking which have gone to the composition of Hitlerite Germany. Already dynastic and conservative defence against the rising electoral tide of trade-union socialism was being conducted under the banners of anti-Marxism; "Church and State" Christianity was defending its ample privileges from democratic attack by polemics against the "subversive atheism" of Jewish radical politicians and newspapers; and small tradesmen, handicraftsmen and peasants were being cleverly gathered into Christian Social parties to protect them from "Jewish exploitation" in the shape of "usurers," wholesale produce merchants, modern store proprietors and market and stock exchange operators.

Indeed, the acute irritation caused to so many "interests" during the first generation of full Jewish emancipation in Germany and Austria was to be vented in an astonishing and resounding reversion to "ritual murder" credulousness, which grew even more dangerous when it spread to Russia and Rumania. But it proved perilous enough even in the Central Empires also, as the famous and fiercely debated trial of fifteen Hungarian Jews for the "ritual murder" of Esther Solymossi showed in 1882. The peril was the greater from the fact that an anti-Semitic theologian of credit, Professor Rohling of Prague, to whose notorious *Talmudjude* much of the ritual murder credulousness is to be ascribed, was ready even after the Hungarian acquittals of 1882 to "prove" that there was chapter and verse in the Cabbala giving detailed directions for the ritual sacrifice of Gentile maidens.

In the Central Empires, however, it was inevitable that ritual murder credulousness would in the long run do smaller

harm than belief in less extraordinary legends. Here, too, Professor Rohling had provided anti-Semitic agitators with ideal material. He claimed the ability to prove from Jewish printed works that Jews regarded Christians as idolators and were wont to call them "dogs," "asses," "swine," and so forth. Moreover, he made the specially perilous claim that the Talmudic Jew was bound by his religious principles to seek, even by means of lying and treachery, to effect the moral and physical ruin of those who were not Jews. To confirm Dr. Rohling, too, there was the inevitable convert from Judaism, "Dr. Justus" (a *nom de plume*), whose widely circulated *Judenspiegel* claimed to reveal one hundred of the maleficent regulations binding Jews in their relations with Christians. It was significant of some of the forces then at work that Dr. Justus's book was issued from a famous Catholic Press in Germany, and that its order of ideas was strenuously supported by powerful monastic influences. It is not surprising that German peasants suspicious of the prices of Jewish grain-merchants or horse-dealers, Viennese craftsmen-shopkeepers fearful of damage from the arrival of Galician Jews in the capital, and Hungarian rustics in debt to Jewish publicans or shopkeepers, could only too easily be persuaded that their troubles were solely ascribable to malevolent Jewish agency.

The classic individual political career founded on the exploitation of economic fears of the Jew was, of course, that of the famous Dr. Lüger, burgomaster of Vienna and pillar of the Austrian Christian-Social party. No study of the origins of Hitlerism can, indeed, be said to be complete without a review of the activities of this man, whose shadow loomed very large over Austrian political life in the years of Hitler's very impressionable youth. How the young and strenuous Dr. Lüger, after being worsted in the course of factional rivalries among the Vienna liberals of the seventies, hit upon the happy idea of founding an anti-corruptionist Economic Party, and how it took the easiest road to electoral success by adopting the anti-Semitic banner, is primarily a matter of Austrian history. Here it will suffice to note some of his activities as he reached the point of complete success in 1895, and swept the whole of the working- and lower middle-class Vienna away from "liberal" influences and into the anti-Semitic camp. "The Jewish Press," he said in one oration,

"has sown dissension among all the classes and all the nationalities, it has set peasant against artisan, artisan against peasant, and everyone against the nobility and the clergy. The question now is not equality for the Jew, but equality for the Christian." In another oration of 1896, when he had already been hailed throughout Austria, he committed himself to the view that "when once the Jews, who sow dissensions among the nationalities (of Austria) for their own advantage are vanquished, the quarrels of the nationalities will cease."

In practice Dr. Luger proved much less terrible than his words and when his famous burgomastership of Vienna, begun in 1897, ended with his death in 1910 there was some sincere mourning in Jewry. As a great practical administrator he had found it wise to ignore much of his platform rodomontade and to come to reasonable terms even with the "international Jewish finance" he had once strenuously denounced. Indeed, he must long have looked at "Jewish finance" as a potent ally in the Christian Social struggle to preserve the working-classes of Vienna from increasing Marxist infection. The Jews of older settlement in Vienna, too, had often privately come to feel that Dr. Luger's readiness to denounce undue Jewish aggressiveness was not altogether an evil if it kept Galician newcomers to the capital watchful to avoid conduct which might arouse new anti-Semitic storms.

Despite all this and the widely diffused prosperity of the pre-war years, it is plain that anti-Semitic feeling was still one of the major political forces in the Central Europe in which Hitler grew to manhood. No better proof could, perhaps, be found than is available in Mr. Wickham Steed's famous work on the Hapsburg Monarchy, a book written in 1912-13 and all too little referred to in the discussions of to-day. Mr. Steed's *Hapsburg Monarchy* is the more revealing from the fact that the author, though an impartial Englishman trying hard to take an objective view, was from the Jewish standpoint much too greatly influenced by the fascinating new race-biology theories which were destined to provide subjective anti-Semites with the pseudo-scientific jargon that has made Nazi Aryanism the laughing-stock of the world. Hitler's speeches, indeed, may be searched in vain—even those avowedly on race-subjects like the *Politik*

und Rasse (April 20th, 1923) and the *Rasse und Wirtschaft* (April 24th, 1923)—for anything so historically significant as the amazing letter which Mr. Steed reports having received in 1905 from an Hungarian half-Jew who had turned anti-Semite. A quotation is amply justifiable.

"Is it indeed true," wrote this Hungarian patriot, "that this race batters so upon the land it has fastened its tentacles on, that, whether the race be comparable with orchid or spider, nothing remains but the dead trunk or the bloodless corpse? Is it true that all the banking, all the distributing trades, nearly all the retail trades and most of the land are in Jewish hands; that the Hungarian noble leaves his land to Jews who own the peasants, body and soul; that by usury they extract from the smaller freeholders what they possess, and that having exploited the nation which harbours them from the sowing to the reaping, they then minister to their physical weaknesses and their moral by the ultimate exploitation of the tavern and the brothel?"

"If this, or nearly this, be true, there is no Hungarian question in the true sense. There is a Jewish question, and this race means not only to master one of the grandest warrior nations in the world, but it means, and is consciously striving to enter the lists against, the other great race of the North (the Russians), the only one that has hitherto stood between it and its goal of world-power.

"Am I wrong? Tell me, for already England and France are, if not actually dominated by Jews, very nearly so, while the United States, by the hands of those whose grip they are ignorant of, are slowly but surely yielding to that international and insidious hegemony . . ."

It is the full Hitler nightmare-land, and in 1905! Ritual murder charges, it is plain, had now come to be practically eliminated from the anti-Semite thesis except in Russia, and in their stead was being substituted a cunningly patterned anti-Jewish indictment better adapted to the current credulities of "enlightened" populations. Already in 1901 there had appeared in Czech the first version of what was in 1905 to be fashioned into the notorious *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* under the direction of the Tsarist Police. Anxious to ward off the threatening revolution, these gentry brought "Professor Sergyei Nilus" on to the stage with alleged proofs, stolen it was claimed from the Zionist headquarters in France, that the overthrow of the Tsardom would be almost the final step in the insidious Jewish "liberal" game, practised

since the French Revolution, of establishing a Jewish world-autocracy on the ruins of all settled government. Like many others in the Austrian Empire, Mr. Wickham Steed's Hungarian correspondent had evidently drunk deep of such sources and, thanks to Dr. Alfred Rosenberg of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, the precious *Protocols* were ultimately destined to play their part in promoting National Socialism.

But in pre-war Germany diseased types of anti-Semitic sentiment were fortunately not nearly so prominent as in pre-war Austria and Russia. Thanks, indeed, to Germany's increasingly intimate cultural and commercial relations with the British Empire and America, the vast bulk of German "public opinion" had been becoming more and more immune from the grosser types of anti-Semitism. The war and the post-war period were, however, to introduce some strange changes. To indicate them it is hardly necessary to do more than to make some quotations from the first Hitler speech to which any real importance can be attached, the programme-speech delivered on April 19th, 1922. The application of an Austrian-bred anti-Semitic mentality to Germany's agonising post-war problems will be found strangely revealing. Discussing the reasons for the German collapse of 1918, Hitler spoke as follows :

Did the Jew gain from the German defeat? To-day we can decide that quite objectively. You must know that among all war-sufferers Jews are the rarest. Don't tell me of the poor Jew refugees from the East. Certainly they possessed very little at first, but only because they arrived from a land (Poland) which they had been ravaging and devouring for centuries. It is quite understandable that these gentlemen came poor. But just look at one of these orientals after being here for five or six years. If you were to compare the million Berlin workers of 1914 with what they are to-day, you would find them thinner, poorer, and worse-clad. But now look for the 100,000 Eastern Jews who arrived early in the war. They are not to be found. The greater part of them have made money and drive in motor-cars. Not because they are abler—for I refuse to believe that millions of honourable workers are just blockheads—but because these 100,000 never intended to co-operate for the common good of the body politic, but regarded the mass of the people as nothing but a forcing-bed for their gain.

The Jew has not grown poorer. He is waxing fatter continuously, and if you don't believe it, just look at the spas. There you will find two classes of people: the German, who arrives in order to

recuperate and to breathe some fresh air after a long absence, and the Jew who goes there in order to take down his weight. And go to the mountaineering resorts, whom will you find there in splendid new climbing boots and with wonderful rucksacks mostly full of improper articles? And then they only go to the hotel or where the railway runs, for where the railway stops there they stop also and sit for a kilometer around like blue-bottles round a carcase.

The Aryan regards work as the foundation for the maintenance of society, the Jew as a means for the plunder of other peoples. He never works as a productive agent except with the ambition of attaining domination. He is the unproductive exploiter and enjoyer of other people's labour. And that is why we seize on the iron phrase which Mommsen once used: "The Jew is the ferment of decomposition among the nations." That means, he is a destroyer and must be so because he totally lacks the idea of community-construction. It is unimportant, therefore, whether an individual Jew here or there is "respectable." The character which Nature gave him is inescapable. To us the Jew is harmful. Whether he is consciously so or only unconsciously does not matter. We have to look after the good of our own people.

To such poison it is well to supply an antidote quickly. And for English readers none, perhaps, could be better than to convict this dangerously able and fanatical demagogue of the unpardonable ignorance or worse with which he conducted his agitation. Here is a short quotation from a speech of April 13th, 1923, in which the principal blame for anti-German propaganda during the war was laid on the "Jewish Press." "But who is the chief of the entire British world-Press? One name emerges at once—Northcliffe—a Jew! Every week he sends thirty million papers into the world. Indeed, ninety-nine per cent. of the Press of England is in Jewish hands." Even the Englishman inclined to think that there may be something healthy in Hitlerism must be repelled by this.

But it is necessary to search even more widely to explain National Socialism's ability to sweep ever-increasing proportions of the German people towards the enactment of such supreme anti-Semitic follies as marked the opening months of the Hitler régime. One contributing factor was undoubtedly the inability of large religious circles to free themselves from a certain medievalism of attitude in regard to the Jew. Indeed, the relative political success of Jews in a Republican Germany which allowed their civic equality to function free of the checks that had been operative under the Empire led

such circles to blame "Jewish influences" for the reign of "gross materialism" that was alleged to have set in after the war. By some the post-war age was deplored almost as Satanic.

It will throw some light on the alliances which were thus being prepared for Hitlerism if an example is given of the way in which "Jewish influences" came to be treated in Histories of Culture. Here is a quotation from Egon Friedell's widely-read *Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit* (English translation, Vol. 3, 1932), a book written avowedly from a Christian standpoint. The author is dealing with Psycho-Analysis :

Psycho-analysis has one catastrophic defect: namely, the psycho-analysts, whose elaborations represent a mixture of the Talmud and bachelor reading. The Americans call psycho-analysis, in contrast to Christian Science, "Jewish Science." And indeed that *odium generis humani*, of which the Jews were already accused by the classical world, seems to have become vocal once more. Its aim is quite undisguisedly the vilification and dedivinising of the world. "With the Jews," said Nietzsche, "begins the servile insurrection in morals." And with psycho-analysis begins the servile insurrection of amorality. What should really be done is to psycho-analyse psycho-analysis. Its conception grew out of the domination-desire of the neurotic, who seeks to bring humanity into subjection by assimilating it to himself. This he does because of a transference-neurosis, which objectifies its own hypertrophied libido-complex as "world," and because of an instinctive hatred of the content of religious consciousness which the adept of the "Jewish Science" would like to eliminate in all his fellow-creatures, knowing that, as a Jew—which means, as a typical *homo irreligiosus*—he cannot compete with "the others" in this sphere. In short, it is, to borrow from Nietzsche once more, "a parasite's attack, a vampirism of pale underground bloodsuckers," a grandiose attempt at infection, a stealthy act of revenge by those who have got the worst of it: the whole world is to be neuroticised, sexualised, diabolised . . .

It is clever writing which can so neatly turn the arms of the "Jewish Science" upon the race which allegedly gave it birth. But what if the writer, and the many other gifted professional men of his stamp whose slow drift towards Nazism was one of Germany's tragedies, should be psycho-analysed? What interpretation of their "anti-Jewish complex" would emerge?

S. MACCOBY.

NATURE AS DEPICTED IN FABLE.

INSTRUCTION by entertainment has been practised since primitive man first acquired his early store of wisdom. Red Indian braves, when teaching their sons to shoot, suspended some choice edible from a branch and offered it as a prize to the first young marksman who could bring it down. The tuition of modern youth, again, is now much facilitated by instructive toys or games. There can be little doubt, however, that the most effective manner of spreading general knowledge is by means of some popular story in which the subject concerned plays a conspicuous part. Knowledge thus acquired, moreover, is usually retained, being inseparable from the incidents of the tale, which, if sufficiently arresting, imprint themselves indelibly upon the memory, particularly of a young reader. Thus, more history is learned from historical romance than was ever accumulated in the class-room, while a vivid adventure tale, the scene of which is laid overseas, goes farther to create a realistic impression of life and conditions in remote corners of the earth than can be gleaned from works of reference.

There was little historical or informative fiction, as we now understand it, in ancient days. It was mainly fantastic, as represented by the *Arabian Nights*, and instruction, when imparted by such means, took the more figurative form of the parable, the allegory, and, above all, the fable. The value of the latter in this connection is aptly illustrated by La Fontaine, who, when introducing his weighty volume first published in 1668, remarks as follows :

Tell a child that Crassus, when he waged war against the Parthians, entered their country without considering how he should be able to get out of it again, and that this was the cause of the destruction of himself and his whole army, and how great an effort will the infant have to make to remember the fact! But tell the same child that the fox and the he-goat descended to the bottom of a well for the purpose of quenching their thirst, and that the fox got out of it by making use of the horns and shoulders of his companion as a ladder, but that the goat remained there in consequence of not having had so much foresight, and that, consequently, we should always consider what is likely to be the result of what we do, and—tell a child these two stories, I say, and which will make the most impression on his mind?

The example, though crudely expressed, serves to explain the purpose of the fable in the folk-lore and tradition of all countries and ages. It is interesting to note, however, that the most celebrated of these fictitious anecdotes almost invariably present animals as the principal figures, although the latter usually play the part of human beings, the effect being to create a fairy-tale atmosphere that is purely fantastic or grotesque. Since the moral relates to man and his doings, the advisability of depicting its actors in the guise of bird or beast is not at first glance apparent, until one applies La Fontaine's argument, not only to the implied lesson, but to the incident itself. Then one realises that the story owes its longevity and wide circulation, not to its merits or the truth of its moral, but to those very animal characters through the medium of which it is presented. In that bizarre atmosphere, indeed, lies the real secret of its popularity. If described as a mere human transaction with ordinary people for characters, the occurrences would be too commonplace to arouse even passing interest, just as the tricks of a performing animal would seem trite enough if demonstrated by a human being. Even as "truth severe" creates a deeper impression when expressed in poetry rather than in prose, so the maxims of the ancients were expounded with more permanent effect when delivered in the form of an anecdote sufficiently quaint to appeal to the imagination.

The subtlety of these ancient story-tellers is further emphasised when one realises the curious applicability of animal life to human standards. Widely divergent and in many ways incomparable as are man and beast in respective outlook, as often as not it is some trait or characteristic of the latter which provides the best example of those qualities upon which human standards, good or bad, are modelled. There are few types of humanity that are not more or less aptly represented among the furred and feathered races. Take, for instance, the famous fable of the leonine king, shown as the embodiment of sage organisation, who, when mobilising his subjects for war, refused to dispense with the apparently useless asses and hares, upon the grounds that the former could serve as trumpeters, the latter as couriers. The outstanding ability of each animal finds its parallel in a distinct vocation which no class of human beings would have served so aptly to illustrate.

Fable, at all events when relating to animals, achieved an

appeal and a popularity of its own, which latter was responsible for its gradual development into the more modern combination of fairy-tale and animal-story to which a corresponding general principle applies. Even as in fable human wisdom is illustrated by the actions of animals to render the narrative more attractive, so in animal fiction furred and feathered creatures are represented as resembling human beings in thought and deed, in order that they may appeal more strongly to human sympathy. The White Rabbit would not have been so realistic a character had he not worn a waistcoat and carried a watch, nor Toad of Toad Hall had he been unable to drive a car and masquerade as a washer-woman. It is tolerably certain, moreover, that Mowgli would not be a living character to-day but for his conversations with the Jungle beasts and the very definitely human atmosphere of the wolf household.

It is generally recognised that natural beauty is impaired by the artificial touch, yet, anomalous as it may well seem, animal life and animal ways become the more attractive to mankind when endowed with qualities other than their own, or when figuratively removed from their natural setting. Actually, perhaps, this is not as incomprehensible as it may appear at first glance, since animal nature in the main is unintelligible to human mentality, and a mystery which completely baffles solution soon loses its ability either to interest or attract. The latter circumstance, however, in no way alters the fact that the animal is preferred when represented in alien guise, and this becomes the more curious when one remembers that the natural inclination of man is towards the real rather than the artificial. The passion for discovery is at the root of much human activity, and scientific research is little more than effort to arrive at truth. This predilection, moreover, is evinced towards any form of fiction other than that which concerns birds or beasts. When the story deals with man or woman, the first task of the critic is to determine whether the actions and motives attributed to the characters are compatible with human procedure, and there is no severer form of condemnation than to describe the incidents as "untrue to life." Yet with a very few outstanding exceptions, the famous animals of fiction have scarcely even nominally conformed to the natural laws of their kind, their popularity in the majority of cases being derived from the human

qualities and propensities with which they have been endowed.

Some years ago a famous publisher was comparing the work of two writers upon natural history, the one being new and still comparatively unknown, the other a well-established and world-wide favourite. The former, he predicted, would never achieve the latter's popularity, being a *truer exponent of animal nature*. This was a significant pronouncement, amounting to a plain assertion that, despite the generally recognised desirability and demand for scientific accuracy, the latter, when achieved, provides a common cause for unpopularity. Truth may be stranger than fiction; it is frequently more interesting. At the same time, it is seldom so spectacular or so "satisfactory," and, naturally, it is not so favourably received if at variance with the desires or personal opinions of the recipient. Bumble, when rewarded for information—believed to be accurate—concerning the character of Oliver Twist, made the belated discovery that a favourable report would have proved more lucrative, and the attitude of his employer upon this occasion was only characteristic of human nature. Again, acceptable ideas gain ground more rapidly, and this perfectly accountable tendency is undoubtedly responsible for many attractive ideas concerning birds and beasts, originating in the main from the story-book. That the most pleasing theory gains the widest credence and support goes without saying, since the desire to believe constitutes the shortest cut to conviction.

Many of the qualities conventionally attributed to some particular animal may be traced to popular fiction, upon the character of which depends the accuracy or otherwise of the impression. The widely reputed cunning of the fox, for example, has been depicted in anecdotes so old that the originator of the idea can scarcely be traced. Æsop's fox invariably appears as a past-master of subtlety, and this highly imaginative writer doubtless based his representations upon the ideas of his time. The picturesque and romantic atmosphere that always invests the "father of cunning" lends countenance to this character which the fox has borne throughout the ages, although in actual truth there are few creatures more entirely innocent of genuine craftiness. Like the weasels, he practises many clever hunting tricks, particularly in the "fascinating" of small game. Such artifices,

however, are habitual to his race, and not the outcome of originality in which alone true guile is displayed. Elusiveness, keenness of sense and supreme agility constitute the fox's principal means of defence. He possesses few wiles, falling an easy victim to the most simple device contrived for his destruction, and, comparatively speaking, of all British wild creatures he is probably the least capable of self-preservation.

It is interesting to note that Uncle Remus, whose delightful old stories contain a sound sprinkling of animal lore, never presented Brer Fox as the sagacious member of the four-footed community. Upon the contrary, the russet bandit was almost invariably duped by the wily old rabbit who figures as the hero of so many adventures, and though the fox, like all members of his order, possesses a high standard of *intelligence* in his own walk of life, for true cunning Uncle Remus was perfectly correct in representing him as the rabbit's inferior. So steeped in guile is the fox of fable, however, that he is able to overreach even the crafty crow or raven—the identity of the bird being subject to variation—an achievement which the relative mentality of the creatures concerned renders inconceivable.

There is, however, scarcely a fable which, despite the inevitable disposition to humanise the wild creature, does not contain shrewd observation and knowledge. Even the given instance of the crow and the cheese is not without a possible foundation in natural history. The mere sight of a fox is sufficient to plunge any individual of the extensive *Corvus* family into the wildest excitement. The bird no sooner spies its sworn enemy than it breaks forth into frantic denunciation, and were it carrying some edible morsel at the moment would certainly relinquish its hold in its haste to vociferate. That the fox would linger in such circumstances to annex the prize is improbable. He would be in too great a hurry to escape the publicity which the bird's outcry would ensure in the immediate future. It is just *possible*, however, that he might find time to profit from an exceptional opportunity, and it is not unreasonable to assume that some such incident, witnessed by or related to Æsop, originally suggested the fable.

Equally characteristic is the somewhat less famous story of the stag and the vine, through which may be traced the same misinterpretation of motive, together with the curious

confusion of science and fantasy that seems to have been inseparable from the natural history of those days. The incidents are realistic in every detail; the hunted animal concealing itself under cover of the vine and eluding its pursuers: its foolhardiness when, oblivious of its recent imminent danger, it neglects to make good its escape, remaining instead to browse the shrub which had sheltered it until no effective cover remains; finally, the return of the hounds and the inevitable "fresh-finding" of the foolish one, whose behaviour in demolishing his leafy screen is depicted as an act of gross ingratitude justly requited. As an illustration of cervine mentality and actual procedure in a corresponding case, the example is perfect, nor could the author have devised a better instance of neglected opportunity and general lack of foresight. The obligation to the inanimate vine, naturally unrecognised by the stag, is rather the shadow in which the substance of the real lesson is overlooked.

Indeed, fable, like old poetry, moved upon somewhat stereotyped lines. Ideas and similes were for the most part conventional rather than practical, accuracy and error, therefore, being strangely mingled. *Æsop*, apparently, was aware of the strong antipathy that exists between foxes and wolves, although he ran counter to natural history by usually allowing the fox the better of the argument, assigning to the wolf a stupidity which is unaccountable. The enmity certainly exists, but it is the fox that gives place, standing little chance against his grim relative, mentally his equal, physically his superior. Even where the coyote abounds, the fox can scarcely exist.

One is frequently faced with the question as to the actual amount of knowledge that original narrators of world-famous animal stories really possessed. Take, for example, once again the typical case of Uncle Remus, when he presents his two famous characters, Brer Fox and Brer Rabbit—usually at loggerheads—conversing amicably together, or hatching some mischievous plot in company. The association seems utterly incongruous for all purposes except a fairy-tale, and yet, apart from the collusion, there is in truth nothing remarkable about it, since at certain times of the day, notably early afternoon, despite the inveterate character of their normal relations, a truce exists between the hunter and the hunted, and the experienced naturalist would not be surprised to see a fox sitting

at the mouth of his earth complacently regarding the antics of rabbits which gambol within a few feet of him, apparently regardless of his presence. He might be a benevolent old gentleman watching boys at play, and the rabbits, apparently, have no fear that he will abandon this attitude. They are well aware that until dusk falls he is as harmless as a tawny owl at noonday, except upon those unaccountable occasions which have nothing to do with the general argument, when foxes hunt during the daylight and other wild creatures are correspondingly alive to the situation. The latter, however, is a digression. As a rule, harmony prevails between noon and the first perceptible lengthening of the shadows, and one cannot but wonder whether Uncle Remus not only was aware of the circumstance, but assumed that his original listeners knew as much and many other things.

From beginning to end of animal lore in fiction, old or new, there is no line of demarcation between intent and accident, knowledge and ignorance. It might even be claimed that there was never any attempt at scientific accuracy in picturing animal nature or habit, the creatures merely serving the purpose of the fable or the production of an entertaining story. At the same time it seems tolerably certain that the qualities and characteristics ascribed to the animals of *Æsop* and his successors have become traditional, and are, indeed, responsible for many mistaken ideas that have been generally adopted concerning birds and beasts. Impressions formed in the nursery are not easily eradicated in after life, and it would seem that a unique opportunity of imparting much valuable knowledge of natural history to posterity was lost when so large an element of fantasy was allowed to invade these early pictures of animal life and outlook. The tenacity of ideas inculcated during childhood and largely obtained from standardised animal fiction is evidenced by the curious fact that each generation receives the same original impressions, despite modern research and discovery, only to embark later in life upon the identical "hardy annual" discussions that have been proceeding for centuries.

Even La Fontaine argues in verse upon the psychology of birds and beasts, and falls into the error, equally prevalent to-day, of confusing instinctive or habitual methods of defence with strategy, which is the outcome of individual intelligence. In proof of animal ingenuity he cites the hunted

stag's common trick of rousing a junior or a hind to face the music in his stead, and the example of the game-bird who feigns injury to distract attention from her young, although in neither case does it cost the creature further mental effort to execute such an artifice than is required of the man who dodges to avoid an approaching vehicle—the proceeding being purely automatic.

A further proof of the influence that fantastic stories exercise upon subsequent opinion is provided by the same writer, who proceeds to contest his case for animal intellect upon the strength of the well-known story concerning the two rats and the egg. This would have proved ingenuity indeed, had the incident really occurred. Being fictitious, however, it is purely misleading. It would be almost as logical to regard the dissertations to which Ouida gave expression through the supposed pen of a dog as evidence of canine ability to philosophise.

In conclusion, since error attributable to popular fiction seems to be almost ineradicable, one can only conjecture at the effect that might have been produced upon prevailing ideas concerning wild life had every furred or feathered hero of fable or story-book appeared in its natural character, its doings limited to its mental and physical capacities. But here again one is caught within the rotations of the old vicious circle, if, indeed, the "humanising" of the wild creature is necessary to ensure its appeal to general sympathy. A fellow-feeling makes us wondrous kind, and if sympathy is impossible without understanding, the elevation of the animal to the human plane may constitute the only means as yet devised for achieving the desired end. It seems regrettable, however, that the one device for bridging the gulf should in practice have the actual effect of widening it the more irrevocably.

DOUGLAS GORDON.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MR. ROOSEVELT AND THE RICH MEN.

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT became President of the United States on March 4th, 1933. His period of office will therefore elapse in eighteen months' time from now. There is material enough to form a view of what he has attempted to achieve, and what he has achieved, in his historic Presidency; and he is in fact now being judged by the American electorate in preparation for the new election. The stage has even been reached where his personal character is being attacked, his integrity besmirched. That is absurd, but it is not more absurd than most of the tactics employed at most elections in most countries. No sane person ever doubted Mr. Roosevelt's personal integrity or the sincerity of his public purpose. He was put into office two and a half years ago by a scared United States. The machinery of civilised life in its economic and financial aspect had broken down. Money had ceased to function as a means of exchanging values. The banks had closed their doors against their panic-stricken creditors. The whole people of the United States were faced with the possibility of something like starvation merely because the confidence which enabled the daily necessities of life to be financed, organised and distributed, had been lost. A widespread feeling of helplessness forced Mr. Roosevelt willy-nilly into the position of an unquestioned despot. He was unanimously expected to do something, and to do it quickly, to restart the machinery that had stopped. He was left to his own absolute initiative and discretion to decide what to do. There are more than 100,000,000 people in the United States. Few men in the history of the world have had thrust upon them a responsibility such as Mr. Roosevelt had to face. Yet he did something and did it at once. What he did, achieved its immediate object of enabling the 100,000,000 people to obtain the elementary necessities of life, and it re-established the confidence upon which money as a token of exchange in the buying and selling of goods and services could perform its function.

He went further. In the emotional stress of the emergency—or so one must suppose—he jumped to the conclusion that the system on which civilisation in its economic and financial

aspect had been based must itself be rotten if it be capable of so complete a collapse. He therefore decided to reform the system. As there seemed to be no limit to his power, so there seemed to be no limit to his assurance. The famous Congress and the famous Constitution of the United States, famous for their intransigence, had stood meekly aside and had given *carte blanche* to a President. What he decided upon in effect was an experiment in socialism. He decided that the old capitalist system must go; that private enterprise as the motive of business must be replaced by a political ruling imposed from above. The thing itself is so interesting and so big that the philosopher who specialises on a study of the material forms and methods of human life finds it difficult to collect and appreciate the mass of evidence in its true proportions. But two and a half years is a long enough period in human life to enable at any rate a superficial opinion to be formed of what Mr. Roosevelt has done. The initial paradox was this. To say in March 1933 that the system on which material life was organised in any country, not excluding the United States, was that of "capitalism" in the sense of the private management by individuals of their own affairs, was to do violence to the obvious facts. The whole mesh of international debt contracted by governments, and its appalling effect upon the exchanges and upon gold as the medium of international economic exchange, were the works of politics. It was those works that had crippled the so-called capitalist system, had in short prevented that system from working. Mr. Roosevelt oddly diagnosed that what was wanted was still more politics. He attempted to "plan" the United States as Lenin had attempted to "plan" Russia, as Mussolini and Hitler have attempted to "plan" Italy and Germany. It is an interesting thing for the political philosopher to trace the course of Mr. Roosevelt's subsequent progress. At the end of two and a half years he has been thwarted both by Congress and by those whose business it is to interpret the Constitution, and is apparently now concentrated on fighting a rearguard action in a purely political sense, all consideration of economics and finance having been thrown by him to the four winds, except only that he is still determined to impose heavy taxes upon the rich.

What he attempted was on the face of it impossible. It is in one point of view hardly to be wondered at that under the

grinding pressure of the circumstances that obtained in March 1933 a man of Mr. Roosevelt's temperament should be misled in his judgment. No man who has reached a mature stage in his personal evolution ever expects any lesson in the political field to be learnt. The forces are too big and too chaotic, and by the time a politician reaches wisdom he has in most cases lost his influence and falls an easy victim to the overwhelming pressure of the untrained, unchastened, unwise younger generation. None the less, it is a source of some interest, unprofitable though it be, to trace the stages of Mr. Roosevelt's unhappy progress.

His emergency measures, such as the four-days' bank holiday, were one thing; and they succeeded in their emergency purpose. His long-distance legislation was another. He at once foreshadowed a socialist programme including the subjection of the banks to "national supervision" with a view to protecting the public. How a "nation" can "super-vise" anything is one of the mysteries that only socialist eyes can penetrate. At first Mr. Roosevelt conceived the unsocialist project of saving public expenditure. His Economy Bill introduced on March 16th, 1933, was designed to save 800,000,000 dollars of budget expenditure, mainly at the expense of the "veterans'" (ex-soldiers') pensions. He quickly abandoned that object and reverted to socialist type by launching vast schemes of budgetary expenditure. It was on June 16th, 1933, when the Economy Act was passed—and it was passed in a substantially modified form—that he signed the National Industrial Recovery Act, which he described in a public statement as "the most important and far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress." That Act, in one of its provisions, authorised the expenditure of 400,000,000 dollars for highway construction. But the main feature of Mr. Roosevelt's policy during the first two years of his Presidency was that part of N.I.R.A. which provided for the famous and ill-fated New Deal, or series of New Deals. It dated from June 16th, 1933, and was passed in the first instance for a period of two years. It duly expired on June 16th, 1935, and no question arose of its continuance, for the Supreme Court had ruled it to be unconstitutional. What was the object of the New Deal? He himself, when he signed the Act, said that its aim was "to restore our rich domestic market by raising its vast consuming capacity," and he

explained the means to that end in these words: "The idea is simply for employers to hire more men to do existing work by reducing the working hours of each man's week, and at the same time paying a living wage for the shorter week." On May 7th, 1933, he had announced as one of his objects "the raising of commodity prices to such an extent that those who have borrowed money will, on the average, be able to repay that money in the same kind of dollar as they borrowed." Yet it was obviously his hope that he could raise wages faster than prices; or, put in another way, costs faster than profits. It was from the beginning a source of confusion to experienced people that Mr. Roosevelt should regard such a thing as possible. It was apparently his belief that a stabilised production and an increased consuming capacity would result in (and must therefore precede) an increase in prices. Such an idea is not new to socialists. But it had never been tried on one of the world's chief industrial countries. Profits depend on prices. Mr. Roosevelt in effect invited those who had put their capital and were putting their work into industrial enterprise to postpone their expectation of profits and to accept his reversal of the usual cycle. The theory of diverting profits to an increase in wages instead of to an increase in dividends was a "social" theory, a distinction between the interests of different classes of consumers. Even assuming that the theory could be made to work, and the cost of living could be kept down so as to ensure that the raised wages should retain their real value, it was surely rash to imagine that the normal cycle of recovery from trade depression, which derives from human nature, experience and common sense, could simply be reversed: the cycle namely of expanding profits, expanding production, expanding employment, and expanding consumption. Despite the extent to which every British Government since the war directly or indirectly has interfered with British trade, no British Government has yet attempted to prescribe that the cart shall come before the horse in business practice: fortunately, because otherwise the post-1931 recovery in British trade would hardly have been possible.

The text of N.I.R.A. is likely to become as great a curiosity as that of the Russian constitution of 1923. The preamble to N.I.R.A. made this sweeping pretension: "A national emergency productive of widespread unemployment and

disorganisation of industry, which burdens inter-state commerce, affects the public welfare, and undermines the standard of living of the American people, is hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of inter-state commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof, and to promote the organisation of industry for the purpose of co-operative action among state groups, to induce and maintain united action of labour and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve the standards of labour, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources."

The main substantial provisions of the Act itself were, first, that the "employees shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing," and, secondly, that employers should be subject to certain drastic restrictions upon their freedom to conduct their own business in their own way. The main restriction was imposed by the famous "codes of fair competition." Those codes invited employers "voluntarily" to undertake (with the black-listing implications of the blue eagle to fortify their will) these obligations: Not to employ employees, other than factory or mechanical workers, for more than forty hours in any one week . . . not to employ factory or mechanical workers or artisans for more than a maximum week of thirty-five hours until December 31st, 1933, but with the right to work a maximum week of forty hours for any six weeks within this period, and not to employ any worker more than eight hours in any one day . . . not to pay the first-mentioned class of workmen less than a rate varying between fifteen dollars to fourteen dollars a week in different areas . . . not to pay the other class of workmen less than forty cents an hour, unless the hourly rate on July 15th, 1929, was less than forty cents an hour, in which case not to pay less than the hourly rate of July 15th, 1929, and in no event less than thirty cents an hour.

Life at any rate was made exciting, even if industry was made nearly impossible, by Mr. Roosevelt's ordinances. In effect he ordained that in all industries—whether profits were being made or not—high wages and short hours must come first, and the employers who paid the wages must, if needs be,

wait for their profits. Established industries had to conform or close down. New industries were discouraged. Mr. Henry Ford was exceptional because he refused to conform to the codes. He was in the peculiar and ironic position that he himself had been the world's leading believer in high wages. He himself paid the highest wages in the world—higher even than those prescribed by the codes—and he did so on the severely business-like principle that the highest possible wages should be paid in order to maintain purchasing power (which is obviously necessary for the making of profits) at the highest possible level. Why then did he resist the codes? He did so from the deeply rooted principle that business can be profitably conducted only if the owner of the business is an unfettered dictator, that higher wages can be paid only in proportion as higher profits are made, and that, therefore, the profits must come first. His own history provided the classic proof of his contention. Not only had he himself started life by repairing clocks for no pay at all, merely in order to find out how clocks worked, and then later worked eighty hours a week for seven cents an hour; but when he started his own business he paid less than two and a half dollars a day for a nine-hour day. The fact that he has since quadrupled his rate of pay resulted from the precedent fact that he made enormous profits. What was Mr. Ford's value in the public sense? By his own enterprise, guided by his own despotic will, he established in the United States, and in other countries, one large central industry and fifty subsidiary industries, giving employment directly or indirectly to half a million people, who were paid an average of eight dollars a day. Where was the public harm in that achievement?

By contrast N.I.R.A. sought to impose upon industry "adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to reduce unemployment, to improve the standards of labour and otherwise to rehabilitate industry," etc. Before N.I.R.A. launched those grand objects Mr. Ford's workpeople had been the most contented in the world. After N.I.R.A. was launched, his workpeople went on strike, having been taught that "collective bargaining" meant that by merely striking it was possible to enforce ever-increasing wages and ever-dwindling work. We were presented with the ironic spectacle of Mr. Ford threatening to close down his works if he could not get his workmen back on his own terms. Strikes became the main

enterprise from coast to coast of the United States. The issue between Mr. Ford and N.R.A. was reduced to an absurdity when Mr. Ford, no doubt partly in a mischievous spirit, sent in the lowest tender for the provision of motor trucks wanted by the Government. General Johnson, the administrator of N.R.A., refused the tender on the ground that Mr. Ford had not signed the Automobile Code. Mr. Roosevelt approved General Johnson's action. But the Comptroller-General, who is responsible not to the President, but to Congress, and whose business it is not to waste public money, in his turn overruled the joint action of General Johnson and Mr. Roosevelt on the ground that even though Mr. Ford had not signed the code he was not in his practice violating any of its provisions.

Presumably as a distraction from N.I.R.A., Mr. Roosevelt next plunged, with equal assurance, into experimenting with gold as a method of raising prices. On October 22nd, 1933, he announced in a broadcast address that he was going to try buying gold at increasing prices with a view to raising prices and "managing" the currency. He explained that prices must be raised before the dollar could be stabilised; that the dollar must be stabilised, not on exchange values but on the internal price level; that internal prices must be raised, not by currency expansion but by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation's buying and selling of gold. He had a bad Press—a striking change in his prestige since March—and was criticised by farmers, conservatives and inflationists impartially. He seemed to imagine not only that he could manipulate the exchanges to raise prices, but that exchange prices were the same thing as internal prices; although internal prices are based upon commodities, and in the United States are singularly independent of imports and exports. Mr. Roosevelt did bring down the dollar: but only by the unintentional means of creating a flight from the dollar on the part of those Americans whom he had alarmed. Even before the end of 1933 the initials N.R.A. were being popularly construed in the United States to stand for the slogan "No Recovery Allowed." Mr. Roosevelt precipitated a war between sound money and greenbacks, between the gold standard and inflation, and clearly placed his hope of salvation on the chance that dollar depreciation abroad might do the trick of inflation at home. Long before the end of 1933,

police on the one side and strikers on the other had reached the stage of arming themselves, and blood was shed in the streets.

An incidental, but wholly relevant aspect of Mr. Roosevelt's evolution was that of war debts. He did no harm, except to his reputation for consistency. During the election campaign for what was to be his own Presidency, Mr. Roosevelt joined issue with Mr. Hoover over war debts. He seemed indeed almost to appreciate the harm done to life in general by the comic politics of international finance. He said on July 30th, 1932: "The Republican position has been the absurd one of demanding payment, and at the same time of making payment impossible." On September 29th, 1932, he said: "Billions of dollars of debts are due to this country from abroad. If the debtor nations cannot export goods and services, they must try to pay in gold. We started such a drain on the gold reserves of the principal commercial countries as to force practically all of them off the gold standard. . . . I say to you, in all earnestness and sincerity, that unless this process is reversed throughout the world, there is no hope for full economic recovery or for true prosperity in the United States." Yet as soon as he entered the White House he forgot his criticism of Mr. Hoover so completely that he decided to carry on Mr. Hoover's policy in an unmodified form. Mr. MacDonald crossed the Atlantic and interviewed Mr. Roosevelt (April 21st-25th, 1933) about the new prospect opened in Anglo-American debt relations by what Mr. Roosevelt had said during the election campaign. There was no new prospect. On June 9th the United States Government simply reminded Sir Ronald Lindsay of the amount due from the British Government on June 15th. That was the occasion when the British Government made its famous "token" payment, and when the problem was shelved by the mutual fiction that negotiations should be held in Washington "as soon as convenient" about it. Mr. Roosevelt concurrently intimated that not he, but only Congress, had the power to reduce or cancel debt. By January 4th, 1934, when Mr. Roosevelt read a budget message to Congress, he had reached the point when he proposed to spend 8,000,000,000 dollars in seven months. Mr. Lloyd George had till then held the politician's record by his average expenditure of £7,000,000 a day during the Great

War. At five dollars to the pound Mr. Roosevelt's figure worked out at £8,000,000 a day. Logically and calmly Mr. Roosevelt faced an unbalanced budget for two years ahead, the deficit being estimated in the aggregate at the dizzy figure of 9,306,000,000 dollars. It is a wholly fair measure of Mr. Roosevelt's effect upon industry in the United States to recall what happened on September 1st, last year. At 11 p.m. on that day the cotton textile workers in the Southern States began their great strike. Their objects were: (1) a reduction of the hours of labour from forty (the original figure prescribed in Mr. Roosevelt's cotton textile code) to thirty-four a week, without any reduction of weekly wages (in a six-day week, that would work out at less than six hours a day); (2) the reinstatement of all workers who had been discharged for belonging to the Textile Workers' Union; (3) the recognition by the employers of the Textile Workers' Union as an organisation holding plenary power over all the textile workers in their relationship with their employers; (4) the abandonment by the employers of their right to assign more looms to one weaver; (5) the appointment of a tribunal of arbitration, which should be competent to settle disputes between employers and workers. It is fair to recall those claims because they symbolised the length to which "organised labour" had gone in the United States as a direct result of the New Deal. In one word, what the claims amounted to was the control of employers by workers, the latter deciding how little work and how much pay there should be, and deciding who should be employed; the former being given the job of paying the wages and of making the business succeed, no matter what the price at which the goods could be sold or what the cost at which they could be produced.

It had even by then become obvious that Mr. Roosevelt was almost exclusively concerned with his "social" objects. His other objects had already been proved unattainable. By October 1933 the farmers of the Middle West had lost patience because prices were not rising, a rise in prices being even more essential to them than it was to the industrialists. The farmers went on strike with the object of raising prices by starving the market. North Dakota put an embargo on the export of wheat from its boundaries. Senator Thomas of Oklahoma led a farmers' agitation for a rise in prices. Five Middle Western governors went on a deputation to Mr. Roosevelt

to demand the fixing of a guaranteed price for about a dozen of the chief agricultural products. The request was refused. Mr. Roosevelt sought to appease the farmers by a dose of monetary inflation, which upset the bankers and the industrialists in the East. In industry it was an open secret that many of the employers who had signed the codes had done so in the spirit of "chiselers," that is, as a cloak to their own disregard of the codes' provisions. The newspapers and publishing businesses were restive. On October 10th, General Johnson was warning the unions against the temptation to organise their own direct strikes. Yet at the same time Mr. Roosevelt was combining with the United Mine Workers' Union to organise a strike with a view to forcing the coal owners to accept the coal code, which they had steadily refused to accept. But if N.I.R.A. had failed in its purpose of rehabilitating industry, the social purpose could clearly be decreed *ex cathedra*. Mr. Roosevelt reiterated during 1934 that "Never again will we permit the social conditions which allowed vast sections of our population to exist in an un-American way, which allowed a maldistribution of wealth and power." By the end of 1934 American industry was in a state of chaos, despite the lame promises made from Washington during the year (for instance, by the Secretary of Commerce on August 22nd in a broadcast statement) that it was not the Administration's purpose to destroy private enterprise or the motive of profit in industry, but rather to restore them, to give back "responsibilities which, under normal conditions, belong to business." But it was too late to retrace steps. It is always too late to retreat from socialism, because the electorate, once whetted by the proceeds of robbing the rich, demands ever more.

The inevitable upshot was registered on May 27th, 1935, when the Supreme Court unanimously ruled the New Deal to be unconstitutional. The occasion of the ruling was an appeal by a firm of poulterers against a conviction on eighteen counts for having violated the provisions for fair trade made in the poultry code. On each of the eighteen counts the poulterers won, and N.I.R.A. lost, the case. The ground of the court's decision was a ruling there and then formulated, that the making of codes was a legislative, not an executive or administrative, prerogative, and that Congress was not competent to delegate such power to the President. The court

elaborated its judgment. Congress had exceeded its powers in authorising the President to issue orders for the conduct of business; if the Government were thus made competent to prescribe the wages and hours of workpeople, it would be equally competent to control the methods of doing business, advertising, the aggregate number of employees in any given industry, and other commercial matters, such as rents. The court laconically put on record that "The Federal Constitution does not provide for it."

N.I.R.A. was dead; but on May 18th the President of the United States Chamber of Commerce appealed to industrial and business men to preserve for the time being the level of wages and work that had been enforced by N.I.R.A. As for Mr. Roosevelt, he first announced that no fewer than 411 court cases about violations of the codes would be withdrawn (June 1st). Next he announced that he would submit a Bill to Congress for the continuance of N.I.R.A. in a "skeleton form" (June 4th). In its skeleton form it was nothing more than an academic body for collecting information about industrial conditions. As such it passed through the House of Representatives on June 7th, the voting being 264 to 212, and the new lease of life being dated to April 1936. On that day Mr. Roosevelt reiterated his "social" objectives. The Senate passed the skeleton N.I.R.A. on June 13th. Mr. Roosevelt signed the Act on June 14th. On June 18th he announced, in the form of a message to Congress, his remaining plans—the only remaining part of his original plans—for taxing the rich. He proposed a greatly increased taxation of large incomes and windfalls, and largely increased death duties. That was orthodox enough in political practice. But he went further, and proposed not only to put a special tax on large corporations, but to graduate the tax according to the size of the corporation. "Vast concentrations of capital," he said, "should be ready to carry burdens commensurate with their powers and advantages." That was a conception that was almost impossible to reconcile with common sense. It was not only a tax on the equity of a business that he proposed: an equity divided probably among numerous holders, not large holders, but small; but it was nonsensical in its assumption that the larger the corporation the larger necessarily the dividends of individual proprietors. By its simple logic a small man who invested £100 in a large concern

would be taxed many times more heavily than a small man who invested the like amount in a small concern. If it was not a genuine misconception on Mr. Roosevelt's part, then it was a deliberate attempt to kill big business in the United States: for obviously no one would invest in big concerns if *ipso facto* their standard rate of income tax were to be automatically doubled, trebled, quadrupled, according to the aggregate capital size of the company.

What then are to be the issues at the next Presidential election? Not the New Deal, which will be a dim memory. The two issues seem likely to be Mr. Roosevelt's sole remaining policy of taxing the rich and his demand that the constitution be reformed. On May 31st, Mr. Roosevelt informed a conference of journalists that in his view the Supreme Court's ruling of May 27th presented the country with a great constitutional issue which would have to be decided in the next five or ten years: namely, whether the forty-eight States should continue to have delegated to them the power to control the nation's social and economic conditions, or whether the Federal Government should be given the corresponding powers enjoyed by other national governments, of itself legislating on those matters. There seems to be no doubt that at the next Presidential election Mr. Roosevelt will have a difficult time. The fact that the campaign has already started in vigorous style is interesting as a symptom. On June 11th, for instance, a Republican convention, representative of the ten Middle Western States, met at Springfield, Illinois, and formulated a broadside attack on Mr. Roosevelt's Presidency, on constitutional, financial, and economic grounds. The five thousand delegates represented about a fifth of the party's strength.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

August 15th, 1935.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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/ BERGSON ON MORALITY AND RELIGION.*

With the publication of *Creative Evolution* in 1907, M. Bergson became the most commanding figure in European philosophy, and in the odd twenty-seven years that have since elapsed his theories on free-will, duration, change and movement have profoundly influenced not only philosophers but men of science, while their effect on writers and artists has been equally far-reaching. He has exercised the same overwhelming spell over the continental mind as Descartes did some 280 years ago. Probably his views have been most violently combated in this country, though they are now widely accepted, and this is strange, for his methods are inductive, which is essentially the English way of tackling problems, as may be seen from the general history of English philosophy and science from Roger Bacon to Lord Kelvin. But great as *Creative Evolution* was, it was felt by his numerous followers, and not least by Bergson himself, that his

* *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, by Henri Bergson. Translated by R. Ashley Andra and Cloudesley Brereton with the assistance of W. Horsfall Carter. Macmillan. 10s. net.

philosophic system was incomplete; there was still to come, as the crown and corner-stone of the whole edifice of his thought, his views on morality and religion, questions that specially interest and concern that great mass of thinking people who are not professional philosophers.

He has spent some twenty-five years on the task and some two years ago he published his solution. The book has had an immediate and unparalleled success with the French public. It has gone through eighteen editions and is still selling. It is now presented in an English dress, in the composition of which M. Bergson has himself collaborated. As the chief person responsible for the translation I must leave it to the reader to say if the two years spent in trying to reproduce some of the clarity and charm of the master have been successful or not.

The book opens with a subtle and masterly analysis of the difference between the moral law and a law of Nature, and shows how each has in the course of evolution become impregnated with something of the other's attributes, the first borrowing from the other its appearance of inevitability, and the second its prerogative of compulsion. The social order that binds the individual to the community to which he belongs appears as an imitation of the order observed by Nature. Through the force of habit the individuals in a community hold together like the cells in an organism, and the tie is not a rational one but instinctive. In other words, the social pressure under which we have grown up, though we are often unaware of it, is as constant and continuous as that of the atmosphere of which we are also unaware. This is possibly the hardest part of the book, but if the reader will bear the above points in mind he should be able to find his way through the first twenty-odd pages, and after that, with the exception of a certain number of passages, he will find the book, as a whole, comparatively straight sailing.

M. Bergson's main thesis is that there are two societies, a closed and an open one, each with their own morality and religion, the society described above being a closed society. It is, in fact, a more or less natural growth which finds its extreme type in the ant-hill or the beehive. It is represented by the city state of antiquity and the nationalist state of to-day. Its gods are always the gods of a community or of a state. The static religion it evolves is primarily concerned with the society of which it is a product. Except very vaguely it does

not lead man to think of sanctions beyond the grave. Its immediate purpose is to attach man to life, and this attachment is reinforced by all sorts of traditions and superstitions. The latter are the result of a "myth-making" faculty whose function is to assure the closed society against disorganisation, which the intelligence, if given full play, might bring about. With this master-key we can indeed unlock the most absurd of human superstitions.

The open society is the creation of superior beings, saints and mystics, who have broken through the taboos and traditions of the closed society in which they lived. It works not by pressure but by inspiration. Its religion (dynamic) finds its sanctions elsewhere. It embraces all humanity, and its god is the God of all peoples upon earth. Moreover, its god is essentially a God of Love, which in the case of its extreme exponents, the mystics, finds that the love of God and the love of humanity are one. According to Bergson, it is the Christian mystics who have gone the farthest of all, because they have passed beyond a life of contemplation to one of action, or, in other words, reached a stage at which faith and works are inextricably intertwined.

This is only the barest of outlines of M. Bergson's central position, which must be studied in the book itself in which it is worked out with a convincing abundance of detail. The last chapter with its applications of the doctrine will appeal to a very wide circle of readers, as it deals, apart from questions of morality and religion, with some of the main problems of our Western civilisation: the neglect of agriculture, the menace of industrialism, the prevention of war and the League of Nations, the relations of the sexes (there are many illuminating remarks on women!), and the need for a simpler life, in which M. Bergson suggests our salvation lies. No thoughtful person can afford to neglect the book. It will give him furiously to think even where he most disagrees. In spite of the threatening outlook M. Bergson concludes on a note of sober optimism: Mankind indeed lies crushed under the weight of its own progress. But the future is still in its hands once men have determined if they want to go on living or not, and provided "they are willing to make the extra effort required for fulfilling the essential function of the universe, which is a machine for the making of gods."

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

RENAISSANCE, REFORMATION AND REASON.*

It is very easy to take up this brilliant second volume of Mr. Fisher's history of Europe : the difficulty is to lay it down. It starts with the eve of the Reformation and ends with the eve of the French Revolution. The stirring events in the world of action and the equally stirring events in the world of thought are vividly portrayed from the angle of Renaissance, Reformation and Reason. These three magic words set out with unflinching frankness the importance of the sixteenth century as compared with the eighteenth—at any rate before that crucial year 1789, the year not so much of the French as of the European Revolution. Nor is this change slight, for, whatever else he may or may not be, the Warden of New College is a staunch European. Our own English annals fall into their due place when they affect the movements of the Continent : otherwise we hear but little about them. What is equally plain is the absorbing attraction that the world of thought rightly exercises over the mind of the author. They tell the story of Lord Moulton, the Senior Wrangler, who probably scored the highest total of marks in the old examination, that in the problem paper he largely set forth the method by which he attacked the different problems, and the method of Mr. Fisher is not wholly dissimilar. Take his survey of the sixteenth century, for instance. There are, of course, chapters on the course of the German and English Reformations and on the Counter-Reformation, but for these three chapters we have an illuminating analysis of the thought of John Calvin and the far less important thought of Martin Luther as well as of the enormous share taken by Ignatius Loyola in stemming the tide of the Reformation. We see, as we never saw before, why John Calvin his mark is written over the civilised world, whereas Martin Luther his mark is written over the German world, though, remarkably enough, we have received more German books and pamphlets on the German reformer this year than during the whole of the last three years.

Goethe wished that the Reformation had been conducted by a man like Erasmus rather than a man like Luther. His

* *A History of Europe.* By the Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher. Vol. II. Eyre & Spottiswoode. 18s.

wish was a vain one. It is true that Nature does not normally take a leap. Nevertheless, it is no less true that she has her earthquakes—to say nothing of her atoms—as well as her still, slow processes, her Etnas as well as her Jungfraus. In times when vast forces are called into being, the eruption of a volcano may accomplish in a day what the silent processes of Nature may not accomplish in an age. Erasmus could never have left upon the world the impression which Luther left. The arguments of the scholar were cogent : the arguments of the reformer were compelling. Could the Renaissance, as Goethe implies, ever have become the *via media* between reaction and reform ? For an answer to such a question we simply mention the circumstance that in 1528 it is probable that three men were in Paris together—Loyola, Rabelais, and Calvin. Is there any common denominator sufficient to cover the ideas of these three ?

Eager as Mr. Fisher is to perceive the underlying significance of matters that on the surface seem utterly disconnected, he never commits the mistake of unduly simplifying the forces whose operations he seeks to examine. He is as well aware as Burke himself of the complexity of events and of their hidden connection, yet he contrives to see the connectedness of matters in an illuminating fashion. If we witness the revolution wrought by Gustavus Adolphus in war, we also witness all that he might have accomplished for Germany but for his premature death and the interference of Richelieu. If we witness the astounding genius of Marlborough, we also witness what he might have accomplished for France but for the Dutch deputies and the intrigues of Anne's court. The Battle of Blenheim might easily have been the prelude to the summoning of the States-General long before the eve of the French Revolution, and instead of the destroying revolution of 1789 we might have had the preserving revolution of 1709. The might-have-beens of history are at least as fascinating as the have-beens, and the author's historical *confessio fidei* receives confirmation after confirmation in the most unexpected manner ; for the contingent and the unforeseen play as large a part in his philosophy of history as the necessary and the seen. There is nothing in his first or second volume to bring him to give the scantiest adherence to Bury's doctrine that on the days when he is a determinist he looks on history in one way, and on the days when he is an indeterminist in

quite another. At all times and in all places Mr. Fisher stoutly adheres to the gospel of indeterminism.

The world of ideas is the real world where the author lives, though he is invariably anxious to trace the bearing of ideas on action. The last chapter of his fine book surveys the coming of the Industrial Revolution and the many-sided forms it assumed in different places. One paragraph amply indicates his angle of approach. "The forest-haunted music of Germany recalls to us an age when the material civilisation of northern and central Europe depended almost entirely upon its woodlands. For more than two thousand years men lived for the most part in wooden houses, sailed in wooden ships, warmed themselves at log fires, and drew from the forest the materials out of which were fashioned the common utensils of domestic use as well as the instruments of agriculture and industry. Long after the Italians had shown the way in stone, brick and marble, and the art of brickmaking so well known to ancient Rome had been rediscovered by the contemporaries of Caxton, the principal cities of northern Europe continued to be built largely of wood. It was a wooden London which went up in flames when Charles II was king, a wooden Moscow which burned itself to a cinder under the eyes of Napoleon. So persistent was the rural tradition that even the first steam engine was encased in a carriage of wood, as the first power-loom was worked by a bull."

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

* * * * *

DR. DOLLFUSS.

Mr. J. D. Gregory has written a full, dramatic, detailed and authoritative account of Dr. Dollfuss and his tragic circumstances.* Most readers will open the book to find out first what was exactly the truth about the murder committed on July 25th of last year. The author recounts the facts in his dramatic style, supports them with an abundance of documentary evidence and leaves no room for doubt in any honest mind that Germany's Nazi fanaticism was directly guilty of the murder. Few more appalling things have happened even in the appalling history of Herr Hitler's period of office in

* *Dollfuss and His Times*. Hutchinson. 18s. net.

Germany. The essence, even up to a point the detail, of what took place in July 1934 were already known. The thing was so wicked, so outrageously and grossly inhuman that it drew the eyes of the whole world to it in a fascinated horror. In such circumstances the truth could not but be adequately established. Nor was it done on an impulse. It was cold-bloodedly prepared, and even announced in advance from the Munich broadcasting station. But there is a melancholy satisfaction in having it all put indisputably on record, as Mr. Gregory so overwhelmingly records it. The only thing I looked for and failed to find in the account of Dr. Dollfuss's murder was some reference to the amazing broadcast emitted from the German stations on the evening of that event. I myself heard it, and have wondered how it came to be so completely hushed up. In that broadcast the announcement was made that Dollfuss had been murdered *as a traitor to Austria*.

The remaining interest of the book consists in its historical tracing of the Austrian background during the life of Dollfuss and its complete biography of Dollfuss himself. The historical matter is just enough to enable the reader to understand the political circumstances in which Dollfuss found a mission. The personal matter is commendably detailed, the author having taken immense trouble to find out about his hero's origins and youth from his parents and friends. The word hero is the right word. Mr. Gregory casts Dr. Dollfuss in an unreservedly heroic mould: brave, clever, religious, even mystic, a born leader of men, and a patriot. The patriotism jars a bit. "Dollfuss was Austria in every fibre of his being." Was that, if true, a virtue? His murderers were Germany in every fibre of their being: the more's the pity. Mr. Gregory himself clearly shares all the traditional conventional feelings about fighting heroically for King and Country: than which in human life there is probably no single feeling more disastrously unfortunate. In general the book is well written, especially in its description of Austrian home life and national customs and peculiarities. But it could better have been written in two hundred instead of four hundred pages. Despite, however, the author's longwindedness—due clearly to the deep sincerity of his emotions and to his enthusiastic adoration of Dr. Dollfuss's great qualities—the book, none the less, is a "winner." It will deservedly be widely read.

It gives us precisely the established facts we wanted about July 1934, and is an artistically complete account of one of the historic episodes in Europe's tragic story.

G. G.

* * * * *

LORD BROUGHAM.*

A lasting and equitable life of Lord Brougham by Mr. G. T. Garratt has appeared among the many recent publications of historical biography which the reading public incessantly demands and as recklessly absorbs. Apart from specialised studies, comparatively little attention has been given in recent years to an appreciation of Brougham's career. Mr. J. B. Atlay, in his *Victorian Chancellors*, concentrated upon his legal work, while the recent and most important work of Dr. Aspinall, *Lord Brougham and the Whig Party*, was mainly devoted to certain aspects of his political career. Mr. Garratt's debt to Dr. Aspinall is admittedly great, and the reader is referred to the latter's book for a bibliography. In addition, the author has enjoyed the use of new material released since 1927, including *The Huskisson Papers*, Mr. Gore's new selection from Creevey's letters and, in particular, the first volume of *The History of the Times*, "*The Thunderer*" in the *Making*. The outstanding characteristic of Brougham was his extraordinary versatility, and there is certainly room for a biography which, by covering the whole range of his activities, can present the essential nature of the man and the relation of his work to the history of the time. This, broadly, is the achievement of Mr. Garratt, although his book is comparatively short and might well have been extended to cover in more detail its comprehensive purpose.

So many of Brougham's early activities were related to the growing consciousness of the new middle class, that Mr. Garratt properly points out that "the universal nature of his interests was itself important. It forced the English to see that all these reforms were not just individual notions, but were bound up with each other, and with the general idea of progress." As a pioneer, his activities opened up the prospect and possibilities of reform. Brougham was not prompted by radical theory, but rather by the hardships of the moment.

* *Lord Brougham*. Macmillan. 15s. net.

Mr. Garratt accepts Bagehot's opinion that "he is not absorbed in a creed; he is pricked by facts." Yet as a doctrinaire he might promote the Poor Law Act of 1834 or vigorously oppose the Ten Hours Bill as conflicting with the cardinal tenets of *laissez-faire*. But within the limits which his economic theory permitted, Brougham was active in almost all the great reform movements which germinated in the early years of the nineteenth century and grew to fruition as the century proceeded.

An early disciple of Wilberforce and "The Saints," Brougham was associated in the slavery campaign and instrumental in effecting its abolition in 1834. In the following year he "forced the highly contentious Municipal Reform Bill through the Lords," thus laying the foundation of modern local government. He worked with particular energy and vision in the promotion of education and law reform, and made a beginning with schemes which, though curtailed at the time, were to receive eventual fulfilment. Brougham possessed a passionate belief in the efficacy of education to mitigate the hardships of the poor and "for over a quarter of a century he was continually driving successive Governments towards a system of State-aided popular education, cheap and universal." In 1816 he was appointed Chairman of the Select Committee on Education, and in 1820 brought in his famous Bill for the general provision of schools. In 1826 he became a founder of the famous "Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge" and was a leading promoter in the foundation of London University in 1827. To him, above all, was due the initiation of State intervention in 1833. In law reform Brougham as Lord Chancellor could make little headway, but he did crack the crust of an archaic legal system and start a century of progress. His great vision is exemplified in his Bill for the provision of local courts for the poor, to be established in 1846, and in his plan for the registration of land which to-day is a step nearer fulfilment.

Brougham's activities represented, as Mr. Garratt stresses continually, a sustained onslaught upon the rotten edifice of oligarchic rule. Between 1810-35 he incurred "more than any of his contemporaries, the hatred of the educated classes." His insatiable ambition and, as is said, his vanity in doing good, provided easy targets for disparagement and malicious invention. By electioneering and ceaseless propaganda, novel

to the age, Brougham drew support from the public. Although certainly not the first politician who learnt to "manage the Press," his relations with it, and in particular his collaboration with Barnes and *The Times* until their breach and feud over the Poor Law Bill, are of singular significance and might have received greater elaboration by Mr. Garratt. Nominally a Whig, Brougham was never really accepted by the Party leaders who were yet unable, through the weight of popular opinion, to cast him out. Even as Lord Chancellor he was not admitted to the inner circle of the Cabinet, and was excluded from the Committee of Four which drew up the Reform Bill. It was Brougham, says Mr. Garratt, who preserved the final Bill from the danger of a compromise between Wellington and Grey. The breach with Barnes after June 1834 enabled Melbourne in 1835 to find easy excuses for Brougham's exclusion from the Government; and it is a striking example of the malice against him that the famous sentence in *The Times*, upon the resignation of Melbourne in November 1834, "The Queen has done it," should be attributed to Brougham. "*The Thunderer*" in *the Making* quotes a letter from Croker which inculcates Ellice and asserts that "there need be little hesitation in accepting Croker's statement." Mr. Garratt, however, is only sure that Brougham was not the author.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Leonard Woolf's *Quack, Quack!** is a powerful and passionate appeal for the supremacy of reason against the crude emotionalism which has enslaved millions of our contemporaries, and is dragging back large parts of Europe to the political and intellectual barbarism from which we were steadily emerging. The core of the book is an analysis of the gospel, the methods and the influence of the ruthless Dictators who hold great and civilised countries in their grip. Quackery, as the author reminds us, is as old as human nature, and some of the most effective pages are quotations from Frazer's *Golden Bough*. The greatest achievement of man is the gradual substitution of ordered liberty for irresponsible power, violence, privilege and superstition. But the terrible shock of the war has opened the way to the teaching of witch-doctors who win support by glittering promises of material betterment and national regeneration. Mr. Woolf points out that many of the quacks are not conscious frauds, but are genuinely deluded by their

* Hogarth Press. 7s. 6d.

own quackery. The study of the dictators, which fills the first half of the volume, is followed by an attack on the intellectuals who, by design or otherwise, prepare the soil for autocracy and obscurantism, among them Spengler and Keyserling; and Bergson himself is denounced for his dangerous exaltation of intuition or direct perception. An appendix on anti-Semitism concludes an arresting book, which brings forcibly before us the deadly perils to which our common civilisation is exposed at the hands of violent men and their dupes.

God Among the Germans,* by Paul F. Douglass, is a valuable study of German Protestantism to-day in relation to the new faiths which challenge it. Beginning with a sketch of the race mysticism of the Nazis, he passes on to the teachings of Rosenberg, Hauer's German Faith Movement, Hossenfelder's German Christians, Baldur von Schirach's message to the young, and describes in detail the struggle for the organisation of a National Church on Nazi lines under the leadership of Bishop Müller. The whole book is most instructive, not merely for its facts but as an interpretation of the Nazi totalitarian philosophy. That both the traditional individualism of German Protestantism and the universalism of Christianity are rudely challenged by the substitution of a gospel of blood and soil is clear enough; and the author helps us to understand why the new paganism has found so much support. Himself conceiving religion in terms not of dogma but of life, he points out how far the estrangement of the new generation from traditional practices and beliefs had gone before the Nazi revolutionaries claimed to dictate the thoughts no less than the actions of the nation. Professor Douglass writes with restraint, and occasionally not without sympathy, of the experiments now in progress, refusing to say that the old was all good and that the new is wholly bad. Many of his readers, with the present intensified campaign against the Churches before their eyes, will occasionally wish for a more robust denunciation of the savage intolerance of the Nazi chiefs who are trampling on the rights of man and the claims of conscience in the name of national unity and national strength.

The authority of Sir Ernest D. Simon upon all questions of housing makes his new book, *The Rebuilding of Manchester*,† produced in co-operation with Mr. J. Inman, of more than local interest. Written primarily to promote in Manchester a vast scheme of reconstruction involving the outlay of a million pounds and the erection of 100,000 houses during the next half-century, the book deals in a practical way with problems which must affect every locality. The authors consider, for example, the respective merits of flats and cottages and conclude

* Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. 3 dollars.

† Longmans. 5s. net.

that the cost of the latter, including development and provision of services in a virgin area, is £80 less per house. They also discuss the replanning of slum belts by the erection of subsidised flats, necessitated by limits of space and density of population. They contend that private enterprise should be limited to building well-to-do houses and executing contracts for the Council which can afford adequate planning. Manchester has for long displayed a comparatively advanced policy and the account given of the progress of its satellite town is of particular value. Wythenshawe resembles in amenities and layout the garden town while remaining attached to the city. Dependence ensures the provision of cheap capital and a rapid development necessary to secure an economic return, the absence of which has retarded the growth of the independent unit. Although effective work only began at Wythenshawe in 1931, its population exceeds already that of Letchworth or Welwyn. This volume serves well to advertise the bold and far-sighted policy of Manchester towards the solution of the housing shortage and the problem of urban expansion.

*She Travelled Alone in Spain** is a lively account of things seen and heard in South Spain and later in Madrid. The author, Nina Murdoch, who hails from Australia, entered the country with her head full of old tales of romance. The real romance and also many incidents observed with modern eyes and amusingly told are interwoven all through the book in an engaging and readable jumble. Miss Murdoch entered the country at Gibraltar and went first to Ronda, a fascinating old place where all the medieval charm of Spain is seen in a wonderful setting of sharp cliffs rising from the plain round a river gorge, the houses built mostly at the top, as is so often the case in that country. The description of the Casa del Rey Moro, a 900-year-old palace, restored up to seventeenth-century style, is typical. Granada, and its gipsy quarter, the Albaicín, the Alhambra, of course, follow; then Málaga, a modern town with wonderful old buildings in it. The illustrations to this book, forty-three drawings by Victor MacClure and some photographs, are well chosen and delightful. In the chapters on Seville, as indeed all through, are street scenes, family interiors, observation of ways and manners, personal encounters of all kinds, culminating in a Whitsunday expedition with a pilgrimage, the Romería del Rocío, to the Virgen del Rocío who worked miracles. This *fiesta* lasted two or three days, the principal features being

the *caballeros* riding all day with the *señoritas* a-pillion behind them in the dresses of a bygone age, and at night the revival of old Andalusian dances and the singing of *flamenco*.

After Córdoba Miss Murdoch spends some time *en pension* in Madrid, and pays many visits to the Prado. Her descriptions of the pictures in

* Harrap. 8s. 6d.

the big Velasquez room and her personal reflections on them are readable and imaginative.

Perhaps one of the most amusing portions of the book is that discussing the Spanish household with whom she stayed, and especially Rosita, the little serving-maid, "the one Spanish woman with charm that I met in my four months' sojourn," who worked for the family from six in the morning until half-past eleven at night, cooked, cleaned, washed, sewed, and was quite content.

A debt of thanks is owed to Professor Frederick S. Boas for his edition of *The Diary of Thomas Crosfield*,* published for the Royal Society of Literature under the terms of the Dr. Richard's Trust. Crosfield was in residence at Queen's College, Oxford, from 1618 to circa 1640, subsequently becoming a Yorkshire parson, and his *Diary* ranges, with gaps, from 1626 to 1640 and from 1653 to 1654. While some extracts have been published already for specific purposes, it has been left to Professor Boas to edit the diary as a whole and to print "the entries that seem to me of permanent interest—about three-fourths of the *Diary* proper." While the *Diary* is an invaluable source for the history of Queen's College, it also throws light upon the life of the University during Laud's momentous chancellorship and the growing politico-religious ferment. Moreover, Crosfield "is distinguished from other academic diarists by the width of his outlook upon national and international affairs," and his notes and comments, though intermittent and scrappy, upon contemporary events will receive close attention. The interest and value of the *Diary* have been increased greatly by informative notes and an index.

Mr. H. W. Horwill's scholarly *Dictionary of Modern American Usage*† is designed, not like the *Dictionary of Modern English Usage* to maintain a correct standard of literary and oral expression, but rather as a collection of words which are assigned different meanings in England and the United States, and also of purely American terms which have been adopted in the English vocabulary. In each case the American interpretation has been exemplified by literary and journalistic quotations and contrasted with the English meaning. The work is fairly comprehensive. Mr. Horwill might have included the American use of the word "exposition" as meaning an exhibition of objects for inspection. The dictionary should lead to a fuller understanding of American literature and speech and assist in removing a frequent cause of embarrassment. The volume excludes slang expressions, while covering colloquialisms which are taking a permanent place in the language. The former, however, have been collected together by

* Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d. net.

† Oxford Clarendon Press. 7s. 6d. net.

Professor Maurice H. Weseen, of Nebraska University, in an adequate and valuable *Dictionary of American Slang*,* which contains, under classified heads, over 13,000 words and expressions.

The Heart of England† is an apt title for Mr. Ivor Brown's vivid and penetrating sketch of English life. In his account of maritime England with her great ports and coast resorts, of the country and rural life, of industry and the growing multitude of suburban dwellers, of the sport and leisure of the people and of the political temper of the nation, the author has described the peculiar flavour of contemporary England as very few others have done. He writes throughout as a realist on an optimistic note. Upon balance, he welcomes the development of English life with its "advantages of an upward levelling in social standards and of the health and happiness which universal locomotion can offer." The excellent collection of photographs reveals the disparities which have yet to be remedied. While fully appreciative of the heritage of English life, Mr. Ivor Brown has little use for that sentiment which hankers after the past as such. He is quick, for example, to dispel "the romantic rubbish" about the English inn and to recognise that "the picturesque façade of the traditional English cottage is usually the mask of a rural slum." In an age of decreasing labour, the author devotes much space to the recreation and leisure of the people. He has a timely word of support for the Mountains Access Bill to grant to the urban worker entrance to his countryside which progress has now enabled him to enjoy. Are these great empty spaces "to be legally endowed with so extreme a solitude that none but the owner and the tenant-shooters can enjoy their loneliness"? This lively, exhilarating and well-balanced estimate of contemporary life should be widely read.

The work of the United States politician is significantly considered by Professor J. T. Salter of Wisconsin University in *Boss Rule*.‡ His book is largely a series of interviews with local party "bosses" whose "basic task" is "to sell the party ticket to every potential voter," and who quite frankly describe their work and experiences. With the financial support of lucrative public sinecures, they can give assistance to the voter, which appears from this volume to take largely the form of improper pressure on the Courts, whose judges are popularly elected and party men, or of some favour by the local administration. The author would excuse somewhat this conduct as a form of social help in the absence of a public system of social service. The "boss" is not concerned with national policy. He "never thinks of dissipating his energy on public affairs." In the days of prosperity the game of

* Harrap. 8s. 6d. net.

† Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

‡ McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. Ltd. 12s. 6d. net.

politics had little influence upon policy, which was determined, as it still is, by movements of public opinion. But, Professor Salter declares, with the great depression and revulsion of feeling, the vote has become again an instrument of public opinion. With a growing recognition of social responsibility in government, the voter is looking for social action rather than personal favours. The author visualises a scope and standard of local government which in England is taken for granted. It is, indeed, to be hoped that the author is right in seeing the end of a system which has stained so much the reputation of public political life in the United States.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

An admirable introduction to classical antiquity has been written by Dr. T. R. Glover in his new work, *The Ancient World*.* The author carries his account to the age of Constantine the Great, although comparatively little space is devoted to the Roman Empire. The volume is not intended as a chronological textbook of events, but rather as an interpretation of the movements and outlook which progressively dominated the atmosphere of the ancient world. While successfully keeping "a firm hold upon the thread of the story," Dr. Glover has concentrated, therefore, upon causes rather than events, upon the work and character of the great teachers and thinkers of antiquity, upon art and literature and upon contemporary life; all of which are enriched by his erudite comments and reflections and blended by his attractive prose into an exceptional picture of classical culture. The book includes a series of plates and maps, together with the index and a useful table of dates.

The Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs has published a Memorandum upon *Abyssinia and Italy*† which contains a concise statement of the facts and circumstances surrounding the dispute, up to the suspension of the Conciliation Commission's meetings in July. After a brief summary of pre-war relations, including quotations of the relevant clauses of the Tripartite Agreement of 1906, the conditions attending Abyssinia's admission to the League in 1923 and the subsequent treaties and agreements ending in the Italian-French Agreement last January, are outlined. An account of the actual Walwal incident and the respective cases of the parties is followed by that of the subsequent diplomatic handling of the dispute. Two final

* Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d. net.

† Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, London, S.W.1. 2s. net. Now reissued and brought up to date.

chapters discuss internal conditions in Abyssinia and the interests therein of foreign Powers. In this admirable Memorandum the correlation and severe condensation of available material enables the reader to view the question as a whole. The necessarily impartial treatment in this publication is more eloquent than any advocacy.

Short sketches of Cardinal Wolsey, the Young Pretender and Cobden are among the recent additions to the *Great Lives* series which provides, in general, useful introductions to the larger biographies. In Mr. Ashley Sampson's depreciatory, but interesting, account of *Wolsey*,* the Cardinal is described as "shallow-minded and big-brained," the absence of whose career "would have left the history of England almost entirely unchanged." He goes on, however, with perhaps greater perception, to state that "but for him England would never have risen to be a first-rate Power in Europe." The volume on *Prince Charles Edward*,* by Miss Carola Oman, contains a very light sketch of the '45 Rebellion and a useful account of the Young Pretender's subsequent life. The author's style is especially suited to the more romantic side of the Prince's career. Mr. Ian Bowen has produced an important little book in his *Cobden*,* which is written with historical sense and displays both erudition and critical judgment. The volume includes an excellent summary of the anti-corn law movement and a valuable appreciation of the Cobdenite outlook. Much of the correspondence utilised by Mr. Bowen has been drawn from unpublished sources.

A readable book introducing the countryside to the townsman is *English Earth*,† by Marjorie Hessel Tiltman. Mrs. Tiltman has visited the typical centres of production and interviewed farmers and producers, getting their confidence, in some cases to the extent of noting down their business calculations. She describes with sympathy and charm the ancient farmer and his gradual adjustment to modern ways. She visits Kentish and Worcestershire fruit farms, hop fields, Lea Valley market gardens, the strawberry industry, glass-house cultivation, the canning industry—which she calls "The Tin Revolution"—the cider country, the egg and poultry business, the pigs at Brierley Hill, cattle, sheep in Northumberland, wheat growing, milk collection and distribution. "Change on the farm, the change of the farmer, the change, even, of what is farmed—changes so rapidly accomplished that . . . a hundred years seem to have passed in ten," are here presented and should give the motorist something to think about as he speeds on his way.

* Duckworth. 2s. 6d. net each.

† Harrap. 10s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

OCTOBER 1935.

PROSPECT AND RETROSPECT.

WAR between Italy and Abyssinia may or may not have begun before these pages are published. If war is prevented the outlook will have changed for the better. In that event Sir Samuel Hoare's careful and solid speech to the League Assembly will be counted to him and to us for righteousness, after our many sins of omission and commission. If not, the question of restraining aggression will arise, and none can yet say how it will be met. The existence of the League on the one hand and of the Fascist system on the other may be at stake, for the vital principles of the two are incompatible. It is largely because we have persistently failed to understand this and to act accordingly that we have helped to bring things to the present pass.

In the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for September, Professor Salvemini showed one aspect of this truth. He wrote:

A Mussolini, a Hitler, cannot do otherwise than make war, and dare not postpone their war too long. Long-established régimes can play a waiting game. Upstart militarist dictators cannot afford to wait. They must win glory in their own lifetime. The wonder is that he has waited thirteen years. Why has he waited all this time? Because up to 1935 he had not yet secured the necessary complicity among European Powers.

Since 1925, when Sir Austen Chamberlain lent British countenance and support to the Fascist leader who had barely recovered from the shaking he got after the Matteotti murder, Great Britain has been partly the dupe and partly a tacit accomplice of Fascist Italy. But, as Professor Salvemini points out, it was M. Laval, as Foreign Secretary in the Flandin Cabinet of last January, who removed the obstacle which French opposition had for ten years put in the way of Italian designs. In effect, he bartered away the peace of North-East Africa for the hope of security in Europe.

Nobody seems to know exactly what passed between him and Mussolini. In a contest of wits between a Romagnol faction-leader and an Auvergnat politician the betting is on

the Romagnol. Yet the Anglo-French Agreement at the end of January, the German repudiation of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty on March 16th, and the protests at Stresa and Geneva in April against that single-handed violation of treaty obligations might have enabled Great Britain to exert some restraining influence in Rome had British Ministers not put themselves out of court by concluding the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18th. To join in denouncing an international misdemeanour and then forthwith to compound it for an ostensible advantage was a proceeding surely unprecedented in the annals of modern British diplomacy.

No doubt British motives were excellent. They usually are. British imagination was at fault, as it often is. Things were not made better by Sir Samuel Hoare's statement to the House of Commons on July 12th that "on no account could we have made an agreement that was not manifestly *in our view* to the advantage of the other naval Powers." (The italics are mine.) Sir Samuel seems to have overlooked the trifling circumstance that none of the other naval Powers had authorised us to decide what was or was not to its advantage. He seems, indeed, to have caught the spirit of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement itself since it permits the Germans to build up to 100 per cent. of our submarine strength whenever "in their view" the situation requires it. This, if you please, as a prelude to a general limitation of naval armaments.

France showed lively, and Italy much less lively, displeasure at British conduct in condoning single-handed an equally single-handed violation of an international treaty. Apart from the naval issue, M. Laval (who had meanwhile become Prime Minister) felt that Great Britain had thrown away her power to restrain Italy from dangerous adventure by any appeal to Anglo-Franco-Italian solidarity, and that the onus of restraint, if any, would therefore fall chiefly upon France. He may have felt, too, that after his conversations with Mussolini in January he was the last man in the world to exercise such restraint without inviting a caustic rejoinder from the "Duce." Besides, provisional military arrangements under which France was able to transfer troops from her south-eastern to her north-eastern frontiers might be imperilled by overt French disapproval of Mussolini's projected conquest.

In fact the Anglo-German Naval Agreement put France in a very tight place. It was all the tighter because France could not take at their face value Mussolini's boastings of his power to fight Abyssinia with one hand while he fended off Germany from Austria with the other. His financial and economic position is far too groggy ; and France could not, even if she would, pay for his quest of glory. The proposed Danubian pact hung fire. So the Central European problem loomed up threateningly before French eyes ; and, beyond it, the problem of the Baltic States which felt that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement had handed them over to the tender mercies of a re-armed Germany with her renascent navy and ominous nursing of the quarrel over Memel. Poland was at best a doubtful ally ; and Germany had lost no time in sending her new submarines and up-to-date cruisers into Baltic waters where they have carried out naval exercises as far east as the Gulf of Finland. Not without reason Herr Alfred Rosenberg, the Baltic Nazi apostle of the new German religion of race and blood, rubbed his hands.

Unenviable though the plight of France had thus become, that of Great Britain was scarcely better. On many good grounds this country could not look complacently upon the forcible subjugation of Abyssinia by Italy, all the less after Mussolini had given to his enterprise the colour of a contest between white races and black. Much, perhaps too much, has been made of the "interests" which are supposed to lie behind the present British policy of upholding the League Covenant and of invoking it against Italy although Sir John Simon and his colleagues were manifestly unwilling to stand by it when Japan assailed China in Manchuria four years ago. British statesmen learn slowly, but in the past four years they may have learned something.

In 1931-32 our policy was incomprehensible on any far-sighted reading of national and imperial interests. It was panic-stricken and pawky. In the *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* for August 1932 I suggested that the one explanation of it was that "British statesmen shun the thought of collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace" ; and four months later I added that the value of the suggestions in the Lytton Report, and of any other steps which the League Council might recommend, would depend chiefly upon British firmness in standing by the League Covenant, the

Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. "If Great Britain wavers," I wrote, "or allows doubt of her impartiality to persist, the Far Eastern dispute will not be settled by peaceful means, the Disarmament Conference will not achieve any real measure of success, and international affairs will drift through a period of rivalry in armaments towards inevitable war."

Great Britain wavered. Then her Ministers took an egregious part in promoting the disintegration of Europe. Early in 1933 the consolidation of the Central European position was in sight. Poland was on good terms with Soviet Russia, and was likewise on the eve of signing a treaty of perpetual friendship with Czechoslovakia which would have meant, in effect, Polish adherence to the Little Entente. At that moment Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon rushed into a Fascist-Nazi trap. They flew to Rome where Mussolini gave them a draft Four-Power Pact of which, in Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's words to the House of Commons, "the big and almost only detail was treaty revision"—that is to say the obliteration of the Polish "Corridor" as a beginning. In view of this precious plan Marshal Pilsudski resolved to deal with Herr Hitler "on his own." He put to him the drastic questions which presently led to the German-Polish Agreement of 1934, stabilised the "Corridor" for ten years, secured Polish indifference towards Nazi seizure of Austria and bound Poland to make no understanding with Czechoslovakia.

In all these things there was not much of that "unwavering fidelity to the League" which, if our Ministers, including Sir Samuel Hoare, are to be believed, we have always shown. On the contrary there was a growing sense of international insecurity fostered by the sheer untrustworthiness of British policy. Germany was obviously re-arming—with the scarcely disguised approval of British journals which drew their inspiration from the late Foreign Secretary, though not, perhaps, from his experienced officials. The City of London continued to "back Germany" as heavily as it dared and far more heavily than was prudent, seeing that Germany was pouring out money like water for clandestine re-armament on land, on sea, and especially in the air. To these things we obstinately closed our eyes. Ministers did not want disturbing information. They preferred "dope." Timid

questionings in Parliament were met with emphatic assurances that we still possessed a considerable margin of superiority over Germany in the air. When at length Sir John Simon went to Berlin, Herr Hitler tore to shreds these self-satisfied imaginings; and on June 18th we were half-bullied and half-cajoled into making with Germany a Naval Agreement which, apart from its international indecency, beggars description as a piece of statecraft.

Emboldened by the scorn we thus poured upon the sanctity of treaty obligations, Mussolini made up his mind to go ahead against Abyssinia. Like Hitler, with whom he had provisionally quarrelled, he had spared neither money nor effort to strengthen himself on land, on sea and in the air. He fulfilled his boast that he would make of the Italians "not only a military but a militaristic" nation. We may have thought he was bluffing. It suited us to think so. Our own forces were in no condition to "call his bluff" with assured impunity, and the spectacle offered by the Jubilee Naval Review did nothing to persuade foreign observers that our navy was better than obsolescent. It is said that we had ample warning of Mussolini's projects, that Sir John Simon was given notice of them in an Italian memorandum as early as last January—and paid no heed. The truth is that the matter was not thought urgent, that Mussolini said nothing of it at the Stresa meeting in mid-April, and that the Italian memorandum was only dealt with in July—after the Anglo-German Naval Agreement had given Mussolini the knife by the handle.

All this is lamentable, and not surprising. Surprising were our wilful ignorance of German aerial and naval preparations and the reluctance of our statesmen and financiers to take full account of the financial positions in Germany and Italy. This reluctance is explicable only on the assumption that they looked, and look, upon Fascism and Nazism as tolerable and, on the whole, laudable political and economic systems for Italy and Germany at any rate, and think it no concern of ours how foreign peoples manage their affairs. Italy might pile one huge deficit upon another, impound the foreign credits of her nationals, reduce every Italian bank to effective insolvency under State control and pay her way by discounting her own I.O.U's, without moving our wiseacres to enquire what her ulterior purpose might be. Even a

megalomaniac dictator does not court dire financial catastrophe for nothing.

Similarly with Germany. The other day an authoritative Central European journal published the news of a tiff between General Goering, Prussian Prime Minister and Reich Air Minister, and General von Blomberg, the Reich War Minister, because the latter, supported by the President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, had insisted on making cuts to the tune of 450 million marks (£22,500,000 at par, or more than £36,000,000 sterling) in General Goering's air budget. I have not seen this statement denied. If these were the "cuts," what was the original total, and what is the total after deducting the cuts?

Not very long ago Dr. Schacht informed an acquaintance, who congratulated him upon his success in overcoming Germany's financial difficulties in 1934, that "1935 would be far more difficult" and that he could only keep things going by lucky expedients. There is almost an accent of sincerity in his recent cries of distress. He must be assumed to know the true position. Outsiders can only guess at it. Those who care to guess with a modicum of knowledge might do worse than study an obviously competent analysis which appeared in a German periodical, *Das Neue Tage-Buch*, published in Paris on September 6th. It shows that between Hitler's advent on January 30th, 1933, and the end of May last, the total of the German internal floating debt in the form of—mainly Government—promissory notes and bills of exchange rose from £425,000,000 (at par) to £1,340,000,000. (In sterling these totals are nearly double.) During the twenty-eight months of the Hitler régime up to the end of last May, the balanced revenue of the German exchequer came to roughly £850,000,000 (at par), supplementary estimates and admitted debts to some £212,000,000, and the secret expenditure and debts to £912,000,000. In this period more than £1,000,000,000 (at par) of the unbalanced expenditure was financed by short-term bills, i.e. the German floating debt increased by over £1,000,000,000. On August 31st this debt had risen to £1,470,000,000 (par). On that date the British short-term floating debt was nominally £900,000,000 and really not more than £650,000,000 sterling.

Germany seems thus to be heading for utter bankruptcy—or for some adventure that shall disguise, justify and, it may

be fondly hoped, pay for the Nazi gamble. How, as far as can be ascertained, does Italy stand? She has had a series of deficits, each admittedly formidable, since 1930. According to her official figures one-quarter of the national expenditure in the financial year 1933-34 was unbalanced by revenue, and the real deficit must have been far larger. The Fascist Government has financed its public works and agricultural schemes and paid its vast subsidies to shipping and other enterprises by issuing certificates for "deferred payments" in the form of "Labour bills" and otherwise, or undertakings to pay by annual instalments during periods extending to fifty years. These liabilities are not mentioned in the budget. But the Italian Finance Minister recently estimated that, between the advent of Fascism in 1922 and the current year, the "present capital value" of these deferred payments had gone up from 4,000 to 24,000 million lire, or roughly from a little over £40,000,000 to more than £242,000,000 at post-war par. These commitments are outside the recognised national debt, which rose by some £120,000,000 in the same period.

These (approximate) figures are already out of date. They take no account of the outlay upon preparations for war against Abyssinia which had cost more than £6,000,000 at post-war par, or some £10,000,000 in sterling, by the end of April. Since then it is safe to reckon that this figure has been quintupled and, according to some estimates, the total cannot now be far short of £100,000,000 sterling. No wonder that Italy has been driven to spend her gold reserve. In almost every sense of the word Fascism has for some time been bankrupt.

Any reflecting mind ought therefore to have understood that either Nazism in Germany and Fascism in Italy were heading for economic and financial collapse or that their leaders were planning some escape from disaster through foreign adventure or the threat of it. But instead of facing these prospects frankly, British Ministers and the greater part of the British Press spoke suavely and allowed pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi propaganda to poison the public mind through a hundred channels. They seem entirely to have lost sight of the wholesome effect that informed criticism and disapproval in this country may have upon foreign Governments. As a natural result, opinion in Italy, Germany and elsewhere drew false conclusions; and when, at last, the

dangerous quality of Fascist policy could no longer be hidden, and British feeling began to stir, its stirrings were straightway ascribed to the hypocrisy that is alleged to be a British characteristic, and to the desire to pursue our own material interests under cover of the League of Nations to whose Covenant we have not always been true. Something more than Sir Samuel Hoare's excellent speech to the League Assembly, with its denunciation of "Government propaganda" as "one of the most dangerous features of modern life," may be needed to dispel the scepticism which our past policy has fostered abroad.

We refuse to be irritated by the misrepresentations and insults that have been prominent in Mussolini's press. We may even smile at them. But we ought not to forget that the Italian masses are allowed to hear nothing else, that official wireless propaganda dins these and other outrageous follies into their ears and that the truth, as we see and believe it, has no chance whatever of being known to the nation which we would fain withhold from catastrophic courses. This is why the ambiguity, the reticences, the under-statements that have marked British utterances until very recently amount to a heavy and damaging indictment against ourselves.

What, then, of the future? I am writing before the issue at Geneva has been or can be decided. I hope that British leadership may have given new life to the League and have availed to rally all its peace-loving members, in effective unanimity, to earnest service of the ideal for which the League stands. If so, if Italy can be restrained at the twelfth hour and Mussolini be compelled to listen at home to the reflections of his own disenchanted folk upon the bellicose bombast with which he has deafened them and the world, even Germany may pause in her massive march towards war and discover that the ways of peace, though hard to the feet of would-be war-makers, are safer than those of aggression.

If not; if, for all our brave show at Geneva, we find that the collective adoption of measures against an aggressor is not "collective" enough, and we claim therefore to be excused from "doing our bit," we shall be faced with the urgent necessity of raising our armaments, no matter at what cost, to a level at which we can hope to fend for ourselves. In any event some renewal and some increase of our armaments will be inevitable. We must be strong, not weak,

for peace. Our very espousal of the collective security upon which we so long looked askance will bid us dispel, if only for our own sakes, the humiliating doubt whether, should the worst come to the worst, we dare stand firm and make our due contribution to the one system that offers itself as an alternative to international anarchy and destructive conflict. We have run and are running great risks, far greater than our Government or our Press has allowed the nation to understand. Risk for risk we should, I think, choose the risk which our people as a whole would be most ready to face, and choose it now rather than later.

I have sought carefully to weigh the arguments advanced in favour of keeping out of the Italo-Abyssinian imbroglio, of avoiding "sanctions" at any price because we are not strong enough to enforce them should they be resisted in arms, and of biding our time till we have renewed our navy, multiplied our aircraft and got ready to face whatever may befall. There has been and is more weight behind these arguments than many of our more militant pacifists perceive. Yet these arguments leave out of account the likelihood, not to say the certainty, that were we to withdraw our support from the League and its Covenant and to place our future trust solely in our own strength, other nations whom we have allowed to steal a long march upon us in the field of military preparation would not grow weary in ill-doing and would strain every nerve to forestall us in our effort to improve our position relatively to theirs. The risk might then be as grave as it is to-day, with the added and perhaps fatal drawback that a policy of rearmament for its own sake would not command that steady support of public feeling which might be indispensable to its fulfilment. To stand by in impotent disapproval while Fascist Italy seeks to subjugate Abyssinia and robs the League of its last vestige of authority would be to spread disillusionment wide and deep among the masses of our own people and to expose them, and perhaps the world, to a danger of incalculable dimensions.

Disguise it as we will, the truth is that large sections of the well-to-do classes of this country, and most of the wealthy, have looked with favour upon Italian Fascism and German Nazism because they ignorantly supposed them to be safeguards against the Communist peril. For this reason these short-sighted "conservatives" have closed their eyes to the

other peril inherent in the very nature of Fascism and Nazism and in the suppression of political and personal freedom—that such systems necessarily develop in a militarist sense and end by extending to international relations the principle of armed violence upon which their faction-rule is based at home. These “conservatives” also forget that, by condoning and even applauding political and racial persecution in faction-ridden countries, and chuckling at the use of violence in ostensible defence of the “sacred rights of property,” they were giving a certificate of legitimacy to the future use of violence against property if ever the revolutionary opponents of Fascism and Nazism should in their turn get the upper hand. Meanwhile, if they fail to uphold collective action against war, these “conservatives” would potently accredit what I hold to be the fallacious Marxist doctrine that war and the capitalist system are inseparable.

Should we come through the present crisis in our political and social thought without disaster, and be able calmly to look back upon the persistent muddle-headedness that has done duty for a firm grasp of essential principles during the past two decades, we shall review with shame the years in which we suffered ourselves blindly to be led by the blind. Doubtless, our political and social systems, like those of other countries that still cherish representative democratic institutions, sorely need reform. Without question, international relationships require to be built up anew on fairer and honester foundations. Certainly, Sir Samuel Hoare was right in pledging this country to consider means of giving other countries fuller equality of access to raw materials when once the war atmosphere has been dispelled. But when all is said and done there can be no escape from merited misfortune unless we cling to and defend the ideals of personal and public freedom and responsibility which our fathers upheld, and unless we cease to coquet with systems that condemn or spurn them.

With our Allies we won the Great War. Sometimes with them, sometimes against them, we have gone far to lose the peace. The testing time is now upon us. I trust we may come through it with tardy honour to ourselves and lasting profit to the world at large.

WICKHAM STEED.

September 16th, 1935.

THE AMERICAN HORIZON.

THE murder of Senator Huey P. Long on September 8th was the most sensational event of its kind in the annals of the United States. There are three points in connection with it that should be noted before one sets out to consider its immediate significance and the change it has made in the presidential campaign soon to begin. First, there is the astonishing swiftness of Huey Long's rise to national prominence. When he entered the Senate, his fame was that of a rowdy local boss. He had made a limited reputation as an eccentric Governor of Louisiana. As a new Senator he was not a success. When Mr. Roosevelt became President, Huey Long was a stranger to the larger American public. In less than two years he became universally known. Secondly, after leaving the governorship and when he held no elective office in the State, he made himself dictator of Louisiana. He was so completely master of his dominion that in the actualities of personal rule he had no equal in the world of to-day other than Mussolini himself. And thirdly, he was the first American public man occupying a conspicuous position to be the victim of political assassination. This last point calls for a few specific words of explanation.

“The principle of violence is un-American,” said Mr. Roosevelt, surprisingly, on the day of Huey Long's murder. Very few of the President's fellow-countrymen, we may assume, would put it like that; but the truth is that political assassination, as the world knows it, has had virtually no place in the United States. Three Presidents have been killed while in office, but in no case was the deed done for political reasons by a political opponent singly, or acting on behalf of a political body. The man who killed Lincoln was a war-maddened fanatic. Garfield's murderer was a disappointed office-seeker. The crazy anarchist who shot McKinley was certainly un-American. It is an extraordinary fact that the United States—with a population comprising all the unruly elements of Europe, and in its industrial and civic life embodying a variety and ferocity of violence unapproached by any other civilised country—has not generated a cult of political slaughter. Party leaders have lived in safety. No one expects the mayor of New York or Chicago or San Francisco to be shot. “Big Bill” Thompson, a stirrer

of hell-broth if ever there was one, could always move about in the city of Al Capone without misgiving. Such politicians as W. J. Bryan and Senator LaFollette of yesterday, or Senator Borah to-day, have provoked political passions of the fiercest and most enduring. But one may doubt whether anyone in America has ever seriously thought of them as being in peril of the assassin, while it is probable that the wildest adherent of the Ku-Klux-Klan would have been outraged by a suggestion that at some time or other the white-hooded crusaders might be led into the ways of regular political murder.

One cannot, I think, resist the deduction that this freedom from organised assassination in the public life of the nation may, in large part, be explained by the facts and tradition of American political democracy. A republican system, as the world knows, embodies no guarantee of public dignity, morality, or decency; but it would seem to be undeniable that there are positive merits in democratic politics and government. The citizen's vote is in some degree a safeguard. The United States has latterly presented and explained itself to the outside world as a land of widespread and multiform violence. And yet the assassination of Huey Long—as the work of a professional man, acting from deliberate political motives—stands by itself. This fact is extraordinary. It may well carry an important moral for the American people. Huey Long was a phenomenon of a new kind. He started and organised a new game of power in the United States. If he is to have imitators, it is probable enough, as Mr. Raymond Swing suggests, that some of them may in future be destined for a similar fate.

The career of Huey Long may be cited as yet another proof that present-day America is as full of romance, and of incalculable opportunity, as was the wildest West before the Civil War. A child of the Mississippi delta region, a product of the poor-white community in Louisiana, Huey Long began life at sixteen as a travelling salesman. He peddled various wares with missionary fervour, put himself through a law course and acquired a law degree, and discovered in himself a talent for advocacy which later earned the plaudits of the Supreme Court in Washington. He fought big-business interests in the courts, and declared that he never appeared for a large corporation, except against a more powerful one. He entered

the politics of his native State and in 1928 was elected Governor, on a programme of promises as reckless as those of Hitler. He appealed to a poverty-stricken electorate, knowing only too well that its institutions and politicians were rotten with corruption. Governor Long set out to spend. There was at least enough of genuineness in his championship of the under-dog to make him a forerunner of Roosevelt in public spending. He gave Louisiana a new road system, bridged the rivers and threw causeways across the marshes, built schools and expanded the State university, created a medical college which is a wonder for the Deep South, together with the beginnings of a public-health service. Louisiana was a derelict area; Governor Long, caring nothing about debts, started his State on the road of modern development, under boss rule.

He had at the same time built up a complete political machine, which held the whole public life of Louisiana in its grip. His power was such that he could hand the governorship to a tame lieutenant and himself go to Washington as Senator from Louisiana. The most surprising fact about the Huey Long dictatorship is that it was completed after he had ceased to hold any office in his State. In Washington he was Senator; in Louisiana he was simply boss, without official status. He owned the entire administration. He gave orders to the legislators; the judges were his creatures; he had his own criminal investigation bureau. The public patronage was wholly in his hands; all government servants of every kind and grade were his serfs. He levied tribute as he pleased, piled taxes on his opponents; spent public moneys for his own purposes and for the rewarding of his friends. He was extraordinarily ruthless and without scruple.

A regional dictator, however, is one thing in America, a popular national figure is something quite other. Huey Long could not have emerged from Louisiana on the strength of his local achievements, and his machine was of no account outside his own State. Nor was his membership of the Senate important in itself, notwithstanding that in the last year of his life he was a renowned grotesque, by far the greatest popular "draw" that the modern Chamber has known. Huey Long as national agitator, or crusader, was made by the continued depression and the reverses of the Rooseveltian New Deal. In the election of 1932 he was a valuable supporter

of Mr. Roosevelt. During the President's first year he was a New Dealer. But he became the most virulent and abusive of anti-Rooseveltians and, despite his own great fortune, the spectacular head of the "Share-our-Wealth" movement. Denounced as a Communist by the Right and a Fascist by the Left, Huey Long was content to call himself a capitalist, while he promised to provide, upon the old American individualist basis, a \$5,000 home for every American family, with a motor-car, and free college education for every young person demanding it. He was inspired by a consuming hatred of Mr. Roosevelt, was resolved to prevent his re-election, and during the last months of his life was engaged in breaking the solid Democratic South. Huey Long had a far larger supply of ability than even the powerful demagogue usually possesses; he had boundless conceit, the good-humour of the complete vulgarian, and inexhaustible energy. In the Senate he could speak easily for five hours, and if necessary for fifteen. He had devised a technique for the microphone which ensured him a full national audience whenever he was on the air. It is possible that he was not exaggerating when he claimed that the Share-our-Wealth clubs would soon reach a membership of ten million citizens. One would find it, I think, difficult to over-state the importance, and the danger, of Huey Long at the time of his death. Perhaps it would be no less difficult to over-estimate the extent of the change in the political field, and especially in the presidential outlook, which has been wrought by Dr. Weiss's revolver. Huey Long's energy was prodigious; he was the most resourceful demagogue in America, and was only 42. Given ten years in times like the present, such a man might destroy any system of government.

A noteworthy feature of the present Administration is the recurrent suddenness of change, in the general prospect and in Mr. Roosevelt's standing. The past half-year has furnished many illustrations. The Supreme Court judgment on the National Recovery Administration in the spring was a blow that seemed to imply ruin for the New Deal and a thorough discrediting of the President as legislative leader. But Mr. Roosevelt found his own way round and shifted the weight of his attack by means of a limited and temporary N.R.A. and, as his opponents assert, by entering upon a policy of

systematic hostility to Big Business. His tax programme, they contend, is altogether of this character, while his drive against the holding companies in the province of the public-utility corporations is, according to Wall Street opinion, the most flagrant assault upon the structure of great corporations—deemed by the Right to be at once necessary and beneficent in the modern age—that America has witnessed since the energetic "trust-busting" of the earlier Roosevelt thirty years ago.

Three things were confidently anticipated by the President's foes on the morrow of the Supreme Court judgment. The first was that, with the N.R.A. codes out of the way, there would be an immediate and unmistakable revival of trade; the second, that a nation-wide reduction in wages and labour costs would now be practicable, and the third, that a decisive check must come to the President's legislative activity, which check could not fail to be apparent in the disappearance, or great diminution, of Mr. Roosevelt's authority over Congress. The trade recovery is undoubtedly manifest. Many observers believe that it is strong though still disappointingly slow; but the interesting point here is that the available evidence does not appear to support the business-men's analysis and expectation. It was said that the abolition of the regulating codes must be followed by a big spurt in both production and purchasing. When, after the first excitement, it was seen that the pace of improvement continued to be slow, the argument was heard that the codes were not so important one way or the other as had been supposed, and anyhow they were already moribund when the Supreme Court struck. Then, as regards the second point, it was speedily realised that there could be no such general lowering of wages as had been demanded by many powerful interests before the dissolution of the N.R.A. The codes, after all, had been worked out under the direction or with the co-operation of the great employers; they were the means of registering certain standards which Big Business on the whole acknowledged to be wise and necessary; they stood in general for the American conception of the worker's purchasing power, and, actually, code wages and code prices were sustained over wide areas after the N.R.A. had become past history. As for the third point in the business opposition's forecast, touching the President's leadership of Congress and his power in

compelling legislation, it was contradicted so flatly by the record of the session that the public could hardly be surprised when, in early September, Mr. Roosevelt found a convenient correspondent through whom he made a statement on the situation before setting out upon his extensive autumn speaking tour.

The correspondent in question was Mr. Roy Howard, head of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain. He pointed out to the President that alarm had been caused by the new Tax Bill; there was dissatisfaction throughout the business world; sinister influences were at work, "seeking to delude the public into believing that the orderly modernisation of a system which we want to preserve is a revolution in disguise." Mr. Howard asked for reassurances, and Mr. Roosevelt gave them. As to the Tax Bill and other recent measures, he said it had seemed better to achieve the objectives "as expeditiously as possible in order that not only business men but the public generally might know the modifications in conditions and rules of economic enterprise" involved in the policy—a cumbrous sentence but quite intelligible. The basic programme, Mr. Roosevelt added, had now reached substantial completion; a breathing-spell was at hand—"very decidedly so." The President, that is to say, was wanting to convince the bankers and industrialists that, with Congress in recess for four months, they may dismiss from their minds all fears of further disturbance from Washington and devote their energies to co-operating with the Administration to further economic recovery and to find employment for the still terrifyingly large army of the unemployed.

The President's announcement as to a breathing-spell, and his natural anxiety to make peace with the business power, will not make any impression upon the opposition in the East and the near Middle West. The great interests are under no illusion as to the driving force behind the Roosevelt policy. They know that the vast spending programme must be pursued, that the expenditure on unemployment relief cannot be reduced, and therefore that the Tax Bill of this year must be followed by more drastic measures. They realise, further, that whatever the difficulties of the new Labour Relations Board, the Government must continue the fight for the establishment of collective bargaining, and

that, although the insurance provisions of the Social Security Act are not to take effect for several years, the Act stands for a method of constructive protection for the American worker to which Mr. Roosevelt has committed the United States. And, moreover, Big Business has been convinced by the President's tenacity in the matter of the holding companies that he will not modify his resolve to bring the public-service monopolies under public control. Mr. Roosevelt, accordingly, must relinquish the hope of conciliating the money power and base his appeal, as hitherto, upon the broader lines of his policy and upon the legislative record of his Government.

That record makes, in the present year, a surprising chapter in the history of Congress. When trying to estimate it we must remember that midway in the session the President had suffered a reverse so crushing that his opponents could not believe in the possibility of his recovery, while they assumed that, the magic of his power having been broken by the Supreme Court, he would be no more able than the average Chief Executive to get anything out of Congress in the Administration's third year. There was no substance in such assumptions and forecasts. The session which lasted until late August produced an amount of significant legislation which seems amazing when set beside the most fruitful of British parliamentary years, and the central fact concerning it is that the most important Bills came out substantially as the President wanted them. The banks and holding companies, Labour relations, and loans to the cotton farmers; the Guffey Bill, which seeks to bring order and collective responsibility into the anarchy of the bituminous coalfields, and the Social Security Bill with its tentative schemes of workers' insurance and pensions—these, in addition to the Tax Bill, inadequate as that is, make a completed programme of legislation which stamps 1935 as a remarkable Congressional year.

Mr. Roosevelt's most definite failure in the latter part of the session was the Senate's resolution on American Neutrality. The resolution itself was as nearly unavoidable as could be. American popular sentiment was overwhelmingly for it. The country to-day is more isolationist than in 1920, and the American people are more positive than ever in their determination to keep out of war in the Old World. After the

piled-up revelations of the Nye committee of inquiry into the international arms traffic it was certain that the Senate would declare its will, and the Abyssinia crisis became acute just as the Houses of Congress were grappling with the final congestion. The resolution puts an embargo, in case of an armed conflict between nations, upon all implements of war, without definition, and the President is deprived of all discretionary authority. This, of course, is vexatious to Mr. Roosevelt. He wishes, in the event of war, to have the power of safeguarding American neutrality in the way that may seem best to himself and the Department of State, and this power the Senate has withheld. Before next February, when the resolution expires, events in Europe or Africa may unhappily strengthen Mr. Roosevelt's position in respect of discretionary authority, and they may compel the Senate to face the complicated difficulties of definition and application.

The unprecedented circumstances of the year leave the President virtually no choice in the matter of self-defence and the exposition of his pre-campaign policy. It may still be true, as many political observers are saying, that his power in the country is virtually unimpaired, although no one imagines that, if there were an election this autumn, he could repeat the triumph of November 1934. But Mr. Roosevelt is aware that he cannot take his position for granted. Before the Supreme Court's condemnation of the N.R.A. there were signs in abundance that the Roosevelt of romantic legend was fast vanishing; there was danger even of a destructive popular reaction. No such danger threatens the President now, as he goes before the electorate in no fewer than twenty-eight States of the Union. Here is an effort of heroic proportions, all the more astonishing when we remember the special personal handicap carried by this remarkable leader. He starts his tour in the shadow of further Supreme Court pronouncements. The judgment on the constitutional validity of the A.A.A., the Agricultural Adjustment Administration upon which depends the vast structure of agrarian relief and economic stimulus, is impending, and the President is organising his programme of speeches in relation to many other major concerns in an atmosphere entirely conjectural. His own conviction almost certainly is that

the presidential contest of 1936 ought to turn upon great constitutional matters, and especially upon the central issue which Sir Willmott Lewis states thus:

What are to be the relations between finance and industry, integrated and interlocking, on the one hand, and the structure, procedure, and activities of the Federal Government on the other? The question reaches into the very vitals of the Constitution; it involves by implication the relation between capitalist and farmer, employer and worker: it is, in fact, in interrogative form, a compendium of all the issues which have been acute ever since the Civil War ended and the urban and industrial development of the United States began with such prodigious rapidity to overshadow the agricultural.

There it is: the structure and machinery of the Federal Union, held together by a formal instrument of government comprised by a company of very able men working in a world of principles and aims before the crash of the French Revolution. Or, as Mr. Roosevelt preferred to put it in a colloquial phrase that sounded apt enough on the morrow of the N.R.A. judgment, whether the United States can remain within the bounds of a constitution belonging to the horse-and-buggy age.

A great constitutional campaign, it is assumed, could not take shape in the United States without a long spell of preparation and popular debate, and in any case the conditions of 1936 may make it impossible. The Democratic Party, which the President must of course hold in line, can hardly be thrilled by the prospect of an adventure so incalculable. Mr. Roosevelt himself may be altogether against taking the risk. The amendment of the Constitution would be a terribly complex electoral issue for a nation struggling with economic depression. It would provide material for endless and affrighting perversion, against which the more responsible politicians would be helpless. It would be hailed by the Republicans as a godsend. They would count upon the Old Constitution to restore their majority, while belabouring Franklin Roosevelt as a would-be dictator, bent upon destroying the national structure of self-governing States and guarded federal authority for the consolidation of his own power. The Republicans, no doubt, would find themselves in possession of a damaging weapon, and they would be justified in looking for a great recovery in voting

strength. But their party managers could not overlook one most ironic circumstance: namely, that if the Republican opposition to Mr. Roosevelt were to be reorganised upon a basis of resistance to constitutional reform, the two parties would be completely changing over. The Democrats would stand for a dominant central Government; the Republicans for the rights of the States and a limited federal power. And then indeed, as heartbroken American elders would exclaim, mankind might agree in confessing that the Civil War was fought in vain.

Congress will reassemble in January, and we may reasonably anticipate that the preliminary manœuvres of the presidential campaign will begin early in the year. The renomination of Mr. Roosevelt—given, of course, his continuing health—cannot for a moment be in doubt. There is no other Democratic leader. One may be even more emphatic, and add that America to-day contains no other national statesman—or at any rate, that no other is at present discernible. Nothing in the realm of party politics is more extraordinary than the condition and outlook of the great Republican Party—without a coherent organisation, without a collective mind or evidence of emerging leadership. Mr. H. G. Wells has recently written that a manifest need of the United States is the remaking of the Republican Party with a liberal programme. Progressive Republicans like Mr. William Allen White of Kansas and his friends of the agrarian Middle West are decidedly of the same opinion. Senator Borah, obviously, could not entertain any other. And yet, on the side opposed to President Roosevelt the undeniable fact is that there is no outstanding candidate for the party leadership. The name, indeed, of Herbert Hoover is again being heard in the land.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

MEMORIES OF GLADSTONE.

IT was in my childhood's home in an Inverness-shire glen that I first knew and loved Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone. At Guisachan (meaning in Gaelic "the place of the fir"), in the heart of the Highlands, my parents had created their home. There they loved to entertain their friends of all political parties, and it was there that Mr. Gladstone, during his first premiership, came to visit us. My father was his faithful follower in the House of Commons for thirty years. Besides a common sympathy in party politics, there were other ties of a literary and artistic character that united the two men. They used to meet in the old bookshops and old china and silver shops, where they would discuss the rival merits of the art treasures that both loved to collect. One of the objects of Mr. Gladstone's pilgrimage to Guisachan was to see a famous collection of Wedgwood ware.

It was the custom of the house for my sister and me to act as guides to those visitors who wished to ride on ponies through the mountains on the many bridle paths made by my father; my mother took the other ladies out driving, and my father looked after the sportsmen. That custom gave me one of the great inspirations of my life, for Mr. Gladstone did not think it beneath his dignity to ride beside a little eleven-year-old girl, and to talk to her about nature and art and poetry and music as if she were a grown-up person, asking her opinion and drawing her out in a way that made her his for ever. He asked me about my lessons and what subject interested me most; he talked about the great value of history, and of studying the characters and lives of those who had dominated public opinion in different countries and in succeeding generations. And then he would ask about the habits of the birds in the district, and he was greatly interested in my telling him about a tame cock grouse which we children had given our grandfather to take to his home near Henley-on-Thames, but which had found its way back to Guisachan.

Schoolroom tea gave the children of the family another chance to see Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone in intimacy. Regular afternoon tea in the drawing-room was not yet a fully established custom in 1869; it was understood that guests who wished a comfortable tea with cake and jam must find their way to the schoolroom. There Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone would

make themselves thoroughly at home with us, and would tell us stories and also let us understand some of the interests and responsibilities that absorbed their lives. One evening, I remember, the conversation turned on the qualifications of certain candidates for two bishoprics that were then vacant. I was greatly impressed when Mr. Gladstone said: "You must pray for me, that I may be guided to make the right choice." Thus at Guisachan were laid the foundations of a friendship between Mr. Gladstone and myself that was made still closer by my marriage with the grandson of Lord Aberdeen, the Premier, for whom Mr. Gladstone had ever entertained a deep admiration and affection. He used to say of him that of all the statesmen he had known it was Lord Aberdeen who had inspired him with the most personal love. Yet he recalled that when he was summoned for his first interview, when he was offered his first Government office, he went in fear and trembling because of Lord Aberdeen's reputation for austerity.

My husband's earliest personal remembrance of Mr. Gladstone was when he was an undergraduate at Oxford, when he received a letter offering him a nomination for a clerkship in the Treasury just before the privilege of making these nominations was abolished. It was in remembrance of the affection he had had for Lord Aberdeen the Prime Minister that he made this offer, intending that it should lead to my husband becoming one of his private secretaries. He was then in his last year at Oxford, and, although the offer was very tempting, he came to the conclusion that he ought to stay at Oxford and take his degree. This decision pleased Mr. Gladstone very much.

It so happened that July 25th, the anniversary of Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone's wedding, was the day on which Lord Aberdeen and I became engaged to each other, and on the evening of that day we received our first wedding present—a picture of Mr. Gladstone, which always hung in Lord Aberdeen's room till the end of his life, and now is treasured by our grandson, Lord Pentland. That same day Lord Aberdeen was driving me down New Bond Street in an old-fashioned high phaeton when we passed Mr. Gladstone. We pulled up, and with a bound the great statesman was up on the hub of the wheel, congratulating us and speaking to us very much as if we were his own children. Through the long years that

followed we were privileged to see much of that beautiful family life, in which our great leader carried out so faithfully the precepts that he preached. We travelled with him from place to place through his triumphal Midlothian campaigns, when all Scotland was hanging on his lips; we saw him the acclaimed choice of the people of Great Britain; and we saw him in defeat, forsaken, giped at, cruelly disappointed in those whom he had relied on as his friends. But never did we see him lower his colours or forsake his faith. Only in the close intimacy of home life could you realise the full grandeur and simplicity of his character, and we had very unusual privileges of such close contact.

After the General Election of 1880, when Mr. Gladstone had once more assumed the heavy responsibilities of the Premiership, his close friend and trusted physician, Sir Andrew Clark, was very anxious that his patient should always spend Sunday out of town. But Mr. Gladstone stoutly rebelled. He was a vigorous opponent of the week-end custom; he declared that it separated parents from their children on a day when they should be together, and that people who came to London for the parliamentary season had a duty to the church and to the parish in which their town house was situated. Sir Andrew Clark did us the compliment of thinking that perhaps we could coax Mr. Gladstone into following his advice. We then happened to have the lease of Littleberries, an interesting old house near Hendon, within an easy drive of London. It had the tradition of being the home of Nell Gwynn, and in it were several fine old paintings and carvings and decorations, about the origin and authenticity of which there was some question. We begged Mr. Gladstone to come down to inspect them. He came for one Sunday, and came again. For a long succession of week-ends he came, and brought with him art critics and literary celebrities, to discuss the works of art, the principal of whom was Mr. George Scharf, Director of the National Portrait Gallery, whose water-colour drawings of Littleberries we still possess.

The practice of spending the week-end with us was established, and when we moved to a much more modest residence, Dollis Hill, Willesden, Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone spent many more quiet Sundays with us there. Sometimes they would come down on Friday night, after the House of Commons had risen; and then, however late the hour, the first thing was a

cup of tea to be made by Lord Aberdeen, whom Mr. Gladstone declared to be the best maker of tea he knew next to my mother. Tea never prevented Mr. Gladstone from sleeping, but he was very insistent that it should brew for only three minutes. Usually, however, they would not come until Saturday afternoon. Sometimes Mrs. Gladstone would drive down, and he would follow later, perhaps riding part of the way on a bus. Often he had a story to tell of how, much to his enjoyment, he had eluded the vigilance of the Government detective who was always told off to follow him as a matter of precaution. Once he had dropped into an old bookshop; some people recognised him, and a crowd assembled to see him come out; but he evaded both crowd and detective by slipping out by a back door. In strawberry time Mr. Gladstone, on arriving, would at once be off to the strawberry beds. He believed that he could only eat strawberries with immunity when he gathered them himself direct from the growing plant. During those week-end visits the talk would range over every conceivable subject. Because of his earnestness he could never touch a subject without imparting to it something of interest; his coming into the room seemed immediately to raise the whole level of conversation. And yet he was so natural and simple that we forgot that we were entertaining anyone of importance.

Mr. Gladstone was the soul of courtesy and consideration towards his hosts. On Sunday mornings when we came down to breakfast we would find him already down, probably with his Bible and Greek Testament. He always had special books for his Sunday reading, and he put official business altogether aside unless an emergency arose. He had a sense of intense responsibility as a public servant, and considered it to be his duty to the country to try to keep himself at his best, and to take only such relaxation as seemed necessary for that purpose. While he was in office he left the management of his private affairs to Mrs. Gladstone and his son. He was a regular attendant at church, and very pleasant are the remembrances of our drives through the country lanes to the picturesque church of Willesden. There he often read the Lessons, until the hope of hearing him drew such large crowds that he gave up the practice and took to attending a small and very old church at Neasden in a more sequestered part of the district. A brass tablet is now put up in the church at

Willesden recording the fact that Mr. Gladstone often read the Lessons there. We treasure as a precious remembrance of those days a whole shelf full of books that he read and discussed with us—books that he marked himself, and annotated by a system that Mr. John Morley explains in his biography. The inscription in, and a letter accompanying a copy of *Cranford*, always a great favourite with him, and from which he used to quote with great gusto and many chuckles, is in particular cherished by me, for in it he says: "It would have been a worthier return if I could have written *Cranford* for you instead of merely sending a copy." Some of the hymns which he translated from Latin or Italian were written at Dollis. On our return from church one morning, he asked Lord Aberdeen if we had a hymn-book at hand, and on this being given to him, he took it straight to his bedroom. The translation of "Hark, my soul, it is the Lord" into Italian was produced that afternoon, and this on a Sunday when he was in much anxiety regarding political matters in Egypt, when messengers from Downing Street were coming and going, and Lord Granville was also there to confer about a statement to be made next day in both Houses.

Another Sunday stands out in our remembrance, only a fortnight after the murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish in Dublin, and when Lady Frederick herself was with us, too. We can never forget the attitude of calm Christian resignation, and the absence of all bitterness and gloom in the demeanour of both Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone, and in that of the much-loved niece who was so at one with them, and who bore her terrible bereavement in such a noble spirit. She only wished to prevent Mr. Gladstone from reproaching himself for having sent Lord Frederick to his death, and prayed that it might be vouchsafed to her husband to accomplish even more for Ireland by his death than he might have done by his life. But despite this outward calm, the tragedy which struck like a knell through Great Britain, and Ireland, too, had deeply riven the hearts of those noble souls, to whom Lord Frederick had been so intensely dear; and we possess some verses written by Mr. Gladstone at Dollis, immediately after the event, which shows how he strove to comfort himself and his widowed niece.

In May 1883 our second son was born, and Mr. Gladstone to our great joy consented to be his godfather on condition

that two other active godfathers were found as coadjutors. We readily complied with this condition, and Dudley Gladstone had the distinction of the Prime Minister actually leaving a Cabinet meeting in order to be present at the christening and, moreover, bringing a beautiful edition of the Greek Testament as his present to his godson. During those years we had many parties of various descriptions at Dollis Hill—sometimes of a political character, sometimes purely social, sometimes a hay-making party for children, with May Day frolics, Jacks in the Green, and garlanded cows, syllabub, and Punch and Judy. Needless to say, these were great occasions for our own children, but it was not children only who entered into the zest of the occasion, and we love to recall the picture of Mr. Gladstone, Sir William Harcourt, Lord Granville and other grave statesmen as care-free as any schoolboys, gleefully watching Mr. Punch's outrageous proceedings.

In 1884 a long-cherished desire was fulfilled, when Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone agreed to include Haddo House in the programme of their autumn visit to Scotland, thus revisiting a house full of associations connected with his friend and chief of the early days of his political career. He used to describe the stately formalities which were part and parcel of daily life in the old days at Haddo, and the keen interest taken by Lord Aberdeen in all his improvements on the Haddo House estate and at his marine villa at Buchan Ness. Therefore, after an interval of nearly forty years, Mr. Gladstone returned to note with interest the changes which had taken place, the growth of the woods and plantations, and especially the cedarwood library and the chapel.

Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone's journey to us from Mar Lodge via Ballater and Aberdeen was a triumphal progress, as it was indeed wherever they went in Scotland. Arches, bouquets, pui dresses, and crowds of people congregated at every station priva village. Three hundred mounted tenants waited to regulate the illustrious visitors at the boundary of the property, remem-in and escorting them in great style for the remainder picture journey. Lord Aberdeen, having introduced the Lesson tenants, galloped on ahead on his favourite black that he-o be in time for the arrival at the door of the house, very o a vast crowd had assembled, together with a big house-the d on the balcony above. Then came addresses from

employees and tenants, and delightful responses from Mr. Gladstone, in spite of some huskiness of voice due to the many open-air speeches he had had to make already that day.

If Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone were the most delightful and considerate of guests, how can they be described as hosts? To know what Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone's home life meant it was necessary to see them at their own beloved Hawarden Castle. Never was there a wedded couple whose lives were so absolutely one. Mr. Gladstone told us that never had he kept any secret, political or other, from Mrs. Gladstone, and never had he found any secret leak out through her knowing it. Few people realised her remarkable ability and real knowledge of affairs. The rôle she assigned to herself was to appear as the devoted wife, the kindly philanthropist, experienced in all the arts of nursing and ready to help all works of charity, but little versed in public affairs, and therefore one before whom it was quite safe to talk of political secrets with her husband. Soon after our marriage Mrs. Gladstone said something to the following effect: "Now, my dear, your husband is going in for a political career, and there is no career that so separates man and wife unless they determine to share it. I will tell you my experience. When we returned from our wedding trip, my husband at once took up his political work again; and as soon as we settled in our new home I took my desk into his room, and said: 'Now I am going to write my letters and do my work here, except when you want to see anyone in private, when I shall go away.' Politicians coming in would look surprised, but they soon became accustomed to it. When health permitted it, I have always accompanied my husband to all his meetings and campaigns, and so our lives have never been divided." That blended life was indeed a beautiful harmony, but few realised the interdependence of the two, or how much Mr. Gladstone owed to his wife's constant, wise and loving ministry. As my thoughts turn to those days, I seem to see him once again going up the hill to the morning service at Hawarden, wearing over his shoulders a shepherd's plaid that I had spun for him; or later in the day Lord Aberdeen getting a lesson in tree-felling. Then my thoughts turn to some of those talks in his own library, so rightly called "the Temple of Peace."

I must now go back a little in my story, to refer to Lord Aberdeen's first adherence to the Liberal Party which brought

us into close and happy co-operation with Mr. Gladstone. He succeeded to his title very unexpectedly, and in a very tragic way, through the sudden death of both his elder brothers, one being swept off the boat going to Australia on which he was travelling incognito as a first mate, the other by an unfortunate rifle accident. He had not thought much of politics—he was only twenty-three—and his friends all seemed to take it as a matter of course that he would take his seat on the Conservative side, and so he did. His chief interest then lay in railway organisation, and he became Chairman of the Railway Accidents Commission, and was interested in measures dealing with social reform. But when a few years later the Afghan war broke out, and then the Zulu war, he found himself in disagreement with his party, being ever an ardent follower of peace, and he both voted and spoke against the Government.

A speech on the Afghan war brought warm letters of congratulation and encouragement from Lord Granville, Leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Lords, and from the famous and eloquent old Duke of Argyll, a friend of his grandfather's. When next year Lord Rosebery invited us to come to Dalmeny to stay with Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone during the first Midlothian campaign, he decided to make this the occasion of his formal adherence to the Liberal Party, and he was received most warmly and kindly by Mr. Gladstone. Early in the following year he took his seat on the Liberal Benches of the House of Lords on the very day when Lord Beaconsfield announced the dissolution which resulted in the Election of 1880 and the return of the Liberal Party to power, and Mr. Gladstone's second term as Prime Minister. Lord Aberdeen was wont to say that, in spite of all the disagreeable experiences which naturally accompany a change of party, he never for one moment regretted his decision, and for fifty-five years he proudly declared his firm and devoted belief in the efficacy of Liberal principles. He never wavered, nor would he ever associate himself with any particular section or camp that was formed from time to time in the Party; and when his great Chief announced his belief that the time had come that these Liberal principles must be applied to Ireland as a result of the mandate given in two General Elections by the Irish people, that Home Rule should be granted, he most heartily agreed.

To the general public Mr. Gladstone's announcement of his

Home Rule policy came as too sudden a surprise; but to us who had seen so much of him at Dollis there was no surprise, for we had watched how the trend of events in Ireland had convinced him that this was the one and only policy to adopt. This new crusade to which he devoted the closing years of his life with such self-sacrificing devotion brought us into still closer association with our wonderful leader during the years when he had to endure so much calumny and which led to the fatal split in the Liberal Party. It was a very proud moment when he communicated his decision to recommend Lord Aberdeen's appointment as Viceroy of Ireland when making this new departure. It came as a great surprise. Lord Aberdeen was at that time Chairman of an important Commission on the Loss of Life at Sea, and the Commission was at work when an urgent note from Mr. Gladstone arrived asking him to come and see him without delay. I must not dwell on the results of that interview, nor on our experience in Ireland, nor on our close intercourse with our beloved Chief during those few months on the result of which so much depended and which, alas, resulted in disaster.

We came over from Ireland for the second reading of the Home Rule Bill, and Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone spent the weekend before that debate at Dollis. My brother, Edward Marjoribanks, then Scottish Liberal Whip, came on the Sunday afternoon to tell how the result of the calculations made foreshadowed defeat, and when writing his name in the Visitors' Book, Mr. Gladstone said: "Shall I add 'going to the stake'?" We heard his wonderful speech in the House, and witnessed the scene when the result of the decision was declared, and when the noise of the jubilations of the majority was drowned by the shouts of the Irish Members rendering homage to him. And then we experienced that amazing demonstration of mingled grief and hope on the occasion of our leaving Ireland, which showed only too plainly "what might have been" had Mr. Gladstone's policy then been adopted. No one who saw that demonstration could ever forget it, and the words of the Lord Mayor T. D. Sullivan, just as we embarked, still ring in my ears. "I ask Your Excellency to offer to Her Majesty the Queen the assurance that, wonderful as the enthusiasm has been to-day, even this will be surpassed by the outburst of joy on the day when the Queen comes to open the Irish Parliament on College Green."

We were with Mr. Gladstone when the news came of the divorce case in which Parnell figured. It is difficult to convey the impression made by his intense grief at this announcement coming after the assurance that there would be no such case; but at the same time there was the noble course he had marked out for himself in his policy for Ireland. And always he would remind us that our work must be accompanied by prayer. I quote from one of his letters. "The Irish embroglio is not only the greatest of our time, but is exceeded so far as I know by none in history. Our own line has been clear. The doubt and uncertainty made for us by others have created an excellent time to pray. It is more prayer, and more prayer, that we want most of all."

In 1892 when Mr. Gladstone was once more returned to power, but with a precarious majority, his friends persuaded him that he must use all his resources, and that he must give up that personal work of rescue with which he had been identified all his life. He reluctantly agreed, but there were a few cases in which he was interested and which he decided to entrust to the care of friends. I was honoured by being given the charge of one of these, and it was indeed touching to experience how, in the midst of the urgent duties and anxieties of that Parliamentary session, he always had time to hear news of his protégés. I remember on one occasion, after an all-night session, he was up at our house between nine and ten in the morning to discuss some point which might be of advantage. And I have a ring which he gave me in remembrance of this effort we made together.

In 1893 Lord Aberdeen was appointed as Governor-General of Canada. The plan had been for us to go to Hawarden and to proceed thence to Liverpool, and Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone proposed having a special farewell service for us in the church. But meanwhile it had been considered better for them to come to Scotland, and so they, with their son Stephen, the Rector of Hawarden, were staying at Blackcraig, Perthshire, as the guests of Lord Armitstead. He kindly asked us to stay the night, so that the idea of spending our last night in Britain with the Gladstones and starting on our new quest with their benediction might be carried out. We thus had the opportunity of a last confidential talk, and Mr. Gladstone told us how he had talked over our going to Canada with the Queen, and how he had assured her of his

confidence in our success there. Morning prayers on the day of our departure were arranged so as to take the place of the special service contemplated at Hawarden, and I am glad my kodak was faithful in preserving for us a picture of our beloved old friends standing at the door of the castle as we left with their "God bless you and yours" on their lips. That photograph has always been near us wherever we have lived since. It records Lord Aberdeen's last sight of his beloved chief and friend.

I saw him twice again on the occasion of two visits home in 1894 and 1897, this last trip being largely undertaken with the object of seeing him once more. And it was in his own room—the Temple of Peace—that I had my last talk with him. The trouble had begun that was to bring such terrible physical suffering during his last days, and he was perhaps a little disposed to look on the dark side of things. But some of his words may well close my effort to pass on my sacred and inspiring memories of the wonderful friendship which was one of God's best gifts to us. "It may be the natural pessimism of old age," he said, "but when I look out on the future my heart fails me. The responsibilities and the strain on men holding public office have increased tenfold since my day. We used to receive news of foreign affairs and of political events in advance of the public, and we had at least time to think and to consult. Now the man in the street knows all that is going on in the world through telegrams and telephones and the public Press as soon as the statesmen in charge of the country's affairs. And I do not see increased power to discharge such heavy responsibilities but rather the reverse. Our task during the last century has been mainly that of clearing away obstacles in the path of reform. You of the present day and the future have to take up the heavier mission of construction, and I can see vast forces arraying themselves against you. Faith and faithfulness, love and prayer, are your only weapons. Pray and act, and above all do not be afraid."

ISHBEL ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

THE important and substantial improvement which has recently taken place in the relations between Great Britain and Russia is one of the most outstanding features of the changing position in Europe and in the world generally; and this improvement is remarkable for its comprehensive nature and the rapidity with which it has been achieved. As such a transformation in the relations between two great Powers cannot but give rise to scepticism in many quarters, there is need for some explanation why two nations, who have for generations suspected each other throughout the vast area stretching from the Baltic to the Yellow Sea, have now found that common interests predominate all along the line. The following is the text of the official *communiqué* issued in Moscow on March 31st this year as result of the conversations held between Mr. Anthony Eden on the one side and M. Stalin, M. Molotoff, and M. Litvinoff on the other:

The representatives of the two Governments were happy to note as the result of a full and frank exchange of views that there is at present no conflict of interest between the two Governments on any of the main issues of international policy, and that this fact provided a firm foundation for the development of fruitful collaboration between them in the cause of peace. They are confident that both countries, recognising that the integrity and prosperity of each is to the advantage of the other, will govern their mutual relations in that spirit of collaboration and loyalty to obligations assumed by them, which is inherent in their common membership of the League of Nations.

In view of what has passed, such a statement is perhaps astonishing, but it proves once more that common interests between two nations can lead to friendship in spite of the widest divergence in their respective systems of internal government. While the first indication of this possibility was provided by Italy in her good relations with Russia, the principle may be one with many surprises in store. It is therefore as well to appreciate the circumstances through which the present position has been reached, and to realise the significance of Anglo-Russian friendship in the Baltic, in South-Eastern Europe, in the Near and Middle East, in India and the Far East. But for this purpose we must first consider

the foreign policy of St. Petersburg as dictated by the Imperial House of Romanoff.

For a considerable time before the Great War the relations between Great Britain and Imperial Russia were characterised by a considerable amount of conflict and mutual suspicion in many areas of political activity, chiefly owing to the many points of contact between one empire with world-wide interests and another covering an immense territory stretching continuously from Western Europe to Eastern Asia. In this country Russia was regarded as a menace to the interests involved in the British Imperial system, which found full expression in the anti-Russian rather than pro-Japanese attitude of the general public during the Russo-Japanese War. This feeling was intensified by incidents such as that of the Dogger Bank, when the Russian Baltic Fleet under Admiral Rojdestvensky fired on a fleet of British steam trawlers from Hull, and thereby committed what was denounced by Lord Rosebery as an "unspeakable outrage." But the feeling, which burst into flame on this and other occasions, was the outcome of political rivalry of an extended nature. In the Baltic Russia constituted an ever-present threat to the British principle of a *mare apertum*, the Russian Empire then including Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with the ports of Helsingfors, Reval, Riga and Libau. With the German Navy in its early adolescence, and the Scandinavian nations in a state of more or less political inactivity, the power and influence of Russia was always a troublesome factor with which to deal, the more so as her Baltic policy was often influenced by events elsewhere. In South-Eastern Europe the rivalry of Russia and Austria-Hungary in their efforts to secure political hegemony in the Balkans was anxiously watched by British statesmen, who foresaw in the success of Russian policy a definite danger to the freedom of the Straits giving access to the Black Sea. That Russian policy aimed at the actual occupation of Constantinople there is no possible doubt, and there is visible proof of detailed Russian preparations for the conquest of the Turkish capital. While the Imperial Russian Embassy on the heights of Péra was so constructed as to be easily converted into a fortress, the ambassador's summer residence at Beuyuk Dere on the Bosphorus was well supplied with gun positions disguised as tennis courts. But Russian opposition to British interests

with regard to Turkey did not stop at the Golden Horn. It was extended to Egypt and up the Nile to the Sudan. In 1882 the Tsar openly expressed his indignation at the British bombardment of Alexandria, and later in 1897 Russia, in collusion with France, not only prevented the use of the surplus of the Caisse towards the expenses of the Dongola expedition, but actually complained of the Egyptian Government accepting the money from Great Britain without her consent. These, however, are merely two examples of a clash of interests in the region of Egypt and the Red Sea.

Although in the Middle East the chief area of conflicting policies between Great Britain and Russia had its centre in Persia owing to Russian determination to obtain an outlet in the Persian Gulf, there was a belt of territory stretching from Asiatic Turkey to India constituting a chain of buffer states, the maintenance of which was a time-honoured axiom of British policy. In Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and even in Tibet, Russian political activity was continuously under suspicion on our side, and often openly clashed with our vital interests. The influence of Orthodox Russia in the Holy Places and her interest in the Baghdad Railway are examples of Russian activity in the Ottoman Empire, apart altogether from the question of Constantinople and the Straits. In Persia Russian influence was very strong. A Persian Cossack Brigade, commanded by a Russian colonel and a carefully chosen group of Russian officers, was quartered in Teheran in one of the largest barracks in the world. Besides a powerful Russian Legation, there was a Russian bank with considerable financial influence. The tendency was for these three missions gradually to increase their hold, which was greatly facilitated by the fact that each was controlled by a different Ministry at St. Petersburg, which was skilfully used as a means of refuting any accusations of encroachment. British influence, chiefly confined to South-West Persia, was mainly regulated by the fluctuations of Russian influence in the North, and for some time a policy of advancing and retiring was carried out by the two great Powers. This led to a Self-denying Ordinance by which Great Britain agreed to exert no influence in the North, while Russia consented to assume a negative policy in the South. This, however, proved to be a failure, but came after a period during which St. Petersburg insisted that Persia should fall entirely under Russian influence

with a view to advancing by a trans-Persian railway to a fortified base on the Persian Gulf. That such a policy on the part of Russia was considered most dangerous to the safety of India can be seen from Lord Lansdowne's declaration of British policy in 1903. "First, we should protect and promote British trade in the Gulf. Secondly, we should not exclude the legitimate trade of others. Thirdly, we should regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal."

This Anglo-Russian friction, however, was not confined to Persia. It extended to Afghanistan, Tibet and China, where Russia was systematically trying to threaten the security of the British position in India and the Far East. While Russia at one time began to build strategic railways towards Afghanistan, she used her influence to persuade the Tibetans to look to Russia for protection on the understanding that Tibet would be used as a part of the world-wide scheme against Great Britain. Again, these are merely examples of an all-round conflict of interests between an aggressive Russia and a British determination to safeguard Imperial possessions and communications.

Although with the outbreak of the Great War the two Powers sank their differences and joined in a common cause, events have shown that the war years were only a lull in a relationship of suspicion and distrust. The Russian Revolution came, and with it all the indescribable horrors associated with such upheavals. British opinion was antagonised by what took place within the frontiers of the new Soviet Russia, by the political creed of her rulers, and by their policy of world revolution involving interference with the internal affairs of other countries. As time passed, incidents accentuated a feeling of complete estrangement between the British and Russian peoples. While the Russians were induced to suspect Great Britain of plotting for their downfall, the average Briton charged the Soviet régime with a policy of undermining the stability of the British Empire. For years after the Revolution the taps of Communist propaganda were turned on in Moscow, and the flow was continuous in this country itself, in the Near and Middle East, in India, and in most British possessions overseas. Trotsky's theory that the

success of the Communist system in Russia depended on the establishment of similar systems throughout the world was paramount. The result was that this stream of propaganda from Moscow constituted almost the only link between Russia and the outside world, the Russian people being practically oblivious to conditions in this country, and our own countrymen being highly suspicious of all that happened in Russia. It is not my purpose to touch in any way upon the systems of government favoured by either country, but only to show how after the Great War Anglo-Russian relations became more strained than ever before. The foreign policy of St. Petersburg had been replaced by a Moscow policy differing little in objectives but much in method, and still more in motive, while the amicable feelings of Petrograd were confined to the stress of war. Hence, the British Empire and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together forming nearly one-half of the entire world, have until recently been practically at loggerheads with one another.

Let us now consider how the recent transformation in Anglo-Russian relations has taken place. When people get into trouble they tend to become either friends or close acquaintances, partly for self-defence and partly through a psychological desire for comradeship in distress. It was, therefore, not surprising that a defeated Germany should stretch out her hands to a practically exiled Russia; and this is what actually happened at Rapallo when these two distressed Powers joined hands in, shall we say, a comparatively close acquaintanceship of mutual understanding. It is impossible in the space at my disposal to deal with the interests involved in this Rapallo policy beyond the fact that there was a common desire on the part of Germany and Russia to upset the post-war map of Europe and order of things generally. If Germany somewhat strengthened her position *vis-à-vis* her former enemies, Russia obtained a spearhead of influence in the main body of Europe and ranged herself on the side of destructive policy. In the Germany of Stresemann and Brüning this Russo-German agreement continued to travel over rather rough ground, and was kept alive by German-Polish antagonism over the question of the Polish Corridor. When, however, the star of Herr Hitler began to rise in the Teutonic heavens, the situation became more and more impossible until finally it developed into a positive antagonism

between Berlin and Moscow, chiefly based on Germany's professed policy of aggression in directions affecting the vital interests of Russia. Meanwhile, a similar policy actually being carried out by Japan was threatening Russia's vital interests in the Far East, which necessitated a complete re-orientation of policy in the West. Russia, therefore, had to abandon her previous courses of action, and to adopt a policy of safeguarding peace in Europe. For this purpose she had to establish friendly relations with those Powers which believe that in present circumstances peace can only be preserved on policies involving no radical changes. Threatened by German aggression in the West, Russia replaced her rival in the League of Nations and has adopted a most realistic peace policy. While Russia favours in principle treaty revision, she now realises that in present circumstances this is impossible without war, which cannot produce any better result. Moreover, peace is essential to Russia's formidable task in the internal development of her immense domains. She, therefore, maintains that a continuance of the *status quo* is the least unwise course to follow. This is in complete harmony with British policy, and brings Russia in concert with those who are working for peace by co-operation. Moreover, British opinion favours the Russian contention that the only sure guarantee against war is that of mutual assistance whereby an aggressor would be confronted with a hostile combination of overwhelming force. For this reason Russia strongly urged the conclusion of an Eastern Pact of mutual assistance between Germany, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the three Baltic States, with France as guarantor. In exchange for this Russia expressed her readiness to guarantee Locarno. Although the British Government favoured this proposal, the support of Germany and Poland was not forthcoming, with the result that Russia has concluded mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia, leaving the door open for the participation of others. In this respect our close friendship with France, obviously of vital importance although not recorded, brings our European relations with Russia closer together, irrespective of other considerations.

Whereas in Europe Russia has to safeguard herself from attack by an aggressively minded Germany determined to expand, in the Far East she needs security from a similar attitude on the part of Japan. Russia, therefore, creates

continuity between the European situation and that of the Far East, thereby producing a similarity of interests between Germany and Japan, the latter being in many respects the eastern counterpart of the former. Hence, Russian policy aims at keeping Germany and Japan in their places and to build up security of a thoroughly effective nature. For this reason the co-operation of Great Britain and Russia is a question of mutual interest, and is made possible by two main considerations. First, the Communist policy of Trotsky, which aimed at a widespread encouragement of world revolution, has been superseded by that of Stalin, which holds that Communism in Russia can thrive best as a self-supporting concern. This accounts for the fact that the taps of Communist propaganda have been turned off at Moscow, and that such propaganda as still continues emanates from local sources throughout the world. Secondly, there is practically no clash of interests between the two countries through the whole area from the Baltic to the Far East. The former Russian policy with regard to Constantinople and the Straits has been entirely abandoned, the attitude of Moscow in the question of Turkish fortifications being for the most part one of indifference. In the territory formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire Russia has practically no interests, her influence in the Holy Places having been absorbed by the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the value of railways in the Middle East having been much reduced by the development of aviation and motor transport. In Persia and in the Gulf there is no longer any conflict, as both nations wish to maintain the national independence and integrity of Persia, and the same applies to Afghanistan. Further, it is understood that Russia has no longer any designs on India on the grounds that she has no pressure of population, no need for external markets in India, and has no investments in the country. Russia also has abundance of raw materials. Indeed, the more Russia concentrates her attention on internal development the greater is the need for peace on her frontiers.

In the Far East Russian policy is again to maintain peace, to preserve the integrity of China and the principle of the open door, and to prevent Japan from becoming too powerful and aggressive. In all these areas the interests of Great Britain and Russia are at present almost identical, and there is no reason why they should not remain so, provided that the

principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs is strictly maintained.

Meanwhile, the maintenance of stability in the Far East is of the utmost importance to Great Britain, and a most important factor in this direction is the increasing power of Russia in her Amur and Maritime Provinces. Here a self-supporting defensive area has been set up independent of the long line of communications with Moscow, which has been made more efficient by the construction of a double line on the Trans-Siberian Railway and the building of a further strategical railway from Lake Baikal to a new port on the Sea of Okhotsk. At the same time, Vladivostok has been strongly fortified on the most up-to-date lines, while other defensive measures have been taken to supplement the strong naval, military and air forces stationed in and around the Maritime Province. The result of these Russian defensive measures has been to divert Japanese penetration to a more southerly direction where British interests are involved. Consequently the British Government is called upon to consider these forward moves of Japan in the light of Britain's own interests as well as that of the influence these moves may have in other parts of the world. In any case, a weak Russia is a danger to peace in the Far East, while a Russia strong enough to balance the power of Japan falls in with the peaceful aims of British policy.

Although a transformation of the highest importance has taken place in Anglo-Russian relations, mainly as a result of the aggressive policies of Germany and Japan, a considerable time must elapse before the existing barriers of prejudice and suspicion can be broken down. This, however, provides all the more reason for carefully considered and systematic plans for overcoming the difficulty. The task is not an easy one, and will call for the utmost patience and perseverance, but time, labour and resource devoted to this object will be more than repaid if a friendly understanding can be reached between the educated classes of Great Britain and Russia.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

THE RELIGION OF THE BLOOD.*

SINCE the days of Voltaire and Gibbon, it has been a frequent taunt with cynical laymen that in the religious wars of the past, Churchmen have generally been fighting for principles which they did not understand and for dogmas which they could not define. We were told that the early Greek Church literally fought for an iota, wrangling as to whether the Son of God was *homousios* or *homoiousios*, whether he was consubstantial with, or merely in the likeness of, His Father. We were told that Lutherans and Calvinists fought because they disagreed on their several interpretations of the Doctrine of Grace. We were told that Gallicans and Ultramontanes fought because, whilst both accepting the dogma of papal infallibility, they differed on the exact limits of that infallibility.

But to-day, not even the most cynical scoffer would presume to assert that in the religious war which is dividing the Churches in Germany the belligerents do not know what they are fighting for or what they are fighting against. They are not fighting about the interpretation of any particular dogma. Rather are they fighting for the defence and preservation of those essentials and fundamentals of historical Christianity about which all Christian Churches, whether Catholic or Calvinist or Lutheran, whether conservative or progressive, are unanimously agreed. They are fighting against a new gospel, which, whilst still pretending to call itself Christian, aims at wiping out all that institutional Christianity has ever stood for.

In fairness to the Nazi "Christian" German Church, it must be admitted that there is nothing ambiguous or vague or elusive about either its principles or its policy. For the new creed has been expounded in an imposing array of books and pamphlets whose numbers are only kept down by the fear of the censor and of the policeman. It has been elaborated in many commentaries and doctrinal treatises. It has had its forerunners and true prophets like Paul de Lagarde, its false prophets like Oswald Spengler. Last but not least, it has been expounded in three sacred and oracular books which may be described as the synoptic gospels of the Nazi religion, each one of which is ten times the size of the Christian Gospels.

* *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*. By Alfred Rosenberg.

Those three gospels are (1) *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, by Houston Stewart Chamberlain; (2) *Mein Kampf*, by Adolf Hitler; and (3) *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, by Alfred Rosenberg.*

It is passing strange that of those three synoptic gospels the third should have remained almost unknown in this country. For, without at least a summary knowledge of its contents, even the educated and well-informed British reader will fail to understand the vital issues involved in the present German *Kulturkampf*. The title of the *Myth of the Twentieth Century* has obviously been suggested by the *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* of Chamberlain. The author, Alfred Rosenberg, is a striking personality, as remarkable in his own sphere as Hitler, and much more cultured and even more of an enthusiast. Still in the prime of life, he holds one of the key positions under the Nazi régime, as Director of the Foreign Press and as Editor in Chief of that formidable chain of official papers constituted by the *Voelkischer Beobachter*. And because of those key positions, there is behind everything he writes the power and prestige of an omnipotent government and a docile audience of millions of readers. Quite apart, however, from his official position, he is an original journalist and a controversialist of the first rank. But he is much more than that. He combines the parts of St. Matthew, St. Paul and St. Thomas Aquinas. He is both a missionary, an apostle and a father of the Church. It may be worth recalling that immediately after Hitler's accession to power he was sent to England in order to win over British public opinion. He received, however, so uncomfortably warm a welcome from the London crowds that this first mission was also his last. Since then he has abandoned his work in *partibus infidelium* and has preferred to concentrate on the much more important home mission field.

Rosenberg is the writer of many books, most of which are denunciations of the Bolsheviks and the Jews. Here we are only concerned with his masterpiece—*The Myth of the Twentieth Century*. In moulding the opinions of the new Germany, it is only second in importance to the *magnum opus* of Hitler.

* It may not be irrelevant to point out the paradox that not one of those three symbolic gospels of the new German religion is written by a German. The first is written by an Anglo-Scotsman, the second by an Austrian, and the third by a Balt, who, until the war, was a Russian subject.

But it is as different from *Mein Kampf* as the Gospel of St. Matthew is different from the Gospel of St. John. It is neither an autobiography nor a narrative. It claims to be impersonal and "objective." It is mainly doctrinal and therefore more systematic and also more extreme in its views. Its 700 compact pages are divided into two parts. One half is controversial and aggressively polemical and makes most entertaining reading. The other half is a *Summa de omni re scibili et de quibusdam aliis*. It is an exposition of the metaphysics and ideology of the Nazi creed, and for that reason it is likely to be even more unintelligible to an educated English reader than the typical German metaphysical treatises. The difficulties of its esoteric language have not prevented Rosenberg's *Summa* from being eagerly devoured by hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic disciples. A cryptic phraseology, which would repel an Englishman, seems to provide an additional attraction for the metaphysical Teuton.

Rosenberg has been dubbed by his opponents "The German Anti-Christ." In the Introduction of the *Myth* he bitterly resents and repudiates such an appellation. But if the word is taken in its literal sense, it does not seem to be unfair. For he is indeed a bitter enemy of "institutional" Christianity. It is true that he professes to admire in some vague and distant way the personality of Christ. But he proceeds to add that it has been made unrecognisable "by Jewish fanatics like Matthew, by materialistic Rabbis like Paul, by African Jurists like Tertullian, by mongrel half-breeds like Augustine." The ordinary reader may well ask himself what remains of the historical Christ if, at the very outset of our investigation, we eliminate the Gospel of St. Matthew, the Christology of St. Paul and of St. Augustine. Rosenberg himself does not attempt to explain his own conception of the personality of Christ. What seems to remain is a Nazi Christ, born in Galilee, of Amorite Nordic parents, a stern, aggressive revolutionist who did not come into this world to bring peace, but a sword.

Not only is Rosenberg repelled by the personality of the traditional Christ, he is even more emphatically than Nietzsche the passionate opponent of all Christian Churches. Even as the pure figure of the ideal Christ has been disfigured by the Popes and the Jesuits, the initial heroic rebellion of Luther and Calvin has been frustrated by the

Lutheran and Calvinistic Churches, which merely exchanged the servitude of Jerusalem for the servitude of Rome and which, until this day, constitute a denial of and a challenge to the Nordic ideal. Throughout the *Myth*, Rosenberg opposes the religion of Wotan and Siegfried to the religion of Rome and Wittenberg and Geneva. He opposes the Nordic Swastika, the symbol of the "Sun God," to the dreary symbol of the Christian Cross. He opposes the living religion of Race and Blood to the unreal and demoralising and denationalising religion of the Universal Spirit and human brotherhood. He opposes the religion of the Superman to the religion of the weakling and of the "Underman." He opposes the elemental German virtues of honour and freedom to the debilitating Christian virtues of pity and charity, which every honest German feels to be a sinister and constant menace to the soul of Nordic Europe. To Rosenberg the creed of all the historical Churches, without exception, has been consistently a principle of decay and a creed of slaves.

Like Nietzsche, Rosenberg gives us a transvaluation of all our moral and spiritual values. But he goes much farther. Being not only a moralist but a political and religious reformer, he also presents us with a transvaluation of all the historical values which hitherto have been universally accepted by mankind. Philosophical historians have always assumed that civilisation originated from the Asian plateaux and that it spread from south to north and from east to west. According to Rosenberg such an assumption is hopelessly wrong. He believes that the march of civilisation has invariably proceeded from one centre and from one direction—from north to south. For 4,000 years and still farther back it is the Nordic-Germanic races which have been the sole master builders of human values and ideals. Wherever, in ancient or in modern history, we observe a blossoming of culture, it is the Germanic race which has sown the seed. On the contrary, wherever there has been decay, it has been because the Nordic racial elements have been eliminated or tainted by the corruption of inferior races like the Africans and the Alpines, the Jews and the Negroes.

Rosenberg adduces as an incontrovertible scientific fact that in prehistoric times successive waves of German migration, starting from the Scandinavian North, colonised and civilised India, Persia, Greece and Galilee. Again in the early

centuries of the Christian era, successive waves of Nordic tribes rejuvenated every part of the Roman Empire, and until this day the descendants of the 200,000 Gothic families settled by the heretic Gothic king, Theodoric the Great, constitute the best blood of the Italian people. Again, in the tenth and eleventh centuries, successive invasions of a comparatively small number of Norse Vikings conquered Scotland, France, England, Russia, Sicily and Syria. Thus it is the German racial element which always and everywhere has evolved order out of chaos, light out of darkness. It is the Germans who created the gods of India, Persia, ancient Greece, and the modern European nations, who founded their states, who inspired their poets, who made their laws.

Philosophical historians further assume that modern history has been a steady, if slow and erratic advance, that it has progressed by successive stages, from the advent of Christianity to the radiance of the "Renaissance" and from the Renaissance to the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Here again we are assured by Herr Rosenberg that our assumptions are hopelessly wrong. What we are pleased to call progress has really been a wandering away from the Nordic truth. We have been witnessing what Oswald Spengler, who was once the prophet of Nazism, has described as the "Decline of the West." The Golden Age lies far behind us. He wants us to travel backwards 2,000 or 4,000 years. The introduction of Christianity has been the beginning of European decay. The defeat of the Arian heretical Goths by Clovis and his conversion by his "hysterical wife," the conversion and defeat of the Saxon hero Widukind by Charlemagne after thirty-three campaigns, were disasters not only for "Germanity" (*Deutschtum*), but also for humanity. Charlemagne was not an authentic German: he was a mongrel with a round skull and a thick short neck. Alas! this wandering away from the Germanic truth has steadily continued for the last 400 years. All that has happened in modern history, all that our so-called "progressives" are boasting of, the establishment of parliamentary government, the rise of "Democracy," the triumph of humanitarianism, the poisonous influence of the international and cosmopolitan spirit, the spread of liberalism, pacifism and feminism, are so many alarming symptoms of an almost universal European retrogression and disintegration.

THE RELIGION OF THE BLOOD.

In the first edition of the *Myth*, which was published end of 1930, two years before the triumph of Hitler, Rosenberg disclaims any intention of founding a new German religion, protesting at the same time that he is not speaking in the name of his Party and that it cannot be held responsible for his views. Within six months after Hitler's accession to power, his disclaimers were forgotten and the conditions which he considered impossible and which he depicted as a reality: a Nazi Church came into existence under the protection of the Government. It came into being in the exact form which Rosenberg conceived. And the structure was built up on the foundations which he laid out and in exact conformity with the plans which he expounded in his *magnum opus*. For, in the Nazi philosophy, a religion must be strictly National. A "Universal" Church is an unreal monstrosity. There can be no living religion which is not inspired by the national spirit and by a specific racial idea. "Nations are the thoughts of God." Of no nation is this more emphatically true than of the German. More than any other people, the Germans have been sent to fulfil a sacred mission, and the only conceivable purpose of a German National Church is to mobilise and unite all citizens in the service of that divine mission. The old separation between the temporal and the spiritual powers is heresy and a crime against the German nation.

In order, therefore, that the new German religion should discharge its vital national function, Rosenberg demands uncompromising elimination of the Old Testament, repudiation of the abortive attempt to transform and assimilate the Germans spiritually into Jews, the elimination of the dogmatic foundations of historic Christianity, whether Catholic, Lutheran or Calvinistic. He demands the rejection of the spurious moral values of the Sermon on the Mount, the elimination of the dogma of original sin and the doctrine of grace. He demands the suppression of the old and, instead of the dreary and degrading dogmas and sacramental symbols of the present Churches, he demands that the New German Church shall substitute the Nordic myths and sagas and fairy-tales which alone since the beginning of time have expressed German aspirations and ideals and represented German moral values. Henceforth, instead of deriving their spiritual sustenance from the Gospel of St. Paul,

and the Epistles of St. Paul, the German people shall draw it from the Icelandic Sagas, the Eddas, the Nibelungen, from *Faust*, from the *Deutsche Schriften* of Lagarde, from the works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, from the *Foundations* of Chamberlain. These, henceforth, instead of the Jewish Bible, shall be the sacred books of the new dispensation. Odin, Siegfried, Widukind, Theodoric, Wagner, Frederick the Great, Bismarck, Hitler shall be the heroes worshipped by the new Germany.

While the Nordic Superman preserved his racial values and racial purity, retained his racial virtues, his love of freedom, his aggressive heroism, tested and hardened in daily fighting, he was able to impose his will upon the whole world. A tragic destiny ordained, however, that the noble Germanic blood should be tainted by the invading tide of Mediterranean, Alpine and Oriental and especially of Jewish blood. It ordained that the virtues of the German race, their exalted sense of honour and militant courage, should be undermined by the demoralising influence of Christian charity and humanitarian pity, and that the German Superman should be submerged by non-German mongrels and weaklings. Unless, and until the new Germany of Hitler succeeds in eliminating from its body politic that deadly Oriental poison, first by ruthless anti-Jewish legislation, second by drastic eugenic measures, third by a radical religious spiritual revolution, there can be no salvation for the Fatherland, which must inevitably succumb to a world of enemies whose overwhelming numbers will compensate for their inferior moral values. This is what is at stake in the present *Kulturkampf*, an issue of life and death. To restore the old Nordic values, to purify and rejuvenate the German people with the assistance and authority of the Nazi State, to liberate them from the corrupting influences of Jerusalem, Rome and Wittenberg, to enthrone the mystical religion of the blood and the heroic religion of honour and valour, this and nothing less shall be the glorious task of the new German Church.

CHARLES SAROLEA.

THE UKRAINIAN NATION.

A LITTLE while ago the very word "Ukraine" was almost unknown; to-day even those who take no special interest in international affairs are asking: What is the Ukraine? or, Where is the Ukraine? It is remarkable that it should be necessary to put such questions about a nation once prominent among nations, and still in existence, though no longer independent. But the fact that they are being asked is an indication that the conspiracy of concealment, of which the Ukraine has been a victim, is coming to an end, and that at last her cause is to be heard.

For two and a half centuries the Ukrainian nation, which has an authentic history of more than a thousand years, has been missing from the community of free nations. Prior to the War, under the designation "Ukraina" it appeared on the map as an independent nation for the last time in the seventeenth century. Finally, it was subjugated by the Great Russians or Muscovites, and incorporated in their dominions. Thenceforth they obliterated the very word "Ukraina," malevolently replacing it by the name "Little Russia." Their tactic was to deny and to hide the very existence of the nationality which they thus stifled. In 1863 the following assertion was made in an order issued by the Minister of the Interior: "There never has existed, there does not exist, and there never can exist a Little Russian nationality." This aphorism has been glibly reiterated by Great Russians down to the present time. In the nineteenth century, when but little heed was paid to nationality questions, it passed unchallenged. But in the present epoch, when nationality is an outstanding issue, we are less inclined than were our forefathers to accept history falsified by oppressors to justify their oppression. Russian history, it must be remembered, was written under rigorous censorship; for that reason much of it is unscientific or crudely fictional.

No one can deny that it was in the territory now designated Ukraina that the State of Rus was founded with Kiev as its capital, and that in the eleventh century its cultural and economic attainments were outstanding. The Ukrainians are justly proud of this embryo of their nation. But Great Russians seek to rob them of it, and to appropriate it as the

starting point of Russia "one and indivisible." History speaks otherwise; it says that in the twelfth century the ancestors of the Great Russians migrated from Kiev into the forests and swamps of the north and east where, freely inter-marrying with savage Finnish-Mongol tribes, they lost whatever civilisation they had brought with them, became a quite new people, and created for themselves the orientalised State of Muscovy. Great Russian authorities wilfully disregard all relevant history before the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when Ukraina was absorbed by Russia. They overlook the fact that before then an independent Ukraina existed at various times, and that in the intervals it was dominated by Poland for a much longer period than it has since been conquered by Russia, a circumstance which accounts for its Western inclinations and traditions. Historical paths so markedly divergent as those of Muscovy and Ukraina were bound to result in markedly different characteristics, denoting separate nationalities.

It is not difficult to perceive that the mode of life of the Russians (we may dispense here with the prefix "Great") is still strongly coloured by their forest and swamp origin. They are a raw people who neither respect themselves nor others. To this day, in fact, they remain primitive "mass" men, Eurasians to whom the civilisations of Europe and Asia alike are unfamiliar. The Ukrainians, on the contrary, conquered their environment and elected for the West. In them is manifested all the traits of an old culture, one that a European, who comes in contact with it, at once identifies as his own. An experienced and gentlemanly people, dignified, restrained, and trustworthy, they cherish freedom, esteem independence, and live neatly and artistically. Indeed, they are incomparably more artistic than the Russians; but owing to censorship they have been deprived of opportunity of making this fact known to the world. The genius for music is in the Ukrainian people; like the Italians they are gifted with beautiful voices. Their literature too is of a high order. Unfortunately they were not allowed to print their own language in Tsarist times, but their literature is enshrined in exquisite lyrics and ballads, which have been imprinted on the memories of the common people, and circulated for centuries by word of mouth. It is this literature above all which proclaims Ukrainian nationhood; for it is a literature

that could only have sprung from Ukrainian soil and have been inspired by Ukrainian heroism.

While prohibiting the printing of Ukrainian, Russia also forbade the use of Ukrainian for sermons, lectures and instructional purposes. At the same time she denied the very existence of a Ukrainian language just as she denied the very existence of Ukrainian nationality. Ukrainian was officially declared to be a dialect of Russian. Yet the difference between Ukrainian and Russian is not less than between Polish and Russian or English and German. Even were it otherwise, and the two people spoke a common tongue, nothing would be changed; for language in itself is not a determinate of nationality.

Differing in origin, language and history, clashing in temperament, character and custom, Ukraina and Russia were bound to set up conflicting political systems. From the moment when Muscovy (or Russia) came into being she knew no other régime than one of gloomy, ferocious despotism. During more than three centuries her notion of government has remained primitive and Asiatic; thus there has been no break with the rule of forest and swamp. The Muscovite people have never learned to trust each other. Always they have felt that their lives would not be bearable, or even safe, unless one and all they were restrained by rude strength.

But Ukrainians have shaped their destiny on other lines. The freedom of the Steppe, with its far horizons, has entered their blood, and the ancient civilisations which flourished on the Ukrainian soil have endowed them with wisdom and maturity. Hence it is not surprising that whenever they have manifested a form of government of their own it has been democratic in tendency. This inclination to democracy, it should be emphasised, has been persistent throughout their history. To repel raids from surrounding lands, to carry out reprisals, and to wage ceaseless struggle for independence, it was necessary to gather together armed men (cossacks), and set up a military régime; but this régime was never otherwise than democratic in character, for its affairs were always directed by an elected council, and a president (or Hetman) was chosen yearly. Liberality of government led to liberality of culture. In 1632 an Academy, or what we now call a University, was established in Kiev by Peter Mohila, a scholar who enjoyed a European reputation in those days,

and not the tragedy lay in the triumph of a backward civilisation and the consequent expansion of its power over an enormous part of the earth's surface. Assured of the position of Ukraina, Muscovy paid her the compliment of taking much from her. At that time the Muscovites thought that the world outside their frontiers was inhabited by pagans who knew much less than themselves. It was the Ukrainians who gave them the art of printing and who brought to their knowledge Western science and erudition. Such Europeanisation as they could absorb they received to a very large extent from the nation whom they had conquered. They imagined that they could acquire culture at its expense, and then allow it to sink into obscurity and degradation.

In the nineteenth century, when Russia made a certain amount of progress, Ukraina was deliberately kept back. She was treated not as part of Russia, but as a colony to be exploited. Every conceivable obstacle was put in the way of the growth of industry and of an intelligentsia. Ukraina was to be no more than a supplier of food and raw materials to Russia: her people were to remain peasants. In pursuance of this conspiracy, Russification was enforced and Ukrainian patriots were sent into exile. In these conditions it was not surprising that the national spirit should have become depressed. The nineteenth century was the century of rampant imperialism, and little sympathy was felt anywhere for submerged nationalities.

At the time of the Russian revolution, Ukraina summoned all the strength that was left to her and made a very gallant attempt to recover her independence. But once more her peculiar geographical situation told against her. Before she could organise effective resistance, Poles, Germans, and Russians, both Red and White, invaded her territories: enfeebled by war and revolution she was again beaten.

While nominally conceding a place to Ukraina in the Soviet federative system, the Bolsheviks have in reality oppressed Ukrainian nationality far more than did the tsars. Ukrainian autonomy is a fable. The authority of Moscow is all-embracing, and centralisation is practised to a much greater extent than before. Against all their traditions, customs and inclinations the Ukrainians have been forced to submit to crude collectivisation and to a dictatorship which seeks to control their every thought, word and deed. It is

true that the use of their own language is not denied them; but they are only allowed to express their views in a way which Moscow approves. As a result of all these measures Ukraina is now completely under the heel of Russia. No nation in Europe has suffered so cruel a fate as she. Her frontiers with the West are closely guarded, and no Ukrainian is allowed to send an uncensored communication abroad. Only diligent students of the situation can discover what is really happening in the country. Ukrainian nationalists have fought and are still fighting magnificently for their cause. The Bolshevik aim is none other than to exterminate them physically to the last man. I have before me, as I write, a long list of important persons who have been shot; among them are a number of Communists who revealed Nationalist sympathies, including several prominent commissars.

The peasants too have fought and are still fighting desperately. Rather than give up grain to their conquerors they have died in millions from famine. For this assertion there is now available an abundance of conclusive proof. Not always have the peasants protested by self-immolation. For active participation in rebellion large numbers of them have been shot, and still larger numbers exiled to remote regions. For nearly eighteen years, unknown to the West because of the rigour of the Russian censorship, Ukrainian nationalism has waged ceaseless war upon Russian imperialism, masquerading as Russian communism. At the recent Congress of the Comintern in Moscow Mr. Popov, the Ukrainian delegate, repeating the words of Stalin, said: "The struggle against Ukrainian nationalism as the main danger is being carried on with undiminished vigour by our Party."

There are also Ukrainians living on territories conceded to foreign countries adjacent to Soviet Russia—Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia. Of these the largest number—five millions—is in Galicia. At the end of the eighteenth century, when Poland was partitioned, this Ukrainian region was taken over by Austria. On the conclusion of the Great War justice required that all Ukrainian territories should be united and the Ukrainian nation re-created. Had Poland been as sincerely attached to liberty as her own valiant and victorious struggle for it had made people think, she would have assisted to promote such a solution as this. But she did not do so. On the contrary she forcibly occupied Galicia and

It was thus that when the Bishop of St. Asaph laid claim to a new church on a disputed boundary, Gerald hastened to buttress his claims by possession. But while he was consecrating the church, the Bishop arrived and threatened excommunication—though professing reluctance to take such a measure against one who had been his school-fellow in Paris. “If you excommunicate me,” countered Gerald, “I will excommunicate you.” “But an Archdeacon cannot excommunicate a Bishop. . . .” “Though you are a Bishop,” rejoined Gerald, “you are not my Bishop. I have as much right to excommunicate you as you to excommunicate me.”

The Bishop leaps from his horse and dons his mitre. Thereupon Gerald’s clergy emerge from the church with lighted candles. The Bishop begins to excommunicate “the enemies of St. Asaph’s.” Immediately, Gerald begins to excommunicate “the enemies of St. David’s,” and, since the church is in his hands, commands the bells to be tolled in triple peal. The ill-omened sound strikes such horror into the watching crowd that they mob the Bishop, and drive him to flight. The epilogue is characteristic. Gerald sends after him a present of provisions and “some very excellent drink,” with a letter of “graceful words.” By these the indignant prelate is appeased, and the old school-fellows are once more friends.

But the incident, which reveals Gerald in typical form, would have far-reaching consequences. Gleelessly, he told the story to the King, who laughed heartily with all his court, but drew his own moral: the lively Archdeacon was no such docile instrument as would serve his plans. And so when, the See of St. David’s being vacant, the Canons unanimously put forward Gerald’s name, Henry turned on them in rage. He would have no Welshman, and never such a Welshman, related too, to the ever restive princes of the land. And Gerald, after urging in vain that the new Bishop should be at least “a notable man, acquainted with the Welsh language”—his insistence on this and on the importance of Welsh preaching is of particular interest, for elsewhere such issues were rarely raised before the fourteenth century—turned in disgust to console himself with renewed studies in Paris.

He wished, he says, “on foundations of arts and literature, to raise walls of civil and canon law, with a roof of Holy Scripture and theology.” An ideal of vast and general

culture, which would tend to become rare in the succeeding age, when the humanism of the twelfth century was ousted by the predominance of law and logic. In Gerald’s hearing, Mainhard, Abelard’s favourite pupil, lamented that the days were at hand “when law would blot out the study of letters.” He himself, revising his earlier enthusiasm, would note that “abuse of logic stifles true learning,” and come to agree with the old priest who had once roused his indignation by declaring that logical subtleties were no better than riddles and divinations over a winter’s fire, to drive away weariness or tedium of illness. (He might have been speaking of a crossword puzzle!) To his own legal studies he brought a background of classical learning; when he came to lecture, his illustrations from the philosophers and poets charmed his hearers, so that they were carried away by the “sweetness of his words.” He is too engagingly eager in his own praise for us to believe him always, but here, why doubt? Have not Welshmen always excelled in eloquence and law?

In 1184, he is back in Wales, with enhanced reputation—to be a thorn in the side of the new Bishop for many years, and more than ever a perturbing figure to the King, who thinks well to make him court chaplain, and sends him to accompany Prince John to Ireland. The fruit of that journey was his first important literary work, the *Topography of Ireland*. The Irish have never forgiven Gerald for that *Topography*. It is understandable. He looked on Ireland through the eyes of the conquering Normans, all his near kinsmen. But what lively reading the book makes, even to-day! Nothing is foreign to his alert curiosity. He observes geographical features, climate, fish, birds, beasts. In the second book, *Of Miracles and Marvels*, he passes from the tidal influence of the moon to “islands, in one of which no one can die, in the other no female can enter,” in short, into the domain of folklore and legend—noting, when he comes to the Irish Saints, that they seem to be of a spiteful turn, like the people! In an historical section, that begins with Partholan and Nemed, the coming of the Milesians and the Gaels, he reveals a knowledge of Irish literature. And while he concludes with a nasty attack on the Irish character, he is enraptured with their sweet music.

He has an eye for natural beauty, as when he describes a castle “delectably situated, among lakes and woods,” or

laments that custom has dulled the wonder that should greet "sunrise and sunset, than which there is nothing in the world more beautiful or more stupendous." It is this, and his delight in concrete detail that brings him so near to us; it has been said, truly, that he writes like a modern journalist. He himself had misgivings: should a scholar concern himself with trivial fact? To disarm criticism and win renown—he has the passion for glory characteristic of classical renaissance—he reads his book at Oxford, where the most learned of the kingdom assemble to hear him. And—possibly inspired by bardic tradition, and the Eisteddfod the Lord Rhys, his cousin, had held some years before—the first day he feasted all the poor of the town; the second, the doctors of the faculties and pupils of note; the third, other scholars and townsmen. It was indeed, he says proudly, "a costly and noble act, in which the authentic and ancient times of poesy were in some measure renewed."

A few years later, he would complete the picture by a *Conquest of Ireland*, in which, it is notable, he writes not as a chronicler, but as a Renaissance historian, moulding his matter to epic form. In the meantime, in 1188, a journey in attendance on Baldwin, Archbishop of Canterbury, to preach the Second Crusade, provided the theme for his later *Itinerary through Wales*. We follow every step of that arduous journey—after climbing a ravine between Caernarvon and Bangor, the Archbishop sinks on to a falling oak; and, as talk turns on birds, and someone tells him that nightingales never come to Wales, murmurs: "Wise nightingales!"—see the country, meet its inhabitants, learn its history and local lore. At Caerleon we hear of Roman remains, palaces, baths, theatres, temples, with "stoves contrived with wonderful art, to transmit the heat through narrow tubes passing up the side walls"—and also of the knight Melerius, "of our own times," says Gerald, who was possessed by demons and knew the future. At Llandaff we learn of the foundation of the monastery, and of a gallant dog that fought for its master in battle, with a dissertation on dog nature. (Plainly, Gerald loved dogs.) Swansea was the home of the priest Elidor, known to Gerald's uncle the Bishop, who as a boy was led by two tiny men into the fairy country, and then banished therefrom for theft of a golden ball. His account of the fairy speech leads Gerald, always excited by etymology, to comment

on the basic similarity of certain common words in English, Welsh, Irish, Latin, French, German, Greek . . . The book, in short, is encyclopædic.

Later, Gerald, "from love of his native land," would add a *Description of Wales*, dealing directly with Welsh customs and character, their hospitality and faithlessness, how they worked the land and how they brushed their teeth. And there is an interesting passage in which, speaking of Welsh poetry and use of alliteration, he points out how this is an ornament also in English and Latin verse, but, curiously, has no place in French.

He had intended to take part in the Crusade he preached. But, when in 1189, Henry II died, Gerald, who witnessed and would describe his tragic end, was sent by Richard to keep the peace in Wales. John, regent in Richard's absence, later summoned him back to court. There, he wearied. The Plantagenet Kings seemed to him to show too plainly their descent from the Demon Countess, and soon, "considering the vanity of court life, the failure of deserved advancement," he would withdraw from the "noisy sea of clamorous tongues, and seek in study a quiet haven." It was to Lincoln he went, then a theological centre, where he knew bluff St. Hugh and his pet swan, noted its smooth, yellow beak, and how it used to thrust its head up the Saint's sleeve and lament his absence. Of himself we catch a revealing glimpse, sitting in his study, and roused from absorption in his books by the cries of the hungry poor beneath the window, so that his eye falls with compunction on his cloaks of rich fur, and he resolves to sell all for alms, and only wear lambskin in future.

But now the period of his life, which Gerald would describe as "filled with immense labours and perils and persecutions" is about to open. In 1199 the See of St. David's again fell vacant, and again the Canons' unanimous choice rested upon Gerald. Other bishoprics had been offered to him, but he would have none of them. It was to St. David's he aspired, for that impoverished church on "stony ground, remote on the Irish Sea, barren and unfertile . . . ever swept by the winds and tempests," was to him the mother church of all Wales; whose claims to metropolitan status, inspired by old memories of the strife between the Celtic Church and Canterbury, he would now seek to vindicate once for all. Again he had to face a mighty adversary, this time in the Church

itself—Hubert Walter, Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Justiciar, at whose death six years later John would cry: “Now only am I King!” But this time Gerald, like a knight-errant—Don Quixote and Sancho Panza in one!—“committing himself to God and to St. David for whom he fought,” set off for Rome, there to deliver battle “not only against the Archbishop of Canterbury but against the King and all England.”

His reception by the great Pope Innocent III was such as to delight him. “*Alii libras sed nos libros*,” said Gerald, none too tactfully, thinking he could offer no richer gift than his own complete works. Innocent accepted them in the proper spirit; he kept them—Gerald recounts exultantly—beside his bed, and, as a great concession, lent them to pleading Cardinals one at a time. The pearl of the collection, the *Gemma Ecclesiastica*, intended by Gerald as a manual of theology for his clergy in Brecon, he would never allow out of his possession, reading and re-reading it with unquenched delight. It is possible. Few theological works can be quite as entertaining.

Evidently, Innocent enjoyed Gerald, who has much to tell of his jokes and kindly raillery. But the issues involved were too thorny for settlement out of hand. Hubert Walter—in the words of the Welsh Chronicler—was “the eye of the Pope and his legate in all England,” and soon his indignant letters were in the Pope’s hands. “He writes,” Gerald told Innocent, “more like the Arch-Enemy than an Archbishop!” Innocent encouraged him to make public reply, which he did, with scathing zest. A description of the Welsh as a “savage and lawless race” rouses him to a vehement denunciation of the Saxons, a perfidious race, fit only for employment as cowherds, or for cleaning out drains. To the Archbishop’s attacks on his own character he makes sharp rejoinder, in which his enemy’s figure appears as curiously capitalistic. For besides bad Latin and simony, sacrilege and murder—he had indeed dragged from sanctuary and hanged a priest guilty of preaching what to-day would be called Socialistic doctrine—Gerald accuses him of exporting corn in time of famine and of . . . speculation in armaments! The theme is so topical that his precise charge is worth formulating:

Knowing—for it was the outcome of his counsel—that war was preparing between the Kings, he ordered a search for arms to be

made throughout England . . . and bought up arms of every kind. Then, having issued a public edict making the possession of arms compulsory throughout the kingdom, he sold the arms he had bought and made immense profits. (*De Invectionibus*.)

Hubert Walter, perspicacious politician, as clearly as Henry II, saw in an independent Welsh Archbishopric a “head of rebellion,” and would oppose it with formidable might. The Pope favoured Gerald as far as his judgment allowed, made him interim Administrator of his diocese, and appointed a Commission to judge between him and his adversaries. But when the Bishop-elect returned to St. David’s, to collect fresh proof of its traditional independence, it was to find that bribes and threats had shaken the loyalty of the Canons. A year later, after a second sojourn in Rome, his clergy had forsaken him utterly. But the laity stood by him and the Welsh princes; the issues were now plain. He was the champion of Welsh nationality.

“Many and great wars,” said Gwenwynwyn, Prince of Powis, “have we Welshmen waged with England, but none so great and fierce as his who fought the King and the Archbishop, and withstood the might of the whole clergy and people of England, for the honour of Wales.”

He was outlawed; his friends dared not house him; the Commission decided against him. It was only in disguise, after days spent in hiding in a boat on the Medway, that he was able to slip out of England and carry a fresh appeal to Rome. And there the imps of comedy, always his familiars, have a fresh trick in store. The case is being tried with due solemnity, when the emissaries of Canterbury accuse him . . . of stealing a horse! But Gerald is equal to them. The incident delighted the Pope, as Gerald recounted it, in friendly intimacy, by the Fonte Virginis in the cool of the evening. “And now tell me more about your Archbishop’s howlers in Latin,” Innocent urged him.

But gradually Gerald realised that he could hope for nothing tangible from Rome. “What,” said the Pope, smiling, as he came to take his leave, “and the status of St. David’s? Will you abandon it?” But when Gerald answered bitterly, Innocent found kind words to console him.

And now at St. David’s, which he reached after a perilous journey, he was shunned by all. Only one old woman dared to murmur as he passed: “Many are sorrowful to-day that

they cannot support you as were fitting and as they would wish." It was plainly a hopeless struggle. For a little while he continued to harass his adversaries and then, since the rival candidate to the Bishopric sponsored by Canterbury was not personally obnoxious to him, and was, indeed, his kinsman, made his peace. He resigned his benefices and once more journeyed to Rome, but this time as a pilgrim, for his soul's health. The rest of his life, till his death about 1223, was spent in studies, rewriting earlier works and writing new—his *De Rebus a se gestis*, his *Book of Invectives*, and his *De Jure Menevensis Ecclesiae*, commemorating his lost war; the *Speculum Ecclesiae*, that gives so vivid a picture of the Church in his time, and the *De Instructione Principis*, that is really a lively history of the Plantagenet Kings. The time came when John, at odds with Stephen Langton, would have had Gerald revive his claims against Canterbury. Gerald adroitly referred him to the Bishop of St. David's. Stephen Langton was his friend; to him he dedicated his new version of his *Itinerary* and *Description of Wales*, with the hope that he would not do "as some leading men . . . who shut up within their book-shelves the excellent works with which they are presented," and a lament "that the respect paid to literature vanished with literary princes."

There is a poem he adds to his autobiography, thinking it more seemly to attribute it to an anonymous admirer:

Hector, defender of Troy, fell with his city,
But Hector shall ever be praised, his fame endureth forever.
Lover of right, defender of right, Giraldus
Stands with his right, worthy of praise among men.

There is something very Celtic in this glory in a lost cause. *Amator juris*—he deserves the epithet. "I come," he says elsewhere, "of both Norman and Welsh stock, and when I see injustice in either race, I hate it." The fame he craved would be for long denied him, but it is pleasant that in the Brecon that knew him as Archdeacon, his name, in its Latin form, is to-day a household word among the country-folk, whose characteristics have changed so little from those of his time. It was thus I myself first heard of him as a child, from my old Welsh nurse.

BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER.

SYMBOLISM. "THE NEW AND LIVING WAY" IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

OUR subject is the crying need at this critical time for education, of a new and living way in the presentation of religion to all children, if they are to leave school with a zest for life, without which their "education" has missed the mark. This new way (at the same time the oldest in the world), is, of course, "*invisibilia per visibilia*"—caught in the glass which nature holds up to grace in life's procession through the seasons of the year.

The likeness is caught best, perhaps, by concentration on the single "kingdom" in nature which lies between the "elemental" and "animal"—I mean that of vegetation—because it reflects vividly (both by its internal conflicts and its relations to these other sub-kingdoms as well as to the "human" kingdom) the spiritual drama in the life of grace and of man. "For the invisible things . . . from the creation are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."

Now symbolism has served as a trunk-road through the ages for a communication of religion (one can never forget: "Without a parable spake He not" . . . etc.). It created rather than fashioned the creeds; it has dominated all worship; it hides behind all its records. Religion knows of no other language or logic than the symbolic expressions which it gathers from every realm of life. Anyhow, the appearance of an English quarterly journal, entitled *Religion in Education*, has proved a very happy sign of the times. Let us rejoice at its insistence that the first requisite is to secure *craftsmen* and *craftswomen*, enthusiastic as well as equipped (rather than *students*, however rightly keen and inquisitive about the subject-matter) for what is an art as well as a science. In these days when such elementary "subjects" as physical and manual training fall into skilled as well as sympathetic hands, character-creation, the goal of which lies in the child's heart and will rather than in his mind, must not fare worse. The teacher's appeal should be to the children's whole nature, senses and observation, reason, imagination, and activity.

But let us come back to the unique function of religion in education: we may call it *self-realisation*—with no attempt

to define the infinite content of either complement in that compound expression. The very word religion is a mystery. Its origin may involve the idea both of obligation and reflection, tradition and intuition. It stands for a sacred tradition, but it rests on the intuition of the individual. Not one of these ideas perhaps primarily appeals to a child, they are too remote, even if they do not repel. There remains, however, another channel by which "religion" does reach him unconsciously and germinates in his "unconsciousness," as we call it to-day.

The word "character" will help us to understand. It means the mark of the Graver's Hand, the image in which the child is made, that most mysterious seal which we call his individuality, not, of course, in act but in potentiality. And that is a secret to which the child awakes, be it ever so dimly—which he hugs to himself half-consciously all his life, though he will die without unsealing it—yet which beats in his heart, shadows his mind, stirs in his will and, however faintly and feebly, spells out what we call self-determination in his life. That secret possesses for him a twofold charm. It gives him the sense of freedom and of a goal in life which, however it may retreat before his eyes, he strives to win. This conflict the child instinctively embraces. It appeals to his ambition, and he welcomes any sign of it elsewhere.

Now there is one glass in nature which mirrors that sense of conflict and this miracle of conquest—actual transformation of one order of life into another. The kingdom of vegetation perpetually attests that miracle in all its complex operation within a single procession of the seasons and its manifold relations to operations in the other kingdoms. To put the matter in a moment: the sunshine quickens the seed, converts the soil and transforms both into the life of the body, animal and human, the latter with all its higher potentialities of joy and mutual service. Nowhere else in nature do we witness and co-operate with such an evolution from a lower level of life, such a struggle and survival of the fittest, such a devolution of its fruits. And be it remembered, the child in and from an elementary school on his way to the secondary school has a large, and will have, it is to be hoped, a growing share in this spectacle and experience of every year.

Are these to bear no fruit for his inner life? That pageant of the year arrests his attention and engages his activities at

each step in its course, and the drama of which it becomes the symbol in the Church's Year—the achievement of an ever-expanding process in the spiritual world—gradually comes home to him. It proceeds from Advent (the Dawn of another A.D. or Life of Christ in His Body the Church), through the Daybreak of Christmas, to Epiphany—the season of Daylight on Earth. It pursues the struggle for and conquest of the Higher Life from Lent to Easter. It celebrates Light's triumph and Life's transfiguration from Whitsuntide to such festivals as Corpus Christi, Transfiguration and the Assumption. Finally, it reaches the New Life's ingathering and aftermath in the seasons of All Angels and All Saints, with their harvest-home of love and service, human and superhuman.

It is not enough, of course, merely to make such a sweeping assertion about the seasonal teaching of the Church. Enough here to say that this teaching displays the mystery of the Faith in one organic scheme, like some great window in one of her cathedrals, by the unity of its "broken lights." That scheme calls for restoration of this calendar glass inasmuch as the unity and continuity of its reflection throughout the year have been defaced through many causes and are still obscure to all who have not scrutinised closely the sequence and grouping round the Sundays of its progressive periods, even in its latter half. Close scrutiny of the liturgical scriptures and collects reveals at once the fact of a seasonal succession there in the Church's as in nature's calendar.

The story of the Church's Calendar has yet to be recovered from the ravages of mutilation, neglect and misunderstanding, which half-reveal and half-conceal its essential integrity throughout the whole of the circling year. And this fascinating subject must be reserved for the moment (though it demands attention in these pages) in order to clinch the immediate rather than the previous question, and to ask: where does the child come in, how does the root of the matter, "religion," emerge from this handling of the "Church's Calendar"—what secret steals upon the child through this symbolic method? The answer is not far to seek; there breaks upon the child the fact that, as in the soil, so in the soul a higher life is ever renewing its struggle to overcome, transfer and transform the lower into its own likeness: "Marvel not that I said unto thee, 'ye must be born again.'" That supreme secret of all religion lies in a measure behind him if he has been Christened,

but in any case it lies before every soul if the ideal is to become reality. Conversion means such a transformation, though it is often confounded with the mere "will to conquer." "Total eclipse" (of darkness into light) is the story of every seed, which responding to the sun's rays realises in its earthly body the goal of fruit—yielding seed abundantly.

Such a "high road" lies alongside of the "low road" already in the consciousness of every child; and the mystery of good and evil is present to that consciousness simply as a pressure for "more life, more life"—whether or not he cries for "more light, more light." His nature, like the nature of the seed, needs must seek the higher road; certainly his will must wake. That is where the child comes in and so his eyes open to the light: he begins to scan the breadth and depth and height of life. And such a child, when he grows to manhood, must needs adore the highest when he sees it. The natural ambition may anyhow suffer a sea-change and turn to that "pearl of great price," though shadows linger in the light—the pearl of love.

Perhaps we faintly catch in a whisper the conclusion of the whole matter. There will be no "religion in education" unless there is a teacher, not after the "letter" in any sense, but "after the spirit," one whose presence creates and perpetually re-creates its atmosphere. The very word education derives from the frequentative verb, *educare*. Incubation is a parallel. Better than this: the greatest of all teachers compared His school to a bird's nest, "How often have I tried to gather you as a mother-bird . . .": while to a Roman soldier "*educare*" meant training for a war, in which he never "put his harness off." These are the sorts of images which appeal to children, boys and girls alike. They are all looking for a "flight," to break the egg themselves, to "gather" in their own ways, to explore the "world" at all costs. What a world for religion if all the worlds were to become their way! What opportunities for the men and women who will lead them, and whose task it should be to lead them higher!

But it should be on "imagination's airy wing." What image is there of the operations on man's imagination to compare with that of his mingling in nature's operations. There is no better mirror than a sheet of water under the sky, with its dancing yet perfect images. The year is such a mirror. Man not only looks into it, he mingles with it. That palace of

"pictures" which mirror the dealings of God in all these kingdoms of nature and grace—pictures which we call the "scriptures"—rises out of the calendar's procession in the liturgical and semi-liturgical order of the Bible for the year—"of imagination all compact." One figure fills the background, that figure of the Son of Man and Son of God. But this sequence of the calendar does not tell only His story. It is the drama of His Life in "His Body the Church," which is being enacted on the stage of time.

The object of the teacher is not so much even to hold the mirror in one hand, as with the other to show the child his own figure, place and part there as a potential member of that great body and anyhow as an actor himself upon the stage. "The play's the thing wherein to catch the conscience of the king," and we might add of the child, who is to become one of nature's princes, or to leave his palace a rubbish heap and become himself a prisoned soul in his own body. Education is both the discovery and the recovery of the mould in which he was made—his "character." His second birth in baptism starts with the work of "The Son of Man and His Angels." But it is "the child who runs the race and must fight the fight," rather let us say play the game, of the second life. Otherwise character becomes caricature. We all agree that *Punch* is drawn from the life, but no child ever wants to be recognised there. And his concern, we might say, with education is to keep himself out of such drawing.

Many motives conspire—not the least powerful again is love of adventure—to "take off" the earth, really to risk and not to ride for a fall, as religion so often meant once even among the sons of the prophets. Yes, there is a new hope not only for education in religion, or even for religion, but for education through religion. But this involves a reconception of what we mean by education, primarily in what we venture to call Church schools! We are on rock-bottom when we speak of elementary education. If "through religion" should be the watchword there, our whole ideal of education is obviously at fault. Our schools are machines without the motive power, hopelessly out of date and behind the times, not because of a decaying religious tradition but for lack of a new and living way in education itself.

The Bolshevik is quite right to be fearful about such a way being found. The "material way," which to him is the only

way of life, demands death to the resurrection of religion in any form. But we must not shut our eyes to the need of a resurrection—a spiritual life in education which shall leave the tomb of mere tradition bereft of its skeleton. We cannot at this crisis in both education and religion insist too much on this “*fons et origo mali*”—but let us hope not “*mali*,” rather “*boni*.” Primary stress has been laid here on the absolute necessity of regarding education as an art in the hands of the teacher and—(greatest of all its aspects)—as an “action” (indeed a world drama), with the child himself as the indispensable protagonist.

The reader will perhaps allow an allusion (to fix this point) from a work which Shelley called a bridge thrown over the stream of time to unite the ancient and the modern world. Giovanni Papini published last year a new and living view of Dante’s work, specially in the *Commedia*. He called it “*Dante Vivo*” (Dante come to life). Certainly he has brought new light and life into the world-theme of the life that-now-is on its way towards the life-to-come. And the name of that drama is itself suggestive of school life. This should be a “comedy” to the child, an “As you like it,” let us say. Again, it should deserve that name, as Dante says, because it has a happy ending. Lastly, it is already what soon that “comedy” was called—“Divine”—because its “author and finisher is God.” But here we are concerned with its process. Papini has a suggestive chapter on what he calls “*Il Poema Demiurgico*,” by which he means that it is the creation of a craftsman. Dante himself calls “art the grand-daughter, as nature is the daughter of God.” It is well to remember that the teacher is the craftsman and producer, not the author of this “*Comedy*.”

It is indeed all-essential to realise that nature in God’s hands takes part with revelation in this play. For us, perhaps, it is most important to recognise the child’s freedom and ultimate supremacy in the action, but Papini’s most suggestive word will put the matter in a nutshell: “In reality, he says, at least in the author’s intention, the *Commedia* is an act, an instrument of action, an ‘opera’ in the original sense of the word—that is, an attempt to change and to transform the material—in this case the human material.” He is using the word *opera* in just the sense which applies to our problems in every detail. Let the reader recall the medieval couplet (with

its quaint quantities) about the study of “scriptures” in nature and human nature:

“*Litera gesta refert : quod credas Allegoria :*
Moralia quod agas : quod operes, Anagogia.”

We might render :

The letter tells great deeds, behind’s your creed :
 Conduct, that’s in your hands : your end’s a crown.

Perhaps the last words should rather run, “Lay hold on life.” Children are fond of singing :

Lay hold on Life and it shall be
 Your Joy and Crown eternally.

Anagogia is the old Greek name for the Ordeal of Initiation : and “to enter into life” is a counsel of the Gospel.

Anyhow, the last word lies with the child. The end of school is to launch him on the game of the Great Life, with the ball in his hands. It implies, like all sport, the passion for individuality, with—in loyalty, sacrifice and fellowship—the eucharistic outlook. It springs from and strives for self-expression. There is a call—and room surely to-day in the Church school and in all schools throughout all lands—for the sake of society no less than for that of the individual—to re-conceive our ideal of education—“To take a thought and mend.”

S. UDNY.

ROBERT RAIKES: 1735-1811.

Gloucester, set in a broad vale between the last low ridge of the Cotswolds and the silver loop of the Severn, is famous as the birthplace two hundred years ago of Robert Raikes, the man who founded Sunday schools. There used to be a local phrase, "As sure as God's in Gloucester." Even before Raikes started his Sunday schools, the city had a reputation for righteousness; the churches scattered in each narrow street, and the great cathedral surrounded by green lawns testified to an exceptional godliness. But Mammon, too, had his temples there. In the eighteenth century, Gloucester was an important centre of the pin trade. This industry prospered on the cheap labour of children, who from the tenderest age would work all day in the dark, unhealthy factories, to contribute a few shillings weekly to the family income. With that strange diversity, that blend of benevolence and barbarity, sentiment and insensibility, which marks the eighteenth century, philanthropists, who condemned slave trade abroad, saw nothing to criticise in the slave conditions that existed in industry at home.

One of the most prosperous citizens of Gloucester was Robert Raikes. Born on September 14th, 1735, in a house in Palace Yard, near the cathedral, he was the eldest son of a printer and publisher, who, in 1722, had founded the early provincial weekly, the *Gloucester Journal*. In 1757, at the age of twenty-two, Robert Raikes succeeded his father as proprietor and manager of the *Journal*, which by then had extended its circulation into several counties. Advertisements for patent medicines, and notices of race-meetings, bankruptcies, auctions, and the latest arrivals at Cheltenham Spa, took up most of the space, while there were also lengthy descriptions of trials and executions, enlivened with suitable moral reflections, and evincing no less a love of the gruesome than the police court reports of the present-day Press.

The *Gloucester Journal* also gave up some of its space for philanthropic purposes. Appeals were made in its columns on behalf of various charities, and collections were announced for the benefit of the poor. The sentimental bias of the age was favourable to philanthropic enterprise, for the ability to shed frequent tears of compassion was taken to be a guarantee of

goodness, and benevolence was held a most desirable and engaging virtue. Among the notices which appealed to the generosity of the readers of the *Journal* were numerous ones calling attention to the woeful state of the prisoners in the two Gloucester gaols. Not only were they given little or no allowance of food, but they were also expected to pay heavy fees to the gaoler, so that sometimes people who had been acquitted were still detained in prison, because they were unable to pay the fees which had accumulated while they were waiting for trial. Herded together in the most insanitary conditions, they were apt to die of hunger and neglect if kindly citizens did not contribute voluntarily to their maintenance. The State assumed no responsibility for their welfare.

Some years before Howard started on his tour of the gaols, Raikes began to take an interest in prison conditions, and, as well as publishing appeals for the prisoners, would frequently visit the gaols in person. The exemplary citizen was appalled at the depravity of the criminals. The severity of the sentences given, and the hardships experienced in gaol were, he realised, useless as deterrents to crime. The ignorance and poverty of the workers, whom the Industrial Revolution had gathered to the towns, led to a general lawlessness, symptomatic of a latent spirit of rebellion. Even before the disturbing events of the French Revolution, the middle classes in England were uneasily aware of the smouldering discontent which lay beneath the surface of society. We read in the *Gloucester Journal* of the formation of a "Society for the Protection of Persons and Property and punishing Felony." The various philanthropic movements of the day, Howard's prison reform, Mrs. Trimmer's industrial schools and Hannah More's output of moral tracts were partly dictated by the instinct of self-preservation. It is not usually recognised how near to revolution England was at the end of the eighteenth century.

Raikes, during his visits to the Gloucester prisons, felt that one of the causes of crime was to be found in the ignorance and profanity of the prisoners. Most of them could not read, and many had no knowledge of religion. He saw that it was too late to attempt to reclaim these hardened offenders, and so he turned his attention to the younger generation: the criminals of the future. The children who played in the streets of Gloucester on Sundays were ragged, unruly and blasphemous.

Raikes realised that if they were taught the elements of Christianity, they might be made into dutiful citizens. He was not, however, the first to have thought of Sunday schools. To the devout, the presence of these little heathens so close at hand must have been disquieting, and various individuals in different parts of the country had already set about mitigating the evil. Theophilus Lindsey, for instance, had founded a Sunday school at Catterick in 1763, and he was followed a few years later by the Methodist Hannah Ball at High Wycombe. In Gloucester, itself, the clergyman Thomas Stock had already started Sunday classes. These isolated efforts, indicative of a growing uneasiness at the moral state of the working classes, were, however, quite unco-ordinated, and were hardly known outside their immediate vicinity.

Raikes was the first to make the movement a national one. This he was able to do, because he appreciated the value of publicity, and in his position as manager of a well-known paper could make use of the Press. The Sunday school movement may be said to have been inaugurated on November 3rd, 1783, when an article first appeared in the *Gloucester Journal*, explaining the aims and the needs of the schools. From then on, not only did notices of the foundation of new schools and accounts of festivals and prize-givings appear in the *Journal*, but Raikes had letters and articles of his own published in other papers and magazines. Before long, the "Sunday School Society" was formed, so that "while the poor remain destitute of the comforts of this life, they may not be altogether unacquainted with that which is to come." The movement was not confined to the Established Church. William Fox himself, the founder of the Sunday School Society, was a Dissenter, while half the members of the Committee were Dissenters, and half Churchmen.

The first schools were for boys only. The teachers were not voluntary, but were paid at the rate of a shilling or one and sixpence a day. The children were so poor that they complained that they had no clothes in which to go to school or to church. Raikes used to reply that they could come in rags, so long as they were clean and tidy, and he would make them learn a rhyme :

Clean hands, clean face, and tidy combed hair,
Are better than fine clothes to wear.

The children were hungry as well as ill-clothed. Raikes, in a description of a Christmas dinner given at Painswick, relates that "When the meal was set before one boy, it was observed that he could not eat. He was asked the reason, and the poor wretch said that it was three days since he had had any food, and his stomach was gone. However, by taking a little, his appetite at last returned. Another was asked if he had eaten so plentiful a meal this twelve-months. 'No, nor these three twelve-months,' replied the boy." The physical as well as the spiritual needs of the children thus obtruded themselves on the organisers of the Sunday schools. At Painswick, the scholars each contributed a penny a week to a clothing-club; dinners were often provided by charitably-minded people; while the little rewards and prizes distributed by way of encouragement did not only consist of Bibles and prayer-books, but also of clothes and combs.

The children, in spite of the material advantages which accrued to them, did not go to school willingly. Even a Bible, a comb or a shirt did not compensate them for the loss of the one day's freedom they enjoyed in the week. The Sunday school classes lasted from morning till evening, and after six days' work in a factory, a Sunday in the streets, playing at "Chuck," and shouting and swearing, must have been preferable to a day spent in Bible reading and hymn singing. Sometimes the boys would be sent to school with logs of wood tied to their ankles to keep them from running away. This side of the picture is not described by Raikes. Though he does not acknowledge it, he himself treated these "little savages," as he called them, roughly enough. Even in the age of Eton under Busby's rule, and Christ's Hospital as Lamb described it, Raikes was by no means tender-hearted. He kept order among the "little lawless rabble" by force: on one occasion, we are told, he took hold of the hand of one boy who had told a lie and pressed the tips of his fingers on the bars of the stove till the skin blistered. And yet, in a letter to a friend, he writes: "Often have I given them kind admonitions, which I always do in the mildest and gentlest manner." The children were, of course, rough and unruly, and were probably used to cruelty, but, nevertheless, Raikes' attitude seems hypocritical or at least inconsistent. Hidden motives prompted him to a harshness that was out of keeping with his principles.

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Though Raikes deserves all credit for the significance of his work, he had weaknesses that cannot be ignored. He was inordinately vain, both as to his looks—he was known as “Buck Raikes” owing to his dapper appearance—and as to his virtues. He so loved the spectacle of himself doing good that he could not help parading his good works. This weakness was noticed by his neighbours. On one occasion, after the Sunday schools had been working about two years, Raikes invited some friends to breakfast in his house. The window of the room in which the party assembled opened on to a small garden, and in the garden were seated in rows one above the other the neatly dressed children of one of his schools. This provoked a rebuke from one of the guests, a Quakeress: “Friend Raikes, when thou doest charitably, thy right hand should not know what thy left hand doeth.”

Raikes was a man of the world, with a great appreciation of possessions and position. At his comfortable house in Bell Lane he entertained all the famous people who passed through Gloucester: Fanny Burney, John Howard, Jonas Hanway, Charles Wesley, who used to stay with him for the music festival, and even George III, when the latter was on a visit to Cheltenham in 1788. Fanny Burney has left a somewhat malicious description of her encounter with the Gloucester philanthropist:

Mr. Raikes is not a man that, without a previous disposition towards approbation, I should greatly have admired. He is somewhat too flourishing, somewhat too forward, somewhat too voluble; but he is worthy, benevolent and good-hearted, and therefore the overflowing of successful spirits and delighted vanity must meet with some allowance.

Raikes' vanity did not make him popular in his own town. He was accused of hypocrisy, and some people even said he was a Sabbath-breaker, because he used to correct proofs on Sunday in order to have his paper ready for distribution on Monday. It was suggested that he organised Sunday schools so that he should not be disturbed in his work by the noise of the children playing in the streets. Raikes may seem at times to have been vain, hypocritical and domineering, but in most of his actions and his opinions he shows himself to be merely a product of his age. It is not fair to judge him according to modern standards. For instance, he never, it is

true, makes a criticism of the employment of child labour in the pin factories of Gloucester, or of the insanitary conditions under which the children worked. That the conditions were bad, we know from contemporary evidence. Fanny Burney was dissuaded from visiting the factories on account of the dirt, and Torrington, on his visit to Gloucester, noted the “sickly looks” of the workers. Raikes, in his calm acceptance of the evils of child labour, did not, however, differ from the bulk of his contemporaries.

His complacent attitude towards the miseries of the working class may strike us as inhuman, but we must remember that even the most sincere philanthropist of the age did not criticise poverty as such. It did not occur to anyone at this time to question the system which allowed such suffering, for the Industrial Revolution had come too quickly for people to realise to the full its implications. The governing classes did not feel themselves able to cope with or even to state clearly the vast problem of poverty that lay before them. The Poor Laws merely encouraged pauperism without stemming the evil. Poverty was still considered an act of God, and not an effect of social maladjustment, so that instead of acknowledging it as an evil, the arguments of an outworn theology were used to explain it. Stephen Duck, in his little poem *On Poverty* (1728), expressed the current attitude:

Let poverty or want be what it will,
It does proceed from God; therefore's no ill.

The Sunday schools, like other charitable institutions, were not to attempt to alter social conditions, but were rather to discourage complaints against them. The objection that the education given to the scholars might make them discontented was anxiously refuted; it was claimed, on the contrary, that they would learn to bear their hardships with greater patience. In 1784, a statement was published in which the pin manufacturers expressed their satisfaction at finding that the children they employed had become more obedient and more painstaking, since the inception of Sunday schools. In discussing the schools, the emphasis is quite frankly laid on the benefits accruing to the rich rather than on the good done to the poor. As Nicolls, the printer, said, they were founded “to the great advantage and comfort of the poor, and still more to the security and repose of the rich.” At a festival at

Painswick, this small town subscribed the sum of £57. "This may be accounted for from the security which the establishment of Sunday schools has given to the property of every individual in the neighbourhood."

The contemporary attitude towards education, too, was shared by Raikes. This attitude, dominated as it was by the belief in original sin, was expressed by Samuel Glasse, in his sermon on "The Piety, Wisdom and Policy of promoting Sunday schools" (1786). "I would to God, that parents would check the first beginnings of vice; that they would bow down the necks of their children by wholesome, but tender restraints." Games of any sort were, of course, banned on Sunday, even though the health of the children suffered from not being allowed even one day of amusement and exercise. This puritanical view inspired Cowper in his hymn:

Thanks for thy word, and for thy day,
And grant us we implore,
Never to waste in sinful play
Thy holy sabbaths more.

But though the attitude of Raikes and his contemporaries seems selfish in its motives and repressive in its effects, their work had greater results than they realised. Their object was to teach the children religion and morality, but to do this they had to teach them to read, and it is to their credit that they also encouraged the parents to come to the classes—an opportunity of which the women availed themselves more than the men. The Sunday school organisers were thus important promoters of popular education.

Only a few outstanding men were able to transcend the limitations of their age and to attain to a more humane and generous attitude towards the poor than that shown by Raikes and his followers. One of these was Doctor Johnson. Piozzi said of him: "He loved the poor, as I never yet saw anyone else do, with an earnest desire to make them happy. What signifies, says someone, giving halfpence to common beggars? They only lay it out in gin and tobacco. 'And why,' says Johnson, 'should they be denied such sweetness of their existence? It is surely very savage to refuse them every possible avenue to pleasure, reckoned too coarse for our own acceptance. Life is a pill which none of us can bear to swallow without gilding; yet for the poor we delight in stuffing it still

barer; and are not ashamed to show even visible displeasure, if ever the bitter taste is taken from their mouths."

Blake was another man who felt the cruelty of offering salvation in heaven as a compensation for suffering on earth. He could not sympathise with the good intentions of the affluent bourgeois, who preached humility and piety to cold and hungry men and children.

But if at Church they would give us some Ale,
And a pleasant fire our souls to regale,
We'd sing and we'd pray all the live-long day,
Nor ever once wish from the Church to stray.

BETSY AIKIN-SNEATH.

HISTORICAL JUDGMENTS AND POLITICAL EVENTS.

EVERY generation looks upon history from its own point of view, interprets historical facts in regard to its actual hopes and necessities, preferring such periods which are (or seem to be) congenial to its own situation, refusing others which are contrary to actual sentiments. It is beyond a doubt that even historians of the first rank are subjected to the irrational influence of contemporary social, economic, theological, and other movements, not least to that of actual politics. It is superfluous to blame or deplore such deviations from scientific objectivity, for they are rooted in human imperfections. We must only demand that everyone should be conscious of those limits, and possess the will to sincerity, even against a momentary party advantage.

Every genuine philosophy of history has to acknowledge the sentence of Ranke: "Every epoch is immediately near to God; its value does not depend on what results from it, but on its existence itself." It is the distinctive mark of a false philosophy of history, biased by considerations of its own time, that it denies the proper value of former periods and only inquires as to their advantage or disadvantage in relation to present time. The historian, bound by the power of facts, has to acknowledge their necessity in the whole development of human civilisation. The pseudo-historian, on the other hand, rashly gives his verdict, praising or blaming the heroes of history as a schoolmaster his boys. Thus political instruction, only a secondary object of history, is made its principal purpose. History is no more, as it ought to be, *magistra*, but *ancilla vitæ*.

Germany, not having been a national state for centuries, lacked a common perception of her own history. The foundation of the empire in 1870 produced a view of history which, henceforth, preponderated for many decades. Its standard was not the development of the German nationality, but the growth of Prussia and the glory of the Hohenzollern dynasty. German history was regarded as the direct continuation of the history of Brandenburg-Prussia, now realised in the realm of 1871. It is significant of the manner in which German history was described in the school-books that till the end of the Thirty Years' War the general history of the old Holy

Roman Empire dominated, while thenceforth it was supplanted by the history of the Brandenburg electorate and the Prussian kingdom. The Great Elector as well as Frederick the Great were described as champions of German unity, whereas the Hapsburg dynasty passed for an un-German power at all times—in a word, the development of centuries became adjusted to the present situation of the Germany founded by Bismarck.

The Iron Chancellor himself testifies to the specifically Prussian and authoritarian features of that instruction in history. For him, the Greek and Roman republicans, as well as the hero of Swiss liberty, William Tell, were nothing but "rebels and murderers." "Every German prince who opposed the emperor before the Thirty Years' War vexed me; since the times of the Great Elector, I was biased enough to regard matters in an anti-imperial sense."

The most representative historian of those who identified Prussian and German development is Treitschke. His *German History in the Nineteenth Century*, a masterpiece of style, made an enormous impression upon the judgment of several generations. Tirpitz, for instance, professed to be deeply indebted to Treitschke for convincing him of Prussia's vocation to hegemony over Germany, and, generally, of the decisive influence of "blood and iron" upon history. Influenced in his philosophy by the successful events of the Bismarck era, Treitschke considered every adversary of Prussia as an adversary of Germany. The most hated was Metternich, who, from 1809 to 1848, influenced not only the destiny of the German Union but also, since the Vienna Congress, in a great measure that of Europe.

The catastrophic collapse of the Bismarckian Empire in 1918 challenged the wisdom of Prussian politics during the nineteenth century, especially with regard to the elimination of the Hapsburg monarchy. Consequently a new channel was opened for a better understanding of the political aims of Metternich. The Austrian historian Srbik undertook an impressive vindication of Metternich, who now appeared as a statesman of a very European mind—not at all as a reactionary, but as a promoter of equality and security among European states.

There can hardly be any doubt that Srbik wrote his excellent monograph under the impressions of our time. The

ruinous consequences of the world war for nearly all European countries, the hope for a more regulated co-operation of the different nations through the recently founded League of Nations, the destruction and the revolutionary condition of Central Europe—all this produced a sounder estimate of a politician than as considered from the same angle after the Napoleonic wars. Srbik's volumes are the expression of Austrianism in post-war times, as Treitschke's work had been the product of Prussianism in the Bismarckian epoch.

Of course the great transformation of 1918 deeply influenced the German view of history. The breakdown of the empire and of Prussian hegemony gave a new aspect not only to the most recent history, but to the whole German past. Such a revision was certainly necessary and inevitable. The democratic republic ought to understand the past in many points, in another sense than the monarchy had ever done. Events had taught that Bismarck's politics were not, as hitherto believed, the pivot of all statesmanship. It was understood that among the causes of the catastrophe were some mistakes of his political system. There was, however, a group of writers who, beyond all justifiable criticism, replaced monarchical tendencies with a republican or socialist attitude. That "new school" of historians (as it was called by its head, Emil Ludwig) offended historical truth no less than the older, perhaps even more. Adherents of liberalism and democracy among German historians did not hesitate to deal with historical falsifications of this kind. They emphasised that an attitude inspired by resentment is not good even for the political system it pretends to serve; for partiality inspires retaliation.

The various ways of treating Frederick the Great in discussions of party politics show how seasonable that admonition has been. His adversaries described him as a man who began his wars, one after the other, impelled by personal ambition, mere dynastic interests, and English bribery. He definitely guaranteed the possession of Alsace and Lorraine to the French; by pushing Austria out of Germany he prepared Austria's destruction in 1918. Frederick, who preferred French to German culture, appears as the corruptor of Germany. A century ago even the Tory Camarilla denied Frederick's surname "the Great" because his frivolous rationalism was opposed to genuine royalism. On the other

hand, monarchists wrapped the Great King in clouds of incense. He was described as the ideal of a good monarch, as the champion of German nationality, as the guardian angel of the classical period of German culture. The chairman of the German National Party, who was also proprietor of the biggest German film company, used the "movies" for the Fredericus Rex propaganda. The result has been a vigorous propaganda for the restoration of the Hohenzollern family which had produced such an incomparable hero—the ancestor had to cover the faults of his last successor.

There are different opinions also in French, English and American historiography. Jacques Bainville does not renounce his faith in monarchy, Macaulay surveys British history in the seventeenth century from a Whig standpoint, Woodrow Wilson glorifies the story of his country from the angle of democratic optimism. Nevertheless, they too agree with their respective opposite historians as to the chief principles. There is no Englishman who would banish Henry V from the series of his great kings because his useless French enterprise finally failed, and he did not subdue Scotland or anglicise the Irish. Is there any Frenchman who would blame St. Louis as an "alien criminal" because he violently subjugated the Midi and destroyed the flower of Provençal culture?

There is a famous example of the influence of political opinions upon historical judgment: the dispute about the advantage or disadvantage of the policy of the medieval emperors. The discussion, linked to the names of Sybel and Ficker, began in 1859 when the Hapsburg monarchy was ejected from the greater part of her North Italian possessions, when the German *Nationalverein* was founded to advocate Prussian hegemony. In this atmosphere Sybel blamed the acquisition of the imperial crown by the medieval kings and their waste of German blood for alien interests. Were the emperors right in marching again and again into Italy, placing their power at the service of the Papacy? Would they not have done better devoting themselves to the completion of the German kingdom, preventing the growth of feudalism and particularism, and restricting themselves to the consolidation of a unified national realm in France, England, and Spain? Sybel wished the German Question to be decided in the Prussian sense that excluded Austria from Germany; he repudiated Austrian ambitions in Italy and the anti-Prussian

politics of the South German States; and he transplanted these opinions to the Middle Ages. When he attacked the Ottonian, Salian and Hohenstaufen rulers, he was aiming in reality at Francis Joseph. In contrast to the Prussian Sybel, the Catholic Ficker defended the medieval emperors, not least because he sided with nineteenth-century Austria, and hoped to damage the Prussian party by condemning the particularism of the medieval princes, identifying the adversaries of Austria with the rebellious dukes in former times. Sybel and Ficker had in common the application of modern standards to medieval politics.

The German collapse after the Great War raised the old question under changed conditions. Medieval imperialism was charged with the loss of the war. Georg v. Below, the most radical antagonist of the medieval emperors, combined his attack on Barbarossa with an onslaught against democracy, liberalism, and the republic. The dispute about medieval politics culminates in the question why the emperors did not prefer to colonise and Germanise the present territories of Poland and of the Baltic States. The invasion of East Prussia by the Russian armies in 1914-15, the loss of Upper Silesia, Posen and West Prussia, the quarrels about Danzig, the precarious situation of German minorities in the Baltic and Balkan States, may seem to justify the blame. But the censure is unjustified. The medieval emperors never neglected the Eastern frontiers; Otto the Great, who initiated the policy of empire, simultaneously inaugurated the Christianisation and Germanisation of the Slavs; the reception of the crown at Rome and the foundation of the Archbishopric of Magdeburg, later the missionary centre for the East, are closely connected.

During the tenth and eleventh centuries, Germany was lacking in men as well as money for colonising districts scarcely populated and still waiting for cultivation, whereas the rich and civilised Mediterranean lands invited every bold conqueror. With the same reason one might ask why Peter the Great did not concentrate his efforts upon the conquest of Siberia. Or is it an argument against the empire policy of Chatham, Disraeli, Chamberlain, that the New England States finally broke away from the mother country, that the conquest and maintenance of the Sudan, South Africa, and India have required English blood and investments without absolute certainty as to the results? As to medieval imperial

policy in Italy, the only question was whether the German or the French king would make himself master of the Italian anarchy and the weakness of the Papacy. Is it not absurd to think that twenty rulers and their advisers, one after the other, have been fools enough never to make up an account as to the practicable and desirable aims of their policy? There is little if any difference, for instance, between the intentions of Barbarossa and his adversary Henry the Lion. In the same decades, when the emperor fought against the Lombard cities and the Pope, the duke built up an almost independent state in North Germany. Therefore, one school of opinion regarded him as a forerunner of the Hohenzollern realm, and Alfred Rosenberg, the official instructor of the Nazi Party, honours him as one of the "great rebels against the Holy Roman Empire" and an ideal for the Third Realm. Unfortunately, Henry the Lion cannot be considered as a conscious representative of Germanism. He had purely dynastic interests, whereas Barbarossa is at any rate the representative of a universal idea, the *Sacrum Imperium*. When Henry the Lion's son Otto was elected emperor, he, too, did not think of Eastern politics, but followed the line of all former emperors in the Papal coronation and an attack on Sicily. Henry the Lion would not have dealt with imperial politics in any other way.

Even more glorified than Henry is another "rebel," the Saxon duke Widukind, who opposed Charlemagne. "The question of Charlemagne or Widukind," states the organ of the Association of Teachers of History, "has become the touchstone of opinion nowadays." "We must cease to write *sine ira et studio*. To hell with all science which does not, ever and exclusively, start from and look at its own nationality as its highest and last goal!"

The critical examination, or rather the condemnation *a priori*, of Charlemagne is chiefly based upon racial prejudices. Racism, transplanted to Germany by the French Comte de Gobineau, completed by the Englishman Houston Stewart Chamberlain, raised to a dogma of the National Socialist Party by *The Leader*, sees the origin of all human civilisation in the Nordic race. This theory ascribes to the Germanic race a culture not only equal but superior to that of the ancient Mediterranean nations in ethics, religion, and nearly all branches of science. How does it happen that we

do not possess anything of the treasures of heathen Germanic civilisation? Where are the poems of the Nordic Homers and Horaces, where the products of the fine arts, philosophy and science? It is not difficult to answer: the Christian Church and her servants, primarily the Anglo-Saxon Winfrith-Boniface and the Frank Charlemagne, consciously and systematically destroyed all that. Charles the Frank—the title “the Great” has been banished—has been reproached with the subjection and Christianisation of the Saxons. The Saxons are held to have been the purest and, therefore, the most valuable German tribe; the Saxons, and not the Franks, were qualified for the political and cultural leadership of Germany. German history would have taken a better and more fortunate course if not the Frankish king Charles, but the Saxon duke Widukind, had triumphed. It is an amusing pastime, worthy of the satirical wit of Bernard Shaw, to imagine how history would have developed in that case. For serious historiography it is only a waste of time.

Boniface, by Christianising the German tribes, brought to them not only the eternal values of Christianity, but also a key to the genius of ancient civilisation. Charlemagne, by joining the Saxons with the Frankish Empire, laid the foundation of German nationality. A few decades after the subjugation of the Saxons, a Christian Saxon priest composed one of the most outstanding Old-German poems, the *Heiland* (Saviour). From Saxony, after a century, the dynasty of the Ludolfings, descendants of duke Widukind, founded the “First Realm.” Romanesque and Gothic cathedrals, the poem of Wolfram von Eschenbach and Walter von der Vogelweide, Master Eckhart and German mysticism—all the achievements of the following centuries prove the fertility of the fusion of ancient civilisation, Christian religion, and Germanic race.

But the crowd is taught less by the results of scientific research than by the desires of political opinions. Examples are more frequently supplied by historical novelists than by historians. The majority gathered their knowledge of religious and social life in the first century A.D. by reading *The Last Days of Pompeii* or Wallace’s *Ben Hur* rather than the *Cambridge Ancient History*. The age of Elizabeth and the Stuarts is best known from *Kenilworth* and the *Waverley Novels*. Millions of readers and spectators know the world-war from

Journey’s End or *All Quiet on the Western Front*; how many read a line in the volumes of the Committee of Imperial Defence?

The impetuous discussion about Charlemagne, in a larger sense about Germany’s Christianisation, has been decided for the multitude by the description the poet Hermann Löns gave of the combats of Charlemagne with the Saxons. The author was, in the decade before the Great War, one of the most popular poets of German youth. His heroic death for his country in 1914 still further increased his popularity, so that his condemnation of Charlemagne in the famous ballad of *The Red Rivulet* made a deep impression upon his numerous readers. This poem is to the same degree poetically impressive and historically untenable.

Löns describes the execution of 4,500 Saxons at the Aller rivulet near Verden, whom Charles had condemned to death for their repeated rebellion. In the poet’s eye, the Frankish ruler appears not as a judge but as a murderer; therein we have the origin of his nickname “Charles the Saxon-slaughterer.” From the historical point of view the execution of the Saxons cannot be separated from similar massacres, such as the murder of 700 Slav war-prisoners by Otto the Great in 955, and of the Old Prussian captives by the Teutonic Order (about 1245). All these horrible cruelties can only be understood in the light of that time. Four times the Saxons had broken treaties, solemnly confirmed by oath, and had treacherously slain Frankish troops. Charlemagne repaid perfidy by severity; he acted in conformity with the Frankish law of high treason.

There are, however, political causes which contributed to the unfavourable opinion of Charlemagne. The whole post-war time in Germany passed under the pressure of the Versailles Treaty. The more its weight was felt, the more animosity increased against all achievements of “western” civilisation. The actual political opposition against the victorious Powers was carried back to former periods, and the legend grew up that European West and South had been disastrous for Germany from the beginning of western history.

It is well known that popular opinion in France and Germany had disputed for long years whether Charlemagne was German or French. Each nation claimed the great

emperor, whereas he was neither the one nor the other, but a Frank. He is the hero of popular epics in France as well as in Germany. All European nations between the western and the Byzantine zone derived the name of "ruler" from the name of "Carolus" (e.g. Polish *król*, Hungarian *király*). Charlemagne is the common possession of all continental nations in the West, and it is a vain endeavour to reclaim him for one alone.

Those endeavours, however, are settled since Germany of to-day refuses Charlemagne. "He has been the chosen favourite of former cram-books, perhaps because the Frank brought schools to us. He cannot be introduced in a German school-book but as the 'Saxon-slaughterer.' Down with him!" Such is the verdict of a Nazi poet. An encyclopædia was forbidden in 1933 because in it "Charles called the Great" is quoted as German Emperor, whereas "the Verden massacre was un-German in its cruelty."

In comparison with Charlemagne the Saxon duke Widukind has been praised as the champion of true German spirit. Widukind was one of the leaders of the first Saxon rebellions (778-785). Unfortunately, his panegyrists forget that, three years after the Verden massacre, Widukind became a Christian and henceforward kept peace with the Franks. This "blot" on his character cannot be extinguished, but will be eliminated by the curious argument: "Christened Widukind concerns us no more."

When "the times are out of joint" it is risky to side with impartiality. The historian will scarcely be able to prevail with the arguments of scientific research, for they do not flatter the selfish aims of parties in control. Patriotism, respect for one's own nationality and hero-worship are of the highest value, and the scholar dare not neglect them if he is not to lose himself in the sphere of bloodless abstractions. Nevertheless, in view of all temptations of this or another kind, he must remain loyal to the maxim: *Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas*.

HISTORICUS.

RAPTUROUS RESORTS.

THOSE who harbour a preference for plenteous heat and ample sunshine, or to whom unusual scenes appeal, should steer for the lovely Balearics; particularly if, perforce, they must take their holidays late. For "Phœbus Apollo" presides almost continuously in those Mediterranean isles to the south of Barcelona: British money there, too, being still as good as ever, Spain's currency also resting no more upon gold.

Various-sized colonies of our countrymen are met with, nowadays, throughout the hamlets of those fifteen picturesque islands—large and small—that lie parallel to Spain's south-eastern coast. The cloudless skies and mild, equable climate common to this group have captured those wanderers who, enamoured of the prevalent, faint suggestion of the East, as well as of a past redolent of romance, have finally come to anchor there. Moorish ruins and relics, moreover, add charm to existence in the Balearics, where indented, rugged coasts and seas of marvellous beauty combine enchantingly with mountains, rocks and woods.

A life of primitive simplicity and cheapness, surrounded, in the larger centres anyway, by all the amenities of civilised life, has lured, as well may be imagined, many impoverished persons of not merely British but other nationalities to establish themselves upon these jewels of the Mediterranean, sometimes styled the Fortunate Isles, or Countries of Content. The islands in question, indeed, once belonged to us, our occupation of them having extended over three separate stretches of time—from 1713-56, from 1763-82, and from 1788-1803—which cover together a period of sixty-seven years!

In olden times the innumerable rocky caves seaming the cliffs of the Balearics formed an admirable base for the armed piracy once so rampant in Europe's Middle Sea. But when, at long last, this had been repressed for ever, and the islands had come to be considered as virtually a part of the Peninsula, it was Port Mahon, Minorca's excellent harbour—best, say mariners, of all thereabouts—which actually formed the prize struggled and fought for throughout the centuries by Spanish, French and British forces. At the end of Britain's first occupation of the Balearics, this fierce rivalry between

the Powers led, in fact, to Admiral John Byng being haled before a firing-party; to appease popular fury at the loss, with too little resistance, so some said, of the above-named fortress to the French. It was also this court martial, by the way, which led the witty philosopher, Voltaire, to vent his spleen, on hearing of this trial and its subsequent sentence, by minting that phrase of biting irony, "*Pour encourager les autres.*"

Steaming by night from Barcelona, the route commonly followed, travellers enter the harbour of Palma, capital of all the Balearics, on Majorca, the largest island, just as the sun has risen to gild its roofs and towers. Tourists and exiles naturally provide much of the livelihood of the natives of these lovely isles, where, in unparalleled surroundings, visitors may thoroughly enjoy tennis, picnics, bridge, bathing, boating and fishing; lobsters in Majorca's many coves and caves being the main catch provided by this last. Vines and olive trees, fruit and grain, are extensively cultivated too throughout the Balearics, while capers furnish an uncertain but always welcome harvest. These little black blobs, usually associated by us with steamed fish or boiled mutton, are the unopened buds of a bramble-like plant creeping there over ruins and most waste places. The buds of such vines, when gathered at their proper season by the nimble fingers of Mallorcan girls and women, are spread in the sun upon a clean linen cloth and dried for a few hours. They are sold then to local bottlers, who store them in barrels of strong vinegar. Afterwards they are put up in bottles of a milder vintage, and merged by wholesalers with the larger quantities coming from Sardinia, Corsica, and places along the Riviera coast.

A quite unusual degree of industry and a charming hospitality characterise the Mallorcans, who nowadays may be classed as belonging to the Spanish race, and as much akin to the Catalans. Crime is rare among this loyal and religious people, travellers invariably speaking with delight of the agreeable contacts they have made when sojourning amongst them. The islanders have evidently improved, for not always were they thus complaisant. Formerly, the caverns in Cabrera, south of Majorca, were used for confining the French captured in the Napoleonic Wars; the islanders having sided with Spain against "*le petit caporal.*" These prisoners were originally rushed to the above-mentioned

retreats to save them from the rage excited in the islanders at news of the excesses the French had committed in Spain. But once safely incarcerated, they were shamefully neglected, callously left, indeed, almost to perish of starvation!

At Arta, too, in Majorca itself, the land is honeycombed with caves containing numerous stalactites. Some of these caves are immense. And from one such once were taken five hundred men, a further two thousand and a quantity of cattle being taken from another, by James of Aragon at the time of the famous Conquest.

Grouped into two clusters lie these delightful islands—the Isles of Pines, consisting of two large and four tiny rocky spots to the south-west, and the Balearics proper, made up of Majorca, Minorca, and seven small islands, farther north and east.

As one enters Palma's fascinating port—the chief one in Majorca—its strange, foreign aspect makes an immediate impression. Sheer from the water-front rise not only the city's cathedral but the royal palace, and the *Lonja*, or public exchange. Which persons really were responsible for the planning of Palma's cathedral has never been ascertained. James Fabre, a Majorcan architect, certainly had at one time a deal to do with its construction, which extended, however, through many a century. The royal palace adjoining occupies the actual site, and, to some extent, embodies the very shape of the former abode of Majorca's vanished rulers. Its principal tower, the Tower of Homage, has always been, and still is, adorned with a large bronze angel, cast by Campredon in 1309. This finely-modelled guardian figure has served as a weathercock to many generations of islanders. Indeed, a local saying has grown up about this undoubted survival of over six hundred years, to the effect that an unstable man actually is "as the angel of the palace."

The recessed doorway of the chapel of Saint Ana, with its arch of three tiers of red jasper relieved by three round columns of the same stone, but yellow, is another interesting feature of the palace where once Majorca's former lords held court. But this chapel, of much interest both for architects and artists, is revered by the Mallorcans mainly as the last resting-place of the very much-travelled remains of Saint Praxedes, which in more pious days attracted to themselves vast quantities of priceless gifts.

Left of the cathedral and royal palace, as these are approached from the sea, stands Palma's famous *Lonja*: a magnificent, rectangular Gothic hall, begun in 1426 by William Sagra, the master-of-works of Majorca's fine cathedral. The proportions of this structure actually are perfect, its carvings superb, and its other ornamentations in very happy taste; while above the gable or canopy of its eastern doorway is a graceful study in stone of our modest Lady Saint Mary.

Two notable cross-roads almost facing each other are encountered right and left at about the ninth kilometre from Palma, travelling westward out of this city through the fishermen's quarters of Santa Catalina, the fashionable suburbs of El Terreno and Porto-pi, and finally rural Cas Catala. That to the left leads to the chapel of Portals, from the quarries at which spot came much of the stone employed for the cathedral. Extremely picturesque is the situation of this chapel, which stands on the common above an overhanging cliff; set round by matchless glimpses of sea and irregular shore, and backed by wooded mountains.

The road to the right runs straight to Bendinant—a modern mansion of curiously mixed architecture, the rooms of which now house many reminders of the conquest of this island from its former African possessors. Close by are the memorials which mark the spot where, on September 12th, 1229, Ramon and Guillem de Moncada, the famous brothers whom even death could not divide, fell fighting for James of Aragon in his struggle against the Moors. It was here that the Bishop of Barcelona celebrated the first Mass said upon the island after the Conquest. And an iron cross upon a base of stone, standing in a field, still keeps green the memory of the final crushing of the power of the Crescent within the Balearics.

Only slightly farther inland from these martial situations lie the hamlets of Calvea, Puigpunent, Galilea and Escapdella. They dot some of the most peaceful valleys in the island; the most picturesque being Galilea, spread across the summit of a gulch set high amid the hills. Re-descending to the plain eventually brings one to Andraitx. This is one of the very oldest settlements on the island, and its former port of San Telmo looks across the sheltered channel where the fleet of the Conqueror once made itself fast to the islets of Pantalea and rugged Dragonera; then sent its fighting men ashore upon Majorca in boats, rafts and spars!

No part of this island revels in greater wealth of natural beauty—of lovely valleys, fields bordered by rich woods, vistas of mountain summits, and below everything a boulder-strewn shore washed by the foam-edged, deep blue of the Mediterranean. This westernmost corner, too, cradles within it such hamlets as Estallenchs, Esperlas and Bañalbufar; this last celebrated as having been the scene of the first weeks of the hapless honeymoon of Georges Sand and Frédéric Chopin.

Curving up the coast-line, northwards and eastwards, Majorca's principal mountains rise sharply from the sea in a continuous chain that faces the shores of Spain. The foot-hills south of this long ridge flatten into an extensive plain occupying most of the remainder of the island. On the extreme south-east, this, too, is bordered by other, lower hills which reach their greatest altitude not far east of Palma. If one strikes up the gorges from the capital northwards into the mountains, a steady climb brings one eventually to the picturesquely placed monastery of Valldemosa, for ever a resort of pilgrimage for lovers of music, as well as for all persons addicted to romance. For there, on November 27th, 1838, arrived the great Chopin, accompanied by Georges Sand, her children and a maid. At this wondrously situated spot the famous Pole had his all-but-fatal illness, and here, along with the passionate French woman writer, he spent the latter portion of his tragic love-making. Memories of these two caged hearts crowd thick upon one in looking from the monks' cells here away towards Miramar, Deya and Soller—enchanted city in a vale of orange groves; while on either hand and behind one roll wooded mountains, height upon height, and to one's left spreads the sea—a wide expanse of matchless blue!

Majorca's place-names, such as Buñola, Binisalem, Lloseta, Lluchmayor, Alcudia, Inca, Arta, Manacor, Felanitx, Randa, remind one of the departed Moors and strike a northern ear most curiously; the last bringing back memories of Majorca's most famous son. Still revered all over the island is the name of Ramon Lull; the sensual young courtier who, becoming converted, changed first into a recluse and afterwards into a notable missionary. The son of a noble who fought alongside James of Aragon at the Conquest, he was born in January 1235. On turning hermit, he retired to the slopes of Randa—

a peak of twin summits some thirty kilometres east of Palma. Missionary ardour, however, later sent Lull travelling through northern Africa, where he was stoned to death at last outside Bougie in 1315 for preaching against Mohammedanism.

In the towns of Majorca's central plains a native cloth is woven. The blue and white colours of this material create a most delicious sense of coolness in the heat prevalent for several months throughout the Balearics. Renowned among these resorts, too, is Petra—birthplace of Juniperro Serra—which thus is directly linked with the United States of America. For this celebrated Serra had the enterprise to send out a party of French missionaries to California. And it was from the settlement these monkish brethren founded that eventually arose the present flourishing city of San Francisco!

Iviza and Fomentera, although in themselves comparatively small, are by far the largest units of the Balearics' southerly, more western group, known locally, as already mentioned, as the Isles of Pines. The other four islands in this collection, indeed, are little more than expanses of undulating earth and outcropping rocks. Notwithstanding their limited area, however, the foregoing two isles possess the greatest variety of scenery and the most fruitful soil of any members of this truly romantic chain. They cannot compete for all that with the larger islands to the north and east, in particular with Minorca, or Majorca, which, from their size, situation, and more numerous and bigger settlements, immeasurably surpass them in importance.

THEODORE RUETE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE LEAGUE AND SANCTIONS

ITALY'S quarrel with Abyssinia, whatever value it may otherwise have to the political philosopher, has thrown some light on the theory and the practice of the League of Nations. When the League was constituted in 1919, it was based upon the assumption that all the Great Powers in the world, including the United States, would be embraced within its membership. There are seven Great Powers: the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan. The theory was that if the nations of the world were agreed that there should be no more war, there probably would be no more war. But it was essential to that theory that the Great Powers should form the backbone of the organisation. In 1919 it was confidently expected that the theory would work, because at that time the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan were the effective total of the world's Great Powers. Germany was regarded as an outcast for one reason; Russia for another. The question was, not whether Germany and Russia would consent to complete the composition of the League of Nations, but whether and when they would themselves qualify for the privilege of membership.

The outlook therefore seemed good. Peace was to be imposed upon the world. Granted a true, that is a full, League of Nations, no difficulty arose about the "sanction" for preserving the peace. All that was necessary was that the members of the League should undertake collectively to punish an aggressor, and to regard him as an aggressor against the whole body of the League. On the then prevailing hypothesis such a machinery seemed simple, almost foolproof. As is the case with all good sanctions, its strength would lie in its very semblance of strength, the effect of which would be to dissuade any party from ever putting it to the test. An analogy may be drawn from the factor of "confidence" in the financial field. In the event of a winding-up none of the big five joint-stock banks in London could possibly be solvent, because their assets are so immense that the Stock Exchange could not absorb them in the event of an enforced sale. The market itself would crumble. In the autumn of

1931 the banks triumphed only because the public assumed them to be sound. A run on the banks would have ruined them. Similarly, a really representative League of Nations would attract such confidence that its sanction against war need never even be invoked.

The best laid schemes of mice and men, however, gang aft agley. When the United States Congress refused to participate in the League of Nations, despite its joint American authorship, the League for all major practical purposes had lost its virtue. True, it has dissuaded sundry small states from engaging in war, though it has not been uniformly successful even in the case of small states. Bolivia and Paraguay, for example, could in the long run ignore Geneva. In the hypothesis of a Great Power being disposed towards war, or towards any other violation of the Covenant, the League of Nations "sanction" was unconvincing, and for that reason ineffective. Both Japan and Germany seceded from the League of Nations, and pursued the course they had set themselves. The present position is that of the seven Great Powers of the world, three (the United States, Germany and Japan) stand outside; a fourth (Italy) has joined issue with the League. In the case of Italy's dispute with Abyssinia therefore the "sanction" discussed at Geneva was not in effect a League of Nations sanction at all; but a Franco-British combination against Italy. If, in the case of Japan, the League of Nations had attempted anything so foolish as an "economic sanction," the only probable result would have been a war between Great Britain and the United States. A League of Nations' attempt to prevent Japan from doing business with other countries would have involved the British navy in the enterprise of forcibly preventing the United States from trading with Japan. Similarly, a League of Nations' attempt to prevent, say, Italian ships from passing through the Suez Canal would clearly involve Great Britain in a naval war with Italy in the Mediterranean. Even granting that the discrepancy between the League Covenant and the Suez Canal Convention of 1888 could be obviated, the theory of trying to prevent a war between Italy and Abyssinia by means of a war between Italy and Great Britain is odd enough to imply that some hidden force has been at work. Nor is that hidden force far to seek. It happens that in Great Britain the League of Nations has taken popular root as one

of the great causes. The cause is pursued with a grim disregard of the facts. The prestige of the League of Nations Union typifies that cause, and constitutes a serious electoral factor. Speaking of the British people at the League Assembly on September 11th last Sir Samuel Hoare said: "It is because they cling to this ideal that they would be deeply shocked if the structure of peace to which they had given their constant support were irrevocably shattered." On that occasion Sir Samuel Hoare made an impressive plea for using the League machinery, defective as it was, as the only available machinery for preserving the peace; and he faced the logic of his plea by making this remarkable statement: "In conformity with its precise and explicit obligations the League stands, and my country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression." Those whose business it was to explain British policy during the session of the Assembly in September protested that there was no question of Great Britain taking action against Italy except as one party in a general sanction, and that if there was to be "war" between Italy and Great Britain on that score, there would by the same token be war between Italy and France, the Little Entente countries, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian countries. The British argument in short postulated French agreement, failing which there could be no League "sanction." It seemed fair therefore to put it that in essence it was a question of a Franco-British combination against Italy. What they further said in British official quarters was that if the League of Nations could not prevent Italy from annexing, or making war upon Abyssinia, it could not be expected to exert any restraining influence upon Germany in her designs upon Austria or Memel; that indeed Germany was watching events with a view precisely to assessing her chances of success in her extra-League course of European conquest. The critics of British policy asked: could it help the League or any good cause in Europe if Italy followed the German and the Japanese example and left it?

A FRANCO-BRITISH SANCTION?

The essential interest of what has happened at Geneva in relation to the Italo-Abyssinian dispute therefore derives

from the evolution of the French and the British attitude to the Covenant in its bearing upon that dispute. There have been several stages in that evolution. The first was reached during the night of May 24th-25th, when a dramatic meeting of the League Council achieved what looked like a triumph. On May 20th a telegram from the Emperor of Abyssinia had been circulated in which he made the charge, among others, that "Italy is illegally occupying an important part of Ethiopian territory," and accordingly asked that the Council should take steps to ensure the execution of the Covenant. Negotiations took place at Geneva between M. Laval, Mr. Eden, Baron Aloisi and M. Avenol. The Stresa front had not yet been broken by the Anglo-German naval agreement, and M. Laval gave full support to Mr. Eden's plea that the Covenant should be invoked. An agreement was reached. It was telephoned as a proposal to Signor Mussolini, who accepted it. It was then drafted as a resolution. The resolution noted that the two parties had agreed to settle the Walwal dispute in conformity with Article 5 of the 1928 Treaty; that they had nominated their arbitrators as provided by that Article; that they were in agreement in entrusting to these arbitrators the settlement of subsequent incidents; and that they had agreed to fix August 25th as the date on which the procedure of conciliation and arbitration should be concluded; and stated that the Council requested the Secretary-General to communicate to its members all information that might reach him from the two parties, in particular regarding the development of the arbitrators' work. It further stated that the Council, leaving to the two parties full liberty to settle the dispute in accordance with Article 5 of the 1928 Treaty, decided to meet if, in default of agreement between the four arbitrators for the settlement of the dispute, an understanding as to the selection of the fifth arbitrator; the Council also decided to meet to examine the situation if on August 25th the settlement by means of conciliation and arbitration had not taken place. It looked at that time as if the League had induced Signor Mussolini to take a pacific route to a settlement. Mr. Eden received a good Press on the ground that he had remained inflexibly firm at a moment when it looked as if the enterprise must fail; and it was he who suggested the three cardinal points in the proposal accepted by Signor

Mussolini. A French commentator described him as "*ce jeune homme terrible qui désire tant la paix.*"

Alas! at the beginning of June Herr von Ribbentrop and his delegation arrived in London to negotiate the naval agreement, and at the same time Paris plunged into one of its periodic Ministerial crises. The Stresa front was broken. A different Mr. Eden left London for Paris (June 21st), Rome (June 24th) and again Paris (June 27th), in an attempt to mend it. He found that Paris was full of mistrust of British policy and disposed not to jeopardise French friendship with Italy. He found Rome disposed to look upon Germany's triumph in London—for such it undoubtedly was—as a lesson that if Italy wanted to take the quickest way to achieving her ends in Abyssinia she must follow the example given jointly by Japan and Germany, and ignore the League of Nations. In the first week of July the French Government firmly intimated to the British Government its refusal to support Britain in any further immediate attempt to influence Italian policy, and went so far as to explain that France would not consent to jeopardise her friendship with Italy on account of the Abyssinian dispute. The British Government thereupon embarked upon the dual adventure of explaining away the naval agreement and appealing to France to support the League of Nations. Sir George Clerk, British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed to submit two considerations to M. Laval: (1) That when the negotiations for an air pact began, there could be no question of bilateral Anglo-German negotiations, and that therefore France would be able to withhold her acceptance of such a pact until she were satisfied of Britain's full loyalty to the Stresa policy; and (2) that French interests were as deeply engaged as British interests in averting any danger to the League and to the principle of collective security that might result from Abyssinia's being able to represent herself as a victim of Great Power aggression.

Sir Samuel Hoare seconded Sir George's efforts by a speech delivered in the House of Commons on July 11th in which he declared: "We have surely found in the past that it is possible to adjust demands and differences of this kind without recourse to war, and I am not prepared even now to abandon any chance that may present itself for averting what I believe will be a calamity, whether it be through the machinery of the 1906 Treaty, or whether it be through

the machinery of the League, or whether it be through both."

Through the diplomatic channel London and Paris thereupon began to explore in the first instance the possibility that the 1906 tripartite treaty might be made the instrument of an Italo-Abyssinian settlement. Its main attraction in a mediatory sense was that on the one hand it would engage the three Great Powers—France, Great Britain and Italy—in common action, and on the other hand it would postulate both Abyssinia's integrity and the safeguarding of Italy's legitimate economic interests. In his speech of July 11th, Sir Samuel, while stating that "as long as there is an effective League we are ready and willing to take our full share of collective responsibility," at the same time roundly ridiculed the notion of an Anglo-French "blockade of Italy."

In passing it is worth while to recall the relevance to the question of League sanctions, of the international status of the Suez Canal. The Convention respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal was signed on October 29th, 1888, by Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia and Turkey. The first article reads: "The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to all merchant or war vessels, without flag discrimination. Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree in no way to prevent the free use of the Canal in time of war as in time of peace. The Canal shall never be used for the exercise of the right of blockade." By contrast Articles 20 and 21 of the League Covenant read thus: "Article 20. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. Article 21: Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

Is the Suez Canal Convention "inconsistent" with the Covenant or does it qualify as an instrument for "securing the maintenance of peace"?

The conversations which led to the so-called Paris proposals began in Paris on August 7th, when M. Laval held a preliminary consultation with the British and Italian Ambassadors and fixed the date of the meeting as August 15th. Mr. Eden and Sir Robert Vansittart arrived in Paris on August 13th and saw M. Laval in advance of the meeting. On August 15th a series of informal talks took place between M. Laval and Baron Aloisi; M. Laval and Mr. Eden; M. Laval and Mr. Eden together, and the Abyssinian Minister, Mr. Teclé Hawariat; Baron Aloisi and Mr. Eden. On August 16th the Three-Power Conversations proper began at the Quai d'Orsay. Baron Aloisi is understood to have argued that the Italian claim to a virtual protectorate over Abyssinia was in principle recognised by the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 and by the correspondence which took place between the British and Italian Governments in December 1925. There is something to be said for the Italian claim, as can be seen from the British White Paper published on June 24th, 1926. As long ago as 1919 Italy had proposed that in return for British support of an Italian claim to a railway connecting Eritrea with Italian Somaliland through Abyssinia, Italy should support a British claim to a concession from Abyssinia for barrage works at Lake Tsana, the object of which would be the improvement of the flow of water into the Blue Nile. In 1919 the British Government rejected the Italian suggestion, but accepted it in December 1925. The further promise was then made to Italy that if the barrage works were duly carried out, the British Government was prepared to recognise an extensive Italian sphere of economic interest in the west of Abyssinia. In the correspondence itself and in statements made by the British Foreign Secretary, it was emphasised that there was nothing in the proposed "deal" which conflicted either with the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 or with Abyssinia's sovereign independence. Concessions granted by Abyssinia logically resulted from an exercise of Abyssinia's sovereign rights.

The whole question of Italy's colonial expansion in Africa has been made difficult by the vagueness of the war-time promises made to Italy. Article 13 of the Pact of London of

1915, as a result of which Italy threw over the Triple Alliance and entered the war on the Allied side, promised that in the event of Britain and France receiving territorial additions in Africa as a result of Allied victory, Italy "might claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya, and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain." It was one result of the Pact of London that the Treaty of Versailles (Article 119) transferred to the Allies all Germany's colonial rights for their disposal. A further result was that a small slice of British Kenya was transferred to Italian Somaliland in May 1924.

In August 1935 however Mr. Eden rejected Baron Aloisi's argument relative to the correspondence of December 1925. The ground on which he rejected it is obscure. He and M. Laval then proceeded to draw up a series of proposals to be submitted to the Italian Government as a basis of negotiation. The two governments offered to use their "good offices" to obtain from the Abyssinian Government "very wide economic opportunities" for Italy in Abyssinia; to help in negotiating with the Abyssinian Government an understanding whereby the frontiers of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland should be safeguarded against attack and Italian subjects in Abyssinia should be protected; to suggest to Abyssinia that she should appeal to the League of Nations to be given economic help in the form of "collective assistance" from Great Britain, France and Italy. The proposal was that the new agreement should take the form of a four-Power Treaty between Great Britain, France, Italy and Abyssinia, which would supplant all the existing agreements, and from which the greatest share of benefit would fall to Italy. The proposal was subjected to the three conditions that Abyssinia's political integrity be respected; that the new scheme in its final form be freely accepted by Abyssinia; and that it be approved by the Council of the League of Nations. On August 18th the Italian Government's answer to the proposals was received in Paris. Italy in effect rejected the proposals and made a counter proposal that Italy should be given a dominant position in Abyssinia with French and British concurrence. The counter proposal in its turn was rejected by France and Great Britain.

The League Council duly met on September 4th. Mr. Eden

began by recalling the ineffective Paris proposals to Italy. He ended by affirming the British Government's consciousness of its responsibilities as a member of the League and its disposition "to use the machinery of the League." He did not specify that machinery, nor its use. M. Laval, with less vehemence, expressed the French anxiety to respect the Covenant, but placed his emphasis on his "will to serve peace." Baron Aloisi again rejected alike the Paris proposals and the assumption that Abyssinia's status was equal to Italy's. Professor Jèze outlined Addis Ababa's defence against Rome's charges, and the Council adjourned. On September 5th Baron Aloisi bluntly symbolised Italy's feeling by walking out of the Council chamber. By that time Rome had published its 5,000-word indictment of Abyssinia. Private consultations took place on September 5th and 6th, resulting in a proposal that a conciliation committee of five members, including France and Britain, should examine the facts and report to the Council. On September 5th Baron Aloisi objected that, if Italy be excluded from that committee, then the other signatories of the Treaty of 1906, namely France and Britain, must also be excluded. On the following day he waived that objection, and the committee was duly constituted by M. Laval, Mr. Eden, Colonel Beck (Poland), Señor Madariaga (Spain), and Mr. Aras (Turkey). The Italian document issued in Geneva on September 4th fell into three parts, constituting a serious historical survey. The first part summarised relations between the two countries since the middle of last century. Instances were therein given of Abyssinia's deliberate violation of treaty pledges. The second part recounted the history of Abyssinia's membership of the League, originally sponsored as a friendly gesture by Italy herself. It contained the like burden of unfulfilled pledges and a proof, overwhelming in Italian eyes, of Abyssinia's unfitness for League membership. The third part contained documentary evidence and photographs illustrative of "atrocious practices" in Abyssinian life, in violation of "the fundamental principles of humanity and civilisation."

A diplomatic disturbance was caused on August 31st by the news that an oil concession had been sold by the Emperor of Abyssinia, who needed cash for obvious purposes, to an obscure concern called the African Exploitation and Development Corporation. It was negotiated by a British subject.

The humour of the matter had a grim effect in Paris as well as in Rome. On September 3rd, however, it emerged that the beneficiary company was a subsidiary of the Standard Oil group in New York. The British Government protested its innocence, and urged the withdrawal of the concession. Washington splendidly exonerated London. Addis Ababa bowed to the storm, and the concession was abandoned. The Council therefore met on the following day in the exclusive atmosphere of its own trouble.

Throughout the following week Geneva was concentrated upon an exploration of the Covenant's relevance to the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. On September 7th the Council gave way to the Committee of Five, M. Laval and Mr. Eden having first expounded to the Committee the Paris proposals of August 16th. Sir Samuel Hoare arrived in Geneva on September 8th in readiness for the meeting of the Sixteenth Assembly, which was to begin on September 9th. As could have been foreseen, the Committee of Five quickly escaped its work by merely appointing a sub-committee of itself to examine the Italian memorandum of September 4th. The Assembly duly met on September 9th. Fifty-five countries were represented, twenty-four of them by their Foreign Ministers. Dr. Benesh, who holds the unique record of having been continuously in office since the war, was elected President. Sir Samuel addressed the Assembly on September 11th. The essential sentences of what he said have been quoted above. Two months before, on July 11th last, when he addressed the House of Commons, he said: "As long as there is an effective League we are ready and willing to take our full share of collective responsibility." Only his emphasis, not his substance, had changed in the intervening period. Now, as then, the substance was that League action must be "collective." In Berlin, as in Rome, therefore, eyes were turned to Paris. M. Laval delayed his speech till September 13th. In the meantime he had shown the courtesy and the precaution of displaying a draft of his speech to Signor Mussolini. He, of course, protested French loyalty to the Covenant. But he placed his greatest emphasis on the need of European solidarity. He recalled the Franco-Italian agreement of January 7th. He recalled Stresa. He recalled the Franco-British initiative of February 3rd for a European appeasement. He emphasised "the value which I attach to

the maintenance of such solidarity in the very interests of the European community and of general peace." On September 11th M. Corbin, the French Ambassador in London, asked the Foreign Office in London whether British readiness to resist aggression, as announced that day by Sir Samuel Hoare, applied to Central Europe (that is, to Austria) as well as to Africa. Both M. Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare were in Geneva on that day. The procedure of inquiry at the Foreign Office in London was presumably dictated by the French desire for formal assurances. Sir Samuel returned to London by air on September 13th after hearing M. Laval's speech. The French question had not yet been answered, when this paper was written. In one sense the inquiry was unnecessary, because Sir Samuel's formula was comprehensive. In another sense it was clearly dictated by the apparent discrepancy between what Sir Samuel said on September 11th and the former British refusal to enter into any precise commitment about Austria.

There was, however, much more in the French inquiry than struck the eye. It is no secret that the outbreak of war between Italy and Abyssinia was by then regarded as inevitable. The real object therefore of the exchanges that were taking place between London and Paris was to consider what could be the method of stopping the war on the first opportunity, and of dealing with any of the potential European complications. A German *Putsch* in Austria was one of the hypotheses to be considered.

BERLIN, KOVNO, AND MEMEL

Representations were made to the Lithuanian Government on September 12th by the French, Italian and British Governments. They were in effect also addressed to Berlin. As guarantors of the Memel Statute it was the clear duty of the Three Powers to demand an assurance from Kovno that the elections of September 29th would be conducted in accordance with the terms of the Statute. In that respect no difficulty was anticipated about the necessary assurance being given. Article 1 of the recently revised Electoral Law duly declares that "The members of the Diet of the Memel Territory are elected by general, equal, direct and secret ballot in accordance with the fundamental principles of proportional representation." The doubt that had been thrown upon Lithuanian

good faith originated in the intensive German propaganda that had been waged for many weeks. The point at issue was the disfranchisement by the Lithuanian authorities of certain Germans alleged by Lithuania to have been imported into the territory for the precise purpose of voting on September 29th. The relevant Article of the revised electoral law (Article V) prescribed that the following three categories of residents in the Memel territory should neither vote nor be eligible for membership of the Diet: (1) Persons who have acquired Lithuanian nationality by naturalisation; (2) persons who, having opted for Lithuanian nationality, hold the promise of a foreign State to grant them its nationality; (3) persons who have belonged to an organisation which, in conformity with the Court's judgment, has pursued the object of depriving the Lithuanian State of its independence or of detaching a portion of Lithuania's territory, if five years have not yet elapsed since the judgment of the Court." A semi-official statement issued on September 13th in Kovno, referring to the representations made by the three Powers, declared: "We confirm that these suggestions are in full conformity with the attitude of the Lithuanian Government and its executive measures. The representatives of the signatory Powers were so informed on the 13th inst. (Friday)."

The German interest in the representations of the Powers derived from the reminder that if the German Government had any complaint to make about the Lithuanian Government's behaviour, its proper procedure was to use the machinery provided in the German-Lithuanian Treaty of 1925, whereby all such cases should be submitted to a mixed commission. So far Germany had refrained from using that machinery. The three Powers were commendably anxious not to give the German Government a handle for the charge of being biased against Germany; but the anger caused in Berlin by their ostensible representations to Kovno was proof enough of their underlying sympathy with the Lithuanian Government in its unequal struggle with the stronger German Government, whose activities in the Memel territory have been distinguished by no greater scruple than have Hitlerist activities elsewhere.

September 15th, 1935.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE FALL OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC.*

Mr. Clark has written an authoritative and arresting account of one of the greatest tragedies of our time. The birth of German democracy was welcomed in the dark months following the war as one of the encouraging factors in a world torn with suffering and strife. Many people agreed with President Wilson's view that we had been fighting the Kaiser and the German militarists, not the German people. No Englishman sympathised more deeply than Mr. Clark with the efforts of a politically inexperienced nation to rebuild its life on new foundations, and to-day nobody grieves more bitterly over the failure of the experiment. This substantial volume enshrines his hopes, his disappointments, and his criticisms. Starting with the conviction that liberty is the supreme social and political good, he traces the vicissitudes of the struggle and sketches the principal actors on the crowded stage. Having watched the evolution of the drama at close quarters for many years he writes with the realism of an eye-witness and the passion of a born democrat.

* R. T. Clark. *The Fall of the German Republic*. Allen & Unwin. 15s.
VOL. CXLVIII.

Mr. Clark knows far too much to imagine that Hitler overthrew the Weimar régime by a blow of his fist. His path to power was cleared by the timidities, the rivalries and the stupidities of the Republican leaders. Attacked by the Die-hard Nationalists on the right and the growing power of the Communists on the left, the middle parties should have stood firmly together against the wreckers. For the real struggle was not between the socialists and the bourgeoisie, but between the friends and foes of constitutional government. Democracy is a poor affair without leaders, and never more so than in times of crisis. The Weimar régime produced one statesman of the first rank whose praises fill many pages. But his work killed him, and his premature death moves the author to the most eloquent passage in the book.

During the war Stresemann had been as wild as the rest, but he gradually adapted his mind to the new situation, growing in wisdom and stature with experience and responsibility. Liberty at home and co-operation with the Western Powers was his programme. Mr. Clark defends the writer of the famous letter to the Crown Prince from the charge of insincerity. The Locarno policy, he points out, meant ultimate revision, not surrender. It renounced aggression, not the hope of restitutions. No German could be expected to accept for ever the sacrifices imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, any more than the French had accepted the settlement of 1871. The only question was whether changes were to be made by violence or consent. Mr. Clark applauds both the domestic and foreign aims of his hero, and castigates the short-sighted politicians who put obstacles in his way. "For eight years he had borne alone Germany's destinies on his shoulders, as the men who fought at Marathon had borne alone the fate of Europe on the points of their long spears." It is perhaps a little exaggerated, for he had good comrades in the fight. But it is impossible to overpraise his patriotism, his strength of purpose, and his vision. His greatness is measured not only by his achievements but by comparison with his rivals and associates. Mr. Clark's portrait gallery presents a strange variety of types. Ebert was a good bourgeois, Hugenberg able but utterly selfish, Seldte, the founder of the Stahlhelm, honest but commonplace, Hermann Müller, the thoughtful Socialist Chancellor, the most attractive of them all.

With the death of the great architect new problems and

fresh actors swarm on to the stage. Stresemann had left the Republic in good repair: could his successors keep the structure intact? The foreign situation was easier; but the economic blizzard, which started from New York in 1929, burst upon Europe in 1930, toppling over banks, doubling the army of unemployed, and driving millions of Germans into the arms of the extremists. Hindenburg wanted Hermann Müller to grapple with the situation. General Schleicher, however, the political brain of the army, secured the appointment of Brüning, a brave, able, high-minded, unselfish man who struggled gallantly against adversity for two years, but unfortunately lacked the gift of popular appeal. A doctor, but not a leader, declares our author. Any Chancellor would have lost popularity at such a time, and in the spring of 1932 he was unceremoniously evicted by the President whose re-election he had just striven successfully to secure. Mr. Clark is by no means sparing in his censures, and the figure of Schleicher, the prince of intriguers, comes out very badly in these dramatic pages; but he is curiously indulgent to the old President, whose reputation would have stood higher in history had he died at the beginning of 1932.

The substitution of Papen, a mediocre reactionary, for Brüning opened the flood-gates and signed the death-warrant of democracy. He and Schleicher soon quarrelled, and neither of them possessed sufficient following in the Reichstag or the country to bar the advance of the Nazis, who had capitalised the sufferings and discontent of their fellow-citizens for the benefit of their own revolutionary aims. Mr. Clark's narrative ends with the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor, the Reichstag fire, and the elections of March 5th, 1933. But the story of the struggle for power reveals the Leader and his comrades almost as clearly as the tale of the Dictatorship. Hitler appears as thoroughly second-rate both in mind and character, excelling only in the vulgar arts of a purveyor of patent medicines, promising all things to all men in the struggle for power, a cunning petty bourgeois, suspicious, neurotic, fanatical, irresolute. Is that the whole man? Perhaps it is too soon to answer the question. Of his lieutenants Gregor Strasser is declared to have possessed the best brain, and Mr. Clark wonders how he would have developed had he not been murdered by his old comrades in the blood-bath of June 30th, 1934.

The volume closes with the Reichstag session of March 16th, 1933, on a note of anger and bitter grief. "The dictatorship was established in legal form; the German republic had ceased to be. And in its place came horror, a horror that is still with us and has plunged Germany back into that savagery from which the Western world may yet live to regret she ever emerged—legal horror, cultural horror, artistic horror, moral horror, physical horror. . . . And the greatest horror of all is that when freedom went down into bloody darkness, not one German, not one descendant of Arminius, was taken arms in hand and fighting, except a poor Jewish boy driven crazy by seeing his mother battered into unconsciousness before his eyes."

G. P. G.

A POET IN WONDERLAND.*

The subject of Mr. de la Mare's book, as indicated by its full title, makes an instant appeal to all child-lovers; this is enhanced by his happy instinct in selection, and by his understanding—so far as is possible to any adult—of the child-mind. It is a fresh and dewy posy that he has gathered, from descriptions of children in literature, from his own recollections, and those of others who have had the gift of remembrance; or from the writings of such children as were able to set down their thoughts and experiences as they occurred. The result is a comprehensive study of infancy and youth, in their varied aspects, grave and gay. Any "foolish notion" of condescending to children, explaining them, or dogmatising about them, is expressly disclaimed. Mr. de la Mare's lovely writing, with its inwoven literary allusions, gives the reader constant thrills of delight, as do the quotations chosen for chapter headings.

Most of the children described here became famous later; their early days were passed under very different auspices, but the same notes recur in many records. Such, for example, are the first instant of self-realisation (Jean Paul Richter's "I am a ME"); the marvel of other discoveries; first impressions generally ("fresh, novel, vivid, sharp, engrossing,

* *Early One Morning in the Spring*: Chapters on Children and on Childhood as it is revealed in particular in *Early Memories* and in *Early Writings*. By Walter de la Mare. Faber and Faber. 1935. 21s.

dumbfounding sensations"); affection or dislike for some person; love of solitude, of Nature, or of reading. We find, too, bright and definite pictures of places (the leisurely travel of earlier days favouring these); delight in imaginings of "making-up," in home-made treasures and in "collecting." But the morning sky has its clouds, the April garden its lurking shadows of sorrow or even terror. Bereavement, home-sickness, timidity, nervous alarms by day or night, bugbears, religious or other (less frequent, one hopes, nowadays), instances of childish heartlessness—these also figure in many recollections. The child often suffers too from a lack of real comprehension by "grown-ups," even the best-intentioned; he remains aloof, his inner citadel not to be taken by coaxing or force. He has his own ideas, says Mr. de la Mare, of what is serious, and resents flippant handling of it: "he may consent to be amusing, never, against his will, to be amused." How little of a child's true self, he points out, can be measured by "intelligence tests." There have been many instances of prodigies gifted with a mechanical or "parrot memory," as contrasted with imagination. The absorbed, daylong "busyness" of even young children is noted, and the "odd" fact that there is "comparatively little mention" of food "in early autobiography"—certainly less than of clothes. References to school are not on the whole enthusiastic. One reads with incredulous horror that "even within the limited range of autobiography referred to in these pages there are no fewer than nine public executions" recorded as witnessed in childhood by their writers, Carlyle and Hardy among them.

Statistics prove that very few recollections date from an earlier age than three, though Henry James remembered driving through Paris before he was two! The first twelve years are, naturally, the richest in impressions. Children's diaries and letters, we are reminded, are sometimes written with a view to the parental eye; of the letters given here, some are in stilted language, others more natural. The best-known diary is darling Marjory Fleming's, "it is as if one stood peering through its bottle-glass window-panes into a brightly-lit toy shop." Some of the child poets show remarkable promise in thought and diction, as the 14-year old Poe does with his precocious poem "To Helen." But first place must, we think, be given to the rhythm of a little girl, "dictated to her mother when she was three months under

five"; it describes a dream-princess, and has these lines of rare beauty:

I may not even see her
But still, but still, her steed will arrive soon,
I could kiss her feet, as she stands
among the leaves, her loveliness and her long hair—
The world is perfect because she's there . . .

But one could quote endlessly from Mr. de la Mare's anthology. In a future edition, he might draw from Lady Acland's exquisite *Good-bye for the Present: the Story of Two Childhoods*. His illustrations—portraits of famous men and women, mostly literary, in childhood—are all of interest; one of the most graceful is of Hazlitt at 13; Jane Austen looks charmingly vivacious, and the infant Emerson preternaturally solemn, while the group of the 3-year old Thackeray and his parents cannot fail to provoke mirth.

E. G. S.

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ST. THOMAS OF CANTERBURY.*

Mr. Eliot's play presupposes the dominating presence of the *dramatis persona* mentioned in the title: Canterbury Cathedral. It was written for a Canterbury festival; and the reviewer, who did not witness the performance, has tried to atone for the disability by recalling that environment and the spell it casts, stones which testify and the ghosts of centuries. Other *personæ* imposing conditions on presentation were the twentieth-century spectators whose appreciation rewarded actors and producers, and of whom the author is so conscious that he discards classic convention towards the close for an ironic burlesque. Becket's murderers defend themselves in platform style, appealing to the sympathies of a British audience. Mr. Eliot, no more than Bernard Shaw in *St. Joan*, can forgo the preacher's claim to supplement the dramatist; although his play fittingly ends with the penitential chant of the chorus, the Women of Canterbury. They represent "the small folk drawn into the pattern of fate, the small folk who live among small things."

We did not wish anything to happen.
We understood the private catastrophe,

* *Murder in the Cathedral*. By T. S. Eliot. Faber and Faber. 5s. net.

The personal loss, the general misery,
Living and partly living;
The terror by night that ends in daily action,
The terror by day that ends in sleep;
But the talk in the market-place, the hand on the broom,
The night-time heaping of the ashes,
The fuel laid on the fire at daybreak,
These acts marked a limit to our suffering.

The doom they are powerless to avert they have foreseen;
after its accomplishment they praise God for His glory
revealed in creation, but beforehand Nature appears godless,
thronged with evil portents.

What is woven on the loom of fate.
What is woven in the councils of princes
Is woven also in our veins, our brains,
Is woven like a pattern of living worms
In the guts of the women of Canterbury.

This sense of impending doom shared by all participants is reminiscent of Greek tragedy; but the effect of dramatic power and craftsmanship would be enhanced if prose and verse were less intermingled and uneven in quality.

St. Thomas in those last hours face to face with death is inevitably spiritualised, purged of mortal dross. In finely conceived dialogues, of which the form and classic restraint match the conception, four tempters strive to undermine his constancy. The first two recall former temptations, urging him to conciliate the king by resuming earthly gaieties

Flutings in the meadow, viols in the hall,
Laughter and apple-blossom floating on the water,

and the temporal powers of Chancellor.

To set down the great, protect the poor,
Beneath the throne of God can man do more?

The third who advocates alliance with the barons against the king is dismissed with greater contempt although he evokes a confession:

To make, then break, this thought has come before,
The desperate exercise of failing power.
Samson in Gaza did no more.
But if I break, I must break myself alone.

It is the fourth who is formidable, appealing to motives discerned by modern critics.

Seek the way of martyrdom, make yourself the lowest
On earth, to be high in heaven.

The religious martyr is suspect to-day, thanks to the investigations of psychologists, and St. Thomas forestalls them.

Is there no way, in my soul's sickness
Does not lead to damnation in pride?

The last temptation is the greatest treason :
To do the right deed for the wrong reason.

He finds deliverance by faith in God's over-ruling power and guidance ; and proclaims that faith to the audience, during the Interlude, by preaching a sermon to them :

A martyrdom is never the design of man ; for the true martyr is he who has become the instrument of God, who has lost his will in the will of God, not lost it but found it, for he has found freedom in submission to God. The martyr no longer desires anything for himself, not even the glory of martyrdom.

His opening speech in the drama contains another version of the same thought which is embodied in the final utterance of the fourth tempter :

Neither does the actor suffer
Nor the patient act. But both are fixed
In an eternal action, an eternal patience
To which all must consent that it may be willed,
And which all must suffer that they may will it.

The actions of St. Thomas had exasperated many people and perplexed many more, as the play indicates, before that perplexity was shared by historians ; but his contemporaries were startled into a passion of veneration, which is shared by millions to-day, for the Christian Archbishop who was willing to be broken for the Church's cause, who cried to the frightened priests who had barred the cathedral doors :

Unbar the doors! throw open the doors!
I will not have the house of prayer, the church of Christ,
The sanctuary, turned into a fortress.
The Church shall protect her own, in her own way, not
As oak and stone ; stone and oak decay,
Give no stay, but the Church shall endure.

The determining factor in history lies not in opportunism or statecraft as princes in Church and State have proved to their cost. "Small folk" like the Women of Canterbury never attach undue importance to their endeavours.

Destiny waits in the hand of God, shaping the still unshapen :
I have seen these things in a flash of sunlight.
Destiny waits in the hand of God, not in the hands of statesmen.

D. P. H.

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THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.*

The recent foundation of the New Commonwealth Institute, under the presidency of Professor H. W. V. Temperley, has given a fresh impetus to the study of international progress. Taking up the work previously performed by the Research Bureau of the International Section of the New Commonwealth Society, the Institute is devoted to the "study of fundamental principles of international relations and research into the particular problems of international justice and security." The establishment of peace is the supreme task of mankind and intensive consideration of the efficacy of law to satisfy all the needs of international life is both a necessary precedent and a stimulant to its practical application. This vast field of investigation has been classified by an Advisory Research Committee, containing names of the highest academic reputation, into the three categories of Principles of International Relations, Questions of International Justice, Law and Equity, and Problems of International Security. Under these headings the Institute has already issued a number of research monographs.

The first publication, *The Legal Process and International Order*, by Professor Hans Kelsen, is a short and provoking

* The New Commonwealth Institute Monographs. Constable. i, *The Legal Process and International Order*, by Hans Kelsen, 2s. net. ii, *The Power of the International Judge to give a Decision ex æquo et bono*, by Max Habicht, 4s. 6d. net. iii, *The Contribution of English Equity to the Idea of an International Equity Tribunal*, by Wolfgang Friedmann, 4s. 6d. net. iv, *William Ladd: An Examination of an American Proposal for an International Equity Tribunal*, by Georg Schwarzenberger, 4s. 6d. net. v, *The Theory and Practice of International Policing*, by Hans Wehberg, 4s. 6d. net. vi, *A Plan for the Organisation of a European Air Service*, by Rear-Admiral R. N. Lawson, 2s. 6d. net. vii, *New Commonwealth Quarterly*. 2s.

thesis based upon the intimate connection between the technical evolution of law and the progress of international organisation. He argues in particular from the evolution of municipal law where primitive self-help is followed first by judicial decision and thereafter by the growth of an executive power which assumes the execution of sanctions judicially allowed to the injured party. Similarly between States,

self-help cannot be eliminated, nor can it be curtailed until the much more serious question of auto-decision on the question of right or wrong has been disposed of.

The immediate task is for all States to agree to refrain from "any interference in the guise of a sanction" until empowered by judicial decision. To meet the contingency of interference before the Award, the Court is to permit the other party to take emergency action to resist such coercion. Professor Kelsen argues that no hypothetical considerations as to the meaning of aggression will arise, for the simple formula "no coercion without authorisation" of law will designate the offender. This stage in international law has not been reached, and an international police force must wait until the "restricted self-help," or sanction permitted by the Court, is being collectively enforced by a group of Powers. Disarmament belongs to an even later stage when an international executive has evolved from the collective enforcement of judicial acts.

Professor Kelsen's proposals are based upon the acceptance of arbitration in all disputes, and three monographs, under the second category of research, are devoted to the problem of an international equity jurisdiction which may eliminate, in Professor Kelsen's words, "the hypocritical and fateful distinction between justiciable and political disputes." The one of most practical interest is Dr. Max Habicht's volume, *The Power of the International Judge to give a Decision ex æquo et bono*. The author examines some fifty post-war Agreements, including the Statute of the World Court and the General Act of 1928, which provide for the application of equitable principles by mutual consent as well as positive law in deciding disputes. Dr. Habicht concludes that such equity jurisdiction is not designed to supplement, but rather to override the legal rule. "A decision *ex æquo et bono* will be contrary to the obtaining rules of international law in so far as they are not

equitable." The competence of the judicial decision in the so-called "non-justiciable" dispute has been widely recognised and Dr. Habicht sees a beginning of the compulsory *ex æquo et bono* settlement in some minor Agreements where one party may demand a decision in equity. As Dr. Habicht says, the equity judgment is a form of legislation "which reflects to a certain extent the legislative machinery that is lacking," and has its counterparts in Roman and English law. The latter point is elaborated by Dr. W. Friedmann in *The Contribution of English Equity to the Idea of an International Equity Tribunal*. The historical achievement of the English Chancellor in supplementing and ameliorating the Common Law in a particular case within the limits of defined principles of conduct has an important bearing upon the potentialities of international law, although, as Sir William Holdsworth says in his preface, the progress of English Equity was ultimately based upon force. Dr. Friedmann, however, does not stress historical parallelism so closely as Professor Kelsen. "It is impossible to reproduce primitive stages of jurisdiction by means of organisation," but he can well deduce from English legal history a general principle applicable to international law. William Ladd: *An Examination of an American Proposal for an International Equity Tribunal*, by Dr. G. Schwarzenberger, is another important comparative study. The author discusses the significance of Ladd's "originality" in vesting his Court of Nations with an equitable power "where treaties and laws fail of establishing the point at issue" and proceeds to argue its method of application at the present time.

The first of two monographs upon security is a learned and highly instructive volume in *The Theory and Practice of International Policing*, by Professor Hans Wehberg. After considering the various instances of international administrative police, he deals with the movements for an international force to enforce Awards and maintain the peace, and advocates the creation of a small nucleus of a force. He concludes, however, in line with Professor Kelsen, that a more general acceptance of international arbitration must precede its success. Rear-Admiral R. N. Lawson is more sanguine of this in his *Plan for the Organisation of a European Air Service*. He outlines a scheme for internationally controlled and decentralised air police, whose duty will be to stop "armed

to its Founder. In the third lecture an account is given of the depreciation of the historical element by Spinoza, Lessing and Kant, upon its importance for Hegel, and on the work of Croce, who boasts that he has stripped philosophy of those rags of "transcendence" which were left to her by Hegel, leaving history and religion entirely apart. The fourth lecture deals particularly with the view set forth by Mr. Oakeshott in his book, *Experience and its Modes*, that philosophy stands entirely apart from religion, science and practice, these three being subordinate, departmental and mutually exclusive activities of the human mind. In the supplementary chapter Mr. Webb discusses the attitude that should be taken towards such distinctive features of the Christian religion as the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection of Christ, the Institution of the Eucharist, and the Apostolic Commission. In the presence of modern criticism and scientific difficulties Mr. Webb holds that "the specifically Christian experience" should be held fast, which is that of "sharing in a life, the whole significance of which lies in its origin from the actual historical manifestation of One who had passed through death into a higher life and can impart to those who are in communion with Him the principle of this life, so as to enable them to determine in accordance therewith their reactions to their earthly circumstances." It will be seen from this brief account that this book deals with a subject of great importance and in a way that, though necessarily slight, is characterised by the competent thought and the breadth of view which we have learned to expect from its author.

J. S. L.

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Two books, *Slaves and Ivory** and *Abyssinia on the Eve*,† are among the volumes which provide a valuable account of conditions in Abyssinia, which is four times the size of the United Kingdom with a population of about ten million. The first is the second edition of a book written in 1925 by Major Henry Darley, who had spent many years in Abyssinia since the days of Menelik, first as a hunter and explorer in the interior and subsequently as British Frontier Agent at Maji. Few have experienced a more intimate knowledge of Abyssinian life than Major Darley, who describes as an eye-witness "the essential barbarism" of an anarchic feudal State in which a small dominant race enslaves, persecutes and decimates subject peoples and raids undisturbed neighbouring territory for slaves. "It is strange indeed," he writes, "that such a Government should be allowed to continue, with its rule, consisting, in practice, of murder, robbery, and slavery open and unblushing." That was ten years ago and the present conditions are discussed at greater length in attractive and moderate language by Mr. Ladislas Farago, who visited the country for the first time last spring. *Abyssinia on the Eve* contains all the

* Witherby. 7s. 6d. net.

† Putnam. 10s. 6d. net.

information on conditions and affairs which could be gleaned by a Press correspondent with special facilities who spent most of his time in or near Addis Ababa, and later in Ogaden, and who interviewed leading officials in addition to the Emperor and his Swedish military adviser, General Virgin.

The reader of this book is at once impressed by the tremendous odds against the Emperor and his band of young educated followers in their work of Europeanisation. The former has achieved a remarkable degree of political control over his feudal princes, but the pace of development is very slow. Economic resources remain untouched and communications undeveloped. Abyssinia enjoys only 200 miles of modern roads. Outside the capital social services, such as hospitals and schools, are negligible. Abolition of slavery was nominally decreed in 1924 and the absence of a transitional period is deplored by Mr. Farago, whose views on the treatments of slaves should be compared with Major Darley's. "They are in no way," says the former, "down-trodden pariahs. Slavery is a trade like a joiner's or a shoemaker's." "Slave-unemployment" and the horrors of secret trading internally and with Arabia have made their lot infinitely worse since 1924. "The slaves were happy then and did not want freedom." But the Emperor has made a beginning in progress and while the present crisis has united the nation, war will restore to power the "backward and pitiless" reactionaries. In spite of the lack of a trained army and the paucity of munitions, Mr. Farago foresees a drawn-out struggle in a wooded country where aircraft is useless and in which guerilla tactics, if persisted in, may extend the war for many years. He visited the Ogaden theatre in the south-east, and emphasises the difficulties of a campaign in that tropical and waterless region where intermittent stony desert and bush provide "infinite possibilities for camouflage." The vivid illustrations in both books, particularly in *Abyssinia on the Eve*, add materially to their worth. It may be pointed out that the British punitive expedition took place not in 1870, as stated by Major Darley at p. 111, nor in 1869, as Mr. Farago would have it at p. 59, but in the early months of 1868.

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Mr. Arthur Henderson's little book, *Labour's Way to Peace*,* is a clear and authoritative statement on the most difficult question of our time. An ex-Foreign Secretary speaks with authority, and it is encouraging to find that his experiences in Downing Street and Geneva have left his idealism intact. The essence of the problem is to find means of changing the *status quo* by consent, and the most important chapter is devoted to this topic. That discontent may be diminished by economic opportunity as well as by territorial revision is generally agreed, though the pooling of food and raw materials is a long way off.

* Methuen. 2s. 6d. net.

"Labour," he writes, "means business with the League and peace, and adopts an attitude on these vital issues that is fundamentally different from the attitude of other parties." This is an exaggeration, for different views are held by leading members inside the Labour Party as well as elsewhere. The book closes on the familiar Labour note that "the roots of war lie deep in the private profit-making system of production." Unfortunately they lie deeper still—in the imperfections of human nature. If private profit were superseded by national ownership, greedy and unscrupulous States could quarrel and fight on their own account. No living Englishman has worked harder than Mr. Henderson for the brotherhood of man; and every reader will be impressed by his passionate sincerity, even if he disagrees with some of his statements.

The late Sir John Alder Burdon fortunately was able to complete the editing of the third volume of *Archives of British Honduras*,* which covers the years 1841 to 1884, when the territory became a separate colony independent of Jamaica. The volume contains a digest of local documents, recording events of importance, as selected by Sir John's able committee, with a view to giving "without comment, a true picture of the conditions and difficulties, administrative, legislative, judicial, material, human and external, then existing." Unfortunately, from 1870 onwards the records become increasingly scanty, probably due to the burning of the Colonial Secretary's office in 1918. It is to be hoped that the proposed fourth volume, dealing largely with questions of policy, will come to fruition. Similar publications from all the colonies would greatly assist the colonial historian whose search for information is particularly difficult.

Pilsudski, Marshal of Poland† is an interesting little sketch of the late dictator's life by Mr. Eric J. Patterson, who has spent much time in Poland. Throughout this eulogy, the author is entirely sympathetic to all Pilsudski's aims and actions. "Through strength," he concludes, "Pilsudski has given contentment, security and specific progress" to Poland. The barest attention, however, is given to the post-war period and Mr. Patterson is content to generalise briefly upon the work and policy of the Marshal after his *coup d'état* in 1926. On the other hand, rather disproportionate space is given to his pre-war agitation in Russian Poland and to the expulsion of the Russian invaders by his great victory at the Battle of the Vistula in 1920. Proportionate compression is a matter of great difficulty and the dominant part played by Pilsudski in the foundation and growth of the new Poland is clearly disclosed in this little book.

* Sifton Praed & Co., 67 St. James Street, London, S.W.1. 7s. 6d. net, or 20s. net for the set of three volumes.

† Arrowsmith. 5s. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

NOVEMBER 1935.

THE CRUCIAL TEST OF THE LEAGUE.

IT has become a commonplace to say that the events which we are now witnessing constitute the crucial test of the League of Nations. It may be worth while to examine into this statement and to inquire wherein precisely this test consists. It is all the more desirable to do so since the view that is now commonly held in Great Britain about the character and functions of the League is by no means universally held by other members, even in Western Europe.

The first issue which is being put to the test is as to whether the League is an alliance or something essentially different from an alliance. There has always been a school of thought which has looked upon the League as a decorative façade behind which the play of alliances, as practised in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, would go on as before, perhaps even less subject to observation and disturbance. There have, indeed, been several treaties signed within the last fifteen years—some of them solemnly registered at the League and published in its Treaty Series—which gave frank expression to this point of view, entailing as they did obligations, such as neutrality in certain circumstances, that were plainly incompatible with the Covenant. The recent votes in the Council and the Assembly brought this issue to a head. Of the three satellites of Italy who dissented from their fellow members, Albania was the most explicit. Her representative stated outright that the treaty of alliance between his country and Italy prevented him from associating himself with the action about to be taken under the Covenant by his fellow members. In saying so, he put the claims of alliance above the claims of the Covenant and broke his faith to his fellow members, since the Covenant expressly provides that its obligations should be overriding. But he was only expressing in blunt terms a doctrine which has been widely espoused in recent weeks in the Press of many Continental countries, where the claims of "friendship" have been put in the balance against the claims of treaty obligation. The same doctrine even found expression in certain official declarations

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after the Italian violation of the Covenant had been placed on record.

Such utterances show how extremely difficult it is, in a world consisting of a limited number of states and a still more limited number of Great Powers, to establish an international system on a basis of principle. The vice of the old jingoism lay in following the doctrine "My country, right or wrong." The vice of the alliance system lies in thinking in terms of "My ally, right or wrong." In other words, the members of the League, in doing their work of justice under the Covenant, find it hard to put the traditional bandage over their eyes. Perhaps the mood of some of those who have been foremost in carrying out their duty is best expressed in the *bon mot* attributed to one of them at Geneva, who is reported to have said that he only succeeded in doing his work in the Sanctions Committees by refusing to allow himself to think of Italy and substituting for her an anonymous aggressor. This is better doctrine than that of those who are only supporting the League on the present occasion as a sort of dress rehearsal for future action against Germany. If Germany should violate the Covenant she would incur sanctions and the British people would assuredly not be behindhand in applying them. No one on the Continent need have any doubt about that. But they would be applied against her as a "Covenant-breaking state" and not as the traditional enemy of one European Power or the exponent of a different social and economic system from that of another. It is the inveterate habit of thinking in terms of alliances—a habit due to long-standing political conditions on the Continent—which is responsible for the consternation—no other word is appropriate—which was caused in France and over a large part of the Continent by the signature of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

British opinion is perfectly familiar with the distinction between an armaments agreement and a treaty of alliance. We favour the former and dislike the latter, except in special cases such as those of Portugal and Iraq. But it should have been realised in Whitehall that Continental opinion has never understood this distinction and that therefore the Naval Agreement was certain to be interpreted both by the Germans and by outside parties as a political *rapprochement*, to say the least. The haste with which it was signed and the nature of

the explanations which followed only increased the fear and suspicions aroused. It shattered confidence for the time being in wide circles of popular opinion, especially in France. Moreover it gave the enemies of the League and disintegrating forces in general exactly the opportunity that they had been waiting for. Thus we went into the present struggle on behalf of the Covenant with a very serious handicap against us. We have done a great deal since June to live down the Naval Agreement, but the process is not concluded yet. It is extraordinary that, after fifteen years of constant intercourse and co-operation with France and other Continental powers at Geneva, a psychological blunder of this magnitude should have been made.

The second issue which is being put to the test is whether the writ of the League is to run outside Europe. Our Government has stated—and rightly stated—that this is the last opportunity open to the League to prove its effectiveness in maintaining the rule of law. Expressed in terms of geography the meaning of this is simple. Owing to the absence of the United States, the writ of the League does not run in Asia east of Singapore—this was proved by the events of 1931 and the following years. Equally owing to the absence of the United States the writ of the League does not run on the American Continent. This was proved in the Chaco, where members of the League were allowed to carry on a war of attrition which lasted three whole years. These two instances do not prove that, unless or until the United States joins the League, a state of international anarchy must necessarily prevail in these regions. It may, and indeed should, be possible to make arrangements for international co-operation in the prevention of war under the Kellogg Pact. But the fact remains that the area left to the peace-preserving machinery of the League is greatly restricted. Broadly speaking, it consists of Europe, the Near and Middle East and Africa.

The view of the Government is that, if the League proves unable to assert itself in Africa it will be so discredited that it would not be worth while to maintain it in a truncated form for the affairs of Europe. The contrary opinion, held by many who are tainted with the "alliance" theory of the League, is that African affairs are "colonial" and that therefore the peace-preserving machinery of the Covenant does

not apply to them. "Colonial wars," are, on this view, in a class by themselves.

In challenging this doctrine and in insisting that Ethiopia should be treated exactly like any other member of the League, so far as the protection of the Covenant is concerned, the Government have taken a stand that will prove historic. It is hard for us to realise the far-reaching significance of the fact that the resources of the Covenant have been set in motion on behalf of a backward non-white people against a European Great Power. It is a reversal, not in words but in deeds, of the philosophy of white supremacy which was still strong enough in 1919 to keep the affirmation of racial equality out of the Covenant and thus to inflict a lasting wound on the sensibility of the Japanese. No doubt, when faced with the issue, we could "do no other." But the fact remains that the decision was taken and the seal thus set on the work of all those, administrators, missionaries and sociologists, who have laboured during the last generation to establish human contacts between Europeans and Africans and to obliterate the evil traditions that have lingered on from the days of the slave trade.

Looked at in the light of pre-war diplomatic history what has happened appears no less remarkable. The Abyssinian crisis of 1935 is the Fashoda crisis of 1898 reversed. In 1898 the object of our statesmanship was to keep the other Powers from interfering in what was regarded as an issue confined to Great Britain and France. When the British Ambassador in Paris informed Lord Salisbury that there was a prospect of other Powers interesting themselves in the matter, on the ground that it was an "offshoot of the Eastern Question," the news was regarded with apprehension. To-day the fixed determination of the British Government is to keep the Abyssinian question within the orbit of the League, and it is other Powers, notably Italy herself, who are engaged in trying to convert it into an issue between Great Britain and Italy. There could be no more striking example of the extent to which British foreign policy has become bound up with the collective system.

A third issue which is being put to the test is as to the possibility of the successful employment of economic sanctions. The idea that an aggressor state might be forced to yield, or a would-be aggressor be deterred, by concerted economic

action, without the employment of military force, has won its way in the world with remarkable rapidity. During the Crimean War a loan was actually raised in London for the Russian Government, so inconceivable did it seem in the hey-day of *laissez-faire* for high politics to intrude into the sacred sphere of business operations. From 1900 onwards certain Governments—the French amongst them—began dimly to realise the potentialities of the "economic weapon." But it was still thought of as a national weapon, an "instrument of national policy." It was only the experience of the blockade which caused the framers of the Covenant—in the first instance the Phillimore Committee—to think of employing the economic weapon as an international sanction. Thereby, of course, it gained enormously in effectiveness, for if the economic system is in essence international the means taken to interrupt its working in any given country must be international also.

If the economic sanctions now in operation prove effective, common opinion, especially on the Continent, will think very differently of the rôle of the soldier in the future. One of the difficulties in securing full French support for the League at the present time is the ingrained belief of the ordinary Frenchman that sanctions mean war and that war necessarily means a general mobilisation. Whereas the Englishman feels that something ought to be done to protect Abyssinia, as the weaker power, from the Italian bully—that "something" being done by the Navy—the Frenchman feels that he is not called upon to shed his blood for an African people. If he were to become convinced that the League could carry out its task of protection through the use of the economic weapon without putting the ordinary citizen into uniform his attitude would become very different. On the other hand there is undoubtedly a danger that the adoption of a policy of economic sanctions without adequate previous preparation and in the face of French reluctance may lead to widespread recrimination and so give a set-back to the whole idea.

There is a fourth test which has already been decided. This is as to the value of the League machine for dealing with sanctions under Article XVI of the Covenant and with the war situation resulting from this. The League machine has simply been unable to function and its place was taken,

immediately that Article XVI had come into play, by a diplomatic conference of the ordinary pre-war type. The reason for this surprising dénouement to a problem on which years of thought had been spent is simple. The Covenant is, in many respects, a badly drafted document and it proved simply inapplicable in the special circumstances that arose in October. For one thing, Italy did not resign from the League, and France and other states were not inclined to expel her. Thus she retained her full membership and with it the right of veto on all Assembly and Council proceedings. But even without this special difficulty the League Council and Assembly are neither of them bodies adapted to deal with the present situation. Thus the members of the League who were committed to the employment of sanctions freed themselves from all burdensome constitutional restraints by adopting the most flexible system that was available. This victory of British over Continental ideas at a moment of emergency deserves to be noted. It will certainly exercise a considerable effect on the future development of the League.

Another kind of test—perhaps the most crucial of all—is as to the loyalty of League members to their obligations. Here certain results are already to hand and they are exceedingly interesting. The first state to take action in regard to economic sanctions was Holland. Her interest in the particular issues at stake is indirect. What led her to act so promptly is her interest in the principle at stake and her traditional devotion to the cause of international law. Holland is the one country in the world for whom it is natural to regard international law as an actual rule of conduct for Governments. The Northern States, in spite of their reiterated objections to sanctions, have been better than their word. The U.S.S.R., the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente have been well to the fore. The countries that have lagged most behind, apart from the satellites of Italy, are France and Switzerland. Amongst non-members of the League the United States with its new doctrine of neutral *duties*, as contrasted with neutral *rights*, has made a most important step forward. It is disappointing to find a number of other countries, in Latin America and elsewhere, alleging difficulties on the ground that they number Italians by culture among their citizen body. Affinities of this kind

should no more affect the working of the Covenant than that of a court of law.

Whether the League will emerge successfully from the test or tests, taken as a whole, it is too early to say. The uncertainty may well last for months, though if French opinion can be brought to understand the real issues at stake it could come to an end very rapidly. What strikes the observer who has watched the process at close quarters is the extraordinary difficulty of inducing fifty states, holding what are in effect fifty different views of the Covenant and its obligations, to take concerted action. To have set sanctions in motion at all, after Article XVI had been regarded for fifteen years as a dead letter, was something of a miracle. It required the pertinacity, the infectious idealism and the Geneva experience of Mr. Eden to accomplish it. The officials of the League themselves were some of them almost bewildered at the sight of the rusty machinery actually grinding out results.

But this concentration on the machinery of collective action must not blind us as to the limits set to achievement in this field. The Governments at Geneva can agree together to take action; but unless their peoples are behind them, the action cannot be effective. What has been too lacking at Geneva, in the atmosphere of diplomacy engendered by fifteen years of conference, discussion and routine, is the moral fervour which Woodrow Wilson took for granted as the driving force of his system of "mutual guarantees of protection." It is this that is behind the demand of the British people for swift protection for Abyssinia. It is this that has made the working-class movement—and especially the trade union movement—throughout Europe so united and so ready to act in the cause of the League. If, through the inertia or selfishness of individual states, this opportunity for common action on behalf of the rule of law is missed, the disappointment will be intense and it is difficult to see how co-operation can be continued within the framework of the League. The states that have stood the test and proved trustworthy will feel inclined to act together, leaving the others to their own devices. The results of such a movement upon the development of international politics are quite incalculable.

But this is to suggest possibilities which there are many

good reasons for believing will never be realised. For it is surely unthinkable that the peoples of Western Europe, having at last within their grasp the solution of the problem of security, will fail to join their forces in making it effective. *Ex Africa semper aliquid novi*. Is it to be good news or is Africa, "the grave of reputations," to prove the grave of the League? The answer lies with the peoples of the Continent.

ALFRED ZIMMERN.

THE U.S.S.R. BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY.

AT present an ominous political shifting is taking place in Russia; a change in the national feeling and in the policy of the dictatorship. What does the country want? What direction is the Government taking? Not only Russians, perturbed at the fate of their country, are faced with these two questions. These problems also confront every foreigner who realises the direct connection between internal events in the U.S.S.R. and international relations in Europe and Asia, especially in the Far East.

A radical change in the external policy of Moscow, exemplified by the entry into the League of Nations and the fight shown there for the stabilisation of peace, has met with the unanimous approval—and rightly so—of European democracy. Still, whilst supporting the Soviet Government in their endeavours in the cause of continual peace in the world, it is at the same time necessary—and this in the interest of Europe as well as of Russia—to get a reply to the question: "Why is Moscow so acutely concerned with the preservation of peace?" The will for peace can be born either out of strength or of weakness. In the latter case it only whets the appetites of the neighbouring Powers, and then the only way to eliminate this danger is to eliminate the source of weakness of the country which finds itself the aim of aggressive plans.

Those conversant with the Moscow Press know the declarations of Molotov, President of the Cabinet; Voroshilov, the War Minister; and of Stalin himself, that Russia is facing the very real danger of formidable external conflicts and of a new dismemberment of its territory. It can also be incontrovertibly established that the Kremlin has been seized by this fear of aggression from the time that the results of the first Five Years' Plan, detrimental to the State economy, became known. The advent of Hitler, with his programme of "Colonisation of the Ukraine," has created, according to Moscow diplomats, an aggressive triangle encircling Russia: Tokio-Warsaw-Berlin. Whether such danger really exists is questionable. One thing is certain: individually the rulers of the U.S.S.R. feel that such threat of aggression does exist, and that they are not in a position to risk a war with Japan or any other first-class Power. So writes K. K. Kawakami,

the expert authority on the U.S.S.R. and the old Russia, in *Contemporary Japan*, No. 4, 1935. The development of the aggressive policy of Japan in North China and on the borders of the U.S.S.R. (Mongolia and Manchukuo) is based on exact knowledge of the economic and political conditions in Russia. Those Europeans who desire the collaboration of the Soviet Government in the stabilisation of peace and the fight against Hitlerism ought to make equally sure of their facts.

During the first years of the Bolshevik dictatorship I was protesting in the European Press against military intervention and an economic blockade, and by doing so roused against myself the public opinion of practically all Europe. Now, when European democracy has gone to the other extreme, and will only pay regard to the "brilliant achievements" of the U.S.S.R., nay, when it wants to elevate the leaders of the Bolshevik dictatorship into "Defenders of Democracy," I am again taking the line of greatest resistance. The historical period that Europe is passing through is far too serious to allow anyone to live in a world of illusions.

There is no doubt that the Bolshevik dictatorship is at present at the cross-roads. By joining the League of Nations the Bolsheviks have passed from the "revolutionary internationalism" of Lenin to the methods of bourgeois diplomacy. In their wish to create in case of war a favourable psychological atmosphere the Bolsheviks are beginning, at first timidly and insincerely, to make some concessions to the population; and Stalin and Molotov are laying special stress on the democratic nature of their reforms. There has been convened a special Commission which, under direct guidance from Stalin, is re-editing the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and drafting a new law referring to direct and secret election to the Soviets. Where, however, there is still an atmosphere of terror, and amidst a population that still has no political rights, with not even any freedom of Press or speech, a "direct and secret election" can be nothing but a meaningless fiction. Up to the present the basic foundations of the autocratic régime, as will be shown further, remain unshaken. Stalin has yet to prove that he is capable of something which no dictator has ever yet achieved: he has to prove his ability and willingness—without waiting for a war or a revolution—to restore political freedom to the people. It goes without saying that in this course he would be whole-heartedly

supported by all Russian democrats both in Russia and abroad, and the past would be forgotten. But I repeat that this new policy does not yet exist. So far there is nothing more than some juggling with democratic formulæ. Yet a great many democrats and liberals in Europe are already mistaking a problematic future for present-day reality, and are beginning to regard the Moscow dictatorship as a "new socialistic democracy."

I want to dwell on this situation somewhat more exhaustively, as I am very much troubled by it. I am troubled because Western democracy, in making friends with the Bolsheviks at a time when they are passing through a very critical period, places its moral authority in the scales with the dictatorship. Such "moral intervention"—so to speak—can influence the development of internal events in Russia either in a very beneficent or a very harmful way. It can only be beneficial if the mutual relations of Western democracy and the Bolsheviks are not based on illusions, misapprehensions and a short-sighted policy of utilising them because "for the moment it is expedient." "No compromise is possible with those who are trying to kill the spirit. Where there is no liberty of spirit, no literary masterpieces can be created. Lies and contempt of the spirit lead to sterility." Thus spoke Heinrich Mann, a recent fugitive from Germany, at the recent Congress in Paris for the Protection of Culture. At this Congress, summoned for the protection of humanitarianism against the onslaught of Fascism and Hitlerism, the greatest ovations were accorded to the delegation of Soviet writers, that is to say writers belonging to a country where the liberty of spirit has been completely abolished and where there is not a vestige of an independent press.

In their speeches they all—of course with Stalin's express permission—extolled Soviet freedom, the freedom of intellectual activity in the U.S.S.R., and fiercely denounced the "crimes of European dictators against the spirit." The renowned French humanitarian, a faithful adherent of Stalin, M. Vaillant Couturier, openly proclaimed that "Socialistic humanitarianism as represented by the Soviet delegation had made a brilliant appearance in Western Europe and immediately won the rights of citizenship for itself. This is a kind of diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia in intellectual fields." And indeed, according to the most prominent

exponents of Western humanitarianism, such as M. Romain Rolland, there is in Europe and America—which are succumbing to a cultural barbarism—only one bright spot where love of freedom, of culture, of man, is still to be found, and that is Moscow. M. Barbusse, a French novelist of repute and an ardent admirer of Stalin, openly declared in a recent booklet on his hero: “The question of respect for human life presents a grave and serious problem for the Bolsheviks, the genuine socialists of our time.” That, no doubt, is the reason why since the beginning of this year youthful offenders, be they only twelve years of age, are being dealt with under the general Criminal Code and have become liable to capital punishment! Of course even M. Barbusse cannot conceal the existence of terror in Russia, but “The Bolsheviks are doing away with a few in order to save thousands, in order to save the future and to build up a new world.” But who has given Stalin and his adherents the right of deciding what number of human beings have to be destroyed in order to secure the welfare of future generations? Was there ever a humanitarianism that admitted murder as a weapon of progress? Moreover the same argument—“the welfare of future generations”—is constantly used by Hitler in defence of his power and terrorism.

Quite recently the Seventeenth Congress of Komintern (Communist International) has been called in Moscow and a new policy proclaimed. The proletarian revolution has been allotted the task of defending the bourgeois democracy. This Komintern policy coincides with the aims of the Soviet Government. “It is imperative to fight immediately against Fascism and preparations for war,” stated *Pravda* on the occasion of the opening of the Congress.

“From now on the task of the Komintern lies in creating a united front of the working class against Fascism, as well as in creating a united revolutionary party. Some socialist and democratic leaders are against it. They wish to continue collaborating with the bourgeoisie. The communists do not strive for a coalition, but for a united working class which thanks to its discipline and enthusiasm will play a predominant part. It will also support the remnants of the bourgeois democracy against the onslaught of Fascism.”

This new “democratic, international policy” of the Communist International reminds one most forcibly of an

instruction given at one time by Moscow. In the official paper of the Komintern, the *Communist Bulletin*, the famous M. Bukharin, who after several years of disgrace regained the goodwill of Stalin and has now been appointed editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, wrote as early as 1925:

“The proletariat of every country entering into an agreement with the U.S.S.R. is compelled to proclaim an armistice with its bourgeoisie, and in case of war it is the duty of the revolutionaries of all the world to support the bolshevik-bourgeois bloc as one body.”

It is the danger of war and Hitlerism, the very understandable fear of a *débâcle* that is dictating to the Kremlin its present “new, humanitarian, democratic,” international policy. This policy is quite reasonable and intelligible: it is imperative to try and avert by all means this very real danger. To preserve the European equilibrium, or in its own interests, some democratic government may promise help to Stalin, may even conclude a military pact with him. This policy is also quite intelligible. But what practical or moral results can be expected from a fight for freedom of intellectual expression, for political democracy and social justice, if this fight is made in union with a Government which is denying and destroying these cultural riches in its own state? For various reasons one may feel Hitler’s régime more acutely than that of Stalin. It is natural that a German or a Jew should show more tolerance towards Stalin than towards Hitler. I will not concern myself here with the comparison of the practical methods of these two régimes. One fact should be clearly understood by all champions of human progress: The principles of Hitler’s dictatorship are copied in full from Lenin and Stalin. Only where the progenitor of all European dictatorships wrote the word “Class,” Hitler has inserted “Race.”

Stalin upholds the present U.S.S.R. as a model for Western democrats. And Western democrats emphatically accept this “communistic socialism.” But *what* do they accept? Here we have an exceedingly important and disturbing question. Do they know in the West the real, actual humanitarianism of Stalin, which now comes to their help in the struggle with the anti-human rule of Hitler and Fascism? I am convinced that they do not; because if they knew and accepted it

consciously, then by so doing they would render the greatest service to all dictators of all times and deal what would very likely be a mortal blow to all traditions of democratic and humanitarian culture.

Propaganda is not my aim. My only intention is, by analysing indisputable data supplied by the Bolsheviks themselves, to reveal the substance of Stalin's "proletarian democracy." To understand the real system of Bolshevik dictatorship it is necessary first of all to find out the social structure of the Soviet State, and thus to get a correct idea of the whole State activity of the Bolsheviks. At the Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. in January of this year, the President of the Soviet Cabinet, M. Molotov, made a very important declaration. According to statistics the population of the U.S.S.R. is composed of the following classes: 28·1 per cent. state employees, engineers, technicians, and workmen; 3·4 per cent. the army, students and pensioners; 68·4 per cent. Kolkhoz peasants and small farmers; and ONE-TENTH PER CENT bourgeois class. Nine-tenths of this latter category is represented by rich peasants (kulaks) and one-tenth is made up of the town bourgeoisie.

It is hardly possible to over-estimate the importance of this official declaration, which has passed unnoticed by Western Europe. In publishing the figures showing the social structure of U.S.S.R., Molotov has acknowledged that in the present Russia all capitalistic classes have been practically annihilated. The 145,000 kulaks as compared with 77 millions of Kolkhoz peasants, and a few thousand of former bourgeois—now deprived of all social rights—as against a population of 150 million, such figures are infinitesimal. The tiny remnant of the capitalistic classes, deprived of any property, cannot be considered as a distinct "class," a separate economic factor, or a social power able to make history.

If Molotov's statistics be applied to the Marxian doctrine—and it is this doctrine which at least by word of mouth is being professed by all the leaders of the Bolshevik State—one must acknowledge that the class struggle in U.S.S.R. has come to an end, that the proletariat and its ally, the working peasantry, not only have overcome the resistance of their enemies, the capitalistic classes, but have entirely destroyed them. It should follow that there can be no more class-struggle, that the country has reached the stage of a non-class

or rather one-class community, so that the "kingdom of absolute freedom" should come, accompanied by an immediate disappearance of all coercive and terrorist functions of the State. Actually something quite different happened. The "proletarian terrorism," just as ruthless as before, has now, owing to the physical annihilation of the well-to-do bourgeois classes, thrown its full weight on peasants, workmen, Soviet employees and members of the Communist Party itself.

It is a well-known fact that the State Political Police has at present at its disposal over fifteen concentration camps, to which the "enemies of the Soviet State" are being exiled to be annihilated *en masse* without open trial. No European mind can imagine the terrible conditions of life of these camp slaves. With Molotov's official statistics in hand, it is impossible to trust implicitly the declaration of the Soviet Government that in the concentration camps only "class enemies of the workers" are to be found, and that these are undergoing there, in "the most humane manner," "a social re-education." Here are the statistics of one of those camps, of a quite small concentration camp, the so-called "Svirlag," in the North of Russia, comparatively near Petersburg. The 70,000 inmates are composed of: 2·5 per cent. intelligentsia; 22·0 per cent. workmen; 12·0 per cent. convicts; and 63·5 per cent. peasants. Other camps, farther north, have several hundred thousand each, and are of a similar social composition.

It can be seen that these statistics agree with the statistical table of Molotov. Therefore, on the basis of official data we can assert that, whilst ruling a state where all capitalistic classes have been practically annihilated, *the Bolshevik dictatorship is in a state of civil war with the working population of the country.*

Stalin himself realises the damning accusation implicit in his own statistics and tries to find a psychological justification of his terrorism. "We cannot say," said he at the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party, "that we have conquered the survival of capitalism in the human mind. We cannot say this, not only because the consciousness of men lags behind their economic position, but also because there is still existing a bourgeois ring, which is trying to rekindle and foster the survivals of capitalism in the minds of the U.S.S.R. people."

If the crushed capitalistic remnants can impress 99·9 per cent. of the population and keep the "proletarian power" in a state of siege, then truly the charms of capitalism are almighty and irresistible. As a matter of fact, this psychological excursion of Stalin has no value whatsoever. In the first place, the social structure of a State is not determined by the psychological feelings of its population, but by an impartial analysis of statistical data referring to its class composition; and secondly, the great majority of the U.S.S.R. population by reason of their age have no recollections of Russia as it was before the advent of the Bolsheviks. All commanding posts in the domains of agriculture, industry, administration, army, etc., with a few exceptions, are occupied by persons under forty years of age, who in the majority of cases are members of the Union of Communist Youths (Komsomol). Even in the villages 40 per cent. of the presidents and members of collective farms (Kolkhoz) are eighteen to twenty-one years of age. Is it possible that the bourgeois past could dominate the consciousness of these young administrators? Some of them were only born during the Bolshevik régime; the others, at best, were only infants in capitalist Russia. Yet it is precisely with the youths that Stalin's relations are now getting strained. Indeed the psychology of Russia is undergoing a change, not through recollections of the past but under the pressure of the present.

If anyone is working for the cause of the regeneration of bourgeois psychology, it is Stalin himself. Indeed, a complete ruin of the peasants' farming, the disappearance of cattle in the villages, have forced him to utter those rudimentary but quite reasonable words: "If you do not have yet plenty of produce in the Kolkhoz, if you are unable to supply the members of Kolkhoz and their families with all they need, then it is better to admit openly and in all honesty that Kolkhoz members *must be allowed to do their own individual farming*, on a very small scale, but individually." Of course this cautious attempt at the restoration of "individual farming" cannot be considered as a means of fighting the survivals of capitalism in the minds of the people. There are some other reasons to account for the concentration camps in the U.S.S.R. being crammed with peasants and workmen. The analysis of the U.S.S.R. budget reveals the real cause of the tragic struggle between the Government and the people

by disclosing the economic methods of the Bolshevik dictatorship.

In the budget for 1935 the revenue is shown as 65·9 milliards of roubles. (The official rate of exchange is a little over 6 roubles to the pound, but the real value of the Soviet rouble in Russia is at present 1d.) Out of these 65·9 milliards, 47 milliards, i.e. over 70 per cent. of the revenue, consist of food taxes. The Government confiscates all foodstuffs and raw materials from the peasants at the official prices, impossibly low, and sells them to the population, partly to the very same peasants, at a fantastic increase. For instance, it takes wheat from the peasants at the price of 1 rouble for 10 kilograms. In the town, 10 kilograms of bread are sold for 10 roubles.* For a quintal of oats it pays peasants 5 roubles 50 kopecs, and sells it at 75 roubles. It is the same with meat, butter, wool, etc.

Until this year, workmen and Soviet employees in the towns enjoyed a more privileged position, as they were given food cards. But now the proletariat has also been subjected to an increased, extortionate taxation. The card system of supply to the privileged classes of the town population has been abolished. Monstrous taxation has been put on the earnings of workmen and employees by means of exorbitant increases in prices. Wages, it is true, have been increased by 10 per cent.† But the workman has now to pay 1 rouble for 1 kilogram of inferior brown bread, instead of 9 kopecs as per the food card; for 1 kilogram of barley he now pays 3 roubles instead of 27 kopecs. In other words, whilst wages have increased by 10 per cent., taxation increased by 900 per cent.

In connection with this budget based upon a ruthless expropriation of earned income from peasants and workmen, one is reminded of Lenin's words at the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party in 1919, denouncing the confiscation of bread from the peasants: "To act in such a way against the peasantry is so nonsensical, stupid and idiotic, so ruinous to our cause, that only *agents provocateurs* could do it

* Since this article was written, the retail prices of bread and certain other foodstuffs have been lowered about 15 per cent. by a decree of the Soviet Government.

† In 1934 the average wage was 148 roubles. This was to be increased in 1935 by 10 per cent. to 162; but the decree has not yet been universally applied and in many instances payment of wages has been deferred for several months even at the old local rates.

consciously." At present not only peasants, but also workmen and the rest of the population, are subject to expropriation ; but it is no longer possible to refer to *agents provocateurs*. The situation is much more serious and hopeless. The execution of the first Five Years' Plan has swallowed up an immense amount of the material wealth of the country, which had been more or less restored by the famous New Economic Policy. All that remains now to provide the State with the necessary resources is the earned income of the population. Thus we get a vicious circle. The annihilation of material wealth destroys the defensive power of the State : defence demands an ever-increasing expenditure owing to the ever-increasing danger of war.

Stalin and his colleagues quite realise this difficult state of affairs. They realise that it is impossible to preserve their power for a long time by means of diplomatic combinations and "united fronts" with foreign Powers, unless they get support from the people and restore the material wealth of the country. But it is impossible to restore the national wealth of the country without first restoring the right of free work and free initiative. A new political atmosphere must be created to enable productive economic work to be achieved. Thus by the march of affairs the dictatorship is forced to look for some new political rule, and for some new course in their economic policy. The relations within the Communist Party itself, the relations between the Government and the young generation, between the dictatorship and the peasantry, make it more evident day by day that the Government has to renounce its methods of a terrorist dictatorship, methods that are already obsolete. If Western democracy would realise this fact, then by accepting the Moscow dictators into its midst it could—if it so wished—perform an historical task. It could by its moral authority speed up the restoration of Freedom, Right and Social Justice to the Russian people.

ALEXANDER KERENSKY.

THE CONFLICT IN MEMEL.

IN 1924, at the time when the Memel-land Statute was drawn up, it was presumed that, in spite of the vagaries of Russia and Italy, the world had been made safe for democracy. The Memel Territory to the north of the Niemen, according to the logic of economics or geography, seemed clearly to belong to the new Lithuania, to whom it would supply a much-needed port, and in the river a satisfactory frontier. Nationality was still regarded as the first among all political principles when frontiers had to be drawn. Here the case of Memel-land was extraordinarily perplexing, but since statistics showed that 48·5 per cent. of the Memel-landers spoke Lithuanian by choice, while an easy majority were Lithuanian by descent, it was not unreasonable to recognise Lithuanian sovereignty while safeguarding (through the Statute) democratic autonomy for the Memel-landers, German- and Lithuanian-speaking alike. Apart from the sanguine assumption that the Lithuanian Republic would forever remain a democratic republic, only Article 17 of the Statute deserved serious criticism, for it laid down that the President of the Memel Directorate, in other words the Prime Minister of Memel-land, was to be appointed by the Governor sent from Kovno,* and at the same time to have the confidence of the Memel Chamber. But this only meant that the Governor must choose from the majority party, a choice which seemed at the time to present no difficulty.

The year 1926 brought, in this part of Europe, a year of rude awakening for those who thought only in terms of democracy, for this form of government was now rejected by both Lithuania and Poland ; the Lithuanian Chamber has never met since April 1927, and a more or less military dictatorship has governed the country. From that time the Statute became in many ways meaningless, and the representation of Memel-land in Kovno (provided for by Article 3 of the Statute) automatically ceased. From that time Article 17 became difficult ; the Governor found all members of the German-speaking parliamentary majority in Memel distasteful since he himself represented the military point of view of the Kovno régime. Soldiers are invariably centralists

* In Lithuanian *Kaunas*, as Memel is *Klaipėda*, but it seems simpler to use the more familiar names.

and the new Lithuanian authorities were no exception to the rule ; they regarded autonomy in Memel-land as a dangerous piece of federalism which must be ended at the first opportunity. The years from 1926 to 1933 should, however, be regarded as a transitional period, for a common hostility to Warsaw kept Berlin and Kovno on ostensibly good terms, and in 1928 Stresemann recognised the *status quo* in a treaty then concluded with Lithuania. Autonomy worked fairly well, and it gave the majority of Memel-landers more or less what they wanted. Lithuanian conscription might not at first be enforced, and the local population concerned themselves only with the affairs of their own Memel Territory.

Gradually, however, tension increased between the Lithuanian Government and the elected rulers of Memel. In the post offices and railway stations, which were central government concerns, the German language tended to disappear. On the other hand Lithuanians resented the fact that the most prominent Memel-land politicians were Germans, who had come into the Territory mostly from East Prussia after the war, and who worked in very close collaboration with Germany. Early in 1932 this led to the dismissal of the Memel-land President, Böttcher, by the Lithuanian Government ; subsequently the Hague tribunal confirmed the deposition of Böttcher, who had been indicted for his intimacy with the government in Berlin. The Böttcher affair was but the prelude to the storm which burst over Memel with Hitler's accession to power in January 1933. From this moment the Lithuanian case became very much stronger and the German case proportionately weaker ; the Memel-landers themselves have become mere pawns in the game, and their democratic rights are now the instrument of a German dictatorship. It is clear, moreover, that an aggressively racist Germany has a weaker claim to a territory the majority of whose inhabitants are almost certainly of non-German descent, than had a rationalist Germany which could point to the fall in the standard of life at the old Russian frontier between Memel-land and Great Lithuania. The Memel Territory, however, was an essential preliminary for Germany's new *Drang nach Osten* which was urged upon Hitler by one of his favourite advisers, Rosenberg.

It happened that the political leaders in Memel at this time, while strongly pro-German, were far from being National

Socialists. They belonged to the local *Volkspartei* or *Landwirtschaftspartei*, and Dr. Schreiber, the President of the Directorate, was a well-known Freemason. The inevitable discontent of the period denounced Schreiber and his associates as reactionary, and followed the lead of a revolutionary parson, von Sass. Sass founded a left-wing Nazi society called the *Christlich Sozialistische Arbeitsgemeinschaft* (or *C.S.A.* for short) and scored a great success at the Memel municipal elections in May 1933. The right wing pro-German people answered by the formation of the *Sozialistische Volksgemeinschaft* (or *Sovog*). Both the new societies professed to have purely social and perfectly legal aims, but no one can explain why in that case there was any need for them unless they were Nazi. The German Consulate, whose activities are remarkably extensive in Memel, supported the *Sovog*, and every effort was made to induce Sass to submit to Neumann, its leader. The effect of the Nazi revolution, following upon the worst years of the slump, was bound to be very disturbing in any territory bordering on Germany and formerly German. As it was, circumstances had inevitably made Memel-landers increasingly pro-German since the low standard of living in Great Lithuania ; and its insistence upon a difficult language of no general utility, naturally drew Memel-land eyes towards Germany. And then from 1933 it was so romantic to hope to be part of the great German race, while the inspired legend that Hitler had abolished poverty was eagerly accepted. Working-class movements were weak in the Memel Territory, since Socialists and Communists had been pressed by the other political leaders into an anti-Lithuanian alliance. Pastor von Sass awoke the latent dissatisfaction of the working people with this state of affairs, and captured them in his Nazi *C.S.A.*

In pre-war days the Lithuanian peasants, speaking a language which in its affinity with Sanskrit deserved the term Aryan, and whose use was forbidden by the Tsarist régime, were the *protégés* of Germany, or at any rate of German professors. It was not unnatural that after the war the Great Lithuanians should genuinely consider it their duty to revive the national self-consciousness of their Germanised brothers in Memel-land. The Statute was regarded by Kovno as a hindrance to national consolidation ; from the beginning, the Lithuanians believe, it was exploited by Germans to

frustrate the union between Lithuania and the Memel Territory. The German political leaders, like Conrad and Schreiber, were landowners or well-to-do townsmen, an upper class which despised Lithuanian as the language of peasants, and had successfully resisted the onslaught of Sass. With Hitler in power, the position had become intolerable for the Lithuanians. In the German-speaking schools of the Memel-land guaranteed by the Statute, the children were now taught with the new German text-books full of German irredentism, Hitler-worship and the new Nazi distortions of history. It was fairly clear from material evidence that the *C.S.A.* and the *Sovog* were masked Nazi organisations directed from Berlin, Königsberg and Tilsit; their members were working for the return of the Memel Territory to Germany, and were, in fact, traitors to the Lithuanian State. It therefore seemed justifiable to the Lithuanian authorities in June 1934 to suspend the Statute, and to dismiss the constitutionally chosen Directorate headed by Dr. Schreiber, who was felt to be far too lenient in the matter of text-books and new societies.

Towards the end of last year the Lithuanian Government decided to follow up the expulsion of Schreiber and his colleagues by a grand treason trial. It was essential, they felt, to make a stern stand, for Memel was becoming like Austria over again. At any moment disturbances in Memel-land might open a door to some thinly-veiled German invasion for which no one would admit responsibility; in July, after all, Munich had backed the Nazi *Putzsch* in Vienna, and only the immediate mobilisation of Italy caused Germany at the last moment to disclaim the conspirators she had egged on. The trial, however, was so clumsily mismanaged as to serve the purpose of German, rather than Lithuanian, apologists. Instead of a single demonstration of the disloyalty of the *C.S.A.* and *Sovog* leaders, they were accused of planning an armed insurrection at a time which the divisions between them easily proclaimed to be premature. The evidence was flimsy and the sentences were harsh. To a large number of the simple inhabitants of Memel-land who knew nothing of the intrigues of the German Consulate or of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Nazi Party in Berlin, an unfounded police persecution from beyond the old Russian frontier seemed to have set in, and the powerful

voice of the Königsberg wireless took care to exaggerate this impression.

It obviously suited the German Government to direct the main stream of German chauvinism against Lithuania, and further to denounce her as the tool of the wicked Soviets. The tradition of Lithuania was as anti-Russian as Tsarist oppression had inevitably made it, while her rulers were fascists hostile to Moscow. With the Polish-German Agreement of January 1934, Lithuania was, however, compelled to think better of her hostility to Russia. From that time on the German Press and wireless worked up the Memel Question as one of the main themes in the anti-Russian storm which they have been stirring up with increasing vigour ever since. It was announced as unquestionable that Russia had demanded the harsh sentences that ended the Kovno trial as the price of the commercial treaty signed with Lithuania at the time. This accusation is categorically denied by the negotiators concerned; all that it is safe to affirm is that M. Karski, the Russian representative in Kovno, is a strong personality who makes the most of the influence with which the present situation provides him.

The Lithuanians are bitterly aware that their future—indeed their survival—depends rather upon international relationships than upon the efforts they may make themselves. Of the three small states on the east coast of the Baltic, Lithuania's position is the most exposed, and all conflicting interests converge upon Memel. It is common talk in East Prussia that Germany will make short work of conquering the Baltic Littoral, and it is not surprising if the early symptoms of the new *Drang nach Osten* have at times driven Lithuania to the folly of despair. It is unlikely that Russia will go beyond diplomacy over Memel; even Poland, though she would declare herself to be more directly concerned in Baltic affairs, would be unwilling to go very far. The Lithuanians, if it comes to it, will choose to sacrifice Vilna (a forlorn hope, of course, though they cling to it desperately) if it brings Polish support, rather than to throw the sop of Memel to Germany. At the time of Hitler's Nürnberg outburst on September 15th, it seemed as if Germany, presuming upon her naval agreement with England and the African preoccupations of all the League Powers, was about to fall upon Memel. The *Führer's* speech

backfired, however. The Poles displayed their disapproval by talks with the Lithuanians at Geneva, and although these have proved abortive, Poland must unofficially have made her feelings about Memel fairly clear to Germany. Lithuania is responsible for the autonomy of Memel to the four Powers that signed the 1924 Statute; of these Japan has ceased to interest herself in something so distant, while England was interpreted all over the Continent as having "gone over" to Germany with the Naval Agreement. Italy, it was evident, would oppose Lithuania if Hitler showed any substantial sympathy for Mussolini in defending himself against the "aggressions" of Mr. Eden and the Negus. But the sympathy was withheld, and Italy seemed almost eager to preserve her solidarity with France at least in the matter of Memel. Indeed Great Britain, France and Italy found no difficulty in agreeing to make the *démarche* of September 12th requiring Lithuania to remember her obligations, and the fury of the *Führer* on the 15th seems to have thrown Lithuania back upon the three Signatory Powers who had themselves been included in Herr Hitler's reproof. Since the end of the trial last spring the Lithuanians had been making conciliatory gestures by the appointment of a new Governor to Memel, and by the promise of an election on September 29th. With September 15th they decided to follow up these gestures in the spirit of the recommendations of September 12th.

The election in Memel-land on September 29th will go down to history as a byword for confusion. But before attempting to comment upon this electoral fiasco, it is essential to suggest more exactly the circumstances in which it occurred. The Lithuanian centralists and the Memel-land autonomists had become so completely estranged that it was difficult, for instance, for foreign inquirers to communicate with one side without being entirely cut off from the other. There was all along a good deal of chicanery and intimidation on both sides, of which those who were innocent were also ignorant and therefore annoyed when a hostile finger was pointed. All along the Germans had all the propagandist advantages. They could blame the Lithuanian authorities for every economic hardship. They could claim that the Statute had been broken without admitting that National Socialism had completed the process by which

it had become unworkable. The "Wait-till-Hitler-comes" threat had been gathering force with the fulminations of the Chancellor in May and September, and it was strengthened by the autumn Army manœuvres in East Prussia. The Königsberg wireless could outcry the inferior apparatus of Kovno any day; it proclaimed to the world, as well as to the Memel-landers, that the Lithuanian authorities were responsible for a reign of terror in Memel-land and were preparing to disfranchise thousands of its citizens while packing the polling-booths with Great Lithuanians. It was subsequently made clear that some 5,000 Great Lithuanians had, in the natural course of events, come into the Territory since the election of 1932, and that sixty-nine people would be disfranchised by the electoral law decreed in August. The disfranchised included naturalised citizens and those who had participated in disloyal activities; people like Dr. Schreiber came into the first category. It was undoubtedly harsh to disfranchise men who had previously been prominent in office, but even in easier circumstances many governments behave harshly towards naturalised citizens.

Much of the trouble is due, not to malevolence, but to a shifty clumsiness which is characteristic of peasants and officials in peasant countries. One has to wait an incredible time at the best hotel in Kovno between ordering and eating one's lunch. The big treason trial and the September election, when an attempt to introduce an intricate form of proportional representation* resulted in an organisational breakdown, were examples of peasant clumsiness too, and particularly exasperating, no doubt, for those who worship German efficiency. Lithuanian officials have constantly failed to give their reasons for administrative actions in Memel, and their opponents immediately presume that they have none. The worst methods of the *Gestapo* seem to be unknown to the Lithuanian police, but when the Memel-land schoolmaster died from appendicitis in prison, it was probably due to sheer incompetence on the part of the authorities.

The result of the election leaves the Chamber unchanged,† and—what is worse—the problem unsolved. The Memel-

*The method used was directed against the attempts of the autonomist *Einheitsliste* to compel electors to vote for or against their whole *bloc*.

† I.e., 24 Germans to 5 Lithuanians. As 20 members are required for a quorum, the Lithuanians were eager to obtain 10 seats.

landers have voted for autonomy, not for Germany. But though the complete restoration of the Statute is all the German Government professes to desire, it is obvious that German influence will never allow the Memel-landers to settle down; Germany, after all, is determined to make the post-war settlement of Europe intolerable, and trouble in the Memel Territory is probably her readiest weapon. It is true that the new government in Poland, which is less pro-German than its predecessor, is also more likely to come to terms with Lithuania, and Lithuania, chastened by her failure to make good in Memel, may be readier to make concessions to Poland. But the Lithuanians are well aware that they may at any moment become Hitler's Abyssinians, and although they have now underlined their fidelity to the Memel Statute, they will never willingly consent to what they regard as its exploitation at Lithuania's expense.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

THE DISSATISFIED POWERS AND THE WORLD'S RESOURCES.

THE League Assembly of 1935 was memorable for something more than its handling of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. It will be remembered as the occasion on which a British Foreign Secretary raised for the first time, as a subject of public international discussion, the question of the repartition of the world's resources. For though, in the traditional style of British Conservatism, he touched only on the fringe of this question, and confined himself to the problem of access to raw materials, it will be impossible to avoid going further, and raising many greater and more complex problems—the whole problem, in fact, of the needs, or supposed needs, of the “dissatisfied” Powers. If these needs are not soon taken into account, and generously met, the peace of the world will continue to be threatened, at short intervals, for years to come. I would even urge that the proposal of a World Conference for this purpose ought to be associated with the final settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict.

The precarious foundations of peace, with which we have made shift since 1918—the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg Pact, the predominance of France on the Continent, the Locarno truce, the Washington Treaties in the Far East—are being severely shaken. At no distant date, unless great changes are made, they will crumble away. The main reason will be that Japan, Germany and Italy are not satisfied with the place they hold in the world, and are determined on changes which can only be attained (in the absence of peaceable international regulation) by war. It is necessary here to attempt a provisional definition of what is meant by this “dissatisfaction.” It is a claim to “equality.” Evidently the word “equality” can only be used in a rough and ready sense. Evidently, too, the definition must take account of many ideas which the economist or the statesman may criticise, but which are part of the current political thought of the day and are likely to remain so for many decades to come. Bearing this in mind, we may say that Japan, Germany and Italy have not the advantages which, according to current ideas, are appropriate to “Great Powers”—the advantages that we British, for example, as a “Great Power” guided by

current ideas, should expect for ourselves if we were in their position. The victims of the inequitable distribution of resources and territory will never be whole-hearted supporters of the League of Nations. In their eyes it appears as the organ of the "satiated" Powers. It takes for granted the permanence of a *status quo* which they consider fundamentally unjust. They see no advantage, therefore, in resorting to its arbitral machinery. They will be driven more and more to pursue their aims by other means.

On the threshold of the discussion we must answer the argument that no concessions, colonial or other, should be made to the Powers concerned on the ground of our objection to their present forms of government. It is perhaps enough to say that, unless we do, the world is faced with something like a certainty of war on a large scale at no distant date. But the real answer is an appeal to justice, not an appeal to fear. We must look upon Japan, Germany and Italy as countries with certain fixed characteristics of history, position and population—in short, a certain place in the world—and realise that these characteristics have to be taken into account, whatever the form of government may be, because, whether we like it or not, they will persist.

The first stage, when the discussion begins, is to elucidate the alleged grievances. We shall probably find that there is much exaggeration and misconception. Not the least of the advantages of the Conference will be that the dissatisfied Powers will have to state their case. That they have not stated it is partly their own fault, and partly the result of the absence of any suitable forum for doing so. Once the Powers whose "place in the sun" is unquestioned have given some indication of their readiness to consider the question of "sharing," the way will be open for formulating claims with a view to rational persuasion, as well as for discrediting such claims as will not bear the light of day. Undeniable facts of economics and politics will emerge as the basis for the readjustment, whether great or small, which the interests of justice and peace require.

The complaint with regard to raw materials, referred to by Sir Samuel Hoare, will probably, taken by itself, be found to rest on a very small basis of fact. The possessors of raw materials, for the moment at any rate, are only too anxious to find purchasers. But this may not always be so. What is

complained of is not so much present shortage as insecurity for the future. Changes of economic policy cannot be predicted, and what the dissatisfied nations resent is being at the mercy of other Powers, who might hold them to ransom. A good example of this is the Stevenson rubber restriction scheme. It raised the price of rubber, caused furious indignation in the United States, and was only brought to an end because another Empire (the Dutch) refused to co-operate with the British. No nation, it is said, can safely adopt an economic system based on foreign purchases and foreign sales (and only by such a system can these nations live at all) without some guarantee that the necessary conditions will continue. Above all, they feel that they have no security for their economic system in time of war.

The financial difficulty, of which so much is made—the difficulty of paying in foreign currency—is at bottom a mere reflection of the underlying economic obstacles. Raw materials have to be paid for, wherever they may be situated; but inside your own country you have the means to pay for them, because there are no barriers to the exchange of goods and services. When they are not in your own country, the financial problem is how to obtain foreign currency to pay with; but foreign currency can only be obtained, on a healthy basis, by sales abroad; and sales abroad cannot be effected in the face of tariffs and quotas. Thus the real complaint is economic, not financial—the absence of markets for export, and in particular of markets assured for a reasonable time in advance. The real question raised is the whole issue of economic nationalism *versus* the movement of trade across frontiers. When the Conference meets, the unvarying opinion of the League's Economic Committee, and numerous other international bodies, in favour of freeing the channels of international trade, will at last pass from the stage of academic pronouncement to the stage of intensely practical negotiation, dominated by the idea of world justice and world prosperity.

We have to remember that the obstacles to foreign trade have only made themselves felt in their full intensity quite recently—since the Great Depression of 1931. Some hold that the marked fall in the standard of living in Germany and Italy is largely due to this new intensification; while the blow dealt at Japan by our trade policy since 1934 has been little less than shattering. In any case, their people believe this,

and associate it with the absence of raw material resources in their own territory. Serious alarm is felt as to an imminent and rapid continuation of the process of impoverishment. No doubt the persistence of economic nationalism, in some degree, must be counted on for many years to come, but a great impetus will be given towards the removal of trade barriers, the allocation of markets, the stabilisation of exchanges, when these things are definitely considered in relation to the problem of world peace, and as part of a process of world resettlement.

The Conference will, in its earlier stages at any rate, be concerned with the "backward," and particularly the tropical, regions of the earth. And here the whole question of extending the Mandate System comes into prominence. For its extension to all colonial possessions—if we can envisage such a possibility—would solve at one stroke the problem of opening up the tropics to the trade of all nations. Every Mandate includes the provision for the "open door" for all League members, and it has worked with almost complete success so far as imports and exports are concerned. True, much remains to be done in making the "open door" a reality as regards concessions, contracts, and investment. In this sphere (as Lord Lugard has recently made clear in his *Times* articles on the opening up of Africa) all the advantage goes to the nationals of the Power that holds the Mandate. Both on this ground and on many others, what we should aim at is to develop the Mandate system, and to embody in it, to a far greater degree, the principle of international control.

Here we are looking, no doubt, a long way ahead. There are many alternatives, and many degrees of advance. New Mandates might be created in certain regions. Existing Mandates might be transferred. These are the steps which have hitherto been discussed. But I suggest that many difficulties might be avoided if we tried from the beginning to view the matter in its broader aspects, and gradually to work out a new system for the development of the "backward regions," in line with the tendencies of modern thought. The exclusive national possession of colonies was not regarded, up to the seventies of the last century, as the one possible way of developing Africa. Can we not ask ourselves the question afresh: What, in present conditions, would be the best and safest way of opening up the world's backward areas?

The League, through its Mandates Commission, should be able to supervise the provision of capital in colonial territories, insuring to all nations their opportunity of sharing in it. It should face also the problem of personnel—of giving to the nationals of all countries a chance of sharing, not only in commercial development, but also in colonial administration. Probably this will necessitate, in the long run, an international college for colonial administrators, just as we have already an international secretariat for the general business of the League. And here we are led back to the primary object of the Mandate system, the protection of Native races. The Mandates should include far more definite provisions, and the powers of the Mandates Commission, both for inspection and for control, should be increased. The most important provision of all would relate to systematic preparation for self-government. Even from the point of view of expediency, we shall be forced to take account of the growing self-consciousness of the so-called "subject races." But there should be strict provisions also as to the handling of the land question, the maintenance of labour standards, and the conditions of White settlement. The experience already gained by the Mandates Commission will be invaluable here. Even the thorny question of the transfer of Mandates would be robbed of the terrors it inspires in many minds to-day, if the Mandatory Power, whichever it might be, held its trust upon strict conditions and under League control.

If such restrictions were imposed upon the "possessing" Power, it may fairly be asked, what inducement would remain for "possessing" colonies at all? The answer is, very little inducement on grounds of national selfishness, but every possible inducement on grounds of the honour and credit of discharging a great and difficult task, in the interest both of the weaker peoples and of world prosperity at large—of fulfilling, in Lord Lugard's now classic phrase, the "Dual Mandate." But in so far as selfish inducements would be eliminated, to that extent would the craving for colonies also be eliminated, in the crude form in which it confronts us to-day. That, indeed, would be the chief purpose, from the point of view of world peace, of such an extension of the Mandate System as is here suggested.

Mingled with each one of the topics above considered is the vital question of migration, which bulks so large among the

grievances of the dissatisfied Powers. No doubt there is much exaggeration as to the extent to which the population-pressure of Japan, and in a less degree of Italy and Germany, could be relieved by migration to the tropics. But it is not the tropics alone that we have to consider. The undeveloped or underdeveloped spaces of Asiatic Russia, North China, South America, Canada and Australia, must be taken into account as well. All sorts of thorny problems at once suggest themselves. Is a nation entitled to increase its population by deliberate governmental action, and then complain that it has no room for them to live? Can the British Empire use its military force for all time to enable Australia, for instance, to have 3·92 cultivated acres per head, while Japan has only ·49 cultivated acres per head? How far would big movements of population—such as that of the Japanese into the Malaysian region—be regarded as alarming, if they were not supposed to involve the danger of an ultimate demand for territory? How far do differing standards of living stand in the way of migration, and can we hope for a rapid raising of standards among the “backward” peoples?

Evidently the first need is that the question should be faced in dispassionate discussion. And for this purpose it needs to be far more thoroughly studied. It opens up a vast range of inquiry, which is well within the competence of the existing organs of the League, and which could be undertaken with great advantage to the world, before any concrete schemes or proposals need be devised. We simply do not know the facts as to the possibilities of development, nor as to the capital equipment required for opening up the under-populated areas. A good beginning, which might serve as an example, is the study made by the International Institute of Agriculture on the problem of bringing together idle men, idle land and idle capital.

I would end this brief survey by a warning against a very real danger. In such a Conference as I have envisaged there will be much clarifying of economic realities, and much exploding of economic fallacies. But it will not be enough to tell the dissatisfied Powers that they can just manage to live if they obey economic laws, and confine themselves strictly to the physical needs of their populations. The privileged Powers have much more—according to current ideas—than the mere possibility of sustaining life. They have greater

security in war. They have prestige and influence. They have the opportunity to spread their culture beyond the frontiers of the home country. They have a vast and varied choice of careers and occupations for their sons and daughters. They have an extended sphere for the investment of their surplus capital. They have more or less secured markets for their products. Their people can emigrate without becoming aliens in a foreign land. In short, we have to take into account a whole cluster of ideas which together make up the conception of a “place in the sun.” To tell the unprivileged peoples that they must renounce all these advantages—even if they are doubtful advantages, even if they are sheer illusions—is like a rich man telling a poor man that he can live perfectly well on a pound a week, if he is content to exercise strict economy, and to renounce all the “extras” which the same rich man continues to enjoy.

For we—the “rich men” of the world—quite definitely believe these “extras” to be essential to our welfare. It does not lie in our mouth, therefore, to say to others that they are not advantages at all. We believe that we should be economically poorer, as well as politically less considerable, without them. That belief is the basis of our dogged determination to “keep” the Empire at all costs. What could be a better proof of this than a recent utterance of Mr. Churchill, who may be trusted to find picturesque phrases to express the typical John Bull reactions of the moment? These were his words on September 29th last:

“If we lost the Empire (as we may well do if this question of making concessions is pursued) we should be left *starving* in this little island, with the population of a first-class power.”

Was it a stroke of satire? Or did our orator, for all his wisdom, not realise that he was providing Japan, Germany and Italy with a powerful confirmation of their claims?

CHARLES RODEN BUXTON.

LABOUR AT THE CROSSWAYS.

THE Labour Conference at Brighton was the conference of a crossways choice and a single dominating debate. Originally the noted seaside town had been selected because of the expected near approach of a testing General Election. The candidates must be able to proceed from it with the utmost possible dispatch to their would-be constituencies. The General Staff must not be taken too far and too long away from London. It was believed that at this late period of the year nothing but election preparations and colourful election slogans would be disturbing the autumnal air. So it was at the Conference at Llandudno before the last General Election when the Labour forces sang together *The Saving of the Pound* and then dispersed throughout the country amid scenes of the utmost enthusiasm.

This time there was not the slightest appearance of electoral enthusiasm. Now and again it was mentioned that Brighton was the last Conference before the great decision, and conventional references were made to what the Labour Party would do when it really succeeded to power. But these references were hardly ever expressed in more than merely conventional language. They were never reiterated with the accents of passionate conviction. Not that this was a bad or even an unfortunate omen for the future. The enthusiasm of Llandudno was succeeded by the greatest landslide that Labour had witnessed in the course of its brief but brilliant history. Are we entitled to conclude that the contrary will be the effect of the more frigid climate of Brighton?

The truth is that the delegates made for the southern coast in a condition of very definite uneasiness. Peace and war were both very much in the air, and everyone of them was aware that there had emerged a difference in the party on this burning question. Mr. George Lansbury is, with the exception of Keir Hardie, perhaps the best-loved leader who ever arose in the course of the Labour movement. Hitherto he had headed the party in the House of Commons without dispute or question. But this was because, as he himself admitted in the course of the discussions at Brighton, he had been contented to play the part of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Dr. Jekyll was the convinced pacifist who believed that war was at all times and in all circumstances an iniquity

and a snare and who preached the doctrine of non-resistance as valid both for individual and for national life. Mr. Hyde was the mere politician who went to Sir Samuel Hoare and expounded the more mundane policy of his party so well that his words were quoted as definitive by Dr. Dalton when he was expounding it in the opening speech of the Brighton debate on sanctions. Circumstances and the public Press had now brought these competing personalities together before the microphone. What was the party to do? Was it to forswear a policy which a few weeks before had been reaffirmed with convincing emphasis by the Trades Union Congress at Margate? That was what all the delegates were asking when they looked each other in the face at Brighton.

This policy, which has been summarily termed the policy of sanctions, was a part of that general Labour policy of peace and security by the collective action of the League of Nations which had been associated with the Labour Party since the Geneva Protocol of 1924. The Geneva Protocol, with which the name of the late Mr. Arthur Henderson will be for ever connected, was an effort to fill in certain gaps in the League Covenant and in particular to make more definite the obligations of the League members under Article 16. It was to be followed by a Disarmament Conference, and until the Disarmament Conference issued in some definite result, it could not come into final effect. Mr. Henderson piloted it in Geneva, despite disquieting references in the Conservative Press to our entangling commitments, with convincing agility and success. Indeed it would be correct to say that in these days of the first Labour Government we were nearer some effective measure of disarmament than we had ever been before and certainly than we have ever been since.

When, however, the Conservative Government came into office after the Zinovieff letter and the defeat of the Labour Party at the polls, Sir Austen Chamberlain, then Foreign Secretary, took the serious step of refusing to ratify the Geneva Protocol, thus destroying the chances of any considerable measure of disarmament, it may be for a whole generation. And in the Labour Party, now an Opposition and not a Government party, two more or less considerable currents of opposition to the policy of sanctions embodied in the protocol, began at once to disclose themselves. The first arose from those who were generally termed pacifists, some

on religious grounds, such as that of Quaker stock, some on generally humanitarian grounds, and some advanced Socialists with certain Tolstoyan leanings. They had, many of them, been irreconcilable conscientious objectors during the war, and, though not large in numbers, they were held in great and deserved respect throughout the movement for their consistency and high-minded advocacy of their cause. The other came from those who were organised in the Socialist League, which was mainly composed of people who refused to go out into outer darkness with the Independent Labour Party when that party resolved to separate itself from the main Labour stock. They were to some appreciable extent composed of young men and of young women of the upper and middle classes who had a more irreconcilable idea of the workers' class war than the workers had ever had themselves. They were neither very numerous nor practically influential in the Labour movement, as the result of the sanctions debate at Brighton plainly showed. But they had the advantage of being organised in the Socialist League and, as they were very insistent and vociferous, they succeeded in leaving their impress on the resolutions which have been passed during the last few years in the conferences of the Labour Party, on the subject of collective action for the attainment of peace by the abolition of war.

Their great specific was a mass movement of the workers to prevent the outbreak of a war. The workman must not be beholden to the capitalist. He must win every engagement by his own unaided strength. Consequently he must spurn the help of what they regarded as that capitalist institution, the League of Nations; and at Brighton Sir Stafford Cripps scornfully spoke of what he was pleased to call the "International Burglars' League." But hard words break no bones; and it is not to be conceived that the Socialist League could have led the Labour Party to the crossways, had not events and paragraphs in the Press associated explicitly the name of Mr. George Lansbury with the Socialist League, in a combined effort to reverse the executive motion on the subject of sanctions at Brighton. At Hastings, two years before, this motion had been coupled with a reference to the combination of the workers in every country to strike against war; but when the whole question came before a Joint Committee from the Trades Union Congress as well as from the Labour

Party, it speedily assumed a more orthodox shape. At Southport Mr. Arthur Henderson delivered a comprehensive and persuasive speech on the whole subject. This speech was printed and became a living inspiration of the movement; and the result was that when the delegates met at Brighton they were officially asked to make war not worth while by upholding the reign of law and by applying if need be the Covenant, the whole Covenant, and as a last resort, even the military sanctions of the Covenant.

This is not to be wondered at. The head and mainstay of the serried phalanx which triumphantly voted the decision in favour of the full application of the Covenant was the embattled force of the trade unions, and the leaders of the trade unions have ever been proud to regard themselves, not as theorists or dreamers, but as "men of action." So it was that Sir Randall Cremer characterised them as far back as 1863 when, on May 19th of that year, he represented the carpenters in a deputation to Lord Palmerston "to call on Russia to desist from her present conduct and, if she will not attend to that call, thrash her into compliance." Mr. Ernest Bevin, the trade union leader who presented his case most faithfully and aggressively at Brighton, would never have put it so crudely. As someone else said at another part of the debate, sanctions is a much more respectable term than war. But there was in his whole attitude and argument the same disdain for the futilities and hesitations of the theorist, and Sir Stafford Cripps listened in cowed submission while he told him bluntly that he had "said nothing" in his speech, and that he and his theoretic friends were simply proposing to hand over the burden of standing up for the League Covenant to his half a million transport workers instead of taking their place, with all the other classes of the community, to maintain the sanctity of their bond. They had agreed with the rest of the last two Labour Conferences to take the Trades Union Congress into their confidence in this matter of the war against war; and now that all the Labour Executives had joined in a common report, they proposed to move back this report and run away from their European engagements.

The argument was overwhelming, and the Socialist League opponents of the official view on sanctions would not have been able to stand up against it for a single moment, had it

not been for the temporary coalescence with them on this particular question of the pacifist forces headed by the Leader, Mr. George Lansbury. With what a passion of affection their leader was regarded by the whole Labour movement was apparent at every turn of the Conference. Even the trade union forces felt the power of the spell, and when Mr. Ernest Bevin was mercilessly exploring the recesses of the Lansbury conscience, he seemed bracing himself almost painfully to the task, amid many expressions of dissent when his words appeared unusually severe. There were Quakers in his audience who had been good friends of the Labour Party. There were the conscientious objectors to the Great War who had endured much to uphold their undying faith that "force is no remedy." They believed that what the Archbishop of York has termed a "noble heresy" is a "higher view of life," though Dr. Salter of Bermondsey, who most clearly disclosed this attitude of mind, offered not a single shred of supporting argument for his assumption.

The delegates were plainly uneasy lest they might seem to be blindly supporting their Tory opponents and sinning against the light, and it was only when Mr. Lansbury applied what was essentially an individual choice and responsibility to the more comprehensive commitments of a statesman that it was evident there was some serious flaw in the course of their argument. It might be valid for the individual to go out like Tolstoy into the wilderness, or to strip himself of all his means of defence in faith's last defiance to his foes. But for a statesman, as Mr. Lansbury proposed, to go to Geneva, and then to announce the unilateral disarmament of his country in the face of a mad world aggressively multiplying its arms, was a very different proposition, which did not win the same respectful acquiescence. As in the case of the contentions of the Socialist League, there appeared also in this contention to be the same passing over of responsibility. Even if the pacifist statesman had been returned to power by a majority of his people, he would hardly be justified in taking such an utter and irrevocable step. Even if the minority was a mere handful of reactionaries, how could he be entitled without the consent of each to deliver any of them helplessly to his foes? It was some such perception of the weak points in Mr. Lansbury's appeal that prevented its practical conclusions from exerting their full force on the minds of the delegates.

The result was that by a crushing majority the Conference resolved to be faithful to its obligations and to support the full operation, against an aggressor, of the Covenant of the League. The debate itself was on a very high level. There was not a single unworthy speech, and the Chairman of this year, who proved very successful, did not, like last year's Chairman, make the mistake of calling on too many of the insistent champions of "impossible loyalties," thus giving a false impression of the prevailing tone of opinion in the Conference. Mr. Herbert Morrison's speech in winding up the debate was a remarkable *tour de force*. As an *ad hoc* appeal it was simply magnificent. It caught the prevailing mood of the delegates. It glided easily around difficult corners. It patted and soothed opponents. It was deservedly greeted with salvos of applause. But his sketch of a Labour foreign policy was hardly satisfying and showed that he had scarcely made a very deep or prolonged study of the subject. To affirm that the League of Nations is the only good thing that arose from the Treaty of Versailles and then lightheartedly to make passing mention of the "revision of Treaties" would have been to usher himself into a hornets' nest at a League sitting in Geneva. It was noticeable that Mr. Lansbury, who had been visibly perturbed while Mr. Bevin was speaking, was considerably relieved during the speech of Mr. Morrison and, at its close, warmly shook the speaker's hand. But he continued enigmatic during the whole sitting of the Conference as to his ultimate intentions, although he caused it to be known that he had called a meeting of the Labour Parliamentary Party and he has now, since the Conference, taken the only honourable course.

This debate on sanctions, as has been already indicated, overshadowed everything else at the Brighton Labour Conference. No summary programme was disclosed for the coming election, and a motion on the agenda giving prominence to trade union subjects was met by the previous question; but it is understood that when the date of the election is finally known, the Executive Committee will issue a considered deliverance on the subject. The miners, after a speech by Mr. Joseph Jones which fairly gripped the delegates, let it be known that problems relating to their industry would be bound, in the event of a next Labour Parliament, to occupy a primary order of importance. The

Executive, indeed, had issued a sketch of a report on mining, but the Miners' President warned the executive that his workers would want to know more of the details of any executive scheme for the future government of their industry before they could count themselves pledged wholeheartedly to its support. This seems to show that the executive have not yet evolved for all sections a completely satisfactory scheme for a democratic government of industry. Despite an earlier announcement of hostility from Mr. Mellor, the scheme for the future government of the cotton industry was at a later sitting unanimously passed by the Congress; but then the cotton industry as regards its trade union government has always been to some extent infected by the methods of bureaucracy.

What, then, are the prospects and policy of Labour for the General Election and after, as disclosed at the Brighton Conference? Confronted with a choice at the crossways, the Labour delegates have certainly taken some steps to the Right. It is becoming fairly clear that a future Labour Government and certainly a future Labour Opposition, must manifest a strong trade union influence. It was the absence of any fixed and abiding contact with the trade unions which was a great source of weakness in the two previous Labour governments, so far as the general sense of the Labour forces can be plainly discerned. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, though he gave them abundant lip service, was never practically very enthusiastic about the trade union side of the movement. He termed himself a working journalist, but he always refused to join the National Union of Journalists. He was vaulted to the leadership of the party, but it was by the help of the Clydesiders and he defeated by a small majority of votes the trade union leader of the party in the previous Parliament, Mr. J. R. Clynes. It would not be surprising if the parliamentary party in the future retraced this previous step and reverted again to one whose trade union record is undoubted, and who has always shown himself broad-minded, progressive, and conciliatory.

Undoubtedly the vote at Brighton will be all for the Labour Party's good. It is well that a workers' movement shall be broadly based on the strong common sense of the organised proletariat. At Llandudno, just before the General Election, Mr. Henderson, himself sprung from the trade

union ranks, proclaimed that this was the lesson of the previous few weeks. Neglect of it will, as the speech of Mr. Bevin at Brighton plainly showed, produce a schism and a scission in the Labour Party ranks. On the other hand the organised trade unions bring to the Labour Party caution, moderation, practical experience, and a strong and determined opposition to all fascist attacks on liberty, freedom, and the reign of law. Mr. Baldwin saw clearly this side of their work when he paid his tribute to them at the Conservative Conference at Bournemouth. For the time being they are at one with the National Government in the effort to uphold the Covenant of the League of Nations; but their speakers made it very plain at Brighton that, with agreement on present issues, they had yet wide and fundamental differences with the general course of the Government's foreign policy, which will have to be plainly expressed in the event of a General Election. When that may be and how they will fare was then in the lap of the gods; but Brighton has not made the Labour chances less promising, and if, in the course of the next few weeks, the Government falter or fail in relation to the aggressive attack on Abyssinia there can be no doubt that the Labour chances of a decisive victory at the polls will be immensely increased.

J. H. HARLEY.

NEW LIGHT ON RUSSIA'S POLICY IN REGARD TO THE EASTERN QUESTION (1876-8).*

PROFESSOR SETON-WATSON has always given us something new and something interesting in his studies of Eastern Europe. But he is not likely to give us anything which exceeds the work before us in permanent value. He is always well informed as to the Press and public opinion of the periods of which he writes. And such knowledge is particularly important in this period—both as to the newspapers and popular movements of Russia and of England. But that does not constitute the main value of this contribution. Nor are the extracts from English private papers, like those of Gladstone, Granville, Harcourt or Layard the tit-bit. The real revelation lies in the extracts from the archives of the old Russian Embassy in London. There in the correspondence of Count Peter Shuvalov we have, as our author claims, “the realities,” that is, the realities of Russian politics. I am not certain the author has similarly laid bare the “realities” of British politics of the time. He has consulted Buckle but not the Disraeli papers direct, and there are other gaps. But revelations are seldom complete and exhaustive. One thing is certain: the author has turned searchlight of blazing and brilliant intensity on the Russian share in public events and its effect on British policies and politics during a most critical period of European history. It will indeed take some years before historians will assess the full measure and weight of this contribution. But it is likely to be considered a small one.

Some criticisms I would venture on before examining the main positions. Speaking generally the Turkish side of this is imperfectly appraised. Thus Ahmed Vefik Pasha is denounced as “a Liberal of honest reputation,” whose Liberalism was “skin deep” (p. 352) because he allowed the parliamentary Chamber, of which he had been President, to dissolve. It was dissolved two days after Abdul Hamid had appointed Ahmed Vefik Grand Vizier, “but with the new title of Premier for foreign consumption.” Now it is quite true that

Abdul Hamid dismissed the parliament and used Ahmed Vefik as a tool in an anti-parliamentary campaign. But Ahmed Vefik was not only quite honest, but quite willing to be so used. He was not a “Liberal” at all of the Midhat-parliamentary type. He was an old Turkish Conservative who was anti-parliamentarian and believed only in administrative reform. When President of the Chamber he openly flouted speakers and on one occasion silenced one with the observation “Shut up, you donkey!” He was therefore not sorry to send the other “donkeys” packing, and was doubtless chosen by Abdul Hamid because of his Conservative tendencies. To the end of his life Ahmed Vefik feared the too rigorous introduction of European reform. Midhat, on the other hand, is denounced by our author as insincere in his liberal and parliamentary reforms. It is certainly true that he would have put down the Bulgarian insurrection with a strong hand. But in previous days he had suppressed an insurrection there, though he had then been distinguished by equal justice to Christians and Turks. During our period Midhat was placed in an impossible position, but the criticism of our author goes too far (p. 123). Even Lord Tenterden admitted, after several interviews with Midhat, that he was sincerely in favour of a constitution. Now the reason Midhat favoured a constitution was undoubtedly that it meant the rule of law, i.e. of some restraint on the Sultan. Any such restraint on Abdul Hamid would have been good. Lord Fitzmaurice, whose death has only recently been recorded in these pages, had opportunities of seeing Midhat. He told me he was convinced he was sincere and that the realisation of his constitutional projects would have done good. This judgment from the last of those who knew the personalities of this period, or played a part in it, seems to me weighty. I mention these points merely to show that the Turkish case has not been fully, or altogether impartially, stated by our author.

There is another point on which I find myself at issue with him. The origin of the insurrection in Herzegovina is put down by our author to the oppression of the Turks. He is perfectly right in denouncing, as he does frequently, the inaccuracy of Elliot, Layard, and the Consuls in denying the oppression and in ascribing the disturbances to Russian gold. But the case, as stated by the insurgents themselves, does not bear out the view that oppression was the cause of revolt.

* *Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question. A Study in diplomacy and party politics.* By R. W. Seton-Watson. 590 pp. Macmillan & Co. 21s.

Oppression was habitual, what mattered was the opportunity. In the winter of 1874 chiefs of the semi-independent clans had concerted revolt, and their reason was that it is "such an opportunity as we shall *never* have again! This is the right moment to seize. If we fight long enough, Serbia and Montenegro will go to war, Bulgaria will rebel, Russia will fight Turkey, and Europe will then be obliged to step in." This is the argument embodied in the folk songs of Sobačić, who collected the tradition at the time, and it is the belief of the peasants to-day. Simonjić, the son of the most famous of the rebel chiefs, told me that his father had always held this view, so did Lazar Sočista, the son of the Montenegrin leader. As Serbs they had always hated the Turks. There was no unusual oppression at the moment, but it seemed a good opportunity to rebel. If the clan-chiefs really reasoned thus at their councils (and it seems they did) they had longer views than any diplomats in Europe.

The main thesis of our author in the book goes on the following lines. He thinks that Disraeli was fundamentally wrong in his policy. He was anti-national and pro-Turk and therefore against the Balkan nationalities on principle. Any good he did was therefore incidental. Our author regrets that the Queen, in view of her hatred of Russia, exercised no restraining hand on her Prime Minister. He views Elliot and Layard with suspicion, is rather kind to Derby and respectful to Salisbury. In view of his condemnation of Disraeli his summary and criticism of the Treaty of Berlin exhibits a rather surprising moderation. He points out the difficulties of settlement and admits certain merits in the treaty. None the less he does condemn Disraeli. He thinks that Gladstone, with his "prophetic vision" of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples," was right and that the principles, upon which Gladstone fought the Midlothian campaign, might have influenced our foreign policy more. With some diffidence I would submit, and try to illustrate from the materials of our author's work, a somewhat different thesis. I should stand half-way between the author's condemnation of Disraeli and his eulogy of Gladstone.

The two main questions to be answered are these: (1) Could Disraeli have averted the war? (2) Could he have made a better peace? On each we can only assemble the probabilities. But our author certainly makes out a strong case

about the Berlin Memorandum (pp. 32-5). This instrument of pacification between Turkey and her insurgents was drawn up by Russia, Austria-Hungary and Prussia and approved by Italy and France. It was Disraeli who caused its rejection, and defended it thus to the Queen: "Had Your Majesty sanctioned the Berlin Memorandum, Constantinople would at this moment have been garrisoned by Russia, and the Turkish fleet placed under Russian protection!" Our author justly terms this assertion "wildly exaggerated." Even if Disraeli was exaggerating somewhat to convince the Queen, he was none the less indicating his own instability. The rejection of the Berlin Memorandum was considered a fatal mistake by Lord Fitzmaurice, and it certainly did a good deal to produce the war. In the same month (May) the Cabinet ordered the British fleet to Besika Bay not, as Disraeli explained, "to protect Christians or Turks, but to uphold Your Majesty's Empire" (p. 35). There is a still more remarkable point, not mentioned by the author: Lord Russell, in extreme old age, now pointed out that it was "too humiliating" for England to send a fleet to Besika Bay and to do nothing to protect the Bulgars, who were being massacred. The sending of the fleet without any such effort was surely the best way to convince the Turks that England would support them in case of war. Within one month Disraeli had prevented Europe from putting pressure on Turkey, had failed to prevent the Bulgarian massacres, and had encouraged the Turks to think that England would back them against Europe. Yet, by his own admission, he wanted to do none of these things. In November of this same year Disraeli was telling the Cabinet that Turkey ought to sell us a port on the Black Sea, e.g. Varna, Batum or Sinope (pp. 99, 109). Now it is extremely probable that Turkey heard of these proposals and was correspondingly encouraged to resist Russia. And it is quite certain that, if England had got and armed a Gibraltar in the Black Sea, the result would have been war with Russia. Disraeli did not therefore do all he might have done to avert war, and his "fiery imagination" proved dangerous to his country. That Disraeli was ignorant of Turkey, despite his travels and his Oriental proclivities, is quite certain. That he was poorly informed by Elliot is also true. But the imagination of a genius proved more dangerous than ignorance.

That Salisbury was embarrassed when he went to the

Conference of Constantinople may also be taken for granted. He remembered the "policy of legerdemain," and did not want to be dominated by it. He was perplexed and hampered by a chief whom he neither trusted nor understood. Salisbury's leaning towards Ignatiev at Constantinople and his opposition to Elliot, which have both been condemned, were due to the erratic leading of the Prime Minister. Lord Salisbury was left in serious doubt as to his intentions. Disraeli had indeed already made one secret (and presumably) serious overture to Russia to secure peace in June 1876, and he made another at the last moment in March 1877. But both failed. Disraeli's earlier threats to Russia caused the failure of his later cajoleries. As Morley said once: "We have had great peace ministers like Walpole and great war ministers like Chatham, but we cannot have a Chatham and a Walpole at the same time." Disraeli played many parts, but he could not duplicate these two at the same moment.

Thus the answer to the first question is that Disraeli did not avert war, and that his attempts to do so were blundering and ill-conceived. But the question as to the peace is a different matter. In the first place, though our author has thrown much light on the internal politics of England, he has hardly thrown enough. He finds the policy of Derby difficult to understand. For instance, he regards it as strange that Derby should publish a Blue Book on April 14th, 1877, revealing the Russian law of tolerance towards Uniats. This, our author says, was "to confuse the issue and rouse public hostility towards Russia" (p. 174). Derby was really "interfering by official representations in the internal affairs of others." Derby would not have admitted this. He had at one time been an advanced Cobdenite Radical, and he still was so in foreign politics. He believed in big business, and in splendid isolation. He had devised the meaningless explanation which reduced the British guarantee of Luxemburg (1867) to a farce, and he now equally disclaimed any meaning for the European guarantee to the Turks in 1856. He was genuinely for peace, and even peace at any price, caring little what happened to the Turk. But this refusal to put material pressure on Russia was just the reason why he put moral pressure on her. To discredit her in the eyes of the British public was his only weapon, and he can hardly be blamed for using it. It is a very British policy. Halifax in 1688 would not

rebel by arms against James II, but was delighted to write pamphlets attacking him. Derby, in 1877, would not go to war with Russia, but was delighted to issue Blue Books reflecting on her treatment of her subjects. Disraeli did not understand, and indeed despised, Derby's pacifism as he did that of Carnarvon. But Derby could not be ignored, while Carnarvon could. Derby stood for common sense, and the Midlands adored him. His idea of John Bull minding his cash-box, and sending both Russians and Turks to the devil, was just what many of his countrymen liked. It was only as the war fever grew that Disraeli obtained support. Derby stood for a solid mass of English political feeling and it was long before Disraeli could dare to move against him in the open. Therefore he moved against him in secret.

The decision was really taken in April 1877, for Layard was then sent out to replace Elliot at Constantinople. Now Layard was a strong pro-Turk and an anti-Gladstonian and wanted vigorous measures. Layard was undoubtedly intended by Disraeli to restore British prestige with the Turks, to persuade them that England was their best friend, and to produce a working agreement between the two countries. If war broke out between Turkey and Russia (as it very soon did) this working agreement was bound to lead on to something like a Turco-British alliance. In such case there would be war unless Russia gave way. This result was, in fact, exactly what happened. Layard thus became an essential wheel in the complicated organism which Disraeli controlled. He received ostensible despatches from Derby enjoining relatively moderate courses; he received private letters from Disraeli advocating more violent ones. In July, some ten weeks after Layard's arrival and the Russian beginning of the war, Disraeli began advocating attacking Russia from the side of Asia and seizing Batum. Our author rightly points out the flaws in Dizzy's geography and logic. But I do not think that he quite draws the conclusion. If Layard remained in Constantinople—in view of Disraeli's private letters—strong measures against Russia were extremely probable. But it is clear to me that these strong measures would have been more effective in the autumn of 1877 before the fall of Plevna than in the spring of 1878, when the Russians were threatening Constantinople. The policy of the strong hand might have succeeded if exercised at once. Derby was the main reason it

could not succeed, and Derby and *laissez-faire* dominated the Foreign Office until January 1878, and exercised some influence until his final fall in March.

Disraeli and Salisbury were in control from the end of March 1878 but, as is generally admitted, Disraeli gave the lead. Salisbury clearly did not approve of much that Dizzy had done or wanted to do. But after all the struggles in the Cabinet he was willing to follow him to a considerable extent. It is in this light that we must read the Treaty of Berlin. Salisbury's idea of inducing the Turks to reform Asia Minor and of enlisting the interest of the British public by our occupying a strong fortified post was a good one. The choice of Cyprus was bad and our author does not praise it. But he does not point out that Mohammerah or Basra would have served much better. It is true that Mohammerah was technically Persian. But the independence of the local sheikh could have been obtained, and he could then have been protected by England. Layard strongly favoured developing the commerce of the Tigris and Euphrates and supporting Turkey from the south against Russian advance in Armenia. For this purpose Basra would have served as well as Mohammerah. Disraeli and Salisbury rejected this advice in favour of the apparently crazy scheme of securing Cyprus, from which Disraeli at any rate believed a British force could march to the defence of Armenia. It would have meant a long flank march through extraordinarily difficult country, and over deserts and mountains, an absurd and impracticable scheme. If England had chosen to establish herself at Basra or Mohammerah, the history of the world would have been different. Then Germany's Berlin to Bagdad railway would have been viewed with equanimity, for England would have secured the door into the Persian Gulf where it ended. So here a great opportunity was missed by Disraeli, to which none of our historians draw attention.

I do not think the author gives Disraeli the credit he undoubtedly deserves for preventing Constantinople from being either occupied or annexed by Russia. As he well points out (p. 331), such plans were in Russian heads. But for the boldness of Disraeli and his support of Layard, they might well have materialised. There Disraeli scored a considerable success over the "awkward squad" of his Cabinet. And I do not think anything but the "policy of legerdemain"

could have accomplished this result so skilfully, or perhaps could have accomplished it at all.

As regards the rest of the peace there is not so much to be said. Our author, a little surprisingly, is more favourable to Disraeli over the terms of the Treaty of Berlin than one would expect. A supply of ideals seldom fails the critics of peace conferences, but in certain respects he holds his commendably in restraint. He doubtless sees that Disraeli was bound by public opinion. His defence of the Balkan line as the limit for Bulgaria was probably a corollary of his defence of Constantinople. That was the logic of the public who devised the refrain:

We don't want to fight, but, by Jingo, if we do.

Our author sketches brilliantly the dissensions in the Liberal party, the ineffectiveness of Granville, and the half-heartedness of Hartington, though he does not mention his great blunder of dining with the Turkish Minister. What emerges is the force and passion of Gladstone overcoming all obstacles within and without his own party. This old man, who carried "such fire in his belly," was wonderful and ultimately resistless. But to go on and praise the Midlothian campaign and commend the speeches as a programme of foreign policy is to go too far. Despite some mild criticisms (pp. 549-50) I feel that the author really has more sympathy with Gladstone's principles of foreign policy than they deserve from an objective standpoint. Gladstone seems, to me at least, much more admirable for seeing the strength of national feeling in the Balkans, than for shadowing forth international ideals at a moment when Europe was unlikely to accept them. In the one there was the vision of a seer, in the other the intoxication of an orator. Nevertheless, whatever views we may hold of Disraeli or Gladstone, I do not think anyone will deny the value of our author's comment upon both. I believe there is still much to be written and something to be revealed on the European politics of the time, on the policy of the British Foreign Office, and on the *nuances* of British party warfare. But the secret history of Shuvalov's manœuvres in London, the working of his profound and subtle mind, the unravelling of the hundred threads of his diplomacy has been revealed in a masterly fashion.

HAROLD TEMPERLEY.

THE REFORMATION AND THE ENGLISH BIBLE.

ON May 31st last a movement was launched at Westminster to celebrate the Reformation throughout the country in 1938. The special object of this commemoration and the choice of the date have been determined by the fact that in the year 1538 a state injunction was issued which "enjoined" every curate, that is incumbent, to "provide" an English Bible for his church, and also to allow his parishioners to read it themselves and aloud to one another. The translations of Tyndale and Coverdale, together with the printing press, made this project practicable; the religious movement, with the awakening of individualism, made it urgent. This date, therefore, marks an epoch in the history of English Christianity, which has been of vital importance not only to the Church but to the nation, for as T. H. Huxley said in 1871, the Bible is "the book that has been woven into the life of all that is noblest and best in English history." Hence the proposal to celebrate this event should awaken the widest interest and secure the broadest co-operation possible in regard to the Reformation. It should also be the least controversial, especially as it avoids any conceivable treatment of the Bible as apart from and over against the Church by concentrating attention on the Bible *in* every church. It is not surprising, therefore, that the proposed commemoration has won the support, not only of the archbishops and bishops of the Established Church and of the leaders of the Evangelical Free Churches, but also of eminent representatives of every school of ecclesiastical thought in the Reformed Churches of England.

The practical object of the movement has been set forth by its promoters in the following statement.

The world needs a Christian interpretation of a Nationalism which will be consistent with and not destructive of the divine conception of the essential unity of all men and nations in the family of God. This generation needs the invigorating discovery that in allegiance to Christ will be found the "service which is perfect freedom" and "the way," which is also "the truth and the life." There are few who do not need to recover an instructed, personal religion built up by habits of Bible Reading,

Prayer and Sacrament. It will be of real help to realise that it is precisely at these points of our greatest need to-day that the history of the Spiritual Movement of the sixteenth century throws most light, and its achievements supply the greatest inspiration.

It is because of the comprehensive nature and the profound spiritual object of the commemoration that the movement has been launched so long before 1938, for the committee is anxious to secure, in due order, the mobilisation of leadership in all parts of the country, the active co-operation of educational societies and movements throughout the country, the co-operation of ministers and church workers in groups, schools, etc., accompanied by courses of preaching, teaching and study in order to prepare the way for a worthy and influential witness of the Churches in the year of public commemoration.

It is important, at the outset, to note the sequence of events that have given the Bible the outstanding place in English religious and national life to which Huxley paid so striking a tribute. The meeting in Westminster was held during the week in which the 1,200th anniversary of the death of the Venerable Bede was commemorated. It was on Ascension Day, A.D. 735, that this great saint, scholar, and teacher passed away, uttering his last doxology just as he had dictated the last sentence of his translation of St. John's Gospel. His impressive character, outstanding catholicity in every sense of the word, encyclopædic learning and unique service as an historian, combine to make him the greatest personality of his age. Yet his imperishable memory is, above all, treasured because he was the first great expositor and translator of the Holy Scriptures in English history. Then comes the Injunction of 1538, followed by the publication of the Authorised Version of the Holy Scriptures in 1611. Next in order is the foundation in 1804 of the British and Foreign Bible Society, one of the most important results of the Methodist Movement and the Evangelical Revival of the eighteenth century. Finally, there has been the establishment of the Bible in every "provided" school, now universal, which was initiated by the London School Board in 1871, as the result of the discussion in which Huxley took so remarkable a part. Hence the succession of the Bible in English, the English Bible in every church, the Bible in every home, and the Bible in every school has given its

distinctive character to English religion, and supplied the noblest inspiration to English national life.

Much might fruitfully be said about the widest aspects of this great history. But in this article I desire to concentrate attention upon the meaning of what was done in 1538 and upon what should be the result of the commemoration of 1938. A threefold significance is to be observed in both.

1. Foremost is the watchword, Back to Christ! It is obvious that the placing of the English Bible in every parish church and the instruction to every curate to allow his parishioners to read it for themselves, marked and followed upon the rejection of the papal claims and the final revolt from the sacerdotal authority of the Roman Church. This attitude is as vital to-day as it was four centuries ago, and is so obvious as to need no comment.

It is, however, of more immediate importance to observe that free access to the Bible is the best antidote to an ever-recurring danger of hard-and-fastness in religious faith and of the substitution of intermediate authorities of various kinds for direct access to our Lord Himself. *Integros accedere fontes*, to quote Lucretius, may well be taken as the watchword of the movement. The long-standing opposition between the Law and the Prophets, between the letter and the spirit, between authority and freedom, has certainly not been confined either to Old Testament times or to the controversy with the mediæval Church. This opposition is due, not chiefly to these in themselves, but to attitudes of the human spirit, with its sectional loyalties, traditional habits, and inherited prejudices. The trouble with these is that they are so deep-seated as to inform and fashion the positive religious faith and experience of those who are limited by them. For example, I have heard, from time to time, congregations of descendants of the Puritans and of Wesley sing "Faith of our fathers, living still," with the same fervour but with a very different reference from Faber's in this well-known hymn. The very freedom of the Spirit has become incrustated with the fixity of the Law, as a mere habit of thought and practice. Moreover, the theological interpretations of the Christian Faith, as contributed age by age by individual thinkers and frequently embodied in the binding Articles of Communions, have often reflected the

current opinions and practices of the particular age—whether metaphysical, juridical, or political—to the obscuring of the original gospel. The transient organisation of human thought and life has been so systematised by theology and ecclesiastical authority as to degrade and deform the profound simplicity of Christ, and to substitute for the transcendent immanence of His Revelation of the Father a series of conceptions which are at once too ephemeral and too external to account for the ways of God with man. Worst of all, perhaps, is the uncritical allegiance to particular teachers and schools without the criticism that is directed by the Bible to the truly catholic interpretation of the gospel. Back to Christ, and to the Bible as the record of the Divine process which culminated in Christ, should be not merely the watchword of the Reformation, but the guide in all the uncertainties and perplexities of the present time.

It may be objected that the present state of Biblical, and particularly of New Testament, criticism, has shaken our confidence in regard to the Personality of Christ. As to this, I will only remark in this place that even though critical investigations of the Four Gospels should reveal certain probably insoluble problems, yet despite all this the main features of Christ and of His revelation are clearly discernible. Christ is the Creator, not the creature, of the Christian faith. The spiritual revelation and transformation wrought by Christ must have an adequate explanation. Its origin is in Him, and not in His followers. The fellowship of His Spirit doubtless did much to develop the interpretation of His Person and work. Yet only the supreme greatness of His Personality and influence could have conveyed to His obscure and commonplace followers the inspiration that transformed their lives and created His Church. The secret of Christ is to be found in His Divine Sonship, and it was because of this that He conveyed to His humble disciples "the power to become sons of God."

2. Yet, if the injunction of 1538 was a movement back to Christ, it was also a movement forward to the freedom of spiritual and personal maturity. It accompanied, informed and ordered the rise of individualism, with all its spiritual, intellectual and social consequences. The Reformation and access to the Bible did not create the rise of individualism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The awakening

of personal self-consciousness, with its claims of manifold freedom, was due to the process of human evolution. It was the inevitable, and on the whole salutary reaction and response of the human spirit to the influence of the time. The revival of learning with the recovery of the classics of Greece and Rome, freed the learned from the bonds of scholasticism by confronting those who enjoyed it with other interpretations of reality and other modes of intellectual and social life. It compelled men to think for themselves and to reorganise their life accordingly. The growth of nationalism, with the political problems it raised, carried the process of emancipation outwards to the people at large. The new spirit of adventure, leading to the discovery of new continents and to the dawn of modern science, stimulated individual enterprise both by the influential examples of fruitful personal activity and by the incentives that the new situation offered to those who took advantage of it. All these influences were both revolutionary and constructive. If they occasioned the rise of a new philosophy, they appealed to the common sense, which links the minds of ordinary men to the efforts of speculative thinkers to make men spiritually and mentally at home in their world and in their times. It was providential that, in face of the dangers and opportunities thus created, the new access to the English Bible introduced the plain man afresh to Hebrew literature, to a religion which, though and because it was truly catholic, was instinct with the spirit of personal freedom and responsibility, while it supplied the background through which individual freedom was saved from anarchy by entrance upon a great spiritual and moral inheritance, to be freely appropriated for the guidance of personal life. Access to the English Bible at once inspired and corrected individual freedom by giving it *a faith*.

From this point of view the proposed commemoration should be appreciated. In a time of far-reaching unsettlement and of the frequently undisciplined and uninstructed adventure of so-called emancipation, it is, above all, essential to carry over and inward the faith of the Supreme Spiritual Values of which the Bible is the repository for the deepening and uplifting, the enlargement and steadying of the personal life of the present generation.

3. Finally, free access to the Bible led upward to direct

contact with the interpreting Spirit of Christ. Older men, still alive, cherish memories of saintly and untutored people, who were "men of one book," the Bible. Such students, despite their ignorance, often manifested a serenity of spirit, an enlarged vision, and a soundness of judgment, which owed their existence and their impressiveness entirely to the educational influence of close and continuous study of the Holy Scriptures.

Doubtless there has to be set against this the many errors of interpretation and application into which such reverent, yet uninstructed, students often fell, through excessive literalism and the failure to recognise that the Bible is not a static collection of oracles, but the record of a gradual process of revelation, which culminates in Christ, Who in transcending both fulfilled and corrected the preparatory stages of the past. In regard to this, the commemoration of the Bible in the Church is of moment. There must be a collective, indeed catholic, interpretation of the Scriptures if their place in personal religion is to be preserved and protected from abuse. The fellowship of the faith must be cultivated, and this fellowship includes the contribution of scholars towards fashioning the collective mind of the Church as a means of informing the personal faith of individual students of the Bible. Neither man nor the Spirit of God is individualist. Spiritual influence, like personality, is social. Only in fellowship do the words of the Bible become, in the highest degree, "Spirit and life."

It follows from all this that the devout and well-informed study of the Bible is all-important, not merely for the verification but for the sustenance, enrichment and vivifying of the Christian faith. The old and well-worn tag, "The Church to teach, the Bible to prove," is thoroughly misleading. The Bible is the record of the Church, both teaching and proving. It is not a book of reference, but of continuous guidance. It is not a storehouse of proof texts, but the spacious unfolding of the Divine self-manifestation and self-giving. Thus used it makes the Christian faith deeply inward and thoroughly personal. Yet it carries men out above and beyond themselves. It enables and summons its readers to contemplate the "eternal purpose of God," coming to its fulfilment through many stages, by means of manifold types of human character in co-operation with God, and through

succeeding world-movements, which, always threatening in their advent, became co-operant with it in their process and results. Above all, it roots the redemptive progress of man in the self-giving and sacrifice of God. Hence no true student of the Bible can be self-sufficing, narrow or mean in his ideals and conduct of life. The Bible invests common men with its own sublimity and sanctity by making them "fellow-workers with God" in the advancement of the kingdom, whose watchword is "As in heaven, so on earth."

But, it will be objected, does not this movement stand for "bibliolatry," to the ignoring or disparagement of those results of criticism which have, for the present, shaken the authority of the Bible? Certainly not. All critical tests—whether textual, literary or historical—should be applied to the Bible with the unshrinking approval of the Church. The results of all the researches into the genesis, development and nature of religion throughout all the peoples and all the ages of mankind should be welcomed and applied to the study of the Bible. At every stage of the growth of the Bible there are manifold signs of action and reaction between the prophets and teachers of the Bible and the religions by which they were surrounded. Moreover, close and frank investigation of the Old Testament reveals as imbedded in it many of the conceptions and practices which the progress of the revelation eventually sloughed off and deliberately excluded. "We have this treasure in earthen vessels," to quote St. Paul, and the work of Biblical critics supplies the valuable, though subordinate, instrument for distinguishing the treasure from the earthen vessels that contain it. Yet the treasure is there and is imperishable. True explanation does not explain away. The scrutiny of the phenomena heightens the significance and value of the substance. Above all, cautious and well-authenticated criticism gives still greater force to the assertion that "Back to the Bible" means ultimately "Back to Christ." The process of revelation culminates in Him, alike as historic fact, comprehensive spirit, reconciling and regenerating power. The subjectivity of Christian faith is rooted in, springs forth from, and is fashioned by the objectivity of Christ. The Bible unifies the inward and the outward, the spiritual and the cosmic, in Christ, in whom the Father is revealed so that all things are "summed up" in Him, and "in Him all things hold

together." Without Him, all things fall to pieces, and the universe becomes a baffling and inexplicable mystery both for thought and endeavour. Hence the enlightened study of the Bible unifies the spiritual values, by which man is made and re-made, with the organic process of the universe. It does so by enabling men to apprehend the truth and meaning of the self-giving of God, whose creative activity in nature is subservient and leads up to His grace in man. Faith is "the gift of God," not the invention and artifice of man. Man lives "not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." These words become a language in Christ "the Word."

Viewed in this light, there can be no question as to the timeliness of the proposed commemoration, and of the comprehensive efforts that are in progress for giving effect to it. "Back to the Bible" would mean for this perplexed and restless age the triumphant renewal of "the work of faith, the patience of hope, and the labour of love." So may it be!

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

FINLAND REVISITED.

FINLAND to-day is the only State in the world that is paying all its debts, including even that to America. This alone entitles her to our attention, but there are also many other reasons why that country should be studied, and her quite remarkable progress of the last few years be made better known. Furthermore, her importance as a factor in international relations has just been demonstrated by the visit of Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, to Helsingfors. To a person like myself, who was practically an eye-witness of the birth of the Finnish nation, the road they have travelled since they seceded from Russia after the Revolution is of particular interest.

The Finnish Republic was born after the war and the Russian Revolution, like the other Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. But it is slightly senior to all of them, its independence having been recognised as early as January 1918, not only by Soviet Russia, but also by Germany, France, Sweden and other countries. Furthermore, the position of Finland at the beginning of her independence movement was quite different from that of the other States. Although since 1809 she had been a part of the Russian Empire, and although during the last two decades of Tsarism she had been made the object of dangerous and stupid attempts at Russification, on the whole the Grand Duchy of Finland (to give it its correct name of those days) had managed to preserve a remarkable internal national autonomy. Indeed, it is amazing to what degree the entirely non-Russian political and cultural superstructure—the results of seven centuries of Finland's union with Sweden—was allowed to survive, and thus enabled the country to maintain and develop both its national Finnish and Scandinavian culture. The collapse of Tsarism gave Finland the opportunity of breaking away from Russia and establishing herself as an independent legal entity. But when this moment occurred Finland found herself in the happy position of actually possessing a firmly established State machine, with its traditions, laws and institutions—centuries old, but still in force. In fact, the whole framework of the State was there, and only required a little adaptation to the new conditions. But on the whole the substitution of sovereign independence for autonomy was only a formality.

Yet bloodshed and civil war proved unavoidable even in

Finland, despite the singularly favourable conditions described above. Numerous Finnish Socialists sympathised with the Russian Bolsheviks, and the whole of 1917 is characterised by a stubborn fight between them and the bourgeois parties. With increasing bitterness and brutality, this struggle was gradually becoming more and more violent until in January 1918 it definitely turned into civil war. The Reds now availed themselves of the help of the remaining Russian and completely Bolshevised troops, whereas the Whites found support in Germany. First Germany merely helped to train and equip them. But after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, when the Soviets had to guarantee their neutrality in Finland's civil war, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag decided to send a German army corps to rescue the Finnish Whites and in return to obtain far-reaching commercial and political advantages from them. The largest of the German units sent to Finland consisted of something like 12,000 and was commanded by the famous General von der Goltz. Before long the Reds were driven out of Helsingfors, and after the conquest of the capital, German and Finnish troops together (the latter under General Mannerheim) proceeded to wipe out the Reds in the country. By May 1918 order was fully restored. Finland's Diet, considerably reduced by all these events, now elected Prince Frederick Carl of Hesse as King. But this was in October 1918, and Germany's defeat a few weeks later prompted the Prince to decline the Crown that had just been offered him. Thereupon, in June 1919, the Finnish Republic was proclaimed, with a very democratic constitution.

It is only natural that the years immediately following all these commotions should have been full of difficulties. But the country recovered with amazing rapidity, and normal political and economic conditions in the young Republic were soon firmly established. The majority of the Social Democrats, in contrast to a small group of Communists, became fervent parliamentarians, and in 1927 actually formed a cabinet under their able and efficient leader Väinö Tanner. It was a minority Government, tolerated by certain bourgeois groups. To-day the position is reversed, and there is a bourgeois cabinet, tolerated by the Socialists, who are the largest single party in the Diet, but have no absolute majority. They have, as it happens, thirty-nine per cent. of the total national representation, a curious and significant fact, because in the

three Scandinavian countries the Socialists, too, have about forty per cent.

It is a strange paradox that, while the only really grave internal political problem with which Finland is faced to-day is the strong chauvinistic drive against the Swedish section of her population, the whole national development of the country is very much on Scandinavian lines. As to her foreign relations, the tendency towards a close co-operation with Sweden, Norway and Denmark is more pronounced than ever. The vexatious question of Finland's Swedish minorities is delicate and hard to comprehend. It has been much abused by unscrupulous demagogues, who try to make political capital out of it. It is quite true that the Swedes have a very great cultural influence that is not commensurate with their numerical strength, for they represent barely ten per cent. of the population. Yet since they are localised along the coast and in a few principal towns, and, furthermore, since the birth-rate is moving so much in favour of the Finnish and against the Swedish sections of the population, the issue should really before very long solve itself. Meanwhile, a battle royal continues around the language question, for until now the country has been practically bi-lingual. In fact, in academic and business circles, Swedish seems to be still predominant, which causes considerable annoyance to certain classes of Finns. It is a pity that the present struggle, which is going on for no discoverable reason, should trouble the otherwise amazingly successful and steady development of the young Finnish Republic, with its ancient culture and traditions, part of which has been definitely inherited from Sweden.

This development is not in any way sporadic, but it is an indigenous and deep-rooted growth. Indeed, it is quite impossible to understand it without fully appreciating the factor of nature and national character. Like Sweden and Norway, Finland has a vast area (over one and a half times the size of Great Britain) with a small population of 3,700,000. Over ten per cent. of the country is occupied by lakes, and of the land area something like seventy-five per cent. is covered with forests. Northern Finland remains under snow for over 200 days in a year, while in the centre and the south the figures are 150 to 180 days and 100 days respectively. It is a rocky country, too, with much stone and granite. This is enough to explain a certain grimness of character coupled with a belief

in the ancient popular myths and folk-poetry. Suffice it to mention the Kalevala, Finland's great national epic, first collected and published just a hundred years ago—the recent centenary celebrations were a most important event in the life of the country. This national epic was handed down from generation to generation by certain old men chanting it. From its very inception therefore it is connected with the national music of the country, which to-day holds a place of honour in our civilisation. It is significant that Finland's greatest modern composer, Sibelius, devoted his masterpiece to the Kalevala. Over fifteen thousand folk-tunes have been collected and published in Finland, some of them dating back over a thousand years to a time when the Finns were still heathens. Peasant arts and crafts, too, are carried on in exactly the same way as many centuries ago, the hand-woven rugs occupying a place of special distinction.

Side by side with this ancient, romantic, primeval Finland there is the modern, industrialised, busy and highly efficient Finland. It carries on a large international trade, not only in timber and wood goods (such as paper pulp, plywood, spools, furniture, boats and many other articles) but in a variety of manufactured goods, as well as in agricultural produce. Indeed, both the volume of foreign trade and the export surplus have been growing in an amazing way. The following figures are most striking, especially when the general setback in world trade is taken into account (value in millions of Finnish marks*) :

				<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Excess of Exports</i>
1934	...	...	...	4,772·1	6,217·0	1,444·9
1933	...	...	...	3,928·1	5,297·7	1,369·6
1932	...	...	...	3,502·3	4,631·5	1,129·2
1931	...	...	...	3,464·7	4,456·7	992·0
1930	...	...	...	5,247·7	5,404·1	156·4

The first half of 1935 has brought no serious changes in the extremely favourable trade development, and the consolidation of the country's economic position has proceeded still further. Industrial equipment and the rationalisation of production have been greatly improved. Agricultural production has been allowed to grow to such a point that Finland

* The rate at which the Finnish mark has been pegged to sterling is 226·7 marks = £1.

can easily make herself independent of imported food. Unemployment has been continuously falling and practically disappeared altogether during the summer months. The home market has shown signs of healthy development and expansion. The Budget shows a surplus of nominally 35 million marks, but a sum of 200 millions was set aside during the year for a special reserve "Depression Fund," in addition to the 100 millions already provided for this purpose.

The national finances have been further strengthened through a series of successful conversions, and a large part of Finland's long-term foreign indebtedness has been paid off or repatriated. The short-term foreign debts have been practically wiped out within the last year or two. Finland is privileged to enjoy a singularly wise financial administration, Mr. Risto Ryti, the Governor of the Bank of Finland, being a man of courage and great ability. After the original currency difficulties incidental to a new State, Finland adopted the gold standard at the close of 1925, which, however, she abandoned at the same time as England. This country is her best customer, taking about forty-six per cent. of her total exports; and it is essential for her to be a member of the Sterling Club, even though her accumulation of gold and foreign currency make the keeping down of the mark rate no easy task. Mr. Ryti is supported by a number of excellent bankers, Mr. R. von Fieandt of the Nordiska Föreningsbanken deservedly enjoying a high international reputation. There are nine joint stock banks, with about 500 offices between them; the three principal banks are well known in the international world of finance, and play a prominent part in regulating Finland's economic life. So do the Co-operative Wholesale Societies, which are extremely powerful and prosperous. A great deal is being done for the promotion of foreign trade by the Finnish Export Association and many similar organisations.

Finally, a great effort is being made to attract the foreign tourist, who is offered an unusual variety of amenities in this clean and picturesque, romantic and modern land where the unspoiled peace of nature blends with industrial achievement. Communications with and in Finland are excellent; and foreign tourists come in ever-growing numbers to see this successful country, also commercial travellers of all nationalities, and—of late—foreign politicians.

This brings me back to the question of Colonel Beck's recent visit to Helsingfors, which must have puzzled many people. What was the object of his trip? It was hard to believe that he had travelled all the way to Finland merely to reciprocate a courtesy visit her Foreign Minister had paid to Warsaw some months ago. The suspicion that the trip was merely a move in the extremely intricate political game which for some time past has been played around the Baltic soon found confirmation in the international Press. But what did not become immediately apparent was that here was one more attempt on the part of Nazi Germany to conduct her machinations in the Baltic through the agency of Poland.

For the time being, Germany is still badly in need of Poland's support, as her surrender in the recent Danzig conflict has clearly shown. Despite the fact that the naval agreement with Great Britain has more or less presented Germany with hegemony in the Baltic, she does not as yet feel strong enough to carry out her "Rosenberg" intentions there all by herself. She needs an ally, several allies if possible. The plan of campaign, then, becomes comparatively simple. Finland has a key position in the Baltic, and, in case of war, offers an ideal point whence to attack Russia. Were Finland to join in an anti-Russian military campaign, not only would Leningrad be immediately threatened, but the best possible base for Germany's air fleet would be created, and Moscow would be within raiding distance instead of enjoying its present practical immunity against air attacks. With Poland simultaneously marching into the Ukraine, Germany as the head of an anti-Russian alliance consisting of herself, Poland and Finland, would be in a very strong position. Not only would such a combination control the Baltic (the little border States being swept aside) but it would make things more than difficult for Soviet Russia and her new ally France.

This fantastic plan, or some similar scheme, did not come off, and Colonel Beck's negotiations in Helsingfors do not seem to have achieved the desired object. Finland had the sense to see the suicidal danger of such an arrangement. She refused to die a heroic death *ad maiorem gloriam* of Herren Hitler and Rosenberg, and turned a deaf ear to the Polish diplomat. That Finland both hates and fears her most powerful neighbour, Soviet Russia, is true enough. Yet she has established a reasonably friendly *modus vivendi* with the

Russians, which it would be dangerous and highly unprofitable to upset. She knows, too, that, at the moment, the Russians have too many troubles of their own and dread a war almost more than any other country. Peace with the Soviets is therefore fairly well assured, at least for the time. And the risk of first a German occupation and then possibly a Russian invasion is not worth taking: the dark days of 1917-18 are not so far away as to be entirely forgotten. That is one aspect of it. There is also another one.

Despite the internal anti-Swedish wave, internationally speaking Finland feels herself more and more drawn into the Scandinavian circle of nations. These are not in any sense a political alliance, but a moral union with certain specific economic interests. They are pillars of true democracy, too, and despite occasional conflicts and a certain amount of aggravating competition in every field of human activity, they are nevertheless members of one large family. They have the same cultural inheritance, they have endless cultural, political, economic, dynastic and family ties. They represent a great moral force by standing together, as well as more practical advantages. In case of a new world conflagration the socialistic and democratic Scandinavian *bloc* offers a better chance of peace and security than an adventure among rival dictatorships in brown or red shirts. Finland's shrewd and cautious rulers are fully aware of it. On the other hand, the Scandinavian trio would be glad to welcome the unqualified advent of Finland into their midst so as to turn themselves into a harmonious North European quartette. In the sphere of economic co-operation this adhesion of Finland—despite all difficulties and rivalries—seems to have become an established fact. Finland will take part in the next inter-Scandinavian consultations. It is to be hoped that this will also lead to more active political co-operation. It would be a thousand pities if the young, successful and prosperous Finnish Republic were to allow itself to be drawn into some such scheme as the one described here. Poland's own international position at the moment seems more than ever problematical; she certainly has a part to play between Germany and Russia. But this need not necessarily be that of Hitler's satellite. As to Finland, if really put to the task of choosing between Berlin, Warsaw and Moscow, her wisest course would be to choose—Stockholm, Oslo and Copenhagen.

GEORGE SOLOVEYITCHIK.

MADAME DE MAINTENON.

WRITING half a century ago Döllinger pronounced Madame de Maintenon (1635-1719) the most influential woman of French history, and since that date there has been no alteration in the verdict. The Salic Law used to prevail in the succession to the throne of France, yet it may safely be stated that there is no country in Europe where women have enjoyed more power without the sense of responsibility that is naturally associated with that power. Her fair fame has been dimmed in her own day by the malignity of Saint-Simon and the jealousy of Elizabeth Charlotte, Duchess of Orleans, and 200 years ago by the biography of La Beaumelle. The causes of the malignity of Saint-Simon are obvious. He hated her because in his judgment she had, by her marriage to Louis XIV, gravely injured the position of the *noblesse*, and thereby the position of the King himself, in the eyes of all Europe; and he also hated her because she constituted herself the protector of the legitimatised princes whom he loathed with all the malice of his heart: how unbounded was that malice all readers of his memoirs are well aware. The Duchess of Orleans was the sister-in-law of Louis XIV, and, filled with rage for the treatment she had received at court, she vented it on Madame de Maintenon most unfairly. According to the Duchess, Madame de Maintenon was a murderess, a poisoner, who had made away with the Dauphiness, who had poisoned Louvois and Mansard. The truth is that the Duchess had so poisoned her own mind that she was completely unable to do justice to a very remarkable woman. La Beaumelle, in pursuit of the thesis that Madame de Maintenon was a clever and cold coquette, forged some letters, mutilated others, and interpolated passages in order to prove his thesis beyond the possibility of a doubt. The verdict of Lord Acton is that "her letters have been tampered with by an editor, who was a forger and a falsifier," and against that verdict there is no appeal.

If we forget the malignity of Saint-Simon, the jealousy of the Duchess of Orleans, and the forgeries of La Beaumelle, we stand in some prospect of understanding her. Even the Duchess admits that "the women are jealous of their husbands more from ambition than from love; wishing to rule

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over all and to make all things subordinate to them, so that there is not a kitchen-maid who does not suppose herself to be intelligent enough to govern a kingdom." If Françoise d'Aubigné Maintenon were hated, she was also loved, and loved with no common affection. The tone of deference towards her, running throughout Fénelon's letters, is quite unmistakable, and with this deference is combined admiration in the letters of the Princess Orsini and Marshall Villars. Madame de Miramon, who was revered as a saint, begged for the presence of Madame de Maintenon upon her death-bed. Nor are the Abbess of Fontévrard, sister of Madame de Montespan, and Madame de Dangeau a whit behind her in their admiration. Madame de Sevigné pronounced that "her position is unique in the world; there never has been, nor ever will be again, anything like it." It would be easy to swell the chorus of adulation. Ambassadors of the class of Foscarini, Erizzo, Girolamo Venier, and Ezekiel Spanheim—who carefully excepts her attitude to the Huguenots—also agree, and since they presented their reports to their respective Italian and German courts, there is at least a strong presumption that they were telling the truth. Take the account of Foscarini written in 1683. He points out that she enjoys the highest reputation at court; is universally esteemed, and lives very quietly in great retirement; that she has won the affection of the King through her vivacity and the refinement of her mind, through her accommodating spirit and tact in sympathising with the feelings of others; and that the high favour in which she stands is considered a matter of rejoicing, because it is believed that she may impart to the King some of the kindness and amiability of her own nature.

Françoise d'Aubigné Maintenon was the strange grand-child of that sturdy old Huguenot, Agrippa d'Aubigné, leader and champion of lost causes, the friend and companion of Henri IV. The son was unworthy of such a father. He fell into grave misfortune, and lay under sentence of death in the prison of Niort. In this prison Françoise was born 300 years ago. Prison, poverty, and privation were the earliest associations of the child. She spent her early life in America, returning to her widowed mother. Her poverty induced an aunt, Madame de Vilette, to adopt the girl and bring her up as a Huguenot. In due time she proceeded to

stop with another relation, who was a Roman Catholic. With her, after a prolonged struggle, she yielded, and turned Roman Catholic. In days to come she used to relate that, at twelve years of age, with her Bible in her hand, she plied the priests with the arguments suggested by her ingenious mind, and at last, after two years of argument, she yielded. On the death of her mother she stood alone in the world, still faced as a good-looking girl of fifteen with the privation she had long experienced. In order to avoid taking the veil in one form, she took it in another, for she married the comic poet, Scarron. His crippled appearance, combined with his age, rendered the marriage one only in name. She was nurse and secretary to him, and he was instructor to her. He taught her three languages, and naturally Latin was one of them. While he taught her much, the literary coterie, which her grace and intelligence collected, taught her more. His wit and wisdom, the ability and the variety of interests of those who gathered in her tiny *salon*, were among the influences of her formative years, years pregnant with much for the destinies of Europe. On her husband's death, she once more encountered her old associates, poverty and privation, though they were now alleviated by the welcome and esteem accorded to her in the highest literary circles of Paris. She loathed her poverty and privation, and, much as she liked the welcome and esteem of her intimates, she could not live on them.

A new and most amazing turn of fortune befell her. The Abbess of Fontévrard had a sister, the notorious Madame de Montespan, who opportunely invited her to undertake the education of the children she had secretly borne Louis XIV. Madame Scarron consented, but upon her own terms. She stipulated that she should receive her new task directly from the King himself. She took up her abode in a remote, isolated house in Paris, where she was governess to the Duke of Maine and his sister. At first Louis XIV could not bear her society. Was she not a *Précieuse*, a prim, pedantic person, utterly beneath his attention? Hear Saint-Simon on his early attitude to her. "*Qu'elle lui étoit insupportable, et que pourvu qu'on lui promît qu'il ne la verroit plus, et qu'on ne lui parleroit jamais, il donneroit encore; quoique, pour en dire la vérité, il n'eût déjà que beaucoup trop donné pour une créature de cette espèce.*" In the days to come "*une créature de cette espèce*"

was to be the guiding star of the King's existence! To be sure, he first met her in 1666 when she was thirty-one, and he was three or four years younger. It was with reluctance that he conferred upon her that estate at Maintenon which gave her the name by which she is known to history.

In 1666 her character was fully formed. Prison, poverty, privation, America, the experience of two faiths and of relations who had altered her attitude to these two faiths, her marriage to Scarron, her literary coterie—all these had been among the great and grave influences in her thirty-one years of existence. She cared deeply for religion, which meant much to her, and she cared no less deeply for her honour. She coveted a *bonne gloire* that won the praises of the virtuous. "I never wished to be loved by any particular person," she confessed in later life, "I wished to be thought well of by all. I cared nothing for riches, I was far above self-seeking; all I wanted was honour. Honour was my folly, honour was my idol, for which perhaps I am not punished by excess of greatness. Would to God I had done as much for Him as I have for my own reputation!"

With such ideals in her mind she shrank from contact with Madame de Montespan. Unconsciously at first, consciously later on, she set herself, in all good faith, to win Louis away from Madame de Montespan. Madame Scarron's life was most reputable, whereas Madame de Montespan's was most disreputable. The governess, fortunately for herself, owned a cold temperament which "went gently, but carried far." She was never the slave—always rather the mistress—of feeling. Even well into middle age she retained her regular and placid beauty. Softly sweet and sweetly serious, she gradually won the royal confidence. She was witty enough for the brilliant Montespan, but not too witty for the King, whose intellect was mediocre. To Madame de Maintenon the King came for refuge from the storms excited by his tempestuous mistress, whose rage and arrogance were beginning to tell upon him. Madame de Maintenon gradually formed her resolution. She had not the faintest intention of occupying the position of the imperious mistress she was stage by stage dethroning. For one thing she was religious, and for another she coveted the maintenance of her *bonne gloire*. She would gravely and wisely counsel the monarch; she would bring him to a better frame of mind; she would rid

him of his evil companions. Was not Madame de Montespan the most outstanding of them? She would reconcile him to his long-suffering and much-wronged Queen, Maria Theresa. "Providence," cried this long-neglected Consort, "has raised Madame de Maintenon to bring my husband to me." Madame de Sevigné mentions that as early as 1676 Madame Scarron had gained universal admiration in her arduous position, and in the three years from 1680 to 1683 she stood at the very height of her fame. In these happiest years of her life all bowed before the rising star. Nor must we overlook her disinterestedness, for the Queen seemed likely to enjoy a long life, now that her husband at long last took her once more into favour, and treated her with due respect. She was at the time of her reconciliation with the King, her husband, healthy and younger than she who had brought to pass this reconciliation.

Maria Theresa lived but a short time after this reunion, dying on July 30th, 1683. At the beginning of January 1684 the sometime nominal wife of Scarron, now fifty years of age, became the wife of Louis, the marriage ceremony taking place at midnight. The celebrant of the marriage was Archbishop Harlai of Paris, and there were two witnesses. Louvois was one, and we can easily believe how it galled his haughty nature to have to act in this capacity. The marriage was a private one, and it is hardly to be expected that she should remain content with its privacy. She is said to have gone down on her knees to Louvois in order to have it declared publicly, but even she was unable to prevail upon him. In a letter to her spiritual director, Godet, she stated that she willingly sacrificed an earthly kingdom for a heavenly one; for she had been taught to regard the renunciation of the avowal of her marriage as a sacrifice to be offered up to God. She accordingly destroyed all letters and records which testified to her marriage, saying to a confidential friend, "None shall learn what I have been to the King."

It has been necessary to show what manner of woman she was in order to lay bare what she proved to have been to the King for two and thirty years, during which she was the unacknowledged lord of France. The fatal Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, by which the Huguenots lost their toleration in 1685, the Nine Years' War from 1689 to 1697, ending with the Treaty of Ryswick, the Partition Treaties, the War of the

Spanish Succession which raged from 1702 to 1713, ending with the Treaty of Utrecht—these are the broad features of this period; and in all of them Françoise de Maintenon, her mark, is written in large letters. Her power over Louis was unlimited. “Never,” grudgingly admits the Duchess of Orleans, “was a young and beautiful favourite so worshipped as this old woman, so enamoured is the great man of his treasure.” In fact, she concedes that “she was mistress over all his affections and thoughts.” In 1698 Madame de Maintenon wrote that the King came regularly three times a day to her apartment. Later, she lamented her want of time, and how inaccessible she was to others, as the King was scarcely ever out of her room. When present at his deliberations with his ministers, he was sure to ask, “What does your Wisdom think of this? How does this strike your *Solidité*?” She was only twice present at an actual cabinet meeting, but was her influence not always present with Louis?

To her friend Brinon she had confided, while the Nine Years’ War was in progress, that it was the cause of God that the King was defending, and that in consequence the enemy would surely be overcome. She confirmed her husband in the view that God would grant him success, and that He who willed the end also willed the means. Did she ever reflect that among the means were the barbarities executed in the Palatinate and Piedmont? In October 1870, Thiers asked Ranke, “With whom are the Germans fighting since the fall of the Emperor?” “Against Louis XIV,” was the stern reply, and Ranke might have added, “Against Madame de Maintenon.” The feelings that actuated her in 1689 also operated in 1700 when she pressed her husband to break his plighted word and nominate a French prince as King of Spain. Dollinger unhesitatingly pronounces that “no one had in reality contributed to this result (i.e. the breaking of the royal word) more than Madame de Maintenon,” though he adds: “the connection of events was certainly at that time beyond any one’s ken.” The great German historian draws an elaborate parallel between her and the Empress Maria Theresa. If Louis continued to believe the truth of the words which Voltaire put into his mouth, “*L’Etat, c’est moi*,” it was in no small measure due to his wife. The events even of the War of the Spanish Succession might have shaken his robust confidence in his own powers, but how could this robust

confidence be really shaken so long as his wife was close at hand to reassure him?

Louis worked regularly in her chamber, and he was a very hard-working man. There he consulted her on matters of diplomacy, family questions, affairs of conscience, specially on all that concerned the welfare of the Church. Saint-Simon bitterly remarks that under her rule the King had become “a devotee, and that too in the utmost darkness of ignorance.” Of her he no less bitterly remarks: “She believed herself to be universal Abbess, specially in spiritual matters . . . she fancied herself a mother of the Church.” The new religious bias she bestowed upon him proved to be the origin of some of the worst evils of his reign. A Jansenist was offensive to her as to him—because he dared to think for himself—and both unconsciously recognised that nothing is so dangerous for an autocracy as thought. A Huguenot was offensive to him and to her for this reason—and to her for another—for she displayed the proverbial liking for her new faith and her loathing for her old. Well aware of the atrocities committed in the Palatinate and Piedmont, she never expresses a word of regret or sympathy with the inhabitants given over to fire and sword. Was not her cause the cause of righteousness? Well aware of the horrors committed before the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes on those who used to be her fellow-believers, she never expresses a word of regret or sympathy with them. Was not their cause the cause of unrighteousness?

She calmly reports to Cardinal de Noailles that several hundred more “fanatics”—Huguenots fighting for liberty of conscience—have been killed in the Cevennes, and that she expects that the whole of Languedoc will now be “purged” from them. After that fatal year 1685, tens of thousands of Huguenots were compelled to leave their native land simply because they would worship God as a girl called Françoise d’Aubigné used to worship Him. Of that vast flight it is not creditable to historians that no connected narrative has ever been written. Many of the best men in the British Islands and in North America, in Germany and Switzerland, come from the strong stock of the Huguenots, from Puritan ancestors who scorned delight and lived laborious days, doing strenuously what their hand found to do, and thus fixing a character which forms one of the greatest of national assets.

In old farmhouses one may still see on the book-shelf a Genevese French Bible or New Testament of the seventeenth century ; on the fly-leaf we may still trace the names of the refugees, written in ink browned by age, illegible from time and perhaps from tears. It is the frail memorial of a race that has left an abiding mark in many diverse lands.

Of a character greatly resembling Madame de Maintenon an historian declared that she was a good woman in the worst sense of the term. Madame de Maintenon was emphatically a good woman in the worst sense of the term. Some may think of her school at Saint Cyr. We for our part can never forget the horrors of the Nine Years' War and of the War of the Spanish Succession, and, above all, of the wanton persecution of the Huguenots for which we hold her largely responsible. She stands on a bead-roll of fame which we do not envy her. The most influential woman of French history, her peers are Lenin and Trotsky, Hitler and Mussolini, and all who believe that the sword is mightier than the pen.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

FASCISM AND THE INTELLECTUALS.

THE intellectual, like the physical void, is the negation of life. But the spirit is gallant, its reserves are not easily drained. The cultured Italian stands at the apex of civilisation. His tradition is coeval with history and nothing human is alien to him. Perhaps that is why he was easy prey. The years of the depression have educated all of us. We have learned that it is impossible to grasp at once even a material change of sudden and unexpected vastness. Our first refuge is unreality. To all but the unemployed the new economic situation remained long in limbo. Confronted with the systematic destruction of culture, of morality and freedom in Germany, recurrently we put the question, "Are we actually alive and awake?" We were not surprised to learn that even German Jews failed to take the Hitler ideology seriously until it became a fact. Yet Germany had had the benefit of Italian experience. The Italians themselves, at the advent of fascism, were unprepared for the most monumental destruction of spiritual values of which history has left any record. It was the height of unreality. One could not, of course, deny the effects of castor oil, of beatings that eventuated in death, of murder as the fascist prerogative and principal glory, but it was inevitable that one should discount its permanency. It was bound to disappear like any other nightmare. Moreover, its methods defied the man of culture, defied any man who was not organised into savagery. That kind of fury would inevitably spend itself.

It did not spend itself save in its more spectacular manifestations. The new violence differs from the old in its dynamic quality. It has settled down into a leaden brutishness that slowly and the more surely dulls and ultimately paralyses the life of the spirit. The victim feels it as a void, as utter spiritual privation, as suspension in an abyss that swallows every manifestation of life without a trace, without an echo. The non-fascist finds all doors closed to him. State control is complete in industry, the professions, the Church, so that it is rapidly becoming impossible to make even a modest living outside the P.N.F. (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*). It goes without saying that in the present circumstances of unemployment and overproduction, the chances either of a job or of a business enterprise for the non-fascist are equally

insignificant. It does, of course, happen that a man of superlative attainments, a man who combines extraordinary intelligence and widely diversified experience, to cite an actual case, may find some minor employment and less compensation in a large business which still retains an eye to commercial advantage, patriotism, nationalism and fascism to the contrary notwithstanding. Under its weak leadership the Church has officially capitulated with cowardly completeness. I say officially, because many ecclesiastic personages are in fundamental and persistent opposition to fascism. Yet the man who has incurred the displeasure of the State by refusing to take the fascist oath finds any related employment in the Church equally beyond his reach.

Professional and artistic activity as a function of the P.N.F. necessarily involves results that are incalculably beyond any purely individual, concrete considerations, for the subject matter ranges widely and involves a comprehensive variety of repression. That the full scope of political literature is confined to the endless series of fascist apologias need hardly be stated. That no purely literary or artistic work by a non-fascist can reach the light of day carries implications more far-reaching in character. No publisher of standing will accept a book by a non-fascist. This initial fact means nothing less than decimation of the number of readers. That a more or less unknown printer may be found for a meritorious work by a writer of note who has failed to succumb to the powers, is not beyond the realm of possibility. The market that awaits such a publication is limited to the writer's personal friends and to such occasional people as may frequent the rear of bookshops in byways. The completeness with which this ban operates is reflected in the disappearance from the market even of important works of literature and of literary criticism, pre-fascist in date but non-fascist in authorship, as shown by the writer's subsequent political or lack of political affiliations. Assuming that an important writer might reconcile himself to so limited a public, his work is denied all further contact with his peers. It will not receive adverse criticism, it will receive no criticism whatever. It will be as if it had never been.

Translated in terms of art, all exhibitions, whether public or private, are held subject to permission by the proper committee of authorities. Eligibility as an authority again

depends on fascist loyalty and in no case the merits of a non-fascist artist come within the discretion of the committee. Assuming the possibility of private invitations by an artist he would again be subject to that pall of silence, the absence of all critical repercussions. With baffling completeness the padded cell has been perfected for non-fascist expression of whatever superior excellence or insignificance.

Within the fascist fold the government arrogates to itself the determination, one might almost say the licensing, of competent critics. Theoretically the syndicate of artists and professional men is autarchic—a new word has been found desirable for a new situation—but as in all the syndicates it is the direct government representatives who wield the power. To appreciate the quality of fascist criticism, the projected railway station in Florence may be taken as a case in point. In general, public opinion was agreed that it was ugly and the pros and cons were discussed for a time. Then the edict went forth that discussion was closed. Henceforward the Florence railway station was officially beautiful and any observation to the contrary would be considered an offence to the government. In the literary field the case of Ungaretti is amusing. His work was so effectively parodied by another poet that it passed among critics and the public at large as Ungaretti's own; and a certain critic reflected on the none too serious lyrical quality that lent itself to such perfect imitation. At this point *L'Italia Letteraria*, the most important Italian literary review, wrote as follows in connection with the incident:

We ask quite simply whether this is the way to criticise the work of a poet. We would like to know just how far tolerance will acquiesce in a kind of criticism so unseemly and stupid that it dishonours our country. We insist on knowing in the name of whom and of what this presumptuous pseudo-scholarship has been making a show of itself, let us say for far too long a time. The spectacle begins to grow irritating rather than amusing. We are living in a period of ordered hierarchy. Why do we delay in protecting the work of a poet—of whom, indeed, there are none too many—who represents and does honour to Italy? We may not be able to protect him from ignorance, but at least we can protect him from the disrespect which is at best worthy of a humorous sheet. And, not to quote a professional critic, who might be accused of complicity, is not this the very Ungaretti whose work and worth Benito Mussolini recognised in a number of written pages that we may all re-read?

From the university down, the appointment of professors and teachers, which used to be autonomous in each institution, is in the hands of the State. The full effect of this regulation will not be felt for some time inasmuch as many of the pre-fascist appointments are still in force. But the type of the new appointee is rather definite and may be approximated when it is considered that a university appointment is a legitimate form of reward for fascist loyalty as dismissal is the legitimate answer to so-called fascist agnosticism. It has been said repeatedly that fascism is a religion and the fascist may not be lukewarm in the faith. Translated into practice, this means that the intellectual may not be politically indifferent. Whether he teach literature, engineering or mathematics, as a teacher his political faith is of primary interest to the government. One after another every possibility of activity relentlessly closes, and the non-fascist may be tempted to look within the citadel for some form of non-political activity in which purely technical, expert services may be utilised and which may leave him, as an individual, a relatively free man. Such a search ends before it has begun, if not by reason of political loyalties, inescapably by reason of personal loyalties. For the fascist creed has destroyed the backbone of morality, it has destroyed loyalty in the name of the State. The new race of men which the fascists are breeding may be able to live without loyalty, indeed the possibility has already been demonstrated, but it cannot be effaced in those who have known and valued it.

It has been put to many severe tests, to the final test, the destruction of friendships. Italian culture has formed a relatively compact group. It is comprehensive, universal, homogeneous; hence informal conversation in small gatherings was the natural medium for exchanging ideas. To-day, three anti-fascists under one roof would constitute a case for police intervention. Police intervention, when it does come, is swift and sure, a procedure without formalities. The institution known as the *confino* has been created to fill the need. It eliminates the unpleasant name of prison as a corollary to eliminating the judicial process. To send a man to the *confino* is simply to send him. He disappears, literally and completely. His immediate family may be informed, if he has one. Having none, his friends are less than powerless, for too assiduous inquiry may have unpleasant repercussions

for him. Not only his whereabouts, but his term of sequestration, his life or his death are equally unknown. A mason engaged on a particular job left his work one night. He was not again seen or heard of during four years although his employer and his sister-in-law made every effort to trace him that was consistent with his welfare. At the end of that time he reappeared as suddenly. The fate of many men in public life, fascist and non-fascist, is completely unknown. Yet this is less than prison—a man lives where he will within the prescribed area, receives five lire per day for his livelihood and is subject to visits by a guard at intervals of fifteen minutes, not only by day but by night. The frequency of the visits is a function of the government's individual grudge. The fifteen-minute interval has not been unknown even over a considerable period of time.

Letter writing among supposedly free men is a lost art and a useless one, since even within Italy letters have long since ceased to be private. Individually one might take one's chances but in a letter two people find themselves involved. The ordinary sociability of the tram, the railway carriage and the countryside have gone the same way, for with a proportion of 15,000 civilian guards and a host of unpaid spies in the city of Rome, for example, with a population of one million, every person naturally becomes a potential spy. And so no man knows what the other man thinks or even what he himself thinks. He is quite capable of telling you with equal sincerity that the most difficult cross to bear is the desertion of one's friends to the fascist camp, that the fascists themselves are really anti-fascists, that there is no way out, that he doesn't know what keeps it up since it is all sham—the means do not exist for finding out anything real since statistics are government made—that constitutional government was all a mistake—the Italian people were not really ripe for self-government, that only their physical welfare interested them, that they are now destitute and hopeless. The newspaper, as we know, has long since been converted from a source of information into a source of irritation. Day after day, day after day, it records the personal triumphs of the Duce and the institutional triumphs of fascism. What goes on in the world, or indeed in Italy itself, is a matter of indifference unless it directly reflects glory on the fascist régime.

In the name of whom and of what, the anti-fascist asks himself in bitter earnestness, has he been deprived of the means of livelihood, of the stimulus of books and of people, of the possibility of serving his country, of contact with the life of his time, of the opportunity to rear his children in dignity and in freedom? He doubts himself and his ideals because they have been passive in the face of disaster. He feels that something has eluded him, all the positive goods of life could not have been routed merely by violence. That violence must have content, content of a spiritual order that refuses to penetrate the void in which he has been insulated. And so he begins the cycle again—he reviews the history of events, how the march on Rome turned on a hair, on the weakness of the King who withdrew the order of siege already issued, how castor oil and beating became the order of the day, how politics and statesmanship turned from a game with rules into a brawl of force, how the embers of journalistic liberty died under the heavy hand of propaganda, how the censorship tightened into self-imposed vacuity, how all forms of life but the physical slowly relinquished their spark and the system settled into rigidity. Surely there must have been a point at which resistance could have been effective, surely the fascist State must mean something beyond the arbitrary will to govern. It cannot be that the battle is clinched with a shadow. The contact with life may have been lost temporarily but somewhere it must be possible to reconnect. The anti-fascist is haunted, pursued by the necessity for content, a content which by definition can never be found.

For the philosophy of fascism, if it has one, is opportunism, the glory of the State individually interpreted by Mussolini and all his little Mussolinis. He is the final authority, they are the lesser authorities in literature, art, morality, finance, statesmanship, religion—in short, the categorical imperative incarnate in whatever field of human endeavour. "Forty million people have been condemned to eternal celebration," to rejoice under the fascism of Mussolini.

CECIL CLARK.

SYRIA UNDER THE FRENCH MANDATE.

THE most striking political feature of Syria, by which I mean the whole French Mandate, is division. Religion has divided the Syrian people into a variety of sects unrivalled in any other country of equal population, 3-3½ million, in the world: Moslems, a majority, Sunni and Shi'a; offshoots of Islam (Alaouites and Druzes); Christians (Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Maronite or Syrian Catholic and Protestants); Jews; and a new minority both racial and religious, the Armenian refugees. On top of religious divisions, moreover, social cross-divisions are arising between those who have had a western education and those who have not; while even among those who have there is division, according as they have attended the schools and colleges of French, American or British missions. It might seem impossible to reconcile these elements politically. But there are compensating factors of unity. The Arabic language is spoken almost universally. The Syrians are probably of Arab stock in the main. Syria has an undeniable geographic and economic unity, a unity which extends, indeed, beyond the French Mandate to include Palestine and Transjordan. It is even possible to discern common elements in the Syrian character: a certain nimbleness of mind, for instance, which may be a vice or a virtue.* The feeling of unity, moreover, is increasing with the spread of nationalist ideas, the growth of nationalist parties, and the decline of religious intolerance, especially among the educated younger generation. So that there may certainly now be said to be a Syrian nation. These elements of division and unity have been dwelt upon because they have given rise to some important political problems, as will be seen below.

After the war France took over the coastal Lebanon peacefully from Allenby, but the larger inland part of Syria by conquest in 1920, driving Feisal out in a brief campaign and occupying his short-lived kingdom. By such means was the French Mandate constituted. But the ejection of Feisal created bitterness at the outset; and after 1920 there was unrest and disturbance, culminating in the Druze rebellion in

* Another characteristic was noted long ago: "*Permanet in Syris ingenitus negotiationis ardor, qui per totum mundum lucri cupiditate discurrunt*" (Hieronymus). Add to this a social nature as a rule, but with it an individualism perhaps excessive.

What were the reasons for this surprising rejection? The French claimed that the treaty was modelled on that of Great Britain with Iraq. So it was in many respects. "Syria" was to become a "sovereign" state, democratic, allied to France, with membership of the League of Nations, and guaranteeing protection for Christians: all reasonable enough. But objection was found to the form of some of the reservations. During the twenty-five years of the treaty, French advisers and certain officials were to be obligatory, not merely "expected," as in Iraq; and the French military forces were to be stationed where and in what numbers they pleased, and on an extra-territorial basis, in contrast with the strictly defined position of the British forces in Iraq. But the greatest bone of contention was the question of the unity of Syria, the whole Mandate. This treaty was presented to the province of "Syria" alone: the other provinces were to continue separate. Now the Syrian Nationalists, and not only they, have always held it a cardinal point in their creed that Syria should be united in one state, and have consistently opposed its partition into what amounts to four separate states. When, therefore, a treaty was offered which proposed to continue this partition, strong resistance was inevitable. The French, however, have remained firm; so that deadlock has resulted up to the present day.

What are the considerations urged on both sides in this important question of the unity of Syria? The French urge, first and foremost, that the partition which they have made is the minimum possible. Christian Lebanon, they say, cannot be left to the mercy of a Moslem majority, in view of the persecution which Christians suffered before the war; and France is under a special and traditional obligation to protect the Lebanon. The backward Alaouites and Druzes need special attention and must have direct rule, conversely they must not be allowed to retard the constitutional development of "Syria." France, moreover, is not a free agent, but responsible for these minorities to the League of Nations, and must therefore take every precaution for their well-being. Finally, the difficulties of governing a land of conflicting peoples are almost insuperable without some degree of division. To these arguments the Syrians reply that Syria has after all a population smaller than that of Paris; so that a division into four parts is not only *prima facie* unnecessary

but the first thing to be avoided: such a small, poor country cannot support four governments with all their organisations and expenses. The citizens of one are not allowed to seek employment in another; and all the time the fact of division tends to produce the spirit of it. The Syrians are a single nation and must be treated as such; the difficulties could surely be solved by a less obtrusive regional system. The French, it is alleged, have divided up the country on the Roman principle, the more easily to rule it.

To hazard an opinion about this difficult problem: assuming that the French intend to leave the country at some future date, it seems clear that unification is the first necessity. It should not be impossible to frame a constitution which, while establishing one central government, will allow for local differences by some measure of local autonomy. But in order to secure true unity, two conditions will probably have to be fulfilled: the idea of a thorough democracy will have to be renounced among such varying elements, and a strong but tolerant ruler, most probably a Moslem (not Ibn Saud), should be found, to ensure stability to the government, and peace and freedom to the various minorities. Monarchy has been found to be a suitable form of government in most of the surrounding countries.

To return to the present political situation in Syria, the survey requires to be completed by some general remarks applying to all the provinces alike. So far it may seem as though the tale is of nothing but failures and difficulties. That is because successes are often in politics by their very nature unobtrusive. In the midst of all troubles the French have at least achieved the solid assets of peace, order and tolerance: and tolerance at least is a great new boon to many of the Christians, who had suffered oppression for centuries under the Turks. If the law courts are still not free from corruption as in Ottoman days, it is unnecessary in Syria to attribute this entirely to the influence of the French. Education has been extended in some degree, though not as fast as it might. On the other side must be set that tactlessness which has characterised the French government of Syria, the outstanding example being the employment of Senegalese troops throughout the country; and the accessibility to bribes and wire-pulling that is found among administrators, French no less than Syrian.

Finally there are the following economic difficulties. Economic depression has afflicted Syria like all other countries during the past five years. Here, too, as elsewhere, people are disposed to censure the Government for all their troubles, especially since it is a foreign government; and here their censure is not without some justification, as will be seen. Syria is not a land of great industrial resources; it is primarily an agricultural country. But in addition to this it holds an excellent geographical position for commerce. Leaving agriculture aside for the moment, then, Syria ought to be a market for the products of the Near and Middle East, and a thoroughfare for the transit trade of the world. Since the war Syria has been unnaturally isolated from the large imperial hinterland which she always enjoyed in the past. Hence it should have been the duty of the Government since the war to free the channels of commerce as much as possible. But instead of encouraging trade the Government has acted in many ways as a brake upon it. Import duties are not only being constantly changed but are excessively high. The average level of duties in Syria is almost twice as high as that of Palestine. All the main imports: cotton goods, silks, automobiles (taxis are the chief means of rapid passenger transport in Syria), tyres, and a very wide range of other commodities are heavily taxed, although there have been some reductions recently. The inevitable result of these duties is that less is being imported than in former years. Syria, with a population two and a half times as large as that of Palestine, imports and exports less—not entirely due, surely, to the presence of the Jews in Palestine. The Syrians are being pressed very hard. Smuggling, moreover, has become so profitable that it is carried on on a large scale across the Transjordanian and Palestinian borders. This, too, has been somewhat checked recently, but it is impossible to guard the land frontiers completely.

By this uneconomic method revenue is raised for the Common Budget of Syria. Equally uneconomic taxes—burdens on buildings, on agricultural produce, on advertisements, heavy harbour charges—support the provincial budgets. The result of all these restrictions and taxes is the stagnation of private enterprise. Industry has in any case only a precarious foothold in a land little suited to it and apparently without mineral resources; and commerce is

already overloaded with merchants. The numbers of the unemployed are increasing.

Agriculture, which is the staple source of Syria's wealth—wheat, fruits and many other products are grown—is decaying. The world economic depression has struck the Syrian farmer, like everyone else: but his position would not be intolerable but for certain aggravating factors. He pays a heavy tithe to the provincial governments. Harvests have been poor in recent years. The land is in some parts being bought up by large landowners, and the peasants are becoming tenants instead of owners. But above all the farmer is not receiving that aid from the government which he urgently needs. Irrigation is a first necessity: the possibilities are greater than in Palestine: yet practically nothing has been done in this direction. Reafforestation is almost equally urgent, and the scope for it is large; yet in Lebanon, the chief field for this, only a trifling acreage has been planted in recent years. The most surprising feature of the Syrian countryside is surely its lack of development. Agricultural research and education, too, are vitally needed. With proper cultivation, grading and packing there is no reason why Syria should not export as much fruit as Palestine. Increased exports are essential, to balance the necessary imports.

These are the omissions of the rulers of Syria. Certain public works have been performed, such as the oil pipe-line, air ports, and some road construction; harbour improvements are being undertaken. These are useful works, and it is, perhaps, unfortunate that their nature affords ground for the suspicion among Syrians that the reason for their execution is not one of pure benevolence to Syria.

There has been an enormous adverse balance of visible trade for many years. Imports are now three times as large as exports. Not that imports are high: exports are so low. In recent years there has been a serious shrinkage in the value of both. Meanwhile since the depression the remittances which used to come from the many Syrians abroad have almost ceased. Also Syria has suffered with the other gold standard countries from an adverse rate of exchange. As a result of all this and of the shipment of gold by the banks to France, the amount of gold currency in circulation in the country has fallen from £Turk. 31 in 1925 to £Turk. $\frac{1}{2}$ in 1934.

The natural remedy for the poverty which has resulted, among a people with the commercial genius of the Syrians, would be the setting up of new enterprises in industry and agriculture. But where there is an opening Syrians are not always given a chance. Monopolistic concessions are given to foreign companies, mainly French, by the governments in the most liberal manner; which means profits to foreign shareholders and employment for foreign professionals. A recent large tobacco concession to a French company (*Régie Générale*), the cause of a great outcry in Syria, is an instance of a practice which is exasperating the Syrians more than anything else.

There is naturally a great deal of discontent among the people on account of their economic troubles; and this is reinforced by the more purely political grievances described above; finally by the introduction of social habits and modes of life foreign to the nature and traditions of the Arabic world. As, however, agitation and outspoken criticism of the Mandatory Power are firmly suppressed, and as the individualism of the Syrians has up to the present proved too sturdy to allow them to combine effectively for opposition, resistance has been unsuccessful so far. Thus there is little likelihood of any change of régime in the immediate future. But granted that the French Mandate is likely to continue for some years, there would be some justification for a strong and independent League of Nations Commission of Inquiry. If the Mandate system is to mean anything at all, something must be done to ensure that the Mandatory Power governs both efficiently and in the interest of the governed.

G. F. HOURANI.

THE LATIN QUARTER.

TOWARDS the close of the Dark Ages the Latin Quarter took a firm root on the south bank of the Seine as a great centre of learning. A magnetic charm has ever since clung both to the name and to the place. For the student quarter of Paris having firmly established itself on the slopes of the Pont Sacré, King Philippe Auguste surrounded it with high ramparts and bestowed on it special privileges. The Latin Quarter thus became a state within a state, a condition unique in the history of scholarship. During the eight centuries of its existence as a university, the Quarter has more or less maintained this position. Even to the present day one feels on crossing the Pont St. Michel from the north that there is a different atmosphere from that prevailing in the rest of Paris. There is a mysterious mingling of the elements of youth, with its ambitions, dreams, ideals, arrogance, and nonchalance; and the absence of bustling trade or frivolous pleasure. The Quarter is still a state by itself.

To appreciate properly the evolution of this unique student quarter, it is necessary to go back to the days of the Roman Empire. The successors of Julius Cæsar built in Lutetia, which is now Paris, a road, later called "La Rue St. Jacques." It is one of the famous roads of the world, for on each side, before it passes out of the ancient limits of the city on its way to Orleans and Rome, learning has thriven for generations. Before retiring to the defence of the motherland, the Romans considerably developed this Gallic settlement of Lutetia, dividing it like all Gaul into three parts. The big island of the Cité was to remain for a thousand years the main section of Paris, defended by high walls, and through its navigating interests to give to the town its coat-of-arms: a ship, and the words "*Fluctuat Nec Mergitur*." Constantly the town grew north and south of this island, where now loom the familiar outlines of Notre Dame at one end and the towers of the Conciergerie and Saint Chapelle at the other. Rapid extension on the left bank by the Romans gave the Latin Quarter a start over the opposite bank, which has since developed into the great city of commerce and pleasure. There southern Latins, a Frankish invader, Clovis, in turn absorbed by

the Gallo-Roman civilisation, erected a building on the top of the Quarter's hill. Curiously enough this became the first important educational building and, in a way, the foundation-stone of the Latin Quarter, for, so legend relates, this barbarian ruler of Paris, before his departure to meet a fresh onslaught of invaders from the east, hurled his lance with great force and, fulfilling a vow upon his victorious return, constructed an abbey whose length equalled the throw of his lance. The building was later dedicated to the patron saint of the City, Sainte Geneviève, whose ashes repose in the nearby church of St. Etienne du Mont.

About the year 1150, when the new cathedral school of Notre Dame was overflowing into the Quarter, a great teacher, Abelard, became involved in an educational quarrel with the Cité authorities. As a result of this dispute, Abelard, followed by a mass of pupils attracted by his great prestige as a professor, withdrew to the top of the mountain and established his famous school in the Abbey of Sainte Geneviève. Unhappily the Tour Clovis, part of the Lycée Henri IV, immediately behind the Panthéon, is all that remains of a building so important in the early struggles of this mother of modern universities. The Panthéon itself with a great classic dome now physically dominates the Latin Quarter and is, in a way, its Capital. Built in the middle of the eighteenth century, and originally dedicated as a church in honour of the saintly lady whose Abbey had formerly stood so near, it is now the resting-place of France's great men, renowned in science, literature, or politics. Its unhappy architect, Soufflot, overwhelmed by his own audacity in erecting such a vast dome, and dismayed by the opinion of friends and enemies that it would soon collapse, committed suicide. As it has stood for a century and a half in vigil over a mass of schools, libraries, and churches nestling around it, one is tempted to recall that criticism is easy and art most difficult.

Notre Dame, having fostered the early school, thrust it forth to thrive more or less under the Church's maternal guidance across the narrow Seine to the south bank, thus practically instituting the student Quarter. Thereafter, in the nearby Rue du Fouarre still existing in name, the uproar of the scholars at their recitations and disputes became a source of annoyance to the island dwellers around the

cathedral. This Rue du Fouarre, named after the straw on which the hardy scholars of the period sat while following the master's discourses, soon linked up with the Rue St. Jacques. Abbeys and schools increased along its slope until, from the river to the Abbey of Sainte Geneviève, the Quarter assumed its distinctive character.

Living conditions in those old days were trying. The wealthy student dwelt under his master's roof, the less well endowed sought a night's shelter, if driven from most humble lodgings, under archways, in cloisters, or where fate provided. Even the illustrious Dante, one among many of the immortals who studied in the Latin Quarter, was driven by poverty from his room in the Rue du Fouarre and forced to retire around the corner to the courtyard of the Church of St. Julien le Pauvre. This little church is one of the most precious relics of the Quarter's history. First constructed in the sixth century, pillaged and partly destroyed by Norman pirates in their great attack on the Cité, it still stands triumphant in that St. Séverin section, long the meeting-place of the university Fathers, so reminiscent of old Paris. Through the courtyard, well known to Dante Alighieri, tourists now troop to visit the famous dungeons running far below, one of the shows of Paris by night. The dungeons are genuine enough, however, and no doubt many a medieval student received merited discipline in them at the hands of the stern university authorities of the time.

Close to St. Julien looms up the far larger church of Saint Séverin, likewise ancient and full of venerable souvenirs. By its door has passed a long line of students with immortal names, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Loyola, Bacon, Calvin, Erasmus, Rabelais, and Villon. A few steps beyond the church the signplate, "Rue de la Parcheminerie," recalls a period long before the invention of printing. At that time parchment was costly, and conversation, not written matter, predominated. The art of argument flourished, and violent discussion was encouraged by professors to nourish the faculty of concentration, to induce greater flexibility of mind, and to develop a lively interest in scholarship. A large decoration in the courtyard of the Sorbonne recalls that there used to be an annual Fair of Parchment Makers, when the whole university, with music and much merriment to offset the dignity of the official

cortège, marched over the wooded hill of Montmartre to St. Denis.

This medieval period in the history of the Paris university was one of romantic picturesqueness and of vast importance to modern education. The idea of a university, as we know it, was slowly crystallising. In the first instance the renown of individual professors, such as Abelard, together with the protection bestowed on the Quarter by Church and State, acted as a compelling magnet to students from near and far. An international character was given early to student Paris. Civilisation was struggling to its feet again, and its youth were thirsting for knowledge. The young scholar who nailed a shoe of his horse, according to custom, on the door of St. Séverin, as an *ex voto* for safe arrival, was necessarily something of a real enthusiast, and not an educational dilettante. Many were compelled to travel on foot or horseback through country infested with bands of cut-throats. This picture, and the fact that, upon arrival in the Latin Quarter many students faced the prospect of considerable hardship in order to obtain some learning, irrespective of future awards, makes many of these medieval scholars objects of deep admiration. Needless to say, among the four thousand young men in the Latin Quarter at the height of its fame in this early period were turbulent and disreputable spirits. Hence the dungeons in the courtyard of St. Julien. No doubt, the scholars who frequented the taverns of the Rue de la Harpe—to the present day not entirely a street of angels—or the famed Pomme de Pin on the Cité, could use in sudden quarrel the dagger or sword, proud prerogatives of the student, or could frighten a passing citizen into parting with his purse. François Villon, Master of Arts, father of some of the most divine verses in French literature, and a type of the wayward student of the fifteenth century, is credited with the writing of a perfect guide-book to the obtaining by such means of a free meal.

The university authorities were from an early date given complete jurisdiction over this Quarter. Even individual churches, such as that of St. Benoît, where lived Villon, with his "more than father" the venerable Guillaume de Villon, could exercise justice for crimes ranging from petty larceny to murder. Incidentally this church with its cloisters

and courtyards occupied the ground just below the present Sorbonne. While seated before its great door on the Rue St. Jacques one quiet summer evening, François Villon entered into a quarrel, stabbed mortally in self-defence, and thus began an endless conflict with the Châtelet. The Provost or Chief of Police had his headquarters at that time in the fortress prison of le Grand Châtelet, near the site of which now stands the Theatre of Sarah Bernhardt, and theoretically had no control over the Latin Quarter. Nevertheless, the Châtelet was frequently the scene of much drama for the iniquitous scholar, the climax being a third act on the gallows of Montfaucon. Jealous of its rights, the university on certain occasions replied to action by the Châtelet in a positive and forcible manner, going to the extent, as in 1303 when a student was hung by the Provost, of closing down all classes. A century later another Provost was compelled to cut down from the gallows a couple of students hanged for murder, kiss them on the mouth, and make a public speech of contrition before burying them. Years later three sergeants of the watch promenaded through the Quarter in their nightshirts as a penance for rough-handling some teachers. The climax of these century-old feuds with the Châtelet occurred in 1425, when an exasperated Provost had the temerity to enter the Quarter at the head of his men-at-arms to seize forty students. The Rector ordered classes to be closed in protest, and the university was reopened only a year later, after the police had been duly punished by Parliament.

Two figures stand out prominently from among those who toiled for the progress of the student Quarter. The first is that of Robert de Sorbon, chaplain of Saint Louis, who had the inspiration to found a college that included lecture halls and dormitories. Sorbon's example was gradually followed and in Villon's student days there were about eighty colleges, large and small, including the Collège des Ecossais, and the Collège des Irlandais, the latter still existing. The Collège d'Harcourt survives in the Lycée Saint Louis on the Boulevard St. Michel, with the famous student Taverne d'Harcourt commemorating the name. The Collège de Navarre, the scene of one of Villon's nocturnal looting parties, is now the military school of the École Polytechnique. The uniforms of its cadets still lend a gay

note of colour to the streets of the Quarter. The other great constructive figure in the Quarter's history is that of Cardinal Richelieu. When on May 1st, 1625, he laid the foundation-stone of the new Sorbonne, that was to replace and vastly increase the original Collège of Robert de Sorbon, an event of vital importance to learning took place. Richelieu, with extraordinary foresight and grasp of his nation's affairs, linked by this act the medieval past of the university with a future that is still evolving. The Sorbonne thereafter became the citadel of learning, laboratories, lectures, and great meetings. Although the buildings erected by Richelieu were replaced some forty years ago, with the exception of the church with its beautiful tomb of the cardinal, the new Sorbonne plays the same rôle as the old. No longer, however, do students dwell within its walls according to Robert de Sorbon's intentions.

Some distance south of the Latin Quarter has sprung up since the Great War a strange and new Cité Universitaire. This consists at present of thirty foundations, old houses, many of them very handsome. With their libraries, dining halls, and clean individual rooms at a low price, the new Cité is trying to combat the higher cost of living in the Quarter, and to develop in the mixed student body a better understanding and *esprit de corps*. With the celebration two years ago of the centenary of Romanticism one comes to that phase of life known as "bohemianism," so generally implied when the Latin Quarter is mentioned. The historic "Boul Mich" runs parallel to the Rue St. Jacques, and the Rue de la Montagne Sainte Geneviève from the Luxembourg Gardens to the river. On or near it are located many of the taverns or cafés so famous in the story of the Romantic period. The Café d'Harcourt, La Source, Soufflet, Taverne du Palais, Taverne du Panthéon (now the flourishing Capoulade), and the Closerie des Lilas, opposite the Bal Bullier, are all alive with memories of the students, artists, and famous literary bohemians of the past. Up to a few years before the Great War the Quarter was the centre for famous art schools such as Juliens and the École des Beaux Arts, still existing in a diluted form. The art student and the struggling artists of those days furnished a colourful subject. Their dress, joyous irresponsibility, and wit made the Boulevard St. Michel a unique sight.

Du Maurier with *Trilby*, excellent in its illustrations and in characterisation built largely from personal acquaintance, and the more fantastic *Scènes de la Vie de Bohème* of Murger, are classics of this romantic period. This age of bohemianism, out of which we have emerged with modern cares and standardisation, was no doubt one of the reactions to the previous Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. The Quarter itself had been the scene of much plotting and some bloodshed. Near the École de Médecine is a district full of these Revolutionary memories, the house where Charlotte Corday stabbed Marat, and close by the Église des Cordeliers in which were billeted the ragged battalion from Marseilles who brought the thrilling anthem, now the song of France.

It is difficult to explain the lure of the "Quartier Latin." Behind the picture of its great schools, churches, libraries, gardens, and streets full of a storied past, there is a charm almost impossible to define. Perhaps it lies in a sense of a certain freedom of thought, in the contemplation of joyous youth against a venerable and beautiful background. Even as far back as 1265 Pope Alexander IV wrote: "*Paris remplit l'univers de la plénitude de sa science, répand la lumière de l'intelligence, chasse les ténèbres de l'ignorance, révèle au monde les secrets de la connaissance. C'est la cité renommée des lettres et des sciences, la première école de l'érudition.*" Later in the sixteenth century German student refugees called Paris "The City of Light," and thereby undoubtedly referred especially to the "*Moult vieux*" Quartier Latin.

ARTHUR HASLAM.

ODD CARGOES AND QUEER PORTS.

MID-WINTER, you may say, is not the time of year to visit queer ports and to see cargoes in transit. You want high summer to watch the little trades and boats at work, for the best part of the traffic goes and comes with the swallows. I do not agree: a queer port looks a sight queerer when the light is bad, the air full of wind and maybe a touch of snow. All round the coasts of Britain are queer little ports where unusual and casual cargoes are or were handled. They are now practically deserted; they are out-of-the-way even from roads; with a low-roofed cottage or a farm, and not a shed in sight. The old cargoes did not need shelter from weather. The quay or strand in use to-day is not equipped with lifting tackle, and the ship's winch, sometimes a manual affair but usually driven by petrol, must shift the consignment. The crews of these casual coasters are as much dockers as seamen, and they are good at both trades.

Granted that many of our little ports are practically unlighted, and that their navigation cannot be guaranteed in wintry weather. The boats at that time are tied up at distant quays until with spring the next consignments are ready. I know a minor port where the merchant or consignee, expecting a cargo, looks out at time of low tide with a brass-tubed telescope of prodigious length. The "scheulie" says that the merchant can really see the length of the moon with it, but that's havers. If a schooner is in sight, the merchant sends messengers to gather a few farmers and their men. The entrance to the port is so tricky and neglected that the few miles from the open bay takes six hours with the boat scraping and lifting on a sand-bar here and there. The merchant keeps anxious watch, and his comment is alternately irate and smooth: "She's fast . . . she's loose . . . she's stopped . . . she's away." I have not tried boarding the schooner or two-master in the bay, but the travel up stream must be a dreary pilgrimage. At times the short bowsprit is said to brush the meadowsweet and foxgloves on the river bank. The last stage, and the mooring, is full of excitement. The merchant wants the boat at a certain point so that the tide will leave her on a hard spit for the unloading, and he cannot believe that the master appreciates this. So he roars in a dialect which is not comprehensible to the outsider. "She's

right, I tell ye," bawls the master; "in line with the church and hill top, and with the staith and the ditch there." I never knew the merchant to step on board the moving boat: they say that such a motion would make him seasick. That's one of the benefits of using a minor port; you are not compelled to take the lift of deep water.

Some of the queer ports are coves in long leagues of sea cliff, difficult to reach if the wind is wrong. Some such are the haunts of Cornish and Devon smugglers, and I wonder how the seamen found the places in mist and darkness. On the Scottish coast, similar harbours were used by "persons proscribed the realm." Near the Firth of Forth, under an important old castle, is a narrow clint swept by currents where only a reckless captain would risk his craft, and where only a desperate man would come ashore or embark. Yet history tells us that the landings came often at Hogmanay or New Year's tide. At another castle on the same coast it was usual to take secret visitors up by aid of a winch or whip somewhere on the cliff. The man was hauled up from the ship in which he had sailed from France.

Other little ports in the English shires are quieter and queerer without being menacing. There is a little nook of slack water in Essex where the mud is constantly silting up. There is a small inn behind the short staith where the road crosses the marsh, a windmill, a few old piles, a farm or two to give a cargo now and then. In winter the old coaster is pulled up close to the staith, and the captain retires into the bar parlour. He knows that the waterway is losing its straightness, that the soft banks are falling in, and each voyage he audibly declares will be the last. "A waterway must be used to keep it in good order." I listen to his plaint while the wind is rolling across the marsh, making a noise like so many horses. "All comes of these blessed 'ens, poultry," he declares, letting his black cutty go out, "time was when the land here lived by growing wheat for London. Now it's eggs . . . eggs . . . eggs. Nothing for the boat. Behind this inn is fifty acres of good wheat land given up to poultry coops, and every farmer is adding hundreds of 'em every year. Eggs go out by road; the lorries brings back any extra seeds them blessed birds want. It makes a diff., I can tell you."

Many of our queer ports are tiny pools in estuaries which

drain out at low tide. There is a special type of craft for this job, which the insurance companies pass as "fit to take the ground." They don't like them to come up in a storm however, and they don't allow much winter traffic. The boats are flat of bottom, mere barges, but rare holders of cargo. If the wind is strong, they anchor or scuttle into shelter.

One Christmas tide I visited a queer port on the Irish Sea, and chatted with an old man there. "Next port in size to Chester they tell me it was in Roman days," he declared, "and a big place before Liverpool or Bristol was ever thought of. What is it now? The tide runs in through a narrow neck as it did for the Romans but there's no deep water for miles. A clever-clogs of an officer came here in the war, and said it should be dredged. If it had been a port, it could be a port again, he said. However, it was found that there was about six miles of sea sand to cut through before there was a score feet of draught, and they were scared about that. In Roman times the port must have been busy; I have seen bits of old Italian wine jars which came here by water, and they were big enough to fill with beer for a wedding party, I can tell you. Six foot high and a yard and a half through the belly of 'em. And the trade wasn't all lost in my young days, for we had as many as a dozen boats in the deeps, anchored, and either taking on grain or unloading stuff for the farmers. Oh yes, I know what you're sneezing about. The last ship as came here was loaded with artificial manure for the farmers, and the wind blew from the berth across the village where you was lodging. It doesn't matter now, for we've never a boat from Wicklow since the war."

Some of the queerest ports are "might-have-beens." One winter week-end I travelled across wild Wales to find Porthdinlleyn. It is a haven down the Lleyn peninsula, away from roads and railways, with a nook of rocks to guard the anchorage. Deep water, good holding, and harbour works would have cost next to nothing. In the early days of railways, Porthdinlleyn was a rival (on paper) against Holyhead as the steamer port for Dublin and Ireland. Though the great George Stephenson favoured Holyhead, there was much support for this other. The Committee in Parliament was equally divided, and it was the Speaker's casting vote that went in favour of the shorter and older route. At the time of my visit the harbour master was a lady, and she showed me

the brief and simple list of arrivals and departures from Porthdinlleyn. The grey seals in summer come inside the reefs and make funny faces in the clear pools of the harbour.

There are other queer harbours in Wales. At St. David's, pilgrims were received by the thousand in the old monkish times. Those from Brittany landed in a rocky bay dedicated to St. Nun, mother of St. David. Those from Ireland and Scotland came to Whitesand Bay to the north. In these days Whitesand Bay is a lost landing, for no ships come inside the Bishop and his Clerks (towers of rock just off the bay). The old pilgrims used to land on the sand, and go to St. Patrick's chapel to render thanks for their safety. The chapel, however, has been buried in moving sandhills for centuries. Further up the coast, there are many secret nooks in the rocks of Cardigan Bay, where the Welsh fishermen manage to land and launch their craft. They are hardy and daring people, and have contrived little harbours and piers in places which other seafolk would never dare to use. I have in mind one little cove where in former years there was a small church. Storms wrecked this, hurling off the roof and blowing in the windows. They almost washed away the burial ground and graves, but the Welsh folk stuck to the place, and repaired the damage. The little bay has still its boats. On the Glamorgan coast the sandhills gradually shifted and buried a small town and its port. Even the name was erased and lost. As a rule, however, it is the sea which is the raider. On the Yorkshire coast several tiny ports have disappeared, including Ravenspurgh, which is mentioned by Shakespeare, and other places which have sent their representatives to Parliament. Only very strong defences prevent the tides from taking a big slice off the Holderness coast every year.

Some of the ancient trades have departed. Either Turner or de Wint made a water-colour picture of a sailing craft being laden with gunpowder, and casks are passing from hand to hand over the side to be stowed in the hold. A risky cargo, with a big wind blowing across, a rough tide rising, and tempest depicted in every tint and cloud. At another port the railway came in, threw viaducts across the river, and there is little trace left of a shipbuilders' yard which used to specialise in coasters. Oak was the timber, oak which had strengthened in the gales passing between the sea and the fells. The increasing size and change in materials for ships

ended these local undertakings. At Whitby the old masters in ship-craft built ships for the Greenland whale fisheries and for Hudson Bay. Three hundred tons was the limit of their capacity, and so the trade passed to bigger yards and deeper ports. The old boat-builders too have moved, though a tiny firm (usually one-man power) may remain for repair work. There is no sight more dismal than an abandoned shipyard when the mud cakes and gluts round the piles, and the mist and wind come thick and strong. Better stay at home, than be depressed by such a sight. Once I saw a party of wild geese in the pool where the keels of big ships had been laid—but there was no gun within a mile.

Let us look to the stormy north. The herring industry has left its relics of queer ports. These fish move in shoals, but no man can be sure of their happening in a particular place. A few days ago I visited a cove of Luce Bay where there is a broken pier. "Fifty years since," said an ancient fisherman, "I have seen that ground (a space of about twenty acres) all silver with herring, and we used to work proper sea-trips from that pier to the Isle of Man. There were plenty of people here when trade was good." A few herring shoals stray at times into the Irish Sea, and the Manx boats turn back to their capture. Up the Hebridean coast, Ullapool and Loch-inver were founded for the herring industry, but few boats land there, and they are forty miles from a railway. In Orkney, Stromness and Kirkwall are back numbers, and the fishery concentrates on Whitehall in the island of Stronsay. The next important ports are Lerwick to the north and Wick to the south. The latter is queer in its way. Even after the engineers have had their way for a century, there are periods when the boats move in and out at great risk. Thurso Bay and Loch Eriboll have herring histories I am told, but at the last named the curing sheds have disappeared. Eriboll is a lobster port, and lobster never yet kept a population: the craft is for men with single boats and the "pots" or traps are dropped in a few open spaces among rocks. Thurso has still its tiny nook of a port at Scrabster where the mails for Orkney are taken over. Helmsdale is another port which suffers from storm: the outer pier has been shattered more than once, and there is now a sunken barge in a broken place near the river entrance.

In such manner I could list the curious half abandoned

ports of Moray Firth. There are some where the timber from Cairngorm mountains was turned into boats and into baulks for cargo. The most casual places I know are the "Puffer Ports," where a small black coaster "takes the ground" twice a year, and coals are weighed out over the side into farmers' carts. The "puffer" is black and not comely; her smoke pollutes leagues of sea and land, and the reek has soot as well as coal in it. Such a boat will come into a strand of Iona, under the old cathedral of St. Columba, and discharge twenty or thirty cart-loads for the farmers in that glorious and historic isle. Only a winter gale will render that bay uneasy. On Iona there is neither wood nor peat, and little timber comes in with the tide. The crofter isles of Coll and Tiree to the west intercept any log which might float in the Gulf stream across the Atlantic.

After the "puffer" has supplied Iona, the boat lifts in the next tide, and goes across to the Mull side where Fionnphort and other houses need help. Then she moves up the Ross to Bunessan. Such a steamer makes her own quaint ports: if a big house needs call, the "puffer" steams to the handiest strand and is prepared to supply. She does not lie up for winter, but takes a more sheltered line of isles and lochs for her voyages. In Ulster I once witnessed a trade comedy. At a little pier and coal shed the price of coal was posted. Inland I came across a small leaflet stating that the coal smack *Margery* had taken the ground in a certain river-bay, and that Cumberland coal over the side could be supplied at a cut price of about 5s. per ton on the more regular service.

Some queer ports are the result of failures. At Portpatrick on the Galloway coast, enormous sums have been spent in sea defences and extensions to deep water. This was the old mail route from Scotland to Ireland, twenty-one miles across the North Channel to Donaghadee. So long as sailing craft brought the letters, the accommodation was sufficient. When steam came into vogue, the British Government endeavoured to add to their port, but the defences went down before storm and tide, and the port remains as tiny as before. It is a pretty place for motor boat excursions, but as a cross-channel port it is impossible.

The little harbour of Drummole seems somnolent like the rest. In summer there are a few holiday makers, but the winter population is familiar and quiet. I was walking the

quay when I noticed, hard and dry, a schooner or two-master, *Mayflower*. She was unkempt, untidy from long disuse, rather mean and disreputable for her great name. To a seaman I commented, with a turn of my head. "Has she been here long since she took the Pilgrim Fathers across to America?" The feeble joke failed—if the man even heard it aright. "She was built across the Atlantic, if that's what you mean. Bay of Fundy most like. They tell me that for many years she was in the Newfoundland trade, and if so, she must have crossed the Atlantic more than once. She's been laid up the strand there for five or six years, I think, and I have doubts whether, if she gets a cargo, she will ever go to sea again. The insurance companies are very strict about old ships. I guess she's a lot older than either of us. The *Mayflower* would be a good boat if she was properly 'found.' Her hull is sound, and that's a lot, but the pumps are dismantled, and everything that could go has gone, and the rest is rusty."

The *Mayflower* has been derelict for years. Even in my dreams I do not see that she will float out into the Irish Sea and pass again the lighthouse on the Mull on her way to a sea-trade. I recall her with the winter mist creeping like smoke along the tide and a snow squall whipping round the houses and hiding her tattered rigging from our view. Farewell, queer port. Farewell, queerest ship of all.

W. T. PALMER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE LEAGUE AND ITALY.

THE history of October 1935 is likely to be remembered, not because Italy invaded Abyssinia, but because the League of Nations thereupon attempted for the first time in its experience to apply "sanctions" against an aggressor. The unvarnished diary of what took place gives food for thought in many senses. The purpose of the League of Nations is to prevent war, and in the alternative to shorten a war it has not been able to prevent. Italy began her invasion of Abyssinia on October 3rd; but neither party made a formal declaration of war. As a result mainly of the strong lead given by the British Government at Geneva, Article XVI of the Covenant, the "sanctions" article, was invoked. The resultant chaos of conflicting diplomatic currents is bound to be a lasting subject of discussion. It happened, no doubt because the British Government had taken so determined a line in a matter such as peculiarly touches the imaginative sense of the British people, that something like a storm of popular indignation against Italy was created throughout the country. Many detached observers stood aghast at the spectacle. It contained all the irony, the danger, the muddle that normally characterise mass emotion. There were British newspaper correspondents wiring messages from Geneva, from the Palace of Peace, full of a warlike determination to safeguard the machinery of peace. The Labour Party at its Brighton Congress voted overwhelmingly in favour of "sanctions," that is, for collective war against Italy in the sacred name of peace. The Archbishop of Canterbury was expressing the view of the majority of the episcopal bench and the whole body of priests when he lent the weight of his authority to the side of what may not unfairly be described as pacifist war. A strong lead was given by the Free Churches in the like sense. In the eyes of the British Government the severely juridical fact of its having put its signature to the Covenant of the League of Nations was of cardinal importance, even though by honouring that signature experience might prove that its essential purpose was defeated.

The consideration which seems not to have been given much weight either by the Government or by the electorate

was that in effect the League of Nations originally planned in 1919 was never achieved. The defection of the United States was decisive. The analogy between a police system within a national state and the idea of an international police which underlies Article XVI of the Covenant breaks down on that fact alone. A national police system depends for its sanction on the universality of its application. The sanction of course is force. Other things being equal it would be as fair to deride a national police system on the ground that it attempts to prevent murder by collective murder (that is, capital punishment) as to deride the Covenant of the League on the ground that it attempts to prevent war by collective war; but other things are not equal. In the national state the sanction derives from the united support of the system. If there were exceptions, if there were counties or classes of the population who did not recognise the authority of the law, and who were able to stand outside the operation of the law, it is obvious that the law could not be applied. The League of Nations is not a super-state; and it is not even a full voluntary association of states for the specific purpose of preventing war. If it were either of those things, the Covenant would be effective. As it is neither of them, obviously the Covenant cannot be effective. An ineffective sanction is itself a danger, the danger namely of precipitating and enlarging the very evil it pretends to combat. At this moment the United States, Japan, Germany and Italy, either by formal abstention or secession, or in effect, stand outside the League's sanction against war. The sanction therefore is futile. Of course it did not prevent Japan's annexation of Manchuria. Of course it did not prevent Italy's invasion of Abyssinia. Of course it will not "shorten" the war between Italy and Abyssinia, though its enthusiasts may claim that it has done so whenever the war ends.

The history of October 1935 is valuable in the sense that it illustrates the elementary dogma above propounded. There is little need to recall the deeper background. It was on October 2nd that the Emperor of Abyssinia telegraphed to the Secretary-General of the League to inform him that Italian troops had transgressed the Abyssinian frontier in the region south of Mount Mussalli, in the province of Aussa. On the following day the Emperor telegraphed to Geneva that Italian aircraft had bombed Adigrat and Adowa, killing women and children

and damaging Red Cross hospitals. Rome on that day telegraphed to Geneva a counter-allegation. The telegram referred to the "warlike and aggressive spirit fomented in Ethiopia among chiefs and tribesmen, who have long been insistently demanding war with Italy and have succeeded in imposing it"; alleged that Abyssinian mobilisation constituted a "grave and immediate danger" and therefore claimed that the Italian Government had "found itself obliged to authorise the high command in Eritrea to take the necessary measures of defence." Since the beginning of the world all wars have been defensive on both sides. On October 5th the Council of the League met at Geneva to face the fact of war and to study the Covenant of the League in relation thereto. There was already in being a Committee of Thirteen, being the members of the Council, less Italy, who, acting under Article XV of the Covenant, had drawn up "a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto." On receiving that report the Council proceeded to set up another Committee of Six (consisting of Great Britain, France, Chile, Denmark, Portugal and Roumania) to examine the position in greater detail. The "recommendations" prescribed by paragraph 4 of Article XV amounted merely to this:

The facts brought to its notice since its last meeting by the two parties make it first and foremost the urgent duty of the Council to draw attention to the obligation of conforming to the provisions of the Covenant. For the time being the only recommendation which it makes is that any violation of the Covenant should immediately be brought to an end. The Council reserves the right to make subsequently such other recommendations as it may consider desirable.

Both the Italian and Abyssinian delegates submitted statements to the Council on that day. Mr. Hawariat (Abyssinia) demanded that the Covenant be "enforced." He represented his country to be the victim of an aggression. Baron Aloisi (Italy) accused the League of having stultified itself by the assumption that Abyssinia could be treated as a civilised country, and by neglecting to give due weight to the Italian case against Abyssinia as a well-armed, dangerous country, herself the main cause of the war. On October 7th

the Council, excluding Italy's vote as that of a party to the dispute, adopted the report of the Committee of Six, which found that the Italian Government had resorted to war in disregard of its covenants under Article XII of the Covenant.

That was the historic day on which Article XVI of the Covenant was for the first time brought into operation. On October 9th the Assembly met to receive the Council's report and to "act" upon it. Austria and Hungary refused to take part in any resultant action. On October 10th, after Baron Aloisi had recorded Italy's objection, the Assembly decided by a majority vote of fifty to two, Italy and Abyssinia being excluded, to institute collective measures against Italy. The said fifty States were constituted into a Co-ordinating Committee, which on October 11th decided as a first measure to raise the embargo on the export of arms and munitions to Abyssinia and to impose the like embargo against Italy. Albania thereupon followed the example of Austria and Hungary in refusing to participate.

THE "MACHINERY" OF SANCTIONS.

One of the difficulties encountered, not only by private individuals who tried to understand what Geneva was doing about "sanctions," but also by the Co-ordinating Committee at Geneva, whose business it was to say what was meant by sanctions, was that in this as in other respects the Covenant itself contains nothing beyond tentative provisions and leaves their meaning to be thrashed out by experience. And there had been no former experience. The Covenant is worded in such a way that Austria, Hungary and Albania can refuse to take part in economic sanctions against Italy and yet maintain that they have fulfilled their obligations under the Covenant. At the Second Assembly (September 1921) a series of resolutions were passed about "the Economic Weapon." The ninth resolution ran thus:

It is not possible to decide beforehand, and in detail, the various measures of an economic and financial nature to be taken in each case where economic pressure is to be applied. When the case arises, the Council shall recommend to the Members of the League a plan for joint action.

By virtue of that resolution, Austria as long ago as April 30th, 1922, filed this claim at Geneva:

In view of the geographical and economic situation of the Republic, the Federal Government feels bound to draw the attention of the Council at once to the fact that, in certain circumstances, it may be necessary to ask the Council, as provided in the ninth resolution, to postpone wholly or in part, for a longer or a shorter period of time, the actual putting into force of such of the economic sanctions provided for in Article XVI as the Council may recommend with regard to Austria. . . .

The actual position is that by the Covenant every member of the League must regard itself as having suffered an act of war against itself by Italy; but is under no obligation to do anything about it. The Council can only "recommend" measures to be taken. Any member of the League can take them or not, without derogation from its duty. And the other members are free to decide, on the consideration of what is done or not done by others, whether "sanctions" can be effective or not, and thereon to decide whether they themselves shall do anything or nothing. In other words, there is no League machinery at all for the application of sanctions. It remains to be fashioned, if at all, by this, the League's first experience of sanctions.

THE FRANCO-BRITISH DIVERGENCE.

The interest of what took place openly at Geneva was overshadowed by what took place behind the scenes, in particular by what took place between Great Britain and France. It was a tragic comedy. The British Government for many reasons, among them the consideration that British public opinion being what it is, and an election being imminent, no British Government dare expose itself to the charge that it had failed to take the League of Nations seriously enough, put upon the Covenant a severely juridical and logical interpretation. It safeguarded itself by the blessed word "collective," which had been emphasised not once but many times by Sir Samuel Hoare, and whose virtue consisted in the fact that it kept open a back door out of the Covenant. If the other members of the League failed to play their covenanted part, then the British Government could cry off, with a clean and even wholesome conscience. By contrast the French

Government stood aghast at the risk the British Government was taking. The French view of the Covenant is that it gives a safeguard to France against German aggression. British participation in the sanctions of the Covenant is therefore of the first importance to France; but in the name of all that is holy, French opinion was bewildered to observe that the British Government had got hold of the wrong end of the stick. The Covenant in French eyes had never been intended as a weapon for use against Italy. Italy indeed was properly a party to the Stresa front, an indispensable ally against Germany. Even the Franco-Italian military agreement concluded last January was as important to France as the Stresa front, was indeed an essential element in the Stresa front. It enabled France to remove from the Franco-Italian border troops that were more properly needed on the Franco-German border.

On September 11th therefore, when Sir Samuel Hoare made his declaration about steady resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression, M. Corbin, the French Ambassador, called at the Foreign Office in London and verbally invited the British Government to state categorically that its announcement would apply equally against Germany as against Italy. The British answer (written) was published on September 30th. What Sir Samuel Hoare wrote was such a masterpiece of typical British diplomacy that its chief passages deserve to be quoted. Morally it sounded excellent. Practically it was devoid of all meaning. Sir Samuel Hoare wrote:

I have the honour, in reply, to invite your attention to the words which I used in the course of my speech to the League Assembly at Geneva on September 11th. I then declared that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be second to none in their intention to fulfil, within the measure of their capacity, the obligations which the Covenant lays upon them; and I added that the ideas embodied in the Covenant, and in particular the aspiration to establish the rule of law in international affairs, had appealed with growing force to the strain of idealism in the British national character, and that they had indeed become a part of the national conscience. As your Excellency will also recollect, I further took the opportunity in the course of my speech at Geneva to repudiate any suggestion that the attitude of His Majesty's Government had been one of other than unwavering fidelity to the League and all that it stands for, and I drew attention to the fact that the recent response of public opinion in this country showed how completely the nation supported the Government in the full

acceptance of the obligations of League membership, which was the oft-proclaimed keynote of their foreign policy. I added that to suggest or insinuate that this policy was for some reason peculiar to the Italian-Abyssinian conflict would be a complete misunderstanding. Nothing could be farther from the truth. I said, and I sincerely welcome this opportunity to repeat with full responsibility, that it is to the principles of the League, and not to any particular manifestation thereof, that the people of this country had demonstrated their adherence. Any other view would be at once an under-estimate of British good faith and an imputation upon British sincerity. In conformity with its precise and explicit obligations I pointed out, and I re-emphasise, that the League stands, and this country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, *and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression.* I would draw your Excellency's particular attention to this last sentence. I think it will be generally agreed that no member of the League could lay down its policy, in advance of any particular case likely to bring that policy into consideration, with greater clarity and decision than in those words. Your Excellency will observe that I spoke, as I am now writing, of all acts of unprovoked aggression. Each word in that sentence must have its full value. It is at once evident that procedure under Article XVI of the Covenant, appropriate as regards a positive act of unprovoked aggression, is not made applicable as regards the negative act of the failure to fulfil the terms of a treaty. Further, in the case of a resort to force, it is clear that there may be degrees of culpability and degrees of aggression, and that consequently, in cases where Article XVI applies, the nature of the action appropriate to be taken under it may vary according to the circumstances of each particular case. Your Government, as I am aware, already recognises these distinctions. And similarly, in regard to treaty obligations it is pertinent to recall that, as I have already said at Geneva, elasticity is a part of security, and that every member of the League must recognise, as the Covenant itself recognises, that the world is not static. . . . His Majesty's Government believe that an organism which, in the considered opinion of this nation, represents the one and only real hope of avoiding the senseless disasters of the past and ensuring world peace by collective security in the future, will not lightly render itself impotent by lack of faith in, and refusal of effective action on behalf of, its own ideals. But that faith and that action must, like the security, be collective. . . ."

Sir Samuel Hoare's letter incidentally summarised the whole philosophy of the British Government in its bearing upon the "sanctions" provision of the League Covenant.

Sir Samuel for his part, on September 24th, had put a question to the French Government. It had been suggested by a question put to Sir Samuel Hoare by the representative of a small state at Geneva about the bridging of the famous Covenant "gap." The gap forsooth consists in this, that the Covenant makes no provision for collective protection in the interim period between the commission of an act of aggression and the League's formal application of Article XVI. The representative of the small state aforesaid in effect asked Sir Samuel: "Suppose we are attacked by Italy or by another party in that interim period, do you come to our help?" Sir Samuel promptly answered "yes," thereby boldly jumping the gap. It then presumably occurred to him that his boldness might reap its reward in Paris. At that moment the British and Italian fleets were engaged in the Mediterranean in the quiescent but dangerous pastime of cruising round each other. Suppose an Italian Admiral by design or by accident attacked a British ship, would France be committed to fight on Britain's side against Italy? High diplomacy has its crude moments.

As the French Government, *mutatis quibusdam mutandis*, had been asking a precisely similar question for ten years, it had now no alternative but to answer a reluctant "yes" to Sir Samuel, but did so on the strict condition that Great Britain should recognise the back-handed reciprocity of the commitment. In their turn the main phrases of the French answer to Britain deserve to be published as a typical masterpiece of French finesse. Its complicated phraseology was such that it perfectly enshrined the French feeling of embarrassment. The text of the British question was not published, because it had been put "verbally." It was accompanied by a written copy of the spoken word, but the document did not come up to the category of an *aide-mémoire* because its only object was to safeguard the accuracy of M. Corbin's memory of what had been asked as a personal help to himself, and not as a collateral reminder to accompany the transmission of the question to Paris. Such are the nuances of high diplomacy. M. Corbin's answer, which was a written answer, for the reason that the French Government wished to put on record the condition on which

the affirmative answer was given, was published on October 8th, and its main passages ran thus:

The proposal of the British Government, if given a wide application, fills in very opportunely a gap in the system of "collective security" to which our two Governments are firmly attached. In the interests of clearness it is necessary to define the conditions in which the proposed undertaking will be applied. The obligation of assistance which is contemplated, binding the two Governments, must be reciprocal, that is to say, it must bind Great Britain with regard to France as much as France with regard to Great Britain. Moreover, it would be difficult to imagine that a State might or might not be regarded as having been attacked according to whether the attacks occurred on land, by sea, or in the air. The undertaking of assistance must therefore operate in each and every one of these cases. Finally, the mutual support from now on provided for in the third paragraph of Article XVI is equally due in case, in virtue of Article XVII, Article XVI is applied. The preliminary assistance which the British Government proposes must therefore be equally assured whether the aggressor State is or is not a member of the League of Nations. In a general way the contemplated undertaking ought to take effect only after a joint investigation has been made into the circumstances and agreement reached on the measures of precaution which these circumstances may justify as being strictly necessary in order to prepare for the carrying out of the Council's ultimate recommendations. This joint investigation ought to take place as soon as a state of political tension arises sufficiently serious to give ground for fear lest it lead sooner or later to the application of Articles XVI and XVII. Subject to these observations and on condition of reciprocity, I am authorised to inform your Excellency that the French Government are ready to assume in regard to His Majesty's Government the following undertakings: (a) If either of the two Powers judges it necessary to take military, naval or air measures, with a view to placing itself in a position to carry out, in case of need, its obligations of assistance arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Treaties of Locarno, it will enter into consultation on this subject with the other Power; the procedure shall be similar if either of the two Powers judges it necessary to take military, naval or air measures with a view to placing itself in a position to meet, should it arise, a situation in which, under the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Treaties of Locarno, it would be entitled to receive the assistance of the other Power. (b) The fact that one or other of the two Powers, after this consultation and the resulting agreement, takes the measures referred to above shall not on that account be regarded as constituting a

provocation such as would justify any failure by a third State to fulfil its international obligations. (c) If either of the two Powers is attacked on account of such measures taken after consultation and agreement, the other Power will render it assistance.

The two documents quoted above, the one British, the other French, throw a flood of light on the old ways of the new diplomacy at Geneva. Geneva's diplomacy is "open" in the sense that its decisions are openly taken and published for the world to see. But the unwritten motives and undisclosed manœuvrings from which those decisions result are as old in type as diplomacy itself.

SIGNOR MUSSOLINI'S DIPLOMACY.

It is one of the attributes of dictatorship that it is cut off from popular opinion, ensconced in its own stronghold. There was the classic case of the dictator who had a newspaper of his own, written by himself, read only by himself. Are the Mussolinis and Hitlers in a different case? Their newspapers publish only what they allow them to publish. On October 3rd Signor Mussolini was completely isolated. So far as Italy was concerned, his view was the only view. His colleagues merely vied in agreeing with him. There was no opposition, no difference of opinion. So far as the outside world was concerned, he was inaccessible to foreign diplomatists, hardly cared what foreign governments thought, cared only for what they did. It must be counted the more remarkable, therefore, that on October 4th, within twenty-four hours of the outbreak of the war in Abyssinia, he took a certain diplomatic initiative. Through his ambassadors in London and in Paris he made a proposal to the British and French Governments. A tactical question of some importance was thereby submitted to those Governments. The communication was welcomed in Paris. No official expression of opinion was made in London, although it was obvious what that opinion was. Signor Mussolini's suggestion was, on the one hand, that Italy should remain a member of the League of Nations, and on the other hand that the Italian, French and British Governments should separately consider what would be a fair basis of an Italo-Abyssinian settlement. The prevailing purpose of the League of Nations being the shortening of a war already started, Signor Mussolini suggested a means to that end; but an alternative means

to that of the League. The embarrassing question was whether the British Government would agree to the achievement of the League's purpose by non-League means.

Signor Mussolini accompanied his suggestion by a full explanation of Italy's policy, including an explanation of the reason why in his view the Geneva machinery was no more capable of shortening than it had been of preventing the war. His case rested upon the argument that Abyssinia is not a fit member of the League for reasons suggested by the British delegate on September 19th, 1923, when Abyssinia's request for admission was discussed at Geneva: that, as a result in some degree of Abyssinia's admission to membership, she had trained a large army, not equalled in any other North African province. What Italy demanded therefore was that Abyssinia be disarmed to a level comparable to the fighting strengths normally maintained in Morocco, Tunis, Egypt, Eritrea, and the several Somalilands; and that the railway she claimed in the west of Abyssinia, connecting Eritrea with Italian Somaliland, should be given some form of political security. It was an incidental point in his case that the British Government was committed by the correspondence of December 1925 to support an Italian claim for a protectorate in the west of Abyssinia in return for an Italian support of the claim for barrage works desired by the British Government at Lake Tsana for the purpose of improving the flow into the Blue Nile. It is known that the British Government this very summer had reached the stage where tenders had been received for the construction of the barrage works at Lake Tsana, consideration of those tenders being then postponed by reason only of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. French official opinion was understood to regard Signor Mussolini's proposal as an important development. The British Government, though it refrained from indicating its view, was assumed to regard his communication as important in so far as it expressed a desire for a settlement by agreement, but not so important in a practical sense, inasmuch as British policy at that time regarded League means as the only admissible means to League ends. Whether formulæ might be discovered for preparing a settlement outside Geneva and for clinching it inside Geneva—a device not unknown to high diplomacy—was a speculation that gained immediate currency.

"COLLECTIVE" SANCTION.

No person who can lay claim to even a small share of common sense ever imagined that a really "collective" sanction could be organised. Austria, Hungary, Albania, Switzerland—countries neighbouring upon Italy and therefore of cardinal importance to any sanction—stood aside and refused to participate. It was no secret that Yugoslavia found much embarrassment in the theory of cutting off her own trade with Italy, which totals sixty per cent. of her entire trade, and is mainly constituted by the export of pigs to Italy, in order to dissuade Italy from an enterprise of which Yugoslavia for reasons peculiar to herself found it hard to disapprove. Poland, who was engaged in secret diplomacy with Hungary and Germany to the end that a new Central European grouping be effected, had no incentive to cut off her trade with Italy. It was appreciated, if not by every state represented at Geneva, at any rate by most of them, including the British and French Governments, that the negative co-operation of the non-member states would be cardinal to the success of any sanction. The chief non-member states were Germany (who chiefly owns Austria's armament firms) and the United States. What was to divert Germany or the United States from capturing the trade voluntarily abandoned by the sanctionist countries? It was never any secret that in the case of Germany at any rate the question of financial compensation was raised. Who would pay for the potential "loss" to Germany incurred by a voluntary offer on Germany's part to refrain from defeating the purpose of Geneva's sanction? Speculation along such lines would go well in a Gilbertian opera.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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ROUND THE WORLD.*

Mr. and Mrs. Wedgwood Benn have written a delightful book. They enjoy travelling, and they know how to communicate their pleasure to the reader. They describe places and peoples, countries and celebrities, with skill and insight. The whole volume breathes a warm humanity. The authors love their fellow men and are at home in every part of the world. It is not surprising that they found or made friends everywhere. The story opens on the familiar American stage, where the impressive figure of Mr. Ford stands out in bold relief. "Here was the greatest triumph of mechanical organisation in the universe. Tens of thousands of people were working with meticulous precision and harmony—a perfect example of a team. But a team without a team spirit. A team run by an individualist of individualists." Every worker is spurred on by two powerful motives—the desire to earn as much as he can and the terror of instant dismissal. It is not a very pleasant picture.

Some attractive sketches of Hawaii are sandwiched in between America and the Far East, to which half the volume is devoted. Our authors readily responded to the very different appeal of Japan and China, which not every traveller is

* *Beckoning Horizon*. By the Rt. Hon. Wedgwood Benn and Margaret Benn. Cassell. 12s. 6d.

which followed it. In 1933 the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation awarded him a Fellowship for a period of eighteen months, which enabled him to give up his journalistic work and to complete the two big volumes now before us.*

The work is indeed a monument of research. It starts from the downfall of the Tsarist régime in March 1917 and ends with the introduction of the New Economic Policy in March 1921, which latter date, as the author says, "represented the beginning of an entirely new phase in Russian social and economic development." The story excites all the interest that is the normal reward of an author who takes the trouble to master his facts and sets them down in full. Any story that is complete, true and detailed enough to give a fair knowledge to the reader of what actually happened in a given episode is inevitably interesting. The four years chronicled in these volumes were indeed historic in their effect upon large masses of human beings. Mr. Chamberlin says: "they present a gigantic historical panorama, always moving and dramatic, heroic, or tragic or both." He gives us pictures of all the leading men and women who brought about the revolution and carried on the new form of government, with full biographies. He collates many of the chief State papers issued during the four years, a collection of human documents deriving from almost incredibly mixed idealism, brutality and stupidity. Those documents are one of the most valuable features of the work.

Another valuable feature is the frequent quotation from speeches made by bolshevik leaders at the several stages of the revolution. When Lenin returned to Petrograd on the evening of April 16th, 1917, his first words were: "I am glad to greet in you the victorious Russian revolution. . . . The robbers' imperialist war is the beginning of civil war in all Europe" (Volume I, p. 117). There are, no doubt, many people who, having had experience of human affairs in their political aspect, have lost all hope that civilisation and common sense can ever be reconciled. On Mr. Chamberlin's showing—and other students have agreed with him—Lenin was an earnest and sincere man. How otherwise could he have done what he did? He was sincere in the glee with which he hoped for the

* *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921.* By William Henry Chamberlin. With illustrations and maps. 2 volumes. 42s. net. Macmillan.

"beginning of civil war in all Europe." Who shall define a madman? Who is competent to do so? Signor Mussolini in 1935 sends a quarter of a million of Italian youths, including his own two sons, to a hellish war in Africa. He is, of course, mad. He is sincere enough. The Archbishop of Canterbury is sincere when he denounces Italy (as he did for example on October 8th, 1935) with such burning indignation as to rouse all the war feelings in British breasts that were roused against Germany in 1914. Those politicians and bishops who argue that League of Nations principles must be vindicated even to the length of a war of sanctions are as sincere as they are mad. Lenin's indignation against what he called imperialist war drove him into postulating civil war. Your Geneva enthusiast's indignation against an Italian war drives him into demanding a world war. In its politics the world always was mad and it appears always will be.

In 1917 a member of the Duma remarked: "the population is loafing and thinks only of how it can best rob someone" (Volume I, p. 189). The remark was clearly true; idealism or madness? Mr. Chamberlin makes a shrewd observation on p. 275 of Volume I when he writes: "The predestined standard-bearer of the social revolution according to Marx proved to be neither the miserable, half-naked, rice-fed coolie of Shanghai or Bombay nor the skilled mechanic of Essen and Birmingham, but the Petrograd metal-worker or the Donetz miner, sufficiently literate to grasp elementary socialist ideas, sufficiently wretched to welcome the first opportunity to pull down the temple of private property." In Volume II the author relates the steps taken to "arm" the revolution. "From the first days of the Bolshevik Revolution its leaders recognised the necessity of creating an armed force which would defend the new régime, crush its enemies *within the country* [reviewer's italics] and beat off attacks from outside." The activities of the Cheka or secret police must rank high among the inhuman phases of human history. Or is it inhuman, after all? Is it human nature to become on occasion a fiend? On pp. 90 *et seq.* of Volume II the author gives in detail the revolting story of the massacre of the Tsar, his wife, his children and chambermaid.

Those men who engineered the Russian revolution and who had the spirit in them to drive their enterprise to its end had idealist phrases for ever on their lips. The baffling thing for

the philosopher is that they had a background which explained their temper. Only moral indignation against an existing state of things could supply the motive power. And that power in its turn produced a state of things even worse. Mr. Chamberlin has left no stone unturned. He has produced a work which in the historical sense is an achievement that does him honour. It is interesting and vivid all through. But at the end of it no thinking man will feel more cheerful about the world he lives in.

G. G.

THE PROBLEM OF THE GOSPELS.*

In his Bampton Lectures of 1934, Mr. R. H. Lightfoot has dealt with the problems raised by the Synoptic Gospels, and especially with St. Mark. He is a follower, in the main, of Dr. Dibelius and an advocate of what is termed *Form Geschichte*.

By the new technical term, *Form Geschichte*, which has become accepted by Dr. Dibelius and his fellow critics, is meant "that, in the earliest years, memories and traditions of the words and deeds of Jesus were only handed on from mouth to mouth, and, secondly, that they were valued, not so much (as we might have expected) in and for themselves, as for their importance in solving problems connected with the life and needs of the young churches." That is to say, history, in the Gospels, is subordinate to interpretation; interpretation expresses the faith held by particular groups of Christians at successive periods during a process of development, and the narrative was drawn up, not so much for information as for edification. Thus what may be called sagas were fashioned and used by circles, which were subsequently collected and connected by the Evangelists, each of them being guided in his work by his own individual point of view.

Hitherto the chief difficulty for this explanation has been the Gospel of St. Mark. Various features reveal the priority of this Gospel. Its narrative both of the words and works of Jesus was adopted, with minor variations, by St. Matthew and St. Luke. Its apparent simplicity and vividness are

* *History and Interpretation in the Gospels*. By Robert Henry Lightfoot. Hodder and Stoughton. 10s. 6d. net.

obvious. Hence the statement of Papias that this Gospel represents the teaching of St. Peter has, for many years, been accepted both by expositors and by critics. Now, Mr. Lightfoot, following Dr. Dibelius, challenges this judgment. St. Mark's Gospel resembles the Fourth Gospel in having a doctrinal object, namely, to show that Jesus was "Son of God," that is the Messiah. This object explains the distinctive way in which this Evangelist treats the disclosure of our Lord's messiahship, first of all as being recognised by "demons," then as a secret disclosed to the disciples, and only finally asserted publicly by Jesus Himself. According to Dr. Dibelius, sixteen distinct groups of statement can be detected in the narrative; according to Mr. Lightfoot there are eleven. They owe their origin, not to St. Peter, but to the stories, leading up to outstanding sayings of Jesus, which became current among particular groups as expressive of the faith held by them in regard to our Lord.

This theme is elaborated by Mr. Lightfoot throughout the Lectures, and leads him to the final conclusion, "It seems, then, that the form of the earthly no less than of the heavenly Christ is for the most part hidden from us. For all the inestimable value of the Gospels, they yield us little more than a whisper of his voice; we trace in them but the outskirts of his ways" (p. 225).

It is impossible, and indeed unnecessary, to deal minutely with this subject within the brief limits of this review. A few general comments must, however, be made. This critical attempt to unravel the sources of St. Mark's Gospel is, of course, legitimate. It may ultimately yield valuable results, though, to the present writer, many of the steps that are taken to support the hypothesis appear overstrained, and in fact meticulous. It was, indeed, inevitable that attempts to record the sayings and doings of Jesus should be inspired and directed by the faith in Him that had been produced. Interpretation, therefore, was inextricably bound up with narrative. But there must have been something inexpressibly great that needed this interpretation. The fact of Jesus, however explained, was not created by groups of Christians or by Evangelists. It created and recreated them. Whatever may be said and discovered about the way in which the Gospels were constructed, and however the important differences between them may be explained,

Miss Beatrice White's careful study of Mary Tudor—unhappy child, disappointed woman, thwarted ruler—enables the reader to estimate her character more fairly than has, until recently, been attempted; it also shows how many aspects of her reign have been neglected through too exclusive dwelling on her dealings with heretics. Perhaps the most interesting evidence is derived from the intimate records of foreign Ambassadors at her Court, in especial the Venetians, Michiel and Soranzo (here strangely spelt Sorranzo), whose sympathies were on the side of "this most serene queen" (serene—poor, harassed Mary!). But it cannot seriously be argued that, as Miss White maintains, the Princess's girlish journal, with its notes of kindly gifts and love of innocent things, "very effectually dispels the phantom of 'Bloody Mary.'" Nor, when all allowance is made for the difficulties, vexations and dangers that beset her throughout life, and all credit given for her fine qualities—courage, integrity—can the Queen be acquitted of final responsibility for the burning, in less than four years, of some 300 men and women for their religious opinions. Many of these were quite humble persons, unconnected with any seditious movement. (Miss White's description of them as "welcoming a fiery death with hysterical ecstasy born of a blind faith," is hardly a fair one.) The will of the sovereign, then paramount, could have overruled Bonner and the Privy Council; even the pious, but politic Philip was alarmed, as were the foreign Ambassadors, at the possible effects of such "severity." But Mary verily thought within herself that the contagion of heresy must be suppressed at all costs.

Mr. Evelyn Waugh gives an eloquent and sympathetic delineation of Campion. In the long tale of barbarous cruelties and magnificent heroisms on either side, no figure stands out more attractively than his, like More, a saintly scholar of "gentle courtesy." After a brilliant career at Oxford, Campion became gradually convinced that the Roman Church was the true one, and, after admission to the Jesuit Order abroad, returned to England in 1580, with dauntless courage and enthusiasm, to engage in the perilous mission of secret ministrations to the scattered Romanists. The Papal Bill of 1570 had absolved Elizabeth's subjects from their allegiance, and, in view of this and of the constant danger from invasions in Ireland and conspiracies in favour

of Mary Stuart, the Queen and Cecil had been driven to employ harsh measures. But Campion from first to last protested that his concern was only with souls, and that he acknowledged Elizabeth as his sovereign; no plot or treason was ever proved against him, in spite of repeated rackings. Betrayed by a notorious spy and arrested, hectoring and misreported by his judges, he was offered freedom and advancement if he would abjure his faith. It was for loyalty to this, not for political disloyalty, that he suffered the ghastly traitor's death, praying "for Elizabeth, your Queen and my Queen."

E. G. S.

RICHARD CROMWELL.*

No one is more competent to write a biography of the great Protector's eldest son and successor, Richard Cromwell, than Mr. Robert W. Ramsey. For years he has laboured among the contemporary material relating to the Cromwell family. His valuable *Studies in Cromwell's Family Circle* and the more recent and scholarly life of *Henry Cromwell* have been followed by an equally learned volume in which continuous documentation is easily absorbed into the narrative by an easy and attractive style. A large proportion of the work deals with Richard's private life. In particular the correspondence of the Pengelly family, with whom he lived after his return from voluntary exile in 1680 "present a singularly complete and intimate picture upon which one is perhaps tempted to dwell at too great length." Apart from its intrinsic interest, however, a study of his private life and interests assists in forming a good idea of Richard's capacity and character during his short reign of eight months—from September 1658 to May 1659.

Oliver himself recognised little industry or ability in his son and, at least till near the end of his life, showed no ambition for his future. Richard played no part in the Civil War, was married in 1649 to the daughter of a landowner of no significance, and a year later, at the age of twenty-four, was still living the secluded life of a country gentleman, while receiving

* *Richard Cromwell, Protector of England*. By Robert W. Ramsey. Longmans. 10s. 6d. net.

the admonitions of his father for his idleness and debts. He was, says Mr. Ramsey :

more inclined to country sports, riding, hunting and hawking than to the studies his father recommended, a little careless in expenditure, being of a free, generous disposition, not unobservant of the times, but devoid of ambition and content to be free of responsibility.

By 1655, however, the ascendancy of Oliver was drawing Richard into the vortex of affairs. He removed to London, sat in Parliament, became generally courted as the Lord Protector's eldest son and was appointed to the Council in December 1657. But he never enjoyed such authority as was entrusted to his younger brother Henry, who was brilliantly commanding the army in Ireland. Yet it was Richard, who, as Firth has pointed out, "had roused no jealousies or animosities, and created no fears" and whose defects did not unfit him as a constitutional monarch, whom Oliver named his successor on his death-bed on September 2nd, 1658, "in presence of 4 or 5 of the Councill." But before his second installation as Protector, Oliver had nominated his successor in a written sealed letter ; the loss of which before his death had resulted in the oral nomination. There is a tradition that the person named in the document was Fleetwood, and that he was obliged by the Council, after Richard's succession, to renounce his claim, should the letter ever be found. In these circumstances it is surprising that Mr. Ramsey should quote without comment an extract from a news-letter found in the Clarke Papers and dated September 4th, 1658, that upon the Protector's death "the Councill mett and open'd the writing the Lord Protector had sealed uppe, which did declare that the Lord Richard should succede as Protector."

"For some weeks," as Dr. G. P. Gooch has aptly said, "Oliver ruled England from his urn." Richard succeeded his father "as quietly as any King had ever been succeeded by any Prince of Wales." He gained at once a popular reputation for modesty, moderation and disinterested conduct and as a leader "flexible to good counsels." But he was unknown to the army, inexperienced and without the resolution or insight of his father. At the moment of conflict with the army, he declared "my greatness . . . is a burden to me" and refused to pit force against force. "Violent

counsels suit not with me." With the restoration of the purged Long Parliament by Fleetwood and the army officers on May 7th, 1659, the Protectorate, based upon the Humble Petition and Advice, was swept away. Richard's Great Seal (of which there are striking photographs in the text) was broken in the Commons, and on the 27th he made his formal submission to Parliament. While the Protector's fall was immediately due to his own qualities, the Protectorate as such was condemned inevitably, in the view of Mr. Ramsey, by the general reaction against military and arbitrary rule.

Richard gladly retired from public life, "a patient exile in the years that followed, and at last, an old gentleman living in a desired obscurity, contented with simple pleasures and acts of kindness." Forgotten by the Government, except in 1683 when he was sought in vain and without foundation for complicity in the Rye House Plot, he eventually died in 1716 at the age of eighty-six, secluded and unknown.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

*Pacifism is not Enough** is the title chosen for the ninth series of lectures on Problems of Peace, delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations in 1934. As usual all the papers, eleven in number, are worth reading, for specialists deal with their own subjects. One of the most striking, and certainly the most controversial, is Mr. Attlee on the Socialist View of Peace, which stresses and exaggerates the economic factor in the making of wars, though he does not suggest that it is the only cause. It is amusing to read that "modern States are controlled by capitalists, except in Russia." Great Britain, to go no further afield, is controlled not by capitalists, but by a Parliament freely elected by universal suffrage and able, owing to the absence of a written constitution, to do what it wishes. Readers who are not members of the Labour Party will find themselves more in agreement with Mr. Phelan on Social Justice and World Peace and with Professor Maciver's National Economic Planning and International Organisation. The latter reminds us that there are other varieties of economic planning as well as Socialism, such as President Roosevelt is gallantly striving to apply. We can all agree, however, that no system can produce the good life for the ordinary citizen if it attempts to operate independently of the outside world. Social justice; however we may

define it, is unattainable without international co-ordination. "I take it for granted," writes Professor Maciver, "that a real international order is inevitable, and that the world-rôle of Geneva has scarcely begun." How much the small States, "the most faithful champions of the League itself," can do in this direction is proclaimed by Professor Rappard; and what obstacles the Great Powers can place in its way is discussed in a realistic spirit by Professor Zimmern.

It is rare for a continental jurist to appreciate and still rarer for him to produce an outstanding treatise upon English law. This is the achievement of Professor Henri Lévy-Ullmann in *The English Legal Tradition, Its Sources and History*,* translated from the French by Mr. M. Mitchell and revised and edited by Dr. Frederic M. Goadby, and which Sir William Holdsworth can well describe in his Foreword as "the best introduction to the study of English law that I know." Professor Lévy-Ullmann has studied English law for a generation and this work, the product of ten years' labour, contains the substance of lectures delivered over many years to continental and oriental law students. Although Roman law can claim a longer ancestry than ours, the continental lawyer rarely has to look beyond the Napoleonic codes, while the historical sources of English law continue to support and nourish contemporary legal doctrine. A knowledge of historical origins, therefore, becomes a necessary condition to an accurate appreciation of English legal principles. This fundamental truth is recognised and more than vindicated in this history which traces, upon the foundation of their respective sources, the growth of the three distinct categories of our system, namely Common Law, the Rules of Equity and Statute Law. This is, undoubtedly, the most lucid method of enabling the English or foreign novice to grasp in their proper perspective the intricacies of our legal history and thereby the principles of our jurisprudence. This arrangement, however, is less convenient for the trained British or American lawyer, who will find, for example, the history of contractual obligations distributed among different sections of the work. Professor Lévy-Ullmann's treatise represents more than an outstanding study of English law objectively and critically treated by a foreign jurist; for throughout he has compared the analogous characteristics of his own system with the purpose of promoting "the world-wide synthesis" of the two great bodies of jurisprudence in private as well as international law.

A valuable explanatory survey of the new Government of India Act has been written by two barristers, Mr. J. P. Eddy, who is an ex-judge of the High Court of Madras, and Mr. F. H. Lawton, with the assistance of another ex-Indian judge, Mr. A. G. P. Pullan, in a short volume,

* Macmillan. 16s. net.

India's New Constitution.* Under the Act Burma becomes a distinct and separate entity and this volume is confined to those provisions dealing with India proper. The authors follow closely the classification of subjects arranged in the Act and summarise in a historical setting its main provisions. Some of the more important sections are printed textually. They have included also the draft Instruments of Instructions to the Governor-General and the provincial Governors, presented to Parliament in May, and also the draft Instrument of Accession published as a White Paper last March. Designed to "enable all who are concerned with or interested in the future government of India readily to appreciate the scope and effect of the new Act," this book ably epitomises and classifies the clauses of a most intricate Statute. This analysis should also prove a useful work of reference for the constitutional student who will welcome the inclusion of a number of legal cases. But it is essentially not a legal treatise upon the law of the Indian constitution.

Mr. H. Vere Redman, who is an English journalist resident in Tokyo and also "associated with a semi-official propaganda publication in the English language," conveys his impressions and views of the Japanese standpoint and mentality in his book *Japan in Crisis*.† Since 1931 Mr. Redman has corresponded regularly upon current affairs affecting Japan, and this volume contains a selection of somewhat verbose letters, representing "comments on the passing Japanese scene" during the last four years, in which "I hope to have given some sort of living picture of the preoccupations, aspirations, loyalties, etc.," of Japan. Mr. Redman is a very sympathetic critic. He is more than anxious to condone the taking of Manchuria. The Japanese, "resolute, industrious, and collectively ambitious," are determined upon expansion in China, for primarily political rather than economic reasons. "I suggest that on those political objectives we can and should yield voluntarily and ungrudgingly," and recognise a Japanese Monroe Doctrine in the Far East. By such recognition we can protect without danger "those interests which are really vital to us: the route to India and to Australia."

The admirable publication of the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs on *Abyssinia and Italy* has now been followed by an extremely valuable paper on *Sanctions*,‡ which provides a concise and impartial survey of the whole question. While the position of Italy is not specifically dealt with, an idea of the efficacy of economic measures against her may be gauged from the

* Macmillan. 6s. net.

† Allen & Unwin. 6s. net.

‡ Royal Institute of International Affairs, St. James' Square, London, S.W.1. 2s. net.

quantity of facts provided. After discussing briefly the legal basis of sanctions with particular reference to Article XVI, as interpreted by the 1921 Resolutions, the paper goes on to analyse the various types of sanctions from the organisation of public opinion to the imposition of economic embargoes and military blockade. A third section deals with the obstacles to effective action, such as are found, for example, in the determination of aggression, national opinion and policy, and the rights of neutrals. The appendices contain the relevant Articles of the Covenant and of the Kellogg Pact and a note on the recent United States Neutrality Resolution, now invoked by President Roosevelt. There is also a statistical table showing the sources of origin and production of the raw materials essential for war purposes, although the production of oil from Iraq is curiously omitted.

Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves' little book, *Our Future in the Air*,* contains a short survey of British commercial and military aviation in particular relation to foreign development, with an alarmist plea for immediate expansion. He argues that the rapid execution of the Government plans to achieve parity with the strongest air-Power within striking distance is essential either to an isolationist policy or to effective collaboration in the collective system. The Royal Navy is largely blamed for retarding the growth of the Royal Air Force in the past. General Groves deplores the size and condition of our commercial air transport and urges its development upon the foundation, as in other States, of large subsidies through which it will become most quickly self-supporting and able to provide an adequate contribution to air defence. This book is a valuable publication, if only because it renews attention upon the rapid expansion of civil and military aviation in foreign countries and the comparative weakness of our own.

A new volume of the Lonsdale Library is devoted to *Motor Cruising*,† which has gained rapidly in popularity during recent years. Like its predecessors, this volume is designed as a comprehensive text book, containing a mine of information on all branches of the subject and should prove an invaluable companion both to the expert yachtsman and the mere "sea-motorist." The Editors, Mr. K. M. Miller and Mr. John Irving, have selected a number of expert contributors who include Messrs. W. McC. Meek, G. H. Wainman and T. C. Letcher on yacht construction, and Messrs. J. R. Barnett and W. O. Horsnaill on engine matters, also dealt with by Mr. Miller. More than half the volume is contributed by Mr. Irving, who writes upon the all-important problems of navigation and kindred topics. The work is completed by more than 500 plates and diagrams and a useful glossary of sea terms.

* Harrap. 2s. 6d. net.

† Seeley Service & Co. 21s. net.

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THE LEAGUE ON ITS TRIAL.

THE League of Nations has reached its testing-point; and not alone the League of Nations, but civilised humanity itself. For, if the attempt made in 1919 to rid the world of war fails, the responsibility for that failure will rest not only with the nations that have come within the League, but to an equal—aye, perhaps to a greater degree—upon those which remained outside. If the League fails it will be because America has failed; Germany has failed; Japan has failed; Italy has failed. The co-operation of these Powers in what is the greatest effort that the world has ever put forth to make peace reign was essential to its success. Each one may have thought that he had good reason for his abstention, or withdrawal. Each one may have convinced himself that he was doing what was best for his own people. But each and all forgot that humanity was looking to him for help. If the American Senators, in 1919, had sacrificed a little of their own *amour propre* what a different tale Geneva would have to tell to-day! If German statesmen had had a little more patience; or those in Japan, or Italy, had felt a little more keenly the obligations which they had voluntarily accepted when they signed the Covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris, Europe, instead of being now upon the verge of war, would be far advanced along the road to permanent peace.

But the failure will not be due only to these causes. Responsibility for it will also rest with the nations whose representatives have attended, year after year, at Geneva and the statesmen who have directed its policy. It is true that they have laboured assiduously at the solution of various problems that have come before them; but they have achieved very little, and the world has been waiting to see some great result. When, after five years of slaughter, an exhausted humanity welcomed the League, it was hoped that it would bind all nations together in the bonds of peace and build up an organisation capable of regulating human society without recourse to war; but this has not come about. On

the contrary, although Geneva has done something to create a feeling of solidarity amongst certain nations, we are bound to recognise that there is, in many places, a reactionary tendency which is impeding all attempts to advance universal brotherhood. In this respect we are further from permanent peace that we were in 1914. Public opinion, as a moral force, is still playing too small a part in international relations.

And yet moral force is the foundation stone of the League of Nations. When President Wilson presented the Covenant of the League to the Peace Conference on February 14th, 1919, he said :

Through this instrument we are depending primarily and chiefly upon one great force and this is the moral force of the public opinion of the world. . . . Armed force is in the background of this programme ; but it is in the background and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a league of war.

The first duty of the League is, therefore, to enlist on its side the moral forces of the world, and this is what it is doing in relation to the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. It is a slow process ; but it must be remembered that the whole scheme of the Covenant is based upon ideas of deliberation and conciliation. In any action that the League takes it is essential that it carry with it the general assent of all reasonable men, and this requires time. In the present case it entails delay, and with it a regrettable effusion of blood and continuance of the horrors which are inseparable from war ; but even these have advantages in that they bring on to the side of the League many whom it would be impossible to convince by mere arguments. Moreover, whilst the steps taken by the League have been slow they have been sure and, as each stage in the process laid down in the Covenant has been duly reached, the Members of the League have become more resolute and united. This procedure was really in the best interests of world-peace, since too rapid action might have strained the solidarity of the League before it had to brace itself for the final struggle. The test through which the League is now passing is a test not only of the statesmen assembled in Geneva, but also a test of the good faith of the nations which they represent. There being no longer any doubt that Italy has

been false to her word, public opinion in every country is more and more prepared to condemn her action and to authorise whatever joint measures are necessary in order to restrain her.

But whether we succeed or fail in preventing Italy from conquering and absorbing Abyssinia, the future of the League will demand thorough consideration. If, notwithstanding the difficulties it has had to surmount, the League triumphs, it will gain immensely in reputation, and it may happen that states which have refused to join it will desire to participate in its work. In that case its constitution would undoubtedly have to be reconsidered. But, even if it fails on this occasion, as it did with Japan, and retires from the contest defeated and dismayed, it will be all the more incumbent upon the nations of the world to approach anew the problem of how to make it more effective for protecting the world from war. It were well, therefore, to discuss why it is that the League has not fulfilled the expectations of the men who ushered it into the world in 1919.

The first, and by far the most important, cause of the difficulties that the League has had to surmount was the absence of the United States. It is useless to complain of this. As already stated, had the American nation taken its seat at Geneva and joined in the common effort to rebuild the world, the history of the last fifteen years would have been changed. The League of Nations without America was only half a League. An institution which depends for its success upon having the moral support of the world and does not receive it from the American people is like a table with one leg broken ; it can stand upright, but nothing can rest upon it safely. It is of no use to complain about America. All we can do is to watch with admiration the efforts of a small, but growing, band of men and women within the United States, who are striving to persuade their countrymen that, notwithstanding the existence of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, America cannot for ever maintain her attitude of "splendid isolation." Sooner or later she will recognise that three thousand miles of sea are not enough to absolve her of her duty towards her neighbours.

The presence of Germany, Japan and Italy is also essential in any league of nations, and if the League holds its own in the present struggle it is probable that some of these states

the League and its faulty administration. At the same time the minorities themselves, who at the outset looked to the League to give them that protection which would have enabled them to settle down contentedly under their new rulers, found themselves left to their own resources and having to fight their own battles within their respective states where the sentiments of the majority of their fellow-countrymen were usually adverse to their demands. Amongst other results that have arisen out of this failure to reconcile the minorities to their new allegiances is the growth of a *Deutsches Volkstum*, an ideal which aims at a spiritual and ultimately a juridical reunion of all persons of German race. The idea is extending into many countries where men of German blood are settled, and it bids fair to become a serious menace to the peace of Europe. It is being constantly fanned into flame by real, or alleged, acts of oppression towards the minorities on the part of Germany's neighbours, and it will gain more and more force as the governments against whom these allegations are made become less and less responsive to the League's admonitions.

When the treaties were made it was clearly intended that the Council of the League should hold a commanding position in relation to this matter and, in the early years after the war, the Council of the League adopted this view; but as the years passed and the personnel of the Council changed, and especially as the influence of certain governments, specially affected by the treaties, increased, the Council became more inclined to negotiate than to direct. This was unfortunate, inasmuch as the provisions in the treaties constituted a *bona fide* attempt to assure legal rights to minorities of race or religion as against those majorities in whose hands lay the political power. If it had succeeded it might well be extended to the rest of the world and ultimately become the basis of a universal law. The opinion that such a law should be common to all nations is growing rapidly amongst the members of the League, as was shown by the recent debates on the Polish proposal for a "generalisation" of the Minorities Treaties. So long as these minorities are deprived of the privileges that they hold dear, there can be no real peace in Europe. Peace can only flourish where justice is firmly planted in the soil and allowed to spread its shade over all sections of the people.

Amongst the accusations that are freely brought against the League is that relating to the revision of treaties. By Article XIX of the Covenant it is provided that "the Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." It is true that these words are vague; but the article was inserted for a definite purpose and the League was entitled, and indeed bound, to see that that purpose was achieved. In the debates at Versailles, President Wilson urged that it was impossible to expect that the treaties of peace would be perfect in all respects, and he suggested that there should be some means whereby they could be reconsidered. His proposal was objected to by the Powers, who thought that the terms to be then insisted upon should be inviolable. Article XIX was accepted as a compromise, but those who signed the Covenant never intended it to be a nullity. They desired that when a treaty does become inapplicable, or when conditions do arise that may endanger the peace, the Assembly should act. But the Assembly has been afraid to face the task. There are provisions in the Treaty of Versailles that have become inapplicable, such as those relating to reparations and disarmament which, if they had been openly swept away, would have deprived Germans of some of their most justifiable grounds of complaint and done much to improve relations between them and the other nations. If the League had turned its eyes towards places where the continuance of international conditions was endangering the peace of the world it could not fail to see that there are places on the borders of Hungary, Austria and Italy where a comparatively small revision of a treaty would have done much to secure the peace of Europe.

The failure of the League in these respects has been due very largely to the fact that the League has been half-hearted in its work. Those who had to do with its creation looked to its becoming, if not a super-state, at least a supreme advisory body, whose function it would be to take in hand at once some of the great international problems that were forcing themselves to the front. In addition to the matters referred to above, there were other questions that demanded international treatment, such as problems of public health and social conditions. There was the question of the currency,

SLAVERY IN ABYSSINIA.

THERE are many countries in the world in which slavery prevails, such as Arabia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and China, but Abyssinian slavery has a special significance, partly owing to the fundamental part it plays in the social structure of the country, and partly because Abyssinia is a transit country in the slave trade between Africa and Asia. Although the Abyssinians are Christians, their whole mode of life is dependent upon the institution of slavery, which is supported and practised by the Church as well as by high Court and Government officials. The practice has continued since the earliest times, establishing a tradition which is deeply ingrained in the minds of the people in every rank of the social scale. After spending a short time in the country, one realises that an Abyssinian without his slaves is in present conditions inconceivable. In the matter of slave-trading Abyssinia is not only a source of supply for the slave markets of Arabia, but forms a trade route connecting the sources of supply in the Sudan with the shores of the Red Sea. The subject, therefore, has to be divided into three aspects—domestic slavery, slave-raiding and slave-trading—apart from other forms of servitude prevalent in the country.

About one-fifth of the population are slaves, who are employed in practically every Abyssinian home, rich and poor alike. Although the majority of slaves are employed in domestic service, rich landowners also employ them on their land. The Abyssinians as a whole consider menial tasks humiliating, and employ slaves to fetch and carry for them, and to create an impression of their own importance. But, curious to relate, there are occasions when favourite slaves are in a position to give orders to hired servants. When ordered to take their master's luggage to the railway station at Addis Abeba, slaves have been known to hire porters to do the work. Even private soldiers regard menial work as degrading and rely on slaves to carry it out. In many cases domestic slaves are treated as members of the family, and have no complaints to make about the treatment they receive at the hands of their masters; so that it is common for slaves who have been liberated to return to the scene of their former servitude and ask to be taken back. But frequently it is a case of preferring servitude to the bewilderment of newly

gained liberty. Again, the Abyssinian Rases, or chiefs, have a habit of giving slaves as presents, when they form part of a gift of live-stock and farm produce.

Female slaves are for the most part engaged in the grinding of cereals, gathering of wood and drawing of water, while males are employed as servants, and follow their masters with the caravans during their journeys, carry rifles, look after cattle and transport food. This, however, is only one side of the picture. Very often female slaves are also the concubines of their masters. Sometimes the slaves are almost naked, or only covered by a few rags, are fed on the leavings of their masters' meals, and are left in a state of utter material and moral neglect. Their children are brought up on falsehood, immorality and cheating; at an early age they are employed in the most humiliating, exhausting and enervating occupations. Slaves have no family life, as marriage among them is merely a casual union. Those who are old or ill are abandoned or left isolated in huts. The opportunities of exercising cruelty in the punishment of slaves is unlimited, and this is practised to a large extent in the outlying districts. In some cases the feet are chained close together, while in others the victims are flogged, mutilated or submitted to other kinds of torture.

Many travellers have described the peculiar penalty, practised by the Abyssinians, of hanging the slave by his feet with his head downwards, and burning grains of dry berberi under him so as slowly to asphyxiate him with its acrid smoke. The following examples show other types of brutality which have been encountered in the country. At Harar in 1929 a notorious slave-owner hung a sixteen-year-old slave by the feet to the ceiling and smoked his head with berberi. He then beat him to death and buried him on his estate. Although this crime was well known throughout the district, it was ignored by the judicial authorities. At the same place in the following year, a female slave, who had asked for liberation, was drowned in a well by the wife of an official in the Emperor's Palace. There is also the case of a female slave who had been found in the company of another man, and was so scalded with boiling water by her infuriated master that she died from the effects. Another female slave was for the same reason burnt to death with red-hot irons. It is notorious that slaves are maltreated for trifling offences, severely beaten, and tied up for a long time at the caprice of their masters. The

slaves shrink from appealing to the authorities, knowing that they can hope for no satisfaction and that such appeals would expose them to serious reprisals. When life becomes impossible the only alternative is to escape, with the risk of being caught and trussed up for an indefinite time. But one of the most pernicious effects of all slavery, whether humane or inhumane, is the loss of human personality, individual thought and character.

An almost greater evil, however, is to be found in the practices connected with slave-raiding and slave-trading. Although slave-trading is forbidden by law, the practice is widespread and takes various forms. As concealment is found to be necessary, the transfer is often conducted under the pretext of a gift, payment being made through a series of intermediaries who may be servants or personal friends. If, however, the transfer is discovered, it may result in the liberation of the slave. For example, at the Slavery Court in Addis Abeba there was a case in which a woman claimed from another a slave who had been stolen. Although the theft was admitted, the plaintiff lost her case on the grounds that the slave had been sold subsequent to the Emperor's Edict of 1924 forbidding the practice, and the slave was set free. Another form of trade is carried on in men and women who have recently been caught as slaves, and have been sent off to a part of the country unknown to them as a precaution against escape. As such removals may involve a month's journey by mule over mere tracks, it is necessary to employ the services of professional slave-traders. The work of these individuals is of two kinds. First, there are small caravans of children which travel from north to south, and *vice versa*, some of which pass dangerously near the capital. Secondly, there are caravans of captured negroes from the districts in the south-west and west, many of whom are ear-marked for transport to the coast for shipment to Arabia. It is estimated that at least a thousand slaves pass through Abyssinia every year, and cross the Red Sea on their way to the Arabian slave-markets. Some of these caravans carry as many as fifty boys, and their state of emaciation is often pitiful. If they try to attract attention in the hope of release they are usually shot, and left to be eaten by the hyænas. The cruelties practised during the passage of the Red Sea are evident from the fact that many dhows carry a heavy ballast of stones, which in

case of pursuit can be attached to the feet of slaves, especially children, so that they can be instantly drowned without trace. Among the greater difficulties of exercising any control over this traffic in the Red Sea is the common practice of including slaves in the retinues of important chiefs making the pilgrimage to Mecca. In this connection it is interesting to observe the following statement,* showing how the demand for slaves in the Hedjaz and other parts of Arabia is one of the main causes of the Red Sea traffic between Africa and Asia :

In the Hedjaz the supply of human merchandise is kept up in two ways. There is in the first place breeding for the market. The Sudan and Abyssinia have furnished such a vast number of slaves during the passage of years that their children are sufficient to meet the demand to a great extent. There are organised means at work to multiply the offspring ; there even exists a corps of female agents who keep in touch with owners on the control of reproduction on the selective principle, and are rewarded when a child is born.

Secondly, there is the slave trade. This consists in bringing a human cargo to the Arabian coasts by the deserts and by clandestine *sambouks*, and then despatching it by caravan to the great towns of the Hedjaz. This is risky.

The pilgrim method is less dangerous. The slaves are embarked well within all the regulations as pilgrims, but they never return. Then it also comes about that parents who have taken their whole family to the sacred city are beggared by the exploitation of faith practised there, and sell their children in order to have money with which to return. . . . As for an ordinary subject of commerce dominated by the law of supply and demand, so for the slave trade there is the region where raw material is found. There are exporters, intermediaries, consumers on the spot and outside. There are variable prices according to the abundance of the supply and the difficulties of transport.

Although the export of slaves to Arabia has diminished, this is only on account of the control exercised by the bordering European colonies, and because the areas subject to Abyssinia which formerly provided slaves are now depopulated. Moreover, slave-owners in these regions take care that their own slaves are not carried off. To suppress the trade altogether in the Red Sea is a most difficult undertaking, as use is made of secluded harbours and shelters behind coral reefs ; and British naval activity is hampered by want of

* Mr. Joseph Kessel, in *Le Matin*, June 13th, 1930.

information, of suitable craft, and of access to non-British territorial waters.

Slave-raiding is chiefly confined to the western lowlands of Abyssinia inhabited by negro or negroid tribes, who have no means of resisting the raiding parties. These bandits shoot up the villages at night, rapidly dispose of the older people, and carry off as slaves the younger natives of both sexes. The captives are then taken north in caravans, which only travel at night, and are either sold in Abyssinia or exported to Arabia. Although the Emperor has issued Edicts making this trade illegal, the only result has been to diminish it slightly and make it less open. Consequently, business is now done under cover of the wattle huts instead of in the market-place. As Government administration in these lowland districts is practically non-existent, and the illiterate natives are unable to read the Edicts posted in the villages, the traffic in slaves continues. Furthermore, as the Abyssinians strongly dislike the hot and unhealthy climate of these areas, they lose no time in collecting slaves for sale on their return journey to Addis Abeba. While raiding in some parts, such as the district of Kaffa, has diminished owing to the almost complete depopulation of the area, in other parts it is a common practice to pay taxes with boys and girls and to sell children in exchange for rifles. Indeed, the power of the slave-raiders is so great that the local governors have not the means of breaking up the slave-raiding bands in accordance with the Emperor's instructions. When troops are sent from the capital to deal with the matter, their efforts are often useless owing to local opposition and corruption.

But it is difficult to see how these Edicts and instructions from the Emperor can be treated seriously, when the Emperor himself and all the important Rases own slaves in large numbers. As recently as 1932 some Europeans met a caravan of twenty slaves, chained by the wrists in couples and under the command of the Chief of the Court servants. These slaves were on their way to Addis Abeba and were intended for the use of the Emperor himself. They were being sent by a local governor as an instalment of the annual contribution of two hundred slaves which this official had been sending for years to the Emperor in lieu of the usual tax in gold. How can the slave traffic be abolished when taxes are paid in slaves, by handing over women and children, when the failure to make

these payments means terrible and brutal retribution, and when refusal or resistance is punished by the annihilation of whole tribes, the wholesale carrying off of cattle, and all this legally perpetrated by the authorities? And further, of what value are the denials of the central government, when they themselves admit that they have no authority over the distant areas?

Another evil is that of kidnapping. Young boys are known to be caught even in Addis Abeba, and girls are often taken away when gathering fuel or drawing water. Although long terms of imprisonment and heavy fines are inflicted for this offence, it is well known that kidnappers can usually obtain their release by a distribution of money in the right quarters.

Yet another form of servitude, largely responsible for the agricultural backwardness of the country, is the *Gabar* system. Throughout the conquered territories of the Ethiopian Empire Abyssinian officials and soldiers, with their families, have been settled in the country at the expense of the inhabitants, who have been registered by the local Rases according to families. To each Abyssinian family one or more families of the vanquished tribes are assigned as *gabars*. The *gabar* family has to support the Abyssinian family, supplying them with land, building and maintaining their dwelling-huts, cultivating the fields, grazing the cattle and performing any sort of labour required. No remuneration is paid for this work; it constitutes a perpetual serfdom resulting from the defeat inflicted by Menelik thirty years ago. The *gabars* can never be liberated, even by payment, and they are not permitted to leave the land on which they serve. If they escape they are subjected to barbaric punishments, and their village has to hand over to the Abyssinians another family to replace the one which has run away. In consequence of this pernicious system, and of slavery in general, vast fertile areas in the conquered territories are lying waste. Every Abyssinian Ras assigned to these areas considers it necessary to provide himself with slaves and the families of his officials and soldiers with *gabars*. When a Ras leaves a conquered territory on transfer elsewhere, he carries off as many slaves as possible for use in his new headquarters, permitting his subordinates to do the same with their *gabars*. This constant abduction of human beings from the conquered territories is the cause of much cruelty, as many of the slaves and *gabars* undergo great

suffering owing to hunger, thirst and brutal treatment during long marches through the country. But from a national standpoint one of the most serious results of this system is the disinclination to cultivate the land more than is necessary for the immediate needs of daily life.

It is satisfactory, however, to observe that in the capital slavery is diminishing. As the possession of a motor-car is sufficient proof of a man's importance, there is less need for him to have a display of slaves, whose upkeep in Addis Abeba is much more expensive than in the country districts. In the country the cost of the grain they consume is never considered, but for Rases whose wealth consists of land rather than of money, town prices are a serious consideration. But when one considers the little that has been done towards abolishing slavery, one is forced to the conclusion that the Ethiopian Government have not only failed to carry out the obligations imposed by Article 23 of the League Covenant, but have also failed to carry out one of the essential undertakings under which the country was admitted to the League of Nations. Article 23 of the Covenant imposes upon States Members of the League the obligation of assuring equitable and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children in their own territory, and of maintaining with this object the necessary international organisations. As slavery is still the basis of the Abyssinian economic system, it is obvious that these provisions of the Covenant have been ignored. On the strength of this Article members of the League of Nations automatically become members of the International Labour Organisation; but during twelve years of membership of this organisation, Abyssinia has shown no sign of active participation in its work. She has never been represented at the annual Labour Conferences, nor has she ratified any of the International Labour Conventions. While this lack of action is probably explained by the absence of even the most rudimentary system of labour legislation, Abyssinia has further ignored the Convention on forced labour to which Liberia has adhered. Furthermore, the oppression and depopulation of the conquered territories shows no desire to improve the moral and material conditions of their native inhabitants, in accordance with the provisions of the above-mentioned Article of the Covenant and the special obligations assumed by Abyssinia on admission to the League of Nations.

On this occasion the Declaration signed by the Ethiopian Government was to the effect that "The signatory Powers, exercising sovereignty or authority in African territories, shall continue to provide for the preservation of the native population and for the improvement of their moral and material conditions: they shall in particular exert themselves to secure the complete abolition of slavery in all its aspects and of the traffic in coloured people by land and sea."

The Edicts issued by the Emperor cover nearly all the transitional measures proposed by the Slavery Commission of the League of Nations and were in the following terms: 1. Children to be born free; 2. Ill-treated slaves to be liberated; 3. Slaves to possess civil rights; 4. Owners to have no right of sale; 5. Registration to be enforced; 6. Right of self-redemption to be granted. While the first four measures were introduced in 1924, the remainder were replaced by a decree that, on the death of an owner, his slaves should be liberated. In Abyssinia, however, it is one thing to issue edicts, but quite another to ensure their execution. As long as the government of the country remains centuries behind the times, and there are no proper road or other communications, there is no hope of carrying out such measures, and the Ethiopian Government must have been fully aware of this when they undertook the obligation to abolish slavery. If the officials charged with the duty of enforcing these anti-slavery measures are themselves owners of slaves, and therefore privately sympathetic to the traffic, no progress can be made. Furthermore, it is quite impossible for the Abyssinians themselves to abolish a system so deeply rooted in their social and economic structure; and one which is upheld by a powerful and barbaric Church claiming guardianship of the Mosaic Law and regarding slavery as an institution decreed by Jehovah. The abolition of slavery in Abyssinia involves a complete social and economic reformation, and can only be carried out by external pressure and the exercise of European administration.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

AFTER THE GREEK PLEBISCITE.

THE Greek plebiscite of November 3rd has shown, according to the official returns, that 97·88 per cent. of the voters voted for the Monarchy, which obtained a large majority even in such a traditionally Republican island as Crete. It is well to remember the warning uttered by the Warden of New College, when he represented the British Government at Geneva in 1921: "the statistics of South-Eastern Europe are like the figures of Herodotos—they must be received with caution." Possibly the Monarchist percentage might have been somewhat less, had two of the Republican leaders not been confined in an island of the Archipelago and had the censorship of the Greek Press not prevented them and their colleagues from presenting their case to the public. But in Greek politics accomplished facts are more eloquent than figures, and the result of the plebiscite has been the restoration of the King, who was forced to leave Greece in December 1923, and whose deposition and the proclamation of the Republic were confirmed by another plebiscite in April 1924.

Before the revolution of March 1st, 1935, there was little talk of a monarchical restoration. M. Tsaldares, who was then for the second time Premier, had formally recognised the Republic in 1933 and had, somewhat tepidly, it is true, celebrated the tenth anniversary of its proclamation in 1934. General Kondyles was still the "Cromwell" of the Republic and not yet "the General Monk of the Greek Restoration." But the stupid and unnecessary insurrection of March 1st, in which M. Venizelos, against the advice of some of his wisest friends, participated, damaged him and his party, and strengthened the hands of the Royalists. Greeks are, as St. Paul discovered during his visit to Athens, lovers of change, not in politics alone. A German film star was idolised when she visited Athens last year; when she returned this year, her visit passed almost unnoticed. The Greek people, by which are meant the "man in the street" and the "man in the fields," as distinct from politicians, journalists and place-hunters, who come up from the country and throng the doors of ministries when new cabinets have been formed, are weary of continuous revolutions, of which the writer has seen seven and another British resident fourteen. Inclined

to exclaim: "peace, be still," the business man and the workers want stability and quiet, so that they can get on with their work, instead of going to bed under one form of government and waking up under another because there has been a *coup d'état* in the night, as has twice happened to the writer. Their attitude is somewhat that of the poet who wrote:

For forms of government let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administered is best.

Comparatively little is known of George II by the Greek people, for his previous reign lasted only fifteen months and for nearly twelve years he has lived in exile. A Republican who saw much of him told the writer, who has only once met him, that of all the members of the Royal family he most resembled his grandfather. That would seem to have been the opinion of M. Venizelos, who on the morrow of his defeat at the election of November 1920 telegraphed to General Paraskeuopoulos, who publishes the telegram in the recent volume of his *Memoirs*,* that the best solution in the circumstances would not be the return of Constantine but the accession of the present king to the throne. When the Allies dethroned Constantine in 1917, George, his eldest son, was excluded from the succession on the ground of his alleged Germanophil sentiments, and his brother, Alexander, made King instead.

The King's long sojourn in England and friendship with our Royal family may be expected to have taught him the practical working of constitutional monarchy, "crowned democracy," as the blue Royalist voting-papers used at the plebiscite were inscribed, and he probably nourishes friendly feelings towards the land which from the revolutionary year 1848 downwards has been the traditional refuge of kings in exile—not by any means the least agreeable form of kingship for the monarch, when the land of exile is England. More than one exiled monarch would probably agree with the ex-sovereign of a Balkan State in George Birmingham's novel *The Grand Duchess*, who preferred a country-house in Ireland to a draughty palace on the volcanic soil of his kingdom.

But George II has decided to return to be "King of the

* Vol. II, p. 371. [In Greek.]

Hellenes"—not "of Greece," a title never used since the deposition of Otho in 1862 but still perpetuated in our *Court Circular*. It is a plucky act, for he must know the difficulties which await him and which will require great tact and knowledge of men to overcome. For the history of the five kings of the two dynasties which have reigned over Greece and the Greek people is not encouraging. Three have been deposed—one of them twice—Otho in 1862, Constantine in 1917 and 1922, and the present King in 1923; one, George I, was assassinated in 1913; and one only, Alexander, died in his bed in Greece in 1920. Moreover, through no fault of his own, George II has not the legend and the aureole which still attach to Constantine in the popular imagination. Constantine was to the Venizelists anathema, but to many of the soldiers, especially in the Peloponnese and the villages round Athens, "the son of the eagle," who was to "draw the sword and smite Anglo-French and Italians together," and recapture Sta. Sophia from the Turks. In his message to his people after the plebiscite the King has specially referred to the achievements of his father; but in practice he would do well to choose as his model his grandfather, who achieved the feat of reigning over the Greeks for forty-nine years by his tact, democratic manners and impartiality in politics. He reigned but did not govern, and in foreign affairs through his relationship with the British and Russian courts and his annual visits to "Europe" was the best ambassador of his adopted country. But Europe has changed since his days; the Russian court is no more, and Copenhagen is no longer the meeting-place of European dynasties. Geneva is a more important international centre, and monarchs do not take their walks in that garden of Eden. Outside League of Nations' circles dictators hold sway, and monarchy and a dictatorship do not cohabit easily.

But the difficulties of internal Greek politics are the first obstacle which the returning monarch will have to face. The Royalist party is not united, but is divided into three groups, under General Kondyles, M. Tsaldares and General Metaxâs respectively. At the last election, of June 9th, General Metaxâs came out with a strangely Royalist programme, which sought to make the Restoration depend upon a vote of the National Assembly without confirmation by a plebiscite. But he obtained only seven seats out of 300, mostly in

his native island of Cephalonia, which, like the other Ionian islands, has been traditionally Royalist. The policy of M. Tsaldares, with whom General Kondyles was then collaborating, was more moderate than that of the distinguished military expert, of whom the late Queen Sophia wrote during the war "Only Jannaki [Jack, General Metaxâs' name] can save us," and who was one of the chiefs of the counter-revolution of 1922. M. Tsaldares, as chief of the "Popular" party, held that "the people" was alone competent to decide by which form of government it should be ruled and that, therefore, a plebiscite must be held after the election of the Assembly. The result of the election, from which the Republicans officially abstained, was a huge majority for the "Populist" party. M. Tsaldares, whose Vice-President and Minister of War was General Kondyles, continued to refuse to make any declaration of his own views on the question until after his return from Germany, where he was educated. When he returned in September, after a meeting with members of the Greek Royal family at Bohinjsko Jezero, he at last came out with a proclamation advocating a Royalist Restoration, to which General Kondyles had been converted.

But M. Tsaldares still delayed to put the question to the Assembly and seemed to General Kondyles to be hesitating about the plebiscite; a Revolutionary Committee, composed of General Papagos, Admiral Economou and General Reppas, head of the Aviation, made the *coup d'état* of October 10th, stopped M. Tsaldares on his way into Athens from his villa at Kephissia and demanded the resignation of his Government. M. Tsaldares was obliged to yield to superior force, and, with the consent and support of the Revolutionary Committee, his colleague, General Kondyles, became Prime Minister. There could scarcely be a greater contrast than that between these two Royalist leaders, not only in their opinions—for the former, like his dead chief, Gounares, was originally a Monarchist, while the latter gained his nickname of the "Thunderbolt" from the rapidity with which he crushed the insurrection against the "Revolutionary" Government in October 1923, and was a very recent convert to the Crown—but also in their methods and mentality. M. Tsaldares studied in a German University, Germany is his "spiritual home," as it was that of Haldane; like Haldane, he is a learned and distinguished lawyer, but he seems to his critics

to have taken as his model of political tactics Fabius Cunctator, postponing till to-morrow what General Kondyles would have done to-day, in the hope that something might turn up meanwhile to save the situation. General Kondyles, on the other hand, has risen from the ranks of the army to be Premier and Regent; he acts at once and strikes hard, and has educated himself by the study of history, including English history, especially of the Cromwellian and Restoration periods. An active soldier, not merely a bookish theorist who sends other people to the firing-line to execute his theories, he "had taken part in fifty-two engagements" up to 1924, and the rapidity with which he abolished the Pangalos dictatorship in 1926 and the insurrection of March 1935, shows that he can still be a "Thunderbolt" of war. The very day of the deposition of M. Tsaldares he formed his Cabinet, proclaimed martial law and a censorship of the Press, and obtained from the rump of the National Assembly, from which M. Tsaldares and his followers had withdrawn without voting, a vote abolishing the Republic. This vote has been officially confirmed by the plebiscite. General Metaxâs expressed in the Assembly his satisfaction at this prompt solution of the Monarchical question. General Kondyles assumed the post of Regent till the King's return.

To abolish the Republic was an easier task than to unite in harmonious development of Constitutional Monarchy. Already, even before the King's return, the opinions of the Royalist leaders differ as to who should form the new Ministry. General Kondyles will doubtless resign *pro forma* on the King's arrival, and it will then devolve upon the King to summon someone to compose a Cabinet. The usual practice would be to ask General Kondyles to remain in office, which doubtless the latter would consent to do. But M. Tsaldares can claim that it is he, and not General Kondyles, who has the majority of votes in the Assembly, and that therefore, on a vote of confidence, the latter would be defeated. To this General Kondyles has replied that the Assembly was a "one-sided" affair, that its mission has been accomplished and that the King should be asked to dissolve it and hold another election for the Chamber in December, so that it could meet in January. On the other hand, it has been argued that the country is weary of elections, of which this would be the third in less than three years. It is suggested

that a Ministry of Affairs, composed of men never mixed up in active politics, high judicial and other officials, should be formed till the King has had time to study the situation on the spot, where it will probably look somewhat different from what it appeared from the windows of Brown's Hotel, Jermyn Street, or from the censored articles of the Athenian newspapers. Such a Ministry would, of course, be only a stop-gap till some more lasting solution were possible.

Politics in Greece are largely personal; men count for more than measures, and this renders the position of a restored Monarchy difficult. Like our Charles II, George II will be placed before the dilemma of employing only Royalists, who may claim his gratitude for their past services, and even among them there are, as we have seen, several shades; or of trying to win the support of moderate Republicans by calling them also to his councils, in which case the former may regard his politic impartiality as ingratitude and drift into opposition. But, if he wishes, as he appears to wish, to be "King of" all "the Hellenes," he must adopt the latter course. Here, however, it is incumbent on Republicans to collaborate with him, and this at present seems to be difficult. For three Republican leaders have circulated an open letter to him, in which they recall the past, which, in his message he stated to be "closed," and refuse to recognise him. There is, however, something more important than the triumph of either Monarchy or Republicanism—the good of Greece, which can be obtained by unity alone. If George II has the same aim as his grandfather, that of "making Greece a model kingdom in the East," he can achieve it only by being a national, not a party, leader. Greece is a far more difficult country to govern than Great Britain. The Greeks are more critical, less fond of compromise and more individualistic than the British, and lack that leaven of stupidity which Bagehot declared to be a useful element in the satisfactory working of our unwritten constitution. Royalty in Greece has not behind it the long tradition, the innate conservatism of the British character, and the existence of an aristocracy, which are such powerful supports of the British throne. It must rely on popular sympathy alone, as George I recognised in the motto, repeated by his grandson: "My strength is the love of my people."

But the most essential condition of the stability of Greek institutions, Monarchical or Republican, is that the army should definitely abstain from politics and mind its own business. Every revolution in Greece from that of September 3rd (O.S.), 1843, which overthrew Bavarian autocracy, to that of October 10th, 1935, itself the seventy-third anniversary of that which dethroned Otho in 1862, has been the work of the army. As long as the military are divided into "ins" and "outs," these officers who are in the army because they share the views of the political party for the time being in power, and those who have been dismissed from the service because they were supporters of the political party which had previously been in power, there will be no guarantee of permanent peace. The army should be "a national force, not a Prætorian guard." It was the "Military League" at the Goudi barracks which inaugurated contemporary Greek history in 1909; can we hope that it was the military *coup* of October 10th which has definitely closed that stormy period and inaugurated an era when all will be for the country and none for party?

This is especially desirable at a time when the international situation looks gloomier than at any moment since 1914, and when Greece, from her geographical position and by virtue of her fine harbours, might find herself in the position of a fair and richly dowered maiden wooed by rival lovers. Patriotism and interest alike impose the categorical imperative of giving the King a fair chance. A century ago Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, to whom the Greek throne was first offered, showed as King of the Belgians what a democratic monarchy should be, adopting as his motto: *L'Union fait la force*. Great Britain might also assist not only by her example but by taking more interest in Greece, where she is still popular, but is being rapidly overshadowed by German propaganda. United, the talented Greek people might easily be the first of the Near East and not the last of the Near West. If it continue to be divided, as it has so long been, by party passions, it will gravitate towards South America rather than towards Northern Europe. If George II succeeds in uniting all parties round his throne, he will secure a place in the long history of his glorious country.

Athens. November 8th.

WILLIAM MILLER.

A KEY TO THE COLOUR QUESTION.

THE chief distinctive importance, socially, of the Colony of Jamaica among all communities founded by British Imperial expansion (including the United States and South Africa), lies in the fact that there has there been attained the nearest approach to a comfortable elimination of the prejudices and inequalities common in mixed societies of European and African racials. The coloured population are, of course, not native, but the descendants of slave importations, transplanted wholesale into the setting and institutions of English Christian civilisation. Obviously, therefore, the problems of social adjustment between the white and the black are in some respects different from what they are in South or East Africa. Nevertheless, inter-racial relations in such artificially mixed communities form a distinct group among British Imperial problems; and the most obvious and fundamental factors of difficulty—difference of race and the existence of a considerable section of mixed racial origin—are the same and have produced like reactions and prejudices on both sides of the Atlantic.

Colour difficulties so far as they are racial and not economic (a very far-reaching reservation) arise out of organically evolved variations in the blend of human and animal qualities in the character. The animal impulses of African mankind are in many respects, though by no means in all, less disciplined than those of the well-bred white man have been by the Catholic and European cultures which we call civilisation; and its spiritual controls act through rules of conduct different from those prescribed by the religious formulas of the European. But Africans have the human conscience, their human characteristics are at bottom the same and can be appealed to and fortified. Indeed, to a sympathetic approach and appeal they lie nearer the surface and are more frankly displayed than is generally the case among Englishmen. This is why those who have had much to do with Africans in specifically human (as distinct from industrial, economic or commercial) relations—as have missionaries, ministers of religion, and educationists—love and think highly of them, even to the point of incurring supercilious disparagement as "negrophilists." This attitude does not arise from any specialised "negrophilia," or even from what, in a cynical sense, is described as

"philanthropy." It is, in fact, an intelligent and clear-sighted humanism, springing from the recognition and appreciation of specifically human qualities in an unfamiliar and unpromising setting, and among barbarian and grotesque-seeming superstitions, traditions and social habits.

In regard to essentials the negro Jamaican possesses a lively conscience. Bold as the statement may seem, he has conscience in a sphere in which he seems, to superficial observers, to have so little—that of sexual indulgence. He is religious, that is to say, he has, more acutely than great numbers of contemporary Europeans, the consciousness of God and of his own spiritual nature; and he responds with direct apprehension to sincere appeals to this; incontinent though his general practice in matters of social and industrial morals may be. Conversely he is acute in detecting and criticising, from the point of view of spiritual and disinterested standards, anything merely self-interested, or commercially minded, or hypocritical in appeals addressed to him, or incentives applied to him to be industrious, or to conform to strictly commercial standards of civic duty. He is exempt from the superstition of the divine authority of private rights in property. Hence he is and may not unwholesomely remain, difficult and incalculable in his response to the utilitarian formulas which European political economy and British commercial statecraft predominantly embody, and to which they habitually appeal. The conscientious British administrator, operating on accepted British assumptions, will therefore constantly find the edge of his expected achievement turned, keen business enterprise will be disheartened and the records of colonial life will be full of apparent failures. On the whole the African continually disappoints his European employer, but does not entirely defeat him; he absorbs from him and feeds his own efficiency; recognising that the latter is practically still his master and can be his leader, because he knows more and because so many centuries of enlightened religion and culture have built up in the Catholic European some realisations, however imperfect, of human character which the African admires and desires, and believes it is possible for himself to attain to, well knowing that he is, in many respects, far behindhand in their achievement.

The prevailing unconsciousness of any irksome "colour-problem" in the everyday life of Jamaica, the absence of any

vocational colour-bar at any rate in the masculine world, and the much-attenuated quality of the colour-prejudice which still haunts the gossip of snobbish afternoon-tea-tables—chiefly affected for the benefit of white visitors—are due to three strains of influence: the resolutely independent character of the African spirit, however cautiously camouflaged by the prudence acquired under slavery, the predominance in the religious sphere of the influence of evangelical free-church Christianity and the fact that, exceptionally in Jamaica, the majority of the black people have been able, though with protracted difficulties and distressful experiences, to establish for themselves, maintain and extend their independence of wage-employment through the personal possession of land for their food supply. Contributing to this elimination of colour difficulties has been, very importantly, the history and character of the large class of Jamaicans of mixed descent and the efficient and indispensable part they have played in the developing life of the Island community. That topic, however, I leave outside of the scope of this article.

Negroes in Jamaica retain conspicuously many of the characteristic human qualities of their African kindred. They are a socially and fraternally-minded people. They are good-humoured, but not slow to express their sense of their dues, having been accustomed to living with personal rights in a free community. They have a natural attitude of human consideration and courtesy. This fact is often remarked on as surprising by English visitors, who expect boorishness or servility in the lower orders. It surprised James Anthony Froude in 1885; and he gravely attributed it to the good breeding and culture of their former aristocratic owners, of whom, unfortunately for his hypothesis, nine out of ten resided in England, leaving the management of their estates to Caledonian overseers, who have left little traditional reputation for polished urbanity. They have a great respect for law and justice, having sprung from communities which had developed the notion of law very markedly, vesting its exposition and authority in the chief of the state. They have the parliamentary habit: palaver, believing in reason and argument. They are dialectically disputatious, but the slave did not learn this from his Scottish taskmasters, whose only argument for him was the whip. They are profoundly religious, dominated by the sense of spiritual power. Christian

missionaries brought them a doctrine which delivered them from the formulas of their native witchcraft; which in Jamaica to-day survives merely as blackmailing quackery. They are highly courageous, personally cunning and cautious and not disposed to personal sacrifice, but if sacrifice or companionly help is demanded entirely brave and indifferent to hardship and pain. Domestically and in sexual relations their native system was patriarchal; the father was controller of the woman and children; the father under control of the tribal headman and council, in their turn under the control of the paramount chief and council. Sexual and conjugal morality was founded on established conventions of social utilitarianism. Its transgression might be a tort, but was not a crime or a sin, except where taboos against relations deemed incestuous were violated, incurring the wrath of the spiritual world. The art of agriculture for their own purposes was adequately developed. Those who were transported to the West Indies were not pastoral, but forest Negroes, and had their own arts of food production. They had a highly developed system of marketing.

Under slavery their whole social and religious government was destroyed. The whole of their conjugal and family system went with it. They were not allowed to marry. Their children were not their own; they belonged to their masters. In regard to their mode of subsistence, conditions in Jamaica were different from those which obtained at emancipation in the other principal sugar-producing colonies. The slaves fed themselves, raising provisions in "grounds" allotted to them in the mountains which adjoined or belonged to the sugar estates in the plains or vales. They owned the produce they grew and sold the surplus. They bought all but their working clothes. They built their own houses. Every Sunday there was an immense marketing traffic on the estates and in all the towns, and many slaves grew rich by selling poultry, pigs, goats, ginger, honey, fruit, basket work and other productions of their own labour, besides the yams, tannias, plantains and other vegetables which formed the main diet of most of the population.

When, therefore, during the term of apprenticeship intervening between the proclamation of freedom in 1834 and its completion in 1838, the estate managers treated the labourers placed under their legal control with inhuman oppression, in

the endeavour to force them to work at low wages, the negroes, having learnt what they might expect if they had to continue to live upon the estates, renting their houses and grounds, eagerly sought to acquire freeholds and were helped in this by ministers of the free churches and some English sympathisers. All the most capable and intelligent ex-slaves left the estates, on which, but for this pressure, they would have been quite willing to continue to work. There was no change in their habits of self-supporting industry. But the time they used to spend for their masters' profit they could now spend for their own.

From Emancipation up to the suicide of the old Jamaica Assembly in 1865 not only did the Island Government wholly abstain from giving any help or encouragement to these new settlers in aid of their economic progress, but it did all that it could to prevent the liquidation and breaking up of abandoned estates, and to compel the negroes by heavy taxation to work for wages. This policy however did not succeed in preventing the continual acquisition of land by such as could pay for it, because many smaller properties, especially coffee estates, had become so worthless that their owners were fain to sell them at any price. In this manner about 200 free villages were quickly established, and the new freed class were always on the look-out for opportunities to pick up small holdings. Moreover, though the larger landowners would not sell, their agents and many of the resident owners of decaying estates were forced to make income by the only available means: the easy expedient of letting land to the black people; and though this system was thriftless and in the long run damaging to both parties concerned, it kept the country people able to feed themselves and at any rate partially independent of wage employment. New opportunities of acquiring land were afforded when Sir John Peter Grant, after the "Jamaica Rebellion" of 1865, took in hand the forfeiture of abandoned estates in arrears for taxes.

In 1896, with a population of about 650,000, there were in Jamaica 81,934 taxed holdings of land not exceeding ten acres. By that time successive Governors, beginning with Sir Anthony Musgrave, had begun to recognise the volume and value of the unaided achievement of the small settler class, who were producing more than 70 per cent. of the value of all the Island's exports; and in 1895 under Sir Henry Blake's

initiative, the public policy of the Government, up to that date principally addressed to the support of the large estate industry, began to be modified. Blake offered Crown land in small holdings to settlers on easy terms. The road system was greatly improved and extended to enable the peasantry to get out their produce. The Island Agricultural Society was established to help them to improve their production methods.

During most of the nineteenth century the black population endured much hardship and poverty. The earlier body of settlers who left the sugar estates and bought accessible land had done well and in general were prosperous, though much tried by long periods of drought, as well as by epidemics of smallpox and cholera, to combat which there was no available medical or hospital service. But their holdings were too small to provide their children with employment and maintenance; and the next generation both deteriorated in character and found less opportunity of purchasing land. They had to rent or squat on remoter parts of the uplands; such schooling as they could get was provided entirely at their own cost or that of the missionary societies that assisted them. But towards the close of the century they began to earn money by working in Central America and a new source of wealth was arising in banana production, the fruit being grown by the peasant settlers and marketed principally by American fruit companies which energetically built up a large trade. Education and public health were being better attended to and the energy and heart of the people began to revive. Remarkable evidence was given to the West India Royal Commission of 1897 by an experienced Jamaican planter:

The people who own their own plots of land are the best labourers. Those who live on the estates are generally worthless, and too idle to look for a piece of land and cultivate it. The people who own their own land are the best sort. They are more independent but they work much better.

On the other hand the labourers who did not leave the sugar estates have ever since slavery-time remained the poorest and worst-conditioned of the rural population. Estate work in Jamaica has never been anything but injurious to the Jamaica labourer's character. It has never conduced in any sense to his civilisation. That is the unbroken testimony of local educationists and ministers of religion for the last hundred years.

With the improvement of opportunities the people resumed the progress they had been able to make during the earlier years of freedom. The official schedule of properties at its last revision showed a total of 213,395 holdings distributed among a population of 1,022,152. More than one-fifth of the inhabitants of Jamaica owned real property. There were 187,603 holdings of land of a quarter of an acre and upwards. Whilst the cultivation of half an acre of land is not sufficient, even in Jamaica, fully to provide for a family, though it goes a long way towards doing so and wage employment is not continuously necessary in addition, the properties classed as from half an acre to five acres, which numbered 108,477, yield substantial and often quite adequate incomes to more than half the families in the Island. In addition to these there were 31,038 owners of from five to fifty acres, capable of providing very comfortable independence for more than another one-sixth part of the population. I doubt whether any other civilised country in the world could show so high a proportion of freeholders among the mass of its people.

When the Jamaica slaves were told they were free they took that information seriously and regarded themselves as entitled to stay so. They had always grown their own food and they continued to grow it. If they could not buy land for the purpose they rented it, and grew coffee or anything else they could sell for spending-money. But they did not regard themselves as under any obligation to work on estates for wages, except when they wanted to do so, and to this principle they consistently clung, discerning unerringly that if they became dependent upon the estates for their right to live they would not be free men but slaves. Thomas Carlyle and other contemporaries represented them as doing no work, because the term "work" in the economic vocabulary of the period meant "labour for wages." For their own purposes they worked actively, clearing and cultivating vast areas of rocky forest, building their own dwellings, chapels and school-houses, and tramping great distances every week from the hills to the towns to market.

They were fortunate; because in Jamaica they were able to buy or rent land, and the first call on their labour, they recognised, was to feed themselves and their families. In this they maintained unimpaired the fundamental tradition of their African social economy, never having been broken in to

the habits of English workers over whom the industrial and agrarian revolutions of our own history had passed. It was not so elsewhere in the British West Indies, where, to this day, in Barbados, Antigua and St. Kitts, the sugar estate monopoly of the land remains unbroken, so that the workers have to buy their food out of the wages they can only earn from employers. Economically, in consequence, the black population are far worse off in those Islands than in Jamaica; and at the same time colour-prejudice remains exceedingly strong. When recently, in a debate on slavery, Lord Strickland, a former Governor of the Leeward Islands, startled the House of Lords by observing casually that the labourers of Antigua to-day were worse off than they would have been as slaves, and was asked to explain so Marxian a proposition, he merely uttered what would have appeared to any Jamaica negro an obvious commonplace. But I am here concerned not with the economic but with the social effect of this difference of Jamaica from other colonies. The absence of "colour-problem" or colour-bar in Jamaica is fundamentally due to the fact that the new freed people did take their declared status seriously and that the great majority of their descendants have resolutely, in the face of all their difficulties and hardships, maintained that birthright.

Moreover the new peasantry, resident principally in the mountains and not confronted corporately as a wage-working with an employing class, were not socially a proletariat, and there arose no such trouble between two organised classes as was constant all through the nineteenth century between employers and workers in more highly industrialised societies. This comparative laxity of the contact between white and black, so far from promoting a tendency to segregation, in the sense in which that ideal is contemplated in America and South Africa, has favoured and promoted a continuously progressive integration and general fusion of the racial elements of the community; because it has given greater freedom of adaptation to all sections—black, white and coloured—in all matters in which they have either common interests or no practical grounds for antagonism and aloofness. This effect has been conspicuous in many reactions. The great Banana Producers' Co-operative Association, including landowners and agents of all degrees and all racial origins, is only one example.

Moreover in Jamaica the idea of the equal rights and personal freedom of Englishmen, emphatically asserted in the great State Act of Emancipation, was exceedingly strong. It had always been so among the white colonists themselves. The temper of the Cromwellian regicides who settled the Island has persistently tinged their traditional civic philosophy. It was asserted officially in the attitude of the British Government, and was specially characteristic of the religious and educational leaders who helped the development of the new community. The Established Anglican Church, which remained for long after Emancipation encumbered by its former subservience to the plantocracy, had but little contact with them, and they were spared the applications familiar in England during the same period of the precepts of the lesser Catechism. Owing partly to these antecedents there never obtained in Jamaica anything approaching the degree of presumption of inequality and incompatibility which disgraces African mixed societies and endangers their future. The Jamaican Englishman never decayed to the Boer view of the black man.

The moral of the history of social development in Jamaica during the hundred years since emancipation, checked experimentally by comparison with that of other West Indian colonies is, beyond controversy, that if a mixed community of Europeans and Africans is to develop wholesomely, it is essential that the black people shall be left economically and industrially free; and that the first condition of this development is that they should have command of their food supply by possessing their own land, and not be deprived of it as they have largely been in South and East Africa. Granted this basis the African is fully capable of progressing, as he has done in Jamaica, to take his part in every vocation of a civilised European community. And he will never profit or be taught how to progress by being compelled to depend on wage labour on white men's plantations. That kind of contact is morally of no educational value to him; but rather the contrary, and is only useful to him as a subsidiary source of income for the satisfaction of his increasing social needs.

OLIVIER.

ARCHBISHOP DAVIDSON AND THE ENGLISH CHURCH.

"IN losing him (whenever that happens) we shall lose the wisest and best man that I know in the world. Many others have more State politics; but he had the true Christian policy: great goodness and integrity improved by long experience, and a natural sedateness and steadiness of temper and a general knowledge of men and things. Had it not pleased God to raise up such an one to steer in the stormy times that we have had for these last twenty years, the Church in all human probability must have been shipwrecked over and over." The words of this tribute, written of Archbishop Tenison a fortnight before his death by one of his chaplains at Lambeth, spring readily to the mind on reading the *Life of Archbishop Davidson* by the Bishop of Chichester, himself a whilom member of the Lambeth household.* There is indeed a remarkable and unusual aptness in the application of these words to the great Primate whose twenty-five years' rule in the seat of Augustine covered so large a part of the contemporary history of the English Church and nation. The appearance of the official record of his primacy is an historic event, which has been eagerly awaited in the widest circles of English life.

It should be said at once that anticipations will not be disappointed, and that Dr. Bell has accomplished his task almost superlatively well. He has achieved especially the essential quality of good biography, the elimination of himself and the presentation of a portrait of his subject largely in the words and through the eyes of the subject himself. Not indeed that expressions of opinion, and even criticism, on the part of the biographer are lacking; in particular his summary of the Archbishop's policy in the Prayer Book revision episode of 1927-8 affords a good example of critical appreciation. In the main the Bishop's chief contributions have been the sober dignity of style, congruous with the character of his subject, who eschewed appeals to rhetoric and oratory, and the series of mottoes placed at the head of each chapter, of which all are charming

and relevant, and some piquant or even impish. Behind the façade of the finished work lies the labour of perusal of countless documents and memoranda, public and private, of which only persons with experience of such toils will be able to take the full measure. The result is a living portrait of a real figure and a revealing account of the influence of Davidson on his times and of the ideals by which he sought to guide his conduct and policy.

The career of Randall Davidson itself is not without striking elements of romance. What could be stranger than the contrast between the disappointed young man of twenty-four, coming down from Oxford with only a third class (a failure which retained its memory of sharpness after half a century of success), hindered by ill-health from pursuing his preparation for ordination under Vaughan, settling afterwards in a Kentish curacy which seemed the prelude to the obscure life of a country vicarage, and the divine of only ten more years who had declined already three benefices (that of Maidstone twice), and two residentiary canonries, of Canterbury and Durham? Such a story might seem redolent of the pre-reform age of the eighteenth century; and the agent of the transformation was one well known to that epoch, namely admission to the archiepiscopal household of Tait as domestic chaplain, followed shortly by the more intimate relationship of son-in-law. But even stranger things were to come. On December 9th, 1882, Mr. Davidson had a first interview with Queen Victoria, the purpose of which was to communicate to Her Majesty the late Primate's opinions concerning the succession to Canterbury, and the issue of which was to install the youthful chaplain completely and intimately in the royal confidence; so that on May 9th following he received the offer of the Deanery of Windsor, and henceforth to the death of the Queen, eighteen years later, he remained her confidential adviser upon all major ecclesiastical appointments. Nor was his advice formally asked or tendered; "I never scrupled to advise her to veto nominations if they were really unsuitable or bad, and during my years of advising her the veto was exercised a great many times." Fortunately for the smooth operation of this confidence, Davidson enjoyed in equal measure the trust of the new Primate, Benson, who plied him likewise daily with papers and documents. But the responsibility placed upon

* *Randall Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury*. By G. K. A. Bell, Bishop of Chichester. Two volumes. 36s. Oxford University Press.

the shoulders of a divine of only thirty-five years was certainly unusual and heavy.

The story of the friendship between the Queen and her Dean is told by the Bishop of Chichester, largely in Davidson's own words, with fullness and with delicate restraint. To observers whose memories do not stretch back to that strangely distant and far-off age, the picture is almost as antique as if taken from the reign of Elizabeth; it possesses the charm and interest of a world before the deluge. But it should be noted that the portrait of Queen Victoria emerging from Davidson's recollections is one of strength, dignity and authority; and that the future Primate was convinced to the end of his life that the Victorian age would challenge parity with the Elizabethan, not only in national achievement, but in the force and personality of the regnant Queen. From the standpoint of Davidson the chief interest of the episode lies in the remarkable combination of tact, gravity and suavity displayed by the young Dean in so formidable a situation. From such a vantage-point his further preferment was certain; though Her Majesty was a little shocked at first that he should be willing to leave Windsor and its relationship towards herself. "The Queen wonders if the Dean is at all an ambitious man"; but, once convinced of the necessity of his advancement, she would have sent him at first remove to Winchester in 1891, had not Lord Salisbury insisted that this would provoke severe criticism and that a junior bishopric should be the first step on the bench. Davidson accordingly went to Rochester (which he chose rather than Worcester), and was translated to Winchester in 1895. In 1901 he was pressed to succeed Creighton at London, but declined despite the prophetic warning of Salisbury, "if you feel forced to decline I fear the Church may have much to suffer." Despite his removal from Windsor, Davidson retained the confidence and full consultation of the Queen; and so immersed had he become in the inner councils of the Church that during the primacy of Temple from 1896 to 1902 he felt it "the strangest of all the changes of his life to find himself out in the cold as regards the central affairs of the Church of England after nearly twenty years of closest knowledge." The hiatus, however, was brief; for amid the general approval of churchmen, lay and clerical, he was nominated to the primacy in 1903.

Both as Bishop and Archbishop Davidson stood in the long line of statesmen-prelates, a succession stretching back in England certainly to Dunstan; and his name will stand high amongst its many names of renown. In his generation the sign of this statesmanship was indeed no longer, as aforetime, the holding of office of state; but though much changed in outward form, the reality of his influence in affairs of the nation was not the less evident. His participation in the debates of the House of Lords, begun during his episcopate at Winchester, was emphasised during the quarter of a century of his primacy; and in a letter written in 1907, in reply to a taunt of Augustine Birrell that the episcopal bench had never supported a single great cause nor said a word in the cause of humanity, he enumerated the many occasions of his own intervention in Parliament on behalf of a variety of measures of social amelioration. The list is interesting as showing clearly that Davidson interpreted the social responsibilities of the episcopate in a wide and liberal manner. During the later years of his primacy he was much occupied with more purely political and constitutional issues: he played an influential and important part in the Lords' debates upon the problems of the relations of the two Houses, and the Irish question, in the years immediately before the Great War. Not the least interesting extract from his papers printed in this biography is a long memorandum setting down his considered opinion upon the constitutional issues, involving the relations between Crown and Cabinet, raised by the Parliament Act and the promise secured from the King to exercise the royal prerogative of the creation of peers in certain contingencies. During the course of the war the Archbishop was necessarily much occupied in Parliament with a wide variety of issues arising out of its prosecution; and after its conclusion he came forward again as a prominent speaker upon domestic problems, such as the perennial Irish question, and upon wider imperial questions such as the welfare of African natives. Perhaps the most spectacular intervention made by him in domestic affairs—spectacular in the sense only that it attracted the widest public and popular notice—was in relation to the General Strike of 1926.

The assiduity of his attendance at the House of Lords was recognised, by champions and critics alike, as an essential

characteristic of his primacy. It was indeed an integral part of his conception of the duties and opportunities of his office. To him it seemed not only a proper function for the Primate, but also a positive advantage to the national Church, that he should play his part on the public stage of Parliament and that he should encourage occasions of conference privately with leading statesmen. He enjoyed the confidence not only of a series of Prime Ministers but also of a remarkable number of Members of both Houses of Parliament, irrespective of party; and it was a striking, though natural consequence of his character and policy that he should have played the part of intermediary between Asquith and Bonar Law during the difficult negotiations concerning Ireland in 1914. To him such activities called for no apology. "It means a good deal in my judgment for the Church's good that the man who holds the Archbishop's position should have this kind of natural and friendly access to the men to whom is given the responsibility for the nation's affairs. It places not the Archbishop only but the Church in quite a different relation to public life in its religious and secular aspects." It is true that Davidson's absorption in public affairs provoked from Bishop Velimirovic of Serbia the puzzled comment that "his work seemed primarily in Ireland, the House of Lords, and other affairs of a public character which could get on without him; the Archbishop should remember that he stands for the eternal." But this is not the sole feature of the Church of England incomprehensible to foreign visitors, clerical and lay.

Upon the whole it cannot be doubted that the Primate's influence in political matters was of real service to both Church and State. Nor, as his intervention during the General Strike indicated, did his position and relations with ministers of state prevent his taking an independent line. In a few cases, however, his regard for the susceptibilities and difficulties of his statesmen-friends prevented him from voicing his own convictions; and unfortunately these were of vital importance. Immediately after the signing of the Armistice Professor Deissmann of Berlin addressed to Davidson through the Archbishop of Uppsala an appeal for the mobilisation of Christian opinion in the victorious countries for the making of a peace of reconciliation, not of vengeance. The Primate, scenting a political motive in the letter, replied

discouragingly. "It was a moment," observes his biographer, "when an added word of kindness might have done inestimable good." The more profound, therefore, was the responsibility resting upon him to do all he could within his own country to assist a temper of reconciliation. Instead there followed the "coupon" election of December 1918, during which, although he disapproved "of the flood of hatred and passion let loose on the hustings," he kept silence. "It was a misfortune," comments again his biographer, "that the Archbishop though entertaining these sentiments, did not proclaim them to the world." Later, in 1919, he was apprehensive about the terms of the dictated peace, and perplexed as to whether he should speak out his misgivings. "Should he, for example, attack the proposed peace terms, so far known, at Edinburgh when he was speaking at the General Assembly on the League of Nations? His friends advised against—on the ground (as Lord Robert Cecil put it to him) that nothing should be done to give the Germans a handle for not signing, with the consequent horrible continuance of the blockade." His silence here may be accounted tragic; for a lead to the forces of Christian opinion given by a leader of such renowned moderation and caution as Davidson might have been of incalculable service to the cause of true peace.

It should not be supposed that the Archbishop's commerce in affairs of state prevented his giving full attention to his ecclesiastical situation as a veritable *alterius orbis papa*. During his primacy indeed this description became not merely symbolical but realised. Not only did it fall to his lot to preside over two Lambeth Conferences, from the latter of which in 1920 there issued the momentous *Appeal to All Christian People*, but the volume and variety of business flowing into Lambeth from all branches of the Anglican Communion involved him in a truly œcumenical correspondence. Before the dividing line of the Great War he visited Canada and the United States in 1904, and was faced by the Kikuyu crisis; whilst after the cataclysm, in addition to new problems of Anglican missionary activity in Africa and elsewhere, he was brought into recurrent, intimate and official relations with the Russian Church, the Orthodox Church, and the unhappy Assyrian Church. And out of the Lambeth appeal of 1920 there proceeded a series of

conferences with representatives of the Free Churches in Great Britain, and the Malines conversations with Roman Catholic divines approved by the Papacy. To relate the story of any one of these aspects of the Archbishop's task would need more space than is available; but the mere enumeration of only a selective list of items may leave some impression of the magnitude of the labours of the Archbishop of Canterbury and of the reality of the fulfilment of the title bestowed upon Anselm.

Within the domestic sphere of the Church in England Davidson pursued throughout his primacy an unswerving course towards the preservation of its comprehensive character, and the recognition therein of the rightful place of critical scholarship in biblical and historical studies. Writing in his private diaries of the aim of his primacy in January 1917 he said: "If I were forced to put it in a single phrase, I suppose it might be described as a desire to assert in practice the thoughtful and deliberate comprehensiveness of the Church of England as contrasted with the clear-cut lines and fences of demarcation which mark the rulings of the Church of Rome and the corresponding, though quite different, rulings of Protestant sects in England, Scotland, America, and presumably Germany in the seventeenth century and since." Consequently in all the "modernist" controversies, beginning with discussion of credal subscription in 1903, continuing through the disputes of 1913-14 and those surrounding the elevation of Dr. Henson to the episcopate in 1917-18, and culminating in the further debates of 1921 and the appointment of the Doctrinal Commission, the Archbishop stood on the side of as wide a latitude of interpretation and subscription as possible, against "the rigorist bishops" led by Gore on the other side. To him the Church of England owes the great debt of the preservation of freedom of theological discussion and study, and the prevention of an Anglican reflection of the policy of the encyclical *Pascendi* of Rome. The same principles of action governed the Primate's policy in all the several Education controversies of his rule, almost the only sphere in which he scored no success, his eirenic efforts being consistently defeated by the *intransigents*.

The perennial and ubiquitous problem facing him throughout the quarter of a century of his primacy was that of

liturgy and ceremonial, and it is upon his handling of this that the verdict on the domestic aspect of his policy must depend. From the outset of his chaplaincy to Tait, through the Lincoln Judgment of Benson, and during the entire period of his own rule he was never free from this intractable problem. His biographer traces in full his reactions towards it before and after the watershed of the Enabling Act. Its culmination in the history of the Prayer Book revision projects of 1927-8 is too recent and familiar to need recapitulation; and in the rejection of these schemes the failure of his policy may seem to be writ large for him who runs to read. It is of especial importance, therefore, to emphasise the conclusion of the Bishop of Chichester that the set-back was the result, not of Davidson's own policy, but of his failure to press his policy upon the episcopate. He could never bring his whole mind to bear upon such questions, which he did not consider to be "of supreme deep-down importance"; and he regretted the absorption of "clerical interest" therein "to the detriment of wider things." Most significant of all, his personal instinct was against alteration of, or provision of an alternative Order to, the 1662 Communion Office; and he was "certain that such was the view of the overwhelming majority of English churchmen throughout the country." Upon this issue, and that of Reservation, the two crucial points upon which the project of revision was wrecked, he allowed others to take the lead and determine episcopal policy. It is perhaps the most severe criticism upon his primacy that he failed here to give an unequivocal lead and to carry his own policy in the most vital crisis of ecclesiastical affairs. Even so it is equally characteristic of him to have refused to consider the rebuff of 1927-8 as more than an episode, and certainly "not one that called for heroic measures or a drastic resignation."

In his biography the Bishop of Chichester has written not only the life story of one of the greatest of the successors of St. Augustine but also the contemporary history of the Church of England and its relationship to the nation during the last fifty years. Yet even this does not exhaust the significance of his volumes. They approach towards a prophecy of the future. Archbishop Davidson, both in personal piety and public policy, represented the typical tradition of English religion, strong in its correspondence with and reliance upon

educated lay opinion, and remembering always Arnold's dictum that the laity *are* the Church—minus the clergy. The vital issue of the near future is whether the Church of England will pursue his ideal and policy, seeking to become truly *Ecclesia Anglorum*, or whether it will become content with a sectarian conception of its character and call which will result surely in its reduction to a sectarian position. The Bishop of Chichester has done the great service of setting forth such a living portrait of his subject that through his pages Randall Davidson being dead yet speaketh. *Quis habet aurem, audiat quid Spiritus dicat ecclesiis.*

NORMAN SYKES.

ELIZABETH, EMPRESS OF AUSTRIA.

COUNT EGON CORTI'S new book* throws fresh light on a familiar theme from the correspondence between the Emperor Franz Josef and the Empress Elizabeth, of which only a part had been published; the diaries of the Archduchess Marie Valérie, Elizabeth's youngest daughter; the Reminiscences of Countess Marie Festetics, the Empress's lady-in-waiting, and those of Frau Ida von Ferenczy, her reader and confidante. The Empress was born in Bavaria, the fourth child of Duke Max and the Duchess Ludovica (daughter of King Maximilian I of Bavaria) who had seven children. It was, so to speak, by accident that she became Empress of Austria when only sixteen. Her mother and the Archduchess Sophie, mother of the youthful Emperor, were sisters. The latter's husband, the Archduke Franz Carl, the rightful heir to the Crown, had yielded to his wife's pressure and renounced the throne in favour of his son. Despite the consanguinity the two sisters agreed to unite their respective children in marriage. As a matter of fact it was Ludovica's eldest daughter, Helene, who was chosen to become Empress of Austria. But when she arrived, together with her mother and younger sister Elizabeth, at Ischl, where the young people were to become acquainted, the twenty-three-year-old Emperor fell so deeply in love with Elizabeth that he declared to his mother, without delay and with full fixity of purpose, that it was she whom he intended to make his wife, and not, as had been planned, her elder sister. If the Archduchess Sophie was not enamoured of her son's decision, it caused no important change in her own plans. The union which she desired of the Houses of Habsburg and Wittelsbach could also be achieved in this way; it was merely a matter of changing the bride.

In this manner Elizabeth became Empress of Austria, after the Pope had granted the dispensation necessitated by the near relationship of the couple. The wedding took place in Vienna with great pomp and ceremony, on April 24th, 1854. It was a love match such as is very seldom concluded in royal families; of course a one-sided one, for love existed only on Franz Josef's side. Not that Elizabeth had entered upon the

* *Elisabeth, die seltsame Frau.* By Egon Caesar Graf Corti. Salzburg, Anton Pustet, 1934.

marriage against her will; she had no aversion whatever towards Franz Josef. He was a handsome, youthful, elegant figure, the heir of one of the oldest and noblest ruling families of the earth, Emperor and Sovereign of one of the mightiest kingdoms in Europe, and—last but not least—he was as much in love with her as a young lieutenant. What girl, what princess, would have repulsed such a suitor? Was it not inevitable that she should be blinded and intoxicated by the prospective honour and splendour? All the more so as she was really still a child, for when Franz Josef came into her life she was not yet sixteen. A fortnight after the wedding she gave vent to her feelings in a poem, in which she laments that she “had forsaken the path which would have led her to liberty”; that she had gone astray “on the broad road of vanity.” “I have awakened in a dungeon,” she continues, “and my hands are in fetters.” . . . “I have awakened from a delirium, which held my spirit a prisoner, and I curse this awakening.” Her passionate young heart was filled with homesickness for the freedom of her girlhood and with a loathing for the Viennese court in which she found herself. The contrast, in truth, was all too great. At home, in the Castle of Possenhofen on the Starnberger Lake, she had lived solely for her childish hobbies, her parrots and her dogs, untrammelled by any court etiquette, rarely rebuked by her parents. And this young creature, who was very self-willed to boot, and who had grown up in complete freedom, had been transplanted overnight, so to speak, into the circles of the Viennese court, regulated and confined as it was by a thousand precepts, and amidst a host of people who were quite strange to her and whom she disliked, in the gloomy halls of the Hofburg and of the Imperial Castle of Laxenburg.

Two factors prevented her from adapting herself to the change: her wilful temperament, and her mother-in-law. The Archduchess Sophie, accustomed to the obedience of the entire Court of Vienna, even of the first man of the realm, her son, could not grasp the fact that a youthful creature—still almost a child in spite of her womanhood, and her niece into the bargain—should venture to be otherwise than she wished, and should even oppose her with sulky resistance. Thus a bitter, implacable struggle began between the two women—the imperious matron and the obstinate young wife—which was to last for years and which poisoned the lives of both, a

struggle in which both women were in the wrong. One is more inclined to impute the greater blame to the older woman; yet the younger was no less in the wrong. Sophie, as the older and more experienced, and in other respects a very clever woman, ought to have had more psychological insight. And Elizabeth ought to have realised that she was no longer the little princess, who could live solely for her whims and her hobbies, but that she had become the ruler of a great Empire with duties that she could not ignore. Had she sinned against these duties only on account of her youth and of her defiance of her mother-in-law, posterity might have granted “extenuating circumstances.” But later on, as a mature woman, she not only fulfilled her duties as ruler as little as before, but actually laid them entirely aside, and led a life that would have been inexcusable even in the childless wife of a rich private gentleman, let alone an Empress.

The birth of three children, following one another in rapid succession, made the dissension between the two women still more acute, for the Archduchess Sophie took the children away from their mother. Elizabeth extended her hatred of her mother-in-law to the whole Court, as this was under Sophie’s influence. As the latter was considered the more powerful of the two, court society adhered to her and the majority took sides against Elizabeth under the leadership of Count Grünne, the Emperor’s all-powerful General-Adjutant and Sophie’s favourite: a man who was unworthy of such a distinguished position, and who has been looked on, not incorrectly, as the evil genius of Austria in general and of the youthful Empress in particular.

We should be doing Franz Josef a grave wrong if we were to infer from his occasional slips that his love for Elizabeth had died out in the course of time or in consequence of her behaviour. He still loved her most tenderly; his heart remained untouched by chance flirtations. It would also be a mistake to assume that Elizabeth did not care for him. This is shown particularly in 1859, during the unfortunate war waged by Austria against France and Sardinia. Had she felt aversion, or even indifference, towards the Emperor, she would not have opposed his departure to the front, nor have felt so lonely and unhappy after he had left, nor have vainly implored him again and again to let her join him there.

Public opinion rightly laid the blame of the unfortunate

close of the war on the faulty leadership of the army, and, in the last resort, on the government, and public bitterness was directed against them and above all against the man who was considered the representative of the system, Count Gr  nne. The Emperor, deeply distressed by the misfortune which assumed a particularly threatening aspect in Hungary, considered it advisable to remove the favourite from his post, which he had to exchange for that of Master of the Horse, thereby losing his political influence. The blow struck not only at Gr  nne himself, but indirectly also at his patroness, the Emperor's mother, who suspected in his dismissal—and perhaps with reason—the hand of the Empress. There seems occasion to believe that it was owing to the Archduchess's influence that the relations between the Imperial couple, who seem to have drawn closer to one another in misfortune, now became so much worse that Elizabeth declared she must go away for reasons of health. This was certainly not good at this time, at least judging from appearances, for she had become very thin and was suffering from a cough. Lung trouble was feared, even consumption of the larynx was mentioned. A long stay in the South seemed imperative, and the anxious Emperor proposed Meran or Arco. Elizabeth wanted to go to Madeira. The Emperor gave his consent, but unwillingly, because he could not bring himself to refuse a wish of the wife he still loved, and also because he shrank from the responsibility of delay in view of her health.

Her journey and long absence gave rise to all kinds of conjectures. She set out in November 1860, and only returned in May 1861, via Spain and Corfu. In Spain she received an invitation from the King and Queen, as she had done six months previously from the Queen of England. The Emperor, filled with joyous emotion after such a long parting, awaited her arrival in Trieste. She looked brilliantly well. It was all the more noticeable when she again left Vienna and Austria, only a few weeks later, because her chest trouble had reappeared; a pretext which nobody would believe and which was belied by her perfectly healthy appearance. The journeys and lengthy absences gave rise to the ugliest of the rumours that were in circulation concerning the domestic life of the Imperial family. She did not return till August 1862 to Vienna, from which, except for about four weeks, she had remained absent for no less than two years.

The struggle between the two illustrious ladies now continued its course with heightened bitterness, to which the education of the little Crown Prince Rudolf added fuel in abundance. Count Gondrecourt, the tutor engaged by the Archduchess Sophie, thought he must drill the child entrusted to him with Spartan militarism, which of course did not agree with the delicate, nervous boy. So far Elizabeth was fully in the right when she raised protests against such a training. But she received no support from the Emperor, whose mentality was entirely militarist, and who thought highly of his mother's educational methods, of which Gondrecourt was the exponent. Elizabeth then resorted to extreme measures, and begged her husband to choose between Gondrecourt and herself. Alarmed by this ultimatum, and knowing his wife's eccentric ways, Franz Josef dismissed Gondrecourt from his post and yielded to Elizabeth's peremptory demand that henceforth the boy's education should be under her control. It was a decisive victory over her mother-in-law. She probably owed it in the first place to the unchanging love of her husband who, enchanted as much as ever by her beauty, was unable to refuse her anything in the long run. But since his belief in his mother's political principles was shaken, he no longer considered her an oracle in educational matters.

Henceforth Elizabeth kept the upper hand with the Emperor in the struggle between the two women. This was to be shown especially in the political sphere. If she had hitherto evinced very little interest in politics, she now set her face in the opposite direction. The reason, as is usually the case with women, was not objective, but personal; her chief motive was her mother-in-law! The latter's strongly clerical and reactionary attitude sufficed to induce Elizabeth to reject such an attitude and to flirt with liberal ideas and liberal principles; and the fact that the Archduchess was an opponent of Hungary and was hated there, stimulated her to lend Hungary her sympathies. With all the exaggeration and passion of her nature, she took sides enthusiastically with the Magyars, threw herself eagerly into the study of the language, appointed a number of aristocratic Hungarian ladies as ladies-in-waiting, and chose only Hungarians for her more intimate circle. Frau Ida von Ferenczy, who had officially been appointed to read to her, soon became her confidante. This lady knew Count Julius Andrassy, the former rebel of 1849.

She introduced him to her mistress, and the charm of the by no means handsome, but gipsy-like and adventurous-looking man also worked on Elizabeth. Andrassy became her political adviser and ardent admirer. Cleverly exploiting her sympathies for his country, he had no difficulty in winning her support for Magyar aspirations, which desired an independent position within the framework of the Monarchy. When she received a deputation of Magnates in January 1866, and spoke to them in Hungarian, she evoked a storm of applause. The applause, which was directed as much to the beautiful woman as to the friend of their nation, found still more glowing expression when she appeared in Hungary soon afterwards at her husband's side.

When, a few months later, the war broke out which Austria had to wage on two fronts—against Prussia in the north, against Italy in the south—Elizabeth again remembered, as in 1859, her duties as a wife, and remained throughout those days of misfortune at her husband's side. She was convinced, through an infatuation for Hungary, that Austria could only regain the political position that had been damaged so heavily by the lost war, if she made peace with Hungary, that is, if she agreed to all Nationalist demands made by the Magyars. She devoted all her energies to this end, and the Magyars succeeded, through their powerful intercessor, in obtaining what they would scarcely have gained without her. It was an extraordinary test of her influence over Franz Josef, for he had not forgotten the rebellion of 1848-9 and the deposition of his House by Kossuth. The result was the Dual Monarchy. Trifling causes—great results!

The *rapprochement* also found expression, after an interval of nine years, in the birth of a daughter, who received the names of Marie Valérie and became Elizabeth's favourite child, whose education she undertook entirely. But however she idolised her youngest child, there was no repressing the passion for travelling which took possession of her more relentlessly than ever and drove her restlessly from one place to another. Hand in hand with this went an equally fanatical passion for riding, which reached its crowning point in the break-neck audacity, she followed the pack; no hedge was too high, no ditch too deep. Never before had an Austrian Empress given vent abroad for weeks at a time to her wild

joy in horsemanship, surrounded by Hungarian and English cavaliers. It was only natural that these extravagances should again give rise to malicious comments, all the more since she expressed her aversion to Vienna and evaded almost every opportunity of showing herself in public, when it would have been her duty as Empress to do so. It became known, and was naturally taken amiss, that when she drove out in the capital she always held her fan before her face, so as not to be obliged to return the greetings of the people, whereas in Budapest she always bowed graciously to right and left. She felt herself to be Queen of Hungary, and no longer Empress of Austria. Public opinion would have criticised her hunting visits to England and Ireland still more sharply had the cost of them been made known. A few weeks' stay in the spring of 1876 cost 106,000 Gulden (£8,800), a visit to Ireland in 1880 even 158,000 (£13,000). Franz Josef paid these vast sums without a word of blame for his wife, who had no idea of the value of money. He could only look with displeasure on her visits to England, for he was in constant anxiety lest a serious accident should befall her. Accidents there were, but fortunately without any permanent results.

When the passion for riding came to an end, owing to the demands of her health, she threw herself with the same vehemence into the sport of walking. She undertook marches of five to seven hours, to the despair of her ladies, who could not keep up with such feats of endurance and with her tempestuous pace. The motives for these forced marches were the urge for restless movement and the fear of losing her wasp waist, which was also the reason why she ate scarcely anything. Anxiety about her health drove her from one spa to another, and her passion for travelling hunted her from country to country. As her conscience was not clear towards her husband, whom she left more and more alone with the cares of government that were almost overwhelming him, and as she was obliged to own herself that she was no support to him either as wife or as sovereign, she rejoiced when he became interested in a pretty and charming actress, Frau Katharina Schratt. She even furthered the relationship, and, during her rare visits to Vienna, drew Frau Schratt into her circle, invited her to intimate little dinners, and surprised the Emperor one day by a life-size portrait of his friend. Strange as was the relationship of these three people, public

opinion took no offence at it, and did not grudge the ageing sovereign this substitute for a domestic happiness which the Empress's manner of life had destroyed, especially as Frau Schratt never took advantage of her position, and, being full of tact and intelligence, never gave rise to painful scandals.

The Emperor was not to be granted undisturbed enjoyment of his new happiness. On January 31st, 1889, the terrible news of the Crown Prince's tragic death struck him like a flash of lightning out of an apparently cloudless sky. No one dared to tell him, and the Empress was requested to bring her husband the dreadful tidings. She herself bore the cruel blow at first with surprising composure, but later she lapsed into deep melancholy. It was a long time before she had so far recovered that she could resume her wandering life. Henceforth she remained invisible to the public; her misanthropy knew no limits. She had a villa built in Corfu, the Achilleion, a visible symbol of the passion with which she had plunged into the study of Greek antiquities. But she could not long endure the solitude of Corfu, and wandered restlessly from place to place, until at last the dagger of an Italian anarchist put an end to her broken life in Geneva in 1898, and gave her the peace she had sought in vain in her lifetime. No one felt her death more deeply than the husband who had loved her with unchanging love for more than half a century, although no one had suffered so bitterly from her hysterical extravagances.

THEODOR VON SOSNOSKY.

THE ITALIAN CORPORATIONS AT WORK.

THE first legislative act referring to the Italian corporations was introduced in 1926, but eight more years were required to put the machinery into operation. Practically every activity in the country's life had to be examined, revised and then co-ordinated on a new plane and according to a new standard which would allow the corporative machinery to work. This was the pre-corporative phase in which the State is the chief protagonist, assuming control over all essential activities and supervising their reorganisation according to the dictates of a far-reaching social plan rather than by following out any detailed programme. This plan underwent many set-backs which were due partly to *contre-temps* that could not have been foreseen and partly to antagonistic interests. The world depression was not, naturally enough, without its influence, but the initial movement has arrived at a point when a new phase can well be entered on, that, namely, of creation in which the State maintains its control, at the same time conceding the actual work of developing the system to the corporations.

The first phase can best be described as of re-equipment, of preparing and adjusting the country's economy for a higher task. The banking system was liberated from the clutches of the speculators. Some inflated industries were reduced to more reasonable proportions, and certain new enterprises were started. For this purpose semi-state financial institutions were created. Agriculture received a new impulse, and vast public works schemes enriched the country with new roads, bridges, port improvements, electrification of railways, new schools, hospitals, and so on. Special *ad hoc* bodies were empowered to undertake the rationalising of certain sections of productions and trade. For instance, the National Cotton Board and the National Rice Board operate along these lines.

All-round cuts in wages and salaries, necessitated by a heavily adverse trade balance and a policy of deflation, were to some extent offset by similar all-round cuts in rents and prices as well as by a series of temporary measures and the creation of numerous permanent institutions concerned with the health, housing, culture and economic security of the masses. Parallel to this material reorganisation, a redistribution of functions has been effected. The entire active

part of the population has been classified and drafted into trade unions, employers' associations, associations of professional men and experts. Affiliation with these bodies is not compulsory, but at the same time they represent the whole of the various trades or professions in all dealings that arise in connection with them between employers and employees. Not only do these bodies regulate the conditions of employment; they have even other more extensive functions. They form from the number of their associates a panel from which most deputies to Parliament and the majority of the delegates to the corporations and other corporative institutions are chosen. These latter deal with special branches of production and distribution and send in their turn representatives to the National Council of the Corporations which to-day handles chiefly corporative matters, but will partly replace the existing Parliament when the moment arrives to embody the various corporative institutions in a new constitution.

Italy is only now entering the true corporative phase, in which the State devolves and delegates to the producers, organised into self-governing bodies or corporations, the task of handling production, distribution, the professions and what are to-day generally defined as public services. At first glance these corporations may be thought to be much the same thing as marketing boards, consortiums, cartels, code authorities or similar bodies created in different countries for the purpose of rationalising industry and trade in the interests of the employers and owners, and without much regard to the interests of employees and the general public. The outstanding difference between bodies like the foregoing and the corporations lies in the fact that the former are established as monopolies mainly concerned with production and profits, with what is called "rationalisation" to-day. The character of the Italian corporations is not monopolistic, though each corporation controls a definite section of the country's activity. We can see this by examining two facts in particular. They are not monopolistic first because they include all producers, that is not only employers but also the workers, and also representatives of technicians, of experts and the public as consumer, and secondly because they are not private organs of any group, but public institutions responsible to the State.

It is, then, the political character and the social inspiration

behind the Italian corporations which differentiates them from bodies of an apparently similar nature existing in other countries. No responsible Italian statesman has ever claimed that the corporative system is complete, or that it has definitely solved any of the grave problems of our age. The one straightforward claim made for it is that it is trying out and testing principles, methods, means and systems which promise to be more suitable and efficient than those at present in use for the solution of identical problems.

The system is not yet complete, and there are certain problems which are waiting their turn for attention. Both enemies and partisans of the corporative system should be more careful and accurate in framing their judgments and opinions on it, whether these be in the nature of pæans of praise or strictures of condemnation. The most that can be surely claimed or denied is whether or not the corporate tendencies have a solid background. Contemporary history seems to have answered this query in the affirmative. We have seen quite recently that a series of States, great and small alike, have attempted to meet emergency situations with corporative measures; the Marketing Boards, the N.R.A., the *Ententes Obligatoires*, just introduced in France and Holland are all signs of the same corporate trend which seems to be inherent in our Power Age. To transform these emergency measures into constitutional acts or, in other words, to reduce the new trends into permanent institutions is the great task facing modern statesmen. It is known, for instance, that the Roosevelt administration is endeavouring to transform the remnants of the N.R.A. into a permanent system.

Their historical and juridical sense prevented the Italians from adopting the Russian pattern and from engaging in such futile efforts as the abolishing of private property. Their method is not a form of proletarianisation, but rather the opposite, a deproletarianisation of those classes which hitherto have had no stake in the country. This is done by creating small holdings and developing other forms of land settlement for landless peasantry, while industrial workers and experts are being made effective partners in industry by means of the corporative system and its developments. For example, beside settling peasant families on newly reclaimed territories, and making them owners of their farms, land is being found for farm labourers also in some other ways. In various

provinces the Union of Farm Labourers, together with the Farmers' Union, have been conducting for several years a careful survey of every farm. Where it was found that part of the land was badly cultivated because those individuals or families to whose care it was entrusted were not sufficient, allotments were formed from the surplus land and distributed amongst the farm labourers who hitherto worked for wages and only seasonally. The income from these allotments now supplements their wages. In one province alone about 37,000 acres were allotted during the present agricultural year to less than 10,000 agricultural labourers. This is an example of what the Italians call "corporate method." In industry this method is applied by "enabling the workers to obtain a more and more intimate knowledge of productive processes through participating in their necessary discipline" (Mussolini). A recent decision that the industries must abolish all systems of "scientific management," specifically the Bedeaux system, and are not to introduce others without trade union control, is sufficiently indicative how far corporate action has penetrated. A new form of economic civilisation is in course of formation in which the chief stress is no longer laid on individual profit; but rather on the collective interest.

The Corporation concerned with "Livestock and Fisheries," the first to meet (January 7th, 8th and 9th), has acted already in the spirit of the system, deciding on a number of measures calculated to effect an all-round improvement in the livestock situation. The corporation in question also entered the province of distribution, resolving that "the distribution of milk for human consumption and the business of milk distributing centres are to be considered as public utilities which should have no speculative character, and should not seek to make industrial profits. They must, therefore, be disciplined and managed corporatively by all the categories concerned."

These resolutions and decisions, and particularly the regulations according to which the milk business is to be reorganised as a "public utility," and as a non-profitmaking corporate institution, have been approved of at once by the Central Corporate Committee (a small co-ordinating body, in which all the corporations and trade associations are represented, together with the government departments, the Fascist party, and the National Union of Co-operative Societies), and will become law by Decree or by a vote of Parliament. Impending

constitutional reforms will establish another more direct procedure for converting the regulations issued by the corporations into laws. It is not excluded that a twofold system will be inaugurated in which the National Council of the Corporations, representing "organised interests," with a leavening of wider cultural, scientific and political bodies, will legislate in the field of production, distribution and the services and a Senate will deal with military and foreign affairs and general legislation.

The Corporation for Livestock and Fisheries is composed of forty-three members, delegated by every trade engaged in the industries coming under its jurisdiction; trade unions and employers' associations are represented by an equal number of delegates; the corporation also finds place for representatives of the association of agricultural experts, from the profession of veterinary surgeons, from the co-operative dairies, from fishermen's co-operative societies, while three members of the Fascist party represent the consumers. Officials of the government departments interested in livestock and fisheries and experts acquainted with the problems connected with these industries also take part.

There are twenty-two corporations, all of them formed on the same lines; the corporations of cereals, horticulture, flowers and fruit, wood, textile products, metallurgy and engineering, chemicals, clothing, paper and printing trades, building trades, water, gas and electricity, mining industries, glass and ceramics, insurance and credit, professions and arts, sea, air and internal land communications, theatre and tourist industry. Each corporation represents a whole cycle of production or activity, and is not based on a single commodity or a single form of service. In this way the necessity for many sub-divisions was eliminated and a comprehensive character was secured for the working efficiency of each single corporation. In special cases, however, when problems arise that interest several corporations, the latter can form an inter-corporative committee which is able to come to a common decision that has to be submitted for approval to each of the single corporations represented in the Committee.

The corporations are empowered not only to debate and decide on all immediate questions of production and distribution, but they can also draft the policy which each individual trade and the national economy as a whole should

follow. They can make plans for their own industries, restrict, increase and alter production and distribution. They are entitled to settle prices, interfere in the matter of profits, salaries and wages. Their very composition tends to create an equilibrium that respects the public interest. They are essentially regulating bodies and, as far as present legislation goes, they are not allowed to own or manage industries or enterprises themselves. Their task is to determine the methods according to which existing business shall be run, though they can also take the initiative in creating new enterprises of a corporate nature, to be run independently on behalf of the community.

A strong current of opinion and action is in formation, especially in the trade unions, the co-operative movement and the younger generation of university men which lays emphasis on this ulterior form of collective organisation. These people claim furthermore that from the corporative standpoint all activities must be considered as public, and that "the corporation is a characteristic juridical form of state organisation of social services" (Prof. Volpicelli of the University of Pisa). The corporation is, then, a state organ, exercising a state service; it is a state administrative body, incompatible with the traditional bureaucratic administration, directly governed and managed by the producers themselves in their own interest, which is indistinguishable from that of the state; the corporation tends to assimilate and absorb in its special form of juridical organisation the whole of the old state organisation. The corporations in their present phase of development represent only the first step; they are not yet absolutely self-governing bodies because their decisions still need the sanction of the bureaucratic state. As things are to-day overlapping cannot be avoided sometimes. For example, The National Institute of Social Assistance, which is managing on behalf of the state the whole sphere of social insurance, has also invaded the field of the state Health Department by organising medical assistance and by creating hospitals all over the country; its funds come from the public whom it serves; it is quite independent of any state financing or state bureaucracy; on the contrary, this Institute has loaned milliards to the state to finance public works, while it fulfils its public task with great efficiency as foreign experts have repeatedly acknowledged. It is but logical to expect

that in the process of its further development this Institute may assimilate all the functions of the State Health Department, and take the definite form of a Corporation of Public Health and Social Insurance.

It has often been stated that the Italian corporate system is not democratic, that it is run on dictatorial lines, and that the people have no direct voice in it. This is only partially true, inasmuch as the system is only in part constructed. It does not mean that the dictatorial features at present visible are really of the essence of the system, and that it will not be possible to eliminate them when the system has attained maturity. The principle of functional representation lies at the very base of the system, and there are no reasons why it should not permeate the whole institution when it is completed. In the very process of building up this system, the functional capabilities of the masses are evoked. The aim, a higher economic and cultural standard for the whole nation, is being realised through the dialectics of social creation, which substitutes for the class war a competition between organised bodies of men representing various functions; the rigid dualism or pluralism of the classes is resolved in a mobile but at the same time economically and juridically homogeneous series of hierarchical differences. A new type of society needs a new type of man, a new psychology, new ethics. Self-government of industry by all those concerned in it presupposes willing co-operation, enthusiastic understanding, a corporate consciousness and the direct participation of the masses. Otherwise it will not work.

Compared to this psychological revival, to this spread of an *affectio societatis*, the effort of erecting the material framework dwindles in importance, and recedes into the background. No régime in Italy was ever so earnestly concerned in awakening and training the functional, political and moral capabilities of the people as the present one. The régime we are considering has from the outset defined this as its fundamental task, and, conforming to the problems of our time, it seeks to realise it by enlisting the masses in the actual daily work of creation of a corporate functional democracy where the liberties of the individual and his group are defined in terms of the public functions he or they are called upon to exercise.

ODON POR.

WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT.

DURING the hundred years which have passed since the death of Wilhelm von Humboldt in 1835 the tendency of intellectual life has been towards increasing specialisation. This tendency was no doubt necessary, and without it mankind would never have solved many of the problems with which it was faced; but it has certainly robbed intellectual life of one of its most charming features. To the modern mind a statesman who translates Greek tragedies in his spare time, and learns a dozen languages in order to discover the essence of language, might not be a unique but would certainly be an exceptional phenomenon. Even in England, where there is an astonishingly high number of scholar statesmen, people might feel disinclined to take such spare-time activities too seriously. Humboldt was not only a statesman and political thinker, a philosopher and philologist, a literary critic and a connoisseur, but he had in addition to his scholarship the special attraction of a rich and amiable personality. He was the close friend of Schiller and Goethe, and his letters to his wife and friends are counted among the treasures of German literature. The influence he exerted by way of personal contact with the leading figures of the time is inestimable. Thus he was one of the exponents of that literary and intellectual revival by which Germany made up for centuries of comparative aridity, and by which it attained equal rank with English and French culture. Together with Goethe he was one of the last great "poly-histors" whom modern times have produced. The riches of his knowledge, however, were not simply stored up in his mind: he was able to use them productively so that each of his activities furthered and enriched the rest. He was convinced, as he wrote to Raumer, that the world would gain if every statesman would make a point of reading every day, like a morning service, a chapter of Demosthenes or some other classical writer—in the original.

At the time of Humboldt's birth that rich intellectual movement with which he was so closely associated had just set in. As the son of a wealthy officer of noble family he received a liberal education, and one of his tutors, Campe, familiarised him with the philosophic thought of the age. Like all young intellectuals of the period he grew up under the

influence of the Enlightenment, with Leibniz and Wolff as his models. Campe, however, brought him in touch with another thinker whose influence was to be more lasting. It was Rousseau who taught him to question the arid logic of rationalism. Campe himself had learned from Rousseau a deep love for the primitive and simple, and showed his veneration for nature unspoiled by civilisation. In this spirit Robinson Crusoe seemed to him not only a story of adventure but a literary embodiment of the programme of Rousseau. He translated the book, which owed its prodigious success in Germany to the fact that it was considered as "Rousseau-esque." Through Campe Humboldt first came under the influence of Rousseau's political and educational ideas, learning his unshakable belief in the natural power of man to develop his inner nature to the full if only he is not disturbed by outside forces. This idea expounded in *Emile* had been taken up by Pestalozzi, and influenced deeply the thought of Humboldt's generation. On the other hand he took over the philosophy of Kant, whose unswerving idealism attracted him although he never became a Kantian.

One of his first important writings bears the significant title *Ideas on an Attempt to define the Limits of the Authority of the State*. While recognising the necessity for power to be invested in the State, he approached the question from the point of view of an individualist and ascribed to its activities a very limited scope. In his opinion the State should interfere with the liberty of the subject only in so far as is absolutely necessary for his protection, undertaking only those activities which citizens cannot discharge themselves. This means in the first place that it should only concern itself with giving security and, above all, refrain from allying itself with religion or trying to influence the morals of the nation. In this treatise distrust of the State goes so far that anarchists have been able to use his arguments for their case. Humboldt, however, was far from being an anarchist, for he had too strong a belief in the necessity of a political authority. He only believed that this authority should be limited and be used to give direction to the individuals rather than to force them. As Rousseau had given a direction to education by showing its limits, Humboldt wanted to point out the way for the State by exhorting it not to interfere with the liberty of the individual. "The highest ideal for the life of human

beings in society for me would be a state in which every man develops himself according to his nature and for his own sake." Thus he summarises his ideal of the State.

To understand this ideal we must bear in mind that the political system which prevailed at the time when the *Ideen* was written was that of benevolent despotism. Under this system the suppression of individual liberty and activity had gone to the extreme, sometimes with wholesome results but very often to the detriment of the commonwealth. Reaction against such a system of tutelage was bound to arise. We must further consider that it was the time in which the middle class gained strength and needed for its economic activities, above all, liberty. Guilds and other feudal limitations of economic liberty were no longer compatible with the new spirit in trade and commerce. On the other hand men like Lessing and Herder, Wieland, Goethe and Schiller, had shown what strong forces in Germany had developed without the aid of the princes and partly in opposition to them or even, as in the case of Goethe, had assisted a prince in his work. Small wonder that amongst intellectuals a growing self-consciousness appeared which turned against the system of the absolutist state. If Humboldt therefore attacked the Enlightened Absolutism, he only gave expression to a general feeling prevailing amongst the progressively-minded circles of his age and could count on men like Fichte and Kant as allies.

Humboldt's intellectual attitude was fed from still another source. In his youth he felt himself attracted to ancient culture, and throughout life he devoted a considerable amount of his energy to its study. Like Goethe and Schiller he saw in the Greeks the people in which the process of civilisation had not destroyed the original forces of man, in which there was no discrepancy between nature and culture. In this veneration there was a great deal of romanticism, if by romanticism we understand the glorification of the past at the cost of the present. Therefore between classicism and romanticism in its proper sense there is no such fundamental difference as modern scholars have often maintained. The romanticists only substituted veneration for the medieval times for that for ancient culture, and stressed instead of objective form the forming subject.

The attitude of the classicists towards life was romantic

also in so far as they tried to escape from the political sphere altogether and saw their goal in the "cultivated individual." Thus it comes about that none of these poets and thinkers was really deeply interested in political questions, or, as in the case of Schiller, soon lost this interest. If we look at the correspondence of men like Schiller, Goethe and Humboldt we are surprised to find how little they were concerned with political issues. Unfortunately the letters which Humboldt wrote to his fiancée during his first visit to Paris have been lost, but we know how calmly he watched the revolutionary events beyond the Rhine. He regarded the revolution not as a politician but as a critic of culture, and he judged it more objectively than for instance Burke, since he recognised its social grounds. When he turned against it he did so because he saw it as the outcome of rationalism. "You cannot graft constitutions on men as branches on trees."

As his chief interest lay in intellectual problems his relation to the State always remained somewhat unsatisfactory, though he was to play an important part in the service of Prussia. His ideal was that of humanism. "The true end of Man," as he puts it, "which is prescribed not by vague and transient desire but by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a consistent whole." Freedom is the first presupposition for the attainment of this goal. This is for Humboldt not a political but an æsthetic concept. Freedom means manifoldness, the capacity of man to develop himself into a work of art. The State means crude interference with the spontaneity of the individual, which inevitably produces monotony and thus endangers culture. Just as Plato thought poets dangerous for the state, Humboldt thought the state dangerous for the artist in general.

Humboldt never published his essay on the limits of the State, though parts of it were read in periodicals. It did not appear until 1851, when it influenced Mill and Laboulaye. We do not know why he refrained from making his political opinions publicly known. He realised perhaps that the essay contained only a philosophic protest against absolutism but no positive contribution to political thought. It was the work of an idealist who sketched an ideal state only capable of realisation if all men were guided by the same lofty culture as his own. It is one of the tragedies of German history that

cultural and political life ran alongside but separate from each other like two parallel streams. This was not the case in other countries. Shakespeare was the embodiment of the Elizabethan age as Molière and Racine were representatives of France under Louis XIV. In Germany Schiller's wish that the king might unite himself with the poet was not fulfilled. Frederick the Great derided German literature, and Goethe was only the friend of a princeling.

Humboldt left the public service at the age of 24 and devoted himself to his private pursuits. He continued his studies of the ancients and concentrated his energy on philology, studying Basque and several North American languages for which his distinguished brother had furnished him with material. He returned to the service of the State only because with his growing family he could not afford a wholly private life. He went as ambassador of Prussia to Rome, where he passed the happiest years of his life. Like all educated Germans he had the traditional desire for Italy in his blood, and Rome seemed to him the city in which one was nearest ancient culture. He proved himself a skilful diplomatist and rendered valuable services, though his position at the Papal court as a Protestant was not easy.

The collapse of Prussia in 1806 moved him deeply, but only after severe struggles did he make up his mind to place his talents at the disposal of his country. Stein had recognised that Prussia could only be reorganised if its intellectual foundations were renewed, and he proposed Humboldt as the head of the education department. "They behave as if no one in Prussia could learn writing without me," he grumbled, but he accepted the offer at last. He has been blamed for this grudging attitude which was considered as selfish and lacking in patriotism, but we must remember that he realised how strange it was that it should be his task to reorganise education after denying the state any right of interfering in that sphere. He recognised, moreover, that his position was ambiguous. He was subordinated to a man who was greatly his inferior, and he rightly dreaded that difficulties would arise from this fact.

Humboldt was in control of education in Prussia for one year only, but during this year he reorganised the whole system. He took special interest in the "*Humanistische Gymnasium*," the high school with a classical bias, since he

still believed ancient culture to be the foundation of education. His greatest creation was the University of Berlin, to which he called men like Fichte and Savigny. In order to realise the significance of this achievement we must remember that Prussia had just lost a war in which she had to cede a great part of her territory and to undertake immense financial obligations. In spite of his success he felt far from happy, especially since the expected difficulties arose. When Hardenberg became Premier Humboldt went as Ambassador to Vienna. Here he had to fulfil the important diplomatic mission of bringing about a *rapprochement* between Austria and Prussia, and thus contributed to organising the forces which were to overthrow Napoleon. Again he had to face many difficulties, for Hardenberg distrusted him and discredited him by communicating over his head with the Austrian Government. Metternich went even so far as to have his private correspondence with his wife supervised. During the Vienna Congress, however, he was one of the closest collaborators of Hardenberg. He showed himself an ardent patriot and endeavoured to win for Prussia what she seemed to deserve for her share in the destruction of Napoleon and for her sufferings. Since England and Austria however desired to spare France as far as possible, he attained only a part of what he deemed necessary. After a short sojourn as Ambassador in London he finally left the service and devoted the rest of his life to his studies, above all comparative philology.

Like all who have concerned themselves with the essence of language he undertook to answer the question of its origin. Was it given by God or invented by man? This was the alternative upon which all linguistic thought had hinged. Humboldt gave a different answer. He was no more willing to accept the divinity of language than the divine origin of the state. But with the same determination he denied that languages were invented by man. In his opinion language is something organic, grown like a plant, the expression of the life of the people. It is "a true and inexplicable miracle coming from the lips of a nation and not less admirable if daily repeated amongst us and ignored as the babbling of a child."

Humboldt is a humanist, not only because he represented the wide range of human knowledge, but because man was

in the centre of his thought. He was a liberal in the best sense of the word, if we understand by it a man who is free from prejudices. He was great enough to shake off the fetters of his own caste. Like Mirabeau, by whom he was greatly influenced, he, the nobleman, the "*Junker*," turned against the prerogatives of nobility. He denounced the oppression of the Jews and demanded their emancipation. If he was mistaken in his judgment of political questions, the reason was that he thought too highly of men, in whose natural goodness he believed, like Rousseau. "Man is prone more to benevolence than to arbitrary actions." This was the touchstone of his activity. The demand of Shaftesbury that man should construct his life like a work of art had strongly impressed him. His own life indeed was like a work of art, simple yet rich, receptive and generous, the complete expression of a creative personality. Of this life he once wrote to his wife: "The living always conquers the dead and prevails and creates life and light: deeds and works perish, but merits and feelings are eternal and propagate with inconceivable energy."

To-day it is particularly expedient to remind ourselves of this personality. Humboldt, it is true, was mistaken in assigning too narrow boundaries to the activities of the state. The whole development of the social life of the nineteenth century would have been impossible but for its help, and he himself had shown what tasks it was able to perform. But he was right in his judgment of the danger which threatens liberty if the rights of individuality are neglected. The dangers which he clearly recognised, uniformity, persecution, suppression of intellectual life and threatening of culture, are close at hand. We shall do well to remember his ideal of humanity and bear in mind that only those states can last which give scope to the creativeness of their citizens.

REINHOLD ARIS.

NATIONAL WELFARE AND THE PEOPLE'S OCCUPATIONS.

THE Report which Lord Palmerston, as Home Secretary, received from the Census Office in 1854 discussed the occupations of the people in such cultured passages as these:

The Tenth Class comprises . . . persons . . . employed about animals. . . . This Tenth Class is altogether a peculiar race of men; silent, circumspective, agile, dexterous, enduring, danger-defying men, generally—but modified variously by the classes of animals which occupy them. They contain the representatives of the hunting tribes of old, when wild animals abounded, and men lived on the produce of the chase. What dignity Hercules has lost in his followers, Ceres we may hope has gained in conformity with the poet's prayer:

*"Fertilis frugum pecorisque tellus
Spiceâ donet Cerecem coronâ."*

Formerly in this country spinning was carried on extensively as a domestic occupation; and weaving, or tapestry work, was the occupation of ladies of high quality, who, after the heroic age, might have been addressed in England and Scotland as the King addressed Penelope's attendants:

*"Ye modest maids, away!
Go, with the Queen the spindle guide; or cull
(The partners of her cares) the silver wool."*

(*Odyssey* XVI)

Nothing of this sort is to be found in modern Census Reports.

Mention of the Queen is a reminder of another charming feature of early Victorian Censuses. At the top of the subdivision for those engaged in national government appears the entry: "HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN . . . I," and in its appropriate place throughout the tables this august unit is sprinkled amongst the columns of vast undistinguished figures. Perhaps the possibility of a Royal Reader was in the Registrar-General's mind when he was writing of the employment of women:

The importance of the duties of a wife is seen in the Anglo-Saxon labourer's cottage—in the clean house, the dry floor, the

healthy children and their neat clothes—the husband's comfortable meal, and the enjoyment which, under all difficulties, she manages to shed round her; and is still more strikingly displayed in higher circles. The duties of a wife, a mother, and a mistress of a family can only be efficiently performed by unremitting attention; accordingly it is found that in districts where the women are much employed from home, the children and parents perish in great numbers.

If the Reports have lost in literary value the Tables relating to occupations have improved immensely. The statistics relating to the work of the people have always been called the Occupation Tables, but the classification used was not purely occupational until the first post-war Census; it was partly occupational and partly industrial. An example will make the distinction clear: if an individual's Census form shows him to be employed in recording the wages of miners for a colliery company, an occupational classification will put him down as a clerk, but an industrial classification will assign him to the coal-mining industry. Efforts begun nearly a hundred years ago to improve the published figures at each Census culminated in 1921, when two separate sets were tabulated, one purely occupational and the other industrial. The same Tables have now been issued for the 1931 Census, and changes which have taken place in the occupational and industrial groups during the decade are presented here in support of the propositions that there is a tendency for the number of people engaged in the more essential industries to diminish proportionately to the number in less essential and luxury industries, and that there has been a similar movement from more essential to less essential occupations.

The new Census classification divides industry into twenty-two main "Orders," which are shown in the table overleaf arranged in a series with, at the top, the industry in which the personnel has most expanded, relatively, during the decade and, at the bottom, the industry in which the number employed has most decreased. The number of people employed in industry as a whole grew by 10 per cent. during the period, so that an industry in which man-power increased by less than 10 per cent. suffered, relatively, a contraction. A line across the middle of the table divides the expanding from the contracting industries.

Order	Industry	No. engaged in 1,000's 1921	No. engaged in 1,000's 1931	Percentage increase or decrease
	Total	17,178	18,853	10
20	Entertainments and Sport ...	122	180	48
13	Building, Decorating, etc. ...	726	1,021	41
15	Gas, Water, Electricity ...	163	228	41
17	Commerce and Finance ...	2,275	2,972	31
12	Paper, Printing, etc. ...	357	444	25
4	Bricks, Pottery, Glass, etc. ...	177	214	23
21	Personal Service ...	2,047	2,423	18
10	Food, Drink, Tobacco ...	541	617	14
14	Other Manufacturing ...	185	211	14
19	Professions ...	515	588	14
18	Public Admin. and Defence ...	1,336	1,478	11
5	Chemicals, etc. ...	198	217	7
16	Transport and Communication ...	1,204	1,288	7
8	Skins, Leather, Leather goods, etc. ...	80	86	6
11	Wood, Furniture, etc. ...	262	276	5
1	Fishing ...	40	41	3
7	Textiles, Textile goods, etc. ...	1,154	1,186	3
9	Clothing ...	806	833	3
6	Metals, Machines, etc. ...	2,196	2,185	—0
3	Mining and Quarrying ...	1,284	894	—7
2	Agriculture ...	1,124	1,018	—9
22	Other Industries ...	388	149	—62

With the exception of Transport and Communications all the industries which have declined are concerned with the production of goods, the greatest decrease being in Agriculture. (The contraction of "Other Industries" (Order 22) is to be regarded as not so much an industrial change as an improvement in the accuracy of the Census returns by which the figures of all other industries have benefited.) The growing industries, headed by Entertainments and Sport, include several devoted to manufacture—most prominently the Building industry, with Bricks, Pottery, Glass, and Gas, Water and Electricity, which to a great extent depend upon building, Food, Drink and Tobacco, and Paper, Printing, etc. The flourishing condition of the latter cannot be unconnected with the vast growth of Commerce and Finance, which has added about 700,000 people to its strength during the ten years. The other industries in the upper half of the table are Personal Service, the Professions, and Public Administration and Defence. The totals in the table conceal the rises and falls in the branches of each industry. Dog-racing

appears for the first time in 1931 as a separate branch of Sport. At the other end of the list, in Agriculture, only Poultry-farming and Government Forestry show gains. The Mines and Quarries employing more men are, as might be expected, mainly those which supply building materials. While the Chemical industry has declined on the whole, a few branches of it have expanded, and, since there are 700,000 more people in Commerce and Finance it is not surprising that the manufacture of Ink has required a 30 per cent. increase of man-power. The general contraction of the Textile industry is mitigated by the employment of 17,000 more people, an increase of 418 per cent., in Artificial Silk Spinning. Other notable expansions of employment are 34,000 (41 per cent.) in the production of Newspapers and Periodicals, 11,000 (302 per cent.) in Gramophones, 13,000 (257 per cent.) in Omnibus Services, and 41,000 (94 per cent.) in Hairdressing, Manicure and Chiropody. The branches of the Professional industry which have grown most are Political Associations (52 per cent.), and Accountancy (46 per cent.). The 22 main Industries are divided into about 500 of these branches, of which nearly every one shows some interesting deviation of its own, sometimes obviously accountable, but often inexplicable without special knowledge.

Turning to Occupations, which are classified in 31 main divisions, a similar table shows that 17 of them have grown relatively during the decade, while 14 have diminished. The latter are all occupations concerned with making goods or working in materials, with the exception of Public Administration and Defence, the second section of which was reduced during the period. The greatest reductions were of Workers in Precious Metals, of Manufacturers of Watches, Clocks, etc., of Workers in Mines and Quarries, of Workers in Agriculture, of Fishermen, and of Metal Workers. Transport Workers just held their own with an increase in numbers of 10 per cent. In the growing Occupations the leading position was taken by Electricians and Makers of Electrical Apparatus, followed, in order, by Workers in Chemical Processes and Makers of Paints, Oil, etc., and Builders, Bricklayers, etc. Other producers of goods who increased in number are Workers in the Treatment of Non-metalliferous Mine and Quarry Products, Makers of Bricks, etc., Workers in Wood and Furniture Makers, Makers of Paper and Cardboard, Printers

and Photographers, Painters and Decorators, and Makers of Foods, Drink and Tobacco. These changes reflect the growths of Industries shown in the table and, chiefly, the expansion of the Building industry. Otherwise, the occupations which grew during the decade are, in order, the provision of Entertainment and Sport, Commercial, Finance and Insurance Occupations (excluding clerks), Professional Occupations, Personal Service, Warehousemen, Storekeepers and Packers, and Clerks and Typists.

Whereas these occupational changes do reflect variations in the relative importance of the different industries, they do more than that. They indicate that even in the stationary industries the nature of work has altered. In 1921, out of every 1,000 persons employed in industry 569 were doing work which comes within the official categories, "Production, Repair and Maintenance" and "Others (mainly labourers)." Ten years later only 533 out of 1,000 were so employed, and the remaining 36 had been transferred to other jobs, usually clerical. Engineering Works, for example, employed fewer engineers and more clerks and, generally speaking, the number of workers who came into physical contact with the goods with which they were concerned declined. Thirty-six out of a thousand represents a transference of about 650,000 workers in the course of ten years.

The figures for one decade alone cannot be taken as proof of a tendency operating over a longer period. The statistics for 1911 are not comparable with those of 1921 without much adjustment and then only broadly. As one goes back further complicated adjustments are necessary in order to make each Census even roughly comparable with those before and after it. Every change in the classification was no doubt an improvement, but it created new difficulties for statisticians. Moreover, the material from which the Tables were compiled becomes less reliable the further back one penetrates into the nineteenth century. But inaccuracies due to this inherent, though diminishing, defect and to the inexactitude, even after adjustment, of comparisons are not of so much importance if nothing but a very broad picture is attempted. Taking, on the one hand, the occupations which may be called productive and, on the other, all the remaining occupations, comprising transport, commerce, finance, the professions, personal service, and clerical work, it is found that

in 1861 the former group was about 75 per cent. and the latter about 25 per cent. of the whole. Ten years later the productive proportion had fallen to 72 per cent. In 1881 it was 69 per cent.; in 1901 and 1911 67 per cent. Leaving a break there and beginning a new series there is a drop from 57 per cent. in 1921 to 53 per cent. in 1931.

The terms—"essential," "less essential," "luxury"—used to characterise the various industries and occupations—are relative and their use could not fail to arouse controversy if applied with close discrimination. But in this short article comment may, perhaps, be confined to statements about which there would be general agreement. Mankind supports life by eating animal and vegetable foods, the product of agriculture, which may therefore claim to be the most essential of all industries. Commerce is concerned with dealing in goods and must, generally speaking, be less essential than the industries which produce those goods. Goods can be produced and consumed without commerce, but there can be no commerce without goods. The mining and quarrying industries cannot be regarded as less essential than the manufacturing industries which depend upon their material. Buildings, of sorts, can be put up without the help of architects, but no architect can make a living unless there are building trade and other operatives to carry out his designs. By such considerations as these the question, which of two industries or occupations is the more essential, can usually be settled. Sometimes it may help to ask which of two individuals would be the more useful companion on a desert island—carpenter or cinema-operator, lawyer or doctor, chemist or tobacconist, cook or accountant.

The term "luxury" may raise more debatable questions, and it might be better to deal only in degrees of essentiality, but it seems useful to apply another word to such an industry as Entertainments and Sport, to certain branches of the manufacturing industries and even to Personal Service. For the individual woman to "have to go out to work" may be a sign of poverty, but the fact that she can find employment in Personal Service means that there is wealth in the community as a whole. The busy middle-class housewife might protest that her one maid-servant was no luxury, but her working-class sister gets through as many domestic tasks without a servant's help. Leaving that controversial case,

who would say that a vast increase of hairdressers without an equivalent increase of heads is not a sign of greater luxury?

The movement from more to less essential industries and occupations, according to the definitions suggested in the preceding paragraphs, is shown clearly enough by the Census statistics, in details where details are available, and by the broad distinction between productive and non-productive occupations. The change is, in fact, a greater one than the figures show. For example, during the decade 1921-31 the building industry and others serving it have flourished. These are essential productive industries, it may be claimed, but, as every local observer knows, many of the new buildings have been shops, banks and cinema theatres and to that extent the growth of the building industry reflects the enlargement of Commerce and Finance and Entertainments and Sport which have been characterised as less essential and luxury industries.

There are objections to be raised to the picture drawn of a continuous increase of the less essential occupations and industries at the expense of the more essential. One is that the change indicated, while admitted, is merely part of the development of world industry and trade in which this country (all the figures quoted, by the way, are for England and Wales) has allowed others to supply some of its agricultural and other needs while it has become more and more the market, the counting-house and to some extent the playground of the Empire and the world generally. This could be true, but, without offering statistics in support, the writer asserts his belief that the movement which has occurred in this country has occurred also in all others, roughly in proportion to the degree of their "advancement."

The other objection also admits the facts, but protests against any implied inference that the change is for the bad. Fewer people are employed in agriculture and, of those, fewer are actually agriculturalists, but this, it is argued, does not mean that less of mankind's essential food is grown and consumed; it means that agricultural produce is being gained at the expense of less human effort owing to the science of engineers and chemists. Throughout productive industry generally machines have displaced man-power and the release of men for the so-called non-productive industries, which, in truth, produce higher forms of intangible goods, is a sign

of the wealth arising from this development. The growth of Personal Service is an indication of a greater degree of specialisation which, by relieving from domestic labour those best fitted for higher employments makes for the greatest production of wealth. We are living in a highly developed social and industrial community to which desert island standards do not apply and, in short, the movement from more to less essential industries and occupations, as here defined, is in reality nothing but an aspect of economic progress. There may be undesirable elements in it, but we cannot set the clock back.

In fact, the clock can be set back, and is now being set back by all countries which are curtailing their international trade for the sake of economic nationalism. Nevertheless there is much truth in the above arguments, and the question really to be decided is whether the clock could not be set forward. Are the changes wholly inevitable, as a part of economic progress, and if not can the undesirable elements in them be prevented? The loss of health due to transference from field to factory is well recognised, and many people deplore a loss of a different kind which they see in the divorce of masses of people from directly productive labour. Opinions will differ as to the value of the compensations received for these losses, but, from the point of view of national welfare, it is questionable whether any compensation at all is to be gained from, for example, a great increase in the retail distributive trades unaccompanied by an equivalent growth of the manufacturing industries on which they depend.

The changes of the people's occupations need to be studied and their meaning determined. It is impossible to examine the evidence afforded by the Census statistics without wondering whether the benefits due to society as the result of industrial progress are not being dissipated to some extent in support of a growing class of people whose labours, if not definitely anti-social, seem to add nothing to the wealth of the community. Consideration of some of the occupations which have arisen and which tend to grow suggests that they are due not to any essential need of advanced industrial and trade organisation, but to the necessity for individuals, hard-pressed in an ill-organised economy, to wring a livelihood for themselves out of it. The struggle of individuals for existence seems not always to make for national welfare.

S. S. BULLOCK.

TABU AND THE JEWS.

“HE said unto Abraham, know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs,” and to-day, almost four thousand years later, the Chosen People are strangers in many lands where they remain alien, notwithstanding long generations of local-born ancestors. The Israelites ceased to be a nation when their territorial propinquity was disturbed. Exiled, they became landless inhabitants of Europe, and in this respect they may be compared with gipsies; but whereas the gipsies preserve their tribal organisation and nomadic habits, the Jews show a tendency to gravitate to towns and engage in trade—to which end they perforce adopt the speech of the people among whom they settle. Common occupation of territory and uniformity of language are two factors considered indispensable to the maintenance of social solidarity; yet in spite of all disadvantages the seed of Israel flares like Semitic poppies among the Aryan corn. Persecuted beyond human endurance, the Jews are still less prone to suicide than their persecutors. Beaten to baptism, as converts they constitute only a reproach to Christendom. “A great nation” they became in fulfilment of the Covenant made between Abraham and his God, Jehovah. “A great nation,” in the sense of their being a distinct people, they remain though denationalised and dispersed. This social invulnerability proved a puzzle for thinkers in medieval times, and a theological explanation was avidly sought. St. Bernard said: “They are a living symbol for us of the Lord’s Passion. For this they are dispersed to all lands, so that, while they pay the just penalty for so great a crime, they may be witnesses for our Redemption.” Even as late as 1741, J. J. Beck, in his treatise published at Nuremberg, took the attitude that they must be tolerated because God has tolerated them.

The nineteenth century, like an adolescent schoolboy, thought it knew all things and that it could very speedily settle any point that was obscure. It abandoned Abraham’s Jehovah in favour of science, and undertook the task of providing an answer to the “Jewish Question.” With admirable thoroughness the anthropologists set to work, for if the Jews were no longer a nation, the probabilities were in favour of their being a race that remained pure of blood. Calipers

and rules were applied to their frame; pigmentation was studied; Galton composite photographs were printed off; and every effort was made to establish the anthropometric limits of the "typical Jew." Contrary to expectation "the People of the Book" ranged from ultra-dolichocephalic to ultra-brachycephalic. In their ranks were found tall and short, dark and fair extremes; in fact, European and American Jews yielded results similar to their Gentile neighbours. The Jew averaged a little shorter in stature, a little weaker in musculature, a little lower in lung capacity; but such deficiencies were very evidently due to the stunting conditions of the ghettos, not to a racial inferiority.

Science was not to be so easily baffled. As determined to wrest from the Hebrew the secret of his being as the popes and princes had been to wrest from him his wealth, the anthropologists worked on. The "Jewish nose," sufficiently characteristic to have become a universal jest, was put to the test, with the startling and bewildering result that it proved to be as fabulous as the unicorn's horn. Only fourteen per cent. (in round figures) of Jews have aquiline "Jews' noses," and over fifty per cent. have Grecian or straight noses. Twenty-two per cent. have *retroussé* and the rest flat (negroid) noses. This discovery was very discouraging, but noses were not to be abandoned so soon. Further patient research established the fact that the Jew is inclined to possess the "flared" or "winged" nostril; yet even this could not be declared a "racial characteristic," for not all Jews are distinguished by this "nostrility," as it is termed, whilst it is particularly highly developed in many of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Asia Minor and the Caucasus. The "Jewish lip," the "Jewish eye" and the "Jewish back" all proved equally shaky foundations for a racial theory to rest upon. Jewish susceptibility to disease was investigated. Proven deficient in lung capacity, the Semite should surely be ravaged by pulmonary affections, especially phthisis. Again figures revealed the Jew to be abnormally immune: it was as rare for a son of the Covenant to die of consumption as it was for him to commit suicide. Science succeeded in discovering that there was nothing to discover, and far from solving its problem it added mystery to mystery. Instead of defining a Jewish racial type it revealed Mongoloid and Nordic Jews; Slavonic and Negroid Jews; it even went so

far as to describe Chinese Jews and Indian "black" Jews, and by the same token it was forced to admit the existence of "Jewish-looking" *pure* Mongols, Nordics, Slavs and Negroes!

All these facts are the more annoying because the veriest cockney street-boy can pick a Jew out of a crowd with little danger of ever being mistaken! Fishberg says: "... persons who are of tall stature, have blonde hair and blue eyes, straight or even snub noses, delicate lips and [are] clean shaven . . . can be pointed out as Jews. In contrast . . . one often meets persons who are short of stature and of poor physique, brunettes, who have long, hooked noses, thick lips and other 'Jewish' traits, yet everyone will say . . . that these persons are not Jews." Typically Jewish features described by Thackeray in *Codlingsby* as "Ringlets glossy and curly . . . eyes black as night . . . haughty noses bending like beaks of eagles—eager quivering nostrils" are no more typically Jewish than they are typically non-Jewish. Zangwill states the case much better. In describing a conclave of Jews he says: "... a strange phantasmagoria of faces. A small sallow Pole, with high cheek-bones; a blonde Hungarian with a flaxen moustache; a brown hatchet-faced Roumanian; a fresh-coloured Frenchman . . .; a dark Marrano-descended Dutchman; a chubby German; a fiery-eyed Russian . . .; a dusky Egyptian . . . [having] all but the nose of a Negro; a yellow-bearded Swede; a courtly Viennese lawyer . . . and one solitary Caftan Jew, with earlocks and skull cap. . . ." The foregoing might easily be the description of a gathering of national representatives, each as "Aryan" as the fiercest of Nazis—indeed, European and American Jews are as Aryan as Gentiles, for in spite of its gross modern misuse, the term has only a linguistic significance. "Aryan" people are those who speak the Indo-European group of languages, and this the Jews certainly do. Hebrew is not an Aryan tongue; but Jews do not converse in Hebrew any more than Roman Catholics chat together in Latin. There is no "Aryan" race, just as there is no "Jewish" race, for in its correct usage the term "race" refers only to inherited physical characteristics.

What then makes the Jews "strangers in a land that is not theirs" when they speak the language of that land, are imbued with the national spirit of that land, and enjoy full

rights of citizenship therein? Is it that there is unity of feeling in a common faith? Hardly; for were that the case the great European War (to mention no other) in which so many Christian nations joined, could never have commenced, much less been carried through! The Jews themselves take their separateness as a matter of course—as part of the Covenant—as natural to the “Chosen People.” The Hebraic ambivalent intellectual strength and weakness is very subtly betrayed in the answer a rabbi recently gave to an archæologist, who remarked that Mr. Woolley had unearthed an eleven-foot deposit of water-laid sand at Ur, thereby “proving” the story of the Flood to be true. “Ah,” said the rabbi, “how clever you Gentiles are becoming; you are at last believing the Bible—we have never doubted it!” In the apt reply of this erudite old man, at once so wise and so naïve, is revealed the key to the secret of the Jews’ preservation and solidarity.

There are “liberal” Jews who believe in “assimilation,” describing themselves as Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen or Dutchmen of Jewish persuasion, who conduct the ancient Hebrew synagogue service in the language of daily life. There are “national” Jews who believe in Palestine as the home of Israel, and sink their wealth in water-works, electric generating plants and mass-production orange groves, and who, furthermore, endeavour to conduct normal daily life’s conversations in “modernised” ancient Hebrew. These extremes, however, no more represent Jewish thought than, let us say, the readers of severally the *Daily Worker* and the *Blackshirt* represent English thought. The average Jew is content with his lot as a stranger in a land not his own, wherein he wishes to be left in peace to earn his living, to say his prayers (to which end he reverts to Hebrew), to keep his feasts and fasts, and to be above all an irreproachable citizen; for a Jewish legal maxim is, “The law of this land is also the law of Israel.” Investigation reveals that drunkenness and violence are crimes to which Jews seldom descend; and fraudulent bankruptcies are actually no more prevalent among them than among Gentiles engaged in the same classes of business. Facts and figures, strain them as we may, serve only to indicate that there is no physical difference between a Jew and a Gentile. Shylock expressed this in his bitter tirade: “Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands,

organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? . . . If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?” Yet, in defiance of facts and figures, a difference is suggested by even younger sciences than anthropology.

Dr. C. F. Jung in *Psychological Types* has pointed the way; Kretschmer in *Physique and Character* has blazed the trail, whilst numerous others, including the endocrinologists, have taken steps in the right direction. It is a moot point whether the mind makes the man or the man makes the mind. If a cretin, that repellent, human caricature of a pig, brainless more than imbecile, almost degenerative to the jelly-fish level, can be successfully converted into a normal human being, normal physically and mentally, by feeding with thyroid extract, then philosophers do well to pause again, and ask if the cerebral cortex and the frontal lobes of the brain are so important after all. Perhaps Moleschott’s famous dictum, “no sulphur, no thought,” was right in the main, and holds good if we substitute thyroxin for sulphur. How very greatly “thought” allied (as it seems to be) to the hormonopoietic system affects the physique may be clearly seen in its extreme activity among the insane. In cases of *dementia præcox* it is by no means infrequent for the face entirely to change. Naso-labial folds may develop deep as plough furrows on a hitherto smooth cheek, and, on the contrary, those already in existence may become totally smoothed away. Not only the face but the whole form can be affected: a tall, upright man may slowly degenerate into the intra-uterine attitude, or a slight stoop may be replaced by a vertical, catatonic spine. To-day asylum inmates are regarded as exaggerated portraits of normal types, and as such are closely studied. An efficient Mephistopheles must be thin, a Falstaff fat. The physique with its attitudes and gestures is thus accepted as the concrete shadow of the soul: hence, Jewish thinking makes the Jew, and his “Jewishness” is endorsed by the family likeness strengthened by inbreeding. Events during the last three or four decades go to confirm this; but before enumerating them we must enquire what makes “Jewish thinking,” and why is it different from “Aryan thought.”

The Jewish faith is more than a religion—it is a system of living closely allied to the tabu system of primitive people.

Tabu is a Polynesian compound word, divisible into "ta" meaning "mark," and "pu" meaning "exceedingly"; thus, "mark exceedingly" or "beware of." The tabued person, place or thing is set apart, either because it is holy and may not be defiled by human contact, or because it is unclean and may not be touched lest it defile the human being. The tabu system is found with differences here and there among primitive peoples in numerous ethnographic areas. It is considered by some authorities to be the fundamental, underlying idea of morality. The Jewish faith is essentially a moral faith. Christian morals are based on the Ten Jewish Commandments.

Professor Elliot Smith and Dr. W. J. Perry by their joint researches have made it clearly more than probable that all culture diffuses from one origin centre: it may change in transit, but is basically the same. Hence (little as the Jew will relish the comparison) "savage" culture and Jewish culture are built up on the same foundation—tabu—the essence of morality, a force more powerful to preserve than the rack, the thumbscrew and the gallows are to destroy. The Pacific and American "savages" were happy and prosperous people, highly moral and law-abiding (according to their own code), without a policeman to superintend them, until we assumed the "white man's burden" and violated their tabus.

Among the "savages" specific animals are tabu and must not be eaten. The Jews also have their dietetic laws prohibiting the use of certain creatures for food. A nice distinction must be observed, however, between animals tabued on account of their holiness, and those whose exclusion is due to an alleged uncleanness. Totemic folk believe themselves descended from, and therefore closely related to, their totem beast; in consequence they refrain from eating its flesh. The totem animal is regarded as holy (just as ancestors are holy) and is tabu; but it would be a manifest absurdity to argue that since Jews are forbidden to eat the flesh of the pig, they are, or at some prehistoric period of their development were, "men of the pig totem." This possibility is precluded because not only are the crab, the eel, and numerous other creatures considered equally "terefa" to the Jew, but people who possess a totem kill and eat of the species annually as a form of sacrifice. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that Jews

never eat pig-flesh, or any creature tabulated in Leviticus. Perpetual tabus on account of an animal's holiness certainly do exist, but in such a case the beast is regarded as an incarnation of the Deity, and is treated with respect. Although the thought of eating a holy animal would fill the people with abhorrence, there is never a suggestion of disgust. To the Jew the pig is disgusting, and its exclusion from the kosher diet is solely because the animal is regarded as unclean.

The totemic system and the tabu system often run concurrently, but they are not integral parts of each other. "Savages," whether totemic or otherwise, observe a periodic tabu on women—so does the Jew. Both totemic and non-totemic people practise the "Jewish" rite of circumcision, for the same reason that the Jews themselves perform their ritualistic operation, that is, in obedience to the commands of a God, and with no other purpose. Even the rationalisation offered by the deprivation's undeniable prophylaxis is also inadmissible. Crops are tabu and landmarks are tabu throughout the Pacific Islands. We find in Deuteronomy, "Thou shalt not remove thy neighbour's landmark"; and again, "Cursed be he that removeth his neighbour's landmark"; whilst Job, expressing the utter depravity of the people, complains:

Why, seeing times are not hidden from the Almighty,
Do they, that know him, not see his days?
Some remove the landmarks,
They violently take away flocks. . . .

The foregoing are but a few points wherein the laws of Israel and the tabu system coincide; yet that little is sufficient to indicate a common origin. The tabu system is found among the non-Aryan tribes of India, but not among the Aryan-speaking peoples of either India or Europe. The "savage" refrains from violating tabu, because he believes the consequence to be sure and speedy retribution—the vengeance of an offended deity. The Jew refrains from violating the law because of the punishment that lies in store for him: Jehovah is a jealous and a vengeful God—showing mercy only to those who keep his commandments. We find that all sorts of punishments were threatened the Israelites: "sores that will not heal . . ." (the savage expects and experiences the same thing!) and, which is

rather important, in Deuteronomy it states, "The land shall smite thee with a consumption. . . ."

We have now to examine, be it only superficially, the effect upon tabu-fearing folk when the tabu system is destroyed. Among "savages" it means extinction, because there is nothing left. Among Jews it is somewhat different, because they live the life of the land in which they dwell, in addition to their tabu life. The last three or four decades have seen the younger generation of Israel "mixing" with the Gentiles, broadmindedly eating bacon for breakfast, bread during the Passover, and slowly but surely becoming less Jewish. The physique is improved. To-day we have Jewish boxers and Jewish professional footballers, whilst the old-fashioned, orthodox Jew still considers such pursuits beneath contempt. Perhaps one agrees with the elders of Israel when it is observed that this emancipation has not improved the moral tone. It is becoming increasingly common for young Jews to be arrested for drunkenness and violence. Suicides are no longer so rare that Jewish periodicals are sure to report them; and, strangely enough, having reference to Deuteronomy, consumption is more prevalent as a result of alcoholism.

Thus by a strange contrariness we see that the anti-Semite is a friend to Israel, inasmuch that his hatred and persecution drives Jews firmly back to the Faith of their fathers, while the philo-Semite, by seeking the intimate friendship of the Jew, creates the conditions that will enable the Jew to destroy himself: it is but one short stride from a Semite to an "Aryan." No potent, disease-immune, life-loving Semitic blood needs dilution by generations of mixed marriage: that is an exploded theory, and in any case it is not the solution to the "Jewish Question." Inter-marriage has been occurring since Biblical days. Such unions produce offspring who are simply pure Caucasian—not half-castes; they may be reared as either Jewish or non-Jewish, either Semitic or "Aryan," either tabu-fearing, or tabu-immune, for in the thought *motif* alone is the difference between them.

JULIAN FRANKLYN.

THE ANTIQUITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAN.

EVER and anon our daily Press announces some "amazing" discovery of a human skull or tooth, in some cave in Galilee or in Kenia, and adds: This now proves that man must have existed so many thousand or even million years ago. But doctors seem so often to differ, and the accounts often seem so conflicting, that the plain man must wonder where now we stand. And if the plain man be, as he often feels impelled to be, an honest inquirer, he may be glad to have set before him what the lawyers call the *status quæstionis*. It is the plain man, not the expert, whom this article has in view. It is bound to seem dry to many, and it will unavoidably contain learned and unfamiliar names. But these shall be made as few as possible.

We are fortunate in that, to-day, the *odium theologicum* has largely vanished. Scientist and theologian are now agreed that they must both seek the truth and nothing but the truth. They no longer rejoice in heaving brickbats at each other's heads; and in thoughtful circles it is no longer disputed that the evolution of man has been a long process, and that his physical connection with the lower animals is quite certain. True, there are some fundamentalists, chiefly in the Southern States of America, who still keep up a hopeless guerilla warfare. No doubt they would feel insulted if told that it is an undisputed fact that savage races often firmly believe they have descended from lower animals. It is a very interesting fact all the same. But surely, devout and worthy men as they oft-times be, they might well rest content with two very important things.

1. The oft-despised and sneered-at first chapter of Genesis is now admitted, by those most competent to speak, as a quite unique document. It unfolds the creation of the universe and of our world in the way which the old Hebrew was best able to grasp, he who knew nothing of palæontology or of biology, nor wanted to know. Broadly speaking, in order of progression Genesis I is scientifically accurate. The little objections, easily picked out, would be counted of no moment either by the writer or by his Hebrew readers. But how impressive is the start: "In the beginning God"; and how grandly, with what steady progress, the story moves on—the

primeval chaos, the forming of fixed lights or stars, then of sea, then of dry land, then, first of plants and next of animals, in their order, up to man, admittedly creation's crown. And God busy all the time until "the seventh day"—no one now needs to be told that "day" to the Hebrew often means "period"—when God rested, as in this quaternary or latest geological epoch He is resting, in a very genuine sense, as any qualified judge will tell.* Boldly may we challenge any objector to tell us where, in all the annals of man, and where in the books of any other religion, an account of creation is to be found, which, for truth and purity, can for a moment be compared with this. And if it be not "inspired," as from of old it has been called, then surely here is what old-fashioned folk may well term "a miracle."

2. Darwinian evolution is now largely thrust aside. A few, like Prof. Julian Huxley, may still defiantly declare that it is not. But an impartial inquirer will soon discover that natural selection and the survival of the fittest is no longer admitted to be the chief factor in the origin and development of species. The voice of our best palæontologists tells heavily against that. More and more are our scientists feeling bound to admit that there has been and is a plan and a steady, ever-up-moving purpose in the evolution of animal life. Evolution, to-day, on the best-informed lips, does not mean No God.

Complete agreement is not yet reached. Our scientists are still wrestling hard at the precise planning out of that marvellous ladder of life which leads up to man. Already, we may safely say, there is no "missing link" of any importance. For the sake of the plain man let it here be interpolated that geologic time is now divided into Primary, Secondary, Tertiary and Quaternary or Pleistocene. No one is now much concerned about finding an ancestor for man any earlier than the very end of the Secondary. Up till then all mammals were small and unimportant. Only near the top of the Cretaceous, i.e. the latest Secondary rocks, do we find the first traces of the higher or placental mammals, little insectivores or insect-eaters. They were found a few years ago in the lonely Mongol desert of Gobi, not far from the famous dinosaurs' eggs, of which much talk was made. It is now agreed that our direct ancestor could not have been a lowly

* See for animals, Alf. R. Wallace, *Mammalia*, 1910, pp. 198 and 31, and for plants, A. C. Seward, *Plant Life*, 1931, p. 14.

marsupial or pouched animal like the opossum, but a higher or placental mammal. Dr. Broom, the South African expert, one of our highest living authorities, thinks we must begin with some primitive "menotyphlan," or mammal still blind at birth, some beast like the tree-shrew, which lived in Cretaceous days; though this beast's fossils have not yet been found.

Here it may be further explained that the Tertiary epoch is divided into Eocene ("dawn of the new life"), Oligocene, Miocene and Pliocene. Up till this epoch mammals are very rare. Then, with the very start of the Eocene or the Palæocene ("oldest Eocene"), in Montana and New Mexico and near Rheims in France, we find a great outburst of new and higher life. This is one of what are called "Nature's Expression points." For Nature, as a rule, does not advance by very slow and minute and blind changes, as the Darwinian holds, but rather by leaps or sudden advances of life or structure.* E.g. already in the Palæocene we find several species of so high a mammal as the lemur, at Fort Union, Montana, and probably others at Puerco, New Mexico. At a bound we have already reached as high as the monkey. It is still in dispute whether the lowly lemur is in our ancestral line. Dr. Broom thinks it may be; so does Canon Raven, who is quite competent to speak: "Man developed, not from a pachyderm or beast of prey, but from the weak and defenceless tarsiiids (lemurs), the pioneers of stereoscopic vision, the inquisitive monkeys and apes with their ordered, almost rational, social life."† The next step may be seen in *cænopithecus*, "common, generalised ape," whose teeth, clearly lemuroid, have been found in the German Mid-Eocene.

But a remarkable linking form, *typotherium*, "type animal," has been found a little later on. For evolutionary purposes it is a pity it has not been unearthed lower down, before the Lower Miocene, in the prolific *pyrotherium* beds of Patagonia, which also yield low-typed monkeys. *Typotherium* looks more of an ungulate or hoofed animal than a monkey, but it has, like man, a well-developed collar-bone, which hoofed animals never have. In other respects it is little modified from the very earliest of the placentals. Undoubted apes are met

* For some further proof of this salient truth see a previous article by the present writer, on "The History of the Fishes," CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, July 1932, especially p. 100.

† *Jesus and the Gospel of Love*, p. 114.

with as soon as the Lower Oligocene; while *dryopithecus*, "ape of the oak," in the French Upper Miocene, is a gibbon. But it is also something like a gorilla; and Gaudry, notable name, held that it was actually higher than any of our living anthropoid apes—the gorillas, orangs and chimpanzees. Thanks to the efforts of Dr. G. E. Pilgrim and the Indian Geological Survey, we now know of abundant remains of anthropoid apes, which lived in the Himalayan jungles in Miocene days. Their teeth show them the precursors of man; and *palæopithecus*, "old ape," from North-West India, offers a connection between the orang-outang above it and the gibbon below.

By now the air seems full of whisperings that man himself is coming. There is still debate when the branch which bore our ancestors broke off from the parent stem of the apes. Sir Arthur Keith thinks that the divergence took place as early as Miocene days. The evidence looks more in favour of the opinion of Dr. Broom, who holds that there is nothing which we can safely call human till the very end of the Pliocene or the beginning of the Pleistocene, geology's latest period. All the same Sir Arthur Keith is a very high authority; and at this moment we have perhaps no better guide than his *New Discoveries relating to the Antiquity of Man*, published in 1931. Though fresh fragments of information have been appearing since every now and then in *Nature* and *The Times*, Sir Arthur Keith's wealth of anatomical details, most carefully set out, are of highest value and very illuminating.

Yet, whenever the shoemaker leaves his last, i.e. whenever he passes from anatomy to chronology, he becomes strangely confused and contradictory. In his diagrams he places the Piltdown, Peking and Java remains—of which anon—down in the Pliocene, but in his letterpress he speaks of all three as (earliest) Pleistocene. In his diagrams and on page 35 he estimates the Pleistocene age as only 200,000 years long; but again and again in his book he puts the figure at 250,000. Then, in his first diagram, he reckons the Miocene age as lasting only 450,000 years and the Eocene only 600,000, which is absurd. Here he is plainly millions of years wrong. But the upshot is, that true man has perhaps not lived on our earth for more than a quarter of a million years, and may have arrived less than 200,000 years ago, a very moderate estimate compared with some recent bold speculations.

We shall now set out, in probable order of time, the chief examples of remains claimed as those of early man. Here we have been helpfully checked, but not wholly guided, by Sir Arthur Keith.

1. *Australopithecus*, "southern ape." This is a fossilised skull discovered near Kimberley by Prof. Dart of Witwatersrand University, South Africa. He calls it, "not an apelike man, rather a manlike ape," dating perhaps half a million years ago, early in the Pliocene; but Broom and Keith would place it a good deal later. All agree it was intermediate between ape and man. In size it was like a chimpanzee, and it could not speak. But it was one of the brainiest of all known anthropoid apes, for its brain measures 500 cubic centimetres.

2. *Pithecanthropus* ("ape-man") *erectus*. Many readers will recall the sensation caused by this discovery at Trinil, Java, in 1891-2, by Dr. E. Dubois, when it was loudly hailed as the missing link. In thick layers of volcanic tuff, lowest Pleistocene (this is the latest verdict, Dr. van Ess, 1932) Dubois found the top of a cranium, skull very thick and low-pitched, a large and humanlike molar tooth, and a thigh-bone quite straight, for erect walking, but nearly three times the weight of an average man's. We may now safely accept Keith's verdict that this animal was "humanoid," but still apelike in several features, canine teeth, etc., though probably he could speak. It would seem he must have ceased to climb among trees. It is now fairly agreed that nothing which could be called a man ever lived and hopped about in a tree. At no stage in man's embryo is his foot like an ape's. True, the Java skull had prominent brow-ridges like an ape, but the skull capacity was about 930 c.c., a very marked advance on (1). He has just reached the level of the lowest-known human brain, an Australian woman's, while the average human brain is 1,450-1,500 c.c. A Neanderthal man's skull from Gibraltar, "the most apelike he (Huxley, senior) ever beheld," measures 1,200 c.c.; while, notable gap, the gorilla averages 610, maximum 655, the chimpanzee only 290, maximum 500. Well then may Keith speak of the "essential humanity" of *pithecanthropus*; yet he was so apelike that he became an ancestor to no man now living. He had a branch to himself.

3. *Sinanthropus*, "Chinese man," from a limestone cave south-west of Peking, will be almost as old as (2), i.e. early

Pleistocene. Yet development looks rapid, for here for the first time we can say without a stammer: Behold a man! but a very early and generalised type of man. The skull top is very like *pithecanthropus*, but the bones are thicker and more tumid. The skull vault is still low, and so the brain mass has increased only a little. In one specimen it is 1,000 c.c., in another, 1,100; but this is a big advance in so short a period. The skull still has prominent brow-ridges; but this man certainly could speak; and, what is more, unlike any ape before or since, he used fire and could make "well-shaped tools" of stone and bone, and, as someone has suggested, had already a makeshift knife and fork. Prof. Davidson Black, from fossil baboon remains in China, thinks there is some reason for tracing *sinanthropus* back to the baboon. But what a gap there is between this ugly, and chiefly African, monkey and any man!

4. *Eoanthropus*, "dawn man," from Piltdown, Sussex, is also placed in the early Pleistocene, so can be little later than (2) and (3); yet the very thick brain case has a capacity 400 c.c. higher than (3). How fast man's brain grew once it started! The skull is still low and squat and the jaw apelike, but there is a good, smooth forehead with no brow-ridges, and there are modern-looking, deep sockets for the joinings of the lower jaw. This also is "a man"; "Yes," says Dr. Marett, "and an Englishman."

5. *Homo Rhodiensis*, from Broken Hill, South Africa, will be much later, though probably a good deal earlier than Neanderthal man, who dates 50,000 to 30,000 years ago. Here the brain is primitive, but the limbs are, in the main, modern. Features were "ample," and the brain capacity higher than that of some living Australian women, being nearly equal to that of the oft-cited Gibraltar (Neanderthal) skull, which is 1,200 c.c.

6. *Homo Heidelbergensis* may have been pre-Neanderthal, as his worked flints are very primitive; or he may give us one of the first relics of Neanderthal (Düsseldorf) man. His teeth are not apelike, but his chin is, and the mastication very powerful. He could speak, but perhaps not very well. Skull vault is still low and brow-ridges are still large, so he is decidedly of simian type; and he is not ancestral to modern man, who stands quite on a higher plane. Here come in recent finds at Mount Carmel, Galilee, where were got six human skeletons,

including the most perfect Neanderthal skeleton yet known, a man of thirty, with a perfect set of gleaming white teeth and with a chin, yet "a brute of a face." Beside him were found a woman of twenty-five with no chin, and a girl of three and a half years. Even Mousterian man, who succeeded the Neanderthal race, has an ape's chin and a flattened, recurved thigh. With him cave-life seems to begin, and apelike though he may be, he is aiming higher, for he is a skilled flint artist, and he has his deep, far thoughts. Already he envisages a life beyond the grave, and so buries tools and weapons with his dead.

7. *Cromagnon man*, from Perigord, South France. He belongs to the period after the Mousterian, and did not develop from Neanderthal man, who is now extinct. He is "the earliest representative of the modern type of European" (Keith)—a man tall and strong, with the top of his head beautifully arched. Perhaps no shapelier man could be found to-day. He must have been something like a nineteenth-century Tasmanian. Probably the Australian of to-day shows us modern man's generalised, ancestral type better than any other, specially in his small brain. "The Tasmanian stood nearest to *homo fossilis*, but morphologically, had progressed a very long way from *homo primigenius* and the anthropoid ape" (Prof. R. J. Berry, Melbourne). Why, the brain capacity of one Cromagnon skull is greater than the average of 125 modern Parisians'; and this man's height would be above the average, too. Cromagnon man had quite a taste for the fine arts, and his wonderful talent for drawing animal figures on his caves comes in almost with a bound.

We have now given the seven leading, early types; but two others must be mentioned. There are the *Ehringsdorfer* skull and jaws, found near Weimar, 1914-25. These must date well down in the Pleistocene; Keith even affirms there is "no great difference" in their age from that of our (1). Yet the difference in brain is enormous, for that of *australopithecus* only measured say 500 c.c., while the Weimar brain reaches 1,450! Then, the Oldeway beds of Kenia, explored in 1913 and in 1931, show *homo sapiens* very early in East Africa—how early is still contested; and they give us relics of the whole evolution of culture from the pre-Chellean period onwards. The Chellean comes in between Neanderthal man and the Mousterian. At Kanan, Kenia, Dr. L. Leakey, of

Cambridge, found a human mandible, "probably the earliest* in the world," showing a very definite chin, and a more human arrangement of the teeth than the anthropoid's. Its age is as old as (3) and (4), possibly older.

Then, "in the last Ice Age the forerunners of modern Europeans suddenly appear" (Keith), so we need not go any further. Sir Arthur Keith would not date the earliest relics of "civilised" man much before 5500 B.C., those of the Badari men in Egypt, who could already produce pottery of highest finish. So far as we yet know—fresh light is coming in every year—man's earliest civilisation must have progressed by rapid leaps and bounds. At the British Association, 1931, Sir Arthur Keith, from brain casts there exhibited, emphasised the great rapidity of man's brain growth—"the great increase of size, complexity and power." Man's brain did develop by leaps and not through natural selection. Here Keith hardly differs from Alfred R. Wallace, joint "discoverer" of Darwinism. It is well known that he flatly denied that natural selection could ever have produced man's brain. Moreover, Keith is no Lamarckian. "Whatever be the conditions or influences which give rise to exceptionally large brains, whether in ape or man, I feel certain that 'use' is not one of them. Evolution seems to bring about changes in human type from causes which are inherent in the physiology of our bodies rather than from outward causes."† Yet there is clear evidence of purely natural selection in the development of man's skeleton in Pleistocene days.

The fast-accumulating proofs of the last forty years have wrought remarkable changes in the views even of the most conservative scientists. In last generation there was no higher authority on the Pleistocene beds than Prof. Joseph Prestwich. As late as 1895,‡ he said, he inclined to believe that an "eolithic" (early Stone Age) man may have existed fully 50,000 years ago. That was his limit, and that solely on the evidence of certain flint scrapers, etc. Yea, more, for many a day the existence of man before the Ice Age, even before the third and last stage of it, was wholly denied. Little over twenty years ago Dr. G. F. Wright, no mean authority, in his *Origin and Antiquity of Man* said that the Trenton, U.S.A.,

* Prof. Boswell in *The Times*, February 8th, 1935, 18'5, thinks its age is still quite doubtful.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 138.

‡ *Nineteenth Century*, Apr., pp. 617 sq.

gravels left by the Ice Age might be 14,000 years old; and in them were man's oldest remains in America. The skull and thigh were those of a typical American Indian; and that race, he said, came from Eastern Asia, where the type must be far older. Even yet, in all America, we have no sure evidence of early man unless it be one Pleistocene skull from Punin in Ecuador.

It may perhaps be proper to add, that the age of many recently unearthed traces of early man has often been placed absurdly high. A great and sober authority like Sir W. Flinders Petrie has dated the earliest deposit of Nile mud not before say 7000 B.C., and the earliest known mummy may be almost as old, though we saw that Keith would start Egypt's civilisation even later. The earliest remains yet found in the Euphrates Valley, at Nippur and Telloh, let us take man there back to 6000 B.C., or a little earlier. The much-talked-of discoveries at Anau in North Persia Dr. S. H. Langdon sees no reason to date before 5000 B.C., and he will only say that the Sumerians, with their great prehistoric civilisation, must have entered Mesopotamia before 5000 B.C. "The original foyer," says Prof. Hall,* "may well have been Elam"; while, on the previous page he writes: "The prehistoric Elamite pottery, found at Susa and Tepe Musyan by De Morgan, is among the first ever made by man." Surely once more rapid development. Over thirty years ago Prof. Sayce declared: "Civilisation seems to spring up suddenly out of a night of darkness like Athene from the head of Zeus." He would hardly need to change his words to-day.

Does not all this confirm the suggestion of Sir Chas. Lyell, in his *Antiquity of Man*, 1863? After some speculations on the sudden appearance of individuals far above the human average, he asks if such leaps up the scale of intellect may not "have cleared at one bound the space which separated the highest stage of the unprogressive intelligence of the inferior animals from the first or lowest form of improvable reason manifested in man." These are the words as to which Chas. Darwin wrote: "a sentence at the top of page 505 makes me groan." Man, from the first, as seen in the Peking type, was a highly intelligent animal. Thus, unlike all apes and all mammals, too, except, curiously, the whale, mouse and bat, man is, and has long been, a world-wide mammal, able to

* *Cambridge Anc. Hist.*, 1923, I, 362.

adapt himself to life anywhere. And wherever we find a very degraded race to-day it is probably one which has retrograded, not a race which has never begun to develop at all.

Much of the jubilant and even braggart language of thirty or forty years ago about the Javan apeman found by Dubois, sounds to-day strangely ill-balanced and inept. Thoughtful men to-day, while fully admitting the links and resemblances between man and ape, dwell with much more of satisfaction and hope upon the even clearer differences, which demand, as many of them hold, a Divine direction. They dwell with good cheer on man's capacities and possibilities far surpassing any other animals, his marvellous reasoning powers, his unique spiritual grasp and reach. "Time is for dogs and apes, Man hath forever." Not only dogs but apes can learn to do much by carefully imitating man, their master, as nearly every zoo is now demonstrating. But, if left to itself, what more can any ape do to-day than any ape did a million years ago? Nothing. Here yawns a mighty chasm, which natural selection, even with unlimited time, could not bridge, and never will.

We may well conclude with a striking sentence from Dr. Broom, in a recent presidential address before the South African Association for the Advancement of Science: "The strange course of the history of life on the earth appears to admit of but one explanation, that it has been brought about by spiritual agencies, and that the production of man has been the chief purpose of it all."

JAMES B. JOHNSTON.

Note.—Sir A. S. Woodward's British Association address (September 9th, 1935) was given since the above was written. The chief points noteworthy are: his suggestion that ape was first modified to man to the north of India, when the upraising of the Himalayas shut off a portion of the great, warm forests of India and left the apes to develop in a more bracing climate; and the statement that the Galilee skeletons show "a remarkable mingling of the characters of Neanderthal and modern man. They seem to show us modern man in the making."

MRS. BARBAULD'S SCHOOL.

"I HATE by-roads in education," said Dr. Johnson, preferring, according to Boswell, public to private schools; and after denouncing the uselessness of making children precociously learned, he proceeded to a concrete example. "Miss—— was an instance of early cultivation, but in what did it terminate? In marrying a little Presbyterian parson, who keeps an infant boarding school, so that all her employment now is 'To suckle fools and chronicle small beer.' She tells the children, 'This is a cat, and that is a dog, with four legs and a tail; see, there! you are much better than a cat or a dog, for you can speak.'" If he himself, the Doctor added, had bestowed such an education on a daughter, and had "discovered that she thought of marrying such a fellow" he would have "sent her to the *Congress*."

By "Miss ——," whose name Boswell omitted out of delicacy, there is no doubt that Johnson was thinking of Anna Lætitia Barbauld, wife of the Reverend Rochemont Barbauld, a minister of religion with Unitarian leanings, who, with his wife, was at that time (1775) keeping a school for boys at Palgrave in Suffolk. Mrs. Barbauld, under her maiden name of Aikin, was already known to Johnson as part author, with her brother John Aikin, of miscellaneous *Pieces in Prose*, and he paid her a compliment, as Boswell elsewhere records, as a not wholly unsuccessful imitator of himself. "No, Sir; the imitators of my style have not hit it. Miss Aikin has done it the best; for she has imitated the sentiment as well as the diction." He appears to have regretted that she should have now turned schoolmistress and given to teaching what she might have given to letters.

Unquestionably Anna Lætitia Aikin (1743-1825) had been a precocious child. The daughter of John Aikin, D.D., a dissenting minister of Lowland Scottish descent, and the granddaughter, through her mother, of the Rev. John Jennings, of Kibworth Harcourt, Leicestershire, where she was born, she is reported at two years old to have "read sentences and little stories in her *wise book*, roundly, without spelling," and "in half a year more could read as well as most women." Her father was then a schoolmaster; but in 1758 he joined the staff of the famous dissenting Academy at Warrington as tutor in classics, and for the next fifteen years

Miss Aikin lived in that small society of high thinking and plain living, to receive, together with her father and her brother John, many years afterwards, the posthumous honour of having her portrait put into one of the windows in the library of the lineal present-day descendant of Warrington Academy—Manchester College, Oxford. Meanwhile, before she married, she had written the prose which attracted Johnson, and a number of poems, including one which should have been dear to the heart of Boswell—on Corsica. To-day her poetry is almost forgotten, except for one piece, "Life, I know not what thou art," which Palgrave shortened, for a reason best known to himself, for the *Golden Treasury*, but "Q" gives it in full in his Oxford anthology. Wordsworth envied the writer for it, and it bids fair to be the most enduring thing she wrote. Her *Prose Hymns for Children*, however, continued to be printed as late as the latter part of the nineteenth century, and perhaps there are families still where *Evenings at Home* are not wholly forgotten. Her brother John, however, wrote most of those pieces; *Eyes and No-Eyes*, the title of one of his contributions, is almost a proverb.

Mrs. Barbauld lived the last years of her life at Stoke Newington, and died in 1825, having known and corresponded with many of the leading men and women of letters and enlightenment of her time, including Scott, Lamb, Coleridge, Miss Edgeworth, Joanna Baillie, Dugald Stewart, Priestley; a complete list would be too long to enumerate. In 1774, after declining to set up a girls' school at Warrington, she was married; her husband, who came from French Protestant stock, had just opened his boys' school. He died in 1808, insane, drowning himself in the New River, but his wife's devotion to him was unwearying, even in personal danger, to the end.

Of the school, of which Dr. Johnson was so contemptuous, only a vague account has been preserved in the memoir, now over 100 years old, of Mrs. Barbauld compiled by her niece Lucy Aikin the historian; but further particulars about it can be obtained from papers of Mrs. Barbauld's which have never been drawn upon. They suggest that Johnson was not altogether just in his strictures. Probably he did not know exactly what the curriculum at Palgrave was; certainly he could not have known what distinguished pupils Mr. and Mrs. Barbauld were about to turn out. The school flourished, in the truest sense, for eleven years, that is until 1785, when the

Barbaulds, finding it laborious, though also profitable, gave it up, and before settling down elsewhere, made a tour of pre-revolutionary France. Mrs. Barbauld's was probably the dominant share in the management of the school, for she came of a pedagogic and didactic family, and she liked little boys though having none of her own. She had her own methods of making geography a reasonable and congenial study; her lectures on Roman history were well prepared, and she was a good classical scholar. The school, however, passed as Mr. Barbauld's, as the following rules for it, preserved in his wife's handwriting, show. They suggest anything but the infant school of Dr. Johnson's imagination:

Privileges and Duties of the Captain of Palgrave School.

The Captain shall take his place wherever he chooses at dinner and supper, and wherever the boys are assembled together he shall always have a place at the fire in the school or hall.

He shall have a right to the sitting-room above stairs.

He shall arbitrate in all disputes amongst the boys, reserving however a right of appeal to Mr. Barbauld.

If any presents of fruit, etc., are made to the school he shall divide them and claim a double share himself.

The Captain shall hold himself obliged to set a good example in the school, both in morals and diligence, to protect the younger ones from oppression, to preserve order; and as far as is in his power to prevent anything from being done which may throw dishonour on the society. It will be the Captain's business to deliver the sense of the school when any favours are to be asked of Mr. Barbauld or any other person; or when any thing is to be said which relates to the whole body.

The office of Captain will continue for one session only; he is to be chosen by a majority of votes, Mr. Barbauld always reserving to himself a negative on the candidate.

If the Captain should be guilty of falsehood, breach of trust, oppression, habitual indolence, or any other capital fault, he will be immediately degraded from his dignity.

Form of declaration for voters: I, A.B., promise on the honour of a gentleman that I will give my vote unbiassed by any motives but a serious and deliberate regard to the merits of the candidates.

Form of engagement for the Captain: I, A.B., engage on the honour of a gentleman to conduct myself in the office I am elected to in such a manner as may best promote the reputation, order, happiness and improvement of the society to which I belong.

*It is expected that the Captain be never seen without his badge at home or abroad.

There is not much evidence here of the "cat" and "dog" of Dr. Johnson, but the Barbaulds did not refrain from taking very young children, who, it may be supposed, were specially looked after. One of these infants was "Tommy Denman," who came to Palgrave when he was three and a half years old, and stayed until he went to Eton; he became the well-known Lord Chief Justice, and always retained grateful recollections of Mrs. Barbauld's character and teaching. Other boys who rose to eminence were William Taylor, of Norwich, the German scholar, who was a lifelong friend of Mrs. Barbauld's family; Dr. Sayers, the Norwich antiquary, and Sir William Gell. By a piece of good fortune the names of many other pupils of the Barbaulds have been preserved. There survives in manuscript a specimen of a "weekly chronicle" which Mrs. Barbauld compiled for the amusement of the school; consisting of four written pages, it contains pieces of verse, a set of bout-rimés to be filled in by the next week, and "prose essays, letters, etc." Under this last heading is tabulated a list of words or expressions meant to designate the name of a boy: the names, which have been added in pencil, may perhaps be taken as a rough indication of how many boys there were in the school. Thus against "a fen" is pencilled the name of Marsh; against "the food for horses and what has a guardian," Hayward; "all these met at a grave and what is thrown over it," i.e. Palgrave. Other names are Mason, Says, Scott, Wright, Denman (a man behind a cave), Cotton, Badeley, Page, Merewether (a sheep and nothing else), King, Coldham, Bunney, Moore, Butcher, Hunter, Dyson (hang yourself child), Dawson and Upton. The pencil in four or five other instances cannot now be read.

Who were these boys, one wonders, and what became of them? Some of their names appear again in a manuscript playbill of Rowe's *Tamerlane* to be presented "by the young gentlemen of Palgrave School Friday the 26th of May" (the year is not given). From the manuscript it appears that the *dramatis personæ* were: Mr. Steele, *Tamerlane*; G. Coldham, *Bajazet*; Cockell, *Axalla*; Scott, *Prince of Tanais*; H. Elsdén, *Omar*; Firth, *Mirvan*; J. Dyson, *Zama*; Mounsey, *Haly*; E. Dyson, *Dervise*; Bunbury, *Selima*. Before the play Mr. Cholwick was to give "part of Young's paraphrase of Job"; Lewis, "A song by Marloe"; Thompson,

"A Fable of Dodsley"; W. Coldham, "Part of Young's Paraphrase of Job"; and Douglas, "Ode to Fear by Collins." The "first interlude" was to be "scene out of Foot's *Commissary*"; Mr. Lowndes, Zachary Fungus; Mr. Baker, Isaac Fungus; Mr. Mounsey, Mrs. Mechlin; Mr. Isaacson, Gruel. The second Interlude was to be "*L'Allegro* by Milton," Mr. Aikin (Mrs. Barbauld's brother). Third Interlude—Pope's Third Pastoral, Scott junior and Jeffery. Fourth Interlude—Harpagon's Soliloquy by Molière, Mr. Elsdén. Fifth Interlude—A Scene of Steele's *Tender Husband*: Tipkin, Mr. Say senior; Sir Harry Gubbins, Wakker; Humphry Gubbins, Say junior. Sixth Interlude—Virgil's Pollio, Mr. Partridge. After the Play—A scene out of the first part of *Henry IV* by Shakespeare, Prince Henry, Mr. Marsh; Sir John Falstaff, Purdie. For this play Mrs. Barbauld records that she is making "paper vandykes" and "trimming up" the boys' hats "with feathers." All this, one feels, would have greatly surprised Johnson, as happening in a Presbyterian infant school and perhaps made him revise his judgment. Presumably the names with "Mr." in front of them are not those of boys. On another occasion a little masque was given, of which the parts, an ingenious blend of *Comus* and Shakespeare, with possibly a touch of Mrs. Barbauld herself, are extant. Carter, Coldham, Firth, Purdie, Kerrison and Cotterel appear as the names of the performers. In September 1781 *Comus* was given at Palgrave, with a special prologue spoken by Miss Carter.

Another glimpse of the school can be obtained from *A School Dialogue*, a clever imitation of a Virgilian pastoral, written by Mrs. Barbauld. Three boys, William, Edward and Harry, are the speakers; they hint at escapades to the nearest town when the master was out, and one of them confesses to a flame, Anna by name. Her praise is sung in a passage which recalls with a slight difference, another in *Pickwick*, where Master Bardell's marbles are described. "Alley tors or commoneys" Mr. Serjeant Buzfuz called them, "both of which I understand to be a particular species of marbles much prized by the youth of this town."

"As far as alleys beyond taws we prize
Or venison pasty ranks above school pies,
As much as peaches beyond apples please,
Or Parmesan excels a Suffolk cheese;

Or Palgrave donkeys lag behind a steed,—
So far do Anna's charms all other charms exceed."

For tracing "Anna's cypher" in candle-smoke on the whitewashed ceiling near his bed this scholar is warned by his interlocutor of "fines and jobations," whenever "our mistress spies the sullied wall." Electric light has now finally abolished this juvenile practice, but a mention of it in Oxford colleges occurs in *Verdant Green*.

A gay and social place, then, was Palgrave in Mrs. Barbauld's day, and it is plain that her school contributed to the amenities of the neighbourhood. Johnson need not have lamented this incident in "Miss ——'s career," for there is other evidence beside that of some of her Palgrave pupils to show what a good teacher Mrs. Barbauld was, and that her practical experience of boys stood her in good stead afterwards. James Martineau, though born later than the Palgrave period, was greatly impressed by her in his youth; and to the end of her life she was drawn to young people. The last surviving person to have remembered her was probably Henry Reeve, the journalist and diarist, who read with her as a little boy and died as late as 1895.

C. W. BRODRIBB.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

"SANCTIONS" ON PAPER.

IT was on October 7th that the League of Nations decided to apply sanctions against Italy. The first effect was to cause a state of diplomatic tension between Paris and London and of Italo-British naval tension in the Mediterranean. In both its effects the unpleasantness reached its climax on October 18th, when the French vied with the Italian Press in expressions of indignation against Great Britain. It was suddenly deflated on the evening of that day as a result of certain diplomatic exchanges that were conducted through the normal ambassadorial channels between the three capitals. In some ways the old secret diplomacy is a more pacific instrument than the new open diplomacy. In open diplomacy the vulgar people shout loudest and are heard furthest. The October picture of British enthusiasts clamouring for war upon Italy, and both French and Italian enthusiasts clamouring for vengeance upon Great Britain, was a fair if depressing commentary upon the diplomatic method deriving from Geneva.

The trouble arose from Mr. Eden's pursuit of Article 16 of the Covenant. It had already been decided to forbid the supply of arms and munitions to Italy and to allow them for Abyssinia. The Financial Subcommittee on October 14th drew up a scheme for the refusal of credits to Italy. On October 16th Mr. Eden proposed that member states should refuse to accept Italian exports. Italian indignation thereupon reaching boiling-point, and French reluctance to participate reached zero. French opinion was openly accusing Great Britain of hostile purposes against Italy. British official opinion descended to the device of accusing the French Press of responsibility for falsely inciting Italy against Great Britain, an accusation which hurt many level-headed Frenchmen, who could argue and did argue that the French Press had merely quoted what British newspaper correspondents at Geneva had been telegraphing about Italy. It was in those ugly circumstances that the ambassadors in their privacy exerted themselves. Their concern was nothing less crude than the danger of naval war in the Mediterranean. It was on October 14th that Sir George Clerk, on instructions, had asked

M. Laval for a more specific assurance of French naval support for Great Britain in the event of a Mediterranean clash between Italian and British ships. The French answer was delayed for the only reason that such a clash seemed all too possible. Paris suggested that what was more urgent than a French commitment in the sense desired was an attempt to deflate the temper that had created the emergency; that to such an end Great Britain should remove ships from the Mediterranean in return for Italy's removing troops from Libya. On October 17th Sir Eric Drummond reported from Rome such a state of Italian emotion against Great Britain that the British Government perversely decided that the argument pointed, not to a removal of ships, but to their retention. On the following morning, however, he had an interview with Signor Mussolini, which led to the issue of a reassuring *communiqué* from Rome.

A great change at once resulted. What happened simply was that London assured both Paris and Rome that the British Government had no intention either of economically "blockading" Italy or of engaging in "military" sanctions against her. Paris assured both London and Rome that she for her part entertained neither of those intentions. Rome assured London that Italy had no intention, no interest and no desire, to attack British ships in the Mediterranean, or British territory in North Africa. The tension was relieved. Paris promptly (October 18th) conveyed to London its answer to the question put by Sir George Clerk four days before, and the answer was a clear "yes," inspired by the confidence that the answer would now have none but a platonic value. Fortunately the so-called Co-ordinating Committee at Geneva had adjourned till October 31st, when its resumption would have for its object the fixing of the date when the economic sanctions so far agreed would come into force. As the League's influence was suspended, the ambassadors took the opportunity to replace with courtesy the insults that had been so bitterly bandied about. Their theory was that not force, but persuasion, was the fitting instrument of pacific diplomacy. Signor Mussolini himself took the opportunity to transmit to Paris, and Paris passed on to London, an informal and tentative suggestion about terms of peace. When Signor Mussolini first made the suggestion, and he made it within twenty-four hours of the outbreak of the war, the

British Government was disinclined to listen in any other atmosphere than that of Geneva. On the new occasion that government was more broadminded and the discussion of peace terms duly began.

The chief embarrassment was the limelight that was thrown upon the matter from all sides. Delicate matters are best discussed in the spirit of confidential privacy. Therein lies still another of the Geneva paradoxes. When the first version of Signor Mussolini's suggestion was published in Paris (October 24th)—the day on which M. Laval communicated it to Sir George Clerk—the Quai d'Orsay promptly disowned it, for the transparent reason that the bid for peace might be jeopardised if tentative and elastic suggestions were blazed abroad as precise and rigid "terms." What Signor Mussolini suggested was that Geneva's proposals be applied only to the pure Amharic regions; that Tigré be declared independent; that a League mandate be created for the other non-Amharic regions and that Abyssinia be disarmed. The problem he thereby launched was how the Committee of Five's offer could be harmonised with Italy's claims.

The brighter prospect was blurred the moment the Co-ordinating or "Sanctions" Committee resumed its work at Geneva. Those people of a sanctionist mentality, of whom there were many in British official quarters, were deliberately concerned "to put Geneva back into the picture." Mr. Maurice Peterson, the Foreign Office expert on Abyssinia, went to Paris to gather both Signor Mussolini's and M. Laval's suggestions. For M. Laval, seeing that Signor Mussolini's suggestions were not immediately acceptable, made a counter-proposal of his own, if for no other purpose than to keep the pacific diplomacy in action. What the British Government did was to reject both the Mussolini and the Laval proposals and to announce (October 29th) that Sir Samuel Hoare as well as Mr. Anthony Eden would go to Geneva for the sanctionist meeting of October 31st. Yet Sir Samuel when he reached Geneva proved himself to be wise enough to engage in extra-League private conversations with M. Laval and Baron Aloisi, on the probable pretext that if and when the chance came for peace it was just as well to have the "yardstick" ready. Why any pretext should be necessary for pursuing peace by peaceful means, by contrast with the warlike methods now pursued by the League of Nations,

would be hard to understand, apart from the unfortunate history of the part played by the British Government in this matter.

None the less there are certain implications of British policy which are bound to have lasting effects in other aspects of European high diplomacy. German, French and Central European opinion alike recognise that the British Government is now committed to an active support of League sanctionist principles, "and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression" (as Sir Samuel Hoare reiterated in his Note of September 30th to France). Dr. Beneš, who has a way of hitting a nail on the head, gave one of his excellent periodic surveys to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czechoslovak Parliament on November 5th. He diagnosed Sir Samuel Hoare's pronouncements as "a considerable change in British policy as hitherto pursued," and in particular extracted from them as the three cardinal ideas of future British policy: "the League of Nations, international collaboration in the protection of the minor states, and universal peace for all through collective co-operation." It is now an article of faith throughout Europe that if Austria or Memel are attacked by Germany, the British army, navy and air force will be automatically ranged against Germany.

THE GENEVA PROTOCOL.

The application of sanctions against Italy was in fact though not in form a first exercise of the famous principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1924. The abortive draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 and the divergencies of view it opened out were directly responsible for the resolution which was passed by the Fifth Assembly on September 6th, 1924, on the joint proposal of M. Herriot and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain. The resolution led to the formation of a Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The central purpose of that Protocol was to define the sanctions, more vaguely prescribed by the League Covenant, which should be applied against an aggressor, and to emphasise the obligation of members of the League to take their part in the application of those sanctions. One of the prescriptions of paragraph 6 of Article 4 of the

Protocol, for instance, read thus: "Should a State in disregard of the above undertakings resort to war, the sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant, interpreted in the manner indicated in the present Protocol, shall immediately become applicable to it." Article 10 of the Protocol conferred the "rights of a belligerent" upon a state applying sanctions against an aggressor.

Speaking in the Assembly debate Lord Parmoor said that the British delegation was "prepared unhesitatingly and with all the influence at its command, to recommend to the British Government the acceptance for signature and ratification of the proposed Protocol." He boldly faced the implication of that undertaking in these words: "I do not shut my eyes to the fact that, although the motive of action may be assistance to the victim, it may not be possible to give this assistance without creating a state of war as against the aggressor." But the Labour Government of 1924 was swept out of office before it could commit the country to the Protocol. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was succeeded at the Foreign Office by Sir Austen Chamberlain, who on March 12th, 1925, explained to the Council of the League of Nations sitting at Geneva the reasons why His Majesty's new Government could not accept the Protocol. What he said then neatly and adequately puts the case against the policy adopted this summer by his very political friends. It is of some historic interest that within ten years a political party in office (for it is fair enough to regard the National Government as in essence a Conservative Government) has adopted two diametrically opposite views of the same thing. Alas! when Sir Samuel Hoare spoke about sanctions this summer an election was imminent, and the British public happens to have decided views about the League of Nations, right or wrong.

When Sir Austen Chamberlain spoke about the same thing in 1925 the election was just behind him, instead of just ahead. Hence perhaps Sir Austen's greater wisdom. Three passages only of his statement need be recalled: (1) "As all the world is aware the League of Nations in its present shape is not the League designed by the framers of the Covenant. They no doubt contemplated, and as far as they could, provided against, the difficulties that might arise from the non-inclusion of a certain number of states within the circle of League membership. But they never supposed that among these

states would be found so many of the most powerful nations in the world, least of all did they foresee that one of them would be the United States of America." (2) "The 'economic sanction,' if simultaneously directed by all the world against a state which is not itself economically self-sufficing would be a weapon of incalculable power. This, or something not very different from this, was the weapon originally devised by the authors of the Covenant. To them it appeared to be not only bloodless, but cheap, effective and easy to use, in the most improbable event of its use being necessary. But all this is changed by the mere existence of powerful economic communities outside the limits of the League. It might force trade into unaccustomed channels, but it could hardly stop it; and though the offending state would no doubt suffer, there is no presumption that it would be crushed, or even that it would suffer most." (3) "The fresh emphasis laid upon sanctions; the new occasions discovered for their employment; the elaboration of military procedure, insensibly suggest the idea that the vital business of the League is not so much to promote friendly co-operation and reasoned harmony in the management of international affairs, as to preserve peace by organising war, and (it may be) war on the largest scale. . . . It is not wholesome for the ordinary man to be always brooding over the possibility of some severe surgical operation; nor is it wise for societies to pursue a similar course. It is more likely to hasten the dreaded consummation than to hinder it. And it certainly seems to His Majesty's Government that anything which fosters the idea that the main business of the League is with war rather than with peace, is likely to weaken it in its fundamental tasks of diminishing the causes of war."

It is refreshing in 1935 to read what Sir Austen said ten years ago.

THE NAVAL CONFERENCE.

On December 6th the great Naval Conference is to begin in London: great, in the sense that its object will be none other than to discover an alternative to the expiring Washington treaty. The need of such an alternative results from the fact that on December 29th, 1934, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington visited the State Department and announced

the intention of the Japanese Government to terminate the Washington Treaty of February 6th, 1922, with the result that the treaty would "cease to be in force after December 31st, 1936." Such denunciation had been expected.

During the summer and autumn of last year an attempt was made, on British initiative, to formulate an agreed basis for the inevitable new treaty: but the attempt broke down on Japan's insistence on an equality of ratio with the United States and the British Empire. When therefore Japan at the end of the year formally denounced the treaty, she issued an official statement of her reasons for doing so. She therein explained that "the present step taken by the Government is only a logical outcome of our fundamental policy, which aims at the conclusion of another pact to supersede the Washington Treaty. . . . Japan endeavours to promote the cause of peace by establishing the principle of non-menace and non-aggression through the suppression or drastic reduction of the offensive weapons." The Japanese reason given for rejecting a continuance of the Washington Treaty was the contention that that treaty "not only permits the retention of the offensive arms, but admits disparity in naval strength through the adoption of a ratio system. Moreover the allocation of an inferior ratio, so detrimental to our national prestige, is bound to remain a source of permanent and profound discontent to our people." The statement, having thus expressed the Japanese objections to the Washington Treaty, went on to suggest an alternative set of principles best calculated, according to Japanese thought, to serve the cause of disarmament and of security for every Power concerned. Three principles were enunciated: (1) that the new treaty should rest not upon any ratio principle, but upon an agreed common upper limit, (2) that the limit be fixed as low as possible, (3) that defensive arms be adequately provided, but offensive arms be totally abolished or drastically reduced.

The governments primarily interested in the conference are the United States, the British Empire, Japan, France and Italy. But it is inevitable that Germany will be invited to take part in the later stages. She is not a party to the Washington or London treaties, but is invested with an even juridical status by the Anglo-German naval agreement concluded in the spring of the present year. By that agreement

the British Government made commitments which it cannot ignore in the new treaty now due.

It was at the end of May of last year that the British Government invited Washington, Tokyo, Paris and Rome to take part in a series of preliminary bilateral consultations through the diplomatic channels on questions of procedure and other technical matters. When the consultations began, they of course went beyond their technical agenda and plunged into questions of high policy. They began in June of last year. They continued intermittently to the late autumn, but never reached the stage of seriously embracing either France or Italy, because the three Powers primarily interested, the United States, the British Empire and Japan, themselves never approached an agreement in principle.

The interesting thing is that the Washington Treaty of 1922 constitutes the only achievement that has been reached in the whole field of armaments limitation as attempted since the war. In 1922, as in 1935, one of the main problems was that while the United States was a simply western, and Japan a simply eastern, Power, the British Empire was both. In 1922 the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was still in force, approved by Australia, opposed by Canada, for obvious reasons. At that time British policy was coloured by the notion of fair play for Japan, a notion which in 1935 has become unnecessary. While therefore in the preliminary London conversations of last year the British spokesmen were still concerned about all legitimate satisfaction for Japanese ambitions in the Far East, they rejected the Japanese claim to a position of special responsibility in that quarter, and agreed with the United States in rejecting the Japanese claim for equality in naval strength. The British problem at the new conference will be all the more difficult because Britain is not merely both an eastern and a western naval Power, but also a European. Both the United States and Japan can and do ignore Europe. Britain cannot. Moreover, she has this very year become the more implicated in Europe both by the conclusion of the naval agreement with Germany and by the "sanctions" policy pursued at Geneva.

The post-war history of navies in their diplomatic aspect presents many oddities. On February 6th, 1922, seven treaties were signed. The first was a Five-Power Naval treaty (the parties being the British Empire, the United States, France,

Italy and Japan) which provided for the limitation of naval armaments and of the British, American and Japanese fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. The second, signed by the same five Powers, regulated the use of submarines and poisonous gases in war. Those treaties were designed to remain in force till December 31st, 1936, but a provision was inserted to the effect that in view of possible technical or scientific developments, the United States, after consultation with the other contracting parties, should arrange after eight years for a conference of all those parties to consider what changes, if any, might be necessary to meet such developments.

The provisions of the Washington Treaty were mainly concerned with capital ships. Capital ships were defined as warships, other than aircraft carriers, whose displacement exceeded 10,000 tons, and whose gun calibre exceeded eight inches; aircraft carriers being defined as warships with a displacement of less than 10,000 tons, designed for the specific and only purpose of carrying aircraft. The treaty provision was that the United States and the British Empire should have a total displacement in capital ships of 525,000 tons, and Japan 315,000 tons (a ratio of 5 : 5 : 3). France and Italy were allotted a displacement tonnage of 175,000 each, France having held out for 350,000 and having finally given way only on condition that she be allotted 90,000 tons for submarines and 330,000 tons for cruisers and auxiliary ships. That French condition was responsible for the main defect in the treaty. Mr. Balfour, on behalf of the British Empire, proposed the complete abolition of submarines. Mr. Hughes on behalf of the United States, proposed a submarine tonnage of 60,000 for the United States and the British Empire, 31,500 for France and Japan, and 21,000 for Italy. As France refused to accept a less tonnage than 90,000 for her submarines, Mr. Balfour announced that the British Empire could not in that case agree to any limitation for anti-submarine craft. The result was that the treaty had to be drafted without incorporating any limitation for submarines or auxiliary ships.

Such was the chief result of the Washington Conference. The next step was taken at the beginning of 1927, when President Coolidge addressed a Note to Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to suggest that the problem of disarmament

on the sea be considered separately from that of disarmament on land (for the League of Nations had already started its preliminary work for the Disarmament Conference which began on February 2nd, 1932), and that the British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives at Geneva should discuss with an American delegation the possibility of extending the Washington 5 : 5 : 3 ratio in capital ships to apply to all auxiliary vessels not provided for in the 1922 treaty.

A conference duly met at Geneva on June 20th, 1927. It ended on August 4th without agreement. Indeed it never looked as if it could agree. The chief Power on whom the agreement about the auxiliary ships depended was France. France refused to attend the conference. Within a few days of receiving President Coolidge's suggestion, the French Government (February 15th, 1927) had sent its answer, setting out the reasons which made it unable to accept it. The chief of them was that it would compromise the chances of success at the general disarmament conference then being prepared by the League of Nations. The Italian Government, on February 21st, gave an equally decisive refusal to Mr. Coolidge. The Note stated that Italy had peculiar geographical circumstances which made it impossible for her to restrict her freedom in the matter of naval defence (item, she depended for supplies on lines of communication through the Suez Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar and the Dardanelles; item, she had a vast coast line to defend as well as her lines of communication with her possessions in the Mediterranean), and that therefore Italy must decide her policy in the light of what other nations were contemplating. The conference therefore met without the participation of France or Italy. It was not a League of Nations Conference, though it was held in Geneva. The participants were the United States, Japan and the British Empire (Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Irish Free State).

For six weeks those three parties unfolded a continuous tale of disagreement, except only that they did agree on a joint final statement setting out the precise grounds of their disagreement. The statement is important as showing the formidable gaps which at that time divided even the three naval Powers who alone had consented to attempt an agreement. It read thus: "The American delegates presented the view that within total tonnage limitation, which they initially

suggested should be between 250,000 and 300,000 tons in the cruiser class for the United States and the British Empire, and between 150,000 and 180,000 for Japan, each of the Powers should have liberty to build the number and the type of vessels which they might consider best suited to their respective naval needs, with freedom, subject to the limitation of the Washington Treaty, to arm these vessels as they saw fit. The British delegates, whilst putting proposals tending to a limitation of the size of vessels of all classes, have opposed the principle of limitation by total tonnage alone on the ground that the largest ship and the heaviest gun permissible must inevitably become the standard. They desired first, a strict limitation of the number of 10,000-ton eight-inch-gun cruisers; and, secondly, the establishment of a secondary type of cruiser of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons carrying guns of a maximum calibre of six inches. The British delegates contended that the establishment of this type would alone enable the British Empire, within a moderate figure of total tonnage, to attain the numbers which it regards as indispensable to meet its special circumstances and its special needs. The Japanese delegates presented the view that low total tonnage levels should be fixed which would effect a real limitation of auxiliary naval vessels. As for the question of the eight-inch-gun cruiser, while the Japanese Government could not agree to any restriction as a matter of principle, they had no difficulty in declaring that, provided a tonnage level of 315,000 for auxiliary surface vessels were fixed for Japan, they would not build any further eight-inch-gun cruisers until 1936, except those already authorised in existing programmes.

Various methods were considered of reconciling the divergent views indicated above, but, while material progress has been made and the points of divergence reduced, no mutually acceptable plan has been found to reconcile the claim of the British delegates for numbers of vessels, for the most part armed with six-inch guns, with the desire of the American delegates for the lowest possible total tonnage limitation with freedom of armament within such limitation, subject to the restriction as to armament already set by the Washington Treaty."

The third post-war attempt to agree upon a comprehensive scheme for the limitation of naval armaments was begun in London on January 21st, 1930. The main purpose of

the conference, after what had happened in 1922 and 1927, was necessarily confined to limiting the size of the smaller craft (eight-inch-gun cruisers, six-inch-gun cruisers, destroyers and submarines). France and Italy together—but it was France who was primarily responsible—had made such achievement impossible in 1922 and again in 1927. Those two countries together now again made it impossible. The conference ended, after a three months' duration, on April 10th, 1930. It had failed. A treaty was indeed agreed and signed, but it was a ramshackle formality lacking substance. The French and Italian Governments refused to sign the important part of it which stipulated the limitation of naval strength. There were five parts to the treaty. Parts I and II recorded an agreement on technical matters, and on a "holiday" in battleship construction. Part IV gave a list of rules for "humanising" a submarine (one of the grim conceptions of high diplomacy). And Part III was the substantive part, prescribing the agreed limitation of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. France and Italy, who had failed to agree with each other because France refused to concede the Italian claim to parity and Italy refused to drop it, settled the matter by standing wholly aloof from Part III of the treaty, which thereby took on the character of a Three-Power Treaty inserted in the middle of a Five-Power Treaty and containing the only substance discoverable in the treaty. Part III was given a special preamble of its own to the effect that the United States, Great Britain and Japan "have agreed as between themselves . . ." etc. By that agreement the total aggregate tonnage in the four classes of ships above-mentioned was fixed at 541,700 tons for the British Empire, 526,000 for the United States, and 367,050 for Japan.

This month's conference will be the fourth post-war attempt to agree upon the comprehensive limitation of naval armaments.

November 15th, 1935.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE GERMAN NAVY.*

It is a remarkable fact that hitherto no detailed study has been issued of the momentous and, indeed, tragic Anglo-German Naval Question. A very large amount of authentic information about it has been made available, in such works as Mr. Lloyd George's and Admiral Tirpitz's *Memoirs*, and particularly in the German Government's series *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* and the British Government's *British Documents on the Origins of the War*; volume VI of this latter series is especially rich in documents bearing on the question. Mr. Woodward has now published a very substantial work, so well-referenced and documented, so many-sided and thorough in its treatment, that the public has at last a complete survey. There is, naturally, still room for differences of opinion about the naval policies of Great Britain and Germany, but there can be no doubt at all about the relevant facts which are very fully presented, summarised and compared in this book, supported by extracts from state papers and dispatches, from published speeches, and from newspaper commentaries. Mr. Woodward patiently

* *Great Britain and the German Navy.* By E. L. Woodward. Oxford University Press. 21s.

and carefully follows the whole question through the period 1898-1914 year by year, and maintains throughout a graceful, interesting style of writing and, in spite of a large amount of detail, admirable clarity.

The subject is of special interest to-day in view of German rearmament and of the recent (1935) Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which creates a thirty-five per cent. ratio between the navies of the two countries. Whatever misgivings may be felt in this country concerning German land and air armament, there appears to be complete equanimity on the naval question. The Naval Agreement, freely negotiated by both parties, has achieved a veritable *détente* in Anglo-German political relations, and has in no way diminished the self-esteem of either party. It will naturally occur to every reader to ask why an Agreement of this kind could not be concluded in the period 1898-1914. The answer is given clearly enough in Mr. Woodward's book. It is that the German Government did not want and were determined not to have one. And when the question is pushed further and it is asked why they would not have such an Agreement, the answer seems almost inevitably to be because of stupidity and pride: stupidity, because they did not see the catastrophe which the naval tension was producing; and pride, because they would not own to themselves the impossibility of German naval equality with England. Curiously enough only the redoubtable Holstein gauged the situation honestly and truly. At any rate he was reported as speaking, three months before his death, of "the lying and treacherous fallacy that every fresh ship is an addition to the power of Germany, when every fresh ship causes England, to say nothing of France, to build two ships."

That the British Government, and particularly Grey, made determined and continuous efforts to reach an agreement is amply proved from *Die Grosse Politik* and *British Documents on the Origins of the War*. Grey, whose diplomacy in other directions is open to very serious criticism, deserves nothing but the highest credit for his patience and persistence and fair-mindedness in the handling of the naval question. Time and again he pointed out to the German authorities that no question of prestige really entered into the matter. He pointed to the superiority of the German army and admitted that the army was essential to Germany's safety. A defeat

at sea would not compromise Germany's safety. For Great Britain a defeat at sea would be quite fatal. What military security was to Germany, naval security was to England. But this argument made no impression at all.

At the beginning of the race of naval armaments, Tirpitz could make a case for a big German navy, by putting forward his "risk" theory. This was to the effect that while the German navy could never equal the British, it could nevertheless become so powerful as to be able to inflict serious damage on the opponent. Thus, if a great naval battle were fought, the British navy, though it would be victorious, would be so weakened that it would practically be at the mercy of other Powers, or at any rate greatly in danger from them. The British Government, accordingly, would prefer not to "risk" a battle with a powerful German navy, but would rather give way when political controversy arose and would even consent to make valuable concessions. But, as Mr. Woodward points out, the "risk theory" was absolutely invalidated when the Anglo-French *entente* was made in 1904, which ensured that even a badly damaged, though victorious, British navy would not be exposed to a French attack. Nevertheless, though the German statesmen could no longer hold out the prospect of concessions wrung from England by means of pressure under the "risk theory," they still went on with the naval programme, burdening both England and Germany with a continually increasing expenditure which never seriously or for any length of time altered the ratio of strength between them.

There was, indeed, one condition on which the German Government would consider a halt in their shipbuilding programme, namely that the British Government would promise neutrality in a future Continental war. A pledge of future neutrality is very difficult for any country to give. A pledge not to make an unprovoked attack is easier, and Grey was ready to give this. The only weak point in Grey's diplomacy over this question of a neutrality pledge was that, since the inauguration of the Anglo-French military conversations in 1908, he was in a sense almost pledged to take sides with France, in spite of the Anglo-French exchange of notes in 1912 about the "free hand." The fact that Grey felt himself not formally but practically involved in something like a military understanding with France, must have made him

particularly cautious, not to say elusive, in dealing with the German suggestion for a neutrality pledge. This caution, which the Germans could not help noticing, may have made them form conclusions about the dangers of Anglo-French understanding which the situation did not really warrant.

By 1914 the Anglo-German Naval Question had lost something of its importance. Grey was patiently pursuing the path of Anglo-German *rapprochement* by way of a colonial understanding and also of agreement over the continuation of the Bagdad railway beyond Bagdad. Tension over the naval question existed, but it was less acute than it had been in 1912. Nevertheless the Anglo-German naval competition seemed to have a limitless prospect, though doubtless some day or other, if war had not intervened, the two states would have been compelled to stop for lack of funds, this insensate perpetual doubling of the stakes. The German Admiralty and Foreign Office could no longer base their naval policy on the "risk theory," and probably few German statesmen, except the Kaiser, would have justified the policy of naval expansion on grounds of practical expediency. Bethmann-Hollweg probably expressed the position correctly when he told Lord Granville that "Germany required her fleet not merely for defending her commerce, but for the general purpose of her greatness." The navy was one of the expensive and politically dangerous means of expressing *Machtfreudigkeit*. Tirpitz was suggesting that a ratio of 16:10 would be satisfactory to Germany, and had the war not intervened there was a reasonable prospect of some agreement on this basis.

R. B. MOWAT.

STUDIES IN LITERATURE.*

The death of Professor J. G. Robertson at the height of his powers in 1933 was a calamity. Happily he left a good deal of valuable material ready or nearly ready for publication, including the great work on Lessing to which all students of the eighteenth century are looking forward. The present volume, edited by Professor Edna Purdie, is fully worthy of his high reputation, and it will be read with particular delight by all who care for German and Scandinavian literature.

* *Essays and Addresses on Literature*. By J. G. Robertson. Routledge. 12s. 6d.

Some of the essays and addresses have appeared in print, but are not generally accessible; others are entirely new. The range of learning is immense, but the critic is never overlaid by the scholar. Robertson is always thoughtful and suggestive, an ideal interpreter of men and ideas.

The first half of the volume is devoted to German literature. We begin with a penetrating study of the reconciliation of Classic and Romantic, one of his ripest utterances, in which he rejects the familiar dualism as an untenable over-simplification, and finds a higher synthesis. "We have to go back behind the sharp distinctions which the nineteenth century imposed on the spiritual life of its early years, to understand that, at bottom, the two opposing forces spring from a common matrix, from that wonderful conception of Humanity which is the most precious of all the heritages that have come down to us from the eighteenth century. . . . There are no hard and fast boundary lines in literary history. Nor is the individual soul to be dogmatically labelled Classic or Romantic, or anything else; indeed, most sensitive souls go through a series of moultings, in which they are Romantic and Classic by turns. The great poets of the world are all both Classic and Romantic. . . . Goethe stands for the harmonious synthesis we must endeavour to achieve." Our inestimable debt to the eighteenth century is assessed in greater detail in a stimulating address on that epoch of literary cosmopolitanism, of growing enlightenment, of spiritual emancipation, of what the Germans called *ästhetische* education; and it receives further illumination in a bicentenary address on Lessing.

The studies in German literature are completed by the exquisite Taylorian lecture on the Gods of Greece in German Poetry, which concludes with a fervent tribute to Spitteler's epic, *Der olympische Frühling*. Robertson was one of the first British writers to call attention to the Swiss poet, whose significance was proclaimed to a sadly indifferent world by the award of the Nobel prize for literature. "This wonderful epic," as he calls it, with its "real, living gods, no pale shadows of the classical tradition," is described in detail in the essay on Spitteler reprinted from the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW. We are on more familiar ground in the essays on the melancholy Grillparzer and the Swiss story-teller Gottfried Keller, whom Robertson admired more than most of his English readers. Keller, we are told, succeeded better than

any of his German contemporaries in keeping the old romantic ideals alive in the later nineteenth century.

The second portion of the volume deals with Scandinavian literature in the persons of Ibsen, Kierkegaard, Pontopiddan and Strindberg. The four lectures on Ibsen present in eighty pages the most masterly introduction to the study of the great dramatist available in our language. To those of us who have seen most of the plays on the stage it is a delight to hear Robertson's verdicts on each in turn. Of Ibsen's greatness there is no possible doubt. *Brand*, which took the world by storm, does not wear so well as *Peer Gynt*, "the greatest and richest poem of northern Norway." *Emperor and Galilean*, though poetically the weakest of the dramas, is declared to be spiritually the deepest. Ibsen, declares our author in conclusion, "was Hebbel's successor in the higher dramatic poetry of Europe." Knowing as we do Robertson's admiration for Hebbel, that is high praise. The essays on Kierkegaard, Pontopiddan and Strindberg are careful studies of men too little known in England. The former, we are told, "holds the indispensable key to the intellectual life of Scandinavia." He is Denmark's greatest thinker, a pioneer and apostle of modern Romantic individualism. Pontopiddan, the author of *The Promised Land*, holds the mirror up to Danish life at the turn of the century, and finds little cause to be content. The powerful study of Strindberg reminds us that the repulsive naturalistic dramas *The Father* and *Miss Julie*, so well known on the Continental stage, are only one aspect of his work. His "wonderful historical dramas," in Robertson's view, "represent his most valuable and positive contribution to the imaginative treasure-house of Europe." Strindberg was a hopelessly complex personality, "and yet at the same time a poet endowed with enormous, world-compelling genius—the nineteenth century has seen none more gifted." The volume ends with addresses on *Literary Cosmopolitanism*, the *Spirit of Travel in Modern Literature*, and *Literature in the Universities*.

G. P. G.

MR. NICOLSON'S "MORROW."*

The reader of a biography in nearly every case has two persons of interest to study: one, the subject of the book, the

* *Dwight Morrow*. By Harold Nicolson. Constable. 18s. net.

other the author. It is next to impossible for an author to reveal his subject's character without incidentally revealing something of his own. Mr. Nicolson writes so much and writes it so well that when one comes across something that jars, the event stands out and invites comment. In the middle of this entrancing book one is presented with a favourite remark of Dwight Morrow's: "'I'll tell you,' he would often say in later years, 'who won the war! The war was won by the Civil Servant of the type of Sir Arthur Salter'" (p. 225). Mr. Morrow was orthodox in his view of the war. What of Mr. Nicolson? It is true that he at once makes this remark about the Morrow dictum: "This was an exaggeration, induced by Morrow's own respect for integrity, tolerance and precision." But the author continues: "Yet it is a fact that the war might well have been lost had not the Allied Civil Servants been so imperturbable, so gifted, so independent, and so incorruptible." Mr. Nicolson is normally so thorough and so original in his thought that anything shallow or smug comes surprisingly from his pen. The essence of war is to have a bayonet stuck through one's stomach or to have one's head blown off. It is easy enough to be "imperturbable, gifted, independent, incorruptible," for those who by contrast sit at an office table in Whitehall, earning their pensions.

If Mr. Nicolson in that instance lost an opportunity of criticising a mischievous form of cant—for non-combatant cant about war is surely more mischievous than most other—even when it fell from such lips as Mr. Morrow's, there is little else in the book that excites any other feeling than that of admiration. Mr. Nicolson gives us a full, detailed and intimate picture of the man Morrow, "a man of action . . . ambitious, determined, precise, cautious, unremitting, and shrewd" (p. 51). He dismisses "the Morrow legend" as a "trivial" thing: the legend namely of "a little man of gentle gaiety, of sweet unworldliness, of brilliant intellect."

Mr. Nicolson has a highly developed taste for adjectives, as witness this passage, which is typical: "Mrs. James Morrow again—small, stout, bustling, practical, and sharp—was more than shrewd and more than merry; she was frequently witty and acute. There was nothing grim or dark about Dwight Morrow's childhood; it was strenuous, congested, intensive, penurious, happy, competitive and crude" (p. 8).

Early in Mr. Morrow's evolution, when he was a corporation

lawyer (1899-1914), he showed signs of his great gift of diplomacy. It was a gift described by Mr. Thomas D. Thacher in his contribution to the New York Bar Association memorial of 1931 to Mr. Morrow, as "an uncanny knack of quickly finding the common ground upon which the conflicting claims of divergent interests could be resolved." Examples of the value of that gift abound in the book. The author himself states that Dwight Morrow "became a model for the completely civilised man" and that it is thus justifiable to approach him "from a human, or universal, rather than from a national, or particular, point of view." Mr. Nicolson in fact makes a fascinating study of Mr. Morrow's evolution from his early ethics and later education.

Mr. Nicolson already has to his credit a series of important contributions to an understanding of the diplomatic events of the past half-century, in particular his well-known diplomatic trilogy (*Lord Carnock, Peacemaking and Curzon, the Last Phase*). With great knowledge, shrewd judgment, and a lively appreciation of the subtlety and irony of our times, he has performed a great public service. His new book on Dwight Morrow deserves to be added to his memorable achievements. Mr. Morrow gave us, as the author claims, a "fresh conception of the American mind in action." The book brilliantly places Mr. Morrow as one of the distinctive influences of our time, and in addition gives us a charming insight into the life of one of the most human and lovable of men.

G. G.

THE PROGRESS OF GOVERNMENT.*

Nearly thirty years have passed since the last edition of Sir William Anson's treatise on the Crown, contained in his great work on *The Law and Custom of the Constitution*, was published in 1907. A new edition has been for long eagerly awaited because the Executive power and the structure of Imperial government have undergone extensive development during this period. The difficult task of editing has been done admirably by Professor A. Berriedale Keith, who has restored to the work its full measure of usefulness. The original

* (1) *The Law and Custom of the Constitution; The Crown*. 2 parts, 4th Edition. By A. Berriedale Keith. 30s. net (2 vols.). (2) *The Governments of the British Empire*. By A. Berriedale Keith. 21s. net.

text has been thoroughly revised and also compressed to make room for the consideration of matters not discussed by Anson. The editor has "avoided substantial alterations in matter of opinion," except as seemed essential in view of new information. The main framework of Anson's book remains, with its basis of acute historical perspective.

It is axiomatic of our constitution that its growth has developed under cover of old forms. Writing in 1867, Bagehot made his famous remark that "so well is our real Government concealed, that if you tell a cabman to drive to 'Downing Street' he most likely will never have heard of it, and will not in the least know where to take you." However disputable the inference that even then the average Englishman still looked to Buckingham Palace for effective executive government, Bagehot was clearly right in regarding constitutional growth as a disguised and often unappreciated process. Such a development has been steadily progressing during this century in relation to the Cabinet. Not only has the Executive so increased its power over Parliament that it looks more to public opinion than to the House of Commons for support, but it has also encroached upon the sphere of the Legislature and Judiciary. Professor Keith has therefore necessarily added chapters dealing with this fundamental development. The modern view of governmental function as one of paternal interference for the national welfare necessitates the use of delegated authority to fulfil the social or economic programme of Parliament. The bulk of delegated legislature may be illustrated by the year 1925, in which fifty-one out of ninety-one public statutes conferred such powers upon various authorities. The annual average of Statutory Rules and Orders amounts to nearly fourteen hundred. A submissive Parliament has been persuaded to extend these powers to cover questions of principle, as under the Import Duties Act 1932, or to enable the Minister to amend the statute under "the Henry VIII clause," and has attempted to exempt the Executive from any control by the Courts, even upon grounds of acting *ultra vires* the enabling act. Parliamentary safeguards have proved in practice ineffective, and as Professor Keith says, "governments have shown great reluctance to accord effective control." Unfortunately, the dangers of an uncontrolled bureaucracy, so powerfully pointed out by the Lord Chief Justice and others,

have awakened a poor response among the public, which is hardly aware of the principles involved. The Government has been able to disregard the recommendations of the Committee on Ministers' Powers, appointed in 1932, providing for greater judicial control and an effective degree of Parliamentary scrutiny.

The high authority of Professor Keith upon all questions of imperial constitutional law makes him singularly well fitted to deal with the great developments since 1907. At that time the South Africa Act had not been passed, and the Dominions were still without that full measure of autonomous equality with the United Kingdom, to be conceded in 1926 and enacted by the Statute of Westminster in 1931. In India, in 1907, the early stages of constitutional progress represented by the Morley-Minto reforms had not been reached; while in the Colonial empire the mandated territories, with their particular obligations, were to be a product of the Great War. Professor Keith discusses this period of structural change concisely and authoritatively. He has, however, covered the same ground, along with an analysis of the home government, more elaborately in his new work, *The Governments of the British Empire*. Fortunately he has been able to include in both works an account of the principles which will govern the new Indian federal constitution when brought into operation.

Professor Keith's view of the British Commonwealth's future is extremely pessimistic. Canada, South Africa and the Irish Free State "have successfully secured the disappearance of all that was formal in Imperial unity. . . . Despite profuse assurances that freedom is the necessary prelude to co-operation, there has been vouchsafed no sign of the latter." This despairing outlook is hardly supported by events. Apart from the imponderable elements of unity, such as a common Crown and mutual enjoyment of freedom and democracy, economic preferences and a united foreign policy are tangible signs of Imperial co-operation. Consultation upon foreign affairs is a regular procedure, and the Abyssinian dispute has produced an unqualified endorsement of the United Kingdom's assertive policy by all the Dominions, including Canada, who, says Professor Keith, "regards the obligations imposed by the League as too onerous." Yet it is Canada who took the leading part in proposing a coal,

iron and oil embargo. The potential advantages of co-operation are not forgotten by the units of the Commonwealth, although difficulties may from time to time persist.

M. SIEGFRIED ON THE CRISIS.

M. André Siegfried* has written a short essay (128 pages), in the neat and compact form he has led us to expect of him, on the origins and prospects of Europe in her economic aspect. His former treatise on *England's Crisis* contained much that was interesting and provocative, but hardly satisfying to those who appreciate the mistiness of British character. Neither M. Siegfried, nor many other people in or out of England, ever understand England in her politics, diplomacy or morals. In the present book, however, the author treats impersonally of a large subject in its broad outline. There are no pitfalls for him. He therefore gives us an interesting, suggestive and well-written survey.

His theme is that in the nineteenth century Europe equipped herself industrially to supply the needs of the whole world, and did supply them. At the end of the century the British dominions, the United States of America and South America no longer needed Europe's services in that extreme sense. The Great War had the effect of losing to Europe the remnants of her commercial supremacy. Moreover the Far Eastern peoples were becoming sufficient to themselves.

M. Siegfried surveys a Europe which still possesses its machinery, but has lost its markets. Only in the field of pure finance does he recognise a chance that Europe may continue to fulfil her former mission in the world.

The particular crisis that has been upon us since 1929 he diagnoses in this way: "First there was the liquidation of the war, which, contrary to the general illusion, had not been already fully carried out. The main difficulty was to absorb an over-expanded industrial equipment. While Europe was fighting, the rest of the world feverishly equipped itself in order to supply the needs of the belligerents and to cope with their withdrawal from the international markets. After the war, however, Europe in turn wished to recapture what she had lost" (page 13). Moreover, M. Siegfried gives full play

* *Europe's Crisis*. Jonathan Cape. 5s. net.

(page 111) to the argument that in the coloured countries employers could employ "children, young girls and women" for long hours; and in Japan low wages, conspiring with a technique often superior to that of Europe, made it impossible for the West to compete. He roundly concludes (page 116) that "without a doubt, under present conditions of world competition, Europe is beaten in certain fields."

He shows a full appreciation of the political cause of Europe's economic disablement: of the fact that the politicians achieve their present-day overweening power by competitive bidding for the favour of their respective electorates at the cost of overburdened budgets. While the author clearly exposes the present economic weaknesses of Europe, and recognises its general dangers, he suggests no remedy. Nor could any remedy be suggested. Socialism feeds upon itself. Once started, the socialist practice whereby politics submerge individual enterprise must of necessity go further and further. In Europe political extortion by rates and taxes of all kinds yearly increases. In the nature of things it cannot do otherwise, for the swollen and swelling body of politicians, central and local, depends for its continued power and existence upon such increase.

G. G.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Miss A. Ruth Fry has done service to the work and reputation of a remarkable economist and social thinker of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in her book on the Quaker, *John Bellers, 1654-1725*.^{*} She has collected together the few known facts of his life and reprinted copious extracts from his writings. In numerous tracts and pamphlets Bellers explained and reiterated proposals for reform which covered an extensive field and were often far in advance of his time. He was an advocate of penal reform upon the lines elaborated a century later by Howard; he urged the need for the education and medical treatment of the poor and in particular for their secure and permanent employment in Colleges of Industry which were to influence Francis Place and Robert Owen, receive the approbation of Karl Marx and find a counterpart to-day in Mr. Peter Scott's "Experiment in Self-help" among the unemployed of South Wales. But the most topical and striking of Bellers' proposals is to be found in *Some Reasons*

^{*} Cassell. 6s. net.

for an European State, 1710, clearly influenced by Sully's Grand Design. Bellers envisaged a form of Covenant and an annual Senate through which "the Princes and States of Europe may settle all Disputes among themselves, without Blood or Charge and prevent the Rash from such Dismal Adventures as are the Consequences of War, whilst they must know that every Man in the Senate hath 1, 2 or 3 Thousand Men to back what he concludes there." This is to be followed by limitation of national armaments "for without it, the peace may be little better than a truce." Bellers, though writing two centuries ago, shows a remarkable grasp of the need and problem of collective security which faces the world to-day. If he was unduly optimistic of his age, there was a strain of realism in his outlook which largely accounts for the permanent value of his writings.

Miss Eva Scott has produced a series of provocative essays upon James V, Mary Queen of Scots and the four English monarchs in her *Six Stuart Sovereigns*.^{*} Her view of the Stuarts as "able, well-intentioned sovereigns, misunderstood, opposed, maligned, rejected," yet fervently beloved, well accords with the contemporary efforts of a class of historical writers to rehabilitate the political reputation of that unhappy dynasty. Miss Scott's presentation of this case is made especially persuasive and delusive by a powerful and artistic style, by a constant dwelling upon the Stuarts' personal qualities, by denying to their opponents the existence of disinterested motive and by a dangerous disregard of the course of constitutional development both before and during the periods of conflict. Stripped of their trimmings, the issues of the seventeenth century were essentially political. Miss Scott argues that Parliament, and in particular an oligarchic and Puritanical House of Commons, was attacking the legal rights of the Crown. Yet the sovereignty of Parliament and the predominance of the Commons had been recognised, immaturely perhaps, in the fifteenth century and was accepted *de jure* by the Tudors, as exemplified in the Statute of Proclamations, 1539. As the sixteenth century proceeded, royal tutelage was increasingly resented; and it was this claim for the independent exercise of legitimate functions which James resisted and which was converted by the conduct of his son into a revolutionary movement in the 1640's. The inability of Miss Scott to appreciate the changing nature of the conflict may be illustrated by her statement that in 1628-9 the Commons "attempted to erect their unrepresentative, irresponsible, single chamber into an oligarchy, supreme in every branch of government." Any attempt at substantial vindication of the Stuarts must remain inconsistent with the conclusions of historical research. The worth of this book must lie in its portraiture of their private lives and characters rather than in its appreciation of their political conduct.

^{*} Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

Virgin Soil Upturned,* by Mikhail Sholokhov, is a deeply interesting account of farm collectivisation in the Don Cossack region of Russia. It is written in the form of a novel, and thus brings out the play of personalities in the extraordinarily difficult task of co-operation. That the Soviet Government should ever have dreamed of making such demands on the primitive and ignorant Cossacks is only matched by the angelic patience and persistence of the engineer, Davidov, sent from a workshop in the north of Russia to effect the collectivisation, without any previous experience of agriculture; and by the ultimate success of the spring sowing. The struggles of that winter were trying in the extreme. First the kulaks were dispossessed and sent packing—to what fate nobody knew; then the middling farmers were all argued with. Some drove their cattle into the collective shed the day after the first meeting; the bulk of the farmers held back. Secret wreckers were interfering, sowing distrust, and the first result was the killing of their animals and a great gorging of the meat before joining. The author spares us nothing in his descriptions. The wreckers, however, fail to achieve a rising. Gradually the farm is organised, the ploughs are got ready, and the land is mapped out. When it comes to collecting the seed grain from the farmers a propaganda column of young communists from the nearest town arrives to help, and by threats and arguments and cajolery the seed is brought in. At this point a letter from Stalin to the nation saying that the farmers are not to be forced to join causes large numbers to demand back their animals, their ploughs, and finally their seed at the very moment of going out to the fields in the spring. They are refused, and uproar and violence, thieving and much bedrubbing of the young engineer, especially by the women, ensue. The revolting farmers are finally quelled by their comrades and scolded, the ploughing and sowing successfully take place, and so the book ends with all the promise of spring.

Comparing this story with Comrade Sholokhov's former book, *And Quiet Flows the Don*, there seems to be a considerable advance in the Cossack region. Most of the farmers can read and write, they are more or less politicians, with a deep respect for the Soviet Government and an affection for Stalin. They learn under some compulsion the first lessons of co-operation, which many far more highly developed individuals fail to do; and that has been achieved in less than eighteen years! Here is a conversation on principles:

"Join the Party; Kondrat. I'll gladly support your application. . . . It's reaching the point where the world revolution is likely to come at any moment."

"No, comrade . . . I can't, because even now I'm in the collective farm I'm sick with longing for my property. I'm sick at heart for my bullocks and I'm sorry for them. . . . They don't get the care

* Putnam. 7s. 6d.

they ought to get. And Akim . . . chafed my horse's neck with the collar during the harrowing. When I noticed it I couldn't eat all day because of it. . . . If I still haven't got rid of my desire for my property, it means my conscience won't allow me to be in the Party."

"Yes, you're right there. . . . If you see your old bullocks in your sleep, then you can't be in the Party. You must come into the Party without any suffering over property . . . when you're clean all through."

Amidst all the brutality and sordidness described in this book there is much humour as well as pathos, things unknown at the District Committee Bureau.

Two new history books for children represent laudable efforts to make the course of world history attractive and fascinating to the child mind. Miss Elizabeth Underwood has followed up her successful text-book, *From the Renaissance to the League of Nations*, with a second volume, *From the Fall of Rome to the Renaissance*.* The whole text, along with numerous illustrations and maps, is compressed within less than 250 pages. Miss Underwood's method of presentation is clear and straightforward. "She selects," writes Mr. Nowell Smith, the late Headmaster of Sherborne in his Introduction, "with a trained sense of proportion and describes in a style which is succinct without becoming dry." The first volume of Miss Mabel Cleverly Paine's three volume work, *The Story of the World for Young People*,† is written even more concisely, in a simpler style, and is suitable for younger minds. It covers the whole of ancient and medieval history and is roughly comparable in length to Miss Underwood's book, while the format and print of the former are much larger. Both books have regard for facts and stories that attract particularly the child's interest. The consequent, if necessary, risk of losing the thread of continuity has been somewhat lessened by Miss Paine's time charts which display at a glance the historical sequence of great concurrent movements and events over a long period.

A new anthology of English poetry has been compiled by Mr. Charles Williams with the assistance of Lord David Cecil, Dr. Ernest de Selincourt and Dr. E. M. W. Tillyard in *The New Book of English Verse*.‡ The aim of the volume is to supplement *The Golden Treasury* and *The Oxford Book of English Verse* so that the selections in the three volumes together may indicate the full scope and power of English poetry. All the poems included are of "poetic importance" which "is not the same as to say 'great poetry'"; so that some items "have rather an indirect than a direct relation to greatness." A

* Macdonald. 3s. 6d. † Muller. 7s. 6d. net. ‡ Gollancz. 7s. 6d. net.

feature of this selection is the inclusion of poetic speeches from drama, long poems and extracts from still longer poems not to be found in the other anthologies. The items are arranged by authors in chronological order in a handy volume of some eight hundred pages, clearly printed on thin paper.

In his book, *I Photograph Russia*,* Mr. James E. Abbe, the well-known American press photographer, describes in energetic and racy language his experiences and adventures during a recent Russian tour. The main interest of his book lies in the eighty remarkable photographs which give a realistic impression of various sides of the Soviet régime. Apart from those photographs which official propaganda permitted or encouraged him to take, Mr. Abbe succeeded in "shooting" a number of forbidden scenes, such as queues for bread and clothes.

Mr. Lynn Doyle has written a delightful book in *The Spirit of Ireland*† and Messrs. Batsford have added to its charm with more than one hundred and thirty fine photographs. It is not merely a guide book but an introduction to Ireland and the Irish. The author begins his tour at Dublin, journeys all over the South, and then travels through four of the Six Counties with the same cheerful spirit of impartiality. Politics are not discussed except in connection with historical background, so that the people stand out as types peculiar to districts rather than as members of political factions. Mr. Doyle shows Ireland chiefly from the view of business men and peasants, which is the real Ireland, though perhaps less familiar to England. Ireland as a holiday country offers unbounded scope and variety of scenery, people and sport, so well weighed up in this attractive sketch.

Those who appreciate the short stories of Edgar Allan Poe will enjoy the new large edition of *Tales of Mystery and Imagination*,‡ with illustrations by Mr. Arthur Rackham. His twelve drawings in colour and seventeen in line possess a style singularly adapted to depict the gruesome nature of the scenes related, while a quaintness and touch of fantasy mitigate their horror and cast upon the reader a spell of fascination.

* Harrap, 12s. 6d. net. † Batsford, 6d. net. ‡ Harrap, 21s. net.

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