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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1934.

CROSSING THE FLOOR.

CCROSSING the floor is an act which symbolises the final dissociation of the Liberal Party from the present Government, its refusal to accept responsibility for Government measures other than those of which it may specifically and explicitly approve, and the resumption in Parliament as well as in the country of its political freedom of action.

The Liberal Party does not by this action disclaim responsibility for the policy which it helped to frame for dealing with the financial crisis in 1931, a policy which was endorsed by the country at the general election and has been justified by experience. To find the solution of that crisis was the sole objective of the National Government. It was not to impose tariffs that a National Government was created. It was because the measures which were indispensable for dealing with the financial crisis were expected to be such as would leave any Party Government open to misunderstanding, suspicion and devastating unpopularity that a Government was formed in which the responsibility and the task of exposition would be shared by the leaders of all parties. By the responsibility which they accepted for those distasteful and unpopular measures the Liberal leaders stand.

The Prime Minister in a speech broadcast to the nation on August 25th, 1931, said:

"One thing, and one thing only, will put British credit in a position of security at this moment, and that is a scheme consisting in economies on the one side, and further revenue on the other. A scheme well balanced, with burdens imposed as lightly as possible but imposed equitably. That scheme will be produced. *In order to do it a Government has been formed.* It is not a Coalition Government. I will take no part in that.

"It is not a Government which compels any party to change its principles or to subordinate its individuality. I should take no part in that either. It is a Government of individuals formed to do this work."

The Liberal Party has never wavered from its conviction that this basis of co-operation ought not to have been

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departed from, that the National Government ought to have completed its financial task, that the different parties should then have placed before the nation their proposals for dealing with the economic and political situation as a whole and that thereafter the people should have been consulted at a general election.

The National Government, however, had not been long at work before strong pressure developed in favour of an early general election. The Liberal Party did its best to resist it, but before long the Liberal leaders were faced with the necessity of deciding whether they would break up the National Government with its task unfinished and indeed hardly begun, or whether they would acquiesce in the determination of the leaders of the other parties to make an appeal to the country on a nebulous issue which emerged in the form of "a doctor's mandate." The Liberals decided that the duty of giving full co-operation to the National Government at a time of crisis was paramount, but in acquiescing in a general election they made it clear that their co-operation must involve them in no surrender of the political and economic principles in which they believed.

It is sometimes said that Liberals appealed for support at the last general election on the basis of giving the Prime Minister and the majority of the Government a free hand. That is quite untrue. At the beginning of the election campaign separate manifestoes were issued to the nation by the Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, the leaders of the Liberal Party, and by Sir John Simon. In their manifesto the Liberal leaders said :

"We feel bound to declare our views that whatever emergency measures might be found to be necessary to deal with the immediate situation, freedom of trade is the only permanent basis for our economic prosperity and for the welfare of the Empire and of the world. Taxation on the staple foods of the people has always been opposed by the Liberal party, and would lay fresh burdens on those least able to bear them."

That manifesto was shown to the Prime Minister before it was published, and, while it would be wrong to claim that such foreknowledge on the part of the Prime Minister was equivalent to approval, it is clear that it was not then deemed inconsistent with the appeal of the leaders of the National Government to the country. Not only were Liberal candi-

dates returned to Parliament on the basis of that declaration, but candidates of other parties which supported the National Government received the votes of Liberal and Free Trade electors who would have withheld them if they had not thus been assured that there would be in the National Government men who shared their political and economic convictions.

The principal issue between the Liberal Party and the other Parties which constituted the National Government was, of course, the question of Protection. The attitude of the Liberal Party was that there ought to be no permanent change in our fiscal system without searching and impartial inquiry, and it was understood that such was the policy of the Government. Indeed, Mr. Neville Chamberlain said at Dudley on October 26th, 1931 :

"All these matters are going to be examined carefully, thoroughly, exhaustively, impartially by the National Government when it is formed again. But you have not got to decide to-morrow whether you are going to have a tariff or Free Trade."

And Mr. Baldwin at Leeds on October 20th, 1931, said :

"What is the fundamental issue? It is not Socialism, it is not individualism, it is not Free Trade, it is not Protection. Perhaps I should say a word about those who have tried to confuse the issue with attempts to revive the Free Trade-Protection controversy of twenty-five years ago. That is not the real issue."

While the Prime Minister, addressing a meeting in the Seaham Division on October 24th, 1931, said :

"There is nobody talking about full-blooded tariffs. What is being considered is whether tariffs will give us more advantage than disadvantage—whether a tariff applied here and there will enable us to balance our trade or not."

Liberals and Free Traders had no reason to shirk, and indeed believed that they had much to gain by, an inquiry provided it was "careful, thorough, exhaustive, and impartial," and Mr. Lloyd George and other Liberal speakers had made this clear during the fiscal controversy which had raged in the years 1930 and 1931. No such inquiry, however, took place. The only inquiry was one by a Cabinet Committee, such as precedes the introduction of any important measure.

In these circumstances, on the production of the Import Duties Bill, the Liberal Ministers and Lord Snowden felt bound to tender their resignations. Strong appeals, however,

were made to them by the Prime Minister and their Cabinet colleagues to remain in the Government. Committees of the Round Table Conference were at work in India, the Disarmament Conference at Geneva and the Conference at Lausanne on War Debts and Reparations were about to assemble, the World Economic Conference was in prospect, and, above all, the primary tasks for which the Government had been formed, to balance the budget and to restore the national credit, had not yet been accomplished. In these circumstances it seemed to the Cabinet as a whole of primary importance to preserve over as wide a field as possible the reality of co-operation between members of all the great political parties. Consequently, at the suggestion of their colleagues, Lord Snowden and the Liberal Ministers consented to remain in the Cabinet on the clear understanding that they would retain their freedom to speak and vote in the House of Commons against the Import Duties Bill, to the underlying principles of which they were fundamentally opposed, to make their views on this subject clear in speeches in the country, and to support candidates in by-elections who, while supporters of the National Government on other grounds, would oppose the policy of Protection.

This expedient, which was known as the "agreement to differ," made it possible for the Liberal Ministers to remain in the Government until the end of August, when the conclusion of the Ottawa agreements provoked a new crisis in different circumstances. By this time the primary purpose of the National Government had been fulfilled, the budget had been balanced, a huge conversion of debt had been effected, the blessing of cheap money had been bestowed on industry, and the national credit had been restored. It is true that the economic situation remained grave, but in the view of the Liberal Ministers it was being aggravated by the Protectionist policy of the Government, and from their standpoint the only possible justification for remaining in the Government was the hope that the World Economic Conference would result in an abatement of economic nationalism throughout the world and the restoration of world trade.

This hope, however, was impaired, if not destroyed, by the Ottawa agreements. If international trade was to be restored, one of the primary objectives which the British Government were bound to pursue at the Conference was the abolition of

quotas which Mr. Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, described at St. Ives on February 2nd, 1933, as "insane" and "the curse of European trade." Yet as a result of Ottawa we should be adopting quotas in this country at the very time when the Prime Minister, as Chairman of the Conference, would be appealing to other nations to relinquish theirs. Similar exhortations would be delivered by leading British Ministers to foreign nations to lower their tariff walls; yet at the same time, as a result of Ottawa, large increases of British tariffs were in contemplation. The professed object of the Government at the World Economic Conference was to be to promote the freest possible exchange of goods between all nations of the world, while, as a result of Ottawa, British Ministers and their supporters in Parliament were boasting that trade would be diverted from the United States of America and other countries to countries of the Empire.

Consequently the policy of economic imperialism at Ottawa seemed to the Liberal Ministers to be incompatible with the effective pursuit of a policy of "good neighbourliness" and economic disarmament at the World Economic Conference. Accordingly they resigned, and Lord Snowden, taking the same view, resigned also. Already the results of Ottawa have justified their action. The effect of these agreements on public opinion in the United States of America and in particular on the mind of Mr. Roosevelt was clearly shown in his interview with Mr. A. J. Cummings in October of last year, in a message from its Washington Correspondent published in *The Times* of January 23rd, and in other press dispatches.

From the pursuit of a policy of "good neighbourliness" and of promoting common action between the United States, Canada and Great Britain, the thought of the men who were to compose the new Administration in the United States was deflected towards measures the inevitable effect of which was to postpone the possibility of international co-operation in the field of currency stabilisation. Even so, progress should have been possible at the Conference in the direction of lowering tariff and quota barriers. But the British Government, shackled by the Ottawa agreements, could give no lead and the initiative passed to the United States Secretary of State, whose efforts failed for lack of adequate support

from British Ministers. On the one hand, by undermining the World Economic Conference Ottawa destroyed the prospect of freer world trade; on the other hand, by guaranteeing free access to the British market for Empire produce, it exposed British farmers, freshly handicapped by protective duties on their implements, fertilisers and feeding-stuffs, to the competition of Dominion producers aided in some cases by Government subsidies, and thus not only widened the gap between the British farmers' costs and prices but also proved to be an obstacle to any fair and rational system of protection. Nor has British industry or British shipping benefited. Lord Essendon, the Chairman of the Manchester Liners, declared on October 18th that "outward cargo from the United Kingdom to Canada showed a decrease, notwithstanding the high hopes based upon the Ottawa agreements"; and, whereas in a speech at St. Ives Mr. Runciman complained of "Italians spending an immense amount of money subsidising their shipping" now since Ottawa it is the South Africans who are spending money on subsidising Italian shipping. It was as a result of Ottawa that our trade treaty with Russia was denounced with disastrous results to our fishing industry and other export trades. Nor have the hopes of the other industries been realised and, if the results of Ottawa be judged by the criterion which the Protectionists invariably apply to our trade with overseas countries, it will be found that our adverse balance of Empire trade (excluding the Irish Free State, with which no agreement was signed) has swung still further against us since Ottawa (comparing the first nine or pre-Ottawa months of 1932 with the same months in 1933) by four million pounds.

The Liberal leaders and the Liberal Parliamentary Party were, however, resolved that no action of theirs should weaken the Government in the councils of the world or hamper them in the conduct either of the Disarmament negotiations in Geneva, or of the War Debt negotiations with the United States of America, or of the World Economic Conference in the success of which the Government still professed to believe. They were also determined to give the Government their full support on its Indian policy and in the measures which were necessary to secure the financial foundations for economic recovery which the National Government had laid. Accordingly the Liberal Parliamentary Party continued to

sit on the Government benches and, while freely criticising measures of which they were unable to approve, accorded to the Government their support against attacks from the Right as well as from the Left, not only in regard to India and the maintenance of a balanced budget, but also in all demands which they made upon the time of the House of Commons and against all motions involving censure by the Opposition.

The events of the present year have, however, destroyed whatever remained of Liberal confidence in the present Government. The failure of the World Economic Conference justified the forebodings of the Liberal leaders in regard to Ottawa; the foreign policy of the Government has been almost uniformly unsuccessful; although there has been some slight recovery in our overseas trade from the low level at the beginning of the year, our exports up till the end of October (the latest date for which figures are available) are still smaller than they were for the corresponding period of last year, which was the worst year for British export trade since 1905. The housing policy of the Government is strongly objected to by the Liberal Party on the ground, not only that the concentration upon slum clearance to the exclusion of the abatement of overcrowding will defeat its own object, but also that a forward housing policy would give a much needed impetus to trade revival and substantially reduce the number of unemployed in the building trades.

Indeed as regards economic policy the attitude of the Government seems to be one of inaction tempered by repeated doses of agricultural protection which do little or nothing to mitigate agricultural distress, and trading agreements which do little to expand trade because in each case the negotiations have been confined to one country and to a narrow range of goods and commodities. Up till the time of the failure of the World Economic Conference it was believed that the main policy of the Government was directed to the removal of tariff and other restrictions upon international trade. Now that that avenue is blocked by Ottawa the Government seems to be bankrupt and impotent to frame any policy either for the revival of international trade or for the development of national resources.

There is much to be said for a frankly opportunist Government, composed of men of different political and economic

convictions, for dealing with great crises—such as the war or the financial crisis with which the country was faced in 1931—to the solution of which all political and economic considerations have to be subordinated. But, once such a Government turns to tackle broad political issues and large problems of economic reconstruction, differences of opinion inevitably arise, and the differences of opinion in the present Government are notorious and openly confessed. The speech in which the President of the Board of Trade denounced quotas as insane and the curse of Europe has already been quoted, but the Minister of Agriculture has declared that quotas “have come to stay.” Again, in the first speech to the World Economic Conference the Prime Minister, following the admirable brief prepared for the Conference by the economic experts who drew up its annotated agenda, declared: “. . . as the experts have reminded us ‘it will not, in our judgment, be possible to make substantial progress by piecemeal measures. A policy of nibbling will not solve this crisis.’” But in the House of Commons on July 4th the President of the Board of Trade expressed the opinion that :

“ unless we are prepared to proceed piece-meal, it will be impossible for us to achieve anything like that agreement in trade relationships between the countries of the world which is necessary for freeing trade, increasing trade and co-operation in trade.”

After his return from Washington the Prime Minister signed jointly with the President of the United States of America a *communiqué* in which appeared the following declaration :

“ Enterprise must be stimulated by creating conditions favourable to business recovery, and Governments can contribute by the development of appropriate programmes of capital expenditure.”

but when a proposal was made at the World Economic Conference to appoint a Committee to consider the question of public works the President of the Board of Trade replied :

“ We have terminated our schemes for dealing with unemployment by way of capital expenditure works and we shall not reopen these schemes, no matter what may be done elsewhere. . . . If a Committee were appointed we could not participate in its deliberations.”

These examples might be multiplied, but if this Government is to deserve the name of National it must evolve and

pursue a consistent theme of national policy—otherwise it will continue to drift aimlessly with the consequences inevitably attached to opportunist action unanchored to principle. Sir John Simon, speaking in his constituency on October 21st, 1931, said that “it would be a disastrous thing if Mr. MacDonald were returned as Prime Minister surrounded by a cohort of Tories.” The “disastrous thing” has happened, and, under the pressure of 470 Conservative members, the thirteen followers of the Prime Minister and the thirty followers of Sir John Simon are drifting into a purely Conservative policy of Protection and stagnation. This Coalition is becoming increasingly dominated by the spirit and policy of the Conservative Party, and now the Government is acting as though the boast of Lord Stonehaven, the Chairman of the Conservative Party Organisation, were true :

“ We have a National Government with a mandate to carry out Tory policy.”

Nevertheless Liberals are keenly conscious of the heavy burden of responsibility resting upon the Prime Minister and his colleagues in the Cabinet, nor do they underrate the difficulty and complexity of the political and economic situation. They admire the Prime Minister's courage and devotion to public duty and recognise the loyalty with which Mr. Baldwin and Sir John Simon have supported him. It may well be that the present trend of the Government's policy is the inevitable resultant of political forces too strong for individual Ministers to control, however loyal, able and respected they may be. Therefore in the opposition which it will be the duty of the Liberal Parliamentary Party to offer in the House of Commons to measures of which they disapprove and to a trend of policy which they think incompatible with the spirit of the national appeal at the last general election, there will be no resort to those traditional tactics of Parliamentary warfare which are aimed at the indiscriminate obstruction of Government business and are animated by a desire to thwart, embarrass and trip up the Government by every legitimate Parliamentary resource. On the contrary it will be for the Liberal Party to justify by methods of opposition both critical and constructive their claim that the course which they have followed since 1931 is one of true and consistent loyalty to the national will as expressed at the general election.

In the sphere of world policy the chief count in the indictment of the Liberal Party against the Government is that since Ottawa it has increasingly surrendered to the spirit of economic nationalism, the manifestations of which in other nations it rightly condemns. Liberals believe that the peace of the world and the survival of civilisation depend on the resolute pursuit of a positive and constructive policy of peace and disarmament both military and economic. In the domestic sphere their main criticism is that the Government have adopted the policy of raising prices by means of creating an artificial scarcity instead of enlarging demand by clearing the channels of trade and putting purchasing power into the hands of the unemployed by setting them to work on useful and necessary undertakings of public importance.

Coalitions are bound to become increasingly Conservative, a tendency which is overwhelmingly strengthened by the composition of the present Government's majority in the House of Commons. In the opinion of Liberals the return of a Socialist majority to the House of Commons with the present policy of the Labour Party would be disastrous. It follows that it is their public duty to offer the country an alternative policy—a policy directed towards peace, disarmament and political and economic co-operation between all nations, or as many nations as are prepared to work together in the common interests of humanity and civilisation, and towards the fullest possible development of our own national and imperial resources on the basis of sound finance and public economy in the interests of our own people and especially of our unemployed, the chief victims of the present depression—a policy of freedom directed against bureaucratic and Socialistic encroachments upon individual liberty and enterprise. To that constructive task, untrammelled by association with other parties, the Liberal Party now sets its hand.

ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR.

AUGUSTINE BIRRELL.

THE many tributes paid to Mr. Birrell, as willingly paid as they were richly earned, have been practically unanimous upon the charm and value of his literary work. But in their estimates of his political work they have naturally varied, and one of them, not the least interesting, has described him as a man ill-fitted for the hard battles of politics, drawn almost against his instincts into a political career. Those who shared Birrell's political opinions, and who watched him, sometimes at close quarters, fighting for them with a power and energy and humour such as few of his contemporaries displayed, will find it difficult to accept this view. Birrell was no bewildered man of letters straying inadvertently into politics. He was for many years one of the most practical and popular of Liberal politicians, a Parliamentary figure in the front rank, a Cabinet Minister whom his colleagues both trusted and admired. The great part which politics played in his life ought not to be forgotten, even if it be true that many men loved his books while they hated his political opinions, even if it be true that his contribution to the world of letters will be remembered longer than the admirable service which he rendered to his party and the State.

Birrell came of a Scottish ancestry and a sturdy Non-conformist stock. He inherited perhaps from both a certain stubborn independence which sometimes gave a touch of bluntness to his talk, strong sympathies, strong convictions, and strong common sense. To these qualities he added the racy and irrepressible humour which was his most characteristic gift. The cynicism, of which one or two friends have spoken, was with him chiefly a form of humour and never went very deep. I knew him first over fifty years ago, when he was a member of a little private debating society in London, called the Sons of Ishmael and originally, I believe, started by a group of able and cultivated Nonconformists. They allowed a schoolboy and undergraduate to attend some of their debates, and I was the means later of introducing to them two Balliol friends, J. A. Hamilton* and Anthony Hope Hawkins, to be chaffed perhaps by Birrell on their Balliol manner, a quality which he always pretended to resent but

* Now Viscount Sumner.

could never be brought to define. It was for this society, I think, that Birrell, then a rather grave-looking young barrister, saddened by the recent death of his first wife but of a nature made to throw off sadness, wrote some of the essays afterwards gathered into a little volume of *Obiter Dicta* destined for fame. I still remember his reading to it his essay on Carlyle. He belonged to a generation to whom Carlyle was seer as well as historian, unquestionably a greater historian than Macaulay, for whom Birrell then cherished a distaste almost as vivacious as Mr. Winston Churchill's. He shone as a star in that little circle of debaters until he passed on to shine in greater debates elsewhere.

In the years which immediately followed Birrell worked at his profession as hard as solicitors permitted, and employed his leisure unobtrusively, informally and almost accidentally in winning reputation as a man of letters. It may not have helped him with the solicitors that he sprang so quickly into literary fame, that he was recognised presently as the natural heir of Charles Lamb and the ideal editor of Boswell. A time came when the lawyers forgave him for his gift of illuminating everything he touched, essays, biographies, even legal treatises, with a charm and humour all his own. But it may be doubted whether he ever sought whole-heartedly for success at the Bar. There is probably truth in the familiar story of Birrell leaving the House of Commons one day with Mr. Balfour, after listening to a speech by a consummate lawyer who never found himself quite at home in Parliament as a Law Officer of the Crown.

"You tell me, A.B., that that man makes £18,000 a year at the Bar. Why, if I went to the Bar, I should make £80,000."

"No, my dear A.J.B., if you went to the Bar, you would make what every other man of genius makes there, just £800 a year."

Politics were destined to prove a stronger interest and a more exacting occupation than either literature or law.

Perhaps only those who belonged to Birrell's political party can realise the value of the services he rendered to them. In West Fife he held for many years a safe seat. All the world knows the tale of his stopping Asquith and Haldane on a Scottish hill-top and reminding them that the country round so far as eye could see was represented by three barristers from London. In 1900, during the Boer War, in a time of

depression for the Liberal Party and at a moment when an ambitious man might well have thought it essential to remain in the House of Commons, Birrell, at the request of the Liberal Whips, surrendered a constituency in which he delighted, and went off to Manchester to fight a hopeless seat. A party of candidates, bent on the same errand, travelled down with him on that occasion and consulted him about their chances. "My dear fellows," he assured them, "not one of us has the ghost of a chance." It was Mr. Chamberlain's Khaki Election, and Birrell's forecast was unerringly right. But that conviction in no way affected the eloquence and vigour of his campaign. In those difficult years, it may be added, when some Liberals were accused of carrying on a war to the knife and fork against each other, no man rendered happier service in reconciling differences or in laughing out of existence unnecessary feuds. The letter-bag of Herbert Gladstone as Chief Whip bears witness to the indefatigable work which Birrell did in the constituencies and to the high place which he had won in the confidence of Liberals up and down the country.

Birrell had the rare gift, as speaker, writer, talker, of never being dull. He became a great figure in Parliament. But it was, perhaps, on the platform that he was seen at his best. There his fine voice, his robust and cheery presence, his strong feeling, his inextinguishable humour, told. He did not talk down to his audience, as even great speakers have been known to do. He did not indeed, so far as my knowledge goes, attempt—what statesman but Mr. Gladstone ever successfully attempted?—to hold great popular audiences by closely reasoned speeches depending on formidable statistics and details. But his speeches often had something of the large air and flowing vivacity which marked the platform utterances of the famous leader whose closing triumphs only he witnessed in the House of Commons. One occasion among many recurs. Towards the end of 1910 Birrell was injured in a scrimmage by the Suffragettes, and in December of that year he had to fight an election when he could hardly stand. I was hard pressed at Plymouth, and my chairman, a veteran Liberal, appealed to Birrell to come over from Bristol to help us. He responded with equal gallantry and kindness to a request he might well have refused. Seated in an armchair on the platform he delivered a spirited and impressive speech,

which was heard, I believe, without effort by an audience of three or four thousand people, packed in a hall by no means famed for its acoustic properties. The physical triumph was not less remarkable than the good comradeship he showed.

The Parliament of 1906 saw him at the height of his reputation. He was asked to take in turn two offices which were at the moment difficult to fill. The Education Bill of 1906 was doomed to be defeated by the House of Lords. It was not possible, in the prevailing temper of parties and of churches, to secure agreement on problems which, if ecclesiastical and political feeling could have been eliminated, neither parents nor teachers would have found it difficult to solve. But if the Bill failed the Minister did not. Though new to office he revealed from the first Parliamentary gifts of a high order. Few controversial measures were ever piloted through the House of Commons amid more general acknowledgments of the fine temper and ability shown by the Minister in charge. Men even began to speak of Birrell as a possible leader of the Liberal Party. In 1907 Birrell succeeded Mr. Bryce in a still harder task. It has been said recently that he was wrongly appointed to a position for which he was unsuited. I do not remember anyone expressing this opinion in 1907. It would have been difficult in those days to find a Chief Secretary whose capacity the House of Commons rated more highly. It would have been impossible to find one who possessed and kept to the end more completely the confidence of the Irish Nationalist members.

The principal representative of the Irish Administration in a Government whose leaders were pledged to Home Rule, but unable at the moment to redeem their pledges, had no easy position to sustain. Birrell was a convinced Home Ruler. But he realised, like his colleagues, that the Election of 1906 had not been won upon Home Rule, and that Home Rule could not during that Parliament be put in the front of the Ministerial programme. If it was a difficult situation for the Ministry, it was a difficult situation for the Irish leaders also. It was only Birrell's loyal goodwill, his readiness and humour in debate, and his determination to work with the Nationalist Members, which enabled him to hold his own in Ireland and in Parliament for nine years as he did. Critics there were, even among Liberals, who thought that on some points he deferred too much to Nationalist opinion. But an under-

standing with the Nationalists, whose views he generally shared, was an essential condition of his administration. The Irish Councils Bill of 1907 was indeed little more than a half-hearted measure, which nobody wanted and which nobody mourned. But the Irish Universities Bill of 1908 was a notably successful piece of legislation. It gave to Protestants and Catholics alike the opportunities of University education which they wanted. It settled on broad lines a problem which had perplexed and baffled several Governments. And it owed its good fortune in no small measure to the spirit and methods of the Minister who carried it through.

How far, when the catastrophe came in 1916, was Birrell to blame for what happened? He took the blame instantly with dignity and courage. He had, no doubt, been too sanguine. He had misjudged the situation and underrated its risks. The Nationalist allies, on whom he had counted, had proved equally mistaken and equally unable to answer for the Irish people. But the Sinn Féin rebellion was the inevitable result of permitting politicians to prepare for civil war. Methods of defiance allowed to pass unchecked in Northern Ireland could not but rouse envy and emulation in the South. The beating up of old feuds and old enthusiasms, the exploiting of religious zeal for party purposes, the daring bluff superimposed upon genuine convictions, the excitement of drilling an army, the inborn love of a row, these things, permitted to triumph in one part of Ireland, inevitably fascinated the imagination of the rest. There was force, no doubt, in the Government's plea that it would be a mistake to treat these threats too tragically, that men did not fly to arms before they were injured, that to trust to common sense and patience was wiser than to precipitate an outbreak the consequences of which no one could foresee.

"I am not in the least embarrassed," Mr. Asquith told a great audience in Dublin, "when asked, as I constantly am, 'What are you going to do in the event of civil war?' I tell you quite frankly I do not believe in the prospect of a civil war. Minorities have their rights; they have not only their rights, but their susceptibilities, which ought to be considered and provided for. But to say that a minority, before any actual wrong has been or can be done to them, are, in defiance of the terms of the Act of Parliament and of the supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament, upon a suspicion or apprehension that they may peradventure at some

future date be injured—to say that a minority is entitled on such grounds as that to thwart and defeat the Constitutional demand of a vast majority of their fellow-countrymen and to frustrate a great international settlement, is a proposition which, in my opinion, does not and never will commend itself to the conscience or to the judgment of the British people.”

In these swelling periods Birrell probably concurred. But the Opposition were in no mood to listen to constitutional demands. There was “no length of resistance,” Mr. Bonar Law told his followers in July 1912, in which he would not be ready to support the Ulstermen. While the British Government argued, Sir Edward Carson organised his battalions, and before long 80,000 National Volunteers appeared upon the other side. All the ancient instincts of disorder awoke to life and mischief in the South.

It is possible that the Liberal leaders, skilful Parliamentarians as they were, looked on the whole question too much from the point of view of Parliamentary tactics. Tactics unquestionably played a large part in the attitude of the Unionist Party. Birrell, like Asquith, an intimate and sympathetic friend, found it hard to believe in the threat of rebellion. He could not in 1912 foresee the fatal opportunities likely to be offered to enemies of England by the European War. He knew that the Ulstermen were not enemies of England. He did not suspect the existence of such enemies in any formidable members in the rest of Ireland. So the Government persevered with their legislative proposals, resolved to modify them if necessity arose but not before, and meanwhile they were content to minimise the risks they ran. History, with her matchless power of judging after the event, may, it is conceivable, decide that they were wrong, that the only way of avoiding disaster was to stop at the beginning all playing at treason, and to make clear from the beginning that, if the Protestants of Ulster could not be persuaded to join in the new Parliament, they should have an opportunity of standing out.

There is no reason to suppose that Birrell dissented from the judgment of his colleagues, though he was characteristically willing to leave to the Prime Minister the chief part in the conduct of the Home Rule Bill and to make way for Mr. Lloyd George at the famous conference in Buckingham Palace. Like them he took the risks their policy involved.

Unlike them he paid the penalty for a grave though generous mistake. But if he had chosen the opposite course and determined to suppress the Sinn Feiners, the consequences, a serious though abortive outbreak, might not improbably have been just the same. His political career ended, as he said sadly, in the ruin of his hopes and aspirations. But he kept the regard and admiration of all those who knew him best. He lived on for years to enjoy no discontented retirement, writing often, speaking occasionally—he was always sure of a delighted audience—talking as readily and pleasantly as ever: the power to charm his hearers never failed. He spoke once latterly of the happiness brought him by his friends' affection. His writings still show why men loved him. And few Liberals of his generation brought finer qualities into public life.

CHARLES MALLET.

THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRACY.*

"THE Breakdown of Democracy." I deny my title. To affirm such a thing is to make the admission that the free spirit of man has broken down and ceased to be free. We do not say that the law of gravitation, the great law of the action of material bodies in space, has broken down because Einstein has arisen. Neither should we say that the principle of democracy, the great principle of the action of the human spirit in the organised societies which it has constructed, has broken down because on the Left and the Right—in Russian Communism and in Italian and German Fascism—the grandiose figure of the would-be dictator of the human spirit has emerged. Not that there is any real parallel between Einstein and Hitler. The one has modified our conception of natural law by a new discovery. The other is seeking to change our conception of human principle by taking us back to the ancient blood-group, or clan, in which the only spirit is that of the Group, and its only expression is the mind and will of the Leader. It is one thing to go with Einstein on a new sort of voyage through space. It is another thing to go with Hitler on a voyage back through time into the ancient Hercynian forest.

Before we speak of breakdown, we must first of all look at the facts—the facts of geography, and then (for a moment's space) the facts of history. Geographically, and confining ourselves in the first instance to Europe, we can see a great area to the West of the Rhine (for many years past a river of division in European thought) where democracy is not dead. In that area are the democracies of England, France and Spain; of the Scandinavian countries; of Belgium and Holland. So far as that goes, and so far as Europe to-day is concerned, it would seem that democracy is mainly a Western phenomenon. But there are two other things to be said. In the first place, the division of Europe at the boundary of the Rhine is not a new thing. Ever since the Romantic movement began in Germany, about 1770, there has tended to be a division between thought and politics to the West of the Rhine, and thought and politics to the East. To the East of the Rhine there has lived a Romantic philosophy of the *Volk*, or

personified people, as a super-spirit or super-person somehow transcending the individual spirit and person of each of its members—singing its own *Volkslieder* in its own *Volksprache*; creating its own *Volksrecht*; constructing its own *Volksstaat*; in a word, engulfing "organically" in the sweep of its own perpetual becoming the life of all its members. This is a philosophy which culminated in Hegel and in Hegel's disciple Marx, who simply transferred to the idea of class the attributes which Romanticism had previously vindicated for the idea of the Folk. It is a philosophy which has spread—here in a Marxian and there in a Hegelian form—to Russia and Italy. It is a philosophy which, furnished with the new jet of the idea of Aryan race-purity, has been fanned into an ardent flame in Germany to-day. There is nothing new in the contrast between anti-democratic Romanticism, with its cult of the group, and democratic liberalism, with its belief in the intrinsic value of the individual; and if in Europe to-day democratic liberalism is mainly confined to the West, we can comfort ourselves by reflecting that it has not lost ground which it had ever permanently won. But there is also another comfort, and another thing to be said. If we look outside Europe, we can hardly say that democracy is a losing cause. It still informs the British Commonwealth. It still informs most of the continent of America. And if we look at the continent of Asia, shall we say that democracy is dead or dying when in India and China, which contain nearly half of the human race, democratic ideas imported from the West (as the wind carries seeds on its wings) are struggling for growth and development?

So far of geography. One brief word may be added by way of historical retrospect. Twenty years ago, in 1913, there were three great Empires in Europe—Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary—and an Emperor was the central figure and (as a German thinker would say) "the bearer of the authority of the State" in each of the three. To-day, in 1933, these Empires are all gone. It is hard to say what permanent organisation will take the place of the German Empire of twenty years ago. But it may safely be said that there is already more of democracy to-day in the old dominions of the Hapsburgs—in Prague, in Vienna, in Cracow—than there was in 1913. It may also be said, not without fear of contradiction, but yet with some measure of confidence, that there is more of

* An address delivered before the Liberal Summer School at Cambridge, on August 4th, 1933. The title of the address was suggested by the organisers of the School.

the spirit of democracy to-day in Leningrad and Moscow than there was in 1913. We have to say to ourselves, "Perspective," and yet again, "Perspective." We live in turbulent and moving times. More particularly, at this moment, we live among economic exigencies, which affect the normal play of political institutions. It is hard to discern the set of the tide. We can only fix our eye on great landmarks, and endeavour to judge our course quietly by the guidance which they give. So far as I see, the great landmarks give us no reason for despair.

But what, after all, is democracy? For our purposes, and from the point of view of our argument, we may say that it is two things. It is a principle of the action of the human spirit—the principle that free spirits, in the area of social and political as well as of individual life, should freely guide themselves to freely determined issues. It is also a system of institutions, operative in a political community, which enables this principle to be realised and serves as the means of its realisation.

In this statement the two things are essentially interconnected; and both of them must be present in order to constitute democracy in the full and general sense of the word. This connection has been denied. In the literature of Italian Fascism, and more particularly in Mussolini's essay on *La Dottrina del Fascismo*, an antithesis is drawn between what we have called the principle of action, and what we have termed the system of institutions. The one is defined as the creed of Liberalism, and the other as the essence of Democracy—and Liberalism and Democracy, thus defined and distinguished, are treated not as allies or complements, but as mutually exclusive enemies. Liberalism, upon this view, is *laissez-faire*: it is a warning to the State to leave the individual to his own devices: it is J. S. Mill; it is Manchester. Democracy, as contrasted with liberalism, is the right of a whole people to control itself, and thereby all its members, by the force of arithmetic and the method of majority-vote: it is a warning to the individual will to submit to the will of the number; it is Rousseau; it is Geneva.

Now we may distinguish liberalism and democracy in thought, but we cannot oppose them as opposites. Liberalism and democracy are two sides of a single coin. The essential stuff of which the coin is made is individual human personality.

This is the intrinsic value which must serve as our standard of measurement. Because individual human personality has an intrinsic value, and because its development is the ultimate end, two consequences follow which are linked to one another by a natural sympathy. The first is that each individual should be guaranteed and secured the conditions under which he can develop freely. Those conditions were once designated, in an old English phrase, by the name of civil and religious liberty. But civil and religious liberty is not enough. There is also an area of economic liberty—including in its broad scope the various conditions necessary for the free development of all the millions of workers in industry—which it is the peculiar problem of our age to discover and define and secure. This brings us to the second consequence. The only way of discovering the general sum of conditions which is necessary to the free development of individuals is the way of free debate and discussion among individuals. The second consequence, therefore, of the basis from which we start is that each individual should be free to express his views on the general affairs of his community; free to join in the great and healthy process of discussion which, acting through its various organs, determines the conditions under which we all live and the rights we all enjoy; free, in a word, to participate in that energy of democratic self-government which is also, as J. S. Mill argued, a great and ennobling way of individual self-development.

We may call these two consequences, if we will, by two different names. We may say that the one is the cause of liberalism proper, and the other the cause of democracy, in the more specific sense of the word. But they are really twin consequences, issuing equally from the same basis; and there is no quarrel between them. Liberalism, if it is genuinely derived from its own true basis, is also democratic; and in the same way, and in the same condition, democracy is also liberal. Democracy, even if we confine the term to its more specific sense, is something more than the mass weight of number, and something greater than a mode of government by mathematics. It is a way of giving to each individual person, as such and because he is such, a voice and an influence in determining the conditions of life in his community. Democracy is not, in its essence (though it is in one of its external forms), a matter of voting. It is not a method of government

by counting heads instead of breaking them. It is a method of government by laying heads together, in a common debate in which all share, to attain a result which as many as possible are agreed in accepting. Dr. Johnson once said of a man he admired, "He is a fine fellow, sir; he fairly puts his mind to yours." This saying touches the true significance of democracy. It means, where it succeeds, that we all attain a higher measure of human dignity, because all of us "fairly put our minds" to the minds of others. It means government by discussion; and that is its inward essence. Apart from any system of institutions which it involves, it demands a gift for participation in a rational process of common deliberation.

To join in a rational process of common deliberation is not an easy thing. It requires a large measure of self-control. Discussion is not a battle, waged with personal passion for the sake of personal victory. It is a co-operative enterprise, conducted for the sake of attaining the greatest possible measure of general agreement. But it is not easy to lay heads together without rubs. It is hard to put one's mind fairly to the mind of another man without a jar. Discussion between different views and different political parties is a necessary part of democracy; but if views become opinionated and parties intransigent, discussion may readily pass into collision, and co-operative enterprise may degenerate into sheer war. Nor is this all. It is hard to keep the spirit keyed to the pitch of rational discussion. Emotion is always waiting for its opportunity. A community which is not on the watch may easily slip down with a run into the abandonment of mere group-sentiment. It may do so all the more easily because the art of advertisement and mass-suggestion, nowadays so highly developed, can readily play entrancing tunes to stir the emotions. When this is done, and done successfully, the high democratic art of rational discussion is abnegated. An induced unanimity of emotion takes its place. The basis of emotion may be class, as it is in Russia. It may be race, as it is in Germany. It may be nation—the nation as a higher personality, superior to all its members, the very *anima dell' anima*—as it is in Italy. Whatever it be, it is the opposite of that basis of individual human personality on which democracy rests, and from which democracy results. Whatever it be, it necessarily entails, at any rate for the time being, a breakdown of democracy.

Will such a breakdown last? Must we contemplate the disappearance of democracy, at any rate from a great part of Europe, as an historic and outworn form? Our answer to such questions must depend in the last resort on our view of the spirit of man. We may say, with Shakespeare, "What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason, how infinite in faculties!" Or we may say, as some are now beginning to say, "Men in the mass are a managed multitude, and those who have the art of management had better practise it, and indeed have the right to practise it, whether as dictator for the proletariat, or as *Führer* for the coming Aryan race, or as *Duce* of the higher personality of the nation." The choice is before us; and the responsibility is with the chooser. Those who choose the first alternative may take this comfort to themselves, that they believe in the reasonable and self-determining mind of man, and that sooner or later, in the process of his long education, man will justify their belief.

We have spoken of the democratic process of discussion as acting through various organs, and thus involving a system of institutions. We may say that this system of institutions includes four essential organs of discussion, through which the general community and all its members are able to determine freely the conditions of their common life. The four organs are party, electorate, parliament and cabinet. They are arranged like a pyramid, in an ascending series, with discussion initiated at the first stage, but assuming a more intense and responsible quality at each later stage, because it comes nearer the point of final decision. But the analogy of the pyramid is pictorial rather than real. We must not press it to the point of arguing either that party and party-formation should dominate the whole because they are the basis, or that cabinet and cabinet-guidance shall dominate everything because they are the apex. The proper working of a democratic system of institutions depends on a curious and delicate balance, in which each of the four factors keeps its place, and while making its specific contribution to the process of government by discussion claims nothing more than the right to make that specific contribution. We may illustrate this general idea of balance by reference to the particular place and the specific contribution of parliament. Parliament has to carry discussion, begun already in the electorate, and even before that in the parties which place their views and

their candidates before the electorate, to a higher stage in which it begins to impinge upon and to affect the decision of the cabinet. In carrying discussion to this higher stage, and thus making its own specific contribution, parliament must balance itself in its place between the electorate on the one side and the cabinet on the other. It has to do two different things in regard to either, and to do them both simultaneously. As regards the electorate, it has both to pay due regard to previous discussion and voting upon issues among the electors, and to discuss these issues anew itself with a sense of its own responsibility. As regards the cabinet, it has both to exert an influence on the policy of the cabinet by the force of its own discussion, and to leave the cabinet free to form its policy freshly by its own deliberation on its own responsibility. The illustration will show the delicacy of the balance of a democratic system of institutions. The delicacy of that balance will serve to explain the difficulty of working such a system. That difficulty will in turn explain why we may well have minor breakdowns, at this or that point of the system, from time to time. But it may also suggest that we need not despair if such breakdowns occur. The balance has been disturbed. It is our business to get to work, and to seek to restore the balance. One organ has got out of gear, and is running, as it were, free. We must seek to engage it again, and to make it play its proper part in the system.

The particular problem of democracy at the present time is party. It is not the only difficulty. The electorate will create difficulties if it seeks to go beyond its specific contribution of general discussion and the election of members to carry discussion further, and if it seeks to be a co-partner with parliament and cabinet by way of referendum and initiative. Parliament will create difficulties, if it, too, seeks to go beyond its specific contribution—the general discussion of the lines of cabinet policy—and if it attempts to control the cabinet by a system of committees which drastically interferes with its responsibility. The cabinet will create difficulties, and may even put the whole system out of gear, if it grows impatient of debate, and if it throws itself into the arms of a congenial party at the expense of both parliament and electorate. But the particular difficulty of our times is party; and it is most of all a difficulty when it leaps to victory over parliament and electorate, and governs “totalitarianly” through

a party leader who dominates his colleagues and turns even the cabinet itself from an organ of discussion into a mouth-piece of decision.

Party, in its own true nature, is both an organ of discussion in itself, at the first or primary stage of that process, and a constituent element in a general scheme of organised discussion, in which it duly co-operates with other elements. Because it is an organ of discussion in itself, at the first or primary stage, we must necessarily assume the existence of a plurality of parties. It takes at least two parties to create the beginnings of public discussion; and it may be a healthy thing, for the sake of proper discussion of all the great alternatives by which a community may be confronted, that there should be more than two. Again, because party-formations are one of the constituent elements in the general scheme of organised discussion, they must recognise the existence and the functions of other elements. They must seek to aid and support, but not to control or dominate, the operation of those elements: they must adjust themselves to the whole, and not claim that the whole shall be adjusted to them. When democracy begins to break down, or to run slowly and heavily, it is generally because party-passion refuses to allow one or other of these consequences to be drawn. If we look at the matter historically, and consider events as they happen in order of time, we shall generally find that it is the second consequence which is first denied and rejected. Parties refuse to recognise the independent existence and the separate functions of the other organs of discussion. They seek to control and dominate the electorate by a system of “integral” proportional representation under which it is only allowed to vote for prepared party lists, with the candidates already arranged in the order in which they are to be chosen. Going further, they challenge the independence of parliament, as an organ of free discussion; and the various party caucuses settle in advance the lines to be taken and the votes to be given with a sole regard to party-interest and party-discipline. When these things happen, the working of a democratic system of institutions has already been gravely impeded; and meanwhile party passions have also been exacerbated, partly by the process of cutting and paring the electorate as if it were a cheese, and partly by the warfare of the different caucuses in parliament. In the exacerbation of party feeling

the next step may then be taken. The first and the most elementary consequence which follows from the very nature of party may be rejected. The principle that there must necessarily be a plurality of parties begins to be scouted. One party resolves, instead of discussing issues and policies with the rest, to eliminate them all, and to rule alone. This is what has happened in Italy and Germany. A single party, claiming to be the sole depositary of an alleged idea of national personality or racial purity, has established a monopoly of power. It has eliminated all other parties: and not content with dominating electorate and parliament, it has reduced them both to ghosts, pleading that the living "leader" is the true and authentic voice of the whole community. Party, formed for discussion, has killed the discussion for which it was formed. One of the means has destroyed the end. Democracy has perished at the hands of one of its children.

There is a sentence in *La Dottrina del Fascismo* which admirably expresses the new régime. "A party which governs a nation totalitarianly is a new fact in history." It is indeed a new fact; and it is also a sad fact. It means two new and sad things. It means the government of one party, which has no need to debate with other parties, for the simple reason that there are none, or to adjust itself to other organs, because it has already assimilated other organs to itself. It means again that this government, thus immune from the salt of criticism, is also exempt from any limits to the area of its operation. Free to play on the minds of all by a monopoly of the means of publicity, it is also free to play on every sphere of life. That is the sense of the word totalitarian. No sphere of voluntary activity and no voluntary institution—neither economics, nor religion, nor education: neither trade union, nor church, nor university—can escape the logic of that word. It was the tendency of parties in some European countries, even when parties were multiple, to seek to engulf the lives of their members, and to provide them with party trade unions, party sports clubs, party methods of education, and a general party apparatus of life. That tendency attains its apotheosis when a single party swallows the rest, and arms itself with the whole power of the State to provide a total inspiration, which is also a total control, for every citizen. The new absolutism which is thus installed is far more drastic than any of the old absolutist monarchies. A party, knit to-

gether by party enthusiasm and united by a common devotion to its leader, is a far more efficient agent than a monarch and his advisers. The cause of liberty is meeting to-day one of the greatest foes which it has ever encountered.

If we ask ourselves why party has thus been accentuated, until it has become an end in itself, we shall readily find a number of causes. Some of them may be called universal, because they are operative everywhere. There is the universal fact of the professional politician—the paid organiser who lives by his party and naturally exalts the organisation by which he lives. Deeper than that, there is the universal fact that parties are everywhere drawn into the grave social and economic issues of our times, and are led to regard their solutions as the only possible solutions of these stirring and rending issues. In a moving world, in which new social strata are seeking to thrust themselves upward (here an impoverished middle-class, and there a depressed proletariat), parties become the instruments and organs of social change. They cease to be based on merely political principles, if indeed they ever were: they seek to become philosophers of life, and to mould all life into the image of their philosophy. But besides these general causes, which are common to the civilised world, we may also trace particular causes which belong to particular countries. In Germany, for example, the nation is not even agreed about the ultimate foundations of its life and the whole basis of its future. It is confronted—if we may borrow the title of a book written by a sympathetic student of its life, M. Vienot—by *les incertitudes allemandes*. Shall it become a Communist society? Shall it take the form of a system of State-regulated Socialism? Shall it permanently assume the shape of a nationalist Aryan Folk devoted to the doctrine of blood and purity of race? When a nation is face to face with uncertainties so profound, its parties will inevitably be passionate and wage a passionate war of extermination. The past history and tradition of German parties, as well as their present problems, serve to explain their absolute temper. Observers have long remarked their doctrinaire spirit, which makes them uncompromising and intractable. They cultivate an exclusive ideology, and they cherish a passion for realising that ideology to the *n*th degree. This spirit and this passion are by no means entirely the fault of the parties themselves, or of the nation behind the parties. They are largely an

inheritance from the old pre-war absolutist system, which deprived parties of any real chance of responsibility, and of the chastening and moderating effects of responsibility. Parties were not built into a system of democratic institutions, as one of the essential organs of that system. They stood on the circumference of an alien system; and isolated as they were, they were driven to isolate themselves still further. It takes time to shed the inheritance of the past; and Germany is still labouring to-day under that inheritance.

Whatever the causes, particular or general, we are confronted to-day by the problem of party. Party is necessary for democracy; but we have to make party safe for democracy. This was the issue which vexed the sage and much-travelled Ulysses of English politics, Lord Bryce. His hope came to be fixed in an expert and impartial second chamber, which would be a sort of Solon in the strife of parties, and would stand, as Solon said of himself, "throwing a strong shield over all, and not allowing any to carry the day unfairly." It is not easy to dress ourselves in that hope. No single institution, and least of all a reformed second chamber, can be our salvation. What hopes are we then to cherish, and what shall we advocate?

First of all, we may say that a system of government by discussion demands a certain temper of mind, which it is our bounden duty to cultivate, both individually and as a nation. It demands a common acceptance of the rules of national discussion and the standing orders of national debate—unwritten rules and orders which require abstinence from imputation and innuendo, jibes and personalities, flouts and jeers, unless such flouts and jeers be administered in that happy spirit of chaff and teasing which only a master of tact can ever possess. Again, it involves a gallant readiness to accept defeat, when the electorate has pronounced its verdict. No party (and least of all a traditional party rooted in social connections) is justified in using social power or social influence to defeat or avert the verdict of national debate. Again, and above all, a system of government by discussion demands a quality of mind which we may call by the name of agreement to differ. In other words, it demands agreement on the general lines of the national constitution and the general trend of national development, coupled with genuine difference on particular policies and programmes. It is here, and at

this point, that a radical difficulty emerges. There are those who believe that redistribution of wealth and equalisation of status (which, it may safely be prophesied, the future has in store for us in any case) must be achieved immediately by a sudden break. *Their* policies and programmes, they argue, necessarily involve a rejection of some of the lines of the constitution, and a departure from much of the trend of national development. Such an argument is in itself a challenge to the temper of democracy; and the policy in which it issues is a challenge to democratic institutions. The policy is a policy of dictatorship (though it may be called by the softer name of emergency power), issuing from a single chamber, responsible only to the party majority in that chamber, and uncriticised and unchecked by the courts of law which, for centuries past, have acted as the guardians of the constitution. The danger of such a policy is less its own realisation than the realisation of its opposite. Few of us would seriously fear an effective dictatorship of the Left. Many of us might seriously fear the rapid emergence of a real dictatorship of the Right, by way of instant reaction against any appearance of dictatorship on the Left. The only dictatorial power that could actually be established in Great Britain is that of the great professional class which is so strongly entrenched, by its very functions of direction and management, in our national life. May it never be inspired to make the attempt; and may the quiet process of victory by general conviction never be displaced by the *élan* of victory through a *coup d'état*.

Democracy not only requires an appropriate temper: it also requires appropriate institutions. Not the least important of those institutions, especially in its bearing on party, is the electorate, and the methods by which the electorate votes. Here, so far as the evidence goes, it would appear to suggest that a method of voting on the principles of proportional representation ultimately tends, when it is pushed to its logical conclusions, to accentuate and exacerbate party, and to make it assume the character of an end in itself, and not a means in a system of democratic government. If each party can be assured of its proportionate share, every party will do its utmost to secure that share. There is indeed a great difference between the system which is advocated for England by the Proportional Representation Society and the integral systems of some other countries which only allow the voter to vote for

prepared party lists in many-member constituencies. But if we once begin to listen to the logic of mathematics, we may easily be driven by that logic beyond our original intention. If we desire to escape the growth of over-mighty parties, and if we prefer to keep a member in close touch with his constituency rather than assign him directly to his party, we shall be wise to keep the single-member constituency and a simple method of voting. By the logic of mathematics they may be dubious. But the real question we have to solve is not a question of mathematical logic. It is a question of what best suits the logic—and not only the logic, but also the life—of democracy. Dictators have sometimes climbed to power on the ruined steps of proportional representation.

We have not only to consider the old institutions and methods of democracy. We have also to consider the possibility of new methods and institutions: we have to ask ourselves whether their adoption may not help to preserve a balance, and to prevent party, or any other existing organ, from becoming unduly dominant. Some have advocated a National Council of Industry, or an economic sub-parliament, which might provide another forum than that of parliament and its parties for the discussion of economic issues. It is not clear that these grave issues can ever be considered fruitfully by any body other than parliament; nor is it likely that the divisions in an economic sub-parliament would be less acute than those in parliament itself. But there are other methods and organs of discussion which are already beginning to be tried, and which are well worthy of our attention. In particular, there is the method of consultation, in many of the ministries in Whitehall, between official experience inside and the free expert outside. Some of us have joined, for example, in the constant discussions which are always on foot at the Board of Education, and we have seen those discussions issue in educational policies of the very first order of importance, such as the policy of the Hadow Report. This is a new development of the democratic principle of discussion: and here democracy is using its essential principle to enlist in its service the expert advice and the general experience to be found in the civic community. It is a matter of happy augury that the executive side of government should thus be devising new methods of discussion which bring the expert and the spirit of science into the service of democracy. There has been some

criticism, in recent years, of the new despotism of bureaucracy. Should there not also be some praise of the new democracy of the bureaucrats?

There is one last way of making party safe for democracy which lies open before us all. If we wish for the continuance of democracy—and it may safely be said that every man in Great Britain does—it is our bounden duty to see to it that our party seeks to work out the fundamental principle of the intrinsic value of human personality in its application to the economic life of our nation. The days are gone in which we can be content with the eighteenth-century ideal of civil and religious liberty, or the nineteenth-century ideal of political liberty and a free vote for every citizen. To-day it is laid upon the Liberal party—and indeed upon all parties—to have some vision of the new economic liberty which has still to be won, and which will make every worker a free man co-operating freely in a free system of industry. There are different ways of attaining that liberty, and every party may advocate its own way. But every party has to think out, and to advocate, *some* way. It would be a grave exacerbation of party, and a serious menace to democracy, if one party stood alone in calling men to a new Jerusalem, and the rest were still content to offer the ancient shibboleths of the old. Those who belong to the Liberal party may well congratulate, as true servants of democracy, the members who joined in producing, five years ago, the vision which they called by the name of Britain's Industrial Future. So long as an old and historic party can think in such terms, and bring such a contribution into the forum of discussion, there is no great reason to fear the breakdown of democracy in our country. But the duty of our own party is also the duty of all other parties. Within the lines of our national constitution, and within the general trend of our national development, all parties are essentially bound, by their very nature as organs of democracy, to think and to ponder how the fundamental principle of democracy can be introduced more fully into the field of economic life and organisation. The greatest way of making democracy safe to-day is that all our parties should join in discussing how best it can be carried further. It will only break down if it is made to stand still.

ERNEST BARKER.

GERMANY'S SECOND REFORMATION.

LAST November Germany celebrated the 450th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth, not in rejoicing but confusion, for the legitimate heirs of Luther were struggling against those who sought, in Luther's very name, to defile their heritage by the consummation of what was alleged to be a second Reformation. Never through all his stormy life can Luther have witnessed greater spiritual turmoil than that which has prevailed in Germany of late. The eternal problem of the relation of Church and State perhaps supplies the kernel of the conflict. This, in the sixteenth century, was intensified by the clash between Emperor and Princes; to-day the sudden appearance of a remorseless revolutionary dictatorship has made it more actual than ever before, and a new crystallisation of religious forces has resulted from the ambitious demands of the new State.

Only a short time before the National Socialists captured the governmental machine of Germany, a new group had appeared in the Protestant or Evangelical Churches of Germany. These people call themselves German Christians; they desire a logically complete Nazification of religious life, which would, in effect, cause the Church exactly to mirror the Nazi State. The organisation of the Church should, they hold, be authoritarian, its membership conditioned by racial purity, while its teaching should condemn all liberal, internationalist or peace-loving thought.* One need scarcely add that the German Christians take every opportunity to emphasise a soldierly attitude to life; their meetings are something like military parades, and their spokesmen regard war as a divine education in heroism. "Theological Storm Troops" first appeared in Saxony, but since the Storm Troops have again been opened to new recruits, all young pastors are being urged, by persons such as *Landeskirchenführer* Schultz of Mecklenburg, to enlist.

The German Christians, although very German, appear to be very logical. Their aim is a National Church which includes

* Dr. Krummacher, the Commissioner temporarily superimposed upon the Church in Westphalia and the Rhineland last summer, issued an order on July 8th, which ended with the following characteristic words: "... Whoever does not recognise in the State's attack [on the Church] a Divine Judgment upon the ineptitude of the Scribes and Pharisees ... must know that he is standing for Liberalism and Marxism, and for the division and weakness of the Evangelical Church, and ... for a pastors' church which is alienated from the people. ..."

all members of the German race—here they have hopes of leading, not following, the State—and excludes all others. One would, therefore, expect to find them in conflict rather with the Catholics than the Protestants. But they are content to make an armistice with Rome, while organising the seduction by patriotism of German Catholics; after all, Herr Hitler and Dr. Goebbels are very satisfactory Catholics. Perhaps the most perplexing point, both for the German Christians and their chroniclers, is their attitude to Christ Himself and the literature of the Jews. The argument is sometimes used that Christ was in revolt against the Jews, but since it is held to be alien blood, and blood alone, which blackens, this cannot meet the case. A convention has, however, been created by which the resurrection of Jesus has become a symbol for the heroic resurrection of Germany in 1933, and the Cross, we are told, may be regarded as complementary to the swastika.* The Old Testament is in general to be replaced by German History, and in September, for instance, the authorities in Schleswig forbade the teaching in schools of the "un-German" story of the sacrifice of Isaac. As for the unfortunate persons who, like Colonel Dusterberg, the *Stahlhelm* candidate for the Presidency in April 1932, are guilty of a Jewish grandparent, baptism cannot make them fit to be either pastors or lay members—they are to form separate communities now sometimes strangely named Christian Ghettos.

Although the German Christians regard themselves, not without justice, as the religious expression of National Socialism, a large number of good Nazis do not support them, and some, indeed, belong to the Young Reformers' movement. For some years now this movement has been trying to revivify the Protestant Churches of Germany. The Young Reformers were hostile to the liberal, free-thinking fabric of life in the Weimar days, and hampered by the multiplicity of loosely associated local churches. It is intelligible therefore that they greeted the Nazi Revolution with "a joyful yes,"† and welcomed Hitler's project for "tidying up" German Protestantism by the appointment of a Primate and a central advisory body. Not only the Lutheran, which was dominated by the Young Reformers, but also the smaller "Reformed"

* "*Christuskreuz und Hakenkreuz gehören zusammen*" is a favourite slogan.

† "*Ein freudiges ja.*" This phrase has been used a great deal.

or Calvinist group agreed to accept a co-ordinating reform. But almost immediately the mass of the Protestants found themselves in an impossible position, for they were not prepared to say a joyful yes to theological gymnastics with Christ's unmistakable teaching. All the most distinguished theologians, including the stoutest patriots—men like Dr. Dibelius,* who had been asked to preach at Potsdam on March 21st—found themselves up against the German Christian exhortation to be German first and Christian afterwards. For orthodox Lutherans the Bible *in toto* must still receive the reverence Luther had offered it, and blood must count for less than baptism. In Westphalia and the Rhineland and wherever Calvinist influence was considerable, there was, in addition, a strong resistance to the plan for wiping out self-government in the Church. The Young Reformers had, until now, thirsted for a little discipline and authority in the chaos of the self-governing Protestant communities. Suddenly they found that they, too, must fight against coercion.

For the German Christians had not unnaturally captured the Chancellor's ear. Herr Hitler, years ago, had met a certain chaplain named Ludwig Müller, to whom he became attached, and to whom he has remained characteristically loyal. Müller became involved with the German Christian movement; he is a weak character, and easily, though not altogether willingly, became the instrument of its more violent leaders, among whom Hossenfelder was soon conspicuous. Herr Hitler was naturally ignorant of the problems of Protestantism, and readily accepted a German Christian diagnosis. He was assured that Protestant feeling had swung round as eagerly to the German Christian view as political feeling had rallied to National Socialism, and approved Nazi methods were then applied to make sure that this should be true. For the Young Reformers could then be branded as no better than a lot of superannuated Social Democrats.

The struggle centred around the choice of the new Primate, for the mass of the Lutheran clergy supported the nomination of the deeply respected Dr. von Bodelschwingh, while the German Christians put forward Ludwig Müller. All along the Prussian secular authorities have been particularly enthusiastic in supporting the German Christians, a sect of which the Prussian Premier, General Göring, whole-heartedly

* Dismissed in September from his position of General Superintendent.

approves, and at the end of June the Protestant Church was subjected to virtual occupation by Prussian commissioners and Storm Troopers. The Reich officials are less violent, owing to the Lutheran feelings of Hindenburg and the common-sense views of Hess,* and the *Reichskanzlei* interfered in a moderate direction in July. In the Synodal Elections held on July 23rd, however, the German Christians received every secular encouragement in their demonstration that the Protestants of Germany wished them well. The Press refused to publish any but German Christian news; Storm Troops confiscated the pamphlets of the "Gospel and Church" group—a coalition of the enemies of the German Christians; thus, simple people, where they could not be personally reassured, were bewildered. In Berlin, one orthodox pastor was taken off by car to have a "short talk" with the local Storm Troop leader half an hour before he was to address a meeting; the Brown Shirts drove him round Berlin for two and a half hours; when he returned home, he found that a German Christian had addressed the meeting in his place. This incident is typical. In most of Berlin and in Westphalia, the "Gospel and Church" nevertheless gained an absolute majority, but it was announced that the Synodal elections had resulted in a great victory for the supporters of Müller.

The German Christians now arranged that the events of September should crown those of July. When the Prussian General Synod met on September 5th, the "Gospel and Church" group were threatened with imprisonment in concentration camps; as they could get no hearing whatever, they seceded, leaving the German Christians in possession of the ground. The Aryan clause,† as applied to State jobs, was then adopted for the Church in Prussia,‡ and Hossenfelder was nominated Bishop of Brandenburg. National festivities were arranged to precede, at Wittenberg, the final election of Müller as Primate, and the Swedish Archbishop was invited to participate. The word "*Glaubensgenossen*,"§ as he whispered to some of his friends, stuck uneasily in his throat. Meanwhile, the Lutheran pastors had formed their *Notbund*

* Herr Hitler's deputy, who has just received full Cabinet rank.

† The disqualification of anyone with one Jewish grandparent. One of the earliest protests against this was the remarkable statement from the Marburg theologians on September 20th.

‡ After this it was applied in several other States.

§ Comrades in Faith.

(Emergency League); out of a total of some 16,000 pastors, 2,000 hastened to join; the number soon reached 3,000, while many sympathisers were of course held back by the fear of dismissal with nothing but the dole to follow. The *Notbund* was formed to facilitate all kinds of co-operation, but especially to disseminate information—since all other sources were sealed—from the pulpit. Twenty-two of the leading pastors—it was impossible to collect more signatures in the little time available—now drew up a protest, in the name of Truth and Love, against coercive measures and the Aryan clause. That protest was somehow put into the hands of every member of the National Synod at Wittenberg; when it was still ignored, they pinned it up on the trees and fastened it to the church railings. It was 416 years since Luther had nailed up his theses in that very place. Yet Müller was elected *Reichsbischof* on September 27th, 1933.

Not long after Germany slammed the door on Geneva, some of the *Notbund* leaders hastened to express a keen approval in a telegram to the Chancellor, dated October 15th; and a period of religious truce to cover November 12th, the day of the Referendum, was tacitly agreed to. The extremists could not contain themselves even so long. In his notorious speech at the Berlin *Sportpalast* on November 11th, General Göring openly insulted the Catholics, and by inference the Lutherans, and earlier that day the Prussian Church authorities ordered the suspension of two *Notbund* heroes—Martin Niemöller of Dahlem and von Rabenau. With this the battle was joined. On the following Monday the *Sportpalast* was the scene of a demonstration which outdid the fervour of the Prussian Premier. After a speech from Bishop Hossenfelder, who then left the Hall, a German Christian official named Krause addressed the public; his remarkable speech deserves quotation.

“Luther,” he said, “as a German national* preacher, who strove to bridge the gulf between God and the German man, took German mysticism as his starting-point. . . . German nationality in language and custom were to him precisely as the nature of God’s work and a divine gift. How do things stand to-day with this National Church created by Luther? The National Socialist claim to totalitarian authority cannot halt before the Church which

* The words *völkische*, *Volksthum*, etc., defy the translator. For *völkische* the French translate “*raciste*.” I have alternated between national and racial.

National Socialism desires to revivify with its own spirit. . . . The Protestant people of Germany is not concerned with a new constitution . . . for the Church, but rather with the perfection of the racial mission of Martin Luther in a second German Reformation. . . . This involves the uncompromising expulsion of everything alien to the race, the cancellation of the Old Testament as Holy Writ, and of the obviously distorted or superstitious portions of the New Testament. . . . Holy Places are to be sought not in Palestine, but in the Fatherland. A close relationship between the Nordic spirit and the heroic Jesus must be emphasised, and the consummation of Martin Luther’s Reformation will signify the final victory of the Nordic spirit over oriental materialism.”*

At this the leaders of the *Notbund* were for the first time able to take the offensive—with no uncertain voice they threatened schism if the extremer German Christian authorities were not removed. Almost immediately they gained the dismissal of Krause and the suspension of the regional application of the Aryan clause. But it was only on November 28th that Bishop Hossenfelder, protégé of Göring, was compelled to resign, together with Dr. Werner, from the Primate’s Spiritual Ministry, after a transitional period in which the Primate vacillated, while the *Notbund* pressed hard with a strong declaration from the 3,000 pulpits on November 19th. Between November 19th and November 28th it became every day clearer that Protestantism, as a whole, supported the pastors, while, except in Thuringia, the German Christian leaders were to some extent deserted by their own rank and file. For the orthodox Lutherans have two strange allies—or, perhaps, one should rather say accomplices—the Catholics and the German Faith Movement. The latter is an apparently growing conglomeration of people with Germanic, not Christian, beliefs. At a congress at Eisenach in the summer, seven groups of this kind amalgamated, and elected as their first President Professor Hauer of Tübingen University. Another leader of the German Faith Movement is Professor Bergmann of Leipzig, who has enunciated the following new creed:

“I believe in the God of German religion, who works through Nature, through the lofty spirit of man and the strength of his people,

“And in the Ally in struggle, Christ, who fights for the nobility of the human soul,

“And in Germany, the school† of the new humanity.”

* A usual indictment of Jewry. † The German word is *Bildungsland*.

a compromise which, while imposing an outward uniformity upon the Protestant Church, will allow a considerable freedom to those who preach. An enormous number of questions remain, at the moment of writing, unanswered. How will the Primate's Spiritual Ministry be reconstructed? Will Müller himself remain? Will the orthodox pastors agree that the German Christians may be free to preach heresy?—for that is what it must amount to, despite the recent declaration from Hossenfelder and the Weimar Congress of German Christians that they adhere to Bible and Creed. If the *Notbund* pastors stand firm, they will probably lose their last hope of influence over the keenest Nazi spirits, men like the Youth Leader, Baldur von Schirach, who is proud to declare with Göring, "I am neither a Catholic nor a Protestant—I am German." At the moment the German Christians seem determined to remain within the Church; as extremist Nazis, they must find it good *raison d'état* to remain, in order that the Church shall be, at some point, duly and finally harnessed to the State. They are hoping now to accept a dissolution of groups within the Church,* and so to disarm their enemies of the *Notbund* while they still exert disproportionate influence in high places. Even if the events of this autumn must be admitted to constitute a set-back, they will renew their efforts to realise Christianity at the first opportunity. Then in the last resort, some Lutherans, it appears, may turn back to Rome. It will be strange indeed if the violence of National Socialism can bring about a reunion, which, since the Diet of Ratisbon in 1541, has seemed—except perhaps to Leibniz—too remote to deserve contemplation.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

* Foreshadowed actually as long ago as July by a statement of Müller's in *Das Evangelische Deutschland*.

THE NEW UNEMPLOYMENT BILL.

WRITING during the second reading stage of the new Unemployment Bill one may congratulate the Government on the polite reception which their proposals are receiving, without quite accepting their own valuation of them as "one of the most constructive pieces of social legislation for many generations." The Bill is really a strange collection of Bills. It runs all over the map of social affairs and, in the name of unemployment, transforms a great deal of scenery. It is an Education Bill which, potentially, raises the school age to eighteen for all unoccupied persons. It sets up a new State Poor Law. It amortises a vast public debt and it revolutionises our traditional ideas of what should be the proper spheres of national and local government. Evidently the House of Commons likes its pickles mixed!

There is of course no mystery about the reason for the Bill's popularity. Part I is drawn on sympathetic lines for assisting the insured unemployed, and puts the insurance scheme on a so-called "actuarial" basis; while Part II relieves the ratepayers and corresponds with the sentiment of the country in trying to make the whole of unemployment a national responsibility. Few people seem to understand the administrative upheaval that is involved. Part I of the Bill, which deals with Unemployment Insurance, is the lesser part, but none the less contains some excellent features. It extends the duration of benefit from six months to a full year for those with a steady contributory record over the preceding five years; it brings juveniles into insurance at the school-leaving age, thus filling the present gap below 16, and it links with this a more promising scheme for ensuring that if a boy is not in work then he shall be in school, at any rate in the larger towns. These betterments are only feasible because the Insurance Fund is now able to show a balance on the right side of nearly £1,000,000 a month. But, having thus provided, the Minister of Labour cannot yet see his way to restore any part of the 1931 cuts in benefit nor to lower contributions. Insured persons may, however, reasonably hope for one or other of these boons at an early date, if the level of unemployment continues to be lower than the Government's estimate.

The present satisfactory position of the Insurance Fund is really due, not so much to the drop in unemployment since January 1933, as to the major reforms which the National Government were prompt to introduce during the crisis of 1931. In effect they then cut the scheme in two and restored the top half of it to its original function as a limited liability insurance, with fixed benefits governed by contributions. For the other half of the insured unemployed free benefits were continued on the same scales, but subject to a local Means Test. These were called Transitional Payments, and a point to note is that they were limited payments and were thus unlike poor relief which has to meet total needs. Such limits have immensely simplified administration and have at the same time left practically no consequential problem for the local Public Assistance Committees. Only some 40,000 families in the country are found to be receiving supplementary relief from local funds in addition to unemployment benefit or maximum Transitional Payments. The Poor Law is, however, looking after some 200,000 other so-called able-bodied persons and their families, who are shut out from any Ministry of Labour payments either because of personal failings or because they have not been normally employed in insured trades. Another significant fact is that, out of 5,000,000 insured workers who experienced unemployment at one time or another in the last year, over 4,000,000 of them qualified for a spell of benefit on their contributions (minimum—thirty in previous 104 weeks). This may look inexplicable, seeing that at every monthly count about 1,000,000 of these persons could not so qualify and were in consequence claiming Transitional Payments on a needs basis under the Government's secondary scheme. The reason is that, even in the worst of years, there is a continuous change of personnel throughout almost the whole of the total register of unemployment.

The main purpose of Part II is to terminate the 1931 emergency scheme of Transitional Payments to ex-insured persons and to set up in its place a new and much wider system of State relief which will provide, not only for those who exhaust their benefit rights, but also for those who have hitherto been excluded altogether from Unemployment Insurance and Transitional Payments, such as agricultural and domestic employees.

Over a year ago it was the business of a Royal Commission

to present to the Government a comprehensive scheme for this purpose. They proposed a new Unemployment Assistance Service to be operated, under the control of the Ministry of Labour, through the local authorities which are already equipped for the social assistance of poverty and sickness in all its many forms. For purely industrial needs, such as training and placing, the Ministry of Labour was to remain responsible. That plan has not been adopted although, administratively, it could and can be supported by strong arguments. For the present the Government have turned away from co-operation with the local social services and have committed themselves to a centralised system. An Unemployment Assistance Board is to be set up, independent of Parliamentary control and with something over £50,000,000 a year to spend in relieving the total needs of all families, any *one* of whose supporting members between sixteen and sixty-five years of age is unemployed and becomes a client of the Board. This is a vast undertaking. It nationalises for the first time the relief of poverty, the poverty, on present figures, of some 5,000,000 persons, including dependents, in the course of a year. It creates a new National Poor Law. Yet it does not mean that our local Public Assistance Authorities will have no more concern with the able-bodied. They will still have to keep their appropriate services in being. They must still deal with all cases of sudden and urgent necessity, with the medical needs of the able-bodied man who has fallen out of health insurance and with his maintenance too if he has left his job through sickness. They must still stand by to receive the "rejects" of the Board and, since the Board has power to expel from its allowances all hopeless or recalcitrant cases, there is no knowing how many may thus be left to the local Poor Law. In addition there are still some 2,000,000 working-class people who will always be excluded from the favours of the Board because they do not happen to have been employed under contract of service, e.g. small traders and hawkers, as well as those who have been above the £5 a week scale.

It follows, therefore, that the task of providing for the able-bodied poor is still to be divided between the State and the local authorities, though the State's share of the business is to be immensely increased. In every area there will be two sets of officials administering public assistance in two sets of premises. Records and home visits will be duplicated and

there will be two Means Tests. Many families will be continually passing from the hands of the P.A.C. into the hands of the Board and back again, and, over an important margin of cases, a conflict will be set up between the Board and the local authority, each trying to make the other accept the burden of maintaining the family.

There is still a slight mystery about the Regulations under which the new Board will work. It is clear that they are to be laid before Parliament by the Minister of Labour. It is probable that they will specify the scales of monetary allowances, the details of which Parliament will *not* be able to amend. But since the Board has to make discretionary payments for the relief of an infinite variety of circumstances, can the scales be more than a general guide? What about rent which may vary from 20s. to 3s. 6d. for identical families? How many different definitions of a lodger, etc., will have to be made? In any case it is not to be supposed that the scales could be so inelastic as to preclude any distinction between areas with a higher and areas with a lower cost of living than the average. Surely uniformity is unattainable?

The Board's allowances will be drawn at Employment Exchanges or, in remote districts, at Post Offices. They may be given by way of supplement to wages or to unemployment benefit. They must, like Poor Relief, meet the whole estimated needs of the family which lives as an economic unit, and it will not matter whether those needs are all due to unemployment or not. Among the Board's clients will be people who, having voluntarily abandoned or refused a job, have been disallowed insurance benefit. Such persons may thus return to the Exchange which disallowed them and draw as much or more than they would have got in benefit. There is, of course, a grave danger in all this to the insurance scheme. If it is to be a common practice for the Board to supplement benefit or to pay allowances to the non-insured which exceed the benefits of the insured, the whole idea of the contributory system begins to look foolish. These things occur here and there to-day, but under the present system it is the local P.A.C. that is responsible for total needs as a *social* problem while the State makes *industrial* payments in respect of unemployment at flat rates or subject to definite limits. Owing to the separation of the two services and their real difference of function, the difficulties are not now conspicuous. In the future, however, the State is to be responsi-

ble both for paying fixed benefits drawn as a right and for meeting maximum social needs. Are these two functions really compatible? Above all, should they both be implemented through the Employment Exchanges?

In the opinion of the writer there are only two basic principles and two methods open to any modern community which has to relieve unemployment. It must either (1) give compensation at fixed rates, subject to some fairly simple industrial tests of genuine unemployment, in which case the benefit or free dole would have nothing to do with poverty; or (2) it must relieve poverty as such, irrespective of its causes, which are usually more complex than unemployment. In the former case a central industrial authority should administer the service; in the latter case local social authorities must do the task. Now, as ever, the relief of the distressed is a neighbourhood affair, especially when the whole range of assistance services, maintenance, medical and educational, are themselves locally controlled.

What is happening under the Government's Bill is that, owing to temporary political and financial exigencies, a service is to be set up which confuses the principles of type (1) above with the practice of type (2), and then lands the State with the administration of the mixture. The only logical excuse for such a departure would be that it was consciously planned as a first stage in the rapid evolution of a network of centralised services to take the place of the whole range of local social administration. Of that, however, there is no sign at present.

But it is a graceless task to go on picking holes in this most vulnerable of projects. The decision in favour of centralisation seems to be irrevocable. The money issue has killed the Royal Commission's plan stone dead, and the chance of a co-operative scheme with local authorities has "gone by the board." There is, however, one way in which Part II of the Bill could still be amended without destroying the main principle of the Government's policy. The clue to it lies in the existing scheme of Transitional Payments, which, in many respects, has been a success. These payments besides being subject to a Means Test are subject to the limitation that they must not exceed the rates of insurance benefit and are only given to persons who satisfy the statutory conditions of benefit, other than the contributory conditions. That is to say, they are not open to those who are personally to blame for their own unemployment, who have left or refused suitable

work, or have been dismissed for misbehaviour. They are also restricted to persons who can show that they are normally employed and are still in the industrial field. If these payments were now thrown open to uninsured workers, including agriculturalists, they would solve much the same problem of able-bodied unemployment as that for which the new Unemployment Assistance Board is being proposed, and they would do so without some of the worst embarrassments involved by the Bill on its present lines. Such a scheme could be regarded as an approximation to an industrial compensation scheme (type I above); it would leave the relief of poverty as such to the proper local bodies and it would not constitute an immediate threat to contributory unemployment insurance. Nor would it be a plunge in the dark, but would be based on the experience gained since 1931. The Ministry of Labour could, of course, dissolve its partnership with the local P.A.C.'s and could proceed, in orthodoxy, to assess its own payments by its own test of needs. Theoretically, as the Labour Party now insist, there should be no Means Test in any strictly industrial scheme, but the test is essential in practice in order to keep away a whole army of spurious claimants and to save perhaps £20,000,000 on the enlarged clientèle. Ultimately the payments could perhaps be linked with insurance benefit in a wide unitary scheme, much as in Germany Standard Benefit and Crisis Benefit have always been associated. Some of the difficulties and some of the anomalies alleged above against the proposals of Part II would certainly remain, but one supreme advantage would be gained if, under this simplified version, the Government could be persuaded to turn their Unemployment Assistance Board into an advisory body, to concentrate executive power solely in the Ministry of Labour and to abandon the pretence that the Dole can possibly be kept out of politics.

One further point: what justification is there for splitting into two the most valuable and expert training work which has, since 1925, been developed by the Ministry of Labour for the unemployed under thirty-five? Why should the Board be allowed to have jurisdiction over its own separate training schemes and centres, which are bound to be on the same lines as those to be retained by the Ministry? If the Bill could be amended on some such lines as are indicated above, this and many other false steps in administration might yet be avoided.

RONALD C. DAVISON.

THE PROBLEM OF AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY IN A EUROPEAN WAR.

THE present moment is one in which the tense political atmosphere which for the last few months has been oppressing Europe seems slightly to have eased. We are on the way to direct negotiations between France and Germany on the vexed question of armaments; the recent unfortunate incident on the Austro-German frontier by which a German frontier-guard lost his life has been handled with marked reserve by the German Press; one or two obviously "inspired" statements in the Austrian newspapers, coupled with conciliatory references to Germany by the Chancellor, Dr. Dollfuss, suggest a desire to heal over the feud which has led to so much bitterness between the two countries. But it would be over-optimistic to conclude that we are "out of the wood." The arrest of Dr. Frauenfeld, a prominent leader of the Austrian Nazis, almost at the time of writing, shows no slackening down in Dollfuss's determination to tolerate neither the Nazis nor their works, whilst there are many of my own friends in Vienna, fervent admirers of Hitler, who make no secret of their own conviction that German diplomacy, at the present day, is directed mainly to an attempt to isolate France. Germany, they assure me, even at the present time, is quite capable of dealing with France alone. But she cannot face a world in arms. Thus she is concerned to avoid the errors made by her diplomacy in 1914, and to throw the onus of any failure to reach a settlement exclusively on to the shoulders of the Government in Paris. This may perhaps be an exaggerated view. It is earnestly to be hoped that it is. But writing here in Austria, in close touch with the realities of the situation, I may stress that the possibilities are still very grave. Suppose France and Germany fail to reach an agreement? What is going to happen should the very worst occur? Germany, we will assume, starts to rearm in defiance of the goodwill of France; France deems her only path to salvation to lie in striking before Germany is ready. War ensues. To those who would answer that talk of war breeds war, that we must not even contemplate such a catastrophe, I would venture very humbly to reply that there is not much sense in emulating the policy of an ostrich. God grant that there will be enough in the way of wisdom and statesmanship

among the Governments of Europe to avoid so dire an issue as a new edition of 1914. But the danger is real and obvious; so real and obvious that only a fool or a lunatic could venture to ignore it.

Should war come, what is likely to be the fate of Austria? Or the rôle played by the Austrian Government? I will start by stressing, what many people in recent years are apt to forget, that the Austrians are fundamentally Germans. Moreover, it is inevitable that Germany should exercise a tremendous gravitational "pull" over Austria. To get the real relations between the two countries, and to appreciate the intense, if suppressed, bond of racial sympathy, one must imagine the British Empire cut to pieces as ruthlessly as occurred with the Habsburg Monarchy; one must imagine the people of Canada surviving as a fragment, and think of the mighty magnetism bound to be exercised upon this remnant by the mass of Anglo-Americans dwelling south; the inevitable tendency for any great popular movement which swept the United States to sweep also across an artificial boundary line, and to carry Canada with it. The real history of the Austrian Government within the last few months is the history of a Government fighting to dam down a fierce tidal wave of human passion, and successful in doing this because it has at its disposal one of the most efficient bodies of police in the world, backed by a well-paid, well-equipped, and well-disciplined army; favoured, moreover, by a reaction on the part of industrialists and intellectuals against the crimes and blunders which stained the Nazi movement.

Conservative elements were horrified at the outspoken violence of the Nazi creed; the Jews, in Vienna a very powerful body, were roused to fury by anti-Semitic outrages; industrialists feared for the stability of the schilling; desperately anxious to get the loan promised from Geneva, and no less anxious to avoid doing anything which might estrange France. This combination of motives led to the Nazi effort to "rush" Austria being sharply repudiated. The Government, fighting for its own very existence, ruthlessly met force by force, and the issue showed that it could command greater financial and military resources than were at the disposal of the Nazis. For Germany to have invaded Austria would have meant an immediate crisis with France before she was ready. Thus Hitler was reduced to looking on,

and doing practically nothing, while the Austrian Nazis, who looked to him for help and inspiration, were proscribed, imprisoned, or exiled; their Party organisations forcibly dissolved, their funds confiscated, their Press prohibited. All these are things which it is safe to say have created an unbridgeable gulf between Hitler and Dollfuss.

If the Nazis ever got the upper hand in Vienna, the present Austrian Chancellor's life would not be worth a farthing, should he be unfortunate enough to fall into their hands. His most probable fate would be to be shot "while attempting to escape," or else to commit "suicide" whilst awaiting trial as a "traitor." Yet with it all Nazi-ism in Austria has been only scotched and not killed. The population might be divided at present into one-third Nazis, one-third Socialists, one-third members of other Parties. Among the Nazi third may be included a large proportion of the professors; most of the lesser officials secretly sympathise with the Nazi movement, although, owing to the threat of summary dismissal, they fear to show this openly. A considerable proportion of the professional classes, the smaller tradespeople, and an overwhelming majority of the students are also Nazi. In Linz and Vienna the bulk of the working people are of course Socialists; Jewish members of the professional classes are also Socialist; in Tirol, Carinthia, Styria, traditionally the strongholds of the Christian Socialist Party, the Nazi wave has surged high; there was a time when troops from other districts had to be drafted in to preserve order.

Against these successes by the Nazis must be set the rise of the Patriotic Party founded by Dollfuss. This aims at cultivating Austrian Particularism. The motto runs *Oesterreich über Alles*. The old patriotic songs and marches are played at party meetings; the old military uniforms have been restored. I can recall the time when, in the case of one of my own lectures given at the Government broadcasting station, the charmingly courteous official who acted as a sort of censor, put his pencil through a passage in which I described a crowd on the Heldenplatz in Vienna singing *O Du Mein Oesterreich!* with tears in their eyes, and said that patriotism in Austria was not yet dead. Politics, quoth he, must not be introduced on the "wireless." Dollfuss has made a great change in all that and in my opinion a beneficial one, for he has worked on the lines of stimulating national self-respect,

and of opposing to Nazi idealism a counter-idealism. Yet he suffers from his own dependence on foreign support. The Nazi agitator, who subterraneously is just as active as ever, has a telling argument at his command. "Look," he says, "here is a man who talks patriotism. And he goes to London, Paris, Rome, to the very people who were Austria's most bitter enemies and wrought her ruin, and who divided millions of Austrians up among Slavs and Italians like so many head of cattle, and asks for *their* help against his brother Germans." Of course the argument is unfair. Dollfuss, as gallant and patriotic a little man as ever served his country, has been forced to go to London, Paris and Rome, as the only means of saving his country from bankruptcy, and the Austrian people from ruin and starvation. But the people who listen to Nazi agitators are seldom capable of taking fair or just views on any problem. And the general state of depression is a powerful lever in Nazi hands.

Although figures have been published indicating an improved trade balance, and a reduction in the number of unemployed, the opinion of any observer in close touch with business and professional circles will run that people seem to have even less money at the present time than a year ago; prices have risen, but earning-power has not risen proportionately. The heroic efforts of the present Government to balance the budget have led to crushing taxation, the prolonged and arduous struggle to maintain the schilling exchange, has led to the ruthless cutting down of imports, with inevitable reactions upon the state of industry in general. Austria's present economic position is one of those paradoxes baffling to the conventional economist, and which suggest that the so-called science of economics is in reality an art. Theoretically, Austria should be prosperous. The schilling has sunk only a few points on the par of the gold exchange, far less than the dollar or the pound sterling. At par rates, for instance, sch. 34.50 = a pound sterling. At present rates in private clearing, a natural and not a manipulated rate, sch. 28.80 = a pound sterling. The depreciation of the pound sterling in terms of the gold standard is even greater, thus 23.50 sch. gold = a pound sterling. Imports and exports almost balance one another. Thus here we have the state of affairs which, according to the theories preached by eminent economists, should be almost ideal, namely a stable

currency and a natural balance between imports and exports. Yet, in reality, Austrian industry is on the verge of bankruptcy; old-established business houses are forced to plead with, beg and cajole the taxing authorities to gain time in which to pay their taxes; trade is in a state of stagnation.

It is hard to say how far the internal Loan, only just floated, will alter these things. The Loan, issued for sch. 200,000,000 and subscribed to the extent of sch. 250,000,000, is, from the financier's point of view, a brilliant success, and everyone connected with it, in especial Dr. Kienbeck, the Director of the National Bank, deserves to be congratulated upon a very fine piece of work. But although issued nominally at an interest of 4 per cent., the system of bonuses and other charges makes the real interest far higher; for the first ten years not less than 8 per cent., and it all depends upon how this sum is expended whether the Loan will be beneficial or not. Theoretically, it is to be spent upon public works to reduce unemployment; but unless these public works are profit-paying enterprises it is obvious that to spend money on them is merely a case of taking money from one set of pockets to put it into another. Viewed from any sound economic standpoint, any such process must be regarded as a redistribution of existing resources, not as something which adds to resources. These are considerations which lead me to the conclusion that, although Kienbeck has scored a success from the financial standpoint which deserves the warmest acknowledgment, it is too early to say whether he will be equally successful from the economic standpoint. The only economically successful loan is the one which adds to the taxable resources of a country instead of diminishing them. It is to be hoped that his great experience and vast ability will suffice to avert the danger that the Loan may be expended in a fashion to lead merely to a temporary stimulation of industry, to be followed ultimately by an even greater stagnation; it is certain that men such as Dollfuss and Vaugoin are strong enough and clear-sighted enough to realise the danger of pandering to party fads.

But will Austria, after all her sufferings and sacrifices, be afforded a fair chance to put her own house in order? That is the crux of the whole problem. The present Government has to face the fanatical opposition of two brands of extremists, the Nazis and the Socialists. To the Socialists, Dollfuss is at

best the lesser of two evils. They prefer him to Hitler, but they dislike both. Dollfuss has been forced by the logic of hard facts to disregard Parliament. It must in justice to him be stressed that the present Austrian Parliament is an unworkable institution, so torn with internal feuds and dissensions as to be unable to produce any firm majority for any policy at all. He has been forced by the logic of hard facts to impose drastic measures of censorship, and to rule by police and military power. The Socialists recognise, generally speaking, that he has been himself largely the victim of circumstances beyond his own control. It was for him a question of govern, or be kicked out by the Nazis. But they claim that he ought to have made a coalition with the Socialists, who were and are just as much opposed to the Nazis as he is himself. Instead of this he has been just as antagonistic to the Socialists as to the Nazis. The truth is, of course, that his own supporters would not hear of any alliance with the Socialists. For the Chancellor to have attempted this would have been merely to split his own party, and to drive more than two-thirds of these direct into the arms of the Nazis. The non-Nazi bourgeois parties hate the Socialists even more than they hate the Nazis. Nor do they love the Jews, and most of the Socialist leaders here are Jews. Thus, however desirable such a combination may have seemed theoretically, it was not "practical politics," and Dollfuss, from his own standpoint, was quite right to turn down the Socialist offer of an alliance. Still, the present position of the Government, waging a double-fronted fight, may be illuminated by two cases of summary dismissal which happened recently in the Allgemeines Krankenhaus, a State institution. A workman was dismissed after twenty-five years' service because he was a Socialist and suffered his tongue to wag too freely. A nursing sister was dismissed for the same offence because she was a Nazi.

So far as concerns any internal opposition, whether by Socialists or by Nazis, there is no doubt that the Government can maintain its power and may remain in office for a decade. But what is likely to be the effect of any open conflict between France and Germany? We must stress again that the Austrians are Germans. The Austrian non-Nazi may dislike Hitler and his ways, but this does not prevent him from feeling sympathy with his German kin. No competent or

honest observer can be blind to the fact that, even in quarters bitterly hostile to the Nazis, the feeling is much more in favour of Germany than of France. The real strength of this feeling is by no means reflected in the Press; it is to be found not only amongst Nazi extremists but—and this is particularly significant amongst the moderate-minded Austrians who take no great interest in politics but who remember Germany as the nation which fought shoulder to shoulder with them against a world in arms, and France as the country which embraced the cause of Czechs, Slavs and ultimately Italians, to bring ruin on Austria. So strong is this feeling that there are even high officials who, in private conversation, make no bones about admitting that, whatever Hitler's sins in other respects, they sympathise with his action in leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, and accept the standpoint that the conditions imposed on Germany were intolerably humiliating. I am not concerned to discuss whether this feeling is justifiable or not. The principal thing is that it exists, and must be taken into consideration.

How is it likely to affect Austria should, what God forbid, the antagonism between Germany and France issue in an armed struggle? There is not the slightest doubt that the conservative and propertied classes would throw all their influence in favour of neutrality; there is just as little doubt that the present Government would be prepared at need to defend Austrian neutrality by armed force, no matter from what side the attack came. Thousands, nay, tens of thousands, of volunteers would troop across the frontiers to join the German Army in event of war. No Government would be able to stop them. But so long as Germany refrained from any overt breach of Austrian neutrality the Government would have both the will and the power to keep the Austrian people, as a whole, out of the war. Austria would be officially neutral. But what would happen if Germany invaded Austria? There is the rub. Can anyone expect Austrian troops, who are German troops, to fire on their brother Germans for the sake of maintaining an independence sanctified by the peace of Versailles, which the average Austrian considers to have been an act of monstrous injustice? Can anyone expect an Austrian army, led by officers who for many years fought shoulder to shoulder with Germans, and who rejoiced in German successes as being Austrian successes, and who

sorrowed over German disasters as being Austrian disasters, to show any enthusiasm over the prospect of turning their arms against Germany for the benefit of France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland? I put this question only a few days ago to a thoughtful, patriotic Austrian, who hates the Nazis and their ways. I said: "If Germany, being in a state of war with France, invaded Austria, do you believe that Austrian troops would fire on them?" He pondered the question rather sadly and then answered: "I don't believe they would," and, with a sudden outburst, "I know I wouldn't."

Those who read history without a bandage of political prejudice will know that the neutrality of any State in time of war depends mainly upon the military interests of the combatants. A State strong enough to make itself unpleasant can force the belligerents to respect its interests. Other States will be left alone because they are too far away from the main theatre of war to warrant any diversion of force, or because it is to the common interest of both groups of belligerents to respect their neutrality. The tragedy of the present situation, as concerns Austria, is that Germany has everything to gain by disregarding Austria's neutrality, and nothing to lose. For Germany, war with France, or Czechoslovakia, or Poland, means automatically a state of war with all three, and very probably war with Italy, Yugoslavia, and Roumania besides. For her to invade Austria will not add to the number of her enemies, but will afford her a chance of joining hands with a Hungary which is just as hungry for vengeance as she is herself; it means the chance of adding to her own resources those of six million Austrians and of as many Magyars. Germany is not at present ready for an offensive against France on a great scale. She will need at least six months, and very possibly a year, to rush through her armaments programme on a scale to give her the chance of crushing and decisive victories in the West. But, make no mistake about it, she is ready for an offensive in the East and South-East. Austria, in particular, is a land of hills, mountains, forests, in which tanks are almost useless; reconnaissance and artillery observation from aircraft can be carried out only under very great difficulties; German superiority in infantry, machine-guns, and field-artillery can be exploited to the full. Thus, should war come, Germany's scheme will be, in all proba-

bility, to act upon the defensive on the West, with an eye to a subsequent offensive, and to strike hard at Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. All these are countries in which there is no lack of Nazi sympathisers. In Czechoslovakia alone, for instance, there are three million Germans who will welcome German troops as liberators. German troops, crossing the Austrian frontier at Salzburg or Kufstein, would also find themselves in a countryside swarming with their own supporters, and ready to welcome them with open arms. One may be as unsympathetic to Hitler as one likes. But there is not much use in shutting one's eyes to facts. And once German troops come swarming down on Vienna, what is going to be the plight of Dollfuss and the present Austrian Government? What happened to Hanover and other German States in the war of 1866?

Should German troops take Vienna, some very grim things are likely to happen. All the fierce passions of civil war will be unchained. The Nazis will rise against the present dominating faction in the spirit of Guelphs against Ghibellines. It will mean a long list of proscriptions, murders, in all probability a pogrom of the Jews. These things are almost certain to occur unless Europe recognises the danger and acts in time. And what about the people who have invested money in Austrian loans guaranteed by the League of Nations? If Germany is victorious she will snap her fingers at the League or its obligations. If she is beaten she will be ruined, and Austria will be ruined with her, and nobody will be able to get a farthing out of either country. Thus for the unfortunate subscribers it is going to be a sad case of "Heads you win, tails we lose." This, also, is an aspect of the problem which deserves to be brought to mind.

No one who knows the Austrians will have any other feeling than liking and sympathy for them. They are a charming, unhappy people. The responsibility for the present state of affairs rests not alone with Austria or with Germany, but with all Europe. It will be a crowning blunder to a long list of blunders if Austria is suffered to become a battle-ground for contending armies owing to lack of care and foresight on the part of those who bestowed upon her independence—against her own will.

VICTOR WALLACE GERMAINS.

NEWFOUNDLAND: ITS PLIGHT AND ITS PILL.

JOHAN CABOT got £10 from Henry VII for discovering Newfoundland. Cynical commentators say he ought to have got "ten years hard." Instead of which it is the Colony itself which is going to have the "ten years hard," while the old country is going to have to pay many times £10 to get her eldest colony out of the hole in which she finds herself to-day, and to set her again on her feet.

In resources Newfoundland is well off. John Cabot's report of the size and the numbers of the fish that teemed in her waters drew the fishermen of many European countries across the Atlantic, and the waters have been fished continuously year by year ever since. It is estimated that 200,000,000 cod are caught every year. Yet so prolific is the supply that there is no sign of its falling off. Of the seal the same cannot be said. The average kill is now some 200,000 per annum. It was once 500,000. The lobster and salmon both need to be watched. In the last eleven years the export of brine-frozen salmon, mainly to the United Kingdom, has been over one million a year, running up to nearly five millions in 1930-31. It is usually labelled "Arctic Salmon" in the shops. In addition there are smelts, caplin, halibut and turbot. The one substantial gain that Newfoundland secured at Ottawa was a differential duty imposed by Great Britain on Norwegian cod-liver oil entering the United Kingdom. It is disappointing, but owing to the failure of the inshore fishery the total production for 1933 will probably turn out to be the lowest recorded for forty years.

The forest areas which are equal to five-sixths of the total area of Scotland consist chiefly of spruce and fir, the best material for paper-making. These remained undeveloped until, in 1905, Messrs. Harmsworth set up big paper mills in the interior. This was followed by another big development on the Humber River in 1923. The product of these two companies runs to 1,100 tons of news scrip per diem. Both are worked by water-power, which is abundant.

Mining development is also of recent date. The Wabana iron ore mine is the largest in the British Empire, and the fourth largest in the world. But inasmuch as most of the output is taken by Germany, it is at the present moment only one-tenth of the normal; only half the regular number of

men are employed and these only for one-third of their time. The zinc and lead mine at Buchans is only four years old, but it has in spite of low prices continued to work full time and has increased its output. It is in fact an oasis in the economic desert. Copper mining was at one time one of the chief industries. Since 1918 the mines have not been operated. There are coalfields in the south-west which have been several times surveyed, but the stratification seems to be broken, and capital is timorous.

Agriculture has been neglected. Settlement on the land was deliberately disallowed for centuries by the Home Government, whose policy was to maintain Newfoundland as a fishing station based upon England (the trade being practically wholly in the hands of west country merchants), and also as a training ground for the British Navy. In any case the population was scattered along the coast. The main industry was fishing and agriculture was subordinate to that. There is fertile soil in the great river basins, notably in the valleys of the Codroy, Humber and Exploits, but in other parts it is shallow, light and stony. In one long stretch along the West of the south coast there is no cultivable ground within reach of the fishing settlements. In other parts, and specially in the interior, the land is boggy and sour, and there is no lime within reach. In these districts the recent experiments with the sour lands in Scotland ought to be valuable to Newfoundland when she sets out to develop the possibilities of her soil. But in gauging the agricultural possibilities it must not be forgotten that the season of growth is very short. Newfoundland is, so to speak, a salient of the Arctic zone. Though the latitude of St. John's is the latitude of Paris, the Arctic floe ice drifts down from the north in great icefields and towering bergs, and this delays the spring until June. The regular time for sowing is the end of May. If one sows earlier, one simply has to sow again. Once the seed has started, growth is rapid. But there is no chance of Newfoundland being able to supply herself with spring cabbage or early vegetables of any kind. Her earliest green food, apart from importation, is dandelion. Oats will ripen even on the east coast, and so will the garnet wheat with its fourteen-week term from sowing to reaping. But, as there are no mills, the grinding into flour would have to be done abroad and, therefore, wheat growing, except for domestic purposes, is not profitable. The climate of the south-west coast is more similar to Canada and the northern

stretch of the west coast is quite suitable for cattle rearing.

Accordingly the chief stand-by of the people is and must remain the fishery. Including the deep sea fishery on the Banks, the fisheries of Newfoundland include pretty well all the varieties of fish found in the colder waters of the northern hemisphere, and the consistency of the yield shows that, apart from lobster and possibly salmon, the supply gives no sign of falling off. The same cannot be said of either whale or seal, both of which are classed as fish for purpose of statistics, if not ecclesiastically for purposes of Lent. Potentially the Newfoundland fishery is the best in the world.

But the very abundance of their wealth has made the Newfoundlanders too easy-going. Other fishing nations, like Norway, Iceland and France, have forged ahead. They have introduced modern methods of catching, curing and marketing: they have learned how to utilise profitably their waste products. Consequently they have gone forward. Newfoundlanders are intensely conservative. They do not readily co-operate with one another. They resent Government control which is in any case difficult to exercise owing to the enormous stretch of coast along which the fishing population is spread. The coast is so irregular and so indented with coves and fjords, and there are so many islands, that the total coast line is somewhere near 6,000 miles.

Until recent years nothing has been done to apply modern biological science to the fishery. Without troubling their head about these matters, Newfoundlanders made easy money in war time, and that made them careless. Security is mortal's chiefest enemy. The war period actually saw a setback, because it was then that the tal-qual system was introduced, a system under which there was no sorting of the fish, but the whole catch was sold just as it was (*talis qualis*). This has now, at length, been made illegal and "the thin end" of a government system of cullage and grading has been introduced. Also, within the last three years, a Marine Biology Station has been set up with the help of the Empire Marketing Board. A full biological survey of the waters is being carried out, the best scientific methods are being worked out for drying and curing the fish, and experiments are being made with improved methods of canning and the manufacture of fish offal.

One other vital matter has of late years been receiving attention. The Newfoundlanders have an inborn instinct

for the sea. One sees boys of fourteen in command of schooners and piloting them in and out of most intricate harbours, even in the stormiest and foggiest of weather, as sure in the mist as in the clear. The personal courage of the men is without any superior. Take, for instance, the seal fishery, or, as it should rather be called, the seal hunt. Even in calm, clear weather it is a risky business on the broken ice floe which covers the sea for thousands of square miles; it is no easy task to go out in long trails, jumping from pan to pan, for as far as from ten to twelve miles from the parent ship. But when a sudden blizzard sets in, driving the parent ship, in spite of her engine power, miles and miles further away, and the men are caught in the icy, choking "drift," blinded and frozen, with the ice rafting in one place and opening up into broad lakes in another and all the while heaving, it seems a miracle that any of the sealers win through at all to safety. In 1852 more than forty sailing vessels were smashed to matchwood on the rocks by a devastating gale from the N.N.E. Captain Bob Bartlett, who was Peary's skipper when Peary conquered the North Pole, and skipper of the *Karluk*, when she had to be abandoned off Wrangel Island, knows well both the Newfoundland seal hunt and Arctic exploration. In his opinion the sealing voyage entails far more hardship and far more danger. And yet every spring, when the lists are opened in St. John's to make up the sealing crews, the appointed captains are besieged with men eager to be signed on. There is never a shortage. Every captain could find at least three capable and willing men for every one he engages. And every captain, as soon as he has got well out to sea, has to send back a boat load of stowaways of all ages. There is no lack of practical seamanship, still less of courage. And yet, surprisingly, when the fish is shipped in the autumn to Oporto, Mediterranean ports and Brazil, the ships which carry the fish are almost entirely Scandinavian, mostly Norwegian. What is the reason? It was not always so. In former years, before sailing vessels were displaced by steam, St. John's was the centre of a flourishing ship-building industry and hundreds of vessels locally built and locally manned were employed in the carrying trade. Why has all this been lost? Mainly because the Norwegians learned navigation and marine engineering. In Newfoundland education was so far behind that the young fisherman had not the requisite knowledge to enter a navigation school, and the nearest navigation school for

him to enter was in Halifax, Nova Scotia. There were laws on the statute book forbidding any vessel to be cleared for sailing without having qualified men "with their ticket" on board. But the laws were not enforced. Politicians could not or did not withstand the soliciting of kinsfolk and friends, and so the statute became a dead letter.

It is the politician who is the source of the trouble: not poverty of resources, not lack of manhood, but lack of integrity and public spirit. The United States takes five-thirteenths of the Newfoundland exports and one-third of her imports come also from the U.S.A. Unhappily, among the imports, though no account of them is taken by statistical returns, have been Tammany politics. *Cum adventiciis mercibus adventicii quoque mores importantur*. Unfortunately, Tammany has been, if not undetected, at any rate successful, as the world counts success. In Newfoundland it has been the same. The trouble began before 1920, but in 1920 it became serious. Since 1920 the public debt, the national debt, has been more than doubled. In 1920 it amounted to 43 million dollars; it now amounts to upwards of 100 million. Every year the budget has been unbalanced. Every year there has been borrowing. When that sort of thing begins, *facilis descensus Averni*: there could be but one issue and it has now come. The country is face to face with impending bankruptcy.

It has not been for lack of warning. Ten years ago Sir Richard Squires' first administration came to an end because his colleagues found they could not trust him and demanded an inquiry. The Recorder of Derby, Mr. Hollis Walker, K.C., was sent out to conduct it. A story of wholesale corruption was laid bare, with the Prime Minister himself as the villain of the piece. The report revealed what was happening. But the trouble was what did not happen. Had action been taken and the malefactors been brought to book, Newfoundland might have recovered. But no action was taken. A charge was formulated against Sir Richard. The Grand Jury found there was no true bill. No one else was punished either.

On the very day after the Hollis Walker report was issued Sir Richard marched in procession openly with the Orangemen through the streets of the Capital. Ever since he has posed as a persecuted innocent. It was through the subtle intrigues of his political opponents that Mr. Hollis Walker was brought over to compass his ruin. The Orangemen in the outports, who knew no better, were told that the letters K.C.

following his name meant Knight of Columbus. Obviously, the whole thing was a Popish plot, and the Titus Oates spirit was enlisted on the side of Sir Richard, who at once began to plan his come-back.

Mr. Walter Monroe's party came into power with their slogan: "Clean up and keep clean." And Mr. Monroe himself was the person to carry it out. But unfortunately it was not possible to find a team of like-minded integrity. Some of the new government were, on less ambitious lines it may be, out for all they could get. Sir Richard himself was not elected to the new House. He was, therefore, free to devote himself to nursing the constituencies. He is a past master at the art. It would take the pen of a Gibbon to do him justice. After four years he was returned with a big majority. Corrupt politicians mean, unfortunately, a corruptible electorate. Mr. A. E. Hickman, who had been, for the last four years, the leader of the opposition, was quietly shouldered out and Sir Richard became again Prime Minister. He was by this time more circumspect, but it was a shock to right-minded people in the colony when he came over to the last Imperial Conference of Colonial Prime Ministers, and was made a Right Honourable Privy Councillor.

Meanwhile, the usual loans were being floated year by year. Mr. Monroe had borrowed for the purpose of developing the roads. He initiated a tourist policy and it was idle to expect tourists unless there were good roads. He also built a fine new hotel at St. John's, and constructed a large dry dock. There was further, year by year, a loss to be made good on the operation of the railway. All this new money pouring into the country created a spurious feeling of prosperity. As Judge Prowse expresses it, speaking of the beginnings of the railway in 1881:

"The money thus spent . . . came on the community like a gentle rain from heaven; its refreshing dews descended alike on the friends and opponents of the new enterprise; its rills trickled into everyone's pocket—merchant, trader, small shop-keeper, all alike experienced the good results of this large outflow of money."

Sir Richard Squires carried on the same tradition of borrowing. But it could not go on for ever. The day of reckoning was now at hand and, when the slump came in the world's prices, Sir Richard found that neither in Montreal, nor in New York, nor in London, was there any financial company ready to tender for a loan of five million dollars which he was

anxious to float. The Newfoundland Board of Trade demanded that an application should be sent to the British Treasury for expert advice and control. There was nothing for it except to assent and Sir Percy Thompson and Mr. J. H. Penson were sent out in the early fall of 1931.

In December of that same year when there was no prospect of Newfoundland being able to meet the half-year interest coupons falling due on January 1st, 1932, the four Canadian Banks which operate in the island were induced at the last moment to save the colony from default by advancing rather under two and a half million dollars, subject to an agreement whereby the revenue received from custom duties (amounting to, roughly, seventy-five per cent. of the whole revenue) were to be paid into a special account at the Bank of Montreal. The decrease in the volume of imports and still more in the price has meant a shrinkage of roughly three-tenths in the revenue. This has made it impossible for the present government, in spite of the cutting down of expenses to the most irreducible minimum, in spite of hard work and honest administration, to balance the Budget. Default stares them in the face. Default is a thing hitherto unexampled in the history of the British commonwealth of nations. Default would mean not only disaster to Newfoundland credit and Newfoundland trade; it would impair the good name of the British Empire all over the world and undermine that confidence which is the soul of trade. The British Parliament has, therefore, stepped in, and at the request of Newfoundland, a request which was endorsed *nem. con.* by both Houses of the Legislature, has undertaken the responsibility for her finances, and the whole control of her government, until such time as that government has been set upon its feet again and become able to carry on independently.

In the absence of an efficient and corruption-proof Civil Service, this means government by commission. The Report calls it euphemistically "a rest from party politics." As there is no way short of revolution for suspending the politicians, leastways, some of the politicians, the only way is to suspend the constitution under which they carry on the dark ways for which they are peculiar, and just wait till the whole breed dies out through atrophy.

All Britishers believe in self-government. It is only through participation in their own government that we secure the maximum of public-spirited energy from the whole body of

individual citizens. Self-government is part and parcel of the British tradition. But the fact has to be faced that democratic government in this case has broken down hopelessly. Nor has it any chance to retrieve itself. The present government has had to take such drastic steps in cutting down expenses that it is inevitably already unpopular. Only a miracle could secure them a majority at the next election. The alternative is Sir Richard. True, the present proposals are without a precedent. But they are not inconsistent with the British practice. In several boroughs where the administration of the Poor Law has become reckless and wasteful the Central authority has had to supersede the elected guardians and instal special Commissioners. And after all, Newfoundland's population, just over the quarter million, is no larger than that of a borough of second magnitude.

In the case of Newfoundland there is more than merely recklessness and waste. There is such poverty that a continuance of the present condition means most serious impairment of physique. None but strong men can win a livelihood under the hard conditions of a Newfoundland fishing settlement. Major Greene's book, just published, *The Wooden Walls Among the Ice Floes*, gives a vivid idea of what these conditions are. No grown man, even John Chinaman, could maintain his strength on 7s. a month. The British Medical Association puts the lowest figure at 5s. 10d. a week. Yet 7s. a month is all that some quarter of the population of Newfoundland have been getting as poor relief during the winter months. And the cost of living in Newfoundland is forty per cent. higher than in England.

There are also evil customs and habitudes, deeply ingrained, which cannot, apparently, be successfully tackled from within. Deep-seated disease yields only to drastic cure. The sick man, in any case, is not entrusted with his own régime.

As to the Statute of Westminster, it has not yet been adopted by Newfoundland. The situation is peculiar. It may be best described by saying that she approved the principle, but did not adopt the statute. The same may be said of both Australia and New Zealand. Still, in any case, the British Parliament would never legislate for a Dominion except at its request and with its consent. That consent has been given. Newfoundland holds closer than ever to the mother country. She shows not the slightest trace of a disposition to follow the example of her nearest neighbour to the east.

J. L. PATON.

NATIVE LABOUR ON THE TRANSVAAL GOLD-MINES.

FIVE and twenty years ago the question of labour on the Transvaal gold-mines was one of acute controversy in this country. But the last Chinese coolie left the Rand in March 1910, and two months later the Union of South Africa was proclaimed. With the scotching of the Yellow Peril and with South Africa's assumption of Dominion status there ceased to be any obvious reason why Britain should concern itself with conditions on the gold-mines, and there has been little detailed discussion of them here from that day to this. But the prominence into which the whole question of gold as a medium of currency and exchange has lately risen, combined with the recent boom in gold-shares, has renewed interest in gold-mining as a form of industry. That interest may perhaps be presumed to include an interest in the labour conditions under which the industry is carried on. The subject is also relevant to the prospective establishment of gold-mining in Kenya.

In the Transvaal native labour is quartered, rationed, and disciplined on what is known as the compound system. The workers, having taken leave of their families for the duration of their service, live the segregated life of the barrack, within strict bounds, which it is a criminal offence to break. It is, on the average, about eleven months, and in many individual cases much longer, before they see home again. The gold-mines employ over 200,000 natives. The workers come from every corner of Africa south of the Limpopo, so that the Johannesburg area presents about as comprehensive a Babel of tribes as it would be possible to collect. They fall into two classes, recruited and non-recruited. The volunteers have certain important privileges as compared with the recruits, chief among which is freedom to choose the mine on which they wish to work and, within limits, the period for which they will contract to work. This period varies on different mines from a minimum of one month to a minimum of six months. The recruit, on the other hand, is obliged to contract for not less than 270 shifts. These shifts, when Sundays and holidays are taken into account, cannot be worked off in less than ten and a half months and, allowing time for the journeys to and fro and for the formalities of reception and discharge

at the mines, involve a minimum absence from home of about eleven months. Inducement to remain at work for more than 270 shifts is held out in the shape of a bonus of 2d. for each extra shift, or about eight per cent. of the average wage. Natives from Portuguese territory constitute a special case. Although they are not recruited in the strict sense, they are engaged on a longer contract which in practice averages about eighteen months. This accounts for the strong preference shown by the mines for Portuguese labour. Its wastage in personnel is little more than half that of British South African labour—the term “wastage” covering those who take their discharge, those who desert or get sent to gaol, and those who die.

Of British South African natives the number recruited is a little less than half the total. Recruiting is a costly business. It runs away with nearly half a million a year, which means more than £3 a native, or 1·78d. per native per shift worked—of all natives, not only those recruited. The latter figure equals about half the cost of feeding natives employed on the mines. The system has been condemned by expert investigators and by outspoken Government officials both for its expense to the mines and its bad effect on the natives concerned. But the mines will not abandon it for fear of shortage in the labour supply—a fear which is itself an admission that the present supply is subject to some sort of pressure. There are, in fact, two forms of pressure at work; the direct pressure of the recruiting agents, of which I shall say more below; and the pressure arising from the fact that the Reserves are too small or too little developed economically to support all the tribesmen who have claims to land in them. It is quite certain that a negligible number of British South African natives would work on the mines, or indeed in any other European employment (but especially on the mines), if the tribal areas furnished enough for their elementary economic needs. But this they do not do. The tide of mine-labour flows when food is scarce or when the need of money for taxes and other cash requirements becomes urgent in the Reserves; in times of plenty it ebbs. In other words it varies inversely with the capacity of the Reserves to support their populations. Thus a certain degree of inadequacy in the Reserves is one of the objectives of South African native policy. That policy is often described as one of segregation. But the segregation aimed at is only

partial. The real aim has been to whittle down native holdings of land to a point at which the resulting overspill of population from them balances the labour demands of European employers. The Reserves are regarded not as areas set aside for the development of tribal life, but as the cheapest form of parking-space for that part of the native population which the labour market happens for the moment to be unable to absorb.

The general value of the recruiting system from the standpoint of the mines is thus that of an auxiliary engine which can be turned on at need to compensate for any periodical easing of the economic difficulties of the Reserves. It has a special value also. Every year the employment curve on the mines shows a steady drop from about May to December, months which cover the reaping, ploughing, and planting seasons in the Reserves, and a sharp rise from January to April, months in which the cultivation of the growing crops can be left to the women. The recruiting system does what it can to level out the May-December decline, and to even up the distribution of labour throughout the year. By the same token and to the same extent it jeopardises the prospects of native agricultural progress.

The recruiting system has given rise to many abuses in the past. Efforts to remove these were made in the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911, which sought to impose reasonably scrupulous methods on recruiters; and in the Natives' Advance Act of 1921, under which cash advances made to natives as an inducement to sign a labour contract were limited to £2 (or £3 for a nine months' contract). An index of the success of these measures is afforded by the fact that the cost of recruiting has fallen from about 84s. a boy in 1913 to about 62s. to-day. The Advance Act, however, did not prohibit a trader-recruiter from giving extensive credit to natives and then compelling them to go to the mines to work off their debts. This method is still widely used by recruiters. Another device still in vogue in some districts, though sometimes in contravention of the law, is that of bribing chiefs to influence their tribesmen to sign on for the mines.

Now let us look at the life the worker leads on the mine. He is at first allotted, according to his experience and estimated capacity, to some particular class of work—machines, hammers, tramming and shovelling, and so on. He is also

placed either on daily task-work or on piece-work. About one-third of the total labour force is nowadays employed on piece-work. For the first week or two he is treated rather as being on probation, and the "full day's work of an able-bodied adult according to the accepted standard of the mine," for which his contract stipulates, is not strictly insisted on. The ground given for this concession is that the standard of feeding in the Reserves is generally not adequate for the hard work required of natives on the mines; consequently they have to be fattened up before the full task is exacted of them. It is a significant comment on economic conditions in the Reserves.

The day's work is supposed to take about eight hours. This does not include time taken getting to and from work, which may be quite considerable, since the mines consist of miles and miles of galleries. The men go down all together after breakfast at about six o'clock, and they straggle up again as they finish their tasks, mostly between four and five in the afternoon, but, in the case of piece-work men, sometimes later. When they knock off for the day, the shift-boss (who is a European) makes a record of the work done in the ticket-book which every boy is required to carry. If the day's task has not been completed, the boy is given what is called a loafer ticket, which means that he gets no pay for that day, nor does the day count as a shift towards the fulfilment of his contract. Complaints of assaults on natives by Europeans are frequent, though less frequent than they have been in the past, and less frequent than the assaults which actually take place.

When the boy comes up from underground, he immediately eats a large meal, after which he is free either to amuse himself in the compound or to get a pass and go outside. If he goes out, he is normally required to be back by 9 p.m. The advantages of going out are that he can see his friends, if he has any; he can look round the stores and spend his money; he can buy illicit liquor if he knows where to go for it; and he can visit a prostitute. If he stays in, he can sit talking round a brazier; he can gamble at cards; he can play various ball games and so on, if the day's work has left him enough superfluous energy; he can try and learn English in a kind of night-class run under missionary auspices; on certain nights he can watch a cinema show also put up by the mission-

aries; he can organise a tribal dance; and, if he cares to make the necessary arrangements, he can indulge in sodomy. The whole problem of the social evils arising from the compound system needs careful study. It is one which appears in various forms throughout Africa, but it has not yet received from students of native affairs the attention its gravity demands. Even if wages were increased and working and living conditions improved, the unnatural life led by hordes of men segregated in compounds would still produce much of the demoralisation visible on the Rand to-day.

A compound, which in many ways resembles the *Ergastula* or slave penitentiaries of ancient Rome about the beginning of the Christian era, is a kind of cross between a barrack and a gaol. It consists of long brick buildings with tin roofs built round a dusty quadrangle. Inside the buildings are long rows of bunks built usually of cement and arranged in two decks. Each boy has a bunk where he sleeps and keeps his few belongings. Above and around the bunk he is allowed 200 cubic feet of air space, or about twice the elbow room he will have in his grave. The compound is under the charge of a compound manager, a European, assisted by a number of native "police" employed by the mine. As a compound may contain anything from 1,000 to 6,000 miners, the manager has to rely largely on the native "police" for the maintenance of discipline. These "police" have the reputation of being harsh and officious. Complaints of assaults are common, and so are complaints of interference with boys who want to talk to the compound manager or otherwise establish touch with higher authority. There is also evidence that the "police" abuse their position by imposing illegal fines on workers and otherwise extorting money from them. These tendencies are unavoidable under a prison régime such as the compounds provide.

In addition to free board and lodging the mine native also receives free hospital accommodation. The mines have, indeed, by now acquired sufficient sense of animal husbandry to pay a good deal of attention to the worker's health. A minimum ration scale, which meets with medical approval, is prescribed. The average mortality rate has steadily declined through the last thirty years. In 1903 it was 71·75 per thousand; in 1924 it was 12·39, of which 1·90 was due to accident and 9·49 to disease. Hospital accommodation suffi-

cient for two and a half per cent. of the total number of men employed is provided and seems to be adequate for normal needs.

I turn now to the important question of wages. First, let us compare the wages paid to native employees with those paid to European employees, remembering that the latter do work which on a Welsh coal-mine, for example, would not be paid much more highly, if at all, than the work done by the ordinary miner. In 1930 wages earned by natives averaged 57s. 6d. a month; those earned by Europeans averaged £31 7s. a month. As the native worker is provided with free board, lodging, and medical attention, while the European is not, the cost of these benefits has to be added to the native wage, if the comparison is to be fair. It amounts to almost exactly a guinea a month. The comparison is thus between 78s. 6d. earned by the native and £31 7s. earned by the European; in other words, the European earns eight times as much for less arduous work. There is discrimination of a similar kind in the rates of compensation for accident and disease.

The historical record of native wages is interesting also. The mines first agreed upon a uniform wage for native labour in 1897. The schedule then drawn up reduced native wages by about one-third, and at the same time transferred the cost of train fares, etc., to and from the mines, from the employers to the employees. As a result of these changes the gross earnings of the native miner fell from about 3s. to 2s. a shift, and the drop in his net earnings was, of course, greater. From that day to this there has not been even a nominal rise. The average rate per shift was still 2s. in 1914 and in 1930 it was 2s. 1·7d., and that in spite of a forty-eight per cent. rise in prices between 1910 and 1925, a period in which white miners' money wages increased by twenty per cent. The native's real wages to-day are worth about a third of what he was getting in 1896 and earlier. It should be remembered also that meantime his efficiency as a worker has increased, and so has the economic pressure on him from his expanding appetite for the fruits of civilisation, from the imposition of taxation, and from the overcrowding of the Reserves.

One of the reasons why native workers on the mines have been unable to resist all this kind of treatment of the wages question by the management is that they are industrially

quite unorganised. Effective industrial organisation is, in fact, illegal for them. In European and American countries an employee who breaks a contract of employment, a civil contract, is liable to civil action only; and in most of them the right to strike is explicitly recognised by law. A native mine worker in South Africa, on the other hand, is guilty of a criminal offence if he withholds his labour during the currency of his contract, and becomes liable to a fine of £10 or two months' hard labour for each offence. In a similar way, the colour bar, the basis of which is partly legal and partly conventional, prevents a native on the mines, whatever his efficiency, from engaging in any skilled occupation and in many semi-skilled ones. The white trade unions and the managements between them have thus contrived both to make native industrial organisation a crime in itself and to make crimes of most of the aims which such organisation could have in view. It is a flagrant example of the use of legislation to exclude, for the benefit of the politically privileged class, another class that has no representation in the legislature from the normal economic opportunities to which its economic function entitles it. To such lengths is the white industrialist prepared to go in his efforts to ensure that industry shall afford no possibility of advancement, no shadow of a career, to the native worker.

When we consider the difficulties of the mines—how the gold of the Rand is, on the whole, a low grade proposition; when we consider that the price of gold is fixed in a world market over which producers have no control; when we consider that wages must be strictly limited by the payable output of gold, and that it is impossible for the mines to pass on any increased costs to consumers; then we may feel inclined to acclaim the efficiency of an industry that has contrived, by hook or by crook, to produce so much gold at a profit. Within the limits of the system described, the Transvaal gold-mines are unquestionably an ably conducted industry. When we consider how completely the mines have the native workers in their power, how little the public sees of compound life, and how indifferent public opinion is to the treatment of natives in this or any other industry, then we may well feel surprise that working conditions on the mines are not worse than they are. It is true enough, too, that the mines are not worse than other employers. If they seem more unpleasant to watch, that is mainly due to the scale on which they

operate. Wherever European interests, large or small, come into contact with natives, the same game is played with the same type of result. But even admitting all this in the mines' favour, we are still entitled to exclaim: What a system!

It is the distinction of the mines to have rendered slavery unnecessary by retaining its substance while dispensing with its form. In South Africa the whole tribal system, and indeed any distinctive way of native life, is being broken up for the sake of a transient industry. A time-honoured organisation of society, in many ways admirably adapted to its environment, and happily embraced by millions of people, is being destroyed, and nothing whatever is put in its place, except an aimless drudgery which is carefully designed to bring no profit to its victims and which cannot even last as a means of keeping the wolf from the door. The mines exemplify a relation between labour and capital probably as barren and as injurious as it would be possible to find anywhere in the world. What will happen, how will any tolerable equilibrium be found again, when the mines pass out of existence?—these are questions the mines do not ask. But posterity will ask them, and posterity will have to find an answer. And on our own generation the question forces itself whether the mines do not represent a degree of industrial tyranny that no age, laying claim to some enlightenment, ought to accept.

LEONARD BARNES.

EXPERIENCE, AND ITS CLAIMS IN CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

IT is time that Christian leaders should come to some agreement about the ever louder claims of experience to be a prime factor in religion. Dean Inge has warned us that

"The centre of authority in theology is moving away from authority to experience."

The Church of Rome (witness Father D'Arcy's recent writings, in which he specially denies this) holds to its age-long claim to dominate men's souls and minds, prescribing inexorably tradition, dogma, and submission to authority.

Not many leaders of the Anglican Church have spoken out clearly, though in his Diocesan Conference address of 1932 the Archbishop of York did so, saying "Anything which is not verified by experience cannot be called religious truth," adding "I do not know what would be meant by calling it either religious or true," and "all life for a religious person is a process of experimenting with faith." This is very definite, and this reference to faith as the primary ingredient of the Christian life should be noticed, and may relieve us from a charge brought sometimes against experience, of seeming to challenge the central position given to faith by Jesus, St. Paul and others. It is probable that in the ordinary course faith will come first, and must leap before experience, but faith's verification comes gradually through experience. Neither is made perfect without the other.

As regards other Christian bodies, Oman, speaking as a representative Presbyterian, says in his *Grace and Personality*, "infallibilities are gone for ever. . . . a structure which crumbled before scientific and historical investigation cannot be raised again by affirmation"; and "we need a better security than some uncertain authority outside both of the truth, and of ourselves, even the direct witness of truth to our own souls." The Christian body called "Methodists" (now the largest body of Protestant Christians) has always laid great stress on experience, and in so doing may be held to speak to a large extent for Free Churchmen as a whole. It is doubtful how far the Eastern or Orthodox Church has sufficiently weighed this matter, at any rate in its more recent

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developments, but it decidedly lays tremendous stress upon tradition. The Lutheran and Calvinist bodies will be found more often in the opposite camp.

The object of this essay is to suggest certain claims which experience can urge, and without pretending to settle the question, to ask whether the more Catholic sections of Christianity have given them full consideration. Many of them, especially the example of the New Testament and of the primitive Church, might be expected to appeal to them. Surveying the paths along which a danger-signal may be looked for, we come to tradition. Tradition may be said to be the basis of the belief of ninety-nine out of a hundred professing Christians, and this is natural because, as Gregory of Nazianzen says :

"It is not everyone to whom it is given to enter into an enquiry concerning God."

Therefore, let us beware of yielding to tradition less than its due, especially as it represents the fullness of Christian experience of the richest and most devout souls of the past, of men of spiritual insight, whose experience has proved sufficiently powerful to influence others and to live on. Evidently dogmas thus conceived stand in vital connection with the living realities of sustained spiritual experience.

Indeed, here comes in the true claim of the Church, "the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth." Our supreme quest must be experience of God, and in the Apostolic age this was felt and expressed within the sacred Community, so that the doctrines of God and of the Church are closely linked. Seeing that religious people need some mould of creed and practice into which to pour the flood of new life and emotion, it follows that the time-honoured archives of the Church, and its storehouse of slowly accumulated traditions will always rank among the most precious heirlooms of Christianity, and should command our deepest respect. No Christian has to start *de novo*, but can stand on the shoulders of his forefathers, "paying," as Emerson says, "to antiquity its due reverence." But then the debt is best paid, not by credulous acceptance of undigested truths, which do not become truths to us till we digest them, but by following Goethe's advice, "What a man inherits from his father, he must earn for himself, before he can call it his own."

So we must sometimes choose to which side we lean, and recalling, as we must, how the greatest spirits in all ages—we need only mention from the New Testament such names as John the Baptist, Jesus, Stephen, Paul—have been bold to challenge the traditions and authority of their age, we reflect that “a faith that enquires” may often prove nobler than docile submission; and if wise, we shall not rest satisfied till what we are taught becomes part of ourselves, and is no longer objective only, but subjective as well. Only such beliefs will be reality to us.

Though Christ a thousand times
In Bethlechem be born,
If He's not born in thee
Thy soul is still forlorn.
The cross on Golgotha
Will never save thy soul,
The cross in thine own heart
Alone can make thee whole.

This is all the more cogent because God is ever revealing new truths to men. New light is constantly dawning, and there is development going on, if not exactly of the truth, yet of the knowledge of it vouchsafed to men. Many past religious confessions are challenged by new research, and fail to interpret satisfactorily God's revelation to man. No traditional forms can survive without proving themselves shrines wherein men can experience more fully the Divine love and purpose.

Dr. Burkitt reminds us that “In the old days the Authority by which it was considered that all causes must be tried, was almost always something in the past, now it is something in the present. The appeal is made to what is called experience.”* It follows that while there should be no conflict between tradition and experience, and while youthful scepticism will more often than not discover that the old truths not merely survive, but prove themselves wiser than later doubts, yet tradition should be regarded as a guide rather than a master, a starting point rather than a goal. The day is bright in which we can say:

“Now we believe, not because of thy saying, for we have heard ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ.”

* *Outline of Christianity*, IV, 341.

The claims of revelation—now being over-pressed, for man must surely count for more than Barth and others will allow—lead us to the same conclusion. No satisfactory distinction can be ultimately sustained between natural and supernatural, for God is the source of all truth, goodness and beauty, and He works as truly through the ordered movements of nature, as in certain apparently unique and epochal moments of history. So, as there can be no religion without revelation, neither can there be any science. In either case man's response—we may also call it discovery—is needed. It must become experimental. “The fullness of time” involves not only God's readiness to bestow, but man's readiness to receive. Lessons learnt in God's school in Babylon, Egypt, Judaea, Greece, Rome, all contributed to make possible God's full revelation in Jesus Christ. Revelation, personal in its source, demands personal apprehension. The test of revelation is that it reveals and verifies itself in human experience.

What has reason, one of God's noblest and best gifts to man, to say to the appeal to experience? We speak of course of reason as a faculty of the individual, for summarised reason, as we meet it in Aquinas' great book, comes under tradition. If experience be regarded, as it must be, as the totality of what is felt and known by man, including in itself the whole of man's powers, energies and their results, it is clear that knowledge or reason is part of that whole and so reason and experience cannot be merely rivals. It is, however, humiliating to be reminded by a contemporary writer* that throughout the centuries man has been driven by a profound instinct to regard his own reason as a hostile force to religion; and to recall Goethe's affirmation that this attitude of mind is “the deepest, nay the one theme of the world's history to which all others are subordinate.”

Thankfully may we of Western Christendom (at least) affirm, that the glory of Christianity is that it demands that what the heart holds should likewise be provable by the head, and that, as Pascal said, there are two extravagances, to exclude reason, or to admit only reason. What is known by the head only, and not by the heart also, does not become really part of our life. Even if great thoughts arise most often in the heart, they must go round by the head, or if the order

* Cf. Kidd's *Social Evolution*, *passim*.

is reversed, at any rate both are needed. But we are only too apt to omit such super-rational things as love, laughter, sorrow, anger, courage, reverence, sympathy, imagination, all elemental parts of human life. So the appeal is for a balanced collaboration of man's faculties, under the guidance of reason, as the final arbiter. In this way, reason, operating on experience, will become a sufficient guide to truth, and controller of our destiny, without repressing the richness of our nature and its potentialities, our emotions, and our arts.

If Bishop Butler's words are true that reason is the only faculty we have wherewith to judge of anything, even revelation itself, then seeing we have already made faith our starting point, while faith ranks higher than reason, reason will rank higher than anything else. On the other hand our religion must be experiential as well as intellectual. Until it is felt in the soul, it is not really part of us.

We have been treading paths in which experience might seem to be a trespasser, but apparently after all it has a claim to be called a friend, and even one of the family. We have not as yet wandered from strictly Christian paths, yet as the whole world is God's, and as it is the same God who reveals Himself in all good men's lives, and vouchsafes a vision of Himself to all who seek after the Reality manifested to us in the supreme values of Beauty, Truth and Goodness, we are bound, though it can only be in passing, to remind ourselves that this appeal to experience has the support of such men as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Roger Bacon, Da Vinci, F. Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, J. S. Mill, etc., etc. For Plotinus (204-270 B.C.) "God was not merely the conclusion of an argument, He was chiefly the object of an experience." Want of space forbids our developing this assertion, or discussing its relevance to our subject. To return to strictly Christian sources, we cannot help noticing how Jesus always adopted this appeal Himself. Think of His recurrent phrase, with all it implies, "What man of you?" Recall His method of starting from what His hearers knew by experience. How true a psychologist He was. When His forerunner sent to investigate His claims, He at once referred the messengers to the results of His ministry, "The blind see," etc. Should we not, perhaps, stop to reflect that there may be here an explanation which is deeper than appears at first sight, and that we are touching depths too pro-

found to do more than hint at? Was not Jesus treating men as God had treated Him? Had He not Himself learnt fellowship with God by experience, and was He not leading others to do the same? He "advanced in wisdom," He "grew in favour with God." But who can plumb the depths of personality in any man, and in particular in the highest personality of all? Yet if His own religion and profound knowledge of God was acquired by experience, and He was trying to help others to share it, there is more meaning than ever in Matthew Arnold's words:

"Jesus bases Himself always on experience and never on theory."

But while we appeal first and principally, as Christians, to Jesus, it is well to remind ourselves that the whole Bible is a record of the experience by which men came to know God, of how they responded to, or refused His appeal. It is for religion, not history, or even theology, that we value the Bible, and the story of religion therein and elsewhere is the story of experience. The method of the early Church is an illustration of this, Christianity being the outcome of experience of fellowship with God, made possible by Jesus Christ; while the fellowship comes first, being followed later by the theology which sums it up. It is the province of theology to garner the records of Christian history and experience, and thus to fulfil its high function of tracing more and more fully the lineaments of God, as He has revealed Himself to man.

The doctrine of the Trinity gradually developed from the experience of Christians who found it the only way of explaining their experience of Jesus Christ and His revelation of the Father. It was an experience and a pragma, before it became a dogma. The primitive Church knew God in Trinity, because God came to them in Trinity. This order, experience first, formulation later, is a spiritual one, and applies also to the Incarnation, Atonement and to Christology generally. It was a law Jesus Christ always observed. An unqualified declaration from Him would have robbed faith of its spiritual value. It is manifest in His gradual revelation of Himself, and in the way His disciples gradually became aware that He was more than mere man.*

* Cf. Anderson Scott's *Dominus Noster, a Study in the progressive recognition of Jesus Christ as Lord.*

The Christology of the Creeds is the result of the Church's experience, and supplies an intellectual explanation of its actual life. The Creeds are a summary of truths learnt in the school of experience. The order here found can be traced through the whole scale of Christian belief. Experience first, doctrine second; Christ first, then Christology; the new birth, then the doctrine of regeneration; forgiveness found, then the atonement. As in science, so in theology, the test of the belief is its power to verify itself in past and present experience. The disciples who walked and ate and slept with Jesus could not at first account Him to be more than a very wonderful human person. It was the after-reflection on their earthly experience, and the after-Resurrection experience they had of Jesus as a living Lord which led them on to the tremendous step of deciding that He held for them the value, the honour, the spiritual dynamic of God.

"We have not a perplexing dogma imposed, but a triumphant discovery based on experience, as all scientific truth must be. Theology is a science which, like other sciences, sets out from a certain department of experience of which it attempts to give an orderly and rational account. Religious experience precedes dogmatic formula. Because of this, Christianity is a veritable science."*

Before we leave Jesus Christ, it is well to say that it is because Christianity is Christ, and Christ is Christianity, that the necessity of experiencing Christ, of the impact between His personality and ours, lies at the basis of all our religion. If religion is a personal matter—and if not, it ceases to be religion—religion must be through and through experiential. Only a person can experience another person, and the distinguishing mark of Christianity is that "God is in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself," and this is the unique way of knowing God.

There is no room here to trace the process through others later. St. Paul is a notable instance, both before and after Damascus. His religion and teaching are based entirely upon his own experience. The Christ he worships has first been experienced as a living presence within. The Cross has pierced his soul, so he proclaims it. He has learnt the reality of the struggle with sin, and the dynamic of being "in Christ." The Atonement has become a way of life to him. When he would

* W. Temple, *Christus Veritas*, 112 ff.

persuade men of the truth of the Resurrection of Jesus, his appeal was not to the empty tomb, but to the effect of the appearances of Jesus especially upon himself. He does not hesitate to appeal to the experience of the Corinthians, as to whether he is justified in describing the reception of the Eucharistic elements as fellowship in the Body and Blood of Christ ("Judge yourselves what I say," etc.) or not. Every sentence he writes is instinct with the personal equation, and throbs with the emotion of experience. What is true of him is or should be true of all Christians. Indeed, it has so proved itself through all the generations since the coming of Christ.

I set out to ask whether experience has not a better right to be considered than some sections of the Christian Church are ready to admit. It is no real reply to emphasise the limits of the authority of experience. They are obvious, and it is the function of thought to analyse and articulate experience, and to tabulate the proper tests which need to be applied to it. Of course, all experience is not of equal value, and its ultimate security cannot rest on a feeling of assurance, for much assurance and experience is a delusion. No sane man would want to rest the whole case on experience; nor can the abuse of anything disprove its legitimate use.

Tests as to the value of experience will always be required. To be authoritative to Christians it must of course agree with the revealed teaching of Jesus Christ, and with the collective experience of the Church as expressed in its highest and most inspired representatives, and must moreover share the moral, ethical, and religious values of Christianity. The new science of psychology may find that one of its God-given functions is to aid faith, by compelling philosophy, in its dealings with faith, to be sure of the actual facts of Christian experience, and to provide suitable tests of that experience.

Secondhand thoughts are not our own thoughts, and nothing is really true to us until we have made it our very own.

D. S. GUY.

A SCIENCE OF COLONIAL GOVERNMENT.

ONE of the most remarkable developments of opinion in the post-war era has been the emergence among the general public of a new attitude towards colonial questions. Interest in them is no longer confined to the relatively small number of people who have direct connections, economic or personal, with some one of our overseas possessions. Everyone whose acquaintance with political issues goes beyond the pages of the penny newspaper follows colonial matters with as much attention as affairs at home and with by no means the complacency of the last century. The modern attitude is one of criticism, of a demand that imperialism shall justify itself by new ethical standards, sometimes of denunciation of all colonial expansion as nothing but a vice inherent in the capitalist system. The system of administration under mandate, which has been applied to the former German colonies, not only establishes the principle of trusteeship as a binding international obligation and lays down broad lines along which this principle is to be interpreted, but through the publicity of its proceedings focuses upon those areas the jealous gaze both of those who are anxious to see its avowed aims realised and those whose desire is rather that it should be discredited.

The demand, in whatever form it may be put, is in effect that those Powers which control tropical territories and the exploitation of their natural resources should so govern and so exploit them that the native populations may benefit from their control. The paramountcy of native interests is a doctrine that has been enunciated by successive British Governments with reference to that one of our colonies which contains the largest non-native population, and it is by the harmony of its actions with such a doctrine that a modern colonial Power is judged.

But what is the basis of the judgment? In most cases it is founded on considerations of the apparent conformity of policy with the general dictates of humanitarianism. Dr. Norman Leys has suggested as an infallible criterion the question, "How would you like it yourself?" A recent writer on the Mandates System, adopting what is perhaps not after all a fundamentally different standard of evaluation,

deduces from a comparison of export statistics that the mandated areas in Africa are "behind" those which are governed as colonies. Neither of these tests, nor any other simple all-embracing rule, can really provide an answer to the manifold questions which a colonial administration has to face, and so long as criticism follows such *a priori* lines the champions of "the man on the spot" as the best judge—even though they never make it clear which man they mean—will have a fairly strong case.

Yet the men on the spot do not speak with a single voice on the matters which are the subject of controversy at home. In the region where that controversy is most bitter—that of the relative parts to be played by native and non-native populations in economic development—high authorities disagree. Lord Lugard sees as the foundation of Africa's participation in the economic life of the modern world the native "working in his own time, in his own way, for his own profit and with the assistance of his family." General Smuts speaks of "decent white employment" as "the most natural and obvious way to civilise the African native," and the Australian Mandatory Administration in New Guinea has stated as a principle that "occupation for the native being of paramount importance, those to whom his care has been entrusted" must find it for him, by means of the indentured labour system. The Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission has expressed the view that in a mandated area "the white population ought only to be considered in so far as it assists in achieving [native] progress," and Sir Donald Cameron when Governor of Tanganyika described his policy with regard to European settlement in very similar terms; while Sir Edward Grigg leads the protests of the European community in Kenya against the doctrine of paramountcy of native interests, and at a conference of Governors of East African Territories "the whole problem" was stated to be "to arrive at a just and far-seeing method of harmonising the best progress and welfare of the native inhabitants with the maximum of production."

Admittedly, then, there is not only a conflict but also a problem, which cannot be solved simply by the contest of political debate before the bar of "enlightened public opinion." Here, as in almost every question with which modern governments have to deal, the issues involved are

too intricate to be decided by the judgments of the marketplace, and here even more than elsewhere it is no longer possible for the Aristotelian reasonable man to form his opinion on the basis of his own experience. Colonial administration, like every other governmental activity, calls for the guidance of scientific knowledge—of a body of objective data upon which practical decisions can be based.

The creation and application of such a body of knowledge have hardly yet been seriously considered by the colonial Powers. Comparison of results, pooling of experience, exchanges of views between members of different administrations and between representatives of different States there have been through such organisations as the International Colonial Institute, and, for a limited number of territories, in a very effective manner in the discussions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. Through international contacts of this kind a good deal has been done to enable administrations with fundamentally similar aims to pursue the method of trial and error in concert rather than in isolation.

But it is only recently that the accumulation of the knowledge which colonial administration needs to apply has begun to be regarded as a task too serious to be undertaken as a mere by-product of administration or missionary activity. Up till the last few years, "research" in connection with tropical territories has meant the study of diseases, of plant-breeding or animal husbandry, and the larger issues have been dealt with only as they became the subject of political controversy, and then piecemeal, not on a coherent plan, but in ways which have differed in contiguous territories, sometimes in recognition of essentially different circumstances but sometimes only through the relative power of interested parties. The need for fuller and more accurate knowledge as an essential preliminary to the establishment of general principles of native policy was stressed by the Hilton Young Commission on Closer Union in East Africa, and the programme of investigation which their Report suggests raises questions which go to the root of the matter not only in East Africa but in every other tropical territory.

The problem of native policy as stated in that Report is "to define what are the essential native interests" and to determine "the conditions which must be created and preserved in order to give those interests a fair field and an adequate

measure of protection and assistance for their development"; and the encouragement and support given to non-native enterprise should in the Commission's view be limited by the maintenance of these conditions. While the conclusions which they drew from these premises have not met with universal agreement, the premises themselves could hardly be disputed by anyone who was not prepared to repudiate the doctrine of trusteeship. Indeed, those who complain that too narrow a scope is assigned by the Report to non-native settlement usually assert, not that such settlement should be increased whatever the consequences to the native population, but that it is in fact essential to the welfare of the latter.

If, then, the problem of colonial administration can be reduced to these two basic questions—the essentials of satisfactory native development and the relation to it of European economic penetration—where are we to look for their objective solution? Not simply in a superficial comparison of governmental action in different areas, but in a comparative study which penetrates to the realities of the process of transformation that colonial government involves, and interprets them by reference to those sciences which are capable of elucidating their significance for the communities in which this process is going on.

Viewed in this light the modern colonial problem resolves itself into two series of questions, one economic and one sociological. Under the first head fall discussion of the relative merits of "open door" and assimilation policies, transport development and railway rates, the apportionment of the incidence of taxation between the native and non-native populations of a territory. Here, too, we should be able to look for dispassionate answers to such disputes as that which arises over the so-called East and West African systems of production—that of large-scale enterprise under European direction, financed by European capital and requiring a constant supply of native wage-labour, which characterises Kenya, part of Tanganyika and the Belgian Congo, and that of cultivation of economic crops by individual natives for their own profit, which has been fostered in Nigeria and the Gold Coast as well as in Uganda, and which the French and Belgian Governments are beginning to view with increasing favour. Is one system inherently better than the other, or are climatic conditions and the requirements of different crops of different

that it is futile to attempt comparison? Does the large-scale system depend for its success on a supply of labour so cheap that it would not be forthcoming if the native was able to supply his new needs and meet his new obligations in any other way? On the other hand, can that production on which ultimately the revenues of a territory, and therefore the expenditure on native welfare, depend, only be effectively carried on through the expansion of European enterprise? Is a happier solution to be found where European participation is limited to the investment of capital? Such questions can be answered only by the economist, not by persons whose livelihood depends on one particular answer, or even by the most single-minded champion of the principles of justice and fair play.

But the economist's answer is not in itself conclusive, for when we have it we have to face an issue more fundamental still—is native welfare synonymous with the maximum economic production, even given a system of production such that the native is assured his fair share of the return? In other words, what is the real result on the life of a primitive people of the new economic influences to which they have been subjected in the last few decades with ever-increasing intensity in all parts of the world? It is here that the "How would you like it yourself?" test breaks down, for the nature of the sociological effects produced by the sudden incorporation into the European economic system of peoples whose culture is that of the Stone Age or but little removed from it is a problem to which no intelligent layman's experience can provide the key. Here, above all, the need for scientific study has been insufficiently recognised and the case for it is too often misunderstood.

Social anthropology, the newest of the social sciences, which studies the culture of the simpler peoples as a functioning organism, and sees in their most uncouth institutions essential elements of a coherent whole, does not claim a voice in the construction of colonial policy simply because it can present the life of a native society in such a way as to make it intelligible and to show the *raison d'être* of customs which have been hastily condemned. What is wanted is far more than goodwill and a readiness to "see the other man's point of view." We are all familiar with stories of occasions when a European has mistaken for an insult some honorific native custom and acted accordingly with disastrous results; that is the kind of mis-

take which could be avoided by ordinary common sense. It is something more vital than instructions in etiquette that social anthropology has to offer to the theory of colonial government.

From the realisation that the institutions of any society—government, organisation of production, ownership of property, marriage, law, religion—are inextricably knit together, that the special characteristics of each depend upon its relation to the rest, has grown a new attitude towards that process of contact with a higher civilisation which it used to be assumed must be automatically beneficial to the more backward community. Very few people would now light-heartedly make this assumption, but there are still many who believe that all the colonising Power has to do is to select those aspects of its own culture which are generally approved by its own people and initiate into them the populations under its control. Some even hold that not to do so is to deny to the subject peoples blessings to which they are in justice entitled, and that any plan for the development of native society along its own lines is a mere cloak for the determination to keep them in permanent subservience.

For the objective comparison of policies with regard to native development, however, what is important is not the motives which actuate their supporters but the results which they may be expected to produce. Here only a scientific analysis of the contact of cultures by the method of social anthropology can give the answer—in demonstrating the extent to which the organisation of a native society can stand the stress of the new circumstances which it has now to face; in pointing to institutions forming part of the traditional structure which can be preserved and adapted to serve new purposes; possibly in saving from destruction native practices whose disappearance would leave some essential social need unsatisfied; in estimating the suitability to a given society of innovations of different kinds, or the degree to which policies of rapid assimilation have been or can be effective.

The question is exceedingly complex and difficult. It cannot be answered under laboratory conditions, for the process of change is going on continually. The task of those in control is not the relatively simple one that it would be if they could select the external influences to which their wards were to be exposed and regulate the rate of their introduction. Rather

they must be awake to the inevitable changes and devise means of successful adaptation to them. The focus of all these changes is the desire for material acquisition that grows so rapidly as soon as the introduction of a money economy gives it play—a desire which leads to demands for alterations in the traditional organisation that may or may not be socially beneficial. A chief whose tribute in kind was a source of help to his people in time of need may take to buying motor-cars with his tribute in cash; an estimable individual may wish to be freed from the ties of collective rights in land in order to develop an up-to-date plantation; a less estimable one may evince the same desire from anxiety to raise a sum of ready money. Then the question of adjustment arises. If the chief's tribute is abolished will his authority cease to be respected? Can the system of land tenure be modified without destroying essential safeguards? Only knowledge of the whole social structure in each case can give the answer. Usually, too, it provides a basis for constructive development other than that counsel of despair which urges the speediest possible Europeanisation of all native peoples as the only way of fitting them for a place in the modern world.

Such knowledge, too, is indispensable in the framing of an educational policy which aims at fitting the pupil for the life which he is to lead. How can such an aim be professed if those in charge do not know what that life is going to be? The advocates of a literary education fall back on the argument that it gives a "wider outlook," and rather scorn the question how such an outlook manifests itself in practice. Yet it is by the answer to that question that their method must be judged. Here again we are dealing with societies in transition, and here more than anywhere else it is essential to know how the school can train the young generation for a new mode of life in a way that will not detach it abruptly from that continuity with the past which is such an important element in the maintenance of social stability.

Within the last few years the need for comparative study on scientific lines has begun to be realised, both in this country and abroad. The International Institute of African Languages and Cultures, which was founded in 1928 and represents official, religious and scientific bodies in twelve different countries, in 1931 laid down a plan of research whose object was stated to be "a better understanding of the factors of

social cohesion in African society, the ways in which these are being affected by the alien civilisations which are penetrating the continent and the tendencies towards new social groupings and the formation of new social bonds." Study on these lines has been begun in British and French colonies, in the Belgian Mandated Area and in South Africa. The Institute of Pacific Relations has had a similar plan of study before it for some years, and investigations of the results of culture contact have been carried out in many areas by its Directors. The Rhodes Trust has founded a travelling fellowship for the study of native administrations. The latest phase in the development of this new branch of political science is the establishment of a Department of Colonial Administration at the London School of Economics, where it is hoped to build up a centre that will embrace the whole field of colonial government, British and foreign, for comparative study on the lines outlined above. As Lord Lugard said in the lecture with which he inaugurated the first Course in Colonial Administration, it is fitting that the seat of such a study should be in the heart of the British Empire. It is also fitting that it should be pursued as part of that body of sciences which aim at the understanding of human affairs with a view to their rational guidance.

L. P. MAIR.

COSMIC RADIATIONS AND THE DIVINING-ROD.

IN his volume *L'Oscillation Cellulaire** Georges Lakhovsky, the well-known Paris scientist, pays a tribute to Italian scientists for having been "the first to take into consideration his theories, and for undertaking remarkable researches along his lines." The fundamental theory of Georges Lakhovsky and its physiological applications are well known. Every cell of every living being inasmuch vibrates, lives, emits radiations, as it essentially consists of a microscopic oscillating circuit or electro-magnetic resounder, which is actuated by the energy supplied by "cosmic waves." Among all the oscillating cells of each living organism a sort of balance is attained, the alteration of which creates morbid conditions; disaggregation causes dissolution of vital harmony and physical death. To demonstrate this theory and its applications, and throw light on the mysterious instincts of animals and migratory birds, on the great influence of solar "spots" and moon revolutions on plants and animals, on cyclic epidemics and famines, on the endemic diseases caused by the reaction of soil to cosmic rays, and on many other mysterious phenomena, Lakhovsky undertook a scientific investigation as to how to effectively counteract the disturbing interferences which destroy the harmony and balance among the cells of an organism. He introduced into biology and therapy the use of his metal "oscillating circuits." The function of these is to capture from among the innumerable electro-magnetic waves crossing the atmosphere *one* selected by the length itself of the circuit, and to place the organism under the influence and protection of its magnetic field, which filtrates, as it were, cosmic waves, absorbs their intermittent excess, preserves the balance of organisms.

Innumerable experiments were carried on by Lakhovsky himself, and by his disciples in every nation, but especially in Italy. At La Salpetrière, in Paris, pelargonium plants, which had been inoculated with cancer, all died, except those protected by Lakhovsky's "oscillating circuits"; the latter soon recovered and prospered to an abnormal vigour and size. Such experiments have even more value than for the practical,

* *L'Oscillation Cellulaire. Ensemble des Recherches Expérimentales.* G. Doin et Cie 8 Place de l'Odéon, Paris. 1931.

therapeutic, biological benefits attained, because "by following the new aim we shall arrive also at a true knowledge of the universe in which we are" (F. Bacon). Brief mention may be made of the series of experiments carried on in the University of Bologna by Professors Mezzadrolì and Vareton on the influence of "oscillating circuits" on the germination and growth of seeds and plants of every sort; those of Professor Rivera, with analogous purpose; those of Professor Mascia of Cagliari University on gyrinuses, which led him to conclude that "All living beings emit radiations, and most of them are capable of acting as detectors of waves"; the experiments of Professor Dr. Attili, head of the radiology department of the Hospital of the Holy Spirit in Rome, who applies the "oscillating circuits" to the treatment of cancer, diabetes, carcinoma, etc., with notable success; the photographs of human life-radiations taken by Professor Senator Guido Crimonese; the famous researches of Professor Cazzamalli of Milan University showing that the human brain and nervous system are the most sensitive and delicate receivers or percipients of waves and the most powerful transmitters of radiations. "From my experiments," says Cazzamalli, "it clearly emerges that the human subject irradiates electro-magnetic waves analogous to radio-electric waves, in close connection with certain metapsychical and psychosensorial phenomena of the brain. . . . With regard to the metapsychical phenomena of metagnomy, cryptesthesia, television, etc., of which no immediate cause can be assigned, and with regard to those psychic states underlying crises where the subject brings forth such creative activity as automatic writing, there is no doubt that the presence may be presumed of special mechanisms of perception due to peculiar psychosensorial states, which in certain cases transcend the ordinary ways of knowledge, and are capable of realising the perception of far-distant events."

These latter words of a keenly critical scientist show that in the process of scientific restoration of the conception of cosmic synergy, harmony, unity, it is the faculties of man's mind and even its abnormal activities that have emerged, becoming the object of a new and earnest interest. The study of radiations and cosmic rays has naturally paved the way in Italy to the interest in rhabdic phenomena, or rhabdomancy, in which man himself is the feeler and subject. In this

scientific atmosphere, the first International Rhabdomantic Congress was held in Verona, with the declared practical purpose of contributing to the discovery of oil-fields, mines, water-springs, and of scientifically testing the divining gift; but with the unforeseen result of giving a decisive impulse to the science of the human soul.

As might have been expected at a scientific congress (I try to cull a few selections among the twenty-five extremely interesting reports read at the Congress), the exponents of the two main interpretative theories, the physical and the psychic (and metapsychic), confronted each other at every step, with the utmost earnestness. Is the movement of the divining-rod or pendulum due simply—as the late Sir William Barrett would have it—to involuntary unconscious muscular action, aroused by subconscious suggestion in the mind of the dowser, and due to the telesthesia of the subject with regard to physical radiations and influences, so that the dowsing-rod or the pendulum would be simply an “autoscope,” revealing and amplifying automatic muscular contractions? Or is it rather physically produced, directly by the influence of special radiations on the rod or pendulum, and dependent in its modes both on the quality of the radiations and on the peculiarities of the receiving brain-station? As a matter of fact, neither of the two theories, so far as the debate showed, appeared to cover the whole ground; there were even distinct cases in which not even their combined use seemed to give an exhaustive satisfactory interpretation of the phenomena in terms of modern science. It was just at these critical points that the words: “telepsychic, telegnomic, cryptic conscience, metapsychics, mediumship,” were whispered, and suggested with some hesitation.

To give an instance of the puzzling problems arising from the discussion of the phenomena: it is an ascertained fact that with some diviners the presence of underground water is revealed by means of twigs, while that of metals is revealed by a metallic rod or fork: *but* with other diviners this differentiation does not exist, or is reversed. Again, while with some diviners the rod only informs as to the quality of water which is sampled by a witnessing-bottle they have with them, a simple mental change in the intention of the seekers may neutralise this selective influence and make the rod sensitive to any spring of water, which may previously have been

passed unnoticed. The use of differently coloured rods or twigs will secure, with some diviners, the detection of different metals, minerals, waters, according to the selection of different radiations of varying wave-lengths operated by the different colours (for instance, Marger uses ninety-two different combinations of colours to detect different types of atoms: a quite new chemistry): but there is also no doubt that other diviners get the same differentiation with the use of other colours and processes; for instance, with the Abbé Mermet the pendulum describes four spirals in the presence of hidden iron, six with silver, seven with copper, etc.

On the other hand, as against the theory of automatic muscular contractions as an exhaustive explanation of the phenomena, there stand apparently such facts as the experience, for instance, of Dr. Perduca, a physician, who, when he tries with all his strength and will-power to stop the rod turning round its axis in his hands, finds that it will rather break than stop; or this: that two watercourses running underground at different depths, or a watercourse crossed over by a mineral bed, will either combine or neutralise the respective influences. Are not these and other peculiar characteristics to be mostly accounted for by physical causes? But there are even more puzzling features of this complex phenomenon. Here is the description given by Solicitor B. Isi of his prospecting in the mining district of Vallezza, in the Province of Parma:

From several scores of pits, I chose some on bare chance. I placed myself at the opening of a pit, and set voluntarily my rod (a black-coloured one: this colour, with me, doing well for carbon compounds), turning round its axis, holding its ends in my hands. I counted aloud the number of revolutions of the rod, each of them corresponding, with me, to a measure of five metres. Then suddenly, at a certain moment, a series of spontaneous, involuntary revolutions started, I reckoning the numbers aloud and my assistant writing them in a different column. Eventually the spontaneous series exhausted itself and a new voluntary one began, which was succeeded in its turn by spontaneous rotations of the rod. Then I passed on to other pits: and, at the end of my prospecting, I wrote down that spontaneous rotations, of short duration, revealed and located the existence of gas; and the successive voluntary ones indicated the existence of oil. I then checked these results with a yellow rod, the yellow colour selecting, with me, siliceous substances, especially sand. . . . At the end, I

multiplied my sums by *five*, and so I got the definite indication of the depth of gas and oil manifestations, and also the information about the extent of sand layers. My results were then compared with the stratigraphic data preserved in the offices. The correspondence was striking. My prospecting on one occasion reached a depth of 2,000 metres. I once indicated the first vein of water as 530 metres deep, with an error of 20 metres only. In another mine-field of the same company, Engineer Cambi tried to lead me into mistakes, at times, by purposely suggesting false indications; but all in vain, my rod would not give in, its indications were always exact, etc.

How can either of the two theories, the physical and the psychic, cover the whole ground of rhabdic phenomena? Solicitor Isi was forced, much to his disappointment, to leave the question open.

Another accurate diviner, Doctor Giuseppe Totti, an economist with a large experience of rhabdism and well acquainted with the psychic problems it raises, felt compelled to evoke other hypotheses to account for even more wonderful phenomena. Not only can he trace radiations emitted by oil fields and deposits of ore of mercury dozens of miles away, while sitting in his office, by the use of a metal antenna as receiving-station: but also he can prospect simply on a photograph or on a planimetric map of the region, or even on a drawing of it, no matter how distant the place nor ever visited by him or studied before, merely by using the pendulum or the rod, and a few secondary conditions. The radiations he subsequently perceives on the spot are the same "in quality, intensity, situation," as those felt when prospecting on the map. For instance, by prospecting on the map he discovered an underground passage which was to lead from Villa Gonzaga, in Novellara (Reggio), to a neighbouring village. The passage was, then, actually found. Other cases of rhabdic prospecting on a map were reported at the Congress by Mager, Padey, Bosset. The name of the Abbé Mermet may be added, who ended his report in response to a referendum of the *Revue Métapsychique* (August 1931), with the words: "*Toutes les prospections que je fais sur le terrain, je les fais dans mon bureau, avec la même facilité et la même certitude, sur un Plan Cadastral de la région ou de la propriété à étudier.*"

Dr. Totti concluded by cross-examining and rejecting all the pseudo-hypotheses suggested to explain this phenomenon,

such as auto-suggestion (which?) and telepathy (by whom?): while "telepsychism" he seemed to welcome, only objecting that in this hypothesis the necessity of a pendulum or a rod, even of the map itself and other minor conditions, cannot well be accounted for, "as in other telepsychic phenomena no such conditions seem to be required." His final conclusion was: "This phenomenon is indeed wrapped in mystery. In the present state of our knowledge we cannot suggest a logical explanation of it."

Want of space prevents the relation of many other very interesting records. I will only mention Dr. G. Gori's experiments on the injurious, and even lethal, influence of radiations from subsoil minerals, especially mineral waters, on plants and animals; the discovery of Father Randoald, a Swiss Capuchin friar, that the mysterious "stable diseases" are mostly due to the same causes; the researches of Raimondo Jemma, a keen student in telluric radiations, on the origin and quality of rhabdic radiations: (are they not analogous to Röntgen rays, the superficial masses of metals, or the running water, acting like the anticathode of an X-ray tube, in which the cathode is formed by the magmatic rays emitted by the central metallic earth nucleus?) and the theories advanced by others on their origin as derivations from "cosmic rays," "sun radiations," etc.

I cannot refrain from special mention of the views of two diviners from Fabriano: Gasperini Giacomo and Serafino Pellicciari, who have found by numerous experiments that, as underground, especially mineral, waters and metals constantly emit: the former two lines of radiations, about 100 metres from the central radiations and parallel to them, and the latter four lines of radiations towards the four cardinal points, or intermediate to them, forming a kind of circular belt, people endowed with hypersensitive qualities are liable, when they stand, especially at dusk, on those radiating spots, to get subconscious psychic impressions which, according to the peculiar psychology of the subjects, may be interpreted to their consciousness as visions or voices referring to nymphs, fairies, angels, saints, devils, wild animals, etc. This accounts for many visions experienced even nowadays by peasants, especially hypersensitive girls, accompanied sometimes by real gifts of clairvoyance, healing magnetic power, etc. If the said subconscious impressions rise to the threshold of

consciousness during sleep, very likely they will take a dramatic form, possibly that of a deceased relative revealing the existence of a treasure, a spring of water, caves, etc.; or bidding the dreamer build a church, and so on. Only, in these cases, it is the hidden treasure, the water, the caves, etc., that have given origin to the message and vision: and their eventual discovery, far from being a confirmation of the reality of a spirit presence, would explain the vision away as evidence of it.

That man, through his brain, is the most delicate receiving-station for all kinds of world radiations, was repeatedly proclaimed at the Verona Congress, especially by the Rev. Donato Castelli, a Roman Catholic priest (there were about a dozen R. C. priests and friars present), a diviner himself and an inventor:

Our soul, through our brain—he said—is the most marvellous transmitting and receiving station one can imagine. Man sympathises and synchronises with the whole creation. It is this wonderful capacity that alone can explain—or is at least the dominant cause of—all rhabdic phenomena, which are generally closely connected with metapsychics, telephysics, psychophysiology, and partially with cosmic radiations. Physical science alone cannot explain them: but that is not the only human science.

The Congress scientists did not protest against this proclamation of metapsychics as a science, they applauded it. There is here reason for hope that the near future may see, even in Italy, an increase of interest not only in radiesthesia and rhabdomancy, but in the science of the human spirit.* A Congress is gathered for the aim and purpose of seeking water-springs for thirsty populations, and oil and minerals for industries: and lo! the human soul stands revealed in splendour and power. Old Bacon was right: "By following the new aim, we shall arrive also at a true knowledge of the universe. Truth and utility are in ultimate analysis the same."

GIOVANNI PIOLI.

* See on this subject, with special reference to the Verona Congress: *La Question du Sourcier* in the *Revue Métapsychique*, October, 1933.

A QUEEN'S VENTURE.

AT the beginning of the year 1642 Charles I and his Queen, Henrietta Maria, were, like many less exalted folk before and since, greatly in need of money. They were in such straits that in January the latter had to coin or sell her chamber plate to supply their most pressing needs. Such penury was due to the fact that there was no money in the Exchequer, and the officers of the Customs, whose duty it was to supply the weekly allowance for their Majesties' Households, had been forbidden by the Commons to provide any money without their special consent. A month earlier the Queen had sold some of her own jewels for the sum of £3,000 (or £5,000), so that Charles might fortify Portsmouth and buy out the Lieutenant of the Tower—which was regarded as the "bridle of the city"—in order to put in his place a soldier on whom he could rely. For the relations between King and Parliament grew daily more acute and it became increasingly evident that Charles must either yield his most cherished convictions or fight for them.

Amongst those counsellors who strongly urged him to adopt this latter course was Henrietta Maria, who was convinced that the King's prerogative could only be maintained by force of arms. But if it came to fighting, the King must have money, and therefore it was decided that the Queen should go to Holland, ostensibly to escort her daughter Mary, but really to raise money for the King through the help of their son-in-law the Prince of Orange. She left England in February, taking with her the remainder of her own jewels, some of the King's and some of those left by Queen Elizabeth. These, when she reached Holland, she proceeded to sell and pawn. She found at first some difficulty in doing this, for it was reported that she had carried the jewels away secretly against the King's wish, so that if money were lent upon them they would be no real security. At last it was necessary to show the King's written permission to sell, and then the Queen found customers amongst the merchants and bankers of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the Hague. She sold the King's pearl buttons, about which she wrote to him: "You cannot imagine how handsome the buttons were when they were out of the gold, and strung into a chain, and many of them as large as my great chain. I assure you that I gave them

up with great regret." But she complained bitterly that she only got about half their value for them. She pledged, but did not sell outright, her own great chain. She had taken with her the King's "great ruby collar," as well as a smaller one, and these she tried to pledge either at Antwerp or in Denmark. One merchant lent her 40,000 guilders on six of the rubies. An account of these transactions, particularly those connected with the ruby collar, was sent by one of their agents to Parliament, which issued an order stating that these were crown jewels, "by the law of England they ought not to be alienated," and that money obtained through their sale would only be used "to provoke war." Therefore, anyone lending money on the jewels or taking any part in their sale should be held "a Promoter of this Intended War and an Enemy to the State." But this did not prevent the Queen pawning the rest of her stock. A year later it was reported that for some jewels pledged at Brussels she obtained 100,698 florins, at Antwerp 95,000 florins, making a total of 195,698 florins. This amount Sir Harry Vane reckoned to be worth £19,680, and that the money was lent at the rate of twelve per cent. Thirty years afterwards the total amount raised on all the jewels was said to be 2,000,000 guilders; but probably this was an exaggeration.

Whilst Henrietta Maria was in Holland she had rings, lockets and bracelet clasps made with her cipher H.M.R. in a monogram of delicate filigree gold, laid on a thick crystal cut like a table diamond, and set in gold on a ground of crimson velvet. These trinkets, called the "Queen's pledges," were presented by her then and later to those who lent her money, as a token that if presented when she was more fortunate they would ensure, if possible, either repayment of the loan or some equivalent favour. Two of these royal pledges were, in the year 1844, still in the possession of two English families. Part of the money raised by these means was sent directly to Charles, who received £2,000 by July. Part of it was used to purchase arms and ammunition, which were to be sent to England "in order that so good a company as the Queen heard was daily gathered about the King should not be dissolved for want of weapons to defend one another." The ammunition was not forwarded immediately, but kept in readiness in Holland till it was needed by the King who had retired to York whilst he carried on negotiations with his Parliament.

Meanwhile, Henrietta Maria was beset with difficulties, for the sympathies of the States of Holland were with the Parliament, and they placed every possible obstacle in the way of the Prince helping the Queen to communicate with the King, or send ammunition to him. Amongst those ships which had convoyed the Queen to Holland was a small one named the *Providence*, commanded by a Captain Straughan (or Strachan), who was a very ardent royalist. The King had given him orders that he was to hold himself at the Queen's disposal and, knowing this, Henrietta Maria delayed him in Holland under various pretexts until June. Then she commissioned him to carry letters and ammunition to the King. Straughan knew he would have to go warily, for the Earl of Warwick, Admiral of the fleet, had received strict orders to intercept any vessels from the Queen and Straughan was already suspect. His ship which had a very light draught, and so could run into any small harbour, was loaded with two hundred barrels of powder, two or three thousand arms, and eight field pieces. Straughan tried to keep the date of his sailing a secret, but the spies did their work too well. Directly he put to sea a small, fast boat was sent with the news to the fleet in the Downs. Warwick immediately sent three or four ships northward, who sighted the *Providence* just as she was making the English coast. Clapping on full sail, they chased her into the Humber, meaning to drive her into Hull, which was held for Parliament. But Straughan, who knew all that part of the coast well, avoided Hull, and sailed his ship into the mouth of a narrow river which led into the country some miles above the city. His pursuers found their ships were too heavy to follow him, "so with shame and anger they gave up the chase." Straughan continued his course, and having determined to sacrifice the ship, ran her ashore near Burlington and sent in haste to tell the King of his arrival. Charles immediately gave orders to the local royalists to call out the train bands, and hold back the soldiers, who made sorties from Hull to secure the ammunition. The soldiers were driven off, and the ammunition, arms and artillery taken safely to York. Six weeks later the King raised his Standard at Nottingham.

The Queen redoubled her efforts to get ammunition to him, and early in October, hoping for a repetition of Straughan's success, bought and despatched another ship to England. This sailed from Rotterdam, carrying ten pieces of ordnance,

fifty barrels of gun-powder and a hundred and fifty cavaliers, some of whom were veteran commanders whom the King particularly needed. They were entrusted with letters to the King and the Earl of Newcastle, and were ordered to make for Newcastle from which place the ammunition could be easily conveyed to the King. But before the ship reached that port she sprang a leak, and was forced to "hover near" Yarmouth. It was a great piece of bad luck for the Cavaliers. Yarmouth, which had fallen foul of the King's government only two years before over smuggling foreign soap into the country, was whole-heartedly on the side of the Parliament. Early in July the townspeople had decided that "they would observe the orders and directions of the Lords and Commons in Parliament [when opposed to those of the King] as conceiving that to be the most fitting way to preserve the publick peace both for King and Kingdom." They also brought in a large quantity of money and plate to be used for payment of soldiers and ammunition "for the defence of King and Parliament." Thereupon the Parliament deputed the bailiffs to raise and command the train bands, to nominate officers to lead them, and to keep £1,000 of the funds they had raised with which to fortify their town.

When, on October 6th, the men of Yarmouth saw the Queen's ship "hovering near their port," they hurriedly held a Council. Should they let her lie in the port whilst her sailors repaired the leak, or should they capture her? The bolder amongst them were all for this course, but the more staid and sober held back. They had no orders from Parliament to conduct any offensive operations, and though the town had "admiral jurisdiction," it did not extend to where the ship lay. So by a majority it was decided they could not touch her. But amongst the bailiffs was one named Johnson, "a proper young man and stout," who had from the beginning been foremost in urging the capture of the ship. When the majority decided against this course he, who was one of the captains of the train bands, went into the street, summoned his men and called for volunteers to take the ship. A hundred men responded instantly, and flinging themselves into boats rowed out and captured her. The cavaliers, crowded on her deck, had known directly they saw the boats making for the ship what their fate must be. They were not sure that they would be justified in using their ammunition to fight the men of Yarmouth,

for they had no guarantee that such a step would be countenanced by either King or Queen. But they felt most strongly that some steps must be taken about the letters they carried. "They began to bethink with themselves that it was better to drown all their Letters than to put to the hazzard of having all their Secrets come to light." So they agreed that they would sink the packet before the boats reached them. Hastily they put some bullets into a packet with the letters, bound them tightly and threw them overboard—as many a merchant captain did with his ship's papers when attacked by submarines during the Great War. But alas for the Cavaliers! A fisherman who was lying near by saw the packet fall, and dived after it, "being well acquainted with the depth of the Water in that place." He managed to seize it, and rowing back to the land presented it to the town council. The captured ship with its crew and cargo was then detained at Yarmouth, whilst the letters and a full account of all the proceedings were forwarded to Parliament.

The reception of the letters and news was awaited in some trepidation by the authorities at Yarmouth who knew that, legally, they had gone beyond their rights. They need not have worried. Parliament decided that "the men of Yarmouth . . . had done nothing but what was agreeable to the fundamental Laws of the Land, and that they would justify them in so doing, or any others that should do the like in any other part of the Kingdom." A letter of thanks was also sent saying that "Parliament takes it to be a very acceptable service done by them." And it was ordered that the captured officers, who had been confined at Yarmouth, should be sent to London in different ships, so that there might be less danger of their escaping. The cargo of the ship, a large quantity of wheat and beans, was to be sold to defray the cost of the Cavaliers' maintenance during their detention at Yarmouth.

Meanwhile the Queen's letters had been read in the House of Commons. The one written to the King told him she was sending the ship laden with ammunition, and would get all the other assistance she could, particularly that of her brother, the King of France. A letter, purporting to be this captured one, was published later, but it is such a complete contrast in style to all her other letters to Charles that it was probably one of those drawn up by her enemies which they printed at intervals. The beginning and end illustrate this marked

difference. The commencement : " Most royall and illustrious monarch of Great Britain, my great, my good and worthy liege, the most regall object of my loving heart, best affections and utmost endeavours. Be pleased to let this paper in all humility salute your princely hand . . . " contrasts very unfavourably with the almost invariable commencement of her genuine letters : " My dear heart, . . . " And the end : " Sir I am and always shall be your most dutiful wife and liege woman," is very different from her usual brief " Adieu, my dear heart," or " Absolutely yours." But perhaps the printed letter was some Puritan's idea of how an obedient wife *should* write to her husband. The Queen's letter to the Earl of Newcastle expressed her longing desire to come to England, and told him that she was only waiting for the arrival of two English ships to conduct her over.

After reading these letters, Parliament sent a messenger to Holland, asking that any ships laden with ammunition for the King might be prevented from sailing. The States promised they would do this, but they did not always succeed. Though one of her chief ventures had failed, the Queen got other ships safely through, and four months later she, herself, eluded the vigilance of the Parliamentary Admiral, landed at Burlington and joined the King. But the ship for which she had paid was kept at Yarmouth, and after a year's delay given by Parliament to the town to form their quota for the naval defence of the Kingdom. She was re-fitted, and under the name of the *Adventure* put to sea in 1644, where she fought for Parliament against the King till 1647, when she was sold to a merchant trader for £416.

The history of those Cavaliers who were captured in her is not definitely recorded. But no doubt, in accordance with the general custom at the beginning of the Civil War, they were, as occasion offered, exchanged for Parliamentarians of similar rank who had been captured by the Royalists.

FLORENCE E. DYER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE EUROPEAN UNREST.

SO far as British general opinion was concerned, the strained diplomatic atmosphere that followed the German withdrawal from Geneva on October 14th lasted in its acute form for little more than a month. Those who, after October 14th, took to redoubling their prophecies about a war in Europe soon found that in Great Britain, at any rate, they could no longer make anybody's flesh creep. Why? The superficial facts had not changed. In some ways they were worse. Not only had Herr Hitler and his colleagues made it clear that they had no intention of returning to the League of Nations except on conditions which France was unlikely to concede; Mr. Litvinov stated on behalf of the Russian politicians that they had no intention of joining the League of Nations (December 5th). The Fascist Grand Council passed a resolution (also December 5th) somewhat ill-temperedly announcing that Italy would secede from the League unless it were radically and quickly remodelled to her liking. And it could not be remodelled quickly because no Great Power in the world, except perhaps Great Britain and France, any longer took any serious interest in the League as a diplomatic instrument. The United States, one of the pioneers who created the League, had never joined it. Russia had never been asked to join it, and now would not. Germany, invited to join it in 1926, gave notice of secession in 1933. Japan had given the like notice. Indeed, the very name League of Nations as applied to the Geneva organisation had become a caricature. The Disarmament Conference, after nearly two years of unrelieved failure, was universally recognised as spent. Berlin made clear her intention to rearm; Paris her intention not to disarm. Official London began to describe the condition of British armaments by talking about the " edge of risk " (for instance, Sir John Simon on October 17th and Lord Hailsham on December 1st); Washington foreshadowed a big new naval building programme (December 2nd).

Yet the alarmists could not peddle their wares in Great Britain. The fact was, or appeared to be to those who had not engaged too earnestly in seeking documentary evidence about

the inevitability of the next war, that no convincing analogy could be drawn between the circumstances of 1914 and those of 1933. Whereas the conditions in 1914 made a big war easy; those of 1933 made a big war difficult. In 1914 it was obvious that if war broke out Great Britain would be fighting with France against Germany. The Entente Cordiale was a flourishing reality. Germany had a terrific, efficient military organisation and a mad Kaiser longing to see it in action. Great Britain had the untouched accumulated wealth of a century, big enough to finance any war to a bitter end. To-day France, it is true, has a terrific military organisation; but the French are a more human people than the German, and therefore not as dangerous militarily as the Germans were in 1914. Great Britain is financially crippled as a result of the last war. When the last war started, British income tax was based on the standard rate of 1s. 8d. in the £. To-day the standard rate is 5s., and the budget is annually submerged by the war legacies and by vast socialistic expenditure. Even socialism has something to be said for it from the British diplomatic point of view. By destroying the nation's wealth it has made it the less likely that Great Britain will be able to take part in the next Franco-German war. The fact that the French people are faced with the almost insoluble problem of bridging a big budget deficit by increased taxation and by cuts in socialistic salaries is a contributory financial safeguard against the possibility of a prolonged war; but the best financial safeguard is probably the poverty of Great Britain. Despite the Locarno Treaty, and despite the argument that the English Channel in a military sense has been dried up by the air above it, it is not in 1933 obvious, if there is to be a war, that Great Britain will necessarily take part in it. In spite of Herr Hitler's revivifying effect upon the Entente Cordiale, that bond is not what it was. The decisive thing will probably be, not the view held by a particular person or party that Great Britain, whether by virtue of treaty obligations or by virtue of British interests, so diagnosed, ought to plunge into the next war on the French side; but the balance of strength between those who favour and those who oppose British participation in the war. It is not easy, for example, to imagine that Mr. MacDonald within the next twelve months will be the British Prime Minister who will declare war upon Germany. If he were to resign (again for the sake of the argument) there

would be a domestic crisis. In general the proof of a case is in the event: and in the present case the event cannot be foretold as confidently as it could, for example, in the spring of 1914. The only tangible fact so far is that by the middle of December the war panic of late October and early November had in Great Britain abated.

The focus of general interest none the less continued to be Germany. If one is to attempt a balanced view of the diplomatic situation as it had developed by the middle of December, it seems best to trace the evidence in its several regional aspects.

(a) *In Germany.* The fact has to be faced that in spite of the pacific protestations made by Herr Hitler the feeling grew in France, the Little Entente countries, Poland and Russia, that Germany was heading for war. The eternal difficulty about the German character is that it is insanely patriotic, is murderously efficient in a military sense, and has a public opinion solidly unanimous. Few Frenchmen, Czechs or Poles doubt that Herr Hitler's pacific statements are "eyewash," and that his other statements of the "Mein Kampf" type express the true feelings of himself, his colleagues and the mass of the German people. Such fears may be unfounded. Even to other than French, Czech or Polish eyes, however, it appears difficult not to accept as true the apparent fact that the single simple motive of the Nazi German politicians is to undo everything that has been imposed upon Germany since 1918. There are those who believe—and among them are the best-informed, if not the most pacifist, students of affairs—that the present German Government, supported by the unanimous German people, pursue a deliberate plan: namely, to recapture, if not by consent then by war, all the territories lost in 1919, Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar, the Polish Corridor, Upper Silesia; to tear up the Treaty of Versailles, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, and to default totally upon the Dawes and Young Loans. Nazi propaganda at home has been largely based upon the "wrongs" that have been done to Germany. The Nazi youth of Germany seem to be convinced, in a way which a people of more equable mental balance such as the British people can never even understand, that it is a good thing to fight in battle for the Fatherland. This peculiar German form of madness (all patriotism is a form of madness,

but the degree varies in different countries) is a misfortune that does not confine its effect within the German frontiers. It creates fear and suspicion abroad.

M. Daladier, for instance, observed on October 17th: "If one sincerely wishes for understanding, why begin with rupture?"

Herr Hitler's pacific pronouncements have been a remarkable feature of the period. On the very day, October 14th, he broadcast a statement in Germany about Franco-German relations. "I speak," he said, "in the name of the whole German people when I affirm that we are all filled with the genuine desire to remove a feud which has claimed a number of victims so disproportionate to what has been gained by it. The German people is convinced that the honour of its arms has remained pure and unsmirched, just as we see in the French soldier only our old but glorious opponent. . . . It would be a mighty happening for all humanity if these two nations of Europe would, once and for all, banish force from their common life. The German people is ready to do so. . . . When the Saar territory has been restored to Germany, only a madman would consider the possibility of war between the two States . . ."

On October 22nd he spoke at Kelheim, denounced "*Hurrah Patriotismus*" (jingoism) and declared that "every German man, woman and child is solidly behind us in our demand for peace and quiet in order to be able to work." He added that "there is no better guarantee for the peace and quiet of the world than the fanatical unity of the German people." On October 26th, at Cologne, he said: ". . . we cannot have any other thought except peace. We long for peace. We are also prepared to treat with France." On November 8th he said, at Munich: "The League of Nations will never see us again until the last vestige of discrimination is removed. They say we Germans want to see blood spilt. No, the Germans want work, peace and happiness." One of the most remarkable of his statements, the one most likely to cast doubt upon the soundness of the diagnosis that he means war, was made on November 10th, when in a broadcast address he said: "I am not crazy enough to want a war. How many foreign statesmen fought in the war? I fought in it; but not one of those who agitate against Germany and calumniate the German people have ever heard a bullet whistle." The fact

that Herr Hitler was a belligerent is certainly in his favour. If the qualification for political office in every country were that a man had served at the front in the last war, and would have to be sent among the first detachment to the front in the next war, then there would be no next war. On that criterion Herr Hitler is only half qualified: for in the next war he will no doubt be a politician, not a soldier.

President von Hindenberg broadcast a message to the nation on November 11th, in which he made the same sort of point as the Chancellor had made the day before; he also being a former soldier, and he also affirming that the horrors of war imposed "the paramount duty" upon Germany and upon the whole world of maintaining the peace intact. On November 15th it looked as if Germany's peace talk was to be translated into action. On that day Herr Hitler received the Polish Minister. An official statement was thereafter issued to say that "full agreement" had been established, that both Governments had decided to "renounce the use of force in adjusting their mutual relations," and that they would now "take up direct negotiations on all German-Polish problems in order to consolidate peace in Europe." Polish official quarters immediately inspired the *caveat* that, by an express reservation the territorial questions had been excluded from the scope of the agreement thus announced. By an odd stroke of bad luck for Dr. Goebbels—for Dr. Goebbels was the Minister of Propaganda in the German Government—an article appeared over this name at that very moment in a London weekly paper, demanding the full restitution to Germany of all her territorial losses, including the Polish corridor. The authenticity of that article was at once, of course, denied in Berlin, but it looked as if neither in Berlin nor in any other European capital was either the article or the denial taken seriously. On November 22nd the *Paris Matin* published an interview that had been given by Herr Hitler to M. de Brinon, a French journalist of good repute in France. In it Herr Hitler declared that "once the question of the Saar is settled, there will be nothing, absolutely nothing, to divide France and Germany." He protested his pacifism: "I shall need years to restore Germany's prosperity. Do you really think I should want to upset my work by a new war?" He uttered the slogan: "Not a single German for a new war, every German for the defence of the Fatherland," and con-

cluded by offering to negotiate with France "if France is prepared to look for security in a free agreement with Germany." In this case also it looked as if the words might be accompanied by action, for on November 24th Herr Hitler was visited by M. François Poncet, the French Ambassador in Berlin.

Although no official disclosure was made either in Berlin or in Paris about what took place at that interview, a copy of M. François Poncet's report of the interview was sent confidentially to London, to Prague, and to Warsaw (not, apparently, to Rome). As so often happens, however, in the case of diplomatic secrets—especially when Paris is a link in the chain of secrecy—the substantial contents of that report became generally known. Herr Hitler had asked that the Saar territory be handed back to Germany without waiting for the 1935 plebiscite; that Germany should be allowed an army of 300,000 men (instead of the existing maximum of 100,000), on the understanding that the larger army be trained for only a short period of, say, nine or twelve months instead of for the twelve-year period prescribed for the Reichswehr by the Treaty of Versailles. In regard to "defensive" armaments he claimed that there should be no limitation for Germany, as there was no limitation for any other country, but promised that in any event Germany would rearm only gradually and *pari passu* with the expansion of the new army. In regard to "offensive" weapons (i.e. bombers, heavy tanks and guns above a 6-inch calibre) he offered an undertaking that Germany would be bound by the same restrictions as bound the other countries. In other words, he demanded equality plus the restoration of the Saar territory.

Thereafter the activities of German diplomacy were conducted through the ambassadorial channel. What emerges from the post-October 14th chronicle of German diplomacy is that Herr Hitler and some of his colleagues have lost no opportunity in public of professing pacific ends. Every few days Herr Hitler has announced to the public of the whole world that he wants peace. It may well be so. Only the event will prove it. On December 14th Sir Eric Phipps, British Ambassador in Berlin, arrived in London bringing with him still more pacific messages from Herr Hitler, to the effect that Germany would be prepared to engage in pacts of non-aggression, and to eliminate militarist elements from university and school education, in order to prove to France and her other neigh-

bours that Germany's rearmament was not directed against any of those countries.

(b) *In Great Britain.* On October 16th Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking at Nottingham, described Germany's action of two days before, as "both precipitate and ill-judged." Sir John Simon's views on that subject were stiffened a little more than they need have been because Baron von Neurath accused him of misrepresenting what had taken place on October 14th. Sir John described that accusation as "absurd" (October 17th, in a broadcast statement), and went on to reaffirm that the statement he made on October 14th had been previously endorsed by the United States delegate to the conference. Mr. MacDonald, on October 23rd, speaking at Crawley, defended Great Britain against the German accusation that she had not disarmed, protested also that she had been Germany's "greatest friend" and appealed to Germany to co-operate for peace. The arrest of Mr. Panter, the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in Munich on October 27th, somewhat strengthened the then prevalent view in Great Britain that Germany, in 1933 as in the period 1914-18, was a difficult country to be friends with. But by November 3rd the first sign of change had manifested itself. On that day Mr. Eden, speaking at Skipton, argued against the scaremongers, and began to discuss the European controversy on its merits, reaffirming the old British thesis that the main difficulty the Disarmament Conference had had to face was that of reconciling the German demand for equality with the French demand for security. He recalled that Germany had once before seceded from the Disarmament Conference and had been brought back; and he announced that the British Government's present policy was to prosecute the work of the conference in the belief that some measure of agreement on a reduction of armaments was the only way in which a race in armaments could be averted. On November 7th, Sir John Simon, in the House of Commons, again referred to German claims, and to French fears, and stated, as a principle of British policy, that the problem was primarily a matter for Germany and France to settle directly between themselves, the interest of Great Britain being that of a third party who above all other things wanted to see rearmament prevented. He went on to hint that British mediatory services were available, if wanted. That speech was the first manifestation of the

returning impartiality of the British attitude, and it rapidly became a source of grievance to France. France, in short, accused Great Britain of again "wobbling" under the influence of Germany. Really, therefore, the united diplomatic front against Germany had begun to crack in less than a month.

It was in that same speech that Sir John Simon made the remark: "We have never been sticklers for method if we can help in the result," a remark that caused first confusion and then indignation in Paris, because French opinion had made it a cardinal point of its tactics to insist that Germany must return to the League of Nations and to the Disarmament Conference before the discussions about disarmament could be resumed. French opinion was still further incensed against the British Government two days later, when, at the Guildhall Banquet, Mr. MacDonald blandly said: "the situation needs to be studied in all its aspects." The last thing that any Frenchman at that time wanted was that the situation be studied in all its aspects. The first thing he wanted was an unequivocal statement from London that in the event of war the British army would fight with the French army against Germany. Mr. MacDonald even expressed some tentative sympathy towards Germany in her resistance to the unequal condition that had been imposed upon her. Hardly a day now passed without some statement by one or other member of the British Government on the European situation.

On November 21st Mr. MacDonald announced in the House of Commons that, on the advice of Sir John Simon, who had consulted other parties at Geneva, the Government proposed to carry on the work of disarmament, not by the method of the Geneva Conference, but by the old diplomatic method of ambassadorial conversations, in which, he hoped, Germany would participate. Within a fortnight that new procedure was, in fact, put into practice, and Germany was, indeed, participating. Sir John Simon, on November 24th, addressing the House of Commons, revealed the way in which the decision to try that new method had been reached. He had himself been in Geneva from November 18th to November 20th, and had consulted with the seventeen nations represented on the Bureau of the conference. The Bureau on November 22nd unanimously agreed, as a temporary expedient, to give to the ordinary diplomatic machinery an opportunity of engaging in bilateral

conversations between nations on the understanding that the results were ultimately to be communicated to the conference. The British Government at once put the new machinery into operation by instructing Lord Tyrrell, the British Ambassador in Paris, to inform the French Government that if the French Government were to begin direct negotiations with the German Government, the step thus would be greeted in London with great good will; and by instructing Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador in Berlin, to inform the German Government that the British Government had taken note of the German Government's recent declarations and would use its influence to encourage a resumption of the general negotiations. In his speech of November 24th, Sir John Simon delivered a sentence which by itself gave a fillip to the negotiations. "Germany," he said, "is not a target for dictation, she is a partner in discussion."

Having thus embarked upon the attempt to reach agreement by reasonable methods Sir John Simon plunged enthusiastically into the collateral work. On the very same day he spoke at Cleckheaton and took the occasion to say something nice and impartial about both Germany and France. Of France he said that she was a nation "most deeply and sincerely devoted to peace." To the Germans he conceded that their leader "embodied their claim to the dignity and status of equality" and he sympathetically diagnosed German feeling as "nursing a memory of humiliation, of defeat and disarmament imposed upon them by a treaty which did not indeed make that disarmament conditional upon the disarmament of others, but certainly recorded the intentions of the victors to follow with disarmament of their own." The only criticism that was passed upon Sir John's performance by cold-blooded people was that, despite the exalted nature of his motive, his psychology was a little lacking in subtlety, for the typical young Nazi applauds most vigorously when Herr Hitler declaims that Germany was not beaten at all in the last war (but was betrayed), that she never had been beaten, never would be beaten, etc. That particular aspect of the German mentality is understandable, because Sir John Simon himself (for instance) probably does not believe that Great Britain was beaten in the last war, or that the throwing up of British caps on November 11th, 1918, was due to anything but to thankfulness that the war was over, lost or won.

Mr. Baldwin, on November 27th, summed up the objects that would be pursued, so far as Great Britain could decide the matter, by the new form of diplomatic action. He diagnosed three alternative possibilities: general disarmament to Germany's level; an equalisation of armaments with an agreed exclusion of "offensive" armaments; or an unrestricted, unqualified competition in armaments. The first being unpromising, and the third disastrous, he indirectly hinted that the second should be the object of realistic diplomacy.

Thereafter the work was handed over to the professional diplomats. Diplomacy by conference had been finally discredited by the experience of the Disarmament Conference and of the World Monetary and Economic Conference. Yet there are few people left in the world who are young enough to believe that we have done with diplomacy by conference. At any moment it may break out again. When Lord Curzon made the opening speech at the Lausanne Conference ten years ago (November 20th, 1923) he recalled the many inter-Allied conferences in which he himself had taken part since the Armistice, and expressed the hope that this would be the last. It proved to be not only not the last, but the first of new and enlarged series of conferences, which were to persist throughout a decade and which were to make the glamour even of Mr. Lloyd George's Genoa look pale.

(c) *In France.* The fact that France seldom has a stable government does not affect the unchanging stability of her diplomatic front. When Germany seceded from the League of Nations it happened to be M. Daladier who was Prime Minister of France. On October 17th he spoke in the Chamber. On the one hand he outlined a financial programme for balancing the budget, and stated that the Government would stand or fall by the resultant vote. (It fell. October 24th.) On the other hand he outlined French policy towards Germany, saying: "We are deaf to no appeal, but we are blind to no act." He elaborated the simple point that Germany's act in quitting Geneva was a matter of concern, not only to the French, but to all peoples who had been associated in the "great and noble" enterprise of the Great War. M. Sarraut, who on October 27th formed the new French Government, announced his policy to the Chamber on November 3rd. The essential thing, he said, was that the interests of France were best served by a continuity in foreign policy. He had no

difficulty in obtaining an overwhelming vote of confidence from the Chamber when his foreign policy was debated. (November 14th. 395 votes to 194.) He said that the members of the Government could remain cool in face of what was taking place, because, like the 40,000,000 other extant French people, they could not spell the word "fear." It is nearly always the case that when people say that they do not know how to spell the word "fear," they are afraid of something. When Sir John Simon and other British politicians speak of "French fears," as they often do (for instance, Sir John Simon on November 7th), they are saying something merely commonplace. On November 16th M. Albert Jullien (the successor of M. Philippe Millet as Foreign Editor of the *Petit Parisien*) began publishing in that paper a series of quotations from a confidential circular which he alleged had been sent from the Central Propaganda Bureau in Berlin to Germany's diplomatic agents abroad. The burden of the instructions therein contained was that France was the enemy of Germany and Great Britain was the friend of France; that Germany must win her ends by peaceful means if possible, and if that be not possible, then the responsibility for the breakdown of peaceful methods must be saddled upon the other parties. The authenticity of the document was, of course, denied in Berlin; but it caused some interest in France. A sidelight was thrown upon French feeling by the circumstance that less interest was excited by the publication in the *Matin* of November 22nd of the interview, above alluded to, which had been given by Herr Hitler to M. de Brinon.

The Sarraut Ministry resigned on November 23rd, having held office for less than a month and having been driven from office, in common with the Herriot, Paul-Boncour and Daladier Ministries which preceded it, by the indignant onslaught of the Socialists. The Socialists objected on any ground to the cutting down of salaries paid to State officials, State salaries being the very graft of socialists the world over. The new Ministry was formed by M. Chautemps on November 25th. He therefore attained office at a moment when the new diplomacy had reverted to the methods of the old, and was being conducted by the ambassadors. Lord Tyrrell, for example, flew from Paris to London on December 7th and stayed in London till December 12th, having in the meantime informed the British Government of the concern felt by the

French Government about British "wobbling" in having "abandoned" the standpoint of October 14th. The truer way of putting it would be perhaps to say that a plan which presupposed German co-operation could not be pursued unless Germany co-operated. It emerged, however, and the old diplomatic channel could not conceal the fact that the French Government had not been impressed, and was indeed not disposed to pursue, the German offer to negotiate on the basis described by Herr Hitler to M. François Poncet on November 24th.

AFTER HITLER, BETHLEN.

The success of Herr Hitler's table-thumping over the Treaty of Versailles went to the head of Count Bethlen, who decided to try his hand at thumping over the Treaty of Trianon. As Great Britain offered the only promising ground for such experiments, he and one or two select companions came to England in November. They addressed several audiences in London, and the Hungarian papers duly recorded their progress. The Hungarian people thereby learned that the main preoccupation of the British people and the British Government at the present time was to tear up the Treaty of Trianon and with the least possible delay (for the matter was urgent) to hand back the Slovaks to Hungary. One Father Jehlicska, a Roman Catholic priest who had political aspirations, did his best to help Count Bethlen by uttering the most startling accusations of personal gross immorality against the Czech nation in general and particularly against its political and educational leaders. The only practical interest attaching to the English adventures of Count Bethlen's party was that the remarkable accounts that were published about it in the Hungarian papers produced an unfortunate effect upon those Hungarian patriots whose main conception of patriotism is to start a war against Czechoslovakia at the earliest possible moment. The small band of academic, left-handed English intellectuals who are ready at any moment to broaden their minds by listening to the sort of stories that are told them by Count Bethlen, Mr. Tibor Eckhardt and Father Jehlicska, do not contrive to broaden their minds to the extent necessary to enable them to perceive the kind of use to which they themselves are being put.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

December 15th, 1933.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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THE BAD BISHOP: A GHOST STORY.

WHEN Geoffrey Leader and his wife went to Wiltchester for the Christmas vacation it was with the hope that there would be no more ghosts. In his letter of invitation Dr. Snatchett recited, as usual, his labours throughout the year. He had discovered in the Cathedral library some rare manuscripts: for instance, a complete *De Divisione Naturæ* of Joannes Scotus, made at Malmesbury at the end of the ninth century as an act of just penance by his infuriated pupils who had stabbed him to death with their pens. The Dean had done some digging in his garden and found treasure trove. He had gone to some pains in investigating the flat tombstone upon which his front door opens. He had traced the history of the occupant who had given up the ghost, having completed (according to the Latin text of the inscription) sixty-nine years seven months three weeks two days and nineteen minutes. He was a Bishop of Wiltchester at the time of his death, but he had not long been in that see. His life had been a strange one. "I will tell you all about it when you arrive: I am afraid he was or is a bad man." That was the only ghostly reference, since Dr. Snatchett had been busy with other things and his wife had been ill as a result of his underground investigations. She was better, but wanted

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to see and talk to Mrs. Leader. The Dean was writing for her. "I don't think," said Geoffrey when they had settled in the westward train, "that anything ghostly is likely to happen." "What about the old Bishop? I remember now the tombstone. It is just on the front door. I remember that we made out the name, Galfridus something or another, and a long Latin epitaph which I couldn't read. The stone stretched to the house and may have been older than the house. The Dean writes as if the old fellow is still alive." "Nonsense," said Geoffrey, and busied himself with a mass of papers for a January private international law case in which he was leading a junior who knew nothing of foreign law.

The Dean was, in fact, looking forward to the opportunity of taking Geoffrey Leader's opinion on a state of things which had puzzled the whole Chapter of Wiltchester as well as the Bishop. There was no tradition of haunting in the precincts, nor in the Bishop's great house. It is true that the fact that a certain skull had been stolen from the Cathedral by the Dean some years before had given rise to strange midnight scenes, but the restoration of the head and re-burial on a certain snowy night had ended Mrs. Snatchett's terrors and the Dean's fears. There was the matter of the Bishop's half-crown and the ghostly butler, but that had been half explained. Indeed, Miles Crow was a confidant of the Bishop. There was also the little matter of Arthur Toogood and the Carrion Crow, but that also had been brushed aside. Yet the importance of these cases was that it had made Geoffrey have a new respect for the intellect of the Dean and they could talk on equal terms. Now in the summer Dr. Snatchett had spent the long fine evenings in an investigation that he had often dreamed of. He had worked out the life history of a certain Bishop of Wiltchester who died in 1485, after a career that equalled in infamy that of the Duke of Gloucester who became King Richard III of England. The line of the Bishops of Wiltchester had been a credit to the pre-Reformation as well as to the post-Reformation Church of England.

There was one black spot and it was never mentioned, since after all Galfridus Quirinus was not an Englishman but a Venetian, and he reigned only two years. It was Dr. Snatchett's aim to discover the mystery that surrounded the man who,

through the influence of the King, had been made Bishop of Wiltchester. He had raked out of manuscripts in the Cathedral library all the details of the life of a man who mingled vast scholarship with lurid iniquity. The *Life* was complete, and he took it to the Bishop with a certain sense of accomplishment. A parson whom the *Dictionary of National Biography* did not mention turned out to be one of the greatest scholars of the Renaissance. He was a cousin of Laurus Quirinus, the man who told Pope Nicholas V that Mahomed II destroyed more than 120,000 volumes when he captured Constantinople in 1453. Galfridus was the authority for that statement and was in the doomed city when it was captured. He was a correspondent of Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, and visited him in 1446, the year before that great scholar's death. He was sent to Constantinople by the Duke in search of manuscripts. He became a spy in the employment of the Conqueror and there was some reason to think that he was a Moslem priest, a turncoat from the Church of Rome. He eventually returned to England with a pile of priceless Greek manuscripts and became the tutor of Richard, Duke of Gloucester, and eventually his familiar, instructing him in all the horrible arts which Richard's ancestor, King Peter of Castile, practised. Galfridus was with Richard in the Tower on that night in May 1471 when King Henry VI was murdered, and he was his main emissary in the Tower in 1483 when the young Princes were murdered. In the autumn of that year he became Bishop of Wiltchester.

The Bishop read the horrid story with disgust and expressed his feeling in a few words when he returned the Dean's manuscript. "The man was a monster and I don't like to think that his dust soils our precincts. He was a great scholar, but he was, on your showing, also a spy, a poisoner, a man of endless iniquity. Away with him into the everlasting darkness that is his portion." These words awakened a new train of thought in Dr. Snatchett. He resolved to dig up the bones and burn them. That was in the end of October and awful happenings resulted. The two nuns who were seen fleeing from a strange tall man were the beginning of it all.

A series of interviews followed the arrival of the Leaders. By a cosy fire in Mrs. Snatchett's boudoir that lady told

her troubles after tea over a cigarette, which she declared was necessary for her nerves. The Dean, in October, had removed the tombstone (which, in fact, formed the entrance to the front door) and in a cautious survey of the ground found a dim chamber in which there was a table covered with parchment manuscripts of various thirteenth and fourteenth century alchemists, a curious lump of gold and various glass phials. A chair with rotten cushions adjoined the table. At the far end of the dim chamber was an empty coffin-like box. The Dean identified the manuscripts as some that had been indexed in a fifteenth century list or catalogue of books in the Cathedral library, manuscripts that had disappeared. Apart from this he altered nothing, but called in the Bishop, accompanied by the Head Verger and Miles Crow as witnesses, and then with their help closed the entrance which, while the tombstone had been lifted, had blocked the front door of the Deanery. Mrs. Snatchett's theory was that *something* had escaped from the tomb and was wandering about the precincts and even into the Cathedral. She stated that an old priest, tall, good-looking and with dreamy eyes, had passed her on several occasions on the stairs, and she had seen him studying papers in Dr. Snatchett's library. She was frightened even to go downstairs alone.

Meantime, Geoffrey was interviewing the Dean in the haunted study. There was a good fire illuminating that great room, and (the weather being tempestuous and bitterly cold) they were hugging the fire. "I must see the secret chamber," said Geoffrey. "It was evidently a place where the old fellow was trying to turn lead into gold. Is there any evidence that he was a hoarder of gold?" "Plenty," said the Dean, "and, in fact, I came across one of his hoards last month; here it is," and Dr. Snatchett gave Geoffrey his find, a great mass of dimly shining metal which sent out strange gleams in the dancing firelight. "Who is that in the room?" said Geoffrey sharply. For a moment a tall figure had appeared, glanced at the gold and then went to the Dean's writing-desk and apparently made some notes. "I don't see anybody," said the Dean, "but we had better have a light." The figure had disappeared and Geoffrey, for his own reasons, preferred to rely on the firelight. "There has been a good

deal of talk about appearances," said the lawyer; "what have you seen?" "Nothing," said the Dean, "except—except when I am holding the gold which you are holding now." "Is there any story—you know the whole of the horrid history of the man—connected with the gold?" and Geoffrey clutched it tight. "Oh, yes. Richard the King gave a substantial sum in gold as well as the Bishopric in return for the deeds in the Tower, and the Bishop was attempting to multiply it. Do you see anything?" "Yes and no," said the lawyer. "It must be my fancy, but I seem to see a figure at your desk making notes and pouring something from one glass phial to another. It is fancy, because it fades when I loose my hold on the gold." They were conversing in whispers over the fire. The Dean said, "I gave my wife a gold ring that I found in the chamber. Perhaps that is why she is always seeing things. I gave the Bishop and the Head Verger the two other rings. They have seen things." "Ah, well," said Geoffrey rising, putting down the gold treasure trove and putting on the electric light, "I am going to solve this silly mystery. I am certain it is fancy. Neither the Bishop nor the Verger nor I believe in ghosts. I am going to put the treasure trove in your precious safe." "While you are doing that," said the Dean, "I have to write a letter upstairs," and Dr. Snatchett, looking very care-worn, left the library. As Geoffrey was carrying the treasure trove to the safe somebody else entered the room in search of the Dean. "I had better wait," he said, "I am the new Canon, and Dr. Snatchett is expecting me." They both sat down and Geoffrey put the treasure trove into his lap. The visitor was a tall, courteous man of more than middle age, with dreamy eyes—an Oxford man (he said) and a student of Roman and mediæval law and philosophy. Geoffrey introduced himself, and the Canon knew his name and referred to an essay that Geoffrey had written years before on Roger Bacon. While they were talking with eagerness on the new possibilities of alchemy in the light of the new physics, Dr. Snatchett returned, entirely ignored the new Canon, and said sharply, "I must go at once to see a dying man. Excuse me, Geoffrey," and departed. The Canon apparently did not notice the Dean's abrupt entrance and exit, but in the lull of the conversation Geoffrey rose and deposited the treasure trove in the safe. When he turned round the new Canon also had departed. The lawyer frowned;

the whole of his legal being was alert. "The evidence fits in perfectly and leads to an absurd result," he muttered. Then he remembered that he had promised to meet the Bishop in the Cathedral at six o'clock to see the newly cleaned late fifteenth-century glass. It contained a portrait of Galfridus Quirinus, Bishop of Wiltchester (1483-5).

The Bishop was waiting for him with the Head Verger, who whispered to Geoffrey, as the Bishop led the way to the North Transept, where the glass had been replaced, "His Lordship is very disturbed. Something has happened. His Lordship has seen the vision of the Bad Bishop on his episcopal throne. I have seen the vision. We need the advice of a King's Counsel learned in the law. His Lordship is very disturbed: *Da quæsumus, Domine misericors, fidelibus tuis veniam, et pacem, ut, ab omnibus suis culpis expiati, securâ tibi mente serviant.*" The Head Verger, having delivered his soul in the mediæval Latin that he loved, relapsed into silence, and the two, after Geoffrey had glanced at the verger in quiet astonishment, caught the Bishop up just as he was looking at the extraordinary likeness in the window. "Wonderful thing, modern cleaning of mediæval glass! Your predecessor, my namesake, looks just like the new Canon." "What new Canon?" said the Bishop, without his usual serenity and cheerfulness. "I've just met him: a sound Oxford mediævalist." "There has not been a new Canon appointed here for at least ten years. By the way, I don't think the glass has been fitted very firmly round the Bishop. I saw it shake with the last gust of wind." Geoffrey ignored this technical point and said to the Bishop: "I want to speak to you and the Dean and the Head Verger privately, and I cannot do it here. First, will you give me the old rings which Dr. Snatchett gave you? I have already the ring that he gave his wife. I am advising on this case." He produced Mrs. Snatchett's ring and without a word he took the two other rings and deposited the three under the window in a corner. "I propose we should meet this evening after dinner in the old Bishop's chamber and tomb. This will give time to have the place opened again and aired, and give me time to carry the lump of alleged gold in the chamber, and the treasure trove in the Dean's study, to this place, and secure the lost manuscripts."

This was done by Geoffrey before dinner, and as it had already been arranged that the Bishop was dining at the Deanery, Geoffrey's plan caused little disturbance.

But something else caused a disturbance. The lawyer, after dinner, explained his theory. He asseverated once again his disbelief in ghosts and the Bishop agreed, with some mental reservations. He said that the fact that only in certain circumstances—the possession of certain gold or alleged gold—did an alleged ghost or phantom appear, showed that the whole business was subjective and the additional fact that Dr. Snatchett did not see the alleged Canon was additional proof of this. The lawyer proceeded to explain that in some way, at present unknown to science, the fifteenth-century alchemist had so impressed or photographed his personality on to the metal with which he was dealing that anybody who had contact with the metal seemed to see the alchemist as, indeed, he, the lawyer, had seen and talked with him. It was all subjective, and presumably science would explain what was really a simple scientific fact, the stirring up of the subjective mind by the aid of an objective thing. The Bishop agreed, with larger mental reservations. Mr. Leader was in his most persuasive mood, a mood in which he had often overwhelmed the House of Lords in the face of fearful legal odds.

At this moment terrific crashes sounded and resounded through the Deanery, crashes like many thunderbolts. The front door had been blown open and a pale moon looked down on a scene of curious significance. The secret chamber and tomb had given way and carried into its sinister depths many things, including a whole brick summer-house, the old tombstone and many yards of the most exquisite turf. There was nothing for the moment to be done. All that remained to be done could be done on the morrow by callous British workmen glad of any job. The front door remained intact and was closed immediately. It was a cold night. The Bishop said, "I am going to the Cathedral; will anyone accompany me?" The Head Verger is here." Dr. Snatchett and Geoffrey Leader at once volunteered. A side door of the Cathedral was opened and in a few seconds the place was flooded with light. The great building had been closed since the conclusion of

verspers. The Bishop led them to the North Transept to see what was to be seen. The night was tempestuous and the Bishop had remarked before on the apparently insecure character of the newly fitted old glass. But all knew what they were to see. The portrait in glass of Galfridus Quirinus lay shattered into a thousand fragments. That was natural. But the gold was gone. That was unnatural, and yet (so the Head Verger said) the ruling passion strong in death might explain it.

J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY.

MARLBOROUGH.*

Mr. Winston Churchill, in the first volume of his monumental work, *Marlborough His Life and Times*, deals with the life of his great ancestor down to the death of William III in 1702. Marlborough's genius as a military commander, comparable only with that of men like Cæsar or Napoleon, has long been accepted. But his moral character and political scruples have received the most ruthless condemnation until almost the present time. Mr. Churchill steadily pursues the work of rehabilitation, rejecting somewhat easily the calumnies of Macaulay and inclining towards the more equitable conclusions of Paget.

Marlborough was over fifty before he earned imperishable fame in the War of the Spanish Succession. His earlier years were spent mainly as courtier and servant of the Duke of York, afterwards James II, and thereafter under suspicion, sometimes in disgrace, under William III. Yet it is clear that William recognised in Marlborough a man of genius in both war and diplomacy and ultimately gave him his confidence.

Marlborough's early association with Charles II's mistress, the Duchess of Cleveland, has attracted the most sordid speculations and unfounded accusations, notably from that notorious volume *The New Atalantis*. Mr. Churchill does not, indeed cannot, deny the fact of their association, but he does effectively dissolve the lurid tales of vice, especially about the

* *Marlborough His Life and Times*, Vol. I, by Rt. Hon. W. S. Churchill. Harrap. 25s. net.

gift from the Duchess of £5,000 with which Marlborough purchased an annuity from Lord Halifax. Mr. Churchill accepts Paget's judgment.

For the loathsome imputation cast upon him . . . we can discover no foundation even in the scandalous chronicles of those scandalous days. That he did not bring to the Court of Charles the virtue which made the overseer of Potiphar's household famous in that of Pharaoh, must be freely admitted. . . . Far be it from us to be the advocates of lax morality; but Churchill must be judged by the standard of the day. He corrupted no innocence; he invaded no domestic peace.

It is clear that after his marriage with Sarah he was always a most devoted and constant husband.

Marlborough owed his early advancement almost entirely to the patronage of the future James II, and his subsequent vacillation between that King and William of Orange and his ultimate desertion have aroused endless controversy and frequent condemnation. Mr. Churchill endeavours to give to Marlborough's actions a logical and honourable sequence. At least one constant factor appears. He remained openly a Protestant in the face of James' Catholic bigotry. In those troublous days, religious opinions determined ultimately political allegiances. The employment of a Protestant was clearly advantageous to James, though he never bestowed on Marlborough his utmost confidence, as is shown, for example, by his subordinate rank at Sedgemoor. On Marlborough's side, there grew an "unseen rift." Commenting upon the Duchess of Marlborough's account of the shipwreck of the *Gloucester* in 1682 with James on board, some sixty years after, Mr. Churchill says:

We, however, in this afterlight can see quite plainly where the Churchills stood in relations to James. It is not merely want of sympathy, but deep disapproval. They served him because it was their duty and their livelihood. He retained them because better servants could not be found elsewhere. But all this lay far below the surface.

For a time at least he placed his duty before his conscience. "From the beginning of 1686 onward he was resolved to resist his master's designs." In May 1687 and again in August 1688 Marlborough wrote secretly to William, offering his support. He remained, superficially at least, an adherent of

the King until a few days before his flight in December. Did he remain for his own sake or for the sake of William? Mr. Churchill believes the latter. Marlborough's reputation and influence in the Army were unequalled by any other officer. By guiding the army into the arms of William he made the Revolution bloodless.

What in all the rest is rightful, salutary action in a great crisis, in Churchill is "a dark conspiracy." But for Churchill's action, England would have been drenched with English blood—yet he alone is the villain. . . . The relief and joy of the nation that an inevitable revolution was accomplished without the agony of civil war have resounded through the ages; and with them echo the censures upon the one man whose action, and whose only possible action, brought so great a blessing.

But it may, of course, be argued that such a result does not prove the intent and is rather evidence of duplicity. Mr. Churchill presents an extremely able argument for his view, although, as he admits, Marlborough's subsequent intrigues with James "seem to stultify his former action, to rob it of its basis of conscientious scruple, and to arm his innumerable assailants with every weapon that indignant rectitude or implacable malice could desire." The intrigues of the Jacobite Court at St. Germain's involved nearly all the English statesmen of the day. Self-interest which once demanded favour from William of Orange now sought a pardon from James.

That Marlborough, like most Englishmen, together with all the Revolution statesmen, should become estranged from the new Government; that he should quarrel personally with King William; that he should seek to safeguard himself in the increasingly probable event of a Jacobite restoration, are not in themselves, and under the conditions of the period, wrongful or odious behaviour. The test is whether he was false in intention or in fact to the cause of Protestantism and constitutional freedom, and above all whether the safety of England or the lives of her soldiers and sailors were jeopardised by his actions.

Certain it is that the Jacobites never gained anything by their dealings with Marlborough. He toyed with them; but to what purpose? Mr. Churchill argues that he had nothing to gain from a restoration. "At the best a contemptuous pardon and a justly ineradicable distrust. Of all the notables

of England he had the least to hope and the most to fear from such a restoration." Apart from the times when he was active in the field against the French or engaged in diplomacy, it is difficult to appreciate any other motive than that of self-preservation against a possible Jacobite return.

Mr. Churchill has devoted to this work all his fascinating powers of argument and presentation. To the general reader he presents a thrilling story, to the historian a very learned and often provocative treatise.

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THE SLUM PROBLEM.*

The slum problem is a true subject for a Christmas and New Year tragedy since the Christmas season celebrates Christ in the Home, and when the Home is not fit for the Christ-child it is not fit for any other child. Therefore, Sir E. D. Simon's trenchant book, describing the Anti-Slum Campaign, is the best Christmas book that has been published since Dickens' *Christmas Carol*.

The book which Sir E. D. Simon has written (the most recent of his many writings on this dreadful subject) shows the way to abolish slums. He is a great authority on the subject of slums. He has been Lord Mayor of Manchester; he was the chairman of the Manchester Housing Committee for five years; he was Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health in 1929; he was a Member of Parliament until 1931, and his activities on various committees and councils have been ceaseless.

During the whole of this period my one aim has been to get the children out of the slums. I have always believed that it could be done, and that it could be done only in one way: by building enough new houses to let at suitable rents. I have always criticised the action of successive Governments from this one point of view. I have always believed that the country was rich enough to afford the building of these houses, and to give whatever subsidies might be necessary to let them at reasonable rents so long as the whole thing was done economically and on business lines. Throughout this book I have endeavoured to keep the same point of view before me.

* *The Anti-Slum Campaign*, by Sir E. D. Simon. Longmans. 2s. 6d. net.

Buy and read the book. It is very cheap; it is eminently readable—the author is a master of style—and it deals with a Christmas problem that must be solved. It gives a full and fair history of post-war housing. It puts before the reader the conclusion of the National Housing and Town Planning Council, that “the vital task is not to destroy the old slums but in the first place to build 1,500,000 houses during the next ten years to be let at from 7s. 6d. to 11s. inclusive rent.” Sir E. D. Simon condemns the attitude of the last Labour Government, and, indeed, of the present Government, in regarding slum clearance as of more importance than the building of additional houses to be let at low rents. He deprecates undue optimism and Sir Hilton Young’s demand in Circular 1331 of April 1933, that the local authorities in their programmes “should, so far as practicable, be drawn on the basis of clearing all areas that require clearance not later than 1938.”

Sir E. D. Simon admits that the machinery is there and is working fairly well. “The main improvement that is required is a reorganisation of the Ministry of Health.” Overcrowding is the most serious aspect of the slum problem. Families are forced to share houses because of the insufficient supply, while many of the existing slum houses are too small for families with children.

To do away with overcrowding we must first continue to build houses until there is a separate house for each family. . . . Until we have a separate house for each family no existing property should be pulled down unless it is so bad that its continued existence absolutely cannot be tolerated. Once we have provided a separate house for each family, slum clearance and rehousing should proceed with all possible speed.

Yet, surely, Sir Hilton Young’s plan is not altogether inconsistent with Sir E. D. Simon’s plan. In different districts the slum problems are different, and if the problem is solved in one area it can be in the process of solution in another. The goal is one house for one family, but that goal can be reached in many ways, dependent on different conditions. The rural and the village slum is different from the town slum and the suburban slum. Sir Hilton Young’s optimism may turn out to be a good thing, and, at any rate, it sets a standard and a rate of progress.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Canon Tissington Tatlow, a stalwart worker for many years in the Student Christian Movement of Great Britain and Ireland and the draftsman of the constitution of that Movement (under the title of the British College Christian Union), has compiled the materials for its history.* The story of movements of this type goes back in Europe to the Renaissance, if not earlier, and took new life in England with the birth of the Evangelical Movement a hundred and fifty years ago. There are student societies in connection with the universities now at work that were in existence seventy years ago. The United States of America stimulated these societies, and men like C. T. Studd and Stanley P. Smith, the great Cambridge athletes, gave them new life. The Inter-University Christian Union was born in 1893 at Keswick, and the International Students’ Missionary Conference at Liverpool in 1896 was a great event in the larger history of the Movement. From that date it was clear that a new great Christian force was in motion. The Student Movement in London among women began with the Art Students in 1890, as a result of the Keswick Convention of 1889. When was the Keswick Convention first founded? It is not clear from Mr. Tatlow’s book and it is a very important point. The work among women students was encouraged by that great painter, G. F. Watts. In 1898 the Art Students’ Christian Union was founded and affiliated to the Student Movement, and in the same year the London Women’s Sub-Committee was formed. This Committee had a great effect in reorganising the whole London Movement, and after the War the London Intercollegiate Christian Union for men and women (including theological students) was formed. The women students were, and are, as keen as the men on seeing changes in the order of society. This valuable and very lengthy compilation of material for the history of the Student Christian Movement, which brings in its international importance, will be useful when the time comes for writing a brief and inexpensive history in exact and literary form of a great Movement. The present book is too cumbersome and expensive for general use among students.

* *Through Fascism to World Power*,† by Ion S. Munro, is a study of the evolution and the doctrines of the party which has ruled Italy for eleven years. Since the author has lived through the whole period as a journalist, his book is full of information and interest. He is deeply impressed both by the personality and the work of the Dictator, which, he declares, baffles the imagination. “It is doubtful if any man in world history has so much transformed a nation in so

* Student Christian Movement Press. 12s. 6d. net.

† Maclehose. 12s. 6d.

short a period of time. He has changed the spirit of a race, individually and collectively." The testimony may mean much or little, according as on the whole we approve or disapprove the said change. Mr. Munro sets forth an impressive list of achievements in many fields, and nobody would deny nowadays that Mussolini is an extraordinary man. But the whole story is not told in these pages, and cannot be told by a writer who appears to care so much less for political and intellectual liberty than most Englishmen. Let us read this useful work and weigh its contents. But let us also remember the shadows in the picture, the cruelties to the political prisoners, the impoverishment of the spiritual life of a nation in which only one pattern of citizenship is allowed and only one unchallengeable will prevails. For the deeper aspects of the drama we must turn to the writings of such distinguished Italian Liberals as Professor Salvemini, Don Sturzo, and Count Sforza.

Professor G. M. Trevelyan's three classical works on the Italian risorgimento, namely *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic* (1848-9), *Garibaldi and the Thousand* (May 1860) and *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy* (May-November 1860), have been published together in a popular omnibus volume entitled *Garibaldi*.^{*} The general public, which has always appreciated Professor Trevelyan's books, will certainly welcome this new cheap edition which is well bound and clearly printed on good paper. It has been found necessary to omit the appendices, bibliographies, indices and most of the illustrations contained in the original separate volumes (which are still on sale). Except two, all the maps, which are quite indispensable, have been retained. In his Preface Professor Trevelyan reminds the reader that *Garibaldi* does not follow the Strachey model of modern biography. The book is "both biographical and historical in purpose. . . . I am an historian rather than a biographer." He is concerned with the whole history of the period, "not from his hero's angle of vision alone. Certainly I see these events as much from Cavour's angle as from Garibaldi's, and I believe that is no disadvantage in a biography of Garibaldi."

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

In his preface to *Here and There with Birds*† Mr. Hendy declares that he writes for those who "are fond of birds but do not know much about them," adding his belief that it is through this section

^{*} Longmans. 8s. 6d. net.

† Jonathan Cape. 7s. 6d.

of the bird-loving community that we shall one day arrive at effective bird preservation. Just how ineffective it is at present is made clear in a chapter on "Dartford Warblers and Hobbies." Chapters describing visits to famous bird haunts, small and isolated, incidentally direct one's attention to the fact that what is required is to turn the whole of the English countryside into a bird sanctuary. Nothing short of this can be effective. Glimpses of individual birds, some rare, some common, introduce one to the joy and beauty of bird-life. It is interesting to learn that in West Somerset Cirl Buntings have not been seen by Mr. Hendy above an elevation of about five hundred feet, whereas, so recently as last June, the reviewer saw a cock of this species at over nine hundred feet on Dartmoor—an interesting discrepancy of habit. Excellent photographs add to the interest of the book.

Germany: My Country,^{*} by Friedrich Sieburg, translated from the German by Winifred Ray, is a less striking work than his brilliant study of French character, entitled *Is God a Frenchman?* For it is probably easier to write about another country than about one's own. Occasionally the reader may feel that he is getting rather lost in a cloud of psychological generalisations. The Prefatory Letter contributed to the English edition shows the author at his best, and that is a high compliment. Though not himself a Nazi, and far too civilised to approve the horrible savagery which has disgraced the movement, he realises that Hitler represents more than a triumph of a party. "Germany was living in a sort of Babylonian captivity, in spiritual distress and moral despair. She was languishing beneath a sort of evil spell; but none of her leaders could find a magic formula with which to unbind the spell. Adolf Hitler found it. . . . Our youth is trying to extricate itself from the general world despair, for it is recovering its faith in Germany."

Sir George Young's *The New Spain*† is the most illuminating book on that interesting country since the well-known volume of Madariaga. The author has seen and described revolutions in several countries, and his task in the present work is to relate the new forces to the old. In two hundred pages, packed with knowledge and reflections, he discusses the Church, the Army, the Monarchy, and the Cortes, while a closing chapter deals with the Communists and the Catalans. He speaks with extreme severity of the Church, which he accuses of abusing its power in the days of its strength; and he rejoices in the liberation of education from clerical control as a

^{*} Jonathan Cape. 10s. 6d.

† Methuen. 7s. 6d.

reform long overdue. The Army, on the other hand, is hailed as a progressive force throughout the nineteenth century, when most of the officers were recruited from the Liberal middle class. Alfonso is described as "a good king as kings go," and the better side of the Estella dictatorship is generously recognised. Sir George, needless to say, is a strong supporter of the new Spain, which, he declares, is now likely to give us a lead in more than one direction.

* * * * *

Wing-Commander A. H. Orlebar trained and led the High Speed Flight of the Royal Air Force which won for Great Britain the Schneider Trophy in 1929 and 1931. In *Schneider Trophy** he has written the inside story of the Flights "from notes, some very rough, others rougher still, which I made at various dates, while the High Speed Flight was preparing for, and competing in, the final two Schneider Trophy contests of 1929 and 1931." It is a fascinating story of a great human endeavour and achievement. His frank and intimate narrative describes the preliminary training and tests and the great climax of the actual races. They were a triumph of team work. Wing Commander Orlebar pays generous tribute to the designers and technical staff while minimising perhaps the courage and endurance of the pilots themselves. The book is profusely illustrated and contains important information dealing with technical particulars and records of the aircraft.

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In a review of Dr. Heber Hart's important book, *The Bulwarks of Peace*, contained in the December issue, the author is represented as advocating "the creation of a Supreme Executive Force drawn from the Great Powers and controlled by the League." Dr. Heber Hart in fact discusses two distinct kinds of International Forces. The first he describes as a Collective Force "composed of contingents provided by the Great Powers (and perhaps some other states)" and which would "be consistent with the continued existence of separate states and with the stage of social integration at which the world has already arrived. . . . The proposal to establish this Force is eminently practical." The second is a Supreme Executive Force which "would involve the establishment of a world state and the cessation of the existence of all other states." Dr. Heber Hart, quite rightly, points out that in his book he does not advocate the creation of such a force but regards it as quite impractical under present conditions. The reviewer greatly regrets to have omitted this distinction though he contends that even a Collective Force is an unworkable proposition to-day.

* Seeley Service and Co. Ltd. 12s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

FEBRUARY, 1934.

WILL DEMOCRACY SURVIVE?*

THERE is said to be in these times a world trend towards dictatorships. In many countries thoughtful men are asking themselves: Will democracy survive?

In the far-off days before the Great War, the type of government in civilised countries appeared to be almost standardised. With minor variations here and there, the typical modern State was ruled under the direction of a parliament which was elected by the people; the decisions of a majority, among the voters and in the parliament, were accepted as conclusive, binding upon all until a majority for a different policy was obtained. There was liberty of person, of thought, of the Press; religious toleration was the rule; individual citizens could not be arrested or punished, except by due process of law. That was democracy, as understood in the modern world. During the nineteenth century it had spread from the Anglo-Saxon countries over the greater part of the globe. Russia, Germany, Austria and Japan still had their Emperors; but in those countries also representative institutions had been established, and exercised, if not a final authority, at least a large influence. Even in Turkey and China the old autocracies had been overthrown and parliaments set up. It seemed only a question of time when free political institutions would be the rule everywhere.

To-day, over a large part of the world, the picture is very different. Russia has exchanged the autocracy of the Tsars only for a so-called "Dictatorship of the Proletariat"; for good reason or for bad, liberty, both constitutional and personal, has been discarded in Russia. In Italy, Yugoslavia, Poland, Turkey and Persia, powerful individuals have established, by revolutionary action, "authoritarian" governments. Spain, not long ago, had followed the same course, and now Germany has joined the list. The events in Great Britain in 1931 and in the United States in 1933, when, in grave economic emergencies, powers were granted to the executives more comprehensive and more drastic than ever

* This article has been published also in the United States in *To-Day* of New York.
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before in modern times had been granted in those countries in time of peace—those events have been held to be part of the same tendency. The question arises whether democracy stands self-confessed as a failure. Men are asking themselves whether anywhere in the present-day world democracy will endure.

Let us examine the facts a little more closely. First, it is clear that the case of Great Britain and of the United States must be distinguished very sharply from that of the other countries which are cited. What was done in the two great English-speaking democracies was done voluntarily; it was not achieved by force or intimidation. There was no marching of armed men, no arrest or imprisonment of opponents, no suppression of freedom of speech or of the Press. The new powers were not seized, they were conferred; and they were conferred upon the regularly constituted executives by legislatures freely elected in the regular way. This is not an infringement of democracy; it is part of the democratic process. It is not a sign of weakness; it is a sign of strength. The peoples recognise that governments in a democracy must be effective as well as representative; that the machine must work; that in exceptional times exceptional action may be necessary, and that therefore exceptional powers may need to be granted. The very large authority conferred by Parliament upon the National Government in Great Britain, and the even larger authority conferred by the American Congress upon the Roosevelt Administration, together with the vigorous use that was made of those powers—these have been a vindication, not a surrender, of democracy.

Next, let it be remembered that, in several of the other countries that are in question, free institutions had never taken root. In Russia, Turkey and Persia they had no established hold; there was no instructed electorate; the working of democracy was not understood. Much the same may be said of Yugo-Slavia. In Spain personal rule has already been overthrown, and the Spanish nation, after a bitter experience, has returned to free government.

Further, those who draw up the list of the countries which are under dictatorships usually forget to accompany it with the list of the countries which are not. France shows no faltering in her grasp of the banner of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity; Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Nor-

way, Sweden, do not weaken in their adherence to free government; the democratic constitutions of the new states of Czecho-Slovakia and the Baltic countries remain unimpaired; the chief South American countries—subject to the vicissitudes which have always affected them—have not discarded their representative institutions. When to all these we add the United States of America, and Great Britain, and the great Dominions of the British Commonwealth, it is seen how false is the picture which presents the modern world as one in which democracy is already overwhelmed and personal rule triumphant. There is in fact no “general trend.” Analyse what is new in the present situation and it will be found to reduce itself to little more than the two special cases of Italy and Germany.

In any event, the question to be answered by self-respecting men is not whether democracy *will* survive, but whether democracy *should* survive. Is it, or is it not, to the advantage of a nation that that system of government should prevail? If the answer is Yes, then it is our business to make it prevail. If it is No, then let us make ready for the alternative. That, and that alone, is the issue which matters. To prophesy what is likely to happen is a futile occupation; to decide what ought to happen is one of the chief duties to which men of intelligence and goodwill may set themselves.

Let it be admitted that there are peoples which are not yet qualified to work with success the complicated mechanism of a democratic constitution. That is a task which requires a certain standard of popular education; a general willingness to give time and energy to the public cause; a readiness on the part of a sufficient number of men and women of intelligence and integrity to accept the burdens of office in the executives and of representation in the assemblies. If a nation feels that it does not possess those qualifications it may be well advised to admit the fact and to accept some authoritarian form of government. But to confess its own inaptitude for political liberty is one thing; to draw from that the conclusion that liberty has no value for others, who may have reached a higher stage of development, is quite another. Let those accept the rule of dictators who feel incompetent to rule themselves. That is their affair. But let them not pretend, in order to cloak their failure, that they are really in possession of some nobler political philosophy of

their own. Let them not try to persuade us that it is finer to be led blindfolded than to walk by one's own vision.

Ought democracy to endure? We know its defects. But what of the defects of the alternative? The success of dictatorships depends upon the personality of the dictators. A vigorous, honest, far-seeing leader, established in power, may administer his country's affairs with high efficiency and confer upon it great material benefits. But how ensure equal capacity and integrity in his successor? Are there many cases recorded in the annals of the past of one great ruler being succeeded by a second of equal calibre? In almost every instance the great man is followed by a little man aping greatness. Then, away from the wholesome fresh air of free discussion, issues of policy and public appointments soon come to be settled by personal influences, by favour and intrigue. There creeps in the atmosphere of the Court. Cavour, who had much experience both of Parliaments and of princes, summed up the experience of a lifetime when he said "the worst Chamber is better than the best antechamber!"

The supreme need of our time is peace among nations. All questions must be viewed in relation to that. Here again history gives a clear guidance. Emperors and dictators—the Cæsars, the Napoleons, the Bismarcks—bring wars. The common people ask for nothing better than to be left in tranquillity, to be allowed to lead their lives in quiet in their homes; let them control their own destinies through free political institutions, and they will use their power, in the main, for peace. The danger-spots in the world to-day are not to be found in the countries with democratic constitutions. They lie—obviously enough for all to see—in some of those States that are now under authoritarian rule. Extend the number of such States and you multiply the risks of war.

Will dictatorships help to restore prosperity? It is the promise that they would do so which largely accounts for their emergence during this period of economic depression. So far the facts give no ground for supposing that they will succeed better than the other system. There is no particle of evidence that the prosperity of the countries of the world to-day varies inversely with the freedom of their constitutions.

And this final question must present itself to each one of us. Could we, of the English-speaking countries, bear to submit

to a system of government in which we had no effective share in the choice of our rulers; in which we were not free to speak our minds about the policy of our State at home and abroad; in which the newspapers we read could print only such news and such views as the Government might think expedient; in which our sons and daughters could be taught in the schools and universities only such kinds of knowledge as the State might approve; a system in which any one of independent mind among us could be arrested without warrant and imprisoned without trial?

"The spirit of the age," "the trend of the time"—these things have no reality. We may, if we choose, sum up in such phrases the characteristics of movements proceeding around us, but they describe no actual forces. Look closely and you will find that there is nothing there; nothing but the action of numbers of men and women like ourselves; of numbers of people, in many countries, following, or refusing to follow, particular leaders, accepting, or refusing to accept, particular doctrines. There are no Powers irresistibly at work, like Destiny in a Greek tragedy, sweeping mankind this way and that—forces against which effort is futile and hope is vain. Look closely and you will see that there is nothing there but your decisions and mine, your actions and mine, and the decisions and actions of millions of others such as you and me. We ourselves are the "spirit of the age." We ourselves fix the "trend of the time." And if we judge that democracy, well organised and wisely directed, is, on the whole and in the long run, a better form of government than personal rule, then it is our function to do our share in organising our democracies well and directing them wisely. We shall seek to eliminate, in the electorates and among the representatives, the incompetence, the dishonesty, the dissensions, which have helped to make self-governing institutions unworkable in certain countries, and have led to their discard.

I believe that the peoples in the English-speaking countries will do that. Fascism will gain no hold here, nor in many other of the progressive countries of the world. Our example, if successful, will spread; the recent currents will be reversed. Then, soon or late, free institutions will be restored in places where they have been overthrown, and extended perhaps to new domains; and mankind once again will be able to draw deep breaths of the fresh air of Liberty.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

NOTES ON THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ROOSEVELT EXPERIMENT.

IN the smoking compartment of a parlour car of the Washington express some time towards the end of 1930, a group of old political hands were discussing Prohibition. The members of this group, seven or eight successful politicians, had all made a professional study of the trend of American opinion, and the inside working of American politics. They all agreed, without a dissentient voice, that Prohibition would not be dislodged from the laws of the land; that the Volstead Act might be circumvented, but that the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, if it were attempted and if it could be done at all, which all of them doubted, would take at least a quarter of a century. They gave reasons for their doubts. An American newspaper man present, who agreed with the verdict, described the position of the American people in the matter of Prohibition as "beyond human aid."

Four years after that conversation between political experts the Eighteenth Amendment had been repealed and Prohibition was no more.

Anyone at all familiar with opinion in the United States, including the opinion of those "in the know," as it existed four or five years back, could duplicate the above experience. It marks a characteristic of American life; characteristic, that is, of the violent oscillations of American opinion; its incalculability; of the way in which those who are in a position to know it best can be grievously mistaken. And it is a warning of the unwisdom of prophecy of any sort where the rapid swings of public opinion are involved. These oscillations, incidentally, reveal themselves as much in relation to persons as to policies. The experience of a Wilson, who, lauded as a demi-god in the war period, was a year or two later pulled down from his pedestal with bitter rancour, is not unique.

All this has to be taken into account in any judgment of the probable course of the Roosevelt experiment. Yet, there are certain trends of the American democracy bearing on that experiment which, despite the oscillation just referred to, do seem pretty constant, almost invariable, indeed. One is

peculiar to that democracy: the close association of an inflationary monetary policy with the popular, democratic side of politics, and of "sound" money with the wealthy, privileged, conservative side. The radical and revolutionary movements of Europe against privilege have never been marked in quite that way. But the association of "soft" money with radical and popular movements in America comes down from colonial times. The same lines of demarcation are forming in respect of President Roosevelt's policy. Now, as in the Bryan campaign, in the Greenback times, in the struggles of Alexander Hamilton, we find pretty much the same alignment: On the one side the farmers, the workers, "the people," advocating a more-money policy as against the cities, the mercantile classes, the rich, the bankers, the conservatives, resisting inflationary devices. With this difference, however: In the present situation, a great many who would previously have been on the conservative side, are now on the popular or radical. The smaller business men, what the Marxians call the *petit bourgeoisie*, who in previous conflicts would have made common cause with urban business as a whole, now make common cause with the farmer (who in Europe would be called the peasant) as against big business and the banker. Never, in occasional contacts with American opinion stretching over thirty years, have I known so intense a feeling against "the money power" as at the present time. I knew agricultural America (which most city Americans do not know at all), so far as one can get to know it by living with American farmers, at the time of the Bryan campaign, and the feeling against Wall Street is without doubt far more intense and widespread to-day than it was when Bryan fought the cause of monetary expansion by means of free silver considerably more than a quarter of a century ago. In the prosperity periods the Rotarians, the Lions, the Kiwanis, Babbittry of all colours in the towns, supported big business in its resistance to government interference. To-day, without any sort of doubt, Mr. Babbitt is glad to see the banker getting from the government in the way of control and restriction "all that is coming to him."

To this feeling against Wall Street on the part not merely of rural America but of much of the lesser bourgeoisie, there is added a general distrust of the whole governing order.

Attending a Rotarian luncheon in Chicago recently, I was amazed to find my hosts expressing generally the belief that there were very few American judges who could not be bought; very few administrators—city, state or federal—who were not lining their pockets at the public's expense. One used to hear this from the radicals and irresponsibles, but to hear it expressed, without protest, in a gathering of Rotarians is something new in American life.

Yet, by a paradox which is not peculiar to America, those who expressed this distrust of government in general are those who support Roosevelt in his proposal to enlarge enormously the control by government of the major economic activities of the country.

It is precisely in this paradox—a distrust of and hostility to administration and government, coupled with a demand for the increasing control of economic forces by the government—that the whole Roosevelt method will find its greatest obstacle. The mass of plain folk in America have always taken a Jeffersonian view of democratic government and administration, the view broadly that "the people" should exercise a direct, not indirect, control over administrators and rulers; that "the people" are competent to exercise that control; that everybody should vote on everything; that any plain, honest man is capable of filling any position to which he may be elected; that administration is not a technical task at all, and should not be in the hands of those trained for it, or forming a professional order.

It was a view which in the eighteenth century worked more or less well. In the small agricultural communities of that time, it was a perfectly feasible and common-sense arrangement for the whole community to meet on the village green, or in the New England city hall, and decide that John would make a good magistrate and Jake a good sheriff. The electors were competent for such a decision. They had known John and Jake by personal contact probably all their lives. But the American democracy has insisted on applying this method, suitable enough for the conditions of the agricultural eighteenth century, to the conditions of the industrial twentieth century, to cities like Chicago, with the result that the voter, who may be Luigi Valetta who keeps the fruit-stall finds put into his hands a ballot paper, sometimes five or six feet long, containing the names of literally hundreds of

officials—governor, vice-governor, sheriffs, judges, school superintendents, park superintendents, sanitary officers, treasurers, accountants, keepers of court-house records. That is to say, the theory is that Luigi is supposed to be able to answer the question whether Mike O'Connor, whom he has never seen, would make a better county treasurer than Jan Polaski, whom he has never seen, not knowing what a county treasurer has got to do. If the problem presented by the average Chicago ballot were to be put to an ordinary business man; if, that is to say, the manager of a big business had to decide as between three hundred or four hundred claimants for all sorts of unfamiliar jobs, he would want months for the task and the assistance of a dozen clerks. But Luigi has to decide this question in the few magic moments that he is in the voting booth. Of course, it reduces the whole thing to comic opera.

Yet that, to the average American voter, is democracy. Any proposal to alter it is usually criticised as anti-democratic. And there is in his hostility to any change a feeling that, by handing over administration to a professional civil service, he is depriving the plain man of opportunities of advancement. The European has a feeling that the first, and indeed the only, function of, say, a judiciary is the impartial administration of law. But in the popular American mind, the chance of being elected to a judgeship is one of the means of ensuring equality of opportunity so that any country lawyer can aspire to the position. The individual, not some abstract conception of society's need, occupies front place in the mind of the average American. The American politician who plastered the walls of a city with a picture of his wife and six children, describing them as seven reasons why the voters should elect him, knew his voter. "Many a man has been elected to office," said an old politician to me, "because the voters felt that he needed the money."

This Jeffersonian view, not only of government but of administration, is still astonishingly strong in America. Again and again, when the crime and gangster problem has been under discussion, I have put it to Americans that if these evils exist in their country more than any other civilised country whatsoever, it is not because—as Americans themselves are apt to declare—their police and judiciary are "inherently" more corrupt than in other countries, but because the whole system of an elective judiciary and the

mixing of, for instance, police administration with politics is inherently unworkable; that any country which adopted it would get about the same results; and that the problem can never be efficiently handled until both the bench and the police are made professional, not subject to election in any way, divorced from politics altogether. But almost always is one assured that this method of approach would never appeal to the American; that it would be—and is—resisted as “undemocratic”; that he would feel that he was parting with his control over his rulers if he abolished the long ballot, and that he prefers to attack the problem of crime not by modifying defective political or social mechanism but by “uplifting” appeals to the moral ardour of all American voters. Because those appeals are sometimes temporarily effective in mitigating the evil, they are persisted in, and serve as substitute for the more scientific measure.

To that characteristic of the American political machine add others: The amazing overlapping of governing functions—city governments, county governments (of which there are twenty thousand in the United States)—State governments, Federal government, all with taxing authority and all but the last directly elective.

It was doubtless with something of this in his mind that a very eminent American publicist was prompted to remark in private: “I don’t believe for a moment that we could work an unemployment scheme in America. The whole thing would break down from political complexity and friction and cumbersomeness and the corruption that would necessarily go with it.” Yet it is on this political foundation that the country is proceeding to one of the greatest experiments in controlled economy, in national planning, that has ever been tried outside of Russia.

This does not mean, of course, that it may not in large measure succeed. It probably will succeed in the sense that there can be no return to the “rugged individualism” of the beginning of the century. Too many eggs have been broken for the omelette to be unscrambled. The eggs having been broken, an omelette of some sort must be cooked, a control that must continue so long as unemployment at all on the scale of the last few years is endemic; and, or, any form of monetary and banking policy demanding constant public control is maintained.

Indeed, whether the monetary experiment upon which those who have been so vocal in their attacks upon Wall Street have based so much of their hopes fails or succeeds, increased government control must result. Failure would ensure that outcome just as much as success. For failure would produce conditions that only nationally organised effort could meet. It is assumed that a rise in the general price level will of itself cure the economic ills of that America—agricultural America—which has suffered most. One defender of the Roosevelt policy seriously argues:

Reduced to its simplest terms, President Roosevelt’s rubber dollar or commodity dollar is only a means of preventing falls of the price level. If the commodity dollar is set up nobody will be able to move the prices of goods, and consequently farmers and industrialists will be assured, for generations, of a fair price.

But the plight of the farmer has been due to the disparity between the price of primary products and of manufactured articles and necessary services like railroad transportation. A rise in the general price level may relieve his burden of debt, but of itself will do nothing to close the gap between agricultural and industrial prices. Furthermore, if by monetary manipulation we *could* ensure the agriculturist a “fair price” for his produce, how is the adjustment between production and consumption to be effected? While there can, if you will, be no general over-production, there can certainly be over-production of specific products; rubber (to go for a moment outside America) is probably one. If the price to-day of such a product is remunerative, and is, thanks to monetary manipulation, so to remain; and if all rubber companies double, quadruple or multiply by ten the area of planting (which will not come into bearing for four or five years) each getting the same bright idea in ignorance of the fact that every other planter is also acting upon it . . . what is to become of all the rubber? In the case of the manufactured article there has always been a degree of control over output greater than that possible in the case of agriculture, exposed to the hazards of weather. Yet manufactures have had in addition the protection of the tariff which it has not been possible to accord to agriculture. The correction of the disparity will demand some permanent form of government intervention.

President Roosevelt has, of course, already made the discovery that if you guarantee the price of a product, you must control the amount of the product which that guarantee covers. There is no escape from that conclusion. The very success of his monetary policy, in giving a lift to enterprise, to the farmer, will be the signal for a far completer control of what the farmer shall grow, and how much. Already the need for such control has been attempted by the hog-killing and cotton-destroying campaigns. If there is that over-production of specific products at a time when their production did not pay, what is likely to be the situation when their production does pay, unless this element of conscious control is introduced?

But that brings us once more to the political question: How is the political instrument, an efficient and incorruptible bureaucracy, capable of that degree of control, to be created out of the conditions and out of the traditions which I have just described? The spirit which has created the N.R.A.; the boldness; the initiative, the taking promptly of vital decisions, is magnificent. But magnificence of itself will not win the battles of peace any more than the battles of war.

A certain sharp distinction has to be made. It is true, I think, that the old individualism and *laissez-faire* has gone for good; that America is ill equipped with a political instrument adequate for the control and direction which must succeed the old *laissez-faire*. But there is no likelihood that she will turn to Dictatorship of the Fascist kind. Any hint from President Roosevelt that he did not intend to submit himself for re-election; any indication that he intended to make himself dictator for an indefinite time, for life, would raise against him forces he could not meet. For he finds his present support mainly among those with whom Democracy is a real faith, nurtured by early suggestion, by school-teaching, by hostilities, resentments, hates, based firmly upon legend, myth, as well as upon falsehood. The President has only to hint at such intention to arouse at once the impulse to tear the mighty from their seats, which has been so constant a feature of American history, for him to share the fate of so many previous idols of the American people.

NORMAN ANGELL.

THE PROBLEM OF THE SAAR.

IN accordance with the undertaking given in the Treaty of Versailles to the inhabitants of the Saar basin, they will be called upon, in 1935, to express their preference for one of three forms of government—union with France, union with Germany or maintenance of the existing system, which is administration of the territory by the League of Nations. It is desirable to begin by recalling this pledge, given by all the signatories to the Treaty, because it appears to be assumed by a good many people, and some Governments, that the ultimate disposal of the Saar depends only upon an agreement on the subject being reached between France and Germany or at most between the Powers who signed the Treaty. The most recent form taken by this assumption is the suggestion made by the Hitler Government that the Saar shall be handed back to Germany by France without holding the plebiscite at all, and the reference by Herr Hitler to the Saar question as the only territorial issue between France and Germany which remains unsettled.

But this is not the first time that it has been taken for granted that once Germany and France are agreed on the matter, everyone else concerned has only to fall into line and accept the *fait accompli*. For confidential Franco-German negotiations were carried on a few years ago upon the question, and did not fall far short of reaching a conclusion.

It is true that if the conclusion had been in favour of returning the territory to Germany, it would almost certainly have been confirmed by a referendum to the inhabitants, perhaps ninety-nine per cent. of whom would have been at that time in favour of being reincorporated with the Reich. The pledge to hold the plebiscite could, in fact, have been safely carried out. The conditions are by no means the same to-day. Not only would there be nothing like a quasi-unanimity for union with Germany, but it is not at all certain that there would even be a majority. The pledge to consult the inhabitants remains, however, and although the text of the Treaty itself does not give a specific undertaking to abide by the result of the consultation, there are on record declarations made by the Allied Powers at the same time, which leave no doubt as to their intention that the Saarlanders

should, in 1935, freely choose between the three alternatives presented with regard to the form of government under which they should eventually live.

Article 49 of the Treaty says that the inhabitants shall "indicate the sovereignty under which they desire to be placed." The annexe to that section of the Treaty says that "the League of Nations shall decide on the sovereignty under which the territory is to be placed, taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants as expressed by the voting." In neither case is the obligation to follow the opinion expressed in the plebiscite made complete. However, the reply of the Allied Powers to the observations of the German Delegation, made on June 16th, 1919, not only declares in its preamble, over the signature of M. Clemenceau, that the population "will have complete freedom to decide whether they wish union with Germany, etc.," but states in the body of the document "that the whole arrangement is only temporary, and that at the end of fifteen years the inhabitants will have a full and free right to choose the sovereignty under which they are to live."

Now supposing the inhabitants of the Saar, who were Germans before the War and remain Germans in language and in national and cultural sympathies to-day, do not, for reasons which I shall give in a moment, express a desire to return to Germany, and do not make the choice, which has never really been in question, of being incorporated with France, but vote for the continuance of League of Nations rule. It has recently been claimed, especially in Germany, that this would be an entirely impracticable decision for a permanent form of government. Moreover, I have also recently heard this argument advanced in the Saar itself by a sympathiser with the Germany of Hitler:—"Is it conceivable that we, who are Germans, shall be permanently content to remain under the autocratic rule of an international commission, whose chairman is an Englishman, and whose members include a Jugo-Slav, a Frenchman and a Dutchman and only one of our own people?" Arguments of this sort assume that "maintenance of the régime established by the present Treaty and this annexe" necessarily means the stabilisation of League Government in its present form, which is certainly autocratic in its nature—although there is an elected advisory council—and is certainly almost entirely foreign in its com-

position; but they leave out of account that the annexe provides that although Germany shall, in the event of this decision, surrender to the League of Nations her sovereignty over the territory—which is at present technically in suspense—the League is empowered to "decide upon the sovereignty under which the territory is to be placed" and that it will be its "duty to take appropriate steps to adapt the régime definitely adopted to the permanent welfare of the territory and the general interest." There will therefore be nothing to prevent the League setting up an independent and autonomous Government in the Saar under international guarantees.

If anyone objects that such an idea is Utopian and impracticable, the reply can be made that exactly eight miles from the Territory of the Saar is a state hardly larger, whose independence was guaranteed by all the European Powers as long ago as 1867, and has survived the war of 1870 and that of 1914-1918, though in each case it was not a day's march from the line of battle. If you follow the frontier of France from the point where it leaves the south-eastern corner of Belgium and runs almost due east until it turns sharply to the south on reaching the Rhine not far from Carlsruhe, you will immediately find on your left the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, a triangle with an area of a thousand square miles, with Belgium, Germany and France each on one of the three sides of it. Proceed a little further—the eight miles aforesaid—and the frontier turns slightly to the south before continuing eastward. In the angle is the Territory of the Saar, eight hundred square miles, with Lorraine to the west and south of it and Germany to the north and east. To-day the Saar is, like Luxembourg, a buffer state between France and Germany, and neutralises over sixty miles of Franco-German frontier. Would it not be an element of peace that it should continue to be a buffer state and continue to neutralise those sixty miles?

The Saar basin—Saar Territory is the official designation—received special treatment at the Peace Conference, because the Allies desired to give France immediate compensation for the destruction of her coal mines in the Department of the Nord by the Germans, and the coal mines of the Saar were a conveniently available counterpart, as they were not owned privately but by the German Government. They

were handed over absolutely to France, and are now worked under French State management. This transfer of property would not be revoked, even if the political sovereignty of the territory were to return to Germany, for it is provided by the Treaty that in this event Germany shall repurchase the mines at a gold price to be determined by experts.

The Saar, which was put politically into commission at the end of the War, had not always been German. Until 1815 it had been French. Sarrelouis, which still bears its French name, was built by Vauban, and it was only comparatively recently that the village of Vaudrevanges, which contains the country house of the family—French in origin—of the wife of Herr von Papen, became Wallerfangen. However, it would be quite misleading to pretend that there remains any French national feeling. The agricultural classes, among whom such feeling might subsist, have indeed preserved certain French traditions and habits, but numerically they are negligible as compared with the workmen of the coal mines and the blast furnaces, whose slag heaps and tall chimneys are to be found in every prospect along the otherwise pleasantly wooded valleys, while their rows of cottages under the smoky sky and their close network of railways give the whole country, which is the most densely populated in Europe, something of the appearance of parts of Lancashire or the Potteries. These workmen are quite definitely German. Throughout the century during which Germany ruled the country, she very deliberately and successfully Germanised it, not only industrially, but by developing it as a military centre. Military considerations may indeed have had at least as much as industrial to do with the intensification of the railway system before the War and also with the German desire to recover control of the territory to-day; for, as we shall show in a moment, the Germans neither took great pains to encourage the economic prosperity of the Saar before the War nor would be likely to do so now. On the other hand it is only necessary to look at a map to see the value of the Saar railway system in a mobilisation scheme.

The Saar, therefore, is definitely German, and one is aware of the fact as soon as one walks down from the station at Saarbrücken along the main street, the Bahnhofstrasse, of the town. The enormous offices of the administration of the mines—said to be the largest single industrial enterprise in

the world—are to some extent occupied by Frenchmen. The territory is included within the French Customs system and the French postal services and its currency is the French currency; but it remains German, and many of the inhabitants have retained their German nationality, as they are entitled to do. However, it by no means follows that there is a complete sympathy with the Germany of to-day. Nazi propaganda is so active and indeed aggressive that it is a little difficult to estimate the strength of the anti-Hitler element. There is a social reign of terror which it is difficult for the Government to defeat, especially as the police and the magistracy are openly threatened with the ruin of their careers and with definite reprisals if and when the Saar returns to Germany, and there is a lively recollection of how the German promises of immunity for French sympathisers in the Rhineland were kept after that country came under German control once more. This campaign of intimidation results in its being almost impossible to obtain the arrest by the police of Nazis who break the law, or their conviction by the Courts if they are arrested. Opposition to the Nazis is consequently obliged to become secret when it is not entirely passive; but that does not mean that it does not exist.

In the first place it may be said that the middle class, from which the Nazis are chiefly recruited, is so small in the Saar as to consist almost exclusively of the magistrates, the civil servants, the police and technical staff in the steelworks and the mines—entirely French in the mines and about half French in the furnaces, for rather more than half of the steelworks are controlled by French capital. Indeed, one of the most curious things about the aspect of Saarbrücken is that of a town consisting principally of workmen and their wives at various stages of prosperity. Of these workmen twenty per cent. were shown by the 1932 elections to the Landesrat, or Advisory Council, to be Communists, and ten per cent to be Socialists. All of these would have been for Germany then, but would not be to-day. The Jewish vote, which is estimated at five per cent, would also now go against Germany. The issue would really turn upon the line that would be taken by the proportion of the workers—nearly fifty per cent.—who voted for the Catholic Centre party in 1932. This party has officially been dissolved, but only by a narrow majority. Some of the Catholic workmen have no

doubt joined the Nazis—no longer called National Socialists in the Saar but *Deutsche Front*. But the Saar Catholics are by no means happy about the prospects of the working of the Concordat in Germany. Some of them, who went to the Catholic Congress in Munich, came back with disquieting stories of their rough treatment there. Accounts which have leaked out at private conferences, which Herr von Papen has held with the object of rallying the Saar Catholics to the Hitler Government, indicate serious differences of opinion. The suggestion has even been made that during the plebiscite period the authority of the German bishops of Trier and Speyer—a part of the Saar is attached to each of the two sees—shall be replaced by a specially appointed Papal representative, in accordance with a previous precedent, and an emissary from Rome, Monsignor Tasta, has recently been in the Territory on a journey of enquiry, and is to return there again shortly. And now a Catholic association has openly been formed with the declared object of opposing the Nazis and defeating any return of the Saar to a Hitlerite Germany. That the Nazis no longer count on the support of the Catholics in general is shown by an incident which took place at the beginning of January at Sulzbach, when a New Year dance, organised by a Catholic association, was broken into by a group of Nazis, who threatened the Catholics with persecution when once the Saar shall have returned to Germany. Moreover, the one native member of the Governing Commission, who belonged to the Catholic Centre party, recently heard that his son, who was studying in Germany, was arrested and his rooms searched without any apparent reason. These facts would appear to indicate a growing coolness between the Saar Catholics and the Nazis, and it may be stated that although the aforementioned Governing Commissioner has in the past frequently caused his express reserves to the decisions of the Commission as a whole to be mentioned in the official reports, he did not do so in connection with the letter, which was sent the other day to the Council of the League of Nations in reply to the protests of the Nazis against the Commission and its President, but was apparently content that the Nazi objections to the President and his powers were stated in the course of the letter.

The miners and steel-workers in general, whatever their political or religious opinions, may also be disposed to be

doubtful of the benefits of Hitlerism for the particular reason that they have been as yet unable to recover possession of their Trades Union funds, which have been merged in the Trade Union funds of the whole of Germany and obligatorily nationalised with them. There are other considerations, of a general economic character, which should make the inhabitants of the Saar hesitate before voting for a return to Germany. The Saar lives upon its publicly owned coal mines and its privately owned steelworks. It is fairly clear that both of these industries have less to fear in the future from the restriction of economic relations with Germany than with France and more to hope from trading with France than with Germany.

The fact that Germany, when the Saar was hers, never connected it directly by canal with the Moselle and the Rhine shows that the Ruhr always mattered much more to her than the Saar, and that neither Saar coal nor Saar steel was to be given facilities for competing with the steel of Essen and the coal of Westphalia, which, moreover, is of better quality. It is hardly likely that the policy would be different to-morrow. On the other hand, the iron ore, upon which the Saar metallurgical industries depend, comes from Lorraine, while the steel produced by the Saar, sold to Germany before the War in the proportion of seventy-five per cent. and as recently as 1929 in the proportion of forty per cent., now finds its best customers in France. As for coal, France, which took less than a third of the Saar export in 1913, compared with more than half taken by Germany, now takes nearly three-quarters, while the share of Germany has dropped to less than one-eighth. In general the Saar exports four times as much to France as to Germany and imports seven times as much—of course including the iron ore—from France as from Germany. If it is argued that before the War her trade was greater with Germany than with France, it can be replied that at that time Lorraine, which is the Saar's source of supply for ore and to a great extent her market for coal, was then German and is now French.

It must not be supposed, however, that even in the best of circumstances either Saar coal or Saar steel is likely to find a very ready market anywhere in the future. Germany did not really want either before the War and now wants them still less. France found the rather indifferent grade of

Saar coal very useful immediately after the War, when the Pas de Calais mines were in ruins, but finds it much less indispensable to-day, when these mines have been rebuilt and are themselves obliged to reduce their working month to 17 days. If it were possible to produce from the Saar coal a coke which would be really satisfactory for use in blast furnaces, the position might be altered; but although a series of experiments have resulted in a process, called the Salerni process, which is claimed to produce good results, it has not yet been followed by any economic change, and the probability of Saar coal and Saar steel advancing to a joint prosperity is still remote. For, taken independently, the future prospects of Saar steel are hardly brighter than those of Saar coal. It has to meet keen competition even in France, and its plant is by no means up to date.

It would seem, therefore, that there are motives, both of a political and of an economic nature which should induce the Saar workman to vote against a return to Germany. Indeed, the Nazi partisans seem to be alive to the fact when they agitate for a return of the Saar to Germany without a plebiscite at all. For it is hardly necessary to take very seriously, either the ostensible altruism of their argument that France would do well to come to terms, as a crushing vote for Germany would damage her prestige, or the flamboyant patriotism of their plea that it would be an indignity to ask a people which is German whether it wants to return to Germany. What is much more likely is that while they anticipate a majority, they fear that it will be far from overwhelming, and that consequently it will not be French prestige but German which will suffer.

On the other hand, there is a very different party who are also by no means anxious that the plebiscite shall take place at the beginning of 1935. They certainly do not desire that the Saar shall be handed back to Germany without a plebiscite, for they are the opponents of Hitlerite Germany. Nor do they desire that the question shall finally be settled without a plebiscite; for although they are opposed to Hitlerism, they are German in spirit, and they no doubt hope for a future when Germany will no longer be committed to Hitlerism, and Socialists and Communists and Catholics will come into their own again. Meanwhile they would vote against the return of the Saar to the Germany of to-day, and they are convinced

that there is a majority in the Saar whose real opinions would lead them to vote in the same sense. But they are not confident that these voters will not be induced by Nazi propaganda and Nazi intimidation to vote against their real opinions, and they therefore suggest that the plebiscite be postponed until the expression of the true desires of the inhabitants shall become possible.

It is indeed doubtful whether the League of Nations can, in the present circumstances, perform, in spirit or even in letter, the duty which the Treaty lays upon it of "securing the freedom, secrecy and trustworthiness of the voting." With its present police force, it could hardly guarantee that those who are known to be opposed to a return to Germany could get safely to the poll. But even supposing an international body of troops were to impose order and security on the day of voting, that would not be sufficient to convince voters of the secrecy of the plebiscite. They are daily being told by the Nazis that it will be discovered which way they have voted, and they are daily being threatened with the kind of retaliation which—as I have already indicated—is promised to policemen and magistrates who do not show Nazi sympathies. However, even if the population can be convinced that it will be able to vote freely, safely and secretly, the "trustworthiness of the voting" will not be secured if, as is the case to-day, the only propaganda which can be openly carried on without petty and sometimes violent interference is Nazi propaganda; for the minds of the voters will effectively have been poisoned by the time the date of the plebiscite arrives.

The difficulties which the League will have to face if it tries to secure a sincere expression of opinion may be inferred from the letter, already mentioned, which Mr. Knox, the President of the Government Commission, addressed to the Council before its recent meeting. Anticipating that, at this meeting, the Council would discuss the conditions under which the plebiscite is to be held, the Saar Nazis had already sent to Geneva a protest against the criticisms of their terrorising methods passed by Mr. Knox in his last quarterly report. His letter is a reply to this protest and also to certain suggestions that pressure was being brought to bear upon miners to induce them to send their children to the special French schools rather than the ordinary German schools.

These French schools, established for the children of the many French engineers in the mines, have certainly been attended by children who are not French; but this is not because the parents wanted to give their children a French education, but because, being Jews or Socialists, they preferred to send them there rather than expose them to the humiliations and annoyance which the Nazis would have inflicted on them in the ordinary schools. Mr. Knox even stated that the Governing Commission felt themselves obliged to accede to the demand of the Jewish community, and to open special Jewish schools, which, he points out, is virtually to return, as far as the children are concerned, to the mediæval principle of the ghetto.

Mr. Knox says that the Governing Commission daily receive numbers of complaints of the boycotting and persecution not only of Jews but of all opponents of Nazism. He quotes documentary evidence, obtained by a search of the offices of the Nazi organisation at Neunkirchen, of the kidnapping of a Saarlander and his transfer to Germany—where he is still in prison—merely for the crime of assisting in the distribution of an anti-Nazi newspaper. The letter shows that this kidnapping was carried out in execution of orders received from Germany. Another letter seized contains an offer to the Austrian Nazi leader, Habitsch, to send him recruits from Saar, who would more easily pass into Austria than Germans, as they carry Saar passports. The elaborate card-index system of confidential denunciations amounts to an attempt, says Mr. Knox, to establish a secret and unofficial Nazi system of government in opposition to the regular government.

This state of things, it must be remembered, exists in a community the majority of whose population is probably not in sympathy with the Nazis, but where the Nazis are able to exercise their usurped power because they have the open sympathy of the magistracy, the civil service and the police, and because they possess an energetic organisation liberally financed from Germany.

PHILIP CARR.

THE MALTA SITUATION.

CONSTITUTIONAL government has once more been suspended in Malta, and the islands are again subject to administration on Crown Colony lines. While the necessity for this step is much regretted both in this country and in Malta, the Governor (Sir David Campbell) could not do otherwise than dismiss the Nationalist Ministers who, in spite of adequate warning, had acted against the interests of the British Empire in general, and those of Malta in particular. Before, however, examining the factors composing the situation that led up to this unfortunate political event, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the background to current Maltese affairs.

Perhaps it is not out of place to recall the fact that Malta represents a group of islands situated between Sicily and Italy's colonial possessions in North Africa, and is therefore a "Little Bit of Britain" sandwiched in between the Kingdom of Italy and Italian Libya. Ever since the days of the Knights of St. John, Malta has been a fortress of great importance, as well as a stronghold of Christianity, the former being manifest in the vast thickness of the fortifications built by the Knights, and the latter by the large number of churches and clergy in the island. Little change has been wrought by the passage of time. The massive fortifications which resisted the Turks in the famous siege of 1565 remain to this day; the Grand Harbour, as in former times, is the base of a great fleet; and the same Christian faith is paramount. If the British First Battle Squadron has replaced the galleys of the Knights, and the white ensign has succeeded the standard of the Order of St. John, Malta remains what she has been throughout the centuries, a strong Christian fortress and important pivot of sea power.

The Maltese people, who are Phœnician by race,* speak a distinct language of their own, which is so akin to Arabic in many ways that a traveller speaking Maltese can make himself easily understood from Morocco to Palestine. It is, therefore, a gross error to imagine that because of their geographical position they are in any way Italian in race or language, although there is a small Italian minority in Malta and some Maltese people can speak Italian. Indeed, it is not

* Hannibal is a common Christian name in Malta.

too much to say that the real Maltese people are no more akin to the Italians than the Carthaginians were to the Romans, except in so far as nations have tended to become somewhat standardised by civilisation and progress. In religion the Maltese are fervent Catholics and their loyalty to the Church is proverbial, so that the influence of the priests is far-reaching, especially in view of the large proportion of priests to the lay population. They are also a patriotic people, most of whom cling tenaciously to the Maltese language as an expression of their independent nationality. Yet most of the priests speak Italian and are strong supporters of Italian culture, in which they have the full support of the Italian minority in the island as well as strong Italian influence from outside. It is here that most of the present trouble lies. In their loyalty to the British Crown the Maltese come second to none, a quality which has been engendered partly by sentiment and sense of security, and partly by the fact that they rely almost entirely for trade and commerce on the British fleet and the military and air forces stationed in the island. On Armistice Day I had the honour of attending the special Low Mass celebrated in the ancient and beautiful Cathedral of St. John, which was filled almost to overflowing with Maltese Catholics; and I can say with conviction that I have never attended a ceremony more British in character or more expressive of loyalty to the British Crown. If Maltese loyalty needs further confirmation, that is quickly found in conversation with all classes of the people, when the real cause of trouble soon comes to the surface. But, before going any farther, it is necessary to look at the beginnings of constitutional government in Malta.

In June 1920 Lord Plumer, then Governor of Malta, communicated the decision of the British Government to grant to the island a form of self-government under Maltese Ministers, and the new Constitution came into force in May 1921, after elections for the Senate and Legislative Assembly had been duly held. The Constitution, however, provided that questions of imperial interest affecting defence, foreign relations, currency and external trade should be regarded as reserved matters, and as such should be entirely outside the jurisdiction and control of the Maltese Legislature and of the Administration. These matters were to remain in the hands of the Governor assisted by a Nominated Council. In politics, the people are split up into three main parties. The Con-

stitutional Party, which follows a pro-British policy in continuation of the policy initiated by Lord Strickland in 1889, has favoured the substitution of English for Italian as a second language, and has encouraged Maltese as the mother-tongue of the people. The Constitutionals have criticised the clergy on the ground that they tend to keep the people in a state of ignorance in order to promote pro-Italian feelings at the expense of loyalty to Great Britain. The Labour Party, with a policy of "Malta for the Maltese," has demanded the emancipation of the masses from educational ignorance, and has tried to strengthen the position of the Maltese language, while discouraging any increase of Italian influence. The Nationalists, on the other hand, have enjoyed the support of the Italian-speaking elements, including the great families and landowners, the Church, and a small element favouring annexation to Italy. At the 1927 elections the Constitutional Party, supported by the Labour Party, came into office with Lord Strickland as Prime Minister, and consistently endeavoured to promote British influence and culture; to provide more education in Maltese and English on strictly Catholic lines; to establish the right for Maltese to be tried in courts of law in their own mother-tongue; to obtain equal justice for all; and to introduce legislation ensuring fair parliamentary elections. In carrying out this policy Lord Strickland had the support of the majority of the Maltese people, most of whom are very loyal to the British Crown, but he had to contend with the opposition of the old ruling class, in which the Church occupied a most prominent place. Lord Strickland, a Catholic but at the same time a champion of self-governing institutions and political progress on modern lines, was in an almost impossible position. On the one hand he had to fulfil his duties to the State, while on the other he was personally tied to the traditions and discipline of the Church. This led to a most difficult position, in which the Church's spiritual power was used for political ends; and the tension between the Vatican and the Maltese Ministers became so strained that, on the eve of a general election, the Archbishop of Malta and the Bishop of Gozo issued a joint Pastoral, stating that it would be "mortal sin" to vote for Lord Strickland's party, and that anyone so doing would be liable to excommunication. This intolerable interference in the affairs of a British self-governing colony created a situation imperilling public

safety, which forced the British Government to suspend the Constitution. Hence, on June 26th, 1930, an Order-in-Council was issued, placing the full legislative and executive authority in the hands of the Governor, Sir John du Cane, with the retention of the Ministry in a consultative capacity.

In the following year a Royal Commission was sent "to visit Malta and to consider the existing political situation in the island, and to make such recommendations as may seem to them desirable as to the steps which should be taken to deal with it, with special reference to the possibility of re-establishing constitutional government." As a result of the recommendations of this Commission, constitutional government was restored in April 1932 by the issue of Letters Patent amending the Malta Constitution Letters Patent of 1921. Among the amendments were provisions that, although Italian was to remain the official language of the Courts of Law, English and Maltese were to be used in cases where individuals of English or Maltese nationality were involved. Provision was also made that Italian should be eliminated from the curriculum of the elementary schools, and that English should be the only second language. Meanwhile elections were duly held returning to power the Nationalist Party, with Sir Ugo Mifsud as Prime Minister; and it is in the policy of this Government that lies the immediate cause of the recent suspension of the Constitution.

After the elections of 1932, Sir Ugo Mifsud and several Maltese Ministers came to London in an attempt to persuade the British Government to withdraw the provision deferring the teaching of Italian to the secondary stage of education, contending that the language question had been the main issue at the elections. The reply of the Colonial Office was definitely to the effect that the provision of the Letters Patent must stand. Yet, in September 1932, Dr. Enrico Mizzi, Maltese Minister of Education, issued a circular to the education authorities which was an obvious attempt to evade the decision of the British Government. The circular called for the teaching of Italian on voluntary lines in all classes of the elementary schools out of school hours, stating that the Ministry intended to do its utmost to encourage the teaching of Italian, and that the Minister trusted that this initiative would "receive the cordial support of all the members of the elementary school department, and that the

above instructions will be readily complied with by all concerned." Although this means of evasion was forbidden by the Colonial Office, it was not long before the Ministry resorted to the setting up of intermediate schools in order to circumvent the Letters Patent.

Meanwhile the Ministry's educational policy, set out in the September circular, was confirmed by Dr. Mizzi's speeches emphasising the Italian nature of the island (about ten per cent. of the Maltese can speak Italian), by the extravagant subsidising of private schools teaching Italian, and by the sending of school teachers, both elementary and secondary, to Italy to learn the Italian language. Further, the activity of Italian subjects in Malta, in supporting the teaching of Italian at the expense of the natural language of the people, was so pronounced that it became necessary to promulgate an ordinance prohibiting aliens from taking part in educational work at all without the permission of the Governor, who at the same time took over from the Ministry the control of the police. Although the Ministry were quite straightforward about the policy which they intended to pursue, the following examples of their action prove their determination at all costs to defy the authority of the British Crown. They lowered the admission examination and lowest standard of the secondary schools at the expense of the elementary schools, thereby enabling children to learn Italian at the earliest possible age. They sent elementary teachers to Italy for training, although the only languages with which they were properly concerned were Maltese and English. They threatened to spend thousands of pounds in teaching Italian outside the elementary schools. They insisted that Italian should be taught in private schools receiving State grants.* They even went to the length of ordering the Italianising of children's names in school, unless the parents specially objected. They also made Italian a compulsory subject in examinations for minor official posts, thereby penalising those without knowledge of that language; insisted on the use of Italian for public purposes where Maltese should have been used; and announced the intention of taking into consideration the political views of those tendering for Government contracts. Although policies of this nature may be

* They made a knowledge of Italian compulsory for admission to various classes of technical instruction.

suit and acceptable to some nations to-day, they are not only repugnant to the Maltese people but directly contrary to the system governing the British Empire. Moreover, the policy of the Nationalist Ministers with regard to the language question in Malta was dictated by a foreign Power, and supported by foreign subsidies. The truth of this is unchallengeable, and is accepted by the highest authority.

In these circumstances there was no other course open to the Governor but to dismiss the Ministry for two reasons, apparently separate but really interdependent—their determined attempts to evade the Letters Patent of 1932 concerning the position of the Italian language in education; and extravagance in finance, threatening an excess of expenditure over revenue. These two questions together represented an influence calculated to undermine the British position in Malta, and therefore became a “reserved matter.”

While sufficient has been said to show that the late Government resorted to every possible device to impose the Italian language on the Maltese people, whose natural language is Maltese, but who have to know English for practical purposes, the reason for their so doing needs some explanation. This is to be found in the fact that ministers tried to inflict upon the coming generation a tri-lingual system, in the hope that, in course of time, Italian would become the language of the majority, and so prepare the way for further Italian penetration. But the root of the whole matter lies farther afield. The geographical position of Malta, midway between Sicily and Italian Libya, together with the fact that the island is a natural fortress and pivot of sea power, brings it within the orbit of Italian ambition; and this situation is intensified by the presence of a large number of Italian-speaking priests and a ten per cent. minority capable of speaking the Italian language. Consequently, the Italians are applying to Malta their policy of peaceful penetration, which is already being applied elsewhere, and their endeavours are facilitated by the strong influence of the Roman Church with the Maltese people, as well as by the closer relations between the Italian Government and the Holy See.

In certain aspects of external affairs there have recently been strong indications of a liaison between the Quirinal and the Vatican, and this is fully apparent in Malta to-day. But in order to appreciate the character of the means that are

being employed, it is necessary to recall one of the basic features of Italian foreign policy, which consists of a cleverly thought-out system of determined preparation and exercise of influence, designed to create a state of affairs favourable to ultimate possession by negotiation. In this particular case it is hoped, by increasing the number of those who speak Italian in Malta, to convince the chancelleries of Europe that the Maltese are a Latin nation separated from their mother country, and thereby to prepare the way for European sympathy towards a possible Italian claim in the future. To such a policy the Maltese people are strongly opposed, including a considerable proportion of the Nationalists themselves; and it is only the disciplinary influence of the Church on the private lives of the people that gives the movement any substance whatever. At the same time, the Maltese are always anxious to be on good terms with their Italian neighbours, and are a hospitable people. Indeed, it is quite usual to see Italian officers, on their way to or from Tripoli, walking about the Strade Reale in uniform; and there are few places outside Italy where certain aspects of Italian culture are more appreciated. But the Maltese deeply resent the pressure of outside influence, especially when that influence is so designed as to compromise their religious obligations.

Nor is this policy in the true interests of the Italians themselves, who have everything to gain by upholding their time-honoured friendship with Great Britain. Not only can the two great nations help each other, but together they can be a strong and valuable influence in the affairs of Europe. Judging by articles in the Italian Press on the subject of Malta, and by broadcasts from Italian wireless stations, in Italian, German and English, it might be imagined that Italy had no further need of British friendship; but this is far from being the case. The Italians know as well as we do that Anglo-Italian friendship is essential in the Mediterranean, but, unfortunately, the two lines of imperial activity cross each other at the island of Malta. For this reason it is in the interests of both Powers that some definite understanding should be reached. In any case, Anglo-Italian relations cannot thrive on Italy's subsidised penetration, however peaceful, of a most important bulwark of the British Empire, in the hope that a linguistic majority in the future may become a sufficient claim for possession later on.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

SPAIN AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

AT the moment of writing this article a gloom of uncertainty hangs over Spain and bodes trouble for the near future. The collapse of the Liberal forces in the recent elections has raised fundamental issues. Evolution has been again displaced as a solution for Spanish problems and, as in 1931, the threat of revolution is a stark reality. Spain, with that feverish intensity characteristic of Latin nations which tend to alternate long periods of lassitude with brief outbursts of volcanic activity, has run through in years a Liberal cycle which in nations of a more phlegmatic temperament took decades. This, at least, appears to be the most logical explanation of the violent swing from Left to Right in the general elections.

It is, of course, possible to take a more simple view of matters. One may quote the figures given by the Catholic organisation "C.E.D.A."* to the effect that the net balance of two and a half years of Liberal-Socialist rule was "180 churches set afire, 2,650 bombs exploded, 643 riots, 335 killed and 638 wounded in social disorders," and deduce from this that Spain has reacted from the men who tolerated it. One may quote the pontiffs of the Conservative Press, who say: "The annihilation of the Liberal forces reflects the hatred and contempt felt by the nation for the men who outraged the deep religious sentiments of Spain."

But the results of the elections were so emphatic that it is difficult to avoid the impression that much deeper forces were at work than those attributed to social disorder, to which Spain, unfortunately, has always been accustomed on a greater or lesser scale, to an anti-clericalism which, however unnatural it may appear to the foreigner, is nevertheless undoubtedly shared by no small section of Spain's inhabitants.

The comparative figures of the Liberal forces in the Constituent Cortes of 1931 and now may be seen in the following table:

	June 1931	November 1933
Radical Socialists	60	3
Republican Action	30	5
Catalan "Esquerra"	42	18
Galician "Orga"	18	3
Federals	16	0
	<u>166</u>	<u>29</u>

* Confederacion Española Derechas Autonomas.

Socialists were reduced in numbers from 110 to 60. The Catholic and non-republican Conservatives soared from 48 to 198 and the Radicals increased their number from 91 to 106. It may, of course, be argued that the Radicals of the veteran Don Alejandro Lerroux should be included among the Liberal forces. But the influx of Monarchists into the Party since the change of régime, and the excessive opportunism and appetite for power of many of its members, make it quite impossible to classify this Party as being genuinely Liberal. That certain of its members, such as Don Diego Martinez Barrio, present War Minister, and Don Antonio Lara, Finance Minister, are of Liberal beliefs is true, but until they separate, or, alternatively, gain control of their Party, they must take responsibility with the rest of their colleagues for the reactionary work of Sr. Lerroux.

The Liberal parties representative of the "petit bourgeois" class had to shoulder immense responsibility after the change of régime. It was necessary to find at once a completely new team of local and national authorities. If a considerable number of these men did not come up to standard, at least there were no scandals of magnitude such as might easily have arisen. In some cases exceptional ability was shown. There is the much-discussed case, for example, of Don Manuel Azaña. He dealt decisively with problems which had been festering in Spanish politics for half a century. He separated Church and State. He took an overstuffed and hopelessly inefficient Army out of politics and reorganised it. He decentralised by conceding autonomy to the restless region of Catalonia. In the face of Monarchist and Anarchist revolt and of the most discouraging and intense opposition of his fellow Republicans, he succeeded in inducing a Spanish Cortes to pass 463 laws in two years and three months, and one of these was nothing less than a new Constitution.

It is debited against Sr. Azaña that he allowed himself to be a puppet of the Socialists, and that he pursued in their company a sectarian policy of persecution which alienated public opinion. There was considerable and unnecessary persecution of Catholics. But this was somewhat difficult to avoid in a nation where, from the Restoration of 1875 until 1931, all non-Catholics had been subjected to continuous, and not always petty, persecution. Supposing that Sr. Azaña had turned into opposition the most efficient dyke

activity; they assert, in the words of the anarcho-syndicalist leader Angel Pestaña, "that the State must be destroyed and the executive power transferred to the municipalities which will be autonomous," and they advance violence as the only weapon of combat. They condemn the proletarian dictatorship as exercised by the Soviets but are not clear as to how they propose to organise their society.

The anarcho-syndicalist labour movement is now in the hands of a group of modern bandits, or racketeers, who help themselves freely to the workers' subscriptions, do an occasional bit of bank robbery and, once in a while, stage a revolutionary movement in order to prevent the workers' becoming too inquisitive as to what happens to their weekly subscriptions. Salvador Durrutti and Ascaso, the two men presumably responsible for the recent revolt, which affected at least ten Provinces and cost, according to approximate estimates, seventy-seven dead and 160 hurt, are prototypes of these modern social bandoleros who operate in the cities instead of the sierras of Andalusia. The result in the long run is to leave great masses of the workers completely disillusioned and to provide suitable material for the first aspirant to the rôle of Dictator who happens along.

The anarchy latent both in Spain's upper and lower classes has already driven the State to considerable intervention in matters economic and, in the words of the last commercial report on economic conditions in Spain published by the Department of Oversea Trade, "a tendency to extend the functions of the State has become manifest." Under a law passed by the Cortes on August 31st, 1932, the right to superintend the administration and operation of practically the whole of the railroads in Spain was conceded to the State. The Bank of Spain has been brought almost entirely under State control through the appointment of Government nominees. Petrol, oil, tobacco and matches are State monopolies. Various of the great hydro-electric and irrigation schemes are wholly or partially under State control. The State intervenes directly in all labour disputes.

In view of this heavy responsibility shouldered by the State it is not surprising to see that the last elections favoured those parties which offer solutions along the lines of a planned economy. The sixty Socialist Deputies do not represent numerically the volume of opinion behind them. Socialist

candidates received at least 2,000,000 votes, a great triumph for this party in the face of a hostile campaign which had the patronage of the Government, in which money literally flowed like water and in which the most shameless pressure was put on employees to prevent their voting for the Party. As an example may be cited the most important department store in Madrid, whose women employees were catechised as to how they had voted; one girl who admitted that she had voted Socialist was immediately discharged. Spain's diehard Conservatives lived well up to their reputation on the election days of November 19th and December 3rd. In addition, the electoral system is fatal to single parties and gives heavy rewards to coalitions, and as the Socialists on this occasion decided to avoid contact with the Liberals, except in a few Provinces, they sacrificed a number of seats.

The coalition premium, on the other hand, favoured the Catholic "C.E.D.A." organisation, led by Don José Maria Gil Robles, which secured 110 seats, the greatest number won by any party. This Party is the "live wire" of Spanish conservatism. It professes to be heading towards that somewhat vague entity known as the corporative State, but Gil Robles and others of its leaders are alert enough not to make the mistake of trying to adopt lock, stock and barrel any foreign political system. In the words of one of its principal figures: "We intend to grope towards a system of planned economy most fitted to Spanish conditions."

Gil Robles was hissed in Barcelona last March when exalted young Catholics took objection to his categorical statement: "We affirm our radical disagreement with Fascism, in its programme, in the form in which it appears and in the tactics used by it." But although the "C.E.D.A." has resisted the temptation to issue coloured shirts to its youth, it nevertheless has supplied them with life preservers—the writer has seen businesslike specimens sported by youthful Catholics at the "C.E.D.A." headquarters—it has formed "civil mobilisation committees" to mobilise masses if needed, it has an "air force" of eight aeroplanes which is disguised as an "aviation club" and, in short, it is preparing at top speed an organisation capable of supporting a régime of violence. Its great need is time for organisation. Hence Sr. Gil Robles' interest in backing Lerroux; and if that veteran fails him he hopes to put into office Don Melquiades Alvarez, the

peasant masses and the impossibility of these people, impregnated as they are with a semi-oriental resignation, helping themselves. If dynamite be necessary in order to break up once and for all the old order, then it is better that this should be used than that this misery and suffering should continue indefinitely while palliatives are applied. Whether the galley chains are of the Right or the Left brand, it is possible that they constitute an economic necessity in order that Spain may break through the barriers of ignorance and prejudice to a situation where her masses will be able to appreciate and reach out after liberty and social justice, which are not figures of prostitution, but those clean-limbed, healthy symbols of a joyous and full existence, which have never ceased to beckon and draw man on to higher things through the history of civilisation.

HENRY BUCKLEY.

THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF SOVIET RUSSIA.

THE January 1st, 1934, issue of the *Izvestia* contains a long article by its Editor, Karl Radek, who is also the official Soviet spokesman on international affairs. This article deals with the "Preparation of the struggle for a new partition of the world," and elucidates the position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in this international struggle which, in his opinion, will sooner or later bring about a world war. Only a fortnight earlier he published another enormous article in the same paper on the "Foundations of Soviet Foreign Policy," which is the Russian text of his contribution to the January issue of that excellent American quarterly *Foreign Affairs*. Furthermore, at the recent conference of the Central Executive Committee both Molotov and Litvinov dealt extensively with the Soviets' international relations and finally Stalin discussed the Japanese situation with a foreign journalist. Thus there is an amplitude of material supplied by the Bolsheviks themselves, which throws some illuminating evidence on this problem of world-wide importance as it stands to-day. Yet there have been so many changes in this respect in past years, and the fluctuations both of Soviet Russia's and other countries' actions and reactions have been so manifold, that nothing should appear surprising, and 1934 may completely alter the present position.

It is an intricate one indeed. Although Russia had never actually ceased to be an important factor in world affairs (which in the case of a country occupying one-sixth of the globe and with a population of 150 millions would have been impossible) the main new feature of 1933 is, that she has become once again an active and influential member of the *Comitas Gentium* who rule the world. Litvinov's recent trip to New York and all the principal capitals of Europe, as well as the work accomplished by him last summer in London, when the abortive World Economic Conference enabled him to establish personal contacts in so many directions, can serve as a striking proof of the new stage Moscow has reached in its foreign relations.

An analysis of this transformation reveals a curious contradiction between aims and realities, whether it is considered

from the Soviet point of view or that of the capitalistic world. The Soviets' aim is, and always has been, World Revolution. This they have never renounced, and only recently the thirteenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International held in Moscow took some far-reaching decisions of how to bring about this much delayed World Revolution. Yet, at the same time, in restoring normal relations with the U.S.A.—despite the crisis a stronghold of capitalism—and in generally establishing themselves among the *Comitas Gentium* as one of the world's leading nations, the Soviets are compelled to act against the very aims they are so vociferously proclaiming. It is true that American recognition and friendly relations with a number of other countries cannot but strengthen the position of the Soviet Government both at home and abroad, from the political, economic and even military points of view, thus enabling them to foster World Revolution with new strength at the appropriate moment. But the fact remains that in entering into all these arrangements, the purpose and the value of which shall be discussed a little further, the Soviets forfeit the right to claim that as "the one and only government of the Proletarian Revolution" they are in open opposition to the capitalistic world which is alleged to be its lifelong and irreconcilable enemy, to be decadent and doomed to just retribution and disaster.

So much for the main contradiction as far as the Soviets are concerned. A similar contradiction can be found in the capitalist camp, that would-be natural enemy of communist Russia. As a result partly of the world crisis—which has certainly shaken capitalism to its very foundations—and partly in view of the durability of the Soviet Government, the principal capitalist countries of the world have greatly altered their outlook on Russia. Some of them did it at a fairly early stage of post-war history; others have done it only now. But whether they opposed the Soviets out of moral, or economic, or political considerations, they have all given up this opposition. In fact this durability of the Soviet Government which seems to weigh so heavily in its favour now, is very largely due to the fact that the righteous indignation of some of the capitalist countries lasted much less than that of others, and invariably became transformed into direct or indirect support of the Bolshevik

régime in Russia. And further to the fact that Germany—whether ruled by the Kaiser, or the so-called Republican Government or the anti-communist crusader Hitler—never stopped her really sinister collaboration with the Bolsheviks, which began even before they came into power, and greatly facilitated their *coup d'état*. Who can deny that the attitude of the capitalistic world to the Soviet Government is no longer hostile, and that all ideas of isolation, boycott or intervention are dead and buried? In fact, representatives of capitalist democracies, as well as those of militant fascism do not hesitate to sit down at one table with Litvinov, and treat him as an equal. More: they are actually competing for his good graces, they are willing to pay a heavy price for communist Russia's friendship, or at least her neutrality.

The Bolsheviks' diplomatic record for 1933 is remarkable: official recognition by the U.S.A. and by Spain; the conclusion or ratification of important pacts with Italy, France, Czechoslovakia, and other states; a chain of "non-aggression" pacts with all their neighbours, except Roumania; a second chain of agreements defining the meaning of "aggression"—this time including Roumania; a great consolidation of friendship with the world's two oldest fascist states, Italy and Turkey; a rapprochement with Poland and France, a better understanding with Persia, and the resumption of trade negotiations with Great Britain after the unfortunate Moscow trial episode. At a superficial glance a truly wonderful series of achievements, especially the long-hoped for recognition by the U.S.A. This picture of triumphs is spoilt, however, by the situation in the Far East where the danger of war with Japan becomes daily more imminent; and by an extremely uneasy situation *vis-à-vis* Nazi Germany, which on the one hand proclaims its friendly feelings towards Soviet Russia, yet on the other hand is openly threatening it.

In his article, which appeared in the *Izvestia* and in *Foreign Affairs*, Radek spoke a great and very plain home truth, which curiously enough is frequently being denied. "Foreign policy is a function of domestic policy," he says. "It solves problems which result from the development of the given society, a given State, under definite historical conditions." And it is only in the light of this truism Radek has felt called upon to state in cold print, that the recent developments in Soviet diplomacy can be understood.

Having met with a series of rebuffs in their extremely active international revolutionary propaganda, the Soviets in 1927 decided to inaugurate the Five-Year Plan for industrialising Russia and creating "integral socialism" in their country alone, without waiting for a World Revolution which was so slow in coming. As Radek explains at some considerable length in his *Izvestia—Foreign Affairs* article, the three main objects of the Soviet domestic policy (of which the foreign policy is but a function!) were: (1) industrialisation, (2) collectivisation, (3) national defence. Now, the truth of the matter is that the application of this policy made the Soviets the absolute tributaries of the rest of the world, which was to supply them with everything they required. Machines, industrial equipment of all kinds, or the actual installation of the plant, engineers, experts, foremen and even workmen with special technical knowledge—all this was to come from abroad. Part of it could be obtained on credit; part of it had to be paid in cash. And not in worthless Soviet currency, but in dollars or sterling or marks or gold. This indispensable fund of foreign currency could only be created by increased exports, chiefly of raw materials, and by a severe limitation of imports to whatever was most essential. They obtained both their credits and their foreign currency; the Five-Year Plan was proving a most successful instrument of blackmail and bluff in Russia herself and abroad.

But while in their domestic policy the slogan was "make Russia self-sufficient and independent of the capitalistic world," they were in point of fact becoming more and more dependent on the latter. And while in their foreign policy the slogan was "peace at any price," they were telling their own population that an attack by the foreign imperialists was imminent and that the realisation of the Plan should be carried through first in four, and then even in three years in order to safeguard the "only country of the Proletarian Revolution" against the world bourgeoisie. While the militarisation of the Soviet Republic was being carried out—very largely with German help—at a terrific pace, Litvinov was telling the foreign experts at Geneva that their disarmament projects were no good, and was suggesting the obviously unacceptable plan of immediate, universal, complete disarmament. At the same time he was missing no opportunity to reiterate that capitalism was obviously incapable of

preventing future wars, and that only communism could save the workers of the world from participating in the next great slaughter. The game was impressive, and his apparent sincerity could not but attract thousands of the uninitiated. Meanwhile, however, he seemed to see a panacea in international pacts, and gradually became the greatest collector of them. He insisted on being among the first to sign the Kellogg Pact, which he did despite the fact that his suggested amendments were turned down. He signed a number of treaties of friendship with Soviet Russia's Asiatic neighbours and then proceeded to add to them a series of "non-aggression" pacts extending from Finland to Afghanistan.

These diplomatic arrangements, however, have never prevented the Soviet Government from also pursuing their other policy: that of the Communist International, wherever and by whatever means they can. For it would be wrong to assume that the policy of pacification or stabilisation comes from any altruistic desire on the part of the Soviets to see the capitalistic world recover from its wounds or avert another war. "The main object for which Soviet diplomacy is fighting is peace," says Radek, and a little further he explains the position quite clearly. "The defence of peace and of the neutrality of the Soviet Union against all attempts to drag it into the whirlwind of a world war, is the central problem of Soviet foreign policy."

This is quite true and has some very excellent reasons. Paradoxical though it may sound, at the very moment that she has become an active world power again, Soviet Russia is weaker than she has been for a good many years. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the Five-Year Plan; suffice it, then, to mention that not one of the aims the Plan set out to accomplish has become a reality. Individual industrial giants have been built, but at an uneconomic cost and they function badly; the agricultural situation is such that once again there is a famine in Russia, this time not owing to a drought, however, but solely and entirely as a result of the Soviets' crazy and inhuman treatment of the peasants. "Socialism" has most certainly not been established or even approached. Ample proof for these statements can be found daily in the Soviet Press itself. These enormous sheets, which are constantly being filled with decrees, instructions, threats, pathetic appeals, admonitions and exhorta-

from the notorious memorandum. Rosenberg's statements in the Press are in the same key. The repeated assurances that Germany hopes for no territorial aggrandisement on her Western, i.e. French frontier, simultaneously with the claim for territorial expansion makes the choice of the direction fairly obvious. Once again Germany is thinking of a Ukrainian adventure and once again the Kaiser's "own" Hetman Skoropadsky has emerged as a centre of these particular intrigues in Berlin. And one of the main planks of Hitler's propaganda abroad, that he is saving the world from communism (which is of course absolutely untrue) meets with certain sympathies in many countries. There are also those who hope that by throwing the hungry German wolves an easy prey in the shape of Russia, they might buy off the Hitler danger as far as they themselves are concerned.

These tendencies can be found even among the new friends of the Soviet Government, not to mention the fact that Hitler's foreign policy meets at least partly with the approval of one of the Bolsheviks' oldest friends—Mussolini. Again Poland, immediately after the signature of her pact of friendship with the Soviets, embarked on a policy of rapprochement with Nazi Germany. And Pilsudsky's anti-Russian, anti-French and pro-German views are no secret.

So much for the military danger with which Soviet Russia is faced on her Western frontier. In the Far East she is involved in an old and very acute conflict with Japan. The Japanese danger is even more imminent than the German one. For years Japan's responsible statesmen have openly proclaimed the need of expansion. It must, therefore, have been obvious to the Soviets that the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was but a part of a larger and carefully calculated plan. And they must have known perfectly well that a far greater issue was involved than that of the Chinese-Eastern Railway, although that alone would be quite enough in view of the enormous importance of this line which connects the maritime province with the huge Siberian continent. The danger of the whole of Russia's Pacific coast and adjacent territory being lost to the Manchurian and Japanese forces cannot have escaped the attention of so shrewd a group of men as the Soviet Government. Their reactions to all this were pitiful. First they tried to be friendly, even servile. Then they used very violent language and threatened but did

not take action. Japan on the other hand was showing grim determination and was answering Soviet words with military, political and diplomatic deeds. Moscow gradually talked less and less and yielded more and more. In the autumn of 1932 Litvinov offered to Matsuoka as an alternative to Japan's demand for Soviet recognition of an "independent" Manchuria a "non-aggression" pact. Matsuoka turned this down and used very plain language. He did not trust these Soviet pacts, he said, for he saw no guarantee that even if the Soviets refrained from a military attack they would not drive Japan to starting a war first, either by means of an economic boycott or intensified communist propaganda (incidentally instructions to the latter effect have just been issued by the Communist International); and the Soviets had to accept all these humiliations. During the whole of 1933 they had to pursue a policy of abdication and capitulation towards Japan: it was obvious that they could not risk a war. But this also explains the new orientation of Soviet foreign policy.

Thus the key to their friendship with Mussolini (despite the Communist International's hysterical outbursts against fascism) is to be found in the influence the Duce is said to possess over Hitler. If he can stop Germany from attacking Russia—and that depends, after all, on the value Hitler attaches to the Duce's friendship—then "the government of the only Proletarian Revolution" may well call the originator of fascism "the Saviour and Protector of Universal Peace." The price is not too heavy for any service of this sort. Or again the new friendship with France is easily explained in the case of both governments by their fear of Nazi Germany. The *de jure* recognition by the U.S.A. and the unprecedented, really exceptional, concessions Litvinov has made to accelerate it (no doubt, it would have come anyway) must be judged chiefly in the light of Japan's threat both to Russian and American interests in the Far East.

It is absurd to view this recognition from the commercial angle, for the world to-day has no illusions about trade with Russia. That bubble has been pricked by hard experience a long time ago. For in point of fact the Bolsheviks never buy: they take up credits, or else they sell, or else they export gold, which at the present moment they seem to be reluctant to do. But in the long run, although trade with Soviet Russia may benefit individual firms, industries or even communities, it is

always at the expense of the given State, which has to assume or guarantee the major part of these liabilities. The foundation of trade with Soviet Russia is a political and not an economic one, and political considerations may induce Roosevelt to put at Moscow's disposal through one of his many organisations, some very large funds. Whether France will give the Bolsheviks credits is more doubtful. What the U.S.A. and France may hope to or will actually get out of all this, is a matter of conjecture. But the political significance of the French and the American deals is certainly strengthening Moscow's position *vis-à-vis* its two most dangerous aggressors.

Encouraged by prospects of American help, or possibly with the courage of despair, the Soviets have of late shown some determination towards at last resisting Japan. Molotov's and Litvinov's speeches, the Stalin interview, Radek's articles and all the reports of responsible foreign correspondents in Soviet Russia, confirm that they consider a war with Japan as unavoidable and expect it in the very near future. In the case of an unpopular war there would be a great danger that the population once it was armed and mobilised might turn against them. But in a war against the partition of Russia, against German or Japanese expansion, this danger at least is considerably reduced.

These internationalists, who have by means of their written Constitution abolished the very word "Russia," and created a perfectly fluid State that may absorb others or altogether dissolve, which is not even limited to a territory but is merely a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—these internationalists are by way of being constrained to pursue a national Russian policy. In trying to avoid war and the annexation of any part or parts of the unfortunate territory to which they themselves have done so much harm during the last sixteen years, the Bolsheviks are not merely trying to save their own necks. This may be their principal consideration. But they are also engaged in a much bigger battle. For, whatever course future Soviet foreign policy may take, such is the irony of fate that, having become an active member of the *Comitas Gentium* through their internal weakness, in their present attempts to preserve peace they are fighting for Russia.

GEORGE SOLOVEYITCHIK.

THE FUTURE AND PROSPECTS OF LIFE.

A NUMBER of eminent persons have recently indulged in speculations as to the future of life; among them Bishop Barnes, the leader of the English Modernists. Does life, he has asked, exist upon other planets? If so, what are the possibilities of communication? What, again, of the future of life on this planet? Is it dependent upon the matter of the planet in the sense that, when the material conditions which are suitable for life no longer obtain, life will cease to exist, or may it transcend the limitations imposed by its material environment and win for itself a complete emancipation from matter? These questions are perennial, yet each generation answers them differently in the light of the changing knowledge of its times. What is the answer of ours?

The issues raised turn very largely upon the controversy between Materialism and Vitalism. According to Materialism, life is a product of material forces: it is only by the rarest of accidents that these forces have generated it upon the earth. From the point of view of physics the universe must be regarded as a fortuitous jumble of atoms which are destined to perform meaningless operations for a period and then to fall back into a dead and uniform world of cool radiation. Let us consider the facts.

There are, first, facts relating to the insignificance of man's planet. There is not, as astronomers used until recently to think, one system of stars, but many. Each of these systems came into being as the result of the gradual break-up of a spiral nebula, to which Sir James Jeans gives the name of "an island universe." About two million such nebulae are visible through the great 100-in. telescope at Mount Wilson, and Sir James Jeans quotes an estimate to the effect that the whole universe is about a thousand million times as big as the area of space visible through this telescope. Each spiral nebula contains enough matter to make a thousand millions of our suns. If a thousand million is multiplied by two million, and that again by a thousand million (the average number of the estimated stars in each nebula), then the resultant figure gives some indication of the probable number of stars in the universe. It is, Sir James Jeans estimates, "probably something like the total number of grains of sand on all the sea-

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shores of the world!" Now the sun is one such grain of sand; yet the sun is a million times as big as the earth and three hundred thousand times as massive!

In spite of this immense number of stars, space is almost empty. "If," says Jeans, "we place an apple in the centre of the earth and place a grape fruit, two more apples, two apricots and a currant in the six continents of the earth's surface, we shall have a fairly good scale-model of the arrangement in space of our sun and its six nearest neighbours." There is no reason to suppose that space as a whole is more densely crowded than the region adjacent to our sun; there is, indeed, some reason to suppose that large areas of space are less crowded. With regard to the size of space as a whole, we are told that light which takes a seventh of a second to travel round the earth takes "probably something like one hundred thousand million years to travel round the universe."

Secondly, there are facts showing the fortuitous character of life, and the rarity in the universe of the conditions in which alone we can suppose it to be possible. Life, as we know it, can occur only on those tiny specks of burnt-out ash which are planets. According to the tidal theory of the formation of planets, a necessary condition of the occurrence of a planetary system is the close approach of two stars in a certain condition of development. The odds against such an approach are very great. To quote Sir James Jeans again: "Exact calculation demonstrates that, with the stars moving as they now are, in the neighbourhood of the sun, in a period of seven million years only about one star in a hundred thousand will approach near enough to another for the birth of a solar system to be possible, and even then there are odds of perhaps ten to one against a solar system actually being formed." Thus the occurrence of a planetary system is an exceedingly rare accident, and the number of planets in the universe on which conditions even remotely approximating to those in which life, as we know it, is possible, is exceedingly small. We should have to visit thousands of millions of stars before finding a planetary system as recent as our own. Elsewhere Sir James Jeans estimates that the zones of the universe in which life, as we know it, is possible, added together, constitute only a thousand million-millionth of the whole of space.

A third set of facts which point in the same direction are time facts. The life of our own planetary system judged in relation to an astronomical time scale is very short; the period of life upon the earth, judged in relation to a geological time-scale, is very short, and the period of human life, judged in relation to a biological time scale, is very short. To take the biological time scale alone, it is estimated that the past of life upon the earth, from its earliest appearance in the shape of specks of protoplasm floating in the tidal scum on the shores of the earth's first seas, is roughly about twelve hundred million years. The past of human life from Neanderthal man up to the present day is about one million years; of civilised human life, admitting as civilisations all doubtful cases, about three thousand.

The cumulative effect of facts of this kind is to suggest that the occurrence of life is an unplanned accident in a fundamentally lifeless universe. Taking the facts accumulated by science at their face value the only possible conclusion, in Sir James Jeans's view, is that "one tiny corner at least, and possibly several tiny corners of this universe of atoms has chanced to become conscious for a time, but was designed in the end, still under the action of blind mechanical forces, to be frozen out and again leave a lifeless world."

Now let us turn to the story of life on this planet, as recounted to us by the Materialist. For inconceivable æons of time the planet was lifeless. For something like twelve hundred million years there has been life. This life, he asserts, is the product of the same forces as those responsible for changes in the climate and consequential changes in the conformation of the earth's surface. Life, in fact, on this view, is an eddy, as scientists used to be fond of telling us, in the primæval slime. Once our planet was too hot and too moist to maintain life; matter had not reached the stage of development necessary for its generation, and the earth was lifeless. As the central fires of the planet began to cool a crust was formed upon its surface, and, as the earth grew colder yet, this crust decayed, and out of the evil humours of its corruption bred life, much as a rotting cheese will breed maggots. Life, then, is a disease in the constitution of the earth, a product of rotting matter preying like a fungoid growth upon the planet on whose surface it crawls.

This view is an unpleasant one, acceptable only to satirists

and cynics who like to think as lowly of man's estate as the theologians think highly. But its implications must be seriously faced. If science is right, if life is really a product of material conditions, a chance passenger across a fundamentally alien and hostile environment, then, when the conditions are no longer suitable, life will disappear; the passenger, in other words, will finish his pointless journey with as little noise and significance as, in the person of the amoeba, he began it. For, just as the earth was once too hot and too moist to harbour life, so it will one day grow too cold and too dry. When the sun goes out, a catastrophe that is ultimately bound to occur, mankind will have disappeared. The last inhabitants will be as destitute, as feeble, and as dull-witted as the first. They will have forgotten all the arts and all the sciences. They will huddle wretchedly in caves alongside the glaciers that roll their transparent masses over the remains of the cities where men now think and love and suffer and hope. One day the last survivor of the race will exhale to the unfriendly sky the last human breath, and our globe will go rolling on, bearing with it through the silent fields of space the ashes of humanity and the remnants of the Greek marbles frozen to its icy surface. So much for the future of life, if Materialism is right.

The prospect is not attractive, and it is a relief to turn to the other alternative, which is that life is not a product of matter but is an independent force or stream of which, in common with all other living creatures, we are temporary individual expressions.

The objection usually brought forward to this alternative is that life or mind, being an immaterial agency, cannot possibly influence matter. Either life is material, or it is not. If it is, we are thrown back on the materialist hypothesis, and the movements of small particles of matter are literally the only events that can take place in the universe. If it is not—and we are proposing for the moment to proceed on the assumption that Materialism is not true—then life must be immaterial. If it is immaterial, it will have none of the attributes of matter, neither weight, shape, size, mass nor occupancy of space, and its constituents will not be those which are analysable by chemistry and physics, molecules, elements and atoms, but will be the unconscious drives and urges which, presumably, make up the experience of the lowest type of organism, and

the stream of emotions, thoughts, hopes, wishes, desires and so forth which constitute consciousness, as we know it. But, it is asked, if life is so different from matter, mind from body, that the one possesses no single quality in common with the other, how can life enter into and animate matter; and how can mind mould and influence body?

Because of the alleged impossibility of interaction, similes are suggested which purport to represent the soul or mind as a material emanation from or function of the body, dependent upon the body for its existence. Thus, Sir Arthur Keith has likened the soul to the flame of a candle, which goes out when the candle is burned.

But such a simile begs the question at issue. If we must use material similes to illustrate the immaterial, let us think of the body as a portable wireless set which receives wireless waves. Now nobody would contend that, because the water and other substances in the batteries were used up, the wireless waves previously intercepted were no longer there; or that, because the set had ceased to record them, the waves had ceased to be. Since wireless waves are the most immaterial kind of material thing that we know, this metaphor, while it cannot be pressed, is much more appropriate than that of the candle flame. Let us suppose, then, that there is an element in the human make-up which, to use a non-committal word, we will call the psychic factor, which is other than and additional to the material body. This element, we will suppose, uses and directs the matter of which the body is composed to further its purposes, playing upon it much as the fingers of a skilled pianist play upon his instrument, and employing the brain as its organ of communication. The brain, on this assumption, will be like a telephone exchange: it transmits messages which it does not originate. There comes a time when the telephone exchange is damaged or wears out and ceases to work. When this happens we say that there is death.

On this assumption, then, life must be conceived as an activity other than matter, using matter for its own purposes. Though it may be everywhere indissolubly associated with matter now, it does not follow on this view that it was necessarily always so associated. It may have been smuggled, as it were, into the material universe at a definite point of history when some corner of the universe had reached a stage of development at which it was capable of receiving it. It is a

fact that this planet was at one time a mass of molten material, of glowing gas upon which the existence of life, as we know it, would have been impossible. I have commented above upon the rarity of the conditions in which life can appear in the existing universe. Even upon the earth life is possible only within a narrow layer or stratum a few miles thick. It is to all intents and purposes tied to the surface of the earth. It cannot penetrate more than a mile or so below its surface, nor exist more than a few miles above it. These facts are admitted, and are generally, as we have seen, claimed as evidence for Materialism. But the claim is by no means necessitated. What we know is that life is only found in association with matter at a certain stage. This may be because life is a product of matter, as Materialism asserts; but the fact is also compatible with the view that life is an independent activity which is only able to make use of matter at a certain stage; that, in short, there are only certain kinds of chemical combinations which will take the current of life, just as there are only certain kinds of metal which will take the current of electricity. Life has, therefore, on this view, to wait until the matter of which the earth is composed, developing in accordance with the laws of physics, had reached conditions suitable for its reception before it could make its appearance on the planet.

The point is of interest in connection with the researches upon which bio-chemists are engaged in connection with the production of protoplasm—that is to say, the material stuff of which living organisms are constructed. Many of the organic compounds found in living organisms, or secreted by them—such as urea, sugar, or starch—can already be manufactured in the laboratory. Hence it is said that, if we could continue the manufacture of these organic compounds until we had made a mass of protoplasm, and could subject the protoplasm to suitable treatment, we might expect it to exhibit the phenomena of living organisms. As to the likelihood of this development, I am not competent to express an opinion. It is important, however, to emphasise the fact that its realisation would in no sense be tantamount to the creation of life. What I have suggested is that the material universe, at first lifeless, in course of time reached a stage suitable for the reception of life. Now, there is obviously no reason why a stage of development which was once arrived at by natural

means in the past should not be effected by human agency in the future. Yet, even so, it is not life that would be manufactured by chemists, but only the material which is capable of receiving it. To identify the manufacture of synthetic protoplasm, which began to behave like a living creature, with the creation of life would be like saying that the builder who constructed a house had created the tenants who proceeded to occupy it.

On this view we shall think of the evolution of life as a continuing process, each species rising to higher levels and qualities of life on the shoulders of its predecessors. The path of evolution is littered with the debris of life's past experiments, and it may well be that, unless we learn to behave ourselves better in the future than we have done in the past, we shall be sent to join the mesozoic reptiles on the evolutionary scrapheap. For there is no reason to suppose that life in us has reached its final form.

Consider again the time scale upon which life's operations are conducted! Life's past in this planet is, as we have seen, generally reckoned at about twelve hundred million years, man's past at about one million. Represent this million years by a month, and the whole past history of civilisation works out at about seven or eight hours; while, on the same scale, the period during which we may expect our planet to remain habitable is a hundred thousand years.

This means that life has about 1,200,000,000,000 years in which to conduct its operations. Can we suppose, with this vast tract of time in prospect, that the human race will be life's last experiment merely because it is its latest, that man will remain for all time the instrument best fitted to carry evolution forward, and that life will not be able to overcome its present humiliating dependence on a material body?

To sum up the foregoing, we may say that if life is ultimately material in origin, then it is dependent upon a certain condition of matter for its continued existence. Life on this view is doomed in advance, and its progress is a progress to extinction. If, on the other hand, life is an independent activity which makes use of matter, then the destruction of our planet, and even the reduction of the whole universe to a uniform condition of radiation, is very far from involving the destruction of life.

C. E. M. JOAD.

STANDARD PRICES IN AGRICULTURE.

It will, I think, be admitted that Mr. Walter Elliott, the present Minister of Agriculture, is a remarkable man. He has, with a considerable measure of success, taken a course that I suspect to be unique in the history of a modern democratic State. Having apparently satisfied himself of the fundamental soundness of the agricultural marketing policy, based on standard prices, the control of imports and the more scientific organisation of distribution, recommended for adoption by the Rural Reconstruction Association, he proceeded, without wasting time in explaining in detail what he was about, to secure its adoption piecemeal and by indirect methods. By this procedure, dangerous as it was, for it involved many errors in detail, he not only managed to evade the criticism of the very large number of influential people who habitually attack any ideas with which they are not familiar, but also succeeded in escaping the all-powerful opposition of that group of financiers who, concerned in the production of food in other countries, have blocked for generations any attempt to revive British agriculture. Only when the nation was irrevocably committed to his policy did the Minister make it clear that his object was to secure a complete revival of agriculture and incidentally to find employment for some 1,000,000 more workers on the land. As an outcome of this procedure it came about that few people outside that Association and the officials of the Ministry have had, until recently, more than a vague idea of what exactly was his policy and his object. Even now most people are puzzled and inclined to take the view that we are embarking on an entirely new policy; in fact we are returning to the traditional English methods of controlling trade—a point which it is important to understand if we are to see both the problem and the policy in their true proportions. On this historic aspect then something may well be said.

Up to the end of the Tudor period, and to some extent for two hundred years later, national policy was directed to securing the largest possible measure of stability of prices. Nevertheless it must be realised that there was no universal practice of price-fixing—it was the dominating idea rather than the dominating practice—and to a considerable extent prices, particularly in agriculture, must have vacillated as

they have done in modern times, though to a less degree. Moreover, even when prices were fixed, they were, in a large number of cases, fixed by producers' Guilds, in somewhat the same way as prices of such things as cigarettes and patent medicines are fixed to-day by producers and producers' associations. There seems, however, to be this difference between the early and the present practice, that in earlier days a local or other authority might intervene to lower prices if they appeared to be excessive. Market Committees, representing or at least supposed to represent the interests of producers and consumers, also fixed prices. It is this exact practice of fixing prices by an independent Committee that has been revived in the milk trade. Magistrates, Justices of the Peace and local authorities had also powers for dealing with prices, whilst on occasions the State intervened and prices might be fixed by Royal Proclamation or by the direct action of Parliament. A price list, issued by Edward VI "in Council," dealt with corn, oxen, cows, sheep and pigs and so on down to geese, capons, hens, chickens and eggs. To-day again we find the State, through Parliament, intervening directly to fix agricultural prices. This widespread practice of price-fixing was supplemented by the law, which severely punished dealers in produce, who when caught might be fined, imprisoned, put into the pillory or driven out from the town in which they lived: they might also, I believe, be excommunicated by the Church. The producers' Guilds also endeavoured to support their price-fixing regulations by control of supplies, whilst in agriculture legislation was directed to equalising supply and demand by the regulation of overseas trade, encouraging importations of food products when there was a shortage and exportation when there was a surplus.

All these rules, regulations and legislative acts seem to have been consciously or unconsciously inspired by three clear-cut ideas: (1) The fixing of standard scales of prices; (2) some measure of control of overseas and local trade; (3) a control, through punishment of dealers and otherwise, over distribution. Economic problems change very little, as we see if we peruse the Report and Declaration of Policy adopted by the Policy Committee of the Central Chamber of Agriculture in 1930. It dealt with the same three points under the headings of Standard Prices, Control of Food Imports and Scientific Organisation of Distribution. This document,

though it was obviously prepared without reference to the history of the problem, might, save for its phraseology, have been drawn up by a fourteenth century schoolman.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all traditional ideas on these subjects were slowly weakening, and their actual dissolution came during the second half of the latter century. It may then illuminate the present position if we try to recapture the mood and occurrences of that time of dissolution. We find many adherents to the traditional view, which was based, according to Lord Kenyon in his well-known judgment in the case of *The King v. Rusby*, on the Common Law of the land, accepted, as he affirms, without question by the Courts since Saxon times. No one was to come between producer and consumer to lower the price to the former or raise it to the latter. There were to be no two prices for the same article. The miller and baker and others concerned in converting raw produce into food had a right to charge for their services and so no doubt had the retailer and transporter: but sales in open market and elsewhere had to be carried through at the customary price, the "just price" of the schoolmen. It was as evil a thing, in the view of the traditionalists, to sell below the common price as to sell above it. Recently the Milk Board, returning to the earlier practice, fined a man £50 for selling milk at 4d. and 5d. a quart, instead of 6d., the common price of the neighbourhood. This action caused considerable sensation, not only among agriculturists, but also in the Press; and there was some condemnation. In the latter half of the eighteenth century such action would hardly have been noticed, and if it had been, it would have excited, save amongst a few intellectuals, general approval. The common man would have said that the salesman who had charged below the common price had sinned against common law and custom: he had got what he deserved.

It must not be supposed that the practice of that time conformed to the traditional outlook of the common man. There were no doubt plenty of people, dealers and money-lenders, buying and selling below and above the common price and so making a profit: indeed, in 1800 we find the Recorder of Dublin in his charge to the Grand Jury referring to the mischievous operations of dealers as being "unbounded and universal." But for all that they represented in the minds of the people the forces of evil, and when they managed to evade

the law and get off with the spoil, the farmers, at any rate, were indignant. Thus much for the traditional outlook.

There was also then emerging an entirely different school of thought that had secured for itself the label of "The New Enlightenment." In the sacred name of liberty members of this school put forward the view that all price regulations, and control over dealers which went with regulation, ought to be abolished. "Dealers," had said a proclamation issued by George III in 1766, "are oppressors of the poor and enemies of their country." "Dealers," on the other hand, said Adam Smith, "are no more to be feared than witchcraft"; no doubt this writer reflected the view of the intellectuals concerned in securing the removal of restrictions on trade and on prices. The intellectual fallacy that lay beyond the teaching of Adam Smith and his school had not, at that time, been detected: but many people may well have agreed with a contemporary writer who declared that "ingenious theories ought not to be hastily adopted at the expense of the experiences of ages."

The controversy between the traditionalists and the adherents of the New Enlightenment went on in very lively form until the very end of the century, by which time it had shrunk until it concerned itself with little else but the position of the dealers. Parliament to some extent supported the view of the newly enlightened and repealed laws against dealers. The law courts said no repeal of laws affected the situation and relying on common law vindictively punished dealers when caught. Indeed, even as late as 1796 a man who bought and sold 141½ quarters of oats in Odney market and made a variance in price for his own benefit of 17s. 6d. in all, about 1½d. a quarter, was fined £200 and sent to prison for a fortnight. Finally in 1800 Pitt came over to the side of the dealers and made a declaration in Parliament to that effect: thereafter prosecutions for dealing became fewer and fewer. This special controversy was then replaced by discussions over Free Trade and Protection, which closed in its turn with a victory for the Free Traders.

From the time of the introduction of Free Trade prices were left to take care of themselves. The view put forward in support of this action was somewhat as follows. Prices, it was thought, interlocked with supply and demand, on which they depended, whilst such vacillations as took place would regu-

late automatically this supply and demand; as a result both prices and supply and demand would automatically adjust themselves, controlled by economic laws. It did not seem to have occurred to these theorists that many things affected prices besides supply and demand nor that other things affected supply and demand besides prices. Cobden, impressed by the case put forward, went so far as to prophesy that the price of wheat would settle down to about 45s. a quarter, a reasonable figure for that time. But in fact the price of wheat ran up to 100s. in 1847 and thereafter for some forty years vacillated between about 80s. and 30s., finally running down in the nineties of the last century to 17s. 6d., and thereafter slightly rising. Prices in all other agricultural produce varied in the same way. Prices also varied even on the same day, as they do to-day in the different markets of the country and even in the same market from hour to hour. As a general result farming became a gamble and almost every branch of agriculture was ruined in turn by a collapse in prices. There was as a rule a subsequent revival, until we come to the years 1930-33 when almost all branches were ruined, for by the accident of fate all prices fell together.

In the first decade of the present century an active agitation broke out to return to the old system of a stabilised or, as it was then called, a "just price." Supported to some extent by agriculturists, this movement secured the immediate opposition of political leaders of all parties, whether they were Conservatives, Liberals or Socialists. This opposition was explained by a well-known Liberal agricultural Member of Parliament by an illuminating remark. "If," he said, "people were to think in such terms, they would vote for none of us." There was, of course, much rather haphazard price-fixing during the War, and the standard price for sugar beet was thereafter established. Then after the War the whole problem began to be reconsidered. We find the Rural Reconstruction Committee reporting in 1925 in favour of standard prices as the basis of a policy of agricultural revival, and the Rural Reconstruction Association, founded in the following year, has since carried on an extensive and extremely skilful propaganda in favour of this system. In 1929 there began a widespread change of opinion on this subject amongst leaders of thought. This change of opinion was reflected in a series of statutes passed in 1931, 1932 and 1933, all of which

dealt, directly or indirectly, with the price problem. The Act passed in 1931 was followed by the introduction of a standard price for hops. The 1932 Act secured a standard price for wheat. The 1933 Acts made it possible, by a somewhat tortuous procedure such as politicians affect, to introduce standard prices for all agricultural produce by degrees, and of this tortuous procedure advantage is now being taken. The object of this legislation is to secure for the British farmer a first claim on the home market at a fair price, through price-fixing, supplemented by control of imports and the more scientific organisation of distribution and other methods directed to maintain, so far as possible, a continuous equalisation of supply and demand.

We may now consider what is the best way of adopting this standard price system. Probably the best method is the appointment of price-fixing Committees. Such Committees, which must, of course, be free from political control, should in approaching the subject carefully consider the effect of any particular price or scale of prices on our national life. The interests of producer, consumer and the nation have to be reconciled so far as possible. In dealing at the present time, for example with agriculture, price-fixing Committees would naturally first consider the immediate need of sustaining the industry in a high state of efficiency and of providing a good living for those who conduct it, thus enabling a reasonably high rate of wages to be paid for labour—matters of great importance, since it is fairly obvious that from the purchasing power of agriculturists, so created, come our best hopes for the permanent revival of city industry. They would also have to consider the need of providing a sufficient margin of profit, firstly to make possible a rapid extension of the industry, needed not only to increase the nation's wealth, but for the absorption of our unemployed—at least half of whom may be attributed to the agricultural decadence—and secondly, to make possible the progressive reduction of the heavy debts that burden almost all farmers to-day. In considering such issues, they would have to take account also of the interests of the consumers, for it is obvious that retail prices should not be raised unless it is absolutely necessary. Such matters having been considered, it would be the duty of the Committees to promulgate a price-list, to be revised from time to time as experience dictates. That

price-fixing should be based on a sound theory is a matter of great importance; to-day under the Government schemes prices appear to be fixed without any guiding principle.

Standard prices, like all the other proposals of the modern constructive school of economic thought, rest on a philosophy of life different from that which is common to-day. Philosophy and its practical application to life make very little appeal to the British mind. One may try, however, to explain the practical importance of the system. From the point of view of the agriculturists the standard price system will make their industry solvent, not only temporarily, but permanently. The farmer, knowing that his market is reasonably secure and so free from the constant anxiety which is the curse of the farmer's life, will turn from the study of markets to the study of production. It will be his interest to go straight ahead, since the more he produces, the better he will do. He will create more and more wealth and absorb more and more workers and so serve the national interest. The middlemen if scientifically organised will no longer make it their primary interest to purchase at the lowest and sell at the highest price: they will be concerned with distribution and it will be their main interest to carry distribution through in the best and cheapest possible way: the cost of distribution and conversion of raw products into food might indeed well be reduced from sixty per cent. of the retail price, the present computed average, to forty per cent., and the difference might be divided between producer and consumer. The consumer's position would also be improved. Though he would be deprived of the occasional opportunity of buying food at a price below the cost of production and transport, his price would be reasonably certain—it might indeed in its turn be standardised—and would no doubt on the average be below the recent average price taken over a series of years.

In outline these are the main permanent benefits that one may expect from the introduction of the standard price system. The supporters of these proposals also claim that if these methods were adopted, it would be possible to employ in agriculture and closely related industries some 1,350,000 more individuals, whilst the purchasing power of these individuals might in turn provide work in the towns for perhaps half that number. Two millions of the unemployed could thus be absorbed and a saving of perhaps £100,000,000

a year in doles and other payments secured. There is a final point to be made. With a view to creating a permanent condition of security for agriculture, impervious to trade slumps and economic crises, we should be making a complete turn-over from a system based on vacillating prices to another based on standard prices. The ultimate advantage to the nation may be very great, but it is important to recognise that in making the change we may become involved in difficulties and also in considerable costs. We must make provision for the costs of reconstruction. Subsidies may be necessary and this contingency must be faced. It is suggested that it would pay the country well, for the purpose of installing this new system and bringing it into working order, to allocate temporarily to agriculture a small proportion, say twenty per cent. of the savings to be effected by the reduction of the costs of the unemployment that arises specifically out of the agricultural decadence. It may be said in defence of this proposal that we shall thus be subsidising employment instead of as now, subsidising unemployment.

MONTAGUE FORDHAM.

THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF GERMANY.

HITLER'S achievement of power was in no small degree due to his far-reaching economic promises to the German electorate. A proportion of this electorate supported him on account of what was a truly ambitious and socialist programme. It is now almost a year since he and National Socialism rode to power on these promises, and thus enough time has gone by in these days of greatly accelerated economic evolution to be able to ask, in all fairness, for a balance-sheet. One strange fact is immediately apparent. Politically, he has kept many of the promises he made, even though they had disastrous effects upon the prestige of Germany as a civilised nation. Economically, hardly one of the promises made has been fulfilled, and it will be seen that the half-hearted attempt to keep some of them was soon abandoned after resulting in a chaotic dislocation of the commercial and industrial machine.

The most important feature in the National Socialist programme (the propagation of which gave Hitler many million followers) is point thirteen of the official programme, which was declared in section 2 of the Constitution of the Party to be unalterable for all time. It says simply: "We demand nationalisation of all businesses which have been up to the present formed into companies (trusts)." To all competent observers who knew that the head of the most important German trust, Thyssen, had provided the Nazis, within two days, with three and a half million marks for the Presidential Elections in 1932 alone, it was obvious that Hitler could hardly attempt to put point thirteen of his ambitious programme into practice. In fact, the investments of Thyssen and other German industrialists in the party have proved to be very good indeed. This is best illustrated by the following symptomatic facts. During the first days of the Brüning administration, the Reich, to save the Steel Trust from bankruptcy, had taken over half the capital of the holding company of the German Steel Trust. Thus Thyssen and private capitalism had completely lost control over Germany's most important industry. The first thing Hitler did when he came to power was to merge this holding company with a number of other absolutely valueless companies which existed more or

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less only on paper, but which belonged to the Thyssen group. In the new amalgamation the Reich controls less than 20 per cent. of the capital. Thus Hitler handed back to private control what Brüning had acquired for the Reich to be administered for the common good. It is impossible to expect that he should put that part of his programme into practice which is diametrically opposed to the interests of those who have oiled, in fact kept going, the party machine before their achievement of power. Thus we have also point seventeen in the programme, which says: "We demand land reform suitable to our national requirements, confiscation without compensation of land for communal purposes, and the abolition of interest on land loans." Although it must be admitted that the Minister for Agriculture attempted to put some of these reforms into practice, and in fact gave to German peasants a new and official social status, there is not a single estate in East Prussia, Pomerania, or anywhere else, which has been confiscated in order that it might be split up into small homesteads for the unemployed.

Throughout 1933 we had a number of very optimistic official declarations about the economic development, emanating mainly from the Minister of Propaganda. Comments made by foreign observers have hitherto been largely a matter of guess-work. This was unavoidable in view of the fact that no reliable statistics have been available. Even to-day the available statistics are comparatively few, and many of them are not above suspicion. Great claims are made as regards the solving of the unemployment problem. The statistics of the German Free Trade Unions give for the beginning of 1933 the following figures: workers, employees and domestic servants, 20,832,000. If we deduct about 300,000 for sick people unable to work, we see that the labour market offered, in January 1933, 20,532,000 hands able to work. According to the *Institut für Konjunkturforschung*, the Reich Sickness Insurance Institute had, on May 25th, 13,170,000 paying members who had employment; on June 25th, 13,185,000; and on September 25th, 13,403,000. If we add to this figure the visible unemployment, as shown by the Reich Labour Exchange statistics to have amounted on September 15th to 4,828,000, we have accounted altogether for 18,231,000 people out of the labour market which offers the hands of 20,532,000 people. The difference between these two figures

is accounted for by *invisible* unemployment. The *Institut für Konjunkturforschung* accounts, on August 3rd, for approximately 2,000,000 invisible unemployed. But even this figure gives only part of the invisible unemployment, for it does not contain the figures with regard to the invisible unemployment in the middle classes, the traders, shopkeepers, insurance agents, commercial travellers, etc., who easily make up for the remaining 301,000. Altogether this means that in September 1933 the visible and invisible unemployment in Germany amounted, as far as fairly reliable statistics go, to 7,129,000 people. It may be added that invisible unemployment in the middle classes amounts to considerably more than 300,000 people. It is generally accepted that about 11,000,000 Germans belong to what is commonly called the middle classes. Of these more than 1,000,000 have to-day no income at all. This million is made up of the above-mentioned small shopkeepers, insurance agents, agents and traders of small but independent existence, who have been the victims of the ever-increasing rationalisation and centralisation of business into the hands of the big combines, as well as the several hundred thousand Marxists, Catholics, Socialists, Jews and Pacifists, who have lost their jobs in civil and public life as a result of the change of régime, and who furthermore are cut off from all form of relief and do not figure in any unemployment statistics. It thus appears that there are at least 8,000,000 people in Germany not earning their living or doing any constructive work.

All this would also be an explanation of the remarkable difference between the German Free Trade Union statistics, which show from January to the end of November 1933 a decrease in unemployment of 1·8 per cent., and the statistics of the Ministry of Propaganda, which allege a decrease of no less than 16 per cent. These official statistics are in fact nothing else but the result of a wangling which can lead only superficial observers astray. The statistics concerning persons receiving public charity are an example. These official figures speak of the decrease of 35,000 persons, or 1·4 per cent. for the fiscal year 1932-3. Since at the same time the number of persons receiving charity classified as "in dire need" rose by 75,000 persons, it means that there was in reality a total increase of 40,000 public charity recipients. The figures for the third quarter of 1933 are 38,000 and 88,000, or a total

increase of 50,000. This is fairly typical of the statistics of the Minister of Propaganda, and it may be added that the alleged 16 per cent. decrease in unemployment is reduced to absurdity by the fact that the total working income of the German workers, employees and domestic servants amounted in the third quarter of 1933 to 6·8 milliards of marks, which is only 4 per cent. higher than that of the same period in the preceding year. Another significant fact is the difference between the number of people who contribute to the unemployment insurance and the number of people who pay membership fees to the Reich Sickness Institute. As we have seen, the Reich Sickness Insurance Institute had, in September 1933, 13,403,000 members as compared with 9,800,000 people who, according to the *Institut für Konjunkturforschung*, contributed during the third quarter of 1933 to the Reich Unemployment Insurance. The difference between these two figures can be accounted for by 1,000,000 Hitler Storm Troops and Steel Helmets and the Reichswehr.

The "voluntary" Labour Corps are in the official statistics as employed people, that is to say the Reich pays their membership fee due to the Reich Sickness Insurance Institute, but does not make the contribution due to the Reich Unemployment Insurance Institute which is made by all other employed people. It is naturally a matter of opinion whether the Storm Troops should be regarded as employed people; certain it is that they do not do any constructive work, and their sole occupation is exercising on parade grounds. If we put these people on the unemployment list we would reach the appalling figure of at least 9,000,000 unemployed in the third Reich.

Those of us who oppose the idea of Hitlerism, on account of the principles of neo-barbarism for which it stands, reserved judgment until the opportunity had come to see some of the results of the Nazi economic policy. We intended to understand and tried to make allowances for the terrible suffering, moral and physical, to which the German people had been subjected for two decades, and thus hoped that the sacrifice of all those accepted decencies of civilised life which Nazi-ism had ordered might at a later date be more justified by the economic results achieved. Unfortunately, this hope has been in vain, at least as far as the year 1933 and the immediate perspectives of the German economic situation are concerned.

This is fatal for Germany, as well as for the rest of the world. Particularly the policy of the Reichsbank now directed by Dr. Schacht has been the cause of much embarrassment to foreign investors in German securities as well as competitors with German industries. This is due to the fact that the Reichsmark has been inflated in effect by more than 30 per cent.; for it is possible to buy German marks out of the blocked mark accounts of frozen foreign credits in Germany, in London, Amsterdam, Paris and New York, at a discount varying from 25 to 40 per cent. This naturally has enabled German industries and trade to do some effective and unfair dumping, which severely affects English manufacturers and exporters.

In the last week of December the City of London found it necessary to request the Government to intervene on behalf of British holders of German bonds. The British Government saw itself forced to address a strongly worded note to Germany protesting against the high-handed and arbitrary policies of Dr. Schacht. The President of the Reichsbank, without even entering into negotiations with the creditors, had informed them that Germany did not intend to pay the interest on foreign obligations as before, and would decide for herself what percentage she could afford to pay. This decision was unwarranted in view of the fact that the Balance of Payments had been greatly relieved by Germany's dumping and by the actual depreciation of the mark.

What ultimately will happen to the Dawes and Young obligations apparently nobody dares to predict, although the scramble to get rid of them at any reasonable discount is still going on at this moment in all financial centres of the world. All other figures which are available now, and have been available during the year 1933, show the declining trend of activities in all spheres of industry and commerce. Tax receipts have fallen by 15 per cent. during the last six months, and the income of the Reichsbahn has declined by 17.5 per cent. during the first six months of 1933. In the third quarter of 1933 there were 22.3 per cent. fewer foreign visitors than in the same period of the preceding year. The aggregate business in the retail trades in the third quarter of 1933 was 7.5 per cent. less than the same period of 1932. The Reich Ministry for Posts and Telegraphs reported in December a fall of more than 100,000,000 marks in the postal income of 1933 as

compared with 1932. The coal output in 1933 is about 1,000,000 tons less than in 1932. The total coal stock on the dumps was already, in July, 12.5 per cent. higher as compared with the same months in the preceding year. By December 1933 there were, in spite of the decreased output, some 18,000,000 tons of coal, coke and bricks on German dumps, which is about one-third more than in 1932. Indeed, every figure published during 1933 illustrates the worsening of the general situation of the Reich as well as that of the individual German. There has been, for example, from April 1st to July 31st, 1933, a fall of about 95,000,000 marks in the income of the Reich in taxes and customs receipts as compared with the same months in 1932. Here it is important to note that the fall in ownership and traffic taxes was particularly high, and that the decrease amounted to about 80,000,000 marks, while the income from customs receipts fell only 15,000,000 marks, in spite of a general decrease in imports. The rise of retail prices continues at a rate which is out of proportion to raw material prices. While according to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* the rise in the retail price-index amounted in the last quarter of 1933 to nearly 10 per cent., the rise in raw materials was less than 2.6 per cent. Thus we have the depreciation of the purchasing power of the consumer and increased profits for the producers. The statistics of the Reich Ministry of Finance again, as an interesting comment upon the unemployment situation, showed already by August, 1933, a fall of income-tax receipts from wage-earners of 6.5 million marks.

Statistics about particular industries and trades published during 1933 by such authorities as the Chambers of Commerce, industrial organisations and trade papers, show the same situation, namely that economically no progress has been made. In the election days of January 1933 the Nazis boasted that "the fact that they did not have a programme was their greatest asset," and indeed they have tried very hard to make the best of it during 1933, with the above-described results. We thus come to ask what Nazi economics really are, for the programme of their party has not indicated it. The newer German economists like Dr. Leibrock have said that Nazi economics are Spenglerian in interpretation. This means that Nazi economists believe that there is no such thing as economic evolution, but that there exist a number of self-

contained economic entities or units. They then proceed to argue that the orbit of German political influence must embrace the area over which the German economic unit is supposed to exist. They thus hope for a Third Empire which extends from the Baltic to the Alps economically independent of the outside world. These are the ultimate ends in view. How they are going to be accomplished is beyond ordinary imagination, save that the attempt must involve a complete repudiation of all German obligations, governmental, municipal and private, and a general lowering of the living standard of every individual in Central Europe.

All these developments and ideas tend to create an atmosphere fraught with political complications. They present a challenge to the rest of the world, particularly since the German Government has to provide shock-absorbers for reactions due to economic distress by an ambitious foreign policy. Germany contends that she is the strategical centre of the "strong economic unit, Middle Europe," and is determined to apply the Spenglerian interpretation of economics to practical politics. Thus all through 1933 constant propaganda was kept up on the borders of the Saar, Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark and Switzerland to let Nazi ideas filter through into these countries. Active financial support is given by the Ministry of Propaganda to Nazi organisations which are founded within these countries. It is reckoned that the influence of these organisations will spread and eventually be met by the ever-increasing influence from without, and so bring about a complete pro-German orientation. The whole of Scandinavia, Lithuania, Latvia and Holland is covered with a network of Nazi spies, propagandists, and *agents-provocateurs*. When the situation within Germany comes to a climax, and the people get restless and demand the fulfilment of Hitler's economic promises, there will be no other alternative than to attempt to divert the discontent of the masses into channels which will bring about, according to the official propaganda, the erection of the Third Teutonic Empire.

JOHANNES STEEL.

BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE FIRST DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE.*

MANY people have forgotten by now that the idea of bringing about disarmament by means of a Conference had its origin in a manifesto published by the last of the Romanoffs, Tzar Nicholas II, on August 24th, 1898. This manifesto suggested the holding of an international conference on disarmament and led, in the further course of the negotiations, to the first so-called Peace Conference which met at the Hague in 1899. With the aid of documents lately published in double number L-LI of the Russian historical review *Krasny Archiv*, it has now become possible to take a peep behind the scenes of the negotiations that preceded this Conference.

Two points emerge: firstly how the idea of the Conference arose, and, secondly, why the Conference was doomed to failure from the start.

On March 13th, 1898, the Russian War Minister, Kuropatkin, wrote a letter to the Foreign Minister, Muravieff, in which he described the then rapid development of the armaments of all European countries. Kuropatkin mentioned that Germany had decided to adopt a new quick-firing gun and had already armed five army corps with this new type. Austria and Russia had only undertaken extensive trials, without having decided upon any particular type up to that time. He said that the introduction of a new type would cost Russia 120,000,000 roubles and Austria about 100,000,000 roubles. Kuropatkin then suggested that an endeavour should be made to conclude a military convention with Austria to the effect that no quick-firing guns should be adopted in the Russian and Austrian armies for the next ten years.

Kuropatkin's proposal did not, however, meet with the approval of the Russian Foreign Office, as we learn from a memorandum dated April 5th, 1898, which has also been published for the first time in the volume of the *Krasny Archiv* mentioned above. The memorandum states that Austria would never agree to a disarmament convention with a Power outside of the Triple Alliance behind Germany's

* From fresh Russian documents.

back, but that it might be assumed with certainty that the idea of a general convention for the reduction of land and naval armaments would meet with the hearty support of both states. The hope was further expressed that England and France would also take part in a Conference of this kind. The moment appeared favourable to Russia because she had finally secured what she had been aiming at for centuries, namely an ice-free port in the Far East.

We thus see how the idea of an agreement regarding armaments with Austria alone, which was not considered feasible, developed into the far-reaching plan for general disarmament. We also learn from these documents that the essential purpose underlying the proposed disarmament conference was the avoidance of the expensive introduction of a quick-firing gun and the retention of the existing numerical superiority in an economical way.

Among the numerous explanations given of the origin of the idea of the Conference, the palm may be awarded to that given by E. J. Dillon, who bases his remarks on what he was told by his friend Witte, the Russian Finance Minister under Muravieff, and writes in his book *The Eclipse of Russia*: "History will retain the decisive fact that the motive of its prime author was to hoodwink the Austrian government and to enable the Tzar's War Minister to steal a march on his country's future enemies."

We shall now see to what we must attribute the fact that this Conference was doomed to failure from the start. The Imperial Manifesto for an international disarmament conference was published in the *Government Gazette* of August 24th, 1898. The *communiqué* was also sent at the same time by the Foreign Minister, Count Muravieff, to all the accredited Ambassadors in St. Petersburg. In the manifesto we find the same ideas which again form the basis of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. The maintenance of peace is set forth as the final goal of international policy. The conclusion of powerful alliances between the great states and the development of their military power, which were to serve for the preservation of peace, had not sufficed to bring about its desired establishment. Work and capital were being squandered unproductively on armaments. National culture, economic progress and the production of values were paralysed and misdirected in their development. Most of the economic

crises were caused by the system of armaments and the constant danger inherent in the accumulation of war material. In order to put a stop to incessant armaments and obviate the evil, said the manifesto, His Majesty had been graciously pleased to command Count Muravieff to propose the summoning of a conference to deal with this serious question. The efforts of all states honestly endeavouring to secure the triumph of the great ideal of world peace over all elements of dissension and discord were to be united in an alliance of the Great Powers.

The Tzar's manifesto made a profound impression at the time on public opinion in all civilised countries, and it almost seemed as if the long-desired epoch of eternal peace was about to arrive. But the politicians were more sceptical. It was only in the United States that the Russian suggestion met with the heartiest approval. As in the case of all European questions that assail public opinion in America, it was evident that things were treated too superficially and that the difficulties always inherent in the complicated relations in Europe were not taken into account. Public opinion in England kept aloof. Of the British Press, the only paper that really advocated the Tzar's peace manifesto was the *Manchester Guardian*. Lord Salisbury also expressed himself as "very sceptical" about the idea of the Conference to the German Ambassador in London, Count Hatzfeldt, and described the whole programme in general as "*pas sérieux*."*

In Germany also the Russian peace idea was generally rejected, while in many quarters the proposals were regarded, not without justification, as a manoeuvre that had little to do with real disarmament for the purpose of securing permanent peace. The German Kaiser made the following note on a report from Prince Bülow regarding a conversation with M. von Staal, the Russian representative at the Hague Conference: "I will play my part in the Conference comedy, but I shall wear my sword during the dancing."†

The attitude of France, however, is of special interest. Apart from socialistic circles, the attitude assumed by public opinion was partly one of aloofness and partly one of doubt. But the manifesto caused considerable alarm in the Quai

* *Grosse Politik*, vol. xv, no. 4237.

† *Ibid* p. 196 (footnote).

d'Orsay, regarding which the Russian documents provide absolutely fresh and most interesting information.

The French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count de Montebello, was directed by the Quai d'Orsay to ascertain the aim and purpose of the Conference from the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Muravieff, and sent the French Foreign Minister Delcassé a detailed report of his interview with Muravieff. Delcassé utilised the opportunity offered by this report to discuss the Conference with the Russian Ambassador in Paris, Prince Urussoff. Urussoff sent a report on his conversations with Delcassé to Muravieff on September 1st, of which we learn the following details from the documents now published by the *Krasny Archiv*. Delcassé informed the Ambassador that the French Government was quite ready to take part in the Conference as soon as the programme was drawn up. At the same time he pointed out that France,

notwithstanding her feelings with regard to the Treaty of Frankfurt, has carefully observed it and thus given indubitable and clear proof of her love of peace. To demand more than that from France would be unjust. France cannot once more confirm and approve the forcible seizure of a part of her territory from which she is still suffering. All nations and even the Germans must respect France for her conduct and for the dignity she has displayed. This respect would be diminished were she voluntarily to admit the renewal and recall of the affronts and humiliations she has suffered."

On September 8th Delcassé paid another visit to Prince Urussoff in connection with the same matter. Urussoff's report on this interview has now also been published by the Russians. Delcassé had received a telegram from the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Montebello, in which he reported a conversation with Muravieff. Delcassé read the telegram to the Russian Ambassador, the gist of it being that Muravieff has said to Count Montebello that the Tzar's idea had less to do with the question of disarmament and more with the question of an armament truce, and that political questions would not be touched upon at the Conference. The object of Delcassé's visit was to obtain from Urussoff confirmation of Montebello's statements. On Urussoff personally confirming the official statement of the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Delcassé at once assured him that in these

circumstances the whole of France would be happy "to participate in this excellent work, and that the French Government would take up the matter with genuine zeal." It accordingly appears from Urussoff's first interview with Delcassé that the anxiety felt by the French is mainly accounted for by the fact that it was feared in Paris that political questions would also be discussed at the Conference, and that France might possibly be called upon to recognise the Treaty of Frankfurt anew. In other words, France feared the emergence of Locarno conditions, such as were demanded from Germany after the occupation of the Ruhr.

Notwithstanding Montebello's report to Delcassé and the second conversation between Prince Urussoff and the French Foreign Minister, the anxiety in the Quai d'Orsay was not yet entirely allayed. In spite of the latter statement, they were still distrustful in Paris, because the Tzar's manifesto had not been communicated to France before the other nations were informed. They were also afraid that the introduction of the new field-gun, which was considerably superior to the German gun, might be sacrificed by the Conference. It was therefore considered necessary in St. Petersburg to do something more to allay the anxiety of the French, and the Russian War Minister, Kuropatkin, was consequently entrusted, at an audience with the Tzar on September 22nd, with a special mission to acquaint the French Minister of War, Chanoine, with the military import of the proposed Conference. Kuropatkin started immediately after the audience and stayed in Paris until October 1st. He wrote a detailed memorandum describing his negotiations with the French Minister of War and a conversation with the President of the French Republic, Félix Faure, which he sent to the Tzar from the Riviera on October 31st. The contents of this memorandum, which has also been published in the *Krasny Archiv*, are of special interest.

Kuropatkin begins his memorandum by repeating the orders he received from the Tzar, in doing which he mentions that the proposals of a military nature to be laid before the conference were (1) the prohibition of the introduction of a new automatic rifle, (2) the limitation of the employment of explosives and (3) the laying down of the effective strength in the military budget for the future. The result of his impressions, based on the information he collected in

Paris, as Kuropatkin says in the memorandum, was as follows :

The Government statement of the 12th August has had a depressing effect on the French Army. I was told that "the officers of the French Army were going about with hanging heads." The unexpectedness of the statement and some obscure passages in the French translation have been interpreted in the French Army in a sense unfavourable to the statement. I was informed that in the French text the word "*desarmements*" had been used instead of "*les armements*." Disarmament after the great efforts made and expenditure incurred in 27 years, would deprive them of the hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine, for the proposal for a possible confirmation by the Conference of the hard conditions imposed on France by the Peace Treaty of Frankfurt was also closely connected with disarmament. The French are also unable to abandon the hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine, because this hope is a *bond uniting* the best men in France, independent of their belonging to different political parties.

Kuropatkin also reported that the French feared that Russia might endeavour at the Conference to obtain the abandonment of the introduction of the new field-gun, remarking that the French were very pleased with their new gun and recognised its great superiority to the German model. Kuropatkin then goes on to say that he had handed two memoranda to General Chanoine, the first being an explanation of the meaning of the Government statement of August 24th, and the second containing the proposals of a military character which might be laid before the Conference for discussion. These two memoranda, which would certainly throw a very interesting light on Russia's views with regard to the Conference, have unfortunately not been found in the archives of the former Russian Foreign Office, and have consequently not been published in the *Krasny Archiv*. We may surely express the hope that, in the corresponding volume of the first series of the French publication of official records, these documents will be made available for students of history.

In addition to his conversation with General Chanoine, Kuropatkin also had an opportunity of discussing the proposed Conference with the President of the French Republic, Félix Faure. The audience took place on September 29th, and Kuropatkin's report of it is as follows :

"In view of the absence of the Foreign Minister from St. Petersburg, I also sent copies to Count Lamsdorf.*

"After Count Muravieff had arrived in Paris, he was fully informed of the conversations I had had, and he asked Prince Urussoff to inform me by telegram that he approved of the negotiations completely and unreservedly. I received this telegram on October 20th (8th), and the enclosed reply from General Chanoine on October 25th (13th). (General Chanoine's reply was written by him personally in French, and translated into Russian by Adjutant-General Baron Fredericks.)

"In his reply, the passage is deserving of notice in which General Chanoine, without taking up the question of the new system of rifle at all, expresses the opinion that the suitable time for the limitation of armaments will have arrived when all the great powers are approximately equally armed with field- and siege-artillery. Even although General Chanoine recognises the great difficulties of studying the question as regards the limitation of the employment of high explosives, he hopes, relying on the beneficent example of the Brussels Conference, that it will be possible to arrive at some results in this matter.

"When the President of the French Republic had received Chanoine's report on the negotiations conducted with me, he expressed the wish to see me personally, and appointed September 29th as the date of my reception. In the course of my long conversation with the President, it appeared that he had been most disquieted by the following questions :

Is there any foundation for the continued discussions of disarmament in the entire Press ?

Is it proposed to raise at the Conference the question of the limitation of the technical success already attained in the French Army ?

Will the question of the new quick-firing gun adopted by France be touched upon at the Conference ?

Finally, Monsieur Faure asked me : "In how far can the Government statement of August 12th affect the existing Military Convention between Russia and France ?"

"In replying to the President's questions, I explained to him that the orders given to me by Your Imperial Majesty

* Kuropatkin's letters to Muravieff and Lamsdorf have not been found in the archives of the former Foreign Minister.

were to conduct provisional negotiations regarding the question of the limitation of armaments with the French Minister of War. As in the conversation with General Chanoine, I laid particular emphasis on the fact that Your Imperial Majesty had forbidden me to touch on the political side of this important question. I further explained to the President that Your Imperial Majesty had been surprised at the conversations which had occurred with regard to disarmament; I said that there could be no question of any kind of disarmament, and that the negotiations at the Conference would not affect in any way either the existing Military Convention, or the technical progress already made in the French Army or even the question of the introduction of a new quick-firing gun in France.

"On Monsieur Faure asking me why France had not been previously informed of the important step in preparation, a step which was also important from the military point of view, I ventured to make the following statement, as an expression of my personal opinion: Without desiring to modify the Military Convention in any way or to diminish the military progress achieved by France, our gracious sovereign recognises that the summoning of a Conference is a perfectly new question which is independent of our relations with France and will not disturb them in any way. In order that the weighty words spoken from the throne of the Tzars should be accepted by all governments and nations as a disinterested desire for the general good, it was necessary not to accord special treatment to any power but to make the proposal for the limitation of armaments really the same for all."

"If our Government had previously got into touch with the French Government with regard to this question, the proposal would doubtless have awakened the suspicions of the Powers of the Triple Alliance. If these Powers had been justified in assuming that the proposal emanated from the Dual Alliance, they would have sought for means of opposing the new agreement. This would have diminished the prospects of the success of the Conference. On the other hand, while a proposal which was equally surprising for all might even cause dissatisfaction, no power has the right to doubt the impartiality of the proposal."

"The reply of the President of the French Republic was, in general, in the following terms: He said that he was glad to

hear me make the statement recorded above. He said that in France they would be reassured when they learned that the confirmation of the provisions of the Treaty of Frankfurt did not form part of the work of the Conference, that the army was not to be deprived of the guns that had now been introduced, and that the question of the strength of the army was not to be touched upon. Monsieur Faure replied in detail to the proposals which I made to General Chanoine as follows: The new automatic rifle has not yet been tested, so that no time has been lost with regard to the retention of the present type of rifle in the armies, but at the same time the limitation of the employment of the explosives will be difficult—everything is being done in secret.

"France will take part in the Conference in any case, and the President hopes that her joint labours with Russia at the Conference will still further strengthen the bonds between us. Everyone was now aware, he said, that this *rapprochement* was not merely formal, but was based on a real inclination of the Russian and French nations for each other. 'We must therefore hope,' said the President in conclusion, 'that we shall stand shoulder to shoulder at the Conference and successfully cover the first stage on the way indicated by the noble-minded Russian Tzar.'

"In the course of the conversation the President also advised me to make the acquaintance of the heads of the French Army. He made special reference to the Chief of the General Staff, Renouard, and his work, and also spoke of the importance of common preparations with us in the eventuality of war. He expressed the opinion that the highest military authorities in Russia and France ought to consult each other more frequently. Finally he expressed a wish that I should make myself acquainted with some of their mobilisation work."

Kuropatkin was invited by the President to lunch at Rambouillet on September 30th, which gave him another opportunity of speaking to the President about the Conference. Kuropatkin reported this conversation in full. We reproduce below his own words, taken from the memorandum in question:

"Before lunch the President took me into an adjoining room and informed me that General Renouard had to tell me that they had modified the plan of advance in view

of the greater readiness of the army attained by them. As Monsieur Faure thought that we had also made progress in this respect of late, he was of opinion that it was necessary to re-examine the Military Convention concluded between Russia and France and to supplement it.

"I expressed the view that the basis of the Convention did not require any modification, as it was satisfactory to both parties. Monsieur Faure responded that the Convention contained certain figures and that the modifications would be confined to these details. I was able to declare myself satisfied with this view. In insisting in the course of our conversation on the necessity of a re-examination of the Military Convention, the President apparently wished to convince himself above all (after we had declared ourselves ready to revise this Convention) that the Government statement of August 12th has really altered nothing in the mutual obligations between France and us. In the general company Monsieur Faure also said to me with special energy that Russia and France must be very cautious in dealing with the Chinese questions.

"When the President of the French Republic took leave of me after lunch, he made the following remarks :

Please convey to your master and Emperor the conviction I have frequently expressed, that His Majesty's presence in France has had a profound and lasting effect. Convey to Their Imperial Majesties my hearty greetings and my deep and permanent gratitude for the reception accorded in Russia to me as the representative of France. I am firmly convinced that nothing can alter the feelings of the French people for Russia and its rulers. Convey to your master and Tzar my confidence in the durability of the present existing agreement. Repeat my earlier remarks to the Tzar. I regard the Tzar of Russia's undertaking with complete confidence. I am reassured with regard to the aims of the Conference, and I trust that a fortunate start has been made with the great humane work—the reduction of armaments. We in France have our own tasks, and it will, of course, not be the aim of the Conference to impede the fulfilment of these, our own tasks.

All the above remarks were at once recorded by me in writing."

So much for Kuropatkin's memorandum.

In no document hitherto published do we find it expressed with such frankness how very firmly France clung to the idea

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of the reconquest of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine that were lost in 1870-1, and how she did not propose to let anything interfere with the fulfilment of this purpose. The Tzar's fine intentions to realise the ideal of peace were therefore already frustrated before the Conference began. Instead of furthering the cause of peace and disarmament, the preliminary negotiations in Paris rather led to the strengthening of the Franco-Russian Military Convention and to an increase of the military preparations for the coming war.

ALFRED VON WEGENER.

Berlin.

KING ALEXANDER OF YUGOSLAVIA.

AMONG the outstanding personalities who are engaged in fashioning the New Europe, King Alexander holds a position apart as having actively contributed to the establishment of the State over whose destinies he now presides. Barely forty-five years of age to-day, he has spent the past twenty years laboriously and unremittingly in the task, first of liberating, then of reuniting, and finally of consolidating, the Southern Slav peoples into a single national entity. Unlike other great leaders who have appeared on the scene at the eleventh hour only, when countries were on the verge of chaos and disaster, Alexander has been a steady factor in the evolution of his people.

In 1912, as Crown Prince of Serbia, he gave battle to the Turkish troops at Kumanovo and won the decisive victory which terminated the age-long struggle of the Serbian people against Turkish oppression. Two years later he was called to act as Regent of his country, and within a few months he was discharging the double office of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Head of a State whose very existence was in peril. His personal valour, his devotion to the Army with which he made the epochal retreat across Albania, his military genius that enabled him to return in triumph to Belgrade at the close of the year 1918, won for Alexander universal recognition as a great and gallant soldier.

But it should not be forgotten that during the whole course of the war there were important and often difficult negotiations with the Allies, and Alexander had to exercise the abilities of statesman and diplomat. He was in London in April 1916, and it was here that he made his solemn declaration for Yugoslav liberation and unity. His plea with the Allies was successful and soon he was back again among his own men and the Southern Slav volunteers who had joined up on the Salonika front. As commander and comrade, Alexander inspired and encouraged them for the great offensive which finally brought him and the victorious army to Belgrade on December 1st, 1918.

Alexander was never King of Serbia and perhaps that explains why it was easy for him to assume straight away the rôle of Sovereign of the United Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes when he ascended the throne on the death of

the aged King Peter in 1921. The problems which confronted him in this new phase of his career were, if less formidable, in many ways more perplexing and more disparate than those of Serbia's struggle for bare existence. Differences of outlook, of mentality, of culture had all to be taken into consideration in the new Southern Slav democracy over which Alexander Karageorgevitch was called to preside. He worked laboriously as a constitutional monarch during a period of ten years to bring about unity and cohesion in an atmosphere where ideals of a common nationality and traditional aspirations had become vitiated by regional jealousies and even by petty, local divisions and rivalries. With ever-increasing misgiving he watched the bickerings within the Serbian parties, the dictatorial methods of certain political groups and the uncertain, confused exertions of the abstentionist Croat leader, Stepan Raditch. Through his own personal endeavour the King eventually succeeded in winning over the latter to participation in the *Skupshтина* and even to a seat in the Cabinet—for a time at least. Erratic in his own course, yet well-intentioned and eager to do the best for his people, Raditch had been the first to suggest personal government by the King in place of political dictatorship by the *Skupshтина* or Parliament, and in the course of the intimacy that grew up between Raditch and himself, Alexander learned much of the aims and legitimate desires of the Croat people, and together they discussed the programme of the Croat Peasant Party.

Meanwhile passions in the *Skupshтина* grew stronger, hatreds and invective more unbridled, until they culminated in the appalling crime enacted on the floor of the House by a fanatic and murderous Montenegrin. The unhappy Raditch, although not fatally wounded, succumbed some weeks later in Zagreb to an old malady aggravated by his injuries. King Alexander had frequently visited him as he lay stricken in the hospital at Belgrade, and it is noteworthy that up to the very last Raditch had maintained his belief that the King and the people (*Kralj i Narod*) should be the sole factors in the land.

A weaker and less courageous man than Alexander might have quailed before the situation that now arose. The hand of an assassin had brought to naught his most cherished dream of Serbo-Croat co-operation, and so embittered were the Croats that they refused ever to return to the blood-

stained *Skupshtina*. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes seemed on the brink of disruption. It is characteristic of Alexander that he made no sudden decision, even though he must at once have realised that he alone could save the situation, and that upon him rested the entire responsibility of rescuing the country from disaster. Communism was already beginning to show its head, and the rump Parliament sitting at Belgrade was helpless to provide a remedy.

As had often been his wont in grave moments, he withdrew to meditate in quiet at his little country house at Topola in the shadow of the church which he had erected to the glory of God and to the memory of his ancestors. It was during the period between the Catholic and the Orthodox Christmas festivities that he finally made up his mind to assume the task so inevitably forced upon him. He was to bear the entire burden of the State which he had been instrumental in establishing.

On January 6th, 1929, he issued his proclamation. It was a new form of appeal to the country whereby he sought the co-operation of his subjects directly with himself. Party wranglings, cabals, partisanship had hampered the political and national consolidation of the triune kingdom and a barrier had been erected between himself and the people. This should no longer be, and nothing should be allowed to stand between them and their sovereign, determined to use every means at his disposal to remedy the past and fulfil their needs and expectations. The *Skupshtina* was dismissed as no longer representative of the people, political parties were dissolved, the Constitution was abolished, and a Cabinet of experts was formed to deal with immediate problems under the direction of the King himself.

In his proclamation King Alexander gave no specified period of duration for the new form of government he was instituting, but he let it be understood that his undertaking was an emergency measure which must continue until the time was ripe for a change. With the same courage and determination with which he had led Serbia through the war he now stepped into the breach. The inherent power of Alexander's personality and the conviction, born of his own sincerity, that nobody could misconstrue his intentions enabled him to shoulder the responsibility of personal government in a land reputed to be the most democratic in the

world. In certain conditions democracy is reconcilable with dictatorship, and the King was prepared to bring about such conditions first of all by a complete reorganisation of the State. His substitution of the name *Yugoslavia* for the cumbersome appellation of "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," as the realm had been known since 1918, was a master-stroke, for it at once conveyed the notion, so poorly apprehended during the past years, of the perfect civic equality of Slovene, Croat and Serb without priority for any one of the groups.

Alexander's realisation of the psychological factor in national affairs, however, made him forestall any resultant tendency to suppress the intense individual consciousness of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In the course of an interview the King explained to me that the generic term Southern Slav (*Juzni Slaven*) to denote all citizens of the State should not obliterate the names or the specific national patriotism of Serbs, Croats or Slovenes. It merely connotes the community of their interests and their identity of purpose as expressed and fulfilled in the integral existence of Yugoslavia. The parallel is very much that of Great Britain, where English, Scottish and Welsh are all loyal British citizens while retaining their own individuality. "Indeed," added the King with a merry twinkle, "I know that a Scotsman will invariably inform you, lest there be any mistake about it, that he hails from Scotland. Could anyone suspect him on that account of being less devoted to the British cause?"

The next step in the process of unification was the adoption of a single State flag in place of the divergent tricolours which had hitherto been flown—and often aggressively—in various parts of the triune kingdom. A radical sacrifice had to be made and it was primarily made by the King himself. On September 6th, 1930, the Serbian colours under which Alexander and his army had fought and conquered—colours which were so familiar too in this country during the war—were reverently but permanently laid away and the new Yugoslav tricolour was hoisted. It would be idle to deny that there was much heart-burning on the subject, and, however deeply the Croats felt the removal of their flag, the wrench could hardly have been as acute for them as for the Serbs, who had clung so tenaciously to their standard during the long struggle begun one hundred and thirty years ago by Alexander's

grandfather. But the King's motive was understood, and the Yugoslav flag has been accepted as a symbol of that national unity which alone guarantees the future of the Southern Slavs.

Whether energetic leadership or frank dictatorship predominates in the King's scheme of government there is no doubt that the country has made considerable headway during the past five years. Prophecies of failure had not been wanting on the part of pessimists abroad, and extremist elements at home, when the King first assumed control; yet it is generally admitted to-day that the process of Yugoslav unification is steadily going forward. Legislative and administrative reforms which had been the theme of fruitless and embittered discussion in the old *Skupshtina* have at last been enacted and the codification of laws is almost completed. A sound financial policy has stabilised the dinar, and agriculture, forestry, mining and other industries have been reorganised, with the result that the universal economic depression is somewhat less acute in Yugoslavia than elsewhere. Abuses have, of course, not been entirely eliminated, but to-day there are better opportunities for redress.

In September 1931 the King granted a new Constitution providing for a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate, and thus established a wider basis for the collaboration of the people in home affairs; but he retained the right to conclude political treaties with foreign states without consultation with the legislative body. In this he showed admirable prescience; for in the task which he has now set himself, of establishing closer relations with other Balkan States—particularly Bulgaria—it is imperative that his policy of goodwill and conciliation should be unhampered by heated and perhaps prejudicial debate in Parliament.

The position which King Alexander has so rapidly attained among the world's constructive statesmen whose labours tend towards the consolidation of European peace may be explained by the genesis of his career, and the many vicissitudes and fateful events which crowded into his boyhood and early manhood. Alexander was born at Cetinje in 1888. He was the third child of Prince Peter Karageorgevitch and Princess Zorka, eldest daughter of the King of Montenegro. From his earliest infancy he was imbued with the spirit of Serbian and Slav patriotism and of national kinship with all the neighbouring peoples who spoke the same language.

There was a certain amount of Court etiquette to which even as a child he had to conform, but he was allowed to mix freely with the simple folk and visit them now and again in their dwellings. Their frugality and primitive mode of existence did not fail to leave a lasting impression on his mind, and many years later, as ruler of Yugoslavia, he instituted a special fund exclusively devoted to raising the standard of life among the peasantry in the most poverty-stricken districts.

He was sent to school in Switzerland and although he was also for a while at an Imperial college in Petrograd he owes the greater part of his solid all-round education to Geneva, on which he always looks back with gratitude and affection as his *alma mater*. Naturally of a studious bent, history was his great passion, but he also showed much aptitude for mathematics and natural science. When his father, Prince Peter, was called to the throne of Serbia in 1903, Alexander begged to be allowed to continue his studies. A long-cherished ambition of travel could now at last be fulfilled and he visited various lands in the company of a tutor. He spent some time in Italy, where he visited his aunt, Queen Elena.

But Alexander, the student-Prince and second son of a reigning king, was suddenly called to become Crown Prince and leader of armies, and from 1912 onwards he has been engaged in making, instead of reading, history, and in studying men and events, not from books but at first hand. Whilst possessing to a marked degree the traditional qualities of his race—patriotism, determination and courage—Alexander's stable wisdom, his imperturbability in the face of danger (many times has he looked death in the face during and since the war) and his imaginative foresight are unquestionably the fruit of his abundant experience. Some have described him as self-willed and domineering because his undertakings are often so challenging that they would seem doomed to failure. Yet there is no one more deeply conscious of the weight and complexity of his burden, and he never acts without ripe reflection nor without having listened to opinions both contrary and favourable to his projects. He is devoid of personal egotism and petty vanities; ambition he undoubtedly possesses, but it is an ambition so bound up with the prestige and well-being of his people that it serves no selfish individual purpose. Those who have attempted to reach him by flattery have been disappointed. He has no use for lip-service, and

prefers reasoned dissent from those he consults, than the ready acquiescence which betrays lack of sincerity or understanding.

It is almost impossible to bring before King Alexander any subject about which he does not already possess some information, whether it concerns an intricate point of ecclesiastical doctrine or the desires, say, of the tobacco growers in Herzegovina. Few can deceive his penetrating eye, and if at the outset of his royal career he may have been misled by politicians, there is far less likelihood of this to-day, because of his psychological insight, which is as amazing as it is sometimes disconcerting in its accuracy. His patience and tact are inexhaustible, for he desires to hear the truth, however unpalatable. With the perseverance and tenacity of a man dedicated to a cause he strives to remove obstacles, misapprehensions and abuses which still stand in the way of the moral, intellectual and political unity of the State. His simple unaffected manner and irresistible charm make him beloved by the people.

The Croat people, who had long been debarred from personal acquaintance with their sovereign, were completely won over when he paid his first lengthy visit to Zagreb in 1931. They were delighted at his simple democratic ways when they met him in the market-place or on the road. It was a new and attractive notion of royalty to be addressed on familiar topics by the King in their own language. Since then the King has paid frequent visits to Croatia, and whatever the attitude of some of the political die-hards, there is no doubt that the mass of the nation are loyal and attached to him.

The self-discipline which Alexander practised during the war has become second nature to him, and he continues to lead a frugal, regular life of hard work. Eight o'clock in the morning finds him in his study, and by ten o'clock, when he begins his audiences, he has already perused the most important reports and extracts from the home and foreign Press.

King Alexander has found great happiness in his married life, and the young Queen, who has, like himself, a lofty sense of duty, helps him effectively in his business of State-building by her practical interest in social and cultural institutions and her personal encouragement and supervision of the many child-welfare services which she has been instrumental in

establishing. Recently she inaugurated a new hostel and dinner-club for indigent school-children in Zagreb.

The simple home life of the Belgrade Court is an example to the people at a time when luxuries and love of pleasure threaten to invade even so temperate and patriarchal a country as Yugoslavia. The three boys are being brought up with care and method to understand their responsibilities and the duty of service. Ten-year-old Crown Prince Peter is fully alive already to his obligations as first schoolboy in the land, and chief of the *Sokol* organisation founded by the King to foster patriotic and civic ideals among the young generation. The royal household is superintended by the Queen, and her spare time is spent between the nursery and the schoolroom. Both are fond of gardening, and the King's early boyhood's taste for botany now finds scope in the cultivation of plants and flowers. He is also a farmer of no small repute among the peasants at Topola, where he competes with them in agricultural produce and where he has been made a member of the local vintners' federation.

The King is often seen driving alone; he does not care for pomp and pageantry, and prefers to go about without an escort. On a recent occasion, when rumours of infernal machines were current in Belgrade, he dispelled all anxiety by calling for his car and driving unaccompanied to the alleged danger spot.

It would be a mistake to suppose that King Alexander's attention and devotion to his army connote dreams of invasion or conquest. The Yugoslav Army has not the same rôle that naturally fell to the Serbian Army, which had to liberate and defend. Lovers of peace the world over must hope that the Yugoslav Army will never be compelled to defend its frontiers; but until the Disarmament Conference achieves something practical, Yugoslavia must maintain an efficient army. The term of military service has, however, been reduced to a minimum, and armaments have also been cut down. Moreover, the Yugoslav Army exercises a cultural influence which could be achieved in no other way. Shepherd lads from mountain districts, where compulsory education cannot easily be enforced, learn their three R's in the army, and it is in the army, too, that the process of national unification is being steadily accomplished.

King Alexander was amongst the earliest signatories of the

Briand-Kellogg Pact and is a staunch supporter of the League of Nations ; so, indeed, is the whole Yugoslav nation, which has seen too much of war at close quarters not to champion every international effort directed towards the maintenance of peace. Looking back on the past few years, nobody can withhold from Alexander the credit of having steered Yugoslavia through dangerous waters and weathered the storm of her early existence. By putting out a strong hand he was able to contain passions and rivalries and gather in dispersed forces for joint co-operation, and thus has he awakened her national consciousness of a unitary State.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald said the other day that the success of dictatorships lay in their having " managed somehow or other to make the soul of a nation alive." This is certainly true of Yugoslavia, where King Alexander has inspired his people " with a new vision and a new energy to pursue national affairs."

ANNIE O'B. CHRISTITCH.

OLYMPIA MORATA.

1526-55.

FOUR hundred years have passed away since in the city of Ferrara there was to be found one of those child prodigies who are born to excite the wonder of the world. Ferrara, though one of the smaller states of Italy, was at that time a home of art and learning. Lamartine says that the company that met every evening " in the splendid halls of the d'Este," might have been a colony from the Court of Augustus, and Vernon Lee, in her *Euphorion*, amplifies the statement in a glowing description :

Ferrara, in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, was a Court elegant, orderly, brilliant ; a Prince not risen from behind a counter like Medicis, nor out of blood like Sforzas, but of a noble old house whose beginnings are lost in a mist of chivalry. . . . In a garden where the butterflies crowd among the fruit-trees bowed down to the tall grass of the palace of Schifanoia, we can imagine Boiardo or Ariosto reading their poems to just such a goodly company as Cinthio the Ferrarese describes—gentle and spiritual ladies, with the splendid brocaded robes and the gold-filleted golden hair of Dosso Dossi's wonderful *Circe* ; graceful youths, jesters, captains, and a little crowd of pages with doublets and sleeves laced with gold tags, sedate magistrates in fur robes and scarlet caps, white-clad maids with instruments of music and embroidery frames. . . . The ladies listen, with their crimped golden locks, and the youths with their soft beardless faces framed in combed-out hair, with their daggers on their hips and their plumed hats between their fingers ; and the serious bearded men in silken robes, drawing nearer and nearer to the poet, letting go lute or music book as they listen on the villa terrace, or in some darkened room, where the sunset sky turns grey-blue behind the pillared windows and the roses hang over the trellis of the cloister.

It was into this brilliant world that Olympia Morata was born in the year 1526. Her father, a native of Mantua, was a great scholar who, some years before her birth, had been made Professor of Latin in the University of Ferrara and appointed to the post of private tutor to the younger brothers of Duke Ercole. The child was a favourite with the other learned men of the city and in 1533, when she was seven years old, Calcagnini, one of the most renowned of the band, when writing to her father asked him to kiss for him " the little Muse," whose prattle was already so charming. Calcagnini was a

highly esteemed friend, but it was Celio Secundo Curio whom Fulvio Morato owned as his guide and master, and whose influence over the wonder-child was to have far-reaching effects.

A native of Piedmont, Curio had been educated at the Turin University and had gained many honours, but his interest in the Reformed doctrines that were beginning to excite the fears of the ecclesiastical authorities brought him under suspicion, and he was arrested and thrown into prison. The story of his escape is a sensational one: by way of confining him his feet were thrust into stocks, and when they became swollen he begged the gaoler to let him have his right leg out for a time; the man complied and, stooping sideways, Curio collected rags and straw from the littered floor of the cell, and made them up into a roll, the end of which he stuffed into his shoe. This roll he tied to his knee and when the gaoler returned he asked if he might have his left leg out, at the same time holding out the artificial leg to be put back in the stocks. The cell was dark and the man unsuspecting, and having padlocked the artificial leg he let out the left one, thus freeing his prisoner completely. It had not been thought necessary to lock the door on a stock-fast prisoner and, watching his opportunity, Curio slipped out, having first broken up the artificial leg, so that his escape appeared miraculous. Search was made for him, but he had good friends who sheltered him, and it was not until the Pope threatened to excommunicate the whole city if he was not given up that he fled from Turin and took refuge first in Venice and then in Ferrara.

It was in 1528 that Duke Ercole married the learned Princess Renée of France, henceforth to be known as Renata. A convinced disciple of Calvin, she was more than ready to befriend Curio and other men of his school of thought; the Pope was suspicious of her from the first, but what with the recent sack of Rome and the difficult negotiations with the Emperor Charles V, he had too much on his hands to take heed at the moment of affairs in Ferrara, and it was not until 1533 that the Duke was so alarmed by reports of his displeasure that he banished several of his wife's friends and followers.

Among the number was Olympia's father, and he, like Curio, found a refuge in Venice; but his troubles did not

prevent him from continuing her education, and by the time that he was allowed to return the tale of her acquirements was a truly marvellous one. Greek and Latin were as familiar to her as her native tongue, but she was also well versed in Philosophy and Mathematics, and had made a special study of Rhetoric. Her nature was too sweet a one to arouse envy and jealousy, but there were not wanting those who refused to believe in the existence of one so young and so highly gifted. In a letter to a friend who had written to make enquiry, Curio says:

You write to me that you desire to be informed of our Olympia, because many deem the name and character fictitious. Her father was Fulvio Morato, a native of Mantua, a man famous for learning and probity, with whom I was very intimate. I have heard her at Court declaim in Latin, improvise in Greek, explain the Paradoxes of the greatest of orators and answer all the questions put to her. It might have been thought that she was one of the learned ladies of Greece or Rome to whom she might justly be compared. Do not fall in doubt respecting the Sapphic Ode written in Greek in which she celebrates the praises of the Most High; it is indeed the work of a real Olympia whom we have known from her infancy, and whose other productions we possess; nor does it at all astonish us, for she is skilled in Greek and Roman literature beyond what anyone can credit. She is also renowned for her knowledge of Religion.

If Olympia had been less renowned in the last respect, her fate would not have been so tragic a one. The Grand Duchess Renata was anxious to find a companion and fellow-student for her daughter, and attracted by Curio's description of her learning and her piety she had her brought to Court, where she remained for some years, thus becoming closely associated with one whose attachment to the Reformed doctrines was well known.

That Renata was unhappy in her new life was hardly to be wondered at; her mental powers won her the respect of the learned men of Ferrara, but her plainness of face and slight deformity of figure were displeasing to the beauty-loving Italians, while her reluctance to learn their language and her determination to have none but French attendants caused great dissatisfaction. Bernado Tasso, the father of the poet, had been one of the Embassy sent to Paris by the Duke to bring back his bride, and for a time he was employed as her

secretary, but he seems to have been the only Italian in her service, and in 1535 he left Ferrara. Her persistence in harbouring French and German Reformers was a constant source of annoyance to the Duke, and the rift between husband and wife widened steadily.

When Olympia first took up her new duties, however, the storm was only muttering in the distance, and she entered with zest into the pleasures and occupations of the Court. Anna d'Este was born in 1531, and was thus five years younger than her companion, but though she was less advanced in her studies she was well on the way to become equally learned, her instruction having been begun in Latin, Greek, Philosophy and Mathematics. A true friendship seems to have existed between the two girls; Anna was not only a keen student, but she had great beauty of face and sweetness of disposition, and Olympia became more and more attached to her as the years went on.

But this peaceful time was not to last. Curio was believed by the Pope to be one of those most active in the dissemination of heretical opinions and he, therefore, sent for him to Rome to answer charges concerning his conduct. Determined to save one for whom she had so great a regard, Renata sent him to Zurich; but though he reached his destination he had no sooner secured a shelter for his wife and family than he was rash enough to return to Italy to fetch them, with the result that he was arrested near Lucca by the Captain of the Papal Guard. Once again he made a sensational escape; he was seated at his meal in the inn when the captain entered the room, and he sprang up with the carving-knife in his hand, so alarming his captor that he fell back before him. Seizing his chance, Curio fled through the open door into the yard, leaped upon his horse and rode away, leaving the captain stupefied with surprise.

Renata's action was bound to incense the Pope still further against her, but he did not as yet attack her openly, and when in 1545 he issued an Edict ordering all persons suspected of heresy to be arrested and put to the torture, the fact that Olympia and her father were objects of her special favour gave them immunity. Olympia may well have thought that her friendship with the Princess Anna would be her perpetual security, but after her father's death in 1548 her fortunes changed; the Duke already had it in mind to banish his wife,

and though he did not carry out his purpose until 1554, he stripped her one by one of her fellow-believers. That she did not dare to intervene in Olympia's behalf is shown by a letter that Olympia wrote to Curio; in which she says:

I remained alone, betrayed, abandoned by those who ought to have sustained me and exposed to the most unjust treatment; not one of those whom we had called our friends dared testify any interest, and my sisters, involved with me in disgrace, were plunged into an abyss of ruin.

Desperate as was her plight, she would not let herself sink in despair; her mother was in bad health, and she managed the house, nursed the invalid, and found time to educate her younger brothers and sisters. But though poverty and hard work could not daunt her, she knew that she was watched by spies, and that her presence in the home was a source of danger to her family. It was at this moment that a young and gallant knight came to her rescue. Andreas Gründler was a German student who had come from his home in Franconia to improve himself in the classics and in medicine, which latter was to be his profession. Professor Sinapius, a friend of the Morata family, was his tutor, and through him he became acquainted with Olympia and fell deeply in love with her. To marry her and take her away to safety was his one desire, and though the wrench of leaving those she loved was terrible to her, she believed that the answering love she felt for him had been sent to make a way of escape. The marriage followed, and though he was obliged to leave her for a time that he might secure a shelter for her, he returned in safety and they set out together on their long journey.

From one member of her family she had not been able to part: her youngest brother, Emilio, was as dear to her as if he had been her own son, and on her promising to watch over him with the utmost care, her mother was induced to let him go. "A tranquil heaven after the floods of the great tempests," was her description of Germany in one of her first letters after her arrival, and for a time all went well with them. She writes:

We had been kindly received by Hermann, the Chancellor to the King of the Romans, with whom we have spent some time, and my husband has cured him of an illness. I am very happy, my husband is much esteemed and our affairs are prosperous.

Gründler's successful treatment of the Chancellor was followed by the flattering offer of the post of chief physician to the King of the Romans ; this he refused, knowing that he should not be allowed to make open profession of the Reformed Faith, and less advantageous openings were accepted, first in Heidelberg and then in his native town of Schweinfurt. Olympia's surroundings must have seemed rough and uncouth to her after her long residence in the luxurious Court of Ferrara, but she made no complaints, for in spite of her weight of learning she was a true woman at heart and the love of her husband was the joy of her life. A visit to Augsburg, in which she accompanied him, led to her acquaintance with the celebrated Fugger family, who had not only enriched the city with schools and hospitals, but had purchased a neglected district and laid it out as a Garden Suburb. With such enlightened people she had much in common, and her letters to her mother continue to tell of the happiness that reigned in her home and of the marvellous progress made by the nine-year-old Emilio, who reads with her Homer, Virgil, Cicero and Horace. Peaceful as her own life might be, she did not for a moment forget those who were less fortunately placed, and though Anna d'Este had made a brilliant marriage and was far removed from her old companion, she ventured to write and ask her to use her influence at the French Court on behalf of the persecuted Reformers in France :

Olympia Fulvia Morata wishes health in Christ Jesus to Anna d'Este, Duchess of Guise.

Most Illustrious Princess Anna,

Although we are now so widely separated from each other, believe me, I have never forgotten you. Hitherto diffidence has prevented my writing to you, but an opportunity having presented itself by the visit of a learned and pious man of Lorraine, I first eagerly embraced it to inquire of him what you were doing, and when he promised to see a letter from me conveyed to you, I felt persuaded that you—who were educated along with me from your infancy—would not be so hard-hearted as to refuse to read it. For you know how familiarly, although you were my Princess and mistress, we spent so many years together and how those studies which ought to increase mutual goodwill, were in common between us.

OLYMPIA MORATA.

Their mutual love of God's Word and desire to do His will is, she says, another bond between them, and it is on this that she bases her plea :

Wherefore, excellent Princess, since God has so favoured you as to make you see the Truth, and since you know well that all those persons who are now consigned to the stake are innocent and submit to such tortures for the sake of the Gospel of Christ, duty enjoins you to manifest your sentiments, either by using your influence with the King in their favour, or if that shall fail, in praying for them. For if without remonstrance or open displeasure you permit them to be martyred or slain, you will appear by your silence not only to connive at, but conspire in their murder and to be in league with the enemies of Christ.

Olympia, perhaps, scarcely realised the position of the young Duchess : that she could do anything to mitigate the sufferings of the Reformers was probably out of her power, but at least it is recorded of her that she was the only lady of the Court who wept over the Massacre of St. Bartholomew.

Olympia's own position was not so secure as she thought it, but for the moment she was at peace and her beloved classics once more absorbed her. Curio was now safely settled at Basle, and the letters which passed between them show that he had lost nothing of his admiration for her talents ; the Greek Odes that she sent for his inspection seemed to him worthy of all praise, and he continually urged her to fresh achievement. Deeply religious as were both these great scholars they were never assailed by doubts of the propriety of secular studies, such as have troubled some devout souls ; Curio incited her to work by holding up the learned women of Greece as examples, and Olympia declared her belief on more than one occasion that her talents had been given to her by God and that the fact that nothing had been able to turn her from them was a proof that He meant her to use them.

But the time was at hand when she was to discover that her fancied security had no foundation in fact : in 1552 the Emperor Charles V quartered a troop of Spanish soldiers in the town ; Gründler was appointed to the post of garrison doctor, and this event was followed by an incursion from the Margrave of Brandenburg, who, vain and ambitious, was hated by his neighbours. The town of Schweinfurt seemed to him to be a suitable place for entrenchment against the threatened attack of his enemies, and for fourteen months the unfortunate

citizens endured the miseries of famine and plague in addition to bombardments by night and by day. Olympia and her little brother were housed in a cellar for safety, and rarely saw the light of day, while Gründler performed miracles in the way of succouring the sick and wounded. In the summer of 1554 the Margrave contrived to make his escape, with the result that the siege was raised, but the helpless people were in no better case for, all innocent as they were, the victors wreaked their vengeance on them.

Olympia and her husband and brother went to take sanctuary in a church, but were warned that it was going to be set on fire, and having succeeded in passing through one of the gates of the city, they sought refuge in flight. In a graphic letter to her sister she describes her experiences :

In my flight I lost my shoes and stockings, and had to run barefoot over rough stones and rocks, so that in truth I know not how I endured. Again and again I said—"Here I must fall and lie, for I can bear no more." Then I cried to God, "Lord, if Thou wilt that I live command the Angels that they carry me, for carry myself I cannot."

It was in Heidelberg that they found a refuge, and though her journey had left her "torn, bleeding, dishevelled, looking like the Queen of the Beggars," as she wrote to Curio, her spirit was undaunted. The kindness with which they were received did much to help her; the Professorship of Medicine was bestowed upon Gründler, and the learned Doctors of the University welcomed her as one of themselves. Their possessions had been swept away in the siege and her friends did their best to restock her library, knowing that it was the loss of her books that grieved her most. The printers of Basle made a contribution of classical volumes, and her faithful Curio sent her a Homer, urging her to take up her studies again "and produce something worthy of Sophocles, thus obtaining the laurel which has long been your due."

This command she so far obeyed as to turn back to her books with renewed appetite, but her sufferings had undermined her strength, and in her last letter, written a few weeks before her death, she tells him that she has high fever and continual cough and cannot sleep at night; had she been able, she says, she would have shown her gratitude to the kind friends who had supplied her with books, but her days of

work are over and all she has been strong enough to do is to write out from memory the poems that had perished with her other papers in the siege. These she entrusts to his care, asking him to edit her works after her death. The letter reached him on the same day as the news of her death, which took place in October 1555. It was her broken-hearted husband who sent him the account of her last days :

It hath pleased the Lord to fill up the measure of my former afflictions—the ruin of my country, the plunder of my goods and the loss of nearly all my friends and relations—by depriving me of my beloved wife. While she was yet left to me the loss of all other things appeared comparatively light; but this calamity, like the huge tenth wave following all the others, has so entirely overwhelmed me that I can find no possible alleviation of my grief. . . . We had been united not quite five years, but never have I known a soul so bright and pure, or a disposition so loving and upright. There is a kind of sorrow, like mine—and it is the greatest of any—in which tears cannot even be shed, when the mind, wearied and spent by an accumulation of disaster, is so struck down by some final blow as to be absolutely stupefied. A short time before her death, on awaking from a tranquil sleep into which she had fallen, I observed her smiling very sweetly; I went near and asked her whence that heavenly smile proceeded. "I beheld," said she, "just now while lying quiet, a place filled with the clearest and brightest light." Weakness prevented her from saying more. "Come," said I, "be of good cheer, my dearest wife, you are about to dwell in that beautiful light." She again smiled, and in a little while said: "I am all gladness," nor did she again speak, till her eyes, becoming dim, she said: "I can scarcely see you; but all places appear to me to be full of the fairest flowers," and not long after, as if fallen into a sweet slumber, she expired.

Their married life had been a short one, but the time of their separation was to be shorter still, for not a year had passed before her husband and brother followed her to the grave, victims to an outbreak of plague, and were laid beside her in the Church of St. Peter in Heidelberg.

"Sweet child, thou hast been taken away by Death, young in years, but in wisdom like the old," runs Emilio's epitaph, while the tender love and the noble qualities of the quickly reunited husband and wife are given a glowing tribute. Nor was it only in Heidelberg that they were commemorated: their house in Schweinfurt was rebuilt at the public expense and the inscription placed upon it—"A poor and humble

house, but not without glory, for here lived Olympia Morata."

The publication of her works was undertaken as a pious charge by Curio, and in 1558 the book was brought out, with a dedication from his pen to Donna Isabella Brisegna, wife of the Spanish Governor of Piacenza, who had been so cruelly persecuted for her religious opinions that she was forced to fly and seek shelter in Switzerland. A copy of this exceedingly rare edition is preserved in the Bodleian Library, but others were quickly called for, one of the later editions being dedicated to Queen Elizabeth. The book was greeted with a chorus of praise from every side, and among the many touching and eloquent tributes to the memory of the writer none is more beautiful than that contained in a letter written by Curio to her mother :

Olympia is not dead; she lives with Christ, blessed and immortal, and after many griefs and trials she is received into sweet and wished-for rest. I say, Olympia lives! she lives even in this world, and will live while there are men on the globe in the immortal memory of her works, those divine monuments, remembered by all discerning minds. For that which is confined to the body is not the only life, there is a brighter existence which shall flourish through all ages, which posterity shall augment and which Eternity itself shall not diminish.

MARY BRADFORD WHITING.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ARMAMENTS AND THE DIPLOMATISTS.

AT 5 p.m. on New Year's Day M. François-Poncet, French Ambassador in Berlin, called upon Herr Hitler at the Chancellor's office in the Wilhelmstrasse and gave to him the text of a new French *aide-mémoire* on the subject of armaments. For three days before the actual document was delivered M. François-Poncet had been "coaching" Herr Hitler about the purpose with which the Quai d'Orsay had drafted it. It happened that Herr Hitler and M. François-Poncet were at that time on good terms with each other personally. It also happened (of this the evidence seems to be convincing) that Herr Hitler at that time genuinely contemplated the possibility that he might now become the man who had solved the Franco-German problem. Thirdly, it happened that the French document was worded in such a way as to leave little doubt in the mind of any well-disposed person who read it that the French Government was now anxious in a rather chastened spirit to enable Herr Hitler to come to an understanding with France.

When these lines were written the text of the French memorandum had not been published, but one had had an opportunity of reading it. It was one of the least unsatisfactory diplomatic documents of the post-war period. One remembered the whole series of former state papers issued from the Quai d'Orsay during recent years on the subject of "disarmament," whether during the London Naval Conference of 1930 or during the League of Nations' Disarmament Conference that has had its quarters at Geneva since February 2nd, 1932. In spirit (and the spirit is generally more important than the substance) this document of January 1st, 1934, was something new. The substance itself had several important new things in it. The former underlying principle that a German threat to the peace in Europe could be kept under by the simple expedient of Germany's being kept under, was gone. Instead, France genuinely admitted Germany's equality. In words she had admitted her to equality on December 11th, 1932; but on that occasion the formula was perhaps not unreservedly to be valued at its face value, even though Germany accepted it. The 1932 formula contained an under-

taking on the part of Great Britain, France and Italy "that one of the principles that should guide the Conference should be the grant to Germany, and to other Powers disarmed by treaty, of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations, and that this principle should find itself embodied in the Convention containing the conclusions of the Conference. This decision implies that the respective limitations of the armaments of all States should be included in the proposed Convention. It is clearly understood that the methods of application of such equality of rights will be discussed by the Conference. On the basis of this declaration Germany has signified her willingness to resume her place at the Conference."

The history of 1933, however, clearly showed that French diplomacy still hoped to achieve an agreement about disarmament without in practice admitting Germany as an equal. It is not easy for any neighbour of Germany in a military sense to contemplate the prospect of their both starting from "scratch," for the German character seems to lend itself more than that of her neighbouring countries to militarist exploitation and seems to contain a higher proportion of warlike qualities. The last diplomatic position established in 1933, namely the position of October 14th, revealed France as still insisting that the progress towards equality be achieved over a period of eight years, the first four of which were postulated as virtually a "trial" period for Germany. In other words the Quai d'Orsay offered to Germany the prospect, conditionally on her good behaviour and on her respect for the Versailles stipulations over an initial period of four years, of being gradually admitted during the following four years to a position of ultimate equality. The Quai d'Orsay knew, as the corresponding people in London and Rome knew, that Germany would not even look at such a prospect. The Quai d'Orsay's attitude in short was almost frankly one of resignation to the unlikelihood of an agreement being reached with Germany.

On January 1st of this year by contrast France made such an approach to Germany that Germany could hardly refuse to discuss it without convicting herself of ill-will. France no longer insisted upon the eight years of transition, which had been Germany's main lever of opposition. She made no specification about the length of time the transition should

take. She expressly offered Germany "equality." She proposed that the armaments of each country should be subjected to equal, general and automatic control and supervision. She thereby took Herr Hitler at his own word, for in his proposals of November 24th, while rejecting the October basis of a unilateral trial period for Germany, he declared that Germany would be ready to submit to a system of control and supervision if it were general and equal in its application.

France further declared that she was ready to put into practice, if every other party were ready to put into practice, the resolution adopted by the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference on July 20th, 1932, for the prohibition of all bombing from the air. That prohibition would apply to the bombing not only of cities and of civilian populations but of military forces or property. The relevant passage of the resolution of July 20th, 1932, reads thus: "The Conference, deeply impressed with danger overhanging civilisation from bombardment from the air in the event of future conflict, and determined to take all practicable measures to provide against this danger, records at this stage of its work the following conclusions:

"1. Air attack against the civilian population shall be absolutely prohibited;

"2. The High Contracting Parties shall agree as between themselves that all bombardment from the air shall be abolished, subject to agreement with regard to measures to be adopted for the purpose of rendering effective the observance of this rule.

"These measures should include the following:

- "(a) There shall be effected a limitation by number and a restriction by characteristics of military aircraft;
- (b) Civil aircraft shall be submitted to regulation and full publicity. Further, civil aircraft not conforming to the specified limitations shall be subjected to an international régime (except for certain regions where such a régime is not suitable) such as to prevent effectively the misuse of such civil aircraft."

In her aide-mémoire of January 1st, 1934, France subjected her proposals about air armaments to the condition that there should be set up an international air police force. The main proposals themselves were that ultimately all fighting air-

craft should be abolished, and that as an earnest of that ultimate intention there should be an immediate all-round reduction by fifty per cent of military aircraft now in commission. It was collaterally but verbally explained to the British diplomatists that the figure of fifty per cent. could hardly be expected to apply to the British air forces, which had already been reduced by a far greater extent than had those of any other Great Power; but there was nothing in the *aide-mémoire* itself to suggest such an exception.

For the rest the French memorandum made tentative suggestions about land armaments, such as that in a computation of effectives the irregular German trained organisations should be included, and expressed the regret that would be felt by France if Germany carried into effect her notice to leave the League of Nations.

DISARMAMENT IN THE AIR.

As if by tacit understanding, the diplomatic politicians of London, Paris, Berlin and Rome seem now to be guided by the principle that disarmament in the air is the cardinal problem upon which must hinge not only the outcome of the present disarmament diplomacy itself but the probable future determination of peace or war. The origin of that principle is the recognition that the next war, if any, is likely to be fought for the most part in the air, and that navies and armies will be important only in so far as they serve the purposes of aircrafts. That consideration explains why those politicians who have taken the most businesslike view of the disarmament conference have insisted upon air armaments as the first objective, the more so because, being the newest branch of armaments, and perhaps the most terrifying to civilians, it offered the best chance of success. It was as lately ago as 1909, that M. Blériot first flew the Channel. When the last war started aircraft was still in an experimental stage. The first British war aeroplanes that crossed the Channel in August 1914, could carry neither guns nor bombs nor even cameras; a supply of petrol being the limit of their carrying capacity. It needs little appeal to the imagination to show that when the next war starts the position will have been revolutionised, and that aircraft will by far be the most destructive arm.

That consideration no doubt explains why both French and British policy at the Disarmament Conference has been based upon extremist proposals for disarmament in the air. Three days after the conference started M. Tardieu, in presenting the first set of French proposals (February 5th, 1932), suggested that it should not be permissible for individual States to possess or to construct any aeroplanes except they be too small to be of military value; that the League of Nations should be the sole possessor of heavy bombers; that medium-sized aeroplanes should be allowed to individual States only on the understanding that the League of Nations could commandeer them at any time; and that all civil aviation be internationalised under the control of the League of Nations. It has been the consistent principle of French policy to advocate the abolition of all national air armaments and at the same time to found an international air force for police purposes under the direction of the League of Nations.

It is true that at the beginning of the Disarmament Conference the British Government had not quite reached the point where air armaments were regarded as the decisive objective. It was the initial British principle, as Sir John Simon explained at Geneva on February 8th, 1932, to try and whittle down all armaments bit by bit, beginning with those armaments which could conceivably be catalogued as of the more "aggressive" or "offensive" type such as submarines, poison and gas. But before the end of the year the British Government left no doubt that it regarded disarmament in the air as the first and most important goal, although it took a cautious line about the French proposal for international control. It was Mr. Baldwin who made the first disclosure of the extremist nature of the British Government's view in this matter. The occasion was a Foreign Affairs debate in the House of Commons, on November 10th, 1932. Mr. Baldwin frankly started from the premise that the next war would be fought in the air, and not on land or on the sea, and that the casualties would be inflicted not primarily upon the troops, but upon the civil population, including women and children. "The speed of air attack," he said, "compared with the attack of an army, is as the speed of a motor-car to that of a four-in-hand, and in the next war you will find that any town that is within reach of an aerodrome can be bombed within the first five minutes of war from the air." He next argued, on the

basis of some interesting detailed calculations about air spaces and the three dimensions, that defence against air attack was virtually impossible, and that victory in the war would go to the side that first broke the other's *moral* by killing more of its women and children more quickly than the other. He said that he had "been reduced to despair" by the time wasted at Geneva on discussions about reducing the size of aeroplanes, prohibiting the bombing of the civilian populations, and even prohibiting bombing on the war fronts.

His point was that nothing short of the total suppression of air armaments could be of any avail. "If it were possible," (he said) "the air forces ought all to be abolished, but if they were, there would still be civil aviation, and in civil aviation there are the potential bombers. It is all very well using the phrase 'international control,' but nobody knows quite what it means, and the subject has never been investigated." He went on to suggest that "it is necessary for the nations of the world to devote the whole of their minds to this question of civil aviation, to see if it is possible so to control civil aviation that such disarmament will be feasible."

None the less the British Government had supported the League of Nations resolution of July 20th, 1932, to the effect that all bombing, whether upon civilians or upon military objectives, be prohibited, in spite of the despair to which Mr. Baldwin said he had been reduced. No doubt the consideration expressed by Mr. Baldwin on November 10th about civil aircraft was to some extent satisfied by that part of the July resolution which recommended that civil aircraft be regulated and subjected to full publicity.

While it seemed to be established as a result of two years' diplomacy about disarmament that the air offered the best chance of progress, opinions differed both about the practicability and about the true expediency of such progress.

The difficulty about practicability was illustrated in the first fortnight of the present year. After receiving M. François-Poncet on New Year's Day Herr Hitler left Berlin for the country and did not return till the following Wednesday week (January 10th). During his absence there appeared in the German Press a remarkably uniform series of criticisms of the French proposals, so uniform as to suggest a common inspiration. There was reason to believe that it was not Herr Hitler's inspiration, whence it follows that some of Herr

Hitler's difficulties were domestic. The most interesting of the criticisms were directed against the French proposal for an immediate fifty per cent. "cut" in military aeroplanes. The German newspapers openly expressed the suspicion that the proposal was disingenuous, that the literal terms of the French memorandum could be satisfied by France's withdrawal of fifty per cent. of her aeroplanes from commission, and that such withdrawn aeroplanes could be merely re-labelled and kept in their sheds, ready at a moment's notice to be put back into commission. Now the word used in the French text was "reduction." That word has been a commonplace, both French and British, in all the Geneva formulæ about the reduction of armaments. When France suggested that aeroplanes in commission be "reduced" by fifty per cent., she could not have meant, unless the word was deliberately meant to mislead, anything but the halving of the fighting strength. The German newspapers said that if the French word had been "destruction" instead of "reduction" it would have made a more businesslike appeal to German opinion.

By the time this paper was written (January 15th) the official German answer to the French proposals had not been delivered, and it was therefore possible that the German Government itself would not officially express the suspicions which had obviously been officially inspired. But the fact that such suspicions were expressed in the German newspapers illustrated one of the difficulties. A French diplomatist who had read those German newspapers, made this comment in conversation: "If my Government told me that my salary was to be 'reduced' by fifty per cent., I should not regard the intimation as equivocal, even though it was the French Government that said it; and it would not matter to me if that Government had used the word 'destroyed' instead. Similarly I imagine that there would be no difficulty, if the Germans wished it, in substituting the word 'destruction' for 'reduction' in the memorandum about disarmament. Moreover, if the Germans wanted a sort of Reichstag bonfire of the aeroplanes to be scrapped, I imagine that the French Government would not object, provided all the other parties were willing to start corresponding bonfires in their own case." Indeed French opinion made no secret of the circumstance that, even from a military point of view, little was to be

gained from the possession of large numbers of aeroplanes of an obsolete type—all types being obsolete almost as soon as they are produced. Such an argument is perhaps a little naïve, for it suggests the principle that the important thing to possess from a military point of view is not a large fleet of aircraft, but a large and up-to-date plant for the production of aeroplanes. Given the plant, the aeroplanes can be turned out quickly in large numbers. It is one of the qualities of French diplomacy that having embarked upon a certain direction, it is prepared realistically to discuss, and even itself to suggest, the arguments against its own proposals. None the less a spectacular reduction of fifty per cent. in the world's air forces would have a tremendous psychological value.

On the expediency of the proposals for using the air, so to speak, as the jumping-off ground for general disarmament, there were to be found, even among the professional diplomats, those who wondered if such proposals were tactically wise. One heard the view expressed, and there was clearly something to be said for it, that the best safeguard against the next war would be the certainty that the moment war were declared the civil population, women and children included, of London, Paris and Berlin, would be bombed to bits, and flooded with poison gas. From the point of view of the women and the children it argues perhaps a lack of imagination to assume that the killing of a husband and a father in a Continental European ditch would be any better than the direct physical outrage of being bombed themselves; but the real argument is that the civilian population includes the whole body of politicians and the non-belligerent arm-chairs such as War Offices, Admiralties and Foreign Offices. It would obviously lessen the danger of war, and shorten an actual war, if such institutions were the first to be bombed. The several proposals, therefore, for protecting the civilian population from bombing and poison are at least controversial as practical remedies. The argument is the old one that the best way to stop wars would be to make them as undisguisedly frightful as possible to the maximum number of people; to abolish, for instance, not poison gas, but the Red Cross organisation; not to talk any more rubbish about "the rules of civilised warfare"; in short, not to whitewash the business but to present it plain, on the theory that as fear produces war, so a greater fear may prevent it.

JAPAN AND DISARMAMENT.

An unfortunate aspect of the diplomacy that followed the suspension of the Disarmament Conference on October 14th was that its scope was confined to four Powers, namely France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain. The most that could be aimed at, therefore, was some measure of tentative localised agreement such as might be used as an inducement to the other Powers to resume the real work. In such a cause the real work must necessarily be universal in its scope. The key position among those other Powers was held by Japan. If Japan could not be induced to reduce and limit her armaments, it followed that Russia would not. If Russia would not, it followed that Poland would not. If Poland would not, Germany would not. Yet during the three months that followed October 14th there was absolutely no contact between Japanese diplomacy and that of the four Powers aforesaid. When, for instance, the League of Nations Council began its seventy-eighth session on January 15th, 1934, no Japanese representative went to Geneva. Japan had given notice of her decision to leave the League of Nations, and she no longer took any part or any real interest in the work of the League.

Indeed the occasion of that session of the League illustrated another contemporary truth, that the work of disarmament can no longer be prosecuted within the framework of the League of Nations. The only Great Powers represented on that occasion were France, Great Britain and Italy, the third of whom had moreover made it generally known that her own continued participation in the work of the League, in its present reduced circumstances, could not be counted upon. Germany, Russia, Japan and the United States were not represented in the regular work of the League. Few informed people believed that Germany or Japan would withdraw their notices of secession from Geneva, or that the United States or Russia would seek admission to the League. In spite of Russia's latter-day harmony with France and her inclination to run counter to Germany's policy, the French diplomatists were unable, at any rate up to January 15th, 1934, to crystallise such an atmosphere into a Russian willingness to join the League. The statements made by Mr. Litvinov at the end of his recent visits to Washington and to Rome to the

effect that Russia would not join the League, were found still to hold good in Russian policy.

Japan, for her part, had not moved from the terms of the Imperial Rescript of March 27th, 1933, which gave notice of Japan's decision to leave the League on the main ground that "Japan has been led to realise the existence of an irreconcilable divergence of views dividing Japan and the League on policies of peace, and especially as regards the fundamental principles to be followed in the establishment of a durable peace in the Far East." Indeed, the break with Geneva seemed to be irreparable. On October 21st, 1933, for instance, a special Cabinet meeting was held in Tokyo to receive a report of the Cabinet Committee on national policy, after which a public statement was issued. "National policy (it read) shall be pursued by diplomatic means having regard to world peace. The national defences shall be sufficient to make the nation secure against injury and insult and in accordance with the national strength."

The only occasion during the past nine months when Japanese opinion has shown the slightest interest in the League of Nations arose in the first week of December, when the Italian Fascist Grand Council passed its famous resolution of December 5th, demanding the radical reform of the League as a condition of Italy's continued membership. On that occasion Japanese officials unofficially commented that the Japanese view of League reform remained what it had been expressed to be in the March 27th Rescript, namely, that the single central League of Nations be abolished and replaced by a series of regional Leagues operating in the several regions of the world and varying in their principles according to the varying needs and conditions of those regions.

It says something for the resilience of French diplomacy that the Quai d'Orsay has not hesitated to recognise the futility of expecting any progress to be made towards disarmament so long as the discussions are labelled League of Nations. On January 1st M. François-Poncet is understood to have said to Herr Hitler that if Germany found it impractical to renew her collaboration in the League of Nations, much as France would regret it, there would be no French objection to the disarmament negotiations being pursued outside Geneva and outside the framework of the League of

Nations, provided it be understood that in the French view any agreement that might be reached should ultimately be given in the form of a League of Nations agreement. It was a matter of commonsense that if the nations of the earth could agree about the reduction and limitation of air, land and sea forces, there could be no difficulty about a subsidiary agreement upon the form the agreement was to take.

MR. ROOSEVELT'S EXPENDITURE.

If the economists were right in saying that the velocity of money establishes the difference between a boom and a slump, then the governments of the world ought to produce nothing but booms; whereas it looks as if in fact it is they who produce most of the slumps. The money certainly moves to and from the hands of governments at an ever-increasing pace. Mr. Roosevelt, on January 4th, read a budget message to Congress. He estimated an "ordinary" expenditure during the current year of \$3,045,000,000 and an "emergency" expenditure of \$6,358,000,000, emergency expenditure being money to be spent on schemes of "recovery." On that basis he calmly expected a deficit of \$6,143,000,000. But he went further. He said that there was still more expenditure, which he estimated at \$1,166,000,000 and which he believed to be "necessary." His grand total of expenditure thereby was brought up to the good round figure of \$10,569,000,000, his grand deficit for the current year being estimated at \$7,309,000,000.

Mr. Roosevelt is planning to spend \$8,000,000,000 in seven months. That is making American money move faster even than Mr. Lloyd George made British money move in the Great War, for Mr. Lloyd George averaged only £7,000,000 a day. It is not an easy sum in "simple arithmetic" to calculate what Mr. Roosevelt's equivalent amount per day would be in sterling, because Mr. Roosevelt is also engaged in a complicated process of cheapening the dollar. If, however, one assumes, for the sake of simplicity in illustration, that five dollars equal one pound, Mr. Roosevelt's expenditure in those seven months will amount to the equivalent of nearly £8,000,000 a day.

But in addition Mr. Roosevelt's plans apparently contemplate another unbalanced budget in the following year, i.e.

in the financial year 1934-35. The total deficit so far estimated over the two years amounts to the prodigious sum of \$9,306,000,000. There are not many people whose minds can move in such altitudes and yet retain a sense of what the figures mean in practical life. Yet Mr. Roosevelt does not seem to have lost much ground, rather to have regained some of the ground he had lost, in public confidence.

There is a National Economy League in the United States. On December 16th it sent a petition to the President expressing its fear that the cost of the recovery programme constituted a menace to the nation's credit, and urging the alternative policy of balancing the budget "at the earliest practical date." It is a thankless enterprise for any organisation to suggest economy to any democratic government, for in general the more money a democratic government spends, and spends it, as it must, out of the pockets of a small minority of the electorate, the more support it receives from the majority of the electorate. In the United States the vast governmental scheme of expenditure seems to have excited little uneasiness except among the bankers, financiers and business men whom Mr. Roosevelt so deeply despises, even though it is they who in the long run must provide the money for his experiments. When on December 7th last General Johnson declared at a dinner in New York of the National Association of Manufacturers that the Roosevelt dollar was "the soundest money on the face of the globe, now or at any other time," he no doubt raised among his audience the comfortable post-prandial sense of well-being that is appropriate to such occasions, even though it was one of General Johnson's own major objects, in so far as he prosecuted Mr. Roosevelt's policy, to depress international confidence in the dollar.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

January 15th, 1934.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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FIFTY YEARS OF EUROPE.*

It would be difficult to overpraise Mr. Spender's survey of European history from 1871 to 1914. It ranks with Fay's volumes on *The Origins of the War* and with Brandenburg's masterly treatise *From Bismarck to the World War*; and it is desirable that French and German translations should appear as soon as possible. For the author is not only a patriotic Englishman but a good European, not only a great journalist but a historian and a judge. He has known many of the statesmen whose work he describes, and on British policy he speaks with the authority of an intimate friend of Grey. He is also quite at home in the vast ocean of official publications as well as in the biographies and apologias of the protagonists. He is a master of arrangement, and his lucidity makes complicated issues plain. He never raises his voice, but we are none the less conscious throughout of his warm human interest in the peace and happiness of mankind.

It is a commonplace to-day that the causes of the world war must be sought not in the last five weeks of peace, but in the

* *Fifty Years of Europe*. By J. A. Spender. Cassell. 21s.

decades that went before. The best starting-point is undoubtedly the creation of the German Empire, which ushered in the system that perished in 1914. Its main author was Bismarck; its main feature was the division of the Powers into rival groups; its cardinal doctrine was the supremacy of force. Mr. Spender tells the story of power-politics at its height, leading, as it was bound to lead, to a catastrophe. All the Powers played the perilous game with varying success. Bismarck, the greatest of experts, performed miracles of diplomatic skill; but his occasional habit of bludgeoning his opponents was a psychological blunder, and his treatment of defeated France was a costly mistake. "The main weakness of his policy," says Mr. Spender with perfect truth, "lay in its foundations. The idea of finding security for one nation in the permanent subjection and outlawry of another was in the long run doomed to failure." The policy of keeping France in quarantine was breaking down while the Iron Chancellor was still at the helm, and after his fall in 1890 it speedily collapsed. The first hundred pages are on the Bismarckian system and the Bismarckian era, and they are one of the best portions of the book.

When Bismarck was gone his forceful methods were carried on by successors who lacked his skill and abandoned his saving principle of limited liability. "Holstein, the Kaiser and Bülow were a trio of incomprehensibles to British statesmen: Holstein burrowing like a mole, Bülow performing on a tight-rope, and the Kaiser dancing about between the two, now currying favour with us as our best friend, now stabbing us in the back, and always improving the occasion to point the eternal moral that Germany was helpless without a big fleet." Of their mistakes in alienating England by the *Flottenpolitik* and forcing England and France into an unwritten alliance, Mr. Spender writes with just severity. But he never for a moment falls back into the foolish and facile generalisation current during the war and later that Germany was the one black sheep in a relatively well-behaved flock. It is one of the merits of the book that he recognises the immense and ever-increasing significance of the Ballplatz in the last years of peace, and he agrees with the majority of the experts that under Bülow and Bethmann Austria was the rider and Germany the horse. For the naval rivalry with England and the recurring disputes with France over Morocco called the Triple

Entente into being, and left the Kaiser with no alternative but to cling closely to his only dependable ally. At the very end of his long term of office Bülow began to realise the danger of the *Flottenpolitik*; but it was too late. The political morality of Germany was no worse than that of most of the other Powers, but her mistakes were numerous and irrevocable. In Mr. Spender's opinion French diplomacy was the most skilful, while the British record wins the prize for candour and rectitude.

The ultimate cause of the war was not the misdeeds of this or that country or statesman, but "the system by which the nations dealt with one another in these years, and its total incompatibility with the good life desired by the vast majority of human beings." The last phase of the disintegration of an anarchical Europe is dated by Mr. Spender from the annexation of Bosnia in 1908, which divided the Continent sharply into two hostile groups, reopened the Eastern question, and was followed by the Tripoli and Balkan wars. The Agadir crisis of 1911 was a terrifying interlude in the West, but from 1908 onwards the main anxieties were found in the East. Mr. Spender emphasises the importance of Conrad and his unceasing demand for preventive wars against hostile Serbia and disloyal Italy before Russia regained her fighting strength. The aged Francis Joseph desired to close his eyes in peace, but Berchtold was gradually won over to a policy of action. He was encouraged by a historic conversation with the Kaiser, in October 1913, shortly after the conclusion of the Balkan wars. In speaking of the possibility that Serbia might resist the demands of Austria, he declared: "You may rest assured that I stand beside you and am ready to draw the sword whenever your initiative makes it necessary." Austria could count absolutely and completely upon him. Whatever came from the Vienna Foreign Office was a command for him.

Such words were enough to make Bismarck turn in his grave, for in creating the Dual Alliance in 1879 he desired to prevent and not to provoke a war with Russia. Berchtold had now the blank cheque in his pocket, and he could cash it whenever he liked. Russia was rapidly regaining her strength, and her encouragement of Pan-Serb aspirations was becoming scandalously notorious. The Sarajevo murders provided the pretext; but Mr. Spender believes that in any case Austria

would have struck out before very long. A life-and-death struggle with Russia was regarded in both countries as virtually inevitable, and according to the bad old rules of the game it seemed best to fight while there was still a chance of victory. The volume ends with an argument that Grey did all that man could do to avert the catastrophe, and that, when his efforts failed, we had no choice but to enter the war. The moral of the tragic story is that the old cynical system of power-politics led inevitably to war, and that, unless we trample it under our feet, it will do so again.

G. P. G.

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THE OXFORD MOVEMENT: BEFORE AND AFTER.*

Although it is some thirteen months since Mr. Wilfrid Ward's edition of Newman's famous *Apologia* was published, it is not out of place to consider this excellent and final edition in connection with certain lines of thought brought out vividly in the notable pamphlet entitled *After the Celebration of the Oxford Movement*, by the Hulsean Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, and by the condemnation by the Bishop of Durham of the current Group Movement which, emanating from America, has been identified in the minds of some ignorant persons with Oxford, and even with the Oxford Movement. It is sufficient to draw attention to Dr. Henson's examination of the Group campaigns and its advertising methods and his conclusion: "I have stated in my Charge, and I here repeat with increased emphasis, that I am unable to regard Dr. Buchman's movement as wholesome, or to recommend it to the clergy and laity within my jurisdiction"; and to the fact that the Group Movement no more sprang from the Oxford of 1933 than it could have done in the simpler days of 1833.

* 1. Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*: the two versions of 1864 and 1865 preceded by Newman's and Kingsley's Pamphlets, with an Introduction by Wilfrid Ward. Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d. net.

2. *The Group Movement*. Second edition. Oxford University Press. 2s. 6d.

3. *After the Celebration of the Oxford Movement: Some Considerations*. By W. Emery Barnes. Bowes and Bowes: Cambridge. 6d.

4. *A Service for such as would make or renew their Covenant with God*. Published by order of the Conference. Wesleyan Conference Office, 25-35 City Road, E.C.1. 1d. net.

The celebration of the centenary of the Oxford Movement in 1933 has, as Dr. Emery Barnes says:

undoubtedly been attended with success. Its "captains" and its "kings," Edward Bouverie Pusey and John Keble *imprimis*, have received an acclamation from many sides which they earned by their gifts and by their constancy. And if the name of John Henry Newman still awakens a doubt, let those only who can penetrate the secrets of a great lonely soul pass judgment.

But it must be confessed that acclamations encourage a one-sided attitude in religion. The Oxford Movement did much good, if only because it moved and awakened many who had fallen asleep, but many of those who acclaim it seem to forget that it was only one of several Movements. God has sent not one but many *seasons of refreshing* (Acts iii, 19) upon the Church of England. While we are thankful for the awakening which began in 1833, we ought not to forget that God has fulfilled Himself in many ways to His people both before and since the Oxford Movement.

Mr. Ward, in his fascinating Introduction to Newman's *Apologia*, prints the two Appendices which Newman specially wrote for the French editions of the *Apologia*, published in 1866 and 1868, one dealing with the constitution and history of the Church of England, and one in which Newman describes for his French readers the history and constitution of the University of Oxford. To a Cambridge man the Oxford Appendix seems singularly unfair, though the unfairness is not directly based on the controversy with which the *Apologia* is concerned. Cambridge is as old, and has a history as distinguished, as that of Oxford, and yet Newman stated, for the benefit of his French readers, that

The University of Oxford has been the intellectual centre of England ever since the Middle Ages. Six centuries ago Paris alone surpassed it as an ecclesiastical school and it was the mother of the great theologians, Scotus, Alexander of Hales, and Occam.

The University of Cambridge is not mentioned and was apparently, in the mind of the future Cardinal, too contemptible to be mentioned. If Kingsley had not been so completely and deservedly beaten in the controversy that led up to the *Apologia*, he might with reason have complained not only of the omission of the labours of the University of Cambridge in the successive revivals of national religious

fervour, but in the choice of pre-Reformation names. Duns Scotus, the realist and the opponent of Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, the realist, and William of Ockham, the nominalist, were representative of Paris rather than of Oxford, as indeed Scotus' tomb attests. Roger Bacon and Wycliffe were representative of Oxford in a truer sense than these three wandering Franciscans. But Newman so loved Oxford that he attributed to her "each of the three theological parties that exist to-day in the Established Church," the Evangelical, the Tractarian, and the Liberal or Broad Church parties, and by inference the whole of the Nonconformist movement. He wrote :

The Evangelical party of to-day owes its origin to Whitfield and Wesley, who, towards the middle of the last century, began their religious life as Oxford students. Oxford was again, as this volume proves, the sole mother and nurse of Tractarianism ; and the Liberalism which to-day inundates the English intelligent classes sprang rather from Oxford than any other source.

In this way Newman persuaded himself and perhaps some of his French readers that the University of Oxford "has been the intellectual centre of England ever since the Middle Ages." Mr. Ward, however, notes one change since Newman was writing in 1866. He says :

It would be instructive if some student of the fortunes of the Church of England, as accurate as Newman, were to trace the causes which have made one of Newman's statements so completely inapplicable to the present day—the statement that the clergy, and especially the high dignitaries, are "always distinguished for their Toryism on all English questions." The alliance of Bishops of the Established Church with the democracy is, as we are reminded by this statement, a modern development, and the important part played by the episcopal bench in passing the Parliament Bill would probably have suggested some interesting reflections to Newman could he have foreseen it.

But was Newman's statement as to the Toryism of the clergy and the bishops true in any universal sense ? In the history of any of the English dioceses there are clergy and bishops in even the age of Toryism, the eighteenth century, who were utterly opposed to Tory principles. An instance—one of many—is John Hinchcliffe, Bishop of Peterborough, who died in 1794. It is true that he was a Fellow of Trinity College,

Cambridge, and a schoolmaster, the headmaster of Westminster, but he made great mark in the House of Lords in the debates on the American War, advocated a change in the system of colonial government, and strongly protested against the employment of savages as allies in war. There were many divines of great note who were not Tories, and in later times a certain vicar of the Church of England who became a Roman Catholic, Cardinal Manning, was a life-long ally of democracy pure and simple.

One danger of attributing all good and all bad intellectual and spiritual things to the university that had the good fortune to train the mind and character of J. H. Newman is the danger of want of historical balance, a danger which Newman would have been the first to detect in any objective critical survey. For instance, in any account of the evangelical revival at the end of the eighteenth century, a revival that fairly must be compared in ultimate effect with the Tractarian revival, Joseph Milner and his famous brother Isaac should be mentioned. Both were Cambridge men, the latter an incomparable mathematician with vast intellectual and spiritual powers who became Dean of Carlisle, the former a clergyman in Hull whose writings on the early Fathers exercised at one time great influence on Newman. Isaac Milner made Queen's College, at the end of the eighteenth century, "a nursery of Evangelical neophytes." The Evangelical movement, born at Oxford, died there in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, while it was flourishing at Cambridge or under the inspiration of Cambridge men. In addition to Isaac Milner and many other dons was that great evangelical leader Charles Simeon who, dying in 1836, lived to see the Tractarian revival, Farish of Magdalene and Jowett of Trinity Hall, while William Wilberforce was among the many evangelicals who made the Movement in many parts of England a force for righteousness and for religious revival that preceded by many years the Tractarian revival.

The Cambridge Evangelical Movement at the end of the eighteenth century strove to combine educational and spiritual advancement with a measure of success that is too often forgotten. The great and noble influence of the Oxford Movement and of the Tractarian revival in the second quarter of the nineteenth century should not blind us to the equally noble influence of the Cambridge evangelical revival

beginning in the second half of the eighteenth century, nor blind us to the fact, tersely expressed by Canon Overton and Mr. Relton, that in the second half of the eighteenth century "Cambridge was far more productive than Oxford of men who influenced religious thought and life." Of these William Paley, Richard Watson, Bishop of Llandaff, and Professor John Hey, Liberals all in the sense that Newman attaches to that Church party, must be included. There were indeed, as Dr. Emery Barnes says, many seasons of refreshing and, perhaps, of these the Methodist or Wesleyan recombination in the past year is not the least significant, nor the revised Covenant Service, originally introduced by Wesley in October 1755, the least fruitful.

J. E. G. DE M.

PAINTING IN ENGLAND.*

Mr. Miles de Montmorency, himself a painter of merit, has written an attractive short history of painting in England, compressing into some 230 pages an account of the evolution of English pictorial art from the sixth to the twentieth century of our era. Professor Gleadowe commends the book and its judicial outlook. Indeed, he writes that the author

is so just and right-minded that, try as I may, I cannot differ from him. And, even if I could, I should feel bound to correct my views in the light of his. For he has had direct and competent experience of the things of which he writes. . . .

This author also presents, to quote Professor Gleadowe again, "many first-hand views." It is these views and opinions that make, whether we agree with them or not, the chief interest of a book that carefully illustrates the growth of art in England, period by period, by definitive views about the greatest of our English painters. The selection of names is, of course, very limited, and this or that critic of the book will regret that or this omission—the omission, for instance, in Victorian times of the name of Sir John Gilbert, whose self-portrait adorns the famous gallery in Florence. But you cannot satisfy everybody, and the purpose of the author is to present something more than "a bare catalogue of names

* *A Short History of Painting in England.* By Miles F. de Montmorency. Introduction by Professor R. M. Y. Gleadowe. With Reproductions of sixty paintings and drawings. J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd. 6s. net.

and dates. I have tried to make clear the connection between the art and life of the English people, and to show that painting . . . must have roots deeply struck in the soil of national life." That goal is certainly achieved, and the importance of the achievement can be seen at a time when the necessary connection between Art and Industry has stirred the Government of this country to immediate action.

Definite and first-hand views and opinions have, in the region of Art as elsewhere, their disadvantages as well as their obvious advantages. Mr. de Montmorency throughout the book, point by point, period by period, painter by painter, has plainly made up his mind. He has been reading, observing and thinking deeply and dispassionately, and records his conclusions in clear and unmistakable fashion. Yet sometimes he provokes criticism. He has come, apparently, to the definite conclusion that Roman and pre-Roman Art, of the period ending in A.D. 410, do not come into what may be called the British tradition. Is that certain? Dr. Rice Holmes held the contrary view. Again, in the account of glass painting in England, the author's views do not fully accord with those of the latest experts on the subject. The Canterbury glass is demonstrably thirteenth century.

To turn to the eighteenth century and later times, the tribute to William Hogarth is a pleasure to read and a revelation of the work of that great master; the estimate of Reynolds is admirable: "It was the constant aim of his life to raise and dignify the position of the arts in England, and if we except Hogarth he did more than any single man to found an English school of painting." Of Gainsborough he says, "of all English artists he had the greatest natural genius as a painter. As a colourist he was the equal of Reynolds, and as a draughtsman he had precisely that sensitiveness to form which Reynolds lacked." His criticism of Romney should be true to our present outlook, but it is somewhat harsh. A great tribute is paid to George Stubbs (1724-1806). Of his picture of the racehorse Hambletonian with a groom and stable-boy, the author writes:

In draughtsmanship, design, and handling of paint it is one of the greatest pictures in English art. From the very simplest material and without the slightest straining after effect he has produced a picture which can stand comparison with the works of the great masters.

The glowing tribute to Richard Wilson (1714-82), the great landscape painter, is well deserved; the account of the work of Turner and Constable almost compels the reader to fly to their pictures. He calls Turner "perhaps the greatest artist England has produced." Of Old Crome, he writes: "No other painter, unless it be Millet, has conveyed so well the friendly strength of the earth and the things that grow from it." Of the genius as a painter and draughtsman of William Blake the author is well aware, and rightly draws attention to his revival of the mediæval linear pattern. "His art has a richness of spiritual content which can be compared to Michaelangelo alone." These extracts, from many opinions, show that Mr. de Montmorency has determinate opinions and views which may be differed from but must be, at any rate, attended to, and especially by those who wish to appreciate the present exhibition of English Art at Burlington House. He concludes with a half-prophecy as to the future. It is, he says, difficult to believe that English Art in the future "will not be distinguished by a strain of romanticism and a sense of linear pattern"; in fact, that the English tradition of fifteen hundred years will still continue.

A. B.

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HANS ANDERSEN.*

Hans Andersen is a classic in England, Europe, Asia, and America, and a large library has gathered round his loved and loving personality, his poems, librettos, novels and, above all, his fairy-stories. The personality of Hans Christian Andersen not only inspired but is written into all his work. In a sense he had the universality of Shakespeare, true to nature always, the nature of man and bird and beast and countryside and town life under a mystic veil. He cannot be compared with the Grimm brothers, since they based their stories on folk-lore, while he based his on his experience, and yet in any ultimate analysis the comparison is just, for the experience of Hans Andersen plumbed the same deeps as the folk-lore of the Grimms.

* *The Life of Hans Christian Andersen*, by Signe Toksvig. Illustrated. Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 10s. 6d. net.

Who was Hans Andersen as the English always call him? He was born at Odense in Denmark, in April 1805 in great poverty, he died by the beautiful Danish waters of the Sound on August 4th, 1875, surrounded by all the love and all the honour that a king and a nation could give him. Miss Signe Toksvig tells the story, in a wonderful fashion, of the seventy years' sojourn on the earth that Andersen had made heavenly for many generations of children and folk with childlike hearts. The story of the little home where he was born the son of a poor cobbler and his wife, an indomitable washerwoman, is beautifully told.

These were the people to whom the poet was born, seemingly a washerwoman and a cobbler, in reality a sturdy practicality and a high-strung, ambitious imagination. It was the blending of those qualities that made Hans Christian Andersen, as it was the courage and sensitiveness of his parents that sheltered his childhood. He was always grateful. Many years later, when he first entered the Cathedral of Milan and was overwhelmed by the suavely coloured flood of light that streamed through the high windows into the incense-laden darkness, he compared this light to the lambent radiance which haloed his earliest years for him. Whatever he wrote about it was bathed in this effulgence, and distance and gratitude effaced all shadows. . . . The little room was cheerful with greenery and pictures, and Ane Marie kept it scoured and tidy. It was her pride that the sheets and the short window curtains were snowily white, as it was her pride that her man and boy always wore clean shirts. . . . In Hans Christian's childhood, Odense still had a great many folk-festivals, which made a deep impression on him, colouring his imagination, as though he was able to remember having lived in almost mediæval times.

Miss Toksvig tells of the tragedy and the inherent wonderfulness of those years between the ages of eleven, when his beloved father was taken from him, and twenty, when the indomitable spirit and the abounding genius of the young man began to make their mark. There is some reason to suppose that the father was on his mother's side of noble German stock, and he was certainly a man of great ability, who dreamed of better things. The efforts, manners and dreams of the son, who inherited also the practical and loving character of the mother, Ane Marie, are seen in all his struggles and all his successes. The purity of his beautiful mind was allied to great ambition to succeed on the greatest scale.

When he was not yet fifteen he ventured on the journey to Copenhagen, with a little money gathered in his clay money-box (the collection of years) and a protector in the shape of Colonel Guldberg, who had been struck with the abilities of the lad. But his chief faith was in God and himself. It is an amazing story. He was full of creative literary power. He matriculated at the University of Copenhagen (which meant the licence to write) and in April 1829 he had a play accepted and performed with great success at the Royal Theatre. He had gathered friends around him. He never was really in love, though he once or twice seriously thought of the marriage that never came. He was an author, and beginning to be a widely read author. He travelled wisely and well on very small means. He found that Italy was his bride. Florence, Rome, Naples, stirred his whole nature. It was about that time that his mother died, broken with the temptations of drink after a life of many sorrows. To the last he, of course, helped her, though his own income was very small. He had only a half-sister left, and she had disappeared.

Fame and comparative wealth came to Hans Andersen before he was forty, and he is on terms of equality with the nobility. It was at this time that he wrote *The Ugly Duckling*, "that most poignant of his many veiled autobiographies." His thoughts at this time, perhaps at all times, were straying back to Odense "to the boy with bare feet in wooden shoes." He was not, indeed, allowed to forget it; even in 1842 his half-sister Karen wrote to him from her obscurity, a good soul apparently, since she wanted only a little money for urgent needs and did not trouble him much. Her need was indeed responsible for *The Ugly Duckling*, a story for children, and also a story for men and women: the life of the great man made perfect. The story of the life of Hans Christian Andersen is indeed the story of the swan who was hatched by a duck. He had great ambitions from the first, but they were never low ambitions, never sordid, never unclean. He found friends everywhere from the first. His ambition was to realise something that did not clash with earthly ambitions. He thought he was in love with Jenny Lind and the thought begot that great story *The Nightingale*. He was always travelling—in England Charles Dickens was his natural friend—and he was working almost to the last, outliving most of his friends, but making the whole world his friend. It is a wonder-

ful story, and Miss Toksvig has made of the life of Hans Andersen a true romance, based on love, sorrow and tragedy, but nevertheless forming a beautiful inspiration for the service of the world.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Mr. F. S. Marvin, in his useful book entitled *The Nation at School: A Sketch with Comments*,* endeavours with much success to disentangle English education as a whole from its administrative network and "present it as concretely and intelligibly as possible" to the general public. The results of a century of public work in education is summarised, but the author also pleads for "the primary personal duty of self-education. . . . Can the most hopeful critic maintain that up to the present, though much is being done, the proportion of the five million [whom the State sends to school] who make good is satisfactory?" In fact there is not in modern English education any question of developing on uniform prescribed lines. Nor is Mr. Fisher's Act of 1918 in any way a dead letter. It was incorporated in the Act of 1921. There is educational freedom for all after the basis is laid, and yet Mr. Marvin seems to complain of the innumerable agencies for self-education since he says it would seem "impossible to escape education, and many must long for a more restful and contemplative spirit which would feed in solitude on the beauties of the world and reap the harvest of a quiet mind." That is just what the County Libraries aim at. On the subject of the private school, Mr. Marvin comments, "we seem to be attaining in education, as in so many other things, that compromise between pure individualism and State direction which suits the national temper." It is a temper that has worked in education for five centuries. In writing of Oxford and Cambridge Mr. Marvin says that they have "Even so far modernised themselves as to accept a modest contribution from the public purse." In fact, they have done that since 1821. "Cambridge ranks as the largest, if not the most advanced school of science in the country." It is certainly not the largest, but it is probably the most advanced school of science not only in this country but in the world, as, indeed, the fact that it has been the European home of advanced mathematics since the fifteenth century renders probable. The new vast Cambridge University Library now approaching completion deserves some comment beside the notable changes in the great Bodleian Library. Mr. Marvin's son, Mr. A. N. Marvin, contributes a very useful essay on the development of technical education in England.

* Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 5s. net.

The volume entitled *Recent Poetry, 1923-1933*,* which has been edited with an introduction by Mrs. Alida Monroe, is a "collection" of verse and not precisely an anthology which purports, with one vital difference, to do for poetry of the last ten years what the five volumes of *Georgian Poetry* did for some of the poetry of the period 1911-22. The collection, however, includes poets of all schools. Mrs. Monroe says that Mr. W. B. Yeats is included "because he, above all twentieth-century writers, has bridged the tremendous gulf that cuts off the past century from 1933. His latest book, *The Winding Stair*, has unquestionably established him as the giant of our time, who represents his age both in mind and in his expression of it." Mr. Drinkwater, Mr. W. W. Gibson, Mr. D. H. Lawrence, Mr. Ezra Pound, Mr. Masfield, and Mr. W. H. Davies have been omitted because their reputations are made. There is a good deal of sadness in the volume, but Mr. Roy Campbell redeems all sadness in his excellent and brave verses, and especially in "Choosing a Mast," a new and noble theme. "The Strange Spirit" of Mr. Walter de la Mare is very fine, as indeed is all his work. Mr. T. S. Eliot has some ideas, but they are hidden in a mass of words which is hardly poetry, though well meaning. Mr. Oliver Gogarty finds real poetry in "The Plum Tree by the House," while Mr. Richard Goodman in "Cowslips" finds it also and Mr. F. R. Higgins gives Ireland to England in noble verse. Mr. Harold Monroe thinks new thoughts in "The Garden," Mr. John Pudney knows what poetry should be, Mr. Herbert Read utters deep and not really sad thoughts, Mr. Siegfried Sassoon gives the student some exquisite verse, as do Miss Edith Sitwell and her brothers and Miss Pamela Travers. Mr. Yeats closes this interesting and attractive volume with two brief poems.

In *The Poems of Annette von Droste-Hülshoff*,† selected and edited with an introduction and notes, Dr. H. G. Atkins, the Professor of German in the University of London, gives English readers an exquisite collection of poems written by certainly the greatest German poetess. Annette belonged to an ancient Westphalian family and was born in 1797 at Münster and died in 1848, the year of revolutions, at Meersburg on Lake Constance. She lived through a period of European stress, yet, as Professor Atkins says, "she remains almost as unruffled by the storms of her age as Jane Austen herself." In the old romantic castle where she lived she developed very early, receiving with her brothers lessons from a tutor in Greek, English, Italian and mathematics, while she also drew, played the piano, and wrote verses. Her chief characteristics were "absence of affectation, integrity, steadfastness, and truth, and these are her characteristics as a craftsman and artist, too." She was not well known as a writer till she was over forty, but her volume

* Gerald Howe Ltd. 5s. net.
† Sidgwick and Jackson. 4s. 6d. net.

the *Gedichte*, published in 1844, was an immediate success. She is essentially a marvellous interpreter of Nature though she is, too, a religious mystic. Her work has become a classic and this little volume should be much read in England.

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In *A Great Lady's Friendships** Lady Burghclere presents a generous selection from the mass of letters written during the 'sixties and 'seventies to Mary Marchioness of Salisbury, later Countess of Derby. The accomplished editor died on the eve of the publication of her last work, but the task had been completed with her usual scrupulous care. An admirable Introduction, supplemented by annual summaries and bibliographical notes, describes the heroine herself and the men and women, English and foreign, who were proud to call her friend. It is a pity that we are given none of her own letters, but we can partially reconstruct her attractive personality with the aid of her many correspondents. Such collections are of value, both for the light they throw on famous people and for the information they provide on historical events. In the present case it is the former rather than the latter which claims our attention. Lady Burghclere has, so to speak, put Queen Sophie of Holland on the map—the delightful Württemberg princess who found solace in her friendships for the prolonged unhappiness of her married life. Through Queen Sophie, as indeed through Lord Cowley, we come in frequent contact with Napoleon III and the Empress Eugénie. To the former she was warmly attached, but the latter appeared to her "very fragile in mind and incapable of reflection"—in politics at any rate an extremely bad influence. Among the other figures on the crowded stage we may notice the fascinating Lord Clarendon, the gifted Lytton brothers, and the brilliant but difficult Robert Lowe. But the dominant impression, as Lady Burghclere would have wished, is that of "the Victorian Great Lady at her best in heart and mind."

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The Constitutional Year Book† for 1934 contains a mass of political information, invaluable to all persons interested in government. "Special attention is drawn to the complete information relating to Parliamentary Constituencies, Members, Candidates, and Elections; to the statistics bearing on General Elections; and to the condensed Tables of Statistics on many subjects of national importance, which have been carefully revised and brought down to the latest possible

* Macmillan. 21s.

† Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 5s.

date." A specially compiled table setting out the employment and unemployment figures for each month since January 1924 is exceptionally interesting. This year book deals in varying detail with a great mass of political matter. On wider matters of purely constitutional interest, as for example the position of the Judiciary and the Church of England, this book is not, and, it seems, does not intend to be, adequate. The system of indexing might well be simplified and enlarged.

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Notice is overdue in these columns of three important books by two eminent economists. In *The Theory of Unemployment*,* Professor A. C. Pigou has written a learned work, intended for students of economics and "strictly academic in tone and content," in which he sets out to analyse and discuss the principal factors upon which unemployment and its fluctuations depend. In *The Corn Laws and Social England*,† Dr. C. R. Fay reviews "the circumstances under which in former times such taxes and restrictions were imposed and then repealed." The past and present problems of food taxation are vastly different. There is no scarcity of food in the world to-day. The problem is one of distribution. "The risk seems to be," writes Dr. Fay, "that by devices such as the quota we shall clog the course of commerce and involve ourselves in some of the hindrances and circumventions that clustered so thickly around the Corn Averages of an earlier day." In the third edition of his well-known work, *Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present Day*,‡ Dr. Fay has added a supplement dealing with "a decade of rationalisation (1922-32)" and has compiled a bibliography of books published in 1928-32.

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A Septuagenarian's Scrap Book,§ by Sir George Arthur, is no common-form book of reminiscences. It contains rather a haphazard collection of views upon a varied number of men and matters met with in the course of a long and distinguished career. As Sir Herbert Maxwell writes in his Foreword, Sir George has taken "quick note of men and manners; recording, but not in all respects deploring, the sweeping changes he has witnessed in social life and manners, in political, ecclesiastical and military affairs." He discusses such men as Mr. Gladstone and Lord Salisbury, Lord Kitchener and Lord Curzon. He pays a striking tribute to Lord Wolseley's work in reforming the army. Upon Earl Haig he bestows the utmost praise, while under-estimating perhaps the difficulties and achievements of the Government at home. The author's frank, sometimes provocative, comments and his friendly style make this scrap-book extremely interesting.

* Macmillan. 15s. net.

† Longmans. 12s. 6d. net.

‡ Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d. net.

§ Thornton Butterworth. 12s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

MARCH, 1934.

WHAT IS AMISS WITH THE LEAGUE?

AT the present moment the League of Nations is like a ship in the trough of a wave. If the helm can be kept steady and the stays hold she will rise to the top. If not, the white billows overhead will shatter her into splinters. For those who believe that in the life of this vessel lies the future of mankind there is but one thing to do—to hold on and keep the sail full. At the same time we may well ask ourselves how it is that the position of the League has become so precarious. Is it due only to the turbulence that surrounds it, or have there been failures in navigation which might have been avoided?

The League came into being in circumstances peculiarly favourable to its creation. The World War was ended—a war in which more than half of the population of the globe had been concerned, and by which the leading nations were bled white in treasure and in men. There was a universal feeling that something must be done to render impossible a repetition of the experience of the five years, 1914 to 1918. There was a general conviction that, if the world were allowed to return to the pre-war conditions, civilisation was doomed; and there was a widespread determination to break with the past and to plan out a new scheme of international society.

All this rendered possible the establishment of what the French have properly named a "Society of Nations." It was a new conception of how to regulate human affairs and, unfortunately, it encountered at the outset two serious obstacles. Although it was an essential feature of any such society that it should include all civilised States, it was launched upon the world with neither Germany nor America within it. Indeed, none of the enemy States were original members, and thus it started not as a league of nations but as a league of victors. From the beginning it appeared to Germany as an organisation intended to keep her down, and although she was admitted seven years later the League has, by reason of this, never become popular amongst her people.

The other obstacle arose at Washington. There is no use in recounting the story of President Wilson's failure to carry

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date." A specially compiled table setting out the employment and unemployment figures for each month since January 1924 is exceptionally interesting. This year book deals in varying detail with a great mass of political matter. On wider matters of purely constitutional interest, as for example the position of the Judiciary and the Church of England, this book is not, and, it seems, does not intend to be, adequate. The system of indexing might well be simplified and enlarged.

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Notice is overdue in these columns of three important books by two eminent economists. In *The Theory of Unemployment*,* Professor A. C. Pigou has written a learned work, intended for students of economics and "strictly academic in tone and content," in which he sets out to analyse and discuss the principal factors upon which unemployment and its fluctuations depend. In *The Corn Laws and Social England*,† Dr. C. R. Fay reviews "the circumstances under which in former times such taxes and restrictions were imposed and then repealed." The past and present problems of food taxation are vastly different. There is no scarcity of food in the world to-day. The problem is one of distribution. "The risk seems to be," writes Dr. Fay, "that by devices such as the quota we shall clog the course of commerce and involve ourselves in some of the hindrances and circumventions that clustered so thickly around the Corn Averages of an earlier day." In the third edition of his well-known work, *Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present Day*,‡ Dr. Fay has added a supplement dealing with "a decade of rationalisation (1922-32)" and has compiled a bibliography of books published in 1928-32.

* * * * *

A Septuagenarian's Scrap Book,§ by Sir George Arthur, is no common-form book of reminiscences. It contains rather a haphazard collection of views upon a varied number of men and matters met with in the course of a long and distinguished career. As Sir Herbert Maxwell writes in his Foreword, Sir George has taken "quick note of men and manners; recording, but not in all respects deploring, the sweeping changes he has witnessed in social life and manners, in political, ecclesiastical and military affairs." He discusses such men as Mr. Gladstone and Lord Salisbury, Lord Kitchener and Lord Curzon. He pays a striking tribute to Lord Wolseley's work in reforming the army. Upon Earl Haig he bestows the utmost praise, while under-estimating perhaps the difficulties and achievements of the Government at home. The author's frank, sometimes provocative, comments and his friendly style make this scrap-book extremely interesting.

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the American Senate with him in his noble attempt to bring his nation to the rescue of the world. It suffices to say that the United States of America did not join the League, and the result of her refusal has been to render the League impotent. Under the Covenant, as agreed to by Wilson, America would have been one of the guarantors of the peace of the world. With that great nation standing side by side with other peace-loving peoples no one would have ventured to defy the League, and it would have been possible for the League in its early years to do things which, in its crippled condition, it has not dared to undertake. It could have adjusted many matters that were left by the treaties in an unsatisfactory position. It might have re-arranged frontiers and reconciled people to the changes brought about by the war. None of these things has been done, and the League is now charged with failure, whereas, in reality, its task was rendered almost impossible by the absence of America from its counsels.

But, apart from these two misfortunes, there are other events which are responsible for the lack of faith in the League that is widespread throughout Europe. Take the case of the Geneva Protocol. As is well known, the Covenant does not clearly lay down what action can be taken by the League in the event of a member resorting to war in defiance of his undertaking. By Article XVI various kinds of sanctions are contemplated embracing those of a diplomatic, economic and military character, and the Council of the League is charged with advising the members of the League as to the manner in which these sanctions shall be applied. In the early years of the League the Assembly devoted much time to considering how Article XVI could be made effective, and in 1923 a draft treaty for mutual assistance was prepared. This draft was not accepted; and, in 1924, the Assembly agreed to substitute for it another document called the Geneva Protocol. At that Assembly England and France were represented at Geneva by their Prime Ministers, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot, and the scheme went forward with the full support of both governments. Unfortunately, in the autumn of that year, Mr. MacDonald's government was defeated at the polls and the Conservatives refused to carry on the work of their predecessors in office. The Protocol was laid aside and the Locarno agreements took its place.

Without discussing the question as it presented itself to the various political parties at that time, it cannot be denied that, whatever may be the respective merits of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Protocol or the Locarno agreements, the abandonment of the Protocol had a very unfortunate effect upon the reputation of the League. In the opinion of many people abroad the Protocol did not impose upon its signatories any heavier obligations than those which they had accepted on signing the Covenant, and the refusal of the British Government was construed as being an intimation that the British Empire was not prepared to stand to what it had promised in 1919. Up to the moment when the government of this country rejected the Protocol it was universally thought that the Covenant was an instrument which gave a right to every member if attacked to receive support from all the other members. When doubt was cast upon the correctness of this view the whole basis of the League began to crumble. Its operations became more and more vacillating, and its intervention became less and less effective. Its moral influence gradually oozed away. This fact became patent to all the world when the League was called upon to intervene between China and Japan. Had the Protocol been completed in 1924, and the succeeding years been devoted to elaborating methods of joint action in support of the Covenant, Japan would not have dared to defy the League as she did in 1931. She was encouraged by the knowledge that the other members were powerless through lack of union amongst themselves.

The uncertainty as to the extent to which the Covenant gives security largely accounts for the difficulties that the Powers have encountered with regard to the reduction and limitation of armaments. When, by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany and her allies in the war were subjected to a system of almost complete disarmament M. Clemenceau stated that this was to be the first step towards a general reduction of armaments which it was to be one of the first duties of the League to promote. Nevertheless, eleven years elapsed before the League called together a conference for this purpose, and during that period the question how to combine security with equality remained unsolved. Through all that time the League knew that Germany would not treat on any other basis than that of equality. When admitted to the League in 1926, she had demanded and obtained from the Powers an assurance

that "her entry into the League took place on the footing of equality of rights." All that remained to be done, in relation to disarmament, was to comply with France's request that the organisation of the League should be such as would provide security to all its members against aggression. It was the League's failure to reconcile these two claims in advance that brought disaster to the Disarmament Conference.

The fact is that, in this as in other matters, Members of the League have either not understood the full purpose of the Covenant, or have been afraid to utilise it to its full extent. They seem to have regarded it merely as a piece of machinery whereby to prevent two nations from coming to blows; whereas the aim of those who drafted it was far higher. Its purpose, as stated in the preamble, was not only to "achieve international peace," but also to "promote international co-operation." It aims at "the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between the nations"; "the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments," and "the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another." If all these were carried into effect there would be a new world. Peace would ensue; not because it is enforced, but because it would have become the normal state of the system of world administration.

Moreover, it is not only the preamble which aims at the ideal. The succeeding articles pointed to a different system of human relations from that which has been accepted hitherto. They provided for setting up machinery for deciding legal disputes arising between States and for arbitrating and mediating in other kinds of disagreement. They inaugurated an international system of altering treaties whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world. They brought into being a new method of administering uncivilised countries by "mandates" entrusted to the more advanced Powers and supervised by the League. They introduced various novel provisions, whereby international action may be brought to bear upon problems which have previously been regarded as under the sole direction of individual States, such as ensuring fair and humane conditions of labour, just treatment of Native races, preventing the traffic in women and children and the trading in drugs and arms and ammunition, securing

freedom of transit and equitable treatment of commerce and generally encouraging the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world. The Covenant was in fact the first stage towards a charter of peace and progress for the entire human race based upon the conception of a common brotherhood of mankind, and the universality of the moral law.

When the League began its work it was inspired by these ideals. It erected the Permanent Court of International Justice. It fashioned its machinery for arbitration. It appointed its "Mandates Commission." It organised the "International Labour Bureau." It framed schemes for administering all its various humanitarian duties; but it seems to have got tired of well-doing. It has never launched out on the wider sea of international reform which the framers of the Covenant invited it to explore, and the result to the League has been a weakening of fibre in its own fabric, and a loss of support from those whom a more courageous policy would have drawn towards it.

For example, we hear a great deal now about the "revision of treaties." Amongst the defeated nations the demand for this is widespread, vociferous and insistent. The vast majority of those who clamour for it do not know what particular revision they wish for, and, as a matter of fact, the practical effect of complying with their demand would not be very disturbing to present conditions. Nevertheless, it has become one of the major problems of European politics at this moment. It need never have reached this point had the League of Nations done its duty in this respect. It will be remembered that during the proceedings at Versailles President Wilson, who realised the impossibility of constructing any single treaty which would satisfactorily settle the multifarious questions raised by the war, proposed that the League of Nations should have the right to adjust any matters that appeared to demand re-consideration. This idea was not accepted; but Article XIX (Review of Treaties) was agreed to and it gives the League considerable powers in that direction. Had the Assembly utilised Article XIX as a means of removing the manifest imperfections of the treaties in relation to some of the frontier lines, there is every reason to think that, through friendly pressure by an united League, the worst of the mistakes made at Versailles would have been

rectified, and much of the trouble that has prevailed since the war, and is still a menace to peace, might have been removed.

The tendency of the League to minimise its responsibilities has been the main cause of its failure with regard to "minorities." Under various agreements fifteen States have been subjected to special obligations towards the racial, linguistic and religious minorities living within their territories. The League was constituted the guarantor for the observance of these obligations and in 1920 the Council formally accepted that position. At that time the Council was fully advised as to the extent of the task that it was undertaking and especially that it would be bound to satisfy itself that the minorities enjoyed the rights that were promised to them. A branch of the Secretariat was organised for this purpose and a system of investigating complaints was elaborated; but the enquiries have never gone beyond the study of individual petitions, and in no case has the League had before it any general report as to how far the States concerned have fulfilled their duty in this respect. The result is that the minorities are still dissatisfied. They complain constantly that the procedure adopted by the Council is unfair to them, and many of them declare that the League has abandoned them to their fate. Had the Council acted up to its obligations in the first years of its existence, when the new States were making their laws and shaping their methods of administration, there is little doubt that the minorities treaties could have been made an effective means of reconciling large groups of persons to the changes brought about by the Versailles settlement.

The eleventh article of the Covenant is one which might be of great use in improving international relations if utilised as part of the normal work of the League. It provides for the Council giving attention to "any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." This function of the League is evidently of a far-reaching character. Had it been brought into play in the early stages of the troubles between China and Japan it is most probable that the clash would have been averted.

In these and other similar matters the League has given the impression that it is afraid to take the lead in the new system of international society to which it was hoped the

great war had opened a way. Those who fought in the war had been told that they were fighting not only for their country; but for the world. A new order was to emerge from that catastrophe. Peace was to be secured through universal co-operation. Fifteen years have elapsed and progress towards this goal has been slow and disappointing. The Assembly of the League has met year by year. Schemes have been discussed and postponed, and often postponed again and again. Rapid action by the League seems to be impossible. It is true that, in some of the administrative duties specifically relegated to the League, the Council and its Committees have accomplished much that is good; but in the broad task of building up a new world the League has nothing to its credit. It was hoped that the open negotiations at Geneva would take the place of the older methods of diplomacy which had fallen into discredit before the war. At first it seemed that this policy would be followed; but later on the governments drew back and the foreign offices in European capitals are now as closely sealed as ever.

But it is on the broader lines of world policy that the League has disappointed its supporters. As already stated, it failed to devise any method whereby the principle of collective action, which is the very foundation of the Covenant, could be made applicable for preventing war. During the period that has elapsed since 1919 it might have made some progress with a problem which must present itself before many years are over; namely, the political relationship which shall subsist between all nations. M. Briand made the attempt to unite the States of Europe; but he obtained little support for his idea, and now it seems to have been abandoned. International questions are relegated to a second rank. Humanity is still confined in water-tight compartments—made, indeed, more water-tight every year. Tariff walls are still being piled up, although commerce is crying out for freedom. Even the universality of the air and of the ether, which one hoped might be utilised for uniting mankind, is being applied to purposes of war and the dissemination of hate. Differences of language, religion and customs are being exaggerated until they have become real menaces to peace; and all this is because the world has not yet discovered any means whereby affairs may be regulated in the interests of its entire population.

Of course, no one will contend that such immense changes as these could have been effected by the League of Nations; but it might have pointed a way towards them and, by this means, have prepared the nations to think internationally and led them to favour co-operation rather than competition when dealing with those tremendous racial and economic problems which threaten to overwhelm civilisation.

The complaint against the League is not that it has failed to achieve the impossible; but that it has not attempted what might have been quite possible. It is this that has caused some of its most earnest supporters to lose faith in it. They fail to see any *soul* in it—any ideal towards which it aspires; and they ask themselves whether the failures that they notice are due to faults of construction—which can be remedied by “reforms,” or is the work beyond the power of the men who direct it?

When criticising the League it must be borne in mind that it operates through representatives of governments, and thus the policy of the League has become the policy of governments. In its earlier years stress was laid upon the advisability of sending to the Assembly representatives of the different parties in each State, and for a few years this practice was followed with very beneficial results. Men of international repute, like M. Léon Bourgeois and Dr. Nansen, were thus brought into the work of the League. This class of delegate has, however, gradually disappeared and the Assembly consists now almost entirely of persons belonging to the political party in power at the moment in their respective countries. It may be that this change was inevitable; but it has resulted in the Assembly of the League becoming mainly a gathering of politicians and, with this, it has tended to become less internationally-minded and to divide itself into groups who seem to be more concerned to safeguard their own national interests than to labour for the benefit of the world. This tendency is not unnatural, since they have their own constituents and their own governments to consider. International administration constantly demands a sacrifice of national interests which it is sometimes hard to justify to the people at home. Even Briand and Stresemann, when they were loyally trying to discover a means to reconcile their two nations, found that their chief difficulties lay in Paris and Berlin. When we add to this the fact that side by

side with the growth of the League there has grown up, in many countries, a counter-movement in the shape of an exaggerated nationalism, distorting public opinion and giving rise to unreasoning suspicion and distrust, it is not to be wondered at, if the men who guide the League lose hold of the world-view of affairs which is indispensable to the conduct of its business.

It is this that lies at the root of the trouble. The world is losing the spirit of internationalism and, unless this can be revived, it is of little use to talk about “reforming the League.” All civilised nations must be brought to realise that human progress demands not only the “international peace,” but also the “international co-operation” foreshadowed by the Covenant. Neither amongst the members of the League, nor amongst the masses of the people, has this truth been fully appreciated. Men still talk of the brotherhood of man and the federation of the world; but we are in reality further away from that ideal than we were twenty years ago. We have assumed too rashly that when once a League of Nations was set up human nature would change of its own accord. It has not done so yet, and those who labour for a League that is truly international have still a long and heavy task before them.

DICKINSON.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S FIRST YEAR.

THERE has been no opening of an American presidential term which could be compared with the first year of Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt. He took office on March 4th, 1933, amid conditions of unexampled crisis. The crushing defeat of Mr. Hoover in the preceding November had befallen as the United States was entering the blackest winter since the Civil War. The stagnation of trade was reflected in a general despair such as the present generation of Americans had never known. There were no complete statistics of unemployment, but fifteen millions was accepted as a moderate figure, and over against this were the facts of an agrarian situation, with many millions of farmers unable to sell their produce and sunk in debt. And if, twelve months ago, there was any aspect of the national state of affairs more serious than that displayed in the external facts, it was to be found in the general scepticism and disillusion as to the American system, its institutions, and its dominant interests.

The Presidency had declined, to a lamentable extent, in power and influence. Three occupants of the White House in succession had, in widely different ways, affected the prestige of the greatest elective office in the world, and of the three the last had been markedly unfortunate. Congress had virtually no friends. The largest and oldest of political democracies was decrying its politicians and making a mock of its national Legislature. And more than this. The United States is the home of a business civilisation, and that civilisation had crashed. The structure of American business lay in ruins; and for the first time in the history of the Republic the average American citizen was openly sceptical and scornful of the men who had been looked upon as industrial and financial leaders. The confident and abounding people which had voted in 1928 for Hoover and four more years of prosperity was more than ready for his successor. Franklin Roosevelt had been governor of New York State during those four years, but, curiously, he was still an unknown man. He has revealed himself as a man of remarkable talents and of magnificent will; and we see him to-day occupying a position such as no American President has ever attained. He seems to afford convincing proof that the special provi-

dence which at crucial times in the past has watched over the American nation is still operating.

At the moment of Mr. Roosevelt's inauguration all the banks of the United States were closed. The first action of the new President was an announcement that they could not be reopened without the sanction of the Federal Government. This was equivalent to an admission that the national crisis was deeper and more extensive than the people in general had realised, and it was an intimation that the new Administration was in full command. There followed, in March and April, the series of events which made known to the world that the United States had come under a Chief Executive who believed that the duty of an elected ruler was not only to govern but to initiate policies. Washington in 1933 afforded the most striking contrast to Berlin. Herr Hitler, given his majority on the day following the inauguration of the American President, made an end of German democracy in a week of smashing blows, against which no resistance or protest could avail. Mr. Roosevelt was equally swift, but he appealed to Congress and relied altogether upon public opinion. He was aided, of course, by the sense of national peril, and every step was taken in the knowledge of overwhelming popular support. The Administration's Banking Act was in the circumstances moderate. The economy measures were not contested. The grant of emergency powers to the President could hardly have been more complete; there were few prepared to argue that it went beyond the plain necessities of the hour. Mr. Roosevelt withstood the demands of the American Legion on behalf of the ex-soldiers. He was the first President since the Civil War to do this. The nation made emphatic acknowledgment of his courage and rightness, and even the legionaries in conference could not forbear to cheer. Given power to alter the gold content of the dollar, the President moved with caution and made no further advance towards currency legislation until the reassembling of Congress in January.

In the legislation of the first half-year two measures stand out as of cardinal importance—the Securities Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act. Both were passed at mid-summer. They are twin columns of the structure of the New Deal. The Securities Act was framed on the model of the English Companies Act, and it was carried by Congress with-

out a dissentient vote. Its provisions are of a kind so familiar in this country that our only cause for wonder is that the American business community should have been able for so long to do without it. The Securities Act must be regarded as ultra-conservative, but even so, it is the object of unceasing attack from a powerful section of the financial world. The N.I.R.A. is another matter. It is the central charter of the Roosevelt policy. From this remarkable measure has developed the organisation and the extraordinary activity of the Administration's second half-year; and around it, as one cannot fail to note, a great deal of English speculation and criticism has been spun—characterised, as it seems to me, by less knowledge and discernment than one might have expected. Members of Parliament and others who have visited Washington and run through the Middle-West return to England, impressed by the renewed energy of America, but confessedly unable to understand the basis and aims of the recovery policy. Mr. Stanley Baldwin is not alone in describing President Roosevelt as a dictator wielding powers going beyond those of a Mussolini. Mr. Runciman and Sir Josiah Stamp represent what is no doubt a large percentage of the business community unable to believe that Rooseveltian America can be headed for any destiny save a catastrophe greater than that of 1929 or 1932.

And yet the Roosevelt policy is no mystery. It sprang directly out of the conditions of financial and industrial crisis in which the Hoover epoch ended. Its stages appear to be not only natural but inevitable. And President Roosevelt's personal leadership shines in our contemporary world with a freshness and lightness which, one might have thought, should have won enthusiastic plaudits for him in England. What, then, are the aims, and what is the philosophy, of the New Deal? Can these be summarised in terms that would be accepted by the President and his present advisers? Undoubtedly they can; and I venture to think they may be stated in terms that should be of especial interest to those British people who are conscious that they themselves are living under a régime of an altogether different character. The Administration of Franklin Roosevelt is the one great democratic government in the world that is committed to a positive, creative, adventurous policy.

The most revealing sentence in the President's inaugural

address contained a statement that the American nation had called for action. The New Deal is based upon the belief that a democratic government should be able to devise a policy of action that will avail to arrest the descent of a great nation into the economic abyss and to make a fresh start on the upward road. Mr. Roosevelt was convinced before taking office that the American people were demanding to be led out of their prolonged defeatist mood; they were not willing to be overwhelmed in economic disaster; they were willing to be led into a great co-operative effort of self-help. Here is the central fact of the situation; and if we were to invite an explanation from any one of those advisers of the President who have from time to time expounded the purposes of the New Deal, we should get a statement not materially different from this.

The recovery programme, which cannot be separated from a long-range policy of reconstruction, is first of all an endeavour to adjust the American form of society to the fact (or what in our time has had to be described as the curse) of Plenty. In other words, it stands for a considered effort to make the benefits created by mass production available for the entire population. Under the industrial system hitherto, Plenty has been thought of merely as over-production, a condition of affairs involving severe discipline in the form of industrial unemployment and financial liquidation. We are compelled to face a growing refusal of the people to think of Plenty in this fashion. And, moreover, it is no longer a question, as one authority puts it, merely of obtaining for ourselves the maximum benefits made possible by mass production; it has become a question of preventing mass production from bringing about our destruction. We must accordingly adjust the inequalities that lie within industry, and those that exist between industry and agriculture. Steel and motor-cars cannot flourish upon a bankrupt coal industry, nor can industry be maintained against a bankrupt and pauperised agriculture. The post-war years have provided overwhelming evidence of the fact that the adjustments which have become imperative cannot be made if the so-called natural forces are allowed to operate unchecked. Four years of depression in the United States created an army of the unemployed not less than one-third of the total population of Britain. Relief funds under the system prevailing until the

close of the Hoover period were exhausted, and in Congress it was repeatedly asserted that before the end of 1933 the unemployed might reach or exceed the staggering figure of 20 millions. Action, therefore, could not be delayed. The most conservative Senators were speaking in favour of a Bill that would impose a working day of six hours, a working week of thirty hours. No American Government in 1933 could have refused to move forward with a recovery and reconstruction programme. And, therefore, the Roosevelt Administration produced the N.I.R.A.

The primary aim of the Act was to arrest the calamitous decline in the purchasing power of the community; hence the proclamation of a minimum-wage policy under the emergency measure of regulation known as the Blanket Code. The indispensable first step, it was assumed, was to put a firm bottom under wages in those industries which, harassed by cut-throat competition, were driving wages down to the utter destruction of the worker's buying power. The too prevalent notion that America is a land of general high wages had been continuously exploded during the depression; but until the revelations began at the hearings relating to the N.R.A. industrial codes, the American public had no realisation of the shocking levels to which wages had sunk, in the textile trades and elsewhere. Since—as the debates in Congress had made clear—all parties were at one upon the plain necessity of restoring consumption power, a minimum-wage policy was unavoidable, and with it a movement for the immediate abolition of child labour and a shortening of hours. The former was regrettably overdue, while a standard short working week was increasingly seen as a necessity for a land in which technological unemployment is an outstanding feature.

No people are more ingenious, or more active in ingenuity, than the Americans, when once they set themselves to grapple with a problem. The National Recovery Administration had the appearance of a huge improvised machine, and it was natural to assume that it must move slowly and with difficulty in grappling with a national problem of almost unimaginable complexity. But the rapidity of its organisation was remarkable, and the force of its attack along a hundred roads has been a marvel. President Roosevelt, it is admitted, has not been uniformly successful in his appointments, but there

appears to be a general recognition that the N.R.A. could hardly have attained its present dimensions without the personality of its Director, General Hugh Johnson. His voice is loud and his methods are rough-handed. But it might be easy to argue that a gentler administrator would not have been of much use in dealing with the hard-boiled representatives of big business and of Labour, who, since the making of the industrial codes began, in the early autumn of last year, have provided absorbing occupation for the army of N.R.A. officials in Washington. General Johnson is completely identified with the N.R.A. Not a few of his public addresses have contained effective statements of the policy as well as a forcible defence of his own methods, and, while not long ago the newspapers were printing conjectures as to his probable removal, at the time of writing he would appear to be in secure control of his unique department. It is the centre of an amazing development of democracy which, as one may suppose, the American people can never have expected to see in a time of peace.

The new codes are wholly characteristic of contemporary America. It is said that they contain nothing particularly new in method, that they are nothing more than a huge and elaborate expansion of our trade boards. That may be so, although I should cite the Agricultural Marketing Act as a more adequate British analogy. But the interesting and important features of the American code system are to be found in its enormous scope, its general acceptance, and the rapidity and thoroughness with which the machinery for discussion and compliance has been built up. Within a brief space of time nearly all the greater industries have been brought under codes, the most notable fact in this connection being the willingness to come in, after a natural interval of hesitation, of such anarchic or monopolistic industries as textiles and steel. By the beginning of 1934 more than 200 codes had been negotiated and passed through. The activity in the departments continues to be feverish, and the expectation is that the larger part of the fields of manufacturing and commerce will be covered before the end of the N.R.A.'s first year. The codes are first of all agreements of fair practice. They are designed to establish tolerable minimum standards. Their object is to regulate, not to abolish, competition; to avoid the fixing of prices and to protect the consumer public

against monopolist interests. A criticism frequently heard is that the codes have enabled big business to escape the irksome restrictions of the anti-Trust Act, so constantly referred to and so insistently evaded. There is no doubt the codes do this; but the defence of the Administration would be that the anti-Trust Act has never prevented monopoly, while the manifest tendency of the codes is to achieve a measure of equality as between employers, employees, and consumers. One serious practical objection is that evasion is widespread and enforcement almost impossible; that, for example, the codes have not by any means eliminated child labour, while the recognition of trade unions—an essential provision of the N.R.A.—is still being refused and violently resisted. These complaints are only too amply justified. The N.R.A. has not brought industrial peace. On the contrary, it may be said to have produced conditions which appeared to encourage industrial strife. Since the Act was passed, eight months ago, the country has been seething with strikes, while in many areas notorious for the savagery of their conflicts the New Deal has had a bitter baptism. No one can be surprised at such things. Coal, steel, and textiles in America are synonymous with bloodshed and oppression, and in some other industries unionisation has never been possible. The right to organise and to bargain collectively is in the Act; but there are groups of employers who will go to any lengths in resistance or evasion. The recovery policy has brought a great increase of strength to the labour unions. But it has also emphasised the defects of organised Labour and revealed the unfortunate results of a movement which, during half a century, has pursued policies only too nearly parallel with those of the reactionary associations of employers. For the first time, however, the unions have the advantage of position, and if the code system is maintained, their advantage will increase. Full recognition of the right to organise is the line of manifest wisdom. American labour unionism is brutal because it exists in the atmosphere of war. The way to eliminate the poison of hate and violence is to admit the right which in a non-fascist State cannot be indefinitely denied to Labour.

So far I have spoken only of the N.R.A. The question is open to doubt whether, in respect of actual policies and expedients, the record of the Roosevelt Administration since

last summer has not been more important or more successful in the enormous department covered by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. I have heard it maintained that, while the N.R.A. is concerned with matters over which a large note of interrogation must hang, the A.A.A. is achieving in a notable degree that restoration of economic balance between industry and the agrarian order upon which the official defenders of the New Deal are apt to lay most stress. I do not see how a positive opinion can be expressed upon this point. Both departments are vastly and continuously experimental. They are both alike built upon the assumption that the Government of a great modern State must actively concern itself with a redistribution of the national income, conceived of as consuming power. And, in the present stage of the United States, the A.A.A. includes as a major part of its purpose the subsidising of the farming community in respect of an agreement to limit production. But the yield of the earth, under modern conditions, is largely independent of acreage, and we cannot tell how far the purposes of the A.A.A. are likely to be defeated by Nature and the American farmer.

It would seem to be almost indubitable that the success of the N.R.A. programme must depend upon the chances of world recovery. If it be true that economic conditions are decisively improving, then those conditions will carry the Roosevelt policy. In England, as we know, it is believed that the general upward movement is well on the way. In America opponents of the Roosevelt Administration are contending that the actual movement began towards the end of 1932, and that the N.R.A. has had the effect of retarding those forces which, given the free play of American economic life, should by this time have been operating in strength. Obviously, it is impossible to prove anything of this kind. The Roosevelt Administration must in any event have been forced into a national recovery policy for the reason that, even if the upward turn had been unmistakable, the millions of destitute unemployed could not have been left to starve. A great public works programme would have been entered upon by any Administration, however cautious, in 1933. Mr. Roosevelt obtained a vote in Congress for a Bill permitting the expenditure of \$3,300 millions, only to discover in the course of a few months that the task of laying out that vast sum was beyond the capacity of a Federal Administrator.

The next step, therefore, was the creation of the Civil Works Administration—the C.W.A., which during the past three months has had continuous prominence in the headlines and has absorbed the attention of civic authorities and relief workers all over the country. The quota system of the C.W.A. has furnished a considerable portion of the home news. Every county and city has had its appropriation, and hence the C.W.A. has been the one hope of multitudes in distress. A total of four million men and women put into jobs is the generally accepted estimate; but as the spring approaches, the question arises, How can the Administration hold to its first intention of breaking up the C.W.A. as an emergency department, and, given the necessity of continuance, which is as certain as anything can be, how is this addition to a budget already stupendous to be met?

This question brings us to the central problem—that of income and expenditure. Mr. Roosevelt's budget statement of January dealt with an estimated annual expenditure of \$10,000 millions. The American people gasped, and then seemed not to be unduly appalled. Perhaps they found some degree of assurance in the President's forecast of a balanced budget by 1936; but in any case, the calmness with which the figures were taken is to be read as evidence of two important realities—the President's standing in the country and the American people's complete emancipation from the mood of the Hoover epoch. Mr. Roosevelt's position, so far as one can judge, is altogether unimpaired. It would be difficult to challenge the statement that he is stronger at the beginning of his second year than he was at the thrilling moment last spring when the American people awoke to the fact that they had elected a Chief Executive who was at once a decisive ruler, a masterly administrator, and a brilliant popular leader. The difficulties and perils of 1933 put him in positions of danger from time to time. There was a dismal interval before the launching of the national recovery programme. There were weeks of acute anxiety towards the end of the year. The currency experiments, the gold-buying policy, the threats of inflation, the lengthening period of misgiving in the business world before the decisions leading to the Gold Bill of January—these and other events and influences appeared, at intervals during the second half-year, to imperil the President's popularity or authority.

But no danger so far has been serious for him, no storm has gathered head. His management of every problem as it has emerged could hardly have been more skilful. His handling of Congress is no less assured and successful than it was during the first astounding session. The press contains plenty of criticism, and some powerful dailies are not only outspoken but are already merciless in criticism. Mr. Roosevelt can afford to leave them unanswered, while in contrast with his predecessors he shows no sign of irritation under attack. He keeps in reserve his unequalled power of persuasion over the air, having wisely come to the conclusion that a President, while feeling free to talk on ceremonial occasions, should be careful in his use of the radio for statements of policy and appeals for public support. Franklin Roosevelt has yet to be tried in the fire, and tried beyond all question he will be. At present we can hail him as by far the most attractive man occupying high office in any part of the world. On January 30th, 1934, the American people accorded him an anniversary celebration which, in spontaneity and universality, must be described as unparalleled. This was his 52nd birthday. If it should be given to him, in 1935, to enjoy his 53rd amid circumstances in any way comparable, Franklin Roosevelt will indeed be a world's wonder.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

New York, Feb. 10.

LIBERALISM AND LIBERTY.

THREE years after losing sight in both his eyes, Milton wrote in a sonnet to Cyriac Skinner :

What supports me, dost thou ask?
The conscience, friend, to have lost them overplied
In Liberty's defence, my noble task,
Of which all Europe rings from side to side.

England has no Milton to-day, no organ voice like his to denounce in melodious verse and resplendent prose the cruelties of religious and racial bigotry or the oppression of nations by tyrants crowned and uncrowned. His outspoken abhorrence of persecution, whether by priest or presbyter, his holy wrath at the massacre in Piedmont, his incomparable *Areopagitica* against the censorship, his defiant vindication of a free commonwealth at the risk of his life when he saw the approaching restoration of the Stuarts—these surely are words and deeds that entitle John Milton to head the roll of our libertarians.

But it is a noble company. Among Milton's contemporaries we count Pym and Hampden, the protagonists of parliamentary government, and the learned Selden, whose *Liberty above all things* is so often cited by his eloquent admirer Mr. Isaac Foot. Then there is Algernon Sydney, the last great Englishman who died on the scaffold for freedom, and William Penn, who testified in Quaker fashion* for a toleration which Locke's philosophy soon helped to establish on a rational foundation.

Nothing makes me so proud of being an Englishman as the thought of our long line of illustrious heroes and martyrs—saints and sages, poets, prophets, philosophers and statesmen—who have built up the edifice of law and custom and tradition that gives every citizen an equal right to think aloud, to act, speak, write and vote as his conscience dictates. For more than two generations we have been so accustomed to breathe the fresh invigorating air of freedom that we have fallen into a sort of lethargy. Public spirit is somnolent. Liberalism is only half awake. Even the rantings of Sir Oswald Mosley and Sir Stafford Cripps fail to rouse it from

* See especially *Trial of William Penn and William Mead at the Old-Bailly in London*, 1670—a rare pamphlet of which I possess an excellent reprint by Headley Bros., London, 1908.

this drowsy fit. English Liberals are rubbing their eyes and wondering that events abroad and at home are calling them back to the noble task which their famous leaders and thinkers—Charles James Fox, Bentham and Mill, Cobden and Bright, Gladstone, Campbell-Bannerman and Morley—seemed to have completed. Even to-day one hears feeble voices raised in the Liberal Party begging us to refrain from such “negative and unconstructive work” as the defence of personal, political and economic liberty. There is a silly school of writers in the so-called Liberal Press which would confound Liberalism and Progress with every encroachment of State Socialism upon individual rights, with every movement “to the left.” As if civilised progress did not depend upon independent thinking, and on the free initiative and enterprise of individuals over the whole range of human activity. As if it had begun in the Fabian Society and ended in Moscow!

Is it not time to revert, in the words of Wilhelm von Humboldt (cited in Mill's *Liberty*), to “the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity” as the grand leading principle of politics?

That personal liberty is in jeopardy even in its chosen home, no cool observer of parties, no student of Hansard, no intelligent reader of the newspapers can doubt. How different the atmosphere from that in which John Stuart Mill penned his famous *Essay on Liberty*.

“The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by,” so wrote Mill in 1859, “when any defence would be necessary of the ‘liberty of the Press’ as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear.”

But while he felt fairly confident that in Great Britain and in other constitutional countries a Government more or less responsible to the people was not likely to suppress or coerce opinion unless it thought the people wished it to exercise such coercion, Mill emphatically denied the right of a majority of the people or of their Government to silence a minority, however small. The opinion of an individual may be right or it may be wrong. In either case it ought not to be

suppressed ; for if it be right, other people are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth ; if it be wrong, "they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error."

All that Mill has to say on the subject ought to be read and re-read ; for it is all-important that we should grasp the full significance of freedom of discussion and realise that it is an imperative condition not only of civilised progress but of happiness—at least for every human being who is capable of citizenship. No doubt there are in every country a large number—in some countries a majority—of servile minds, unworthy of the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, devoid of public spirit, insensible to art and science, and only fit to be drilled and disciplined. What fills one with dismay is that nations, well educated, and well advanced in manufactures, science and the arts, should have fallen since the War under the rule of dictators, who have not only stamped out ruthlessly almost all vestiges of political freedom, but have introduced a system of punishments and torture almost medieval in cruelty. That every form of personal liberty, including the right to own property, the right to run a private factory or open a private shop, the right to farm one's own farm and to enjoy the crop one has sown and reaped, should have been swept away in Russia under the inspiration of Karl Marx, is less surprising than that civilised countries like Germany and Italy should have submitted to systems of National Socialism, which (while preserving property and economic liberty for those who are not proscribed) have annihilated all self-governing institutions and deprived those who were previously citizens of the moderate share in government which they used to enjoy. Such a spectacle, and the feeble resistance offered by the countrymen of Luther and Garibaldi to the new dictatorships, may well make us ask whether our own constitutional safeguards and bulwarks are strong enough to resist a panic, a famine, or even a temporary wave of emotional fanaticism or political insanity. There is need for the warning, finely expressed by an old Greek poet, that the rights of citizens and the independence of States are secured not by fortifications but by the men who man them.

So it is with internal liberties. Under the strain of war, Magna Charta and Habeas Corpus were of little avail against

D.O.R.A. ; and we have seen even a Conservative Parliament adopting measures of a character so bureaucratic, and so repugnant to the traditions of English law, that a clever Socialist barrister like Sir Stafford Cripps welcomes them as providing an instrument and a precedent for a Socialist dictatorship, while his rival, Sir Oswald Mosley, is trying to organise a Blackshirt revolution. Moreover, it is quite possible, if not probable, that the new régime of tariff protection and quotas for food may before long lead to such a scarcity and such profound discontent among both the employed and unemployed that, by polling two-fifths of the voters, under the present electoral system, Labour may gain a Parliamentary majority as large as that held by the Tories in the present Parliament. With a three-party system this peril can only be met by adopting Proportional Representation, at any rate for the towns. Here we are reminded of Mill's wisdom and foresight ; for among the bulwarks of personal liberty he laid great stress upon the importance of giving not only free expression to the opinions of minorities but a fair representation to them in the House of Commons.

English Liberals used to be proud of the freedom of the Press. We are less proud of it now, partly because its editors are less free and its writers less independent. For this the Press magnates and the syndicates are mainly responsible. I should like to see two reforms. First, no company or individual should be allowed to own or control more than one morning and evening daily paper. Secondly, there should be some means of compelling editors to print letters challenging their views, provided that such letters are reasonably concise and courteous. It is something that any person, if he has enough money, can publish a newspaper, a book or a pamphlet. It is something that the half-dozen London papers which command a wide circulation are not under one control. But with the exception of *The Times* I don't think that one of them admits as a rule letters from individuals opposing the policy of the editor or proprietor on matters of political importance, though such exclusion is certainly bad journalism. One often hears the complaint that preachers can say what they like from their pulpits uncontradicted and uninterrupted, although there are thousands of preachers and pulpits exhibiting the utmost diversity of doctrine. But in the dozen or so newspapers which claim to have circulations of

half a million and upwards there are hardly any voices that deserve to be heard. I doubt if one of our Press magnates would hold his position if he had to submit his qualifications to a competent and representative jury of his fellow citizens.

Happily the standard outside London is much higher. There are a number of excellent newspapers which treat their opponents fairly. They give honest reports of speeches and open their correspondence columns freely to the views of independent people. Mill was quite right when he demanded freedom of discussion. Without that, freedom of the Press may be of little value. If for instance at the present moment the only newspapers circulating in England were the *Daily Mail*, the *Daily Express*, the *Daily Herald*, and the *News-Chronicle*, the opinions of genuine Liberals and genuine Conservatives would be practically silenced.

Let me give a personal illustration which will serve to point the moral. On November 29th of last year, after consulting a number of prominent Liberals, I wrote the following letter to the Editor of the *News-Chronicle* for publication :

"I observe that in your correspondence columns to-day, an anonymous Liberal ex-organiser endorses your attack on Sir Herbert Samuel and the Liberal Party in the House of Commons for not voting for the Labour Party's Amendment to the Address. If Sir Herbert Samuel were to go with the Labour Party as you suggest, and were to ignore the complete irreconcilability between the aims of English Liberalism and English Socialism, his Party would rapidly dwindle and would become at best a small and despised ally of the Labour Party.

"The general plan of the Labour Party, as revealed by the Hastings Resolutions and by the leaders, is to socialise or confiscate the banks and other key industries, as part of a general plan for the extinction of private trading and private capital. Personal and civic liberty would inevitably disappear in the process. In so far then as Sir Herbert Samuel and his colleagues distinguish their aims from those of the Labour Party, and revive the Liberal tradition, including Free Trade and Public Economy, they will deserve, and should receive, the support of all true Liberals."

The Editor, Mr. Aylmer Vallance, acknowledged my letter but did not publish it. A few days later I wrote again saying :

"I cannot see that either your answer to my letter or your editorial contains any justification or excuse for refusing to allow

any expression in the *News-Chronicle* of the views of that great body of Liberal opinion which supports Sir Herbert Samuel and his colleagues against Mr. Lansbury and Sir Stafford Cripps, and regards it as vital to the existence of the Liberal Party that its economic aims should be clearly and definitely dissociated from those of the Labour Party.

"Neither I nor any of my friends make any claim to interfere with the editorial policy of the *News-Chronicle*. I have no doubt that you are conscientiously convinced that the Labour Party is progressive in a good sense and that its objects deserve Liberal support. Whether, while professing to remain a Liberal newspaper the *News-Chronicle* is entitled to support the Labour Party and deride the Liberal Parliamentary Party, only those responsible for its conduct can decide.

"What I do dispute is your moral right to suppress all Liberal criticisms and protests. Such action on the part of a Liberal organ of opinion is an affront to freedom of thought and discussion. If your policy is right, you need not be afraid of criticism. Freedom of discussion is a birthright of English Liberalism."

I also mentioned that when Editor of the *Economist* I never excluded a letter, however much I differed from it, provided it was civil, grammatical and reasonably concise ; and I reminded Mr. Vallance that the late Mr. C. P. Scott, probably the greatest Liberal journalist of our times, opened the correspondence columns of the *Manchester Guardian* quite freely to all views. Mr. Vallance's reply showed that he was not prepared to budge from his position. I thereupon wrote describing his persistent suppression of Liberal opinions with which he disagreed, as obviously illiberal and unfair in the case of a newspaper which is supposed to embody the great traditions of the *Daily News* and *Daily Chronicle*. I added :

"In so doing you have, in my opinion, and in that of friends, whom I have consulted—including several competent authorities—lowered the standards of Liberal journalism ; and, what is more serious still, you have prevented thousands of Liberals throughout the country from knowing that there is a large, and, as I believe, a vastly predominant body of Liberal opinion which strongly opposes your policy and disapproves of the projected alliance with Socialism.

"In these circumstances, I propose to circulate this correspondence ; but before doing so I beg to ask whether you have any objection to the reproduction of your two letters."

Mr. Vallance thereupon refused to allow his letters to be published, but promised to state his policy at some length in the *News-Chronicle*. To this I replied on December 9th, 1933, reiterating and reinforcing the argument and recommending him to procure a copy of John Stuart Mill's *Essay on Liberty*, "wherein you will find a chapter on freedom of thought and discussion." A few days later Mr. Vallance published in the *News-Chronicle* a portrait of himself and a signed statement which included among his articles of faith Free Speech, Liberty of Conscience, and Freedom of the Press.

Those who follow my advice to the Editor of the *News-Chronicle* will find towards the end of Mill's chapter a paragraph on the mischiefs of political intolerance and the value of nonconformity. "Unless," he writes, "opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and to individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale is sure to go up and the other to go down. . . . On any of the great open questions just enumerated, if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be tolerated but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority." Strange as it may now seem, he went on to say: "I am aware that there is not in this country any intolerance of differences of opinion on most of these topics."

It is curious that most of the London newspapers, including the *Sunday Times* and *Observer*, are quite tolerant about non-political questions. They do not insist that all scientific men and all who have opinions differing from theirs on art, music and literature should be silenced. Indeed they welcome and encourage controversies about the colour of a poet's eyes or a disputed pronunciation. Even religious heterodoxy is permitted. But the *political* ground on which the editor treads is sacred. *Favete linguis*. Let no profane tongue be heard. Let no unorthodox voice be raised. How much better is the policy of the New York papers. The *Herald Tribune*, for example, a severe critic of President Roosevelt's policies, publishes regularly a widely read signed article by a Liberal

Democrat, Mr. Walter Lippmann. It relies for its editorial influence on the ability and persuasiveness of its leading articles, and I have no doubt that its circulation is much wider because its policy does not exclude the views of dissenters, which appear almost daily in its correspondence columns.

Liberalism has many aspects. A good Liberal is a patriot as well as a citizen of the world. He is not merely a Party man. Good Liberals may differ on such questions as whether direct taxation is too high, or whether there should be this or that expenditure on a public service, or whether a subsidy should be increased or diminished or cancelled. There is room for much diversity of opinion on foreign policy and disarmament even among those who love peace and hate wasteful expenditure. But differences of degree may become differences of kind, as they did when the Liberal Party joined the National Government to enforce economy and balance the budget, or when they left it rather than share the responsibility for a protective and preferential tariff.

What then are the distinguishing marks of Liberalism? The most important certainly is a passionate devotion to liberty in its widest and most comprehensive sense as the main element of progress. "The only unfailing and permanent source of improvement" (to quote a weighty sentence from Mill) "is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals." The enjoyment of liberty by the individual citizen and his independence are founded upon legal and constitutional rights; first of all upon the security of his property, with the right to earn, to save and to spend as he chooses, after he has paid his rates and taxes, and secondly on his constitutional right to control, so far as he can by vote, speech and writing, the proceedings of Parliament and of the local authority in the district where he lives.

"This is true liberty, when freeborn men
Having to advise the public may speak free."

There is always a danger that the securities for personal property will be destroyed by confiscatory taxation. To the Socialist, no argument is required for increasing national and local expenditure for the purpose of enlarging what are called

"social services," or of adding to the unemployed dole and to the wages of public servants, who are already as a rule remunerated on a scale more generous than that which can be paid by the principal industries of the country. Nor do the leaders of the Labour Party see any difficulty about providing for increased expenditure, either by borrowing, or by issuing paper money, or by raising still higher the income tax and death duties.

One may say, I think, that the Liberal theory of public economy is founded on Gladstonian principles. At the present time most Liberals believe that a reduction of taxes would stimulate trade more fairly and more permanently than a big programme of public works, involving as it must an increase of taxation and a consequent diminution of individual expenditure. Liberals also believe that, owing to the great fall in prices since 1925, the burden of taxation has become much too heavy and is one of the main causes of bad trade and unemployment.

Those who have seen Russia, or studied the failure there of the attempts to create an industrial state and to maintain agriculture, understand why Socialism will not work. There is a system of punishment, but no adequate rewards. You have a system of State control and ownership of land and capital as complete as any practical Socialist can hope to get in this world, and also as little of personal property and political and economic liberty as is conceivable. Until quite lately, the Russian experiment has been praised to the skies by our English Socialists. We have been told to admire and imitate it; but the result is now seen to be utter failure, economic misery, and famine conditions constantly recurring. As a substitute for incentives to work in a free country like ours, you have economic conscription and the terror behind it. Socialism, of which Soviet Russia is the most complete modern fulfilment, may be defined as any theory or system of social organisation which aims at extinguishing private capital and private management of industry, and would socialise, by confiscation or otherwise, banks, and all the instruments and means of production, putting an end to free trade and competition. In brief, Socialism means monopolisation of the means of distribution and production by the State.

These ends and objectives will be found in the Hastings Resolutions of the Labour Party, and in the reports or

pamphlets which expand and explain them, as well as in the speeches of their leaders in Parliament, especially of Mr. Lansbury and Sir Stafford Cripps. The whole "plan" is explained comprehensively in *Problems of a Socialist Government* (Gollancz, 5s.). The first steps towards the extinction of private property and private trading are to be the seizure of the Bank of England and of the banks, and the "socialisation" of bank deposits. The banks and the staple industries of the country are to be managed by Committees of Socialists. The internal and external trade of the country is to be controlled by Import and Export Boards, appointed by the Socialist Government. "State planning" is one of the catchwords borrowed from Mr. Cole by Mr. Walter Elliot, who has explained that "the policy of the quota is the policy of planning trade." In pursuance of this policy for British agriculture, he boasts, "drastic and far-reaching measures have already been carried through."

The path towards Socialisation and the extinction of economic liberty has indeed been made much easier by our present National Government. It has given a lead by showing how Parliamentary control over the executive can be got rid of. The new protective tariff, the quotas and the regulation of agriculture, are being carried on by what have been fairly called "Star Chamber" devices. Large instalments of Protection and Socialism have been introduced, and put into effect by Orders in Council. On May 29th, 1933, during the Report stage of the Agricultural Marketing Bill, Sir Herbert Samuel moved an amendment to omit a clause providing that "the making of an Order in pursuance of this Section shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this Act have been complied with." But the Labour Party was delighted with the provision. "This is an excellent precedent," said Sir Stafford Cripps, "which will be followed widely in the future, and seems to us in every way to be desired. We shall be delighted when on future occasions [as Ministers] we have to draw the attention of hon. Members opposite to the excellence of the precedent."

Again, later, on July 5th, 1933, when an Order made under the Imports Duties Act was being discussed, Sir Stafford Cripps on behalf of the Labour Party said: "We desire to put it upon record decisively that this is a mode of procedure which, if we get the opportunity, we shall adopt in an increas-

ing measure. . . . We hope we shall be able to utilise it for just such measures as the transference of the national wealth from one lot of people to another." The connection between Protectionism and Socialism, not only in aims but in methods, has never been more clearly brought out than by the present Protectionist Government and the present Socialist Opposition. The propertied classes who support the National Government because it is supported and controlled by the Conservative Party under Mr. Baldwin may find before long that they have weakened, if not destroyed, the constitutional safeguards on which they have hitherto relied for security against confiscation and revolution. This is the penalty for carrying selfish and unfair legislation by unparliamentary devices.

Burke was fond of reminding impatient reformers in his day that true liberty, the most valuable of all the possessions which men derive from self-governing institutions, cannot exist without law and justice. To enjoy these three blessings in peace is the ideal of good Liberals. To extend them by wise reforms, careful administration and sound finance is the perennial task of Liberal statesmanship.

FRANCIS W. HIRST.

THE NEW ATMOSPHERE IN THE BALKANS.

MANY reasons account for the marked improvements which have been apparent lately in the political atmosphere of the Balkan States. The better perspective granted by time for reviewing events, the imperious craving of Governments to obliterate the effects of the world crisis by mutual understanding and the development of common interests, the fact that the peoples of South-Eastern Europe are much better disposed to one another than a casual survey would lead the ordinary onlooker to suppose, constitute the main factors of a very welcome change. The friendly contacts which have taken place in the Balkans, even if they do not culminate at once in agreements signed by all, are happy omens of a future of peace.

Let me briefly summarise the facts. The journey during last August and September of King Boris of Bulgaria to Western Europe, his two meetings with King Alexander of Yugoslavia, the successive visits to Sofia of the Turkish Prime Minister and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the Rumanian Foreign Minister, M. Titulesco, of the Hungarian Prime Minister, General Gombos, and his Foreign Minister, M. Kanya, and the two meetings between the Bulgarian and Rumanian sovereigns and their respective Prime Ministers, have caused much discussion about a new orientation in the foreign policy of Bulgaria. As regards Bulgaria herself there is, however, no new orientation; Bulgaria since the World War has not swerved one inch from her political programme based on the wish to entertain friendly relations with all her neighbours, and to remain one of the factors of European peace. The recent events, therefore, as far as Bulgaria is concerned, are the logical results of this policy. Through these meetings and conversations Bulgaria has intended to arrive at a settlement of the various questions in suspense between herself and her neighbours, as well as to improve her political and economic relations with them.

It is on the other side that the welcome change of weather is apparent, showing as it does that Bulgaria's neighbours have grasped the fact that Balkan unity cannot be achieved without her. Bulgaria fully realises the importance of this reconciliation, for in the Balkans it seems more difficult than elsewhere

to bury the hatchet. The Bulgarian people have considered all the recent meetings as sincere attempts made for the removal of the misunderstandings existing between Balkan countries, attempts which also emphasise her desire to prove her goodwill. As public opinion represents a greater force in Bulgaria than in most countries, the Government, in accordance with these interpretations, appears to have no special intention of signing agreements or concluding pacts. This result may, however, follow in due course, but as an English writer remarked lately: "Within recent months, Bulgaria has been the recipient of much advice and frequent appeals; it will be better to let the words spoken have time to bear fruit than to stultify them altogether by premature action."

A new agreement was concluded on February 9th between the Governments of Greece, Turkey, Rumania and Jugoslavia, but I decline to call it a Balkan pact, for under that name, without the participation of Bulgaria, it would be quite meaningless. On February 5th, Mr. R. Davies asked the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's Ministers in Jugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria had received instructions to express His Majesty's view as to the terms on which peace and co-operation might be best secured in the Balkans, and whether such terms provided for the application of full rights under the minority treaties for the Bulgarian minority in Jugoslavia. Sir John Simon answered as follows:

His Majesty's Ministers in the countries concerned have, on my instructions, informed the Governments to which they are accredited that His Majesty's Government would welcome any pact between the Balkan States tending to general pacification and co-operation, provided that it is not directed against any other Power or Powers. It would for this reason be desirable that the terms of the pact should, if possible, be so drafted as to secure the accession of Bulgaria. In reply to the last part of the question, provisions for the application of the minority treaties are already contained in the treaties themselves and in the rules of procedure laid down by the Council of the League of Nations.

I will refer to the minority question later, but I warmly welcome the British Foreign Secretary's statement.

The idea of a Balkan pact is by no means a new one; since the Balkan Crusade against the Turks in 1912, schemes for

the grouping together of the Balkan States have ranged from the ambitious ideal of a federation of all the countries to the more modest plan of a pact of non-aggression. We have had during the last decade Balkan conferences, Balkan gatherings, Balkan religious meetings, all demonstrating the increasing tendency of these nations to emancipate themselves from the political and economic influences of Western Europe. May I recall that the first peace treaty ever known to have been signed between two enemies was a product of the East: the Treaty of Ramses II with Hattusil, King of the Hittites, 1250 B.C.? Recorded on silver tablets, the text was placed on the market-squares of all the villages of Egypt and of the lands of the Hittites, and for many centuries there was no warfare between the peoples of Egypt and Syria. The friends of the Balkans would rejoice to put up similar tablets all over the troubled peninsula, but the hour has not yet come.

Concerning this question of international agreements I would like to quote the eloquent words written in 1887 by a French statesman, the Duc de Broglie, whose knowledge of foreign affairs was extensive.

Pacific tribunals and international pacts do not always produce an immediate effect in establishing peace between nations; one must be fortified with patience and entertain no illusions. Respect for treaties has never been less assured than to-day; rival influences have never been so hard at work; but, on the other hand, never have so many efforts been made to bring nations together. We have not yet discovered the means of setting up an international tribunal powerful enough to end the quarrels of nations by arbitration. Two elements are missing which as yet it has been impossible to find: arbiters belonging to no special nation to deliver the judgment, and gendarmes wearing the uniform of no special army to enforce such judgments. But it is always better to settle international differences by diplomacy than to solve them by force!

The real Balkan pact, the one which must include the signatures of all the Balkan States without exception, must be based on the principle of give and take, and the new negotiations cannot be made in the same spirit as the post-war treaties. We should substitute for the theory of *le droit du plus fort* a comprehensive study of mutual interests, which would enable the Balkan States to inaugurate a new era of realistic politics based on the reciprocity of needs. This cannot be brought

about in one day. Any experienced student of the problems of the Near East would agree that there is no immediate necessity for a Balkan pact. The new atmosphere brought about by the recent *prises de contact* is in itself more beneficial a result than any of us would have dared to hope for a year ago.

The State visit of King Boris and Queen Ioanna to Belgrade in December was a success, certainly due in great part to the charm and dignity of the Royal visitors and the cordial welcome of their Royal hosts; but there was an unmistakable note of popular rejoicing in the streets of Belgrade at the reconciliation of the two "Slav" brothers. There was no official stiffness, but an atmosphere of friendly understanding enhanced by the fact that King Alexander and Queen Ioanna are first cousins. The State visit has been followed by an exchange of visits by groups of Bulgarian and Yugoslav journalists, artists, students, musicians, authors. In Sofia, there have successively been concerts given by the Yugoslav choir, *Obilitch*, with 160 performers; an exhibition of Yugoslav art opened by the Yugoslav Artists' Association, *Oblik*; a visit of 32 members of the Yugoslav P.E.N. Club, who, with their Bulgarian colleagues, voted a resolution which would compel responsible authorities to guarantee the free sale and circulation of literary and artistic works in their two countries. This shows that the Yugoslav authorities must intend to lift the ban hitherto imposed upon Bulgarian books and papers. A Bulgarian-Yugoslav review has been started. Four Commissions in Belgrade have opened negotiations with Bulgaria for a commercial treaty and conventions governing veterinary arrangements, communications and the simplification of passport facilities. There have been other most hopeful signs that the two countries are paving the way for a friendly settlement of their long-standing differences, though no impartial observer could fail to admit that great difficulties have yet to be overcome before a thorough understanding can be reached.

"Get not your friends by bare compliments, but by giving them sensible tokens of your love"; these words of Socrates should be remembered just now by the neighbours of Bulgaria. The difficulties of securing agreement are perhaps best understood by examining Bulgaria's position with regard to the other Balkan States. Some of their differences have been settled, for instance as regards reparations, but between

Bulgaria and Roumania sources of controversy remain in the treatment of Bulgarian nationals in the Dobrudja. I will not insist on the dangers of the policy followed by the Roumanian authorities, in that district peopled by Bulgarians and Turks, of dispossessing the inhabitants by forcing them to surrender their homes to aliens. This persecution has driven large numbers of Turks from the Dobrudja to Turkey, and has embittered the tranquil Bulgarian peasants against the local officials to a dangerous degree.

Between Bulgaria and Greece there is a list of financial differences, the same thorny question of the Bulgarian minorities under Greek rule being deprived of the rights guaranteed to them by the treaties, and the unsolved problem of Bulgaria's outlet to the Ægean Sea, as provided by Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly. Fifteen years have passed and Bulgaria has still not been granted the use of a port on the Ægean. At the present moment, Bulgaria is cut off from access to the Ægean, although the Treaty of Neuilly was actually signed on the understanding that Thrace should be placed under some form of international control. The question is vital as regards the economic situation of Bulgaria; for as matters now stand trade between the Western Powers and Bulgaria is most seriously hampered by the fact that ships travelling between England and Bulgaria follow the route Salonika-Smyrna-Constantinople-Varna, while if Bulgaria could use the port of Dedeagatch 1,000 miles of sea journey would be saved, thus ensuring lower freightage and quicker delivery of goods. Under the present conditions, the commercial relations between Bulgaria and Great Britain are unavoidably restricted. At the time of the Lausanne Conference, 1922-3, a proposal regarding an outlet to the Ægean was put before Bulgaria, but with provisions and reservations that would have involved her in great expense without giving her sufficient guarantees.

Regarding Bulgaria's relations with Yugoslavia, the question of minorities has been the great stumbling-block. During the troubled years since the war, she has certainly not expected her neighbours to give up a square mile of territory for the sake of peace; but she has often asked them to apply the elementary rules of justice in their treatment of their Bulgarian minorities. I have quoted Sir John Simon's allusion to the special treaties regarding the rights of minorities. These

treaties have not been fulfilled. The Bulgarian minorities are still deprived of cultural rights of church, schools, even language; they are denied the exercise of all civic rights; the States now in possession of territories peopled by minorities, instead of applying to them a special régime of benevolence or at least a régime of transition, have enforced methods of centralisation that one might call compulsory assimilation. During the last few years Bulgaria has made repeated appeals both to the League of Nations and to her neighbours to enforce the fulfilment of the terms of the minority treaties. The situation has not improved. The States in possession of minorities, when questioned about their administration, have answered so far: *Noli me tangere!* The minorities, not having been granted the promised improvements, ask: How long will you tax our patience? From the League of Nations comes the usual answer: "Wait and see!"

Certainly after the harsh régime imposed on the Macedonian province in the recent past, the Yugoslav Government will have to provide a basis on which Bulgaria can negotiate; for the Bulgarian Government has to reckon with public opinion. It would be a mistake to deny the existence or the importance of the Macedonian question: "Conceal the wish of a Slav under a fortress and it will blow up the fortress," said Joseph de Maistre. But it would be difficult for the Macedonians to persist in harbouring a grievance if the clauses of the minority treaties were fulfilled to the letter by Yugoslavia. Fair treatment for the Macedonians is the Bulgarian public's perpetual request. Bulgaria should also be granted equality of armaments in proportion with the forces of the neighbouring States.

I have enumerated the outstanding obstacles which impede the path of Balkan friendship, but none of them are insuperable. Regarding a general agreement the elements of success are all at hand: time, wise leadership and a friendly atmosphere. I do not think I shall be contradicted if I state that King Boris of Bulgaria is one of the principal factors of the Bulgarian *rapprochement*. The same age as the Prince of Wales, and in many respects resembling him, he has a steady breadth of view and balance, the statesman's mental calm which is the real sign and seal of the governing mind. With great personal charm, extraordinary courage and unlimited power of work, beloved by his subjects and pledged to his country's welfare, King Boris is the nation's most valuable

asset. He has never failed Europe, and once again he is playing his usual modest but powerful part at one of the most important hours of Balkan history. It is a personal satisfaction for him to have entered into relations of friendship with King Alexander of Yugoslavia, a monarch equally conscious of his responsibilities, whose sound common sense should be a great asset just now to the Balkan cause.

Reading between the lines of the Royal speeches, made during the official visit of King Boris to Belgrade last December, one detects stronger currents of feeling than customary Royal greetings. King Alexander, in proposing the toast of his Royal visitors, said: "My people are sincerely happy at your visit. We have never ceased to believe that the exceptional qualities and good sense of Your Majesty have always served the idea of peace and understanding and friendly relations between our two peoples. I am profoundly convinced that only a policy of peace and consolidation of the existing order can secure for our peoples the full guarantee for a better future." King Boris, in answering, "I and my people greatly appreciate the noble efforts that Your Majesty has devoted to the idea of peace, understanding and good relations between our two countries," paid a personal tribute to the work of his Royal colleague. But the Bulgarian answer did not take up the reference to the "Policy of peace and consolidation of the existing order," for, alas, there can be no existing order and no peace in the Balkans till the Dobrudja and Macedonia are granted the integral application of the clauses of the minority treaties. One can detect exactly the same note in the Royal speeches at Bucharest; but I can only repeat that these little hurdles in the path of success are not unusual obstacles and may all be cleared in good time.

Bulgaria is not asking for favours but for legitimate rights. She maintains her original standpoint that the conclusion of pacts of non-aggression in the spirit of the League Covenant would be the surest means of guaranteeing Balkan peace. Article 19 of the Covenant: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world," is at the disposal of all negotiators working for peace.

I always feel that the words "Peace to men of goodwill"

were made for King Boris and his people; they have given countless proofs year after year of their wish to heal their war wounds by pacific remedies only and to live on good terms with their neighbours. No one could expect Bulgaria to consent after so much patient waiting to enter new combinations which guarantee the security of others and to sign a document which does not guarantee her own. Her neighbours wish to retain all their gains, but do not propose to help her to obtain the fulfilment of the international stipulations guaranteed by the peace treaties. She is sometimes accused of having mysterious intentions and hidden plans; nothing is less true. She has been, and remains, a stickler for correct procedure as regards the carrying out of the treaty clauses. She has claimed her rights, again and again, through the correct channels.

It is impossible to pursue any longer in the Balkans a policy of mending and patching. Moreover, Balkan countries should remember that from the point of view of international politics, and apart from their own troubles, they are always placed in a difficult position. "These nations," said King Nicholas of Montenegro once, "represent the small change (*menue monnaie*) of the Great Powers!" The Balkan States are apt to be exploited instead of helped by the Great Powers of Europe; they can no longer afford to be pawns. Separate treaties and divisions, or a combination of a handful of States, directed against other States, will not help the Balkan nations or promote the peace of Europe. They only provide weapons instead of harmony. A new Balkan Peninsula, a new "Near East," must be founded on relations of mutual friendship drawn up in broad daylight. To quote a British friend: "When this stage is reached, the ground should be ready not for a mere superfluous Balkan Pact but for a comprehensive Balkan Union, which will pave the way for each of the Member States to a material prosperity to which they will all be strangers while they remain separate units."

All hopes lie in the younger generations of the Balkans, led by their present staunch rulers. The three kings have been important factors in the Balkan reconciliation, and King Boris, most constitutional of monarchs, has performed, with exemplary tact, the delicate mission entrusted to him by his people. The Roumanian Sovereign is equally sincere in his desire to cement a lasting friendship with Bulgaria, a friendship based on historical associations; for Roumanian armies

fought alongside the Bulgarians at Plevna, and Roumanian territory was always hospitable to Bulgarian refugees during the period of the Bulgarian insurrection against Turkish rule. The three Balkan kings have served their respective countries well; since 1913 they have all performed similar gallant deeds, though in different camps; all three are excellent soldiers and patriots, bound to respect each other. King Boris, though the youngest in years (born in 1894), is the doyen of the three as ruler, for he ascended the throne in 1918. King Alexander, born in 1888, became king in 1921. King Carol, born in 1893, became king in 1930.

I well remember the coming-of-age of the then heir-apparent of Bulgaria in 1912. The festivity was attended by many Royal representatives, and for the first time the heirs-apparent of Serbia, Roumania, Greece and Montenegro foregathered in the Bulgarian capital. The celebration of the coming-of-age of Prince Boris coincided very significantly with the ratification of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, which was the prelude of the Balkan Alliance of the summer of 1912, one of the greatest diplomatic achievements of the time. That alliance led to a glorious general victory. Times have changed, and we want no more wars. But it is perhaps not too much to anticipate that if the expected gathering of the three Balkan kings once more takes place in the Bulgarian capital it will be a happy omen. Let us hope that the three monarchs and their Ministers, realising that "Peace hath its victories no less renowned than war," will then, by mutual understandings and by mutual concessions, again unite their countries in the achievement of a glorious Peace. The Balkan States are the links between the East and the West, and nothing permanent will ever be achieved regarding the peace of Europe without their collaboration. *Ex Oriente Lux.*

DIMITRI STANCIOFF,

Former Bulgarian Minister to the Court of St. James.

POLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY.*

ONE of the basic problems which faced Poland on her restoration was that of determining and fixing the broad lines of her foreign policy. Post-war Europe, in accordance with the doctrines preached during the Great War to the masses inhabiting the Continent, was to receive a more perfect structure than it had prior to 1914. The League of Nations was to be an international organisation whose influence on the course of political problems was to be, according to the conceptions of its founders, considerable. To-day, after several years of experience, I can say that Poland's opinion as regards the Geneva body is simultaneously positive and critical. Being fully in sympathy with the final objectives at which the League should aim (amongst them a prominent place is occupied by the postulate that the peaceful and amicable coexistence of countries is to be assured), we Poles regard it as a body which ought to play an important rôle in the forming of post-war relations among the nations. But we also consider that the worst defect which is badly paralysing it is that it has no executive enforcing respect for its decisions in practice. In our opinion, it is not enough to want peace. Peace must be organised and we must be able to defend peace.

Please also note that as early as from about the fourteenth century, Poland at no time had a standing army. A form of militia was the only type of defence organisation in existence and service in its ranks could only be required for the defence of the country, and that only when the need actually arose. Poland indeed was wiped off the map of Europe as a direct result of the lack of a large, standing army which could have defended the territory of the Commonwealth against aggression. We Poles cannot but remember that after we had voluntarily (or, as we would call it to-day, light-heartedly) deprived ourselves of such a standing army, we—the first country in Europe to withdraw from the run for armaments—were then given an object-lesson which cost us about a century and a half of alien annexation. Hundreds of thousands of troops from neighbouring States invaded our country and help from outside was conspicuous by its absence.

Our historical experience and the traditions of our policies

* A lecture delivered at King's College, University of London, October 25th, 1933.

accordingly oblige us, in our own interest, to co-operate with all the efforts of nations or States aimed at joint and effective guarantees for world peace: they also oblige us to make a thorough examination of all projects for disarmament. On this account disarmament is, according to us, very closely connected with the question of security, and we consider the former to be dependent on the latter.

Poland has consistently worked for the condemnation of war, but I will cite only one instance, namely, her initiative in 1927 which led to the well-known resolution of the League of Nations Assembly binding all its members not to admit wars of aggression. The practical outcome of the Polish proposition was the Briand-Kellogg Pact, concluded at Paris in 1928 and containing a most solemn renunciation of war by all the countries signing the understanding. In spite of that document, however, and of a number of other international covenants, the feeling of security amongst the nations of the Continent has by no means been enhanced. In our opinion the reasons for this can be reduced to a single factor: namely, to the consciousness that, in addition to the most binding of statements and pledges against war, it is essential that still other means for ensuring peace must exist in order to meet cases where one or other of the parties disregards its solemn assurances, breaks its pledges and attacks a neighbour. In fact, as we understand the matter, the decisive force in such a situation would not be merely moral but also physical aid to the attacked country, and the menace of punishment for the aggressor committing that international crime which war undoubtedly is.

According to Poland, disarmament as a universal system for the automatic creation of security is an impracticable conception, if only for the reason that, with the present development of the exact sciences, it is impossible concretely to define what are instruments of war and what are not. Thus it was that the Committee of Experts at Geneva clearly expressed their opinion that the technical possibility of banning chemical warfare really does not exist, since, in order to make its prohibition effective, it would be necessary to destroy the whole chemical industry. With such a situation facing us, further complicated as it is by many other political issues, it will now be clear why the Polish delegate to Geneva advocated the conclusion of a limited agreement long before

the crisis in the Disarmament Conference was officially acknowledged. He considered it wiser to pass from the quicksands of maximum postulates to the firmer ground of what could be positively attained at the time.

Speaking of these guiding principles which would bring about disarmament by stages, I beg to draw attention to what the Polish Government emphasised last year in connection with the Five-Power Agreement of December 11th, 1932, and the so-called "equality of rights." Poland, in consort with a number of other countries, has taken up the firm attitude that agreements between individual States, or mutually binding understandings concluded by them, can have no obligatory force on the decisions of such a collective body as the Disarmament Conference and, moreover, cannot bind countries not participating in such agreements. We likewise want to have it made clear that, in case of danger, not only a classical outbreak of war should be taken into consideration, but also any acts which might be accompanied by the use of force.

In this respect I can refer to the Pact concluded by Poland with the Soviets and with a number of other Eastern European countries in London on July 3rd, 1933. This agreement proves that the Polish definition of an aggressor and of aggression which is not limited only to classical outbreaks of war, can lead and has led to international treaties being concluded on that basis. We consider that the success of disarmament action is strictly dependent on appropriate guarantees of security—whether these are of general or only regional scope. Until such guarantees are furnished we prefer—just as England does with regard to her navy—to put our trust in our own power and consider our army to be in the nature of an insurance premium paid for the security and independence of our native land.

It is certainly characteristic that the whole budgetary expenditure of Poland for her army of 250,000 men is exactly half the German estimates for the 100,000 force of the Reichswehr. The cost of maintaining this army accounts, it is true, for a considerable portion of our national budget; but, following up the simile of the insurance premium, we all know that the cost of insurance rises according to the neighbourhood of the insured object; it is always much enhanced if there are, for example, ammunition dumps or stocks of explosives or of inflammable substances near by.

The situation is also complicated by the fact that there are some statesmen who couple the problem of disarmament and security with treaty revision. Here I must make clear one thing. In Poland we by no means hold that international agreements can be valid and binding through all eternity. We continue to share the view that the exigencies of life can, and often do, bring about the revision of various international understandings. But we state, and this is our firm, immovable attitude, that changes in any treaty stipulations can only ensue on the mutual consent of the interested parties being attained, and the possibility of the revision of such a binding treaty is certainly excluded when one of the signatories flatly rejects all attempts or suggestions which it holds to be really attacks on the integrity and independent existence of its country.

The revision of treaties is, we consider, equivalent to the evolution of political relations with the changing needs of normal neighbourly relations expressed in due legal form. All changes and additions contrary to the text of the original agreement constitute revision. Poland, basing herself on this standpoint, has concluded a number of supplementary treaties, has revised the text of the original Polish-German Transit Convention of 1921, and has agreed to the revision of the contractual stipulations in respect of optants. At the same time we believe that if every international agreement has to be changed as soon as one of the parties threatens recourse to war, then it would appear that every agreement or treaty would lose its value, becoming but a scrap of paper, dependent on the good or bad will of one of the signatories. Should, however, the vital interests of Poland be threatened, we shall know how to defend our country and its independence with all the resources and strength at our command. I mention this only because the importance of this fact has not always been properly appraised in recent years.

I now pass to another matter of first-rate importance: that of the protection of minorities. We consider that the system set up after the war is unjust. As you doubtless know, Poland was the first of a number of countries to sign the Minorities Protection Treaty. But, please, take this into consideration: whilst Poland has on her soil about 800,000 citizens of German nationality, of whom only 300,000 are on territory formerly held by Germany, there are over a million

Poles living on German soil. With the exception of those living in German Upper Silesia, this Polish minority is deprived of the most elementary international protection. In addition, the existing protection of Poles in German Upper Silesia is due to end when the Geneva Convention expires in 1937.

Both from the point of view of a proper care for the millions of Poles living outside their native land, and from that of the most general considerations, Poland believes the position of the protection of minorities to be untenable in its present discriminating form. For this reason the Polish delegate at Geneva recently strongly supported the motion that Minority Treaties should be generalised, i.e. that they should become operative in, and be binding for, all and every country having national minorities within its boundaries. The motion has not been accepted. Poland will, nevertheless, continue to support this demand, and if this is not attained it will prove impossible to maintain the present status, in which inequality of rights and all the consequences that discrimination entails have become only too glaringly apparent.

Since I have touched on one of the points connected with Polish-German relations, I shall, with your permission, outline the basic aspect of Poland's foreign policy in this very important domain. Poland's western frontier originally ran along the line of the river Elbe, and embraced the island of Rügen, Kolberg, Stettin, and, of course, Danzig. During the past thousand years of our history Poland has lost 200,000 square kilometres of territory in favour of Germany, this area roughly equalling a half of present-day Poland and two-fifths of contemporary Germany. The great historical process in Polish-German relations consisted in the struggle for the Baltic and its shores. In spite of the diminution of Poland's territory in the west, her maritime province of Pomorze remained an integral and actual part of the Polish Commonwealth until the Partitions, with only one break during that time, from 1328 to 1466. In addition, this Polish province of Pomorze always through the centuries specially separated East Prussia from other German territories.

I would emphasise, further, that in the ten centuries of Polish-German relations, Polish forces have never crossed the German frontier. On the other hand, the rôle played by Prussia in Poland's history is well known. The epilogue of

cutting Poland off from the sea, the seizure of Pomorze and the dismemberment of the Commonwealth—these are all facts too well known to require elaboration. For us at the present day it suffices that, as a result of the Great War, a considerable part of the territory of the former Polish Commonwealth has been restored to us, in this manner undoing the crime of the Partitions. Our victory in the war of 1920 furnishes the conviction that, when all is said and done, we owe our independence to ourselves. This has been well pointed out by Lord d'Abernon in his remarkable book *The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World*.

But at the same time, we Poles, who have, as a nation, been spared none of the direst experiences of history, are determined to repel all and any attempts to repeat such a history: and we hope to do so the more effectively that contemporary Poland, in respect of her organisation and strength, in no manner resembles the Polish Commonwealth of the eighteenth century. When Germany understands this, when the Germans revise their thousand-year-old policies regarding Poland, then they may perhaps realise that contemporary Poland, if left in peace, does not intend to exist either as an antagonist of Germany or as a dependant of Germany, but on an equal footing with her. Such a simple formula is of great importance. It furnishes the key to our German policy, namely, that our attitude towards Germany will be identical with that of Germany towards us; it lends support to the conviction that two countries having two thousand kilometres of common frontier, and supplementing each other economically, should in their own interests and in those of the whole family of European nations coexist normally.

On the other hand the claims for revision of the Polish-German frontier advanced by the Germans during the last fourteen years are recognised by us to be a continuation of the policy of conquest carried on by Frederick the Great at the expense of his neighbours, a policy which, since the world war, is being disguised under a new cloak of words. For Poland the term "corridor," used in respect of our province of Pomorze, has no meaning. All we know is that we have a province called Pomorze: that it is larger in area than Alsace-Lorraine; that it has a population of a million souls, i.e. not much less than independent Estonia; that Poles form 90 per cent. of this population; that the province belonged to

Poland for 650 years before the Germans seized it ; that it affords us our only access to the sea, and that 67 per cent. of our foreign trade, being sea-borne, passes through that province ; and lastly that the Baltic-Eastern-Central Europe trade route leading through that province is the only one not under the control of Germany.

All this does not mean that we fail to understand that for Germans it may really be unpleasant to look at a map of Europe as it is to-day, and that the present *status quo*, which lasted for that matter for whole centuries before, is repugnant to their sense of prestige. We quite understand that this may be so. But please remember that whilst in the case of the Germans only an unpleasant feeling is registered, in the case of the Poles supremely important and vital issues arise which are decisive for our national existence and economic welfare.

A parallel with which you are all acquainted will perhaps make the position clearer to you. The Canadian province of British Columbia is in respect to the American State of Alaska in the same position as Pomorze is to East Prussia, always, of course, with the difference that the United States has never made the absurd claim that its prestige suffers thereby. But to make the parallel more exact, Canada should be imagined not with an Atlantic seaboard but as a large country wholly dependent on British Columbia for contact with the outside world, and transacting 67 per cent. of her trade through Vancouver. What would be your attitude if a foreign country were to demand that British Columbia be given up with a million British inhabitants to an alien power ? I cannot doubt that it would certainly be the same as the Polish attitude as regards German pretensions to Pomorze : a decidedly negative one.

Besides, two areas connected by all the most modern means of communication are not, practically speaking, separated from each other. The province of Pomorze, through which are conducted the telegraph lines of a foreign country, through which German citizens travel to and from East Prussia freely without visas or customs examination, through which scores of thousands of German goods-wagons and military material pass by paying the very same tariff as on German lines, does not practically constitute a real obstacle in the domain of communication. The fact that, during the twelve years of existence of the Mixed Transit Tribunal through Pomorze,

only two petty complaints have been filed is the best indication as to what conditions exist in this field.

As I have already said, Poland's foreign policy is based on respect for existing international treaties and for our rights independently of any political fluctuations which may arise. A characteristic example of this attitude of ours is afforded by the Polish-Danzig Agreement concluded last year. During the last election campaign in the Free City of Danzig, one which brought victory to Hitler's party, fear was expressed in some Western countries as to what Poland's attitude might be in the face of the course events were then taking. For Poland's foreign policy, however, the matter was quite clear. We considered then, as now, that, regardless of the flag under which the Danzig Senate may sail, Poland remains the co-proprietor of the port of Danzig, necessary to her for economic reasons, and that she is therefore directly interested, and can be expected so to be, in the integral maintenance of her internationally sanctioned rights in that area. Both the agreements of August 5th, 1933 : that in respect of Poland's utilisation of the port of Danzig and that in respect of the rights of Polish citizens and of the Polish minority in the Free City, furnish indisputable evidence of these trends in our policies. I believe that, in the light of the clear-cut postulates of Polish foreign policy as outlined by me, the visits exchanged last year between the Polish Prime Minister and the President of the Danzig Senate need little comment. Mr. Rauschning, it may be remembered, visited Warsaw once again a month ago. Polish-Danzig relations have certainly in this case yielded a practical test of our political principles, based on tradition, respect for our rights and a proper appraisal of actual reality.

With regard to Poland's neighbours I may recall that at the beginning of November the Polish Premier, speaking in Parliament, made use of the following words :

Wherever we see practical possibilities of a betterment of our relations with other countries and the strengthening of the feeling of mutual confidence, there we are at all times ready to collaborate sincerely and actively. This allows us to add a constructive element to the common work and efforts of all European nations. Those efforts aim at stemming the tide of discontent and have as their goal steady, objective, and above all constructive work for the rebuilding of international solidarity.

A notable illustration of this statement has been furnished by our subsequent relations with Germany. Soon after the Premier's announcement, the Polish Minister in Berlin called on the German Chancellor and political conversations took place which were in entire keeping with its spirit.

In regard to another of Poland's neighbours, I cannot neglect the opportunity of pointing out the contrasting and increasingly positive shaping of Polish-Soviet relations. The various stages of the progress attained are marked by the Polish-Soviet Pact of Non-aggression, signed in July last year; the Conciliation Convention of November in the same year; and the Pact of Eight, containing the definition of an aggressor, concluded in London this year. When M. Titulescu, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, visited Warsaw on the 9th of October, he had the opportunity to hand in, on behalf of his Government, to the Soviet Minister in the capital of Poland, the ratification document concerning this important pact. This document had been sent to Moscow, and simultaneously with its deposition in the Soviet Foreign Office on the 16th of the same month, the Polish Minister to Moscow presented a similar instrument on behalf of the Polish Government. This aspect of Polish-Soviet relations is a noteworthy expression of the decided desire for peace and stabilisation in that part of Europe.

Poland's policy of defensive alliances remains to be commented on, and her special attention must be devoted to our allies, France and Rumania. Our relations with France have their deeply rooted historical traditions. They supplement a community of interests and they aim at the assurance and the maintenance of peace in Europe. As regards our second ally, Rumania, I cannot but draw attention to the fact that the efforts for peace made by the foreign policies of the countries concerned and ourselves have resulted in Rumania and Russia signing a momentous political pact introducing the stable element of peace into their mutual relations.

This picture of Polish foreign policies would not be complete were I not to touch on Polish-Lithuanian affairs. To this day, unfortunately, we have no normal diplomatic relations with Lithuania, but we believe and hope that time and the traditions of the past will help to bring it about that Polish-Lithuanian relations will assume the character of an economic and political community of interests, in which the two

sovereign States will be able to co-operate on terms of mutual confidence and respect. Finally, there is another field—a most important one in Europe—where Poland's rôle and influence, whilst not generally realised in England, is of great importance. I allude to current Danubian affairs. I wish only to state that in connection with our economic and political situation on the cross-roads of the great trade-routes of Central Europe, our participation would not only enhance the prospects of successful political action in that part of Europe, but seems to me altogether indispensable.

In this sort of paper it has, of course, been impossible to describe Poland's foreign policy exhaustively and in detail. I trust and believe, however, that the broad lines of our traditional and present policies have been made clear. These can be summarised in three conclusions, which I challenge anyone to deny or disprove:

1. Poland's foreign policy is marked by the total absence of aggressive tendencies regarding any of Poland's neighbours.
2. The efforts we have put forth in the realm of stabilising and strengthening peace have been great and arise from a profound conviction and proper appreciation of our own interests.
3. Our motto has been and still is: Peace at any price, but never at the cost of the fundamental rights of our country or its vital interests.

Since the above lecture was delivered its encouraging references to the future of Polish-German relations have received a crowning exemplification in the Declaration concerning the relations between Poland and Germany, signed in Berlin on Friday, January 26th, of the present year. Concerning this Declaration, the *Gazeta Polska*, the Polish semi-official paper, wrote, in its issue of January 27th, while the ink was yet fresh on the signatures of the Pact, that "it binds Poland and Germany to refrain from any violation of the peace in their mutual relations during ten years at least—and thus binds them not only morally but legally. Also, it lays down the principle that any questions which may arise between the two States can only be settled by a method mutually accepted by each of the parties. Furthermore, it contains the formal statement of an obvious truth, namely, the unchanging nature and obligatory force of the several international agreements and alliances entered into by Poland."

ADAM TARNOWSKI.

THE PHENOMENAL AND REALITY.

AT the recent Tercentenary Commemoration of Spinoza in Holland, a remarkable address was delivered by Dr. H. F. Hallett, Professor of Philosophy at King's College, London, one of our ablest and profoundest philosophical thinkers. In his eulogy of Spinoza, Professor Hallett expounded, with approval, the underlying principles of his philosophy. In the course of his address he remarked:

"It is a fundamental principle of the philosophy of Spinoza that all ultimate problems of the nature of the Real are metaphysical problems susceptible only of metaphysical solution. Theology, Ethics, History, Science yield at best only phenomenologies, and at worst vain superstitions."

Having declared, following Spinoza, that "Thought and Extension are ultimate characters of the Real," and that, while irreducible, "their ultimate dualism is an intolerable burden," and having given reasons why both these conclusions are irresistible, Professor Hallett went on to deal with the doctrine of Value. He observed that "we hear much in these days of the Eternal Values without close inquiry into their reputed eternity and adequacy," and then went on to remind his hearers that

"Spinoza himself connects, and I think rightly connects, these ideas of Value with the belief that Nature as a whole works to some end, and in particular that all things are made for Man under the operation of final causes or purposes. There is nothing more characteristic of Spinoza, both in his iconoclastic and in his most religious moods, than the rejection of final causes in the interpretation and explanation of the Real."

Having referred to the three Values—Truth, Goodness, and Beauty—and observed that Holiness has a longer history than any of these three, since "men were religious before they were philosophers, moralists, or critics," Professor Hallett declared that these Values "do not belong to the Real as it is in itself but emanate from the finite nature of Man in its relation to external things." "They have no reference to the infinite." Even Truth "cannot be predicated of total Reality." Perfection and Imperfection, according to Spinoza, "are terms all too often used to signify no more than

that a thing does or does not fulfil the purposes of its author. As thus used these terms must not be applied to the Real which never either reaches or falls short of a preconceived plan; for Nature does not work to a preconceived plan." Professor Hallett concluded by saying that "the philosopher can afford to wait in patience while phenomenologies are elaborated towards their ultimate self-contradictions, while half-truths dispute, and superstitions arise and wilt." He had previously remarked, with Spinoza, that "it is amazing that it should ever have been thought that the argument for the *consensus gentium* had the slightest validity, since nothing is commoner among men than vulgar errors." It is clear from these quotations that the revival of Spinozism, not merely as a great philosophy of the past, but as supplying for the present the underlying principles by which the Universe should be explained, raises the profoundest challenge to the claims made on behalf of all the great Values by which human nature is coming to itself that they constitute a true, though imperfect, revelation of eternal Reality as it manifests itself in Time.

A good deal of Professor Hallett's exposition and criticism must be accepted as true. To begin with, it is true that all attempts to unify Thought and Extension are open to serious criticisms; whether those of Idealists, who have sought to translate the materiality of Extension into terms of Thought or, still more, those of Materialists who have endeavoured to destroy the independent significance of Thought. Man cannot transcend the subject-object relationship by which the whole of his experience is conditioned, although, on the other hand, the course alike of physical science, of psychology, and of philosophy is tending to transfer to Thought much that has hitherto been claimed for the Materiality of Extension. Yet this dualism, with the ever-increasing ascendancy within it of Thought, must be transcended, in a way inconceivable by Man, in the eternal perfection and consciousness of God. Again, the crudities which have marked the Common Sense of Mankind must not only be acknowledged, but insisted upon.

Furthermore, it is true that "all ultimate problems of the nature of the Real" are problems, "susceptible only of metaphysical solution." It is the province of Metaphysics to deal with them, and if this task be abandoned, Metaphysics

will be permanently out of work. Yet, in attempting this its peculiar task, Metaphysics must have regard alike to Theology, Ethics, History and Science, and must not lightly dismiss them as "at best only phenomenologies." After all, the Metaphysical impulse has arisen out of them, and all have been alike aroused and impelled by the Real, as presenting to them the Cosmos, which conditions Man, and of which each from its special point of view and for its own special purposes seeks an interpretation. All are, in common, the offspring of Reality, and therefore, all contain, in differing degrees, the revelation of its Nature. Even Metaphysics cannot altogether escape the relativity and finitude by which the others, just because they are human, are enmeshed.

Again, it is obvious that Spinoza was confronted by many childish versions and applications of the doctrine of Final Causes, which naturally irritated him and provoked what Professor Hallett describes as his "biting criticism." If the doctrine of Final Causes is to be upheld it can only be as a statement of the deep-rooted faith that Man, as the apex of the evolution of which we are aware and as a spiritual though finite being, proceeds from God and that his temporal experience, despite all his imperfections, is the promise and process of his ultimate return to God in fulfilment. All else, if suggesting Final Causes, must be interpreted as subordinate and ancillary to this supreme end. All must be seen in the light of that "one far-off, Divine, event to which the whole creation moves."

Finally, it is in the light of this procession from God and return to Him that the Spiritual Values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness should be estimated. It is doubtful whether Holiness should be added to the list. For Holiness is a quality of Reality and an attitude towards it, as it manifests itself in the tri-unity of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. Worship is impelled to recognise the existence and to pursue the experience of the as yet undiscovered, the inexhaustible, fulness of these Values as Divine. The Holy is the hinterland and the source of the True, the Beautiful and the Good. The Numinous is not the "altogether other." In the earliest consciousness of it, it contains the faint promise of disclosure and thereby attracts attention and pursuit. This pursuit is rewarded by the growing revelation of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, by which the Awe that

dreads, passes into the Reverence that appreciates and adores. The meaning of the Supreme Values cannot be apprehended, if Man, as phenomenal, be isolated from the Reality in which his being is grounded and from which, in common with the rest of the Universe, he springs. When Man is thus seen to be grounded in a Reality, which transcends him and to which he is relative, then the Values, which he comes to reverence and pursue, are seen by him to be the golden links between him and that Reality, and to reveal, in forms relative to himself, the Nature of Reality in itself.

Hence everything depends upon the view that is taken of the relation between the Phenomenal and the Real. Upon this subject I venture to offer the following considerations.

The naïve consciousness of Mankind assumes that Phenomena manifest Reality. The phenomenal and the real are not divided from one another, but belong to one system of existence. Apparently the initial consciousness of an infant would present to it a unity, undivided into Thought and Extension, into Self and Not-Self, were it not for the activity—his own and that of others—which produces changes of relation between the child and his environment. Not only do these changes take place, but the infant takes his part in producing them by his own activity, which, starting with restlessness, soon becomes incipient desire and conation. Hence at the outset, the nascent experience of an objective and extended world is associated with and is partly the result of rudimentary will, as the cause of changes which present a succession of objects upon which it exercises itself. Hence the eventual distinction between Thought and Extension springs out of and carries along with it the impulse and intuition of Causality. Thus the primitive quest to which, first of all, the rise of Theology and then that of Metaphysics has been due, is not to discover an underlying and uniting Substance, but an explanatory Cause. This quest has been, to begin with, concerned with events taking place within the system of experience, if system it can at that stage be called, but has subsequently sought to discover a Cause of the system as a Whole. The primacy of this concern for Causality is indeed conceded by Spinoza when he affirms that *Substantia* is *Causa sui*, and therefore, presumably, is the Cause of its Attributes and Modes.

As Intelligence grows and begins to claim its ascendancy,

the quest of Cause becomes the demand that this Cause shall be a Sufficient Reason. This qualification of Cause as sufficient Reason leads on to the assumption that this Cause is both the First Cause and that its character is such as to explain its effects. These effects must manifest and satisfy their Cause. By means of this mental development it comes about that what is nowadays termed the Numinous eventually becomes apprehended as God—or gods, the Supreme Cause and in Himself the sufficient explanation of what exists and of what takes place. Creativity is implicit and by and by becomes explicit in this idea.

This is not all. Man eventually discovers that he is the effect of a Process, and is himself an agent, truly co-operative though apparently insignificant, in its advance. What emerges in history, both cosmic and human, is a process, which appropriates, subordinates or even supersedes, and thus transforms, what has gone before. The activity of Man himself is thus transforming in proportion as he advances in self-realisation. As he looks out upon the Cosmos, Man discovers a universal process of which his own development is an illustrative part. Hence this Process is eventually construed as revealing stages and degrees of Reality, and these come to be estimated and graded by the Values, which disclose themselves as the objects and ends that direct, and explain by satisfying, his unfolding and advancing nature. Thus, to quote the words of Weyl in his book entitled *Space, Time, Matter*, men become

“inspired by the conviction that reason is not only a human, a too human, makeshift in the struggle for existence, but that in spite of all disappointments and errors it is yet able to follow the intelligence which has planned the world, and that the consciousness of each one of us is the centre at which the one light and life of truth discovers itself in and from phenomena.”

As Sir William Miller puts it in his book, *The Place of Mind in the World*, “polarising into subject-experience and object-experience does not coincide with the division into mind and thing, for the object-experience remains with mind.” There is, in short, a sense in which even the human mind embraces matter, for the perception—let alone the explanation—of the world as a Cosmos, means that the Cosmos has become the object of mind—that it is “deeply interfused” with mind—

without losing its subordinate independence, so far as human minds are concerned. If this account be true, then instead of affirming that “Theology, Ethics, History, Science yield at best only phenomenologies,” we shall conclude that in so far as they do this, they conduct us into the presence of Reality, as it discloses itself for particular purposes to finite minds. It is possible to exaggerate the distinction between Metaphysics and these other activities of the human mind, as Roman Catholic philosophers do when they magnify the objectivity of Reason, or rather of ratiocination, and so depreciate the value of subjectivity as to resent its importation into the discussion of theological problems. After all, Reason, while it rightly claims the supervision of all else, proceeds from the same human source as Intuition, Imagination, Morality, and Aspiration. Both the analysis and the synthesis of Reason are dependent for their material upon the synopsis of intuitive experience, however liable to be crude and mistaken.

For the purpose of this discussion, everything turns upon our judgment in regard to the category of Causality. Is it only phenomenal, or is it a primary and determinative revelation of Reality? Is it true that, to quote Professor Hallett, when Descartes produced and made use of “the ontological proof of the existence of Perfect Being” he made “a real advance on his first anthropological proof in terms of causation”? What if the Perfect Being be causative because He is perfect? It was assumed by Spinoza that causality in pursuit of Final Ends must needs imply a poverty that needs satisfaction. May it not at least equally stand for a wealth that must needs overflow in Self-impartation? Is not this latter conclusion borne out by the fact that Existence, as we know it, is not static, but processive, and that its process is a universal, and not a merely provincial, feature of its being? Spinoza, as has been already observed, carried the category of Cause into the realm of Reality by his statement that Substance is the Cause of itself. What is more important is that Kant’s philosophy broke into two pieces over this problem. Having placed Causality among the Categories of the mere Understanding, and, therefore, treated it as enclosed in the phenomenal realm, which is shut off from noumenal Reality, he felt compelled to attribute noumenal freedom to the Will, and to treat Morality as conveying a revelation of

Reality, the possibility of which was denied to exist within the limits of mere Understanding.

To sum up, the truth of the matter as it appears to me is as follows.

1. It should be impossible for philosophers to ignore or to belittle the significance of Time. All of us enter this world in Time, pass through, and pass out of it, in Time. The temporal experiences of our life start largely shaped and directed by the temporal experiences of our parents, and are handed down, in a similar way, to our children. Memory supplies the record, expectation the forecast of process in Time. The tradition of the family enables us to pass beyond it to history, as the record of a series of events in Time that reach out in every direction to practical infinity. These events have left their record both in literature and archæology. From them we pass out to contemplate and explore the terrestrial and then the cosmic records which convince us that the Universe itself is in a state of ordered flux, and can only be described as the present result of a process which has gone forward through the countless ages of past Time.

Our experience starts with the experience of Time within ourselves, and Time is manifested to us in the changes that take place around us, for example, in the succession of day and night, but also, and not least of all, in the changes wrought by our own activity as temporal. The pursuit of our ends through successive stages gives to us an experience of duration in change—that is of Time.

Yet Change and Duration suggest, as an antithesis, Changelessness and Eternity. And this antithesis of Time and Eternity is not merely the abstract result of metaphysical reflection. Men have both Time and Eternity within themselves. Their pursuits are in Time, but their satisfaction in attainment—in inward and qualitative realisation—lifts them, for the moment—a contradiction in terms that represents the truth—above the Time process into the dawning sense, not of duration merely, but of Timelessness—of Eternity, as the counterpart, though not ultimately the contradiction, of Time. "This is Life Eternal." Time and Eternity, as contrasted yet combined, are implicitly contained in the experience of men. Hence despite the truth that *Omnia exeunt in mysterium*, it is possible for men to hold that God "inhabith the Eternity" of changeless Perfection, and yet that He goes forth in the

activity of Self-manifestation and Self-impartation in Time. The statement of Plato that "Time is the moving picture of eternity" is for Men the poetic statement of a fact which is shadowed forth in human consciousness, though it transcends the limitations of conceptual thought.

2. It follows from what has been said that the experience of Process and the Form of Time are inseparably bound up together. Each is unthinkable without the other. Process is in Time; Time is revealed in Process.

3. This fact of Process in Time, born out of the consciousness of Activity, suggests, of necessity, both the Dynamic of Cause and the *Energeia* of realisation; the former being the means by which the latter—an ever-receding goal—is being achieved as End. Thus the doctrine of Final Causes springs out of the inmost depths and the characteristic deliverances of human consciousness.

4. The Process of Time appears, on investigation, to be systematic—a universal movement that, just because it must needs be *valued*, is seen to be upward, and, therefore, appears to be Purposive. A static world might conceivably be attributed to chance, but a world that moves towards the Higher in an ordered and interacting process, which is both human and cosmic, must inevitably be treated as Progress, and this, not merely *within* the Whole, but *of* the Whole. The very fact that "the things that are shaken" tend to pass away carries with it the accompaniment that there are "things that cannot be shaken," and that, therefore, abide.

5. This Process, seen as development, and interpreted as purposive, has culminated—so far as human experience is aware—in the advent of Man—that is, of beings who are the product of this development and whose nature is, above all, purposive. This purposiveness exercises a ceaseless urge, so that it extends to an ever wider range and essays to reach upward to an altitude which combines loftiness with universality. It ceaselessly endeavours to seek and to attain Truth, to appreciate and to achieve Beauty, to apprehend and to pursue Goodness. These Values are the Ideals by which Man seeks to discover, and not merely to discover but to fulfil, the meaning of the Universe, and to subordinate its Materiality to the ever completer manifestation and dominance of these Spiritual Values. Other creatures have apparently reached the goal of their development. So also has Man in his physical

development. Yet the finality of his physical development is accompanied by the spring of the spiritual development, the prospect and promise of which appears to be unlimited save by Reality itself. This Purposiveness of Man is aligned with, emerges from, and confirms the suggestion of the Purposiveness of the Universe.

6. From this quest have sprung Science and Art, Morality and Civilisation.

7. Yet what is even more significant, human experience has culminated in the sense of the Holy—in Aspiration, in Reverence, in the conviction of absolute Obligation, in the endeavour to obtain oneness with the Creative Source, which is also the Sovereign and Satisfying End. This oneness can only be reached in communion with the supreme Spiritual Values, in and for which Man is coming to himself. Theology is the persistent, though imperfect, attempt to describe and explain this, as yet incomplete, development in terms of human thought.

All this is phenomenal. It *appears*. But does it *manifest*? Surely it is Reality that is appearing and is manifesting its nature in terms of the humanity which, while organically related to the Cosmos, transcends, appropriates, and transforms it. The phenomenal is the Real in activity and revelation. It is the projection of the Eternal into Time. In the realisation of his spiritual nature through, yet beyond, commerce with the Cosmos, Man, who has come from God, returns to God. What Man is impelled to become, God eternally is. It is in the sense of the Holy, as adorable in its unimaginable perfection, yet as gradually manifesting itself in Truth, Beauty and Goodness, and making conformity with it obligatory upon Man, that Reality is revealed. The phenomenal in Man as he becomes Spirit, conveys to him and conducts him to the Real—that is to God. And God is revealed, above all, not in the totality of the Universe as a Datum, but in the progress of the Universe to a Spiritual End, which is its Final Cause.

J. SCOTT LIDGETT.

WILLIAM MORRIS, HIS INFLUENCE AND REPUTATION.

ONE hundred years ago, on March 24th, at Elm House, Clay Hill, Walthamstow, William Morris was born. Sixty-three years later he died after a life of ceaseless and buffeting activity as a poet, story-teller, designer, craftsman, lecturer, pamphleteer, political agitator and master printer. Now, four decades after his death, the verses have grown dusty on the library shelves; the very name *Earthly Paradise* is a mocking chimera in a world that sways and rocks in uncertainty: his Utopian communism, where to be happy is but to work purposefully and with beauty, seems equally removed from the proletarian despotism of Russia and the dreary collective bargaining of English Trade Unionism. In interior decoration simpler styles have replaced his furniture and the patterns of his wall-papers and chintzes. The wood blocks for the initials, ornaments and illustrations of his Kelmscott Press books are preserved in the British Museum with the condition that they shall not be reproduced or printed from for a hundred years; and the books themselves are hidden away beneath glass cases in the libraries of wealthy collectors.

Even Morris himself has for the popular mind a remoteness, a sense of oddity, which Mr. Max Beerbohm's cartoons in *Rossetti and his Circle* have tended to emphasise. The image of him that arises is that of a tousled bundle of a man, squatting on an enormous oak settle, with, as a background, a Burne-Jones panel and a lady or two working at embroidery: there he sits writing away endlessly, thin and sickly-sweet verses, or news from nowhere, of how everyone went back to handwork and medievalism, and laughed all day long in a clean, white England, beautiful and well-swept, the brave new world of an idle singer of an empty day, a reactionary, an escapist, a peddler of idle wares, out of contact with the pressure of contemporary circumstance.

It will not do. The picture that emerges from Dr. J. W. Mackail's graceful biography, the figure that leaps into life from any reminiscence of Morris, cry out to deny the popular conception of the man and his work. To all who met him he gave an impression of robustness and power, a wildness in the leonine hair and massive beard, with a compensating kindli-

ness in the eyes, while the rough blue serge jacket suit, the blue cotton shirt and collar, "loose at the neck without scarf or tie," emphasised the suggestion of shaggy strength and independence. Even if his work had proved completely sterile that personality would signify something, for he symbolised an attitude to life, one of untiring energy, an advocacy of the full and free development of every human potentiality, and a mute but irresistible courage whenever fate seemed possessed of an antagonistic malice.

His own avoidance of all introspection, his cheerful simplicity of vocabulary in discussing serious matters—"a chap can only do his best"—obscure his brave acceptance of the crises in his own life as commonplace incidents. He had gained confirmation for that courage—his only substitute for a religious faith—in the sagas, and he practised it unswervingly. It can be seen when in the most spectacular period of his success as poet and craftsman he courted misunderstanding and misrepresentation by determining to become an active member of the Social Democratic Federation. In those years honours were crowding in on him, the offer of a candidature for the Professorship of Poetry at Oxford, a Fellowship of his college, a professional commission that led him to the reception-rooms of St. James's Palace and to the hangings of the throne. He turned away from it all, as simply as a man out on a walk may choose to go along one path instead of another, and he kept his own counsel on what the decision cost him; kept it so quietly that some superficial observers would suggest that it cost nothing.

Nor is it that memory of his life which alone impresses him on this age. Even if his name is seldom on our lips, or his books in our hands, his influence moves amongst us in innumerable ways. Thus although the Kelmscott Press, that favoured child of his last years, has ceased to issue its beautiful books, Morris's influence on the resurrection of a tradition of fine printing permanently remains. He had established the Press not as a rich man's hobby but as a conscious attempt to reintroduce fine typographical work: to print books which would have a "definite claim to beauty while at the same time they should be easy to read and should not dazzle the eye or trouble the intellect of the reader by eccentricity of form in the letters."

What is true of the Kelmscott Press, the last of his activi-

ties, remains equally true of the rest of his work. The major part of his adult life was spent as an artist craftsman. He would probably have called himself quite simply a decorator, implying that this was a part of architecture, the manufacture of all necessary and comely things for houses, or for churches and other buildings. The designs, the chintzes, wall-papers, and dress materials associated with his name were to be modified, degraded, and exploited for commercial purposes. With a final irony the art which he had insisted was ultimately a conception of life was to become associated with a faddish mode, fashionable with the sophisticated for a time and then set aside, like every other fashion, as *vieux jeu*. But the lesson that underlay Morris's craftsmanship was far more important than any design he produced, and it remains one which we can ignore only at our own cost. He would have had us go up and down the earth destroying all the *impedimenta* of life, all pretentiousness that masquerades as beauty, every inanely decorative object that exists only for its own sham prettiness. He would have made such a holocaust to reintroduce simplicity into life, for he held tenaciously to the principle which he had learnt from Ruskin that art began in design governed by utility.

In his more despondent moments he would tell his audiences that the appreciation of art was in danger of dying out from our civilisation, and here he implied not the observation of pictures and vases in galleries and museums but the conversion of everything in life, down to the meanest utensils, into objects made beautiful by the worthiness of design. One dares not imagine what he would have thought to-day now that ill-contrived suburbs have been spawned around our great cities, desecrating "the noble craft of house-building," as he called it, with an equal shoddiness in many of the "lesser arts." He would probably have leapt into one of his characteristic rages and demanded that the heads of all the despoilers and perpetrators should be strung up along the Tower, and then more calmly, as in his own life, he would have given examples of work honestly done, so that even if one disliked the detail, one could not withhold admiration of its solid and serviceable merit in workmanship.

It has often been urged that Morris's work was nullified by a reactionary medievalism. That he had a deep attachment to the Middle Ages is everywhere apparent. He had grown to

manhood when creative minds—Carlyle, Disraeli, Newman—were being quickened by various medieval impulses, while his own masters in social and artistic conceptions, Ruskin and D. G. Rossetti, had elevated medievalism into a central doctrine in their creeds. But in his maturity Morris had an individual approach. Unlike Rossetti, he would not withdraw from all preoccupation with contemporary problems into a limited æsthetic world, nor like Ruskin would he commit himself to an uncompromising idealisation of medieval institutions. His own imagination lived in the Middle Ages, and when he wished to portray a more seemly way of life he turned naturally to them for his background, but he knew that the nineteenth century must work out its own salvation in another way. Thus while medievalism circumscribes the forms of his art, he makes in his social thought and in his discussion of the purpose of art a consistent and rational adaptation of medievalism to the conditions of modern life.

In his work as a craftsman he went back to the Middle Ages for the simple reason that he found in those centuries great traditions of design, in the same way as he found examples of type for the Kelmscott Press in the work of the Venetian printers of the fifteenth century. He was content that those traditions should be modified and developed, but when he began his activities he found present in the lesser arts, indeed in all that had contact with domestic architecture, no vestige of a tradition with which an artist could identify himself. If Morris be judged solely by the work he produced, then it can be affirmed that in his crafts and in his verse an adherence to medievalism in design, decoration and form cramps and sometimes even corrupts his individuality. But that limiting medievalism is no essential part of his central doctrine on the purpose of art in its relationship to life, nor does it in any way invalidate that doctrine.

He is equally lucid on his relationship to the machine. He distrusted the machine, but here modern civilisation has caught up with him and with Samuel Butler. Even before *Erewhon* was published he realised that the machine would become a menace to civilisation. For not only did the machine destroy craftsmanship but the machines had continually to be fed, so that the markets of the world were crowded with unnecessary and ugly wares. Yet Morris did not advocate a stubborn and reactionary policy for the abolition of machinery.

Wherever a piece of necessary work was mechanical he readily admitted that a machine should perform the work. The danger, he added, was that we should allow the "machines to be our masters and not our servants": ultimately they would destroy our civilisation; they would trample not only beauty out of life but even the memory of beauty. His position can be judged better from his lectures than from the *News from Nowhere*, which is after all more of a romance than a political tract, but the central argument is apparent even there. He maintained that we have complicated life by cluttering ourselves with the waste products of the machines. Destroy everything that enters into daily life that does not combine utility with beauty; the machines will have less work to do, and as the concept of the artist will supersede that of the commercial machine-master the true place of the craftsman by hand will be once again envisioned. For whatever the machine can do, it cannot create works of art. Man would make fewer things, but they would be necessary and beautiful things; further, Morris reasserted the Ruskinian doctrine that men would find pleasure in the labour of creating them. "Time was," he wrote in *Art and the Beauty of the Earth*, "when everybody that made anything made a work of art besides a useful piece of goods, and it gave them pleasure to make it. That is an assertion from which nothing can drive me; whatever I doubt, I have no doubt of that."

With such a belief Morris was led inevitably to challenge the economic basis of society. Some of his biographers have looked askance on that period of socialist agitation in his career as if it were an aberration. The strange thing is that he held back so long. True, his work as an agitator was ineffective, and it led him into strange places and to even stranger associates, to the hustings, to "Bloody Sunday" in Trafalgar Square, and to the dock of the Thames Police Court. Nothing remains from his career as an active communist except the symbol of personal courage, but the dilemma which Morris was attempting to resolve still remains for every artist, indeed for every citizen who believes not in overcrowding this earth with shoddy, useless wares but in simplicity and comeliness. Morris's weakness lay in his belief that a cataclysmic evolutionary change, rapidly concluded, could usher in a social system where men could work with brotherly co-operation, agreeing that all that could be made comely in

life should be worked to perfection and that all unpleasantness should be shared as equally as possible.

This belief in a simple revolutionary reconstitution of life has often been ascribed to a naïve Utopian element in his politics, even to an inability to understand the complexity of modern economic conditions. In reality it arose from limitations in his own mind, closely allied to his virtues, and deeply embedded in his temperament. For some potent factors in life were apparently shut out permanently from his field of vision. His relationship to the Christian faith was a problem which ever since his Oxford days he had solved by ignoring it, just as if he had locked it up in a drawer and thrown away the key. When asked for his religion he would say that he was a pagan, but the pagan has his deities, while at the centre of that medieval world which he so much admired lay the medieval church, gathering up the work of architect, painter and scribe equally to its purposes. If men were to gain that change of heart which he portrays in *News from Nowhere*, then some faith must have affected them, and their art would become its symbols. He believed that men could find salvation through a common conception of work well done, resulting in an art which made lovely this world, without ever inquiring of the hidden purposes that might be beyond. He looked farther than this only in considering that death could cut short a life of full and happy activity, and this thought gives sometimes a mood of despondency to his highly coloured world, the fear that underlies the apparent placidity of his *Earthly Paradise*.

This detachment from impulses which have long aroused and divided mankind can be seen equally in his aversion to all philosophical or metaphysical speculation, with the absence, so apparent in some of his imaginative work, of any profound psychological insight. An honest companion, he lacked intimacy, and for him friendship could often be best expressed by joint workmanship on a common task. This aloofness gave him freedom for his incredible activity, but it left him ignorant of many powerful passions which both distress and stir up the human race. The very circumscription of his mind released him from the main Victorian controversies. He had no teleological preoccupations to reduce him to Matthew Arnold's melancholy. If his approach to human conduct was simple it possessed at the same time a

freshness and an entire absence of cant. Place the conceptions found in his lectures against the atmosphere of Tennyson's *Idylls* and how untrammelled they seem. A typical expression occurs in the passage on "good health" in *How we live and how we might live*:

To feel mere life a pleasure, to enjoy the moving one's limbs and exercising one's bodily powers; to play, as it were, with sun and wind and rain, to rejoice in satisfying the due bodily appetites of a human animal without fear of degradation or sense of wrong doing: yes, and therewithal to be well-informed, straight-limbed, strongly knit, expressive of countenance, to be in a word beautiful—that also I claim.

Of his poetry it is difficult at this time to speak. It is not dead, but for a while it has been set aside. The romantic tradition, so seldom dormant in our verse, matured in the nineteenth century into a major and dominant tradition, and in that movement Morris had an individual part. The simplicity he pursued in verse, the story-telling such as a minstrel might have practised in a medieval hall, has no contact with the hard, keen, intellectual complexity of imagery and conceit which modern poetry has developed out of its own necessity and from the tradition of the metaphysical school. Nor does it assist his reputation that he is best remembered from *The Earthly Paradise*, a rarefied product of his middle years, where a sense of detachment, not typical of his life as a whole, became dominant. Even this poem has exceptions, but here if anywhere could the charge be brought that he was making things too easy for himself, weaving his narratives with a quiet unhurried movement, so that they appear dim and nerveless, "Like an old dream, dreamed in another dream."

Very different is his earliest volume, *The Defence of Guenevere*, with its poignant penetration into the blood and tears of life: here he possesses what Swinburne described as a mastery in the "perception and expression of tragic truth of subtle and noble, terrible and piteous things." Incidentally, there exists within this volume an almost incredible variety of metrical form and ingenuity. At times it has been asserted that Morris never recaptured the intensity of *The Defence of Guenevere*, but such a criticism ignores his major achievement. For arising out of *The Earthly Paradise*, and in vivid contrast

to its dim contours, there exists *The Lovers of Gudrun*, his rendering of the *Laxdaela Saga*, which marks his adherence to Icelandic literature as an inspiration not only in verse but in life itself. He found there a view of life heroic in its resistance to fate, dominated by action rather than thought. He discovered himself in entering into this northern world, as can be seen from the lines which he wrote in the manuscript of his translation of the *Eyrbyggja Saga*:

Tale-teller, who 'twixt fire and snow
Had heart to turn about and show
With faint half-smile things great and small
That in thy fearful land did fall,
Thou and thy brethren sure did gain
That thing for which I long in vain,
That spell, whereby the mist of fear
Was melted, and your ears might hear
Earth's voices as they are indeed.
Well ye have helped me at my need!

The view of life of the sagas allowed him to break through the hesitations of his middle period to the open-hearted, courageous advocacy of his own purposes. Poetically they led him ultimately to *Sigurd the Volsung*, where he matured in poetic strength in manipulating a theme of epic dimensions. The lead that he gave in exploiting the literature of the North has never been followed, and the opportunity remains when English poetry returns to look once again to more romantic sources for its models. It is strange, too, that his experiment in *Love is Enough* at adapting the medieval morality should have had no successors. Cut away generously all that may be considered dead wood in his poetry and more than enough remains to re-establish him once that the hostility to the romantic tradition has passed away. Even now if his poetry is unread there must be many who find pleasure in that timeless world which he discovered as a setting for his later prose romances which began with *The House of the Wolfings* in 1889. They combine in an uncanny way an atmosphere that is purely imaginative with a precision and concreteness of detail. Their prose is simple and lucid and yet possesses a rare rhythmical quality, more individual and impressive than much in Morris's verse. Nothing in later literature has precisely the same effect: they seem to arise from a secret

imaginative world, all compact of Morris himself, but one which he knew as intimately as his own library at Kelmscott. Their prose was studied by later writers, and Wilde has captured some of the effect into his own tales.

Once one surveys Morris's work as a whole, and removes the false conceptions of his endeavour, it becomes apparent that he is closely related to our own age and that much in his teaching, and in the principles of his art, remains valuable. He stands in contrast to the majority of modern artists in his refusal to remain detached from his time, in angry and fretful resentment, reducing art to a satire of our distress. Equally he was removed from defeatism in social and international thought. He could not bring himself to figure out on the future mere phantasms of failure. He knew the dangers that threatened civilisation and he saw that the artist had to contribute in the struggle to resist them, so he attempted to find ways by which the earth and man's life on the earth could be fashioned into a more worthy form.

B. IFOR EVANS.

GERMAN EASTWARD POLICY AND THE BALTIC STATES.

THE greatest chapter of German history lies in the period between 800-1400 when the German Roman Empire extended eastward at the behest of the Church, converting the heathen and claiming the wilderness for civilisation. This astonishing movement which in its first phase saw temporal and spiritual powers blended in the achievement of a mighty task—*gesta ecclesia per germanos*—may be said truly to have substantiated the "holy" title of the Empire. The true Prussian spirit of discipline and service can only be comprehended by a realisation of this accomplishment, the colonisation of a realm dedicated to the Virgin Mary by a warrior order of priestly nobles. Even as the Cistercians came in their white habits with black girdles and scapularies to rule the sandy *terrain* of Mark Brandenburg, so further eastward these Knights Templar came wearing the black cross on their white mantles. There is something awe-inspiring about the noiseless determination of this masculine achievement. For these were men who knew the living secrets of human order and political skill, who manifested the principle of true aristocracy which is power based on self-denial and service.

These soldier-priests and the peasant pioneers who trekked eastwards in their train, came from the old Germany of nether-Saxony between the Elbe and the Weser. In this older Motherland the forms of country have the beauty and intimacy of a venerable, undisputed civilisation steeped in the details of human achievement and tradition; they have a softness and tenderness which, no doubt influenced by the penetration of oceanic weathers, mark their kinship with the subtler and moodier landscapes of coastal Britain. The country is richly differentiated and the spirit of place is everywhere. But eastward beyond the Elbe the earth is mastered by civilisation with a severity which seems to suggest that dominion is, or was but lately, in dispute. The oceanic climate here confronts and transfuses the continental, so markedly indeed that in spring, east of Berlin, trees will be bare while those west of it will be breaking into leaf. The Russian steppe may be said to reach as far as the Elbe, which river still marks the passage from old Germany to the colonial Ostmark.

In Charlemagne's day this colonial territory beyond the Elbe was largely swamp and virgin forest. In our time Mark Brandenburg is an orderly, almost over-tidy landscape, with a beauty that is flowering from the austere sandy soil as men learn not only to cultivate and fertilise it, but to view it with affectionate eyes and to cherish its differentiations. It is like the canvas of a painter on which the light daubs of colour still reveal traces of the naked cloth. Beyond the Oder the texture is yet thinner and at the Vistula Europe marches with Asia under vast skies which were the tent of Jengis Khan. The belt of real civilisation which girdles the Baltic from Danzig through East Prussia to Memel and beyond it to the other Hansa cities, Riga, Reval and the gulf of Finland, is narrow. Studded with the monuments of a masterful colonial genius, magnificent red-brick Gothic churches, monasteries, castles, patrician cities and manor houses, it forms a ring of power and defence against the unclaimed Slavic interior. This girdle of defence was created by the Knights of the Ritter Orden and by the merchants of the Hansa. It included also the final outposts of English influence in north-eastern Europe, as the archives of many merchant guilds and the annals of the Ordersritter at their headquarters in Marienburg or the Vistula testify. From these cities and centres European culture under German leadership could penetrate the vast plain of Muscovy and ward off all attacks from its Asiatic hinterland.

The tradition of colonial frontier service has persisted along the entire length of eastern Germany through the centuries. Resistance against successive invasions of Tartars, Mongols and Turks has been the European office of the Germans. In this they can be said to be in the heroic tradition of the Greeks who frustrated the barbarian at Thermopylæ and Plataea and who first seem to have been conscious of the difference between European and Asiatic ideals and of the independence of Western civilisation. Since the rebirth of the Empire the defence of Europe with its finely differentiated, decentralised civilisation against the menace of despotically and centrally governed hordes of nomads has been an ever-recurrent necessity. In this German arms have always sustained the first shocks. The Germans have made bulwarks of civilisation against the barbarian. And time and again they have moved forward across the vast land-ocean of eastern

Europe to anchor their vessels of order, skill and homeliness in the midst of the waste.

An old chronicle tells of the settlers thus :

They left the sweet soil of their native country and entered into an alien land, in which their future was to be, where for many years they were destined to endure hardships without hope of return homeward even unto the fourth or sixth generation of them. They came from a fertile homeland, peaceful and quiet, and penetrated a country of horror and vast solitude and filled with baneful war. In a word, putting behind their backs an abundance of everything in this world, liberty, home, honour, they accepted hunger and thirst, endured infinite poverty, endless discomfort, failures and perils.

The character and psychology of the Germans cannot be properly understood without recognition of the historical fact of their heroic labours in the European east. The Germans are pre-eminently frontiersmen and their martial inclinations and search for discipline are natural consequences.

Nowhere perhaps has this German frontier tradition been of greater importance than on the north-eastern shores of the Baltic. Sokolowski, a German Balt who spent a long life in the Russian service, makes an emphatic affirmation in his book *The Sanding-up of Europe*, when he says : "The most important and perhaps the most fruitful result of the World War was the formation of the Baltic States in Eastern Europe."

The four Baltic States : Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not Slavic countries. From the time of Peter the Great until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 they were members of the Russian Empire, but none of them is Russian by race, culture or outlook. The races composing the bulk of original inhabitants fall into two groups : the Urugru-Magyar peoples occupying Finland and Estonia and the Indo-Germanic peoples occupying Latvia and Lithuania. Culture was brought by the Swedes, Danes and Germans, who have in turn, or in conjunction, controlled the destinies of the Baltic throughout the Christian era. As we have already pointed out the Order of Teutonic Knights and the Knights of the Sword swept the north-eastern coast in the thirteenth century. Riga was founded by the Bishop of Bremen in 1201. The Knights purchased Estonia from the Danes in 1346. But long before

this Estonia, which lay on one of the great trade-routes across Russia to the Black Sea, had been settled by Danish, Swedish and German merchants and craftsmen. The Hansa had a famous trading-station at Novgorod not far from the later St. Petersburg, and the Estonian ports Reval and Pernau became important cities in its league.

Reval occupies a curiously interesting position because on it converged the two eastward-moving cultural influences of Sweden and Germany, the one sweeping clockwise through Finland, the other counter-clockwise up from East Prussia. The descendants of the German Knights of the Sword and of the German and Swedish merchants became the aristocracy of the country. With the decline of the Ritterorden, and Sweden's rise to predominance in the Baltic, the territory passed under Swedish rule which lasted until 1700. In the eighteenth century Peter the Great absorbed Estonia together with the rest of Courland and Livonia (now Latvia) into his Russian Empire. It was the first apparent attempt to organise the great land-ocean of Muscovy. But in reality it was the annexation of already organised regions to an unorganised interior : "the Czarist state was a state without a people . . . chiefly interested not in Russia but in Europe, in foreign politics, in the prestige or territory which it could find abroad."

It was the German-Balts who from now on supplied the Czarist court with officers and administrators. Sokolowski devotes an important chapter in his revealing book to this percolation of Russia by German influences ; he shows how a civilisation began to be built up in the great plains, and how the effort was frustrated by the fanaticism of the Pan-Slavists. These intellectuals later forced a policy of Russianisation on the far older civilisation of the Border provinces. In the Baltic States they could not uproot the powerful hold of the German aristocracy on the land, but they deprived them of considerable influence by systematically appointing Russians to administrative posts. This shrinkage of the scope of the Germans in the administration of the Baltic provinces had two effects : first it drove the younger Germans to seek their careers in Russia itself, which made them vulnerable to Russian influences, and second it induced a certain stagnation amongst those who remained behind. The results were critical because immediately before the Russianising period,

the Balts were on the point of ameliorating the status of the Estonian and Latvian peasants now awakening to political consciousness. The Russians crossed these intentions with their ruthless system. It was in fact a good example of the maxim: "*divide et impera*." The result was the Lettish rising of 1905 which was directed as much against the Russians as against the Balts. Balts and Russians were driven to join forces in the suppression of the rising, and the Balts of course got the blame. From now on their relations with the Estonian and Latvian peasantry were undermined; their chances of bringing about reforms, of achieving a symbiosis with the peasant population were destroyed.

The important point to grasp in the development of national consciousness among the Estonians and Letts was that the sense of nationality grew with the accretion of a middle class. Until the 'sixties of the last century these peoples were still entirely peasant in character. The cities were German, and the artisans and craftsmen's guilds were German. It was only during the last quarter of a century that an urban population of Estonian or Lettish origin grew up in the German towns. The period of Russification nurtured the growth of socialist societies which took up the cause of folk identity largely inspired by German pastors and writers earlier in the century. The bourgeois ideals of the French Revolution however flourished in the hearts of this new intelligentsia. Its ideas of culture were by no means of local growth, despite the fostering of genuine sentiment for local folk customs, but were imported from the West. Its mentality was that of a pushing servant class resentful against its privileged and doubtless often haughty masters and disdainful of their achievements. The revolutions which Great Britain and the Allies aided and abetted in 1919 were not so much national revolutions as social insurrections. English liberalistic views of the sacred rights of small nations were sealed in a union with the French conception that a nation necessarily connotes a sovereign state by the Wilsonian doctrine of "self-determination." The same triumph of the ideals of the French Revolution was registered down the entire length of eastern Europe "balkanising" the Austro-Hungarian Empire and creating the tangled situation with which we now have to contend.

It will be remembered that the German-Balts fought with the greatest valour in the expulsion of the Bolshevik armies

from the Baltic. But the intervention of the Allies on behalf of the Estonian and Latvian national assemblies deprived them of their due share in the "self-determination" of their home-lands. The "agrarian reforms" introduced by the victorious Lettish and Estonian chauvinists penalised their former hereditary masters to the utmost. The great estates were confiscated, their pedigree-herds destroyed, their buildings, machinery and apparatus rendered useless. The land was split up quantitatively among smallholders, the former lords of the manor being reduced to the status of the latter, noble families often living in small cottages or outbuildings while the ancestral home crumbled into ruin before their eyes. A great deal of propaganda has been expended on justifying these "reforms" and on attempts to prove their benefit to the countries concerned. English journalists, ignorant of the German language, have been carefully hoodwinked into believing in the improvement of agriculture and the general welfare of the people. But they have been made blind to the main results: the expulsion and neutralisation of a civilising force by a vindictive and self-righteous class of national parvenus; the unnatural swelling of an autochthonous urban population and the creation of an intellectual proletariat of superfluous lawyers, doctors, writers and intellectuals.

Neither Estonia nor Latvia possessed conditions favourable to the development of a peasant democracy versed in the technique of co-operative organisation such as that of Denmark. They lacked both the qualities of character and the wise educational efforts of the Danish farmers. The sons of the more enterprising peasants left the land to seek careers in the new State services, the money which might have gone to modernising and improving the family farm being sacrificed to their education. The countries had to find the personnel for the staffing of the new State services; they therefore withdrew the best blood from the service of the land and local administration to the capitals and central offices. This meant an impoverishment of the soil which was not compensated for by the settling of land-hungry proletarians in the country. The vindictive measures of the "agrarian reforms" have left the new States with tasks which they are finding formidable. With a population of not more than 1,900,000, Latvia, for example, has created a university at Riga which is attended by 9,000 students daily. The overhead expenses of running a

civilisation on these lines are high. The care of the soil is inevitably left to less enterprising and intelligent members of the population, and the process of "sanding-up" described by Sokolowski in his book on Russia advances ominously.

Of the three countries Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the first shows by far the most hopeful tendencies. The Estonians, in whose veins flows a greater amount of Scandinavian and German blood than they are always ready to acknowledge, are a steady, fair-minded people who deserve every encouragement in their efforts to build up a resolute, industrious, agrarian civilisation. With their traditional affection for Sweden, and their close kinship with the brisk, capable people of Suomi, across the Gulf of Finland, they exert a sobering influence on their excitable and headlong neighbours in the south. But for a country as large as Denmark and with a third of the latter's population the available forces are scarce and it seems ludicrous that the Germans with their overflow population should be denied access to this land in which their colonising energy might achieve great services to northern civilisation. One of the results of the agrarian reforms is that the rural population of Estonia is on the decline; formerly a peasant could have as many children as he liked and the lord of the manor would care for them; to-day he can only afford to have one or two. The only part of Estonia where population is on the increase is in the primitive south-east where a prolific Russian community exists. Unless the Estonians recruit their population from Germany they will one day find their land populated by a people, perhaps Estonian-speaking, but Slavic in blood and temperament. And this would defeat their own avowed aim which is to make Estonia a member of the Scandinavian community.

One of the prime issues of the Great War was whether the Baltic should remain a Germanic or become a Slavic sea. The German victories in the east decided the matter. The new states really owe their independence to the successes in arms of the Germans. The Bolshevik uprisings and invasions both in Finland and Estonia-Latvia were overcome with German help. It is very doubtful if the U.S.S.R. to-day have any aspirations to the reconquest of the Baltic shores. But meanwhile, trading on the chauvinist mood of the new countries and their guilty fear of German influences, the Poles have set themselves forward as champions of the situation in the eastern Baltic. They have

more or less proposed their own candidature, for the leadership of a Baltic federation. This suggestion has, however, been received very coolly in Finland and with some scepticism in Estonia; but it is none the less a possibility which the increasing difficulties of the economic situation and the need for some sort of union may make actual.

The Swedes, who might very well have taken the initiative and applied to the League of Nations for a mandate in the Baltic States, have preferred to remain aloof, unwilling to assume any risks or to endanger a prosperity compromised during the past two years by the effects of the world economic crisis. Therefore it is to Great Britain that the new states turn persistently for succour and upon whom they depend in the event of danger. But Great Britain has only seen in this reliance on her goodwill an opportunity to strengthen her trade position in the Baltic.

A wise and long-sighted view must realise that the securing of the Baltic for the values of northern civilisation cannot be achieved save through the utilisation of German energy and German colonial ability. British statesmanship must reconcile the Baltic peoples to the Germans and advise the Germans in their dealings with these sensitive and no longer servile nationalities. There is no question of a German state *Machtpolitik*. To suggest that Estonia should be governed from Berlin is beyond the wildest dreams of German nationalists. But some opening up of opportunities for beneficial German colonising energy is essential if the Baltic States are to be preserved from decay and Slavic encroachments. Should we not strive for a new flowering of European culture around the shores of the Baltic, in which the Baltic States shall fulfil their destiny in a federation under British-German leadership? Such an issue out of the chaos and distractions of the present would bring a great renewal to the people concerned and a boon to the world.

ROLF GARDINER.

This article was written before the German Revolution. Hitler's repeated disavowal of imperialism and of any intention to Germanise foreign peoples enhances the conviction of the writer that the Baltic peoples have little to fear from German policy. At the same time the need of British-German collaboration in fostering the North-European character of these countries remains urgent.

MARRIED WOMEN AND WORK.

AT the present moment there is a great deal of bitter antagonism to the employment of married women. Two ideas, of the utmost simplicity, inspire it. The first is that if a married woman works she is "taking a job which a man or a single woman could have"; and the second is, that "a married woman's place is the home." The usual defence put up in favour of married women workers is based on the common right of individuals to order their own lives in their own way. It is a woman's own concern, the defence runs, whether she sells her labour outside the home or gives it for nothing inside. She and her husband alone have the right to decide which course is the best for their family. And if this is admitted, the contention that married women, by taking work, keep someone else from getting it becomes no more applicable to them than to any other group of workers.

The further argument that it is wrong for "two incomes to go into one house" (which is the next stage of the attack) opens up very wide vistas of social change. If it is accepted, it means, of course, that no man with an independent income, and no man with a rich wife, should stay at work. It involves, indeed, the distribution of jobs on the strict basis of need, and implies that no one has a right to earn more than what is actually necessary for subsistence. Logically and theoretically, the case for the married women seems to me unanswerable; but logic is not the thing which is most commonly applied to matters relating to women, nor is theory of much use in combating bitterness. The facts of the employment situation to-day are so stern, and the pressure upon all classes of workers is so heavy, that argument is of little avail.

I am myself a married woman worker and, as such, I am conscious of the hostility to my existence. I have discovered that my personal rights of liberty of judgment and liberty of action do not weigh for much. However passionately I believe that I share with the rest of mankind the right to sell my labour where I can, I cannot get others to admit it. "You are a married woman," they say, or think, "therefore you must not be employed." As if marriage actually put one in a civil condition different from that of ordinary citizens, and implied a definitely uniform way of life. Experience has taught

me that it is not much use to argue upon this point. But it has also taught me something else, which is that the position of married women workers is a danger not only to themselves but to the whole community. I therefore think that it may be useful to set out the facts of the situation, and to try and call attention to what is actually going on.

One of the oddest things in our confused industrial history is the almost complete neglect which has overtaken the part played by women. Nearly everyone, nearly always, seems to overlook it. Because they are generally transitory workers, and are generally low paid and in subordinate positions, it seems to have been assumed that they were more or less unimportant. Their part in the Trade Union movement has been remarkably small, their part in the world of employers has been non-existent. In legislation, indeed, they have figured; but even there, there has been a very marked tendency to consider not so much their own needs as the effect upon their male fellow workers of the protection or restriction, or whatever was in question for them. Even since the enfranchisement of women this attitude of mind has persisted, and only last year the cuts in the Health Benefits (for women only) were imposed in the interests of the stability of the general funds, with very little apparent realisation of what those cuts involve to the lives of the women workers themselves.

This neglect is, in a way, natural enough. For centuries the concerns of women have been subordinated to those of men, and even women themselves have believed them to be of less importance. Also, of course, it is actually the case that one of the importances of women's affairs is their reactions upon men's (though the converse of this is equally true). But however many explanations of the fact there may be, it remains very remarkable and, what is more, disastrous. To-day, when the whole industrial world is in a state of change and confusion, it is more dangerous than ever. At one and the same moment new machines are altering methods of production, rationalisation is altering organisation, the post-war readjustments of frontiers and tariffs are altering markets, and the financial tangle of war debts and reparations is altering confidence, credit and currency. All these factors are complicated, and they are so evident and so alarming that attention is focused upon them, with the result that people seem to be too much occupied with what ought to be done to

have time to consider what is really happening, and especially what is really happening to women.

Events, however, do not wait for international conferences or the conclusions of experts ; and there is actually going on in this country to-day an industrial revolution of the very greatest social importance, which the thoughtful public and the experts alike almost entirely ignore. This revolution—to put it in plain words—is that the women of the country are no longer being supported by the men. More and more, with every year that goes by, they are being forced into the labour market, whether they are married or single, and more and more the joint household and the next generation become dependent upon their work outside the home.

It is easy to establish this fact by statistics. In 1921, out of a total female population (between the ages of 15 and 65) of 13,285,000 there were 5,065,000 returned as occupied, that is to say 1 in 2·6, or rather less than 2 out of every 5. To-day the total female population of the same ages is estimated at 13,494,000, and the number occupied (or out of work but seeking it) at 6,180,000, which is 1 in 2·18, or rather less than 2 out of every 4. This means that very nearly half the women in the country to-day are either earning their own livings or, at least, contributing to a family budget ; and since that is so it is obvious that there must be a large number of married women at work. In the census returns of 1921 the number of these “occupied married women” was given as 693,000. If the proportionate increase has been the same for married women as for all women, that figure to-day is 820,000 ; but there are a good many indications that in actual fact the proportionate increase has been greater among married women than among women as a whole. I believe that it is a conservative estimate to say that we have not far short of a million “occupied married women” to-day in England and Wales. What is more, I believe the matter has now become so plain, if people will only look, as to need no statistical proof. For everybody knows, in their experience, that married women are being driven to try and earn money, and that young men have great difficulty in earning enough money to support a non-endowed or non-wage-earning wife.

Those who come in contact with young people know, further, how great the temptation is becoming for a young couple to marry secretly, or to live together without marriage,

because the woman's chances of good employment dwindle so abruptly as soon as she is known to be married. Laws and morals and conventions still make a stand against this tendency, but its existence is plain, and it is the inevitable result of the various barriers which are erected against married women.

It is a significant fact that the barriers apply almost entirely to the stable and better-paid employments, and vanish at the level where cheap labour and casual work are the rule. Although women are required to resign on marriage from the Civil Service, from teaching posts under local authorities, from banks and retail shops, and from many of the best-managed businesses, nothing of the sort happens to charwomen and cleaners. A friend of mine, an expert shorthand typist in acute need of work, told me that she had sought it at scores of firms in London ; but because she was married, she was not even considered until she found a firm which offered 30s. for a 60-hour week. This firm took her on, and she found that it was almost entirely staffed by married women, who told her they had drifted there because no one else would have them.

Now the consequences of this state of affairs are obvious. At the best of times, and under the best conditions, it is not very easy to be a married woman worker ; but as things are it is almost intolerably hard. The married woman is driven to seek work because of her need. She is driven into low-grade work because she is married, and she becomes and remains a black-leg. She can only obtain rates of pay which undercut other workers ; she lives under such pressure and in such poverty that her sickness is unduly high ; and bit by bit she becomes an unsatisfactory worker and adds proof to the assumption that married women workers are an untrustworthy and inefficient lot. The thing is a vicious circle.

Even vicious circles can be broken, and there are two ways of breaking this one. The first way is by a system of family endowment, which would recognise the married woman's work within the home as having a definite money value, and would supplement a man's wage according to the needs of the family. If this system were in force, it would be possible (though even then, I think, undesirable) to restrict the activities of married women and refuse to allow them freedom of action. But the actual probability of seeing this system established in the near future seems to me to be slight.

The other way of breaking the vicious circle is to recognise the facts, to remove the ban on married women and to allow them to compete at least on equal terms—in short, to let them take their chances on their merits like anyone else. If they prove to be unsatisfactory workers, let them be dismissed for that. If they can be useful, let them be useful. But to impose upon an already desperate or overdriven class the artificial handicaps and moral disapprovals which at present burden and depress them, is not only cruel and unjust, but unwise. It does not stop the work of married women, but only ensures that their work shall be a danger to their comrades and a misery to themselves.

Even if the artificial barriers and the sentimental disapprovals were removed there would remain, no doubt, some special difficulties in the employment of married women. These do not arise very noticeably, it is true, in those occupations in which they now have a free run, such as the stage, or the medical profession; but they have an obvious theoretical existence. It is very easy to say that a married woman is inevitably an unreliable worker. While society is organised as it is, she does carry a double responsibility and, especially if she has young children, she has many things to attend to. This must be frankly admitted, but it need not be exaggerated. What worker is there who has not got his private life upon his mind? Single women, all too often, have the personal care and nursing of their parents to undertake while at the same time working for their support; and even men, exempt as they are held to be from all such things, have to face the normal anxieties and troubles of family life. Some women, of course, have large families of small children; but others have small families of large ones; and because Mrs. X comes late and is flustered, why should Mrs. Y get the sack?

The whole position is riddled with inconsistencies, because so few people care to attend to it seriously. The only clear and coherent factor as yet seems to be the penalisation of married women, and that is a serious menace indeed. We are allowing a real social revolution to take place without thinking of it, and in consequence we are injuring a million people. And they are people who are important, not only for themselves—but because they are the mothers of the next generation.

R. STRACHEY.

NADIR SHAH AND AFTER.

IN order to prove the great services which the martyred King of Afghanistan, Ala Hazrat Mohamed Nadir Shah Ghazi, has rendered not only to his own country but to the cause of world peace, it is necessary for me to give a new reading of the Afghan mind, and in the narrative so to knit his personality as to show his proper place in contemporary Islamic history.

The Afghan, as a Moslem, subscribes neither to the communist tenets of his neighbours on the north, nor to those essentially conservative characteristics of the English on the east. Yet he strives to live in amity with both. His faith causes him to regard all Moslems as brothers, and he can, therefore, understand and appreciate the underlying force of communism which would make all men equal. He has also, very highly developed, that conservative trait which venerates tradition and which promotes a wholesome respect for the rights of the individual. Like the Englishman, he says: "What I have I hold," and his home is as much a castle and a sanctuary as that of the most conservative westerner. He can, therefore, adjust himself to two vitally different and opposing atmospheres. In his relationship with the Russian, one side of his character is brought into relief. When he descends the Khyber Pass the other facet is exposed.

Withal, the Afghan has very strong national characteristics, and those who have sought to delude themselves to the contrary have only to recall the fierce joy with which he has defended his homeland on many occasions to realise how intense is his love for his country and for his countrymen. And he takes pride also in those things which are essentially of his nation. This national pride, indeed, was the secret cause of the downfall of King Amanullah, who sought to tamper with it. It must not be supposed that the Afghan is opposed to modern progress or to infiltrations from the western world, for he is not. All he demands is that that which is national and traditional shall not be supplanted or submerged. To the Afghan, western conceptions of progress are only of use when they can enhance and augment the national phase. This is where ex-King Amanullah made his great fundamental mistake. He made a hurried journey all

over Europe and he returned to Afghanistan with a curious medley of polyglot and exotic ideas.

Amanullah returned to Afghanistan determined to ape the West. He knew not how to adapt that which he had learned on his travels. He would ruthlessly uproot and discard much that his subjects held in reverence and much that had been cherished over the centuries. Moreover, he displayed more passion than diplomacy in his likes and dislikes, and the Afghans groaned. The beginning of the end of Amanullah's reign came with the rebellion in Khost. This was suppressed and Amanullah took on a new lease of life. Unfortunately for him, however, his Commander-in-Chief contracted a very severe illness and was ordered to Europe to recuperate. There was more in it than that, for Amanullah did not want any wise counsel of his Commander-in-Chief and the court hangers-on welcomed his sojourn in France. The moment that Nadir Shah's influence was removed Amanullah reverted to his former ways and Afghanistan was in despair—so much so that when Habibullah, the water-carrier's son, raised the standard of revolt, the country as a whole surrendered to his pretensions.

Sick in body and sick in heart, Nadir Shah lay in Nice when a call came to him from his countrymen. They entreated him as a soldier to come to the rescue and to deliver them from the rapacity of Habibullah. Nadir Shah was desperately ill and well-nigh penniless, but he obeyed the call and eventually arrived on the frontiers of Afghanistan without an exchequer, without an army and without arms and ammunition, with nothing, in fact, except the prestige of Nadir Shah, successful soldier and true Afghan. This, however, was sufficient, and gradually he found himself at the head of a formidable force. It naturally took time for people to flock to his banner, for they thought that he sought to replace Amanullah upon the throne, and, in the interim, Habibullah did much to cement his original successes. He advanced on Kandahar, where Amanullah was still holding court, but Amanullah refused battle and fled the country, leaving the water-carrier's son in virtual possession.

Soon, however, Nadir Shah felt himself strong enough to try conclusions with his country's enemy, but when he reached the outskirts of Kabul he found himself in a quandary. The wily Habibullah had imprisoned Nadir Shah's relatives

and had so disposed them that any attack on the capital would expose them to extreme danger. Nadir Shah had to make a fateful decision—and he opened his bombardment. Fortunately, when the city fell and Habibullah retired, Nadir Shah's kinsmen had suffered no hurt. With Kabul in his hands Nadir Shah might easily have proclaimed himself King, but to the behests of the people he replied: "I have come here as a deliverer, not as a King. If you desire a King you must elect your own." The country took him at his word and, through its spokesmen, declared in as many words: "You are the only man in whom we have confidence. Since you say that you are the servant of the nation, the nation demands that you continue to serve." The National Assembly was convened and General Nadir Shah was proclaimed King.

As can be imagined, the inheritance was no happy one, but the new ruler attacked his almost impossible task with determined and characteristic vigour. When he ascended the throne Herat was a no-man's land, Habibullah was still at large, Kandahar was ablaze, the Khyber Pass closed, the army unpaid and the State money-chests mockingly empty. Within a very few weeks Habibullah had been captured, tried and sentenced to execution, the revolt in Herat was suppressed, communications with India were restored and, what is more, the people had come forward voluntarily and had paid a year's land revenue in advance.

It was upon this very firm foundation that King Nadir Shah began to build up his monarchy, one that is now well established and that has produced a steady flourishing and united Afghanistan, an Afghanistan that only seeks to be at peace with its neighbours. And it is advancing, but not upon the paths suggested by Amanullah. Women are being emancipated, but in a manner which offends no Islamic susceptibilities. Education is in the forefront, the co-operation of the clergy is sought rather than their submersion as in Amanullah's time. One of the most recent acts of King Nadir Shah in the avenue of education has been to institute free travelling schools. These are proving immensely popular and are already awakening in the outlying districts a great desire for knowledge and learning. In the realm of economic development Afghanistan, under its popular ruler, has advanced rapidly. And although in a self-sufficient country like Afghanistan foreign trade has never been of great volume, it

is estimated that it amounts to no less than £5,000,000, the bulk of which is negotiated through the Khyber Pass. Piece goods and hardware, however, are imported from Russia, also a goodly quantity of oil, tobacco, sugar and even grain. A substantial balance in favour of Afghanistan was paid in treasure, to the value of £150,000, only a couple of years ago.

The enlightened monarch looked upon the highways as the most pressing need of Afghan trade. Next he addressed himself to its organisation, for beyond the well-metalled roads that link the God-gifted Kingdom of Kabul with India through the Khyber Pass, magnificent has been the endeavour in road-making both in the south and the west of the country, to join the capital with Kandahar and Herat on the Persian border. Nor is the question of laying a network of railways forgotten: for although the Afghan railway construction has slumbered since the days of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, whose historic and sagacious advice not to build the railway till the Afghans themselves could build and maintain it is still remembered, it is being reconsidered in as much as the modern Afghanistan has now a number of students in training for engineering.

A time, therefore, cannot be far distant when a railway line in Afghanistan may make it possible for a traveller to buy a railway ticket from Charing Cross to Delhi. The suggested line, naturally, will operate in Afghanistan internally at first, before establishing contact with the Indian or Russian rail-heads either at Quetta, Peshawar or Termez on the Oxus. A line would thus run from the capital (Kabul) towards the Khyber Pass, but as 8,000 feet up to Khurd Kabul has to be surmounted, only a narrow gauge will be possible. Nor can there be any doubt of its reaching Kushk on the Russian frontier, or meeting the Indian line in Kurram Valley from Parachinar to Thal. It is conceivable, however, that there will be a break at the frontiers, for very obvious reasons.

In other aspects of economic development, too, the young Afghans, under the guiding influence of the present régime, are going forward. French-trained Afghans are already assisting in the work of raising the silk-worm industry to a high level of perfection. Egyptian and American cotton seeds are imported and acclimatised on the Government agricultural farms; a raw-sugar factory is working on modern lines at Jalalabad in the Eastern Provinces; woollen shawls of

exquisite beauty are being manufactured at Kandahar, whilst so successful have the cloth factories been under Afghan workmen that within ten years the requirements of the entire country may be met by the cloth factories of Kabul and Badakhshan. There is more than a mere conjecture regarding the tremendous economic potentialities of coal mines in the Central Provinces, as well as in relation to the immense oil finds in Herat.

In all these national endeavours the King took a deep personal interest. He was literally the hardest worker of all men of Afghanistan. From dawn to midnight that modern wonder of the Afghans was at work, reviewing the troops, inspecting the offices, visiting schools, attending college sports, dictating, writing, broadcasting. If I may respectfully strike a personal note—he was somewhat of Nowshairwan who seemed to know about every Afghan, and never forgot his nationals in whatever part of the world they were. His wisdom was further proved by taking the counsel of such giants of intellect and achievement as Sadr Azam Sahib, Wala Hazrat Sirdar Mohamed Hashim Khan, Wala Hazrat Sirdar Shah Wali Khan, and that distinguished young diplomat, His Excellency Ali Mohamed Khan. Afghanistan of to-day, therefore, with a galaxy of brave and public-spirited men, and presided over by such a noble symbol of Afghan nationalism as Ala Hazrat Mohamed Nadir Shah Ghazi's son, His Majesty Mohamed Zahir Shah, is marching towards a glorious future, with peace and goodwill to mankind written large on its banner.

The important point, however, to note is that even after the foul crime of assassinating King Nadir Shah, the value of his programme of nation-building was proved by the lack of any internal or external disturbance to the Afghan State. Submissively and with the full appreciation of his illustrious father's selfless services to his country, the people signified their allegiance and loyalty to the present Afghan King, with the result that, although a great soul is removed from amongst us, his work has remained a permanent beacon of light to guide the young Afghans towards the fulfilment of their national destiny.

But although all quiet is officially reported in Afghanistan, and although any serious outbreak can be effectively dealt with by the Government forces, yet anxious inquirers are persistently asking whether Amanullah will make a bid for the

throne. The repudiated King's own words, couched in no delicate tone, on the assassination of Nadir Shah have answered the question in some measure. But for a thorough understanding of the subject more intimate light should be shed on Amanullah's chances. His success depends on three factors. Firstly, it rests on the extent to which he or his agents have prepared certain Afghan regions for his being re-accepted; secondly, what financial and even military backing he has to carry on his *coup d'état* in its initial stages; and, lastly, when in possession of Kabul, what magnitude of power can he command to hold the country down, and evict the present reigning dynasty. These are weighty considerations.

As to the first condition, the powerful clansmen in the eastern province of Afghanistan who not only led the revolt against him, but remained his inveterate enemies even when certain other tribesmen, wayward in their antipathy, would still not have Amanullah's name spoken at their tribal gatherings, the Kohistanis of the Northern Highlands, whence the brigand water-carrier's son rose to drag Amanullah down from the throne, cannot envisage any friendly sentiment for him. Even the generally amiable clans of the west, in the Herat area bordering on Persia, have no particular love for Amanullah—ample proof of which was elicited when Amanullah's Foreign Minister, Ghulam Sadiq, flew to the Western Province bearing bags of gold, trying in vain to buy their loyalty for his master during the revolution. The only remaining section of Afghanistan where he may hope to have a hearing is in the south, where his mother's family has some influence. Regarding this, it is worthy of notice that these southern clansmen were so hostile to Amanullah that they actually hesitated to join forces with popular Nadir Shah against the water-carrier's son, thinking that Nadir Shah was fighting to re-install Amanullah.

Thus, from south, north, east and west of his father's legacy, he stands finally divorced as a leader of men, and the Afghan king is either a leader or a dead man; although Amanullah preferred to save his skin by running away, possibly in the hope of fighting another day.

IKBAL ALI SHAH.

AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY YEARS.

ABOUT one hundred and thirty families of English folk and Scots had by 1783 found their way through the dense woods of Pennsylvania and had settled at the head waters of the Ohio. They had come on horseback by Indian trails over range after range of mountains. Here, at the edge of the world, they fought with Indians, built log cabins, cleared the woods, and ploughed fields. They called their settlement Pittsburgh. With them life was reality. It was much like a battle. But they were the kind of fighters which no wilderness could long withstand. Then, as they gained food and shelter, they began to think of other things. Among these things were churches, schools, village greens, cottages with flowers at the doors, apple trees and gardens, books, games—all suffused with friendliness to an English way of living. They wanted that way of living. For some years the community grew in hope more than in size. They gave English names to their village streets: Forbes, Stanwix, Penn, Smithfield. Relentless contact with the frontier gave them an intuitive sense of right values, and by 1787 they were united upon what should be their first community project: they would build an academy.

All of that was long ago. They built the Academy with logs. In time it became the University of Pittsburg. The log building disappeared more than a hundred years ago, and not much is left to mark that original settlement, for a modern business district rises over the site. Yet, through all the growth and changes, one thing remains: a way of living that is essentially English. The story of how that Academy became the unifying ideal, intellectual and spiritual, of those frontier folk is touched with epic grandeur.

They built the Academy, then, for practical reasons, as they thought, just as they planted corn. They needed the Academy and they needed corn. They had come to the edge of the world to stay. There was no turning back to England now. They had ambition, religion, and children. Out of such a situation, some glimpse of civic greatness ahead was as inevitable as the morning. It came, and, in time, fashioned for them from the substance of hope the city of their desire: a city in which their children, if not themselves, were to grow to the full

elevation of their minds, to follow their natural bents, and to prosper. The idea was practical enough to make them leave the shingling of their own cabins until the shingles were on the Academy.

Those pioneers—the Barrs, Rosses, McMillans, and other leading settlers—knew what they wanted. But why did they lay such store by the Academy? To answer this question, it seems to me, we must get their ideas associated, as they were then, with the smell of oak chips and of newly split walnut shingles about a log school. We must live in imagination in that village and be kept awake at night by owls in the woods outside and by the fear of Indians; feel our arms and backs ache with too much work; and realise that the fine things of life—music, reading, science, poetry, and leisure—had been left east of the mountains. We must share in the first common cultural project of the village and respond with our own heads and hearts to the dedication hour of that school.

Children had been growing up and growing wild, like quail in the wheat above Smithfield Street. They might become like Indians. But now, no, they were to learn “the useful arts and the sciences and literature.” The charter tells us that. But the charter does not tell all. If we had gone to the dedication of the Academy we probably should have heard less about the useful arts and sciences and literature than about the life abundant. No record is left of that meeting; and if the record were left, still we could not get the full import of what those folk wanted to say; for when the heart is full and the aim high, what a man would say is in his voice and his way of telling.

There was not much talk, I suspect, at the meeting; but such words as were said were direct and to the point. There were silences, too, I like to think, when the only motion in the room was the flickering of candles. Tired men and women, bewildered, yet hopeful, “their eyes turned earnestly on Heaven,” were gathered in a sense of victory. Life more abundant was on the way. The meeting began with prayer. Not much imagination is needed to know that these English villagers expressed silent and individual thankfulness during that prayer for fat iron tea-kettles swung at their fireplaces, for turnips and fish and wild turkeys, for iron ore and coal, for wheat and corn and cows and sheep.

Life was possible and would go on. Better than that, the

glory of God and what life would be in the settlement were fused in their thinking. The frontier touched sublimity. Something mightier than their own wills had them. They had met hardships, suffered, worked, and won. That was clear. In the chopping of trees, however, for their cabins or for the clearing of fields or for boat-building, in the carrying of stones for their chimneys, in fights with Indians, and in the hard competition for a little money, they had somewhat forgot about justice and kindness and life abundant. But now, in the candlelight, they were understanding again. God was energy and force, helping them with the long day's work. He was intelligence and understanding too, wakening their souls.

Listen again to some of the names of folk who were at that meeting: Barr, McMillan, Henderson, Ross, Denny, Wallace, Wilkins, Walker. The names breathe, or purr with r's, a nationalism and a sectarianism of a northern land. These names are of Scots, wide-ranging Presbyterians, born into the stern theology of John Knox, whose sincerity had penetrated the cottages of Scotland. They shuddered in their responsibility to God. In the drab twilight of Scotland they had learned that some day God would ask, “What have you done?” Here, at the edge of the world, in a brighter twilight, some day they would answer, “We are making a great and righteous city.”

There is something about a school that is sacred: a responsibility about it so powerful that it makes strong men grow quiet. These pioneers, as they sat in the log school, were caught by that vague something. They felt a high sense of duty. They were seeking God. In the search they found joy that could not be told. God was a presence, and wisdom, and the possibility of life abundant. The Academy was fused into this mood and thought. It was a means to life abundant. It was a symbol of wisdom and of spirituality.

People in Pittsburgh were so much simpler in 1787 than we are now that we cannot easily see through their eyes nor think in their fashions of thought. They had more of the woods in them. They lived more alone. They experienced more of those lonely moments in life when the stars blur and improve one's thinking. The range of their thinking was, no doubt, narrow; but their thought, I believe, was more intense within their range, and more original, and they cared more profoundly about their convictions.

The first aim of the Academy, then, was the good life—spirituality. Wisdom was a part of the good life : useful arts, science, literature. But now, though the land was God's, it was also theirs ; theirs to clear into fields on which to sow and to harvest, theirs in which to dig for coal and iron and, above all, theirs to govern. They would have a kind of government called Democracy which was adapted to the new world. Democracy was a partnership with God for the right use and government of the new land. The Academy should train men in wisdom and particularly in the understanding of government, for the new Commonwealth would need them.

That was in 1787. Years went by and the community grew. It spread out past Grant's Hill and crossed the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers. At night yellow windows glimmered on the hilltops. A road from the east was completed across the Alleghany Mountains. Over it came thousands of covered wagons drawn by horses or ox teams ; men and women came on foot—all intent upon the free lands of Ohio, of Indiana, and of the unknown West beyond. They needed blankets, pots, crocks, horseshoes, axes, guns. The townsfolk began in earnest to make these things. They gave their names to new streets. They built wharves along the rivers. Pittsburgh was becoming a city. From over the mountains came vague stories of the Battle of Waterloo. After a time the Ohio River brought news of a Mexican war. Then came the Civil War. But by and by the country settled again to peace. Meanwhile the little English city grew still more and prospered.

Pittsburgh did not know, however, that the close of the Civil War had brought with it a new force destined to change the city's character. Already steamboats were on the rivers. The old settlers were proud of that. Steam made men able to do bigger things ; with it their children could thresh more grain, plant more land, dig more coal, shape more steel. It made men more productive. Then came an idea. For a long period people in Pittsburgh had been pioneers. They had got used to the daring spirit of that life. They had been learning about industry. Here was new opportunity to carry on in the old way. They would be frontiersmen, not of the woods nor of the soil, but of industry, steam-driven and of proportions beyond all former thinking.

The new idea was turned to action. Smokestacks rose along the river banks ; the sound of the flail was lost in the humming

of machines. Farmers left their farms to take part in the new day. The world was asking for glass, coal, and iron. Pittsburgh, a pioneer of machine production, was famous, just as things happen in a fairy story. After a short time men were called from the outside world to help—Italians, Poles, Slovaks, Magyars, Czechs, and others.

For a long time the settlers did not realise what they had done. Then suddenly they saw that times had changed. The English settlement had been diluted. Pittsburghers found that they no longer passed only their neighbours on Smithfield Street. There seemed to be no neighbours. It was strange to try to be friends with these new folk. With the breaking up of the compact community, they saw the old life and the old ideals being submerged in the rush for industry. Never before had money been made with such speed. There was coal to be taken from the hills, steel mills to make, and after that the steel. There was pipe to make ; and more glass than, it seemed, the world could need ; gas wells to sink and gas to use ; oil unlimited ; bricks and ropes and machines ; and machines to make more machines.

In this outburst of action a man's worth was measured by dollars. That was new. To make money was like a game. The score was in dollars. Then the aim of life and a high score tended to be the same thing ; and, unaware, on week-days men found that their primary hope was reachable and obtainable. How strangely something had gone wrong ! When hope can be got down and touched and held, it is no longer hope. When it can be defined in terms other than human relationships, its loveliness gets dull and its meaning lost.

In 1929 came the crash. It was a big crash—one that was more than a slump in securities : it was a slump, too, in self-confidence. What has happened ? Let us look back. A long path is there. At the far end is the frontier with its unbounded hope in government. Loyalty to one's duty as a citizen and belief in God were scarcely separable. They were a measure of a man's worth. Not much else mattered. Then woods gave way slowly to farming. A glad agricultural era came on. The land was fertile. If you wanted anything, all you had to do was to plant a seed. Life was getting better. It would improve from now on. The whole intellectual and cultural heritage of England should be moved to Western Pennsylvania farms, villages, and cities. That, now, was what mattered. Emerson

was only reflecting an appraisal of his age when, in 1832, returning from a visit to Landor, Carlyle, Coleridge, and Wordsworth, he said, speaking of these men, "they feel themselves to be so rich."

What happened in 1929 seems plainer as we come toward that year. The industrial age had come in an orderly way. Its spirit was action, romance, adventure. We liked that. It sent men's imaginations beyond their accustomed limits. It added to our comforts; gave us better houses, food, roads, transportation, churches, schools, hospitals, and museums. Medicine and science, both having direct value to industry, especially prospered. All of this was splendid. But gradually, while men were not half aware of the changes, their impelling interests moved from patriotism and religion to agriculture and education, and then to industry and wealth. The air became charged with plans for getting rich. The thing to do was to get rich.

By "rich," though, men did not mean what Emerson had meant when he wrote, "they feel themselves to be so rich." We know what he meant; but do we quite admit that a sensible man would define riches as hunger in the heart to possess one's heritage? When we hear, as from another world, of a man whose zest in life seems to make the sunrise last for him all day, do we count him rich? If we integrate ourselves through our work, finding the width and length of our personalities, are we rich? Here we are in 1934. Production is still down. A sense of mistiness is in the air. We wonder what is to come. Perhaps we are entering a new era, an era when, as never before in history, men will give less time to earning a living or to the gathering of material things, and more to trying to realise the full richness of the common life by living it more intensely.

We are already in an era with more leisure in it than has appeared before in history. But leisure, let us not mistake, is not mere vacant time. It is not empty playtime. It is not laziness. Rather, to an intelligent mind, leisure brings more work into a day because it brings more incentive to work. *It is opportunity for growth.* It is the barest beginning, the basic element, by which we are privileged to move into our true dwelling-places, to discover our spiritual dimensions, to enrich life with a vibrant significance not limited to our material surroundings.

Pittsburgh to-day is a dynamic city. It is finding itself. Much of it is ugly; all of it is potentially beautiful with its hills and valleys, its three broad rivers. Along its streets runs a full life of strong, peaceful affections. Among these people are some 250,000 folk of non-English-speaking origin, eager—so much more eager than most of us know!—to take pride in the city, to learn its ways, to love it. They are waiting. Could we, by a common effort sustained for a decade, reaffirm our heritage and draw ourselves into an organic oneness? Could we recall a way of thinking, so rich and vital and human that it would well up, strike its effect, and cause Italians, Slovaks, Magyars, Germans, and the rest of us to say, "Pittsburgh is my home: its government is the extension of our noblest character; here our children are to be what God intended them to be"? We cannot say all of that now.

What the founders wanted in Pittsburgh was prophetic souls; and, before them, for thousands of years, men had tried to invent a plan to bring such souls into society. In this long hope they evolved the college or university—Oxford, Cambridge, and others—an institution conceived in a desire for justice and a passion for righteousness and dedicated to the education of youth in such human relationships.

The aim, then, of the university, the successor of the log academy, is not to teach boys and girls how to earn dollars. The character of its founders left too deep an impress for that. The aim is scarcely to teach at all: it is to inspire youth to walk in the newness of life toward Heaven's Gate. It is to open windows, revealing in the long reach back what men have fought for and prayed for, and what wealth lies yonder to round out, to lift up, and to perfect the personalities of these boys and girls, touching them, now, with the sublime simplicity with which Homer told a story of the Greeks, or again, with the pipe organ music with which Milton made poetry. Above all, it is to waken in them a profound loyalty to a way of living—a way with the charm and the honour and the stability of England in it. That was the unifying ideal of a log academy, and that still is the unifying ideal, adapted to wider conditions, to new influences, and to a new age.

JOHN G. BOWMAN.

CHARLES II AND HIS HAPSBURG LIP.

LOVERS of English history are very grateful to *The Times* for the curious pictures of the wax effigy of King Charles, and for Mr. Tanner's reference to Queen Henrietta Maria's grandmother, Giovanna de Medici, born Joanna of Austria, who gave Charles II his Hapsburg lip. Ancestors are a great help towards understanding the characters and peculiar traits of our friends in history. When Queen Henrietta was a young mother she wrote to Madame St. George in Paris to send her a game of *joncherie*s or spillikins. Mr. Tanner has set us playing this dear old game. As we dislodge the ancestors one by one we pass down a "Madame Tussaud's" of the vanished centuries, and the wax figures each contribute something to the idea of the tall king we love so well, in spite of his unblushing faults, and because of his fun and originality.

Waxworks are delightful things. They appealed to Dickens: Mrs. Jarley is as much a part of life to real lovers as Mr. Pickwick. They appeal to children, without whose zest the world's curtain would long since have gone down in sawdust and orange peel. They appealed to the weird imagination of the great Elizabethans, such as Webster, whom Bernard Shaw unconsciously praises when he sneers at him as "Tussaud Laureate." To the ignorant, such as the writer, it had always seemed a pity that none of Henry VIII's and Catherine of Aragon's children had any descendants, and so the great ancestry of Ferdinand and Isabella seemed to have left no trace in our royal line. But now their descendants in the line of Henrietta Maria acquire fresh interest, thanks to Giovanna de Medici and her Hapsburg lip. Giovanna was the daughter of Charles V's brother and successor, the Emperor Ferdinand I, and grand-daughter and namesake of Catherine of Aragon's sister, Juana la Loca or Joanna the Crazy. In fact Charles II's grandparents with four "greats" were Ferdinand and Isabella.

But not only may we include these Spanish great ones in our gallery of the past, but that unique character Maximilian, King of the Romans, whose wonderful empty tomb we all view at Innsbrück, was a fourth great-grandfather in another direction. No wonder Charles II was witty and whimsical when he had Henri Quatre for his grandfather, and a few

steps higher up the ladder the Ritter Theuerdank himself. When we were young *The Dove in the Eagle's Nest* introduced most of us to Maximilian, scaling the lofty spire of the Dom at Ulm, or sharing his hobbies and interests of bookman and craftsman with the twins Ebbo and Friedel in Schloss Adlerstein. How natural that Charles II should delight in the Royal Society and its scientific experiments, when he had Maximilian and his adventurous Queen, Mary of Burgundy, among his forbears.

We turn a darker page when we pass to Giovanna of Austria's interesting husband, Francis de Medici, Grand Duke of Tuscany. Perhaps it excuses some traits in Charles that he had the dark and murderous blood of the later Medici in his veins, and it is well that through Francis' grandmother, Maria Salviati, he was also descended from an early Medici, her grandfather, the great Lorenzo de Medici himself. Charles was very fond of his beautiful boy, the Duke of Monmouth, and of his many other children. As we remember his affection for them we seem to see Henri IV on all fours, playing with his little Louis and Christine, when an ambassador is unexpectedly announced: "Are you a father?" says the brave old hero of Ivry: "Ah, if you are then we will finish the game." Henri's second Queen, Marie de Medici, lost her mother, Giovanna de Medici, in 1578, when she was a child of five, and she was brought up by her Uncle Ferdinand's wife, Christine, that exception to the Medici wives who lived to be a dignified old widow lady. We seem to know her from the wonderful portrait of her in her old age, by Soustermans. She had been the favourite grand-daughter of Catherine de Medici, and her marriage journey from Blois to Florence was long delayed by the sickness and death of her grandmother and the sailing of the Spanish Armada.

Charles' great-grandmother, Giovanna, had had much to try her, and the Hapsburg lip had plenty to make it pout. By nature it tended to curl with disdain. Francis de Medici was already wholly enslaved to the beautiful and able Bianca Capello when Giovanna married him in January 1564/5. It was in 1563 that Francis had looked up at the window of Bianca as he was crossing the Square of St. Mark, and had become her "servant" for the rest of his life. At that time Bianca's husband, Piero Buonventuri, was still alive, and it was some years before he was murdered. Catherine of

Braganza herself had not a harder bed to lie on than the proud Austrian princess. Giovanna was daughter, sister and aunt of three successive emperors, and she plainly looked down upon the Medici as bankers and money-grubbers. Her old father-in-law, Duke Cosimo, did his best to welcome her, and Vasari has told us how he himself painted frescoes of Linz and other Austrian towns on the walls of the courtyard of the Palazzo Vecchio to do honour to the imperial bride. We may still see them, though it is not every English tourist who remembers that they were painted in honour of the grandmother of Queen Henrietta Maria.

In the Uffizi there are two portraits of Giovanna of Austria. Some of the history books say that she was plain and fretful, and no companion to her scientific and artistic husband Francis. But the portraits are not plain at all, and unless they are as different from her as Holbein's portrait of Anne of Cleves, with the smallpox left out, was from the real lady, Giovanna was a woman of blonde beauty with a fine intellectual forehead. We may many of us remember the big room at the end of the Louvre gallery, where her daughter, Marie de Medici, is painted again and again by Rubens, on whom her fair and rosy plumpness made a great impression. It is interesting to note that Giovanna was the first cousin once removed of Bloody Mary, and remarkably like her, though much better looking: Mary of England was born in 1516 and Giovanna in 1547.

Giovanna's mother, Anne of Hungary, was a noble and devoted wife. No doubt the descendants of Giovanna and Francis benefited by the Hungarian infusion. The brothers and sisters of Francis de Medici were a lurid group in Florence, which has given rise to John Webster's great Roman and Florentine play, *The White Devil or Vittoria Corombona*, and Thomas Middleton's less interesting *Women beware Women*. Giovanna's father, Ferdinand I of Austria, has been a little put into the shade by his greater brother, Charles V, but he had many fine qualities. In his youth he was the pupil of Erasmus, and throughout his life he tried to do justice to both Catholics and Protestants. It is astonishing that in such a bigoted age he preferred a married clergy to a licentious priesthood, and pressed for reforms at the Council of Trent, which were worthy of his friend and correspondent Erasmus or of our own Catholic reformers, Colet and More. It is true

that he swerved sometimes from the narrow path. He was not innocent of the assassination of Cardinal Martinuzzi in 1551, and his political enemies, such as the Bohemian patriots, often drove him to acts of injustice and tyranny. But when the fierce conspirators sent Ferdinand the ear of the murdered Martinuzzi, with its awful tuft of hair, his fine and good Queen Anne of Hungary had been dead for four years and the want of her gentle influence could be clearly felt. The mixed character of Ferdinand suggests many of the traits of Charles II, who hated persecution and yet had none of the consistency which sticks to principle and defies consequences.

During most of those sad thirteen years, 1565-78, while Giovanna had to see all the love of her husband's heart go to Bianca Capello, her brother Maximilian II was Emperor of Austria. He had decided Lutheran sympathies, and though he always remained a Catholic he abhorred the Massacre of St. Bartholomew in 1572. This was an event which must have shaken Giovanna in her palace at Florence, for Elisabeth, the pure and gentle Austrian queen of Charles IX, who stands out so clearly from the pages of *The Chaplet of Pearls*, was Giovanna's niece, the daughter of her brother, the Emperor Maximilian II.

Charles II used to say to his brother James, Duke of York, "They will never kill me, James, to make you king." As our waxworks of the past come into being, we notice a foreshadowing of this story, though the case is of first cousins and not of brothers. Giovanna's brother, Maximilian II, was brought up in Spain with his first cousin, Philip II, and he afterwards married Philip's sister, Mary, a good but bigoted Spaniard, who bore him sixteen children. The eldest, Anne, married Philip II of Spain, as his fourth wife, in 1570, so Giovanna's Austrian *hauteur* had an additional stimulus, though the lonely Grand Duchess could not have found much that was enviable in the lot of the poor young girl, who bought the crown of Spain at the heavy price of being chained to the inexorable Philip, her mother's brother. The two cousins, Philip II and Maximilian II, were as different from each other as their kinsmen, Charles II and James II. Philip was bigoted and morose but Maximilian was winning and tolerant, and learnt from his fine tutor, Wolfgang Severus of Silesia, to see both sides of a question.

One of the greatest boons we owe to Charles II is St. James' Vol. CXLV.

Park. The great love of gardens which distinguished Charles we may trace in his Medicean ancestor, Francis, and his father, Cosimo, who laid out the Boboli Gardens, which are among the loveliest spots in Florence. Sad as her life was, Giovanna must have won respect from her original and peculiar husband, Francis, for he set up her image, as the statue of Abundance, at the top of the Boboli Gardens.

Francis was impatient, like Charles II: many a time he would not leave his scientific experiments to receive "persons of importance," and "would often give audience," says Colonel Young, "to his Secretaries of State, standing before his furnace, bellows in hand." He discovered how to melt rock crystal, and he started the beautiful porcelain industry which still exists at Florence. It is well that he had something to distract his mind from the horrid amours and poisonings which seemed to be the destiny of his family.

The drama of blood and horror, as set forth by John Marston, Thomas Middleton, and even the great John Webster, seems exaggerated and ghoulish in these quiet times, but it may have seemed all in the day's work to Charles, the inheritor of the Hapsburg lip, who had to keep the peace among a bevy of rival mistresses. When Middleton's play, *Women beware Women*, was acted by the Queen's Players, it is to be hoped that Henrietta Maria, who had early storms in her married life, could not follow the English! In Middleton's play, which had been on the stage since 1613, Giovanna, the Grand Duchess, is not mentioned by name, but the Duke's mistress, Bianca Capello, whom he married on Giovanna's death in 1578, is the heroine of the play. In Middleton there is none of the striking genius of Webster, but much truth to everyday life, as in the picture of Bianca's old mother-in-law. Bianca created a memorable phrase when she referred to her mean husband, Piero Buonventuri, as "the former thing." Queen Henrietta's mother, Marie de Medici, must have been old enough at fifteen to remember the awful death of her father the Duke Francis and her step-mother Bianca on the same day. Marie was brought up by her uncle, the former Cardinal, Ferdinand II, and his Duchess, Christine, and one version of the deaths or murders was that the Cardinal had prepared the poison for his enemy, Bianca. The stories of the murder vary. Some authorities say that Bianca poisoned wine, others say tarts, for her enemy the Cardinal. He was

warned against the poison by his ring, a gem which changed colour at poison. Francis accidentally swallowed death, and Bianca followed suit because she would not live without him. The Cardinal resigned his hopes of the Papacy, succeeded his brother as Grand Duke, married and reigned for twenty-two years. Some modern historians are incredulous about these old murders, and try to explain them away, but they do not succeed. Whatever may be the facts it is hard to believe that two previously fairly healthy people would die of a sudden illness within eleven hours of each other from a natural cause.

The great plays on the Medici family murders were written very near the time they happened. Both Middleton, Webster and his friend Marston had probably had the story at something like first-hand. There were many Italians in that old dramatic circle of the small London of Elizabeth and James I. Not only was there John, the son of Michael Angelo Florio, in the household of the Earl of Southampton, but we know from a recent work, *New Links With Shakespeare*, that the Diodati family had roots in London and were close friends of the actor, Condell. Giordano Bruno paid a visit to London about this time, and the list might be indefinitely prolonged.

The recent play *The Venetians*, by Mr. Clifford Bax, has Bianca Capello as the heroine and the blonde Duchess, Giovanna, as one of the characters. The play is wonderfully alive, and it makes us feel how helpless the Austrian lady must have been to cope with a rival of such forcible and fine type as Bianca. Mr. Bax's play will surely live.

Perhaps it aggravated the case that Giovanna had small as well as great troubles to make the Hapsburg lip tremble. She was very extravagant and her accounts would not come right. There is a curious letter to her from her father-in-law, Cosimo, begging her to keep calm and to take all the doings of her husband Francis as "trifles." Yet there was something fine in Giovanna's protests, and she had nothing of the walnut-tree in her composition. Old Cosimo warned her not to excite her husband's aversion, and told her she was better treated than her sisters. He seems to be referring to the fact that Giovanna's sister, Catherine, had married Sigismund, King of Poland, after the death of his wife, her eldest sister, Elizabeth, and had had the indignity of being divorced for barrenness. That crime could not be cast in the teeth of Giovanna or her daughter, Marie de Medici, who had both brought plenty of

heirs to their lords, though after Giovanna's death her baby boy died, too. The letter recalls one of the most delightful traits of Charles II. At the time of the Popish Plot, when everyone was whispering to him, "Divorce your barren wife," Charles was adamant, and nothing would part him from Catherine of Braganza, whom he loved sincerely in spite of the many wrongs he had done her.

O poor Charity,
Thou art seldom found in scarlet

Vittoria Corombona says, in Webster's play, to another Cardinal who is *her* enemy, and Charles' protection of his Portuguese wife reminds us that the actions of sinners sometimes improve on those of saints.

When King Charles II strolled into the theatre and "walked along the gallery with that wonted large pace," described in the diary of the pirate-hunting parson, Henry Teonge, did he know that Vittoria Corombona had been the successor, and in Webster's play the supplanter, of a real Isabella, the sister of his great-grandfather, Francis de Medici? Murder was a household word in that Medici court. Francis' brother, Pietro, had invited his wife, Eleanora, to a quiet meal and then plunged a sword in her breast. The historic story of the murder of Isabella, Duke Francis' sister, by her husband, the Duke of Bracciano, is more terrible even than the long-drawn-out horror in Webster's *White Devil*. Colonel Young tells how Bracciano sent for his wife Isabella: "When they retired after supper to their apartments for the night her husband, while pretending to kiss Isabella, suddenly slipt a noose round her beautiful neck and, after a violent struggle, strangled her." To do this deed he had had a hole made in the ceiling, and five men let down the noose from the room above.

Good-bye to our waxworks of long ago. How we love our old kings and queens who teach our children in such a graphic way the things to do and the things to leave undone! How deplorable it must be for the drab republics of the rest of Europe with no royal family to cherish and no Hapsburg lip and Kings of the Romans to link them on to the old Roman empire and the glories of the past!

CLOTILDA MARSON.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE DISARMAMENT FAILURE

THE publication on February 1st of a British White Paper on disarmament (Cmd. 4498) looked deplorably like a final, and not very convincing, attempt to reach an agreement about disarmament. The measure of failure in that field is most readily given by the circumstance that few people any longer really believed that the nations would agree to disarm, or even to reduce their armaments. In outward form the British memorandum made still another attempt to bridge the Franco-German disagreement. Its practical purpose, if one is to admit an obvious fact, was to delay the armaments race, and if possible to keep it within limits when it started. An examination of the detailed stages whereby the French, German and British Governments—for those were the three governments chiefly engaged—reached so perverse an end to their prolonged diplomacy, illustrates the way in which governments do contrive not to act in harmony. The detail, the finesse, the subtlety, and the futility of the various French, German and British documents, when read side by side in a cold-blooded spirit, are an interesting study in the field of pure intellect. What is more interesting to those who study diplomacy from a human, philosophic point of view is to face the fact that, on overwhelming evidence, diplomacy is useless as a constructive instrument for the good of man, unless indeed one believes that war and international disorder are in some mysterious way good for mankind.

The very mass of detail in this particular aspect of international disagreement tends to obscure a plain and simple story. It is more than fourteen years since the Treaty of Versailles was signed. In that Treaty the disarmament of Germany was prescribed as a prelude to general disarmament. The Treaty, as was perhaps inevitable in so elemental a field of human activity as war between the nations, imposed upon Germany a status of inequality. Germany was "defeated" in the field. She was now made to disarm, but the "victors" by implication promised that they also in a chastened spirit would disarm. There was therefore on the one hand a promise of ultimate equality, in the cause of ultimate good sense; but on the other hand no date was given for the redemption of

that promise. At Locarno in the autumn of 1925 a second promise was made by the victors to the vanquished, namely that the 1919 promise would forthwith now be redeemed. In Locarno, when the Treaty was initialled on October 16th, 1925, one spoke with Sir Austen Chamberlain, M. Briand, Dr. Benesh and other leading diplomatists who framed it; and one discovered that they all said substantially the same thing, namely that the war-time division between "enemies" and "allies" was at last eliminated from the diplomatic background. During the course of the conference, as by a tacit and exalted convention, the words "allies" and "enemies" did not once fall from the lips of any delegate. In the room of the British Foreign Office—the "Locarno" room—when the Treaty was ceremonially signed on December 1st of that year, one observed that the speakers again expressed the same aspiration. In the text of the Treaty, it is true, there was no reference to the "equality" to which Germany was now to be admitted; but in fulfilment of the none the less unequivocal understanding in that sense, Germany was duly admitted as a member of the League of Nations on the next appropriate occasion, namely when the Assembly next met, in September 1926. Membership of the League of Nations itself implied, or ought to have implied, a status of equality. By virtue of such equality, it was one of the principal objects of the Locarno Treaty, and was in so many words defined in the preamble to the Treaty, to "hasten on effectively the disarmament provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

General disarmament therefore was undertaken by the Powers as a commitment in 1919. Six years later the Powers virtually announced that they were now about to do something about it. It took another six years of involved diplomacy to convene the projected disarmament conference. It did at last meet on February 2nd, 1932. In the late summer of that year Germany seceded from the conference on the ground that "equality," so long promised her, was not in fact being given to her, and that the basis on which the disarmament conference itself was working was one of inequality as between Germany on the one side and her former enemies on the other. The autumn of that year saw some highly critical, highly spectacular and highly pompous diplomacy, whence emerged in an atmosphere of triumph on

December 11th the acceptance by Germany of a formula offered by the other Powers, in return for which Germany again agreed to take part in the disarmament conference. What was it that the new formula offered to Germany? In all solemnity it offered Germany—could any schoolboy have guessed it?—simply and nothing else than "equality." The very word "equality" was written, as one of tremendous moment, in the formula itself. This was at the end of 1932, six years after Locarno, Locarno being six years after Versailles. On December 11th, 1932, the third six-year period presumably began to run. It had run for less than one year when Germany again left the disarmament conference, this time declaring that she would also leave the League of Nations, on the ground that she was again in fact denied equality. The open conference having thus broken down, it was decided by the Bureau of the conference on November 22nd that the old-fashioned kind of secret diplomacy should now be given a chance of mending matters so that the open conference could later be resumed. It was not called "secret," but "parallel and supplementary," diplomacy. It consisted in the first instance of a Franco-German exchange of opinion, the results of which were later crystallised in a written French *aide-mémoire* submitted to Germany, and a written German answer; and in the second instance of a British and an Italian statement of their views, as revised by the Franco-German exchange, now proved to be abortive.

The characteristic differences thus again revealed between the four capitals are examined below. In passing there are two major circumstances to be observed of a general nature which illustrate the initial unlikelihood that the secret diplomacy aforesaid would perform any useful service. The first was the fact in itself that Germany had now resolutely seceded from the conference and had given notice of secession from the League of Nations. The observation made by M. Daladier on October 17th last: "If one sincerely wishes for understanding, why begin with rupture?" was unanswerable. The very fact of a rupture starts tendencies and entanglements which make the original objects of all the parties more remote of achievement. Herr Hitler for example had now engaged German prestige in the thesis that no good could be expected by Germany of the League of Nations. As in physical war, so in diplomatic controversy, *la victoire intégrale* becomes the

equally senseless object of both sides. On the other hand, few experienced people will deny that in diplomacy, more than in other human spheres, intransigence has a way of yielding its authors a greater measure of material satisfaction than sweet reason. The French *aide-mémoire* of January 1st virtually dropped the former French claim for a "probationary" period to be imposed upon Germany as a precedent condition of French disarmament down to Germany's level. The British memorandum of January 29th even more precisely dropped such a condition, whereby both the British draft convention of last March and the plan of October 14th last were to that extent amended. Does any realist person imagine that the French and the British Governments would have dropped that condition, if Germany had remained at Geneva and had shown herself sweetly reasonable, instead of bouncing out of Geneva and showing herself outrageously unpleasant? When Germany was guided by men of reason, namely by Herr Stresemann and by Dr. Brüning—and the period of such guidance lasted from 1923 to 1932—no one in the Quai d'Orsay paid the slightest attention to German claims, good or bad. The moment a change was made in the Wilhelmstrasse, from a good to a bad temper, both Paris and London began conceding German claims. Such in some of its aspects, among them the diplomatic aspect, is human nature. The other circumstance above alluded to is that even if Berlin, Paris, Rome and London had contrived to agree not to embark upon an armaments race, the achievement in itself would have been valueless except as a possible inducement to the world at large to resume the discussions about disarmament. Disarmament in Europe is, of course, impossible without disarmament in the United States, in Japan, in Russia. Japan had given notice of secession from the League of Nations: the United States and Russia never had been members of the League of Nations. Japan was engaged in warlike operations in the Far East and was fast increasing her armaments. Russia was already embarked upon an armaments race with Japan. Even in Europe, even in what may be called League of Nations Europe, it was inconceivable that Poland would disarm so long as Russia increased her armaments; and if Poland refused to disarm, it was obvious that Germany would be still further tempted to pursue her policy of rearmament. In short, the odd thing would be if anybody

ever expected the disarmament conference to result in disarmament. It is even arguable that the disarmament conference hastened on the process of general increased armament, for Germany's secession from the League and her consequent stiffened attitude of defiance against the Geneva Powers directly resulted from the operation of the disarmament conference itself. There is something to be said for those who have come to the philosophic conclusion that diplomacy by its very nature cannot produce anything but muddle and mischief. In the history of the world so far it never has produced anything else. If one thinks honestly about it, it would be surprising if such were not the fact. The idea that the mass of Americans, Chinese, British people, French, Germans, Japanese, and Russians, for example, in their millions of further sub-divisions of classes and temperaments could ever act as one man is really rather absurd. Looked at sensibly, such an argument of despair is not even depressing. The complete failure of the disarmament conference, as of last year's monetary and economic conference and of every other diplomatic conference that preceded them, makes it the more difficult to convene any such conferences in the future. If conferences are never to meet, they clearly cannot "fail." The most hopeful and the most constructive form of propaganda, therefore, is to encourage a general distrust of diplomacy with a view to lessening the scope of diplomacy. Certainly, trade would benefit if left to its own devices. And whether the post-Versailles conferences, the League of Nations and the other phases of contemporary diplomatic activity have made less likely, or even postponed, the next big war, is a question that, on the one hand, cannot be answered, because in diplomacy, as in medical treatment, one can never know what would have happened in the alternative; yet, on the other hand, most people have a shrewd suspicion that the next war would at this moment be more remote if the diplomatic people had done no work at all in the meantime. After all, if there were no such thing as international diplomacy, war would be impossible.

It was on November 22nd that the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference decided to suspend the conference and to allow the "parallel and supplementary" offices of ambassadorial diplomacy to explore a new approach to the problem. For more than a month those new conversations were pursued

in Berlin and in Paris. On January 1st the French Government submitted to the German Government an *aide-mémoire* to record what practical offer that Government was now prepared to make in order to attract Germany's goodwill. The substance of that offer was summarised in this section of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW last month. The full text of the document was published in Paris on February 1st. The German answer to it was delivered to the French Government on January 19th and the text was published in Berlin on February 3rd.

Stripped of the subsidiary detail what France proposed on January 1st was as follows: (1) In the matter of security: There should be a system of effective supervision and control of all armaments, guaranteed by the collective sanction of all the parties signatory to the disarmament convention, including an international air police force, and an international control of civil aviation. (2) In the matter of equality: Effective equality should be reached in two stages, the first being transitional. The length of the first period was not specified in the French document, but was postulated as long enough to enable the present German Reichswehr of 100,000 men based upon a twelve-year period of service, to be transformed into a new army of 200,000 men, based upon an eight months' period of service. In that transitional period France would undertake not to increase her existing armaments, and Germany would undertake not to increase her armaments beyond the necessary additional material appropriate to the new short-term army of 200,000 men. As the German changes were progressively effected, France would *pari passu* make the corresponding changes in her own forces and organisation, so that at the end of the transitional period, the ground would be prepared for the equalisation of all armaments. (3) In the matter of armaments: Such equalisation of armaments would be effected by a general disarmament down to Germany's level, instead of by Germany's re-armament up to the level of the Powers now heavily armed. As an earnest of such ultimate equalisation France offered an immediate 50 per cent. "cut" in the number of fighting aeroplanes now in commission.

The German answer to those proposals may be thus summarised: (1) The suggested system of supervision and control would in practice become a menace to security, not a safe-

guard, because the fear would remain in German minds that the full equality promised for the second period would be dependent upon a satisfactory report of the control commission at the end of the transitional period; and the control exercised during the transitional period would be "unequal," because there would be something to control in Germany's case, on account of the big transformation from one kind of army to another, whereas in the case of France, whose arrangements would remain almost static during that period, there would be nothing at all for the control commission to supervise. The so-called transitional period in short was diagnosed as in effect and in intention a "trial" period, and as such was wholly rejected by Germany. (2) Equality could be established only by an immediate equalisation of rights, not by the interjection of a so-called transitional period which might postpone effective equality for many years. Moreover, the French proposals, while conceding numerical equality between the German army and the French mainland army, made no reference to the French overseas forces, which, it was to be presumed, would remain as an additional French force. (3) The figure of 200,000 suggested in the French *aide-mémoire* as the ultimate strength of the German army was rejected as inadequate to the defence of Germany, in view of her geographical position, and the length and nature of her frontiers. A minimum force of 300,000 with twelve months' training would be necessary for German defensive purposes. As for the French offer of an immediate reduction of 50 per cent. in commissioned aeroplanes, if it were the case that in the transitional period it was the French intention that Germany should possess no military aircraft at all, the difference between a 100 per cent. cut and a 50 per cent. cut was of no practical interest to Germany.

The effect, therefore, of the Franco-German exchange of views was the establishment of a complete deadlock. In that circumstance the British Government set about the formulation of new proposals such as might attract the interest of both France and Germany. The British proposals were circulated to Berlin, Paris and the other capitals that had been represented at the disarmament conference and were published on February 1st. On February 6th Sir John Simon reviewed their purpose in a long statement he made to the House of Commons. Concurrently with the publication of the

British White Paper a statement was issued in Rome expressing Signor Mussolini's suggestions for solving the problem created by the Franco-German deadlock. There were certain points of similarity between the British and the Italian statements, although the Italian statement contained less detail.

The British proposal was, no doubt consciously, framed in the conviction that if it proved to be ineffective as a means of inducing general agreement, then the cause of disarmament must be regarded as irrevocably lost. The memorandum was divided into two parts, the first being devoted to an exposition of general principles and of the gravity of the choice that lay before the world, and the second outlining certain specific detailed suggestions for a disarmament convention.

In the first part the premise was made that the post-November 22nd exchanges, although useful, had not produced a "firm basis of agreement," and that a resumption of the conference at Geneva "without any new directive suggestions" would merely lead to further disappointment. Next, it was conceded that the British Draft Convention of last March now needed adjustment if agreement were to be reached, because it was now clear that a solution was no longer attainable which involved the abolition by the whole world of such weapons as were withheld from Germany. The British object now, therefore, was to attempt what still could be regarded as possible. It was the conclusion reached by the British Government that it was no longer a practical policy to discriminate against Germany by denying to her certain arms permitted to other Powers; and that, as it was now established that the other Powers were unwilling to disarm to Germany's present level, the world was faced with two practical alternatives, namely: (1) to reach agreement in a convention which would involve the abandonment of certain classes of weapons by the most heavily armed Powers; or (2) to reach agreement on the basis that the most heavily armed Powers, while unable or unwilling to disarm, would at any rate undertake not to increase their present armaments. It was the first alternative that the British Government urged the other governments to adopt. To achieve that object specific proposals were made in the second part of the White Paper under the three heads: (1) security; (2) equality of rights; and (3) disarmament.

The detailed proposals may be thus summarised: (1) *Security*. His Majesty's Government regard the present form of the security provisions contained in the first four articles of the British Draft Convention as one of great importance, but they would suggest the addition of three further articles, one of which would be the present Article 89 of the Draft Convention (declaring that the loyal execution of the Convention is a matter of common interest to the signatories), the second an Article providing for immediate consultation in the event of the Permanent Disarmament Commission reporting the failure by one of the parties to execute loyally the Convention, and the third defining the object of such consultation, namely to exchange views as to the steps to be taken to "restore the situation." These provisions would emphasise the inescapable duty of the signatories of the Convention to prevent or to remedy any violation of it, and when taken together with the German Chancellor's proposal for the conclusion of pacts of non-aggression, would present a sum total of security worthy of general acceptance. (2) *Equality of rights*. His Majesty's Government declare that the practical application of the principle of equality of rights is no less essential in an agreement than that of the principle of security. (3) *Disarmament*. Attention is drawn to the voluntary renunciation by the German Chancellor in the course of the recent conversations of offensive weapons, although the heavily armed states might not be willing to abandon their existing armaments. It therefore follows that a positive contribution to disarmament by the heavily armed Powers would help to bring the scale down all round and should logically reduce the demands which Germany might otherwise be disposed to put forward. His Majesty's Government consequently put forward the following proposals on the assumption that the agreement should last for ten years:

(a) *Effectives*. The Draft Convention suggested 200,000 men with eight months' service as the average daily effectives stationed in the home country for France, Germany, Italy and Poland. Germany claims 300,000 with twelve months' service. His Majesty's Government consider that it is the principle of parity rather than the actual figures which is important and think that it should not be too difficult for these States to find an accommodation between 200,000 (which they believe is preferred by the majority of the

Powers concerned) and 300,000. They would be prepared also to acquiesce in the longer period of service if such is the general desire. The process of standardisation at the agreed figure should be completed in four years. Military training outside the army of men of military age should be prohibited and the prohibition checked by permanent and automatic supervision.

(b) *Land War Material*. Attention is called to the fact that under the Draft Convention restrictions on Germany in the matter of anti-aircraft guns would disappear. Maximum calibre of guns in permanent frontier and fortress defensive systems to be fixed by international agreement. *Tanks*. Tanks over 30 tons to be destroyed by the end of the first year, over 20 tons by the end of the third year and over 16 by the end of the fifth year. Further international examination as contemplated in Article 21 of the Draft Convention should be undertaken and completed by the end of the third year. His Majesty's Government for their part would agree to the new German short-service army being equipped with tanks up to six tons, which, Germany maintains, are necessary for defensive purposes. *Mobile Land Guns*. His Majesty's Government would still prefer to adhere to a maximum limit of 115 mm. as provided for in the Draft Convention Article 19, but are prepared, in order to secure prompt and general agreement, to concur in the new German short-service army being equipped with 155 mm. guns which Germany maintains are necessary for its defensive armament. Guns over 350 mm. to be destroyed by the end of the first year, over 220 mm. by the end of the fourth year and over 155 mm. by the end of the seventh year.

His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to corresponding arrangements for Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria in respect of mobile artillery and tanks.

(c) *Air Armaments*. If the Permanent Disarmament Commission has not decided on abolition at the end of two years, all countries should be entitled to possess military aircraft. Countries to increase or reduce, as the case might be, by stages in the following eight years so as to attain eventually the figures in the table annexed to Article 41 or some other figures to be agreed upon, Germany acquiring parity with the principal air Powers by these stages. Corresponding provisions for other Powers not now entitled to possess military

aircraft. Apart from this adjustment articles 34-41 are maintained intact.

(d) *Naval Armaments*. His Majesty's Government stand by the Naval Chapter of the Convention, but are prepared to make proposals for a simpler arrangement if thought necessary in view of the near approach of the 1935 Naval Conference.

(e) *Supervision*. His Majesty's Government will, if agreement is reached on all other issues, agree to the application of a system of permanent automatic supervision to come into force with the obligations of the Convention.

In a concluding paragraph His Majesty's Government point out that their proposals have been framed so as to meet essential claims on all sides and to promote general agreement; and emphasis is laid on the view of His Majesty's Government that the return of Germany to Geneva and to the League of Nations should be an essential condition of the agreement.

The Italian proposals, which in substance had been shown to Sir John Simon in Rome on January 3rd, were likewise published on February 1st. In their turn they were made in the form of a general argument followed by certain specific suggestions. The argument was that the armed Powers had now proved that they would not disarm; that equality could no longer be denied to Germany; that unless armaments were limited by agreement, there would begin a process of rearmament without check; and that Italy was in favour of disarmament, not rearmament, if possible on the general lines of the British Draft Convention of March 1933. The detailed proposal was that a convention should now be signed for a limited period only, to end in 1940; that the German claim for a 300,000 army on a short-term basis be accepted; that the land armaments of the other Powers be stabilised on the present level; that the expenditure of those other Powers on armaments be stabilised at the present level, subject to the need of replacements and the completion of defensive works now in progress; that chemical warfare and the bombardment of civilian populations be prohibited; and that the question of naval armaments be reserved for discussion at the naval conference of 1935. On the criterion, therefore, of the three heads under which the British proposals were made, it appeared to be the Italian view that

(1) security would be given to France for the duration of the convention by reason of her retention of her present armaments; and in addition there would be the security afforded by the Pact of Rome and the Locarno Treaty; (2) adequate equality would be given to Germany by reason of the acceptance of Germany's own figure for her army; and (3) in the state of actual armaments the best result now possible would be achieved by stabilisation on present levels and by the prevention of an armaments race.

As a rider to those proposals, Italy suggested that Germany, in acknowledgment of the satisfaction of her claims, should return to Geneva to sign the disarmament convention and should withdraw her notice of secession from the League of Nations; and that the four Powers should now meet to discuss the situation, other principal Powers being invited also to take part in the discussions.

As these lines were written, the said four Powers were resting from their labours. The British proposals were impartially ridiculed in the German and in the French press, but the governments of those two countries were in theory engaged upon an examination of the proposals. There was little evidence that the German Government was therein deeply engaged, even though Herr Hitler, on January 30th, announced that he would examine the British proposals "with the greatest of goodwill." In so far as any French Government could survive more than a week, it was chiefly engaged in quelling the riots that ravaged Paris, or in conducting a tariff and quota war with the British Government.

Indeed, the spectacle of government in Europe, as it met the eye of a casual observer in the middle of February 1934, was one that almost froze the hope that springs eternal. If it did not spring eternal, it no doubt would never spring at all. On the face of high diplomacy, the Governments of France, Great Britain and Italy were making proposals to prevent German rearmament, the while they knew that Germany was already rearming. Austria plunged into civil war on February 12th. The French Government—each succeeding French Government—was at loggerheads with the German Government about the next war and was at loggerheads with the British Government about present Franco-British trade.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

February 15th, 1934.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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WILLIAM WORDSWORTH.*

William Wordsworth is always a subject of extraordinary interest, both as a thinker and a poet. Born in 1770, dying in 1850, he lived through successive periods that showed the capacity of England and the continent of Europe respectively to assume wide differences of political and social change. When Wordsworth was a child of ten the old monarchy of France still subsisted in almost unchanged form; he lived to see in action the French Revolution, the Napoleonic era, the Industrial Revolution in England attaining its height, the reaction on the Continent that followed the field of Waterloo, the revolution in England that consisted in the peaceful passing of the Reform Act in 1832, the growth of education that began in the starting of government grants in 1833, the attack upon the social horrors that accompanied the Industrial Revolution, and he lived also to see 1848, the year of revolutions on the Continent that was the answer to the terrible social and political reaction of the more than thirty years that followed the disappearance of Napoleon. Wordsworth saw all that was to be seen in the old non-mechanised world, and even in respect of mechanical changes he saw the advent of steam and the railways. He was in the position to prophesy

* *The Later Wordsworth*, by Edith C. Batho. Cambridge: at the University Press. 16s. net.

the conditions of a totally new world. In fact he was a man of vast intellectual power who, from first to last, looked sanely on a world of apparent instability, and discerned in it not chaos but growth. Miss Edith Batho, in her able book in which she discusses at great but legitimate length the "later Wordsworth," says :

It is clear that in his later years Wordsworth had not lost in any true sense of the word his enthusiasm for liberty and humanity, though he was, not unnaturally, more conscious of the danger which beset them than in his youth. It is equally clear that his mind had not closed or become rigid : all the Liberals and Radicals of his own day who talked with him bear independent witness to his candour and readiness to consider the arguments and point of view of the other side—Mill and the Benthamites, J. J. Tayler, Crabb Robinson, have been quoted, and others might have been added to the list ; it is chiefly the illiberal dogmatism of later writers, their insistence on shibboleths and ignoring, if not ignorance, of historical circumstances, which have fixed upon him the reputation of a narrowing and stiffening reactionary, a High Church Tory of the dullest kind.

Wordsworth was not a party man. He distrusted the Whigs, but he was in agreement over many things with the advanced Radicals, and especially about Poor Law and the over-centralisation of Government. He would have been delighted with modern Poor Law developments and the splendid work now being done by the modern local authorities. Miss Batho states with truth that his political development "was a consistent development" and she goes on to show that that was the case also in his religious development. In an ironic passage of real value, Miss Batho says :

The conclusion most frequently put forward at present, that Wordsworth's increasing attachment to the outward forms of religion was one symptom of a decay in his poetical, spiritual and intellectual powers, tells us rather more about the critics who favour it than about Wordsworth : that they cannot conceive how a man can develop as he did, religiously as well as politically, unless his powers of mind have decayed. But the unfortunate truth is that men of great powers do refuse to accept or retain the opinions which we think they ought to hold, and their refusal is no more a sign of decay in them than, let us hope, our refusal to conform with them is a sign of blindness and decay in us.

That is an unanswerable passage. The sane mind of Wordsworth adopted its inevitable path, the path of conscience and

character, to the very end. He was not a Lost Leader at all. He was a thinker who thought in poetry ; he was, or believed that he was, a spokesman of the people. The late Professor Saintsbury, the greatest critic of our age and possibly of all modern times, says of Wordsworth and Coleridge :

Both were poets of the very highest power, the interval and inequality between whose best and worst poetry is vast and very nearly incomprehensible. . . . There is now no difficulty, except to those who either do not possess critical power or decline to use it, in detecting, so far as such things can ever be detected, the secret of Wordsworth's poetical inequality. It is that his poetical power, though of the intensest and noblest, was very narrow in its possibilities of application, and that, reinforcing a native arrogance with an acquired theory, he thought it capable of being applied almost universally. It was his mission to reverse the general tendency of the eighteenth century by averting the attention from towns, manners, politics, systems of philosophy, and directing them upon the country, nature, the inner moral life of man, and religion. Occasionally a sort of splash of that limited but magnificent poetic genius of his has fallen beyond the usual circle ; more often he has endeavoured to extend the circle at the expense of the power. Perhaps twice only, in *Tintern Abbey* and in the *Ode on Intimations of Immortality*, is the full, the perfect Wordsworth, with his half-panteistic worship of nature, informed and chastened by an intense sense of human conduct, of reverence and almost of humbleness, displayed in the utmost poetic felicity. And these two are accordingly among the great poems of the world.

The native arrogance that Professor Saintsbury detected was undoubtedly there, the arrogance of genius always suppressed, but always there in the manifestation of his superb, calm brain and character, and in his belief not only in himself, but in the human race for whom, as he believed, he was the chosen spokesman.

J. E. G. DE M.

* * * * *

ART AND ARTIFICE IN SHAKESPEARE.*

The first consideration of Dr. Stoll's book is its title, *Art and Artifice in Shakespeare*. "Art" may be defined as the

* *Art and Artifice in Shakespeare : A Study in Dramatic Contrast and Illusion*. By Elmer Edgar Stoll, Professor of English in the University of Minnesota. Cambridge University Press. 7s. 6d.

creative faculty in man, and "artifice" as the means to that end. Shakespeare is the artificer who brings to his creation a unity of truth and beauty; contrast and illusion are his tools: "Then there is mirth in heaven, when earthly things made even atone together." Dr. Stoll has produced an exhaustive series of essays on the above subject, delivers a vigorous attack on what he considers the trend of modern scholarship, and illustrates his theories by a detailed examination of *Othello*, *Macbeth*, and *Hamlet*. It is a book that deserves careful consideration.

In all studies of Shakespeare and his work, as it seems to the present writer, the man and his genius must occupy the foremost place. He is the key to his work. Many modern critics regard his work objectively, not subjectively, neglecting the dramatist's own humanity. Yet never was one more human and it is that very quality that endears him not only to his own nation but to all the world, west to east. It must always be taken into account, however, that he was writing for the public of his day, whom he knew so well, and his success depended largely on his audience. His plays were in demand, and it was often necessary to curtail them, so as to bring them into a given time, say a two hours' performance. There is no doubt as to his hasty methods, and his frequent discrepancies. The critics seize upon this and try heaven and earth to elucidate the seeming error. There is too much anatomising and psychologising at the present day. Many centuries ago St. Paul warned his hearers not "to be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ." Sometimes, we moderns overload a thought, and so deprive it of that simplicity which is the very core of Shakespeare and the Bible.

The play, or rather the poetical and dramatic tragedy of *Othello*, is a study in contrast and illusion, the theme being the contrast between the jealousy of hate and the jealousy of love, both of which are travelling to journey's end, Emilia and Cassio being the route thereto. All tragedy must of necessity be an exaggeration of the ordinary, in life or in drama, and can only be accounted for psychologically, the mind being obsessed by a dominant thought or desire. Shakespeare builds on the known nature of Othello, a man apparently free from jealousy, or "not easily jealous," and makes passion, the heritage of his race (and here psychology

comes in), besiege the noble mind, and he falls a victim to the villainy of Iago, of whose honesty he is fully convinced. We find in *Macbeth* the same disability: "There's no art to find the mind's construction in the face: he was a gentleman on whom I built an absolute trust." It was that very trust in Iago which proved Othello's downfall. Shakespeare employs this hidden jealousy of Othello for the purpose of dramatic art, as an artifice, not of nature as we know it, but an acceleration of nature. We cannot fail to realise that the whole tragedy turns on the psychology of Othello. Dr. Stoll holds that dramatic contrast and illusion, light and shade as we would term it, is Shakespeare's method of construction, not psychology, which at present may be overworked and takes from man free will. But it surely has its place in drama as much as or more than the supernatural, an artifice Shakespeare constantly uses and on which he builds his plot: without the Ghost in *Hamlet* the whole fabric would have collapsed, but hand in hand with the psychology of the Prince it falls on prepared ground and starts the tragedy of the play. So in *Macbeth*, the witches do not appear to Lady Macbeth, but to the ambitious, weaker nature of her husband, and his psychology receives and transmits it to his wife.

Dr. Stoll's criticism is a little difficult to follow or fully grasp, as it is so mingled with the opinions of, and quotations from, other critics of the works of Shakespeare, and it is especially difficult to those who are not conversant with Dr. Stoll's earlier books on the same topic. But after all, "the play's the thing," meaning the situation, the poetry, and the whole æsthetic unity of the play, since the aim of all drama should be to hold the mirror up to nature whereby we may see ourselves, whether in tragedy or comedy, as others see us. And the supreme genius of Shakespeare lightens all he touches with a poetry which unifies, and convinces, so that even Othello, a murderer and self-murderer, remains a hero who "loved not wisely but too well." Those who love and study Shakespeare, as Dr. Stoll does, they, and they perhaps alone, "will know of his doctrine," meaning his Art and his Artifice, his creative faculty and his methods of making his creations live.

S. DE M.

THE GROUP MOVEMENT.*

This is a solid book, attractive, provoking, and very good reading. The writer is no exponent of a religious "stunt," but gives a straightforward account of himself, and shows how all the philosophy and psychology of which America is capable failed to meet his real needs. He unfolds in clear language, devoid of mannerisms, not only the "Why," but the "How" of a way of life which is transforming. He writes as a business man (who has been in turn engineer, journalist and advertising agent), as a one-time pagan, egoist and philosopher, and the book will make a distinct appeal to men of business affairs as well as to idealists.

The author describes how he met and responded to the challenge of a practical Christianity, resulting in the solution of his personal problems, and the last part of the book is given up to the wider application of the challenge, and sets forth the possibilities of a new quality of life in political, industrial, religious, economic, national and racial affairs. Many spiritual autobiographies are apt to leave behind them mournful echoes of egotism and introspection. This book conveys the healthy glow of confident and courageous living.

Life had not evolved according to the author's hopes and plans, and he sought various ways of escape from the resulting disillusionment and confusion, chiefly in work and other "false gods," until financial losses determined him to seek the real meaning and purpose of life. He had tried Egotism, Humanitarianism and Theism, without finding any answer to his questions. Life, he concluded, must be intended for the growing of souls, and he wrote a book to prove the theory, only to learn through its reception that the world cannot be converted to a mode of thought, though it may be won to a way of life. His philosophy did not result in any new way of living, science and spiritualism left his problem still unsolved.

Finally, when he met the Group Movement, he discovered that the soul-qualities for which he sought were not mental but moral qualities. "I found that a man had simply to step out of his own light to become immediately and keenly conscious of the presence of God." Truth came to him in the

* *I Was a Pagan*. By V. C. Kitchen. Hodder & Stoughton. 5s.

acceptance of a sharing fellowship and in obedience to God's guidance. There resulted a new happiness in home life, and a new quality in his relationships with other people; while following upon his experience of Christ there came a clearer understanding of Christian theology. "Pagan's Progress" might well have been the alternative title of a book whose story proves that human nature *can* be changed—not by a method, but by a power.

L. K. C.

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PROFESSOR MURISON'S *ILIAD*.*

Professor Murison has now added his first instalment of the *Iliad* to his translation into English verse of the Odes of Pindar, of Horace and his translation into English hexameters of Virgil's *Bucolics and Georgics*. His energy is unconquerable, and whatever we may think of the expediency of rendering Virgil's *Bucolics and Georgics* into English hexameters there can be little doubt that it is the right way to deal with Homer. The test is the reading of the great rhapsody so rendered. Occasionally we get a phrase that some purists would not have used—"crook-counselling Kronos" is an example—but the real test is reading. Professor Murison holds that "it is the only English metre capable of representing Homer with a reasonable measure of success." He knows well the arguments against and for the hexameter and the complex argument is not yet resolved by experts in prosody. The latest translator writes:

Pending a reasoned analysis by experts, a mere practitioner may be permitted to suggest that the question is not to be solved by argument, that the difficulties are but slightly (if at all) inherent in the hexameter itself, and that the most hopeful line of advance lies in the free extension of the course adumbrated by Oliver Goldsmith (*Essay*, xviii). . . . Once more I have adhered closely to the original text, trusting to find expedients to neutralise the effects of the inevitable restriction, and encouraged by the spontaneous approval of highly competent scholars. While I have kept in view the main principles of Homeric translation inculcated by Matthew Arnold, I have often felt unable to rely on his teaching in details.

* *The Iliad of Homer rendered in English Hexameters*, by Alexander Falconer Murison. Vol. I: Books i-xii. Longmans, 10s. 6d.

"The practitioner," that is to say a writer who has the Greek text in his heart as well as in his mind and thinks in the wonderful Greek of six or more centuries before our era, justifies his choice by the very fact that the story as rendered by Professor Murison keeps its essential nobility, its detachment that raises the poet far above the gods and men that he depicts and yet is as readable and delightful as any translation can be.

The Greeks were drenched with the Homeric spirit and the Homeric metre from the time (it is almost safe now to adopt Dr. Leaf's theory) that "an official copy of Homer was made in Athens in the time of Solon and Persistratus" through the classical age and down to the first century of the Christian era in the Troad. Dr. Sandys truly adds that from the Athenian age to the present day, the study of Homer has never ceased. There is something about this mysterious author that seems to be more than human. Dr. Sandys says that Sophocles in his dramas reproduces "the Homeric spirit. He is also Homeric in the ideal, yet human, conception of his characters, and in the calm self-control, which characterises him even in scenes of violent excitement." The same can be said of Shakespeare in *King Lear*, *Macbeth*, *Othello* and in *Midsummer Night's Dream*. He is a creator in the Homeric or the Sophoclean sense. Both gods and men are his children. Cardinal Newman in his famous essay on "Poetry, with reference to Aristotle's Poetics" has various things to say about the *Iliad* which seem to confirm Professor Murison's choice of metre. This metre seems capable of dealing with the "vulgarieties of old Phœnix in the ninth *Iliad*" which Newman attributes to "the wantonness of exuberant genius." This great critic justifies in the case of Homer as in the case of Shakespeare the introduction of "unpoetical matter" as a method of relief. The present writer believes that this relief can be expressed in hexameters but certainly not in English blank verse. Newman goes on to say :

the style of Homer's poems is perfect in their particular department. It is free, manly, simple, perspicuous, energetic, and varied. It is the style of one who rhapsodised without deference to hearer or judge, in an age prior to the temptations which more or less prevailed over succeeding writers—before the theatre had degraded poetry into an exhibition, and criticism narrowed it into an art.

Professor Murison's translation of the *Iliad* preserves (so far as any translation can preserve) all these qualities. It may not be great poetry in itself and does not pretend to be, but it carries the idea of rhapsody "without deference to hearer or judge" to full length and that idea of rhapsody in the case of Homer is exactly what the ancient Greeks looked for and what an English reader can have in this very valuable translation.

J. E. G. DE M.

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THE HISTORY OF GUERNSEY.*

Mr. Ralph Durand's book on Guernsey is historical but is not a regular history. It consists, apparently, of a number of chapters brought together without any formal regard to date : the early history of the Island and pre-history, subjects of extraordinary interest, are at the end of the book ; the Napoleonic wars precede the story of Guernsey under the Tudors, and so forth. The book, perhaps, is none the worse for this lack of system, and it has made an immediate success in Guernsey since two editions were called for in the autumn of 1933. Great pains have been taken to secure the accuracy of what may be called the feudal part of the story, and this is especially important since most of the feudal system of England and all the English customary law, with possibly one exception, have been abolished by the legislation which culminated in the Law of Property Act, 1925.

The earliest history of Guernsey is written in stone, but the customs that accompanied that earliest history have survived, in attenuated form, to the present day. Guernsey is possibly the European home of dolmens and menhirs, those mysterious upright stones which almost certainly in the later form were statues. Mr. Durand associates them with fertility rites and with the Great Mother of the Gods. This is doubtful. A remarkable discovery in 1932 by Dr. Ayscough, whose photographs adorn this volume, has, indeed, changed the whole situation and brought us back to the eighteenth-century view that these dolmens were druidical. Dr. Ays-

* *Guernsey : Present and Past : an Island where Feudalism lingers*, by Ralph Durand, illustrated from photographs by Florence Ayscough, D.Litt., second edition (revised). Guernsey : Guernsey Press Company Ltd. 2s. 6d.

cough photographed by artificial light the under surface of the capstone of the dolmen called La Hougue de Déhus and discovered that the whole stone was covered by engravings (one representing a sword and belt), and Miss V. C. C. Cullum, a specialist on megalithic culture, has come to the conclusion that the dolmen was the grave of a Gaulish chieftain approximately of the first century before our era. Now, as Dr. Rice Holmes says in his *Ancient Britain*, "the most eminent of modern French archæologists maintains that the dolmens, chambered tombs, and standing stones of France were erected under the influence of Druids," while in England the belief has long been growing that Druidism was of Neolithic origin. There is something to be said for the Normandy legend that the Channel Isles were the sacred burying-ground of Normandy. That would account for the abundance of dolmens and menhirs in Guernsey.

The earliest historical reference to Guernsey is (Mr. Durand tells us) on a plaque dug up in Corsica in 1920, which contains an inscription to the effect that the Emperor Vespasian had granted Roman citizenship to a certain *Basiel Turbeli Gallinaria Sarniensis*, who had long served the Roman fleet. No reference is given. Mr. Durand does not mention the fact that in the famous *Antonini Itinerarium Britanniarum*, which is usually attributed to the Emperor Antoninus Pius (A.D. 138-61), there occur in the list of islands between Gaul and Britain three islands named Riduna, Sarmia and Caesaria, which are usually identified with Alderney, Guernsey and Jersey, though Mr. A. W. Whatmore in his *Insulæ Britannicæ* suggests that they are probably to be sought amongst the Scilly Isles. But the fact that Guernsey was known in the time of Vespasian seems some reason why the Channel Islands should be included in the Antonine Itinerary. Perhaps Sarmia was the origin of the name of St. Martins. St. Sampson and St. Maglorius, British scholars, fled from the Saxon invaders of Britain with many others that were destined to people Brittany, and in the course of their flight visited Guernsey and converted it to Christianity. The islands were incorporated by the Northmen into Normandy before the middle of the tenth century, and when the last Duke of Normandy, King John of England, lost Normandy, he managed to retain the islands. It was the chance, apparently, that the then Lord of the islands, Pierre de Préaux, preferred

English to French rule, in 1204, while by treaty in 1217 France recognised the English rule.

For more than seven hundred years Guernsey with the other islands has been a part of the British Empire. It is not part of the United Kingdom; it was a Dominion seven centuries before the rest of the Dominions came into existence; it has its own laws and makes its own laws; it has no trial by jury, its Royal Court will not grant divorces; it has conscription, and it has a freedom which is altogether different from English freedom. Its customary laws have endured for all these centuries; its ancient families endure—the Extent of 1248 mentions names such as Gosselin, de Havilland, Toustain, Rohais, de la Court and Blondel. The Guernsey militia was in existence long before the Hundred Years' War which began in 1339, and when the Service Battalion embarked overseas in the Great War of our time it marched "to the air of the *Chanson de Roland*, the song that Taillefer, William's minstrel, sang as he rode to his death at Senlac." It is a strange and wonderful story of a little island which has kept its personality and its French language through all these centuries. The continuity of great sailormen from the time of Basil in the reign of the Emperor Vespasian to the time of that great Admiral Lord de Saumarez in the Napoleonic Wars and Admiral Sir Reginald Tupper and Admiral Sir Osmond Brock in the Great War of 1914-18 must be mentioned. Space does not allow of any account of education in the island, but it may be mentioned that in the seventeenth century and later young men were still sent to the University of Caen to learn law and (though Mr. Durand does not mention it) to the University of Saumur until 1637 to acquire scholarship and divinity. Oxford took the place of the French university.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

The eighth series of *Problems of Peace*, containing the lectures delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations in 1933,* is as interesting as its predecessors. Professor Gilbert Murray leads off with a survey of the situation combining disappointment with confidence in due proportion. "We have not got an organ of world government.

* Allen & Unwin. 8s. 6d. net.

That is very far distant. What we have is an organ of consultation." Professor Rappard speaks frankly of recent failures of statesmanship, including our own. "At no time," he declares in discussing the conflict in the Far East, "had one the impression that British policy was determined essentially by the will to uphold the Covenant and to protect China." The new situation in Germany fills him with alarm. "Is there anyone within or without Germany who honestly considers the present German régime to be peaceful in its instincts, in its desires, and in its intentions to-day?" Mr. Arnold-Forster discusses Disarmament with the authority of an expert, and M. Henri Rolin, the Belgian jurist, discourses on the arms traffic. Professor Manley Hudson of Harvard University, reviews some of the recent territorial disputes in which the League has played a helpful part, including the Greenland case and the South American troubles. Professor Moritz Bonn, formerly of Berlin, attempts to simplify the question of the gold standard. Among the fourteen addresses, all of them by acknowledged authorities, none will be read with more profit and sympathy than that on the needs and prospects of China by Sir John Hope Simpson, whose work in the Flood Relief gives him a special title to speak. The volume ends with a most thoughtful analysis by Dr. Delisle Burns of Authority and Force in the State system. The State, he declares, is essentially an instrument of Peace, and War is a survival from primitive times before the State existed. But the State exists not only to keep the peace, but to help its members to develop their capacities for the common good. The Dictator's ideal of tame citizens doing his bidding without question is rightly denounced by Dr. Burns as an outrage on human personality.

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The Book of Scientific Discovery,* by Dr. D. M. Turner, is an ideal introduction to one of the most fascinating stories in the world. "I have endeavoured," writes the author, "to show how some parts of our present scientific knowledge have grown"; and the many admirable illustrations facilitate her task. Beginning with a reminder of the ignorance of the Middle Ages, we are introduced to Roger Bacon, the first of the pioneers, to Leonardo, to Vesalius, and to the sixteenth-century founders of modern astronomy. The mighty Galileo has a chapter to himself, and with Harvey and the revelations of the microscope we find ourselves at the opening of the era of experiment. The survey of the seventeenth century ends with Newton, and we hurry on to the era of inventions which ushered in the industrial revolution. At the end of the eighteenth century we return to pure science with Lavoisier and the early chemists, and at the opening of the nineteenth century we salute Dalton's atomic theory and the coming of electricity with Faraday and his forerunners. The closing chapters sketch the immense achievements of the last century, with Lyell, Darwin, Mendel,

* Harrap.

Pasteur, Lister, Röntgen, the Curies, Einstein in the foreground of the picture. Dr. Turner's pages on the theory of relativity render a difficult subject as clear as words can make it; but even then it requires an effort to grasp. Dr. Turner knows far more than she has space to use; but this wide knowledge enables her to concentrate on the most essential points. She is to be cordially congratulated on a work which any intelligent amateur can enjoy.

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The original woodcuts of George Buday's *Book of Ballads*—a textless book illustrating the pilgrimage of the peasantry of Szeged made yearly to the church of the Virgin Mary, the ballads of the Hungarian Lowlands, the ballads of Transylvania, and the ballads of the poet John Arany—are here printed in an English edition from the Press of Isodor Kner of Gyoma Hungary, a notable example of what this Press can do. In some introductory notes by Mr. Charles Rosner, the Hungarian correspondent to the "Studio Publications" of London, some account is given of the College of Art of Szeged, "a community of progressive young Hungarian artists, writers, essayists and sociologists who—tied by blood and emotional bonds to the peasantry—aim at an artistic and scientific expression of the original human traits of a race distinct from others of Central Europe." Mr. Rosner gives an account of the work of George Buday, a leader of the group, a Hungarian of Transylvania who began exhibiting ten years ago as a painter, but in 1931 turned to woodcutting with much success. His *Pilgrimage to the Holy Virgin* of that year was pronounced by the Hungarian Bibliophil Society as one of the three most beautiful books of 1931, and that verdict was repeated in 1933 with respect to other work. His woodcuts seem weird and strange, but their technical skill is undoubted, and the successive illustrations, expressive and well-produced, give life to the spiritual and mystic feelings of an almost unknown peasant stock. Indeed, these woodcuts seem full of some Eastern artistic spirit entirely divorced from Aryan art. It is a pity that translations of the Ballads have not been added to the woodcuts, which aim at illustrating their inner meaning.

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Mrs. J. E. Courtney has written an interesting book on *The Adventurous 'Thirties. A Chapter in the Women's Movement*.* The present generation is inclined to look upon the early nineteenth century as a period in which women lived in a state of lonely servitude, and those who escaped from domestic bonds were the rebels of a tiresome age. In fact, as Mrs. Courtney makes abundantly clear, for more than the first quarter of that century, women of the educated classes were as active mentally as they are to-day. Their authorship for the most part

* Oxford University Press. 8s. 6d.

was poetry and light literature, but it was work which produced money, and in many cases was the mainstay of the home. The era of middle-class governesses appears to have arrived after the accession of Queen Victoria, when penniless women exchanged the age of romance and the possibilities of literature for the dull exacting home-teaching of the period. Women, unfortunately, adapt themselves to circumstances very quickly, and when the Queen, with the urgency of youth, insisted on the pure domesticity of her sex, they responded with cruel rapidity. She was young, and possessed of everything that the world could give her, and when she condemned women to the hearth, she forgot that her own keen intellect worked with great effect in many spheres. Probably no woman had a greater sense of duty, but it was not only her great position that gave her interest in affairs; she herself was keen, and needed, consciously and unconsciously, outlets beyond domestic life. She could have done so much for the advancement of women; instead, for the most part, she deliberately retarded them. Mrs. Courtney in her sixteen biographical sketches gives an extraordinarily modern picture of the lives and work of her heroines; they were writers of all kinds, travellers, philanthropists, and hostesses of salons. Yet different as they were, both socially and mentally, they make a united whole in showing that the women's movement started more than a hundred years ago. Mrs. Hemans, Miss Martineau, Mrs. Fry, and Baroness Burdett-Coutts, are well-known names, but there are many people in this book whose work deserves remembrance, if only to show that there were lesser women whose work was known and well remunerated in their generation.

In his learned volume, *Italy and the Reformation to 1550*,* Dr. G. K. Brown certainly does not underrate the influence for good of the Papacy in very difficult pre-Reformation times: "The modern forgets that the medieval display of might was often required to enforce necessary religious reform . . . the Papacy led the Renaissance . . . it also derived immense support from" the Regulars of the fifteenth century. It was, however, static and exclusive, and there were the seeds of rebellion in Italian humanism which resulted in an organised body hostile to the Church, since reform did not come from within. The Reformation in Italy began slowly with ultramontane influences and before the middle of the sixteenth century was definitely a force in Como, Milan, Venetia and Tuscany. The Papal States, including Bologna, shared in the movement; Naples was affected. Adrian VI desired and sought reform. Paul III definitely tried to root out ecclesiastical abuses, but it was too late to stop the Reformation. Dr. Brown's account of the Italian theologians of the sixteenth century is very valuable and his whole book is full of learning and judicial inquiry.

* Basil Blackwood. Oxford. 18s. net.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

*The Peace Year Book** published by the National Peace Council annually provides an excellent review of the year's work for peace. "This Year Book," says the Editorial Note to the 1934 Edition, "has been prepared to serve as a book of reference for Peace workers at home and abroad concerning the Peace movement throughout the world, and to provide in a concise form reliable information on the major international questions of the day." Mr. W. Arnold Forster passes in review the events of 1933, which "has seen far the worst defeat for the cause of world order since the post-war peace-building began." Recent events may, perhaps, make somewhat illusory his pessimistic forecasts of the future. Among other contributors to the Year Book are Mr. G. D. H. Cole, on the World Economic Conference; Dr. G. P. Gooch, on the German Revolution; Mr. Maurice Dobb, on Soviet Russia and World Peace; and Mr. Stephen Heald, on the Locarno Agreement. Among a mass of information there are a number of useful statistics on armaments, including a summary of the trade in arms and munitions by the leading countries.

This memoir of the late Bishop of Winchester, Dr. Frank Theodore Woods (1874-1932),† by the Bishop of Croydon and the Archdeacon of Leicester, gives a vivid picture of a man who, from and indeed before, his Cambridge days, through six periods of parochial work and through the heavy duties of the two dioceses of Peterborough and Winchester, which he filled with distinction, was one who devoted his whole physical, mental and spiritual powers to the advancement of the Kingdom of Christ. The authors trust, and there can be no doubt of their success, that they have given "a true impression of a bishop who, in quite a singular degree, manifested in character and service the Christ-like qualities of Pastor, Prophet, and Pilgrim." He was intensely interested in the education of the young, and worked hard for religious education from first to last. He was a descendant of Elizabeth Fry, and through her derived from Quaker stock. At Peterborough he was known as the enginemen's bishop because he loved engineering and understood the industrial problems of the drivers. He was a gifted musician and his gift helped many sides of his life and work. His wife, who, through thirty-four happy years, shared his labours, also was a musician.

This *Life of Christ*, by Mr. Vaughan Stock, is a "Consecutive Narrative Transcribed from the Texts of the Four Gospels,"‡ and is illustrated by eight exquisite wood engravings by Miss Maud L.

* 1s. 6d.

† S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d. net.

‡ Methuen. 6s. net.

Wethered. It is divided into seventy short chapters, and extends from the birth of John the Baptist to the ascension of Our Lord in Galilee. It uses the words of the Authorised Version and as a connected narrative, with all the simplicity of diction of the famous version, it should command many readers. It is a record of the Divine Life on earth, to quote the statement on the cover, "such as might have been written by one who had followed Him throughout, and it is intended primarily for those who wish to do so now." It is a wonderful little book, but it is possible to regret the omission of the interview with "the Gardener." Surely this could be inserted in the next edition.

Mr. C. H. Walker, formerly of the Sudan Civil Service and H.B.M. Consul for Western Ethiopia, has written in *The Abyssinian at Home** a most interesting account of Abyssinian life, consisting of "a translation of Amharic notes, which are the statements of natives taken down in their actual speech and pieced together under the appropriate subject so as to read more harmoniously." The chapters begin with birth, baptism, education, and pass on to marriage, divorce, death, social, legal and ecclesiastical life. The Abyssinians are, of course, Christians, and the account of the fasts and festivals is particularly interesting. The fasts are very exacting and include every Wednesday and Friday. The Fast of Lent is fifty-five days; the Fast of the Assumption fourteen days. There are other fasts for priests and great men, such as the Christmas Fast which begins on December 11th. The religious life is full of interest and is dictated by the priests. The account of the process of divorce is particularly valuable.

It is not possible often to notice second editions, but with the great increases of tramping and hiking it is tempting to give a few words to the second edition of Dr. E. A. Baker's admirable book, *On Foot in the Highlands*,† as he has some additional words to say as to the compulsory closing of many Scottish Highland hotels and the inordinate charges of the hotels still open in view of the disappearance of competition. Dr. Baker does not say that all are in this category, but he declares that the remedy lies obviously in youth hostels and other special holiday accommodation. The Scottish Ramblers' Federation has inexpensive accommodation all over Scotland. The great railways ought to take up this point and develop inexpensive hostels and inexpensive holiday travel to the Highlands. It would pay well and do a good turn to North Britain.

* The Sheldon Press. 7s. 6d. net.

† Alexander Maclehose & Co., 58 Bloomsbury Street, London. 5s. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1934.

THE AUSTRIAN COUNTER-REVOLUTION.

TO such good purpose have Dr. Dollfuss and Major Fey sat at the feet of the propagandists of Herr Hitler and the apologists of Signor Mussolini that despite patent facts it is perhaps still worth while to furnish some justification of the above title. It would be more necessary to justify it inside than it should be outside Austria, for concurrently with the dawn of complete dictatorship by the Fascists, Austrians became the most ignorant persons in Europe concerning Austrian affairs. Ceaseless reiteration of untruths and half-truths in the Press, on posters and over the ether, coupled with the hermetical exclusion of any counter-argument worth comment from abroad, have done their deadening work here as quickly as they did in Germany. That is, perhaps, why it was possible for a British Conservative leader, on the strength of a couple of days in Vienna, to swallow *en bloc* the Fascist propaganda version of the February conflict and to repeat it under the presidency of Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Birmingham Unionist Association. Had Mr. Amery lived in Vienna for the past few years, or even studied from abroad the public pronouncements and actions, particularly of the Heimwehr but also of the Socialists, he would not so readily have committed himself to repeating such distortions of fact as to call the desperate defence of the Republic (against a self-proclaimed Fascist "revolt" to put pressure on Dr. Dollfuss to destroy democracy) a Socialist "revolution." Nor, had he seen the municipal housing blocks (accepted as models by town-planners all over the world) gradually growing up year after year, reducing by their gift of sun and air to former slum-dwellers the Vienna tuberculosis death-rate from 30 to 18 per 10,000, would he so readily have repeated the Fascist charge that they were "fortresses." The Austrian Architects' Association, by the way, has already refuted such charges implicating the world-famous architects responsible for these buildings. Even the existence of a Fascist régime has not prevented them from giving the lie direct to Major

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Fey's accusations, that these buildings were from the start designed as fortresses and only for that reason constructed of concrete and ferro-concrete. That the stocks of arms which, as will be shown later, the Socialists originally acquired with the consent of the Government, were buried or bricked up in all sorts of places where it would be hard for the Fascists to find them, does not in the least justify the "fortress" story. And if Mr. Amery had stayed here a little longer he might have found Dr. Dollfuss's "wise and generous clemency except for the summary punishment of a few ringleaders" a little hard to reconcile with the work of the courts martial for a single week—nine hangings, three life sentences, four hundred years of imprisonment for thirty-one prisoners—apart altogether from some two thousand persons detained in Vienna at the moment of writing awaiting trial, thousands more imprisoned in the provinces, the mayor and councillors of Vienna and other Socialist leaders including women committed for trial on the fantastic charge of "high treason," and a third of the population of Austria in terror of being thrown on the streets to make room for the Fascist victors. The defeated Socialist leader, Dr. Otto Bauer, has urged the Socialist workers "not to be betrayed by hatred of the blood-thirsty and stupid dictatorship of Dollfuss and Fey into joining the Nazis." One might also urge the enemies of Nazi Germany (among whom one hopes are most Conservative as well as all Liberal, Socialist and Communist Englishmen) not to be betrayed by their hatred of Hitler brutality into condoning that of Austro-Fascism.

One important difference between the triumph of the Fascists in Austria and the triumphs of their colleagues in Germany and Italy is that the Austrian tragedy is a genuine counter-revolution. It is the triumph (due chiefly to fortuitous external circumstances) of ancient reactionary forces which have been long lying in wait, not of disillusioned, blinded and fanatical youths as in Germany. It is the victory of the old men over athletic, working-class youth, of superstition over enlightenment, of the timorous over the fearless, of the backward and bigoted alpine peasant over the modern and open-minded mechanic and factory hand. The Italian Fascists killed to the tune of *Giovannezza*. The Nazis made a god of Youth and offered to it their human sacrifices. The Austrian reaction is not borne aloft gaily on the upstretched

hands of fanatical youths, but on the stooping shoulders of revengeful priests, feudal lords and embittered ex-generals. Its triumph was celebrated by such acts as the ceremonial installation in the presence of the Chancellor and the Cardinal Archbishop of a crucifix in the Rathaus, by forcing on the sullen anti-clerical workers in the municipal dwelling-blocks Roman Catholic "soul-saving centres," by the proud announcement of the permanent illumination of a statue of the Virgin on a modern bridge and by the reopening for the burial of Jesuits the mouldy vaults of a city church which the Emperor Joseph I closed for sanitary reasons a hundred and fifty years ago. Austria has put her clock back one and a half centuries. She put it back to 1918, even before burying the dead, by destroying Hanak's fine piece of modern sculpture, the Monument to the Republic. Yet, despite fifteen years of Social Democratic rule in Vienna, the reactionaries returned to power to find all the Imperial monuments intact.

Fascism is essentially cruel and essentially stupid. The essential cruelty of Austro-Fascism is on a par with that of Italian Fascism (which the world has long forgotten) and with that of the Nazis. "Scrutator" has well reminded us in the *Sunday Times* that Fascism is not a modern discovery, as its followers like to pretend, but one of the oldest forms of government in history—sheer despotism ruling by terror. The world hears less, and will hear less, of the Austrian terror than of the German terror for several reasons. The first is Austrian *Schlamperei*, as opposed to German thoroughness, which makes even terrorism to some extent inefficient. The second is the milder Austrian temperament, which will sometimes cause the instruments to modify the execution of the orders of the directors of the terror. Although it is the riff-raff of the population which has joined the Heimwehr, there is even among some of them a little of the spirit which animated a Republican Defence Corps man with whom I have just talked. Once a machine-gunner in the Austrian Imperial forces and to-day a fugitive from a Government prison, where (as I saw for myself) his back was lacerated by brutal thrashings, he told me: "My job was to keep the enemy from storming our municipal house. I kept up a sharp barrage fire from my machine-gun whenever they tried to advance. But when it came to the point, I couldn't actually shoot down a policeman. Again and again I could have mown them down in dozens, as

I did the enemy in the war. But, after all, they were Austrians like ourselves."

Unfortunately, however, this is not the main reason why Austrian terrorism can work in the dark. One main reason is that the Austrian Fascists, warned by Germany's experiences, are going to be very chary of touching (anti-Semitic as their leaders are at heart) that prickly hedgehog, the Jews. The other hedgehog on which Germany has pricked her fingers so badly, the Vatican, is actually behind Austrian Fascism.

The sudden shutting down in the majority of British newspapers of all accounts of the beatings and other ill-treatment of prisoners both by Heimwehr and police, which have been so widespread, suggests another reason—the necessity for British policy of keeping Austria and Germany apart. This interest, of course, is not at all served in reality by suppressing the misdeeds of Austro-Fascism and thus giving it free rein to deepen the embitterment of the workers until it reaches a point where they will revolt, either with the Nazis or in a desperate proletarian rising. But it is already clear that the columns of the British Press, which have been open always to stories of Nazi outrages, are going to be closed to those of the discreet, Jesuitically-directed but merciless Austrian terror. It is obviously as difficult to make the directors of British policy realise the danger of suppression as it was to convince them during the past year that by supporting Dollfuss in a reactionary course instead of making clear that international support could only be afforded to an essentially anti-Nazi régime—a democratic coalition—they were heading straight for civil war in Austria, which in February was within an ace of bringing about a European war; during the critical days in Vienna, both Italy and Germany were on the point of armed intervention. The last reason why little will ever be heard of the Austrian Terror, moral as well as physical Terror, is that its authors are so successful in hiding it beneath a hypocritical cloak of clemency and generosity to the vanquished. When one sees the decree which destroyed all hope of the workers defending their own interests (by forcing them into a Fascist State organisation miscalled a trades union, financed by their own money stolen from their unions and controlled by the Fascist Social Welfare Minister and headed by Fascist and Clerical leaders nominated by him) introduced by the words "In the spirit of Christianity and of

Social Justice," one almost sighs for the healthy brutality of a Goering. The ceaseless reiteration of the lie (which the Government knew from the start was a lie) that the workers' leaders had fled abroad with the men's money at the first sign of conflict, the latest hypocritical Heimwehr poster asking the workers of a two-million city like Vienna: "Why did not the Socialist municipality build you little houses in God's free nature, surrounded by gardens filled with flowers and vegetables," and replying "Because they did not want homes, but arsenals and snipers' posts," or the perfectly meaningless daily repetitions of expressions of goodwill to the rank and file of Socialists (those of them who are left outside the overcrowded prisons and concentration camps) have much the same effect.

In claiming that the aggression came from the Socialist side, the Fascists are relying, probably justly, on the short memory of mankind. For the last seven years the Heimwehr have openly proclaimed by word and deed (long before there was the faintest hint of a Nazi peril for Austria) that their only aim was the complete destruction of the Social Democrats and all their achievements. During these years they have openly increased (partly from Italian, partly from Austrian Government sources) their stores of arms. Starhemberg, Steidle and Fey have constantly throughout these years announced their intentions in the most blood-thirsty terms. That they were armed partly from official sources, and that their arms were in some cases actually kept ready for them by the authorities, was admitted by Chancellor Dr. Seipel in 1930. For their part, the Socialists have never denied that the Republican Defence Corps had arms at its disposal and was decided to use them in the last resort against Fascism. When, in 1926 and 1927, the first raids were made by the Minister of War, Vaugoin, on Socialist munition stores in the Vienna arsenal, the Socialist deputies revealed in Parliament that the "discovery" of these arms was a piece of hypocrisy. They had been acquired with the consent of the Government and of the Clericals by the Social Democrats as their share of the arms which Austria retained in defiance of the peace treaties. In 1929 and on a dozen subsequent occasions the Socialists made formal proposals for general disarmament of the private armies, warning the Government that until they disarmed the Fascists also, the Socialists would not only not surrender the arms they held to defend the Republic but would

somehow or other acquire "three rifles for every one seized." Always the Government refused to touch the Heimwehr arms depots, on which they could have laid their hands at any moment, while continuing to seize every Socialist depot they could find. The pretence of surprise and indignation by the Government to-day that the Socialists turned out to be well armed and ready to use their arms, is the sheerest hypocrisy.

On October 31st, 1926, Dr. Bauer made his famous speech on the aims of Austrian Social Democracy, known as the Linz Programme. It is a typical Government misrepresentation (which is now generally believed, as the result of the usual Fascist method of ceaseless reiteration of a lie until it becomes more familiar than any truth) that Bauer declared that the Party would abandon democracy and set up a dictatorship of the proletariat once it became certain that democracy would not bring them full power in the State. What Bauer actually said was :

The Austrian workers established the Democratic Republic and forced the bourgeoisie to accept it. We are going to use this Democratic Republic in order to secure power by democratic means and spiritual weapons. If the bourgeoisie dares, it will try to overthrow Democracy and establish a Fascist Dictatorship. It will not dare to attack Democracy so long as the police and gendarmerie are not on the side of the Fascists and Monarchists. But the bourgeoisie may succeed in transferring the struggle to another battlefield than that of Democracy. Only if we have to defend Democracy against a counter-revolution would we be left with no other choice than to fight with violent means. Violence in our programme has only a defensive rôle. By violence we mean civil war. We know that the Fascist danger may confront us with the choice of defending ourselves with arms or surrendering. Therefore we say, "If we are attacked, you will find us armed and ready for self-defence if driven to it."

On the same day the *Reichspost* itself commented that Bauer "rejected terror and violence as a means for securing power in the State." So much for the "Bolshevism" of the most hated "Austro-Bolshevik" of all, Otto Bauer, the man who in reality did more at the revolution of 1918 to prevent Austria falling into line with her neighbours, Soviet Hungary and Soviet Bavaria, than anyone else.

In 1929 and 1930 the Heimwehr leaders constantly threatened the "march on Vienna." The Socialist municipality prohibited parades both of the Heimwehr and of the

Republican Defence Corps in Vienna, but were overridden by Dr. Seipel. Every Sunday brought its parades and counter-parades and casualties; only foreign pressure delayed the counter-revolution. Prince Starhemberg raised and armed private battalions with the approval of the Government. The German *Putz* expert, Major Waldemar Pabst, as Chief of the Heimwehr staff, prepared the plans for the *Putz*. Prince Starhemberg publicly dared the Government to touch their illegal armouries, which, of course, was the last thing the Government thought of doing. Only the vigilance of that sound policeman, Chancellor Schober, foiled a Heimwehr *Putz* in 1929, under the pressure of foreign insistence that the Heimwehr should be disarmed. For this the reactionaries broke in, and Vaugoin and Starhemberg ruled as semi-dictators for a month, recalling Major Pabst, whom Schober had expelled. He drew up a detailed plan for a *Putz* on November 18th, which was vitiated by its publication in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* ten days ahead. On September 13th, 1931, armed Heimwehr rose in Styria and proclaimed the establishment of Fascism in Austria. Owing to internal jealousies the rest of the Heimwehr failed to co-operate and the *Putz* collapsed. The Government troops sent to Styria were ordered not to deprive the Heimwehr of their arms. Prince Starhemberg was arrested but never tried, and no one was punished for the blood shed by the Fascists.

The triumph of Hitler in Germany was the beginning of the end for the Socialists. Dr. Dollfuss, compelled to seek foreign support, played his cards very cleverly as between Democratic France and Fascist Italy. Italy, of course, had always supported the Fascists because free Socialist Vienna with its amazing housing success, welfare institutions, and the probity of its finances amidst Clerical banking corruption was an eyesore for her. Italian hatred of the Socialists was intensified a year ago when the latter brought to light the scandal of the arms which Italy was smuggling into Austria, partly for the Heimwehr and partly for the Hungarian irregulars. There was a *démarche* of the Powers, and the Austrian Government was compelled to promise to return the arms to Italy. The scandal was revived when on February 24th, 1933, Herr Schorsch, head of the Austrian railway trade union (who wisely was one of the first to flee the country on the collapse of Socialist resistance), revealed that the General Director of the Federal

Railways had tried to bribe him with enormous sums of money to smuggle the arms into Hungary, while empty cases to deceive the Powers were returned to Italy. There is little doubt that, in point of fact, many of these Italian arms were finally used to shoot down the workers during the February fighting. As long as such Italian arms, Italian Fascist guidance and Italian money are available, Fascist Austria may stand. The moment these are withdrawn it will collapse, for it is an unreal thing with no root in Austrian soil.

Two groups were afraid of Hitler acquiring Austria—France and the Little Entente, who wished for a democratic Austria allied to themselves, and Italy and her reactionary allies, who wanted a Fascist Austria which should complete the Fascist encirclement of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and at the same time keep Hitler off the Brenner. Dr. Dollfuss kept the French group guessing until he and the Heimwehr had so strengthened themselves six weeks ago that, seizing the opportunity of the downfall of a left régime in France (and even of the day of the French general strike, which made it quite impossible for the French Government to remonstrate against Fascist violence), they were able to strike.

In his articles and interviews from exile, Dr. Otto Bauer has given most convincing details of the repeated efforts of the Socialists during the last eleven months to form an anti-Nazi coalition with Dr. Dollfuss, as well as (in a new brochure) a frank admission of the technical mistakes of the Socialists. Dr. Dollfuss personally promised the Socialist Dr. Danneberg, said Bauer in March 1933, to open negotiations with the Social Democrats in April for Constitutional Reform. But in the meantime the Chancellor experienced difficulty in getting the money he wanted from Paris, and secretly decided to accept Mussolini's terms, which were, first, a complete wiping out of the Socialists, then full Italian support. From April onwards he rejected half a dozen Socialist attempts to get into touch with him. They tried him with new leaders as negotiators; they tried him through President Miklas; through moderate Clericals; through the Archbishop of Vienna; through religious Socialists and Catholic Democrats; and, finally, even offered to let him govern for two years without Parliament, provided he would appoint a small advisory Parliamentary Committee on which he would have the majority. Dr. Dollfuss turned a deaf ear to every offer, and

Major Fey has publicly said that he was right to do so. They both wanted to drive the Socialists into a corner and destroy them. Socialism had to be destroyed, as Mussolini let the Chancellor see on each of his two visits to Rome last year. There can be no doubt that the final steps were settled during Signor Suvich's visit to Dr. Dollfuss in January and Dr. Dollfuss's conference with him in Budapest just four days before the fighting started. Dr. Dollfuss returned to Vienna on Saturday; on Sunday, Major Fey told the Heimwehr he was now certain that Dollfuss was their man, and that they were going to start cleaning up Austria on Monday. By ten o'clock on Monday morning the fighting had begun in Linz. Nobody disputes that the first shots were actually fired by the Socialists. This was another triumph for Dr. Dollfuss's political agility, but in view of the whole history of Austria for the last seven years—particularly for the last eleven months—this no more absolves the Heimwehr from the charge of being the aggressors from start to finish than the definite establishment of the name of the man who fired the first shot would affect the question of responsibility for the world war.

Why did the Socialists fail? In the first place because of the incompleteness of the general strike. For eleven months the workers had seen Fascist arrogance growing, unchecked by counter-action of their own leaders. They had seen the Constitution thrust aside, Parliament suppressed, many of their leaders arrested and punished, their own newspaper confiscated more than fifty times. The railwaymen had made a protest strike a year before, which had failed, and the efforts of the Socialist leaders to protect the railwaymen from victimisation had resulted directly in the suppression of Parliament. The Government had lost no single opportunity during the fateful eleven months of filling the streets with steel-helmeted troops, machine-guns and artillery. The workers had expected again and again the call for a general strike and armed resistance, especially when Parliament was suppressed, when the Fascists simultaneously banned the Republican Defence Corps, when the Government deprived them of some of their meagre unemployment benefit, and when, in September, Dr. Dollfuss openly proclaimed that he was going to establish a reactionary Clerical Fascist State. But the once-revolutionary party had become owners of property—some of the finest municipal and social welfare property in

the world, which they held in trust for the workers, and they refused to imperil either this or the lives of their followers except in the last emergency. This, they announced, would arise if either their party or the trades unions were suppressed, the Rathaus occupied, or a Fascist Constitution proclaimed.

The Government knew precisely what to expect and deliberately—joyfully—went ahead. The declarations of Bauer, Seitz, Renner and Deutsch in Parliament in 1928 and 1929, that the Socialists would defend themselves at the last with arms in their hands, were constantly repeated in the *Arbeiterzeitung*. As recently as February 3rd of this year, the Social Democratic Deputy Schneidmadl declared, in the Lower Austrian Senate: "I warn you with the utmost gravity that Starhemberg and Fey are steering straight for civil war. I warn them, and I warn you." He read an order of the Heimwehr, telling them to be ready to report instantly, as the decisive hour was near. For the last time he repeated the eagerness of the Socialists that Dr. Dollfuss should accept their help in fighting the Nazis instead of that of the Heimwehr. But already the Heimwehr had "risen" (of course, with the connivance of the Government), carrying their illegal arms and refusing to disband until their Fascist programme, including the destruction of the Social Democratic Party, was fulfilled. It was in this atmosphere that the Government's attempt to seize arms in the Workers' Club in Linz, on the morning of Monday, February 12th, met with armed resistance. It was a local action, contrary to the orders of the Party Executive in Vienna, who had told the Linz workers to submit to anything on Monday because they hoped that the Clerical Governors of Provinces, who were seeing Dollfuss on Monday, would force him to refuse full compliance with the Heimwehr demands. The Linz workers either never received—apparently it was suppressed by the Government—or disregarded the order, and refused to postpone resistance until the Government, by seizing their arms, should have made them incapable of it. Thus the final struggle began. There was not even a properly organised general strike, but a series of sporadic strikes which, too late, it was decided to make general.

In anticipation of the coup against the Socialists, the Government, during the previous week, had arrested not only many of the vital leaders of the trades unions, but also

most of the key men of the Republican Defence Corps, who alone knew where the arms were hidden and what the defence plans were. They were enabled to do so by the treachery of Edward Korbelt, a district leader of the Defence Corps, who sold himself to the Fascists. Thus, while the howitzers pounded their shells into one municipal house (with the defence rifles and machine-guns growing steadily weaker), frantic men—and women also—were grubbing with their hands in courtyards and cellars of neighbouring houses, anxious to defend their comrades with the arms which they knew must be there—but where? Even so, with the dice loaded against them in almost every imaginable respect, with nearly all their leaders absent in prison (while the Government radio propaganda broadcast hour by hour the lie that they had fled abroad with their pockets full of money—the lie that did more than any material deficiency to break the spirit of resistance), the Austrian Socialists, in contrast to the German, put up a defence sufficient to show that if they had had to fight the Fascists on a fair field, with police and army neutral, they would have swept away the Heimwehr in a day.

All the great achievements of Austrian Socialism are to-day as though they had never been. Those leaders still at liberty seem to have no heart left to organise the illegal party which the rank and file desire. The masses of the Socialists, unaware of the truth of their own heroic fight, unaware that they enjoy the least foreign sympathy or practical support, broken-spirited and sullen, fearing unemployment more than imprisonment as the result of their party loyalty, are drifting desperately into the ranks of the Communists and the Nazis, or accepting with bitter hatred the charity of the victors, for which they are deliberately being forced to apply to their worst enemies, the Catholic priests. They do not know of the wonderful courage with which their murdered leaders, such as the shockingly wounded young Münichreiter, the heroic university graduate Karl Weissl, and the defiant Koloman Wallisch, faced the Fascist gallows, for the mantle of Fascist silence has fallen upon Austria. But the gallantry, if not the wisdom of their last desperate stand to preserve Vienna as the key position of democracy in Central Europe, has won them a place of honour in a far wider world than that of international Socialism—in the hearts and memories of those everywhere who believe that liberty is a thing worth fighting for—and dying for.

W. W. McC.

THE POLITICAL RESULTS OF THE FRENCH SCANDALS.

DETERMINED efforts are now being made in France to establish the facts concerning the matters which have recently disturbed the public mind—and not only to establish them, but to publish them, and not only to publish them, but to take public action, judicial or political, in consequence of them. The phrase “opening up the abscess” has been used more than once, and appropriately enough, for it responds to a guiding instinct of the French people, which is that when things go wrong there must be no secrecy, that no consideration of persons or institutions must be allowed to stand in the way of throwing light on events, grave and even humiliating though they may be, or attaching responsibilities, whatever the standing of those responsible.

This instinct, which is described in France as a passion for justice, sometimes in fact makes justice take the shape of a pitiless and ferocious vengeance, and is made up, partly of the critical faculty which is so essential to the French mind, and partly of two leading traits in the French character—the first, a certain envy for the highly placed and a delight in seeing them brought low, and the second a sudden break in a tolerance which has allowed things to drift far too long, and an indignation which is violent on account of a suspicion that patience will not hold out to see the thing through unless action is taken quickly. The immediate result is a spate of unsupported and often fantastic accusations, made all the more freely in consequence of a state of mind which even in the law courts allows affirmations of beliefs, convictions and opinions to be accepted as evidence, and reproduced with all the more impunity because the law of libel is virtually inoperative.

Take up a Paris newspaper—and not even a newspaper of extreme opinions—and you will find members of the present and former governments publicly accused of being liars and swindlers, either on mere hearsay or on the evidence of cheque counterfoils and records of telephone calls, which, even if they can be established as authentic to start with and as not having been tampered with since, prove nothing beyond that an attempt was made to communicate with a certain telephone number or that the owner of the cheque book wrote a certain name, without even proving that he drew the cheque, that the

cheque was in that name, or that it or the money it represented was ever paid to that name.

You will find the police accused, not only of deliberately retarding and confusing the inquiries with which it is charged, in order to prevent the truth from coming out, and of wilfully suppressing or altering compromising documents concerning politicians which it has been instructed to shield, but actually of having itself committed the murders whose perpetrators it is responsible for discovering. You will find political adversaries in important positions mutually charging each other with preparing conspiracies to seize the reins of power by armed force, but unable to substantiate these charges with anything more solid than a report of a conversation with a friend, whose name is refused. You will find the solemn assertion of such fragile statements as that of certain ex-soldiers, who swore—and quoted their war experience as their qualification—that machine-guns were turned on the crowd, when it was proved that not one ever left the barracks.

You will find the Right accusing the Left of being tarred with the Stavisky scandal, and the Left retorting that a Finance Minister of the Right had to resign because he was involved in the Oustric scandal, and that the municipal councillors of Paris, who marched to the Chamber on the night of February 6th with their tricolour scarves across their chests to protest in the name of clean government, are all involved in the scandal of the secret service funds of the *Métropolitain*, which has just been brought to light. Topaze, say the papers of the Left, is the last man who should dare to raise his voice. You will find the Right accusing the leagues and associations of the Left of providing themselves with arms, and the Left bringing the same accusation against the leagues and associations of the Right. In any case, leagues and associations are much worn just now on both sides, and recruiting for them is active.

As for the really extreme papers, you will find the Communist *Humanité* daily calling for the arrest of M. Tardieu and M. Chiappe, the former as an accomplice of Stavisky and of other earlier swindlers, and the latter not only as such and as the avowed friend of several of Stavisky's known associates, but as an active fomenter of fascist insurrection as well; while it describes the association of the *Croix de Feu* as openly turning itself into an armed and trained military force under

the benevolent eye of General Weygand, in preparation for the next fascist assault. You will find the Royalist *Action Française*, at the other end of the scale, daily accusing the "assassin Frot" and the "assassin Daladier" of preparing a *coup d'état* from the Left in co-operation with all the Radical Freemasons, with certain army officers who are named, and with M. Paul-Boncour, M. Pierre Cot and half a dozen other members of the last government, whose arrest is in turn called for—together with that of M. Chautemps—as an urgent measure of public safety. Incidentally the same paper accuses all these politicians of having been involved in the Stavisky scandals, with the collusion of the police of the Sûreté Générale, who are now trying to cover their tracks, while it accuses the Radical party in general of having had its successful electoral campaign of 1932 financed by Stavisky.

Through this welter of contradictory assertions no less than five responsible authorities have been trying to find their way, and four of them are still at work. There was the judicial committee, which concluded that M. Pressard, the Public Prosecutor and brother-in-law of M. Chautemps, was guilty of a dereliction of professional duty in connection with the repeated adjournments, over a course of six years, of a criminal charge against Stavisky, which adjournments left him at liberty to carry out new frauds. There is the police inquiry into the murder of M. Prince, the judge who had been connected with the financial section of the Public Prosecutor's office, and was believed to be ready to reveal the names of politicians who had intervened to obtain the above-mentioned adjournments. There is the preparation by the examining magistrate of the prosecution of those involved in the Stavisky affair of the fraudulent issue of the bonds of the Bayonne municipal pawnshop, in connection with which over twenty persons, including two deputies and three editors of Paris daily papers, have already been arrested, and two ex-Ministers have been called upon to explain their action. This investigation has now been transferred to Paris. Finally, there are the two parliamentary committees of inquiry, the one into the Stavisky frauds in general, and the other into the disturbances in Paris at the beginning of February, and their origins. The sittings of these committees are not public, but the verbatim report of the proceedings is issued.

The following facts may be said to have been established

up to now. Stavisky was a convicted swindler and card-sharper, awaiting trial on further charges. He evaded this trial for eight years and was able, under a new name, to set enormously bigger swindles on foot. This he succeeded in doing, partly because he was tolerated by the police in return for his supposed services as an informer; partly because he distributed large sums in bribery and blackmail; partly because he employed advocates who were also deputies, and were thus able to bring pressure on persons in the judicial and other government services; partly because he induced some of these advocates and several other deputies, several newspaper editors and even certain ministers eventually to become his accomplices in fraud; partly because he was thus able to obtain the appearance of a government guarantee for his worthless bonds, and led the representatives of insurance companies and public bodies to accept the heavy secret commissions which he paid, and to invest their funds, in the confident hope that if anything went wrong the government would pay; and very largely because his lavish hospitality had gathered round him a circle of friends, each of whom was glad, without any payment, to do him a small service, which they only now realise to have been dishonest and no doubt bitterly regret.

Among the defects in the social, judicial and political systems revealed by the Stavisky case are: the dangerous police practice of working through shady informers, so long established in France; the overlapping and rivalry and lack of co-ordination between the two police and detective systems, namely, the Préfecture de Police for Paris and the Sûreté Générale for the whole country; the social and administrative disadvantages of using the police as a political instrument first and only a protection against crime afterwards; the temptation to dishonest financiers of the government's readiness to avoid scandal by "re-floating" shaky and even doubtful concerns, which readiness was shown in the Aero-postale, the Banque Nationale de Crédit, the Transatlantique and other cases before certain people expected that it would be repeated in that of the Bayonne bonds; the venality of a large part of the Press; the excessive power possessed over ministers by any private member of the Chamber, who can obtain administrative favours by promising to continue or threatening to withdraw his support of the government;

above all, the special danger of this power when the private member is a barrister and the judges before whom he appears know that their promotion depends upon the Minister of Justice, who may be his friend and may one day be himself.

Some of these things were known and even tacitly accepted, though some of them are put into a new and lurid light by such revelations as the existence of a club where card-sharps and detectives hobnob out of working hours, and by the fact that the police inspectors who keep an eye on the gaming tables at the big watering-places only receive a hundred francs a day for their expenses and yet manage to live in the smartest hotels. Some of these things were not known, and have provoked a genuine public indignation, especially the discovery that it is possible to influence the administration of justice and the honoured integrity of the civil service. The indications of the general lowering of the standard of public and private honesty have also produced a quite sincere reaction.

A study of the situation will show, however, that this indignation, sincere as it is, has immediately been exploited by the two parties in what is a fierce struggle for political power, and that they have each tried to monopolise it. The Stavisky scandal was not really the cause but the occasion for the disturbances at the beginning of February, in which that struggle was expressed. The Right and the Left are at grips for the mastery. The old party labels are already ceasing to count—they never counted for very much in France for any party except the Socialist, all the others, even the Radicals, being peculiarly fluid in action and even in declared principles. It may even be said that as the fight proceeds, the whole French political machine is found to be in evolution. That does not mean, however, that the antagonism between Right and Left is diminished. It is even accentuated. They may not be quite the same Right and Left, but they are more definitely than ever the Right of big business and big capital and the Left of the small man, the Right of the Owners and the Left of the Earners—with whom must be associated in France a certain number of small Earner-Owners.

It is by no means certain that the evolution will lead away from parliamentarianism. It is true that, even if it does not, the parliamentarianism will be considerably modified. It

is true that the last two governments were forced to resign by demonstration in the streets of Paris, though each of them could still command a parliamentary majority, and that the political composition of the present government does not represent that majority, which is unchanged. But although the prestige of the parliamentary system is undoubtedly shaken by the proof that street rioters—for they were rioters even though they were respectable and doubtless sincerely indignant ex-soldiers—could twice overthrow a government, it does not follow that the men who were behind those street rioters could assume the administration of the country, that they would be willing to do so, even if they could, or that they would be capable of carrying it on, even if they were willing. As M. Mandel said the other day, Colonel de La Rocque and his Croix de Feu would probably be very embarrassed if M. Doumergue were suddenly to offer to hand over to them.

The fact is that the only possible governing personnel is a parliamentary personnel, with parliamentary traditions, and that probably not a single member of it desires to abolish the parliamentary machine. That does not mean that the machine must not be reformed, or that the old gang must remain in the saddle until they are gradually superannuated. They are very much in the saddle now; for although a change of government no longer means a re-shuffle of the same set of Radical Ministers, as it has meant in the last two years, and though the power is virtually in the hands of the Right to-day instead of the Left—for M. Doumergue's "truce" government is really a Right government—the neo-Socialist, M. Marquet, is the only Minister except the two generals in the military posts who is not an ex-Minister or even a veteran, and in six cases an ex-Premier. The present government does not, however, mean the end of the struggle which is now going on, and whether the Left or the Right wins that struggle, there will certainly be new blood introduced into the governing team, partly because the younger generation is knocking vigorously at the door and partly because opinion is prepared to dispense with those who have been in close touch with the repeated scandals of the last ten years, even when they have not been involved in them.

New blood may mean new parties, new issues and new methods, but it does not necessarily mean the dictatorship which the Right and the Left are now so loudly accusing each

other of trying to seize. There is one powerful reason why a dictatorship of the Right is an unlikely development. The Right, perhaps, represents a majority in Paris, though even that is doubtful if the working-class suburbs are included. It certainly does not represent a majority in France. If a General Election were held now, the result would be that although the Radicals would lose heavily to the Socialists and the Communists, the majority would once more be on the Left, as every deputy who has recently visited his constituency reports. Paris is not France and has never been France. Perhaps it is merely that Paris is ahead of France, that what Paris says to-day France will say to-morrow; and it is recalled that France still gave a *plébiscite* to Napoleon III when Paris was already turning against him. Be that as it may, France is Left to-day.

This, it may be said in passing, is one reason why the present government, which is controlled by the Right, is unlikely to try to obtain from the Senate the permission—which is required by the Constitution—to dissolve the Chamber before the normal expiry of its mandate in 1936. Moreover, as there has only been one dissolution since the Third Republic was formed in 1875, it is unlikely that the Senate would agree to a course which has very often been talked about and proposed, but was only adopted on that occasion. Meanwhile, the Chamber has sufficiently humiliated itself by surrendering its control over finance and giving the government a free hand to make its own budget and promulgate it by decree; and if the Chambers are in session for five months during the year, there is nothing to prevent the administration of the country quite legally being carried on without their presence.

The counter accusation, which is brought against the Left, of having prepared a bid for unconstitutional and arbitrary power, and of having only been prevented by the violent indignation of the people of Paris from carrying it to success, rests upon evidence still less convincing, and upon a far smaller probability. For the Left possessed the constitutional power. They had the parliamentary majority. Why, then, were they unable to govern? They had the parliamentary majority at the election of 1924, but in two years a Chamber of the Left submitted to a government of the Right, that of M. Poincaré. They had the majority again in 1932, but in two years a government of the Right is once more in power.

The usual explanation is that the Left majority is composed of the two incompatible elements of the Radicals and the Socialists, who cannot co-operate because the Socialists refuse to enter a coalition and only give their grudging and entirely precarious support. That is true; but there is another and perhaps a really stronger reason. The Left not only has all the financial and commercial forces of Paris against it, but it is not supported by a single influential Paris newspaper. The one big newspaper in France which is of the Left is the *Dépêche de Toulouse*, which is hardly ever seen in Paris. The result is that the Left always has to govern against the influential forces of Paris, and although Paris cannot impose its will on France, France cannot, in existing circumstances, impose its will on Paris, especially if it has not the Paris Press on its side. It is true that the secret funds at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are largely spent by governments of the Left, as by governments of the Right, in subsidies to the Paris newspapers; but as a Minister remarked to me, when a Radical government is in office the subsidy only secures favourable comment for the two days in each month which precede and follow the day of payment. To be effective it would have to be paid in daily instalments.

Consequently, the Left are by no means unfavourable to the suggestions which have been made for amending the Constitution in the direction of strengthening the Executive, though they might not be in full agreement with the proposals of M. Tardieu, whose avowed object is to strengthen it against the Legislature. His suggestions, which he has now brought out in the form of a book, are fairly well known, for he first advanced them several years ago. The most important of his five points is the granting to the Premier of the right to advise the President of the Republic to dissolve the Chamber, thus bringing the French practice into line with the English. His next is to restrict the right of introducing measures involving the spending of money to the Government and to remove it from private members. That Civil Servants be forbidden to form themselves into trades unions and, consequently, to strike, that votes be granted to women, and that there should be a referendum on political questions, are the rest of his proposals.

PHILIP CARR.

THE DYING PEACE?

THE Disarmament Conference is upon the verge of breaking down. Sir John Simon has uttered an explicit warning that the failure of proposals for restriction and regulation means "a scramble in re-armament—unregulated, unlimited by any promise, and unchecked by any form of inspection—re-armament in a fog." Experience shows that the immediate issue of such competition is a condition of international suspicion, rapidly corrupting good relations. The ultimate issue is war. We have repeatedly been told that a new war would be incomparably more horrible than the Great War. One further consideration is usually not noticed. There are two conditions that make violent revolution probable in this country. The one is a sharp accentuation of the economic crisis. There seems to be a reasonable possibility that this may be avoided during the time required to push forward with imperative economic reforms. The other is protracted war.

The dangers recognised, a false deduction is customarily made. It was an eminent Liberal statesman who recently remarked: "If they want to have a hell on the Continent, it is our business to keep out of it." This policy easily becomes identified with that of "no entanglements," which is notorious on the other side of the Atlantic, although fortunately not unmodified of recent years. The obvious objection is that this detachment is, militarily and economically, impracticable in the event of a war of any magnitude breaking out in the Occident. The last war showed that the Atlantic Ocean was not a gulf; aircraft has reduced the Channel, militarily speaking, to a ditch. It is a policy that has an ominous similarity to the official policy of non-commitment pursued by Lord Grey in the days of the international anarchy that preceded and culminated in 1914.

There is a second and distinct body of opinion that adopts, for different reasons, a similar attitude. I do not refer to the supporters of Lord Beaverbrook and the doctrine that Britain rules the waves of, by and for herself alone. I refer to the extreme pacifist group which regards League action, and any system of collective security and abrogation of sovereign rights by the road of international commitment, as merely substituting new wars for old.

Those who uphold this contention rightly talk about the importance of moral disarmament; about the force for peace of public opinion; about the importance of not thinking in military terms; about the principle of keeping oneself uncontaminated by the hatreds and crime of war. They quite rightly note that the ordinary citizen obeys the law, not because a policeman with a truncheon stands at the next corner of the street, but from motives of habit and conscience. Changes in the mechanics of international organisation will effect little while the dynamic mood remains the same. It is psychological change that is required to usher in the reign of peace.

All this is true. It is not new. It is what the Christian Churches have put into their confessions for the last two thousand years. But, taken alone, it does not meet all the difficulties and, insisted upon dogmatically and obstinately as though it were a complete answer, it is an obstacle to clear thinking and a dangerous impediment to effective peace. It is significant that it is a view most strongly held in America. The geographic and historical facts of the American situation—and to a smaller degree of the British—produce an atmosphere favourable to the notion of self-sufficiency, to detached righteousness, to the vaunting of abstract principle. We reach the dangerous conclusion of Senator Borah, the most doughty exponent of this view, and of his adviser, Professor Borchard, of Yale, that "liberty is more important than justice." This thesis sometimes assumes the shape that one should not soil one's hands with the League, which represents the nefarious principle of force, but, since man is wicked and offences must needs come, if a war does happen it is oneself that must have the largest navy to protect the experiment of peaceful democracy.

The other name for liberty that is more than justice—liberty outside the law—is anarchy. Peace is much more important than the sovereign licence of any state. Indeed, the time has come to think no longer of states, but only of nations in the context of civilisation, and of the complementary spheres of national and of international government.

It is not arming the police (as in most countries they are armed) with firearms that makes their activities "war" by "bandits," but only if the police no longer acts under an impartial constituted authority. Conversely, "war," in the

sense of the Kellogg Pact, is a crime in so far as it is levied without impartial constituted authority, contrary to the universal reign of law, and for the purposes of local "sovereign" policy. The implications of that reign of law have been admirably expounded for us by Professor Kelsen and Professor Lauterpacht.

International police action is neither a war nor a wrong if undertaken against those who, individually or corporately, abet their local governments in the high crime of using force contrary to due process of international law and in a fashion subversive of the reign of law. Just as we may hope to abolish the death penalty, so we may hope, in time, to abolish all need for punitive police action. But that action is no more a crime, nor a "war" in that specific sense in which reasonable men since the days of Erasmus and of Kant have condemned war, than is capital punishment properly to be denominated a crime.

It is, perhaps, necessary to insist that, in so far as collective guarantees are made effective by the commitments, without diplomatic reserves, of the member states, the need for forcible action is reduced to zero. A system of international air and transport control can be largely effective in bringing organised pressure to bear on recalcitrants without necessarily operating as a military force. A Court of International Justice need no more have military force at its disposal, to execute judgment, than the Supreme Court of the United States requires such power against the States of the Union, which nevertheless abide by its decision. A military power must, however, be available in order to arrest those who choose to act, treasonably and seditiously, against the general peace. As Washington said: "influence is not government." This power, not of a world empire, but of a world confederacy, to arrest aggression is essential. It is for public opinion to secure that the commitments are so effective, and the amassing of potential power so overwhelming that the actual use of force, to give sanction to law, becomes, in practice, unnecessary.

One objection, however, must be considered to all proposals that involve a system of collective security and international sanctions. It is the damaging one that all such talk to-day merely reveals a childish lack of sense for political realities. The so-called French plan, with its scheme of long-service

contingents in a League army, it may be argued, can only be regarded as a wrecking proposal, intended to stultify, by *reductio ad absurdum*, proposals for international action. The reception of M. Litvinov's demand, at Geneva, for total disarmament reveals, it will be said, the utter hollowness of all capitalist peace talk.

Two distinct charges of bad faith can be brought against any suggestion that support of the League is an immediate duty. Of these the first "realistic" objection—which can be denominated "the German objection"—is that the League is merely an instrument of France for the maintenance of the *status quo*, and for the oppression of the countries that were losers in the late war. From this point of view, clause nineteen of the Covenant, which contemplates the equitable revision of treaties, can only be regarded as fudge and boloney. To this charge the answer can be given out of Herr Hitler's own mouth. The British Commonwealth is a dominant, if not predominant, member of the League. Italy is another. And, as Herr Hitler has shown in *Mein Kampf*, the interest in foreign policy neither of the British Commonwealth nor of Italy is identical with that of France.

The true answer surely is that the League (as Stresemann saw) need only be anti-German just so far as the French alone interest themselves in it, and in so far as Germany prefers to put her private views of equity before the established procedure of international justice founded upon law. The precondition, however, of all legal development is that formal justice is recognised (as has been the case domestically, in England, since the Possessory Assizes of Henry II) as taking precedence of all equitable claims—due process of law taking the precedence of even the most justifiable self-help. Germany has to learn this and to learn that plans of optimum population must be plans of optimum population on one's own territory or for free emigration—and not to populate the territory of other people.

The second "realistic" objection to the League, the Communist objection, is far more radical. Superficially contradictory of pacifism, Communist belief is psychologically a very easy position for the disappointed and embittered pacifist to take up. Briefly, it means that we want one more war to end war. Lenin expresses the position quite clearly in *Imperialism* and again in *The State and Revolution*.

Engels wrote, on the subject of the French Commune, "the first commandment of every bourgeois at the head of the State is the disarmament of the workers." Lenin comments: "This is a summing up of the experience of bourgeois revolutions, which is as short as it is expressive." . . . "The essence of the whole matter—also, by the way, of the question of the State—viz. has the oppressed class arms? is here wonderfully expressed." But, by the same token that an exploiting class objects to workers being armed, it objects to the official instruments of mastery—the police "Force" and the military force—being disarmed. A capitalist power must oppose, as a matter of class interest, called "domestic security," any total disarmament. But it may acquiesce in a scheme for building up new armaments to be placed, on paper, under the international direction of an assemblage of capitalist and social chauvinist states such as the League of Nations.

This position naturally commends itself to those who adopt the Marx-Leninist analysis. Thus we find the No-More-War Movement issuing a leaflet, entitled, *Shall We Arm the League?* The Movement, for which eminent people have written pamphlets, here states that "the League is itself dominated by imperialist states, which are aggressive by definition." "League sanctions mean . . . security for foreign rule, fascism and exploitation; in short, a one-sided war of the dominating classes and races on the expropriated classes and races." "It is a League, for the most part of fascist and imperialist states. . . . To lend moral support to its authority is, therefore, to support the authority of dictators and imperialists against the unenfranchised masses of the world's inhabitants." "If government is the crystallisation of power usurped from people by foreign rulers and fascist dictators, then the established "law" is established banditry, and our final proposition will be that, in such circumstances, it is not only the right, but the moral duty of pacifists to refuse all voluntary support to such laws and, where practicable, to disobey them. This applies emphatically to the application of League 'sanctions.'"

Actually, however, the official representatives of the U.S.S.R., who have the responsibilities for the destinies of a great people, have not spoken in the same key. M. Stalin, on December 25th, 1933, said: "Notwithstanding the with-

drawal of Germany and Japan from the League of Nations—or perhaps because of this—the League may become something of a brake to retard the outbreak of military actions or to hinder them. If this is so, and if the League could prove to be somewhat of an obstruction that could, even to a certain extent, hinder the business of war and help in any degree to further the cause of peace, then we are not against the League. If historical events follow such a course, then it is not impossible that we should support the League of Nations in spite of its colossal defects." Irritated Communist comments, to the effect that "Stalin is in his dotage," really do not help here.

In July 1933, the delegation of the U.S.S.R. submitted, at London, a precise definition of an aggressor which presumed an international machinery and was propounded for acceptance at Geneva. Commenting upon this, M. Rosenberg, counsellor of the U.S.S.R. Embassy at Paris, referred to "the solidarity of inaction" that had greeted this Soviet proposal; adverted to the impossibility of localising war; and added: "The U.S.S.R. has always, on principle, favoured all forms of international collaboration, and its attitude towards the League of Nations is determined by the power of this instrument to serve the cause of peace"—a power largely dependent upon the acceptance of an adequate definition of aggression.

M. Litvinov, on December 29th, 1933, said: "The tendencies which are interested in the preservation of peace seem to be gaining the upper hand in the League of Nations." . . . "The U.S.S.R., for its part, is ready to participate in carrying on this task" ("of co-operation for the rightful self-defence of all those who are not interested in violating peace, so that no one would think of daring to infringe it") "for any work in this direction is dictated by the interests of the toilers throughout the world, by the security of all peoples, including, of course, the peoples of the Soviet Union." "Not all capitalist states any or every time or always desire war to the same extent." M. Litvinov added significantly, "we Marxists are the last who can be reproached with allowing our feelings to dictate our policy."

The fact is that the gross political forces are beginning to assert themselves. The directors of Russia are rightly more concerned "to maintain Socialism in at least one country"

than with a Trotskyite resolve to stake everything on the dogma that the provocation of revolution is the sole route to Socialism. If it were pointless to act at Geneva until all are Socialists, it would be pointless to act at Westminster until all are converted. In the larger, as in the lesser, Parliament the right tactic is not that of secession.

Instead of attenuated remnants of the Wilsonian League, which was only capable of giving still-birth to the Geneva Protocol, a bloc of powers is forming in which the defence of peace is founded upon self-interest and which will only permit treaty adjustment by discussion. Those powers are France, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. It is essential that the British Commonwealth should come in with those powers (without forgetting Germany's just claims for equality and for equitable territorial treatment, especially the Vistula) so that such overwhelming force is displayed as is adequate for peace. Those who choose force will be crushed by it.

It is further essential that this united interest shall be subject to the form of law; shall serve to maintain the habit of international organisation; and shall proclaim the rights of international sovereignty. It should, in brief, operate through the League (at least, pending a time when Socialist powers have, in fact, something better to offer).

Further, if armament increases must needs come, it is important to press that they come in the shape of an international force, displaying the League flag (which need present no greater difficulties than a loyal international civil service, whether of the League or such as exists at the Vatican). Neither France nor Russia can well oppose this suggestion. There was a pre-war American official proposal for such a force at sea. This step towards the general security, which it lies with public opinion to make effective by giving to governments a mandate, is the largest that can be taken towards the establishment of international sovereignty—until an Alexander Hamilton arises who will institute a system of direct international taxation. It befits the prestige of this country to take in this work a leading part. We know what are the alternatives.

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN.

HOLLAND IN THE DEPRESSION.

A FEW years ago a description of Holland might have run somewhat on these lines. A small but densely populated and highly prosperous country, situated at an important crossing of some of the principal highways of international commerce; not that its prosperity depends on trade and shipping only: agriculture and horticulture, both raised to a high pitch of efficiency and organised for export, contribute largely to it, and there are, moreover, several important exporting industries, some again (one has only to mention Philips) testifying to the highest and most modern technical skill; furthermore, this country is the master of flourishing colonies, containing several times the mother country's number of inhabitants,* producing oil, sugar, rubber, tin, tea, coffee and tobacco, and less extensive and important only than the colonial empires of England and of France; it is a country, finally, distinguished by a very high level of popular education and a very high standard of living, with an old tradition of self-government, and firmly wedded to free and democratic institutions.

It needs little argument to see that in the times we live in, a country like this must be hard put to it to maintain its position and stick to its traditions. The tale of dwindling foreign trade, of agriculture in distress, and of falling public revenue, is no doubt a familiar one; but, owing to her peculiar economic structure and dependence on certain large foreign markets, Holland has been hit with a suddenness and a severity which have staggered her people. Germany and England used to be by far her most important customers, both taking huge quantities of agricultural and horticultural produce. The factitious prosperity of Germany, based on international loans, between 1924 and 1928, stimulated the growing of the most delicate and expensive fruit, vegetables and flowers in certain districts of Holland; all that was directly involved in the collapse of the German financial system, but all along the line the impoverishment of Germany, on top of which came the attempt to restore the situation by protectionist measures, was immediately felt by the Dutch farmer. Much worse did the position become when things began to go wrong with the market on the other side, when

* Holland just over 8,000,000; Dutch East Indies nearly 60,000,000.

the pound sterling fell to two-thirds of its value and at the same time England, too, resorted to tariffs, directed with particular animosity against the very agricultural and horticultural produce in which Holland had specialised. Some figures will show the enormous difference made by these developments.

In 1928 Holland exported to Germany goods to the value of 462,000,000 guilders (£38,500,000 at par); in 1932 this had fallen to 176,000,000 (£14,700,000 at par); in 1933 still further, to 156,000,000 (£13,000,000 at par). In 1928 the value of Dutch exports to Great Britain was 431,000,000 (nearly £36,000,000 at par); in 1932 only 160,000,000 guilders (£13,333,000 at par); this, too, fell still lower in 1933, viz. to 126,000,000 (£10,500,000 at par). The downward movement was not, of course, confined to the exports to those two countries; yet while, in 1927, Germany took 24·64 per cent. of Holland's exports, and Great Britain 23·89 per cent., in 1932 these percentages had decreased to 21·38 and 19·13 respectively. How important a factor the new English tariffs have been in the decline of Dutch imports into this country appears when the figure for 1931 is noted; although the absolute value had then already fallen to 318,000,000 guilders (£26,500,000 at par), the percentage actually rose to 24·62; but from 1931 to 1932 occurred a sharp decline, from 318,000,000 to 160,000,000 guilders and from 24·64 per cent. to 18·90 per cent.; the 126,000,000 guilders to which Dutch imports sank in 1933 represented only 17·41 per cent. of the total. One further unfortunate factor for the Dutch exporter has been the economic collapse of the Dutch East Indies, which is worse than that of the mother country.

Translated into terms of reality these figures mean that a large portion of the Dutch merchant fleet is lying idle, that the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam offer an aspect of desolation, that unemployment has increased by leaps and bounds, that the farmers all over the country—but, in particular, the highly specialised fruit and vegetable growers in certain districts of the provinces of North and South Holland—are in desperate straits. A really critical situation developed, in which large groups of the population, menaced by forces absolutely beyond their control, looked towards the State to save them from ruin. And this at a moment when, as an inevitable concomitant of that self-same economic depres-

sion, the State was embarrassed by a disastrous drop in public revenue.

The total revenue of the Dutch State in 1933 was 392,040,000 guilders (£33,650,000 at par); this was 8,485,000 guilders less than the year before, which itself yielded nearly 40,000,000 less than 1931, when already there was a drop of 18,600,000 guilders. And these figures are far from representing the real decline in prosperity, for almost every year saw the introduction of heavy new taxation. To take the yield of income tax by itself, during 1933 this totalled not quite 60,000,000 guilders (£5,000,000 at par), which was 17,800,000 guilders less than the year before, and 31,900,000 guilders less than in 1931. Still more dismal are the figures for the dividend tax, which yielded in 1933 considerably less than half what it used to some years ago.

This financial and economic crisis has governed the political situation in Holland for the last year or two. To deal with it must be the first and foremost task of any Government. The Dutch parliamentary system has its weaknesses. For a number of years the multiplication of parties, encouraged by a highly logical system of proportional representation, has made the formation of parliamentary governments difficult; so much so, indeed, that since the war the country has been governed, more often than not, by "extra-parliamentary" cabinets, composed of somewhat colourless persons more or less loosely attached to parties which commanded a majority in the Second Chamber (the House of Commons), but which would not coalesce or take responsibility. People wondered how the system would stand the stress of present circumstances. Its first reaction has been to pull itself together and draw on rich reserves of strength. Although even the present Government, formed last summer, is not strictly a "parliamentary" one, the difference is largely academic. Its personnel is drawn from all the non-Socialist parties, and it is led by a man whose personality has strongly impressed the country, Dr. Colijn.

The leaving out of the Socialists is in accordance with the general trend of the political movement. Ever since the situation became urgently critical, the Socialists have had little share in the shaping of policy. Opinion has taken a decisive turn towards the right—as in most European countries. The bugbear of Communism has something to do

with that, although the Communist party is weak in numbers and spends as much time in reviling the Socialists as in attacking the capitalist system. Anyhow, the Socialists seem to have lost such goodwill of middle-class and moderate opinion as they possessed. They never governed the country as did their opposite numbers in England—their strength never rose above one-fourth of the seats in the Second Chamber—but they did take part in the administration of most of the more important towns, and there is now a widespread feeling that there, be it by their housing policy or by driving up the wages paid to workmen in the municipal service, they encouraged a reckless disregard of sound finance. In one town after another Socialist representation on the Committee of Aldermen has come to an end.

One sensational incident early last year did the party a very great deal of harm. The mutiny in the *East Indies* of the crew of the cruiser *Zeven Provinciën* raised, of course, much wider issues than those of economics or finance, although even here there was a connection, since it was directed against pay cuts. But Dutch public opinion saw in it the subversive effect of anti-militarist propaganda and of red organisations amongst the sailors, and when one Socialist leader at home applauded the rather silly and altogether hopeless affair, there was an outburst of indignation. The Minister of Defence, Mr. Deckers, a Catholic, who was taken over by the Colijn Cabinet, dissolved Socialist federations of non-commissioned officers and prohibited all connection with Socialist organisations to members of the armed forces and to officials in his department.

Truth to tell, the Socialists did not lose much ground at the general election, which was held soon afterwards, but there were great heart-burnings within their own ranks. Dissensions between Right and Left wing were no longer hidden from the public, several well-known intellectuals severed their connection with the party, and both on the question of national defence and on that of public expenditure for social purposes the Socialists now either talk a language which has become an offence to any but the stalwarts of their own party or give an impression of half-heartedness and of lost faith in their own theories. Little is left, for the time being, of the party's political effectiveness.

The most significant line of cleavage in Dutch party politics used to be one of religion. On the one side were found the

Catholics (the largest party in the Chamber) and two Protestant parties, one the Christian-Historical Party, identified with the orthodox wing of the historic Reformed Church; the other the anti-Revolutionary Party, with the still more orthodox groups which had at various times left that Church on account of its latitudinarian character. On the other side there were the Liberals and Radicals as well as the Socialists, "the Paganists," as Dr. Kuyper, the great leader of the anti-Revolutionary Party of a generation ago, used to call the three of them together. Surprising as this coalition between Catholics and Calvinists may appear at first sight, it is easily explained by the importance which the education question used to have in Dutch politics. The common desire of the confessional parties to have their denominational schools not only recognised but subsidised by the State formed a strong bond. But in 1918 they attained their object. The other parties co-operated in a revision of the Constitution, and free denominational schools have since been treated on an absolute equality with the State's own "neutral" schools. The loosening of the bond between the confessional parties, which was the inevitable result, contributed to the difficulty of forming stable parliamentary governments in the post-war period, but it has now enabled Dr. Colijn, after an election which was in spite of apparent confusion dominated by a strong feeling that the situation was too serious for the Chamber to abdicate any longer, to break away from the old division on religious lines altogether and compose his "Crisis Cabinet" out of Liberals and Radicals as well as Catholics, Christian-Historicals, and his own anti-Revolutionaries.

Besides the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Verschuur (another Catholic), was taken over from the previous Government, and the creation of the "Crisis Cabinet" did not mean that a new course was going to be followed, only that the policy of the last few years was to be continued more vigorously and in closer co-operation with the Chamber. That policy is, on the whole, an "orthodox" policy, a policy of conservation rather than of experiment. Yet the danger in which certain classes, particularly the farmers, found themselves, has led to State interference on a scale that would have staggered the orthodox politicians of an earlier generation. Not only have Treasury advances been made to certain districts, but one "crisis" organisation

after another has been set up to regulate production, importation and prices of certain products, like meat, butter and eggs. To reduce the production of beef, for instance, 200,000 head of cattle were recently ordered to be slaughtered, the meat being tinned for the use of the unemployed. The establishment of a monopoly in grain has enabled the Government, while buying at the low rates of the world market, to keep up prices in the country. The profits made in this transaction, as well as the "levy" imposed on the consumer in respect of home produce, are used for the further relief of the producer. Some critics complain that the town dwellers are being sacrificed to the countryside, others that a "high-price island" is being artificially maintained which must sooner or later topple over. So far, however, the situation is undoubtedly well in hand, and the almost revolutionary resentment with which a year or two years ago the farmers saw their efforts wasted by world forces altogether outside their control has given way to a new confidence.

In the view of the Government—and it is here that its "orthodoxy" appears—all this, and in fact the whole of its policy, must be firmly based on sound finance. It is determined to balance the budget, and to do so without going off gold—an attitude reminiscent of that of the National Government in this country on its formation in 1931, although in the latter particular the Dutch Cabinet has so far been more successful than its English counterpart. There are economists in Holland who advocate the devaluation of the guilder, but the prevailing view is that such a policy would not provide a way out of trouble. The high value of the guilder may constitute one of the difficulties of Dutch export trade and of Dutch shipping; it needs a good deal of optimism, however, to believe that with a cheaper currency the export trade could recover in the world which is still piling up obstacles in the way of international trade. Why, then, risk an operation which would in other ways involve a weakening of the country's financial position? (Always provided that the abandonment of the gold standard would reduce the guilder's exchange value, an assumption which is doubted in some quarters.)

For on the strength of the financial position of Holland there can be no two opinions. From the figures given above it will be clear that the balancing of the budget must be a formidable

task, but it is being carried out with unshakable courage. The new Minister of Finance, Mr. Oud, a Radical, was faced with a deficit of 190,000,000 guilders (£15,833,000 at par) on the budget for 1934. So the sad tale of increased taxation—to the tune of 106,000,000 guilders—and further economies of 84,000,000 guilders—goes on. As the yield of taxes, as well as the figures of trade and employment, have shown a slight improvement during the last few months (the still somewhat sickly sun of the world revival shines on gold countries and non-gold countries alike), the fear that a further decline may yet throw everything into confusion has subsided and there is a feeling that the situation is under control.

Not that the policy adopted does not entail further heavy sacrifices. The Dutch public is certainly not fed on easy optimism or pleasant promises. The view held in responsible quarters is that the depression is not just one of conjuncture, but of structural change. The industrialisation of Asia and the erection of new trade barriers by all countries will, so it is thought, make impossible the speedy return of the old prosperity. And so the policy of cuts is practised along the whole line of national life with a severity far surpassing that with which the National Government of this country acted two years ago. The most sensational action of the Government in this respect was its cut in "Indian pensions." The Dutch East Indian Government posts make the career of a large proportion of the Dutch middle class. It was argued, not without force, that pensions constitute an inviolable contractual obligation. But Dr. Colijn, who holds the Colonial portfolio himself, painted a dark picture of the financial situation of the Dutch East Indies, which is in fact saved from a complete breakdown only by the credit of the mother country, and argued necessity. In the upshot the affair strengthened the position of the Cabinet by showing the ascendancy which its chief exerts over the Chamber.

The municipalities, on which falls a large proportion of the cost of unemployment pay, are similarly struggling to balance their budgets, and their inability to make both ends meet without help from the State, has compelled them to accept Government interference with their affairs in a measure unknown to Dutch traditions. In one small municipality local government has been suspended on the ground of reckless expenditure of public money—as a warning to others. Wages

are cut, working hours lengthened. On the national budget it is especially Defence and Education which are exposed to the axe. The Minister of Education, Mr. Marchant, is another Radical, and while admittedly the multiplication, under the pacification of 1918, of small schools, all faultlessly equipped, has been extravagant, the reforms now in progress fill many observers with concern. Socialist critics speak of "demolition," and assert that the whole fabric of social welfare measures built up by the last generation is in danger of the same fate.

To all of which the answer is, that only by preserving intact the credit of the State can anything be saved at all, and that the Government is anxious to maintain all those institutions and arrangements which have made Dutch society what it is. Yet Mr. Oud does not shrink from telling the nation bluntly that the standard of living must come down.

It should not be thought, however, that constructive efforts to restore prosperity are lacking in the Government's programme. For one thing, it is their intention to borrow that its the budget has been safely balanced, 60,000,000 of its (£5,000,000 at par), to be devoted to public works for the relief of unemployment. Doubts have frequently been expressed as to the wisdom of proceeding with the reclamation of the Zuider Zee now that not only the expenditure weighs so much more heavily on the State, but the money value of the additional land will remain far below the original estimation. Dr. Colijn, himself the son of a farmer in Haarlemmermeer, which was reclaimed a century ago, has always protested against abandoning the gigantic undertaking, and it is being continued in spite of adverse circumstances.

Furthermore, the Government means to make a determined attempt to obtain better conditions for Dutch exports. Holland has been the last country to surrender free trade, but the feeling is now very general that she must resort to retaliation when others deny reasonable opportunities to her goods. It will be remembered that Dr. Colijn, as chairman of the Economic Sub-Commission, played an important part at the World Conference last summer. Before going to London he stated quite unmistakably that if the Conference failed to bring the world to its senses, Holland would have to reverse her traditional commercial policy. Unfortunately, the Dutch-Belgian scheme for the formation of low tariff groups was

declared unacceptable by Mr. Runciman on the ground that it conflicted with the Most Favoured Nation principle. After the failure of the Conference, Mr. Verschuur introduced a Bill, which was passed by the Chamber with remarkably little opposition, designed to make possible the use of quotas as a weapon in international trade relations. The use of quotas was first made possible in 1933, but the new Act enables the Government to grant to countries which treat the Dutch exporter favourably extra-quotas above the percentages fixed by law and equal for all countries. At the beginning of this year these percentages were reduced for several articles from the level obtaining in 1933. A new commercial treaty was concluded with Germany just before the Act came into force, but its fairly favourable tenour is ascribed in Dutch circles to the strong bargaining position which the forthcoming measure gave to the Dutch negotiators. The great question of the near future is, will it be possible to come to a satisfactory agreement with England? Mr. MacDonald said only the other day, that England wants to continue her series of commercial treaties. He will find Holland willing, and indeed anxious, to negotiate, but he will also find Dutch statesmen convinced that the new English tariffs on foodstuffs are amongst "those barriers to international trade that are not really necessary for national protection, but are impediments in the volume, the necessary volume, the economic volume, of international commerce." If, in these negotiations, it is argued from the English side that the balance of trade between England and Holland, although as a result of the diminution of Dutch imports very radically altered, is still not unfavourable to Holland, the reply of the Dutch is likely to be that English imports into Holland have never been kept low by Government interference, that the neglect of what is even to-day one of the richest markets in the world is entirely the fault of the English trader; while, on the other hand, the ruin of Dutch export to England is directly attributable to a sudden and unprovoked change in tariff policy.

The picture of Holland and her problems is not a cheerful one. Last year, when the great revolution took place across the border, in Germany, there was at times an uneasy feeling that in Holland, too, the very foundations of social and political life might give way. A loud-voiced movement, styling itself National-Socialist, denounced parliamentary institu-

tions, "the party bosses," and pacifism. Nothing could be more grotesquely at variance with the traditions of Dutch society than the crude discipline of the authoritarian and totalitarian State. Individualist to a fault, split into a number of religious communities, of which the most politically-minded, the Calvinists, are the last likely to submit to State dictation, used to self-government, tenacious of private rights, the Dutch people are unlikely stuff for these new fashions from the East. Yet there are, perhaps, too many young intellectuals with no prospects of a career, and too many harassed and ruined shopkeepers, for traditions to be a sufficient safeguard against folly.

So much the more gratifying is it to observe that the Dutch have found a sufficiency of living political wisdom. They appear to be facing their troubles manfully and resourcefully. Measures like the prohibition of uniforms as party distinctions and the dismissal from official posts of members of the National Socialist party would not in themselves mean very much. But that the country should have got a strong Government, which works on a coherent plan and is supported by a large majority of the Chamber, that is in these times something of inestimable importance. "Only Socialism can protect Democracy," said the Dutch Socialist leader, Mr. Albarda, the other day. Events in Europe hardly seem to bear out that view. It may well inspire greater confidence when we see a man like Dr. Colijn, conservative, but firmly rooted in a peculiarly national and popular tradition, at the head of a coalition of parties, affirming a strong, even a passionate, determination to uphold parliamentary government and spiritual liberty, which can only flourish when diversity is respected. "Let parties co-operate," so he said in a speech to fellow anti-Revolutionaries not long ago, "but let each remain true to its own principles. Away with this modern craze for unity, which spells death to all liberty." There is not only the tradition of a stubborn sect, there is a personal conviction behind those words. They are heartening to those who have from the first believed that Holland will prove, not a conductor for, but a bulwark against, these new forms of the old heresy of State absolutism. P. GEYL.

PS. According to Dutch official statistics the trade balance between England and Holland in January 1934 turned against the latter country.

THE POLITICAL UPHEAVAL OF SIAM AND THE WESTERN POWERS.

IF it is a true saying that a country without a history is a happy one then Siam, up to June 1932, must have been extremely happy. On the threshold of a Far East in the throes of war and unrest, the Kingdom of Siam stood out like an oasis of political wisdom and social peace where a dynasty, skilfully favouring progress, was helped continually by unexpected luck. But for the last eighteen months the history of this tropical Arcadia has entered into a revolutionary phase, and one can only hope that the murderous rebellion of last October will be its final epilogue.

Can the Western Powers remain indifferent to the political upheaval of an Eastern State which, with a confidence rare in these distant countries, has unceasingly looked to them for advice? Great Britain, by the quantity and the quality of her advisers, by the importance of her school and college students, and by the irresistible attraction which her monarchy holds for the Royal Family and aristocracy of Bangkok, was largely responsible for the intellectual formation of contemporary Siam. England taught the *élite* of the native youth those ways of thinking and that behaviour and culture so characteristic of Oxford and Cambridge. In the domain of education other Western Powers had their specialities; America had taken over the medical faculty, Germany military science and technique, France jurisprudence. Immediately after England, though a long way behind, the educative influence of France was active on a slightly inferior level. Whatever may be the extent of their sphere of action, all these Western "masters of how to think" can only follow attentively and sympathetically the struggle for modernisation of an Asiatic race which, in so many ways, had desired to be, and had been, their pupil.

A revolution in Siam awakens a new curiosity; it touches wide economic interests, because, taking advantage of guarantees offered, the Western Powers invested capital in the country, creating banking houses, acquiring real estate. Here, also, Great Britain holds first place, with two-thirds of the foreign trade. Powerful British companies settled in the country for more than fifty years. The Anglo-Siam Corporation, Bangkok Docks, United Engineers, have made such an

exclusive place for themselves in the market that even non-British industrials have confided the sale of their products to them. To mention the "Borneo" or the "Bombay Burmah" is to evoke possession and exploitation of great teak forests. England is also the principal, and since 1909 the sole, banker for the Siamese kingdom, which has now no other foreign creditor. All these are well-founded reasons for following closely what is happening. America, France, Denmark, Belgium, all have the same reasons, for their industry, trade, works of civilisation are based on perfectly legitimate title deeds. The great question being asked by the occidental Powers is whether the Siamese revolution implies an economic and social upheaval.

There is also another reason for the interest taken by foreign Powers, but it belongs to Siamese foreign policy. To what extent will the democratic transformation of the Bangkok monarchy react on the neighbouring native states? What attitude will New Siam adopt towards the aspiration of the nationalist movement which is becoming general in these sections of the Far East and tending to abolish even the semblance of a European supervision? Siam is like a melting-pot, where all the Asiatic races are amalgamating. Chinese, Hindoos, Burmese, Malaysians, Javanese, Annamites, Philipinos rub shoulders there. Prudent and loyal to the Colonial Powers, the absolute monarchy has taken great care to encourage no anti-foreign intrigue and has never hesitated, where necessary, to expel the agitators.

Will this Siam, outcome of the revolution, be an element of stability and preservation as was the monarchy? I am sure Great Britain is not indifferent to this question. It interests chiefly France, however, who, at the present time, is undertaking great reforms in Annam; and political refugees are to be found in Siam seeking shelter from the French Protectorate. The three groups they have formed in Sakhon-Nakhon, Lampang and Pitchit, are in close communication with Indo-China cells and with the Canton Central Committee. The whole Western world may well be interested in the Siamese Revolution.

There are, it seems, always precursory signs of a revolution, yet governments on the wane are always blind and deaf to the warnings. It was in an atmosphere of distinct uneasiness that in April 1932 the Siamese dynasty celebrated the 150th

anniversary of its foundation. Impartial onlookers could not be mistaken. A general discontent was simmering, stifling respect and traditional loyalty; the Princes, especially the older ones, saw nothing, admitted no liberal movement. What is more, the American counsellor, Mr. Stevens, consulted by the King, wrote a long report showing all was for the best in the best of kingdoms and that the hour for political reform had not yet struck. The King, reassured, left for the seaside, 200 kilometres from Bangkok. He had relinquished the control of his people's destiny.

In order to help the reader find his way through the labyrinth of events in Siam during the last eighteen months, I think it advisable to call attention to four dates: June 24th, 1932, revolutionary *coup d'état*; April 1st, 1933, conservative reaction; June 20th, 1933, second revolutionary *coup d'état*; October 12th, 1933, conservative insurrection.

June 24th, 1932: In the absence of the King, who was spending the summer at his villa in Hua-Hin, Colonel Phya Baho, inspector of artillery, assisted by other field officers of German training, incited the garrison of Bangkok to mutiny, arrested the Princes of the Blood and general officers, and proclaimed a government of the People's Party. An insurrectional Senate composed of seventy members settled down in the Throne Hall. The King, recalled by telegram, accepted a provisional constitution presented by Luang Pradit, a young doctor of law from the Paris University. All the princes were excluded from military and political positions; most of the general officers were superannuated; and Phya Baho became Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a sort of Lord Protector of the Revolution.

On December 12th the definite Constitution was promulgated, and the Senate began to legislate. Two leaders stand out from the crowd: the conservative Phya Mano, late President of the Court of Appeal, and now President of the Council of Ministers; the radical, Luang Pradit, upheld by the socialists and youth element, who prepared two important drafts, an electoral law, and social and economic reforms. Behind them parties confronted each other, and the struggle attained its height in March when the broad lines of the reform of Luang Pradit became public. "It is sheer communism," exclaimed the native conservatives, and the

British Press agreed.* However that may be, Phya Mano had no trouble in convincing Phya Bahon and the King that the Siamese State was rushing into Bolshevism, and on his proposal the Senate was dissolved, Luang Pradit was expelled from the Council of Ministers and requested to leave Siam.

June 20th, 1933 : Second Revolutionary *coup d'état*. There was no more question of elections, and Phya Bahon, Protector of the Revolution, came to the conclusion that he had been tricked, that the constitution would remain a dead letter, and that the return to absolute monarchy was certain. On June 20th Phya Bahon caused Phya Mano and the conservative Ministers to be arrested. The King from his villa at Hua-Hin, which he no longer left, approved of the new *coup d'état* : Phya Bahon became President of the Council ; the Senate again met, and Luang Pradit, recalled from exile, landed in Bangkok on the 29th, and was offered the portfolio of the Interior.

October 10th : Conservative Insurrection. On October 10th there came a clap of thunder : two regiments belonging to the Laos division of Korat mutinied, marched on Bangkok and seized the aerodrome at Donmuang. Prince Bovaradej was at the head. Educated in England, he had passed through Woolwich, a man of rare European culture and of exceptional firmness and integrity. No doubt the Whites were behind him. The fighting began in the suburbs. But Phya Bahon and the People's Party did not lower their flag ; they mobilised the reservists, led a counter-attack against the insurgents and put a price on the heads of the leaders. The King cut himself loose from the Vendée, condemned it by a Royal decree, and, to escape from a doubtful regiment, went on board his yacht and sailed for Singora in Siamese Malay. A fortnight later the revolt was strangled, and Prince Bovaradej escaped by air to Saigon. Then the storm abated ; general elections took place without incident, lawyers and subordinate officials obtained a majority in the Senate. On December 12th, at the moment chosen by astrologers, the King solemnly opened the first Parliamentary session.

How did this absolute monarchy, which crumbled almost

* See an article of the *Straits Echo* reproduced by the *Bangkok Times*, April 19th : "There is one danger in the movement and that is Luang Pradit, the brains of the People's party. Educated in France, he has imbibed those principles of equality and liberty which in an Eastern kingdom can only find expression in a communistic kingdom."

without resistance in the night of June 23-4th, 1932, rule ? At its head were the Chakkri, a royal family, industrious and prolific, in truth a princely company, loving to cover themselves with a European education and not lacking in men of talent. They entered the lists of the administration and army, and formed the Council of Ministers and the Supreme State Council. A little lower, but still on the high social scale, was a tribe of military and civilian officials, twelve to fifteen thousand adherents and liegemen of the dynasty, bound by oath of allegiance and also by the certainty that tact and the luck of kings would offer them a bottomless mine of personal advantages. On the lowest plane was a population still primitive, frugal-minded, accustomed to looking on the Sovereign with almost religious reverence. That population could never dabble in politics.

In the days of prosperity the Chakkri monarchy was rather like a board of directors, to whom an imposing group of shareholders had given full powers and who, in looking after its own interests, was obliged to look after theirs. Unfortunately the economic crisis arose ; and here we discover the primary reason for the revolution, the present cause being in reality only the general impoverishment after two years of depression. From the summer of 1930 the sole source of wealth dried up ; rice could no longer be sold, at least at a profit. The falling off of budgetary receipts followed in double-quick time, and to balance the budgets of 1931 and 1932 severe measures were put into force. The number of state beneficiaries were reduced, and salaries were cut ; but this proved insufficient. The Royal Government crossed the Rubicon and had recourse to income tax ! It thus struck at the whole bourgeois class—that horde of officials whose salaries had just been cut ! Their discontent grew and attained its height in April 1932, when the King allowed the 150th anniversary of his dynasty to pass without giving the vote as many had expected, and of which he had during a recent visit to the United States declared himself a partisan. The festivities went on, no decree was promulgated, and the King left for his summer residence.

Three months later the revolution broke out, taking by surprise only those who were blind and deaf. Foreign observers did not fail to remark a more remote reason for the revolution—so essentially middle-class and liberal, the people

having up to now had no hand in it. This reason was the birth and progress of a new class hitherto unknown in Siam. Henceforth there is a Siamese "intelligentsia," grown from the Western education that is given yearly to many hundreds of students either abroad or in the native colleges and universities. As time went on, they made a large total; gradually they felt themselves stronger and stronger, and made known in the right quarter that they had their word to say in the government of their country. How was it that the Chakkri, so wideawake and business-like, did not perceive the emergence of these intellectuals? Perhaps they counted on the army, always so faithful to their old allegiance. But an ethnical transformation had taken place in the Siamese and had touched their very souls, and the words of their oath no longer held the same meaning.

In order to develop the wealth of the country, the absolute monarchy had prepared the absorption of a part of her people by a hard-working element though one difficult of assimilation, whose introduction seemed at first a good thing for the native race. This element was the Chinese. For centuries the Chinese had known their way to the Siamese Delta, but for the last two generations during the fat years following the war, immigration had increased to a flood. Formerly masculine and separately, the immigrants now began to come in a body with their families, so that at the present time one-sixth of the population of the kingdom is composed of pure-bred Chinese, and the two million Chinese, attached to the country of their origin, form, especially in Bangkok, a state within a state. And there is the half-breed, a very important phenomenon. How many so-called Siamese have Chinese blood in their veins? By degrees these half-breed Sino-Siamese have penetrated and taken over that class above-mentioned of officials, officers in service and in the reserve, intellectuals, business men. For these half-breeds the old Thai oath was a prayer to a god in whose existence they did not believe. That is the true cause of this unexpected revolution; if in appearance it is the revolt of officials, in reality it is the revolt of the half-breed Chinese.

What direction is the revolt likely to take? That is the question her neighbours are asking. The democratic government has won, and with it New Siam, but only at the price of a civil war, and the young democracy will have lacked none

of the trials undergone by all régimes that are the outcome of revolution. All the efforts of the Thai people towards modernising their political status have the good wishes of France and Great Britain, their neighbours and friendly Powers, who hope the victory will be definite. But it is impossible not to observe that Bangkok, that overgrown capital, which, by its bulk and its vitality, forms the sole source of national energy, is the centre of Siamese democracy; and it is Bangkok that is the hive from whence swarm and prosper the Chinese and the half-breed Sino-Siamese, or, as they are called there, the "*Louk Tsin*," sons and grandsons of immigrants. These *Louk Tsin* have been the chief movers in the revolution, and have reaped the profits. It is interesting, therefore, to examine how, under their influence, the political edifice has been reconstructed.

First, the monarchy was not abolished, and this is a proof of the perspicacity of the revolutionary legislators. But we must not expect to see on the banks of the Menam a parliamentary monarchy of the British type. Of course, many young Siamese belonging to the liberal classes have been at Anglo-Saxon and French universities. But when they seized power they did not imitate the political system of the countries who had taught them. Their first care was to form a People's Party which since then has exercised a dictatorship, and will probably continue to do so for at least ten years. For in the next Parliament, elected by universal suffrage, half the seats are reserved for ten years for members of the revolutionary Senate emanating from the People's Party, and as for the other half, no candidate is accepted without the consent of the Party. In the East, as in the West, dictatorships are fashionable! That of Siam resembles in many ways the Chinese Kouomintang dictatorship, and we need not be astonished, for we know that western ideas have been assimilated by brains which have traces of Chinese heredity.

Moreover, the course of events and the fatal revolt of October 12th, have eliminated all those linked with bygone Siam. One can hardly conceive that henceforth the moderate and conservative elements will be able to assist in governing, or to act as a brake. Luang Pradit, the soul of the revolutionary movement, has come into the front rank. He is said to have abandoned his former plan of nationalising property and industries. But will he be independent enough to stand

up against the radicals who are now the more exacting that they have just, rifle in hand, upheld the Revolution? Sure of their supremacy, the People's Party will probably show three tendencies of a marked radicalism. Firstly, a socialistic tendency coming from the needy class of subordinate officials and petty tradesmen who suffer terribly from the economic crisis. Secondly, a nationalist tendency which will carry Siam farther from the West and will cause her to dispense with her European advisers so much esteemed formerly by the Absolute Monarchy. Thirdly, a pro-Chinese tendency, perhaps even pan-Asiatic, which will cause the Siamese democracy to establish official intercourse with China and, wittingly or not, to adopt an attitude that will hardly find favour with the colonial Powers.

It is quite possible that something may stem the course of a Siamese demagogy. There is the Sovereign, there is Phya Bahon, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the former a sincere partisan of a constitutional system, the latter a firm opponent (he has many times declared) of communist doctrines. And there are still the Western Powers so directly interested in the sound political evolution of Siam. "Should any untoward shift in the policy of the government eventuate," wrote the *Bangkok Times* of April 1st, 1933, "there is no doubt that His Britannic Majesty's Minister will wrest increased guarantees to offset any difficult situation. This is only a very remote possibility, but adequate and timely precautions are desirable, inasmuch as a single spark will often suffice to cause a conflagration of considerable magnitude." All Frenchmen will agree with this conclusion of the *Bangkok Times*, convinced that firm and good advice given to excited irresponsible elements by the two important neighbours, England and France, would suffice to show them the way of wisdom.

BARON DE LAPOMARÈDE,
Formerly a member of the French
Diplomatic Mission in Siam.

GLADSTONE AND THE QUEEN.*

NOBODY can put down Mr. Guedalla's most interesting volumes without realising that they were needed for the full understanding of nineteenth-century history. The letters and telegrams that passed between Gladstone and the Queen and her secretaries number six thousand documents. Mr. Buckle, when he edited the Queen's letters, had necessarily to choose his documents with reference to his main task, which was to illustrate and interpret the Queen's career. Mr. Guedalla's purpose is different. He seeks to illustrate and interpret the relations of the Queen to the most important of her Prime Ministers. Proceeding on this plan he has published some fourteen hundred documents that have not appeared in print. He has been able to throw valuable light on these documents by the use he has made of the Gladstone Papers now in the British Museum. He has introduced each of his two volumes with a vivid but balanced narrative in which he traces the growth of the estrangement between the Queen and Mr. Gladstone, and discusses its significance and its causes.

Gladstone is so complicated and subtle a personality that few questions into which his character enters can be treated as simple. But nobody who studies the documents set out in these two volumes will have much difficulty in discovering the main causes of the divergence which grew into antipathy. They are, of course, connected with temperament, but they are ultimately differences of view—differences that were acute and fundamental.

It may seem paradoxical to say that of all the Prime Ministers who served the Queen, Gladstone was the most loyal and the only one who suffered for his loyalty. Yet that view emerges from these pages. In the 'seventies, when the relations of the two began to drift into misunderstanding and hostility, Gladstone lost the Queen's confidence because he pressed her to take a more active part, at a time when she felt that her health was not equal to it. Gladstone was between two fires. He had to defend, to the Queen, colleagues whose indiscretions alarmed and irritated her. In this task he

* *The Queen and Mr. Gladstone*, by Philip Guedalla; 2 vols., 25s. each, Hodder and Stoughton. *Disraeli and Gladstone*, by D. C. Somervell, 3s. 6d., Faber and Faber. *Gladstone*, by Francis Birrell, 2s., Duckworth.

showed himself most generous ; whether he was defending Sir George Trevelyan, of whose first speech as a Minister General Grey wrote to Gladstone, "It seems, indeed, to H.M. to be a serious question whether, after so grave an offence, Mr. Trevelyan should be allowed to continue to hold the situation to which he has been appointed" ; or Mr. Chamberlain, whom she expected Gladstone to prevent from making speeches "setting class against class" ; or Bright, whom she accused of making speeches entirely at variance with his position as a Cabinet Minister. It is curious to reflect that the most important of the Ministers whom he defended with such chivalry ended in the Queen's favour when he was out of it. While defending these Radical colleagues to the Queen, Gladstone was defending the Crown from the Radicals. General Grey, the Queen's private secretary, was concerned "about the strong feeling excited by the Queen's continued seclusion," and he urged Ministers to press the Queen to appear more often in public. Gladstone, though privately more ready than Grey to make allowances for the Queen's health, felt it his duty to act on this suggestion, and he wrote to the Queen when a definite occasion arose :

All questions involving Your Majesty's health and capacity for effort must of necessity fall in the last resort under Your Majesty's sole cognisance. Yet Your Majesty would have just cause to reprove your confidential advisers as wanting in the truthfulness which Your Majesty values beyond all things, were they to fail in laying fully before Your Majesty the circumstances which may appear to them deserving of being weighed by Your Majesty before a final decision . . . the appearance of the Sovereign in public from time to time on occasions of great interest, while in exterior it is a mere form, is in reality among the substantial, and even in the long run, indispensable means of maintaining the full influence of the Monarchy. . . . Mr. Gladstone sees from time to time indications in the public journals, which were they once to become systematic, it would be extremely difficult to avert by any remedial measures. The *growth* of controversies on questions of this class cannot be stopped ; but their beginning may be averted.

Of Jenner, who encouraged the Queen, Gladstone wrote to Granville, that he "thought it his duty to look simply at what is desirable in the highest degree for the Queen's health, and to decline taking into consideration how far this can be abated or departed from in deference to the great exigencies

of the British Throne. He does that which if my doctor did for me, I should, however much against my will, be compelled to seek another." Some have blamed Gladstone for acting with too little tact or skill in his efforts to persuade the Queen to take a more active part. That view may no doubt be held. But nobody could believe that he acted as he did from anything less than his strong sense of duty. The Queen, like anybody else, preferred to be encouraged to do what she liked, than to be urged to do what she disliked. Gladstone, taking a definite view of the place of the Crown in the public life of the nation, acted as his self-respect prompted him, and he paid the penalty.

The penalty was the heavier because of the character and temperament of his successor. The great contests between Gladstone and Disraeli gave to politics such a dramatic and heroic interest that public affairs provided for a generation the excitement that the modern world finds in amusements and pleasures. Nothing could be more dramatic than the change which followed when Disraeli succeeded Gladstone. The Queen soon found herself far from this bleak climate of truth in what Mr. Guedalla calls "a strange fairyland where a romantic Prime Minister played skilfully on her emotions." One of Disraeli's colleagues was alarmed by the lengths to which the romantic Prime Minister was ready to go. "Is there not just a risk," Derby wrote, "of encouraging her in too large ideas of her personal power, and too great indifference to what the public expects?"

"Her own dramatic instincts," says Mr. Guedalla, "starved by her long retirement and the unexciting rôle of constitutional monarch, were richly satisfied by the new tone. The dull charade of public business acquired fresh meaning for her, as she learned from her delightful teacher to identify each act of State with her own self."

Disraeli acted on the formula he had laid down in a remarkable passage addressed to the Queen in 1868, at a time when he had not yet attracted, much less dominated, her fancy :

All that he desires is that his views should be placed before Your Majesty and that they should be considered. Whatever Your Majesty's final judgment under such circumstances, he is disposed to believe the best ; nor is there anything that he would more deprecate than that Your Majesty should ever, on any subject,

give a constrained assent to any of his counsels. That would cause a cloud between Your Majesty and himself, than which nothing could be more injurious to the satisfactory government of Your Majesty's realm.

There is another respect in which Gladstone's view of his duty to the Queen differed from that of his successor. Mr. Somervell makes the interesting comment that Gladstone found it harder than Disraeli to be magnanimous to opponents of his policy, because he was a man of religion, whereas Disraeli was a man of the world. To the man of religion, the wrong view is heresy. Yet nobody who knew nothing more of Gladstone, Disraeli, and Salisbury than he could learn from their correspondence with the Queen, would think Gladstone less magnanimous than the others. On the contrary, Mr. Guedalla points out that as soon as Disraeli became Prime Minister he changed the character of the letter that the Prime Minister used to write to the Sovereign reporting the debates in the House of Commons. He used it as a party weapon. In the debate on the Public Worship Regulation Bill he wrote of Gladstone that in a "rhetorical point of view he surpassed himself; as a statesman he threw off the mask, and the only logical conclusion of his address was the disestablishment of that Church of which Your Majesty is the head." Gladstone, as Mr. Guedalla points out, had reported scores of speeches by Disraeli, but never once had he sought to infect the Queen with his own profound distrust. From this time Disraeli, whether in or out of office, used all his influence with the Queen to fan her hostility to Gladstone. What is more surprising is that Salisbury followed his example. In 1891, when there was every prospect that Gladstone would become Prime Minister, Salisbury wrote to the Queen: "Lord Salisbury sympathises deeply with Your Majesty's feelings as to Mr. Gladstone. . . . The worst part of the matter is that, more and more, it is evident that he has entirely outlived his judgment, though his eloquence to a great extent remains, and his passions have become more imperious."

If Gladstone, less magnanimous to men who differed from him, as Mr. Somervell thinks, was so much more magnanimous in this relation, what is the reason? It is surely that his sense of duty taught him that it was his duty to make it easier, and not harder, for the Queen to work with the men who became her Prime Ministers. And these pages show again

and again that there were occasions when the Queen's judgment was better, her intuitions were truer, than those of any of her Ministers, and that it was most undesirable to create or stimulate the mistrust that Disraeli and Salisbury fostered between Sovereign and Prime Minister, the mistrust which Disraeli had described as most injurious to her realm.

After 1880 the Queen and Gladstone were divided by both personal and public differences. Just as Gladstone could not think of Disraeli without thinking of his treatment of Peel, so the Queen could not think of Gladstone without thinking of his treatment of Disraeli. For her the great Midlothian campaign was "shameless persecution" of her hero. It may indeed be said of that great campaign that it was in one sense a Pyrrhic victory. For though it swept the country, it made the Queen implacable and it helped to produce the spirit of bitter faction that governed the House of Commons during the Gladstone Government. The Queen could not forgive the blow struck at her idol; the Opposition could not forgive the storm of anger that had swept their party away. Gladstone had made the issue the issue between right and wrong. Politics had been raised to a temperature in which men do not easily forgive each other. And it was in that temperature that the House of Commons debated Egypt and South Africa, Khartoum and Majuba, and all the desperate problems that filled the storm-tossed career of Gladstone's Government.

Deep as was the Queen's personal animosity, the incompatibility of their public views made the conflict with Gladstone inevitable. The incompatibility is well described by Mr. Guedalla when he says that

the processes of growth took them in opposite directions, and they grew away from one another. As the years went by, Gladstone moved steadily towards the Left in politics, whilst, by a sad mischance, his Sovereign inclined towards the Right. Worse still, Gladstone did not stop growing. For while the Queen retained for life the fixed impression of Disraeli's teaching, Mr. Gladstone continued to grow visibly more Radical. This obstinate development widened the gulf between them; and it resulted that the Queen, with her mind firmly set in the safe principles of Disraelian Conservatism, surveyed his popular vagaries with deepening and elderly disapproval. True, she was ten years his junior; but Mr. Gladstone was still growing. He could still change his mind; and it was the paradox of his long career that, as the years passed, he steadily grew younger than his juniors.

It may be questioned perhaps whether this description of the Queen is quite accurate. She never lost her devotion to Disraeli, but her political outlook in the last years of her life was surely influenced by Disraeli's successor. Disraeli made her imperialist and adventurous; Salisbury was not much less critical of Disraeli than Gladstone. Would it not be truer to say that the Queen regarded Gladstone with the emotions excited by her affection for Disraeli's memory and the suspicion excited by her regard for the safe principles of Conservatism taught by Disraeli's successor? The Queen was a Jingo when the Disraeli influence was strong upon her. When that had passed she settled down to the quieter conservative temper of Lord Salisbury.

But this change did not help to bring her into sympathy with Gladstone. For Gladstone's development, following a line of its own, had brought him to a state of mind that was just as obnoxious and suspect to Salisbury as it would have been to Disraeli. Perhaps even more. For though there was nothing in common between Gladstone and Disraeli in their outlook on the objects and purposes of policy, there was more in common between them in their view of popular government than there was between either of them and Salisbury. Salisbury regarded democracy with the rooted mistrust of the old governing class. Disraeli never had that mistrust. He was a Radical who had kept, when he became a Tory, his fundamental confidence in democracy. He thought that one Englishman was at bottom very much like another, and that leaders who stood for his wholesome and steadying prejudices could hold their own against leaders who stood for his quixotic and disturbing fancies. There was no reason in his view why the workmen should not vote Conservative in defence of habits and tastes that they shared with other classes. Nor were they likely to be less susceptible to the passions on which he played in turning England into a policy of adventure and external glory. To the man who dished the Whigs in 1867, the English workman was a much more manageable person than he seemed to Salisbury; much more easy to fit into the existing political system. His own career seemed to justify this view. Disraeli had the success of his life after the town workman had been enfranchised.

To understand why and how Gladstone and the Queen drifted further and further apart we must follow the course

of his development. Everybody is agreed that whereas most men grow more conservative as they grow older, Gladstone grew more radical. Now the growth of his radicalism was due to a definite and fundamental discovery that he made after the age when men generally lose their generous illusions. Most men find less reason for confidence and hope as experience turns their young dreams into cold fact. Liberty looks nobler before it is won. The great reserves of moral power that are neglected under the government of a class seem richer and more imposing before they are called into use. There was a good deal of difference between the Italy that Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour made between them and the Italy that each of them thought he was making. How often has it happened that a reformer has liked his reform when he has got it half as much as he expected to like it? Disillusionment is the law of politics.

Gladstone broke this law. His belief in the power in the world of the sense of justice was at its strongest at the end of his life; and that belief had governed his policy more and more, so that he seemed mad to people whose reading of their own experience had brought them to just the opposite temper. Mr. Francis Birrell pointed out, in the brilliant little biography that he published last year, that the real turning-point in Gladstone's career came when he took to public speaking. The cynical critic will say that if a man finds that he can do what he likes with great audiences, he passes easily to the view that mass sentiment is not a dangerous but an admirable force in public life. But nobody to-day would be satisfied with a cynical interpretation of Gladstone's character or his career. Those superficial views could pass when men were still involved in the most violent party quarrels, but they will not stand considered examination afterwards. The truth is admirably put in Mr. Somervell's vivid and penetrating study, now available in a cheap edition—a masterpiece of judicial treatment. "Gladstone was first and foremost a moralist. Every question became to him a question of right and wrong." Elsewhere he has an illuminating comment. The nickname of the "mystery man" has stuck to Disraeli, but it would have served as well, perhaps better, to describe his rival. Disraeli was a novelist and a Jew. "No Englishman," wrote Frederick Greenwood, of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, one of his warmest admirers, "could approach him without

some immediate consciousness that he was in the presence of a foreigner. He was an Englishman in nothing but his devotion to England." Gladstone was equally remote, for he was above all things a man of religion. He was not merely devout; his whole mind was steeped in and coloured by the conceptions of scholastic theology; he had, we are told by an intimate friend, "the mind of a thirteenth-century school man." It is here that we find the link between the old Gladstone and the new—the conservative and the radical. Both as a young man and an old, Gladstone brought to politics a special outlook of his own, or perhaps we should say a special perspective of his own. He regarded his nation as a member of a family of States, with a common basis of history, law and civilised obligation. In this world he saw the perpetual conflict of good and evil; of the spirit of justice and the spirit of force. "*Quid civitates,*" he would have said with Augustine, "*sine justitia nisi magna latrocinia?*" His view of the actual remedy for injustice that was needed might differ from time to time, but alike in 1850, when he denounced the Naples prisons, in 1870 when he wanted to protest against the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, in 1855 when he supported the Crimean War, and in 1878 when he denounced the Turkish policy of Beaconsfield, he was inspired by the same fundamental view. He looked on Europe as a world of States living by public law. The great object of statesmanship was to make public law supreme, and the great object of a patriot should be to make his own nation conform to that ideal and to guide its policy by that sense. The Gladstone who denounced the Naples prisons was the Gladstone who proposed to give Ireland Home Rule.

Now, the determining discovery that Gladstone made was the discovery that great popular audiences would take these truths from him. When he appealed as a Conservative to Conservative sentiment on behalf of the sufferers in the Naples prisons, he received little response at home and less abroad. Guizot said that the choice was between cut-throats and tyrants, and that he disliked tyrants but disliked cut-throats more. But when a generation later he attacked Disraeli's Eastern policy, he found that workmen and tradesmen would listen spellbound to the most complicated historical passages and to abstract arguments about the place of law and mutual obligation in the life of the world. "The

Midlothian campaign," says Mr. Birrell, "must be about the only successful example of leading a party to victory by an appeal to nothing but moral standards." "Few contrasts," says Mr. Guedalla, "are more lively than that between the effects of Mr. Gladstone's speeches and their austere reality." Mr. Somervell quotes a passage which he describes as Midlothian in a nutshell. It begins: "Remember that the sanctity of life in the hill villages of Afghanistan, among the winter snows, is as inviolable in the eyes of Almighty God as can be your own." Gladstone was called a demagogue, but if Cleon had talked like this, the word "demagogue" would never have gained its sinister meaning. Thus Gladstone was brought in old age to a view that made it impossible for him and the Queen to find common ground—the view that "on all the great questions dependent mainly on broad considerations of humanity and justice, wealth, station and rank had been wrong and the masses had been right." Disraeli had noted with satisfaction when he stayed with the Queen in 1881 that she thought Gladstone mad. When he told her the wild truth that he had learnt from his long life, her worst suspicions had come true.

J. L. HAMMOND.

THE LEGEND OF ITALIAN SCEPTICISM.

PROFOUND freedom of mind towards dogma and discipline, instinctive distrust of formal heresy of any kind : such are the two most characteristic and most constant traits of Italian religious consciousness. Is this a contradiction, the explanation of which would lie in a lack of religious ardour simultaneous, in the Italian, with a cold precocity of political sense ?

Indeed, few European peoples have shown such repeated outbursts of religious feeling. One generation prior to Francis of Assisi, Joachim de Flora rouses the soul of half Italy. Dante puts him in his *Paradiso* :

Il calavrese Abate Giovachino,
Di spirito profetico dotato.*

To this day is the cult of him alive in the churches of Calabria where, on his feast-day, they sing this anthem, of which it is impossible to say whether it inspired Dante or is an echo of him : "*Beatus Joachim, spiritu dotatus prophético, decoratus intelligentia, dixit futura ut praesentia.*"

Shortly after Joachim de Flora's death, the message he had bequeathed was taken up again in Umbria, but eased of all apocalyptic threats by Francis of Assisi, who brought the first human message of which one might dare say it comes near that of Christ : Francis commits the salvation of Christendom to the inner man ; the Church shall be saved by the work of the souls, by the unanimous effort of the faithful. Francis is never in fear of an avenging God ; even as his Hymn to the Sun, his *Fioretti* have left us a perfume of flowers, foretelling a paradisaic vision. Those who have not the lyric power of the *Poverello* are content to know that it is not true that this world is a *lacrimarum vallis* ; it is for them as for his companions of the Porziuncola that Francis dictated in his Rule : "let the brothers be *gaudentes in Domino, hilares.*" Italy then had—as she did until the Council of Trent—her free religion, just as she had had her free Communes.

I said at the beginning that one of the constant traits of the Italian conscience seems to have been an instinctive distrust of formal heresy of any kind. Indeed, the most permanent law of political history in Italy will probably have been a

* The Calabresian priest Joachim—endowed with the gift of prophecy.

seeking for balance between the two powers, each of which wanted to overrule the other : the pope and the emperor. This was the first and highest exercise of that so Italian spirit of *combinazione*, of which I shall speak a little further on. Even the most ardent Ghibellines are never, in their hearts, entirely free of a certain love of this Roman Church in which every one recognised a masterpiece of Italian organisation. The *Comune* of Rome never lost a chance of undermining the temporal power of the popes, at any rate until the dawn of the *Cinquecento* ; the whole of Italy spoke, sometimes gladly, of outrages inflicted on pontiffs. But never did Italians side with the antipopes ; for the Italians the antipopes were never anything but puppets in the hands of the emperors. Not only were they foreign in the making ; but the balance would have been broken and Italy would have run the risk of becoming *tedesca*.

On her side, the Church often compromised in Italy. She never seriously attempted to stop the spread of those Italian masterpieces in which she was so often ill-treated : the *Divine Comedy*, for instance, and Petrarch's *Canzoniere*. If she forbade Dante's *De Monarchia* it was also partly because nobody read it ; she was thus certain she would not be disobeyed. The same tolerance was witnessed towards Ariosto, whose satires and comedies so scantily spared the clergy and the sale of indulgences.

The truth regarding the religious feeling of Italians is that, since Dante, and until the time of the Italian Jansenists who were so much more numerous than is thought—Manzoni, as a young man, was a Jansenite openly and, despite himself, remained one throughout his whole long life—the underlying essence of the history of Italy sometimes breaks out into marvellous fruits ; and sometimes into morbid, but sincere, phenomena like David Lazaretti who, but yesterday, brought about a fit of feverish mysticism in Tuscany, the most sceptical of Italian regions ; and sometimes flows by, hidden, like an underground stream. In vain does one believe the spring is dried up ; suddenly it breaks forth anew to the surface. External aspects change according to the times and the generations ; but the essential trait, such as the history of Italy has carved it, endures : a hardly formal reverence for hierarchy and traditional observances, and, on the other hand, direct aspiration towards God which makes Dante, and after

him so many other great Italian minds, say : the true religion is in our hearts.

Naturally, one also finds in Italy a certain form of catholicism made up of compromises and traditions, mental negations and hereditary adhesions. But how does it prove an accommodating scepticism, specifically Italian ? I very much fear this kind of catholicism flourishes, and apparently prospers, in France just as well as in Italy, in Austria as in Belgium, in Hungary as in Croatia. . . . But, on the other hand, there does exist one characteristic which is essentially Italian, in matters of religion as in science and—in normal times—in politics : I mean tolerance. The old Italian anti-clericals never had the hatred of priests ; at most did they make fun of them ; this, for that matter, is to be seen in all Italian literature ; from Boccaccio to the very catholic Manzoni.

This more or less happened for the Jews also. There never was any anti-semitism in Italy. There could not be any, with 40,000 Jews in a nation of 40,000,000 souls ; and practically all these Jews were *Sephardim*, Spanish Jews, often steeped in Western culture. But in the towns where the Jewish element is more numerous, like Leghorn or Pisa, one notes on their behalf a mockery devoid of spite ; somewhat like that of the “ anti-clerical ” for the vicar to whom he will one day hand over his children for their first communion. But this, possibly, is nothing but the amiable tolerance of everyday life, the fruit of an ancient history which has gone through so many things ; something less, however, than what prevailed amongst the Chinese of yesterday who, when they questioned one another, said : “ What is your honourable religion ? My ridiculous bundle of superstitions is . . . ”

If there is any Italian scepticism, it has two sides and two extremes, like everything Italian. Amongst the poor wretches struggling for a most precarious* material life, it is mainly a question of mental laziness concerning problems less immediate than that of their hunger : their poor and humble philosophy is the *non te ne incaricà* of the lower classes at Naples. After all, the phenomenon is general ; and if in Italy it is more obvious, that is also due—besides the harder daily difficulties—to a psychological reason which strangers find it difficult to grasp, but which, for me, is undeniable : sceptic-

* Contemporaneous Italy only knew one period of ample general prosperity, between 1900 and 1914.

ism, opportunism, are exaggerated because one is ashamed : vanity, pride ? How often, when one has seized this double meaning, do the most sceptical words betray the bitterness of that, only apparently, cynical stanza of a little-known poet of the fourteenth century, Bindo Bonichi :

Un modo c'è a viver fra le genti
Ed in ogni altro tu ti perdi i passi :
Cessa da' magri ed accostati a' grassi,
Odi ed ascolta e di tutto consenti.*

It is especially amongst the highest intellects that words of scepticism, so frequent on the lips, have struck me often as being only the result of a bitter knowledge of history and of life ; a knowledge and a bitterness which it is not strange to find in the intellectual *élite* of a nation whose history is one series of dreadful trials. The complete emancipation from all and any respect for official phraseology which one notes amongst this *élite* is, besides, only a counterpoise to Italian bombast which blooms like a poisonous and luxuriant plant during the recurring periods of mental and moral abasement, amongst the *petits bourgeois* with pseudo-classic training. In all the Italians whom, when I was young, I esteemed and loved most, a superficial observer would have noted a scepticism which hid—only too well—a haughty dignity. It is this same dignity which explains the paucity of Memoirs of Italian public men, as compared with French and English statesmen : a feeling of the mediocrity of the work accomplished in comparison with what one had once dreamed of doing.

For thirty years Italy and Europe have quoted Giolitti as the type of the sceptical politician. One day Giolitti was being attacked in the Chamber on certain laws for provinces where public life was not exemplary. And he, in a whisper, turned to me : “ They are right ; yes, as much so as if they were blaming a tailor for cutting a suit for a hunch-back.” But, rising, he answered in bleak administrative manner, and with not the slightest sarcasm. He despised those who publicly vied for wit. This same Giolitti it was who, when he was eighty-two, having lost his wife in their modest country place at Cavour, went alone, at two o'clock in the morning, to kneel for hours at the side of the coffin in the little village

* There is but one way of living amongst people—And any other will lead thee astray : Flee from the lean and come near to the fat,—Be all ears, listen, and say amen to all.

church. I saw him a few days later : he only said to me, after a long silence : "Do you know what I found in my wife's *Libro di messa* ?" A letter I sent her from Rome thirty years ago, during a ministerial crisis, and in which I told her my disgust at having to live in the midst of the mean jealousies of politicians." And he immediately changed the subject of conversation. Such was the true Giolitti; but it is probable that historians of the future will stick to the easy legend which has described him as the accomplished type of sceptical Italian.†

Men apart, the most purified form of this scepticism may be seen in the most Italian book existing, Manzoni's *Promessi Sposi*. It is, possibly, the essentially Italian character of this book which prevented, and still prevents, foreign readers from finding in these pages all that we read in them. When strangers praise it most warmly—Goethe began with his Eckermann—their praises sound flat to our ears, so much more intense is what we think of it. Are the strangers wrong ? Perhaps not ; it is only one more proof of the difficulty of feeling "in Italian." Manzoni only sees the souls ; and deliberately ignores political systems, religious systems. At every page one finds contempt, but hardly expressed, for political events, whether it be the war of Montferrat—"quella bella guerra"—or the tumults at Milan under the Spanish rule. Here is an example of his style : he recalls, in parenthesis, that a statue of King Philip II was changed into Brutus at the time of the invasion of the French under Bonaparte and then, Bonaparte becoming Napoleon, shelved one knows not where. "Who could have foretold that to Andrea Biffi when he carved it ?" No more. At every page hardly perceptible traits endow the *Promessi Sposi* with the same privilege which—with ten other books in the world ?—Shakespeare's *Tempest* enjoys : works with a twofold import, which ravish one at sixteen and which one discovers, moved, at forty. What one finds especially in the *Promessi Sposi* is the ironical and resigned pessimism of the Italian soul, too often mistaken for ordinary and facile scepticism.

* Prayer-book.

† "The most astute old fox I have ever seen" ; so did Lloyd George speak of Giolitti after having spent one day with him at Lucerne.

Giolitti was not so conventional with me when, on seeing me after his return from Lucerne, he said to me of Lloyd George : "Extremely quick ; he has only got one naïveté ; he always thinks he has done you."

For Giolitti's personality I shall refer my readers to the chapter I devoted to him in my *Makers of Modern Europe* (New York, Bobbs Merrill, 1931).

This legend of scepticism has popularised, especially in the international political world, a quality—or defect, others think—of the Italians : the *combinazione*. I have taken part in a good many post-war Supreme Councils and in other international conferences : all my colleagues, from Lloyd George to Briand, from Curzon to Poincaré himself* did nothing, even as myself for that matter, but seek *combinazioni* : they are the very essence of a normal political and social life. The civil grandeur of England was confirmed only when England nationalised that Italian art, and *combinazione* became *compromise*. Why, therefore, is the *combinazione* criticised in Italy, and more even in France when it is tried there, whereas compromise is quoted as a supreme proof of English wisdom ? Because the English never talk of generalities ; nor of programmes with "sacred" ideals ; hence their combinations do not shock.

One day, after I had negotiated an essentially important treaty with our Slav neighbours, the Nationalists asked me, at the Committee of Foreign Affairs, what had been my guiding line. And I, boasting a little, for indeed I had mainly tried to serve my country, answered by a *boutade* in which there was a parcel of truth : "I wanted discontentment to be fairly shared between the two nations." The answer was so Italian that for one instant—oh, for an instant only—it did not even displease my adversaries.

Setting aside for a moment the spectacular shows, thanks to which, in these troubled post-war times, the public life of so many countries has been reduced to one gigantic publicity enterprise, if one studies the true essence of the Italian people, one sees that this people still keeps—hidden perhaps—traits which are the opposite of the so-called Italian scepticism. The real people in Italy are just as moving still in their humanity, their simplicity, their deep understanding, as they were in the times of the *Poverello*. Not régimes only—ephemeral anecdotes—but the sharpest moral and social crises have never altered the essential in the Italians : the will to dignity in individual intercourse, excluding all servility and real inequality. Even to-day, in spite of so many jingo palavers, the Italian people feels, in the very depths of its soul, that nationalisms have brought Europe to the verge of

* I said, himself, for he was too juridically minded to see the "*combinazioni*" which, in his heart, he wanted just as much as the others did.

disaster ; that therefore a recrudescence of nationalisms cannot cure the nations. A steady and faithful contact with this "*umile Italia*"* which sees so clearly at home (where it can undergo all trials and never in its heart be lowered) and abroad (where it remains so Italian) has convinced me more than ever that, on our continent, my people is the one whose European trend is ripest.

Spengler—that philosopher for second-rate newspaper men—has invented the formula of the decadence of Europe. But decadence is only by comparison—and the United States and Asia are going through crises even severer than ours. What ails Europe really? Her boundaries are henceforth too straight for her economic and intellectual resources. With all the prevailing hatreds and hazards, this assertion may seem Pangloss-like optimism. And yet have we not, with our own eyes, witnessed the big change? Thirty years ago one could be only English, French, Italian. . . . Now, one cannot any more. The very writers who purvey us with gospels of nationalistic hatreds would be desperate if their books were not read, translated, discussed beyond their frontiers. Our intellectual and economic needs overflow our boundaries : a German moral problem, an Italian moral problem, forthwith become European problems.

In the face of this new fact one has a right to wonder whether these agitations for formulæ of hatred to be catalogued according to the colour of shirts are not somewhat like the growing violence of bombardments during the war, on a front several miles long : the frightful but happy announcement of imminent retreat. It may be, certainly, that the crisis will be long—long enough for us not to witness the end of it in our lifetime. But for those of us who harbour neither ambitions nor hatreds, it is joy enough to feel that the future will vindicate the ideals we remained true to.

At the dawn of this future I, an Italian, feel certain that the Italian soul will be ready to merge in this new life. It will show also how Italian it has remained—not in words, for the more one is *italianissimo* in words the less Italian one is—but in its deep essence, which was that of our highest intellects, from Dante to Mazzini, and of our simplest and most limpid natures, from Francis of Assisi to the peasants in arms who, in 1917, fought and died in the hope that their children might see a world less selfish and less cruel.

SFORZA.

* Dante, *Inferno* I.

JAPAN'S COMING CRISIS.

JAPAN'S Budget for 1934-5 was approved by the Cabinet on December 2nd and will, it seems, pass the Diet, despite discontent in several quarters at its size. Though the total of 2,111,000,000 yen, to which have yet to be added the supplementary charges, represents only about one-quarter of the British Budget at par, it constitutes a record for Japan. And there is one fact about it of extraordinary significance : 937,000,000 yen are devoted to the armed forces, or nearly as much as the sum which Great Britain, with all her vast Empire and sea-communications to protect, spends annually in this direction. Of this sum, the navy will receive more than half, notwithstanding the army's preoccupation in Manchuria.

Japan's army, navy, and air force will account for approximately 44 per cent. of her total expenditure. This is an increase of nearly 20 per cent. over 1933-4. It is something like 30 per cent. more than Great Britain devotes to naval and military purposes, 27 per cent. more than the United States, 22 per cent. more than France, and 20 per cent. more than Italy. It is actually 3 per cent. more than Germany allocated the year before the outbreak of the Great War.

Since Japan's armament increase is obviously too enormous to be motivated merely by shallow sympathy with the present world movement, several questions inevitably arise : Is Japan scheming for further expansion? Is she preparing to bring about another war, as Conroy and other experienced writers believe? If so, is it to be directed against the U.S.S.R., the United States, or the British Empire? (China herself can safely be excluded from consideration, for obvious reasons.) There can be no denying the international danger from a country whose steady population increase of a million a year has already caused it to outrun its home-grown food supply ; where birth control is frowned upon ; whose people are, on the whole, disinclined to emigrate, and are prevented from doing so even if they wish to by the immigration laws of the white countries on the Pacific littoral ; whose unemployed number 600,000 in a boom period ; whose only hope at present rests on the expansion of her industries ; and whose foreign markets are being surely limited and defined by boycotts, tariffs, and quotas against her.

Nevertheless, the indications are most conflicting, and foreign observers not thoroughly acquainted with such a strange country—observers whose views are gleaned from a cursory study of English-printed books and journals, or are founded on a two or three months' fleeting visit—are, perhaps, even more at the mercy of their personal prejudices than they are in Russia. Japanese literature written for foreign consumption must be suitably discounted. Its tone, its stress, and even its subject-matter, are often at complete variance with what is being thought and said in Japan itself.

A glance through recent vernacular Japanese newspapers and magazines would seem to leave little doubt of the nation's militancy. It is difficult to believe that such a spate of bellicose utterances could appear in any country except Nazi Germany. Almost every issue of the dailies is full of photos of soldiers manœuvring, and even girls being trained to handle rifles. A number of writers have contemplated Japan's chances in a war against one or several of the great Powers around her, and few have not concluded optimistically. The fact that Japan has never been beaten in armed conflict, having actually, single-handed, overcome one white Power—Russia—in 1905, coupled with the Shinto belief that "the Japanese race was placed on earth as a realisation of the life of the gods, and is possessed of their divine attributes," as a famous Japanese professor has declared, are never-failing sources of confidence.

General Araki, the Minister of War, has said: "If anybody should dare to impede the march of this country, he must be beaten down ruthlessly and without giving quarter, whatever that body may be." On the subject of the Indian cotton dispute and the British tariff movement against low-priced Japanese goods, a subject which has aroused anti-English sentiment in Japan to an extent inconceivable to Englishmen at home, Araki is reported to have talked of extending Japan's Manchurian policy of self-defence to India. Admiral Inji has said that "Japan does not wish to be in conflict with England, but she must 'down' any country, whatever it be, that hinders her peaceful progress or threatens her life-lines." The doctrine of "Greater Asia," or "Asia for the Asiatics"—an Asia free from the tyranny of the white man, and under the enlightened leadership of Japan—is frequently bruited by journalists and politicians, and seems to enjoy wide favour.

Talk of war with the United States is even more constantly in the air, the ultimate issue being clearly the hegemony of the Pacific. And behind it all, in Japanese minds, there looms over Tokyo the Muscovite Red Hand, which may clutch at any moment and must be repelled at all costs. The N.M.R. dispute, the "incidents" that are reported almost weekly from the Amur frontier, and such statements in the Japanese Press as "considering that the Maritime Province is practically surrounded by land under the Nippon sphere of influence, we Japanese naturally dislike to have an 'anti-Japanese island' right in our midst," are all symptoms of a chronic disease which may become acute at any moment.

The direct accusation that Japan has aggressive designs or warlike intentions would be indignantly—and thoroughly sincerely—repudiated by almost any Japanese. Aggression and "national defence" are very different things, although foreign witnesses may confuse the two. Count Uchida's statement to the Diet, that "the fundamental principle of Japan's foreign policy is to secure the peace of the Orient, and, as a corollary, that of the world," concisely expresses the sentiment of the nation. Araki himself has said: "Dai Nippon treasures peace: we smite only those who oppose justice." Where the "national existence" is at stake, clearly, stern measures must be taken.

It must be understood in this connection that war does not invoke the same personal horror in the Japanese as it does in Englishmen. Human life has never held the same value in the Far East as it holds in England, and the Great War did little or nothing to change the Japanese mental perspective. None of Nippon's soldiers took active part in the fighting on the Western Front, and, compared with the millions of casualties incurred by Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Russia, and the other European countries, her losses were microscopic. Though she gave loyal help to the British Empire at sea, Japan was never in any danger, and so far from undergoing the mental and physical suffering which Europe was subjected to, she experienced an unprecedented period of prosperity. The Japanese have good reason to be grateful for the War, for besides giving them the German Pacific islands north of the Equator and advantages in China, it gave their industries their great opportunity—which they were not slow in seizing. Yet despite Japan's comparative inactivity in all but the industrial

spheres between 1914 and 1918, the *Osaka Mainichi*, one of Japan's greatest and most representative newspapers, was able to tell its readers recently that "without Japan's aid it is doubtful if the Allies would have won."

The old fighting *samurai* spirit lives vigorously in the Japanese heart. It is the greatest dream of a Japanese boy to lay down his life for his Emperor, his *Tenno*, the sacred Son of Heaven. Should anyone dare to question this ideal—and it would be difficult to find such a person—he would be viewed as a traitor and a coward. A learned Japanese professor, on being told last year of the Oxford pacifist motion, "That this House will in no circumstances fight for King and Country," asked how many women there were at Oxford now. To a Japanese, a woman is not only devoid of the sterner qualities, but she is in most respects the indubitable inferior of a man. Officially, the dissemination of pacifist doctrine is decidedly unwelcome. The International Anti-War Conference, which was to have been held in Tokyo last autumn, was prohibited from meeting on Japanese soil, and Lord Marley, who was to have presided, was even refused permission to land.

Beneath their self-assurance and faith in ultimate victory, however, runs an undercurrent of misgiving verging on fear. Japan is well aware of the colossal resources behind potential enemies like America, Britain, and Soviet Russia, and her own comparative poverty. Her wooden cities are particularly vulnerable to air attack, and though the nearest foreign air-base, Vladivostok, is as far from Tokyo as London is from Berlin, while the British and American bases are still farther—over 1,500 miles away—nearly the distance of Moscow from London—she is even more alarmed at the prospect of a future war in the air than any European State. It has always been one of her most fervent desires to secure the abolition of aircraft carriers and bombers. Only last August Tokyo was plunged into almost total darkness for three nights while mimic air-raids on an extensive scale were staged above. Other cities are to enjoy the same experience this year, when armament plants are to operate under war-time conditions.

Of her army Japan is confident. It has never suffered defeat at foreign hands, and her soldiers will die rather than surrender. Quite lately they showed their worth in driving the Chinese out of Jehol and in cleaning up the Manchurian bandits. But her navy is the cause of grave concern. It is not

the quality of her ships. The *Osaka Mainichi* said recently, in describing some Japanese cruisers:

These ships are epitomic of scientific Japan's triumph plus the highest symbol of patriotic Japan—a combination before which several Gibaltars and Singapores might totter. . . . These vessels of ours . . . carry more 8-inch guns, more torpedo tubes, are faster and far more seaworthy than the cruisers of corresponding classes in the other Powers' navies.

On another occasion:

Japan has been manufacturing first-rate naval guns and battleships superior, in fact, to those of British make.

Nobody who knows the Japanese can deny their confidence in the superior quality of their products.

The trouble with the navy is not its efficiency, but the profound dissatisfaction with the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio laid down at the Washington Conference of 1922, and extended for a further five years by the London Treaty of 1930. Japan feels acutely that she is in constant peril from an American navy bigger than her own.

"Why must Uncle Sam enjoy a 40 per cent. advantage?" demands the *Mainichi*. "He may have the shores of two oceans to protect, but is not a 40 per cent. superiority in capital ships and a 10-7 advantage in auxiliary vessels enough to safeguard the 'land of plenty'?" . . . Who has the right to dictate to Japan that she must be satisfied with the danger of having a mighty fleet, 40 per cent. superior to hers, swoop down upon her from across the Pacific?"

The visit of the American Atlantic fleet to the Pacific last October caused unbounded consternation, which has not been stifled by the Nira 28-year building programme.

If the Washington ratio did not meet with universal approbation in Japan in 1922, the maintenance of the *status quo* in 1930 was highly unpopular. Especially in navy and army circles, which are all-powerful, was it felt that the Government policy in consenting to a 5 : 3 ratio in favour of America was not merely weak-kneed, but practically treachery to the Emperor—the greatest sin a Japanese can be guilty of. Inukai, the Prime Minister, was murdered on May 15th, 1932, because of the London Treaty, although he was

not in office at the time it was signed. At the recent trials (the naval, military, and civilian defendants were, by Japanese law, tried in separate courts), which have stirred the interest and patriotic fervour of the entire nation for the last few months, the assassins have been acclaimed everywhere as popular heroes, and even General Araki and the Navy Minister, Admiral Osumi, have publicly extolled their patriotic motives.

Events subsequent to the murder of Inukai have but deepened the sense of insecurity and humiliation which Japan feels with a navy only three-fifths the size of that of the U.S.A. or Great Britain. A non-party ministry came into power which could not be accused of wavering on the Manchurian issue. The refusal of the rest of the world to approve or condone Japan's conduct in that affair, and her consequent notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, has, by isolating Japan completely, produced an agonising feeling of tension within the country about her international relations. But there are no mutual recriminations. Lord Lytton said that the General Staff, which controls the Government, believes that it can defy both Moscow and Geneva, but "the people of Japan have always been sincere and enthusiastic in support of the League of Nations." If he thinks that the people are enthusiastic about the League now, he is wrong. Whatever the Japanese may have been in the past, they are certainly not now. Let there be no mistake about that. An Imperial Edict, issued on March 28th last year, endorsed Japan's withdrawal from the League, and with an Imperial Edict there can be no arguing. Such argument would be tantamount to sacrilege. The people of Japan, with the insignificant exception of a few inarticulate dissentients, are solid to a man in their support of the General Staff and its refusal to accept the verdict of Geneva and the world.

It may be disputed whether the opponents of the Government are really so unimportant. Chief among them are the Communists, whose activities, propaganda, and even sympathies are illegal and are rigidly suppressed. Though their number is small in relation to the total population, and their possible influence on Japan's immediate future negligible, they have been causing the authorities profound anxiety, particularly so as a large proportion of them have been members of the intelligentsia. During the past few years thousands

have been arrested, among them many university students, professors, barristers, and even several judges. Long sentences of imprisonment have been doled out in no illiberal measure. According to reliable sources, however, the movement has lately been showing signs of abatement. Of the 27,500 members of the party who, between March 1928 and March 1933, were arrested but not indicted, the great majority have severed all connection with Communism and its opposition to international warfare, and have actually come to insist "that Japan should take the initiative in participating in wars for the benefit of the various backward nations of Asia," to liberate them from "the yoke of European and American capitalism."

Constitutional opposition to the "strong" foreign policy is now practically non-existent. No responsible statesman, of whatever party, has dared openly to question the Government's attitude on Manchoukuo, and it is very difficult to find a private citizen who does. One must bear in mind that, as the late Dr. Nitobe, that great apologist of Japan, himself pointed out, the idea of liberty has never taken root in Japan. The Japanese, as a whole, do not agree to differ on their politics, as Englishmen do, nor do they venture to oppose the Government on major issues. The toleration in Japan of such "unpatriotic" attitudes as those adopted by the Liberals during the Boer War, or some of the Socialists during the Great War, would be inconceivable to most Japanese. In place of the conception of individual liberty, self-sacrificing and unhesitating duty to the Emperor is the leaven of their political and social structure.

Now the General Staff is responsible not to the Cabinet or to the Diet but to the Emperor himself. What affects the ultimate security of the Empire in time of emergency is, therefore, all theories and surmises to the contrary notwithstanding, for the General Staff to decide. The Cabinet, in practice, can only modify or explain its decisions. The great mass of the people find no difficulty in identifying themselves with the Governmental views if they are told that their patriotism is on trial, but follow gladly and unquestioningly. Even the 300,000 Christians—a few of whom object to bowing before the Imperial insignia at Shinto shrines on the grounds of idolatry and are consequently under a cloud of suspicion—as a body respond loyally to the call of patriotism.

The present, General Araki has laid down, is a time of national emergency. The creation of Manchoukuo has by no means solved Japan's problems. Her hour of trial, so far from being over, is yet to come. She is surrounded by potentially hostile Powers, who are but waiting for their opportunity and closely scrutinising her every strength and weakness. Japan must not flinch; she must not concede them the opportunity they so urgently desire. Her one objective is peace. Her intentions have always been righteous and pacific, though the rest of the world may misunderstand her. There is no Japanese who does not share some part of this outlook. There are few, indeed, who do not accept it in its entirety.

But the misunderstanding abroad is so great that General Araki was led to assert, in the late autumn of 1933, that "war is unavoidable" and Japan must guide her actions in the light of that assumption. The Cabinet did not agree on this contention, and an apparent compromise has been arrived at—a policy of "pacific diplomacy with military preparedness." What this means is vague, but some inferences can be drawn from the course of the disagreement between Araki and the civilian Ministers which has naturally arisen over the interpretation of the policy. During November the main problem was the Budget for 1934-5. The Minister of Finance, Takahashi, held out for nearly a month against the enormous increases—approximately double the amount he considered feasible—which Araki and Osumi demanded for the army and, more especially, for the navy. Although Takahashi insisted that they would lay too heavy a burden on the already strained resources of the country, the military and naval leaders finally had their way.

The date of the coming crisis is already settled: it will be in 1935-6, when Japan's notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations expires and the naval treaties come up for review at Washington. Japan expects to meet with stern, probably unyielding, opposition over the question of the Pacific mandates and her demand for what she considers a more equitable naval ratio. It is for no other purpose than to back up her policy on these two points that she is building up her navy to the utmost limit permitted by the London Treaty. Her armaments will give her what she believes to be the necessary bargaining-power for her diplomacy. If it fails, she will be prepared for all emergencies. Throughout the country, every-

body is discussing or preparing for the "Crisis of 1936." Schoolchildren even write essays upon it. There are serious projects, emanating from General Araki, of organising agriculture on a "National Defence" basis. The army has as its ideal "arrangements for converting the peace-time industrial organisation into one of war-time." Acting with the co-operation of the War Office, the National Defence Associations already number over ten million young men.

Among the very few public men, like Shidehara and Yoshizawa, who have ventured to question the existence of the 1936 crisis, Baron Wakatsuki, who was the leader of the Naval Delegation that brought home the unpopular London Treaty in 1930, has aroused most attention. General Araki caustically remarked that those who cannot understand the impending crisis should retire to a monastery and meditate. Three weeks later, two generally deplored and fortunately unsuccessful attempts were made on Wakatsuki's life. He has made no unpopular speeches since.

Why should Japan be so anxious about the mandated islands? There being some legal grounds for doubt whether they were originally allotted to her by the Versailles Peace Treaty or by the League, Japan, sensitive of the lack of sympathy the Powers have lately shown her, is convinced that, unless a strong front is shown, the League will decide she herself granted them, and will possibly attempt to deprive her of them when she leaves. The islands are of vital importance to her. As Manchoukuo is her "northern life-line," they are her "southern life-line." They would occupy an important strategic position in "the coming Pacific war," as it has been spoken of in Japan, intercepting America's communications with the Philippines. According to the admission of Japanese officials, £100,000 has already been spent on constructing harbours in Pelew and the Mariannes, though their commercial value is small, and the inhabitants do not exceed 11,000. The Japanese ridicule the suggestion that they would break the treaties and use the islands in time of war. Yet it has been repeatedly pointed out that "Mandates" was merely a polite term given to the spoils of war. The Government, enlarging upon the League definition that the islands are to be administered as integral parts of her own territory, has declared that nothing could be more remote from its intentions than to annex them; but their status is nevertheless

the same as that of Formosa, and any attempt at questioning Japan's possession of them would inevitably be unsuccessful. The Japanese emphasise the fact that a foreign Power in control of the islands would constitute an unbearable menace to the security of their country, since they would provide excellent locations for air-bases within easy striking distance of Tokyo.

The problem of the naval ratio embraces that of the mandates, since the navy must guard not only the islands but the whole Empire. However inequitable the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio before 1931, it is doubly so now. Japan's new commitments on the Asiatic continent, it is urged, necessitate a revision. It is unthinkable, with feeling in the country running as high as it does at present, that any Japanese delegation will dare to return from Washington in 1936 with an extension of the present ratio. Better for it to return with nothing save its honour. Matsuoka's much-lauded Geneva stand of "do or die" is the only one that the Japanese public will stomach.

What Japan's minimum demand for "security" will be is as yet doubtful. Only two or three months ago a 10 : 10 : 7 ratio was generally considered as fair. The feeling that this is lamentably insufficient, however, has been steadily growing since the beginning of the May 15th trials and the heaping-up of criticism which the London Treaty has been receiving in court and elsewhere. Last December (1933) a responsible spokesman for the navy, Capt. Sekine, writing in *Contemporary Japan* on behalf of "united Japanese opinion," demanded nothing short of parity. Of European disarmament proposals he is, like most Japanese writers, frankly sceptical. "The objective of universal security," he says, "will never be attained until all nations have renounced disarmament as an instrument of national policy." His arguments for parity, briefly, are :

1. That the British and American desire to maintain the present position is due, not so much to the wish to prolong their ascendancy, as has been frequently put forward in Japan, as to their innate Anglo-Saxon devotion to the *status quo*. With this attitude Japan cannot sympathise.

2. That security is more important than the improvement of international relations, and Japan cannot be assured of security unless she is conceded parity.

3. That by the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol of September 15th, 1932, Japan is pledged to defend the Manchurian seaboard in precisely the same way as that of her own islands. The London Treaty, which was signed by Japan on the understanding that she had only her own islands to defend, does not, therefore, apply to the current situation.

4. That Japan consented to the London Treaty only in the belief that America and Great Britain would not build up to the maximum permitted by it. That belief has recently been proved erroneous.

5. That each nation has an equal right to armaments.

6. That America, being a wealthier and more populous nation, for that very reason does not need larger armaments than Japan. America's and Britain's potential superiority are a partial guarantee of their defence.

7. That if Japan had a navy equal to that of Great Britain or the United States, it would undoubtedly constitute a hypothetical menace to Hong Kong, Guam, and the Philippines. Such a menace, however, is as nothing when compared with the present menace to Japan herself.

Alternative to the demand for parity, the navy spokesman suggests a clear distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" armaments, the "offensive" armaments alone being subject to limitation. Such a concession, of course, would give Japan, for practical purposes, more than parity, since it would leave her activities in the Eastern Pacific and on the Asiatic mainland without a shadow of a challenge from the Anglo-Saxon Powers. With regard to the main arguments, it is enough to notice that point (5) carries especial weight among Japanese, being taken from the lips of the American Navy Secretary, Mr. Swanson himself, when he explained the American "Bigger Navy" programme. Comment on the other points would be superfluous.

Although the Japanese demands are directed mainly towards concessions from the United States, they necessarily involve Great Britain as well. Not only would we be called upon to make the same substantial concessions upon the same grounds, but we are deeply concerned in any question affecting the relationship between the United States and Japan. British trade and interests in the areas immediately and secondarily involved, moreover, are considerably greater than those of any other country, not excluding even the United States. British industries, especially the textiles, are

more actively in competition with the Japanese than are the American, and England has not infrequently been represented as the evil spirit responsible for the Australian, Dutch, Indian, Egyptian, and even Chinese movements against Japanese manufactures. England is still widely regarded as having inspired the League's condemnation of Japan for motives of her own, and "Sir Simon" and "Sir Lytton," like Mr. Stimson, are among the most cordially disliked men in Japan. Such immoderate elements are not in control of the diplomacy, but it would be very unwise to ignore the other side of the medal. It is no subject of mere academic interest that we should follow as closely as possible the course of events and the development of opinion in Japan, lest we should suddenly be confronted with a dangerous situation on the other side of the world as real to us and as threatening as any in Europe, of which we had no adequate forewarning, and for which we had made no suitable provision.

J. PARMENTER.

EDUARD MÖRIKE.

IN the last quarter of the nineteenth century and during the years before the War, the reputation of Eduard Mörike steadily increased. The news of his death in 1875 came, indeed, as a surprise to his fellow countrymen. So thoroughly was he withdrawn from the toil and dust of the arena, that many or most learnt for the first time that he had been living among them, their own contemporary. In the various histories of German literature up to that time he had been reckoned but as one of the several Suabian poets of an erewhile Romantic School whose lustre was dimmed by that of Uhland, their acknowledged chief. Presently, however, he was to pass from the position of a poet, cherished alone by brother poets and the select few, to that of a national luminary. Slowly but surely he came to be recognised as one who, delicately combining the elements of realism and romance and classicism, rounded off the Romantic movement to a harmonious close; as one to be ranked high among men of letters, and even hailed as the greatest master of the German lyric since Goethe. Such a claim is worthy of inspection. In these days of anxious or patient waiting upon German fortunes, Mörike may pleasantly engage us and serve to revive gracious memories of a land once known for its learning and candour.

Born at Ludwigsburg in 1804, and sprung from a stock of doctors and pastors, Mörike was destined by his guardians for the Church. Docile, he proceeded from the seminary of Urach to the Evangelical Foundation connected with the University of Tübingen, a student attentive rather to his dreams of poetry. But there seems to have been no great conflict between the two vocations. He was to furnish a career as curate or temporary substitute in many a parish of Würtemberg, the romantic Suabia of days gone by. Once, indeed, after a thousand hopes and plans that failed, he broke away and essayed the writer's trade at Stuttgart, but made speedy return, disillusioned, convinced that not for him was a life that allowed no space for quiet meditation. But his clerical engagements were interrupted by frequent leave of absence. From early days a valetudinarian, he suffered from a rheumatic affection and hypochondria, and was like to be regarded as a malingeringer. Even the one promising post at

Cleversulzbach might not stand him in lasting stead; in 1843 he was allowed or bidden either to discharge his office unaided, or resign. With a slender pension and the help of his friends, he could tide over difficulties till at last, in 1851, a lay position was found for him. In the Katharinenstift, the High School for Girls at Stuttgart, he gave lectures upon German literature and, for a while, dramatic readings in the Museum. But his infirmities increased; and the dread of activities, even the slightest. In 1866 he released himself from all regular duties, was pensioned again, and lingered on for some years, comforted by the sense that he was recognised at least by his literary peers.

An idyllic and harmonious life, it has been urged by those who have come under the spell of Mörike's poems and letters; the life of one spared all inward and outer storms. Hardly so, if we recall his precarious circumstances; his constant and vain effort to secure some little ease and freedom from monetary cares. Besides, who shall measure the mental agitation of another, or decide that the causes of such agitation are inadequate? In early youth, Maria Weber, a love-lorn adventuress in the wandering train of the mystic, the charlatan, Frau von Krüdener, so fascinated him that only by the strongest exertion of will could he wrest himself away, blameless, at the cost of a fevered sick-bed. The elder brother he admired was to involve him, unwitting, in a political conspiracy and the risk of a prison; and a younger, a ne'er-do-weel, must draw upon his ill-furnished purse. His engagement to Luise Rau, a pastor's daughter in whom he discovered treasures unknown to her family, protracted itself till at length she married another of the profession with surer fortunes. His slender post at Stuttgart enabled him later to marry Margarete von Speeth, but against his own forebodings and strait warning from without. Already for some years this Margarete, friend of his sister Klärchen, who kept house for him, had dwelt with the pair, Mörike thinking no harm and incurring ill-gossip and censure for his perception of the poetry of her Catholic rites. But jealousy arose between the bride and Klärchen, who had rejected marriage for her brother's sake; and it was Margarete who at last withdrew, only to return when Mörike lay a-dying. And yet, despite all this, we are somehow left with a general impression of his cheerful content, nay even happiness. Here was one who rode

mild hobbies; who loved to watch the antics of pet birds and wake the laughter of children. Character, in short, is vision. Mörike beheld the world in the light of his golden fancy; was—in the phrase used by an early friend—Poetry itself. His, if any man's, the abundant harvest of the quiet eye.

There are, indeed, seeming incompatibilities in Mörike's nature; contrasts a little difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, expansive, he could charm his youthful associates. There was the making of an actor in him; a lasting aptitude for mimicry and the use of gesticulation. And, on the other, he remained the shy lad who shrank from music-lessons lest he should be called upon to display his talent; the dreamer who looked beyond actualities to the real-ideal; the born recluse for whom social duties were an ever-growing burden. Mörike himself was conscious of the contradiction. Painfully, in youth, he marvelled how that he could wear the mask of prudent silence when his heart bade him reveal himself; how that he could indulge the lively jest and thereupon be moved to melancholy and whole dissatisfaction with himself and the world. Perchance it would be enough to declare that Mörike's nature was lyrical, open to whatever influx of joy and sorrow. Peace, the equilibrium of his faculties, was only to be won—if it was won—with the help of age and common sense.

But the readier way of explaining the impression of harmony is, of course, to make of him a type, a German Vicar of Wakefield. Naïve, assuredly, and a man without guile, was Mörike: the simple Christian, tolerant of weakness in others and strict in his own requirement, avoiding theological dispute with his colleagues, untroubled by the theories of his lifelong friend, David Friedrich Strauss. But one would also have to imagine a Vicar of Wakefield with a remarkable turn for friendship and letter-writing. It has even been claimed that Mörike is to be ranked with Lessing, Goethe and Bismarck as a complete virtuoso in the kind. Such an estimate, on the face of it, is all too high. But one can well acknowledge the sweet reasonableness of the letters to Luise Rau or Margarete von Speeth, and warmly admire, in those addressed to his confidants, the lavish power to disclose the poetry that lies in common things. Cowper should be added to Dr. Primrose for a composite image and parallel.

The antecedents of *Maler Nolten*, the long novel published

in 1832, are obvious. *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* had been enthusiastically welcomed by the elder Romantics, and presently disdained; whereas Mörike from first to last adhered to his chosen master. And, for further influence, we must look not so much to Tieck's *William Lovell* and *Franz Sternbald*, those parodies, one might say, of Fichte's metaphysical and misunderstood Ego, those distressful heroes who set no bounds to desire, as to the *Schicksaldrama*, the phantasmagorias of fate and shuddering terror, the pattern for which, set by Werner, was to be followed even to this day by many a playwright. Mörike was essentially a man of the gentle and sober heart. But the mysterious fortunes of Mignon and the problem of elective affinities had impressed him; and he could not but discover in his relation to Maria Meyer the germ of a tragic disaster that might have awaited him. He was for using Goethe's method of deliverance. The writing of a *Maler Nolten* would bring his malady to the daylight; would disperse—as he put it to a friend—his “subjective mass” of crazed fancies. The difficulty is that, later, Mörike could not endure his production. Future readers must know it only in altered shape. For years upon years he laboured to rewrite it, mitigating the “dæmonic” element so far as was possible, reducing romantic excess to classical sanity as best he might. And, even so, his “child of pain” never came to the full birth. Another hand must link the second part, still unrevised and requiring—so he hoped—the barest or no revision, to the first. Such irksome labour is anything but commendable. Imagine a mature Millais not to be withheld from re-painting the works of his pre-Raphaelite period! Besides, the initial situation of innocent folk, fated and fatal, remained; and the inevitable—was it inevitable?—sequel. Those were the times of the occult “Nature-philosophers”; and Mörike was moved to symbolise the dark, subliminal powers that frustrate conscious purpose and allure to destruction. It is the strange tale of folk that are mad or like to turn mad; a case for psychologists or the sceptical. Historically, one would assign it as a link, not—as it has been said—between *Wilhelm Meister* and *Anna Karenina*, but between *Wilhelm Meister* and *Der grüne Heinrich* of Gottfried Keller. It can be read a second time for the clearness and charm of its episodes, and the beauty of its prose—Goethe's prose with an added grace and

fluency. But in this second reading, the interest will probably centre upon Mörike, dividing himself into Nolten and Larkens, transfiguring Luise Rau, and throughout exhibiting the range of his idiosyncrasy.

Of Mörike's poems it is difficult, and even idle, to speak. It was given him to write a certain number of perfect lyrics, of *Lieder* distinct among the best. And, that said, all is said. Such things are the choice expression of pure emotion; are as those happy strains of “absolute” music which, existing of themselves and for themselves, ask no comment. The fusion of content and form is complete. Paraphrase in prose, attempted translation in verse, even the free adaptations which at times may be successfully put forward as equivalents rather than as substitutes; all these are of small avail, and can but meagrely suggest the original. Thus, *Schön-Rohtraut* and *Der junge Dichter*; *Das verlassene Mägdlein* and *Agnes*; *Ein Stündlein wohl vor Tag*, *Heimweh*, *Im Frühling*; the mythopœic *Um Mitternacht*; *Erinna an Sappho*, its marble flushed with modern sentiment; the humorous, fanciful *Turmhahn*; and, above all, those Nature-symphonies in little, *An einem Wintermorgen vor Sonnenaufgang* and *Besuch in Urach*. Whereupon, singling out some few, and straightway ready to double the list, a critic had best stand aside and leave them to produce their own effect. Mörike, after trial of his powers, would seem to have concluded that he must await the rare harmony of soul and bodily condition; await and use the perfect mood, the hour of whole inspiration. And these hours would seem to have come most frequently when his heart was moved by tender love and solicitude. But what of the many, many other poems he has given us? It is as if, also, he had too seriously taken, or agreed in advance with, Goethe's advice about the poetry “of occasion.” The ever-changing present should bring the poet sufficient occasions to record himself as in a diary. And, accordingly, between the edition of 1838 and the last revised of 1867, the poems grow in bulk. Countless ephemerality—there is a further second and even a third collection—threaten to submerge the rest. His craftsmanship, however excellent, has become an imperative habit; a method of busy idleness. In literature, doubtless, much must be furnished that somewhat may be chosen and retained.

The *Idylle vom Bodensee*, the domestic epic of 1846, despite

the tender love episode in the fifth canto—Margrete is Margarete von Speeth idealised—and many a touch of grace and beauty throughout, can hardly be said to rival *Hermann und Dorothea*. Hexameters better agree with the German language and taste than with our own. The fault lies not here, but in the construction of the plot. The use of a merry prank as the knot, and the insertion of still another drawn from the youthful memories of the rustic perpetrator, hinder the full effect of poetic realism. It was rather in the *Schatz* of 1836 and the Stuttgarter *Hutzelmännlein* of 1853 that Mörike could fully exhibit his love of narrative for its own sake, and his characteristic turn for fanciful humour. Folk-tales recover for us the childhood of the race. Tieck has used the Märchen to convey melancholy terror or vent satiric laughter; Novalis to express and veil his mystic home-sickness; and Goethe to mystify the “intellectuals.” Already, the child and adolescent, Mörike had dwelt in a fairy island, and could exchange its latest news with comrades pledged to secrecy. In the collected poems, the *Märchen vom sichern Mann* shows us a grotesque figure commissioned by the younger gods to endite a cosmogony and rehearse it in the underworld, much to the annoyance and discomfiture of the Devil. And here, in these lengthy and not a whit too lengthy examples, Mörike could restore the folk-tale to its proper nature; could allow it to exhibit its clear and joyous belief that all is well in a wondrous world, and justice shall accrue to the honest and upright. *Der Schatz* has its modern setting and smiling defiance of rationalisation; the other transports to the Middle Ages and thereby facilitates acceptance of marvels. You may choose as you will, or welcome both, if so you care to be a “Sunday-child” and live in a bustling daydream, intimate with elves and gnomes, lucky shoes and the wisdom-teeth of marine monsters.

But it is in the *Mozart auf der Reise nach Prag* that Mörike achieves his prose masterpiece. With happy skill he avoids the snares and pitfalls that beset novelists and dramatists when they would bring the illustrious before us, and present-day biographers who are for reducing them to common levels or dowering them with latest modes of thought and feeling. Mörike presents a single day in the life of his darling musician; and in its course resumes the whole. The golden hours of the light heart must fleet and pass; the morrow

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THE OUTLOOK IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

HE is an enviable wight who can say what the outlook in Central Europe may be. There was a time, in the years before the war, when any man versed in European affairs could foretell what would happen if the Government of the Hapsburg Monarchy should follow a given course. It followed this course and went to perdition. But to-day so many unknown quantities enter into the Central European equation that to work it out is a highly speculative venture. Herr Hitler, Signor Mussolini, Dr. Dollfuss, General Gömbös and Dr. Beneš are all engaged upon it in their several ways. Doubtless they know what they would like to happen; they can hardly know what will happen. Therefore, if I make bold to set forth my own notions, it is with full consciousness that they are merely notions and can lay no claim to authority.

The trouble for those who, like me, are blessed or cursed with long memories is that they cannot get rid of the feeling that past realities may in some degree lie behind present appearances. If their minds had no yesterday, if they could start with a clean slate, they might be more certain of the future. But the past is there. I remember that in the summer of 1910 Professor (now President) Masaryk asked me, standing blank in Vienna: "Do you see any hope?" "You mean the Hapsburg Monarchy?" I answered. "Yes," he replied. "I see none." "Neither do I," was my reply. Masaryk went on to explain that for years he had worked and hoped to find some way in which the needs and the rights of the non-German and non-Magyar peoples in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy could be reconciled with the continued existence of the Monarchy itself. But after the revelations in the famous Friedjung trial of December 1909 that forgeries had been deliberately used to blacken the faces of the Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs, and in view of the obstinate refusal both of the Magyar oligarchy in Hungary and of the various German parties in Austria to countenance any reform that might transform the Hapsburg realms into a federal polity such as to ensure some measure of freedom and self-government.

their races, he could see nothing save drift, more or less rapid, towards disaster and ultimate destruction. The Hapsburgs, he felt, had lost their old *raison d'être*—which had been to stand as the bulwark of Western Christendom against Islam—and were incapable of finding another in the motto which they had proudly inscribed on the outer gateway of their Imperial castle: "*Justitia Regnorum Fundamentum*." Thus the only thing to do would be to leave the dynasty out of account and to work with and for its subject peoples.

I felt he was right, and before I left Vienna in July 1913 came to understand that in his vision there was prophetic quality. Events and his own career were soon to show how prophetic it had been. Nor should it be forgotten, by those who think the "dismemberment" of the Hapsburg Monarchy at the end of the war a serious error of Allied policy, that some German observers were not far from sharing Masaryk's foresight. On May 22nd, 1914, for example, the German Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirschky, wrote to the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow:

I constantly wonder whether it really pays us to bind ourselves so tightly to this phantasm of a State which is cracking in every direction, and longer to toil at dragging it along with us. But I still see no other political constellation which could replace the extra strength we still draw from the alliance of Central European Powers. For if we had not this alliance our policy would be forced to aim at a partition of the Monarchy. It is doubtful whether England would give us *carte blanche* for this, even if she could have been brought into really steady relations with us; also whether it would be a good thing for us, in the long run, if the German provinces (of Austria) were joined to the German Empire. I think the fruit must ripen a bit more. Time will show whether anyone can succeed in firmly reuniting the heterogeneous forces of the lands under the Monarchy. If the attempt fails, dissolution will certainly be a very rapid process, and we shall have to shape our policy to meet it.

In the autumn of 1918, after the Western Allies had tardily realised that there could be for them no certainty of complete victory—that is to say, no means of preventing the formation of a pan-German Central Europe, without the liberation of the subject Hapsburg races—the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was a very rapid process indeed. It has come much earlier, and have shortened the war

appreciably, had the Allies understood the position in 1915 or even in 1916. To anyone who knew what Austria-Hungary was like "from within," this was an axiom of war dynamics. It was because I knew Austria-Hungary "from within" that I answered, on July 22nd, 1914, the appeal which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London, Count Albert Mensdorff, then made to me, "as a friend of Austria," to do all I could to "localise" the impending Austro-Serbian conflict, by saying curtly that I was much too good a friend of Austria to help her to commit suicide. Count Mensdorff, like many Austro-Hungarian diplomatists abroad, knew little of the true state of his own country, just as little as the British Minister at Munich, the late Sir Fairfax Cartwright, knew of it when he impressed the British Foreign Office by his elaborate despatches upon the proper way for Great Britain to treat Austria-Hungary. Sir Edward Goschen, his immediate predecessor at the Vienna Embassy, saw those despatches in the Foreign Office "Confidential Print" and read them aloud to me, punctuating every paragraph with an (even confidentially) unprintable English noun. He felt that Cartwright had "mugged up" Austria from without; and it was with some amusement that I heard Cartwright himself exclaim, after a few months' experience as Ambassador to Austria-Hungary: "How different everything in this country seems to be now that one is inside it!"

Cartwright was by no means alone in his painstaking ignorance. Most British, French, Russian and Italian statesmen shared it, even after the outbreak of the war. Baron Sonnino, the strong-willed and short-sighted Italian Foreign Minister, who concluded with Great Britain, France and Russia the iniquitous and fatal Treaty of London on April 26th, 1916, as the basis of Italian participation in the war, was not only ignorant but was positively misinformed and wrong-headed. He did not want Austria-Hungary to disappear or to go to pieces, nor could he understand that, once war had broken out, no power on earth could prevent this, short of a complete German victory, in which event Austria-Hungary would merely become a German bridge to the Near and Middle East. Not until after the disaster at Caporetto, in October 1917, could Sonnino be induced even to tolerate attempts to promote a better understanding between the Italians and the subject Hapsburg races. Mussolini, to dis-

justice, then seemed to see the position, and Italy's lasting interests, more clearly. He took part in the Rome Congress of those races early in April 1918, and actually worked on one of its subcommittees, with Professor Seton-Watson as his British colleague. Later in the same month I had a long talk with him in Milan and found him, apparently, convinced that Italy should aim at the moral leadership of the Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks and Rumanians, whose liberation must be at once an essential condition of true victory and of a durable peace.

The Italian *Duce* has probably forgotten these episodes—as he has forgotten, or prefers to ignore, much else. True, he tried vainly to exploit the sound relationship which Count Sforza had begun to build up between Italy, Yugoslavia and the other Succession States of the old Hapsburg Monarchy, but then reverted to the worst sort of Italian Nationalism and sought, by intrigue and propaganda, to dismember Yugoslavia and to checkmate the Little Entente. Simultaneously he fostered Hitlerism in Germany, never guessing what any man with informed foresight would have seen—that, as soon as the Nazis should hold sway in Germany, they would become a serious embarrassment, not to say a nightmare, to Italian Fascist Nationalism. If one thing more than another makes Mussolini's flesh creep, it is the prospect of seeing a Hitlerite Austria united with Germany, and pressing, with all the weight of 70,000,000 disciplined Aryans, upon Italy's northern borders. The Southern Tyrol and Trieste might then become, once again, very burning points of contact between Rome and the Germanic world.

A faithful chronicle of Mussolini's changing views upon the outlook in Central Europe would be a document of surpassing interest. After the singular project which formed the secret background of the "Europe Congress" at Rome in November 1932—a project aiming at the division of the Danubian region and the Balkans into Italian and German "spheres of influence"—he discovered that the Western Yugoslavs, whom he had been striving to detach from Serbia, would, if the worst came to the worst, rather link up with the Germans than come under the Italian heel. So he changed his tactics, curtailed or suppressed the funds for separatist propaganda among the Croats, and hoped to fob Germany off with the

"Four-Power Pact"—which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon so foolishly welcomed—as a means of promoting "Treaty Revision," ostensibly in the direction of the Polish "Corridor." So gross was his diplomacy that it assured all the intended victims of "revision" in their turn that the Four-Power Pact was in no way directed against the particular recipient of his soothing assurance. It seems not to have occurred to him that each recipient would compare notes with the others, or that they would jointly draw conclusions unfavourable alike to his intelligence and his veracity.

The present crisis in Central Europe dates from the negotiations for the Four-Power Pact. Before it could be concluded the Mussolinian and, to some extent, the Hitlerite stuffing had been knocked out of it by the sturdy resistance of the Little Entente and of Poland. Despite repeated appeals from Sir Austen Chamberlain, our Government have never ventured to "lay Papers" upon this not particularly creditable phase of recent British foreign policy; and even the little French Blue Book which contains most of the documents upon it has been so carefully withheld from publicity that it is almost a collector's rarity. In any event the Four-Power Pact is now as dead as mutton. In its place we have the series of non-aggression pacts between Soviet Russia and her neighbours, the consolidation of the Little Entente into a political unit, the ten years' non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland, and the three protocols, signed at Rome on March 17th by Signor Mussolini, Dr. Dollfuss and General Gömbös.

What any or all of these instruments may signify in practice their authors may know. I do not; and I doubt whether there are in Europe half a dozen statesmen who, putting their fingers upon this or that clause of each or any of these agreements, could say precisely what they would amount to in given circumstances. The Soviet pacts of non-aggression are doubtless intended to be a safeguard against sundry Hitlerite ambitions on the one hand, and against Japan on the other. The consolidation of the Little Entente may be taken to mean that its three members will not be the pawns of any Great Power, since, taken together, they form a Great Power by themselves. The Polono-German non-aggression pact seems to be interpreted in one way at Warsaw and in another way at Berlin. Hitler's reference to it was the only point in

anniversary speech to the Nazi Reichstag that was received in dead silence. Obviously Hitler intended it to keep Poland quiet while he dealt with Austria. The Poles, for their part, would have been foolish to reject the German overtures, if only because the removal of the "Corridor" bugbear from international intrigue and discussion enables Poland mutely to make fools of those dupes of German propaganda who have for years insisted that the "Corridor" is the one insuperable obstacle to the organisation of peace in Europe. Among the rank and file of the Nazi Storm Troops, in so far as they are allowed to think or to talk politics, the Polono-German pact is looked upon as a device to gain time for the great blow which Germany will strike when she is ready, and not exclusively in the direction of Warsaw. Eastern Europe, they believe, can be mopped up the more readily when obstacles to Nazi freedom of action have been obliterated elsewhere. Of the Poles it is perhaps safest to say that they are not necessarily dullards, and that the Italian proverb "A lunatic knows more in his own house than a wise man in others' houses" may apply to them.

Meanwhile this pact has not yet given Hitler quite as much freedom of action in and against Austria as he may have expected from it. Even the British Government has been roused to declare that Austrian independence is essential; and the three Rome protocols seem designed to withstand the Hitlerite menace. The first protocol takes the form of a consultative pact between Italy, Austria, and Hungary, and is alleged to be inspired "by the intention to aid the maintenance of peace and the economic restoration of Europe on the basis of respect for the independence and rights of every state." One of its objects is to enable the three Governments to take counsel together "on all the problems which particularly interest them and also on those of a general character" with the aim of developing the treaties of friendship already concluded between them. The second and third protocols foreshadow attempts to increase economic intercourse between the three signatories by the exchange of their products and by resisting "unhealthy tendencies towards economic self-sufficiency."

The proof of this particular pudding will be in the eating. Notwithstanding Italian assurances that the consultative embodied in the first protocol does not signify the crea-

tion of a new and exclusive group of States, Signor Mussolini's move is widely regarded as an effort to bring Austria and Hungary under an Italian political protectorate. Coming after the vindictive and brutal crushing of Austrian Socialism in Vienna—of which a vivid account was given in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW last month—the Rome protocols cannot be interpreted as a manifestation of pure idealism on Signor Mussolini's part. He it was who insisted that the Austrian Socialists must be smashed as a condition of Italian support of Austria. He it was who subsidised and, in part at least, equipped the Austrian Heimwehr for this bloody and superfluous work; and if one of its results is directly or indirectly to increase Nazi strength in Austria, by driving a section of the industrial working classes into the arms of Hitler, Signor Mussolini's responsibility for this development will be beyond dispute. Yet it is possible that, for the time being, the Rome agreement may have staved off what seemed last February to be an acute danger—the danger that a Hitlerite attempt to gain control of Austria, by means of an invasion which the "Austrian" Nazi division in Germany had been trained and prepared to carry out, would bring on international hostilities. Had this attempt been made, military intervention from at least two quarters would have been likely, not to say certain; and Europe might have witnessed a conflict between Italian and Yugoslav troops eager to be first in securing important strategic positions on Austrian soil, at Bleiburg and elsewhere. Time may have been gained for maturer consideration of the Central European problem of which the future of Austria remains a principal term.

In these circumstances it is important to bear in mind the aims, not only of Germany and of Italy, but those of countries which, like Czechoslovakia, are directly interested in a solution. On the morrow of the Rome agreement, Dr. Beneš, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, defined the policy of his country with a frankness that leaves nothing to be desired. After citing the pronouncement of the Great Powers on February 17th, 1934, that it is essential to preserve the complete independence of Austria, and that a violation of that independence would therefore be a breach of international treaties which are still in force, Dr. Beneš revealed the fact that, during the war, President Masaryk and he recommended the incorporation of German Austria in

German Empire, since they believed that this course would be the most acceptable to the Western Allies. They abandoned this view as early as 1917 when they found Italy, France and Great Britain emphatically opposed to it: and in deference to the European interests of those Powers, Czechoslovakia has always worked for Austrian independence and played a prominent part in drawing up the Geneva protocol of September 1922, on the strength of which the economic and financial salvage of Austria was undertaken. Neither Czechoslovakia nor the Little Entente as a whole, continued Dr. Beneš, looks with disfavour upon the protocols recently signed in Rome, though judgment must be reserved upon them until their legal, political and economic results can be seen with absolute clarity. Should they, however, signify an abandonment, breach or alteration of the Geneva protocol of 1922, which "is and must remain the Magna Charta of Central European politics," Czechoslovakia and the Little Entente would be obliged to oppose them.

An Austro-German union, or *Anschluss*, being ruled out, Dr. Beneš examined and dealt with the other plans for a Central European solution. He dismissed the idea of a Danubian federation as impracticable, not merely because Italy and Germany oppose it but because "this solution is obviously not sincerely desired by any one of the five Danubian States interested. All of them have an instinctive aversion from a federative solution because it reminds them, each in a different sense, of the old Monarchy." For cogent reasons the States of the Little Entente oppose the political and economic union of Austria and Hungary, for it would mean splitting up the Danubian States into two mutually destructive groups, and persistent rivalry between Italian and German influences in Central Europe. Economically, the union of Austria and Hungary would involve loss, not gain, for all. Two States, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, with an aggregate population of approximately 30,000,000, would be lost for sound economic relations with Austria, and their place be taken by merely 8,000,000, the population of Hungary. Moreover, such a union would serve only as a preliminary to the return of the Hapsburgs, for the union could only be maintained by dynastic links. In all circumstances the Little Entente will uncompromisingly oppose this solution, since a return to the Hapsburgs would imply a ceaseless struggle for

the inheritance of the former Hapsburg Empire. Thus the end would be worse than the beginning.

In Dr. Beneš's view the only practicable solution is the absolute independence and integrity of Austria under European guarantee. The foundations for this solution were laid in the Geneva protocol of 1922. Austria must remain Austrian. Any solution must be based on the assumption that all the Danubian States are now politically so mature that none of the Great Powers needs to act as their patron or to exploit one of them against the other. Nor is any of the interested Powers strong enough by itself to force a solution of the Austrian problem against the others, but each is able to frustrate solutions proposed by its rivals. Any attempt to force a solution might bring on a European war. Yet, once a political condition of security and inviolability were bestowed upon Austria, she would enjoy new conditions of economic existence and would receive more favourable treatment from her neighbours. Hence the independence and intangibility of Austria, under European guarantee, are the postulates of any sound solution.

Looking upon Central Europe as a whole, and bearing in mind the forces which caused the old Hapsburg Monarchy to explode in October 1918—before the war was over, and months before the Peace Conference met—I am inclined to think that Dr. Beneš speaks to-day, on behalf of President Masaryk and of the Czechoslovak Government, as truly as Professor Masaryk spoke to me at Vienna in 1910. The Rome protocols need not endanger Austrian independence unless the other Great Powers acquiesce in an Italian attempt to establish an effective protectorate over Austria and Hungary. Against such a protectorate Hitlerite Germany would certainly take drastic action sooner or later, with the support of Austrian feeling. But even Hitlerite Germany—and this consideration applies to the maintenance of European peace in general no less than to the Central European problem—will hardly venture to ignore the settled will of the rest of Europe, if that will be really settled and firmly expressed. The time for half-hearted measures and comfortable purblindness has gone by. We can have peace or we can drift into war. If we choose peace we must be prepared to work for it and to uphold it.

WICKHAM STEED.

THE EVOLUTION OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

THERE is an anecdote of President Roosevelt going the rounds of the Press, vouched for by the Washington correspondent who circulated it. It runs as follows: "An old friend of Roosevelt's, who had not seen him for many years, called on him recently. They had a quiet talk. Finally the friend said: 'Franklin, I can't get over how amazingly you have changed!' Roosevelt shook his head. 'I haven't changed at all. You see, all my life I have wanted to be President. I studied for it, and I watched my step every minute. I was a politician, because I had to be. But since the fourth of March, I've been myself.'" If this really throws some light upon the extraordinary change which has come over Franklin D. Roosevelt since he entered the White House it is most welcome. Certainly no one of us who has followed and personally known the President since his first venture into politics in 1909 was prepared for the change which took place in him in March 1933. As Governor of New York he was conscientious, intelligent, and not without ability, a good Governor, but not a distinguished one. His Administration was as clean as a whistle, and he drew to the State's service able assistants, like Miss Frances Perkins and Henry Morgenthau, Jun., both of whom are now in the Cabinet of the United States as Secretary of Labour and Secretary of the Treasury respectively. He got on well with the politicians—quite too well. He bore no resemblance to the militant young reformer who in 1909 sought office as an outspoken and fearless enemy of Tammany Hall, for Tammany had nothing to complain of him. In his personality he was, as always, charming. He was usually frank, and was as accessible as Governor as he is as President. It is true that there were severe critics among the legislative correspondents of the New York dailies, who were stationed at Albany. They accused the Governor of what has been alleged against other Roosevelts in our history, that he made promises too readily to too many people; that his word was not always to be relied upon; that promises were broken, and that he agreed too frequently with the views of his callers, however diverse. He was always conscious of his candidacy for a higher office.

Altogether, it would be impossible to assert that Mr. Roosevelt's administration of the Empire State was distinguished, or that it was as vigorous or as stimulating as the régime of Alfred E. Smith, who preceded him. He broke little new ground, and put through no radical, no far-reaching changes. He did challenge the electric power and light combination of public service corporations, and he was keen for the development of the St. Lawrence River as a source of electric power to be controlled by the State. But he was careful to make it clear that he did not believe in the State going into the actual business of retailing the product of its water powers and its generating plants to individual consumers, as is done so cheaply and amazingly well across the northern boundary of New York State in the Canadian Province of Ontario. In short, had the Governor not reached the White House, but retired to private life, his Administration would not have stood out as a pioneering or reforming one, nor would he himself have been in the slightest degree regarded as having been the apostle of a "New Deal," or of a new social order. He would have been remembered as the gentleman Governor whose Administration was without scandal, or outstanding achievement. Nor could it be said that he really won the hearts of the people of the State, although he was easily re-elected at the end of his first two-year term.

During his Presidential campaign there was also little or nothing to suggest the impending change. His speeches rarely showed depth and, with the exception of one, in no wise prepared the public or his friends for what was to come. He indulged in the usual glittering generalities; his tariff views, promptly discarded in the White House, reflected neither thorough economic training nor appreciation of the situation of the world. He promised a sound and honest dollar, and scoffed at his opponents' suggestion that anything would happen to that medium of exchange, or to the gold standard, should he become President. When he appeared before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, he did outline something of a social reform programme, but somehow or other that speech made little impression in the East, notably among the journalists. True, he steadily appealed for the "Forgotten Man," but few understood that appeal to mean that he was pledging himself whole-heartedly to espouse the cause of the masses as against "the masters of privilege and of capital."

and their servants the bosses"—to borrow a phrase from Woodrow Wilson—or realised that the New Deal was to be a mighty effort to achieve the "Square Deal" of Theodore Roosevelt, and the "New Freedom" of Mr. Wilson, of which it is the logical successor.

When Mr. Roosevelt became President the country was literally in chaos, and for its salvation he appeared in the White House to be a man of entirely different characteristics and policies. He who had been accused of much vacillation in Albany, of being slow in deciding what position to take on a given question, suddenly found himself able to decide, without a moment's hesitation, issues of a most far-reaching nature. Undoubtedly he was compelled to do so by the gravity and the urgency of the situation. But this ability to make quick and firm decisions and to stick by them has remained—he is constantly making the most momentous ever witnessed in peace time. As Governor unwilling to put his feet upon radical paths, he has now no hesitation in essaying untrodden ones, and reversing his previous positions—he has, for example, put the Federal Government into the business of selling electric power from the Muscle Shoals Dam generating plant. Whenever he has made new and startling departures he has promptly reassured the public by stating that if they prove to be mistaken he will retrace his steps, and retrace some he already has. He who was timid and unsure, and stepped softly, now ventures. He dares; his courage is unlimited. His audacity is nothing less than astounding. He is afraid of no risks.

As for his advisers, he has chosen them not from among the politicians, nor the masters of capital; he has turned to the universities and taken men, hitherto unknown, who have been promptly dubbed his "Brain Trust." For his second Secretary of the Treasury he has now chosen a youngish man, who served him well in Albany in the agricultural field, but is without the slightest experience in banking or finance, who knows nothing of the technical problems before him. As his unofficial financial expert he has appointed a professor of agriculture and entrusted him with the manipulation of the dollar, with complete power over the gold supply. Whether his advisers be the right ones or not, he sticks to them loyally until, or unless, he finds it necessary to discard one or the other in the case of Professor Raymond Moley. If his diplomatic

appointments have savoured too much of the conventional in that too many have been bestowed for personal political services rendered, or for contributions to the party chest, he was the first President to appoint a woman as Minister to a foreign country, to make another a United States Judge, and to place a third in his Cabinet. There is hardly a trace left of the conventional country gentleman in office on the banks of the Hudson.

That he was a skilful politician was long known; but how skilful was never realised until twelve months ago. Here he exceeds his extremely persuasive and versatile fourth cousin, Theodore Roosevelt. Of this the examples are unending. Suffice it to cite that when the Congress met in January of this year it was widely heralded that it would demand nothing less than printing-press inflation on an incredibly large scale, and that it would no longer be guided by the President's wishes. Congress came, met—and collapsed, as far as this programme was concerned. His manœuvring with the dollar, his commandeering of all the gold, his decreasing of the gold content of the dollar, his sops to the silver-purchase advocates, completely dished the paper inflationists. His quiet and firm assertion of authority has prevented anything save a couple of minor rebellions and one serious defiance of the President's wishes in the matter of ex-soldier compensation. Here he has been aided not only by the charm of his personality, which he consciously or unconsciously works to the limit, but by his unparalleled personal popularity.

The newspaper men are his sworn and devoted friends, if not henchmen; as in the case of Theodore Roosevelt, it is even to be feared that they are favouring him considerably instead of holding the scales exactly even. As his Press opponents are putting it in the vernacular of the day: "The dailies are giving him all the breaks." No President, except Theodore Roosevelt, has ever been on such good terms with the journalists who meet to cross-examine him. To attend one of these conferences is an experience well worth having. Here the President is at his best, simple, straightforward, frank and able, and extremely diplomatic in handling the personalities before him, whom he flatters not a little. He gives them good information and a lot of it. When he cannot answer questions he says so. Frequently he says "now this is off the record," and takes them into his confidence, telling

them important State secrets, and his confidence is never violated. He is perfectly at ease, without self-consciousness or a trace of egotism, is in complete and masterful control of the situation, and extraordinarily winning. There could be no greater contrast than that between him and his predecessor, of whom a witty Frenchman has just written that "Mr. Hoover had a talent for unpopularity, an instinct for tactlessness, and a craving for rudeness," which he mastered sufficiently "never to push his unpopularity, nor his tactlessness, nor his asperity to such lengths as would have given them glamour and distinction."

Even more remarkable is the President's conquest of the public. Here again we have an astounding contrast between the Governor and the President. No Chief Executive in Washington has ever won the affections of the voters as quickly or as completely. I have just returned from an 8,000-mile trip to the Pacific Coast, during which I have inquired as to public opinion in a dozen States. The universal testimony was that if the President should be up for re-election to-day, he would receive more than ninety per cent. of the suffrages of his fellow citizens. No American has ever seen anything comparable to this. That does not mean that the public feels that he has made no mistakes. They did not like what he did in cancelling the air-mail contracts, as to which he has just admitted his error by reversing his policy. Everyone believes that his abandonment of the Civil Works Administration, through which employment was given to 4,000,000 men in all sorts of local undertakings, is a gross blunder which may cause more serious unrest than anything that has happened. Many are unhappy over his monetary policies, and still more over the fatuous limitation of crops, the destruction of foodstuffs when millions are on the verge of starvation, and his latest proposal to license and control every planter of cotton who produces more than ten bales. Still others deeply regret that he cannot see the light in the matter of the tariffs that are steadily ruining our export business. There is often dissent from phases of his foreign policy. But these criticisms do not affect the public's admiration for him. It is quite ready to blame his errors upon his subordinates. Out West it will not let speakers attack him, and boos anybody who tries to do so. His extraordinary radio voice is in large degree responsible for this admiration—I

might almost say adoration—and for the unlimited confidence given to him. I am told that the heads of the radio companies say privately that if they could find another man whose voice had the same charm, combined with similar clearness of statement, insinuating, almost affectionate, friendliness, beauty of diction, and all-convincing sincerity, they would pay that man unlimited sums of money. But in nothing else has the President shown greater shrewdness than in his refusal to make frequent use of this direct road to the hearts of the people. He will not allow his speeches to be broadcast except when he has something very important to say, or when he wishes to speak directly to all the people. He will not cheapen his extraordinary power of appeal.

One cannot wholly envy the President his popularity, for it carries with it the most awe-inspiring responsibility—enough to break any ordinary man—just as it places in his hands a power never before granted to an American President. Not Washington or Lincoln had such a following. It is alarming to think how this overwhelming power might be used for personal purposes, or for ill-considered social or political or economic changes. From one point of view the overriding on March 28th of the President's first veto by Congress, although it was really indefensible, has one good phase; it proves that Parliamentary Government still survives in America, and that the Executive is ready to abide by the decision when it goes against him. It is likely, too, that next fall's elections will show a decrease in the majorities of the President's party in both houses of Congress. Should this not happen it would be an amazing break with political tradition and precedent, for the outs usually gain in the mid-term contest at the polls. It must be remembered that the strain on the unemployed is tremendous, and on other large groups as well. But, contradictory as it seems, I somehow feel that even if the Democratic majorities should be decreased, the President's popularity would still remain in large degree. Even Congress's voting against him will aid him rather than hurt him outside of veterans' circles. I am aware that Americans have had idols before, and that some of them have tumbled speedily from the heights to which they rose. It is not beyond possibility that we shall witness this again. But only Mr. Roosevelt himself could be the architect of a personal disaster. What a contrast here with some of the European

dictators, who win popularity and dominance by promising all things to all men, by cruelty, violence, oppression and suppression! Mr. Roosevelt has found his way to the hearts of his countrymen by convincing them that he has no other aim than to serve them, than to rescue them without thought of self-aggrandisement, while achieving reforms for which many of us had laboured during long years without hope of living to see them achieved.

But the President can only hold this extraordinary position if he continues to convince his fellow countrymen that he is really master of the situation, and that he is not yielding to the dominating masters of capitalism. If he begins to weaken, the public will be likely to write him down as just another politician. Unfortunately there are ominous signs of a letting down of his standards. The Bill for the purification of the drug and medicine business has largely been emasculated, the Wagner Bill to stiffen the labour provisions of N.I.R.A. has been much weakened, and the President's decision in the motor-car industry dispute shows quite a considerable surrender to the dictators of that industry in favour of company-controlled unions. Labour is getting restless because the Administration has not yet succeeded in bringing to book a single one of the great capitalistic violators of the codes. Fortunately for Mr. Roosevelt's party, and for the President himself, there is to-day no political opposition worthy of the name. The Republican Party has never before been in such a mess, nor so destitute of leadership. If the President loses ground there will really be no one, at least not next fall, to profit thereby.

Especially admirable is the manner in which, at the very moment that the President has received despotic powers never before bestowed upon any President, he has distinctly deflated the Presidency. By this I mean that he and Mrs. Roosevelt, by their courage, their simplicity, their good breeding, their true Republicanism, their lack of ostentation, and their refusal to consider themselves superhuman beings because they happen to be in the White House, have done away with much of the flummery and the ceremonial which had been especially built up by Mr. Roosevelt's immediate predecessors. They have taken us back to the ideal of Cincinnatus. Especially is their courage to be stressed. Mr. Hoover always had two secret service men on duty on each of

the bedroom floors of the White House, and four constantly patrolling the living and entertainment rooms. They are all eight back in the secret service guard room. Unlike Mrs. Hoover and Mrs. Coolidge, Mrs. Roosevelt refuses to allow any detective to trail after her, or any policeman to guard her on any of her travels—she covered 40,000 miles by air, rail-road and motor car during the President's first year. The President himself is attended only by the minimum of guards, despite the fact that the bullet intended for him at Miami killed the Mayor of Chicago by his side.

When you are a little man and socially not sure of yourself you go through the White House with a bugler to announce your coming, and a colonel in uniform to make sure that people appreciate that you are the President. When you are a well-bred gentleman you don't need any of these things to exalt you; you take it for granted that the office will speak for itself, and that nothing that you can do will increase its dignity. You instinctively know that the simpler and more modest and the humbler you are, the better it will be for you, and the bigger the job will appear. I like especially the story of a wedding which took place at Hyde Park last summer in a house near to the President's, the bride being a relative, the bridegroom the son of an old friend. The President and Mrs. Roosevelt attended the church ceremony, but refused to come to the reception until an hour or more after it had begun. Then they appeared just as simply as it was possible for them to come, and the President explained his delay in these words: "I have never forgotten how when Eleanor and I were married, Cousin Theodore, then President, came to our wedding. Everybody went into the next room to see the President, and on what was to have been our greatest occasion we were left alone." No other story of the President would more clearly illustrate the kindness, the modesty, the consideration and the simplicity of this man.

Whatever the final explanation of the change that has come over Franklin Roosevelt, I am one of those who prefer to believe that the change is one of mind as well as of will. A writer in the magazine *Fortune* thinks that it has to do with the greatest triumph of Mr. Roosevelt's career, his soul's rising supreme above what seemed the hopeless disaster of his bodily infirmity. He points out that, unlike many invalids—if one may call him such—he is "chiefly remarkable for the

curious calm with which he meets crises which upset his uninvalided associates." That may be true; it is also a fact that he never before had to apply the virtuosity of his mind to difficult problems such as challenge to the limit the mental ability of anyone seeking the answers thereto. There were no such crises at Albany, and no issues to put him to such a test; there, as through most of his life, fate was gentle with him; the road of life was smooth before him; good fortune attended him at every turn. To-day he has to set his teeth into questions that can only be answered by most tremendous application and unfaltering courage. Avoidance has been impossible, and so he has risen on the dead Governorship to higher things.

To-day no one can even surmise where this man is going, or where he will finally land. He may swing back to the middle of the road. He may find himself forced well to the Left by the intolerance of his enemies, or by the logical development of the economic ideas and forces which he has unleashed. We have seen statesmen, like Woodrow Wilson, start out as radicals and end as conservatives. Will Franklin Roosevelt swing back to conservatism if things return to normal in America? Or will he find himself more and more bound to keep his hand on the plough until he has completely tilled the soil of the new economic undertaking? The answer to these questions will be the history of the next three, or seven, years of the United States of America.

OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD.

THE BALKAN PACT.

THE first observation to be made about the Balkan Pact, signed at Athens on February 9th, but really settled at Belgrade beforehand, is that, according to so competent an authority as Professor Jorga, it is a misnomer. The Roumanian historian and ex-Premier holds that there is only one Balkan State—Bulgaria—because Greece is mainly Mediterranean, Turkey chiefly Asiatic, Roumania essentially Carpathian and Trans-Danubian, Jugoslavia largely Central European and Albania wholly Adriatic. Thus, according to him, the only wholly Balkan State, Bulgaria, is not included in the Pact, which is, therefore, in the nature of "*Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark." Apart, however, from its geographical inexactitudes the term, "Balkan States," is nowadays misleading and objectionable. It is misleading because, since the treaties which followed the European War, only 7·6 of the population of Turkey is in the Balkan peninsula, two of the three component races of Jugoslavia live outside it, and of the Roumanian population of 18,025,037, only 8,766,932 are in the old kingdom, which, according to Professor Jorga, was never Balkanic. It is objectionable, because Western Europeans, although their management of their own affairs has not been always so conspicuously successful as to justify their pretensions to teach the peoples of the south-eastern peninsula how to conduct their concerns, are apt to regard the word "Balkans" as synonymous with medieval methods and continual conflicts. Yet, in recent years, the maligned "Balkans" have set supercilious "Europe" an occasional example of the desire for peace and concord. Such is the Balkan Conference, the first meeting of which was held at Athens in 1930, and the fifth has been fixed for October at Constantinople. Such also is the Balkan Pact, even if the latter has, unfortunately, failed to include all the six States of south-eastern Europe.

The Balkan Pact, as published, consists of three articles. By the first "Greece, Roumania, Turkey and Jugoslavia mutually guarantee the security of all their frontiers." By the second they "undertake to concert between themselves as to the measures to be taken in the presence of eventualities capable of affecting their interests as defined by the present agreement. They undertake to take no political action

towards any other Balkan State not a signatory of the present agreement [i.e. Bulgaria and Albania] without previous mutual notice, and to assume no political obligation towards any other Balkan State without the consent of the other contracting parties." By the third "the present agreement will come into force from the date of its signature by all the contracting Powers, and will be ratified as quickly as possible. It will be open to every Balkan State, whose adhesion will form the subject of a favourable examination on the part of the contracting parties, and will take effect from the moment when the other signatory countries shall have notified their agreement."

This brief document provoked lengthy discussions between the Greek Government, represented by the Premier, M. Tsaldares, and the Foreign Minister, M. Maximos, on the one side and the leaders of the other political parties who were summoned to consult with them. The fundamental cause of these discussions was the fear lest the obligations undertaken by Greece in the first article might involve that country in war with a Great Power. Three years ago King Alexander of Yugoslavia informed a prominent American publicist, from whom the present writer had the information at Bled, that the danger to Yugoslavia from Italy was not in Dalmatia, but in Albania. The resolution of the Conference of Ambassadors of November 9th, 1921, signed by the British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives, and communicated to the League of Nations on September 26th, 1922, stated that "if Albania found herself unable to maintain her territorial integrity, she should be at liberty to ask the Council of the League for foreign assistance," and that the four above-mentioned Governments should "in such case instruct their representatives on the Council of the League to recommend that the restoration of the territorial frontiers of Albania be confided to Italy." Italy was thereby recognised as having a special position in regard to Albania for reasons of her own "strategic security," despite the doctrine, prevalent since the elimination of Russian and Austrian influences from the Balkan peninsula, of "The Balkans for the Balkan peoples." The present influence of France in Yugoslavia, typified by the gigantic new French Legation at Belgrade, is a further example of the return, under other names, to the pre-war system in south-eastern Europe. In both cases the financier

has been the ally of the diplomatist: Italy has lent money to Albania, France to Yugoslavia.

Italo-Albanian relations were further strengthened by the two treaties of Tirana of November 27th, 1926, and November 22nd, 1927, by the former of which the two contracting parties "recognised that every disturbance directed against the political, juridical and territorial status of Albania is contrary to their political interests," and "pledge themselves to lend one another their mutual support and cordial collaboration to protect those interests," and "not to conclude with other Powers political or military agreements prejudicial to the interests of the other party." By the second treaty, which was to be for twenty years, each party pledged itself to support the other "with all its military, financial, and other resources" in case of a war not provoked by it, while an annexe provided that in such case an Italian officer would be commander-in-chief in Albania. The engineer followed the diplomatist and the financier, and roads were made under Italian direction from the Albanian coast towards the Yugoslav frontier. This second Italo-Albanian treaty closely followed the signature of that between France and Yugoslavia eleven days earlier. Thus "the two Latin sisters"—Tacitus wrote of *nota inter fratres inimicitia*—each has her *protégée* on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, just as Austria and Russia had theirs on the southern bank of the Danube.

This being so, all parties at Athens were desirous of being quite sure that they had entered into no obligations under the Balkan Pact which might conceivably bring them into conflict with "a Great Power"—in other words, Italy. Greco-Italian relations have greatly improved since the bombardment of Corfù in 1923; eminent Italian lecturers come over every winter to lecture to the lecture-loving Athenians at the new Italian Institute, on Italian politics, literature and art; the Italian Government has leased for five years at an annual rent of £2,000, with the option of purchase, the most expensive hotel in Athens, the former palace of Prince Nicholas, containing forty-two rooms. Great Britain has not even lectures on English literature at the Athens University, and her Legation, though described as "the finest house in Athens" in the early years of Otho, and situated in a central position, cannot boast of such accommodation. Obviously Italy wishes to cultivate good relations

with Greece, while Greece's geographical position with her numerous exposed islands has led her, despite the Italian occupation of the Dodekanese since 1912, to conclude a treaty of friendship with Italy as well as with Yugoslavia. The natural desire of all Greeks to avoid war with their western neighbour caused considerable discussion between the Government which had signed the Pact, and the Opposition and, as always happens at Athens where there are twenty-two daily newspapers, this discussion was reported and commented on in the Press. However, after several days' deliberations, the party leaders were able to come to an agreement, thus restoring that unanimity in foreign policy which, despite profound alterations in the domain of domestic affairs, especially since the attempt upon M. Venizelos on June 6th last, had characterised Greek public life during the previous five years. An explanation interpreting the Pact was made and accepted, according to which "Greece in no circumstances, in performance of the obligations assumed in virtue of the Pact, can be drawn into war against a Great Power." Thus, war against Italy was held to be excluded, and the Chamber and, after some delay, the Senate, in which the Opposition has a majority, voted the ratification of the Pact, the latter on April 2nd. Similarly, at the time of the signature of the pact of friendship between Greece and Yugoslavia on March 27th, 1929, M. Venizelos, then in office, informed King Alexander that, in view of the above-mentioned decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, he "considered the Albanian question as closely connected with the Adriatic, which possessed no interest for Greece, and that consequently in every discussion arising out of this question on any difference between Yugoslavia and Italy the Greek Government intended to remain completely neutral." Thus, in both cases Greek policy, in 1929, as in 1934, has been to avoid a collision with Italy.

There is, however, besides the published text of the Balkan Pact, a secret protocol, which the Greek Government declined to communicate to the legislature. During the debate in the Senate, however, the Premier declared that "the secret protocol confirms the general principles which are not contained in the Pact," adding that "there is no danger that by the Pact Greece may be led into a war against a non-Balkan Power." Thus, both Senate and Chamber ratified a treaty,

the secret protocol of which they had never seen. The world has been repeatedly told since the Great War that the era of secret diplomacy is over. That, like various other Utopian theories connected with the Allies' victory, requires considerable qualification. Probably, in the present case, the secret protocol, which has been seen by the party leaders who met to discuss the Pact, and communicated to the British Legation, is not particularly important but innocuous. In that case, however, it may be asked, why make a secret of it and thus stimulate curiosity, which may lead people to think that there is something serious to conceal? Already a Bulgarian newspaper has published what purports to be the contents of the secret protocol; possibly before long it may be a *segreto di Polcinello*.

The first effect of the Balkan Pact upon the non-signatory Balkan States has been somewhat unsatisfactory. When the Council of the Balkan Conference met at Athens on April 2nd to fix the agenda for the fifth Assembly in the autumn, the Albanian group sent a message, stating its decision to cease participation in the Conference on the ground that Albania had not signed the Pact. The President of the Balkan Council, M. Papanastasiou, who may be justly styled the father of Balkan union, for which he has worked incessantly during the last four years, and who was the first Premier of the Greek Republic ten years ago, pointed out that the Albanian argument was baseless, because the Balkan Conference does not represent the Governments which signed the Pact, and, if there be faults in the Pact, it will be well to try to correct them. He also compared the different conduct of the Bulgarian delegation which, although its country had also not signed the Pact, none the less participated in the work of the Council. Whether the Albanian delegation's abstention was spontaneous or due to suggestions from outside, is a point not stated.

But the absentee Albanians were not alone in expressing dissatisfaction with the Pact. The Bulgarian delegation raised the thorny question of the minorities, which is one of the crucial difficulties of Balkan union—for, although the Bulgarian minority in Greek Macedonia is insignificant and remains voluntarily there, the Bulgarian minority in Serbian Macedonia is considerable. The Bulgarian proposal was to form a committee to consider this question, and advocated

the creation of bipartite tribunals for the reciprocal protection of minorities so as to avoid the discussion of the question by the League of Nations and international congresses. The Yugoslav delegation, as might be expected, voted against the Bulgarian proposal, which was, however, adopted by a majority of one vote. But this was not the only result of the Pact. The Yugoslav delegation, although opposed to the Bulgarian on the minorities question, proposed the adjournment of the next Balkan Conference for a year, so as to give time for the removal of the misunderstandings produced in Bulgaria and thus to prepare the way for more effective collaboration with her. Such a step, coming from Yugoslavia, is significant, and was foreseen by the diplomatic correspondent of the *Morning Post*,* who pointed out that since the visits of King Alexander to Bulgaria in October and of King Boris to Belgrade in December, the other main Bulgarian claim, that to an outlet on the Ægean, was "viewed with sympathy in Yugoslavia." That Greece should cede a territorial outlet to Bulgaria at ports where there is practically no Bulgarian population, is out of the question; but it is understood that an arrangement might be made with Bulgaria similar to that by which Yugoslavia has, under certain conditions, a free "Serbian zone" in the port of Salonika.

The Bulgarian delegation supported the Yugoslav proposal for adjournment, hinting at the psychological effect of nationalist propaganda upon the Bulgarian people. This joint proposal for adjournment was rejected after M. Papanastasiou had replied that the alleged incomplete character of the Balkan Pact constituted an additional reason for the Conference to meet in order to improve it. He added that it was "absolutely false that there was a secret agreement between Greece and Italy." This improvement of the relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia is familiar to the readers of THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW from M. Stancioff's recent article.† But the late J. D. Bouchier, with his unrivalled knowledge of Bulgaria, once said to the writer in talking of the Balkan League of 1912, that the most difficult part of those negotiations *quorum pars magna fuit*, was to bring Serbia and Bulgaria together. From the Greek standpoint, the second article of the Pact, requiring "the consent of the other contracting parties" to the assumption of any

* March 15th.

† March.

"political obligation towards any other Balkan State," may be considered a safeguard against a Yugoslav-Bulgarian alliance and an argument for the Pact. For the Ægean frontage of Macedonia, notably the valuable tobacco-port of Kavalla, is one of the most important assets of "new" Greece. From the standpoint of travellers by the Simplon-Orient express it will be an advantage if better relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria mean the cessation of the repeated attempts to blow up that international train by Bulgarian *komitadjis* as a protest against a state of things for which the innocent travellers are not responsible.

While the Pact has thus been ratified by all its signatories, the Bulgarian Premier, M. Mouchanoff, has stated in the *Sobranje* on March 31st the reasons why Bulgaria did not adhere to it. Like the Roumanian ex-Premier, M. Jorga, he considered the Pact "superfluous"; he thought that "the system of pacts of non-aggression would have been a solid guarantee of peace, all the more so because all the Balkan States are members of the League of Nations and signatories of the Kellogg Pact. Adhesion would have meant for Bulgaria voluntary renunciation of the hope based on Article 19 of the Covenant that treaties cannot be eternally immutable. In this sense the Pact of Athens is not in harmony with the principles of the League and the spirit of the Covenant." But his complaint that his "Government was not kept informed of the negotiations for the Pact is denied at Athens, where the semi-official organ of the Greek Government has stated that he was made acquainted with the negotiations leading up to the Pact on three separate occasions—at the meeting between Kings Boris and Carol at Giurgevo on October 30th, and during the visits of King Boris to Belgrade, and to King Carol on January 27th, on all of which occasions M. Mouchanoff was present. However, he considered that Article 18 of the Covenant obliges the signatories to publish the secret protocol, and stated that the Pact would not affect Bulgarian policy towards them. As regards Greece in particular, he pointed out the natural economic ties between that country and Bulgaria, which would be made closer by better railway communications between Salonika and Sofia. As was remarked at the meeting of the Balkan Council at Athens, the best way to Balkan union is the improvement of economic relations. The North German Customs' Union was

the first step towards the German Empire. A Greco-Turkish postal union already exists; the Bulgarian, Roumanian, and Yugoslav delegates to the Council pledged the adhesion of their countries to it. So M. Papanastasiou, in closing its meeting, could say that, "despite certain recent difficulties, the idea of Balkan Union has enabled the delegates to surmount obstacles."

Still we must remember that doctrine of *sic stantibus*. A saying of Signor Mussolini, engraved in golden letters at Budapest, reminds the Hungarians that "the peace treaties are not eternal." Change of circumstances prevails over the text of the most carefully drawn treaties. Unless the national psychology breathes into it the breath of life, the text remains a dead letter, interesting to international lawyers alone. Juridically guarded as it is, would the Balkan Pact stand the storm and stress of the European conflict, which would probably follow the outbreak of war between one Balkan State and a Great Power? Another Great Power would probably be drawn into the arena, and the two big rivals have their respective *protégées* and clients not only in the Balkan Peninsula but in the small nations near it. Of the signatories of the Pact, however, Greece has, of late years, pursued the foreign policy of being the friend of all the Great Powers, the satellite of none. Moreover, her pact with Turkey has shown that even in the Near East, where history, even medieval history, exercises a peculiarly malevolent influence upon present politics, and where a holocaust of the school-books of history would be the first condition of Balkan friendship, traditional enemies may become warm friends.

The writer has on several recent occasions witnessed the Turkish and Greek flags flying together at Athens. More extraordinary still, on March 25th of this year Turkish Boy Scouts came over to celebrate the anniversary of Greece's emancipation from Turkey, and laid a wreath upon the cenotaph of the Unknown Warrior, who died fighting against their compatriots, while Turkish aeroplanes circled over the once Turkish fortress of the Akropolis. Who would have believed in 1821, in 1897, or in 1922, that the day would come when these two hereditary enemies would sign an agreement, whereby "the delegate of one of them shall have the mission of defending the common and several interests of both parties"? After-dinner speeches and festivities have con-

tributed less to this fraternisation than the hard fact that, since the exchange of populations in 1923, there are no "unredeemed" Greeks in Turkey outside of Constantinople, and that "the Great Idea," which was the guiding light, and sometimes the *ignis fatuus*, of the reigns of Otho and George I, has ceased to dominate Greek political life. Greece has important internal problems before her, and now that Hellenism is mostly concentrated within her enlarged borders, administration takes precedence of foreign policy. Without believing that the Balkan Pact will create "a new heaven and a new earth," we may accept it as a proof of collaboration in the interests of peace in the hope that it may be extended.

WILLIAM MILLER.

Athens.

WASTED OPPORTUNITIES IN INDIA.

THE most disquieting feature of the Indian situation revealed to me during my last (and eighth) visit to India, a year ago, was the grave spiritual estrangement between Government and people, between Britain and India; a myopia on the British side, leading to a distrust of almost all things Indian and giving a mischievous twist to Indian national sentiment, however naturally expressed; a profound and almost universal disbelief, on the Indian side, in British good faith and good intentions. The intensity of estrangement may have resulted from a momentary accentuation of that which ordinarily exists, and the tension may possibly have since somewhat relaxed. But it was indubitably worse than I had ever known it before, in an experience of Indian conditions covering almost a quarter of a century, and it has been emphasised by the widespread economic distress. Where an omnipotent Administration claims credit for every good thing that happens in the country, it is unreasonable to complain if it should be called upon to bear the blame for the evil things that may befall. Certainly, what was formerly epidemic has now, I fear, become endemic. The disease, in my opinion, can only be cured by an early grant, in a generous spirit of goodwill, of a large measure of self-government with automatic provision for the attainment of complete and genuine Dominion status, within the scope and meaning of the Statute of Westminster and in a calculable and not distant period of time.

It was in 1909 that I first travelled to and through India. My mission was a public one, non-controversial, so far as India was concerned, and entirely unconnected with Indian internal affairs. It was to present to the Government and the people of India the facts relating to the disabilities of Indians in South Africa, leading to the long and desperate passive-resistance struggle in which they were engaged. Both Government and people in India were keenly interested in the subject, and were notoriously sympathetic towards the South African Indians in their troubles and difficulties. It was the one subject that brought men of opposite political schools together on the same platform.

I was known to be an Englishman. My passport made the matter quite clear. Upon my arrival at Bombay it was marked

by the special police. My baggage was rigorously searched, and my correspondence, papers, and books were narrowly scrutinised. My meetings, sometimes attended by a sprinkling of friendly Europeans, were always reported upon. My hosts were questioned as to why they gave me hospitality. In Madras a European police-sergeant was put at my hotel table to watch with whom I spoke. A police spy sat on the dickey of the *gharry* that carried me about the city to interview public men. Attempts were made to obtain surreptitiously from the offices of the publishers advance proofs of my little book, *The Indians of South Africa*. It contained a plain statement of facts, never refuted (and indeed accepted by the Government of India), that had been rigidly "vetted" by Mr. Gokhale, and from which any "purple patches" had been carefully expunged.

The situation became so unbearable that I consulted the late Mr. V. Krishnaswami Aiyar, then member of the Madras Executive Council. He advised me to write to the Commissioner of Police, stating that I had nothing to conceal and would be glad to answer any questions if he would send to me some senior police officer. I did so and, whilst there was no direct response, the police espionage, though continued, was less obvious and offensive. Ultimately I accepted this as a matter of course, especially when I came to know that Indians of the highest distinction were not immune.

I came to the conclusion then (and nothing that I have since seen has altered my conviction) that, so far as the general population is concerned, the régime in India is that of a Police Raj.* The titular head of the police is the District Officer. Immersed in his duties, he is almost entirely dependent for his information regarding peace and order upon his senior police officer. He is seldom willing, even if able, to test the police reports from independent sources. The police, who have long since lost (if they ever possessed) the confidence of the public, are regarded as the special favourites of the Administration. When the latter's nerves get "jumpy," the police are given a free hand. In an atmosphere of repression and mischief, the policeman's word is final, his actions are

* In his Convocation Address delivered to the University of Allahabad, on December 16th, 1933, the Rt. Hon. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a former Law Member of the Government of India, says: "You are changing and you must change; but if the change is to be an all-round change and a harmonious change, you are entitled to expect that the conception of the State as a 'Police State' must undergo a change."

condoned by the higher authorities, and he is regarded with fear and dread by the most peace-loving and law-abiding citizen. One cannot easily forget the Forrester Paton case. It often happens, therefore, that what the Governor reports to the Viceroy and the Viceroy reports to the Secretary of State (and the latter accepts unquestioningly) is nothing better than the uncorroborated but uncontradicted statement of the local policeman.

It could hardly be otherwise with an Administration distrustful of and distrusted by the people, and ultimately responsible not to them but to an alien electorate six thousand miles away, almost entirely ignorant of Indian affairs and very little interested in them. One of the results of this régime is that repressive laws, originally designed to meet a temporary emergency, are now incorporated in the ordinary Statute Book of India, thanks largely to ineffective legislatures, weakened by the inclusion of nominated members, special interests, and official *blocs*. As early as 1909 official *zulum* in Bengal was such that it was with the greatest difficulty that public meetings on South Africa could be arranged, and in several places the leaders refused to hold meetings under the conditions imposed upon them by the local officials. In the Punjab, outside Lahore, fear of the officials was so rife that no one ventured to call down the wrath of the authorities by arranging a public meeting on South Africa. This fear of the officials was, at the time, almost universal. It has somewhat diminished of recent years, with the rise and spread of national sentiment and the small increase of power that accompanied the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms.

It will be seen that, from the beginning and even before I could undertake any activity, I was branded in European and subordinate official circles as an agitator. Notwithstanding friendly and sometimes confidential relations with a succession of Viceroys, Governors, Members of Council, and Secretaries of State, not to speak of distinguished Indian officials and leaders of Moderate opinion, I doubt if I have yet been entirely cleared of the imputation in certain official quarters. Yet, throughout my years of work in India on behalf of Indians overseas, and until I settled down again in England in 1917, I sought only to procure the removal of their disabilities and the abolition of the system of semi-slavery known as indentured labour emigration, and so to improve

racial relations. I scrupulously avoided public participation in any Indian internal matter, realising that, not being ordinarily resident in India or exercising the duties of a British voter at home, I had no right to interfere where I had no responsibility. And I honestly did my best to bring my fellow countrymen into collaboration with the Indian people on neutral ground. My success in this direction was, however, limited to some missionaries, a few eminent churchmen, members of special groups, and a handful of broad-minded commercial men, mostly in Bombay, where racial relations have, on the whole, been better than elsewhere. Otherwise, I found indifference or else resentment at the implied criticism of white men in another part of the Empire. One was not supposed to offer such criticism, even by implication. It might have undesirable repercussions in India!

My Indian friends were generous enough to give me their confidence in full measure. If these things could happen to me, an Englishman, engaged in what in India was a non-controversial cause, let me imagine, they said, what must be the treatment accorded to public-spirited Indians all over the country in connection with their own political affairs, and with what results. They spoke freely and intimately to me of their hopes and fears, their humiliations and weaknesses, the country's difficulties and aspirations, the bitterness of racial relations, the almost complete absence of political and social contacts between Indians and Europeans, the suspicion with which the officials regarded the growth of national sentiment and the contempt that they showed towards the generality of educated Indians, except the fawners and the self-seekers, the cowards and the betrayers of their country's cause—and, perhaps, a few eminent Indians, whose distinction of character, remarkable qualities, and high attainments could not be ignored.

In 1911 I travelled out to India for the Durbar with my wife, on a steamer in which the passages were all first class. The passengers carefully segregated themselves into mutually exclusive groups—the military, the civil servants, the non-officials. There was a fourth group also. It consisted of our two selves, for reasons that we could not at first understand. Later, we learnt that word had gone round that I was an agitator, and that on our arrival in Bombay I was to be arrested. So we were boycotted by our own countrymen. I

recall with emotion how one distinguished Englishwoman, who strongly disapproved of my supposed views (of which she could have known nothing), offered my wife unlimited hospitality in case anything should happen to me.

I have travelled frequently by British steamers carrying Indian passengers. Sometimes I was already acquainted with them; usually I made friends with them. Always they and I were boycotted by our British fellow passengers, almost without exception. I remember one particular occasion when I was returning home in 1917. The war was on. The passengers included a few civilians going home on leave or to take up war work; some women returning home for nursing-training; a number of Army officers, and one or two other Europeans of the professional classes, including the late Sir Valentine Chirol. The Indian passengers included several students and the late Sahebzada Aftab Ahmad Khan, proceeding to London to take up his appointment as a member of the India Council. He was thus one of the most notable people on board. The Sahebzada was well known to some of the British passengers, who, with one exception, treated him with good-natured indifference, and whilst some of them were invited to sit at the Captain's table, the Sahebzada was allowed to go to a side-table. One day, soon after the voyage began, I privately expostulated to Sir Valentine against this discourtesy, with the result that an invitation was received by the Sahebzada from the Captain. But nothing would then induce him to change his seat. As for myself, with the exception of Sir Valentine and my other neighbour, a rather jolly artillery officer with a sense of humour, I shared the spontaneous boycott accorded, as usual, to my Indian friends. It happened that a few weeks earlier a mail-boat had been blown up within a few hours' steaming of Bombay harbour. We ourselves might have been blown sky-high at any moment up to our arrival at Marseilles; but until we were, we might not mix!

For the last twelve years I have preferred to "travel foreign," as have an increasing number of my Indian friends. We are all foreigners alike, British and Indians, on a foreign vessel; but on a British one we have observed that there are two classes of British subjects: (1) whites and (2) non-whites and their white associates. I believe that of late years, under the pressure of economic competition, the British lines have

offered better treatment to their Indian passengers, and I am also aware that not even the most race-conscious Englishman can altogether ignore highly distinguished Indian fellow passengers who have rendered eminent service to the Empire. But, in general, the habit of racial aloofness still prevails, especially on the eastward voyage, and it bears its inevitable consequences in racial embitterment and trade loss.

During many visits to India I have been fortunate enough to make and keep a large number of Indian friends, who have extended to me the hospitality of their homes, where I have been accepted as a member of their families. It was broadly hinted to me, early in my career, that this very fact made me ineligible to associate with my own compatriots. The inner side of Indian social life has been freely opened to me, as well as to a very small number of other Europeans. But we have been a tiny handful. Why is it that there have been so few British who have been taken to the hearts of Indians? Why have the hundreds of thousands of us, that have visited or dwelt in India during all these years of the British connection, made so little attempt to enter into the social life of the country, or to try, as Sir George Birdwood, Sir Francis Younghusband, and other notable exceptions have done, to understand and appreciate the true significance of Indian culture and the true character of the Indian people?

Might we not have done much to gain their affection had we not, while pretending to despise caste and untouchability, treated Indians generally as untouchables and maintained ourselves as a ruling race, a caste apart from and above all the people of the land? Inevitably, when people live in air-tight compartments and know little of each other's points of view and ideals of life, misunderstanding will arise, lack of mutual confidence will appear, suspicion will grow, and motives will be attributed that are false. For from suspicion grows dislike, from dislike fear, and from fear hatred. Can we wonder, then, if racial estrangement spreads until it is like a disease covering the country?

The figure of the Christ and the beauty of the true Christian life are held up by us as the ideals for all mankind. In India, however, I have usually found Christianity, without its virtues, associated by Indians with the governing race and the official hierarchy. Sometimes, too, it is so associated by the

British themselves. I recall an episode that occurred in 1917. I was addressing a series of public meetings on the evils of the indentured labour system. At one place I interviewed the bishop, who assured me of his entire agreement with my arguments and that he intended to be present at the morrow's meeting. I asked him if he would express his sympathy in a brief speech. Judge of my dismay to hear this reply: "I am afraid that I cannot. You see, I shall be the *only official present!*" I have met in India bishops of a very different kind, but I wonder what might have been the position there to-day if bishops, officials, and mere ordinary British, professing the doctrine of the Christ, had recalled and lived St. Paul's teaching of "Christ in you," the Divine nature of men, irrespective of race and creed. If we can point to the failure of religion among Indians, cannot they, with these object-lessons under their very eyes, equally reproach us with the failure of religion among ourselves?

No right-minded person can honestly deny the many admirable services rendered to India by a splendidly organised and highly efficient bureaucratic machine, whose technique has been perfected over a long series of years. But it has worked from above: it has been irresponsible, secure, privileged, resentful of and largely unresponsive to criticism, and jealous of challenge to its authority as an Imperial instrument. At best, it has adopted the patriarchal attitude; but it has never recognised the ruled as the equals of the rulers. It has provided many of the material things making for the advantage of the Indian people, but these it would have had to provide, in any event, in its own interests. It has given to the people few of the spiritual gifts. It has not realised that an alien Government can never respond to the needs of the people as naturally and as spontaneously as a Government native to the soil. Its conscientious and hard-working officers, absorbed in the details of administration, have forgotten that the true problems of government are not mechanical or material, but human and of the spirit. It has dealt with Indian affairs as though they were contained solely in dockets, files, memoranda, and reports, rather than to be found in fields, factories, workshops, and the household. The non-official British population has been too absorbed in its pre-occupation of money-getting, often as monopolists, under the protection of a hierarchy composed chiefly of its own country-

men, to have time to ponder over and share the emotions and the ideals of the people of the land.

It is, of course, true that individual officials are and have always been friendly, frank, sympathetic, approachable, and constructive, and that a few non-officials have displayed an enlightened understanding of Indian political and economical aspirations. I willingly recognise that since the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, and with a new Constitution on the horizon, the relations between some of the British officials and non-officials and some Indians, particularly those in the Legislatures, have been more friendly and mutually responsive. I do not, however, think that the "change of heart" has gone very far or very deep. As a general proposition, I believe the above analysis to be substantially accurate. Racial superiority is now so ingrained in the British community that it has become a complex. The bitter reaction of Indians towards its constant demonstration is not understood, even if it is at all sensed. It is attributed to them for original sin.

How many opportunities of justifying British control of Indian affairs have been lost by lack of imagination, hypocrisy, false prestige, patronage, religiosity, or pride of race, degenerating into suspicion of the Indian people and contempt for their cultures! Instead of consciously seeking to win their affection and to help to draw Asia and Europe into permanent bonds of brotherhood, we have gone far to set up once again the old antagonisms between the two continents. Is it yet possible to find new occasions of inter-racial understanding and mutual goodwill? If so (and I believe it to be the case), an entirely different attitude is called for on the part of the British in India, encouraged, it may be hoped, by the British at home.

I would appeal for a greater effective appreciation of the wonderfully sacrificing service of numerous individual British people in India, official and non-official, commercial and missionary alike, during the last century. Some of it has brought fame; in most cases it has been rendered unobtrusively and often unobserved. Its fragrance, however, pervades even the present poisoned atmosphere, and it still obtains generous recognition from the most affectionate and responsive people in the world. If we could but more largely infuse inter-racial relationships in India with this spirit of service, half the problem would be solved.

HY. S. L. POLAK.

ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE LEAGUE.

ECONOMIC conditions in all countries during the years since the Great War have been radically different from what they were before the war; and these new conditions have affected very seriously the relation between the nations. Not only has international trade decreased, but confidence in the investment of capital abroad is shaken, and currency depreciation, which once was an accident of war-finance, bids fair to become a new method of securing the special advantage of one nation against others. Our policy, therefore, in commerce and finance should rest upon the new conditions and not upon the traditional analysis of pre-war conditions; and it should envisage the likelihood of further changes in economic conditions during the next twenty years. We cannot assume that we are merely passing through a transition, nor that what is to follow will be anything like the pre-war situation. Perhaps we are at the beginning of a new economic order, not by design nor because of the policies of any Governments, but as a result of great changes in trade organisation, methods of production and habits of consumption. The most general economic "laws" will remain indisputable; but they may need to be restated in the light of these new developments, because policy must be based upon the particular conditions within which such laws operate.

CAUSES OF ECONOMIC CHANGE

The economic changes especially affecting the relation between nations are due, as the Economic Conference of the League in 1927 declared, partly to the war. Industries were then set up in new areas for war needs; and such industries exercise a "pull" upon policy even after the need for them has passed. Moreover, as is the case of Japan, war shortages gave an opportunity to develop new industries which remain on a competitive basis after the shortage has passed away. War teaches nations—and not only belligerent nations—to be self-sufficing. It is essentially a lesson in barbarism; but barbarism is not yet obsolete, and all nations envisage the possibility of new wars in which they may have to be self-sufficing again. Thus the danger of future war and a possible "race" in the preparation for it cause new obstacles to trade,

as each nation tries to be self-sufficing. Also, financially, the war left many Governments burdened with debt, and victory was followed by fantastic demands for reparation payments in some cases. This has made the normal transfer of capital for use abroad very difficult and in some cases positively unsafe.

But the changes of the recent past are not all due to the war. Some of them are the results of tendencies which had been in operation before the war. For example, new sources of power-supply, oil and electricity, were being rapidly developed. New forms of machinery for transport (motors) and for manufacture (automatic machines) were coming in; and the application of new methods increased agricultural production, such as wheat in Canada and the United States. The needs of war disturbed these tendencies, reinforcing some and deflecting or repressing others. For example, automatic machinery was perfected in the making of some forms of munitions, and great numbers of women entered that form of industry. On the other hand some new forms of material, for example artificial silk, were not steadily developed but, after being neglected, were suddenly and in some cases disastrously promoted. Again, industrial development in new regions was stimulated during the war; and the stimulus was reinforced during the recent depression by trade restrictions imposed by the older industrial countries. The rapid rise of Japan as a nation exporting industrial products is the most obvious illustration of this tendency; but the whole movement towards economic self-sufficiency in Europe and elsewhere promotes the development of manufactures in new countries under less advantageous economic conditions. As the western European nations protect their agriculture, the agricultural communities elsewhere are compelled to develop industries of their own.

Another cause of the change in economic conditions since the last century is the growth of new tastes or standards of consumption. New foods and new forms of dress are desired. The increase of leisure, both the undesired leisure of unemployment and the leisure due to more efficient production (shorter hours)—has led to new uses of leisure in the cinema, radio and motor cars. Some nations learnt to eat more meat in the war; others, since the war, have learnt to eat more fruit and less wheat. Others again, like Japan, are learning to

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use woollen clothing, a fact of great importance for Australia and for trade in the Pacific. All these changes are themselves due to immense and not exactly calculable changes in the number and character of populations. In the west, the population of most countries contains fewer children in proportion to adults, as compared with 1880, and a greater number of adults survive after fifty years of age. This involves a reduced consumption of wheat; and since local production has also been expanded, the wheat-exporting countries have been doubly hit. On the other hand, new possibilities of increased consumption of wheat have opened up in China. Also popular education has deeply affected social habits and, therefore, the *kind* of goods and services consumed. The increase in the so-called distributive trades in some communities, for example, may be a sign of a new form of social habit.

EVIL EFFECTS OF RECENT CHANGES

The changes caused by the war, by the new production and the new consumption, have had two great economic effects. The other effects are no less important—the political, the cultural effects, and perhaps also the effects upon the relations between the sexes and between the different generations. But here we are concerned only with economic effects, and first with those which may compel us to adopt a new policy. These are evil effects. First, there is a loss of security and confidence in the investment of capital “abroad.” The nineteenth century expanded industry in Europe by “exporting capital” outside Europe to develop various districts in America, Asia, and finally Africa. These outlying districts, from the point of view of the countries in which large numbers had accumulated capital, were “raw material” and food-supplying countries. But precisely these “undeveloped” countries were most deeply affected by the changes in production and habits of consumption referred to above. Therefore the enterprises in which capital had been invested abroad were often unable to pay what they owed to the investors. And even before that happened, the Russian Revolution had led to a repudiation of payments to those who had invested capital in Russia, who were chiefly foreigners. Finally, after the “recovery” of 1924-6, which seemed to be a return to normal pre-war times, Germany proved to be unable to export enough to pay what

had been expected to the foreign capital-owners whose money had helped her to survive the pressure of the years before. When times are good the payment to capital-owners is not felt; but when times are bad in any country the fact that capital-owners are *foreign* seems to be a good reason for feeling that one's country is “exploited.” Also, the consciousness of separate nationality which the war aroused in many lands, in Turkey, in China, in India, as well as in Finland and Esthonia, assisted the growth of resentment against payments made to foreigners. Why should one's own country be subject to a tribute to people who had no responsibility and no interest in the country except to get money out of it? Naturally, capital-owners lost “confidence”; for refusal to pay foreigners may be closely connected with discontent at having to make fixed payments to any capital-owners, payments agreed to in easier times. All this makes an international monetary and financial system more difficult to reconstruct; but it may not preclude colonial and regional capital-developments such as those in the French colonies or the British Empire. The tendency towards the development of such larger economic groups clearly requires careful consideration, if international trade is to be maintained.

Another evil effect of the many changes in production and consumption is unemployment and the loss of wages due to unemployment. Unemployment after the war in most industrial countries came upon a society no longer so callous and so confident as that of the early industrialism. Therefore provision was made for support of the unemployed out of public funds, which strained those funds, already overburdened as they were by war debts; and secondly, the general loss of wages decreased the amount of purchasing-power used for food, clothing and other “necessities”—leading thus to more unemployment in the trades which had served the unemployed when at work. The causes of unemployment in different countries were probably very different; but in general it was clear that some of the causes were outside the nation suffering. Either foreigners would not buy, or they sold more cheaply than “we.” War-propaganda had filled the minds of most men with a deep suspicion of foreigners. Some were open enemies capable of any atrocity, and some were friends indeed, but very untrustworthy friends. Our-selves for ourselves, therefore, was a very natural conception

of the proper basis for policy. It reinforced among the wage-earners the hostility to foreign capital-owners noted above ; and it gave advantage to those capital-owners who had investments at home.

OLD POLICIES TO MEET NEW DIFFICULTIES

Action of some sort was demanded from every Government : and most Governments, looking about for ideas on policy, can find only old ones. Therefore the ancient and almost defunct controversies of the middle of the nineteenth century were revived. Free Trade and Protection rose again, out of the pigeon-holes of political controversy in the 1880's and 1890's.

A few new practices also were adopted in some countries—repudiation of foreign obligations and depreciation of currencies, for example ; but in the main the policies intended to be permanent were supposed to turn upon the old question whether a country ought to allow “free” investment or export of capital and “free” commercial sales of foreign goods, or should protect the home manufacturer by preventing wicked foreign goods coming in. Thus the issue seemed to be whether, in the conditions of 1933, we ought to act as in 1833 or as in 1733. The economists in general preferred 1833 ; for in 1733 there was hardly any economics. But the popular mind and many politicians tended to regard the new-fangled ideas of the 1830's as having failed ; and there were no others available except those repudiated, at any rate in England, at that date. And, besides, most other nations had never got as far even as the 1830's in their trade policies. Why should we then not do to them what they did to us ? It was useless to ask what we would wish them to do to us ; for that they certainly would not do.

The attempt to meet the difficulties of the new situation by various forms of what is called “economic nationalism” cannot be condemned outright. Clearly some forms of the policy so-called are objectionable because they are inspired by aggression and reckless trade rivalry or the unreasonable fear of such rivalry. But there are other forms of national policy, which are inspired by a desire to prevent incalculable economic movements abroad from undermining the social structure of a country. Not all forms of “national” economic policy are wrong ; but the new policy which is required for the

new situation should preserve the economic interests of a nation as a separate unit, while promoting deliberately at the same time the interests of that same nation as an integral part of the family of nations. The traditional terms in which the present situation is interpreted are defective ; and this prevents it being seen that the same policy can be both “national,” in the good sense, and of common advantage to all nations.

New difficulties : new means for dealing with them—and no idea how to use them ! No idea in most financial and commercial circles even that they *can* be used ; and, therefore, a futile harking back to the old methods of dealing with quite different situations of many years ago.

A NEW BASIS FOR POLICY

In order to find a suitable economic policy in new economic conditions, it is necessary to distinguish what is fundamentally different in those conditions from what conditions were long ago. In particular we are concerned here with the international situation ; but clearly policy in the international field must be consistent with domestic industrial policy. In the economic relations between nations at present two fundamental difficulties arise—first, the return on foreign investment and the finance and currency difficulties associated with that ; and secondly, the rivalry of producers in different countries with different standards of living. The means for dealing with these two difficulties are in our hands. The new means were made available before the need for using them was understood ; but these new means are new factors in the situation not usually considered in the national controversies about trade policy. *They are the League of Nations in its economic and financial sections and the International Labour Office.*

It is quite obvious that the new means have not been used by the Governments. In 1927, for example, the League Economic Conference resolved that tariffs and other obstacles to trade should be reduced, or at least stabilised. But in 1929 all the chief Governments, inside the League and outside, were rapidly changing and increasing the obstacles to foreign trade. The same policy has continued until to-day : and it has not prevented, even if it was not alone in promoting, a

general decrease of the value of all trade between the nations, from about £1,000,000,000 in January 1929 to about £300,000,000 in January 1933—a third of what it was. This decline in trade values was partly due to the fall of prices, and the quantities of goods passing across frontiers have not decreased to the same extent. Also the situation has been made worse by a misuse of capital in wild speculation and in ill-judged production. But the policies of Governments have had their share in causing the general decline of industry and commerce and, in any case, have not prevented that decline. Each Government has tried to save itself alone, and all nations are in greater distress as a result. Again, the International Labour Office Conferences have attempted to initiate a common policy for the maintenance of the standard of living of the workers in all countries and the maintenance of their purchasing-power—to the advantage of shareholders and employers; but the Governments have refused to agree to shortening hours or improving conditions by international conventions. Each has tried to help its own people by measures injurious to foreigners; and the result has been that “the purchasing-power of the wage-earning population shrank by 48 per cent. in the United States, by 20 per cent. in Germany, and by 19 per cent. in Italy, between 1929 and 1932”; and in our own country “the shrinkage of money wages amounted to 7 per cent. between 1929 and 1931 and probably to about 10 per cent. between 1929 and 1932.” (*Report of the Director of the International Labour Office*, June 1933.) The additional results are reduced profits, reduced taxable capacity, the insolvency of some Governments and the “economy” of others, and a general lack of confidence in the future. The policies adopted by the Governments have evidently not improved the situation. It is time, therefore, that new policies were tried.

These new policies must be based neither upon the assumptions of the Free Trade era nor upon those of the earlier eras of Protectionism. It is not true, as was often assumed in the nineteenth century, that the production and consumption of the modern world is a perfectly fluid system of world-wide exchange and free movements of labour and capital. It is not true, as it was assumed before the nineteenth century, that any nation can isolate itself from all foreign imports or capital investments, without returning to a medieval standard of

living. The actual situation shows the dependence of the standard of living in all countries partly upon “national” organisation of capital and production and partly upon international interchange. We must, therefore, control and direct the *relations* between the national economy in each nation and the international structure of finance and commerce. But this cannot be done either by one nation acting alone or by any one nation trying to compel other nations to forgo their control of their own fate. No nation can force other nations to reduce their tariffs or to accept foreign products by threatening them with hostile commercial policies directed against them. The economic problem is like that of armaments for “defence”: the more each nation “defends” itself by increasing its armaments, the more other nations render that “defence” inadequate by increasing their armaments. Such policy in armaments leads to war; and in economic affairs it leads to general impoverishment. We shall all be completely “protected” against all foreign trade, when we are all reduced to the condition of the ancient Britons! And if we were all completely “free,” those with special advantages would impoverish the others.

A LEAGUE POLICY

The only possible alternative, if we are to maintain and improve our standard of living, is a policy of joint and co-operative international action. But, as in the case of disarmament, that involves the acceptance of the “collective system” instead of “the balance of power” as the basis of our policy. It means that the Governments must aim not at getting as much out of the common pool as each can for itself, but at increasing the common pool of wealth and well-being.

Commercial policy must be, not a scramble for markets but an effort to increase markets; not a rivalry of “national” traders and financiers, but an arrangement for the improvement of all openings for trade. Clearly there will be no progress if what “England” gains, “France” must lose. On that basis neither will assist the other by reducing tariffs or by improving the purchasing-power of its workers for foreign goods. The only hope is in the growth of some desire for a *common advantage*, in which both “England” and “France” can share. But the traditional rivalries, and the mythology

of a "balance of trade," like the "balance of power," prevent the understanding of the principles embodied in the League system. Clearly any nation can have a "favourable balance" which is, therefore, "unfavourable" for all the other nations it deals with! But *all* cannot have a "favourable" balance! Like all "balances" of power, the balance of trade is an excuse for "over-balancing" the other fellow. Can we not think of some less primitive basis for policy affecting other people?

Some of the evils from which we are suffering are the results of the misuse of what is good. Increased productive power is good; and it is good that such power, industrial and agricultural, should increase in countries such as India and China and Japan which had not advanced so rapidly as Europe in the last century. It is good that oil and electricity should be added to coal as motive-powers, even if they change the balance of natural advantage between different nations. It is good that the amount of leisure and the ways of using it should increase among those with low incomes. But all these good things are new, and they create confusion unless they are directed by a new policy. That new policy must be world-wide: and as there is no world authority with compulsory powers it must be a policy of agreement arising out of a reconciliation of conflicting interests in view of a common good. The League system provides the material instruments for such a policy.

HOW TO USE THE LEAGUE

How, then, can the League be used? On the financial side we have experience of League loans, of the restoration of certain countries by League assistance and of the added security which a League guarantee can give for the proper use of capital invested abroad. Also the Bank for International Settlements, having finished its "reparation" tasks, still has the function of connecting Central Banks in their normal work of stabilising the issue of credit. The failure of the Monetary Conference of 1933 was partly due to the lack of preparation for it. The use of the League system cannot be improvised. Years of hard work on the part of the competent departments of the several Governments concerned are necessary for the working of the League system. But we can begin that to-morrow.

As examples of what should be done at once—first, the Governments should take steps to avoid the use of currency policy as a weapon in an economic war. The League system should be used in the adjustment of currency difficulties. It will be disastrous for the common people in all countries if the chief Governments devalue their currencies in the attempt to gain an advantage over foreign traders or creditors. Hardly less disastrous would be the stabilisation of its currency by any Government at such a level as will set up new strain and cause another collapse later. The right policy is stabilisation of the chief currencies on an international basis, by agreement between the Governments; and the League system can be used for that purpose.

Secondly, an international monetary system should be maintained by closer consultation through the Bank of International Settlements. At Basle, the Bank of International Settlements is almost helpless, as it has no financial market to work upon; and the Bank of England, although it is becoming again the only real international bank, is limited at present to the "sterling area." The Bank of International Settlements may have to be moved to a real money market and should be given important work to do as a clearing-house and a reservoir, particularly for those countries which are financially weak.

Thirdly, in order to effect the resumption of international investment, the Financial Committee of the League should be studying the technical details. Through the League it should be possible to develop a system of international supervision and control which would assure the most fruitful distribution of capital, to the greatest satisfaction and security of borrowers and investors alike. Perhaps new forms of financial instruments are needed or new devices for watching the flow of investment and giving advice to investors and borrowers. While the constitution of the League is being discussed, attention should be given to the strengthening and improvement of its economic and financial organisation. Financial improvements must precede any alleviation of the present restrictions on trade; and the League system can be used for this. By such means a settlement and composition of outstanding debts may be reached, so as to make possible the freer flow of trade.

It does not follow that the traditional method of finding

markets by making foreign loans or investments is the only way in which the increased purchasing-power required for using increased production can be attained. It is always possible also to increase purchasing-power within a nation by new banking or governmental policy so as to increase the proportion of the national income which goes to the working farmer and the wage-earner. But here financial policy must be co-ordinated with such policies as are promoted through the International Labour Office.

On questions directly affecting employment and wage-earners generally the International Labour Office provides the means for a much safer protection of the standards of living than can be provided by tariffs and currency juggling. For example, we have to meet a situation which is due to the fact that in China in 1920-3 the number of spindles increased by 180 per cent., in Japan by 115 per cent., and in India by 42 per cent. In the rest of the world there was a decline of 3·8 per cent. Under the old "free" trade, this would lead to the closing down of the older factories and a movement of industry to countries with "cheap labour." But the real difficulty is that in such countries modern machinery is being installed in communities which are otherwise primitive in their organisation. The International Labour Office has, therefore, two important functions to perform for the advantage of all the countries concerned: first, to promote the fixing of minimum standards, particularly of wages, and, secondly, to increase the purchasing-power of the workers in the less-developed countries. But we have not begun to use the International Labour Office as it could be used. It is still regarded by many "practical politicians" and business men as a sort of "charity organisation" for the workers. But it might be, and was intended to be, a means of improving the organisation of employment by securing international agreements to raise rather than lower the level of the conditions under which industry works.

But, whatever the efficacy of the existing League system in meeting present economic difficulties, the main point is that those difficulties in their international aspects must be met by international means. If the League and International Labour Office are not good enough, then improve them. But the principle they embody is unshaken. It is a counsel of despair to go backwards simply because one has met a

difficulty in going forwards. New times need new means to meet new obstacles. Our policy and the methods of applying it in the economic sphere must be as different from the pre-war rivalry of trade as the policy of the reduction of armaments by international agreement is different from the old policy of a race in armaments; for the old policy, so far from meeting the new difficulties, only makes matters worse. The League system involves co-operation between the nations, not subordination of the nations to a fantastic World-State. A League policy, therefore, is a means for promoting both the interests of each nation and the interests of all. Separate interests are not necessarily opposed interests; and, indeed, interests which appear to be opposed are in some cases interests misjudged. But in no case does any nation lose when its policy supports those interests which are common to all.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

THE STRONG MAN OF HUNGARY.

TO begin with an anecdote, possibly untrue: As General Gömbös, Prime Minister of Hungary, was on a speech-making tour of the provinces soon after his accession to office in October 1932, he came to stay the night with a distinguished local official, whose wife is mistress of the delicate adornment of lamp-shades, screens and so forth, with neat sketches in a suitably archaic style. She even makes whole series of such illustrations for different rooms, choosing historical subjects. When General Gömbös was shown his room he turned to his hostess and said in tones of the liveliest pleasure: "But how charming of you, Madame!" For a moment the hostess was nonplussed as to the reason for her especial charmingness. Then—no doubt—she smiled delightfully and diplomatically. The room was her Napoleon room.

Such a tale is, of course, misleading. It may indeed be suspected of having an all-too-close connection with the doubtless perfectly fortuitous fact that Gömbös has a trick of putting his right hand into the front of his coat, and so assuming a pose similar to that without which Napoleon would be unimaginable to the majority of those who have ever heard of him. The story is, in fact, a reflection, as much on its tellers—Hungary—as on its butt—Hungary's strong man. In the light of subsequent events, indeed, it implies a compliment to the latter's vigorous qualities. For it was assumed in many quarters, both within and without the country, when he took office in 1932, for the first time Prime Minister, that Hungary was in for virtual, possibly actual, dictatorship. Such a supposition provides a rather sad commentary on the political life of the nation.

His predecessor, Count Károlyi, an earnest, ageing and scholarly figure, had held office for thirteen precarious months after Count Bethlen's fall in 1931. He was generally considered as nothing more than a stop-gap for the same Count Bethlen himself, who, in spite of considerable unpopularity in the country, seems to be credited by friends and enemies alike with superlative powers of political recuperation. His stop-gap nominee fell victim to much the same combination of party dissension and economic difficulties as had ended Count Bethlen's own long reign. And, again with the latter's vigorous support, Gömbös became Prime Minister.

Although he is by way of showing himself a hardened political pragmatist, his significance to the country at the moment of his accession was contained in his past rather than in his future. He was known above all, as his critics abroad did not fail to emphasise with gloomy satisfaction, as a one-time leader of the fiercely reactionary Hungarian nationalist movement of the immediate post-Communist period. While under Count Bethlen's handling, however, this noisy agitation died a dwindling death, and most of its prominent figures vanished mercifully from the political stage; while others, more able, followed changed convictions and the trend of political markets into the Opposition, Captain Gömbös bided his time. Finally he made his peace with Count Bethlen, and this action and his undoubted ability were shortly afterwards recognised by his appointment to high office in the War Ministry. At a time when corruption within the State was beginning to acquire a certain abstract publicity value, towards the close of the Bethlen reign, Captain, soon General, Gömbös acquired a reputation for uncompromising severity in matters of administrative scandals, and for some proficiency in their detection. His friendship with Admiral Horthy, the Regent of Hungary, is held to have influenced his rapid promotion; but he has shown himself perfectly capable of rising to his opportunities. So he came to be War Minister in Count Károlyi's Cabinet, which preceded his own.

It may be conceived that as regards his country the new Prime Minister could hope for nothing more than sectional popularity. To the Jews he bore the reputation of a one-time vigorous anti-Semite. To the Legitimists he was—and still is—the representative of the forces which balked King Charles of his Hungarian throne in 1921, for he had played no small part in the defeat of the Royal troops almost before the gates of Buda. He was somewhat of a "self-made" man in a land of pronounced exclusiveness. As the Elisha to Count Bethlen's Elijah, he is, as is incidentally the Regent, also a Protestant. Active Legitimist forces in the country are mostly aristocratic and Catholic. As regards Parliamentary support, however—and more than one Hungarian Deputy has been called to order for talking of a Parliamentary dictatorship in the land—he could count on a far greater welcome, not only as the potential consolidator of the Government party, but as the personal friend of several of the Opposition, notably

of M. Tibor Eckhardt, leader of the Small Farmers' Party, who in his unregenerate days displayed much the same nationalistic fervour as Gömbös himself. By far the greatest danger to him and to his country was naturally the agrarian slump.

To deal with this situation came a man of determination and ambition. As such all knew him. He has been accused even of slight megalomania, and he may be suspected of a certain grim sense of humour in so far as one of a congenitally humourless race can enjoy that distinction. His person is extraordinary in an unremarkable fashion. Not above medium height, he is prodigiously deep-chested, and he gives the impression of being one of the few Hungarian soldiers who enjoy a civilian suit. He is forty-eight. The Cabinet which he formed was also dubbed the "forty-year-olds," from the fact of there being hardly a man over fifty in it. It is also the first non-revolutionary Hungarian Cabinet not to contain a count or a baron—for what that fact is worth as a sign of the times.

The "ex-Fascist," "militarist" potential dictator of Hungary began by the enunciation of some eminently liberal intentions. His public political utterances were indeed models of realism. He reassured the Jews, renounced dictatorship and declared for democracy. The official state of emergency, in force since September 1931, was raised, liberty of assembly was partially restored and liberty of the Press was mentioned. Moreover, he pledged his Government, not for the last time, to reinstitute in Hungary general secret suffrage. At the same time, in the first months of his ministry, Opposition victories in Parliamentary by-elections, which had disturbed the complacency of the Government party in the last months of the Károlyi régime, came to an end. The Opposition were left to their protests and evidence of minor but effective electioneering pressure on the part of the authorities. Gömbös also announced a vague prospect of an agrarian reform. In a speech-making tour of the country these and many other hopes of nation-wide co-operation and effort were developed in a programme, the number of whose points grew daily, to the delight of the cartoonists and the coffee-house wits, till it reached ninety-nine, and by an afterthought rounded off the hundred. "Don't criticise. Work," was the dominant note of his oratory.

General Gömbös is above all a realist. Neither of his more

sensational positive announcements has so far borne fruit. Secret suffrage, the persistent, not disinterested cry of the Opposition, he has solemnly announced will be instituted under his Government. He may be presumed not unjustifiably to be foreseeing a lengthy future for the latter. His treatment of this problem is, however, eminently rational. He is steering his craft, almost under emergency conditions, through the narrow, shallow seas of economic crisis, and he is having no easy job. It is doubtful whether any portion of the crew, passengers, cargo or rats would be any the better for a squabble for control of the tiller at this stage. The second major point, agrarian reform, considered as a real project and not as the mere soothing promise to which it has apparently been reduced, contains elements of a neat political manoeuvre which is also of great social and political significance. Such a reform would bring Hungary nearer the rank of one of the agrarian democracies of Middle Europe, would broaden the basis of the anti-revolutionary element in the country; but first of all it would take the wind out of the sails of that leading Opposition party, the Small Farmers.

Finally, in his efforts to instil ideals of unity and co-operation into his countrymen may be detected a desire to circumvent the Parliamentary hegemony of the so-called United Party, with whom the General may well have expected friction. This policy he may be found continuing, cautiously, throughout his time of office. There were seven secessions from the Opposition on his assumption of power, and there has been at least one notable reconciliation with a personage who had previously retired from politics in a huff. The founding of a newspaper (with the ingenuous title of *Independence*) and the creation of a pin-button as badge of Gömbös-loyalty are also straws in the wind that blows from the Prime Minister to the mere lay politician.

Much of Gömbös' energy has been expended against a somewhat intractable internal situation, in modest but doubtless meritorious effort to combat economic depression and to consolidate his own position with regard to party politics. In foreign affairs his policy has been all the richer in contrasts. Conditioned though it must be by the country's unceasing, weary, sometimes almost hopeless-seeming struggle for treaty revision, it has provided an astonishing number of somewhat paradoxical sensations.

The greatest contrast is between his first action and his latest. For the first and not the least sensation of his reign was his change of Foreign Minister, the new appointment being M. Kánya, till then for several years Hungarian Minister in Berlin, whence he came with the reputation of a thorough Germanophile and a "very lively gentleman indeed," as a famous English journalist described him. His appointment was hailed as a sure symptom of Gömbös' orientation of Hungarian policy towards a *rapprochement* with Germany as the patron of treaty revision. This was in contradiction to Count Bethlen's constant attention to Italy. Gömbös seemed to have ideas of his own.

He proceeded to illustrate them—or, as his severer critics declared, his lack of them—by a political round of calls. Thus contact was made with Vienna shortly after the assumption of power in Germany by Hitler, when there was talk of the *Anschluss* on the one hand and Austria-Hungary on the other. Followed a visit to Rome in accordance with the friendly relations assiduously preserved between Hungary and Italy on Count Bethlen's initiative. But in sharp contrast to both of these came a totally unexpected visit to Herr Hitler in Berlin, when the Prime Minister stole away by night without the knowledge of anyone but the Foreign Minister himself. Yet another event of importance was the visit of M. Kánya to Paris, the first occasion on which a Hungarian Foreign Minister has been received at the Quai d'Orsay since the war. With the Little Entente all agog, the conversations were ostensibly confined to the problem of economic co-operation of the Danubian States: M. Kánya is understood to have expressed a somewhat natural preference for bilateral agreements as opposed to adherence to any scheme for Pan-Danubia based on the *status quo*. The final visit of 1933 was to the Balkans, in which some saw in Gömbös and his Foreign Minister the emissaries of Italy engaged in promoting resistance to the coming Balkan Pact.

This all-embracing political sociability up to a certain time was perfectly expressive of Hungary's international position, and, it may be presumed, of Gömbös' ideas on the subject. Much of the country's activity in the foreign sphere was devoted to her desperate economic needs, to elaborating a system of bilateral commercial agreements with her encircling neighbours, or to the discovery of distant and improbable

markets for her products. On the purely political plane, Gömbös—that little, one-time Napoleonic gesture forgotten?—was "hedging."

His resolution has been sudden. It may be suspected of being the work almost as much of Hitler as of Gömbös. Hungary has now definitely associated herself with Austria and Italy in opposition to German wishes. The value of this new association has yet to be tested, but it would seem to have introduced into Central Europe a new and life-giving element. The people of Hungary at any rate are in no doubts about it. Gömbös' Government has lived to hear a great hymning sigh of relief and hope go up in the country, as though the stranglehold of the Little Entente had been forced to loosen ever so slightly. Some may see in the new step a justification of a foreign policy which was not Gömbös' except by compulsion, and which he owes to the initiative of his predecessor, Bethlen. Hungarian thanks to God for His mercy may soon seem to have been premature. But the Rome agreements can hardly fade in essential importance, if their immediate effect is but slowly perceptible.

There is a corollary to this which concerns Gömbös particularly. As often as the question of any sort of association of Austria and Hungary together assumes importance, the Monarchist problem crops up again. If there is to be any Austro-Hungarian union, say the Legitimists, what better form could it take than a double Monarchy? A Habsburg restoration was declared to be a *casus belli* by Czechoslovakia over twelve years ago, and the usual official reply to Legitimist agitation is an implicit reference to Little Entente nervousness and possible aggressiveness. There is another consideration, which is of especial interest now that the question crops up more insistently than ever. Gömbös' personal attitude to Monarchism in Hungary must willy-nilly bear reference to his action against the returning Habsburg king in 1921. In that he was associated with Admiral Horthy, who is now Regent of Hungary and a personal friend of his.

R. M.

SOUTH AFRICA TO-DAY.

SOUTH Africa to-day may be described as a country flowing with prosperity and problems. Thanks to the gold premium, it has witnessed a return to good fortune, sudden and dramatic, even for a country where good luck has a trick of coming in the manner of a fairy tale. It is indeed pleasant to visit a city like Johannesburg, brisk, enterprising, confident, care-free, after residence in a London only now slowly recovering from depression, or after brief visits to those cities of modern Europe whose fictitious gaiety serves only to advertise the profound melancholy which has descended on their squares and streets. Johannesburg is not only prosperous, but it believes, not without good grounds, that that prosperity is going to continue. The gold boom, I was informed, will last at least another five years, and then if gold fails, well, something else will turn up—radium for example, or exploitation on a large scale of the great potential mineral resources of the country. Thus the shops, the hotels, the bars, the cinemas, even the theatres of Johannesburg are thronged. Everybody—from millionaires to typists—is speculating. Brokers, hitherto innocent of any knowledge of Stock Exchange procedure, are making small fortunes. London houses of venerable standing are opening new agencies to cope with this rush of business on the Rand. Great Kaffir houses, like the Anglo-American Corporation, the General Mining and Financial Corporation, and the Union Corporation, are showing remarkable profits. The mines, with an eye on new possibilities, are recruiting black labour from new areas in the north, calling these boys “tropicals.” Johannesburg, in a word, is thriving, and its prosperity is flowing into every city and dorp and homestead of the Union. The country is living on gold, and while the boom lasts the task of a Union Finance Minister is an easy one.

There is, of course, an element of uncertainty and artificiality in any such dependence on an industry so sensitive to world conditions and labour costs, and South Africans are well aware of it. And that is where the problems come in. Kimberley, for example, is a town which lives on its past, and what has happened to diamonds might yet happen to gold. That is why the Government and the people of South Africa are determined to use this gift from the gods for the purpose

of developing their other industries and, above all, that venerable industry of agriculture which, despite the vicissitudes of seasons, the caprice of world prices, the absurdities of tariffs, is too securely based on the fundamental needs of men ever to sink into decay. Using its new wealth, the Union is spoon-feeding the farmer—the votes of the veldt are precious in the eyes of the politicians—is embarking on ambitious State ventures like the new iron and steel corporation at Pretoria; is refashioning its harbours and its railways; is pushing its foreign trade with remarkable zeal. And it is the State, rather than the individual, which inspires all this activity. There is probably as much State control in South Africa as there is in Russia. Ever since the days of Paul Kruger there has been a tradition of paternalism in South African administration, and the vast distances, the climatic changes which in one month bring all the horrors of a drought on the land, and the next deluge it with rains which sweep away rivers and bring transport almost to a standstill, and the activities of the locust, the malaria-carrying mosquito and other pests, make the individual look puny, and call for the concerted efforts of the whole community. Everywhere the bureaucracy is at work, experimenting and controlling, and every additional ounce of gold mined on the Rand whets its appetite for interference.

The problem, however, of developing other industries than gold-mining is a difficult one, and the courage of South Africa in tackling it is to be applauded. The country is primarily pastoral, and the fall in wool prices grievously affected the farmer, particularly as, owing to the drought, he was not able to take full advantage of the recent remarkable price recovery in that commodity. The fine fruit farms of the Cape Province, and the cane fields of Natal, have suffered from the general fall of prices. When I was recently in the Paarl district, I saw thousands of cases of beautiful pears originally destined for London side-tracked to Johannesburg owing to the break in the dollar and the consequent dumping of Californian fruit on the British market. The dollar and the climate between them make the lot of the South African farmer a hard one.

There is another economic complication of recent date which is perturbing South Africa. The Union has always looked to Great Britain as its best market, and Ottawa was

held to have put the seal on that idea. It is true that the home country is still the best market, but all the Dominions are now beginning to realise that the British Isles can no longer be expected to absorb that expansion of agriculture which is their goal. Great Britain is now in process of becoming a highly protectionist country, and is announcing to the world, not forgetting the British Commonwealth of Nations, that not only the British industrialist but the British farmer is to have first place in the economic plans of its rulers. Moreover, Great Britain, with its large population and great purchasing power, is still the magnet which attracts all the surplus products of the world. For these two reasons the Dominions are being compelled to look elsewhere for potential markets. South Africa is still maintaining the former level of its exports to this country, but taking its export trade altogether last year witnessed a decline of from 48 to 38 per cent. in its exports to Great Britain. The last citrus season, owing to competition from Brazil and other countries, was a bad one, and though the present deciduous season was not unsuccessful, it held its own only by great efforts. The next two years, it is estimated, will be highly critical. The Union, therefore, is looking to Europe as an outlet for that surplus production which it feels Great Britain can no longer absorb. That is the explanation of the decision of General Hertzog to appoint new ministers in Berlin and Paris, and generally to strengthen South Africa's diplomatic service; that is the plea urged in favour of the Italian Shipping Subsidy, which was described to me by an influential South African as "a bribe to an Italian shipping line to push South African goods in South-eastern Europe."

And what South Africa is trying to do in Europe, Australia it will be noted is already attempting in the Far East, through the mission which, headed by Mr. Latham, is now visiting Japan, China, Java, Malaya and the Philippines.

It is the economic problem which besets South Africa, as it besets almost every other nation in the world. Even those issues which on the surface do not appear so are at the moment fundamentally economic. Thus, the native problem is resolving itself into a labour issue. Unlike India, the native problem of South Africa is not political in its character. The Bantu tribes have no political consciousness. Their congresses reveal no signs of an effective racial solidarity and, indeed,

the dissensions of the various tribes are pitifully revealed at them. The South African native is still a child, as their leaders have frankly confessed to me. The Tshekedi affair was primarily a rivalry between two conscientious men—a zealous British official and an equally zealous native chief. The South African natives are happily free from that form of pride which seeks expression in claims of political equality, but at the same time they have their grievances, and these grievances are mainly economic, though, of course, the educated South African native suffers dreadfully from that inferiority complex to which white men, who may be his inferiors in intelligence and in moral conduct, are always drawing his attention.

In a country like South Africa, where a certain proportion of the white population, particularly among the Afrikaners, finds it difficult to understand and to grapple with the intricacies of modern civilisation, there is bound to be a residue of inefficients, who in a white country would in process of time sink to the level of the unskilled labourer. In South Africa, however, the "poor white," in his descent downwards, comes sharply up against the black man. The resulting economic clash is one of the gravest issues which South African statesmen have to face. All kinds of attempts are being made to maintain the privilege of the white man, even of the poor white. Every effort of government is strained to save the youth of the country from the peril of having to compete with the native, and that is one reason behind such institutions as the Special Service Battalion at Roberts Heights, near Pretoria. Here some two thousand youths are subjected to military discipline, and at the same time are trained in various industries, as cobblers, carpenters, railwaymen, telegraphists, and so on. The scheme, which may be extended to Capetown, is meeting with considerable criticism in Labour and University circles, but it is justified on the ground that otherwise those youths would ultimately degenerate into unemployables.

In conversation with the native leaders I have invariably found that their grievances ultimately were economic—the complaints of the mine workers (on the whole unjustified, because it is in the interests of the mine owners to look after their employees), the pass system which puts restrictions on the movements of "the boys" in towns, the housing shortage

which sends the native to live in locations too far from his work, and the eternal land hunger. The Government at the moment is thrashing out its native bills, and has to face this double problem of providing reserved land for the tribes, and of securing them such representation as will enable them to ventilate constitutionally their economic grievances. Generals Hertzog and Smuts are thus confronted with a hard task. Perhaps, in the long run, they may find a solution through the new spirit in which the youth of South Africa, particularly in the universities, is approaching his black brethren.

The native is not the only economic-racial trouble in South Africa. Natal, for instance, is seriously preoccupied over the growth in numbers and influence of the Indians. Repatriation is the official solution, but I am told that for every Indian repatriated, ten are born. The Indians in Natal have no desire to return to Mother India. Many of them are low caste, many of them are prospering, and all of them are more intelligent and industrious than the natives. Moreover, they feel that they have behind them a Government of India which, as in the case of the Indians in East Africa, will fight for their interests.

Moreover, the Asiatic problem is troubling South Africa in another direction. "The Japanese menace" is as much a subject of conversation in Capetown and Durban as it is in Manchester and Leeds. Cheap Japanese goods have been flooding the Union shops, and the Union Government have imposed what is virtually a prohibitive tariff, thus protecting their own goods, but not of course British, against this persistent Nippon trade push. Moreover, South Africans are seriously perturbed over the footing which the Japanese have attained in Abyssinia, and over the rumours that they are trying to wring immigration concessions from the Portuguese in Mozambique. South Africa fears Japanese designs on the African continent, and there is little doubt that it is Japan which has prompted Mr. Pirow, the Minister of Defence, to devote so much time to the Air Force and to the general defences of the Union.

There is also a Jewish problem in South Africa. For a long time many Afrikaners, despite General Smuts' ardent support of Zionism, have been railing against Jews, particularly against Jewish immigrants, whom they call, for some mysterious reason, "Peruvians." The Jews have secured a strong

grip on the hotel industry and the retail trade of the country, and the old familiar story of the rich Jewish Shylock and the poor Christian farmer is being told again all over the veldt. The Jews, in their turn, fanned the dispute by their opposition to the Government's quota system for regulating immigration—an unnecessary step on their part, for the quota in practice is working out in their favour. More recently a new factor in the anti-Semitic campaign has arisen in the activities of bodies known as Grey Shirts who, strongly supported by certain German interests, are fulminating against Jews, particularly in the eastern parts of Cape Province. These Grey Shirts are mainly Afrikaners, and being unable to attack the British owing to the new political alignment, and being tired of attacking one another, are now mobilising against the Jews. Anti-Semitism is a favourite subject of conversation in South Africa, but though it has dangerous potentialities it is doubtful if it will ever become as serious an issue as it is on the continent of Europe. For one thing, the Jewish leaders in South Africa are as highly respected as the Jewish leaders are in England and, moreover, the Jews have contributed so much to the prosperity of South Africa that any serious persecution would be as stupid as it would be unjust.

Such, in brief, are some of the problems which confront South Africa. They look and are formidable enough, but on the credit side of the ledger are two cheering assets. In the first place, the very gravity of these problems is at last bringing the Afrikaners and the Englishmen together. A co-operation as friendly as that, say, of the Englishman and the Scot will be long in coming, and there are many Britishers in the Union who shake their heads and declare it will never come at all. Yet it is something after all that General Hertzog and General Smuts have buried the hatchet, and that even so astute a politician as Doctor Malan, so far, has not wrecked, though he may retard, the fusion movement. South Africa is responding to the new forces sweeping throughout the world, and is finding the old political feuds and shibboleths threadbare and meaningless. There are, of course, political feuds in South Africa—the Afrikaner is a born politician, and Natal grows political enthusiasm as fruitfully as it grows sugar—but it is a hopeful sign that the most acrimonious battles are no longer between British and Dutch, but between Dutch and Dutch (*vide* the editorials of *Die Burger*).

The second great asset on the ledger is the buoyancy of the people of South Africa. It is very difficult to be pessimistic in a country where Nature refuses the inhabitants permission to be bored, and where with her gracious caprice she is perpetually giving with one hand what she takes away with the other. The country is intensely alive ; it is too young to be wearied. The South African is up and doing, and if he makes mistakes he is too busy to brood over them for long.

NEIL GRANT.

SIR WALTER OF HENLEY AND THE GOSPEL OF HUSBANDRY.

THE mysteries of the Middle Age are manifold, and they may be associated with various aspects of the national activities. Naturally, too, they will include literary problems such as the authorship of some well-known work which has been ascribed to one writer or to another with the complacent confidence engendered of tradition. Eventually this fabulous title is challenged and found defective, though it may continue to receive a certain amount of learned support for another generation or even longer. Such at least might be the fate of the *Treatise of Husbandry* referred to in the present article, for which a romantic origin has been claimed regardless of a possible inquisition of a "third degree" in the form of a "historical revision."

That the origin or text of this important treatise, which remained a household book for nearly three centuries, should remain obscure is indeed surprising in view of the progressive study of economic history which is now a subject of international interest as well as of local piety. In particular, the development of the English rural economy has received special attention during the last fifty years. Valuable texts and essays have been written or edited, and special bibliographies and glossaries have been compiled by English and American or other foreign scholars, aided by academic institutions and by local societies or guilds. At the same time these agrarian studies have not been always helpful for the elucidation of certain aspects of the subject which have for some reason or other been taken for granted or merely overlooked.

In any discussion of the sources and literature of English "Husbandry" it is important to remember the earlier significance of the term, and to distinguish between didactic treatises on the management of landed estates and records of administrative proceedings relating to their survey or valuation. These two aspects may be easily confused, because later students have found in the unequalled stores of English records, central and local, concrete examples of the processes of manorial farming which seemed far more original and impressive than the *obiter dicta* of anonymous essayists.

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official treatises for the procedure of the King's Court and Household, so they have neglected the treatise of Husbandry and its satellites in favour of the manorial muniments which are being brought together by the public spirit of the present Master of the Rolls.

The mere fact that the manors which form the background of these studies represent a great national interest (for agriculture was, whatever it may be now, the premier industry of medieval England) explains the preservation of such manorial treatises and emphasises their value as a source of information; but although a serviceable edition was published for the first time in 1890, it was available only to Fellows of the Royal Historical Society and to subscribing libraries at that date. It follows, therefore, that a large number of students may not have had sufficient opportunities of appreciating the wisdom and charm of these quaint and sententious dissertations; and certainly they have not attempted to grapple with some difficulties in the texts or with the obscure relations of the various groups of manuscripts which furnished forth the belated edition referred to above.

Again, we must remember that the descriptions of medieval farming contained in such works as *Ælfric's Colloquy*, *Winner and Waster* and the *Formularies* for manorial accounts just published in memory of J. P. Gilson are not "treatises," but memoranda relating to title-deeds or administrative precepts. Even the curious *Ledger* of the monk-bailiff of Fountains Abbey, compiled in his "chamber" (where he also slept), and carried in his head while he rode forth on business of his house, tells us nothing in the author's own words, though if we help ourselves from its pages we can discover that manorial officers might supply the lack of a village store by debiting food and clothing and stock on the credit of wages due. This, however, was near the end of the Wars of the Roses, and even then we do not find as much information about husbandry in the family papers of the Pastons and Stonors or other families concerned with the wool-trade as we can pick up from the *Estate Book* of Henry of Bray, a contemporary of Walter of Henley and the ex-bailiff owner of a model estate which underwent few changes down to a recent date.

And so, after all, the medieval treatise on husbandry is quite an uncommon survival, as may be indicated by the vogue of copies made for the information of manor lords, or

ladies, and religious houses. Léopold Delisle, who began his work on Norman agriculture between the discovery of a MS. of Walter of Henley's agriculture in the Bibliothèque Nationale and its publication for the École des Chartes in 1856, remarked that such treatises are rare in France. Certainly this manuscript was regarded as a precious survival, though no attempt was made to collate it before the English edition of 1890. Thus the medieval field was left clear for the industrious compilers of treatises on husbandry and housekeeping, who rang the changes upon Bishop Grosseteste's *Rules* and Walter of Henley's *Husbandry* (with its subsidiary treatises) from the middle of the thirteenth to the close of the fourteenth century, when the effects of the Black Death had begun to undermine the old manorial system of demesne farming.

It is possible, too, that an increasing use of the vernacular coupled with the tradition that Grosseteste had translated his own *Rules* and Walter of Henley's treatise from English into French, had encouraged the production of English versions during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, some of which are extant. These English versions, and earlier Latin ones, are interesting and may assist in identifying the respective *codices*. An English version of the *Husbandry* was first printed in the time of Wynkyn de Worde, but at this date the manorial system was being manipulated by business-like lords and lawyer-like stewards to meet the changing conditions of demesne farming and, before long, a new text-book was compiled and published by a "Master Fitzherbert," whose *Book of Husbandry* practically ignored the treatise of his predecessor.

The subject of printed texts or versions of these treatises may remind us that an interesting and useful collection of Englished texts was published a few years ago for an English landowner under the title of *The Manor Farm*. Mr. Cripps-Day tells us in his introduction that his own experience of farm bailiffs and farm hands led him to believe that these treatises might still prove edifying to owner-farmers. His personal contribution is shrewd and scholarly, though not concerned with critical discussions, and he has done good service by including the facsimile of an English version of *Husbandry* communicated to Sir Francis Walsingham by a "Gentleman of Caen" as a wonder work of English agrarian lore. This version was printed in 1589 as *The Book of Thrift*.

of The popularity of Fitzherbert's *Book of Husbandry* is not altogether surprising in view of the wider appeal made by a work which, though chiefly concerned with husbandry for the information of "husbands," also suggests occupations for "housewives" and "moderation" for young gentlemen; while gentlemen's servants were provided with a list (to be learnt by heart) of all the wearing apparel that their masters would require to be packed for travel. But a still greater attraction may have been, in an age when sport had to be rationed by statute, some useful tips on the "properties" and diseases of horses, besides supplementing the earlier treatises by information on bee-keeping and on the planting of orchards that were soon to change the face of the countryside.

Later still, further attractive information is included (perhaps in both cases by the enterprise of printers) in an *Epitome of Husbandry* which interpolates, in the days of Walton and Cotton, "Directions for the right use of the Angle." And so the *Book of Husbandry* kept its place until important changes in agrarian economy paved the way for a long succession of agricultural text-books, supplemented by histories of British Agriculture. Finally, in 1882, Fitzherbert's work was critically edited for the English Dialect Society, and Walter Skeat dealt faithfully with an Elizabethan editor who had bowdlerised the plain but terse prose of the original in order to produce a more "elegant" effect; but when we recall that Walter Harte's agricultural *Essays* (1764) were highly praised by Lord Chesterfield and Dr. Johnson for their "elegance," these incidents may quicken some misgivings as to the effect of interpolations by early scribes or of embellishments by later editors upon the text of Walter of Henley's "treatise."

That text dealt with the related manuscripts of four treatises which may be very briefly mentioned here in order of date: (1) *The Rules of St. Robert* (Grosseteste); (2) Walter of Henley's *Treatise of Husbandry*; (3) *The Anonymous Husbandry* and (4) *Seneschaucie*. Of these the first can be assigned to the years 1240-1 and the others to some dates between 1253 and 1312. The language in each case is Anglo-French. The authorship of the third and fourth treatises is unknown. To these French treatises must be added the text of a version in fifteenth-century English, with extracts from another English and a Latin version. For the *Seneschaucie*,

the text of Fleta would have to be collated. This is a bald statement of the printed materials available in the 1890 edition. It might be added, however, that the editing of these texts involves the examination and collation of some thirty manuscripts, most of which have been classified and described in the 1890 edition or elsewhere.

The case for further study and research in connection with the manuscript sources of these treatises is briefly this: The subject itself is one of national as well as of learned interest, but it is one that needs fuller elucidation from the materials that are now available. The edition of 1890, which purposely attempted no collation, correction or exposition of the text and which disregarded the literary and linguistic interest of the treatises, is now exhausted. And then, quite recently, an early manuscript of Walter of Henley's *Husbandry* has been discovered in a register belonging to an English monastery, which had been preserved in the family of the grantee of the monastery site in 1536, a manuscript that possesses some features of great interest.

The above statement seems to invite some pertinent questions. It is easier to ask questions of this sort than to answer them; but such questions would not be asked unless they seemed likely to help towards completing the pioneer work of a distinguished scholar to whose sagacity and industry we owe the inception of a difficult and long-neglected task. There is of course the alternative—to remain wise in our own conception of the matter; but we are told that wisdom is justified of her children. The first question that would occur to any such inquirer must be "Who was Walter of Henley, and what was his connection with the several treatises relating to husbandry?"

The manuscripts of the Treatises of Husbandry do not usually mention the name of a reputed author, but several of the copyists assign the credit for one of them, at least, to Walter of Henley. "This is the ditty," we read, "of Husbandry that a wise man once made, who had for a name, Sir Walter of Hengley." Here, alas, we are held up, for though editors, commentators, bibliographers and possibly the resourceful organisers of local pageants have assumed that Henley-on-Thames is indicated, there is really no justification for the assumption; and so our topographical progress is checked by the long array of Henleys in the gazetteers.

These lie in fourteen counties at least, and they were variously spelt of old and are now variously modernised. Even the admirable learning of the Place-name Society could scarcely help us here; and even if Oxfordshire were intended, it would involve a hue and cry in Bucks and Berks also. In this predicament it might be best to avoid Henley Bridge altogether and to follow new clues, in Kent or Hampshire, to our author's experiences as a landowner or land agent, a knight or friar. For the above extracts from the manuscripts can be continued as follows: "who first was a knight and then rendered himself a friar preacher." It would seem then that Sir Walter was first bailiff or keeper of some group of manors and that then, like his contemporary Henry of Bray (whose career can be actually traced in his own memoranda), he acquired and farmed land himself. His treatise contains an incidental but very human allusion to the practice in certain manors "at the time when I was bailiff," and there are other allusions that suggest the interest of a manor lord in the conduct of its business. This could not flourish, he assures his readers, unless the lord is ever on his guard against the "malice" of his officers which may deprive him of some fraction of the working-day, or even of a few handfuls of corn, or a dead sheep's skin; to say nothing of the bailiffs who fail to account for the profits of heaping the measures or "tipping" the scales, making merchandise with their lord's money to their own profit and not to the profit of the lord, a thing which is not "loyal."

So much for the name. Something more might be said as to a family to fit the name or as to local features that might agree with the author's commentaries, such as the mention in an unidentified manuscript of serjeants and bedels as typical manorial officers, a feature of Kentish establishments. For the present, however, we must be content to treat this worthy bailiff or manor lord, knight or friar, as an abstraction that might have been realised in many a manor or house of religion. After all we may not lose more by listening to the courtly *patois* of this unknown master of the Complete Art of Husbandry in some unnamed manor than if we were hearing a lecture by one, Isaak Walton, on the Gentle Art of Angling beside some purling brook, without learning that the *maestro* was a Cockney draper and his enchanted stream the river Lea.

We might fairly ask ourselves what manner of teacher was this, who made such a deep impression on those coming after him in many generations. As to this, Maitland has warned us that he may have been in advance of his time, like Arthur Young. But was his work a solitary inspiration; and were there not, through the centuries, scores of able manorial officers who had no means or ambition for displaying their knowledge, even if they possessed wit and personality for improving an occasion? We know that a Dominican could be a missionary, even in his own country, and we are told that after Sir Walter had become a friar he taught the people how they ought to live wisely and honestly of their goods, and not waste too much beforehand lest they should want after.

This then may be the copious source of our author's inspiration. His altruism reminds us that Bishop Grosseteste wished his noble pupil to get her officers interested in the affairs of their manors; but though Sir Walter the friar writes that a lord's servants ought to regard his business as though it were their own, Sir Walter the ex-bailiff adds that there are few who observe this principle. Is it not possible that his bitter disillusionment may have led this eager and loyal official to devote himself to the reform of economic and social evils, like so many others of the noble army of friars? And may we not be permitted to envisage a burly friar, cunning in scripts and ready of speech, addressing a group of lay brethren, as an Anglo-Saxon archbishop had done before him, rolling the r's of his sonorous Norman-French and pausing frequently to expound an example with arresting questions: "Why?" (or "How?")—"I will tell you!" and then the pithy proverbs "As men say in French" (or "in English").

If this interpretation of the message which Sir Walter wished to convey to all and sundry connected with the cult of husbandry may seem fanciful, we should remember that the need for theoretical instruction in agrarian science can be inferred from the vogue of still earlier tracts and table books. Moreover, the manor at work or at rest provided the preaching friars with homely but graphic expositions of Biblical allusions, and one of the most delightful descriptions in medieval literature of the progress of the farmer's boy through the changing seasons of the husbandman's year was written by a teaching friar, the contemporary of Walter of Henley, while a later medieval word-book, still useful for its agrarian exposi-

tions, was also compiled by members of that order. In this connection, therefore, might not the latter have addressed his treatise, with the encouragement of manor lords and ladies, to the officers of the courtyard responsible for the profitable working of the demesne by the intelligent team-work of the farm hands and the assiduous services of the village?

It is significant that the primary object of the *Treatise of Husbandry* with its appendices was not merely to instruct the lord or his officers in the various operations of husbandry according to the routine prescribed in the Shepherd's Calendar or by local custom, but also to enable them to watch out and test the system of husbandry, stock-keeping and house-keeping employed, in order to ensure a prescribed standard of efficiency and a calculated rate of profit. These precautions were enforced by means of preliminary and *interim* extents, inquests, charges and changes, with final visitations, accounts and audits, each stage of the proceedings being checked by precepts, oaths, witnesses, indentures, tallies and acquittances. This elaborate machinery could only be worked by means of a system of service in which everyone had an appointed place, with *liaisons* between the several departments of the household and between these and the offices of the *curia* (or farm-yard), the object of the whole system being to ascertain the lord's income and especially the profit, without which no industrial or commercial operations were regarded as being on a sound basis.

We are told about these and other points of a well-ordered manorial economy in every one of the four treatises, but we do not find that much use has been made of some common features of the texts for the purpose of determining the probable relations of the respective *codices*. In particular, we might venture to ask if our earliest treatise on Husbandry in relation to the household economy may not be something more than advice *ad hoc* offered by a saintly bishop to a widowed *châtelaine*.

The famous *Rules of St. Robert*, referred to here, might indeed be regarded with certainty as abstracts from an establishment book for the regulations of the bishop's own house and manors, prepared for the same purpose and on the same lines as Walter of Henley's treatise, their object being to enable a lord to live "from his own estates with all his household." One of these Rules is in fact an analysis of the

bishop's household diets. In another the bishop sets out to show the folly of selling the straw with the grain, since it might be used as fodder or litter in the sheepfold and eventually as manure. It should, therefore, be scattered in the fold, and even threshed straw will do as well, if mixed with hay. Now Walter of Henley urges the very same practice, ending with the same recommendation as to mixing straw and hay, which he considers most important. It has been suggested that bishops and abbots were only interested in the development of livestock farming because of the revenue from wool; but it might appear that what may be either advice or dogma in one case must be the same in another, and when a knight who has turned friar and a bishop renowned for his piety and learning are represented as discussing the merits of fodder and manures for high farming in the thirteenth century, we must feel that the cause of British agriculture has been advanced by such research, and that the method of those earnest researchers should be more widely appreciated.

There are other questions which we might wish to ask, but to which no considered answer could be given here. It may of course be decided that the present edition, though out of print and also out of date, will suffice for our immediate needs; but if it were agreed that a new edition must be provided, it would have to be determined whether or not it should be prepared on the lines of the rather daring experiment of 1890. Should preference be given to a rugged copy of the earliest form of the text: or should further pains be taken to restore the sense from new and from uncollated manuscripts? The time has come when we might wish to read these remarkable treatises as they were written and rewritten some 500 years ago.

HUBERT HALL.

MAN AND INSTINCT.

SEVERAL uncritical assertions, some of them popular, some learned, which have been made on the strength of the general acceptance of the idea of evolution, require to be dealt with. One of these is that man's behaviour, conduct, and activity are dominated entirely by instinct. The glorification of "the blood," the "wild body," and the irrational impulses, to which so many modern writers owe their popularity, rests upon this doubtful assumption. Since man has "come up" from the lower animals, so the argument runs, he must be "understood," body and soul, by his lowly origins. As the naturalists have "placed" man by his anatomy, so it has been assumed the task of psychology is to relate his mental and moral traits to animal origins and to his physiological or even his physical make-up. It has even been inferred that there might be different chemical formulæ for a good man and for a bad man, as witness the following: "The quantity of adrenalin in the blood at a given moment may be the cause of a man being a murderer or an adulterer." Some popularisers of the new knowledge do not hesitate to refer to moral and spiritual ideas as illusory, as belonging to a make-believe world with which man is alleged to have cushioned his lot. The Christian apologist, however, must not allow himself to be driven into defending an abstract spirituality, the bloodless spiritism which regarded body and soul as entirely independent entities. "What art thou?" said Marcus Aurelius, "a little soul carrying a corpse." Christianity has suffered unfairly for this view, which derives ultimately from Plato. If Platonism was Christianity's "old nurse," as we are told, it is well to remember to have an eye on the nurse. Since so much has been made of the debt of the Christian religion to Greece it is only fair to require full acknowledgment that this disconnectedness of body and soul came to us from Greece rather than from the Scriptures of either Old or New Testament.

We must at the outset as faithfully recognise the bodily basis of man's spiritual activities as did the early Christian writers of the New Testament and such early teachers as Origen and Augustine. These availed themselves of the best secular knowledge of their time. They took their stand upon the science of their day more courageously than most Church

teachers of modern times. The modern representative of the Christian message should have at least the same faith in truth, and should rid himself once for all of the notion of a necessary feud between revelation and science, and get to work upon a presentable doctrine of human nature. The Pauline doctrine of the "flesh" at "enmity" with the spirit, until by a higher synthesis, the "redemption of the body," it becomes the "temple of the Holy Ghost," sufficiently indicates that primitive Christians wore no blinkers to conceal the gross facts of human existence. The attribution of one part of human nature to the Devil was consistently repudiated as a heresy, and the aspiration of the whole man finds noble expression in the Psalmist's words:

My heart and my flesh cry out for the living God.

Robert Browning did not discover this, but reasserted it:

Let us not always say, Spite of the flesh to-day
I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole!

It is not the frank acknowledgment of the body's dependencies and needs, but the assertion that these determine absolutely the mind, character and spirit of the man, that is destructive of the Christian view of things. To show that, notwithstanding the acknowledged process of evolution, this is a world in which learning is possible to the creature, and that experience counts; that blind impulses can be synthesised, in short that man's world provides a path whereby he may climb "from flesh to God"—that is what is required to be done again for our time.

Before we can rebut the proposition that human nature is comprised entirely within a formula of instincts, or profitably discuss the place of instinct in man, we must clear up a large misunderstanding as to the meaning of instinct. When a popular word is drawn into scientific usage confusion is liable to follow. The confusion in this case is due to the fact that biologists have given the term "instinct" a definite and restricted meaning, whilst psychologists commonly use the word in the much wider and perhaps the popular sense. The agreed meaning of the word, for all parties, may be expressed by "inborn tendencies," but the definition of the word cannot be kept separate from the discussion of the alleged fact—and we have immediately three differing points

of view: (i) Are any of man's tendencies inborn? (ii) Are all of man's tendencies inborn? (iii) Are just some of them inborn?—questions which might well serve to introduce a survey of the rival schools of science and philosophy. Let us first obtain a clear idea of what the biologist means by instinct by recalling some of the best-known and undisputed examples of purely instinctive behaviour. A dog will go through the action of burying a bone, even on the carpet; he does not have to learn to do it; the impulse comes to him even though he has not mingled with his kind. A chick hatched in an incubator will follow any moving object as if following the mother hen. Typically instinctive actions do not have to be learned; they are usually perfect from the first and independent of individual experience; as witness the nest-building activities of birds; web-spinning by spiders; immobility or death-shamming in the presence of danger in many classes of creatures.

Whilst we call actions "intelligent" which appear to be done with a "purpose" in view, we must admit that "instinct" achieves a purpose from the point of view of the species, but as in many cases the purpose is fulfilled after the death of the individual which manifests it, it cannot be deliberate or intentional on its part. Think of the laying of eggs by insects in the requisite place for ensuring food for the grubs—as of the blow-fly upon carrion, or of butterflies upon the right species of plant, or the hiding of the carrion by the burying-beetles. Think of the return of the eels at 8 or 9 years of age to the Atlantic waste near Bermuda for spawning, not one of them living to guide the young elvers to our inland ponds and streams. Such action or behaviour is what the biologist understands by instinct. Now in distinguishing this type of behaviour as instinctive the naturalist is thereby demarcating it from another type of behaviour, namely the purposive. On the one hand is the automatic and ready-made; on the other the self-adaptive and purposive, reaching to intelligence.

It is probably correct to say that the psychic life of all creatures contains both purposive and instinctive elements, but mingled in varying proportions, though we must never forget that in the behaviour of animals any reference we make to mental activity is only an inference from our own conscious life. We are needlessly hampering our understand-

ing of animal life if we go so far as to deny consciousness to all creatures except ourselves. But in regard to these instinctive activities, whether mind had anything to do with the formation of instinct or not, naturalists are probably right in their agreement that consciousness now plays a very small part and in some cases none at all.

It has been frequently stated of late that the "old and popular" distinction between instinct and intelligence has broken down, or is no longer held to be scientific. (*Query*—Is this the rationalising tendency of the mind ever trying to substitute a single principle in place of two or more?) For the relation of instinct and intelligence there are three possible alternatives before us. As a sheer guess arising out of evolution it has been held that intelligence was derived from instinct. The reverse of this, viz. that instinct is hereditary habit or fossilised intelligence, i.e. action which in bygone ancestors for so many generations was deliberate until at length it became automatic, even as we form personal habits, is a view which has received the most powerful advocacy, Samuel Butler being its most famous protagonist. The third alternative is that neither is derived from the other, but that both are diverging lines in the developing of a primitive psychic activity. Bergson is a well-known exponent of this view. We need not be distracted by this debate in our present inquiry, but we may perhaps say that it is the last alternative which seems to us to fit the facts. Man shares with practically the whole living creation three fundamental needs, namely hunger, sex, and companionship. We believe that these needs or urges are the raw material of instinct; that is to say, instincts are concerned with the satisfaction of these needs but in a proper use of the word they themselves are not to be termed instincts. And (lest we should seem to shirk acknowledging them) let us immediately add that these three fundamental needs are no less the raw material of the human virtues—the kingdom by the subjection of which man rises to spiritual freedom. The hunger after righteousness; the devotion of the soul, and the fellowship of the spirit, are not escapes, or "sublimations," but victories whereby the reality of the spiritual is vindicated by its power to harmonise and create a world of its own.

Man comes of a stock, the mammals, in which the principles of "initiative and referendum" (if we may borrow a political

phrase) are put at a premium. The significance of the mammalian fore-brain is held to be just this—that reaction to impressions from the outer world can be referred to the individual experience of the creature. Man's great fore-brain, which provides the means for his learning by experience, is itself a witness to his deliverance from the merely instinctive life. This is not to deny that the animal and instinctive equipment of a pre-human stage may even yet underlie our human nature, as the late Dr. Rivers believed. His own investigations, with those of Dr. Head, in morbid cases and cases of war injury, led him to find in the nervous system itself a primitive instinctive foundation overlaid by the higher human synthesis. Take for example the explanation of dumbness produced by shell-shock, given by Dr. Rivers. The effect of panic fear may be either to run uncontrolledly or to "lie low and say nothing." This "all-or-none principle" is observable in the behaviour of gregarious creatures, as we have had occasion to observe in geese near the sea; when the shadow of a sea-bird fell on them either they all gave voice with might and main or all crouched motionless and silent. Dr. Rivers' view was that the shock of battle, by destroying the higher control, released this ancient all-or-none reaction. But none has warned us more effectively than Dr. Rivers of those psychologists who, after studying morbid cases, have exclaimed: Behold, the real human nature! Regressions there are, not only to infancy but probably to pre-humanity, but these are not the typical human, which may be said to be characterised by the subordination of the instinctive to the intelligent, not to speak of the spiritual, a level which is above the average man's head until he desires it.

Let us now turn from the biologist's standpoint to that of the psychologist. It is a very strange fact that the psychologists for the most part have written upon instinct, and in particular upon the human instincts, without regard to the strictly biological conception. They have chosen the much wider significance, indicating the total equipment of man. They might have been right in so doing if they had not so deliberately marked out their province as beginning where the biologist left off, and defining their objective as providing "an evolutionary natural history of mind." The result is that human nature comes to be exhibited as a "bundle of instincts." In answer to the question from which psychology

may very well set out: What are we interested in and why? these psychologists answer: We are interested in the phases of a world into which we have come as an evolving animal species, and for which we are adapted by a number of inborn responses, "the instincts," released as time and circumstances arise.

Dr. James Drever (*Instinct in Man*) follows Prof. McDougall in

recognising that the original springs of human action are either instinctive or of the instinctive order, and that human reason is in the main applied in the seeking out of means for the attainment of ends, determined ultimately by these original instinctive forces.

We turned to Prof. McDougall's new book, *The Energies of Men*, to see whether he had modified his insistence that intelligence is inseparable from instinct. Apart from offering us the word "propensity" in place of instinct, he is unrepentant. He holds that man is the most richly endowed with instincts of all the animals. The paragraph which best summarises the ground of his belief is as follows:

Now biologists are at one in regarding mankind as the most highly evolved species of mammal; they hold that the differences between the human species and the great apes, the mammals nearest to man in the scale of life, are of the same nature as those which separate the apes from the lower mammals. If then, these generally accepted principles are sound, we must expect to find that the human species has all or most of the propensities common to the rest of the mammals . . . and perhaps some special propensities.

Prof. McDougall uses phrases which seem to betray an adherence to the view of a serial or linear progress; his use of "higher" and "lower" is uncritical, and he appears to regard "higher" as equivalent to "more complex," after the Spencerian fashion. Despite the above statement of "the common agreement of biologists," an increasing number of them would state the matter differently, thus: (1) Physically, apart from the vastly developed cerebrum, man is not "the most highly evolved" but among the simplest and least modified of mammals; in limbs and teeth he is extremely primitive. Man may not be derived from the stock of the anthropoids at all. His line may run back independently to

the most primitive mammals, cutting out all the apes, monkeys and lemurs. Among the authorities for such an opinion are Snell, Hubrecht, Oettking, Boule, Klaatsch, Wood-Jones and H. F. Osborne. Now in all the animal types specialisations in instincts are correlated with modifications in structure. Excepting only his great brain, man is markedly devoid of these. (2) The possession of a cerebrum so large as to envelop and conceal the lower brain is so unique a characteristic (shown even in embryonic man, or in the oldest fossil skulls) that to call it a "difference of the same nature" as that which separates apes from lower mammals is to minimise the chief anatomical evidence as to the nature of human mentality. Prof. McDougall himself in his chapter on the physiology of the brain admirably presents us with the evidence that "the seat of the propensities" is in the thalamus or mid-brain, i.e. that part which is fairly equally developed in all the mammals. Prof. McDougall has dealt such doughty blows at materialism that many have looked to him to provide a statement of the case for regarding the human brain as evolved for the free functioning of consciousness. His work on *Body and Mind* was a stalwart defence of "animism" or the primacy of mind or spirit; he still stoutly resists the "behaviourists," and openly triumphs over the "reflexologists"; why should he surrender conscious intelligence and reason to instinct?

Let us cite one more outstanding psychologist. Prof. E. L. Thorndike, in *The Original Nature of Man* (1926), is keenly sensitive of the inadequacy of "the early and emotional instincts" to account for human motives, and warns his reader against trying to make too much out of tendencies which have little in them for education in the world to-day.

We should of course make as much as we can out of everything in man's equipment; but we had best realise once for all that pouncing upon and wrestling, playing in cave-like places, hunting birds' eggs, returning a blow, fearing thunder, pitying men with sores, and the like, are trivialities for education and life compared with instinctive manipulation of objects in general and delight in thought for thought's sake.

Having thus rebuked his fellow psychologists for cramming back human nature into animal categories, we should have expected him to disown the instinctive theory of human

nature; but apparently this would be a break with the school which holds his allegiance. How does he keep his orthodoxy? By classifying the intellect as an instinct.

Intellect is not dignified by denying its natural origin or removing it beyond usefulness to the crudest and triviallest of the wants of living men. Intellect is of the same flesh and blood with all the instincts, a brother whose superiority lies in his power to appreciate, harmonise, and use and save them all.

Now the Christian thinker would not dispute the incarnation of the intellect, but he does definitely disbelieve the deification of the flesh. To derive mind from not-mind is not explanation but conjuring. Thorndike continues; "There is a warfare of man's ideals with his original tendencies, but his ideals came at some time from original yearnings in some man." We should agree to this. But Thorndike's object seems to be to derive these yearnings and ideals ultimately from the bodily and animal nature rather than from that toward which they yearn and aspire; to accept as "original human nature" what comes "from below," regarding as inadmissible any element purporting to come "from above." This instinctive theory of man fails to take account of the whole universe which is man's environment: the implicit order of Nature to which his intellect is the response; the moral life of the community to which the response is conscience; and the sense of Self-hood behind Nature, to which the response is religion.

Except for clearness, it matters not if these responses are called instinctive, but so used it means that man's intellectual, moral, and spiritual activities are the spontaneous and natural responses of an original human nature to objective realities in relation to which he has his being. St. Paul's illuminating distinction, the "natural man" and the "spiritual man," keeps open the upward way. There is no objection on Christian grounds to the psychologist's use of "instinct" as signifying the total human outfit of responses so long as it is "total," and recognises the total situation to which human nature may be regarded as the response.

How far is the "program" of the individual human life indicated from "within"? What are the promptings or leadings which are "given" to us as we reach the successive stages and are faced with the widening circumstances of life?

Whatever the psychologist can teach us of these things is of the utmost value for our educational and religious life. As the suckling stage of the newly born is left behind and the psychic life of the young human being is transferred by example and speech and thought to the life of the community, as mating and parental instincts awaken, they do so not as a film is shot, or as a record is played, but they do so for an active self, increasingly self-determined. For we do not live in a vacuum, neither are we disembodied spirits, but in some sense each of us inherits the experience of all the ages, and such impulses as we call curiosity, pugnacity, acquisition, construction, and the rest have crystallised out of the past not to govern us but to guide us to a true valuation of things. For it is the personal, man as valuer and man as valued, that alone gives significance to creation.

In answering the question, then, whether human nature is entirely comprised within a list of instincts, we must know which conception of instinct has been adopted—that of the naturalists or that of the psychologists? On the naturalist's definition instinct is the reverse of learning, and in human capacity the power to learn is man's chief asset. By this token man is the least instinctive of creatures. But human life is not lived in a vacuum, void of emotion, desire, passion. On a naturalist's understanding, then, instinct in man is the root but not the stem and flower. We will not stickle over the matter of definition, however, and if the usage of the term "instinct" which has been adopted by the psychologists be preferred then we shall be careful to insist that the completion and satisfaction of man's interests are in a sphere clean beyond that of the bodily functions, in the artistic, intellectual, moral, and religious life; in short, in the attainment of relations that are universal.

J. PARTON MILUM.

MY MEETINGS WITH TOLSTOY.*

N EARLY all my life has been spent in passionate love for him.

When did I learn of his existence? In any case, rather early. As a child I already had an idea of him, not from reading his books but from conversations at home. Among other things I remember that my father used to laugh, telling how some of our neighbouring squires read *War and Peace*: one read only *War*, another only *Peace*: one, in fact, left out all that concerned war, the other all that concerned peace. Even then my feelings for Tolstoy were not simple. My father had many passions and shortcomings—he was a negligent landlord, a squanderer, he drank, gambled, spent his days out shooting, and at times would excuse himself by referring to Pushkin, to Turgenev.

"God alone is without sin," he would say. "Take Pushkin; he could not write a single line without a bottle of champagne. He was, after all, a tremendous *bon-vivant*, a gambler, a duellist, inflammable as powder, in fact a man of just our cut. . . ." Or he would say: "And what kind of landlord is Turgenev? Spends months out shooting or gadding about his Paris." And of Tolstoy he would say: "I used to know him a little. We met during the Crimean campaign. . . . He's no better either! He could not see a pack of cards without getting excited." And I remember how admiringly I looked at him. Why, he had actually seen Tolstoy in the flesh!

Why did I have such feelings about a man of whom I had not yet read one line? But for me it was enough that he was a writer. Ever since my childhood writers were to me a race apart, men for whom I felt a kind of adoration and enthusiasm, an indescribable emotion which I still cannot understand or define with any measure of sense, just as I cannot say how, when or why I myself became a writer. To say that is just as impossible for me as to state since when, and just how, I have become what I am. And when it was decided, somehow automatically, that I was to be a writer and nothing else, my second life became life in the world of poets and authors, where people invent and write. But again, I do not remember when exactly I did start reading Tolstoy, and how I came to single him out from all others. A man will sometimes sud-

* Translated from the Russian by Gleb Struve.

denly discover with surprise something beautiful and dear to him. It was not so in the case of Tolstoy and myself; such a moment I do not recollect. Generally speaking, all the beautiful things I came across as child and boy and youth, never seemed to surprise me—on the contrary, I felt as if I had long known them, so that it only remained for me to rejoice at finding them. Such, for instance, was my first encounter with mountains, and with the sea: at the first sight of the marvellously blue sea gulf, breathing its morning mists, which suddenly met my eyes through the carriage window at the approach to Sevastopol, my whole soul, I remember, was enthralled, I felt overwhelmed with joy. But that joy was not mixed with surprise—it was a joy at encountering something long familiar and loved, a part of my own being and existence. It was the same with Tolstoy's works when I first read them.

Thereafter, for many years, I was actually in love with him, with that self-made image which filled me with longings and dreams of seeing him in reality. It was an importunate, tormenting dream, but how could I realise it at the time? Go to Yasnaya Polyana? Ask Tolstoy to let me have at least a peep at him? But how, on what pretext, could I go there, a totally unknown, shy boy? Once it got the better of me: on a fine, really fine summer day, I suddenly saddled my Kirghiz riding horse and rode across the cornfields, along the boundary-lines and field-tracks, to Efremov, in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana, which was not more than a hundred miles from us. But on reaching Efremov I took fright, decided to think it over more seriously and spend the night in Efremov. And all night I could not sleep for emotion, changing my mind every now and then; all night I wandered about the town, and got so tired that, entering the public garden at dawn, I fell sound asleep on the first bench; and when I woke I was quite sobered; I thought it over a little more, trailed sadly back to the inn to fetch my horse, and then trotted lazily home. There the farmhands said to me: "Well, young sir, how did you get your horse so tired out in one day? Whom were you chasing?" After that I "chased" Tolstoy for a few more years. In my youth, captivated by dreams of a clean, healthy and goodly life amidst Nature, by one's own labours, wearing light and simple garments, in brotherly friendship not only with all the poor and oppressed people,

but with all the vegetable and animal world, too, and above all, because of my being in love with Tolstoy as an artist, I became a Tolstoyan—not without a secret hope, of course, that it would at last somehow entitle me to see him, perhaps even to become one of his intimates. Thus began my Tolstoyan novitiate.

I was living then in Poltava, where somehow I found a number of Tolstoyans with whom I soon became intimate. On the whole they were quite unbearable people, but I put up with them. The first man I learned to know was a fellow called Klopsky. He enjoyed a certain notoriety in some circles at that time, and had even been chosen as the hero of Karonin's story *The Teacher of Life*, which then made a sensation. He was a tall, lean man in top-boots and a blouse, with a narrow, grey face and turquoise eyes, a cunning and insolent rogue, and a tireless chatterbox, everlastingly lecturing and edifying everybody. He liked to flabbergast people by sudden pranks and insolent remarks, and by his general behaviour which enabled him to keep fairly well fed and merry, wandering from town to town. Among the Poltava Tolstoyans there was a doctor called Alexander Alexandrovich Wolkenstein, a great gentleman by birth and by nature, who had something in common with Steve Oblonsky. On his arrival in Poltava, Klopsky went first of all to Wolkenstein, and soon through him was admitted to the drawing-rooms of Poltava. Wolkenstein introduced him there both for ideological purposes as a preacher, and for mere amusement as a curious fellow, and Klopsky used to hold forth there like this:

"Yes, yes, I see the life you lead here—telling lies and munching sweets, and offering thanksgiving services to your idols in churches which it is high time to blow into the air. When will an end come to all the absurdities and iniquities in which the world is drowning? Take this, for instance: I was travelling here from Kharkov. A man, called for some reason the conductor, comes and says: 'Your ticket, please.' I ask him: 'What do you really mean, what sort of ticket?' He answers: 'The ticket by which you are travelling.' To which I say: 'I beg your pardon, but I am travelling not by ticket but by train.'—'Which means that you have no ticket?'—'Of course not,' I say. 'In such a case we will get you out at the next stop.'—'Well,' says I, 'that's your business, and my business is to travel.' At the next stop they actually come. 'Will you please get out?' 'But why should I?' I say, 'I am all right here.' 'You mean you don't want to get

out?—'Of course, I don't.'—'Then we'll have to lead you out.'—'Lead me out? But I shan't go.'—'Then we'll drag you or carry you out.'—'Well, do, it's your business.'—And here, indeed, they took me out: two huge peasants, two loafers who could do much better by tilling land, carried me in their arms, to the astonishment of all the onlookers. . . ."

That's what this famous Klopsky was like. The others were not famous, but they were a queer lot, too. There were the brothers D., who had settled on the land near Poltava, extremely boring, dull, conceited fellows, though very humble in appearance; then a certain Leontyev, a short, puny young man of extraordinary though morbid beauty, a former cadet of the Corps des Pages, who also tortured himself by peasant work and lied, both to himself and to others, pretending that it made him feel happy; then a huge Jew looking like a racy Russian peasant, who afterwards became known under the name of Tenoromo, always giving himself important airs and condescending towards ordinary mortals, an intolerable rhetorician and quibbler, engaged in hooping casks. He was my chief instructor both in "doctrine," and in living by the labours of one's own hands; I was his apprentice, learning how to hoop the casks. What did I want those hoops for? Again, only because they somehow bound me to Tolstoy, gave me a secret hope of one day seeing him, of becoming intimate with him. And to my great delight this hope, quite unexpectedly, soon came true. Before long all those people were looking on me as one of their own set, and Wolkenstein—it was towards the end of 1893—suddenly invited me to accompany him, first to the "brothers" in the Government of Kharkov, the peasants from the village Khilkovo, and then to Moscow, to Tolstoy.

It was a journey full of hardships. We travelled third class, with many changes, all the time trying to choose the most "democratic" carriages, and ate vegetarian food—the devil knows what!—although Wolkenstein would sometimes give in, rush to the station buffet and gulp down with terrible greed a couple of glasses of vodka, and eat some burning-hot meat patties, after which he would say to me in all earnest: "I have once more yielded to my lust, and it makes me suffer a lot, but I fight myself and I know all the same that the patties don't possess me, but I them: I am not their slave, if I want to I eat them, if not I don't. . . ."

What chiefly made the journey difficult was the fact that I burned to reach Moscow as soon as possible, yet we had to travel by bad trains, and also stop with the Khilkovo "brothers," establish personal intercourse with them, and fortify both them and ourselves by that intercourse. This we did—we stayed three or four days, I think, with the Khilkovo peasants, and in the course of those days I came to hate, heart and soul, these well-to-do, pious, kind-looking villagers, the nights in their cottages, their pies stuffed with potato, their psalm-singing, their stories of fierce and ceaseless struggle against "priests and authorities," and their hair-splitting discussions about the Scriptures. Finally, on New Year's day we set off further. I remember that I woke up that morning in such high spirits that, forgetting everything, I wished Wolkenstein a happy New Year, for which he gave me a downright scolding: Did I realise what it meant—the New Year, what old nonsense I was talking? But I cared not a bit. I listened to him and thought: "Well, well, that's all rot—to-morrow night we shall be in Moscow, and the day after to-morrow I shall see Tolstoy." And so it was.

Wolkenstein offended me enormously by going to Tolstoy the very moment we reached our Moscow hotel, and not taking me with him. "Impossible, impossible. Lev Nikolaevich has to be warned. I'll do it"—and he rushed off. He came back very late and did not even tell anything about his visit. "I seem to have had a drink of life-giving water!"—was the only hurried remark he threw at me, and by the smell of him I could tell unmistakably that after it he had also drunk some Chambertin, evidently in order to prove that the Chambertin was his slave, and not he the Chambertin's. The only good thing was that he had actually warned Tolstoy—I had had little hope even of that: this slightly effeminate, handsome, dark-haired man, a little on the fat side, was very nice, but much too scatterbrained. Nevertheless, he did warn Tolstoy, and the next evening I ran, panting, to Khamovniki.

How shall I tell all that followed? A moonlit frosty night. Here I am, standing still and catching breath. All around is desolate and quiet, a desert moonlit lane. Before me is the entrance, an open gate, a snow-covered courtyard. At the bottom of it, on the left, an old wooden house, some of the windows of which are lit with a reddish light. Further to the left, behind the house, is a large orchard and, over it, lovely,

fairlylike winter stars, quietly scintillating with multi-coloured rays. But then everything around looks fairlylike. What a peculiar orchard, what an extraordinary house, how mysterious and significant are those lighted windows behind which is He, He. And such a stillness that one hears one's heart thump—with joy, of course, and also with the terrible thought: "Would it not be better to take a look at the house and run back?" At last I rush in despair down the courtyard and up the porch, and ring the bell. The door is opened at once—I see a footman in tail-coat, and a bright hall, warm and homely, with lots of fur coats hanging on pegs. Right in front of me is a steep staircase covered with red cloth. To the right, under it, a closed door behind which are heard a guitar and merry young voices, surprisingly careless of the fact that they are raised in such a very special house.

"Whom shall I announce?"

"Bunin."

"I beg your pardon?"

"Bunin."

"All right, sir."

The footman runs upstairs and to my astonishment at once comes running back, hopping sideways, touching the banisters with his hand. "Will you come and wait upstairs, in the salon?" In the salon my surprise is still greater: I had hardly entered it when at the far end of it, on the left, a small door opened at once and from behind it dived out, jerking up his legs with clumsy adroitness—for behind it were a couple of steps leading down to the passage—a large grey-bearded old man with slightly crooked legs, wearing a large, home-sewn blouse of grey flannel, trousers to match, looking rather like breeches, and blunt-toed shoes. Quick, light, terrible, sharp-eyed, with frowning eyebrows. He walked quickly towards me—I had time to notice meanwhile that in his gait, and in his bearing in general, there was a great likeness to my father. Quickly approaching me with a slightly curtsying gait, he stretched, or rather flung out, his large hand, palm upwards, grasped mine, pressed it softly, and suddenly smiled with a most charming smile, gentle and at the same time rather doleful, even a little pitiful; and I saw that those small eyes were not terrible at all and not sharp, but as keen as an animal's, although they, too, had something pitiful and doleful. His scanty grey hair, light and thin,

slightly curling at the ends, was parted in the middle in peasant fashion, his large ears were set unusually high; the knots of his eyebrows projected over the eyes; the beard, dry, light, uneven and sere, enabled one to see his slightly protruding under-jaw.

"Bunin? Was it your father I met in the Crimea? Have you come to Moscow for a long time? What for? To see me? A young writer? Do, do write, if you want it very much, but remember that it never can be an end in life. . . . Sit down, please, and tell me about yourself. . . ."

He began to talk just as hurriedly as he had entered, instantly pretending not to notice my utter embarrassment and hastening to draw me out of it, to distract me. What else did he say? He kept on asking questions.

"Are you single? Or married? One must live with a woman only as a wife and never leave her. You want to lead a simple life of toil? That's all right, but don't do violence to yourself, don't turn it into a uniform; one can be a good man in any life. . . ."

We were sitting by a small table. A fairly tall old porcelain lamp softly burned under its rosy shade. His face was behind the lamp, in a light shadow. I saw only the very soft grey flannel of his blouse, and his large hand which I longed to kiss with exultant, really filial tenderness; I heard his slightly high-pitched old man's voice with that peculiar sound which a protruding jaw makes. . . . Suddenly there was a rustle of silk, I looked up, trembled, and rose: a steady, elegant lady, resplendent with her black dress, her beautifully done hair, and her bright dark eyes, was coming from the drawing-room. "Léon," she said, "you have forgotten that they are waiting for you. . . ." He rose, too, and with an apologetic, even almost guilty smile, with raised eyebrows, looking straight into my face with his small eyes, in which some dark sorrow still lingered, he once more took my hand in his:

"Well, good-bye, good-bye, God help you! Come to see me again when you're in Moscow. Don't expect much from life, you'll never have a better time than the present. . . . There is no happiness in life, only flashes of it—value these, live by them. . . ."

And I left: I ran away quite beside myself, and spent a mad night, dreaming of him all the time with such striking vividness and in such a wild confusion that it is still uncanny to

remember; on waking up now and then I found myself mumbling something, talking in my dream. . . .

Back in Poltava I wrote to him and received in reply several kind letters. In one of them he again intimated to me that it was not worth my while to try and become a Tolstoyan, but I would not desist: I stopped hooping casks, but I began to deal in *Posrednik* books, selling them illicitly, without proper authorisation, at the markets and fairs; this led even to my being tried and sentenced to prison, from which I was saved, to my then great distress, by the Tsar's manifesto. Then I started a bookshop, the Poltava branch of *Posrednik*, and got so muddled with my accounts that I even thought of hanging myself. In the end, of course, I gave up the bookshop and went to Moscow, but even there I still tried to persuade myself that I shared the views and ideas of the leaders of that *Posrednik*, and of those who were everlastingly present on its premises, edifying each other with the rules of goodly life. It was there that I met Tolstoy a few more times. He would drop in there in the evenings, and without taking off his coat would sit for an hour, or half-an-hour, surrounded on all sides by his followers who would sometimes in all earnest ask him questions like this: "What should I do, Lev Nikolaevich, if I were, for instance, attacked by a tiger?" In which case he would merely smile an embarrassed smile and say: "What tiger? Where from? I have not met a tiger in all my life. . . ."

I also remember how once, in a desire to say something pleasant and even flattering to him, I said: "Take now those temperance societies arising everywhere. . . ." He interrupted me with a frown: "What societies?" "Temperance societies. . . ."

"That is when people meet in order not to drink vodka?" he asked. "Nonsense, nonsense. There is no need to meet in order not to drink. And if you meet you must drink. All this is nonsense, lies, substituting for action a semblance of action. . . ."

To his house I went only once more. I was led through the salon where on that first occasion we had been sitting by the nice pink lamp; then through the small door, down the steps and along the narrow passage. I tapped timidly on a door to the right. "Come in," said an old man's high-pitched voice. I entered and saw a small, low room, drowned in twilight because of the iron shield over an ancient candlestick

with two candles; a leather sofa by the table on which that candlestick stood; and then himself, a book in his hand. When I entered he quickly rose and with an awkward, it even seemed to me, an embarrassed, movement, threw the book into the corner of the sofa. But I had keen eyes, and I saw that he had been reading, or rather re-reading (probably for the tenth time, as we the sinners do) his own work which had just been published—*The Master and the Man*. In my admiration for it I was tactless enough to utter an enthusiastic exclamation. He blushed to the roots of his hair, and waved his hands at me. "Oh, don't mention it! Oh, no, what are you saying! It's horrible, it's so paltry that I even feel ashamed to appear in the streets."

His face on that night was thin, dark, austere, as if made of bronze. He was suffering very much in those days—not long before, his seven-year old son Vanya had died. And from *The Master and the Man* he passed straight on to him. "Yes, yes, he was a nice, charming boy. But what does it mean—died? There is no death, he is not dead since we love him and live by him." Soon we came out and went to *Posrednik*. It was a black March night, a spring wind was blowing, making the lights of street lamps swell. We ran across the white, snow-covered Maiden Field, he jumped over the ditches, so that I could hardly keep pace with him, and kept on saying—in a curt, severe, sharp manner—"There is no death, there is no death!"

For the last time I saw him about ten years later. On a terrible frosty night, among the lights behind the shining, frost-painted windows of the shops, I was walking along Arbat and suddenly came face to face with him, running with his springy, hopping gait. I stopped and snatched off my cap. He also stopped and recognised me at once. "Ah, that's you. Good evening, good evening, please put on your cap. . . . Well, how are you, what are you doing and how is the world treating you?" His old man's face was blue and frozen, and this gave him a miserable look. The blue knitted object on his head looked like an old woman's bonnet. The large hand which he pulled from a woollen glove was quite icy. After a talk, he shook my hand firmly and tenderly several times, once more looking dolefully into my eyes, his eyebrows raised: "Well, Christ be with you, Christ be with you, good-bye. . . ."

IVAN BUNIN.

THE EMANCIPATION OF BRITISH JEWRY.

IN 1829 when Catholic Emancipation was being carried after the liberation of Dissenters from their last important civic incapacities, the time seemed to have come to make representations on behalf of the Jews. Unimportant in point of numbers as compared with Dissenters or Catholics, a mere 27,000, perhaps, in the whole of Great Britain and Ireland, the Jews had so questionable a legal status in the country that their very able pamphleteer, F. H. Goldsmid, thought fit to devote much of his space to a proof that British-born Jews were not aliens, expellable at will by the Executive power, that they had a lawful right to own land and that the Courts would probably hold that the Act of 1813, drafted to give Unitarians the belated benefits of the Toleration Act, applied also to the Jews. But the widest civic and professional incapacity was inflicted on them by virtue of oath formularies to be taken "on the true faith of a Christian" and the very nearly invariable requirement that any oath formulary whatever should be sworn to on the Four Evangelists.

By such means it was that entry to Parliament, to civil, military and corporate office, to sheriffdoms and justiceships was made impossible, and even the right of voting might be denied. Nor was this the worst. The Inns of Court were closed to the Jew; he could not attain the Fellowship of the Royal Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons; he could be neither schoolmaster nor yet usher; and the City of London, which denied him freemanship, charged him as much as £1,500 for the admittedly indispensable "Jew Broker Tickets" of the Stock Exchange and provided therewith for Lord Mayor's Expenses. In common, moreover, with all other non-Churchmen, the Jew was excluded from the universities and was left to agitate with the rest for the bestowal of degree-granting powers on the newly founded, non-sectarian University College of London.

It was unfortunate that both the richer and poorer sections of the Jewry of the day afforded the opponents of Jewish Emancipation very specious causes of resistance. The Stock Exchange fortunes of Rothschilds, Montefiores and Goldsmids might well seem to be somewhat questionably acquired, and there were sufficient smaller accumulations in the hands of

Jewish merchants, especially in the East and West India trades, to give a little extra plausibility to the view that the Jews were mere money-getters and were so rich, besides, that they would buy all the seats in the House of Commons. It was even thought fit to argue that they were already sufficiently well-off and did not wish to be emancipated; that they avoided all political identification with the nations among whom they were dispersed because their object was to return to Palestine, and that in any case Parliamentary seats were impossible for them to take because they would not be prepared to attend on Saturdays.

In that aristocratic age, however, it was inevitably the poorer Jew who seemed to give the best justification for opposition to Jewish Emancipation. It was but too easy to associate the Jews in general with the unsavoury hawking, peddling and "old clothes" trades, which so many of them practised, and to forget that Jews had not adopted them for love, but because eighteenth-century crafts had been virtually closed to them, and because retail shopkeeping, too, had often been denied them, as, for example, in the City of London. Indeed, a not unimportant milestone in the history of Jewish Emancipation was to be the generous effort by which a philanthropic party in the then Radical-minded City threw open retail trading to the Jew in 1831, and shortly afterwards made him eligible for freemanship.

The City, of course, which still housed in those days a large proportion of the total Jewish population of the country and had most of the remainder on its very confines, knew better than the average Church and King Tory how solid were the virtues which could be set off against Jewish demerits. The extensive philanthropy of the richer Jew, who not only provided for his poorer co-religionists an abundance of charities to keep them from the Poor Rates, but whose hand was open to every good cause besides; the aversion felt by the whole race to violence and bloodshed, an aversion remarkably emphasised in the statistics of violent crime; the strength of Jewish family bonds and the striking Jewish freedom from the drunkenness which was still a great national evil—these were facts which the Jewish pamphleteer needed not to press overmuch on those who had administrative contacts with the race.

It was tactful, too, in the Jewish medical pamphleteer who

in 1831 made out such a case as that outlined above not to overstate it and to admit the existence of another side. Though he felt it was unfair to blame the Jew for his unwearied industry and his unceasing pursuit of money when money was the only thing by which he could rise to consideration, he yet sorrowfully admitted that there was an ugly counterpart in the crime statistics relating to property. This was the more serious in that Press reporting, normally stressing charges against Jews, tended to give an exaggerated idea of their proportions which were not abnormal. That Emancipation, however, would raise the standards of the poorer Jew the pamphleteer proved from the case of Denmark. To widen the horizon, moreover, even of the wealthier Jewish family, hitherto confined virtually to commerce, and to give its members scope for public and professional distinction, would, he felt, enable British Jews to render their country the same services rendered by the Jewries of the United States, France and Holland. There is something pathetic, indeed, in the eagerness shown by the Jewish pamphleteers to collect the names of even minor Jewish office-holders in the above countries which, with Denmark, were the only ones of standing that had yet conceded Emancipation. When in 1831 Jamaica and in 1832 Lower Canada passed Emancipation Acts under which local Jews received appointments, similar lists were obtained and added to the rest. They made it less necessary to emphasise the formidable but not very relevant medieval list of the Jewish notabilities of Moorish Spain.

Meanwhile in Robert Grant, a very eloquent Member of Parliament with distinguished connections, the cause of Jewish Emancipation had obtained a most reputable Parliamentary advocate. His Bill of 1830, though defeated on Second Reading, was the most interesting private member's measure of the session, and Macaulay, who made his maiden speech in its favour, kept the subject before the public by means of a famous article in the *Edinburgh Review* of January 1831, which was destined for decades to remain the classic plea for Jewish Emancipation. When the Reform Bill excitements, too, had terminated in the election of the first Reformed Parliament, Grant, with the added authority of ministerial place, again moved for Jewish Emancipation and carried it through such a Radical-minded assembly as the

Commons of 1833 without special difficulty. It was not a Government measure, however, and a House of Lords which was already recovering from its Reform Bill defeats of 1831-2 showed no hesitation in rejecting it. The process was often to be repeated in the next quarter of a century.

As the Lords held up a general Emancipation Bill, the process of liberating Jews from their disabilities was begun piecemeal by those authorities who had some measure of competence. In 1833, for example, Lincoln's Inn took the initiative in permitting Jews to be called to the Bar, and in 1835 the City of London, by electing the strenuous David Salomons to the sheriffdom of London and Middlesex, enforced the passage of special legislation enabling him to act. Two years later when the sheriffdom for Queen Victoria's Coronation year was bestowed on the famous philanthropist, Moses Montefiore, a Whig Ministry ventured to advise the conferring of the first knighthood yet awarded to a practising Jew. David Salomons, in the hope of finding a constituency which would support him in an Emancipation struggle with the Lords, had meanwhile undertaken his first unsuccessful Parliamentary candidature at the General Election of 1837, and had also begun his long struggle to gain entrance for Jews to the London Court of Aldermen. Not till ten years after his first election of 1835 as Alderman of the Aldgate Ward did the long litigation his exclusion provoked, combined with the fact that such corporations as those of Birmingham and Southampton had already admitted Jewish members, win from Peel's Government the Act of 1845 ending Jewish disabilities for municipal offices. Meantime Lord Chief Justice Denman's Evidence Act of 1839 had at length allowed Jews and others for whose oath difficulties in the courts and analogous situations the law had yet made no provision, to be sworn in the manner most binding on their consciences.

In 1847 the City Liberals chose to raise the Emancipation question in a particularly critical form by returning the head of the banking house of Rothschild as one of their members alongside Lord John Russell, the Prime Minister. When after a delay of two sessions Russell's powerlessness to overcome the Lords' opposition to the Cabinet Emancipation Bill was plain, Baron Lionel de Rothschild resigned his seat, but was re-elected against a very strong Conservative candidate by 6,019 votes against 3,104. Again he awaited patiently the

results of the renewed efforts made by the Government to do something for him and the City. But when in July 1850 the Peers rejected yet another Government Emancipation Bill, Rothschild in fairness to his constituents resolved to go down to the House. Days of agitated constitutional debate followed. After arduous discussion the book on which he should swear the Parliamentary oaths was successfully separated from the rest and a majority was gained for making it the Old Testament. When, thereupon, the oath formularies were tendered to him he repeated them, but altered the conclusion from "on the true faith of a Christian" to "so help me God." He was then ordered to withdraw and again strenuous constitutional debate opened as to whether the words uttered by him could be taken as legally tantamount to the Parliamentary Oaths. As many members who favoured Jewish Emancipation yet found it impossible constitutionally to admit that Rothschild had taken the proper oaths, he was denied his seat by a majority of seventy-four.

In June 1851 Greenwich Liberals by electing David Salomons at a by-election ensured that the case was taken a step further. Waiting till the Lords had committed their now customary slaughter of a Government "Jew Bill," Salomons presented himself next day to take the oaths. After reciting them in the manner of Rothschild, Salomons disregarded the Speaker's request to withdraw, but passed amidst a tempest of cheering to take his seat on the Government side of the House. Three days later, after making himself liable to all manner of penalties provided in the anti-Jacobite legislation of the past against those who voted without having taken the oath abjuring Stuart Pretenders, Salomons submitted to being conducted out of the House by the Sergeant-at-Arms. The "common informer" litigation he had thus deliberately invited ended on April 19th, 1852, with a very reluctant Exchequer Court Bench finding by majority that Salomons had really incurred most serious penalties by his votes in Parliament. When a Conservative Government thereupon resolved on special legislation annulling Salomons' penalties, it was made plain that there were those on the anti-Emancipation side who were aware how delicate the situation was becoming.

Though at the General Election of 1852 Greenwich could not again be persuaded to forgo one of its members in the

interests of Jewish Emancipation, the City maintained its struggle by returning Rothschild once more. But obstinate peers continued to regard it as a duty to come down from the country to vote against the "Jew Bill," which the Commons persisted in passing even in the Crimean War years; and so reputable a Tory politician as Henry Drummond could find no better explanation of Rothschild's re-election than that "the rabble of London, partly out of the love of mischief, partly from contempt of the House of Commons, and partly from a desire to give a slap in the face to Christianity, elected a Jew." Rothschild was re-elected at the General Election of 1857 shortly after the City had demonstrated its confidence in David Salomons by making him Lord Mayor for the year 1855-6. Despite the great efforts made in the Commons after the 1857 elections, the Lords again rejected the "Jew Bill" sent from the Lower House. When Rothschild thereupon resigned and was re-elected by the City, the matter was plainly entering upon an acute stage. The Commons majority was losing all patience with the continued attempt of the Lords to impose Jewish exclusion on the constituencies and the Lower House.

This impatience was forcibly expressed when Rothschild was appointed to a Commons Committee selected to draw up reasons for disagreement with the amendments made by the Lords in Lord John Russell's Oaths Bill of 1858. To this Bill, which had attempted to make Jewish Parliamentary Oaths part of the larger question of Parliamentary Oaths in general, the Lords had made undesirable amendments, one of which would have thrust Jews anew outside Parliament. Only when it was made plain that the Commons would probably proceed to admit Rothschild by Resolution and risk the struggle with the Courts which the very doubtful constitutionality of such a step would entail, did a sufficient section of anti-Emancipation Peers, anxious not to make the life of the minority Conservative Government of the day impossible, reluctantly offer a compromise. A Bill was permitted to find a way to the Statute Book which still denied the Jew full political status but allowed either House, if it so desired, to authorise a Jewish member to omit from the oath the concluding phrase of "on the true faith of a Christian." Each Jewish election to the Commons, therefore, still needed specific validation by the House as a whole and a Jew

raised to the Peerage might be denied a seat in the Lords indefinitely.

It was not a position which proved tenable long, especially as constitutional examination in 1859 showed that under the new arrangement each Jewish member would have to appeal afresh every session for permission to sit. A first change was made in 1860 by which the House of Commons was allowed to make provision for Jewish membership in its standing orders which automatically run on from session to session. Moreover, when the long-drawn-out controversies concerning the Parliamentary and Official Oaths ended in the modernising legislation of 1866, 1867 and 1868, anti-Jewish discrimination had become as legislatively impossible as it was soon to prove in the sphere of Oxford, Cambridge and Dublin University education. The crux of the bitter University Tests struggle of 1869-73 lay, indeed, in the determination of Radical Dissenters to throw open to the nation the huge University endowments which Conservatives insisted on treating as exclusive Anglican preserves. When considerable danger existed of a perilous conflict between the Gladstone Government and the Lords, the possibility of such a Jewish Mastership of Arts as Oxford was for the first time to see on June 22nd, 1871, was a relative triviality from the first.

It has only just become known that Gladstone had meanwhile mooted the question of the first Jewish peerage in 1869, but that his suggestion of ennobling Lionel de Rothschild, so often elected M.P. for the City, was vetoed by Queen Victoria. "She cannot consent," wrote the Queen, "to a Jew being made a Peer—tho' she will not object to a Jew baronet," and she further defended her veto by drawing a distinction between Rothschild's financial pursuits and "that legitimate trading which she delights to honour." The issues raised in the Bradlaugh case were destined before long completely to overshadow the once allegedly portentous significance of a Jewish entry into the Upper House, and the peerage bestowed on Nathaniel de Rothschild in 1885 certainly aroused little but friendly and congratulatory comment. Gladstone, indeed, who despite his former opposition to Jewish Emancipation was responsible for the Peerage of 1885 as for the suggestion of 1869, had long before 1885 taken what was in effect a more decided initiative. In 1871 he had appointed Sir George Jessel his Solicitor-General, and had promoted him two years

later to the Mastership of the Rolls. Jessel's remarkable ten years in that very important judicial office must rank as a greater vindication of Jewish Emancipation even than that famous Rothschild advance of 1875 which permitted the purchase of the Suez Canal shares.

Following on the anti-Semitic outbreaks in the Tsarist Empire, beginning in 1881, a new wave of Jewish immigration began flowing into the land where Jews had achieved not only legal emancipation but practical equality of treatment. The arrival of new immigrants can scarcely be said to have ceased until 1914. Though the newcomers rapidly established themselves in industries of their own, their position was apt to be trying during the frequent "bad times" of the period between 1881 and 1908. When unemployment was rife in the poorer quarters of the cities, the presence of the immigrant Jew was often resented.

Fortunately Unemployment Insurance has ended for ever the old kind of distressing "bad times" which occasionally brought anxiety. Moreover, the foreign Jew now forms a slowly-diminishing minority of the total Jewish population of the country, whose present majority is composed of his British-born children. This new generation of Jewish Britons shows every prospect of equalling the Jewry of older settlement, whose sterling qualities eventually procured the lowering of nearly all social barriers against them. Though nationally prominent figures like Sir Herbert Samuel or Lord Reading are not yet to be expected, able professional men, energetic business folk and industrious and thrifty artisans abound. Their admiration of the British national record is great, and they have an eager desire to earn the unqualified approval and trust of their fellow-citizens.

S. MACCOBY.

THE SHEEP COME HOME.

IN highest Scotland the mountain sheep are now on their way from the sea-level pastures, where they have wintered, back to the high bens. At such a farm as Achintee, under the flank of Ben Nevis, the ewe flock remains all winter. In snowy weather a small ration of hay or turnips has to be carted or sledged to the sheltered fields. There is little danger of long-continued frost or overwhelming snow drifts so near sea level, and despite the presence of snow on high ridge or in deep corrie, the grass is already sending up fresh green shoots, which can be grazed. Already, in deer country, the stags and hinds are out on the flows, snatching at the green stars of the cotton grass, which will open even beneath a drift of snow.

The sheep of Ben Nevis and other mountains winter on farms by the Moray Firth, taking (from Achintee) three days in autumn travelling to Newtonmore, and then forward by train. From upper Speyside the road is thronged with flocks and dogs and men. Beginning with April, the flocks leave the low country, that of Achintee being one of the first perhaps to return. Other farms which have little low-lying pasture, and are difficult to approach, must wait until April is quite past. A Lochaber winter may be long and harsh, but the glens near sea-board benefit by soft air flowing from the Atlantic, and the trees bud and catkins shake golden tresses a fortnight before there is a sign of spring in the upper glens. The upland grazings, too, are more storm-swept, and the feeding of a flock there may be a month less than near the seashore.

The sheep come back. You can hear them bleating on the railway trucks on the Highland Line; you can watch them muster in the yards at Newtonmore and many a like station, and you can watch them begin their trek. To Lochaber this is a good forty miles. The pastures of Moray Firth are full of winter eatage, and the manure of the sheep, dropped as they go along, is a valuable help to keep the fields in high condition. In Lochaber there is no belt of grass land between the rocks and the tide. In Moray the nearest hill is miles from the natural meadows where the tide fills the trenches twice a day.

Days back, Donald and his two or three collies walked eastward to meet the flock; to receive them at the railway station; to pay the low-country farmer for their keep. For

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this service there are settled terms, which vary in every area. Sometimes the custom ignores any sheep which is backward in condition; elsewhere there is deduction of a sheep's pasture for each sheep which has been lost, either by illness or drowning. A big storm-tide may catch the flock in the open, and there is a terrific scramble to get the sheep back beyond the lipping of the water. At other times, as Donald says, sheep just lie down and drown themselves in the deep pasture-ditches. When a certain saturation is taken up the fleeces seem to sodden suddenly, to chill, and to weight down the poor creatures into the mud. A half-yard trench is sufficient to trap and "perish" a weak and wet sheep. I have seen this happen on southern pastures as well as in the far north. The shepherds of Romney Marsh know the point at which a sheep, all coated with mud and wet, ceases to strive for life, and dies out of hand.

I have wandered often through the sheep lands of the north when the sheep are coming home. There has been cold moonlight when the flock straggled up the farm lane, and the gate into the higher pasture was opened. The ewes immediately take up and exchange cries with the returners, but as a rule peace comes before many hours. The sheep answer perfunctorily for a few minutes, then cease, for the tired incomers have dropped in their tracks with a sigh and are already asleep. The ewes do not put the passion into their bleats which was apparent when the lambs were taken away in August, or even when the wintering flock was drafted away in October. Even with sheep time heals most of a sair heart, and the ewes are now stirred with a new interest in a generation which is yet to be born.

I have met the returning flocks alongside a lochan, where their clamour was echoed from broken rocks and hanging woods; I have watched them crossing shallow rivers by fords, and I have watched the sharp hard hooves striking water from a wet marsh with solid rock below. In a Perthshire Easter long ago I met a whole plenishing of sheep and young cattle going up into the hills to graze the summer through. This was probably the last "sheiling" or summer farm in that neighbourhood, and I have often wondered whether it still exists. Men and maidens, horses, cattle and sheep were withdrawn from the bothy or rough farm buildings under Shiehallion, and they returned in early summer.

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Droving sheep home needs keenness and skill. Even a hard young sheep cannot go three days on tar macadam without feeling some effect—it may be teasing it to the point of bolting. Footsore sheep will trail in the rear, and collies and men have to be busy. Moreover, the flock is hunted and hustled by motor-cars on every half-mile of the road past Loch Laggan, down the Roy and Spean rivers. “*Rin awa’, Jammie*; and open the gate into the upper pasture,” says the shepherd to the round-eyed wean who has perhaps crept from his warm bed and donned half his day-time attire in order to meet the sheep which are coming back home. Of course, Dad is coming too, after a distant walk among the hills which left him, Jammie, the only man to guard the house and fold. Jammie’s wee bare limbs twinkle as he runs ahead, turning a sheep here and there, and calling to the collie, which knows exactly what to do. The latch is lifted, the chain or ring or peg moved, and Jammie swings on the lower bars, and then fastens the back-peg so that the sheep may come through without any halt or stop.

I know other farms of highest Scotland where the stock returning from winter has to be driven up rough paths, along the face of a cliff almost, to pass some deep gorge or rough waterfall. The flock must keep to one or two tracks among the rocks, and so the work is rendered easy but awfully tedious. After you have seen five hundred sheep pass through a certain notch one at a time, you are ready to concede that a hundred more would send the most vigilant person to sleep. Yet patience must continue. If a collie barks, even at a distance, the sheep may stop and try to turn on the narrow path; there will be a bolting and painful scurrying among the steep stones. “*Yes, all the king’s horses and all the king’s men will have trouble in getting the sheep through that place again.*” The tangle may be fearful—or a clever shepherd and collie will restore confidence at once.

“*Ach good,*” said the old shepherd one time to me, when his dog had come to the right point and stopped a panic; “*they are going in the right way, and—yes, there the sheep are jumping, one at a time. We can go forward now, for the sheep they will not pass a place where they have been scared without a leap and a rush.*” Nor did they. Every sheep cleared a little gap, where the mischievous collie had barked, at a jump, and then bolted ahead. After the trick of jumping and

running had been performed a hundred times I ceased to take further interest, but the last little band in front of us, an hour later, did the same trick, and Donald said that all had gone the same way. That shepherd was about the only man who has made me sorry that Gaelic was not my second language. He was so patient and clear and particular in his English that I felt rough and unable to follow his thoughts.

The home-coming of the flock is a festival in the flock-master’s year. At night men and collies are welcomed, but it is often next day before the master can put his foot among the sheep, and mark the condition of every one which has returned. He knows each sheep pretty nearly as well as his shepherd. Moreover, the stock is bred along certain known lines of pedigree, and has characters which mark out each family or group. “*There’s lots of differences among the Mackays, yet they’re all one clan,*” explained a northern flockmaster at Tain market. I felt rebuked, for that day I certainly could not have picked one blue-jowled Mackay from the next. Familiarity often breeds knowledge rather than contempt. The proverb is wrong among sheep and men alike.

All through April snow may fall on the upper bens, and sleet on the hillside. The sheep, however, are canny and keep close when there is a storm brewing. In fact, in my mountain walks, I have often taken the wisdom of a sheep as guide: when the flock was easy and kept up the hill, then I could go forward with content that the day would not be stormy. Otherwise, I took more care about my way out and home. The day generally ended in a gale, with whirling snowflakes. The ancient drove roads I have never seen used for Highland sheep on their return from the seaward pastures. The traffic is different. In the old times Skye and the Outer Hebrides used to fill the mountain passes with herds of black cattle and ponies for Falkirk and other trysts. Sheep were comparatively rare in the Isles in those days. During the past few years, sheep farming in highest and furthest Scotland has not been prosperous; there are hills in Skye and on the mainland too, where flocks have been entirely cleared, and the estates remain waste except for casual game birds and beasts. The flocks were sold off at almost trifling prices because the annual losses became too serious a burden for either tenant or estate. Tenants at places paid large amounts to be freed from their leases of sheep farms before they were ruined.

At the present time there is a brighter business outlook, though I am aware that certain flockmasters have already decided to dispense with the practice of droving to Moray Firth or other distant winter pastures. If the decision should be carried out, one of the road's most picturesque sights will be lost—a drove of five, six or ten hundred young sheep is a splendid vision, more beautiful to the eyes of some because they are going, merely to return. Collies and shepherds will be remitted some heavy labour if the droving comes to an end, but I think the shepherds at any rate will regret parting with an old custom. Certainly there is bound to be a change, I am told by one who had droved his flock again to the bens after a winter on the seashore pastures. There is bound to be a change. The rushing motor-vans, lorries and private cars make the work of droving very difficult and tiresome, and the macadam is hard on the hooves of trotting sheep. "I fear that this will be the last year of the open road, anyhow," he asserts, "but the sheep may go by motor-lorries, two-decks of them at a time, as they take out the lambs and market drafts to-day already."

The droving of sheep in and out of the bens in autumn and spring will lose much of its charm and beauty if the flock-master merely sends a card for two or three motor-lorries to transport his sheep a hundred at a time from the bens to the shore; they will return the same way, of course. Highland shepherd life has lost too many of its old customs already to part company with the little relic of the old droving days without a pang and a word of regret. But to-day the flocks are back on the glen side; the new arrivals are searching here and there for stars of grass, nibbling industriously, and perhaps at times looking at the frowning glories of hills where a few days ago they could see nothing but blue sea and clear sky far and far away.

W. T. PALMER.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

GOVERNMENTS AS FINANCIERS.

ON April 4th the American House of Representatives and the Senate passed Senator Hiram Johnson's bill for the purpose of outlawing the bonds, securities and obligations of any foreign government which is "in default in the payment of its obligations, or any part thereof." The votes were not even counted, the bill being passed by acclamation. The nature of the debate did not surprise anyone who was familiar with the unchanging sentiment of Congress about the ingratitude of those sometime belligerent countries to which the citizens of the United States had "opened their hearts and their pocket-books." The only criticisms of the bill that were heard in Congress came from those members who protested that the mere outlawry of a defaulter's bonds did not go far enough as a punishment. No distinction was made between the formal defaulters and the virtual defaulters who have been making "token" payments. Great Britain therefore must be counted among the outlaws. At the time of writing the bill had still to be signed by President Roosevelt, but everyone in the United States appeared to take his signature for granted. When he signs it he will by the same token—wherein again a "token" is found to be unpleasant—sign away his own previous opinion, as well as that of Mr. Hoover who preceded him, that Great Britain is not a defaulter. The American capital market, it appears, is to shut its doors to every government that was associated with the United States in the Great War, with the singular exception, foreshadowed by implication in one section of the bill, of the Russian Government, the world's greatest defaulter, to which organisation the Export-Import Bank contemplates the grant of commercial credits.

In the face of such a bill it will clearly be absurd, or more absurd than before, for the British Government on June 15th next to make a "token" payment to the United States. On June 15th, therefore, the British Government will have no alternative but to enter the swollen ranks of the formal defaulters, unless in the short interval the American Congress be transfigured by some overpowering miracle. To that extent there can be few regrets. It is a bad thing to default

upon a formal obligation. It is a worse thing to default and yet to claim the form of correctitude by making a "token" payment. One's tailor would be justified in refusing a "token" payment as a method of discharge. One's bank would not accept a "token" payment in discharge of an overdraft, except from an established bankrupt. Certain English and American critics have argued that the late President Coolidge committed a *gaffe* when he said, "Well, they hired the money, didn't they?" because forsooth "they" did not "hire" any money at all, but pigs, cotton, munitions, clothing, and the like; but it is the critics themselves who commit the *gaffe*. If one's tailor supplies one with a suit of clothes he rightly expects to be paid in cash, not in kind. On the other hand it is true that the cash must be earned, and that the payment by Great Britain of the war debt contracted by her to the United States simply cannot be repaid, for the commonplace reasons that the American tariffs have had the effect of rejecting payment by means of the trade balance, and that the only alternative means of payment, namely gold, was not available to Great Britain, partly by reason of the United States Government's own nonsensical financial behaviour. That circumstance in no wise detracts from, and only partly explains, the fact that the British Government is a defaulter to the United States. The loan was borrowed from the United States. It is not being repaid. The obvious answer is that the British Government had no business to borrow money from the United States and then turn round and say that she could not pay. The disastrous business of "winning the war" has nothing to do with the question. The only inference that holds good is that the British people, whose standard of financial honesty in its commerce and in its private finance is as high as that of any other country in the world, and higher than most, have been victimised by their government, and made to accept the stigma of national default.

The American aspect of the matter is America's business. Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler has often expressed the opinion that, as he put it for example on November 25th, 1932: "The chief obstacle to the return of prosperity to the people of the United States, and the one which may be most quickly removed by prompt and intelligent action at Washington, is that due to the so-called inter-governmental war debts. It is

assumed that because these debts are debts, due on their face to the Government of the United States, the people of the United States would profit by their payment and would be relieved of the necessity of taxing themselves to make good the sums that would be lost were these debts not paid. These statements are true in form, but not in fact. Every day that this debt question remains unsettled, the difficulty of recovering from the depression in the United States is increased, and every farmer, every wage-worker, every manufacturer, every transportation system and every public utility corporation is made to carry new and heavy burdens and to suffer new and heavy losses."

Therein he expresses the opinion of sensible private persons. But the American Congress, by virtue of the all-too-familiar incapacity for honest thinking which afflicts every national political organisation in the world, cannot share the opinion of sensible private persons. There is something in politics that seems to warp the simple honest view of life.

THE DANUBIAN AGREEMENT.

The preliminary events that led to the three-Power conference held in Rome last month were summarised in this section of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW last month. General Gömbös, the Prime Minister of Hungary, arrived in Rome on March 12th, and Herr Dollfuss, the Chancellor of Austria, on the following day. The formal discussions between them and Signor Mussolini were begun on March 15th, and culminated in a three hours' meeting on March 16th, when two of the protocols were initialled. On March 17th all three protocols were ceremonially signed. The first was political, the two others economic. Their general purpose was described as "to help the maintenance of peace and the economic restoration of Europe on the basis of respect for the independence and rights of every State." In the first protocol the three signatories undertook "to concert together on all the problems which particularly interest them, and also on those of a general character, with the aim of developing, in the spirit of the existing Italo-Austrian, Italo-Hungarian, and Austro-Hungarian treaties of friendship, based upon the recognition of the existence of their numerous common interests, a concordant policy which shall be directed towards effective

collaboration between the European States, and particularly between Italy, Austria and Hungary. To this end the three Governments will proceed to common consultations, each time that at least one of them may consider this course opportune."

Protocol Number 2 was described as an instrument for improving the economic relations of the three countries by "giving a new impulse to the exchange of their products, and thus opposing the unhealthy tendencies towards economic self-sufficiency" and by putting into effect "the spirit of the decisions taken at the Stresa Conference" and the principles expressed in the Danubian Memorandum submitted by the Italian Government on September 29th last. The four articles of the protocol provided (1) that the Governments would increase the facilities for reciprocal export and thus exploit the complementary nature of the separate national economies. To that end new bilateral accords would be concluded before May 15th; (2) that steps would be taken to overcome the difficulties felt by Hungary from the fall in grain prices; (3) that bilateral accords would be made to facilitate and develop the transit traffic through the Adriatic ports; (4) that a permanent committee of three would be set up to follow the course of economic relations and formulate proposals for their development.

The third protocol was devoted to Austro-Italian trade. It provided in Article 1 for the setting up of a system of preferences for Austrian imports into Italy within the limitations imposed by the "principles laid down in section (c) of Article 2 of the Italian Danubian Memorandum."

The most immediate question of practical interest that arises out of the Rome protocols is their probable effect upon the general diplomatic relationships in Europe; for the Danube basin has a traditionally cardinal influence upon the forces that push the European diplomatists into war or save them from it.

What, in the first place, is Signor Mussolini himself consciously aiming at? On March 18th, addressing in Rome the second quinquennial assembly of the leaders of the Fascist party, he reviewed his foreign policy on a wide ground. He claimed that Italy had been the post-war pioneer in friendship for Austria, and that her consistent object had been the defence of Austrian integrity and independence.

He affirmed that Austria could count on Italy to that end. To Hungary he gave the epithet "despoiled," and said that that country, thus described, had found understanding in Italy. He made the unqualified assertion that "Italy has upheld and will uphold" Hungary's demand for "justice" and for the execution of the solemn promises made at the time when the peace treaties were written. With Jugoslavia, he said, Italy's relations were "normal, that is, diplomatically correct," but could and should be improved at the right moment. So much for his Central European outlook. He did not mention Czechoslovakia.

He went on to speak of Western Europe. He said that relations with France had "improved," but added the remarkable statement that "None of the problems, great or small, outstanding for the last fifteen years have been solved. Nevertheless a *rapprochement* has come about of a moral nature, and on certain important questions of a European character this is a favourable factor which can lead, as we hope, to further developments."

He again raised the question of League of Nations reform, which, he said, must be postponed till the disarmament conference had been concluded, "because if the conference fails there will be no need to reform the League of Nations; it will be enough to record its demise." He added that such a failure was probable, at least so far as the original aim of the conference was concerned, because "the armed states will not disarm, and the unarmed states will carry out a more or less defensive rearmament." He made the comment that it was an illusion, perhaps already corrected by the facts, to suppose that a country such as Germany could be kept for ever unarmed; and that therefore the Italian memorandum (see CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, March 1934, pp. 367-8) was the only practical basis for an arms convention, failing which Europe would sink into decay. He thence developed the thesis that Italy must be militarily strong enough to meet any situation that might arise, and hinted that in view of the paralysis of the disarmament conference Italy's budgetary economies on armaments could not be indefinitely maintained. In particular he mentioned the need of defence for Italy's long sea coast. He ended by a reference to Italy's centuries-old destiny, that of collaboration between the Italian people and the peoples of Africa and the East—not by territorial conquest

on Italy's part, but by what he called a process of natural expansion.

The question whether Italy was disposed not to repeat the blunders already committed by France and Germany in attempting a form of political lien over the Danube basin was thus left unanswered.

Next, what of the effect of the Rome protocols upon the Danubian countries themselves? General Gömbös, on his return to Budapest on March 18th, broadcast a somewhat restrained statement, emphasising the importance of the movement that had thus been started for abolishing the practice of national self-sufficiency, and also the fact that the co-operation, on certain conditions, of the other Powers was to be welcomed by the Rome signatories. Perhaps Count Bethlen's recent experience in London of the unwisdom of exaggerated exaltation in diplomatic propaganda had had a chastening effect in Budapest. Vienna was markedly enthusiastic. The semi-official *Reichspost* stated that "Signor Mussolini is the first of all the European statesmen to draw the consequences from the old-established truth that it is not enough to decree the independence of Austria; and that Austria must also be given the means of living and paying her way by her own resources. The third protocol is the most important act of friendship that the new Austria has ever received."

It was not surprising that Vienna and Budapest should, on the immediate return of Herr Dollfuss and General Gömbös, express satisfaction with what had been accomplished. What was more interesting, and perhaps more important, was the effect upon Prague. Dr. Beneš, on March 21st, spoke on the subject to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czechoslovak parliament. He made a long and admirable survey of the historical facts in the post-war treatment of Austria, and submitted, as a resultant doctrine, that "Any solution of the Austrian and Danubian problem must be based on the assumption that all the Danubian States are so politically grown up and mature that none of the Great Powers need act as their patron, and that none of the Great Powers is to exploit one of these States against the others. It is round this point that up to now the main fears of the Central European States have focused, and this was hitherto the main cause of the difficulties in the Danubian area. Were

this not the case the Central European problem and the Austrian problem would have been solved long ago, and solved well." He gave it as his own view that Austrian independence could best be maintained on the basis of the Geneva Protocol of October 1922, and the Lausanne Protocol of July 15th, 1932, which expressly excluded the predominant influence of any Great Power in Austrian affairs.

Oddly enough Dr. Beneš, who alone of his contemporaries has held continuous office throughout the post-war period, retains a freshness of memory and a grip of realities undiminished by the experience of that debased and disheartening period of the world's history. There are few men who have lived through, observed and studied the events of the period 1914-34 who retain much spring in their gait. The quality of the political thought and action of that period is low enough to discourage belief in the very probability of wisdom by politics. Yet Dr. Beneš, every time an ideal is knocked down or an avenue to peace, prosperity and common sense blocked by some political obstruction, arises in his resource and resiliency, surveys the field, and propounds a policy of escape from the mess. His latest such essay, "The Problem of Central Europe and the Austrian Question" is published in English by "Orbis" (Prague XII, Fochova 62) at 1s. In it he summarises the relevant facts to illustrate his thesis that the Austrian question is a matter not only of Central European, but of general European, concern. He discusses the various rival plans for a solution of that problem. In discussing the plan for an Austro-German *Anschluss* he recalls that Czechoslovak opposition to it is based wholly upon loyalty to the "Allied" opinion which insisted upon the separation of those two countries. He recalls this interesting historical fact: "President Masaryk and myself personally have, however, one title, which is perhaps but little known, to speak impartially and openly on this question. During the War, at the time when we had won over the Western Powers for the plan of dismembering Austria-Hungary, we recommended with complete impartiality the incorporation of Austria in the German Empire, believing that this would perhaps be the most acceptable course to the Allies, as excluding the formation of the so-called Little Austria, a solution unfavourable to us, and that it would at once constrain the remaining small independent States of Central Europe to a close political and

economic collaboration. At that time it was, so to say, one of the eventualities of our political programme, and our propaganda maps of that period showed a new Europe that included a large Germany."

Of the Mussolini-Dollfuss-Gömbös agreement he states that neither Czechoslovakia nor the Little Entente as a whole "look *a priori* with disfavour" upon it, and adds: "... we may note that it is emphasised on the Italian side that they are not directed against the Little Entente, and that indeed they are designed to prepare the way for collaboration and for agreement with the Little Entente States and other countries interested, on the basis of existing treaties. In this case we should even give them a welcome."

Dr. Beneš tabulates and discusses the various solutions that have been suggested, including the rival plans for a Habsburg restoration and for a Central European federation or lesser form of political and economic co-operation. By a process of elimination he argues clearly to the conclusion that "the only practicable solution" is "the absolute independence and integrity of Austria under European guarantee." The tranquillity of the general prospect may now be said to depend upon Signor Mussolini's restraint in not himself making any attempts upon Austrian independence and integrity: a hope which fortunately seems likely to be justified.

ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE.

The Bureau of the Disarmament Conference met again in Geneva on April 10th, by which date the conference itself was already in its third year of life, if "life" be the right word. Thus it appears that although disarmament is for the present a lost cause, those who pursue it cannot reconcile themselves to the formal admission of failure. In the March CONTEMPORARY REVIEW some account was given of the several governmental documents which established the deadlock: namely the French *aide-mémoire* submitted to Germany on January 1st and published on February 1st, the German answer delivered to the French Government on January 19th and published on February 3rd, the British memorandum of January 29th which was published on February 1st, and the Italian memorandum which was also published on February 1st.

In an attempt to loosen the deadlock Mr. Anthony Eden left London on February 16th to visit Paris, Berlin and Rome. He was away a fortnight. It had been provisionally arranged that the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference should meet on April 10th, and therefore the practical problem was to try and extract from the expressed views of London, Paris, Berlin and Rome a common measure of agreement substantial enough to justify that meeting. But on March 23rd another French Note was published. It was an involved and dilatory document, but was clear enough in its general sense as an unpromising answer to Mr. Eden's mission. It is nearly impossible for any person not endowed with superhuman patience to read the ever-growing mass of governmental statements on this subject. Out of the mass, however, there did emerge, on March 23rd, one simple conclusion, namely that the French and German Governments were now no less at variance than before. The difficulty was that the French Government, while recognising the German Government's concession about the heavier type of armaments, made a stand upon two rigid objections, namely (1) that it would be impossible to guarantee that Germany would limit her production of armaments in the class below 6-ton tanks and 155-mm. guns, or even limit her production to that class; and (2) that in any event France would not herself further reduce her armaments in any measure whatsoever. In face of such a deadlock (which was only confirmed, not established, by the French Note of March 23rd) the British Government was prepared, and the United States Government has for the same reason expressed itself also to be prepared, to accept the full implications of a system of universal inspection and control of all armaments. Neither the British nor the American Government pretends that it would be agreeable to have a roaming international commission competent to explore to its heart's content every detail of military, air and naval armaments, arsenals, factories, and what not. But if such a system were proved to be the price at which the French Government could be induced to participate with the German Government in some sort of convention for limiting armaments, then both the British and the American Governments have decided that they would pay the price.

Wearily, therefore, the British Government faced again the question of "guarantees." Lord Tyrrell was instructed to

ask the Quai d'Orsay two questions: namely what precise "guarantees of execution" would satisfy the French Government, and whether, if satisfied, the French Government would thereupon agree to a reduction in her own, and to an increase in German, armaments with a view to the signing of a convention on the lines of the British draft of March 1933, as amended by the British memorandum of January 1934.

The difficulty was not confined to France. If the French element in it were solved, it would next be necessary to solve the problem of Germany's demand for a 300,000 army and her unwillingness to return to the League of Nations. If, however, France were satisfied about the guarantee, it seemed likely that Germany would be disposed to be more business-like. The details of the 1934-5 German budget were perversely published on March 27th. The most striking feature of the general increase foreshadowed in expenditure was an increase of no less than 33 per cent. in expenditure on arms, mainly on the air forces. The former total of 586,000,000 Rm. was to be increased to 894,323,200 Rm., air force expenditure from 78,000,000 Rm. to 210,000,000 Rm. German rearmament thus ceased to be a diplomatic question, and became a projected fact.

A certain lessening of the tension, however, was caused when on April 7th the French Government transmitted to London its answer to the two Tyrrell questions. The answer was not quite so negative or so dilatory in effect as a jaded Europe had excusably expected. Indeed it gave an almost lively excuse for the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference to adjourn on April 10th in order to enable the French and British Governments further to discuss an apparently new element in the situation created by France. The new element was that France (1) expressed her willingness to begin an exchange of views with Great Britain about the feasibility of a convention in which a measure of German rearmament would be recognised (no French Government having ever before consented to discuss the matter on such a basis), provided that such rearmament be limited and its limitations be subjected to full international control and supervision; but conceded that such control and supervision be exactly the same as would be imposed upon every other signatory; and (2) welcomed the implication of the British questions that the British Government was now willing to discuss further

guarantees of execution. So far as the detailed answer to the British questions was concerned, the French Government promised a fuller document at an early date, but made the interim suggestion of a further Franco-British discussion in view of the meeting at Geneva. The immediate effect upon British policy was that it might now be possible to explore the possibility of a localised European agreement for the stabilisation of armaments within specified limits. It was not the case, as was rumoured, that a Western European pact was contemplated. What was contemplated was a series of treaties within one general treaty. The European treaty would embrace the whole of Europe, including Russia, with possibly a rider to safeguard Russia's freedom in armaments for Far Eastern use in the event of Japan's refusal to sign the relevant treaty in her own case. Such an expedient would involve the diplomatic division of Russia into two separate entities. Another treaty, to which the United States would be a signatory, would institute the system of the general control and supervision of armaments, to which the United States Government had already agreed (Mr. Norman Davis, Geneva, May 27th last). The first step in the process now made possible by the terms of the French communication was an agreement about the nature of the "guarantees" for the faithful execution of any convention that might be accepted by the European States.

THE 1935 CONFERENCE.

It is one of the least satisfactory features of the diplomatic activity centred upon armaments that nearly every European diplomatist one meets in private confesses that the objects being publicly pursued in Europe are not only unattainable but, on the face of them, nonsensical. So far, for instance, as its public profession goes, the British Government believes it possible to conclude a localised European convention for the stabilisation of armaments on their present basis, whatever the present basis, by common assessment, may be. The public argument is in the nature of "half a step, half a step, onward!" If pressed for something a little less ostrich-like as a policy, the apologists of the Government's foreign policy claim that a European agreement, no matter how trifling it might be in its substance, might become a lever for something

more business-like when the naval conference meets next year: for Japan must needs attend that conference, as must the United States. In the meantime everyone knows that an armaments agreement confined to Europe could not be worth the paper it was written on; and most people, official and other, in their hearts doubt the wisdom of risking popular contempt for such diplomatic methods. A convention confined to Western Europe rules itself out as absurd, because the circumstance that might provoke the use of armaments by the Western Powers is more likely to arise in the east and in the south-east than in the west. At the very outset of the inquiry, therefore, it becomes obvious that Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Danubian countries are essential parties to any European convention. It then becomes obvious that a Polish signature could not be given without a Russian; and Russia is a Far Eastern as well as a European Power. The notion that Russia could sign a European convention on the understanding that only one half of Russia, her European half, be thereby committed—and one heard such a suggestion seriously discussed in serious diplomatic quarters—is almost childish. Nor could Russia, on a European motive, undertake to limit her armaments in general unless Japan were also committed in the like sense. Between Tokyo and the European capitals, however, there is no present contact whatsoever. Even the United States, who has announced her willingness to submit to the international control and inspection of arms as a method of helping a European agreement, would not (of this no diplomatist in Europe has any doubt), agree to sign Part I of the British draft convention which suggests a machinery for preventing aggression in Europe, even though the suggested provisions of Part I are subtly correlated with the provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. An armaments convention drafted in several separate parts, severally signed by different sets of Powers, even though in form it had the Locarno Treaties for a precedent, would not inspire any confidence in any realistic person. The most practical people are now discussing the rival merits, on the ground of common sense, between the policy of prolonging the discussions in Europe on so flimsy a pretext, and that of frankly abandoning them until next year's naval conference provides an opportunity for a fresh start.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

April 15th, 1934.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT.

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CIVITAS DEI.*

In his new book *Civitas Dei*,* Mr. Lionel Curtis has turned from the problems of the Far East, which he treated in *The Capital Question and China* and in his *Dyarchy*, which dealt with India, to what may be termed a spiritual interpretation of the meaning of history as illuminating the present situation and as a guide to the future of mankind. His historic survey leads him to the conclusion that "no political science will furnish guidance in practical politics unless it proceeds from a definite conception of ultimate values" (p. 287). Having summed up the teaching of Jesus in regard to this, the author goes on to remark:

That spiritual values are the ultimate reality and indestructible, cannot be proved. No more can the opposite be proved, though a certain order of scientists would seem to think otherwise. In the search for truth the limits of human knowledge must be recognised. Belief, in the true sense of the word, is not the assertion of knowledge, a dogma, but courage to act on the best hypothesis we are able to conceive. Unbelievers are those too timid or idle to guess at the truth and act on the guess.

* Macmillan. 10s. 6d. net.

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From this point of view :

Insistence on belief in a supernatural event as necessary to prove the teaching of Jesus is in fact fatal to the principle of faith in the true sense of the word. (p. 194.)

Hence the main thesis of the book may be described as centring in the spiritual teaching of Jesus stripped of the supernatural, treated, not only as an accretion, but as actually detrimental to the spiritual apprehension and treatment of life.

Mr. Curtis is master of a remarkably lucid style. His survey of history is both terse and luminous. Both the limits of the volume and his characteristic temperament lead him to present throughout positive conclusions and not considerations for detailed exposition and discussion. His review of pre-Christian history and of the several contributions made to human progress by Hebrew, Hellenic and Roman civilisations are marked by true insight and proportion. The conclusions drawn are not only valuable summings-up of history, but furnish most seasonable "Tracts for the Times." In particular his emphasis both on Freedom and on Consecration to the Community is of special importance, when mankind is confronted by the problem of applying the principles that have been made good for particular peoples to mankind, to a veritable and universal Commonwealth of Nations. The study of the ways by which these permanent principles of human well-being have been invaded, and for long periods defeated, by the inferior and essentially hostile principles of autocratic authority supplies a much-needed warning for the present age. For all this we have reason to be grateful to Mr. Curtis.

The summary of the teaching of Jesus given by the author has considerable value.

"Our Lord," Mr. Curtis says, "had realised that the souls of men cannot grow to perfection unless the structure of society itself is ordered in accordance with the laws of God, that is to say, founded on verities. To him the ultimate verity was goodness personified—God, whose nature is expressed, however imperfectly, in His creatures. The cardinal factor in human nature, as he saw it, was the instinct in men to serve each other. By strengthening that instinct, and not otherwise, was it possible to develop the nature of God in men." (p. 195.)

It is, however, in regard to the so-called supernatural, both in the life of Jesus and in relation to faith, that criticism must be offered. The way in which this element is dismissed from the life of Jesus, and, in particular, the treatment of the Resurrection narratives, is too facile, and the result is inadequate to bear the weight of the spiritual facts. The old hard-and-fast conception of the material world remains, even though it is enriched by being treated as the basis and instrument of a spiritual structure. It is indeed true that the teaching of Jesus cannot be *proved* by a supernatural event. Yet it can be manifested. Nor is such manifestation hostile to faith, for it both exercises and satisfies it. The faith of mankind cannot rest upon a "guess," however courageous and fruitful. Only a disclosure of God, by God Himself, can inspire and sustain the corresponding discovery by man, which is the venture of faith. The self-revelation of God is essential to the progress of man, and the power of the spiritual over the material is, as yet, incomplete. It was foreshadowed in Jesus, the supreme and world-transforming personality of history.

J. S. L.

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TOLLER AND WASSERMANN.*

The autobiographies of Toller and Wassermann have little in common except that they are the work of distinguished German Jews. They belong to different generations, and their temperaments are as divergent as their careers. Toller is forty, and the war was his initiation into life. Wassermann was sixty at the date of his recent death, and his reputation was made in the last years of peace. The younger man was spurred to action by the horrors of the struggle, while the elder remained to the end an observer. Both reveal a sensitive spirit, and their witness to the travail of the German soul must not be overlooked.

I Was a German opens with a brief preface, dated "the day my books were burnt in Germany." The note of protest is struck at the outset and echoes through the book. "Beneath the yoke of barbarism one must not keep silence, one must fight. Whoever is silent at such a time is a traitor to

* *I Was a German*. By Ernst Toller. The Bodley Head. 5s. *My Life as German and Jew*. By Jacob Wassermann. Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.

humanity." The struggle is waged not only against the Nazi tyranny which has made him an exile, but against the innate savagery in man which finds its extreme expression in war. The bursting of the storm found him a student in France, and the call to the colours fell on patriotic ears. But the grim lessons of the battle-field forced him to reflect on the causes of war and to visualise the unity of mankind. After a year at the front he fell ill and was discharged from further military service. He had now time not only to think but to read. The war had turned him into an opponent of war, but he now discovered that the German Government was as much to blame for the catastrophe of 1914 as anybody else. Pursuing his studies he reached the conclusion that the rulers themselves were caught in a mesh of vested interests, and that the question of war-guilt paled before the guilt of capitalism.

At the moment of his discovery he was introduced to Kurt Eisner, of whom he speaks with admiring gratitude, and he was swept into the anti-war movement in Munich. His share in a strike gave him his first taste of prison, and when the revolution of November overthrew the old régime he became Eisner's right-hand man. After the murder of his chief a short-lived Soviet Republic was set up in Bavaria, the description of which fills the longest and most important chapter in the book. It is a story of quarrels, of confusion, of heroism, of hairbreadth escapes. While fighting and risking his life for the working class, Toller had no illusions as to the hopelessness of his task. "The instinct for freedom and voluntary action simply does not exist in Germany. It will take years to erase the imprint of the old militarism. The old Germany found her strength in the blind submission of her citizens to authority, as taught in schools and barracks and preached in the Press. But the new Germany can only be built up by free men. Blind submission can produce nothing." The counter-revolution was as terrible as it was inevitable, and his reward was five years of imprisonment.

When Toller emerged at the age of thirty, he was a celebrity, one of the leading dramatists of his day, with the reputation of a man of action as well as words. He looked back on the revolution, however, with mixed feelings. The cause was holy; but what of the methods? "I had always believed that Socialists, despising force, should never employ it for their own ends. And now I myself had used force and appealed to

force; I who hated bloodshed had caused blood to be shed." The Weimar Republic was assuredly an improvement on the Hohenzollern Empire; but how disappointing it was! A brief Epilogue, entitled "1933," holds the unworthy Republicans in large measure responsible for the Nazi revolution by which they were roughly overthrown. "And now barbarism is triumphant. Nationalism, racial hatred, state-idolatry dazzle heart and mind and eye. . . . Everywhere the same lunatic belief that a man, a Cæsar, a Messiah, will suddenly appear and work a miracle; will suddenly arise and take upon his shoulders all responsibility for the future, will master life, banish fear, abolish misery, create a new people, a new kingdom of splendour, will suddenly appear endowed with supernatural powers to transform the old Adam into a new man! And everywhere the same lunatic fever to fasten on a scapegoat for past misery. . . . Only to-day we are not content to sacrifice beasts; we demand the blood of men." It is a moving story, told with a passionate humanity which goes far to resolve the harshest discords.

Wassermann's autobiography, published in 1921 and now translated, with an Epilogue, is far less tragic in detail, but is even sadder than that of Toller, for it lacks his generous faith in humanity. The novelist who won world-wide fame after the war started with an unhappy home, an unloving father, a hostile stepmother; he was unfortunate in his friends; he knew the pangs of hunger and the sting of neglect. Recognition came so slowly and so late that it found the springs of gladness dried up. And behind the familiar story of an author's struggles stalks the grim shadow of anti-Semitism. He calls himself a German Jew, not a Jewish Jew, and the essence of his book lies in the distinction. It is a study in divided allegiance, with the usual result of loneliness and misunderstanding. He is fully aware of the failings of both races. When things go badly with Germans, he bitterly complains, they shift the responsibility for their distress upon the Jews. Yet the persecutors, he confesses, have something to go on, since the Jews are in some respects the Jacobins of our age. Thus he stands between the two camps, fully accepting, and accepted by, neither. The Epilogue, entitled "Twelve Years Later," briefly surveys his life, and declares the dominant idea of his work to be that of justice. The crowning tragedy in the life that closed last year

was that he lived long enough to witness the triumph of the Nazis, the enthronement of a fanatical anti-Semitism as a principle of government, and the proscription of his books in the land that he loved.

G. P. G.

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MR. LAWRENCE.*

It is expected of Captain Liddell Hart that his work be well written, interesting and accurate in its matter. His present book will even enhance his reputation in that sense. It is an enthralling but depressing book. Of "Colonel" Lawrence we already knew enough to appreciate in him a singularly original character. So original, that exaggerated myth had unnecessarily conspired with fact to embellish it. Captain Liddell Hart has expunged the myth and rigidly reduced his subject within the cold—yet not so cold—reality. He started the task in 1929 with a somewhat different object, namely to write an account of the Arab revolt which became an integral part of the Allied operations in the Great War; and in only a subsidiary sense to write of Colonel Lawrence's part in it. In the process of amassing and assessing the material he found that the order must be reversed; that his main theme must necessarily be Colonel Lawrence, and the subsidiary theme the particular manifestation of Lawrentian activity in Arabia. He regards Colonel Lawrence as a "great" man. In a military sense he puts him high, even outstandingly high, among history's greatest leaders of military operations and exponents of what he calls the "art" of war. A cultured man, Colonel Lawrence lived the life of the Arabs in the desert, suffered hardships hardly credible to a man born and bred in the material comforts of a far different civilisation, and thereby won in the esteem of the Arabs a position of authority amounting to dictatorship. Colonel Lawrence had an exquisite sense of humour, of which Captain Liddell Hart tells many agreeable instances. He had a conscience which made him do penance for the Allied betrayal of the Arabs by enlisting after the war as a private soldier in the British army, under the variant names of Ross and Shaw.

* *T. E. Lawrence. In Arabia and After.* By Liddell Hart. Jonathan Cape. 15s. net.

One puts down the book with a hopeless feeling that Colonel Lawrence was one of millions of good men whose qualities were senselessly sacrificed to the nightmare purposes of war. Captain Liddell Hart writes as an authority on war. He accepts war as a human institution (as, of course, it clearly is), but he shows no conception of its flat, unredeemed stupidity, and even writes admiringly of great generalship. He apparently does not even recognise the essential contradictions of his own matter. On page 415 he writes of Colonel Lawrence's aversion from "the useless sacrifice of men's lives" as a point of good generalship. Yet on page 272 he describes as a "gem" of "military apologia" a confession of Colonel Lawrence's own that he sacrificed life out of sheer personal temper ("I could have won by refusing battle. . . . Somehow bad temper and conceit together made me not content just to know my power, but anxious to display it openly. . . . I knew that by my decision to fight I had killed twenty or thirty of our six hundred men, and the wounded would be perhaps three times as many").

Moreover, the book indirectly reveals—though this is not consciously the author's theme—the appalling waste of British taxpayers' money with a wholly cavalier unconcern on the part of the military leaders who squandered it, and also the appalling dishonesty and sordid shiftiness of the general diplomatic activity. Simple, honest men will be confirmed, in Captain Liddell Hart's own narrative, though not perhaps in conformity with Captain Liddell Hart's own view, that war cannot be associated with anything good or decent whatsoever in human nature; that even a man of Colonel Lawrence's pristine goodness is a man whose fine qualities have been wasted. Captain Liddell Hart writes of the latter-day Lawrence (p. 397): "All his own achievements, indeed, had but woven a crown of thorns that now pressed harder than ever upon his brow." That is the inescapable verdict; but when the next war comes another Colonel Lawrence will do heroic deeds, and another Captain Liddell Hart will chronicle them without any sense of even their initial futility, or worse.

Probably the best of Colonel Lawrence—Aircraftsman Shaw as he now is—has yet to be chronicled. Some of his observations and *obiter dicta*, which Captain Liddell Hart preserves for us, reveal in him a potential philosophic *flair* which one hopes will fulfil in another sense than that of the context

(p. 448) the consummation of Colonel Lawrence "as the man who could, if he would, be a light to lead stumbling humanity out of its troubles." It is understood to be his intention when next year he completes his army service, "to settle down" (in the author's suggestive phrase) "in his Wessex cottage, a hermitage with a window to the world" (p. 434). Once, when asked if he was really happy, Lawrence answered: "At times. No one who thinks can be really happy." If he would retire to his cottage, do some thinking, and publish the results, he would do something far more interesting to mankind than the whole of his Arabian adventures, and might, indeed, confer some benefit upon mankind.

G. G.

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ITALIAN STUDIES.*

These essays, contributed to various periodicals by the late Edward Armstrong, and edited by one who is herself an authority on Renaissance Italy, will be valued by the scholar and the ordinary reader alike: they will be read with instant delight, and kept for continual reference. Two of the fourteen have not been previously published. An illuminating notice of the historian by the late Dean of Winchester serves as Introduction to the volume. Its varied contents show his unrivalled knowledge of Italy and the *roba d'Italia*, his wide research, humanity and wit, while preserving, happily, some of the charm that characterised his spoken lectures.

The first section deals, as is fitting in the case of a foremost English Dantist, with Dante under several aspects. The two weightiest essays are, perhaps, those on Dante's "political ideal," as set forth in the *De Monarchia* and realised for an all-too-brief space in the Emperor Henry VII; and on the traces of his influence on later political thought, in the writings of Marsilius of Padua, Petrarch, and others. (An essay of the second section, *Machiavelli as Political Thinker*, may be linked on to these.) Another compares the two greatest Florentine tragedies—Dante's exile and Savonarola's martyrdom—maintaining that the city showed a more criminal

* *Italian Studies*. By Edward Armstrong, F.B.A. Edited by Cecilia M. Ady. Macmillan. 1934. 12s. 6d. net.

ingratitude to her devoted "alien guest" than to her famous son, the importance of whose political rôle, incidentally, has been over-estimated. "No statesman," comments the essayist in one of his delightfully caustic asides, "has been a poet of the foremost rank—unless Bacon was really Shakespeare." A lighter essay, but one still packed with learning, treats of Dante in the unwonted guise of showman to the pastimes of his day. Another, affording an example of minute, painstaking research, establishes the disconcerting fact that there were no Capulets at Verona! The name describes a faction, not a family, and belongs to Cremona. Dante's allusion cannot be held "directly responsible" for the error.

In the second section, a study to which many will turn with an eager anticipation that will be fully gratified is that on the art of the *Quattrocento* as illustrating contemporary social life and incidents; these "artist-journalists," we are told, prove invaluable to the historian. A notable specimen (dating from a few years later) is the series of frescoes by Pintoricchio in the Cathedral Library, Siena, depicting the meteoric career of Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, Pius II. That Pope forms the subject of another vivid article: here one may venture to note with surprise the omission of any reference to Nicholas of Cusa. In another, Lorenzo de' Medici is shown as revealed in his correspondence. All these figures, greater or lesser, are drawn with the sure, masterly touches that are only possible when exact knowledge is combined with wide sympathy.

Space forbids more than the bare mention of two interesting essays, that on the Republic of San Marino, and *A Grand Tour in the Sixteenth Century* from a lively diary kept by the chaplain of a Spanish Cardinal. But our author should be followed on two attractive by-paths of his own exploring—the account of the "Spanish College" in the University of Bologna, and the adventures of a certain "agreeable scamp," Leonardo Trissino, in the war of the League of Cambray. In the latter we have an instance of Edward Armstrong's delicate word-painting in his description of the gracious little city of Vicenza and its surroundings, and also a vindication of the justice and popularity of the rule of Venice over her outlying subjects.

E. G. S.

EVERYMAN'S FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY.*

Hitherto the really modern French-English dictionary has been lacking. Good and accurate as one or two of the better ones are—we are thinking in particular of that model of concision and correctness, Bellows'—they are not sufficiently comprehensive, i.e. they only illustrate the more common instances of idiomatic usage; they only deal sparingly with "commercial, radio, engineering, motoring, naval, military" and similar technical terms, and they do not sufficiently take into account that numerous body of colloquialisms which have crept into the French language, mainly since the war, especially those to be found in the pages of realistic and naturalistic writers, which include downright *argot* or slang. Moreover, nearly all these dictionaries have one particular failing: the English renderings are often couched in the phraseology of the eighteenth century and not infrequently the equivalent of some idiom or colloquialism can only be described as approximative.

For many years Messrs. Harrap have been considering the task of trying to fill the gap. Happily they have had at their disposal that excellent bilingual scholar, Mr. J. E. Mansion, who for many years before the war had been making a collection of French-English and English-French equivalents with a view to producing not only a French-English, but an English-French dictionary (the appearance in the autumn of this latter volume is actually promised). The project was naturally suspended during the war, but in 1919 a staff was got together to tackle the problem. The time was ripe. Hatzfeld and Darmsteter's *Dictionnaire Général* had been published, and the *New English Dictionary* was approaching completion.

Many thorny points had to be settled. The first to be decided was that the dictionary must be one of the present day. This involved the removal of an almost incredible amount of archaic lumber still persisting in most dictionaries, echoes of short-lived fashions and of outworn technics, due to the besetting sin of the average dictionary-maker, who blindly appropriates material of his predecessors, even to the inclusion of their errors. At the same time it was realised that the dictionary must provide a key to the great treasure-houses of

* *Harrap's Standard French and English Dictionary*. Edited by J. E. Mansion. Part I: French-English, about 900 pages. 42s. net.

French and English literature within certain dates and limits. For France these had to be fixed at the commencement of the *Grand Siècle*, because every educated Frenchman is nurtured on the seventeenth-century dramatists, La Fontaine and Madame de Sévigné. Hence the need of illustrating the vocabulary and syntax of the period. On the other hand, English people are far less well acquainted, with the exception of the Bible and Shakespeare, with the English writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Moreover, the vocabulary of English is far more extensive. It was therefore found necessary to select the nineteenth century as the starting-point of the English to be included, while taking cognisance of the exceptions mentioned above.

But difficulties did not end there. For whom should the dictionary be compiled? Should it cater not only for the average man, but for all sorts and conditions of professional and business men? This, of course, would have meant nothing short of an encyclopædia in several volumes. Another basis had to be sought, and the compilers chose that of the well-informed reader of the newspaper and novel of to-day. Even this was extensive enough in all conscience. It includes politics, literature, science, dramatic criticism, law reports, new inventions (motoring, aviation, etc.), sport of all kinds, the movies, the talkies, games and bridge.

An exhaustive testing of the dictionary convinces us that the compilers have been extraordinarily successful in achieving their purpose. After many hours of search we have failed to detect a single error or misprint. We have only found a few omissions, mostly of a trifling nature. We have no hesitation in saying the dictionary is a masterpiece of accuracy, precision and comprehensiveness. And we venture to predict that it will remain for many years the standard dictionary of its kind, indispensable to every student, and indeed to every reader of modern French. CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

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UTRECHT AND THE HANOVERIAN SUCCESSION.*

Professor G. M. Trevelyan has completed his brilliant study of England under Queen Anne in a third volume entitled *The*

* *The Peace and the Protestant Succession*. By Prof. G. M. Trevelyan. Longmans. 21s. net.

Peace and the Protestant Succession. This book deals with the last four years of the reign. The events of this period, so full of intrigue and party warfare, are of necessity highly involved and complicated. With his usual lucidity and admirable style, Professor Trevelyan has sifted the mass of material available and presents the dramatic story with decisiveness and almost with simplicity.

The reign of Queen Anne both reflects the constitutional struggles under the Stuarts and also provides the key to the domestic calm and consolidation during the eighteenth century. This is especially true of the short period dealt with in this book. The rejection of the Stuarts and the acceptance of the Hanoverian succession were virtually assured, and the Peace of Utrecht provided a long period in which the new institutions might become established and grow. Professor Trevelyan opens his narrative with the Battle of Malplaquet in the summer of 1709. As a military achievement it is rightly classed among the victories of Marlborough. But it was not decisive, and only a second Blenheim could justify Godolphin and the Whigs in their demand for an unconditional peace. The nation was wearied of war and the great Allied losses provided plenty of fuel for Tory criticism. "No Peace without Spain" had become a hopeless cry and an unnecessary bar to peace. The extremely foolish impeachment of the notorious Dr. Sacheverell rallied against the Government the forces of unrest and set in motion once again the popular outcry of danger to the Established Church. During the summer of 1710 the Whig ministers were gradually replaced by Tories and the subsequent general election in October returned a large Tory majority to the House of Commons. This gradual change in the political complexion of the Government was indicative of the immaturity of the system of constitutional government. Ministers were still regarded as personal servants of a sovereign who personally exercised authority, and yet were subject to the will of Parliament. Indeed, the support of the House of Lords was regarded as almost as important as that of the Commons. The vote of the Lords in 1711 against a peace without Spain, in opposition to the Ministry, necessitated the well-remembered precedent of creating a batch of peers to restore the Government majority.

The first and great task of the Tory ministers was to obtain

a favourable peace with France. After nearly three years of incessant intrigue and negotiation England secured at Utrecht a highly advantageous treaty. Throwing over the Allies and disregarding the Barrier Treaty with Holland, Oxford and especially Bolingbroke obtained the best spoils for England by a secret preliminary agreement with France, and left the Allies to glean what they could at the general conference at Utrecht. The use of such a method has raised continuous controversy. Without defending its moral aspect, Professor Trevelyan argues that it might receive some justification on grounds of political necessity.

There was everything to be said for this plan as a means of securing British interests, and something to be said for it as a means of securing European peace. It might well prove the only way in which so many self-regarding States and Princes could be compelled to come to any settlement at all.

The secret negotiations are commonly associated with the name of Bolingbroke. Professor Trevelyan is careful to point out that they were initiated and continued by Oxford for nine months without Bolingbroke's knowledge. The latter, however, was the real architect of the Peace and responsible for the final terms.

He stands in history as the man who, by courses however devious and questionable, negotiated a Peace which proved in the working more satisfactory than any other that has ended a general European conflict in modern times.

It may be argued that the satisfactory working of the Peace was as much due to the impotence of Holland as to the skill of Bolingbroke. Her decline from the status of a world power was inevitable and, as Professor Trevelyan says, "was not primarily due to Bolingbroke."

The logical and necessary consequence of the Tory peace negotiations was the revival of the succession question. By conspiring with France against the Dutch, the Tory leaders involved themselves inextricably as supporters of a Jacobite restoration.

The Ministers obtained, indeed, a reasonable peace for Europe, with specially good terms for England; but they did so by becoming fellow-conspirators with French statesmen and Jacobite agents to coerce the Whigs, the Dutch and the Elector of Hanover into the acceptance of terms dictated by England and France. Our Allies became our enemies and our great enemy our ally.

It had, however, long been apparent that the nation would not tolerate a Roman Catholic king. Even a violent Tory like Swift could loathe the Papists and the Pretender. Although a personal friend of Bolingbroke, Swift was kept to the end in ignorance of the former's relations with St. Germain. When, in February 1714, James indignantly refused to change his religion and declared that he would rather forfeit his rights, it became finally clear that the Hanoverian succession was assured. "The cause of a constitutional, Anglican Jacobitism was a dream of English country-houses and had no root in the realities of the exiled court overseas."

Although his main theme is the struggle round the Peace and the Succession, Professor Trevelyan has written several valuable chapters dealing with the colonial empire, the state of Scotland and her reaction to the Union, and the condition of Ireland. Several years ago Professor Trevelyan published a volume of select documents for the reign down to 1707. Now that his history is complete a further volume of documents down to the accession of George I would be very welcome.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Mr. Wickham Steed's *A Way to Social Peace** contains five lectures delivered last autumn on the invitation of the Halley Stewart Trustees. Like all the author's work it is distinguished by wide knowledge and a welcome clarity of thought and phrase. While rightly rejecting the Marxian generalisation that the disappearance of class antagonisms will suffice to remove national antagonisms, he stresses the need of social peace, not merely as desirable in itself, but as a method of getting rid of war. His idea of social peace, however, is not that of Marx, the Fascists, or the Nazis, all of whom desire to crush our liberties beneath the autocratic or "monolithic" state. Regimentation, he reminds us, is not civilisation. Is there really no middle way, he asks, between competitive anarchy and a ruthless dictatorship? Co-partnership, or employee partnership, he replies, provides the key. Profit-sharing is quite inadequate. The workers must share not only in the profits, if such there be, but in the secrets and the responsibility of the firm. Businesses have been saved from ruin by the magic of confidence between employer and employed, when no purely economic remedies availed. The accounts of some of these successful experiments, which fill the latter part of this striking little volume, are very encouraging.

* Allen & Unwin. 4s. 6d.

That the workmen have inherited a deep distrust of their employers is sorrowfully admitted by the author—the evil that men do lives after them. But the need of both sides for industrial prosperity is so urgent that traditional animosities cannot be allowed to block the way. If the machinery is to function, imagination, sympathy and comradeship must grease the wheels.

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The increasing use of machines and other new devices in the art of farming makes *Change in the Farm** by Mr. T. Hennell a book of great interest and value. The author describes, with the help of many excellent illustrations, the old-fashioned ploughs, implements of an earlier generation and "the just and time-honoured methods of those who wielded them." Contemporary knowledge is fast disappearing and the facts of the old economy, to use the author's happy phrase, can "be extracted only at leisure from a welter of daily common-places, the genial warmth of fire and beer bringing them ripely from the dwindling memories of the third generation back." Almost every county had, and in some respects retains, its own farming traditions. Mr. Hennell describes the peculiarities of many localities and enables the reader to make valuable comparisons. Among the mass of information which he has collected, it is interesting to note that the bullock team was still in use a few years ago, if it is not to-day. "The only team left in England in 1931 was the celebrated one of six Hereford cattle, which belonged to Earl Bathurst, at Cirencester. These Herefords are in constant work between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., and yet are always fat and well looking." As time passes, and when all the symbols of the old order have disappeared, this book will retain for the historian a lively record of the past.

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Princesse Marthe Bibesco has made an interesting volume of family papers in *Letters from the French and English Courts, 1853-9*,† written by the Princesse de Chimay and now published for the first time. Emilie de Pellapra, who became on her second marriage the Princesse de Chimay, was a natural daughter of Napoleon and a lady of great charm and beauty. Her letters and certain mementoes which had belonged to Napoleon were handed down to Princesse Marthe Bibesco, who has made from them a delightful pen-portrait of the writer. The letters were written mostly to her children, giving them vivid accounts of visits with her husband, to Napoleon III at Fontainebleau, and to Queen Victoria at Windsor. She was a much-loved and devoted mother and was never too tired or too gay to find time to write to her children. She told them of life at the Courts, of the people she met, and of the clothes she wore on various occasions; it is obvious that there was no detail too small for their interest. They were a devoted family, and

* Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d. net.

† Jonathan Cape. 6s. net.

in the midst of their pleasures the parents remembered to send empressed flowers and bon-bons, and they in their turn sent a joint daily letter called the "mosaic." Perhaps to English readers the most interesting letters and papers are those written from London and Windsor a few years later. She speaks with disgust of the hard English beds and of the indigestible food, but the lack of smoking delighted her. "People don't smoke! Servants would not dare, masters would not deign, and I'm enchanted! In spite of the stifled and very smoky air of London, this absence of the tobacco infection is such a relief to me that I am really well!" She gives gay accounts of Court balls and other amusements, and if sometimes she is a little unkind in her descriptions, there is never spite or malice in her sting. Family letters even if descriptive can be so dull, but these are full of vivacity and interest and give some idea of Court life in France and England at that time. Mr. Hamish Miles has made an admirable translation from the French of a delightful book.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Miss Elizabeth S. Haldane, in her volume *The Scotland of our Fathers*,* gives us, in amply illustrated form, a "Study of Scotch Life in the Nineteenth Century." Miss Haldane asks whether Scotland, in joining the England of the nineteenth century in world-wide achievement, had "as a nation . . . lost its soul"† Her answer is definitely in the negative and, indeed, no reasonable and well-read person can doubt that Scotland not only is a nation but a nation that in saving the souls of other nations has saved her own. Miss Haldane's account of that nation and its work, quite incommensurate with its small population and the lives of its people, will convince those who had any doubt. The only point in which the Scotch have shown any weakness is the neglect of the Gaelic language, and it is not yet too late to remedy this defect.

The Letters of Stephen Gardiner,† edited by Dr. James Arthur Muller, the Professor of Modern Church History in the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge, Massachusetts, is a work that will be valued greatly by all students of the sixteenth century, both with respect to England and England's continental activities in the reigns of Henry VIII and Mary I. Dr. Muller gives the student a sketch of Gardiner's life and an account of recent Gardiner literature. The letters began with one to Erasmus of February 28th, 1526 or 1527, and concludes—there are 173 letters in all—with a letter to Bonner of April 10th, 1555. It is an invaluable volume.

* Alexander Maclehose & Co. 12s. 6d.

† Cambridge University Press. 31s. 6d. net.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

JUNE, 1934.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S THIRD BUDGET.

WHEN Mr. Neville Chamberlain opened his third Budget on April 17th it was known that the financial year ending March 31st, 1934, had resulted in a realised surplus of £31 millions. The revenue exceeded his estimates by £25,800,000, and the expenditure was somewhat less. The surplus of £31,148,000 represents the difference between an actual revenue of £724,567,000 and an actual expenditure of £693,419,000. But the real surplus, as he pointed out, was about £39 millions. This requires explanation. In his second Budget he had suspended the Statutory Sinking Funds, and had arranged to borrow a token payment of £3,300,000 for the debt to the United States. But, fortunately, the actual cost of the interest and management of the national debt proved to be less than £213 millions; and as he had provided £224 millions for the purpose, he was left with sufficient funds to defray out of income, without borrowing, both the token payment to the United States Government and the statutory sinking funds, which amounted to £7,750,000.

After the announcement of last year's surplus, the sensational Press conjured up fantastic visions of abounding prosperity, and prophesied a prospective surplus of anything from £50 millions to £80 millions. It was indeed a case of "Great Expectations" after "Bleak House." At the outset of his statement, however, Mr. Chamberlain ranged himself with the optimists and quoted "gratifying evidence that the efforts of His Majesty's Government are bearing fruit." On the other hand—and this he did not refer to—last year was the worst on record for British shipping and British agriculture, and one of the worst for the cotton trade and coal-mining.

In his illuminating pamphlet *Why Tariffs Have Failed*, Mr. Ronald Walker reminds us that in 1929 the country was agitated by the terrible figures of unemployment. There were 1,123,000 unemployed people on the registers at the time of

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the general election. Tariff reformers attributed it to Free Trade; the Labour Party attributed it to Capitalism. After two years of Labour government, with a rapid increase of expenditure, debt, and taxation, the figure had risen, in October 1931, to 2,755,000; and the nation was confronted with a Budget deficit unparalleled in time of peace. At the end of that year, thanks to a rise in prices, following the abandonment of the gold standard, and prior to the introduction of a general protective tariff, unemployment had fallen to 2,560,000. To-day, after including a large number of unemployed who have been excluded since 1931 from the register, the total may be put between 2,300,000 and 2,400,000—more than double the figure of 1929.

If we turn from employment to commerce, it is easy to understand why the figures we have quoted are so unsatisfactory. Taking imports and exports together, the total overseas trade of the United Kingdom (in sterling values) shrank from £1,701,000,000 in 1930 to £1,119,000,000 in 1932. Imports were 33 per cent. down, and exports 36 per cent. down. In 1933 the total had fallen to £1,043,000,000. So much for the claim that our industrial and commercial prosperity is in a fair way to being restored. As long as the country is shackled by a protective tariff, and trade is restricted by quotas, any further great improvement in financial conditions depends upon a reversion to public economy, by which alone, in the absence of expanding revenue, the burdens of taxation can be reduced.

Before entering upon the size of the prospective surplus and its disposal, it may be well to recount briefly the main features of our financial history since the fall of the last Labour Government. In the autumn of 1931, soon after the formation of the National Government, Mr. Chamberlain succeeded Mr. Snowden in the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Budget for that year, and for the ensuing year, had already been balanced in heroic fashion; for Mr. Snowden, with the consent of the Cabinet and without any recourse to protective duties, had imposed £60 millions of economies and £80 millions of new or additional taxation. The economies consisted mainly of percentage reductions in the allowances of the unemployed and in the salaries or wages of various classes of Government servants. These retrenchments were an inadequate recognition of the fact that, after

years of public extravagance and falling prices, the national expenditure was in reality nearly double that of the years 1924 and 1925, though the nominal increase, measured in sterling pounds, was comparatively small. The whole apparatus and machinery of government had become, and remained, extravagantly expensive; the consequent burden of taxation was, and still is, intolerably heavy; and the effect upon trade and employment may be judged by the simple fact that in recent years the numbers of unemployed have more than doubled under the strain. The economies, long overdue, were dictated by common sense and necessity. They were trifling in comparison with those which have been forced upon other countries. Indeed, the scale of wages and salaries in our civil service, as well as in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, is enormously higher than that which is being drastically reduced in France and Italy.

What of the taxpayers? Since 1929, the standard rate of income tax has been raised by two successive sixpences from four shillings to five shillings in the £. The surtax on incomes above £2,000, which rose on a graduated scale from ninepence to six shillings, has been raised to a range of from one shilling to eight shillings and threepence, while the death duties have been increased to a maximum of fifty per cent. Nor should it be forgotten—though Ministers of the Crown find it convenient to overlook the fact—that the last general election turned above all on the question of public economy. It was a battle between common sense and socialism, not between free trade and protection. It was to resist retrenchment that the Labour Party cast off their Prime Minister and their Chancellor of the Exchequer, and made their appeal against taxpayers for the votes of the unemployed and of the civil servants. Since then their leaders have constantly and loudly (even after the deficit of 1932) demanded the restoration of all the "cuts." On the other hand, economists of the Gladstonian school complain with far more force and reason that the economy pledges made by the National Government in 1931 have been only half fulfilled.

The following table has been constructed to show the course of expenditure. It will be seen that the "economies" in the service of the debt, including the cessation of sinking fund payments and the practical cessation of the American Debt

payments, conceal an enormous advance in ordinary expenditure since 1924.

(In £ millions)

	Total Expenditure (including debt charges)	Debt Charges	Expenditure (excluding debt charges)
1913-14 ...	173	24	149
1924-5 ...	730	357	373
1931-2 ...	771	322	449
1932-3 ...	777	308	469
1933-4 ...	693	224	469
1934-5 (est.)	706	224	482

From this it appears that in the last ten years the ordinary expenditure of the Government has risen in sterling pounds from 373 to 482 millions, although the purchasing power of the £ has nearly doubled! Clearly the time has come for another severe scrutiny of public expenditure. Some idea of the profuse generosity with which public money is ladled out may be formed from the salaries offered by Mr. Elliot in connection with his precious "schemes" or "plans." On the Milk Marketing Board, for example, the manager was offered £5,000 to £7,000; the accountant, £2,500 to £3,000; the secretary, £2,000 to £2,500; the marketing officer, £2,000 to £3,000; and so on.

In the first year of the Government, a strong Conservative Economy Committee was formed in the House of Commons. It examined the estimates and formulated proposals for effecting large reductions. After giving a little preliminary encouragement to his supporters, Mr. Chamberlain burked the whole question. He faintly referred to it in last year's Budget speech, but in this year's he never even alluded to the matter! Indeed, so far from economising, Mr. Chamberlain has until this year practically done nothing but tax; for he has laid hundreds of protective and preferential duties upon imports, and the only considerable relief to consumers was last year's reduction of the beer duty.

Quotas, for which we are indebted mainly to Mr. Elliot, are even worse than tariffs; for they restrict trade and raise prices, and diminish, instead of increasing, the revenue. The quota warfare in which we are now engaged with some of our best customers, in the Empire as well as in foreign countries, may prove far more pernicious to our overseas trade than

the tariff warfare with which it is associated. It must be difficult for Mr. Runciman and Mr. Elliot to work together, seeing that they are at cross purposes. It must be difficult for Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's son to tolerate the rejection of New Zealand's offer, which might have brought into practical politics his ideal of Empire free trade.

We may now turn to Mr. Chamberlain's estimates for the coming year. His statement was simple, concise and lucid. On the expenditure side he has allowed the fixed debt charge to remain at £224 millions. Last year there was a surplus owing to the fact that the rate of interest on Treasury Bills was only twelve shillings and sixpence per cent. If trade improves, the rate is likely to rise; but, thanks to further savings on debt conversions, it may be hoped that there will again be a surplus sufficient to defray the charge for statutory sinking funds. The Chancellor of the Exchequer quite realises that the ordinary sinking fund ought to be restored, and has given a very proper warning that "a larger provision will have to be made in future financial periods" for the fixed debt charge. Not long ago, as he observed, that charge amounted to £355 millions—the difference being due partly to American debt payments, partly to the provision for a sinking fund, partly to the much higher charge for interest on both the floating and the long-term debt. The supply services this year are to cost £461,924,000; those for the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been raised by £4,765,000—an ominous and alarming comment on the Disarmament Conference and the state of the world. The civil estimates, however, are more than £6 millions lower than those of last year, thanks to an expected* decrease in the Ministry of Labour vote, and a certain automatic decrease in war pensions. But for these two items—unemployment benefit and pensions—the civil service estimates, which stand at £355½ millions, would have been considerably higher than last year. Adding together all the items of expenditure, except the self-balancing expenditure on the Post Office and the Road Fund, Mr. Chamberlain arrived at £698,124,000 for the total Expenditure of the current year. That is the amount he had to provide out of revenue.

In estimating his revenue on the existing basis of taxation, Mr. Chamberlain began with customs and excise. Last year receipts from customs and excise were more by £17 millions than his estimates, thanks to larger imports than were ex-

* On the hypothesis that unemployment will go on diminishing.

pected under the protective tariff, and also to an increased consumption of beer. Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Elliot together are illustrating by the logical method of concomitant variations a neglected economic truism. By lowering the beer duty last year, Mr. Chamberlain reduced the price by a penny a pint and improved the quality. The result was a large increase in consumption, though he attributes this partly to the hot weather of last summer. Meanwhile his colleague, Mr. Elliot, unable to tax milk, has raised the price by a distributing scheme, a socialistic "plan," and has thereby greatly reduced the consumption. Perhaps "more beer and less milk" will be a plank in the National Government's programme when it once more appeals to the country?

Making a very modest allowance for continued expansion of trade, Mr. Chamberlain budgets for a customs and excise revenue of £290 millions, which is about £21 millions more than last year's estimates, and about £4 millions more than last year's receipts. Among the reasons why he is not as optimistic as some of his critics is that the sugar subsidy, the Ottawa agreements, and the application of quotas to imports from Ireland, are all adverse to customs revenue. Indeed, if the Cabinet pursues its present path of quota warfare with other countries, including the Dominions, our trade and revenue are as likely to contract as to expand between now and the next Budget.

Next in order come income tax and surtax, which together are expected to yield precisely the same amount as customs and excise—£240 millions from income tax and £50 millions from surtax. The yield from death duties is put at £76 millions. Altogether, Mr. Chamberlain estimated that on the existing basis of taxation his revenue would be £727,200,000, against an estimated ordinary expenditure of £698,100,000, leaving a surplus of £29,100,000.

In describing it as the largest surplus for ten years, Mr. Chamberlain ignored the awkward fact that, if he had provided for the sinking fund which his predecessors, Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Snowden and Mr. Churchill, all thought necessary, there would have been no surplus at all, but a deficit. However, apart from this unwelcome reflection, we rejoice that Mr. Chamberlain could foresee a surplus sufficiently large "to begin the long-awaited process of relief from the burdens and sacrifices of the last few years." Whether he will be able to continue this much-needed process next year will depend first

upon whether he can curb the spending departments, and, secondly, whether trade and employment improve between now and next spring. The fate of the National Government will depend largely upon the next Budget. If there is another substantial surplus, and another substantial reduction of the taxpayers' burden, the country is not likely to place the Socialists in power, though it may give at least a controlling voice to the Independent Liberals, if they have the good sense to frame their policy on Gladstonian lines. On the whole, I conclude that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was justified in framing more modest estimates of revenue than were expected. It looks as if the limit of expansion in the home market had been nearly reached, and the international trade barometer certainly does not point to fair weather ahead.

When we pass from the size of the surplus to its disposal, we have no complaint to make. Mr. Chamberlain, it must be remembered, is interdicted, by a fiscal policy which he has inherited, from removing the protective duties that restrict and hamper our overseas trade. They might all have been struck off with the surplus of £29 millions, for his own estimate of the yield of the general tariff is only £24 millions—a sufficient comment on the absurd, but frequently repeated, statement of some Liberals who now support Protection that the necessary expenditure of the country could not be defrayed, or that the Budget could not be balanced, without the revenue derived from protective duties.

Of the minor changes in taxation, the only important one is the reduction in the licence duty on motor cars and motor cycles from £1 to 15s. per horse-power. But the cost of this concession will be borne mainly by the Road Fund. As the change is likely to augment the number and pace of motor cars, it is to be hoped, not only that local speed limits will soon be imposed in all towns and villages, but also that some portion of the Road Fund will be spent on setting the unemployed to make footpaths by the side of country roads. I have calculated that if the present ghastly casualty roll of over 7,000 killed and over 200,000 injured annually on our roads could be reduced by half (as it most certainly could be without inconvenience to decent motorists), an economic wastage of £10 millions a year would be prevented.

In disposing of his surplus, Mr. Chamberlain resisted the clamour of those who demanded that it should be entirely devoted to restoring the cuts, without any regard to the great

body of taxpayers, from whose exertions and earnings are derived the funds that support not only the unemployed, but all our public servants and employees, including soldiers, sailors, policemen, and postmen. He chose rather to act upon the principle enunciated by his predecessor, Viscount Snowden: "A surplus now must in justice be devoted, as far as it will allow, to relieving those classes who suffered when the crisis was acute." As the income-tax payers made the largest contribution to the deficits of 1930 and 1931, he devoted £20 millions of the surplus to reducing the standard rate from five shillings to four shillings and sixpence in the £. This is still sixpence more than the rate at which it stood before the Budget of 1930. To the dismay of the Labour politicians, who had predicted the breakdown of the capitalist system, he also restored the cuts in the unemployment benefit, at a cost of about £3,600,000, and devoted the remainder of his surplus to restoring half the cuts in salaries and wages.

These concessions will cost more next year than this, as they only take effect from the summer; but the Chancellor, in his concluding remarks, intimated that he had no fear that either the tax burdens he has removed or the cuts he has restored will have to be put back. It is obvious, therefore, that, if trade and revenue fail to expand any further, he will have to be much more careful than he has been about the growth of ordinary and extraordinary expenditure. In the last few years, derating has cost the Exchequer—so it was stated during the discussions on the Budget—£63 millions (for two years only), the sugar beet subsidy £42 millions, shipping subsidies to the Cunard Line £9 millions, the coal subsidy £30 millions, and civil aviation £2,800,000. Since the War over £120 millions has gone in housing subsidies, and Mr. Chamberlain has himself induced the House of Commons to vote £375 millions for the Exchange Equalisation Fund for the purpose of maintaining (such is its justification) the stability of our inconvertible paper currency by immense purchases (or sales) of gold and by secret operations on the foreign exchanges. On this subject the Chancellor of the Exchequer assured the House that the Exchange Equalisation Account is covered by assets and "continues to show a profit"; but every accumulation of gold means a loss of interest, and, as Mr. D. M. Mason pointed out, the gold hoard can only be said to have shown a profit if and when the Bank of England has disposed of it with advantage to the Ex-

chequer. Moreover, since 1914, unemployment has cost the country over £1,000 millions, and some £600 millions have gone in rates and taxes for poor relief. More doles for agriculture, cotton, shipping and housing are in prospect. No one—not even Mr. Elliot—can predict the cost of "Elliotry" either to British taxpayers or British consumers.

Those who believe in a balanced and honest Budget will thank the Chancellor for having turned a deaf ear last year to the seductive proposals of Mr. Maynard Keynes and his socialistic disciples. An extract from Mr. Horobin's speech on April 18th, the second day of the Budget discussion, reminds us of what was proposed and what has happened. After touching on Mr. Macmillan's arguments for an unbalanced Budget, he went on:

To descend to comedy, I may turn to the principal exponent of this view outside the House. I will quote from Mr. Maynard Keynes, who in *The Times* of April 5th last year, when arguing for a policy which included a £50,000,000 deficit and development loans running into the wrong side of £100,000,000, said: "I should be hopeful that this relief would increase employment after a certain interval by 300,000 or 400,000 men, making a total improvement of, say, three-quarters of a million men from the two branches taken together." That is to say, public works and a deficit on the Budget. I wish to draw the attention of the Committee to these words: "Nor would there be cause for blame even if time and disappointment were to reduce our hopes by one half." . . . We are now in the happy position of being able to test from facts, not from guesses, what actually has been the increase in employment by carrying out the exactly opposite policy which was engendered by unintelligent Treasury officials, by the Machiavellian people at the Bank of England, and by the unimaginative and practically superannuated Chancellor of the Exchequer. . . . There has been an increase in employment of 615,000 men."

For this, at any rate, Mr. Chamberlain deserves our unreserved congratulations. The other day a friend of mine, who was reading through the Gladstone papers, came upon the following in Mr. Gladstone's handwriting:

RULES OF FINANCE

1. To pay your way.
2. To reduce your debts.
3. To practise economy.

Are these rules out of date?

F. W. HIRST.

JAPAN AND CHINA.

IN the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW of April 1933 I suggested that the best answer which could be made to Japan's aggressive action in Manchuria was the reconstruction of China, pointing out that "long before the process is complete Japan will claim to take part in it." The process has hardly begun, yet Japan has not only claimed to participate in it but even ventured a veto on the actions of others, including the League of Nations itself. The motives of this action are obviously different from those which Japan professes. It is not yet possible to know and understand them all. But the situation is so serious that it has merited and claimed the attention of public opinion throughout the world and it is worth while to consider its implications.

It should be noted that it is not without precedent in the previous history of Sino-Japanese relations. It is only natural that the Chinese should again refer to the notorious Tanaka Memorandum. This document is undoubtedly a forgery, but it is one that would never have been composed were it not for the existence of a real precedent for such allegations in the "Twenty-one Demands" of the year 1915, forced on China while Europe was helpless to intervene and the attention of the United States was distracted elsewhere. Most of these concerned Shantung and Manchuria, but the fifth group was meant to give Japan a virtual protectorate over the whole of China, as is seen by the following articles:

ART. 15: The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

ART. 17: "it is . . . necessary that the police departments of important places [in China] shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan the improvement of the Chinese police service.

ART. 18: China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent. or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government) or there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased."

Even under the corrupt and weak Government of that time and virtually without foreign protection, China was able to resist these demands and they were in fact withdrawn. They served, however, to demonstrate that there was one group in Japan which aimed at a definite control over China. The strength of this group has varied with the changing character of world affairs. It must be remembered that Japan's policies have been much influenced by imitation of others, ever since she entered the comity of nations eighty years ago. In the pre-war period Germany was her political model because it was Germany that seemed to be the predominant world Power. During the war itself, though ranged on the opposite side, few Japanese statesmen believed that Germany could be crushed. They planned rather to strengthen their own position in the Far East by methods similar to hers with the possible further objective of combining with her when she emerged, as they expected her to do, intact and unbroken, if not indeed triumphant, at the end of the war. Her complete overthrow came as a great shock and Japan hastened to imitate the democratic countries, which had survived the great struggle while the autocracies and aristocracies had collapsed. Now that democracy in its turn has shown signs of weakness, and autocratic power is being re-established to deal with the problems of the economic depression, the military and feudal elements in Japan, which had never really surrendered their control, have begun to resume it and, in alliance with the big industrial leaders, resumed also their plans for the hegemony of the Far East.

In the interval, however, Japan had accepted a policy of international co-operation in China entirely opposite to that of the "Twenty-one Demands." She had, it is true, obtained in return the Washington and London Naval Treaties, which in effect recognised her strategic control of the Far Eastern seas. But by the Nine-Power Treaty and other instruments signed at Washington she had made a self-denying ordinance as regards the Chinese mainland, reaffirmed the doctrine of the Open Door and recognised that the reconstruction of China was an international question in which all Powers with Far Eastern interests were concerned. The clauses of the Treaty are comprehensive and definite. The Powers agree:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable Government.
3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights and privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states. . . .

For these objects the Powers bind themselves not to enter into treaties with one another nor to support their nationals in seeking exclusive privileges, spheres of influence, or railway discrimination. This treaty was and is a great obstacle to Japan in her Manchurian policy. It is even more embarrassing to those who want to resume the endeavour to secure her preponderance on the Chinese mainland. And yet the situation created by their defiance of it has made it all the more necessary for them to prosecute schemes to overthrow it. For if China does secure the effective and stable Government specified in the treaty she will be able the more easily to resist the aggression of Japan. Moreover, the restriction or monopoly of markets, which is part of the policy of all Powers in other quarters of the globe, reinforces the demand that Japan should establish in the Far East, not that equality of opportunity and "the Open Door" which is the declared object of the Nine-Power Treaty, but a market secure for herself and protected against the rest of the world. Thus political and economic interests have combined to produce this new attempt at self-assertion.

That it was prematurely made has been shown by the result and it may well be asked why it was put forward at this particular juncture. There is considerable evidence that it was not part of a well-designed scheme but rather, in its inception at any rate, intended as a *ballon d'essai*, or due to the desire of one party to commit the country irrevocably to a policy during a period of temporary ascendancy. There is an obvious disposition in Western opinion to endow Japanese statesmen with a power of calculation and foresight and "oriental cunning" far greater than they really possess. Their Government is subjected to the same balance of forces as those of other States. There have been, indeed, exceptional fluctuations of policy during the course of the last twelve

years. The Manchurian episode was carried through with great courage and consistency, once the issue was joined, but even then the Shanghai incident showed neither systematic design nor certainty of object. The same confusion of thought is even more apparent on the present occasion.

The declaration has been called a "Japanese Monroe Doctrine for the Far East," but the term is an unfortunate one. The United States never attempted to prevent the South American States from obtaining either commercial loans or naval and military assistance from European Powers, who have supplied them with large quantities of munitions, warships and military and naval missions. The Monroe Doctrine was directed solely against attempts by Europeans to obtain territory or control of territory or to impose their institutions on South America by the use of force. The assertion by Mr. Eiji Amau, the Foreign Office spokesman at Tokyo on April 18th, even in its later official form, endeavoured to make Japan the judge of what assistance should be given to China by other Powers and in particular assistance in military and especially aerial armaments, whether by direct aid or by loans for that purpose. There is no precedent for such claims unless the Power that makes them has established or is in the process of establishing a virtual protectorate over the area in question such as Britain obtained over Egypt.

The declaration was followed by others on the part of the Japanese representatives at Washington, Berlin and Geneva, of which the last was made in terms especially hostile to action through the League of Nations. There has been a tendency to suppose that those declarations were all part of a long-matured and well-thought-out plan. But the language used and the methods employed hardly seem to lend themselves to this interpretation. There was a crudeness of expression and hesitancy of manner which seemed to show that these were individual efforts made in embarrassing circumstances rather than part of a concerted scheme.

The motives of those who wished to assert Japan's right to control the reconstruction of China can only be guessed, but there are a number of factors which seem to explain its emergence at this time. First and foremost are her relations with China herself. It is well known that Chiang Kaishek and other Chinese have long wished to accept the situation created by Japan in Manchuria and to resume more friendly relations

with her. Negotiations have for some time been proceeding between the Commissioner of the Chinese Government in North China and Japanese officials. But public opinion in China has prevented the Chinese Government from coming to any agreement. The Nationalist intelligentsia still bitterly resent their humiliation and influence the masses, and Canton has opposed all reconciliation. For this party reconstruction means obtaining sufficient strength to recommence the struggle. In any event if China succeeds in increasing her administrative and economic efficiency by the aid of foreigners, she will be the more able to resist the encroachments of Japan. But reconstruction also involves the increase in efficiency of military and naval and aerial forces. Plans have undoubtedly been made for developing the Chinese air force and it is significant that a Chinese Naval Attaché has just arrived in Great Britain. Japan regards this development in exactly the same manner as France the rearmament of Germany, though she possesses no treaties by which to forbid it. She is especially sensitive to any challenge in the air, an element for which she has as yet shown no very special aptitude herself. The danger from a Chinese air force seems all the greater since the U.S.S.R. is apparently concentrating on that arm as her main weapon of defence against Japan. If this threat should develop, the military and naval supremacy of Japan might still fail to give her that complete security which she desires. There can be no doubt that the military element which has the last word in Japanese policy desired to stop the prosecution of China's plans before they reached a dangerous stage.

Moreover, the reconstruction of China has now reached a position in which foreign loans of some kind are very desirable if not absolutely essential. Plans for a great extension of roads, railways and river reorganisation have been preparing for some time. The report to the League of Nations of its principal expert in the Far East shows how comprehensive these schemes are and how vast a programme of planned economy has been laid down. Through the Consortium agreements Japan has a certain control over loans to China. Only last year she refused to agree to allow such loans to be raised without her own participation. But if a well-established programme of reconstruction was endorsed by the League, there are many ways by which foreign capital might be obtained for its prosecution. It is no secret that plans for raising money

from outside sources have been under discussion for some time. If these could be carried out Japan's control over the future of China would tend to diminish and the interest of other countries in China's prosperity and welfare would increase. That the Japanese declaration was aimed at preventing any such development is clear from its form, and it may well be that it may accomplish some of its intention in this respect. For capital is very sensitive to political considerations and the certainty of Japanese hostility might prevent the success of financial negotiations with private persons which would otherwise have come to fruition.

Japan is suspected also of wishing to forestall any arrangement between the U.S.S.R. and China. Her own negotiations with the U.S.S.R. have proceeded slowly and she has yet to complete by legal purchase the control which she already exercises in fact over the Chinese Eastern Railway. It does not seem likely that the U.S.S.R. would be able to challenge Japanese supremacy in the Far East for a long period. But there is always the possibility, however remote, that Russia and China might come together in a common hostility to Japan as they did after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95.

Moreover, Japan is already asserting her right to a larger proportion of sea power when the Washington and London Treaties are reconsidered next year. At Washington she only obtained concessions by bartering away part of the position she had obtained in the Far East during the World War. It is hinted that this new assertion of her superior interests there are part of a comprehensive plan to make her strategic position even less liable to challenge than it is to-day.

Some of these suggestions seem to attribute to Japan a far more complete scheme of world diplomacy than she in fact possesses, and it is more probable that her intention was mainly to warn those concerned with China that she would not allow big schemes of reconstruction to go forward without her own interests being taken into special consideration. In any case the plan, whatever the intention, has met with but poor success. In the Manchurian adventure Japan could act and the rest of the world could only talk. But Japan has now merely talked and the rest of the world, whatever their pre-occupations, did not find it difficult to talk back. The protests of the United States, Britain and France were indeed

unanswerable since they were based on the Nine-Power Treaty, which Japan could hardly repudiate.

Finally, it must be remembered that the question of Japan's share of world markets has been raised by Britain in a manner which Japan has a right to resent. What would British merchants have said at the time when their own goods had an almost unchallengeable cheapness and value in the markets of the world if it had been suggested that they should limit their activities because it was inconvenient to other Powers which could not compete with them? Yet this is what has been done in Japan's case, and when she has claimed her undoubted right of selling her goods at her own price, often to meet a demand which other Powers could not satisfy with their higher-priced products, she is met with the threat of exclusion from the colonial markets of the world. If Japanese products are to be refused entry into areas which Britain, France and Holland control will she not be tempted to declare that she must create her own special markets in regions where she holds a preponderance of force? A large export trade is a necessity to her and of her determination to obtain it there can be no doubt. The party that wished to secure it by cultivating the goodwill of the Chinese people has been overthrown.

This is a situation which cannot be met by merely negative policy. It demands some solution and the whole problem of the relations of China and Japan are bound up with it. Is not the time approaching to bring into review the whole situation? The economic, political and strategic interests of the Far East are so closely knit together that they need to be considered in relation to each other, as, in a sense, they were at Washington on the initiative of Britain. It may be hoped that these considerations are in the minds of the China Committee of the League and the Committee of the Assembly which is still legally concerned with the Manchurian question. Japan's insolent claim to decide the reconstruction of China has been repudiated and her isolation in world affairs once more effectually demonstrated. But nothing will be gained by ignoring her strategic position in the Far East or her legitimate demands for commercial expansion. The problem of Manchuria is at present insoluble by itself, but it might become less so if it was considered in relation to the other problems of which it forms part. It is surely in this direction that wise statesmanship should endeavour to find a path.

C. K. WEBSTER.

EUROPE AND OURSELVES.

THE closing phase of the Disarmament Conference finds us in this island face to face with an issue which we have succeeded in postponing for fourteen years. *Should we, or should we not, pledge ourselves to secure the observance of a General European Treaty?* If we decided to give such a pledge we could do much—though not so much as at any time before the present crisis—to determine the character of the Treaty. It would be a Treaty for the limitation, control and perhaps also in some measure the reduction of armaments. If we decided not to give any pledge, there would be no new General European Treaty, and the observance of the existing treaties would be avowedly maintained by force and not by consent. There would be renewed competition in armaments between the Continental Great Powers. The result would not necessarily be war, or, at least, immediate war. But it would certainly be a situation beyond the control of statesmanship, whether British or non-British.

Before analysing the conditions of our choice more closely let us ask why we have been so reluctant to face the issue. For, after all, it has been confronting us ever since the United States withdrew in 1920 from that post-war European system which President Wilson took such a large share in establishing. Had the United States remained our partner in Europe, we would have ratified the Anglo-French Treaty of Alliance concluded in 1919, and we would have been ready to interpret the Guarantee and Sanctions articles (X and XVI) of the Covenant in the sense in which they were drafted, without making use of the loopholes which allow their meaning to be weakened. Finding ourselves without the United States, we have been reluctant either to follow them in withdrawing from the system or to participate in it according to the original intention. And our hesitation between these two courses has been a principal reason for the unsettled state of European politics during the last fourteen years.

It is easy to see the external forces which have been pulling us in opposite directions. We are tied to the Continent by geography and by the development of air power. We are drawn away from it by our closer relationship to the Dominions who, naturally enough, tend to share the United

States view of Europe rather than our own. Thus, if we become too closely involved with the Continent, we run the risk of losing touch, not only with the United States, but also with the Dominions. But if we disinterest ourselves of Continental affairs we jeopardise vital interests of our own. But there is a deeper reason for our indecision. We feel instinctively that the Continental peoples and, in particular, the Continental Great Powers do not understand the *motives* which actuate our policy. If we really felt that they understood us, even in the imperfect measure in which we are understood at Washington, we would be readier to enter into a partnership which would safeguard our own interests as well as theirs. But, in fact, we are not on comfortable terms with them. Their whole outlook is too different. It was because of this difference—one might almost say this incompatibility of temper—that, in spite of geography, we kept our association with them down to the barest limits in the nineteenth century. It was only the menace to our sea-power which drew us closer to Continental politics in 1904. And, in spite of the establishment of the League of Nations, this incompatibility still persists.

There are indeed two groups of states on the Continent—one group which accepts the League of Nations idea and is prepared to go a long distance in applying it in practical policies, and another group which rejects it and clings more strongly than Louis XIV and Bismarck to the idea of State absolutism. But the group, or at least the more important members of the group, which supports the League of Nations idea does so in so un-English a manner that its attitude seems almost as foreign to us as that of those who reject it. For to them the League, or any collective system, signifies a concentration of power against an aggressor state, whereas to us it represents something resembling our own decentralised Commonwealth, a group of states co-operating together because they are animated by mutual goodwill. Thus *our* motive in forming the League was to consolidate a condition of goodwill which we assumed to exist among its members. But the motive of the French and most other European peoples (the Northern nations excepted) was to establish conditions of safety out of which goodwill should ultimately emerge.

Thus during the last fourteen years we have constantly

been at cross purposes with the French. They have tried to develop the League along their own lines, and we have tried to develop it along ours. As a result, neither of us have been able to go very far in perfecting our own design. No doubt both of us have been hampered by forces equally opposed to our own and to the French idea. But even had those forces not existed, the divergence of plan and the mutual misunderstanding of motive would have rendered progress very difficult. It is true that each side has gone a certain distance to meet the other. The Locarno Agreements represent our concession to the French desire for a system of safety. The numerous French offers to us as a counterpart to a more definite pledge on our part represent their concession to our system of goodwill. So also does the general policy of the French Left from the accession of M. Herriot to power in 1924 down to the resignation of M. Daladier in February last. But what is extraordinary, in retrospect, is how little real understanding has resulted from the immense effort expended by the statesmen and diplomats of two peoples, each sincerely and indeed ardently desirous of peace. After endless conversations and negotiations we are almost where we were in 1919. The reason for this is not bad statesmanship. It is a mutual incomprehension going so deep that we cannot even take stock of it and agree to differ. How many Frenchmen understand—one is almost inclined to say are capable of understanding—Dominion status, our constitutional monarchy, the relations between the Colleges and the University at Oxford and Cambridge? This may enable us to realise what equally dark places there may be for us in the French system, which, like ours, is not simply a system of politics but a system of life. We shall not really be members of a *common* League of Nations till far more Englishmen understand what the words *Société des Nations* naturally mean to a peasant in Eastern France, to a *petit bourgeois* with his *coffre-fort* at the bank, or to a Socialist workman brought up on the doctrine of Jaurès' *Nation in Arms*.

But there is no time for us, on either side of the Channel, to go through this process of education. It will take at least a generation—if not as long as the forty years between the French Revolution and the recovery of British Liberalism from the shock that it gave us. We are forced to take a decision. Shall we overcome our reluctance and co-operate

more closely with the Continental supporters of the collective system? Or shall we lose touch with them and leave them to themselves? Let us examine the facts of the situation. They are not so favourable to us as they were in 1919. At that time democratic ideas were predominant on the Continent up to the borders of Russia. No doubt Continental democracy differs from our own in many respects. Nevertheless had we immediately after the war thrown our full weight into the League system as the Continental peoples understand it, we could have done a great deal to promote the growth of common political ideas and of practical co-operation between the different European peoples. Unfortunately we missed our chance. To-day we are faced with the fact that there are two schools of ideas contending for mastery in Europe. One great Power, France, together with a group of other states (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States) hold ideas akin to our own: that is to say, they stand for peace in external relations and for democracy based on the Rule of Law in domestic affairs. Side by side with them, it seems, curiously enough, that we can now place the revolutionary government of Russia, which has discovered that peace is an indispensable prerequisite for success in its own social and economic experiments. On the other side there are two Great Powers, Germany and Italy, which have officially espoused doctrines that, taken literally, are more dangerous to the world's peace than the Prussian Power politics preached in the years before 1914. Another state almost of the same rank, Poland, must be counted as an incalculable factor owing to the excessive importance attached by her rulers to considerations of prestige. This is intelligible enough in the light of Polish history, but it is none the less unfortunate. A number of other states, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Roumania, have slipped back into conditions which can, perhaps, best be described as unstable. In this state they are an easy prey for the intrigues of Power-politics. Thus, at the moment when she could least afford it, Roumania has lost one of her wisest and steadiest leaders, M. Duca, at the hands of assassins inspired by German doctrines. Yugoslavia has for years been exposed to outrages by terrorists trained in Italy, and German Nazi propagandists are busily engaged in inflaming passions whenever there is opportunity for mischief,

in the New World as in the Old, from Estonia to Holland and Switzerland, in the United States, in Canada and in South Africa.

In these circumstances, we in this country are tempted to break out of the circle of Continental diplomacy, with its never-ending round of new permutations and combinations, extending to-day even to Japan. And this natural inclination is strengthened by recent events, which have increased the ranks of those who are opposed to all that we stand for, till it might seem that the task of supporting the minority of freedom-loving states must be too great for our strength. Hence we find a curious alliance in our public opinion between the Extreme Left and the Extreme Right, between the Peace at any Price School and the Jingo Imperialist School, both of them idealist in their own way, both equally blind to political realities, and both also—if the truth must be told—influenced, though no doubt subconsciously, by a new element that has crept into our public opinion, Fear.

If this fear were justified, the situation would indeed be critical, though even then isolationism would be no remedy. But in point of fact our cause is not nearly so weak as it appears. If the anti-democratic forces in Europe were united, they would no doubt be very formidable. But, devoid as they are of a common purpose, they are hopelessly divided amongst themselves. The two despotic Great Powers, Germany and Italy, cross one another's path throughout Central Europe. Italy can check German expansion in Austria; but she cannot turn that country into an Italian protectorate, still less disrupt Yugoslavia to establish her hold over Croatia. Poland may enter into a pact with Germany because she has her eye on the Ukraine or in order to warn France to treat her as an equal; but that does not dispose of a rivalry running back a thousand years.

There is an alternative view which claims that we can disinterest ourselves of the Continent, not because it is doomed to disintegration and reaction, but because France is strong enough to keep order there without our help. It is the line of policy summed up in the formula, "Thank God for the French army!" This acquiescence in a sort of belated Napoleonic hegemony involves an even more subtle and ignoble evasion of responsibility than that of the out and out pacifists. It makes a pretence of friendship for the French

people when it is really encouraging them to proceed alone along an exceedingly dangerous path. Frenchmen themselves are well aware of this. They know that such a hegemony could only be maintained for the time being by means of diplomatic combinations both complicated and fragile. The policy of military alliances was reluctantly accepted as a bad second best by the French people in 1920. It is no service either to them or to Europe to drive them to continue it. It might serve them for the few years, five at the most, during which Germany will be completing her rearmament. After that it will be at the mercy of circumstances to which even a Talleyrand could hardly be equal.

The only way in which peace can be ensured and the seeds of goodwill planted in Europe is through a collective system centring round the democratic and peace-loving peoples. If we co-operated wholeheartedly in such an endeavour we could make this system acceptable to most, if not all, of the other Powers. If we fail to co-operate, the system cannot function. For French military power is no substitute for a collective system. Of this the present attitude of Belgium is perhaps the most striking evidence.

But is it to our own interest to take the lead in an enterprise admittedly foreign to our traditions and involving a considerable measure of risk? Such a policy may be the best for Europe. Is it the best for us? Let us examine the matter coldly from our own insular point of view. The isolationist school wishes us to put an end to our Locarno obligations and to have no more to do with Europe. It may be mentioned in passing that those who advocate this course cannot have read the Locarno Treaty, which can only be terminated when the Council of the League of Nations voting by a two-thirds majority "decides that the League of Nations offers sufficient protection" to those whom we have promised to protect. Is it really desired to treat this engagement of eight years' standing as "a scrap of paper"? But, apart from this, the policy advocated, so far from being conservative, as it purports to be, goes back upon at least four centuries of English history. The maintenance of the independence of the Low Countries and their freedom from occupation by an inland Power is not a post-war policy or a nineteenth-century policy. It is the oldest tradition in our conduct of foreign affairs. And it is doubly necessary to-day when air-power and the

submarine have diminished our island security and altered the whole strategic situation. Thus, to take only one example, the permanent demilitarisation of the Rhineland, involving the prohibition of air-bases in that area, pushes, or should push, the nearest German air-base considerably further from our shores than would otherwise be the case. This is not an advantage lightly to be abandoned.

There is no space to discuss in detail the dangers to which we should be exposed if we gave up our traditional responsibilities on the Continent. We should in fact be inviting a coalition against us; and it would not be a coalition of governments that either respected us or shared our ideas. It does not take much reflection on these and kindred possibilities to arrive at the conclusion that the choice of policies presented to us by the isolationist school is not the actual choice before us. The actual choice is between a League of Nations' policy based on a General Treaty and a policy of Alliance pure and simple.

The policy of Alliance has a certain attraction at first sight. It is simple. It makes an appeal to our instinct for friendship and our respect for loyalty as between old associates. And it involves no irksome obligations in detail, such as the limitation of our armaments and the acceptance of supervision by an outside body. But the moment it is examined realistically its disadvantages become apparent. It would cut us off both from the Dominions and from the United States. It would drag us alone into the Continental arena, forcing us either to acquiesce in the policies of our Ally or to be involved in perpetual bickering in the effort to restrain him. In a word, it would entail all the inconvenience—to use no stronger word—of our situation in the years preceding 1914, together with the reproach of having abandoned the effort to work a better system.

The alternative solution is a General Treaty for the control and limitation of armaments embodying a guarantee, at least on the part of the European signatories, to ensure its effective observance in Europe. Admittedly this is not what we would have preferred. Like the United States, we would rather have an agreement resting simply on the good faith of the parties. This was the system adopted in the Washington Treaties. But has the sequel shown that this is a really satisfactory method in the world as it is to-day? Be that as

it may, our choice to-day is between a collective Treaty with a guarantee and no collective Treaty at all. And a collective Treaty even in this form does present a number of solid advantages. It maintains our contact both with the Dominions and the United States. It ensures us, as a result of President Roosevelt's declaration last year, against the danger of a conflict between the two chief sea-powers. It puts an end to competition in armaments and cuts at the root of that struggle for power which, if unchecked, must sooner or later involve Europe in a new war. It brings home, not only to our own people but to the peoples of Europe, who still have an exaggerated belief in the power of armies, the overriding importance of sea-power in an industrialised civilisation. Above all, it marks the victory of political principle over opportunism, and so prepares the way for those organic processes of co-operation from which alone can spring the mutual understanding and goodwill which rightly remain the ultimate goal of our foreign policy.

ALFRED ZIMMERN.

THE PASSING OF A PARTY.

THE new Austrian constitution declares Austria to be a corporative State, although it admits that the corporations do not yet exist. Never was a more hollow construction invented to hide the fact that the Government which devised it is utterly unable to rely on any considerable section of the population. The German and the Italian Fascist régimes are based on the existence of a single, all-powerful party, which, though it owes everything to force, still maintains the appearance of a political body supported—by means of sham elections—by the majority of the people. In Austria the Government cannot claim to represent more than a tiny minority. They have no party behind them. They dare not risk an election. Therefore there are to be no parties in Austria.

This ridiculous travesty follows at the heels of a dramatic tragedy in which one of the best organised parties lost its existence: Austrian Social-Democracy has gone down fighting. The Austrian Socialists have often been accused by their opponents of being hard-boiled Bolsheviks because they stood for low rents which vexed the landlords, and because they built houses out of tax-revenue instead of having recourse to loans. There was a time in Vienna when everybody, including soldiers and waiters and domestic servants, was organised in trade unions, and the respectable people were afraid that if these unions were to call a strike they (the respectable people) would have to go hungry and walk about with uncleaned boots. But there never was such a strike. However, on May-day (May 1st) the trams were not running until noon, and that, to the respectable people, seemed perfectly scandalous.

For those who knew better, Austrian Social-Democracy afforded a striking example of an all-inclusive mass-movement whose activities ranged from the political, the industrial, and the educational fields to the co-operative stores, the cinemas, the kindergartens and the sports grounds. In half a century of evolution strongly accelerated after the War, this vast organisation had been built: two generations had worked hard to promote its growth, hoping that their children might reap the rich harvest of their patient labours. This peaceful development of their own state within the State was the

greatest gift which democracy had bestowed upon the working masses.

The natural history of political parties has yet to be written. Hitherto the laws which govern their lives have hardly been explored. Do they experience youth and manhood and old age like human beings? Is their organism subject to change or decay? Some indication of a special character may be gathered from the history of the international Labour movement. Being a class movement it normally starts with the industrial organisation; however, where political rights do not exist, the political party is the first to be born. In countries where autocracy rules the workers get together to fight for the right to organise, for the freedom of Press and meeting, and particularly for the right to vote. The extreme type of this kind of mostly clandestine organisations is represented by the Socialist parties in pre-war Russia. Their nature is fight: a revolutionary struggle in spite of threatening gallows, conducted by conspiratorial methods, inspired by the solidarity of the catacombs—but without the masses. The vanguard only is fighting, the very *élite* of the workers, and it fights regardless of the well-being or even the life of the individual. In the West, where democracy existed prior to the formation of the political Labour movement, this movement starts on a very different line. The British Labour Party came into existence without having to fight first for civic liberties. Its organisation is broad and comparatively loose. Its essential elements are the masses. Its strength resides in numbers and it strives for the well-being of the many.

For the small revolutionary party the most rigid discipline is a vital necessity of self-defence. Since any individual side-stepping may bring disaster upon the whole group, the strictest obedience to the party's decisions is required and the principles laid down in the party programme are binding upon all its members. (Even now the Russian Bolsheviks who have not yet forgotten their conspirator days, although they are no more the victims but the masters of the Government, expel leading members of their party for no other reason but slight "deviations" from the official opinions; they are even banned or imprisoned for having expressed views which differ from those of the Central Committee.) In the democratic parties of the West it is no crime to think other-

wise than the party executive, subject to the acceptance of the general principles laid down in the constitution of the party. It is only now—after more than thirty years of existence and having been twice in office—that the British Labour Party feels the need to enforce observance of its rules and is engaged in the process of setting up a more definite, comprehensive and watertight programme.

In Central Europe the Labour movement in the course of its evolution had developed into a combination of both these extreme forms. Under the semi-feudal régime of the old Hapsburg and Hohenzollern monarchies it began as a small fighting party. The revolution of 1918, which brought about full political freedom, changed its character: although retaining most of its revolutionary ideals, it lost part of its fighting spirit and grew into a broad mass-organisation. This essential change in the attitude of the Social-Democratic Party was most conspicuous in Germany, where it was accentuated by the split between Socialists and Communists; it was less obvious in Austria, where the party not only kept alive the phraseology of its earlier days, but in fact never departed from the conception of class policy. None the less it experienced the problems of a mass-movement whose wide range is at variance with its fighting aims and activities; and these problems were unsettled when it was crushed by Fascism.

This leads to the question which agencies are peculiar to the mass-organisation and how they react upon the fighting force of the movement. Every mass-movement is bound to create functions, institutions, i.e. a machinery which tends to specialise and to stabilise itself. When a party branch is formed by twelve members they may divide the work amongst themselves; as soon as it has got twelve hundred it cannot operate except through the expedient of functionaries who act on its behalf. The party machine develops a tendency to become bureaucratic; this, too, is a natural result of growth. And it is by no means peculiar to democratic movements: the Russian Communists openly complain of the choking abundance of officialdom, and there is no political party which has more quickly grown into a colossal apparatus of bosses and officials than the Italian Fascists or the Nazi movement in Germany. Dictatorship breeds bureaucracy.

Nor is the development of the party machinery the most

distinctive or the most important feature of the democratic mass-movement. Its predominant and lasting effect is mass-education. Undoubtedly, the modern Labour movement, with its vast range of activities spreading over the various parts of human life, is the greatest educational movement in history. It has brought the toiling, slumbering masses within the reach of culture and science; it has lightened the burden of the manual worker, and by giving him access to the wealth of civilisation, hitherto reserved for the privileged few, enhanced the riches of the nation. By the time the movement had grown large the benefits which the individual member derived from this evolution amounted to a considerable raising of his standard of life.

But at the same time this share in moral and material gains obtained by the Labour movement naturally changed its outlook. Before the war no worker in Central Europe would have expected to get anything from his party: to be a Socialist meant not to gain but to be ready to sacrifice. After the War, when democracy opened the door to the masses, Labour was able to secure social protection and political influence for the workers. To be a Socialist now meant to take part in the profits of the eight-hour day; to belong to those who stood for better wages, better housing and better education; to partake in social progress and cultural advance. The Labour movement now appeared to the individual worker as the force which had built houses and taken care of his children: he looked upon it as a power to whom much was owed but from whom much more was still to be got. When later the political balance turned and the big party lost its influence, this change left the masses utterly bewildered.

But why did it lose its power? It is no paradox to say that, when it came to the point of offering active resistance, the mass-movement by its very size and importance has been impeded in its capacity to act. At the time when a trade union had a few hundred members it might risk in every strike whatever power it represented: if it failed the organisation could quickly and easily be rebuilt. With the large mass-organisations things are different: the greater the influence they wield the less will they be prepared to risk the whole of their existence, the results of many years of successful efforts, and the well-being of many thousands of men. The responsibility of the leaders who have to decide whether or

not to lead a party of nearly a million members to civil war is more than a human being can bear; and there is the danger that this momentous risk is not taken until it is too late, and everything is lost in a much more humiliating defeat than if the battle had never been waged. Thus, in Germany, the leaders waited for the masses to rise while the disciplined masses waited for the leaders to give orders to fight; and the powerful German Labour movement—Socialists as well as Communists—went down ignominiously because it had grown so big that nobody would take the risk. In Austria the moment of bringing the masses into action was put off until it was nearly too late to save more than honour.

In the light of these reflections the events which led to the closing stages of the Austrian Socialist Party's fate are easy to recall. On March 7th, 1933, two days after Hitler's triumph in Germany, the Austrian Government embarked on a semi-dictatorial régime. Availing themselves of a pretext afforded by a trifling incident (the resignation of the three presidents of the Austrian Parliament—a subterfuge later abandoned, since Parliament reassembled, if only to sign its own death-warrant) they cast aside Parliament and issued the first decrees, one restricting the freedom of the Press and the other limiting the liberty of meeting. They were based on an emergency law dating from war time (1917) giving powers to the Government to regulate current matters of an economic nature; a measure designed to deal with the food shortage of the time and expressly limited to "the extraordinary circumstances arising out of the War." These first infringements of the constitution were followed by an incessant stream of decrees reducing day by day the scope within which the laws remained effective yet avoiding their formal suspension or abolition. The limitations imposed on trial by jury (which has now been abolished altogether), the suspension of the High Court of Constitution, the interdiction of elections, the restriction of trade union rights, including the prohibition of strikes, the curtailing of the powers of the City of Vienna—to mention only a few—were amongst the most noticeable of these measures. The workers found themselves deprived of many precious rights; yet as they still had to lose more they clung to the hope of a peaceful solution which would enable them to preserve at least part of their legal position. By maintaining and defending democracy they placed themselves

on the defensive. When, at last, they struck out in reply to intolerable provocations their outburst, gallant though it was, bore the mark of a defensive revolution.

Thus Austrian Labour, with its back to the wall, finally met its fate. The movement, founded in the 'sixties of the last century, had passed through years of ruthless persecutions and bitter internal feuds; it had been united by Victor Adler in 1889; it had fought a great fight for political freedom and obtained universal suffrage in 1907. It had been victorious after the War and readily lent its force to the building up of the Republic. Under the leadership of Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler it withstood the pressure of the Communist tide; while men like Karl Seitz and Karl Renner helped to give the young State its democratic constitution, and the late Ferdinand Hanusch set up a model of progressive social legislation. Though never disclaiming its socialist aims it had been thoroughly democratic; and, except for a trifling set-back in 1920, had steadily advanced at every election until it had attained more than 40 per cent. of the electorate and become the strongest party in the country. Now, sticking to its legal rights, it fell a victim to an aggressive minority in power. Now, with hands tied by the very size and weight it had attained under democratic rule, it went down fighting as the one and last stalwart of democracy. It suffered defeat not because it had been aggressively socialist but because of what had been the virtue of a democratic party and now turned out to be its weakness.

This is in itself an answer to the criticism which their opponents have often levelled at the Austrian Socialists. They have been accused of having abused the power of their numbers, obstructed the parliamentary machine, and made excessive demands on the social administration. Had it really been possible to avoid disaster by a more compromising attitude? To answer this question there is no need to point to Germany, where compromise begot defeat, nor is it necessary to dwell on the repeated offers of co-operation on constitutional lines, made by the Socialists to the Government during recent months, which were haughtily rejected in spite of the Nazi danger. But if the Socialists were blamed for overstepping the rights of a minority in the country, what about Vienna? There, in the capital, they had a solid majority of more than sixty per cent., which they had increased at every

poll; they had 400,000 organised members of their party out of a population of 1·8 millions, which meant that every second male adult and every fifth woman in Vienna was a Socialist. There was no prospect of their losing this majority by any democratic means—and that is the reason why the present rulers of Austria, rejecting any idea of a compromise, deliberately abandoned democracy in order to oust them.

It only remains to state the conclusions which the Austrian workers themselves are drawing from their defeat. At their secret little gatherings they eagerly discuss how it all came about. They have lost all faith in democracy. They have been true to it and they regret it now. They want a party which is not big but fighting, and which, if ever it grows large again, shall retain its fighting spirit. Some of them are less anxious to regain the benefits of their mass-institutions than to make a determined bid for power. Their mind is definitely turning towards a fervent desire to obtain Socialism. And this is how they read the bequest of their dead comrades who have been killed by the guns and sent to the gallows because they defended Democracy. Democracy is not enough. And this is how the workers of all countries understand the lesson of Vienna and glorify the passing of a party. Every idea lives for which men have been ready to die.

OSCAR POLLAK.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE PROTECTORATES.

THE British nation is now confronted with one of those supreme moral and political issues which have repeatedly challenged our people. This time it is the future of the three Protectorates of South Africa. General Hertzog with the support of General Smuts has decided to ask the Imperial Government to transfer to the Administration of South Africa the three native Protectorates—Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland. The decision reached upon this matter will affect native policy throughout South and East Africa. And not merely native policy in Africa, but the honour of the British race in its wider relationship to the millions of native races throughout the Empire.

What are the main features of this challenging demand? Foremost is the question whether or not the territories shall be incorporated in the Union of South Africa; secondly, upon what conditions. If the Protectorates are not to be incorporated, the question of transfer to the Colonial Office will immediately arise, and with it the probability of annexation and economic obligations of a substantial kind.

The three territories concerned—Swaziland, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland—comprise a territory larger than France, Austria and Belgium put together. Their population is less than 800,000, spread over nearly 290,000 square miles, but, unfortunately, these countries are largely undeveloped and are drifting into a serious economic *impasse*. The most completely native territory is Basutoland, for apart from missionaries and officials, whites are not permitted to settle within its boundaries. The land belongs to the natives and they manage their own affairs—rather well. Swaziland has been grossly mismanaged by the native chiefs, but the spheres of the natives and of the white settlers are governed by the admirable settlement made by Lord Selborne. The third and more remote Protectorate, Bechuanaland, is virtually a native territory, governed to-day by the most brilliant, if sometimes difficult, young chieftain to be found in South Africa. White settlers are allowed in Bechuanaland and possess mineral and other rights of some potential value.

South African policy looks forward to the incorporation of all British territories south of the Zambesi, a development

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which gives some promise of advantage to all the territories concerned. But is the moment ripe for swallowing up these huge native areas? True, the 1909 Act of Union anticipated and provided for transfer and, largely due to the foresight of Earl Selborne, a "schedule" was attached which is a kind of native charter. The schedule purports to protect native rights in Basutoland, and so far as Basutoland is concerned it is doubtful whether any substantial change would be involved providing the schedule conditions were observed, not only in the letter but in the spirit, by incorporation. Bechuanaland is a huge undelimited territory in which there are substantial vested interests, both white and native; these would be affected vitally by incorporation. Swaziland is in an entirely different position from either Basutoland or Bechuanaland, because it was once transferred to the Transvaal, but when the Transvaal was annexed, Swaziland was "re-annexed." The Transvaal was then placed under the Governor, and it was only in his capacity of High Commissioner that he controlled Swaziland—a typical British procedure! It cannot be denied that relatively the Union Government has a stronger claim to incorporate Swaziland than either of the other two Protectorates.

The schedule, upon which so much depends, reposed like the Act of Union upon the continued association of the Union and of any "transferred" territories with the British Crown. It is largely due to the fact that the constitutional proposals now before the South African Parliament appear to imperil that connection that profound uneasiness has arisen as to the value of the entire schedule as a protection for native rights; as Professor Berriedale Keith says:*

As the legal assertion of sovereign independence is now taking place, it will be necessary to reconsider the position of the Protectorates and Basutoland. The proposal to hand them over to the Union was contemplated when the South Africa Act, 1909, was passed, because the Union was intended to remain an integral part of the Empire. It would clearly now be impossible to transfer these territories without their full assent, and that of the British Parliament, to an independent kingdom whose connection with the Crown of the United Kingdom could in law be severed by a simple Act passed by a bare majority in either House.

* *Morning Post*.

It must also be remembered that each of the three Protectorates has special treaties with the British Crown, which cannot be lightly abrogated, and presumably not without the consent of the parties. The natives of Bechuanaland, for example, are certainly entitled to demand respect for the treaties and agreements entered into between Khama and Sir Charles Warren in 1885, by which their tribes were guaranteed freedom of administration under the protection of the British Crown. Then the Swazis were guaranteed their independence in 1881. The sturdy love of independence by the Basutos has been a household word in South Africa ever since that memorable day when the forces under Sir George Cathcart suffered so severely in "Lancers Gap" at the hands of the bold mountain warriors of Basutoland. Politically, the Basutos have never forgotten double treaty events in their history, when in 1883 they received the full benefits of the Act of Disannexation, coupled with the offer of a liberal constitution, and followed by the greatest Pitso ever held in the territory. At that historic Pitso independence was formally declared by the Basuto Parliament and accepted by the Government of Queen Victoria.

The schedule to the Act of Union does not purport to transfer the sovereignty of any of the Protectorates, it lays down terms for the transfer "of the Government" of "any territory belonging to, or under the protection of, His Majesty." It then sets forth in twenty-five Articles the conditions governing any such transfer of functions. Ten articles in the schedule deal with the Governing Commission. This Commission is to be composed of not less than three persons, whose duty it will be to act as advisers to the Governor-General and to the Prime Minister. These Commissioners are to be appointed for ten years, succeeded by reappointments of five years' duration. They are to be given fixed salaries and can only be removed from office "upon addresses from both Houses of Parliament passed in the same session." All papers concerning the territories are to be made accessible to the Commissioners, and they are to be entitled to submit recommendations to the Governor-General and the Prime Minister.

One of the most important features of the schedule is the confirmation of native land rights.

Basutoland.

"It shall not be lawful to alienate any land in Basutoland."

Bechuanaland.

"It shall not be lawful to alienate any land forming part of the native reserves."

Swaziland.

"It shall not be lawful to alienate any land forming part of the native reserves."

Following the provisions for protecting natives' lands comes Article 16, under which native Pitsos and native Assemblies are to be maintained. Another important Article provides that subject to certain provisions set forth in the schedule, "All revenues derived from any territory shall be expended for and on behalf of such territory." Other clauses deal with the prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors, certain rights of travel throughout the Union, and the prohibition of differential duties on produce.

Thus any transfer of the control of the Protectorates is governed by (a) existing Treaties, (b) the terms of the schedule to the South Africa Act of 1909. But at this stage there emerges a third element, namely, the formal pledges of His Majesty's Government. The first concerns the British Parliament, and the pledge given by Mr. Thomas* is as follows:

In accordance with the pledges given when the South Africa Bill was before Parliament, the House will have the fullest opportunity of discussing, and, if they wish, of disapproving, any proposed transfer of these territories to the Union.

The second was to the natives, and this was given at the same time by Mr. Thomas:

The Government "will not make any decision until the native population and the white population have had full opportunity of expressing their views, and any representations which either the native population or the white population may make to His Majesty's Government will receive the most careful consideration before the Government come to any final decision in regard to the matter."

The British people must never forget that they are Trustees of these "Estates" and are, therefore, entitled to receive assurances upon the question of native policy before agreeing to transfer their trusteeship to others.

The native people, we are told, will be given every opportunity of stating their views, and it is understood that

* April 30th, 1934.

opportunities to present their wishes in person in this country will not be denied to them. It is, of course, inconceivable that the British Parliament will agree to a transfer without the consent of the natives themselves.

These, then, are the two issues round which controversy will now revolve: (a) What native policy the Union Government proposes to adopt for these territories; and (b) The native consent. It is, alas, only too true that the Union Government has never yet evolved a native policy for its own 5,000,000 natives. These to-day are industrial helots and political outcasts. The natives of the Union have before them no prospect of citizenship. To-day, only about 15,000 in Cape Colony possess the franchise, and within recent years legislation has been designed to reduce this vote to nominal value. In none of the other territories does the native possess the vote and, still worse, there is no prospect of the native being given a vote, no matter how he may advance in the scale of civilisation. In the industrial sphere regulations have followed legislation with such brutal consistency and rapidity that the natives are now debarred from some fifteen to twenty skilled trades. The native within the Union is not a man—he has no share in the political development of his country, he is refused any right to devote his skill to industry. In many parts he is compelled to pay his share of the pathways upon which he may not walk. In nearly every part of the Union he may not share educational or religious aspirations with the immigrant races; whilst sleeping or waking his body must be labelled by a "Pass." In every civilised country in the world such limitations are only imposed because of defects in character or capacity. In South Africa, no matter how noble the character, no matter how high the attainments, these disabilities still attach to the natives because they are the penalties of the one thing over which the native inhabitants have no control—the colour of their skin!

Until the British Parliament and people have before them guarantees in the form of a native policy, they are assuredly debarred from surrendering their trusteeship. In this connection it is well that South Africa should be reminded of the remarkable manifesto on native policy issued in 1930 by a group of experienced South African statesmen. The signatories to this manifesto included the Rt. Rev. the Archbishop of Capetown, the Rt. Hon. Henry Burton, K.C., the Hon J. W.

Jagger, Sir Clarkson Tredgold, K.C., Sir J. Rose-Innes, K.C. (until lately Chief Justice in the Transvaal), and Mr. P. Ross Frames (former Chairman of De Beers and Premier Companies). The manifesto covered the whole area of citizenship. The signatories said:

The eyes of the world are upon us. We are in the front trench of the struggle of opposing policies, and the experience and accumulated wisdom of the world are on the side of the policy we advocate. Ultimately it must prevail, but if we depart from it now, we shall be brought to the goal of equal rights through years of conflict with increasing embitterment and estrangement. We shudder to think of leaving such a legacy to the generations that are coming after us.

The following are some of the most arresting passages from this memorandum on policy:

The importance of this issue transcends all party considerations.

Equality before the law, freedom for any man to perform any work for which he is competent, and equality in the exercise of electoral powers by all who have satisfied a uniform standard—these have been the birthright of all men.

The welfare of the whole country, and not that of any single race or colour, is the true concern of all the people.

If they (the natives of South Africa) develop and full citizenship is denied them, there is bound in the end to be a clash. It would, no doubt, be possible for a time to keep them down by force, but force has never proved to be a lasting remedy, least of all in South Africa.

"What"—it may quite properly be asked—"are the main lines of a native policy which would satisfy public opinion?" The answer is, "Nothing more than the well-known features of British native policy as set forth in British official documents." The foremost of these is the principle contained in several despatches, namely, that wherever the area in question is predominantly a native territory, "His Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail."*

Next in order comes the question of citizenship. Any native policy to be satisfactory must include a highway to full

* Cmd. 1922.

opportunities to present their wishes in person in this country will not be denied to them. It is, of course, inconceivable that the British Parliament will agree to a transfer without the consent of the natives themselves.

These, then, are the two issues round which controversy will now revolve: (a) What native policy the Union Government proposes to adopt for these territories; and (b) The native consent. It is, alas, only too true that the Union Government has never yet evolved a native policy for its own 5,000,000 natives. These to-day are industrial helots and political outcasts. The natives of the Union have before them no prospect of citizenship. To-day, only about 15,000 in Cape Colony possess the franchise, and within recent years legislation has been designed to reduce this vote to nominal value. In none of the other territories does the native possess the vote and, still worse, there is no prospect of the native being given a vote, no matter how he may advance in the scale of civilisation. In the industrial sphere regulations have followed legislation with such brutal consistency and rapidity that the natives are now debarred from some fifteen to twenty skilled trades. The native within the Union is not a man—he has no share in the political development of his country, he is refused any right to devote his skill to industry. In many parts he is compelled to pay his share of the pathways upon which he may not walk. In nearly every part of the Union he may not share educational or religious aspirations with the immigrant races; whilst sleeping or waking his body must be labelled by a "Pass." In every civilised country in the world such limitations are only imposed because of defects in character or capacity. In South Africa, no matter how noble the character, no matter how high the attainments, these disabilities still attach to the natives because they are the penalties of the one thing over which the native inhabitants have no control—the colour of their skin!

Until the British Parliament and people have before them guarantees in the form of a native policy, they are assuredly debarred from surrendering their trusteeship. In this connection it is well that South Africa should be reminded of the remarkable manifesto on native policy issued in 1930 by a group of experienced South African statesmen. The signatories to this manifesto included the Rt. Rev. the Archbishop of Capetown, the Rt. Hon. Henry Burton, K.C., the Hon J. W.

Jagger, Sir Clarkson Tredgold, K.C., Sir J. Rose-Innes, K.C. (until lately Chief Justice in the Transvaal), and Mr. P. Ross Frames (former Chairman of De Beers and Premier Companies). The manifesto covered the whole area of citizenship. The signatories said:

The eyes of the world are upon us. We are in the front trench of the struggle of opposing policies, and the experience and accumulated wisdom of the world are on the side of the policy we advocate. Ultimately it must prevail, but if we depart from it now, we shall be brought to the goal of equal rights through years of conflict with increasing embitterment and estrangement. We shudder to think of leaving such a legacy to the generations that are coming after us.

The following are some of the most arresting passages from this memorandum on policy:

The importance of this issue transcends all party considerations.

Equality before the law, freedom for any man to perform any work for which he is competent, and equality in the exercise of electoral powers by all who have satisfied a uniform standard—these have been the birthright of all men.

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British citizenship rights, regardless of race, creed or colour. Any "test" of civilisation should be common to all His Majesty's subjects in any colonial area—as common in its obligations as in its value. Citizenship involves the question of political advancement, and here again British policy has been set forth officially with regard to an area predominantly native; it is this:

His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that the establishment of a common roll is the object to be aimed at and attained, with an equal franchise of a civilisation or education character open to all races.

The land question in the Protectorates has been made as secure as words can make it in the schedule—if the obligations of the schedule are accepted and incorporated in declared native policy, then there need be no cause for anxiety upon the land question. One of the darkest features in the treatment of the South African native is the denial of industrial freedom. No native policy designed for the Protectorates would be satisfactory which ignored the present economic repression of the natives of South Africa. Industrial advancement should be open to all applicants of good character who have attained adequate technical qualifications.

Given the acceptance of the obligations of the various treaties and of the schedule, given a native policy which opens the way to the native to become a civilised man and a citizen—what then remains? Just this one thing—the native consent to the transfer of the Protectorates. But again it may be asked: "How can that consent be obtained?" It can be expressed by the native Pitsos and native Assemblies. It can be done by sending duly appointed Chiefs to this country. If Chiefs fifty years ago could sign treaties for placing their territories under the Colonial Office, they are certainly not less competent to-day to sign a transfer to the Union.

If there is any objection to these methods, then the well-known procedure of an impartial Joint Commission could ascertain the views of the native peoples in the three Protectorates. But transfer without consent and without a native policy would be a fatal step!

JOHN HARRIS.

THE DEFEAT OF DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY.

ONE of the great political facts the last year brought to the European world was that in the most populous of West European nations democracy was struck off the list. The earlier defeats of this system since the end of the war might have seemed to be accidents of no lasting importance, as they had taken place in the sphere of nations without much political experience. Even in the case of Italy those who would not see the crisis of democracy coming nearer reassured themselves by hinting at the relatively large number of illiterate people among their population, and from this arrived at the conclusion that democracy required a certain minimum of general popular instruction that in these cases was lacking. It is not necessary for our purpose to reveal the innate flimsiness of this assertion. For now the events in Germany have made it quite clear that they cannot be the consequences of general want of instruction. So that explanation is proved to be too simple.

It seems certain that a very powerful cause of the breakdown of democracy in Germany (as in other countries) must be sought in the field of economics. In great part this was simply the breakdown of a system overwrought with work of the most difficult and tiring kind. We are a generation of quick forgetters. We have become so well accustomed to economic catastrophes and revivals on the largest scale that we have almost lost the faculty of seeing in their true proportions the present slump and the upheavals in Germany from the beginning of the World War to the end of the inflation in 1923. The sacrifices which Germany was forced to make in the effort to fulfil the obligations deriving from the Versailles treaty (were they ever so inconsistent and half-hearted) amounted, on the whole, to an unheard-of bleeding of the industries of that country. These reparation payments and deliveries in kind were made, a new commercial fleet was built, the chaos of 1919 was overcome, the devastations brought about by the occupation of the Ruhr district were repaired, the second chaos of 1923 was overcome; the productive equipment of industry and agriculture was enhanced to the point of being able to nourish, clothe, shelter, instruct and amuse a people growing in numbers with dreadful speed;

all this could only be done by transforming a great part of this revived body in a social spirit. Then, at the moment of the deepest slump in the history of capitalism, the governing bodies were left without clear, undisputed, and timely advice and assistance from economic science. That is sufficient to explain the state of exhaustion that had overtaken the governing and administering forces of democracy and the exhaustion of patience and reason of the masses at the end of 1932.

But the peculiar construction and exhaustion of German democracy during these years had causes of its own, and became for itself the cause of distinctive weaknesses of the ruling system which crippled all resistance to the onslaught of the enthusiasts of dictatorship. And it is desirable to isolate for once this strand in the rope on which civic freedom and equality of rights in that unlucky country have finally been hanged.

Democracy can be taken by its adherents as an ethical norm or as a convenient rule for the organisation of public affairs. They can take it as a moral obligation, or, if you will, only as something advised by wisdom. This difference in the theoretical significance of democracy is developing far-reaching consequences in actual democratic practice. If the first of these alternatives is to be followed, the consequence will be that it is a duty of every man who, in this sense, is a democrat, to try to bring about as quickly as possible the largest measure of democratic institutions possible. If the second alternative is chosen, the consequence ought to be that the whole problem is removed from the field of principles and that only considerations of political convenience can decide as to the kind and extent of democratic institutions to be created. That is not to say that immediate consideration of party tactics should be the determining factor in forging particular decisions, though to the true believer in the principles of a party its maintenance and power must be nearly identical with the power and glory of country and people.

If we try to decide which of these two meanings of democracy determined the political development of Germany from 1919 to 1933, we find on the whole that the first of them prevailed; traces of the other were found very rarely, and in the field only of powerless critical and theoretical literature,

not of real creations or institutions or even the will or wishes of leading statesmen or their helpers. From this point of view political parties in Germany might be divided into the following groups: those to which democracy was a moral postulate of the first order; those to which it was an evil that at most could be tolerated unwillingly for a certain time but had to be curtailed by passive resistance at every forthcoming opportunity; and those which quite clearly and openly declared it a work of hell and did their utmost to destroy it as quickly and completely as they could. The governing parties belonged to the first and second of these three groups, and most of the governments of the Reich and (with the exception of Prussia) of the individual States were composed in membership and parliamentary adherence of elements from these two groups. Particularly, most of the Roman Catholics, organised in the Centre party, and the great industrialists, bankers and land-owners of the People's Party and the German National Party belonged to the second group and were more or less necessary partners in the various coalition governments. So the first group generally in matters of democracy had its way; the more so since a large part of the second group with scarcely concealed joy observed the realisation of principles that, as they thought (and rightly thought), would in the end conduce forcibly to the self-destruction of democracy.

To recognise the problematical nature of democracy in its German embodiment is made difficult to-day by the fact that the prestige of the Weimar ideas seems to many to be bound up narrowly with ruthless and uncompromising defence of all democratic institutions. But in the situation that has come about now it would be a fatal mistake to follow this bias. For every hope of reconstituting a system of civil freedom and human behaviour in Germany is bound up with the recognition of the truths (be they ever so bitter) which are contained in the experiences of the past fourteen years. Unprejudiced criticism of forms, functions, achievements, and shortcomings of the system from 1919 to 1932 is necessary for every constructive policy in the future.

Firstly, then, it must be said that democratic government is an art that must be learned; which cannot be learned, however, by book study alone but also requires practical experience on a large scale. Certainly history can teach many a good thing; it was alarming to observe that obviously

German democracy was not prepared to learn from the achievements and failures of democracy in other countries. But the main factor was certainly that until 1918 the play of democratic forces in the every-day work of government and administration was not known by any measure of practical experience to the majority of the leaders of post-revolutionary Germany. Only so can we understand that the leaders of this régime thought to strengthen the political foundations of their power by enfranchising the young people down to 20 years of age and the women, i.e. two groups particularly inexperienced in taming their passions of the moment in favour of cool prudence. It is a fact that, without the vote of the young among the workers who had a bias for the Communist party, and of the women (who voted in a higher degree than the men for non-socialists), in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of 1919, the Social Democratic Party would have had a clear majority; and a beginning with such a non-coalition government would have resulted in a development totally different from that arising from the vital necessity of Government by coalition.

It might seem a nearly insoluble riddle why Germany went the way it actually chose. Its solution is to be found in what republican public opinion in 1919 thought to be elementary human rights, to secure which from the start seemed to be the chief justification of the first victorious revolution in the history of this people. The fact that the realisation of a human right to the utmost degree in the beginning of a new régime cannot be of overwhelming ethical value if it should prove to check in the end all hope of its own stability, could not be part of the thoughts of a people that had no experience of the fragility of democratic institutions and was dazzled by the halo of victory which wrapped the great Western democracies of Europe just at that moment.

So our knowledge of the democratic ideals prevailing then in revolutionary circles helps us to understand psychologically and sociologically why this maximum of democratic equality in voting was granted in 1919. To understand this, however, is not incompatible with recognising that the enfranchisement of a majority, partly emotionalist, partly traditionalist, could not but create from the start a grave difficulty for the functioning of democratic government.

For what are the requirements every system must fulfil in

nearly the same degree, if it is to prove a practicable organisation of public affairs? Firstly, that the government be powerful and agile enough to work efficiently even in the crises requiring quick decisions and changes of tactics. And secondly, that each governing group should direct affairs in such a manner as to be able to look with a certain equanimity to going out of office for a certain time. For the first requirement the best expedient is to be seen in government by one party or by coalitions of nearly equal dependence of all its partners on maintaining the coalition. The second necessity, however, asks for compromise and recommends the golden way of mediocrity, but finds its most important quality in banishing all fanaticism from the field of political life.

In both these directions the history of democracy in France and England should have been able to teach German democracy something. Even if this had been recognised it would not have proved simple to fulfil the postulates of such theoretical maxims. For what is a "simple" government? What is the ruling out of fanaticism in political practice? All this is ambiguous and requires rather delicate distinctions. With an electorate largely composed of traditionalists and emotionalists an intellectual task of this kind must prove nearly hopeless, and has proved so indeed.

In Germany democratic representation had been given throughout the form of proportional representation. In any elected corporation (from the smallest villages and the largest towns to the individual States and the Reich) representatives of lists of candidates sat according to the proportion of the vote each party got of the whole vote reached in the election. So every personal responsibility of a member of such a corporation to his electors was totally destroyed, and the influence of the caucuses became monopolistic. The limit of this system was reached in the so-called "Empire-lists" and "State-lists," lists of candidates valid for the whole of the electing territory and proposed by the caucus of each party. All votes that formed a surplus on the proportional number for the mandates given to each party in the individual constituencies were then added up, and the parties were given as many more seats from this central list as were proportionate to the average number of votes cast for one member declared elected in the constituencies. These members represented the maximum of independence of every kind of responsibility to

any certain part of the electorate, and there were elections, to the Reichstag for instance, which gave more than a tenth of all seats to candidates from "Empire-lists." Smaller parties got sometimes nearly 50 per cent. of their seats in this manner.

A further consequence of this mechanisation of equality of voting rights was that in the municipalities and in their associations (counties, provinces, etc.) even the administrative bodies (Magistrate, *Kreisausschuesse*, *Provinzial ausschuesse*—boards of aldermen) were composed in proportion to the party composition of the electing parliaments. It is a sheer miracle that the governments of the individual States and of the Reich were not also elected proportionally. The consequence of these exceptions, however, was a grave disharmony between the political parliament composed on the lines of proportional representation and the government composed on the lines of parliamentary majority. The practical importance of this incongruity can be seen from the fact that in the provinces, towns, counties, and villages, this disharmony did not exist in any remarkable measure, whereas the unproportionally composed governments of the Reich and of the individual States were forced to seek a supporting majority in their proportionally composed parliaments. As the government was one of a party or of a group of parties, and as the parliament was a sort of seed-bed of even the smallest political groups rising by proportional representation to the dignity of parliamentary parties, and as, thirdly, proportional representation had a natural tendency to equalise the size of parliamentary representation of the bigger parties, coalitions became the normal case. Not coalitions of two or three big parties, but coalitions that in most cases depended on the adherence of quite a handful of petty parties too for the forming of effective majorities. These "dwarf-giants" wanted to be paid for their continually necessary votes, e.g. with political concessions that embarrassed the legislative work and with concessions to personal ambitions.

Dictatorships know these embarrassments also, and in no small measure, though less is heard and read of them. But it is a peculiarity of democratic régimes that the fullest publicity attaches to these things and gives rise to an exaggerated but poisoning criticism which enhances the difficulties. There seems to be no example of a government in Germany after

1918 that reposed only on one party. Even the case of the Prussian Government (which depended from 1924 to 1932 "only" on three parliamentary parties) is an eloquent example of this; for its majority depended on two or three members of the Centre party (among whom was von Papen); the necessity of adherence of even the last member of these three parties at every vote forced this government to such a cautiousness that its lameness was not to be wondered at.

Another consequence of these facts was that the persons employed in public service were in no way hindered in their own party activities. The army had no electoral rights; and among the judges a certain political aloofness was at first after 1918 a postulate of good form, though later good form asked only that the judge be not politically active for one of the republican parties. But the majority of the public officials, from the highest in the ministries down to the pettiest of posts, had the full right to belong to some political party. There was generally no difference made between the various parties, though membership of the Communist party was forbidden; and officials were often in Parliament. In some of them the members of the different parties who were public officials formed a very large part of the whole; often they collaborated in fighting for rights and salaries of the officials without regard to the party they belonged to. The unpopularity of the republican system was due to a rather large extent to the fact that reckless criticism of government decisions and purposes was continually proffered by officials. But limiting the political rights of public officials was not to be thought of, as long as these rights seemed to be given not on grounds of political convenience, but inherent from birth and morally gained by not being a criminal or a lunatic.

To be a good democrat was a fulfilment of an ideal that was the foundation of the system. So the degree of merit was determined by how much of this good thing a politician was prepared to grant. We do not deem a good cook a man who, having gained the experience that curry is a good thing in pinches, gives whole spoonfuls of this condiment. But with democracy this opinion prevailed. And so the multiplication of democratic institutions and corporations became a moral postulate in itself. At the side of the Reichstag was placed the Reichsrat as well as the Reichswirtschaftsrat, and in this case something might be said for it; for they were no mere

repetitions of the Reichstag, but reposed on their own principles—the first on the representation of the individual States, with more than proportional protection of the influence of the lesser and petty States, the second on the idea of equality between employers and employees in advising for legislation on social and economic matters. But here mechanical copying without differentiating principle set in. At the side of the Landtag in Prussia stood the Staatsrat, a mere repetition of the former.

In municipal administration the same endeavour to multiply the democratically elected corporations that occupied themselves with the same things was represented by two groups of phenomena: firstly by setting to work at the same things more than one committee of the municipal representation, and secondly by repeating the whole work of these committees in all its details in the plenary meetings of the corporations themselves. All this ate up the time and strength of the members of the corporations, and resulted in the fact that only party officials, well-to-do people or public officials (whose salaries were paid even if they sat on these boards and did not work at their job), could accept membership. So quite generally allowances had to be paid for the activity of members in all of them, down to rather small towns or even greater villages. So a rather slow and clumsy working of all this complicated machinery lamed legislation and administration; moreover, the receiving of allowances for honorary work became one of the most popular slogans in the reckless battle fought against democratic representation in general. As the faults of pre-democratic days were either ascribed to war-time difficulties or mostly completely forgotten, and as there was no practical experience with dictatorial systems and their shortcomings, just comparison could not take place. Democracy, with its own mistakes, partly inherent in one or the other manner in every system, partly only childhood diseases, was proclaimed as a deep swamp of defects in morals or power of will; not technical reform of the democratic institutions, but the abolition of every trace of democracy, became an overwhelming slogan with all radicals, on the Left as well as on the Right.

To recognise that democracy in Germany has failed, at least in the form in which its realisation had been undertaken, is no light duty for the opponent of all dictatorial régimes.

For the danger is very actual that to avow this failure is taken for the far wider avowal that democracy in principle has proved to be an impossible nuisance—at least in Germany. Such a judgment would suppose that this people is incapable of being educated up to democratic forms of public business. Now it is quite conceivable that many an observer should reach this conclusion, for, indeed, of education to maturity in democracy there was little to see. But possibly the foregoing enumeration of the causes of the breakdown of democracy in this case may show where the dangers are lurking. In England one of these dangers was seen at an early time, and its consequences were drawn: the relative independence of the ministers during the period of stability of their parliamentary majority has been developed in a measure that in German democratic circles has been scoffed at often under the nickname of “cabinet cæsarism,” etc., without understanding the cruel actuality of the problem the British solution of which they giped at. The political reserve adopted and, if necessary, enforced upon a large part of the public functionaries, and the large measure of independence of their work from political interference, belong to the same order of facts, and so do the absence of proportional representation and the peaceful behaviour of political opponents to each other. Whether we disapprove or approve these British peculiarities, it seems certain that many of the German experiences may be of interest for the further development of democracy in England.

PENSIEROSO.

THE ETHICS OF COERCION.

MR. BERNARD SHAW, in discussing the condemnation of Joan of Arc, observes that "though all society is founded on intolerance, all improvement is founded on tolerance." The obvious truth of this remark is somewhat disconcerting to those of us who happen to value both improvement and society. Tolerance in regard to religious opinions is to-day approved of by all non-Catholics at least; but when Catholics ask why, if religion be true and important, irreligion should not be coercively restrained, while immorality should, the right answer is not always ready to hand. This situation suggests the need for re-examining the ethics of coercion in general; and there are some other factors which reinforce the demand.

Many thinking people nowadays are no longer convinced of the possible rightness of war by the accepted rightness of a police-system. Yet can one be logically condemned if the other is admitted? What is the precise difference of principle between imprisoning the burglar and bayoneting the invader? Again, any attempt to analyse the concept of coercion reveals the need for clarification. The old idea of "force" as the real issue is much too indefinite to serve in that capacity. Coercion represents a sub-group under the genus "pressure"; and the various forms of pressure—coercive and otherwise—need to be segregated and compared, if satisfactory ethical judgments are to be passed on them.

We hardly need to discuss afresh the morality of the motive with which pressure is exerted on others. It is as a rule comparatively easy to say whether such and such a reason for wishing to move another person to do something is morally right or wrong. What troubles us is the rightness of the method of pressure used. There is no necessity either to enter upon a detailed description of these several methods, which are naturally familiar to us all. Yet it is desirable—and it will suffice—to run briefly over the main types of action we have to consider.

First, we may note, as embodying the minimum of aggression, that magnetic power which enables certain gifted individuals to exercise authority over others without effort—"the power in his eye that bow'd the will." Akin to this is the leverage which Christians believe to reside in inter-

cessory prayer, and which many would explain as operating telepathically. Slightly more overt is the self-reproductive tendency of good conduct as such—what we call "the force of example." In the closer relationships of life, this tendency is enhanced by love and kindness on either or both sides. To trust the apparently untrustworthy is one way of calling forth honesty, to forgive the offender one way of changing him into a friend. Calm non-resistance has often proved an effective defence against a dangerous assailant, the "soft answer" turning away his wrath. Collective non-resistance made the Church in past days an anvil that broke many hammers; and the same policy may yet make some martyrdom the final vanquisher of war. Unsought and *bona-fide* suffering is sometimes intentionally obtruded for the purpose of moving others to shame or pity: sometimes suffering is purposely self-inflicted with the same end in view. Such exhibitions are, in fact, acted suggestions, of which, of course, there are many other varieties. The effort of governments to affect public sentiment by displays of one kind and another may be instanced as an employment of the acted suggestion. The more normal thing, however, is for suggestions or appeals to be spoken or written. Under this heading come personal advice, advertisement, the publication of written compositions, definite requests (perhaps led up to by flattery), the use of rhetoric, persuasion, argument, preaching, protest, censure and denunciation.

Somewhat more invasive is the definite refusal to co-operate. A man may resign his office rather than obey immoral orders. Where resignation is not open, such disobedience—as in the cases of the early Christians and conscientious objectors to military service—involves martyrdom of some kind. Civil disobedience in India (a special example of refusal to co-operate) was advocated by Gandhi, not because (like idolatry or fighting) the thing ordered was judged to be inherently wrong, but because the refusal to do it exerted valuable political pressure.

When promises (including efforts to bribe) and threats are used, the consequences held out as alluring or deterrent may be natural or supernatural. But the method forms a link between the appeal in words and the appeal (by means of reward and punishment) in action. It is at this point, too, that we pass sensibly from influence to coercion proper. The

essence of coercion, as distinct from influence or non-coercive pressure, is the use, not of physical force, but of any pressure against the will, and despite the resentment, of the person affected. Thus the strike and the boycott are not simply refusals to co-operate : they are unwelcome threats to involve others in serious financial loss. Punishment generally may be regarded as coercive pressure designed to control the subsequent conduct of men. None but a few idealists would argue that it can be eliminated altogether from the domestic and educational training of children, though all would agree that our forefathers overdid it. The private punishment of adults (through murder, duelling, piracy, or highway robbery) has passed away from normally civilised society : but we are left with the important custom of deterrent punishment of offenders by the State. Curiously allied thereto is the power of the vote, depending as it does on the willingness of the average citizen to obey the constitutional enactments of the State from habit and good will, and not because they are enforced under threat of punishment. This fact puts voting in rather a different category from pure punitive coercion, though not quite perhaps in that of simple persuasion.

The existence of the Roman Church makes it needful to refer here to persecution. The Roman Church holds theoretically that all baptised persons are her subjects and therefore legitimately punishable if disobedient. But in practice this theory is not pressed where a large minority of baptised Protestants is in question. What is maintained, however, is that the Church has an indefeasible right to the coercive support of the State in order to protect herself and her adherents against the criticism or even the competition of others. Modern Catholic authorities explain that the disuse of this right to-day is due to its practical inexpediency, not to any change of theory on the matter. Such persecution as the early Protestants were guilty of was due to the difficulty of throwing off at once all the errors in the medieval Catholic heritage : now, however, Protestants, unlike their Catholic fellow-Christians, are quite clear that religious truth, however vital, ought not to be enforced by coercive means.

The last item in the category of coercive forms of pressure is of course war. What constitutes the peculiar problem of war is not the motives with which it is waged (which therefore we do not need to discuss), but its inherent character as a

method of pressure. It is sufficient in this regard to observe that war owes its peculiar character to (a) the lethally destructive power of the weapons used, and (b) the hatred and savagery aroused in the combatants. The latter of these would be to some extent restrained by humane sentiment to-day (as compared with the times when the inhabitants of captured cities were often deliberately massacred) : but any improvement under this head would be more than counterbalanced by the vastly deadlier efficiency of the modern instruments of war. Furthermore, the large introduction of machinery into modern fighting has not yet made obsolete the soldier's duty of personally plunging his weapon into the vitals of the man opposed to him, and twisting it as he draws it out so as to make a jagged gash.

Such being, then, the chief methods in which pressure may be put upon others, we have now to ask which, if any, of these methods is morally wrong, and under what conditions, and why? Our answers will in the first place necessarily depend to some extent on the effectiveness of the treatments concerned : and something must therefore be said on the question of their comparative success. In brief, they are all frequently successful ; but the success of any one of them in any particular case can never be relied on as certain. Thus, kindness and gentleness sometimes meet with unresponsive hardness. The spoken word sometimes evokes, not compliance, but resentment. Punishment undoubtedly often deters : brigandage and piracy, for instance, have been effectually stopped, both in ancient and modern times, by rigorous police measures. The fact, if it be a fact, that sixty per cent. of the persons imprisoned in this country for a first offence never enter prison again, proves some effectiveness in the prison system. On the other hand, punishment often evokes hatred, and may deter without convincing. There is plenty of evidence to show that prison often makes the offender worse.

Persecution, it must be admitted, is often successful, at least for a time ; but truth is strong, and usually finds means of prevailing. Since, however, few will feel that the wrongness of persecution depends on its futility, we do not need to linger over this point. In the case of war, on the contrary, the question of success is vital. What reconciles many good people to entering occasionally upon it is the conviction that it is the only effective means of securing certain essential

ends. It has been claimed, for instance, "that no nation or race or caste has ever won its liberty, whether in Ireland or Poland or any other country, without either the use or the threat of violence."* A surface-view of history seems undoubtedly to justify this plea: but it is questionable whether a full study of the facts would vindicate its complete accuracy. Belligerents normally take arms hoping

To reap the harvest of perpetual peace
By this one bloody trial of sharp war.

But in history war always exhibits the same fatal tendency as the feud, namely, to perpetuate itself by endless repetition. In the last analysis, then, it settles nothing.

Modern feeling on the subject of torture, capital punishment, and war indicates that, while ineffectiveness (if demonstrated) suffices to render certain methods inexcusable, even effectiveness is not of itself sufficient to justify any and every method of coercion that has a good object before it. The reason for this misfit between rightness and efficacy is that rightness has to take account of *all* the effects of a practice, whereas efficacy is judged according to a single selected consequence.

By what standard, then, are we to decide whether the effects of a particular method are such as we ought to approve, or such as we ought to condemn? I would submit in reply that the one reliable standard is the absolute value of personality—the standard implicit in the Golden Rule (for every man naturally wishes his personality to be respected and ministered to). To carry out that Rule, we have to imagine ourselves to have once been in our neighbour's present position, and then ask what treatment we (with our present ideals) would now like to have then received. Thus a grown man may look back with approval on the chastisement he once—doubtless with great disapproval at the time—received from his father: but he could never, no matter what his fault, regard with approval a punishment that had left him permanently maimed. Now if ministering to personality be the mark of right and violating it the sign of wrong, it follows that the gentler methods of pressure are morally higher than the strictly coercive, and that the more violent of these latter must be definitely ruled out. This last for the

* N. Leys in *The Congregational Quarterly*, April 1932, p. 263.

further reason that the gentler methods often forfeit their best chance of success, unless those who employ them are known to refrain from the sharper methods of coercion. Risk of failure in particular cases does not discredit the gentler policy; for risk of failure in particular cases is common to *all* methods of action: indeed, failure in the immediate case has often been the only condition of ultimate success (as was the case with the death of Christ).

But seeing that all the methods shade off gradually into one another, where is one to draw the line between the right and the wrong? The difficulty of finding the right place for the clean cut was long thought to be a sufficient refutation of the whole undertaking. The conscientious objector who admitted that he would lock up a burglar was treated as palpably inconsistent for refusing to mangle Fritz. But the supposed refutation is, in fact, entirely illusory. In practical morality, the line between the moderate (and therefore legitimate) and the excessive (and therefore sinful) often cannot be drawn with precision.

Yet who would preach it as a truth
To those that eddy round and round,

that, because moderation is allowable, excess must be allowable also? In indulging the bodily appetites, in spending time and money on amusements, in taking medicine, in correcting children, and in many other things, the whole practical difference between the morally right and the morally wrong consists in a difference of degree. A moderate amount is useful and good, because it ministers to personality: excess is harmful and sinful, because it violates personality. Yet who beforehand can draw exactly the line between them?

What perhaps makes it hardest for us to agree that violent and injurious coercion should be invariably ruled out is the fact that situations arise in which the use of it is the only alternative to permitting some apparently still graver preventable evil. One obligation bids us protect the innocent: another bids us remember the uselessness and guilt of bloodshed. What is a man to do? Even with all the circumstances known to us, that question is difficult to answer; and without such knowledge generalisation is futile. One thing at least we may say: the abandonment of a morally valuable course (as incompatible in the circumstances with one judged

still more valuable) must not be treated as of itself sufficient to condemn a particular decision. If it were, no conceivable solution of a true dilemma would ever escape moral condemnation.

The difficulty is that of rightly assessing the moral value of the two (or more) alternatives open to us in any given situation. In the problem before us, we have to pit the value of (even violent and injurious) restraint against the value of ministering to the offender's personality. In other words, we have to weigh the evil of enduring (or letting others endure) the offence, against the evil of gravely damaging the offender.

That there is a moral value in the punitive restraint of wrong, who can doubt? Some people speak of vengeance as if it were clearly separable from the administration of justice, and unqualifiedly wrong. But desire for vengeance has its roots in a real love for justice.* Not a Christian among us but would morally object, if Shakespeare had let Iago or Don Pedro or Claudius of Denmark or Edmund go scot free. Punitive justice, at least of a rough kind, is seen in those ordinances of God which we call Laws of Nature, but which in Bible times religious men described, in the only way possible to them, as the *ad hoc* visitations of an offended Deity.

On the other hand, some significance surely attaches to the fact that Jesus, while apparently accepting the current Jewish belief regarding the just severity of God, went out of His way to dissuade His followers from all retaliation, and that it was largely His own consistent advocacy and practice of gentleness which first alienated the patriotic sympathies of His fellow-countrymen, and then (by keeping Him disarmed) occasioned His death. His eager disciple Paul repeated His teaching, and urged that, just because vengeance does belong to God, it does *not* belong to the Christian man—though he allows it a place in the hands of the (pagan) magistrate (Rom. xii. 17—xiii. 6). Down the ages the conviction has repeatedly forced itself on the Christian mind that Christians are set aside for a work in the world which requires the abnegation of vengeance and punishment.

The ethical deadlock here revealed becomes clearly apparent when we look at the public administration of justice. A community, we can see, ought not to ignore the responsibility of safeguarding the lives of its members from wanton

* Cf. Bruce, *Apologetics*, 329f.

disorder and outrage. This involves the restraint (violent, if necessary) of wrongdoers. "All society," as Mr. Shaw says, "is founded on intolerance." Universal tolerance and non-resistance on the part of the executive would imperil sacred human rights. The discouragement of crime by publicly punishing offenders seems a *sine qua non* of any ordered social life, and therefore morally just. Yet the coercive element in government is replete with moral drawbacks. Apart from the risk of error in the verdict, the police-officer is required to inflict gloomy punishments, against which his conscience may protest. He has to be "one whose hard heart is button'd up with steel." Possibly he knows himself to be as deserving of punishment as his prisoner. The well-attested liability of imprisonment to make the offender worse cannot but raise acutely the question of the moral right of imprisoning. Hence the widely-held view that police-work is not fitted for conscientious and tender-hearted men, and that the exercise of civil rule is not the proper sphere for those who—as Christian idealists—aim at complete purity and nobility of life. That was the feeling behind the confused medieval cleavage between Church and State. And in our day it shows itself, not only in the widespread demand for the abolition of capital punishment, but in every grade of criticism and dislike for the coercive machinery of the State, right down to pure quietistic anarchism.

The only possibility of resolving this deadlock seems to me to lie in the acknowledgment that not only subjective justification, but (necessarily with it) objective moral rightness and value, inheres in *both* of the two contrasted policies, in so far as they are conscientiously followed. The difference between them consists, not in one being wholly right and the other wholly wrong, but in the fact that they both approximate to absolute right *in different degrees*, the gentler method (as Christian teaching makes clear) being a closer approximation to absolute rightness than is the more violent. What makes it possible for the less good to be morally right for many is the fact that they are subjectively unprepared and therefore unable to see the matter as Jesus saw it. He however who is really able to see it thus is alone able to use the gentler methods with success; and he is for that reason under a moral obligation to use them. But he will gladly acknowledge the *relative* rightness of other methods

and their production of some real good along with the evil inseparable from them. He will cheerfully and loyally co-operate as a citizen with his fellow-citizens in all enterprises common to himself and them. In deciding how this duty of co-operation bears upon his voting, his tax-paying, his jury-service, and so forth, he may sometimes feel perplexity, and must be prepared to be criticised as an inconsistent casuist by those who do not share his ideals. But from two things he will refrain as unquestionably evil—from religious persecution, and from war.

It is time that some answer was given to the Catholic argument that religious error (unless it be, as sceptics think, an entirely unimportant matter) should be coercively restrained. It needs to be said that, while scepticism is a good reason for not persecuting, it is not the only good reason. Granting the serious duty of holding true beliefs about God, the analogy of all other fields of truth-seeking indicates that, in religion also, freedom of opinion and discussion is an essential condition of the discovery and retention of the truth. Unless a man's acceptance of religious truth is free, based on unforced consideration and conviction, it is religiously valueless. To argue, as Catholics often do, that because the Church is a society it has the right to coerce its members, is to drag the Church down to the level of the non-Christian state, and to deny to her that attribute of self-sacrificing love which was the distinctive feature of her Founder's life, but which non-Christian organisations like the state and other human societies cannot yet be expected to exhibit.

War, like religious persecution, has had its champions, though—with the coming of aircraft and poison-gas—they are less vocal than they were. Time was when the Church counted the instigation of certain wars among her duties. She thinks differently to-day. The irreconcilable incompatibility between Christianity and war is coming to be a *sententia accepta*. It rests on the fact that war violates the personality of vanquished and victor alike. "The death-groan is fearful; how much more appalling is the spirit of murder which extorts it!"* As for the supposed necessity of war for the protection of great human interests, a survey of the aftermath of 1914-18 is a sufficient explosion of it. The experts' confession that they know of no adequate means of

* Channing, *Works*, ii. p. 594.

defence against a well-planned gas-attack from the air, reduces the old plea of fighting in defence of hearth and home, King and country, to a manifest absurdity. Meanwhile, advancing historical study is correcting the old belief that Jesus gave no definite decision on the subject of war. His interpretation of Messiahship and His acceptance of the Cross, if they were not (as many have thought) parts of some inscrutable pre-ordained transaction, are explicable only on the assumption that He morally disapproved of war, even in circumstances where every human consideration seemed to sanction it—in other words, that He took His own teaching in the Sermon on the Mount seriously. And when we consider the place given to the Cross in the faith of all Christians, we see that the historical facts and ethical convictions leading up to it must needs have a very direct bearing on their own theory of conduct. These facts and principles mean that, for the understanding Christian, war is for ever excluded, the triumphs of the Crucified rousing in him the glad confidence that, if love's sovereign method of pressure be bravely trusted, momentary defeat is but the prelude to final victory.

C. J. CADOUX.

FASCISM AND YOUTH IN ITALY.

MORE than eleven years have passed since Fascism came to power in Italy. After a struggle which lasted four years, during which much blood was shed, the leader imposed himself as the absolute ruler of the State ; and, as time passed, his dictatorship has become more absolute and intolerant. Moreover, Fascism has become ever more and more the arbiter of Italian life. After having assumed political power it has gained control of the economic, financial, intellectual and even moral life of the nation, penetrating ever more deeply into the intimate life of the individual. Such is the destiny of dictatorship that in order to maintain its power intact it must grow more rigid and absolute : a quite natural phenomenon, if we remember that time weakens all political régimes, and that in order to resist the inevitable tendency to opposition it is necessary to restrict all opportunities for it to manifest itself. Opposition to a political régime can be shown by economic action, and therefore a dictator needs to bring within his control all economic activities. Even after the possibility of political and economic action has been eliminated, an opposition can still express itself through the intellectual, moral or religious life of a nation, and a dictator needs therefore to bring those departments also within the sphere of his authority.

In 1922 Fascism was mainly a political movement of the younger generation, which had been convulsed by the war and needed a *sistemazione*. The men of the older generation were weak and indolent, and, though willing to pursue the political battle on constitutional grounds, they were quite incapable of opposing the Fascists in street fighting ; hence their speedy collapse. This does not necessarily mean that the majority of the younger men were in favour of Fascism ; but undoubtedly those who donned the black shirt were among the more virile and reckless, and were endowed with the strength that is conferred by a clear objective, in this case the conquest of power. Other young people were liberals, democrats, republicans, socialists, syndicalists, communists, or anarchists. Many of these had become members of the older political parties, but instead of strengthening them they were a cause of weakness. The old liberal, democratic, republican or socialistic tendencies no longer satisfied the

rising generation, and the juvenile groups of these parties were in constant conflict with the older members. The young people who refused to join the Fascist party fought valiantly against it ; but, for causes which would be too long to analyse, they failed all along the line, and by the end of 1926 the despotism of the Dictator was firmly established.

Since then several years have elapsed and the younger generation has completely altered. To the young people who passed through the war, with its disrupting influences, have succeeded those born within the present century. Most of them were too young to participate in the fierce struggle between Fascists and democrats ; and many have only had what education they could receive at the hands of the Fascist State. This new young generation is completely different from that which, in 1922 and 1926, brought the democratic régime to an end, and it is on them that one can judge of the effects of seven years of despotism. These effects should supply food for thought to those who, dissatisfied with democracy and seeking a more perfect political system, have been carried away by the achievements of the various dictatorships established throughout Europe.

One of the first acts accomplished by the new régime in Italy was the "Fascistisation" of the educational institutes, which in great majority are under State management. Fascism began by attacking public education at its weakest point, the primary schools, whose teachers were soon compelled under pain of dismissal to join the Fascist organisations. Yet this meant for them the obligation to give a particular tendency to their teaching, and to inculcate admiration for Fascism and the most servile devotion to the Dictator. The last act of this "Fascistisation" of the primary schools was accomplished a few months ago when the State took over from the *comuni*, or local authorities, the control of the schools, and placed them under direct authority of the Minister of Education. A similar success attended the "Fascistisation" of the secondary schools, and all the teachers who remained obdurate and refused to inculcate the Fascist spirit in their pupils were dismissed. The universities were for long regarded as the last stronghold of anti-Fascism. When the Dictator considered that despotism and lassitude had produced a sufficient degree of demoralisation, he imposed on the university professors an oath of allegiance to the Fascist Govern-

ment; and their complete inefficiency as educators was demonstrated by the fact that with only eleven exceptions all the professors took the oath.

The Italian teachers are now reduced to a servile condition and are compelled to display a devotion which only very few feel in reality. They are always nervous lest some envious colleague may denounce them for political reasons. Under such conditions it is impossible for them to give really efficient training to their pupils, for they are unable to instil either honesty or moral dignity. They can only transmit the servile spirit that the dictatorship has imposed on themselves. During my four years of residence in Italy I was enabled to meet a great number of primary, secondary and university teachers. I knew that in their hearts they were completely opposed to Fascism, yet they were compelled to submit themselves and to renounce all free expression of their own thoughts. Many people say that a dictatorship may modify the teaching of historical, moral, philosophical or social subjects, but that science can escape all interference. I have observed, however, that this is completely false, and that a professor of physics or biology is no more independent than a professor of history. Every teacher, besides conveying knowledge to the brain of his pupils, must also educate their consciences; and this second function is sometimes even more important than the first.

The narrowness and one-sidedness of Fascist teaching is effectively shown by the textbooks now used in the elementary schools. These textbooks are edited by the Government, and, among other absurdities, they teach that no progress can be realised under a liberal-democratic régime, and that only a dictatorship can confer power and prosperity on a nation. Such narrowness is also proved by the fact that the works of Benedetto Croce, Rousseau, Humboldt and many other thinkers have been recently withdrawn from the syllabuses of the secondary schools. It has been customary in Italian schools to make a special study of Croce's work on æsthetics, and it might have been assumed that no relation exists between the teaching of æsthetics and the political constitution of the country. But the nervousness of the Dictator is so great that he is suspicious of a book on æsthetics written by a liberal.

On the whole the new generation which has been brought

up under the Fascist régime is weak and lacking in energy. Nothing is more sad than to frequent the Italian universities, as I did until 1932. With but a few exceptions I have found no interest in intellectual problems. One may say that the dictatorship has attained its object; it has destroyed the personality of the young people of to-day, together with their spirit of initiative. I am far from believing that this young generation is, on the whole, Fascist. I have met very few young men who believed sincerely in Fascism. For the most part they accept the dictatorship with resignation; they join the juvenile associations because otherwise they cannot pass their examinations nor, indeed, attend school; before doing their military service they receive military instruction from the *Militia*, because they are compelled by law to do so; they wear the black shirt on Sundays in order to avoid trouble and interference; they take part in the parades and shout "*Viva il fascismo*" simply because everybody is expected to do so; and they accept the various "manifestations" imposed on them as a burden impossible to avoid.

Fascism has been very successful in arousing great enthusiasm for sport. It has done so not so much for the physical amelioration of the race but simply to divert the attention of the young people from problems which may be dealt with only by the Dictator and his lieutenants. It has also diffused among the young generation a militaristic spirit, and in this it has favoured a natural tendency in the Italian—who has always been addicted to uniforms and parades. But, judging from my long experience of Italy, I do not think this militaristic spirit is really very efficient: it can become efficient only when individuals are willing to sacrifice their lives for some ideals. But what ideal can inspire the present young generation in Italy? The *Patria*? Now the concepts of Fascism and fatherland have been so confused for the young generation that, as it is not ready to die for Fascism, neither might it be willing to sacrifice itself on the altar of patriotism. As for the person of the Dictator, very few young men would feel called upon to sacrifice their lives for him. One may say that, in Italy, there is more the appearance of a militaristic spirit than its reality. And from this point of view Fascist Italy is very different from Nazi Germany.

The political belief of the average young Italian is that all political problems must be dealt with only by a superior

authority with which he has nothing to do. He has completely renounced any personal political opinion. In democratic countries, whenever an important problem arises, everyone feels free to express his point of view. In the face of any new problem the average young Italian does not attempt to make up his mind; he simply asks: What does the Dictator think? It is quite natural that they should follow Fascism; but it cannot trust them, and it is not on them that a permanent Fascist State can be built up. To-day these young people are Fascists, but they are quite ready to become liberals, socialists, republicans or even communists to-morrow; they must always be on the winning side, and the only thing they would really resent is the lack of a master. Having acquired the habit of constant submission and of never thinking things out for themselves, the worst that could happen to them would be the necessity for acting on their own responsibility.

In this apparently united crowd it is easy to distinguish three categories. Very few (in four years I met only two) believe sincerely in Fascism as an ideal and would be ready to sacrifice their lives in order to defend it. It is necessary to note, however, that these young enthusiasts do not win the encouragement of the leaders of Fascism. Very many have joined because they are ambitious and because it is only members of the Party who can succeed in any career. They are for the most part intelligent, but no party could trust them very far. They are able to win promotion in the hierarchy and politically they are of the same mentality as the Dictator. Only one thing interests them: Power. And, in Fascist Italy, to hold political power means to become rich, as has been the case with the great majority of the leaders. In this connection I can quote the case of a young friend of mine. He is still under thirty, and always held socialist opinions, for which he was once ferociously beaten by the Fascists. For several years he remained an anti-Fascist, but seeing that things did not change and that it was impossible for him, in spite of his marked intelligence and learning, to make a career, he was reduced to every subterfuge in order to gain admission to the party. Now he attends Fascist parades, together with the very men who beat him; but as a reward he has received a chair in a small university.

We have, then, those who are Fascist from necessity, who

constitute the great majority. To fight against Fascism, or simply to manifest an opposition by remaining outside it, is a luxury which cannot be afforded by everybody. Those who have family responsibilities cannot compromise their future. I met numberless young men deeply opposed to Fascism and sincerely devoted to the ideals of freedom and social justice; yet at a certain moment they were forced to beg admission to the party or the Fascist syndicates in order to be able to secure a job and so maintain their families.

The best proof of the decadence that Fascism has brought is provided by the low intellectual standard of the literary work produced by the young men who have become Fascists. A feeling of pity arises from the reading of books and reviews which they publish; there are no fresh ideas, there is no originality, but only the repetition of familiar platitudes, both in literary and scientific productions. Of what value can a work on philosophy be if the author—in order to obtain permission to publish it, or the possibility of a wide sale—is obliged to refer in the introduction to the greatness of the Dictator and the benefits of Fascist rule? No possibility of issuing really good books can exist in a country where the authorisation for publication must be obtained from the police. History repeats itself: despotic régimes, by destroying freedom of thought, have always hindered intellectual progress.

The foregoing conveys a general picture of the situation where Italian youth is concerned. Happily for the honour and the future of the nation, there are a certain number of exceptions; and these are the more admirable because of the immense difficulties against which they have to contend in order to remain honest and irreproachable amid the general servility. All these more high-minded men and women are anti-Fascists. Fascism demands submissiveness and obedience, and they refuse to submit themselves. The leader does not tolerate any independence of mind in others, and those, therefore, who are endowed with an independent personality must, of necessity, come up against Fascism. The best men who joined the party in 1919 and have since refused to become the wholly docile servants of the Dictator have been eliminated, and the process of elimination is still going on.

It is very difficult for foreigners to realise how great are the difficulties which all must face if they wish to maintain their

individuality and refuse to bow down before the Dictator. There is no possibility of any career for them; for nobody in Italy can rise above the general level unless he possesses the Fascist *tessera* (membership card). If men are not possessed of independent means they are reduced to starvation, for Fascism means bread for its partisans and hunger for its enemies. The barrister who has not joined the party receives no briefs, the anti-Fascist doctor has no patients, the engineer no jobs. No post can be obtained in the civil service, in the armed forces, in the judicial or educational departments. This state of affairs was legalised a few months ago by a decree that no one was eligible for State employment unless he was a member of the party.

It is under conditions such as these that the young anti-Fascists have to live. Yet in spite of so many difficulties their number is much higher than people ordinarily assume. They may be divided into two groups. The first is comprised of those who, though not willing to submit themselves to the régime, do not dare to combat it openly and prefer to stand aside, taking no part in public life. The second group is formed of those who are active anti-Fascists. Retirement and obscurity are the lot of the first, while the Special Tribunal and the deportation islands await the second. The former are passively anti-Fascist, or what are sometimes called *afascisti* (non-Fascists); the latter are active anti-Fascists, and the whole of the vast organisation of police and spies which has been established is directed against them.

In Italy there are many ways of fighting against Fascism. One of the most widespread is the intellectual propaganda in favour of the ideals of liberty, democracy and social justice. Of course, there is no possibility either of making speeches or of writing books in defence of such principles. But under the appearance of philosophical, economic or historical research, it is possible to make a veiled criticism of Fascism, though without ever mentioning it. During the last few years a great number of historical studies on the Italian Risorgimento have been produced, thanks to the activity of young anti-Fascist intellectuals. Many volumes on Mazzini, Romagnosi, Cattaneo, Pisacane, Cavour, Spaventa, Settembrini and other famous patriots have been published. They contain criticisms of the Austrian, Neapolitan, Piedmontese and Papal despotisms, which may equally apply to Fascist despotism. A

description of the corrupt and servile life of the Italian nation before unification might equally be a description of corruption and servility under Fascism. It is true that it is not always safe to produce such publications, and I may here recall the case of a group of young Roman intellectuals who were arrested and deported for having reprinted in cheap editions some of the works of Cattaneo, Mazzini and other patriots. There are also weekly and monthly reviews in which, under the appearance of literary, historical and economic studies, a campaign may be carried on.

Other young men, for whom such intellectual activity is not sufficient, try to build up clandestine organisations. Such organisations have no chance of bringing about a revolution, but they are very useful for facilitating intercourse among persons who otherwise would remain isolated. The old political parties have disappeared and in their place two main tendencies have developed: the democratic tendency which is grouped around the liberal-socialist programme of *Giustizia e Libertà* and the communist tendency. Both of these have furnished a great number of victims to the police, for in a régime as full of spies as that of Fascist Italy no insurrectionary work can continue for long before being discovered.

When I was arrested in July 1932 I found in the Roman prison alone about 600 political prisoners. The great majority were young people under 30, while many were mere boys of 18 or 19, and I well remember the case of a boy of 17 who was brought before the Special Tribunal. In the prison at Naples, to which I was removed in January 1933, I also noticed that the majority of the political prisoners were quite young. When, in July 1933, I left the island of Ponza, there were about 320 deportees, many of them young men. This goes to prove that the fight is no longer led by men belonging to the pre-war and war generations, but by those who are supposed to have been educated in the Fascist spirit. Very little has been published concerning the numerous victims of the Special Tribunal; but among them are many who in the matter of courage can bear comparison with the most admired heroes of the Risorgimento. Among my friends have been not a few who listened with a smile on their lips to sentences of 10, 15, 20 or 30 years. What future can this young generation prepare for Italy? So long as Fascism

endures, and (thanks to the weakness of the great majority) the corrupt and unscrupulous will remain in power, the small group of members of the opposition will continue to work below the surface. Will this small minority be capable of replacing Fascism and establishing a régime inspired by the spirit of liberty and tolerance which characterises periods of progress? No one knows.

In any case a grave problem needs to be faced by the leaders of Fascism, a problem concerning which even Fascists talk, but *sotto voce*, because it refers to the succession, and the Dictator strongly resents any reference to the subject. When the days of the present leaders come to an end, who is to take their place? How can individuals who have acquired the habit of passive obedience suddenly transform themselves into the leaders of a great nation? Those who in 1922 were young men are now becoming middle-aged, and the revolution of the young men is becoming the reaction of the old. Nobody can foresee the future. But, for the honour of the Italian nation, it is to be hoped that the small group of young opponents who are now fighting for the freedom of their country will some day be enabled to take the place of the present leaders.

A YOUNG ITALIAN.

THE CENTENARY OF LA FAYETTE.

THERE are at least forty contemporary portraits of La Fayette still to be seen, paintings and drawings, statues and busts, but they give such curiously different and conflicting impressions of his appearance that for a student of his personality to-day it would be almost better if half of them did not exist. This is the more remarkable that in reading the voluminous printed records of La Fayette's long career one experiences no such bewilderment. It is the same impulsive, sanguine, simple-minded, selfless, warm-hearted, splendidly brave, engagingly flamboyant La Fayette we see from beginning to end. That, at least, is how we who admire him see him, largely discounting the faults and weaknesses so much insisted on by his decriers. He was always to have decriers. Mirabeau mocked him to his face as "a Cromwell-Grandison." Talleyrand belittled him with amusing malice. Napoleon, resentful over fruitless efforts to win his alliance, called him "*un niais*." In the eyes of the Comte d'Espinhal he was "a hypocrite" and a "timid conspirator," yet, as such, guilty of so many crimes that "a volume would be required" to record them. While to a writer in the *Quarterly Review*, in 1827, he was "a vain, feeble, doating coxcomb." Carlyle and Mr. Hilaire Belloc have followed suit.

One would like to think that at least the earliest picture of him is true to life—probably it is: the picture in which he is shown to us as a round-faced boy of seven, with large, frank, wide-open, dark eyes, and full, well-shaped, half-smiling lips, standing beside his handsome, exquisitely dressed young mother, and helping her, with his chubby dimpled left hand, to hold up straight between them an oval portrait of a girl cousin. There is nothing in his features here, perhaps, to foretell a great future, but he seems to have in him the makings of a most lovable man. One feels convinced somehow that the delineation is to be relied upon. And although the boy is gazing at us now so serenely, and his expression is so gentle, one can easily imagine him, a year older, as the resolute young champion ready to face and kill a certain "monstrous wild beast" then terrorising the inhabitants of his ancestral property in the Auvergne. Mr. Brand Whitlock, in his well-known biography of La Fayette, tells the tale very prettily. The Abbé Fayol, it seems, had been answering the child's

questions regarding the terrible animal in question—it turned out later to be an exceptionally large and ravenous wolf :

As Gilbert walked back to the château beside the Abbé, he fell silent. He walked erectly in his stout buckled shoes and thick woollen stockings, the skirts of his coat with the great flaps at the pockets balancing with his stride, the three-cornered hat giving him a sedate air for one who was only eight years old. An expression of determination had settled on his freckled face, he had made a resolution : he would go forth and slay this monstrous wild beast in single combat ; it was his duty as a nobleman, lord of the Manor of Chavaniac—and a La Fayette.* He was the Marquis now, the last of his line ; it all depended upon him.

Young Gilbert was still a patrician when, in his tenth year, he was taken for the first time to Paris ; he was not pleased to note that people did not take off their hats to him as they did at Chavaniac. But before his eleventh birthday he had given utterance to one of the most characteristically subversive ideas he was ever to formulate. Being called upon at the College of Plessis, where he now had his schooling, to write a composition describing “ the perfect horse, which the mere sight of the driver’s whip would render obedient,” he described the perfect horse, instead, as one which at sight of the whip would throw its rider. “ Republican anecdotes always delighted me,” he says in his *Memoirs*, “ and when my new connections wished to obtain me a place at Court I did not hesitate displeasing them to preserve my independence. I was in this frame of mind when I first learnt of the troubles in America ; they only became thoroughly known in France in 1776, and the memorable declaration of the 4th of July reached France at the close of that same year.”

At thirteen we find him (having inherited a fortune from his grandfather) a wealthy gentleman-cadet in the Black Musketeers, in a uniform incongruously garish for a regiment with such a name, “ a uniform of scarlet and gold, with jack-boots and a cocked hat, and, floating from his shoulders, a great mantle of blue, embroidered with a cross of silver, encircled by flames.” Tall for his years, he is said to have become by now rather awkward in bearing, self-conscious, easily embarrassed, and with a cold exterior. This will have

* The name was so spelt. It was not until Revolutionary times—in 1789—that the form was changed to Lafayette.

been due chiefly to the boy’s attitude towards his surroundings. In his *Memoirs* La Fayette himself alludes to “ the unfavourable opinion ” held of him at this period owing to his “ habitual silence ” when matters were being talked about which he did “ not think worth discussion.” In April 1774, at sixteen and a half, he was married to a girl of fifteen, Adrienne, one of the five daughters of the Duc d’Ayen, eldest son of the Duc de Noailles, head of the greatest family in France ; and he now became a Captain in the Noailles Dragoons. Adrienne was to prove an altogether ideal wife. A daughter was born to the very young couple in December 1775.

It is in April 1777 that the name of La Fayette begins to be one of the most famous in the history of two hemispheres. That enthusiasm for liberty which was to prove the master passion of his life, together with love for France and a fierce youthful enmity to England, now caused him to offer himself as a volunteer to the American rebels. The incident which set his mind aflame is thus recorded in his *Memoirs*, the English edition of which was published by his family in 1838 ; the account was given by him to an American, Jared Sparks, who visited him in France ten years earlier, and who had already printed it :

In the summer of 1776, M. de Lafayette was stationed on military duty at Metz, being then an officer in the French Army. It happened at this time that the Duke of Gloucester, brother to the King of England, was at Metz, and a dinner was given to him by the Commandant of that place. Several officers were invited, and among them Lafayette. Despatches had just been received by the duke from England, and he made their contents the topic of conversation ; they related to American affairs, the recent declaration of independence, the resistance of the colonists, and the strong measures to crush the rebellion.

The details were new to Lafayette ; he listened with eagerness to the conversation, and prolonged it by asking questions of the duke. His curiosity was deeply excited by what he heard, and the idea of a people fighting for liberty had a strong influence upon his imagination ; the cause seemed to him just and noble, from the representations of the duke himself ; and before he left the table, the thought came into his head that he would go to America, and offer his services to a people who were struggling for freedom and independence. From that hour he could think of nothing but this chivalrous enterprise. He resolved to return to Paris and make further enquiries.

After some months of difficult negotiations with the American representatives in Paris, and in defiance of disapproval from his family and from Versailles, the youth chartered, entirely at his own expense, a small frigate, the *Victoire*, and, accompanied by a seasoned old war veteran, known as the Baron de Kalb, and a small body of spirited young men, set sail for the West on April 26th, 1777. A brief passage from his *Memoirs* (which he began to write in the first person but continued in the third) will be enough to give us an idea of the dare-devil spirit in which he entered upon the venture :

As soon as M. de Lafayette had recovered from the effects of sea-sickness, he studied the language and trade he was adopting. A heavy ship, two bad cannons [*sic*], and some guns, could not have escaped from the smallest privateer . . . he resolved rather to blow up the vessel than to surrender.

After seven weeks of rough weather and some narrow escapes of capture, the *Victoire* reached Georgetown in Carolina in June. Made welcome to the house of a notable inhabitant, Major Huger, La Fayette, weary after the voyage, opened his eyes next morning upon a scene the unfamiliarity of which delighted him : "The room, the bed covered with mosquito-nets, the black servants who came to ask his commands, the beauty and foreign aspect of the country which he beheld from his windows and which was covered with a rich vegetation . . . all united to produce on him a magical effect."

He and his comrades were presently to experience disappointments and disillusion which I have no space to recall here, but his first letters to his wife were rapturous :

"I want to speak of the country and its inhabitants," he wrote four days after his arrival. "They are quite as amiable as my enthusiasm imagined them. Simplicity of ways, a desire to oblige, love of country and liberty, a sweet equality are the rule with everyone here. The richest and the poorest are on the same level, and though immense fortunes exist . . . I defy anyone to find the slightest difference between their respective manners towards each other. What delights me most is that all the citizens are brothers. In America there are no poor, nothing one would even call peasants. All citizens have decent means and the same rights as the most powerful landowners . . ."

Upon which conclusions his latest biographer, Mr. Michael de la Bédoyère, remarks with some force :

Lafayette . . . did not notice that if his judgment was correct, his arrival in the name of liberty and the defence of the Rights of Humanity must have been rather unnecessary. When the colonists talked of liberty, they meant secession ; Lafayette imagined they meant also a liberty which they had already enjoyed in a measure undreamed of by Frenchmen.

In June 1777 the American army under Washington was in a pitiable, almost desperate, condition, ill-equipped, half-disciplined, almost starved. Its maximum strength at the time of the evacuation of Boston by the English in March 1776 had been 20,000. Since April of that year, when he had placed some 9,000 of these under Isaac Putnam, Washington's force had been in continual danger. Now La Fayette was to find it at Valley Forge, almost at the point of exhaustion. The great military leader was ashamed of the outward aspect of his men when he showed them to the dashing young foreigner. "We must feel embarrassed," he said, "to exhibit ourselves before an officer who has just quitted French troops." "It is to learn and not to teach that I come hither," replied La Fayette. Thus began one of the most romantic of international friendships.

Washington's reputation as a human being has suffered from the idolatry of his earlier biographers. The small boy who could not tell a lie developed into the legendary statesman too remote for companionship and too solemn for laughter. One of his panegyrists, Edward Everett, in an address delivered in Faneuil Hall, "at the request of the young men of Boston," describes the meeting of Washington and La Fayette in words which are too quaint to pass by. Having carefully prepared his listeners' minds for the coming climax, Everett proceeds :

Before that master he is yet to appear. The youthful adventurer has a test of character at hand more severe than any to which he has yet been subjected. He has stood from his youth before princes and kings, and felt that his clay was as good as theirs. But he has yet to stand before that face, where, more than ever yet in the face of mere man, the awful majesty of virtue abode in visible personation : the serene but melancholy countenance which no smile of light-hearted gladness illuminated from the commencement to the end of the struggle.

If Washington as a boy could not tell a lie, he had outgrown that disability so well and became so famous for his wiles in warfare that his British opponents nicknamed him "the Old Fox." In the same way that "awful majesty" of his often relaxed in the circle of his "Family," as he called his headquarters staff. His laughter could be as hearty as his swearing, and this is to say a good deal, apparently. On one battle-field, according to an officer under him, he swore "until the leaves shook on the trees." "Never," declared this witness, "have I enjoyed such swearing before or since!"

The legend of Washington's friendlessness was almost equally ill-founded. While he undoubtedly kept most people at a distance, he had in the course of his career a fair number of faithful friends, but no one seems to have come nearer to his heart than La Fayette. M. de la Bédoyère, in the book already cited, sums up thus the six years' intercourse between them :

It may be that the wealth and birth of the young French volunteer had been the first reason why Washington had treated him so differently from the rest of his countrymen, but this motive soon gave way to genuine admiration and affection. He had been the first to recognise his military skill; he had been the first to appreciate the unselfish idealism, the genuine love of freedom, the honest respect for the individual personality of men which lay behind the childish nationalism, the tawdry love of popularity and first rank, the hectic restlessness, the immature pomposity of "the Marquis." Lafayette's life story will show that in many ways he lacked the quality of greatness, but Washington's faith in him during this period when his faults were so obvious is proof enough that he had it in him to be great. He was to be thrown into circumstances of which it may be said that in them no man was able to be successful and honest. Lafayette was to be honest and his ideals, if not his actions, were to be successful. Washington would not have disapproved of him.

M. de la Bédoyère, on the whole, is an appreciative biographer, although in his anxiety to be honest and balanced—as perhaps in the passage here cited—he may seem sometimes to temper his praise with excessive blame. I wonder whether this judicially-minded young writer of to-day, who has given so conscientious an examination to all the available evidence in print—hundreds of volumes—comes nearer to the real La Fayette than Mme. de Staël in her *Considérations sur la Révolution Française*, published in 1818. In the first volume

of her famous work she devotes a striking little chapter to the soldier-statesman, who at this date had been for forty years one of the outstanding figures in French history. In 1785 he had taken the initiative in freeing the Protestants of France from their disabilities; in 1788 it was at his instigation that the States-General were called together; no need to recapitulate here his main exploits during the Revolution or the story of his long imprisonment by the Emperor at Olmütz, or that of his attitude later towards Napoleon. Mme. de Staël, the most caustic commentator of her age, sees almost nothing in La Fayette to criticise. She recognises in him, indeed, that "desire to please" at which so many of his contemporaries were inclined to laugh, but she declares that it never led him into dishonest speech, and that he was unshakable in his loyalties. By that year, 1818, he had been guilty of all the faults and all the errors of judgment of which Napoleon was thinking at St. Helena when he used the contemptuous phrase "*un niais*." Let us listen to Mme. de Staël on the subject :

Les haines dont M. de La Fayette est l'objet n'ont jamais aigri son caractère, et sa douceur d'âme est parfaite; mais aussi rien n'a jamais modifié ses opinions, et sa confiance dans le triomphe de la liberté est la même que celle d'un homme pieux dans la vie à venir. Ces sentiments, si contraires aux calculs égoïstes de la plupart des hommes qui ont joué un rôle en France, pourroient bien paroître à quelques-uns assez dignes de pitié: il est si niais, pensent-ils, de préférer son pays à soi; de ne pas changer de parti, quand le parti qu'on servait est battu; enfin, de considérer la race humaine, non comme des cartes à jouer qu'il faut faire servir à son profit, mais comme l'objet sacré d'un dévouement absolu.*

Many of La Fayette's critics—especially when harping on his failure to cope with difficulties and dangers beyond all parallel in the French Revolution—have sought to contrast his weakness and irresolution with the strength and firmness of a man like Washington. Mme. de Staël's view is very different :

S'il avoit eu le bonheur de naître aux États-Unis sa conduite eût été celle de Washington: le même désintéressement, le même enthousiasme, la même persévérance dans les opinions, distinguant

* These passages have, of course, often been translated into English, but it seems to me preferable to give them here in the original—archaic spelling and all.

l'un et l'autre de ces généreux amis de l'humanité. Si le général Washington avait été, comme le marquis de La Fayette, chef de la garde nationale de Paris, peut-être aussi n'aurait-il pu triompher des circonstances; peut-être aurait-il aussi échoué contre la difficulté d'être fidèle à ses sermens envers le roi et d'établir cependant la liberté de la nation.

However that may be, one rejoices to know that La Fayette was able, at least, to bring his career to a fortunate and tranquil end, in Washington's fashion, "beneath his own vine and fig-tree." His manor of Chavaniac had passed out of his hands together with most of his wealth, but at the château of La Grange, inherited by his wife, whose death in 1807 had been the one great grief of his existence, he spent his last years happily and most beneficently, a providence to the poor of his canton, a revered patriarch surrounded by devoted children and grandchildren. He was on a short visit to Paris when he died on May 20th, 1834.

FREDERIC WHYTE.

BETTING AND LOTTERIES: THE NEW GOVERNMENT BILL.

WHEN the National Government appointed a Royal Commission in 1932 "to inquire into the existing law and practice thereunder relating to lotteries, betting, gambling, and cognate matters, and to report what changes, if any, are desirable and practicable," it was recognised that the Government were committed to legislative action. But even those who are most aware of the nature and extent of the gambling evil did not anticipate, from the Royal Commission, a Report so complete in its indictment. Two facts make the report the more impressive. The twelve commissioners were not only of admitted ability, but without prejudice. The purpose of the Government was to constitute a Commission entirely neutral in its approach to the problem. This first fact adds enormously to the significance of the second, which is that the report carries the unanimous support of the Commission, the minor reservations made by one or two members not affecting any of the main conclusions.

The Bill now introduced by the Government gives no indication of any desire to shirk the responsibility of this report. There will be regret that the troubled question of street betting or "off-the-course" betting, to use the more correct technical term, is not touched. But it was probably too much to expect that any one Bill could embody the whole of the recommendations of the Royal Commission. This present Bill is limited to certain phases of the question and is surely to be regarded as an instalment. Further the Bill does indicate an evident measure of compromise at two points where it differs from the conclusions of the Commission. Taking it as a whole, however, the Bill seeks to implement the considered conclusions of the Royal Commission and is a substantial measure of social reform.

The Government have taken an unquestionable risk in introducing such a Bill. The extremists on one side will be critical because the Bill does not go further. On the other side the financial interests of greyhound racing, the book-makers and their associates, the persistent advocates of lotteries, will alike find sections of the Bill which they will certainly oppose. Governments are usually said to be sensitive to the opinion of the Press, but this Bill courageously sets out

to limit certain Press activities. This probably explains why certain sections of the popular Press have given themselves to premature prophecy that the Bill is dead. The fact that the risk has been taken is a distinct tribute to the Government. The Bill steers a straight course and is to be regarded as an honest and unprejudiced attempt to deal adequately, within the necessary limits of legislation, with certain outstanding phases of a growing evil.

This new Bill deals mainly with greyhound racing, lotteries, and Press competitions, and the justification is to be found not only in the report of the Royal Commission, but in the voluminous Minutes of Evidence presented during the inquiry which lasted nearly twelve months. So serious is the problem of the betting in connection with greyhound racing regarded, that an Interim Report was issued by the Commission, the central conclusion being, to quote their own words, "The weight of the evidence shows that serious social consequences are ensuing." The rapid development of greyhound-racing tracks, their proximity to the large centres of population, their continued opening almost day by day throughout the year, the fascination exercised upon young people, the extensive profit involved to the promoters, all these and other factors serve to isolate greyhound racing as a matter of outstanding social significance. It is a striking fact that the only witnesses in support of greyhound racing were those representing the organised financial interests involved. The mass of evidence on the other side came from such unquestionable sources as the Y.M.C.A., Charity Organisation Society, Hulton House Club, Football Associations, Church Army, Salvation Army, Police and Probation Officers, and the united evidence of the Churches.

The inquiry by the Commission into the whole question of lotteries had a most significant result. On this point the Commission does admit a certain prejudice. So vociferous had been the agitation on the part of certain groups in the House of Commons, as well as elsewhere, that the Commission approached their examination of this phase of the question feeling that some legalisation would be necessary. So conclusive and overwhelming was the evidence, however, that the Commission unanimously concluded that public lotteries are most undesirable and ought not to be legalised. No Government can rightly ignore a verdict of this kind. Newspaper

competitions have been an irritating factor in connection with this problem, as shown by the report of the Joint Select Committee as far back as 1908. The Royal Commission reached a somewhat similar conclusion to that earlier inquiry. Here then is the factual basis for the Government Bill. Let it be said emphatically that critics of the Bill put themselves out of court immediately unless they are prepared to deal both with the findings of the Royal Commission and with the evidence upon which those findings are based.

A further point of extreme difficulty, as well as importance, has to be settled in connection with legislation on questions of this kind. To what extent ought the State to interfere with the habits and practices of the individual? The basal rights of individual liberty are to be jealously guarded. However unfortunate may be the result of certain gambling practices are they not capable of change only by moral influence, and not by legislative interference? The Royal Commission faced this issue frankly and fully. Chapter 4 of their report is of particular importance in respect to all legislation having to do with social evils such as gambling. Prohibition is ruled out as both impracticable and unwise, but the State has, nevertheless, certain responsibilities. Where there is "organised exploitation of the gambling instinct for private gain," there is an infringement of the rights of the community which calls for action by the State. The Commission further point out that the State has a special responsibility in safeguarding the liberties of children and young people against this "mass exploitation." The Government have clearly accepted this judgment as to the lines of legislative action. Could they do otherwise? It is from this standpoint that the Bill is to be judged.

Turning to the detailed provisions of the Bill, it will be noticed that the larger and more complicated section deals with betting and, almost entirely, betting upon greyhound racing. This is a form of gambling unknown eight years ago, and, as the Royal Commission have indicated, the country is afflicted with it because of the lack of suitable local power to restrict or control its development. The Bill sets out provisions for tracks which are or might be used not only for greyhound racing, but also for any other similar interest which could be used as the basis of betting.

Certain of the restrictions recommended are carried over

into the Bill unaltered. The days upon which betting is to be allowed on any such tracks are to be limited to 104 in each year, an average of two per week. Sundays, Christmas Day, and Good Friday are excluded. No betting is to be allowed with any young persons under the age of 17. Then the important provision of local control is introduced. Under this Bill, betting can only take place on a track which is licensed for the purpose by the council of a county or county borough. Such licenses, when granted, will remain in operation for seven years unless withdrawn for breaches of the regulations. Before granting licences, the Licensing Authority are to take into account the health and comfort of the neighbourhood, the interests of schools in the district, the congestion of traffic, the preservation of law and order, and the general amenities of the place. They are to hear all parties who have personal or representative interests in the matter. In addition to the question of granting licenses, the licensing Authority are to appoint the days for opening and to secure that they are the same for all tracks within their area. Existing greyhound racing tracks are granted a moratorium of five years, after which they come under the general provisions of the Bill.

Undoubtedly these restrictions will be opposed, but a strong case can be made out on the basis of the Royal Commission Report for strengthening them in certain particulars. It might be particularly desirable that the days when the tracks could be opened should be limited to not more than two days in any one week, so as to prevent every day being used in some weeks. Then it would seem desirable to exclude children under 14 from entering the tracks at all when betting takes place. Further, the Licensing Authority should be clearly entitled to consider the effect of greyhound racing tracks upon both the moral and social amenities of a district. This is not necessarily excluded from the Bill, but should be quite definitely understood.

In one important particular the Bill departs from the findings of the Royal Commission. In its Interim Report, and confirmed in its final report, the Commission opposes the legalisation of the totalisator on dog-racing courses, as likely to secure a marked increase in the opportunities for organised betting. Evidently the Government have felt themselves under some necessity to make a concession at this point. Doubtless a *prima facie* case can be made out for allowing the

totalisator on dog-racing tracks. It is allowed on horse-racing courses and, therefore, why not the other? If there is to be betting, why not the method which is, at least, fair and honest? The Royal Commission took these points into account, but the Government have evidently been influenced by such considerations and have included in this Bill the legalising of totalisators on greyhound-racing tracks. Having done so, the Government have accepted the principle laid down by the Royal Commission that the promoters of such tracks should have no financial interest in betting. Therefore, the Bill limits the amount which can be taken by the promoters from the totalisator pool to three per cent., and further limits the amount which can be charged to bookmakers for their stands. An outcry is being made against these limitations. Let it be noted on the other hand that those who feel with the Royal Commission that the introduction of the totalisator is unwise, could only give their support to this Bill if the restrictions are fully maintained. If it be argued that the 3 per cent. would not make it possible for all the tracks to be run at a profit, the answer is obvious. It is not the business of the State to arrange for profit to be made out of gambling, but to ensure that the community is properly safeguarded from those who would exploit it for the sake of profit. This the Bill endeavours to do and therein lies its value.

While there will be differences of opinion with respect to certain of the provisions with regard to greyhound racing and many will deplore the legalisation of the totalisator, it cannot be denied that the situation envisaged by the Bill is a great improvement upon the situation which exists to-day. One clause of the Bill is being withdrawn on the ground that it affects "off-the-course" betting, which the Government are not attempting at the moment to include in any legislative proposal. Thus the restriction upon what is commonly called "football pool betting," is withdrawn. This is most unfortunate and would appear to be another concession to the betting interests.

At the end of Part I there are two clauses which deal with the totalisator on horse-race tracks, operated under the Race-Course Betting Control Board. Since the setting up of that Board in 1928, a system has gradually developed whereby "off-the-course" betting is remitted to the totalisator on the race-courses. This is done by an allied company known as

"Tote Investors Ltd." The legality of this was challenged in the High Court and the decision given in favour of the practice. The Bill regularises this position. There can be no question that it was never the intention of the Act itself that such practices should develop, and it is, therefore, greatly to be regretted that the Government have taken this course. It would have been fair and equitable to all classes of the community that the operation of the totalisator on horse-race courses should have been limited to betting on the course, as will be the case of the greyhound-racing totalisator under this Bill.

In the section dealing with lotteries, the recommendations of the Royal Commission are taken over without change. The provisions of this Bill take up into a single statute a series of old Acts on lotteries covering a period of nearly two centuries. It is not always realised that the fact of these restrictive acts is evidence of the growing disquietude in the country during the time that lotteries were legal. The Bill makes illegal all large-scale lotteries, whether promoted in this country or elsewhere, and sets out, in a series of clauses, various offences, such as printing, selling or distributing tickets, or advertisements in respect of the lotteries. This is a definite strengthening of the present position though it does not involve any change in the policy of the law.

A new point is introduced in the provision of this Bill which makes it an offence to print or publish advertisements of any foreign lottery, reports descriptive of the lottery, lists of prize winners, or any other matter calculated to act as an inducement to participate. This provision would bring to an end the scandal of the large amount of space given in the Press to the particulars of the Irish Sweepstake. The reputable Press welcome this provision and undoubtedly it will do much to reduce the participation in the Irish Sweepstake of people in this country.

The Bill also follows the Royal Commission in seeking to regularise the position with regard to small public and private lotteries. Bazaar raffles will immediately spring to the mind, but it should be clearly understood that both in their evidence to the Royal Commission and in a more recent statement to the Home Secretary, the Churches have indicated their opposition to any legalising of bazaar raffles. That is not the only point involved, however. While the Bill allows these

lotteries associated with entertainments of various kinds, it lays down rigid restrictions so as to secure that the lottery is subsidiary to the main purpose of the entertainment and no general public sale of tickets is involved.

With regard to private lotteries, these are limited to members of clubs, persons working on the same premises, and the like, but with serious restrictions. Opposition that is threatened from Clubs to the restrictions is an indication of the need for the provisions of the Bill. If these private lotteries are to be allowed, then undoubtedly information should be sent to the proper quarter guaranteeing that they do not go beyond the agreed point, both in respect of the sale of tickets, the prizes offered, and the use of any proceeds. With these restrictions, the position would certainly be an improvement on the loose procedure common at the present time.

The Bill further implements the report of the Royal Commission by making definitely illegal all newspaper competitions which are based on the forecasting of future events and all other competitions which do not "depend to a substantial degree upon the exercise of skill." The first point is clear, but the latter point is likely to involve difficulty in practice. A "substantial degree of skill" is extremely difficult to define. Would it not have been better to have adopted the detailed recommendations of the Royal Commission and to have provided that with regard to these other competitions: (1) no money should be involved other than the newspaper coupon; (2) not more than one entry from each competitor; (3) no single prize beyond £100. The question of the amendment of the Bill along these lines is a point which ought to be seriously considered.

It remains true that the Bill only deals with part of the problem and, further, that in one or two provisions it is open to serious criticism from the standpoint of those who accept the findings of the Royal Commission. Even with these limitations the Bill is definitely a measure of reform. Without trespassing beyond the rightful limits of legislative action, the Government have suggested safeguards for the public against the exploitation by financial interests which is so largely responsible for the growth of gambling in recent years. All who have regard for the welfare of youth and the reduction of temptation to indulge in betting, should welcome this measure, not as a final act of legislation, but as a step forward.

E. BENSON PERKINS.

REVOLT IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

I HAD lived in Honduras only a short while before experiencing one of those frequent revolts which have made the Caribbean Republics a constant irritant to the United States, and was somewhat forcibly made to realise that in this modern world there are still countries where law and order are almost unknown, and where revolution forms the chief amusement for the politicians. Disagreeable rumours had been prevalent for some months, but nobody had paid much attention, as so frequently the flames of revolt had died down without burning the fingers of the foreign community. It was not until one morning late in October that definite news came to hand, and a few of us walked down to Progreso, a small island town situated a short distance from where we lived, to ascertain the true position.

We arrived to find the squalid street thronged with excited people, who clamoured with anxiety and fear. Their shrill voices rose in a babel of discordant sound. Some shouted one thing, some shouted another. No one seemed to know who the leader was, what he wanted, or why the peace of this impoverished country should again be disturbed to gratify the whim of some schemer for the presidential chair. Haggard-looking shopkeepers, with furtive glances, were hastily closing the shutters of their shops, and removing their valuables to some place of safety, in the hope of evading the notice of the revolutionary troops. These people still remembered the last revolution, when drunken soldiers forced the canteens, looted the stores, destroyed the furniture and fired rifles and revolvers indiscriminately throughout the town. On one or two of the shops owned by Syrians or Armenians the Union Jack had been hoisted so as to demand respect from the aggressors—an unusual setting for this symbol of the Empire.

Rumours turned to authentic information. A straggling party of soldiers returned with the news that General Ferera with three thousand men under the Red banner had crossed the border from Salvador, taken the town of Esperanza, and was advancing rapidly on Puerto Rios, a town some twenty miles distant. Again this information was corroborated by the fact that the telegraphic communication had been cut between Progreso and Esperanza. A few barefooted soldiers, dressed in old khaki uniforms with felt hats, and

armed with antiquated rusty rifles, were posted at odd intervals throughout the town; while in front of the Comandancia, the Comandante, in a bibulous flow of language, harangued the crowd, explaining that he and his twenty soldiers would defend them against a hundred Fereras! His oration was received in respectful silence—for Miguel Caseris when in his cups was a dangerous man, quite capable of silencing some argumentative person with a bullet—although it was suspected that he and his soldiers would be the first to vacate the town. Another messenger arrived with the news that Ferera and his army had reached Puerto Rios and would probably cross the river that evening. News in Honduras travels slowly; at one moment the revolutionists may be heard of in a town sixty miles away, and the next in a village only twenty miles distant. Consternation among the people broke out afresh, and the opinion appeared unanimous that our company headquarters, situated outside the town, was the obvious place in which to take refuge.

Revolutionary periods are times of intense anxiety to the managers and executives of American companies. The uncertainty of the issue of these disturbances, and, again, the uncertain duration of time that any party may remain in power, makes it extremely unsafe for a company to side with any one faction. Care must be taken not to offend the revolutionary troops—in case they become victorious—but if, on the other hand, they are defeated, it is probable that the company will be accused of revolutionary sympathies. With some trepidation we watched the continual stream of refugees, some wheeling barrows with household goods, others assisting infirm relatives to wend their way from the town to the company houses. Even had we wished, it would have been impossible to turn them back, for the Comandante's courageous attitude had long since been submerged in a bottle of whisky, it being doubtful if he would regain consciousness in time to depart before the arrival of the enemy!

Confusion reigned in the offices of the company building. Telephones rang, while anxious voices from the coastal headquarters inquired the latest news. As the morning drew on, refugees continued to stream into the office buildings and grounds, until every inch of space was crowded with humanity. At about 11 a.m. we heard from the overseer of an outlying estate that Ferera's advance guard had been seen crossing the

river, and might be expected to reach Progreso in a short while. In an isolated position, we were entirely cut off from the coast and American protection, with an army of revolutionists advancing whose attitude towards foreigners was extremely uncertain. There had been some ugly rumours about it being an anti-foreign revolution. But the position of overseers on outlying estates was undoubtedly worse, for alone, with not more than two assistants, they would be the first to receive intimation as to Ferera's attitude, friendly or otherwise. Telephone communication could no longer be obtained with the outlying estates, so we assumed that the advance guard must have reached the fringe of the property. There was nothing for us to do but await events and protect our belongings from the hordes of natives swarming all over the office building.

During the afternoon the Comandante, with his bare-footed soldiers, received orders to leave the town and join the main body of Government troops in San Pedro. Before leaving he staggered up to the office, very drunk, and presented me with the key belonging to his mud hut, which, as he explained with much difficulty, would afford protection in the event of trouble with the revolutionists! He was armed with, among other things, an enormous pair of binoculars, which he focused with unsteady hands in the direction of the enemy!

Towards evening a few scattered rifle-shots cracked through the stillness; we knew that at any moment the advance guard might arrive. Cries of terror broke from the refugees, and it required all our combined efforts to avert a panic; fortunately a large number of them fled from the building, seeking shelter in the near-by woodland. Thus having got rid of a great many of our unwelcome guests, we settled down to wait, endeavouring to keep up a somewhat foolish and disjointed conversation on everyday affairs, but at the same time keeping our eyes and ears open for further developments. One of the assistants got up and began playing the latest jazz, just sent from America, on a somewhat dilapidated gramophone. The others continued to smoke innumerable cigarettes.

A sound of hurried footsteps came from the back of the house, and eight soldiers, all heavily armed, ascended the steps leading to the veranda. Without ceremony they burst through the door and confronted us with revolvers and rifles. The situation for the moment looked unpleasant, for troops,

whether revolutionary or otherwise, seldom break into a company house with arms at the alert unless they mean serious business. "Where is your telephone?" demanded the officer tersely. Someone pointed towards the corner of the room. A soldier immediately raised his machete and cut a large slice out of the wooden case.

"Wait a minute," I shouted in Spanish. "Surely the Red Party does not wish to damage American property?"

"We have strict orders to put all telephones out of action," replied the officer suspiciously, but at the same time signing to the men to lower their rifles. I felt that we had gained a point, and that with careful handling this man could probably be squared. By way of showing my good faith, I walked forward and cut a large piece out of the wire, and presented it to the officer, who was still rather dubious, his glance roving between his revolver and the telephone. Somebody, quick to see my advantage, produced a bottle of whisky for the officer, and some bread for the men. At the sight of the whisky bottle the officer quickly replaced the revolver in its holster and became informative.

It appeared that the main body of troops was concentrating at a point about half a mile away, and that Ferera's attitude towards foreigners was of the friendliest nature. With a second whisky and soda the officer began apologising profusely for his somewhat unconventional entry. "*Quién sabe?* . . ." He broke off with a shrug of his shoulders—a typical Latin-American method of dismissing an embarrassing subject. We replied suitably, feeling only too thankful at having avoided the inaccurate aim of some excitable soldier! The last drop of whisky having been drained (we also had helped ourselves), the officer, who turned out to be a colonel, suggested that we should accompany him to where the troops were concentrating. Accordingly we set out on muleback, with the soldiers straggling along behind at irregular intervals.

On arrival a sight was unfolded that can only be seen during a Central American revolution. A seething mass of ragged humanity rested under the shade of tall banana mats. Arms and accoutrements lay all over the ground, where almost every type of rifle imaginable could be seen, but, judging by the number of brand-new Lee-Enfields, it was obvious that foreign influence had offered financial assistance. Uniforms, except in parts, were non-existent; one man might

have a jacket, another a pair of trousers, another a cap, while a few would have a jacket and a pair of trousers, the effect being spoilt by an old slouch hat, but none was fully equipped, and the swarthy faces showed at least four or five days' growth of beard—a villainous-looking crowd; one that, in looks, could easily live up to the reputation of dagoes in the cinema world! Mostly mounted on excellent mules, commandeered or stolen from the inhabitants in the interior, the officers were a great deal more serviceably equipped, being in possession of American army pattern .45 automatics, which, again, must have been purchased with foreign money. Here and there through this motley crowd fluttered the red banner, the symbol of the party which the revolutionists supported, and just beyond, outside the main circle, stood a small group of men—Ferera and his staff.

The General greeted us with a rather surly "*Buenos días, señores,*" then relapsed into silence. I was inclined to think that our friend, the officer, had been somewhat optimistic regarding the reception by the revolutionary chief. We were, however, afterwards to find that this morose attitude was natural, being caused by shyness when in converse with foreigners. He was surrounded by an efficient-looking group of officers; the chief of staff being an American soldier of fortune, who, from necessity, had left the United States some years ago, and now spent most of his time in assisting to stir up trouble in Central America. One or two other foreigners had joined the army, but these were mostly tropical tramps, who scented rich pickings, should the enterprise be crowned with victory, but who, in the event of failure, would be the first to abandon the cause. To my intense disappointment Ferera proved uncommunicative, merely explaining in brief sentences that the company had nothing to fear, and that personal property belonging to foreigners would in no way be molested.

After a long awkward silence, Ferera turned towards me and, never lifting his eyes from the ground, said in Spanish:

"You, *señor*, have served in the English Army?"

I replied that I had.

"Then you will realise that discipline must be maintained, otherwise the damage to foreign life and property would be tremendous." I entirely agreed.

"The man whom I am going to court-martial has been

guilty of looting provisions from one of the stores on the other side of the river." There was a short pause. "An example will be made," he said, as he walked a short distance away.

A wretched-looking man, cowering with fright, was led before him and two officers. A short peremptory conversation followed, from which the occasional whine of the unfortunate malefactor could be heard. A sharp order rang out—an officer and three soldiers dragged the terrified prisoner behind some adjacent trees—three revolver shots cracked through the stillness—discipline had been enforced.

A bugle sounded the stand to; officers mounted their mules, and the Army was once again ready to march. Feeling dazed, and very disgusted at the execution, we returned to the house, in front of which the column of troops would pass along the railroad on their way to Progreso.

Late that evening the advance guard, headed by a mounted officer, carrying an enormous red banner, passed the house. From then onwards a straggling chain of troops, making no attempt to keep any kind of military formation, marched along the line. An occasional mounted officer riding in their midst presumably denoted a company or battalion commander. Ferera and his staff passed in about the centre of the column, and stopped for a few minutes to drink water in the house. Alcoholic refreshment was firmly refused, in spite of the look of disappointment that came over the face of more than one officer. Machine-guns strapped on the backs of mules, and guarded by stalwart negroes, gave the impression that Ferera really meant business. Provisions carried in large pack-saddles by either native ponies or mules brought up the rear of the column; but, succeeding the entire force and guarded by two officers and six men, came one solitary mule, carrying a mysterious-looking cargo wrapped in tarpaulin. "What could it be?" we surmised. "Bullion," seemed the universal opinion.

Not until the moon rose above the hills, saturating the valley in a pale opalescent light, did the Indian troops, recruited from the pure-blooded tribes of the interior, pass the house. What a difference! Keen, hawk-like features and well-built bodies presented a striking contrast to the straggling mob ahead. The men marched barefooted, moving in quick, silent cohesion, as they passed like phantoms into the stillness of the night. Here were troops in which confidence might be

placed, and it could only have been the inadequacy of their numbers that prevented a *coup d'état* by the revolutionary forces. On the last of the troops having passed, the figures of our refugees appeared from the adjoining woodland and crept back towards the house, the verandas and floors of which were soon thick with recumbent figures. We had arranged that night to keep watch in shifts in case some of our visitors should become troublesome, but this proved quite unnecessary, for sleep was impossible in rooms only divided by a thin partition from the chanting of women's prayers, and sounds of nasal music exuding from the somnolent men. About midnight I went over to my house, and fell into a troubled slumber, with a feeling that things were about to happen. . . .

At 4 a.m. I was awakened by the sound of machine-guns on the far side of the river, to be followed by a regular fusillade of rifle-shots from the direction of the town. An undue banging on my door caused me some uneasiness, but, on cautious investigation, I found my servant, José, bearing the news that the revolutionists were vacating the town, and that the Government troops had arrived from San Pedro. I hastily donned some clothes and, with the aid of an electric torch, went over to the office. Everything was in a hopeless state of confusion—men, women and children running about in abject fear, while tired machine-gun bullets whistled overhead. As the fighting gradually approached nearer, a number of bullets sped in our direction. It brought back memories of the Great War, this fusillading, as the first streaks of dawn stole across the sky. One felt so helpless with absolutely no protection except a house built of wood, while women and children implored one's help. The servants were busy, seizing all available mattresses and lining them round the walls; this afforded some cover for those who had sense enough to lie down. Four natives and the cook were hit—not badly, but their cries and moans caused such an uproar that most of the refugees sought shelter in the woodland; this we encouraged, as it was really by far the safest place. The old crones were the most plucky; one woman sat by the door throughout the battle, reciting her prayers, and blessing us all as we went in and out!

After two hours, the firing died down; we heaved a sigh of relief, imagining that now the revolutionists had been defeated we should receive protection from the Government

troops—but in Honduras one should never imagine! During the morning some of us started towards the town, in quest of news. The road was littered with casualties, mostly civilians who had been shot in their frantic efforts to gain the protection of the American flag. On arrival at the outskirts we found the streets full of drunken Government troops; soldiers roaming about in search of trouble were spending their time in canteens and disreputable houses; those men not in possession of money to purchase liquor obtained it at the point of their rifles! Not liking the look of things, we hastily returned. Later on, one of the assistants came puffing and blowing towards the office, having been pursued by two drunken soldiers armed with machetes! He had bad news, for apparently the Government troops were commanded by a general well known for his anti-foreign tendencies.

Towards evening the situation became more serious. A drunken general in command of the Government troops came to the office and accused us of having supported the revolutionary troops. He thumped and banged his fist on my office desk and with the other hand played with his revolver. A dangerous situation was only saved by the tactful behaviour of one of his officers. But, before leaving, the General ordered sentries to be posted at the office gate, and gave strict instructions that no company official was to pass without a special permit signed by himself. We were virtually prisoners—placed under restraint by a Government general—a situation almost impossible to believe! But it has frequently been proved in past revolutions that the Government troops are a great deal more to be feared than the revolutionists! Villainous-looking soldiers paraded the road, shouting obscene language about *gringos* (white men) and foreign capitalists. One soldier, rather more drunk than the rest, levelled his rifle at the office building and fired a number of shots. It was miraculous that no one was hit. One of our men, a Mexican, and therefore born and bred to these disturbances, whipped out his revolver and fired in the direction of the soldier. Luckily, the bullets went wide of their mark, for the shooting of a soldier would have brought swift retribution by the drunken troops.

A disagreeable period followed; armed either with rifles or revolvers, we kept vigil all night. The town inhabitants had long since been forced by the infuriated General to abandon

sanctuary, and to return to their homes, where, in many cases, they found nothing but a heap of ashes. For this order we all felt thankful! At daybreak the Minister of War entered the town. We immediately filed our many complaints, and were given an assurance that Progreso would be left in charge of a more friendly general, and that we had nothing further to fear.

It was never known exactly what happened to Ferera after his retreat to the hills, but the general belief is that, owing to enforced delay due to torrential rains and swollen rivers, his money and supplies ran out, causing a large number of his men to desert for their native villages. A few skirmishes took place with the Government forces, in which numerous revolutionary officers were taken prisoners; Ferera himself escaping to Guatemala. But the hand of justice was quick in its descent, and the unfortunate prisoners were immediately shot without any trial; their mutilated bodies being photographed, and the prints sold on ten-cent postcards!

Some weeks later one of the clerks was travelling by train from Progreso to the coast; at a small wayside station he noticed a band of Government troops with a prisoner tightly bound by his wrists. He recognised our friend, the officer of telephone fame!

RAWDON HOARE.

WILLIAM CAREY: THE APOSTLE OF INDIA.

IT is right and understandable that an Indian Christian should pay a tribute to the memory of an Englishman who has meant so much to India. William Carey's gift to India was the establishment of the Indian Church, which has brought a new life to her people. William Carey can rightly be called the Apostle of India even though Christianity was introduced into that country before his time. From the days of the first century there has existed on the West coast an ancient Church owing its allegiance to Antioch. In the 14th century the Roman Catholic Church sent out its agents to the Moslem Court, but neither of these ecclesiastical systems had any life in them nor did they in any way challenge the existing social order. Until Carey came to the field it is true to say that the existence of Christianity was hardly noticed on the soil of India.

Before dwelling upon Carey's Indian experience we must ponder for a while upon his environment at home. Born of humble parents, with hardly any opportunities of education, he had to leave his village home of Paulerspury in Northamptonshire in 1775, at the age of 14, to earn his own living as a cobbler. He was of an adventurous spirit from his childhood. It was his ambition to do great things. And so he did, but not in the spirit of the age in which his lot was cast.

By the latter part of the 18th century England had established her dominion on land and sea in different parts of the world. Her military and naval adventurers and her commercially enterprising sons had extended her influence far and wide. She was becoming the most powerful shipping nation. The eyes of big business were turned towards the markets of Asia, Africa and America. The one objective was to make money and to make it quickly. The methods by which it was made were not a matter of serious consideration. British boats were carrying human cargoes of slaves between Africa and America. The conditions under which this inhuman trade was carried on are too well known to be repeated here. The spirit of adventure was making England great, materially and politically, so that she became a deciding factor in the world of politics at large.

One wonders if the statesmen and politicians of to-day at all realise how much this country owes to the cobbler Carey for giving England the moral leadership which she now enjoys in the world. Carey wanted and longed for his country to be great and powerful, but in another sense. He longed for the adventure to be turned in another direction—into the realm of the spirit. There were victories to be won and new conquests to be made. Human beings, he felt, should not be looked upon merely in terms of trade and commerce, or in terms of money, but in terms of service and salvation. It was for the soul of the people in India, Africa and China that the struggle had to be carried on. It is a commonplace for people in England in these days to speak about moral responsibilities towards the various races in the British Empire. This moral tone in imperial politics was introduced at the beginning of the last century. It was Carey who raised the issue and tried to awaken the conscience of his countrymen through the Church "to expect great things of God and to do great things for God." The burden of the deeper needs of the coloured races was very much on his heart.

It was on October 2nd, 1792, that the great trumpet-call was sounded at Kettering, when with £13 10s. od. the soul of England was going to be awakened regarding her responsibilities overseas. On that day the Baptist Missionary Society was born and soon after this others followed suit. It is no exaggeration to say that it is the missionary enterprise, the great venture for the Kingdom of God, which has given to England the place she holds in the world. Henceforth men and women in these islands were to think of the different races of the world, not as potential buyers of coal, iron, steel, woollen and cotton textiles, but as human beings whom God loves and for whom Christ died, that they may have life and have it abundantly.

Little did Carey realise, on the day when he launched his scheme of conquest of the world for his Master, that by 1934, a hundred years after his death, the Protestant Churches of England alone would be spending about three million pounds a year in the service of the coloured races. In 1795 the London Missionary Society was founded. In 1799 the Church Missionary Society was established. In 1816 the Wesleyan Methodists, who already were concerned about their own people overseas, turned their attention with great vigour and enthusiasm to

the evangelisation of the world. The torch that Carey lit did not light the soul of England alone, but its glow was felt by the Protestant Churches of Europe and America. Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany and France also began to think seriously of the Great Command to go to the uttermost parts of the earth.

The ways of Providence are strange. Carey had always dreamt of following the footsteps of Captain Cook and going to the Pacific lands, but strangely enough he found himself finally drawn into the net of India's life. It is significant of the spirit of the age that the British authorities would not allow him to settle. They put every obstacle in his way and even actively opposed him. He was spoken of in contemptuous language by the great financiers of England. It was to the Danes that the credit must go for having allowed him hospitality at Serampore, where he established his college, which is now the only Christian University in India. He was facing hostility from his own people while at the same time he found so much that needed to be done. His soul yearned to give the people of India the Light that was in him. The great souls that India's own religions produced were hidden away in the mountains and forests. They were wrapped up in the ecstasy of their own spiritual joy. The needs, physical and spiritual, of their own folks did not much interest them. Each one must work out his own Karma. Why should one waste time, sympathy and service over others?

The condition of the Bengal to which Carey came was appalling. Two hundred years of military rule at the hands of Moslem governors and commanders had had a deadening effect. Brahminical power had grown enormously. Its corruption was dragging Hindu society downwards. Poverty and ignorance, superstition and disease were rampant. The utter helplessness of the people was tragic. The East India Company's officials, the British merchants, the planters and other Europeans showed no concern for the people. In fact their own careless lives, "unbaptising themselves on their passage to India," and the godless and profligate manner in which they lived did not give Carey much encouragement to preach the religion which he had come to propagate. Yet he did not lose his faith. The Europeans and the Indians both stood in need of the same Gospel of salvation and this he would proclaim.

In his effort to put the message of Christ to the people of India Carey found great sympathy from a group of Bengalees who saw beneath the surface to the heart of the message. India, at least, did need the ethics of Jesus, His social sense, His great gift of freedom for the individual. Ram Mohan Roy and others with him saw what Brahmin priesthood had done. By its sanction and even by its teachings babies were sacrificed to the Ganges, abandoned or drowned, devoured by crocodiles.

"The hateful swinging by the flesh hooks drew throngs to the festivals. India's widows, specially in Rajputana and Bengal, were taught that it was widowhood's glory to burn with the dead bodies of their husbands, and thousands were selfless enough for this dreadful immolation: in Bengal alone some six hundred every year, many of them girls not yet out of their teens. By the same inhumanity of priests, lepers were burned and buried alive."

Carey may well claim to be the man who gave the Indian reformers the inspiration to carry on their agitation. His task was twofold in ridding India of her social evils. In the first place, he had to convert the European to be true to the highest in his faith, and secondly to keep the fire of reform and progress alight in the heart of the handful of Indians who had realised the meaning of the value of each human personality.

It is often claimed for the Christian Scriptures that they are the lantern for our feet. The intrepid Carey entered enthusiastically on the task of translating the Bible into different Indian languages. He had in this the co-operation of various Indian scholars. How much the precepts of Jesus have meant to the life of India it is difficult to say. It was through his efforts that education for men and women, hospitals for the sick, asylums for the lepers and the hundred and one different methods serving India were introduced. What enrichment they have brought to India in giving her a renewed hope in her own destiny! It was Carey who lit the torch which spread its light throughout Protestant Christendom and gave new hope to the human race.

Carey's influence on the Indian Civil Service cannot be over-estimated. During his term as a tutor to the young civilians who came out under the East India Company, he passed on to them some of his own fire. Even though his duty

was to teach Sanskrit and Bengalee, and generally to introduce the young Britishers to their new environment, he could not help being what he was. The faith and the passion that were in him came to the surface. Outside the lecture room the young civilians saw the man as he was, utterly consecrated to the things of the spirit, full of a consuming zeal to give to India the highest and best he knew. While the public schools of England and the great centres of learning have sent men out with the burden of an imperial task as Rome saw it in her day, it was Carey who impressed on the civil servants that they had a moral and spiritual service to perform. It was as a result of his influence that there began a kind of subtle struggle between the trader and the civilian, the former concerned with making money, the latter with serving. The various administrators with whom Carey had to deal saw that it was their moral duty to co-operate with those who knew that something more than an efficient administration was needed to improve the condition of the people, viz. to inculcate in the people themselves a desire for the understanding of those vital and dynamic factors that alone can change the springs of life. Hence their gradual conversion to give their support to the enterprise of the Christian Church, which stood for the propagating of these very principles.

Nor was Carey's enthusiasm for righteousness conveyed to the civilians only, but the traders and planters had seen what they could do in discharging their obligations towards those who worked for them. Carey had been obliged at one time to act as manager on an indigo plantation; he proved to be an ideal man in that position. How could he help it? His main concern was to be an apostle of the Good News, and in his business duties that main purpose never left him. There was a tie of affection and mutual regard existing between him and the coolies on his estate which was absent in the case of others. The planters could not escape from the contrast, and several of them learnt from this consecrated manager lessons which they tried to carry out in their own lives. There has been in existence since the days of Carey a certain group of British business men who have not forgotten that they are looked upon as members of a Christian race, and from them is expected something more than the process of coining money. The real "white man's burden," according to Carey, was not

to be living in an unhealthy climate from a sense of imperial and financial duty, but to live a life which would be a credit to his country and above all to the faith which he professed. Carey tried to impress upon his countrymen the fact that no white man can be a neutral in his moral and spiritual ideals in the East. Whether he likes it or not he will be looked upon as a professing Christian. The same is true in Africa. How often missionaries lament the fact that the greatest hindrance to the success of the work is the professing white Christians themselves!

The India of to-day, in spite of her critical attitude to the British Government and people, ought to recognise her debt to William Carey for pouring into the lifeless body of the India of the 18th and 19th centuries a new life which has roused her to a new sense of her own rights, privileges and potentialities.

The most vital factors in the life of India to-day are its women's movements. Some of the evils that Carey saw in his day do still exist in one form or another in the experiences of Indian womanhood, but no one is more conscious of the need of their removal than the emancipated and enthusiastic daughters of India themselves. They are fighting against orthodoxy, they are sitting on magistrates' benches, practising as lawyers, doctors, and nurses. They are demanding educational reforms for the girls, and opportunities for every child; they are pressing for women as censors of cinema films; they are fighting for the abolition of houses of ill fame; they are anxious to co-operate with their sisters in other lands for the cause of peace. Indian women in their thousands to-day are dedicating themselves in their homeland to the supreme task of creating around them a spirit of true patriotism and love of humanity, so that rising above the narrow confines of communities and provinces they may see fulfilled the vision of a larger India, ready to take her place in the world comity of nations.

How different the India of 1934 is from that of 1834! The torch that Carey lit in Calcutta has indeed spread its light over the land that he loved. England and India together must pay their respects to the man who should be included in the great list of the master builders of Christian civilisation. He passed away into the Fuller Life, amidst the trees and flowers which he had planted, on June 9th, 1834.

SHORAN S. SINGHA.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

CZECHOSLOVAK LANDMARKS.

AS these lines were written Czechoslovakia was preparing to celebrate two events which were likely to attract the interest of political students far beyond her own borders. On May 24th, Dr. T. G. Masaryk was to be re-elected for a third term as President of the Republic. Four days later (May 28th) Dr. Edward Beneš was to reach his fiftieth birthday.

Dr. Masaryk for his part reached his eighty-fourth birthday on March 7th. It is an almost conventional custom to remark the youthful qualities, or the tenacity of intellectual power, in really old people. In the case of Dr. Masaryk, while it would be absurd to say that he was youthful in type—he possibly never was—yet he is both physically and mentally as alert as ever. Although his hankering after a young and frisky horse for his daily two hours' ride in the forests of Lány may be the single exception to his complete innocence of affectation, the essential fact is that he does still ride daily for two hours, alone; and that he is astonishingly agile and hard. But his intellectual and moral quality is too deep, the "atmosphere" of his presence is too impressive, for one to think of him as other than one of the great men of history, old in accumulated knowledge and wisdom.

By contrast Dr. Beneš is in fact young. He is the only survivor in executive office of the Versailles politicians, having held the office of Foreign Minister continuously since the birth of the Republic in 1918. He is a man who has experienced in his own career the appalling course of human affairs since the Peace Conference of 1919, which, as one almost desperately believed, would put an end to such events as those of 1914 to 1918. He has seen Europe sink back into gross diplomatic disorder. He has had in his own relationships with European, American and Far Eastern politicians an overwhelming proof of the world-wide chaos that seems to be the normal product of diplomacy. Yet he rejects the proof. He goes on working with undiminished zeal for constructive ends. It is almost odd that in Dr. Beneš there appears to be no trace of cynicism, no attrition of hope by disillusion. He is young in type, in his looks, in his energy, in his resource, resilience

and freshness. Yet his motive is not of the dreamy type. Thought and action were never more practically realist than his.

Those two men have been associated in a great political enterprise since 1915. They are the symbol and the embodiment of a great achievement that is now universally associated with the name of Czechoslovakia. Why is Czechoslovakia so greatly honoured so far afield? She is surrounded by countries whose political machinery in varying ways and in varying degrees has broken down. Democratic government has failed on all her borders: in Germany, in Austria, in Hungary, in Poland. She herself by contrast has made democracy succeed. Her territory is situated in the midst of a continent whose outstanding feature in political finance has been dishonesty or bankruptcy, or both. Of her neighbours Germany and Hungary have uncaringly defaulted upon national obligations; Poland and Austria at one time or another have found themselves in financial difficulties. Czechoslovakia by contrast has maintained a sound internal finance and fully met her external obligations with the single exception of her war debt to the United States, towards which her policy has followed the precise pattern of British policy, for the precisely like reason. It is a wholly different reason from that which made Germany default upon her medium and long-term debts, or Hungary upon her League of Nations debt. Lastly, Czechoslovakia has found herself in the thick of revisionist propaganda against the Treaty of Versailles, from which her whole national entity derived. Yet she has on the whole maintained intact the contentment of her minorities. Both Germans and Slovaks work loyally within the Government. It is a glorious achievement, if only by contrast to the surrounding and almost universal disorders of our time.

Of Dr. Masaryk's career there is little need for a repetition of well-known facts. He was appointed first President of the Republic he himself had largely brought into being, in 1920. He was re-elected to a second term of office of seven years in 1927. And now to a third term. The normal constitutional provision is that a President is eligible for only two periods of office. Dr. Masaryk was exceptionally made eligible for life. The deep unquestioning respect upon which his authority is based is itself one of the cardinal factors that have made of the country a steady, solid, prosperous people.

Less is known outside Czechoslovakia of Dr. Beneš's career. He was born on May 28th, 1884, at Kožlany in Bohemia, the son of a farmer. He was a student successively at Prague University, at the Sorbonne and the École des Sciences Politiques in Paris, and at Dijon University, where he graduated into a doctorate of laws. Before the war he was engaged in academic work, in 1909 joining the teaching staff of the Commercial Academy in Prague, and three years later becoming lecturer in sociology at Prague University. During the war he helped Dr. Masaryk in the diplomatic propaganda that resulted in the formation after the war of an independent Czechoslovakia. He was made the first Foreign Minister of the new state, and has held the office continuously ever since. Continuity is one of the features of Czechoslovak qualities.

He has been interested in the political problem of Central Europe since early manhood. The University thesis that won him his doctorate in 1908, when he was twenty-four years old, had for its title "*Le Problème autrichien et la Question tchèque*." It was in 1915 that he escaped from Austria, of which Prague was then a part, to join Dr. Masaryk—still known then as Professor Masaryk—in Switzerland. They drew up a typically thorough plan of propagandist campaign on a world-wide scale. While Dr. Masaryk went to the United States and thence completely round the world, Dr. Beneš went to Paris and founded the Czechoslovak National Council (1916). He concentrated on propaganda in Great Britain, France and Italy, writing numerous pamphlets, newspaper articles and books, the latter including *Bohemia's Case for Independence*, which was published in London in 1917. On January 10th, 1917, M. Briand, in a communication to President Wilson, gave Czechoslovak independence as an Allied war aim. His diplomatic ground being now prepared, Dr. Beneš next turned to the organisation of Czechoslovak belligerent participation in the work of producing the result. On February 7th, 1918, he signed an agreement with M. Clemenceau to the effect that a Czechoslovak army be constituted with a separate general staff under the command of General Janin. Dr. Beneš thereupon did organise a Czechoslovak force in Italy and in France. He attended the Congress of Oppressed Nations in Rome in 1918 (April 9th to 12th). In the summer of 1918 he received, first from M. Pichon (June 29th) and then from Mr. Balfour (August 9th) a form of

diplomatic recognition, the first recognising the Czechoslovak National Council as the embryo Government of the future Czechoslovakia, the second recognising Czechoslovakia as an "Allied" nation. On October 14th, 1918, a provisional Czechoslovak Government was completed, its date of origin being given retrospectively as September 26th. It remained for the Peace Conference to delimit the frontiers of the new State. It was Dr. Beneš who, on February 5th, 1919, submitted the Czechoslovak claims to the Council of Ten.

On November 24th of that year he entered the duly constituted independent Czechoslovak Republic, with a promptness and detail which does not surprise those who have known him through the long years he outlined a policy to the National Assembly, within six days after his arrival (November 30th, 1919). The voluminous subsequent statements of the like kind he has made in fourteen and a half years have not diverged from the original principles he then expressed; which fact again illustrates the continuity of Czechoslovak work. It was he who drafted the agreements that were reached with Yugoslavia and Rumania in 1921, and which constituted the Little Entente. Since he arrived in Switzerland in 1915 he has never ceased travelling from one European country to another. He must have crossed one or another European frontier in the last twenty years at least a thousand times.

From the beginning he was one of the keenest and most regular attendants at Geneva, in which matter he easily holds the record. He was elected to the Council of the League of Nations in the autumn of 1923 and a year later was elected President of the Sub-Committee for Arbitration, Security and Disarmament, whose *dossier* is his main monument at Geneva. Among his other activities at Geneva his arbitration in the Anglo-Persian Mosul dispute was one of the most fruitful.

British opinion has always reacted vigorously to Dr. Beneš. There was a time, more particularly in the difficult period of diplomacy by conference between 1920 and 1923, when all except the habitually "pro-French" sections of opinion in this country regarded Dr. Beneš as too much the echo of the Quai d'Orsay. Many of his former critics now say that it was fortunate for Europe that he did "echo" the Quai d'Orsay; they could go farther, and by reading his speech of November 30th, 1919, above alluded to, they could console

themselves by the reflection that it was not an echo after all. The period when the principles of the balance of power induced certain British students of diplomacy to divert their sympathy away from a victorious and a strong France to a defeated and a weak Germany, has given way to a period in which the strength of Germany—partly the result of the British sympathy aforesaid—is being more widely diagnosed as one of the dangers to European peace.

Dr. Beneš's excellent series of books published periodically from the house of Orbis (Prague) in good English, well printed on good paper, are to be found as reference books on the shelves of many students of affairs in this country, whether or no they happen to agree with the deductions he draws from the facts he so clearly chronicles. And more British people now agree with those deductions than at any time since 1919.

MR. ROOSEVELT'S DILEMMA ABOUT THE DEBT.

It is only too easy to understand Mr. Roosevelt's inconsistency about the war debts owed to the United States. The inconsistency itself has been established in three clear stages. The first emerged during the Presidential election campaign of 1932, which was fought largely on Mr. Hoover's debt policy. Mr. Hoover was in thrall (as are all American Presidents) to Congress, and he had therefore taken the line of demanding from America's debtors the full discharge of the obligation, despite the obvious economic and financial impossibility of that demand, which he knew full well. Mr. Roosevelt, being a candidate for the Presidency against Mr. Hoover, of course had to contradict everything Mr. Hoover said or did. He therefore attacked the Hoover debt policy; which was easy work. What he said was this: "... the Republican position has been the absurd one of demanding payment, and at the same time of making payment impossible" (July 30th, 1932). He dared not advocate the remission of the demand itself—he would not have received many votes if he had—and therefore had to concentrate his criticism on Mr. Hoover for having "made payment impossible." What he advocated on his own part was the lowering of tariffs to enable payments to be made. A little later (September 29th, 1932) he put the argument in this way: "Billions of dollars of debts are due to this

country from abroad. If the debtor countries cannot export goods and services, they must try to pay in gold. We started such a drain on the gold reserves of the principal commercial countries as to force practically all of them off the gold standard. . . . I say to you in all earnestness and sincerity that unless and until this process is reversed throughout the world there is no hope for full economic recovery or for true prosperity in the United States."

Mr. Roosevelt succeeded—if to-day he still regards it as a success—and became President of the United States. On December 15th, 1932, which date fell in the virtual interregnum between Mr. Hoover's and Mr. Roosevelt's presidency, the British Government made a half-hearted non-committal part payment to keep the ball rolling. What did Mr. Roosevelt do? He solved his own problem by not doing anything, a device which in almost any other circumstance would have amounted to wisdom on the part of a politician. He had been urged to negotiate a settlement. Although Mr. MacDonald crossed the Atlantic and went to see him in Washington (April 21st to 25th, 1933), he maintained a resolute and a silent front. June 15th, 1933, approached. Mr. Roosevelt continued to be silent, until on June 9th, through the formal channel of the United States Government, he laconically informed Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador in Washington, that "75,950,000 dollars interest is due and payable on June 15th, 1933, on account of your Government to the United States, pursuant to the debt agreement of June 19th, 1923."

Having won the election by condemning Mr. Hoover's debt policy, Mr. Roosevelt went on to adopt Mr. Hoover's debt policy as his own. The British Government refused to pay the "75,950,000 dollars," but postponed its decision in that sense till 10 p.m. in the evening of June 14th, hoping till that late hour that Mr. Roosevelt might decide to do something a little more consistent with his own election cries of the year before.

In acknowledging the "token" payment made by the British Government on June 15th, 1933, the United States Government took the occasion to observe that the President could not alter the schedule of payments, explaining that "such power rests with Congress." We all knew that as well as Mr. Hoover had known it. Mr. Roosevelt no doubt felt the

need of finesse in the transition from his pre-election to his post-election sentiments. He issued a "personal" statement in Washington expressing his view that by paying only a "token" of the liability Great Britain had not "defaulted." ("In a spirit of co-operation I have, as executive, noted the representations of the British Government with respect to the payment of June 15th instalment, inasmuch as the payment made is accompanied by a clear acknowledgment of the debt itself. In view of those representations and of the payment, I have no personal hesitation in saying that I do not characterise the resultant situation as a default. Beyond this the law and the Constitution do not permit me to go.")

The third stage in Mr. Roosevelt's evolution emerged when, on April 4th of this year, Congress passed Senator Hiram Johnson's bill for the outlawry of the bonds, securities and obligations of any foreign government which is "in default in the payment of its obligations, or any part thereof." President Roosevelt signed the Act on April 13th. By signing it he logically followed his Congress into postulating that unless on June 15th next the full payment were made by America's debtors, default would be the formal stigma. Fortunately, as far as the past was concerned, Mr. Roosevelt was treated tactfully by his countrymen. On May 5th the Attorney-General issued a ruling to the effect that so far all was well with the token payers: that Great Britain, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Latvia and Lithuania, who had paid tokens, were "not at the present time in default under the terms of the [Johnson] Act." He defended so kind a ruling by an ingenious definition of the term default. He defined it as a failure to honour an obligation "to pay a fixed amount at a definite time, unless such default has been postponed or waived in some competent manner or by a transaction having that effect in law or good morals." The "competent" manner would, of course, be the approval of Congress, which will never be given. "Good morals" is an excellent formula to apply to those who, not paying the full amount due, yet admit the full liability. Mr. Roosevelt's bacon was thereby saved, as well as the British Government's; but only up to June 15th next. What was Mr. Roosevelt now to do? He had begun his career by attacking Mr. Hoover's "impossible" policy. He had next adopted the very same policy himself, but tempered the wind to the shorn lambs of London by shielding them as a

purely "personal" act of grace from the horrid word default. Congress having now made the continuance of such kindness itself impossible, and Mr. Roosevelt having no alternative but to follow his Congress, what could he do to make his record a little more scholarly? The British Budget came to him as a godsend in his dilemma. On May 9th he addressed a Press Conference at the White House. He explained that it would be difficult to impose a rigid criterion to the status of token payments in the future (for he must indeed have known that the choice for June 15th lay between accepting something or receiving nothing); and went on to propound the doctrine that in the future the United States would insist on payment in full from her debtors unless the debtors could substantiate a claim for relief on the ground of "distress."

What man shall accuse the politicians of cleverness? To a short-sighted public it no doubt was "cute" to offer to Great Britain the alternative of handing over her recently revealed Budget surplus to the United States or of accepting the stigma of default. But from the American point of view Mr. Roosevelt's abuse of the word distress was not an achievement of which a really serious person could be proud. Have they forgotten in the United States the "Hoover" moratorium of June 20th, 1931: the proposal made by the President of the United States that the whole world should suspend the payment of debts because of the universal distress? Have they, has Mr. Roosevelt, forgotten that the whole world acted upon America's suggestion, and that then **America**, alone in the whole world, insisted, as she still insists, upon the full payment of the debts owed to her despite the distress? If it be forgotten, let a few of Mr. Hoover's own words be recalled: "... Subject to confirmation by Congress, the American Government will postpone all payments upon the debts of foreign Governments to the American Government payable during the fiscal year beginning July 1st next, conditional on a like postponement for one year of all payments on inter-Governmental debts owing to the important creditor Powers. ... The purpose of this action is to give the forthcoming year to the economic recovery of the world and to help free the recuperative forces already in motion in the U.S.A. from retarding influences from abroad. ... The fabric of inter-Governmental debts, supportable in normal times, weighs heavily in the midst of this depression. From a variety of

causes arising out of the depression, such as the fall in foreign commodities, and the lack of confidence in economic and political stability abroad, there is an abnormal movement of gold into the U.S.A. which is lowering the credit stability of many foreign countries. These and other difficulties abroad diminish buying power for our exports, and in a measure are a cause for our continued unemployment and continued lower prices to our farmers. I do not approve in any remote sense the cancellation of debts to the U.S.A. World confidence would not be enhanced by such action, none of our debtor nations has ever suggested it; but as a basis of settlement of these debts was the capacity, under normal conditions, of the debtor to pay, we should be consistent with our own policies and principles if we take into account the abnormal situation now existing in the world. . . . It represents our willingness to make a contribution to an early restoration of world prosperity, in which our people have so deep an interest."

It is true that Mr. Hoover never proposed the cancellation of debts. He did propose a revised settlement. As a direct result of his initiative the non-American creditors and debtors made a new settlement, the only practical settlement, by wiping out the whole body of the debts that had caused such mischief. The United States, however, has ever since refused even to discuss a new settlement with her own debtors. She has repeatedly promised to discuss it. She has gone no further. After three more years of the greatest financial and economic distress that has ever befallen the world, America herself being one of the worst casualties, Mr. Roosevelt has invited the debtors of the United States to make out a case for distress or to pay. The world in its political aspect always was, and therefore probably always will be, divorced from common sense.

The comedy in its American setting was pushed to an extreme. On May 10th of the present year the Ambassadors of France, Italy, Belgium and Germany, and the Minister of Czechoslovakia, were informed by the American Under-Secretary of State, Mr. William Phillips, that although token payments, if offered on June 15th, would be accepted, such payment would not save the payer from the status of formal defaulter. The like intimation was repeated by Mr. Phillips to the British Ambassador on the following day.

The simplest explanation of these perverse events probably

is that the United States is a democratic country, that the democratic organ is Congress, whose constitutional competence is absolute. The President has no power in these things, and little influence. In the case of Mr. Roosevelt, the personal dilemma is intensified by the circumstance that he is engaged in an unpromising experiment in domestic economics. The "new deal" has not prospered. Its theory was that wages could be put up first and prices after. It was a difficult, almost an unpractical, conception, as are all political attempts to interfere with trade. But in the United States any enterprise dependent upon the full and faithful execution of a law politically decreed is doubly difficult because in the United States there is a traditionally wayward tendency not to respect the law too solemnly. In this case the decrees of the new deal have not been solemnly honoured. Prices were put up by producers more quickly than costs had been put up by Mr. Roosevelt's imposed wages, so that real wages belied their nominal value. The result is that nobody has been pleased. Labour disputes increase in their bitterness. The discontent recoils upon Mr. Roosevelt's head; and the elections are due in the autumn. How can Mr. Roosevelt, in a politician's circumstance, court additional unpopularity by disapproving of Congress in the matter of debts, when he knows both that Congress expresses the feelings of the average American citizen (Dr. Butler is not an average American citizen) and that his disapproval would in any case have no effect on Congress?

JAPAN AND THE FAR EAST.

Europe being enmeshed in quarrels about armaments, and the United States being enmeshed in an economic experiment, Japan has given recent evidence of comparative confidence in herself. On April 18th the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office made a statement to the Press making certain claims to a position of special responsibility in the Far East, especially in relation to China. The statement need not be quoted, the more so as it had been made before, namely last summer, when Dr. Rajchman, who had been acting as a liaison officer between the League and China, was attached for a period of one year to the National Economic Council of China.

There are two sides to the question. On the one hand, Japan in effect, though not in form, does claim an exclusive influence

over the 450,000,000 Chinese people, despite the seven other non-Chinese Powers who signed the Washington Treaty in 1922. She further has inspired the expectation that at next year's Naval Conference she will claim parity in strength with Great Britain and the United States. A Japanese newspaper has even had the assurance to protest against the Singapore base on the ground of its being a menace to Japan. On April 25th Sir Francis Lindley, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, invited Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, to say whether Japan still respected the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty. The answer, as could have been foretold, was a formal assurance in the affirmative. The matter in its formal aspect there ended, the principle of equal rights being formally upheld. The form perhaps is less important than the substance; and the substance clearly is that Japan takes a large and expanding view of her opportunities in the Far East.

On the other hand Japan is a vigorous, prosperous and honest industrial country, passing through the phase that Great Britain passed through half a century ago and not yet stultified (although that misfortune is bound to come) by the creeping paralysis of Socialism. She is to an increasing extent shut out from White markets. China is of such a quality that economically she can hardly avoid being exploited by foreigners, being incapable of exploiting herself. In the Japanese view, the resultant opportunity fairly falls to Japan. Moreover, the League of Nations has worked with unfortunate results in that field. By a too precipitately and exaggeratedly critical front to Japan's military exploits the League drove Japan into enmity against Geneva. Dr. Rajchman was sent to China; and Dr. Rajchman never concealed his impatience of what he regarded as the enormities of Japan. It may be right, it may be wrong, on abstract ethical principles. Men of the world, however, find that the device of suspending censure, indeed almost of keeping one's mouth shut, is the least mischievous principle of conduct in a troubled world.

The decision to set up a National Economic Council was taken by the "National Government of the Republic of China" in May 1931. It began functioning on November 15th of that year. Its purpose was to consult, as General Chiang Kai-shek expressed it at the opening plenary session, with "private persons from the outside, selected, not because of the position they hold, but because of their personal qualities

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and abilities." Dr. Rajchman was made the technical delegate of the League of Nations Council to that body. He has issued a report subscribed "Nanking, April 1934," on the progress so far made and on the remaining prospects of national economic reconstruction in China. The text of the report was published from Geneva on May 9th. Dr. Rajchman did not arrive in China till October 3rd last, and his report covers the period up to April 1st, a bare half-year. Of progress as distinct from prospects it would be unreasonable as yet to expect much evidence, but Dr. Rajchman makes an interesting survey of the existing possibilities in the fields of agriculture, cotton, silk, water conservancy, roads, health and education. He concludes that "one of the most hopeful prospects for the success of reconstruction in China lies in the manifold activities of a large number of its citizens specialised in many fields of technical work who carry on their work steadily, away from the limelight of publicity, in a spirit of public service and guided by the interest of accomplishment. These men, having known the disillusionments attendant on changes of political programmes and political régimes, and having passed through bitter experience of calamity and war at home, and of the ineffectiveness of measures of international collaboration on major issues, have now attached themselves resolutely to positive development work and some of them to the task of planning how best to build up their own country in all the present circumstances." What that may mean in precise practice must be answered by one's imagination or by experience still to come. Dr. Rajchman even explains that "the present stage is marked by a search for a new structure for economic and financial development, for social transformation and a new political orientation," which seems to make the scene still vaguer.

The quotations made above are fairly typical of Dr. Rajchman's style. It is in truth not easy to be excited by hope when the League of Nations embarks upon economic or financial adventure. The disaster of its European exploits in that field, involving a gigantic loss of money to those who subscribed to the loans, ought surely to have acted as a brake. The contemporary proof is overwhelming that it is not in politics to help, but only to hinder, the commercial enterprise of mankind.

May 15th, 1934.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

No. 393.

June, 1934.

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EMPIRE PROBLEMS.*

It is refreshing to read a soldier who writes: "Canada is . . . absolutely secure. Her military weakness, when compared to that of the United States, is her sure shield against invasion. First, as long as she is weak the United States has nothing to fear from her; and, secondly, because she is weak it will prevent any foreign nation annexing her" (p. 21). But the main thesis of the rest of the book is exactly the reverse of such a doctrine. The author surveys the British Empire, sees it "in dissolution," argues that in general world interests as well as in British interests it ought to be made strong again, and submits to that end a scheme of political and military reformation.

He has much to say, and says it bitterly, about the futility, or worse, of the modern fashion of diplomacy by conference. He scoffs at the League of Nations, and writes about the apostles of internationalism in a way which will excite the ready agreement of many disillusioned people. The present reviewer (to take a random example) agrees with most of what he writes about the modern spread of international political

* *Empire Unity and Defence*. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. Arrowsmith, 10s. 6d. net.

busybodying; but General Fuller apparently would cure the evil by substituting another. He believes in the *pax Britannica*, and wishes simply to recapture it. But that again is all politics, as futile as the rest. It may be that in human life, as in the jungle, the best guarantee of security is an adequate and universally recognised belligerent strength; but in the jungle the struggle is between individuals; it is not a struggle of masses politically organised and made infinitely deadly by the work of the scientists. To that extent the beasts of the field are far less savage than human kind. General Fuller does not concern himself with the philosophic aspect of his own matter. His main quarrel with the hideous effects of Geneva and all the post-war conventions about diplomatic equality and fraternity is that they have destroyed the British Empire's dominant belligerent sea power, and that the other people, especially those of the United States, are humbugs, encompassing only such destruction of British power.

To cut adrift from the League of Nations and from all international conference at the present stage and begin an alternative political enterprise based upon the predominant strength of an isolated British Empire would in practice be difficult. The attempt itself would be dangerous, for no danger in diplomacy is greater than that of violently new ideas. General Fuller's own restlessness and earnestness of doctrine are themselves a manifestation of the trouble that is politics. Yet, as there is no escape from politics, many pacific people would gladly welcome the realisation of General Fuller's dream of an Empire strong enough to impose a *pax Britannica*; even if few people believe it to be realisable. For one thing, nations nowadays are too closely linked by commerce to allow the possibility of a soldier's isolation of one unit against the rest. Such a conception belongs probably to the realm of fairy stories.

The author's style of writing is full of vigour and intensity, sometimes charming, but is not perhaps always neat or careful, simple or pure (e.g. on p. 283: "Should however the reader agree with me that the Empire is worth the saving, then I must ask of him creative criticism, and he must find 'a better hole' than mine in which to secure the Empire against the shot and shell of disintegration." Such unhappy passages abound.) Nor is General Fuller much of a diplo-

matist, for which defect one likes him the better. On p. 293 he writes: "Let us next turn to Europe and say: 'We have had enough of your foolery. For us this sham which you call international relations shall not continue; we are sick to death of your humbugging.'" That is a delightful way to talk to Europe. It would indeed be delightful if General Fuller could be given his head, allowed to shut up all the diplomatists, make the British Empire strong enough to keep them shut up, so that we could all live in peace. But alas! is it practical? G. G.

* * * * *

TWO VIEWS OF NAZI GERMANY.

General Göring is not the man to commend his party to the English-speaking peoples whom he addresses in a brief Foreword to *Germany Reborn*.^{*} For there is no other Nazi leader whose name inspires such detestation among the nations which retain their liberties. That the author is filled with a boundless devotion to his country is doubted by nobody; but his little book is written in a spirit of blustering intolerance which will make his foreign readers more thankful than ever that they do not live under his rule. The whole work, with its violent language, its sweeping judgments and its emotional excess, reads like a noisy election speech.

The picture of recent German history presented in these pages may perhaps deceive some of his countrymen, but nobody else. Germany, we are told, was entirely guiltless of the war, for "threatened from all sides, she had the sword thrust into her hand." The violation of her pledge to respect Belgian neutrality was self-defence. Defeat was the work of traitors and cowards at home, whose sole aim was to destroy their country. "And so, on November 9th, 1918, that vile rising of mutineers took place and Marxist dominance was established." The Treaty of Versailles was more devilish than the mind of a Dante could have conceived. The Weimar state was born of treachery and cowardice, its corner-stones were misery and shame. Corruption, immorality and indecency were the outward signs of the Republic. The Marxists, many of whom were Jews, were in control. And then, when the need was greatest, God gave the German people a champion of overwhelming genius and greatness of character.

^{*} Elkin Mathews. 2s. 6d.

"Just as a Roman Catholic considers the Pope infallible in all matters concerning religion and morals, so do we National Socialists believe with the same inner conviction that for us the Leader is in all political and other matters concerning the national and social interests of the people simply infallible. . . . For we love Adolf Hitler, because we believe deeply and unswervingly that God has sent him to us to save Germany." The German people did not want to govern themselves. They wanted to be governed and led. And now they know that the longed-for and inspired leader has come. Such is the fairy-tale which German children are now being taught in the schools. As a contribution to history it is grotesque. Its sole interest lies in its revelation of a neurotic mentality.

Of greater importance are the closing chapters in which the author draws on his own experience. Brüning is contemptuously dismissed as a conceited ascetic; Papen, though he had to be thrust aside, is praised as a patriot and a man; Schleicher is denounced as a treacherous mediocrity. How Papen combined with Hitler and Hindenburg to overthrow Schleicher, by whom he had himself been overthrown, and to instal the Leader in office is told with inside knowledge. The Nationalists, we learn, passionately opposed Hitler's demand for a general election, which he made a condition of his acceptance of the Chancellorship. Finally, they gave way, and the election justified their fears, for they, like all the other parties, have been swept aside. The story ends with a chapter entitled "My Task," which describes the author's manifold activities in the organisation of the police, the annihilation of Marxism and Communism, and the encouragement of aviation. The latter, he assures us, is purely for defence, and the Leader is the first guarantor of European peace. The future will pronounce on this daring claim. But the triumph of the Nazis raises another issue only less important than the threat of war. Are the principles of constitutional liberty and equal citizenship to go down all over Europe before the brutal onslaught of the totalitarian state? If Göring's apologia increases our sense of the danger which threatens our civilisation, it will not have been written in vain.

Hitler over Europe? though written from a diametrically opposite standpoint, is no more convincing, for it also suffers from patent exaggeration.* The author, however, who con-

* *Hitler over Europe?* By Ernst Henri. Dent. 5s.

ceals his identity behind a *nom de plume*, is a man of considerable ability and wide knowledge, and his book is as thrilling as a detective novel. The first portion of the volume, "The Power Behind Hitler," presents Thyssen as the heir of Stinnes in his power and his ambitions, the villain of the piece, the real director of Nazi policy at home and abroad. The first chapter, entitled "Thyssen's Plot," is perhaps the most valuable, as it contains a mass of information about the rival magnates of the Ruhr. Thyssen, we are told, needs an enormous expansion of markets for the ever-increasing output of his industries. Hitlerism is the political expression of Thyssenism. Without Thyssen, Hitler would not exist; but only through Hitler can Thyssen continue. The second portion of the work asks, Where is Hitler going? Here the leading figures are Rosenberg, the planner of a new map of Europe, and Göring, the ruthless instrument of his schemes. Hitler himself appears throughout as a rather colourless individual, used as a tool by stronger men for their own ends. Can Germany win a war? asks the author. He answers that she might win in the air, though certainly not on the ground. We are left with a vision of Göring's Air Force hovering over Europe, waiting till it is strong enough to swoop down on France. "Whither Germany? There are only two perspectives: war or civil war, external or internal explosion of Hitlerism. There is no third." In the long run, he believes, the Nazis will be overthrown by the numerous enemies and victims of Fascism, co-operating under the leadership of unflinching German Communists. "The German workers and their allies will in the end snatch the initiative from Hitler. But before this happens Hitler can shatter half the world." It is the most sensational work produced by the Nazi revolution.

G. P. G.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION.*

In his recently published *Essentials in the Development of Religion*, Dr. Turner has added another important volume to the numerous previous contributions which he has made to the combined philosophic and psychological treatment of the nature and evolution of religion. By this series Dr. Turner

* *Essentials in the Development of Religion*. By J. E. Turner. George Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

has established for himself a high reputation as one of the most suggestive and fruitful thinkers on this great subject. This volume is to be welcomed as worthy of all that has previously come from his pen, and as giving further elucidation of his characteristic treatment of the problems concerned.

The range of this book is very comprehensive, for it deals with the standpoint and method from and by which the subject should be approached, treats of the essential features and development of religion and reaches, by a coherent process of discussion, to the culminating considerations of Immortality, The Supremacy of Religion, and Divine Personality. At every stage of his argument Dr. Turner shows himself to be fully abreast of the most recent advances that have been made alike in philosophic speculation, in psychological investigation and in physical hypotheses. Within the brief limits of this review, it is only possible to call attention to a few of the outstanding topics treated in the volume, in the hope that even an inadequate notice may help to secure for it the careful study that it deserves.

In the first place, Dr. Turner does well to emphasise the importance of combining psychology and philosophy in the study of religion. That religion demands psychological investigation should go without saying, for we are here concerned, not only with the deepest and most universal deliverances of human consciousness, but also with the relations into which religion has entered and must, of necessity, enter with all the other characteristic activities of human thought and interest. The neglect of such investigation has led, in the past, to numerous misunderstandings and controversies, which might have been avoided had more comprehensive psychological insight been available. Yet the psychology of religion, essential as it is, must be combined with a philosophical outlook. For, after all, religion is not merely a subjective concern, but essays to give an interpretation of Reality as a whole. It is the special task of philosophy to test such interpretation, in whatever form it may be given, in order to clarify it, to make it coherent, not only in itself, but in relation to all other conclusions and to pass judgment upon its value as truth.

In the next place, attention should be called to what Dr. Turner insists upon as the outstanding feature of religion. At every point he emphasises his view that religion is dis-

tinguished as the response of the Whole Man to the Whole Universe as he apprehends it. This twofold totality is essential to religion, and it is just in this wholeness that it is contrasted with the more limited concerns of science, art and practical life. Dr. Turner concludes that the

inherent wholeness of experience will assume varying forms concordant with the main tendencies of the concrete content of man's life; it will therefore be emotional in great art, rational in a comprehensive philosophy, exhaustive in religion, and practical in conduct that conforms, as it best may, with this rigorous discipline. But apart from some type of religion—which must, in principle, be the highest that can under any given conditions be achieved—morality must always lack some essential part of its fullest development (p. 210).

In regard to this emphasis on Wholeness in religion it should, however, be remarked, that in order to be religious the response, from the crude outset to the culmination, must be subject to and unified by a controlling principle or principles; and this either permanently, or at all events for the moment and for the prevailing mood. Without such governing control Wholeness cannot be attained, and this appears to be Dr. Turner's view, for he speaks, in this reference, of "the ideational capacity of the mind."

Dr. Turner traces the development of religion from its earliest beginnings to its growing assimilation of rational and moral elements, in addition to emotional intensity, in a series of important chapters. At the conclusion of his exposition he returns to his "initial principle that humanity is inherently religious in precisely the same sense that it is inherently rational and moral" (p. 200). Religion is, in his contention, supreme, and unfolds both its meaning and its values with the growing development of human personality. From start to its ever-receding finish, "Religion is always the unity of experience in its explicit wholeness" (p. 85). It is only possible, in conclusion, to call attention to the distinctive feature of Dr. Turner's treatment of Divine Personality. It is twofold, both theoretic and spiritual. In regard to the former, Dr. Turner euphemises, as he has done before, the presence in the universe of mechanism, and treats this feature as strengthening, instead of weakening, the theistic argument. He accepts Lotze's statement, "how absolutely universal is the extent, and at the same time how completely subordinate

the significance of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world" (p. 275). As to the spiritual significance of Divine Personality, Dr. Turner argues, with weighty reasoning, that in view of all that is contained in human personality, communion with the universe is only possible for man on the basis that he has to do with Personality, free from human limitations, and that not only can he approach this Divine Personality, but that God can approach man in the communion that condescends, guides, and saves from the sin and infirmities by which man is burdened.

J. S. L.

SAINT-CYR AND ITS FOUNDRESS.*

A seventeenth-century Academy for Young Ladies, founded as an educational venture by an "uncrowned Queen," and for whose theatricals a great poet expressly composed suitable dramas—such is the theme of Dr. Barnard's latest study in French education. The history of Saint-Cyr, and of the august lady who planned it and spent her happiest hours in its supervision, is presented in delightful fashion, and is based, as the valuable bibliography and footnotes show, on contemporary documents, notably the *Mémoires* of the *Dames de Saint-Louis*. Madame de Maintenon is here seen, not as politician, but as a true pioneer in girls' education, and Saint-Cyr as the achievement by which she best deserves to be remembered. Her life up to 1684—the date of her secret marriage to Louis XIV—is summarised in the opening chapter.

It was owing to the experience of poverty through which Françoise d'Aubigné, as a young girl of good family, had herself passed, and to her knowledge of the deplorable lack of education or training for after-life in an ordinary convent upbringing, that she sought later to supply the need for an establishment for *demoiselles* of the "noblesse indigente" which would train them to be "bonnes séculières," "bonnes chrétiennes et bonnes françaises" rather than professed *religieuses*. (A considerable number of its pupils did, however, become nuns.) The King also desired to help the families of his officers and other nobles impoverished by war, and gave his patronage to Saint-Cyr, on its foundation near

* *Madame de Maintenon and Saint-Cyr*. By H. C. Barnard, D.Lit. A. & C. Black, 1934. 10s. 6d. net.

Versailles in 1686; its 250 pupils were his nominees. The 36 *Dames de Saint-Louis* who were entrusted with their care were not originally nuns, but in 1693, after a revision of the constitution, they adopted a version of the Augustinian Rule, vowing in addition to devote themselves to education. From this date, the *Dames* were recruited from the *demoiselles*.

"No girls' school before or since has enjoyed among its contemporaries so great a reputation." A charming account is given of the daily life, which was evidently a happy one, in spite of certain drawbacks, such as an unhealthy site and frequent epidemics—and of a minute *surveillance*, which the *demoiselles*, unlike Charlotte Brontë later, did not resent. A threatened invasion of the fashionable Quietism was firmly checked. Some features anticipate the modern school—e.g. a system of prefects, and groups distinguished by different coloured ribbons. The foundress did not aim at producing *femmes savantes*; she was "always far more concerned with the education of character than with the training of intellect through specific school-subjects." French must be correctly spoken; music, needlework, courteous manners, and household duties were all studied. Games were encouraged, and recitations, though acting in public was stopped after the performances of *Esther*, as tending to bring the pupils too much into the limelight. One touching incident is related—that of a visit by Louis, when saddened by old age and his army's reverses; he found solace in a loyal prayer sung by the girls, which bade the angels "watch over a king who watches over us."

After Louis' death in 1715, Madame de Maintenon retired to Saint-Cyr, and died there in 1719. The traditions she had inaugurated, and the connection with the Court, were maintained until the Revolution, when the school was dispersed (1793). After several vicissitudes, Saint-Cyr has become, as is well-known, "the Sandhurst of France."

Dr. Barnard suggests that Madame de Maintenon's enlightened theories on education were partly inspired by Fénelon's treatise *De l'Éducation des Filles*. After one or two experiments on a humbler scale, she was able to give them tangible expression in her beloved Saint-Cyr, and through it her influence affected later schools and educationists. Readers will thank Dr. Barnard for his portrait of an often misjudged woman who, childless herself, lavished

thought and care on the household of girls to whom she was at once patron, *institutrice* and mother.

E. G. S.

THE ENGLISH CHARACTER.*

During the autumn of 1933 Mr. Arthur Bryant broadcast a series of nine talks which have now been published in book form dealing with the characteristics of the English people. Few writers in recent years have done adequate justice to the subject. The foreigner rarely possesses more than a glimpse of our national life and an imperfect appreciation of our mental outlook. The Englishman himself is too connected with the subject to provide an impartial and balanced analysis. Mr. Bryant has made an able and courageous attempt at detachment, and couches his views in admirable prose. It is not to be expected that all his conclusions will be accepted. His assertion, for example, which accords with the recent opinion of a foreign writer, that the Englishman, while he seldom flinches from the truth when the alternative is a literal lie is "not much distinguished by moral courage" may well be challenged. National character, however, is largely a question of emphasis, and men can argue *ad infinitum* as to the nature and extent of our qualities and defects and their effect upon our general characteristics.

Mr. Bryant discovers the secret of the English character in the view that "our culture . . . is a country culture," and that our subconscious selves are still dominated by rural instincts and ways of life.

We are shut off from them as it were by a tunnel of two or three generations—lost in the darkness of the Industrial Revolution—but beyond is the sunlight of the green fields from which we came.

In that rural England are to be found the bases of our national character. By way of illustration and explanation the author considers seven traditional types, most of which reached their zenith before the Industrial Revolution: the country squire, the parson, the yeoman farmer, the craftsman, the merchant, the adventurer, and the housewife. The nineteenth-century merchant is heavily indicted. "In their quest for property, the Forsytes destroyed everything that clashed with it—

* *The National Character*, by Arthur Bryant. Longmans. 5s. net.

beauty, love, even life itself." Mr. Bryant blames the "drab morality" of puritanism which "became a species of valuable property to the English merchant classes," and somewhat cynically remarks that the English Sunday served as "a rallying ground for the English energies before resuming their terrific task of harnessing the forces of the world to the chariot of their wealth."

Throughout this book Mr. Bryant compares the England of two centuries ago and almost likens it to a golden age. The inhuman, haphazard method of industrialisation "struck down the ancient arts of life that had flourished so gloriously in this land, and constructed practically nothing in their place." But in spite of spiritual starvation, the English people have clung to "the accumulated traditions of their past" and, beneath the crust of cosmopolitanism,

lies the rich varied meat of our native English character—its ancient prejudices and stolid conservatism, its passionate longing for justice, its mulish stupidity and instinctive wisdom, its patience, its courage, its incorrigible good humour.

Mr. Bryant quite rightly seeks in the past the foundations of our national character. But in so doing he overstresses the attractions of the old rural England. Moreover, in his anxiety to show the historical tradition, he has not adequately dealt with the English character under present-day conditions and faced by modern problems.

THE FASCIST STATE IN BRITAIN.*

Mr. James Drennan is an ardent Fascist, and in his book *B.U.F., Oswald Mosley and British Fascism* indicates the political wanderings of his leader and attempts a philosophical and historical discourse upon the nature of his present political creed. Mr. Drennan is most anxious to persuade his readers that the Fascist State is not unsuited to the British people and that its advent is a practical proposition.

The possibilities of the development of a revolutionary momentum in Britain on lines similar, and in some degrees parallel, to the contemporary successful movements on the continent of Europe, are by no means so obscure as the complacent class of parliamentary politicians is pleased to believe.

* *B.U.F., Oswald Mosley and British Fascism*, by James Drennan. 7s. 6d. net.

The Fascists propose to obtain power by constitutional methods. In Italy it was the will-to-power rather than force which secured the victory of Fascism. But Mr. Drennan significantly adds that "opposition crumbled before the knowledge that force was behind that will-to-power." But once in authority respect for the Constitution ceases, and individual liberty is threatened. In no Fascist State is freedom of speech and action respected.

"The British people," Mr. Drennan asserts, "are by no means devoted to the Parliamentary system," and Fascism is "the modern expression of a very strong and definite tendency in the history of British thought." Although, as Mr. Drennan asserts, representative institutions were not original to Britain, they have persisted in this country in an unbroken line from the Middle Ages, and have preserved a continuous tradition of personal freedom and liberty of conscience without parallel among any other people. Mr. Drennan is wrong in thinking that English and Continental institutions have a common derivation. He shows extreme ignorance in stating that our legislation is based on Roman law. Moreover, our parliamentary institutions were not founded on a capitalist system as, for example, in the Italian cities. They appeared in England long before the rise of capitalism and had their origin in our peculiar feudal system. The political creed advocated in this book has no historical justification in this country and inevitably will be rejected by the Briton, once conscious of its threat to liberty.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

*Memoirs of a Camp-Follower** contains some of the experiences of Dr. Philip Gosse while a medical officer in France and India during the war. The reader must not expect to find the horrors of war so lavishly detailed as in the average war book. Dr. Gosse is a profound naturalist and an expert taxidermist. Under extraordinary conditions and with wonderful perseverance, he contrived at odd moments of leisure to study wild life and secure specimens which have found their way to our national collections. On one occasion he obtained a tiny garden shrew to be found in Western Europe but not in England, and was able to get it transported alive by his batman to the London Zoo. The

* Longmans. 10s. 6d. net.

persistence of animal life seems amazing. Even birds remained not far from the battle area and occasionally braved the firing line. In the vault of a ruined house at Fricourt a pair of swallows "built their nest, laid their eggs, and hatched their young during an almost continual hail of shot and shell." He describes the wild cry of curlews "amidst the crash of exploding bombs, the roar of low-flying German planes and the barking of our anti-aircraft guns and machine guns." Dr. Gosse was appointed "Rat Officer to the Second Army" and describes very modestly his invaluable work in resisting the menace. His rat lecture, officially styled "A Lecture in Zoology on its relation to Sanitation," became famous throughout the army. After over two years in France, Dr. Gosse was transferred to India where, under more genial surroundings, he collected hundreds of specimens, including a species of bat unknown to science and which has been named in his honour *Tadarida Gossei*. But the background to these pursuits is the war and the reader is always aware of the senseless slaughter, and incidentally of the heroism of the R.A.M.C., which though rarely expressed is vividly inferred. Dr. Gosse describes many of the incidents in his official work and shows us from an unusual angle the life of the soldier at the front. He states his views fairly and frankly on many a kindred topic, as for example the work of the Army chaplain. The simplicity and unusual freshness of this book make it especially attractive.

*Russian Engineer** is a further addition to the long series of books describing conditions in Soviet Russia. The author, Mr. John R. Westgarth, was employed by the Russian Government for two years as a technical expert to look after the State Planning of factories and industrial installations. Unable to obtain work in England, Mr. Westgarth went to Russia, with an open mind, and there can be no doubt that this book contains a sincere account of his views and of many personal experiences. He warns others not to follow his example. "Any Russian contract is worth very little in Russia and they may well be severing themselves entirely from England if they hearken to Russian promises." He emphasises also the disillusionment which inevitably awaits the foreign communist or the unemployed workman who goes to live in Russia. "No matter what your conditions now, you would be worse under Communism." His account of the poverty and degradation of the peasant is not new, and has often been told before. Through his duties, Mr. Westgarth was in close touch with the organisers of the Five-Year Plan and he describes many interviews with the Communist leaders. Upon this question he speaks with authority, but unfortunately fails to discuss the Plan in any detail and confines himself to little more than general comments. The Plan "was doomed to

* Denis Archer. 8s. 6d. net.

failure before it started." The bureaucratic machine is corrupt and inefficient and quite incapable of taking effective action. The real driving-force is the O.G.P.U., which terrifies, without reforming, the whole system. There is "too much talk, too many arrests—and the resultant complete confusion." The foreign experts, whom the Soviet are bound to employ, are controlled by ignorant Russians. The average workman is entirely apathetic and incapable of using machinery. In spite of the Plan, there is no incentive to work. Mr. Westgarth sums up the position when he says "The whole thing is abortive for the standard of civilisation throughout the U.S.S.R."

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The Red Macaw* was a broken-winged bird, both fierce and tender, who dominated the kitchen quarters and yard of the writer with undisputed sovereignty in a distant and little-known region of Old Brazil. She is the point of unity in the book, and for over a hundred years watches the life of the white man and his slaves. This book has been written with force and artistic skill from an intimate knowledge of liberated slaves and their descendants. It is a ruthless and truthful study of slavery, that greatest of human tragedies, and its effect on the mentality of negro and European alike. With the Wilberforce centenary so recently in mind this book is of interest, but it is strong, vivid writing as well, almost too tragic in its sorrow, were it not for the art and magic of its gay tropical background.

The early settlers in Brazil brought to battle with the forest a toughness of physical and mental make-up and a ruthlessness without which they could not succeed. These qualities in a position of unbounded power over other lives result in the unscrupulous slave-owner. In all countries where slavery existed the nations are facing the aftermath, and it is essential that our interest should be roused to study the historical facts. The heritage in Brazil of brutality, of evil, of superstition, has made a deep impression on Mrs. Haggard, and in a startling way brings home this constant peril of sadism whenever the weak are in the power of the strong. A generation which welcomes dictators may discover this too late!

The Red Macaw's observing begins with that time when a party of Portuguese, having bought land from the Emperor of Brazil, came to mark out their estate and stake their claim at the root of the greatest sapucaia, and the primeval forest surrendered the glory of its virginity to the stranger. In her descriptions of the forest and the marsh, Mrs. Haggard finds easy scope for her powers of observation and description; the forest with its abundant fruitfulness of bud and flower; the haunted marsh country where the Kagsa Mortail, "the terror of the shroud," gives its weird cry in the night. Mrs. Haggard, a niece of Rider Haggard, came with her husband to live in this district just after the war. With

* *Red Macaw*. By Phoebe Haggard. Jonathan Cape. 7s. 6d.