

by his death, universally as he was mourned, for in a History of the Reign of King James, published in 1653, it is recorded that the loss of the Prince, in November 1612, was not allowed to dim the rejoicings of the following Christmas, the King specially enjoining that "its jollity, feasting and magnificence must not be laid down."

That the same spirit ruled in the reign of Charles I is shown by a ballad written in 1630, beginning

When Christmas-tide comes in like a Bride
With Holly and Ivy clad,
Twelve days in the year with mirth and good cheer
In every household is had.

It was when the power of the Puritans began to be felt in the land that the Christmas Festival fell into disrepute. John Taylor, the Water Poet (1580-1654), laments that

all the liberty and harmless sports, the merry gambols, dances and friscols, with which the toiling ploughman and labourer once a year were wont to be recreated and their spirits and hopes revived for a whole twelve months, are now extinct and put out of use as if they had never been. Thus are gone the Merry Lords of Misrule at Westminster, nay more, their madness hath extended itself to the very vegetables; the senseless trees, herbs and weeds, are in a profane estimation among them—holly, ivy, mistletoe, rosemary, bays, are accounted ungodly branches of superstition for your entertainment.

It is Parliament, he says, that tries to keep Christmas out of the land, denouncing plum pottage as "mere Popery, a collar of brawne an abomination, roast beef anti-Christian, mince pies relics of the Woman of Babylon, and a goose, a turkey or capon, marks of the Beast." But in country places, far from the malign influence of Parliament, Christmas is still honoured; and speaking in the name of the Festival, he says:

We went to church, where a good old Minister spoke very reverently of my Master, Christ, and also he uttered many good speeches concerning me, exciting and exhorting the people to love and unity with one another, and to extend their charities to the needy and distressed. After prayers we returned home, where we discoursed merrily, without profaneness; played games, sang,

and the poor labouring hinds and the servants danced gaily, singing.

Let's dance and sing and make good cheer,
For Christmas comes but once a year.

These complaints were not exaggerated. The Records of Canterbury, for instance, reveal that on December 22nd, 1647, "The Cryer of Canterbury, by the appointment of Master Mayor, openly proclaimed that Christmas Day and all other superstitious Festivals should be put down, and a Market held on Christmas Day." Nor were such restrictions merely local, for in December 1652, an order was made in Parliament that "no observation shall be had of the 5 and 20th day of December, commonly called Christmas Day; nor any solemnity used or exercised in churches upon that day in respect thereof." The Puritan view of Christmas was summed up by William Prynne, a Parliamentarian who in later life altered his views and hailed the return of the Stuarts. His great work, *Histriomatrix*, was published in 1633, while Charles was still upon the throne; but the Puritans were already a powerful body and Prynne spoke in their name when he denounced actors as the ministers of Satan, called theatres Devil's chapels, and put cards, dancing, music and false hair in the same category as the sinful celebrations of Christmas.

It was not until the return of the Stuarts in 1660 that Christmas came into its own again. As one of the popular Ballads says:

Now thanks be to God for Charles' return,
Whose absence made old Christmas mourn;
For then we scarcely did it know
Whether it Christmas were or no.
No meat was hanging on the shelves,
The cooks they might go hang themselves,
For anything they had to do;
So likewise might the fiddlers too.
The high-soule lords of Cromwell's making
Were not for dainties, roasting, baking;
The chiefest food they took most good in
Was rusty bacon and bag pudding,
Plum-broth was popish and mince-pye
O that was flat idolatry.
Thus did each idle-pated clown
With frantic zeal cry Christmas down.

Robert Herrick, the parson-poet, penned some of his merriest Christmas carols and ballads after the Puritan rule had come to an end :

Come bring with a noise
My merry, merry boys,
The Christmas log to the firing,
While my good dame, she
Bids ye all be free
And drink to your heart's desiring.

His Ode to Sir Lewis Pemberton shows that in the return to feasting and jollity, the poor at "the lower end of the table" were not forgotten :

Thou, like to that hospitable god
Jove, joyst when guests make their abode
To eat thy bullocks' thighs, thy veals, thy fat
Wethers, and never grudged at
The pheasant, partridge, godwit, reeve, ruff, rail,
The cock, the curlew and the quail ;
These and thy choicest viands do extend
Their taste unto the lower end
Of thy glad table, not a dish more known
To thee, than unto anyone.

The same generous spirit is revealed in a contemporary Carol :

Now that the time is come wherein
Our Saviour Christ was born,
The larders full of beef and pork
The garners filled with corn ;
As God hath plenty to thee sent
Take comfort of thy labours,
And let it never thee repent
To feast thy needy neighbours.

A curious book entitled *Round about our Coal Fire* was published anonymously in London during the reign of George II (1740). It laments the lost delights of Christmas time and comments very unfavourably on the way that the Festival is kept under Hanoverian rule :

You must understand, good people, that the manner of celebrating Christmas is vastly different now to what it was in former days ; there was once upon a time Hospitality in the land, an English gentleman at the opening of the great Day had all his tenants and neighbours enter the hall by daybreak, the strong beer

was broached, and the Black-Jacks went plentifully about with toast, sugar, nutmeg and good Cheshire cheese ; the Rooms were embower'd with Holly, Ivy, Cypress, Bay, Laurel and Mistletoe, and a bouncing Christmas log in the chimney, glowing like the cheeks of a Country Milkmaid. The Servants were then running here and there, with merry Hearts and jolly Countenances ; every one was busy welcoming of Guests and look't as smug as new-lic't puppies ; the Lasses were as blithe and buxom as they were in good Queen Bess' days, when they eat Sir-loins of roast Beef for Breakfast. This great Festival was in former times kept with as much Freedom and Openess of Heart that everyone in the Country where a Gentleman resided possessed at least a day of Pleasure in the Christmas Holidays ; the Tables were all spread from the first to the last, the Sir-Loins of Beef, the Minced-Pies, the Plumb-Porridge, the Capons, Turkeys, Geese, were all brought upon the Board and all those who had sharp stomachs and sharp knives eat heartily and were welcome. The Geese which used to be fattened for the honest neighbours have been of late sent to London and the Quills made into Pens to convey away the Landlord's Estate ; the Sheep are drove away to raise Money to answer the loss of a game of Cards or Dice, and their Skins made into Parchment for Deeds and Indentures ; nay, even the poor innocent Bee, who was used to pay its tribute to the Lord once a year in good Metheglin for the entertainment of the Guests and its wax converted into benevolent plasters for sick Neighbours, is now used for the sealing of Deeds to his disadvantage. Give me the man who keeps up the old ways, feeds his people till they are as plump as Partridges and as fat as Porpoises, and not keep a parcel of sneaking-looking wretches about them, whose Ribs are as apparent as those of a Gridiron.

If there were no records of Christmas celebrations in Stuart days except this lament of Hanoverian date, we might conclude that they were exclusively concerned with eating and drinking. But there was another side to them, and as an example of the noble thoughts and high aspirations that animated the breasts of many of the merry-makers, we may turn to the pages of Nicholas Breton. Like all who were not included in the ranks of the Puritans, Breton loved the jollity of Christmas. In his *Fantasticks*, published in 1626, he says :

December. It is now Christmas and not a cup of ale must pass without a caroll ; the beasts, fowle and fishe come to a general execution and the corne is ground to dust for the bakehouse and the pantry. Cards and dice purge many a purse and the youth show their agility in Shoeing of the Wild Mare.

But though he could enter wholeheartedly into the festivities of Christmas, he could also soar in spirit to those Regions from which He who gave the day its name came down to earth, and in his lovely lyric—the cadences of which are so strangely akin to the cadences of Shelley—he seems to have caught an echo of the Angels' Christmas Song :

Sing, my soul, to God thy Lord,
All in glory's highest key ;
Lay the Angels' quire aboard
In their highest holy day ;
Crave their help to tune thy heart
Unto Praise's highest part.

Tell the world no word can tell
What the hand of Heaven deserveth,
In whose only mercies dwell
All the Heaven and earth preserveth—
Death's confounding, sin's forgiving,
Faith's relieving, comfort's living.

Praise of Praises, where Thou dwellest
Tell me (if the world may know Thee)
In what sense Thou most excellest
When Thy wonders forth doth show Thee,
In that state of Heaven's story
Where Thou gainst Thy highest glory.

And when all the world together
Join with Angels' harmony,
Let my soul come singing thither
With that blessed company ;
God in mercy's power victorious,
Be above all glory glorious!

MARY BRADFORD WHITING.

FEMININITY IN BRITISH ART.

THE celebration this December of the bicentenary of the birth of George Romney, the portrait painter, enables us to review the contribution made by English artists to the interpretation of femininity, for Romney was pre-eminently a painter of lovely women. He possessed a deep and genuine love of feminine beauty which he never tired of recording and the sensitive interpretation of which is his chief title to fame. The tribute to the English genius for feminine portraiture which his name calls forth is evoked the more readily this year because the exhibition of British art held at Burlington House in the spring is still fresh in our memory and we recall that to many visitors the most attractive pictures in that exhibition were those masterpieces in which the giants of the Augustan age in English portraiture interpreted the radiant charm and simple grace of Georgian womanhood.

To say that the English artists have had a genius for feminine portraiture may seem an extravagant claim to make when we recall the work of their French contemporaries. The delicate evocations of Watteau, the provocative sensuality of Boucher, the vivacity of Fragonard and the seductive charm of Greuze might make the work of the English painters seem dull and prosaic. Yet, though unlike their French contemporaries, the English painters were not preoccupied with a preference for feminine charm rather than masculine strength, they have not lacked the ability to render the elegance and daintiness, the vivacity and grace, of their womanhood. Indeed the greatest challenge which English art has made to the world has been in the sale-room, where its feminine portraiture has reached prices beyond the most priceless old masters.

During the eighteenth century in particular a constant procession of court beauties, country ladies and courtesans passed through the studios, and it was the special genius of the majority of our painters then to capture the essential spirit of womanhood in all its naturalness. It would never have occurred to a Boucher to paint the *Shrimp Girl*, nor, if it had, could he have evoked so delightfully natural a result as did Hogarth. Not idle beauties, placed high upon an aristocratic pedestal and worshipped from afar, but ladies taking a real

part in life, have been the subjects of the English painters. The lady is dressed for a visit to her friends, or sits reading in the park, or romps with her children and dogs : only rarely does she lie in a boudoir. Already is she an open-air girl, not afraid for her hair to blow in the wind. She is even prepared to co-operate in the country life of her husband. In fact our eighteenth-century artists were feminists more than a hundred years before their time. All unconsciously they anticipated the twentieth-century emancipation of woman, for in their pictures she is man's companion, not his doll, she is the ramblor rose rather than the hot-house plant.

The great triumvirate of Reynolds, Gainsborough and Romney provide the natural starting-point for our discussion, though five hundred years before a native artist had given a wonderfully sensitive and tender interpretation of the Virgin in the *Chichester Roundel*. Hogarth was dry and stiff in his finished portraits, a slave to the style of Hudson and his other contemporaries, but in his unfinished sketches, such as the *Shrimp Girl* and his *Servants*, he truly revealed his ability to catch the feminine spirit. Reynolds was the first great interpreter of womanhood, though there is much in his art to make this surprising. His psychological insight was more truly revealed in his male portraits. A Sterne or a Dr. Johnson or a Goldsmith so called forth all that was best in his powers that his intellect climbed up to theirs and, fusing with them, enabled him to record on canvas wonderful elucidations of their personalities. Nor would we imagine his theatricality and love of the "grand manner" as suited to the portrayal of feminine charm as the spontaneity and lightness of his great rival, Gainsborough.

Yet we cannot deny that Reynolds revealed an unfailing sympathy with and understanding of all types of human character and a precious romantic sensibility to the sweet and gracious charms of womanhood, which enabled him to produce some masterpieces of feminine portraiture. Above all was this the case when the women were with their children, for despite his celibacy he had a great love for children, and he interpreted better than any of his contemporaries that ever-popular subject, happy young mothers playing with their children. He never equalled the ability of Gainsborough to catch a likeness ; he was too busy realising an ideal and attempting to emulate the triumphs of the old masters for that, but we will

never ask anything better of feminine portraiture than the perfect and delightful *Nelly O'Brien*, so lovely in colour, so enchantingly lit and so human in its sympathy that mere likeness ceases to count and this blue-eyed beauty becomes a symbol of the permanent and mysterious fascination of womankind.

Gainsborough, though less logical and more temperamental than Reynolds and lacking his intellectual power, was more sensitive to the mood of his sitters. He could not, like Reynolds, when he found himself up against a dull, unsympathetic sitter who struck no chord in his romantic nature, fall back upon a recipe in the "grand manner." Gainsborough could not paint when he was bored and never could he create animation where only mental inertia existed. He was a realist and any antipathy between himself and his sitters revealed itself in the dullness and lifelessness of the resulting portrait, but when there was sympathy between artist and sitter, each of the ladies who sat to him was the source of fresh inspiration. The artist's instinct enabled him quickly to capture, in the moment of their fleeting acquaintance, each sitter's own special charm, whether it was the demure sweetness of Mrs. Robinson, the pert vivacity of the dancer Mrs. Baccelli, or the exquisite, lovable distinction of Mrs. Graham, that queenly gracious figure whose portrait when exhibited at the Royal Academy recalled to a critic those lines of Otway :

There's in you all that we believe of heaven
Amazing brightness, purity and truth,
Eternal joy and everlasting love.

Gainsborough did not give his sitters the air of theatrical elegance and sensuality given by Van Dyck, nor the air of worldly consequence which Reynolds sometimes failed to avoid, but an air of refinement and culture. He strikes a lyrical note which is not unexpected in so musicianly a painter. He did not deny his gifts to the old or middle-aged and he has left many sympathetic records of dowagers growing old gracefully, not the least important of which is his portrait of his wife now in the Courtauld Institute.

Though Romney is usually placed third in the great triad of Georgian portrait painters it is a decided step down to him from Reynolds and Gainsborough, yet he is important in this connection because it is as a painter of women, and of boys

before the fullness of masculinity has laid its hands upon them, that he is famous. It was as a painter of women that he became so popular in his own time as to rival Reynolds and with him to share the honours of the town. He was particularly susceptible to the inherent charm and power of evoking admiration possessed by the courtesan, and his pictures of Lady Hamilton, the *Parson's Daughter* and Mrs. Robinson, are a tribute to his ability to realise the personality of members of the frail sisterhood. Paradoxically, like the bachelor Reynolds, he had a peculiar sympathy with the charm of motherhood and childhood, a sympathy which a knowledge of his personal family history and treatment of his wife makes hard to understand. At his best, when he was inspired—but not yet malignantly obsessed—with the captivating beauty and melting sweetness of Lady Hamilton, his portraits possessed undeniable charm and a freshness of approach and direct vision that were quite inspiring.

It is a further step down to Lawrence, Beechey and Hoppner. The charge of superficiality, which could too often be laid against Romney, became characteristic with them. They were too near the triumphs of Reynolds and Gainsborough and they used the formulas these men had elucidated, without possessing their instinctive sympathy and sincerity. They could, however, always be relied upon to produce portraits possessing charm and sweetness, whatever their defects in characterisation might be. Too often, however, sweetness is a fatal ingredient of the feminine portrait—it can so easily become so cloying as to rival the large-eyed, round-mouthed, luscious beauties which adorn our chocolate-boxes.

Of the Scottish artists of the period, Allan Ramsay possessed something, though only something, of the lightness of touch and sensibility of Gainsborough. He produced a number of refined portraits, full of spontaneity, in not a few of which the dour common sense of his national type can be discerned beneath their animated charm. It was his misfortune that he was the slightly older contemporary of Reynolds and Gainsborough, and was too old to benefit by their influence when he came into contact with it. It was Walpole who ventured the criticism, "Mr. Reynolds seldom succeeds with women, Mr. Ramsay was formed to paint them," a dictum which is interesting as expressing contemporary opinion of Ramsay's special gift but which would not have the support of those

who admire Reynolds' *Duchess of Devonshire* or his *Georgina, Countess Spencer*.

The name of his later fellow countryman, Raeburn, on the other hand, is usually synonymous with bold manly portraiture. We think of his direct and forceful square brushwork as suited above all else to the virile masculinity of a McNab, or the rugged massive features of Scotch lawyers or men of letters. Yet he frequently made contact with the native simplicity and genuine human qualities of the homely, natural, country breed of ladies he painted. Particularly was this the case with ageing or middle-aged women, and from his brush we have a delightful series of portraits from which gleam all the canny humour and shrewd understanding of life of the Scotch "Grannie."

The nineteenth century would seem to have been propitious neither to portraiture in general nor to feminine portraiture in particular. There are no nineteenth-century painters who stand out like Reynolds, Gainsborough and Romney for their ability to capture and imprison upon canvas the essential spirit of womanhood. The hard materialism of the nineteenth century was not so favourable for evocations of femininity as the light-hearted humanism of the eighteenth. The patronage of art had passed from the old aristocracy and landed gentry to a new class of industrialists who required for their delectation a different type of picture. If they did desire their artists to paint portraits, it was not the mothers of those large Victorian families who were painted, it was the man, the head of the house, that idol of the nineteenth century the successful merchant, who was glorified. When the glory of the golden age of English portraiture passed away there passed with it much of our power to delineate the charm of femininity.

Not that the Victorian era was without its successes in that direction. In such portraits as his *Mrs. Leonard Collmann* or his *King Alfred and His Mother*, that unrecognised genius, Alfred Stevens, recaptured some of Michelangelo's power and revealed that he at any rate could make a sensitive and sympathetic contribution to feminine portraiture. Some of the earlier portraits of Watts, the other Victorian artist who, in addition to Stevens, followed Reynolds in an emulation of the great Italians, are sensitive conceptions of our theme.

The virtuosity of Sargent enabled him to become the interpreter of contemporary womanhood which Reynolds had been

a century before, and his slick workmanship and cosmopolitanism was unrivalled in its interpretation of the Jew or continental of whom England was the adopted country. Millais was something of a tragedy. If only he had retained the high level of his sympathetic characterisation in the *Blind Girl* or *Autumn Leaves* instead of pandering to sickly sentiment and the pretty prettiness of *Bubbles* what might he not have given us in understanding records of the feminine spirit as it was revealed in such famous women, who were pioneers, as his contemporaries Florence Nightingale and Elizabeth Fry. Rossetti was enthralled by those aspects of feminine beauty presented by the tragic Elizabeth Eleanor Siddal and under her inspiration he evoked for us a type of opulently sensual, languorous beauty with which his name will always be associated.

In more recent days Wilson Steer has succeeded in recapturing some of the spirit of Gainsborough and McEvoy, was, until his untimely death, the recognised interpreter of "society" girlhood and womanhood. With Augustus John we associate portraiture of a more dynamic type and dark, flashing gipsy beauty, but we see in him an artist worthy of comparison with the best of the eighteenth century.

Though the English painters of womanhood have been so personal and individual in their conceptions they do not lie altogether outside the traditions in feminine portraiture. Reynolds saw his sitters through the medium of the older masters, and like the seventeenth-century Italians loved to represent them in historical and mythological costumes. Gainsborough, with his lightness of touch and splendour of colouring, was the English link in a chain whose other links are Rubens, Watteau and Renoir, whilst the frank vision and direct execution of Sargent and Raeburn can be linked to that of Velasquez and Manet.

CHARLES CARTER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

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BRIGHTER EUROPE.

THE face of Europe lost much of its ugliness during 1934. The change became mainly evident during the last two months, and had the agreeable effect of creating in the minds of level-headed people a feeling almost of confidence about the immediate future. Memories are short. Those who do remember the diplomatic nightmares of only twelve months ago are able to measure the improvement that has taken place in so short a time, and to offer an unreceptive front to the habitual prophets of war. Indeed, in December 1934 it was not easy to discover many serious, informed and experienced students of diplomacy who were greatly concerned about the possibility of war, near or remote, on a scale big enough to involve the Great Powers. The Gran Chaco, where Bolivians and Peruvians fight to the last man for no discoverable reason, is no doubt a symbol of something permanent in diplomatic practice; but in December 1934 the students of diplomacy were able to take a detached view of so minor a perversity. By contrast a year ago the serious people were disturbed by the European relationships.

It seems incredible that the face of Europe in twelve months could change so much. It was on October 14th, 1933, that Herr Hitler's Germany withdrew from Geneva, and defiantly advertised her intention never to return, except on conditions which she knew France was not likely to accept. To-day the terms on which Germany is prepared to return to Geneva are a matter of practical, even reasonable and promising diplomacy on the part of the British, French and German Foreign Offices. On December 5th, 1933, Mr. Litvinov stated that Russia had no intention of joining the League of Nations. To-day Russia is a member of the League of Nations. Also on December 5th, 1933, the Fascist Grand Council passed a resolution to formulate Italy's intention of leaving the League of Nations unless that organisation were radically and quickly remodelled to Italy's liking. To-day Baron Aloisi presides over a League of Nations committee which, sitting in Rome, has enabled the Germans and the French to reach an agreement on the Saar mines: a matter which had created one of the unpleasant issues in Western Europe.

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A year ago, in short, the League of Nations seemed to be dangerously near a collapse. Its expectation of life had become a subject of common discussion. To-day the League has recaptured a prestige as great as any it has enjoyed since it started functioning in January 1920. Not only is Russia for the first time a member, and Germany, partly as a consequence of that fact, desirous of returning to active membership; even the United States, whose aloofness from Geneva has been the world's biggest misfortune since 1919, is for the first time giving ground, small though as yet it be, for the hope that she may become a full and active member. If that hope were to be fulfilled, the peace of the world would become one of the world's probabilities during the next decade.

The American Ambassador in London, Mr. Robert Worth Bingham, gave a striking interview to the *Observer* (December 2nd last), in which he said: "An entirely new situation has arisen in the United States itself which makes possible now what has not before been possible (I frankly admit it) since the war. It is a commonplace of British and European comment on American diplomacy that the United States proposed the formation of a League of Nations, yet did not join it; proposed the formation of a world court, yet did not adhere to it; in short, that, in the words of the old epigram, the American President proposes, but Congress disposes. That criticism was fair; but it no longer holds. No American President was ever in the position Mr. Roosevelt is now in. He is not merely a democratic President. He is a National President. He is supported by two-thirds of the House of Representatives and of the Senate. No American President before him increased his majority at the mid-term election. But the point is this: he is not only wise, statesmanlike, and fair to every party and interest in the United States; you may depend upon it that he will never propose anything to Congress which he is not certain in advance Congress will endorse. That is the great new thing." Mr. Bingham's context, it is true, was not the possibility of an American membership of the League of Nations, but of an Anglo-American understanding. Yet the one is not far removed from the other.

The course of events in Europe during 1934 has been that of a parabola, the crest of which was reached when Herr Dollfuss was murdered on July 25th. At the beginning of

1934 public opinion in France, the Little Entente countries, Russia, and even Poland, seemed to be convinced that Germany was heading for war, with the deliberate and formulated programme of regaining all those territories lost in 1919 which could not be regained by other means: Alsace-Lorraine, the Polish Corridor, Upper Silesia; of defaulting upon the Dawes and Young loans; and of tearing up the Treaty of Versailles, including the Covenant of the League of Nations. On November 24th, 1933, Herr Hitler was understood to have demanded of M. François-Poncet, the French Ambassador in Berlin, that the Saar territory be restored to Germany without even waiting for the 1935 plebiscite. On December 3rd, 1934, at the Aloisi meeting in Rome, Germany agreed, in the event of the Saar on January 13th voting for restoration to Germany, to pay to France a sum of 900,000,000 francs in compensation for France's loss of the mines.

As one good turn deserves another an event took place at Geneva on December 5th which produced the unusual spectacle of the Great Powers of Western Europe, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, competing openly with each other in expressions of sweet reason, mutual confidence and harmony. The potential danger that had been commonly foreseen for the plebiscite of January 13th was that, as the sole forces available for the safeguarding of order in unpleasant contingencies were French forces, the very effect of such a dispensation upon German nerves and German ill-will or upon French imagination and French nerves might itself produce the very contingencies which in theory were to be provided against. At the Council meeting, therefore, which took place on December 5th, Mr. Anthony Eden arose and made this simple contribution to common sense: that the duty of safeguarding order in the Saar should be entrusted to an international force including neither French nor Germans. If France and Germany agreed, and if Italy and other neighbouring countries were willing to contribute to such a force, he conveyed the British Government's willingness also to contribute to it. His effect was immediate. Berlin, Paris, Rome, Prague, all welcomed the proposal.

On the following day Sir John Simon explained to the House of Commons the motives of that British suggestion, with the remarkable result that Westminster in its turn became a nest of cooing doves. The Labour Party suspended its normal

and primary duty of attacking the Government and instead supported it. Sir John Simon described his great achievement in these words: ". . . A Committee appointed by the Council of the League and presided over by Baron Aloisi has been sitting in Rome for the purpose of endeavouring to adjust a number of matters connected with or arising out of the plebiscite. The other members of this committee were representatives of Spain and of the Argentine Republic. . . . On a number of difficult questions, including certain financial questions which would arise if the Council, after considering the results of the plebiscite, decided in favour of the union of the territory with Germany, the Committee has been able to make agreed recommendations, which, as I understand, are approved both by France and by Germany. . . . But the Committee of Three did not make any recommendations on the subject of securing due order in the Saar territory during the period before, during, and immediately after the plebiscite, when it is so necessary that calm and quiet should be preserved in order that the plebiscite may be carried through in the proper atmosphere. . . . Mr. Knox stated that if an international force of the nature now proposed were to be stationed in the Saar in advance of the plebiscite date, the Commission would feel sure that order would be maintained, and that the plebiscite and the subsequent difficult period would pass off peaceably. It appeared at one time that the only source from which outside help could be drawn in case of emergency was France. But H.M. Government have always taken the view that because of the special interest which both France and Germany are bound to entertain in regard to the future of the Saar Territory, this was a most undesirable source to use, and in my previous statements I have made it plain that both France and Germany hoped that the plebiscite could be peaceably carried through without any such intervention. M. Laval confirmed this view yesterday at Geneva, insisting that the Saar was not a Franco-German problem, and he asked that the Council itself should assume the burden of deciding how the task of maintaining order in the Saar should be discharged. The Lord Privy Seal, on the instructions of H.M. Government, then intervened, with the most happy effect, urging that the right way to deal with the matter was not to provide for the introduction of troops from outside after trouble had arisen, but to see if it were not

possible now, with the authority of the Council and with the assent of France and Germany, to take steps to prevent the possibility of such trouble arising. This would be by introducing into the Saar, on the responsibility of the Council as a whole, before the plebiscite took place, an international body for the purpose of police duty, which should not include troops from either France or Germany. H.M. Government, if invited to co-operate, would be prepared to do so, but only on the conditions, (1) that other countries which are conveniently situated for this purpose were also prepared to provide a contingent, and (2) that both France and Germany assented to the proposed arrangement. H.M. Government had already been in communication with certain Powers about this suggestion, and M. Laval, who was attending the Council on behalf of the French Government, at once expressed their concurrence, and it is therefore agreed that, if the proposed international body can be constituted, the French will take no part in its formation. I have already received a reply to my inquiry from the German Government, who say that they consider that it would be very helpful to have this international force in the Saar both before and immediately after the plebiscite, and they approve of the condition that neither France nor Germany should take part. I can also announce that Italy will co-operate on the same conditions as H.M. Government."

There were many other symptoms of the better feeling in Europe. Whereas a year ago Herr Schacht went out of his way to advertise Germany's intention to repudiate her foreign debts, on October 30th last he informed the British long- and medium-term creditors that 55 per cent. of the proceeds of German exports to Great Britain would be made available for the payment of British exports to Germany and that the service of the Dawes and Young loans would in the future be adequately secured. And far from tearing up the Covenant of the League of Nations, Germany was contemplating a return to the League of Nations, Herr von Ribbentrop being commissioned by the German Government to visit London and Paris to prepare the ground for such return.

He arrived in London on November 8th, saw Mr. Eden on November 12th and Sir John Simon on November 13th. Though his conversation roamed vaguely and generally over the diplomatic field he did contrive to convey the hint that as

the Disarmament Conference at Geneva had failed to create a condition of equality by the disarmament of the ex-allied Powers, the essential object might be achieved by an alternative method : namely by Germany's rearming without the official knowledge of the Disarmament Conference or of the League of Nations, and on the basis of the *de facto* equality thus established withdrawing her notice of secession from the League of Nations. It was impossible for the British Foreign Office to take formal notice of such a suggestion from Herr von Ribbentrop. Yet there was no doubt that the British Government as a direct result of Herr von Ribbentrop's visit began to engage in discreet and informal inquiries in Berlin about the precise extent to which German rearmament had already proceeded, and about the precise extent to which it was further proposed to proceed. There was no commitment of any kind on the part of the British Government. It was, however, frankly recognised that Germany's rearmament was a fact that had to be faced, and that the general European interest would be better served if Germany were inside the League than outside it.

The stages through which the European transformation—for it was hardly less than a transformation—was accomplished in 1934 make an unusually cheerful subject of study. They also illustrate the continuity of human nature in its diplomatic aspect. The two main points of post-war diplomatic conflict between Germany and the Versailles Powers were reparation and disarmament. In the matter of reparation the problem was disposed of by Germany's ceasing to pay. When she had ceased to pay, the debt was posthumously forgiven her in the formal terms of the Treaty of Lausanne. How much mischief had been done by the reparation controversy can be measured by the contrasting and universal benefit to economics and finance that has been experienced since its elimination from the agenda of high diplomacy. The debt obviously never would have been forgiven on the spontaneous initiative of the Versailles Powers.

As 1932 was a decisive year in the diplomacy about reparation, so 1934 was a decisive year in the diplomacy about armaments. Before the beginning of 1934 Germany had been offered equality in verbal formulæ, but not in realistic substance. The Disarmament Conference, having survived two years of obviously hopeless work (obviously, because Germany

was the cardinal factor) had to be suspended when Germany refused any longer to participate. Attempts were thereupon made to recapture German collaboration, but the end in view was still substantially the same as before, namely that a treaty be drafted on a differential basis as between the Versailles Powers and Germany. It was at five o'clock in the afternoon of New Year's Day a year ago that M. François-Poncet, the French Ambassador in Berlin, called at the Chancellor's office in the Wilhelmstrasse and presented to him the text of a new French *aide-mémoire*, of which the central point of interest was the precise nature of the new offer therein made of "equality" for Germany. There clearly had to be an advance on the formula of December 11th, 1932, which was "that one of the principles that should guide the Conference should be the grant to Germany, and to other Powers disarmed by treaty, of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations, and that this principle should find itself embodied in the Convention containing the conclusions of the conference." That was a muddled formula, further damaged by the absurd condition that the actual grant, even of such equality, should be preceded by what was called a probationary period of eight years.

What by contrast was offered on January 1st, 1934, was in the one part a straightforward, unequivocal status of equality, accompanied by a suggestion that each country's armaments be subjected to equal, general and automatic control and supervision—a suggestion which indeed had been made by Herr Hitler himself on November 24th, 1933—but in the other part, although a "probationary" period by that name was no longer demanded, the actual achievement of German equality was to be effected by "stages," long enough to enable the existing Reichswehr of 100,000 men recruited for a twelve-year period of service to be transformed into a new army of 200,000 men recruited for an eight months' period of service. The German Government on January 19th rejected that French offer on the ground that the period of transitional "stages" would in effect be a probationary or trial period ; and that equality could not be otherwise granted satisfactorily to Germany than by an immediate equalisation of rights. There resulted a complete deadlock between the French and the German Governments, which the British Government, by means of a clever memorandum dated January 29th, 1934,

tried but failed to unloose. Sir John's essay contained, indeed, a typical British formula for accommodating German equality with French security : to the effect that the practical application of the principle of equality of rights was no less essential to an agreement than that of the principle of security. Sweet reason reaped its normal reward of satisfying neither party ; and thereafter the diplomatic search for an agreed basis of disarmament in Europe was dropped.

Up to the beginning of 1934 the underlying theory of the work which had been done on disarmament and which had been first propounded in the Treaty of Versailles was that equality of status between Germany and the other Powers should be achieved by the disarming of the other Powers down to Germany's level. That theory had never been translated into practice, and the pretence of thus translating it was finally dropped in the early days of 1934. Thereafter Germany proceeded to achieve *de facto* equality by arming up to the level of the Versailles Powers, in defiance of those Powers. Inasmuch as Germany was now controlled by such men as Herr Hitler and General Göring, who did not inspire confidence in their pacific intentions, it was hardly surprising that in the summer and early autumn of 1934 Germany's neighbours gave way to unconcealed alarm. By the end of the year the established fact of German equality by the means of increased German armaments had to be faced, and high diplomacy could therefore start its work again on the new and more realistic basis. Herr von Ribbentrop's visits to London and Paris were the first steps in that new diplomacy. It was the more promising because it had shed the accumulated nonsense of fifteen years. The better atmosphere was further improved by a concurrent chastening in the domestic feelings of Herr Hitler and his colleagues. Their experience had taught them that the simple Nazi doctrine was not so simple as they had thought. The notion that politicians are, or should be, the unquestioned dictators in all the affairs of their subjects, political, spiritual and cultural, had in practice provoked an unexpected strength of opposition.

THE HUMOUR OF TRADE BY GOVERNMENTS.

Half-way through December certain German business men, who for many months had had nothing more substantial to

live on than Nazi theories, were elated to learn that their government had hit upon a new device. It was the device of primitive barter as a method of restarting some of Germany's foreign trade. The elation was understandable, for in adversity any gleam of hope is welcomed, even though it be a mirage of words. It was made known that the German Government had arranged with the South African Government that an amount of wool, equivalent in value to some £2,250,000, should be exported to Germany, and that in exchange Germany should export to South Africa an equivalent amount of her heavy products, such as locomotives, rails, textile machinery, electrical equipment. It was concurrently made known that the United States Government had been invited to accept some £6,000,000 worth of German nitrates in return for an equivalent amount of American cotton. By such means, it was argued, German industry, which badly needed wool and cotton as its raw materials, might obviate the obstacle of the Reichsbank's lack of foreign exchange wherewith to pay for it ; and the ghastly roll of unemployed workers in Germany might thereby be reduced. On a smaller scale the German Government had already experimented with that theory by exchanging German coal for Brazilian coffee ; German chemicals, manufactured goods and livestock for Polish geese and timber ; and German locomotives for Bulgarian tobacco.

In certain countries of South-Eastern Europe such a device has for several years been a commonplace method of evading exchange restrictions. The Czechoslovak shoe-making firm of Bata, for instance, has accepted payment in kind for its exports to Austria.

There was no doubt about the fact of Germany's new enterprise. It was equally true that the Reichsbank's shortage of foreign exchange had been a worse obstacle to trade with Germany than had been the corresponding exchange difficulty in the case of most other countries. The deduction that was drawn, however, in certain alarmist British quarters, to the effect that if the system were further expanded it might constitute a danger to the interests of British exporters, seemed hardly to make sense. In essence all international trade is based upon simple barter. Cash and the exchanges are called into use only in so far as a balance of payment (that is the balance of both trade and services) is established

as a "favourable" balance on one side or the other. At the present time such balances due, for instance, from the Argentine to Great Britain are being remitted by the indirect means of buying the new Argentine loans with peso balances in Buenos Ayres and selling them for sterling in London. The pure barter system now explored by Germany could not in itself affect the problem of exchange remittances on account of balances of payment. It amounts to nothing more than an agreement that in practice there should be no "favourable" balance at all on either side; in other words, that exports should be exactly balanced by imports.

The real interest of what was taking place was that it constituted a reaction against the obvious absurdity whereby every government had been attempting by the political method of exchange restrictions and tariffs to establish an export surplus over every other government, in defiance of the elementary fact that a surplus on one side is the same as a deficit on the other. In practice the so-called barter system in itself makes no difference to the essential operation of international trade. It merely registers the comic climax of governmental interference with trade by putting back the book-keeping technique of international trade to its primitive and clumsy beginnings. If the governments would only leave it at that and allow the traders to rebuild the simpler system whereby money is used as a token of value, they might revert to their own theoretic and original purpose as ministers to the common interest.

JAPAN AND NAVAL EQUALITY.

The European controversy about German equality has its counterpart in the relationship of the three chief naval Powers. Human life is remarkably consistent. For more than six months the representatives of Japan, the United States and Great Britain have conferred in London with a view to preparing for next year's naval conference. Since 1922 the United States and Great Britain have had the treaty right to a 5:5:3 ratio of strength over Japan. Japan, as she has often announced during the course of those conversations, has made up her mind that she will no longer accept a status of inferiority in strength. December 31st, 1934, is the first date on which the Washington Treaty can be denounced by any signatory.

As these lines were written Japan had not formally denounced the Treaty, but her spokesmen in Tokyo had informally announced that she would do so before December 31st.

As the new year opens, therefore, the alternatives are an Anglo-American diplomatic front against Japan; or the establishment of an equal treaty basis between the three parties. The London conversations themselves were largely nugatory, as they needs must have been. The only real issue was clear, but could not be discussed. The United States Government has left no doubt that its inclination is for an Anglo-American common front. The British Government, true to its abiding principles, held on to the last moment to the hope that Japan could be won voluntarily to accept an agreement on Anglo-American terms. The Japanese Government delayed its denunciation of the Washington Treaty, and in the meantime took an academic interest in the evolution of Anglo-American relations. One of the essential difficulties of the problem is that the United States is West, Japan is East, and Great Britain, despite her own Mr. Kipling, is both. Yet it is as clear as anything can be in this troubled life that a full Anglo-American alliance, operative for all purposes, good and bad, right and wrong, would automatically impose peace on the world. Many other equally obvious truths do not necessarily, by reason of their truth, translate themselves into practice; for human life is consistent also in the permanency of human muddle.

THE MARSEILLES AFTERMATH.

It was on October 9th last that King Alexander of Yugoslavia and M. Barthou of France were murdered. The further consequence of that crime could be measured when Mr. Yevtich, the Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia, addressed the Council of the League of Nations on December 7th. Yugoslav opinion in a crescendo of indignation had seized upon Hungary as the real culprit; and by the very violence of its emotion had created a further danger in Europe. There is a somewhat morbid interest attaching to the precise catalogue of Mr. Yevtich's charges, as made by him on December 7th. In effect he accused Hungary of direct responsibility for the murders and gave a detailed history of the general terrorist activities organised by Hungary.

It was not surprising, life being what it is, that the Hungarian representative, Mr. von Eckhardt, was thereby in his turn stung into aggressiveness. In the true spirit of war, whether waged diplomatically at Geneva or physically on the battle-field, he not only attempted a total defence of Hungary against every charge; but also attempted a few charges himself. He observed that the Yugoslav charges against Hungary were a political manoeuvre which should be obvious to the Council. The death of King Alexander, which was deplored in Hungary with the same feelings of horror and disgust as elsewhere, was due, not to foreign plotting, but to the domestic situation in Yugoslavia and the revolutionary bitterness to which the internal régime of that country had given rise. He went on irrelevantly to expose the injustices of the Treaty of Trianon and the legitimate irredentist feeling to which it gave rise in Hungary. With Croatia, Mr. von Eckhardt naïvely remarked, Hungary desired nothing but friendly and neighbourly relations.

There was no doubt, as Dr. Beneš observed, that Hungary was not blameless. Dr. Beneš indeed strongly supported the Yugoslav case. He said that attempts had been made in Slovakia on the northern Hungarian frontier against the integrity of Czechoslovakia, and that if an act of terrorism occurred on that frontier he would immediately appeal to the League. There existed in Central Europe, he said, a tension which might grow worse. King Alexander had been assassinated by terrorists who had lived for long in a neighbouring country to Yugoslavia; and the authorities of that country had not taken the necessary precautions. Mr. von Eckhardt, he observed, desired the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia and that was also the purpose of the terrorists. Hungary had similarly fomented terrorism in Slovakia and had tried to revive it after it was crushed by the Czechoslovak Government in 1929.

Fortunately the European atmosphere in December 1934 was such that even Balkan animosities could not for long disturb it. On December 8th, after a mollifying speech from Mr. Eden, a Yugoslav-Hungarian reconciliation was enacted before the League Council.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

December 12th, 1934.

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CHAMBERLAIN AND SOUTH AFRICA.*

Mr. Garvin's third volume, like both its predecessors, surpasses our expectations. As the work advances towards completion the reader's admiration grows. Every page is alive, every portrait skilfully drawn, every incident dramatically described. If it is not the greatest of our political biographies, it has, at any rate, no superior. Those who belong to a different school of thought from Mr. Garvin, and occasionally find the eulogies of his hero a little excessive, join in gratitude for a work which will be studied so long as Englishmen are interested in their Parliament and their Empire.

A brief notice can only deal with the two outstanding themes of a volume of over six hundred pages, and must pass over such fascinating subjects as Chamberlain's share in the settlement of the Venezuela quarrel, his handling of the anxious problem of French rivalry in West Africa, and his launching of Australian federation. That the Liberal Unionist leader was not merely Secretary for the Colonies, but virtually co-Premier, is illustrated at many points. If his Departmental

* J. L. Garvin, *Life of Joseph Chamberlain*, Vol. III—1895-1900. Macmillan, 1934. 218.

duty, as he interpreted it, was to bind the Empire more closely together by help, consultation and understanding, it was also his right, as the most important member of the Cabinet after the Premier, to study the even larger question of its security. While Salisbury remained content with the traditional principle of combining a strong navy with a free hand, his colleague, alarmed by the hostility of Russia and France, pined to escape from isolation by a working partnership with Germany and the United States.

The latter, he was aware, did not make alliances with European Powers; but why should not England and Germany agree to stand together? He had no love for the Kaiser, and he shared the anger of his countrymen at the immeasurable folly of the Kruger telegram. Diplomacy, however, has often to turn sharp corners, and, with Russian aggression in the Far East and an impending French challenge on the Upper Nile, the friendship of the strongest Continental Power seemed increasingly desirable. The story of Chamberlain's conversations with Hatzfeldt and Eckardstein was revealed many years later by Eckardstein himself, and in more detail in the vast collection of German documents published after the war. Since no material was found in our Foreign Office by the Editors of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, we have all waited eagerly for Mr. Garvin to produce the Colonial Secretary's side of the story. Here at last are his Memoranda, and most interesting it is to read them.

The initiative came from the German side, yet there was no considered principle behind it. German policy at this time was made by the Kaiser, Bülow and Holstein. But the ruler was not invariably in agreement with his advisers, was not always informed of what was going on, and was himself as changeable as a weathercock. The immense issues at stake, the bright hope of a genuine understanding, and the tragic bungling of the whole episode by the Wilhelmstrasse, make a lamentable story. The Germans let their opportunity slip, convinced that a better opportunity would recur when Franco-Russian hostility to England should come to a head. France and Russia, however, instead of fighting us, became our diplomatic partners, and it was realised too late that it was Germany, not England, who needed friends. Chamberlain had warned her that, if we could not reach an agreement

with Berlin, we should turn elsewhere. It was not his fault that the hint fell on deaf ears.

The larger part of the volume is naturally devoted to South Africa, for the Raid occurred a few months after Chamberlain's appointment to office, and henceforth his main anxieties centred in that inflammable quarter. Mr. Garvin is an admirable portrait painter, and the protagonists come to life again under the vigorous strokes of his brush. The rugged grandeur of Kruger, hugging the independence of his little country to his breast, is generously recognised. Rhodes appears as an unattractive Colossus with feet of clay. Milner's temperamental failings are as fully realised as his strength. Indeed, the candid reader will probably conclude that a man so impatient and so prone to drastic solutions was the worst possible choice for a post requiring exceptional tact and insight into natures widely differing from his own. There were no abler or more devoted men in the service of the Empire than Milner in South Africa and Curzon in India. Both were tragic failures for lack of certain human qualities indispensable for successful dealing with other races and types of mind. That the Salisbury Cabinet was aware of the High Commissioner's faults comes out again and again.

Compared with Milner the Colonial Secretary was patient and conciliatory. He liked the Boers, Mr. Garvin tells us, while Milner's dislike of them was unconcealed. Chamberlain was sincerely anxious to avoid war, not merely because he was bound, as Milner was not, to think of the scowling faces surrounding us, but because he realised the terrible nature and consequences of a conflict. Over and over again we find him pouring water into the High Commissioner's wine, partly because he disliked being rushed, and partly because he desired to carry public opinion with him if things ever came to the worst. It is typical of the two men that Milner broke off the fateful Bloemfontein Conference a few hours before the arrival of a telegram ordering him not to do so, and that, when the war had come at last, Chamberlain repeatedly rejected the demand for the suspension of the Constitution in Cape Colony. The Colonial Secretary comes out better than some of us expected, the High Commissioner even worse.

Can we, then, adopt Mr. Garvin's view that, apart from one or two minor slips, Chamberlain's handling of the South

African situation from beginning to end was wise, and that he was in no way responsible for the coming of war? At this distance of time it is no longer a question of the party to which his readers belong, but of the evidence available. Is the new version of his dealings with Rhodes and his underlings complete? In some quarters it is still believed that the Colonial Secretary was more deeply involved in the conspiracy of the Rand than he ever confessed. That Jameson was going to bolt across the frontier without orders neither he nor Rhodes ever dreamed. But that was only the premature explosion of the powder magazine. Chamberlain knew that a revolution was about to break out at Johannesburg, and he did nothing to stop or postpone it. Kruger's régime was oppressive enough, and his intransigence was exasperating; but it was playing with fire for the Colonial Office to countenance a revolt under the auspices of Rhodes and his associates. At best it was a gamble, and failure was bound to make the trouble worse.

Even if we accept Mr. Garvin's story of the Raid as complete, can we really regard his hero's handling of the situation after the collapse as entirely adequate? To dispel the angry suspicions of the complicity of the Home Government the affair should have been probed to the bottom and fitting punishment meted out. Certain telegrams demanded by the Parliamentary Committee—and here printed—were refused by Hawksley, Solicitor to the Chartered Company, and the demand was not pressed. Chamberlain condemned the actions of Rhodes in the House of Commons, but vindicated his personal honour. Rhodes remained a member of the Privy Council, and the Chartered Company continued to exist. Such mild treatment of one of the gravest of political offences strengthened the position of Kruger and determined even the more progressive Boer leaders to prepare for a second attack. The time to prevent a war was in 1896 and 1897. Nobody can be sure that firmer action in punishment of the conspirators would have averted the catastrophe. But it is beyond dispute that our policy at that critical time rendered a conflict far more probable. That Chamberlain was a great man and a great force no reader of this wonderful biography will deny. How far he was also a statesman of the first rank is another matter, on which different opinions will continue to exist.

G. P. GOOCH.

THE TORRINGTON DIARIES.*

The Hon. John Byng, afterwards Lord Torrington, who was born in 1743, was a page to George the Second, then a soldier for rather more than twenty years and afterwards on the staff of the Inland Revenue Office at Somerset House. Between the years 1781 and 1794 he made a number of tours and he left diaries describing them in 24 volumes. Mr. Andrews came across one of the volumes of the diaries and, after diligent search, he has succeeded in tracking down twenty-one of the others, scattered about in all sorts of places, including the Bodleian, the public libraries of Luton and Cardiff, and a number of private houses. The present volume is prefaced by a general introduction by Mr. John Beresford which is lively and interesting, though sometimes tantalising, for it refers often to volumes not yet published.

The present volume covers tours to the West in 1781 and 1782, a tour to North Wales in 1784, a tour to Oxford, Woodstock, Stratford and the neighbourhood in 1785, a tour in South Wales in 1787, and a tour in Sussex in 1788. Byng was an antiquarian and he took notes of churches and great houses. He was very angry with Lord Guildford, who would not let him into Wroxton. "Very rude this, and unlike an old courtly lord. Let him either forbid his place entirely; open it always; or else fix a day of admission; but, for shame, don't refuse travellers, who may have come twenty miles out of their way for a sight of the place." His reflections at Hereford are melancholy about the future of the cathedrals.

Here I watched the cathedral bell for morning prayers, where I attended, almost alone, at an hasty, slovenly service; the whole church has been daubed over with an yellowish composition, and now that the wind and rain have scower'd some of the pillars, you may perceive that they were formerly painted, *al fresco*, in a grand and beautiful manner; but the days of religion (or, as now call'd of superstition) are past; and in a few years, all the cathedrals must tumble down; how they have lasted so long, appears to me a miracle.

He regrets in one place that the rage for collecting brasses is leading to the pillaging of churches, but unfortunately he does not set a good example himself, for he tells how he took advantage, when the clerk's back was turned, at Stratford, to steal a tessellated tile at the head of Shakespeare's gravestone.

* Edited by C. Bruyn Andrews. Vol. I. Eyre & Spottiswoode. 18s.

His comments on customs and social conditions reflect the sentiments of a kindly man with a dread of the destruction of tradition and a keen eye for poverty and distress. He says at Burford that the old yearly procession commemorating a battle won by the Saxons was "lost in the poverty and distress of the lower people." "The upper kind of people (even the young farmers) go to London to enjoy the play and the dance; nor will the latter condescend to the old merriment of the Malt House." In another place he notes that Welsh harping was declining with the influence of the Methodists. At Gloucester he saw one of the new large workhouses built on the model of the great workhouse at Bristol which became famous and was copied all over England, but he did not admire it: "I shudder at the sight of the (noble as they are call'd) new county infirmaries, and parish workhouses, built with a grandeur and loftiness exceeding most other edifices." He had already visited "the pin manufactory, belonging to Mr. Jeffries, and repined at the unwholesome trade, and the sickly looks of the workmen." He disliked the Welsh. "To me the Welsh appear'd as inferior to the common English in civility as they are in stature and comeliness; particularly the women who are very ugly and dwarfish." Like Cobbett he deplored not only the loss of old customs but the changes that were coming over England with better communications. Here is a good description, written when in Wales:

But a few years since travellers were scarce in this country and post-chaises unknown; now, the country in these southern parts is become a high road to Ireland; Newton and Swansea are bathing places; and strolling players, with all other mischiefs, will get, nay, have got among them—Their language kept them innocent and at home; that lost, they read, hear plays, debauch and emigrate. Whilst the Erse, and bad roads lasted, the Scotchman kept to his country. But when people read of riches, and luxuries, they will hunt after them, tho' they perish in the pursuit.

For terse English the passage would be hard to beat.

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ROUMANIA AND HUNGARY.

One cannot approach a Seton-Watson history of Roumania* in any but an expectant and grateful spirit. It at once

* *A History of the Roumanians. From Roman Times to the Completion of Unity.* By R. W. Seton-Watson. Cambridge. 25s. net.

becomes, of course, the standard work. There is no other man who could have done it. Dr. Seton-Watson's learning, his precision, his grasp of detail, yet his unclouded outline and perspective, his documentation, become more and more impressive and attractive as each new work comes from his pen. His exposition and language become clearer and simpler. His matter is more interesting even to non-specialist readers by the very reason of his detail and mastery. He acknowledges his debt to the "whole library" of works by Professor Nicholas Iorga, of Bucarest University, on Near Eastern, Byzantine and Turkish history; but his own work is the first complete survey by a British authority of Roumanian history from its obscure origins down to the contemporary achievement of national unity. The book therefore stands by itself in the English language as a full and authoritative history. But it is more than that. Dr. Seton-Watson never was, probably never will be, satisfied by the cold and fish-like detachment one sometimes associates with the business of an historian. Since he first descended some thirty years ago upon the Magyar field and as an anonymous Scottish traveller scattered the prevalent delusions about Hungarian government, he has never ceased to feel and to write about Slovak, Serb and Roumanian maltreatment by their Magyar overlords.

In the present book we are shown how the Roumanian spirit survived the appalling trials to which it was subjected. The story ends with the Treaty of Trianon. The author merely refers to the problems of reconstruction thereafter to be faced, and still, one may add, to be faced. But he observes—and the reader of his book will have the complete evidence before him—that "her chief asset is the Roumanian peasant, who amid adverse political surroundings has shown a virility and endurance that border on the miraculous" (p. 554). With his characteristic array of evidence, the author reveals the obstacles which for many centuries held back the development of the Roumanian people, obstacles mainly deriving from the rivalry and interference of powerful neighbours in the south, north and west. We are given the full story of the sufferings of the two Principalities (namely of Moldavia and Wallachia which were the forerunners of the united Kingdom of Roumania) at the hands of the Turks, Magyars, Russians. Roumania's

importance in the whole Eastern Question is made fully clear. The Transylvanian problem ("which provides the key to a right understanding of the Roumanian problem as a whole") is explained with special care, with the incidental effect of throwing a flood of light (not before thrown by any work in English) upon the unhappy history of the Roumanian Orthodox and Uniate Churches. The Great War and the two Balkan Wars that preceded it provide a subject about which general ignorance is not quite so complete: but when Seton-Watson's history is read, most of those who read it will recognise that they knew far less even on that subject than they suspected.

Mr. Macartney's book on Hungary* takes us to the other side of the frontier. We know by now what to expect from Mr. Macartney as an historian. He is a good scholar, and an industrious. He writes well. He has no prejudices (which perhaps is only another way of expressing his scholarliness). His recent book on Minorities showed that such gifts as his can take him into dull subjects without making him dull. And Hungary is a far from dull subject. Indeed, among students of the European political jungle, the mere mention of the name Hungary produces, in spirit if not in physical fact, something dangerously like a free fight. All students of Hungary know their Seton-Watson, Mr. Macartney among them. What Mr. Macartney distinctively gives us is a reliable and readable summary of such relevant facts about Hungary as need be known by those who wish to form views worth forming when the Hungarian question comes to a head, as it is almost bound to do, in the next few years. Mr. Macartney regards Hungary as "quite unlike any other country in Europe." In common with many British people he admires this essentially Asiatic race that finds itself in the middle of Europe. His sympathy is not incompatible with a frank recognition of the political and diplomatic difficulties created by the extremist agitation for revision. His own view is a little vague. He writes on the one hand that "the claim of Hungary to a form of revision which should bring the political line into closer conformity with the ethnographical is a very strong one" (p. 332). But on the same page he observes: "I am in complete accord with some of the

* *Hungary*. By C. A. Macartney. With a Foreword by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher. Benn. 21s. net.

strongest opponents of Hungary's claim to revision." He distrusts mere frontier rectifications and repeats the tentative thesis he argued in his book on Minorities that "the only true solution is to readjust the relationships between nation and State."

G. G.

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A MODERN MYSTERY CYCLE.*

It has been noted more than once that an outstanding career often implies the sacrifice of other potentialities that would have led to equal eminence in very different realms. If the dominant activity is checked, these may burgeon, even late in life. Thus it is not as surprising as it might at first seem to find Don Sturzo, hitherto known for his political and social work and writings, devoting some part of his exile to a series of mystical poetic dramas which, while they reveal the constant philosophical and spiritual background of his action, denote also a return to dramatic and literary interests of his youth. The *Ciclo della Creazione** is a Christian tetralogy on vast and ancient themes: the Fall of the Angels, the Creation of Man, the Redemption, the Apocalypse; which, often treated (one recalls at once Dante, Milton, Madach), inasmuch as they are basic admit of perennial re-interpretation. In Don Sturzo's hands they have a fresh profundity that does not detract from the essential dramatism of plays written for actual performance as modern Mystery Plays.

In *The Angels*, these are represented in accordance with tradition as pure intelligences, and the fundamental motif is the encounter of the finite intellect with the "mystery of the infinite." By power of thought the newly created Angels enter into possession of the created universe; they become conscious of its limits, and begin to wonder over the existence of a transcendent Power, not yet revealed. When the revelation of Deity comes, Michael adores, Gabriel is aflame with a mystical ecstasy, but Lucifer rebels at the very thought of a Power his understanding cannot compass. At that moment the figure of Ahriman appears as his shadow, to

* *Il Ciclo della Creazione*, by Luigi Sturzo. Bloud & Gay, Paris. 24 francs.

which he eventually unites himself—symbol of the duplication that comes about in any spirit aware of choice between good and evil, of the seduction of evil, of the “will to death.” The “everlasting war of good and evil,” has begun with the war in heaven.

In *Adam* the same positions are repeated. The opening scenes have a charming and virginal grace. When Adam awakens to find Eve at his side, the whole universe rejoices at the first love-song, the first human kiss. But Lucifer, hidden in the garden, smiles to think:

That this new creature,
Long looked-for, prophesied,
To pierce the mystery of the infinite
Will not be able.

The first breath of temptation comes when Eve enquires: “But what is good and evil. . . . And what is death?” With the fall, Adam and Eve pass into mortal life, into history; the second drama ends with the apparition of Uriel, bearing in a chalice the blood of Abel, as though in celebration of the Mystery of Death. Such the opening half of the Cycle of Creation. The *Redemption* and the *Apocalypse* conclude it—the *Redemption*, a study in Lenten greys and purples, in which the souls in Limbo echo the drama of the Redemption as it is enacted on earth, and the *Apocalypse* in which, in a world where the dominant temptation is no longer thirst of the mind but thirst of the senses, and Ahriman reigns as Antichrist, preparing to unite humanity to himself as once Lucifer, and hidden away, a lonely girl watches over the last Host, consecrated by the last priest, all the earlier *motifs* are woven in skilful pattern, and the symbolic figures of St. John, Enoc and Elijah—the three who according to medieval legend never knew death—appear to announce the end of all. And the Cycle is completed, with liturgical austerity and grandeur, by the end of the world and the beginning of the “new heavens and new earth.”

Such is the *Ciclo della Creazione*, in which discerning critics have seen, not without reason, the most important Italian literary work of the century, and indeed, one of the major poems of our time.

BARBARA BARCLAY CARTER.

MARLBOROUGH.*

In Volume I of his masterly treatise upon the life of the first Duke of Marlborough, Mr. Winston Churchill traced the chequered and contentious events of his career down to the death of William III in 1702. Thereafter, at the age of fifty-two, Marlborough commenced those military operations and feats of diplomacy upon which his reputation rightly rests. In his second volume, Mr. Churchill is principally concerned with the first four campaigns, ending in Marlborough's frustration by the Dutch on the field of Waterloo in 1705. During these years

Marlborough led England as Captain-General and, with Godolphin, as virtual Prime Minister. He conducted by personal negotiation with sovereigns and potentates the essentials of England's foreign policy. He was the mainspring of the Grand Alliance and its many signatory States. His tent or headquarters were the clearing-house for all the ceaseless disputes and tangles of the whole confederacy against Louis XIV. He was the essential link on which everything was fastened. He supplied whatever there was of command, of cohesion and design.

Marlborough received ultimately from William III his full trust and confidence, and after his death became the executant of William's policy. He was, throughout, the central figure of the Grand Alliance, and Mr. Churchill adequately shows his unifying influence, his control of policy and especially his amazing perseverance in the field. Marlborough never enjoyed unlimited power of command. Three of the campaigns described in this volume were frustrated by the veto of the Dutch and the victory at Blenheim was only made possible by the concordance of Prince Eugene. On at least four occasions in 1702 chances of decisive success were thrown away by the refusal of the Dutch Deputies to countenance a full-scale engagement. The reluctance of the Deputies has been continually denounced. But, as Mr. Churchill points out, it was not due to personal timidity but to strict instructions from the States-General not to risk a battle that could possibly be avoided. Indeed this direction was fully in accord with the prevailing ideas of waging war. Sieges and the slow

* *Marlborough. His Life and Times*, by the Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill. Vol. II. Harrap. 25s. net.

wear and tear of the enemy were the main business of operations. The strategy of Marlborough, Eugene and Villars, designed to force on advantageous terms a decisive encounter, was novel to the age, and any text-book general of the time must have been content with Marlborough's powers. His capture of the fortresses along the Meuse was a brilliant example of contemporary methods.

The March to the Danube and the Battle of Blenheim form naturally a climax to the volume. Mr. Churchill's narrative is fresh and vigorous, and contains several divergences from the usual account. Prior to the passage of the Danube, Marlborough effected a junction with the Imperial troops under the Margrave of Baden; and it has been generally assumed, even at the time by the assiduous Dr. Hare, the Duke's chaplain, that each enjoyed command of the combined forces on alternate days, and that Marlborough was careful to attack the Schellenburg on his own day, July 2nd. Quoting a report written in April by the Archduke Joseph to the Emperor, Mr. Churchill points out that "the alternation only affected the ceremonial and the watchword." The two generals were in command of independent armies, but there was a definite understanding that Marlborough should direct the campaign. As early as June 27th the Margrave had agreed to the attack.

There is no doubt that Marlborough's will prevailed continuously throughout these days, and that, while taking pains to carry his co-general with him, he acted during them and afterwards reported upon the battle as if he were the sole commander-in-chief.

The Margrave was absent from the Battle of Blenheim, at the Siege of Ingoldstadt. Mr. Churchill differs from the usual view that, in Professor Trevelyan's words, "he was induced to undertake" the siege by Marlborough and Eugene. It was, rather, an agreeable coincidence. The Margrave had long favoured the capture of Ingoldstadt. Eugene offered to conduct the siege in person. But the Margrave "desired above all things" to do so himself, and Marlborough's choice was easily made.

The decisive factor in the Battle of Blenheim still remains the subject of considerable discussion. In his *Tactics and Strategy of the Great Duke of Marlborough*, Mr. Hilaire Belloc voices the view that Tallard's dislocation of his centre by

the concentration of his forces on his right wing in the village of Blenheim enabled Marlborough to destroy the weakened centre by the shock of a cavalry charge. It is peculiar that Mr. Belloc should regard as an error the attack on Blenheim which made possible such dislocation. Sir John Fortescue also regarded the charge as decisive. In the view, however, of Mr. Churchill, and also of Professor Trevelyan, expressed in his *England under Queen Anne*, the result was already certain before the final charge began. Having crossed the marshy Nebel, Marlborough's centre was drawn up in great strength in a novel array of horse and foot. It very gradually advanced, the foot alternately covering and being covered by the cavalry and both supported by artillery. In his long and careful description of the battle, supported by the accounts of eye-witnesses, Mr. Churchill is able

to expose the delusion that the battle of Blenheim was gained by a cavalry charge. It was gained by the onset of a largely superior force of all arms working in close accord with one another at a decisive point. At least an hour elapsed between Marlborough's advance from the foot of the slope, before the moment of the final charge was reached. And by that time the result could hardly be doubtful.

Although this second volume will appeal to the general reader even more than the first, it is no mere popular biography. It is the outcome of very considerable research and contains a large quantity of new material from the Blenheim papers. Mr. Churchill's judgment of men and events is fair and weighty, although at times aggressive. This volume exhibits his usual vigour and lucidity of expression; and the campaigns give great scope for his powers of descriptive writing. There are a large number of excellent maps and plans in addition to plates and facsimiles.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

The Master. A Study of Michelangelo, by J. Howard Whitehouse and Colin Roake*, is an unpretentious but none the less welcome addition to the vast literature concerning the greatest creative artist in history.

* Oxford University Press, 1934. 10s. 6d.

In this slender volume, beautifully printed and richly illustrated, young students and travellers will find an admirable introduction to the life and character of a man who, alone of mortals, reached the stature of genius in sculpture, painting and architecture, and was no mean poet as well. To think of Rome is to see in undimmed memory the towering dome of St. Peter's and the frescoes in the Sistine chapel of the Vatican. But Florence also breathes his great spirit, and even those who can never cross the Alps may learn something of his combination of delicacy and strength. Our authors regard him, as he regarded himself, primarily as a sculptor. "Had he been a free agent, he would have devoted all his time to sculpture. He was not a free agent, and perhaps this was well." Next to Classical Athens, Renaissance Italy is the most marvellous single chapter in the flowering of the human spirit; and Michelangelo was the greatest of its children.

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In view of the approaching Naval Conference the publication of Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond's *Sea Power in the Modern World** is singularly appropriate. It contains a brilliant and dispassionate application of first principles to the determination of naval strength. Sir Herbert discusses the requirements of the Maritime Powers essentially in relation to the fundamental purpose of sea power. He regards air power simply as "an important new instrument of sea power." As in all questions of armaments, the problem of security is uppermost. Sir Herbert would welcome the co-operation of national navies under a collective system. But failing this, he has to consider the more immediately practical question of the part played by naval armaments in providing individual security. This involves an enquiry into the purpose of sea power. He separates the "natural" maritime State which is necessarily dependent upon sea communications from the naval Power whose object is expansion and prestige. Legitimate sea power is proportionate to such dependence. Naval needs are comparative and a basic strength should be fixed for the smallest Power, and not as at present an arbitrary one for the largest. Sir Herbert suggests Germany's eight 10,000-ton ships as a basis and proceeds to allocate to the other Powers proportionate strengths which are smaller but no less effective than those which at present exist. He is a strong advocate of the 10,000-ton battleship. The great size of the modern capital ship, reaching to 35,000 tons, is largely determined by the existence of the 8-inch-gun battle cruiser. Protection of trade routes is a principal function of cruisers and therefore their strength should be "dictated by the number of points, fixed and moving, which require and can be given protection." In such work the small cruiser is equally effective, and the abolition of the battle cruiser would permit

* Bell. 10s. 6d. net.

a reduction in the size of the battleship and allow to each Power all the cruisers they need. Doubtless not all naval experts will agree with Sir Herbert, but the importance of his work as a rationalisation of sea power upon a basis of needs will long remain.

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*Flower Decoration** by Constance Spry is a delightful and stimulating book. One's imagination soars. But alas! in the small houses of the present day there is not room for such handsome arrangements, and this is really counsel for the large mansion, the ballroom and the public luncheon. Some beautiful illustrations at the end of the book, nevertheless, suggest style and variety which may well be copied on a smaller scale. The argument, to begin with, is against the conventional bunch of a dozen "blooms" just thrust into a vase, any vase. The flowers selected are very various and are picked in a large garden or conservatory, or purchased at a West End florist's. But to combat the idea that only the rich can aspire to such fine decoration, rhubarb leaves, spurge, seakale in flower, are used on occasion. In a chapter on "Table Decorating," some fun is poked at the dinner-tables of our mothers and our grandmothers, but many of the subsequent suggestions are much on the same lines, with the velvet or satin table-centre left out, perhaps.

There are chapters on colour schemes in which varieties of flowers to enhance the colour of the room are chosen. For instance: "In a white room an alcove or niche filled with a solid group of white lilies has the effect of a high light in a picture . . . instead of adding leaves to our flower groups, we actually remove much of the foliage" (for instance from white lilac and syringa) "to allow the colour of the flower to predominate."

There is an amusing story of Mrs. Spry's schooldays, when at a table-decorating competition the author managed to get some pink monthly roses, which she

. . . used lavishly. I must admit that I added a few bows of pink ribbon. There was no doubt about the pinkness of that table. It won a prize, and I was accordingly elated, until a school-mistress . . . addressed me in this manner: "You have been awarded a prize for your table, I see, but I should like to point out to you that the guests at dinner-parties are usually of more mature age than you have yet attained, and your decorations would be trying to the complexions of most of one's guests. I hope in future you will show a greater consideration for the feelings of others in this respect."

There is a chapter on parties, another on aids to flower arrangements and methods of preserving them, with some admirable advice on London gardens and their special difficulties. Finally, an alphabetical appendix of all the flowers mentioned in the book, with hints on their culture, brings a most readable book to its close with fine illustrations.

* Dent. 12s. 6d.

in the lofty galleries of the House of Lords and of the House of Commons looking down on the men beneath me who were debating proposals for the better government of India. They were debating a very great question. They realised its gravity and its complexity. Time after time they would say that it was the greatest problem with which Parliament had had to deal. Often they would repeat that it concerned 350,000,000 people varied in religion, in stage of culture, and in race. Yet these men were only legislators. They were doing their task with a characteristically British thoroughness. They had already been seven years over it and it was not yet complete. They had sent out some of the ablest among them to India to study conditions on the spot. They had brought to England some of the ablest of Indians to inform them of their views and feelings. Upon all this the Government had drawn up a statement of the conclusions they had reached. That statement had been most exhaustively considered by a Committee of both Houses of Parliament—again assisted by the best Indian advice. And now the report of that Committee was being debated by these highly experienced legislators beneath me. But as they debated—and debated with all the dignity and the solid sense of men with immense experience of public affairs—the reflection did keep coming to me that, after all, these were only legislators, that they were dealing only with the political, commercial and financial aspects of our relations with India, and that there were other and more important aspects of those relations which were outside their purview, but which were emphatically within the province of the Sovereign when she wrote that letter to Lord Derby.

What was being discussed was the degree of self-government which might at this stage be given to India. The idea of gradually leading Indians to govern themselves had for long been in the minds of Englishmen. We had not gone to India for the sake of dominion. We had not set out with any Napoleonic idea of establishing an Eastern Empire. We had gone there for trade. Dominion had been thrust upon us. Partly owing to the disordered state of India on the break-up of the Moghal Empire, partly owing to the rivalry of other traders, Portuguese, Dutch, and French, our own traders had been forced, first to arm themselves, then with their armed forces to take part in the politics of India, and finally

to establish their supremacy. But it is noticeable that all through we tried, whenever we could, to work with the people of the country. To this day one-third of India is ruled by its own rulers. Two-thirds of the armed forces by which India is defended and internal order maintained are Indian. And in a total population of 350,000,000 only 150,000 are British.

Moreover, among the British governors there had always been those who looked forward to the day when having established order and set Indians in the way of governing themselves, as they had done for centuries, we should leave them to control their own destiny and ourselves revert to our original purpose of trade. This was obviously in consonance with the whole temper of our national character. The exercise of dominion over peoples who are capable of governing themselves is directly against the grain of our innate disposition. It comes more naturally to us to help people to help themselves than permanently to govern them. And it is noteworthy that in the last half-century those Viceroys who have come to India after holding the Governor-Generalship of a self-governing Dominion have been the most zealous in advocating more self-government for India. Lord Dufferin fifty years ago saw the need of having some organ through which Indian public opinion could express itself and so encouraged the retired Indian Civil Servant, Mr. A. O. Hume, to found the Indian National Congress. Under another ex-Governor-General of Canada, Lord Lansdowne, both the numbers and the powers of the Indian members of the Legislative Council were increased. And a third ex-Governor-General of Canada, Lord Minto, was the prime originator of the Morley-Minto reforms which still further increased the share of Indians in the government of India.

But it was during, and as a result of, the Great War that the most important step forward was taken. It had confidently been expected by many—and, in particular, by the Germans—that as soon as Great Britain was engaged in a serious war India would seize the opportunity to throw off what was supposed to be the "yoke" which Great Britain had forced upon her. But India, instead, instantly and wholeheartedly threw in her lot with Great Britain. Southern Ireland rebelled, but India stood by the Empire from the beginning to the end of the war. Partly in gratitude for this generous action, but more particularly because, as a result of

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

*Prince Louis of Battenberg** is a very sympathetic account of Prince Louis' career in the Royal Navy, from the day he entered as a cadet in 1868 until his resignation from the post of First Sea Lord in October 1914. No one is more qualified than the author, Admiral Mark Kerr, to write upon Prince Louis' great and sincere services to the navy and the nation. The author served in 1881 as his Midshipman of the Watch, and in subsequent years held a number of subordinate commands under Prince Louis, including two years as his Flag Captain and Chief-of-the-Staff in 1905-7. Assisted by Prince Louis' own account of his early experiences and his long descriptive letters, Admiral Kerr describes his exceptionally interesting work afloat and visits abroad. Attached, for example, in 1875 to the *Serapis*, he accompanied the Prince of Wales on his Indian tour. The author stresses his natural aptitude for command, his great work in reorganising the whole system of naval intelligence and his share of responsibility for the modernisation of the navy prior to the war. Admiral Kerr deals at length with the campaign of calumny which resulted in Prince Louis' resignation in 1914, and emphatically denies his responsibility for the disaster of Coronel. This book is the tribute of a friend to Prince Louis' "great name for loyalty, efficiency and leadership."

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To lovers of *The Bridge of San Luis Rey*, Mr. Thornton Wilder's new book *Heaven's My Destination*† will be a shock. It is a story set out in bald Americanism, with no beauty of surroundings, no "culture," all things and people raw or half-baked. And yet, perhaps, it is as good and as clever a reproduction of the atmosphere of the Middle West as *San Luis Rey* was of Spanish South America. The young hero is a fundamentalist and he goes through processes of cutting his teeth on all the people he meets as a traveller for a book-selling firm. And yet on looking at him closer there is much beauty of character, thoughtfulness, generosity. The training at Shiloh Baptist College has given him a good start and at all crises, of which there are many and most amusing ones, he is guided to act with effect and with a deeper meaning. He does not reach his "Destination" at the end of the book, so we may look for further developments in a future volume.

* Longmans. 10s. 6d. net.

† Longmans. 7s. 6d.

THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

FEBRUARY, 1935.

INDIA AND THE EMPIRE.

WHEN the draft of the Proclamation announcing the assumption by the Crown of the direct government of India was read to Queen Victoria she raised objections to its wording. In a letter to Lord Derby, she wrote: "The Queen would be glad if Lord Derby would write it himself in his excellent language, bearing in mind that it is a female Sovereign who speaks to more than 100,000,000 of Eastern people on assuming direct government over them." . . . "Such a document," she added, "should breathe feelings of generosity, benevolence, and religious feeling." The draft Proclamation was accordingly altered so as to be in strict harmony with the Queen's wishes. It contained a passage on religion: "Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects." And it proceeded to state that all the Queen's Indian subjects should be impartially treated by the law, and live unmolested in the observance of their several religions. Thus amended it was sent to Lord Canning, the first Viceroy of India, and a few months later the Queen wrote to him: "May the publication of the Proclamation be the beginning of a new era. . . . The Queen rejoices to hear that her Viceroy approves this passage about Religion. She strongly insisted on it."

What Queen Victoria said about Lord Derby's draft Proclamation will surely have to be said about the new Constitution for India after it has finally been framed by Parliament. It will be the best that the wit of man can devise. But to it that something extra will be needed which will mean far more than the Constitution itself. Before it is actually brought into operation someone speaking on behalf of our country as a whole, and not only in the political aspect, will have to give just that touch which Queen Victoria gave, and which turned a dry official document into a living message from the heart of England to the heart of India.

This was the thought that constantly came to me as I sat
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the stress of the war, the innate love Great Britain has for freedom was being expressed with unusual vehemence, an announcement was made by the British Government in August 1917 that the goal of British policy in India was responsible government.

There was discussion in the War Cabinet as to the precise terms of the announcement. The formula drawn up by Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, stated that Government contemplated "the gradual development of free institutions in India with a view to ultimate self-government within the Empire." But some considered that the term "self-government" had the technical meaning of a Parliamentary system of government on a democratic basis; and Government did not want to commit itself to that particular system. So they adopted an alternative formula drawn up by Lord Curzon which stated that their policy was "the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the Administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." The expression "responsible government" was thus deliberately substituted for self-government.

The Government of the day was sadly lacking in the sense of occasion, and this momentous announcement was made by Mr. Montagu in answer to a—put up—question across the floor of the House. But it stated in carefully chosen language for the first time that we were looking forward to a time when India would be able to govern herself. A big step in that direction was taken by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. And the last seven years' deliberations and the recent debates in both Houses of Parliament have all been concerned with the further steps which may be taken in the direction of that goal.

As regards the Indians themselves, what they are chiefly concerned about is their future position in the world. Their status is at stake. This ancient and proud people must naturally be sensitive about their standing among the nations of the world. That standing, of course, depends mainly upon themselves. They may make India an object of respect or an object of contempt. But it depends also upon us British. We can raise or lower India in the eyes of the world. And we should not forget that as we raise or lower India, so do we

ourselves rise or fall in the opinion of the world. And here we have been unwise in talking so much of "holding" or "losing" India, of "giving up," "surrendering" India, as if dominion over India was a bone over which we were engaged in a dog fight. Nor has it been wise, in my opinion, to lay such stress upon keeping India within the Empire, giving the same impression of holding on to her by force. Much of the discussion has turned upon safeguards. And true it is that every Constitution—even the unwritten Constitution of this country—has need of safeguards. Besides which we have every justification for ensuring that the work we have done in unifying India, establishing order, maintaining internal peace, and protecting her from outside aggression, shall not be undone and India left to lapse into the condition of China. But some of the discussion on safeguards has gone beyond this. It has given the impression that what we are chiefly concerned with is clutching tight hold of India as men would of a rich possession. India is often spoken of as "the brightest jewel in the British Crown." And many debaters on the safeguards have spoken as if India had to be guarded, like the Crown in the Tower of London, against possible burglars. So long as India is regarded as a possession she can never be satisfied with her position in our eyes.

At one time there was much talk of her future position being that of "Dominion Status." In the report of the Select Committee this expression dropped out. And in subsequent debates it seems to have been assumed that Dominion Status would imply the removal of the British Army from India, and India's capacity to defend her frontiers. But we should be careful of pressing this argument too far. For what Dominion *is* capable of defending itself? Neither Canada nor Australia could defend herself against an attack by Japan. Nor could South Africa hold her own against an attack by Germany. All the Dominions, without exception, are dependent for their defence upon the British Empire as a whole. And if a British Army is maintained in India for the defence of India it is no less true that the Indian Army permanently maintained is always available for Imperial Service. Long before Canada or Australia were able to put trained, armed and well-organised forces into the field an Indian Army Corps was fighting in France. These things should not be forgotten when the question of status is being discussed.

The most recent term used is "partner." India is to be a partner in the British Commonwealth of Nations. This is moving along in the right direction. Thirty years ago Lord Curzon spoke of British Dominion in India as being founded upon neither military force nor civil authority, but upon the eternal moralities of righteousness and justice. That was good as far as it went. But we have moved beyond that. We now speak less of dominion and more of partnership. And deeper than the austerities of righteousness and justice we seek for foundations in the basic affinity of man with man and nation with nation.

Lord Willingdon struck the right note when he added the word "willing" before partner. India was to come into willing partnership with Great Britain. That is the whole point. And this addition of the word "willing" before partners brings me back to the point on which I was earlier insisting, that the men whom I was watching in debate were only legislators and not representatives of the nation in all its aspects and activities. They were doing their job with thoroughness. But that job was limited. It did not go beyond legislation. It dealt only with political and commercial relations. It had nothing to do with the finer relations which must necessarily subsist between Great Britain and India. For a full consideration of our relationship with India we have to leave the realm of statesmanship and enter the realm of kingship which includes the social, personal and spiritual relations which are so much more fundamentally important than the political, commercial and financial relations which occupy so much of the attention of us commercially-minded and politically-experienced Englishmen.

We went to India for trade and the trade with India is of great value to us. We were drawn into political relations with her, and those political relations have recently been receiving marked attention. But the personal and social relations between British and Indians both in England and India will become increasingly intimate in the future now that Indians come more to England, and especially since the women of India have begun to come out of their seclusion and enter public life. So also is it with the spiritual relations. Not only have Christian missionaries gone out to India and through direct propaganda, through education, through the establishment of hospitals, and through special care for the destitute,

the outcast, and the backward striven to impart the spirit of Christ—not only is there this spiritual going out to India, there is also a spiritual indrawing from India, a fuller study of the sacred books of the Hindus and Buddhists and of the Koran of the Muslims and a livelier appreciation of great Hindu, Buddhist and Muslim personalities. In addition there is an increasing flow of spiritually-minded Indians to England to make us aware of the intense spirituality of India.

These more important social and spiritual relations are established outside the walls of Parliament. They are created by public opinion. And public opinion on them has to be formed by, among others, men like myself, who have lived and worked in India and who in the past, through sheer ignorance, have grievously sinned against the canons of good taste which should be observed by every Englishman in India with peculiar rigidity, but who now see how outrageous has been their conduct and would desire to give their countrymen the benefit of their experience in order that better relations may be created in future.

Englishmen in India inherit from their predecessors much that is noble and great. And of that they may be rightly proud. They also inherit from the coarser times of a century and two centuries ago much that is simply vulgar and pompous. And the latter must be expelled as vehemently as the former is retained. Gentler relations must subsist between British and Indians. Indians are gentlemen; and should be treated as such. Especially at this particular moment when they are on the point of acquiring a new status in the world and are in a peculiarly sensitive condition the most delicate care should be taken not to offend their susceptibilities.

This much is of pressing necessity on the personal and social side of our intercourse with India. And in that direction the Royal House of England have given a most splendid lead. But one final touch—and that the most important—has yet to be considered. Queen Victoria showed a sure instinct when she insisted on inserting a clause regarding religion in her great Proclamation. The Indians are essentially a religious people—the most instinctively and naturally religious people in the world. What they value most are their spiritual ideals. And Queen Victoria took the exactly right line in this most delicate matter by showing faith in her own religion, but respect for theirs.

As a Christian people it is naturally in the spirit of Christ that our hearts go out to the Indian people. In the spirit which governs those who realise that we are all members one of another, that together we form one world-community, that the welfare of India is our welfare and her harm our harm—in the spirit of compassion, of rejoicing with them that do rejoice and grieving with them that grieve—in the Christmas spirit of active and initiative goodwill the heart of the British people does after these centuries of connection go out to the people of India.

For the time and method of expressing these sentiments towards India we must show a finer sense of occasion than we displayed when we made the momentous announcement that self-government was the goal of our policy. But we have at hand in the Sovereign a most fitting instrument for their expression. And a most appropriate time and method might be by Message or Proclamation at the opening ceremony of the Legislature to be brought into being under the new Constitution.

The King of England has been crowned Emperor of India in India. In his last Christmas Day address he told us how he has been sustained during the last twenty-five years by the affection of his people. Among his people, none are more capable of affection than the Indians. And we may safely trust the King in his own time and in his own way to follow the example of Queen Victoria and give just that touch which will warm the heart of India and unite her willingly with us in that fellowship of free nations of which the King spoke.

The altar will then be laid; and may grace from above descend upon it to fire the soul of each till the practicality of England stirs the meditativity of India into fruitful activity and the spirituality of India gives poise and point to the strenuousness of England. Then each, stimulated by the other, will contribute of its very best to the welfare of humanity, and India will rise to that proud position among the nations to which her gifts of the spirit incontestably entitle her.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

THE ROME PACT.

WHEN M. Laval left Paris for Rome on January 3rd he began a journey which seems likely to become as distinct a landmark in the post-war history of Europe as was the initialling of the Locarno agreements on the shore of Lake Maggiore eight years ago. In one way the two events are a little like each other. With the experience of Locarno behind it, the new event may have better luck in its aftermath. The fact is that both events resulted from an exercise of international goodwill; but after Locarno the devil got well, and the promise of "equality" to Germany was never carried out. At any rate there is no danger of the Rome Pact being ruined by the denial of equality to Germany. Germany has rearmed to *de facto* equality, if not farther.

Every succeeding European problem is the same in its essence as the one that went before it, though the form may be different. The problem is to find a method whereby the Great Powers may live and let each other live, and let the small Powers also live. M. Laval's visit to Rome was the first official visit paid to the Italian capital by any French Foreign Minister since the war. It is sixteen years since the war ended. For so long a time the French and Italian Governments have been so seriously at issue on the main essential problem of Europe that they have not once been able to exchange the ordinary diplomacy courtesy of an official visit. In Article 13 of the 1915 Treaty of London, France undertook to give to Italy, in return for Italy's entering the war on the side of France, certain territorial concessions in Africa. Partly as a result of the post-war difficulties with Italy, France has refrained till now from satisfying Italy's resultant expectations. Italy for her part has almost consistently pulled her weight against the causes dearest to French interests and to French wishes. She has fished as it were in the troubled waters of the Danube; and for her own purposes has encouraged both German and Hungarian revisionist aspirations. In naval matters the chronic disagreement between Paris and Rome, the latter demanding equality in naval strength and the other denying it, has been a main stumbling-block to a general naval understanding. That quarrel had the effect of limiting the scope of the Washington Treaty of 1922. It ruined the naval conference of 1927. It reduced to a farce the

naval treaty of 1930. What then after sixteen years has made so great a difference that M. Laval could go to Rome and on January 7th, 1935, could sign with Signor Mussolini an agreement of substantial present value and future promise for the whole peace of Europe? In diplomacy humour plays its part as greatly as in other fields of human life. Those Frenchmen who thank Herr Hitler for the Rome agreement are not being funny. Frenchmen are not inclined to be funny on this particular subject. If it had not been for Herr Hitler's devastating parade of the possible effects of treaty revision it is likely that Signor Mussolini would have continued to cast his nets in Berlin, Budapest and Vienna, and that the cancer of treaty revision would have grown unchecked. Two years ago even Dr. Beneš had to concede in public statements that some measure of treaty revision was inevitable. To-day the cause of revision is dead, and not regretted. It was Herr Hitler who was fated unwittingly to warn Europe that once the politicians began meddling with frontiers, there was no telling where the process might end except in some sort of chaos, probably in war.

The origins of the Rome agreement just concluded are traceable to the spring of 1934. The first international reaction to Nazi Germany's ill-concealed designs upon Austria was formulated last spring. The position then was that German propagandists were promising the 300,000 Slovenes in the Trieste district that Germany's object was to restore them to Italy, and were promising the 180,000 Germans in South Tyrol that they in their turn would be restored to Germany. Dr. Dollfuss staked his career—and, as it later proved, his life also—on the independence and integrity of Austria. Signor Mussolini, whose relations with Hungary had been friendly since 1927, saw in the Hitler-Dollfuss combat an opportunity for the fulfilment of his own Danubian dreams. He cultivated good relations with both Herr Dollfuss and General Gömbös. On March 17th a three-Power series of agreements was duly initialled in Rome, the express object being to "concert together on all the problems which particularly interest them, and also on those of a general character, with the aim of developing, in the spirit of the existing Italo-Austrian, Italo-Hungarian and Austro-Hungarian treaties of friendship, based upon the recognition of the existence of their numerous common interests, a concordant

policy which shall be directed towards effective collaboration between the European States, and particularly between Italy, Austria and Hungary. To this end the three Governments will proceed to common consultations, each time that at least one of them may consider this course opportune." Only a few weeks earlier, on February 17th, Herr Dollfuss had induced the Governments of Britain, France and Italy to issue a common statement to the effect that they took a "common view as to the necessity of maintaining Austria's independence and integrity in accordance with the relevant treaties."

When on July 25th Herr Dollfuss was murdered by German Nazis the question of Austria's independence became of cardinal importance to European security. On it seemed clearly to depend the peace of Europe. Last summer European nerves were as jumpy as one remembers them to have been since the war ended. That circumstance was directly responsible for a renewed declaration about Austria by the three Great Powers. During the session of the last League Assembly at Geneva, M. Barthou, Dr. Schuschnigg, Dr. Beneš, Sir John Simon and Baron Aloisi discussed a new text for such a declaration, with the result that on September 27th this statement was issued: "After having proceeded to a fresh examination of the Austrian situation, the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and Italy have agreed in the name of their Governments to recognise that the Declaration of February 17th regarding the necessity of maintaining the independence and integrity of Austria in accordance with the Treaties in force retains its full effect and will continue to inspire their common policy."

The fatal journey to Paris embarked upon by the late King Alexander of Yugoslavia at the beginning of October last symbolised the importance to the whole of Europe of the Austrian question. When on October 9th he and M. Barthou, the French Foreign Minister, who had gone to welcome him, were assassinated in Marseilles, it looked as if the Austrian problem could not be solved. It had been M. Barthou's intention to go to Rome immediately after his conversations with King Alexander in Paris. Suddenly, however, in the last two months of 1934, the general atmosphere in Europe greatly improved. One of the reasons for that improvement was the success of the League of Nations Committee which was sitting

in Rome under the presidency of Baron Aloisi, discussing the problems attendant upon the impending plebiscite in the Saar territory. On December 3rd one of the worst of those problems was solved by Germany's agreeing, in the event of the voting on January 13th resulting in the restoration of the Saar territory to Germany, that she would pay to France the sum of 900,000,000 francs as compensation for France's loss of the mines. The pace at which the good work in Europe thereupon increased was an unusually cheerful thing to behold. It was on December 5th that Mr. Anthony Eden made the famous offer at Geneva which led to the formation of an international army for police work during the Saar plebiscite to the exclusion of both French and German troops: a great stroke of simple common sense.

It was now hardly surprising that M. Laval felt himself able to go to Rome to fulfil the mission denied to M. Barthou. He reached Rome on January 4th, and within three days the new Pact of Rome was signed. It was signed at 8 p.m. on January 7th. Signor Mussolini on that occasion said that the pact was "very important" and that it constituted "a common Franco-Italian attitude in possible eventualities." He added that the instruments signed were "in no way directed against anybody, but have been made in the hope that they may serve not to narrow but to widen the horizon of European life so as to rescue us from the distress in which the peoples have been too long plunged." M. Laval was still more enthusiastic. "We may now," he said, "without reserve and in an atmosphere of mutual comprehension freely face the examination of all the problems which impose themselves upon the attention of all Governments that desire to maintain order in Europe."

The immediate importance of the pact, great as it was, was not so great as the opportunity it opened for a general improvement in the whole field of European relationships. It opened the prospect of Germany's return to the League of Nations and of an agreed European limitation of armaments based upon a system of security evolved within the framework of the League of Nations. Certainly Europe has had nothing so good to contemplate since the Locarno Treaties were negotiated.

The Pact itself settled the long-standing colonial account between France and Italy, and also laid the foundation for a

general European understanding both about the Danubian problem and about disarmament and security. As this paper was written the official text had not been published, but an official summary was issued from Rome on January 8th. That statement showed that Article 13 of the Treaty of London is to be fulfilled by frontier rectifications in Eritrea and Libya. The new frontier separating Libya from French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa will leave in Italian territory Aozou and Guezenti, and in French territory Bardai and Tecro. The area of territory now recognised as belonging to Libya is approximately 43,000 square miles. The frontier between Eritrea and the French coast of Somaliland is to be rectified by a line which will give Italy a strip of coast facing the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. France recognises Italy's sovereignty over the Island of Doumetrah. The boundary commissions are to delimit the frontier and to draft agreements of friendly and neighbourly relations. A Protocol on the Tunisian question stipulates that the Conventions of 1896 are to be prolonged, so far as the question of nationalities is concerned, until the end of 1965. All the individuals born in Tunisia of Italian parents up to that date will be of Italian nationality, with, however, the right for those born between 1945 and 1965 to opt for French nationality on reaching their majority. In regard to Italian schools the Protocol stipulates that they shall be maintained up till March 28th, 1955, when they will become Italian private schools subject to the local French scholastic legislation. In regard to the other questions the Conventions will be prolonged until 1945, after which a return to common law will come progressively into force in accordance with a Convention to be drawn up. Independently of the régime fixed by this Convention, it is agreed that the Italians who before 1945 shall have been admitted to the liberal professions shall preserve this right during their lifetime.

In the matter of Austria and Central and Danubian Europe the two Governments agree to recommend to the States principally interested the conclusion of an agreement of non-interference in their respective internal affairs and a reciprocal undertaking not to foment or favour any action which aims at an attempt by force upon the territorial integrity or the political and social régime of one of the contracting countries. The agreement is intended in the first instance to be concluded between Italy, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia

and Austria—that is to say, between all the contiguous neighbours of Austria and Austria herself, and is to be open to the adhesion of France, Poland and Rumania. The French and Italian Governments, in consideration of the necessity to maintain the independence and integrity of Austria, agree that should this independence and integrity be menaced, they will consult between themselves and with Austria on the measures to be taken. Such consultation is subsequently to be extended by France and Italy to the other States in order to invite their concurrence. Next, in regard to colonial economic interests, the statement says that Signor Mussolini and M. Laval have recognised the expediency of developing the economic relations of their metropolitan territories with their colonies in Africa and with the neighbouring countries, and of agreeing to take the dispositions necessary to realise such collaboration. Under this head falls an Italian participation in the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway. On the question of armaments it is stated that “The Italian and French Governments, referring to the Declaration of equality of rights of December 11th, 1932, have found themselves in agreement in their recognition that no country can modify by unilateral act its obligations in the matter of armaments, and that in the case of this eventuality being established they should consult each other.”

No sooner was the pact signed than the general diplomats, official and unofficial, professional and amateur, from one end of Europe to the other, began discussing the old, old thing: how could the Rome achievement be made the precursor of a general European system of security? It happened that the Saar plebiscite was due to take place at that very time, on January 13th. The League Council met in Geneva on January 11th with the prospect of continuing to sit throughout the week following the Saar plebiscite. Now it was of the essence of the new attempt at a European settlement that Germany should participate in it. Her experts had already attended the meetings of the Aloisi committee in Rome. What could be better than that she should take her seat on the League Council for the restricted purpose of the discussions about the post-plebiscite problems in the Saar: namely the method whereby Germany should pay the 900,000,000 francs agreed by Germany at the Aloisi meeting on December 3rd last to be paid as an indemnity for the mines

and other French State property; the use to be made of the 1,200,000,000 or 1,500,000,000 French francs circulating in the Saar; the safeguarding of contractual and property rights obtained during the period of the League's administration; the service of the Saar's outstanding foreign debts, and the like? It would be to Germany's interest to discuss such questions at Geneva. If she could be got to Geneva for such a purpose she might perhaps be kept there for other purposes as well, especially as everybody knew that she would be only too pleased to be back at Geneva on a good enough face.

The problem of faces, however, is one of the abiding problems of diplomacy. Sir John Simon had been spending a fortnight's holiday at Cannes during the period of the Roman discussions. It was a busman's holiday. He spent much of his time at the end of a telephone wire to Rome, Paris and London. When the pact had been signed and while he was in Geneva attending the League Council meeting he caused a certain inquiry to be made in Berlin. It was obvious that if the full fruit of Rome was to be gathered, it would be necessary for Europe to agree on a new system of security. To that end it was obviously necessary for Germany to return to the Disarmament Conference and to the League of Nations. It was obvious that Germany should be asked to return. Yet it was also obvious that Sir John Simon could not put himself in the position of asking, still less of urging, Germany to do so, even for the restricted purpose of taking part in the discussion of Saar problems. What therefore happened was that the British Foreign Office caused an inquiry to be made in Berlin, merely to ask whether Germany intended to take her place in the following week at the meeting of the League Council with a view to helping in the discussions about the Saar. By making such an inquiry the British Government contrived to drop a hint without incurring responsibility or the supposed indignity of making a suggestion. Such is the stuff of diplomacy.

Nor was that particular exercise of finesse the only contemporary illustration of one of the abiding difficulties of European diplomacy. French thinkers began thinking about the new circumstances created by the prospect of Germany's return to the fold of European civilisation. It was known in Paris as elsewhere that the question of German “equality” was no longer a practical question for the Disarmament Conference. Germany was in fact now an equal. She had

rearmed to the level of the other European Powers despite Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. Now M. Flandin and M. Laval were men who were disposed to call a spade a spade. If in fact Germany had rearmed, it was of no use arguing about whether Germany should rearm. On that criterion M. Flandin and M. Laval were more elastically minded than had been M. Doumergue and M. Barthou. The practical question, therefore, to the minds of MM. Flandin and Laval was how to make the most of the inevitable recognition by the Versailles Powers of the fact that Germany had gone beyond the limits prescribed in the military, naval and air clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. If, however, they, MM. Flandin and Laval, were in principle ready to recognise existing facts, it did not follow that the French Chamber or French public opinion were ready to do so. Indeed, at the very moment when Sir John Simon was making his inquiry in Berlin, M. André Géraud ("Pertinax") in the *Echo de Paris* was accusing M. Laval of contemplating a flagrant form of treason to his country. The practical problem for M. Laval therefore was to obtain from Sir John Simon a definite statement about Great Britain's willingness to enter into new commitments in the cause of European security so that he could appear before the French Chamber and say something like this: "It is my policy to abandon Part V of the Treaty of Versailles. The reasons why I invite you to support my policy are that Part V of the Treaty of Versailles has been made inapplicable by reason of the fact that Germany has violated it, and that I can offer something far more attractive to you to take its place, namely a definite written undertaking by the British Government that in the event of a German aggression against France, a British military, naval and air force of such-and-such dimensions will be immediately mobilised on our behalf."

Now it is one of the difficulties of French statesmanship that whereas most of the problems of French diplomacy would be automatically solved if such a statement could be made to the French Chamber, in practice it is not easy to obtain a commitment of such a kind from any British Government. The British Government has as great a horror of written commitments as the French Government has a liking for them. No brilliance of French diplomacy, for instance, could ever have obtained from the British Government a written commitment that British troops would take part in an international force

for the preservation of law and order in the Saar territory during the period immediately before, during and immediately after the Saar plebiscite. Yet the British Government enthusiastically did what it never would have committed itself in advance to do, and what indeed in advance it had refused to do. It is broadly true to say that there are hardly any limits to the action that British diplomacy will in an emergency perform provided that there is no written commitment to perform it; just as there is hardly any limit to the actual losses France will gladly suffer provided only there is a full written international guarantee to save her from such losses. In the circumstances here being described it was the clear concern of French diplomacy to obtain a written commitment about the future sanction of security in Europe. The Locarno treaties had no sanction. There was nothing more than a commitment that in certain circumstances the signatory Powers would do something, unspecified. To a French mind a commitment to do something without specifying what, is no better than no commitment at all. The new Rome Pact had no sanction. To consult what to do in an emergency is in French minds to trifle with the thing. If, therefore, Part V of the Treaty of Versailles was to be given up, for the reason which to every Frenchman was both decisive and excellent, that it could no longer be maintained, it was necessary for the signatories of the Locarno treaties to say precisely what they would do in an emergency such as was provided for in those treaties.

With the promptness and clearness that nearly always characterise French diplomatic thought, the essential post-Rome considerations were thus diagnosed: (1) The Locarno agreement must be elaborated, or an alternative agreement substituted, so as to prescribe the precise military action to be taken by the signatories in the event of an aggression by any party; (2) Germany must return to the League of Nations; (3) there must be an agreement for the limitation of armaments in Europe, in which provision must be made, in conformity with the French memorandum of April 7th last, for guarantees of execution (see CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, May 1934, pp. 622-3); (4) that the agreement must be framed within the League of Nations and must be reciprocal and equal in its application. Such a programme was logical, simple and comprehensive. It embraced every known postulate of

French diplomacy. If the Treaty of Versailles was to be revised to the extent of removing from it the military, naval and air clauses, then the method must be that of Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which allows, indeed almost prescribes, "the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable." To revise the text of the Treaty of Versailles by the Covenant means was a wholly excellent proceeding according to the French view. How then was the transition to be made from Germany's violation of the Treaty of Versailles to an agreed revision of that treaty in precisely the like sense? It happens that on January 12th *The Times* published a leading article, which had been carefully preceded (as there was reason to know) by an exploration of official thought in both London and Paris. At the end of that article there appeared this remarkable passage: "It is agreed that Germany cannot properly free herself from the restrictions of the disarmament clauses by unilateral action. But the solution of a formal deadlock might be found and a new starting-point for negotiation might be provided by unilateral action on the other side. It is open to any beneficiary of a settlement to surrender the advantage he enjoys. It is open to the victorious Powers which signed the Treaty of Versailles to give up their advantage, fully or in part, without laying themselves open to the accusation of treaty-breaking. A new way of moving towards a settlement of the chief problem of European politics might be for Great Britain, France and Italy to suggest to the other States which benefit from the Treaty of Versailles that they should agree to a joint declaration to the Council of the League on the subject of the military clauses contained in Chapter V of the Treaty. The communication to the League might be on the lines that the Powers concerned consider that after sixteen years of peace the moment has arrived to declare that the restrictions imposed by the Treaty should operate no longer against any signatory Power, provided only that some general system of limitation be agreed upon and made applicable to all States without discrimination."

One of the interesting aspects of that suggestion, made without any open official inspiration in London, was that it was known to have been approved in advance by important elements of French official thought. It is one of the charming experiences that fall to students of diplomacy that such

absurdities as the one suggested in the passage quoted above are quite often perpetrated in a spirit of the greatest solemnity. The same sort of thing happened before at the Lausanne reparation conference: which achieved an elaborate device for staging a generous, unilateral cancellation of Germany's debts by Germany's creditors. Those creditors knew that anyhow Germany had stopped paying and would never pay again. As in reparation so in armaments, it is the consistent achievement of the diplomacy of the Versailles Powers that it can with great good sense and with a perfection of ceremonial presentation say this sort of thing to Germany: "You refuse to pay your debts? So be it, provided this be my decision, not yours. You disobey my order not to arm? So be it, provided that the decision in that sense be taken unilaterally, not by you, but by me." One even heard quite serious people argue that if the case were put to Germany in such a way, it would be the more difficult for Germany not to return to Geneva. And that argument was obviously sound, because there was no reason why Germany should not want to return to Geneva, on such terms.

Granted, then, the return of Germany to Geneva, how was the new sanction to be extracted from Great Britain? This paper had to be written before M. Laval and M. Flandin came to London. No Frenchman concealed the difficulty he felt. He knew that British opinion had so completely seen the point about aeroplanes that it was now inclined to ignore all else. An innocent Briton, for instance, said to a Frenchman: "Who cares about long-range guns nowadays?" And the innocent Frenchman answered: "Perhaps the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine?" None the less it was clear that British opinion being so concentrated on the air menace, a start might be made in the air. It would be impossible for British enthusiasts to go farther than France had gone in proposals about air limitations, the prohibition of bombers and the like. Mr. Baldwin's famous speeches about the air peril suggested to many minds on both sides of the Channel that a beginning in the new attempt at agreed disarmament might be made by the formulation of a scheme of air force limitation embodying the common measure of promises, pretensions and proposals announced since 1932 from Berlin, Paris, Rome and London. It was suggested in some quarters that the Locarno machinery should be extended specifically

to include the contingency of aggression by air. Such a contingency is already logically implied in the Locarno treaties, for the dropping of bombs on foreign territory is hardly in logic distinguishable from an infantry attack on foreign territory. Yet there are those in France who quote Talleyrand's famous observation : "*Ça va sans dire ; mais ça ira encore mieux en le disant.*"

What in short was produced in Europe by the signature of the Rome Pact was an enforced renewal of the attempt to safeguard European peace by juridical sanction. It was the common view in all diplomatic quarters that if success was to be achieved the old shibboleths would have to be dropped and new words found for the same old things. To mention the Geneva Protocol of 1923 is to raise a storm of disgust in Great Britain. Yet the essential principles of that Protocol, so long as the name of the Protocol itself be suppressed, are now accepted in London as in Paris as a promising subject for the new and refreshed diplomacy launched by the Pact of Rome. If sanctions against aggression are to be agreed, it will be necessary to face again the old bogey of defining an aggressor. The Litvinov definition adopted by the Security Committee of the Disarmament Conference in 1933 seems good : "that a State be deemed to have committed an aggression if it has committed any one of five acts—namely : (1) declared war on another State ; (2) invaded another State with or without a declaration of war ; (3) attacked another State by land, naval or air forces with or without a declaration of war ; (4) navally blockaded the coasts or ports of another State ; or (5) provided support to armed bands which have invaded the territory of another State despite the appeal of that State that such support be withdrawn."

GEORGE GLASGOW.

January 14th, 1935.

NATIONALISM AND PEACE.

NOT very long ago, I was invited to attend some meetings of a newly formed organisation called the "International of Nationalists," which were taking place at my hotel in Berlin. The title intrigued me. Did it indicate a new move by Dr. Goebbels, a subtle reinforcement of the pacifist smoke-screen behind which, some say, the rulers of Germany are pushing forward their plans for world hegemony ? Was it a device to spread the gospel of Hitlerism over the world ? Were the anti-Reds of the world to unite under the opposite of the famous proletarian slogan ? At any rate, I decided to go.

It was not very easy to follow the somewhat chaotic proceedings. At every possible opportunity two indefatigable anti-Semites endeavoured to convince the conference that if only Jewish influence could be eliminated by international action, universal and perpetual peace would be assured. A voluble delegate from Italy maintained that only a Fascist international organisation, presumably under the supreme leadership and certainly under the patronage of Signor Mussolini, could save the world. The principal organiser, a young and able German professor of international law, discouraged both these views, and for himself strenuously denied any wish to form a Brown Nazi International. But the introductory text of a pamphlet he had distributed to all participants stated that "Nationalists of all countries are united in the belief that the idealistic-socialistic-nationalism of the folk community will create, by overcoming the nationalistic-imperialistic nationalism of the Power-State, the basis of a supernatural peace order," and thus seemed at any rate to indicate that the principles of National-Socialism should attain universal recognition.

The conference was a purely private gathering, with an interesting, though perhaps not very influential, assembly of delegates—professors of law from the Scandinavian countries, Poland and France, the leader of a nationalist party in Switzerland, an exceedingly anti-British Irishman whose local standing I did not gather, and many others. The French contingent was the strongest from abroad ; it included besides the professor one of the leaders of the Neo-Socialist groups in the Chamber of Deputies, who made the most impressive

speech of the gathering, and several members of War Veterans' Associations. On the German side professors were much in evidence, and the Propaganda Ministry as well as various Government Departments gave benevolent assistance.

Although the International of Nationalists did not quite know what it wanted to do, nor had it succeeded in attracting delegates carrying very much weight in their respective countries, the very fact that it should have called such a conference seems to me significant. The Swiss nationalist leader expressed the underlying idea in a manner which might rather have been expected from the Irishman. If, he said, the nationalists of the world could not find common ground upon which to have an international order, they would ultimately be superseded by their competitors, the internationalists.

The other day a well-known journalist who writes for a newspaper generally regarded as extremely jingo, confided to me his firm faith in the World State. It was quite evident, he said, that under modern conditions of transport and economic development, all these little nationalisms—we had just passed a frontier together—were quite absurd. But why were the advocates of internationalism often such depressing people? Could we only achieve the goal by delivering ourselves up to the intellectuals? If you met a good stout German or French or Polish nationalist, you always felt incomparably more at home with him than with some earnest Left-Wing apostle of peace.

Some such ideas are behind the recent tentative moves towards Franco-German *rapprochement* made by the War Veterans' Associations on both sides, which culminated in the interview given by Hitler to Jean Goy. There is undoubtedly a fellow-policy between old soldiers, on whichever side they may have been fighting. I wonder how many British ex-soldiers or -officers visiting post-war Germany have found the very fact of having fought in the war the best introduction to their German *confrères*, particularly when they met somebody who faced them on the same sector? No doubt it is all psychological rather than practical, and the French diplomats may respond to Hitler's appeals for reconciliation in the "Spirit of the Front," by asking what he is going to do about armaments, Austria and the Eastern Pact. Nevertheless, a

very shrewd German industrialist, whose knowledge of Franco-German relations is probably unequalled, maintained to me the other day that if the generation which went through the war cannot succeed in achieving a lasting reconciliation between the two countries, then no reconciliation would ever be possible.

Patriotism is sometimes contrasted with nationalism to the disadvantage of the latter. "The patriot," wrote Lord Cecil, "loves his own country. The nationalist hates all countries but his own." I cannot help feeling that this is a misleading statement. The distinction between patriotism and the nationalist movements, which are so powerful a factor in Europe, seems to me to be quite another one. Patriotism is the natural love of country and race which has always exerted a major influence upon human history. Nationalism, on the other hand, with its exaggerations, its flag-waving, its patriotic songs, its marching and the like, is the banner under which the middle classes of Europe are successfully resisting the assaults of the "proletariat."

In all ages men have sought to rally round some cause, to serve it, and even in the last resort to sacrifice themselves to it. Modern psychologists talk about the herd instinct; some of them even maintain that the will to sacrifice is due to masochism. But whatever the psychological basis may be, this collective spirit, this longing to be a part of a community, has rarely been stronger than it is to-day.

The real test of the appeal of any cause, be it nationalism, or religion, or a political doctrine, lies in the extent of the sacrifices men are prepared to make for it. Only two causes really answer to that test in the modern world. One is nationalism, and the appeal of which the war graves of Europe are sufficient testimony, and the other is the world revolution, whose apostles have demonstrated their devotion in the streets of Vienna and Oviedo, and in the concentration camps and prisons of many lands.

"Proletarians of the world unite!" The appeal of the famous slogan to the underdog is based on an important truth. The lower strata of the city working-classes are very alike in most countries; they have the same simple minds; they have no time for nationalistic theories; few differences of habit and manner separate them; in short, when even the language difficulty is overcome they are quite prepared to take

one another to their bosoms and agree that the only enemy is the wicked capitalist.

The middle and lower-middle classes, on the other hand, the peasantry, and even workers who have risen in the social scale, are far more susceptible to the nationalist appeal. They have a "stake in the country"; they have traditions, well-defined habits, which differentiate them from their fellows in other countries. They are subtly permeated with what the whole-hog Marxist calls "bourgeois ideology."

Such are the classes which form the tradition of all Fascist régimes, where the use of nationalism as a counter-weight to the idea of working-class solidarity is most evident. It would carry me too far afield to discuss the large question of whether such nationalism is merely a red herring drawn by cunning capitalists across the Marxian path to plenty; it is certainly a social, economic and political phase which really has even more to do with domestic than with foreign political relations.

This is the only reasonable explanation of the curious fact that the young enthusiasts in all the Fascist countries are so intensely interested in Fascist or nationalist movements elsewhere. I have just completed a fairly thorough study of Nazi Germany, in the course of which I came in contact with many of the rank and file in S.A. and S.S., students' "Comradeship towns," and labour camps. Almost without exception they inquired as to the progress of Mosley's Blackshirts, and when I was not very reassuring on this score they expressed considerable disappointment and asked whether some other form of "national resurgence" was not to be expected. Surely this is rather different from the jingo nationalism of the past. All intelligent imperialists must have hoped for their possible rivals to be pacifist, defeatist and generally feeble; it is a somewhat novel form of nationalism to hope that other countries will become as nationalist as your own.

The idea of a universal extension of extreme nationalist movements is rather frightening. The conference of the International of Nationalists finished its proceedings with a reception at which all the national anthems of the countries participating were played at length. With the rest of the company, I must have been standing to attention for at least twenty minutes. Once I was almost moved to protest when the tune of "God Save the King" was played a second time. It appeared, however, that another anthem—if I recollect

rightly it is the Finnish—is set to the same tune. Those who remember the end of the war, when the whole world seemed to be allied or associated, will sympathise.

Assuredly the Communists have a distinct advantage. The "Internationale," to which I listened almost daily recently in the Saar, is a dreary tune, but there is only one of it. I could not help reflecting, moreover, as my legs grew steadily wearier, that the nationalists had found it almost as difficult to agree on practical courses as they would have done to combine their several anthems into a brief and inspiring potpourri.

Although it may well be that these modern varieties of sentimental nationalism, Fascist or otherwise, are not bringing the world nearer to solving the problem of peace, neither are they really increasing the danger of war. From the anthems, banners and incessant marching of Hitler's Third Reich, I have just crossed, via the Saar, to Paris. In the Saar one of the keynotes of German front propaganda was the idea that the return of the Saar to Germany would settle the last outstanding question at issue between France and Germany, and thus enable a final reconciliation between the two peoples after a thousand years of struggle. There can be no doubt that in voting for the return to Germany the Saarlanders believed that they were voting for peace—as one ardent Nazi railway porter put it to me, they are well aware that as a border people they would bear the brunt of any war. The same note ran through Hitler's speech after the result was made known. Patriotism and peace went hand in hand—in propaganda at any rate. It takes a good deal more cynicism than I possess to believe that all this is nothing but a grandiose swindle.

When I arrived in Paris, I went to see one of the leading men on a newspaper which is at the moment strongly advocating a conciliatory foreign policy, even towards Germany. As soon as this subject came up, he stiffened. "Yes," he said, "that is the policy of my paper. But I am going to give you my personal views. Reconciliation with Germany is impossible. The only thing the Germans understand is force. We did not crush them properly in 1918. We ought to have gone back to the traditional policy of Richelieu, to have divided them and kept them divided. Failing that we ought to have seized our opportunity of making a preventive war when Hitler came to

power. The Germans are not really a nation—it is merely that periodically somebody comes along and tries to convince them that they are.”

During many years' residence in Germany, I never remember hearing the wildest nationalist or Nazi speak thus of the French. Here is surely a classic example of the nationalism attacked by Lord Cecil—unbeatable for suspicion and bitterness. Although here in Paris there are neither bands nor flags, and uniforms are rarely to be seen, it would be difficult for decades of Nazi mumbo-jumbo to turn out more ardent nationalists than can be met with on any street-corner or field of France to-day. Germany is trying, amid the execration of the world, to create a religion of race; for generations France, or at any rate French civilisation, has been the real religion of Frenchmen.

Just as there is no more nationalistic people than the French, so there is none more intensely bourgeois. France affords the clearest possible demonstration of the connection between nationalism and middle-class civilisation. Unless all political portents are misleading, however, it is a middle-class rather than a proletarian world towards which we are moving. Nationalist movements and dictatorships have dealt the Socialist hopes of finding a lowest common denominator a crushing blow.

Another internationalist dream has been finally destroyed by the economic crisis—that of the nineteenth-century Liberals. The tariffs, quotas and prohibitions from which the world is suffering so severely to-day are perhaps less the direct results of nationalism than of the imperative necessity in which statesmen found themselves to take immediate action without regard to the boomerang-like effect of their measures. But these measures have now become a part of the general economic structure and few expect anything better than a gradual modification of them. Governments, moreover, are more and more being compelled to control economic life, and the hopes which Mr. Wells, for example, placed in the great international trusts and cartels have been sadly disappointed.

Nationalism, in short, both political and economic, shows no signs of abatement. Hopes based on cosmopolitan internationalism must for the moment be abandoned. The problem of peace remains what it has in reality always been—how to establish an international order on a nationalist basis.

We have seen that the International of Nationalists did not make much concrete progress in this direction. But it did bring out two important issues.

The first was the question of the interference by some peoples in the domestic affairs of others. As Mr. Keynes has well pointed out, one of the most important reasons for modern nationalism is the desire of each people to be left alone to hammer out the solution of the fundamental political, social and economic problems with which we are all confronted. Nothing is more resented, or creates more bitterness, than attempts from outside to impose, or to undermine, a given political régime. That was the great lesson of Soviet Russia after the war. And I could not help reflecting in the Saar, where the Left-Wing elements of so many countries had concentrated in the hope of helping the “Status Quo” supporters to inflict a defeat upon Hitler, that nothing could have been so detrimental as their success to the prospects of the peace they profess to desire.

The second issue was between what might be described as the static and dynamic conceptions of nationalism—security and revision. The great threat to peace to-day does not lie in the difference between this or that political system, whether Capitalist, Fascist, Socialist or Communist; it lies in the division of the peoples of the world into the haves and the have-nots, the satiated and the discontented. It is natural that nations with great possessions, with dominions, colonies, empty spaces, subject minorities, should concentrate on securing what they have. But it is equally natural, and no more blameworthy, that other less fortunate peoples should refuse to accept as final the state of affairs existing at a purely fortuitous moment in history. Here lies the essential weakness of schemes of collective security.

There has been much discussion of late on the causes of war. They have been debated from all angles—political, economic, psychological. Innumerable causes have been suggested and remedies proposed. And yet is the matter so very complicated? Is not the primary cause of war the fact that no other method has yet been evolved of making major changes in the relations between nations and peoples? Surely the rise and decline of great races, the clash of competing civilisations, are the very stuff of history. No international order will stand which does not take them into

account. The problem of peace is, above all, the problem of peaceful change.

I often wonder whether the instinctive realisation of this fact is responsible for the reluctance of the British people to undertake collective commitments, despite the obvious advantages which guaranteed security would afford to their interests. We have given within the Empire an example of peaceful change and growth which stands alone. Is the time now come to give the same example in international relations?

In the near future we are going to be asked to give more extended guarantees of international security than we have hitherto been willing to grant. In Paris I was told quite frankly that that was the form in which we were expected to pay the price for the recognition of German rearmament. Why we should pay at all for the recognition of a fact in favour of another nation is not quite clear. But if we are going to pay, let us at any rate see that real progress towards peace is made. Our action in the Saar has re-established the prestige of the League and once more given us the lead. A *status quo* has been peaceably changed albeit within the Treaty framework. If it were possible to demonstrate that Article XIX of the League Covenant providing for Treaty revision is to be taken seriously, even though no immediate action may be possible, there could be no more valuable step towards the establishment of a peaceful international order.

H. POWYS GREENWOOD.

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC SITUATION.

WHATEVER else may trouble the observer of current economic life in America, he cannot complain of monotony. Problems and proposed solutions appear and disappear in disconcerting variety and with bewildering rapidity. The United States, with its vast continental area of over 2,383,000 square miles, its more than 120,000,000 people, a variegated climate and vast resources, permits a kaleidoscopic succession of events that at times confuse and dishearten one who attempts to understand and to interpret.

A relatively new country, still viewed by many Europeans as provincial and without a culture, its life is intensely dynamic. Its economic institutions lack stability and its mental patterns and traditions are unsettled. While it was still struggling with the problems of an extreme depression, a political upheaval occurred, placing in the presidential chair a past-master of political dexterity, who has been able to shift public attention quickly from one point of his programme to another. Difficulties and even failures can be quickly forgotten as the fascinations of each new plan catch the attention. If one is to judge from the analyses in foreign journals and from the comments of our many visitors, Americans are not alone either in their interest or even in their bewilderment. Apparently what is called "the American experiment" is being closely watched with a curious mixture of hopes and of misgivings.

While acknowledging the difficulties of presenting a clear picture, it is possible to distinguish at least three major aspects of recent efforts, to list the points of immediate controversy with the issues that are involved in them and then to attempt a brief explanation of the contest that is being waged. The outlines are not always clear, the outcome in many directions is far from certain and a student may err in any effort to interpret a scene where there is so much confusion and contradiction. Yet it is important to try.

Monetary control has a peculiar attraction. Business cycles with their alternating periods of prosperity and depression are accompanied by price fluctuations. Prices are merely a statement of values in terms of money. Money is a measure of value but its own value is constantly changing. It is not only desirable but quite possible to have a fixed measure of

length or of weight or of volume. Why not at once secure or create a fixed measure of value? This would, by definition, mean an unchanging price level and eliminate all the ills that flow from price changes. Even the proposals of the technocrats were a nine-day wonder. Ergs and joules and kilowatts were for a time discussed, not soberly by small groups but wildly and widely. Their absurdity was almost obvious, but the suspension of gold payments and the attempt to raise (and control) the price level by constantly adjusting the price of gold was more mysterious and has had a greater vogue. It is possible to calculate index numbers and prepare charts which convey to the neophyte a suggestion of balanced simplicity and profundity. It all seems easy. Prices are expressed in terms of the gold dollar. Presumably a dollar of lighter weight will have less value than one of greater weight. Alter the "price" of gold, change the weight of the dollar. Each dollar being lighter will buy a reduced volume of commodities, i.e. prices will rise.

So simple a device was fascinating. The protests of the professional students of money, whose unanimity against the plan was even greater than that a few years earlier against the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, were of no avail. The experiment was tried and has failed, with the anticipated exception that the foreign exchanges were affected and some influence was exercised on the prices of exported and imported goods. But even with these classes of commodities other forces promptly began to operate which offset in whole or in part the effect of "devaluing the dollar."

Both presidential and public confidence have been weakened. Prices have risen but the advances have been so clearly due to other influences that it seems improbable that further executive action will be taken in connection with dollar manipulation. But the federal budget is a long distance from balance with the end of deficits not yet in sight. Special groups, especially the war veterans, are clamouring for grants. Numerous senators and congressmen may be able to force legislation even over a presidential veto and are already attempting to reconcile their differences regarding method and to present a united front. To many of them the failure to secure the anticipated results is due to an inadequate amount of the stimulus and is to be remedied by a larger dose of the same or of a similar medicine.

That attempts to aid agriculture would be made by the Roosevelt Administration was to be expected. Since 1920 the farm groups had been energetic in pressing their demands. For a time they were pacified by the imposition of tariff duties on many agricultural products, in spite of the glaring futility of such an approach. As a debtor group many of them were seriously caught by the fall of prices in 1920 and they were politically powerful enough to make their grievances felt. The efforts of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration have differed in form but not in broad purpose from those made under Presidents Coolidge and Hoover. But crop control in the United States has encountered the same obstacles as have been met elsewhere. Appeals for voluntary curtailment failed. Rewards for restricted acreage brought results, even though some are slight and others create new problems, worse than the old. Each farmer withdrew his least fertile acres from cultivation. Many used additional fertiliser on the reduced areas and raised as large or nearly as large crops as before. The weather is after all more important than any other factor, with the result that many crop yields were generous in 1933 and sharply reduced in 1934 because of the severe drought.

Prices of many agricultural products have risen, but this has brought little satisfaction to those who have no crops to sell. Others have gained through the operation of the "domestic allotment plan," but new difficulties have arisen, especially in the South. The present law, known as the Bankhead Act, restricts total production to a specified amount per farmer. The prospective reduction in acreage plus the fact that the government makes loans on cotton at 12 cents per pound means a market price higher than that level. But this price, which seemingly is advantageous to American cotton-growers, is so high as to create a sharp differential against American cotton in the world's markets. Exports have sharply declined during 1934, and many observers now definitely fear a prolonged or perhaps permanent loss of the foreign markets for the American product. If this should occur, there follows from it the necessity for a sweeping readjustment of production and of population in our Southern States. The agricultural problem is the same in the United States as in other exporting countries, and is no nearer a solution.

Even more spectacular have been the events connected with the National Recovery Administration—the famous

N.R.A. American business men have for years been critical of many of the legal restraints within which they have been compelled to operate. The federal Sherman Anti-Trust Law and the comparable laws in the various States have seemed to them unfair. But curiously enough they were not able to foresee the consequences that would follow any relaxation of these restraints. When the National Industrial Recovery Act was passed and they were permitted to establish codes, many of them were surprised at the terms imposed upon them. Not only were they compelled to assent to the prohibition of child labour and to minimum-wage and maximum-hour provisions, but they were also required to accept section 7 (a), which gave to workers at least a nominal right to equality in bargaining power. While there is as yet no clear and final decision of the courts regarding many aspects of the law, the general trend is clear. The legal position of labour is stronger than in the past and its economic power will be determined in large measure by its breadth of vision and the ability to make its potential strength an active force. Although no miracles are to be expected, hours, wages and working conditions will probably be better than in the past.

In other regards the N.R.A. has been less successful and is now undergoing a thorough modification. Like other "New Deal" innovations, its legal life will soon expire, but its existence will be prolonged. General Johnson has disappeared from the scene. The new and less centralised body that has succeeded him is busily engaged in readjusting the entire structure in the light of experience to date. Probably it is too early to be certain of many of the changes, but one seems fairly clear. "Price-fixing" will either disappear or be profoundly modified. There have been two difficulties with it. One is that the business men who have been the chief framers of the codes have been either helpless or short-sighted. They have in many cases raised prices so high as sharply to reduce demand. The other is that price increases in some lines have been so great as to offset any gains to workers from increased employment and higher wages. Also, the farmers, whose purchasing power was presumably to be brought back to the pre-war relationship to manufactured goods, have found that their real gains to date have been slight. Price-fixing has already been eliminated for the lumber industry, and similar modifications are said to be pending elsewhere.

With so many events crowding the last two years it is difficult and perhaps presumptuous to select these three as the most significant, but the choice is probably not an error. Manipulation of the monetary unit, assistance to agriculture and the conglomeration of efforts known as the N.R.A. are outstanding. Yet other activities have been important and in some respects perhaps more so. The most significant are, however, less novel. Thousands of able men have been given temporary employment at modest wages in the Civilian Conservation Corps. For a time relief funds were distributed on a vast scale through the Civil Works Administration, and later through a new organisation with a new name, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. The Home Owners Loan Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and others have been active. Many of them are temporary and are to be viewed as emergency activities with no lasting significance.

Yet there are several movements emerging which will command universal attention during the winter and will probably have a lasting influence. They arise in part out of the current depression and in part from certain broad economic trends that are not peculiar to the United States. They are also related to the efforts of the last two years, originating in the same consciousness of social need. To some extent, too, their organisational form is a development of alphabetical structures already in existence, structures that will be modified in the light of experience or as the decisions of the Congress may determine.

As this is being written the Press is filled with the controversy between the leaders of the privately owned and privately operated public utilities and the advocates of more government owned and operated public utility enterprises. While the public utilities, notably the electric light and power companies, are subject to control by various government commissions, there has been a growing conviction, even among expert observers, that this control is far from effective. The large power companies are intricate structures, their officers are able and the legal and economic difficulties connected with the determination of "fair" charges for service are enormous and perhaps not solvable. Criticisms have come in waves with a growth in recent years, and the proposals of President Roosevelt for a government enterprise covering

a large area in the Middle South—the Tennessee Valley Authority—have received a generous measure of public support. His idea is that this enterprise will act as a “yardstick.” Its costs and the charges it makes for electric current will be a guide to the public, who will thereby be able to judge more accurately the fairness of the rates charged elsewhere. More recently the aggressive mayor of New York City has alleged that the payments made for electric current by that municipality are unduly high and plans have been announced for the construction of a publicly owned and operated electric power plant, which, it is contended, will save large sums to the city. Federal aid is said to be assured. Needless to say, this has brought an outburst of criticism and of counter-charges by those who are opposed to such an extension of government activity in industry. Nevertheless, some rates have been lowered and other reductions are said to be pending.

Before this article is printed another issue will probably be a contestant for public interest. A comprehensive plan for “economic security” will shortly be presented to the Congress for consideration and action. Its elements have not yet been announced but will certainly include some provision for “unemployment insurance.” There may also be a plan for “old-age pensions” and perhaps a scheme for “health insurance.” At present even these leading items do not seem to be settled and the broad principles to be applied are not known. In the United States there are obstacles, especially on the legal and constitutional side, that are not to be found in Great Britain, but these can probably be overcome if the economic difficulties can be surmounted and sufficient public support be secured. The prospects seem good, at least for “unemployment insurance.”

A third issue will probably arise during the winter. The weakness of the American banking system has been serious and in some quarters scandalous. A few reforms have been effected, but much remains to be done. The contest will be between those who believe that effective direction of economic affairs is impossible without public or government control over credit and hence over the banks, and that this necessitates the creation of a strong central bank dominated by the government. This means in practice control by the Treasury. The opposition argues along familiar lines against extension of government authority, and in particular voices the fear that

the fiscal needs of the Treasury will interfere unduly with the proper functioning of such a bank. It is contended that discount rates and credit extensions will unduly influence matters which should be kept strictly distinct.

This recital has designated three major lines of effort during the past year and indicated three issues that will probably be to the front in the weeks just ahead. There is a real danger that both Americans and outsiders will become so absorbed in these matters, and especially in their details, that certain main tendencies will be overlooked. In conclusion it is worth while to undertake a brief appraisal. The need is perhaps not so much for a judgment on each of the items mentioned or on the many others that might have been included, but for an interpretation of the movement as a whole. In spite of the unprecedented amount of publicity and even of “ballyhoo,” which may mislead us, it is evident that the American public is undertaking a readjustment of its economic and, if need be, of its legal structure, to accomplish certain results.

First is an effort to reconcile two important principles which ordinarily do not clash but which come definitely into conflict in times like the present. One is the sacredness of contract upon which business operations so strongly depend. Agreements cannot well be entered into unless they can be relied upon. Promises may not be viewed lightly, to be broken by either party if he sees fit, or even if he encounters serious difficulties. At the same time, conditions may arise under which agreements cannot be adhered to. An attempt to enforce them may mean a breakdown—a conflict with another principle, that of function. If business is to function—to operate with freedom—some contracts must be modified or broken, no matter what the law or even the alleged sacredness of the promise. An extreme decline of prices, especially if rapid, may put large masses of debtors in a position where they cannot pay what they owe. Either the promises must be modified or business will collapse. Any disagreement over method should not blind us to this important issue.

A second struggle is over the old legal principle of *caveat emptor*. Under modern conditions the buyer is increasingly unable to safeguard his own interests and in many directions there is being substituted the principle of *caveat venditor*. To such a shift there is bound to be opposition by the sellers, and the conflict in America centres at present about the attempt

to make certain ones of them, especially the bankers and the private electric light and power interests, deal more satisfactorily with those who must purchase their services.

Finally there is the endeavour to introduce more control and guidance into our social and economic life—to modify *laissez-faire* more fully. The fact that “economic planning” has become a catchword or that many “plans” are absurd does not dispose of the issue. Washington contains many planners whose views may be bizarre, but the need persists and the efforts will continue. Mistakes will be made. Follies like the gold purchase scheme may be repeated. At times business men may have real grounds for complaint. But an increasing number of thoughtful persons are giving their attention to the question both in the large and in detail. Even though there may be a reaction because of errors, the movement will continue. If government relaxes its efforts private interests will persist in undertaking controls, each in its own field. But in the years to come government will probably play an increasing part. For the present the American public views with approval two main lines of effort—to reduce instability in prices, in wages and in employment, and to lessen somewhat the existing inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income.

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WHITHER CENTRAL EUROPE?

IN spite of all the stirrings of passion in the tide of human events, in spite of all political and economic crises, the fundamental problems, as determined by considerations of territorial and national policy, remain for the most part unchanged; it is seldom, and sometimes only with the lapse of centuries, that they are actually altered. Thus, ever since the time when democratic ideas began to take hold, the question lying at the root of all political problems in the territory we call Central Europe extending from the North Sea to the *Ægean*, with a fluctuating Eastern boundary, has been that of the relationship between the German and the various other peoples inhabiting this territory. While it is true to say that the Habsburg Empire, in which German and Hungarian influence was paramount, succumbed to the impelling desire for emancipation on the part of the many peoples it embraced, it is likewise undeniable that after the war the new states containing prominent German minorities became forced, by their anxiety to maintain and develop their autonomy, to follow a line of foreign policy which estranged them politically from their natural economic centre of gravity, namely Germany. This fact has not, however, prevented the spiritual relations between these peoples and the German people from being not only maintained but in many respects intensified, in spite of the very considerable efforts made and assistance afforded by other centres of culture. This course of development resulted quite naturally, having regard to differences of history and attitude, in a peculiar division of labour between the little Austrian commonwealth set up by the provisions of the Peace Treaties and big Germany.

The tendency towards the formation of large-scale economic entities in the rest of the world, and the grave economic depression which has struck at the very life of the agrarian exporting countries in the eastern and south-eastern portions of Central Europe, gave rise to a sequence of varied projects for the economic grouping of this area which had become split up by a diversity of frontiers dictated by the Peace Treaties from altogether too one-sided political motives. The intentions underlying these projects were in some cases more and in some cases less honestly economic or infected with the substance of power-politics. With one single exception, all

these proposals were thwarted by the political interests of one or more of the Big Powers or of the Central European states themselves. The exception is the Italian trilateral agreement concluded this year between the governments of Italy, Austria and Hungary, which aroused misgiving and antagonism in various quarters, but which in the end was not balked either by the neighbouring countries or by other interested parties.

It is justifiable to assume that this attitude of *laissez-faire* on the part of the world at large was in the main attributable to two causes. The principles on which the Italo-Austro-Hungarian *rapprochement* has been built up can in the first place be said to have become to a great extent common property, after years of theoretical and political dispute. The substitution of preferential treatment for most-favoured nation treatment, more particularly between neighbouring countries, and the use of clearing arrangements, more particularly between countries with weak currencies, are now recognised elsewhere also, after having long been attacked from many quarters, as being the right course to take—right because probably the only feasible course in the present economic state of the world. In the second place, the interested parties have quite dispassionately taken a good look at the Italo-Austro-Hungarian reckoning, and have been able to calculate with the aid of statistical figures that there are very natural limits set here as elsewhere, that the margin between the three countries capable of being exploited by preferential duties is not any too large, and that if the natural limits set by the present economic situation were to be overstepped for political reasons the capital basis required for doing so would probably soon be wanting. It thus came about that the opponents of the Italian triangle were actually persuaded, in spite of the manifest political motives which may be taken to have contributed to the conclusion of the pacts, to lend an ear to the repeated assurances on the part of the statesmen concerned that what was being done was only the first step towards a larger and more far-reaching system of inter-state economic co-operation in Central Europe, and to adopt a waiting attitude towards subsequent developments.

While the countries of the Little Entente have for years past seen all their efforts to provide an economic foundation to their political alliance invariably thwarted by the nature

of their non-complementary economic structures, in spite of all existing political pressure, the German Reich has not only concluded a political truce with Poland but has embarked on a far-reaching scheme of economic co-operation with that country. Moreover, Germany is now setting to work to become definitely geographically orientated in its commercial policy and to carry out a large-scale redistribution of its imports through new commercial treaties with the countries of South-Eastern Europe. On the collapse of world trade, and with it of the widespread German overseas trade built up on the principle of most-favoured nation treatment, Germany began to look about for raw materials obtainable nearer at hand and at all events payable by way of clearing arrangements, and discovered that South-Eastern Europe would be in many respects a suitable source. At the same time it was clear that to increase the purchasing power of these countries would redound to the benefit of Germany's industrial exports; and further inquiry showed that, in order to establish such a geographically natural and in every way economically stimulating exchange of goods on a permanent basis, all that was needed was some readjustment of the agricultural production of these countries to suit Germany's requirements, such as restriction of wheat production in favour of the production of vegetable oil and various kinds of fodder.

This readjustment has only become possible owing to Germany's having won through to a clear and permanent economic orientation towards the South-East. For it is an admitted fact that readjustment more particularly of agricultural production is only possible when it is effected at long sight, and when the producer can rely on a safe market at profitable prices for years to come. In this effort to build up a natural and organic inter-state complementary economic system, untouched by political ambitions and embracing the agrarian countries of Eastern Europe and the industrial countries of Central and Western Europe, we can see the first premeditated and long-sighted step yet taken towards combating the present economic depression, which owes its disastrous aggravation in a great measure to the economic anarchy promoted by the Peace Treaties.

German commercial policy thus at present comprises German-Polish business relations and the economic relations between the medium-sized and small states on the one hand

and the big German market on the other hand, built up on the basis of bilateral preferential agreements ; and this policy is now being followed alongside of the relations established by the trilateral Italo-Austro-Hungarian agreements. Hungary not only belongs to the Italian economic union but also has a very far-reaching and favourable commercial treaty with Germany, and has, moreover, steered a remarkably steady course directed by political long-sightedness and cool regard for her own interest, through the emotional crises, conflicts, and clefts of recent times. And, as the forthcoming visit of her statesmen to Warsaw would appear to indicate, it is probable that this country is working in the direction of bringing these two economic systems nearer together and possibly some day of combining them. Should this come about, the political field of force in Central Europe would also become gradually shifted, bringing nearer solution a number of questions which are open wounds in its body, constantly poisoning the relations between the nations and above all between the German people and the medium and small peoples in this area, and constantly threatening to resolve the present condition of quasi-peace and legal uncertainty into one of chaos and revolution.

Meanwhile, the postponement of the official Hungarian visit to Warsaw, and the interest taken in Paris and more particularly in Prague in the recent interview between the Duce and the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg at Florence, suggest that the French bloc wishes to work in with the Central European preferential system now being advanced from all sides. It seems probable that Paris has now realised, as a result of the events of the end of July, that its Danube system, built up on money and arms instead of on the natural exchange of goods, would meet with considerable difficulties, in the case of an emergency, in regard to the actual interests of the partners, which means that the practical fulfilment of the treaties of alliance is questionable. French diplomacy thus has every reason for adopting a new course and participating in combinations with good economic prospects, or recommending its partners to do so, with a view to combating the danger of losing its influence in a later phase of development. At the same time there is no denying that it possesses a number of effective means for carrying its wishes through. In colonial negotiations it has much to offer Italy, and behind

the projected security pact there stands the French army, a fact which makes the deepest possible impression on the small states in concern about their independence and sovereignty. Over and above these considerations, the gold reserves of the Banque de France and the fabulous lending power which they confer are contemplated with fascination and longing by all the states hard hit by the depression.

The ultimate success of any inter-state economic reconstruction in Central Europe will largely depend on whether the diplomacy, more particularly of the French group of states, has learnt from the experience of the last decade that it is only by furthering economic development on geo-political lines in harmony with the conditions governing the opening up and growth of markets, not by way of the Procrustean bed of political coercion and fanatical adherence to a *status quo* long out of touch with reality, that any positive and lasting success can be achieved.

The fact of the shift of Germany's economic orientation towards South-Eastern Europe is not the only reason for stating that the German revolution is the most important event in Central Europe since the World War. In discussing and appraising its more distant repercussions we must distinguish between its effects on the non-German nations ; secondly, on the German minorities in the states governed by non-German peoples ; and thirdly, on Austria.

At the outset the fact that National Socialism in the first outburst of revolutionary ardour succeeded in launching the structural reform of the Reich, and in at once carrying through the politically most important part of this reform by abolishing the state character of the German provincial units, very considerably enhanced the prestige of the German Reich, as did also the unqualified manner in which the demand for equality of rights in the matter of military policy was thenceforth made. The middle and small non-German peoples in Central Europe saw at once in the first measures proceeding from the German revolution evidence of a new political will. Growth in power and prestige is equally apt to arouse sympathy and fear in others, and this is true of the present instance also. There were circles in non-German Central Europe which immediately felt the sovereignty and political self-determination of their states to be threatened, and pictured the coming of a Central European régime under the

hegemony of Berlin, in which the Prussian top-boot and mailed fist would crush out of existence the national and cultural aspirations of its various peoples. Then came Hitler's declaration before the Reichstag on May 17th, 1933, which has since become famous, in which he proclaimed his thesis of ethnological nationalism ("*Volkstum*") as the basis of the politics of the new Germany. Affirmation of one's own nationality in this sense implies recognition and affirmation of the nationality of others in its existence and right to live, and involves the rejection of Germanising, that is to say of the attempt to convert alien groups to one's own national type, as has commonly been done in the past hundred years.

This avowal on the part of the German Chancellor and Leader of the national revolution produced great relief throughout Central Europe, and it soon became manifest that of the effects of the increase in Germany's prestige the sympathies were gaining ground over the fears. In very truth this National Socialist doctrine of "*Volkstum*"—however it be judged in detail and more particularly as regards its racio-philosophical background—is capable of providing a Magna Carta for a new order in Central Europe which could at last set up a new legal edifice, in place of the agglomeration of conflicting nationalities drifting from one crisis to the next which has been in force since Europe became democratised. Passing for a moment in imagination from the reality of the present to a future transmuted by this new theory of racial nationalism, we may envisage a condition in which the peoples (not states) have mutually recognised and reciprocally guaranteed their national estates, ruled no longer by the majority principle in a pluralistic party system, but by a unitary party established by plebiscite.

Thus the political power-wielding and shaping force has nothing to gain, either in the upper circles or in the most subordinate cell in the smallest village, by increasing the number of its adherents and with it the numbers of the nation in the struggle of nationalities; and—this is the decisive and novel feature—the individual is deprived of the freedom to decide for himself whether he will belong to this or that nation, at least for a certain period, under the terms of an international truce which would be necessary in order to make it clear to the peoples themselves that it is not in their interest to absorb elements of alien nationality. A settlement on these lines of the warfare

between nationalities which has now filled Central European history for a century past would have an historical precedent. The Wars of Religion were also brought to an end compulsorily by the application of the principle *cujus regio ejus religio*, which robbed the individual of the right to decide for himself to what religion he belonged. Despite the admitted distance of the vista thus disclosed, there can be no doubt that practical politicians, including those of the non-German peoples, will have to consider the question of the application to Central Europe of this "*Volkstum*" conception derived from the German revolution.

The example set by the development of Germany is also acting upon ideas of domestic politics among the non-German peoples of Central Europe. Here the ideas of Fascism and National Socialism meet. The union of nationalism and socialism falls on particularly fertile soil in those countries in which capitalism gained little or no foothold in the nineteenth century, and which are filled with lively resentment, more particularly since the war, against the workings of the international "price scissors" in the agrarian markets. The national liberty movement, both against the Turkish Empire and more particularly, at the end of the World War, against the Habsburg monarchy, had long taught these peoples to combine the national attitude with the social. The Czech revolution of 1918, which together with the Hungarian initiated the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, showed that it is necessary, in addition to the bourgeois-democratic nationalist idea, to win over the proletarian-socialist elements, in the interest of a complete mobilisation of all available forces for the struggle for freedom and political independence. But even in the nations in which the army plays a larger part in the shaping of their political destiny, many a valuable impulse could be derived from the ideas underlying the German revolution. Discipline, absolute obedience and loyalty to the leader, unqualified subordination of the individual to the interests of the whole, self-discipline, and the leading of a hard and simple life are the canon laws of the soldierly attitude everywhere and at all times. Although Mussolini and Hitler and their collaborators are never tired of insisting that the Italian and German revolutions are not articles of export, there is no denying the fact that Fascism and National Socialism are nevertheless the expression of a twentieth-century

revolution which is taking hold not only of the whole of Europe but also, judging from indications in America and Asia, probably of the whole world. In these circumstances it is readily understandable that more particularly the peoples of Central Europe, which have been hit harder even than others by the economic depression, should be following the international development of the German revolution with intense interest.

Fear of the new Germany, the first reaction in the peoples of Central Europe, expressed itself first and foremost in worse treatment of the German minorities. Fear of the spectre of German hegemony taking shape in Central Europe made the German groups suddenly appear to these peoples to constitute a threat to their independence as states, and led to an even more rigorous suppression of these groups than had already been practised since the conclusion of peace. In addition, the tidal wave of the National Socialist movement in the main body of the German people naturally did not stop short at the frontiers of Germany but also embraced the minorities outside, and tended to cleave these minorities in a party sense, producing considerable uneasiness in the early phases of development. This condition has now to a great extent passed, the inner conflicts have died down, and the national front, the lack of which would of course have implied a grave danger to the national existence of these groups, has been re-established. With the disappearance of the first fears, which were in many cases definitely in the nature of a panic, and with the growth of the confidence of these peoples in the new Germany, which has also been furthered by measures of commercial policy, a general return to ease of mind began in this direction also. Nevertheless, until the doctrine of nationality becomes generally accepted in Central Europe, each advance of the European revolution in these states is bound to react against the minorities.

In spite of certain peculiarities of historical tradition and more particularly of its intellectual and artistic life dominated by Vienna, the territory and people comprised in the present Austria which owes its existence to the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain, were from the beginning of their history down to 1866 a part of the German Reich, and after 1866 extremely closely bound up with the German people of the Reich both intellectually and culturally, and also

indirectly politically through the union between Habsburg and Hohenzollern. It does not therefore imply any questioning of Austria's independence as a necessary feature of the European constellation to regard the appearance of Austrian National Socialism as being a perfectly natural and obvious concomitant and part of the pan-German revolution. Also, the antagonism between the three groups or trends purely Austrian, Austro-German, and purely German is true to the facts of the political tradition since democracy found its way into Central Europe. The eventful and difficult course of Austrian politics, more particularly since the loss of the great statesman Dr. Seipel, has been the subject of the keenest conflicts of opinion inside and outside the country. From the Central European point of view, the solution of Austria's internal problem is a pre-condition for all further reconstruction and for the development of a new order of things in this area. Given the existing distribution of political and social forces, this solution can only be arrived at in the spirit of Seipel, by gathering together on the broadest possible foundation all the forces making for reconstruction, with affirmation of Austria's independence as a state and of the natural, cultural and political bonds by which it is tied to and interwoven with the German people as a whole, if it is to have any prospect of permanence. Given a solution of this most urgent of Central European problems, we can hope that, with the genuine assistance of a greater or smaller number of other interested Powers, the reconstruction of the economic system of Central Europe already begun will make rapid and successful progress. On these lines, and by ever closer cultural and political co-operation between the two states populated by the German people and the middle and small peoples of Central Europe, there could be built up a new order capable of securing for a long time to come the peace at present gravely threatened in this area.

KARL ANTON PRINCE ROHAN.

SPAIN TO-DAY.

UNLESS events in Spain change their course soon there is considerable danger of this nation sinking into a state of permanent revolution. This situation derives naturally from the collapse of the centre policy of Sr. Azaña. Left and Right, neither strong enough to prevail, are showing a blind intolerance which prohibits all social or political peace or progress. Two and a half years of Republican-Socialist rule failed to consolidate the young Republic which emerged so immaculately from the polls on April 12th, 1931. Twelve months of Centre-Right administration show a distinctly worse record. In fact no year since the loss of her last colonies has been so disastrous for Spain as that which has elapsed since the last elections.

There has been revolt in the coal region of Asturias with one thousand dead and a city partly in ruins; rebellion of the Generalitat of Catalonia; a revolutionary general strike which paralysed the nation entirely for one week; a peasant strike affecting hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers; an anarchist general strike with serious disturbances in the North; a serious conflict of municipal character between the Basque Provinces and Madrid; a three months' strike in the metal trades; a general strike lasting over one month in Saragossa. This year likewise has seen the Socialist Party, the pillar of the Republic during the first two and a half years of its existence, adopt a revolutionary attitude. It has seen also Republicans so little suspect of any extremist attitude as Miguel Maura, Sanchez Roman and Martinez Barrio declare solemnly that they "broke all relations with the organs of the régime."

It would, of course, be unfair to place the entire blame for this chaotic state of affairs on the shoulders of the two men who have either directly or indirectly inspired governmental policy during this tragic twelve months, namely Don Alejandro Lerroux, leader of the Radical Party, and Don José Maria Gil Robles, the head of the clerical C.E.D.A. Party. Responsibility obviously goes deeper than errors in tactics or lack of vision or of capacity. In seeking the reasons for the collapse of a régime which commenced so auspiciously it is worth while quoting the opinion of a Portuguese Republican politician who might be expected to understand the peculiar

circumstances which affect Spanish politics rather better than could most foreign observers.

Alfonso Costa, a prominent figure in the Portuguese Republic which got into difficulties after a rather more decent interval, in the prologue he has done for the book recently written by Marcelino Domingo entitled *La Experiencia del Poder*, points to what he considers fatal errors made during the first months of the new Spanish régime. He says that the Spanish Republicans who came unexpectedly into power on April 14th, 1931, had a mandate to fulfil and that the destruction of the monarchy was not their only objective. They should have gone ahead and made the revolution, using full powers. He instances his own experiences in Portugal, saying: "During eighteen months the Provisional Government managed to satisfy at least a part of the demands of the people and of the collective conscience in the field of the essential liberties of liberal principles and social progress. . . ." By government with provisional decrees social progress was made possible which not even the present dictatorial régime had had the courage to undo. Even so, Costa believes that they failed to go far enough, with the result that the reactionary forces remained masters of the field; being greatly assisted by the enthusiasm with which representatives of these elements were welcomed into the moderate Republican parties.

Costa obviously puts his finger on many sensitive points. One result of the convocation of Parliament four months after the triumph of the Spanish Republic was to flood the nation with laws which governments entirely occupied in the difficult task of parliamentary leadership had neither time nor surplus energies to put into execution. And the enthusiasm with which the moderate parties, such as the historic Radical Party of Sr. Lerroux, welcomed former monarchists to its bosom and later even collaborated electorally with persons who could not but be in opposition to all that the Republic originally stood for, has undoubtedly contributed largely to the present chaos. A revolution which was but half-begun has become inextricably mixed up with a counter-revolution.

Dr. Gregorio Marañón, who combines the task of specialisation on internal secretion glands with that of political critic and mentor to the young régime, qualifies the reforms put through during the first years of the Republic as being "minimum" and similar "to those desired under the

Monarchy by many persons who were far from revolutionary." But he points out that this minimum of reforms had as result—through errors of those in control—the irritation of the Church and of other elements affected by the changes. In other words, the Republic annoyed those forces which are generally assumed to represent the "Old Spain" but it did not disarm them. With the result that these interests were able to triumph in the first elections to be held.

The entry of the forces of Sr. Gil Robles into the Cabinet was the signal for revolt; it was assumed to be the symbol of the triumph of the reaction. This proved to a certain extent to be unjust in the light of later events when Sr. Jimenez Fernandez, Minister of Agriculture, commenced to show that the Christian-Socialist policy of which the C.E.D.A. had often spoken was intended as a reality. But those who were most surprised were not the Socialists but the Monarchist forces who had—so they said—paid amply towards the electoral costs of the C.E.D.A. Party and were hurt to find that the landowning interests were to have their wings clipped by a Minister representing that Party.

Undoubtedly the Socialist threat of revolution had served to keep the C.E.D.A. from the Government for some months. But in the end Sr. Gil Robles decided to call their bluff. He has since said that he expected this rebellion and had precipitated it in the belief that as large supplies of arms were in the process of being acquired in Catalonia, it was better that the storm should break than that it should be postponed for a few months and when it might be much more difficult to suppress. This attitude seems natural enough, except for the fact that it seems rather strange that more adequate steps were not taken to deal with the movement if it was so confidently expected.

However, there is no doubt that the revolt broke before the Socialists had made all their preparations, although this is not to say that the result would have been changed. The police during the first days of the revolt rounded up large quantities of arms and munitions which apparently no one had attempted to use. The Socialists naturally found that there is a good deal of difference between talking of revolution and putting across a successful revolt. Nor could it be an easy task for a Party which, with the exception of the revolt of 1917, had adhered to the policy of evolution rather than revolution; an

aspiration which General Primo de Rivera was one of the few Spanish conservatives to appreciate.

Twelve months earlier, Sr. Gil Robles had said in Madrid: "Democracy is for us not an end but a means; a means to conquer a new State. When the moment comes, either Parliament submits or we will make it disappear." From that time onwards, the entry of the C.E.D.A. into power had been foreseen as the triumph of Fascism, or at least as being the thin end of the wedge. Not only the Socialists objected to the entry into a Republican cabinet of the Clerical forces. Don Miguel Maura, who, along with Sr. Alcala Zamora, gave conservative respectability to the revolutionary movement which brought the Republic into being, likewise protested and published a note saying that he "broke all relations with the organs of the régime." This attitude was also adopted by persons so little suspect of extremist ideas as Don Felipe Sanchez Roman and Sr. Martinez Barrio. The Catalan autonomist groups of the Left likewise objected verbally, before going to further lengths. Sr. Albornoz resigned the post of the Presidency of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, the second best paid official post in the land. Sr. Zulueta resigned the Embassy in Berlin, as did Sr. Barnes in Mexico City. Virtually, the only Republicans who did not protest were the members of the Radical Party—the Party accused by its opponents of betraying the Republic.

Even to-day it is difficult to say to what lengths the various groups approved or supported the Socialist rebellion. The Right Press, perhaps not altogether without reason, suggests that there was an understanding. There had been interviews in the days preceding the revolt between prominent figures of Socialist and Republican parties. Possibly there was a certain amount of bluffing on both sides. The Republicans were very anxious to get back to power and to apply the lessons they had learned from their errors and omissions of the first two and a half years and they probably were confident that they could again assume leadership once the Lerroux Government had been overturned by revolt in various parts of Spain on a scale impossible to check. The Socialists on the other hand needed the support of Republican Army elements and also knew that whatever happened in Catalonia, and probably in the Basque country also, would be of a Republican-Autonomist character and outside their direct control. Perhaps they believed that

the movement would be of such a nature throughout Spain as to put them in power completely.

However, judging from the rather scanty facts available, it seems more than likely that the idea of a Republican-Socialist coalition existed and that there would have been no attempt whatever to set up any kind of integral communism in Spain. Nationalisation of banks, or of certain banks, and of a few industries, with rough and ready expropriation and colonisation of land, and reorganisation of army and police forces, was probably the ultimate goal of those behind the October revolution. It is difficult to imagine that such measures would have produced anything other than economic chaos for a period of time, but they would at the same time have given a serious blow to the interests of the "Old Spain," and possibly some of the Republicans believed that such a result would in the end have made it easier to organise Spain on new lines.

One factor which made revolution possible was the wave of class hatred which has been born in Spain during the last few years. There is probably no country in Western Europe to-day where such a terrible feeling of bitterness is evident among the workers. It is perhaps a natural result of the tempting vision of a new order of things which has been dangled before their eyes during the Republic and has aroused desires and ambitions which no Government is going to find easy to appease.

The lack of a strong middle-class capable of organising Spain's economy on a sound basis naturally makes the fulfilling of such aspirations supremely difficult. Sr. Cambo, the Catalan financier, says "Spain's economy suffers from rickets." Sr. Araquistain, the Socialist writer, says: "Our bourgeoisie has created nothing; neither an efficient industry, nor a modern and prosperous agriculture. It is a class which historically has never advanced beyond the stage of pre-capitalism. Unintelligent, uncultured, miserly and insensitive, it relies only on the inhuman forces of its money and on the police forces for the resolution of the social problems of Spain."

Nothing could be more difficult than to try to sort out the present tangled skein of Spanish affairs. A new complication is introduced by the manifesto of the Monarchists, which virtually commits both them and Don Alfonso to a Fascist programme. While on the other hand the split between the

partisans of Sr. Gil Robles and the Monarchists has become deeper and the former now find themselves committed more strongly than ever to the Radical Party, just when that Party appears to be feeling once again certain yearnings towards the Left policy which it had professed for nearly twenty years—until this year.

The difficulties which surround Sr. Gil Robles appear to have upset his judgment ; the fact that he is only thirty-four has become rather apparent during the last few weeks, and this despite the tuition he receives from the clever Don Angel Herrera, the head of Catholic Action and brother of a well-known Jesuit preacher. His dictatorial manner and the parliamentary manœuvres he has employed to eject first Sres. Samper and Hidalgo from the Cabinet and later Sr. Villalobos, Minister of Education, have not enhanced his prestige as a politician. He runs considerable risk of splitting the Centre forces as efficiently as he managed to split the Right.

Another difficulty which enmeshes both Radicals and C.E.D.A. is the question of the excesses committed by native Moorish troops and by the Foreign Legion during the occupation of Oviedo after the rebellion. Naturally, the fact that the rebels had murdered ten priests and a dozen or more mining engineers and other male civilians excused a certain amount of violence. But by use of an iron censorship and by a tactless attempt to intimidate foreign journalists, the Government appears to have made a very serious error of judgment. It tries to smother the whole business. Sr. Lerroux has described as "sheer fantasy" the reports that excesses have been committed. Probably exaggeration has distorted the truth. But hard, cold details such as those given to the Public Prosecutor by the Radical-Autonomist Deputy for Valencia, Sr. Marco Miranda, cannot be dismissed lightly. He gives the names, addresses, ages, of forty-six persons, including two women and four children under fifteen years of age, alleged to have been summarily shot without trial by Moorish troops or Foreign Legionaries. These were all persons who appeared not to be implicated directly in the rebellion ; it does not include those who may have been caught with weapons in their hands. Repression has always been a sensitive point in Spain. The shooting of Francisco Ferrer in 1909 virtually ruined the career of Don Antonio Maura. Sr. Azaña was discredited by the terrible executions of Casas Viejas when seventeen

peasants were shot in cold blood by Guardias de Asalto. It is quite evident that the occupation of Oviedo will bring political consequences sooner or later.

He would be a wise person who would play the prophet in Spain to-day. But it does at least seem clear that the counter-revolution will be unable to succeed without the setting up of a Dictatorship. And it also seems very clear that unless some political party carries out prompt and energetic measures calculated to reorganise Spain on an economic basis more in keeping with the twentieth century, then continued and violent social unrest is likely to persist.

HENRY BUCKLEY.

THE CHURCH, THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, AND WORLD PEACE.

MR. HENDERSON has declared that in his opinion the choice between co-operation and conflict, between peace and war, must be made now if we are to avoid slipping back into barbarism and anarchy. "I believe," he said, "most profoundly that it is the duty of the Churches to take sides in this struggle which, at bottom, involves a conflict between two views of life, the pagan or anarchistic view and the Christian belief in the brotherhood of man." The implications of this last sentence are worth considering. How shall the Churches take sides? What can the Church of England do? What are its opportunities? Whence do they come? Before we reply there are one or two general observations to be made.

First of all the Church, wherever it is placed, owes its authority to its Divine Master, and in dealing with individuals and congregations it is independent of worldly movements and motives if it is true to Him. Secondly, therefore, as regards the Governments of the several nations and the formation of opinion among men and women as electors, the Church is detached more or less from those political influences, many of them honourable, which carry weight in the minds of statesmen when they are directing the lines which their countries, in their opinion, should adopt.

If we look at the first of these considerations it is plain that the aim of the Church must be to promote peace and mutual brotherliness among men. Turning to Mr. Henderson's appeal for brotherhood we must note that in the New Testament the word "brother" appears primarily to mean brother-Christian. The fellowship of the early Christians was clear and active in face of the totally different outlook and the opposition of the heathen world by which they were surrounded. *They* could not preach a tepid kind of brotherhood of mankind; they had to exclaim: "Come out from the life of the unregenerated world in which you are living: join our fellowship which has its focus of unity in another world; our citizenship is in heaven. Love the Brotherhood."

Now when we say that the Church if true to its vocation must have the will to peace, we have to recognise that the peace which it proclaims can only be a purposeful and active

peace. It seeks, to use the old words, for "unity, peace and concord." These words mean an eager co-operation for a peace that is worthy of its name, and go beyond an easy tolerance and feeble friendliness in personal life or in an unaggressive international quietude. Unity is conscious; concord is forceful. Our ideal of peace must be removed from any notion of a state of things where the heart and the purpose do not primarily count. And this is the case because a peace that has no deliberation and intention in it is no less open to the danger of collapsing by itself than to the risk of being futhlessly broken in upon from outside. What one may call an accidental peace provides a ready prey to those who have more consistency of purpose than their victims have. The peace, then, which is to be our goal is to arise from conviction and effort. And we rightly insist that the Church has a unique opportunity of inculcating this peace and of training the thoughts and the outlook of all those who listen to its voice.

It is no part of this article to discuss the implications of the term "peace," or to explore the difference to be found between a rightful and a wrong peace; or to inquire whether war is ever a duty, or is always to be rejected as a means of settling international disputes, even when arbitration has failed and the life of weaker nations is being overridden and individuals are being outraged. Nor does disarmament in any form, or degrees of disarmament, come within our purview. What is here simply urged is that the whole Church and its ministers are, by their calling, on the side of peace, of peace and right.

When we look at the second of our considerations, namely that a part of the influence of the Church arises from its being removed from political concerns in the narrower sense, we certainly cannot speak generally for all Churches. The reason is that the detachment of the Church varies so much in different countries. For there may be many stages between a Church like that of the Apostolic age, wholly independent of political influence, and a Church which is dominated by its political and national environment. It is only too possible to envisage a Church so fully obsessed by a national patriotism that it finds itself preaching a nationalism which leads on in the direction of eventual war rather than of peace. This is not necessarily to say that such a Church is insincere; the truth

may be that it has first misled itself before it proceeds to mislead others. No Church is immune from this dangerous and unsuspected self-deception. The Church in such a case may propound the doctrine that peace is a very desirable thing and that it will best be found in the acknowledged dominion of the country to which this particular Church belongs. In the name of peace it may be all the time preaching a cruel and war-crushed subjugation which carries no contentment of the conquered with it. We are reminded of the British leader two thousand years ago when he criticised the Roman occupation of the country, and declared, as Tacitus records, "They make a desert and they call it peace."

A Church in this situation can scarcely be said to be in a position to preach to men and women on a different plane from the guidance of the politician, for the simple cause that it has been infected by the outlook of the politicians themselves. It may have a different field of operations. It may use a different language, but the text of its exhortation will be the same. Its scope will differ from that of the politicians in that it will be able to get an entry into the minds of many who will listen more readily to religious arguments, yet unsuspectingly all the time are hearing a new exposition of the old political thesis.

We have also to consider the case of a national Church which its Government repudiates. This, also, we see before our eyes. Such a Church may still be national in the sense that it is the Church of the people and guides and blesses their holy aspirations. But it reaps no longer any advantage from association with the national régime. State and Church, national Church though it be, are at variance. Nevertheless, such an outcast Church would still have a power coming from its former position. It is not like the late Apostolic Church, persecuted by an alien Government; it is a Church thrown down from its old position, and robbed of its own accorded privileges. But the privilege of service abides, such a Church has a special calling to help its adherents in all that is good. It is not dethroned from the hearts of the faithful. It leads them to seek in hours of tribulation for the morning dawn of righteousness and peace. It is still national in memory and power.

A wise and pure Church would find a part of its duty and privilege to preach an eager and sane patriotism; a patriotism

which recognises that a true love of country is not to be held as a defiance and challenge to other nations, but aims at making the country which it loves a contributing power to the success of all. As the great Athenian statesman explained, the true patriot does not wish to keep the best things of his country to himself, but is ready to share them with others and to give them a world-wide publicity. "Athens," he exclaimed, "is the school of Greece." Such a patriotism in the modern world takes a wide view and remembers that it is a law of life that all, whether individuals or countries, are members of one another and can promote a common and larger good in which all can partake. "No one's real loss can be another's real gain." This should be the attitude of a Christian nation. The Roman Catholic Church, it may be observed, presents no exception to the Churches' general approval of a noble contributing patriotism, unless it is in so far as it has a universal scheme of centralisation which transcends all local boundaries and national Churches. For its ideal is not that of a reunion of national Churches and coherent communions with certain essentials secured, but of one single Church unified throughout its system, and paying its homage to the throne of St. Peter.

No one can deny that one great enemy to peace, perhaps its greatest, is fear. It is through mutual fear that the nations in this century have piled up armaments against one another; fear has been a potent force in commercial competition. What the whole world needs now is a sense of security; nothing could do more to advance the cause of international peace than the removal of the nervous fears of aggression on the part of others, and the fears of the results of selfish and isolated patriotism. But such fearfulness and the causes from which it springs are quite contrary to the Christian ethic, which, if on the positive side it induces peace, on the negative side has no place for the fear which is bred of insecurity and antagonism. If fear springs from rivalry and distrust, right relations are the happy fruit of mutual faith and respect.

When we turn to the influence of the Church of England it is clear that the fact that it is a national Church and that there is a union, a spiritual nexus, between the English Church and the English nation unquestionably gives a unique opportunity in this whole matter to the Church of England. This opportunity may be grouped under three

heads, first of all at home, secondly in the Empire, thirdly in the world at large. The Church of England at home is placed very differently from any other religious body. It has a special privilege of service. The clergyman of the Church of England, resident among his people, has an accredited access to them, not only when they are assembled in church, but in their homes. His home stands among the homes of his people. However brotherly our feeling may be towards the ministers of the various Free Church bodies, and however much we may appreciate the good results of their lives and preaching and teaching, not least on the subject of peace, they have necessarily to minister to their adherents by congregations and not by parishes. If the clergyman of the Church of England is a wise man, he will visit in the houses of all his parishioners who will give him a welcome. On their part, whether they belong to the Church of England or to one of the Free Churches, they will look upon him as a friend to whom they can turn in all the movements of their personal and family life.

We can find a good illustration of all this in the work done by the clergy during the Great War. Especially in our country districts, the War might have been received in a different spirit if the clergyman and his wife and family (for we must not forget these) had not been at hand to help his flock in every way that lay in his power. He was there to break the sad news of bereavement, to explain the papers that had to be filled in, to guide the service of the boys and the girls, to sympathise with the perplexities, to guide one and all in the ways of steadiness, self-sacrifice and uncomplaining purposefulness. A man occupying such a situation affects the public opinion around him. To some extent his brother in the noble medical profession shares his opportunities, but not in the same way, because the doctor has not the same permanent right of entry and authoritative position. His services are only required from time to time and his influence is less concentrated.

If the clergyman sets himself on the side of all that makes for peace, he counts towards the success of a policy for peace. Think of the effect of one man doing this in every parish all over England! Think of this man constantly purifying the springs of action which, if misdirected and mishandled, promote war! It may be in the first instance the petty war

between neighbours, it may on a larger scale be war between sections and classes, it may be on the largest scale, a war between nations. Now if the Church at home has this wonderful man-power to use in the dissemination of the things which make for good and for peace, it must be carefully observed that its influence reaches farther and all over the Empire. The Church of England in the Empire is not established and is independent of the State; it is only one among many religious bodies and spiritual forces. But it makes the greatest difference that the Church extended in the Empire is in touch with the Church of England at home. This adds a prestige to its ministrations, and once again the prestige is the privilege of serving righteous causes, with greater force and acceptability. The Bishop when he speaks, and everyone knows it, not only speaks as the Bishop of the diocese, but as one who is in touch with the Bishops of the home Church. These Bishops have a recognised place of leadership in the national life. Some of them have seats in the House of Lords, from which they can urge policies that are generous and wise, and tend to promote the Kingdom of God. Here, yet again, is a privilege of opportunity for advancing the things that make for right and for well-being, and of using for this purpose a big position which a Christian State from its very beginning has accorded to them.

But this must not be read as if the Bishops were an isolated group, the only champions of good causes in an Upper House of Parliament that was mainly worldly and selfish in its outlook. They are not marked off by their demeanour as they are by their dress in the House of Lords, of which they constitute one of the very oldest parts. The present writer remembers a day when, passing straight from the Lambeth Conference, in which a discussion on War and Peace had taken place, he stepped into the House of Lords and happened to find a debate proceeding there on the same subject. The only distinction he could draw between the one place and the other was that the House of Lords seemed more vividly to recognise the practical considerations which encompassed and therefore corrected the idealism of the Conference. At heart they were one. In spite of the fact that individual Members of Parliament need not be Christians, the Christian outlook of the whole body can be quickly recognised by one who observes the way in which from a hundred years ago the

legislature has more and more been ready to pass social legislation for the benefit of the community. The action of Parliament in regard to slavery and the slave trade comes into mind when we are commemorating the work of Wilberforce, and in more recent years the output of humanitarian Acts has been very large.

Thirdly, we have to remember the effect of the National Church of England over the world at large, especially, no doubt, in Europe. The fact that there is here a national church reveals to the world that the public life of England is openly Christian. For example, our Assizes always start with a service in the Cathedral of the Church; both Houses of Parliament begin their daily sessions with prayer. The Sovereign is crowned in Westminster Abbey. This official connection between the Church and State does not deaden the appeal of the Church; on the first Armistice Day, before any public services were announced, people rushed to church, by nature one might say, to give expression to their thanksgiving, very much as those who lived in London hastened to Buckingham Palace, where the King represented the corporate personality of the nation on its day of joy. So it is still. However apathetic the people may appear to be on an ordinary Sunday, there are times when if their emotions are stirred by public or domestic events they come to the church to consecrate their feelings and to lift up their hearts to God.

There is nothing like this public confession of Christian allegiance elsewhere. Foreigners are aware of the strength and the reality of the Christian outlook and sympathy diffused in our public life. Sometimes on the Continent of Europe we find Church and State in opposition or taking up the position of armed neutrality. It was a wonder to such nations that the discussions on Prayer Book revision should have evoked all the interest that was aroused in both Houses of Parliament, and on such a very lofty plane. The Church of England has a special opportunity of influencing national policy and the public opinion on which in the end such policy must rest. Let the Christian voice lead the political voice. This way lies the way of the peacemaker. The national character of the established Church of England is the measure of its power to promote all righteous causes in the world and among them the cause of peace.

In conclusion we must lay great stress upon the fact that

side by side with the efforts that are being made for reunion at home we find a growing coherence existing between the Churches of various countries. There is a noble freemasonry between them which can enable those who belong to nations, politically at variance, to be one in investigating their Christian heritage and in promoting the cause of unity internationally on the ecclesiastical plane. It has been noteworthy the way in which in the last fifteen years the Churches in various European countries have been meeting together in conferences, and in discussions of points of difference and agreement: all this has led to sympathy and understanding, and to methods of closer fellowship. In England the Church led the way to the unity of the nation. Once more we may discover that, through such unity as the Church offers to its sections and branches, a greater unity arises between the countries in which those sections are found. Here is the Church at work as a power for peace.

B. NORWIC:

THE COMMON INFORMER.

ON November 6th, 1934, the House of Commons gave leave for the introduction of a Bill designed to disable any common informer in future from starting a penal action for his own benefit. It may well be that Parliament will come at long last to realise that it is wrong for a free country to allow an informer to seek redress for his own pecuniary advantage in respect of a public wrong in which he has no direct personal interest or concern. A wrong to the State should surely be atoned for by a penalty payable to the State alone.

The origin of the practice whereby private persons can exploit the wrongs of others goes far back into English history. Penal actions of this type arose generally because men doubted whether the eyes of the primitive State were sufficiently watchful and its arm sufficiently long to discover and punish offenders. In a few cases of later date the legislature may have distrusted the zeal of the executive. In others again, such as those which were associated with the State monopoly of lotteries, the motive was simply the wish for the better detection of unauthorised private competitors.

The golden age of the informer was the Tudor period. In Sir William Holdsworth's *History of English Law* reference is made to the long line of sixteenth-century statutes in which the common informer was given the penalties recovered by his energy, and collusive proceedings by friends of culprits were treated as "covinous" and therefore no bar against a genuine informer's suit. The system gradually provoked resentment among the many who were "unjustly vexed and disquieted by common informers," and this class found a powerful champion in the great Sir Edward Coke. In his *Third Institute of the Laws of England* he describes informers as "*turbidum hominum genus*," and as ranking among the "viperous vermin who endeavoured to have eaten out the sides of the church and common-wealth." By their diligence in setting penal actions on foot they impoverish "chiefly the poorer sort for malice and private ends." Coke's influence caused a marked decline in the statutory recognition and encouragement of common informers. Probably the Crown recognised that it paid better to take the penalty for itself. Coke expressed this view in more dignified words: "The

King cannot commit the sword of his justice or the oil of his mercy concerning any penal statute to any subject." It is thus noteworthy that two of the Sabbatarian laws of the seventeenth century (the Sunday Observance Acts of 1625 and 1677) punished offenders by fines for the benefit of the poor of the parish and, in default of payment, by being "set publicly in the stocks," rather than by rewarding the piety or cupidity of the informer.

The tide turned again in favour of the common informer in the reign of George III. The House of Commons (Disqualification) Acts of 1782 and 1801, while properly disabling members who enjoyed government contracts from voting in the House, assigned the severe penalties incurred on any breach of the law to the first person to issue a writ. The heavy litigation in which several claimants raced to recover some £46,500 from a member who had inadvertently contravened the 1801 statute in 1913, proved that the common informer had still an opulent niche in the English penal system.

The most interesting statute of George III's reign, however, which still avails the informer, is the Lord's Day Observance Act, 21 Geo. 3 c. 49, to which Chitty's Statutes, the Statutes at large, and the House of Lords' Committee of 1895 assign the date 1781, though the Law Reports uniformly give the date as 1780. The Sunday Entertainment Act, 1932, confirms the latter view. For several generations this statute was believed to apply simply to debates in theological academies—a belief based on a wrong view of the importance of its preamble. In 1869 its aid was invoked by a common informer in an action to recover penalties against persons for lecturing on Sunday for reward in St. Martin's Hall. The Court of Common Pleas held that lectures designed to portray "science as the handmaid of religion" could not be described as being given "for public entertainment or amusement" within the words of the statute. An occasional "diverting passage" in a lecture was not enough. Unhappily, in *Terry v. Brighton Aquarium Company* (1874), £200 were recovered as a penalty by an informer on the ground that the public feeding of fish at the aquarium was an "amusement." The fact that sixteen bandsmen played a selection of sacred music in order to lessen the entertaining character of the exhibition was held to make no difference. In *Reid v. Wilson* (1895) the plaintiff failed because he sued the wrong defendants, but the Court of

Appeal held that the Leeds Sunday Lecture Society had in fact broken the law by reason of the jokes which a lecture by Max O'Rell on "John Bull, Sandy and Pat" made inevitable. The character of the lecture transformed the hall in which it was held into "a disorderly house."

As a result of this case, a select committee of the House of Lords considered in 1895 a proposal by Lord Hobhouse to amend the Act of 1781. The report of its proceedings is well worth reading. It illustrates how far England has since travelled towards what some may call a more profane conception of Sunday. It was seriously argued before this body whether the tune "See the Conquering Hero" was more permissible on a Sunday than "Sally in our Alley," as it came from an oratorio. The Rev. Frederic Peake, a witness, gave evidence that one Sunday a lecturer had even vindicated vivisection, "not at all suitable teaching for the Lord's Day or any other day." Objection was made to Sir Robert Ball's lectures on the ground that "I am a pupil of a much greater Astronomer-Royal, who says the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament sheweth his handiwork." The Archbishop of Canterbury thought that the use of limelight might convert "instructive" addresses, which were arguably outside the ambit of the statute, into "amusing" addresses, which were taboo. On the other side, much evidence was adduced as to the popularity in London and the industrial North of Sunday lectures and concerts, and of the good results of opening libraries and museums on Sundays. Nothing came of the report of this committee. The 1781 statute has in fact remained on the statute book, subject to the right of the Crown under an Act of 1875 to remit penalties, but not costs. This right is by no means always exercised by the Home Secretary, to whom it is in practice delegated.

In 1931 the Court of Appeal condemned as quite unfounded and unconstitutional a belief of the London County Council that the Act of 1781 was "obsolescent" and unenforceable, and that the Council had power to dispense with its provisions in licensing entertainments. This decision led to a revival in the activities of the informer until curbed to some extent by the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, which partially legalises in certain areas the opening of cinemas to the public on Sundays and modifies the Sunday Observance Acts in respect of musical entertainments, museums, lectures and

debates. In other respects the code of 1781 still operates in 1934. As recently as last August a garden party organised for a Sunday on behalf of certain charities in Manchester, to which entrance was to be obtained for payment, had to be deferred at the last moment on account of the apprehensions of its promoters. A letter from Lord's Day House in London had in fact been written to the Chief Constable of Manchester, calling his attention to the statute and asking him to exert his authority to prevent breaches of the law.

Nor is the ambit of the informer's activities confined to laws as to Sunday observance. In 1923 two humble town councillors who sat as members of the Morpeth corporation without having filed returns of their election expenses in pursuance of the Municipal Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Act, 1884, were sued for heavy penalties. The court found that it had jurisdiction to grant relief in view of the defendants' "inadvertence." Among the difficulties inherent in the law and practice relating to common informers are the constant doubts which have arisen whether they or the Crown are entitled to sue in penal actions and whether the Crown or the courts can in law or will in fact remit penalties. One of Bradlaugh's triumphs was in persuading the House of Lords in 1883 to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeal, and to hold that a common informer could not sue him under the Parliamentary Oaths Act, 1866, for having sat and voted in the House of Commons without having made and subscribed the required oath. It was held that in order to enable a common informer to maintain an action for a penalty, an interest in the penalty must be given to him by express words or by sufficient implication. Lord FitzGerald's speech includes the weighty dictum that "the legislature may have considered it better not to give a right of suit to the common informer in whose hands it might be made an engine of oppression, and rather to leave the enforcement of the law in all proper cases to the Attorney-General, responsible to the Crown and to Parliament for the due performance of his duty."

It remains true, however, to say that the laws which give rights to the common informer have never been separately tabulated; that among such laws there are material differences between the proportions of any penalties recovered to which an informer will be entitled; that there is no uniform system or principle by which certainty can be expressed whether a

power to relieve from penalties can or cannot be exercised; that it is doubtful to what extent the saving clause which is inserted in the Common Informer Bill, recently introduced in the House of Commons for the purpose of preserving the right of the Crown to recover penalties, fines and forfeitures in penal actions, will enable statutes hitherto enforced at the instance of common informers to remain enforceable at the instance of the Attorney-General or the Home Office. None of the perplexities which these facts involve ought to stay the reformer's hand.

There has been complete agreement among the judges who in our own times have dealt with penal actions as to the personal worthlessness in most cases of the common informer. Their views have been in accordance with the practice of interpreting penal statutes strictly and of treating technical defences with more sympathy than they excite in other cases. The informer has few friends among the public or in the Press. The glamour which rightly attaches to the spy who uses his craft and courage for his country, often for scanty or no reward, can never attach to the spy who, with no personal risk, exploits another's error for his own enrichment.

In these circumstances there would seem to be no answer to the case for abolishing proceedings by way of penal action when initiated by a common informer.

GERALD HURST.

MR. GANDHI AND THE UNTOUCHABLES.

FOR nearly two years a periodical called *Harijan* has reached me week by week from India. Only a score or two of these papers are read in England. Yet it is but eight foolscap pages of print ; and anyone who reads on an average one page per week will learn more in a year about the essential India—the India of 700,000 villages—and of her problems, economic, social, religious, than by reading many blue-books. Moreover, he will learn more of Mr. Gandhi's mind, and of his work and activity, his ideals and, it may be, of his limitations, than by reading many telegrams from special correspondents, and many estimates of his character by perplexed Western observers. Everyone in the West knows that Mr. Gandhi, whatever his political influence may be from day to day, is a force to be reckoned with in the world, and not just in Anglo-Indian relations—and everyone knows, too, that Mr. Gandhi does not fit easily into our ordinary Western standards : he remains something of an enigma to his own generation. Yet how few seem to trouble to go to the source for their knowledge of the man ! The present writer is strongly tempted to do like many other Westerners who know Mr. Gandhi personally, and to say : " Listen to me and I will interpret him to you truly." But it is better to say : " Listen to his own voice : some explanation and some interpretation must be offered ; but it shall be as little as possible."

So let us take a month's issues of *Harijan*, Mr. Gandhi's weekly paper devoted to the service of the Untouchables, or, as he calls them, the " Harijans," the people of God. It must first of all be recalled that in August, 1933, when Mr. Gandhi was unconditionally released from prison, he undertook to devote himself for the remaining year of his prison sentence wholly to the service of the Untouchables, to those fifty or sixty millions of his fellow-countrymen who have been kept out-caste and submitted to frightful disabilities by their fellow-Hindus. It is, indeed, a fact that many of them engage in occupations that must make them dirty ; and under the rigid caste system of India every child born into an Untouchable family must follow the occupation (dirty or not) of his or her parents. Mr. Gandhi insists that, instead of consigning these people to the most insanitary parts of the towns and villages, and refusing to allow them access to the ordinary

water supply or schools, the very fact of their unpleasant but necessary and valuable occupations is a special reason for honouring them and giving them the fullest facilities for a clean and healthy and happy life. So for most of a year he went on tour, by train, by motor, and on foot, through the length and breadth of India, addressing meetings in town and village, taking collections for the " Harijan Sevak Sangh," as the society for serving the Untouchables is called, pleading with the caste Hindus everywhere to recognise the Untouchables as their brothers. Near the end of the tour, a certain high-caste Hindu, who had dogged Mr. Gandhi's footsteps and organised counter-demonstrations, was molested and hurt ; although the responsibility for this act of violence was not brought home to any of Mr. Gandhi's followers, he decided to undertake a week's fast at the end of his tour in penance for this act of violence and for other things that he had seen and heard during his tour which had caused him to feel shame. So the *Harijan* of August 10th begins with this statement :

With the completion of the tour and the year of probation during which I was to devote myself wholly to the Harijan cause and take no active part in politics, many have begun to speculate about my immediate future activity. Happily, the fast is to pre-determine my course during it and for some time after. But, even apart from the fast, I should like to say that, whilst it is open to me to speak and write on politics, I propose to keep myself aloof from them as much as possible. The joy of the past self-restraint is too fresh to fade from the memory and to induce volubility of political speech. My partiality for Harijan and kindred causes persists and will persist, I hope, to the end of my life.

" The joy of the past self-restraint " . . . " my partiality for Harijan and kindred causes " . . . what do these phrases suggest ?

In the same number we find a report of work done for Harijans ; this is a weekly feature, reports being sent in by provincial committees month by month or quarter by quarter. Thus, we have here the report for June 1934, from Rajputana. Under the heading " Educational," particulars are given of the opening or re-opening of eleven special schools, and of the admission of several Untouchable students to ordinary schools. Under " Economic," there are particulars of employment, loans, clothes, school books, and other things provided.

Three hundred and forty-eight sanitary rounds were taken in Harijan *mohallas* (quarters) in 28 different places; 1,289 Harijan pupils were given baths at 26 different centres; 1,902 Harijan boys were taught to clean their hands, feet and faces in the schools; 2,452 Harijan students were taught to clean their teeth; 1,322 Harijans were supplied with washing soap free. Fifteen meetings were held at seven different places, attended by over 600 Harijans, where the advantages of abstinence, education and social economy were explained. Ninety-six Harijans took vows to abstain from liquor and carrion-eating; 141 ailing Harijans were given free medicine; 84 recovered. One new well for Harijans is noted as under construction. Ninety caste-Hindus took vows against the observance of untouchability. And so on. Finally, an exact account is given of the money spent, by far the largest item of expenditure (over 1,600 rupees) being for the new schools.

Is all this detail too trivial to mention? Surely not. It is these reports that provide the real test of action. Mr. Gandhi has shown himself in all his work as meticulous about detail, both in the keeping of accounts and the routine of administration, as the Government of India itself. Are these figures absolutely reliable? it may be asked. Certainly, there is always the human factor to reckon with. Some volunteers may enter things as achieved which have only been attempted. But it is difficult to see which of the above figures can be seriously exaggerated.

I have quoted the above because it happens to come in the number of *Harijan* before me. Some reports show less work done for education—some show more done for improving water-supply or drainage or housing. But the cumulative effect of glancing through these reports week by week, from the length and breadth of the Indian continent, must be to convince the most sceptical reader that a steady stream of effort is continuing, week by week, month by month. No doubt in a country of the vast size of India many districts are still scarcely affected; ground won is sometimes lost again; but if the effort is sustained at this rate for a generation, the evils of untouchability must be practically wiped out.

We turn next to an account of one of the last weeks of Mr. Gandhi's tour—his visit to Cawnpore and Lucknow. It is unnecessary to give the details. There are public meetings, visits to the Harijan quarters, wretched hovels "reminding

the visitor of the caves of pre-historic humanity," one quarter "situated just near public latrines and liquor shops, centres of physical and moral infection." Mr. Gandhi pleads with the caste-Hindus to open their hearts to their despised brethren, and with the municipality to carry out reforms; he urges the volunteers to more vigorous action, he tells the Harijans how to improve their own lot, he collects money for carrying on the work. Those who have followed in his track testify to the renewed energy that these visits impart to the workers.

Here are some of Mr. Gandhi's own reflections on his tour, given to journalists at its close:

The impression left on my mind is that untouchability is on its last legs. The millions who attended the meetings were not all utterly ignorant of all I had to say to them. They were certainly not indifferent. The intensive propaganda carried on by Sanatanists (the orthodox Hindus who oppose Mr. Gandhi's emancipation work) had left no room for ignorance or indifference. Nothing was left undone to prejudice the mass mind against the movement. The grossest falsehoods were broadcast. It would be wrong, therefore, to say that the attendance of multitudes at the meetings was purely a personal compliment to me and had no reference to my message. I am quite sure that the message has appealed to the reason of the masses. I am also fully aware that not all of them are yet ready to translate their beliefs into practice. . . .

A demonstrable awakening on a large scale has taken place among the Harijans. Many of them have made unsolicited statements before me that the position had advanced and that they had confidence that untouchability would be a thing of the past in the near future. I share their confidence. . . . As to the Temple Entry Bill, I hold that it is a legal necessity. But I have declared, times without number, that I would be no party to forcing the Bill through the Assembly by the vote of a mixed majority. . . . How I wish that the undivided attention of all Hindus was concentrated on the ameliorative measures which have been adopted by the Harijan Sevak Sangh!

The next number of *Harijan* gives some account of the week's fast Mr. Gandhi undertook at the beginning of August, and clearly explains its purpose: indeed, the title is "Purification Week." And here is his own message:

As I enter upon the seven days' fast from to-morrow, I would like to re-emphasise the necessity on the part of Harijan workers

of helping the cause by greater personal purification and greater concentration on the work before them. The monster of untouchability will not be killed without constant and ceaseless effort on the part of the workers who have faith in the mission and who have by patient toil built up personal purity and integrity. Let everyone also realise that fasting is not for everyone and for every occasion. Fasting without faith may even lead to disastrous consequences.

The next morning he spoke these words to those who gathered round him at the beginning of the fast :

There are two enemies against which we must guard : untruth and impurity. Purity of the mind is essential for the observance of all the vows. If the mind is not pure, no amount of physical restraint would avail. The Gita teaches us that the man who restrains the organs of action, whilst he allows the mind to run after the objects of the senses, is a hypocrite. We may fail to restrain the mind, but let us not be hypocrites. If we fail, let us own up, rather than be guilty of the double sin of untruth and want of restraint.

As it happened, just on this day when his mind was set on purity, he read in the papers about a sad marital calamity that had befallen a gifted Indian woman.

"Whither are we drifting ?" he asked. "How are we to save the women of India ? 'Follow your impulses as they rise' is the lesson that our youths have readily learnt from the West. They rush in to adopt any new shibboleth that comes their way. 'Transfer all means of production to the masses!' But what kind of masses ? Are they ready for it ? Don't they first need to be educated ? But who is going to educate and organise them ? The cry for equality has deprived us of our reason. Is there no difference between enlightenment and ignorance ? Until the end of time the difference will remain, and if you arm the ignorant with power and weapons they cannot wield, they will deal their own destruction. Russia is still in the melting-pot and is maintaining the present régime by sheer brute force. Everywhere there have been terrible reactions, and our youths will not see that, in trying to help the masses, we will end in making them more miserable and land them into more tragic straits than ever before."

The fast was broken on August 14th after the singing of hymns from the medieval Hindu saint Tukaram, and the reading by Dr. S. K. Datta of the thirteenth chapter of Corinthians, and

passages from the Koran by one of Mr. Gandhi's Mussulman friends.

In the next number we return to a common feature of the paper for some months past : a reminder in large print at the head that a meeting of caste-Hindus from all over India, held in Bombay, on September 25th, 1932, the orthodox Pandit Malaviya in the chair, unanimously passed a resolution "that henceforth, amongst Hindus, no one shall be regarded as an Untouchable by reason of his birth, and that those who have been so regarded hitherto will have the same right as other Hindus in regard to the use of public wells, public schools, public roads and all other public institutions." It also declares for "an early removal of all social disabilities now imposed by custom upon the so-called Untouchable classes, including the bar in respect of admission to temples."

Mr. Gandhi is in these pages constantly replying to critics, including some Harijan critics. One frequent criticism from that quarter is that the work is controlled, not by Untouchables themselves, but by high-caste Hindus. Here is the reply :

You complain that your own people are not being made members of the Servants of Untouchability Boards, and you suggest that they should be given a larger share in the administration. If the caste-Hindus were over-lords or a bureaucracy ruling over you, I could understand the suggestion. I would then ask them to surrender all power. But they are no over-lords, they are servants pledged to atone for the wrongs their forefathers have committed for ages. How can you share in the atonement ? They are doing what they are by way of penance. You have no penance to perform. Rest assured that, the moment you claim a share in the administration, the burden will be shifted on to you, and the caste-Hindus will declare themselves free of all responsibility. There is no power or pride of possession in the responsibility to collect funds and administer relief. I have made drastic suggestions for cutting down the administrative expenses, and they are being carried out. Instead of asking to be appointed on the Executive of the Anti-Untouchability Board, you can form your own Advisory Boards to help the Anti-Untouchability Board with suggestions every now and then. That is how you can make yourself most useful.

In line with these ideas, again and again we find Mr. Gandhi warning the active workers that they must not dominate the Untouchables, or order them to do this and that ; their task

is to go among them as humble servants, penitent for the past sins of the caste-Hindus, and win their love and confidence, and then show them how to live a healthier, cleaner, more independent life. From time to time special reports come in showing some volunteer who is conspicuously successful in achieving this; such cases are published as an example. Other reports come in, showing where the workers have adopted a wrong attitude; these provide occasion for a warning.

Here is part of Mr. Gandhi's advice to those about to undertake village work :

All his (the volunteer's) hours minus the eight hours of sleep and rest will be fully occupied with some work. He will have no time to waste. He will allow himself no laziness and allow others none. His life will be a constant lesson to his neighbours in ceaseless and joy-giving industry. Bodily sustenance should come from bodily labour, and intellectual labour is necessary for the culture of the mind. Division of labour there will necessarily be, but it will be a division into various species of bodily labour, and not a division into intellectual labour to be confined to one class, and bodily labour to be confined to another class. Our compulsory or voluntary idleness has to go. If it does not go, no penance will be of any avail, and semi-starvation will remain the eternal problem that it is. He who eats two grains must produce four. . . .

The village worker . . . will soon find that he has much to learn from the simple villagers. He will enter into every detail of village life, he will discover the village handicrafts and investigate the possibilities of their growth and their improvement. . . . Sanitation and hygiene will engage a good part of his attention. His home and his surroundings will not only be a model of cleanliness, but he will help to promote sanitation in the whole village by taking the broom and the basket round. . . . Remember that our weapons are spiritual. It is a force that works irresistibly, if imperceptibly. Its progress is geometrical, rather than arithmetical. It never ceases so long as there is a propeller behind. The background of all your activities has, therefore, to be spiritual. Hence the necessity for the strictest purity of conduct and character.

One is tempted to go on quoting, but these extracts from a single month of *Harijan* are perhaps sufficient to show the life and thought of Gandhi. In England we think of him far too much as a perplexing political leader, whose political ideas no ordinary administrator can fathom. That is, indeed, an essential part of the man. But it is not his heart. If we can

understand the principles of his life, we may begin to understand his politics. Close study of his daily work for the Harijans reveals those principles. "Understand Gandhi," we have been told by Mr. Sastri and others, "and you will understand India."

In the past few weeks he has taken a definite step away from the routine of politics, in order to devote himself more fully to village welfare, especially to the fostering of village industries. Just after the session of the Indian National Congress when Mr. Gandhi retired from the leadership, one of his closest associates wrote in a private letter: "The Congress is over and though Bapu (Mr. Gandhi) has retired, he seems more triumphant in his retirement than he was when he actually led. He has definitely set his face against having any part in planning the official politics and programme, though on questions of principle his guidance will as ever continue to be sought for and given. He is feeling so easy and free after the change and will have enough time to devote to the constructive programmes, especially to the reconstruction of some of the institutions in which he is keenly interested." All who care for the welfare of India must wish him many years of activity for the continuance of his heroic labours on behalf of the "semi-starved millions" of his fellow-countrymen.

HORACE G. ALEXANDER.

THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS.

RECENT events in Europe have again brought this question into prominence. It is manifestly one of great importance. The right solution of this problem must have the most far-reaching consequences in the near future for peace or war. The Disarmament Conference is proceeding slowly and has almost come to a full stop. There seems to be some confusion as to the principles which are to be applied in arriving at a solution of the difficult questions involved. On what principles are we to proceed in arriving at a decision on some of the vital questions at issue? Are we to rely on the undertaking not to commit an aggression, to submit disputes to conciliation, arbitration and law, as our supreme guarantee of peace, or are we to rely upon force, whether the force be that of each individual State, or a force wielded by an international body of supreme states, supporting its decrees by strong armed forces?

To clear our minds let us take the Covenant of the League of Nations, which contains two conflicting principles. The first clause opens with the words:

The High Contracting Parties in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security, by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

There are supplementary provisions for treaties and decent behaviour between States. But later we have Clause 10 which envisages force and Clause 16 which permits the use of force and war in certain circumstances, but delays its application. These conflicting principles remain and time has only served to emphasise the conflict.

The determination of France not to rely on moral agencies but to demand a guarantee of force and a return to the pre-war system of special alliances and the Balance of Power has hitherto prevailed. France is now asking for more specific guarantees of collective action; she pins her faith on security attained by force and common action. Here is her statement on Disarmament recently presented to the League of Nations:

The principle of common action must supersede, in the minds of the nations, that of individual defence. It implies that the League is considered by them as a living reality, invested with positive responsibilities and possessed of effective power.

In effect her proposition is: security by force in common action, or no more reduction.

We must therefore carefully examine this matter and see what answer we should give. Let us clearly understand what is meant. We are to have a sort of International Police Force to send against an aggressor. Here we come upon a common error which confuses the use of a "policeman" in civil life with the use of a police force in international affairs. The analogy seems to have the effect of settling this difficulty for many people who do not take the trouble to examine what the application of the "policeman" theory really means, and therefore why it is not applicable to the relations between nations. Even in internal affairs the "policeman" now plays but a small part. Public opinion is the real support and guarantee of our liberties. This was illustrated on the occasion of the General Strike in 1926 when the small police force was powerless, and law and order were maintained by the people themselves. There is also the case of Ireland where no man's life or property could be guaranteed though we had there 30,000 soldiers and 15,000 constabulary, because the people were not behind the Government. As a contrast to this example of the inefficacy of force we may take the instance of the murder of Sir Henry Wilson in London by two mad Irishmen: the people in the street closed on them, though armed, seized them and handed them over to justice, no police being present. They were determined to support law and justice.

The sending of a policeman to enforce order and peace in the international sphere means war. Now the avowed object of the League of Nations is the avoidance of war; so that you are brought into this sharp contrast, that to avoid war you must go to war. Again someone must decide in what cases and when a "policeman" must be used. You must have some central authority entrusted with the tremendous power of issuing decrees against nations. This means the creation of a super state with sanctions to enforce its decrees and maintain its authority. Now let us apply this to the present League and see what kind of an authority would have to act. It would be the Council of the League, but the Council of the League is dominated by the four most powerful nations, who are given the right to lay down the law and enforce it against the less powerful nations. This provision is justified by its

authors because the great Powers giving the guarantee would have to do most of the work of force and should therefore have the right to say when and how it should be used.

This is a clear violation of the fundamental principle of the equality of nations in the eye of International Law, a principle on which Mr. Gladstone laid such stress. Might, not right, would in fact decide. This is the very principle which the war was said to be fought to end. It is the principle on which France invaded the Ruhr. In the years which have intervened since the foundation of the League we have seen the results of the reliance on force. Like all false remedies or quack medicines the suggestion is that we have not had enough, that we require more of them.

Although the terms of Clauses 10 and 16 guarantee the component States, yet we have had a constant succession of attempts to add to those strong clauses. The proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Protocol which succeeded it went in this direction, and the same may be said of the Locarno Treaty. So now the Covenant of the League, strong as it is, does not contain enough force, but there must be more force. As Lord Balfour very pertinently pointed out, "the suggestion of a further guarantee beyond that of the League of Nations was the calling in of a Treaty in order to protect the nations, in the event of the Treaty which they have already entered into not being observed, this was rather paradoxical."

Does history give us any hope that the use of force by a super state is likely to diminish wars? The Pope was a super authority; he gave Mandates to Spain, Portugal, and others to extend Christianity by taking possession of various parts of the new and the old world. This led to many wars. Canning decisively rejected the Holy Alliance, which was an attempt to create a super state to control the other States of Europe. So far as it functioned at all it led to several wars. Napoleon tried to unite Europe by force in 1805 when he said, "there will be no peace in Europe except under a single chief or Emperor, who shall have Kings for his 'officials.'" He had his wish, but there was no peace. He had relied entirely upon force. In the end he realised that force had failed and in his testament he wrote: "I was obliged to tame Europe by arms; to-day it is necessary to convince it." He went on

strongly to recommend his heir "to unite Europe in indissoluble Federal Bonds."

The history of the Amphictyonic League in earlier times showed that a confederacy with coercive powers over the component states is more often the cause of war than a safeguard of peace. The question was debated in great detail at the time of the founding of the Federal Constitution of the United States of America. A specific guarantee controlling the States was rejected in the Federal Constitution; all sanctions and coercive powers over the States were purposely omitted. Both Hamilton and Madison discussed them and decisively rejected them. Madison said, "the practicability of making laws with coercive sanctions for States or political bodies has been exploded on all hands." Hamilton said, "to coerce States would be one of the maddest projects ever devised. No State would ever suffer itself to be used as an instrument for coercing another."

This latter difficulty has come up in the case of our Dominions, who very clearly see the dangers which will arise from the attempt to use them as instruments for coercing other nations. As the Prime Minister of Australia pointed out in regard to the Protocol, "the League was being altered from being a powerful moral agency for the moulding of the world's opinion in the direction of peace and healthy international relations, to being an organisation for the imposition of pains and penalties." The Dominions have a rooted objection to being used to enforce decisions of the League against other States. We are now a commonwealth of free nations, there is no compulsion in the British Empire. Our Dominions all want peace, but they do not agree with the view that peace can be got by force. We see then a distinct cleavage arising between the Dominions and the Mother Country on this subject. None of them have signed the Locarno Pact. This is a great blow not only to the solidarity of the British Commonwealth of Nations but to the idea of the present League becoming a world force and a world League of Nations. The Dominions from the first objected to Clause 10 with its guarantee of force and tried to get it altered later at Geneva.

America rejected the League of Nations largely on account of the use of force embodied in Clause 10, which it feared

might commit it to war in Europe. Here are the objections concisely summed up by President Harding :

In the existing League of Nations, world governing, with its super-powers, this Republic will have no part. . . . The aim to associate nations to prevent war, preserve peace and promote civilisation, our people most cordially applauded. We yearned for the new instrument of justice, but we can have no part in a committal to an agency of force in unknown contingencies ; we can recognise no super authority. Manifestly, the highest purpose of the League of Nations was defeated in linking it with the Treaty of Peace, and making it an enforcing agency of the victors in the war.

We see then that the positive guarantees and use of force have prevented America joining in the League and have made our own Dominions very shy of it. Any extension of this idea, such as a collective army, would make them still more so and would go still further in undermining the moral authority of the League.

There is another aspect of this suggestion of the use of collective force. We are all hoping to reduce and eventually get rid of large armaments. But if guarantees are given we perpetuate armaments. When the terms of the Protocol were laid before our War Office and Admiralty by our Government for their advice, they reported that if its obligations were undertaken by us, our armaments could not be diminished, but would have to be increased beyond their existing numbers. The Irish Free State in giving its views on the Protocol said, "the application of sanctions implies the maintenance of armaments rather than their abolition and in this respect is scarcely compatible with one of the primary objects of the Protocol, namely disarmament." The Prime Minister of Canada wrote in his reply to our Government's inquiry, "We do not consider it is in the interests of Canada or of the British Empire, or the League itself, to recommend to Parliament adherence to the Protocol ; and particularly to its rigid provisions for the application of economic and military sanctions in every future war." The Dominions see clearly the danger of being drawn back into the old regions of force and war, instead of increasing the moral factors which make for peace. The United States takes the same view and refuses to join us in such a calamitous step backwards.

We must aim at eliminating force from the constitution of the League of Nations. We have separated ourselves from America and from our Dominions to join in the quarrels of the Continent by our military guarantees. The first clause of the Covenant of the League has been forgotten. It proposes to give security. How ? "By the undertaking not to resort to war." The proposal now is to get our security by more preparation for war. Those who think themselves threatened will prepare to resist. We are so often tempted by an apparent short cut to the attainment of some good purpose by the sacrifice of some principle. It is a dangerous delusion.

What then do you propose ? it may be asked. How do you propose to secure the observance of agreements without these sanctions ? The answer is that the sanctions must not be those of force and war, they must be moral sanctions, founded on an enlightened and informed public opinion. Each power should undertake for itself not to violate the territory or impair the political independence of its neighbours. Now let us examine our great fundamental laws and international agreements from this aspect. Take the British Commonwealth of Nations which gives peace to an area of the world's surface nearly three times the area of Europe and in five continents. We have no sanctions, no majority would dream of coercing a minority of our States. The United States with forty-seven States has no sanctions and gives peace to an area equal to all Europe. One hundred and fifty years ago they discovered the impossibility of coercing States by force, we are groping towards that knowledge in Europe to-day.

Again, England, America, Japan, France and Italy at Washington made a Treaty limiting their navies and also giving peace to a vast area in the Pacific. But there are no sanctions in that Treaty, and no one fears that it will not be observed by its co-signatories. Then take the Kellogg Treaty entered into by nearly all the nations, and there again there are no sanctions. The recent Naval Treaty of London has no sanctions. The only remaining area of disturbance in the world is Europe, the home of our modern civilisation and the supposed seat of the world's highest intelligence. Can its twenty-seven States not be induced to surrender their rights to fight each other ? Our material progress in the arts and science is stupendous, but our moral development has not kept pace, so that we are behaving like children who have

found some dangerous weapons and are injuring themselves because they know not how wisely to control their use.

Here is what that great soldier, Sir William Robertson, said recently about war :

War has become, in short, a wholly detestable thing ; is almost, if not quite, as disastrous to victor as vanquished. Let human nature be as wicked, ambitious, and unstable as it may, I suggest that every man and woman should energetically support all efforts made for devising some more sensible and humane way of composing international differences than the destructive and futile methods upon which reliance has hitherto been unsuccessfully placed.

The late war shows us how true and profound was Plato's remark :

Man is a tame animal nevertheless, although when he meets with right education and has a happy disposition, he becomes the most divine and gentlest of creatures ; yet if he be nurtured inadequately or ill, he is the wildest of all the offspring of mother earth.

It is for us to note the words, "when he meets with right education," and see that he has the chance of getting that right education by discussing and throwing light upon the meaning and implication of these great international questions, so that a right judgment may be possible ; that his moral nature is fully developed and not warped and destroyed by evil teachings of hatred against our fellow nations.

To return once more to the League of Nations and force. Many of us are still under the influence of the war mentality and so are some nations ; they believe in nations suddenly running amok. This is what they believed happened in 1914, but history has thrown quite a different light on the origin of that terrible war, and has shown that fear was the dominating factor in a disastrous situation, for which all the nations had their share of responsibility. The League of Nations now calls all together and professes it will discuss, conciliate, arbitrate, and decide by law. All its members will act in a neighbourly way by all its fellow members. In addition we have the Kellogg Pact, as all the leading nations who are members of the League of Nations have also signed this Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of public policy.

The effect on the Covenant is that the gap permitting war, which was left in the Covenant, is now closed.

We have then in the League of Nations an instrument for dealing with international relations as an alternative to force and war. As it functions in these directions its moral prestige will grow and successful handling of difficult crises will give confidence in its goodwill, justice and impartiality. Moral forces will take charge more and more. Force and war as instruments of national policy will be abandoned, not only in name but in reality. Of such a nature is the growing hope of mankind and such its foundation. The fact then is that the League of Nations, constituted for the definite purpose of avoiding the use of force and war, if it resorts to the use of force and war to carry out its purposes, however beneficent, stultifies itself and denies its own fundamental principle. The League was constituted as a means of settling disputes by reason, discussion, conciliation, arbitration, and law, as opposed to settling them by the principle of force and war. It cannot have it both ways. It must be consistent and must itself be true to its fundamental principle. We must not destroy our one hope, the League of Nations.

P. A. MOLTENO.

A GOOD HATER.

IF the general reader wants to know what the average German thought about us in the eighteenth century, he turns to one of the better-known travellers such as Moritz or von Pöllnitz and does not, as a rule, look much farther. These two visitors saw a good deal of our failings and virtues, but were content on the whole to praise us, even if they did not join in the glorification of England and everything English which is a feature of German travel-diaries, at least after 1714. Amidst such a chorus of approval it is not always easy to catch a discordant note, but good fortune drew my attention recently to one traveller of the latter part of the century who disliked us intensely and was not afraid to say so. His name was Andreas Riem. Very little is known of him, except that he describes himself as Canonikus and wrote a study of ancient painting and a work on the *Aufklärung*, but he was certainly what Dr. Johnson would have called a very good hater. He was here in 1785, and in 1798 he published at his own expense, as part of a larger work dealing with Germany, France and Holland, his *Reisen durch . . . England in verschiedener, besonders politischer Hinsicht*. The book must now be very scarce.

Riem was obviously well-read and seems to have travelled widely in Europe. He quotes Shakespeare, Smollett, Fielding, Johnson, Burke, Adam Smith and Goldsmith, and had more than a smattering of English history. He had no interest in archæology or antiquities, but he was a keen student of nature, and although our national wickedness and degradation left little room in his mind for anything else, he could still find a place for some of the most delightful descriptions of the English country-side which are to be found in any traveller of the period.

His first impressions were very favourable, for Riem was entranced by the sight of Dover cliffs from the sea. While waiting for the tide he watched with delight the passing shipping and the revenue boats at anchor, until a flag was hoisted on the Castle hill and the packet-boat could make the harbour. Riem had taken a through ticket from Paris for eight louis d'or, which included transport and food by the way, and obviously did not expect to find tea, coffee and chocolate ready for the travellers at the inn without extra

charge. In great good humour he climbed the cliffs and took a little path which ran along the top. Far away in the haze was the coast of France and below him were the waves dancing in the sunshine. The sea was dotted with fishing-boats, and the picture remained imprinted on his mind for years. For Dover itself he had nothing but contempt—Englishmen might be relied on to ruin any work of nature—but where they had left the country untouched it was so lovely that it was fit to be inhabited by honest Germans.

His visit to the custom-house, however, soon aroused his ill-humour. His luggage was ransacked from top to bottom. Every shirt was taken out and shaken in search of lace. Then an official found his books. Some of them were bound in leather, and leather was contraband. Riem protested that knowledge was free, that the possession of four or six small leather volumes ought not to cast upon him the suspicion of being a leather merchant, but all in vain. The officer with a knife sliced off the covers very neatly, charged him 5s. 4d., and then demanded a gratuity. Riem offered him a lien on his "imported leather goods" and departed in a huff. In this mood even the beauty of the Kentish roads, the play of sunlight on the grass and hedges, and the stately country seats which he passed on his way to London left him cold. So did Canterbury and Rochester. Churches and palaces, he tells us, are everywhere the same. A man who has seen one Gothic building has seen all, and as for the monuments of royalty, dead kings and princes smelt no better than dead beggars, and it was a waste of time to look at their graves.

London, as a whole, he thought vastly inferior to Berlin or Dresden, but he admired our parks and open spaces. These were, of course, essential in a town which was befouled with smoke and fog, but it was a matter of surprise to Riem that Englishmen should have given the matter any thought at all. He has some praise for Somerset House and the Royal Exchange. St. Paul's also comes in for mild approval, but Westminster Abbey was a great disappointment. He entered by way of the Cloisters with excited curiosity. But he was immediately disillusioned. The building itself was stately enough, but the monuments were too close to each other and wretchedly conceived and executed. To anyone with a modicum of ordinary taste they were just a disgusting medley of ugliness. The guide was ignorant and hurried. With one

eye on the arrival of fresh sightseers, he chased Riem and his companions from monument to monument, and finally introduced them to the waxworks. Here he snatched General Monk's cap from his head and held it out for tips—a practice which continued down to the times of Ingoldsby: "This here's the cap of Giniral Monk! Sir, please put summut in."—and the raree-show was over. The only church he admired was St. Paul's, Covent Garden, a veritable Greek temple, and so restrained and beautiful that it might have stood on Greek soil, but after Riem's visit, and before the publication of his book, it was burnt down—a sure sign that a monument of such taste and purity could find no lasting home amidst a depraved and servile people.

Some of his other observations on London are amusing, if at times a little surprising. In spite of the boasted wealth of Great Britain, the seats in St. James's Park were rickety and so dirty that it was dangerous to make use of them. Westminster Hall was damp and bare, but, like the Houses of Parliament, it was close enough to the river for the people to drown their reptile politicians and law-givers if only they had the courage to do so. The Custom-House was typical of the English character—the true home of perjury and fraud. It was said that in a very short space of time 100,000 false oaths had been sworn there, the streets and alleys adjoining being packed with affidavit men who could be hired at all prices for the purpose of defrauding the State. The Bank, the Exchange, and the coffee-houses were so many convenient meeting-places for the furtherance of dishonest dealing. In the coffee-houses, as soon as the newspapers arrived, there was the silence of the grave. Each person sat absorbed in his favourite sheet, as if his whole life depended on the speed with which he could devour the news of the day. Not a word was uttered, for no Englishman ever spoke until his curiosity was satisfied. Riem's investigations seem to have taken him into queer places. He speaks of one tavern in a cellar to which the patrons descended by a ladder, which was at once removed and not replaced until they had paid their bills, and where, for better security, the knives and forks were chained to the tables.

Our traveller lodged at first in Ludgate Hill and later in Tavistock Street, and he had friends in the Strand and elsewhere. He seems to have seen much of C. G. Woide, at one

time preacher at the Dutch Chapel Royal, St. James's Place, and assistant-librarian at the British Museum, and obviously moved freely about the town. He gives us one or two glimpses of life in the streets, but his head was too full of politics and the crimes of politicians to bother much about the common people. There was an unfortunate encounter at night in the Strand with some of the girls of the town, and once at midnight, in the neighbourhood of Covent Garden, he was confronted by an evil-looking ruffian who was obviously intent on violence, but a polite request for the time was answered with equal politeness, and Riem is bound to admit that the general attitude to foreigners had improved on the whole and was then almost universally friendly.

Our visitor attended a Court and makes some very unflattering remarks about the great people he saw there. The Queen was gracious and talkative, but the King preserved a grim and silent manner. The Duke of Newcastle—the second Duke—is described as ugly and old, a kind of living skeleton who spent his time ogling the ladies through his spy-glass. At one time he must have been a fine figure of a man, judged according to British standards, but lust and dissipation had reduced him to such dimensions that he seemed scarcely to have five pounds weight of flesh on his bones. Moore, Archbishop of Canterbury, was a Goliath among the Philistines, and Pitt a Saul among his father's asses. The Primate was a big man, all body and no brains. Pitt wore an embroidered French coat. His face, according to Riem, was already disfigured by wine, and marked by a growth of some kind on the left cheek-bone. Rodney, a man whom the traveller had pictured to himself as a typical sailor, was little more than a pigmy. His cheeks were pendulous, like the jowl of a dog. His eyes were small and green, and his arms hung motionless by his side. "Never," says Riem, "have I been so deceived in my idea of a hero as in Rodney. His victory over de Grasse was the victory of a dachshund over a giant."

When Riem sets out to describe our politics and methods of government his contempt and abuse know no bounds. Unfortunately he seems to have relied for his information, less on his own observation, than on a scurrilous pamphlet called *The Political Progress of Britain*, written in 1792 by a Scotchman named James Thomson Callender, which was almost immediately translated into German. Callender's aim was to

present "an impartial account of the principal abuses in the government from the Revolution of 1688, the whole tending to prove the ruinous consequences of the popular system of war and conquest." For political rancour and venom this pamphlet would be hard to beat. The author's conviction was that unless we mended our ways the best thing that could happen would be for the two islands to be swallowed up by earthquake, so that the progress and remembrance of our crimes might be blotted out. Callender was promptly arrested, but escaped to America where he spent the remainder of his days. How Riem must have revelled in such expressions as "the ruffian catalogue of English Kings," "the Asiatic plunderers of Leadenhall Street," "the miserable rabble of Change Alley," and the endless chatter about blood-suckers, muckworms, tyrants, traitors, and butchers! This is no place to attempt a defence of the English political system at the close of the eighteenth century, but in considering Riem's denunciations it is permissible to ask whether, in spite of the *Aufklärung* and the consequent intellectual awakening, the situation was so much better in Germany than in England. Had Germany no corruption in public life, no buying and selling of places, no tyrants, no downtrodden classes, no medieval lumber in its courts of justice, and no taverns and houses of ill-fame?

According to Riem, to put it briefly, the curse of England was gold and lust. Every department of public and private life was honeycombed with corruption and vice. Riem repeats the statement made by another traveller that as much money was spent in London in bagnios and taverns in one night as would discharge the whole public expenditure of the United Provinces for six months, and adds on his own authority that the prostitutes numbered one-fifteenth of the whole population of London, and that they were supported regularly by at least one-in-ten of the citizens—otherwise they would die of starvation. The consumption of brandy, rum and gin was worse than in Russia. Indeed, gluttony, soaking and debauchery had reached such a pitch that not even the most insignificant matter of business could be transacted without the expenditure of a fortune. An Englishman would tolerate the destruction of his liberties, but threaten his stomach and there would be a revolution. Any money left over from indulgence in gluttony and riot was dissipated in

prize-fighting, horse-racing, fox-hunting, betting and gaming. As much as £50,000 would change hands at a single prize-fight. People of all conditions would travel fifty miles to see a contest, noblemen and persons of rank vying with each other for the privilege of acting as seconds and assistants. Pressmen were rushed to the ring in order that the coffee-houses in London might have the earliest news of the fight. Indeed, Riem tells us that he never met an Englishman who, on the smallest difference of opinion, did not say, "What will you bet?" There was no desire to understand the foreigner's point of view, or to know anything of foreign achievements in art or literature. Topics, on the other hand, which no decent German would discuss were debated in every class of society with such eagerness and relish, and such animation of features, that Hogarth might have taken his models from any polite London assembly. If the aristocracy was so lost to shame, what was to be expected from the common people? They were equally vicious, but their vices did not spring from any natural disposition to crime. They were the victims of years of misery, oppression and misgovernment.

Riem has some good words for the middle classes, who were being crushed out of existence, and approved of our women, who were virtuous and surprisingly tolerant in the face of their husbands' habitual infidelities. Indeed, if Englishmen possessed any virtues at all (which was denied), they owed these qualities solely to maternal influence and care. But even here Riem at once proceeds to qualify his approbation and excludes the society ladies, who were intent only on pleasure and, in fact, no better than they should be. Taken as a whole, England was a paradise inhabited by a race of creatures whose villainy must be known to be believed. Wealth, which elsewhere softened a nation's habits and aroused feelings of benevolence, with us only stimulated our inveterate greed. We were fraudulent in all our dealings, excessively ill-mannered, addicted to every vice in its most abandoned form, and entirely incapable of shame or amendment. That we were suffered to exist at all was an outrage to which Riem could never become reconciled. Our motto was: "Beware of treason, theft and the forging of bills of exchange. Short of that do what you please—the law cannot touch you." Not even a visit to Drury Lane, with Siddons playing Desdemona, could moderate his loathing for us, for Iago was

presented in the true British fashion, with such calculated cruelty and lust for murder that the actor might have been enacting the part of Hastings or Clive, or any one of the British factors in India.

As for the politicians, Riem reserves most of his invectives for Pitt. Reformers, like Stanhope, Fox or Sheridan, might spend themselves in the cause of liberty, and struggle with the forces of corruption, oppression and intrigue, but they were voices crying in the wilderness, and their honesty only served to increase the general gloom. The administration is attacked, the ministers are assailed in the grossest manner, and the mere mention of such topics as the slave trade, the British policy in India and Ireland, the European situation, the persecution of dissenters, and the administration of justice produces a torrent of invective, concluding generally with the observation, to which Riem returns again and again, that we were a race of cowards and scoundrels, fit only to be conquered and enslaved.

Two chapters are devoted to the administration of justice, and it is not surprising, even after some acquaintance with Blackstone, that Riem should find our laws, both civil and criminal, ineffective and barbarous, and a disgrace to civilisation. He belabours us in magnificent style, making great play with extracts from Callender, an unreliable witness, whose testimony cannot now be checked, and adding some material of his own from sources which he does not specify. He condemns our love of technicalities, and quotes a case where a man indicted for bigamy was charged with having two wives. He married a third wife in prison, so that when he came to trial there was a flaw in the indictment and he was discharged. Nor were we consistent in the administration of justice, for if all thieves were hanged there would not be a minister of the Crown, a Member of Parliament, a Government official, or a servant of the East India Company left alive, and the road from London to Windsor would be lined with gallows in place of trees. It is difficult to-day to say much for a system which comprised two hundred capital crimes and could hang a man for pretending to be a Chelsea pensioner, but in fairness it should be observed that the very technicalities against which Riem inveighs, coupled with a more humane outlook in the matter of reprieves, had helped for some years to mitigate the worst severities of the criminal law, and that there were

other foreigners to whom our jury system and the scrupulous impartiality of our judges were matters for admiration and envy.

We leave our traveller without much regret. He is not our only critic, but he is the most consistently anti-British writer of the whole of the eighteenth century. Unfortunately, there was an element of truth in many of his charges against us, but his hatred and bitterness deprived him of all capacity for reasoned judgment. Nearly all his assertions are extravagant. Many of them have no foundation in fact, and his method of attack is often so outrageous that the reader is reminded of some of Gillray's more scurrilous caricatures. But hard-hitting can be stimulating at times, and a traveller, however misguided, who can think for himself is generally worth listening to. It is amusing to find another German of about the same period describing England as the only country in Europe where real political liberty was to be found. One can only hope that the two writers did not meet.

MALCOLM LETTS.

ALBANIA FACES THE FUTURE.

NO nation can need or deserve Europe's help and sympathy so much as Albania. Yet none, on the whole, has had less of it.

To have achieved freedom on the eve of the war, amid an atmosphere compact of intrigue, covetousness and suspicion; to have seen hostile armies march and counter-march over her soil for four years in a quarrel that was none of her own, and then for long months at the Peace Conferences to be the sport of Big Power interests almost indifferent to her own claims, is a fate that the richest and most vocal of races might well dread. How much more for a little State of 1,000,000 inhabitants tucked away in an obscure corner of the Adriatic, with a language and traditions known to few, and so impoverished by 450 years of Turkish rule as to be incapable of the vivid propaganda of her rivals?

Even to-day the greater part of the little news that filters into the Western European Press from Albania comes from vitiated sources—from Belgrade, Athens or Rome. Seventy per cent. of Albania's population is Moslem, and the equation Moslem=Oriental=uncivilised person is such a beautifully easy one for hostile propagandists to put over. No one, of course, has heard of the Bektashis, the strongest Moslem sect in the country, probably more liberal and tolerant than even the Friends. Not only Christians but even agnostics can belong to this secret order, which, with its creed of universal human brotherhood, has some claims to be regarded as the fount of European freemasonry. Certainly Bektashism is unknown to the popular papers, for whom there is the irresistible lure of the "good story" in depicting Albania as a Ruritania with a musical-comedy king and a population of picturesque brigands.

It may be that with our present economic structure disinterested friendship between nations is impossible. In any case, it is Albania's misfortune that she has no neighbours in whom she can put real confidence. It is partly, therefore, as the result of a choice of evils that she has been forced to turn so much to Italy for aid. Though cut off by mountains from the main peninsula, she is essentially a Balkan State, and in a reasonable world would take her place in a Balkan group, with probably a common marketing organisation and foreign

policy. Till that day she must face the fact that her products are all of the same kind as those of her Balkan rivals. Of her total of 5,487,828 gold francs of exports in 1933 (the gold franc is the currency unit and is fifteen to the £ at the moment) 2,044,908 represented olives, 692,029 cheese, 633,964 hides, and 528,567 gold francs fish. And of these exports, almost eighty per cent. went to Italy, as against only six per cent. to Greece and three per cent. to Yugoslavia.

Italy, of course, has been only too eager to take advantage of this orientation. She has never been able to forget, least of all under Fascism, the beautiful promises of Adriatic dominion held out by the Pact of London. The oft-whispered-of plan of an Italian agricultural colony in the Albanian plains would solve much of her overcrowding problem. It is quite true that it would be almost impossible to make Albanian opinion stomach such a colony; but the plan grows larger, in the whispers. When it was last mentioned in the European Press, in the autumn, it was 100,000 Italian families—almost half the population of Albania—that were to be settled in the Mousesqija district.

But though it has been argued that the Treaty of Tirana saved Albania from a Yugoslav invasion some years ago; though the 50,000,000 gold francs private Italian loan and the never-completed 10,000,000-a-year State loan may have helped the development of Albanian economy, Italy has won anything but love in non-official Albania. It is claimed that the greater part of the work done was done with Italy's advantage in view; that the roads built under Italian guidance are all strategic roads, that the Government buildings at Tirana were constructed with unnecessary magnificence to put money back in Italian pockets; that there was no need for quite so many Italian experts and, in any case, for the short-lived Academy of Music at Tirana with its highly paid Italian teachers. It is extremely unlikely, it is urged, that it can really pay an Italian company to run a six days a week steamship service from Bari to Durrazzo, especially as the boats are always nearly empty. And it will be suggested that the accommodation in these boats, with four-berth cabins, even in the first class, is admirably adapted for the work of troop transports.

The same argument will be put forward about the thrice-weekly air service from Durrazzo to Trieste and from Rome

to Tirana. And it will be added that the aerodrome at Tirana is far too large for any possible Albanian commercial needs and that it is constructed precisely on the pattern of Italian military aerodromes. Such charges as this may, or may not, be well founded, but they show the state of mind that exists in the Albanian man in the street. They are complicated by only too many examples of Italian tactlessness. There was, for example, the Italian teacher in a Catholic seminary who told his pupils to remove the Albanian national rosettes from their buttonholes or leave the place: all fifty walked out. There was another Jesuit teacher who told his class: "It is we foreigners who have made you what you are. You Albanians are too lazy to make anything of yourselves." And this atmosphere was made ten times worse by the mysterious "Durrazzo incident" of last summer, for though news of it was withheld in the Albanian Press it spread through the country like wildfire, exciting indignation everywhere.

Only one somewhat highly coloured explanation, current in non-official Albanian circles, seems to fit the facts, still a subject for discussion in the Tirana diplomatic corps months afterwards. It will be remembered that one Saturday at the end of July the First Italian Naval Squadron of more than twenty vessels suddenly appeared before Durrazzo. No notice had been given of the visit, the customary salutes were omitted, and it was only a junior officer who landed to pay his respects to the civil authorities. The next day the Italian Minister in Tirana called upon King Zog and, it is understood, put certain demands to him. These are said to have included the reinstatement of the large number of Italian experts "sent on leave" earlier in the year, the revocation of the Organic Law of Education, which nationalised the country's schools and closed down the Italian Catholic institutions in the north, and the dismissal of the English inspectors of the Albanian gendarmerie. King Zog is said to have replied that he would discuss nothing while the Italian fleet remained at Durrazzo. Whatever, in fact, was the outcome of the interview, the greater part of the Italian vessels weighed anchor next day, with no demonstration apart from the commander's display of bad manners and with nothing gained except a good deal of Albanian resentment. And an extremely unconvincing explanation was issued from Rome about a

telegram, warning the Albanian authorities of the visit, which had gone astray in a Ministry.

The real explanation, according to the story unofficially current in Tirana, was that a remarkably Machiavellian Italian plot had miscarried. The Italians, it was stated, had miscalculated the amount of feeling which would be created in the Catholic north by the taking over by the State of their religious schools. They had arranged with their agents there that the arrival of the Italian fleet should be the signal for a popular rising "in defence of the faith." This, they hoped, would be so serious that the Albanian Government would be compelled to ask for their aid—and Italian forces would have been landed to suppress the rebellion that Italy herself had fomented. With these once ashore there could have been no difficulty about satisfying any further Italian ambitions.

Unfortunately, religion sits far more lightly on the Albanians, most tolerant of races, than the Italians had calculated, and the alarm of religious persecution really was a little too thin. Besides which King Zog, in his short reign, has built up a very considerable loyalty to himself, and Albanian nationalism is a force to be reckoned with. So, according to the story, when the signal to rise came, nothing happened. And relations with Italy are now returning more to the normal.

Jugoslavia, to the north and east, has long been an uneasy neighbour for Albania. She has, of course, an Albanian minority of 700,000 within her borders, and has from time to time openly displayed a desire to add to it. When a commercial treaty between the two countries was signed last year it was hoped that old differences might be forgotten. But *after* the signature of the treaty that well-known form of persecution, discrimination against Albanians under the Yugoslav land laws, began anew. The excessive zeal of local officials may be blamed, but the tragedy is that Albania cannot afford to receive the landless exiles. And last September fifteen families a week were passing through Istanbul on their way to resettlement in Turkey.

With Greece Albanian relations had seemed to be becoming more friendly till last autumn the Athens Government raised the question of the Greek minorities again, with the accompaniment, unfortunately, of a cloud of Press misrepresentation. The facts are simple. There is a Greek-speaking minority

estimated at 30,000 in Southern Albania and an Albanian minority of 25,000 to 35,000 in Northern Greece. The Greek minority in Albania has forty-five schools, as well as two members in the Tirana Parliament, and is represented in the public services. The Albanian minority in Greece has none of these advantages. By the Albanian Education Law of 1933 all the country's schools were taken over by the State, and in many of them new teachers were appointed. The law was really in great part directed against the undue spread of Italian influence, but naturally no discrimination could be made, and American institutions suffered as well.

This law Greece represents as a persecution of her minority : it has been alleged in the Athens papers that Greek schools have actually been closed down, or that the teaching of Greek in them has been forbidden, both erroneous assertions, and, far more unpleasantly significant, the Press is still referring to the district as "Northern Epirus." The name recalls the unhappy pre-war days when, with every circumstance of terrorism to support it, and with the scarcely concealed connivance of the Greek Government, Greek subjects set up an "Autonomous Government of Northern Epirus" in Southern Albania. Little everyday incidents like the calling-up of the *Albanian* servant of a Greek consul for military service have been depicted as anti-Greek persecution, and in the last few weeks the wildest reports of a quite fictitious "Albanian revolution" have been appearing in the Athens papers. Something of the same sort has been put out from Belgrade too, an old and familiar trick for discrediting Albania before the world.

What is Albania doing to forward her own development ? She has two great problems, the economic and the educational, and with the first anyhow there is something of a vicious circle : without money no achievement, and without achievement no money. Those who have seen the soil of the Albanian plains and valleys know how rich it is, but a great deal of it is under the perpetual menace of inundation or covered with forests which the paucity of roads makes it too costly to cut. Cultivation is very primitive, and owing to this and the comparative smallness of production there can be no guarantee of the uniformity of products. From time to time, for example, one will come across extremely drinkable Albanian wines, in quality not unreminiscent of a lighter Burgundy. But no

producer can, or will, promise that the next bottle will be like the bottle one has just tasted. As a result, over the last five years the country's exports have been only 29,000,000 gold francs, while imports have been 105,000,000.

As far as money can permit, an advance is being made on quite a number of different lines. Co-operatives, for instance, are being set up among olive-growers, and factories being built for the production of oil will be taken over by them. By the King's newest plan, half the conscripts called up for army service will be drafted into a land labour force. Thus they will not only help towards the improvement of the soil, but will receive instruction in new methods of cultivation which they will carry back to their villages. Under the pressure of the younger generation it is hoped the older cultivators may abandon such bad old habits as the beating down of the olive crops from the trees, which bruises the olives and breaks the new shoots, and the refusal to prune old branches.

For the development of the fishing industry—the fish of Lake Ochrida, among others, is famous—help is being sought from Denmark. And a start is being made with the planting of new crops, such as cotton. With more money, too, quicker progress may be made with the application of the land reform law, which limits the possession of ground to forty hectares for each male member of a family. It has been often alleged, with some show of reason, that the Government's slowness over this has been due to the pressure exerted on it by the feudal bey class. But it is not an altogether unfair excuse that the cultivation of a number of smaller holdings does require more implements—and more money—than of a few large estates.

Finally, there is the tourist industry, which should have every prospect of a reasonable future. An Albanian Automobile Club has been in existence for some time, and this autumn an Albanian tourist bureau, with headquarters at Tirana, has been set up. It is no use pretending that luxury can be found in Albanian hotels, but it is the bureau's aim to ensure at least cleanliness. The startling novelty as well as the savage beauty of so many things in a country such a short distance from the big European capitals, combined with the extraordinary hospitality of the inhabitants in the remotest districts, should at any rate attract the young and adventurous. It has already attracted the Germans : hundreds of "wander-

birds" in uniform shorts and rucksacks were wandering over the Albanian highlands last summer.

One does not realise the importance of roads if one confines one's travels to Western Europe. The smooth surface and the attainability of every spot are taken for granted. In Albania really good roads are still comparatively few, though it is now possible to travel from the Greek frontier in the south to the Yugoslavian in the north by motor-bus. The new road from Tirana to Elbasan is excellent, but the very important Durrazzo-Tirana one is already showing signs of wear. Maintenance of the roads already built is just a thorny problem, as fresh construction and skilled labour can scarcely be expected from the yearly road work which the countryman puts in.

On the grounds of expense the project of a Durrazzo-Tirana railway has been abandoned. But the service of motor-buses and hired cars, their prices fixed by the Government, links the two towns quite adequately. More money for roads is certainly needed, for it is probably to their construction, just as much as to the efficiency of the gendarmerie, that is due the disappearance in the mountain districts of the blood feud, against which no previous régime had been able to make any kind of progress. And if more money were available Albania might find herself less of a prey to foreign rumour by being linked to the European telephone system. At present the Durrazzo-Tirana line is the only long-distance one in the country; for other calls telegraph circuits have to be borrowed. And communication is not made any easier by the fact that the Post Office cannot afford copper for its wires, but has to use zinc instead.

Of schools—elementary, technical, normal, lycées, and even kindergartens—there are now 525 in Albania, with more than 51,000 pupils. The greatest difficulty, of course, is how to reach the children in the isolated mountain valleys, with their scattered populations. The difficulty is being met by the establishment of mountain boarding-schools, of which there are now fifteen—one for girls—with 1,600 pupils. For all higher education, of course, youths and girls have to go abroad.

The building up of a younger educated class is, too, of paramount importance for Albania. King Zog is not in the least a tribal chieftain varnished over, or a Rudolph of Ruritania. He is an extremely serious young man—he is not yet 40—who gives one the impression to meet of an

Oxford don who has seen service in the army. But he is an extremely lonely ruler: a Kemal Ataturk, on a smaller scale, without an Ismet Inonu. One hears complaints sometimes of the conservative circle with which he is surrounded. But to whom else can he turn? In the Cabinet the only men under middle age are the very intelligent Ministers of Education and of National Economy. Among its older members the King can expect little active sympathy for his plans for the education and eventual equality of women. And the younger generation, who have grown up free of Turkish influence, have thrown up no outstanding figures so far.

Yet public opinion is changing slowly. A few years ago a woman teacher was regarded as something of an outcast. The earning of her own living implied almost naturally that she was a discreditable character. Now women teachers are taken for granted: their profession is regarded as quite normal and honourable, and women are to be drafted into as many posts as they can fill in the public services. The veil, of course, was never very widely worn in Albania. But all the same, such a display of sun-bathers and beach pyjamas as one could see last summer on Durrazzo *plage* would have been unthinkable only a year or two ago. Some will resent this encroachment of the Lido on another of the world's shores, but there are times when a change of fashion denotes a very much deeper change of mentality.

"Albania's independence," King Zog told me this summer, "is essential to the peace of Europe." But does not justice as well as fear demand it? Albania is a small State. Her annual budget is only £1,000,000; her note circulation is less; the average income of her agricultural workers does not exceed a shilling a day. She is making very considerable exertions to modernise herself and to develop her resources, with very little assistance from the outside world. Though she has a minority beyond her borders nearly three-quarters of the population within them, she has never given trouble through irredentist activity. She has considerable economic possibilities: must she be forced to barter them away to greedy concessionaires? One could hardly think of a clearer case for a League loan, yet no application that has been made in the past has met with any response.

It may be true that the idea of absolute national sovereignty is a dying idea. So far, unfortunately, it is dying only in

theory. And while it still lives it seems monstrous to maintain, as one has heard it argued, that it is "unpractical" for small races to preserve a separate political existence. It sounds an insult to a nation that has maintained its individuality and language under four and a half centuries of Turkish rule, with none of the imperial traditions of Serbia or Bulgaria, or the classical memories of Greece, to buoy it up—that it would be better off under some form of foreign protection. Yet that is the unspoken thought behind the attitude of the world at large when it passes Albania by on the other side.

RONALD MATTHEWS.

GREAT BRITAIN AND COLOURED RACES.

LESSER signs in 1934 showed the observant that the invisible Press censorship in which Great Britain has excelled is at long last beginning to be broken down. Observations in print by Mr. Humbert Wolfe and Mr. R. A. Scott-James and in speeches by Mr. H. Wilson Harris and Mr. J. B. Atkins were the climax, perhaps, in the one month of December indicating the deleterious effect on our populace of present newspaper trends. Why has this form of Press censorship prevailed for so long, and why are the majority of people ignorant both of it and of its dangers? Perhaps the answer is twofold. Our history proves us both an arrogant and a blind race in many respects—views unpleasant to national pride are disposed of by being kept out of public sight on an ostrich-like principle; or the men in the newspaper editorial chairs, not interested themselves in these matters, come to believe their readers similarly apathetic if not entirely unintelligent.

Residents and travellers who know local conditions under British rule in dependencies and Crown colonies and, from sojourn in other countries, are acquainted with their national views, have been unable for the most part to find space in print for their opinions. These things ventilated in the newspapers years ago might have changed the course of world events. In July last Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe, former Editor of the *Calcutta Statesman* and a lecturer well known in the United States, over which he has travelled on speaking-tours twenty times, uttered some striking and significant words in London, when delivering the Merttens Peace Lecture. Quotation is from the spoken word, the book on sale the same night differing slightly:

Inherent in the doctrine of imperialism are the doctrines of the dominant people and the dominant race. There are many people who have known that about our own British system a great deal better than most British people have ever understood. Our critics are reminding us that the British system which matters to the world is that portion which has not yet come under the working of British constitutional ideas; the British Empire is *news*, i.e. abroad, not generally in England, ironically enough, far more striking and continuous news than any part of Europe save now Central Europe.

Some ideas, not unrelated, were expressed in a leading magazine for August, when Lieut.-Col. Sir Arnold T. Wilson discussed his experiences in Germany, where he had been lecturing at the principal universities: "Let us not judge a hard-pressed nation by the equivocal acts of its rulers at their worst moments; above all, let us avoid the Pharisaical note, the often hard voice of the world's 'senior governess' which does us so much harm and hurts the heart of those whom we wish to influence."

The large is but the sum-total of the small. In illustration of the kind of thing which shows from what our own race dominance or the politics of power has arisen, let us look at small dictators in little individual circles, long typical of our "white prestige" attitude in India and Africa. In *The Government of Egypt*, Mr. E. M. Forster puts a footnote on British officials:

... Some of the officials have served previously in India; such may be useful for their administrative qualities, but they, and still more their women folk, introduce a racial arrogance from which the regular Anglo-Egyptian officials are free.

Symptomatic of the struggle against this world-disease which is decimating liberty in almost all countries of the globe is a Gold Coast matter of 1934. Two delegations travelled the 4,000 miles from West Africa to England to protest against aspects of British administration in the colony. This is 78,802 square miles in extent, including the Protectorates of Ashanti and the Northern Territories but excluding the mandated territory of ex-German Togoland. Three of the members of the leading delegation under the paramount chief, the Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa, Nana Sir Ofori Atta, K.B.E., are on the Legislative Council. The delegation was received by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, on July 24th. But ingrained in us is the official attitude to our so-called "subject races." And as the sequel shows, not only was the Colonial Office reception discouraging to those who dare to travel to London (and incidentally expend fruitlessly a considerable sum of money, especially on the legal expenses connected with our red-tape *de haut en bas* method of administering Crown colonies) to air grievances*

* See also *West Africa*, September 1st, 1934, p. 976.

but the like attitude prevails in West Africa whither these Africans returned in September.

A little publicity was given in June and July to one of their grievances because of our own *furor* over the Incitement to Disaffection Bill made law in October in a modified form. It concerned the Amendment to the Criminal Code, known locally as the "Sedition Bill," signed last March by the then Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, despite the unanimous protests of the African members of the Legislative Council. Under it the Governor-in-Council has power to prohibit any newspaper, book, or document which contains what he or his officials *think* is "seditious" writing, and enables persons in the Colony to be prosecuted for mere possession—not dissemination—however innocuous their purpose and proved their loyalty.

Those who watch with misgiving these invasions of liberty the world over and note with disquiet how freedom of speech, freedom of the Press and freedom of constitutional action, for which many of our ancestors fought so strenuously, are being abolished will inevitably recall how this kind of thing works out in actual practice. The very Governor who promised that the Amendment to the Criminal Code, with its arbitrary rights given to any too-zealous official, should never be abused has now been transferred to Malaya. What subsequent chief officials will do remains to be seen; but what zealous officialdom can do, and the lengths to which it will go, are indicated to anyone who will take the time, for instance, to wade through the two-volume (foolscap size) judgment of Mr. R. L. Yorke in the Meerut "Conspiracy" Case, which dragged out in India while the thirty men were in prison from 1929 to 1933, until the Allahabad appeal after much agitation here—very little aired in most of the newspapers in England—modified the preceding judgment.

Likewise there is a significant episode in West Africa. The Criminal Code of Nigeria, a Crown colony 368,000 square miles in extent, more than four times the size of Great Britain and second only to India, was amended in 1927 ostensibly to stop communist literature penetrating into the dependency. But on September 24th of that year three American-Negro newspapers, the *Negro Champion*, the *Negro World* and the *Gaelic American*, which stimulate the Negro racial sense and from which the local newspapers had been wont to select and

quote, were banned from Nigeria. The amendment to the Gold Coast Criminal Code was largely modelled on the Nigerian example.

It is clear from the Colonial Secretary's own statements on July 24th that the Gold Coast Government had power already to act surreptitiously under its Customs Ordinance. Since 1931, he said, summing up the figures he gave, 2,768 items had been intercepted and destroyed by the local government. All of his explanation was news to the Africans, even to the Members of the Legislative Council: the Paramount Chiefs want to know why, if the Gold Coast Government had real reason to suspect "sedition," they were not taken into confidence as heretofore on other matters, and point out that so ardently loyal are the inhabitants of the colony to the British Crown that there has not been a single prosecution under the Sections of the Criminal Code dealing with Sedition during the forty years it has been in force.

But the Gold Coast grievance which figured first in the Memorial was one under the Water Ordinance of 1934, whereby water drawn from *public fountains* of the pipe-borne water supply now installed in five of the principal towns is charged for. In 1913, Sir Hugh Clifford, the then Governor, promised in the seat of Government, Accra, that only water laid on into houses would be chargeable; to the poorer Africans who draw and carry theirs from the public fountains, it should be free. This, let it be said, was as much a precautionary measure in the interests of public health as the possible benevolence of a paternal administration which derives benefit from occupancy of the colony. In the years when the Africans drew their water from their own poor wells or from old tanks in which rain-water had been stored during "the rains," mosquitoes bred freely, the deadly *anopheles* disseminating malaria to such an extent that the Gold Coast used to be known as the "White Man's Grave."

The promise is now set aside because water is laid on in four other towns besides Accra, on the score that the Governor never meant to pledge the Government as construed by the Africans. The Minute recording the promise was lost; but it has again been found. Even small charges for water from public fountains—in Winnebuh, it is said, as much as 1d. per kerosene tin of water is exacted—operate as a great hardship owing to the slump in cocoa prices consequent on the world

depression. (The Colony supplies nearly one-half the world's cocoa.) This is especially resented by the women.

Of the several other Gold Coast grievances, there is space to consider but one more. It concerns Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti, protectorate of the Colony, where the Government is encroaching on land outside the fixed mile limit around the Fort and, by means of leases of twenty-five years' duration and an increased ground rent of £1 *per foot* as against the old £2 for fifty feet, is dispossessing the Ashantis of land, residential and commercial buildings.

None of these grievances receives redress outwardly, but one concession on Provincial Council representation is being made. It is true that the two principal administrators in charge at the time discontent arose have been transferred and that the Governor, now in charge, was very popular in Sierra Leone where he was administrator. But our own typical British dominant race manner of brushing aside grievances as negligible and our dominant man attitude to alleged subject-peoples is indicated in Sir Arnold Hodson's speech at the Swearing-In Ceremony in Accra, on October 24th last:

It is betraying no secret to say that lately there has been a certain amount of political unrest among you. The matters which caused this unrest have been referred to the highest authority and decisions have been given. I most earnestly hope that these decisions will be loyally accepted, and that politics will be allowed a rest for some time to come. . . . I trust, therefore, that you will forget your differences, and that every section of the community *will give me* its support and co-operation in a united effort for the general welfare and prosperity of the Gold Coast. (*Italics mine.*)

As against this British idea of what may or may not be "for the general welfare," let us contrast what Mr. Charles Roden Buxton said after his tour in West Africa where he stayed with Africans in Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. He was speaking in London on December 6th, and want of space alone precludes the quotation of all the relevant matter:

Even from the point of view of our own self-interest, in view of the future, it is extremely important to understand and sympathise with the educated African. . . . I certainly think that the grievances and opinion of the educated African is a thing we ought to give some attention to. . . . There is a tradition of a sort of rough, contemptuous mode of speaking to Africans which is very

painful. . . . It is general to address them in a tone which no one would dream of addressing a European subordinate in. It is a very regrettable tradition which will take a very long time to get over. It gives great pain to sensitive people, especially when these sensitive people are *at least* as highly educated as the people who are addressing them. There is a sensitiveness there which is constantly being outraged.

Those without colour-prejudice feelings and personally acquainted with Africa, India, America, as well as these British Isles, know that every race has its high-minded and efficient workers, *Public Servants* in the deepest sense of a term much in use in our Administrative Service where, be it said, *noblesse oblige* is truly the governing motive among a number just as *Arya-dharma* is among some Indians. And every race, our own included, has its inept and dishonest folk. But in Great Britain we have made a "fetish"—to employ the language of West Africa—of our own version of the dominant race theory even as we condemn Germany for practising its specific form of it.

The point of all this is that from spots everywhere where men set themselves up in absolute authority over other members of the human race, a deadly "ju-ju" influence creeps out like miasma over the world. But we are not wont to look sufficiently deeply to diagnose the disease from which the entire human race is suffering. Who questions whether any men (women are included!) other than those far beyond our present stage of evolution, are fit to wield unquestioned authority or power over their brothers, whatever the colour? Plato as long ago as the Golden Age of Greece drew attention to the evil which arises when there is sameness of nature between rulers and ruled—"man is not able to rule man without injustice filling the universe through whims and vanity." If our assumption of racial superiority repels the wholesome effect all criticism has on human nature and if the evils, thus arising, are pushed out of sight in an invisible Press censorship, power inevitably goes to the heads of its possessors and a deleterious effect results in the populace. As to the latter aspect, it can be summed up in the words of Mr. H. Wilson Harris, Editor of *The Spectator*, so well known in other years as a foreign correspondent for daily newspapers:

Finally, I would suggest one reform [he said, in London on December 11th, speaking on "Whither Journalism? 2. Truth"].

The most serious charge against our popular Press is the standard of false values and the things neglected day by day. It is not really a fact that a film star is more important than a British Cabinet Minister or the domestic or undomestic lives and achievements of film stars compared with a report of the League of Nations, Parliament and such events. I think there is a danger of encouraging a false standard of values which must have an infinite effect upon its readers.

On the former or race question our official classes in our dependencies and Crown colonies as, apparently, in Whitehall, regard as unthinkable the fact that every race, white or yellow, brown or black, has its reasoning people, the natural leaders, and the easily prejudiced emotional people, the natural followers. Further, *unquestioned* power and authority given to most natural leaders, whether white or yellow, brown or black, results inevitably in the end in maladministration as Europe alone has abundantly proved during these past few years. But the wish to be free is inherent in every human heart and cannot be eradicated, however rigorous the suppression. Men continue to suffer in defence of it—yes, even in the countries for which we British people are responsible, though most of us know little of what goes on in our names. "Give me Liberty or give me Death"—this has been seen over and over again in the history of our own relations with what are or have been parts of the British Empire, the United States of America, South Africa, Ireland, India, as in Scotland and Wales of Great Britain itself.

By reason of priority of example in India and Africa Great Britain cannot escape responsibility for its part in the deadly fact that freedom of speech, freedom of the Press and freedom of constitutional action are now endangered the world over. If such a policy will prevail, the cycles of history must repeat themselves and the centuries to come be the Dark Ages all over again. That the Incitement to Disaffection Bill even in modified form was passed here, despite the volume of protest, shows how authoritarianism is growing, now, at home, as it has long prevailed in our dependencies and colonies. Surely, to ensure liberty in any real sense, we have to gain it and maintain it by sifting with patient insight all shades of opinion, no matter what the source, and drawing the finest essence of all the views make this the basis for government alike in our dependencies and here in Great Britain.

M. A. THOMAS.

THE NATIONS AND THE CHILD.

IT is impossible to say with any certainty when "Child Welfare" first became a question of public polity—a matter of concern to the community at large as distinct from the family of the child himself. The provisions of the Republic of Plato for the nurture and protection of children at once come to mind, and some of them appear to have been anticipated under Lycurgus of Sparta more than 800 years before Christ. Adoption, which involved the child's leaving his own parents, or was necessitated by their death, and his incorporation into another family which might or might not be of his own kin, was probably the circumstance which first gave rise to what we should now call child welfare legislation. Twenty centuries before Christ adoption was regulated by the laws of King Hammurabi of Babylonia. It was recognised by both Greek and Roman law, and the law of Islam dictates that the destitute child must be taken care of by the community. It is curious to note that this most ancient example of child welfare law dealt with a condition which was to receive recognition in the English legal code only within recent years: not until the Adoption Act, 1926, came into force was adoption legalised in this country. Differentiation in penal laws in favour of children is also of very ancient origin. Hebrew legislators laid it down that a boy under the age of thirteen was not to be held responsible at law for any offence, and under the *patria potestas* of the Romans a child was similarly sheltered. Salic law protected a child under twelve, and the later Ripuarian law advanced the age to fifteen. Such clemency to the juvenile offender affords the first example of any legislation in our own land which falls within the category of child welfare. Athelstane, grandson of Alfred the Great, enacted "that men should slay none younger than a fifteen winters' man"; imprisonment, with opportunity for what we should now call release on probation, was provided as the alternative to the capital penalty which theretofore had been exacted.

In general, however, it was not until the nineteenth century that leaders of public life in this country—or indeed in any other—began to exhibit any concern for the welfare of the young, apart from purely educational efforts and the exiguous provisions of the Poor Law. When Queen Victoria

came to the throne the statute-book showed few enactments framed in the interests of children. The industrial revolution had swept large numbers of children into the labour market, but such legislation as related to them was dictated rather by the interests of the employers than by any desire to protect the children themselves. If any one of the great political leaders of the nineteenth century could return to these scenes, few things would amaze him more than the new orientation of the nation in regard to social welfare. Child welfare was a term which had not yet been invented, and such action as was intended to benefit children was purely eleemosynary or religious. The spectacularly evil conditions under which great numbers of children were living and working began early in the century, however, to attract the notice of statesmen. The elder Peel caused a committee to be set up, which reported in 1815 drawing attention to the inordinate length of working hours. Evidence showed that it was a common practice to keep children of six years old employed from six in the morning until seven at night, and it was counted a virtue in Robert Owen that he employed no children under the age of six, and none for more than ten hours all told, with an hour and a quarter off for meals. Lord Ashley's Act of 1833 represented a great advance by limiting the working hours of children aged ten to thirteen, to nine per day; and as Lord Shaftesbury the same statesman was responsible for the passing of the first Factory Act in 1844, which imposed further restrictions on juvenile employment. Ten years later, Palmerston's Reformatory Schools Act began the long story of removing the young offender from the shadow of the gaol and substituting reclamation for retribution. The Education Act of 1870 marked another important stage in the development of a broad national policy—though as yet unconscious and incoherent—of child welfare. Nineteenth-century England went far, indeed, towards establishing the fact that the community has certain obligations to the child to ensure his proper nurture, his protection from ill and his normal development. It remained for the twentieth century to be popularly known as "the century of the child," and in a far wider sense than was ever dreamt of by those who coined the phrase. To this century belongs the peculiar phenomenon of international co-operation for the welfare of the child.

It has been said that the South African War, which saw

the new century in, discovered the child to the sociologists and legislators of Great Britain. The high incidence of rejections of would-be recruits for the army owing to physical defects opened the eyes of the public authorities and of the medical profession to the ignorance and neglect which were sapping the nation's vitality at its source. Less than twenty years later the losses and anxieties of another war were to have far more potent effect in arousing the nation and the world to the imperative duty of caring for the health and welfare of their youngest citizens. In England the century began well with a variety of legislation having this as its prime object: the Education Acts which placed the organisation of public education on a sounder footing, the Midwives Act of 1902 which abolished the "Mrs. Gamps" of the previous century, the Education (Provision of Meals) Act of 1906, the Notification of Births Act of 1907, and that comprehensive "Children's Charter," the Children Act of 1908. In the same early years came also the inauguration of a national campaign against infant mortality, the establishment of the first "schools for mothers" and, as the first decade of the century drew to a close, of infant welfare centres.

Informal exchanges of experience between child welfare workers in different countries had already presaged the extensive official co-operation which obtains to-day. Juvenile courts, first established in the United States in the 'sixties, had been watched with interest by social reformers in Great Britain and elsewhere, and Canada in 1884 and South Australia in 1895 had begun to establish these courts on the American model. It was not, however, until the Children Act of 1908 that they became general in England, though Birmingham had anticipated the legislature by instituting a special court for young offenders in 1904. The development of a national campaign against infant mortality in Britain also owed something to the inspiration of another country—in this case France. "*Gouttes de lait*," the parents of the modern infant welfare centre, had existed in Paris as long ago as 1892, and their work had been observed by British physicians interested in the problem of infant mortality. In 1905 the first national conference on this question was held in London, and Dr. Eric Pritchard opened England's first infant consultation centre, in the Borough of St. Marylebone, in 1906. It was not until 1912 that a more comprehensive interpretation of "child welfare"

began to gain currency. In that year the United States established the Federal Children's Bureau under the ægis of a Department of State, to consolidate the national concern for "all matters pertaining to the welfare of children and child life among all classes of our people." Notwithstanding the broad scope of these terms of reference—to be amply justified in later years—it was the excessive infant mortality rates which prompted the American, as also the French and in less degree, the British, efforts towards child welfare. War losses and the increasing impingement of war conditions on the health and general welfare of children aroused in these and in other lands a more acute sense of the importance of safeguarding their interests, and the child welfare movement began to appear as a definite feature of national life in a well-developed community. The National Baby Weeks inaugurated in England and in America were characteristic symptoms. In Belgium—hitherto a somewhat backward country in this respect—the important and far-reaching *Œuvre nationale de l'Enfance* was established under Government auspices, and both Belgium and France developed *ligues des familles nombreuses*, with boons by way of reduction in taxes, in railway fares and in the prices of certain commodities for prolific parents—a principle of which our own income-tax rebates for dependent children are a faint reflection. At the present moment, the Government of the Philippine Islands—which has long maintained an efficient Public Welfare Department—is discussing the possibility of setting up a Children's Bureau, presumably on the United States model. This is a development of social welfare organisation which has as yet found few advocates in our own country.

Apart from individual exchanges, international co-operation in child welfare work may be traced back to 1905, when a conference attended by doctors and social workers from several different countries was held in Paris to discuss the organisation of infants' milk centres. One result was the formation of the first international child welfare organisation, the *Union internationale pour la protection de l'enfance du premier âge*, which organised international congresses in different lands during many succeeding years. Not for another twenty years was a really comprehensive outlook on the problem of child welfare taken in an international conference,

until in 1925 there was held in Geneva the "First General Child Welfare Congress," organised by the Save the Children International Union and attended by 700 delegates from sixty different countries, many of them Government representatives. The programme ranged over sixteen questions as widely different as the proper feeding of infants, the standardisation of the definition of mental deficiency, and the education of children in international goodwill.

Nevertheless, these efforts, notwithstanding official approval and co-operation, were essentially of a voluntary character. Meanwhile, the coming into being of the League of Nations had had a profound influence on the world's attitude to the question of child welfare. "The protection of children, young persons, and women" is one of the obligations laid upon the League by Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, and this work is carried out in part by the International Labour Organisation, in part by the Commission for the Protection of Children and Young People. Its range is comprehensive—a definite advance on that preoccupation with infant mortality which was the main characteristic of the earlier efforts of the century. Thus, the League's activities now include the promotion of measures for the protection of employed women before and after childbirth, for the prevention and control of the employment of children, for the reclamation of juvenile offenders, for the suppression of the traffic in women and children and of literature and cinematograph films likely to have a harmful effect on juvenile mentality, and the investigation of social conditions, such as unemployment, which are prejudicial to the welfare of the young.

All these activities tend to conserve the child's rights as defined by the Declaration of Geneva, which was adopted by the Fifth Assembly of the League in 1924 and reaffirmed at the Fifteenth Assembly last September. The Declaration was drafted by an Englishwoman, Miss Eglantyne Jebb, whose work in connection with the Save the Children Fund of Great Britain, and the Save the Children International Union, both of which she had founded to relieve distress among children after the War, had convinced her that something more far-reaching and fundamental than palliative action was needed if the world's children were to be "saved" to make their just contribution to their day and generation. The Declaration expresses, in five succinct clauses, the minimum

needs of all children, everywhere, "above and beyond all consideration of race, nationality, and creed." It has been signed by the heads of many states, including the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the leaders of all the delegations to the Imperial Conference of 1930. Republican Spain has incorporated the Declaration *en bloc* in its Constitution. The French Ministry of Education, some years ago, directed that a copy should be displayed in every State school in the country, and in Bulgaria—whose King is the only reigning monarch to have signed the document—the Declaration is the focal point of the national Children's Day. In Turkey it is the subject of similar emphasis. It is known to have been translated into at least forty-five different languages, European, Oriental, African, Classical and Liturgical.

On the part of the League itself, a great access of activity has marked the ten years since the Declaration was adopted by the Assembly, though it would be *post hoc ergo propter hoc* to attribute all this to the influence of the Declaration. In 1924 the League had hardly got into its stride in matters of child welfare. So far as concerned children in industry and working mothers and expectant mothers, the International Labour Office was already implementing the Conventions of Washington (1919), Genoa (1920) and Geneva (1921), but otherwise the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Women and Children was the sole committee of the League which took cognisance of the interests of children, and its activities were subject to the limitations indicated by the title. Later its scope was enlarged under a new title, the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Women and the Protection of Children, and more recently still the body became the Advisory Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People, with its functions divided under two heads, (a) Traffic in Women and Children, and (b) Child Welfare. Not the least of the League's contributions to sociology has been the broadening of the definition of "child welfare" which has followed the activities of the Commission. At the recent Assembly the Commission's report, that which recommended the reaffirmation of the Declaration of Geneva, dealt with such diverse topics as the welfare and education of blind children, recreational films, institutions for delinquent children, boarding-out, children in moral and social danger, and children of unemployed parents. Remote indeed from

the conception of the pioneers at the beginning of the century, who for the most part thought of child welfare in terms of milk centres, the League of Nations' interpretation of the term is neverless consonant with the pioneers' intention to give a programme different as the Declaration of Geneva puts it) of the child (as the Declaration of Geneva puts it) "the means necessary for his normal development." The work of the International Labour Office is more concerned with that clause of the Declaration which insists on the child's right to protection from exploitation: it has used its influence, for example, to suppress the employment of young children as labourers in the excavations in Egypt, it has secured a minimum age of ten (a great advance) for the employment of children in the Persian carpet industry, and a general improvement in the conditions of work, and it has secured the beneficent provision of a period of rest, before and after childbirth, for women workers. Meanwhile, the Save the Children International Union, founded by the author of the Declaration of Geneva, with its affiliated national committees in nearly fifty different lands, the chief being the Save the Children Fund of Great Britain, has served as the handmaiden of the League, administering emergency relief in time of special distress and promoting experimental work, research and propaganda for the raising of standards of child care and protection throughout the world. "Children," says the report of the League's Child Welfare Commission, "are the most precious form of capital. We ask you to recognise . . . the rights of the rising generation over its predecessor." That is the spirit of the Declaration of Geneva, the spirit which is slowly conquering the world.

EDWARD FULLER.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE GERMAN REVOLUTION.*

Mr. Powys Greenwood's book is the most important contribution to the study of the Nazi revolution since Conrad Heiden's *History of National Socialism* was published a year ago. Having resided in Germany under the Weimar régime, he is able to compare the old with the new and to analyse the causes and stages of the dramatic transformation. His object, he tells us, is to explain, not to accuse and not to excuse.

If I sometimes appear to lay too little emphasis on the individual cases, the tragedies and cruelties of Germany to-day, it is not because I condone them. It is simply because the indignation they rightly evoke tends to blur the understanding. . . . Without an open-minded attitude neither National Socialism nor anything else can be understood.

We must bear in mind these words from the preface while reading this remarkable book. Otherwise we might be tempted to feel that the author takes a little too calmly the detestable crimes which have shocked the conscience of the civilised world.

The first of the three parts deals with the political, economic, social and psychological background of the drama. The German people, he reminds us, have always had a distaste for rationalism, preferring a romantic idealism all their own.

* *The German Revolution*. By H. Powys Greenwood. Routledge. 12s. 6d.
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"They have always distrusted democracy, preferring in their secret hearts leadership to liberty." Thus the Weimar statesmen were condemned to a wellnigh impossible task in attempting to work a democratic constitution in a country without the traditions and instinct of self-government amid the exhaustion and unsettlement of a lost war. Mr. Greenwood is probably right in rejecting the criticism that they should have gone to work with the ruthlessness subsequently displayed by the Nazis. They had not enough backing in the country, even had they not been too humane and civilised for violent courses. When the old régime toppled over in 1918, a nation in despair was ready to give democracy a trial because at the moment there was nothing else available. The Republic failed because it had no real basis in the hearts of the German people. But it also failed owing to circumstances outside its control, namely the conduct of the victorious Powers.

We in the ex-allied countries must never forget our share of responsibility. The isolation and economic pressure, if not the domestic dissension, were in great part our work. The German Revolution in its present form would be inconceivable without the Treaty of Versailles and subsequent allied policy.

This is well and truly said. Now that it is too late, we can all see how right were Mr. Keynes and other Liberal publicists in 1919 who pointed out that it was unwise to trample on our prostrate foe.

The way was prepared by suffering and political humiliation for a vigorous assault against a Republic which had few convinced friends. But there was another factor on which Mr. Greenwood lays great stress. He detests the Marxist ideology, and though he does not echo the foolish charge that the Weimar rulers were Jews and Marxists, he testifies to their prominence and influence. In turning against the democratic Republic, millions of middle and lower-middle-class people, he believes, were striking at materialistic rationalism and the doctrine of the class war. The main cause of the revolution, he declares, "was the urge to assert the unity of the German people or race in the face of adversity. It was above all the failure of democracy to achieve that unity which led to its downfall." Prince Löwenstein, in his *Tragedy of a Nation*, has argued that the Weimar statesmen, with more determination and imagination, might have won post-war Germany to the liberal

principles and practice of Western Europe. In Mr. Greenwood's eyes this desirable consummation was impossible owing to the gulf between the conservative bourgeoisie and the Marxist working man.

The second part, entitled "The Revolution," describes the coming of the Nazis to power. Mr. Greenwood is obviously impressed by the idealism of many members of the party whom he has known, their passionate desire to restore prosperity and happiness to their country, their longing for service, their vision of unity through the abolition of class barriers and class sentiments, their resolve to restore the sanctities and simplicities of family life. He does not appear to have met Hitler, but he feels the emotional power of his appeal. For the intellectual apparatus of the party he has far less respect. "In countless speeches the same leaders at different times and different leaders at the same times have advanced diametrically opposing views. The genius of the Nazis lay in promising all things to all men and successfully inducing belief in their promises." It is a severe indictment; but for the full story of the lies and slanders with which the Nazi chiefs assailed and overthrew better men than themselves, who were nobly striving to pilot the ship of state through stormy seas, we must turn to other guides.

The third part surveys the achievements of the victors. Our author is entirely justified in rebuking those who denounce the savagery of the Nazis but are silent on the far more wholesale butcheries by the Bolsheviks. There is, however, a profound difference between a semi-civilised country like Russia, with its long tradition of cruelty and oppression, and a highly civilised state such as Germany, the heir of all the softening influences of the West. *Corruptio optimi pessima*. The gravest crimes of the Nazis are beyond forgiveness, and they are justly punished by the moral isolation which is their result. Mr. Greenwood believes that Hitler has occasionally attempted to hold back his more unruly followers. Even if it is true, it in no way diminishes his moral responsibility. The mob orator who lashed millions of excitable young men to fury and overthrew the legal foundations of the state cannot shelter himself behind the excuse that they exceeded his instructions. "It is believed," he writes of the wholesale massacre of June 30th, "that in fact the S.S. and secret police ran amok in many instances, and that there were a good many

private vengeance. Hitler is said to have been very angry at these, to have personally investigated several cases, and to have had the perpetrators shot." Such abominations, authorised or unauthorised, are only possible in a country where a Dictator has trampled the reign of law under his feet.

Mr. Greenwood describes the praiseworthy efforts of the Government to combat unemployment, to strengthen the position of the peasantry, to clean up the night life of Berlin. Nobody would deny that good things are done by autocratic rulers as well as bad. But at what cost? The Totalitarian State, with its deliberate suppression of what General Smuts calls creative freedom, its system of regimentation, its ideal of mass production, is an anachronism. "Culturally," confesses Mr. Greenwood, "the Third Reich is barren. . . . I cannot believe that the German people will for ever stand being turned into mere robots, cogs in a vast political leviathan going none knows whither." The Nazis, he adds, will have to remember that the Germans are a highly educated people possessed of intense political consciousness, or they will perish. So far, however, they are still tightening, not loosening, the screw.

To the two questions which all the world is asking we receive no confident reply. Will the Nazi Government last? It will not be overthrown by its internal enemies, he believes, for they are too divided and cowed, nor by economic collapse. As in other great revolutionary movements, however, there may well be mortal strife between rival groups of its supporters. Discontent grows rapidly within as well as outside the party. The Leader's authority is unchallenged, but there is no superman ready to take his place. When Cromwell was gone, the Restoration was in sight. Secondly: will it fight? Here the Reichswehr has something to say, and it is not yet nearly strong enough to strike. "There is not the least likelihood of Germany provoking an armed conflict while she is in her present state of military inferiority." This is very limited comfort, as Mr. Greenwood is well aware. "However sincere the Germans may be in their pacific protestations, they want many things which may lead to war. And when they are strong they will talk in a different tone about these things." We close this able, thoughtful, disquieting book in a spirit of gratitude to a writer who knows so much and keeps his emotions so strictly under control.

G. P. G.

THE MODERNIST MOVEMENT.*

Roman Catholic apologists stress the aberrations of the modern mind bereft of Christian inspiration and conclude that men's rejection of the Catholic Church is responsible for their mental and moral plight. A contributory cause of this rejection is convincingly revealed in Mr. Vidler's scholarly and illuminating essay; namely, the ruthless suppression of the modernist movement in the Roman Catholic Church. The Papal Encyclical *Pascendi* (1907), with its elaborate systematisation of so-called modernist doctrine, misinterprets, he shows, both the motives and aims of Catholic modernists, who individually attempted from different angles to solve the discrepancy between dogma and the proved results of biblical and historical criticism. In order to illustrate his thesis the author relates two tragedies, the life stories of Loisy and Tyrrell. Their doom was a double loyalty: to the truth they proclaimed and sought to preserve in Catholic tradition, and the truth which that tradition ignored or contradicted. Loisy wrote *L'Évangile et l'Église* in order to combat liberal Protestantism as presented in Harnack's historical approach to Christianity, and was encouraged by Mgr. Mignot and Baron von Hügel, who enthusiastically welcomed such a defence of Catholicism. They believed indeed

that the traditional theologians would attack it but they did not foresee that it would lead ultimately and inevitably to the author's excommunication or that it would go down to history as the *locus classicus* of what the Vatican was to describe as "the synthesis of all the heresies."

Naturally Loisy had a double motive; his "modernised apology for Catholicism would be far more likely to win the acceptance of Catholics if it was cast in the form of a refutation of Protestantism." Mr. Vidler is convinced of Loisy's sincerity, despite critics within and without the Church who cannot conceive that he was ever a Catholic at heart. That in later years he rejected both Deism and the Incarnation seems hardly surprising. To him, as to most Frenchmen, Catholicism implied "the Roman Church as it at present exists"; and disavowal of its doctrine appears to them a natural sequence of expulsion from its fold. The repudiation moreover by

* *The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church. Its Origins and Outcome.* By Alec R. Vidler, M.A. (Being the Norrisian Prize Essay in the University of Cambridge for the year 1933.)

Pius X of his final attempt at conciliation, "killed, more than any other event," Loisy's affection for the Church.

With what seemed to him incredible heartlessness, the head of the Church rejected his offer, and demanded of him intellectual and moral suicide. . . . He tried in vain . . . to show Cardinal Richard how impossible it was for him to retract *en bloc* the conclusions at which he had arrived as to the facts of history.

Tyrrell, the mystic and prophet, to whom religion and not science was the paramount interest, was nearer, Mr. Vidler shows, the English conception of Christian faith, "which does not consciously at least proceed from or depend on membership of a religious society, *une patrie des âmes*." To Loisy "it seemed absurd" to profess to be a Catholic "*malgré le pape*." "Because Tyrrell had faith of the individual kind as well" (as shown particularly in his personal devotion to Our Lord Jesus Christ) "his modernism survived, and even thrived on his excommunication" which he refused to accept; "and he died professing to defend Catholic principles against the Vatican heresies." He appealed against the latter to the yet unformulated Catholicism which he proclaimed just before his death (1909) in *Christianity at the Cross Roads*. In this Tyrrell argues that "the Christ of eschatology is substantially the same as the Christ of Catholic tradition and experience, that is, a supernatural, otherworldly, transcendent, essentially mysterious Christ"; and that "these characteristics of the original gospel and of Catholicism too are most alien to the modern outlook." He foresees that "modern faith in humanity and progress is doomed to disillusion"; and that the needs of the human spirit can only be met by a transformed Catholicism, which will have fully to accept the results of the scientific movement.

Tyrrell, it is maintained, by adopting the English Protestants' appeal to concrete human experience, strove to justify against them the whole complex of Catholicism. That the apologetic savoured largely of contemporary pragmatism, Mr. Vidler admits; but he contends that it was not pure pragmatism.

He (Tyrrell) does not hold that absolute or ultimate truth is unknowable. In prayer, in all forms of genuine religious experience, we have a real knowledge of God and the spirit world; but we can express this knowledge only in analagous and relative terms.

The extent to which contemporary thought coloured the appeals of modernists is fully admitted; intensifying as it did the perennial problem of ecclesiastical leadership which the Pope in Fogazzaro's novel expressed to "*Il Santo*."

You . . . have to deal with the Lord alone; I have to deal also with the men the Lord has placed around me, among whom I have to steer my course according to charity and prudence, and above all, I must adapt my counsels, my commands, to the different capacities, the different states of mind of so many millions of men.

But the essence of the modernist appeal was not a particular form of revision but freedom to suggest it in a democratic and scientific era. Not a philosophy was advocated but the right to criticise; and the final answer to such appeals was the Decree *Lamentabili* (1907) which denied any need for revision. Of the successful repressive measures that followed, culminating in the anti-modernist oath, Mr. Vidler gives a terse survey, quoting Tyrrell's friend, Miss Petre, who wrote in 1911: "A priest is more afraid of being called a modernist than of being accused of negligence in his sacerdotal obligations and duties."

In a final chapter the author surveys prevalent doctrines in the Anglican Church, maintaining that the modernism which was extinguished in the Roman Church has been criticised and developed by Anglo-Catholic thinkers, to whom it provided an impetus and important suggestions. They are more concerned with ultimate metaphysical problems than were the Roman modernists, excepting of course Von Hügel, whose insistence on ontological divine transcendence led him in later years to suspect the "immanentism" of modernist friends. The writings of Dr. A. E. J. Rawlinson, Mr. W. Spens and Professor Taylor are stressed as exemplifying a type of High Anglican theology which claims to retain "the essential truth of the gospel of the Incarnation," while disclaiming "absolute truth or finality for dogmatic formulas whether scriptural, credal, or conciliar;" and to provide thereby a new apologetic for Catholicism which evades none of the assured results of historical and biblical criticism.

D. P. H.

THE PURITANS AND MUSIC.*

Any long-established belief dies hard, but Mr. Scholes has, we trust, here given the final quietus to the allegation of Puritan hostility to music in itself. After thoroughly sifting the evidence he is convinced that the charge is baseless; it never figures among the many contemporary accusations of their enemies, nor has any Puritan enactment against music (or dancing) *on weekdays* been found. This brilliant, well-documented book should cause many readers to revise their ideas of life under the Commonwealth, and future writers on music to abstain from repeating unverified assertions. Certain reservations must, of course, be made. The early Quakers do seem to have disapproved of music. *Church* music was suppressed by Parliament as a sensuous distraction from true worship—a similar distrust of elaborate music in services had been shown often before in the Church's history. Hence the silencing or destruction by the Puritans of many Church organs, though some were preserved, for use, apparently, out of service time. Bells were allowed to remain, though the inscriptions on some were filed off, as "superstitious." Other instances of suppression involving music were the closing of the public theatres, the forbidding of some forms of dance and merry-making, such as the Maypole, as tending to immorality—a condemnation by no means confined to Puritans, as quotations from Romanist and Anglican objectors prove, and one only too plainly justified by contemporary evidence. Decorous dancing was encouraged; *The English Dancing Master* (1651), a manual of instruction with tunes, which ran into several editions, had for title page an engraving by Hollar, depicting a school of country dancing. The enforcement by James I's *Book of Sports* of sports on Sundays was anathema, the sports themselves were not; the "Book" was burnt by Order of Parliament in 1664.

That the three greatest English Puritans, Milton, Cromwell, and Bunyan, were themselves music-lovers is sufficiently well known; to them must be added the poets Marvell and Wither, who each wrote a song in praise of music; the lawyer Whitelocke, who was Cromwell's ambassador to Queen Christina of Sweden, and the famous Colonel Hutchinson

* *The Puritans and Music in England and New England.* By Percy A. Scholes. Oxford University Press. 1934. 21s. net.

who, himself a proficient in instrumental music, "spared not any cost for the education of his sons and daughters in languages, sciences, music and dancing." Abundant proof is furnished of the flourishing state of music under Puritan rule, of its pursuit in private families, and musical clubs (as at Oxford); a long list is given of music teachers in London, and a list, also long, of secular music published by one John Playford, which includes the *Court Ayres* (a collection of some 250 dance tunes—"Pavins, Almains, Corants and Sarabands"—made by a Puritan Captain named Taylor in 1655), and several sets of "rounds and catches." "To judge by the amount of music published during the Commonwealth the country would seem to have been bubbling with it" (Parry, quoted on p. 127, footnote). A famous foreign violinist, Baltzar of Lübeck, came to reside in London in 1655, and was heard by Anthony Wood and Evelyn at private musical gatherings. A Government "Committee for Advancement of Musicke" was appointed in 1656-7, while, in the hope that a *musical* "entertainment" might be free from the abuses of the spoken drama, Opera was actually introduced under the Puritans, with Davenant's *Siege of Rhodes*: pastorals and masques were also performed.

How, then, did the popular conviction of Puritan antipathy to music arise? Mainly, Mr. Scholes contends, through the violent attacks on the abuse of music by extremists, often erroneously labelled Puritan; through misrepresentations of the Anglican clergy and the Restoration dramatists. These were circulated towards the end of the eighteenth century by Hawkins and Burney in their *Histories of Music*, and have been repeated ever since by English and American writers, from whom an array of typical quotations is given. Macaulay and Scott spread the idea of Puritan sourness (a defect which must be admitted among the rank and file, and which the present book perhaps hardly recognises sufficiently). The *real* objectors to music and dancing are stated to have been the early Methodists (though not the Wesley brothers themselves) and the "Evangelicals."

We have no space left to describe the chapter on *Calvin and Music*, or to refer other than briefly to the important section on New England. Evidence is quoted to show that both music and dancing were practised there in early days;

if there were any deficiency, it was due to the absence of "wealth, culture and leisure." Taking the single instance of Judge Sewall (1652-1730), it is noted that he refers frequently to music and musical instruments, was accustomed to order instrumental music after his formal dinners, and, when visiting London, "went to Covent Garden and heard a Consort of Musick." (This does not imply the theatre of that name.) Some incredibly narrow specimens of the "Blue Laws" of Connecticut are shown to be the invention of an eighteenth-century parson named Peters. Mr. Scholes's vindication of the Puritans in this respect, fortified as it is by his authority as a leading musical critic and by his exhaustive researches into the documents of the period, should be read with careful attention, and will be found of enthralling interest. The legend of a chill and songless chasm between the musical London of Elizabeth and that of Mr. Pepys is swept clean away.

E. G. S.

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THE CHARACTER OF ROBESPIERRE.*

The primary purpose of Mr. Reginald Somerset Ward's biography is an attempt to examine in the life of an historical figure those factors which cause deterioration of character and the frustration of ideals. He endeavours to trace from the events of Robespierre's life, and in particular his speeches, each stage in his spiritual decline, and finally to analyse the whole process of decay. Upon its purely historical side, this volume displays much erudition and research. Mr. Ward's method of treatment, however, has tended to a rather inadequate picture of the broad background of events and causes. In his psycho-analytical study, the author is fair and temperate, if verbose, finding in the tragedy of Robespierre's life ground for excuse as well as accusation. The incorruptibility of Robespierre, his early ideals and his great influence upon the passage of events were the main reasons for his selection as an example of spiritual deterioration. Unlike Mirabeau, Danton and many other leaders in the French

* *Maximilien Robespierre: A Study in Deterioration.* Macmillan. 18s. net. ✓

Revolution, Robespierre exhibited a very high degree of moral rectitude in his private conduct.

Maximilien Robespierre was born at Arras in 1758 of middle-class parents. On the death of his mother in 1764, Maximilien and his sisters became dependent on relatives. They were left unsupported by a profligate father who tainted the family name, a fact which implanted in the boy's mind "a fear and a sense of inferiority." At the age of eleven, he entered as a scholar the Collège of Louis-le-Grand in Paris. He soon showed great antipathy to the Roman Catholic Church and began to imbibe the theories of Rousseau, both political and religious, which he purported to follow throughout his career. Although Robespierre always believed in a form of personal deism, as exemplified in the Feast of the Supreme Being in May 1794, in preference to the popular civic religion, Mr. Ward argues that his particular tenets, fashioned upon Rousseau, were largely responsible for his spiritual pride and intolerance. It was this which contributed to his distorted vision of the General Will.

From 1781-9 Robespierre practised at the Bar at Arras, and during these years, roused by the injustice of the régime, he turned to politics and associated himself with the cause of the depressed classes. It is interesting to note that as a judge of the Episcopal Court he showed considerable scruples in the imposition of the death sentence. He was elected to the Estates-General in 1789; and for two and a half years, until the dissolution of the National Assembly, "he went into the Assembly with the ideals of Rousseau and his speeches and actions throughout supported those ideals." He fought against *lettres de cachet* and capital punishment and worked for the freedom of the Press, universal suffrage, trial by jury and all the other attributes of democratic government. Two years later, as the leading member of the Committee of Public Safety, he swept all these rights aside and exercised the most arbitrary sway. With the Law of Suspects passed in September 1793, the Terror began. It culminated during the six weeks prior to Robespierre's own death on July 26th, 1794, in the execution of 1,285 persons. It is for this amazing change that Mr. Ward has to account. He appears to be satisfied by Robespierre's original contention that the Terror was necessary for the national safety. He quotes a saying by

Lord Shaw, in a case before the House of Lords during the Great War, that the emergency powers "as such are far more arbitrary than those of the most famous Committee of Public Safety known to history." But there is a distinction between powers and their exercise. Subsequently, however, when the foreign danger was over, Robespierre professed to regard the Terror as an instrument for creating the perfect state. "The Terror," he said, "is nothing else save Justice, prompt, severe, and inflexible. It is therefore an emanation of Virtue." Mr. Ward comments that "it was precisely in this difference that the deterioration of Robespierre's spiritual life during the Terror was to be measured."

Mr. Ward ascribes to Robespierre's moral decline numerous contributory causes. He cites his growing bitterness and arrogance, his intolerance and inquisitorial nature, and above all his spiritual pride. On the other hand, the author respects his sincerity. He aspired, not to tyranny, but rather to unified control in pursuit of his own distorted ideals. Robespierre always professed to believe in Rousseau's General Will. The tragedy was that he associated the General Will with his own and sought to destroy all who opposed it. The political clubs thrown up by the Revolution created inevitably sectarian and competitive factions. The early influence of the Jacobin Club upon Robespierre must have been as profound as his subsequent ascendancy over it. The Jacobins and the Commune claimed the exclusive representation of "the People" and Robespierre, their leader, soon embodied "the People" in himself. His early respect for law and order became subject to maintaining the sovereignty of this attenuated General Will. Thus he had justified the insurrection of the Commune and its attack upon the Tuileries in September 1792. "The State," he declared, "must be saved whatever the means. Nothing is unconstitutional save that which tends to ruin it." So also the Terror was necessary to preserve, from its enemies, the incorruptible will of "the People." Mr. Ward would seem to regard Robespierre's moral decline as due not to insanity as such, but to an all-pervading self-deception, the product of years of growth. At all events Robespierre's methods are not lacking in the world to-day and may perhaps be said to accompany most violent social revolutions.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Viscount Grey of Fallodon, by Politicus,* is a charming little study of a great gentleman who would have approved both its argument and its atmosphere. There is no new material and no suggestion of personal intimacy in these quiet pages, where the admiration is felt without ever forcing the note. He speaks of his "high seriousness, without austerity," and his "magnanimity restrained in enthusiasms." He emphasises the repose, the harmony, the unselfishness of the man, his "sane, central view of English life," his high sense of rectitude. Our author confesses that Grey's mind was not creative and that he is not one of our great statesmen. He had a good brain, but he owed his influence far more to character than to intellect. Stress is laid on his love of Nature and of Wordsworth. The larger part of the book is devoted to an exposition of his foreign policy and to a defence of his action against Mr. Lloyd George and other critics. His desire for peace can only be doubted by those who did not know him. His handling of the situation on the eve of war is approved by our author, who accepts the contention that he could not have acted otherwise. It is easy enough to say that a clear declaration of our intentions at an early stage of the crisis would have kept the peace. Such a contention can never be proved or disproved. In any case he was not a dictator but a member of a deeply divided Cabinet. If he failed to avert the war, he brought a virtually united nation to its support. It is doubtful if any other statesman could have done more.

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A new translation of the First Part of Goethe's *Faust*,† by John Shawcross, is a welcome event. The Senior Lecturer in English Literature at Liverpool University is also an expert on the language and literature of Germany. *Faust*, like the other supreme masterpieces of literature, is untranslatable in the sense that it is impossible to reproduce the perfect flavour of the original. But since it is not in everybody's power to read foreign languages, translations remain indispensable. The greater the poem, the greater the risk. Mr. Shawcross has well-known English predecessors in his difficult task, but he need not fear comparison with the best of them. He wisely sticks as closely as he can to the original. Thereby he reproduces the dramatic intensity of the most marvellous drama in the world, and at times his version rises to lofty eloquence. Those to whom the original is a closed book should read it. Those who can enjoy *Faust* as Goethe wrote it will quickly realise, if they try, how much better Mr. Shawcross has done his work than they could do it themselves.

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Travels of a Chinese Poet, Tu Fu, Guest of Rivers and Lakes, A.D. 712-770,‡ is a second instalment of the works of this, China's greatest

* Methuen. 6s.

† Eric Partridge. 7s. 6d.

‡ Cape. 21s. net.

poet. Mrs. Florence Ayscough has continued her method of translating and printing the poems to show the ideographs. In a Preface she says that "to translate a Chinese poem in its entirety is not possible. Our language lacks the requisite mechanism to give the 'tones.'" But she affirms that every simile and metaphor in the book lurks in the ideograph rendered.

In a previous volume, *Tu Fu*, the poet's childhood and youth and his life at Court are described in his poems. This new book gives pictures of his life in retirement at the Grass Hut at Chêng-tu, of his journey there and other journeys, with many delightful descriptions of nature: trees, flowers, birds and fish, rain and storm, the return of spring, tree-felling.

River in Spate

Outside furze gate, river in spate;
 Little son tells me it rushes in haste.
 Get down from bed; water several feet high;
 Lean on staff; islet in centre has gone.
 Scarcely moving swallows press into the wind;
 Lightly floating gulls sweep on the waves.
 Little boats of fishers twist round and round;
 Is it easy to hold the skiff's prow?

There are many verses dwelling on his sufferings *en route*, his declining age, and the sad thoughts suggested by it, but there are also revivals and compensations:

Not again shall I be bound by convention;
 Verily, free as a wave, I go out to wander.

Mrs. Ayscough is to be congratulated on a very delightful book, and her learning and her method bring enjoyment of this poetry within the reach of the ordinary reader. There are some charming illustrations of scenery etched from photographs by Miss Lucille Douglas.

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Mr. and Mrs. Quennell have now completed their celebrated *History of Everyday Things in England* in a fourth volume entitled *The Age of Production, 1851-1934*.^{*} It is certainly a bold attempt to include in a short book a comprehensive survey of the revolutionary developments achieved in almost every sphere of work during the last eighty years. This series is primarily intended for children of 14 to 18 years of age, and by a judicious emphasis upon representative events the authors have produced on the whole a simplified sketch in true perspective. They confine themselves mainly to the "great essentials" of food, clothes, and housing; and it is upon the last that they are most expansive. They emphasise the great influence of Morris and his

* B. T. Batsford. 8s. 6d. net.

friends upon a drab industrialism. They note the revival of town planning and describe in some detail the foundation of the first garden city at Letchworth. Mention might have been made of the more practical "satellite towns" which are now springing up. The volume includes brief and necessarily sketchy chapters on production and distribution, public health and the expansion of transport and communications. There is also a useful "cursory chronicle" of the whole period. In a book of this size omissions are inevitable, but one does expect some treatment, for example, of the appearance and power of the popular press and the growth of modern sport. Like the other volumes, this book contains the authors' own delightful illustrations and should prove a great incentive to further study.

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Fresh evidence of the work of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England in promoting a proper appreciation of our countryside and the growth of ordered development will be found in the recent Report^{*} of its Ryedale branch. Situated among the magnificent moors and dales of the North Riding of Yorkshire, Ryedale remains as yet unspoilt and has every claim to protection from the menace of exploitation. The aim of this Report, edited by Colonel C. W. E. Duncombe, has been "to give some idea of all that there is at stake in this most beautiful district" and to indicate the dangers of neglect and the means of preservation. It contains a series of delightful studies of the geology, rainfall and flora of the district, its landscapes and villages, local architecture, and its ancient sites and historic mansions. Ryedale can boast of Helmsley Castle, the majestic ruins of Rievaulx and Byland Abbeys and Vanbrugh's masterpiece, Castle Howard. The general interest, however, of the Report lies in its articles on the amenities of the countryside and the problems of building development. It is pointed out that the powers vested in the local authority are amply sufficient, if exercised, to prevent disfigurement. But doubtless the ultimate solution to this question will be found in the work of education rather than in the imposition of by-laws. This Report is no reactionary document. It recognises the inevitability of development and is a strong advocate of rural planning. In the words of one contributor, planning should be considered "in the light of a gentle directing force, pushing natural evolution in the right direction." Thus administered, the Planning Acts may be of incalculable benefit. The threat to rural England, as also to the towns, is due not only to a lack of æsthetic appreciation among a large section of the population but also, as Dr. C. A. Alington says in his introduction, to "the ignorance of those who do not know how much is being done, or threatened, to spoil the beauty which they know and value." In this and other surveys, the C.P.R.E. is doing splendid work in making known the issue and showing the way of progress.

* *Ryedale*. Council for the Preservation of Rural England. Ryedale Branch. 4s.

Mr. Hilaire Belloc's outlook on history is comprehensively revealed in his *Shorter History of England*.* As might be expected, it differs radically in interpretation and treatment from the ordinary text-book. Believing, for example, that English society, including all its institutions, religion, laws and whole method of thought, "derive uninterruptedly" from Roman civilisation, he devotes unusual attention to Roman Britain. His "impersonal" treatment of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is based upon the view that in an aristocratic England "emphasis on particular ministries . . . is futile." Mr. Belloc's own peculiar theories are incorporated as plain history in the text. The highly controversial nature of this volume makes it unsuitable for the elementary schoolroom.

* *The Constitutional Year Book*† for 1935 well maintains the reputation of its predecessors as an invaluable storehouse of political knowledge. In addition to extensive Parliamentary information, elaborate electoral statistics, tables of administrations since 1827 and a brief account of the various government departments, the volume includes a survey of the British Constitution and a brief summary of Imperial relations and of Dominion governments. The statistical tables cover a large field of financial, industrial and social matters including a list of unemployment figures for each month from January 1924 to October 1934. The general index might be considerably enlarged with great advantage.

* Harrap. 12s. 6d. net.

† Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 5s.

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor, THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

SIR,—Mr. Isaac Foot, M.P., in the November number of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, questions a statement in my book on Oliver Cromwell, that he was in the Isle of Wight on December 17th, 1648, and back again the week after. Mr. Foot says that no historian has mentioned this. He is wrong. Mr. Muddiman, in his admirable monograph on the trial of Charles I, has marked the point (p. 41). Walker, in his news-letter, tells us that "Lieutenant-General Cromwell hath gone to the Isle of Wight." The date given for this move is Thursday, December 16th, and Walker printed it the next day—the 17th. Cromwell was at the Council of Officers at Windsor on the 22nd, and got back on the 23rd. It is his presence at the Council of Officers on the 22nd (which is common knowledge) that has confused Mr. Foot.

Very faithfully yours,

H. BELLOC.

January 4th, 1935.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MARCH, 1935.

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND PRESENT WORLD CONDITIONS.*

THE present generation takes no great satisfaction in the world as it finds it. Gone is the complacency of the nineteenth century—the sense of stability, the solid faith in ordered progress. The Great War shook like an earthquake the whole structure of our mental and material life. In the countries engaged in it ten millions of men were killed; many times that number wounded, blinded, gassed, infected with disease; twenty-six thousand million pounds were spent, blown into nothingness. Never were Shakespeare's lines more fully justified:

Man, proud man . . . like an angry ape,
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven,
As make the angels weep.

There followed an intense effort to build defences against another such catastrophe. But now the nations are beginning again the race of armaments, each against each; and that has ever proved the precursor of war. Already the countries of the world are spending at the rate of £2,500,000 a day upon their armaments; the figure is increasing steadily. In Central Europe, in the Far East, there is a widespread feeling of insecurity.

Aftermath of the Great War came the Great Depression—the commerce of the world halved in value; thirty million workers unemployed; vast numbers of people robbed of their life's savings by catastrophic monetary depreciations; food-stuffs burned or thrown into the sea in some places, people half starving in others; a drought, a plague of grasshoppers, the only relief to the agricultural markets; America and Asia glutted with raw materials, German industries stopped for the lack of them.

In some countries which had been foremost in the ranks of civilisation, absolutism usurps power. There follow the

* Presidential Address to the British Institute of Philosophy, delivered on January 22nd, 1935.

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inevitable results ; every opinion but one is suppressed ; men and women are arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned, sometimes put to death. The scales of Justice are given false weights, and her sword is turned by the guilty against the innocent. The judgment of the young is warped by biased history, while their minds and bodies are trained for war.

The spirit of violence that has been let loose in the world expresses itself in all kinds of ways. Statesmen are assassinated in Germany, Austria, Poland, France, Japan, the King of Jugo-Slavia at Marseilles ; shootings, as penalty for industrial offences, constantly take place in Russia ; there has been a political holocaust in Germany ; wild revolutionary outbreaks have kept Spain and Cuba in ferment ; a ruthless war causes untold suffering to the peoples of Bolivia and Paraguay ; there is terrorism in Bengal ; the gangsters and kidnappers of America are an amazing product of the modern age ; swindlers like Kreuger and Stavisky end their lives by suicide after committing frauds on a colossal scale. The new generation may well ask : What kind of world is this into which we have been born ? Some among them, without beliefs, without hopes, are ready to accept any creed, however irrational, however destructive, which offers a new and different civilisation. I know that this is a partial presentation. There is another side to the picture. I shall refer to that later on. But it is right that attention should be focused on the evils and the dangers that surround us.

In presence of these conditions, faced by the questionings of the younger generation, where does Religion stand ? And where stands Philosophy ? What guidance is being given, what effort is being made, by those who care and should understand ?

It may be said that these problems, in the main, are practical matters, of great difficulty and complexity, needing the handling of specialists, that it is for the politicians and the economists to solve them. So far as particular measures are concerned, that is obviously true. But these affairs go deeper than that. Fundamental issues arise, touching the relations of races, of nations, of classes. Politics and economics must take their final direction from ethics ; and ethics is a matter for philosophy and religion. It is not only a question of the framing of laws and constitutions, or of economic planning, or of skilful diplomacy—although all

these are of immense importance. At bottom it is a question of goodwill ; it is a question of national and personal characteristics ; it is a question of public and private morality.

Looking back over the course of human history it will be plain that the chief agent in promoting morality has been religion. Among all the races of men, from primitive times on into the modern world, religion has striven to point the way and to strengthen the impulse to moral conduct. But in our own age this force has clearly been weakening. East or West, wherever we look, we see a growing divorce between religion and daily life. The hold of the creeds upon conduct has been loosening. Great numbers of people, indeed, have not felt the change, but great numbers have felt it. If we compare, in most countries, the influence to-day of the church, the temple, the mosque, the synagogue, with what it was two hundred years ago, or even one hundred years ago, we cannot fail to note the difference. This feature in the contemporary world is not to be ignored, nor its importance under-estimated. If the ancient buttress of morality is weakening, how can it be strengthened ? Or is there a substitute ?

The chief reason for this change is plain enough. The new factor which has come in and has made the difference is modern science. There is a field in which the spheres of religion and of science have overlapped. So far as the creeds have dealt with the nature of the universe, its origins or its history, with the history of man, or with particular events in the realm of nature, they occupy ground which science also occupies. And in that field they have felt the impact of the discoveries of astronomy and geology, of physics and biology. The scientific world accepted the Law of the Uniformity of Nature and the Principle of Evolution ; this inevitably had a profound effect upon certain of the beliefs dating from earlier times which had been regarded as integral parts of the several religions. There arose what has been called "the conflict between Science and Religion." It is this conflict which, more than any other one cause, has thrown the modern world into the state of intellectual confusion in which it finds itself.

The conflict cannot be ended by emphasising the limitations of science—although no one doubts that those limitations are real. With all caution and with every allowance for error, there remain many things, lying well within the present sphere of

human knowledge, which the mind is bound to accept as true. Fatal would be the dilemma offered by any who should say that truths of this order must be repudiated for the sake of religious faith; who would assert that beliefs which reason must reject are integral parts of their creeds, that their creeds are the essential foundation of morality, and that therefore we must accept what we are convinced is false rather than lose what we know is good. Most precious among the possessions of man are both Goodness and Truth. Is he to be told that he may have Goodness only if he is ready to surrender Truth; or else Truth, but at the sacrifice of Goodness? A sound ethic must insist that these two shall not be made the subject of an impossible choice.

Many will doubt whether a reconciliation between religion and science will be greatly helped by the new views of physics, of which, in this country, Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans are the principal exponents. Intended to strengthen our faith in religion, those views seem more likely, if accepted, merely to weaken our faith in science. The behaviour of the waves or particles within the atom is at present found by physicists to be in some respects inexplicable—not in itself very astonishing at this stage of knowledge—and this fact is supposed to prove that a “Principle of Uncertainty” is at work in nature. In that sphere the Law of Causality, it is said, does not apply. And the movements of electrons being undetermined by causes, this, says Eddington, must have an important bearing upon the problem of human free will. It is surely a strange deduction. But the first premiss is not accepted by physicists of an authority not less than that of the indeterminists—in particular by Einstein, Planck, and Rutherford; so that the layman may take heart, and retain his right to believe that the Law of Causality and the Law of Uniformity, which have been established by centuries of experiment in every field of physical science, with never an exception hitherto, may still hold their own. And quite recently Sir James Jeans himself, in his Presidential Address to the British Association at Aberdeen, has declared that, whether we take the wave-theory of the structure of the atom or the particle-theory, causation does after all apply. “The indeterminism of the particle-picture,” he says, “seems to reside in our minds rather than in nature. . . . The wave-picture . . . exhibits a complete determinism.” He adds,

“Things still change solely as they are compelled, but it no longer seems impossible that part of the compulsion may originate in our own minds.” It would seem to follow that, before there were scientists, the electrons may have behaved differently from now, and if human minds ceased to pay attention to them, they would apparently revert to their former behaviour. We may wonder what was the reaction of the British Association for the Advancement of Science to this new doctrine.

Upon religion and science there lies an obligation to find the method and the means whereby they shall draw together. Whitehead has stated the position in powerful language. “When we consider,” he says, “what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the decision of this generation as to the relations between them. We have here the two strongest general forces (apart from the mere impulse of the various senses) which influence men, and they seem to be set one against the other—the force of our religious intuitions, and the force of our impulse to accurate observation and logical deduction.” Philosophy cannot be indifferent to a situation that lies at the very root of our present troubles. She cannot look the other way as though the matter were not her concern.

But what of Philosophy’s own contribution? In the sphere that is primarily hers, what part does she play? Can anyone say that she speaks with a clear voice, proclaiming definite things, which all instructed people can understand, and all sensible people should be ready to accept? Philosophy has spoken too often in an esoteric language. A specialised vocabulary must be learnt before many of its writings can be understood. The ordinary man, having to choose whether he will learn the vocabulary or do without the philosophy, usually prefers to do without the philosophy. But if, with much labour, he does learn the specialised language and then studies what is said, he often finds himself in a world of subtle dialectics. His time may be mainly spent in reading discussions on Appearance and Reality; on the possibility of any kind of knowledge at all, and its nature, if any; on the meaning of the term “Value”; on the question whether a distinction is to be drawn between seeking what is “good” and doing what is “right,” and if so in what that distinction

consists. To many students inquiries such as these seem to be fascinating ; to others they are not.

Further, philosophy has often, in the past, borne the aspect of a study which is essentially historical, a matter of learning the doctrines of the Greek, French, German or Scottish philosophers of former centuries ; just as, in the Middle Ages, science was regarded as a study of Aristotle and other classical writers, rather than a direct investigation of nature. There have been periods when religion, too, was looked upon more as a matter of exegesis on sacred books, or on the treatises of ancient theologians, than as an affair of the spirit. It is always a sign of decadence when an age so distrusts itself that it prefers to rely on bygone authorities. But I do not think that our present-day philosophy is fairly open to that accusation. The time is past when the output consisted largely of commentaries upon the classical philosophers, and then of commentaries upon the commentators. To-day, in this country and elsewhere, philosophy is growing more and more self-dependent, vigorous, original. And one may observe a real effort to drop the linguistic controversies, which hinder the student and repel the layman. Both may find in the philosophic writings of to-day a greater degree of actuality and of clarity than for a long time past.

The manner of presentation is important ; the choice of topic is also important ; but most important of all, of course, are the ideas expressed. It must be admitted that, in so far as philosophy has had an effective influence upon the course of recent events, that influence has sometimes been harmful. Particularly has that proved to be so in Germany. The ideas of Fichte, of Hegel, and now of Nietzsche, can be seen to be among the principal causes of the unrest in the modern world. " Ideas," said Hegel, " have hands and feet." His own ideas have had hands that are violent, and feet of armies marching to war.

It is the Hegelian doctrine of the reality and supremacy of the State which is the root of much of the evil of our times. This doctrine surely rests upon a delusion. The State can be nothing other than a collection of men and women who have organised themselves for purposes of joint action. Apart from them there is nothing ; just as the swarm is nothing apart from the bees. It is true that men, like bees, have an innate tendency to co-operate ; it is true that if they were

not organised in a State they would be different from what they are, and inferior ; and it is true that, when occasion requires, they must be ready to make sacrifices of their own individual advantage for the sake of the social advantage. But this does not confer " reality " upon the forms which they may adopt for the purposes of joint action. Still less does it endow the system, which they have themselves created, with an absolute sovereignty entitled to a blind obedience. The notion that the State is an entity " real in its own right " may be seen on examination to be nothing more than an imagination of sophisticated metaphysicians wandering in a vacuum remote from actuality.

But this fiction has been eagerly welcomed by groups of people of very practical mind, who have wished to find some intellectual cover for a narrow nationalism or a personal lust for power. The majority of mankind do not probe very deeply, and are impressed by the names of famous philosophers. They gather a general idea that national ambition has been vindicated by the teaching of great ethical thinkers ; that the Will-to-power has been shown to be a form of the Goodwill ; that logical reason supports the view that a State has duties only to itself, and none to its neighbours. " The State," says Hegel, " is the absolute power on earth ; it is its own end and object. It is the ultimate end which has the highest right against the individual." He holds that a State has no moral duties to other States, for the reason that there is no higher authority which is able to compel a sovereign State to perform such duties. That is as though one should say that it is only because of the existence of the police force that it is wrong to murder and to steal. Abolish the police and crimes would be no longer crimes.

" Always, without exception," said Fichte, " the most civilised State is the most aggressive." Nietzsche, in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, wrote, " Man shall be trained for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior ; all else is folly." When it is said that this creed is contrary to plain morality, it is answered that it is superior to all morality. When it is said that it is irrational, because in the long run it works injury to the particular State itself as well as to its neighbours, it is answered that there is no need to be rational. Emotion should be the stimulus, intuition the guide, and force the instrument. And the name of Philosophy is invoked in

support of such doctrines. With foresight Tennyson wrote :

Hold thou the good : define it well :
For fear divine Philosophy
Should push beyond her mark, and be
Procuress to the Lords of Hell.

But there are other philosophies. In Britain thought has moved upon other lines, and the effect is seen in a different direction of public opinion, a different national policy, and different results to the welfare of the people. Perhaps philosophy, both in this country and elsewhere, may even now be on the eve of furnishing to the world that broad guidance for lack of which it wanders bewildered. No generation can be the judge of its own importance in the scheme of things ; it must become part of the past and be seen in perspective before its true place can be assessed. Yet there is ground for believing that this last half-century and the years immediately ahead of us may be of special significance. And for this reason : the present age is the first to become conscious of its own evolution.

During thousands of millions of years this earth has been in the making. Over a period of millions of years various forms of living beings have developed. Man slowly emerged many hundreds of thousands of years ago. Civilisation has arisen within the last few thousands. We of the living generation now take our place in the procession of the ages. But there is this difference between our times and all the times, remote or near, that have preceded. There is now, as never before, a race of beings on this planet which is aware, in part at least, of the cosmic process.

The sciences, with infinite pains, have revealed how the present has been evolved out of the past. Although so many things are still unknown ; although the sciences have hardly touched the fringe of the problems of existence itself, of life and mind, and of the Cause moving in the universe ; still we perceive, at least in part, the method that pervades the whole. Glimpses had been caught of it in earlier times by some precursors in the realm of thought ; but only in our own era has it been made manifest, for the instruction of all mankind.

And, little by little, man has been building up the record of his own experience. He is now able, if he will, to draw lessons from it. He may learn, if he will, how his civilisations

have grown, what has helped them and what has hindered. The development of language, of writing, of printing, has made possible the record itself, and its transmission from one generation to another. Libraries are the collective memory of mankind. We have at hand the materials for our own instruction. Evolution there has always been. Now, for the first time, there may be Conscious Evolution.

Living creatures have indeed, from the beginning, helped their own development. "It is bad biology," says Sir James Arthur Thomson, "to think of the struggling organisms as necessarily like fishes in a net ; they often share in their own evolution, selecting their environment, for instance, as well as being selected by it." And this, of course, holds true especially of human beings. But no creature other than man is able to share in the process of evolution with deliberate intention, and man has become able to do so only now. The moulding of our destinies hitherto has been almost wholly at the hands of what Professor Whitehead calls "senseless agencies." Amazing has been the advance already achieved by methods that have been fortuitous. "A blind man," it has been said, "may hit the target ; but how many arrows wasted !" The advance may be swifter and more assured now that we have begun to know its conditions.

In no spirit of diffidence or humility need we approach our tasks, now in this their new setting. Nor need there be pessimism as to the prospect, ultimately, of accomplishing them. If, as we now know is the case, unconscious evolution has enabled animals to be the prototypes of simian man, and simian man of man in civilisation, there is no reason why conscious evolution should not raise us, and with vastly accelerated speed, to something as much higher again in the scale of being.

The principle of conscious evolution will naturally take account of three main factors : first, the physical basis of human life, that is the number and the quality of the human beings brought into the world ; secondly, their physical environment ; thirdly, their environment of ideas. We see, taking their places in an ordered scheme, the new science of eugenics, the work of the educationalists, industrial organisation, politics both national and international, all the branches of sociology. We see ethics entering in ; trying to find what things are good, what aims are worth pursuing ;

teaching that each society exists only to promote the perfection of its members, that each nation should help, not thwart, the efforts of the rest. Ethics sets the goal for politics and economics, for all the vast variety of activities which make up the seething life of the modern world.

Religion may powerfully co-operate. "The paramount virtue of religion," says Matthew Arnold, "is that it has *lighted up* morality; that it has supplied the emotion and inspiration needful for carrying the sage along the narrow way perfectly, for carrying the ordinary man along it at all." I remember Professor Einstein remarking once that, in his opinion, the present troubles of the world have come mainly from the fact that science has been advancing faster than morals; when morals caught up with science, then, he thought, we should enter upon happier times. The world cannot do without science, and ever more science; and he did not, of course, suggest that. But we shall probably agree that, at this moment, the more urgent need is on the side of ethics. Active minds in all countries would render useful service if they were to concentrate on that. Philosophy could help the world powerfully by giving it a system of practical ethics.

Grave as are the evils and formidable the dangers which confront mankind to-day, this is not the moment to lose heart. Least of all is this the moment to lose heart now that the clear vision is opening out before us of an evolution, intelligently directed, more rapid than ever before, bringing mankind forward into a far nobler civilisation than any that has yet been known; this is not the moment to let reason be overwhelmed by violence, for nations to sit cowering in the presence of some vaguely imagined, impending fatality, like a bird fascinated by an advancing snake. The ex-Crown Prince of Germany, in his Memoirs, wrote of the year 1914 as the time when "the enormous pressure of economic and political forces was uncontrollably driving the world towards the catastrophe of war." But the philosophic mind will not admit the reality of any such "forces." It will admit only the action or inaction, the right choice or the wrong choice, of individual men and women—rulers, legislators, citizens, in this country and that country and everywhere. They are themselves the "forces"; and they are not uncontrollable. They are controllable by their own wills. Individual men and

women—whether Crown Princes or common citizens—must not be allowed to evade their proper responsibilities by the invention of mystical, undefinable, abstract "forces," all-pervasive but uncontrollable, in whose grip they declare themselves to be powerless. The snake before which the nations of Europe are cowering in terror does not exist. Their nerves shaken by experiences of the recent past and dread of the immediate future, they suffer the hallucinations of a political *delirium tremens*. It is high time to cease the talk of a fatality which is bringing us all to disaster, a fatality which is irresistible, strive as we may. The notion is the merest superstition, without foundation or substance, but a superstition of a pestilent and dangerous kind. For such beliefs, if widely held, sometimes bring about their own fulfilment.

The militarism which is predominant in some countries to-day is nothing but a surrender. Under the guise of bravery, with all the panoply of gallant adventure, it is really an abject desertion of the cause of civilisation. Militarism is defeatism in the moral sphere. Precisely because it has become predominant here and there, the call is the louder for resistance to it. There was never a more ignominious maxim than that expressed in the often-quoted lines in Addison's *Cato* :

When vice prevails, and impious men bear sway,
The post of honour is a private station.

If ever a private station is a post of dishonour, it is when vice prevails; if ever the duty of public action is urgent upon the citizen, it is when impious men bear sway.

Let us not, however, put too high the evils and the dangers, real as they are, of our times. I suggested at the outset that there is another side, not to be omitted. The countries where an arbitrary or militarist philosophy is supreme are still a small minority in the civilised world. In Great Britain and throughout the British Dominions, in France, in the Scandinavian countries, in Belgium, Holland and Switzerland, in the United States and most of the countries of Central and South America, other ideas prevail of civic freedom and international duty. And in the economic sphere, the average standard of living, taking mankind as a whole, has certainly been higher in our own times than it has ever been in the course of history. The fact is little consolation, it is true, to individuals who find themselves destitute; yet great gains have in fact been won, and

we should be cautious of engaging in desperate measures which might destroy them. We have succeeded in fending off the two great scourges of all earlier ages: famine and plague. We have succeeded in harnessing the forces of nature so effectively that our problem is less the maintenance of production than the efficient direction of distribution. If there is violence, let it be remembered that violence is no new thing. Political assassinations did not begin in 1914. Rather what is new is the widespread revolt of sane men against the spirit of violence. If disasters bulk large in our daily reading, let it be remembered that modern means of communication make us aware immediately of every misfortune in every part of the globe. And it is right that we should give attention to them, while seeing them in their proper relation. Rightly concentrating our attention upon the abnormal, we may be inclined to under-estimate the normal. We must see world conditions as a whole.

Those are the lines, perhaps, on which may emerge the guidance for which the new generation is eager. There may yet be revealed the vision without which the people perish. We may hold the faith that Philosophy, together with her sisters Religion and Science, will yet succeed in pointing the paths along which man should move—now for the first time with a consciousness of what he is doing and where he is going. They are paths that shall lead towards a society better than that about us—in which there shall be dignity as well as activity in private life, simplicity in manners, beauty in environment, majesty in the State and tranquillity in the world.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF MANCHURIA.

THE hospitality and courtesy which are characteristic of the Japanese are put wholly at the service of their national programme, and the visitor to Tokyo finds that every effort is made to prepare his mind to view favourably recent policy in the North Eastern Provinces. Language is attuned to the modern note, and what has happened, is happening and will or may happen is all described as being in fulfilment of a "Mission" in "East Asia"—a line of defence possibly intended as a counterweight to the obvious moral claims of Geneva decisions.

The least attractive apologists of this view are the numerous pro-Japanese foreigners in the Treaty Ports who use their privileges in China to support the cause of her adversaries. The Japanese, however, provide many of their own who speak always with charm and often with a *naïveté* which is caused by increasing isolation from world opinion.

Last summer there was no through service from Peking to Mukden and this compelled a very welcome halt for a few hours at Shanhaikwan. Here at once a Colonel was available to explain his Government's Mission of Peace and his own particular task of promoting goodwill on this frontier. When we reached Mukden itself, we encountered an officer whose special duty had long been to act as advocate among foreigners of Japanese aims. General Dohihara was evidently prepared to receive visitors and a shorthand note was taken of the whole of our conversation. It had been a hard task, he said, to drive out the Chinese forces and banish the greed and mismanagement of the War Lords. How happy now were the peaceful residents to find themselves under a strong Government. He instanced, for example, the currency unified and stabilised as one of the earliest fruits of the new order. But General Dohihara spoke also of the imponderables. The West understood neither China nor Japan. Japan was the natural leader of the East and then, anticipating what we were to hear later from the Prime Minister of the country, the General said something of the Kingly Way, a culture essentially Oriental, based on the civilisation of China but adapted to modern needs. He added—and this note was struck time and time again—that Japan was saving China from the

menace of Communism, which was eating its way in, alike through the Western provinces and Kiangsi. It was impossible not to be impressed.

The journey from Mukden to Hsinking threw light on a rather more mundane aspect of the Japanese connection. It was the Sunday afternoon express and the second-class coach was crowded. The sixty-four seats were all occupied, but only fourteen by Chinese. The rest of the passengers were Japanese, apparently commercial men. They carried innumerable bags, some of which from time to time were opened to display laces, scents, or articles of more practical use, like hose or underwear. It is hard to define in a word the general mien of the travellers on this hot and crowded journey, but perhaps it could be described by saying that they looked like a number of buyers who were going down to a land auction. Beaming, straw-hatted, perspiring, they were laying out maps on their knees, peering at the names of the stations passed, using field-glasses on more distant objects and expressing in every way the pervasive, possessive content of those about to become owners of a new property.

As Hsinking was approached signs of activity were redoubled. Masses of new brick houses came into view and on every side was evidence of the energetic work of those who are responsible for setting up the new Government. Mukden, like Harbin, profited from being in the zone of a foreign railway and has wide boulevards, nobly planned, and hotels and buildings of note. Hsinking, on the other hand, is new. A hundred years ago, when the first Chinese were beginning the cultivation of the ground, it was a hamlet, subject to Mongol princes. It was called then, and for a century after, Changchun. The approach of the Russian railway in 1899 gave importance to the village, and the conclusion of the war of 1905, after which Japan secured control south of Changchun, led to the building of the present city. Three fine avenues radiate from the railway station and the Yamato hotel.

On every side building is proceeding at a great speed. For the coronation of the Emperor P'u Yi in 1934 temporary structures were used, but he is to have a new palace. At present he is lodged in a Government office. The Foreign Office is in Chinese style and has an extensive Information Bureau, directed by Japanese. The Ministry of Education is in modern style and nearby is a bank and a great telegraph

office, which, with its aerials, will be one of the largest wireless installations in the East. As is so often the case in these parts, the construction generally shows evidence of hurry, but that at least is not true of one edifice—the most solid in the city—a brick building with turrets like those of the romantic castle of Nagoya. This barracks is intended to house the Kwantung Army. Whatever is to happen to Manchuria, Japan certainly has a stake in the country, for, in addition to a Government Loan, very large sums of private money have been sunk by the bankers in the construction of the new capital.

Japan's own justification of her Manchurian policy is of course not the necessity for the maintenance of national prestige in the face of "incidents," nor Chinese provocation, nor the imperfect fulfilment by China of undertakings entered into, often under duress. Japan has an imperial policy largely created by an economic problem. Her population increases by say 960,000 a year. They are capable and industrious people. Somehow they must be fed. Since they do not emigrate in large numbers, they must set up in their own islands a workshop for the East. A workshop requires sources of raw materials and markets for finished products. Manchuria meets both needs. Japan therefore conceives it to be her "natural right" and "egoistical duty" to confer upon the four north-eastern provinces the "blessings of settled and disciplined rule."

If precedent were needed, the Japanese find it in profusion in the history of colonial expansion during the last century. When they are told that the West has repented and has accepted a new Geneva standard, they merely smile and point to Ottawa with a sort of puzzled politeness. How can it be right for Britain to have privileged trade areas—they say—and wrong for Japan to do the same? But perhaps it would be more accurate to describe the relations between Japan and Manchuria not as being similar to those between Great Britain and the Dominions under the Ottawa agreements, but rather as illustrating the scheme of reciprocal and complementary trade originally envisaged in Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's imperial policy. Manchuria is to supply wool and cotton, so that in time neither the visits of Mr. Latham of Australia nor Delhi agreements will be of vital importance to Tokyo.

There remains, of course, the question of the tariff. The original position was that, in default of the acceptance by China of the "*coup*," the money actually received from Customs duties was put aside to meet the Manchukuo share of overseas indebtedness. Whatever the upshot of this piece of financial propriety, it was generally felt that, in the end, Manchukuo would be brought somehow into special tariff relations with Japan. In the same spirit, although in China Japan maintains her special privileges, she is contemplating the abolition of extra-territoriality in Manchukuo.

The West, of course, is eager to know how far her trade with what used to be a part of China will be affected. Technically, the new affiliation creates no change. Importers can import what they please and, in the case especially of proprietary articles, British goods appear to hold their former position. But all this ignores the dominant part in business which is played in a young and rapidly developing country by the Government and its associated enterprises. It is for this reason that many English commercial men in Japan and elsewhere favour recognition, for a foreigner who comes to Manchukuo to do business with a Government which is neither recognised by his own Government nor in official correspondence with his own Consular officers is working under a real disadvantage. French investors have already appeared on the scene, operating under joint trusts with the Japanese.

But those who urge recognition in order to promote trade ignore the key position held by the South Manchurian Railway. The S.M.R. is that section of the Russian line lopped off and handed to Japan as a result of her victory of 1905. But it is far more than a railway. It has a vast field of industry of its own. It has, for instance, the famous coal mine in which fifteen thousand Chinese coolies are employed; it has steel works, electrical works, gas works. To it has been confided the direction of the Manchukuo State Railways, i.e. the railways which were previously part of the Chinese system. Apparently the Chinese Eastern Railway will also come under the control of the South Manchurian board. But this organisation has a wider vision even than general industry. It aims at educational and security work. Assistance in seed selection, pig-raising and agricultural research generally are among the services it renders to the villages,

and in return it expects information which will facilitate the suppression of Chinese "bandits." Further, there are schemes for public health and a hospital train is being constructed, which will travel to different parts of the country where there are no hospital buildings and supplement the medical help boxes which are already to be found at many of the stations. In a word, it is true to say that the South Manchurian Railway is at least as important as the Manchukuo Government in the four provinces, and far more vital, from the point of view of the foreign trader. The Railway is under the direct control of the Tokyo Cabinet, to whom the Minister concerned submits the outlines of his policy for its working. It will be seen from all this that effectively the control of the new State is in Japanese hands; and perhaps even more in the hands of the Japanese army than of the civilian authorities.

No doubt the task of creating a government over so large an area would in any case have been very difficult, but the difficulties have been much magnified by the resistance of the inhabitants themselves and by the political necessity felt by Japan of creating an independent façade to conceal a Japanese State. It is not accurate to say that Japanese rule is desired generally by the inhabitants. On the contrary, many Chinese one meets go out of their way to make clear their opposition. When the Japanese speak of the orderly conditions under which they say farming and industry can nowadays proceed, the Chinese point to the fact that in their time millions eagerly flocked into the four provinces. The most obvious evidence of discontent is the banditry, in which there is probably not a large element of sheer criminality, but which is partly economic and partly patriotic. The actual number of offenders it is almost impossible to ascertain. In a sample month in 1934 in the province of Fengtien there were 33,000 bandits involved in 760 encounters and as many as 300 were moving about together. In those days the derailment, especially of goods trains east of Harbin, was common and special care had to be taken to prevent accidents to the west-going mail, which was to join the Trans-Siberian express.

Japan has had an immense task and has felt the strain severely. At a delightful entertainment given by some of the Manchukuo ministers and several Japanese officials it was stated that this was positively the first occasion on which

anything of a social character had been attempted; that hitherto the work had been so arduous as to resemble field service more than civilian administration.

In the light of Japanese belief in the success of their policy in Manchuria it is the most natural thing in the world to ask: Is this the end, or if not, what is to follow? What will be the course of the relations between Japan and China, and relations with what China? There are very many resident foreigners who, from temperament and natural political bias, would like to see Japan completely dominant in this field. They admire Japanese efficiency the more, as they themselves feel victims of the petty annoyances which come from being aliens in an ill-governed country. It is strange, however, to find this ardent support of Japan among the trading community, for one would have thought that, by now, the commercial lessons of Manchuria were pretty clear.

But apart altogether from what the diehards desire, remain the two questions: What does Japan wish? And, what is, in fact, likely to happen? A very well-informed and authoritative Japanese stated that he did not desire the dismemberment of Northern China and did not believe that it would occur. Others, as for instance General Dohihara, expressed the view that the Northern Provinces would hive off and form a government of their own, which would be friendly to Japan. Exactly what provinces would join was undefined, although one Japanese military officer thought that the Yangtze would be the southern boundary of the new area. It was natural, they all explained, that the people who were nearest to Manchukuo, seeing how excellently and peaceably that country was governed, should desire to make a similar experiment themselves.

If such a Northern China were formed, what would be the position of the Emperor P'u Yi? Some thought that he and his Manchu friends were very ambitious and determined to return to the home of his youth; others that Peking itself would naturally desire once again to become an imperial city on account of the prestige and trade that it would thus gain. On the other hand, General Dohihara stoutly rebutted the view that the Emperor would return and pointed out that, both in the case of Chang Tso Lin and in the case of his son, the inter-meddling of those concerned with Manchuria in purely Chinese affairs had only led to disaster. Pro-Japanese

British observers thought it quite natural that the Tokyo Government should put the Emperor back in the Forbidden City.

Such a policy, if pursued, might be represented as being anything from a sheer dismemberment of a neighbouring friendly State to the mere creation of a Chinese federation. According to this forecast the Nanking authorities would then concede to the federating units liberty to pursue such policy as suited their own needs, which in the case of the newly formed province would be one of friendliness to the dominant power in the neighbouring State of Manchukuo. Whatever form the new arrangement takes or however it is defended, it is certain that it will come as no surprise to the Chinese. Everyone, indeed, is expecting something of the kind, and the Chinese in the North certainly would not resist it.

One of the most difficult things to be understood by a League-minded tourist is the apparent passivity with which the defiance of the League has been accepted by all on the spot, and the general recognition of the domination of Japan. The Chinese view is not difficult to explain. Temperamentally they are essentially pacific, and more trouble in the North would inevitably involve the comfort, and even the safety, of the millions of Chinese farmers in Manchuria. But, further, China has absolutely no military means of resisting aggression of this kind. The pitiful collapse of the Northern forces before the Japanese army is still very much in their mind, and it is not merely in the North that Japan can work her will. China has a great coast-line and no navy; Japan is within striking distance and has a powerful navy. The assent accorded by the Western powers to the strong line taken by Japan in Shanghai has shown that, even in Treaty ports, she could put the screw on the Chinese Government. The Chinese complain that the provisions of the Boxer Protocol, which were intended to protect the Legation quarters in Peking, have been repeatedly used to assist foreign military aggression, which had nothing to do with the safety of diplomatic personages. But, however that may be, the fact is plain enough that China can offer no physical resistance to anything Japan may wish to effect—even the occupation of Peking itself. In view of this military weakness it is not surprising to find people so realist as the Chinese statesmen willing to meet Japan more than half-way. The cynical observer declares that they are

corrupted; or at least that the rulers of the North care nothing about Chinese nationalism so long as they keep their jobs; that they would be willing to act as chiefs of a new buffer State under Peking as others were found willing to act as leaders in Manchuria. This cannot be said of them all, for Marshal Feng has never ceased to express himself in the most violent way against the Japanese.

Some thoughtful Chinese even favour the official surrender of Manchuria, in order to spend time and energy in the reconstruction of the remainder of China. Probably they feel the strength of the argument that the example of peace and quiet in Manchuria will affect the neighbouring provinces, and consequently their advice is for China to pursue the work of internal reconstruction so as to set up a rival attraction.

The man who knows the answer to the riddle is General Chiang-Kai-Shek. Chinese nationalists of the Left, of course, accuse him of being in the pay of Japan. From time to time, indeed, he receives what must be very embarrassing praise from pro-Japanese sources. At the same time he has many things to think of. Strong talk is no good without strong action, and strong action in the North means weaker action in the centre against the Reds, which might cause misgiving to the Shanghai bankers, on whom for him so much depends.

China pursues her own politics in her own way and a keen and experienced critic made a very shrewd observation on the situation when he said: "Whatever the solution, it will be a Chinese solution." At the same time it is hard to believe that a great and gallant leader like Chiang is anything but intensely national in his heart. He is winning over the dissident or rebellious elements. He is training armies. He is educating the youth. He is awakening the National spirit. Surely it is not for the purpose of making his country a vassal of Japan. At the same time, as a realist he may have perforce to do much that will be misunderstood. What, for example, would Geneva and the world think if the Nanking Government itself should take the lead in the recognition of Manchukuo?

WEDGWOOD BENN.

N.B.—Messrs. Cassell are publishing shortly a book by Mr. and Mrs. Wedgwood Benn describing their recent world tour of which this Manchurian journey formed a part.

THE PROPOSED NEW PACT.

A FRENCH delegation, consisting of M. Flandin, the Prime Minister; M. Laval, the Foreign Minister; M. Léger, the Secretary-General to the Quai d'Orsay; M. Massigli, the Quai d'Orsay's expert on disarmament problems; M. Noel, the Secretary-General of the Cabinet, and M. Roussel-le-Roy of the Quai d'Orsay, arrived in London on the evening of January 31st. For three days thereafter they engaged in what became an apparently strenuous conversation with Mr. MacDonald, Sir John Simon, Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Eden about European security. The conversation was not, however, as strenuous as the clock seemed to suggest. On the busy second day for example (Saturday, February 2nd), after a full morning of expert work, the political delegates met after luncheon, talked till eight, adjourned till 9.30, and then talked till nearly midnight. But some of that time was, if not wasted, at any rate spent tautologically or irrelevantly to the business in hand. On the British side, neither Mr. MacDonald nor Mr. Baldwin spoke or understood French well enough to dispense with the service of Mr. Wigram, who interpreted for them; and on the French side neither M. Laval nor M. Noel understood a word of English, with the result that M. Margery of the French Embassy had to translate for them. Some of the time was spent in idle merriment, what time for example M. Laval embarked upon the riotous adventure of reading to the assembled delegates an English text of which the meaning was totally unintelligible to himself, and which his pronunciation made nearly unintelligible to his audience. In addition, they conformed to the usual procedure of all diplomatic conferences, whereby the politicians who make the running call frequent halts in order that the experts may be consulted on elementary points of fact; they often break away from the subject under discussion, pending the report of the said experts; and when the report duly arrives, have forgotten the context in which it was asked for, and have to start all over again. It is in short a mistake to assume that a diplomatic conversation between politicians of different countries is a uniformly businesslike or even enlightened affair. On this occasion, however, they seem to have wasted less time than is usually wasted, partly because the main premise from which they worked, namely Germany's equality

in armaments, was a thing prejudged and settled, partly because Sir John Simon, whatever be the shortcomings otherwise attributable to his diplomatic style, at any rate always speaks with a Latin precision which Frenchmen have no difficulty in understanding. Mr. Eden by contrast is normally regarded by French diplomatists as an intriguing, charming, but baffling oracle. He speaks, not Latin, but true polished English: to wit, he never finishes a sentence, always drops his voice before he gets to the point, never calls a spade a spade, makes his greatest emphasis by understatement, and approaches delicate issues by periphrases, idiomatic slang and gently suggestive, glancing litotes all of which to an English audience is both delicious and wholly clear, but which to a French politician is bewilderingly elusive.

The text of the agreement reached was issued on February 3rd, for publication on February 4th, and was telegraphed to Berlin, Rome and Brussels on February 3rd. It is a delightful document to study in the light of what one knows the French draughtsmen wanted to get in and what one knows the British draughtsmen wanted to leave out. Not that M. Flandin or M. Laval were inspired by any disconnected wish to dig at German feeling. On the contrary, they were most realistic and practical. It is not as a rule appreciated by British opinion outside the Foreign Office that the turn of a diplomatic phrase so as not to omit any aspect of Germany's past or present contribution to diplomacy is to Frenchmen a matter of first-rate importance. What one may perhaps call the Anthony Eden sweep of the hand, generously indicative of a willingness to let bygones be bygones, makes no appeal to French thought, which takes the more logical view that inasmuch as the present derives from the past, bygones never are bygones. In the second paragraph of the statement issued on February 3rd, the British and French Ministers "took note of the particularly important part played by the League of Nations in the recent settlements of certain international problems, and welcomed the successful results as evidence of the conciliatory spirit of all the Governments taking part in those settlements." There followed a recital of some of the achievements aforesaid, with particular reference to the Rome pact. The British and French Ministers then expressed the "hope that the encouraging progress thus achieved may now be continued by means of the direct and effective co-operation

of Germany. They are agreed that neither Germany nor any other Power whose armaments have been defined by the Peace Treaties is entitled by unilateral action to modify those obligations." By such preliminary phraseology the Frenchmen contrived to make the three points: (1) that the good Europeans were members of the League of Nations, (2) that Germany was not a member of the League of Nations, except in the technical sense that her notice of secession had not yet expired, and (3) that "unilateral" conduct by Germany was not to be tolerated. All those points were fair and good doctrine. Their recital tended to French rather than to British comfort, although British thought wholly agreed with them.

The kernel of the business to be done in London was how to reconcile Germany's *de facto* violation of the Treaty of Versailles with the "Allied" acceptance of the resultant facts, consistently with the salvation of the "Allied" face and the maintenance of diplomatic correctitude in form. Everybody knew that the solution to so apparently difficult a problem was easy enough. The comprehensive vagueness of the League of Nations Covenant is equal to most such emergencies. The solution was obviously to be found in Article 19 of the Covenant, or in other words in Germany's return to Geneva. This is how the official statement expressed it: "The French and British Ministers are further agreed that nothing would contribute more to the restoration of confidence and the prospects of peace among nations than a general settlement freely negotiated between Germany and the other Powers. This general settlement would make provision for the organisation of security in Europe, particularly by means of the conclusion of pacts, freely negotiated between all the interested parties, and ensuring mutual assistance in Eastern Europe and the system foreshadowed in the Rome *procès-verbal* for Central Europe. Simultaneously, and in conformity with the terms of the Declaration of December 11th, 1932, regarding equality of rights in a system of security, this settlement would establish agreements regarding armaments generally which, in the case of Germany, would replace the provisions of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles at present limiting the arms and armed forces of Germany. It would also be part of the general settlement that Germany should resume her place in the League of Nations with a view to

active membership. The French Government and the Government of the United Kingdom trust that the other Governments concerned may share these views."

A specific cause of concern to French official thought ever since 1918 has been the unwillingness of the British Government to enter into a commitment to participate in European "sanctions." The League of Nations Covenant obligation in that sense was too vague, and its value was not only further damaged but was transformed into something arguably near to a danger to the peace, by America's failure to join the League. The whole efficacy of the Covenant in that part of it which aimed at the maintenance of peace by a system of mutual assistance was based upon the assumption that America would be a party to the general obligation. As that assumption was belied, the Covenant in that aspect became an equivocal instrument. That circumstance has for the most part explained the restless accumulation of pacts of non-aggression, friendship and mutual assistance which have been one of the astonishing features of post-war European diplomacy. In its turn the Locarno Treaty had no sanction. The Rome Pact has no sanction. To French minds there has been a gap, a dangerous gap, in the post-war European system of security. Mr. Baldwin's famous discourse upon the air danger has in the last year or two created in French minds a growing hope that the British appreciation of the modern aeroplane as a factor in war might provide the key wherewith British minds might be opened to the need of a European sanction. Much activity has been devoted by the Quai d'Orsay to an encouragement of British opinion in that sense. The participation of British troops in the Saar police force was regarded in Paris as of good augury. The agreement concluded on February 3rd seemed to reap the first fruit of French hopes. The relevant passage of the official statement reads thus: "In the course of these meetings the British and French Ministers have been impressed by the special dangers to peace created by modern developments in the air, the misuse of which might lead to sudden aerial aggression by one country upon another, and have given consideration to the possibility of provision being made against these dangers by a reciprocal regional agreement between certain Powers. It is suggested that the signatories would undertake immediately to give the assistance of their air forces to whichever of them might be the

victim of unprovoked aerial aggression by one of the contracting parties. The British and French Ministers, on behalf of their respective Governments, found themselves in agreement that a mutual arrangement of this kind for Western Europe would go far to operate as a deterrent to aggression and to ensure immunity from sudden attacks from the air; and they resolved to invite Italy, Germany and Belgium to consider with them whether such a convention might not be promptly negotiated. They earnestly desire that all the countries concerned should appreciate that the object of this proposal is to reinforce peace—the sole aim pursued by the two Governments."

On the evening of February 3rd, before the ink was dry on the official statement, Sir John Simon broadcast a popular explanation of its meaning, which left no doubt that in his mind the essence of what had been done was the proposal that the Western European Powers should guarantee each other against air attack, by a Locarno type of mutual assistance. He gave a long exposition, first of the circumstance that air attack could be launched almost instantaneously, whereas armies have to be mobilised and moved, and navies have to be concentrated and moved; second, of what precisely was meant by A and B going to the immediate assistance of C, if C were attacked by D. Sir John's expository style is almost too elementary and repetitive for grown-up people. He rounded off his lesson by this reflection: "Those rules are the most certainly observed which it does not pay anyone to break, and if it were known that an unprovoked aerial aggression by any one of the four would immediately bring upon the wrong-doer the air forces of the others, is it not probable that this would very greatly increase the likelihood of no such aggression ever taking place at all?" After repeating the whole exposition in another form, he went on, in the eternal spirit of British diplomacy, to ask and to answer the question whether the British Government was thereby entering into a new commitment. For once he therein must have disappointed whatever French listeners heard him, probably because on that occasion he was not concerned about his French listeners, but only about what he called "every man and woman in a British home." He said: "Now you may ask, 'This is an interesting idea well worth thinking over, but has the British Government between Friday night and Sunday night tied

this country to an entirely novel scheme of which very few people have heard more than a few days ago?' The answer is: 'Certainly not'." What seems to be certain is that French opinion valued the London agreement only because the proposal, if accepted, would constitute a new British commitment. Any British Government is so terrified of European commitments, which always become a deadly election weapon in the hands of the Opposition, that if it does decide upon such a commitment it does so on the severe understanding that it is not really a new commitment at all. That is very British, and very confusing to French thought. There seems to be no difficulty in establishing the fact that if the London proposal were agreed by the other Powers of Western Europe, and became a binding contract, the British Government would in effect have taken upon itself a new obligation. The relevant passages of the Security Pact embodied in the Locarno Treaties read thus: "Article 4—(1) If one of the High Contracting Parties alleges that a violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or a breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations. (2) As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present Treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed. (3) In case of a flagrant violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or of a flagrant breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the High Contracting Parties, each of the other Contracting Parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the Party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless the Council of the League of Nations, which will be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its findings, and the High Contracting Parties undertake to act in

accordance with the recommendations of the Council provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the Parties which have engaged in hostilities."

It almost passes the wit of man to assess what in practice would be produced by section 3 of Article 4 quoted above. On the one hand it clearly enough stipulates that in the event of a "flagrant violation" of Article 2 of the Locarno Treaty (whereby "Germany and Belgium, and also Germany and France, mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other") the contracting parties shall come "immediately" to each other's help. Even the word "immediately" is adequately defined, for the burden of deciding whether an aggression has been made is left to the victim of the aggression, who clearly would be immediate enough in reaching a decision. On the other hand it is stipulated that the Council of the League of Nations shall be "seized of the question" and that its findings shall become binding upon all the signatory parties to the Pact, *provided those findings be unanimously agreed* by the members other than those engaged in hostilities. Suppose a German aeroplane one morning dropped a bomb on Metz or Belfort. By the Locarno Treaty it is not clear to French minds that there would be an unequivocal commitment upon Great Britain immediately to send any forces in support of French defensive measures, and moreover, even if there were, the commitment could be met by the despatch of an expeditionary land force which would be hopelessly inadequate to the emergency, both because it would take a day or two to arrive (by which time an aggressive air force might have laid waste the whole of northern France) and because it would be useless when it did arrive. On the other hand, by the air convention proposed by the French and British Governments as a result of the recent London conversation, in such an emergency the British Government would be committed to send an air force at once to northern France, and that would take only a few hours. That is a proposal for a clearly new commitment.

Within twenty-four hours of Sir John Simon's London broadcast M. Flandin broadcast a statement from Paris. His estimate of what the London proposal would mean in practice was more precise than Sir John Simon's, and as befitted its French setting was more concerned to emphasise the novel

element which Sir John denied or belittled. After a preamble about Germany's *fait accompli* in having rearmed beyond the limits prescribed by the Treaty of Versailles, and about the expediency of preventing what might be the resultant race in armaments, he went on to explain what the London proposal meant in relation to the French postulate of sanctions in the form of an international police force. What he said is interesting because it fully expounds in a few words the eternal French view of European security and is worth remembering as a guide to the further conversations that are the object of the London proposal. He said: "For some years Germany has considerably increased her armaments. She has, in practice, thrown off part of the obligations placed upon her by the Versailles Treaty. In view of this *fait accompli* were we to resign ourselves to an armaments race, which, besides the burden it would place on the peoples, might be a danger for peace as soon as the equilibrium of armaments between two nations or groups of nations was broken? Did we, moreover, possess means to prevent this race? France sought in London to reinforce peace and to prevent war. We had first to reinforce the system of guarantees and mutual assistance which support the League Covenant. To the Locarno Treaty has been added the proposed Danubian Pact negotiated in Rome, and the proposed Eastern Pact. We noted with satisfaction the complete agreement and encouragement of the British Government in this policy. The British people are as convinced as our own that all these regional agreements must be embodied in the general Covenant of the League. We can, therefore, affirm together that the return of Germany to the League must form part of the general programme. The French belief in the necessity of an international police force may some day be accepted. Unfortunately we have not yet reached that point. But we have readily reaffirmed our wish to conclude a general convention, freely discussed, for the limitation of armaments, and we have declared that France, like Great Britain, remains faithful to the declaration of December 1932, on equality of rights within a system of security for all. We keenly hope that negotiations for the conclusion of this general arms convention may be reopened shortly. I hope that Germany will seize this opportunity to give proof of her desire for peace. That great nation must take a free and equal part in building up European security. In the troubled state

of the world it is not real security to live under the threat of aerial bombardment. This was a capital and urgent problem. We very quickly came to an agreement, and I may say that we are equally prepared to conclude precise engagements which will have the merit, hitherto not attained, of defining immediate action against war. The defenders of peace will no longer be paralysed by a procedure which might give a decisive advantage to the aggressor. The combined air forces of those who may have to defend peace should give them such evident superiority that no one will be tempted to abuse force." He described the London agreement as an "affirmation of a common Franco-British will to organise an alliance of pacific peoples as a barrier to air warfare" and estimated it to be "a decisive step on the road to peace."

After M. Flandin and M. Laval had returned to Paris all eyes were turned upon Berlin, where the fate of the proposal would necessarily be decided. On the very day following the announcement of the agreement Sir John Simon in the House of Commons announced (February 4th) that he had learnt from His Majesty's Embassy in Berlin that the head of the Press Department of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs had told Press correspondents that Germany would regard the London proposals as a basis for negotiations. Herr von Köster, the German Ambassador in Paris, was in Berlin while the London conversations were in progress, and returned to Paris on February 7th with evidence that seemed to give hope to the Quai d'Orsay. On February 6th Herr Hitler cancelled all the receptions that had been arranged for the following ten days on the ground that he wished to concentrate upon "important political discussions," which object was generally understood to be simply the discussion of the London proposal. He spent the following week-end in the country home in the mountains near Berchtesgaden, where he habitually retires to think over important decisions. It became known that one of the criteria he applied to the London proposal was its probable effect upon the adequacy of German armaments to meet a potential danger from Russia, whose armaments have expanded in recent years to vast proportions. Those who are inclined to become excited over the supposed evil of the private manufacture of armaments might at any rate ponder the classic example of the country where armaments, in common with every form of production, are in the

Government's unfettered hands. Private firms do not manufacture armaments unless they make a profit. Their output is therefore limited by the demand. The human intellect is so chaotic that some people, sincere and earnest people, regard it as immoral that profit should be made out of the manufacture of armaments. Yet they do not seem to be worried by what appears to other, equally sincere and earnest, people as the nightmare of a government being given a monopoly in the manufacture of armaments, untroubled by any but political motives as to output. As wars are political, and as they are waged by governments, there seems to many people to be as much sense in giving a monopoly in armaments manufacture to governments as there would be in investing gangsters with the monopoly of manufacturing machine-guns, so that forsooth no private profit should be made out of the gangster's equipment. As for Herr Hitler's concern about the Russian danger to Germany in the event of Germany's entering into a European system of security based upon a limitation of armaments, his difficulty baffles the imagination. By the very hypothesis of that system, it would be framed within the League of Nations. Russia is a member of the League of Nations, and Russia therefore would be an equal party to any scheme of armaments limitation resulting from the Anglo-French proposal. And it would be an element of the scheme that the execution of the convention for arms limitation would be supervised and controlled by the parties in general. To the plain man who is not versed in the elementary quality of high diplomacy, the sort of difficulty in international affairs that exercises the fears of governments seems nearly unbelievable. There were French influences which seized upon the hope that Germany would refuse the London proposal with the agreeable result that the British Government would thereupon have no alternative but to conclude an Anglo-French defensive alliance directed (defensively) against Germany. Those influences were perturbed when it was suggested, within five days of the conclusion of the London agreement, that Sir John Simon should visit Berlin in person to discuss the German attitude to it. At the time when this paper was written Germany's attitude had not been officially disclosed, although the available indications increasingly suggested that it would be favourable. The two other interested parties both indicated their willingness to discuss the proposal with a view

to putting it into operation. The Belgian Government on February 12th went so far as to request the British and French Ambassadors to inform their governments that Belgium was willing to be a party to the proposed air pact, which in the opinion of the Belgian Government would strengthen the security of Western Europe. The Italian Government on February 10th made known its acceptance of the proposal "in principle" subject to considerations peculiar to Italian circumstances, unspecified. The Italian statement, issued officially on that day, read thus: "Responsible Italian circles have followed with great attention the conversations held recently in London between the French and British Governments, conversations of which the Italian Government have been kept closely informed. These Italian circles look with favour on the final declaration upon the conversations as a whole, and they consider that in it is contained the possibility of an understanding with Germany and consequently the opening of a period of collaboration between the Powers interested. In regard more particularly to the aerial pact of mutual assistance, the position of Italy will be established very shortly in the sense of an adhesion in principle, subject to consideration of the special situation of Italy as regards Great Britain and *vice versa*. Responsible Italian circles have noted with satisfaction the standpoint adopted by Great Britain in regard to the independence of Austria and the Franco-Italian agreements of January 7th."

It seemed probable by the middle of February that the British, French, German, Italian and Belgian Governments would in due course confer upon the proposal made by the French and British Governments on February 3rd; that in short, for the first time since Herr Hitler took office, there was a chance of an understanding in Western Europe.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

February 15th, 1935.

OVERCROWDING—A BAD BILL.

THE object of the new Housing Bill is to cure overcrowding by the provision of low-rented accommodation in the places where it is most urgently needed; this aim is so admirable and so much in harmony with the spirit of the times that the reception given to the Bill has been of the most flattering kind. Even in quarters not usually favourable to the principle of subsidy, criticism has been modified or absent because of the consciousness that public opinion to-day requires drastic action in housing, let the cost be what it may. Unfortunately closer examination of the Bill does little to confirm the hopes of a speedy end to overcrowding, but does on the other hand arouse misgiving as to its effect on the existing slum clearance campaign. For the changes proposed in the established law and practice of clearance and compensation are such as to render inevitable greatly increased expense and delay, if indeed they will not in some cases make clearance procedure so difficult as to become inoperative.

The first major criticism of the Bill must be on the score of its failure to provide a really national housing plan. Slum clearance and overcrowding are still to be treated as two separate and distinct problems on purely local lines, and the whole trend of the Bill is towards centralisation and increased congestion rather than—as it should and might have been—in the opposite direction. The laudable desire to house the worker at a low rent near his work has inspired the adoption of a form of subsidy which can hardly fail to act powerfully in raising land values in the central areas and to defeat its own object. Population attracts industry because it provides labour and because it offers a market for the products. The presence of industry and a market in turn attract more population, and ever higher land values are produced in a vicious spiral. Every housing subsidy specially allocated to central areas is open to the objection that by making it easier to secure labour there it draws industry into those areas, and so increases the very congestion which necessitated the granting of the subsidy in the first place. The sliding-scale subsidy, whereby the higher the price paid for a housing site by the Local Authority the greater will be both the Exchequer grant and the rate contribution, cannot fail to accentuate that

process to an especial degree. Accepting, as we must, the building of blocks of flats and consequent subsidies as inevitable in certain cases, the aim should be to limit both as far as possible and to do what can be done to set decentralising tendencies in action.

The emphasis in the Bill, however, is all on centralisation; the sliding-scale subsidy for flats on expensive sites is automatic, subject of course to the approval of the Minister. The subsidy for building “otherwise than in flats on sites of high value” is made far more difficult to obtain. The Minister must first be satisfied that “having regard to the amount of the expenditure already incurred or to be incurred by the Authority under the enactments relating to housing in relation to the financial resources of the district, the provision of such accommodation would impose an undue burden on the district,” and if so satisfied, he *may* allow a subsidy of not more than £5 a house for a period not exceeding twenty years. There is here indicated an intention to carry out the closest scrutiny of every scheme put up; and the amount and term of the subsidy are to be regarded as being respectively the maximum, to be allowed in whole or in part as may seem proper to the Minister in each individual case. No one knows what “an undue burden” means, and no Local Authority will be able to count on this subsidy for any cottage housing scheme which it may prepare. Bearing in mind that it is only where land is very cheap that houses can be built to let at sufficiently low rents without subsidy, and bearing in mind also that even the new subsidy for flats is far less generous than that provided for similar schemes under the 1930 Act, it becomes evident that the Bill holds no prospect of the speedy erection of the vast numbers of low-rented houses which form the prime need of the working-class population to-day.

To attempt slum clearance without simultaneously attacking overcrowding by extensive new building was to put the cart before the horse; and now to concentrate on flat-building in the centre, to the practical exclusion of everything else, is to jam the cart so firmly back to front as to make it impossible ever to get the horse between the shafts. Had the balance at least been held even between building at the centre and decentralisation the policy might possibly have been less open to attack. But the weighting of the scales in favour of centralisation can only perpetuate at vast public expense the very

evils which it is sought to avoid. Not housing problems alone but transport and planning are involved. The time is ripe for a great national reconstruction plan; decentralisation of industry and population together is urgently needed and could be organised. Factories and workpeople could be encouraged to move out together to new areas; not only could the people so be housed at low rents near their work; but, with reduced congestion, values at the centre would tend to fall instead of rise, transport problems would be eased and public improvements such as street widening, provision of open spaces and replanning would be facilitated instead of being made more difficult and more expensive.

The second major point on which the Bill is unsound is its abandonment of the principle, established in the housing legislation of this country so long ago as 1890, that an owner of house property condemned as unfit for human habitation shall not receive as compensation anything more than the value of the cleared site. The Bill makes two departures from this principle; the first intended to avert an injustice, possible under existing law, to an owner whose fit property might have been condemned merely on account of its "bad neighbours," and the second to mitigate the severity of a clearance order in the case of property which, while properly condemned as insanitary, has nevertheless been "well maintained." A third departure from existing law is the repeal of the "reduction factor" by which the purchase price of a site compulsorily acquired for re-housing by a Local Authority has relation to its value for housing purposes only, rather than to its value in a free market. Whatever may be said in favour of the repeal of the reduction factor, the two other alterations have nothing to commend them. It is admitted that the "bad neighbour" provision has not in fact been a cause of injustice because Ministerial decisions have prevented it; all that could be gained by the proposed change would therefore be to prevent possible miscarriage of justice in the future.

But the words in which the amendment is expressed seem to go further than is needed merely to fulfil the intention to bring the law into conformity with existing practice. The point turns on the words "bad arrangement" and it seems likely that badly arranged, unfit property of a kind common both in London and the provinces which is rightly subject

to clearance under the old wording will escape its just fate under the new. In that event clearance of such property will only be possible by way of compulsory acquisition at market value; this will render clearance not only more expensive and laborious but also far more difficult for the Local Authority, for once "bad arrangement" of the individual house, apart from sanitary defects, goes by the board as a ground for clearance it becomes easy to argue that repair, not demolition, is the proper procedure for a Local Authority to follow. The greater the chance of his schedule of condemned houses being reduced as the result of the local enquiry, the longer a Medical Officer of Health will hesitate to represent a clearance area, especially when he serves a Local Authority not sympathetic to housing reform. Proceedings at local enquiries are already apt to be unreasonably protracted; the proposed amendment will give scope for endless further obstruction by the slum landlord and his clever lawyers, and clearance procedure will be seriously impaired. Even more objectionable, if that be possible, is the wording of the new allowance to be made in respect of "well maintained" property. Bearing in mind that the property in this case must have been properly condemned on account of sanitary defects, the suggestion that it can have been well maintained reads like a contradiction in terms. The number of cases in which a literal application of the provision could be made would be so small as to be negligible. The intention is to discriminate between the owner who has done little or nothing by way of repair, and the one who has done his best to maintain property admittedly unfit for human habitation. Another door is opened wide to endless discussion at local enquiries in the effort of owners to make a case for consideration and here again the added expense and delay will be great.

Summing up the compensation changes, whereas under the 1930 Act the condemning authority has the whip hand, under the new law the property owner will be master of the situation. To get this matter in proper perspective it is essential to distinguish between injustice and hardship. Injustice theoretically possible under existing law did not happen; and hardship is as inevitable in the case of property as of any other commodity which by change of fashion has become out of date and unsaleable, or like bad housing is condemned by reason of the rising standard rightly demanded by

public opinion. The hardship to a widow whose sole means consisted of rents from property which has been rightly condemned is very evident, but there is there no injustice. Hard cases notoriously make bad law and the real moral is that the small owner of working-class property, not possessed of sufficient resources to establish proper sinking funds and reserves, is highly undesirable both in the public interest and his own. Nor is it in the public interest that the owner of worn-out and old-fashioned property, be he conscientious or the reverse, should profit at the public expense merely because of the acute and continuing housing shortage. This was the principle which inspired the Rent Restriction Acts and there is no reason whatever for any departure from it. As the Minister of Health has himself observed, the owner of an unfit house must expect to have it condemned, just as much as the owner of diseased meat. There should be no departure from that salutary principle.

It is regrettable that the Bill fails to provide more effectively for any form of ownership, other than municipal, for the large number of working-class houses which must be built before overcrowding can be cured. That the Government are alive to the possible dangers of an immense extension of municipal ownership of houses is indicated by the provision under which a Local Authority may transfer the management of its housing estates to a Housing Management Commission. But the arrangement is permissive and no one who is familiar with local government in this country will expect to see it put into effect to any considerable extent. The more hopeful method would have been by the encouragement of the Public Utility Society movement, but the provisions on this subject, like those in regard to Management Commissions, will be ineffective to secure the desired object; at the same time both will be hotly attacked by the Socialist opposition. A central housing association may be recognised and a contribution made to its expenses if it is established for the purpose of promoting the formation of housing associations and of giving them advice and assistance. But the power to give the only form of assistance which is really required, namely the power of the purse, is withheld from the central association, and a local association is left utterly dependent on the willingness of the Local Authority to co-operate.

Housing powers of every kind including reconditioning can

at their option be delegated by the Local Authority to the local association and the appropriate subsidy transferred, but such arrangements will not become generally operative any more than the Housing Management Commissions and for the same reason. Without the goodwill of its Local Authority an association will be powerless, and even with the fullest possible measure of assistance its finance will still be on a basis at least one-quarter per cent. less favourable than that of the Local Authority. The voluntary housing movement, representing all that is best in private enterprise in housing, is deliberately kept in a position of hopeless inferiority, and the opportunity, visualised by the Moyne Committee, of creating a great national housing movement on voluntary lines, working parallel to and in harmony with the housing efforts of the Local Authorities, is allowed to pass.

Turning now to the more constructive features of the Bill, the survey of overcrowding is unlikely to take less than a year to carry out if it is thoroughly done, including such measurement of individual rooms as will enable the prescribed standard to be enforced. In the Metropolitan area alone two hundred additional whole-time sanitary inspectors will probably be required for twelve months. But the result will be valuable and should enable the needed number of new dwellings to be more closely estimated than has yet been possible. The establishment for the first time of a legal standard of overcrowding is a matter of great importance, and the basis adopted is interesting. Overcrowding standards have usually been based on floor space per person or air space per person. The Bill for the first time will place a legal limit on the number of persons per room in combination with a standard of floor space. There is also a proviso as to "indecent occupation," i.e. occupation of the same sleeping room by persons of opposite sex over ten years of age other than persons living together as man and wife. The resulting scale is probably as high as is possible, having regard to the object in view, which is of course not to indicate what is desirable, but to prescribe a standard, the infringement of which will be an offence. The standard is mitigated in that a child under ten is counted as half a person, and a baby under one is not counted at all. It will be possible for a father, mother, and three children under ten to occupy two rooms, and a father, mother, and up to seven children under ten, three rooms, without being

legally overcrowded, provided the rooms are not under 110 square feet. Where, however, the age of all the occupants is over ten, the maximum number of persons in two rooms will be three, and in three rooms, five. The standard prescribed differs from the well-known "Manchester standard" in that every room may count as a bedroom; habit differs greatly in different parts of the country in the matter of beds in the living-room, and it may be found necessary to provide a measure of flexibility in the application of the standard, e.g. as between London and the provinces. The standard is to take effect from a day to be appointed; without a great deal more accommodation than is at present available it would of course be quite unenforceable.

The other constructive feature of the Bill is the "Re-development Area." The difference between the Improvement Area of the 1930 Act and the Re-development Area is that the former deals with areas in which re-conditioning by and at the expense of the owner is the appropriate remedy for most of the houses, while in the latter the emphasis is on purchase by the Local Authority. Re-conditioning is certainly not ruled out in a Re-development Area, but it might have to be done by the Local Authority after purchase. For the Bill says the area should be "re-developed as a whole," and the Local Authority is to prepare a plan "indicating the land intended to be used for the provision of houses for the working classes, for streets, and for open spaces, and generally the manner in which it is proposed that the defined area should be laid out."

It is undeniable that the whole tendency of modern housing thought and legislation is in the direction of the transfer to public ownership of working-class property. That road was pointed by the Moyne Committee, and will have to be followed sooner or later. The Re-development Area is therefore a move in the right direction, but ought to have been accompanied by adequate opportunities for what the Moyne Committee called quasi-public ownership, i.e. through the housing associations. The greatest drawback to the present proposal is that the centralising tendency of the Bill, as well as the terms on which the property is to be acquired, will render the acquisition so expensive for the Local Authority as to be prohibitive. If the Local Authority is to become the purchaser of large areas in the centre of all large

towns, policy should obviously be directed towards lowering values rather than to raising them, as the Bill does. Nor is it logical that the creation of the Re-development Area should involve the repeal of the Improvement Area.

The Re-development Area bears much more resemblance to a Clearance Area containing a proportion of comparatively sound properties than to an Improvement Area, and the last-named procedure should be retained as an alternative to re-development. Incidentally by repealing the Improvement Area the Bill deprives towns of under 50,000 inhabitants of any area treatment but that of clearance. The Improvement Area is no doubt repealed because displacements under it carry 1930 Act subsidy, and it is desired to substitute the less expensive subsidy provided by the new Bill. If so, this is not compatible with the declaration that the 1930 Act subsidy, although unnecessarily high, is retained in order to play its part in the pool to be created by consolidation. In point of fact it is only in isolated cases taken by themselves that the 1930 Act subsidy is unnecessarily high; with proper application over large areas it is no more than sufficient to achieve its object, and the new subsidies are regarded by the Local Authorities as too low for the purpose for which they are intended.

To sum up, the Bill is bad, because it is conceived on local not national lines; it encourages centripetal instead of centrifugal forces; it makes slum clearance more difficult and more expensive; it fails to create a working alternative to municipal ownership; and admirable as is the suggestion of a national standard of overcrowding, the idea is likely to remain ineffective because, in the absence of the needed supply of dwellings, the "appointed day" may never arrive.

BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH.

A SAAR CLOSE-UP.

IN the sense of news value the Saar Question died with the publication of the votes cast in the plebiscite and will be buried on the day upon which this article appears, since German rule will formally replace that of the League Commission on March 1st, 1935. The economic aspect of the transfer has presented no insuperable difficulty, and the last arrangements about old officials and a new currency are now being made. But the very silence of the daily reporter since January 15th justifies an attempt, on the part of more serious students of international affairs, to point the moral and adorn the tale. To those who had the opportunity to watch its development in detail, the whole incident was generously instructive with regard to the drafting of treaties and the holding of plebiscites, and with regard to nationalist emotions and internationalist experiments.

On returning to England I found that everyone was accepting the ninety per cent. vote for Germany as a perfectly genuine outburst of patriotism. "How wrong you all were who spoke of seventy per cent.!" people seemed everywhere to be saying. Now the extraordinary thing is that some of us have the effrontery to maintain that we were not wrong, and I think it worth while to make this demonstration of obstinacy, in the interests of historical accuracy and in those of the accuracy of future plebiscites. Of course there was tremendous nationalist feeling in the Saar, enough to overcome much dislike of Hitlerism; there often exists, moreover, a danger that the foreign observer will under-estimate the strength of the more primitive emotions around him. But I still believe that if the plebiscite could have been magically anticipated by a week, the vote for Germany would have been in the neighbourhood of seventy per cent. One did not need to be a highbrow visitor to think this, for the private opinion of many Nazis was the same. "I don't want my windows broken," a chance acquaintance whispered to me, as he put up his flags when the results came out.

The Treaty of Versailles had made the Council of the League responsible for the "freedom, secrecy and trustworthiness of the voting." In view of the unrivalled capacity of National Socialism in the matter of reducing democratic methods *ad absurdum*, it had often been urged that the

plebiscite, to be valid, must be postponed. But the objections to delay were obvious, and the League had despatched a Plebiscite Commission to the Saar to conduct as fair a plebiscite as the times would allow. All along there was bound to be a certain conflict between those who were chiefly interested in the justice of the plebiscite and those who wanted to get the whole business over as quickly and quietly as possible; it would not be inaccurate to take Mr. Knox of the Governing Commission as representative of the first group, and M. Rodhe, the Swedish member of the Plebiscite Commission, as representative of the second. It was curious to observe a tendency for Anglo-Saxons and Latins to gravitate towards the Knox standpoint and members of the so-called Nordic nations towards the other. Throughout last autumn the preparatory organisation of the plebiscite made an impression as if justice—if a little roughened by expediency—were seriously intended. It was all the more unfortunate that the confidence created at this time was at the last moment betrayed. Many people had taken risks which only democratic standards could make worth while; at the last moment they found that the League of Nations, like Hindenburg, could betray democracy with the best of intentions.

The organisation of the plebiscite had to cover a threefold movement of 540,000 people. Voters who lived outside the Saar Territory had to be brought in, those who had changed their domicile within the Saar were constrained to travel back to the place where they had lived in 1919, and those who had remained stationary had to vote, not at the nearest polling station, but at the one which happened to cater for the letter of the alphabet with which their surname began. The first two movements were caused by the wording of the Peace Treaty, the third was an *ad hoc* device to give voters a greater sense of independence from their neighbours. With the arrangements for collecting and counting the votes everyone is familiar. Further precautions included a prohibition of any kind of expression of political opinion within the precincts of any polling station, and a notice in each *isoloir* guaranteeing the absolute secrecy of the vote.

From a constructive point of view, however, that is to say from the point of view of creating an apparatus for the accurate detection of the wishes of any people, the serious critic was faced all along with obvious faults in the machinery

provided by the Plebiscite Commission; its members were, of course, less familiar than the regular Governing Commission officials with the psychological tension created in the Saar by the Nazi Revolution in Germany. In the earlier stages it seemed extraordinary that no attempt was made towards a rough equalisation—as in any English election—of the money spent by each side upon propaganda. In theory the Saar plebiscite—unlike earlier plebiscites—presented the voters with a threefold choice. In practice the Saar plebiscite—unlike earlier plebiscites—involved a choice, not between two sovereign states, but between Germany and a medley of Hitler's opponents under the uneasy protection of the League, and all the resources of the German Ministry of Propaganda were pitted against virtually nothing. One side had all the wireless stations of Germany at its disposal; the other, occasionally driven by desperation to the Strasbourg microphone, was handling a boomerang, for the "Tools of France" cry was as injurious as silence. The Plebiscite Commission begged the Germans to give up the wireless for the last few days with so little success that on plebiscite day the Stuttgart station unblushingly broadcast that all the *status quo* leaders had fled in comfort, leaving "Vote for Germany" instructions for their followers. It is really obvious that the Plebiscite Commission could have very easily silenced the German stations by declaring that the League would regard further action as invalidating the result. In the same way the interference of the German (Catholic) Bishops, which was strikingly different from the perfectly neutral attitude of the Pope, might have been prevented. Under episcopal pressure, a number of priests preached their first pro-German sermons on the morning of January 13th.

Some of the difficulties were inherent in the situation, for some the Treaty of Versailles was directly responsible. There was no valid objection to the plan of the *status quo* people to vote themselves back into Germany later, yet the wording of the Treaty made it difficult to guarantee the possibility of this except by the informal method adopted by Laval, Litvinoff and Beneš in the League Council. It was pointed out to me by one legal expert that the "maintenance of the régime, established by the present Treaty" might well be interpreted as the maintenance of another fifteen years of League Government with another plebiscite at the end of them. What it

would really mean to vote for the *status quo* could not be perfectly clearly defined, but it need not have remained as obscure as it did. The Treaty was also responsible for the ludicrous fact that someone who had lived the last fourteen years in South America could vote, while someone who had spent the same period in the Saar, and wished to remain there, had no say at all in the fate of the Territory. The Treaty should also have made more definite arrangements for drawing up the lists of voters; this delicate operation need never have been left until an embittered plebiscite campaign was in full swing.

When all this has been said, one has not arrived much beyond the state of affairs which existed on the Sunday before the plebiscite, when the appearance of some 50,000 persons at the *Einheitsfront* rally implied, after all the nicest adjustments of calculation, a vote of over 125,000, or about twenty-five per cent. In the week that followed, the German Front in the Saar carried out such a rapid and decisive exploitation of the complacency of the Plebiscite Commission and of all the anomalies of the situation, as, in effect, to hold the plebiscite themselves. This sounds exaggerated, but indeed the plebiscite, when it came, seemed to be the close counterpart of Reichstag Elections in Germany since the National-Socialist régime has held them. The basis of what one might almost call the Nazi *coup d'état* (had it not been a more skilfully gradual process) was the disloyalty of the Saar police to the Governing Commission. Mr. Knox's reports to Geneva have long revealed the Nazification of his police to those who interested themselves in the problems of his rule. He was empowered last June to increase his in any case meagre police force by recruiting at home and abroad. This was an all but empty privilege; it was very difficult to find recruits; at home they were likely to be partisan, while the available foreigners would tend to have antecedents of a Black-and-Tan nature. Despite every obstacle, however, a very able ex-Prussian Socialist police officer called Machts, working in conjunction with the Englishman, Hemsley, created a *cadre* of reliable police, and gave the opposition a new sense of security. Hemsley was able and his men were devoted to him, but he was madly indiscreet in the cafés at night, and the trivial Justice incident in the middle of December was enough to necessitate his resignation. He was

succeeded as Chief of the Saar Police by a certain Major Hennessy. Exactly why this man allowed the German Front to take command between January 7th and the 13th may never be clear, but it was impossible not to notice the Nazi company he kept. The frontier between the executive authority of the Governing and Plebiscite Commissions was ill-defined. In the consequent confusion Hennessy apparently allowed things to happen without the knowledge of the ministers (Knox and Heimbürger) to whom he was responsible. The test day was the day upon which the first big batch of American voters arrived. Large Nazi crowds gathered at the station, which rapidly became the scene of an unlawful political demonstration; the mounted police, who could easily have dispersed the crowd without brutality, according to an expert with whom I spoke, looked on in acquiescence. The anti-Nazis protested, and the German Front, admonished by the authorities, issued one of those "glorious sacrifice" appeals to its followers to desist. Instead the Nazi youths of the *Ordnungsdienst** now appeared at the station with German Front armlets, in the character of auxiliary police, who not only took the incoming voters in charge, but also controlled journalists and officials; when the *Einheitsfront*, attempting a fresh demonstration of reciprocal rights, sent a few of its young men with armlets of their own to welcome arrivals, they were ordered by the police to wear their armlets inside out to prevent any danger to the public peace! On the Saturday night, the eve of the plebiscite, the *cadre* of reliable police was scattered, and Machts and Krumbach (a reliable colleague and, like Machts himself, a much-abused *émigré*) were, at about the same time, sent on leave. Anyone who knew conditions in the Saar had been made to feel uneasy, a few days earlier, by the news that the Plebiscite Commission had asked the local firemen all over the Territory to help police the polling stations; the *Gemeinde*, of course, had long since *gleichgeschaltet* their fire brigades. There was something very sinister in the air when Plebiscite Sunday dawned, and one knew that months of difficult police preparation for this very occasion had been prodigally thrown away, while inside the polling stations helmeted firemen, with Nazi fervour burning in their eyes, glared at the queues of voters.

Beneath an outward calm an hysterical fear was abroad.

* A kind of disguised S.A. troop; the S.A. and S.S. were of course forbidden.

It is very difficult to describe the state of mind which National Socialism can induce in the voter. Outside the polling stations there were now frankly Nazi policemen together with *Ordnungsdienst* youths, and inside and outside Red Cross people—also the nominees of Nazi officials. Everywhere the great *Reichspost* buses transported voters with the aid of German Front officials and endless Hitler salutes; already the opposition seemed to have vanished. In every inn the Stuttgart wireless recited eulogies of Germany or lies about the anti-Nazi leaders. It is rather horrifying to observe how people, who do not with their minds accept lies of this kind, can yet allow their behaviour to be affected by them. I was considerably impressed when a prominent anti-Nazi Catholic told me afterwards that the psychological pressure had been so great that he himself scarcely knew what he was doing when the moment came to vote; this was a man of courage and integrity.

It would not be just, either to Nazi technique or to the average voter, to omit all reference to some other features of the pre-plebiscite week. I saw some of the concentration-camp threats which were then distributed. Meanwhile the *Blockwarte* (German Front officials assigned to groups of flats) went round demanding to see voters' qualification papers; they took down all the particulars they saw, and hinted that it would, in consequence, be possible to trace each person's voting paper. Perhaps the most unfortunate occurrence was the preliminary polling on January 7th and 8th in which various categories of officials participated if they were likely to be on duty on January 13th. These votes, strictly speaking, might have been held to invalidate the result, since they occurred before the completion of the necessary fifteen years' period from the coming into force of the Peace Treaty on January 10th, 1920. Be that as it may, these votes, for which only a few polling stations were opened, were placed in envelopes bearing the registered numbers of the voters in order that they might be distributed to the proper urns on January 13th. All sorts of efficacious rumours were encouraged by this procedure—it was whispered that the voting papers were numbered, for example. The pre-plebiscite week thus provided suitable preliminaries for the actual day.

The Saar plebiscite was the occasion of an interesting

experiment in the use of an international police force which, one had hoped, would have counterbalanced the psychological effect of the Nazi manoeuvres. Undoubtedly the sending of the international force to the Saar put an end to the danger of a serious clash between the Powers concerned; it was all the more disappointing that the troops sent were too few, and some of the officers too simple, to serve any more complicated purpose. A single armed sentry of the International Force outside each polling station would have made all the difference on January 13th. But there were 862 polling stations; one sentry for twelve hours means three men plus a N.C.O. or an officer. The whole force could scarcely cover these requirements, and would, in any case, have been so scattered as to be out of action if any serious disturbance had arisen. It must further be recorded that the German Front had taken good care to be extraordinarily nice to the officers of the county regiments sent from England (surely the Brigade of Guards should have undertaken so delicate a job); these officers could soon tell one all about the common Nordic blood of England and Germany, and how the Nazis were good, patriotic, soldierly chaps and their opponents just a few dirty Bolshies. Even in the case of the Italian soldiers who were a real *élite* and who, poor Latins, were not so cherished, the experiment was, from the point of view of holding a free plebiscite, unsatisfactory. Soldiers are not policemen; it would have been ridiculous to send soldiers who could not speak German to the scene of every act of intimidation either before or after the actual voting. So intimidation, encouraged by the Saar police themselves, was only occasionally checked by the news that some foreign police officer or Governing Commission representative was at hand. The whole question of international policing is still, alas, in its infancy.

The attitude of some of the British officers was a cruder form of that of a large number of the League of Nations officials. Free State Irishmen, for instance, regarded the *status quo* plan as incipient Ulsterism, and other nationals shared this feeling. It was one of the most extraordinary situations that can ever have existed. The international Governing Commission, backed by an international force, was so anxious not to intimidate the voters that the soldiers were literally almost hidden; no executive in history can have

been more modest, so modest indeed as to clear the way for its opponents. The plebiscite was organised by representatives of the League of Nations whose philosophy was often so nationalistic as to wish to hasten the abdication of the authority they represented. Other League officials took the French view* of wanting to have done with the Saar. Even those who campaigned for the retention of League rule represented the hopes of the German opposition and repudiated internationalism as anything but a means to a nationalist end. Internationalism in the Saar was prematurely born and is dead.

If the opposition to Hitler could be bowled over as it was, there are perhaps less tears to be shed than otherwise for the disappearance of its political hopes. But the circumstances of the voting and the magnitude of the German vote† created a panic‡—the minority people lost all faith in the future. The psychological intimidation of the present transitional period has been ably described by the Special Correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*.§ The future may not be so black as people fear, but the Plebiscite Tribunal, which was to have functioned in the Saar till January 1936, does not expect to be tolerated in practice when German sovereignty is fully reinstated. Geneva is to consider the plight of the Saar refugees in May. One cannot but agree that the League, and not only France, should help; some definite offer from Russia to help provide for the Communists from the Saar would not be out of place.

Many people regard the ninety per cent. vote for Germany, however it may have been obtained, as a very satisfactory end to the business, and propitious for the future relations of France with Germany. It should perhaps be recorded that the post-plebiscite rejoicings in Saarbrücken had a distinctly

* When the Quai d'Orsay heard of the growth of the *Status Quo* movement after June 30th, one of its officials referred to the news as "*nouvelles funestes*." Frenchmen in the Saar were horrified at the suggestion that the votes cast before January 10th might have invalidated the plebiscite.

† The actual figures in each district were, on the whole, uninteresting, except for the fact that the biggest vote for the *status quo* appeared at Wallerfangen, where Von Papen's residence provides the only evident explanation.

‡ The leaders mostly showed a fine courage, but a general collapse after the hysterical circumstances of the last few days was inevitable.

§ A leading Nazi figure in Saarbrücken, when invited to accompany some English journalists to Sulzbach to look into the intimidation which the Nazis denied, proved too busy to accept the invitation. This was two or three days after the voting.

anti-French flavour. The first comment I myself overheard on January 15th came from a Nazi meeting a friend in the street, to whom he exclaimed, "Splendid smack in the face for France, isn't it!" The torchlight procession sang *Siegreich wollen wir Frankreich schlagen* that evening, and there was offensive behaviour outside M. Morize's house.* It is always "One thing more and then we shall be friends," d'Ormesson had written in the *Temps* a few days earlier, and the French are not reassured over the demilitarisation of the Saar, to which the Germans have only agreed in the vaguest fashion. The French visit to London seems, however, to offer such hopeful possibilities that it might be culpable to attach more than local significance to incidents in the overwrought Saar.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

* M. Jean Morize was the French member of the Governing Commission.

SCHOLARS IN EXILE.

MOVEMENTS of exile are frequent in the record of history. The exile of the Jews began in ancient history: it was continued during medieval history, when they were expelled from England in 1290: it was renewed in the beginnings of modern history, when they were expelled from Spain in 1492; and it is not yet ended. But there have been many other exiles besides that of the Jews. There was the exile of Greek scholars from Constantinople after its fall in 1453. There was the exile of Puritan divines and congregations from England in the first half of the seventeenth century. There was the great exile of the Huguenots from France after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.

A new movement of exile has begun again in our time with the convulsions of the War and the revolutions which accompanied or ensued upon the War. There was a great emigration of Russians, which must be counted in hundreds of thousands, after the revolution of 1917 which ended in the foundation of the Soviet State. Many of the emigrants were scholars and students. Some of these scholars and students found aid and comfort, and the chance of continuing their studies, in England. There was another emigration, on a far smaller scale, from Italy, after the establishment of the Fascist State—an emigration, in the main, of teachers and writers and thinkers (though there were also others) who could not accommodate themselves to the genius of the new régime. During the last two years there has been a fresh emigration, which has carried some 60,000 persons from the Germany of the Third *Reich* into neighbouring countries and overseas. The flood of emigration poured immediately into France, which received from 25,000 to 30,000 refugees into her territory. But it has touched many other countries besides France, and it has flowed as far as Palestine and the United States.

The cause of this emigration was the triumph of a new conception of national life, resulting in a reconstruction both of the social life of the Nation and of the political system of the State. A doctrine of racial purity was the core of this new conception. That doctrine, when it was translated into social and legal practice, was necessarily inimical to the Jews.

They were, it is true, only one per cent. of the community ; but the number of posts which they held in Universities and the professions attained a far higher percentage. It was accordingly held that, in order to restore the racial purity of the Nation, the balance of its social life must be readjusted by the elimination of the Jew from his preponderant position. But the Jew was not the only person affected by the nationalist revolution of 1933. The revolution was not only animated (though it was primarily animated) by the doctrine of racial purity. It was also animated by a doctrine of spiritual unity. Germany must not only be of one blood : it must also be of one mind. Party divisions must be transcended : national unanimity must be restored. This meant, in effect, the elimination of the parties of the Left, and the reconstruction of the political system of the State on the basis of government by a single party of the Right. The social elimination of the Jew was thus accompanied by the political elimination of the communist, the socialist, the pacifist ; and the flight of the Jew into exile was accompanied by a similar flight of the leaders and spokesmen of the proscribed parties. Sometimes these leaders and spokesmen were themselves Jews ; and when, and so far as, this was the case the two currents of exile became a single current. But this was very far from being always the case. We have to recognise that opinion, as well as race and apart from race, was a ground of proscription and a cause of exile.

Of the 60,000 persons who have left Germany owing to these causes some 3,000 came from the German Universities. About 1,300 of these 3,000 were scholars and teachers, and about 1,700 were students. The general problem of dealing with the whole body of the 60,000 exiles is in the hands of a body called " the High Commission for Refugees (Jewish and Other) coming from Germany," which was instituted by the League of Nations in the autumn of 1933. In the main, and apart from the conduct of negotiations with the governments of States, this is a body which seeks to co-ordinate the work of a number of private and voluntary organisations, all engaged in the attempt to provide immediate relief and to find permanent homes and permanent occupations for a number of different classes of refugees. There are two of these private and voluntary organisations which, in our own country, are attempting to deal with the exiles from German

Universities. They are the Academic Assistance Council, which was formed in May 1933 for the purpose of aiding scholars and teachers, and the British Committee of an international organisation called International Student Service, which—always interested, for many years past, in promoting co-operation and mutual aid among European students—has naturally undertaken the work of aiding refugee students.

I desire to speak more particularly of the refugee scholars and teachers from German Universities, and of the work which the Academic Assistance Council has done, and the further work which it is seeking to do, on their behalf. But I have been closely connected, for many years past, with the work of the British Committee of International Student Service ; and I cannot forbear from paying my tribute to what British students have done, through this committee, to help their exiled fellow students from Germany. The committee, it is true, is a mixed committee, partly composed of students, and partly of senior members of the Universities ; but it is mainly based on student groups and student organisations, and it draws its zest, and the strength of its appeal to the outside world, from those who are still undergraduates or have only just gone down. It has established a Relief Department for German Refugee Students ; and the eager and ardent young officers of this Department have managed to raise an income of nearly £4,000, and to help, in one way or another, as many as 715 students. Some of the funds have been provided by the subscriptions of the students themselves in London, Cambridge, Oxford and the other Universities ; much has been contributed by generous donors who have listened to the appeal which the young have made on behalf of the young. Scholarships have been given for the continuation of study ; other scholarships have been given to enable students to re-train themselves for technical and manual work ; emergency grants have been made to students in dire distress ; hospitality—sometimes free, and sometimes on the basis of teaching in return for board and lodging—has been found for others. The work has been constructive, and it has been accompanied by a steady effort to find some sort of post—either abroad, or in some occupation in England of a non-competitive character (such as the teaching of German or the translation of German books)—for all who have received scholarships or grants. The Relief Department can claim

that every student who has been enabled to complete his training has already been successfully placed. They can equally claim that no German student who has been placed has ousted an English student, or entered into competition with any of our own unemployed.

The work of the Academic Assistance Council has dealt with a graver and more difficult problem. The refugee student is young, and he is still adaptable. The exiled scholar or teacher who has lost his place in his University is a man of middle life, who can hardly turn to another career: he has committed himself to the life of learning: for the sake of learning itself, no less than for his own sake, it is necessary that he should be aided to continue to pursue that life. The primary obligation which is placed upon all countries of refuge is the personal and human obligation to the destitute scholar himself. But there are also other obligations, more impersonal but not less profound. In the first place there is the obligation which we owe to the cause of academic freedom. We aid that cause, and we strengthen the intellectual honesty of all teachers, if we show by our action that those who have suffered, or are likely to suffer, the loss of their academic posts, for reasons entirely beyond their control, can count on the assistance of their colleagues and co-workers in the general republic of learning. It strengthens courage and it fortifies conscience to know that you do not stand entirely alone when you are forced to weigh the duty of honesty and the prospect of livelihood in the scales. In the second place, there is the duty which we owe to the cause of the salvage of learning. Accumulated knowledge and technique, which might result, and indeed are certain to result, in the advancement of learning, must not be allowed to run to waste. We not only aid the general cause of learning, but we also aid our own Universities and ourselves, if we buckle to this cause of salvage. Individually, each scholar stands to gain the stimulus of contact with new minds and new ideas. Collectively, a whole body of scholars, working together in a University, may be enriched by the addition of new methods of study or research—study, for example, in the field of comparative law: research, for example, in the particular fields of science or medicine which have been cultivated, along their own particular lines of method, by exiled scholars who have sought a refuge in England.

These are the reasons, both personal and impersonal, for which the Academic Assistance Council was formed, and these are the obligations which it has sought to meet. It is in no way confined to Jewish exiles; nor is it confined to exiles from Germany. It addresses its effort to the cause of "university teachers and investigators, of whatever country, who on grounds of religion, political opinion or race are unable to carry on their work in their own country." But its immediate problem, in the last two years, has necessarily been the problem of aiding the 1,300 scholars who have been displaced in Germany. There are scholars in every Faculty and every branch of study. Medicine comes first, with over 300; Chemistry comes next, with 180; then comes Economics, with over 100; then Physics and Law, each with about 80; then Philosophy and Biology, each with some 50. With so many scholars, scattered over so many subjects—scholars of different ages, different experience, and different attainments—the problem of the Academic Assistance Council is various and complicated. But much has already been done to meet immediate needs, and the lines of policy have already been traced on which a permanent solution of the problem can ultimately be attained.

During the first year of the Council's work, from May 1933 to May 1934, a fund of over £13,000 was raised, and a service of information was also organised. With the aid of this fund and this service, and by the co-operation of local committees established for similar purposes, 178 scholars, most of them aided by maintenance grants, were placed in British Universities and University Colleges, or in other institutions of learning. Sixty-seven found places in London, and thirty-one in Cambridge; Oxford provided places for seventeen, and Manchester for sixteen. These places were only temporary, and generally for an initial period of one year; but at any rate temporary provision was made for one-seventh of the total number of displaced scholars. Meanwhile, in other countries, places had also been found for a further sixth. The United States had made provision for fifty-eight; France for forty-one; Turkey for thirty-three; Holland for twenty-six; Palestine for seventeen. In all, 211 scholars found places in the Universities and among the learned bodies of countries other than Great Britain.

The whole of this work, however, was directed to immediate

needs and emergency relief ; and even so it was only possible to deal with a part of the total number of scholars displaced. We have also to remember that the displacing of scholars still continues ; nor must we forget that, owing to recent regulations in regard to the transfer of currency, it has become almost impossible for exiled scholars to receive any funds from their property or their friends in Germany. The need of emergency help is still as imperative as ever it was ; and there still remains the ultimate problem of finding permanent places and permanent careers for some hundreds of scholars.

It is this ultimate problem which craves and deserves the most earnest attention. Temporary subsidies, as Lord Rutherford justly argued in an article in *The Times* in the spring of last year, "are justified only in so far as they assist to self-supporting existence once more." The policy of the Academic Assistance Council has been steadily directed towards this ultimate aim. There are two main ways in which it may be achieved. In the first place the Council has to discover, through its service of information, the possibilities of permanent posts in the world at large, to which displaced scholars can be directed and gradually transferred. There are countries which have still to perfect their academic equipment (as Turkey, for example, and Persia are seeking to do) ; and such countries have now an unparalleled opportunity of attracting into their service high academic ability, and of incorporating in their system high academic standards. But the matter does not stop there. Great Britain cannot serve merely as a pipe-line or a channel of transmission. We should be Pharisees if we pretended that we had nothing to learn, and nothing to gain, from the permanent retention, among ourselves, of some of these exiled scholars. In the second place, therefore, the Council has to seek, by an appeal for an extraordinary fund intended for that purpose, to provide special research fellowships which will enable us to retain some scholars in our own country and for our own benefit. In addition to its immediate work of emergency relief, and in addition to its activity of directing and transferring scholars to other countries, the Council is thus attempting to found a trust for the establishment of research fellowships, open to all scholars from all countries who have been displaced from their posts on the ground of their opinions or by reason of their race.

It is an arduous task, but it is a task which can be achieved. At the present moment it may be calculated that about two-thirds (say, about 800) of the total number of displaced scholars are justified in hoping and seeking to remain in the academic world. Of this number the Council, as it approaches the end of the second year of its working, is able to reckon 210 as having found permanent places, and 363 as having found temporary facilities for work. It follows that, in one way or another, nearly 600 scholars, of the 800 who should at all costs be aided, have found some form of assistance. It may justly be claimed that the achievement of the task which the Council has set to itself has been more than begun : it has been carried to the middle of the course, and even beyond. The problem, as it now stands, is a problem of turning the temporary facilities at present enjoyed by 363 scholars into permanent places, and of finding at least temporary facilities, and if possible permanent places, for about 225 scholars whose needs have still to be met. It is a measurable and a definite problem, which admits of a definite solution.

There have been many generous givers to the cause of Academic Assistance. The staff of the London School of Economics have voluntarily taxed their salaries in aid of the cause for a period of three years. The colleges of the old Universities have voted contributions. The Jewish community has been a generous giver. But the cause deserves gifts irrespective of profession and race. If scholars feel a deep obligation to fellow scholars, and if the Jewish community feels and honours its obligations to the members of its own stock, we may all of us feel that we owe our measure of assistance to the plight of the destitute scholar. Scholarship seldom brings any great monetary rewards. The exiled scholar can bring little with him but his learning ; and his learning is not a commodity which can be sold in the marketplace. He has his one resource and his one hope—a place and a post in seats of learning. He deserves any help which can be given towards providing him with that one resource and satisfying that one modest hope.

It is not really to be feared that the displaced scholar who comes to us from abroad will tend to displace our own scholars from posts which they might otherwise occupy. Every organisation concerned with the relief of refugees has

been at pains so to plan, and so to administer, its policy of relief that it should not impinge on the position and interests of denizens. The Academic Assistance Council has been no less anxious than other organisations to observe this principle. The research fellowships which it seeks to establish will, it hopes, attract new funds which would not otherwise be devoted to the service of the Universities. The fellowships will not adversely affect the position, or diminish the chances of promotion, of any British teacher. They will add to our Universities new capacities, which would not otherwise be there at all; they will give to our teachers the stimulus of a new companionship, and the benefit of new methods of research and new points of view. To give is often also to receive; for there's a bounty, as Shakespeare says, which is such that

The more I give to thee
The more I have.

There is a passage in the last report of the High Commissioner for Refugees which is striking. "The number of workers in Holland who have been brought into employment by the direct economic activity of the refugees is approximately the same as the number of German refugees who came to Holland, namely 5,000." That is one of the lessons of history, so far as history has any lessons. The Huguenots who came to England gave England a new industry. So again to-day the exiled scholars who come to England may, if some of them are permanently established among us, give our Universities new incentives and methods of scholarship, which will not only serve the immediate advancement of learning, but will also aid, in the long run and at the end of the account, the ultimate growth and expansion of general English scholarship. *Date and Dabitur* are twins.

ERNEST BARKER.

INDIAN STATES AND THE CONSTITUTION BILL.

THE report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform published on November 22nd was followed by the publication of the Constitution Bill in January, and the second reading in the House of Commons early in February. In all these stages it was made clear, and particularly by Sir John Simon in the House of Commons on December 12th, that the very foundation of the federal structure is the voluntary accession by a sufficient number of rulers of Indian States to the federation. The main recommendation of the Committee to introduce "responsibility at the Centre" is based entirely on the constitution of a federal structure for the whole of India, of which the Indian States coming in on "certain terms" will form a part. Without federation, therefore, there can be no "responsibility at the Centre."

Last autumn some influential members of both Houses of Parliament, headed by the Duke of Westminster, and a few others, addressed a communication to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, which was an amazing and not very creditable piece of propaganda against the Government policy. The letter stated:

We understand that your Highness, in common with most of the ruling Princes, views the scheme for the Government of India contained in the White Paper with considerable apprehension.

We would like to assure you that this apprehension is shared by a large and growing number of people in this country, who are determined to do everything in their power to prevent the scheme from being passed by Parliament. We recognise that your Highness, as Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes with the help of your standing committee, has power to avert this great danger. Time and again the British Government have stated that they will not proceed upon their course, unless the Princes of India support the scheme.

In our opinion, therefore, it is only necessary for the majority of the Princes to make it clear that they are against the scheme. We can well understand the sort of pressure which is brought to bear upon you and your colleagues, but we venture to assure you that whereas if you yield, your destruction is certain, if you stand firm you have nothing to fear.

On December 5th, a few days after the publication of the Joint Committee Report, five members of the Indian Chamber of Princes, including the Chancellor and the Pro-Chancellor, addressed a communication to the Viceroy of India, and to Major C. S. Courtauld, M.P., declaring that unless the Report contained essential conditions on which the Princes are prepared to federate the Chamber of Princes will be absolutely free to reconsider its position.

Major Courtauld came into notoriety during the debate on the Joint Committee Report in the House of Commons by alleging that undue pressure had been brought to bear upon the Princes by the Viceroy, Lord Willingdon. Mr. Baldwin, in his speech concluding the debate, quoted a cable from Lord Willingdon totally repudiating this charge. In this repudiation he was warmly supported by the whole Chamber of Princes during their last session in January. These controversies, however, help us little in judging whether there is a reasonable prospect of the Princes entering the Federation, and whether the Constitution Bill contains those essential safeguards which the Princes have insisted upon as *sine qua non* for their entry into the Federation. The Joint Committee recommendations do not go into this vital issue in detail, and as there is silence and indecision on the part of the Princes it can be presumed that the Committee Report and the Government of India Bill on which it is based does not satisfy them. Although we have some recognition of the wishes of the Princes in the Bill, it still remains to be seen whether the Princes will respond in clear and definite terms, which will set at rest all doubts, and thereby assist the passing of the measure in its present form through Parliament.

It has been made clear by the exponents of the National Government policy, and especially by Sir John Simon, that the whole complexion of the Indian problem changed when, at the Round Table Conference, the Princes declared their willingness to enter into an All-India Federation upon "certain terms," one of them being that a federal Government is a responsible, and not an irresponsible Government. This condition has been fulfilled by a proposed grant of "responsibility at the Centre" which happens to be the main point of controversy between those who support the Government, and those who oppose it in the matter of their Indian Policy. The supporters urge firstly that the unity of India is dangerously

imperfect so long as British Indian Provinces have no constitutional relationship with Indian States, and secondly that mere grant of Provincial Autonomy without "responsibility at the Centre" will not solve the problem, as it will "... give full play to the powerful centrifugal forces without any attempt to counteract them and to ensure the continued unity of India."

The Marquess of Zetland, one of the signatories of the Joint Committee Report, speaking before the East India Association last November stated :

If this principle is not conceded, the whole scheme for an All-India Federation falls to the ground, and the prospect of associating the Princes with the future Government of India is indefinitely postponed if not finally destroyed.

The Joint Committee have clearly anticipated the contingency of federation being deferred, for in Paragraph 27 of their Report they say :

If Parliament should desire to create an All-India Federation the actual establishment of the new Central Legislature may without danger be deferred for so long as may be necessary to complete arrangements for bringing the representatives of the States into it ; but the form of the Legislature must be defined in the Constitution Act itself.

This view is repeated in Paragraph 157 of the Report which states :

... the establishment of Autonomy in the Provinces is likely to precede the establishment of the Federation ; but in our judgment it is desirable, if not essential, that the same act should lay down a Constitution for both, in order to make clear the full intention of Parliament.

The arrangements necessary for bringing representatives of the States into federation have now been clearly indicated, and it may be relevant to refer to them in this connection. In the first place, before entering the Federation the States have to signify to the Crown their willingness to accede by an instrument of accession. Secondly, the instrument should follow, as far as possible, a standard form, although it is anticipated that some of the rulers may desire to make exceptions or reservations of certain subjects by reason of existing treaty rights or long-enjoyed special privileges. It is further stated that the Crown will not be under obligation to accept an accession,

when exceptions or reservations which ought to be made are such as make the accession "illusory or merely colourable." If accession is accepted, a proclamation by His Majesty the King is to follow upon an address by both Houses of Parliament praying that such a proclamation be issued, and when this address is being debated it is expected that Parliament will receive a direct assurance through His Majesty's Government as to the solvency of the financial position. Paragraph 273 of the Joint Committee Report is clear on the point, for it says :

"No doubt before the new Constitution actually comes into operation His Majesty's Government will review the financial position and inform Parliament how the matter stands," and that ". . . Parliament must at the appropriate time (presuming by this they refer to the address by both Houses to His Majesty) receive a direct assurance from His Majesty's Government."

Lastly it is to be remembered that one of the essential conditions laid down is that, until the rulers of the States, responsible for no less than half the aggregate population of the States, have signified to His Majesty the desire to accede to the Federation, there can be no Federation.

We thus see that there can be no Federation without the States; there can be no "responsibility at the Centre" without Federation, and the States will not enter into the Federation unless certain essential minimum safeguards are provided so far as they are concerned. As regards these safeguards, we have them summarised in seventeen points issued by the Chamber of Princes. They mainly deal with internal sovereignty, direct relationship with the Crown and treaty rights and privileges. The matter becomes more difficult when an attempt is made to standardise the reservations and exceptions demanded by the Princes, or to insist, as suggested by the Joint Committee, that moderation in the use of special treaty rights by certain States may be a condition of federation (Paragraph 31).

A clear interpretation of the real intentions of the framers of the Joint Committee Report, as well as the policy of the National Government appearing in the Government of India Bill now before Parliament, is to be found in the explicit declaration from one of the prominent members of the Committee, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, an ex-Viceroy of India, who presided at the lecture by the Marquess of Zetland before

the East India Association last November. Lord Hardinge said on that occasion :

It is quite clear, however, that there must be delay between the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy and "responsibility at the Centre," since there are several conditions to be fulfilled, which have been accepted by the Indians, and which must take time. Some of these are :

1. The accession of the Princes to a federation, there being no "responsibility at the Centre" without federation.
2. The establishment of a Reserve Bank, operating and free from political influence.
3. The budgetary position of India to be assured.
4. The Provinces to be financially solvent, and
5. As provided in the White Paper, federation is only to be brought into being by Royal Proclamation after both Houses of Parliament have presented an address to the Crown with a prayer for its promulgation.

If all these conditions are to be fulfilled, the general expectation is that there must be a reasonable delay of some years before the inauguration of "responsibility at the Centre," and I hope that those who oppose the principle may be satisfied with the delay and with the provision that its introduction must be dependent on a vote of both Houses of Parliament.

Subsequent to this declaration we have had pronouncements by responsible statesmen on the subject. Sir Samuel Hoare in his broadcast speech, as reproduced in *The Listener* on January 2nd, said :

As for the Indian States, I repudiate altogether any suggestion that improper pressure has been brought to bear upon the Princes to force them into the proposed federation against their will. No evidence has been adduced of such pressure, and the only evidence that exists is evidence of pressure being used by Mr. Churchill and his friends to keep the States out of federation. The Princes have been anxious about certain safeguards and when they find, as I believe they will, that their anxieties have been removed, they will make good their original undertakings that were the starting-point of this policy and enter the Federation in the interests alike of their own States and of their Mother Country, India.

On the other hand Lord Lloyd in his broadcast speech, as published in *The Listener* on January 16th, spoke as follows :

There is, of course, another argument used to try to persuade us that these grave risks must be run. It is said : "Oh, the Princes have agreed to federation provided that 'responsibility for

Government at the Centre ' is handed over to Indians, and if we don't hand over that responsibility at once, we may forfeit for ever the Princes' agreement to federation." Are we seriously to believe that the Princes have so little knowledge of their own interests or the interests of India that they are really likely to act in this wholly unaccountable manner?

Does not all this show that both supporters and opponents of the principle of "responsibility at the Centre" are speculating on an uncertain factor, most vital to Constitutional Reform as a whole, namely, the position the Princes will finally take regarding their entry into the Federation? It is clear that the responsibility now rests with them, and not only British India but the British Parliament will naturally lay the whole blame on them if, through indecision or delay on their part, federation is deferred, in which case the reforms will be whittled down to more or less the original proposals of the Simon Commission which is a consummation now definitely wished for by Lord Salisbury, Mr. Winston Churchill and their followers. In that event the whole Indian problem will revert to the position it was in five years ago, and it is not difficult to foresee the dangers and the difficulties that will be created through such a contingency.

One solution of the present *impasse* seems to be to grant full Provincial Autonomy, and to provide simultaneously for a federation of the Autonomous Indian Provinces with a form of diarchy at the Centre such as now exists under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in all the Provinces in British India, leaving the States alone, if for some reason or other the Princes do not come into the Federation. We can thus have a nucleus of the federal structure for the whole of British India, leaving it open to the Princes to accede to the Federation in due course of time if they choose to do so. Lord Hardinge's expectation that the questions demanding settlement before federation comes into being would take at least some years is correct, as matters stand at present. Thus there will be a suspension of the reform structure at the Centre at the very commencement. There is the advantage in following the suggested course of inaugurating the British Indian Federal Constitution, that thereby the Indian politicians of all shades of opinion including the Congress will have tangible evidence of the earnestness and *bona fides* of the framers of the scheme as a whole. Moreover the suspicion that "responsibility at the

Centre" has been conceded in form only, and not in substance, with the full knowledge that the Princes will not find it easy to enter the Federation, will thus be avoided. As a corollary the Princes may be given the option of constituting a federation amongst themselves of the Indian States on parallel lines. Such a measure will circumscribe the controversial points now arising as between the States and their treaty rights on the one hand, and relationship of these to British Indian problems on the other. It has been made abundantly clear that the larger States will not come into the Federation unless some of the pending questions affecting them individually are settled.

The British Indian Federation may be linked up with the Indian States Federation by the establishment of a Council for Greater India which was originally recommended by the Simon Commission in Paragraph 236 of their report. In Paragraphs 31 and 32 the Simon Commission state: "Experience shows that federation has generally come about some time after the federating units have become politically self-conscious." They quote the cases of Australia and South Africa as well as the Dominion of Canada. Here is another extract:

... even if we were to ignore the Indian States and were to rest content with the Provinces as at present constituted, the necessary conditions for bringing a fully federal constitution into being are not yet present.

The new Government of India Bill deals with the establishment of federation and accession of Indian States in only two clauses, namely 5 and 6 in Chapter I, Part II. The foundation, therefore, of the whole structure is laid on these two sections and it is not easy to conjecture at the present moment when they will come into operation. If, therefore, full provincial autonomy is granted immediately, and about this there is no difference of opinion, and all the existing and newly created British provinces are federated under one central Federal Government for British India without the States, leaving it open to the Princes to come into the Federation later, we shall thus have a system of diarchy at the centre, and full responsible Government in the provinces simultaneously introduced. If, on the other hand, Parliament passes the Bill in its present form, for the reasons already explained, there will be no change at the Centre, and the provincial Governments will be

modelled according to the provisions of Part III of the Bill, thereby giving full play to the centrifugal forces which the framers of the scheme have throughout been attempting to counteract. The disappointment now prevailing amongst the moderate and liberal sections of the Indian politicians will be greatly enhanced by the suspension of the introduction of the principle of responsibility in the central Government through a cause over which they have no control. There is also the danger of the propaganda to create dissensions amongst the Princes being continued to the detriment of their own interests. From every point of view, therefore, it is highly expedient to provide in the new Constitution Bill the means for a final settlement and final action which may be practical and also satisfactory to all parties concerned, both British and Indian, including the Princes and the Indian States.

Since writing, the House of Commons on February 11th passed by a majority of 271 the second reading of the Constitution Bill. As there has been little or no discussion during the debate on the second reading, on the subject of the entry of the Princes into the Federation, the points raised will be made clear if I reproduce the exact wording of the resolution which was moved by the Maharaja of Patiala before the Chamber of Princes on this vital question. It is as follows :

The Chamber of Princes reaffirms its previous declaration about the readiness of the States to accede to all-India Federation, provided essential conditions and guarantees which have been pressed for are included in the Constitution.

The Chamber must, however, reserve its opinion on the question until the Parliament bill relating to constitutional reforms and the contents of the proposed treaty of accession and of the instrument of instructions to the Viceroy are known and have been examined.

The Chamber also wishes to emphasise that the inauguration and success of the Federation will depend entirely on the goodwill and co-operation of all parties concerned, and upon the clear recognition of the sovereignty of the States and their rights under treaties and engagements.

The Chamber further emphasises the necessity of prior settlement of the pending claims of individual States.

Further comments will be superfluous, for these extracts undoubtedly justify the suggestions that have been put forward in the above article.

ALBION BANERJI.

JAPAN'S DOMESTIC CRISIS.

IN the past two years Japan's industrial advance has harassed, in one form or another, almost every country in the world. Admittedly a matter of serious moment, it is nevertheless possible that the "cheap goods menace" has attracted more than its fair share of attention—when consideration is given to the relatively small total of Japan's export trade—with the result that the average newspaper reader is presented with a distorted picture of conditions in Japan to-day. It is true that the textile and sundry industries, toys, brushes and novelties, are in many cases making sizable profits. It is also true that sections of the heavy industries under the stimulus of the gigantic war estimates are enjoying a boom. Yet close on forty per cent. of Japan's population are experiencing the leanest years in memory.

A studied depreciation of the currency, coupled with the low wages of a different standard of living, and highly rationalised organisation, have given Japanese exports a tremendous price advantage, but there has been no such escape for agriculture, which is suffering the common lot of agriculture the world over. And when it is realised that some 30,000,000 people have their fortunes bound up with the land, it becomes quite obvious that the prosperity picture presented by rising exports tells only half the story.

Even in a land of cheap living the Japanese farmer's budget makes extraordinary reading. At the last sitting of the Diet a group of angry farmers, who presented petitions requesting relief, revealed that the average income for the 6,000,000 farming families is ¥120 a year. At par rates of exchange—the fairest computation, since the cost of living has not been affected by the fall of the yen—that represents £12 a year for a family of five. For purposes of comparison it may be noted that the average wage paid in the cotton mills works out at a little over £26 a year. The farmer's £12 is net income, after meeting interest charges on the enormous mountain of debt which is slowly suffocating agriculture. It is the fall in the price of his product which is the primary cause of the farmer's distress, but the burden of debt is a very close second, and by a cumulative process it would

eventually have precipitated a crisis, even had the Government's efforts to bolster prices been successful. For years the farmer has been getting slowly into the grip of the money-lender, until to-day his total indebtedness is £600,000,000, on which interest is being paid at an average rate of ten per cent. per annum. Or rather the interest is being half paid, for recent further falls in the price of silk have added a final complication.

Silk and rice are the two staple products. There has been a tendency to encourage alternative crops, but it is on silk and rice that the vast majority depend. Indeed the alternatives are very limited. Practically speaking there is no such thing as stock-farming. Meat finds no place in the average Japanese family's menu, and if it did it would have to be imported, for neither cattle nor sheep can thrive on the wretched bamboo-grass which alone is found on the mainland. There are possibilities in Hokkaido, perhaps, but that is a matter for the distant future, and certainly does not enter into present calculations. Three years ago wheat was regarded as an excellent third crop, and a subsidised five-year plan was drawn up with the idea of placing Japan on a self-supplying basis. This goal has already been reached, there being to-day a total of approximately 1,518,000 acres of wheat. The Government does not appear to be quite certain to what extent further encouragement should be given, but it is not at all unlikely that attention will be devoted to export, though it is not to be anticipated that any attempt will be made to seek markets outside Asia. There has for some years been a prosperous milling industry in Japan, flour ground from Canadian, American and Australian wheat being exported to China and Manchuria. This fact is perhaps worth remarking, in view of the very general misunderstanding that Manchuria serves as a Japanese granary. However, temporarily at least, enthusiasm for wheat has waned now that imports will no longer be necessary.

In any event it is inconceivable that wheat could ever take silk's position in Japanese economics, and it is the huge fall in the value of silk exports—and consequently in the farmer's earnings—which is creating so much perturbation. Not many years ago the export of silk to America used to be reckoned the backbone of Japanese trade. The

extent of the fall may be seen in the figures for the past ten years :

	Yen
1924	622,223,121
1925	849,486,448
1926	709,397,017
1927	698,246,064
1928	687,464,451
1929	755,377,518
1930	398,715,203
1931	342,479,370
1932	360,148,765
1933	355,805,924
1934 (six months)	116,479,829

In quantity the fall is not so great. In 1925, when the export was nearly Y850,000,000, the quantity was 423,000 piculs, and in 1931, when the value was down to Y343,000,000, the quantity was 536,000 piculs. This was when the United States and Japan were both on gold. At 1925 prices the United States would have received only 170,000 piculs instead of 536,000. This year, with both Japan and the United States off gold, the price is just under half what it was in 1925, with promise of a heavy drop in quantity also. The result of the slump in 1929 is clearly seen in the table. Not so apparent is the price rise in 1932, when the yen fell sharply against the dollar. For a few months it appeared that 1925 had returned again, but American buyers speedily realised that they had Japan at their mercy and had only to hold off for the price to come tumbling down in terms of dollars, back to the same price in yen as before Japan went off gold. The depreciated yen failed to create any increased demand. In effect, silk is worth just what the United States is prepared to pay for it. Had the buying been organised thoroughly, the 1925 prices would never have been realised, but the boom in America led to an unprecedented demand for silk, which was more or less maintained until the crash in 1929. In passing it may be noted that in 1925 America bought more than a thousand million yen worth of Japanese goods, just fifty per cent. more than Japan bought from her. Now Japan is buying twice as much from the United States as she sells. A sad change, and silk is the biggest factor in it.

The European purchase of silk, it should be added, is insignificant.

The quantitative drop which began to be observable this year is undoubtedly due to the advance of rayon, and it introduces a new element entirely. Hitherto it has been taken for granted that America would always buy silk, and that recovery in the United States would herald a new silk boom in Japan. That idea is having to be revised. The best rayon is but little inferior to silk, and while science has not yet done with the artificial fibre, the silkworm is showing a lamentable tendency to fall from grace. There is not the slightest doubt that the quality of natural silk is deteriorating, due in large part to less scientific breeding, and poorer mulberry culture. Japan herself is securing a large share of the world's rayon industry, and there is a certain compensation in this, but of course it does not help solve the farmer's problem. At the moment both the Government and the farmer are resigning themselves to a proposed thirty per cent. restriction of silkworm breeding—following a similar cut in raw silk exports—in an effort to stop the price from falling still further. The difficulty, however, lies in the farmer's insistence on the Government indemnifying the loss. So far the Government has made provision for subsidies amounting to no more than Y3,000,000, pitifully small by the side of the fact that the decrease in the income of sericulturists this year is something like Y350,000,000. The domestic demand for silk has fallen heavily, despite several campaigns to popularise its use, the Government leading the way by dressing some of its railway employees in silk uniforms, and experimenting with silk for the army. There was also a suggestion that banknotes should be printed on silk, but apparently there was no sure guard against the forger. Perhaps the strangest outcome of all is the announcement of one of the research laboratories that a method has been discovered of converting silk into wool! The new fibre is stated to be stronger than natural wool, and superior in its resistance to friction. The process is cheap, and the possibilities are thought sufficiently well of to warrant large-scale tests.

Hope springs eternal. On the other hand there is a by no means remote fear that sericulture may degenerate into a cottage industry, the farmer's family weaving the cloth in their spare time. As a luxury cloth it would always earn a

certain profit, if ceasing to be an important industry. But there would have to be some sort of substitute, some new source of employment for the sericulturist. There are two million of them, forming with their families 14 per cent. of the Empire's population. The introduction of a thirty per cent. restriction naturally brings this necessity to the fore, but up to the present no alternative has been found to a cash indemnification, in other words, a dole. The reader with only a superficial knowledge of Japan will doubtless be surprised to learn that converting the mulberry plantations into rice paddies would not help in the least. There is already far too much rice. A moment's thought, however, will show that if Japan had not been self-supporting as far as the necessities of life are concerned, the rise in the cost of living, which would have followed the depreciation in the currency, would have upset the whole foundation on which the bid for the world's markets has been based. As a matter of fact, there has been an annual surplus of rice for years, and though the current harvest is poor, owing to drought, the old stock in hand is more than sufficient to make up the shortage. The irony of it is that after being half ruined by bumper crops, a poor harvest will prove the last straw for the small tenant farmer. At increased prices he will still do no more than barely meet overhead expenses. Some of the larger farmers, who have been in a position to store grain, will be better off, but most of the old stock is held by dealers, brokers and the Government. Rice was bought by the Government at harvest time in order to keep it off the market, and so help maintain prices. The drought has finally crowned this scheme with success, only the man who grew the rice does not appear to be benefitting, but on the contrary is worse off, as the majority sold practically all their crop immediately on harvesting, and are now having to buy back for their own use at the increased prices. The rice muddle is so serious that it will probably never be satisfactorily solved until some definite form of state monopoly is introduced. More than one such plan has already been discussed, and the Ministry of Agriculture is undoubtedly flirting with the idea.

Yet it is difficult to see how there can be any prosperity for the farmer before his mountain of debt is removed. No member of the Government, and no political party, has yet dared to suggest cancellation, or even a moratorium. The

Government is, however, prepared to consider a readjustment of taxes in the farmer's favour. The significant factor is the sudden interest displayed by the Army authorities, who have realised the danger of attempting to build a perfect military machine while ignoring agrarian welfare. It should not be forgotten that the farmsteads and villages supply more than their fair share of conscripts, and that discontented young farmers played a very prominent part in the May 15th affair, when junior military and naval officers assassinated Premier Inukai. The same group had previously been responsible for the murder of Mr. Inouye, a former Finance Minister, and Baron Dan, head of the Mitsui industrial concern. Conceivably this group would have had its emulators but for the overriding influence of Japan's international position. The opposite camp, an off-shoot of the Japan Communist party, has on the other hand shown signs of increasing activity. In the last three years, some 600 country school-teachers have been arrested for studying unorthodox economics.

The possibilities of the situation are patent. No one has yet been able to explain to the farmer why, the harder he works, the worse off he is. The only benefit the industrial boom has brought him is that it has turned his daughters into assets instead of liabilities. There is a Japanese proverb to the effect that three daughters are the ruin of any farmer—a reference to the costly wedding trousseau and feasting which every father has to provide—but that stands in need of revision to-day, when the girls go to work in the cities and manage to send a little money home. An appreciable number of farmers have even migrated to the cities with their families, and more will be tempted to do so as the silk crisis grows worse. Morris Clubs—so named in honour of William Morris, the craftsman Socialist—have provided work for others, but these handicraft industries offer only a precarious living, while a good farmer does not always make a capable factory operative. It is also a reasonable assumption that Japanese exports have reached their maximum, and that when the full effect of the quotas and restrictions enforced by many countries begins to be felt, it will coincide disastrously with breaking-point in the rural districts.

If this happens, something stronger than the make-believe fear of attack by a foreign power will be needed to keep minds from dwelling on their individual woes. The war that to-day

is glibly talked about will have to be produced, or the farmer will start a little adjustment on his own account. Unfortunately there is cause to believe that the military clique see no reason why a carefully selected war should not be profitable. They may not go so far as deliberately to provoke hostilities, but equally they are not willing to leave matters of foreign policy in the hands of the competent authorities. Hitherto Japan has been extremely fortunate in her adventures; the wars with China and Russia, and the World War, all mark distinct stages in the progress from feudalism to the position of a major Power. There has never been a serious check to the steady climb, and no test of domestic stability.

What would have happened had Japan been faced with an unemployment problem in the past decade is a subject for interesting speculation. We may be supplied with the answer, however, in the next eighteen months. In the worst of the depression the total unemployment was not more than 450,000. Though accurate figures are not available the number to-day is less than half that. The Government has never had to concern itself seriously with the workless, and the few public works it sponsored were paid for when the budget was more or less balanced. The defence estimates have since been doubled, and the Government is now spending nearly twice its income. Any interruption of foreign trade will be calamitous. Two million bankrupt sericulturists, unabsorbable in alternative occupations, offer an equally dire prospect. Unless silk prices rise these two million are certainly heading for bankruptcy, and the only hope of a price rise rests on demand on the other side of the Pacific. A very slender hope indeed. Yet much depends on it. To show which way the wind is blowing, mention may be made of the recent deputation which visited the War Minister, General Hayashi. Pointing out that army and navy alone cannot guarantee national defence, these farmers bluntly told the General that failure to deal with the rural crisis will upset the higher command's conception of national security. They concluded with the request that five or ten per cent. of the war budget be devoted to agricultural subsidies. The significance of the deputation lies in the fact that it represents the first threat of a break in the national front formed when the Japanese army marched into Mukden in 1931.

ALLINGTON KENNARD.

THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY AND ITS MARXIAN INTERPRETATION.

MR. BALDWIN merely understated the truth when he recently declared that the eyes of all free countries and of all free spirits in the European countries which have recently lost their political liberties are focused on England, as still perhaps, even more than France herself, the only unconquered and unshaken stronghold of freedom. For however much, as a matter of fact, this be true, to many a Continental eye not a few facts seem to suggest that forces are driving even Britain towards developments at least not wholly unlike the Continental ones. The recent articles in this REVIEW on the Crisis of Democracy hardly seem to touch on those aspects of this crisis which to a Continental observer and critical student of politics appear to be fundamental. Hence the writer's resolution to deal with these very aspects through a criticism suggested by three remarkable works, which have recently appeared in England: Prof. Laski's *Democracy in Crisis*, Mr. D. H. Cole's *What Marx Meant* and Mr. J. A. Hobson's *Democracy in a Changing Civilisation*.

The first thing which has in general struck the writer's mind in these and many similar works, is the emergence of Marxism in England just when on the Continent it is becoming a dying force in theoretical thought as well as in practical influence. The second point is the fact that all the three above-mentioned works express the conviction that the present antiliberal and antidemocratic reaction, especially in its extreme form, Fascism, is due to the crisis of capitalism and to the desperate endeavour of the capitalistic classes to retain by force what they can no longer hold by the mere strength of public opinion and in conditions of equal freedom. It is the purpose of this article to show that this thesis does not bear examination, that the kernel of truth underlying it has a totally different meaning and that, were the Marxian logic true, the case of Democracy would be desperate indeed. Also this criticism aims at being a contribution towards a synthesis of the degrees of truth of liberalism and socialism and towards the co-operation on a higher plane of forces now tragically in conflict, to the advantage of reaction only.

Let us, then, first of all take stock of some admissions of Mr. Cole, confirming the results of Dr. Clapham's study of

English industrialism in the Railway Age, which amount to the frank acknowledgment that Marx's interpretation of that age is completely groundless:

By whatever injustices and oppressions the rise of Capitalism was accompanied, it did undoubtedly lead not only to a large positive increase in total wealth, but also to a wider diffusion of consuming power. It would be sheer nonsense to contend that the poor became in the mass poorer under Capitalism than they were under the system which it displaced. This was not even true of the period which was chiefly in Marx's mind as he wrote; for even in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century, when the abuses of the Industrial Revolution were at their worst, it is scarcely possible to argue that there was more material poverty in England than there had been in the eighteenth century, or, to go back farther, when the medieval economics system was in its most flourishing phase. . . . It is practically certain that at any time after the first decades of the Industrial Revolution the average real income of the poorer classes was higher than it had ever been before; and it is utterly beyond question that the further development of Capitalism in the nineteenth century was accompanied in every capitalist country by a real and rapid advance in working-class standards. . . . Of course, it is open to argue that the workers under Capitalism though they had on the average larger real incomes than the generations before them, suffered spiritual degradation in the loss of craftsmanship and independence. But this view also is suspect; for does it not rest on comparing the spiritual condition of a privileged minority of craftsmen and substantial peasants with that of the worst-placed workers under the new system? . . . The view that Capitalism degraded the general condition of the poor in the advancing industrial countries is based on sentimentalism and not on an objective study of the facts.

Let us add that Mr. Cole sees in Fascism the reaction to the growing power and influence of the working class on the part of classes of experts, clerks, etc., the formation of which Marx inevitably failed to foresee; so that modern society appears constituted no longer, as he thought, by workers and capitalists only, but by workers, capitalists and, between them, by "the brains," the experts and the entrepreneurs. It will at once be clear that the premisses from which Marx inferred the inevitability of socialism arising out of the collapse of capitalism are exploded. Such premisses, formulated in the Marxian theory of value, consisted in holding

that interest and profit are merely unpaid average manual work, and that value is merely work-time ; and, of course, if this was true, what Marx calls the bourgeoisie would be a purely exploiting parasitical class. And Marx had come to hold such theory of value owing to his narrow interpretation of Adam Smith's assertion that all wealth is the product of work, in which work means productive effort in general, manual as well as intellectual, and reflects the fact that in the eighteenth century, more often than not, in the growing new economy, the functions of the workers, of the capitalist and of the entrepreneur were almost undifferentiated and the capitalist-entrepreneur was usually only an emerging abler workman.

Now, no respectable economist holds to-day such theories of interest and profit ; or ignores that the formation of the classes which Marx confuses under the single appellative of *bourgeoisie* is really due to the differentiation of organising and technical ability on the one hand, from saving and investing capacity, and on the other from manual work. Machinery is not merely crystallised *work*, but mainly crystallised *science* ; and the more machinery performs functions hitherto performed by human physical energy, the more, on the one hand the way is open for mere *hands* to become experts and technicians, and on the other tendentially, in normal conditions, to their enjoying greater leisure and becoming owners of land, bondholders, shareholders, professional men. In the end the so-called proletariat would be absorbed into the expanding professional class, while, in the opposite direction the same process would abolish gradually any mere leisure class. The leisure, once monopolised by the *rentier* class, would be more and more shared by all.

Now, if this be the essence of the process which engendered the bourgeoisie ; if the essence of profit is organising ability in different degrees, we can no longer hold that the bourgeoisie is a functionless, parasitical class, and it becomes essentially true that it is that class, in so far as it represents science and technical and organising ability, which is mainly responsible for, not merely the possible growth, but also the possible increasing welfare of the working classes. The very analysis of the productive process and of the differentiated classes mirroring the differentiated coefficients of production undermines the ground of the Marxian predictions. Just because

there are more than two classes and the heart of industry is no longer either mere capital or mere work, but organising and creative ability—commercial, technical, industrial, scientific ability—we may indeed have a permanent strife between classes as each tries to create for itself a monopolistic position ; and we may have therefore also, at any moment, a reaction on the part of the victimised against the exploiting classes in order to socialise, by political effort, the revenues from such monopolies. But this would merely be the continuation and the expansion, on the plane of economico-social phenomena—of the process of application of the principle of the sovereign rule of law, which from the beginning has characterised political development.

Thus there would no longer be room for such dialectical development as Marxism dreams of, through which, by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat, other classes would be eliminated. There would be room only for a constant process of mutual criticism between classes and of ever richer synthesis through legislation. It would be through the legislative self-expression of an ever richer common consciousness of the common good, that Democracy, from being only or mainly political, would also become industrial, even industrial enterprises, from being merely or mainly the property of their founders, would become more and more the common property of all those who are engaged in performing some function in it, and through it, under the control of the common law, to the public.

We submit that the kernel of truth in the Marxian interpretation of fascism and of the general antidemocratic and antiliberal reaction of to-day is this : The so-called bourgeoisie in different ways and degrees, according to the different countries in which liberty either had not been a really national conquest or had not had time to build for itself an authoritative and respected tradition, felt threatened and frightened by a working-class more or less organised movement, which denied it every *raison d'être* and meant to supersede it ; and this on the morrow of an exhausting war and under the nightmare of the Russian Revolution. If the above sketched analysis be only summarily true, no one can wonder that the classes that are and feel the trustees of culture and of organising ability, the pioneers and the guardians of civilisation and of the industrial network of relationships within which the

very working classes have grown to be what they are, in comfort, security and power within society, should have felt and should feel they are merely reacting defensively against the tendency to translate the proletarian dictatorship from a myth into reality.

The fact is that out of and over the undeniable existence of ever-changing and yet perennial frictions between social interests within a common social and historical whole, Marx developed and asserted the purely mythical existence of a radical antithesis between two classes, respectively of exploiters and exploited, of capitalists and proletarians; and thus succeeded in exasperating such frictions and in creating within the same national whole a special working-class social consciousness in radical contrast with the historical social consciousness of the pre-existing and still ruling classes. No doubt he could never have succeeded in that if the selfishness and shortsightedness of the bourgeoisie in its early phases had not created the ethical or rather unethical psychological conditions favourable to such development.

The practical and theoretical outlook and attitude of Marxism in its materialism is but a reaction to and an adoption of the materialism of the ruling economic classes of the epoch. It is nevertheless also undeniably true that theories are *idées-forces*, and may become formidable forces in themselves by focusing men's eyes to some aspects of reality and blinding them to others. And thus it happens that, by creating a sharp dualism between the historical national consciousness and the proletarian class-consciousness, the Marxist myth undermined that common consciousness and will, deeper and stronger than all frictions and divergences thriving at its surface, which is the very foundation of democracy, and apart from which democracy, the common consciousness of the common good in action, cannot even begin to exist. The Marxian myth has created within the pre-existing historical whole a condition of ethical and psychological social warfare, which tends to make democracy impossible, because the members of the same society are inclined to become sharply divided in regard to their intuition of the common good in which all should share.

The social consciousness of the organised working-classes, in so far as inspired by the Marxian myth, sets itself apart from and against that of the rest of the community, not

merely in economics and in politics, but also in ethics and in religion, and aims not at a higher synthesis with it, but at its dethronement and supersession. The chasm is of the same kind as that which prepared the collapse of the Greek City-States before the Macedonian and the Roman Conquests, and which Aristotle analysed under the notion of *Stasis*. The two sides do not feel any longer as if belonging to the same political whole and nourish antithetical ideas of it. This, in the writer's opinion, is the root cause of the present antidemocratic reaction and of fascism in the countries where freedom had not yet become a tradition even in the upper and middle classes. And if such is the case the conclusion is obvious. Where a given historical whole ceases to be a whole and a condition of social warfare more or less holds within it, the problem becomes: How can it form a whole again?

Surely, short of foreign intervention and conquest, the only solution is that worked out by one of the two contrasting parties, red or black, overcoming the other, imposing its own will somehow upon it, and reorganising social life in accordance with itself. This social life will inevitably be organised on a lower plane of political existence than that previously reached and discarded. But thus, political, economical, and above all ethico-social forces, reshaped by silent reflection on the significance of events, will have the opportunity of resuming their work of discordant and yet coefficient tendencies within an ever consciously present and consciously recognised common whole. From this standpoint, if our analysis is right, the present antidemocratic reaction in general and Fascism in particular appear at once as phenomena of political immaturity, especially in those nations where they assume the extreme and barbarous forms we all most loathe, and as developments and atonements necessary to explode the Marxian myth and to prepare the formation anew of that common consciousness of the common good, which is the very soul of democracy.

Once we grasp the full significance of the fact that neither mere capital, nor mere average manual work, but organising ability is the heart of the economic process (which therefore far from being materialistic is as spiritually creative as art or science) we realise also that the classes that Marx described and condemned as parasitical and functionless, are in substance the trustees of such organising ability, of science

and of culture, and in the logic of the undisturbed process would tend to embrace all the others within themselves. Hence two conclusions appear irrefutable. The first is that if we hold fast merely to the logic of economic determinism, if the *bourgeoisie* is the class of "brains" and a homogeneous class, we cannot enjoy the benefits of being governed by it and refuse to reward its services. The alternative is to fight it. But "brains" will always come out on top. The Marxian logic of economic determinism may lead not to socialism or democracy, but to fascism and slavery. The second conclusion is that, fortunately, the cause of democracy, both from the economico-industrial and from the political and ethical standpoints, rests on far safer foundations than those provided by Marxism.

Enough has been said concerning the industrial and economic process as in itself tending to universalise the condition once peculiar only to the wealthy. Something more needs saying on political and ethical issues. Once the Marxian logic is put aside as not only inadequate, but fatal to democracy, it should not be difficult to see that the policy of social reform, far from being merely a policy of palliatives, of mere mending instead of ending, is the only possible and effective one, for it is the bringing under the rule of law, as soon as science allows it, of what hitherto escaped its control. In art, in science, in politics, progress is just the ever-proceeding reduction of multiplicity to unity, of chaos to order, of anarchy to law, through mutual co-operation in achieving an ever richer notion of unity.

On the other hand, on the part of non-socialists, it should not be difficult, especially in England, after such masterly analyses of the evolution of the notion of liberty as those by Thomas Hill Green, Matthew Arnold, L. T. Hobhouse and Graham Wallas, to explode the idea that economic liberty is merely *laissez-faire*, and to see, to show, and to proclaim that it is inherent in the principle of the sovereignty of the rule of law that, on the one hand only those liberties are good in which all can share; and on the other hand, even the reduction and abolition of external restrictions to our activities are only justified on the ground that each of us should be allowed to be all his full most rational self, all that he can be to the profit of all and to the expense of none. It has been a great tragedy that liberalism should have come to be identified with

atomistic individualism, and liberty with something almost perfectly synonymous with irresponsibility, instead of with the power of doing what, after due consideration, one cannot help seeing to be right, to be contributory to the common good.

This takes us finally to the ethical issue. Mr. Hobson grounds his fine vindication of the common sense of the average man as the foundation and safeguard of democracy in the fact that such common sense implies a sense of reciprocal regard and common rights. Certainly; but the tragedy of it is that such common sense may just now have, more or less everywhere, fallen so low; and that we may be so sharply divided on the notion and feeling of the good in which all should have a right to share. How can we strengthen such common sense where it still exists? How can we recover it where we have lost it? Such is the problem on the solution of which, through a sound education, the fate of modern democracy and liberalism seems to hang.

Liberalism and democracy, however much they may have struggled against ecclesiastical institutions and traditions in their self-development, are the offspring of just that spirit of individual and yet shareable freedom which has historically its root in the Christian affirmation that the individual conscience belongs not first of all to the family, the race, the nation, the State or a Church, but to himself, so that he may give himself to God; a God transcendent and Who has been the first to love him. History and psychology alike show that there is no deeper source of creative initiative than love; that there is no greater love than that born of the experience of being loved in spite of our unworthiness; that there is no greater love and power of loving than that born of the experience of being loved by God, and that nobody is so free from men, so free to help men as he who is only God-fearing and God-inspired.

It is out of these experiences that, within a despairing world, Christendom, modern civilisation, democracy, liberalism, were born. They were weakening because their ethical inspiration, apart from the religious assurance which roots it in the very nature of things, itself is weakening. There has never been in history any mere morality; we do not know of any civilisation not sprung at its dawn from the transcendental depths of the personality of some mystic or seer, or not

renewed at intervals, at critical moments, by prophets or saints. We do not know of any civilisation which did not perish for lack of vision. No civilisation ever fed itself on any purely secular wisdom or soulless historical relativism or adrift on the streams of sheer becoming. Man needs the Absolute as he needs water and air. We are daily becoming more and more aware of the powerlessness of mere politics, cut from the springs of ethico-religious inspiration, to remedy political diseases due to germs from beneath politics. Marxism itself owed and owes whatever fascination it still possesses to its racial Israelitic messianic roots and to the latent mystical background of the Hegelian dialectic; and the very fanaticism of the bolshevist anti-God campaign is due to a religious impulse that is unaware of itself.

To-day, in the Russian Revolution, the unequalled driving power of religion in history faces us in its very perversions. Liberalism and democracy will recover their own driving power, will more than ever carry everything before and after themselves, only when they have regained contact and communion with the Living Fountain from which they drew their initial all-conquering *élan*. Carlyle invited his contemporaries to close their Byron and to open their Goethe. Likewise it seems as if events were shouting to us: "Before it is too late, close your Marx, reopen your Plato, your Burke, your Mazzini."

ANGELO CRESPI.

AS OTHERS SAW US, 1764.*

JEAN BAPTISTE JACQUES ÉLIE DE BEAUMONT, to allow him his full complement of pious attributes, timed his trip to England to his best advantage. With the glow of the international reputation won as consulting advocate in Paris still radiantly about him, he would have been a welcome guest in English circles anyhow. But two events of moment added further lustre to his presence: in 1764, the year chosen for his visit here, the *Lettres du Marquis de Roselle* were published by his wife, ran to two editions and were translated into English the next year, while he himself compiled his famous memoir for the widow Calas, a brilliant piece of exposition which carried victory with it. The lady's letters, a French admirer, charmed, described as "the work of a beautiful pen guided by a beautiful soul," while our most piquant of contemporary critics, Horace Walpole, wrote: "A very pretty novel. . . . It is imitated too from an English standard, and in my opinion a most woful one . . . but Mme de Beaumont has almost avoided sermons and almost reconciled sentiments and common sense. Read her novel—you will like it." So that the *Lettres*, the maudlin but not unattractive moral tale of one who sowed his oats most wildly, yet learned his lesson, converted his Corinna, and himself was not lost to virtue, found an advocate in the virtuoso of good taste in England and their popularity was assured.

Armed with these two passports to the drawing-rooms of celebrities, Beaumont crossed from Calais on September 15th of this same year, and was tossed ashore at Deal (instead of Dover) the next day. He "suffered cruelly from the dirty weather and the sea-sickness," and his wallet was forgotten in the ship. But these were his sole mishaps throughout a tour which proved both instructive and successful.

His first impressions are epitomised in an adjective so popular in French, but—the more's the pity—very rare in English: "*riant*." Deal, a pretty town, had a "smiling" aspect with its well-built houses. The country on the road to London "smiled" likewise and presented a sense of ease. Again, Kent resembled Normandy, but that there were "no haggard peasants or mud shacks roofed with thatch" to disturb the conscience or the peaceful "smiling" scene.

* From Élie de Beaumont's Diary, in the *Revue Britannique*, Vol. III, for 1895.
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English roads are "beautiful and excellently kept. As pedestrians there are deemed a part of the nation, a path is made for their requirements . . . protected laterally at intervals by white posts high enough to lean on, occasionally intersected by a transverse post which would impede a man on horseback while leaving sufficient space for a pedestrian to pass." But Élie finds later that not all are perfect: "English cross-country roads are detestable and not even made."

Élie de Beaumont's arrival in London, where he took an apartment off Cavendish Square, was the signal for a two months' round of sightseeing and gaiety. As usual Horace Walpole neatly summed up the situation after Beaumont had breakfasted at Strawberry Hill ten days before his leaving England. The meeting, unlike many such, seems to have gone off well. Élie, a little taken back, exclaims that "all is gothic," and notes the incense burning in the chapel with some curiosity. They talked no doubt "the novel, history, literature" as previously at Lady Herve's: on that occasion Walpole's preference of priest Robertson's *Scottish History* to Mr. Hume's, and "milady's conflicting views" gave rise to an "interesting discussion." Beaumont left the premises the richer for a volume of Bentley's *Lucan* exquisitely bound (in Dibdin's opinion, "the most beautiful volume in point of printing which the Strawberry Hill Press ever produced") and three other treasures from the famous press. Walpole had evidently taken to him; "he pleased me exceedingly; he has great spirit and good humour. It is incredible what pains he has taken to *see*. He has *seen* Oxford, Bath, Blenheim, Stowe, Jews, Quakers, Mr. Pitt, the Royal Society, the Robin Hood, Lord Chief Justice Pratt, the Arts and Sciences, has dined at Wildman's and, I think, with my Lord Mayor."

If asked to analyse the element of fun in this enumeration, we should at once catch at the very essence of de Beaumont's two months' stay. He whirled from City to West End, from town to country, from ministry to opposition, from sect to sect irrespective of creed, eking out his time among celebrities and yet leaving a vivid picture of his breathless tour for posterity to gaze on. It was the fashion in the eighteenth century to keep a diary, and travellers in particular were urged to do so long before this date. If travel was in reality to be "a part of education" then it followed that a daily record was the most efficient way of ordering and memorising

one's impressions. For de Beaumont, as for all travellers of note, it was not difficult to record or "see": armed, as we noted, with effective testimonials, his memoir and the novel, and with copious letters of introduction.

From such sidelights on him which his diary sheds he was a man of parts himself and quick at repartee; a true product of the age of rationalism ready to investigate all problems, interested in history and science, a philanthropist and advocate of toleration in the eighteenth-century sense. Three hours with the Earl of Chatham at Hayes were passed discussing the Calas case, the marriage of French Protestants, Hume's history. This he tells us Pitt "does not approve with reference to the facts, and he regards it as contrary to national liberty and English historians. . . . I breakfasted with him and came away impressed. A very simple exterior, a conversation moderate and noble, and an unaffected tone of patriotism." Perhaps it would be fitting at this juncture to point out that de Beaumont was a definite Anglomane, and ready more especially to admire our "patriots." Walpole tells the following humorous tale: "The noise which our succession of Patriots had made in Europe gave occasion to the following anecdote. Monsieur Élie de Beaumont, renowned for his defence of the family Calas, was in England and went to Bath. Conversing there with Lord Chief Justice Pratt, Lord Strange, Mons. de Beaumont said he wanted to see a patriot. Lord Strange replied there was no such thing. 'You surprise me, my Lord,' said the Chief Justice; 'tell me now, I thought your lordship one.'" Such levity from sterling Englishmen of rumoured melancholy cast must have jarred on the earnest seeker after knowledge! Nevertheless de Beaumont found the meeting pleasant and, according to his diary, Lord Pratt gave him a "distinguished welcome."

His trip to Bath turned out well in all respects. He posted there in company with Colman, playwright and politician. They spent their first evening at the Assembly Rooms, where some fifty persons foregathered, "playing, taking tea, strolling, very freely and politely." The famous Quin was pointed out to him there. The next morning, anniversary of his birthday, he went to the Pumproom "which the music renders most agreeable. The ladies and gentlemen frequent it from 8 a.m. until about 11.30 in *grand négligé*, and thus some beauties may be seen unadorned. The Duke of Bedford hides

his St. George there as do likewise the other lords. This place is a most agreeable picture of primitive equality." Or more realistically expressed by Colman, here in Bath one finds "the same fantastical medley" as in places of entertainment in and about London. The primitive equality and return to Nature of eighteenth-century *litterati* and their fans are inclined to bring a smile to modern lips!

De Beaumont gives a detailed description of the King's Bath and its then poor relation, the Cross Bath. "Who can wonder that men lose their celebrity when a fountain loses hers." The cafés and the splendid architecture of Queen's Square and Pulteney Buildings he admires, and if the windows were of a "decent size" there would be nothing to equal the circus in all Paris. This window business was a complex with de Beaumont; his favourite word for describing English architecture was "*écrasée*," squashed or squeezed together. Buckingham House he found more charming than most "*hôtels*," but there again were those English *fenêtres étranglées*." In fact, a man of very "classic" taste, he was a little disappointed in our mansions. "I traversed various parts of London on business and found a town well built, well planned and full of luxury in an apparent simplicity of *décor*, yet no magnificence in the hotels of the great." The only ones he thought worth mentioning were Buckingham, Marlborough and Montague Houses, and in the latter, then the British Museum, he particularly admired the stairway, "daring in its design and very beautiful." Mr. Aufrere's villa, once Sir Robert Walpole's, on the Thames at Chelsea he found entrancing too, "a charming spot, lapped by the Thames . . . its terraced garden *à l'anglaise* most beautiful, yet without that cold symmetry of our own. . . . The house, without being regular, looks pretty well." The lawns, the hot-houses, the foreign trees enchanted him, the octagon and *chinoiseries*, particularly those mirrors sent from England, painted in China and then returned, and the Chinese pheasants delighted this advocate of good taste.

But to return: one final incident at Bath may cause amusement. Having put in an appearance at the ball he found himself bullied by the vigorous attentions of the M.C., shade of the Beau exerting spectral discipline! Being well dressed ("*comme si c'était ce qui donne des jambes*," an untranslatable *à part!*) he was compelled to take the floor, but once launched

he managed fairly well, and found favour with the ladies, whom he "fetched and returned to their places, which the English do not do apparently." He fears on one occasion that "despite his paunch," his French attire and coiffure may suggest "that pretty animal I so heartily dislike, a *petit-mâitre*." A quaint figure on the dance floor doubtless, but the age of Hogarth and of Rowlandson contained far quainter.

Leaving the pleasures of Bath behind, he posted on via Bristol, a fine town, towards more serious undertakings. For the University of Oxford was about to honour him. On the morning of November 15th an honorary doctorate was conferred on him for which purpose an extraordinary session was convoked. Sir William Blackstone's second in command presented him, and the whole procedure from the donning of a "gown of scarlet cloth lined with crimson taffeta" to the Latin questions and final presentation are described minutely. Such a ceremony would have interested his compatriots, who, like all foreigners, rejoiced in our ancient and individual universities and their ritual. During his short stay he visited all the obvious sights, referring readers to the guide-book for details, dined with Blackstone and conversed with him in English as he knew no French, and English pronunciation of Latin Élie found "unintelligible," and made the conventional trip to surrounding castles such as Blenheim. In the heavy style of the latter, unlike Voltaire, he found a certain beauty. From Oxford he pushed on to Stowe intending to spend some three or four hours there, but Lord Temple sent for the luggage from the inn and retained him for two days and would have kept him longer. His host, assiduously attentive, acted as personal guide round the celebrated grounds and park, later presenting him with the descriptive pamphlet; he sent him into the environs in his own landau, he played quadrille with him, which Élie found expensive! and they talked together till the small hours on literature and travel, education, court intrigue and, doubtless, since Élie seems from his remarks to have held liberal views, all the Tory scandal for which Squire Gawkey was so notorious.

With regard to politics, however, de Beaumont thought discretion the better part of valour, and well he might in the charged atmosphere of 1764.

What Patron shall I choose
Shall I prefer the grand retreat of Stowe
Or seeking patriots to friend Wildman's go?

De Beaumont chose both! His main object as Walpole pointed out was to "*see*," irrespective of conviction. From Stowe he went unblushingly to Wildman's and from Wildman's to court! At court he is not unobservant; his description of the coronation anniversary, where (the *London Gazette* reports) "was a grand appearance of the Nobility and Foreign ministers and other persons of distinction," is entertaining. He depicts in detail their Majesties' gyrations amongst the chosen company, is witty at Lord Mansfield's expense, whom "the king graced with almost a quarter of an hour's conversation, during which time I observed the said lord's visage take on an expression which gave me a slight idea of celestial bliss." He was disappointed in the beauties (most foreigners fell for the fair sex of Angles!) and found the Duke of Cumberland, a habitual butt for vulgar jest, "disgustingly fat." Again he notes astutely: "Absolute monarchs have their friends ready found, an English sovereign is obliged to make his own." His personal presentation to their Majesties took place much later. After a sermon in the Chapel Royal by Dr. Potter, Élie was introduced. The conversation took a literary turn. His Highness, diplomatically, praised French novels, and Élie, likewise diplomatically, "took the liberty of reminding him of the points of English novels, *Clarissa*, *Grandison* and the like, with their power and grand situations so much superior to the secondary qualities of delicacy." . . . The queen, in her little mincing French, spoke of the popularity of Mme de Beaumont's recent work just presented to them by her husband. "All at court," she told him, "insisted that they had wept over it."

Some more of de Beaumont's *hors d'œuvres variées* include "brilliant" parties at Lady Shelburne's, "more brilliant" circles still at the French ambassador's, "magnificent" dinners where innumerable foreigners contributed to the *éclat*, or the hospitality of Thomas Walpole, who saw that the French visitor's knowledge of low life should be enriched. This worthy took our guest to Molly's tavern in the Covent Garden area for a night of it. Élie's own description could not be surpassed: here Walpole "obligingly provided some of the damsels of his acquaintance, so that I might know England under all its aspects. . . . English light-of-loves are very decent and more reserved than ours, but also very dull and very cold. After supper one of them hummed an English air

which I was told was about love, for her eyes conveyed nothing whatever, and its sad refrain was repeated in chorus; that is called enjoying oneself! The amusing part is that the oldest among us, good Fitzherbert who began by preaching wisdom, and forbidding us all the tree of the science of good and evil, is just the one who played a fugue with Eve in the adjoining room." Molly joined them at midnight for champagne, it seems. Despite the presence of the magic trio, wine, women and song, de Beaumont remained cool and critical. Faced by a gathering of professors, of demi-mondes, of sycophants at court or rowdies at the tavern his poise is always perfect, nor do his subsequent observations for a moment lose their equilibrium.

He straightway on arrival "toured the city," seeing all the sights familiar now to us which that entailed at the time: Guildhall, Mansion House, London Bridge, the Strand and so on. More wisely than most travellers he leaves the "printed book" to tell its tale at the Tower or the Abbey, rather than copy out its contents. The West End tour, with Parliament, and Westminster generally he left till later in his stay. At Westminster Hall on one occasion he listened to a cross-examination, for all matters pertaining to the law appealed to his late professional instincts as his talks with Hardwicke, Mansfield, Blackstone evidenced. He made the fashionable inspection of Greenwich, Bedlam and the hospitals, called on Woolwich, in fact omitted nothing that was "done." This tolerant free-thinker, typical of his class and generation, went from sect to sect as, earlier, from Stowe to Wildman's; from a Quaker assembly where all was "nose-blowing, spitting and meditating," and a woman spouted some "unintelligible nonsense," he hastened to St. Paul's which he dismisses as "a preacher and congregation boxed up in the choir—*voilà tout!*" and thence to the Chapel Royal where he found the sermon "dull."

From pulpit to stage rostrum is but a step, and since the Restoration the continent followed up our drama as keenly as our myriad sects! De Beaumont managed to attend twice at Covent Garden and thrice at Drury Lane, one being a command performance. His commentary of *Romeo and Juliet* echoes the voices of his time. "This play, ridded of the faults of its generation, would be a masterpiece." Nevertheless, "the two lovers expiring one upon the other, are stage effects

of a very high tragic order and caused my tears to flow . . . leaving me quite shaken." At Drury Lane with Colman he saw the latter's *Jealous Wife* which he enjoyed, and at the royal performance Mrs. Yates played well, but *Almena* left him unimpressed: "the music is very lovely, the decorations pretty mediocre . . . the choirs badly maintained. One of the singers had long unpowdered hair, not even dressed." Indeed, as has been noticed, de Beaumont was never carried away, although he does confess that Covent Garden is better lit than the Comédie Française. Even our English *pièce de résistance*, Vauxhall, calls forth faint praise only: "this garden, so much mooted abroad, certainly merits a part of its reputation. . . . There all England makes an effort to be gay, and thinks she is which almost amounts to the same thing!" And again at Newmarket where, from Cumberland's own box, he watched the pride of British eighteenth-century turf, King Herod, the sire of a longer line of equine offspring than any other horse, wrest the victory from Antinous, he hardly seems to realise that he is watching history being made! Inspecting Bolingbroke's stables, watching the nobles at the gaming house playing "like hell, yet another path to ruin" he can only see very visible proof of his own statement that "an English nobleman only knows whether he will have any revenue for the year the day after the races are over."

But all such criticisms merely enhance the narrative, bringing out the quality of a diarist far more individual in his pronouncements than many of his contemporary travellers. Ere his departure we mount St. Paul's in company with our foreign friend and survey the scene traversed together. We can but feel that he has shown us much that without him we had missed. And while he stands there "in the splendid sunshine" some 400 feet above the London he had "seen" so thoroughly, no doubt he feels a pang at the coming separation. For although his judgments are at times reserved, his stay has been full of entertainment and his hosts more than ordinarily hospitable. His has been the privilege and pleasure of mixing with an England "lettered and familiar with its Horace" as he expresses it, which means that he took back with him the very best that a prosperous, hearty, cultured section of our community has ever had to offer.

CLARE WILLIAMS.

THE PROBLEM OF THE STARLING.

ONE does not associate that self-sufficient bird the Starling with any particular mystery. But nevertheless its behaviour gives rise to several interesting problems, that have some bearing on the affairs of mankind. So well known a bird needs little description, but it may be noted in passing that the Starling is much more beautiful than is generally thought. When seen in the right light, its plumage is wonderfully "shot" with purple, green and bronze sheens that play over the sombre feathers. This iridescence is most probably due to the curious oily property of the skin, that gives to the bird a peculiarly rank scent. The fact that it does not die of exposure after its evening bath taken just before retiring to roost, even in the hardest weather, may perhaps also be traced to the waterproof qualities of this same property, for it is no hurried wash, this bath of the Starling's, but a whole-hearted and complete immersion.

The Starling is also an accomplished musician. In addition to its chucklings and boyish "phee-oos" (peculiarly explosive whistles), that express most appropriately his rather *outré* manners, the bird is an accomplished mimic. One can rely on any Starling to have an extensive *répertoire* of other birds' songs and calls at its disposal. When visiting a new district one has only to listen to a few Starlings for a short while in order to gain a very fair idea of the various birds resident in the neighbourhood. On the whole it is the short and striking calls in which it specialises: the Curlew's lovely notes; the Redshank's clear, melodious whistle; the "ky-wek" of the hunting Brown Owl; the "churring" call of the Partridge; the Lapwing's "pee-wee." But the Willow-Warbler's haunting diminuendo is a very favourite mimicry; and how often has one been deceived by the rich, mellow notes of the Blackbird in early spring, only to find that it was once again the Starling! For, though a wonderfully true mimic, it never continues longer than a bar or two with one bird's song.

Especially would one miss the Starling during the autumn and winter, when it and the Robin are the only birds that can be relied upon to sing nearly every day. Why and how does the Starling imitate other birds, when it has such an exceptional gift for uttering their most beautiful notes? One would

have thought that, so gifted, it could have composed a song of its own. Does it utter at will any note or song that takes its fancy (as we have seen, it certainly seems to pick out the most striking and beautiful calls), or does it whistle those notes that its subconscious ear has caught and impressed upon its brain? One can hardly imagine a Starling perched gravely in front of a Blackbird, solemnly learning its song! Though, on the other hand, one sees Blackbirds, about to commence their season's song, listening intently to both Song Thrushes and Starlings. But this is probably more a matter of concentration necessary to the production of their own song than anything else. Blackbirds need such tremendous inspiration before they will sing at all: season, weather and food must all be quite perfect. And indeed so fine a song deserves such preparation. It would be interesting to study a young Starling, and observe when, and what, were the first notes it uttered.

Thirty years ago the Starling was common neither in habitat nor numbers. Indeed, in the west of England it was a rare bird. To-day, from Land's End to John o' Groats and beyond, for it has a settlement in the Shetlands, the Starling is common, in many places too common, everywhere: town or farm, cultivated land or barren moor, sewage farm or seashore, all are equally suited to its requirements; in every place, its busy, restless personage is making the most of any opportunity that comes to hand. The rapidity and multiplicity of its increase are unparalleled in the bird world. How has this multiplication of a species been achieved in so short a period? Only the House Sparrow can point to any such success, and it has no chance against its larger rival. But consider the Starling: is it not the personification of energy and determination, full of "push," and brimming over with nervous vitality, but above all social, and though apt to be quarrelsome, never dangerously so? Social success is the key to its expansion. Like the Bee and the Termite, the Starling has learnt that the flock is more powerful than the individual; and though it does not sacrifice the individual to the state, as do the Bee and Termite, it has learnt, unwillingly perhaps, to share its gains with its fellows. To take a simple example: it is obvious that twenty Starlings quartering one piece of ground will leave less unturned than twenty Blackbirds quartering twenty pieces of ground; if one Starling makes a

find, the others share it as far as possible. Or again, if you put out food for the birds in your garden, the solitary Blackbird, if elsewhere, will have no idea that you have done so, but the Starling watching from a near-by tree has seen it and another watcher has seen the first bird drop down off the tree. In two minutes twenty-five Starlings have gathered to the feast (Vultures on a small scale), but by the time that the Blackbird has realised that there is a supply of food at hand there will be little left.

Connected with this social success of the Starling, and a part of its essential being, is its gregarious habit of "flocking." Unlike the Rook, the Starling does not nest in colonies, though one may often find two or three pairs using the same retreat—tree or house or cliff—as does the Jackdaw. However, when the breeding season is over, some time in July or August, the gregarious instinct of the Starling asserts itself. Though, indeed, it is quite usual to find flocks of "bachelor" birds (most of them sexually mature) about the country throughout the spring and summer who evidently have not been able to mate successfully. Why this should be so is not apparent, since both sexes are to be found in the same flock. Is it a question of a lack of nesting accommodation, or merely unwillingness to undertake nesting duties? At all events, any gaps in the ranks of the mated birds are filled by birds from these flocks. When the first broods are fledged the ranks of the "bachelors" are swelled by these young birds.

As we have seen, when the breeding season is finished all the birds commence to gather in flocks for the autumn and winter. And their numbers are greatly increased by winter migrants from North-Eastern Europe. From miles around these flocks gather together at a communal roosting-place: a spinney of laurels, a reed-bed, or perhaps a plantation of closely packed hawthorns, or even the façades of large buildings, such as the National Gallery in London. To such sites the Starlings flock in from all quarters every evening, an hour or so before sunset. Many roosts are comparatively small, containing only a few hundred birds; others are of vast dimensions. In the hawthorn plantation already mentioned there are not less than two hundred and fifty thousand birds roosting nightly during the non-breeding months, and there may quite well be over half a million, since it is difficult to

give an exact approximation of their numbers. These roosts are scattered about the British Isles and with but few exceptions they are to be found in districts that lie less than 600 feet above sea level. The reason for this would appear to be that the Starling feeds largely on cultivated land, especially pasture, the upper limit of cultivation being usually about 600 feet. The densest roosting-areas of the country work out at approximately ten roosts per thousand square miles, these areas being largely extensive grasslands.

When occupied, the appearance of these roosts and the sounds that come from them are remarkable. Take for example the hawthorn plantation referred to above. One is standing at the foot of a slight rise in the ground upon which is the densely packed grove. The time is about half an hour before sunset. From every quarter of the compass solitary Starlings, in small flocks, parties of a hundred, two thousand birds at a time, are hurrying in with direct, purposeful flight to the roost. When a large flock passes overhead there is a powerful whistling of beating wings. All for the most part fly in silence, an impressive point, when one considers the garrulity of the Starling at all other times. Many of these flocks have come in from feeding-grounds twelve or fifteen miles distant, and, in exceptional cases, as much as thirty miles : a journey that has to be accomplished twice a day. Many of course are resident in the environs of the roost, and it seems probable that the majority of the flocks that feed at a considerable distance from the roost are those migrant bands that winter with us. As it approaches the plantation, the flock, a thousand strong maybe, dips as one, and shoots with closed wings like a squadron of German Taubes towards the roost ; then rises once or twice, perhaps, before finally swooping down on to the trees. As each party comes " dropping from the heavens," those already arrived greet the newcomers with noisy welcome. It is difficult to describe the scene realistically : from every side these flocks are swooping in at high speeds, crossing and criss-crossing one above the other, each party keeping to itself and acting as one in the vast maelstrom of apparently aimlessly drifting birds. From below little and large parties of birds are constantly ascending from the trees and changing their quarters. So that from a distance it appears as if a dense storm of black snowflakes is being whirled hither and thither by the wind. Yet actually

the maelstrom is a marvel of methodical organisation : hundreds of parties weaving their own paths through the medley above the roost, while the trees below are black with ropes of Starlings on every branch : strange fruit!

And the noise! Imagine ten locomotives releasing steam at the same time, and you will have some idea of the babel that comes from the roost ; for every single Starling is holding forth in its own particular way ; whistles and chucklings, catcalls and mimicries, all are blended (if one can use such a word in this case) into one overpowering escape of vitality. On approaching the roost more closely, it is just possible to distinguish the *répertoire* of individuals. But the ear remains stunned by the torrent of sound that pours forth as a whole. Until and for a short while after darkness has fallen, this demoniacal noise continues. When finally the birds settle down for the night, a sibilant whispering takes its place that ever and anon breaks into noisy protest against wandering man or beast.

Before dawn the birds are silent and in no hurry to leave the roost. Some quarter of an hour after the first signs of light the sibilant whispering commences again, gradually swelling into a noisy chatter, which, however, never rivals the intensity of the evening performance. Not until half an hour after dawn do the first birds make a move, and then, at more or less regular minute intervals, flocks of all sizes head for their feeding-grounds. By an hour after dawn most of the birds have left the roost. These morning flights are not of the serious nature of those of the evening. Though large parties of birds fly off at the same time, they do not form up in the close phalanxes of the evening, but fly in open formation, covering a large area of sky, each bird moving more or less on his own, though no doubt heading for the same feeding-grounds as his companions in flight. During the day the roost is entirely deserted except for a few injured Starlings and those birds of other species that reside on the common surrounding the plantation. Strangely enough these enormous gatherings of Starlings do not seem to have any adverse effects upon the other birds, who use the roost freely by day and at night. By the end of the winter the trees and undergrowth are white with waste and the ground is four or five inches thick in decay, while the rank scent is overpowering, but vegetation, especially the ivy, appears to thrive. A few

thousand House Sparrows roost with the Starlings, making quite a considerable addition to the noise.

A number of interesting problems arise out of these observations. First of all, how and why is a particular roosting-site decided upon? For these roosts are not immemorial and many are soon abandoned. The one already mentioned has probably been occupied for about ten out of the last twenty-five years. The roost on Lundy, it is true, has been in use with only a few short breaks for one hundred and eighty years, and nearly half the roosts in the country have been in occupation for not less than ten years; but the complete abandonment of a "rookery" is of comparatively common occurrence, though if such dispersal is the result of human agency the birds soon return. It is interesting to speculate upon the mass-sensitiveness to individual reactions that ordains that perhaps two hundred and fifty thousand birds leave the roost at the same time and for the same reason, and depart *en masse* to find a new roosting-site, more especially when one remembers that a flock is made up of such heterogeneous elements as Continental migrants and British residents. It seems necessary to accept some kind of thought transference, which, considering the widespread existence of mental telegraphy amongst the more sluggish human races (the blood temperature of a bird is 103° F.), does not seem to be an improbable solution. One recalls also the prevalence among creatures with less-developed brains but more natural reactions than ourselves of various "sixth" senses that have either become atrophied in the human race, or which it never possessed: the amazing powers of orientation possessed by all living creatures except human beings is the most familiar of these senses, and there are many others. How is a Starling roost started? No doubt a small party of Starlings, resident in the neighbourhood, first fix on a likely place. Others are attracted, in the same way that one bird attracts many others to a supply of food, until gradually, if the roost is sufficiently spacious, one of these colossal gatherings is completed: including within its numbers resident birds and winter migrants. The latter, like most migrants, would probably return to the same neighbourhood every year.

And so we come to the question of why they roost together at all. Such a habit is common among many kinds of birds during the non-breeding season, and is due no doubt to the

desire for companionship. We should, too, expect a bird such as the Starling, that has increased its numbers so rapidly by social success, to carry this habit to extremes. A solitary Starling is always ready to burst into song or chatter, but if it can get ten or twenty companions to join in, so much the better. When there are a couple of hundred thousand fellow Starlings only too willing to assist it, life is evidently perfect! Then again, does every Starling have its appointed place in the roost, among the particular party with which it feeds? Judging by the amount of local movement that takes place after the birds have settled this does not seem to be the case. And though one has not the least doubt that regular bodies of birds feed in regular districts, it seems likely that these birds move off independently in the morning from different parts of the roost. Those large flocks that come in at the end of the day are undoubtedly a medley of various sections that have joined up while *en route* from the distant feeding-grounds; no such large flocks set out in the morning.

And finally, though the multiplication of the Starling has been so rapid as to cause some uneasiness in the minds of British farmers, anxious for their cornfields and orchards, its rate of increase appears definitely to have slowed down, if indeed it has not actually stopped; so that bearing in mind the vast amount of injurious insect life destroyed by the bird, it does not appear necessary to take serious measures against the Starling at present.

B. R. PERRY.

INTERNAL PROTECTION.

THE Liberal Party, under the leadership of Sir Herbert Samuel and Sir Archibald Sinclair, still maintains the doctrine of Free Trade, at least in theory, and so far as foreign trade is concerned. But that doctrine seems to be subject to strange limitations when trade is internal only. Then, apparently, economic laws justify the protection of producers against internal competition, the creation of monopolies, with the inevitable result of increased prices, diminished sales, and compensating subsidies. Whether, in theory, that blessed thing "planning" involves the destruction of individual economic liberty or not, there has been no instance in which the things have appeared together.

In the coal-fields, Lancashire is protected against Yorkshire and Warwickshire against Durham. In other industries the same kind of thing prevails. Steel-makers who can produce cheaply are to be prevented from selling more cheaply than their neighbours, potato-growers are prohibited from selling their produce unless they are registered and controlled, and are fined if they increase their acreage, no one is to be allowed to grow any hops unless he was a hop-grower before the appointed day. The beet sugar subsidy has become a scandal too gross for defence even by those who receive it, and a committee is now busily at work on a scheme the object of which is to hide in future the plunder still proposed to be extracted from the public. Perhaps the clearest case is that of milk, where it has now become a criminal offence to sell below a fixed price. Probably few people realise that fact or how it has come about. The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1931, which is the Act passed by the last Labour Government, not only permits producers to register and thereafter regulates sales by registered producers, thereby *assisting* a voluntary combination to raise prices, but compels every producer to register under pain of penalties which may amount to £200, thus *compelling* such a combination. Once registered, the producer comes under the control of the Milk Marketing Board set up by the milk marketing scheme of the present Government. This provides that no registered producer may sell milk by retail at less than the district price settled under the provisions of the scheme. At first there were exceptions, for very small producers and some special grades. These have

now been abolished, and if a farmer sells half a dozen quarts a day to a few neighbours he must register and pay a levy to the Board, which goes partly towards the expenses of the Board and partly into the fund whence the big producers are paid their price. If any registered producer sells milk in contravention of the scheme the Board may fine him £100.

Apart from the economic repercussions there are two points to be noted about this legislation. Under the Act the crime of an *unregistered* producer selling milk is tried before the ordinary courts of law. But under the scheme the crime of a *registered* producer selling milk below the district price is tried before the Board itself—a modern Star Chamber consisting largely of big producers, men with no legal training and knowing little or nothing of the laws of evidence. Nowadays Press and platform resound with high-flown panegyrics on liberty; perhaps I ought to spell the word with a capital L. Nevertheless, that is the stage at which we have arrived. And nobody has a word to say against it. Possibly the Members of Parliament who voted for the scheme were befogged by the fact that there is a right of appeal from the Board to an arbitrator; but in fact that is no protection whatever. The scheme does not give the least indication of any grounds upon which an arbitrator should vary, modify or upset the decision of the Board, and unless the condemned criminal can prove vindictive spite or other malice, or failure to observe the formalities of the scheme, there does not seem to be any reason why any judgment of the Board ever should be varied. Besides, would no arbitrator ever remember that if he decided against the Board he would most certainly never be appointed a second time? It is a mere delusion to suppose that arbitration under such conditions is any protection. The essential safeguard of liberty, economic as well as personal, is a court of justice which shall try all causes without fear or favour and upon firmly established principles. This Milk Board, being composed mainly of producers, is personally interested, and is in fact both prosecutor and judge, and the proceeds of the fines it inflicts go into its own funds, whilst the wretched arbitrators are exposed to the temptations of both fear and favour.

But the scheme is worthy of further analysis. For a man to plan his own business may be wise, or for many men to join in planning or amalgamating their several businesses. This

is much wider. Every producer is compelled to join. The plan may be good or bad for his business, but he has no choice. What suits the big farmer, sending hundreds of gallons to London, may ruin the small farmer with a little "milk run" amongst poor neighbours. But the big men have got control and the little men must go to the wall. It needs must be that in some industries and in some circumstances small men must succumb to the superior competitive power of large-scale business, but woe to the Liberal Party if in a vain quest for Socialist votes it weights the scale against the small producer where natural advantages, energy and industry permit him to hold his own against long odds. Injury here and now and for ever to individuals is of no consequence to Socialists any more than to Russian Bolsheviks if the result furthers their political theories.

Whether the schemes are good or bad in detail and, although as at present devised they may throw an undesirable burden on the consumer, they are a big step forward and at least are capable of subsequent modification to fit in with Labour's national plan for the industry.

So writes the official Labour Party in its pamphlet on the National Planning of Agriculture. In failing to protest against such things, it is not only the small producers whom the Liberals are selling for Socialist votes which they will not get, they are selling themselves and the future of Liberalism for another generation. It may be said that when the scheme was put before the farmers, all but a negligible minority accepted it. That is the case, but who will have the hardihood to say that they understood it? A little leaflet of three and a half pages in bold type offered glowing prospects. There was no word there of £100 fines to be imposed by trade competitors. The scheme itself consists of thirty closely printed pages of small type with ninety-five clauses and three schedules. How many farmers ever saw that, or if they did could have made head or tail of it? The planners say that the whole industry must be regulated and controlled. Why the whole industry? If producers combine to raise prices they must submit to the terms of combination, even if such terms involve the risk of heavy fines to be imposed on them by their trade competitors. That is their affair, provided that they knew what they were doing and that the prospectus

which induced their agreement disclosed the risks and disadvantages of the combination as well as its advantages. But why should those who realised that they would be injured by the scheme, or for any other reason preferred to keep outside it be compelled to come in?

It is said that every voluntary co-operative agricultural marketing scheme has failed and that only universal compulsion will enable that kind of effort to endure. The reason for such failure usually and correctly given is that "cowardly, greedy and reactionary farmers who had joined co-operative societies fell victims to the blandishments of middlemen who tempted them to break their contracts by the offer of higher prices with the object of ultimately breaking the pool." But this scheme is no cure for that trouble. Even if the proper remedy is not a civil action but a criminal prosecution, how can the temptation of a high price be countered by the prohibition of a low price? And it is the low price which is anathema to the Milk Board. Not only amongst consumers but amongst producers there is a rising chorus of anger at the increase of price which has been ordained. The reason for that is plain. There are vast quantities of producer-retailers, men with a small number of cows, who distribute by means of a pony and cart driven by a boy or girl. The cost of distribution is small, the proportion of profit high. They are finding to-day that their gross takings are smaller now at the higher prevailing price than when they were free to sell at a lower price, simply because their customers cannot afford to buy so much milk at the higher price.

The whole object of this scheme, as of every other protective device, is to raise prices. That is the avowed object of its authors. No farmer, no distributor, no protectionist, no Conservative, no consumer doubts it. But for long years the Liberal Party has talked so much of reforming the marketing system and has writhed under Tory taunts of its incapacity to make farming pay. Now it has jumped at this wicked scheme like a fish at a fly and finds itself fairly hooked and nearly landed. It has joyfully and wilfully shut its eyes to a plain fact, hoping that others too will be blind to its folly. Will it yet free itself from responsibility for making it a crime to sell cheap food to the poorest of the poor? Will it at last attempt to limit the power and authority of the Board, which has threatened to act with rigour against any producers who sell

below the fixed price, and has already imposed many heavy fines for that newest of criminal offences? And yet we still find people who think that the object of the scheme is to prevent greedy farmers from being tempted by high prices. Another defence of the scheme is that vulgar fallacy that under its protective shade efficiency will be promoted and output increased, with an ultimate decrease in price and increase in profit. That is common to iron, steel, woollens, tinplate and every other commodity which has ever sought protection, and is not worth refuting here. But it is surprising to find Liberals and Free Traders affected by such rubbish; yet they will solemnly assert that nothing would induce them to support a combination to raise prices, whilst they bemuse themselves with words. Call it planning or marketing or anything else, it invariably comes back to one thing. The object of those who carry through these schemes is always to raise prices, and that is the invariable effect.

What is the use of making so much outcry against protection from foreign competition and then supporting internal protection such as this? Does it not raise prices, does it not stifle healthy enterprise, does it not support and encourage inefficiency? Is there any vice of external protection from which internal protection is free? It may be, perhaps, that there is one. Its folly becomes more quickly apparent. This milk scheme has been in operation for a few months only and already we begin to see its disastrous effects. At the increased price the milk cannot be sold, and because it is too dear the Government is to provide three million pounds out of the taxes as a subsidy to the manufacturers of milk products, and, with a view of avoiding Press criticism, a further million for a "milk publicity fund," and a further £750,000 to teach farmers how to provide clean milk. This scheme was introduced as a business proposition. It was to make milk farming a prosperous, self-supporting, profit-earning industry, able to carry on its own shoulders largely increased numbers of skilled workers at improved wages. The bubble has burst, the scheme has failed, and is now being carried upon the overburdened shoulders of the taxpayers.

Protection, internal as well as external, now as at all other times, means plundering the public for the benefit of private interests. When will the Liberal Party free itself from both?

ALFRED BEESLY.

WHERE DANUBE AND BLACK SEA MEET.

THE Danube Delta is formed on simple lines. Of its three arms the centre one runs due east, while the others diverge at an angle of thirty degrees north and south. The centre one, called the Sulina Arm, alone is navigable for sea-going vessels. Between these three rivers stretches a strange amphibious world of marsh and willow forest, through which the fishermen guide their high-prowed "lodkas" to reach occasional open lakes of clear water, or some isolated Delta village high and dry on a patch of *terra firma*. The whole, an area of some 1,500 square miles, forms at once one of the richest fisheries in the world, and a wonderful unspoilt realm of bird life. Above the Delta the Danube, forced for a hundred miles to run northward parallel to the shore of that Euxine Sea which has been its goal since it left Bavaria, is constantly seeking to circumvent the intervening barrier of the Dobrudja Hills and, splitting into several streams, forms as it were a false Delta. Here many of the conditions of the Delta proper are reproduced and this premature expansion of the river, known as the Balta, as well as the great lagoon of Razelm, and its adjacent lakes, is included in the Delta Fisheries, a State monopoly administered by the Roumanian Government.

It was once thought that the Delta could be reclaimed in the same way as the Zuyder Zee, but it is now known that to bank out the waters of the Danube and turn the marshes into agricultural land is not possible. For the sedges and reeds, covering hundreds of thousands of acres, are not attached to the soil, but float on a great lake whose level varies with that of the river, while its bottom is below Black Sea level. The floating carpet in which the rushes grow is formed of vegetable detritus, roots and decaying leaves of the sedge itself. In it are open spaces of water, the so-called lakes of the Delta. But they and the sedge fields form in reality one vast lake cut east and west by the banks of the great trident, and north and south by the remains of ancient coast lines, successive outworks abandoned by the Black Sea in its age-long retreat before the advancing Delta. On these banks and ridges live the few inhabitants of the Delta. The majority are fishermen, though at Leti, the most considerable island, there is permanent pasture to be had. The Russians outnumber the

Roumanians, except in the higher ranks of the Fisheries, and the greater part of them belong to the Lipovane heresy, a sect driven from Russia a century and a half ago.

In the Balta above Braila there are beside the open sedge and marsh great tracts of flooded willow forest—willows in every stage of growth, from saplings to coarse-barked old giants. In autumn, when for a few months the Danube shrinks, it leaves a layer of mud from which springs a rich pasture, and the shepherds come and build themselves reed huts and spend an Indian summer with their flocks among the willows on the banks of the waterways. But in spring and early summer when the Danube rises, the sheep give place to an uncountable multitude of fish, driven from the river by its increasing muddiness. Easy it is for them to find the mouths of the watery avenues through the forest, to the lakelets of the marsh, but when the water recedes and the carp and his fellow-adventurers think of returning to the Danube outside, they find their egress barred by hedges of stakes, like split beech paling, that stop the passage of all but the small fry. Then begins the great fish harvest. The Fishery Administration is in constant communication with the River authorities as far away as Belgrade and Pesth, for it is all-important to know the precise moment, usually during the month of June, when the gates must be closed, as at the first sign of the ebb the fish make for the Danube.

In the still water of these silent willow forests there is reflected another world beneath, twin to the one above. Trees, birds, strips of sky all lead a double existence in the dark mirror below. It is a paradise of the bird lover. The herons indeed have made it their kingdom. The Purple and the Night Herons, the Buff Heron, the Egret, the Bittern and the Ibis, as well as the familiar grey figure of our own river banks, all nest here. Birds of prey abound, ranging in size from the great Imperial Eagle and the Osprey to the little Merlin. Duck rise in clamorous alarm. Presenting, as they usually do, only a stern view, they are difficult to identify. Teal, Mallard, and Widgeon are recognisable, but there are some twenty-five kinds of duck in the Delta, and in the early autumn some of the finest duck-shooting in the world can be had for little more than the trouble of organisation.

These sombre willow forests end abruptly at the edge of a great stretch of open water, Lake Sherban ten square miles in

extent, a favourite haunt of the Pelican, not dingy and awkward as in St. James's Park, but white and resplendent on a dazzling blue mirror. Beyond the lake, their peaks reflected in its still waters, lie the shimmering pink mountains of the Dobrudja, the barrier that imposes on the Danube its long turn northward.

Below the Balta is Galatz, the seat of the all-powerful Danube Commission. The Danube is more than half a mile broad at this point, one and undivided, uniting the waters of sources as distant as Macedonia, the Black Forest and Poland. Its southern bank is here shrouded in willows, almost colourless in the burning sun of a June day, at night a solid mass of blackness. The river widens and then divides like a vast letter Y, one arm running north to Ismail, the other, to divide again into two, to Tulcea, the ancient Roman *Ægissus*. The central branch is canalised and strikes due east through the marshes, thirty-four miles to Sulina. On either side is a low and narrow bank with occasional villages and quays. Beyond the bank the rushes start and stretch away to the skyline. Over them wheel ceaselessly the birds of prey, hawks and buzzards, and the scavenging hooded crow; herons abound, and the tall, green rushes are full of brilliant darting dragonflies, born providentially a day or two before the mosquitoes and hungrily awaiting their arrival. These marshes have sheltered many an outlaw. There was a famous brigand whose miraculous escapes became almost legendary, a Dick Turpin of the marshes. He had a tiny boat he carried on his back, and so could take to land or water as he chose. If pursuit became too hot he would sink himself among the rushes and breathe through a hollow reed till the hunt had passed over his head. But he was caught at last, outwitted by two girls he had held to ransom. They were rescued and he was shot.


Sulina must be one of the most oddly situated towns in Europe. A long line of houses with whitewashed walls and red roofs, a lighthouse, a mosque, a Catholic, an Orthodox and a Protestant church, a small hotel with a grandiloquent name, the palatial offices of the Danube Commission and some pleasant bits of garden, huddle on either bank between the narrow passage of the port and the marsh. In summer it is shadeless and hot, in winter icy cold. When the river and sea freeze it is unapproachable save by air or on foot. The constant vital struggle at Sulina is keeping the port open.

Millions of tons of mud brought down by the Danube settle at the mouth, where the languid current meets the sea, and but for incessant dredging and canalisation would form a bar and block the port for anything save the lightest drafts, in the same way as the northern and southern arms have been blocked. The depth of the passage, eight to ten feet at the time of the Crimean War, is now twenty at a minimum. Canalisation between long piers has carried the settling point of the mud further and further out to sea, and the mouth of the port where the dredgers are now working is a kilometre east of the lighthouse and entrance of the 1850's, when the work was started by Sir Charles Hartley, the engineer of the Danube Commission from 1856 to 1907. Now the engineers are faced with a new danger in the form of an enormous bank of mud enfilading them from the north, brought down by the Chilia arm.

Between Sulina and this northern arm is the island of Leti, called after a hamlet of that name. It can be reached by a four-mile drive along the beach, here a natural causeway between the sea and the marshes. From time to time the horses have to pull out into the sea to avoid the oozy beds of a dozen streamlets that drain the marsh. The island, at first sight a scorched, treeless and sandy plain, grows more verdant as the northern arm of the Delta is neared. The sand and scrub give place to undulating parkland interspersed with woods of poplar and oak, that provide nesting-places for the greater hawks and swarm with vicious horse-flies. Across the river from Periprava lies Valkov, on the northern shore of the Chilia arm and close to its mouth, or mouths, for there are some thirty of them forming a miniature delta. It is peopled by fair-bearded blue-eyed Russian fishermen who here have their Lipovane Cathedral, and it is one of the principal centres of the caviare trade. The fish, sturgeon and sterlet, are caught in the open sea on long lines of hooks, and have to be brought up to Valkov in the shallow-draughted lodkas, as the depth over the bars seldom exceeds six feet. Sometimes when a monster is caught he has to be towed. Rather ambitiously Valkov has been called the Venice of the East; a few narrow muddy canals run through it—there the resemblance ceases. But the fish-sheds and ice-houses, dark, salty and reeking of death, are interesting though horrible, the sturgeons' Gehenna. The great fish are cut open the moment they arrive, and the precious roe is torn out, perhaps from the still living victim,

and canned and potted at once with the greatest care. It is worth little less in Valkov and Galatz than in London. Every hour takes away something of the unparagoned flavour of new-got caviare. The best that can be had in the West retains but a memory of its wonder.

The northern shore of the Chilia arm from the junction of the River Prut, a little below Galatz, to the mouth, was until 1918 part of the Russian Empire. It is a flat and open country, sparsely inhabited by a mixed race of Russians and Roumanians and of Tartars whose women are veiled. They make a living partly from intermittent patches of cultivation and



partly from the bountiful Danube. The Chilia arm is much the largest of the three, over two-thirds of the total discharge of the Danube passing through it; it deposits at its mouth more than three thousand cubic feet of mud every minute. It is this fact that at present constitutes the gravest problem facing the engineers at Sulina.

The Delta towns Valkov, Chilia and Ismail, are all situated on this northern shore. The only other town of importance in the Delta proper, besides Sulina, is Tulcea. The northern trio make one think of the Russians, Tulcea of the Turks.

It has the roofs and the smells of the Levant. Below it forks the southern or St. George's arm of the Danube, used in old days by shallow-draughted, heavy-canvased craft plying between Constantinople and the Sultan's Danube provinces, and often taking six weeks from the Bosphorus to Galatz. Now its mouth is as badly blocked as Chilia, and its chief interest lies in the canals cut by the Fishery Administration to carry its fresh water to the otherwise stagnant Delta Lakes and to the great Razelm Lagoon.

This vast lake, over three hundred square miles in extent, produced in old days a great quantity of fish, but owing to the growth of the Delta and its sedge-fields, the supply of fresh water diminished and the percentage of salt increased to an extent that threatened disaster. The Roumanian authorities consequently made up their minds to supplement the fresh water artificially, and cut two canals, the "Regele Carol I," and the "Principele Ferdinand," connecting the St. George's arm with Razelm on the south, while another running north feeds the stagnant lakelets of the Delta proper and returns by a circuitous route to the river some twenty-five miles further downstream. It is not infrequently blocked by floating islands, and a constant watch has to be kept. The islands can generally be pushed aside, but if this is not done at once the blockage may become serious. The construction and maintenance of these canals, of which more than sixty miles have been cut through the willows and the floating sedge fields, though costly, has amply rewarded the courage of the Roumanian authorities. The Delta lakes connected with the river receive a largely increased supply of fish, while Lake Razelm is now the most productive fishery under their jurisdiction, yielding eight thousand tons of fish a year. Its centre is Jourilovka, a station—one cannot call it a town—on the western shore of the lake, the beginning and end of which is fish. The most important catch is that of the fresh-water fish which, thanks to the canals, are now plentiful, but there is also a large haul of sea fish, sturgeon in the Black Sea, an hour distant by steam launch, and the capture of smaller fry in the more salty waters of the Lagoon itself near the mouth. At certain seasons great quantities of fish come into these sheltered waters, and again at an appointed time they are impelled to seek the open sea. In the interval the narrow entrance is carefully barred by fish hedges similar to those in

use in the Delta, and so arranged that the eager multitudes, pent within ever-narrowing limits, are eventually hustled into pens, whence they are ladled in hand-nets into the waiting lodkas. On shore, as at Valkov, are rows of sheds where the harvest of the sea is garnered and the caviare prepared for immediate dispatch all over Europe.

The population of Jourilovka is chiefly Russian, but round about is a great mixture of Bulgars, Turks and Roumanians. In Tulcea and in Babadag, the polyglot capital of the northern Dobrudja, they mingle, and there one sees the Turk still befezzed, the erstwhile master now standing aloof like some cross old dog, mindful of great days that are gone. If the living exhibit diversity of race, so do the dead. Their remains abound. Before the Turk was the Greek and the Roman. Heraclea and Histria, now lonely ruins on the shores of Razelm and the adjacent Golovița Lagoon, were thriving depôts 2,500 years ago. Ionian galleys riding in deep water tied their prows to stone rings still visible in the recently excavated walls of Histria. Restored by Trajan it was sacked by the barbarians, to be rebuilt once more by Genoese merchants a thousand years later. Everything there in June is yellow and blue. Blue waters of the Lake, sheets of yellow flowers covering the parched flats that once were sea, pale blue horizons. On the further side of the low ground on the ancient shore line are the monuments of a still older race. A great multitude of graves, the round barrows that cover our own downs, lie strewn over the rising ground, blue and yellow hummocks crowded together. It is not known who made these graves, nor why there is such a great assembly in this one place. To-day Histria is empty and silent save for a mixed host of birds. In the muddy creeks near the fortress the curious avocet, with his long, upturned bill, nests, as do shelldrakes, flamingos, crested grebes and pelicans. On sandy spits are seen the common and black terns and the lovely little ringed plover. Rollers and bee-eaters flash their blues and greens and yellows in the brilliant southern sun. From old Heraclea set high above the Lagoon it is a short drive to the head of the Delta. Long strings of ibis in fixed symmetrical formation cross the sunset, journeying to fresh feeding grounds. The Danube, like a great golden snake, winds through unearthly clear green marshes, changing to a luminous steel below the hill above Tulcea.

T. F. POWELL.

THE PROPAGANDA OF CULTURE: A NATIONAL SERVICE.

THE Pyrenees act as a dividing line between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe. Indeed, Spain with its twenty-two million souls is in every respect more distant from the sphere of European influence than the other great states of the Continent. It lives through the history of Europe, yet with a difference. As a general rule it begins a phase in history some years, even decades, after other European states have passed through it.

Spain is the youngest of the republics in Europe, and the date of its birth, April 1931, was the signal for a thorough modernisation of the land for the process of adapting it to the present—a process that was everywhere urgent. Spain, the proverbial land of chivalry, was to be democratised. To-day, as in the past, one of the most important problems of the agrarian states of Spain is the division of the land into small peasant holdings. Apart, however, from such measures as apply to the purely material side of life, measures which it will take years to complete and which we shall only be able to judge in the far distant future, the idealistic efforts made towards a spiritual awakening beyond the Pyrenees are of the greatest interest.

The number of illiterates in the Spain of yesterday was enormous. Till a short time ago every second human being could neither read nor write in this most western of all European states. Even the most unenlightened parts of the Balkans can hardly vie with this low level of culture. The spiritual democracy which established itself in Spain in May 1931, which still retains its hold upon the land in spite of differences of opinion among the cabinet and politicians generally, set itself the task of thoroughly reforming the education of the people. A pedagogic five-year plan was worked out under which no less than 25,000 schools were to be erected. And in actual fact 10,000 new schools were already opened in 1932. The municipalities and the state provided funds; new, thoroughly modern school buildings were erected, old schools were adapted to modern needs; moreover, every effort was made to accompany these changes by a change in mentality. The teacher in a Spanish primary school, the *maestro* of some remote mountain village,

suddenly awoke to the fact that his own humble acquirements were no longer considered the acme of perfection. Modern Spain demanded more of its teachers, and summoned even its most ancient instructors to pass through school once more and prove before a special jury whether they were possessed of knowledge—or of a title only. It was made possible for teachers already in posts to attend courses on pedagogy in one of the bigger cities, sometimes in Madrid itself, to attend modern specimen lessons at schools, and finally even to give trial lessons as probationers for several weeks at a time under the eye of the most modern pedagogues. The general illiteracy in Spain was not merely due to a lack of interest in learning on the part of the Spanish; it was due to the lack of school accommodation. In Madrid, one of the most magnificent cities in the world, the capital of Spain, with a population of close on a million souls, there were no less than forty thousand children running wild in the streets solely because there was no room for them in school. Modern kindergartens, too, have been but recently erected. These, like most other social institutions, were in the hands of priests till the foundation of the republic. As a consequence the teaching of the Catholic religion was of far more importance in them than modern hygiene or right psychic treatment of the children. Barcelona, with a population greater by a hundred thousand than that of Madrid, can claim to possess the first modern kindergarten in Spain. It is also the capital of the Catalonian province and has one of the biggest harbours in Europe. Thanks to being near the French frontier it is, moreover, one of the most European cities in Spain. Here, in the buildings erected for the last world exhibition on the hilly slopes of Mont-Juich, some exhibition rooms and kiosks have been adapted to meet the needs of kindergartens which conform to all modern requirements. They are open to children of all classes without respect to creed or political party. Early in the morning the working women take their children into the bright, airy rooms and fetch them again in the evening. They cannot find words to express their amazed admiration at the clean clothes and the food their children get here, at the beautiful toys that are placed at their children's disposal, at the flowers in the windows.

The most interesting and by far the most original elementary school in Spain, the so-called *Escola del Mar*,

the "School at the Sea," is also in Barcelona. Ten years ago a group of advanced students opened it on a small scale ; to-day it is a model for the whole of Spain. Characteristic of this school on the beach is the independence of the pupils. Those in charge look upon it as a preparation not only for a profession but above all for life. Thus the teaching of various subjects is combined with an effort to develop the qualities dormant in the children. All unnecessary dates and numbers are therefore avoided, and the teachers appeal to the children's imagination far more than to their power of memorising. A certain amount of work in various subjects is written up on the blackboard every Monday, and the children are left to master the material in their own fashion by Saturday. Of their own accord they form small working groups, and obtain literature for themselves quite apart from their textbooks on the subjects that interest them, each selecting his books. Every child is free to ask the teacher for explanations. This self-teaching goes hand in hand with lectures by the teacher with as little interference as possible. On Saturdays the children are tested, but they are given no marks in their certificates. The teachers' council simply decides at the end of the school year whether the child is fit to go into the next class or not. So careful are the organisers to avoid all external encouragement to ambition that the classes are not named I-VIII as elsewhere ; they are given the names of different colours or places. Hence the pupil in the "blue class" does not necessarily feel superior to the pupil in the green one to whom he is two years senior. The perfect freedom allowed the children in the *Escola del Mar* has proved an immense incitement to their ambition. In addition to teaching in those schools subjects laid down by statute as compulsory, the children in the *Escola del Mar* perform plays they themselves have written ; they go to theatres and operas, learning to express their own opinion of them in spoken criticisms, while listening to the opinions of others. In the school itself there are also a station for observing the weather, a library which the children themselves have collected, volumes of sayings which have struck them in reading, etc. The state provides for a midday meal, together with all the utensils they may need at school, for the children of the *Escola del Mar*. But the children themselves are responsible for keeping order. They set the tables and take it in turn to act as orderlies.

They are never spectators, never look on at life later ; everywhere they enter into life with the utmost possible activity.

In modern Spain, however, the propaganda of culture is addressed not only to the younger generation ; efforts are also made to awaken the interest of the older people who have outgrown school. There is a special department of "Missionaries of Culture" in the Ministry for Education in Madrid. These "missionaries" are students and young teachers of both sexes who have, voluntarily for the most part, placed themselves at the disposal of the movement for national enlightenment. But they employ no dry text-books. In this land of brilliant colours and sensuous joy they hold no theoretical lectures on politics or economics—their instruments are a travelling theatre and a travelling museum. Time after time the missionaries leave Madrid and the other great cities of Spain in their special large motor cars and travel through the country to the smallest towns, the most remote villages, where even the name of Madrid, their capital, is unknown. There before the very eyes of the onlookers who hurry forward—for it is but seldom that anything happens to break the peace of the village—a stage is erected in the market square. The missionaries of culture are so well trained that they can transform their motor car into a theatre of this type in twenty minutes. A neighbouring cottage serves as dressing-room. Then, after a few introductory words, comes the performance of a simple play by Cervantes, Calderon, or some other famous Spanish playwright. The aim of these graceful, romantic performances is to shake the Spanish countryman from his lethargy, to remind him of Spain's great cultural past, and thus rouse him to a sense of responsibility for the present and the past. "Look, your ancestors created these great works," one calls to them, and urges them to tend their fields more zealously, to be less distrustful of modern agricultural instruments, to make it their pride to achieve something as a Spaniard. Similarly there is another motor car with copies of famous Spanish paintings ; copies of Velasquez, El Greco and Goya, and these are hung on the walls of little village schools. The poverty-stricken peasants, who never enter the towns, are touched by the splendour of the colouring and the harmony of form ; they are proud to know that such beauty has been achieved by people of their blood. They determine to create

as much and as well as their own small natural gifts may allow.

The Spanish missionaries of culture call their travelling theatre and their travelling museum a "propaganda of joy." Joy, the southerners feel, is the best psychological means to employ to rouse the vitality of their fellow men, to awaken through pleasure their industry and their zeal for work. The foreigner cannot quite shake off a certain sense of Don Quixotry. Yet, without doubt, this colourful, slightly operatic propaganda of culture touches many a Spanish heart. It is suited to the Spanish soul, thus promising far more success than an earnest, systematic explanation, the abstract words of which would hardly find an echo in the land of Don Quixote. In a generation or less, in ten, in five years, it will be possible not only to guess at, but to have an estimate in figures—hitherto a weak point in Spain—of the concrete results of this propaganda of culture beyond the Pyrenees.

ALMA ST. WITTLIN.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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LORD ESHER.

The second volume of Lord Esher's journals and letters,* admirably edited by his son Maurice Brett, reveals the man at the height of his influence. Many distinguished names flit across the pages, but King Edward occupies the centre of the stage. "Though you are not exactly a public servant," remarked the monarch in 1906, "yet I always think you are the most valuable public servant I have." Content to enjoy the affectionate confidence of his sovereigns, he declined a whole series of glittering offers, including the War Office and the Viceroyalty of India. Beginning his career as a Liberal Member of Parliament he developed into that rare phenomenon, an Elder Statesman without party ties. In this delightful volume, which brings us to the very heart of great events, Esher emerges as a very attractive human being, modest, thoughtful, warm-hearted and, in his quiet way, intensely patriotic.

In a life of many interests the devotion to the problem of national defence holds the first place. As a member of the Royal Commission on the South African War he became fully aware of the crying need of reform, and as a permanent member of the Committee of Imperial Defence created by

* *Journals and Letters of Lord Esher*. Vol. II. 1903-10. Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 25s.

Balfour during his brief Premiership he took a leading share in the remarkable transformation effected by Haldane. "You have helped me enormously," wrote the grateful Minister. Esher regarded the Haldane scheme as the last chance of the voluntary system. Happily it succeeded, and not even the Minister himself was more anxious that it should. For Esher was as convinced as Fisher himself that a war with Germany was at hand. "The Entente is getting on," he wrote in September 1906. "Not before it is required, either. There is no doubt that within measurable distance there looms a titanic struggle between Germany and Europe for mastery. The years 1793-1815 will be repeated, only Germany, not France, will be trying for European domination. . . . The great fear is that war may come before we are ready." Esher thought of the approaching conflict, not in terms of good or bad nations, but in terms of geography and commerce. "The commercial and naval superiority of Great Britain is threatened, not by the Kaiser nor any man, but by natural forces which require the expansion of Germany to sea frontiers. No greater empire has ever remained cooped up without outlets to the sea. Kiel and the Elbe are utterly inadequate. Germany *must* stretch out her limbs seawards. This means perpetual threats to Belgium and Holland. It is only a question of time." It was a matter not for moral indignation but for adequate military preparations.

In addition to Haldane, French, Haig, Fisher and others connected with the overmastering problem of security, the Esher papers present life-like portraits of the leading public men of the time. He was greatly impressed by Lord Morley's record as Secretary of State for India, and the conservative strain in the veteran Liberal statesman comes out again in these pages as it did in the diaries of Sir Almeric Fitzroy. "He is decidedly no flatterer of the democracy and no demagogue," wrote Esher to his son after his first visit to the Minister's home at Wimbledon. And here is a portrait of Grey. "He is a statesman of the old early-Victorian school, honest, dignified and unselfish. He is thoughtful and laborious, conscientious and scrupulous, with a high sense of duty and no love of politics. But he is an Englishman to the backbone and will never abdicate his right to help govern the country. We talked for an hour about fishing and the habits of fish, his *real* delight." The Esher cake is full of

plums, and we look forward to a third substantial slice in due course. G. P. G.

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JOHANNINE THEOLOGY.

In his new volume entitled *The Father and the Son*,* Principal Lofthouse has made an important contribution to the exposition of the Fourth Gospel. In his Foreword the author states that the book "does not attempt to settle questions of authorship or date, or to suggest fresh critical analyses or rearrangements of the text." He is concerned to analyse "What appears to be the author's central interest and message, his special conception of fatherhood and sonship, as something to be seen and known only in the relations between Him Who is called the Father in the pages of the Gospel, and Him Who is called the Son." Dr. Lofthouse considers "that this specific form of the doctrine is the centre of the actual teaching of Jesus, and has been reproduced in its original purity in the Fourth Gospel."

It will be seen at once from the above quotations that the book deals with a very important, but difficult, theme. It should be said at the outset that Dr. Lofthouse sets forth and supports his thesis by a brilliant and lucid exposition, which is illustrated and enriched by his very extensive and varied learning. The governing position that the Fatherhood of God can only be said to exist, and at all events can only be adequately manifested, in and towards one who actually stands in ideally perfect filial relationship to Him is treated as the specific doctrine of the Fourth Gospel, which, in this respect, is differentiated somewhat from both the Synoptic Gospels and from the Pauline Epistles. Yet even when these differences have been taken into account, showing as they do that the immediate sources of the different writers were independent of one another, sufficient unity of teaching remains to establish the fact that the secret of Jesus and the source of His Gospel is to be found in His unique experience of the Fatherhood of God made possible only by the correspondence of an equally unique Sonship. Hence Dr. Lofthouse makes skilful and effective use of this conclusion in support of the historic trustworthiness of the Fourth Gospel, and of

* *The Father and the Son*. By W. F. Lofthouse, D.D. Student Christian Movement Press. 7s. 6d. net.

the centrality of this unique spiritual relationship for the interpretation alike of God, of Christ, and of redemption. For the purposes of this spiritual interpretation Dr. Lofthouse throws into the background both the declarations of the New Testament in regard to the cosmic relationships of the Son, and also the metaphysical discussions which occupied the Church during the early ages of Christianity.

The view thus propounded leads, however, to other issues in regard to Christian doctrines. In particular, the author feels constrained to deal with the mystery of evil, and especially of sin, in the interest of maintaining the eternal and absolute sovereignty of God. He therefore declares that "sin is not something which disturbed His primal design for humanity, but something which was created in order that it might be overcome" (p. 205), as it has indeed been overcome in the case of those who receive sonship at the hands of Christ, the Son. In regard to this grave problem, Dr. Temple speaks more cautiously in his Gifford Lectures, saying that "we cannot doubt that God foresaw the issues of conferring selfhood upon finite beings, so that sin falls within His purpose, and is even part of it, though it cannot be said that He directly willed or wills it" (*Gifford Lectures*, p. 369). This more guarded view, while not without difficulty, avoids the consequences to Christian theology which are involved in the conclusion of Dr. Lofthouse. These consequences are dealt with by him in a series of chapters, which include The Universal Fatherhood of God, the Divinity of Christ and Atonement. It is impossible to discuss these questions within the limits of this review.

It must suffice to repeat that while some of the positions taken up by Dr. Lofthouse need fuller treatment, and some are open to serious criticism, the book is marked by clarity of exposition, wide scholarship and spiritual elevation.

J. S. L.

FREEDOM AND ORGANISATION.*

No specialist in history will consult the writings of Mr. Bertrand Russell or Signor Croce for the facts of the nineteenth century. The former provides us with a bibliography

* *Freedom and Organisation, 1814-1914*. By B. Russell. 15s. *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*. By B. Croce. 10s. 6d. Both published by Allen and Unwin.

of the books he has employed: the latter does not. Among the general works he has read, Mr. Russell tells us that Fyffe's *History of Modern Europe* is one, though he is seemingly unaware of the continuation of Fyffe which has been published eleven years. Mr. Russell and Signor Croce contemplate their respective tasks from the point of view of men who seek to stimulate the reader and to present him with angles of approach all their own, and herein they are markedly successful. The title of Mr. Russell's book is *Freedom and Organisation*, and its sub-title is 1814-1914, whereas Signor Croce's book title is the *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century*. Both writers have much to say about the growth of ideas, and part two of Mr. Russell's volume is entirely devoted to the march of mind regarded from the angles of the social background, the philosophical Radicals, and Socialism, traced down only to the politics of Marxism. The first three chapters of Signor Croce's book examine the religion of liberty, opposing religious faiths, and the romantic movement, and these three chapters are full of suggestion and stimulus. Nor does the Italian historian confine his survey of *idées-forces* to these three chapters, for throughout his volume we are brought into contact far more with ideas than facts. On the other hand, Mr. Russell supplements the growth of ideas by the transmutation of these ideas into forces, especially industrial forces. We all can form a conception of freedom, and possibly we may imagine that by organisation the author means political organisation; yet he means nothing of the sort. The belief in freedom is that which was common to Liberals and Radicals, chiefly during the early nineteenth century, but the organisation analysed is that which arose through industrial and scientific technique. Consider the following paragraph, and the suggestiveness of Mr. Russell is apparent: "Two men have been supreme in creating the modern world: Rockefeller and Bismarck. One in economics, the other in politics, refuted the liberal dream of universal happiness through individual competition, substituting monopoly and the corporate state, or at least, movements towards them. Rockefeller is important, not through his ideas, which were those of his contemporaries, but through his purely practical grasp of the type of organisation that would enable him to grow rich. Technique, working through him, produced a social revolution; but it cannot be

said that he intended the social consequences of his actions."

One would naturally expect Signor Croce to spend much of his space upon the movements of unification in Italy and Germany, above all in his own Italy. There is, of course, not a little about these movements, but the impressive matter is the sense of proportion that the author most carefully preserves. There is as much consideration of the career of Bismarck as of that of Cavour, and their due place in history is properly related to the broad current of events. Cavour proclaimed that "There is no great man who is not a liberal; the degree of love of liberty is proportionate in every man to the moral education attained by him." To the great Italian statesman this love of liberty was a passion, all the fiercer because he could not accept the religious formularies of his generation. To his diary he confided: "*Nous autres qui n'avons pas de foi religieuse, il faut que notre tendresse s'épuise au profit de l'humanité.*" Bismarck shared similar views in religion, though he acted much more on "*raison d'état*" than even Cavour. The comparative method is in evidence throughout Signor Croce's pages, and when he comes to measure the comparison and the contrast of the Italian and German methods of unification it is used with conspicuous success. The problems of liberty, independence, and national unity were diverse in Italy and Germany, and the author sets forth this diverseness with compelling power.

It is inevitable that when two publicists write on the nineteenth century, they must set their faces not only towards the past but also towards the future. Both men scan the future with the reformer's hope and conviction of better days to come.

The echoes of the past within his brain,
The sunrise of the future on his face,

—they are among the qualities of the statesman, and in this sense both men are statesmen. Signor Croce perceives the decay of nationalism, succeeded by cosmopolitanism and the federation of Europe, though he is well aware of the weary steps to be trodden before this is to be achieved. Mr. Russell is not nearly so sanguine. He notes that the same causes that produced the war in 1914 are still operative. "It is not by pacifist sentiment, but by world-wide economic organisation, that civilised mankind is to be saved from collective suicide."

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

INDIA CALLING.*

Of all the books about India this is one of the most fascinating, for it takes us into the wilds and gives us glimpses of real things in the background, the heart of the country.

When Cornelia Sorabji was a little girl she overheard a conversation between her mother and a lady visitor who came to tell her troubles. The lady had been cheated of all her possessions over a long period of years by a trusted man of business. She now found herself penniless, and there was no redress. When she had gone Mrs. Sorabji said to her daughter: "There are many Indian women in trouble in that way. Would you like to learn how to help them? . . . Then, when you grow up ask to study the Law." There could hardly have been a more suitable preparation for her life's work than the home surroundings and upbringing of this favoured child. Christian parents of Parsee stock, and broad-minded in outlook, led the way in social service. Their children played with children of other faiths. "We grew up in amicable tolerance of one another's 'must- (or must-not-) be-dones.'" English ways and more than English discipline were observed.

In due course Cornelia Sorabji studied first in India, then at Oxford where she had the help and friendship of Dr. Jowett, and finally in a solicitor's office in London, and returned to India to take up her work for the *Purdahnashins*, the women in purdah, in 1894. From this point all kinds of exciting adventures begin and the strangest stories are unfolded. With wonderful courage and enterprise Miss Sorabji penetrated to distant landed estates where she visited the women in zenanas and unravelled their difficulties, considering problems with sympathy and the understanding of a trained imagination:

an itinerary and setting which were like an adaptation of the *Arabian Nights*. . . . I moved from point to point in a variety of ways—by train, riding an elephant, in palanquins, camel carts, in old-fashioned barouches, in a "coach and four" preceded by outriders with drawn swords, in funny little "embroidered" covered carts. . . . Once I was offered a buffalo to ride. . . .

Most of her clients were widows, and in course of time Miss Sorabji was given an appointment as Adviser to the Court of Wards, which had been set up to administer the estates of

* *India Calling*. The Memories of Cornelia Sorabji. James Nisbet. 12s. 6d.

minor heirs and for the general care of dependents of deceased proprietors. Only a woman could deal personally with the secluded woman behind her barrier. Incredible things went on. Oppressions of all kinds were the subject of appeals to the Court, and off would go Miss Sorabji to rescue imprisoned Rani, to get mad people restrained, to save property to the rightful heirs. The story of the imprisoned Rani's flight through the night is one of the "thrills" of the book. Naturally interference with greedy prime ministers and priests in the interests of helpless women was much resented, and every effort was made to thwart her work. The description of the priest who sat in her garden cursing her all day for a fortnight is very good reading, as also is the story of "the bone under the bed."

After thirty years' work in India Miss Sorabji retired from the Court of Wards and came to England to take her Bar examinations. She was subsequently admitted to the High Court at Calcutta, and she visited her *Purdahnashins* once more. But great changes are coming to pass, some of them giving high hopes for the women of India, others with which our authoress has little sympathy.

E. M. B.

THE HISTORY OF *THE TIMES*.*

The 150th anniversary of the foundation of *The Times* has provided the occasion for satisfying at last the long-felt need for an authoritative history of the paper. This volume, the first of three, traces its development from a humble beginning in 1785 until its national pre-eminence under the long editorship of Thomas Barnes. "It is the work of a number of past and present members of the staff of *The Times*," whose names are undisclosed in accordance with the tradition of anonymity so persistently maintained by Barnes. Patient research, particularly among the national archives and the papers of the Walter family, adequately reveals the growing influence of the paper upon the passage of events.

After a calamitous career as a coal merchant and underwriter, John Walter I turned his attention to the foundation

* *The History of the Times*, Vol. I. "*The Thunderer*" in the Making, 1785-1841. *The Times*, Printing House Square, London, E.C.4. 15s. net.

of a printing business, having acquired a new "logographic" patent of composing with whole words instead of single letters. To furnish publicity for his new venture, he published on January 1st, 1785, the first number of the *Daily Universal Register*. Re-named *The Times* in 1788, the paper gradually became the chief support of the business. Under its founder, *The Times*, like every other journal of the day, was a "marketable means of publicity." The proprietor received from Pitt a regular income for his support of the Government. In 1803, his son, John Walter II, assumed complete control and proceeded, during the course of sixteen years, to lay down a new standard of journalism and to transform the news-sheet into a prosperous paper. An astute business man, he foresaw in the independence of the paper its influence and commercial success. John Walter II discarded the hiring journalists of "Grub Street," typical of the time, and attracted the services of young and independent writers who were springing up under the inspiration of Leigh Hunt, Barron Field, Lamb, and their friends. He established a network of correspondents abroad and fought a successful battle with the Post Office for the immediate delivery of their despatches. His foresighted installation of the first steam press, rejected by other newspapers, in 1814 enabled *The Times* to reach a public which appreciated more and more the innovation of an independent press.

Desire for the life of a country gentleman and for a Parliamentary career were among the reasons which induced John Walter II to sever his personal direction of the paper. While retaining control, he had long delegated the editorial side, and in 1819 created the outstanding precedent of appointing a responsible managing editor, in the person of Thomas Barnes. The new editor rapidly raised *The Times* to a position of unrivalled influence in public affairs. It is upon the work of Barnes, hitherto clouded in anonymity, that this volume lays its emphasis. He appealed away from the narrow lines of party politics to the new industrial middle classes. With the help of representatives stationed throughout the country, Barnes voiced and directed the force of public opinion. To repeated charges of inconsistency by the subsidised party press he could retort that the important question was "whether what we say *now* is true and just, and to the purpose *now*." The volume relates at length his great

campaigns. He fought for Catholic Emancipation, and "thundered for Reform" in 1831. Subsequently Barnes attacked the Whig Government for its ineptitude and emerged successful from the famous "war" with Brougham and *The Morning Chronicle*. Lord Lyndhurst could truthfully describe the Editor as "the most powerful man in the country." In the concluding years of his life, Barnes turned to the new progressive Conservatism as exemplified in Peel and the Tamworth Manifesto. It is even suggested that some of Barnes' proposed alterations "were adopted in the published text."

The volume deals also with the internal working of the paper under Barnes and discusses his colleagues and contributors, such as Peter Fraser, Sterling, the elder Delane and Alsager, the business manager. Numerous illustrations and facsimile reproductions complete a remarkable contribution to the history of the Press.

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SIR ROBERT MORANT.*

The great work of Sir Robert Morant in the field of public education forms the principal feature of Dr. Bernard M. Allen's able and very sympathetic biography. The author has enjoyed the use of the private papers of Morant, Balfour and others and has had access to the confidential records of the Board of Education.

Born in 1863 and educated at Winchester and New College, Morant commenced his career as a master in a preparatory school. In 1886 he was appointed tutor to the nephews of the King of Siam and subsequently to the Crown Prince. Before he returned to England in 1894, owing to the political crisis in Siam in which he prominently figured, Morant had displayed his extraordinary energy and organising ability in recasting the whole system of Siamese education. In 1895 he entered the Education Office as an Assistant Director of Special Enquiries and Reports. Dr. Allen deals at length with his meteoric rise, under the ægis of Balfour, to the headship of the Department and in particular the dominating part he played in the passage of the Education Act of 1902. The opportunities which the Act provided of co-ordinating and

* *Sir Robert Morant*. Macmillan. 12s. 6d. net. ✓

planning a unified scheme of public education, with particular reference to the new Secondary schools, were utilised to the full by Morant. The constitutional position of Sir Robert during his eight years as Permanent Secretary of the Board of Education makes a detailed treatment of his work peculiarly difficult. Dr. Allen's comparatively short appreciation, however, covers the main achievements of a man possessed of "a powerful personality, great driving power, singular breadth of vision, an indomitable will and intense devotion to duty." Morant's policy, supported by a relentless determination for its fulfilment, inevitably aroused hostility and his "chance indiscretion" of the Holmes circular "laid him open to the combined attacks of politicians and teachers." His subsequent achievements, in organising, as its chairman, the work of the new National Health Insurance Commission and in the formation of the Ministry of Health are only briefly dwelt upon. Within its limited scope this volume will be widely and rightly welcomed as a high testimony to a great, creative and enthusiastic public servant.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

*The Rise of Gladstone to the Leadership of the Liberal Party, 1859-1868,** ✓
helps to fill in the outlines of a period rather sketchily described in Lord Morley's classical biography of his chief. Utilising the vast collection of papers recently transferred from Hawarden to the British Museum, the author prints, in whole or in part, many of the letters which passed between Gladstone and his great contemporaries. In these days, when it is the fashion in some quarters to sneer at the great Victorians, it is refreshing to read Mr. Williams' generous tributes not only to Gladstone but to Russell, Cobden and Bright. In addition to his discussions of the main events of the decade, from the Cobden Treaty of 1860 to the Reform Bills of 1866-7 and the resolutions on the Irish Church, he quotes evidence from many sources as to the estimation in which Gladstone was held during the years when he had ceased to be merely a Peelite and was not yet leader of the Liberal Party. Everyone recognised his extraordinary abilities, his marvellous eloquence, his mastery of finance, his devotion to economy; but he was not yet thoroughly understood. Mr. Williams has rendered a service to history as well as to biography by a monograph filled with

* Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d.

new material and marked by sympathetic insight into the character and aims of a great statesman.

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Lord Riddell's diaries of the war years and the return of peace revealed a literary talent hardly suspected by his friends. The final instalment (*More Pages from my Diary, 1908-1914**), published shortly before his death, is very welcome. Once again Mr. Lloyd George, the most intimate of his political friends, dominates the scene by his irrepressible vitality and crusading fervour. Mr. Churchill emerges in an attractive light, devoted to Mr. Lloyd George and grieved by the Marconi crisis, but moving away from his comrade politically after his appointment to the Admiralty in 1911. Asquith's patience, tact, and loyalty to his colleagues are eulogised by Mr. Lloyd George and other associates. Bonar Law is portrayed as modest and genuine, more liked and appreciated by Mr. Lloyd George than by some of his own aristocratic followers. In addition to the human interest of the crowded picture gallery, several pages are of direct value to the historian. For instance, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill were quite ready for National Service before the war was in sight, and the latter dreamed of a National Government for the urgent tasks of peace. In February 1913 Sir John French regarded war as inevitable, and expressed the opinion that, if he had to face a big war, he would rather see Asquith Prime Minister than anyone else. The diarist prefers to record the opinions of his distinguished friends, and indeed he never pretended to be a politician. But his own utterances, whenever recorded, display a leaning to the Left and a sympathetic understanding of the feelings of the working man. Lord Riddell's volumes, like those of Lord Esher and Sir Almeric Fitzroy, will be prized by later generations who desire to recapture the colour and atmosphere of the opening years of the twentieth century.

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A welcome and extremely interesting addition to the Loeb Classical Library is to be found in the anthology of *Minor Latin Poets*,† compiled by Mr. J. Wight Duff and Mr. Arnold M. Duff. Apart from the evident difficulties of selecting a representative collection, the editors were at once faced by the question of texts. The absence of a *textus receptus* in the majority of poems has led them to decide upon their own texts. Upon the less pressing, but equally intriguing, problems of authorship and dates of composition, the editors briefly state the contending views and their own conclusions. In addition to introductions to each piece, the lists of editions, sources and relevant works invite further research in fields too frequently neglected. This anthology of "minor imperial

* Country Life. 10s. 6d.

† Heinemann and Harvard University Press. Leather 12s. 6d. net, cloth 10s. net.

poetry" commences with the *Sententiae* of Publilius Syrus and ends with the *De Reditu Suo* of Rutilius Namatianus, the last of the classical pagan poets, in which he describes a journey by sea to Gaul, six years after the sack of Rome by Alaric in A.D. 410. The collection also includes the bucolics and hunting poems of Grattius, Calpurnius Siculus and Nemesianus, the *Laus Pisonis* at one time attributed to Virgil, the remarkable study of volcanic action and natural laws in the *Aetna*, the moral wisdom of the *Dicta Catonis*, the fabulous *Phoenix* and the *Fables* of Avianus. In addition Florus, Hadrian, Reposianus, Modestinus, Pentadius, Tiberianus and Servasius are represented in this very comprehensive anthology. While for the most part the poems are rendered in English prose, the *Dicta Catonis* provides a notable exception of verse translation.

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Mr. Lawrence E. Tanner's short and admirable history of *Westminster School*,* will be warmly welcomed alike by Old Westminsters and all those interested in the growth of our public schools. Since the publication in 1898 of the late Mr. John Sargeant's learned *Annals of Westminster School*, a mass of new material has come to light. In particular, investigation of the Abbey Muniments, of which Mr. Tanner is Keeper, has disclosed fresh information upon the early history of the school and the origin and development of the Latin Play, which dates from about 1550 and is still annually performed at Christmas in the College Dormitory. Although this historical account may be enjoyed as a whole, the author's general aim has been "to supplement, and in a few instances to correct," Mr. Sargeant's book. For example, Mr. Tanner has omitted the school curriculum. But it may be hoped that this volume is only a prelude to a larger and more comprehensive work. Two brief chapters on the school buildings are implemented by over fifty excellent *Country Life* photographs. In addition Mr. Tanner has included several prints, hitherto unpublished, including a remarkable view of the school playing-fields, now Vincent Square, in 1794, surrounded by meadows.

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The work of Sir George Goldie in founding Nigeria has remained too long in obscurity and the appreciation of Lady Gerald Wellesley (Dorothy Wellesley) and Mr. Stephen Gwynn in *Sir George Goldie*† is a very welcome testimony to his greatness. Goldie's desire for self-effacement amounted almost to a passion. He vehemently opposed, for example, a suggestion that the new territory should be named "Goldesia," after the precedent of Rhodes. "*L'œuvre, c'est tout ; l'homme, c'est rien*" was his motto; although, in destroying his papers, our knowledge of the early spade-work in Nigeria is sadly lacking. Until

* Country Life. 10s. 6d. net.

† Macmillan. 8s. 6d. net.

the archives of the Foreign and Colonial Offices are made available an adequate biography of Goldie would seem impossible. But the broad course of events is known and incorporated by Mr. Stephen Gwynn in his valuable historical introduction. George Goldie first visited West Africa in 1877 and became convinced that, in his own words, "the considerable civilisation of the Sudan could make no further progress" and "could have no adequate connection through commerce with the outer world, until a sound basis was substituted for that on which the social system in those regions has hitherto rested." As a first step he united in 1879 the British commercial interests under the United African Company. Eventually in 1885, after continual opposition at home, chartered government was revived and vested in the Royal Niger Company. Thenceforth Goldie was able effectively to forestall French designs for an empire from the Nile to the Niger and to compete with Germany. When the Charter was surrendered to the Crown in 1899, Sir George Goldie had secured for the Empire some of the healthiest and richest regions in West Africa, comprising an area half the size of India with a population of some twenty million. It was achieved by peaceful and beneficial penetration. He removed in 1897 the abiding canker of this civilisation, slave-raiding and slavery, and resolutely refused to permit the traffic in spirits, so profitably and disastrously allowed in neighbouring colonies. Moreover he instituted the present system of "indirect rule" through the native chiefs. Although Goldie's pursuit was trade, it is significant that he preserved the native from further exploitation and returned from Africa a poorer man. As a close friend for twenty-five years, Lady Gerald Wellesley contributes a long, discursive and intimate picture of a man who will live in history as a determined pioneer and a brilliant and foresighted administrator.

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The purpose of Mr. C. Delisle Burns' recent book, *Challenge to Democracy*,* is to propagate the claims of social democracy as the only alternative to dictatorship. It is a moderate and sincere discussion of the emotional forces behind political advance. The life in common offered by Fascism and Communism "can be given even more fully within the democratic tradition." Mr. Burns aims at rousing the greatest measure of co-operation and enthusiasm for the common good, to be followed by "the only practical policy" of "an increase of centralised 'national' direction of a few crucial or fundamental elements in the industrial system." He advocates, for example, co-ordination of all production by the State, controlled inflation, a programme of productive public works and the expansion of the social services, especially with regard to health and housing. To foster and consolidate the community spirit, he would create a single educational system for

* Allen and Unwin. 5s. net.

all classes. Little of what Mr. Burns suggests is new. Much is being done and some would be questioned, even by supporters of his own political philosophy. But he can substantiate the general thesis that the problems of the day can best be overcome through the medium of a free democracy.

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The Peace Year Book, 1935,* offers 300 pages on the peace movement at home and abroad at a very low price. For the general reader the most interesting portion of the volume is Part I, consisting of reviews by experts of the events of 1934, of the work of the League, of changes in Central Europe, of the Disarmament discussions, of economic developments, of the Saar question, and of the journey of Russia to Geneva. The remainder of the book is of special value to members of peace organisations in many countries, the term being interpreted in a very elastic spirit. Part IV contains useful statistical appendices on Armaments and the traffic in arms. This excellent little work gives a vivid impression of the manifold endeavours to organise and stabilise the world.

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Harold Wright, A Memoir,† edited by C. E. Fayle, will preserve for many of his friends the memory of a good citizen who was cut off in the flower of his life. Though struggling from boyhood with ill health he developed a many-sided activity as a journalist, an economist, a social worker, an ardent advocate of Liberalism and of peace. Sir Norman Angell, with whom he was so closely associated by friendship and conviction, speaks of sagacity as his dominating quality of mind, and other contributors tell of his sound judgment in things both great and small. The editor speaks of "his wonderful career of public service"; and the unpretentious little volume on a practical idealist justifies this high praise.

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The Railway King, 1800-1871,‡ by Mr. Richard S. Lambert, contains a lucid and admirable account of the life of George Hudson, and provides a striking commentary upon the business standards of the time. With the assistance of an unexpected legacy of £30,000, the linen draper of York commenced in 1833 his amazing career of railway promotion and amalgamation. Through a process of absorption and new construction, Hudson controlled in 1849 one third of the whole railway system of the country and gave "the nation much of the benefit of a railway system, in place of a railway anarchy." In return for large and immediate profits the investing public was willing to abstain from too close enquiry into financial methods. By a policy of continual expansion and the fresh issues of capital, assisted by loans, the manipulation of

* National Peace Council, 39 Victoria Street. 1s. 6d.

† Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.

‡ Allen and Unwin. 12s. 6d.

accounts, speculation and other forms of financial jugglery, Hudson was able for years to enlarge his undertakings and favourably to impress his shareholders by payment of big dividends, largely out of capital. Hudson's ruin in 1850, after the inevitable collapse of the railway boom, was primarily "due to society's desire to find a scape-goat for the failure of its own system of conducting railway business." Hudson was never prosecuted and became rapidly forgotten. While condemning his financial methods, Mr. Lambert lays emphasis upon Hudson's work of railway co-ordination, and even states that "no one but a man with those faults could have carried through the work which he accomplished."

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Mount Peacock or Progress in Provence,* by Marie Mauron, translated by F. L. Lucas, with a "jacket" designed by Roger Fry, is an account of experiences of a woman who was appointed schoolmistress and secretary to the mayor in a remote village. The chief characteristic of these backward people, charming as they are, appears to be parsimony. The whole story is amusingly told.

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The Things Which Belong—,† by Constance Holme, is a beautiful little story, or perhaps rather a picture, of a spiritual crisis, simply told, reserved but full of deep human feeling and fine drawing. It has now appeared in *The World's Classics*.

* Cambridge University Press. 6s. † Oxford University Press. 2s.

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor, THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

SIR,—Mr. Belloc's original position was difficult. By his letter he now makes it hopeless. His original statement was that Cromwell, in pursuance of his wicked "Plot" against the King, "landed in the Isle of Wight on December 16th, 1647, and left it a week later on the 23rd." Now it is clear that Cromwell was at Windsor on the 22nd, he alters his statement and asserts that Cromwell went to the Island on December 17th, returned to Windsor on the 22nd and got back to the Island on the 23rd. Unfortunately for Mr. Belloc, Cromwell did nothing of the kind. There is evidence that he was at Windsor on December 23rd, as well as on the 22nd. Would it not better serve the cause of history if Mr. Belloc now admitted that there is no foundation of fact for the alleged visit to the Island? May I add that I was well acquainted with Mr. Muddiman's book when I wrote my article, but I had not thought of reckoning Mr. Muddiman amongst the "historians."

February 6th, 1935.

Yours faithfully,

ISAAC FOOT.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1935.

AFTER TWO YEARS.

AMONGST those who once hailed with joy the rising sun of the Swastika and to-day are disappointed by the practices of the Hitler régime, not a few are complaining that the party now in power has not been faithful to its programme. This grievance, however, is beside the mark, because the abstruse and disconnected document dignified by the name of Programme contributed extremely little to the victory of National Socialism. Not even the Leader took seriously the bungled achievement of Gottfried Feder—who has since also vanished into oblivion—and the masses who were carried away by it had, for the most part, only a very hazy notion of its meaning. If they appeal to it now, that is merely a belated attempt to justify support of a movement that has not brought them what they hoped it would. Moreover, they forget that in the years preceding the Revolution they asked practically no questions as to the real goal of the journey, but followed Hitler blindly, in mystic faith in his personality and in the firm conviction that he would lead them, not only to better times, but to glorious times.

Not that nothing was promised. The minor agitators in particular were not lacking in pledges. They told each man what he wanted to hear, and troubled themselves little about the inconsistency of the promises they made, according to need and according to their audience—to the landowners and the peasants, the big industrialists, the small business people and the working men. But a greater reserve was shown in this respect by the leaders. They, and above all Hitler himself, carefully refrained in their propaganda from entering into particular questions, discussion of which might have led to disputes; and Dr. Frick significantly observed that "it was lucky there was no economic programme." Thus all difficulties were evaded, and leading issues could be narrowed down to negations and polemics. Democracy and Parliamentarism, Marxism and Jewry were made responsible for all evils. The removal of these pestilential sores was the first condition for the creation of a new State, which should then

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increase its military strength—and in reality this was the only positive aim to be set up—which should throw off the fetters of the Versailles Treaty and ultimately unite all members of the Germanic race under the wings of the German eagle. Everything else would then follow as a matter of course.

There is no doubt that eager and successful efforts were made during the first two years of the Third Reich to turn this idea into reality. It is true that the frontiers have not yet been extended, save for the restoration of the Saar, but democracy has been beaten down; the Jews have been placed under special laws; the Marxists—in so far as they have not been obliged to flee abroad or trained to become good citizens in prisons and concentration camps by means of severe ill-treatment—have been placed outside the pale of the law; powerful armaments have once more turned Germany into a military State, which makes her neighbours uneasy; her contempt for treaties has helped the system to achieve a few triumphs which bring consolation for the shattering of certain hopes, once cherished, of alliances.

But all these are things which, in the main, merely satisfy the thirst for prestige. For a time they may be sufficient for a nation; in the long run it must demand more, and, no matter what promises have been made, it expects something more from a radical Revolution than increased prestige abroad, which carries with it the danger of isolating the country into the bargain. The new rulers must furnish proof of their ability to meet the vital needs of the State and its citizens better than their predecessors. A nation cannot exist on national idealism, even if it is more genuine and more estimable than that of Hitlerism. It makes justifiable material claims. It desires well-ordered finance, progressive economic policy, and, above all, an improvement—or at any rate no deterioration—in the standard of living amongst its working classes. A Government, however constituted, which is not in a position to fulfil these demands, or even to show clearly which way it intends to go, pronounces sentence on itself and its Revolution.

This is the position of the German Dictatorship, which, far from reviving trade and setting finance on a secure foundation during the past two years, has brought the country to the verge of ruin. It is true that, by dint of force and concealment of the facts, it can maintain its position longer than

some would expect. Moreover, conjectures as to its duration are fruitless. What is more important at the moment, in view of the admirers of the system in other States, is the fact that its inability to solve its problems has become clearly evident.

During the last months of 1932 the Leader made it known through his partisans that he was in possession of an infallible plan to restore trade and abolish unemployment, but that he would only disclose it when the destiny of the country was placed in his hands. Probably this story was only invented for agitation purposes. But at all events the new Chancellor very soon announced his serious intention of grappling with unemployment, and he spoke of a Four-Year Plan, of which the details were never revealed. Unemployment figures actually did begin to drop, and large numbers of the workers themselves, though excluded from all co-operation in reform after the overthrow of their trade unions, indulged in optimistic expectations that the new course would accomplish what democratic Cabinets and Socialist parties had vainly striven to achieve.

At first they did not recognise the dangers of the method which was now to be employed, and which meant that on the one hand an artificial inland boom was to be created by raising vast public funds, and that on the other hand many thousands who, despite the inflation of private enterprise, could not be absorbed by the latter, were to be sent to Labour Camps or forced, under threat of losing the dole, to do more or less unproductive work in building motor roads, etc.

The official statement of the glorious success of the "Battle of Labour" sounded extraordinarily favourable. Yet the fact constantly emerged that the sum total of wages did not square with the increased number of employed. The Government has taken great pains to correct these uncomfortable statistics; for example, in the *Statistical Year Book* for 1934 they simply reduced the sum reckoned as income from wages and salaries for 1931 and 1932, so as to be able to prove the progress achieved under Hitler's régime. But only the figures can be coerced, and nobody can deny that the expensive campaign to end unemployment has already come to grief, in that there can be no question of an increase in mass purchasing power and a resultant increase in the sales of agricultural and industrial products. Wages have fallen, and as National Socialist agrarian policy has raised the level of food prices enormously, neither the workers nor those

dependent on the workers' consumption have been benefited. To quote only one example: the retail sale of food for the year 1934 has remained quantitatively below even the bad years of crisis, 1932 and 1933.

Moreover, a downward tendency in the numbers of employed has recently become noticeable. Seasonal influences are not a sufficient explanation. It is the wretched financial situation that is responsible for greater caution in the artificial creation of labour. A short time ago the German Press announced that in the period between Hitler's accession to power and the end of 1934, eight milliard marks had been raised in short-term loans, of which over five milliards were to be devoted to creating labour. The publication of these figures is of course no proof of their reliability. The Press writes as it is obliged to write, and we need only point to secret instructions issued last month by the Ministry of Propaganda, urgently requesting the commercial Press "to publish more reports of the positive economic triumphs of the new Government." In any case it is also worth while noting another calculation made on well-informed grounds by the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, a paper by no means absolutely hostile to the German Government. It refers to an expenditure of thirteen milliard marks, mainly covered by the raising of new floating loans. The greater part of these thirteen milliards, as is shown in detail, has been spent, directly and indirectly, on armaments, and the percentage becomes still higher if the development of raw material industries and substitute raw material industries is added to the measures of preparation for war. We must further reckon the costs of the Labour Camps, which are also of markedly military character, the subsidising of exports, grants for agricultural and industrial undertakings, etc.

Be it eight milliards or thirteen, or a sum between these two figures, the Government is up to its neck in the water. It is easy to understand that the Economic Dictator, Dr. Schacht, desires to enter paths that lead away from the experiments of National Socialism, which are as amateurish as they are dangerous. His resources up to the present: non-payment of foreign debts and interest, forced loans from the Savings Banks, forced conversion of stock, have only been able to improve the situation to a very slight extent. The greatest damage must soon inevitably arise from his latest

attempt, even if the manœuvre were to be viewed with equanimity abroad, the attempt to limit still further the already dwindling body of exports, so that the countries which, on the basis of the Clearing Agreement, are satisfying the claims of holders of German stock from the surplus of German exports, should be prevented from doing so. But apart from all else, the Government is obliged to take into account the mood of its supporters. It cannot turn the rudder in another direction without causing severe social storms. The decree published a few weeks ago, empowering the Finance Minister to procure funds by means of credits, the limit of which is to be determined by the Führer on the advice of the Minister of Finance, throws a sidelight on the determination to continue the policy of loans.

There could be no greater mistake, however, than to prophesy the speedy collapse of Fascism in Germany as a result of the catastrophic conditions in economics and finance. It is true that ill-humour and discontent are rife amongst wide circles of the population, and in particular amongst those who are in a position to look ahead. But even if this opposition were organised and possessed a united point of view, it would scarcely endanger the system at present. For this there are many reasons. First, the régime relies on armed force. The differences that existed between the Reichswehr and the Government have been removed. The murders of June 30th and the purge that followed them have freed the army from the irksome competition of the militia. Its position to-day is undisputed, and it may well be said to have forced Hitler to divide his authority to a certain extent between the army and the representatives of capitalism personified in Schacht. Thus the Führer's dictatorship is restricted, yet the Reichswehr has no thought of pushing him aside or of allying itself with his opponents. He has done it great service, both material and moral, by his armament policy. For this reason alone it would be unable to let him fall, because, in spite of all that has and that has not happened, his personal prestige with the masses has diminished very little. Now, as before, he is regarded as the man of the best intentions, the deliverer ordained by Fate. People trust him, and decline to hold him responsible for the unmistakable evils ranging from economic distress to the unheard-of corruption of his satellites. This miraculous faith, which is stronger than that felt by the

Russian moujiks for the Tsar, may seem inconceivable to sober minds, but it is there, and every calculation that tries to ignore it will go astray.

At the same time we must not forget how firmly Hitler's prestige is rooted in Germany's relationships with other Powers. The foreign policy of the Third Reich, and the way in which other countries have reacted and are reacting, have been immensely useful in strengthening his position. He proclaims the breaking of the chains of the Versailles Treaty; he is never tired of demanding equality of status for Germany, and in almost every speech he asserts the peacefulness of his intentions. He is continually extending the hand of friendship to France in particular. The people, for whom a critical review of the situation is practically impossible because freedom of opinion is forbidden, cling to his resounding words. They do not ask, or examine, what is to be understood by the "moral and material" equality of status for which they are to strive. They are hardly aware, for instance, that in reality the demand for equality of armaments conceals the aspiration for unfettered sovereignty in the sphere of armaments, and they have only a dim notion that the chief aim of the attempts at an understanding with France is to separate that country from her friends and allies, and thus leave Germany a free hand to undertake adventures in Eastern Europe. The people are nourished with the conviction that the Fatherland is surrounded by enemies who are eager to attack, and that the great merit of the man at the helm has been to make the nation strong and ready for defence by wholesale rearmament and the revival of the military spirit. Thus not only those are won over who have been brought up in a nationalist atmosphere, but the effects of nationalist propaganda can be felt right in the heart of the proletariat.

The policy of other Powers, however, is very largely responsible for this development. The victor States, who watched with pitiless severity the fulfilment of the treaty conditions by German democracy, have retreated before the methods of German dictatorship. This is not to suggest that they should have replied by war and military occupation. But a united front and clearness of aim on the part of non-German Europe was lacking. What did speeches and diplomatic notes, stating that rearmament in violation of the treaty would be considered illegal, amount to? Berlin had the impression

that the Allies were disunited and were losing their heads, and the man in the street ascribed this confusion to the ruthless display of force under the Hitler régime. After Germany had banged the door behind her at Geneva, the others dispersed, unable to agree on their further procedure. Friendly persuasion alternated with very feeble protests, and for a long time a line of concerted action was sought in vain. When at last a basis was found in Rome and in London, Hitler felt strong enough to state his conditions and, at least for a time, not to retrace his steps across the bridges he had broken down.

None of the aims of foreign policy as set out in *My Struggle* has been achieved so far as the overthrow of enemies and the conquest of new territories are concerned. But, thanks to mistakes abroad—amongst which I should like to include the publication of the White Paper immediately before Sir John Simon's visit to Berlin—Hitler has become a danger to peace, a danger all the greater since those same mistakes have helped to strengthen his political power at home.

Thus we see the three strong supports of National Socialism: first, brute force, aided by bayonets, dominating administration, justice and culture, and superintending and ordering the life of the citizen, or rather the vassal, in every detail; secondly, the mystic faith in the Messianic qualities of the Leader; and finally an overheated national consciousness. Against these three pillars the waves of discontent are beating to-day without result. The worker, completely deprived of his rights in relation to his employer; the capitalist, troubled by fears of the future; the small middle-class man, betrayed in his hopes of the removal of big business and of the "breaking of the slavery of interest," all are groaning under the yoke, and in many cases they do not refrain from open criticism. But their grumbling is as fruitless as that of the countryman against the weather.

The only consolation is that all over the country there are groups of people who are ready to make sacrifices and, in face of the greatest danger, are seeking to keep alive the spirit of liberty. They are tending the sparks that are glimmering under the ashes, though the glowing flame will only burst forth after the inner re-birth of the German people. External events may hasten the process. Let us hope that they may not include war, which would destroy, not only Hitlerism, but much else besides, and not in Germany alone.

RUDOLF BREITSCHIED.

THE END OF THE TURKISH INVASION.

EVERYONE who thinks that the culture of the Christianised nations is an asset which it would be disastrous to lose, everyone who aspires, even if not an admirer of Christianity, to be what John Morley called "a good European," must recognise his obligation to those who, in the struggle against the Turks, saved from destruction the Christian states. These states form a group which, whatever we may think of the merits of non-Christian and non-European nations, is the most developed section of mankind, and is, moreover, the most powerful, virtually dominating the future of the world.

This group as we know it would not now exist, if it had not succeeded in repulsing the attack of the Mohammedan forces, represented by the Empire of the Turks. Europe was in danger of being flooded, as North Africa was permanently flooded, by the world of Islam. The escape was an extremely narrow one, and now that the danger is over it is unfitting that, through absorption in the problems and fears of to-day, we should ignore the magnitude of the peril.

The story of the rise of the Islamic tide over South-Eastern Europe, until it reached the gates of Vienna, is too well known to be repeated here. We are more particularly concerned with the course of the struggle in our fathers' times and our own. The salvation of Vienna by John Sobieski marked the turning-point, and thereafter the Turkish power began sensibly to decline. In what condition should we ourselves be to-day, if Vienna had fallen? The whole of Europe feared for its safety if Vienna fell, and Europe's subjection would undoubtedly have followed. Western development would have been cut short where it was in the seventeenth century. England, France, and Germany would have remained nations of peasants, with scanty populations and a minimum of trade. The industrial revolution would never have taken place. Europe would not have colonised America. Africa would still be the paradise of slave-raiders, supplying the Turkish pashas. We ourselves should have belonged to a lower class, to the Christian *raya*, or cattle, tolerated but without rights. Or, if Turkish policy had taken the form which it did in North Africa and Bosnia, our forefathers would have been forcibly converted to Islam, and we should have been brought up as

the children in Egypt or Algeria are brought up to-day. Instead of the public schools of England, we should have had schools like the Al Hazar at Cairo, where one sees a vast hall filled with squatting students, from whom there rises an incessant hum as they repeat passages of the Koran without knowing what they mean.

The last phase of the repulse of the barbarians from Europe belongs to our own day, and this phase is of special interest to us because the Government which, in fact, took a prominent part in delaying liberation was our own. The salient fact in the modern history of the Near East was the intervention of England as the saviour of Turkey. The fact of British intervention is all the more interesting because, on the face of it, our responsibility for the welfare of Europe, in respect to invasion from the East, was no greater than that of other European states, and would have been discharged by mere loyal support to the action of Powers more closely concerned by local proximity.

Yet for England in particular a vital concern was the trade with India, and men found that their general obligation to the welfare of Europe conflicted with their profits. For a hundred years financial interest competed with a sense of justice for the control of our policy. Political ideals had sunk from the conception of Christendom to that of the Balance of Power. To save Turkey we fought the Crimean War, and prepared for war in 1878. Down to the Great War itself, the argument that Moslem feeling in India precluded us from a policy which might appear anti-Moslem continually hampered the action that we should otherwise have taken. It is interesting that in the end the Turkish Government has itself become anti-religious, suppressing the rights of the Islamic clergy. A moralist might point to this fact as illustrating the futility of subordinating the moral course to self-interest.

It is a strange paradox that during the same period we gained a name for befriending freedom. This reputation began with Canning and with the fame of Byron as a fellow soldier with the Greeks. Afterwards it grew with the work of Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone, in the liberation of Italy. But it was again operative in the Eastern sphere through Gladstone's famous campaign against the pro-Turkish policy of Disraeli—perhaps the most memorable episode of his life.

The well-known election in Midlothian in 1880 was fought on the Turkish question. It was won by a policy which had no reference to the interests of the electors, but dealt with purely altruistic considerations affecting our policy in a distant part of the world.

On the whole the pendulum which swung between our pro-Turkish and our anti-Turkish policies inclined to the former. We did our best again and again to thwart Russia by preserving Turkey, yet liberation proceeded all through the century. The Greeks, Serbs, and Rumanians rebelled. In 1827, after the Greek war of liberation had dragged out its course, the Powers combined to sink the Turkish fleet at Navarino and, though the temper of certain classes in England was shown by the Duke of Wellington's description of this achievement as "an untoward event," the independence of Hellas was accomplished. Servia and Rumania won the freedom of small territories by reckless revolt. In 1854 the advance of Russia found the British Cabinet under Lord Aberdeen hesitating between concern for the Eastern Christians and anti-Russian alarms, so that we drifted into war in the Crimea. In the Treaty of Paris, which followed the war, declarations in favour of equal rights between Christian and Moslem were inserted, and helped to soothe the British conscience. The Turks wisely embodied these claims in a proclamation, but it remained a dead letter. Lord Aberdeen relieved his sense of regret in despatches to the Sublime Porte by such words as the following: "The Christian Powers will require from the Porte due consideration of their feelings as members of a religious community, and interested as such in the fate of all who unite in a common belief in the essential doctrines of Christianity, and they will not endure that the Porte shall insult or trample on their faith in any person who embraces it." Unfortunately the Powers proved ready to endure this insult for some sixty years longer.

Russia turned to more diplomatic methods. Hardly had the British ships returned from the Bosphorus than the Slavonic peoples of European territory began to cast about for means of attracting help. If Russia were not allowed to show sympathy it might be won in the west by adopting the Roman Faith. The Pope was asked to recognise the congregations of Orthodox Christians by allowing them to retain their married priesthood, and the liturgy in their own language. This

community of Uniats, as it was named, began to grow rapidly, but Russia took alarm and offered a more enticing bait. She supported the revival of the old church of the Bulgarians, and this proved a strong attraction. The Balkan Slavs had long been exploited by the clergy of the Greek Patriarchate, and the new Bulgarian exarchate, as it was called, met the desire for a revived national existence. The spirit of the Bulgarian peasants, who had been so downtrodden that when Kinglake wrote *Eothen* he did not even mention the Bulgarians, was equal to the risk and effort necessary for rebellion.

The events with which we are dealing connect the Eastern question with one of the famous episodes of English history also. To quote Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, "A rising in Bulgaria, not dangerous in itself, was put down by the Turkish troops with deeds described by the British agent as the most heinous crimes that had stained the history of the century. The Consuls of France and Germany at Salonika were murdered by the Turkish mob. Servia and Montenegro were in arms. Moved by these symptoms of a vast conflagration, Russia, Austria and Germany agreed upon an instrument imposing on the Turk certain reforms, to be carried out under European supervision." France and Italy agreed to adhere to this instrument, but England refused, a proceeding which was taken by the Turk and other people to assure the moral support of Great Britain, and probably to threaten military support against Russia. The action was cynical, and generous minds revolted against it. To the Duke of Argyll, who warmly supported him, Gladstone wrote: "The Eastern policy has been corrupting to the country. A healthier air has been generated by indignation at the Bulgarian massacres, which have thrown us back on our rather forgotten humanity."

The famous pamphlet, *The Bulgarian Horrors*, spread like fire. Within three days, forty thousand copies were sold. "The tract," says Morley, "was hailed with eager acclamation by multitudes who felt all that he felt, by its exhortation against 'complicity in the blackest outrages upon record within the present century, if not within the memory of man'; by its branding of the Turkish race as 'the one great anti-human specimen of humanity'; by its declaration that there was not a criminal in a European gaol nor a cannibal in the South Sea Islands whose indignation would not rise at the recital of that which had been done and which remained

unavenged." Gladstone was not the man for mere denunciation. "Indignation," he said, "is froth, except as it leads to action." What was really needed was the total withdrawal of the administrative rule of the Turk. At a mass gathering at Blackheath, he said to imaginary Turks: "Never again, as the years roll on, so far as it is in our power to determine, never again shall the hand of violence be raised by you, never again shall the flood-gates of lust be open to you, never again shall the dire refinements of cruelty be devised by you for the sake of making mankind miserable." All this recalled to men's minds the spirit of Milton's sonnet on the massacre in Piedmont, "Avenge, O Lord, thy slaughtered saints," the spirit that made Cromwell say that the slaughter "came as near to his heart as if his own nearest and dearest had been concerned."

When Disraeli's policy was debated in Parliament, Gladstone's peroration was memorable. "Sir," he said, "there were other days, when England was the hope of freedom. Wherever in the world a high aspiration was entertained, or a noble blow was struck, it was to England that the eyes of the oppressed were always turned—to this favourite, this darling home of so much privilege and so much happiness, where the people that had built up a noble edifice for themselves would, it was well known, be ready to do what in them lay to secure the benefit of the same inestimable boon for others."

In a later debate in Parliament, he attacked the argument that British interest was something superior to British duty, and said: "I am desirous that the standard of our material strength shall be highly and justly estimated by the other nations of Christendom; but I believe it to be of still more vital consequence that we should stand high in their estimation as the lovers of truth, of honour, and of openness in all our proceedings, as those who know how to cast aside the motives of a narrow selfishness, and give scope to considerations of broad and lofty principle. I value our insular position, but I dread the day when we shall be reduced to a moral insularity." Disraeli had correctly gauged the public capacity for panic, and all that Gladstone could do was to induce some ninety M.P.s to vote against preparation for war with Russia. The Congress of Berlin was called. The English Premier bluffed the Powers skilfully, and secured the restoration of Macedonia to Turkey. Five thousand villages which had been

actually released from the Turkish prison-house were put back under the régime of barbarism.

Gladstone's intervention, however, was not without effect. Without it there would have been no liberation except the cession of Bosnia to Austria-Hungary. Disraeli could not resist the creation of a small Bulgaria or the enlargement of Servia. Events soon proved the wisdom of Gladstone's view that the best barrier against Russia would be found, as he said, "not in a dying despotism, but in the breasts of free men." The election in England which followed, in 1880, showed how a jingo policy had misrepresented the nation, but the Turkish question was no longer on the table, and all that Gladstone could do was to persuade the Powers to join in demanding the execution of minor provisions of the Treaty, such as a small cession of sea-coast to Montenegro, and the addition of Thessaly to Greece.

It is not denied that British action had sacrificed several millions of European villagers to servitude, but this result has been somewhat obscured by the sense that the action was also futile for ourselves. It was followed by a reversal of policy and it led to the efforts of Germany, when she became a great Power with ambitions for colonial expansion like that of other great Powers, to realise that ambition by securing the control of the Turkish territories; perhaps, therefore, Nemesis may be recognised in the Great War.

In six years from the Berlin Treaty the policy of supporting the Turk was admitted to have been a mistake. We had regarded Bulgaria as a Russian outpost, but it rapidly appeared that both we and Russia had been mistaken, for Bulgaria proved independent-minded. Russia was angry, and Bulgaria turned for help to Russia's foe, England. We quickly found, to use Lord Salisbury's phrase, that we "had put our money on the wrong horse." It was Turkey which fell under Russian influence, and it was England that preserved Bulgaria from re-conquest by Turkey. So soon had Gladstone's prophecy come true, that if we wanted a bulwark against Russia we must liberate the nations of European Turkey and pursue a policy of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples." Injustice was the wrong policy, and we paid the price, but the price paid by the victims concerned was infinitely greater.

The chief sufferers from British intervention were the Armenians and the Macedonians, both of whom would

otherwise have become free. The fate of the Macedonians was peculiarly hard because they are of European stock; they belong to the Bulgarian Church, which taught an intense desire for education, and they had actually for a time experienced the liberation which was allowed to become permanent for their brethren in the new state of Bulgaria, from which they were arbitrarily cut off. They are of a vigorous type, and their leading men immediately began to migrate to free Bulgaria, so that at the present day the population of Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, is to a great extent Macedonian. Although it had become a European maxim that peoples once liberated from the Turks should never be returned, these virile people saw themselves put back under the yoke, and it is small wonder if this gruesome fate produced abnormal reactions. In our own day the tendency of the Macedonian revolutionaries to violence (which has continued because, when the Turks had gone, Macedonia received a government which it resented), has produced the ill repute of the Macedonian organisation. They may have degenerated, but we ought to remember the cause. The fact that these people, of European mind, had to live in their villages under a crude tyranny led them to feel a hatred for the tyrant which is difficult for us to imagine. It is well pictured in the novels of Vasoff, and in E. F. Benson's *The Vintage*. It helps us to understand the outlook of the captive Jews, when, in their psalms, they called a blessing on him who "taketh their children and dasheth them against the stones." The Macedonians who had tasted liberty were the last people to follow the maxim of oppressed races: "Bow the head and the sword will not strike." Insurgent movements elsewhere incited them.

The Armenians, who since the insurrection of the Greeks had been employed as the brains of the Empire, put their fate to the risk in 1894. The Sultan, rightly calculating on the selfishness and callousness of Europe, responded by the butchery of 6,000 Armenians carried out before the windows of the foreign Embassies. In 1897 the Greeks, by the revolt in Crete, and by a stroke of luck in rousing the sympathies of a British Admiral, secured the liberation of that island. The Macedonians were not so fortunate. The Revolutionary Committee, of whose descendants we hear to-day as a factor in Balkan politics, was founded in 1899 and created a rising in 1903. The massacres which followed led some of us to institute

relief work, and to form the Balkan Committee, for watching the interests of political reform. Lord Lansdowne, who was then Foreign Minister, was concerned for reform and encouraged our campaign in favour of imposing on the Turkish Government a scheme of reforms to include the appointment of a Christian Governor of Macedonia. Meetings were held all over England. An international Gendarmerie was formed with officers from the great Powers, excepting Germany. The Turkish Government evaded any real control, and snapped its fingers at Europe until, in 1908, an agreement made by Austria for railways in Turkey incited Sir Edward Grey to action. The controlling influence in Balkan affairs was the rivalry between Austria and Russia, and the situation offered a means of friendship with Russia, a valuable opportunity in view of English policy towards Germany. When England and Russia were seen to be acting together the younger and more intelligent Turks saw the danger, and by the Young Turkish Movement induced the Powers to withdraw their officers and trust to internal Turkish reform. But the Balkan States were not to be induced to leave Turkey to reform itself, and in 1912 they co-operated to attack Turkey. The first Balkan War, to the astonishment of the world, saw the small and inexperienced Balkan nations defeat the Empire which had dominated them so long. If things had ended there, we might, twenty years ago, have taken stock of the happy end to the episode of Mohammedan invasion of Europe.

But events had left a feud between the Balkan States, and this was furthermore to prove a weighty factor in leading to the Great War. Since 1918 the establishment of peace in the Balkans has been vitiated by the allocation of Macedonia to a government unwelcome to its peoples, and it is only with the recent achievement of good relations between Bulgaria and Yugo-Slavia that we can view the liberation of the Balkans as a settled achievement. Happily also we can regard the Turkish Republic of to-day as something wholly detached from the traditions of the Turkish Sultanate of the past. Progressive in many remarkable ways, they are as different in mind as their head-dress is different from the crimson fez of the Old Turks. Doubtless the deprivation of alien races and religions to dominate has left them free to develop the finer side of their nature.

The progress and enlightenment achieved under the present

Turkish régime may perhaps be taken as evidence that it was not the inherent qualities of the race, but the blighting effects of the system, and of the moral ideas behind it, which were responsible for the deadening influence of Turkish rule on all the countries which came under it.

The debt which we owe to the nations of South-Eastern Europe ought not to be forgotten. Their liberation was delayed by the egotism of the West, and their defects of character are the result of living under a régime of disorder. It was frequently said by the cynical that the persecutor and the persecuted were equally bad. But it is rather to be wondered at, considering their little experience, that they are alert at the first opportunity to pursue the aims which characterise civilisation. It is remarkable that they held to European ideas of education, of culture, of freedom for men and for women, of social betterment, and of political organisation. They held to the Christian principle of individual value, leading to regard for the welfare of all. They resisted the Mohammedan principle of fatalism. No sooner did any population get free from Turkish rule than it began to develop. Schools were immediately started, prosperity increased, and the peasant population became one of the happiest that one could see.

The episode with which we have dealt has furnished some of the most famous struggles of English political history. It has helped to create the standard of altruism which is happily characteristic of our country. It has developed the humane instincts which perhaps represent the only real progress in human nature with which many centuries have furnished us. If the idea of the value of individual life, which Christianity introduced, is of vital importance for the world, then the invasion and repulse of the Turkish conquerors in Europe has been one of the great events of history, and one which should arouse, now that we are at the moment of its close, our close attention and our profound gratitude.

NOEL-BUXTON.

THE NEW SOVIET LITERATURE.

IN the U.S.S.R. we attribute great importance to the new Soviet literature, that child born of our revolution. When I say "New Soviet literature," I mean, of course, that literature produced in my country since 1917—of which I may take as an example for English readers *And Quiet Flows the Don*, by Mikhail Sholokhov—as distinct from that which achieved world-wide fame before then—the writings of Leo Tolstoy, of Dostoevsky, of Turgenev, of Chekov and others. In this article I propose to deal with the spirit of the old Russian literature, and the spirit of the new Soviet literature, and of the distinction that we draw between them.

We do very greatly appreciate our old classics ; we are very proud of them, and we never had, nor have we now, any desire or intention of renouncing those great geniuses who produced masterpieces that will never die, as for instance, Leo Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, Chekov's *Cherry Orchard*, Turgenev's *Rudin*, etc. For my own part, I have always been a great admirer of Tolstoy, and I am very fond of re-reading *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina* from time to time. I believe, though I am prepared to hear that some disagree, that Leo Tolstoy is the greatest novelist of all time. (I underline "novelist" because of Tolstoy as a philosopher I have quite another opinion.) This old Russian literature constitutes a golden treasury of our culture. We will keep it, we will continue to read it ; certainly we shall make some critical selection, retaining what we believe to be of lasting value from the angle of our new requirements and rejecting what is outworn.

But our high appreciation does not blind us to the limitations of these classics, limitations inevitable in the literature of a certain class at a certain period of history, for in our opinion every literature is essentially the expression of the thoughts, the feelings, the experiences of whatever class dominates a given period, and which imposes its own mental and psychological impress on the whole culture of that period. Viewed from this angle what, then, was the old Russian literature ? It was the creation of men sprung from the old Russian nobility. Pushkin, Lermontov, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Goncharov—all of them represented the opposition to the Tsarist régime, the best, more advanced, more

intelligent part of the Russian landed aristocracy which in the past played a very important rôle in the history of Russia, but which in the nineteenth century had already entered upon a period of gradual decline and decadence, ending so dramatically in 1917. In the nineteenth century the Russian landed nobility was already a doomed class, and its best representatives long before the revolution had some vague forebodings of its imminent fall. They sensed the inevitable decline of their class, a few cut themselves off, crossed the Rubicon, and joined the revolutionary movement. But these were exceptions. The big majority of this progressive group among the Russian nobility had not enough determination to do so. They were weak men. They remained with their class, but they were full of inner dissension; they opposed the brutality and repression of the old Russian régime, but they lacked the courage to fight for its overthrow. They opposed serfdom, while at the same time they lived on serfs. This circumstance had important bearings on the whole spirit of the old Russian literature.

If you glance at the most important of the Russian classics you will not fail to notice that the main characteristics permeating the fabric were three: First, that it was a literature which lauded the weakling—the weak man, not the strong was, shall I say, the darling hero of those works. Secondly, it was highly individualistic; the masses of the people were either ignored entirely, or used merely as a background against which the heroes were thrown into relief. There were some few exceptions to this general rule, but they *were* exceptions. And, thirdly, this literature was extremely pessimistic; your true Russian was a weak man who had the best intentions in the world to remould humanity on the lines of love and justice, but who, in reality, hadn't the ability to "run a wheel stall." Only quite incidentally in the gallery of types left to us by these classic authors does there appear a strong man, like Bazarov in Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*. But he was a rare exception.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century there appeared a number of writers who had come from intellectual circles, of whom perhaps the best known outside Russia was Chekov. But with very few exceptions they, too, followed in the spirit of the old Russian classics. At the turn of the nineteenth century, however, another great literary genius appeared:

Maxim Gorki. Although in terms of time he belongs chiefly to the old period, in spirit he always differed from it. He liked strong men; he was full of fighting spirit, and looked on the world with more optimism than the older writers. After the revolution he became a leader of the new school of Soviet literature. But his example was unique. In his creative work he was the forerunner of the great revolution that had very soon to follow.

Why did the bulk of the old Russian literature glorify the weakling and indulge in pessimism? Had the Russia of the nineteenth century no strong men? Certainly it had. The history of the Russian revolutionary movement, from the so-called "Decembrists" rebellion against Tsar Nicolas I in 1825 up to the revolution of 1917 bears witness to that. In this movement there were plenty of strong men and women able to take their place alongside the greatest characters of all time. The peasant rebellions which were so frequent and which contributed so much to the abolition of serfdom in 1861 were also made by strong men. Nevertheless, when Turgenev and Leo Tolstoy came to write of the Russian peasant they produced feeble types—idealists, dreamers, characters like Platon Karatayef in Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, or Khor and Kalinich in Turgenev's *Sportsman's Sketches*. And when, in passing, these great writers touched on the revolutionary movement (Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Goncharov) they treated it with derision and drew not true portraits but unfriendly caricatures.

What was the reason for this? Simply that these great literary geniuses somehow did not notice, failed to see the strong personalities that were emerging all round them. Perhaps half-unconsciously they disliked them, and certainly this type, so foreign to themselves, did not give enough inspiration to their imaginative and artistic faculties. So, instead, the old Russian writers concentrated all their attention on the very intricate psychology of weaklings who, being much nearer to their own hearts, were a better source of inspiration. And since weak men never succeed in life, it follows inevitably that they will paint everything in dismal colours. The big discrepancy between the rapid flight of their imagination and the slow progress of their practical achievement makes pessimists of them, and so you get the pessimistic note throughout the whole literature of the Russian classics.

These geniuses actually developed into the Cassandras of their own class and of Russian life in general as they understood it.

The world at large was, I believe, very much surprised when, in 1917, quite suddenly there appeared on the Russian horizon the Bolshevik Party. For, whatever criticisms may be made of that party, one fact is indisputable: it consisted then, as it consists to-day, of men so strong, and of such determination and such iron will as can scarcely be equalled in the history of mankind. The harassed world, fed on the old Russian literature, not surprisingly asked itself in amazement, "Where have these people come from? Why has the great Russian literature never even hinted at their existence, or at the possibility of their appearance?" And in the absence of proper preparation by the old writers all sorts of fantastic explanations were advanced to account for this great mystery: That the Bolsheviks were not really Russians—one day they were Tartars, another day they were Jews, the next German agents, and so on. Of course, all this was foolish and unintelligent chatter, but the fault lay not only with the world at large, but also with the old Russian literature, which was unable to depict the strong forces and strong people pushing their way upwards. This was its fault, and at the same time its inevitable class and historic limitation. But, conscious of this limitation and in spite of it, we still appreciate and treasure the heritage left us by our forerunners in cultural development.

So much for the old. What of the new Soviet literature? Who are its creators? Nearly all of them spring from the workers and peasants and the intellectuals. They represent quite a different stratum. They express the thoughts, the feelings, the hopes and the fears of the new masters of the country, in the first place the working class: they interpret in their own way the spirit of the common man and woman whom the revolution brought to the top. This new Soviet literature is, of course, still far behind the old in respect of artistic mastery; such mastery could not be acquired in a day, although there are among current Soviet works some notable successes.

This new Soviet literature is totally different from the old in spirit: the typical hero of the old Russian literature was an individualistic weakling; the typical hero of the new Soviet literature on the contrary is a strong man. He is no dreamer

in the sense of the old Russian classics. He is not some abstract embodiment of all the human virtues, with no faults and no sins. He is a real flesh-and-blood man with his feet firmly planted on the earth and, to use d'Anton's fine phrase, his head proudly in the skies. He is a man of strong passions and powerful mentality; he has the will to carry out his designs; he fights, he reconstructs, he studies, he investigates, he experiments. Sometimes he blunders, sometimes he learns from his mistakes, but always he creates something; he successfully translates his ideals into everyday life. Such is the typical hero of the new Soviet literature. He is not an individualistic hero like the typical hero of the old Russian classics; the mass of the workers are living, moving, in the new Soviet writings. They are no longer a silent background against which the principal heroes move and have their being; they are themselves active participants. In the best works since the revolution the mass itself plays the rôle of the principal hero, and dominates the scene.

And then another thing: the old Russian literature was steeped in pessimism; the new Soviet literature, on the contrary, strikes an optimistic note. In fact, a great all-embracing optimism underlies, partly subconsciously, the whole tone of the new Soviet literature. If you read some poems and novels describing even the most difficult, the most tragic pages of the revolution, you never have at the end a feeling of despair and futility. You are always left with a feeling that in spite of the obstacles, the sufferings, the miseries, the good side of things, the revolutionary cause will triumph. What are the reasons for this great change in the spirit of Russian literature? They are obvious: the revolution itself speaks through our new writers. The new class which came to power in my country seventeen years ago is only at the beginning of its great historical rise. The future belongs to it. It has the greatest confidence in its creative power and in its ability to settle all and any of the vexed problems that may confront it on the way to its final goal. And this is the psychological foundation for the strong note of optimism which pervades the literature of Soviet Russia.

J. M. MAISKY,

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THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE GERMAN "KULTURKAMPF."

POLITICAL students all over the world, of all confessions and of no confession, even laymen who are generally indifferent to ecclesiastical disputes, have been following with increasing interest and also with increasing bewilderment the religious war which has been raging between the Nazi Government and the Christian Churches of Germany. We dimly realise that there are momentous issues at stake, both spiritual and political. We realise that this struggle is very different from those inevitable conflicts between the temporal power and the spiritual power, between Guelfs and Ghibellines, between clericals and anti-clericals, which are perpetually recurring in history. We realise that this is not only a conflict between a State which is fighting for secular aims and a Church which is defending her vested rights. Rather is it a conflict between two antagonistic religions, two conflicting ideologies. It is a conflict between the traditional Christian religion and a new-fangled subversive Nazi religion, which has nothing in common with Christian ideals.

In the conflicts of the past between the antagonistic interests of Church and State, a compromise or "*modus vivendi*" or "Concordat" has always been found practicable and has been generally achieved. It has always been found possible to draw the line where each will exercise an independent jurisdiction. But between two antagonistic ideologies no such compromise is possible. What adds to the perplexity and to the confusion of the layman is that in this German war he is not presented with a survey of the whole battlefield. Nor is he given a clear notion of the forces which confront each other in the struggle or of their strategy and objectives. For instance, in a Protestant country like Great Britain we quite naturally and almost inevitably concentrate on one episode, namely the struggle between some sections of the Evangelical Churches and the new National German Church. We are forgetting the essential fact that on the Christian side this war is being fought not on one front only, but on three distinct fronts, and that although there is one common purpose in all the Churches, yet each stands in a different relation to the Nazi enemy and is bound to follow a different strategy. It is essential therefore that we should

consider separately each part of the battle lines: the Protestant front, the Jewish front and the Roman Catholic front. And of those three lines, the Catholic line is by far the most important. It is the Catholic army which has first taken the offensive, which has fought the first battles and won the first victories. And it is through the wide breach which the Catholic victories have made in the Nazi front that the divided Evangelical forces have now been able to advance and to close their ranks.

Before we define the ultimate objectives of each of the belligerents, and before we examine the successive stages of the campaign, it is essential that we should take a clear view of the political background of the German conflict and that we should understand the main reasons why the Nazi Government had been compelled to embark on this fateful struggle.

Since the dark January intrigue of 1933 which unexpectedly transformed him from an alien Austrian agitator into a heaven-sent and omnipotent dictator, Adolf Hitler, even though he has not succeeded in proving his claim as the Saviour of the Fatherland, has, at least, established a record of spectacular political achievement, both constructive and destructive, which has probably never been equalled in human history. From his accession to power he has been bestriding the Continent like a Colossus. He has kept Europe in a state of breathless suspense and excitement by his foreign policy. At the same time in his domestic policy he has accomplished more fundamental and more revolutionary changes than any demagogue has ever achieved before.

(1) He has suppressed or driven underground the Socialist and Communist parties which represented a solid block of fifteen million voters.

(2) He has destroyed the once omnipotent Catholic party which since 1875 had held the balance of power in German political life.

(3) He has disfranchised more than 1,000,000 German Jews and German citizens who are either married to Jewesses or of non-Aryan descent.

(4) He has destroyed both the old federal structure erected by Bismarck and the new parliamentary system established in 1918 under the Constitution of Weimar.

(5) He has wiped out the territorial boundaries of the Reich and has brought under the central control of the

Prussian Government ancient self-governing States which had existed long before upstart Prussia had appeared on the map of Europe.

(6) He has destroyed the autonomy of the Universities, the liberty of the Press, the right of free speech and debate and has insured that the only opinions which German subjects shall henceforth be allowed to express or to listen to are those opinions which are expressed through the megaphones of the official propagandist.

(7) He has made "a new deal" with the peasants and the workers and has launched countless schemes of economic reconstruction. He has established labour camps in every part of the Reich and on paper, at least, he has succeeded in reducing unemployment.

(8) By negotiating a ten years' Peace Pact with Poland he has temporarily settled the most "difficult" of German problems, he has broken up the French-Polish Alliance and has enlisted the Poles as the allies of Germany against the common Bolshevik enemy.

(9) In defiance of Europe, notwithstanding a depleted treasury, notwithstanding an acute and growing economic depression, he has built up a formidable new army and a magnificent air fleet, for the purpose of compelling a suspicious and hostile world to surrender to German claims.

Whatever one may think of those political achievements and of the methods by which they have been obtained, we cannot help admiring the marvellous efficiency of the team work, the perfection of the party machine, the cleverness of the propaganda. Nor can we help admiring the magnetic personality of the Führer, his uncanny understanding of mass psychology, his titanic and devastating energy, his frenzied courage. The weird nocturnal flight of June 1934, the sudden swoop from the Rhineland to the capital of Bavaria, the dramatic arrest of his supporters who had become his bitterest enemies, the concerted and simultaneous massacre in Munich and Berlin, are as typical of the new policy and of the new methods as the Reichstag Fire Trial or the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss. Hitler may have temporarily failed in Austria and in Italy, but in Germany he has ruthlessly and triumphantly removed every obstacle in his path. Like Mussolini and Lenin he has achieved everything which he set himself to accomplish.

It has to be remembered, however, that so far, notwithstanding the apparent success of his multitudinous schemes, Hitler has antagonised every organised body in Germany and has only managed to carry out the first part of his plan. He has indeed laid down the political foundations of German unity. But the fierce rebellion in the very ranks of his own followers, a rebellion whose gravity can be measured by the merciless cruelty of the repression, the persistent seriousness of the economic situation, and the almost unanimous reprobation of the outside world, must have convinced the leader that his political position remains perilously precarious, that the opposition may again rise up in arms against him, and that the future of his government must continue to be in jeopardy, unless he succeeds in mobilising all the moral and religious forces of the German people in the service of National Socialism, unless he appears to the nation as the victorious champion of a crusade for the regeneration of the German race, and for the supremacy of the "German *Kultur*."

In that crusade, Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Rosenberg, the St. Peter and St. Paul of the new Nazi dispensation, acting in concert with, and under the guidance of the Führer, have a very definite and obvious objective. They have to attempt, in the furtherance of the new religion, what the Protestant Higher Critics had attempted to do in the name of secularism and rationalism. In the first place they have to rejuvenate what they believe to be an outworn, Christian, oriental creed, to expurgate it of its Jewish accretions and superstitions, to infuse into it the purer doctrine of the Nazi revelation and to bring this new mystical gospel into harmony with the political and moral needs of the people. In the second place they have to embark on the heroic adventure of establishing a new German National Church which shall absorb all the other Churches, which shall preach and proclaim the new dispensation in every parish of the Reich and which shall accomplish for the spiritual unification of the German people what the Nazi State claims to have already accomplished for their political unity.

Having decided to set out on this perilous adventure, the Leaders were fully prepared for the bitter and uncompromising opposition of the Roman Catholic Church. They knew that the Catholic Church has never accepted and cannot accept the supremacy of an absolute State. She cannot

surrender the independence of the spiritual power. Even as in France she resisted Louis XIV and Napoleon, as she resisted the Hohenstaufen and the Hohenzollern, she is bound to resist the policy of the Hitler Government. In the realm of dogma the Catholic Church has always proclaimed and maintained against the theological Higher Critics as well as against the unbelievers, the integrity of the Christian revelation, the indivisibility of the Bible, the authority and the divine inspiration of the Jewish Old Testament as an inseparable part of the Faith. Individual Catholics might fight individual Jews in the sphere of ethics or politics or literature or finance, but the Catholic Church has always condemned anti-Semitism on grounds of principle and religion.

Even at a time when the Nazi Party was still struggling for supremacy, the Catholic hierarchy repeatedly condemned the extravagance of German nationalists and anti-Semites. On Hitler's accession to power, the Vatican after long and laborious negotiation signed a Concordat in which the Catholic Church went to the extreme limits of concessions. But the treaty of peace was broken by the Nazis before it was signed, and the German Catholic Church had to defend itself against the fierce assaults of an enemy who was carried away by a spectacular victory and who seemed to have, on his side, the vast majority of the nation.

The first great battle between the Catholic Church and the Nazi Government was fought in Bavaria and lasted from October till the end of December 1933. Already in 1931 Cardinal Bertram had sounded a solemn note of warning and announced the coming "*Kulturkampf*." Two years later, the Primate, Cardinal Faulhaber, the greatest Catholic authority on Biblical criticism, preached and broadcast a series of five sermons to enormous and enthusiastic congregations gathered in the three largest churches of Munich, and denounced and repudiated every one of the fundamental principles of the National Socialist Religion. In the first four sermons he condemned the rejection of the Old Testament as a damnable heresy, he condemned the anti-Semitic propaganda as contrary to the spirit of Christianity and to the teaching of the Catholic Church, and he openly called upon his Protestant brethren to resist the new tyranny and to reject the new paganism. In the fifth and concluding sermon he denounced the Race Theory.

Exactly fifty years ago, Bismarck, at the height of his power and in the intoxication of victory, engaged in a similar *Kulturkampf*. He took ruthless measures to overcome a similar opposition. He crushed the opposition of the hierarchy by throwing in gaol five of the Catholic Bishops in Prussia and by ejecting 400 priests who had dared raise their voices against the government or refused to execute the new laws which their religion and their conscience forbade them to obey.

Last winter as Cardinal Faulhaber continued, week after week and month after month, to denounce the new paganism and to challenge the might and majesty of the new Cæsarism, every Bavarian citizen, whether a Catholic or a Protestant or a Jew, was asking himself anxiously how the Nazi Government was going to meet that challenge. To the amazement of the Bavarian Catholics and to the consternation of millions of indignant Nazis, no action was taken. Not only was the refractory Primate allowed to preach his sermons, not only was he allowed to hurl his ecclesiastical thunderbolts against the Nazi prophets. He was even allowed to print and circulate his attacks and sell them in hundreds of thousands of copies. The Roman Catholic Church had declared open war against the Government in the very stronghold and citadel of National Socialism. It had taken a vigorous offensive, but the Government forces refused to engage the battle. To the vigorous offensive of the Catholic enemy they only opposed a conspiracy of silence. It was an amazing and a paradoxical situation.

How shall we explain this paradox of the inaction of the Nazi Government and of the impunity of Cardinal Faulhaber? Why did Hitler refuse to meet the challenge of the Roman Catholic Church? Why, to use the famous phrase of President Wilson, was he "too proud to fight" the Catholics in December 1933, when he is not too proud to fight the Protestants in October 1934? It is surely not because Hitler is himself nominally a Catholic. Nor is it because Munich is the capital of Catholic Bavaria, as well as the Holy City of Nazism. It is not because the stronghold of the "*Braune Haus*" in the Brienner Strasse is overlooked by the little palace of the Papal Nuncio. Nor is it even because the methods adopted by Bismarck are supposed to have ended in disastrous failure. It most certainly is not because Hitler is the kind of man who would be afraid of resorting to extreme measures.

The one and sole reason why Hitler did not fight the Catholic opposition with the same weapons as Bismarck lies in the fact that his Nazi advisers must have convinced him that there was a much more efficient way of countering and frustrating the opposition of the Roman hierarchy. It would be bad strategy to attack the enemy line where they were strongest, namely on the Catholic front. On the contrary, it would be sound strategy to attack the enemy line at their weakest point, namely on the Protestant front. For the Catholic forces were united whilst the Protestant forces were divided. But it would be possible to take advantage of those divisions and to rally them against the Catholic enemy. Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Rosenberg were absolutely confident that if Hitler succeeded in reviving the old religious feud between Romanism and Protestantism, the future of the new German National Church would be assured.

There were a great many plausible reasons in favour of such a machiavellian policy. And the chances of success seemed to be much greater than any risks of failure. In the first place, the Lutheran Church might be trusted in the end to submit and to close their ranks against the old enemy. Before the war the Lutheran Church had been an Established State Church, its spiritual power had been subordinate to the temporal power and the Kaiser had been the "*Summus Episcopus*." The old principle "*Cujus regio, illius religio*" still prevailed. After the war and under the Constitution of Weimar the Lutheran Church became a free Church, but without any of the traditions of political freedom. All German history shows that in any grave conflict with the State the German Protestant Churches have seldom protested, that the religion of the State has always determined the religion of the subject, and that in the end they have always either yielded to pressure or surrendered to force.

In the second place, the Lutheran Churches were more profoundly divided in doctrine and to outward appearance they were much weaker to-day and much less inclined to fight than they had been for generations. A hundred years of negative Higher Criticism had undermined the authority of the Bible, had unsettled the minds of the people and made them more amenable to an Erastian compromise.

And, last but not least, the Lutheran Churches or at least considerable sections of them had been won over to the new

nationalist creed and especially to the anti-Semitic programme of the Nazi Government. It ought to be easy to coax a Church which prided itself on calling itself German, Evangelical and National, into accepting the elimination of the Jewish Testament. How could they conscientiously object to an honest and thorough-going anti-Semitic policy? Could not Hitler claim the authority of Luther himself? Was not Luther the Father of modern anti-Semitism? Had not many Lutheran leaders adopted as their motto the flaming anti-Semitic puns and denunciations of Dr. Martin?—"der Jude ist nicht ein Deutscher, sondern ein Täuscher; nicht ein Welscher, sondern ein Fälscher; nicht ein Bürger, sondern ein Würger." Was not Franconia, the Protestant part of Bavaria and the stronghold of Julius Streicher, the most fanatic enemy of the Jews and the all-powerful Governor of the Province? Was not anti-Semitism a deep-rooted tradition of a considerable section of evangelical Germany? Had not Treitschke, the most eloquent of Protestant historians, Paul de Lagarde, one of the most illustrious higher critics, and Stöcker, the most influential preacher and Court Chaplain of pre-war Germany, all come forward as the leaders of an anti-Semitic and national movement within the Lutheran Church?

Hitler's advisers might therefore feel themselves fully justified in thinking that by a judicious and intensive use of anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic propaganda they would, in the end, succeed in mobilising all the sections of the Lutheran Church in support of the National Official Church. To understand and to warrant their optimism it is sufficient to take up at random any one of the weighty political utterances which have moulded anti-Semitic opinion in Germany. Whether we consult the classical German History of Treitschke or the *Handbuch der Judenfrage* of Dr. Fritsch which for twenty years has been accepted as the Gospel of the German anti-Semites, or the recent fanatical pamphlets of Ludendorff, or the *Opus Magnum* of Dr. Rosenberg, Dictator of the Nazi Press, or the *Deutsche Schriften* of Paul de Lagarde, or the *Foundations* of Houston Stewart Chamberlain—we shall find that those propaganda writings which are all addressed to the minds of sound Protestants and loyal patriots, have three invariable "*Leitmotive*." The first theme is that the Lutheran Church is the specific German form of Christianity; the second that the Jesuits whose founders, Loyola and Borgia,

were "of Jewish origin" have always been the secret allies of the Jews, and the third that there is nothing to choose between the black internationalism of Rome, the yellow internationalism of Jerusalem and the red internationalism of Moscow.

Such, then, was the policy of the Nazi Government. Such were their confident expectations. If that policy of Dr. Goebbels and Dr. Rosenberg had succeeded, if those expectations had been realised, if the Lutheran Churches could have been united against the Roman Catholic Church and against the Jews, if the "Semitic" Old Testament could have been replaced by the Eddas and the Nordic Sagas and the Nibelungen and the divine anti-Semitic music of Wagner, the Nazi Government would then have achieved a threefold triumph. In the first place, they would have reduced to impotence the opposition of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. In the second place, they would once for all have liquidated the Jewish Question. And, in the third place, they would have unified and disciplined all the Evangelical forces and enlisted them in the service of National Socialism.

The reasons sounded all very plausible. But the unexpected has happened. Whereas all the political parties have been reduced to silence and to abject submission the Evangelical Churches have refused to follow the anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic lead of the Nazi prophets; rather have they followed the lead of the Catholic Church. German Protestantism has had the courage to protest. The German non-conformists have refused to conform. They have refused to listen to the old anti-Popery battle-cries. Instead they have listened to the trumpet calls of Cardinal Bertram and Cardinal Faulhaber.

Hitler has worked an amazing miracle. And the reason for this astounding change is simple and obvious. The Nazi prophets have over-reached themselves. Their extravagant theories and political practices made it impossible for any Christian leader to enter into any kind of understanding or co-operation or compromise with the new German Heathenism. No Evangelical clergyman can fail to see that the ideology of Herr Rosenberg has not the remotest resemblance to any conceivable form of Christianity and that, indeed, the new Nordic religion, the Aryan creed, as expounded in Rosenberg's *Myth of the 20th century* is the negation of every religious or moral principle which historical Christianity has ever stood

for and that any surrender of the German Churches to the Nazi gospel would be religious suicide, and the end of institutional Protestantism.

It is too early to predict whether the Protestant leaders will stand fast and remain united till the end in their opposition to the German Church. If they hold out, the Hitler Government must either resort to extreme measures or it must surrender. In either alternative and whatever may be the issue of the conflict, the consequences will be fatal to the Hitler régime, and its moral foundations will be undermined. In last resort, the authority of Hitler depends on the acceptance by the mass of the German people of the fundamental principles of the Nazi creed. For we must emphasise once again that Hitlerism is much more than a mere political system, it is a mystical religion. Its prestige is not based on any military victory. Nor is it based on any spectacular material achievement. On the contrary, the prestige of Germany abroad is lower to-day than it was years ago and the economic outlook is much darker. The German people are only accepting the moral boycott of the outside world, the loss of their civil liberties, and their severe economic sufferings, because a large section of them are still firmly convinced that Hitler is the chosen instrument of Providence. This naïve belief which was still so strong twelve months ago has been shaken by the insane spiritual experiment of a "German National Church." Spiritual forces have been released which for generations had been dormant.

The *Kulturkampf*, for the first time, is opening the eyes of the common man. It is bringing home to millions of honest and simple-minded Germans that Hitlerism, so far from uniting the German people, is dividing them, that so far from lifting them to a higher plane of civilisation, it is plunging them back into barbarism. For the first time millions of Germans are beginning to understand that the Nordic Race theory is only a new form of that old "*Selbstueberhebung*," that hysterical megalomania which brought about the catastrophe of 1914. They are beginning to understand that the present ruthless suppression of all political and spiritual freedom is but an aggravated form of the old despotism which was tried and which failed in the Great War.

CHARLES SAROLEA.

TRAFFIC IN ARMS: THE TASK OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION.

THE influence of second thoughts upon the course of history is a fascinating subject. Last November the Foreign Secretary, in "a very unfortunate speech" in the House of Commons, had affronted those elements of the centre and of the left who had united to promote the Peace Ballot in this country: he had created the impression, in capitals as remote from one another as Paris and Stockholm, that the British Government was more partial to the manufacturers of arms than to the disarmament movement. Quick to sense the harm which he had unwittingly caused, Sir John Simon had the courage to do Parliamentary penance for it a few days later. We see in the Royal Commission on the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms, which he promised in his second speech, the first-fruits of this repentance.

The Commission, which is about to face its formidable task, has had a mixed reception from the public. Any suspicion that its members might be in sympathy with the armaments industry has been dispelled by the scorn which that industry's most vocal mouthpiece, Mr. C. G. Grey, has hastened to pour upon them in *The Aeroplane*, which he edits with such gusto. Pacifists have welcomed the Royal Commission as a satisfaction of the demand, voiced by the *News Chronicle* and the *Daily Herald*, for some British equivalent of the revelations made by the Senatorial Enquiry in Washington. They do not, however, seem to be very clear what constructive measure they want the Commission to recommend. The League of Nations Union has so far maintained a discreet silence. It will no doubt accept the Commission's invitation to present evidence, and that evidence may be expected to relate to the international character of the armament industry and the stumbling-blocks which it is believed to strew in the paths of peace. But one of the Union's main objects has always been to bring about the restriction of military armaments not on the national but on the international plane. It is more concerned at the present time to prevent a frustration of the American initiative at Geneva in favour of an international convention for the regulation of the arms traffic, than to suggest the domestic legislation which, in the United Kingdom, would be best designed to give effect to the convention.

But, whatever be the real intention of the Government in establishing the Commission, however various the expectations of its findings, a fair examination on broad principles of the system under which war material is at present produced and sold will undoubtedly do nothing but good. The personnel of the Commission ensures the fairness of its enquiry.* The members have been derided as having no expert knowledge of the production of arms and munitions. That is their principal merit. They are an ordinary English judge and an ordinary English jury: and that is high praise.

The terms of reference of the Royal Commission are sufficiently wide, though its powers are not so sweeping as those of the American Senatorial Commission. In the first place it is to report upon the practicability and desirability of the much-canvassed "prohibition of private manufacture of and trade in arms." Secondly it is to consider what can usefully be done "to remove or minimise the kinds of objections to which private manufacture is stated in Article 8 (5) of the Covenant of the League of Nations to be open." Thirdly it is to examine the present British system of export licences and recommend any necessary modification of it. It will be observed that were the answer of the Commissioners, under the first head, to be unreservedly in favour of a state monopoly of manufacture and sale, the questions raised under the second head would fall.

There exists a whole literature upon the malefactions, real and supposed, of the armament manufacturers;† we need not elaborate them here. The controversy between the defenders and opponents of the existing state of affairs seldom reaches a very high level. The disingenuous methods of the apologists of the armourers is equalled by the naïvety of those who assume (as do most of their critics) that the only alternative to the present free play of commercial interests is complete nationalisation and that this is necessarily a desirable consummation. We are all familiar with the bloated capitalist

* Sir John Eldon Bankes, G.C.B. (Chairman), Sir Philip Gibbs, K.B.E., Dame Rachel Crowdy, O.B.E., Sir Thomas Allen, Sir Kenneth Lee, H. C. Gutteridge, Esq., J. A. Spender, Esq.

† Those with a taste for denunciation are referred to *The Secret International and Patriotism Ltd.* of the Union of Democratic Control, or to Mr. P. J. Noel Baker's *Hawkers of Death*. An excellent and fully documented analysis of the United States Senate Enquiry entitled *The Munitions Industry* is published by the Geneva Research Centre. *Profit in Arms* is the League of Nations Union's selection of the evidence.

who habitually adorns the Russian Communist poster: top-hat on head, cigar in mouth, he stuffs his pockets with gold while the toiling proletariat grind out shells for his profit and their destruction. It is the cynic's consolation to reflect that such caricatures are the handiwork of a government which, in a short space of time, has built up the greatest army and the greatest air force in the world through a system of the most complete state monopoly. Out of the frying-pan into the fire!

With this object-lesson before us, we shall beware of believing that a mere change in the methods by which the apparatus of modern warfare is produced will itself either reduce armaments or promote peace. The controversy over the nationalisation of armament manufacture is an important one; but it is only of relative importance. Of far greater moment is the question whether the foreign policy of a nation is firmly devoted to the promotion and consolidation of peace. If it is, it may well be advantageous for the government itself to manufacture the minimum of war material which it requires, and to remove from private individuals and firms the temptation to create and stimulate the demand for armaments of this type or that in different parts of the world. A great deal must also depend upon the degree to which the constitution of a state allows public opinion to exercise a control over military preparations. If truly representative government obtains—there are relics of it in Great Britain, France and the United States; if Parliament's power of the purse is a reality, and if ministers can be required to answer to Parliament for the conduct of any permanent official, then it is arguable that a state monopoly might operate as a means of restricting rather than expanding national armaments. But if the contrary conditions obtain; if the state is controlled (as in not a few great countries to-day) by an absolute ruler or a clique inclined to the pursuit of national prestige, not averse to military adventure, and resentful of international interference, very different consequences may ensue. In these circumstances it would appear that a complete monopoly of the manufacture of arms, so far from facilitating international control and making it more difficult to precipitate war, would do little but increase the power of the government to prepare aggression in an atmosphere of secrecy, enforced with the penalties of high treason. Those who doubt these conclusions are recommended to study recent German laws upon the divulging of

military secrets. Further, it is pardonable for students of bureaucracy to ask whether, if public servants themselves are engaged, not in watching and controlling private manufacturers and traders, but in producing and exporting arms themselves, they will be particularly diligent to detect, or to assist the international authority in detecting abuses. *Quis custodiat ipsos custodes?*

Such are the advantages and disadvantages of the state monopoly of the manufacture of and trade in arms which the Royal Commission will doubtless have to weigh, together with those less important considerations which have bobbed up monotonously in international discussions, from the First Subcommittee on the Manufacture of Arms of the Temporary Mixed Commission in 1921 to the rival memoranda* of the advocates and opponents of nationalisation laid before the appropriate committee of the Disarmament Conference in 1933. Of these less important arguments—for most of them are little more than debating points—one raises an apparently serious difficulty. It consists in the intermingling of the manufacture of objects for military purposes and of objects for peaceful purposes, and the use of the same raw materials or semi-finished products for both. At what stage is the distinction to be made? A careful report† of a non-party Committee of the League of Nations Union examines this problem in some detail. It adopts the definition of the Danish, French, Polish and Spanish memorandum of March 1933:

The abolition of arms manufacture is not designed to concentrate in the hands of the State all manufacture that might serve to produce arms. The sole object is to reserve to the State that part of industrial production whereby a product undergoes the first transformation which renders it unfit for pacific purposes and destines it exclusively for military use.

The report gives in an appendix concrete examples of the stage at which manufacture would pass under the direct management of the state. But the question whether, and to what extent, state monopoly can usefully be introduced is after all one which each country must decide for itself, taking into account

* Pro: Memorandum of the Danish, French, Polish and Spanish Delegations (Conf. D/C.G. 148).

Con: Memorandum of the American, Belgian, British, German and Italian Delegations (Conf. D/C.G. 148).

† *The Manufacture of Arms*, Pamphlet No. 359. 1d.

political conditions and traditions and the character of the national economy.

If nationalisation is not found to be practicable, there are many who believe that the evil effects of the private manufacture of and traffic in arms can be obviated by strict measures of national and international control analogous to those established by the Convention of July 13th, 1931, on the Manufacture and Distribution of Dangerous Drugs and the municipal legislation by which it is implemented. The great merit of the Draft Convention upon "the Regulation and Control of the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms and the Establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission," proposed on November 20th last by Mr. Roosevelt's Government, and now being debated at Geneva, is that it is equally applicable whether its signatories have their arms manufactured in state arsenals, in private factories, or in both. This is the third of three general treaties* which have been framed since the end of the war, to put a check upon the international trade in arms and ammunition. The first two—the Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye of September 10th, 1919, and the Traffic in Arms Convention of June 17th, 1925—failed to come into operation, ironically enough, largely owing to the obtuseness of the American Senate. It will be a tragedy if the rôles are now reversed, and Lord Stanhope is allowed to drown Mr. Roosevelt's new-born convention with cold water.

Briefly the new Treaty, which, except for the Italians, Poles and British, has received the support of all the delegations at Geneva, establishes a definition of arms, a system of licences for manufacture, export and import, and a system of international supervision and inspection, operated by a Permanent Disarmament Commission. The fundamental provision is that contained in Article 2 :

The manufacture of and trade in arms and implements of war being matters of interest to public international order, the High Contracting Parties assume entire responsibility for the control of these matters in the territories under their respective jurisdictions.

The signatory Powers are to permit no manufacture without a Government licence, valid for not more than five years at a time. They are to inform the Permanent Disarmament Commission set up at Geneva of the licences issued, of the orders

* For the text of these and previous proposals see the newly published *Official Documents on the Traffic in Arms*, L.N.U. 2s.

received from foreign sources, within a month of their reaching the works, and of the armaments actually manufactured. Arms may only be exported to a government, or to a public authority empowered by it to receive the consignments, and copies of the export licences must be forwarded to the Commission. One member of this body is to be appointed by each contracting party : substitutes and experts may accompany the members, and the Commission as a whole may co-opt experts. It may hear any witnesses or consult any persons who can throw light on its task. The duties of the Commission are to examine, co-ordinate and publish quarterly the information obtained from the signatories. It shall establish a permanent and automatic system of supervision, and conduct local investigations to establish the accuracy of the returns made by governments and to examine the efficacy of the national control exercised by them over the armaments industry.

It is against local inspection that the British Government (who had accepted it as part of a General Disarmament Treaty) have unexpectedly jibbed. They have also proposed that, if a Permanent Disarmament Commission is to be set up, it should be the subject of a separate instrument—a device, their critics declare, for postponing it to the Greek Kalends. This is not a detail which fits very neatly into the picture of a righteous Britain constantly striving in the face of an unrighteous and unresponsive world to promote disarmament.

There is, however, this important question raised by Lord Stanhope's observations in the Geneva Committee. Can such detailed regulations, national and international, of the making and disposal of arms do much good if they are unrelated to any limitations either upon the quantity or quality of armaments which nations may possess? True, the machinery of the American Convention, once established, would make it easier for a world-wide embargo to be placed quickly upon the export of arms to a country at war or threatening aggression ; the mere fact of publicity for orders and shipments would also have a salutary effect. But if nations may, without violation of international law, accumulate an indefinite number of guns or tanks or aeroplanes, by what criterion is the Permanent Commission or public opinion to judge a government's behaviour? Obviously, restrictions upon the traffic in arms would be far more valuable if they formed part of a general treaty for the reduction and limitation of national armaments.

Meanwhile, public opinion in Great Britain, the United States and France is becoming more and more roused against those interests which unquestionably have been deriving profit from the deterioration of international relations. The appointment of the Royal Commission, like that of the Senatorial Committee, is evidence of the depth of this public feeling, which governments can no longer ignore. The circumstances are, therefore, favourable to the introduction internationally of *some* restriction upon the making and peddling of lethal weapons and ammunition for private profit, even if it be only a small beginning. Simply by dragging the arms traffic into the light of day, as Mr. Roosevelt's Convention would do, something would be achieved. We believe it to be the only feasible measure at the present moment. It would embody in international law provisions which could easily be integrated into a general treaty for the limitation of armaments if and when it can be concluded. And they would inevitably stimulate a public demand for more drastic restrictions, such as penal legislation against the advertisement and touting of armaments by the manufacturers' agents. We believe that the least which public opinion expects of the Royal Commission, under its second and third terms of reference, is a recommendation in favour of the signature and ratification of the American Draft Convention with the consequent modification (very slight) of our domestic legislation. If they feel bold enough to go a little farther, let them consider the excellent proposal made in the majority report of the Temporary Mixed Commission of the League of Nations eleven years ago :

The holder of a licence (to manufacture arms or ammunition) must not be in a position to influence a newspaper, either by owning a sufficient proportion of its capital or by holding any post whatever in its offices. This measure shall apply equally to all directors, managers and high officials of the firm holding the licence.

The holder of a licence must agree not to carry on propaganda of any kind relating to the war material for which a licence has been granted.

The exercise of a legislative mandate is declared to be incompatible with the simultaneous exercise of the function of director or manager of a private enterprise engaged in the manufacture of war material holding contracts with the state.

JOHN EPPSTEIN.

LEOPOLD II, KING OF THE BELGIANS.*

"A NOTORIOUSLY dissolute monarch," the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, which is not much given to strong language, says of Leopold II of Belgium. Is this an unduly harsh judgment? Was King Leopold really as black as he was painted by a thousand hostile pens? Or may we think of him rather—as his champions would fain persuade us—as a great statesman, pitifully unfortunate in his private life and certainly no saint, but no extraordinary sinner? Let us try to see him with the eyes, if not of a Recording Angel, at least of open-minded and charitable fellow mortals, conscious that we are more sinners than saints ourselves.

The worst that has been said of the King has been skilfully reformulated quite recently in a book entitled *Leopold the Unloved* by a Swiss writer, Ludwig Bauer. The case for the defence was also set forth afresh not long ago by a biographer who knew the King well, Count Louis de Lichtervelde, published in an English edition in 1929. Let us listen first to Mr. Bauer. Here are a few typical sentences from a chapter in which he deals with the darkest side of Leopold's record, his attitude towards the Congo :

... For him a nigger was merely a biped who was to help him build up his empire and to provide him with lots of money. Although he had said many fine things about the uplifting of the blacks and about the light he wanted to bring into Darkest Africa, the only purpose of his oratory had been to win over Europeans so that they could not put obstacles in his way ; he told his fellow whites the things they wanted to hear. It never entered his head that he had given pledges which ought to be kept, not merely because a promise is a promise, not merely because it was to those promises he owed his empire, but simply as a fraternal and human duty. Leopold never troubled his imagination to present to himself the Congo nigger in actuality. These black subjects of his were mere shadowy beings who collected rubber and carried loads, so that he might press onwards towards the Nile and in Europe might build stately edifices.

A great portion of Mr. Bauer's book is devoted to Leopold's hypocrisy, callousness and unscrupulousness over the Congo, but he has much to say also about the King's other alleged vices and shortcomings, in particular his cynical and ungrateful handling of his Ministers and associates generally ; the

* April 9th, 1835-December 17th, 1909.

selfishness and inhumanity shown in his treatment of his wife and daughters and all his household ; and the vulgarity and frivolity of his many *amours*. It was one of the King's "rules of life never to praise," Mr. Bauer declares ; he could "never suppress a malicious utterance" ; "he never loved his fellows ; never had he wished to do them good" ; "whatever he did, he did to promote his own power" ; "pride, avarice, revengefulness, lust"—these, it seems, were some of his outstanding characteristics. The book is one long string of such accusations and insinuations, grave or trivial. If Leopold showed some fondness for his little terrier, "Squibs," it was "perhaps because he could thus annoy his wife." He was to be seen caressing it in the palace chapel during Mass on Sunday, and "watching through his eyeglass how infuriated the Queen was." If a pamphleteer in the 'eighties did not actually bring home to him, in a lampoon entitled *Saligaud II*, certain terrible charges of implication in the White Slave Traffic, "it cannot be said that any moral scruples would have restrained the King of the Belgians from the offences attributed to him. He would have denied himself nothing that could bring him pleasure." When in his old age he lived openly with the so-called Baroness Vaughan, the "vulgar and quarrelsome Parisian street-walker" whom he eventually married, he "never felt that his dignity was compromised by the *liaison*." Such is the picture painted of Leopold by his latest biographer, and it has been accepted as trustworthy by many reviewers of the book in leading English papers.

The English (or, to be precise, American) version of Count Louis de Lichtervelde's work was undertaken avowedly with a view to correcting the hostile estimate of King Leopold's character and career which the translators, Professor Thomas H. Read and Mr. H. Russell Read, found still prevalent in 1929. The weak point about this book is that it does not really grapple with the King's assailants. It takes the line that they may be disregarded. The Count's translators thus sum up his method in their Preface :

... Few in Great Britain and America know of Leopold as anything more than a picturesque old man with an enormous beard, whose love affairs and African exploitations made "news" a quarter of a century ago. That he was also that rarest of products, an able King ; that he was a match for Bismarck in diplomacy ; that he possessed astonishing foresight and equally astonishing

persistency in the pursuit of his aims and that these aims were genuinely patriotic and essentially unselfish scarcely anyone realises. In Belgium, on the contrary, public opinion, long divided, has come to accept these facts almost unanimously. The author has only expressed, with supporting documentation, the current opinion of his countrymen upon their second monarch.

There is much interesting matter, excellently set forth, in Count Louis de Lichtervelde's volume, but the portrait he paints of the King is sometimes rose-tinted to a really comical degree. Leopold's mother, Queen Louise-Marie, we are told, "inculcated in her son Christian sentiments which marked his youth and persisted through a troubled life." At the time of his coronation what most struck a French observer was "the air of natural goodness spread over his whole person" and "his noble and gentle face." Leopold I, the first King of the Belgians, had been "a product of that princely *internationale* which formerly permitted nations to be drawn together through their kings. His attachment to the country of his adoption was due to his high sentiment of kingly duty." His son, "a citizen of Brussels by birth, brought up in the Belgian atmosphere," had pledged to the country an "exalted love" and cherished Belgium "with the worthy preference of a great lord for the land of his family." And, in illustration at once of the young King's dynastic feeling and of his lofty idealism, the Count, without a smile, cites a letter which Leopold wrote when still only Duc de Brabant to the ill-fated Archduke Maximilian, wherein he expressed the hope of seeing "the Hapsburgs, united with the Coburgs," give free rein to "their legitimate passion to do good to all kinds of people."

Such sentiments are not out of keeping with the high-minded and patriotic sovereign whom Count Louis de Lichtervelde proceeds to depict for us : miserable in his marriage, bereft of the young son to whom he was devoted, but too much absorbed in affairs of state to allow personal misfortunes to crush him ; and as we turn over the pages we find ample and convincing evidence of Leopold's unceasing and far-sighted efforts for the public good. The scandalous tales regarding his *liaisons* are brushed aside as undeserving of notice. Nor does the Count condescend to deal with the accusations against the King of cynical ingratitude towards fellow workers, but he recounts incidents which do certainly seem in great measure

to refute them. In an enlightening chapter, for instance, entitled "The King and the Parties," we are told how Leopold, touched by the devoted co-operation given him by the Belgian Premier, M. Beernaert, at a period when his African venture was in serious jeopardy, wrote to him: "if the Congo exists, it is thanks to you"; and we are reminded of the deep grief he showed when M. Beernaert subsequently resigned. "When in 1894, in spite of all his entreaties, he saw himself obliged to accept a resignation which he had sometimes in moments of impatience and controversy desired, he was overcome by emotion. His voice was subdued, he bowed his head, and leaning on the table of the Council he broke into sobs." Recovering himself, the King said: "I cannot find words sufficiently to express my gratitude for the services which during six consecutive years M. Beernaert has rendered his country and his King by his work, his talent and his incomparable devotion."

In dealing with the Congo this biographer of King Leopold treats of it from first to last as a great enterprise undertaken and conscientiously carried out for the welfare of Belgium and in the interests of humanitarianism and science. Leopold's censors forget two things, he says: "colonisation requires long effort and the foundation of an empire is not a job for tender minds." And he tells this story:

... Speaking one day with a missionary bishop about the abuses charged to his administration, Leopold II said: "Without doubt, Monseigneur, that is sad, very sad, but one cannot accomplish a great work without doing evil. You build a cathedral; during its construction there inevitably occur many regrettable incidents. There will be injustices, accidents, disputes, sometimes violent fights. Insults and blasphemies will be heard, but in the end the monument is completed to the glory of God and the salvation of souls."

It was the same thing with the Congo! And the Count himself proceeds to show how all has ended happily!

... The errors of Leopold II [he writes] have been atoned for and the good he did lives and multiplies itself. At the present hour is not the Congo the most solid guarantee of the resurrection of Belgium after the disasters of the war? The Katanga produces already nearly 80,000 tons of copper a year. The whole colony with its natural resources—tin, cobalt, cotton and oil—with its mines of coal, gold and precious stones, and with its radium, will

soon achieve the economic independence of the mother country. The native population will gradually become large buyers of the products of Belgian industry. The introduction of machinery for new industries, the construction of railroads, the new equipment of the river lines will absorb an increasing portion of Belgian national effort. The Congo enterprise has turned out to be, as the King announced in 1890, "a work of foresight and perhaps of salvation."

There is something to be said for Count Louis de Lichtervelde's disinclination to dwell at any length in this volume on the disreputable side of King Leopold's private life, for it does not seem to have had much influence on his reign. A detached observer, the late Sir Arthur Hardinge, who was British Minister in Brussels for some years, says in his book, *A Diplomatist in Europe*, that the only Belgians who seemed to be especially shocked by the King's moral delinquencies were a section of the Catholic party, representing the devout middle class. "The general tendency," he says, "of the ultra-radical artisan, who had no religious convictions and had been taught by socialism to reject the old conceptions of marriage and morality, was to shrug his shoulders and say of the King: '*Il a bien le droit de s'amuser comme un autre. A sa place je ferais autant.*'" And Sir Arthur Hardinge proceeds to recall a story which used to be told with keen relish by the more tolerant type of Belgian—the story how, on one occasion, a clerical dignitary—"the Dean of Ostend" Sir Arthur styles him with doubtful accuracy—ventured to remonstrate with Leopold on the scandalous life he was reputed to be living.

... The King turned a piercing blue eye on him [Sir Arthur writes], and asked if he himself believed these statements, and, if so, what steps he had taken to verify them. The Dean, a timid man, lost his head and could only stammer, "*Mais non, Sire, seulement l'on prétend, l'on raconte, il a été avéré. . .*" "*L'on prétend, l'on raconte!*" interrupted His Majesty. "*Eh bien, M. le Doyen, on est venu me raconter une histoire du même genre sur votre compte. On me parlait d'une liaison . . . calmez-vous, M. le Doyen,*" continued the King, as the blushing Dean, amidst the shocked looks of the Chapter, poured forth agitated and quite sincere protestations of innocence, "*je n'ai pas ajouté foi à cette histoire. Vous voyez, messieurs, que j'ai plus de charité chrétienne que vous!*"

Sir Arthur Hardinge himself enjoyed evidently the way in which the ready-witted old reprobate brazened it out. Everyone

knew that the King was unhappy in his home life and that this did not prevent him from working energetically and conscientiously for the welfare of Belgium. His unseemly distractions did not much matter. That was the view of most of his own subjects. Perhaps a sympathetic biographer is justified, therefore, in dispatching the whole theme in a few sentences.

But it is otherwise with the tremendous question of the Congo. Count Louis de Lichtervelde would like to dismiss the late E. D. Morel as "an Englishman of French origin but a proved Germanophile," whose "unbelievable calumnies" no longer call for refutation: I have cited one of the passages in which he himself seeks to dispose of them. In making so light of that epoch-making book, *Red Rubber*, and all the other Congo publications by which Morel won his fame as one of the two or three most formidable pamphleteers in the entire history of the Press, the Count shirks a great opportunity. There have been few more dramatic episodes in modern times than the long and desperate duel between Leopold II, King of the Belgians, and the unknown Liverpool shipping clerk, forty years his junior. One of Morel's associates, Mr. William Walsh, thus summarises it from the standpoint of an admirer, and Morel's admirers in those days were to be counted by the million:

. . . Here may be seen the romantic spectacle of a young man in a shipping office—just one-and-twenty—setting out on a mighty crusade which was to extend over many years, to shake three continents, to hurl an iniquitous King from a usurped throne, to thwart the schemes of commercial and financial corporations composed of the wealthiest and most powerful concessionaires in the world, to save millions of lives that otherwise were doomed to outrage and death, and to restore some measure of their lands and liberties to millions more; and to do all this with a simplicity and lack of self-consciousness which is the mark of true greatness and which our pious fathers would have ascribed to the leading of Providence.*

The Times (December 9th, 1902) thus summed up the whole matter:

. . . The sufferings of which the picture was given to the world in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* are as nothing to those which Mr. Morel represents to be the habitual accompaniment of the acquisition of rubber and ivory by the Belgian companies.

* The "In Memoriam" issue of *Unity*, Vol. XCIV, No. 17, January 12th, 1925, devoted to E. D. Morel.

Perhaps Morel exaggerated—there is room even now for a dispassionate and thoroughgoing inquiry into his charges; but, outside the narrow circle of the King's out-and-out Belgian supporters, Leopold II still stands convicted of a great crime, and it will take a stronger and bolder pen than Count Louis de Lichtervelde's to vindicate him. Perhaps, indeed, it is idle to talk of any possible vindication. Perhaps, really, the fairest and most effective thing that can be said on the King's behalf is that he did not sin much more grievously than many other contemporary exploiters of native labour, and that not all his censors can afford to throw stones at him.

FREDERIC WHYTE.

MOSES MAIMONIDES.

MOSSES BEN MAIMON, commonly known as Maimonides, was born on the eve of the Passover, 1135. The 800th anniversary of his birth, which is being celebrated in many places, is worthy of recall, for in the records of the Middle Ages he stands out as the greatest Jewish thinker and one of the determining influences in the Christian scholastic philosophy. His name, with its combination of Hebrew and Arabic—Maimon being the Arabic for Benedict—and its Greek patronymic, is significant of his place in the history of thought. He was the supreme Jewish Aristotelian, and the fairest flower of Arab-Jewish culture. He was contemporary with, though somewhat younger than, the outstanding Arab philosopher Ibn Rushd, whose name is disguised in European annals as Averroes. They were both born in Moorish Cordova and nurtured in that centre of Islamic-Jewish civilisation. They both sought to combine the Hebraism of their creed with the Hellenism of Aristotle, to harmonise rational and religious ideas, science and revelation. They were forerunners of the Christian teaching which, a century later, inspired the Schools of the Latin countries. Maimonides read the writings of the other on the works of Aristotle and observed that they had much truth. Later historians, reckless of chronology, suggested that Ibn Rushd was at one time sheltered by Maimonides. Their lines fell in different places; Averroes was a statesman in his native land, Maimonides tasted the bitterness of exile from the days of his childhood.

The Jews of the Dispersion have tended to congregate in the intellectual capitals of the world; first at Alexandria, then at Rome, and, in the early centuries of the Middle Ages, at Cordova. Starting there in the middle of the tenth century an Arab-Jewish civilisation was spread through the Iberian Peninsula, and developed happily for two hundred years. It was rendered possible by a peaceful interlude in the advance of Islam which, in the seductive climate of Andalusia, sheathed the sword and betook itself to the humanities. But in the pursuit of the beautiful the Moors lost their vigour; and waves of ruder conquerors burst from over the sea upon their cities. Maimonides had barely attained the age of thirteen when the puritan Almohades who, like the Ikhwan of

our day in the heart of Arabia, preached a Holy War against all unbelievers and half-believers, carried their militant faith from Morocco to Spain, and captured Cordova. Jewish life and Jewish learning were exiled, for the choice was given between apostasy, the sword, or exile. Maimon and his sons preferred to follow Judaism in exile; they moved from town to town which had not yet fallen to the invader, till finally they were driven to cross to Africa and settle at Fez. There, indeed, the Almohades held sway, but were less oppressive to other beliefs. Yet the observance of Judaism was only possible by concealment. And after a few years the family continued their wandering and took vessel to Palestine. The lure of the land of Israel was strong in the Jewish poets and philosophers of Spain. But in that picturesque but intolerant age, when Cross and Crescent were joined in ceaseless war for the possession of Jerusalem, Palestine offered no asylum for the Jewish exile. The sweetest Hebrew singer of the former generation and of the Middle Ages, Yehuda Halevy, had gone there only to meet his death; and Maimonides, after a few months' sojourn in Acre, then in Christian hands and a centre of Levant trade, was forced to move to a securer city of refuge. In the rival fanaticisms aroused by the Crusades, Christendom in the East and Islam in the West denied a home to the Jew.

The wanderers found in Egypt at last a resting-place where they could profess Judaism freely and live at peace with their brethren. There Maimonides spent the remaining forty years of his life, and became the acknowledged head of the Jewish community. Egypt had been ruled for more than a century by Fatimid Khalifs, who belonged to the Moslem heresy of the Shiites; but the mass of the people were orthodox Sunnites, and hated their heretical governors. To support their tottering throne the rulers sought alliance with Frankish Christian and Saracen in turn. Finally Saladin, nephew and general of the orthodox Khalif of Damascus, established his sway over the country and united again Eastern Islam under a single rule. As tolerant as he was chivalrous he put down religious persecution throughout his realm. Maimonides settled in Fostat, the old city by the side of the brilliant capital El Kahira (Cairo), which, supplanting his native Cordova, became the centre of Islamic civilisation. He abandoned commerce, in which the exiled family were first engaged, for medicine. That was the science in which the Jews throughout

the ages had been pre-eminent; and he contrived, by his fame as physician, to take a high place in the Moslem as well as in the Jewish community. In turn he became medical adviser to the Vizier and to Saladin himself. When Saladin in 1187 achieved his life's aim, and having destroyed the Frankish chivalry at the Horns of Hattin, captured Jerusalem, he was induced by Maimonides to allow the Jews to return to their land. But his physician could not leave Cairo where, besides his daily duties at the Court, he was the guide and teacher of the Jewish community. He remained there to his death in 1204, but his body was carried to the Holy Land to be buried at Tiberias by the Sea of Galilee.

In a letter of Maimonides to a Jewish sage who translated his principal works into Hebrew, and wished to visit him and sit at his feet, we have a vivid account of his daily life:

My duties to the Sultan are very heavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the morning; and when he or any of his children, or any of the inmates of his harem, are indisposed, I dare not quit Kahira, but must stay during the greater part of the day in the palace. . . . I do not return to Misr (old Cairo) until the afternoon. Then I am almost dying with hunger. I find the ante-chambers filled with people, judges and bailiffs, friends and foes—a mixed multitude, who await the time of my return. . . . In consequence of this, no Israelite can have any private interview with me except on the Sabbath. On that day the whole congregation, or at least the majority of the members, come to me after the morning service, when I instruct them as to their proceedings during the whole week; we study together a little until noon, when they depart. Some of them return, and read with me after the afternoon service until evening prayers. In this manner I spend that day.

It is interesting that, some forty years ago, the depository for discarded archives in the Synagogue of Fostat, where he must have taught on the Sabbath day, was unearthed, and in its hoard of treasures there were several manuscript letters of Maimonides himself.

The field of action of the Jew in the age of Maimonides was narrowly circumscribed. He could excel in science, philosophy, and literature, but not in public life. The greatness of Maimonides is, then, to be found in his writings. His work is dominated by the clear purpose of introducing order and

reason into the life of his people, whose whole being was centred round their religious heritage. Judaism, like Christianity and like Islam in the Middle Ages, was a complete civilisation. There was a unity about life and thought in each of the three communities. But while the realm of Christianity and Islam was territorial as well as spiritual, the realm of Judaism was purely spiritual and cultural. On the other hand, the Jews exercised in the epoch a distinctive function of being the intermediaries between the two other communities, between the East and West, the carriers of culture and philosophy as well as of goods and money. They were passively international and passively national. They were knit closely together by their law of conduct, the *Torah*, developed from the Bible in the depository of the tradition known as the *Talmud*; and a great teacher among them quickly found recognition through their widespread congregations. Maimonides consciously aimed at being the lawgiver, the Justinian, so to say, of his nation. He recognised the perilous position of a people scattered over the world in small communities, in parts cut off from the outside culture, and threatened everywhere by physical and mental persecution: he felt the urgent need of law and order and reason to prevent disintegration and obscurantism. The Jewish people had no Sultan or King, no ecclesiastical authority with power to issue decrees to the community; but they were prepared to accept a leader who could expound the revealed law authoritatively, and bind together their communities by the force of his commanding knowledge.

Maimonides was master of the whole Arabic culture of his time as well as of the Jewish lore. The Arabic civilisation was pre-eminent in science and philosophy; and for two hundred years the Jews had taken their full part in its development. The writings of Maimonides are partly in the Arabic language, partly in Hebrew. Arabic, indeed, was the language of common speech and intellectual study for the Jews; and his greatest philosophical work is written not in the Arabic but the Hebrew script, indicating that he designed it for his people. He wrote prolifically, in Arabic, too, on medical subjects; but that part of his work had a more ephemeral importance. It was his interpretation of Judaism that has been an abiding influence to our own day for his people, and was an important link in the chain of Western civilisation. It is contained in a trilogy which bears the symbolic titles, the

"*Siraj*," or Light, the "*Yod Hachazakah*," or Strong Hand, and the "*Moreh Nebuchim*," or Guide to the Perplexed.

The first part of the trilogy is a Commentary upon the Mishnah, that is, the code of the oral or traditional law, which was compiled in the second century of the Christian era: the second is a codification of the traditional law as it had been elaborated in the Talmud; the third is a philosophy of Judaism, and in its broader aspect a harmony of the monotheistic conceptions of the Bible with the doctrine of Aristotle. The first two parts were deliberately designed to fortify the life of the whole Jewish people.

"Disasters," he wrote, "follow one another in our days. The need of the moment sets aside everything else. The wisdom of our sages is lost, and the learning of our scholars is hidden. . . . So I, Moses the son of Maimon of Spain, have girded my loins and studied all these works, and calculated the results issuing from them concerning all the commandments of the Law, in precise language and concisely, so that the whole of the oral tradition may be accessible to all in clear and intelligible words."

Maimonides was supreme in those qualities which were rare among the Jews, method and orderliness. He recognised the danger of excessive dialectic and speculation in their Schools, and sought to check it by a clear and ordered presentation of the legal tradition. The vast collection of the *Talmud* is consolidated and codified in fourteen books and one thousand chapters; and, just as Justinian had preceded his Digest of the Roman law with a text-book of the principles, so the Jewish codifier tabulated the law of practical conduct in a *Book of the Commandments*.

It is the third part of the trilogy, however, by which Maimonides became a world figure. It was written for a smaller class, the select few "in whose minds the truth of the Law is well established, who are perfect in conduct, but who are embarrassed by the apparent contradictions of philosophic teaching and the words of the Bible." Its aim is to show that revelation and reason are at one, and that the truths of philosophy are not only consistent with the teachings of Moses and the Prophets but were anticipated by them in allegory. To doubt that perfect truth had once for all been revealed was as difficult in that age as it is for the scientific thinker of to-day to believe it. The sanction of metaphysical,

moral, and political thought was found by Jew, Christian, and Mohammedan in Scripture and in Aristotle. Just as Philo and the Church Fathers a thousand years before had sought to harmonise Scripture with the current Greek philosophy by the method of allegorical interpretation, so Ibn Rushd and Maimonides and, later, the Christian scholastics sought to read the Aristotelian metaphysics, physics, and ethics into their revealed books. In the last book of the *Guide*, Maimonides emphasised the universal value and the rational principle underlying each of the precepts of the Mosaic Law. Judaism was not to cease to be legal in becoming philosophical. But beyond the observance of the precepts he declared that the good life consisted in the intellectual contemplation of God, which passed in turn into perfect love—what Spinoza called later the *Amor Intellectualis Dei*.

Neither the form nor the content of medieval philosophy finds favour with our generation. Its science appears antiquated, its outlook artificial; and, save in Dante, where it is enshrined in supreme poetry, it makes no permanent appeal. The writings of mysticism are for all ages, the writings of rationalism are soon dated. The *Magnum Opus* of Maimonides, then, though translated into the principal European languages, is not likely to be read save by the specialised scholar. In form it is a commentary upon the Bible, divided into three parts. The first deals with the metaphors, allegories, and similes of the Bible, and explains the nature of the universe and the angels; the second explains the nature of God and the celestial bodies; the third treats of the vision of Ezekiel—which was revered as the Mystical Doctrine—and of the Divine Commandments. Maimonides accepts the Aristotelian view that God is the unmoved Mover, transcendental and pure spirit; and the spheres are emanations of God, sentient beings that profoundly influence life on earth. On the other hand, he rejected the current belief of his age in astrology. He contended against Aristotle that the world was created, and not eternal; but he was not positive on that point where the Bible story and the philosophical view appeared to be contrary. Theology was for him the primary wisdom. The secular sciences, mathematics, astronomy, physics and anatomy, were "strange women whom he took into his household as handmaids of his true love," the divinely revealed *Torah* of Israel.

In his lifetime, already, there was dissension amongst Jewish teachers about his philosophical interpretation of the Bible. His rationalism seemed to the pietists and to the mystics a dangerous trend. After his death the fight waxed fierce. At the instance of his Jewish opponents, the Dominicans ordered a public burning of his books in Paris. Then, as now, there were those who believed that by burning books you could cauterise the cancer of free thought. But his philosophy, no less than his codification of Judaism, won general acceptance in the Jewish world; and it kept alive the light of reason in the Dark Ages in which his people were plunged. "Never," he wrote, "should man throw his reason behind him, for his eyes are not at the back but at the front." Jewish thinkers under his influence kept the philosophical spirit alive during the two centuries which were to intervene before the light of the Renaissance was shed upon Europe. At the time that the dawn of humanism began to break in Western Christendom, the darkness of obscurantism was deepened for Jewry. The Lateran Council of 1215 decreed the complete separation of Jew from Christian; while the steady decline of the Moslem power in Spain extinguished the last hearth of tolerance for the Jew in Europe. It is significant that the *Guide* of Maimonides was not printed in its original Arabic till the nineteenth century. It was in a new lamp, so to say, that it became a channel of light for the Christian scholarly society.

Translated first into Hebrew in the last year of the life of the author, and then from Hebrew into Latin in the first half of the thirteenth century, probably at the instance of the Emperor Frederick II, the *Guide* exercised a powerful influence over the Dominican scholar Albertus Magnus, who frequently cites "Moses the Egyptian," and, still more significantly, over Thomas Aquinas, whose *Summa Theologiæ* is, in scope and to some extent in content, its Christian counterpart. It was partly through the translations of Maimonides and Jewish translations of Averroes, first into Hebrew and then again into Latin, that the Aristotelian doctrine passed into the thought of Western Christendom. Yet the supreme philosophical influence of Maimonides was centuries later on one of his own race, and through him on the modern world. Spinoza, as most other Jews with intellectual strivings, was nurtured on the *Guide*, and the influence of the teaching of Maimonides is apparent as well in the *Theologico-Political*

Tractate as in the *Ethics*. The great medievalist and the father of modern philosophy were far apart in method and religious standpoint. They were akin in their faith in reason and in their search for a unifying principle of life, the imitation of the ways of God. Spinoza, indeed, thought and wrote consciously for humanity. Maimonides thought and wrote consciously for the Jewish people; and for six hundred years from his death, during which they were cut off almost everywhere from the broad stream of intellectual life, his trilogy was for them the Light, the Strong Hand, and the Guide to the Perplexed.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

AGGRESSION.

AGGRESSION up till 1919 had a moral meaning only. It meant attack, and implied that the attack was unjustified. But as every State had the unquestioned legal right to go to war in order to enforce its policy, aggression was in no sense a crime. It was merely the description applied by each side in a conflict to the action of its opponent, while its own measures were invariably called "self-defence." Yet aggression, if it was not a legal concept, was a recognisable fact; it was bad behaviour, and as it usually had the result of arousing resistance strong enough to defeat the State which practised it, it was bad policy too. This is why the stigma of Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles is so bitterly resented in Germany; for under it Germany accepts the responsibility for all the loss and damage "to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

The League Covenant marks a new stage. It involves the surrender, by all States Members, of the right to use war to settle their disputes. The only exception is the remote contingency of the "gap" in Article 15: i.e. a failure of the League Council to agree after nine months' handling of the dispute, in which case the Members reserve to themselves the right to take action to maintain peace and justice. As League States give up the right of war, so if they do make war they are guilty of treaty violation. Aggression thus becomes a crime, as between Members. It is notable that the Covenant makes no reservation of the right of self-defence, although delegates at Geneva state, every now and then, that it is unimpaired. None the less, when in 1925 Greece invaded Bulgaria and pleaded self-defence, Sir Austen Chamberlain said in the Council that such incidents had sometimes had serious consequences in the past, but—

It would be an intolerable thing—I go so far as to say that it would be an affront to civilisation—if, with all the machinery of the League at their disposal and with the good offices of the Council immediately available such incidents should now lead to war-like operations instead of being submitted at once for peaceful and amicable adjustment by the countries concerned to the Council.

AGGRESSION.

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But when the Kellogg Pact was signed in 1928, and the great majority of the States of the world renounced the use of war as "an instrument of national policy," some of them, including the U.S.A., added notes reserving self-defence, and Britain excepted some special regions for whose security she felt responsible.

It might, therefore, be supposed that the Covenant does not solve the problem of the State which goes to war proclaiming it is acting in legitimate self-defence. The Kellogg Pact indeed does nothing to clarify it. But the Covenant, in fact, draws the net about aggression pretty tightly. States Members have the positive obligation to submit their disputes to peaceful settlement, and alternative methods are laid down. More than that, the Covenant provides two working definitions of aggression in Articles 10 and 16. Article 10 runs:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Article 16 opens:

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 and 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League.

This means that aggression is defined as any attack which diminishes the territory or independence of another State; or as the use of war instead of the acceptance of peaceful settlement. More, and this is most important, the aggressor is not left to his own judgment; the League Council, under Article 10, and under Article 16 the whole membership of the League, are made judges of whether aggression has or has not taken place. So the Covenant, besides defining aggression, lays upon the disinterested non-combatants the task of *ad hoc* definition; and it becomes extremely hard for an aggressor State to get away with the plea of "self-defence."

History since 1920 has proved that the Covenant system works in this respect. As its drafters foresaw, from time to time a State goes mad and commits aggression. The rulers who ordered the attack are bound to justify it, and they see

that their people are so wrought upon by propaganda that they all believe they are fighting in self-defence. At such a moment the great bulk of the nation is dead to honour and good sense; especially if it is winning. It is, therefore, essential that non-interested States, those who in pre-Covenant times would have been "neutrals," must judge which of two disputants is breaking the peace, and must bring pressure upon it to stop. This is why the Covenant provides for sanctions against the aggressor. Inquiry into the dispute, and just settlement of its merits, are a totally different part of League procedure, and have nothing to do with determining the aggressor. For it is possible that the innocent party to a dispute may be goaded into breaking the peace. From the League point of view it is resort to force which constitutes aggression.

There has never been the smallest difficulty in determining which was the aggressor in hostilities between League Members. When Serbia invaded Albania in 1921 Mr. Lloyd George brought her to heel, as few remember, by invoking Article 16. It was perfectly patent that it was Poland who attacked Lithuania and took Vilna; that Italy committed aggression against Greece when she bombarded Corfu; that Greece invaded Bulgaria in 1925; that Bolivia marched into Paraguay in 1928; that Japan was the aggressor against China in 1931; and Peru against Colombia in 1932. Behind each of these conflicts was a tangled story of disputed rights and accumulating hostility. But under Covenant law, in every case, the aggressor defined itself. Each time the League offered peaceful settlement to both sides and the country which was on the offensive refused it. The completest case, as the Chaco Report points out, was in the 1932 war between Bolivia and Paraguay. Bolivia at first refused arbitration, except on her own terms, and Paraguay accepted it; later their positions were reversed. Each in turn was the aggressor, and if the League had used economic sanctions it should have been against the contemporary violator of the Covenant.

It may be objected that the result varied immensely; that in some cases the aggressor eventually gave way, as Italy did in 1923, or Greece in 1925, or Colombia last year. These reverted to loyalty to the Covenant, while others, such as Poland and Japan, held on their way unabashed. The reason for this is the weakness in the League system, which begins

a stage beyond the definition of aggression. The Covenant lays upon the League Members the duty of stopping the war, by conciliation if possible, by sanctions if need be; and here the collective system depends entirely upon the good faith of the non-disputant States. When they mean business—as they did over Greece—peace follows. Where they are determined to avoid the unpleasantness and risk of fulfilling their pledges, the aggressor goes unchecked.

It is interesting to note that the non-disputants, when intent upon breaking the Covenant, tend to say that they cannot determine the aggressor because they do not know enough about the facts. During the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, for example, the British Foreign Secretary misled many simple minds by repeating that the League could not act while the case was *sub judice*. This was, of course, pure special pleading. The fact that the dispute was obscure, and was under League inquiry, had nothing whatever to do with the duty of the other League States to stop the war. Both sides were offered a truce and peaceful settlement, from 1931. China consistently accepted every League proposal. Japan refused them all; she proclaimed herself the aggressor, and the destroyer of her fellow-member's integrity.

Here I arrive at the heart of my argument. The governments lose their way in attempts to define aggression, not because it is difficult to recognise, or to test, but because they are unsure of the good faith of the League Great Powers. They have seen them fail more than once to carry out their promises. They remark the habits of opponents of the collective system, who make long speeches, saying that it is impossible to define the aggressor. Another school, common in Britain, says "Trust us, we are gentlemen, our honour is sacred." On which the States which live in dread of attack reasonably comment: "Lithuania trusted you; and China trusted you; your honour is dust."

Hence the middling and smaller States try to engage the Powers in pledges to take action against aggression out of which prevarication cannot wriggle. They do not seek promises greater than those contained in the Covenant; but they want to make them hard to evade. Add to this that France is desperately anxious to be sure that Britain will be on her side if Germany attacks her, and so often tries to increase the Covenant obligations. It is worth while comparing

the general position, contained in the Protocol of 1924, with the more stringent provisions of Locarno, which met the demands of France. In the Protocol any State was counted an aggressor if it engaged in hostilities having refused peaceful settlement, if it violated a truce declared by the League Council, or made offensive movements. All States were to come to the aid of the victim of aggression according to those tests. Britain, having refused the Protocol, accepted Locarno in 1925. This pledges the guaranteeing States to come immediately to the aid of the victim, if in their judgment a flagrant violation of the peace, or of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, has occurred. That means, if France, Belgium or Germany, cross each other's frontiers with armed force, or assemble armed forces in the demilitarised Rhine zone, aggression has taken place. More, in committing the guarantors, Britain and Italy, to go immediately to war, without waiting to attempt peaceful settlement, it goes beyond and indeed violates the Covenant.

After the failure of the Protocol the general attempt to define the aggressor fell to some extent into abeyance. When Finland, however, proposed a Convention on Financial Assistance to States victims of aggression, it was Britain which took it up with enthusiasm and was mainly instrumental in getting it adopted in 1930. This treaty defines aggression as the refusal to accept steps taken by the League Council to safeguard peace, including mediation or any other means of peaceful settlement.

The Disarmament Conference revived the controversy once more. Here it was introduced by the non-League States, who have not the safeguard of Covenant law, and feel the "toothless" Kellogg Pact inadequate. M. Litvinoff of Russia opened the ball. He likes definitions and likes them detailed. So he proposed a Security Committee which produced on May 24th, 1933, a Draft Act defining aggression as :

ARTICLE I.

1. Declaration of war on another State.
2. Invasion by armed forces of the territory of another State, even without declaration of war.
3. An attack by its land, sea, or air, forces even without declaration of war, upon the territory, vessels or flying machines of another State.
4. A naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State.

5. Support accorded to armed bands, which organised on its territory shall have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal in spite of the demand of the invaded State, to take in its own territory all the steps in its power to deprive the bandits aforesaid of all aid or protection.

ARTICLE II.

No consideration of a political, military, economic or any other character shall serve as an excuse or a justification of aggression as defined in Article I.

An annex said that no act of aggression could be justified by the internal situation of a State such as revolution or defective administration, or by its international conduct, such as violation of the rights of foreign nationals, boycotts or frontier incidents. The Committee certainly had the Japanese methods in Manchuria in their minds when they drafted Article I paragraph 5. But the whole thing is based upon the various devices used by Covenant-breakers since 1919. M. Litvinoff took advantage of the Economic Conference in London to conclude a Pact of Non-Aggression between Russia and seven of her neighbours in the West and South. The treaty defines aggression in the same words as those of the Security Committee's draft.

It was to the World Economic Conference, too, that the United States President cabled on May 16th, 1933,

That all the nations of the world should enter into a solemn and definite pact of non-aggression. They should solemnly reaffirm the obligations they have assumed to limit and reduce their armaments, and provided those obligations are faithfully executed by all signatory Powers, individually agree that they will send no armed force of whatever nature across their frontiers.

Mr. Davis repeated this suggestion at the Disarmament Conference in June 1934. This simple definition of aggression as armed violation of territory avoids the juridical ambiguity of the words "resort to war" used in the Covenant Article 16. When Japan invaded Manchuria some British lawyers contended that she had not resorted to war, because she never declared war. This strange confusion between name and fact was eagerly seized upon by apologists for British inaction. It was perhaps natural that President Roosevelt should try to make it clear that when he said war, he meant war, and not its proclamation.

Another idea on definition of aggression has since been contributed by France, who has proposed that any State arming itself contrary to a disarmament treaty should rank as an aggressor, and should be subjected to economic sanctions beginning with the denial of war material, and increasing to boycott. Even the British government, which generally shies away from any commitment of this sort, has agreed that in case of violation of a disarmament treaty the signatories should consult as to what action to take to "restore the situation."

In general, however, Great Britain has steadily refused to hear of any definition of the aggressor. The Draft Act, prepared during the Disarmament Conference, and later used by Russia for her non-aggression pact, was met by Mr. Eden with complete opposition. His argument was that a rigid definition would either be needless, because the aggressor would be obvious; or it would be dangerous, because it made guilt depend on certain limited acts, regardless of the circumstances of the case, which might in fact prove that the technical aggressor was the wronged party.

It is true that a list of acts defined as aggression is bound to suffer from incompleteness. The would-be aggressor will think of some new method which has escaped from the list. The British government is reasonable enough in rejecting the Russian definition. It is equally true that the American President, when he makes the test the crossing of frontiers, is displaying that holy simplicity which marks the novice in international affairs. Direct invasion may be forbidden; it certainly is forbidden under the Covenant and Kellogg Pact; but peace-breakers can think of many another way of attacking the territorial integrity and political independence of their victims.

But the blank *non-possumus* of the British government is a serious thing. Their refusal to admit definition symbolises the greatest present obstacle to international organisation; for it is understood everywhere as a refusal to act in case of aggression. France, for instance, is resolute not to disarm unless she is assured that Britain will give the security of concerted action in a threat of war. Hence the debility of the Disarmament Conference. Germany, Japan and the other "unsatisfied States" are encouraged in expansive policies by a belief that Britain will not check them even if they invade

their neighbours. It is no exaggeration to say that world peace depends upon the British security policy; and since that policy is merely negative, the collective system is in flinders and an armaments race has begun.

The story is not finished, none the less. This question of aggression is perennial, and will turn up again and again till security is established upon proven good faith. Even now, with the international machine crawling along firing on about one cylinder, security is part of its load. For M. Litvinoff has salved an examination of the problem from the ruin of the disarmament proposals; and aggression will, as ever, be the crux of those discussions. If, as Señor de Madariaga once said, the world could honestly subscribe to a protocol running "The Covenant means what it says," there would be no need for defining the aggressor. But so long as the Great Powers, and especially Britain, will not commit themselves to join in a common action to restrain Covenant-violation, so long must the States which believe in the collective system go on seeking to convert them to its principles.

And, in the end, just as it has always been possible to know the culprit in League disputes, so it is possible to make a simple and fool-proof definition of the aggressor. The States which compile catalogues of sins, each of which is to be recognised as aggression, have gone astray. Their test is negative, a list of things a State must not do. The real definition is positive, and consists in a single thing the disputants must do. They must, under the Covenant, accept peaceful settlement. There is no getting out of this; it applies to every war and threat of war. It applies to the wronged and the wronger; and thus explodes the British argument about the innocent party goaded into hostilities. The innocent party cannot lose by an appeal to impartial judgment. It is possible that to make this definition absolutely watertight, it would be necessary to amend the Covenant to bring it into accordance with the Kellogg Pact by renouncing the residual right of war left by the gap in Article 15. League procedure, too, would need speeding up, probably along the lines of the Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War which Germany took through the League in 1931. This empowers the Council to impose a truce, to order the withdrawal of forces, to create a neutral zone and if need be to send commissioners to the spot to see that these orders are

obeyed. If they are violated, the violation is to count as recourse to war in the meaning of Article 16. These schemes are founded upon League experience, and they would greatly facilitate common action in many cases. But the general covering principle is that enunciated by M. Herriot in 1924: "The State which refuses arbitration; there is the aggressor." There is no possibility of evasion here; the test is simple enough and supple enough to please the English; it is complete enough to satisfy the French. Its acceptance by Britain would be an earnest of our sincere acceptance of the obligations of the Covenant and would enable the world to begin again to plough for the sowing of peace the ground which now lies fallow as a destined battlefield.

FREDA WHITE.

TOYNBEE HALL AND THE SETTLEMENT MOVEMENT, 1884-1934.

THE story of Toynbee Hall, the pioneer University Settlement, is that of a social experiment attended from the beginning by remarkable success. The international position which it now occupies as the "Mother of Settlements" in four continents was strikingly illustrated when at the suggestion of the American Settlements, which number about seven hundred, there was a radio interchange of greetings between them and Toynbee Hall on its fiftieth birthday.

Toynbee Hall was contemporaneous with the third Reform Act and the Fabian Society, and the Settlements were in fact a consequence of political democracy, on the one hand part of the process of "educating our masters," and on the other a result of the "sense of sin" (as Samuel Barnett called it) which began after 1867 to influence governing circles. The basic Settlement idea was not new. It was the idea of co-operation between the classes which had been expounded by the Christian Socialists but which bore little practical fruit until the generation after the Reform Act of 1867. The Christian Socialist experiments in co-operative production failed and the only concrete embodiment of their ideas was the Working Men's College where were applied the educational principles later associated with the Settlements.

There were individual "settlers" in the sixties, some, such as John Richard Green the historian, enlightened clergymen who combined social activities with pastoral work, and others, such as J. R. Denison, usually regarded as the first settler in the strict sense, who lived amongst the poor with the dual object of assisting and learning about them but not in any professional capacity. In the 'seventies, "settlement" and social work extended under the influence of Christian Socialism and the idealism of Ruskin and Carlyle, as developed by T. H. Green and Arnold Toynbee. There grew up in the East End of London, traditionally the focus of the problem of poverty, a number of social agencies, most of them like the College missions and the Salvation Army primarily religious in aim: and in 1878 the Bishop of London sent Walsham How as the specially designated Bishop for East London with the deliberate object of effecting a spiritual revival. Perhaps most

important of all, a young clergyman, Samuel Barnett, and his energetic wife, now widely known as Dame Henrietta Barnett, built up an elaborate social machinery in their sium parish of St. Jude's, Whitechapel, at that time inhabited largely by criminals and prostitutes, and undertook a famous series of visits to Oxford to awaken amongst the undergraduates an interest in the East End. The most notable of their disciples, a number of whom came to "settle" in their parish, were Arnold Toynbee and Alfred Milner.

But in the early 'eighties the East End was still "Darkest London" to the majority of the well-to-do, and the various social activities hardly touched the fringe of its problems. It was due to a remarkable social agitation, the causes of which are ultimately to be found in the economic situation and recent political developments, that the eyes of the nation were suddenly opened to the gravity of the social question. There were signs of a general awakening of public opinion in the early months of 1883, but it was not brought to a head until October, when W. T. Stead made a rather sensationalist pamphlet, *The Bitter Cry of Outcast London*, the basis of a national campaign for social reform in the *Pall Mall Gazette*. "Where is the leader of men who will preach a new crusade against the crying evil of our times?" The response was amazing. The *Pall Mall Gazette* was overwhelmed with congratulatory correspondence. The political parties united in declaring that something must be done. Lord Salisbury affirmed the necessity for State intervention (to the horror of a few purists in his party) and the Government appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into the housing of the working classes.

But the most important outcome of the agitation was the Settlement Movement. Barnett chose this opportunity of reviving and elaborating the idea of a colony of settlers which had previously been mooted at a meeting at Ruskin's house in 1867. He made it the subject of a paper which he read at St. John's, Oxford, on November 17th, 1883. Again the enthusiasm was remarkable. The *Oxford Magazine* spoke at once of "a new Oxford Movement." Amongst the leaders of the younger generation of Oxford men who collaborated in carrying the proposal into effect were Cosmo Gordon Lang, Alfred Milner, A. J. Balfour, J. A. Spender, Michael Sadler, Bolton King, Lyttelton Gell, Arthur Acland, T. H. Warren, A. L. Smith and Sidney Ball. Cambridge was anxious to be

associated with Oxford and the leaders of the movement there included J. R. Seeley, Oscar Browning, B. F. Westcott, James Stuart, Albert Grey, and of the younger men Prince Albert Victor, Duke of Clarence, J. Austen Chamberlain and G. C. Moore Smith. Meanwhile, another group was proceeding with the establishment of the Oxford House in Bethnal Green, which was the work of those who considered that the Settlement should be linked to the existing ecclesiastical machinery, as opposed to Barnett who held that it should be religious only in a general sense and should be hampered by no denominational ties.

But it is not to underrate the social idealism of the universities nor of public opinion at large as exhibited in all sections of the press to draw attention to another motive which underlay the "sense of sin" out of which Settlements grew. The general conviction that the upper classes had neglected their responsibilities and should make amends without delay was connected with fear lest the influence of the economic depression and continental socialism might lead the masses to a policy of social revolution. This fear was sometimes expressed quite frankly. An article in the *Quarterly* for October 1883, the month of the *Bitter Cry*, pointed out the danger due to the fact that the basis of contemporary social discontent was "not the presence of any exceptional suffering but the growth of a speculative conviction," as was illustrated by the enormous sales of Henry George's *Progress and Poverty*; while a writer in the same month's *Fortnightly* urged that rehousing was a necessary insurance against not only disease but also social revolution. Advocates of the Settlement idea commonly emphasised the increasing danger of the separation between classes and the failure of the rich to fulfil their social duties. "The wealthy middle class deserters from the Commonwealth must take up again their civic responsibilities," wrote Lyttelton Gell, the first Chairman of the Universities' Settlement Association.

Barnett's own main motives were three. A good liberal and democrat, he wished to educate the new "masters" upon whom the future of English democracy depended and to educate them for active citizenship. Hence Toynbee Hall must teach how to live and not merely how to earn a livelihood. He wished also to educate the upper classes, for he saw with equal force the dangers underlying the social ignorance

and indifference of the rich and he wanted them to fulfil their duties as leaders of the community until the masses were capable of producing leaders of their own. Furthermore, he intended Toynbee Hall to be a centre of information and investigation in social matters. Politicians and administrators had too long been dependent on pamphleteers and journalists for information about the poor.

The success of the Settlement experiment was soon beyond doubt and Toynbee Hall had many imitators. By the end of the century there were over thirty Settlements in Great Britain. The first American Settlement was founded in 1886 and the number of Settlements had increased to over a hundred by 1900. The work of Toynbee Hall itself was varied. In education Barnett developed the ideas of the University Extension movement and dreamed of the establishment of a Working Men's University. To this end he stressed the cultural side of the curriculum, developed facilities for discussion and social intercourse amongst the students, fostered learned societies and established two residential hostels on the model of Oxford and Cambridge Colleges. The Workers' Educational Association, too, was in a special sense the child of Barnett and Toynbee Hall. Its founder, Albert Mansbridge, was a former Toynbee student and a personal friend and disciple of Barnett, and the Association was the means of the nation-wide expansion of the educational ideals of the Settlement. But the latter's work in education went further. Barnett and a group of residents, chief amongst them J. Murray Macdonald, strove insistently in the 'eighties and 'nineties for the reorganisation of the national system of education, and in particular for the better training of the teachers and the widening of the opportunities of all for higher education. It is not without significance that the Education Act of 1902, in which many of their aims were achieved, was the work of an ex-Resident, Sir Robert Morant, and that his colleagues and superiors at the Board of Education in the 'nineties included at least three who were connected directly or indirectly with the Settlement, Sir John Gorst, a frequent visitor and a great friend of the Barnetts, Arthur Acland and Michael Sadler.

Toynbee Hall also went far in the furtherance of Barnett's other aims. It was the centre for Charles Booth's monumental inquiry into the life and labour of the people of London which first provided the legislator and the administrator with

the precise information about the problem of poverty which was an indispensable preliminary to modern social legislation. In local government Residents served on the School Board, as Guardians, and on the new bodies created for the government of London, in the formative years of which they exerted a valuable influence. Toynbee Hall endeavoured to create a sense of civic responsibility amongst both electors and elected and urged that party considerations should be subordinated to the need for good government. Its position as a neighbourhood centre was shown in the industrial crisis of 1888-9 when Residents intervened in the "phossy-jaw" dispute and helped the dockers in the great Dock Strike.

The success of the experiment was primarily due to Barnett and his wife. The genius of Barnett as Warden lay in his remarkable capacity for extracting the best from his fellow men. He made the ordinary man feel that there was a task to which he was exactly suited and he stimulated the man of more than ordinary stature to the fullest utilisation of his powers. But he did not simply mould individuals. He helped to mould a generation. He was one of the men primarily responsible for converting England to the policy of social reformism which reached its zenith with the Liberal administrations of Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith. He was amongst the first to set the problem of poverty in its modern perspective. He was a pioneer in adult education, in the provision of facilities for the employment of leisure, in the development of civic responsibility, in the fostering of sociological research. Yet Samuel Barnett cannot properly be considered apart from his wife. It is doubtful whether without her beside him to assist, to encourage, to spur him on, the modest young clergyman would have developed into the crusader against social evils and the leader of a generation. The Barnetts were complementary characters. Theirs was one of several partnerships of husband and wife which have contributed so notably to English public life in the past half century, and it is characteristic of both of them that it should have been one of the first.

It is impossible here to refer more than cursorily to the many other developments of national importance with which Toynbee Hall has been connected to so remarkable an extent under Barnett and his successors. They include old-age pensions, labour exchanges and unemployment insurance,

trade boards, the poor man's lawyers, the Boy Scout Movement and the provision of facilities for popular travel. Of the more distinguished of the Residents there may be mentioned: in the Civil Service, Sir Robert Morant, Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, Sir Arthur Salter, Sir William Beveridge, Ernest Aves and Vaughan Nash; in education, Sir Cyril Jackson, Sir T. Gregory Foster, Professor R. H. Tawney, Professor D. H. Macgregor, Professor E. J. Urwick, Professor Henry Clay, and Professor A. M. Carr-Saunders; in the law, Mr. Justice du Parc; in journalism, Mr. J. A. Spender, Sir Walter Layton and Mr. Wilson Harris; in politics, Lord Pentland, Major Attlee and E. F. Wise.

To-day under the Wardenship of Dr. J. J. Mallon the Settlement is carrying on in manifold directions the traditions of the Barnetts duly adapted to changing circumstances; in education, in social research, in local government, in the life of the immediate neighbourhood. Though it has not developed into the residential university of which Barnett dreamed, it contrasts with the ordinary evening institute by the cultural nature of its classes and the opportunities which it offers for social and intellectual intercourse amongst the students. It is the home of a great variety of organisations both voluntary and official concerned with the social welfare of the people of East London, including the out-stations of two Government departments and the local juvenile court. It is the meeting-place of many associations of working men. But its horizon is not limited to the vicinity. Amongst its important functions are the dissemination of information on social matters and the organisation of sociological research, plans for the extension of which have recently been set on foot.

Public authorities have taken over in part or in whole many of the activities formerly carried out by Settlements. This is an excellent proof of their success and accords with Barnett's idea of their proper development. They should be primarily centres of social investigation and social experiment, active in fields in which the State has not yet recognised its responsibilities or which are unsuitable for State intervention. At present Settlements are greatly concerned with the vital problem of the satisfactory utilisation of leisure, the full gravity of which is perhaps as yet hardly realised. Hence the emphasis on club work. Hence the stress on the cultural and æsthetic rather than the practical side of education. No water-tight

definition of the scope of Settlement activities is possible but it is broadly speaking coterminous with that of voluntary social effort. To the happy relationships which exist in England between voluntary organisations and public authorities Settlements have contributed much, and as long as there is a place for voluntary social service in the life of the community so long it may be predicted Settlements will continue to flourish.

J. A. R. PIMLOTT.

ST. DOMINIC AND HIS ORDER IN ITALIAN ART.

IT is, perhaps, somewhat surprising that the representations of St. Dominic and the chief Saints of his Order in Italian art have received so little attention compared with those of the Franciscans. Although no single scene of their cycle can claim the fascination, the appeal, of many in St. Francis' own life, his friend and *degno collega** is the hero of several dramatic incidents, while St. Thomas Aquinas, with his oft-depicted "Triumph," outrivals in artistic interest his contemporary, St. Bonaventura.† The gracious figure of St. Catherine of Siena may be set against that of St. Clare; of the two, her outward life furnishes more material for illustration. And while her Franciscan fellow-Sienese, St. Bernardino, is far more attractive than the stern Peter of Verona, the Dominican's sensational assassination may almost be described as a pictorial "best seller."

Moreover, if the Franciscan legends were fortunate in gaining early and vivid expression at the hands of Giotto and his pupils, the Dominicans can boast a great painter from their own Order—Fra Angelico, and the Convent of San Marco and the Dominican Church of Sta. Maria Novella in Florence are no unworthy counterpart to the Basilica at Assisi. In sculpture, if the Della Robbia seem to have had a special predilection for the Franciscans, the Friars Preacher can point to two superb monuments in the *arca*, or tomb, of their Founder in San Domenico, Bologna (to which several generations of sculptors, from Niccolò Pisano to Michelangelo, set their hand) and that of Peter Martyr in Sant' Eustorgio, Milan. The exquisite Della Robbia relief in the Loggia di San Paolo, Florence, commemorating the meeting of St. Francis with St. Dominic, will be remembered: the two Saints appear together in many pictures, by Angelico and others; for instance, in the "Disputa" (Conference on the Trinity) by Andrea del Sarto in the Pitti, and in Benozzo Gozzoli's fresco at Montefalco, where the Blessed Virgin sends them forth as her two champions. The story of Pope Innocent III's dream of a shabby-looking stranger supporting the tottering Lateran

* Dante, *Paradiso*, XI, 118.

† The two are said to have received their Doctorate in Theology on the same day at Paris in 1257.

is told contemporaneously by a chronicler of either Order; it is uncertain which borrowed it of the other, and both St. Francis and St. Dominic are depicted in this manner, usually separately but occasionally together.

An attempt is here made to put together some few of the chief representations of Dominican Saints in Italian painting; space forbids any adequate description.* We need not concern ourselves greatly with alleged "portraits" of St. Dominic (1170-1221), such as those at Bologna, or in San Domenico Maggiore, Naples: even if it can be proved that they were painted from life, we know that the art of exact portraiture was not understood at that date. Verbal descriptions are more reliable. The Naples picture does agree fairly well with these, and is known to have been there since 1233.† A century and a half later, with St. Catherine, it is a different matter, and we may accept as authentic the likeness by her artist-disciple, Andrea Vanni. And, still more confidently, those of the Dominican prophet Savonarola, by Fra Bartolommeo, himself a member of the Order.

St. Dominic's personal appearance is described by a Sister Cecilia, a nun of the Order in Rome who knew him well: "He was of middle height, his countenance beautiful, with little colouring, his hair and his beard very fair, and his eyes strikingly fine. A certain radiance shone from his forehead and from under his eyelashes, attracting love and respect. His hands were long and beautiful, and his voice was strong, noble and sonorous. He never became bald, and always retained his perfect tonsure, though the white hairs of age had begun to appear."‡ A similar account is given by Theodoric de Appoldia, one of his biographers; he speaks of the Saint's slight and agile body, his reddish hair and beard, and his voice "sounding like a trumpet."§ These descriptions suggest the fair type of Spaniard. Many of the pictures show the reddish hair and long, slender hands, but the eyes are usually dark: in some, as in the Crivelli polyptych of the National

* For biographical details, cf. the *Acta Sanctorum*, the *Catholic Encyclopædia*, Father Bede Jarrett's *Life of St. Dominic*, Professor E. G. Gardner's *St. Catherine of Siena*, *Thomas Aquinas*, by Father D'Arcy, S.J., etc.

† It forms the frontispiece to Father Jarrett's book.

‡ Quoted by Father Bede Jarrett, *op. cit.*, p. 145. Cf. Mrs. Jameson, *Legends of the Monastic Orders*, p. 364.

§ *Acta Sanctorum*, Vol. XXXV (August 4th), 1867 edition, p. 518. Though Theodoric's *Life* only dates from 1288, he is here quoting a chronicle contemporary with St. Dominic.

Gallery, he is made to look old and wrinkled. We know that he started growing a slight beard when hoping to go on a mission to the East. Theodoric adds that he was ever joyous (*hilaris semper et iucundus*), except when compassionating anyone in trouble.

Dominic, like the other members of his Order, wears its habit, the white tunic and scapular, with the black, hooded cloak over it, a leather girdle, and shoes. The scapular is said to have been added by the express command of Our Lady, as revealed to a distinguished convert, Reginald of Orleans, during an illness. A picture of this episode, of the School of Angelico, may be seen in the National Gallery: in the right half, Dominic kneels before her. He usually holds a Crucifix, a book, or a lily, and may be distinguished by a star on his forehead, or above his head, referring to the legend that his godmother, as she held him at the font, saw one on his brow. Sometimes a black-and-white dog, with a flaming torch in its mouth, is at his feet; this alludes to another legend, a dream of his mother before his birth. In the famous fresco of Church and Empire in the Spanish Chapel, Sta. Maria Novella, the black-and-white dogs guard Christ's flock from the wolves of heresy and, at the bidding of Dominic, attack them when molesting His lambs: curiously enough, the pun (*Domini canes*) seems not to have been thought of at first. It is in his character of defender of the Faith and confuter of heretics that Dominic appears here, but the same fresco elsewhere shows him in the gentler rôle of pointing the way of Paradise to penitents. Still more moving is the aspect of intense, personal devotion in which Angelico again and again depicts him kneeling at the foot of the Cross, as at San Marco, in the great Chapterhouse "Crucifixion" (where Aquinas and Peter Martyr are also seen), and in many of the cells.

The scenes from St. Dominic's life and legend usually chosen are as follows: sometimes six or eight of them are painted on a small scale round his figure; they are sculptured on his tomb, and chased in enamel on the silver reliquary containing his head (both in San Domenico, Bologna); they are shown in the bronze reliefs at the Dominican Church of Santi Giovanni e Paolo (*Zanipolo*) in Venice.

His birth, with his mother's dream.

He sleeps, as a child, on the ground.*

* An instance of early austerity, cf. *Paradiso*, XII, p. 76-8.

He sells his books, as a young student, to ransom a slave.

The dream of Pope Innocent, and propping of the Lateran.

SS. Peter and Paul appear to him in vision, and give him a staff and book.

"The miracle of Fanjeaux." Here the Saint, arguing with some Albigensian heretics, challenges them to submit their and his writings to an ordeal by fire: the heretical theses are consumed, while Dominic's defence of the Faith leaps forth unhurt from the flames.

Angels bring loaves to the refectory where Dominic and his Brethren sit foodless, in answer to his faith. (A twice-repeated miracle.)

The resuscitation of a boy named Napoleone Orsini, who had been trampled to death by a horse. (A delightful, naïve picture of this by Benozzo Gozzoli was lent by the Brera to the recent Exhibition of Italian Art in London.)

The Rule of the Order confirmed by Pope Honorius III.

The Saint saves some English pilgrims from drowning in the Garonne.

He ascends to heaven in vision by a symbolic ladder. His death.

The translation of his body to the new shrine.

St. Dominic is often represented in connection with the devotion of the Rosary, which he, more than anyone, made popular, though he does not seem to have actually invented it. When grouped with Saints other than those of his own Order, it is as Doctor, with e.g. St. Jerome, as in Filippino's lovely, mournful Madonna of the National Gallery, or as Founder of an Order, with e.g. St. Benedict. He is depicted as one of the patron Saints of Bologna. Titian's half-length "St. Dominic" in the Borghese Gallery, Rome, shows him with one hand raised as in exposition. Space does not permit of any full description of St. Dominic's tomb, already referred to, rich in statues and reliefs.* Guido Reni's frescoes on the vaulting of the Chapel which contains it represent the Saint's reception into Heaven.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-74) is often seen with St. Dominic, and, it must be confessed, tends to eclipse him in art in a way that St. Francis was never eclipsed by any of his Brethren, even the popular miracle-worker, St. Antony of Padua. From the first, Dominic, unlike Francis, had deliberately chosen learning, based on the study of the Scriptures,

* Cf. the comprehensive and beautifully illustrated monograph by Père Berthier, O.P., *Le Tombeau de Saint Dominique* (Paris, 1898).

as his weapon in the fight ; Holy Wisdom ranked even before Holy Poverty. Of this Dominican learning the Angelic Doctor was the paladin, his "Triumph" over heresy was its crowning glory. As Lord Conway points out,* it "bore to the Transfiguration the relation that 'St. Francis receiving the Stigmata' bore to the Crucifixion." The *locus classicus* of its portrayal in art is the Chapterhouse of Sta. Maria Novella, known as the Spanish Chapel, where the frescoes of the vaulting and walls combine to set forth the Dominican scheme of teaching and of saving souls. That on the right wall (as one enters) has been already mentioned ; the fresco on the wall opposite exhibits the "Triumph" of Aquinas and the system of medieval education. It is, of course, the subject of one of Ruskin's most characteristic and elaborate interpretations.†

Although it is now known that Simone Martini can have had no hand in them, some of the frescoes, and this in particular, are Sienese in character, recalling especially Lorenzetti's series of "Good and Bad Government" in Siena. They are now usually ascribed to Andrea da Firenze (*circ.* 1365).‡ Opinions vary as to the decorative and symbolic success of the rows of allegorical figures personifying the Virtues, Sciences and Arts, with their chosen exponents, but some individual instances are attractive. Above, in the centre, St. Thomas sits enthroned, holding an open book, inscribed with the text *Wisdom vii, 6* (of which the words *Invocavi et venit in me Spiritus sapientiæ* are frequently seen on his pictures) ; on either side sit the Prophets and Apostles who confirm his teaching ; beneath his feet crouch the discomfited heresiarchs, Sabellius, Arius, and Averrhoes ; they are, as usual, in Oriental dress. Infinitely finer artistically is the "Paradise" of Orcagna in the Strozzi Chapel near by, where the faces and forms are of wonderful dignity and beauty : the *Divina Commedia*, itself enshrining the philosophy of the *Summa*, is closely followed in this and the "Inferno" fresco, so that here, too, Aquinas triumphs.

A treatment of the theme similar to that of the Spanish Chapel was, with certain variations, carried out by more than one painter, by Traini, for instance, in Sta. Caterina, Pisa.

* *Early Tuscan Art*, p. 181.

† *Mornings in Florence*, parts iv and v.

‡ Both he and Traini (see below) were probably among the decorators of the Campo Santo, Pisa.

This apparently inspired Benozzo Gozzoli's picture in the Louvre, which came from Pisa. At Rome, in the Dominican Church of Sta. Maria sopra Minerva, Filippino Lippi shows Aquinas on a throne and in a setting of Renaissance architecture ; four female figures (perhaps the arts of the *Quadrivium* ?) share the throne, and in the foreground are groups of heretics whose writings lie scattered in confusion on the ground. In a lunette, St. Thomas kneels before the Crucifix* whence he is said to have heard the voice : *Bene scripsisti de me, Thoma*. He is often portrayed holding it, or a pen and book, or a chalice or the Host—the last in reference to his glorious Office for Corpus Christi. A gold sun is often seen on his breast ; the Holy Dove may hover above him. In Orcagna's altar-piece in the Strozzi Chapel, Our Lord hands the Gospels to him, the keys to St. Peter.

St. Thomas is said to have been tall and heavy, but well-proportioned, with a well-shaped head, slightly bald.† He, with St. Peter Martyr, usually appears in any group of Dominican Saints, or "Paradise" ; he is seen, full-face, half-length, in Raphael's so-called "Disputa" in the Stanze of the Vatican.

St. Peter Martyr of Verona (c. 1205-52) is easily distinguishable by the emblems of his death—a hatchet stuck in his head or breast, or both, or the blood streaming from his head. He was waylaid in a wood near Verona and set upon by assassins hired by some heretics whom he had accused. The story goes that he wrote the word *Credo* in his blood on the ground as he died. The scene is most familiar to English people from the picture in the National Gallery ascribed, until quite recently, to Giovanni Bellini.‡ The two assassins wear armour, one, on the left, is in the act of dispatching the Saint, who has fallen to the ground ; the other, on the right, pursues another Friar, his companion, who attempts to flee. In the background a shepherd, and wood-cutters at work in an enchanting thicket remain undisturbed by the tragedy. A rather different version, from Lord Lee's Collection, was shown in the recent Exhibition of Italian Art ; here there is a third assassin, and the lopped tree-trunks are bleeding in

* Still shown in San Domenico, Naples.

† One observer compares the colour of his complexion to that of "new wheat"!

‡ And called "undeniably" his by Sir Charles Holmes. *The National Gallery: Italian Schools*, p. 167.

sympathy! Titian's magnificent rendering of the episode, considered by Vasari his masterpiece, was unhappily destroyed by fire in 1867 in the *Zanipolo* Church, Venice, where it is now replaced by a copy by Cigoli. There is but one murderer, standing with his dagger over St. Peter, who looks up at a vision of child angels, while his companion seeks to escape. Fra Bartolommeo painted Peter Martyr several times, once with the features of Savonarola. Angelico sets him over a door at San Marco, with his finger on his lip, signifying the rule of silence. He appears in several National Gallery pictures. The walls of the Chapel at Sant' Eustorgio, Milan, containing his tomb, have frescoes by Vincenzo Foppa, some of which are scenes from his life.

Siena, as is fitting, is full of pictures of St. Catherine (1347-80), alike in the gaunt Church of San Domenico, where she worshipped, and which overhangs the steep, narrow street of her birth; in her father's house, now turned into an oratory, or cluster of oratories—and in the Pinacoteca; while in the stately Cathedral Library Pintoricchio has frescoed her canonisation by her fellow citizen, Pope Pius II. She carries a lily or crucifix. Sometimes, as in the full-length figure by Vecchietta in the Palazzo Pubblico, she is depicted with the stigmata; this is contrary to her own declaration that they were *inwardly* impressed upon her; their visible representation had been forbidden by authority, but popular veneration was too insistent. Sometimes, as in Sodoma's fresco in San Domenico, she is seen in the act of receiving them. Nothing can exceed the quiet and reverent emotion of this last, the famous *Svenimento*, or swoon, in which the Saint sinks back into the arms of the two Sisters tenderly supporting her. The next fresco, in which she looks up at a vision of the Madonna and Child and an angel miraculously bringing her the Host, is too superficially pretty, while the third, where Catherine is seen kneeling at the execution of a young noble, whom she had brought to penitence, is, save for her own figure, quite inferior in conception and execution. The full-length portrait of her by Andrea Vanni, already mentioned, is in another Chapel of this Church: the figure is stiff, but the face is finely spiritual; a woman kneels to kiss her hand, and it is suggested that the Saint is here pardoning one who is known to have traduced her.

St. Catherine often makes a pendant to her namesake of

Alexandria; in several pictures, as in the exquisite one by Borgognone in the National Gallery, the two "Brides of Christ" stand on either side of the enthroned Mother and Child, and the latter places a ring on the finger of one or other, in token of mystic espousal. In Fra Bartolommeo's version of her *sposalizio* in the Louvre, St. Francis and St. Dominic are seen embracing. In the picture by the same painter at Lucca, she kneels with clasped hands adoring the Eternal in the clouds, with St. Mary Magdalene kneeling opposite. This obviously inspired the "St. Catherine" of Beccafumi in the Siena Gallery; both are above their authors' usual level, and the Saint would seem to have imparted to two rather theatrically-minded persons some of her own sincere directness. Another mystical experience of St. Catherine's, the vision in which Our Lord offered her the choice between a crown of roses and a crown of thorns, is often depicted.

Various Sienese artists have painted the scenes in her house—her *sposalizio* again, and canonisation, miracles of healing, and so forth. Two of the most interesting are of historic incidents in which she played a leading part; in one, she admonishes the Florentines to make peace with the Pope, Gregory XI; in the other, she goes on an embassy to the same Pope at Avignon, to induce him to return to Rome. Gregory's return (in 1377) is the subject of a fresco in the Della Scala Hospital, Siena; St. Catherine appears in the foreground.

The limits of a short article preclude any account of the great Churches of the Order, or of other of its Saints, such as the beloved Archbishop Antonino of Florence, or Vincent Ferrer—the latter the subject of an imposing picture by Cossa in the National Gallery. But perhaps more than any renowned Saint the Dominican figures we love best to recall are the two unnamed Brethren, with grave, kindly faces, limned by Angelico in the cloister at San Marco, who, proffering hospitality to a stranger pilgrim, find that they have received their Lord Himself into their house.

EMMA GURNEY SALTER.

RELIGION IN MODERN LITERATURE.

WHEN I was present as a guest at a small gathering—composed mainly of clergy—at which Mr. A. E. W. Mason was to lecture on “Religion in Modern Fiction,” he opened his lecture by announcing that he would have found it almost as easy to discourse upon snakes in Ireland. Certainly, if one means by “modern” literature (as I propose to consider it throughout this article) that of the twentieth century, the search for religion throughout the whole field of purely creative literature does not yield a very plentiful harvest *at first sight*. As our eyes become accustomed to the new philosophy which we shall find is gradually prevailing over the whole of it, however, I think we shall suddenly awaken to the fact that religion has been present all the while beneath a really rather thin disguise.

A brief survey of that part of imaginative literature that displays religion in its traditional beauty will dispense with a certain number of books, and clear the way for that larger and more psychologically interesting body to which I shall return; and so I propose that we shall first look at a few of those novels, plays and poems of the present era that display religion self-consciously. Such works are sufficiently rare for us to get a very fair view of the whole; and an interesting problem immediately presents itself, which I shall not have time to stay and disturb; but must be content merely to state—that the majority of these novels are the work of women, while the poems and plays come from men.

One grand exception is, of course, *The Bridge of San Luis Rey*, in which Mr. Thornton Wilder achieves in a few brilliant strokes a transformation of the mediæval morality play into a modern American novel. It is the echo of an early age in religious literature; but it speaks in the voice of an enlightened era which has writhed through all the agonies of a reformation, and emerged purer and more tolerant—with some of the mediæval rough edges rubbed off in the process. Among the novels which have come from women those of Mary Webb, Miss Sheila Kaye-Smith, Miss Rose Macaulay; and, of a more sophisticated kind, Miss E. M. Delafield, are noted for their religious background in several important instances; but, with the exception of the historical romances of Robert Hugh

Benson, there is no one Englishman who has especially distinguished himself in this field.

In fact, the ruggedness of the mediæval drama has passed out of our modern stage almost entirely. Even Mr. Laurence Housman's *Little Plays of St. Francis*, though they certainly radiate something of its sunshine, have never fully recaptured that granite-like simplicity of action and utterance. The Middle Ages did not so much constitute an era as an atmosphere; and in that atmosphere the morality drama grew as naturally as the folk dance and the Gothic cathedral. In our artificial age we have so far rationalised all departments of literature that it is sometimes almost impossible to decide how far philosophy and how far creative imagination dominates the scene. In *Outward Bound* we have a play which has achieved a complete orientation from its mediæval ancestors; and in which we see a handful of souls spend the first week of their disembodied life in the bar of a small liner.

DUKE: We can none of us get away. We've stopped for good now. This is the judgment.

TOM (*pulling himself together*): No, it can't be. Here in the smoke room of a liner?

DUKE: Why *shouldn't* it be here in the smoke room of a liner? Have any of us really ever troubled very much to think where-and-how-and-when it might be?

ANN (*quietly*): Henry. They won't *separate* us—they can't. [HENRY *merely holds her closer—as if in defence.*]

DUKE: We're for it now all right.

This little scene preserves all the human fear of judgment and dread of the unknown that haunted the mediæval stage, because such fear must always remain an essential part of our mental fabric; but it reveals an entirely changed conception of judgment and eternity. The outward setting and behaviour of the characters has entirely changed, while their inward emotional experience and reaction to the situation has remained the same throughout all these ages. In this little incident we have a glimpse of the permanent and transitory in all drama reduced to a few utterances.

I doubt whether it would ever be possible, even if it were necessary, wholly to recapture the unsophisticated mediæval religious atmosphere in modern art. The novels of Sigrid Undset, the Norwegian Catholic writer, come within measure of achieving this for the fourteenth-century Norway. A

passage from *The Master of Hestkiven* in which the young Olav feels that the spirit of his dead wife is frantically endeavouring to save him from the blandishments of an evil woman before it is too late—deeply moving in its way—is not really in keeping with the simplicity of the age which it portrays :

No, this was not she—and it was as though he heard a cry coming from somewhere without ; a voice which he had heard not with his bodily ears called to him, aloud and wild with fear, trying to warn him. From somewhere, from the ground under his feet, he thought, the cry came—Ingunn, he knew, the real Ingunn, was striving to come to his aid. He could tell that *she* was in the utmost distress ; in bonds of powerlessness or sin she was fighting to be heard by him through the darkness that parted them.

Except for the “powerlessness or sin” with which the soul of Ingunn is revealed to us in a state of purgatory, however, this treatment of her young husband’s consciousness of her presence with him in this crisis is not quite in harmony with the general sentiments about the departed which have survived amid the scanty literature of the fourteenth century. The notion that the dead may not only be aware of our various states but may actually guide or thwart us has, so far as literature is concerned, only recently come into its heritage to any appreciable extent. Thus we have so mystical a poet as Mr. Countee Cullen, the African negro, saying in his poem “Ghosts” :

Breast under breast when you shall lie
 With him who in my place
 Bends over you with flashing eye
 And ever nearing face ;
 Hand fast in hand when you shall tread
 With him the springing ways
 Of love from me inherited
 After my little phase ;
 Be not surprised if suddenly
 The couch or air confound
 Your ravished ears upbraidingly
 And silence turn to sound.
 But never let it trouble you
 Or cost you one caress ;
 Ghosts are soon sent with a word or two
 Back to their loneliness,

a poem which is like an echo to the cry of Ingunn’s spirit to Olav as he fights the love which endeavours to take her place in his heart. Such a situation, however, is more in harmony with twentieth-century theories of the invisible world than with the primitive and elaborately symbolical conception of it in the fourteenth century. There we may hear of ghosts who desolately haunt these regions in search of the rest which they cannot find in their own abode ; but seldom, if ever, of spirits who can be summoned in a moment by our own need in such a way as to come between us and another.

In all cases where religion represents an emotional quality, as in the fear of the unknown, the possibility of life after death, and ultimate justice—it provides the best possible material for the literary artist who is a student of life and character, and there is no sign that these elements will ever lose their high place in all serious literature. There is no doubt, however, that a general feeling prevails among intelligent people that the very powerful *moral* element which had more or less dominated imaginative literature in the Middle Ages has slowly diminished until it disappeared from our midst almost before we realised that it had dwindled. We should probably be told by these people that what is generally known as “a good man” is as rare in modern fiction as a four-leaved clover in a meadow, and that the saint simply does not exist.

Now I am convinced that these critics are wrong, although I admit that at first sight they appear to be perfectly right ; and I think that the surface truth of their contention is to be traced to the same source as their fundamental mistake. We have grown so accustomed to thinking of sainthood in terms of mediæval thought that we are often quite unaware of a saint in our own midst because he is not adorned with that traditional and beautiful type of sanctity which characterised the saints of Europe before the industrial revolution, and in all parts of the world where industrialism has not found a home to-day. The type has not, of course, died out in Europe. We could probably name half a dozen such men living and working in our midst now ; but we should have to admit that such men and women—devoted and practical as their lives often are—seldom afford the best material for an artist who must work against a twentieth-century background.

There are, of course, a few grand exceptions. Miss Sheila Kaye-Smith in her *Green Apple Harvest* has given us a memorable portrait of two countrymen of simple saintly character. Clem is a natural growth of the heavenly soil; but his unhappy and stormy natured brother Joe has to wage a long battle with the flesh and the brutality of men and lapses again and again into weakness before the mystical side of his nature triumphs. This exception, however, confirms the rule, since Miss Sheila Kaye-Smith gives us here a glimpse of that quiet landscape of Sussex which had never caught more than the echoes of the great industrial system. In other of her Sussex novels the type reappears from time to time; and is not lacking in the work of other recent or contemporary fiction. Thomas Hardy and Mary Webb have both produced notable examples in more than one instance, and even Robert Elsmere is on the way to something of the same kind. In poetry the traditional type of saint often appears; but in the Victorian era it seems to have been left to Robert Browning and Matthew Arnold to give him any pride of place.

The greater part of modern literature is perhaps unconsciously concerned with the heart beats of an industrial machinery that has gradually moulded our education, commercialised our literature, worn down our imagination; and, by a steady process that was largely unconscious, achieved a new kind of civilisation in Europe that finally involved the whole continent in war. Against a background such as this, the traditional saint, the man of holiness, does not flourish; and there is no work, so far as I am aware, which endeavours to exhibit him in so uncongenial an atmosphere. The change seems to have begun, moreover, just at the time when our countryside was beginning to be sunk in towns. The mediæval morality play took this type of sainthood for granted, and would have found it difficult to realise any other kind; and even the Elizabethan drama retains something of this attitude. The thunder of Shakespearean tragedy is relieved by flashes of crystal purity amid the black and molten mountain of crime and treachery. Desdemona, Cordelia, Juliet—to mention but a few—are all women who have attained the highest peak of grace, and Harry the Fifth is a reincarnation of the crusading king. A change, however, has already been wrought; and when we step into the eighteenth century we have already left the type behind.

By this I do not mean that the saint disappears from literature; but that he has begun to evolve—a process which I shall endeavour to show is not yet completed. Oliver Goldsmith created one who may fairly be taken as representing the first real step in this evolution of the saint after Shakespeare. The Vicar of Wakefield is neither a watered-down edition of the mediæval mystic nor a civilised edition of the crusading king. He is something new. We see in him the man of sanctity certainly; but one of worldly wisdom and practical ability, and, above all, of deep and abiding humanity. For I am convinced that the mediæval saint's estrangement from the modern world is due to his lack of humanity, whether he were mystic or crusader, and this theory is borne out by the fact that the solitary exception to that rule—St. Francis of Assisi—is as popular to-day as he ever was; and much more popular than he has been for four hundred years.

Now it would have been more surprising than otherwise if the evolution of the saint in literature had stopped short with Goldsmith; and it is just this which has not happened. In fact all that has happened is that the saint has become increasingly humanised in the process of time; and if the result of this is that he has become steadily "unsanctified" in the process, we must admit that, whether this is fortunate or unfortunate, it is probably inevitable. It is, however, because we have in some measure come to confuse "sanctity" with "sainthood" that so many of us have mistaken this change of aspect on the part of the saint in literature for his disappearance from it.

The greatest writers of last century do not give much attention to saints as such—although in the novels of Thackeray, Jane Austen, George Eliot and Charlotte Brontë, we often come face to face with a kind of heroism which can only be differentiated from sainthood by a few degrees. We had, as we shall always have, a few revivals of the simple type; but the evolving type, which we are more carefully considering, does not appear very often. Both Sidney Carton and Tess are, in their totally different ways, on their way to the type of saint which I think has waited for the present age to ripen fully. It seems that the war, with its ample scope for something much less spontaneous and more enduring than heroism, brought this type to a head; and out of the essentially British capacity for "sticking it" the new saint was born.

If we go right into the heart of the trenches we shall see England in the birth-pangs of this type. There are a score of war books that tell of this in every chapter; but, if we are anxious to focus the whole process in a single space, we shall find the scene laid out for us in Mr. Sherriff's *Journey's End*. Here we have a few characters right beneath the microscope, and all of them in various stages of spiritual development. The moralist who claims that there are no signs of any moral soundness in our post-war literature had better watch these half-dozen characters through the play; and then ask himself if he has not made a very foolish mistake. To the many who say that there is hardly ever "a good man" in a modern work of creative art I should reply that, in this play, there is not a single bad one. There is only one who might be considered rather unpleasant; and for him we feel infinitely more pity than dislike. Even those who affirm that the "saint" has disappeared from literature would be faced with a severe task if he had to defend that contention in view of such a character as Lieutenant Osborne. Admittedly he would be the last person dimly to associate himself with such a title; but this is only because we have not found another word that will displace the *sanctus* element with something equally religious, but perhaps more robust.

There is practically no mention of religion throughout Mr. Sherriff's play; but anyone would indeed be spiritually blind who could not see its religious significance. It has even been suggested that the whole play was a disillusioned study of how the war was won by the tactful administration of rum rations. This is to miss practically everything that the play says; and, indeed, to overlook the whole spiritual significance of what is best and most serious in modern literature. To-day men do not soliloquise like Hamlet or sermonise like the old morality play. It was the words that were not spoken, the times when Stanhope did not resort to the whisky bottle, and the things that the little company did not say when twelve men went out on a raid and only five came back, that mattered. Not to realise what these silences cost is, I must repeat, to miss the whole significance of modern literature.

STANHOPE (*looking at TROTTER'S chart*): What's this extraordinary affair?

OSBORNE: Trotter's plan to make the time pass by. A hundred and forty-four circles—one for each hour of six days.

STANHOPE: How many hours are there till dawn on the 21st?

OSBORNE: Goodness knows. Not many, I hope.

STANHOPE: Nearly nine o'clock now. Twenty-four till nine to-morrow; twelve till nine at night—that's thirty-six; nine till six next morning; that's forty-five altogether.

[*He begins to count off forty-five circles on TROTTER'S chart.*]

OSBORNE: What are you going to do?

STANHOPE: At the end of the forty-fifth circle I'm going to draw a picture of Trotter being blown up in four pieces.

OSBORNE: Don't spoil his chart. It took him an hour to make that.

STANHOPE: He won't see the point. He's no imagination.

Here we have nothing of the religious glow which seemed to have been the mainstay of the crusaders of the Middle Ages, and which brought them with honours through the hardships and privations of British life under the Assyrian sun; but I maintain that it was as keen and deep and solid a spirituality which enabled this group of men to joke the time away they spent in waiting for that bloody dawn. The faith which sustained them was not any special belief in their cause (they were unconscious of one) but a knowledge that the best way of waiting to be blown to pieces is by keeping all your spirits up; and if this is not religion, we may admit outright that religion lacks the most vital quality that the present age has produced. It appears very notably in the work of C. E. Montagu, Miss Clemence Dane, John Galsworthy and Miss Radclyffe Hall; and the war poetry of Robert Nichols, Siegfried Sassoon and Wilfred Owen breathes the same atmosphere.

There is much in twentieth-century imaginative literature that displays this essentially spiritual quality to a greater and lesser extent; and so much is it a part of our moral fibre that there are few attempts to re-create the more self-conscious heroism of the past that satisfy. In *St. Joan*, a masterpiece of dramatic construction, Mr. Bernard Shaw gives us a very fine portrait of the saint herself; but the remainder of the characters speak with a certain sophisticated and redundant wit that is more in harmony with a parliament of the twentieth century than a French Court of the fifteenth. The German Thomas Mann, in his Catholic enthusiast of *The Magic Mountain*, revives the strength and weakness of the mediæval mind, when he declaims that

All the pains of the Church, even the stake, even excommunication, were inflicted to save the soul from everlasting damnation—

which cannot be said of the mania for destruction displayed by the Jacobins. Permit me to remark that any system of pains and penalties which is not based upon belief in a hereafter is simply a bestial stupidity. And as for the degradation of humanity, the history of its course is precisely synchronous with the growth of the bourgeois spirit.

Thus we hear the voice which rang through all the best in mediæval literature ; but which now sounds as hollow as a bell tolling in a churchyard. Nevertheless, we shall no more understand the spirit of that literature than we shall the history of the Middle Ages themselves unless we realise that for them that voice was the only one they could hear ; and this brings me to my final contention that there is one aspect in which the religious element in literature has always remained the same, and that is in the realm of poetry. Our ideas of God may differ as the generations grow and our notion of the saint has probably to evolve much farther yet ; but poetry is so essentially symbolical in its appeal and so nearly timeless in its achievement :

Thou art the Way.
Hadst Thou been nothing but the goal,
I cannot say
That Thou hadst ever met my soul.
I cannot see—
I, child of process—if there lies
An end for me,
Full of repose, full of replies.
I'll not reproach
The road that winds, my feet that err.
Access, approach
Art Thou, Time, Way and Wayfarer,

cries Alice Meynell ; and in this cry we hear the echo of all that has been best in the pilgrimage of religious poetry from Dante through Chaucer, Southwell, Crashaw, Herbert, Vaughan, Goethe, Blake, Rossetti and Hopkins, to Robert Bridges. For here we discern what that late philosopher the Baron Von Hügel called the necessarily "creaturely" element of all created work. There are no poets—not in the most massive ages of faith—who have not known the pain of spiritual ascent ; but out of their universal suffering has been born a common language which transcends all ages.

ASHLEY SAMPSON.

WORK AMONG THE UNEMPLOYED.

The law is uniform, but not so the land and the minds and customs of those who dwell in it. Every place must be considered separately. Administration does not consist in forcing more or less wise methods and ideas upon the great mass of the nation, but in giving to the ideas, good or bad, that they already possess, a practical turn which will make them conduce to the general welfare of the State. (BALZAC—*Médecin de Campagne*.)

IN social work among the unemployed one is conscious repeatedly of having to make a choice between political and personal values, between the general benefit of the mass and the particular need of individuals. The first natural impulse in presence of poverty, idleness and bitterness, is to join in the outcry to the Government to provide paid work, or a more generous scale of relief, or to make some change "in the whole system." This outcry has been made for ten years at least, but the fact of unemployment remains. Governments in office, of whatever party, have been slow to move, and the moral and material waste goes on. The mechanical "grid" of the law when applied to changing needs and conditions is bound to press hardly on some and to leave empty gaps for others. A real service may be rendered by those who are in feeling-touch with the unemployed in the enlightenment of the public, not only to the outward facts of the problem, but to the inner feelings of the unemployed man. The facts investigated and published some years ago by the Coalfields Distress Committee of the Society of Friends produced marked effects and paved the way for the Prince of Wales' appeal and the Lord Mayor's Fund. The recent wireless talks by typical unemployed men have also helped still further to break down the indifference, or even censoriousness, towards the unemployed that existed ten years ago. Such a change of feeling may obviously be exploited for party purposes as the sympathies awakened are turned into party antipathies, with the result that the attention of the public and of the unemployed is once again focused on the political arena and upon the hopes and disillusionments of the general party warfare. The recent departure of committing unemployment relief and its conditions to a special department of State may have the effect of lifting the matter above the battle, and of pooling suggestions and experiences not only from

men of different parties but from the unemployed themselves. But that remains to be seen.

It was gratifying to find after recent wireless talks describing the experiences of unemployed men, that letters received from all sorts and conditions of men showed that their writers were no longer satisfied with the moral *alibi* of fixing all blame and responsibility upon the Government. Hundreds of writers in feeling letters expressed great anxiety to be shown something, anything, that they might do themselves to touch even the fringe of the human misery. In addition to sending money gifts and clothing, a considerable number asked to be put into personal correspondence with actual families so as to humanise to some extent their sympathy and action. One letter, for instance, from an artist to whom her art had been a great solace in time of distress, asked to be put in touch if possible with a miner who might like to share her interest in sketching and painting. This was done, and the correspondence that followed had the effect of releasing and enthusing a rather moody embittered man in a way that no mere money contribution could have done. Urgent as the money need so often is, it is a great misconception and an affront to the unemployed man to think of his need as being on a lower level in things spiritual and cultural than that of the professional man. In spite of the economic distresses of the Rhondda Valleys and the desolation of their beauty by a callous industrialism, one has only to pass through the streets to notice how frequent are the announcements of choral and orchestral concerts and dramatic performances, while the unemployed themselves have their biennial Musical Festival conducted by Sir Walford Davies.

In fact, I think the experience of those who have had to do with the distribution of clothes or money on any large scale would not make them wish to repeat the experience. Mass relief, it is felt, is better left to administrative bodies. So soon as distribution goes beyond the bounds of personal knowledge and contact with the recipients, it tends to exploitation by the less deserving and to jealousy in the name of justice. And giving is not sharing. Consequently the alternative method of "Helping the unemployed to help themselves" has become the slogan in social service. Here, again, the difference between the political and the personal solution may become acute. As a political solution "community

service" was open to the sharpest suspicion and criticism from those who regarded personal work as a mere palliative, leaving the weightier matters of the law unchallenged. The doctrinaire Communist dismissed it, like religion, as "mere dope." To suggest that his high ideals of free labour, production for use and community benefit, should be put into practice immediately and locally was rank heresy. Like the Sermon on the Mount, it was as shocking to the orthodox to urge putting it into practice as to deny it altogether. *Aut Cæsar aut nullus*.

None the less, in spite of persistent misrepresentation and opposition, it was possible for groups of unemployed men to achieve remarkable demonstrations of voluntary service of considerable community benefit, as at Ebbw Vale where a dozen steel-workers built swimming-baths of a contract value of perhaps £8,000, or at Brynmawr, where baths, public gardens and a pioneer nursery school were constructed by a larger group. At Rhos, a mining village near Wrexham, the work was directed by the miners' leaders themselves, encouraged by the whole community and supported by student volunteers from British and Continental universities. Here during the summer might be seen at times as many as two hundred unpaid workers, including many employed miners black from the night shift, levelling a great tract of desolate outcrop hillocks that had been an eyesore for two generations, in order to make gardens, bowling-greens and playing-fields for a community which had never risen to such things in its days of prosperity. Important as such pioneering activities may be in demonstrating the public spirit and capacities of unemployed men and of the appeal to non-mercenary motives—and such activities are now to be seen in great variety in many parts of the country—even more important is their revelation of the craftsman's joy in creative construction and of that free co-operation of workers which has steadily disappeared in large-scale industry since the days of the craft guilds. Most important of all, perhaps, was the release of spontaneous gifts of initiative and leadership, and of local democratic control without domination by any alien authority. Professor McDougall has said: "The greatest need of our time is that we shall learn how to release, direct and control the energies of men. The physical sciences have attained their success by learning how to release, direct and control the energies of inorganic nature. The sciences of life must

make a similar discovery." The same need was expressed naively by one of the miners' leaders when discussing the voluntary service scheme at Rhos: "We have chapels and churches and choirs for our feelings, and seven W.E.A. classes in the village for our thinking, but after feeling and thinking we don't *do* anything—we expect the politicians to do everything in London. And they don't. But if we feel, think and act in Rhos, there's a new politics begun."

The evolution of this new neighbour-politics may be studied even more clearly in the Unemployed Men's Clubs of which there are now twenty-six, with a membership of over six thousand in the Rhondda Valleys. Here again, the absence of the money motive in their activities, and freedom from any alien domination or dependence, has allowed very interesting experiments in that "release, direction and control of the energies of men" which Professor McDougall regards as of such importance. In local, as in imperial politics, it seems to be true that "Liberty alone fits men for liberty," as responsibility alone fits men for responsibility. The problem of direction and control is not an easy one in the Rhondda where servility is particularly despised, where the rebel is the hero, and where eleven thousand men voted Communist in 1933 as against the Marxist Socialist who was elected to Parliament. There is the added difficulty in the clubs of attaining unity in so great a diversity of humanity as they represent in the Rhondda—men from Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, quarrymen from North Wales, old soldiers, young toughs, Communists, chapel deacons, are in a medley together. To provide an institution or organisation for such folk, in the shape of a building or model rules, is simple enough. To help in the creation of an organism of fellowship out of such heterogeneous humanity is quite another matter. In fact it is only the men themselves who can create a club which may be a shelter for their minds and feelings and independence, no less than for their bodies. The importance of the creation of this sense of freedom and fellowship was brought out very clearly in the evidence given before the Commission on Unemployment by Mr. William Noble, the pioneer of the Friends' Educational Settlement work among the unemployed in the Rhondda, if not in the whole country:

The first need of the long-unemployed man is the continued fellowship of sympathetic people and contact with associations

that are stimulating and helpful. He must not be allowed to develop the idea that he is a social outcaste. Secondly, he must be helped to do things which are useful. It is not sufficient to open rooms as comfortable shelters for this type of unemployed; neither is it good to give gifts in the form of charity which command no exchange of service, for it is not temporary aid that is needed. . . . It is important that any schemes that are to depend upon the unpaid labour of the unemployed should be considered by the men themselves and not be wholly thought out for them by outside associations. They need centres where they can build up friendship and exchange ideas with others of like interests and also meet people who are in sympathy with them. Both from the moral and educational aspects self-government is essential, and democratic control of all activities gives scope for many to share in committee experience. In some small and almost self-contained village an inspiring individual may induce a group to carry out a useful piece of construction, but it is a mistake to think that it is easy to create a willingness to give labour for something called "community" which, to them, may be merely a vague term. Self-government is all important. The really reliable intelligent men who now form a majority of our unemployed are not willing to accept the hospitality of a Club which is controlled by an individual whose only claim to superiority is that he is employed.

It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of the principles stated here, not out of any academic theory of rights, but from seven years' experience of building up clubs and confidence from the smallest and often most discouraging beginnings. It may be true to say that unemployment does not necessarily bring demoralisation, but a change of morals. At least the awakened unemployed man has leisure to follow interests and to find fellowships which are real and not merely mass reactions and recreations created by the drudgery of his work. Conversation, choir practices, literature, classes, lantern lectures, drama groups, orchestras, as well as allotments, boot-repairing, furniture-making and building give the opportunities for culture and craftsmanship and for a form of extra-mural education which may one day realise Dr. Jacks' ambition for an "education of the whole man."

It was possible to apply more intensively the principle of voluntary service for neighbour-need at the summer holiday camps. A derelict malthouse near the coast was repaired and reconditioned by the men, and over two thousand five hundred of them, in weekly groups of forty to sixty, have made

use of the opportunity of a real holiday in delightful country at a cost of some 8s. a week, of which 3s. was borne by the men themselves. It is difficult to compute the personal and social value of such a holiday with its cheerful comradeship, substantial food, good air, long walks on the cliffs and shore, and of all the silences, sunsets and solitariness that are not possible in the crowded valleys. These are the imponderables, the "things unseen" which may be the eternal. After the invariable excitement and perhaps uproariousness of the first night in camp, the reasonable requirements of an ordered community life and shared labour were explained and accepted with acclamation. Thereafter there was never serious difficulty in getting willing work for the morning's duties in the indoor and outdoor camp activities in field or garden. It was never found necessary to dismiss any man for misconduct. The appeal to the common need and common responsibility brought a quick response. Old soldiers though many of them were, the sergeant-major type of regulation and discipline would be immediately resented and frustrated. There are few places where the realities of freedom and friendship are more appreciated than among the Rhondda miners. In a winter session a group of twenty-two of the men maintained themselves at a cost of 8s. a week for their food, light and coal. The indoor duties and a good deal of heavy work in the garden and of carpentry and colour-washing of the interior were done very willingly. One man unexpectedly developed a gift for pleasant and ingenious colour decoration, and painted some delightful original landscapes on the whitewash panels.

Three courses of tutorial lectures were given each week on "Economic Geography," "The Evolution of Mutual Aid," and "The Political and Religious Approach to Peace." Invitations to schools and training colleges, and to other pioneering groups of unemployed men, helped us to think out and to live out the conditions of real freedom and friendship. Very feeling and fiery discussions arose out of the shortcomings or delinquencies of members of the group, but after "having things out" there was an increasing faith in the practicability of relying on the law within rather than on the law without, with its threats and penalties, which had thrown most of them into an attitude of revolt against the authority and discipline both of schools, churches and collieries. The oldest man among them, a long-service soldier and afterwards navvy,

tramp, unemployed marcher and fighter with the police, left his impression of the life at the Malthouse in the following essay, which I quote *ipsissima verba* :

When I came here I was one of them sort of people—once I made up my mind it 'ad to go, wright or wrong, and if any big noise came banging about, everything was red. But now all that ave change. I go about knowing that I am more contented than half the people with money. I feel I belong to the Malthouse and everyone else is the same who have stayed here. You can speak your mind, enjoy yourself, while you work 2½ hours in the field or garden. You feel new life, more willing, better spoken, more understanding, everything different, life worth living. Even after you have been tramping about and got fed up with the hole world, you come to see that life that is so hard to find if you don't look for it. But it is here, you feel it. If only men would come what a chance to live communist; different from what you've shouted at street corners. Live it then; other people can't ram it down your throat. Some people can never understand what is good and what is bad. If anyone tells them the Malthouse is "dope" they believe it—afraid to come and see for theirselves. If there was more guts in people to try and do their own work, finding things out for their selfs, we may have disarmament sooner, different conditions of living, more understanding, better feeling towards one another. And this is where you learn all this. Don't let others do it for you, do it yourself and then see what a change it will do for you. I chanced it; you can do the same. If you don't like it you can go home again; no one stops you. So be men; lets live together, fight the peaceful way. Then we will be more like men and less like fools. Let's show we are going good by living together as a communal people. Show the world how it is done. So start here, then show the others the way. If you fail with some, others will follow you, then the rest will come; only give them enough time to think. Show you can do what they see impossible. Get them together, have a good time and be happy through all your troubles. Then we will get peace through the hole of the country. So buck up and do your duty for others if not for yourself. Come down and let us help you. No one is too rough; everyone is welcome. So do your best for the sake of the younger people if not for yourselfs.

This naïve idealism, which is willing to act where it is, may seem to have little relevance to a solution of the vast problem of unemployment. Our faith has been so fixed upon the big levers of political compulsions that we have almost lost belief in the power of the "little leaven," the "two or three gathered

together" in spirit. But that power seems to have been the distinctive Christian method by which empires were permeated. The contribution which a Society of Friends may make at the moment is perhaps best described by the concluding sentences of the Report of the Friends' Allotment Committee.

We can only function in limited ways and in making small experiments. Yet our experiences should furnish material towards finding the solution of what is a fundamental question for a religious society, namely the way in which the spirit and moral nature of man can best be developed.

GEORGE M. LL. DAVIES.

APARTMENTS TO LET.

IF you decide to enter the catering business after reading about our avian lodgers, there are one or two things to be remembered. In the first place, rooms should face, not south, but preferably north or east, to avoid the hottest rays of the sun. Moreover, once they are let, any inspection of one's apartments is as a rule deeply resented. The "season" is in the first half of the year, though actually a night rarely passes on which someone does not turn up for "bed and breakfast." And finally, this includes one and sometimes two evening meals—not the equivalent of tea and dinner, but actually two dinners, one on top of the other! Of course, it is only an exceptional bird that demands two meals before turning in for the night, yet naturally one likes to satisfy the needs not only of the average lodger but also of those whose habits at first sight appear to be the outcome of gross eccentricity. I have one such now—a blue tit. Looking at this bird, one would never think that it sometimes eats two dinners, for in other respects it seems quite normal. And, in fact, though I misjudged it at first, I now realise that it is in reality probably no greedier than any of the other blue tits that nightly roost beneath our eaves. It is not the bird but the circumstances of its daily routine that are sometimes abnormal.

The bird-table which has been its undoing is on our verandah. In the angle between the verandah roof and wall are fixed a series of small wooden ledges which are very popular as sleeping-quarters for blue and great tits—though meant as nesting-places for the swallows which have so far not approved of our arrangements. On the ledge immediately above the table the blue tit in question sleeps away the hours of darkness—sufficient excuse, perhaps, for occasionally yielding to the temptation to fly down for another bite. Yet that is not what happens, else I would call it greedy, whereas I think it is merely absent-minded. When the light begins to fail, it flies on to the verandah and settles down to a good square meal. This over, it strops its bill clean on the edge of the table and, after one or two searching glances at the roosting-ledge, flies up to sleep. If now I go out on to the verandah before it becomes much darker, the startled bird flies out and perches on the nearest tree. If I stay too long, it flies off down the garden to sleep elsewhere, but if I go back into the house

within a minute or two, it returns to the verandah and once more retires for the night according to routine. The meal, the bill-cleaning, the careful scrutiny of the sleeping-ledge before the flight to roost—nothing is forgotten. Equally, nothing is remembered. The meal is but a link in the chain of events which brings the day to a close. The fact that the bird has fed already once appears not to be sufficient reason to interrupt a routine that satisfies normal requirements. It would be as logical, from the bird's point of view, not to fly up to its sleeping-quarters a second time simply because it had done so once already. Naturally, if I went out on to the verandah every evening, the bird would adapt itself to changed circumstances, not perhaps by directly cutting out that second meal, but by remaining on its sleeping-ledge and so making it unnecessary. I have inadvertently driven away another lodger so frequently, that at first I feared it would desert its rather conspicuous roost, but now it is so accustomed to interruptions that I can even bang the door of the summer-house, under whose eaves it sleeps, without sending it away.

Tits normally roost alone, though in the day time they are sociable enough, but once, in this same summer-house, two blue tits slept side by side, perching on the same beam little more than a foot apart. Perhaps they always slept together, though I think it more likely that such was the attraction of this particular site that neither would give place to the other. Tits sleep there untroubled by the howling of the wind on the moors, by the rain that splashes seawards in quickly growing rivulets down the steepness of our paths.

Tits do not necessarily roost where they are sheltered from the elements. Near our windows hang tiny inverted flower-pots, and little cream-cartons painted brown, with a perch wedged across the opening. Filled with liquid fat, in which are embedded scraps of all kinds, they form, when the whole sets hard, a convenient supply of food accessible only to the tits which alone cling head downwards from the perch. When one of the flimsy cartons became empty, I was surprised one night to see what looked like the tail of a bird projecting downwards. If it was a bird, it was undoubtedly sitting the right way up on the perch inside the swinging bell. As I opened the window, out flew a blue tit which had evidently chosen this of all places as a roost. The next day it was there again and indeed the bell, despite its many disadvantages, was

so attractive that during three successive winters we saw a blue tit roosting there every night as we went up to bed. Occasionally it would be absent for a night, even for several, and during the breeding season it was never there. Twice the string rotted, precipitating bell and occupant into space. In time, holes appeared in the roof and sides, but still the bird clung to the frail structure.

The slightest breath of wind set the bell in motion, or to a lesser degree spun it round on its own axis. On many nights of gale the bird would fly to roost as usual, only to be forced out of the bell as the night wore on and the wind rose higher and higher. Holding a candle close to the window-pane, we often watched, expecting every moment to see the little mite fly out as its delicate cradle banged against the branches of a tree or swung out two feet in one direction and back the corresponding four. The most astounding thing about this little creature was the amount of buffeting and swinging it would go through on nights just not bad enough to drive it out. That it can have slept on its storm-tossed perch on these occasions seems inconceivable. Eventually the bell fell to pieces, forcing the bird to roost elsewhere. Since then, three other bells in different parts of the garden have been occupied by roosting blue tits.

This nightly inspection of our avian lodgers is one of the perennial delights of catering for birds. With its feathers fluffed out, each little mite surrounds itself with a blanket of warm air. A blue tit sleeping on a twig is a fluffy blue-grey ball of feathers—with a tail! Those that roost in nesting-boxes are more difficult to inspect, for the direct rays of a torch startle them into a series of explosive hisses, and the accompanying flurry of wings, especially of a great tit, suggests that the bird will fly out, a disturbance to be avoided. As the night draws on and the cold increases it is pleasant to know that so many little birds have retired to roost well fed and comfortable, for rarely do birds die of cold when they can get enough to eat.

At times as many as ten blue tits, four great, two coals and two marsh tits scramble for a place at our table. Actually there would be room for all if only they did not demand so much elbow room. In the hedges and tree-tops they spread out amongst the branches, each finding for itself the tiny specks of life that go to make up the meal. When we put out

a vast store of food, it is beyond a bird's comprehension to realise that there is in this one place more than enough for all. Each becomes, therefore, a sort of dog in the manger. The blue tit avoids the hostile advances of the bigger birds in a delightfully neat way. If a great tit crosses the table with lowered head and open bill, the little bird simply effaces itself backwards over the edge of the table, until its beak barely peeps over the edge to which it clings with both its feet. In this way it usually escapes further hostilities while retaining for itself a place at the table. No sooner is the larger bird feeding again than up pops the little one for its share in the feast.

Apart from showing one the various tits right up against the window-pane in their very best plumage after the autumn moult, a swinging bird-tray is invaluable where a table is out of place. The familiar robin will perch on it, make a jab at a tit and then develop the most appalling vertigo. As the tray swings backwards and forwards in the breeze, the robin stands firm, but tries to prevent its head from moving. The comical result is that one sees a robin with its neck alternately lengthening and shortening. If the tray swings in a different direction, to the right and left, the ridiculous bird strains its head in the opposite direction, namely to the left and right. Evidently the robin has not yet got those sea-legs which are as necessary in the tree-tops as in mid-ocean. Individuals become in time relatively proficient, but they are unable to disguise the fact that they are most at home on something as steady as and about the altitude of a garden fork.

In cold spells a few handfuls of corn scattered on the grass add flocks of finches to the birds that already regard a visit to one's tables, trays or bells as an essential part of the daily routine. It is curious to see robins and hedge-sparrows swallowing corn as fast as they can pick it up, while the massive-billed greenfinch, essentially a seed-eating bird, laboriously crushes up each single grain.

Nobody who is seriously thinking of catering for birds should overlook the berry-bearing trees or shrubs where these are possible. The wild honeysuckle berries on our verandah are greatly in demand amongst the marsh tits. While there are any left they usually scorn the attractions of the bird-table. I am never tired of watching this little bird with its glossy jet-black crown, hovering on quickly beating wings as it tears

a scarlet berry from the very tip of a trailing branch. That a tit should emulate a humming-bird in this way is not surprising, but who would think it of a bullfinch? Yet I have seen this lovely gaudy fellow hovering just as the marsh tit does to get at berries otherwise beyond its reach.

The varied activities of our feathered lodgers naturally culminate in the breeding season. The interest they take in a new box is often immediate, for during a great part of the year both blue and great tits appear fundamentally incapable of passing an inviting new hole. I have put a nesting-box close to my window months before the breeding season, only to have a great tit working on it intermittently throughout the winter. Every morning I would hear the bird hammering away at the entrance hole, incidentally without enlarging it to any appreciable extent. Despite this display of interest it nested elsewhere, leaving the box to a pair of blue tits, though later the great tits returned to my window for their second brood. These great tits have a choice of four boxes, in all of which they nest irregularly, as a rule placing the first brood in a certain box close to a bed of roses. Last year I felt sure that this box had been chosen once again, for a pair of great tits were in and out of it all day long, while the cock frequently "sang" in the tree overhead. Then one morning I watched them inspecting a box at least a hundred yards away. The entrance hole being too small, they soon lost interest, only, however, to inspect a third box even further away from home. This also was not intended for great tits, and indeed a pair of blue had already started lining the floor with moss. As the intruder sat preening herself in the pale early morning sunshine within a yard of their home, the little birds perched on the branches as close as they dared, in great agitation. But even when the hen great tit flew down and tried in vain to squeeze herself into the hole, they did not dare to defend their property save by invective. The hen great tit spent so long on this new whim of hers, though she could not get inside the box, that her mate, evidently tired of just looking on, flew into the branches of a tall tree and began to proclaim in a loud voice the fact that this was his territory with as much vigour as if they had begun to build there themselves! Eventually, of course, the blue tits were left to themselves, and the great tit, accompanied by her accommodating mate, returned to her first choice near the roses.

In the garden every season brings its thrill, from the first green shoot to the last dead leaf, but few thrills compare with that of finding each apartment full to overflowing with countless feathered babies. That, however, is a whole chapter in itself. When in due course an avalanche of tiny birds pours from each box, our cup is full. During the rearing of their families the lodgers scatter throughout the garden, but now they return in force, trailing strings of babies to the bird-table on the verandah. And so, before enchanted human eyes, yet another generation of these delightful little people is introduced to our Hostelry for Birds.

G. B. GOOCH.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

FALSE ALARMS IN EUROPE.

BOTH in the west and in the south-east of Europe a recent disturbance has had the effect of illustrating the strength of the conditions which make war unlikely. On March 5th a British White Paper was published which had the triple effect of annoying German opinion, of postponing an impending journey by Sir John Simon to Berlin, and of giving to British Opposition politicians, who had an eye on the next election, an occasion for enthusiastic but not entirely just, indignation. Four days earlier, during the night of March 1st to 2nd, a Greek revolution broke out in full form, but failed to create much fear, or much interest, in the surrounding countries. The circumstances of those two incidents are worth examining.

1. *The Greek Revolt.*

The Greek revolt seems to have originated as an enterprise of General Plastiras, who had had some experience of such adventure. It was he, then a Colonel, who headed the revolt of September 26th, 1922, which drove King Constantine from Athens three months before the King's death at Palermo. It was he, now a General, who in March 1933 attempted to usurp control of the armed forces of Greece with a view to abolishing the parliamentary system. He had followed the course of the elections from Mr. Veniselos's house, and the moment he saw that the Populist party was certain to win, he decided that the democratic system was a mistake. To save the country from itself, he attempted to arrogate full power to himself, and for fourteen hours succeeded. By that time President Zaimis more correctly decided to call upon Mr. Tsaldaris, the leader of the party that had won the elections, to form a government. That government had been in power ever since, and General Plastiras had lived abroad, mostly in France. He and some of his retired army and naval friends started the new revolt. They seized the Evelpides Military College and the barracks of the Evzones in Athens, but surrendered the next morning, after a night's bombardment by point-blank artillery and machine-guns. Meanwhile the retired Rear-Admiral Demestichas and Captain Kolialaxis captured the naval arsenal at

Salamis, the cruiser *Averoff* (the most powerful ship and the flag-ship of the Greek navy), and in addition a light cruiser, two destroyers and three submarines. The first phase of the revolt was a combat between the government's air force and the rebel ships, the number of which was brought up to twelve. Within twenty-four hours the government announced that the revolt was quelled and the country under control. That claim proved to be premature, but was substantiated nine days later, on March 11th.

The revolution was short-lived. Being repulsed from the arsenal at Salamis, as they had been from the Evzone barracks and the Evelpides Military College, the rebels concentrated outside Greece proper. The rebel ships, bombarded the while from the air, sailed for Suva Bay and made Crete their headquarters. Mr. Veniselos, who was in Crete, thereupon put himself at the head of the revolt, and Crete solidly declared against the government. Simultaneously another rebel force took action in Eastern Macedonia, and despite its failure to capture Salonica, contrived to make trouble for a week. The Minister for War, General Kondylis, took personal command of the government forces operating against the rebels. Split as they were between Macedonia on the one hand and Crete on the other, the rebel forces were at a clear disadvantage. The government had little difficulty in crushing them, mainly because the air force had remained loyal. By March 11th it was obvious that the rebel resistance in Eastern Macedonia was at an end. General Kamenos, who had been in command of the Macedonian rebels, fled over the border into Bulgaria. Mr. Veniselos, hearing of the collapse in Macedonia, decided that the civil war had gone against him, and with Mrs. Veniselos sailed at 11 p.m. on board the cruiser *Averoff* for Italy.

So ended what looked like the last of the long series of Greek civil wars deriving from the twenty-years' conflict of Veniselists with Monarchists. Mr. Veniselos announced his retirement from politics, and added that Greece would not see him again. It was not the first time he had made such a statement. He made it in the autumn of 1920 when his famous defeat at the polls started the crumbling process which cost Greece everything that Mr. Veniselos had won for her at the Paris peace conferences. Yet on that occasion he relented. He accepted a remarkable mission as Greek representative at

the Lausanne Near-Eastern Conference of 1922, despite the continuing understanding that he would not set foot in Greek territory. In the latest case it may well be that his words will be literally fulfilled. He is 71 years old. He has made an inglorious attempt to serve political ends by violent means. To many people in many countries the event brings something like personal sorrow. Those who know him, know his gentle charm, and know the sincerity and patriotic conviction which made him, first, enlist his country on the Allied side of the war, instead of on the German side, and, second, engage his own life's work on keeping the Monarchy out of Greece. He is one of the most accomplished diplomatists of our time. Whether or no one may regard the Greater Greece he fashioned as wise, no one can fail to have been impressed by the magnetic force of character which enabled him at the end of the war to obtain for a small and powerless country a prize relatively greater than any prize obtained by any other country, no matter how powerful. Alone he did it, by his charm, sincerity and native shrewdness. There are differing opinions about any diplomatic achievement. There are those who have clearly good ground for the opinion that all diplomatic achievement in the conventional sense of a country's resultant aggrandisement in size, prestige or power, is a stupid, perhaps a mischievous, form of vanity. With that reservation, even if one dislikes the game, it is impossible not to experience the glow of admiration excited by the spectacle of one of its greatest players, and it is impossible not to feel the chill regret that his retirement from the game should result from an apparently complete loss of his former quality.

To non-Greek students of affairs the real interest of the latest Greek civil war was its effect abroad. The Balkan tradition is such that "trouble in the Balkans" has become a sinister portent to the whole of Europe. In conformity with that tradition the first few days of the Greek disturbance produced a state of jumpy nervousness abroad. Newspapers in the West of Europe, as by an ineradicable habit, gave rein to alarm. The several navies, as by routine bound, moved precautionary ships to the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey moved her Thracian forces nearer to the Greek frontier. Bulgaria moved her forces both to her Greek and to her Turkish frontier. On March 7th it looked as if something ugly might emerge. A Turkish newspaper, which therein travestied

the whole spirit of the Turkish Government, suggested that the Turkish army should annex Southern Bulgaria (i.e. Eastern "Rumelia") up to Philippopolis. The Bulgarian Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations on March 7th submitted to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations a memorandum on the Turkish concentration of troops in Thrace, and characterised it as a danger to Balkan peace. It was not denied in Turkish official circles that a whole army corps, complete with artillery and all other arms, was now stationed in Thrace and even within the demilitarised zone prescribed by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. What, it was asked in Turkish circles, was the practical value of so narrow a demilitarised zone in the present circumstances where aeroplanes dominated any strategic consideration? Moreover, last winter the Turkish Government pegged out at Geneva its formal claim that it should be released from the restrictions of the Straits Convention and should have the right to fortify the Dardanelles, as any other Turkish territory, in whatever way in its sovereign discretion it should choose. At that time revision was in the mouths of many European people. Russia, Japan and Germany were outside the League. If other treaties were to be revised, why not the Treaty of Lausanne? Such was the Turkish argument. The argument, however, was not pressed. The Turkish Government merely filed its claim. It was never suggested from Angora that revision was a point of Turkish policy. Indeed those who have studied Mustapha Kemal have been impressed by his quiet common sense. Even while on March 7th Mr. Antonov, on behalf of the Bulgarian Government, was making his representations to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, Ismet Pasha, the Turkish Prime Minister, was addressing the Grand National Assembly in Angora and saying that Turkey remained absolutely loyal to the Balkan Pact concluded last year. It was the central purpose of that Pact to guarantee by mutual commitment the existing frontiers. He characterised the Bulgarian complaints about the Turkish forces in Thrace as a disingenuous cover for a threatened Bulgarian denunciation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly and as the first step towards Bulgarian rearmament. By a transparent euphemism Turkish official commentators unofficially suggested to such as took the trouble to canvass their comment, that the reason why the Turkish troops had been moved to the

Greek frontier was that the Turkish Government chose to be prepared, should the need arise, to carry out its obligations both under the Greco-Turkish agreement of 1932 and under the Balkan Pact of 1934. As there clearly could be no question of the Greco-Turkish frontier being threatened either by Greece or by Turkey, and as therefore there could be no question of a mutual Greco-Turkish guarantee being brought into operation by a Greek or a Turkish violation of their common frontier (the whole point of a treaty of mutual guarantee being its multilateral subscription and its hypothesis of an aggression by a third party), it followed in simple logic that the Turkish concentration could have been suggested only by the fear that Bulgaria might take advantage of Greece's distraction to force a way through to the *Ægean*. Meanwhile the Bulgarian official commentators were protesting that the concentration of Bulgarian troops on the eastern frontier had been due entirely to a normal routine precaution against unforeseen contingencies that might arise from the disturbance in Greece, and that Bulgaria had no intention of advancing beyond the frontier.

In short it was a storm in a tea-cup. The memorandum submitted at Geneva by Bulgaria on March 7th was withdrawn on March 10th, Mr. Antonov explaining that Bulgarian fears had been allayed. M. Avenol, the Secretary-General, was therefore saved from the necessity of circularising the Bulgarian complaint among the members of the League Council. Instead, on March 10th he issued this statement: "The Secretary-General received to-day a letter from the Permanent Delegate of Bulgaria informing him that in view of the friendly conversations which are taking place at the moment between Sofia and Angora he withdrew the memorandum." Equally absurd rumours circulated at the time to the effect that Signor Mussolini was supporting Mr. Veniselos. A popular English newspaper made a big hole in the available space of its front page by a spectacular presentation of such a rumour in the guise of information. Italians laughed. What conceivable object could Italy have in intervening morally in a Greek internal quarrel? And she could not intervene otherwise without first declaring war on Greece. The converse idea that Veniselos should buy Italian moral support (whatever that might be) at the price of handing over to Italy his own stronghold of Crete was not even good as an exercise in hilarity.

The agreeable result of the Greek revolt in its international aspect was that it illustrated one of the fortunate circumstances in present-day European diplomacy. Everybody knows that "trouble in the Balkans" always derived its mischievous potentiality, not from the trouble itself, but from its effect upon the appetites of the Great Powers. The four Great Powers upon whose intrigues depend the entire seriousness of what takes place in the Balkans are Russia, Italy, France and Great Britain. At the present time those four Powers are as cooing doves. Never was their united diplomatic front so impregnable. Greece therefore could plunge into civil war. Bulgaria could make representations at Geneva. There was no threat to European peace. The Serajevo murder of July 1914 was the symbol of Great Power dissension. The Greek Revolt of March 1935 was a local Balkan disturbance and as such internationally harmless.

2. *The British White Paper.*

The trouble in the west started from the publication of a British White Paper (Cmd 4827) "Relating to Defence," issued on March 4th. Its central point was that as the Geneva Conference had failed, and as the whole world outside Great Britain was increasing its armaments, it had been decided by His Majesty's Government that the bad example must be followed; but that the example itself was non-British. The particular immediate storm arose from the fact that Sir John Simon was about to visit Berlin. It had been arranged, and the arrangement had been announced, that he would fly to Berlin on March 7th and would stay there till the 10th. It was the first chance there had been since Herr Hitler became the Führer of the German people of attempting a pacific understanding with the German Government. It was common knowledge that Germany was at that time engaged in an intensive process of rearmament. Indeed few informed people doubted that armaments manufacture constituted the main factor in Germany's economic "recovery." The question for the British Government, having decided as a matter of policy that British armaments should take at any rate a small step towards catching up those of the other chief countries, was whether the resultant programme should be announced before or after Sir John Simon's visit to Berlin? If before, it might make the British talks more realistic and

therefore more businesslike. If after, it might undo any good that may have been done in Berlin. It was decided to publish the document before the visit. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the document read thus: "11. On November 28th, 1934, His Majesty's Government drew attention to the rearmament on which Germany was engaged, and announced a speeding up of the increases in the Air Force already decided upon. The action of His Majesty's Government did not, of course, imply condonation of a breach of the Treaty of Versailles. It merely noted and made public, as a first step, what was known to be proceeding. 12. This rearmament, if continued at its present rate, unabated and uncontrolled, will aggravate the existing anxieties of the neighbours of Germany, and may consequently produce a situation where peace will be in peril. His Majesty's Government have noted and welcomed the declarations of the leaders of Germany that they desire peace. They cannot, however, fail to recognise that not only the forces but the spirit in which the population, and especially the youth of the country, are being organised lend colour to, and substantiate, the general feeling of insecurity which has already been incontestably generated. Nor is the increase of armaments confined to Germany. All over the world, in Russia, in Japan, in the United States of America, and elsewhere, armaments are being added to. We could not afford to overlook all these increases, and so have had to begin to meet our deficiencies, but have been anxious not to make the provisions for necessary defence merge into a race in armaments strength."

On reading that document Herr Hitler promptly decided that he had a "slight cold" and a hoarse voice after his Saar exploits, and asked Sir John Simon to postpone his visit to Berlin *sine die*. No one who is familiar with German thought and German sensitiveness could be surprised by the emotions excited in Germany by the British Paper, even though the facts, dispassionately looked at, were remarkable in quite another sense from that which caused the hubbub in Berlin. The increase announced in the British Estimates for military expenditure amounted to a total of £10,539,000 over last year's figure; but the only arm in which an actual increase in strength, as distinct from replacements, was contemplated, was that of the Air Force. By contrast, the figures of the German Government's revenue and expenditure for the month of December last reveals the fact that, compared with

December 1933, military expenditure had increased by 100,000,000 marks (say £5,000,000 at par). At that rate the German military expenditure had increased at the rate of 1,200,000,000 marks (say, £60,000,000) for the year. Not only is that figure six times greater than the prospective British figure, but it is twice as big as the estimated increase in military expenditure adopted a year ago in the German Budget itself. For the year 1933-4, an increased military expenditure of 605,000,000 marks (say £30,000,000) was estimated. It is likewise the case that the present strength of the British army is well below 100,000; and it would be interesting to know how far the German army's present strength exceeds 400,000.

A lively interest was created in Moscow by the London-Berlin hitch. It happened that some strenuous and protracted diplomacy had been devoted to the question whether Sir John Simon or Mr. Eden or both should go to Moscow after visiting Berlin. To understand what took place it is necessary to recall the sequence of events after the Anglo-French proposal of February 3rd was transmitted to Berlin. The German answer of February 14th suggested that a separate Anglo-German conversation should be arranged. The *naïveté* of that suggestion did not prevent its creating a certain solemnity in Paris, where, if the truth be told, a like suggestion *mutatis mutandis* had already been made. During the week February 17th to 23rd M. Corbin, the French Ambassador in London, called every day at the Foreign Office. As a result, a firm understanding was reached by the British and French Governments that if and when Sir John Simon visited Berlin he should do so on the previously formulated and previously accepted principle that the London proposals should be discussed as an integral and indivisible whole. In other words there would be no separate negotiation of an air pact. That principle was forthwith conveyed to Herr Hitler by Sir Eric Phipps, British Ambassador in Berlin, who was able immediately to report to London that Herr Hitler had accepted it. As though accident came to the help of the Anglo-French understanding on that point, it happened that Sir John Simon had a previously made appointment to visit Paris on February 28th, i.e. before the Berlin visit could take place. He duly went to Paris and delivered (in French) an address on the British constitutional machinery. It further happened that as

long ago as February 17th public comment suggested that it would serve no practical purpose if Sir John Simon went to Berlin without also going to Moscow. That suggestion was not new to French or to British diplomatic quarters. Indeed the Corbin-Simon consultations in London had established the essential requisite of a general, simultaneous application of the London proposals. It followed logically that the whole European system of security, as contemplated in those proposals, would depend for its soundness upon the limitation of armaments. At that point two streams of diplomatic activity, the one from London, the other from Moscow, were seen to converge. It was suggested through semi-official channels from Moscow that there could be no chance of an arms convention unless a sense of security were realised in the East, and that such a sense of security could be realised only by the signature of the Eastern Pact, which differs from all former pacts by its provision for immediate *armed* mutual assistance in case of aggression. It thus became obvious that if any progress were to be made on the London proposals, it would be necessary to extend the originally contemplated scope (which included only Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium) so as to include Russia, Poland and the whole of Europe. The politicians in Moscow, hearing via Harrington House that considerable speculation was afoot about a British official visit to Moscow, were apparently taken by surprise. Although the diplomatic transformation of Russia from the status of a European outcast to that of a cardinal and highly respected ally in the work of European stabilisation had been achieved with great rapidity, yet to the eyes of Moscow the rapidity of the pace with which that transformation was effected appeared almost too good to be true. Mr. Maisky, the Russian Ambassador, was placed in a position of some embarrassment. He knew that Sir John Simon wanted to be invited to visit Moscow. How could he convince Moscow that such was the case? He needed some documentary evidence even in self-defence. On February 28th he called at the Foreign Office to report that the invitation was ready to be transmitted from Moscow, and would be transmitted the moment an assurance was received (in writing) that it would be accepted. Now there are many formulæ of a subtle kind known to diplomatic practice. No formula has yet been devised whereby a formal written assurance can be

conveyed that a hypothetical invitation, if given, would be accepted. Mr. Maisky was informed that his request could not be answered till the Cabinet had considered the matter. The next Cabinet meeting was due to be held on March 6th. It was precisely on that day that Herr Hitler's cold had been transmitted through the diplomatic channel to London.

The Berlin visit being cancelled, the Moscow visit could not be further considered. It looked for the short space of three days that the whole chance of a European appeasement might be lost. But it spoke much of the inherent tendency of Europe as a whole towards peace and security that on March 9th the general misgiving was dissipated. On that day Mr. Maisky called at the Foreign Office in London and delivered the formal invitation for Mr. Eden (not Sir John Simon) to visit Moscow. The choice of Mr. Eden was explained officially by the arithmetic circumstance that the complete tour of Berlin, Moscow and Warsaw would take two or three weeks, and that the Foreign Secretary could not absent himself from London for so long a period. The more probable explanation was that the question of the Berlin visit had not been settled. Yet it was settled on the very day (March 9th) that Mr. Maisky saw Sir Robert Vansittart. Baron von Neurath on that day informed Sir Eric Phipps that Herr Hitler had decided to give his cold another fortnight's run; that he would spend the fortnight in the South, thereby picturesquely pointing the fiction; and that he then hoped to see Sir John Simon in Berlin. Nine added to fourteen gave March 23rd as the likely date of Sir John Simon's visit to Berlin. Both Moscow and Warsaw thereupon conveyed to the British Government the double intimation that a warm welcome awaited Mr. Eden, and that the pleasure caused in those capitals by the prospect of his visit would be still further increased if Mr. Eden were to hasten the event. Yet it was essential to London's purpose that Sir John Simon if possible should go to Berlin before Mr. Eden went to Moscow, for that order of procedure would emphasise what was regarded in London as an essential consideration. The ultimate object was to organise a system of security in Europe, without which there could be no assurance of peace in Europe. No such system was possible unless Germany were a party to it. As Germany was the only European Great Power whose inclusion was so far doubtful, it became the obvious first objective, in the order of urgency, to

reach an agreement with Germany. The upshot was that Sir John Simon arranged to fly to Berlin on March 24th and Mr. Eden arranged to reach Moscow on March 28th. So far the forces making for peace in Europe seemed to make it impossible for the politicians to abandon the big project for security launched on February 3rd. That at any rate was the position on March 15th, when this paper was written.

PEACE FACTORS IN THE FAR EAST

In the Far East peace has become more fashionable. Japanese spokesmen do not tire of assuring us that there is no conceivable basis for a Russo-Japanese quarrel. The matter of the Chinese Eastern Railway has been solved. Japan two years ago moved a division from the northern part of Manchukuo, and has not sent it back, despite the knowledge that Russia for precautionary reasons has been fortifying her Far-Eastern Area and Maritime Province. We are invited to believe that Japan has no intention of attacking Russia, and the invitation is easy to accept because Japanese enterprise will be fully exercised for several years ahead in Manchukuo. So far as China is concerned, the main Japanese object is to remove the boycott, from which Japan is the present sufferer as Great Britain was seven years ago. Japanese statesmanship is at pains to encourage the belief that Japan has no territorial ambitions in China, and that her only concern is the maintenance of the open door, she herself having been the latest sufferer from the closing of that door. Tokyo hotly denies that any attempt has been made to interfere in China's domestic affairs either by encouraging the expulsion from China of her western advisers or by persuading China to secede from the League of Nations. Such protestations are in themselves a factor for peace; and there is no doubt that Sino-Japanese relations have greatly improved, to the common benefit of the whole world.

There seems to be no doubt that the new prospect of a Russo-Japanese understanding in the Far East owes something indirectly to a growing recognition that the alternative in present circumstances would lead to something far more disastrous than could have been foreseen three years ago. It speaks well of Japanese statesmanship that the danger is appreciated in Tokyo.

During the past three years, as a precautionary measure in the unsettled conditions, the Russian army in the Far-Eastern Area and the Maritime Province has effected something like a transformation of the conditions before obtaining. Three years ago half of the food needed by that army had to be transported from Siberia. Now the army is entirely self-supporting as a result of a three-year plan of agricultural development carried out by an Army department specially organised for that purpose. Moreover, the carrying capacity of the Amur Railway to Vladivostok has been increased five times over as a reserve expedient. The single track is being doubled. The work has already been finished nearly as far as Habarovsk, and is expected to be completed to Vladivostok by the end of this year. An entirely new railway to the north of the Amur Railway is being constructed, and is expected to be finished within two years. It will connect Lake Baikal with the Sea of Okhotsk. The former circumstance of Russia's long lines of communication has now, in effect, been obliterated. The local conditions have likewise been transformed. Good roads have been constructed in adequate numbers. Iron and concrete fortifications, gas-proof and bomb-proof, have been built. Vladivostok has been fortified. Munition factories, aeroplane factories, shipyards have been constructed. Coal is plentiful, oil from Sakhalin has been made readily available. The whole coast line has been put into a state of defence. There is already available a submarine fleet, and an air force which is regarded as adequate for the defence of the province. Tokyo is only 600 miles from Vladivostok, and could be reached in a few hours by an air force.

The defensive measures that have been taken in Russia's Far-Eastern Province, and its transformation into a self-supporting economic unit have had the effect of emphasising the unpleasant possibilities of a serious and long-drawn-out conflict in the Far East. In certain circumstances even military preparations may help the immediate cause of peace, though their effect in the long run is almost bound to be in the opposite direction. It seems to be believed in Moscow that her present military strength in the Far East has contributed to Japan's pacific tendency.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

March 15th, 1935.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION.*

Though the atmosphere of the Peace Treaties at Versailles and elsewhere was not one of calm reasonability, some wholly reasonable steps were taken towards peaceful effective internationalism. Not the least important of these steps was the creation of an International Labour Organisation. National Labour Movements had made several attempts before and even during the war to get together on a policy of international co-operation. But the common action of labour, either on a trade-union or a socialist basis, had never reached effective continuity of action. For such co-operative action on the part of workers, separately from employers, governments and consumers, could not provide the necessary conditions for social-economic progress. Revolutionary methods must give place to evolutionary, and the vital interests of all parties concerned in bettering the conditions of labour must be represented.

* Vol. I, History. Vol. II, Documents. Columbia University Press.
VOL. CXLVII.

This, at any rate, was the view taken by the statesmen and lay reformers who sought to utilise the opportunity of the Peace Treaty for laying the foundation for peaceful international commerce and the common interests of all nations in the best exploitation of the world's resources. It was not a novel proposal. An International Association for Labour Legislation was formed at Paris in 1900, when representatives of several governments were present. Conventions were held at Berne in 1905, 1906 and 1913, when policies were adopted for the abolition of the night employment of women and of the use of white lead in the manufacture of matches. These experimental beginnings had a considerable influence on the proposals of the Labour Commission of the Peace Conference in 1919 for the formation of the I.L.O. The Association thus formed was directed to the collection and publication of labour legislation in all countries, especially in its bearing upon the humane conditions of employment, and provision was made for establishing a Bureau and for the holding of periodic meetings of the General Assembly of the Committee. The Commission appointed at Paris to bring into operation these arrangements included in its membership important personages, political and industrial, from the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Cuba, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Great difficulties, however, soon began to present themselves, some political, others economic. America sent no political official, and its representatives both of Capital and Labour were opposed to State interference, though Mr. Gompers made reluctant concessions to a policy which the other countries unanimously accepted. In America the constitutional right of each State to make its own labour rules raised difficulties as to representatives, not alleviated by the similar claims of British Dominions. Deeper down lay real economic divergencies of immediate importance, relating to wages, hours and other conditions of labour, based on long tradition, local circumstances and wide differences in industrial and agricultural development. Such difficulties might have wrecked the experiment at the outset had it not been for the persistence and tact of certain individuals, Mr. Barnes and Sir Malcolm Delevingne of the British delegation, Professor Shotwell of the American, and that great Belgian statesman M. Vandervelde.

Fortunately for the I.L.O., it was a body independent of

the League of Nations, was able to invite to its personnel members of the ex-enemy nations and to set about its work without delay. Of deepest interest is the evolution of the Labour Charter from its early form as drafted by the Sub-Committee of the Commission, and as modified later by the skilful redrafting of Lord Balfour. Recognising that differences of climate, habits, economic opportunities make strict uniformity of labour rules immediately impracticable, the Charter sets out a number of desirable principles including "the right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers," "a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their times and country," "an eight hours' day in a forty-eight hours' week as a standard to be aimed at," "due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein." How difficult of achievement such "principles" are, in view of the overriding "principle" of national sovereignty, and the obstacles in carrying out even the accepted recommendations, became very evident at the Washington Conference in 1919, when the United States had no official membership and when ex-enemy States were not represented. "The greater part of its time was devoted to drawing up six conventions dealing with hours of work in industry, unemployment, the night work of women, the night work of young persons, the age of admission of children to industrial employment, and the employment of women before and after childbirth." It was probably wise to have begun (as our factory legislation began) upon the distinctively humanitarian plane, though even so the unequal ratification, as indicated by the footnote of page 327, shows how far "internationalism" in its wider sense was lacking. The larger issues about wages, hours, etc. appear to have been disposed of in the milder form of "Recommendations and Regulations," i.e. with no attempt to get a binding agreement. The set-back to economic internationalism in recent years makes these volumes with their elaborate documentation rather painful reading, so far from fulfilment seem to-day the hopes and aspirations towards world economic unity that prompted this movement. But in the longer process of human history this early faith and desire of a few groups of believers may well prove of vital significance.

J. A. HOBSON.

INDIA, MINTO AND MORLEY.

India, Minto and Morley, 1905-10, by Mary, Countess of Minto,* is of particular interest at the present moment when we are all thinking about the greatest of our Imperial problems. Lord Morley published long extracts from his letters to the Viceroy in the second volume of his *Recollections*, and Mr. John Buchan's admirable biography of Minto sketched the other side of the story. In Lady Minto's substantial work we have at last the presentation of the drama as a whole. Consisting for the most part of the author's diary and the correspondence of the two statesmen, it revives those crowded years in which repression and reform went hand in hand. Lord Minto emerges as a great gentleman, inferior indeed to his predecessor, Curzon, in ability, but immensely his superior in human insight and tact. Knowing little of his subject when he landed at Bombay, he instinctively realised that India was growing up and was entitled to a larger share in the control of her fortunes. Hence his proposal of an Indian member for his Executive Council, which seemed so dangerous to inelastic minds in Simla and Whitehall, and which now appears a very small affair. Morley backed up the plan, and the names of the two statesmen are forever linked in that monument of their trustful co-operation, the Morley-Minto reform scheme. Considering their widely different training and temperament, the two men got on astonishingly well. Lady Minto complains of the touchiness of the Secretary of State, and throughout the book runs an undertone of resentment at the exercise of his constitutional powers. If Minto knew more about India, Morley knew better what the Cabinet and Parliament would swallow and approve. Thus it was Morley's duty as well as his right to warn the Viceroy that he must not go too far in his measures against sedition, since a Liberal Parliament naturally detested deportation without charge or trial. Most readers of this interesting book will probably conclude that the correspondence reflects equal credit on both the principal actors. Lady Minto was an admirable Vicereine—plucky, tactful, sympathetic. It is a fine record of devoted work in the best spirit of British rule. The only fault of the editing is the excessive space devoted to sport, thrilling enough at the time, no doubt, but utterly without interest to readers thirty years later.

* Macmillan, 21s.

G. P. G.

ANTI-SEMITISM* 69568

The recent outbreaks of anti-Semitism, and in particular the anti-Jewish policy of the German Government, have caused Dr. James Parkes to make an exhaustive study of the origins of anti-Semitism. The first volume of this investigation has recently been published, and carries the history from New Testament times to the beginnings of medieval Europe. A further volume, bringing the subject down to the Middle Ages, is now in the course of preparation, and Dr. Parkes hopes to publish it within a short time. As the author says in his Preface: "The progress of events from the medieval ghetto to modern Europe is fairly well known," but the present work explores the causes which led to the outbreaks against the Jews in the Middle Ages and to the eventual establishment of the ghetto. He does this in a series of chapters dealing with the position of the Jews in the Roman world, the clash with Christianity, and the subsequent relations between Jews and Christians throughout the period under review. Dr. Parkes deals in a series of later chapters with the Theodosian Code in the West, with the position in the Byzantine Empire, and with the subsequent relations of the barbarian invaders to the Jews, in France and in Visigothic Spain. The volume is comprehensive in its range, and almost embarrassing by reason of the fullness of the details that are furnished.

All the existing records, both legal and historical, are included in the able survey that is made. The attitude of the author is dispassionate, and the grounds of his judgment are fully set forth. In regard to some of these judgments Dr. Parkes controverts many of the views which have been made current by such Christian writers as, for example, Dean Milman. In particular, he qualifies the generally accepted assumption that the Jews incurred hostility as money-lenders, showing not only how scanty are the historical allusions in the early records upon which this assumption has been founded, but giving evidence that the principal money-lenders during the early period were the Syrians, whose diffusion throughout the Roman Empire was as wide as the Jews. As he shows, the Syrians were notorious and exacting money-lenders. As the result of his inquiry, Dr. Parkes concludes that the root from

* *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue*. By James Parkes. The Soncino Press, 10s. 6d. net.

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which anti-Semitism grew was not economic, but religious. The position of the Jews under the Roman Empire, which recognised them as citizens and their religious faith as tolerated, deteriorated when the Empire became nominally Christian. From that time onwards the religious conflict between Judaism and Christianity worsened their position alike in law, in administration, and in the public attitude. It is a sorry story almost from beginning to end, though the position was at times mitigated by such an enlightened Pope as Gregory the Great and by ordinary human good feeling between sensible Jews and sensible Christians. On the Christian side antagonism was inspired by such intolerance as was shown Chrysostom and other Church leaders, who were actuated not so much by the character and attitude of the Jews of their time as by the historic rejection of Christ, and in particular by the Crucifixion. Throughout the ages when the force of religious convictions led to ferocious prejudices unqualified by the spirit of toleration, civil administration—which owing to the fall of the Empire in the West became largely ecclesiastical—and mass sentiment alike gave a lead to anti-Jewish movements, and from time to time to persecution. In these lamentable circumstances, enmity between two religions which had a common source exclusively claimed by each side, but which diverged tragically at the most important point, naturally added bitterness to their controversies, and made even good men, not least of all on the Christian side, intemperate in denunciation and from time to time inhumane in action. Dr. Parkes has written what will henceforth be a standard book for all who desire to investigate this melancholy subject.

J. S. L.

* * * * *

ISAAC NEWTON.*

Mr. More is a scientist who enjoys a considerable reputation, and a man of his calibre is certainly required to grasp the complete significance of Sir Isaac Newton, the greatest man in science our race has produced. We have heard a successor in the Lucasian chair pronounce that if you could put together the brains of all the men who have cultivated science A.D. this joint brain would hardly form a corner of Newton's brain.

* *Isaac Newton: A Biography.* By L. T. More. Scribner. 18s.

Praise of this order at least compels us to read this able book with the attention the career of Newton deserves. His formative years at the Old King's School, Grantham, and Trinity College, Cambridge, are described with pith and point, and it is clear that the author has searched the available means at his disposal in order to render his picture as complete as possible. There is perhaps too much censure of Brewster's biography in the text, and some of these attacks might have been safely relegated to the obscurity of footnotes. After all, Sir David Brewster wrote one of the first serious attempts to consider the career of the man whom Professor More regards so highly, and we never feel disposed to criticise harshly the efforts of a pioneer.

Of course our author is able to pay great attention to the discoveries made before Newton transformed the science of his day, and transformed it effectively for generations. It is a singular coincidence to recall that Newton and Descartes effected their most important discoveries in their twenty-third year, then a later age mentally than it is to-day. In his twenty-third year in 1665 Newton enjoyed a period of strenuous mental activity, and his own words are well worth quoting. He then discovered "first the binomial theorem, then the method of fluxions," and began

to think of gravity extending to the orb of the moon, and having found out how to estimate the force with which a globe, revolving within a sphere, from Kepler's rule (the third law) I deduced that the forces which keep the planets in their orb must be reciprocally as the squares of their distances from their centres; and thereby compared the force requisite to [?] the moon in her orb, and found them answer pretty well nearly. All this was in the two plague years of 1665 and 1666, for in those days I was then in the prime of my age for invention and minded Mathematicks and Philosophy more than at any time since.

It has been a tragedy for science that Newton did not continue to "mind Mathematicks," and the reason is transparently plain in this straightforward biography. The discoveries Newton made involved him in controversy after controversy, and he detested controversy. There were controversies with Flamsteed and with Leibniz, the most universal genius of his age. The *odium scientificum* is at least as serious as the *odium theologicum*. Mr. More explains these controversies in lucid language which any intelligent reader can follow.

Our author is naturally stronger on the scientific than on the historical aspect of Newton's life. We hear little about his work as Master of the Mint, and find no reference to his part in such matters as Wood's halfpence. Nor can we accord to the scientist the great place in theology that is here assigned to him. For one of the most amazing aspects of the career of this great genius is that he wrote theology which even in his own day was not first-rate. He fell back on interpretations of Daniel and Revelation which in the early eighteenth century were not supposed to be critical, and history has more than confirmed this judgment.

R. H. M.

* * * * *

GENERAL BOOTH.*

Mr. St. John Ervine has produced an outstanding work upon the history of the Salvation Army in his biography of William Booth. Stimulating and independently written, the work is distinguished for its erudition and the critical eulogy of its central figure. Mr. Harold Begbie's monumental life must always remain a masterly portrait of the great evangelist; and the author's debt is evident throughout these pages. Rivalling it in length, Mr. Ervine's biography, however, surpasses it in research and can at times provide a firmer foundation for historical fact. On the other hand, some of Mr. Ervine's views, especially upon the deposition of General Bramwell Booth, will arouse discussion. William Booth was born in Nottingham in 1829 of labouring-class parents. His consuming passion for saving souls, especially of the poor around him, was stirred early in life. At the age of fifteen he experienced the sense of his own conversion, and two years later his first sermon was delivered. After working for years in a pawnbroker's shop, he became in 1852 a professional lay preacher and ultimately a minister of the Methodist New Connexion. The success of his revivalist meetings among the lowest of the poor quickly attracted attention. The denomination, however, became increasingly nervous of his methods. After continual attempts to restrain Booth to pastoral work, a crisis was reached at the Annual Conference in 1861. According to the account in Commissioner Booth-Tucker's *Life of Catherine Booth*, reproduced in Mr. Begbie's work,

* *God's Soldier: General William Booth*. By St. John Ervine. 2 volumes, 368. net. Heinemann.

Booth's doubts were removed by a dramatic shout from his wife in the chapel gallery, whereupon he abruptly left the sect. Mr. Ervine produces the testimony of two nonagenarian eye-witnesses who provide variations of the story. At all events, Booth did not leave the Connexion until two months later, after mature consideration. Mrs. Booth simply "fixed his decision to withdraw." Mr. Ervine is anxious throughout his work to rebut a common view that Mrs. Booth's influence over her husband was generally decisive. "Her influence on him was powerful, but it was not supreme." In spite of his spiritual zeal, Booth was extremely conservative of change, and it may well be thought that, without his wife's continual pressure in their early years, he would have remained a pastor. But it is equally true that without Booth the Salvation Army could not have been raised.

In 1865 Booth commenced his famous meetings on Mile End Waste which led to the formation of the Christian Mission, later called the Salvation Army. Free from Methodist restraint, he could practise to the full his theory of emotional conversion which aroused such widespread censure and suspicion. "Nothing moves the people like the terrific," Booth had written. "They must have hell-fire flashed before their eyes or they will not move." In Mr. Ervine's words:

the squalor of industrial life was such that sensationally dramatic ways of attracting the attention of working men were necessary if the allurements of the public-house, in which the workman, escaping from the dark streets and his dismal home, could find friends and gaiety and warmth, were to be met and resisted.

No device was wanting to attract a congregation. An officer might parade the town with a halter round his neck or circulate first-class tickets to Heaven. Moreover, the fierce antagonism of publican and sinner was readily welcomed as a means of publicity. An article in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for August 1882, cited by Mr. Ervine, typifies the mistrust of such methods even by well-wishers of the movement. Booth was not blind to the dangers of emotionalism. He never denied that reaction might defeat the cure. But through the Army he designed to retain the fervour of his converts by their immediate dispatch on errands of spiritual rescue. The Mission, he wrote, gathered the converted into Christian fellowship so that "they may be . . . watched over and cared for in their religious course."

In 1878 Booth received autocratic powers over the Mission from its members, whom, Mr. Ervine startlingly asserts, he deliberately induced for the purpose into an emotional fervour. Apart from Booth's personal inclination towards dictatorship, some such change was becoming increasingly necessary. A strong hand was needed to control the rapidly spreading branches. Above all the mass of his followers, themselves converts from the public-house, required military discipline in their simple and courageous task of bringing slum sinners to the penitents' form. But Booth was also laying the seeds of future dissension in an educated army.

The 'eighties witnessed two outstanding developments in the Army's work. Mr. Ervine deals at length with its rapid expansion into America, the British Dominions, and among European States. At Booth's death in 1912, branches existed in fifty-eight countries, where 16,000 officers preached the Gospel. Meanwhile, in 1884 the opening of the first Rescue Home marked a radical change of policy, which aroused in the public a growing appreciation of the Army. Booth had long opposed social relief as such. For the saved, as he himself had experienced, God would provide. Moreover, he gravely mistrusted the consequent ownership of property which might create in his Army a passivity and respectability existing in the churches. But by 1890, when *In Darkest England and the Way Out* had appeared, he was working hard to solve the problem of poverty to enable lost "souls to come more closely into contact with God's grace and the Holy Spirit." Encouraged particularly by Bramwell Booth, social service has taken a growing place in the Army's work.

In the course of a lengthy epilogue, Mr. Ervine discusses in detail the causes and events which led to the deposition of Bramwell Booth in 1929. Like his father, Bramwell regarded the movement as an international force, directed by an autocratic general. Some foreign divisions, however, led by the United States, having acquired a national flavour, resent the dictatorial control of an outsider. This is the essence of an issue, unfortunately aggravated by personal considerations. Mr. Ervine vindicates the attitude of Bramwell Booth and contends that under the electoral system "bureaucratic business men will henceforth rule the Army." Many, with Mr. Ervine, fear for the Army's future and believe that without the ending of internal strife and the renewed vigour

of spiritual leadership, the Army will decline into a purely philanthropic institution.

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CUBA.*

At the request of President Mendieta in March 1934, the Foreign Policy Association in the United States appointed a Commission of eleven eminent American economists and public men to study the economic and social problems of Cuba. Its Report, *Problems of the New Cuba*,* published after three months' intensive investigation on the island during last summer, throws an illuminating searchlight upon the prevailing distress in that country. The economic prosperity of Cuba depends almost exclusively upon the sugar industry. The glut in the international market reached its height in the summer of 1932; and, during a lengthened dead season of nine or ten months, when the mills are closed, the thousands of Cuban sugar-workers are reduced to destitution, unrelieved by any form of unemployment insurance or organised system of relief. The whole position has been aggravated by a long period of corrupt misgovernment, culminating in the Presidency of Machado, who was eventually overthrown in the Revolution of 1933 and whose "administration resorted to methods of brutal despotism, sponsoring the worst forms of corruption and crime." The Report reveals the deplorable state and inadequacy of many social services and the chaotic condition of the national finances.

The Commission outline a programme of reconstruction, to be assisted in its execution by foreign experts. Its main feature is independence of the restricted output and fluctuations of the sugar industry. They advocate a scheme of "land colonisation" to "develop sustenance farming to support the country population during the dead season, and create an agricultural middle class." In respect to the sugar industry itself, they would welcome a new international agreement on the basis of import quotas, adjustable "to changes in demand as reflected in world sugar prices." The Report has to admit that its recommendations are entirely subject to political regeneration. "The fundamental solution of Cuba's political and social problems lies in an improvement

* Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 8 West 40th Street, New York. \$3.

in public morals and the development of a well-informed, public-spirited opinion." The election of President Mendieta and the early events of 1934 encouraged the Commission in this regard. Moreover, in their view, the abrogation in May 1934 of the Platt Amendment, which reserved the right of American intervention, "undoubtedly removed an outstanding obstacle to the development of better government in Cuba." But subsequent events have forced the Commission to appreciate that "the political problem is far from solved." Indeed, the present political confusion and recurrence of revolutionary outbursts has made still more remote those social and economic reforms which only strong government and national co-operation can achieve.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

The Indian Earthquake,* by C. F. Andrews, is a poignant little book, easy to read and impossible to forget. Beginning with realistic descriptions of a terrible convulsion of Nature, he passes on to describe the response of India, the activities of the Government, and the sympathy of the world. His love for the Indian people is known to us all, and it lights up these tragic pages with its warm glow. One of the most interesting chapters describes Gandhi's curious attempt to explain the catastrophe as a punishment for the sin of untouchability—a thesis which was promptly repudiated by Tagore. Our author has written his book with a double purpose. Its immediate aim is to swell the relief fund by the profits of its sale and to induce its readers to send donations direct to the stricken area of Bihar. The wider purpose is to bring the Indian and the British people nearer to one another on the basis of our common humanity, each party sympathising with and eager to help in the sufferings of the other. As Mr. Andrews sees it, the problem of India is not so much political or economic as psychological, a problem of mutual understanding, mutual trust, mutual good will.

At a moment when the establishment of an Indian Federation is largely dependent upon the collaboration of the Princes, Sir William Barton's informative and comprehensive volume on *The Princes of India*† makes a timely appearance. The importance of the Princes in the constitutional scheme is evident and yet, as Lord Halifax says in his Introduction, "less is known in this country of the Indian States than of any other of the principal elements in the Indian question."

* Allen & Unwin. 2s. 6d.

† Nisbet & Co. Ltd. 15s. net.

Sir William sketches briefly the historical background of the existing States and also the growth and nature of the paramount powers of the British Crown. The five hundred and sixty-two States vary enormously both in size and in the extent of their powers. The author is mainly concerned with the few more prominent States; and, with his great experience as a British Resident, he can provide a particularly valuable picture of their life, political conditions and aspirations. The closely guarded autocracy of the Princes and the growing self-government of the British Indian provinces has raised and must continue to provide problems of the greatest complexity. Sir William stresses the great element of stability which the Princes can contribute to the future constitution. Indeed they will hold, together with the minorities, a commanding position in the Federal Legislature. Sir William, however, concludes that the full extent of the Princes' influence will rest ultimately upon the quality of their own administrations. But this popular book is more explanatory than political and should spread a wider appreciation of the character of the Indian States.

Reconsideration of the basis of Christian Pacifism forms the principal theme of Professor C. E. Raven's brilliant little book, *Is War Obsolete?**, which embodies the substance of the Halley Stewart Lectures for 1934. The author's approach is based upon his view of the evolutionary character of Christian ethics. In the course of history, the Christian's duty is progressively revealed in the struggle towards the Christian ideal. Until 1914 war had always been regarded "as the supreme proof of heroic worth," and Professor Raven refuses to condemn the Christian's past willingness to fight. But "if now a vision of peace, not before granted, has been given, then at whatever cost we must be true to it." Professor Raven readily postulates the formative value of struggle upon growth and development. With the appearance of new levels of experience, we have passed beyond the stage of mere physical conflict to the higher effort of attaining spiritual and material progress. The evolutionary case against war is "that it subjects a highly organised creature to conditions which, if they ever had a eugenic justification, have now become not creative but disintegrating." In the spirit of Christianity lies the path to progress and the antidote to war. The particular and immediate duty of the Christian is "to throw himself heart and soul into the more direct service of world evangelism." Public and private standards of conduct can admit of no moral disparity. Moreover, the Christian's duty cannot be fulfilled by the performance of a series of obligatory rules which are applicable to an earlier and cruder state of society. "Actually, as we all know," says Professor Raven, "the general effect of the Catholic ethic is to foster the mediæval eulogising of militarism." In the light of new spiritual growth, the Christian must fight for the moral and religious education of mankind.

* Allen & Unwin. 4s. 6d. net.

✓ A valuable survey of European history, intended for the general reader, will be found in *A Modern History of Europe, 1046-1918*,* edited by Mr. J. Hampden Jackson. This volume of over twelve hundred pages is divided into four books, each written by a competent historian. Mr. Oliver J. G. Welch is responsible for a clear and well-balanced outline of the Middle Ages. Although the volume is styled to begin at 1046, Mr. Welch has necessarily given a tiny sketch of the growth of the Church and State from Roman times. Mr. Welch is a Roman Catholic and the Editor's recommendation of the writer on that account will be questioned by many historians. Mr. C. J. Pennethorne Hughes, in the second book, continues the narrative from the Reformation and the rise of the modern State to the Treaty of Utrecht, 1714. It may be noted that the Battle of Blenheim is not mentioned by name. The succeeding century of "reason" culminating in the French Revolution and the Battle of Waterloo, is dealt with by Mr. H. E. Howard. Mr. P. C. Gordon Walker completes the volume with a short sketch of the nineteenth century and a comparatively long account of the Great War. Written "from the standpoint of the post-war generation" this volume is yet devoted to a sober narrative of fact, without allegiance to a particular historical theory.

The German offensive of March 1918 is dealt with in the new volume of *The Official History of the Great War*,† ably compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds. A substantial section of the work is devoted to the preliminaries on either side. General Edmonds discusses the political and strategical considerations which forced the Allies to resume the defensive and enabled Germany, through the defection of Russia, to throw the mass of her strength against an ill-prepared and proportionately weak defence. These questions, however, have received ample attention elsewhere and the particular value of this volume lies in its account of the actual operations from March 21st to 26th, in which the British troops "quickly learnt the tricks of the trade, and were fighting better at the close of the sixth day than they had been on the second." Lack of material makes an adequate and coherent account of the fighting peculiarly difficult. With the assistance, however, of official records and the information gleaned from a large number of officers, a remarkably consistent narrative has been produced. No attempt has been made, nor is needed, to describe every movement of each unit along a front of fifty miles. "It has been sought to make clear why positions were lost, and how the troops in their retirements got from one position to another." The series of excellent maps and sketches compiled by Major A. F. Becke is indispensable. The volume

* Gollancz. 10s. 6d. net.

† *Official History of the War. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1918.* Volume 1, 12s. 6d. net; Volume of Appendices, 6s. 6d. net; Case of Maps, 5s. 6d. net.

concludes with a chapter on the Doullens Conference, held on March 26th, when Foch was appointed Generalissimo and was able to avert the disastrous separation of the French armies from the British as contemplated by General Pétain.

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Sunrise to Evening Star: My Seventy Years in South Africa,* by Marina King, with a Preface by Viscount Allenby and a Note by Marie Botha-Hawkin, is an account of an adventurous and varied life, mostly connected with farming. Mrs. King did her first trek as a little girl with her parents from the Cape to Natal overland in an ox-wagon, which took six or seven months. There were all sorts of happenings on the way and the ups and downs of farming and further treks provide lively reading. Social life in Maritzburg in the early days also comes into the picture. In course of time there was the gold rush to the Transvaal, and in middle life the author found herself running hotels, with farms alongside, and feeding all kinds of people up country. We go through the Zulu War, the first Boer War, the second Boer War, and finally the Great War, though there is not much about the latter. The last farm Mrs. King bought was in East Griqualand, evidently a very nice part of the country. On the death of Colonel King she decided at the age of 74 to visit England again and, disliking the sea, undertook the journey across Africa in a motor car with her adopted daughter, a white mechanic, and a Zulu boy. Their experiences were very trying indeed; they pushed on instead of stopping to enjoy the places they passed through, for fear of the rainy season coming on. What with the tsetse fly and swamps, and forced driving and losing their road, the journey reads rather like a nightmare, though they experienced some wonderful kindness on the way and saw some wonderful scenery. Finally, they reached the coast and so home to England by sea. The brief descriptions of nature in South Africa stimulate the imagination. Snakes loom large, monkeys, leopards, etc. There is a fearful experience of a bush fire which passed right over Mrs. King and her husband, who were out with their dog-cart. Altogether it is inspiring to read of such courage and enterprise and so lively an interest in the events of life.

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 The fifth and sixth volumes of the "Modern States Series" deal with two very different countries, *Spain*† and *Poland*.† Sir Charles Petrie writes an excellent résumé of Spanish history as a prelude to his forty odd pages of modern Spain and post-war politics. His chapters on the Directory, the Revolution and the Second Republic clarify the maze of recent events. The author is an acknowledged authority on Spanish affairs, and his understanding of the people is apparent throughout. Mr. E. J. Patterson has written an equally clear book on Poland. The volume is divided into three parts, the Old Poland,

* Harrap. 10s. 6d.

† Arrowsmith. 3s. 6d. net each.

Subjection and Restoration (from the partitions of the eighteenth century down to 1923), and the New Poland which brings the history down to 1934. This little volume forms a good introduction to an intricate subject. Both books have maps and short bibliographies.

Students of English constitutional history will appreciate a new and valuable volume of select documents, compiled and edited by Dr. Eleanor C. Lodge and Dr. Gladys A. Thornton. Bishop Stubbs limited his *Select Charters* up to the death of Edward I on the ground that by 1307 our system of government is "raw and untrained and awkward, but it is complete." More recent research, however, as exemplified in the later volumes of Professor Tout's *Chapters in Administrative History*, has demonstrated the great importance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in constitutional development. This concise anthology of *English Constitutional Documents, 1307-1485*,* therefore, will be valuable in providing ready access to the more important and representative records of the period from 1307 until the commencement of Dr. J. R. Tanner's *Tudor Constitutional Documents* in 1485. A number of the documents selected have not been published hitherto. The volume is divided into three parts, the Central Government, the Church, and Local Government; and the main topics in each are preceded by brief historical introductions and useful bibliographies.

In *The Spirit of London*† the late Mr. Paul Cohen-Portheim has produced a brilliant interpretation of London's character, as seen through its buildings and institutions, and the life of its people. While the author's assertion that "whatever is best is hidden and made difficult of access" in London is an exaggeration, his own intimate knowledge of the Londoners' habits and outlook makes this critical guide of especial interest. Many may disagree with some of Mr. Cohen-Portheim's views, as for example in the beauty of Regent Street and Hungerford Bridge, or perhaps hold with Mr. Raymond Mortimer in his Preface that he "grotesquely overestimates the work of both Raeburn and Epstein." But the general appraisal bears the marks of great insight and balanced appreciation from an affectionate and sympathetic critic. The author has certainly caught the spirit of London in a way few other foreigners have done. The striking collection of over 140 photographs, depicting the architecture, life and pageantry of the metropolis forms naturally an integral part of the volume. It should, however, be noted that in at least two cases the titles are wrong and misleading. The photograph of "Dean's Yard" depicts the Deanery Courtyard, leading to the Jerusalem Chamber in Westminster Abbey, and in the photograph of "Middle Temple Hall and Fountain Court," the former is excluded from view.

* Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d. net. † Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MAY, 1935.

THE KING AND HIS REIGN.

THE 6th of May witnesses the close of twenty-five years of the King's reign, to be followed, as His Majesty's subjects devoutly hope, by not a few more years of health and happiness for him, and of renewed well-being for Britain and the Empire. On the 6th of May, 1910, King Edward the Seventh passed to his rest after a reign of nine years and less than four months. As many observers have noted, so much kingly dignity, humanised by so much individual geniality, and quickened by such shrewd appreciation of European politics, had never yet adorned the throne of England. For King George, his succession to the grandest sovereignty in the world was embittered by deep personal grief. No harsh thought or word had ever passed between father and son, and his first thought must have been for his mother, whose radiant beauty had first fascinated the crowds welcoming her in 1863, and who had won the hearts of rich and poor by entering into the life of her adopted country as no foreign princess had ever before dreamed of doing.

Sandringham had been an ideal home for the family of five children. They were brought up in the atmosphere of unaffected ease that in those days distinguished the houses of English country gentlemen—refined simplicity replaced when necessary by splendid entertainment. There was the perpetual delight of sport, and none of the repression of high spirits which an earlier generation had to undergo; while the visits of distinguished public men, and the regular society of members of the Household noted for gallant achievement like Christopher Teesdale and Dighton Probyn, or for wide outlook like Arthur Ellis and Francis Knollys, was an introduction to life such as none of their contemporaries could hope to enjoy. The education of princes is always a problem. The Prince of Wales favoured the *Britannia*, and Queen Victoria, who might have preferred one of the less fashionable public schools, reluctantly acquiesced. This naturally led to two cruises in the *Bacchante*, which together filled the years from 1879 to 1882. It was evident that Prince Albert Victor

could not become a professional sailor, and in due course he was gazetted to the 10th Hussars, a regiment with which the Royal Family had more than once been connected.

With Prince George it was otherwise. The senior service had long attracted members of the Royal House. James the Second, as Duke of York, had fought bravely in the Dutch wars; William the Fourth, as Duke of Clarence, had been a competent sailor, though he may have retained more of nautical freedom of speech than of the orderly tradition of the Royal Navy. The Princes' uncle, the Duke of Edinburgh, had passed through all the grades of the service, and held with credit one of the highest sea-going commands. Each of us has to endure his mystic fate, says the Latin poet: could Prince George's future have been foreseen, it would have been hard to devise a sounder training for what was to come to him. Nobody can depreciate the value of service in a good regiment: a cavalry mess would be no more subservient to a Royal junior officer than would the gun-room or ward-room of a battleship; but in quarters on land it is impossible altogether to avoid the obligations and distractions of civil society, just as it is in passing through public school and university. A man-of-war is an isolated kingdom, with the captain as its autocrat, whose only parallel ashore is a Master of Hounds. Such of the King's shipmates as survive may not be slow to trace some of the effects of the unadvertised spells of hard and sometimes disagreeable work which he undertook in the Navy, in the simple devotion to duty and the unselfish zeal for the public service which have shone out during these twenty-five years. Nor must it be forgotten that he rose to the enjoyment of independent command at sea, a training in the formation of character which he could scarcely have obtained in any other walk of life.

In 1893 the Duke of York, as he had lately become, found the greatest happiness of his life in his marriage to the Princess Victoria Mary, his cousin two years younger than himself, though of a senior generation. It was the opening of a united companionship, and of the completest understanding for which man and wife could pray: as the King and Queen read their history in the nation's eyes, they read it together. Never was a Royal wedding more popular; Princess May, as she was then known, was English of the English; and the country felt that if a foreign princess were chosen, probably

a German, it would be long odds against Princess Alexandra's daughter-in-law turning out to be a reproduction of herself. It was remembered, too, that during all the sad years when Queen Victoria, shattered by grief and longing for seclusion, had lost something of the public regard—for her strenuous labours behind the scenes were unrevealed to most—her cousins, the Duke of Cambridge and Princess Mary, full of energy and good humour, had helped their younger relations to carry on the Royal tradition, by taking the lead at public ceremonies and occasions of interest.

In a brief survey such as this it is only possible to touch on one or two of the aspects in which the King has stood out to his people during these twenty-five years. First, as the guardian of the Constitution, he has been served by five Prime Ministers, presiding over administrations of various complexions—Coalition, Party, and National. Asquith and Bonar Law have gone; but the three survivors would agree that no ruler could have been more scrupulous in observing the tenets of the Constitution, more sympathetic in pursuing the well-being of his less fortunate subjects, or more gracious in his personal dealings with themselves. To revert to the beginning of the reign, King George mounted the throne at a moment of political tension such as this country had not witnessed for more than twenty years. In his boyhood party passions had flared up over the Eastern question in 1877 and 1878. Frantic partisans had passed all measure in vituperation of Lord Beaconsfield or Mr. Gladstone, as the case might be. In 1886 Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill had awakened animosities not less bitter, and many private friendships were severed. The South African War in its turn shattered party allegiance, but its reaction on public and social life in London was less prominent. The advent of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman's Government in 1905 heralded a return to the former conditions of conflict. Home Rule was to progress step by step, not to be carried by a *coup de massue*, but the Unionist party stood in solid alignment, obedient to the prejudices of Ulster. Still more formidable were the fears soon to be kindled by the financial proposals of the Government, peculiarly unacceptable to the landowning majority in the House of Lords. A constitutional crisis might develop at any moment, a crisis in which the Crown could scarcely remain unconcerned. So it happened in 1909, when the House

of Lords, after many searchings of heart, threw the Budget on the dust-heap. The constitutional issue at once emerged; the powers of the Second Chamber, rather than the contemplated taxes, became the subject of dispute. A General Election was inevitable, and King Edward made it clear that if the country should support the Government's financial programme, the further question of the reform of the House of Lords, or of a check on its powers, should in turn be submitted to the verdict of the constituencies. The election of January 1910 left the Asquith Administration in office, and the rejected Budget at last became law. The problem of the relationship between the two Houses remained.

In ordinary times the current of Royal duties and occupations flows smoothly in a majestic stream, unbroken by obstructing rocks or by seething rapids. The British Constitution, with the vagueness of outline which has been its chief protection, has left the operation of the Royal Prerogative to settle itself throughout the changing conditions of two hundred and fifty years. But every now and then Governments, baulked by parliamentary stagnation, have invoked its aid from the Crown. In the turmoil of the great Reform Bill William the Fourth had reluctantly agreed to a possible creation of Peers far larger than that which had carried the Peace of Utrecht under Queen Anne. Queen Victoria had no such difficult decision to make; but in 1871 the purchase of Commissions in the Army was abolished by Royal Warrant, a stroke described by Disraeli as "an avowed and shameful conspiring against the privileges of the House of Lords," which had declined to proceed by legislation. Now, before Parliament was dissolved in November for a fresh election within the year, it was evident that the position of 1832 might be reproduced on a more formidable scale. Party passion, still more excited by the financial policy of the Government, flared up higher than it had on the Eastern Question in 1877 and 1878, or even over Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill of 1886.

It was universally felt to be a hard fate for the Sovereign, not only that his reign should open in an atmosphere so disturbed, but that he should at once be confronted by a constitutional problem more puzzling than any that his illustrious grandmother had had to solve during her reign of more than sixty-three years. It was impossible for the King to give

any pledge to an outgoing Minister to support him in a new Parliament. He might not achieve a majority at all, or a majority so insignificant as to render doubtful the country's approval of his policy. Therefore, anything that the Sovereign could say must be purely hypothetical. But the Prime Minister's path was also difficult. It had been formally announced in February, and repeated in April, that the powers of the House of Lords would be in some respects curtailed, and after the breakdown of the Conference Parliament was dissolved on this issue. Unless there was a fair prospect that the certain resistance of the Peers would be in some way overcome sooner or later, the fervour of keen Liberal supporters would be damped, and the centrally minded voter, the man who creates a large parliamentary majority, would not trouble to assert himself. The main preoccupation of Ministers was to prevent the Crown, and the possible use of the Prerogative, from becoming a principal topic of discussion in the heat of the election, and in the event the danger was, on the whole, avoided. It was agreed that the Sovereign had said as much as he could say, and nothing that he should not have said, constitutionally speaking. The outcome of the Election, and the struggle in the House of Lords over the Parliament Bill are matters of common knowledge. Much space has been given to this constitutional episode, because the King must have been gratefully aware that whatever changes in domestic policy the future might bring, he was never likely again to be troubled by a domestic question so harassing and so unpleasant. Nor was he. The coming years produced sensational events for the United Kingdom, but none that imposed on the Sovereign the burden of a decision so arduous as this.

The fierce campaign for women's suffrage in 1913 was directed against Ministers, not against the Crown. Ireland was a graver matter, because from the introduction of the Home Rule measure of 1912 the possibility that Ulster might force a civil war began to grow into a probability. After a series of untoward incidents, in some of which the Army was unhappily involved, the King summoned a conference to consider the terms on which Ulster could escape submission to a Home Rule Government. The conference failed, not because the problem was insoluble, but because the *personnel* of the body made agreement impossible. Ten days later the

country was at war, and Ireland, Northern and Southern, played her part in the long-drawn struggle ; but not without a succession of tragic blunders and crimes, Irish and English, due to the perpetual incomprehensions of both, which desolated Ireland, and left a legacy of mutual distrust which it will need many years to dissipate. As we all know, the Home Rule conundrum was answered, not solved, by the partition of Ireland into two Parliamentary areas. For thirty-five years the Irish question had embittered political life in the United Kingdom, and had broken many private friendships ; could anybody claim to regard it impartially ? Nobody, perhaps, but the King himself, so that when he went to open the first Parliament of Northern Ireland, his plea for forbearance and peace throughout the whole of Ireland came with a force which the utterance of no statesman could pretend to rival.

The King's personal knowledge of his Empire marks a new chapter in British Sovereignty. Queen Victoria's travels were limited to the nearest European countries, though but for the *malaise* of a sea voyage she would have liked a progress through Imperial India. King Edward had made it as Prince of Wales, and had previously been to America, Palestine and Egypt ; but he was essentially a European Sovereign, immersed in European politics, closely related to most European rulers, and senior to all but the Emperor of Austria. King George and Queen Mary, as Prince and Princess of Wales, had of course visited the principal European courts and capitals ; but the King's familiarity with the Empire dated from very early days. The *Bacchante* went round the world. She touched at the West Indian Islands, Australasia, South Africa, the Chinese and Malayan Colonies, Ceylon, and home by the Red Sea. It was another Empire than that of to-day. Britain had long ceased to exploit her colonies for the enrichment of the Mother-country, but they were still all directed by the Colonial Office, some of them enjoying responsible government, others representative institutions of varying importance. The most independent spirits among them resented the domination of "Downing Street." When, early in the present century, the then Prince and Princess of Wales sailed in the *Ophir* to open the Australian Parliament, and went on to New Zealand, South Africa and Canada, the self-consciousness of the responsibly governed Colonies had greatly developed ; but it was left for the other day to witness

the new orientation of the Empire. The Statute of Westminster did indeed define, if it did not initiate, a novel conception of what the Empire is. The Crown is now the one pivot of the Imperial system.

Like many other changes, this was in part the outcome of the war. Five or six years before 1914 the self-governing Dominions had made it clear that devotion to the Sovereign and the Empire did not mean that they would lightly engage in any quarrel into which any British Government might blunder. When the blow fell in that fatal August, they all rallied to the flag ; and the response of India, not bound by the tie of blood, was even more notable. The King and Queen had toured in India as Prince and Princess of Wales ; and after his accession he had shown his sense of India's special place in the Empire by holding the Coronation Durbar at Delhi. Beyond all question it is on the figure of the King-Emperor, human and sympathetic, but in a way mystical, that the acceptance of English guidance and paramountcy by the peoples of India and their rulers is focused. It is an incalculable advantage to the British Civil Service in India, the finest in the world, to be working under a personal rule that is not arbitrary or capricious. The Imperial presence in the background renders less perceptible the necessary and gradual effacement of Parliamentary control over a progressing India.

When the Great War came the nation turned to the King as the guardian of its faith and the embodiment of its hopes. Through those four terrible years he and the Queen and their family, in their different spheres, devoted themselves entirely to the service of the country. They set an example of material sacrifice, and of simplicity of living, which appealed to everybody, and they shared the burden of sorrow borne in thousands of desolate homes. The King himself paid many visits to the front, heartening his troops and his Allies by close inspection of their needs, and by calm confidence in ultimate victory. When the fighting ceased, the nation remembered all this, for comradeship in adversity outweighs a thousandfold any joint enjoyment of prosperous days. So that when, ten years later, the King was stricken with grave illness, the whole nation was racked with anxiety, and when the imminent peril passed it breathed again. It is the sentiment of intimate friendship, joined to the deepest respect, which inspires the King's subjects to-day. In a real sense, he is one of themselves.

He is not a student, but few Englishmen are students, outside the learned professions. In the best sense he is a man of the world, more widely travelled than anybody, and having taken opportunities of converse with more men and women of wide knowledge and capacity than others have even known by name. He has personally looked into the conditions in which labour lives and works, in the repeated tours which he and the Queen have made through all the great industrial centres in England and Scotland, and his graciousness has known no respect of classes or persons. We are an amusement-loving nation, and the King, when he can escape from serious duties, joins in the people's enterprises and enjoyments. Any special feat of flight or of mountaineering is sure to receive his sympathy, and the final of a Cup Tie often finds him an applauding spectator. His own main enjoyment has been in country pursuits: he is a good rider, with an excellent seat on a horse; but Sandringham is in Norfolk, not Leicestershire, and a Norfolk squire may hunt, or he may not; while if he does not shoot he is in the position of a citizen of St. Andrews who ignores golf. So the King shot regularly from early days, and in a few years any expert naming the half-dozen best shots in England would have included his name. Scarcely anybody could have bettered him with driven partridges on a windy day. He inherited the love of racing, and even more of breeding racehorses. He enjoys the *sans façon* atmosphere at Newmarket; and its pious frequenters devoutly pray that before long they may see his colours to the front on a June afternoon at Epsom. The successes of the apparently immortal *Britannia* delight many who do not belong to the yachting world.

"But these be toys," as Bacon puts it. The country greets this anniversary in a spirit of serious devotion. The five monarchs of the House of Hanover had their differing merits and demerits, but none of them are recorded in history in the company of Alfred or Edward the First or Elizabeth. It was left to the three succeeding Sovereigns to establish the British Monarchy on an impregnable solid foundation. Crowns and thrones have perished, but its Empire stands supreme amidst the changing Governments of the world. Knowing this, King George's subjects unite in the prayer of "God save the King" in one chorus of thankfulness and hope.

CREWE.

HEARTSEARCHINGS.

THERE are moments when men and nations have to make up their minds what to do in circumstances over which they, as individuals or communities, may have little control. For us this is such a moment. In city, town and hamlet more people in this country are searching their hearts and wondering what should be done than at any time within living memory. Peace and war seem to hang in the balance. It is a good English habit to be cooler and calmer than usual at hours of crisis and strain. This habit is misunderstood by foreigners, who often mistake it for indifference or suppose that our trick of emphasising by under-statement is a form of insular arrogance. They ask us to speak out. We feel that foreigners know too little of our mental processes to warrant us in heeding their exhortations. They may be right or wrong. We prefer to tread the path to Heaven, or the road to Hell, in our own fashion.

Public feeling has been shocked, more deeply than foreigners can guess or than our Government may realise, by the way in which Germany repudiated on March 16th the military restrictions embodied in Part V of the Versailles Treaty. Germany's determination to free herself from those restrictions was thought natural; but her defiant repudiation of them, when there was every prospect of their being abrogated by friendly agreement, struck us as an unnecessary display of the "brutality" which, according to his book, *Mein Kampf*, is Herr Hitler's favourite method of action. Further shocks were given by the revelations that Germany has secretly built up an army more powerful than that of any European country except, perhaps, Russia; and, still more, by Herr Hitler's statement to Sir John Simon that her air force is already equal to that of Great Britain. So not a few are doubting whether our Governments, past and present, have not been letting us live in a fool's paradise, and are tempted to exclaim, as Mr. Stanley Baldwin did in his famous letter of June 1919, to *The Times*, that "a fool's paradise is only the ante-room to a fool's hell." Memories of 1914 are still too vivid to allow us to forget that when Germany feels herself strong she is prone to play the bully.

Save in one respect it may be well to put 1914 out of our minds. There are enough differences between 1914 and 1935

to distort any parallel between them. The main likeness lies in the possibility, which many deem a certainty, that firm resolve and clear speech on our part to-day would dispel the war atmosphere and ensure peace. This it is which chiefly merits our attention; and we have to think what the chances are and which of them we had better take. "Homœopathic" thinking will help us little. It consists in imagining that like cures like. We have been suffering from a surfeit of illusions. More illusions will not cure us; severe abstinence is the only remedy.

We thought we could get peace on the cheap, and now awaken to find that this kind of peace is both dear and nasty. We thought we could promote disarmament without security by fine phrases and the force of an "example" which, when all is said and done, suited our depleted pockets as well as the pursuit of peace without responsibility suited our foggy fancy. We flatter ourselves that we have always supported "the collective peace system"—from which we ran away with eager feet as soon as a strong power challenged it in the Far East. In March 1933 we put our name, or the Prime Minister did, to sundry provisions for collective security which were so lamentably inadequate as a basis for disarmament that they had promptly to be turned inside out. To-day we are told that Germany wants peace on condition that her demands—military, naval, aerial, territorial and other, in Europe and beyond—are satisfied; and we are bidden to accept those demands in whole or in part, as the price of Germany's return to a transmogrified League which, it is argued, she would then faithfully support. This is homœopathic reasoning with a vengeance.

What grounds have we to suppose that Germany will observe any treaty or other international engagement a moment longer than she may think it in her interest to do so? Bismarck himself denounced that supposition in 1888. Hohenzollern Germany not only broke the treaty in guarantee of Belgian neutrality but deliberately planned, as early as 1904, to break it in pursuance of her strategy. Mr. Haldane found this out in 1906, and began in consequence to prepare the British Expeditionary Force for the defence of Belgian and French Channel ports. Hitlerite Germany is unlikely to be more squeamish. After Hitler's Munich *Putsch* in 1923, which he had given his word of honour to Bavarian Ministers

not to undertake, he met the reproaches of the Bavarian Government with the assurance that "circumstances had changed." His career has been a long record of broken pledges—and of shrewd gulling of one opponent after another. A well-known writer in an influential weekly journal recently urged that all we have to do is to "take Hitler at his word." Upon this uncritical advice an experienced German who watched Hitler's progress at close quarters sends me the following comment:

All these people (i.e. those who would take Hitler at his word) prove that they have not yet grasped Hitler's basic idea which he himself has expounded so clearly in his book and which he has followed consistently in practice, at least in his home policy. It is the policy of finishing off one opponent after the other and of holding out promises of friendship to those opponents whose turn has not yet come. When he came to power he began by violent suppression of the Communists, while he was in active coalition with the Conservatives, on more or less friendly terms with the Catholic Centre Party, and holding out some hope of reconciliation to the Social Democrats. All these Parties fell into the trap, just as now a part of the non-German world seems to be falling into the trap. The Social Democrats even sent delegates to Paris, London, Copenhagen, Stockholm and other places, begging their Party friends in these countries to desist from denouncing Hitler. They did this at the instigation of Goering, who promised them in this case a sort of toleration. By the time these delegates returned the Communists were already finished off, and Hitler's onslaught upon the Social Democrats began despite all the promises. The Centre Party was induced, at the first meeting of the new Reichstag, to vote for the Nazis and to give Hitler full power; but, as soon as the Socialists were done for, Hitler destroyed the Centre Party and, at about the same time, the Catholic Bavarian People's Party, a member of which even belonged to the Bavarian Nazi Cabinet. Then, in spite of Hugenberg, came the turn of the Conservatives.

This is precisely Hitler's programme in foreign policy as he outlined it in his book. If he were left a free hand in the East he would first destroy the Russian power and dominate South Eastern Europe, while France and Britain would stand by in the hope that Hitler's appetite would be satisfied and that he would keep his promises in the Western sphere. But when he had once succeeded in getting rid of Russia's power and in rallying the small countries of South Eastern Europe around a Greater Germany, France's turn would surely come. If Britain were then to go to the

help of France, things would certainly be worse than they are to-day, because no aid could be expected from Russia or from the Little Entente which would either have been destroyed or dominated by Germany. And if Great Britain were to leave even France in the lurch in the hope of being herself spared, she would discover too late what the real aims of Hitler's policy are.

My German correspondent puts the very question that lies in the background of our minds: What are "the real aims of Hitler's policy"? Hitler has defined them broadly and Professor Banse more precisely. (Professor Banse, by the way, was recently rehabilitated and given a "Chair of Honour" at Hanover.) In my own view Hitler's aims are not compatible with European peace—and it is a commonplace to say that our main interest is peace. The pertinent question is what our peace policy should be. It is not enough to assert that we shall stand by the League of Nations "as we have always done." Are we prepared to impose an economic boycott or to use force of arms on behalf of the League if necessary? I am not sure that, if it came to the point, all the people who have answered in the affirmative the questions put in Lord Cecil's Peace Ballot would be as good as their word. On the contrary, many who think they love peace would be disposed to cry: "Let us keep out of it at all costs!" Nothing short of a direct attack upon our own shores or cities would stiffen the backs of these people; and there would always be a proportion, smaller or larger according to circumstances, who, like the Very Rev. Dick Sheppard, would feel they were doing their Christian duty in refusing to countenance the use of force even in self-defence.

So the matter is not quite so simple as it may seem. The only way out for those who are honestly trying to make up their minds is to ask themselves whether there is anything they would be ready to fight and die for. Having done this, they should conscientiously try to put themselves into the places of responsible Ministers and decide how they would act if they had to frame a policy that might involve their country's very existence.

This is what I have tried to do in the light of such information as I possess. However faulty my conclusions may be I can at least claim that they have not been light-heartedly drawn. At the risk of giving pain to idealists I must confess my belief that no British Government ought, for the sake of

an abstract principle, to commit this country in what may be for it a matter of life and death. National and imperial security should be the chief aim of our policy. If we can get it through the League, so much the better. We do not like the word "security," and have often upbraided the French for harping upon it—because we did not feel that our own security was endangered. Now we know it is endangered, and tend to change our tone. Yet some of us took the Government to task for issuing the White Paper, or *Statement Relating to Defence*, just before the House of Commons' debate on March 11th, and on the eve of the date first fixed for Sir John Simon's visit to Berlin. Those who did so hardly reflected that official military status had been bestowed on the German Air Force by March 9th, or that the publication of the White Paper after the—possibly unsatisfactory—talks at Berlin might have looked like a counter-check quarrelsome.

In sober truth the White Paper said little or nothing new, though it did contain two or three passages of which the sting lay in their frankness. One spoke of German rearmament, and said:

This rearmament, if continued at its present rate, unabated and uncontrolled, will aggravate the existing anxieties of the neighbours of Germany, and may consequently produce a situation where peace will be imperilled. His Majesty's Government have noted and welcomed the declarations of the leaders of Germany that they desire peace. They cannot, however, fail to recognise that not only the forces but the spirit in which the population, and especially the youth of the country, are being organised lend colour to, and substantiate, the general feeling of insecurity which has already been incontestably generated.

Other passages referred to naval needs, and argued that while "developments in the power and range of air forces have increased the vulnerability of this country" and have thus placed "an added burden" upon defence, the necessities of naval defence remain unaltered—a contention which can hardly be gainsaid. But the allusion to our new vulnerability from the air was driven home in a special paragraph to which critics of the White Paper paid too little heed. It ran:

Technical development in the air is taking place very rapidly in respect, for example, of such matters as speed, height, endurance, carrying capacity and potentialities for destruction. The range of

territory on the continent of Europe from which air attacks could be launched against this country is constantly extending and will continue to extend ; and if, in war, an enemy were in possession of the countries bordering the Channel, the area of Great Britain liable to his attack would be much greater, owing to the quicker " turn round " of the bombers and their increased bomb load at shorter ranges. The increase in speed, range and height accentuates the difficulty of obtaining warning in time to bring defensive aircraft into action in favourable conditions to repel attacks. For these reasons the importance of the integrity of certain territories on the other side of the Channel and North Sea, which for centuries has been, and still remains, a vital interest to this country from a naval point of view, looms larger than ever when air defence is also taken into consideration.

Here, at least, we are upon bedrock. We are back not in 1914 but in 1839 when we first guaranteed the Belgian neutrality for which we fought in 1914. The passage in the White Paper means that we have a vital interest in preserving the countries bordering on the Channel, that is to say Holland, Belgium and Northern France, from coming into the possession of an enemy. Our Government probably knows that definite German plans for taking possession of Belgium and of Dutch Limburg, to say nothing of the mouths of the Scheldt, have long been under consideration and may have been adopted by the German General Staff. Therefore we have to conclude that, if any of the countries bordering the Channel were actively threatened, we should be bound to act in their and our defence.

This applies to a palpable threat or to direct attack. What of threats more subtle, such as Nazi or pan-German propaganda in Holland and Belgium, or of indirect attack such as complications in Central or South-Eastern Europe which might compel France to take action and, in the event of defeat, imperil her security ? At this point the issue grows more complicated. We may have no direct interest in Poland, Czechoslovakia or the independence of Austria, and there are some among us who hold that a pan-German Nazi Central and South-Eastern Europe would be preferable to Russian (Communist or other) sway over those regions. But we have surely an interest in preventing a European conflict out of which either of these undesirable developments might come. Even more obvious is our interest in avoiding the overthrow

of France, or such a measure of defeat as might compel her to give up to Germany her North African colonies, since, in that event, our hold on the Mediterranean, and our sea routes through it, would be seriously affected. One of the main perplexities of our national and imperial position is that, in thinking of our own security, we cannot afford to leave these matters out of account.

Thus we are driven back to the truth that the safety of Western continental Europe concerns us, and to the further truth that the safety of Western Europe is not easily separable from the safety of Central and Eastern Europe. In this sense "peace is indivisible"—as, indeed, the British Government recognised in the Anglo-French statement of February 3rd when it accepted the principle of reciprocity, i.e. of eventual assistance to this country, under a Western Air Pact, and gave its blessing to pacts for mutual assistance in Central and Eastern Europe. Germany and Poland have since refused, with varying degrees of emphasis, to come into these latter pacts; and as France, Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia are likely to conclude an alliance of their own if no other form of regional or general security can be devised, uncertainty still prevails as to the course which Great Britain should follow.

In the light of Sir John Simon's and Mr. Anthony Eden's visit to Berlin and of Mr. Eden's subsequent journeyings to Moscow, Warsaw and Prague, the Government ought to have a clear view of the position. Its task is hard and heavy, harder and heavier than it would be if Ministers felt sure of public opinion—which they are too apt to identify with the voice of our "misleading Press"—and if they had not lost touch with the country. For this handicap they have, it is true, chiefly themselves to thank, because they have not been at pains to keep the country informed or to take it fully into their confidence. They have exposed it to unpleasant surprises by stating officially that we still held a good margin of air strength over that of Germany, whereas they must long since have known that, potentially if not actually, Germany is stronger than we are.

Nobody who has striven to keep in touch with German affairs can have been astonished at Herr Hitler's statement to Sir John Simon that the German army consists of 550,000 men on a peace footing—it is much larger in reality—or that Germany claims a naval strength equal to the entire British

fleet in home waters. But our people and, apparently, our Ministers were not prepared for the announcement that Germany's air force is as strong as our own; and ordinary folk are disposed to complain that the Government left them in the dark. Why so much secrecy? There was no need to divulge official or confidential information. German trade figures, imperfect though they be, have long shown the way things were going. We must assume, for instance, that the Board of Trade has been aware of the quantities of aluminium produced and used in Germany during the past three years, since they have been announced in German trade reports and in semi-official publications. In 1932, even before the advent of Hitler, 20,000 tons of aluminium were used, principally, it is fair to suppose, in the making of aircraft. In 1933 the total rose to 27,000 tons, and in 1934 to 60,000. This huge quantity was supplied only in part by German home production which, in 1932 and 1933, was 18,000 tons a year, though it rose to 13,400 tons in the first six months of 1934 and was then being rapidly increased. The remainder of the quantity used came from stocks already accumulated and from imports.

If, on a generous estimate, civilian industry is reckoned to have absorbed 10,000 of the 60,000 tons used in 1934, there would remain 50,000 tons for taking possession of an enemy's aircraft, and by an approximate allowance of one ton for a light machine and three tons for a heavy bomber, a German air strength can be calculated, for 1934 alone, that makes our official estimates look very queer. Lord Rothermere asserts that Germany to-day "could probably open operations with 10,000 machines of military utility." Yet, according to Sir Philip Sassoon in the House of Commons on March 19th, we shall still possess a margin of superiority over Germany at the end of 1935! It would be interesting to know whence the Under-Secretary for Air drew his assurance; for, on March 31st, the Russian War Commissary reckoned that Germany had no fewer than 3,700 fighting aeroplanes. According to my own information Germany possessed nearly 4,000 aeroplanes for military (or rapidly convertible to military) use at the beginning of May last year. To-day this total could safely be doubled without exaggeration. And she has probably 60,000 qualified pilots.

There seems no escape from the conclusion that our Government has either been sadly misinformed or that it has unaccountably closed its eyes to information which bears

vitally upon our national safety. We may, in sober truth, find ourselves "up against it" at any moment; and we have to decide whether our policy shall be to stand by and try to hold aloof while continental Europe either yields to German demands or runs the risk of being smashed, or whether we shall seek to play our part manfully, from now on, and face whatever dangers may ensue.

All things considered I think it likely that, should the Government make up its mind to face the dangers, and let the world know that its mind is made up, the dangers would diminish and might never materialise. In this event the Government could count upon the steadfast support of an overwhelming majority of the people. If, on the contrary, it allows uncertainty to continue, if it lets the feeling grow that we might perhaps buy Germany off by this or that concession at the expense of others, it will expose others to disaster and, soon or late, bring disaster upon ourselves.

Mr. Stanley Baldwin, at any rate, seems to see the issue clearly. In his speech to the Annual Assembly of the Free Churches on April 8th he said:

This country does not want war and does not mean to have war, and if war can only be stopped by letting the aggressor know that war will not be permitted in Europe, this country will play her part, I am convinced, with the rest of Europe to see that no aggression shall take place.

Collective security is a difficult subject. We cannot know what form it might take. But as one studying the working of this question for years, I am convinced that the best way we have of ensuring peace is by some means of collective security. Inside the League of Nations the whole of Europe *that is willing* must get together and devise the means.

I quote from the *Daily Telegraph* report. The three significant words I have italicised do not appear in *The Times* report, though the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Morning Post* also give them. At Stresa some progress was made towards getting together "the whole of Europe that is willing" to stand against war. This is the right and the safest road—though it will not be wholly safe for ourselves or for others until we are known to be ready, and able, to tread it with resolute step.

WICKHAM STEED.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IN MID-CHANNEL.

ON March 4th President Roosevelt passed the half-way mark of his Administration. Just four months previously he had achieved the greatest victory which ever came to a President in the mid-term Congressional election—at least in modern times. It was as if the American people had said to him: "Here's our country, do with it what you will." The result was to make him more than ever the dictator of our affairs. It seemed as if his dominance of the Congress were more complete than ever. With one exception, every one of his opponents whom he specially wished defeated was retired to private life. Apparently the way was open to him to map the course of his Administration just as he wished it to be, with no one to offer effective opposition. He was exalted as no President had been before. Yet after four months it cannot be denied that he faces rougher seas and harder going; that his prestige and position are by no means what they were last November; that instead of marching on triumphantly his path has been blocked, his policy contested, his leadership questioned. It is undeniable that his victory has availed him little if at all; that he has not known how to utilise it, and that his programme for the convalescence and the reconstruction of the United States has broken down at numerous points.

That the privileged and well-to-do classes are becoming more and more antagonistic to the President and his policies must have been expected; the more radical and far-reaching his reforms, the larger the tax burdens he is compelled to impose, the more certain the reaction among those who have profited most by the economic chaos which led to the disaster. But it is undeniable that many of his recovery measures have failed, that the National Recovery Act hangs in the balance, with its inefficiency admitted even by many of its governmental proponents and defenders, with the courts steadily declaring this or that provision of the law unconstitutional. It is more and more being defied by the great capitalists whenever it suits their purpose. It is beyond dispute that as a whole business lags and lacks confidence despite encouraging reports in different fields of industry. The number of unemployed is still estimated (there are no official figures) at

between nine and twelve millions. The head of the Relief Administration admits that, after two years of the New Deal, there are still 20,500,000 receiving aid because "the resources of many jobless are now running out"—this while claiming that the army of unemployed is being steadily decreased by re-employment. The Mayor of New York City has just announced that there are still one million unemployed in that city, no less than 341,451 families and individuals being on relief, a figure that has steadily grown, without standing still one month since 1929. The Mayor admits that the number will continue to increase and that he cannot see to-day where he can find the additional money needed to keep the destitute alive. Finally, labour has been largely antagonised because of the President's failure to enforce Section 7A of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which guaranteed to labour the right of collective bargaining through representatives of its own choosing.

The responsibility for this changed state of affairs must inevitably be placed at the President's door. The disillusionments and disappointments of the past year are in largest measure due to administrative failures and inefficiency, and to the lack of vigorous, clear-cut and courageous leadership on the part of the President himself. In the first year of his Administration Mr. Roosevelt rose to his opportunities and to the national emergency in a way to surprise, delight and astound many who had known him for years and had not been particularly impressed by his four years as Governor of New York. He showed vigour, decision, entire readiness to take new and advanced ground with complete fearlessness of the consequences. But as time has passed we have seen again the emergence of that philosophy of compromise which has been characteristic of both the Roosevelt Presidents. The present President now goes first to the Left and then to the Right. At one time he attacks a group; next he seeks to appease it. He is for labour ardently one day; the next he, or some of his representatives, are currying the favour of big business. This is so obvious that everybody is dwelling on it. Yet, if the election returns of November meant anything at all, it was never so uncalled for. That vote should have put him above compromise on essentials and principles, as it should have put him beyond the necessity of playing politics for any purpose whatever. It made it possible for him to

declare his position once and for all on such a fundamental issue as whether capital shall be made to yield to labour the right to collective bargaining through representatives of its own choosing or not. Exalted leadership, sincere, consistent and fearless was what the hour called for, was what the American people asked and what they still hope from their President, but it has not been granted.

The defenders of the President naturally differ here. They insist that if the President had taken the idealistic course, had hewed straight to the line, had outlined clearly his definite aims, and accepted defeat at certain points rather than to compromise and trim and further entrench the system of spoils politics, the country would be worse off than it is to-day, and that the problem of reconstruction under the stress and strain of the economic crisis would be further from solution, with our economic and political stability further endangered. The answer is that at the end of the second year of his Presidency this policy of the President finds him far weaker to-day than he was a year ago, that his popularity is waning to a remarkable degree. His compromise on Section 7A has satisfied neither capital nor labour. The collapse of the National Recovery Administration is due largely to this same policy of yielding first on this code and then on that, of upholding the National Industrial Labour Board one day, and reversing its decisions the next, of marking a certain business for prosecution, because of failure to live up to the codes or the law one day, and practically abandoning the prosecution the next. In every department of the government there has been this administrative unsteadiness and inconsistency, with resultant constant changing of policy, and frequently of personnel. Finally, there has been, as in the matter of the long promised proposals for old age pensions and unemployment insurance, a lamentable failure to live up to promises made and to realise hopes raised. It is no wonder that liberal and progressive spirits everywhere are dismayed and downcast. They spoke for him and laboured for him, often at considerable personal sacrifice, from the minute he outlined his progressive programme. They are rallying to his support now only because they feel that a half or a quarter loaf is better than no bread.

Yet the fact remains that though the opposition to him has increased so markedly, and the liberal elements in the country

are chilled and discouraged, the majority of the people throughout the country are still whole-heartedly on the side of the man in the White House. I am speaking now of the bulk of the workers, especially those outside of the trade unions, the people on the farms, and in the small towns of the great stretches of the country to the west and the south. They continue to look upon Mr. Roosevelt as their Sir Galahad, their friend in need. There is no doubt that he still has their votes. The more he is attacked by the bankers and great business men along the eastern coast-line and in the great cities of the interior, the more they are for the President. As a whole the country is showing amazing patience, astounding endurance, complete readiness to give the President every opportunity to bring about the return of prosperity. So to-day another election would be nearly as striking as that of last fall, despite the facts that I have enumerated as to the failures of the President's leadership and his Administration's lack of achievement in so many directions. This does not mean that the people will be of the same mind in the election of 1936 if there are not a radical decrease in unemployment and far more evidences of a returning prosperity than is the case to-day. They will not and cannot wait indefinitely. It is simply one of the amazing contradictions of a most contradictory and confused situation that the President is holding the love and admiration of great masses while alienating or damping the spirits of so many of the intellectual elements upon which, in the last analysis, he must fall back for eventual success.

So far as the Congress is concerned, the President's authority has been weakened by his severe defeat in the matter of American entrance into the World Court, and he is again facing a hostile Congressional demand for the immediate payment of \$2,000,000,000 in cash to the World War veterans, the House voting that it be paid in money especially printed for the purpose. In addition, his Bill appropriating \$4,800,000,000 for work relief and cash doles has been months in passing Congress, having such hard going that at times its defeat seemed likely. In part this changed situation is due to a refreshing revival of the spirit of independence in Congress, and its resumption of its right to legislate deliberately rather than to obey a series of dictatorial demands for overnight action. In part the President is experiencing the usual

difficulties which confront the party leader who has to deal with an overwhelming parliamentary majority. Again, the President's own failure to outline his objectives clearly is in part responsible for a certain confusion and rebellion in Congress. It is striking, too, that although he has such a marvellous radio voice, and has had such extraordinary success in winning the people to him by his radio addresses, he has not used that means of communication for three months, while his adversaries in the World Court fight made most skilful and effective use of the radio. The President evidently thought that it was beneath his dignity to appeal to the public for its support in this matter.

In Congress the severest attacks upon him and his policies are now coming from Democrats. The Republican minority, still destitute of leadership and programme, merely continues to denounce the infractions of the Constitution, the invasion of our liberties, and the establishment of a tremendously centralised bureaucratic government, upon all of which ex-President Hoover has just harped in a letter to the Young Republican Assembly in California. The President's bitterest enemy, and most effective one, is a Democrat, the notorious Senator Huey Long of Louisiana, a man who has set himself up as complete dictator of his State in a manner unparalleled in our history. He is making a nationwide appeal on a platform calling for the sharing of their wealth by the rich so that each family may have a home worth a thousand pounds, an automobile, a radio, an electric refrigerator and other luxuries. There are those who believe that if times do not improve Mr. Long will lead a bolt from the Democratic Party which will seriously affect Mr. Roosevelt's fortunes in 1936. Few in Congress like or admire Mr. Long, but he broke the ice in attacking the President, who up to that time had been almost immune from personal assault. Now others find that they may criticise the President without the heavens falling. Here, for example, is a Republican office holder in New York City publicly saying: "There is just one further disgrace which the weak and vacillating Franklin Delano Roosevelt can visit upon this country, and that is an uncontrolled flood of bogus money, that is, inflation. . . . Pledges and promises mean nothing to this man."

If the attacks upon the President from the liberal side are politer and free from personalities, they are none the less

severe. There is, for example, the failure of the original \$3,300,000,000 appropriation for public works to achieve as yet anything of value—\$1,116,850,000 is as yet unspent, and \$247,000,000 is not allotted in any way. Of the sums allotted \$400,000,000 went to the army and navy, and many millions for the expenses of the Federal Power Commission and other government agencies. Apart from a few roads and bridges and post offices, the public works programme has thus far brought little of lasting value. Of \$150,000,000 appropriated for housing \$93,000,000 were recently still unused. The great housing campaign which was to provide labouring men and low-salaried employees with new dwellings at low cost has thus far provided exactly 124 homes. Even if the entire amount had been expended in a year it would have been only one-fourth of the amount usually spent in housing each year in New York City alone. Yet if there is one thing our economists are all agreed upon it is that housing and public works ought to be undertaken immediately on a large scale, and that this programme more than any other one thing would be likely to start the economic machinery again. Sweden has recently achieved remarkable results from carrying out a programme of this kind with promptness and efficiency. With all our boasted energy and efficiency and engineering skill practically nothing has been done in Mr. Roosevelt's first two years, all of which affords a striking contrast to the amazing celerity with which cantonments, factories, office buildings, and innumerable other projects were brought into being in the short period during which we were in the World War. Naturally liberals are dwelling upon this disappointment with no little warmth.

But that is only the beginning of their indictment of the Roosevelt Administration. They charge that the President's decision to transfer the bulk of the unemployed from the dole to public works is inevitably doomed to failure just on the record of inefficiency cited above; that there has been already a slackening of the recovery expenditures, and that there has been an abolition of minimum standards for relief project wages. They accuse the President of permitting modification of the enforcement of the Stock Exchange Control Act and of the Securities Act; that the so-called company unions (set up by companies to prevent the coming in of regular trade unions) are stronger than ever, and that there has been

no real recognition of either labour or consumer under the National Recovery Administration. Even General Johnson, the first administrator of the National Recovery Act, admits that the famous "blue eagle" is down in the dust, though he is very careful not to blame the President, only the big business men, and some of those who worked with him whom he accuses of disloyalty. A recent "purge" of the administrative forces of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, which resulted in the retirement of the most radical element in that organisation, has further saddened the progressive forces. But the Social Security Bill introduced at the President's request and embodying his ideas remains the chief disappointment of reformers, social workers, and liberals generally. At the moment of writing it is not even known whether the measure will pass Congress this session, or in what shape it will be if passed, but it is perfectly clear that it will in no wise correspond to the large promises made by the President nearly a year ago. There is no subject on which he has vacillated oftener.

What further disheartens the President's liberal supporters is that, while it seems impossible to induce Congress to vote adequate sums for the establishment of unemployment insurance and old age pensions, it has unlimited sums for great naval and military increases. Never before has it happened in our history that the commanding general appeared before Congress and asked for and obtained the largest budget in our peace-time history. In addition to an army increase of 42,600 men he received not only all the money that he asked but \$20,000,000 besides. The navy has similarly been favoured not only by Congress directly, but, as already stated, indirectly through the Public Works Administration; we are well along on a new building programme of 125 ships. The growth of the navy can be measured by the fact that in 1905 it had only 30,804 men and 2,252 officers, that between 1925 and 1930 it averaged 93,000 men and officers, and is now to have 110,000 men and officers. In 1919 it cost us \$153,853,567. Ten years later the figures had risen to \$312,743,410. The new budget calls for \$488,133,847. The army bill calls for an expenditure of over \$400,000,000, and the largest standing army in our entire history. Together we shall spend more than \$800,000,000 on army and navy in the next fiscal year, a staggering sum probably larger than

that appropriated by any other country in the world unless Russia be the exception, and the more astounding in view of the fact that the entire budget of the United States Government in 1916-17 did not exceed \$783,000,000, including all civilian, military and naval expenditures, pensions, etc. We shall therefore spend in the coming year more for defence than it cost to run the entire country just before we entered the war to end war.

This figure is the more inexplicable in view of the fact that the President solemnly announced, in his annual message to Congress just before asking for these appropriations, that our relations with the other countries of the world were of the best, and that there was not the slightest danger of conflict with any country. Liberals naturally ask: "Why, if that is the case, these expenditures?" It is impossible for anyone to deny that under Franklin Roosevelt we have entered into a naval armament race with Great Britain and Japan. On top of all this it may be added that the National Guard is to be increased by 20,000 men, and that the Chief of Staff, in addition to asking \$400,000,000 more from the Public Works Administration, is making an earnest plea to Congress that the more than 300,000 young men in the civilian conservation camps be turned over to the army for two months' intensive training after the expiration of their civilian camp service, with subsequent enrolment for five years in the Army Reserve. Without this we shall have under arms or training in summer military camps, in schools, colleges, the army, the navy, the militia, the coast guard, and the army and navy reserve at least half a million men, for a long or short period during each year.

As for the general situation of the country it is extraordinarily difficult to generalise. With a country as vast as ours, with the people living under such different conditions, it is absolutely impossible to make sweeping statements. For example, in some Texas cities people will not admit that there is a crisis; Houston in 1934 profited by the largest water-borne traffic in its history. On the other hand, among the tenant Texas farmers, notably among the Negroes, there has been tremendous suffering; how some of the Negroes can survive is beyond understanding. In Arkansas, and other States, the condition of the "share-croppers" is equally beyond belief; in California the landlords have smashed the

labour unions, set aside the laws of the United States, enrolled the local authorities under their banner, and reduced their labourers to the condition of semi-peons. Yet no detailed news of this gets into the daily press, and only the barest references to these and other conditions that might well bring on revolution are printed. In some of the mining areas families are trying to subsist on \$6.25 a month for food. But the fashionable winter resorts of Florida have been thronged, the hotels crowded, the gambling casinos jammed. In two weeks' time bets aggregating \$8,000,000 were placed at the Miami race track, at the very moment that the Government of Florida was begging for the sum of \$400,000 to keep its unemployed alive a few weeks longer. Any foreign visitor to Palm Beach or Miami would have refused to believe that he was in a country suffering from the greatest depression in its history.

On the other hand, our banks are stuffed with money—the Federal Reserve System reported a gain of \$6,700,000,000 in deposits in 1934—but the banks do not know what to do with the money, on which they can at best earn only $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Investors leave their money in the banks because they do not know what to invest in, and everyone fears inflation. Foreign trade rose sharply in January, exports increasing by \$4,000,000, and imports by \$33,300,000. Automobile production after a bad slump in February rose considerably in mid-March, and there have been encouraging gains in the sale of electric power. The Business Advisory and Planning Council of the Department of Commerce, whose fifty-two members represent practically every phase of industry and trade, report an improvement in certain lines during January and February up to 30 per cent. as contrasted with a year ago. It declares that the nation's credit is secure and the prospects are bright. The first quarterly income-taxes just received showed an increase of 33 per cent. over the similar period last year. The average daily production of steel was 25.6 per cent. higher in February than in February 1934. Food prices have increased during the past year 13.1 per cent., while retail trade advanced both in value and in volume of sales during February; but building and engineering construction awards in thirty-seven eastern States were the lowest in any month since April 1933. The unevenness of recovery is manifested by the fact that in some industries one factory may be doing

extremely well while its rivals close by are doing badly. In some places farmers have gained by the pouring out of government money and the rise of food prices; in others, as in Texas, they are down in the depths. Obviously the most optimistic defender of the government cannot say that recovery is proceeding all along the line. Indeed, at the time of writing the public utilities magnates are convinced that dire disaster is ahead because of the President's radical Holding Companies Bill, which will put all the great utility holding companies out of business, and will jeopardise the fortunes of millions of people who bought the watered stock of the huge holding companies created during the boom years; for the sins of the latter the old-line conservatively managed and operated companies are also to be mustered out within five years, as well as the fly-by-night offenders.

If one turns to the agricultural plans for the coming year and looks back upon what has happened, one finds it difficult indeed to characterise what is happening. The Secretary of Agriculture insists that the policy of reducing crops by paying farmers not to plant beyond a certain amount will be continued. He declares that the maintenance of certain processing taxes is essential if the cotton, cotton-seed, and other adjustment programmes are to be maintained. He sees nothing wrong with rigid curtailment of production when 20,000,000 people are on the bread line and in serious danger of starvation. Even the farmers are revolting against this policy of destroying food, though they are not likely to decline to receive government money for doing so. The Secretary's decision to allow the planting of an additional 900,000 to 2,300,000 acres of spring wheat will not reconcile them to the topsy-turvydom in which they live. He has admitted that when you start upon the business of automatically fixing the size of one crop you must go from one to another, and then to another. He and the President apparently agree that it is extremely demoralising to human beings to receive a dole for doing nothing, but that the moral fibre of a farmer is strengthened and not weakened by receiving pay for work not done and crops not planted. How we shall ever find our way out of this situation, especially in view of the dishearteningly slow progress being made by the Administration in reducing the tariffs, it is impossible to foresee. I have spoken of the dissatisfaction in the labour camp. We are

facing serious industrial discontent on three fronts : in the coal-fields, in the textile and automobile industries. If we do not see serious strikes we shall be lucky ; we are on the verge of a strike of 500,000 bituminous coal miners in the next few days if the intervention of the National Industrial Recovery Board is not successful. Here, too, if prosperity does not return, there will be profound and widespread dissatisfaction by the time of the next election in a group which a year ago stood solidly for the President and could have been kept behind him with unbroken ranks had he been true to himself and his avowed aims.

Fortunately for the President, aside from Mr. Long, no figure has yet appeared on the horizon to challenge his national leadership. The Republicans have absolutely no one in sight, nor is anyone developing leadership in any State or in Congress—an unprecedented situation. There is to be a meeting of the leaders of the ten mid-western States before long to draw up a new programme for the Republican Party ; and it is significant that the present chairman of the National Republican Committee, Mr. Fletcher, and Mr. Hoover, and other survivors of the Republican disasters, have been notified that their attendance is not desired. Under the leadership of the veteran Kansas editor, William Allen White, a platform is to be written which will go far in the direction of social security, old age pensions, etc., but will attack the Roosevelt Administration for its dictatorial and socialistic measures. But a platform which says to the voters, " We will promise you just a part of what Mr. Roosevelt has promised you, and we think that he has been very naughty in doing some of the things that he has," will hardly thrill the electorate. It might make some headway if there were an outstanding personality to head the ticket, some orator of the type of Woodrow Wilson. But no one can answer the question as to the man to be nominated to cope successfully with the magnetism, the charm and the skilful opportunism of Franklin Roosevelt. If the candidate against him is not equally gifted in mass appeal, Mr. Roosevelt will run away with the show, unless, as has been pointed out, there is a radical ticket to draw from him so as to let someone else win in a three-cornered fight.

The pity of it all is that so much should hinge upon personality, and that the weakness of the President should jeopardise the whole reform programme. No equally magnificent

opportunity to reconstruct the government so as to give it back into the hands of the plain people, to reshape our national policies so as to bring about social and economic justice, has ever been vouchsafed to an American. If his programme breaks down wholly, the public loss of faith and disillusionment will be grave indeed, and take the American people far along the road that finally led the exhausted Germans into the abyss of Hitlerism. William Allen White is sincere when he says that he fears an American form of fascism or Hitlerism within three years if something cannot be done really to rescue us. But the President continues serene and apparently undaunted, even though he must be aware that he is losing the confidence of the press, even of the Washington correspondents, who at the outset were dazzled by his charm, his democratic bearing, his calling them by their first names, his skilful answering of their questions. They charge him now with dodging, with concealing facts instead of revealing them—even with deliberately misleading them. Yet the fact remains that he more than any other President has laboured to take the government out of the hands of the rich and the privileged, has striven to lay the emphasis of his government on improving the welfare of the masses, of doing something for the forgotten man. Still he overlooks the forgotten " share-cropper " starving to death in Arkansas, Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and elsewhere and held down by brutal landlords and apathetic or conniving governmental officials. He has not one word to say against the denial of civil liberty, of even the right to meet and discuss unbearable economic conditions—yet this brutal suppression, contrary to the fundamentals of our Constitution, is one of the ways that fascism is coming. I do not wish to seem too pessimistic, because a year from now things may look as differently as they did a year ago. But if things do not change radically there will be a day of reckoning for the President, and it may appear that the Chief Executive, who desired most to free the plain man from an inequitable social and economic order, has actually delivered him " bound as in bonds " to his capitalistic masters.

OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD.

THE VENIZELIST REBELLION IN GREECE.

THE immediate background of the March outbreak in Greece begins two years ago. It was on March 5th, 1933, after some disconcerting manœuvres for and against Proportional Representation, that the Government of Venizelos was defeated in a general election. The night after his defeat General Plastiras attempted to seize power in the interests of the defeated party, but the *coup* failed after a few hours. Plastiras is a simple-minded and rather attractive hot-head, a passionate and unselfish admirer of Venizelos, at whose house he had been dining. The complicity of Venizelos was never proved, and he co-operated with the authorities in restoring normal administration. The worst that could be said about him at the time was that he seemed (like a certain king of England born exactly 800 years before) to have inspired violence without desiring it, because he had chosen to be surrounded by simple and violent men. A few weeks later (June 28th, 1933) there was an attempt of unparalleled brutality to assassinate Venizelos, who was driving home with his wife from a dinner at Kephisia. Mme Venizelos and the chauffeur were seriously wounded. Party feelings were not allayed by the delays of the Government in finding the organisers of the crime, in which a retired brigand had co-operated with a chief of the Athens police. The difficulties of the Government, led by M. Tsaldares, were increased by the fact that the Venizelists had a strong majority in the Senate and were thus in a position to block all Government legislation. Negotiations were, however, proceeding, and in April 1934 the chief question at issue was a proposal to review the seniority of officers in the army list, some of whom had been either suspended or restored in the stormy periods since the war. It was possibly in order to distract attention from their internal difficulties that, in January 1935, the Government announced an ambitious six-year programme of military expansion, which, naturally, rallied all party leaders to their support. As I was permitted to point out in *The Times*, on the very day the rebellion broke out (shortly after the Finance Minister, M. Pesmanzoglou, had been disingenuously arguing the inability of Greece to offer foreign bondholders more than thirty-five per cent. of their interest by referring to the

modest increase of expenditure on salaries and pensions of civil servants and on the "very essential expenses of public education"), this militant programme was wholly unpardonable. "No small nation has a right to burden itself with such elaborate preparations for war; least of all Greece, which in the last few years has shown an honourable trust in the League of Nations and an honourable record of peacemaking with its neighbours."

On that evening (March 1st) gun-fire from the barracks and from the heights of Lykabettos took Athens by surprise. The Evzone barracks had been seized, but were only held for a few hours. The battle-cruiser *Averoff* had been taken over by a group of naval officers and set out for Crete, followed by another cruiser and three destroyers. An outbreak at Salonika was somehow anticipated by the authorities, but at Serres was centred the most serious rebellion on land; against this General Kondyles, the Minister for War, took the field and soon cleared the rebels out of Macedonia. A fortnight later the Movement (*Kínêma*) had collapsed before an unwavering display of Government force. The rebellion was evidently as badly organised as it was ill-inspired. A certain Pistolaki, deputy for Canea and a godson of Venizelos, was said to have been one of the chief organisers of the revolt in Athens: he not only failed to get on board the *Averoff* and was left behind and arrested; but himself left behind a whole house-full of incriminating documents. The greatest success of the rebellion was to seize and hold the *Averoff*, which seems to have shaken off without difficulty all the bombs of the pursuing air force, although it is a ship old enough to have been the pride of the Greek navy at the Coronation review at Spithead in 1911. Unfortunately the rebel admiral could not think of anything to do, as even a fleet in command of the Ægean could not reinforce except by wireless exhortation the Venizelists in the mountains north of Serres, who were already breaking for the Bulgarian frontier. The last revolutionary task of the *Averoff* was to convey Venizelos, with his devoted wife and his adhesive camarilla, to Rhodes: on the Ides of March he left that almost Greek island for Italian exile.

It is difficult to imagine what can have inspired the Venizelists to undertake such a desperate attempt; what, indeed, except a belief that they were more virtuous than their opponents and were bound to win because it was so obviously

unfair that they should be excluded from power. Of all experts at self-deception none are so successful as the friends who cluster round the chariot wheels of a vigorous personality. The outbreak of the revolution must have been like one of those first nights when the actors and the author and his friends have all persuaded each other by mutual and hysterical hypnotism that they are about to produce a masterpiece. It must also be noted that in Greece it is common to find a man with an excellent specialised knowledge of his own department who holds high position, military, administrative or academic, without the remotest conception of the world as it is or of Europe or even of his own country as a whole. Such men, of course, are found in every country. Even in England retired admirals have been heard of and merchant princes whose political ideas would be inadequate for a schoolboy; and distinguished engineers who are pre-Darwinian fundamentalists. There are said to be a good many in Poland. But such men, who are consequently incapable of rational judgment, are nowhere more numerous than in Greece, where their minds are firmly tethered by the Orthodox Church to the darkest enchantments of the Middle Ages.

It must not be forgotten now that the revolutionaries have failed that they had some real grievances. There was first of all the extraordinary slowness of the Government in their attempts to arrest and punish the criminals who had tried to murder Venizelos. The brigand Karathanasses, who had announced his intention of cutting off the head of Venizelos and exhibiting it in the streets, was only arrested in October 1934, not by the police, but by private Venizelists, who found him walking about Athens and dragged him to the police station. Another clearly implicated was a high police official named Polychronopoulos. The Government might have replied that it was never shown that the criminal activities of Polychronopoulos were known to his official superiors; and that the trial of the assassins, though it had been unduly protracted by legal quibbles, was genuinely under way and might ultimately have resulted in a satisfactory verdict. Who knows? Now, of course (March 29th), all the accused have been acquitted, and in the prevailing atmosphere it is only surprising that Karathanasses has been detained in custody on a previous charge of brigandage.

Secondly, there was the trouble about the army list; but

these grievances, though a constant irritation, were not very clear-cut, as both parties had suffered in turn owing to various attempts to restore the seniority of suspended officers.

Thirdly, it was said that owing to the weakness of the Premier the Government allowed monarchist demonstrations, allowed newspapers to advocate the murder of Venizelos, and might at any moment be rushed into abolishing by unconstitutional act the Venizelist Senate. But actually there was never any danger, with Tsaldares and Kondyles in the Government, of a monarchical restoration; and all these grievances at their worst were not severe enough to justify a "preventive" revolution; a revolution the only effect of which has been to allow the Government to proceed with the support of general opinion to all the unconstitutional short cuts which are usually reserved for dictators or other national disasters. All opposition parties and newspapers have been suppressed; there has been a strict censorship of foreign telegrams; there have been wholesale arrests, detentions and confiscations; the Senate has been abolished; and now we are promised a Constituent Assembly, a new constitution, a purge of judges, professors and civil servants, and several extraordinary tribunals!

It is impossible to acquit Venizelos, that much-loved leader who once seemed to be the only honest statesman in Europe who knew his own mind, of a full measure of responsibility for all this folly. If he did not know what his followers were plotting, he ought to have known. He has now (*The Times*, March 19th) admitted that "two months ago" he told the leaders of the revolt that he was "with them in spirit": he evidently at some of the stages since the plan was first afoot (probably in August 1934) tried to dissuade them, but not very hard; and he showed a proper spirit in openly assuming the leadership at a moment when it was obviously going to fail (though he justified his action by a most abominable quibble about the unconstitutional (!) behaviour of the Government and President Zaïmes). It may be noted that two leaders of opposition parties who shall be nameless (not M. Papandreou) sat on the fence as long as they could by going into hiding and coming out to give themselves up to the police and disown the rebellion only when it had collapsed.

Much has been written and rumoured about the apparent decline in the powers of Venizelos. Two years ago there was

already unimpeachable evidence about his intolerance of respectable advice, about his unpleasant camarilla of gangsters, and about abuses and corruption in his neighbourhood. It was comforting to protest that he knew nothing about it; but if you live on a dung-heap it is really no excuse to plead that you did not know it was there. It has even been suggested that marriage had had an unfavourable effect on him: so it may as well be said that Mme Venizelos probably cherishes an irreconcilable hatred of all Royalists: a lady who has been riddled with bullets while driving home after dinner is not disposed to regard her husband's adversaries in a spirit of reason and conciliation, even if she speaks six languages and was born in the Cromwell Road; but her influence in political affairs has always been negligible: her many charities and social benefactions showered on an ungrateful capital have never been guided by political motives; and even her wealth can have had no corrupting influence on her husband, for the simple reason that he is one of those workers who hardly notice the difference between luxury and discomfort. A more probable cause of the suggested decline may be found in his age. We all grow old: "Our brains turn to bone, our hearts turn to stone"; and no one who knew Venizelos in 1912 can doubt that he has lost flexibility and patience. But it has been a long process, the beginnings of which might be traced in 1919 or even earlier. One or two writers have made the easy suggestion that he has reverted in old age to the Cretan lawlessness out of which he first became known to Europe. It is more reasonable to suppose that when he came from Crete to Greece and from Greece to Europe he stood out because he acted on principles of simplicity and common sense, which most statesmen had forgotten. But after long years of toil he has become no better than the others, and has employed his masterful personality and restless intelligence in practising all the tricks of a political game which he continues to despise.

The Government has on the whole behaved with relative moderation, considering the opportunity provided for a party triumph. M. Tsaldares, the leader, who may be said to belong to the class in which Mr. Baldwin is a prize-winner, has kept his head so far and refused to be rushed. Much hardship has undoubtedly been caused in the provinces by the wholesale arrests; some undeserved suffering will be caused by the

confiscation of private fortunes. Ringleaders arrested at Salonika just before the outbreak (by a Government stroke which explains the feebleness of the subsequent campaign in Macedonia), who were put on to a train and sent down to the Peloponnese, were very nearly lynched in the station by the royalists of Argos. But the crowds of politicians and journalists arrested in Athens have been well treated, and were released from prison if they could prove that they were not involved; and there seems to have been no brutality or looting. The credit for this is mainly due to M. Tsaldares, who had forbidden all meetings or demonstrations and thus avoided a royalist outburst which might have swept the Government off its feet. The moderation of Tsaldares has been supported throughout by General Kondyles, and as long as the two work together there is little danger of party extravagances or of a restoration of the royal family. It was Kondyles who ousted from the Government the avowed monarchist Metaxas. It is Kondyles the soldier who, with Tsaldares, has insisted on lenient sentences. The political strength of Kondyles, which has hitherto rested mostly on the refugee element in the population, is likely to be increased in the future not only by the prestige acquired by his business-like campaign but also by the accession to his leadership of the remnants of the Venizelist party. The prospects of monarchy in Greece are not bright and the position of the present Government has been greatly improved by its determined restraint.

When the results of the first court martial were announced (March 31st) it seemed almost too good to be true that there were no death sentences; and it must be bitterly regretted that the court martial at Salonika, where one officer was sentenced to death and was shot (April 5th), has not followed the example of Athens. By a policy of stubborn generosity and in no other way is it now possible for the Government to terminate the feud between Royalists and Venizelists. It is not necessary to expect with M. Venizelos (*The Times*, March 19th) "half a century of civil war." The rebellion has certainly inflamed the hatred of extremists on both sides, but it has also had the effect of drawing together both groups of moderates; and the feud may die out altogether in a few years unless it is revived by further bloodshed.

The division of Greece into two camps which began in the

disastrous quarrel during the war between Venizelos and King Constantine* would have been forgotten long ago if it had not been for the execution of the six Ministers in 1922, an execution which Venizelos, who was then at Lausanne, might, say his enemies, have prevented if he had wanted to. I am ashamed to confess that my own feeling when I first heard the horrible news was a sort of solemn joy, to think that six politicians had been shot after so many thousand common soldiers. Of course they had been led by King Constantine into an impossible position. But they had a way out. The way out, always, is to tell the truth and say "he can't eat me"—a way out which little boys learn and statesmen forget. The six ministers of King Constantine were afraid to tell the truth, and they were devoured by the people. But, if they had been spared, the miserable crowd of royalties whom they served would have been forgotten by this time and the whole feud extinguished. It has flared up again in this desperate rebellion, but if no more blood is shed there is another chance that it may die down for good.

Finally, it should be remembered that Greece is a humble and perhaps an unruly member of the European community; and the health of all the members is conditioned by the community as a whole, as well as by the behaviour of all the other members. Europe has the Balkans it deserves: and it is for the Great Powers to set an example of moderation and decency, and above all an example of peacemaking, to the small nations who look up to them.

JOHN MAVROGORDATO.

* Details may be found in my *Modern Greece*. Macmillan, 1931.

ITALIAN POLICY IN AFRICA.

IN view of the Rome settlement of Franco-Italian differences in Africa, recent Italian progress in Libya, and the present dispute between Italy and Abyssinia, it is interesting to examine Italian policy in Africa generally with special reference to possibilities of the future. If the African outcome of the Franco-Italian *rapprochement* appears insignificant when compared with its European importance, it has aspects with wide ramifications in an age when East and West are being rapidly brought closer together by improved means of transit. In no place on the world's surface has the internal combustion engine shown itself to have such immense power of development as in the desert areas; and, as far as North Africa is concerned, it rests with France and Italy, in co-operation with Great Britain and Egypt, to make the fullest use of this modern invention in the interests of all parties concerned.

Although Italy's first colonial enterprise took place in 1870, when she acquired the Bay of Asab* with a neighbouring island now incorporated in the Italian Colony of Eritrea, Italian colonial expansion received its most important impetus from the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881. This came as a blow to the African aspirations of the Italians, who had a strong claim on Tunisia on proximity grounds as well as on the fact that their settlers far out-numbered the French, that they had already developed communications and commerce between the European and African littorals, and had given the indigenous population the benefit of Italian culture. This forestalling of Italy by France in the general scramble for African possessions had far-reaching results both in Europe and in Africa, material and psychological differences arising between the two countries. But perhaps the most direct result was that Italy, having failed in her efforts to acquire Tunisia, turned her attention to the establishment of a second settlement at Massawa, situated on the African coast immediately north of Abyssinia and now the port of Eritrea. This enterprise of 1885 formed part of an elaborate scheme of African expansion towards the Sudan, involving a further enterprise towards Tripoli and its hinterland either from the Mediterranean or from the bases established in the advance

* Situated 40 miles from Perim and 150 miles from Aden.

from Massawa. As, however, the recent victories of the Mahdi made an advance on Khartoum a dangerous operation, the former project developed unfavourably for Italy, alternative plans involving her in colonial as well as military difficulties. Yet Italy succeeded for a time in establishing a protectorate over the whole of Abyssinia, although the subsequent Italian disaster of Adua led to the recognition of Abyssinian independence, and thoughts of expansion beyond the frontiers of Eritrea had to be abandoned.

Meanwhile, at the suggestion of Great Britain who viewed with disfavour French activity in the direction of Obok, the Italian Colony of Somaliland had been established. This fitted in well with the progressive policy of Francesco Crispi, who had an imposing scheme of creating an Italian "corridor" right through from Eritrea via the Eastern Sudan to Tripoli. His conception was that of a great triangle, composed of the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland and the Protectorate of Abyssinia, which was to form the south-eastern end of his "corridor." The northern end was to rest on Tripoli and the Mediterranean, while the hinterland of Tripoli and the Eastern Sudan were to form the centre. But the subsequent Agreement of 1891, defining the precise limits of the territory which Italy could occupy in the Eastern Sudan, and stipulating that any points occupied should be handed over to the Egyptian Government as soon as it was able to reassert its sovereignty, imposed upon the Italians an Abyssinian policy in the south-east and a purely Mediterranean policy in the north. If little progress has since been made in the former region, a great change has taken place in the development of Tripoli, now known as *Libia Italiana*. Indeed, so remarkable is this Italian achievement that, with modern methods of transport and the settlement of differences between France and Italy, Crispi's conception can no longer be regarded as a fantastic dream.

Let us now consider as far as possible the aims of Italian policy in Africa in view of what has happened in the past and what is taking place to-day. Italy's greatest needs in Africa are the attainment of a sense of colonial equality with the other Powers holding territorial possessions in that continent, scope for Italian energy outside the mother country, and sources of raw materials. While the former consideration has been a stable factor in Italian colonial policy from the outset,

the others are of more recent development. Italy has suffered considerably from injured pride and a sense of being "left out in the cold," which has stimulated her various attempts at colonial expansion. Now, the increase of her population during recent years, combined with a much greater efficiency in all branches of human endeavour, has created an urgent need for some space in which Italian ingenuity and resource can have scope for progressive enterprise. Italy wants to show the world what she can do in opening up and developing a backward continent close to her shores, and she has the capacity in men and material with which to do it. Although enjoying a most favourable geographical position with regard to Africa, Italy has long had to stand aside while France developed Morocco, Algeria and Tunis, and Great Britain guided the destinies of Egypt. It was not until 1912 that she occupied Tripoli at the conclusion of the Italo-Turkish war. It was, therefore, natural that colonial expansion should figure in Italian hopes when Italy joined the Allies in the Great War. How little these hopes were realised was one of the greater injustices of the Peace Conference, but the Italians have adopted the wise course of making the best of such territories as they possess, hoping that time and circumstances will enable them to make use of these to greater advantage. Italian policy, as I see it, consists in establishing foundations of such a nature that the best and most rapid use may be made of such opportunities as occur in Africa. Such a foundation has been well and truly laid in Libya—an enterprise of a remarkable character, which should receive the sympathetic co-operation of Great Britain and France from the wider aspect of Europe's interests in Africa.

The appointment of Marshal Balbo as Governor of Italian Libya drew attention to the great effort which the Italians are making to open up and develop this vast area, and to the importance which they attach to air communications. Moreover, the fact that one of Italy's younger men has been sent to administer the twin colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica points to a still more active policy in forthcoming years. Rapid strides have been made in the improvement of communications by land, sea and air. Italian steamship companies connect Tripoli with Italy, Malta, Tunis, Cyrenaica, Egypt, Eritrea, Somaliland, and South Africa; while air communications are now maintained by a service of flying

boats from Ostia, the airport of Rome, to Tripoli via Naples, Syracuse and Malta. Between Tripoli and Benghazi, the capital of Cyrenaica, there is a regular steamship service supplemented by a service of land aeroplanes flying in connection with the Rome-Tripoli flying boat service. Personal experience has convinced me that all these services are maintained in a high state of efficiency.

As far as internal communications are concerned, the Italians, realising that motor transport is the form of transit best suited to desert or semi-desert areas, are concentrating their attention on road construction, which is essential for their system of colonisation. The main roads, which are of good quality and well cared for, are suitable for all kinds of motor traffic connecting up the chief towns of the coast and the Italian agricultural colonies; and a motor road from the Tunisian-Libyan frontier to the Libyan-Egyptian frontier will be opened next year. Although railways do exist in some areas, most of the travelling throughout Libya is done by motor buses, and new roads are continually being built for this purpose. Even in the desert interior facilities are being provided for motor traffic so that it is now possible to travel by car from Tripoli to Ghadames, although the last part of the journey is over a natural track. As, however, many of the desert oases are connected up by these natural tracks, the authorities maintain a service of motor tenders in areas where there is sufficient demand. While at present the air service in the interior is practically confined to military purposes, it is anticipated that, with Marshal Balbo in charge, aviation will be extensively used for developing these regions and bringing commercial prosperity to their more remote parts. The distance covered by a camel caravan in a month can now be done by an aeroplane in a few hours, and there is no saying to what remarkable extent these desolate regions will be transformed by cheap aviation. Although Libya cannot be regarded as a transit country under present conditions, progress in aviation and motor transport may in the future convert it into an important bridge between Europe and other parts of Africa.

Meanwhile the development of the coastal oases for colonisation purposes has been most successful, and the city of Tripoli has been transformed from one of indescribable dirt into a model example of oriental cleanliness. But, as Libya

does little to solve the question of Italy's surplus population, the colonising capacity of Tripolitania being estimated at about 300,000 settlers, the Italians probably realise that something more than colonisation is necessary in order to make these territories of the maximum value to Italy. Indeed, as the colonising capacity of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland is almost negligible, there seems to be an obvious need for an African policy more comprehensive than one of simple colonisation, and applicable to all Italy's African possessions. While the Italian colonies as separate units cannot adequately meet the needs of the mother country, means may possibly be found of realising Crispi's conception of uniting them as transit countries for the benefit not only of Italy and their indigenous populations, but also in the interests of other nations. If a transit route for aviation and motor transport could be opened up from Tripoli to some port in Eritrea at the south-east end of the Red Sea via the Sudan, the results would be far-reaching under modern conditions. First, a new and rapid route to the East for passengers and certain classes of merchandise would be established, independent of the Suez Canal with its heavy dues, which would be of considerable economic benefit to Italy, Libya, Eritrea, and other territories through which it passed. Secondly, remote areas of the Libyan hinterland would be opened up and brought in touch with the civilised world, with equal benefit to the more outlying districts of the Eastern Sudan. Thirdly, similar communications could be established with Italian Somaliland via Abyssinia, thereby improving conditions in both these countries and introducing a new source of wealth. With the flexibility of aviation and motor transport, such a trade route could be altered as circumstances demanded, and would provide Italy with her own outlet from the Mediterranean and greater possibilities for development in Africa. In these circumstances Italy may well have such a project under consideration for the future, although a working agreement would have to be reached with Great Britain and Egypt, as well as with France and Abyssinia, before anything could be done. While it is impossible to say what attitude these respective countries would be likely to adopt towards such a proposal in these days of rapidly changing circumstances, it seems that an Italian policy on these lines should be regarded as a possible development in the future.

Perhaps the most important development of recent date likely to influence Italian policy in Africa is the settlement with France of questions relating to the north and south-east of the above-mentioned area. In order, however, to understand what has actually taken place, it is necessary to restate the conditions of Article 13 of the Treaty of London of 1915, on which Italy joined the Allies in the Great War and based her subsequent claims. The text of this Article was as follows :

In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, these two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain.

This Treaty was signed between Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy. In accordance with this promise Italy demanded at the Peace Conference rectification of the western and southern frontiers of Libya, with access to Lake Chad, and the cession of Jibuti in French Somaliland, together with the French railway from that port to Addis Ababa, the capital of Abyssinia ; while she asked Great Britain to hand over the valley of the Juba River and the port of Kismayu, situated at the southern end of Italian Somaliland. This last demand was met by the British Government. France, on the other hand, while agreeing to a rectification of the Libyan frontier, refused Italian access to Lake Chad and declined to consider the transfer of Jibuti or the Addis Ababa railway. These differences have, however, now been settled by the Rome Agreements on the following terms : The frontier between Italian Libya and French West Africa is determined by a line which, starting at Tummo, " reaches the west frontier of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan at the intersection of 24° east longitude and 18°45' north latitude." This line leaves Aozou and Guezenti in Italian Libya, and Bardai and Tecro in French territory. The area acquired by the Italians amounts to approximately 43,000 square miles, but they are kept at a sufficient distance from Lake Chad to prevent the possibility of any threat to the communications between French West and French Equatorial Africa. In Eritrea Italy receives a

strip of coast from French Somaliland facing the Straits of Bab-el-Mandab with recognition of Italian sovereignty over the island of Doumetra, while she also obtains the facility of acquiring 2,000 shares in the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway. Although these shares will not give Italy a control over the management of the railway, they will give her an opportunity of collaborating in the economic development of the Red Sea, and of expressing her views in the exploitation of the only railway communication between the Abyssinian capital and the coast.

Moreover, Italy's claims regarding the rights and privileges of Italian nationals in Tunisia have been satisfied by an agreement with France that their privileged status shall be maintained for a period of ten years with a gradual diminution thereafter until the year 1965, when they will come to occupy the position normally enjoyed by persons of foreign origin in French possessions. Italian schools are to be maintained until March 1955, when they will become Italian private schools, subject to the local French school legislation. In respect of all other questions the Conventions of 1896 will be prolonged until 1945, after which a return to common law will come progressively into force. As hitherto the status of Italian residents in Tunisia was dependent on the tacit renewal every three months of previously denounced Conventions, and was, therefore, most precarious, its regularisation brings more confidence and greater stability. When it is realised that the large Italian community in Tunisia is separated by a comparatively short distance from Libya, with which good road communications have now been established, the significance of these agreements is all the more pronounced.

While it is not within the scope of this article to go into the details of the present dispute between Italy and Abyssinia, or to express an opinion as to the rights and wrongs, it is as well to state quite definitely that an early settlement is necessary for both countries. In view of the serious situation in Europe, Italy cannot afford to become involved in trouble in Africa, which is difficult to localise. Military operations against Abyssinia besides being most difficult might have grave repercussions in her African possessions, and thereby weaken her position in Europe. On the other hand, Abyssinia has everything to lose and nothing to gain by unreasonable defiance of Italy in friendship with France, who controls her

only outlet to the sea. The fact that large numbers of Italian troops have been sent to this area has created the impression in certain quarters that Italy intends to imitate Japan's recent action with regard to Manchukuo. I am convinced that this is not the case, for reasons that are more than obvious. Yet Italy sees in the Ethiopian highlands a suitable outlet for her surplus population as well as a source of raw materials in metals and cotton, and finds it necessary at the present juncture to support her influence in Abyssinia with a display of force. In this she is not establishing a precedent, although Italian action may not be solely due to African considerations. Yet Italy has definite interests in Abyssinia, and she intends to improve her position there as opportunity occurs. Her most likely policy is one of peaceful penetration and development, which might bring much material benefit to the Abyssinians. But in this, as in all her African questions, Italy would strengthen her position by close co-operation with Great Britain and France, a policy now made possible by the Pact of Rome.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

WAS STRESEMANN SINCERE ?

IN his foreword to Prince Hubertus Löwenstein's *The Tragedy of a Nation* Mr. Wickham Steed describes how in September 1926, after Germany's entry into the League of Nations, he laid his ideas on European policy before Gustav Stresemann, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Germans were "to accept even the military conditions of the Versailles Treaty as a blessing in disguise" and "to set their minds and their hands to the task of making a centre of attraction to all men and peoples of good will in a Europe deliberately warless." Such a policy alone would "give strength and permanence to the Weimar Republic." Germany alone had the power "to create and to lead" this new Europe. Mr. Steed goes on to say that if it had been a Utopia that he depicted, Stresemann could not have been more bewildered and amazed. He continues: "Why he could not understand it his 'Testament' and his memoranda to the ex-Crown Prince abundantly show. He thought a hand-to-mouth policy, including partial and tactical 'fulfilment' of the Versailles Treaty as a basis for petty-fogging, or '*finassieren*,' preferable to a lofty and far-sighted vision of Germany's future."

Is Mr. Steed's accusation just? I do not now refer to his personal impression of Stresemann. But will his reading of these documents hold water? This question, far from being of merely historical interest, is potentially of great political importance. The rule of Hitler and the ultra-militarists will not last for ever. Even if the Weimar Republic is not revived, the fond dream of revenge will vanish. Some day a different, peaceful Germany will want to resume its place in Europe; German statesmen will again try to earn the confidence of the world. They will be able to invoke Stresemann alone of all German statesmen of the past as a pledge of their good faith. But will they really be able to base their case on him? Was Stresemann honest? Or was he a trickster, too? Germany's fate may yet turn on the answer to this question. There can be no doubt that Europe trusted Stresemann while he lived—and then its trust was shattered at a blow. How did this happen?

In October 1929 Stresemann died. He had for years planned to retire after attaining a certain stage in his political

programme, to restore his seriously impaired health and in his leisure to write the memoirs of his ministerial career. For this reason he was careful to collect memoranda, notes for speeches, reports and letters. After his death this material was published. The first volume produced no effect to speak of, but the second let loose a storm. Stresemann's policy had been mere camouflage and his peacefulness hypocrisy; he, too, had wanted only to pave the way for a war of revenge. He had let the mask fall and now stood revealed as a Prussian militarist. This was believed and repeated, particularly in France, on every possible occasion. Even to-day one continually hears it mentioned as an undisputed historical fact and quoted as proof that no German politician can possibly be honest when he speaks of peace in Europe. In England, too, as Mr. Steed's example shows, one finds the same suspicion of Stresemann's motives, even, I am told, among his closest collaborators in the Locarno policy. No one, as far as I am aware, has ever defended Stresemann. Under Brüning's inglorious régime the German republic had no time to spare for this task nor, it may be, any cause for taking it up. Brüning's chief concern, after all, was to prove to the German nationalists that he, too, was "national." It would have looked strange if he had tried to show that a former director of German policy, belonging to a party that even now was a member of the Government coalition, had had "European" leanings. How Brüning, of all men, managed, in spite of all he did, to win himself a name as a conciliatory politician remains a riddle. But this is not the place for an attempt to solve it.

What had happened? What had the second volume of Stresemann's notes, that scarcely deserved the title of "Testament," contained? Mr. Steed comes straight to the point when he speaks of the "Memorandum" intended for the Crown Prince and when he quotes the word "*finassieren*." It is, in fact, this word that has played a decisive part in these posthumous attacks on Stresemann. It calls for a close analysis of the letter of Stresemann to the Crown Prince in which it occurs. We must first, however, say a few words about the relations of these two men. Stresemann began his political career as a monarchist. As a follower of Friedrich Naumann, the parson who founded the national-social (not to be confused with the national-socialist) party and who later was a democratic Deputy, he believed in the possibility of a

social Empire, a "*Volkskaisertum*" as Naumann called it. After the fall of von Bethmann-Hollweg in 1917, it was the Crown Prince who pulled the wires. It was at this time that Stresemann, who had an aversion to the luckless War Chancellor, came into contact with the Heir to the Throne. Even after 1918 he was still enthusiastic about the "*Volkskaisertum*," although what had been a progressive concept was now considered reactionary. When, in 1921, he visited the Crown Prince in his exile on the island of Wieringen, he was fascinated by him. All who have been in close contact with this "Peter Pan among Princes" agree that he has inherited from his father the gift of enchantment.

Stresemann promised the Crown Prince that he would try to make it possible for him to return to Germany. When, soon after, he became Chancellor, he carried through a decision of the Cabinet to this effect. The decision was unanimous: even the social-democratic Ministers agreed, as well as the Prussian Government, which was under social-democratic control. Stresemann wrote to the Crown Prince: "The Cabinet has noted your declaration that you will take up residence at Oels and refrain from all political activity." This was a promise that the Crown Prince not only broke but repudiated after Stresemann's death. The presence of this charming and insignificant young man, whose time was mostly occupied with sport and personal affairs, was generally thought to have no political significance; his compulsory abstention from politics, which gave the radical Right a fine subject to agitate about, weighed heavily on the Government. To the day of his death Stresemann maintained friendly relations with the ex-Crown Prince. He was not without vanity. He was flattered as much by the Crown Prince's approval of his policy as, for example, by the fact that in the Prince's household he was familiarly known as "Uncle Gustav." All this was, in the main, known when Stresemann's notes appeared in print.

The famous letter was written on September 7th, 1925. On August 30th, 1924, the Dawes Agreement had been signed. The Locarno conference sat from October 4th to 16th, 1925. Germany's entry into the League of Nations took place on September 10th, 1926. The Thoiry conversation was held on September 20th, 1926. On August 27th, 1928, Stresemann signed the Kellogg Pact in Paris. The Hague conference, at

which it was decided to end the Occupation and at which the Young Plan was signed, was in August 1929. On September 9th of the same year Stresemann spoke for the last time at Geneva; on October 3rd he died.

What is the gist of this letter? Stresemann enlarges on the aims of German foreign policy: firstly, "a solution of the reparations problem that shall be possible for Germany to bear, and the securing of peace, which is essential if Germany hopes to recoup her strength"; secondly, the protection of Germans abroad; thirdly, revision of the Eastern frontiers, Danzig, the Corridor, Upper Silesia; fourthly, "in the background," the *Anschluss* of Austria, "although I am convinced that this *Anschluss* is not wholly of advantage to Germany, since it greatly complicates the problem of the German Reich." These aims of German foreign policy were widely known, and approved by the overwhelming majority of Germans. The letter goes on: "If we want to achieve these ends, we must first be willing to concentrate on these tasks. Hence the security pact that is to guarantee us peace. At the same time, however, the security pact involves renunciation of hostilities with France for the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine but, inasmuch as war with France is impossible, this is merely a theoretical renunciation on the part of Germany." Then comes a discussion of the reparation debts: "As far as can be foreseen, the reparation burdens which the Dawes Plan imposes on us will have become insupportable as early as 1927. We shall then have to press for a new conference and a revised estimate of Germany's power to pay: this is a right to which, by the Versailles Treaty, we are at any time entitled." Stresemann goes on to give an account of the advantages that Germany may expect from membership of the League of Nations. There is nothing here that might be considered compromising.

The letter continues: "The question of opting between East and West does not follow from our entry into the League. One can opt only if one has a military power at one's back, which we, unfortunately, have not. We can neither, as some seem to think, become a continental outpost for England nor can we commit ourselves to a Russo-German alliance. We must beware of any Utopian flirtation with Bolshevism. Once the Russians are in Berlin and the red flag flies over the Palace, the Russians, who want a world-revolution, will be quite satisfied with a Bolshevik Europe as far as the Elbe and

will give the rest of Germany as a sop to the French." After further comment on relations with Russia come the sentences that have given rise to the cruel defamation of their writer: "For the first point of German policy touched on above the chief thing is the liberation of German soil from foreign occupation. We must first get the stranglehold off our necks. *In this connection, therefore, German policy, as Metternich said of Austria after 1809, will have to consist in 'finassieren' and avoidance of major decisions.*" A few formal phrases end the letter.

What is its positive content? We have here, on the eve of Locarno, a defence of the policy that was later to bear the name of Locarno, an apologia addressed to a man who, while he had no definite political status, was, as the Emperor Joseph II said, a "professional" monarchist and in broad outline a nationalist. He was a man whom one may assume to have had influence in nationalist and monarchist circles, with the generals and Prussian aristocrats, indirectly perhaps with the President too. The President was Hindenburg, who showed little understanding for Stresemann's plans and could not make out what the League of Nations really meant. But although the tone of the letter is slightly modified by the fact that it is destined for the Crown Prince, it simply recapitulates what everyone knew to be the main lines of Stresemann's policy. Germany cannot fight: why then, as he once said of the Ruhr struggle, "continue the war with other weapons?"

Everyone knew that the first object would naturally be to end the occupation of the Rhineland, if only because a policy of peace could not be pursued at home as long as the nationalists had any ground for agitating about the "black watch on the Rhine." "To get the stranglehold off our necks"—that again is a phrase *in usum delphini*. And now what of "*finassieren*" and "avoiding major decisions"? "*Finassieren*," a word rarely used in German, does not mean, as some think, to trick, swindle or deceive. Littré gives "*petite ou mauvaise finesse*," Hertzsfield-Darmsteter "*user de finesse grossières*," Hamilton-Legros "to finesse, to manœuvre." "To finesse," according to Webster, means "delicate skill, subtle discrimination," according to the *Oxford Dictionary* firstly "fineness" and then "delicacy of manipulation, artfulness, subtle strategy, stratagem, etc." It seems, then, to

have several meanings. One may use it with pride of one's own policy and with anger of one's opponents. Stresemann himself on a later occasion, when Snowden's obstinacy and Briand's indecision had brought him to the verge of madness and made his poor health worse, said he had scarcely been able to bear Briand's "*finassierende Taktik*." Here it means merely hedging and delay, and he said it of the French politician on whom in the future he never ceased to place all his hope. It is a rebuke from one friend to another. "*Finassieren*" and "avoiding major decisions," therefore, amount to one and the same thing.

To what does the incriminating word refer? To what end is a hedging policy to be pursued? He writes: "For the first point of German policy . . ." and again "In this connection." The first point in the letter deals with the solution of the reparations problem. But surely it was a feature of Stresemann's policy that, while he agreed to pay reparations, he was anxious to pay as little as possible; it was his intention, later carried out, to submit Germany's power to pay to a new test and to lighten the reparations burden as relations with the creditor states improved. He let the Crown Prince into what was an open secret not only in Germany but in the whole world. One reference, of many that might be quoted, will be in place here. On June 6th, 1924, Stresemann said in the Reichstag: "I agree entirely with the critics of the [Dawes] verdict and have never in my conversations with foreign diplomats concealed my opinion that, from 1928 onwards, the experts have considerably over-rated Germany's capacities," and more to the same effect.

Protraction, bargaining, "*finassieren*" with regard to the amount of the reparations, was part of the official government programme. The transfer problem, as Stresemann said in the same speech, provided them with a lever for lowering their payments. But every one knew that the political aspect of the question was more important than the technical, about which the highest authorities were always contradicting one another. The context of the letter restricts the force of the word "*finassieren*" to the reparations payments. But Stresemann's critics extend it to his whole foreign policy; they assume that he meant to say to the Crown Prince, the Pretender and the centre of a circle of Junkers and militarists: "Locarno and the League do not mean a final settlement of

German policy, but merely serve ends that may be achieved in twenty or thirty years' time."

Not a single passage in the letter to the Crown Prince nor any other document in the three large volumes of Stresemann's notes and letters can be quoted in support of this opinion. Any number of speeches and letters prove the exact opposite. We must once more consider the time at which the letter was written, and bear in mind the writer's development. He had been Ludendorff's most loyal follower, not an "*annexionist*," it is true, nor a member of the "Fatherland Party" which had been founded for "*annexionist*" propaganda, but an uncompromising whole-hogger or, as was said in Germany, a "*Siegfriedler*." His faith in the Supreme Army Command went to the length of mental flabbiness. For this reason he was rejected by the Democratic Party which was founded in November 1918. He voted against acceptance of the Peace Treaty, remained in opposition for fully five years, and borrowed his arguments from the nationalists. Not before circumstances drove him to the centre of affairs did he become more moderate. He took over the government when the Reich was in the melting-pot of the inflation. The first thing he had to carry through was Germany's submission to France after the Ruhr struggle, the "after-war" as he called it. Almost immediately afterwards he set about preparing for the Dawes Pact and Locarno. The letter was written barely two years after his assumption of office. Anyone who hopes to find proof that Stresemann was not always an apostle of peace need only go back these two years and will find evidence enough. It is no secret that he made a right-about turn. Internal politics show us more clearly still how completely he had changed. A supporter of "*Volkskaisertum*" as late as 1923 (when he was Chancellor), he proclaimed himself in 1924 as a "*republican faute de mieux*" (*Vernunftrepublikaner*). But in a declaration of policy in 1926 he said he would "protect the Republic with his life."

But the change in Stresemann's attitude to his party was even more complete. He had founded the "*Deutsche Volkspartei*" overnight after his rejection by the Democrats, and had collected in it the men who may best be characterised as the politicians who stood on "the firm rock of facts"; in other words, men who, while willing to work in the service of the Republic, more or less openly disliked it. They were the

"*ralliés*" of the third French republic. Ever since, in 1923, Stresemann had begun his new policy, he had endless difficulties to overcome in his own party. He had to conduct a bitter struggle with the very men who had formerly looked up to him with respect. I shall quote only one document of many that show how far he had become estranged from his friends. On March 11th, 1929, he wrote from Geneva to an influential member of the party: "I have nothing more in common with the policy that is being pursued to-day by the party, as seen in its imminent capitulation to the *Stahlhelm* and Hugenberg. . . . The party is therefore at liberty to develop as it likes and I should myself advise it to join forces with Hugenberg at once and to accept without more ado the supremacy of the principles to which it owes allegiance." And on March 13th he wrote from San Remo to another party colleague: "The cliques that have most influence in our party reserve their loudest applause for those who speak for Seldte or Duesterberg." Seldte and Duesterberg were the leaders of the *Stahlhelm*. His last plans were concerned with the foundation of a new party, whose main purpose was to be the continuation of his foreign policy—*rapprochement* with France and preparations for European union. His advocacy of these aims in his last speech at Geneva, on September 9th, 1929, four weeks before his death, was couched in terms that could not but thoroughly discredit him with his former nationalist friends, if that were still possible. For he had long since lost all credit with them.

In Germany also, without a doubt, Stresemann was long considered an opportunist. But it is also beyond doubt that in his later years he recklessly staked his influence, his political station, his very existence on a policy that, while it was supported by the Social-Democrats, enjoyed not the slightest popularity in the bourgeois circles to which he belonged, and on whose support he depended. Before he died, he was without a political foothold. There were shots in his garden, a National-Socialist plot to assassinate him, and charges of corruption—he was pilloried as a traitor and suffered all the martyrdom of a politician whose policy is not endorsed by his supporters, of a pacifist in a nationalist and militarist society. Did he undergo all this for a lie?

My biography of Stresemann appeared only a few months after his death. In it I had tried to sum up his attitude, in his

last years, towards German nationalism and the pacifist idea in the following terms : " He now loved Germany's future as he had loved Germany's past ; he visualised it within the framework of a new Europe." It was my intention to point out that Stresemann, since he had recognised every other way as purely illusory, wanted to revive Germany's national greatness within a peacefully organised European society. Shortly after my book appeared I made the acquaintance of Stresemann's son Wolfgang, an intelligent young man who had been his father's political confidant. I asked him anxiously whether my judgment of his father was correct. He replied that the only fault he had to find with it was that I had wrongly assumed that his father had been driven by purely national considerations to aspire to the union and closer organisation of Europe in collaboration with France. His father had been far too sensitive and far too little cool-headed to be able to fight for a policy dictated solely by reason or ulterior motives. He had had a heartfelt and passionately sincere desire for a permanently guaranteed peace and the organised union of Europe. After a meticulous examination of Stresemann's papers I can see no ground for doubting the truth of his son's words or the correctness of a judgment that he was fully competent to make.

One further point may be mentioned. It has been rumoured that, after the scandal which followed on the publication of the Crown Prince letter in the second volume of the *Testament*, numerous compromising documents had been withheld from the third volume. Professor Veit Valentin, the well-known historian now at London University, who helped to edit Stresemann's notes and papers, assures me that this is entirely untrue. I am to-day more convinced than ever that with Stresemann's disappearance (which, even if he had lived, would probably not have been long delayed), Europe lost its great chance of peace. I am filled with despair and disappointment when leading publicists call a ludicrous character like Hitler a " great German," as Mr. Garvin once did, while the unassuming greatness of a man of Stresemann's stature is distorted and denied.

RUDOLF OLDEN.

SOCIAL REFORMS IN TURKEY.

IT is to the advantage of the man who inherits a property in which ugly growths have robbed the orchards of productivity and weeds have choked the footpaths, that the tenants, if any be left, are dispirited, docile and only too willing to attempt seemingly impossible tasks of rehabilitation under the direction of a master hand. Roused from dejection by promises, as beneficial to the common good as those which might have induced the feudal serf to give his utmost in the service of a "disinterested" overlord, the response of the tenantry is a ready one. So in the reaction which follows indolence the desert of apathy becomes a field of volcanic activity and the "leader" or the "political boss" or, as in this case, plain Mr. Ataturk, is able to stand on the ramparts and watch the transformation of a demesne without the uneasy feeling that his spyglasses have been tampered with by those whose own interests are best served by providing a magnified picture.

Scythe and billhook have been freely used in Turkey during the past decade. And were it not for the clatter of reaping-machines on the other side of the Black Sea greater attention might have been paid to reforms which are changing old values in Asia Minor, putting the Anatolian into European clothes—giving him creased trousers where before there was cow-hide—and slowly, very slowly, bringing the localised peasant outlook to a wider nationalist orientation.

Kamal Ataturk is the Colossus of the Bosphorus. He stands with one leg in Europe and the other in Asia. "Which hand will you have?" he asks. And every time the penny is a bright one, minted in Europe. "This is a poor game," say the dwindling body of reactionaries. They settle down in a corner where they alone are allowed to indulge in fatalist acquiescence; a group as powerless as the waxwork models of viziers, eunuchs and janissaries which hold silent court in the Istanbul Military and War Museum.

A shoal of new coins have lately fallen from the hand of Ataturk. Each, it is true, has been carefully examined by the deputies of the Turkish National Assembly. Almost without dissension each has been accepted. Votes for women, adoption of family names, a complete overhaul of the language, regulation of clerical dress for "the greater unification of

classes." These, as well as the lesser decrees relating to municipal development, carry a hall-mark which, even if misconstrued by those who prefer to think that all governments must keep up appearances with a few popular side-shows, means only one thing to the Kemalist Turk. Another step, he will tell you, has been made towards the attainment of an enlightened democracy which may or may not break up into parties in the future, but which, for the moment, believes that the nation's best interests are served by the Ghazi, and is ready—there being no alternative—with something very near to religious ardour to invest the common good in Ataturk stock (the new name is reserved for him alone).

But the distance which Turkey stands from the democratic state is as evident from the unquestioning faith in a leader as it is in the unrivalled security enjoyed by the man himself. Thus an impression is given that the only democratisation affecting modern Turkey is of neither political nor economic significance—only of outward form. The levelling up of habits of life, adoption by all of Western clothes, widespread interest in cinemas and sport are among the more palatable and easily assimilated features of West European civilisation. Yet it should not be thought that the Turk, through a nationally organised system of education and by the infiltration of political and the stimulation of cultural ideals will not ultimately come to a more intense, if controlled, form of "national socialism" which, it seems, is the nearest approach a capitalist society can make towards democracy, so long as leaders and dictators continue to hold the stage.

At the moment the Republican People's Party is the only political organisation in the country, a tentative opposition led by Fethi Bey, Turkish Minister in Paris, having collapsed after three months' trial in the late summer of 1930. Although the leaders of this People's Party appear to have their own ideas about making the country a fit one for the bureaucrat and the large body of officials who live on ingeniously extorted taxes, there is a real and genuine concern for the progressive welfare of the masses. In the light of this it is, perhaps, discouraging to reflect that the Party still draws its main support from the nationalist enthusiasm which established Turkey within her present bounds and provided her, in the first place, with combustible material for

self-development. While this state of affairs promotes a sort of blind patriotism running counter to the true interests of democracy, it may be regarded as inevitable in the circumstances which attended the establishment of the present régime. The multiplicity of foreign interests, the pre-war loans and concessions came to be looked upon as a means of exploitation. The "hands-off Turkey" policy which resulted is to-day as strong as ever. And in this connection it is to be noted that without a clearing agreement, to which for their own reasons our Government has refused to consent, British concerns are losing ground and in many instances are at a complete standstill.

Thus the sword of nationalism has never been sheathed since the Ghazi secured the territorial integrity of his country by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Neither has any rust accumulated on that uncovered blade. Its sparkle is only equalled by those of a lesser but newer array of weapons employed in the constructive offence. Of these there has recently been a great flourish. They have served to drive home the latest batch of widely acclaimed reforms—actually, for the most part, emergent legislation since nothing except a few prejudices have suffered.

The outstanding law among the many hurried through the National Assembly towards the close of its fourth session last December was that according electoral rights to women. Both sexes are now eligible to vote at twenty-two and to become deputies at the age of thirty. The intermediate steps which have brought Turkish women to this stage of emancipation have been mounted rapidly. In 1926 it first became possible for a woman to divorce her husband, whereas before he could repudiate her without giving reasons. During the past decade she has proved her ability in the professions of teaching, medicine and the law—one is now qualifying to become a judge. In 1930 she was granted the right to vote and to take her seat on the municipal councils. And at that time it was hinted that she would be accorded full political rights before the close, after four years, of the session then starting. The promise has been fulfilled. But nothing has come of a concurrent proposal to make the vote a direct one. So one wonders what contribution voters—men and women—think they are making towards their political destiny when they come to poll, as in January of this year.

The vote of the people is really only an endorsement of the general faith in the Popular Party. The Turkish ballot-box can never have felt the strain of fermenting forces beneath its sealed lid. A voter's duty is simple. The pink slip bearing the names of one second-degree elector for every 400 votes is folded and dropped into the box. In this manner "candidates," nominated by the Popular Party committees, are "elected." The real elections come later, when in Istanbul, for example, 1,600 candidates choose from their own number seventeen deputies—one for each unit of 30,000 electors in the city.

With an increase in the size of the Chamber, owing to the release of the women's votes, it is expected at the time of writing that at least 100 of the 397 seats will be occupied by new deputies, mostly of the younger generation. This faction, it is thought, will increase the agitation for a direct vote and may harden an opposition among those older and more "settled" deputies to whom an open political fight may be distasteful. No one doubts, though, that an effective suffrage will come before very long. Changes are sprung upon Turkey these days and new laws enforced almost before the public are aware of their existence.

Twenty women, it is expected, will take their seats in the fifth session of the Assembly this spring. Some of them will have graduated from the municipal councils, where feminine influence has lately directed attention to hygiene and public health. It is a daily occurrence to read and hear of the "spring cleaners," especially in Istanbul. Helva, a sticky Turkish sweetmeat, is to be inspected to see if it contains a saccharin instead of a sugar content. (Sugar, owing to taxes, costs the equivalent of nearly eightpence per pound.) The methods of millers on the Golden Horn are being scrutinised. "Where do they wash their wheat?" it is being asked, and nobody has come forward to deny that the filthy dock-side waters are used for this purpose. Formerly it was the custom for *hamals*, or porters, to carry unwrapped joints of meat through the city. To avoid contagion and prevent "blood from dripping into the street" a porter is now liable to have his packages examined by the police. Neither is the anxiety of the butcher lessened by the necessity of seeing that his animals are stamped with the slaughter-house mark. Beasts killed under insanitary conditions outside towns find

their way on to the market as "smuggled meat" and perhaps compensate some restaurateurs for the menu tax. Restaurants and cafés are forbidden to place the drinking-water tap next to that used for washing. In the interests of safety anyone over ten must, from the beginning of March, pass an examination if he wishes to ride a bicycle. But with the exception of two short stretches the streets of Istanbul are paved with crude stone blocks providing as little inducement to cycle as there is to walk on the rough and often muddy surfaces. Houses are being renumbered and streets renamed in pure Turkish during the first half of this year. No excuse is being made, though, to perpetuate, as in Latin countries, the names of national heroes. Perhaps the narrow cobbled thoroughfares are thought unworthy of this honour. However that may be, the new bridge across the Golden Horn is to be called the Ataturk Bridge. Plans for this million-pound construction are now before the Municipal Council, as also are the proposals for the virtual renovation of the city.

Financial reasons alone are enough to raise the greatest doubts as to the likelihood of a wholesale slum clearance in the near future, the establishment of a metropolitan railway system, the substitution of buses for trams in streets which are to form part of a geometrical plan, and the laying out of public gardens, playgrounds and aerodromes. So ambitious are these schemes that it may never be possible to co-ordinate them in a single whole. But there is one significant truth to be gained from the serious consideration to which they are being submitted. In the old Constantinople there was no such thing as a civic consciousness. Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Persians, Syrians, Asiatics of every race, came here to meet the peoples of Europe. Constantinople was a city of "quarters," conflicting interests and elements which had no interest in the welfare of the city itself. The attitude of mind is to-day entirely different. The municipal supremacy of Ankara has provided an inspiration for city planning and civic pride. In Istanbul, as at Ismir, the third and only other city in Turkey of over 100,000 inhabitants, there is room for this factor, which should interact favourably with the material prospects of urban development. And there is a long way to go before the mentality stales and civic pride disintegrates into arrogant parochialism.

Dress has always played an important part in the social life of the Levant. A strange mixture of subtlety and almost stark simplicity makes the character of the people of the Near East difficult to analyse. "Then why trouble? Take him at his face value—at any rate until you have further facts to go by!" This is a common assumption. So a man is liable to stand or fall by his dress. On this score the priests of the Greek Orthodox Church, ministering to some 70,000 of their followers in Turkey, have fallen. It is not that they are unimpressive or even given to proselytism. The opposite is the case. But the Turk dislikes anything which may be associated with the pre-Kemalist régime. He wants, too, so he says, to abolish class differences. Actually the sudden influx of Western thought and ways of living and a close relationship and sympathy with the U.S.S.R. have ignited in him the fire of anti-religion. The Moslems have been "disestablished." Turkey is a laic state. As such she maintains the right to dictate in the matter of clerical dress. So the *hojas*, the priests of Allah, find themselves in a similar position to that of the Orthodox clergy. Both must adopt civilian clothes by the end of June, and neither, as yet, have given any indication of what they will wear after that date. The probability is that a dignified civilian habit will be assumed without further protest. Indeed, the Moslems have accepted the law almost without demur. But what is there for them to say when, as I have seen, the muezzins lean from the tops of minarets at midday chanting the prayer call with Apache caps back to front on their heads?

The real opposition to clerical dress reform has not come from within Turkey but only from Greece. The Archbishop of Athens has voiced the feelings of an Œcumenical Patriarch muzzled by political difficulties and the fact that his own supporters were outvoted at the Istanbul Saint Synod meetings by a body of younger radical clergy. But for two reasons these protests were never allowed to come to a head. M. Venizelos pointed out that nothing that his countrymen could say would influence the internal affairs of Kemalist Turkey. His mediation was sufficient to silence one section of the Greeks. Of the remainder the more voluble were quietened by the opening of negotiations for a Turco-Greek commercial treaty and the friendly visit to Athens of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Tefvik Aras.

Again it was the Greeks who found fault with the law relating to the adoption of family names. A little jealous, perhaps, of such imposing surnames as Constantinides, Papadopoulos and Anastassiades, the Turks decreed that these should be curtailed and no name longer than two syllables permitted. Agitation secured the withdrawal of this clause. But except for this minority opposition the Names Law has been welcomed in Turkey. For it can be understood that a nation of "Ahmeds," "Mustaphas" and "Mehmet" are as glad of more definite identification as those who have the task of the official classification and registration of a population of 17,000,000.

It may be supposed that in the normal way a name evolves, gaining a letter, telescoping others and dropping antiquated sounds. Only thus does it attain harmony. One obvious difficulty is, then, the coining of euphonious names. The Turks are not a nation of poets, but they are patriots and many are anxious to take this opportunity to record their national sentiments. So on glancing through the lists, published to prevent duplication in administrative areas, one is struck by the self-esteem rather than æsthetic quality implied in the choice of names. *Erturk*, "brave Turk"; *Aksoy*, "white race"; *Tuzun*, "noble"; *Ozbek*, "pure man"; these represent the choice made by those who have no known historic connection with the country and are therefore ineligible for such names as *Inonu*. *Inonu* is the new name of *Ismet Pasha*, *Kamal Atatürk's* Prime Minister. It commemorates one of the two victories gained by *Ismet* during the War of Independence with the Greeks.

Among the first to suggest themselves to the Turkish mind are such names as *Altun*, *Demir* and *Akgök*. They mean gold, iron and white sky. Combinations of these with prefixes or suffixes, as, for instance, *oglu*, "son," are to be seen appearing on shop signboards which only recently changed from Arabic lettering to Latin characters. National integrity is encouraged by the prohibition of names suggesting foreign or tribal associations. Thus *Bosnak Ibrahim* must drop the first half of his name and *Ihsan İngiliz* seek a less anglophil substitute.

Titles of the old régime are no longer recognised. The fourth National Assembly have made it clear that all male subjects are to be addressed as *Bay*, the women as *Bayan*. But this

does not prevent the continued use of *Effendi*. Formerly this distinction was kept for the man who could read and write. To-day there are comparatively few, even of the peasants, who have not attended some school or other, and although farm and agricultural workers comprise more than sixty per cent. of the population it is said that no more than twenty per cent. of the whole are illiterate. The titles of *pasha*, a high military or state official, and of *agha*, a more or less wealthy yeoman farmer, have both become obsolete.

During the past three years it has been the object of the Turkish Government to eliminate from the language all words of Arab and Persian derivation. The modern Turk wants to speak pure Turkish, at least *Kamal Atatürk* says so. The reform of the language is necessarily slow; but at the beginning of the year a Dictionary Commission was set up and a new Turkish Lexicon, with words of Ottoman origin, will shortly be published. Language reform has been fostered by intensive propaganda, and school-children, trained in the new method, constantly fall out with parents over words now taboo. Linguistic changes and, to an extent impossible to estimate, social upheavals have caused the Turk to revise his ideas on music. The old monotones and doleful melodies of the Moslem cult do not harmonise with the mentality of the modern Turk. Neither, indeed, do the more lively tunes from the West. The new movement, then, aims to assimilate the best European tendencies and, within the framework of a rather primitive musical technique, develop a national character essentially Turkish.

It is a healthy sign that so much attention can be paid to the arts. The propaganda in this sphere is no red herring, for political questions make little appeal to the Turk. The trend of the recent "reforms" has been to give the raw enthusiasm of nationalism a root in the deeper soils of social accomplishments and of culture. If it succeeds the diverse brands of nationalism may be increased by one more variety.

MICHAEL P. A. LANGLEY.

Istanbul.
February.

PROPAGANDA.

"*You cannot propagate propaganda without proper geese.*"—
LORD HUGH CECIL.

IN fairy tales and other imaginative works for the entertainment of youthful minds, each character is, as a rule, either good or bad. So simple a moral judgment is seldom possible with people in real life. Words, despite their elusive ways and their notorious inadequacy to convey a plain meaning without fear or favour or ambiguity, are, in this respect, more like solid mortals: few of them are very highly charged with vice or virtue. But there are exceptions. No giant or hobgoblin, no wicked uncle and no ugly beast, was ever looked upon as more villainous or repulsive than "propaganda" in contemporary England. The older generation remembers this evil word in an earlier and holier phase. It used to stand for missionary enterprise: a congregation of Cardinals, known as the College of Propaganda and charged with the management of missions, was established in 1662. Thus the word came to mean any organisation for spreading a particular doctrine or system of principles; and, sometimes, the doctrines or principles thus propagated.

The World War changed all that. Ministries of Propaganda—Crewe House and its foreign equivalents—lied like troopers; or, to be exact, lied instead of trooping; and, no doubt, lied more systematically and more effectively than any troopers. Their business was to broadcast such news as would make the enemy appear at once odious and contemptible, or as would reflect upon their own side honour and glory. And if no amount of selection, emphasis or interpretation was capable of extracting such news from the facts, then the news must be invented since its supply must not fail.

Propaganda of this sort did not end with the War. The unfortunate inhabitants of countries whose Dictators exercise censorship over the organs of opinion are apt to get distorted views of facts. What we, with many sources of information open to us, condemn as biased propaganda, they, with insufficient means of checking the facts, may also describe as propaganda but without noticing its bias. The "*Reichsminister* for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda" may appear harmless enough in German eyes, while we see, or think

we see, in Dr. Goebbels and his propaganda the hoodwinking of a nation whose thought used to be as free as any in the world. In democratic France the press is as free from governmental control as it is on the opposite side of the Channel; but the people are so accustomed to news being coloured by the financial interests or party preferences of the newspaper proprietors, that "propaganda" of this sort does not arouse the same resentment as it does in Britain, where the better newspapers are more (and, in a few cases, altogether) independent of their owners' fancies. Moreover, French words are held to their meanings more rigidly than their English counterparts.

Small wonder, then, that "propaganda" should have come to mean in English something different from its significance in most of the languages of Europe. Not only is its new English meaning remote from the original, in which sense it may still be used occasionally, but the new meaning turns up far more often than the old and possesses a far stronger emotional tone. Thus, in English, the new meaning dominates the old. Foreigners are often unaware of this fact, and considerable confusion is the result. But it is as nothing compared with the confusion due to the word's ambiguous use in Great Britain, where its respectable past secures for it the *entrée* to good company which it promptly contaminates by its disreputable present. It is indeed fatally easy to describe as "propaganda" any organised attempt to popularise facts one does not like. One may thus infect the facts with a taint from which they never recover, so that a world in need of their new aspect of truth may be put off and misled. And, having thus done untold evil, one can escape censure on the ground that, in its other and older sense, "propaganda" meant no harm. If, however, harm is definitely intended, there should be no mistake about it. When we condemn "propaganda" in schools, we ought to leave no doubt of what it is that ought to be avoided.

Perhaps the best way to remove the ambiguity would be to use the English word only in its modern sinister sense, and to employ some other term—"publicity" might do—when the doctrines or principles disseminated are, or may be, free from the taint now attaching to "propaganda." If some such plan is to work well, we shall need to express this modern meaning as clearly as possible. Take, for example, the

following paragraph from a recent article in *The Economist* (September 29th, 1934) :

Propaganda, spell-binding, national enlightenment, ballyhoo—or whatever we like to call it—seems to have come to stay in the modern world. Last month there was a Presidential Election in Germany. Dr. Goebbels refuelled his famous publicity machine. The word was given; the dampers were opened; the furnace roared at full blast for ten days; and the finished product, a ninety per cent. vote for Hitler, gave evidence to the world, not so much of the will of the German people, as of the wonderful efficiency of the machine. . . .

The machine! There is something quasi-mechanical, something highly organised, about modern propaganda. It is not accomplished without organised effort.

Then again propaganda is, and always was, intended to make people think in a certain way. The aim nowadays may be action rather than thought. But the behaviour of the human body depends upon instincts, habits and memories as well as upon words of command or other incoming sense-impressions; or, more simply, behaviour depends upon the body's own neural dispositions, in the brain and elsewhere, as well as upon its environment. It is true that people in a crowd will sometimes imitate one another's movements or those of their leader, and that, in such a case, their previous neural dispositions have little effect upon their actions. Yet, in general, if we want to influence people's actions we must alter their neural dispositions beforehand; and propaganda seeks to do so by the only means available, and that is by making people think in a certain way. When propaganda aims at State action, rather than at action by individual citizens, its aim is still to make those citizens think in a certain way. It thus creates public opinion which sets an upper limit to what Governments may do and a lower limit to what they must do. "Governments," said Lord Grey, "cannot go ahead of public opinion"; according to Sir Austen Chamberlain, "Governments in these days are the servants of their peoples in regard to foreign policy"; and André Siegfried tells us that, in America, politicians "are the slaves of public opinion."

In the modern sinister sense we seek to define, "propaganda" does not aim at making people think fairly and truly. It does not seek to present facts—as *The Times* of

January 1st, 1935, says that *The History of the Times* presents them—"without fear or favour, in the spirit of true scholarship, concealing nothing and extenuating nothing." On the contrary its business is to give a partial or biased view: for example, to make people think that the Polish Corridor is more Polish than in fact it is, or that Germany was less responsible for the War than in fact she was.

There is another thing about propaganda of the baser sort. It is not merely the result of organised effort by persons with some axe of their own to grind, but it is also essentially false. Accurate statements of fact would not become propaganda merely because they happened to be published for some biased purpose. It is characteristic of "propaganda," in the modern English sense, that it misrepresents the facts.

We may therefore define "propaganda" as

any organised effort to make people think of something (whether concrete or abstract, simple or complex) otherwise than it would be thought of by a perfectly impartial person aware of all the relevant facts.

That is not to say that every organised effort at education or enlightenment ought to be condemned as propaganda unless the teachers are devoid of passion and unless their teaching is absolutely true. The impartial person in our definition must have no special or private purpose of his own to serve. But he is not supposed to be devoid of emotional feeling. It is the instincts, always accompanied by their linked emotions, that are the driving forces of human nature. All education worthy of the name is consequently concerned with emotions as well as with facts, with feelings and purposes as well as with knowledge. Indeed, an ample supply of adequate text-books justifies many good teachers in making it their chief concern to communicate to their pupils not mere knowledge so much as something of their own strong feeling for their subject, their sense of its importance, and their delight in its inherent beauty. The lectures on electrodynamics by a well-known Cambridge Professor used to be full of inspiration for his students because he was so obviously excited by his subject, although he constantly failed to put his mathematics accurately upon the blackboard.

Nor does good sound teaching demand absolute truth any more than it requires absolute impartiality. Indeed,

outside the realm of metaphysics and the sphere of logical truths,* absolute truth is not the subject-matter of education, even at its best. Of all expressions of our knowledge, whether in statements of particular facts or of general laws, those which best fit experience, and are therefore most true, are provided by natural science. But so-called "scientific facts" and "Laws of Nature" are no more than summaries, in carefully defined terms, of human experience up to date. These facts alter as experience develops. Facts discovered by Newton are no longer facts since the discoveries of Einstein. Facts accepted by the physicists of half a century ago are very different from the facts of physics to-day; and the truth that underlies these facts may be very different from either. To-day, a Stonehenge monolith is "in fact" an almost empty space occupied by an exceedingly tenuous cloud of whirling electric particles or waves. In itself, or "in truth," the monolith may well be as different from this fact as this in turn differs from the massive stone made known to us by our direct sense-impressions. The stone has lain there substantially the same for twenty centuries; but our thoughts of it must be always on the move if they are to keep abreast of the "facts."

We have indeed to distinguish between things-in-themselves, things as perhaps they really are, and things as we find them to be in the world of our experience; and we use the word "fact" to denote—not a thing-in-itself, not a portion of absolute truth, but—a thing as it is generally assumed and defined to be after making sure that the "fact" fits all available experience of the thing. It is of such facts that impartial information must consist if its systematic dissemination is not to deserve the epithet "propaganda."

Education does not aim at giving a complete picture of the world of experience. "However great our activity," wrote Henri Poincaré in his *Science and Method* (page 16), "facts

* "We can, of course, formulate propositions which are true because tautological and conditional, or true by definition. . . . If the axioms of Euclidean geometry are true, and their meanings quite definite and quite unequivocal, then various propositions of such geometry may be deduced and regarded as true on those conditions. In this class fall the truths of arithmetic and mathematics. We cannot transfer these from the ideal realm to the physical, without reducing them to mere probabilities; as when we add two to two in the form of drops of water, and find they make, not four, but one. The difficulty is that in the physical realm we can never define our objects completely, since our knowledge of them is always incomplete."—(William McDougall, in *The Frontiers of Psychology*, C.U. Press, 1934.)

outstrip us and we can never overtake them; while the scientist is discovering one fact, millions and millions are produced in every cubic inch of his body." From among these facts teachers must select; and the selection ought not to be the same for pupils whose interests and prospects are very different. Education is thus concerned with subjective as well as with objective presentations of fact. Verbs of teaching take two accusatives, one of the subject and one of the object taught: *Magister Johannem Latinam docet*; and, as the late Sir John Adams used to insist, the teacher who would make a success of his teaching must know both John and Latin. Thus selection, emphasis and interpretation are as much a part of education as they are of journalism. They are far from being characteristic of propaganda.

New experiences, new discoveries, alter facts. Facts may also be altered by the thoughts and deeds of persons who have no claim to rank as discoverers. We can and do alter the world of experience itself: it is surely our business in this world not merely to know it but also to assist in its creative evolution. Our own neural dispositions, at least, are altered by our thoughts. Natural science agrees with so-called "Christian Science" that our bodies are changed by a change in our thoughts; and our bodies are as real as anything we know. A change in public opinion is no less real than any other fact with which statesmen have to deal. Thus an organised effort to make people think of something—a political institution, shall we say—as alterable by their thought is not necessarily to misrepresent it or to adopt a biased or partial attitude towards it. Nor is such an effort brought within our definition merely because it results in transforming the thing itself.

The League of Nations Union, for example, is not engaged in propaganda when it describes, not only how the League of Nations has worked, but also how it was meant to work; or when it teaches people to think of the League, not as some dead thing, remote and unresponsive, but as a living organism changing as their thoughts of it change and, quite possibly, capable of becoming what it was intended to be if people would only realise the possibility. Nor is the schoolmaster necessarily guilty of propaganda when he sets before his pupils the England of his dreams; England healed of her festering sores of slums, unemployment and the rest; "this

little world" portrayed in the great pages of English literature; England as his pupils may help to build it in this green and pleasant land. Nor is the parson to be accused of propaganda because he tells his flock how they also may help to build on earth the Kingdom or Commonwealth of God, in which all nations are provinces.

But it is in the nature of things impossible to compile a list of all that is not propaganda. We may, however, be very sure of one item on this list. Whatever is, in the opinion of competent judges, suitable for inclusion in the curriculum of every school cannot possibly be propaganda, since we are all agreed that propaganda has no place in school. Where shall we look for the competent judges? In most foreign countries it is the Governments, through their Ministers of Education, who determine what shall be taught in most of their schools. But in Britain a wider discretion is fortunately left to the teachers themselves. They are the best judges of the subjects they ought to teach and of how to teach them. They would never be persuaded to admit propaganda into their schools. Yet the whole profession of teachers in schools and in training colleges of England, Scotland and Wales, has unanimously declared that

All children and young people should, before completing their formal education, learn something of the aims and work of the League of Nations, the terms of its Covenant, and the recent growth of international co-operation.

Instruction in the aims and work of the League of Nations may be so given as to serve some of the chief purposes of education:

1. Thus it may increase the architectural consistency of the curriculum, and help to build up the coherent body of knowledge—the "single wide interest"—on which strength of character largely depends. . . .
2. This knowledge is also practically useful because the future of international relations so closely concerns every boy and girl in the modern world. . . .
3. This new knowledge, properly taught, provides a strenuous intellectual discipline just because it links up so many other studies. . . .

A sense of world citizenship has to be created . . . (partly by) the building of larger loyalties out of present patriotisms . . . to cover the whole shrinking world. Disloyalty to the whole involves disloyalty to the part, including one's own State.

Along with the change of feeling towards this wider loyalty, we want to see a change of purpose: a will to seek first the welfare of the world-wide society of mankind. . . .*

The teaching of international relations on the lines laid down in this Declaration cannot be reckoned as propaganda for the reasons we have given. For the same reasons it is safe to assume that there is nothing of propaganda about the Suggestions† for the consideration of teachers recently issued under the auspices of a Committee—the Education Committee of the League of Nations Union—which includes representatives of the professional associations of teachers as well as of local education authorities.‡

The following table gives a rough picture of the distinction we have drawn between good sound education on the one hand, and, on the other, propaganda in the sinister sense commonly understood in Great Britain to-day, the sense to which we propose that the meaning of the word should be confined in future.

Organised effort to make people think—			
What are not facts:—	What may or may not be facts:—	Facts confined to separate subjects:—	Facts in their relation to organised thought as a whole:—
Propaganda.	Advertisement.	Specialised Education.	General Education.
Publicity.		Education.	

* This Declaration of the teaching profession, first printed in April 1927, has been ratified by the following associations of teachers:

The National Union of Teachers, the Educational Institute of Scotland, the Headmasters' Conference, the Incorporated Association of Headmasters, the Incorporated Association of Headmistresses, the Incorporated Association of Assistant Masters, the Incorporated Association of Assistant Mistresses, the Training College Association and the Council of Principals of Training Colleges.

The Declaration was endorsed on October 5th, 1928, by a Joint Committee which included representatives of education authorities appointed by the Association of Education Committees, the Association of Municipal Corporations and the County Councils Association.

† The Suggestions are published as *Teachers and World Peace* (Third Edition, 1935), League of Nations Union. 6d.

‡ The bodies represented on this Committee include the Headmasters' Conference, the Headmasters' Association, the Association of Headmistresses, the Association of

Although this table draws a sharp line between education and publicity, it is, of course, possible for education to be the object of publicity. This happens when a local education authority advertises evening classes in special subjects, or when posters announce that an Archbishop is going to address a public meeting on things in general. But education and propaganda need to be kept rigidly apart.

Our definition of propaganda and our interpretation of that definition have, as we hope, fixed the meaning of one who, accepting the definition, declares his conviction that such and such teaching or preaching is propaganda. There is no more room for doubt about his opinion; and that is a great gain. But it is still possible that his opinion may be wrong. He may not be "impartial," and yet believe himself to be so. He may not be "aware of all the relevant facts," and yet imagine that he knows them. The acceptance of our definition does not eliminate the danger that one may call a system of ideas "propaganda" merely because, being prejudiced, one does not like them, or because, being ignorant, one does not know enough about the subject or sufficiently understand the nature of knowledge. It follows that, unless ambiguity of utterance is their aim, *wise men will be chary of using the word "propaganda."*

MAXWELL GARNETT.

Assistant Masters, the Association of Assistant Mistresses, the National Association of Schoolmasters, the National Union of Teachers, the National Union of Women Teachers, the Council of Principals of Training Colleges, the Association of Education Committees, the Association of Directors and Secretaries for Education, the Workers' Educational Association, the New Education Fellowship, the National Adult School Union, the Y.M.C.A., the Boy Scouts Association and the Girl Guides Association.

TARIFFS, QUOTAS AND THE EMPIRE.

WHEN Mr. Mackenzie King, on the eve of his departure for London last October, said: "Canadian affairs are increasingly bound up with world affairs, and we want to get first-hand information about conditions in Great Britain," he was voicing a view which every responsible Imperial statesman must share these days about his own country. Since our adoption of Protection, Empire relations have become closer and more delicate; and recent events suggest that it may be worth while asking ourselves whether the bonds may not have become uncomfortably tight.

The Ottawa Agreements, we should do well to realise, could not have come into being had Great Britain remained a predominantly Free Trade country, and their existence is dependent now upon our remaining a Protectionist country. Under the Ottawa Agreements we accepted the principle of the "compensatory" tariff, which is designed to neutralise lower costs of imported products, whether of foreign or Empire origin. This action was condemned by most economists, and events have proved that it is impossible to put the principle into practice, and dangerous to attempt it. On March 24th the Canadian Tariff Board, reviewing the import charges on British woollens, declared that "a precise comparison of the production costs of each country is virtually impossible."

As a result of the failure of the Dominions to lower their restrictions against British goods in accordance with this fallacious "compensatory" principle, our cotton and woollen trades, to mention two of the most notable cases, have become profoundly dissatisfied with the treatment they are receiving. And even *The Times* has expressed disappointment. "It must be admitted," said that organ on February 9th, "that the [Australian] Tariff Board has interpreted them [the Ottawa clauses] with reservations which appear to diminish very seriously their value for British trade."

Nor are the Dominions themselves satisfied with the results, as the debate in the Australian House of Representatives on March 28th forcibly reminded us. Only by imposing tariffs on foreign goods, or by limiting them by quotas, are we able to give the Dominions the preferential treatment in our market which they have long felt is their due. Tariffs were in operation before Ottawa. Quotas, which were widely

adopted after Ottawa and largely as a result of the Agreements at Ottawa, were a compromise. Most agricultural producers would prefer straightforward tariffs, but Mr. Runciman, shortly before he became President of the Board of Trade and a key member of the Cabinet, had given a pledge to his Free Trade supporters that he would not stand for food taxes. Quotas were, therefore, introduced, and under the ingenious administration of Mr. Elliot, the Minister of Agriculture, they have been extended to cover all the main classes of food production.

Mr. Runciman has described quotas as "the curse of Europe." Those now operating in Great Britain may very easily become the curse of the Empire. They are unpopular measures, and in the opinion of Free Traders they are radically unsound. The British farmer, like his fellows in other countries, has been suffering from low prices. The plain object of these quotas has been to force his prices up artificially by restricting supplies. Such a policy may succeed in its purpose for a time, but the evidence of scores of similar measures in other countries has confirmed the economic view that the only sound way to make production profitable is to increase demand. Restriction of supplies of staple commodities for the purpose of driving prices up invariably results in a decline in consumption, which must sooner or later reflect itself in another collapse in prices.

The general quota policy of the British Government may not have been in operation long enough to justify our adding it to the long list of failures; but its progress has taken the normal course. The prices of the commodities to which it was applied immediately rose to the consumer. But the producer gained little or no benefit, for the profits, it soon became apparent, were being intercepted; and in the three most important cases the Government was obliged to bolster up the schemes by granting subsidies.

The bacon scheme has received wide attention, and I shall only touch upon it briefly. It received a stimulus from the arrangement completed with the Canadian producers at Ottawa. The effects have been little short of disastrous. Before the policy had been long in operation the Government found it necessary to lend the curers £3,000,000 to enable them to pay the high price guaranteed by the Bacon Board. Even so, the Board has repeatedly found itself in grave

difficulties. In increased prices alone the burden has weighed heavily on consumers. The average wholesale price of bacon rose from 53s. per cwt. to a peak figure of 102s., and the price in the shops doubled. Foreign supplies have been cut down, but we paid as much last year for a greatly reduced quantity as we did in 1932. Despite this restriction of foreign supplies, the home producers have failed to meet the requirements of the British market. Less than one in seven of the registered bacon curers have been able to market a product comparable with the Danish bacon that has been shut out.

We may pass to consider the broader question of the effect of our new policy on Imperial relations. It is worth while recalling Mr. Winston Churchill's famous warning when such a policy as we now practise was mooted in the early days of the century:

"What a dangerous thing it will be," he said, "year after year to associate the idea of Empire, the idea of our brethren beyond the seas, the idea of these great young self-governing Dominions in which our people at present take so much pride, with an enhancement in the price of the necessary commodities of the life and industry of Great Britain. It seems to me that you would, by the imposition of duties upon the necessities of life and industry, breed steadily year by year, and accumulate at the end of a decade, a deep feeling of sullen hatred of the Dominions and Colonial affairs among the poorer people of this country. That, I think, would be a great disaster."

Now this policy is at work. Food prices in Great Britain, and particularly the food prices which the wage-earner pays, have been artificially raised. It is not easy to see how the disaster feared by Mr. Churchill can be avoided. As the British consumer sees Empire goods taking the place of cheaper foreign goods which he wants but can no longer get, is he not bound to associate the restrictions with the idea of Empire? And the home producer, who sees Dominion rivals benefit from the Protection which he had assumed would operate to his own advantage, will he not also entertain unfriendly sentiments?

Mr. Elliot's quota policy has been no less dangerous than the import duties which Mr. Churchill had in mind. Control by quota is, in effect, prohibition, which may be extended to apply to Empire as well as foreign goods; and the call already from the home producers has been that certain Empire

products should be restricted, if not by the machinery at Mr. Elliot's disposal, by some other method. Such a line of action would be the logical outcome of the present policy for reviving British agricultural prices by the method of artificial scarcity in the home market. The success of the restrictive policy is seriously threatened by Empire supplies, as many people must have come to realise for the first time a few weeks ago, when our farmers strongly protested against the raising of the ban on imports of cattle from the Irish Free State. But much more serious, in the view of the home producer who wants Protection to be effective, is the increased volume of supplies from the Dominions. Our imports from Canada rose sharply last year, following the increased restrictions imposed on foreign goods. The acrimonious discussions a short time ago between the trading interests of Great Britain and those of Australia and New Zealand were a foretaste of the bitter feelings which the Protectionist policy in this country, even if it is pursued no more than half-way to its logical conclusion, must engender and aggravate.

So, under the new system, we find ourselves between the devil and the deep sea. If we apply no further restrictions on Empire goods, our consumers, who have to pay the higher prices, and our producers, who see these higher prices go into the pockets of Dominion producers, will both entertain unfriendly thoughts, and the producers will cry out afresh for restriction of Empire imports. If we shut out Empire goods in order to protect our producers, our consumers will be even worse off than they are at present, and the Dominions will find their sentiments of goodwill towards the Mother Country wearing thin. Tariff and quota wars could not be far ahead. The Jubilee conversations between the British and Dominion Ministers will, it is to be hoped, produce a better understanding on both sides, but the problem of reconciling the conflicting interests cannot be tackled courageously until the Ottawa Agreements have been remoulded.

What can the present discussions and those of the immediate future achieve? Australia and New Zealand have made it clear that we cannot pursue our meat quota policy without inflicting grave wounds upon Australian and New Zealand production, making debt payment increasingly difficult. "Any attempt to curtail our exports," declared Mr. Lyons, before leaving for London, "must be strenuously

resisted. Australia cannot meet interest commitments unless she is allowed to continue exporting to capacity." And Mr. Bruce has called upon our Government to terminate its foreign trade pacts at the earliest possible moment in order to give greater advantages to the Dominions. It will all have to be done—under the Protectionist system which we have embraced—by hard bargaining. But what of "the bond of Empire," which Lord Bledisloe, late Governor-General of New Zealand, recently likened to a silver thread? "I ardently hope," he said, "that too great a strain will not be placed on this silver thread by too much of the huckstering spirit." We may share his hope. Yet we, like the Dominions, have armed ourselves with huckstering weapons, and we are now pursuing huckstering methods.

Mr. Baldwin's important statement to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce on March 25th, when he belittled the quota policy, and said that the tendency would be for the Government to turn away from it, and rely on the policy of import duties, did not calm the fears of those who have watched the Imperial situation develop since Ottawa. For had we not just heard of the new method of taxation by levy? In order to give our producers some greater measure of protection, and at the same time grant our Dominions a preference over the foreigner, it is proposed that a levy should be imposed on meat supplies—1d. a lb. on foreign supplies, $\frac{1}{2}$ d. a lb. on Empire supplies—and that the amount collected (estimated at about £6,000,000) should be given as a subsidy to our farmers. They are being subsidised already, of course, but the money comes directly from the taxpayer's pocket, and the full cost is not only felt but seen. Under the proposed new system, the taxpayer, as such, would be relieved, and the subsidy would be paid instead by those members of the community who cannot afford the high-price home meat and have to content themselves with the inferior qualities imported from abroad. The poorer classes of the community would thus pay the producers their subsidy to enable them to sell their high-quality beef and mutton to their regular customers at a not too extortionate price, and still show a profit.

The levy plan has been brought forward because the quota, itself adopted as a compromise, has proved unpopular. But the levy is unlikely to win greater favour. The cry of our farming interests is for a straightforward tariff, and it is

unlikely to diminish. The farmers want a tariff which will be high enough to give them "reasonable" protection and "reasonable" prices. They are tired of regulations and control. They attribute these evils to the quota, and they believe that they would get rid of them under a tariff. They would, in all probability, be disappointed. The Dominions would press for a greater share of the market, and regulation to that end would have to be introduced. The only thing that is certain is that the quota system, as it applies to meat, is doomed. I may quote the words of no less an authority than Viscount Astor, who, in the *Scottish Farmer* of March 6th, wrote: "Quotas, if generally applied, would compel our consumers always to buy in the dearest market." But are tariffs or levies any less oppressive? Let me quote the same authority again—with the reminder, if it is indeed necessary, that he is one of the Protectionist leaders. Writing in the *Western Morning News* of March 15th, he said: "Quotas, import boards, tariffs, levies and subsidies are all devices to put extra money into the farmers' pockets, and so, though the means vary, they are all 'food taxes.'"

Food taxation under the British Protectionist system, whether by direct import duties or levies, or by indirect methods of quota control, is a matter of vital importance to the Dominions. But they will deceive themselves if, in judging the situation, they do not look beyond their increased sales to Great Britain. They should temper their insistence upon wider preferences by reflecting upon the means by which the Ottawa Agreements are being and must be implemented, and the cost to the British consumer. Particularly should they reflect upon the artificial nature of any expansion, which can only be made possible by increased British restrictions upon foreign goods. They should reflect upon the fundamental truth of the statement that every measure which diverts international trade from its natural channels into artificial channels means a loss of purchasing power in the world and a decline in world trade. The Ottawa Agreements are measures of this kind. They should be regarded—and will, I feel sure, come to be regarded—as the most unhappy as well as the most notable consequence of Britain's adoption of all-round Protection. It will be a tragedy if, through their breakdown, something akin to hatred springs up between Great Britain and the Dominions: it will be a much greater

tragedy if they survive, since hatred will spring up and become intensified, until it is no longer sullen but openly defiant.

Can the Ottawa Agreements be modified or scrapped by mutual consent? Closed regions of exchange are harmful to international trade—to the nations outside the ring and ultimately to the nations inside. The negotiation of tariff reduction, never easy, becomes more difficult. Britain's foreign trade pacts since Ottawa have been of small value. They have not lowered trade barriers in Europe to below the 1931 level.

Two leading British authorities, Sir Alan Anderson and Sir Walter Layton, have recently sponsored proposals for the formation of low-tariff clubs, which would be open to any nation that cared to join. So long as the Ottawa Agreements, which constitute a high-tariff club open to none but Empire countries, remain in being, the formation of such clubs appears to be outside the bounds of practical politics. The Ottawa Agreements have not only failed to reduce Empire trade barriers, but they have made the removal or reduction of world trade barriers more difficult. Dominion producers have a vested interest in our new restrictions against the foreigner.

I have suggested that Imperial ties will be strained, perhaps to breaking-point, if the Ottawa Agreements remain. It is certain, at the very least, that the Agreements will have to be modified, or reconstituted. No little tolerance will be necessary during the next critical year or two, whatever be the outcome of the Jubilee talks. Sometimes a national move may tend to cause annoyance to one country or another. Is there any criterion which the people as well as the Government of each country might consult to enable them to judge of the right or wrong of any action and display the proper attitude towards it? If the peoples and the Governments of Great Britain and the Dominions would oppose every measure which involved a fresh restriction in the way of the natural flow of trade, even when at first sight it offered advantages internally, and if they would be quick to approve every new measure which made for the removal of an old restriction, even when it involved the sacrifice of a preference and appeared at first sight to be harmful, we could hope ultimately for a happy settlement, with an improved standard of living for all.

RANALD M. FINDLAY.

THE CHACO WAR.

WHILE the League of Nations remonstrates, pleads and threatens, while peace conferences are held in Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Geneva, while English and American politicians hold up their hands in pious horror at the profits made by their armament firms in supplying the combatants, the war in that swampy, hot and unhealthy jungle of South America known as the Gran Chaco goes grimly on. Spread out over a front of 300 kilometres, from the Brazilian border in the north to the Argentine border in the south, 80,000 Bolivians are fighting desperately to retain their last hold on the disputed area. In the north and centre of the front line each side has a string of forts connected by paths through the dense forest. These forts may have a garrison of anything from a dozen to several thousand men. The known outpost of the enemy may be many miles distant, but at any moment he may be advancing in overwhelming numbers only a few hundred yards off. No Man's Land must be constantly patrolled, a perilous and nerve-racking task, for death, and often a singularly unpleasant death, is the expected lot of every member of the patrol that meets a stronger force in thick undergrowth. Mutual hate between Bolivians and Paraguayans is intense, and who would expect the conventions of civilised warfare to be observed where there are no onlookers, and the jungle swiftly destroys all trace of the most savage atrocities?

In the extreme south of the line, on the sector called Ballivian which directly covers Villa Montes, the Bolivian base in the Chaco, the fighting has taken on many features reminiscent of the Western Front during the Great War. Elaborate trench systems with concealed machine-gun emplacements, barbed-wire entanglements and even concrete defences have been constructed. It is here that the severest fighting has taken place, the Paraguayans having launched innumerable attacks with heavy losses to both sides during the last nine months. The attacking troops were assisted by the wooded nature of the country, giving a poor field of fire to the defenders' rifles and machine-guns, but on the other hand the immense difficulties of transport make the use of heavy artillery for preliminary bombardment an impossibility. Surprise attacks under cover of fire from trench mortars and

light artillery finally achieved the fall of this heavily fortified and strategic Bolivian position, and their base is now in serious danger.

Paraguay has but 40,000 men in the field, or roughly half as many as her enemy, but the reasons for her success are not hard to find. Over ninety per cent. of the Bolivian rank and file are pure-blooded Indians, ignorant and uncivilised, and in many cases absolute savages. They have little love for their country (for which they cannot be blamed in the least), are incapable of reaching any high standard of training and discipline, and are unskilful and neglectful with their arms. Furthermore, most of them come from the high, cold "*altiplano*" in the north-west of Bolivia and suffer intensely in the low, hot Chaco. There have been cases of Bolivian Indians dying from the effects of the climate within five days of their arrival at Villa Montes. The Paraguayan soldiers form a striking contrast. Fierce, ruthless fighters, fighting in their own climate, they endure incredible hardships with a stoicism and patriotism of which any army in the world might well be proud. They are worthy descendants of their grandfathers who fought the combined armies of the Argentine, Brazil and Uruguay until nine-tenths of the entire male population of Paraguay had perished. Assisted by the comparative ease of their communications (La Paz, capital of Bolivia, is some five times farther from the front line than is their own capital, Asuncion), they have in two and a half years of war practically driven the Bolivian army from the disputed area, taken nearly 20,000 prisoners, and inflicted other losses on their enemy probably amounting to 50,000. Their own losses are estimated at about 20,000.

The mortality per cent. of the fighting troops is considerably higher than in the Great War, being about one in five as compared with one in eleven. This is not caused by any superior engines of destruction that have been invented in the last decade of progress, for no weapons of any importance are employed in the Chaco which were not in use during the Great War, while many, such as gas, tanks and heavy artillery, are impracticable and seldom or never used. It is the deadly climate, the mosquitoes and the bad water that send up the death roll, coupled with the fact that primitive medical arrangements and difficulties of transport make recovery from even a slight wound a rare event. Though spared many

horrors, the soldier of the Chaco War seems to be even worse off than the soldier of the Great War. He has less chance of surviving, can expect little or no skilled attention to his wounds, is fighting in an almost unendurable climate with bad food and worse water, when indeed he is lucky enough to get either, and receives no monetary rewards for his pains.

Every able-bodied Bolivian between the age of nineteen and thirty-five is liable to conscription, and it seems likely that the age limit will shortly be raised to include men up to forty-five. The methods of conscripting Indians are ruthless and brutal; the official age limit is frequently ignored, and many children of fifteen and less are swept forcibly into the ranks of the army. As all eligible Indians in the vicinity of La Paz have been already conscripted, many of the most remote and wildest tribes are being rounded up, put into a uniform of sorts (often an old khaki or field-grey that last saw service in France), taught the rudiments of drill and musketry, and sent down to the Chaco. White Bolivians, who form less than ten per cent. of the total population, are, of course, not exempt from the conscription laws, and even those living or studying abroad have been ordered to return for military service.

The Bolivian army has white officers and N.C.O.s and Indian privates, though this is not an invariable rule. The period of training, which is on German lines, lasts three months, much of it being done actually in the Chaco. Neither officers nor men receive any leave except sick leave, and the pay of all ranks is negligible. It is difficult to imagine a more despairing job than that of a Bolivian officer in the front line. Generally a sick man with stomach trouble or malaria, or both, he must never relax his vigilance for one instant not only on his sector of the line but also on his own men, for desertions are everyday occurrences and mutinies by no means uncommon. He must ceaselessly keep up the heart-breaking labour of trying to instil into his troops a little courage and patriotism, and is ever haunted by the fear that, if the officers fail in their task, the ever-impending utter demoralisation of the whole Bolivian army will come swiftly and suddenly, with perhaps hideous consequences to every white Bolivian in the Chaco.

An instructive feature of the fighting is the part played by aircraft. Alarmist prophets and scaremongers always seem

to presume that the next war will be fought entirely in the air, and that the ordinary soldier with rifle and bayonet will play a negligible part. The Chaco War shows otherwise. If either of the belligerents thought that they could win the war by investing in a few hundred aeroplanes, and hiring foreign mercenaries to fly them, they would do so at once. Bolivia at least could easily afford it. Actually Bolivia has at present only thirty planes, while Paraguay has not thought it worth while to have more than five, nor is she greatly inconvenienced by this handicap.

This is not to disparage the magnificent work done by the Bolivian Air Force under difficult conditions. Most of the officers were originally in the Bolivian cavalry, which contained the finest type of Bolivian gentleman, and many are among the richest men in the country. There is one foreign pilot, an Englishman, T. Wewege Smith, late of 601 Squadron British Auxiliary Air Force. He joined six months ago as a "*teniente*" with a pay of under twenty pounds a month, and for some time was in the curious position of being unable to speak Spanish. Most of their planes are of modern American service type, and include some models of the latest single-seater and two-seater fighters built by Curtiss and a few Condor triple-engined bombers. The most important function of the Air Force is harrying the enemy communications, which they do with such success that much of the Paraguayan transport has to be done at night. The Paraguayan Air Force, being weak in numbers and consisting of inferior machines, Fiats, naturally avoid coming into contact with Bolivian planes as much as possible, and aerial combats are rare. Machine-guns from the ground account for most of the fatalities, though a large number occur through ordinary engine failure, for the mechanics are far from expert, and emergency landing grounds are scarce in the Chaco. Even if the pilot survives the crash among trees he is lucky if he does not die of thirst before he can reach an outpost or is discovered by a patrol. There is no bombing of civilian populations, for La Paz is well beyond the reach of Paraguayan bombers, and Bolivia is restrained from bombing Asuncion by the fear that reprisals might be taken on Bolivian prisoners of war and also through the risk of forfeiting the sympathy of neutral nations.

In spite of Bolivia's losses, which are no mean figure for a nation of under 3,000,000 inhabitants, she has firmly made up

her mind that she will agree to no terms which do not give her a port on the river Paraguay, terms which Paraguay at present refuses absolutely to consider. Bolivia is now conscripting all her resources, human and financial. Soon she will be putting as much effort into the war as did any of the combatant nations of Europe in 1918. Paraguay has long been in this unhappy state, for, unlike her enemy, she was prepared for the war, and has never treated it lightly. In educated and official circles in Bolivia no one doubts that they will be victors in the end, provided that no internal troubles curtail the natural duration of the war. This may sound unreasonable in view of the distressing state of their army; but Bolivia has such a tremendous advantage in reserves of men and money that in a war of exhaustion Paraguay would collapse long before them. No defeat in the Chaco alone can end the war, for Bolivia has no vitals there. Her immensely long line of communications, some 600 miles from firing line to capital, give her this one advantage. Even the loss of Villa Montes, which now seems imminent, would not necessarily prove fatal to her. In fact, as the enemy advances Bolivia's difficulties of transport, a most important factor, decrease. She is now fighting under far easier conditions than at the beginning of the war. Paraguay correspondingly has to face increasing difficulties of transport and communications every time she undertakes a fresh offensive.

Needless to say both countries firmly and sincerely believe in the justice of their cause. Bolivia maintains that Paraguay took advantage of her proximity to this far-flung portion of Bolivian territory to occupy and colonise it, and plant military forts there. Paraguay claims that the dispute is simply a case of attempted robbery, Bolivia, with her large income from tin and other resources, trusting in the poor resistance that would be offered her by a poverty-stricken nation, of only 800,000 inhabitants, the vast majority of whom even before the war were women. For many years past this has been a point of contention between the two, innumerable treaties and pacts being agreed to and broken by both parties. Matters reached a crisis in 1932, but it is very doubtful if Bolivia would ever have taken the drastic course of involving herself in a modern war were it not that the possession of the area in question would give her a port on the river Paraguay and a free outlet to the sea, an economic advantage

which she at present lacks, having no sea coast of her own. Paraguay was ready and willing to defend with military force her own claims to this land, which was exceedingly valuable to her cramped and indigent population, for, contrary to popular belief, parts of the Chaco can be developed, proving excellent for the cultivation of various tropical products and for cattle breeding.

The League of Nations recently named Paraguay as the offender, because she refused to accept the peace plan put forward by the League; and it is proposed that all Governments that were connected with the Arms Embargo, among which are Great Britain and the United States, should lift the ban on arms destined for Bolivia and enforce more strictly the ban on the export of arms to Paraguay. It is, however, very doubtful whether an Arms Embargo will ever have the slightest effect. Up to now it has been officially exercised against both countries, and even Bolivia, with no port of her own, was not seriously inconvenienced, while Paraguay appeared to import as much as she wanted without the smallest difficulty. If Paraguay now thinks that there is any possibility of the Arms Embargo ever affecting her seriously, she will presumably lay in a large supply of arms and ammunition before any steps can be taken to make it any more effective than it is to-day.

Both countries are now claiming more than they have ever claimed before. Paraguay is inflamed with success, and determined to give nothing away. Bolivia, confident in her ultimate victory, is prepared to extend the struggle indefinitely. The end of this tragic conflict with its terrible slaughter is still far off. Which country will collapse first remains doubtful, but it is certain that the "victor" will have little strength left to enjoy the meagre fruits of the victory.

A. T. WATKINS.

April 1st, 1935.

THE PUNISHMENTS OF A BARBAROUS AGE.

WHEN George Loveless, the leader of the six Dorchester Labourers, arrived in Van Diemen's Land in September 1834, to serve his sentence of seven years' transportation, he was closely questioned about his Trade Union activities, and, when a statement of the information he had given had been drawn up, he was sent, after a short interval, to work as a labourer on a Government farm. The magistrate told him that the Home Government had ordered him to be worked in a chain-gang, but the Governor had intervened in his favour. The week's interval, spent in a chain-gang, showed him the misery of the fate from which he had been rescued. Behind this incident lies a curious episode in the grim history of transportation, connected with the names of Lord Melbourne, Edward Stanley, afterwards fourteenth Earl of Derby, and Lord Aberdeen.

When the Whigs came into power in 1830, amongst other urgent problems they were faced with a great increase in crime. Before any legislation on the subject was passed the Government departments concerned engaged in an experiment of their own for checking this growth, and it is the story of this experiment that we propose to tell.

Transportation, it will be remembered, had provided, since 1718, a regular method for disposing of convicts. When the war with America stopped the export of these human cargoes to the New World, the system of the hulks in English ports was invented as an emergency method to deal with the resulting problem. Transportation was resumed in 1788, this time with Australia, but the hulks continued, and in 1831 the two methods were in use side by side. Prisoners sentenced to transportation for life or for fourteen years were usually sent out to Australia, but those sentenced for seven years were often kept in the hulks. More prisoners were sentenced to transportation than could be absorbed by the existing arrangements overseas.

In May 1833, Edward Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Lord Melbourne, Secretary for Home Affairs, discussed the question of punishments, and the correspondence containing their deliberations was afterwards published. They decided to get rid of as many offenders as possible by

sending all those sentenced to transportation out of England, instead of keeping some of them in the hulks. This policy, said Melbourne, would lessen expense, would lessen the competition of convict with free labour at home, and would also lessen the evils caused to the community by the return home of discharged convicts. In the current year some 5,000 would be transported, an increase of 1,000 over the previous year. All transportable convicts from Middlesex and Surrey were to be sent off, and it was hoped by this measure to decrease crime in London. At the same time transportation must be made a more effective punishment. No longer must it be possible for the criminal classes to picture it as "a boon and a benefit" instead of "a state of suffering or punishment."

On August 21st, 1833, Stanley sent to Sir Richard Bourke, Governor of New South Wales, a despatch containing the new plan for making transportation more effective. On August 26th a similar despatch went to General Arthur, Governor of Van Diemen's Land. In his despatch Stanley explained that as the present treatment of transports had little effect on their "companions in crime," the Government had decided to "impose a heavier weight of punishment" on convicts. Rigid and solitary confinement in England might seem a solution, but this was debarred by its expense, and also, as he pointed out with, perhaps, a certain want of tact, by the disadvantages of letting discharged prisoners loose at home. The alternative to solitary confinement was to make the conditions of the transported prisoners harsher, and this the Government had decided to do by adding imprisonment in a penal settlement or labour in a chain-gang to the sentences of the most hardened offenders, such addition to be made known to the prisoner in England when sentence was passed. Under the existing law the Governor had power to grant tickets of leave to prisoners with life sentences, after eight years; to prisoners with sentences for fourteen years, after six years; to prisoners with sentences for seven years, after four years. This power would in future be restricted. A convict sentenced for life and to a penal settlement must serve seven years in the settlement, followed by five years in a chain-gang before he could be assigned. A similar convict sent to a chain-gang must spend at least seven years there. Convicts sentenced for fourteen or seven years with the addition of a penal settlement or a chain-gang must spend at least a third of their sentence in one or the

other. Since accommodation in the penal settlements was limited, only the worst offenders would be ordered there at first, but no such limitation was necessary in the case of chain-gangs. Incidentally, Stanley expressed his discontent with the whole system of assignment, and suggested that all transports on arrival should if possible be sent to public works, and only be assigned to a private employer when they had earned such relaxation by perseverance in good conduct.

As soon as Stanley's letter had gone the new arrangements came into force. When a convict ship was about to sail, a sinister little note arrived at the Colonial Office from the Home Office containing a list of those prisoners on board "who from the nature of their offences and character" were to receive the extra punishment. The notes were copied into the Criminal Entry Book but not the lists.

Stanley's despatch reached New South Wales at the end of the year, and Van Diemen's Land a little later. In both places the Governors, neither of whom could be called a sentimentalist, were decidedly critical. In his answering despatch of January 15th, 1834, Bourke, who took great interest in road-making, welcomed the prospect of reinforcements for his chain-gangs from the hardened offenders, but suggested that the time to be spent in them was too long. A man sentenced for life and sent to a chain-gang would have to serve seven years there followed by eight years of assignment before he could hope for a ticket of leave. This would mean "fifteen years of slavery," a period so long that for middle-aged or older men it might impede rather than promote reformation. As for the suggestion that all convicts should be sent to public works when they arrived in the Colony, presumably this meant labour in irons, for unironed men were useless for road-making without expensive supervision. But irons raised a serious difficulty. The Chief Justice of the Colony held that the Governor had no power to alter the sentence of the British Courts in order to impose severer punishment. Transportation meant banishment with servitude, but chains would be an unauthorised addition.

Bourke reminded the Government that the new arrangements entailed additional military force; more iron-gangs meant more soldiers to guard them. At the end of his despatch he emphasised the dangers of the new policy and the clash of interests between England and the Colony. In

respectful language he protested against "sacrificing the probability of reforming the transported offender in the Australian colonies to the hope of deterring the unprincipled inhabitants of Great Britain from the commission of crime. Undoubtedly, if punishment, appalling from its duration as well as its intensity, be heaped on the transport here, however beneficially the history of his sufferings may operate on the fears of the British criminal, it will induce a state of despair in the mind of the convict, which is found to be utterly at variance with reformation." It may be noted that in this despatch Bourke did not actually challenge the legality of the new punishment added by the Home Government, but the legal opinion quoted about the position of the Colonial Government was a broad hint.

This despatch was apparently the only one that Bourke sent on the subject. Governor Arthur of Van Diemen's Land on the other hand sent no less than six communications, beginning with a long despatch in which he acknowledged the receipt both of Stanley's despatch of August 26th, and of instructions for working in irons for seven years sixteen of the convicts newly arrived on the *Southworth*. Arthur was an energetic, outspoken, and independent man, and he was much nettled by the assumption that transportation could be regarded as "a boon and a benefit," for he had, as the Committee on Transportation in 1838 put it, "been long assiduously and successfully endeavouring to render transportation a painful punishment and to make the convict feel his position to be a disagreeable and degraded one." He had already protested against Archbishop Whately's views on the subject, and here was the Government repeating the Archbishop's misconceptions, and writing of transportation as if it were a bed of roses. In his despatches he now turned the tables on the Colonial Office by suggesting that if transportation were to be made more severe, then steps to that effect must be taken in England. Why not make every sentence last for a term of fourteen years, with a period of hard labour included in it, and accompany all such sentences with forfeiture of all property, and the permanent deprivation of certain civil rights? Let a declaration of the true nature of transportation be made in Parliament, showing "that the criminal in place of finding that he was about to work out his own happiness and future prosperity, will, to his sorrow, discover that he had

brought upon himself permanent degradation, and the bitterest form of slavery."

The condition of the assigned, he pointed out, had grown steadily worse. In former times employers might have found it sometimes politic to give their assigned labourers indulgences in order to make them work harder. Now that the police were better organised and there was competition from free labour no such humouring took place. Meat and flour were dear, and the assigned man received only just enough food and clothing to enable him to work. In a vivid phrase he described the convict's position. "He must engage as a slave in that very sort of labour aversion to which perhaps induced him when free to commit crime." Arthur, who was fond of comparing the transport's fate to slavery, knew what slavery meant, for, as Governor of British Honduras, it had been his duty to suppress a slave revolt.

As for making conditions harsher in the colony, he had anticipated the Government, and had already done all that could be done by "sternest severity," and had carried out Government regulations "so far as was consistent with that degree of forbearance, and that regard to health and strength, which in a civilised country must always receive a necessary degree of attention." We may paraphrase his words and put it "I am prepared to administer torments, but I draw the line at torture." He reminded the Colonial Secretary that "there is a point beyond which it is impossible to carry punishment with any salutary effect," and suggested that seven years in a chain-gang passed this point. "Seven years are, to persons educated and accustomed to live and to reason as convicts do, so long a period as almost to extinguish hope." When hope and fear are extinguished by too severe sufferings, apathy follows, and apathy makes reformation impossible. Nor do such sufferings serve as a deterrent, for the convict if "reduced to a state of torpor . . . will neither complain to his companion nor write to his friends in England." Further he warned the Government that severity and economy were incompatible; the harsher the treatment, the more expensive the supervision required. Privation and misery made men desperate, and instead of withdrawing a company of soldiers, as had been done recently, the Government ought to increase the military force to deal with the increase of burglars and bushrangers. Already the growing number of transports

and the greater severity had made the situation critical, and "additional military force must be promptly afforded or convict discipline must be relaxed." Like Bourke, Arthur laid stress on the divergence between English and Colonial interests, and he appealed to the Home Government not "to involve the transport in such misery as will render him hopeless and callous and ready, whenever the eye of the overseer is withdrawn, to rush through mere recklessness into the commission of outrages upon the peaceable part of the community."

Arthur's despatches throw light on the working of the plan. One band of the special prisoners from the *Moffatt* "exhibited so much feeling and sullenness" when told of their fate that, fearing for the safety of the overseers, he despatched them to a penal settlement instead of a chain-gang. Writing on May 27th, he complained that whereas the original despatch had stated that the men would be sentenced to their special punishment in England, none of the prisoners had heard anything about the matter till they reached Van Diemen's Land. Now the published correspondence between Stanley and Melbourne contains a letter from Melbourne to the judges suggesting that grand juries should be informed of the new arrangements, and that convicts when sentenced should be warned of the "degrees of rigour" to be applied to them. Why had this not been done? The explanation is probably given in the same despatch in which Arthur complains of the omission, for he goes on to say that he had consulted his Attorney-General who, though describing it as a bolder measure than he could advise, to refuse to carry out instructions, gave it as his opinion that to send these men to chain-gangs was not consistent with the Transportation Laws. Working in irons was a distinct punishment, and no part of transportation, nor naturally incident to it. In other words the Government instructions about chain-gangs were illegal. The instructions about penal settlements he regarded as legal, since the Governor already possessed the power of moving a convict to any place he thought fit. The Attorney-General remarked that a new Act of Parliament legalising this use of chain-gangs might be salutary, but in that case what punishment would be left for offences committed in the Colony? Labour in chain-gangs, it must be remembered, was a common sentence for such offences, and could be given by two justices.

This despatch from Arthur, with its serious charge of

illegality, reached London in November 1834. By that time the Whigs were no longer in office. They had been succeeded by a short-lived Tory Ministry under Sir Robert Peel. In that Ministry Lord Aberdeen was made Secretary of State for the Colonies, with the young Gladstone as his under-secretary. To a sensitive and conscientious man like Aberdeen, the whole subject of transportation must have been painful, and what he called Arthur's "just and impressive remarks" about the dangers of over-severity moved him deeply. On February 21st, 1835, he sent an important despatch to Arthur. This despatch announces that Mr. Secretary Goulburn (Home Secretary) has consulted the Law Officers, and that they agree with the opinion of the Attorney-General of Van Diemen's Land that "in passing sentences of transportation the Judges cannot direct a convict to be kept to hard labour in chains." Further, "the Secretary of State has not authority to give such an order." The consequences of this error must be repaired as soon as possible, and all persons confined in chains as a result of orders from England must be released from their chains at once.

"Even if the Law," wrote Lord Aberdeen, "had not forbidden the practice of confining the convicts in chains for seven years from their arrival, and if I could have reconciled myself to the infliction of such a punishment as a general or prevalent practice, I should have doubted whether for the reason which you have suggested, such a measure would not have been found to counteract the very purposes with a view to which it had been adopted. I cannot regret the necessity which prescribes the abandonment of that plan." It is desirable, he added, that the conditions of transportation should be known, but greatly increased severity would not stop crime and would deprive the criminal of all chance of reformation. In a confidential letter of the same date, Aberdeen points out that difficulties may arise from the claims of convicts to compensation for illegal detention in chains, a situation which Arthur will no doubt meet with his "characteristic firmness and discretion," realising, of course, that the ultimate responsibility does not rest with him. Similar letters, *mutatis mutandis*, were sent to Sir Richard Bourke.

Arthur's reply, dated September 17th, 1835, shows how unnecessary were Aberdeen's fears that the convicts might prove litigious. "Immediately after its (the despatch's)

receipt I proceeded in person to the station where the gang was employed, and intimated to them this intention of mercy, which they very joyfully received as a boon, and I may add that I do not apprehend unpleasant consequences from any of the measures that have been employed towards these men." Bourke wrote on July 24th that the 247 convicts concerned had all been released from their irons, and had received the relaxation with gratitude.

Long before these replies were written Aberdeen had left his office, for in April 1835 the Whigs came into power again. Stanley did not return to the Colonial Office—he had indeed left the party—and a change of spirit in that department is shown in a minute on Bourke's letter, written, apparently, by Sir George Grey, Under-Secretary for the Colonies. If we were to send our convicts, he wrote, to another planet, to miserable sufferings, in order to deter others, we should be acting "with about equal reason as in thus creating unprofitable because unknown misery on one side of the globe in order to prevent the perpetration of offences on the other side of it." A Committee to inquire into the question of Transportation was set up in 1835. In its Report of 1838 it condemned the whole system of transportation, and (if they ever saw it), the description of chain-gangs given in that Report must have been curious reading for the two highly civilised and cultured gentlemen who had found in these institutions a panacea for the growth of crime. "They are locked up," wrote the Report of chain-gang prisoners, "from sunset to sunrise in the caravans or boxes used for this description of persons, which hold from twenty to twenty-eight men, but in which the whole number can neither stand upright nor sit down at the same time (except with their legs at right angles to their bodies), and which, in some instances, do not allow more than eighteen inches in width for each individual to lie down upon on the bare boards; they are kept to work under a strict military guard during the day, and liable to suffer flagellation for trifling offences, such as an exhibition of obstinacy, insolence, and the like; being in chains, discipline is more easily preserved amongst them and escape more easily prevented than among the road-parties out of chains. This description of punishment belongs to a barbarous age, and merely tends to increase the desperation of the character of an offender."

BARBARA HAMMOND.

A VOYAGE TO BEYROUT A HUNDRED YEARS AGO.

IN the April of 1835 Alphonse de Lamartine eclipsed his own fame as a poet by the production of a work of brilliant prose. In the *Voyage en Orient* he told the story of a journey on which he had set out two years before. Always masterly in his dealings with publishers, he embarked with a contract in his pocket which he calculated would cover even his fantastic expenses : and he always maintained—though we must allow something for his optimism in financial matters—that his journey in the East cost him nothing. Apart from this truly modern incident, the *Voyage*, which took place but a century ago, seems nearly as remote from all the conditions of present-day travel as the fourteenth-century journey of Marco Polo.

We who live in the era of Thomas Cook and Son, and can at any time take a trip to Palestine with ease and security, must needs view with pity and amazement the cost of Lamartine's preparations, and the small amount of comfort he achieved in spite of his elaborate labour. He chartered a brig with a crew of seventeen hands besides the captain. He took with him six faithful servants—one of them an excellent cook—several of his dogs, and three guests—M. Amédée de Parseval, an old family friend ; M. Capmas, an elderly *savant* ; and a Dutch doctor, who was to look after the health of his delicate little daughter Julia, who, he hoped, would greatly benefit by the dry air and sunshine of the East. He arranged that the vessel, which was to traverse the pirate-infested archipelago, should carry a small armoury, including two cannon. He stocked it with two sheep, crates of live fowls, and a goat to supply milk for the little invalid. And since the mind too must be fed, he despatched from his Burgundian home to Marseilles a case containing five hundred books.

The departure from his house in Mâcon had been fixed for May 25th ; but just when carriages had been packed and goods forwarded to Marseilles, little Julia caught a chill and was alarmingly ill. When, after a week, she was out of danger, her distracted father started alone to Marseilles to confer with M. G. Consul-General of Syria, who rearranged his projected route, gave him valuable counsel, and promised

to serve the travellers as far as was in his power. Lamartine, enjoying the warmth of Provence, which always revitalised him, began really to look forward to the voyage ; but when he beheld the sleeping accommodation of the brig, the "airless, lightless holes worse than prison cells," he regretted ever having planned "to expose his wife and child to such hardships." Finally the largest cabin was made tolerably comfortable for Madame de Lamartine and her child. The captain gave up his own to their two maids ; and in the others, just large enough to hold a hammock and a ship's chest, Lamartine ordered portholes to be pierced.

The ladies and their maids were hospitably received by admirers of the poet in Marseilles : on June 13th they went on board to unpack, and on the 14th early in the morning the *Alceste* set sail. Some twelve hours later she was becalmed in the Bay of Ciotat. The captain's home was near by ; he took his passengers to visit it. Possibly he was loath to recognise a breeze that would waft him far from his young wife : certainly it was not till July 14th, when the Lamartines had been four weeks on board, that their voyage really began.

No chapters of the *Journey to the East* are more interesting than those which describe it. None better exhibit Lamartine's mastery of his new medium, the compelling emotional quality of his prose ; none again—not even those dealing with the adventurous ride of husband and wife to Damascus, or of Lamartine's interview with that strange being Lady Hester Stanhope—give us so strong an impression of remoteness from the life of to-day. The routine of the little party which settles down for a period determined by the accidents of tides, storms and quarantines in a relatively small ship, and provides its own diversions and its own nourishment, is archaic ; but Lamartine invests it not only with glamour, but with inevitability ; so that the reader comes to feel that this is real seafaring, and it is existence on a modern luxury liner which becomes by comparison fantastic and unreal. From the standpoint of a passenger reacting to new sensations and to previously unimagined loveliness and terror Lamartine never departs. His seascapes have a wholly different character from those of naval experts such as Conrad or Pierre Loti. His narrative is exempt from that assumption of nautical knowledge which bores us in many modern travels and romances. How simply, for example, he describes the strange,

new experience of losing sight of land, of finding his horizon formed on every side only by

The unplumbed, salt, estranging sea.

It was reassuring to watch the crew : some stretched upon the spotless planks, some squatting, pipe in mouth, on coils of ropes, some offering wisps of hay to the tethered goat, or giving grain and water to the captive fowls ; all cheerful and unconcerned, glancing carelessly at the foaming waves " as a landsman at a pavement that he has trodden a hundred times." The sun dips into the waves, and from the bridge comes a call : *Messieurs, la prière!* Red caps are doffed : the youngest of the crew chants the *Ave Maria Maris Stella*, and the passengers join in the melancholy cadence of the litany. The poet, still looking at the western sky where the departed sun has left " a bank of golden sand," meditates on the inevitability of prayer, " offspring of man's first sigh and joy," when a cry from his child makes him turn to the east. " A fire on the sea, Papa, a burning ship!" There lies indeed a molten, fiery mass. It rounds quickly to a glowing disk, and a flaming moon emerges from the water. The purple sky becomes spangled with stars : the first watch of the night is called : the sailors who go below salute the captain with the words : " May God be with us " : Lamartine's wife and child and friends retire to their cabins ; he himself lingers on deck far into the night.

Sea and sky are transformed before dawn. A day and a night the brig is buffeted by winds and waves and driven out of her course. She skirts the coast of Africa, and not till July 22nd does she reach Malta. Then the captain is informed that if his crew and passengers wish to land they will be subjected to a quarantine of ten days. The passengers do wish to land. Relying on the fact that Julia as a babe has crossed the Channel to and back from England, the contingency of sea-sickness seems never to have presented itself to the optimistic imagination of her parents. Now the fragile child was so exhausted that they asked themselves whether they had better return and spend the winter on the French or Italian Riviera. But there, too, the quarantine regulations were in force, and surely the worst of the voyage was over. Some nights on land, however, were a necessity for her. Lamartine appealed to the French Consul and he to the

Governor. The port authorities reduced the quarantine to three days.

The halt at Malta proved to be the brightest incident of the voyage. Lamartine's name was better known in Great Britain than it is to-day, and his English wife's relatives were people of an assured position. Sir Frederick Ponsonby, the Governor, went out of his way to show kindness to the charming pair and their fascinating child, " receiving us," as the poet declared, " as old friends rather than as chance travellers." One of Sir Frederick's staff, Mr. Grieg, had scarcely been introduced to them before he offered them his country house as a refuge, while Mrs. Grieg promised to send out extra furniture and every possible comfort for the little invalid. Perhaps these strangers perceived what the parents refused to recognise—that the child's days were numbered. It must have been hard for Marianne de Lamartine, who had just discovered in Malta a congenial English environment, to decline Mrs. Grieg's kind proposal. But to have accepted it would have been to nullify the varied purposes and the long-cherished dreams which had induced her husband to plan and undertake the journey. Another equally unexpected proposal was welcomed with gratitude. Captain Lyons, commanding the frigate *Madagascar*, was returning to the naval base at Nauplia, and offered to escort, and even to tow, the *Alceste* through the pirate-infested Aegean ; and the Lamartines were the more touched by his courtesy since they had not even been introduced to him, he and his crew having been prevented from landing by the quarantine regulations which had been relaxed in their own case.

On August 1st, after a good week's rest, they left Malta with an almost homesick regret. Some twelve leagues from it they found themselves becalmed. The frigate, towering above them, seemed

A painted ship upon a painted ocean.

At night the *Madagascar's* crew organised a concert for the benefit of the passengers of the *Alceste*, and each morning Captain Lyons came on board the brig to inquire after the ladies' health. Not till August 6th did the serrated summits of the mountains of Greece emerge against a lowering sky . . . and Lamartine saw his Julia, fair and sylph-like in her white dress and floating curls, cuddled up against her mother,

listening with her habitual vivacity and intentness to stories of the Greek heroes. Such tales must have seemed to the young traveller scarcely less wonderful than her own experiences; for presently the frigate went off to chase a suspicious vessel, and then a second, seen to be full of men in Albanian dress, approached the *Alceste*. The bandits—if such they were—were quickly intimidated by the captain's threat to open fire on them; and protesting that they were merely peaceful merchants, they made off. The crew and passengers of the brig were, however, greatly relieved when, before nightfall, the guardian frigate returned to their proximity.

Their route had been changed in order that they might benefit by the English escort. Lamartine had intended, if he visited Greece at all, to do so on his return journey. Now he must needs enter the harbour of Nauplia; and once again little Julia's extreme exhaustion made a landing desirable. The party spent five nights in a miserable inn, from the windows of which they constantly witnessed street fighting and scenes of violence. Lamartine's letters to his brother-in-law, Montherot, and to his close friend the Comte Aymon de Virieu, reflect the state of the distressful land and the iniquities of its inhabitants. By sea and land, ruin, devastation, brigandage and conflagration. "A week ago Missolonghi was sacked and taken. This morning there was fighting beneath my windows." "We have a view of Argos and Mycenæ, but it is impossible to go outside the walls: Greece is a scene of desolation, pillage, daily massacres."

In Greece and its condition Lamartine had reason to be particularly interested. Two years previously he had been appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to Greece; but unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately for himself, there was at the moment no Court to which he could be accredited. The king designated by the Powers, Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, had not found the honour thrust upon him to his taste, and one night had quietly slipped out of Paris. Before a more courageous monarch could be discovered, the revolution of 1830 had driven the representative of the elder branch of the Bourbons from the throne of France. Lamartine's scrupulous conscience would not allow him to transfer his services to the younger branch. He would acquiesce in the kingship of Louis Philippe so long as his rule gave a good and secure government to his country: but he at once tendered his

resignation of the post conferred on him by Charles X. Now his adherence to his own code of honour was rewarded. It was assuredly no case of sour grapes which made him view with satisfaction the intense discomfort of the post he had coveted and renounced. He dined with M. Rouen, and found him longing "to get out of this deadly hole."

A visit to Athens did not remove Lamartine's unfavourable impression of Greece and its inhabitants. The modern city, devastated by war, had been rebuilt in a shoddy, higgledy-piggledy fashion: and even the great monuments of its golden age, seen under a grey and lowering sky, failed to evoke his enthusiasm. He was not, like Chateaubriand, an instinctive Hellenist, and the romantic in him, viewing architecture as an aspect of landscape—or as the expression of the soul of a people—found in Greece only "the cerecloth of the dead" in surroundings which lacked warmth and colour. Easily stirred by grandiosity—the vastness of St. Peter's, Rome, the colossal remains of the temples at Baalbek—he found the Acropolis bleak and puny, and though he acknowledged, he did not feel the perfection of the Parthenon. His artistic wife did not share his lack of enthusiasm, and, long after, regretted it to her friend and biographer Charles Alexandre. Possibly Lamartine's powers of appreciation and sense of beauty were dulled by anxiety. The entry for August 5th in the note-book from which he subsequently wrote his *Voyage en Orient* is significant: *Vives inquiétudes pour la santé de ma fille.*

To the Comte Aymon de Virieu, his sometime schoolfellow, the brotherless friend of the brotherless poet, his *alter ego*, his counsellor and critic, he had already acknowledged his consciousness of error in bringing the delicate child with him. Virieu, himself the father of a healthy brood, had blamed him for it. Madame de Cessiat, his eldest sister, mother of the girls who were to be the joy and solace of the poet's later life, had implored him to leave Julia in her keeping. He had been obstinate in his belief—curiously shared by his wife—that a sea voyage would benefit her health: while the father dwelt on the educational value of travel, and had laid to his soul the flattering unction that to his daughter's natural "beauty, innocence, susceptibility to lofty and generous sentiment" he was adding an acquaintance with "the most enchanting and marvellous spots on earth." When, however, before

reaching Stampalia, the *Alceste* "rolled and groaned" tossed by a furious storm, and "I passed a horrible night in tending my child and pacing the deck," the unhappy father wished that a celestial messenger could have wafted Julia to the garden of St. Point, the poet's country home in Burgundy where he usually spent the summer.

The storm abated, and Rhodes appeared "like a bouquet of flowers on the breast of the waves." Two delicious days were spent there; but they were followed by six of slow progress and a heavy ground-swell before the wretched brig found safe harbourage in Cyprus. The French Consul and his wife boarded it at once and warmly invited the Lamartines to stay with them. The poet wrote of "the delight of rest after long navigation, and very friendly hospitality"; but he found the island, which under Venetian rule had been so fruitful, prosperous and productive, barren, disafforested and poverty-stricken under the Turks.

Shortly after leaving Cyprus the *Alceste* was becalmed under a broiling sun. For a week the passengers endured all the tortures of the Ancient Mariner with the exception of the lack of water. But the water was warm; and the scorched decks smoked when sprinkled with it. The faces of the crew ran with sweat after the slightest exertion. The poet and his friends opened books, but had not energy to read them. Little Julia panted and languished. Not till September 4th did a slight breeze carry the *Alceste* a few leagues forward: she made slightly more progress on the 5th. That afternoon the captain pointed out the white peaks of the Lebanon range, seeming, as their flanks were veiled in mist, to float high in the sky. The French escort sailed away: the brig had only to make the harbour of Beyrout. But, lest his passengers should be too hopeful, the captain spoke of the possibility of infinite delay caused by the tricks of winds and currents. Lamartine, sleepless himself, heard with satisfaction through the thin partition the quiet breathing of his child. "To-morrow," he thought, "I too may slumber, feeling secure as to the precious life I have hazarded; and I prayed to God that He would pardon my imprudence; and that He would not punish me for having trusted in Him and asked of Him more than I had any right to ask."

Footsteps on the deck above him! The lap of the waves against the moving brig; the vibration of the vessel as its

anchor found a hold. Lamartine rose and looked through his porthole. He perceived scattered stationary lights; he heard the barking of dogs. The *Alceste* was safe in the port of Beyrout, the "Felix Julia" of Augustan times—a name of happy, of fallaciously happy, augury. It was midnight: none of his companions stirred. He got back into his hammock and fell into a profound slumber. The voyage from Marseilles to Beyrout, scheduled definitely to-day at one week via Alexandria and Jaffa, at a fortnight via the Piræus, Izmir and Rhodes, had taken exactly sixty days.

"The first hours on shore after a long voyage are not unlike convalescence after a long illness," wrote Lamartine from the house of the French agent acting for the Consul who was still absent. It was strange and pleasant to sit languidly on a terrace among perfumed shrubs and to look round on trees and verdure, and down on the brig tossing on the harbour's swell. Next morning Lamartine, always an early riser, set forth at daybreak to look for a habitation which should be a temporary home, the starting-point of longer or shorter expeditions, and a winter resting-place for the child who seemed to have revived already, "like a flower planted in congenial soil." On high ground, at ten minutes' distance from the town, he found a group of five Arab houses each containing a ground-floor kitchen, an upper sleeping-room and the flat roof which served as a parlour on hot summer evenings and sunny winter noons. Arab carpenters were at once set to work to connect the little houses by means of wooden galleries. Floors and divans were spread with cheaply purchased Egyptian mats and Damascene carpets; native cooking utensils and pottery were purchased; books and personal possessions were landed from the brig. In a few days the party had settled down in an unconventional but comfortable dwelling, in which they received calls from the Egyptian Governor and all the leading European colonists. Never and nowhere, Lamartine afterwards declared, did he and his wife experience a more cordial welcome, or enjoy more open-hearted hospitality than at Beyrout.

The *Alceste* was dismissed for a year. When it re-entered the Beyrout harbour in the spring of 1833 it took on board only a little coffin. Lamartine wished to spare his childless wife the anguish of retracing the stages by which she had journeyed out with anxiety, but with hope. The bereaved

parents actually endured more perils on their voyage to Constantinople than those they had experienced on the brig; and the caravan journey overland from Constantinople to Vienna nearly cost Lamartine his life.

They had been but a few days in one of their homes in the Mâconnais before Lamartine departed suddenly, and without telling his wife the reason of his absence. Once again he posted to Marseilles, once again went on board the *Alceste*. He returned with all that was mortal of his child, and with his own hands laid the little coffin in the vault built into the Park wall of St. Point. Next day he told his wife that Julia had come home and lay beside his own adored mother, who had not only dearly loved her grandchild but who by her stores of the Land and the Book had first kindled in his own young mind a glowing and inextinguishable desire for *Un Voyage en Orient*.

L. M. RAGG.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ROUNDAABOUT TO STRESA.

NOT for the first, nor probably for the last, time in post-war European diplomacy the leading politicians have been seeking each other out and earnestly discussing how they may avoid making war upon each other. One of their effects has been to excite a nervous feeling on the stock exchanges. It has been a common ground of fear outside of Germany that March 16th might make all the difference to the work in hand; that Germany's formal repudiation of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles might imply the final break-up of the Versailles system, including the League of Nations; and the fact cannot be denied that Germany has now become potentially, if not actually, the strongest military power in Europe. The spectacular journeys of Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden in Europe created an impression in many minds that a last desperate attempt was being made to postpone the next war. When one comes to think of it, the main purpose of high diplomacy at any time is to postpone the next war. The interesting and rather confusing thing is that high diplomacy creates the very danger it tries to dodge.

To those, and they are many, who have forgotten everything that happened in Europe before March 16th, 1935, it would none the less be comforting to remember the comparable and almost innumerable crises that have afflicted European diplomacy since 1918. No doubt January 11th, 1923, when the French marched into the Ruhr, was the less alarming because Germany in one sense and in some degree was at that time disarmed. No doubt the preliminaries to the Locarno Conference of 1925 were protected from panic by the same circumstance. But October 14th, 1933, when Herr Hitler's men walked out of Geneva and turned their backs upon the Disarmament Conference; July 25th, 1934, when Herr Dollfuss was murdered; October 9th, 1934, when M. Barthou and King Alexander were murdered: all those occasions were as essentially disturbing in kind, if not quite in degree, as was March 16th, 1935. In point of vigour and bustle the few days that preceded the grant of "equality" to Germany on December 11th, 1932, were as dramatic as the

few recent weeks of the Simon-Eden visits to the European capitals. It is necessary to preserve the perspective of these many events if one is to preserve one's sanity in face of the egregious things that are performed in the name of peace and security by the politicians who practise diplomacy. It is arguable that the fresh, earnest people who devour *Mein Kampf* with increasing indignation are a greater danger to peace and security than the lazy cynics who take such rubbish for granted. If the world were ruled by cynics, there would be no war. It was Lord Brentford, than whom no more sincere or excellent man ever breathed, who raided Arcos in the summer of 1927: and eight years later the whirligig of time sends Mr. Eden to Moscow in a chaste and almost suppliant spirit. Cynicism is perhaps the wrong word. A better would be restraint, or self-control, a refusal to be "drawn," or to be surprised at anything: in short, the quality described by the classic Greek word σωφροσύνη, a quality which happens perversely enough to be wholly foreign to the modern Greek temperament.

In the present instance the order of events has followed a pattern which hardly can surprise any student of European affairs. It had been common knowledge ever since Herr Hitler entered the Chancellor's office in the Wilhelmstrasse at the beginning of 1933 that he and his boon companions were bent upon showing the world how alarming Germany could be. It has been known for two years that Germany had defied the Treaty of Versailles and was rearming. After Germany had finally quitted Geneva (October 14th, 1933), and after the subsequent attempts made by Anglo-French diplomacy to bring her back to the disarmament discussions had finally broken down (April 17th, 1934), German policy, it could hardly be denied, was launched upon a course of isolated defiance. The attempt upon Austria last summer plunged Europe into five months of panic. The tension was relieved by the conclusion of the Rome Pact (January 7th, 1935), which, it was hoped, might become the precursor to a general system of security in Europe, especially as the harmless passing of the Saar plebiscite (January 13th, 1935) might suggest, even to such minds as Herr Hitler's and General Göring's, that there was something to be said for Germany's trying to attain her ends by fair, rather than by other means.

In January of this year, therefore, the atmosphere had

greatly improved. M. Flandin and M. Laval came to London to see if the combined statesmanship of Paris and London could not take advantage of that better atmosphere to ensure the peace of Europe. On February 3rd they issued their now famous joint proposal. The central idea they conceived was "that the encouraging progress thus achieved [i.e. by the pacific event of the Saar plebiscite under League of Nations management] may now be continued by means of the direct and effective co-operation of Germany." It was none the less obvious to London and to Paris as well as to Rome and to Moscow that Berlin was not yet disposed to co-operate in constructive diplomacy. Germany's answer to the proposal of February 3rd was delivered to the British and French Ambassadors on February 14th, and published the day after. Now the proposal itself had been that a joint conference be held of all the parties concerned. In her answer, Germany said that she "would be glad if" the British Government "were, to begin with, ready to enter into a direct exchange of views with the German Government." The German suggestion was that as the British Government had conferred with the French Government, it should now confer with the German Government. That rejoinder looked both simple and logical; but in its effect, accidental or intentional, it was mischievous.

Consultations at once took place between Paris and London on the question whether the German answer was indeed any answer at all to the invitation given. The British Government, by virtue of its abiding principle that for the sake of peace in Europe Great Britain must run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, decided that Germany had been actuated by the best of motives, and Sir John Simon was instructed to visit Berlin. Thereupon M. Corbin visited the British Foreign Office daily (February 17th to 23rd) with a view to extracting from the British Government a promise that when Sir John went to Berlin he would refuse to be drawn into any sectional discussion of the February 3rd proposal, and would refuse to discuss it except as an integral whole. The promise was duly given. It was thereupon arranged that Sir John should fly to Berlin on March 7th and fly back to London on March 10th. Next, the British Government was constrained to consider the question of British armed strength in relation to the generally increased and

increasing strength of other countries; and it decided that the British forces also must be increased. The tactical question arose whether that announcement should be made before or after Sir John's visit to Berlin. If before, it might damage the chance of success in Berlin. If after, it might damage any success that might have been achieved. It was decided to publish the document before the visit took place. It was therefore published on March 4th (Cmd. 4827. See *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, April 1935, pp. 490-1). The immediate result was that the prospect of Sir John's visit was not only blurred, but obliterated. Herr Hitler pleaded a cold, and the visit was cancelled.

On March 9th Mr. Maisky, Russian Ambassador in London, who hardly concealed the stoicism with which he learned of the British difficulty with Germany, went to the Foreign Office and delivered a formal invitation for Mr. Eden to visit Moscow. It was Mr. Eden who was invited, because the hint had been conveyed to Kensington Palace Gardens that Sir John could not himself spare the time for both Berlin and Moscow. Also on March 9th (for the diplomatic expedient of a cold in the head obviously could not serve any protracted purpose) Baron von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, informed Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador in Berlin, that after a fortnight's cure Herr Hitler would be glad to receive Sir John in Berlin.

The next step in that nervous episode of European diplomacy was taken on March 15th, when M. Flandin's Government announced to the Deputies and to the Senate in Paris that measures would forthwith be taken to restore the balance of the French armed forces which had been destroyed by the fallen birth-rate. It was not an increase in armed strength he foreshadowed. He announced that the deficiency of recruits after the expiry of the current year would be made good by an extension of the period of service for those who were to be called to the colours in April: an extension namely from twelve to eighteen months, to be followed in the case of subsequent classes, those called to the colours up to the end of 1939, by a further extension to two years. The effect of that policy would be, not to increase French strength, but to maintain the total of effectives at the existing figure of 400,000. As Germany's effectives were already nearly 600,000 (including the 200,000 of armed military police), and

as the French population of 40,000,000 contrasted with the German population of 70,000,000, there was little reason for alarm in Berlin. There was more reason for alarm in Paris.

Reason, however, plays little part in high diplomacy. On the very next day, March 16th, the German Government issued its famous challenge. It took the form of a proclamation repudiating the military part of the Treaty of Versailles, instituting immediate compulsory military service, and increasing the regular army to thirty-six divisions, say 550,000 men. So great was the immediate panic created in London that an emergency meeting of Ministers was called for the following morning (Sunday, March 17th). The cause of the panic was that if Germany maintained her claim, a general agreement about armaments limitation in the sense of the Anglo-French proposal of February 3rd would be impossible, because Germany's claim was not for equality but for substantial superiority. It was known that the German "peace" army was already some 400,000 strong, which figure contrasted with 135,000 in October 1933, when Germany left the Disarmament Conference.

The panic spread through Europe. For four days and nights the telephone and telegraph lines throughout Europe were almost uninterruptedly in use. One of the embassies in London, for example, received 160 long telegrams, mostly in double cipher, in those few days: an average of two an hour day and night. The real implication of the German proclamation was promptly diagnosed to be its provision of trained reserves, a matter which had been one of the great difficulties of the Disarmament Conference. Including the trained, armed police, Germany would have a "peace" army of at least 600,000, contrasting, for example, with the French 400,000, the Russian 960,000, the British 93,000; but Germany's potential "war" strength, including the trained reserves to be yielded under a system of conscription, was vastly greater. British Ministers, recalled overnight to London, met on March 17th. French Ministers met in Paris on that same morning and at once transmitted their views to London, for verbal communication to the British Government.

The French Government, first, requested to be informed what view the British Government took of the German proclamation; second, suggested that a protest be at once sent to Berlin; third, suggested that Great Britain, Italy

and France should at once consult together by virtue of the Rome Pact and the Anglo-French proposal of February 3rd; and fourth, submitted that the original basis of Sir John Simon's visit to Berlin (which had now been fixed for March 24th) had been shattered. France did not suggest, however, that the visit be abandoned. Those French views were communicated orally in the morning of March 17th. At the request of the Foreign Office they were put into writing and delivered at 3 p.m. on that day. On the following day (March 18th) M. Corbin, the French Ambassador (who had left London for Paris on March 16th in ignorance of what was impending in Berlin, but took the first train back to London on March 17th), went to see Sir Robert Vansittart at the Foreign Office with a view to further explaining the French feeling and to eliciting information on the British feeling.

That same afternoon it was made known, to the complete surprise of French quarters, that a British Note had been sent to Berlin, had been delivered, and had been answered. Without even waiting to hear the content of that Note, the whole of France exploded into indignation on the triple ground that France had neither been consulted nor informed, nor had her observations of the day before been answered. What in fact the British Note did was to protest against Germany's unilateral repudiation of the Treaty, and to demand whether the German Government still wished Sir John Simon to visit Berlin for the original purpose. To that question Germany at once answered yes.

March 19th dawned upon an unpleasant scene. On that day Signor Mussolini telephoned to Signor Grandi, the Italian Ambassador in London, and instructed him to protest against the British Government's isolated action and to suggest that a Franco-British-Italian consultation take place in Italy before Sir John Simon went to Berlin. The French Government at once seconded that request. The British Cabinet, disturbed by the storm it had provoked in Rome and in Paris, met in the afternoon of that day and decided that, although a consultation in Italy could not be arranged before Sir John Simon went to Berlin, Mr. Eden would go to Paris on March 23rd, if Signor Mussolini for his part would send Signor Suvich, the Italian Foreign Minister, so that the three-Power consultation could be effected in that

way on the eve of Sir John's visit to Berlin. At precisely midnight of March 19th-20th that suggestion was approved by Rome and by Paris, on the condition, accepted by London, that the Berlin visit be followed by a meeting between Sir John Simon, M. Laval and Signor Mussolini in Northern Italy. On March 20th the storm over London, Paris and Rome began to abate. On that day France sent a Note of protest to Berlin; reported Germany's action to the League of Nations as a threat to the general peace; and hastened to accept a standing invitation from the Russian Government that M. Laval should visit Moscow.

One of the consequences of what had taken place between Berlin, London, Paris and Rome was a great accession of importance to Russia's diplomacy. Mr. Maisky visited the Foreign Office in London on March 19th and March 22nd to explain that the Russian Government, as well as the French and Italian, had been incensed by what it regarded as the British Government's hasty and isolated action of March 18th. French opinion was by now openly canvassing the feasibility of an immediate Franco-Russian alliance.

The storm had been produced only by Great Britain's failure to consult her diplomatic friends before sending her Note to Berlin. There was no complaint about the substance of that Note. On March 23rd, when Mr. Eden, Signor Suvich and M. Laval duly met for consultation in Paris, it was decided that the meeting to be held in Northern Italy after Sir John Simon had been to Berlin should be held at Stresa. On the following morning (March 24th) Mr. Eden flew from Paris to Amsterdam, and Sir John Simon flew to the same place from Croydon. They completed the journey together by air to Berlin.

Two days, March 25th and 26th, were taken up by Herr Hitler's exposition of his policy. At a later date (April 9th) Sir John Simon reported to the House of Commons exactly what Herr Hitler had said.

Herr Hitler (he said) made it plain that Germany was not prepared to sign an Eastern Pact under which Germany would be bound to mutual assistance. In particular, Germany was not prepared to enter into a pact of mutual assistance between herself and Russia. On the other hand, Germany was stated to be in favour of a non-aggression pact between Powers interested in East European questions, together with provisions for consultation

if aggression was threatened. Herr Hitler was not prepared, in present conditions, to contemplate the inclusion of Lithuania in any pact of non-aggression. The Germans also suggested that if, in spite of this pact of non-aggression and consultation, hostilities should break out between any two contracting Powers, the other contracting Powers should engage not to support the aggressor in any way. In another connection, however, Herr Hitler dwelt on the difficulty of identifying the aggressor. Asked as to his views if some of the other parties entered into an agreement of mutual assistance as among themselves, Herr Hitler stated that he considered this idea was dangerous and objectionable, as in his opinion it would tend to create special interests in a group within the wider system.

On March 27th Sir John Simon returned to London by air and Mr. Eden left by train for Moscow, where he arrived on the following morning. Mr. Eden spent three days, March 28th to 30th, conversing with Mr. Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Litvinov. He left Moscow just before midnight on March 31st, arrived in Warsaw at midday on April 1st, conversed with Marshal Pilsudski and Colonel Beck till the afternoon of April 3rd, arrived in Prague on the morning of April 4th, and after a long conversation with Dr. Benesh left by air in an attempt to reach London that same night. A hundred miles of snow squalls, severe air sickness, the bursting of a small blood vessel, and the prospect of worse weather ahead, forced him down at Cologne, where he spent the night. He finished the journey on April 5th by train and boat, and retired to bed with phlebitis.

The diplomatic result of his talks in Moscow, Warsaw and Prague was summarised by Sir John Simon, in the speech already referred to (April 9th), in these words :

In Moscow the Lord Privy Seal learned that the Soviet Government considered that the present international situation made it more than ever necessary to pursue the endeavour to promote the building up of a security system in Europe as contemplated in the London *communiqué* and in conformity with the principles of the League. The Soviet Government emphasised that in its view the proposed Eastern Pact did not aim at the isolation or encirclement of any State, but at the creation of equal security for all participants, and they felt that the participation of both Germany and Poland in the Pact would afford the best solution of the problem.

In Warsaw, the Lord Privy Seal learned the view of the Polish Government on this question. Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign

Minister, explained that Poland had, by her existing agreements with the Soviet Union on the one hand and with Germany on the other, established tranquil conditions upon her two frontiers, and the question Poland was bound to ask herself was whether any new proposals would improve or trouble the good atmosphere established by those two agreements. What I have said will give the House some insight into the general attitude of the three Governments named towards the Eastern Pact, and the subject was also briefly reviewed in the short interview which the Lord Privy Seal had with M. Benesh at Prague.

Sir John completed his résumé of the material that had been collected during the European visits in this way :

As regards the idea of a Central European Pact which was more particularly a topic of the Franco-Italian meeting at Rome, we understood in Berlin that the German Government did not reject the idea of such an arrangement on grounds of principle, but did not see its necessity and saw great difficulty in defining "non-interference" in relation to Austria. Herr Hitler intimated, however, that if the other Governments who should wish to conclude a Central European Pact could agree upon a text, the German Government would consider it.

In Warsaw, Mr. Beck told my right hon. friend that Poland was prepared to adopt a friendly attitude to a Central European Pact and considered that the proposed arrangement might lead to appeasement and to the growth of confidence in that region. Mr. Benesh, in Prague, expressed the hope that further progress might be made on this subject at Stresa.

In regard to land armaments, Herr Hitler stated that Germany required thirty-six divisions, representing a maximum of 550,000 soldiers of all arms, including a division of the S.S. and militarised police troops. He asserted that there were no para-military formations in Germany. Germany, he said, claimed to possess all types of arms possessed by other countries, and was not prepared to refrain from constructing certain types until other countries ceased to possess them. If other countries would abandon certain types, Germany, he said, would do the same.

As regards naval armaments, Germany claimed, with certain reserves, thirty-five per cent. of British tonnage ; and in the air, parity between Great Britain, France and Germany, provided that the development of the Soviet Air Force was not such that the revision of these figures would become necessary. If any general agreement as to arms limitation could be reached, Germany would be prepared to accept and work a system of permanent and automatic supervision, on the understanding that such

supervision applied to all Powers equally. Herr Hitler said that the German Government favoured the suggestion contained in the London *communiqué* of an air pact between the Locarno Powers.

On the subject of the League of Nations, Herr Hitler referred to the assertion he had made in May 1933, that Germany would not continue to participate in the League of Nations if she was to remain what he described as a country of inferior right, and alleged, by way of example, that she was in a position of inferiority if she had no colonies.

I have confined myself to an account of what was said by others ; but it must not be supposed that British Ministers did not indicate strong disagreement on certain points, and, indeed, at the end of the Berlin interviews, I expressed our disappointment at the difficulties disclosed in the way of agreement.

There were, of course, other observations on the different topics, but I have endeavoured to communicate to the House with complete fairness and candour the salient matters ascertained in this series of visits. It will be understood that my statement is purely objective, and in view of the fact that comments of leading newspapers in this country are sometimes supposed on the Continent to represent Government opinion, it is desirable to state that His Majesty's Government, faithful to the assurance that they would take part at Stresa without previously reaching definite conclusions, have not yet formulated their attitude to these interviews, and I trust that opinion abroad will await the official utterance of the Government before drawing inferences from any unauthorised comments and pronouncements.

The meeting at Stresa had been fixed for April 11th. On April 8th the British Cabinet held two sessions in preparation for that conference. The knowledge that Mr. Eden would not be able to go to Stresa no doubt partly influenced the Cabinet in its decision, announced on April 8th, that Mr. MacDonald would go. That decision automatically decided M. Flandin in the like sense, and Stresa became a Prime Ministers' as well as a Foreign Ministers' conference. It was on the day following the Cabinet meetings that Sir John Simon made his statement in the House of Commons. Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Rome and Paris alike were waiting for what they all diagnosed would be the decisive disclosure of British policy. It was difficult for them to imagine how a European system of collective security could be realised unless Great Britain were a party to it, unless, that is, Great Britain were willing to abandon her traditional policy of refusing European

commitments. Sir John made no disclosure of British policy, whence it was deduced in the capitals aforesaid that there was no British policy at all, despite the clear effect of Sir John's speech, perhaps not wholly intentional, of emphasising the fact that Germany was probably the strongest military Power in Europe ; that she had offered nothing to collective security ; but had demanded everything she could think of for her own isolated strength : thirty-six divisions on land, air parity with France or Russia whichever be the stronger, thirty-five per cent. of British naval tonnage, and colonies *passim*.

The Stresa Conference began on April 11th. On April 12th a mild form of excitement was created by a statement published generally in the London newspapers, on the innocent, unofficial and apparently misunderstood authority of the Minister who was, or ought to have been, immersed in the preparation of his impending Budget speech, to the effect that Great Britain would make no commitments at Stresa. That statement was hotly repudiated by the spokesman of the British delegation at Stresa. That same day Sir John Simon telephoned to Berlin and obtained some slight modification of what Herr Hitler had said to him on March 25th and 26th.

The main result of the Conference was that the discussions were to be continued in Geneva and in Rome. By that criterion the Conference was a success. So long as the politicians talk, the guns are silent. It was agreed that at the meeting of the League Council to be held in Geneva on April 15th a resolution, drafted in the meantime by the Secretariat, should be considered which would condemn Germany's unilateral violation of the Treaty of Versailles, and set up a committee to report on future sanctions of an immediate and automatic kind to be taken against any further such violations. It was at least conceivable that the germ of the collective system of security might be found in that committee's report. If that hope be fulfilled, there will be a lever for inducing Germany to take her part in the system. For something was done at Stresa to help in the realisation both of the Eastern and the Danubian Pacts. The latter was to be discussed in Rome. The former was given a fillip by the advance in German policy reported to Sir John Simon on April 12th.

When Sir John Simon went to Berlin, Germany rejected the Eastern Pact, even with the arrangement for mutual assistance embodied in an optional clause, for the reason that it would be "dangerous." Germany now said that, albeit reluctantly, she would accept the Eastern Pact, if the scheme of mutual assistance were embodied in a separate document. In other words, Germany would accept the obligation of non-aggression and non-assistance to an aggressor. But the separate document for mutual assistance would enable France, Russia, the Little Entente countries, and perhaps also the Baltic countries, to conclude a multi-lateral treaty, both of non-aggression and of mutual assistance. Of the five points which constituted the Anglo-French proposal of February 3rd, three (namely the Eastern Pact, the Danubian Pact and the Air Pact) were brought at Stresa a little nearer to realisation. While no progress was made on the other two (namely the Arms Convention and Germany's return to the League), the Stresa Conference created the opportunity, which in London was regarded as potentially important, of reminding Germany of the declaration of December 11th, 1932. By that declaration, Germany was offered equality of status within a system of security. Germany had achieved equality and more. The further diplomacy projected for Geneva and Rome would enable the other Powers to apply some little encouragement to Germany to take her part in the collective system. The Conference ended on April 14th, with a long official statement of which the main purport is summarised above.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

April 15th, 1935.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE REIGN OF GEORGE V.*

Readers of Mr. Somervell's earlier writings will expect a competent and balanced account of whatever historical period he selects, and his latest volume will not disappoint them. His study of the King's reign is no hasty sketch designed exclusively for the Jubilee market. He has worked at his theme for years, maturing and revising his judgments as he goes. His sub-title is "An English Chronicle," and we read in the Preface that he does not look farther afield than an English standpoint seemed to require. A second voluntary limitation is the virtual exclusion of the non-political aspects of the time. There is indeed a chapter on the attempted revision of the Prayer Book, but it is only included because of the Parliamentary debates to which it gave rise. Mr. Somervell is quite right to explain exactly what he provides. For a survey of the intellectual life of our people during the last twenty-five years, for an analysis of the immense changes in the world of thought, for a picture of the new tendencies in manners and morals, we must look elsewhere.

The book is written in a straightforward style and aims at a wide public. There are no purple patches, few attempts at philosophical generalisation, no forcing of the note. The author may be regarded as a fairly typical Englishman in his steadiness, his tolerance, his distaste for extremes. He may be

* D. C. Somervell. *The Reign of King George the Fifth*. Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.
VOL. CXLVII.

described either as a conservative Liberal or a liberal Conservative, for he never strays far from the middle of the road. The crudities of Labour and the extravagances of the Diehards are equally distasteful to a man who speaks of Mr. Baldwin with greater warmth than of anyone else. To readers who know the period well the most interesting feature of the book is the series of verdicts on the leading performers in the play. He is sufficiently detached to combine praise and blame with entire disregard of party labels. Thus he admires the solidity of Asquith, the drive of Mr. Lloyd George, the resourcefulness of Mr. Churchill, the Parliamentary skill of Bonar Law, the philosophic elevation of Balfour's later years, though fully aware in each case of their failings and mistakes. Mr. MacDonald reminds him strongly of Gladstone in his exuberant eloquence and moral fervour; and though he does not think much of him as a Prime Minister, he recognises that he had the makings of a great Foreign Secretary.

Of the King himself, whose spirit broods over the book, we hear little, and it is right that it should be so. For it is his duty to be rather than to do, to play a passive role with dignity and tact, to carry out his constitutional duties in such a way as to strengthen the foundations of ordered liberty, to embody the unity and continuity of the national life, to hold the empire together by sterling human qualities. "Some men live in history as the authors of a single outstanding achievement; others build perhaps a safer and a steadier reputation upon a thousand unostentatious actions. It is high up in the second of these classes that King George will find his place." That is well and truly said, and he would desire no higher tribute. The last flatterer of royalty in England was Disraeli. Happily it is not our way. King George lacks the showy qualities of his father and the impressive personality of his grandmother. But he has grown steadily with advancing years, and there are few Englishmen who would care to exchange our system of constitutional monarchy for any of the rival régimes now in fashion.

The book is divided into five parts—the hectic years before the war, the great catastrophe, the first period of recovery, the convalescence of the Baldwin era, and the relapse beginning with the American slump in 1929. The critical reader will detect a few mistakes of fact, such as the statements that Lord Tweedmouth's resignation of the

Admiralty in 1908 was due to the Kaiser's private letter; that Count Metternich was recalled because he had not warned his Government at the time of the Agadir crisis that Mr. Lloyd George had changed his mind; that Abdul Hamid was deposed in 1908; that Greece, Serbia and Roumania attacked Bulgaria in 1913; that Clemenceau was refused the Presidency of the French Republic because he had not achieved for his country an impossible security; that Poincaré occupied the Ruhr in the autumn of 1922; that in 1933 the Nazis secured a bare majority over all other parties. Such trifling errors, however, do little to diminish the value of a thoroughly honest piece of work.

G. P. G.

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METHODISM AND POLITICS.*

In his book on *Methodism and Politics* Mr. E. R. Taylor traces the history of the Methodist Movement from the death of John Wesley, in 1791, to the disastrous year 1851, when the gravest controversy in its history reached its height, and a great secession took place. In his Preface Mr. Taylor rightly says that "No one has, as yet, attempted to find reasons for those alliances between Dissenter and Whig, and between Anglican and Tory, which have played so important a part in the history of English politics," and states his opinion that "Methodism, with its connections with both Church and Dissent, and with its political attachments to both parties, may be the body best fitted to reward such an investigation." The volume throws valuable light upon this important, though limited, subject, but it does more. It is a carefully documented and well-balanced account of the lamentable but inevitable controversies—of which the gravest arose in 1849—that disfigured the greatest English religious movement of modern times during the first half of the nineteenth century. All the controversies which led to the establishment of separate Methodist denominations throughout that period turned in one way or another on the conflict between authority and freedom. Wesley organised his great movement for unceasing evangelistic advance throughout the country and for the consolidation of its results. His marvellous genius and

* *Methodism and Politics, 1791-1851*. By E. R. Taylor. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d. net.

tireless energy enabled him to exercise a supreme authority, which was paternal in its wisdom and gentleness, not only over the entire movement but over its local organisations and even its individual members. After his death the Conference became supreme, and sought to exercise his authority without his genius. On the other hand, the essential features of Methodism—its teaching, its spiritual fellowship and its lay activities—were instinct with the sentiments and principles of freedom. Hence these principles, working in the largest and most aggressive Nonconformist body of the time, powerfully influenced the advent of democracy. They gave to English democracy a spiritual inspiration, while they drew from it an increasingly political bent. Hence the claims of freedom, both ministerial and lay, led to successive outbreaks against the rigid authoritarian control of the Conference, which was exclusively ministerial, and of the Superintendents, who were often autocratic. Hence the rise of Primitive Methodism, the Methodist New Connexion, and other minor denominations, which culminated in the bitter strife of 1849 that led to the greatest secession of all—that of the United Methodist Free Church. This story is told, and its implications are exhibited, in a masterly way by Mr. Taylor. It is well that the subject should have been thus explored. Happily, however, all this has become past history, for the Reunion of Methodism, consummated in 1932, has been effected by means of a Constitution which brings into complete harmony such central authority in the Conference, the Synods, and the Circuits as is necessary to effective organisation, while embodying all the essential principles of freedom for which dissentient Methodists had contended a century ago. The possibility of this satisfactory solution was brought about by the liberal transformation of Wesleyan Methodism during the last half-century, and by the recognition of the rightful claims of ecclesiastical authority which matured experience had brought to the lesser Methodist denominations. Mr. Taylor's book is valuable not only for Methodists, but for all who are concerned with the outstanding problems of ecclesiastical organisation. The careful research, the equitable judgment, and the lucid exposition of the author well entitled his work to the Thirlwall and Gladstone Prize at Cambridge, which was awarded to it in 1933.

J. S. L.

THE GREAT TUDORS.*

"Infinite riches in a little room." The famous line of Marlowe, one of the forty representative figures here selected, aptly describes this book as a whole, and its separate essays; a wealth of compressed knowledge underlies the vivid and discriminating portrayal of each personality. It is doubtful if any other period than the Tudor could supply so varied a galaxy of great names—sovereigns, statesmen, martyrs, churchmen, poets, scholars, courtiers, admirals, merchant adventurers—overtopping them all, the one who, while typically of that age, is still more "for all time." Like a golden thread through many of these pages runs some reference to his plays. The name of Erasmus is another link uniting several essays, those on the group of humanists. An able Introduction by the Editor sketches in the background and discusses the choice of figures. "Various characters," she notes, "appear again and again in more than one essay, and they do not, as they would not in life, always appear in the same light."

The floodlight of critical research, and also of popularisation, has of late been directed on certain dominant Tudor figures; in some instances, popular judgment has been educated beyond what a writer here calls the "Little Arthur" view of history. The attraction that the Tudor age has for our own is explained by Professor A. F. Pollard as an innocuous form of the spirit of nationalism that elsewhere becomes fascism. His account of Henry VIII's dealings with Parliament is one of the weightiest contributions to the book; he vindicates the King's statesmanship, whose "understanding of English mentality and of European politics was profound." The pivotal essays on the English sovereigns are supplemented by Miss Marjorie Bowen's realistic, but not harsh, handling of the much-debated story of the Queen of Scots, who, we are reminded, was "Tudor as well as Guise." We could have spared the fanatical John Knox to make room for Byrd, to whose omission the Editor refers with regret.

Among the great churchmen, the balance is fairly held between champions of the old and the reformed faith; Pole

* *The Great Tudors*. Edited by Katharine Garvin. Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1935. 10s. 6d.

and Latimer both find a place; the canonisation this year of More and Fisher lends topical interest to the essays upon them. More is described as "the last great hero of medieval England"; Fisher, the deeply spiritual prelate, is contrasted with the worldly Wolsey. Both rank with Colet among educational benefactors. The recognition of the saintliness of the Jesuit, Campion, is an act of justice overdue. Cranmer is treated with special sympathy and discernment; lovable, devout, a loyal subject, but no theologian, "the extraordinary fluidity of his theological opinions" throughout his career would seem to be largely responsible for that final vacillation, so nobly redeemed. To him, the English Church owed her Prayerbook, to Tindale's indomitable perseverance in the perilous task of translation, her open Bible; to those typical Anglicans, Parker and Hooker, her continuity, her skilful steering in the fairway between Rome and Geneva. All of which is admirably set forth here.

In contrast to the brilliant figures of Essex and Raleigh, of the dashing navigators and sea-fighters, Drake and his compeers (who, as our authors admit, often crossed the thin line then dividing legitimate sea-warfare from piracy), stand the sober statesmen, Cecil Lord Burghley and Walsingham, who spent themselves in the service of England and her Queen. Of Cecil in particular Mr. Belloc says: "He is the chief creator of all that is to-day called 'England.'" With them may be named Sir Thomas Gresham, pioneer in State finance, and (the period being slightly extended to include him) Francis Bacon. Perhaps the most attractive figure of the forty (unless it be Sir Thomas More) is the poet, courtier and pattern of chivalry, Sir Philip Sidney: easily the most odious is Thomas Cromwell. Of others, Peter Wentworth, says the Editor, "shows the importance of Parliamentary development"; Robert Kett, the idealist Norfolk landowner, who identified himself with the grievances of his peasant neighbours, and led a revolt for which he paid with his life, was included, though perhaps hardly "great," as typical of the more tragic side of country life of the day; Sir Nigel Playfair's paper on Burbage throws light on the Elizabethan stage. It is impossible to mention all the essays, but enough has, we hope, been said to give some idea of the importance and many-sided interest of this compendium.

E. G. S.

METAPHYSICS AND THE SCIENTISTS.*

Sir Arthur Eddington has written another "popular" book after several years' silence. The present work is not a rediscussion of the material contained in previous works, but is concerned with recent developments: and as the author does not like repeating himself, those readers who are approaching Eddington for the first time are best advised to attack his earlier works (that wholly admirable exposition of the Relativity Theory, *Space Time and Gravitation*, and the work on *The Nature of the Physical World*) before attempting the present volume. *New Pathways in Science* is divided naturally into three parts. The first deals with Indeterminacy and the New Physics; the second with Astronomy and the Expanding Universe; and the last with Sir Arthur's own work, in which he links together the greatest and the most minute things in Nature—the expansion of the Universe and the electron. In writing a popular book, Sir Arthur does not come down to a childish level; on the contrary, he treats his public with considerable respect, and makes certain intellectual demands on the reader. Nevertheless, Sir Arthur's style is fluent, and sparkling with wit. Only a careful reader who insists on grasping every concept will feel that any demand is being made on him.

The bearing of the Indeterminacy of the New Physics on our philosophical outlook interests Eddington very deeply. He is concerned ultimately with the question of human free will, and he seems to believe that the nineteenth-century physics excluded the possibility of human free will. Laplace imagined a super-mathematician who knew the position and motion of every particle in the universe at a certain instant. Let us suppose that his knowledge refers to 1800, January 1st, at 0 hours G.M.T. precisely. Laplace supposed that his mathematician could predict from pure physics the subsequent motion of every particle in the universe, including, for example, the molecules in Mr. Gladstone's tongue: so that what Mr. Gladstone said in 1877 could have been predicted in 1800. But according to the New Physics it is not merely impracticable but essentially impossible to know both the position and the movement of an electron. Hence a loop-hole

* *New Pathways in Science*. By Sir Arthur Eddington. Cambridge: The University Press. Pp. x + 333. 10s. 6d.

for those who are perturbed by Laplace's mathematician. Eddington realises the two difficulties in the path of his attainment of a physical explanation of free will. One is physical. It is an obvious fact of physics that whether one can know the position and velocity of an electron or not, one can determine these quantities with great accuracy for any aggregation of particles large enough to affect the human body. The other difficulty is the psychological theory of Behaviourism, to which, as an obstacle, Eddington does less than justice in the present book. Pushed into a corner by Boswell's exposition of Behaviourism (though it was not called by that name in those days), Dr. Johnson's best defence of free will was this: "All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it." Eddington wishes to exonerate physics from forming a part of the theory contrary to experience.

Indeterminacy as a physical theory has many adherents among the most respectable theoretical physicists, but there are still some to whom it is not acceptable as an ideal explanation of laboratory physics, which is, *pace* Sir Arthur, so essentially determinate. Sir Arthur has to arraign a somewhat oddly assorted trio of giants in the world of physics who remain recalcitrant—My Lord Rutherford, Einstein, and Professor Planck, the last-mentioned of whom started the whole quantum theory. On the side of the majority of the angels in this matter, Sir Arthur stands alone in his views on the connection between the universe and the electron. Unless he is altogether mistaken, Sir Arthur has made perhaps the most fundamental discovery in a quarter-century which has seen many fundamental changes in physics. But there is none to judge him, and we must wait for the verdict of time.

It is noteworthy that the one class of scientists amongst whom Eddington's name stands unshaken is the class of working astronomers. His excursions into metaphysics do not interest them professionally: they regard the controversial nuances of the relativity theory and the expanding universe as above their heads; but they do know that Eddington was once a working, one might say a jobbing, practical astronomer like themselves, and that in their field "*nihil tetigit quod non ornavit*." His more recent fields of endeavour call for insight and a capacity for abstract thinking, which he can well supply; but we know further that he brings with him a nice

appreciation of the worth of observational evidence, which is sadly lacking among some of our theorists. The practical scientist will wish for no better exponent of astronomical theory to the lay public than Eddington; but where our author writes on metaphysical subjects, his views are his own, and he does not represent the man in the laboratory—as he probably has no wish to represent him, other than hoping that that mundane individual will one day see the light.

R. V. D. R. WOOLLEY.

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EARLY VICTORIAN ENGLAND.*

The two volumes of *Early Victorian England, 1830-1865*, edited by Mr. G. M. Young, provide an outstanding survey of a period which has determined so largely the direction of subsequent development in our social and economic life. The purpose of this work has been "to provide the background of ideas and habits, to recall the sights and sounds of Early Victorian England," and so to reveal the atmosphere of the time. The eminence, in their own topics, of the seventeen contributors is evidence of the historical accuracy of the work, the soundness of its judgment and the lucidity of its presentation. But the omissions and relative apportionments of space will be challenged by many. Literature is passed over, while art and architecture are each accorded more than generous treatment. The atmosphere of the age is best reflected in its social development; and the relegation of the great work of criminal reform and the progress of national education, under the novel stimulus of State intervention, to almost incidental reference cannot be justified. Similarly, the decay of Church and Chapel in the lives of the poor deserves greater consideration. These sins of omission, however, formidable as they are, do not detract from the value of the individual contributions, and are somewhat compensated by the Editor's brilliant and comprehensive "portrait of the age."

Treating Dickens as expressive of the period, Mr. Young remarks that in all his work

there is a confusion of mind which reflects the perplexity of his time; equally ready to denounce on the grounds of humanity all

* Oxford Univ. Press. 2 vols. 42s. net.

who left things alone, and on the grounds of liberty all who tried to make them better. England was shifting convulsively from an old to a new discipline, and the early stages were painful.

He is doubtless right in pointing to the Factory Act of 1847, rather than the Repeal of the Corn Laws, as the turning-point of the age. Measures of reform and the great outbursts of philanthropy by a dominant middle class were clearly influenced by the acute discontent. But the persistence of private benevolence after the danger was past is at least one indication, as Mr. E. C. P. Lascelles points out in his instructive chapter on Victorian charity, of a sincere desire to alleviate the poor. It was gradually becoming appreciated that only administrative order and supervision could correct the worst abuses and remove the insecurity of an unbridled individualist society. The struggle for the regulation of conditions of work and the growth of collective organisations, facilitated by the increasing concentration of industry, thus naturally form the main subject of Professor Clapham's review of work and wages.

We celebrate the centenary, this year, of the passage of the Municipal Corporations Act, which commenced a revolution in civic government that was to provide in growing measure amenities and safeguards in place of indifference and anarchy. Early Victorian town life, writes Mr. R. H. Mottram, in his admirable account of the towns, "was almost wholly unorganised: the physical basis of it was perilously unsound. There was little or no local government, and there were no drains." He vividly portrays the panic and powerlessness of the Exeter Corporation, with all its civic tradition, during the cholera epidemic of 1831. In London private water contractors might neglect poor districts in favour of more lucrative territory. The need for reform was especially urgent in the growing urban agglomerations of industrial England; and during this period we do see the beginnings of an enlightened policy of providing public libraries and parks and the opportunities of healthy recreation. The influence, however, of the popular press, the endless journals of useful knowledge poured out by an educative middle class and the flood of melodramatic magazines, ably described by Mr. E. E. Kellett, was greatly limited by a high percentage of illiteracy. In Manchester, for example, in 1840-1, sixty per cent. of the population could not sign their names. The education of the

people was beyond the capacity of voluntary bodies, although state-aided, like the British and Foreign and the National Societies. But by the end of our period much had been accomplished and the lines of future progress laid. The suspicion and distrust of the working classes, as exemplified in the Chartist agitation, had died down. Industry was prospering, wages were increasing and bread was fairly cheap. In the words of Professor Clapham,

lowered taxes had cheapened the rare luxuries of the people. The beginnings of an intelligent sanitary policy, of urban parks and free libraries were making town life more tolerable. Mine and factory laws had eased some of the worst pressures of the new industrialism. . . . Plain men who had never seen visions found that they had a little more to spare for the Sunday dinner, the savings bank, the friendly, or co-operative society, or perhaps for the King's Head or the Bricklayers' Arms.

Apart from literature, much of this work is devoted to the æsthetic side of early Victorian life. To the working classes art and architecture meant nothing. Their music was confined to the public-house. The great proportion of educated England was content to accept the standards of a few and disputatious arbiters of taste. Yet the moral outlook of the age inevitably showed its influence. As Mr. A. P. Oppé says in his rather elaborate essay on art, the one clear feature in a period of confusion and transition "is the complete predominance of subject over treatment, and of the intellectual and moral elements over the sensory and æsthetic." Mr. Oppé argues that the "essential truth" of the pre-Raphaelite movement was that it "opened the eyes of Ruskin and the public generally to the real character of the movements in painting which they had been witnessing for most of their lives." In architecture this period sees, of course, the clash of the revived Gothic with the Classical school. In the course of his informative and extremely valuable article, Mr. A. E. Richardson discusses dispassionately the development of the styles and the work and peculiarities of their chief protagonists.

Of particular contributions, mention may be made of Mrs. C. S. Peel's vivid account of manners and habits, in which we can appreciate the increasing uniformity that trickled through the classes. Sport and country life receive characteristic treatment from the delightful pen of Mr. Bernard Darwin.

During our period two millions in Great Britain sought relief from poverty in emigration, and Mr. Douglas Woodruffe has written a striking account of the great exodus, the hardships of the emigrants, and the problems which awaited them abroad. The chapter devoted to the army bears the great authority of the late Sir John Fortescue. A final word of praise must be said for some 140 reproductions which depict the fashions and characteristics of the time.

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JAVA PAGEANT.*

A description of one of the richest, most beautiful, yet little known Islands of the world and the strange customs and beliefs, the industries, religions and wars of its fascinating people, by H. W. Ponder, F.R.G.S., is indeed a revelation of a happy place. Practically unknown to the ordinary Englishman, perhaps because it belongs to the Dutch, Great Britain was within an ace of owning it at one time through the East India Company. Two men, Francis Light and Stamford Raffles, pushed farther east from India. Light established Penang in Malaya, Raffles eventually became Governor of Java and introduced many reforms, sorely needed. But in 1816 the island was handed back to Holland by a treaty to secure Dutch goodwill in Europe. The Dutch have made the most of their opportunity in this Treasure Island. It is well governed, fertile, wonderfully irrigated, and has a beautiful climate. The natives lend themselves well to all the advantages of civilisation, and are evidently superior to the Indians of India in capacity. Mrs. Ponder sketches briefly the history of the island, from the coming of the Hindus perhaps two thousand years ago, traced by ruined temples and huge stone figures, both Hindu and Buddhist, and the waves of Islam which engulfed Java in the latter half of the fourteenth century, to the rivalry of the British and Dutch East India Companies (for the pepper trade, by the way) in 1601, and onwards through many native risings until final possession by the Dutch.

The natives are most attractively described by Mrs. Ponder. Their love of colour in dress, their neat little batik houses,

* Seeley Service. 18s.

spotless cleanliness, and childlike friendliness and gaiety, their genius for irrigation, for gardening and farming, all add greatly to the prosperity and beauty of their country. Java's population is "well over seven hundred to the square mile—the highest in the world—yet actual poverty is so rare as to be practically unknown." A contrast is drawn between them and the Malays who cannot understand hard work. The people are devout Mahomedans; but there is a deeplying primitive animism which is ineradicable and affects their lives at every crisis, including of course illness. They have a mythology which is represented by "Wayang" stories and plays, many of them taken from writings of the Hindu period, but full of fairy magic. The actors are generally wooden puppets about eighteen inches high, beautifully carved and elaborately painted, with grotesque faces.

There are many interesting chapters on the rice fields, the sugar plantations, model dairies and highland settlements, the cultivation of cinchona, rubber estates, teak forests, tea growing and many other crops, the handling of merchandise. Animals, and also volcanoes, come in for a chapter each. The family settlement of the Dutch in Java is contrasted with the hurrying home of all but the smallest European children in Malaya. There are excellent schools in the towns, the mountain resorts are designed for fine invigorating holidays and young Dutch boys and girls grow up in the country. The result is a much more settled European population than the restless exile of the English in the equally good climate of Malaya.

Mrs. Ponder writes brightly and with humour. She herself enjoys all the drama of life. Here is her summing up of it :

Javanese, Soedanese, Madoerese, Malay, Chinese, Arabs, Armenians, Japanese with heaven only knows what racial and religious fusions behind them; the Dutch whose master-hand, beneficent in the present as it was cruel in the past, has moulded Java into the world's model colony; British, Germans, Danes, Swiss and Americans, with their commercial enterprises that are the very soul and spirit of modern history. There they all go, yourself among them, urged forward by the Moving Finger towards an unknown destiny; all part of the cavalcade that travels tirelessly through the green and lovely transformation scenes of the Java Pageant.

E. M. B.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

Living India,* by Lady Hartog, is an excellent little study. In the compass of some 200 pages, so much information is given, in such a well-ordered and compact form, and yet so attractively, that it reads like a story-book. Many authorities have been quoted to supply the facts and figures, but Lady Hartog's own personal knowledge and sympathy provide the key to the charm of this book. After an opening chapter on the Land of India, describing the mountains, rivers, forests, climate, seasons, with touches of scenery at every turn, the author passes on to The Peoples and Religions, a brief survey of the history and principal beliefs of the Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Mahometans, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis, the caste system and purdah, all enlivened by references to the dress and appearance of the various races and sects, their mosques and temples and their wandering priests. Perhaps the most fascinating chapter is the one entitled, "Life in Village and Town." Great stress is laid on the fact that 90 per cent. of the population live in villages. Here one sees the peasant depicted, his anxieties and sicknesses, his ignorance; but also his patience and kindness, his daily toil in the field, his amusements and interests, the various rural welfare agencies for his aid. After so many books on Mud Walls and Uplift and Sanitation, it is a pleasure to contemplate the following picture:

One must not think that village life is all sadness, poverty and ignorance, for that is very far from the truth. In many ways it is happy and especially in its simplicity and peace. In order to realise this one has only to watch the bright-eyed children, the women at the well, the men in the fields, the bullock-carts jogging with jangling bells along the rut-furrowed track, or the village herd of cattle being driven home at sunset by a young lad playing the pipe. As the light wanes, fireflies begin to dance round the trees like fairy lamps. And so we leave the villages of India asleep under the bright starlit night.

India's History, Agriculture and Irrigation with Notes on Forestry and Wild Life, Industry and Transport, Education and Public Health, are all treated, followed by chapters on the Indian States, also vividly described, and the Administration of India, which brings the story right up to date. The book was written at the request of the Imperial Studies Committee of the Royal Empire Society and has an Introduction by Professor A. P. Newton. There are some charming photographic illustrations which have been selected by Dr. Agnes Scott.

The Treaty of Versailles and After† is a collection of broadcast talks delivered last year, dealing with a violently controversial subject from various points of view. After a rather scrappy description by Lord Riddell of the chief actors on a crowded stage, and a careful sketch by Professor Webster of the problem before the peacemakers, we reach the four addresses by Professor Toynbee which form the heart of the

* Blackie. 3s. 6d.

† Allen & Unwin. 5s.

volume and give it permanent value. He bids us remember that most peace treaties have the misfortune to be made by the statesmen who won the war, in other words by dynamic men who are hardly likely to possess the cool judgment needed for the working out of a lasting settlement. On the whole, however, the treaty might have been a good deal worse. "The one great flash of insight and foresight was the League of Nations"; and the new map of Europe, despite its many imperfections, is described as very much nearer than the old to fulfilling the aspirations of the peoples of Europe to be their own masters. A curious omission was the free hand given to Germany to develop her civil aviation, the peacemakers apparently failing to realise that civil and military aircraft are closely related. The second part of the volume, entitled *How the Treaty Looks To-day*, contains suggestive contributions from the French, German, Italian and American side, while Lord Reading and Sir Norman Angell wind up with reflections on its relation to the present state of the world. The whole book is well worth reading, and the tone of the writers is commendably calm. The tragedy is that by the time grave errors are recognised as such it is too late to undo the mischief they have wrought.

The Gate of Life,* by Dr. W. R. Inge, is a very striking collection of Addresses, of which the first gives the title to the volume. In every respect these Addresses, which were given at intervals to students, represent their distinguished author at his highest and best. Grave in their aims, elevated in their tone, and delightful in style, they set the Christian values and their application to practical life, as Dr. Inge sees them, most impressively before the reader. It speaks well for the Bishop of London that he selected the book for this year's Lenten reading. It is difficult to single out any of these discourses for brief notice. They cover a wide range, and are of uniform excellence. Our advice to our readers is: Get them!

The Tragedy of the Assyrians† contains a valuable and informative discussion of the post-war problem of settlement and the present plight of 20,000 refugees in Iraq. The qualifications of the author, Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Stafford, make his narrative and judgment of recent events of particular importance. He has had considerable experience as Administrative Inspector in Iraq, and was present in Mosul during the massacres of August 1933. After tracing the early history of the Assyrian tribes, he describes their revolt against the Turks in 1915 and their expulsion from the Hakkari mountains. The problem of their settlement appeared to be solved in 1922 with their return to their pre-war homes. In August 1924, however, upon the pretext of an affray with the Turks, they were evicted again and crossed into Iraq.

* Longmans. 2s. 6d. net.

† Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d. net.

Possibility of their return was effectively destroyed by the decision of the League of Nations in 1925 that the Hakkari district should remain in Turkish hands. For the next eight years permanent settlement in Iraq was assiduously promoted both by the British Mandatory Power and the Iraqi Government itself which, Colonel Stafford points out, sincerely desired the Assyrians to become contented citizens of Iraq. The refugees, however, were suspicious and truculent, steadily resisted assimilation, claimed treatment as a homogeneous nation and recognition of the temporal authority of their Christian Patriarch, the Mar Shimun. Such demands were clearly incompatible with the growing Iraqi nationalism. The Mandate was terminated in 1932, and in 1933 latent fear and distrust were roused to open hatred and inflamed by Moslem fervour, through the obstinacy of the Patriarch and the aggressive behaviour of his followers. Colonel Stafford describes in some detail the movements of some Assyrians into French Syria, under an irresponsible leader, the fighting which awaited their return, and exposes the subsequent systematic and cold-blooded massacre by the army which had always particularly feared and disliked the Assyrian community. The author considers that a clash was almost inevitable and that, "in giving up the Mandate with the Assyrian question still unsettled a very grave risk was taken." Meanwhile the problem remains unsolved, unless the British Government's offer of a settlement in British Guiana is accepted. While sympathetic to the Assyrians in their twenty years of trial and in their aspirations to remain a corporate entity, Colonel Stafford has succeeded in treating a particularly difficult problem without partiality or passion.

A new and pregnant little book upon the prevention of war comes from the pen of Canon W. L. Grane in *War—Its Curse and Cure*.* He stresses the similarity of the war mentality before 1914 and the aggressive German nationalism fostered by Hitler. "In the conflict of thought during 1912-13 the wrong side won" and it is the present task to ensure the success of the peace mind. Canon Grane accepts as essential to peace the sanction of force. He recognises, in the words of the Archbishop of York, that "the Christian objective is the consecration, not the elimination, of force," and is averse from unilateral disarmament as weakening the general guarantee. He argues strongly in favour of the collective sanction imposed by a preponderating group of nations "to implement the decisions of international justice, and more especially to exercise joint coercive action against a peace-breaker." The author would clearly favour the proposed system of regional pacts. This book is written simply and with a sense of realism. "No small part of its excellence," says Mr. Wickham Steed in his Introduction, "appears to lie in its author's perspective and in his refusal to gloss over ugly facts."

* Allen & Unwin. 4s. 6d. net.

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MR. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S FOURTH BUDGET.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S fourth Budget—which he opened on April 15th—was not awaited, like his first and second, with gloomy forebodings, or, like his third, with great expectations by British taxpayers. A few weeks before, some of our financial pundits had been predicting that there would be neither a realised nor a prospective surplus; but during March revenue came in well, and the expenditure proved to be rather less than had been expected. Consequently, at the end of the financial year, the net surplus of revenue over expenditure amounted to about 20 millions. This substantial surplus was applied as usual to the reduction of the national debt. As last year's surplus was 39 millions, Mr. Chamberlain can claim that, though he has not restored the Sinking Fund, he has been able (thanks partly to cautious estimates, and partly to the trade recovery) to diminish the vast liabilities of the nation by nearly 60 millions. Before the War this would have meant a reduction of ten per cent., now it means a reduction of less than one per cent. According to a calculation made by the *Economist* the week before the Budget, the total dead-weight debt outstanding at the end of the financial year (i.e. on March 31st) was 649 millions in 1914, 7,413 millions in 1931, and 7,800 millions in 1934. The large increase in this nominal total since 1931 is, however, explained by the immense credit voted for the Exchange Equalisation Fund, which accounts for an increase of 350 millions. This fund is stated to be intact; and it has no doubt served a useful purpose in helping to steady the exchanges. But an inconvertible paper currency, which is held to require not only an enormous gold reserve but a still greater equalisation fund, cannot be regarded as a permanently satisfactory solution of the currency problem.

If we exclude the Exchange Equalisation account of 350 millions, our national debt is just about twelve times the pre-war total; but the charge for interest and management, which rose from 19 millions before the War to 293 millions in

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the financial year 1930-1, declined last year to 211 millions in consequence of successful conversions, low rates for Treasury Bills, and the suspension of payments on the debt to the United States. This is an important relief; but unfortunately it cannot be carried much further, and the only satisfactory way to reduce the debt in the future is by well-balanced budgets with a substantial Sinking Fund to provide an annual surplus of public revenue over public expenditure. The debts of our local authorities are also very large. Up-to-date figures are not available; but it is said that the total has risen since 1914 from 562 millions to about 1,400 millions. These local debts are less onerous, because (although they have involved a great increase in local rates) they have been incurred mainly for necessary or useful purposes, such as public health, water supply, and education.

Mr. Chamberlain's Budget, as I have said, was awaited this year without great expectations; for it was known from the estimates that most of the relief which taxpayers might have anticipated from improved trade and rising revenue would be absorbed by increased expenditure on armaments and subsidies. The estimates for Army, Navy and Air Force had been raised by 10½ millions sterling, and the estimates for Civil and Social Services by 14½ millions. Hence it was foreseen that the large prospective surplus available last year for remissions of taxation could not be repeated, though the income-tax returns were highly encouraging.

I need not recapitulate at any length Mr. Chamberlain's estimates of revenue. He anticipated 14 millions more from Income Tax, which yielded at 4s. 6d. in the £ as much as it had yielded at 5s. in the £. He also looked for 6 millions more from Customs and Excise, though the revenue from the Ottawa Duties has been declining, because, as he said, they had been successful in their purpose, which was not to relieve the British taxpayer or even to improve business, but "to divert trade from foreign countries to the countries of the Empire." This is the new commercial imperialism, which forces trade from its natural and profitable channels by preferential and discriminating customs duties. It is a policy which invites retaliation, and gets it. Many people who have been engaged in commerce with foreign countries have suffered heavy and often ruinous losses, and the net result has been a disastrous decline in our overseas trade.

In summing up the position on the basis of last year's taxation Mr. Chamberlain estimated a revenue of £735,580,000 and an expenditure of £729,970,000, leaving a prospective surplus of £5,610,000. This was not enough to provide the money needed for what he called a "Poor Man's Budget." So he appropriated—much to the indignation of motorists—an unused balance of the Road Fund, and increased the tax on heavy oil, besides imposing a new protective duty on soya beans. Altogether he was able to collect a prospective surplus of 11 millions for distribution among taxpayers and Government servants. One slice of the surplus was given to small income-taxpayers, who suffered rather severely from Mr. Snowden's drastic balancing budget of 1931. This was received with general favour as an equitable readjustment. Another considerable sum, which should, I think, have been employed to relieve the general taxpayer, was taken for the purpose of putting an end to all the remaining economies in the salaries of civil servants and in the wages of State employees, which were made during the crisis of 1931 in order to assist in balancing the Budget. If direct and indirect taxation were back at the pre-crisis level this would have been fair enough, but the case is far different; for an enormous number of indirect duties upon consumption have been imposed since 1931. It is true that the average level of prices has been fairly stable, but most of the comforts and necessities of life cost far more than they would have done but for the general tariff. A reduction in some of these new duties would have benefited everybody and stimulated trade. Considering that the employees of the Government, and also of the Local Authorities, constitute an envied and privileged class with higher salaries and wages (on an average), as well as with good pensions and far more security than those who are engaged in the ordinary business and industry of the country, most people will feel that the Chancellor's action was at least premature. But the servants of our National and Local Authorities have become so numerous and powerful that, like protected manufacturers or subsidised producers, they exert greater pressure on Parliament than the citizens who labour for their maintenance.

After helping the small income-taxpayer and placating the Civil Service, Mr. Chamberlain had not much money left. With what remained he reduced the entertainment tax in

order to make the cheap seats in cinema houses a little cheaper, and also seats at entertainments given by living players. Another small sum was applied to lower the licence duties on inns and beerhouses.

On the whole, from a political point of view, it was a clever budget. The Opposition Parties found little to criticise, though the *Daily Herald* styled it "A Budget of Omissions" because "it ignores 90 per cent. of the population." The Labour Party was obviously annoyed because it removed several grievances on which they had counted to provide material for their speakers at the general election, and for this reason it was bitterly described as a "vote-catching" budget. Those who believe that public expenditure has risen to dangerous heights, that taxation is intolerably heavy, and that the margin for contingencies is perilously narrow, deplore the growth of extravagance in all directions, but find some consolation in the maintenance of a balanced budget. It is something, at any rate, that the Chancellor has again refused to listen to the siren voice of Mr. Lloyd George, or to the group of Tory-Socialists who have been clamouring for a "Prosperity Loan" to be spent on Public Works for the ostensible object of relieving unemployment.

Here one may interject two or three criticisms. In the first place, the interest and sinking fund on such a loan would have absorbed all, or more than all, the prospective surplus. There would, therefore, have been no restoration of the cuts, no relief of the small income-taxpayer, and no other reductions of taxation. In the second place, it is now perfectly clear that the million who have been added to the unemployed since 1929 are the victims of Protection and Quotas at home and abroad. Seamen and fishermen, and those who have been thrown out of employment in the export and import trades, cannot be provided with work of a remunerative character in occupations such as the electrifying of the railways (on which Mr. Lloyd George would spend 150 millions of public money), or as agricultural labourers on the land, or even as builders of subsidised houses and new motor roads. If common sense and foresight did not warn us against the manufacture of huge deficits, the recent experience of the United States ought to be sufficient. The expenditure there of 1,000 millions a year on the relief of unemployment, partly in doles but largely in public works, has proved very disappointing; yet projects

of national development in that vast country are far more attractive and plausible than here. Even now the public debt of the United States is much less per head than ours, and the American income tax is much lower than the British. Moreover, the results of perpetual deficits in Germany, Italy and France are decidedly discouraging to our New Dealers.

Surely the only safe and true way back to prosperity is to be found in the old maxims of the Cobdenite and Gladstonian school, which prevailed for more than half a century after the Hungry Forties. I do not say that education, public health, playgrounds and the amenities of civilised life should be starved. But we must remember that the public purse is not bottomless. Within reasonable limits there is still sound sense in the saying that "money should be left to fructify in the pockets of the people." A high scale of taxation and the absorption of private capital in public debt tend to stifle individual enterprise as well as to reduce the purchasing power of the people. They lead, moreover, to State socialism. An examination of the Labour Party's programme recently published by a committee of the Cobden Club,* shows by ample citations that it is not compatible with economic liberty, public economy, or national solvency. We are already suffering from doses of State socialism administered in the forms of Protection, Quotas and Subsidies by this Government and its predecessors. In Germany, Italy and Russia the process has been carried much farther, and the liberty of the individual, not only in politics but in trade and commerce, has been wellnigh extinguished. The leaders of our Labour Party point with delight to Mr. Elliot's work and to his marketing schemes and regulations as preparatory instalments of the wholesale socialisation which they hope to carry out. Some of them, like Sir Stafford Cripps, would revolutionise everything by a few strokes of the axe and a "first-class crisis." A more astute politician, Mr. Herbert Morrison, speaking for the executive at the Southport Conference last October, would approach the same end by less violent means and methods. After taking over the Banks (which is now regarded as an indispensable step), he said: "I would sooner the State through a Labour Government got into its control key industry after key industry, service after service, until within a reasonable time we are substantially masters of the

* Cobden-Sanderson. London. 18.

economic fabric of the community and the means of production and of distribution. Put us in that position. Let a Labour Government go on with its work of socialisation. Make us substantially economic masters of the State. Remove capitalist control over the great field of industry." Then, he added, would be the time to make a clean sweep of private capital and to take "the big decision" which Sir Stafford Cripps and the Socialist League would like to take as soon as a Labour Government can get a majority in Parliament.

At the moment, perhaps, there is not much fear of a Labour majority being returned at the next General Election, though under present electoral conditions, with three parties contesting single-member constituencies, a minority of those who vote may easily elect a large majority of members to the House of Commons. But if the danger of war increases, if the expansion of armaments continues, if another trade depression sets in, our people may call for a change of government. That is a good reason why intelligent citizens should study and reflect upon the present financial and economic situation as revealed in Mr. Chamberlain's financial statement and in the Budget debate. To my mind by far the most remarkable passage in the financial statement was that in which he described the advance towards recovery in the previous twelve months. Our industrial output, he said, had increased by about twelve per cent.; our manufacturing production had established a new record. In 1934 the value of British exports rose by 30 millions. The building trade was active; the registry of motor vehicles rose thirty per cent.; the output of pig-iron increased by fifty per cent., and of steel by thirty per cent. Rayon established a new record. Retail trade was estimated at five per cent. above the previous year. Savings Bank deposits and Savings Certificates grew by nearly 50 millions. More sugar, tobacco, beer and tea were consumed. Altogether there could be no doubt that improvement had been steadily progressive, and he thought it "not without significance" that the forward movement has followed a succession of balanced budgets.

That there has been a definite and in some respects a substantial recovery from the worst moments of the depression in the winter of 1931-2, no one can doubt. Confidence in public credit and in the financial stability of our currency in banking has been restored by the National Government

by the maintenance of balanced budgets, for which Mr. Chamberlain deserves great credit. The successful conversions of debt are an achievement of which anyone might well be proud, though the amazingly low rates for Treasury Bills (which have relieved the Exchequer) are founded upon the miserable shrinkage of the London Discount Market, which is a sign and symptom of the corresponding shrinkage in our overseas trade.

When, however, Mr. Chamberlain declares that in his opinion the country has made an eighty per cent. recovery from the depression of 1930 to 1932, a double note of interrogation and exclamation must be interjected. It is all very well to talk about rayon—a new industry whose progress here has been rapid, though far less so than in Japan. But what of the greatest of our textile industries, cotton? There you have a vast number of idle looms and spindles and unemployed operatives; and there has been no recovery worth mentioning from the very worst period of the crisis. Much the same may be said of shipping and shipbuilding, and their subsidiary industries. The state of many of our ports is deplorable, and the depressed areas supply a sad commentary on the collapse of our imports and exports. Mr. Chamberlain spoke of a 30 millions improvement in exports since last year; but this followed a loss compared with 1929 of twelve times that amount. Between 1929 and 1932 our export trade (in sterling value) fell from 729 to 365 millions. Imports fell correspondingly, though, of course, owing to the fall in prices, the shrinkage in volume was less than the shrinkage in values.

In the old days we were always told that tariff reform meant work for all. This was the line which Mr. Joseph Chamberlain adopted in 1904. It was repeated again and again by his lieutenants, and particularly by Mr. Bonar Law during the prosperous period which ended on the eve of the Great War with an unemployed total of a quarter of a million, and a very small number of people on poor relief. After the War, when unemployment became formidable, Mr. Baldwin took up the tale and asserted that the only cure for unemployment was Protection. On that issue, as Prime Minister, in 1923 he dissolved Parliament and appealed unsuccessfully to the country. I have no doubt that in 1931 Mr. Neville Chamberlain and his friends really believed that a protective tariff would sweep away unemployment by substituting home

for foreign manufactures. The decline of imports from a value of £1,220 millions in 1929 to a value of £675 millions in 1933 ought, according to all our leading protectionists, to have produced an era of extraordinary prosperity. With all these hundreds of millions of pounds worth of products excluded, unemployment should have vanished from our island. But experience has again proved the wisdom of Adam Smith, who told his students at Glasgow 170 years ago that Great Britain should be a free port. Instead of getting rid of unemployment we are confronted by double the amount which existed in 1929 under modified Free Trade, and by eight times the amount which existed under complete Free Trade before the War. As for the improvement during the last year, Sir Herbert Samuel pointed out that when Mr. Chamberlain made his fourth budget speech the number of unemployed on the registers was 2,153,000. Twelve months before, when he made his third budget speech, the number was 2,201,000. This small improvement of 48,000 may perhaps be explained by Mr. Runciman's reciprocity treaties and by the 30 million expansion of exports which they have helped to produce.

If there remains any doubt about the failure of Protection, I would ask students of our statistics to compare the recovery of our overseas trade after the crisis of 1921 with its recovery after the crisis of 1931. I think they will find that whereas in the three years following 1921 the recovery was over seventy per cent., in the three years following 1931 it was not more than seven per cent.

Probably Mr. Chamberlain's mistake is to be explained by the fact that he is accustomed to look at business through Birmingham spectacles. No one pretends that a tariff is not profitable to some industries. Birmingham is one of our few great inland towns, and many of its industries have profited by the tariff at the expense of the whole body of consumers and of our ports. For aught I know there may have been an eighty per cent. recovery in Birmingham.

At the annual dinner of the Bankers' Association on May 15th the Chancellor of the Exchequer denied that he is "a fanatical Protectionist." He held that the combination of cheap money with a moderate tariff has not exhausted its effectiveness and that there is still room for considerable expansion. At the same time he was "quite prepared to admit

that the possibilities in this direction are not comparable with those which might be derived from a great revival of international trade." It would seem, therefore, that he is beginning to profit by the lessons of experience.

What of the prospects? Is the modest recovery which has occurred likely to continue? The Protectionist remedy has been applied and has been found wanting; and even Mr. Baldwin has discovered that quotas are worse than tariffs. If one reads the speeches of business men at company meetings one finds that they are nearly all of the opinion that future improvement depends on the revival of international trade and the reduction of the barriers, including tariffs, quotas and exchange restrictions, which have been responsible for the long-continued depression. By Free Trade alone can scarcities and gluts be removed; for the first condition of prosperity is that individuals and nations should be able to exchange their products freely with one another, and be permitted to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market. Economic nationalism is as injurious to trade as political or racial nationalism is to peace. These twin enemies of civilised liberty and progress are now dominant. Unless they can be vanquished, or at least controlled, Mr. Chamberlain's optimism will prove unfounded, and the confidence which he has built on a few selected statistics will be wrecked on the rocks of increasing armaments and diminishing trade.

F. W. HIRST.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS.

THE high figures of unemployment continue to cause serious anxiety and produce many proposals for its relief. People see that money is cheap and labour abundant; it is not always realised so clearly that it is only under certain conditions and for certain rates of wages that labour can be got. Eminent politicians suggest that a proper use of public credit ought to provide work for everybody and make public enterprises pay. In the United States a powerful Government is seen plunging into vast experiments, the cost of which cannot be doubted, but the results of which have not yet matured. If a New Deal is popular in America, it is argued, why should not some kind of New Deal, based on large expenditure, be popular here? It is so desirable for Governments faced with difficult problems to do something—especially with a general election drawing near. And economists of note are found to argue that the bold spending of public money would, in our present circumstances, be the most remunerative investment we could make.

The argument is stated most fully in the recent speeches of Mr. Lloyd George, which have undoubtedly received a good deal of indefinite endorsement. The propositions there laid down are these:

That money is plentiful and employment scarce.

That it is possible to find work for every employable man by the spring of next year.

That the work provided should be useful, profitable, reproductive, and on a scale adequate to the magnitude of the need.

That houses, roads, drainage, electricity, telephones, water supply, land settlement, are examples of the work required; the regeneration of the countryside is stressed; we should aim at an extra 500,000 hands upon the soil, every one of whom would mean another man employed in other industries elsewhere.

And that projects of this kind, financed by the Government on a sufficiently large scale, would pay so well as to save in five years' time between £500,000,000 and £600,000,000 in doles alone, besides bringing in indirectly another £150,000,000 to the Exchequer.

These are large assurances, seriously given. Can they be made good? Is it worth our while to spend a thousand millions, for example, on public works of this nature? Have we any experience on the point to guide us? And if the

particular methods of expenditure suggested prove disappointing, are there others, like emigration on a large scale, which could be wisely added to them? It must be borne in mind in answering these questions that a good deal of capital is evidently failing to find remunerative investment, and that it is a serious speculation for the State to advance even a hundred millions to finance projects which private enterprise will not undertake. Additions to debt and taxation, however benevolent their objects, rarely mean a permanent improvement in trade.

Now we have a good deal of recent experience to instruct us on the relation between unemployment and public works. In the years which immediately followed the War the unemployment problem was even more serious than it is to-day, and very active efforts were made by Mr. Lloyd George's Government to solve it. Putting aside the dole, established in 1918—a temporary expedient which has since become a profoundly unsatisfactory feature of our economic system—and putting aside also the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920—a far more hopeful and valuable expedient, though marred by imperfections which rendered necessary twelve amending Acts within ten years—various projects of social reconstruction were pushed forward, among which proposals for new houses and new roads took a prominent place. It is well to consider the results of these.

In 1918 it was declared on high authority that half a million houses must be supplied without delay. Great energy was shown in appointing Housing Commissioners, in drawing plans, surveying sites, ordering bricks and encouraging building. Money was not spared. Subsidies were offered to stimulate enterprise. Yet the results on the whole were very disappointing—a few score houses in 1919, a few thousand in 1920, 38,000 early in 1921. There proved to be a serious want of bricklayers and competent workmen. The programme had to be reconsidered and limited. It was discovered that, as the subsidies increased, the cost of the houses increased also. On July 26th, 1922, *The Times* stated that, so far, 120,800 houses had been built in all, that 35,971 were building, and that 17,000 more had still to be begun. Three or four years of lavish effort and expenditure under Government supervision had neither produced a large number of cheap houses nor materially affected the numbers of the unemployed. Since

1922 far more has been done. Great housing programmes are still being carried through. A very large number of houses has been built. Altogether some £670,000,000 of capital has been spent on subsidised houses. But the problem of producing cheap houses is still unsettled, and the problem of extinguishing unemployment remains. Mr. Lloyd George has recently estimated that two million houses are still required. But can we, in the light of this experience, believe that if the Government plunged in to-morrow to build them, the effects on unemployment would be what he desires?

New roads are another popular specific, and new roads may still be needed. Since 1918 they have been lavishly built; and the revenue yielded by motor traffic seems to make the expenditure legitimate. But has our large expenditure on roads in fact contributed much to solve the unemployment problem? Here again the facts for the period of Mr. Lloyd George's administration are significant. Plans were then pushed forward actively and a good deal of money was spent. It was estimated that by August 1922 £85,000,000 had been spent on roads. But it was found that less than one-sixth of this sum, only £12,500,000, had in fact gone to help unemployment. The men needed to build roads and bridges were not, of course, to be found merely by taking workmen who had dropped out of other occupations. If we look at the payments made out of the Road Fund between 1925 and 1933, we find that they exceeded £450,000,000, and that at least a considerable part of this money was devoted to work upon the roads. Yet the unemployment figures for those years were comparatively little affected. Is it reasonable to expect that fresh and lavish expenditure on roads and bridges would suddenly be able to solve the problem now?

Another favourite project is land settlement. Here again it cannot be said that Mr. Lloyd George's experience while in office was encouraging. The Government of that day was full of plans for rural development and regeneration. There was some curious legislation with that object in 1920, which had almost immediately to be repealed. But the schemes of land settlement did not succeed. There was a scheme to provide 16,000 men with small holdings, but many of these men, meeting with unfavourable conditions, fell back before long into the ranks of labourers or unemployed. There was a scheme to set up 100,000 men with small grants in farming

and other occupations, and, though the expenditure was not very large, a good deal of the money seems to have been thrown away. There was a scheme for settlement overseas, much more hopeful if happily conducted. But the selections made and the management of the scheme led to a good many failures. These plans were probably too hastily devised or too much in the nature of temporary makeshifts; and they contributed little to the problem of the unemployed.

Apart from these unsuccessful efforts, however, some interesting and admirable experiments in land settlement have been set on foot, and the evidence indicates that, if the settlers are carefully selected, are helped with individual care and attention, and are liberally financed at the start, an encouraging proportion of those so settled can make good. Everyone will watch with sympathy the experiment now being carried out at Potton. But no one has yet been able to show how land settlement on a large scale in this country, absorbing, as the suggestion is, hundreds of thousands of unemployed men, could be made to answer. Such experience as we have does not encourage the idea. The authorities of the Board of Agriculture have for some time past insisted that, without active Government interference and large Government subsidies, the agricultural population on the land already cannot earn a satisfactory subsistence. The assertion may be, and probably ought to be, sharply challenged. But no Government which believes that the land of England cannot maintain its present population unaided, could be justified in planting a much larger population on it to-day.

It does not, therefore, seem likely that a large new expenditure on houses, roads or land settlement in this country would supply the remedy for unemployment which is sought. There remain the other fields of enterprise suggested, drainage, water, tramways, docks, parks, electricity, telephones and the rest. What are the possibilities there? Once more we have experience to guide us and experience of a recent kind. Mr. Lloyd George's Government established an Unemployment Grants Committee under Lord St. Davids, which made grants to local authorities for these purposes, to encourage not merely relief works but public works and public improvements likely to yield revenue and in time perhaps to pay for themselves. Many well-meant experiments were set on foot, and as time went on a considerable sum of money was spent. But the

unemployment problem was not solved. The summary of these activities published in the Report of the Industrial Transference Board issued in 1928 is significant of the facts. It showed that the money assigned for these purposes, nearly £190,000,000, had not at any time succeeded in providing employment for more than 75,000 men. And it must be remembered that all Mr. Lloyd George's efforts, when in office and in a position of unexampled power, failed in making any serious impression on a problem which was even more difficult then than now. The official figures of the unemployed in May 1921 rose as high as 2,558,000; and later in that year Dr. Macnamara stated on behalf of the Government that all these energetic schemes together had not been able to find work for more than about 100,000 men. Is it reasonable to suppose that a repetition even on a much larger scale of expenditure on precisely the same objects would now give us wholly different results, or would settle within twelve months the difficulties which have baffled us for years?

The truth is that the unemployment problem to-day is much more complicated than some politicians allow. It needs close individual attention. It cannot be dealt with *en masse*. It will never be got rid of merely by spending money profusely on roads or houses or telephones. On houses and roads alone we must have spent already much more than a thousand millions since the War, with advantage, no doubt, to many, but with surprisingly little advantage to the unemployed. Even expenditure on this scale will not find permanent work for those stranded by the economic changes of recent years. The troubles of the cotton industry in Lancashire, of the coal-miners in Durham and South Wales, will not be cured by covering England with new roads. It can hardly be doubted that, apart from questions of wages and trade union regulations, the main causes of our difficulties are the shrinkage of our foreign markets, the paralysis of our shipping and the blocking of our export trade. For these grave conditions Mr. Lloyd George, it seems, recommends no remedy except the ruthless use of tariffs. But many who have watched the operation of tariffs fear that this remedy would only aggravate the evil we deplore.

But it does not follow that there is nothing to be done. If Government expenditure on a large scale is thought to be a necessity of politics, until more can be done to reopen the

normal ways of trade, there is a strong case to be made for promoting water supplies and drainage in our rural areas, and a still stronger case for organised and subsidised emigration. Sir William Younger has done good service in reminding us of a warning recently given by one Scottish Medical Officer of Health. It is mere waste of time to discuss or legislate regarding rural housing until the primary necessities of water supply and drainage have been provided.

The Government and local authorities between them have now allocated something over £3,000,000 to promote water schemes in 1,100 parishes, and at Winterslow one public-spirited parish has provided a water supply for itself. But there are still too many rural districts where little or nothing has yet been done, where thatched roofs allow the rain to go to waste, and where the people are driven to find their water in the ditches by the roadside. Money spent on drainage and on water is a real contribution to the "regeneration of the countryside," and it may be justified as a public utility which can, to some extent at any rate, be made to pay. Most villagers would probably be content to wait for telephones, and even for a vast extension of new roads, till they have got good water and good drains.

But, when all is said and done, there is no method of relieving our unemployment at the moment, and of enabling men, profoundly discouraged by adverse circumstances, to start the world afresh, more hopeful than that which is offered by emigration overseas. We have an Empire with vast empty spaces, in Canada and in Australia particularly, crying out for population, which sooner or later, if not populated by settlers from Great Britain, will inevitably be populated by settlers from elsewhere. What of late has prevented our sending to these great undeveloped territories many families suitable for emigration, whom we find it difficult to support at home? Three things chiefly. The attitude of politicians and trade union leaders in the Dominions; the difficulty of absorbing new settlers satisfactorily; and the very serious cost. Of these three obstacles the cost is possibly the least. The first necessity is to convince the statesmen of the Dominions that, for the sake of the Empire as a whole and of the Dominions in particular, the attitude which discourages immigration from Great Britain ought to be relaxed. That task may not be easy, but no finer object

for Imperial diplomacy could be found. The difficulty of absorbing new settlers, more serious than ever perhaps at this juncture, can be overcome by goodwill, by careful organisation and by taking time. The problem of selecting suitable families, though often inadequately handled, can be solved by competent people provided that sufficient individual care is given. In the case of children there are many orphans now supported by the rates in this country among whom promising emigrants might be found. The cost is, of course, very heavy, but it need not be prohibitive if a large plan were carried through steadily over a certain period of time. If the Governments of the Dominions would provide facilities and offer land at nominal prices, and if the British Government were prepared to spend ten or twenty millions on a great Imperial project without any expectation of return, very valuable results might be attained.

The cost to-day of sending a small family, two adults and two children under ten, from London to Toronto may be put at £60; the cost from London to an Australian port would probably be double that. Landing money, railway fares up country to the place of settlement, and sundry small expenses might bring up the cost in the case of Canada to £80, in the case of Australia to, say, £200. It is obvious that all such estimates can only be approximate. But it seems reasonable to believe that, if the Dominions were willing to co-operate, an expenditure of eight to ten millions—not a fourth of what we have spent already upon sugar-beet—might suffice to settle 100,000 men, 100,000 women and 200,000 children on Canadian soil. Another ten millions might render possible a large experiment in Australia as well. The British taxpayer would have to find the money, and the glut in the City which troubles politicians might be sensibly relieved. But such schemes would obviously take time to complete, and that would ease the charge upon the Budget. The task of choosing and starting the emigrants, and the task of absorbing them in the new countries, might well prove to be serious tests of statesmanship both for the Dominions and for ourselves. But the experiment would at least have in it certain elements of hope for the future, which are not to be found in multiplying *ad infinitum* either roads or houses in Great Britain.

CHARLES MALLET.

AFTER STRESA.

THE main problem of European diplomacy continued after the Stresa Conference to be exactly what it had been before: namely how to avoid a war, near or remote, when the circumstances indicated the probability of war. The circumstances were on the one hand that the politicians who controlled Germany had decided that Germany could be made strong enough to enforce her demands; and, on the other hand, that the politicians of the other countries were afraid that Germany would soon be, if she was not already, strong enough for that purpose. The diplomatic reasoning whereby the two sides argued their case was equally irrelevant. The only relevant facts were that Germany was strong, and the others were afraid. In all experience of animal life, including human life, it is the side that is afraid that is always the most dangerous. From 1914 to 1918 Germany was so inhumanly strong and so militarily efficient that she was inevitably beaten in the field: for the simple reason that her terrified opponents dared not stop the war short of victory. Germany wanted to call off the war in 1916; her opponents were much too scared to listen to common sense, and were concentrated upon the exclusive object, unattainable as it was, of crushing once for all the terror that faced them. By the same token those opponents numbered most of the civilised world.

Similarly, in 1935, the moment Herr Hitler showed his hand, Europe was galvanised into a terrified league against him. He showed his hand on March 16th, when for the first time since 1919, when the treaty of victory was imposed upon her, Germany openly defied the treaty's provisions. Of course, it was a dictated, not a negotiated, treaty. Of course, it was hard upon Germany. Of course, in the fifteen Versailles years that passed before the resurgent Hitler came into power, Germany was "unfairly" treated, and Herren Stresemann and Brüning had beaten the thin air with their sweet reason. A wolf that escapes the maw of a leopard and then masters the leopard is not "fair" to the leopard. When, therefore, on March 16th, 1935, the overlords of Germany no longer concealed their incipient military exuberance, Europe was at once stricken with terror. There is no nation on earth so much to be feared as the German. The average German is

prepared to die at a moment's notice for the "Fatherland." And he is equipped with a physical stamina and a deadly scientific technique such as appals the more human and more reasonable people. The British, the French, the Italian or the Russian can all find something more satisfactory to do than to die for their country. The average German regards patriotism as in itself a virtue (he calls it *Wehrpflicht*, or a duty to go to war in defence of his country). The average Frenchman regards patriotism as a tiresome and uncomfortable folly, imposed upon him by the greater folly of Germany. In Great Britain, when there is a war on, ninety-nine per cent. of the people who can dodge it do dodge it : mainly by making themselves indispensable in a non-belligerent capacity. That is one reason why the Foreign Office and the Church are regarded by sensible and far-sighted parents as excellent careers for their sons.

The work achieved at the Stresa Conference was summarised in last month's CONTEMPORARY REVIEW. The fear that gripped the Stresa Powers was promptly illustrated. They left Stresa on April 14th and went straight to Geneva, where the Council of the League met on April 16th. Agreement had been reached by the three Powers at Stresa upon the exact formulæ to be proposed at Geneva, in condemnation of Germany's unilateral treaty repudiation. The resolution was, in fact, submitted jointly by Sir John Simon, M. Laval and Baron Aloisi. It was preceded by a firm and vigorous speech from M. Laval, who roundly condemned Germany's action as a universal cause of disquiet and gave it as his opinion that the Council must not shirk its duty. The joint resolution began by recapitulating the precedent facts and premises : namely that the Council of the League regarded the respect for treaty obligations as a basic principle of international relations, and that such obligations could not be repudiated or modified except with the consent of the other parties ; that the German announcement of March 16th violated that principle ; that it therefore constituted a threat to European security ; that the proposal made by the French and British, with the approval of the Italian, Governments on February 3rd, containing a plan for a freely negotiated general settlement based upon the limitation of armaments and German membership of the League of Nations, was still under discussion when Germany promulgated an isolated policy

inconsistent with it. The three essential clauses of the joint resolution read thus : the Council "(1) Declares that Germany has failed in the duty which lies upon all the members of the international community to respect the undertakings which they have contracted, and condemns any unilateral repudiation of international obligations. (2) Invites the Governments which took the initiative in the plan of February 3rd, 1935, or which gave their approval to it, to continue the negotiations so initiated, and in particular to frame the conclusion, within the framework of the League of Nations, of the agreements which may appear necessary to attain the objects defined in this plan, due account being taken of the obligations of the Covenant, with a view to assuring the maintenance of peace. (3) Considering that the unilateral repudiation of international obligations may endanger the very existence of the League of Nations as an organisation for maintaining peace and promoting security, (a) Decides that such repudiation, without prejudice to the application of measures already provided in international agreements should, in the event of its having relation to undertakings concerning the security of peoples, and the maintenance of peace in Europe, call into play all appropriate measures on the part of members of the League and within the framework of the Covenant ; (b) Requests a committee composed of . . . [names left blank] . . . to propose for this purpose measures to render the Covenant more effective in the organisation of collective security, and to define in particular the economic and financial measures which might be applied should, in the future, a State, whether a member of the League of Nations or not, endanger peace by unilateral repudiation of its international obligations."

Sir John Simon and Baron Aloisi wholly supported what had been said by M. Laval, as did Dr. Beneš. The resolution was put to the vote on April 17th. Denmark, for an obvious geographical reason, abstained from voting. The remaining thirteen members voted for the resolution, which technically therefore was passed "unanimously." The most practical part of the Geneva resolution was that which set up a committee to organise the measures prescribed by the Covenant for future use against states which repudiated their treaty obligations. It was freely surmised at Geneva that the work of that committee might well constitute the germ of the collective European system proposed on February 3rd. The least

practical part of the resolution was that it did not close the door to Germany. Sir John Simon in his speech emphasised the fact of that famous door. Was it really business-like to say to Germany: "The door is open; please enter, but before you enter it must be clearly understood that you are a mountebank"! Fear works many oddities. The oddity of the open door was one of the effects of fear upon the Geneva Powers. Moreover, it was as certain as most things can ever be, that after March 16th a further violation of the treaty was inevitable. Were sanctions then to be applied to Germany? March 16th was a fact. Compulsory military service in Germany was an operative reality. Obviously, therefore, there would be some form of military training in the demilitarised Rhineland. Contingents in training would be stationed there. As a direct result of March 16th the treaty would again be violated.

On the very day when the Geneva resolution was passed (April 17th), Herr von Bülow informed Sir Eric Phipps that the obvious effect of the resolution would be to make co-operation with Germany more difficult. That was clearly true: unless Germany were disposed to change her methods of obtaining what she wanted. A hurried conference was held at Munich which was attended by Herr Hitler, Baron von Neurath and Herr von Ribbentrop. It was abruptly broken off on April 19th, when Herr Hitler returned to Berlin by air. The following day was his forty-sixth birthday. It was also Easter Eve. There were those who expected that he would celebrate his birthday by issuing a defiant retort to Geneva. He decided by contrast not to disturb the Easter lull in high diplomacy. He contented himself with a brief document issued from Berlin expressing his displeasure with those who had presumed to sit in judgment at Geneva and reserving to Germany the right to say what she might choose at a later date about the matters at issue.

The three Powers who sat at Stresa happened also to be the guarantor Powers of the Memel Statute. All was not well in Memel, mostly because the German Memellanders took their orders from Berlin. Having at Stresa established what looked like a common front against Germany, the three Powers seized upon Memel as a pretext for displaying their high-minded fairness towards Germany. Their first joint act was to reprimand the Lithuanian Government in the interests of

Germany. On April 19th, they transmitted to the Lithuanian Government a joint representation about the existing situation in the Memel territory. The nature of the Note was understood to be that the existing situation was incompatible with the Statute, and ought to be remedied without delay. It would be wrong to deduce that the three Powers regarded Kaunas as wholly responsible for the difficulties that had arisen. Indeed, on the recent occasion when the German members refused to serve on the Directorate, it was demonstrably the Nazi propaganda emitted by wireless from Berlin that dissuaded them from doing so. Yet the technical situation which justified the intervention of the guarantor Powers was that the Directorate did not rest upon the Chamber's confidence. The joint representation was timely because Mr. Novakas, the Governor of the territory, who last year dismissed the German Directorate and set up an all-Lithuanian body in its place, despite the overwhelming German majority in the Chamber, had now resigned.

In the second week of May a meeting took place at Kaunas of the Foreign Ministers of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, to consider the situation arising from the note of the joint Powers. They reaffirmed their solidarity in policy, as was expected. Estonia and Latvia advised Lithuania to satisfy, if possible, the guarantor Powers of the Memel Statute; and that was also expected. The practical difficulty was how to satisfy them. After receiving the Note the Lithuanian Government offered three out of the five seats on the Directorate to the German Memellanders. The offer was refused. The Lithuanian Government also arranged for the holding of elections to the Memel Diet in September. Thereby that Government abundantly proved its desire to behave correctly. It would, however, be absurd to expect from Lithuania any spontaneous sense of friendliness towards Germany.

As long ago as last autumn the Lithuanian Government circulated to the three guarantor Governments a dossier of evidence about the activities of the German Nazis in the Memel territory. The substantial truth of the allegations therein contained could not be doubted, nor could any surprise be thereby caused. In the matter of public education, for example, the Memel Statute provides that the organisation and administration be left in the hands of the autonomous bodies, but that the Central Lithuanian Government should

have the right of general supervision. Up to last year the Lithuanian Government refrained from exercising its right. It had, however, become increasingly clear that the German Government during the past two years had used the schools in the Memel territory as a means to its own ends. In March of last year, therefore, the Lithuanian Government appointed a school inspector to investigate what was taking place. He visited about thirty of the 244 schools in the territory with such result that the Government decided to institute a fuller enquiry. The final result was to establish the fact that two local Nazi organisations—the *Sozialistische Volksgemeinschaft* and the *Christliche Sozialistische-Arbeitsgemeinschaft*—taking their orders from Berlin, had re-staffed the schools. Most of the new teachers were either ignorant of the Lithuanian language or spoke it badly; the walls of the schools displayed portraits of German personalities and pictures of German scenery, the Lithuanian state emblem being found in only one school; the curriculum in history and geography was taken wholly from the Prussian school curriculum; text-books were nearly all German; and class-teaching was used to expound German diplomatic aims. In several such text-books it was stated that the Memel territory had been taken from Germany by the Treaty of Versailles and handed over to Lithuania against the wish of the inhabitants ("*gegen den Willen der Einwohner*"). During the course of the enquiry many of the teachers confessed to having received financial inducement to inculcate German ideas in their pupils; some of them confessed to having been to Berlin for a course of instruction in propaganda, one such course having been addressed by Herr Hitler.

The sympathy of the other two Baltic countries, Estonia and Latvia, was put into formal operation on February 6th, when the three countries sent identic Notes to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, intimating their intention to act jointly at League elections and to adopt a principle of rotation in their representation at Geneva. The Notes also protested against the fact that the Baltic States were not represented on any of the League's permanent commissions and did not occupy a seat on the Council.

On December 14th last the trial began before a military court in Kaunas of 126 Memellanders accused of treason. The trial ended on March 26th, when four of the accused were

sentenced to death for the murder of a Nazi who had betrayed their secrets; two were sentenced to life imprisonment for attempted murder; several others, including an ex-President of the Memel Diet, Herr Dressler, to eight years' imprisonment, seventy others to terms of imprisonment of six years or less; and thirty-five were acquitted. The volume of feeling created in Lithuania was illustrated in Kaunas on March 31st, when a demonstration of about 4,000 students protested against German interference in Lithuanian affairs, in particular against German wireless attacks on Lithuania. On April 1st, that is a few days after his return from Berlin, Sir John Simon in the House of Commons announced that the British, French and Italian Governments had represented to the Lithuanian Government that the existing situation in Memel was incompatible with the Statute and that it ought to be remedied without delay. It was on April 5th that Mr. Novakas resigned. He was succeeded by Mr. Kurkauskas. On the same day the Lithuanian Government officially protested to the German Government against its interference in Lithuanian internal affairs. The formal joint Note of the guarantor Powers of the Memel Statute, referred to above, was delivered in Kaunas on April 19th. In that Note (the text of which was not published) it was pointed out that the Chamber had not sat effectively for nearly a year, and that there was no Directorate in being which rested upon the Chamber's confidence. The Lithuanian Government's answer (April 28th) was to the effect that the steps taken in Memel resulted from the treasonable activities directed from abroad.

If it was the intention of the three Powers to impress Germany with their own fairmindedness and impartiality and thereby to induce in Germany a spirit of peace and reason, they quickly learned that their effect had been nothing of the kind. On April 27th, for the second time in little more than a month, the German Government precipitated a major diplomatic crisis in Europe. What happened on March 16th, when that Government repudiated the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, was equalled when it became known that the same Government had decided immediately to lay down twelve submarines of 250 tons. What made the news the more serious was its background. It had already been arranged that German naval experts should come to London in the second week of May to make known what their Government's

ultimate naval claims might be. Before that meeting could take place Germany presented an accomplished fact: a tactic which closely followed that which had been adopted in the case of land armaments. The German decision violated the articles of the treaty, which forbade any submarines to Germany, but in the existing circumstances the mere violation of the treaty was of less interest than the facts of Germany's armaments. It was reported on authority which one had no alternative but to believe (and responsible circles in London confirmed their substantial accuracy) that the designs for those twelve submarines were drawn up at the end of last year, that the manufacture of the parts was carried out during the winter, and that orders were given in the second week of April to begin the work of assembly. According to a statement attributed to "A Government spokesman" in Berlin Germany was not planning the construction of any submarines or of any ships above the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, and would not do so in advance of the meeting in London between the German and British naval experts. No such denial was made on full official authority, nor to the official quarter of any other country. In default, therefore, of a full official statement by the German Government, known and established facts clearly could not be shaken by a semi-official denial. The origin of the meeting arranged for the second week of May was that the claim made when Sir John Simon visited Berlin to the effect that Germany's fleet should amount to the equivalent of between thirty-five per cent. and fifty per cent. of British tonnage, was rejected by Sir John Simon as inadmissible to the British Government. What the British Government did, therefore, as a friendly gesture, was to suggest that if Germany wished to communicate her considered views on that matter, British official representatives would meet the German representatives in London to receive them, without prejudice to any treaty arrangements, and without any question that the British Government could take any unilateral action.

The gravity of the disclosure made on April 27th was deepened by the fact, now in its turn established, that when Herr Hitler informed Sir John Simon that Germany had attained parity in the air with Britain, he intended to convey, even though, in fact, he did not convey, that he meant parity with the British Empire. Although precise official figures are

not available, what is available is that Germany's present air force outnumbers Britain's present air force by two to one. The British home defence force numbers fewer than 500 planes. The German force numbers at least 1,000 planes. The information about Germany's general military strength accumulates fast. There is good ground for the assertion that Germany has amassed a reserve supply of petrol equal to the whole amount of petrol used in Germany during the past twelve months. A leading British rubber company is known to have encountered difficulties in Germany as a result of a condition lately imposed upon that company's operations in Germany, to the effect that in the future it must maintain a largely increased stock of rubber in Germany.

In short the whole history of Europe in its diplomatic aspect since March 16th has centred on a universal fear of Germany. The Baltic countries; Russia; the Little Entente countries; Italy; France; and Great Britain: all of them were in effect asking the same question, namely does Germany want war? It was well enough known that any member of the German Government, if asked that question, would honestly answer No. The technical military experts in Berlin were known to hold the view that Germany was not yet ready to join issue with the whole of the rest of Europe; the politicians in Berlin were known to hold the view that Germany would be able to obtain all that she wanted without the need of going to war. But the basis of that political belief was Germany's military strength. The mentality of the German people is an abiding obstacle to any feeling of diplomatic comfort in Europe. On May 2nd General Göring was the guest of the Foreign Press Association in Berlin. He made a speech. If he were an Englishman or a Frenchman, or an Italian or Russian, his thunderous but rather babyish simplicity would be attractive. Being a German, with the combined simplicity of 70,000,000 fanatically patriotic Germans behind him, and with not a glimmer of humour to leaven the mass, his arrogance alarms every human being in Europe. He stated, in all solemnity—"without arrogance"—that no enemy had ever seen his (General Göring's) back: and gave that historic truth as an earnest of the further truth that the German air force ("trained in the spirit of Bülcke and Richthofen") was sworn to unbounded self-sacrifice for the Fatherland. He boasted of his own creation of the German

air force "at a single blow." But that was not the main point. The point was that ever since May 2nd it was a commonly accepted open secret that on that occasion General Göring demanded for Germany an air strength equal to the combined air strength of any two other European Powers, and that the German Government had censured the newspaper reports of that particular passage in the speech. By the middle of May General Göring was categorically denying that he had said any such thing. His denial caused satisfaction, because it suggested that the Stresa agreement and the Geneva resolution had together induced a certain hesitancy in German exuberance. Indeed by the second week of May the various Ambassadors in Berlin were sending to their respective capitals a hint that the German Government was disposed to present a more conciliatory front to Europe. Sir Eric Phipps was understood to have conveyed such hints to the British Foreign Office.

It happened that a foreign affairs debate took place at Westminster on May 7th. Sir Eric's first hint had already been received. It is necessary to bear that background in mind if one is fully to appreciate an interesting and important speech made in that debate by Lord Stanhope. He said that a mere reiteration of Germany's desire for peace would serve no practical purpose—we have heard it often—but that a definite proposal to such an end would be welcomed as a practical means to the resumption of negotiation. It is indeed a remarkable thing that since Germany withdrew from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations on October 14th, 1933, the test of whether Europe was tending towards war or towards settled peace has been universally recognised to be the measure of practical progress made towards an agreed limitation of armaments. Before 1933, it is true, no serious person could expect any such progress because Germany was not honestly offered equality. The reason for such a denial may be humanly understandable; but the fact could hardly encourage an armaments settlement which necessarily postulated German agreement and participation. Since then, however, there has never been any doubt of Germany's actual equality both in status and in deed. What has been the result? Herr Hitler has protested *ad nauseam* that Germany wants peace. The other Powers have made proposals for ensuring the peace, in particular by the

Anglo-French proposal of February 3rd. Germany has rejected every proposal, and has never made any alternative proposal, has, in fact, refused to discuss any proposal. Is it surprising that Germany's goodwill is doubted? If by the time this paper sees the light Herr Hitler decides to remove such doubts by making a German proposal of a practical and reasonable kind, he will cause profound relief throughout the world, and will, at the same time, remove the main remaining obstacle to the world's recovery from the great economic and financial catastrophe.

Outside of Germany the movement for an agreed system of security in Europe has not abated since February 3rd. The journeys of Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden in March and April were followed by a somewhat similar pilgrimage on the part of M. Laval, who reached Warsaw on May 10th and Moscow on May 13th. A Franco-Russian pact of mutual assistance had just been concluded. The preliminary negotiations had been suspended in April owing to a French objection to Russia's proposed "automatic clause," whereby France would be obliged to go to war in support of Russia in the event of Russia's being attacked. The hitch had not been serious. There never was any real conflict of purpose between Paris and Moscow. The delay was due to the need of careful drafting. Mr. Litvinov understood, but his colleagues at home did not at first understand, the vital importance to France of a meticulous respect for the Locarno and League Covenant formulæ. In the event, the "automatic clause" was excluded, and the pact became a recognisable offshoot of the League Covenant. The final text was signed in Paris on May 2nd, and published on the following day. Its importance consisted in the fact that thereby Russia was formally engaged in the European collective system of security, which is the great object of contemporary European diplomacy.

Concurrently Signor Mussolini has been busily engaged in preparing for the Rome Conference which is to be held in June. Italian, Austrian and Hungarian representatives met in Venice on May 4th to make a preliminary survey of a difficult problem. One of the Stresa paragraphs foreshadowed the revision of treaty armaments for Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, but stipulated that such revision should constitute an integral part of a system of security. As was both inevitable and right, the Little Entente countries argued that the

effective arms revision should follow, not precede, the security system. The Rome Conference in fact, though it is to be a separate episode, and its formal scope is to be Danubian, is inextricably involved in the general problem of European security. The Balkan Entente countries met in Bucharest on May 10th for a conference on the relationship of the Rome Conference to the European problem.

One of the baffling aspects of all diplomacy is that nationalist feeling tends to breed emotion of a fanatical and even religious intensity. In Germany the contemporary fever of pagan religion has a clearly militarist motive and is therefore dangerous. Evidence accumulates that the "German Faith Movement," as preached for example by Dr. Hauer, not only exacerbates the still raging religious war within Germany, but constitutes something like the culmination of Nazi political dreams in the world at large. The theory is that the German race is a direct vehicle of divinity (this is solemnly preached in that literal, simple form); that German Nazism is therefore divine in origin and in mission, and that the mission amounts to nothing less than the total and general suppression of Christianity. The parallel with Russian paganism just after the war is only partial, for the diplomatic aspect of Germany's case is not only greater, but more alarming.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

May 15th, 1935.

THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM.

LIBERALISM was the characteristic feature of nineteenth-century history. It was the outcome of many forces, but chiefly of English parliamentarianism, of eighteenth-century Voltairianism, and of the French Revolution. This last movement, the French Revolution, had an extreme, a "Jacobin" period, but was gradually taken into control by the moderate elements in France, by the bourgeoisie. Under their guidance the Revolution became a movement for political and social liberty which was soon regarded as a new Gospel all over Europe. The type of mind which regards liberty as the supreme good of mankind, as the requisite for spiritual and indeed for any sort of progress, was called Liberal. In this sense the word *liberal* was first used in Spain in 1816; the opposite term was *servil* but has since been replaced by "conservative." Needless to say, the terms liberal and conservative, as used to describe political movements or people on the Continent, have nothing to do with the two English parties to which these names are also applied. In the Continental sense of the words the English Liberals and Conservatives are all *liberal* because their principles are individual liberty and government by the people, though they may differ in their application of these principles.

Of the three "watchwords" of the French Revolution, European liberalism explicitly retained one, "liberty"; it retained the third, "fraternity," vaguely yet honestly, that is, it held that when all nations were liberal they would recognise each other as brothers and comrades; regarding the second revolutionary watchword, "equality," liberalism only accepted it as meaning equality before the law, for which all liberals passionately stood. But for equality in the "socialist" sense of the word, an equal share of the national income for everyone, they had no sympathy at all. The European liberals were not, and are not, "egalitarian."

Hegel is the author of the famous saying that the history of mankind is the history of liberty; and Benedetto Croce says that the history of Europe in the nineteenth century is the history of liberalism. In the struggle against the despotism of Napoleon the peoples of Central and Western Europe, or at any rate the educated portions of them, became acutely conscious of their need for liberty and of its spiritual value.

They had been promised by their old monarchies that when the struggle should be over and the new age come, they would have liberty. The Peace Treaties of 1815 and the years which immediately followed were a great disappointment to these hopes. Only a few constitutions, of very restricted scope, were established. The absolute monarchs and the classes which had formerly governed Europe under the *ancien régime* were still the implacable foes of liberalism. The "party of resistance," the conservative forces, for which the Austrian Chancellor Metternich and the "Holy Alliance" of monarchs stood, managed to control affairs. Although liberal opinion spread among the "bourgeoisie" and among the manual workers, little formal progress was made in regard to the liberalising of political institutions before 1848.

In that year, as if all secular aspirations and progressive forces found their meeting-point almost at the exact middle of the century, revolutions broke out or were attempted in practically every capital in Continental Europe except in Russia. All at once and everywhere the imposing structure of absolute monarchy fell like a house of cards. The Press censorship, the secret police, the "curators" of universities, the remnants of serfdom, the fiscal immunities of nobles and clergy, were swept away. Every monarch, who had not already done so, granted a constitution to his people; and parliaments based on popular suffrage met in every capital. It is true that all these gains were not equally retained everywhere. The *ancien régime*, after the first shock and collapse, gathered itself together and recovered a good deal of its power, notably in Austria, Prussia, and, strangely, under the name of Napoleon, in France. Certain basic principles of liberalism, however, had been adopted and were not lost or were gradually restored: equality before the law, a free Press, representative assemblies, right of public meeting, careers "open to talent." To complete the liberal system it was necessary that the executive governments in each country should be made responsible to the representative assemblies as in the British constitution. The fifty or sixty years after 1848 did bring the adoption of "responsible government," in theory at least if not in practice, all over Europe except in Russia and the German Empire. The *ancien régime*, in these two countries, however, was unable to stand the strain of the World War of 1914-18 and was swept away at or before the

end of it. The Habsburg Monarchy, which had in practice since about 1900 suspended its liberal constitution, was also destroyed in the World War. Thus, by 1918 or 1919 the historical process of the nineteenth century seemed to have reached its goal; absolutism had disappeared from Europe, and the future seemed to be with liberalism. This was the way in which the French historian, Charles Seignobos, regarded the World War: as the exposure and ruin of absolutism, the colossal storm and catastrophe in which only liberal institutions had been strong enough to survive.

Actually, as events have proved, the *welthistorische Aspekt* (to use an expressive German phrase) is not so simple as that. It is impossible for the historian to say: "Former things have passed away, behold all things are new." Monarchical absolutism was not the only opponent of liberalism in the nineteenth century. In the year 1848, the year of liberal revolutions, people, through the publication of a verbose and rambling but powerfully expressed *Communist Manifesto*, began to be dimly conscious that a new form was coming into the complexity of European society. The class war for the destruction of the "bourgeoisie" which was proclaimed by Karl Marx did not, of course, aim at destruction for destruction's sake. It was to be undertaken with the object of bringing about complete equality in society. Since the Middle Ages the liberal elements in European society, generally called the bourgeoisie, had been struggling, successfully, to destroy feudal privileges and inequalities. Communism was now to extend this process towards property, interpreting equality not only in a legal and spiritual but also in a strictly materialist aspect. Alexis de Tocqueville, the most distinguished thinker of the liberal school, a passionate lover of liberty, viewed this historic process of equalisation with apprehension. "He saw, during the last seven hundred years of history, society rushing madly towards equality, and in this contemplation a sort of religious terror pervaded his spirit. . . . This rush towards equality, even if it seems to be pointed to by the finger of God, threatens human society with anarchy and in its train despotism and servitude." * Heine, writing in 1840, expressed a similar view in looking forward to Communism with alarm: "and ah, it was not disguised. In very truth it is only with dread and horror that

* B. Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (trans., 1934), p. 147.

I think of the time when these gloomy iconoclasts will gain power." Absolute equality, legal, economic, social, as between all citizens in a state is possible, but only through the maintenance of an iron despotism.

In spite of the rise of communism, however, liberalism on the whole held the field as the characteristic movement, the characteristic school of political and social thought and action, in the nineteenth century. Naturally, being a movement for freedom, it was associated with a national movement, that is with the claim within large groups of people to live together and to manage their own affairs, to be independent states. This "national" aspect of the liberal movement was emphasised in people's minds because Italian liberalism, which drew the attention of all Europe in the middle nineteenth century, was necessarily involved in the effort to expel a foreign dominion, the Austrian, from Italy. Yet the basic principle of liberalism in Italy was not "racism" but liberty; it was not that the Italians felt themselves to be different from, or superior to, other races, but that they wanted to be free. Thus the message of Giuseppe Mazzini was not a message to the Italians only but to all peoples; and it was felt as such by the Swiss, Belgians, Norwegians, Poles, and all peoples who were conscious of the desire to live not merely as free individuals but as free groups, that is, states.

Thus among every people, with one exception, even in Russia, liberalism advanced during the nineteenth century. The one exception was Germany, where in 1848-9 it received a severe and for a long time decisive check. In the first half of the nineteenth century in spite of the opposition of Metternich and the conservative princes, nobles and bureaucrats, the liberal movement made marked, if not steady, progress. By 1848-9 the process seemed to be almost complete. A united German parliament, legally elected by the whole people in every German state, assembled at Frankfort, adopted a parliamentary constitution, and offered a constitutional Imperial crown to King Frederick William IV. He refused it, April 3rd, 1849. The liberal parties were disheartened, almost stunned. They fell into disintegration; and the field was left clear for Bismarck to achieve German unity through one state, Prussia, conquering and in effect absorbing (with the exception of Austria) all the rest. Union by means of conquest was, of course, the exact opposite of liberalism,

and the negation of all that the liberals had been working for. The liberals seem to have been themselves overwhelmed by the success of blood and iron, and to have lost all faith in themselves. Nevertheless, the Bismarckian authoritarian empire had really the seeds of dissolution within itself, for it lacked the solidarity, the spiritual cohesion, of a state based on freedom and consent. There was an internal struggle, a suppressed civil war, going on inside the Empire all the time. The failure of the Empire in the World War inevitably caused the collapse of the authoritarian Imperial régime; and in 1919 Germany, and with it all Europe, except the Soviet Republic, was liberal. Every people outside Soviet Russia was free and independent, governing itself under a liberal constitution and parliamentary system. Thus by 1919 the long process of European history, so eloquently described by Croce as the emergence, development and struggle of the liberal ideal, seemed to be completed. Liberalism had come into its own. If there were some serious social outbreaks and political troubles in 1919, these were regarded as the aftermath of the war, which would disappear as the world settled down into the normal life and ways of peace.

Precisely the contrary, however, of all this happened. The liberal governments have fallen, the liberal constitutions have been suspended, and the liberal groups or parties have been suppressed in two of the Great Powers of Europe, and in a third, Russia, they have never existed at all since 1919 or earlier. In the Balkan states likewise the liberal constitutions are not being observed in the spirit, nor indeed always even in the letter. In Austria there is an authoritarian régime, and in Hungary the authoritarian element is at any rate fairly prominent. The Spanish liberal-socialist Republic with difficulty maintains itself, and might be forced into a dictatorship which indeed Spain has already experienced under the late Primo di Rivera. In Holland, Belgium and the Scandinavian states liberal institutions still remain, their enlightened populations clinging, as it were, to a political faith in which, in the present distresses and discontents, they can find little satisfaction. Twice, at least, in the last ten years, liberal France verged towards the *sauve qui peut* that leads to dictatorship, and was saved, by narrow margins, through the resolute action of two old men, M. Poincaré and M. Doumergue.

The reasons for this dramatic and rapid collapse of great political parties, of this burying of a great ideal, are really not far to seek. Two preponderating causes may be assigned. One cause is communism, the other is authoritarianism. In 1919 the chief, the obvious, foe of liberalism was the communist. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" is the antithesis of liberalism. For years after 1919 it seemed that the future lay between these two, between communism and liberalism, and the struggle was intense—in Italy, in Germany, in Spain, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria; there were symptoms of the communist menace in other more securely established states. On the whole, the liberals did not stand up badly. The struggle was exhausting, and communism, at times, when unemployment was particularly severe, gained recruits; but at other times it lost them. In the years of especial depression, from 1929 to 1932, the communists made rather alarming headway in Germany; but they were still only about one in six of the voters, and would diminish with better times.

While beset, however, on one side by communism, liberalism was being undermined from the other side by authoritarianism. The absolute monarchies, the former foes of liberalism, had disappeared at the end of the World War; but in another guise the absolutist forces remained, the absolutist ideal was cherished. The place of Metternich and the monarchs of the Holy Alliance has been taken, in the post-war world, by the dictators. For the principle of divine right which the absolute monarchs upheld, the dictators substitute the right of leadership—non-elected leadership, because election would lead back to liberalism.

Beset by these two adversaries, liberalism has in many countries been overwhelmed. After years of lacerating struggle with one, it is suddenly attacked and overborne by the other. The two adversaries never combine; they are sworn enemies to each other. But one reaps advantage of the efforts and sacrifices of the other. In Italy the liberal régime had been for three years struggling against communist strikes and communist propaganda. It had (so the liberals claim) succeeded in 1922 in overcoming the danger and in restoring social and economic stability; and just at that moment the Fascists marched on Rome and inaugurated absolutist or "authoritarian" government. In Germany

the situation was probably graver, but not desperate. The communist propaganda, communist attacks, were growing in intensity in 1932; but there had been as bad times before, and the liberal government had not shrunk from facing civil war. But the tensivity of the struggle with communism during the great economic depression of 1929-32 was, of course, particularly exhausting; and it was probably when the worst point had been reached and when the liberal régime was likely to have better fortune that, suddenly, authoritarianism intervened; Brüning was displaced by Von Papen.

Thus the danger to the liberalism of the twentieth century is acute. This comes from the persistence of old, nineteenth-century absolutism in the form of fascism or authoritarianism. And on the other hand there is the emergence of communism as an aggressive, powerful, and active movement. The situation is all the more dangerous because, if liberalism is engaged in a desperate struggle (as in Germany) with communism, the authoritarian forces attack in the name of saving society from the red terror. Moreover, the liberal governments cannot, owing to their nature, proceed against the communists by sheer violence. As liberal governments they stand for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, equality before the law, government by consent and discussion. They believe that communists, like other political groups, have a right to express themselves and to be heard and to be reasoned with, and that so long as the law of the land is observed, no party or opinion shall be put under a ban. They believe that error is exposed by publicity and that truth will thus in the long run triumph. But the process of convincing opponents by argument and experience is slow, and at times this method of freedom seems like letting the forces of anarchy and disorder grow almost unchecked.

While this appears to be a fairly correct analysis of the situation, liberals would be wrong in drawing a pessimistic conclusion therefrom. It was the alarming rise and apparently rapid increase of communism after the World War which induced large sections of the bourgeoisie to abandon liberal principles and to adopt the authoritarian ideal. The communists must by this time, however, see that the "World Revolution" has failed. They are never going to be allowed to repeat the kind of success which they achieved in Russia in 1917.

Moreover, with the lightening of the economic depression, communism will undoubtedly lose much of its appeal. Communism is largely the child of misery, of under-nourishment, of unemployment, of the brooding sense of grievance against society. A decent public provision for the poor is, as Dr. Johnson remarked to Boswell, one of the marks of a civilised state; and much is done in the liberal states to meet at any rate the immediate needs of the unemployed and under-paid workers. But the persistence of the economic depression makes the task of public assistance authorities more and more difficult; and in any case relief or insurance benefit is no final solution of the problem. The economic depression must be dispersed if liberal régimes are to revive; and it will never be dispersed by policies of economic isolation or self-sufficiency. Also states should help each other, and at any rate the liberal states which are based on the principle of freedom should do so. The Dutch Government in 1932 produced an excellent scheme for an all-round trade agreement between Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg and any other states which should care to join the association. The scheme was put into the form of a treaty (Treaty of Ouchy), was accepted by the first three states, but never came into effect owing to an objection from the British Government, which would not join, but at the same time insisted upon its "most-favoured-nation" position. The Treaty of Ouchy was open to accession not only by liberal states but by any state whatever. A bloc of liberal states contrasted with "authoritarian" states would not be a good thing for Europe or the world; but it seems likely that a trade agreement on a larger basis than the highly unsatisfactory bilateral agreements which deal with only two countries and one or two commodities could be most easily originated among liberal states, by tradition attached to the ideal of free trade.

Tolerance is not very fashionable in Europe just now. Yet the European liberal was always tolerant; and in the nineteenth century, being national, was friendly to all nations. For nineteenth-century liberal-nationalism was not a principle of division but of association. Nationality to the liberal was his people's personality: their history, traditions, memories, social habits, philosophy of life. It was natural to the liberal to want to see his people united, self-governing, independent; for this was freedom. And it was equally natural to him to

recognise that every other people had a similar claim to be united, to realise each their national personality. This liberal recognition of every people's claim was to be, for instance in Mazzini's view, the unifying bond in Europe: the brotherhood of nations.

Twentieth-century nationalism is something different from this: it is egoistic, self-assertive, intolerant and largely inspired by hate. There is nothing liberal about this, nor is it in accord with the nineteenth-century tradition; it should be called neo-nationalism, not nationalism. Croce, the philosophical-historical exponent of liberalism, would like to call it *activism*. Activists are the kind of people who hate their neighbours and trample upon minorities, refuse to recognise any responsibility outside their own frontier, loathe imports, exclude strangers, and make a god of their collective *ego*.

In some quarters there is or was a tendency to identify liberals with the bourgeoisie, but the identification is not one of principle if the bourgeoisie are regarded as a class. For liberalism is an ideal and transcends class-distinctions. The bourgeois is usually a liberal; but the liberal principle is cherished by many people usually regarded as outside the bourgeois *milieu*. Being an ideal, liberalism is something to work for and live for; and those other people who cherish non-liberal ideals are, naturally, equally entitled to live for and work for theirs. Croce, after going through his long "meditation" on the nineteenth century, concludes with an eloquent appeal, vibrant with emotion, passionate in sincerity, tolerant and liberal in expression:

A history inspired by the liberal idea cannot, even in its practical and moral corollary, end with the absolute rejection and condemnation of those who feel and think differently. It simply says to those who agree with it: "Work according to the life that is here laid down for you, with your whole self, every day, every hour, in your every act; and trust in divine Providence, which knows more than we individuals do and works with us, inside us, and over us." Words like these, which we have often heard and uttered in our Christian education and life, have their place, like others from the same source, in the "religion of liberty."

R. B. MOWAT.

* B. Croce, *History of the Nineteenth Century*, ad fin.

PERPETUAL PEACE, OFFICIAL SCHEMES AND PROJECTS.

WHEN I bade farewell to President Wilson on his return to America, I ventured the remark that the Treaty of Versailles was rather a treaty of war than of a "firm, just and durable peace." Instead of eventual reconciliation which a treaty of peace implied, the Treaty of Versailles was a treaty of "durable" strife, in which the conquered nation would seek for years to come to throw off the burdens imposed on it. "It could not be helped," President Wilson said. But he insisted that each treaty of peace should be preceded by the Covenant of the League of Nations, which should form an integral part of the treaties in question. "Besides," he added, "for the first time a treaty following a great war contains within its four corners the conditions on which the conquered party may apply for revision, when the time comes for such revision."

The Covenant was not all he wanted, and he had inserted a provision in it for the establishment of an International Court. This Court would be able to interpret the clauses of the Covenant in the sense of that peace which, he hoped, would eventually be established among the military powers of the world. Disarmament was only one of the objects of the document, if indeed it is one at all, for it does not abolish armaments entirely, but leaves each state to fix what is necessary to its "safety." It is true that "safety" leaves a wide margin to the operating state which reduces disarmament to the limit determined by its geographical situation as well as by its domestic requirements.*

Since the formation of the League of Nations at Geneva, the Permanent Court of International Justice has been established at The Hague and has been in full operation for two periods of its existence. It is well known that the Court

* A prominent advocate of the League, however, writes me as follows: "... My impression is that if Great Britain does not lose courage and accept defeat, we shall get through our present troubles and probably bring off a real Disarmament Convention the next time we try or the next time but one. The League certainly seems to be rather up in the world. The accession of Russia, together with Turkey, Mexico, Ecuador and Afghanistan not only strengthens the League immensely but shows how the wind is blowing. All these places feel that they are safer inside the League than out."

has a twofold function to perform. It is on the one hand the final tribunal between states, and on the other it has the duty of advising the League on points submitted to it by the latter. It is, moreover, composed of international jurists of European repute who have the sense of their responsibility, apart from their duty to the state to which they owe allegiance. Thus far the League of Nations and the Permanent Court have fulfilled their purposes as well as could be expected for such novel institutions. It is to be assumed that nations must have time to adapt themselves morally to the idea that they have a common interest.

The Covenant provides that no state shall withdraw purely and simply from the League. Germany and Japan have given notice of their retirement; the one is still liable to its obligations under its engagement.* That they will return to the League, which, after all, is the best guarantee that exists of their freedom from the scourge of war, is not a matter of doubt.

That the League of Nations is not a super-state has been claimed for it, but I cannot regard the acceptance of the dispositions of the Covenant as otherwise than the curtailment of the autonomy of the adherent states. The Covenant contains restrictions to which the parties of the League have consented. Does this constitute the League a super-state? If the answer is affirmative, we can leave the question alone. The League is not an empire such as existed under Rome, where every province had its prefect or governor, nor that of Charlemagne, nor that of Charles V. Their component parts enjoyed in general their civil autonomy, but a common ruler centralised the foreign policy of the vast domain held by them. This brings us down to the French Revolution, when men's minds were turned towards the power of the majority to dictate to the minority. The French Revolution eventuated once more in the idea of empire. Whether Napoleon had read among the historical writings he appears to have liked the Abbé Saint-Pierre's work on peace, which my friend Professor Sarolea has so well described in the August 1934 number of the *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, is uncertain. But it is probable that he had among his books Kant's pamphlet written, according to his modern translator,

* Japan gave notice of her retirement on March 27th, 1933, and Germany on October 14th, 1933.

Miss Campbell Smith, in her excellent introduction, in 1795; this pamphlet may have influenced Napoleon's idea of a Europe which would have one law, and the continent of Europe would be the common land of all Europeans.

In the famous Memorial of Las Cases* an account was given of the Emperor Napoleon's intentions. The passage given by Las Cases is as follows:

... Peace in Moscow fulfilled put an end to my wars. It was for a great cause, the end of all risks and the beginning of security. A new horizon, new works, were about to develop for the happiness and prosperity of all. The European system was founded, it had only to be organised.

Satisfied as to these great points, and at peace all around, I too should have had my Congress and my Holy Alliance; these ideas have been stolen from me. In such an assembly of sovereigns we should have discussed our interests in a family spirit.

The cause of the time was won, the revolution over. We had only to put together what had not been destroyed. That was my task. I had been preparing it for a long time, at the cost of my popularity maybe. But that did not matter. I should have become the link between the old and the new alliance, the natural mediator between the old and the new order of things. I possessed the principles and confidence of the one, I had identified myself with the other; I belonged to both, and to each I should have given faithfully their due.

My glory would have been in my spirit of justice.

Europe would soon have contained one same people and everyone when travelling would have found himself always in the common fatherland (*patrie commune*).

Napoleon's idea was partially carried out in Bavaria and in Rhineland, where the French Civil Code remained in force until it was supplanted by the German Civil Code of 1900. The British Empire, which at the present time rather resembles the Roman than Napoleon's idea, has grown up partly by conquest and partly by the play of circumstances, and it has as far as possible respected the principle that each component part of it should be governed by its own laws.

* The Memorial was written largely, according to its critics, from memory of what Napoleon had said, but the passage which is given about Napoleon's intention of a united Europe is not inconsistent with his romantic character coupled with his practical ability.

But to return to the League, it enables the statesmen of different countries to meet each other and understand better each other's outlook. If it has not been able to avoid complications between nations, we must attribute this to the inexperience of youth. After all, it is composed of mortals who know how difficult it is to come to terms on complicated questions with each other. As President Wilson, however, once said to me: "The war has shown that there is a solidarity among mankind. We have a right to good government among our neighbours, and if the Covenant can help in this direction, it will have done good."

As regards President Wilson's proposed Court of International Justice which has since then been established, I must refer here to a man whom I met for the first time at the meeting of the Institute of International Law at The Hague in 1875. I refer to Professor Lorimer of Edinburgh, one of the most subtle thinkers I ever knew.* In Professor Lorimer's book, *Studies National and International*, which his gifted daughter, Lady im Thurn, has edited, he refers to the future in the following terms: "Arbitration too is understood in several senses; but in any other sense than that of a voluntary arrangement between individual states, it presupposes international organisation of such a kind as to render possible the establishment of an international tribunal. Such a consummation I do not regard as impossible, but we are far removed from it as yet. If we ever attain to it it will be probably by the action of those mysterious social forces which time and reason sometimes call into being to the astonishment of mankind. . . ." Professor Lorimer's idea of sixty years ago is now a reality. It must not be forgotten that the President of the Disarmament Commission (Arthur Henderson) is, like Ramsay MacDonald, a socialist, and that Jean Jaurès, the eloquent and powerful exponent of the socialist anti-militarist programme before the war, declared that if his country was invaded by a foreign nation,

* He was one of the specialists on International Law whom Gustave Rolin Jacquemyns originally asked to co-operate with him in the formation of the Institute, which, by the way, held its last meeting in 1934 in Paris under the presidency of the well-known Professor Lyon-Caen. Lorimer was the father of two eminent sons perhaps better known to the general public than Professor Lorimer himself. The one is the distinguished painter, J. H. Lorimer, and the other the well-known architect, now deceased, Sir Robert Lorimer. His elder daughter married Sir Edward im Thurn, the explorer and writer.

every citizen should aid in the repulsion of the invader. In his book *L'Armée Nouvelle*, he says :

What is the use of proclaiming the superiority of militia over the régime of the barracks if the working man of the people does not lend himself to all the free military education, to gymnastic exercises and musket-firing, to open-air manœuvring which will take the place of the fruitless and fatal training of to-day ?

It is curious to see the view of Jaurès concerning militarism. I have heard something similar said by that great anti-militarist, Anatole France.* Why the socialist Jaurès was against a class of military men and yet in favour of military exercises by the whole population is explicable only by the theory that war is made by officers not elected by a popular authority over their heads.

If that was true when Jaurès wrote *L'Armée Nouvelle* (that is before the Great War), it can be maintained by his adherents that his reasons are more cogent to-day than they ever were before. The appliances of war such as machine-guns, asphyxiating and poisonous gases, masks to be worn for protection against them, trenches, damp dug-outs, etc., might be taught to the youth of the nation. On the other hand it is contended, and as I think rightly, that familiarity with the engines of war would promote rather than discourage warfare. The accidents in the Alps do not prevent men from climbing, nor do the accidents in the thoroughfare prevent men and women from exposing themselves to the risks of pedestrianism. Nor, again, do the accidents on the railroad or on the sea or in the air deter mankind from their utilisation. Why, then, should familiarity with the engines of war tend to peace ? Besides, Jaurès' compulsory militia system might evolve into that militarism which the Covenant and the Commission on Disarmament are endeavouring to suppress. All these schemes for the education of democracy in the benefit of peace over war are at present under discussion in a world which is essentially experimental. Old ideas have had to yield to new ones and we are indeed in the midst of a revolution.

Although President Wilson was disavowed by his own countrymen, they have taken the lead in the Briand-Kellogg

* It will be remembered that Anatole France offered himself as a common soldier in defence against the invaders of his country.

Pact under which sixty-three states have agreed to the following clauses : The first article prescribes that

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

The second article prescribes that

The High Contracting Powers agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means.

These clauses bind their peoples under the law of nations, but the *recherché* French dictum probably applies to them as to all far-reaching schemes, "*Qui trop embrasse mal étreint.*"* Federation seems to be gaining the ascendancy. The Little Entente, the Balkan Entente, the Danubian Entente, the Baltic Entente seem to show the direction reforms for the preservation of peace are taking. If so, President Wilson's Covenant as well as the Kellogg Pact will help in the realisation of the common cause of mankind, viz.: that we may enjoy life without that friction which leads to international hatred and eventually to international strife.

One of the points on which President Wilson had to give way was the foreign occupation of the Saar Basin. That he was right in supposing that the Saar was essentially German and should not be torn from the fatherland has been shown by the result of the plebiscite. It must not be thought that the vast majority of the population has given its assent to Hitlerism. A Sarrois voter once told me that as an enemy of Hitler's régime he would nevertheless vote for reunion of his country with Germany, from which it should never have been separated. It is possible no doubt that there are many reasons in favour of keeping the country within the Reich and not the least may be that the majority of the inhabitants of the Saar may throw their political weights against that régime which has not thus far added to the prosperity of the German people.

THOMAS BARCLAY.

* The International Law Association at its meeting at Budapest in 1934, at the suggestion of Mr. W. Bewes, Hon. Secretary of the Association, endeavoured to give legal interpretation to the clauses of the Pact, but has dealt only with the relations of state with state and left aside questions of interpretation however interesting and cogent they may be.

THE INDIANS IN ZANZIBAR AND EAST AFRICA.

A NEW danger is rapidly coming to a head in Zanzibar and East Africa which had not been foreseen in earlier years. The diminution of the Indian population, which could not before be effected by political measures, now seems likely to come about by economic pressure, destructive of Indian trade. The dislike of the Indian by the European in East Africa has been of long standing. Even when it diminishes for a season it crops up again. Though the Indian was there long before the European, the latter still thinks of him as an intruder, and has also persuaded himself that the presence of the Indian is bad for the African. Many Europeans honestly believe this : others use it as a political weapon.

Ten years ago the one persistent aim of the leaders of the Europeans in Kenya was to endeavour to get all Indian immigration stopped by statute. Just as South Africa had "shut the back door" (so the phrase ran), so East Africa must "shut the front door." No further immigration of Indians into Kenya ought to take place on any terms whatever. The "Indian menace" was frequently spoken of in extravagant terms. Lord Delamere and Major Grogan were the promoters of this doctrine of the exclusion of Indians from the whole of Africa. "The front door," proclaimed Major Grogan, "from India into Africa is Mombasa. That door must be shut! Durban has been closed to Indians : Mombasa must be closed also!"

When I was in London, as Adviser to the Kenya Indian Deputation, in 1923, this was the main object which Lord Delamere had in view. He sought to gain it out of the "Kenya Conversations." As it happened, he lost this point, but he gained two things, almost equally important from his own racial standpoint, namely, a racial franchise and a racial bar in the Highlands of Kenya. It was strange that the Colonial Office, which so weakly gave way on the franchise and the Highlands, remained strong on the question of immigration. But there it was. Freedom of Indian immigration was *not* cancelled. The racial bar was not put up on that subject. It was probably only the logic of events that pacified at that time the obstreperous

European colonists. For they were ready to do anything, just then, to get their own way. But facts went against them. It became more and more evident that Major Grogan's cry about "swarms of Indians" coming over in every ship to Kenya was absurd. They never *had* come in "swarms" before ; and they were never likely to do so in the future. Major Grogan and Lord Delamere had cried "Wolf!" too often. In the end, the cry lost its effect.

So, after the "Conversations" in London in 1923, Kenya affairs seemed for a time to settle down. The Europeans felt that they had won completely two out of the three major issues :

1. They had obtained for the future the franchise on a strictly racial basis.
2. They had obtained also the exclusive right of owning agricultural land in the Kenya Highlands.

In this way they had finally established a "colour bar" in East Africa, not unlike that which had already been established in South Africa.

But on the third point, "Restricted Immigration," the Europeans, as I have said, had been defeated. Both Europeans and Indians were allowed to come in on payment of a deposit, provided their entry could not be shown to be detrimental to the interests of the African native. One further point told in favour of the "open door" for Indians into Kenya. Tanganyika, which is Kenya's neighbour, was placed under the League of Nations after the war, as a Mandated Territory. Great Britain took it over in trust from the League of Nations under certain express conditions. One of these conditions was that there should be no discrimination against any nation which was an original signatory of the Covenant of the League. India, as a signatory, held that position. Therefore, Indians could not be excluded from Tanganyika, which was under the Covenant of the League of Nations. This obviously made it more difficult to exclude Indians from Kenya ; for it would be invidious to admit Indians into Tanganyika and exclude them from Kenya. These two practical arguments : (1) That the Indians were not increasing rapidly in Kenya, (2) That the Indians could not be, in any circumstance,

excluded from the neighbouring territory of Tanganyika, told in the end with the European settlers in the Highlands, who were the political leaders in Kenya.

A further event happened later which modified the whole position of the settlers. Sir Francis Scott, who now leads the European settlers, is not so intransigent on the Indian question as these two former leaders were. He has a greater sense of proportion. Therefore, during the past five years the restriction of Indian immigration, which was such a burning question during the Kenya Conversations in London in 1923, has tended to fall more into the background. This does not imply that the Indian in Kenya has become less unpopular with the average European. It only means that the constant anxiety lest the Indian should get the upper hand through weight of numbers has begun to diminish as each year the Government statistics tell the opposite story. The Europeans are increasing, while the Indians are decreasing.

Quite unexpectedly the change in the world economic position has put a new weapon against the Indian into the European settler's hands, and we are on the eve of a new struggle to oust the Indian from East Africa as far as possible, not by political means but by using the new economic factors. This weapon is the employment of economic monopolies for marketing African "native produce." These monopolies would be usually European or State owned, and they would eliminate the Indian trader as middleman and creditor of the African native. The Indian in East Africa from time immemorial has been the trader of African "native produce." He has always pressed forward with his store (or *duka*, as it is called in East Africa), wherever it has been possible to obtain trade. He has marketed for the African native the surplus produce which he wished to sell in order to obtain for himself cotton cloth and other things. In carrying on this form of trade the Indian has often undergone very great hardships; and I have often wondered at his bravery in facing the dangers of the climate and the wild surroundings. He lives out on the edge of the jungle and in the most malarial regions in order to get close to the Africans from whom he purchases goods and to whom he sells goods in return. Very many Indians die of fever. Some are injured by wild beasts, or

even by human violence, in such out-of-the-way places. There is very little police protection.

All these risks are taken for what, after all, is often a miserable pittance. The Indian trader passes a wretchedly lonely existence. No other people would undertake such work, and no European could stand such untoward and solitary conditions. There is competition between these Indian storekeepers, and the African soon realises where he can get the best price for his own produce and also the cheapest cloth for his own use. The one thing that has encouraged the Indian to continue such an isolated existence is the comparative freedom to make his money in his own way, with very little interference and every encouragement given to thrift. Thrift is in his very nature, and here is an open field for it. That is the main inducement to him to live such laborious days. I have often visited such storekeepers, when on tour. They are called *dukawallas* in East Africa. Also I have met them in other parts of the world, such as British Guiana, Fiji, and elsewhere. They are all of the same type. They have many kindly virtues, of which hospitality is one of the greatest. Nothing was too good to offer me on such occasions, if they had anything to offer; and they would be indignant if I ever suggested any payment. I have sat in such shops for hours, after some tiring journey, and have watched the Africans, or other races, come and go, for barter or purchase.

The very first thing which I have noticed is the familiar and friendly relationship between the Indian and the African. The African will stay for hours, loitering about the shop, picking up this or that, and asking its price. Meanwhile others come in, and the shop is almost turned into a club, where they laugh and talk, and in the end make some very small purchases. Never once have I seen any rudeness or rough treatment on the part of the Indian storekeeper. A European would be driven frantic by such methods of business and such leisurely purchasers; but the Indian seems almost to enjoy it! He knows a little of the language of the African, after a curious manner, pronouncing it in his own way, but easily making himself understood. There is no *fear* in the relationship between the two races; and this makes all the difference in a country where the fear of the European is almost everywhere dominant. Only with

some missionaries, who have been able to cast out fear by love, is there such freedom as there is with Indians.

I would like to make this point well understood ; for it is the key to the whole matter. The Indian may have some bad qualities. His penurious thrift may induce him to take advantage of the ignorance of the African. He may drive hard bargains. There may be other vices also. But with him the African is entirely free from the bullying and terrorising which haunt him in the presence of many Europeans and add another fear to his terror-ridden existence. The African can always be at ease with an Indian storekeeper, while he can very rarely be at ease with any European except the missionary. I have seen this, not in one land only, but in many countries, and I have put it to the test in a hundred ways. Therefore I know it to be true.

Let me give one slight example. Only a short time ago I was at Enkeldoorn in Southern Rhodesia, where I stayed for a time, during a long and trying journey, at the store of Mr. Desai. He dealt in what was called "native produce" from the Reserve, which was near at hand. There were about five other Indian storekeepers in the place and we decided to hold a meeting at which I should tell them about the Indian earthquake in North Bihar, and also about Mahatma Gandhi. There were African men and women in the shop who had come out of the Reserve. While we had our meeting, Mr. Desai closed his store. He did it very quietly and the Africans obeyed immediately when he asked them to go outside the shop for a short time. As soon as our meeting was over, Mr. Desai opened his store again, and I noticed that every African, both man and woman, who had been there before, came back to the shop and began bargaining and laughing and talking. Not one had gone away! Surely this complete absence of fear and restraint is a human asset of very great value. I asked Mr. Desai about this, and he said to me that the same leisurely way of doing business, or even of looking on, went on every morning and afternoon, and sometimes late in the evening. It was the only way of doing trade ; and he personally did not mind the inconvenience, for it seemed to suit the African native. But what European could ever afford the time and patience to carry on trade like that ?

The last visit which I have just paid to different parts of

Africa has saddened me. I have been where Indians are congregated, engaged in trade such as I have pictured. On every side I have seen something approaching destitution. Owing to the economic depression, the Europeans who are in authority have determined, *in the interests of the native Africans* (as they assert), to scrap the economic system of trading, bargaining and marketing, in which the Indian has played such an important part, and to make each "native product" a monopoly which only the monopoly-holder can buy and sell under Government authority. It is held that in this way the value of the "native product" can be raised and the African can get a better price for it than he could under the old system of individual bargaining and competition.

Under the old system, the European says, the African native did not get a fair deal. It was ruinous, wasteful, extravagant. Indians, as middlemen and money-lenders on a small scale, really had the African natives at their mercy. Thrift and business astuteness gave the Indian an advantage over the lazy, good-natured African. Furthermore, the European argues, the price of the "native produce" had gone so low, partly owing to unwholesome competition, that the African native and the Indian storekeeper himself were getting nothing out of the trade. The "bottom had gone out of the market."

Thus the European, who is in authority, justifies the creation of these new monopolies controlled by the State, as being the only way of rescuing the trade in "native produce" from bankruptcy. In Zanzibar, for instance, the clove market had very greatly suffered, owing to the economic depression. The Indian middleman had gone on advancing credit to the clove-growers to enable them to tide over the depression. In doing so, without any return, the Indian himself had become nearly bankrupt. The Government was at its wits' end and appointed two Commissions. Mr. C. F. Strickland, an old Indian civilian, was asked to come over and advise the Zanzibar Government on the economic situation. He examined the whole field and warned the Zanzibar Government against the short cut of a monopoly. Instead of this he put forward a carefully thought out scheme of co-operative credit and marketing. This proposal the Indian middleman and traders were

ready loyally to accept and also to help to make it a success. But the Zanzibar Government, listening to the advice of Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Last, two of their own officers who formed the second Commission, decided that Mr. Strickland's proposal would take too long to develop, and the crisis was urgent. Therefore they determined to take the short cut of a "clove monopoly."

It may be said that these economic problems will in the end right themselves; that the Zanzibar Government, when they have burnt their own fingers over a state monopoly, will come back to the old method of trade which they are now discarding. It may be said, further, that in Kenya and Tanganyika things may right themselves in their own way, by the inevitable law of supply and demand, which is greater than all monopolies. Then the Indian trader will have his rightful place given to him once more. This argument is being used by those who have given way to the new economic pressure and failed to resist it. But meanwhile far more serious things are happening. Fundamental rights are being threatened. For instance, in Zanzibar one of the methods of obtaining a state monopoly in marketing is to make the land of Zanzibar inalienable to Indians. But this takes away, at one sweep, the right of land purchase, which Indians as citizens have possessed for over a hundred years. The land of Zanzibar has now been alienated from Indians in the same way as the Kenya Highlands. No Indian can now purchase land without the Resident's sanction. With one stroke of the pen this fundamental human right is abolished by racial legislation.

Or again, to show what is happening beyond repair, owing to these new monopolies in "native produce" the Indian storekeeper is almost doomed. The only fate left to him will be to take a post under the monopoly itself. This monopoly, however, is almost certain to fall into the hands of a European, and the European may act on the principle of eliminating as many Indians as possible. He may even take credit for doing so, and believe that he is "protecting the African native." If he adopts this position the Indian must leave the country. Even to-day the result of this has become obvious. The steamers going back to India are loaded with deck passengers. The net loss of Indian population in Kenya alone during the last six years

has been 6,000 persons. The Indian population has fallen from 40,000 to 34,000, and it is likely to fall even more rapidly if this new economic system of monopolies gets a firmer footing in all the territories. Already this system of monopolies has been adopted and laws have been passed in Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanganyika. Only in Kenya has there been as yet no actual legislation. But we are told that new laws are now impending there also.

The most specious thing about this is that the whole of this economic monopoly system is being put forward in the supposed interest of the native African. He himself, of course, has no voice in the matter. There is no attempt, even, to explain it to him, or to get his own opinion. But the news is circulated everywhere that in these hard economic times the only way to save the African is by means of these monopolies, which will eliminate the middleman, who is making all the profits. Since the middleman is usually an Indian, the matter at once takes a racial aspect. With the well-known dislike of the Indian present everywhere among the European settlers, it is easy to paint the Indian in the darkest colours as being the chief cause of the trade depression and of the misery that has followed from it. In this way prejudices are accentuated, and the bitterness between the races, which seemed to be dying down, has been once more stirred up. The primitive African himself is being taught to look upon the Indian storekeeper as his enemy rather than as his friend.

The picture that I have drawn is a dark one; and it may happen that some sudden rise in staple prices, due to world economic improvement, may take away some of its gloom. But while the present state of things lasts, the position of Indians in East Africa as traders becomes more and more untenable.

C. F. ANDREWS.

WILL THE HAPSBURG RESTORATION SAVE AUSTRIA?

THAT the present Government in Austria endures is due to two factors: one, the internal division of its opponents into two apparently irreconcilable factions and the other, the external fact that Great Britain, France, Italy and the Little Entente deem its continued existence for some time to be an essential requisite for the preservation of European peace. This consideration is, of course, of paramount importance, and it will occur to no friend of peace to quarrel with it. But considerations of this kind are necessarily limited by political possibilities. The clamant question, therefore, arises: "Is it possible for the present régime, even with the moral, diplomatic and economic support of the powers mentioned, to last any appreciable time?" No one acquainted with the state of Austrian public opinion in all classes of society, no one with an insight into what is daily going on under the placid Austrian surface, can answer that enquiry in the affirmative. It is foreign support which for the moment keeps Dr. Schuschnigg in the saddle, and it may possibly succeed in keeping him there until such time as his warring opponents combine forces against him; but it will not be able to do so one day or one hour longer than that.

In February 1934 the "Reds" revolted, the Nazis remained neutral and the Government won hands down. In July 1934 the Nazis rose, the Reds remained quiescent and once again the Government won. But the situation is becoming more tense day by day. Great as undoubtedly is the hatred between the Reds and the Nazis, their common antipathy and even detestation for the present régime is rapidly becoming greater. Already in the dark byways of illegal revolutionary agitation the two hostile factions have ceased to fight each other. No Austrian Nazi to-day would denounce an Austrian Communist to the police—and *vice versa*. On all hands Nazis may be heard to say: "The next time that the Reds rise, Hitler may tell us to be passive as much as he likes, but we shall rise with them!" And again and again in discussing a possible plebiscite Austrian Social Democrats will declare: "If it be a straight issue we would rather run the risk of a Nazi experiment than lend support to the present Government!"

That is the plain unvarnished truth regarding the present situation. One way out of it, of course, would be a revolution. But an Austrian revolution would involve the ghastly risk of setting all Europe ablaze. Another way out has been suggested: to conduct a plebiscite. Certain phrases employed by Chancellor Schuschnigg have been interpreted as indicating a possibility that the Government may ultimately resort to a popular vote. That, indeed, would be a desperate expedient for Herr Schuschnigg, for the result of such a consultation would be an overwhelming and almost contemptuous rejection of the present régime. No other issue is even conceivable unless the electors were given an opportunity of voting for the restoration of a democratic Republic; without that, it would simply be the triumph of Nazism or chaos, and both imply war!

There is a third way out. In many respects it is not ideal. It is open to innumerable objections, but it presents the one advantage, that, of the three alternatives, it is the one least likely to endanger peace. It is the restoration of the Hapsburgs. As such, it is worthy of being closely examined in order to determine the measure of support it has to-day, the manner in which it would be received by the Austrian people, its effects on internal politics, and lastly, its possible consequences in the sphere of foreign affairs.

Half a year ago a restoration was the romantic dream of a few ardent and irrepressible Austrian Legitimists and the secret hankering of a considerable number of very worthy and gallant army officers. Hapsburg propaganda was fitful, and on the whole feeble, and above all else it was purely artificial. With one exception members of the former dynasty avoided Austrian soil. The masses of the people were supremely indifferent. Foreign powers were unanimously hostile. Government spokesmen, when they referred to the question, declared that it was a purely academic matter of no political interest. To-day that is completely changed. In the first place—for in this mundane and material world, money perforce takes first place—the Hapsburg funds are flowing freely. Whence they have suddenly sprung is a minor mystery. The fact is, they are there. It may be merely one of those accidents of time and circumstance that their welcome appearance should so fittingly coincide with a visit which Dr. Weiser, one of the moving spirits of the Bank of

International Settlements in Bâle, paid to Vienna, where he had repeated and long conferences with Archduke Eugene. After that, Hapsburg archdukes descended upon Vienna suddenly like a cloud of locusts. Every big gala and dance during this Vienna season has seen a bevy of them. At the official Ball of the City of Vienna, Archduke Eugene in the full-dress uniform of the *Deutschmeister* Regiment—the premier unit of the old Imperial army—was received with musical honours. Conferences between the leaders of the Legitimists became frequent. Duke Max of Hohenberg received the Press. Baron Erwin Gudenius, Court Chamberlain of "Emperor" Otto came from Steenockerzeel as his august master's personal representative to attend these councils in Hohenburg-an-der-Raab and in Vienna. Some of the minor kinsmen of the Royal House, like Prince Franz Joseph Windischgraetz, grandson of Franz Joseph II., and Dr. Morsey-Picard, husband of Princess Olga Windischgraetz, were, by the Government's connivance, installed as directors of Austria's greatest armaments firm, the *Hirtenberger Patronenfabrik*. Columns of the Press began to fill with Hapsburgian articles. Books galore were published. Thousands upon thousands of photographs and picture postcards of "Emperor" Otto, in the uniform of the Austrian army, made their appearance everywhere. Townships vied with townships in conferring their freedom upon the Pretender. Sporting and shooting clubs and veterans associations elected him as honorary president. Even the Jewish War Veterans' Association sent its president, General Sommer, on a pilgrimage to Steenockerzeel, pledged its allegiance, and was rewarded by receiving, at the hands of Duke Max of Hohenberg, a portrait and an autograph letter of the young "Emperor." This campaign persists, alternately reaching heights of patriotic fervour and depths of sycophantic adulation.

Ten thousand persons assembled recently on the Schwarzenberg Platz in Vienna to attend an open-air mass in memory of Emperor Charles. Members of the Government were present; two thousand uniformed Heimwehr soldiers; a guard of honour in full marching kit with steel helmets and fixed bayonets; and politicians, bankers, society people and archdukes in great array; an incident, it is true, but also a straw showing the direction of the swiftly running stream. In other words, the result of all this campaigning is that within a very

short time the Restoration has become practical politics. The Government continues outwardly to declare that it is not. That is to say the Government as a whole. But some of its leading members, in semi-private and even in public gatherings, sing in an entirely different key. Chancellor Schuschnigg, scion of an old army family, has never made any secret of his strong Royalist convictions. Prince Starhemberg, the leading man in Austria to-day, addressing the assembled Heimwehr officers in Vienna a few weeks since, avowed himself in favour of Otto's return to the throne of his fathers, merely adding the qualifying clause that the Heimwehr (not, be it noted, the Austrian people) would determine the day and the hour of the restoration. The speech in its officially published text was "toned down," but there were at least 2,000 ear-witnesses of his actual declaration. Heinrich Mataja, an ex-minister who stands very close to the present rulers, told the *Ring Oesterreichischer Soldaten* in Vienna recently: "The Legitimist movement is for me an essential part of the great Austrian patriotic revival. . . . We must keep the Legitimist idea rigorously apart from that of a Greater Austria, and we must be content to set the present-day territory of Austria as the limit of the Restoration."

So much, then, for the leaders and politicians; what of the Austrian people? One section, of course, is resolutely opposed to a Hapsburg restoration: the Nazis, for it is obvious that with its arrival all their cherished dream of union with Hitlerite Germany would evaporate once and for all. The Conservative and Roman Catholic elements in the population—and they include not only the aristocracy, the bulk of past and present army officers, but also a large part of the peasantry—are extremely favourable. The Liberal professional and middle classes are in the main not at all hostile to a return to a régime that afforded them far greater liberty and prosperity than they enjoy to-day. The masses of the working classes, while they cannot in view of their inherent Marxist traditions be expected to embrace the idea of kingship, concede willingly enough that a Hapsburg monarchy could not be worse and might be a good deal better than the present system under which they claim that they are misgoverned. Even Communist leaders have said in private conversation that it would not be possible for them to organise a rising of their followers with any hope of success against the restoration.

Thus, from the point of view of Austrian internal policy, the obstacles to a monarchical restoration are few and feeble. The 40,000 resisters, who are the utmost that the Nazis could muster, would be overwhelmed. And from this same point of view it must be confessed that the restoration would present very potent advantages. In actual practice, the policy of a Hapsburg Government possibly might not very essentially differ from that of Dr. Schuschnigg. But it is one thing for the colourless and friendless Chancellor to pursue a certain policy, and an entirely different thing for Otto, heir of the Hapsburg tradition, to do the same. To begin with, the Executive would acquire that which it does not possess to-day, that which it will never secure, and for lack of which it will surely die, namely a broad basis among the masses of the people. That divorce is one of the tragedies of Austrian aspirations for a fuller and a completer national existence. Herein then the Hapsburg tradition is something; the Schuschnigg tradition is nothing, because it never was born.

In another respect the restoration would be a way out of the present impasse. It could, and in all probability would, be used as an avenue towards a return to some measure of political liberty and democratic government. The Schuschnigg cabinet, or its possible successor, a Starhemberg ministry, could not achieve this even had it the will, for there is not one democrat in Austria to-day who would believe in the sincerity of the effort. But a Hapsburg could accomplish it because he would suffer under no such crushing suspicion. It would lie within the tradition of his House—for after all it was under a Hapsburg ruler that parliamentary government in Austria was conceived, and that universal suffrage, liberty of the person and the Press, were conceded to its citizens. In this regard the recent observations of Prince Otto to a French journalist have proved a considerable embarrassment if not an actual drag upon the Hapsburg wheel. With juvenile impetuosity he expressed his warm admiration for a Fascist-Corporative régime. Immediate and somewhat virulent protests from all quarters in Hungary led to a prompt, although only partial, recantation. The young Pretender avowed that his words were only intended to apply to Austria; in Hungary, of course, parliamentary government was inevitable, and even essential. One thing is clear: if a Hapsburg monarchy is to become a permanent solution of

the Austrian problem, it will have to be a constitutional monarchy.

So far, except for the minor difficulties, everything seems plain sailing. But the principal obstacle to a Hapsburg restoration still rears its head, in the form of its international consequences. There seems no apparent reason why any determined opposition should arise from the British side. Great Britain's only aim is the preservation of peace. If a Hapsburg restoration were compatible with that object British interests would be unaffected. It has never been our custom to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. If the Austrians prefer a monarchy, that is their business and not ours. Up to recently Italy has strenuously opposed the idea. Less than a year ago Signor Gayda, inspired by Mussolini, led a chorus in the Italian Press in condemnation of any kind of Hapsburg restoration. It is interesting to note that the captain of the Italian ship of state seems to be trimming his sails to the new breeze. On February 10th, 1935, the *Gazzetta del Popolo*, over the signature of the well-known Fascist publicist, Coppola, printed an article which concluded with a remarkable declaration to the effect that a Hapsburg on the throne in Vienna was in the long run the only guarantee against an extension of German influence to Austria, which would seriously imperil Italian interests. Since nothing is allowed to appear in the Italian Press that is not in conformity with the intentions of the Palazzo Chigi, the publication of that article may be taken as significant. Potentially at least the Italian veto on a revival of a Hapsburg monarchy in Vienna has been removed.

France is in an impasse. Intrinsically there is no more French interest involved than there is British. Speaking generally, an Austrian constitutional monarchy would be viewed by the liberal-minded French people with perhaps more sympathy than the present hybrid Clerico-Fascist imitation of a corporate state. Yet recently M. Pierre Laval, the French Foreign Minister, callously waved aside the idea as inadmissible. A leading French diplomat, discussing the question with the present writer some time ago, put the French point of view very tersely and succinctly. "An Austrian monarchy," he said, "would not hurt us. Quite the contrary, since it would put union with Germany out of the question. But a Hapsburg in Vienna means that Vienna would take on a new

splendour and become an irresistible centre of political attraction in the Danubian regions. That we cannot permit so long as the Czechs and Jugoslavs are our friends. The interests of France demand that Vienna should die!" One almost had the impression however that, for the sake of leading up to that last lapidary phrase, the Frenchman had overstated his case. That impression is strengthened by the nature of the advice which Chancellor Schuschnigg took back with him after that somewhat inglorious visit to Paris, when the French Government smuggled him into the capital by the backdoor of a small suburban railway station. The command or injunction was not: "Thou shalt not bring Otto back!" but rather, "Thou shalt not bring him back just now!" In other words, it is probably true to say that the Quai d'Orsay has no objection in principle to the return, but has a decided objection in respect of time. The Little Entente is indubitably the cause of and the reason for this attitude. And here we touch the nerve centre of the whole problem. The States comprising the Little Entente will not hear of a Hapsburg restoration either in Vienna or in Budapest. Roumania would be affected by restoration only in Hungary; but even in regard to Vienna she is nervous. At any rate she stands by her friends and her friends are, so far, adamant. The objections on the part of Jugoslavia are both understandable and reasonable. The people in those parts of Jugoslavia that were formerly under Hapsburg rule are discontented with Belgrade. They feel that they have exchanged King Log for King Stork. Many sigh for the good old times when the orderly administration of a Great Power protected them, and they were not left to the tender mercies of Serbian officials, who are notoriously corrupt and frequently inefficient. Moreover in Slovenia, adjoining Austrian territory, there is a population that is largely German in speech and in race. The elements of an *irridenta* are undoubtedly there, so that the nervousness of Belgrade is quite comprehensible.

The case of Czechoslovakia is quite different. Her German minority is situated on the German, not on the Austrian, border. Her administration is efficient, and the Czechoslovak Republic guarantees her citizens a measure of civic liberty that turns the Austrians green with envy. It is really a case of municipal rather than national rivalry. Prague, sunning itself in its newly recovered glory as a capital city, fears that

it would experience a diminished lustre and be once more overshadowed by Vienna. There is no conceivable reason of any cogency why Czechoslovakia should object to a Hapsburg "kingdomlet" in Austria. But that is just the point: would it remain a "kingdomlet"? Or would it not wax again into an empire? An emperor in a Vienna that presides over a tiny Alpine country is a historical paradox. One might just as well imagine a King of the Isle of Wight. A Hapsburg on the throne in Vienna and an empty throne next door in Budapest is unthinkable. Therein lies the real danger. Restoration in Hungary would follow restoration in Austria as surely and inevitably as day succeeds to night. The Austrians are douce, quiet, gentle and peaceful people. So long as they have liberty and the wherewithal to live—and at the moment they have neither—they are quiescent and content. But the Hungarians are of very different mettle; they have been cast in another mould. They are turbulent, ambitious and warlike. They might not—their neighbours feel sure they would not—remain satisfied with a revived Austria-Hungary on a microscopic scale. They would dream Imperial dreams and seek ardently and ebulliently to translate those dreams into realities. When these considerations are urged on one of the Austrian Legitimist leaders he has a ready answer: "We are prepared to pledge the honour of the Hapsburgs that there shall be no attempt, direct or indirect, at territorial expansion. And history shows that the Hapsburgs have always kept their word!" It is an answer of a sort, but apparently not of the sort that suffices to convince Belgrade, Prague and Bucarest. Yet the fact remains that upon the higher plane of world politics a Hapsburg in Vienna would afford strong guarantees against German expansion southwards.

Neither Prague nor Belgrade can dam the rising tide of Austrian Legitimism. But in the present highly distraught state of Europe it is imperative that those responsible for the preservation of peace—in Prague, in Belgrade, but also in Paris and in London—should make up their minds now what they are going to do when that tide overflows into the historic Hofburg. It is also urgent, for there are crystal clear indications that the day may not be remote.

W. WALTER CROTCH.

POLAND AND HUNGARY.

POLAND has recently seemed to present an insoluble problem in international politics. For fifteen years—such, at all events, has been the public belief—this recreated State has been a stumbling-block in the path of Franco-German understanding. But when Germany's re-arming in 1933 became an acute danger, negotiations began, surprisingly enough, between Poland and Germany. Puzzling plans emerged and rumours that Poland was to be included in the group of revisionary Powers. The first difficulty encountered by French policy at Geneva after Hitler's assumption of power was a Polish proposal for a change, that is a weakening of the Minority Statute. Here was the second great surprise. At first it was thought that the increase of danger from Germany would strengthen the bond between France and her Eastern ally. Even if this were not the case, a Polish-German *rapprochement* might be expected to bring an alleviation, not an aggravation, of the Peace Treaty attacked so bitterly by the German Nationalists. But still more surprises were to follow. The Government of Poland, that is, of the State whose present frontiers have been challenged most hotly by all revisionists, soon afterwards received the Hungarian Prime Minister, General Gömbös, the head of the most violent of the revisionary Governments. These facts are, indeed, warranted to confuse all the ideas which public opinion, and Anglo-Saxon public opinion in particular, has brought to bear on international politics since the War.

Nevertheless it is possible to understand these events and to discover a logical sequence in what seems to be inconsequent and illogical. To do this a glance at the past will be necessary. It was the Franco-Russian *rapprochement* of 1933 that incited Poland to her strange policy. It is true that the Soviet State is less of a danger to Poland than the old Tsardom. Nevertheless, 1920 was within measurable distance of witnessing a Soviet Poland side by side with a Soviet Ukraine and the consequent restoration, under the Soviet Government, of Russia to its former dimensions. If that has been forgotten in the West, it is remembered in Poland. Perhaps the West did not visualise all the possible results of the Franco-Russian Pact, but Poland realised them all the more vividly. In a

situation such as the present a political alliance is necessarily also a military alliance. To-day, however, the latter demands close technical co-operation between the General Staffs, so that the more powerful ally frequently gains the upper hand. If Poland remains unreservedly attached to the Franco-Russian system—such is no doubt the opinion of the leaders of her foreign policy—it means peaceful penetration by the Soviet State and the ultimate restoration of the old Russian Empire under the Soviet star as far as the Vistula. But the historic attitude of Poland towards Russia resembles that of, say, Austria towards Prussia. It is a relationship of ancient, deep-rooted rivalry for the hegemony of the Slav world.

From the early Middle Ages the Poles have belonged to the Slavonic races driven Eastward by the Holy Roman Empire. The Slavs found themselves mid-way between the orbits of Roman and of Byzantine culture, adopting Roman Catholicism in the North and the Orthodox Church in the South. Their constitution, however, was not based on Roman law but on ancient racial tradition, and Poland might be termed a pre-feudal, tribal Republic rather than a feudal State, as it is generally assumed to be. Thus hereditary monarchy, that most typical institution of feudalism, could never establish itself in Poland; the Kings of Poland remain the elected heads of the State—*reges rei publicæ*.

It was typical of so loosely constructed a federal State that its geographical frontiers always remained fluid. It was the historic tendency of Poland to carry this tribal constitution further Eastward, and to unite all Slavonic races not included in the Roman Empire. In her period of youthful vigour, at the end of the sixteenth century, King Stephan Bathory stood before Moscow. From the time of Peter the Great, that is from the beginning of modern Russian history, the Tsar renewed the old endeavour to unite all the Slav races. The difference between the Tsar's idea and that of the Poles was that the Tsar had in mind a renewal of the Byzantine Empire, whose heir he considered himself to be, whereas Poland dreamed of federal extension. This latter conception assumed a modern form through Poland's great soldier and statesman, Kosciuszko. The eighteenth-century hero and patriot, who had fought in his youth under Washington in the War of Independence, aspired to link up the Slav nations in a kind of United States. He defended Poland, his native

country, in which he traced a residue of the oldest forms of democracy and republicanism, and he defended it as the starting-point of the new democracy of the Eastern nations. He was defeated by the Tsar in 1794 at the Battle of Maczajowicz, in consequence of which most of Poland became Russian. One part had already fallen to the King of Prussia in virtue of ancient feudal rights. Galicia had likewise been separated from the confederation, and then fell to the Empire, that is, to the House of Habsburg. The three Powers who divided up the country had their parties of followers in Poland itself. The strongest was the Russian party, and there were Polish patriots, such as Prince Adam Czartorisky, who looked on Russia's annexation of Poland as a step towards the Slavonic United States.

Needless to say such a past left its traces in Poland. But it is important to note that the new Poland is by no means a revival of the old federal principle, which gave scope to all and sundry races, but a centralised nationalist State on the French model, with unified language and centralised administration. Such a State, however, spells oppression in the eyes of racial groups whose language, dialect or religious tradition differ from those of the State—witness the example of Hungary in the nineteenth century and up to the end of the World War. The Pan-Slav idea of confederation is represented to-day, at least in principle, by the constitution of the Soviet Union which is thus able to attract some Slav groups. In the non-Slav world this past is either unknown or forgotten. The Slavs, however, remember it only too well. In every country there are certain political moments which are determined by past history and which influence the political game in the form of unwritten law. Thus the probability of a war, in which Poland would have to endure occupation by Russian troops, offers a terrifying prospect to the supporters of the modern Polish State, if not to the various political and national minorities.

It is known, moreover, that since the end of the war there have been various differences of opinion between Poland and her Slav neighbour, the Czech Republic. Dr. Beneš has always refused to sign a Treaty of Guarantees with Poland. Though there have been no diplomatic relations between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet Union for a long time, Czechoslovakia has nevertheless seen no reason to bind

herself in a way that might be considered hostile by Russia. Even in 1920, during the Red offensive against Warsaw, no alliance was formed between the two northern Slav republics. One section of Czech opinion believes correctly enough that such questions as Lithuania or the Ukraine do not concern Czechoslovakia. But another section, which represents the Opposition of the Right as against the Radical-Democrat Government policy with its Western leanings, is no less passionately Russophil to-day than in the earlier Austrian period. It is in particular the men of the Right who do not wish to enter upon any course of action against Russia, which would be not only hostile to the Soviet, but also against Russia's territorial unity, be her régime what it may. The reason for the success of Beneš's foreign policy is that his Western frontier has protected the young Republic from all Easterly anti-Russian adventures. As is well known, the more or less vague aims of the Polish Imperialists lie in the Ukraine, whose Cossack races were attached to the Polish confederation in the past. Amongst the Poles it is the Nationalists in particular who show but little interest in those parts of Poland that were formerly German. It is common knowledge that the anti-German Korfanty, like all the Poles of Posen, was opposed to Pilsudski, whose sympathies lay farther Eastward.

In such a state of affairs, it is indeed a difficult task for French foreign policy to keep up a simultaneous alliance with Russia and Poland. Not without reason has Henri de Kerillis, a frequent interpreter in the *Echo de Paris* of the views held by the French General Staff, soothingly pointed out, as an aerial expert, that in a future war the chief importance of the Soviet Union as an ally of France would be in the air, and that it would suffice if the Russian air fleet were to fly over Poland without the presence of Red troops on Polish soil.

Such is the constellation that has arisen through Poland's strange position and policy since 1933, after Hitler's seizure of power and the Franco-Russian Pact, and it is of this that Hungary is now seeking to take advantage. By history and by tradition, that country is very close to Poland, and several times in bygone centuries both countries were under the same rule. Especially vivid amidst their many common traditions are the memories of liberalism—of solidarity in the Wars of Liberation of the nineteenth century. These

memories make psychologically possible the foreign policy which is hovering in the mind of the present Hungarian Government, a policy, of course, by no means based on liberal ideas. Modern official Hungary, clinging with might and main to the phantom of the restoration of St. Stephen's empire, is constantly trying to win over one of the victorious Powers to her claims to revision. France and England are too far away, too little interested in Central Europe, and are, in fact, the authors of the Peace Treaty. Meanwhile, Hungarian policy has succeeded in attaching itself to Italy. The price of this Italian friendship was an active anti-Jugoslav policy. Hungary entrusted her foreign policy to Herr von Kánya, who had worked in closest co-operation with Berchtold before 1914 and who was, so to speak, the first specialist in anti-Jugoslav policy. At this price Hungary succeeded in retaining Italian friendship, although Jugoslavia was the neighbour who had received the smallest share of the Hungarian *Irredenta*. Franco-Italian understanding, which means Italy's renunciation of her previous policy towards Jugoslavia, put an end to Italian patronage in Hungary even before it was complete. During the Hungarian-Jugoslav dispute at Geneva as to the perpetrators of the Marseilles murder the Italian representative remained very cool and almost neutral.

Hungary must look for a new patron amongst the Powers, and the nearest ally can only be Poland. There are various inducements for such a Pact. The Hungarian Government has never quite given up the possibility of a Habsburg restoration; but Poland would cause the least trouble in that regard. Above all, however, the basis of the present Hungarian Government is the anti-Bolshevist reaction. Hungary is the anti-Bolshevist State *par excellence*. At the time of the Red attack on Warsaw in 1920 she demanded a common frontier with Poland—to the detriment of Czechoslovakia—as the price of Hungarian participation in Poland's "new crusade against oriental barbarism." The Hungarian Premier at that time, Count Teleki, had already spoken to that effect in Parliament. In 1927 the *Pesti Hírlap* published a document—which was forged, and was repudiated soon afterwards—dated 1920 and signed by the Ambassador Maurice Paléologue, in which France was stated to have laid such a proposal before the Hungarian Government. Sometimes, the

wish becomes father to the thought—and in particular to the forgeries.

A common frontier between Poland and Hungary would thus far be founded on historical fact, in that the province of Zips, which is now Czech and was Hungarian till 1918, was formerly under Polish rule for over three centuries. A similar case is that of Austrian Silesia, a province which now, like Zips, belongs to Czechoslovakia by virtue of the Plebiscite of 1919, but which Poland had claimed in 1918 on the ground of having possessed it formerly, and because it includes a Polish-speaking minority. Similarly, the Ukrainians who inhabit three different States to-day—the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—were formerly members of the Polish confederation. The plan was that Poland was to renounce her claims to several German provinces. A slice of Slovakia, it was thought, would be a good substitute, because the Slovak language is closely allied, not only to Czech, but also to Polish.

Such are the inducements, ideological and territorial, whereby Hungary is seeking to win over Warsaw to an alliance against Czechoslovakia. Poland is to stand side by side with Hungary as "Europe's anti-Bolshevist guard in Eastern Europe." If Poland were inclined to take up such an attitude towards Czechoslovakia, she would be Hungary's most valuable ally. Hungarian nationalism regards Czechoslovakia as its worst enemy, because it is "a semi-Bolshevist democracy," the head of the Little Entente, and the Succession State which opposes the Habsburg schemes with the greatest energy. It is true that the allied Republic enjoys French protection, and internally it is also the strongest of the Succession States. Nevertheless, there would be some hope of isolating her if Poland and Hungary entered upon an alliance that might also be supported by Germany. Such are the hopes and schemes of Hungary to-day.

We must not imagine, however, that such plans on the part of the various rulers have much prospect of success. Poland is unlikely to be inclined for a final break with France. Moreover, in any difficult situation Germany's opponents can almost always rely on the incompetence and clumsiness of German policy. When the Franco-Russian Pact and its ultimate issues caused Poland, as we saw, to enter into direct negotiations with Germany and to reduce

the problems outstanding between the two countries to the right proportions, Hitlerite Germany must needs approach the Poles with proposals that could only meet with refusal in Warsaw. In the Reichswehr Memorandum to Hindenburg, published (and not since denied) in the *White Book Concerning the Events of June 30th* (Éditions du Carrefour, Paris, 1935), Poland is already referred to as a military ally "on whom, of course, no very high value can be placed." The Memorandum of the Reich Minister of Economics to the London World Economic Conference in 1933 openly mentioned a German colonisation of the Ukraine with Polish support. Such tactless publicity must have been little to the relish of the Poles.

In the German Press, Poland has now suddenly become "the sister nation." This new version is, of course, as incorrect as the previous one. Hitherto the German Nationalists spoke of "the subjection of the leading cultural nation of Europe to the most uncultured Slavs." It was forgotten that the Poland of the Anjous, of the Jagellons, of Copernicus, was a flourishing kingdom during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, at a time when there was no mention of the Hohenzollern State. It was forgotten that Poland seized, to use Mazzini's expression, "the initiative in historical development" in the Slav world, and that in the nineteenth century, with Kosciuszko, she became the model for the national reawakening of Europe.

The assurances made in fresh approaches to Poland by Hitler's Germany, in its despairing efforts to break down the isolation which it had created itself—assurances which guaranteed to Poland possession of the Corridor and the East German frontier for ten years, and in addition the sphere of influence in the Baltic Provinces hitherto obstinately claimed by Germany—went further than any Government of the Weimar Republic in the surrender of so-called national interests. The Republican Government made efforts to earn from so-called Nationalist public opinion the reputation of possessing sound national intentions; a Nationalist Government need make no such efforts, since it already holds the patent for Nationalist spirit. Concessions were made which offered Poland practically everything that she desired.

As a matter of fact, nothing was done towards a German-Polish or indeed towards any German-Slav understanding

during the fourteen years of the Weimar Republic. Whether from ignorance or from inability to set itself free from the old German policy, the German Republic did nothing to prepare, first a psychological and then a territorial understanding. Germany had scarcely any relations worth mentioning with the Czechoslovak Republic and nothing but bad relations with Poland. Hardly any Germans were able to recognise in the Slav revolution the real revolution of Central Europe. The Bismarckian conception of "the policy of force" left no room for the conception of a revolutionary solidarity among the nations, such as had been rife in 1848 and in 1918. Even the approach between Germany and Russia was not planned on an ideological basis, but was conceived either from the purely economic standpoint as by Rathenau, or from the purely military one as by the Reichswehr. It was a policy which drove Poland to strengthen her French alliance.

Probably the Polish Government will never place full confidence in Germany, and as for Hungary as a go-between, the Poles have a more vivid recollection of Hungary's alliance with Germany in the World War than of the Wars of Liberation or even of the common frontier of the Middle Ages. Only recently, at the time of the Hungarian-Yugoslav conflict, General Gömbös confessed in a speech in Parliament that the Third Reich lay nearer to his heart than the Weimar Republic, and that in fact he felt more drawn to the Germany now struggling for recognition in the world than to any other European Power. The Polish Government is more likely to postpone her vague South-Eastern schemes and endeavour to develop her position in the Baltic provinces.

Poland, considering herself the centre of the territorial sphere that divides Russia from Central Europe, has recently seen in the Franco-Russian Pact danger of an extension of the Russian sphere of influence, which would imperil this position of hers in the Baltic provinces. Warsaw's attitude, therefore, is strictly logical. Only sometimes it is difficult to foresee the consequences which Poland may deduce from a position which may be threatening, but which is not unfavourable from a diplomatic point of view.

BÉLA MENCZER.

WILLIAM COBBETT.

ONLY a century divides us from the death of William Cobbett (1762-1835), yet it takes a vigorous imagination to grasp the conditions under which he lived and, above all, the first twenty formative years of his existence. He came of peasant stock, and there probably has never been a time when so many men of that stock have risen to eminence. The peasants, too, of his generation were much better off than is commonly imagined, better off in real wages though not in money wages. The clothes of the peasant may have been scanty, but they were stouter and more lasting than the garments of to-day. No doubt the wages paid in coin of the realm were low, but they were supplemented by the grazing of his cow on the common, the fuel he could readily gather, and the supply of milk that came his way. At harvest there came gleaning-time, when a small family could gather enough corn to last them at least to the New Year. The church bell used to be rung morning and evening, and none could dare begin before others, nor stay at the gleaning work after the evening bell was sounded. The world of the peasant was not precisely Paradise, but there was more happiness in it than we sometimes think.

In these days of schools with large classrooms, scientific apparatus, and specialised teachers, we pride ourselves on the advance made in educational methods. But are we quite sure that this advance is as real as we choose to believe? Take a story. Faraday was once questioned on what he was accomplishing. He was usually a patient man, but to this questioner for once he gave an impatient answer. "I'm not securing results." "Why?" "Because I am not meeting with any obstacles." Obstacles are really required if true progress is to be achieved. No doubt the classrooms of the middle of the eighteenth century were non-existent at the primary schools, and even at the public schools scientific apparatus was conspicuous by its absence, and specialised teachers were almost unheard of. Of course we immediately cry out, "What an unprogressive state of affairs!" Perhaps it was, and yet, in spite of the poor primary schools, Sir Leslie Stephen deliberately affirms that there is probably no period in English history at which a greater number of poor men have risen to distinction, even in science. John Dalton,

the son of a poor weaver, left his mark in chemistry, and till our own day Dalton's law held the field. James Watt, the son of a carpenter, invented the steam engine. Thomas Telford, the son of a shepherd, was the great engineer who covered our land with aqueducts and harbours, erecting *inter alia* the Menai Bridge on the suspension principle, scarcely tried before in England. George Rennie, the son of a Scots farmer, was an agriculturist and inventor of considerable note. Robert Owen, the son of a saddler, was a manufacturer of outstanding importance as well as a Socialist, the father, indeed, of present-day Socialism. Joseph Lancaster, the son of a small shopkeeper, led the way in the reform of education, and the Lancastrian system of education once upon a time held pride of place in the educational world. Joseph White, the son of a poor weaver, was Oxford professor of Arabic. Richard Porson, the son of a Norfolk parish clerk, was the greatest Greek scholar of his generation, sent to Eton and Cambridge by the sagacity of his incumbent and his squire. William Gifford, the son of a small Devonshire tradesman, was a satirist and the editor of *The Quarterly Review*. Thomas Paine, the son also of a small tradesman, was a political pamphleteer who impressed himself upon the United States as well as our own land. Robert Burns, the son of a small farmer, is perhaps the greatest of the poets who have risen from the ranks. William Cobbett, the son of an agricultural labourer, was among the pithiest of our writers. These names on our bead-roll—and they are by no means exhaustive—suggest that there is more to be said for eighteenth-century education than is usually believed.

William Cobbett was endowed with singularly fine physical health, and his mind remained vigorous to the end of his long life. After reaching his three score and ten years he could still boast of riding over the country with the youngest; or doing a day's work as energetic as that of any one of his own labourers. His habit was to retire at eight or nine and to rise at four or five in the morning. No doubt his early life rendered him the abstemious and temperate man—temperate in food, but never in speech—that he always was. He never ate anything after his early dinner, with the exception of a little bread with his tea. He avoided spirits, wine, ale, and porter, carrying his dislike of them to such a degree that he would not sit down in a room where they were consumed. He was,

in a word, a fine physical specimen of the English breed, racy of the soil in all that he said and did, and he said much and did more. Like all of us, he possessed the defects of his qualities. His prodigious industry, his strong self-confidence, his toughness of fibre, his outstanding prejudices, his practical view of life, his insistence on material values, the love of home and independence, the delight in fighting for fighting's sake, and the utter incapacity to recognise defeat—all these qualities characterise the man.

It is time to say a little about his varied career. His father, like his grandfather, was a day-labourer, working at Farnham in Surrey. He had raised himself somewhat in life, having enough arithmetic to become a land-measurer, and his son in turn also raised himself. The valley of Farnham is a rich one, bounded by the unfruitful sands of Aldershot and Frensham. In this contrast of garden and desert the lad learned his love of rural life that never forsook him. He was in course of time to transform himself into a politician and a pamphleteer, but at bottom he was always a man of the soil, caring, in all the hot and bitter struggles of his life, for the farmer and the farm-labourer. When only thirteen he ran away to Windsor, where the homely George III was living, and he secured employment in the king's garden. There he spent his last threepence in buying Swift's *Tale of a Tub*, and he tells us that when he lost this book at sea afterwards he felt the loss more acutely than he ever did far greater calamities. For *The Tale of a Tub* the young gardener sacrificed his supper, and his supper was well lost, for no one can doubt the influence of the grim Dean of St. Patrick's Cathedral upon Cobbett. Not that he possessed the Dean's impressiveness of style or his keenness of satire, but he certainly inherited his simplicity of phrase and his simplicity of diction which he employed with rare effect.

At seventeen he returned home, and returned home to run away again. This time he tried the city, going to London, where he at last turned lawyer's clerk. Towards the close of the American War of Independence he enlisted in a regiment which was recruiting for Nova Scotia. He employed his leisure in acquiring English grammar and reading the English classics, and by this time he had read much more than Swift's writings. He quickly won promotion—such a man could not be kept back—and he also won the respect of the officers with

whom he came into contact. His marriage was characteristic of the man. When he was in New Brunswick he saw one early December morning a girl of thirteen, scrubbing a wash-tub in the snow. She was the daughter of a soldier, a sergeant-major like Cobbett himself. He made up his mind to marry her in due time. Her father supported his suit. Three or four years after Cobbett had made his resolve the parents of the girl were ordered to Woolwich. Cobbett, thinking the risks of a residence in this town were neither few nor slight, recommended her to take up her residence with some decent folk who would board her. In order to meet her expenses he handed over to her all his savings, amounting to no less a sum than a hundred and fifty guineas. They then parted for three or four years, and parting meant much in the days when the Atlantic rolled between a couple and posts were practically unknown for the poor. At last Cobbett returned with his regiment to England to find her a maid-of-all-work in a family. She returned him his hundred and fifty guineas unbroken, and in a few weeks they were married. He was destined to have trouble after trouble in public affairs, but he was among the fortunate ones of the earth to have none in private.

Enemies accused him of speculation, but he triumphantly vindicated himself from this charge. This attack led him to examine with minute attention the pay of the soldier, and in *The Soldier's Friend* he warmly advocated its increase. His action endangered his personal liberty, and he retired to St. Omer, where he applied himself to the study of the French language and literature. The French Revolution was then raging, and he emigrated to Philadelphia in October 1792, where he spent his time in teaching English to French refugees. The American War of Independence had not long finished, and England was still being assaulted, not with the sword but with the pen. "Hearing my country attacked," Cobbett declares, "I became her defender through thick and thin." The last phrase is in complete keeping with the man, for he never could defend by half measures. Whole-hearted support he gave to his country and to the highest interests of the country of his adoption. The question of the American constitution was still being fought out, and it was not in the power of Cobbett not to take a side. On the one hand were Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, the promoters of the

Democratic party, whose sympathies lay with France. On the other hand there were Washington, Hamilton, and Adams, the promoters of the Federal party, whose sympathies lay with England. Could anyone doubt which party Cobbett preferred? He straightway declared war upon the Democrats, and declared war with all the virulence and the violence of the ready pen he commanded. He assailed Priestley, Paine, and Franklin, especially Franklin, under the thin disguise of his favourite *nom de plume*, Tom Porcupine. We give a specimen of his attack upon the last :

Every one will, I hope, have the goodness to believe that my grandfather was no philosopher. Indeed he was not. He never made the lightning rod, nor bottled up a quart of sunshine in his life. He was no almanack maker, nor quack, nor chimney-doctor, nor soap boiler, nor ambassador, nor printer's devil. Neither was he a deist ; and all his children were born in wedlock. The legacies he left were his scythe, his reap-hook, and his flail. He bequeathed no old and irrecoverable debts to an hospital. He never cheated the poor during his life, nor mocked them at his death. He has, it is true, been suffered to sleep quietly beneath the green sward ; but if his descendants cannot point to his statue over the door of a library, they have not the mortification to hear him daily accused of having been a profligate, a hypocrite, and an infidel.

Naturally such a hard hitter found the United States not exactly a bed of roses, and he sailed for England in June 1800, where he found his journalistic writings were to secure him a warm welcome from the government party. His pen was required in the long war against France, and was sorely needed to lend courage to the nation. Windham supported our journalist in his activities against French revolutionary principles, though the stout anti-gallican principles of his daily paper *The Porcupine* failed to secure sufficient support from the public. In January 1802 he began *Cobbett's Weekly Political Register*, which, with very trifling interruptions, was continued to his death, more than thirty-three years after, and in it he delivered his soul frankly and freely.

In 1804 his attitude in public matters underwent a change, for he turned to the popular side in politics. He had spoken his mind on the grave situation in Ireland, and Judge Johnson of the Irish Bench had also spoken his mind. Cobbett had published anonymously the views of the latter, and a charge of libel was preferred against the publisher.

He was convicted, but escaped action on the discovery of the true authorship. Cobbett found that up to now he had been on the wrong side in Irish affairs, and he realised that where he had been in the wrong in one matter, he might be in others as well. As an old soldier he was keenly interested in the army, and old comrades brought him information upon what was actually happening when our country was at war, and when every soldier counted in our defence against Napoleon. Mrs. Clarke was the mistress of the Duke of York, the commander-in-chief, and thereby the master of appointments in the British army. Cobbett supplied facts on the way in which £ s. d. contributed and appointments were obtained, and his facts were generally marked by accuracy and intelligence. Nor did he confine his comments to the bribes paid for appointments. Flogging of soldiers for trivial offences was then too common almost to call for comment, but it called for outspoken comment on the part of Cobbett. He wrote with severity on military flogging, and was consequently prosecuted. He was fined a thousand pounds and imprisoned for two years. He then offered, we regret to say, to drop his paper in order to escape punishment. His offer was unavailing, and he came out of prison a ruined man pecuniarily. Nevertheless, he redoubled his literary efforts in his *Political Register*, where he exposed the domestic distresses of the day and the manufacturing troubles with all the unsparing vigour that had always characterised his pen. In 1816 he pleaded passionately for parliamentary reform, and reduced the price of his newspaper to twopence. The result of this change was that he enormously increased its circulation among the working classes, becoming the popular journalist of his day. He took up all sorts of popular causes, and took them up not invariably wisely. He supported Queen Caroline in her matrimonial affairs, and with an utter disregard for consistency. He glorified Tom Paine as much as he had formerly abused him. Of course the inconsistent can fall back upon the plea Cardinal Newman advanced when he held : "In a higher world, it may be different, but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often." In this sense Cobbett was steadily advancing towards the goal of ultimate perfection. His inconsistencies passed into a proverb. Few journalists have contradicted themselves so flatly and so repeatedly, and yet somehow Cobbett contrived to leave the

impression of tenacity of mind and honesty of purpose upon his readers. On his release from prison Burdett entertained him to dinner, and asked sympathisers also to attend. When the guests lifted their soup plates, each found the reprint of a lampoon which, some years before, Cobbett had written on his host, and which a waiter had been bribed to distribute.

Journalist he was and journalist he remained to the end, yet he never forgot the countryside in which he had been born and bred. To-day, when so many of the causes of his quarrels have long since been forgotten, and when none save students of the past turn even to his *Political Register*, there is his *Rural Rides*, which no one who loves English literature can afford to ignore. His favourite pursuits had always been farming and gardening, and even when he became a member of Parliament he could not forget his old loves. The country landscape, the humble houses dotting it, the village economics among which he was bred—these are quite plain in his book. No less plain are the fine observations of Nature, reminding us of White of Selborne, and his portraits of the men and women he knew intimately have as much a touch of Gainsborough as his picture of the subdued beauty of home scenery; and the innate sweetness of English country life might come from the hand of Constable himself.

Ebenezer Elliott, who sang rhymes that moved Cobbett's generation, thus sang of the man himself :

O bear him where the rain can fall,
And where winds can blow ;
And let the sun weep o'er his pall
As to the grave ye go !
And in some little lone churchyard,
Beside the growing corn,
Lay gentle Nature's stern prose bard,
Her mightiest peasant-born.
Yes ! let the wild-flower wed his grave,
That bees may murmur near,
When o'er his last home bend the brave,
And say—"A man lies here !"
For Britons honour Cobbett's name,
Though rashly oft he spoke ;
And none can scorn, and few will blame
The low-laid heart of oak.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

THE FOREST CAMPS OF AMERICA.

THE United States of America inherited a great storehouse of wealth in her virgin forests. In relation to agricultural land they were greater than those of any other country in the world, not even excepting Australia, Canada, or Russia. When the Pilgrim Fathers landed, they were confronted with what they regarded as an inexhaustible supply of wood. They and their descendants declared war on the forests, often burning them to make their farms, and recklessly destroyed that God-given tree inheritance which seemed to be beyond the possibility of exhaustion. It was natural that the boy Washington with his little axe, even though cutting the proverbial cherry-tree, should become the hero of the nation. In the early days there was always that forest frontier to conquer. The man with an axe became a symbol of progress. The forest was an enemy to be fought. Before a rapidly growing population the destruction became greater and greater until, to-day, seven-eighths of the virgin forests have been cut or destroyed.

But to-day a remarkable thing has happened. Under the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt the nation has become tree-conscious. The value of their tree-heritage has suddenly dawned upon the people. The President's dramatic action in sending three hundred and fifty thousand young men to the rescue of the vanishing forests is causing tree-lovers' eyes to open wide with wonder and the eyes of the prophets of calamity to grow narrow with the stirring that it brings to their imagination. I shall always look back with a deep sense of gratitude to the opportunity that was afforded to me of discussing with the President the project which later took the form of establishing by the United States Government the Civil Conservation Corps.

A few weeks before my interview with Roosevelt, I had been sitting with an old Indian friend at the end of many days' trek in his native woods which naturally he loved, when he suddenly remarked : "There is a lot of unemployment. There will be many forest fires this summer." That was all he said. Like most of his tribe, he was a man of few words, but the deep significance of this simple remark was not borne home to me till I learnt that the custom of the old régime had been to pay casual labourers as much as the

equivalent of a £1 a day to put out forest fires, and that a vast sum of money was being spent annually on this account. Without comment, I repeated the simple statement of my Indian friend of the trees to the President. For several seconds he remained in thoughtful silence with his direct eyes averted and into them came a distant look. I felt then, in the few moments that elapsed before he again spoke, that this man of action was evolving a great plan for forest protection. He knew that millions of dollars were being wasted, never to return, for repeated fires had burnt not only the trees but the humus and good earth that had accumulated through the centuries and had laid bare the rocky or stony subsoil. The damage done by fire cannot be truly estimated. It is more than the destruction of timber, it means the destruction of the soil.

Maybe it was then that he had his glorious vision of combining the task of taking care of thousands of unemployed young men and of building up the forests. Theodore Roosevelt had declared: "When you help to preserve our forests, or plant new ones, you are acting the part of good citizens," and Calvin Coolidge once wrote: "If the Government ever needs to give work to the unemployed, an enlarged system of reforestation would be a partial solution free from objections. It would not interfere with the rates of wages, or marketing of productions in any of the existing industries."

Gifford Pinchot, Governor of Pennsylvania, ever since he was the first forester under Theodore Roosevelt had preached the gospel of conservation, but it remained for Franklin D. Roosevelt to take action.

Statistics show that his civilian army of foresters have effected an average reduction in fire losses for all Federal forest lands amounting to fifty per cent. This is equivalent to saving in one year £45,000,000 worth of timber; so, on that ground alone, his action in establishing the Civilian Conservation Corps Camps has been more than justified. But in addition to this tremendous saving of natural forest wealth from destruction by fire, the Corps have carried out valuable work in thinning 5,000,000 acres of cut-over forests that have come up in a thicket. They have, too, carried out a campaign against beetle and insect pests on another 10,000,000 acres. Besides this, they have planted over 300,000 acres of young trees.

I have followed up the work of these lads in camp. At first they found the life strenuous—that was to be expected. Pioneering in the woods, clearing sites for camps and making roads of access, even though they worked but six hours a day, is a far cry from life in the City. But asked whether they would change their life in the camp for City lights, see what they would say. They have become hard, healthy and creative. They believe in the value of the work they are doing, though they may never see the results of their labours. There is a wonderful spirit in the C.C.C. Camps. Like the old-time pioneers, they have made for themselves homes in the bush. They have their little clearings for cultivation, of course, and those who have a bent in that direction often grow their own vegetables, but the forest to them is not an enemy to be overcome. It is their best friend, for the work of thinning and other improvements is providing them with a life under ideal conditions. In talking to them you sense that particular exaltation that comes to men who work among trees and are in love with them. One of their number, recently describing the life of the C.C.C. Camps, said: "I think it must have been the thought of making us pioneers that made our President speak of recreating our manhood from the ground up."

So valuable has been their work that the President expressed the hope that their number might be increased three-fold. The Forestry officials do not expect to see the Corps cease operations at the end of the emergency. Mr. Ferdinand A. Silcox, the newly-appointed chief of the American Forestry Service, predicts their development into a permanent system for training young men in the appreciation of the nation's forest preserves. "We dreamed years ago of the things we could do with these vast areas if we had the proper help and enough of it," he said. "Now we can see the things which can be done."

We in England have our forest problems, but they are not insurmountable. They are small by comparison with those of the United States of America. Nevertheless they are pressing and should be tackled at the first opportunity. It is not generally realised that during the war we cut four-fifths of our forests and at the present rate of planting it will take over a hundred years to restore our forests to the position that they were in before the outbreak of war. In a time of national

holidays in Northern Europe in a quite particular degree, since it is one of those rare places that is both picturesque and clean—a not too frequent occurrence in the rest of the world, where tourists usually have to choose either one thing or the other. Within the last few years, despite the crisis, the number of British visitors to Sweden has more than doubled itself.

It is a great pity, however, that even these tourists, not to mention the people who stay at home, are abysmally ignorant of all things Swedish, or all things Scandinavian. The history and the cultural life of these countries is worth studying. It is fascinating. In this connection Mr. Bernard Shaw did a truly noble deed when he devoted the whole of his Nobel Prize money to the establishment of an Anglo-Swedish Literary Foundation to promote the publication in England of translations from Swedish authors. A great deal of useful work has already been accomplished by this organisation, and the latest publication sponsored by it is a most excellent *Short History of Sweden*, by Ragnar Svanström and Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna. Mr. Eden carried an advance copy of it on his Scandinavian trip.

If only Swedish were a world language, some of their actors—that great genius Anders de Wahl for instance—would have achieved international renown. The theatres in Stockholm and even in the provinces offer the Swedish public an unusually rich variety of plays, well acted and well produced. English drama occupies a place of honour in their programmes. The films, which, before the talkies were invented, had a great international reputation, are beginning to re-emerge from a long period of comparative obscurity. The opera is one of the best in Europe, and also has a magnificent orchestra. Sculpture, painting, architecture, peasant arts and crafts—in all of these the Swedes have become world famous. In fact, the study of their achievements in all fields of human activity: be it politics or economics, industry or commerce, art or gastronomy (mention of the latter, though belated, is vital) cannot but strike the observer as extraordinary. How do they do it? After all, there are only 6½ millions of them—less than the population of Greater London! A great little country. And in many respects a model and an inspiration.

GEORGE SOLOVEYCHIK.

SPIRITUAL OPTIMISM.

THE Archbishop of York has recently published his Gifford Lectures on *Nature, Man and God*,* which were delivered in the University of Glasgow in the academical years 1932-3 and 1933-4. It appears to the present reviewer that the systematic conclusions reached in them may rightly be described as spiritual optimism. And this for two reasons. In the first place, if the beliefs and hopes of optimism can be reasonably sustained, this is only possible provided that a spiritual philosophy of the universe be held. And, secondly, a truly spiritual explanation of the universe must needs be optimistic, if this term be understood as meaning that, while the graver problems of reality are taken fully into account, any spiritual philosophy must be dominated by the supremacy of the Idea of the Good.

Dr. Temple has made in this volume the most important contribution to philosophic theism that has appeared for some years. Its range is immense, stretching from the Doctrine of Perception to that of Eternal Life and treating of everything that comes between with remarkable thoroughness and lucidity. The argument proceeds by well-ordered stages, and rears a massive structure of reasoned thought with courage and completeness. The clarity of the author's mind and the straightforwardness of his treatment bring, not only his conclusions, but the processes by which he reaches them well within the range of philosophical thinkers and of all who take an intelligent interest in the greatest subjects of human concern. The work is in itself remarkable; it is all the more so, as coming from one who is charged with the unceasing tasks and cares of his high ecclesiastical office. While the foundations of the Archbishop's thought were laid in earlier books that were produced while he enjoyed greater leisure, his Gifford Lectures show a careful estimation of the problems to be dealt with and a balanced maturity of judgment in regard to them which place them far in advance of anything that he had previously written.

The limitations imposed by Lord Gifford upon the Lectures appointed under his endowment, restrict them, as is well known, to what is described as Natural Religion. This

* *Nature, Man and God*. By William Temple, Archbishop of York. Macmillan. 18s. net.

abstract and rigid limitation is indeed question-begging. Has there ever been such religion, and, if so, where is it to be found? Religious faith, whether full or scanty, may be fortified by "Natural" reasoning, but is never created or limited by it. Definite and diversified religions there have been and there are. It is perhaps possible, but extremely difficult to extract from these certain common characteristics of attitude and conviction. These, however, even if discoverable by abstract thought, have never been active or alive. Hence Dr. Temple, while loyally seeking to keep his argument within the confines of the Gifford Endowment, is driven to claim the right to adduce the testimony of historic religions and, in particular, of the Christian Faith, to the essential characteristics of theistic belief. His Natural Religion is, to tell the truth, somewhat diaphanous. Again and again the form of Christianity becomes half-revealed and in its entirety dimly visible. It must indeed be said that the Natural Religion of these Lectures consists to a large extent of pre-suppositions and principles which are the impressions made upon the clay of reason by the living body of Christian Truth. This is not merely inevitable, but justifiable and, in the circumstances, salutary.

In his first series of Lectures Dr. Temple dealt with the Transcendence of the Immanent; in his second with the Immanence of the Transcendent. To begin with, he criticises Descartes, as having led modern philosophy astray by starting from his famous aphorism, "I think, therefore I am." He treated the mind, thereby, as concerned with its own thoughts instead of with the subject-object relationship, which is primary and brings the mind into immediate contact with reality. Hence he set subsequent philosophers, especially Berkeley, Hume and, to some extent, Kant, upon a wrong road, and gave them the unnecessary problem of seeking to discover in what way and to what extent thought, as subjective, stands related to objective reality. Thus arose the one-sided and erroneous contrasts of idealism on the one hand, and of materialism on the other. Dr. Temple's position may, therefore, be described as that of Natural Realism, as it used to be called. This position, while fundamentally sound, as the Archbishop argues, is vital to the whole of his subsequent reasoning. In the unity, yet duality, of the object-subject relationship given in consciousness, each term is

fundamental. The objective element cannot be sacrificed to the subjective, as is the case with idealism, nor can the subjective be reduced to the objective, as is attempted by materialism. The human mind comes to itself in and through its direct experience of the objective world and as it does so finds universal mind to be the underlying truth and principle of the reality revealed in experience. Man is, above all, purposive, and his varied quests are ultimately unified as the "self-expression of a constant and constantly developing character" (p. 432). Thought and action "go hand in hand, the former arising in and out of the latter." The emergence of consciousness at a comparatively late stage of evolution is a fact, and a fact that cannot be explained by what has gone before its appearance. In the early stages of consciousness man's purposive intelligence becomes active in seeking to satisfy his animal needs within his narrowly restricted environment. Eventually, however, he comes to self-consciousness and to the acquisition of "free ideas," which, though derived from actual experience, can be used in order to deal with and interpret new situations and ever-extending interests. Thus man, as purposive, rises to the pursuit of "apparent good."

The quest of "apparent good" involves valuation and thus men are led on to the progressive discovery of the values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. These values are sought and found in objective reality and belong to it. Yet such is the relationship between subject and object that these values are only revealed as subjectively apprehended. Hence this very objective-subjectivity reveals mind in the objective world and leads to the apprehension and affirmation of creative personality, immanent in the universe and yet transcending it. It is only the recognition of this supreme and purposive personality that can yield an explanation of the universe that does not lead to further inquiries. It is final and satisfying. The presence and activity of this transcendent yet immanent purposiveness, thus apprehended, is made manifest in an ordered process, which culminates in the revelation of spiritual values and in the advent of creatures that apprehend, appreciate and pursue them. The Divine Personality, thus immanent, is universally and constantly active in Nature, otherwise Divine Sovereignty would be non-existent. But God is transcendent. The world *minus*

God would be nothing : God without the world would still be God.

Having reached this conclusion in the First Series of Lectures, Dr. Temple discusses the Immanence of the Transcendent in the Second. Having explained what he means by Immanence, he declares that God goes forth to become immanent in His world through His Word. This means that He goes forth from Himself in love. God would not be what He eternally is, but for what He becomes in this self-manifestation. Yet, despite the immanence of God in creation, its finitude leads to evil in Nature and to sin in man. It is the fact of sin that raises a serious problem. Its entrance into the world and its nature must be explained. Sin is due to the fact that the natural self becomes self-centred, and seeks apparent, instead of real, good.

Self-centredness, though false, is mitigated and, for the time being, is partially beneficial. Man cannot deliver himself from it. To some extent he overcomes it in the pursuit of science and art, as well as for certain of the practical concerns of life ; yet only for the limited purposes of these interests. If Men are to be brought out of self-centredness into the Commonwealth of Values, this can only be by "conversion." Such conversion cannot be effected by men themselves. It must be the result of the active influence in grace of the true God made manifest in the appearance of a Personality, who, on behalf of God, claims men in love and for love. Only in this way do men find entrance into the spiritual commonwealth, which unfolds its meaning and is eventually perfected in Eternal Life—the final and all-embracing goal of the Divine purpose of Love. This summary must suffice for the present article. It only remains briefly to offer one criticism, and to make certain comments in support of the main positions of this great book.

The only criticism which the present reviewer desires to make concerns the Immanence of God, which Dr. Temple presses to an extreme that appears to be inconsistent with his conclusions in regard to the freedom of Man and its consequence in Sin. In presenting a doctrine of Divine Sovereignty which may be termed Augustinian, the Archbishop treats God as immediately and fully active at every point throughout the entire cosmic order and process. Any other view he deems incompatible with the Sovereignty which he seeks to exalt.

Do we not, however, find in the cosmic order the dawn of an autonomy, which prepares the way for freedom in man ? May not God, as transcendent though immanent Personality, posit the material world as a self-ordering and self-contained system without reduction of what is essential to His Sovereignty ? Such a system, while in a sense involving the self-limitation of God, makes the cosmic order the basis of the full exercise of His Sovereign Will on higher planes, which emerge from and are built upon this cosmic order. Is it not possible that just as men, in the exercise of their authority, set up routines which they only modify on sufficient occasions, so God acts in the material world, as He certainly does in the spiritual world, in which freedom exists ? The Creation of Man assumes the stability of the cosmic order, and yet confers the gifts of freedom with all that freedom involves. Man's freedom, disastrous as its exercise has been, is subject to a threefold restraint and safeguard—namely, the activity of God, the constitution of His universe, and such kinship of human nature with its Creator that entire and permanent departure from God would mean its dissolution. These saving limitations all proceed from the fatherliness of the creative sovereignty of God ; they constitute the immanent conditions under which man's freedom is exercised and, therefore, involve no external interference with it. Taken together, they give assurance that the triumph of God—the essential meaning of His Sovereignty—is certain, and that it will come, not by the suppression, but by the perfecting of freedom, the freedom of the sons of God.

The following general comments in regard to the whole subject should be made :

1. The spiritual values that are revealed through the interaction of man and the universe are essential to the explanation of Reality. The world as made manifest to us is the world as perceived through our senses, cognised by our intellect, valued by our affections, and acted upon by our will for the various needs of our being or well-being. Apart from the activity of all these the world is, for us, meaningless. All these activities, whether perceptive and intellective, or affectional, appreciative and selective are brought to birth in the world and nurtured by it. In regard to world-explanation they all stand or fall together. Sense experience and the ideas evoked by it are no more trustworthy than spiritual

valuation. For man as a purposive personality a valueless or an unvalued world is meaningless. Mankind, as social, can only be brought into fellowship by entering into a community of values. Both this condition and the inspiration to satisfy it are given to man by the universe of which he is a part. Hence unless full credit be given to the spiritual experience which emerges within the universe and yet transcends its materiality, no reasonable interpretation of reality and its process is possible.

2. It follows that the meaning of reality unfolds itself within the consciousness that apprehends and appreciates it. Human religion and poetry, science and philosophy, are not created by men as outsiders and imposed upon a possibly alien world. All these activities belong to man as the son and heir of the universe. The process of reality is their fontal source. The nature of the whole becomes self-interpretative in man. His purposiveness as seeking the "self-expression of a constant and constantly developing character" springs, not from himself, but from the reality in which he is "rooted and grounded." In his spiritual experience, slowly developed, Reality seeks and finds its self-expression in a finite consciousness which rests upon and emerges from its creative source.

3. Hence the True is the Good and the Good is the True. Man comes to himself only in pursuit of the Good. The process of the universe culminates in the fellowship of the spiritual values just because it is in these that the inmost heart of Reality is being revealed as its explanatory end.

4. Thus the only complete explanation of Reality, as an organic whole coming to its fulfilment in process, is that it proceeds from the immanent activity of a Divine and transcendent Creator. Of His eternal perfection as Love it comes that the spiritual values of the True, the Beautiful and the Good become revealed and realised in man, as the only means by which he comes to himself in the universe to which he belongs. Man's purposiveness is the finite expression of an universal purposiveness. His personality can only be explained by the Personality to which he, in common with the universe, owes his being. That Man, in coming to himself, remains immanent in the world and yet transcends it, means that he is a trustworthy, though imperfect, reflexion of the transcendent, yet immanent, Creator.

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

IRELAND IN 1934.

AS I think of those Anglo-Irish controversies which, as the recently published second volume of the *Life of Lord Carson* has just reminded us, occupied so large a share of public attention in the years immediately preceding the Great War, I am chiefly struck by the mistakes we all made: Unionists, in imagining that one Democracy could indefinitely continue to rule another against its will, and that violent resistance to reform could be entered upon without fatal results to the theory and practice of Parliamentary Government; Liberals—at least the more timid of them—in overestimating the value of statutory safeguards once self-government had been conceded; Nationalists, in underrating the strength of Ulster feeling and the growing influence of separatist Sinn Féin.

But of all errors, surely the most extraordinary was that of Lord Carson himself who seems both to have believed and to have persuaded others that, in the last resort, the interests of the scattered "loyalists" south and west of the Boyne, as well as the safety of the Empire, would be best served by cutting off Ulster from the rest of Ireland. The course of events has completely belied both these assumptions. If Protestants as such have not suffered in the Free State—and that is generally admitted—it is certainly no thanks to anything Lord Craigavon's administration has done, or could have done, on their behalf. Nor is much proof needed that Partition, with its duplication of departments, and vexatious interference with the course of trade, has inflicted grave injury upon both areas. One has but to read the speeches delivered at general meetings of the Great Northern Railway Co., or listen to the complaints of traders in such frontier towns as Londonderry, cut off from their natural markets, in order to realise how adversely large parts of Ulster itself have been affected by this unnatural division.

But this is much less than half the case against Partition. Ulster feared to find herself of no account in a Dublin Parliament. She failed to foresee that, under self-government, the artificial uniformity imposed upon Nationalists by the struggle for Home Rule must inevitably disappear, and that in seeking to maintain close political and economic relations with the Commonwealth she would find numerous allies

among those whom at that time she counted her enemies. What might Ulstermen not have achieved if they could but have had greater faith—I do not say in their fellow countrymen—but in themselves? I can think of no issue from acceptance of the Treaty (if indeed an instrument so revolutionary had in such circumstances to be contemplated at all) to the regulation of trade within the Empire, in which, having regard to the alignment of parties during the past fifteen years, they could not have played a decisive part. As things are, the existence of a separate government in the North-East has merely served to exacerbate Nationalist feeling, while quite impotent to affect that drift from the Commonwealth, which, with ever-increasing velocity, is sweeping away every safeguard, Privy Council Appeals, Oath of Allegiance, Senatorial check on hasty or partial legislation, by which it was hoped to secure both the rights of the minority and the integrity of the Commonwealth.

Now there are unquestionably many people on both sides of the Channel who, despairing of any other solution, and forgetting perhaps that Republicans are but a bare and doubtful majority even in the Free State, are prepared to advocate or to acquiesce in the creation of a "Southern Republic." For Englishmen, in particular, the idea may well have its attractions. Assuming some such arrangement as already exists in respect of coastal defence to be continued, England has (it may be felt) little to lose by frankly abandoning what now appears to have been irretrievably lost. To the tolerant, easy-going English mind, with its love of compromise and its aversion from "nominalism," it may well seem that at any rate peace in our time is to be attained by allowing complete self-determination to the opposed desires of majorities in north and south alike. Nay, even I, a citizen of the Free State, hating the partition of my country which would thereby be rendered perpetual, desirous of retaining my allegiance to the King and my rights as a British subject, conscious how much would be sacrificed by the exclusion of the greater part of Ireland from the Commonwealth, even I might, nevertheless, be willing to accept this thing if I were convinced that we should then be done with constitutional controversy and be able at length to concentrate upon the building up of a better social order. But what reason have we to expect anything of the kind? Whom is it hoped to

please? Evidently not ex-Unionists or old-fashioned Nationalists, nor the party of United Ireland led by Mr. Cosgrave and representing at least forty per cent. of the electorate, nor yet the followers of General O'Duffy; for to all these the idea is abominable. Is it the Irish Republican Army? But it has declared, again and again, that to recognise any form of government other than the all-Ireland Republic proclaimed in 1916 is to be guilty of Treason. Mr. de Valera, then? Perhaps; for on the subject of Partition he has for years been significantly silent. But has it not been remarked that when he speaks, as he so often does, of leaving the people free to choose a Republican form of government, he always carefully refrains from indicating whether the "people" so invoked are, or are not, to include the electorate of "Northern Ireland," and whether the "Republic" itself is to consist of twenty-six counties or thirty-two? One cannot believe that this obscurity is unintentional. His strength, from the very beginning, has lain in the pretence that the settlement of 1921 was a dictated settlement. Can one really believe that any settlement, from which Ulster was excluded, would be regarded otherwise? Is it not more than likely that it would merely serve as the jumping-off ground for a new agitation, assured beforehand of much more general support and threatening far graver risks to the public peace than any we have experienced since the collapse of the "Irregular" Rising of 1922? I suspect it was a tardy recognition of these facts that led to the abandonment of certain negotiations which I have reason to believe were set on foot between Dublin and London early in the past year.

To turn now to more immediate, if in the long run less serious, issues. In the northern area by far the most remarkable development is the newly expressed determination of Lord Craigavon and his colleagues to maintain against all comers the system of Home Rule established in Belfast by the Act of 1920. It may or may not be true that self-government was in that year "forced upon Ulster." It is certainly true that in the interval, as might have been expected, local pride has attached itself to, and vested interests have entrenched themselves around, the Parliament House at Stormont. At Twelfth of July demonstrations this year most of the abuse formerly levelled at Papists and Nationalists was reserved for a handful of Independent Unionist critics

who, in view of the grotesque cost of six-county administration, had dared to hint at a return to the direct rule of Westminster. Ulster has learned what the rest of Ireland learned long ago : the folly of allowing Irish interests to be subordinated to the ever-varying exigencies of British party politics.

In the Free State the year opened auspiciously for the opponents of the present administration. The merger between Cumann-na-nGaedheal and the Centre Party under Mr. Frank MacDermot (already attempted on the eve of the Election of 1933) had been achieved and completed by the adhesion of the Blueshirts, as the association of young men, successively known as the Army Comrades, the National Guard and the League of Youth—have come to be described. With characteristic modesty, Mr. Cosgrave had surrendered the chief place, continuing, however, to lead the United Ireland Party in Parliament ; while in the constituencies General O'Duffy, with the assistance of Dr. O'Higgins (the original founder of the Blueshirt movement) and others, was being very successful in meeting and defeating the appeal of the I.R.A. and its kindred societies to the youth of both sexes. Moreover, the efforts of the Government to check his progress brought it twice at least into collision with the Courts. A writ of *habeas corpus* being sought on General O'Duffy's behalf after his arrest while addressing a public meeting, the High Court ordered his immediate release, because, in the words of Mr. Justice O'Byrne, the Attorney General had failed to submit any evidence "why, by whom, in what circumstances and for what reason" the arrest had been made ; and when the Government tried to mend its hand by bringing against him a charge of sedition and of incitement to murder, the Court, being once more invoked, prohibited the Military Tribunal from hearing the case, pending the lodgment of certain affidavits which were not forthcoming. Thenceforth the Executive Council appears to have abandoned the idea of striking directly at General O'Duffy, but sought to render the wearing of the blueshirt uniform a statutory offence ; only to be again foiled by the refusal of the Senate to pass the necessary legislation.

All these things tended to hearten the opposition, which, during 1933, had been suffering all the moral discomfiture consequent upon a double defeat at the polls. Further, it was confidently expected that the County Council elections, due

to be held in the summer, would show the country to have at last awakened to the disastrous consequences of Mr. de Valera's economic policy. Viewed from this standpoint, the results were both disappointing and puzzling. Mr. de Valera's Labour allies did badly, winning only some 36 seats out of 742. But the Fianna Fáil-Labour combination nevertheless succeeded in establishing an absolute majority on more than half the Councils, thus reproducing on local bodies the situation already to be found in the Dáil. Government candidates did worse than had been expected in the large cities, such as Dublin and Cork, where, if anywhere, the Fianna Fáil policies of high industrial tariffs, cheap food and the promotion of protected industries should have been popular ; relatively well in rural districts generally, and best of all in just those areas which have been hardest hit by British duties on Irish livestock. Meath of the Pastures returned 19 Fianna Fáil councillors against 15 United Irelanders and 1 Independent ; Kildare, centre of the ruined horse-breeding industry, 10 Fianna Fáil and 7 Labour men against 12 members of the opposition. A possible explanation of this last-mentioned phenomenon is that in such counties as these, rural and semi-rural labourers are not only relatively more numerous than elsewhere, but also more disposed to regard the large farmer or grazier (not always, it is to be feared, a very sympathetic employer) as the enemy of the poor.

Indeed, one of the worst features of Mr. de Valera's administration is that it has continually exploited the latent jealousies between town and country and between the poor and the well-to-do. Thus, within the last few weeks, the Minister of Lands has announced his intention of "fine-combing" existing holdings with a view to further subdivision, and has apparently ordered a special return of all holdings of one hundred acres and upward. As our population increases, there may well be a case for reopening the bargains arrived at under the Land Purchase Acts ; but, land being a finite quantity, at some stage or other the process of subdivision must stop, and meantime there is a very real danger in arousing expectations which can never be completely satisfied. Partly as a result of the Government's land policy, still more through the ever-spreading stream of subsidies and grants (not always, if my information be correct, to those most in need) a most unhealthily large section of our

people live either in receipt or in expectation of official favours.

Since the summer the Opposition has been greatly weakened by a quarrel between General O'Duffy and the Parliamentary leaders. The precise ground of the quarrel is obscure; but it would seem that General O'Duffy, whose energy and organising power is certainly superior to his political discretion, had become increasingly restive under the guidance of the Parliamentarians, while these found themselves rendered responsible for speeches and actions which they disapproved. For some months before the split it was apparent that the Blueshirts, whose restraint under great and frequent provocation, had hitherto been altogether admirable, were, here and there, getting out of hand. Farmers' sons for the most part, they were naturally angered by the endeavour of the Government to collect the land annuities by means of forced sales of the stock which the farmers were unable to sell in the open market; and some of them had done things which could not be justified. In certain districts trees were felled, roads blocked, telegraph wires cut; while in one instance an attempt to rush a sale-yard resulted in loss of life. Still more alarming than this sporadic disorder was the attempt made, apparently with General O'Duffy's approval, to commit the Opposition as a whole to approval of a general combination to withhold the annuities; an approval which, however much they sympathised with farmers impoverished through the deliberate sacrifice of their only market, responsible statesmen could not give.

It is as yet too early to guess just how the split will develop; but, remembering some Irish precedents, one can hardly hope that the breach between former friends will be easily or quickly closed. We may, I think, make up our minds that Mr. de Valera's party will remain in power for a long time to come and that the economic quarrel with Great Britain, by now hopelessly involved with the Constitutional issue, will also continue. Just what this quarrel costs the two countries no one knows. Few people realise that, notwithstanding tariffs, ordinary or retaliatory (such as the 5s. a ton on English coal), the Free State is still one of Britain's very best customers, having as recently as 1933 imported British goods to the value of over £19,000,000, a figure only surpassed within the Empire by India, South Africa and Australia.

On the other hand, Free State exports have slumped disastrously since Mr. de Valera took office, being valued at only £13,409,163 for the nine months, January to September, 1934, or little more than half the corresponding figure for the same period in 1931. On the same showing, the adverse trade balance has jumped from £10,761,955 to £15,699,970; a rise all the more alarming in that our invisible exports (chiefly British and other "foreign" dividends, and remittances from American emigrants and migratory labourers in Great Britain) have greatly diminished. Signs of impoverishment multiply. Trade droops; rates are unpaid; there are no buyers in the fairs; the cost of living rises; more and more people are registered as unemployed. Yet State expenditure mounts steadily. Every other day a fresh subsidy is announced, notwithstanding that already during the year ended on March 31st, 1934, the taxpayer had been called upon to finance bounties in support of a diminishing trade to the tune of over £2,000,000, in addition to close upon another £1,000,000 paid for by special levies under the Dairy Produce Act of 1932. The Pension list is swollen by grants to young men who, after the Treaty, took up arms against the Free State. An auxiliary "defence force," largely officered by similar elements, has been raised and equipped. The "dole," abolished under Mr. Cosgrave, has been revived and extended to many persons, such as sons working on their fathers' holdings, who were not previously reckoned as unemployed; and all those in receipt of unemployment pay or home assistance (outdoor-relief) are now entitled to draw in addition a free weekly ration of beef. For the last-mentioned scheme—which is to cost the taxpayer some £600,000 a year and the general consumer by way of increased prices an amount not ascertainable—a small army of Inspectors has been enlisted. The State is to pay the butchers 5d. a lb. for beef so distributed, and the butchers are to pay the farmer for suitable beasts 25s. per live-cwt. Thus the latter will receive something more than the recent average price in the Free State, but fully 10s. per cwt. less than is obtainable in Great Britain or Northern Ireland as shown by comparable prices obtaining in Dublin, Belfast and other markets. Consequently, whatever else it may achieve, the scheme can hardly put a stop to the organised smuggling of cattle across the northern border, which, though punishable by heavy fines and

forfeitures, has, this past year, assumed formidable proportions.

In all these official dealings one can see that strange mixture of shrewd calculation with idealism so characteristic of Mr. de Valera. He has never concealed his sympathy with those who refuse their allegiance to any but a Republican State—after all, that was his own attitude until 1927; and he may well consider it both politic and agreeable to endeavour to win over the more tractable of the I.R.A. by places and pensions. Similarly, I am sure he does believe a new orientation of industry and agriculture to be desirable; and if the English market for cattle is to be regarded as in a large measure finally lost, and our present cattle stocks consequently excessive, what could be pleasanter than to reflect that this winter many will eat meat who rarely ate it before, and that, incidentally, the recipients of Government favour must surely show their gratitude at the next elections?

Those who are bound by self-interest to uphold his fortunes are indeed a numerous and variegated company, comprising not only these humble beneficiaries but, among others, the additional officials required to administer tariffs, subsidies and reliefs, and the manufacturers whose profits depend upon a continuance of high and almost universal Protection. Add to all this the Irish preference for persons to policy and the unquestionable appeal of Mr. de Valera's unusual personality; and it will be understood why he is able to do with us as he will. I suppose no Irish ruler since Strafford has had such power. The abolition of the University Franchise soon to be accomplished involves the disappearance from the Dáil of some of the keenest and best-equipped critics of his administration. The delay which the Senate can impose upon legislation will in a short time be limited to three months; a little later in the year the Senate itself, unless the Government changes its mind, will have disappeared altogether. The Army and the Police have been purged of undesired elements. Henceforward judges will be removable on the vote of the Dáil alone; and have already been warned that should they prove intractable, the Executive Council will know how to deal with them. In short, all the signs go to show that before 1935 is out we shall be living under an autocracy—an autocracy not the less formidable because one subservient chamber will still be left to follow Caesar's car.

HUGH A. LAW.

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN GERMANY.

PERHAPS at no time in the history of Germany was the position of the Church, even of religion itself, more precarious than in the first years after the war. There was a general feeling that it had not justified expectations. It had been unable to prevent the war or to put an end to it. The best that could be said of it was that it resembled the stretcher-bearers carrying the wounded from the trenches but never actually in the thick of battle. When the war had been lost and a revolution came, as it were by surprise, it was believed that a new impetus was certainly not to be expected from the Church or religion, people being only too apt to confound the two and to attribute the failure of the former to the inherent weakness, unworldliness, or impracticability of the latter.

This depreciation of religion, especially of Christianity, was not only due to the alleged failure of the Church during the war: its causes lay deeper. Philosophy had undermined the stability of values, teaching men to think in terms of relativity. The absolute had lost its hold, and thus Christian dogma with its claim to absolute value was discredited. Finally the teachings of Nietzsche, the cruder elements of which had by this time penetrated to the lower classes, found a considerable number of adherents as his neo-pagan attitude to life corresponded to their own. If you add the facts that the modern ideal was the sportsman or, as Count Keyserling put it even more pointedly in a lecture to the students of Marburg University in 1926, the chauffeur; that owing to defeat a frenzy of self-assertion had taken hold of many; that a generation was coming to the fore whose fittest had been blotted out by the war; that even younger people stood aside mourning the death of an age; we shall not be surprised that spiritual things were at a very low ebb.

This situation was not, as we have seen, initiated but it was emphasised by the paragraph concerning religious instruction in the Constitution of 1919. It resulted that parents were now no longer enjoined to send their children to Scripture classes, and only too many availed themselves of the opportunity thus offered. Boys and girls of fourteen were permitted, nay even encouraged, to choose whether they would

have any religious instruction or no. Thus a large number of children grew up practically without any knowledge of the Christian truths. There was, naturally, a widespread anti-Church movement among the workmen. To meet their demands classes for moral instruction were started, and confirmation was replaced by a ceremony named *Jugendweihe*. But also among the intellectuals there was a strong feeling against religion. Thus it happened that in High Schools some merely drifted away, others did not attend Scripture classes because they or their parents were socialists. Of those remaining only the minority were believers, the majority attending because their parents were conservatives and it was the thing to do.*

The Youth Movement itself, originating in a feeling of opposition to the older generation, was in its beginnings essentially anti-Church. For the Church was considered to be merely another of the fortifications of an authority they so earnestly desired to break down, and the religious life they had seen was all but emptied of its meaning. The declaration at the meeting of 2,000 young people belonging to thirteen youth groups on Hohe Meissner in 1913, which still held good after the war: "To shape their lives in absolute sincerity according to their own decisions and responsible to none but themselves," was meant to be a challenge to all conventions and their root tradition—and we must remember that tradition was never in Germany so well established as in the Western countries. It was meant to be a challenge to all obsolete forms of life and thought. They felt they had something new to show, a new appreciation of nature, a new feeling of community (though the word *Gemeinschaft* itself might have gradually been talked to pieces), a new zest in life and hope of mastering it in their own fashion, and not only of mastering it but in time being able to put their own interpretation on it, the feeling of having entered on a quest both fascinating and mysterious.

The young men who came back from the war, the boys and girls who had taken their places in those four dreary years, were not the same as those who had felt ready to challenge the world in the golden pre-war days. There was the same enemy to face, but it had become more subtle. And none are

* This development was, of course, more marked in the large towns of the Protestant north.

more susceptible to the spirit of an age than the very young, perhaps all the more so as they are destined to change it or put something new in its place. The age was cynical, or pessimistic, or simply tired—its most marked feature was a complete lack of stable values. And if there is one thing youth asks of life, it is stability—not security, but stability somewhere. It may be difficult for those who have not experienced it in their own lives to realise how devastating an effect this lack of stability has on youthful minds. They are not yet balanced enough to bear the onrush of conflicting theories. They are still groping after reality. And when they see that any partial truth they might have grasped can be contested and overthrown, when it dawns upon them that there is no reality behind the current solutions of life's problems—in spite of all opposition they are bound to think in the terms of their day—that they are merely words, dry husks; many grow callous, others give up in despair, while some, tired out, blindly seize any gospel that offers itself. Only a few hold on.

I remember the last words of a lesson in 1920 by a very brilliant master, who had the gift of making Greek life and thought real to us, and whose favourite topic was its influence on modern philosophy. The discussion had brought us from Plato to Kant and his theory of antinomies. We were all fascinated, and when the lesson drew to its end I think we all believed we were on the verge of an important discovery. The bell sounded. "Now, dear ladies, I leave you to your antinomies." The words have been ringing in my ears to this day. They have become symbolic to me. We had all been so eager to hear the master's own opinion. He did not give it. He threw us back on our own resources. It was not that he would not, he could not satisfy our craving, belonging as he did to a generation of men who had been brought up in the historical school of thought, and, being afraid of their own authority, looked to youth for a solution of the problems they had failed to tackle themselves.

The necessity of gaining some kind of foothold in a world which presented itself as a chaos of conflicting elements had become very urgent. This is the principal reason why historians of the Youth Movement, either deploring or rejoicing in the fact, can maintain that, about 1923, religion, in the broadest sense of the word, played a most important part in

the thoughts and discussions of young people.* What is said of the Youth Movement can equally be affirmed of a great number of those who did not belong to any organisation. In fact, the Youth Movement in its variety of expression was representative of the manifold tendencies which at the same time or in turns dominated the minds of the younger generation as far as they were at all alive to the spirit of the age. Thus any statement made here concerning the Youth Movement can always be understood as referring to a larger body as well. In former times—this is meant figuratively, for the features of youth are forever changing, types recur, and the best one can do is to trace leading trends of thought not necessarily following each other in the order supposed—in former times boys and girls, trusting in their own strength, had felt they could build a world anew. Now they realised that theirs was a weakness which could only be transmuted into strength by some form of faith.

There were two distinct groups with definite creeds and aims: the Socialist and Communist Youth organisations and the considerably older ones of the Churches. It seems futile in giving their names to evoke these ghosts of the past. Though the former were primarily class organisations with a strong tendency to prepare their members for the class conflict, the feeling underlying their activities, unacknowledged though it might be, was that of youthful reformers who believed they could shape the world according to their respective creeds. It was religion in a very vague sense indeed. For the Church and Christianity were still considered to be in league with the ruling classes and therefore as enemies. And yet some of the elements that go to prepare the way for religion were distinctly recognisable; the feeling that civilisation had turned man against his brother, that all were in reality "in the same boat," that "something had to be done." Thus Curt Bondy's opinion, "I cannot prove it when I say that this irreligiousness is not genuine but merely a pose, that if we go to the depths something profoundly religious can be found in the proletarian Youth Movement,"† seems to hold good.

The difficulty in the case of the organisations in any way connected with the Church is to distinguish between the genuine Youth Movement and parallel activities. In most

* cf. Hans Schlemmer: *Der Geist der deutschen Jugendbewegung*, 1923, p. 173.

† Curt Bondy: *Die proletarische Jugendbewegung*, 1922, p. 95.

cases the authority of adults made itself very strongly felt, and some of them subsequently earned a reputation which was not confined to the comparatively small group. Thus men like Gunther Dehn, who tried to interest younger theologians in the problems of practical Christianity in the large towns, and formed groups of boys not yet confirmed where he played games with them and told them stories not as a clergyman but simply as "Herr Dehn"; and the brilliant theorist of the Roman Catholic Youth Movement, Romano Guardini, soon became known to a larger public. Outside the Church organisations the influence of Karl Barth and Friedrich Gogarten can be traced in the Youth Movement. Their ideas were put into practice by the group named *Religiös-Soziale*, who founded a Christian-Communist settlement at Sannerz and endeavoured "to live the Christian life to the glory of God."

Though these organisations which were under the sway of the Churches or dominant personalities were by some not looked upon as actually belonging to the Youth Movement, they were in reality the same. Their problems were to a large extent the same. Theirs was still a spirit of adventure. For though they believed themselves to be in possession of the key to the world—for the Protestants, the Bible: for the Roman Catholics, the Church of Rome—there still remained much to be done. Before they could enter into their inheritance they had to reform their own lives. And here they were faced by the same problems that challenged the others: problems of their own lives, such as discipline and charity down to the minor though apparently no less urgent ones of sex, dancing, smoking, teetotalism, and those of the world at large: the social problem and the problem of international relations. When we read periodicals dating from that comparatively far-off time (1922-3) it is astonishing to see the mixture of spirituality and practical proposals—verses of sincere religious feeling, profound maxims, the next page actively joining in the battle against alcoholism and smoking. The youthful spirit takes hold of everything, trying to use it for its own ends or to shape it according to its own ideals. Even more astonishing is the depth of understanding presupposed in the boys and girls to whom Romano Guardini addresses his *Letters on Self-discipline*.* Beginning with the

* *Gottes Werkleute, Der Briefe über Selbsterziehung erste Folge*, 1921-2.

most trifling experience of everyday life he suddenly reveals the wealth of its meaning, pointing out how the simplest gesture or action can be transformed into a symbol of profound truths, showing the way to a perfect freedom which can only be realised through perfect surrender and subsequent discipline of self.

The Church organisations naturally comprised only a comparatively small number of young people. The majority was still opposed to any established creed. Though there was a strong under-current of religious feeling it had not yet received any definite form. They exulted in that they had not yet found. This attitude seems as natural to youth as the craving for authority. It is the age of opposites, the age of growing powers, physical, intellectual as well as spiritual. Thus any limitation—and religious formulæ must of necessity present themselves as such to youthful minds—would, though it might be subconsciously sought, be felt as irksome. Their religious experience was, as yet, solely that of the First Person of the Trinity, to which many paths lead. The feeling of universal brotherhood is one, the realisation of nature the most used. But the deity which reveals itself at the end of this way is vast, vague, and undefined. It is only too apt to fade away with our changing moods; it has no power to claim worship; it does not enjoin us to reform our lives.

Thus, when life came with its exacting demands, they found themselves with empty hands. They had to begin their search anew. It is pitiful to watch this groping after reality as reflected in the contemporary novel. I remember reading one, *Jupp Brand* by Otto Brües,* not a distinguished book, but in its crudity revealing more of the truth than any greater work of art. A young workman is described, who spends a year travelling through the Germany of the inflation. It is needless to dwell on the post-war restlessness and sensationalism he comes across. What is arresting in the book is the pathos of those young men and women who are seeking and not yet finding, one boy for instance trying to work out his salvation in complete solitude, another, a girl, giving all unworthily in unconscious imitation of a misunderstood Christ, everything as yet under the sign of futility, and nevertheless evoking in the reader wonder and pity because of the sincerity of the feelings revealed.

* 1927.

It is one of the laws of spiritual life that even sincere and powerful feelings as long as they remain inarticulate are only too easily led astray. The impetus towards religion was in many so vague and misdirected, and their longing for a definite interpretation of the world so strong, that some were satisfied with what anthroposophy or any other of the many modern pseudo-creeds might offer, while others joined mostly reactionary political groups, feeling, as they did, that their services were due to their country and people, their longing for stability being satisfied by the political and philosophical programme their party provided for them. In fact, the years which preceded the Nazi revolution seem to be coloured by political interests.

Though the religious impulse described above might have become less conspicuous, it was by no means in abeyance. It can be traced in the steadily increasing number of students of both sexes who took up theology, in the interest students of other faculties took in theological problems. In the Marburg of 1926-8 I remember students of mathematics, philosophy, and comparative philology crowding the lecture hall of Rudolf Bultmann, a pupil of Karl Barth. Philosophy was only appreciated inasmuch as it treated metaphysical problems, metaphysics being actually akin to theology. The modern theories of phenomenology, though for instance Martin Heidegger firmly asserted, as his teacher Edmund Husserl had done many years before,* that phenomenology was "*Wissenschaft*" and not "*Weisheitslehre*," were taken in the spirit in which you might receive a gospel. Pure philosophy would not satisfy this craving for the absolute. It was at bottom a religious impulse, which can again be traced in the not infrequent conversions to Roman Catholicism—Max Scheler was only the most prominent of many converts—as well as in the influence of men like Karl Barth and Friedrich Gogarten. It seems strange that the "negative theology" of the former and the even more sombre doctrine of the latter should have appealed so strongly to young students. But the fact can, I believe, be accounted for when we consider the barrenness and essential irreverence of the age. Better to return to the stern God of the Old Testament—this is in truth the Barthian conception of the Divinity—than to remain in a world devoid of meaning and authority.

* In the first volume of the periodical *Logos*, 1916.

Better to submit to a complete depreciation of the individual than to continue with its inflation which is only too plainly marked out for failure. The value of the whole development of philosophy since the Renaissance was now doubted. The thinking for oneself, the setting up of man as a supreme judge of good and evil, which had found its consummation in Nietzsche's doctrine of the superman, the Kantian theory of the subject which left the reality of the world out of account, a reality young people had only too definitely experienced in nature, seemed to have led man face to face with chaos.

The only remedy, it was argued by some, lay in the revival of medieval tradition. This is the reason why, quite apart from the work of the Roman Catholic Action which had begun in 1922 with the aim of winning back the Protestant world to the Church of Rome, people began to show a renewed interest in Roman Catholicism. For instance, about 1923 the halls of Berlin were crowded whenever Kaplan Fahsel, a convert, gave one of his lectures on modern philosophy, the subjects of which were chosen with a strong sense of what might appeal to the public—Rousseau, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche—while the influence of Romano Guardini, who began his lectures as Gastprofessor of Berlin University about the same time—Dante, Pascal, Nietzsche were treated in some of his classes—made itself felt even in the ranks of students of Protestant theology. This keen interest in the Roman Catholic attitude to life was not merely one of the many fashions of these bewildered years. It was more than that. It was an expression of man's ever-recurring desire for stability, for authority, for a continuity of tradition.

Perhaps it may be expedient to repeat that the spiritual experience we have tried to describe was not that of the majority. But that does not necessarily impair its validity, for spiritual matters have never been decided by a majority. What the more thoughtful among the young people realised so deeply—that they had reached a point where the old forms of thought, the traditions and shibboleths of the liberalistic age could not help them any further, and that they must somehow work their way back to stability and to an authority which could only be of irrational if not religious origin—was vaguely sensed by all. And there were certainly many who felt and acknowledged the necessity of a new spirit of community and social service.

IRENE MARINOFF.

GERMAN COLONIAL PROPAGANDA IN AFRICA.

THE German "national reawakening" has affected not only Europe; it has also perturbed the considerable non-German populations of the former German colonies. In this review we are concerned with the territories which were conquered by the Union of South Africa, or regarding which General Hertzog told the East African settlers' delegation in London in 1930 "the Government of the Union of South Africa had claims to be consulted on questions of native policy."

The British mandate over Tanganyika Territory, formerly German East Africa, covers a population of 8,000 Europeans, 32,000 Indians and Arabs, and 4,800,000 natives. The Europeans consist of 1,841 British officials and their families, and a non-official population of 2,041 British and 2,217 Germans. These figures, which are for 1931, should be compared with those for 1921 when the European population totalled 2,447, of whom 1,598 were British. The rapid influx of Germans cannot be ascribed solely to the return of pre-war settlers; an increasing proportion of the immigrants is new to the territory. As there is no longer any discrimination against German immigrants the British element may soon be hopelessly outnumbered. The country is eminently suited for settlement and has been estimated to be capable of accommodating over a million Europeans.

Conditions are entirely different in South West Africa. Almost half of this country, which adjoins the Union of South Africa, is occupied by desert. Its native population is 240,000 but of these 150,000 live in areas which are closed to Europeans. The white population numbered 14,830 in 1913. Of these 12,292, including 1,819 troops, were Germans; there were also 1,799 British (mainly Boers). By 1921 the population had increased to 19,432, of whom the minority of 7,855 were Germans, while in 1931 the total population was estimated at 32,840, composed of about 12,000 naturalised and unnaturalised Germans and 20,000 South Africans. The country is unsuited for intensive settlement and its possible maximum white population can be put down at 50,000. The majority of the white settlers are not immigrants: they are South Africans and thus native to the country. Few of

the present German population arrived before the great native wars of 1903-6. More than a third are post-war immigrants and all thus have recent ties with an overseas *Heimat*. Of the South Africans about eighty per cent. are Afrikaners ("Dutch") and of these a number were in the country in the German days.

There is a conspicuous contrast in the administration of the two mandated territories. In Tanganyika, where the opportunities for white settlement are considerable, British policy regards the interests of African natives as paramount; in South West Africa, where there is little scope for a large white population, the settlers and the administration are agreed on the paramountcy of the white race. An important consideration is that the South West African administration is conducted by white officials who are native to the country, while in Tanganyika the officials are either men from overseas with no stake in the country and a traditional sentimental bias in favour of the natives, or Africans and Asiatics. Though it cannot honestly be said that the East African natives harbour any animosity against the Germans, they must undoubtedly prefer the power which declares that native interests shall prevail when they conflict with the interests of the white population (as laid down in the White Paper of 1923).

Until 1924 when the Nationalists came into power, South African interest in South West Africa was half-hearted. General Hertzog had resisted the acceptance of the mandate over "Naboth's Vineyard" as strenuously as he had opposed the military expedition in 1914. Most of the Germans and many South Africans expected that the Nationalists would return the territory to the Germans. Obviously this was impossible as the Union had not received the mandate from Germany and could only surrender it to the "principal Allied and Associated Powers." Moreover the previous administration had encouraged settlement to such an extent that by 1924 almost 1,000 farms, totalling about 19,000,000 acres, had been allotted to over 1,100 settlers, most of them from the Union. During the war and the post-war inflation period German immigration was out of the question and as early as 1921 the South Africans (including no troops) made up fifty-nine per cent. of the white population. The Nationalists were thus faced with the impossibility of handing over

a majority of their own people to the administration of a foreign mandatory.

What their Government did do was to amplify the more liberal treatment of the Germans introduced in the latter days of the Smuts régime. Under Sir Howard Gorges' administration there had been a distinct attempt to establish a paramountcy of native interests—over those of the German settlers!*. A sense of proportion was now introduced into native policy, and the Germans were also consulted in an increasing measure in public affairs. The gradual introduction of self-government was considered and the free use of German in all official intercourse was conceded though English and Afrikaans continued to be the official languages. On the other hand an attempt was made to obtain control of the German schools by making financial assistance conditional on the introduction of the South African syllabus and the teaching of English and Afrikaans. Here the Administration was on dangerous ground and its own experiences in the language and school questions should have taught it caution. With the advent of the first Nationalist Administrator in 1926 the school and language questions received more sympathetic treatment but German national fervour had been increasing as the memories of the military occupation receded. These manifestations received flattering attention from the non-German section which regarded them as a challenge to the Union's sovereignty: the South Africans began to shout back.

Meantime South West Africa was granted a constitution. The preliminary arrangements had been made by General Smuts in London in 1923 when he concluded an agreement with the German government under which the Germans were automatically to become British subjects in order to share in the self-government of the territory. Those who did not wish to become British subjects could lodge a reservation of their German nationality with their local magistrate. But—"according to German law no German could lose his German

* Disagreement, particularly on native policy, between the Administrator and Union ministers created an acute situation. The complaint against Sir Howard was that he insisted that the benefit of the doubt should always be given against Germans in their disputes with natives; General Smuts's action in appointing Mr. Gysbert Hofmeyr in his place seems to show that he considered the complaint to have some foundation. Mr. Hofmeyr later became known in connection with the suppression of the Bondelswart rising.

citizenship (*Reichsangehörigkeit*) as a result of an automatic naturalisation."* Eventually over ninety per cent. of the Germans accepted this naturalisation.

In 1926 elections for the new legislative assembly took place. Despite the fact that the voters roll showed a slight majority in favour of the South Africans, seven of the twelve elected members were Germans. The Administrator added two German and four South African nominated members. The Germans immediately took the offensive. They introduced a motion calling upon the Union Government to repudiate and destroy the blue book on German colonial maladministration.† In this they were supported by the South African members. In reply to the resolution, however, the Prime Minister pointed out that the blue book was not a South African document, that it was in fact a Parliamentary publication of the British Government; at the same time he dissociated himself from its conclusions. The next step was a demand for the formal recognition of German as an official language of the territory; this was refused.

The significant feature of the present friction between South Africans and Germans is that it is essentially one between Afrikaners and Germans. The Boer tradition has always been pro-German and only the German assumptions of race superiority have brought about this radical change of attitude. The Germans unfortunately regarded their Afrikaner fellow citizens, most of whom were men of humble station, as a race which had degenerated from the lofty standards of *Kulturmenschen*. The Boers resented this and in the unedifying game of *tu quoque* which followed retaliated with equally extravagant generalisations. The increasing assertiveness of the Germans also aroused an imperialist feeling in the Afrikaners; perhaps it is more correct to say that a Monroe doctrine for South Africa had come into being. Nationalism had established the doctrine of South Africa First and now the Germans seemed to abuse their Union citizenship for the aggrandisement of Germany at the cost of South Africa. The South Africans, somewhat over-conscious of their liberality, expected perpetual humility and gratitude from the Germans who had been so docile under martial law.

* Geh. Reg.-Rat Dr. Ruppel in *Koloniale Rundschau*, 1924, p. 6.

† "Report on the Natives of South West Africa," Cd. 9146, London, 1918.

Though the Germans had lost numerical strength they had consolidated their political strength in a single organisation, the *Deutsche Bund*. They retained their majority in the towns and controlled the municipalities. In the Assembly they were reduced to a minority of seven as against eleven in 1929, but they could prevent the amendment of the constitution by withholding the requisite two-thirds majority. They feared absorption by the Union and their fear was increased by the settlement in the territory of several thousand Afrikaners who had immigrated from Portuguese Angola. (Incidentally, at the expense of the Union.) The depression enabled the Administration to obtain greater control over the German schools. German still remained the principal medium of instruction but the South African system predominated; this and increased inducements to send their youth to Union colleges and institutions the Germans regarded as attempts at denationalisation. They were aware that most of the children of Germans in the Union had been assimilated by the Afrikaners and they were determined to preserve their *Deutschtum*, their German national consciousness, in South West Africa.

Yet there were some attempts at co-operation. The South Africans agreed to support a request for the recognition of German as an official language, and in their turn the Germans joined in the demand for greater legislative and executive powers. But hardly had this sign of harmony been given when a fresh wave of German feeling gave rise to renewed recriminations. The Prime Minister, who had agreed in principle to both requests, forthwith made their enactment conditional upon the restoration of domestic peace.

The growth of national fervour in the Fatherland had been noted with approval by the African Germans. The colonial associations in Germany and some of the German magnates, amongst them Herr August Stauch, M.L.A., the discoverer of the Lüderitz diamonds, floated a land settlement company and equipped magnificent training farms for the accelerated settlement of German immigrants, most of whom were noblemen or ex-officers. The *Stahlhelm*, German boy scout and other youth organisations, and finally the Nazi Party appeared on the scene. German naval ratings toured the country and were fêted by the enthusiastic populace. Distinguished visitors like the Duke of Mecklenburg (one of the

leaders of the colonial movement in Germany), the Crown Prince's eldest son, Dr. Rohrbach, one of the founders of the German colony, and Dr. von Lindequist,* a former governor and colonial secretary, visited South West and addressed meetings at which the *deutsche Gedanke* was kept alive. Most of these visitors who, it must be emphasised, are associated with the German colonial movement, concluded their missions with a visit to Tanganyika Territory.

No one can blame the Germans much if they are even somewhat noisily proud of the more respectful attention which Germany now commands, but it is to be deplored that their exuberance has jeopardised co-operation with the other section of the South West population. The majority of the German farmers know that a return of the country to Germany would cost them their only market—the Union. They admit that the present administration rests more lightly on the individual than the German system, which would have its compensations only if the German administration could spend millions on an unnecessary but voracious garrison. The majority realise that Germany cannot afford a colony which offers no space for her emigrants, produces few industrial raw materials, is expensive to administer and contains an unassimilable alien majority. But however sceptical these Germans may be, they dare not voice their doubts. Most of them look forward to spending their leave in Germany and under German law they are still German subjects. . . .

So the agitation for the return of the colony to its former owners continues to be encouraged in semi-official German colonial circles. Influential personages, in close touch with the Government and the Nazis, continue to fan the flame of German patriotism in the territory. Feeling has risen so high that stupid "incidents" have taken place and each has caused a wave of counter-feeling amongst the South Africans. The Union flag has been hauled down from the Government Offices in Windhoek; the German imperial colours nailed in its stead. A protest by a moderate (but undoubtedly patriotic) German against the introduction of the *Führer* principle into the school associations was punished by an attack on his property. Nazi uniforms and swastikas appeared everywhere and *gemütliche* Germans began to discuss racial boycotts over

* Since Herr Hitler's accession to power, Dr. von Lindequist is a prominent member of the Nazi colonial committee.

their beermugs. The result was the introduction by the South Africans of a Bill for the prevention of racial propaganda or boycotts, the prohibition of "foreign" (i.e. non-British or S. African) political associations, the importation and distribution of literature encouraging such associations, the wearing of private uniforms and the display of political symbols. The Bill was adopted after the Germans had left the House in a body, but the Union Government reserved its assent for six months in the hope that peace would be restored.

As early as October 1932 the *Deutsche Bund* had resolved against party divisions on economic lines and reiterated the principle that "the progress of South West Africa is best guaranteed by exclusive racial parties." A year later the *Führer* principle was introduced into the *Bund*. A young Swakopmund doctor, hitherto politically unknown in the territory, was designated *Führer* of South West Africa. The German M.L.A.'s, all members of the *Bund*, expressly acknowledged his leadership, thus submitting their mandates to his direction. They had already stated, in answer to the introduction of the anti-Nazi ordinance, that they would no longer as a body participate in the business of the House. The *Führer* disclaimed the suggestion that he would accept instructions from outside the country but the South Africans did not believe in this exception to Nazi practice. They maintained that the conduct of the German M.L.A.'s (all British subjects) would be directed by the German authorities and they discounted Herr Hitler's earlier advice to the South West Germans to conform to the laws of the territory since he also enjoined them to submit to the policy of the *Bund*.

Both the Germans and the South Africans now withdrew from the undertaking which was the basis of the extended powers agreement. The South Africans, recalling General Smuts's statement at Windhoek in 1920 that the mandate was tantamount to annexation, openly advocated the incorporation of the territory as a fifth province of the Union. The intention seems to be a challenge to the Germans to declare unequivocally for the return of the colony to Germany. But the Germans are not likely to be drawn so easily. They continue to protest their adherence to the mandate principle and will not go further than to assert Germany's fitness to exercise a mandate and to complain of South

African maladministration. Though they have duplicated every Nazi institution in the *Bund*, they protest their independence of the Nazis. That party, indeed, was established as a separate organisation and with it came the Hitler Youth and other accessories, all officered from Germany. Then in February last, General Hertzog surprised everyone to whom his German sympathies were known, by assenting to the anti-racial propaganda bill. By July the administration had proscribed the Youth movement and expelled its leader. In October the police raided all Nazi premises; by the end of the month the Nazis were declared an illegal organisation and their officials expelled. A week later the country elected an Assembly in which the South Africans, pledged to work for the inclusion of the territory as a fifth province of the Union, held the requisite two-thirds majority which passed a resolution to that effect.

We have seen that the return of South West Africa is not an economic proposition for Germany; but there is (at least) strong semi-official support for the agitation in favour of such a return. Though it would not be to the advantage of the German settlers, they foster the agitation under the stress of their excited emotions. On the other hand the Union cannot surrender the mandate as this would involve the abandonment of South Africans to alien rule. At the same time the mandate does not rest lightly on the Nationalist conscience which had once repudiated the shifting of a neighbour's beacons.

What then are the forces at work behind the scenes? There can be no doubt that Germany wants colonies: "We insist on the return of the most important of our colonies," the *Reichsleitung* of the Nazi party stated in 1931. Far greater than her need for colonies is her desire for the prestige which their possession is thought to imply. Though Germany's resources are at present wholly inadequate for colonial enterprise she regards the repossession of some of her colonies as a refutation of the *Koloniallüge* and a colonial empire as a symbol of *Weltmacht*. Even with Bismarck this question of prestige was the deciding factor which overcame his aversion to colonial enterprise. But to-day Germany cannot afford to pay as much for prestige as in the days of the

first *Reich*. She must therefore concentrate on those regions which, while affording room for the greatest number of her own people, will also provide her industries with the greatest quantity of raw material. It is obviously Tanganyika Territory which is the focus of her attentions. There, too, the German population, unlike the Germans in South West, is rapidly outnumbering other Europeans.

The Germans are aware of constitutional changes in the Commonwealth. They probably overrate the influence of the Dominions on British policy or misunderstand the functions and jurisdiction of imperial conferences. They may well over-estimate the influence of South Africa on British policy, being misled by General Hertzog's interest in the Delamere delegation in 1930. Then there is no doubt that South Africa is perturbed by the White Papers of 1923 and 1930 which lay down the "paramountcy of native interests for the East African territories" and envisage "a common roll for electors of all races" in those countries—the extreme extension of Rhodes's doctrine of "equal rights for all civilised men, irrespective of race," i.e. of colour. This is not likely to be the German policy and Germany's return to East Africa might allay South African misgivings on this score. South Africa's conscience might also be eased by Germany's voluntary abjuration of South West Africa. In that case even the Swakopmund *Führer* might support the movement for the incorporation of the territory as a fifth province of the Union!

Is this the method behind the apparent madness of German colonial propaganda in Africa? Is South West Africa merely the red herring?

P. BRUCHHAUSEN.

CHRISTMAS AND THE STUARTS.

THE Christmas festival, so dear to English hearts, is less intimate a part of the national life in Scotland, where the New Year celebrations take the first place. It is interesting, therefore, to study the State Records and the contemporary Pamphlets and Ballads with the object of discovering how far the festivities of the season were affected by the accession of a Scottish King. The English Monarchs, from very early days, made merry with their friends and retainers, and showered gifts upon the poor and needy. In one of the ancient Metrical Romances it is said of Richard I :

Christmas is a tym ful honest,
King Richard it honoured wyth gret feast ;
Alle his clerkes and barons
Were sett in their pavilions,
And served wyth gret plentie
Of meate and drinke and such daintie.

Thomas Tusser (1515-80) lays special stress upon the duty of Christmas charity :

At Christmas the hardness of winter doth rage,
A griper of all things, especially age ;
Then truly poor people, the young with the old,
Be sorest oppressed with hunger and cold.
At Christmas by labour is little to get,
That wanting, the poorest in danger are set ;
What season then better of all the whole year
Thy needy poor neighbours to comfort and cheer.
Good bread and good drink, a good fire in the hall,
Brawne pudding and souse and good mustard withal.
Beef, mutton and pork, shred pies of the best,
Pig, veal, goose and capon, and turkey well dressed,
Cheese, apples and nuts, jolly carols to hear,
As then in the country is counted good cheer.

Tusser's Sovereign, Queen Elizabeth, seems to have enjoyed the Christmas festivities to the full. Masques were performed at Court, great banquets were made and costly presents were given and received by her. The profusion of food and drink at these banquets would be incredible if it were not recorded in authentic documents : beef, mutton, pork, veal, hares and rabbits, herons, capons, mallards, pheasants, quails and

pigeons loaded the tables, to be followed by pasties, jellies, tarts, creams and fruits of all sorts, the whole washed down with gallons of ale and wine. That Elizabeth remained unmarried was a source of dissatisfaction to her subjects ; her Scottish cousin was unknown to them, and there were many predictions of disaster should he succeed her. A curious example of these forebodings is a rhyme that passed from lip to lip during the Queen's last years :

When Hempe is spun
England's done.

Its origin could not be traced, and though it was repeated with much shaking of heads its meaning was not very clear, some saying that the spinning of hemp—then an important industry—was a source of danger to England, and others that the danger would arise when no more hemp was left to spin. Then came the true interpretation : it was no raw material that was meant ; the letters forming the word *hempe* were the initials of the Tudor Sovereigns :

H.	-	-	-	Henry VIII.
E.	-	-	-	Edward VI.
M.	-	-	-	Mary and
P.	-	-	-	Philip.
E.	-	-	-	Elizabeth.

When all the Tudors were gone and the Stuarts succeeded them, then would England be done and her glory departed. So said the Oracle, but like other Oracles its utterance was cryptic, and as time went on it became abundantly clear that the glory of England had not departed and that she was only "done" in the sense that she had been wedded with Scotland and become Great Britain.

But though the change meant added prosperity, like all changes it found its critics, and a ballad circulated during King James's reign shows how new customs were resented. It is called *The Old and New Courtier*, and the writer declares that the country gentleman in Elizabeth's time

With a good old fashion when Christmas was come
Called in his old neighbours with bagpipe and drum,
With good cheer enough to furnish every old room
And old liquor enough to make a cat speak and a man dumb,
Like an old Courtier of the Queen
And the Queen's old Courtier.

But now that King James is on the throne a new fashion has come in :

With a new fashion when Christmas is drawing on
On a new journey to London straight we must all be gone,
And leave none to keep house but our new porter John,
Who relieves the poor with a thump on the back with a stone
Like a young Courtier of the King
And the King's young Courtier.

The Royal festivities were no doubt very attractive, for in a letter to the Earl of Shrewsbury dated December 5th, 1604, Sir Thomas Edmondson says : " Our Corte of Ladyes is preparing to solemnize the Christmas season wyth a gallant Maske, wch doth cost the Exchequer £3000." The Queen and eleven of her ladies took part and a glimpse of bygone envies and jealousies is afforded by a significant sentence in the letter : " The Ladie Hatton would feign have had a part, but some unknown reason kept her out, whereupon she is gone to her house." Another peep behind the scenes is given in a letter from Mr. John Chamberlaine to Sir Dudley Carleton dated January 5th, 1607, in which he says that a Masque is to be given at Court on Twelfth Night and that the King was " very earnest to have one on Christmas night, tho', as I take it, he and the Prince received (Holy Communion) that day; but the Lords told him it was not the fashion, which answer pleased him not a whit, but said, ' What do you tell me of the fashion? I will make it a fashion! ' "

A Twelfth Night Masque was performed again in the next year and this time there is no note of a Christmas Masque at Court. Henry, Prince of Wales, took the part of Miliades, Lord of the Isles, and a speech was put into the mouths of some of his followers to the effect that their Master, " boyleing with an earnest desire to try the Valour of his years in Foreign Countries and to know where Virtue triumphed most, sent them abroad to espy the same, who after their long travels in all Countries returned to declare that in the fortunate Isles of Great Britain alone could his wishes be found." Henry was then fifteen years old, a charming boy of much beauty, wit and grace ; he was of a stronger character than his younger brother Charles and had Death not snatched him away in 1612 the Stuarts might never have been driven from the throne. On New Year Night, 1610, he took the name part in

Ben Jonson's Masque, *Oberon, the Fairy Prince* ; it was a silent part, but his grace in the dances was much applauded and he stood in the centre of the stage at the close while attendant Nymphs and Fairies sang his praises :

Who hath not heard, who hath not seen,
Who hath not sung his name?
The soul that hath not, hath not been,
But is the very same
With buried Sloth, and knows not fame
Which doth him best comprize,
For he the wonder is of hearts,
Of tongues and ears and eyes.

A Tournament was held on Twelfth Night in which his " manful part " was as much admired as his graceful dancing had been in the Masque, and those who watched him can little have thought that in two short years this young idol of the Court would be borne to his grave through streets crowded with weeping men, women and children. That some of the regulations of the new Court were extremely strict is shown by a parchment roll that belonged to the then Chancellor of the Exchequer. It contains a list of the Prince's Household, numbering some five hundred persons, nearly all of them young men of noble family. A service was held in the Chapel both morning and evening at which all were to attend, any who failed to do so being deprived of their dinner in the morning or their supper in the evening according to the time at which they were absent. Those who neglected to attend at the service of Holy Communion were to be summarily dismissed from their office ; " light jesting and unseemly oaths " were forbidden, and after eight o'clock no one might pass in or out without a special permit. Sir Charles Cornwallis, Henry's Treasurer, says in his Life of his beloved " Young Master " that though these young gentlemen " were born to great fortunes and in the prime of their years when their passions and appetites were strong, their reason weak and their experience little," the Prince's gracious example was " sufficient restraint upon them, his very eye served as a command and his look alone had more effect than the sharpest reprehensions of other princes." But in spite of these restrictions, Henry, as has already been shown, took his full share in feasts and merry-makings ; nor were they curtailed

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THE FUTURE OF INDIA.

IN our new year 1935 this old mother of nations, Britain, will be called upon for one of the most momentous decisions in her history. It is just five years short of a century since Lord Durham's scheme for self-government in Canada was laid on the table of Parliament. In that interval Britain has been setting up her great Dominions, one after the other, in their own homes, giving them the management of their own affairs, leaving them to learn the hard lessons of life from their own experiments and their own mistakes. One alone remains in dependence and pupilage; and before this century of evolution closes, India claims that she also shall come of age, that she be given the same freedom and the same responsibility as the other children who are now partners in our Commonwealth. From those others she differs in race, religion, history and social structure; but she has been fed on the same intellectual food as they have eaten and imbued with the same political ideals. What then is to be our answer to her claim?

It is for Parliament, and Parliament alone, to say; but rarely, if ever, have our Parliament and our people had such a wealth of material to help them in the decision. For seven years the question has not been absent from the minds of our statesmen, or of thinking men and women of all classes and parties. Few novels have sold like the brilliant study of the problem and its conditions which was published by the Statutory Commission (Sir John Simon's) in the summer of 1930. Active societies have been formed to broadcast facts and to expound the issues. Press, platform and pulpit have been equally busy in educating the public. Controversy has developed, and romantic figures have leaped into the arena. Every phase of thought, both British and Indian, and every school of experience has had the widest opportunity of recording its views. The background of history has been filled in by experts; the lights and shades of Indian life, its social customs, its communal troubles, its religions and its philosophies have been sketched by scores of competent writers. The topic

equivalent of a £1 a day to put out forest fires, and that a vast sum of money was being spent annually on this account. Without comment, I repeated the simple statement of my Indian friend of the trees to the President. For several seconds he remained in thoughtful silence with his direct eyes averted and into them came a distant look. I felt then, in the few moments that elapsed before he again spoke, that this man of action was evolving a great plan for forest protection. He knew that millions of dollars were being wasted, never to return, for repeated fires had burnt not only the trees but the humus and good earth that had accumulated through the centuries and had laid bare the rocky or stony subsoil. The damage done by fire cannot be truly estimated. It is more than the destruction of timber, it means the destruction of the soil.

Maybe it was then that he had his glorious vision of combining the task of taking care of thousands of unemployed young men and of building up the forests. Theodore Roosevelt had declared: "When you help to preserve our forests, or plant new ones, you are acting the part of good citizens," and Calvin Coolidge once wrote: "If the Government ever needs to give work to the unemployed, an enlarged system of reforestation would be a partial solution free from objections. It would not interfere with the rates of wages, or marketing of productions in any of the existing industries."

Gifford Pinchot, Governor of Pennsylvania, ever since he was the first forester under Theodore Roosevelt had preached the gospel of conservation, but it remained for Franklin D. Roosevelt to take action.

Statistics show that his civilian army of foresters have effected an average reduction in fire losses for all Federal forest lands amounting to fifty per cent. This is equivalent to saving in one year £45,000,000 worth of timber; so, on that ground alone, his action in establishing the Civilian Conservation Corps Camps has been more than justified. But in addition to this tremendous saving of natural forest wealth from destruction by fire, the Corps have carried out valuable work in thinning 5,000,000 acres of cut-over forests that have come up in a thicket. They have, too, carried out a campaign against beetle and insect pests on another 10,000,000 acres. Besides this, they have planted over 300,000 acres of young trees.

I have followed up the work of these lads in camp. At first they found the life strenuous—that was to be expected. Pioneering in the woods, clearing sites for camps and making roads of access, even though they worked but six hours a day, is a far cry from life in the City. But asked whether they would change their life in the camp for City lights, see what they would say. They have become hard, healthy and creative. They believe in the value of the work they are doing, though they may never see the results of their labours. There is a wonderful spirit in the C.C.C. Camps. Like the old-time pioneers, they have made for themselves homes in the bush. They have their little clearings for cultivation, of course, and those who have a bent in that direction often grow their own vegetables, but the forest to them is not an enemy to be overcome. It is their best friend, for the work of thinning and other improvements is providing them with a life under ideal conditions. In talking to them you sense that particular exaltation that comes to men who work among trees and are in love with them. One of their number, recently describing the life of the C.C.C. Camps, said: "I think it must have been the thought of making us pioneers that made our President speak of recreating our manhood from the ground up."

So valuable has been their work that the President expressed the hope that their number might be increased three-fold. The Forestry officials do not expect to see the Corps cease operations at the end of the emergency. Mr. Ferdinand A. Silcox, the newly-appointed chief of the American Forestry Service, predicts their development into a permanent system for training young men in the appreciation of the nation's forest preserves. "We dreamed years ago of the things we could do with these vast areas if we had the proper help and enough of it," he said. "Now we can see the things which can be done."

We in England have our forest problems, but they are not insurmountable. They are small by comparison with those of the United States of America. Nevertheless they are pressing and should be tackled at the first opportunity. It is not generally realised that during the war we cut four-fifths of our forests and at the present rate of planting it will take over a hundred years to restore our forests to the position that they were in before the outbreak of war. In a time of national

retains, and must always retain, much of its vastness and its mystery and its infinite variety ; but whatever is humanly possible has been done to help our people to realise its main features, and the arguments for and against any particular course of action.

The results are finally summed up in the report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, upon which the necessary legislation will clearly be based. Of this document the highest praise is to say that it is, as it unquestionably is, worthy of its subject. Apart from the attractions of its style and the logic of its setting, it has three outstanding merits. First is the width of its horizon. It surveys the whole position, with a fine sense of proportion, unaffected by passing extravagances. Its theme is the normal lines along which human institutions are known to develop ; and its purpose is to bring the evolution of India on to this path rather than to magnify the obstacles which might tend to deflect it. The second striking feature of the report is its grasp of detail. This it achieves by an equally firm grasp of principles, as the touchstone to which it brings the countless minor issues arising during the inquiry. It has thus been possible for the Committee to fill in a number of gaps left in the White Paper, and to correct its draft. Some of the corrections will be regarded by one critic as rash, by another as retrograde ; but at any rate they present clear-cut solutions for much that threatened to remain in controversy, besides simplifying the task of the parliamentary draftsman. The third and not the least valuable attribute of the report is its humanity. It deals with the strength and the weaknesses, the factions and the foibles of India precisely as it would have treated those of any other country. There are no moral judgments, no shadows of superiority or patronage. A conspicuous example of this is its consistent equating of the so-called "safeguards" in the new Indian constitution with the unwritten conventions of the British constitution. On that point, some may think, it attempts to prove too much ; but the fault is on the right side, and the tendency is preferable to the disparaging emphasis too frequently laid on features in Indian life which find no counterpart in the West.

Their handling of broad principles is at once put to the test when the Committee approach their primary issue : Is India to be given, or denied, self-government ? The answer is clear and conclusive. No refuge is taken in commitments, no appeal

is made to some promise by the Prime Minister, or some pronouncement by a Viceroy ; no allusion even to that term of ambiguous and sinister fame, Dominion status. To be spared hackneyed argument is a relief. Had the Committee found that self-government means inevitable chaos, no commitments or promises would have availed in justification : even the slender tree of reform planted in 1917 would properly have been uprooted. But there is no such finding, and no such half-hearted plea for progress. The case for advance is based on broader grounds. The "subtle ferments" of education and nationalism have created in India a public opinion "strong enough to affect what has been for generations the main strength of the Government of India—its instinctive acceptance by the mass of the Indian people." When this goes, the government can rest only on force or on persuasion. Force is unthinkable ; persuasion is an art in which an alien power can never compete with an indigenous opposition. Local patriotism may be shallow, ignorant or even dishonest : but it can appeal to the minds, the passions and the prejudices of the masses through channels which are closed to official propaganda : and when it succeeds, the only remedy is to saddle it with the responsibility for fulfilling its promises. In India, forces are at work which are neither ignorant nor dishonest ; and unless we can harness them in the service of the State, they will make our position impossible.

"Sheer Defeatism," comes the scornful cry from a school which is being vigorously led against the Committee's conclusions ; and the criticism is too much in earnest to be ignored. Certain words were invented as nicknames, and then employed as arguments : "defeatism" is one of them, "dyarchy" incidentally is another. To be a defeatist is to retreat, it would appear, from a position which could with courage and common sense have been retained. That this is not our policy in India, cannot be too strongly insisted upon. Our policy is, and always has been, to train India to govern herself, and to hand over the responsibilities of government as soon as she is fit to carry them. At one time we had hopes that the system of dyarchy would operate as an automatic test of her fitness. In that respect it has not wholly succeeded ; and we have had to apply another criterion—the judgment, to wit, of the many competent observers who accompanied Sir John Simon, who sat on the Round Table conferences and who composed the

emergency they were badly depleted, but they probably saved the invasion of our land. Timber is a bulky material and if it has to be imported obviously requires ships. In war-time every ton of shipping was in demand to bring in foodstuffs, transport troops and munitions. Food is perishable and cannot be stored in any great quantity, but has to be supplied fresh as it is required. Unlike food, timber can be stored where it grows, and under proper management can be improved in value for the keeping. Hence, tree-planting may be made a form of national insurance and is just as important a part of the defence in time of war as ships.

In the old days when timber was in demand for the navy, it was considered a patriotic duty to plant for one's country to provide "the wooden walls of Old England"; and one reads of retired admirals who walked along the country lanes tucking acorns into the hedgerows which they hoped in due time would reinforce the bulwarks of defence. In the past landowners generally planted for their sons or their grandsons, but to-day conditions in Great Britain are so changed there is little encouragement for them to do so any longer. In the first place, the death duties take so heavy a toll that only three deaths in succession are required to break up a wooded estate. Thus, this natural inducement to planting has been removed.

As an example of what has been done in another part of the Empire, New Zealand has a constructive forest plan by which forest bonds have been sold to the public. One Corporation alone has disposed of something in the neighbourhood of £4,000,000 worth of these bonds. But in that country, owing to ideal climatic conditions, investors have to wait but a comparatively short time to see results, for tree growth is truly phenomenal. In England it would be necessary to wait for thirty to thirty-five years at least, to reap the full benefit of planting. If only we had embarked upon a really progressive nationally-conceived scheme for afforestation after war-time cutting, we should not have found ourselves in the deplorable condition in which we are to-day. But it is no good regretting what might have been. It is far better to set to work and endeavour to remedy the damage inflicted during the war years. True, the Forestry Commission have made a start; but in 1931 the grant was cut to something in the neighbourhood of £400,000 a year, which under existing

management only allows for the planting of a little over 20,000 acres a year. A simple calculation will show how long at that rate it will take to plant the three million acres which are now lying idle.

Before the war the things that were generally made from wood were numbered as 500, but to-day, with the development of the cellulose industry, something in the neighbourhood of 4,000 uses for wood have been counted. For every single substitute found for wood there are about ten new uses for forest products. As much as £80,000,000 has been paid in a single year to foreign countries for timber and other forest products. A large proportion of that timber comes from Russia. In that country at the present rate of cutting it has been estimated that the accessible virgin forests will be depleted within thirty years. In the state of the world as it is to-day, it is not wise to be dependent on foreign countries for timber. The fact is that we are steering straight for a world-famine in soft wood. The trees, apart from their direct economic value in the shape of timber, exert a beneficial influence affecting climate, agriculture and even the very existence of man. This can be clearly demonstrated in Africa, where vast areas are drying up and are becoming depopulated as the direct result of forest destruction. The traveller in the Sahara can easily see that it has not always been desert. He will find fossilised trees on the banks of vanished rivers and on the shores of dried-up lakes.

When a dust-storm carried soil from the farm-lands of the Dakotas to New York last May, President Roosevelt decided that something must be done to prevent great stretches of North America being turned into desert. In short, the plan is to plant 100 strips of forest, a thousand miles long and seven rods wide. They are to reach from the Canadian border near the middle of North Dakota right away down to Texas as far south as they will grow. Between each wood an open space of a mile wide will be left offering ideal farming conditions. It is interesting to note that the funds for this are to be derived from the money voted for drought relief.

We in England have our drought problems, and an extensive tree-planting programme will provide further catchment areas and conserve the water-supply of the country, obviating the risk of drought in the future. The Forestry Association of Great Britain is sponsoring a plan to afforest three million

Joint Committee. They have come to a favourable verdict by a decisive majority. There are those who disagree with that verdict and would, in all honesty, declare India to be unfit for self-government. One thing is clear, however, that, if these had their way, we should have to maintain our administration by suppressing forces which we ourselves have called into being ; and, in view of what is happening among the dictatorships of the world to-day, that is not a prospect likely to find acceptance with the British people. The only effective argument against the verdict is that it rests on observation of a limited and specialised class, a "small fraction of the vast population of India." Their influence, however, is great and growing ; and, as the Committee observe, "history has repeatedly shown the unwisdom of judging the political consciousness of a people by the standard of its least instructed class." There is no defeatism here : but there is both courage and common sense.

Having thus thrown open the door to advance, the report adopts the project of the White Paper in all its essential features. These are (1) the establishment at once of an elective parliamentary system, with a cabinet government, in each of the eleven great provinces (Burma being treated separately) ; (2) the creation, as soon as a sufficient number of the Princes declare their adhesion to it, of a federal government at the centre, which will comprise its own parliament and its own cabinet ; (3) the direct control by the Crown, through its Viceroy, of the defence of India and its foreign relations ; and (4) the reservation to the Viceroy and the provincial governors, in their respective spheres, of certain special powers to ensure good government. This project clearly falls short of complete home-rule, in so far as it introduces statutory safeguards or discretionary restrictions on the powers of the Indian ministers. As the Committee have been careful to explain, however, the complicated mechanism of full responsible government cannot be reproduced to order ; and without these statutory safeguards the new Indian constitution would be denuded of those "unwritten laws and tacit conventions" which make our own constitution workable. In the aggregate, it must be admitted, they look numerous and formidable ; but each is in itself reasonable, and as they harden into custom their irksomeness will disappear.

Within the Committee there were two dissenting minorities :

one considering that its conclusions are over-generous, the other that they are not generous enough. The latter (Lord Snell and three Labour M.P.'s) are impatient of safeguards, and would guarantee Dominion status "within a measurable period of years," as well as the "ultimate introduction of adult suffrage." The other minority (Lord Salisbury and four Conservative colleagues) state their difficulties thus :

the demand for federation without the provision of equality of status in the units ; the claim of Indians to self-government notwithstanding the lack of personal experience and inherited guidance which handicaps them in exercising the higher functions of government ; the impossibility of any real contact in direct representation between the people and their representatives ; the profound communal differences which split Indian society into fragments impossible to coalesce ; the novelty of Provincial reform and its necessarily tentative character, and the reaction of these upon the Central Government. Unless these fundamental difficulties can be met, any federal system in India must be unworkable.

They dislike the transfer of the police to ministers, regard federation as premature, and would leave the central government much as it is.

With the views of both dissentients the report deals fairly and convincingly ; but there are two points which will continue to exercise men's minds long after the dust of the present controversy has settled. One is the future of the police. The anxiety which is genuinely felt on that score puzzles the Englishman in the street. In England our police are friends ; we try to support them in their lawful endeavours ; we do not picture them as liable to political pressure or partisanship. In India there are no such traditions. The people fear the police and give them little help. They have been exposed to shameful calumny by politicians ; and the funds for their maintenance are often grudgingly voted by the legislatures. Yet they stand between the people and much misery ; and it is no exaggeration to say that the tranquillity of the country hinges upon their being properly treated and impartially led. One needs some knowledge of the underground crime (the so-called Terrorism) of India to realise the heroism of the police. One needs to have stood in the blood-stained lanes of an Indian city after some communal conflict to appreciate how largely the lives and safety of the people depend upon them. It is no

light-hearted experiment, this handing of them over to popular control. It can be done only as an integral part of a larger experiment.

It is in this light that the Committee, closely following Sir John Simon's conclusions, view the issue. They are unable "to conceive a government to which the quality of responsibility should be attributed if it had no responsibility for public order." They set out a number of safeguards for the protection of the police force generally, and particularly of the branch which deals with revolutionary crime. They impose on the provincial Governor a special duty to combat disorder; he must be ready to initiate action to that end, to issue any executive orders, to assume charge of any branch of the government which he thinks it necessary to employ, or to create any new machinery for the purpose. It would be difficult to devise more effective measures of insurance on paper; but the real insurance lies in the certainty that ministers will soon discover for themselves that, unless they are as vigilant for law and order as the British administrator was, the whole scheme of their government will collapse.

The other cause of special anxiety is the capacity of the new Central government to carry the enormous load which will rest upon it. Many will share Lord Salisbury's view that provincial autonomy is revolution enough, without adding radical change at the centre; and the arguments by which the Committee defend a responsible federal government are not in their happiest vein. Considerations of taxation and economic unity are only ancillary. The real compulsion lies in the offer of the Princes to promote an all-India federation, but to promote it only on condition that the federal organ is given the full responsibility of domestic government. A federation of the British provinces might have remained under the control of Parliament; but the Princes own no allegiance to Parliament, and many of them are in treaty relationship with the Crown. If, in their enthusiasm for a unified India, they take a share in the federal government, they have an indisputable right to the condition they have imposed, and on that condition alone can an all-India federation be established. The details of the federal structure are difficult and complex: there is no historical precedent for the union of so many diverse units, and the voluntary sacrifice that will be necessary of so many autocratic privileges. But there is plenty of time

for all this, and the only essential at the moment is that the Constitution Act shall contain provision for the federation starting as soon as all is ready for it. In the interval, the present administration of the Governor-General and his official Council will continue virtually unchanged in form.

From these broad issues of national policy, many readers of the report will turn to those passages which directly affect their own interests. The merchant will study the provisions against commercial discrimination; the civil servant the measures for protecting his pension; the investor will busy himself in the chapter about Indian railways; the soldier in the paragraphs about the Indianisation of the army; and so on. On all these matters the Committee has taken a bold but sensible line. If the Act is drawn as they advise, for example, it will not be possible for an extremist government, as has frequently been threatened, to confiscate British capital employed in India, or to penalise British imports, or to harass the trade operations of British companies. As regards pensions, although the Committee have no doubt that they will be met in full, they record the view that an obligation rests upon His Majesty's Government to see that this is done. Adequate protection is recommended for Indian railways; and the whole problem of defence, with its reactions on other departments, receives effective treatment. In a number of other details, such as the maintenance of a civil branch of the Indian Medical Service, the proposals of the White Paper are amended and clarified; and—a point of ultimate though no great immediate importance—indirect election is advised for the federal legislature in place of the impracticable proposals of the Franchise Committee.

On the borderland between major detail and broad principle, stands the gloomy and enigmatic figure of Finance. For the maintenance of India's credit, which stands deservedly high in the world's markets, the arrangements proposed, including a strong Reserve Bank, are ample. What is not ample is the taxable capacity of the country to meet all that will be expected of the coming régime. The Committee are optimistic about the cost of separating Burma, erecting two new provinces (Sind and Orissa), and starting off the new governments. That, however, is only the beginning. Ministers will pick up their portfolios with a burning zeal for developing the social services, and in the provinces there will be no new

acres of waste land, half of which is in England and Wales and half in Scotland. If this plan is adopted twenty thousand people will be given immediate employment with lasting benefit to the country. What is needed is an energetic campaign to enlighten public opinion as to our forest needs. We must awaken a general interest and build up an intelligent tree-sense. With that object, the Men of the Trees, a Society of Tree Lovers, has been founded and is bringing thinking people together for concerted action. The members realise that the art of forestry and the creation of a universal tree-sense is essential to the progress and well-being of mankind.

In Great Britain the majority of the forest-land is under private management. There is an old saying: "A man who plants trees loves others besides himself," and it is only reasonable that the tree-planter should be given every possible assistance. Woodlands which have been properly cared for by the owner or tenant for life should be exempt from death duties, as no form of taxation has had a more disastrous effect upon good forestry. Properly managed woodlands provide a perpetual source of interest, and those owners who have the courage and vision to set their woodlands in order will not only benefit themselves and the agricultural population, but increase the prosperity of the country as a whole. In Great Britain we have not yet a nation-wide day of tree-planting. It has been suggested that there is a day which comes at the opening of the planting season which tree-lovers might well celebrate as a special day—I mean Remembrance Day. Might we not, in addition, link with this solemn service in memory of our glorious dead, the simple act of planting trees for our children? Since I put forward this proposal in a broadcast talk in January 1934, I have received hundreds of letters from representative people in all parts of the country warmly supporting it.

In our planting let us remember to keep the character of the country by planting the trees which belong to the country. It is bad forest management to plant pure coniferous forests. The value of beech as a soil improver cannot be too much emphasised. Due regard should be given to adequate fire protection. It should be the business of everybody to take an intelligent interest in forestry. Our attitude toward the problem confronting us to-day may determine the feast or famine of to-morrow.

RICHARD ST. BARBE

CHARLES II AND THE JEWS.

IT is a commonplace of English history that the Jews, driven out of this country by Edward I in 1290, remained virtually unknown here until they were readmitted by Oliver Cromwell, three and a half centuries later. This delightfully symmetrical account is reproduced, with scant qualification or none, even by the most recent and least impressionistic historians*: but, like so much else that is commonplace, it is inaccurate. During the past few years a great deal of research has been done on the question with exceptionally rich results.† In consequence of this, the ideas previously held have been completely revolutionised, and a fascinating new chapter of English history has been revealed.

It is axiomatic that the exclusion of the Jews from any land, however rigidly it may be prescribed by law, is never likely to be absolute. England, in the period which followed the fatal year 1290, was no exception to the rule. We read of Jewish deputations from abroad endeavouring to secure readmission: of physicians summoned from Italy and France with ample retinues to attend on King Henry IV, or on the wife of Sir Richard Whittington: of a constant influx to and from the *Domus Conversorum* in London: even of an adventurous apostate, Sir Edward Brampton, who, in the troubled days of the Wars of the Roses, attained the dignity of knighthood, the governorship of the island of Guernsey, and the dubious credit of having taught Perkin Warbeck how to lay claim to the throne. But the real turning point came at the time when the final disaster overtook the Jews of Spain and Portugal. From the close of the fifteenth century there were left in those countries only the so-called Marranos—nominal Christians who, in spite of the Inquisition and its terrors, maintained their

* E.g. (to quote only two admirable works published during the past year) John Buchan's *Cromwell* and M. P. Ashley's *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate*. The current ideas were re-expounded by Mr. W. H. Dawson in an article, "Cromwell and the Jews," in the *Quarterly Review* for October 1934.

† The results, published in a series of studies by Lucien Wolf and others in the *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England* and elsewhere, have been summed up and amplified by the present writer in his *Life of Menasseh ben Israel* (Philadelphia, 1934), which, though essentially English in scope, is not likely, through the accident of Transatlantic publication, to reach the English reader.

lie? As always, in goodwill and in goodwill alone. Let us frankly face the plain facts of the situation with which Parliament has to deal. The success of this new constitution will depend on the Indian leaders using their new powers with moderation, and on the existence of complete mutual confidence between them and the British administrators who are left to help them. If men of extreme views seize power and ride for a fall, the constitution will fall with them. If on the other hand the leaders will work patiently through the period of transition and will dismiss the suspicion that Britain is holding India for its own gain and the aggrandisement of its sons, then the constitution will make steadily for national unity and strength. There is no lack of goodwill on this side: the Committee's report is a powerful appeal for goodwill in India. Should the plea for goodwill sound old-fashioned or vague or sentimental, there is a powerful buttress of material interests behind it; for the links which bind Great Britain and India are bonds of prosperity and mutual advantage.

Thus ends the argument as it began. "The time has come," says the Committee, "for Parliament to share its power with those whom for generations it has sought to train in the arts of government." In making that decision, Parliament will be launching a vast experiment, perhaps the biggest of its kind in history; and the success of the experiment can only be proved by the results. Many anxious questions, both of principle and of detail, have yet to be answered, many doubts to be resolved. But the one point on which doubt cannot be entertained is that, as the Committee say, the time has come and the forward step must now be taken. The risks are undeniable; but with co-operation and common sense they can be faced. The risks of standing still are far greater.

MESTON.

THE FRENCH CRISIS CONTINUES.

WARS which are prophesied every day are not likely to happen—at least the prophesying must be kept up without faltering until it comes true. Revolutions, too, cannot be foreseen. We can note that the conditions are such that something, it would seem, sudden and drastic, must occur. But whether it will, and when it will, always baffles the observer.

For over sixty years the French Republic has been in difficulties. Time after time it has appeared that a change must take place; yet time after time the public dissatisfaction has dwindled into apathy. There have been scandals, though perhaps none so bad as those which are now shaking French public institutions; there has been indignation, there has been a threat of revolt, and somehow the Republic has survived. Parliament has been shown to be corrupt, and favouritism in all the services has been disclosed; but after more or less violent protests the game of misgovernment has gone on. That is why many people think that the French political system will soon become normal again—that is to say, there will be a series of short-lived Ministries, an occasional revelation, and then when the elections arrive in due season the people will vote, as they always vote, for the Radicals, the Socialists, and for a number of scattered and ineffective groups of the Centre and the Right.

Yet there can be no doubt that in February last it was touch and go with the Republic. Nor can it be doubted that the public knowledge of the complacency and complicity of Ministers, of Deputies, of Senators, in crooked financial affairs, has been vastly increased. Bit by bit it has been brought out that official or near-official connections and approval have made possible the career of notorious swindlers. It has been shown that the police of the *Sûreté* are involved. That there are lawyers who use their influence in Parliament to obtain immunity for their clients is amply proved. Nor can the citizen who chooses to follow the proceedings of the Commissions, composed of Deputies, which were charged to investigate certain accusations, be blind to the desire of those Commissions to circumscribe the damage. There were, in the Doumergue Cabinet, Ministers publicly denounced for their actions, which, consciously or unconsciously, tended

fidelity to Judaism, from generation to generation, in the privacy of their homes. They were to be found in every walk of life—from playwrights to pastry-cooks, from pedlars to physicians, from soldiers to friars. But above all they were prominent in business life. Every Spanish and Portuguese mercantile colony throughout Europe comprised a large (sometimes a preponderant) number of these Judaizing heretics who, as soon as the menace of the Inquisition was removed, hastened to revert to their ancestral traditions and to declare more or less publicly their allegiance to the God of Israel.

England was no exception. Recent research has established the fact that as early as the reign of Henry VIII an important Marrano colony was established in London. A hue and cry against the unbelievers throughout the Spanish dominions in 1542 had its repercussions in England, with the result that the Privy Council ordered the arrest of "certain Merchant Strangers suspected to be Jews"; but a few families managed to survive the disaster. Under Edward VI, we find Marrano colonies established, not only in London, but also at Bristol. From the Inquisitional depositions (to which we owe all our knowledge of these matters) it appears almost certain that there was a secret synagogue in London at this time. It is not remarkable that this settlement was driven underground at the time of the persecutions under Mary, when apostasy from the Holy Catholic faith entailed the penalty of death. But, under Elizabeth, it resumed its development once more. Before long it numbered approximately one hundred souls. At their head was Dr. Hector Nuñez, who had already been a leading spirit in previous reigns. His widespread connections were of considerable utility to the Government, particularly as regards Spanish affairs. He enjoyed the complete confidence both of Burleigh and of Walsingham, and actually brought the latter the first news of the arrival of the Great Armada at Lisbon. His closest associate was Dr. Roderigo Lopes, the first house physician at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, and subsequently physician to the Queen herself. It is notorious how the latter became involved in political intrigues, was accused by the partisans of the Earl of Essex of plotting to poison Elizabeth at the instigation of the Spaniards and, after a grotesquely one-sided trial, was

hanged on Tyburn Tree (June 7th, 1594). A miniature anti-Semitic storm was aroused in England, which was probably reflected in the unsympathetic picture of the Jewish character drawn in Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice* and in more than one other contemporary play. This, no doubt, together with the decay of trade with the Peninsula, contributed to the break-up of the community, which was hastened as the result of a petty internal quarrel in 1609.

The decline of Spanish interest in England, and the consequent absence of Inquisitional denunciations to guide us, makes it impossible to tell whether on this occasion, too, some individuals lingered on. A fresh stimulus was however received in 1632, when the crypto-Jewish congregation which had recently established itself at Rouen was denounced to the authorities and temporarily broken up. One of its principal members had been Antonio Fernando Carvajal, a native of Fundão in Portugal, but long resident in the Canary Islands. He, with one or two others, settled in London, where his house at once became the nucleus of the Marrano group. It did not take him long to establish his position in his new home. Before many years had passed he had made himself a name as one of the most enterprising merchants in the city. He possessed his own ships, imported gunpowder and munitions on an extensive scale, and during the Civil War was grain contractor for the Parliament. Of his associates the most notable was Simão de Caceres, a fiery individual, who was so anxious to be avenged on the Spaniards for their cruelty towards his people that he supplied Cromwell with valuable information, and at one time elaborated a plan for the conquest of Brazil by a Jewish force fighting under the English flag. The members of the group were all living titularly as Catholics and attending Mass in the chapel of one of the foreign ambassadors: yet it was no secret which way their sympathies lay. "Touching Judaism," James Howell wrote in 1653 to a friend in Amsterdam, "some corners of our city smell as rank of it as doth yours there."*

It was hardly necessary, therefore, for Cromwell to do

* It is however necessary to exercise a little caution in dealing with ostensible references to the Jews at this time, since the term was applied almost indiscriminately as one of opprobrium or of flattery. Thus the Petition of Robert Rich, in 1653, presented in the name of "the Jews of England, Scotland, and Ireland," turns out on inspection to be a mere Puritan vagary, referring to the religious extremists.

itself, and welcomes a strong man, whether he is called Clemenceau or Poincaré, permitting him to wield virtually dictatorial powers. It so welcomed M. Doumergue. He had all the powers he needed. The fact is—although he was afterwards improperly accused of being ambitious and despotic—that he did not know how to use his powers. Why ask for more powers, it was demanded, when he had neglected the principal job entrusted to him?

What brought M. Doumergue down was, first the lack of energy which both Clemenceau and Poincaré possessed to an exceptional degree, and second the impression that he was, innocently enough, drawing a red herring across the trail. The politicians attacked him because of the first weakness, and the people, though respecting him, could hardly be expected to support him on what must have appeared to them to be the abstract issue of constitutional reform.

In themselves the Doumergue proposals—which are really the proposals of M. Tardieu—are, as I have indicated, admirable. They must, in one form or another, be adopted if the French Parliament is to survive as an institution. The only objection to them is that M. Doumergue's attention should have been directed on the scandals, and nothing but the scandals, and at the risk of upsetting any number of apple-carts he should have tackled these scandals while Parliament was still too paralysed by fright to oppose him, and while his prestige was still unworn. His mistake was, in my opinion, a most unhappy one for France. As the saviour of the Republic, in those early months he could have done anything. It is doubtful whether anybody can now use the vigorous broom of a Hercules. And these scandals, unless the cancer of which they are the symptoms is extirpated, will be fatal, sooner or later, to France. There was the real reform, which M. Doumergue had a chance of effecting, and which he did not effect. All the rest is just ill-timed Parliamentary debate.

Since, however, his constitutional proposals, coupled with M. Doumergue's poor tactics (which consisted in threatening the Chamber with a premature dissolution, though he could not carry out his threat), provoked the Parliamentary plot against him, we should look at them again. They are directed against two standing evils of the Parliamentary régime in France—the instability of Governments and the inability to

pass balanced and reasonable budgets. The expectation of life of an ordinary French Cabinet, it is well known, is not more than a few months. It is growing shorter and shorter. Even this year, despite M. Doumergue's presence, there have been four Governments. Though it is true that the same set of men usually remain, in this preposterous game of musical chairs, it is nevertheless impossible for any department to be seriously directed by a responsible Minister. For example, the post of the Ministry of Agriculture, which is by no means the most unstable, has changed hands nineteen times in fourteen years. It is one of the most important posts in France, which remains half an agricultural country. How is it possible to have any continuity of policy, any efficient direction? Now M. Doumergue would have made the *Président du Conseil* a veritable Prime Minister in the English sense. He would not have the charge of a department. There should be a Cabinet limited to twenty members. The Prime Minister would have the right of dissolving the Chamber. (There were several minor modifications of this proposal, as between the President, the Senate, and the Prime Minister, but the object was to enable the Prime Minister, if defeated in the Chamber, to appeal to the country.) Obviously a Chamber which can now, with complete impunity, in sheer lightness of heart, or in the most frivolous spirit of political intrigue, vote down the Government three or four times a year (and does), would hesitate to do so were its own fate bound up with that of the Cabinet. There would have to be a genuine issue. If the periodic provision of another opportunity of being brought into a new Cabinet was accompanied by the risk of losing his seat altogether, the Deputy would be more careful. In other words, France was asked to adopt the British system of Parliament.

The Chamber has also made good government impossible by voting expenditure as it pleases into the draft Budget. Much of this expenditure is little short of electoral bribery. At any rate, it takes no heed of the financial resources of the State. Budgets are debated in Commission, debated in the Chamber, and after months of chopping and changing (the passing of the Budget is generally several months late) it would be a wise Finance Minister who could recognise his own Budget. The history of recent years, from the financial viewpoint, has been a succession of bad and belated Budgets, the

anything to introduce the Jews into England, where their presence had been almost continuous and fairly notorious for the past century. The object of the mission carried out under his auspices by Menasseh ben Israel was to regularise the position of the Jews in the country, to secure it by legal guarantees, and to organise immigration on a larger scale.

The vast amount that has been written about Menasseh ben Israel's mission has resulted in obscuring entirely what it actually achieved. He arrived in England, at the Protector's personal invitation (after various negotiations carried on through Manuel Martinez Dormido, who was *not*, as generally stated, his brother-in-law), in September 1655. On October 31st he presented himself at the door of the Council Chamber with a petition for the formal readmission of the Jews; and a few days after he had an audience with Cromwell himself. The latter, intensely sympathetic to the idea—for reasons of economic expedience rather than religious tolerance—treated the application with the utmost benevolence. A conference of merchants, lawyers, and divines was summoned to meet at Whitehall at the beginning of December. At the first meeting the two judges present gave their considered opinion (presumably on the ground that the expulsion of 1290 was an act of prerogative and bound only the individuals immediately concerned) that "there was no law which forbade the Jews' return into England." The issue, therefore, resolved itself into a discussion of "the terms on which it was meet to receive them." To this, the rest of the five (*not* four) sessions were devoted. But an adverse current of opinion manifested itself immediately among the merchants, jealous at the prospect of competition; and among the divines, who professed to fear for the integrity of the Christian faith. Before the conference could come to an unfavourable conclusion, or propose restrictions so severe as to discourage immigration rather than the reverse, Cromwell thought best to dissolve it, after chastising its members in a fiery speech, which a contemporary considered the best he had ever heard. It was now the universal opinion that he proposed to settle the question by an act of prerogative. Until not long ago, indeed, it was imagined that he carried this out on February 4th, 1656—an anniversary which was celebrated for some years by a group of enthusiastic Anglo-

Jewish antiquarians as "Resettlement Day": but this is now definitely proved to have been based partly on a mis-translation, partly on ignorance of a fundamental document, and partly on a confusion of date. In the end it became apparent that, true to his usual policy, Cromwell proposed to attain his object by a circuitous route, "con-*niving*" at the Jewish settlement instead of authorising it.

This, in fact, was what happened. Menasseh ben Israel and his associates, broken-hearted at the disappointment of their hopes, returned home. The London group of Marranos, on the other hand, when war broke out with Spain in the following spring, were emboldened to apply for the exemption of their property from confiscation, on the ground that they were fugitives from the Inquisition and, as such, deserving of Protestant sympathy. Almost simultaneously (notwithstanding the fact that Cromwell refused them permission in writing) they ventured to purchase a piece of ground as a cemetery, and to adapt a house in Cree-Church Lane for use as a synagogue. Here, in December 1659, Samuel Pepys (according to a letter recently discovered) heard the lamentations for the death of Carvajal "lately cutt (by the same hand wth my selfe) of y^e stone."

With Cromwell's death—even before the Restoration—it was universally believed that this exiguous progress would be cancelled. Almost as soon as the breath was out of his body, Thomas Violet, "the great Trappaner of England," acting in association with other mercantile fanatics, attempted to get the law set in motion against the intruders. The times were too troubled for attention to be paid at the moment to such a triviality. However, as soon as Charles Stuart was reinstalled at Whitehall, they began again, and found their efforts backed up by the Lord Mayor and Corporation of London. The community, in alarm, assembled in the house of Carvajal's widow to concert measures for self-defence; and prying visitors were rigidly excluded from the synagogue. ("Since the King's coming in," a contemporary writes, "they are very close, nor admit any to see them but very privately.")

Their alarm, as events turned out, was unnecessary. The new ruler was essentially tolerant, in a sense in which Cromwell was not, simply because religion was to him a matter of minor consequence. Moreover, while he was in

to protect the presumed culprits. In the past few weeks there have been belated decisions by magistrates, which could have been taken months ago. But even now it is by no means sure that any real light will be thrown upon the circumstances in which Stavisky was enabled to fleece the public after he had been signalled to the police for what he was, and to retain relations with highly placed persons ; or on the mystery of his death ; or on the still more sinister mystery of the assassination (for the suicide theory is incredible) of a judge who was investigating the case. A policeman who is alleged to have been employed on ultra-secret missions was lately arrested, but it is clear that he was a subordinate. Moreover, a second and, if what is openly stated is anything like correct, an even more extraordinary case of politico-financial methods has been begun with more discretion than is usual in such matters in France.

In short, there is much greater reason to-day for public protest than there was at the beginning of the year, when the streets of Paris were filled with angry demonstrators who compelled one Prime Minister to resign, and then, continuing their manifestations, were fired upon, and the new Government in its turn fled from office. In February, however, there was real fear of the overthrow of the Republic. To-day that fear is apparently not present to the minds of the Parliamentarians, who summoned up sufficient courage to throw down the man whom they had besought to leave his retreat "to save France." They had certainly expected some disturbance when they dismissed Doumergue, who was a popular idol, and it was with astonishment that it was seen that he could go back to Tournefeuille, and another take his place, without provoking more than applause and hisses in the cinemas and a few harmless cries in the streets. The crisis, in its political aspect, was evidently over. The people were cynically indifferent. They resigned themselves to the exhibition of ingratitude towards Doumergue, and they merely shrugged their shoulders and gossiped in the cafés about the Parliamentary intrigues, and the new developments in the judicial domain.

Why ? Why did not even the bodies of former combatants, and particularly the Croix de Feu, which had been so prominent for months, fail to react ? Perhaps it is impossible to keep the public in a ferment for long. At any rate, the deposition

of Doumergue, and the advent of Pierre Etienne Flandin, passed with comparative quiet. The interlude of semi-dictatorship, as it was regarded, ended with less rather than more turmoil than an ordinary Ministerial re-shuffle.

It would be wrong, however, in my view, to take it that the crisis is really over. The crisis continues. All is not well with the body politic of the Third Republic. For my part I think M. Doumergue, though popular as a man, dashed the hopes of his supporters by neglecting his principal (indeed his only) job, and devoting his energies, and committing his fate, to a project which in present circumstances has little importance, and which cannot possibly arouse popular enthusiasm. His job was to clean up the Augean stables ; to see that justice was done, and culpable persons, in no matter what position, brought to the bar ; to act implacably towards the Parliamentarians, the magistrates, the police. Instead, he disinterested himself completely in these essential things ; that was, he considered, the work of the Ministers of the Interior and of Justice, whom he had badly chosen and who did not inspire confidence. The financial situation (for the coffers were empty) required and obtained careful handling. But M. Doumergue chiefly gave his attention to constitutional reforms.

In themselves those reforms are necessary. All the outstanding constitutionalists, including M. Poincaré, who could never be suspected of disloyalty to the Republican ideal, have agreed that the Parliamentary system operates badly in France. But the point was not the badness of the Parliamentary system, but the abuses, unquestionably of a reprehensible and sometimes criminal character, which had declared themselves in public life. To talk of altering the internal regulations of Parliament while the people were incensed at the scandalous conduct of politicians and a section of the police, seemed singularly beside the mark. Further, the real aim of M. Doumergue, as of others who have advocated constitutional reforms, was to strengthen the hands of the Prime Minister. That is a laudable object. It is essential to the good government of France. But it should be remarked that whenever there is an emergency in France, as there was during the war, as there was during the fall of the franc under a succession of reckless Radical Ministries before 1926, as there was last February, the Chamber immediately behaves

exile, he had been supplied with money by the Jews of Amsterdam, and it is far from unlikely that he had come to some formal agreement with them. Accordingly, while the House of Commons was discussing the question, a royal message was received airily requesting it to take into consideration measures for the protection of the Jews. As yet, indeed, there was nothing in writing. But in 1664, after an ingenious attempt at blackmail by the Earl of Berkshire and Mr. Paul Rycaut, the community once more had recourse to the Crown. This elicited a written assurance, above the royal sign-manual, that they might "promise themselves the effects of the same favour as formerly they had had, soe long as they demeane themselves peaceably & without scandall to his Government." Thus, the resettlement of the Jews in England was at last guaranteed by a written charter of liberties: the debonair Charles II conceding easily, almost casually, that formal instrument which Menasseh ben Israel had endeavoured so patiently to procure from the all-powerful Protector. From this period the community (which already, in the course of the past three years, had received notable accretions) grew rapidly. Well over one hundred patents of denization or naturalisation were issued to Jews by Charles II, during the course of his reign. By the time of his death, the London synagogue was among the most important in Western Europe: and its position was so securely established that the religious, political, and dynastic storms of subsequent years could do nothing to shake it.*

If the foregoing account is true (and it can be amply documented at every step by unimpeachable authority) what is the reason for the current conception that the resettlement of the Jews in England was due to the tolerance and statesmanship of Oliver Cromwell? The answer lies in a consideration of the bias of the two schools which have dominated our conceptions of the Protectorate from 1660 to the present time. For many years Oliver Cromwell was abhorred as "the late execrable Usurper," the personification of all that was most abominable in national life and

* While the actual archives of the Spanish and Portuguese community in London do not throw any light upon the question under discussion, there is a reference in its first printed Regulations, in Spanish (London, 1783), to a recommendation made by King Charles at the outset of the Resettlement "in this happy land." This, plainly, was then the official version, though the tradition has since died out.

disgraceful in the national past. It was at this period that the current fallacy first obtained credence. The Jews, too, were unpopular—particularly with the High Church, High Tory element which most execrated the memory of the Protector. It being no secret that he had entered into relations with certain Jews with a view to encouraging their resettlement in England, and it being obvious that they were then to be found there in some numbers, it was taken for granted that he had succeeded: and this was reckoned amongst the many unwise, un-English actions of his rule. Hence the envenomed accounts of the Resettlement which are to be found in writers like Raguenet, Leti, Monteth, and a long succession of contemporary and later authorities.* It is true that, even at this period, a few Whig writers (such as the egregious D'Blossiers Tovey, the earliest historian of the Jews in England) ventured to attribute the credit to Charles II: but their voice was lost in the mutterings of the majority.

The nineteenth century dawned, and with it the triumph of religious tolerance, Jewish emancipation, and Whig historiography. The story which had previously obtained was taken over uncritically, though with a diametrically opposite interpretation. The Great Protector's readmission of the Jews was assumed to be one of his most far-sighted, enlightened, and statesmanlike actions. Lord Rosebery, in his famous speech on the Cromwell Tercentenary in 1899, expressed this with his usual felicity:

There is one more feature which has been already alluded to in his policy as a ruler, and on which we cannot lay too great an emphasis. He was the first ruler who really understood and practised toleration. . . . He was capable of an act of toleration almost incredible in those days, and not even in these days by any means universal. He was the first prince who reigned in England who welcomed and admitted the Jews.

* Among the constituents of the unappetising picture drawn by the Tory polemicists and their sympathisers were a number of fables, which have been accepted naïvely by a majority of historians down to the present day. The most absurd of all was the story that the Jews set negotiations on foot for purchasing St. Paul's Cathedral for use as a synagogue! It is enough to point out that St. Paul's Cathedral was totally unsuited for Jewish worship, and that Menasseh ben Israel, besides being unprovided with money, was pre-eminently sane. In point of fact, this particular libel was a commonplace of Commonwealth political vituperation, many unpopular personalities being accused at one time or the other of similar designs.

dilapidation of the public funds, threatened bankruptcy of the Exchequer, and then a resolute attempt to put matters right. Now M. Doumergue would refuse, by constitutional law, the right of the Deputies to initiate expenditure proposals unless they are preceded by votes for corresponding revenue. He further sought to deny the right of civil servants to strike without losing their posts.

Now, although a Commission of the Left and the Right had endorsed almost unanimously similar proposals, there was instantly an outcry. M. Doumergue was accused of aiming at personal power. M. Herriot actually recalled a private conversation in which M. Doumergue remarked that the mistake of Marshal MacMahon—the only President who, acting constitutionally, dissolved the Chamber with the consent of the Senate, but who was afterwards forced to resign—was that he had overlooked the need of a full Exchequer. He (M. Doumergue) would be more careful. He would ask for three months' provisional credits for 1935 before proceeding to Versailles. Then it would not matter whether the annual Budget was passed or not until the elections were held and the new Parliament had assembled. M. Herriot, the Radical leader, was shocked at such foresight. If a National Assembly was called at Versailles in these circumstances, after voting provisional credits for three months of 1935, M. Doumergue could send the Deputies to the country when he pleased. The Chamber was alarmed. It was ready to seize on the name of MacMahon. In France (as elsewhere) names become banners. I have never been able to see how MacMahon exceeded his powers—or even employed them to the full—but he has become for the French Radicals the symbol of what it is the fashion to-day to call Fascism. And M. Doumergue, in protecting himself better than MacMahon, was (still to use fashionable phraseology) the super-Fascist!

So after some manœuvring on both sides, for neither wanted to be held responsible for breaking the "truce," the Radicals resigned from the Cabinet, and M. Doumergue, unable to execute his menace of dissolution, handed in his resignation too. Thereupon, in quick time, the new Cabinet under the Presidency of M. Flandin was formed. M. Flandin is not a Radical; he belongs to the Moderate groups; and it would seem that the Radicals are using him as their stalking horse. The composition of his Cabinet is not greatly different from

that of M. Doumergue, except that M. Tardieu withdrew in disgust. It is a carefully balanced contrivance which can be broken up, without an adverse vote in the Chamber, at any time by the withdrawal of this or that group. Therefore it is characteristically precarious. Its life does not depend on its merits, or even on an open issue. It depends on the arbitrary decision of a few men inside the Cabinet who think the moment has come for another equally precarious combination. Thus we are back to the system which has brought Parliament into discredit, and nearly wrecked it altogether a year ago.

An impartial observer must commend M. Flandin for his business-like qualities. He has shown himself to be exceedingly efficient. The problems which faced him were tremendous, and if he enjoyed the advantage of having a docile Chamber after the little *coup d'état*, he availed himself very dexterously of that advantage. He turned away from the constitutional quarrel, and tackled more urgent matters. Perhaps contrary to the wishes of some of those who helped to put him in office, the course of justice has been remarkably accelerated. Rejecting the expedient of provisional credits, he showed that the normal Budget could be passed before the end of the year. The Bourse has been reassured. M. Flandin's programme of economies, of reasonable deflation instead of devaluation, of constructive measures which M. Doumergue's procrastination had rendered necessary, is excellent. If politics could only be kept out, then M. Flandin, though his popular appeal cannot be compared to that of M. Doumergue, should succeed where his predecessor failed. He is aware of the need of Parliamentary reforms, but he is not obsessed by them. Nor does he believe that the cumbersome machinery of a Versailles Assembly should be put into motion to impose rules that might be accepted by the Chamber itself in a self-denying mood. There must indeed be stronger Executive authority, but it can partly be obtained by stronger personal authority. Why not use such powers as the constitution gives? Why has the Chamber been dissolved only once since the beginning of the Third Republic when, in fact, the President can dissolve it as often as he pleases with the approbation of the Senate, which could hardly be refused in a grave conflict? In short, the present feeling is that M. Doumergue, instead of settling the real issues, merely raised issues which are unreal at this moment.

Similarly, at the celebration of the jubilee of the Whitehall Conference in 1905, the Right Hon. James Bryce (not yet a Peer) enthusiastically referred to

that memorable event when the great soul of Oliver Cromwell saw that it was right to give your ancestors permission to settle here in England, moved by his love for the literature of the Old Testament.

Such passages can be assembled indefinitely.

This attitude is embodied or reflected by most other students, publicists, and sentimental politicians of the present day : and it has become an integral, unchallenged part of the English as well as of the Anglo-Jewish background. Yet, as we have seen, it is unjustified by the facts. That Cromwell looked with sympathy on the Jews, that he favoured them, that he endeavoured to have their resettlement in England legalised, is unquestionable. But he was unable to carry public opinion with him, and was unwilling to flout it by granting the authorisation on his own initiative. The position of the handful of Jews in London at the close of the Protectorate was therefore nearly as precarious as it had been at the beginning. The actual authorisation of the resettlement of the Jews in England was not the work of the great Protector, but that of his successor—the amorous, yet supremely capable (and in many ways supremely enlightened) Charles II.

CECIL ROTH.

STEFAN GEORGE AND THE GERMANY OF TO-DAY.

STEFAN GEORGE, the idol of a select literary clique, the poet who lived apart from the crowd in an aristocratic atmosphere of his own creating, was really the prophet of the Germany that we have before our eyes to-day. George severed himself, in his art and otherwise, from all the later traditions of his country, as Germany to-day is breaking away from all those traditions which expressed her former life. As his country is scorning the old systems of thought and philosophy, so George scorned them in his day, choosing to stand alone and to forge new and strange weapons of form to defend his novelty of thought—perhaps to veil its thinness—as Germany to-day is forging new weapons of discipline to defend a new movement, perhaps to veil the weakness of the philosophy that lies behind this movement.

Stefan George is generally considered the most remarkable poet of modern Germany. His place as a poet is almost undisputed, but his political influence is not so generally acknowledged. This influence lay in his appeal to youth, in his belief in a new humanity and in the power of youth to build up a new world on the ashes of the old. He called to youth, and youth responded, inspired by new faith in themselves, in their power to break the fetters forged by their forbears, and in the strength of youth to go out to something absolutely new. This new romanticism is the mainspring of the National Socialist movement, which is essentially a youth movement, and of which Stefan George was the prophet.

Du schlank und rein wie eine Flamme
Du wie der Morgen zart und licht,
Du blühend Reis von edlem Stamme,
Du wie ein Quell geheim und schlicht.*

The divine in the human, man as God. This was George's creed, a dangerous one, but appealing because of its danger, and casting roots into Germany's new life. "Ye shall be as gods," this is the idea that underlies the enthusiasms which are shattering homes, religions, traditions in Germany to-day. The final triumph of Atlantis, of the blond Aryan who

* Thou pure and upright as a flame,/ tender and lightsome as the morning./ Thou flowering branch from a noble stem,/ hidden source as of a homely well.

despises both Jew and Latin—this fundamental Germanism is a keynote in George's poetry. Anti-socialistic, anti-democratic, he dreamt of a Teutonic aristocracy of strength, service, solidarity, capable of final triumph, and of remaking history.

Hermann Bahr said once when speaking of this new romantic school: "We like this art because it always wears gloves, and never bows to the masses." Stefan George belonged to this school. In the world of art he gathered round him a circle of like-minded: Schnitzler, Bahr, Gundolf, Hofmanstal. In the world of thought he influenced a group of men who are wielding the destinies of Germany to-day.

Already in the World War George discovered the germs of a renewal, saw possibilities for the overturning of old systems and for the building up of leadership, authority and service. He had nothing but contempt for the desire of peace at all costs, nothing but scorn for democracy, parliamentary systems, and word battles. War to him was holy, he insisted on the fight for race and blood, and on the need of a new nationalism. This has become the dream of the German youth of to-day. Stefan George lived to see the National Socialist revolution, but whether he regarded it as the fulfilment of his ideal is doubtful. The poet dreams, the world acts. George's idea of hierarchical service could hardly find a place in the world as it is to-day. In Germany as elsewhere it is the masses who throw weight into the scale. He denied to the masses the right of superior knowledge, claiming this as the privilege of the few, and advocating the need of an intellectual *élite*. George's appeal was always to the few rather than to the many, and to the leaders rather than to the followers. And yet, strange paradox, his call has been heard by the many.

Stefan George had an exalted idea of the poet's mission. He believed this mission to be that of prophet and law-giver. Personally his ambition was to sound a clarion for all to hear and to become in the highest sense a national poet. *Der Stern des Bundes* and *Das Neue Reich* are written to this end. In these he gave his message in accents sufficiently clear and strong, but the question arises: Was the message worthy of the form in which it was clothed? A certain lack of philosophic thought, of clear outlook, and of grasp on life may strike the reader. The national lyric is a new venture; can it stand

without being buttressed by old truths? George's lyrics, though objective and non-personal, are not cold. The beauty of the form even lends to them a white fire of intensity, but is it a fire capable of scattering sparks to kindle future fires? He forged a language of steel and gold in which to give his message, but will the inner voice within the metal ring true with the passage of time? His apparent denial of everything was perhaps but a prelude to an affirmation of higher possibilities, but were such possibilities based on realities which endure? He dreamt of a new melody of human life as he dreamt of new melodies of lyric form. He saw a new order rising, rich in action, and victorious in strength, moving in order, rhythm and harmony. This dream has been seized, acted upon, popularised, but can it be made lasting or real? He is the prophet of a certain phase of thought prevalent everywhere, but more definitely prevalent in Germany, a phase insisting on the fight for race and blood, on the doing away with Christian ideals, and the elimination of all elements alien to national cult. Stefan George believed in his own race, believed in their capacity for order, discipline and force, and in their ultimate survival, as the survival of the fittest, the new generation, "*das junge Geschlecht*."

Das aus geweihtem Träumen, Tun und Dulden,
Den einzigen, der hilft, den Mann gebiert . . .
Der sprengt die Ketten, fegt auf Trümmerstätten
Die Ordnung, geißelt die Verlaufenen heim
Ins ewige Recht, wo Grosses wiederum gross ist,
Herr wiederum Herr, Zucht wiederum Zucht, er heftet
Das wahre Sinnbild auf das völkische Banner,
Er führt durch Sturm und grausige Signale
Des Frührots seiner treuen Schar zum Werk
Des wachen Tags und pflanzt das Neue Reich.*

Strange that a poet who was accused of worshipping beauty merely for beauty's sake should have been led by political dreams. Dreams and visions come and go, but the poet's art, if it is art, remains for ever.

* (The young generation.) Which out of sacred dreams, deeds and suffering brings forth at last The Man, the one able to save, strong to break fetters, to sweep order into ruined places, to scourge those gone astray, and bring them back to the old eternal law,—where great is great once more, and lord is lord, where discipline is once more discipline,—one fit to nail a symbol to the people's standard, leading his troops through storm and the dread signals of the red dawn, leading them even to the conscious work of day, and to the founding of the new kingdom.

Yet the crisis continues. There is apprehension. In the new year are we to see a recurrence of group manœuvring, of petty personal intrigue? Are Cabinets to come and go in rapid succession? Is the police force to be purified? Are political lawyers to be deprived of their "pull"? Is public confidence in the magistrates to be restored? Are officials who are mixed up in equivocal transactions to be punished? Is the complaisance—not to say complicity—of Ministers in the République des Camarades to cease? Will the Chamber behave rationally? And what effect will the growing economic difficulties of France have on the political situation? And how will the political situation and the international situation act and react on each other? These are questions which cannot be answered. One can only say that the public, despite its recent passivity, is uneasy, is ready to take alarm, to express itself vehemently. The peril to democratic institutions in France is not past. It is as grave as it was a year ago.

SISLEY HUDDLESTON.

THE SAAR.

THE Saar Territory, small as it is, involves one of the stirring, even acute questions of the civilised world to-day. In a measure, something appreciable in the future of Europe—Europe's peace and security, goodwill and reconciliation—is bound up with the fate of this nugget of industrialism, this "diminutive mass of precious metal." It is one of those intense matters on which a crisis, in some sense, depends; in which every word and every action matters; in which almost every gesture is fraught with possible consequences of far-reaching good or ill.

The Saar plebiscite is the last of the Versailles Referenda, the last opportunity, within the framework of the Treaty, of modifying the conditions of that settlement. All the plebiscites have effected real modifications. At first, in some quarters, decried as unnecessary, they proved anything but superfluous. The grievous thing is that this method of Referendum was not extended to every important change of frontier, and of sovereignty, in 1919. Masses of civilised and Christian Europeans should not have been moved about, like cattle, from one pen to another, without any chance of self-determination. I have been in the Saar in March and in December of this year, and I have been deeply impressed with the truth of that generous and searching confession of the French Youth Movement in their organ, *Le Franciste*: "For us the Saar is German by race, culture, and tradition. One Alsace-Lorraine has been sufficient. To make the Saar a new *Irredenta* would be a crime."

Racially, this *Saargebiet*, this *Territoire de la Sarre*, has apparently been pretty Teutonic for nearly fourteen centuries.

It was, surely, among the first regions overrun and deeply colonised by the Germans on the break-up of the Roman Empire in the West, from the days of Alaric to those of Clovis. When the darkness of the really Dark Ages begins somewhat to clear we seem to find here a land, not of "French," but of German stock, culture, and tradition. Quite different, in these respects, from the Metz region, not far away, though both Saar and Metz passed, for ages, and throughout all the greatest medieval time, under a common German and German-Imperial rule. For, from the days and through the decisive action of that great decider of history, Henry I, "the

Stefan George has often been compared with Rainer Maria Rilke and with Hofmanstal, but both his verse and his outlook are fundamentally different. In Rilke and Hofmanstal we find a return to the Dionysian, to the medieval, to the baroque, to the Goethean. George's poetry marks a break with all these influences. It is a direct return to the antique and to certain early, almost archaic, Christian forms. In Rilke there is a joy in the opulence of sound, in the inflowing of verse and rhythm, that George could never tolerate. He is economical of his words, each word is weighed and measured, cut and chiselled, like a piece of marble. Where Rilke is tender George is hard. He aims at strength not sweetness, and if his work is wider and fuller than Rilke's it lacks Rilke's subtlety and charm. Speaking of his own verses, in his poem *Die Spange*, he gives an idea of what he is striving for :

Ich wollte sie aus kühlem Eisen
Und wie ein glatter, fester Streif,
Doch war im Schacht auf allen Gleisen
So kein Metall zum Gusse reif.
Nun aber soll sie also sein
Wie eine grosse, fremde Dolde,
Geformt aus feuerrotem Golde
Und reichem blitzenden Gestein.*

In Hofmanstal there is an unrest, a mystic faith, a conviction that all things are but symbols, a yearning after the infinite and endless, all of which is quite absent from George's work. To him all yearning is weakness, all longing a cowardly dread of what is given us to do, here and now. To George the eternal and the present are one, the beauty to be desired is the beauty that we actually see, and the divine, such divinity as can be found in man.

The three great poets are now dead. Hofmanstal's poems have already taken their place among German lyrics; Rilke's fruitful and fructifying work has been recognised since his death and, translated into other languages, is making wider appeal. Since Stefan George's death two years ago his work is passing from the monopoly of that literary group which believed him to be divinely inspired, and is reaching

* (The Clasp.) I would have had it made from iron, forged as a smooth and solid bar, but the mine offered no vein of ore for such smelting, and so it has taken the form of a cluster, large and strange, made of red gold and richly sparkling stones.

that wider area of the world's literary values where the poet is finally given his lasting place.

George as an artist was a conscientious worker, perpetually striving after greater perfection of form. Each successive volume marked a step forward on the upward ladder. From the tender beauty of the *Hymnen* and the *Pilgerfahrten* in 1891 he rose to the passion and glow of *Algabal* in 1892. In his *Buch der Hirten* the form is marked by an ascent to a primitive religiosity, and in the sequence of his subsequent creations the discipline of form always follows the discipline of thought. In the *Jahr der Seele* and in *Das Neue Reich* form and thought go hand in hand towards the expression of prophetic vision. Here his words are chosen as stones in an architectural structure, each chosen and cut with a view to supporting the whole. Like the early hymns of the Christian Church, George's lyrics are objective, non-personal, non-individualistic. He was the first to present the echo of these hymns in German, and to show the possibility of their Germanising. This alone gives an idea of the widening of the language under his hand. He tuned German till he made it give forth monumental sounds. But those who care for the ordinary German lyrics, for such poets as Lenau, Eichendorf, Heine, will have difficulty in appreciating George. He has no affinity with the nineteenth century romantic poets, unless perhaps with Novalis and Hölderlin, in whose poetry sound is made to accord not so much with individual feeling, as with soul upheavals expressed by word and tone. Like theirs, George's poems play in those realms that lie between the individual soul and the visible world. He has nothing of the simplicity of form to be found in Goethe's lyrics, and nothing of the clear outlook of Goethe's classic poems. Nothing is further from George than the classicism of Goethe and Schiller.

Stefan George's rhythms are peculiar, exotic, in a certain sense archaic, resembling early and long forgotten forms of poetry; they are difficult to read because he introduced a new orthography (now largely adopted), and they are difficult to the ear because of the necessary intonation, and yet the beauty of his verse can be best appreciated only when it is read aloud, in the manner of psalmody, as he intended. These difficulties have given rise to much fault finding, not lessened by the difficulty of getting at the poet's thought. It may be

Fowler," the Saar, of course, becomes politically German in the tenth century—from 925. And so it remains—forming a part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation from the beginning almost to the end (962-1793). With one exception. For the district (and the little town) of Wallerfangen were swept into the net of Louis XIV and were not, like certain other fish, taken from that net, even by the Peace of Utrecht, which put a term to so much daring and successful fishery. On the site of Wallerfangen the *Grand Monarque* built his own "Saar Town" Sarrelouis, about 1670. It was carefully fortified by Vauban (as in 1680-5). And French it continued to be until after Waterloo. The Revised Peace Settlement of 1815 deprived France of all that Saarland which she had overrun and absorbed in 1793, and which the First Peace of Paris had left to her, in 1814. And even Sarrelouis, alienated from Germany for one hundred and forty-five years, now returned to her old home, or to a new Prussian room in the old home.

As to the Saarland in general, the French advocates at Versailles were perhaps scarcely justified in bemoaning the violence done to the loving mother when deprived of her much-loved daughter in 1815. The fact being, surely, that, apart from Sarrelouis, the whole of this region first tasted anything like a continuous French rule with the Revolutionary Conquest of 1793, of which it is a good example. For in the first days of the great upheaval, blinded by the passion for liberty, or the dream of it, the Revolution had countless sympathisers outside France. And not least among the Germans—so many of whom rejoice, or fancy they rejoice, at the French mastery of all lands west of Rhine between 1792 and 1800. *Vive la République* cries a typical German girl, and future authoress, when Mainz is quietly, almost unresistingly, occupied in 1797. The time had not yet come when the movement of liberation is revealed as a movement of conquest, and when the vision of freedom is succeeded by the reality of a new "Frankish" Empire, "the detestable dream of a world-dominion." There is surely good reason to believe that the Saarlanders shared in that new or revived German Nationalism (it was far more than a revival) which Napoleon helped to produce by so much ruthless pressure. And that they, in majority at least, were disposed to welcome their severance from French rule, in 1815, as from one essentially foreign.

Indeed, the Saar Manifesto of 1866 is, I believe, quite applicable to 1814-15, as it is to 1934-5: "Frenchmen . . . given a free vote, there is not one [of us] who would vote for separation from the Fatherland and for union with France. You are French, heart and soul. We are German, heart and soul. We stand by our language . . . customs . . . feelings. We are part of the German Fatherland, in its distress, in its hopes . . . Frenchmen—instead of a deceptive expansion of your power—choose . . . that happiness which comes from friendship with neighbours whose nationality you respect." As in nearly all the Rhineland, the new Prussian Rule in the Saar proved stimulating, and successful, in the great German century of modern history (1815-1914). Napoleon had certainly done something for the material prosperity of the region. But now followed a far more noteworthy development, and the Saar becomes an important industrial district. The coal output is quickly doubled—by 1816. By 1913 it had risen to a figure two hundred and sixty times greater than the highest attained under the first French Empire. And much the same is true of the production of coke, and of the chief branches of the metal industry.

Here Prussian policy, in the century before the World War, undoubtedly deserves some recognition for pursuing the general regional, as well as the national, interests. Industrialism was not allowed to run riot, to desolate the countryside, or to barbarise the inhabitants. Nothing is more remarkable about the Saar to-day than the beautiful and unspoilt scenery which one so often finds in a land honeycombed with mines and metallurgical works. Nothing—unless it is the care which has been given to the social conditions, and especially to the hygienic and educational conditions of the people. Good examples of such sensible philanthropy are to be found in the model villages and other monuments of the untiring will-to-do-well of owners and employers, like the Countess Siersdorff and Herr Hermann Röchling.

The defeat of the Foch-Poincaré policy (at Versailles in 1919) of an open or disguised French annexation of all German lands west of Rhine left a strong wish to demand, and a certain willingness to concede, compensation. And part of this compensation—in a curious compromise—was the Saar. All the more so as M. Clemenceau, for France, had put forward definite and startling claims, which had not then been refuted.

an axiom that beauty is simple, but the simplest is often the hardest to understand, and the monumental simplicity after which George strives comes under this category. The beauty of his verse may be superficially apparent to the superficial reader, it can really only appeal to those who have time and patience to study it. And in this case, it is sometimes asked if the message repays the search for it.

In casting off all the old tradition, George became the prey of primitive forces not easy to interpret in latter-day poetry, and his ambition to be, not only the creator of new forms of poetry, but also of new forms of life, and to act as prophet and lawgiver, does not add to the facility of arriving at his thought, which some argue is not worthy of the superimposed structure. He desired to be a national poet, a singer of a new state, and he wished to see this state recreated on purely pagan lines.

Wir schauen nicht mehr auf Landes Starre,
Den Wald von giftigen Wind ergraut,
Den Grund geborsten durch die Darre
Das fahl gebrannte Gras und Kraut,
Auf Höhen ward ein Quell empfundet,
Und frische Inseln blühen versteckt;
Das neue Wort von dir verkündet
Das neue Volk von dir erweckt.*

Christian ideals had no place in George's philosophy, he scorned such virtues as meekness and forgiveness. He wished to embody in his work the vision of a new humanity where force and beauty could be united, and in which the one divinity, the divine in man, would be recognised. His very form gives the key to his thought, forcible, and at the same time sensuous, as it is. His vision conceived a humanity in which sense would hold its own with spirit, and in which strenuousness of effort and intoxication of joy could go hand in hand. His was an impossible dream, in which man, while not ceasing from man's toil, might yet rejoice as a god. George's poetry is the price of a new struggle with ancient forces, and of a new vision seen through the walls of fate.

A. N. RAYBOULD.

* We look no more to the barren land, or the wood grown grey in the poisoned wind, to the earth burst open with the drought, and its pale burnt grass and weed. A source has sprung up on the heights, fresh islands blossom though out of sight, a new gospel is given, and given by thee, by thee a new people is awakened to light.

"BUT THERE IS NEITHER EAST NOR WEST . . ."

IT is worth noting that the deepest impressions which one gets on a journey are scarcely more matters of will than one's affections; one sets off to see the Sphinx, and behold! the eager face of a young Egyptian girl intent on leading her first little schoolgirl club has ousted that immemorial countenance of stone; one goes to see Ti's tomb with its carved pictures of village life 2,000 years ago, but on the way the living villagers, ignorant, unkempt, ill-housed, are caught by that unseen photographer, and it is they whose portraits are brought back. If there is a blind spot in the eye of most of us, there is, nevertheless, the sensitive lens, only it varies from individual to individual, and no two persons ever really travel the same road.

There are certain advantages enjoyed by one who sets out alone, which fall less often to the lot of the one who goes with a group. The first is that he is thrown much more into the company of the people of the country he is visiting, the second that he can take his arrangements lightly and revise them at will, and if any of them prove failures no one suffers but himself. To such an unforeseen revision I owed my trip into Transjordan.

And here be it remarked that the custom which is common in the Near East of engaging a seat in a car bound for a given destination is an excellent one in some ways—given that one has shed one's Western prejudices in favour of punctuality! It is cheap, it affords plenty of variety in the way of fellow-travellers, and the happy-go-lucky Arab chauffeurs are often exceedingly skilful drivers.

I was tired and fretted by the perpetual exploitation of the sacred places in Jerusalem, and wanting above all things to escape from sellers of souvenirs and sellers of services, when I dropped into the garage by the Damascus Gate and asked when a car would be leaving for Amman. "To-morrow morning at eight," they told me—or rather so said the chemist opposite, into whose shop the garage proprietor escorts clients when an interpreter is needed. I was there in time and took the seat by the driver's. He was presently engaged in roping parcels on to the front step, both sides, so that it became impossible to open either door, and he came

Although no expert, and hardly any tiro, in nineteenth-century history could have accepted them entirely, or "in bulk."

"*J'ai une grande réserve à faire.*" This memorable claim of the 150,000 French dwellers in the Saar (something like a fifth of the Saar people at that time) who demanded French annexation, who had petitioned President Poincaré, and whose rights must be respected, has receded, many of us now realise, into the darkness of legend. Yet, surely there has seldom been a more audacious encroachment of legend upon history? Is it not a terrible thing that fable, difficult to distinguish from imposture, should have played such a part in a great European settlement? How can we avoid the reflection that almost any stick then seemed good enough to beat the German dog withal? Was it not a frightful outrage on the right and the justice to which Clemenceau appealed? And can we forget that there was no German representative at the Peace Conference of 1919? Otherwise that Conference might have heard that there were only about one hundred French people living in the Saar at the close of the war? And that at the last census taken for the Prussian part of the region (about three-quarters of the whole) there were only three hundred and forty-two individuals who registered themselves as French-speaking—in 1910?

In any case, we know only too well, there being no German spokesman, no one else ventured, or chose, or knew enough, to challenge the "*grande réserve*" of Georges Clemenceau. And the utmost consideration was paid to these 150,000 legendary champions. Great stress was laid upon the "mixed" character of the Saarland stock—really the mixture of a drop in a goblet. And an ultimate appeal to this "mixed" population, after fifteen years, was ordered—the famous plebiscite or *Abstimmung* at whose door we now stand.

The whole question of this plebiscite has been complicated by the rise of the National Socialist Movement in Germany itself; by its seizure of power; by its reactions of repression; and by the influx into the Saar (still racially a German district, but outside Nazi domination) of many of the strongest opponents of National Socialism. These *émigrés*, however little entitled to vote in the plebiscite, have been able to express their views fully and frankly—as in favour of the *status quo*, and against German citizenship, under present

conditions. The hopes of all that party which supports the continuance of the present League of Nations régime centre in the cohesion, energy, and ability of these *émigranten*. A typical leader of theirs is still confident of a majority for the *status quo*. Time will soon show whether this forecast is more accurate than the hopes of 90 to 95 or even 97 per cent. for German citizenship entertained by champions of the "German Front" in the Saar. But no one, I think, anticipates any appreciable vote for the third choice—of French citizenship.

The French connection with and quasi-domination in Saarland since 1918 has not been especially happy. Their possession and administration of the Saar coal-mines have not been remarkably successful. Their hopes and assurances of doubling the pre-war output have not been fulfilled. (We have a coal production of eleven million tons in 1933, as against thirteen million tons in 1913.) Nor has technical control and development of these mines, under the Versailles régime, been as efficient and as up-to-date as was hoped and expected. Various urgently necessary improvements, it is said, have not been carried out, or have been very imperfectly and inadequately handled. Of late, indeed, it would seem as if French interest in the whole matter had waned, as the prospect of political absorption had receded. And this applies also, somewhat, to the great Saar industries other than coal. During these last fifteen years (and especially in the earlier period, when a French statesman was President of the Saar Governing Commission) it appeared likely that French capital might gain quite a controlling share in these industries (other than the coal already in French hands). Among these, of course, iron is chief. And here, for a time, only the Röchling works at Völklingen seemed to have a chance of remaining independent. But now the position has been modified, and French capital, though still important, no longer looms so large. Among the five chief industrial centres (always apart from coal) two are now practically without French capital; in the other three this capital appears in the proportion of about 40 to 50 per cent.

I will not do more than glance here at the impassioned controversies about the Saar Governing Commission which impress every visitor. The first President, we know, was a Frenchman, somewhat obsessed by ideas of his mission to promote French

and went through the window almost with the speed of a Jack-in-the-box. He did this fairly often, as the garage entrance was narrow, and whenever anything wished to pass in or out we had to move. But we always returned to the same spot! Towards 8.30 another passenger arrived, by 9 we had a further addition, at 9.30 we were off! But not so fast! A couple of hundred yards down the road the chauffeur recollected something. He pulled up exactly opposite a business entrance, turned off the engine and departed. Five minutes—ten—and behold a large lorry backing down upon us from the entry! Its driver saw us just in time, stopped, climbed in through our window and moved us on; then returned to his own occupation, leaving us where he had placed us. A quarter of an hour—and behold, our chauffeur accompanied by the garage proprietor and a further passenger, also a roll of newspapers. We had already four people on the back seats, and a good bit of luggage, but room was made somehow, and this time we were really off! We swung along the famous road from Jerusalem to Jericho, past the bare mountain slopes with their few low thorn bushes and fewer goats and sheep, past "The Good Samaritan Inn," where travellers may still take refuge at need, past the point marked "sea level," and down, down, down to the wide plain where even the plants look as if nourished on salt and bitumen, thirst-stricken as the Ancient Mariner himself. There are, it is estimated, *five billion pounds worth* of chemicals in this barren region. Jericho, itself, is well watered by Elisha's Spring, and the orange gardens, golden with fruit, were a joy to see. Our chauffeur pulled up in the market-place and once again departed through the window, but he returned with his arms full of fruit and we forgave him. He gave me two oranges large as grape fruit, but sweet and full of juice, and this first gift since I came to Palestine was very good. On we went again, deserting the main road and following an imperfectly marked track in the sand. I wondered why, till I came back with a different driver who chose the beaten but very uneven way. We crossed Allenby Bridge, a narrow wooden structure spanning the Jordan, were interviewed by one of the Syrian Military Police, who was very proud of his English, and took the lonely road among the mountains.

The day was grey and overcast, and the scenery, save for a few plots of cultivated land in the valleys, wild and almost

forbidding. Here and there we passed a Bedouin tent or a cave-dwelling, and some black-haired, shaggy child, like a gnome of the mountains, peered out at us, but there were only two villages all the way, and they were so like the rocks among which they were built that one could almost have passed them unnoticed. It was early afternoon when we entered Amman, the Ammon that Joab attacked long ago, and where Uriah the Hittite fell, and centuries later the famous "Philadelphia" of the Romans. Now it is a market town and the capital of Transjordan. It has a curiously mixed population, partly Circassian (Mohammedan refugees from Russia last century), partly Druse (refugees from Damascus) and partly Arab, but it is at least possible for a woman to walk through it unattended and unmolested by guides or beggars! Whether this is true in the tourist season is another matter, but so I found it the week before Christmas when I seemed to be the only visitor of any kind in the place. Amman lies along a narrow river valley with towering cliffs crowned by an ancient fort on the one hand and steep hills on the other. At the foot and up the side of one of these are the well-preserved remains of a great Roman amphitheatre, while along the stream and beyond the town is a belt of market gardens. Even at that season the cauliflowers were enormous, and broad beans were already in flower.

I had an introduction to a Syrian lady, the wife of a doctor in the Government Medical Service, and in the afternoon I found my way to their pleasant house, high up on the hillside overlooking the town. They were both at home, and both spoke excellent English, and, over strong cups of Turkish coffee, the doctor told me something of his work, which extends not only to the town itself, but into the villages and Bedouin camps for miles around. In some of these the death rate for children under five years old reaches fifty per cent. "Would you care to see my hospital?" he asked me. "It is only a little one with about sixteen beds, not nearly enough for our needs." We went down to it by a steep garden path and stairway, and the first person to greet us was a little boy of about two years old. "No, he is not a patient," said the doctor. "His father killed his mother and then fled, and the police brought him here till the authorities can decide what is to be done with him." He looked such a pathetic scrap of humanity—but one of the nurses caught him up and caressed

THE WRITING OF MODERN HISTORY.

A FEW months ago I published a book which was intended to be a modest and simple narrative of the leading events of our own time, roughly the last fifty years. The majority of the critics into whose hands it fell understood its intention, but I have been severely taken to task by a minority for having failed to interpret events according to one or other of the prevailing theories, and especially the materialistic theory of Karl Marx. So far as I personally am concerned, that is of no importance, but it raises a question about the writing of history which concerns a great many others besides myself, and is, I think, worthy of a little consideration. The critics in question turn up in very unexpected places, but they all draw on the same sources and use the same phrases and idioms; and, if they are sufficiently persistent, they may come to exert an influence which would, I think, be very prejudicial to the writing of history, especially the history of recent times.

To a man of my age who was listening to debates on the theory of Karl Marx more than forty years ago, its revival as the latest novelty of advanced thinking is one of the oddest manifestations of these times. The idea that humanity is marching through class-conflict to a final state of classless equilibrium—a sort of economic “second coming”—was beginning to seem out of date even then, and one would suppose that in these days it could only be held by those who approach economics in the same spirit as the “fundamentalists” do theology. The whole background of thought has shifted since the idea was launched. But unforeseen cosmic catastrophes the minimum period for which science leads us to hope (or expect) that life may endure on this planet is on a low estimate millions of years, and the career of civilised man cannot be traced back for more than about ten thousand years, if so far. To think of anything so dynamic as humanity approaching a final stage, “classless” or any other, in a time which the living generation can foresee or according to a process which it can confidently predict is, in the light of modern science, either extreme simplicity or an extraordinary presumption.

As a prophet Marx has no better credentials for the historian than the prophet Baxter. Both have ideas of an

apocalypse which can neither be proved nor disproved by any experience within our reach. If the question were asked whether the last fifty years afforded evidence that the Marxian process was at work, the answer would have to be in the negative. There were immense changes in this period, but they did not follow the predicted course. The rich did not grow fewer through the concentration of wealth in fewer hands. The poor did not grow poorer, as the rich grew richer and more numerous; the standard of life rose for all and far more rapidly than in any previous period of which there are records. The sharp line between haves and have-nots was progressively being broken down by education, thrift, and the diffusion of wealth through limited liability. Statistical analysis showed that even if the whole of the supposed “surplus value” could (*per impossibile*) have been taken and divided among the supposed “dispossessed,” it would have made astonishingly little difference to the general level of well-being. Finally when revolutions came, they were not the uprisings of the proletariat against capitalist masters, predicted by Marx, but the aftermath of war and the breakdown of civil and political government which followed it. It is indeed one of the strangest ironies of recent history that a little group of resolute doctrinaires should have succeeded in capturing the Russian chaos and turning it to account for an experiment with the doctrine of Marx, for whom peasants scarcely existed, upon a predominantly peasant people. In Russia the whole apparatus of modern capitalism has had actually to be installed in order that it may be converted to Marxian principles. Elsewhere, in so far as the revolutionary movements took on the aspect of class-wars, the victory has fallen not, as Marx confidently assumed, to the proletariat, but to its masters.

It is of course the business of the historian to record the facts, so far as they can be ascertained, but if he starts by imposing a particular theory on them, or even if he makes it his object to refute that theory, he ceases to be a historian and becomes a propagandist. He will almost certainly find, as he goes forward, that the facts will not fit the argument, whether for or against, and that the attempt to bend them to it leads to special pleading and falsification. A man who set out to disprove the Marxian, or for that matter the Spenglerian or any other hypothesis, would be as likely to

him as if this addition to her duties were a welcome one. There were four wards, very small but very clean, and I believe every bed was occupied. The medical service struggles against great odds, the population is illiterate and superstitious, and often very poor, with no ideas of hygiene, and more faith in charms than in pure water and food. Some of the "remedies" of which I heard afterwards a little further north were truly surprising; for earache—olive oil in which newborn rats have been stewed in the sunshine; for palpitation—the beating heart torn from a live pigeon; and so on. The value of the work of Syrian doctors and district nurses in country such as this can hardly be over-estimated. I did not meet any of the latter in Transjordan, but a day spent with two of them in the villages of Macedonia, and accounts given me of the heroic work done by two more and an American nurse in the Syrian mountains are among the best of the souvenirs collected on my journey. I also came in touch with some of a mixed team of students from Beirut University, Moslems, Jews and Christians, who had been doing wonders by spending their long vacation in some of the poorest mountain villages lecturing on hygiene with a lantern in the open air in the evenings, leading personal assaults on the garbage heaps of generations, spraying ditches with paris green to check malaria, and teaching the children to play games and the women to clean their houses. "Oh, my son," said a sheik's sister to one of them, "why did you not come to us earlier? You would have made us human beings by now."

The return trip from Amman was exciting. To begin with I had—so a dealer in curios assured me in awestruck tones—no less than three Emirs as travelling companions! They were certainly very splendid persons in their beautiful Arab dress. "You must answer them if they speak to you," whispered the curio merchant, "they are very great men indeed." We waited in the street while they transacted a certain amount of public business and their petitioners humbly kissed their hands, and then we set off. The chauffeur was not my friend of the previous journey, but a dare-devil young chap determined to show the aristocracy how he could drive, and we tore and bounced over mountain roads and along the edge of precipices, till the unfortunate merchant thought his last hour had come, and almost fainted away. If I had not felt responsible on this occasion for keeping up the dignity of the British

Empire I should have been very much afraid myself—as it was the Emirs and I remained outwardly serene, and I revived the invalid with spirits of camphor—the only remedy of any kind at hand! He was greatly impressed and felt better immediately, and when at last we reached the plain and relative safety, I had to write for him the name of this remarkable remedy. Then he got out, said his prayers by the roadside, and performed his ablutions in an extremely dirty stream which meandered past a small hamlet, collecting what refuse it could.

In extraordinary contrast to these days in the mountains were those that followed at Tel-aviv and Haifa. Tel-aviv is the new Jewish town adjoining Jaffa, built by Jewish labour, planned and organised by Jewish municipal officers, and lived in almost exclusively by Jews. It is a clean, efficient, modern city, a little embarrassing to the wandering Christian in search of something to eat by the fact that practically all its menus (and everything else for that matter) are inscribed in Hebrew. Never was a more drastic policy of "Thorough" than this of the Jews in respect of their language! Everybody talks Hebrew. All newcomers set to work upon it immediately, and it is the language of instruction in all the schools. These dry (linguistic) bones have certainly sprung to life. It seems to me, however, an almost unmitigated misfortune in that it means that Jewish and Arab children are brought up entirely apart, and the cleft between the two peoples is felt already in their schooldays and widened rather than lessened as they grow up.

Other branches of education are by no means neglected by the Jews, and I spent an unusual but extremely interesting Christmas Day in visiting a number of different kinds of schools. How much the people care for education may be indicated by the story one schoolmaster told me. He had under his care an orphan boy, whose sister was a domestic servant earning £4 a month. Of this she spent £3 10s. in keeping her younger brother and sister at school! There are not many such sisters, even in Palestine, but enormous sacrifices are made by parents and friends in order to give children a training which will fit them to be of service in building the "new kind of nation" which the best of the Jews so earnestly desire. What that "new kind of nation" is to be one gets some hints of, not only in Tel-aviv, but from the new type of village which is springing up in very many

interests. The last has been and is a distinguished Briton, who has been distressed and disturbed by the strenuous pace and strong pressure (as he considers) of German propaganda under, or in alliance with, the National Socialist régime. It is surely regrettable that, by the Saar statute of the Versailles Treaty, this Governing Commission of so German a region does not contain any German representative, apart from the local Saar delegate, while a French member is essential. Yet, as the French hopes of annexation have decreased, and with them French intervention, both political and economic, the Governing Commission has perhaps become more independent and important. Although, with the revival of German energy and nationalism, the influence of the eastern neighbour in these last months almost replaces that exercised by France in the first years after the war.

One key, at least, of the present position surely lies in Germany itself, and in the hands of the German Government. The hopes of the German cause in the Saar, I believe, are bound up with the policy of the sun, and not with that of the north wind. In the most emphatic and reiterated repudiation of anything like vengeance, cruelty, or even hardness, after the plebiscite; and in practical manifestations, in every possible way, of such a spirit of forgiveness, moderation and gentleness, especially in matters of religion, lie the best prospects of German success in, and after, the *Abstimmung*. Never was there perhaps a stronger case than in this Referendum for the application of a central principle of the morality of a great religion, not yet powerless:

"Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus . . ."

RAYMOND BEAZLEY.

NOTE

The New Party in the Saar, just founded for Christian principles (as it declares) and against the National Socialism of Germany and "New Heathenism," is, I gather, somewhat clerical (in the old Continental sense), but formed without any support from, and rather against the wishes of, the local bishops—of Speyer and Trier. The latter have, indeed, gone some way to show sympathy with the German Front. And the New Party, though it excites a good deal of interest in

Saarbrücken, cannot be assumed to be very strong in voting power.

In general it must be remembered that, in such a referendum, much prominence may be gained by factors not really responsible, and by persons without votes. Herr Max Braun, one of the most vigorous and well-known personalities of the moment, in the Saar, is such a person. He is a comparative newcomer, and is not entitled, however effectively he speaks and writes, to take part in the plebiscite. All voting strength lies with the Old Inhabitants, domiciled in the Saar fifteen years ago. And everything depends on the alternative: Do these Old Inhabitants, above all things, want to return to their old citizenship, or do they not? Are they ready to cut themselves off from their old country, or are they not? Is it "*Deutschland über Alles*" with them, or is it not?

R. B.

places. It will at least be one in which all necessary work is honoured and is shared.

Much has been written of late of these Jewish Settlements on the land, which are of two main types, the communal and the co-operative. In the former there is private sleeping accommodation for adults, but a common dining-room and reading-room, while the children live in a separate building under the care of nurses and teachers and are only with their parents for a short time in the evenings. This not only trains them for community life from the first, but it sets their mothers free to work on the farm. Strapping young women may be seen among the cattle and on the land, just as the men are, and the farms I saw did great credit to all concerned. The produce in excess of what is consumed by the settlers is sold, and the articles of food and clothing which are needed are purchased and distributed as they are wanted. Private individuals do not have money of their own; it all belongs to the group.

In the other type of village (which would certainly appeal more strongly to all who love a quiet life!) each family has its own house and the children go to day-school in the ordinary way. The land is, however, co-operatively worked, and any who are sick or disabled are well looked after by doctor and nurse, and their share of the work is done by their neighbours till they can get about again.

And what do the Arabs think of all these developments in a country which has been their own for many a hundred years? Most often they are aloof and hostile, sometimes there are active collisions and bloodshed. Esau, indignant and despairing as he sees his birthright slipping from him, Jacob, too absorbed in the immense importance of his own affairs to reflect very much on the suffering of his brother. Besides, does he not pay for the land he takes, full market price and even something over? And is it not his really, by divine right, promised to him by Jaweh through the prophets, and shall not God's word be fulfilled? But the fellahin, who often rent their farms from absentee landlords, only know that a large share of the small percentage of good, well-watered soil which Palestine can boast is being sold away from them for ever. They may be forgiven if they see things in a very different light and if they have little use for an idealism which is costing them so dear. I have seen copies of some Jewish deeds of

ownership, and have noted that the Jewish buyer has undertaken never in any circumstances to allow the land purchased to return to Arab hands.

The sense of underlying strife prevented me from enjoying unreservedly the Jewish experiments in the direction of the New Jerusalem. They seemed so full of them, and if I said "But what about the Arabs? Are they going to share all this?" I never got a very satisfactory reply. Never? Yes, once I did; and that shall be the last of my Palestine pictures. I was waiting in an office in one of the ports when a beautiful young Jew, perhaps about twenty years old, addressed me shyly. "I heard," he said, "that somebody from England wanted to see our Arab Club, and I was so glad." "I should like to so very much," said I. "It is not really the best time," he answered, "because it is Ramadan, and when the Arabs fast all day they must rest and eat in the evenings, but come with me, there will be sure to be some of them there." On the way he explained that the Club is part of the much larger effort of Jewish workers to co-operate with the Arabs; that it is very difficult, because of the language and also because of their different outlook on life, but that they must persevere. Anything less than a reconciliation of the two peoples who both love Palestine so deeply, to both of whom it is sacred ground, would not be good enough. And the Jewish boy was right. How that reconciliation is to be brought about is another and far more difficult question beyond the scope of this article, but the importance and urgency of it, not for Palestine alone but for Jews and Moslems the world over, can hardly be exaggerated. And if it is important for them it is hardly less so for the nations among whom they live.

MARY E. PUMPHREY.

go astray as the man who set out to prove it. In either case he would be starting with a preconceived idea which would never have occurred to him if he had waited to deduce it from the facts, and he will be viewing the facts through a distorting medium. That things are what they seem to be and that the simpler explanation is to be preferred to the more obscure are good presumptions for the historian of his own times. The time will come for generalising and philosophising, but that also will be vanity, unless the foundation of fact has been truly laid.

The same group of critics is aggrieved if history is not written to illustrate their theory that war is the result of "capitalism." There are many causes of war, and it is of course true that the pursuit of economic interests and the desire to obtain new openings for trade are among them. By calling all the human passions and appetites "capitalist" one may prove that "capitalism" is the root of all evil. But to label thus the French desire to recover their lost provinces—one of the greatest sources of trouble in the old Europe—or the immemorial Russian urge to get to the "warm water," or the struggles of the Balkan races to throw off the Turkish and finally the Austrian yoke is to strain words beyond all sense. The historian's theme is the whole complex of forces and emotions, good and evil, patriotic and mercenary, passion for justice, appetite for power, ideals and material objects, of which human affairs have been compounded from the beginning. To disentangle it is a desperately difficult business, and to apply any one formula to it is simply to evade the trouble of thinking.

A plausible case can be made out to suggest that, if the politicians had left the world to the capitalists, war would have been banished and peace established long ago. I personally do not know a capitalist who does not heartily subscribe to Sir Norman Angell's thesis that war is unprofitable, and so much of the capitalist's machinery is (or was) international that it is natural to suppose that he views its destruction in war with disapproval. Whenever the curtain is lifted on the old Europe, the capitalists, Ballin, Cassel and the like, may be seen running about in a vain endeavour to make peace between the politicians. The German bankers came to London on a mission of peace in the last days before the war. On the other hand a case can be made out to

suggest that under the modern system of Nationalist tariffs, capitalists are driven to form national monopolies, the collision between which is among the causes of war. It is probable that all these theories are partly true and partly false, but the historian who pins himself down to any one of them will quite certainly go astray. Most chimerical of all is the idea, which one of my critics impresses on me, that the victory of the workers in the class-war would be the road to eternal peace. A doctrine which assumes conflict and hatred to lie at the root of things is very unlikely to be exhausted when one victory has been won. But this too is a speculation which lies beyond history.

Most of these theories, Spenglerian, Marxian and the like, are monism gone mad. In the varying and unequal conditions of nations, it is inherently improbable that any one theory will cover them all. The differences in their material conditions and systems of government and politics and still more in their education, culture and outlook on life, raise the strongest presumption that they will react in different ways to a given set of circumstances—a presumption abundantly justified by the present condition of the world. A Gibbon writing at a distance of fifteen hundred years and more from the events that he describes and knowing their sequel may discover some rhythm and logic which embraces them all, but the modest student of his own times who projects himself into a future beyond his horizon is soon involved in a web of nebulous, grandiose and pretentious speculation. This may be an amusing game for advanced thinkers, but it should not be confused with history.

To see passing events, if he can, *sub specie historiæ*, and to bring them into some sort of relation with the past and with their setting in the world to-day is task enough for the historian of his time. That in itself may help to bring some modern theories into their right perspective. History does not encourage the idea that evil-doing is confined to one class or one period. One might suppose from reading Marx and his modern disciples that man's inhumanity to man was first displayed in human history when persons called "capitalists" appeared upon the scene. But in truth we have to forget all that was suffered by slaves and serfs in antiquity and the middle ages, and all that is now being endured by men, women and children in the struggle for a bare living in

ENGLAND'S FIRST AMBASSADOR TO THE GREAT MOGUL.

ENGLAND'S first effective contact with India was not till 1608. It is remarkable that though the East India Company, which was formed in the last days of 1600, had already sent ships in two separate voyages to Sumatra and Java (both yielding a rich profit to the Company), nothing had been attempted in India itself. Indeed, the ship which landed Captain Wm. Hawkins at Surat, on August 24th, 1608, was also on its way to the Further East. But it is worth noting the name of the ship, the *Hector*, and the date of its arrival, because the *Hector* was the first English ship that ever touched the shores of India. Almost thirty years before, in 1579, Thomas Stevens had landed at Goa from a Portuguese ship to serve India for forty years as a Jesuit priest, while four years later Newberie and Fitch, with two others, had been taken there as prisoners by the Portuguese from Ormuz, on the Persian Gulf; and Fitch, on his return to England in 1591, had written a record of his experiences which did much to open the eyes of English merchants to the possibilities that lay before them in India. But they were also conscious of the difficulties that stood in their way. Portugal would brook no interference in her trade if she could help it. She had enjoyed a monopoly for over a hundred years, a monopoly which the Pope had confirmed. And England, even more than Holland, was the enemy—especially after the Spanish Armada of 1588. And it has to be confessed that Lancaster, the commander of the Company's first expedition to the Java seas, had done something to justify the charge that the English were a nation of thieves; for the great profits of that voyage were largely due to the fact that he had captured a huge Portuguese galleon, and transferred its very valuable cargo to his own ships; while it has to be added that Michelbourne, a free lance who, much to the annoyance of the Company, had obtained a permit from King James "to discover the countries of China and Japan," took quite frankly to piracy and brought great discredit on the English name.

Be that as it may, the English had not been the only nation to indulge in illegal acts, and the time had come when a definite attempt must be made to challenge Portugal's claim to exclude all other nations from the continent of India. Besides,

the information acquired from John Mildenhall, who had stayed in Agra and interviewed the great Akbar in 1603, had probably convinced the Directors that if they were to secure a foothold and to establish a factory, which, in those days, was reckoned an essential, the Mogul ruler himself must be approached, not by a body of merchants for whom he had no respect, but through their own king, by someone in the guise of an ambassador. Accordingly, when the *Hector* arrived at the Bar of Surat, Hawkins sent three messengers ashore to announce to the local Indian Governor that his master the King of England had sent him as his Ambassador with a letter and presents for the Grand Mogul.

The cordiality of his reception was at first all that he could wish. He was invited to come ashore and told that the country was at his disposal; but when he came to close quarters and entered upon the purpose of his mission—that he proposed to travel up country to Agra to speak with the Mogul, to have league and amity with him, to establish a factory at Surat so that his countrymen might freely come and go, as the custom of all nations is—difficulties at once arose. The native merchants had no objection to his landing part of his cargo, especially articles which were in demand, like iron and lead. But when he brought money ashore to purchase goods which might be sold in the Further East, they protested vigorously on the ground that such action would break the price in those regions. But such opposition was nothing compared to the hostility of the Portuguese, already settled at Surat. With the assistance of one of their own frigates, they intercepted two boats' crews engaged in landing further cargo, and sent no less than thirty English sailors prisoners to Goa. When Hawkins sent demanding their release, the captain of the frigate "most vilely abused his Majestie tearing him King of the Fishermen and of an iland of no import," while another captain whom he met next day declared that these seas belonged unto the King of Portugal and none ought to come here without a licence. "I told him," said Hawkins, "that the King of England's licence was as good as the King of Spaine's and he that saith the contrary is a traytor and a villaine and so tell your great Captaine that in abusing the King of England he is a base villaine, and I will maintaine it with my sword, if he dare come ashore. I sending him a challenge, the Moors perceiving I was much moved

eastern and non-industrialised countries, before we can begin to think of industrialism and the capitalist system, whatever their shortcomings, as having worsened the lot of human-kind. If this thesis be placed in either a world or a historical setting it at once becomes a glaring paradox. The notion that a writer of history should seriously adopt it and seek confirmation of it in a narrative of events is surely an illustration the more of the fanatical temper which attends so much economic and political theorising in these times.

I would add a note about another fashion of these times which is likely to complicate the writing of history. This is the habit of using autobiography to vent old quarrels and grievances. The passion of self-justification which animates so many recent works of this kind, both British and foreign, the evident desire of the distinguished authors to pluck the laurels from all brows but their own, their lack of consideration for old friends and colleagues who shared with them the burden and heat of the former days—all this seriously detracts from the value of their testimony from a historical point of view. Historians who deal with their writings, as they must, will find themselves compelled to weigh and check at every turn, to discount their evident bias and undertake elaborate researches to correct or corroborate their assertions. It is strange that men who were fated to play a part in the stupendous crash of systems and dynasties which took place in their time should not have learnt a little humility from their overwhelming experience.

The historian has to be on his guard equally against the military critics who fight battles after the event, and the political writers who pass confident judgments out of a full knowledge of what came after. No battles would ever have been lost and few political mistakes would have been made, if generals and statesmen had possessed the same knowledge as their critics. The art of government is the perilous and uncertain one of feeling a way through the fogs which envelop the future, and the historian will only do justice if he tries to put himself into the position of those who undertook this task at the time when they undertook it. For all of them visibility was always bad.

J. A. SPENDER.

"OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES."*

CONCEPTIONS of civil liberty do not greatly vary from one country to another. Freedom of speech; religious toleration; imprisonment or penalty only by process of law; the opportunity for every citizen to have a voice in making and changing the law—these have been accepted, wherever the matter has been fully considered, as the constituent elements of political freedom. But there has been a vast difference in the manner in which individual nations have set about to secure them. Generally speaking, the continental method has been the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In these islands we have adopted an entirely different procedure. Such terms as "liberty of thought," "freedom of the press," are practically unknown to our law. What we have done is to build up a great series of safeguards to protect British citizens against any unwarranted invasion of their rights and any unauthorised deprivation of their possessions. The security for the liberty of the subject in this country consists in the checks and restraints that we impose upon those who happen to be in authority. To make my meaning clear I will give two examples.

In the summer of last year public opinion was deeply stirred by the incident of Flying-Officer Fitzpatrick. That was the name of the young man who was said to have carried a suitcase "in a suspicious manner." Having arrived in London in the small hours of the morning, he was trudging through the streets of Victoria, looking for a hotel, when he was accosted by two plain-clothes policemen. He was under the impression that he had to do with bandits. A struggle ensued, in which his arm was twisted and he suffered a few minor injuries. A few days later the matter was raised in the House of Commons. After a heated debate the Home Secretary yielded to the obvious feeling of the House and promised that a full inquiry should be held. Everyone knows the result.

What a contrast! In Germany, those who were known to differ from the dominant party were being assaulted, prosecuted, and herded into concentration camps. And no one dared raise his voice in protest. In this country the whole work of Parliament was held up for over an hour, the Home

* An Address delivered at the Liberal Summer School, August 7th, 1934.

caused the Portugal to depart." However, he got no redress. He had to swallow the insult, and strange to say we hear nothing more of the English sailors or of their fate. The *Hector*, with a diminished crew, set sail for Bantam a few days later. Hawkins was now left alone with William Finch, a merchant, and two servants. But his tribulations did not cease. The Indian Governor was manifestly in league with the Portuguese. More than one attempt was made upon the lives of the four Englishmen, by poison and by assault; attempts in which the Jesuit priests had a share. After months of hazard and delay, it was decided that Finch should remain behind to deal with the local situation and promote the interests of the Company. Hawkins, on the other hand, with his two English servants and an escort of forty Pathans procured with much difficulty, set out for Agra on February 1st. Throughout his journey he was exposed to the plots of the Jesuits and of the Governor, who not unreasonably began to fear that should Hawkins reach Agra alive he would report unfavourably of his conduct to the Mogul. "After much labour, toyle and many dangers I arrived in safety, the sixteenth of Aprill, 1609." The journey, which can now be accomplished in twenty-four hours by a very comfortable express train fitted with sleeping berths, dining car, electric punkahs and electric light, had lasted two and a half months.

With his arrival in Agra the scene was at once changed. Hawkins' two years in Agra constitute a romance. He became a prime favourite of Jahangir, a boon companion who shared in his daily carousals, a man with whom he refused to part; and yet the King would not give him the privileges he asked for his country. But that is a story which must be told with some detail. No sooner did Hawkins reach the city, and in a very secret manner was searching for a lodging, than the Mogul heard of his arrival and sent both horse and foot to find him and bring him to the palace. And so urgent were the soldiers when they found him that they would scarce give him time to alter his apparel. "Having his Majestie's letter in my hand he called me to come near unto him, stretching down his hand from the Seate Royall, where he sat in great majestie something high for to be seene of the people." Hawkins, presenting a poor present of cloth, seized the opportunity to explain that a much worthier gift intended for his acceptance had been appropriated with much else by Mukarrab

Khan, the Surat Governor, a blow which an old Jesuit, who was present, sought to repay by declaring that King James's letter was basely penned and lacking in respect. This led to a dispute in the course of which Hawkins revealed his knowledge of Turkish, an acquisition which further commended him to the King. Not only did Hawkins remain with him several hours that day, part of the time being spent in the more private apartments, but he was bidden come every day. "Both night and day his delight was very much to talke with mee, both of the affaires of England and other countries, as also many demands of the West Indies; being in doubt if there were any such place, till he had spoken with me who had beene in the Countrey."

"Many dayes and weekes being past and I now in great favour with the King to the grieve of all mine enemies," Hawkins took opportunity to ask the King if he would give permission for the establishment of a factory, and thus enable him to go home. But the King would not hear of his departure on any consideration, and declared that his staying would be highly for the benefit of England and would right all the wrongs that had been done to his nation; "swearing by his Father's soule that if I would remaine with him he would grant me articles for our factorie to my heart's desire and would never goe from his word." As a result of "this daily inticing me to stay," Hawkins accepted the invitation and was endowed with an income of £3,200 a year and the rank of commander of four hundred horse. These favours roused the wrath of the Jesuits and Portugals, who "slept not, but by all meanes sought my overthrow. And to say the truth the principall Mahumetans neere the King envyed much that a Christian should bee so nigh unto him." The Surat Governor also wrote begging the King not to grant the English any privileges; that it would occasion loss to his Majestie and deeply offend their ancient friends the Portuguese. The King paid no attention to their appeals, with the result that the Portugals, who were "like mad Dogges," made renewed attempts on his life. Hawkins himself escaped, but his boy Stephen Gravener died, while his man Nicholas Ufflet was "extreame sick."

Jahangir learning what dangers his favourite had been exposed to sent for the Jesuits and "told them that if I dyed by an extraordinaire casualtie they should all rue for it. The

Hawkins and his wife had to go where they went, first to the Red Sea and afterwards to Sumatra. Eventually he was able to set sail for home in the beginning of 1613. Reaching the Cape of Good Hope on April 21st, he tells us "the winde coming faire we departed from Saldania the one and twentieth of May 1613." These are the last words recorded in his journal. He died at sea.

Finch, who was with Hawkins during the latter months of his stay in Agra, decided to travel home overland by Afghanistan and Persia. But he died at Baghdad. He also wrote an account of his Indian experiences. It is to Samuel Purchas we are indebted in the case of both these travellers for publishing extracts from their journals. Unhappily he does not tell us how they came into his possession.

J. M. MACFIE.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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TWO HISTORIES OF THE GREAT WAR.*

With these two books the history of the Great War enters on a new stage. They are the first works which try to include within the compass of a single volume the results of the researches of the last ten years. During that period there have appeared many volumes of official histories, numerous monographs on particular episodes, and the diaries, memoirs and first-hand accounts of many of the principal soldiers and statesmen and their subordinates. Some are still lacking, notably the official life of Haig. The political records of the Grand Alliance and the records of their far-reaching decisions are also to a certain extent still withheld from publication. But a great mass of evidence has been accumulated bearing on every aspect of the gigantic struggle. Its strategy has been discussed in numerous monographs. Some episodes like that of the Battle of Jutland have been so exhaustively analysed that almost every movement of the rival forces has been plotted and related to the complicated causes which produced them. There is still much to be revealed. The responsibility for many actions has yet to be explained. Personal

* *La Crise Européenne et la Grande Guerre (1904-18)*. By Pierre Renouvin. Félix Alcan. Paris. 60 francs. *A History of the Great War (1914-18)*. By C. R. M. F. Cruttwell. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 15s.

Secretary had to promise an inquiry, leading members of the House of Commons joined in the debate—all because one single British citizen had received a few minor injuries at the hands of the police.

A famous leading case provides my second example. Early in 1923 a number of persons were arrested by order of the Home Secretary, transported to the Irish Free State and there interned without trial. One of the deportees, Mr. Art O'Brien, applied for a writ of *habeas corpus*. The application was refused by a Divisional Court, but granted by the Court of Appeal, and O'Brien was immediately released. Mark what followed. O'Brien and his fellow prisoners were members of a subversive and revolutionary organisation. The Home Secretary had acted mistakenly but in all good faith, and undoubtedly in the interests of public safety. But O'Brien and another deportee instituted proceedings in the High Court for illegal arrest and false imprisonment. An Indemnity Bill had to be rushed through Parliament in order to relieve the Home Secretary from the consequences of his action. Had it not become law the Home Secretary would assuredly have been mulcted in damages.

These, then, are the safeguards of British liberty, the constant supervision by Parliament of the executive and the fact that those in authority, from the humblest official to Ministers of the Crown, are answerable, if they exceed their authority, to the ordinary courts of law. Yet each of these safeguards has been considerably weakened in the last few years, and each of them is in great danger at the present time.

Part II of the Unemployment Act provides that the members of the Unemployment Assistance Board are to be appointed by Royal Warrant. They are not to be under the control of the Minister of Labour, and will therefore not be answerable to Parliament. If an ex-service man feels that he has been unfairly dealt with in the matter of his disability pension, his Member of Parliament can raise the subject on the floor of the House of Commons and obtain a full explanation from the responsible Minister. But if the same Member endeavours in future to raise a grievance arising out of a determination by the Unemployment Assistance Board he will receive the answer that this is a matter for the Board, and the Minister of Labour cannot accept responsibility. It is true that the Board is to make an annual report. But

what comfort is it to the man who has a grievance in October to be told that the question can be raised when the report is published in the following March? This is only one example of the movement to evade constant Parliamentary supervision.

Now I come to the far more serious menace of the inroads being made in the Rule of Law. The most dangerous enemies of British liberty are not Sir Oswald Mosley or Mr. Harry Pollitt. They are a body of conspicuously efficient, high-minded, incorruptible, public-spirited men who have their being in Whitehall. The real antagonist is not the potential dictator but the actual bureaucrat.

Of recent years Parliament has tended more and more to enact the outlines of legislation, leaving the details to be filled in by Ministerial orders, rules and regulations. In this way they have delegated to Ministers, that is to Government Departments, most extensive law-making powers. So much so, that of recent years the annual volumes of statutory orders have been far bulkier than the statute books themselves. In the exercise of such powers Ministers are, as a rule, subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts. When an order is made in pursuance of an Act of Parliament any person aggrieved can go to the Courts and apply for a writ of *certiorari*. If the Courts find, upon inquiry, that the Minister has exceeded the powers given him by the Act, they will quash the order. In the present century, however, there has grown up a practice of inserting in statutes a clause which ousts the jurisdiction of the Courts. Generally it runs as follows:

The Minister may confirm the order and the confirmation shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this Act have been complied with, and that the order has been duly made and is within the powers of this Act.

Such a clause, to take two examples only, appears in the Housing Act, 1925, and in the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931. The Committee on Ministers' Powers, which reported in March 1932, regarded such a proviso as objectionable and doubted if it was ever justified. They recommended that there should always be a period of at least three months, and preferably six months, during which the validity of any order could be challenged in the Courts.

Put simply, a clause of this kind means that the Minister

King was very earnest with me to take a white maiden out of his palace and would give her all things necessary with slaves and he would promise mee shce should turne Christian ; and by this meanes my meates and drinkes should be looked unto by them, and I should live without feare. In regards she was a Moore I refused, but if so be there could bee a Christian found, I would accept it. At which my speech I little thought a Christian daughter could bee found." But the King was able to supply this want also. "He called to memorie one Mabarek Shah his daughter who was a Christian Armenian and of the race of the most ancient Christians and in great favour with Ekbar Padasha this King's father. This Captain died suddenly and without a will, leaving the child but only a few jewels. I seeing she was of so honest a descent, having passed my word to the King could not withstand my fortunes. Wherefore, I tooke her and for want of a minister before Christian witnesses I marryed her. The Priest was my man Nicholas which I thought had beene lawfull till I met with a Preacher that came with Sir Henry Middleton and hee shewing mee the error I was now marryed againe ; so ever-after I lived content and without feare, she being willing to goe where I went and live as I lived."

At this time Hawkins was in the very highest favour. He was, to use his own phrase, "continually in the King's sight for the one halfe of foure and twentic houres serving him day and night." But he adds "I wanted not the greater part of his nobles that were Mahumetans to be mine enemies." It was at this period of high favour that he persuaded the King to send for Mukarrab Khan, the Governor of Surat, to give an account of his stewardship. The result was that the Governor was stripped of all his wealth and cast into prison. This was probably an error of judgment on Hawkins's part, for he not only never recovered the goods which the Governor had stolen but found that his very success had only incited both Indians and Portuguese to get rid of him at all costs. The free use of bribes and presents gained the support of Jahangir's own sons, while the Grand Vizier, who had never paid him his allowances, prevented the King, on more than one occasion, from sanctioning the erection of a factory at Surat, by saying that this would occasion war with the Portuguese, and that as they held the seas, this would deprive his Majestic of the toyces he loved ; adding that the "English were a nation that if we

once set foot we would take his country from him." The Viceroy of Goa also at this time sent a letter with many valuable presents, in which he said the King of Portugal took the entertaining of the English very ill.

As part of what was manifestly a concerted plot a number of Indian merchants, along with one of the Jesuit priests of Surat, who had plotted Hawkins's death, maintained that all the profits they received from the Portuguese would be lost if the English were granted any favour. Mukarrab Khan was at this time released, and, if not entirely restored to favour, at least sent back to Surat, for one reason perhaps more than any other to secure a very precious ruby from the Portuguese. It would serve no purpose to detail the hopes and fears which possessed Hawkins at this time. One day the King would give him a solemn promise, swearing by his father's soul. Once at least he had the Royal Commission under the Great Seal with golden letters placed in his hands and sent to William Finch. A few days later he would find it had been recalled. Indeed, so changeable was the King that Hawkins having received permission to depart, and got all his goods and debts together, the sudden dismissal of the Grand Vizier, who was one of his chief enemies, led some of his friends to urge him to approach Jahangir once more. This he did and with immediate success, for the King "presently granted mee the establishing of our factorie and that the English come and freely trade for Surat." The success was but for a moment. The King once more went back upon his promise, but said that if Hawkins would remain he would see to it that he got the maintenance he had been promised, "which I denied," says Hawkins, "unless the English should come unto his ports according to promise ; and as for my particular maintenance my King would not see me want. So I took my leave and departed from Agra, the 2nd of November, 1611."

When he reached Cambay on the last day of December, he got news of the arrival of English ships at Surat. This was a matter of great good fortune. He feared he would have to appeal to the Jesuits (who were only too glad to be rid of him) and by their means get passage on a ship to Portugal and so to England. That humiliation he was now able to avoid. The English ships belonged to the Fourth Voyage of the East India Company and were commanded by Sir Henry Middleton. They were, however, on the outward voyage and

concerned may do something which is *ultra vires* and, therefore, illegal; but as long as he purports to act in pursuance of the statute no one has any redress. The last occasion on which powers of this kind were sought was during the passage of the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1933. It was pointed out by *Punch* that Mr. Elliott would be able to decree that all bacon producers should wear brown bowler hats and there would be no appeal. Fortunately, thanks to the insistence of Sir Herbert Samuel and Lord Reading, the clause was modified so as to allow a twenty-eight days' period of challenge.

His Majesty's judges have often commented unfavourably upon legislation of this type. The late Lord Justice Scrutton once referred to "this kind of Star Chamber clause," and Mr. C. K. Allen, in his little book, *Bureaucracy Triumphant*, recalls a memorable interchange of views in the Lord Chief Justice's Court. The question to be decided was the validity of a Ministerial order under the Housing Act, 1925. The newspaper report runs as follows:

The Lord Chief Justice: Is your argument this: That any order of the Minister, however far it may depart from the Act, has effect as though enacted in the Act if it purports to be made under the Act?

The Attorney-General: That is so, my Lord. Of course it doesn't sound very pretty in that form—(laughter)—and I would prefer to say that the Court will not inquire whether it is within the Act. . . .

The Lord Chief Justice: Do you say that if, under the name of an improvement scheme under this Act, the Minister sanctioned anything whatever, it would have statutory effect?

The Attorney-General: I think that is so. . . .

Mr. Justice Talbot: Suppose Parliament had intended to say what the Attorney-General says that they have said, how could they have expressed it better than they have done?

The Lord Chief Justice: They might have said, "After the passing of the Act the Minister may do what he likes."

Mr. Justice Swift: That is what they have said.

This question of the control of the Courts has figured prominently in the recent utterances of Sir Stafford Cripps. In *Problems of a Socialist Government* he tells us that his Emergency Powers Bill will be wide enough in its terms to allow all that will be immediately necessary to be done by Ministerial orders. A few pages later he goes on to say:

In the extended use of Ministerial orders for giving legislative effect to the general principles laid down by Parliament, one great

change must be effected. At the present time it is left to the Courts to decide whether these orders are within the powers given by Parliament. It is always possible for them to be challenged in the Courts and to be declared invalid. This power must be taken from the Courts and the sole right to challenge such orders must rest with Parliament. . . .

In other words, the subject must look for redress not to the Courts, but to Parliament. But is it really a satisfactory answer to say to the person aggrieved by a Ministerial order: "You may obtain redress if you can persuade a majority of the House of Commons to vote against the Government of the day"? For that is what it amounts to. Not only have our masters in Whitehall the power to make new laws. They also, in several instances, have power to unmake existing laws. For example, the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1929, empowered the Secretary of State to make by order "any adaptations or modifications of the provisions of any Act necessary to bring these provisions into conformity with the provisions of this Act." Again, the Rating and Valuation Act, 1925, enabled the Minister to make an order which might "modify the provisions of this Act so far as it may appear to the Minister necessary or expedient for carrying the order into effect."

There is a famous and frequently quoted saying of the present Lord Chancellor:

Amid the cross currents and shifting sands of public life the Law is like a great rock upon which a man may set his feet and be safe, while the inevitable inequalities of private life are not so dangerous in a country where every citizen knows that in the Law Courts, at any rate, he can get justice.

We should all like to believe that those words are true. But the rock is swept away when Ministers, to serve their departmental ends, may alter the law at their pleasure. And how can the citizen be sure of getting justice when the Law Courts are prohibited from inquiring into the validity of Ministerial orders?

The encroachments of the executive upon the functions of Parliament and the judiciary constitute, in my view, the greatest danger to the liberty of the subject. But they are not the only danger. It is useless to provide against the maladministration of our laws, if those laws are in themselves

jealousies and influences have not all been made clear. In some cases the springs of action still lie hidden from the historian. But much of the evidence has been analysed and assessed by experts of many different nationalities and professions. They are of course still greatly moved by personal, party and national prejudice. Old loyalties and antagonisms, their own past records, vivid memories of deep emotions, sometimes produced by casual and unimportant incidents, still influence their minds and pens. But many have striven hard to be just not only to their foes but also to those with whom they worked and whose weaknesses and errors were even more apparent to them.

The two authors have made a great effort to master this mass of material and from it produce an ordered, relatively impartial and interesting record of the Great War in all its aspects. Each has been strikingly successful, with the result that we have now a standard French and British history. The adjectives are used advisedly, for each writer is obviously writing primarily for his own countrymen. Both were active soldiers and fought and suffered. Trained historians before the war commenced, they have each passed through experiences which show their influence even when the writers are most scientific and impartial. M. Renouvin has more successfully overcome the more obvious temptations. He hardly writes an angry phrase or makes a moral judgment in the whole of his cool survey of four years' bloodshed. He lets the events speak for themselves but the reader is drawn to the conclusions of the writer. Mr. Cruttwell dwells more bitterly on the follies and weaknesses of the combatants. A general flaunting his mistress or officers indulging in vice when they should be solely concerned with the serious business of war rouse his indignation. He praises and blames more freely both soldiers and statesmen.

Nearly one-third of M. Renouvin's book is devoted to the diplomacy of the ten years preceding the war. It is a masterly summary which does not until its final sentences pronounce judgment. Then it is made without hesitation. Not economics nor armaments nor even national emotions but the firm will of Germany to support Austria in crushing Serbia was in his opinion the reason the war came. Mr. Cruttwell on the other hand in the few sentences he devotes to this subject attributes it to the "deep-rooted and incalculable conviction of

insecurity" of all peoples. There is perhaps no real conflict between the two opinions. Throughout his book M. Renouvin, who is first and foremost a student of diplomacy, sketches the diplomatic issues of the war in succinct, impartial and pregnant phrases. His summary of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations is a model of the compact handling of complicated themes. Mr. Cruttwell does not neglect these issues but his vigorous accounts are more superficial.

In his description of the campaigns M. Renouvin naturally makes the struggle in France and Flanders the central theme of his book. He does not neglect other theatres. Almost every corner of the globe is mentioned. But the great struggle on the Western front is clearly what moves and interests him most, as it always did and always will move Frenchmen. He is scrupulously fair to allies and enemies alike in those subjects which attract his attention, but his emphasis is revealing. The Battle of Jutland, to which Mr. Cruttwell devotes twenty pages with plans and diagrams, he dismisses in three. The submarine campaign is handled in the same manner. The French writer is hardly aware of the thesis which Mr. Lloyd George has made so prominent. Not even Mr. Cruttwell, who is always conscious of the struggle between "Easterners" and "Westerners," quite explains that rhythmic swing between East and West which is one of the great features of the conflict. The complications of political and strategical forces are not yet sufficiently elucidated to make clear why on both sides energy and power are so often dissipated in vain efforts which are not pursued with that singleness of purpose which has characterised great wars in the past. Was it because the arena was so great and the state machinery so complicated that every decision was a compromise and not carried out with that intensity of purpose by which victory is achieved? There was nowhere a real control and co-ordination of political and strategic effort. The autocracies of the Central Powers and Russia were no more successful than the democratic governments of the West in this respect. All the great European Powers changed their Commanders-in-Chief in the course of the war.

The reputations of the Commanders are treated tenderly by these historians. M. Renouvin indeed avoids criticism. Mr. Cruttwell even when most severe is always conscious of the new and tremendous problems these men had to solve.

subversive of civil liberties. That is why the Liberals in the House of Commons have spared no effort to resist the Incitement to Disaffection Bill. I will not weary you by enumerating all its provisions. But in the Bill as originally introduced there were two proposals which we should not allow to be forgotten. Section (2) (1) made it an offence for any person to have in his possession, "*without lawful excuse*, any document of such a nature that the dissemination of copies thereof among members of His Majesty's Forces would be an offence under Section one of this Act." This meant that the prosecution would only need to prove possession. The onus would then shift to the defence, and the accused would have had to prove affirmatively the innocence of his intentions.

Section 2 (2) was even more remarkable. "If any person does or attempts to do, or causes to be done or attempted, any act preparatory to the commission of an offence under Section one of this Act, he shall be guilty of an offence under this Act." To appreciate the absurdity of this subsection it is only necessary to work out the form of indictment that would have been framed if it had become law. "Richard Roe, you stand indicted for that you on the first day of April 1935 did cause to be attempted an act preparatory to an endeavour to seduce" Almost any action, however commonplace, might have come within so wide a definition. On Standing Committee the Attorney-General himself admitted that "if a person of thoroughly bad character, a Communist, took a ticket at Waterloo for Aldershot . . . that might be an act preparatory to the commission of an offence."

It is perfectly true that the Bill has been drastically amended. The words, "*without lawful excuse*," have given place to a provision making it necessary for the prosecution to prove criminal intent, and the "*preparatory act*" has gone altogether. But why was the Bill ever introduced in its original form? The agitation to which it has given rise, supported by people of widely divergent political views, is undoubtedly a matter for congratulation. Moreover, the extent to which amendments have been accepted shows that a British Government, however enormous its Parliamentary majority may be, must still have regard to the criticisms of informed and enlightened public opinion. But it remains a sinister thing that the original measure should ever have been laid upon the table of the House of Commons.

Lastly, how can we obstruct and reverse the tendencies I have tried to describe? We need an association of people who are prepared to make resistance to the encroachments of authority their first political objective. We cannot trust a Government capable of introducing the Incitement to Disaffection Bill as it was originally drafted, or, on the other hand, politicians who announce that their first measure on obtaining control will be an Emergency Powers Act which will give their proclamations the force of statute law. In my opinion it can only be done by a Liberal Party or, better still, by a Liberal Alliance. And do not let us imagine that for such an alliance we should look only in one direction. An appreciable number of the younger members of the Conservative Party are really Liberals who have lost their way. But to achieve this purpose we must re-state and re-emphasise the articles of our belief. Liberalism came into being as an insurgent movement, a protest against authority and privilege. The need for rebels is greater now than it has been for a century. As in the past, the duty of Liberals is to lead the perpetual struggle against the oppressors' wrong and the insolence of office.

DINGLE FOOT.

M. Renouvin does not slur over, as French writers used to do, the extraordinary mutinies of 1917 which rendered so large a portion of the French force unfightable, but it is Mr. Cruttwell who brings out the terrible responsibility which this disaster threw on the British army and Commander-in-Chief. Both rightly praise the skill and resolution by which Pétain nursed his army back to health again so that it was able to play its proper part in the great struggle of 1918.

Mr. Cruttwell in his preface apologises for devoting so much space to the "side-shows." But he is surely right in depicting the war as a world-wide conflict in which the destinies of all nations were involved. Ultimately of course the final decision depended on the overthrow of German power. But the future political organisation of the world was determined by the immense efforts that were devoted to the Balkans and the Middle East. Moreover the struggle in Europe depended on the succour which was brought to the Entente from overseas. Thence was repaired their inferiority in munitions of war and thence came the man-power that turned the scale when the issue was trembling in the balance. And before the Americans came, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders were fighting on French soil. M. Renouvin never mentions this contribution to the Allied victory. Even Mr. Cruttwell perhaps hardly does it justice. He lists the separate casualties of the British Isles but not those of the other parts of the Empire. Yet, in a war which began ten thousand miles from her shores Australia had larger casualties than Belgium. At the end the United States dominated the political and economic situation. Even M. Renouvin recognises in his brilliant summary of losses and gains in his final pages that one of the greatest effects of the war was the transference of the world's centre of gravity.

But even here present events warn us that some of the effects of the Great War were more transitory than we imagined. We shall rapidly modify many of the judgments which we now hold just as we already have abandoned many of those of sixteen years ago. Meanwhile we possess in these two books a summing up of our knowledge at the present moment. They serve our needs well and will educate and inform numbers of readers who will later be able to revise and criticise the lessons which they now learn.

C. K. WEBSTER.

THE QUEEN OF ROUMANIA.*

Queen Marie has put her country on the map. Everybody knew that Roumania was one of our numerous allies in the world war; but how many people knew very much more? Few Englishmen visit Bucharest or study the making of the kingdom by King Carol half a century ago. There is no longer an excuse for such ignorance. The Queen's volumes are delightfully easy to read. When we have finished them we find ourselves genuinely interested in the author and the people whom she has learned to love. The admirable photographs help us to visualise the scenes she describes. The second volume depicted Roumania during the last two decades of peace, when the heir apparent and his wife were kept in a gilded cage by the stern old ruler. For a woman with ideas of her own and throbbing with vitality it was a sore trial to be perpetually in leading strings, though, as she grew to maturity, her respect for King Carol's great qualities steadily increased. The third volume is the record of the use she made of her opportunities when her husband succeeded his uncle in the autumn of 1914, and when the war swept the little country into the vortex of world history. It is a thrilling story of service and suffering, based on a very full diary.

No contrast could be greater than between Carol and Ferdinand or between Ferdinand and his wife. Roumania's second King is a curiously pathetic figure, destined to a throne in a strange land without the aptitudes or the ambitions of a ruler. King Carol held all the threads firmly in his hand for nearly half a century, and his daily task engrossed his thoughts. King Ferdinand had been so repressed during the long years in which he was waiting for his call that, when the moment came, he remained the gentle, modest, colourless person he had always been. "Nando is not a man of action," writes his wife, and the truth of the verdict is confirmed by her story of Roumania during the war. In so far as the stricken people found a leader in the hour of its agony, it was not the shadowy Hohenzollern monarch but the full-blooded, energetic, strong-willed granddaughter of Queen Victoria. It was a joy to her to note his growing popularity despite the ill success of the war. "He is now loved and appreciated by his people. They have at last understood how honest, unselfish

* *The Story of My Life*. By Marie, Queen of Roumania. Vol. III. Cassell. 18s.
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THE EFFECTS OF THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN RECONCILIATION.

THE late M. Barthou remarked that the part of his policy that had met with least understanding and appreciation at the hands of his compatriots was the *rapprochement* between France and Soviet Russia. He added that it was at the same time the part of his policy that was the most pregnant with benefits. How did that change of front on both sides become possible? What made the *rapprochement* possible? And what are likely to be its consequences?

It may be said that in the period between the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and M. Herriot's trip to Russia in 1932 there reigned between France and Russia definite hostility; at first violent and open, thereafter less evident but none the less acute. The Soviet Union in the eyes of the French population is a symbol of various unpleasant things; of the renunciation of the alliance while the war was in full swing, and of the wilful destruction of modern civilisation. To the Bolshevik leaders France stands for the former accomplice of Tzarist tyranny and for the very incarnation of bourgeois capitalism. Was it not France that chiefly and almost alone supported the Denikins and Wrangels? Did she not welcome with open arms the Russian "Whites"? Did she not protect Poland, whose resistance to Muscovite invasion was led and electrified by General Weygand?

The result of this Franco-Russian hostility became visible from 1922 in the shape of a friendship between Russia and Germany which found its expression in the Treaty of Rapallo. Russian territory became available as a German arsenal; thanks to German credits and German technical means, Russia was enabled to surmount the difficulties due to lack of capital and to begin her process of industrialisation. The Reichswehr took in hand the task of training the Red Army and air-fleet. Even far more than American engineering, it was German engineering that trained the first Russian technicians. There were less political divergences between Russia and Germany than between her and the other European powers; Germany was then ruled or apparently ruled by the Social-democrats with supposedly Socialist aspirations; both powers detested the Versailles settlement and sought to overthrow it: the Reich in order to reconstruct

German greatness, Russia in order to activate the world revolution. This naturally contributed towards good relations. Yet, when all is said and done, these good relations led to few practical results save in the economic field, for Russia's army was not at that time capable of assuming the offensive and the country was absorbed entirely in the task of giving birth to a new order of things. Still, in intention, in general aims, Russia was revisionist and expansionist.

Such a collaboration between Berlin and Moscow could not but keep up Franco-Russian estrangement. The Soviet Union renewed diplomatic relations with Berlin, with Rome, even with London, before she did so with Paris. Rumania, France's ally, could not make up her mind till August 1934 to recognise the Soviet Government; Jugoslavia, France's other Balkan ally, has not yet done so. The *rapprochement* between Poland and Russia, which preceded the new phase of Franco-Russian relations, was not, at first, viewed with great favour in Paris. France tolerated rather than approved of a policy which she suspected of harbouring possibilities of revolutionary infection.

Two factors contributed to a complete reversal of the situation. In Russia itself a deep-going transformation took place. Not that the Soviet Union abandoned Communism, for what very slight signs there are of a possible gradual modification of the social order due to the rise of a new *élite* are in their infancy and indeed scarcely perceptible. But a very visible change took place in the attitude of the Communist State towards the whole of the capitalist powers. Its hopes of proselytising became feebler; it admits, haltingly perhaps and but temporarily, that universality is not a condition *sine qua non* of the continued existence of a Communist State. Moreover, a civic sense, something akin to what we call patriotism, is showing itself in Russia and is, at least as far as foreign affairs go, tempering the fighting ardour of Communism.

The Soviet Union, which had fondly dreamed of revolutionary expansion, now concentrated on preparations for the defence of its own territory. The Muscovite rulers are afraid of war to-day because they know their history and they realise that war has always been fatal to the rulers of Russia. The Napoleonic wars led to the Decembrist movement, the Crimean war imposed the reforms of Alexander II, the

Japanese war was followed by the bloody riots of 1905-6, and the world war ended by bringing the whole system of Tzardom to the ground. Wars, even victorious wars, have a way of leading to unpleasant consequences for Russian rulers. The longer the régime lasts, the stronger it becomes, the greater also becomes the fear of war. And yet this war is looming ahead as a grim possibility, looming ever nearer and nearer : war to the East as well as war to the West.

Russia tried to foster and profit by a Chinese rising ; that attempt failed. But she is becoming daily more convinced that it is merely a question of time before she will be at deadly grips with Japan, which, using Corea and Manchuria as bases, will seek to push the Russians away from the Pacific coast, to drive them out of Mongolia and to throw them back into Siberian fastnesses. Little confidence is to be gained from a study of the operations in 1904-5. Hence the policy of extreme conciliation followed by Russia towards Japan, a policy of untiring patience that has just found its crowning point in the sale of the Manchuria railway line ; but hence also the steady concentration of troops and war-planes on the Russo-Manchurian frontier and the rising fear of warlike complications between Moscow and Tokio.

The second factor that contributed to this revision of foreign values in Moscow was Germany. It is indeed a pregnant coincidence that the growing Russo-Japanese tension in the Far East comes at the same moment as the advent of Hitlerism in Germany. Hitler must be anathema in Moscow. Not only because Hitler is the sworn foe of Communism, not only because he is the oppressor of the Jews, who are still powerful in Russia, but because the new-fangled version of Germanism has designated the fertile plains of the Ukraine as the God-given field of German expansion. Herr Hugenberg stated it bluntly in his famous memorandum at the London conference last year ; less bluntly perhaps than Hitler states it himself in his book *Mein Kampf*. One might perhaps dismiss these literary emanations as impertinent effusions. One cannot dismiss the actions that give them substance. The recent *rapprochement* between Germany and Poland is for the Russians a clear writing on the wall. It is the prologue of a veritable crusade in which they are fondly condemned to play the rôle of Infidels to European civilisation.

The Soviet Union is threatened in the East. She is threatened in the West. These threats coincide in time. They are surely amply sufficient to warrant Russia passing from one camp into the other. She was revisionist : she is now anti-revisionist. She favoured the overthrow of the territorial order of Europe ; she now favours its maintenance. She has radically altered her course.

That alteration, of course, led Russia on to the same path as France, so that a reconciliation became natural. How did this possibility present itself to France ? How was she disposed to consider it ? It may be stated at once that the French Government from the very outset realised the necessity and the advantages of closer relations. But the great majority of the French nation was not of the same mind. This is hardly to be wondered at. Memories of the Red Terror that marked the birth of the new régime are still alive. The bourgeoisie and peasantry fear the Red contagion. The Russian *émigrés* in the course of years accumulated valuable sympathies in France. The ex-service men have not forgotten the great betrayal of Brest-Litovsk. The Left political groups undertook the task of making Russian friendship palatable to the people. M. Herriot set to work in this direction. M. Cot, at that time Air Minister, did likewise after his air-trip to Moscow in 1933.

The Russians, on their side, were not inactive. They were in a hurry. They wanted to jump instead of walking. They talked of an alliance and tried to induce M. Paul-Boncour to carry this talk into practice on a big scale. The French Foreign Minister did not agree to proceed so far nor so quickly, but he did initiate steps likely to lead to a *rapprochement*. When M. Barthou came to the Quai d'Orsay he found things in this condition. He continued the conversations that had already begun and, as was his wont, he very decidedly and quickly laid down the formulas he had in mind. Chief among these was that there should be no alliance, for that would have been contrary to the Barthou policy which moved within the orbit of the League of Nations and sought to prevent the formation of antagonistic groups of powers. Rather did he aim at a collective organisation of the Powers so as to consolidate the existing order of things. The basis for such an organisation was security rooted in mutual guarantees of frontiers and mutual engagements of

assistance should an attempt be made to disturb these frontiers.

That was M. Barthou's ruling principle, and he tried to apply it in that collection of suggested agreements that were to have constituted the Oriental Pacts. Bluntly stated, it was a project for an Eastern Locarno. Like the Locarno arrangement itself, the Eastern series of agreements was to be essentially in the interests of peace; the theory of French statesmen being that, since no power can be reasonably expected to be amputated of one of its provinces, any revision of existing frontiers must necessarily imply war. By agreeing to the inclusion in the pact of the three Baltic states, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Soviet Union implicitly abandoned any dream of extension in the direction of the Baltic coast. Similarly, Germany would by this means endorse abandonment of any schemes for the "Germanisation" of the Baltic states, and Poland that of possible annexationist designs on Lithuania. The inclusion of Czechoslovakia meant a second and formal recognition of an accomplished fact: the incorporation of the Carpathian and Slovakian districts in the Czechoslovak State. Poland's signature would have implied repudiation of territorial ambitions in the Ukraine, and that of the Soviet Union would have set the seal on her acceptance of the frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Riga. Finally, German assent would have confirmed the Reich's self-denying ordinance regarding the Polish Corridor and acceptance of the present Eastern frontiers.

The plan was, therefore, primarily one for the conservation of existing frontiers; it was a collective plan, open to all, in the execution of which victors and vanquished would have stood shoulder to shoulder. Had it come to pass, the peace of Europe would have been firmly seated on two unshakable pillars: the Locarno of the West and the Locarno of the East. And it would have been a peace acceptable to all and honourable for all. Any such plan to be effective must be rooted in the League of Nations, and for this reason it became indispensable that the Soviet Union should become a member of the League. Juridical chaos would have ensued had a member of the League pledged itself to render assistance to a non-member against another member, as would have been the case had France intervened in Russia's favour in the event of a Russo-German conflict.

The course of events is sufficiently known. Poland rejected the pact politely; Germany did so with a certain brusqueness. Both avowed their preference for bilateral pacts. There has been seen in this attitude something equivalent to a reaffirmation of territorial ambitions. Great though these obstacles were, they had not discouraged the indomitable M. Barthou, and at the moment when he was assassinated he was preparing to reopen the conversations and to reply to the Polish and German objections. The *pourparlers* were to continue. They are continuing.

These conversations may not lead to any result. They may fail to persuade Poland and Germany; or it may be merely Germany. In that case the great plan will remain a plan. Would it be possible to replace it by some arrangement of more limited scope? To vary the question: will the Franco-Russian *entente* remain a simple project, or if not, what form is it to assume?

France does not contemplate a return to the old pre-war Russian alliance. It would run counter to the whole spirit of present-day French diplomacy, and French public opinion would be against it, for it would fear lest fraternity in the foreign field might lead to awkward intimacies in internal politics. While that is so, it remains none the less certain that the Franco-Russian *entente*, on a much more modest scale, will be put into practice, for it has become an absolute necessity for both powers concerned. It is a necessity for Russia because she must secure the possible assistance of the pacific Powers, among which France stands in the front rank, in order to discourage plans for a recasting of the map of Europe, and particularly for an "Eastern colonisation," that have been put forward insistently by National Socialist writers and orators and which might be made to appear to the harassed German people as a remedy against the economic crisis from which it is suffering more and more acutely. Moreover, Soviet Russia must take every precaution against possible joint offensive adventures by Germany and Japan. Since Moscow is exposed to pressure from Germany, Moscow is bound to look around for possible support, and can only find it in France.

For France a reconciliation with Russia is a thing totally different from what it was in 1892 or what the Russian alliance was till 1917. Geographical conditions have radically

and loyal he is." It was inevitable that such a feminine nature should turn for counsel and encouragement to the more masculine and buoyant personality of his wife, and equally inevitable that the world should believe that she swayed her husband's policy. In an analysis of her own character in the first chapter she disclaims the desire to dominate, though she confesses that she had "something of the joyful warrior who never shuns a fight." No reader of this book can doubt that she was indeed a bonny fighter.

The story opens with the death of the old Queen, Carmen Sylva, who lived in a fantastic and embroidered world of her own imagination. The new King, as a Hohenzollern and an ex-officer in the German army, was naturally German in sympathy, and he shared the conviction of the Kings of Bulgaria and Greece that German arms were invincible. But he was far too loyal to his adopted land, as well as too lacking in self-assertion, to oppose the demand for intervention on the side of the allies. It is true that Roumania had been secretly allied to the Central Powers ever since 1883; but the people knew nothing of the pact, and only by the defeat of Austria could the dream of Greater Roumania, above all of the conquest of Transylvania, be realised. The chapter entitled "The Decision for War" vividly describes the fateful Council in August 1916 which determined to take the plunge, and portrays the agony of spirit which the declaration of war caused the King. Once resolved, however, that it was his duty to bow to the wishes of the majority of his advisers he never looked back, bearing in dignified silence the attacks hurled at the renegade Hohenzollern from Vienna and Berlin.

Roumania was crumpled up in the twinkling of an eye by the superior equipment and fighting qualities of the Central Powers, whom she had so rashly challenged by her declaration of war. The Royal Family fled to Jassy, where the remains of the shattered army held on to the northern fringe of the country. For a time it was possible to hope that Russia would come to her aid; but in 1917 the colossus with its feet of clay came toppling to the ground. The chapters which describe these months of torment are the finest in the book, and the descriptions of the author's work in the hospitals, copied from her diary, bring home to the reader once more the unspeakable horrors of war. It was now, after more than twenty years of residence in her adopted home, that she took

Roumania to her heart. "I feel myself," she wrote, "the mother of an enormous family." When the King, Bratiano, Averescu and all the leading men in the country had virtually given up hope, she retained her passionate faith in the ultimate triumph of the Allies. The story ends with the triumphant return to Bucharest in the memorable autumn of 1918, after two years of such overwhelming experiences as only the Queen of the Belgians among crowned heads could match.

G. P. G.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF A BIOLOGIST.*

The distinction of Dr. J. S. Haldane as a biologist is well known. He is also a highly competent philosopher. He has, therefore, made a welcome and valuable contribution to systematic thought in his recently published volume, *The Philosophy of a Biologist*.

In his preface, Professor Haldane acknowledges his indebtedness to British post-Kantian and post-Hegelian thought; particularly to T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley. He claims, however, that while in this sense his book may be regarded as idealistic, yet "in a deeper sense it is, as will be seen, wholly realistic, since it treats the universe as depicted by the sciences, not as 'mere appearance,' but as the real universe imperfectly depicted." After discussing "the fundamental conceptions applicable in the sciences, and more particularly in biology and psychology," Professor Haldane seeks to show "that religion is no mere revelation from without, but enters into the whole of our experience as the direct revelation in it of God." The book is, therefore, divided into four main chapters, dealing successively with Philosophy and Physical Science, Philosophy and Biology, Philosophy and Psychology, and Philosophy and Religion.

The author gives a lucid account of the principles upon which the special sciences are based. These rise from those that physical science assumes, which are legitimate for the limited purposes of physical science, though inadequate to the explanation of reality as a whole. Biological assumptions contribute something higher to world-explanation, and

* *The Philosophy of a Biologist*. By J. S. Haldane, C.H., M.D., F.R.S. Clarendon Press. 6s. net.

altered. There is no common frontier any more between Germany and Russia. Poland interposes between them, and without Polish co-operation no effective action of the Red Army against Germany is conceivable. Polish sanction for the passage of the Red Army through her territory is exceedingly doubtful, for she no doubt fears that once there, the Russians would be difficult to get rid of.

It is evident, therefore, that from the purely military point of view a Franco-Russian *entente* in 1935 could not be expected to have the same effectiveness as the Franco-Russian alliance of 1892. But partial effectiveness is perfectly conceivable. It should be remembered that the Soviet air-force is admirably trained for work at long distances. Even if the Russian army were prevented from active intervention, the Russian "*potentiel*," so far as industry is concerned, would weigh very heavily in the scales. The efficiency of Russian industry is great, and it could render immense services to the powers of the Little Entente whose possibilities in the way of manufacturing munitions and war material are very limited. There is the further factor that a benevolent attitude of Russia would have a liberating influence on these Governments of the Little Entente since it would ensure their full security in the flank and rear. This, particularly in the case of Rumania, would enable them to align the whole of their forces elsewhere. The goodwill even of a neutral Russia would be of singular advantage to these powers.

The benefits of a Franco-Russian *entente* must be sought not only in the military, but especially in the diplomatic field. If this *entente* comes to pass—and it is to-day in a fair way of coming to pass—it will at least for some time to come give an element of dependable permanency to Russian policy. A Russo-German partnership would represent a very definite danger, for in the disruption of Poland it would find an historic ground of action ready prepared. Tradition, similar tendencies towards expansion, the absence of a natural frontier: these are elements that might well lead to the two Powers coming together again in a common lust of division of the spoils. If she were abandoned to herself, Russia might well return to her ancient policy. She did so at Rapallo, and she might do so again. The hand that is extended in friendship to-day must be grasped, for to-morrow it might be withdrawn. The biggest advantage of a Franco-Russian

entente is that it is an alternative and an antidote to a Russo-German *entente*.

There are other advantages of a minor, but by no means negligible, nature. Instances may be given. The encouragements given by Moscow to Angora have been a powerful factor in shaping the conciliatory attitude displayed by Kemal Pasha. The formation of the Balkan Union, which is essentially a work of peace, was indirectly but efficaciously favoured by Soviet Russia.

In conclusion, it cannot now be denied that the admission of Soviet Russia into the League of Nations, which was the necessary preliminary to a Franco-Russian *rapprochement*, has been and is to general advantage. The creators of the League had wished for Russia's membership. Deprived of American co-operation, abandoned, at least temporarily, by Japan and Germany, the Geneva institution was on the best way to lose gradually that character of universality which it must preserve if it is to live and which is the surest guarantor of peace. Russia's admission has redressed the balance and extended the League's sway over a whole continent. Since the Soviet Union to-day stands for peace, its influence at Geneva can only be beneficent.

Such are the considerations which, in the mind of the French Government, prevailed over all the disadvantages which might attach to a *rapprochement* with a Power administered by a régime not only different from but entirely opposite to that of France, and a Power withal which represents not only a Government but a Faith. The fear can never be altogether absent lest diplomatic co-operation entail dangers of social contamination. But there are after all two sides even to that medal. It is permitted to cherish the hope that to open up to the Soviet Union the family of nations and to enable her to lead a normal life may contribute to preparing her return to a mode of existence less exceptional than it is to-day. Frankly, the chances for such an evolution are but slight. But there are observers who believe they perceive the first signs of it. Were that process to be accelerated, the Franco-Russian *entente* that to-day looms ahead would be more than a well-inspired political operation: it would become an event of beneficent importance for humanity.

FRÉDÉRIC SABATIER.

psychological conceptions approach more nearly to a satisfactory account of experience. Yet all these are incomplete. They need to be brought into consistency with one another. It is the task of philosophy to effect this reconciliation, and having done justice to all the sciences in this ascending order of importance, to furnish an interpretation of the universe which shall be satisfactory to reason by exhibiting reality as an organic whole, explicable only in the light of personality and of its highest values.

In the fulfilment of this task, it must be recognised that "the whole world of our physical experience is a world of perceived experience, and non-existent apart from perception, though not merely individual perception. In this sense it is not outside of us, and in imagining the remotest depths of space and time we are only realising what belongs to our own world of perception" (page 28). When this point of view is accepted the immensity of the physical universe, instead of belittling, exalts the significance of man, in whose experience alone is the universe revealed. If this be true of physics, it is still more evident in the case of biology and psychology.

The statement that the universe is "non-existent apart from perception, *though not merely individual perception*," prepares the way for the concluding discussion of philosophy and religion. The search for truth, the perception of beauty, the recognition of goodness, tend to become common to mankind. Yet they are not created by man, but revealed in the personal experience of men and, therefore, of mankind. Hence we realise the existence of all-embracing personality or God, present to and in individual personality, and in perceptions which can be regarded as those of all-embracing personality, so that they are not merely valid or true from one personality among others, but from all personalities" (page 114). To sum up. Reality is experienced. Experience depends upon personality. All subordinate conceptions, while useful to the special sciences, are abstractions from the full content of personality as percipient of reality. Yet personality is not merely individual. There is a commonwealth of personalities who are endowed with the capacity to seek and enjoy the values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. This commonwealth receives and does not create these values. They can only proceed from and be revealed by the all-embracing personality, who is God. Such is the weighty argument which is

presented with great lucidity and with up-to-date knowledge. Space does not permit any detailed consideration of the issues that are raised. It must suffice to pay a tribute to the distinguished author and to bespeak for his volume the careful consideration it richly deserves.

J. S. L.

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JOHN BRIGHT AND THE QUAKERS.*

The publishers claim that their author's investigations "will shatter many an ancient prejudice." But it is modern prejudice rather than ancient which clouds John Bright's memory to-day; the fact that he was a "mid-Victorian" of the Free Trade Manchester School, sharing the fallacies and prejudices of other Lancashire millowners who advocated *laissez-faire* at all costs, even to opposing Lord Shaftesbury's Factory Acts. That he was a model employer of those times hardly excuses him to a generation inclined to suspect his passion for political freedom in an economic system which fails to provide its basis, and to ignore the major inspiration of his crusade against the Corn Laws, which was not economic theory but grief at his young wife's death and Cobden's appeal under its shadow, for homes "where mothers and children are dying of hunger."

That his greatest allegiance was not to any class or party, but to Quaker principles, is stressed and proved by Mr. Travis Mills, who portrays in the first volume Bright's spiritual ancestors and the restricted outlook which circumstances and seclusion imposed on their Victorian descendants. Bright himself deplored "the tests and observances" by which Friends were shackling their diminishing Society. Since the days of Fox they had been persecuted and imprisoned, excluded like other Nonconformists from the universities and public office. It was this "ancient prejudice" (which Englishmen to-day cannot realise, having never experienced its blighting effects) that John Bright did so much to dissipate. Through him Nonconformity spoke at last in Parliament; and his voice was not only that of a supreme orator whose greatest utterances form a portion of our literature, but the authentic voice of the Quaker, who

* By J. Travis Mills. Methuen. 25s.

DEMOCRACY IN SWEDEN.

WHY is it that Scandinavian democracy functions, and functions well, at a time when in most other countries it is either dead or moribund? That is one of the fundamental questions that cannot but strike even the most casual observer who happens to visit Northern Europe. In politics, just as in ladies' dresses or in modern philosophy, there are fashions that come and go and nobody quite knows why. It has become fashionable to assert of late that democracy is inefficient, stupid and corrupt, in fact that it is completely played out, and that a régime of "authority" (in black, brown, or red shirts) is the only salvation from the destructive effects of parliamentarism. And all of a sudden you see a country, Sweden, where the very reverse is true. Here democracy is full of vitality, it acts instead of merely talking and criticising; it is constructive, cautious and in the widest sense of the word conservatively progressive. Furthermore, in this respect Sweden is not alone; in Denmark the position is almost identical, and Norway seems to be gravitating to a similar state of affairs. In fact, the development and consolidation of democracy in the Scandinavian countries is striking and undeniable. And it is essential to realise that the bearers of the democratic idea are no longer the bourgeois liberals, or a radical intelligentsia, but primarily workmen, peasants and the lower middle classes. This makes it particularly interesting and original.

An important reason why democracy is so successful in these countries is, of course, the fact that the Left is privileged to enjoy singularly able, honest and vigorous leadership. These men are not dry theorists and really do not care a scrap about what Karl Marx said, or what some of the other socialist gods wrote to each other. The Swedish socialist leaders are eminently practical men, they are realists, and they are nationally minded. Most of them are disciples and former colleagues of the late Hjalmar Branting, a very remarkable man and a very great statesman, whose influence is still strongly felt in the present-day politics of the country. The result is a Cabinet of personalities, mostly of very humble origin (they are proud of it), who sit side by side with scholars and learned professors. Mr. Per Albin Hansson (the Premier), Mr. Sandler (Foreign Minister), and Professor Undén (Minister

without portfolio), are its leading members. In Denmark the venerable Mr. Stauning has also established a long and successful record as Prime Minister.

But leadership alone, essential though it is, could never be the sole reason for the expansion of democracy in the Scandinavian countries. A most important factor is that of national character. It has often been asserted, before democracy went out of fashion, that there are some countries that are ripe for it, whereas certain others as yet are not. Presumably, the meaning of this would be that the moral development of the latter category of countries must also eventually tend towards democracy. But events of recent years seem to indicate fairly clearly that this is not so, and that one must distinguish between countries to whom freedom and liberty are congenial and those to whom they are not. A glance at Swedish history and even the most superficial acquaintance with Swedish mentality leave no possible doubt as to the Swedes' democratic propensities.

To begin with, they have never been serfs, nor have they ever indulged in any slave trade. That alone raises them above most of the other nations. The Swedish peasants, who even to-day represent two-thirds of the population and until the recent industrial development constituted an even larger proportion of the population, have always been free and have always taken an active part in the affairs of the State. From the first Swedish parliament onwards (it met in 1435 and will celebrate its 500th jubilee this year) the peasants have occupied a conspicuous position in every Riksdag. It was a peasant rising that liberated Sweden in 1434, under the leadership of Engelbrekt, from the Danish yoke. It was with a peasant army that Gustaf Wasa, the creator of the Swedish State, finally threw out the Danes in 1521. Gustavus Adolphus saw in his fight against the Roman Catholic Church a divine mission in the cause of liberty. When in 1905 Norway finally broke away, and did so in a somewhat provocative manner, Sweden agreed to this separation—the union had been a personal one through the King, who ruled over both countries—and behaved with calm dignity and in a thoroughly democratic spirit. Again, after the war, Sweden accepted in the fairest and astoundingly conciliating way the League of Nations' decision in the delicate and vexatious Åland Islands question. A fascist or nationalist government might have seen

understood religious liberty more profoundly than others. With an elevation of spirit that the author reveals, he advocated the right of Roman Catholic Ireland to be relieved of a Protestant State Church; the right of Mr. Bradlaugh the atheist to sit in the House of Commons; the right of Pope Pius IX to install his Archbishop at Westminster; the right of Dissenters to be buried as such in parish graveyards; and finally, the right of Irish Protestants to oppose Home Rule—a recognition which Home Rulers have since been forced to acknowledge. The account of Bright's peace advocacy is illuminating. He did not advocate "peace at any price," but "upon grounds common to all thoughtful men, upon grounds of expediency." He was "a political, not an ecclesiastical, Quaker." His condemnation of the Crimean War was based on what he regarded then and later as the criminal futility and injustice of supporting, through unjustified fear of Russia, the empire of the Turkish Sultan. He thereby provoked public indignation and was burned in effigy in his constituency; but posterity has echoed his verdict. Quaker sympathy with the abolition of slavery induced him alone among public men to support the northern States at the outbreak of the American Civil War. Conscious of "the confusion of politics," where the only choice may be the lesser evil, he admitted that war could be such, although he loathed it with all his soul. In opposition to Palmerston and Disraeli and what he termed "that ghastly phantom, the Balance of Power," he often advocated non-intervention. Even loyalty to Mr. Gladstone and his reforms could not prevent his resigning from the Cabinet in 1882, when Alexandria was bombarded by British guns; and in explaining his resignation to the House he epitomised his persistent challenge to contemporaries.

I have endeavoured from time to time to teach my countrymen an opinion and doctrine which I hold, which is that the moral law is intended not only for individual life, but is intended also for the life and practice of States.

Just as Penn had suggested a Confederation of Europe with a joint army to maintain the peace, so Bright favoured a similar "armed police" for the sea, when "the maritime nations of Europe . . . may see that those vast fleets are of no use."

The disappointment he caused to many adherents in his later life is explained by the fact that "once justice was done,

once the particular evils were remedied which he set out to remedy, the latent conservatism of his nature immediately showed itself." In his enthusiasm for "a balanced constitution," and the implications of political freedom, he was "akin to Burke," whose language he rivalled. The sovereign whom he venerated appreciated his worth; beneath his pillow as he lay dying was a letter from Queen Victoria thanking him for his services.

Mr. Travis Mills has provided a mine of information for fellow Quakers, and a labour of love. With Professor Trevelyan's classic biography it might form the basis of a brief study, in which John Bright is focused afresh for the benefit of a generation that misses his significance.

D. P. H.

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LAW AND PURPOSE IN THE EMPIRE.*

After a period of singular neglect, the constitution of the Union of South Africa has received comprehensive treatment by Professor W. P. M. Kennedy and Mr. H. J. Schlosberg in *The Law and Custom of the South African Constitution*. This work should meet a practical need in the dominion and will doubtless be accepted by all students of constitutional law as the standard work upon its subject. It is written with great clarity and in treatment combines, upon an historical background, commentary with exposition. The authors are anxious to refrain from purely academic issues or from discoursing upon problems yet to arise. Upon the right of secession, for example, much has been written and more said. The authors regard it simply as a political question. "In the theory of law no dominion can declare itself free from the control of the British parliament." But "in a time of political revolution theories of law go by the board, and no purpose would be served by discussing them here." The claim to neutrality, however, in a war by the United Kingdom or another dominion, so fervently urged by General Hertzog, deserves more than such summary treatment. The juridical status of the Union in international law would inevitably arise in the event of war.

* (1) *The Law and Custom of the South African Constitution*. Oxford University Press. 36s. net. (2) *The Empire in These Days*. Macmillan. 7s. 6d. net.

a *casus belli* in the attributing of a territory with a 95 per cent. Swedish population to another country, i.e. Finland.

But such is the Swedish national character. They hate the very spirit of compulsion. Idealism, humanity and freedom are very real sentiments with them, which they feel instinctively. That is also one of the main reasons why they so thoroughly disapprove of fascism and nationalism. The Swedes are practical and sentimental. "A race of lyrical engineers" somebody once called them. They certainly have a quite remarkable aptitude for engineering, and also for making new inventions. It is amazing how many things they actually have discovered, and these range from dynamite to steam turbines! Perhaps they are a little slow and reticent, a bit heavy and awkward (they themselves realise this and suffer from it), not particularly humorous and not very temperamental, but they can become quite ebullient when something happens to strike their inner chords. And this hidden fire suddenly flares up when something happens to wound their sense of fair play, or decency, or humanitarian spirit. It is characteristic of the Swedes that the Kreuger scandal filled the whole nation with a sense of burning personal shame. But there is one thing that makes free intercourse with them rather difficult at times: they are exasperatingly touchy! This is probably one of their worst faults; like all human beings, they also have others. All of these, however, are strongly outweighed by their great qualities.

Reverting to the question of fascism and nationalism, it must be said that the former—despite frantic efforts, especially among the young—plays no part in Swedish public life, except perhaps a ridiculous one. Furthermore, it is divided into several groups and clans that are all busy fighting each other. The events of June 30th in Germany have completely deflated that movement, and it has also covered itself with shame and ridicule by a hoaxed attempt on the life of one of its members—an obvious effort to create a Swedish Horst Wessel. The programme of the nationalists or conservatives does include, of course, certain reactionary elements, but it is not really extremist. The recent communal or Landsting elections have proved that the Swedish people have no use for that sort of thing. In fact, these elections have shown a state of affairs that is almost unprecedented in any country, namely that the Government, after two years of office, not

merely lost no votes but very substantially increased them. That, especially after two such difficult years, and in view of the prevailing world tendency to the extremes of Right and Left, is a true triumph for the Swedish Social Democratic Government.

It would be idle to pretend that the development of the democratic idea in Sweden has proceeded without conflict or irritation. Despite the fact that her democracy is old, her present form of parliamentary system is young, and only dates back to 1918. The struggle of democracy, under the leadership of Karl Staaff, against the crown and conservatism began a long time before the war. But it was in 1918 that the so-called "Democratic break-through" took place and pure parliamentarism became the established régime. To-day the crown is entirely democratic and works in close and harmonious co-operation with the Riksdag and the socialists, who are now its largest single party. No one has a clear majority. Perhaps one day the socialists will have. But for the present they are relying upon the support of the Peasant Party, which is not represented in the cabinet but co-operates with it, especially in agricultural matters and in the very successful fight against unemployment.

This anti-unemployment drive of the government was for a long time delayed by a serious strike in the building industry. Its settlement last February, however, was followed by the immediate development of considerable activity in building and associated industries. Great demand was created for bricks, cement, tiles, woodwork, furniture, glass, iron and similar commodities. This in its turn favourably affected many other trades, and the result was the reabsorption of a large number of workmen into production. It is a remarkable fact that the present employment figures in Sweden are the highest recorded for this particular period of the year since 1920. In the textile, iron and steel industries conditions are especially favourable, while all the other industrial groups—with the exception of the chemico-technical one—show more than moderately good employment. The number of unemployed has fallen to just under 60,000, which is substantially lower than in any of the recent years, but none the less shows that despite the progress achieved in that direction, the problem of finding work has not yet been entirely solved even in Sweden.

The authority of Professor Kennedy upon the practice and theory of the Canadian federal system makes the chapters upon the provincial governments of the Union of particular interest. In contrast with the other provinces, Natal was strongly opposed to a centralised system and the South Africa Act of 1909 evolved a unique compromise between the unitary and federal types of constitutions. While the powers of the central government are unlimited, the local authority exercises functions comparable with those in the Canadian Provinces or Australian States. Representing at once the Union government and the local electorate, the provincial authority has been rendered frequently impotent by the clash of interests. The provincial administrator, appointed for a term of years by the Union cabinet, presides over an executive committee which is drawn from, but independent of, the legislative council. The popular body is largely dependent upon the administrator, who alone can introduce financial measures and who also receives grants direct from the central government. The system exhibits no sign of the Parliamentary type. It is rather a curious mixture of the American presidential system of an elected executive and the separation of powers and the Swiss constitution of a non-political executive subject to an elected assembly. It is, through historical accident, "a foreign innovation, a hybrid conglomeration" which ill conforms with the ordinary English Cabinet system at the centre. The need for reform is generally agreed. Professor Kennedy would not substitute the Canadian federation in which, he complains, taxation is excessive and national legislation is handicapped by provincial rights. At all events, in South Africa the mass of sentiment favours unity, and, as the authors suggest, reform is more likely to rationalise the existing system by making, for example, the executive committee responsible to the legislative council.

The final attainment of complete autonomy and the approximation of theory to practice, common to all the dominions, though particularly urged by the Union and the Irish Free State, has marked the peculiarly rapid constitutional progress of the post-war years. The principle of self-determination was recognised by the Imperial Conference in 1926 and since 1930 the right of direct advice between the Crown and a dominion has been granted. Finally in 1931 the

Imperial Parliament vested in the dominion legislatures full legal authority and reiterated the constitutional convention of its non-intervention without consent.

The Union, more anxious over form than the older dominions, has incorporated her new legal powers in the South Africa Act. The power of the Governor-General to reserve bills, for example, has been abolished except in regard to legislation dealing with Privy Council appeals. It is difficult to appreciate the value of retaining any power of reservation which must be exercised by a ministry responsible to the very legislature which passed the measure.

This work is strictly confined to the constitutional aspect, and a discussion of the political nature and function of the Empire in the modern world will be found in a series of lectures and essays by Professor R. Coupland, entitled *The Empire in These Days*. His approach is historical, as is natural to the author of the *British Empire and the American Revolution*. Trusteeship has been the keynote of the second Empire. The dominions have now reached the final stage of their growth, and the author urges the more positive participation in the cause of peace of the whole Commonwealth which, he argues, is far stronger than the League of Nations. India is compared, historically, with the dominions in their penultimate stage. With the help of personal knowledge, Professor Coupland discusses at length the condition of the African colonies and considers that the principle of trusteeship for the natives is threatened by economic exploitation. While some of the author's conclusions will be challenged, his book is a valuable, if discursive, contribution to the study of the Empire's character.

SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

In *Friendly Relations** Mr. Beckles Willson tells the story of the British Ministers and Ambassadors to the United States with the aid of new material. The relations of the two countries have been so friendly during the present century that it is difficult to realise how strained and unpleasant they used to be. The first chapter, on George Hammond, who crossed the Atlantic in 1791, is one of the most interesting, and none of his successors had quite such a disagreeable task. That the post was considered one of minor importance is suggested by

* Lovat Dickson. 158.

An important member of the Swedish Cabinet recently observed to the present writer that it was wrong to attribute too much credit for Sweden's remarkable recovery from both the world and the Kreuger crises to her government, and that a great deal has happened for reasons over which he and his colleagues have had no control. Whether this excessive modesty is justified or not, the present prosperity of the country remains quite astounding. According to League of Nations statistics, Sweden occupies the first place among all the nations as far as the expansion of production is concerned; from mid-1933 to mid-1934 her production rose no less than 31·8 per cent. It is true that thanks to the exceptionally fortunate natural foundations of her economic superstructure, Sweden benefits in a particular degree from every improvement in world trade, since her main exports, viz. timber, pulp, paper, iron ore and high-class steel products are among the first to be favourably affected. But to this must be added the very wise and cautious monetary policy of the Riksbank—Sweden abandoned the gold standard a few days after this country did—which has made it possible to derive every advantage from a devalued currency, and at the same time build up a very strong position for the krona. Indeed, the accumulation of gold and foreign currencies at the Riksbank is such that if the rate were not deliberately pegged to sterling, on the strength of its cover alone the krona should stand at a substantial premium. It is, however, extremely unlikely that Sweden will abandon the Sterling Club, since she has gained a great deal by belonging to it. Her foreign trade has been continuously growing in volume, and despite the increased importation of industrial raw products, her balance of trade for 1934 is more favourable than during the four previous years. The total turnover is back to that of 1931, and prices are approximately on the same level.

All these factors give Sweden to-day a unique position not only among the other countries of Northern Europe, but in the world in general. And it is particularly gratifying to the present author, who in the hour of Sweden's greatest moral and economic distress, ventured to write in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW in November 1932 that "Sweden in 1932 has been severely shaken, but she has survived in a remarkable way. Unless the world crisis crushes everything, the country seems to be on the eve of a new era of successful political and

economic development." During the last few months of 1934 Sweden's marvellous economic recovery seems to have assumed a somewhat slower pace. A turn in the present wave of prosperity is hardly in sight, but there is no doubt that in certain aspects something like saturation point has nearly been reached. The extreme liquidity of the banks clearly shows that it is becoming increasingly difficult to employ money profitably at the present low rates of interest. In that respect, of course, Sweden has to contend with the same problems as, for instance, this country; but there things have actually gone so far that the banks no longer accept fresh deposits. Hundreds of million kronor are lying idle, and yields on government and industrial bonds have reached quite unprecedented low levels. When the Government offered for subscription a 3½ per cent. loan of 70 million kronor at 99, within half an hour five times that amount had been subscribed. The Finnish 4½ per cent. loan issued in Stockholm by a group of banks was ten times over-subscribed in twenty minutes. Money is simply rushing into bonds of this type, yet the share market appears somewhat neglected despite its not inconsiderable attractions. All through 1934 the Stockholm bourse index has been rising, and most shares are to-day substantially higher than twelve months ago. But the turnover is relatively small, and, in the words of the quarterly report of the *Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget*, "it seems that the unsettled times have debarred people from making investments in shares, which in view of the low level of interest would otherwise have been alluring." Incidentally, it is worth noting that this bank, which was more involved in the Kreuger crash than the others, has had a spectacular recovery, and that its shares have trebled their value within something like a year, standing to-day well over par again.

Indeed, the Kreuger crash is hardly ever mentioned at all. Occasional reports of legal proceedings that are still taking place; or the reappearance of Kreuger's brother Torsten, who was recently released from prison and appears to consider himself the victim of a kind of legal vendetta; or the movements of some of the more spectacular figures concerned in clearing up the complicated affairs of the former industrial and financial giant, attract a little curiosity. But on the whole, as far as the general public is concerned, the whole business is as dead as the late Match King himself. It is worth mentioning,

the fact that for the first half-century we find no name of outstanding importance except that of Stratford Canning, then at the opening of his eventful diplomatic career. With Lord Lyons and the Civil War we reach more familiar ground. The chapter on Sackville West, who represented us at Washington in the eighties, is enriched by quotations from his privately printed memoirs, which describe in detail the well-known episode of his expulsion as a penalty for an incautious letter. The hero of the book is Lord Pauncefoot, the first Ambassador as well as the first lawyer to hold the post. His successor, Sir Robert Lindsay, assures us in a Foreword that "that great diplomatist" made things easier for all who came after him. The closing chapters are devoted to the failure of Durand, the success of Bryce, the trials of Spring Rice during the war, and the less exacting labours of our post-war representatives. This well-illustrated volume conveys a great deal of curious and interesting information in a very readable form.

At a time when the legal validity of the New Deal in the United States is being widely challenged, Professor Edward S. Corwin's brilliant and provocative little book, *The Twilight of the Supreme Court*,* is of particular importance. This volume, which contains the Storrs Lectures for 1934, aims to relate the development of the Constitution, as principally expounded by the Supreme Court, to the constitutional character of President Roosevelt's Recovery Programme. Professor Corwin concludes that "the Supreme Court is vested with substantially complete freedom of choice whether to sustain or overturn the New Deal." The doctrine of judicial review enables the Court to veto any legislation which conflicts with its own interpretation of the Constitution. The Court has become, as Professor Corwin and others complain, an overriding, if negative, legislative body in which the social and economic views of nine judges have come to prevail over the national will. Untrammelled by any strict rule of precedent, it has, however, provided the Constitution with a flexibility and power of growth which has largely reflected contemporary thought and policy. The author discusses the growth of judicial review and deals in particular with the interpretation of the famous "inter-State commerce" and "due process of law" clauses, through which the Court maintained in the latter part of the nineteenth century the prevalent doctrine of *laissez-faire*. The movement in favour of State interference and supervision, however, has been recognised in some of the more recent decisions of the Court, and Professor Corwin contends that the whole trend of constitutional law should be in favour of accepting the new principles, as exemplified in the New Deal. The theory of dual federalism is now being superseded in the light of modern conditions by the earlier doctrine of Hamilton and Marshall, which subordinated the States to

* Yale University Press, \$2.50; Oxford University Press, 11s. 6d. net.

the Sovereign Federal Power. The rigidity of the rule of vested right is being relaxed by the Court in favour of social welfare. Moreover, "our constitutional law and theory to-day ascribes to the President an indefinite range of 'inherent' powers," while the spending power of Congress and the Executive are unlimited in their range. Indeed Professor Corwin declares that such power of appropriation "goes far to envelop the entire institution of judicial review, as well as its product, constitutional law, in an atmosphere of unreality, even of futility." It is, doubtless, this that explains the title of his book.

Australia and England,* by Dr. Henry L. Hall, contains an important and original study upon the development of Australian thought and opinion behind the actual stages to Dominion status which have been so frequently discussed. The author traces in a period of "confused and somewhat blind groping" the many ideas and projects advanced to make the claims of national development compatible with membership of the Empire. This wish to reconcile liberty with authority prompted such schemes as Duffy's plan of neutrality in 1869, Imperial Federation and representation in the British Parliament. The recurrent agitation for separation, initiated in the forties by the fiery Presbyterian minister, Dunmore Lang, was, says Dr. Hall, largely due to the separatists' "inability to envisage a community of nations," and was contributed to by the contemporary English view of the colonies as tiresome and burdensome appendages. Britain's foreign policy and her control of the navy for long aroused suspicion and dislike; but, the author points out, they eventually played a large part, especially in the pre-war years, in inducing Australia to preserve the connection as the safer course. Most of the material used in this work is derived from contemporary speeches and particularly from the Press, which Dr. Hall properly recognises as attempting to influence as well as representing the trend of public opinion. At all events the newspapers "must have kept the problem of imperial relations before the public."

The pivotal position of Mongolia in the relations of Russia and Japan becomes clear from Mr. Owen Lattimore's new and significant work upon *The Mongols of Manchuria*,† to which he has brought his great knowledge and experience of Asiatic affairs. He describes the Mongolian tribal divisions and their geographical distribution and discusses at length the historical background, with particular reference to the Manchu Empire and Chinese penetration, which is essential for a proper appreciation of the Mongol outlook. By creating Manchukuo in 1931 and setting up on its Western frontier the semi-autonomous Mongol province of Hsingan, Japan has set in motion, as Mr. Lattimore points out, a far-reaching Mongol policy. It has provided the focus for a unification of all Inner Mongolia, hitherto under Chinese assimilation,

* Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

† Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d. net.

however, and incidentally a striking proof of the present author's original contention about Kreuger being a great constructive genius as well as a crook, that all his industrial companies are doing quite well again. The Boliden gold-mine has exceeded all expectations, and even the Match Trust seems to have seen the worst and to be gradually recovering.

There is an atmosphere of prosperity and happiness about Sweden; unlike most other countries to-day, these people are content. At least they have every reason to be, for they are in a singularly fortunate position. Their very smallness is an advantage, both internally and externally. The machine of state cannot become so great and unwieldy there as it invariably does in larger countries. And they are not involved in any of the major international issues, which enables them to take a detached view and exercise a most welcome moral influence. Here there is a great point of similarity between all the Scandinavian countries, and the realisation of this fact undoubtedly has greatly contributed to their recent somewhat spectacular *rapprochement*.

With the present state of affairs in the world, they must feel particularly keenly a similarity of fate and also a similarity of interest, both political and economic. England is their great problem: how to go on selling to this country, and whether they can rely on British assistance in case they ever did get dragged into some international complications, which needless to say, for their part, they are determined to avoid. People who pretend to be knowledgeable assert that some of these questions were discussed when Mr. Anthony Eden paid a visit to the three Scandinavian capitals last autumn. Officially, at any rate, this was stated to be a purely private visit, an act of friendship and a gesture of reaffirmation of solidarity between the Scandinavian democracies and this country. Whether this visit had any deeper causes or purposes—and that only a person well in the secrets of the gods can say—its significance, even on its face value alone, is quite considerable. England's friendly relations with the three Scandinavian countries are so firmly established that they hardly call for a discussion. They are one of the few traditional, definite and constant features in an otherwise unstable and continuously changing political world. Friendships are not so easily made: they must be looked after and handled both delicately and intelligently. Especially when your friend

also happens to be your best customer—as England is to Sweden—or when the friend is doing his utmost to become a good customer, as Sweden is doing with England. These economic considerations are a very strong tie between the two countries, although by no means the only one.

Both national character and the political organisation of England and Sweden have a great deal in common. Allowing for local idiosyncrasies, such vital characteristics as a strong sense of duty, reticence, poise, a certain instinctive conservatism in private life combined with an equally instinctive belief in the fundamentals of political democracy, are shared by Swede and Englishman alike. In this respect it is important to emphasise that all the Scandinavian countries, and especially Sweden, have firmly resisted all temptations of solving any of their problems (whether due to the world crisis or local conditions) by any deviations from established constitutional and democratic lines. There is nothing their socialist rulers resent more than the accusation of class dictatorship or of partisan spirit. And they have all taken an uncompromising stand against communism. In domestic as well as in foreign affairs, in matters political and in matters economical, they have kept up a fine standard of freedom, stability and goodwill. Sweden's present wave of prosperity is a well-earned reward for it, and shows the great value of the spirit of co-operation as compared with personal, class or national egoism.

Again, the cultural relations between the Scandinavian countries and England are as old and as firmly established as the political ones. They follow English literature with the keenest interest. Translations from the English, especially since the war, have greatly increased in number—very largely at the expense of German books. There is hardly an English work of interest that does not get promptly translated into one or more of the Scandinavian languages. A personal knowledge of England, especially among the business community, frequently adds to the latent pro-British feelings of the Swedes. There is hardly anybody among the merchants, shippers and bankers who has not visited Great Britain at least once or perhaps even quite frequently, and who has not established some personal contacts with British friends. In return, England, or in fact the whole Empire, sends over an annually growing number of tourists. These invariably enjoy their

in contrast and opposition to the State of Outer Mongolia, under Russian influence. The choice before the Mongols, as a whole, is between revolutionary nationalism, in association with Russia, and conservative nationalism, in association with Japan, but led by their own princes . . . and fortified by their own religion." Hsungan is most inaccessible to intervention and Japanese policy must compare favourably with the Soviets' "essentially generous policy" towards Outer Mongolia. Japan will be forced, desirous or not, deeper and deeper into Mongolia, towards the Siberian frontier, "and creating a wholly new tension between Japan and Russia." Moreover in the event of conflict the strategic position of the Mongols might well make their intervention decisive of the issue.

Mrs. Bertita Harding has written a lively account of the ill-fated Emperor Maximilian of Mexico and his consort, Carlota, the daughter of Leopold I, in her *Phantom Crown*.* In 1864, the Archduke Maximilian, brother of the Emperor Franz Joseph, was persuaded by the blandishments of Napoleon III to accept the throne from a group of Mexican conservatives, maintained in power by the French occupation. Becoming increasingly embarrassed by his Mexican adventure, Napoleon finally withdrew his troops in 1867. Maximilian, deluded as to his Mexican following, remained and was quickly defeated and shot by the Republicans under Juárez. Mrs. Harding ascribes much of the tragedy to the ambition of Carlota and the simple *naïveté* of Maximilian. Her work undoubtedly bears the marks of erudition and research. But unfortunately her theme is too frequently a tag for ornamental description and irrelevant embellishment. The flippancy of her method is exemplified in her treatment of Pope Pius IX, who "arose one day from his pontifical breakfast of hot chocolate and butter-cakes to proclaim the infallibility of popes, present and future." This book at all events makes entertaining reading and is recommended by the Book Society.

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Two recent additions to the Modern States Series are devoted to historical sketches of *Egypt*† and *Turkey*†. Lieutenant-Colonel P. G. Elgood has written a concise and engrossing history of Egypt, which is no easy task in so small a compass. The narrative begins in 3200 B.C. with the Pharaohs and ends with the Egypt of to-day. The author has a first-hand knowledge of modern politics and has devoted nearly half the book to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Mr. T. L. Jarman has divided his history of Turkey into three parts: the rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey in Revolution and the New Turkey. His interesting study shows clearly the growth of the modern State from a decaying Oriental empire. Mr. Jarman endeavours to show how its amazing change to Western methods could be effected. Both books have good maps, indices and short bibliographies.

* Harrap. 10s. 6d. net.

† Arrowsmith. 3s. 6d. net.