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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCCI—JULY 1935

THE DOMINIONS AND THE PRIVY COUNCIL

By THE HON. CYRIL ASQUITH, K.C.

ON June 6 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council delivered, after mature reflection, two notable judgments on appeals from the Court of King's Bench (Appeal Side) of the Province of Quebec, and from the Supreme Court of the Irish Free State.¹ The point raised in both cases was the same—namely, whether the Parliaments of Canada and the Free State, respectively, were competent by legislation passed since the Statute of Westminster to abolish the prerogative of the King to give special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee from decisions of the Courts in question. In each case the Judicial Committee affirmed the competence of the Dominion Legislature so to do, and accordingly its own incompetence to entertain the appeals in respect of which the special leave was sought. At the first blush it might seem that the issue

¹ *British Coal Corporation and Others v. The King*; and *Moore and Others v. Attorney-General for the Irish Free State and Others*.

so raised, while assuredly not unimportant in itself, was a narrow one. Some Dominions—*e.g.*, Australia and South Africa—have, by the exercise of powers granted them in their Constitution Acts, practically abolished the prerogative appeal. The Dominions immediately concerned had, before the Statute of Westminster, no power to do this. For them the point was still an undetermined one: yet it might be thought doubtfully to warrant the pageant of legal learning, the prodigies of forensic talent lavished, for a matter of weeks, on its determination. No such doubts could reasonably have been harboured by anyone who looked beyond the immediate issue to its wider Imperial bearings. For the ‘short point,’ in legal parlance, could not be focussed save against a far larger background, to which it seduced the eye, into which it radiated and ramified, and at times almost receded, with an inviting backward glance to the student of constitutional law. It is this hinterland from which the decisions draw their far-reaching significance. This factor which moves an inquisitive mind to ask what precisely is the legal status of the Dominions to-day; which compels those in search of an answer to review the constitutional development of the Empire during the last hundred years or more; which trains on the Statute of Westminster, the legal consummation of that development, a searchlight whose rays were badly needed to illuminate its epoch-making provisions; and which invites laymen no less than lawyers to reflect how far and how fast in this sphere we have lately been whirled along new legal roads. As they survey the accelerating progress they may be reminded of certain celestial bodies which, if modern astronomy can be trusted, are receding from us the more swiftly the further they have travelled from us already.

Before approaching the wider question just glanced at, it may be useful to expose the grounds and reasoning of the decisions themselves, and, for simplicity, to limit the exposition to the Canadian case, which, though differing in detail from the Irish, was decided by reference to the same broad principle.

A section of the Canadian Criminal Code (enacted before the Statute of Westminster, and re-enacted after it) provided that ‘*notwithstanding any prerogative . . . no appeal shall be brought in any criminal case from any judgment or order of*

any Criminal Court in Canada to any Court of Appeal or authority by which in the United Kingdom appeals or petitions to H.M. in Council are heard.’ What this section aimed at excluding was the prerogative right of the King in Council to grant special leave to appeal to himself from judgments of Colonial or Dominion Courts. This right long pre-existed the Judicial Committee Acts of 1833 and 1844. The King’s prerogative constitutes him, among other things, the ‘fountain’—perhaps ‘reservoir’ would be a better metaphor—of justice. In early times he canalised part of the waters, and distributed them to his subjects

In parcelled jets and regulated rills

through the conduits of the Courts of Common Law; retaining, nevertheless, in himself an undelegated residue, available at his pleasure to suitors who had obtained imperfect redress from the regularly constituted tribunals. The subject desiring to invoke the exercise of this residual power could petition the Sovereign. As Lord Sankey has pointed out, the subject’s petition might, according to the nature of the case, be addressed to the King through his Chancellor—to the King in his Chancery; or to the King in Parliament; or, again, to the King in Council. From these respective petitory venues sprang the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, the jurisdiction of the House of Lords as the supreme appellate tribunal from Courts of the United Kingdom, and the jurisdiction of the Privy Council, as the supreme appellate tribunal from the overseas possessions of the Crown. It is with this last that we are here concerned.

Before 1833 the members of the Privy Council on whose advice the King acted in hearing appeals from his overseas possessions (‘the Colonies and plantations’) were not a body of defined size or unvarying personnel. By the Judicial Committee Act, 1833, such a body was constituted under the style of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In 1844 a supplementary Act was passed affirming the competence of this Committee to entertain such appeals by special leave granted on its advice from all Colonial Courts, not only (as laid down by laws in force in certain Colonies) from Courts of error, or, as we should now say, of appeal.

In 1865 was enacted the Colonial Laws Validity Act. Some doubts had in the years immediately preceding obtained

as to the validity of Colonial legislation which clashed with the law of the Mother Country. The Act placed the position in this regard beyond doubt. Negatively, it gave the *coup de grâce* to a doctrine (propounded in certain, then recent, South Australian decisions) that a Colonial law was invalidated by reason of any conflict between its terms and the rules of the English Common Law. To this extent it was an emancipating statute. Affirmatively—and here it was a restrictive measure—it provided that where a Colonial law was ‘repugnant’ to any Imperial statute extending to the Colony, or to any order or regulation made thereunder, it should be void ‘to the extent of such repugnancy.’

Between 1865—when this crucial Act was passed—and 1926 the gift of ‘Dominion self-government’ was either made or perfected in favour of the Dominions.

The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, remained in full vigour until the Statute of Westminster was enacted at the end of 1931. Five years before its enactment—in 1926—the question whether the Parliament of the Canadian Dominion was competent to abolish the prerogative appeal in criminal cases was raised in the case of *Nadan v. The King* ([1926] A. C. 482) and decided by the Judicial Committee in the negative. The Canadian legislative provision then declared void was the actual section of the Criminal Code which, as re-enacted in identical terms after the Statute of Westminster, has just been upheld. The discrepancy is entirely explained by the intervention, between the two decisions, of the statute.

To appreciate how precisely the statute achieved this Copernican revolution it is necessary to consider the grounds on which *Nadan v. The King* proceeded. They were in substance two. The first was that the section was ‘repugnant’ to Imperial statutes—namely, the Judicial Committee Acts of 1833 and 1844—and was therefore ‘avoided’ by virtue of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. The second was that the prerogative appeal is geographically a composite entity, operating to a material extent outside the territorial limits of the Dominion; and that in 1926 the Dominion was incompetent, or doubtfully competent, to legislate ‘extra-territorially.’² The Statute of Westminster has removed both

² The existence and extent of this disability was at all times obscure, and a subject of controversy.

of these limitations, in relation to Dominion statutes passed after its enactment. For by section 2 it provides (I omit inessentials) that ‘the Colonial Laws Validity Act shall not apply to any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion’; while by section 3 it ‘declares and enacts that the Parliament of a Dominion has full powers to make laws having extra-territorial operation.’

This, however, is not quite conclusive in favour of the right of the Dominion Parliament, since the Statute of Westminster, to abrogate the prerogative appeal. For that statute, while permitting the Dominion to invade other Imperial Acts, expressly preserves the impotence of the Dominion to ‘repeal, amend or alter’ the British North America Acts which embody the Canadian Constitution; and if those Acts withheld from the Dominion power to affect the appeal, the repeal of the Colonial Laws Validity Act could not repair the omission, or supply the deficiency. Strike the fetters from a paralytic, he is none the less still paralysed.

Did the British North America Acts, then, confer, or did they withhold, power to abrogate the prerogative right of appeal? Admittedly on all sides a prerogative power can only be repealed by ‘express words’ or by ‘necessary implication.’ The Acts in question gave no express authority to the Dominion to abolish it. Did their terms necessarily imply such an authority—subject, of course, so long as they were operative, to the chains which the Statute of Westminster has since broken?

The Judicial Committee has now held that such a power did exist. It has held that section 91 of the British North America Act, 1867, which defines the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament, invested that Parliament ‘by necessary intendment’ (= implication) with power to prohibit appeals to the King in Council. This power could not, indeed, be exerted effectively, so long as it was restrained by the Colonial Laws Validity Act and the want (real or assumed) of extra-territorial jurisdiction; but beneath these restraints it was existent and apt for exercise, like a spring compressed by weights. The weights were removed, it was exercised, and the exercise was effective.

Such is a condensed, and therefore necessarily defective, summary of the reasoning which underlay the recent decision.

From the standpoint of purely legal logic the crux of the argument would seem to lie in the character assigned to the Judicial Committee Acts. Of these Acts two views are possible, and were, in fact, advanced and relied on by the contending parties respectively. According to one view, all the Acts do is to regulate the composition of the body of Privy Councillors on whose advice the Sovereign acts in exercising the prerogative. The prerogative itself is not surrendered, or irrevocably delegated, or otherwise lost or merged. Beyond the new consultative body, it subsists unimpaired; 'pervades and broods above,' as the sun continues to shine above the clouds. Counsel for the petitioners, who strenuously contended for this view, supported their thesis by pointing to the undoubted fact that under the terms of the Acts, although it is the Judicial Committee which reports and recommends a certain course, the authority which refers the matter to the Committee for its report, and which after the hearing makes the determinative order in pursuance of that report, is not the Judicial Committee, but His Majesty in Council—'Council' meaning here, not the Judicial Committee, but the general body of Privy Councillors. Of this view, if accepted, it is a corollary that if the Judicial Committee Acts were repealed, the result would not be to abolish the prerogative vested in His Majesty in Council, but at most to scrap the advisory machinery supplied by the Acts for its most convenient and instructed exercise. To revert to a previous metaphor, the result would be to dissipate the clouds, but not to extinguish the sun; or, metaphor apart, to restore the conditions obtaining before 1833.

Against all this the other side urged that in substance and effect the prerogative, *quoad* Imperial appeals, had by the Judicial Committee Acts been bodily taken out of the Crown and transferred to the Judicial Committee; which, whatever formal terminology had been used, or whatever formal procedure prescribed by the Acts, was in reality nothing more nor less than a new Court of Law. From 1833 on, therefore, the prerogative appeal was not merely 'regulated' by the Acts; it derived its whole vigour, its existence indeed, from them. Thenceforward it was purely a creature of Imperial Statute Law, and any Legislature having the capacity to override the statutes in question could

abolish the appeal. As from the passage of the Statute of Westminster the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada was such a Legislature; and its re-enactment of the provisions ousting the prerogative appeal in criminal cases was accordingly effective and valid. This was the view accepted and acted on by the Judicial Committee in the Canadian decision.

That that decision is consonant with Imperial policy, expediency and sentiment, goes without saying. If it had gone the other way, remedial legislation might well have been needed. Further, it is in full harmony with the general intention of the Statute of Westminster as understood by the man in the street. So understood, that intention is to confer on the Dominions the legal status of independent nations, subject only to their common allegiance to the Imperial Crown. The judgment delivered by Lord Sankey on behalf of the Board exhibits a robust adhesion to the common-sense view, and a judicious intolerance of the niceties of 'legal theory.' And legal theory is, in truth, an 'unruly horse.' In legal theory (at least, as interpreted by one authoritative school) the Imperial Parliament, being absolutely sovereign, could undo whatever it has done—repeal any statute it has enacted.³ Parliament, then, could repeal the Statute of Westminster, in part or in whole, to-morrow; and Courts of Law, if no one else, would be bound to uphold and enforce the logical consequences of its repeal. Things would, in the improbable circumstances assumed, then presumably revert to the *status quo* before the statute—subject, possibly, to the baffling legal complication that the repeal of Statute A (Westminster), which itself repeals Statute B (Colonial Laws Validity Act), does not (by reason of the Interpretation Act, 1889) revive Statute B. The decision of the Privy Council has spared lawyers a lot of juridical contortionism by bluffly brushing aside the technical and the unreal. Unreal, in a practical sense, some of these legalities unquestionably are, in the sense that elementary statesmanship must prevent their emergence. The repeal of the Statute of Westminster might well be the signal for the disintegration of the Empire; just as the repeal of the statute which abandoned our sovereignty over the American Colonies would be the signal

³ It is fair to say that there are in this matter two schools.

for Homeric laughter rolling across the Atlantic. The fact, however, that these things would be the actual consequences of taking a particular view of the law is no legally compelling ground for assuming that that view of the law is wrong.

The same rejection of technicality and formality appears in the Committee's treatment of the argument (referred to above) that the Judicial Committee Acts are merely 'regulative' statutes. By the strict rules of the legal game, to which legal tribunals, if no one else, are bound to defer, this argument would seem presentable, if not respectable. Under the Statute of Westminster, unquestionably Dominion Acts can override Imperial Acts.⁴ But what is the effect of overriding these particular Imperial Acts? It cannot be greater than the effect of repealing them. What would be the effect of repealing the Judicial Committee Acts? What, in fact, do those Acts do? Is it patent that they merge the Royal power irrevocably in the Committee? Is it absurd to suppose that their language, which assumes the integrity and permanence of the Royal power, and appears to provide no more than an instrument for its more efficient exercise, is misleading? If an imposingly strong and distinguished Board had not held that it was precisely this, some doubts on this point would have seemed to the present writer not presumptuous to entertain. Reasonable or not, they are certainly not disposed of, as is assumed in some quarters, by the analogy of the case of *de Keyser's Hotel*, nor did the Committee ostensibly base its decision on that analogy. We may nevertheless be thankful, as good Imperialists, that the Committee has discovered a legal 'by-pass' to circumvent them.

Shortly before the statute, a point of no small importance in Imperial constitutional law is decided in one sense. Shortly after its enactment, and as a direct consequence thereof, the same point is decided in a diametrically opposite sense. There could be no more classic example of the working of this great Imperial treaty, nor any better calculated to invite attention to its character and significance.

The statute consummates a peculiarly British evolutionary

⁴ Just as, conversely, under a subsequent section of the Statute, no Imperial statute extending to a Dominion can be passed which does not declare that it is passed at the request and with the consent of the Dominion in question.

process in a peculiarly British manner. And first something as to its manner. Here is a solemn instrument, whose office it is to place the legal coping-stone on the greatest political structure the world has evolved. Some of the majesty of the occasion might well, by anyone but a Briton, have been expected to communicate itself to the form and expression of the document which at once effects and commemorates this consummation. How easily one can imagine the simple ringing tones in which, had it been framed by, say, the authors of the Declaration of Independence, it would have trumpeted to the world its central message—the independent nationhood which the Dominions had achieved in practice and would for the future enjoy in law! But when we peruse this great charter of emancipation, what do we find in fact? A preamble, indeed, not wholly jejune, describing its genesis; and then, as regards its main message, a provision that the Colonial Laws Validity Act shall no longer apply to Dominion legislation, followed by something about sections 735 and 736 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894! How drab, how elliptical, how ineloquent a conclusion: almost unintelligible, it may be, to anyone but the dry-as-dust pundits of British constitutional law. Yet this farrago embodies a settlement more durable and solid, if past experience is any guide, than the most finished monuments of foreign constitutional craftsmanship.

Not less typically British is the evolutionary process the consummation of which the statute crystallises in law. The *motif* of that process is the interplay of law and convention which is the key to so many of our institutions. The constitutional conventions are a bridge between incompatibles. As they reconcile the existence of a King still possessing vast autocratic legal powers with the substance of advanced democratic government, so they harmonise *imperium et libertas*—the fact of Imperial legal supremacy with the enjoyment of practical autonomy by some of the most important members of the body Imperial. In each case the story and the clue is one of legal powers unexercised—held in abeyance by rules of conduct unknown to the law, but jealously enforced in practice.

To be more specific. The grant of Dominion self-government, before the statute, was subject to overriding

legal control by the Imperial Executive, the Imperial Parliament, and the Imperial Judiciary. For :

- (1) Dominion Acts could be 'disallowed' by, or 'reserved' for the assent of, Whitehall.
- (2) Dominion Acts were invalid, by reason of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, if inconsistent with any Imperial statute.
- (3) Decisions of Dominion tribunals were subject to the prerogative appeal of the Judicial Committee.

Such were the paramount powers vested by the law in the various governmental organs of the Mother Country. Of every one of these powers the exercise was, for the most part, 'wisely forborne.' Why? Because the conventions, which are the tribute our public law pays to public opinion and policy, so ordained.

For instance, as to (1), the last exercise of the power of disallowance in the case of New Zealand legislation was in 1867, of Canadian in 1873; and in relation to Australian and South African Acts it has never been exercised at all.

As to (2), the overriding power of the Imperial Parliament to legislate for the Dominions (and Empire as a whole) has been exerted with severe and growing parsimony. Parliament in general has tended to restrict its interference to matters—such as merchant shipping and copyright—in which uniformity of practice throughout the Empire was of paramount importance. When any Dominion which was legally incompetent to amend its Constitution (*e.g.*, Canada) desired to do so, Parliament, in obedience to convention, would always legislate to meet its wishes. In the later stages of Imperial development convention began to freeze into law, or take effect in legal forms. Parliament deliberately embodied in the Constituent Acts of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Union of South Africa power to amend their Constitutions.

As to (3), even in the sphere of the prerogative appeal the same willingness to temper the exercise of legal right to the sentiment of the Dominion affected is apparent. Australia and South Africa were granted, by their Constitutions, powers which have in practice reduced to a shadow appeals from them to the Judicial Committee.

Convention, in our polity, is the electric hare, law the

greyhound that pants after it in vain. At long intervals the hound sprints and shortens the hare's lead. These occasions are marked in part by the enactment of the great 'constitutional treaties,' Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, the Act of Settlement, the Parliament Act. Outraged custom here avenges itself, or approved custom fulfils itself, by assuming the hard lineaments of Statute Law. In the case of the Statute of Westminster—the latest in time and the most majestic in scope of these great treaties—the legal hound has made up almost the whole distance between himself and the conventional hare, and has almost registered a 'kill.' Almost alone among our statutes it refers expressly to 'constitutional practice' and openly avows the intention of enacting it as law.

The war, the Imperial War Cabinet, even the adherence of the Dominions as separate signatories to the Treaty of Versailles and separate members of the League of Nations, left the *legal* status of the Dominions more or less where it was: somewhere far short of independence. Nor, rightly viewed, did the famous Balfour Declaration of 1926 assert anything to the contrary. It proclaimed, indeed, that the United Kingdom and the Dominions are

autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Sonorous words, and true of the 'conventional' or 'constitutional' status of the Dominions, to which they were by the context limited; completely untrue as a statement of their position in law, seeing that one member of the commonwealth—the United Kingdom—could legislate so as to bind all the others, and none of the others could legislate so as to bind the United Kingdom or to derogate from its statutes. The Statute of Westminster was designed to assimilate the legal position to the conventional one; and this, very broadly speaking, it has done. Many indeed are the ragged ends, the qualifications, reservations and suspensions, the special provisions affecting this Dominion and not that. The Dominions can legislate against most Imperial statutes, but some of them cannot amend their Constituent

Acts. The most important sections of the Statute are not to bind Australia, New Zealand or Newfoundland, unless and until adopted by those Dominions. The Imperial Parliament can itself legislate for any Dominion by statutes which declare that that Dominion has requested and consented to such legislation. The Imperial rights of disallowance and reservation—so far as they had endured until 1931—are nowhere in the Act curtailed or, indeed, mentioned. Convention here survives. And the notional right of the Imperial Legislature to amend or repeal the Statute of Westminster itself lurks in the background. A thing of shreds and patches, this Statute, a mass of *disjecta membra*, wanting altogether in clean-cut outline and uniformity of application; yet it is in a legal sense a supremely important charter of Imperial liberty, the first-fruits of which are patent in the decisions of the Judicial Committee which are the immediate subject-matter of this article.

CYRIL ASQUITH.

THE NATIONALISATION OF CREDIT

By SIR GEOFFREY ELLIS, Bt., M.P.

Now that home politics have become submerged in elementary economics, the word 'credit' is so loosely bandied about in speech and propaganda that it has ceased to hold any exactness of meaning. For practical purposes the questions may be put: What is covered by the term 'Nationalisation of Credit'? And what really do our Socialists propose to nationalise? The machinery of credit is to-day in the hands of the Treasury, the Bank of England, and the joint-stock banking system. Operating with, but subservient to, this loosely-tied trinity of power are the issue houses and the discount market.

On the whole, capitalist though it be, and therefore heretical to all good Socialists, this machinery has worked well. Our own people trust it, European capital admires and freely uses it, and America openly envies it.

The Socialists approach credit nationalisation through this system, and their party hopes by gaining control of all the levers that move it to usher in their new heaven on earth. The skeleton machinery, admittedly efficient and smooth-working, need not be altered. Operation will be by a 'Board' responsible to a special Cabinet Minister. The existing managers, provided they are Socialist-minded, will become civil servants; and in due course will be allotted the honours and pensions which follow so desirable a status. The personnel, since competition is considered unnecessary and anti-social, will suffer drastic cutting down.

Before considering the changes of method and policy proposed by the Socialists it will be worth while, since there is so much nonsense now being talked about the genesis and disposal of credit, to state very shortly what in fact obtains. The Treasury exercises a definite and co-ordinated control over new Trustee issues of capital. No actual law governs

this control, but it works by consent through the Bank of England and is accepted by the issue houses ; and, since these are dependent on the banking system for temporary credit, the conventions laid down are generally observed.¹ The actual issue of currency notes is controlled by statutory authority and any increase or diminution in the volume of the issue depends on the recommendation of the Bank of England in consultation with the Treasury, with due report to Parliament. In the end the expansion or contraction of the note issue rests with Parliament. Any profit derived from currency issues belongs to the Treasury, and is not, as Socialist speakers so often affirm, swallowed by the 'privately-owned' Bank of England. The temporary needs of the Government are met by the regular issue of Treasury bills, which, running for a period of three months, are competitively tendered for by the London money market. In this market credit is freely obtainable from the banks or private lenders on the security of these bills, British Government and India stock, and other first-class securities. The credit so obtained is usually for short periods of time, and, among other uses, makes possible the discounting of bank and trade bills, and so provides industry with a part of its liquid resources as and when most required. The banking system, mainly composed of the five great joint-stock banks, but also including a few provincial systems and one large private bank, is by no means the money monopoly Socialist speakers condemn. Its units, by branches throughout the country, remain strongly competitive, the fault rather being that in some areas the country is definitely over-banked. In London there are a number of finance houses which freely lend on security to industrial borrowers ; they also discount industrial bills and sometimes nurse a difficult patient through financial convalescence to a public issue. The many branches of foreign and Colonial banks in London are really outside our deposit banking system, but they are free lenders to desirable importers here as well as in their countries of origin. Under Socialist control they would disappear ; and probably, in retaliation, so would British banks in foreign countries.

The ordinary bank serves a double purpose ; and in all

¹ For recent explanations of the rule see the *Economist* of June 15, pp. 1370, 1373, 1381.

dealings must never forget this duality. The resources of the banking system come from its depositors, the sum total of whose credits are on the average about sixteen times the capital and reserves belonging to the shareholders of the banks. As part security for this mass of deposits the shareholders of the banks have a large uncalled liability on their partly-paid shares, which constitute the larger part of the capital. Long experience has taught the system that about 10 per cent. of its resources must always be kept liquid in the form of currency or at call with the Bank of England, through whom, by the accounts they keep there, all the banks settle their final differences. Nearly another 40 per cent. of the resources must be kept in short-term securities and easily realisable first-class investments. The rest it is safe in normal times to lend to borrowers. Yet the Bank can never forget that the great majority of its depositors have the power to demand repayment of their money at call. It is true that in normal times payments in and out tend to balance, and that as trade improves deposits increase, but the banker's red light is always a possible fear on the part of his depositors that when times are out of joint, trade diminishing and politicians spending wildly, the word will go round that 'our money is not safe.' Once that loss of confidence happens, any system is in danger, and the danger is very present until confidence returns. Could two better examples be found than the runs on American banks before the New Deal era, with all their consequential closings, and the recent rush of the French to exchange currency for gold? Since the banker's power to lend depends on his depositors' confidence the demands of borrowers must be carefully scrutinised. Banks must be satisfied first that a borrower can and will repay his loan on the due date, unless extension be justified, and that the customer is engaged in some established trade and can find a market for his goods at a profit. It is, of course, not unusual for banks to venture loans in new trades and industries, but not unless there is already adequate capital in the undertaking for its major purposes. Certainly it is not the business of a bank to venture its depositors' money in capital loans to industry which may become frozen and incapable of realisation. That banks frequently are left with bad debts is due to their desire to meet their customers in every way possible,

and is in itself a proof that the average bank manager is not simply a pawnbroker always demanding 100 per cent. security. Losses, however, do occur, and make a large hole in the fabulous profits ascribed to banks by Socialist agitators. There must always be an inevitable pull between the desire for profit and an instinct for safety. It would be correct to-day to say that it is the borrower who is shy. The banker is only too willing to lend, since lending is his trade and his main source of profit in a world of slow recovery where profits are hard to come by. It is also his business, and his definite interest, to foster and to encourage legitimate trade in every possible way.

Disappointed borrowers are frequently vocal in their condemnation of a system which 'refuses to help trade,' but they cannot complain with reason if, after visiting all the banks in turn, their story is still found unconvincing. Local branch managers are keenly competitive, and if one and all refuse business there must be some unanimity of opinion without undue caution. Finally, the banks, for the most part without payment, render their customers an immense number of small services by winnowing through their machinery a great deal which otherwise the customer himself—or more often herself—would have to do personally at the expense of time, trouble, and the risk of meeting dishonesty. The complexity of many of these services the customer never realises and cheerfully accepts as his due, often without question or thanks.

But the greatest crime alleged against the banking system is that it creates credit at will and grows fat on the proceeds. The story usually begins with the tag 'Every loan creates a credit.' Then the statement runs: 'Since a banker needs only 10 per cent. of his resources in cash and at call he has 90 per cent. of what he has created as profit-earning.' It is forgotten, first, that although a banker is nowadays willing to lend to credit-worthy borrowers, these will not come to him unless the state of trade warrants their venturing. Both in this country, where the banker is eager to lend, and in America, in spite of the pumping into the system of unlimited credit, the borrowing public fails to respond. Why? Because the money cannot profitably be used. In periods of trade stagnation it is clear that credit, even if capable of creation,

will not be freely used. In times of better trade borrowers' demands increase and are met by the banks up to the safe limit of their own resources. Any attempt to create credit indefinitely would at once bring a check from the Bank of England working on the money market. Moreover, any extension of credit automatically increases the speed of currency circulation, and with this increase comes a growing demand for more currency. Notes can be issued only against gold and the securities of the fiduciary cover; and such extension as the volume of the issue may require is in the end at the will and in the wisdom of Parliament. The Bank of England, too, would naturally examine with increasing caution all industrial bills it might be asked by the banks to rediscount, and in that way can apply some check to excessive lending. So summarised a statement as that given is of course subject to detailed exceptions, but the principle remains that it is impossible for the banks at their pleasure to create credit and so hold an extended position with safety. The checks of the Treasury, the Bank of England and their own inherent experience are in times of expansion salutary and effective. With the exponents of social credit, national dividend, and other forms of controlled and uncontrolled inflation we need not be concerned. The world is strewn with their wreckage; and, in any event, if capital depreciation is to be suffered by a nation, the means adopted should be by taxation so clearly defined and so understandable in its incidence that no one ought to be deceived. If wealth is over-estimated or capital values have shrunk, a definite revaluation by a nation is as logical and necessary as for an individual. The refusal on the part of some nations to face these awkward facts is one of the prime factors in preventing the recovery of international trade.

So far we have been concerned only with the day-to-day deposits and lendings of the banks, and in general terms. The basis of banking procedure is definitely the seeking of a reasonable profit for shareholders under almost 'crystallised' rules of caution. The Socialists intend radically to alter that basis. Any profit basis, they assert, is wrong in principle; and in future, if they obtain effective control, loans will be made only to those whose undertakings are not 'anti-social.' Although such a catch-word is difficult to define when

standing alone, yet in its Socialist context it becomes quite clear. The banking system under Socialism would lend only to those who approved of Socialist industrial and financial policy, as interpreted by the Government of the day. This means, even under the 'gradualists,' the eventual elimination of all private, and therefore of all profit-earning, undertakings, with a steady crystallisation into public utility control of industry served by co-operative distribution. Agriculture, being essentially individualist, would no doubt be left alone; except that maximum prices and free imports of food would probably in the end drive both farmer and labourer off the land, and evoke the need, as in Russia, for collectivist farming, with perhaps as little success.

In the meantime, what of the deposit money sought to be used for these 'social' loans? It is, of course, anti-social to charge any borrower, especially if a Government pet, high interest; therefore, the whole tendency would be to reduce rates of interest to borrowers, and consequently, of necessity, to depositors. In the circumstances, would deposits remain? Would not the savers of the nation prefer something more tangible? Perhaps land worked by themselves for food, or the accumulation of goods for use and exchange. Such might be the ultimate results. Immediate effects, even under the apostles of 'gradualism,' might well be sudden and dangerous to the financial safety of the State. When the depositor goes for his money he expects that its purchasing power will be practically what it was when the deposit was made. But one of the easiest methods of distributing wealth is by currency depreciation, and therefore the Socialist creed favours that method. Would the depositor continue to deposit with steadily-falling currency values clearly apparent? The whole inclination would surely run in the direction of accumulating goods, since this tangible property would tend to appreciate in value just in proportion as currency depreciated.

The commonest form of deception practised by Socialist speakers is to assert that the great bulk of credit in the banking system belongs to the rich, either individually or through the great industrial companies. This is not borne out by facts; but before examining details it will be as well to get a true picture of the relation of the banking system, with its day-to-

day working, to the capital of industry. In the main the fixed capital of industry is the result of past savings by individual savers and the accumulation of the undivided reserves of industry. Some proportion of capital will be borrowed over short periods from the banking system, but its repayment will be expected as other funds come in. According to its nature, and the processes of converting raw material into finished goods, the average industrial concern tends to be in banking credit at certain periods and in debit at others. Obviously all industries do not choose the same times for these variations, and consequently, on the average, credit in one concern often occurs when debit rules in the other, and in this way a sound level is preserved.

It is rather from the personal side of life that there comes the constant credit, the deposit at interest, the savings awaiting investment—the comfortable margin which can be drawn on at any time. This is the main source from which trade and industry derive the liquid resources which enable the system to use its machinery and to deal with the products whose creation fixed capital has rendered possible. Precisely, therefore, it is the regular inflow of this personal money which is so essential to keep the wheels revolving. Since these deposits are the foundation for banking loans, any check on their regular flow inwards must seriously affect the passage of loans outwards.

The business done by the five great banks varies little in character; and therefore the details of one may be held to reflect the course of the whole system. Recently one of the 'Five' examined its deposits and classified them in percentages.² The results are contrary to general belief and flatly against Socialist statements.

Roughly 62 per cent. were personal and professional; 25.6 per cent. belonged to trade, industry, and agriculture. Banking, insurance, trust companies, and all foreign balances accounted for 9 per cent.; while Government and public authorities took the remainder.² These deposits can hardly be termed the credit of the nation when the major part is built up of savings due to the thrift and self-denial of only

² Annual report speech of the chairman of Lloyds Bank, *The Times*, January 26, 1935.

a fraction of the people. Yet it is this credit which Socialism so strongly desires to manipulate.

The deposits reviewed accrue from day to day, and, so far as the individual saver is concerned, the greater part find their way directly or indirectly into permanent investments, either by individual purchase, or through the medium of the various institutions which are used by savers for thrift purposes.

Efforts have been made by some town councils to obtain statutory authority to establish municipal banks, the success of Birmingham being cited as a precedent. These banks are to be for deposit only, and will carry no commercial business. When the Birmingham bank was started there were few deposit collection societies in the district, and thus the city was able to collect easily. The bank is really the city, which accepts deposits at call or on notice and lends for building, using the balance for its day-to-day purposes. Security rests on the city's rates. If anything happened to the city's credit either the Government or the banking system would have to give support. Similar banks throughout the country would mean the establishment of that small-bank system which has proved so dangerous in the United States. It is the absorption of units into a universally-spread system which has done so much for the safety of British banking. Are we once again to invite the old risks?

Since Socialist propaganda strongly denies that the small man holds any real weight of the national capital, it is worth while tracing how it has become possible for him to add materially to his savings, and then to follow the investment of these savings. The small man has far fewer obligations to meet now than he had to face a generation ago. He bears, both directly and indirectly, a minor share of the burden of taxation. According to the Budget estimates of the current year (in round figures), £288,000,000 will be derived from income tax and sur-tax, which, with £80,000,000 of death duties, gives £368,000,000 of personal taxation coming from the pockets, in the main, of a small minority of taxpayers. Customs and Excise, it is calculated, will produce £296,000,000. Since the increase in our home market sales and the restriction of imports by tariff control, fewer people are buying foreign goods. By this much they escape a

considerable measure of taxation, and as prices generally are no higher, there is so much the more to spend and to save. Teetotallers and non-smokers are heavy gainers, since a large measure of taxation is derived from alcohol and tobacco. On the ordinary spending side of life for people of smaller means there has been gradual but growing relief. Elementary education is free, and there is generous provision of scholarships for secondary, technical, and university education. Even in the elementary schools necessitous children are provided with free meals, and milk is obtainable at very small cost and freely consumed. The greatest measure of assistance is rendered under the various Acts dealing with health insurance, child and maternity welfare, and pensions of all kinds. In addition we have unemployment insurance, and where needed a more generous meed of public assistance for the necessitous and partly necessitous. The hospitals, both great and small, public and voluntary, provide the best medical and surgical attention known to the world. It is free to those who cannot pay. A generation ago the equivalent of all these social services, excepting Poor Law assistance, was met by the people themselves. To-day these services and the better wage rates prevailing have liberated immense sums of money which are being increasingly saved, and this in spite of more free spending by the great bulk of the people. In addition, our family habit of staying at home, even long after adolescence is reached, helps, by spreading the burden of housekeeping, in the same direction. These savings now form a great and steadily-growing measure of the credit, not of the nation, but of those who have made the savings. Moreover, this credit belongs, not to the nation, but to the people who have saved it. Any proposals, therefore, for leaving it at the whim of passing Governments must be of vital interest to the savers.

Who are these savers? Where are their savings? They are of every type and come from every class, but the great bulk are weekly wage-earners depending for their employment on the success of industry, which is measured in the long run by its ability to make profits. Moreover, it is frequently forgotten that the reserves of industry, its undistributed profits, have always suffered current income tax.

The channels of investment are as varied as the sources

from which they derive. First come the depositors in the banks, often beginning when they are young with home deposit safes or the pennies collected at school branches to inculcate the habit of thrift. Although a few people may, out of necessity, from time to time draw on their deposits, as a rule the majority regard their savings as a basis on which month by month an insurance can be built against some future need, such as illness, unemployment, retirement or old age. These deposits form part of the 'idle money' of Socialism. On examination of all their deposits by one of the 'Great Five' the average holding appears at £170. This alone shows how large must be the number of small depositors. The same bank has 70,000 shareholders, the average holding of its fully-paid shares being 34.

In the Post Office Savings Bank the latest figures show close on £306,000,000 of deposits with £195,000,000 of Government holdings derived from past savings. Similarly the Trustee Savings Banks, with £196,000,000, do much the same kind of business, and exist entirely for small savers. In addition, Railway Savings Banks alone have £21,500,000 of depositors' capital.

Next, but to-day paramount, come the Building Societies, whose growth of recent years has been phenomenal. These cater for both depositors and borrowers; and are in effect house-building banks with time limits for both classes of customer. It is true that among the deposits may be found a number of large holdings, but these are now being limited. The majority of depositors are undoubtedly small people with individually small deposits. Most borrowers, too, are small people. Building society share capital amounts to £381,000,000 and the borrowers' interest in houses mortgaged to £388,000,000.

Industrial and Provident Societies and Industrial Life Assurance and Collecting Societies, whose customers are pre-eminently weekly wage-earners, have a total collection of £583,000,000 in value.

Friendly Societies have £124,000,000 of wage-earned money, and those approved under the National Health Insurance Acts another £60,000,000. As to National Savings Certificates, taken now by all classes, it is calculated that the small investors' proportion amounts to £244,000,000. In Ordinary Life Assurance funds the small investors' proportion is calculated to have reached the huge total of £476,000,000. Finally, there are the pension funds of industrial concerns and public utilities, to the majority of which employees are part contributors. These are trust funds, and usually invested outside the business concerned. Their capital belongs exclusively to and is at the sole disposition of the members of the funds. There is no official return of these funds, but the total is known to be large and rapidly increasing.

The round total of these savings, on the then available returns,

reached £2,973,000,000. To-day the total must be well over £3,000,000,000; and the rate of growth remains steadily progressive.³ Is it seriously questioned that this capital sum does not belong to those who have saved it, and that it should not be at their disposition through the investment machinery which they have been instrumental in erecting and which they trust on well-tryed results?

Much of this capital is invested in Government securities, a large measure in houses and other buildings on mortgage, in corporation stocks, and more than is sometimes appreciated in the producing units of industry. Some insurance societies are steadily acquiring, out of their premium income, the debentures, preference and ordinary shares of leading industrial companies.

Lastly, the Co-operative Societies, which the Socialist Party so earnestly desires to capture for propaganda and financial purposes, have an immense and steadily-growing mass of capital, much of which is sunk in productive industry.

Let us now pass to the finance of industry. Socialists would have us believe that modern industrial units are mainly the property of millionaires or rich people. This is untrue. While, happily, there are still a considerable number of personal and family businesses in good fettle, the usual producing unit or great departmental store is a limited liability company whose shares are widely held. Particularly since the fall in the rate of interest in gilt-edge stocks have these industrial investments been sought. A glance through the share register of any well-known enterprise, local or national, will disclose thousands of small holdings. These belong frequently to people with no other savings. Banks, since they introduced the fully-paid share, have been specially favoured, while railway stock, in spite of all the buffeting suffered, is still widely acquired in small parcels. Many a weekly wage-earner owns a few shares in the company for which he works, especially where he knows the management is sound and efficient. Many companies have special provisions whereby employees can acquire shares either freely or on co-partnership principles. In every part of the country may be found small people, under advice, taking up year by year small lots of local shares. Many men, too, outside the building society movement own their own houses free or subject to mortgages. Smaller houses are often procured on loan terms from a better-off neighbour.

³ These figures are well set out in detail by Sir Waldron Smithers, M.P., in a letter to *The Times* of April 12, 1935.

So the tally rises and can readily be counted by any observer in any part of the country, be he an honest inquirer. All this, it may be claimed, is fixed capital, and Socialists desire simply to control current day-to-day credit. But every industrial unit gathers money from day to day, and the essence of its finance is that deposits shall always be at call, and that in addition it will be granted such loans as may be needed if it be credit-worthy. The control of day-to-day credit in the banking system must be considered on the basis of daily needs just as much as on a long-term view. If the small man's savings are in the big concern—and this is self-evident if the details of investment be carefully examined—then, since he has less to lose, he is as vitally interested as the richer man with the few big holdings. The ability to pay the eventual risks for which insurance stands depends entirely on preserving the value of investments paid for by accumulated premiums; and therefore the security of the policy depends on the success of industry as well as on the credit of the nation whose Government stock is so large a part of an insurance company's investments.

The last General Election definitely indicated the nervousness of the saver. Clearly he objected strongly to the ineptitude of a Socialist Government which refused to meet the hard facts of economic trouble by the restoration of national credit, and showed his objection by what may reasonably be called an 'anti-vote.' The next election may well turn on the right of the saver to his own savings and the immunity from political interference of the investments into which those savings have been incorporated.

The Socialist demand that the Bank of England shall be placed under the Government of the day to play with currency and credit as it pleases clearly indicates that the 'new deal' will be worked entirely on the basis of political expediency. No other nation vitally interested in international commerce and industry allows its Central Bank to become the plaything of politics. Even Labour Australia has failed to convince a majority of the electors that the safeguards of delay together with an intervening General Election are unnecessary. Moreover, the New Deal in the United States cannot be prayed in aid as a step along the path of progress, since the riddle of the Supreme Court has so far upset all calculations.

Nor is there any real comparison between American conditions and our own. Our banking system is rooted in a competitive branch basis covering the country, and therefore extremely flexible in the provision of credit. The American system is made up of innumerable units, many of which are unconnected with the Federal Banks, and, when the pinch comes, frequently prove short of the liquid resources so essential to keep open their doors. Had the United States possessed a banking system on British lines half her financial troubles might have been averted.

It is pertinent to ask what can Socialism do with the Bank of England which will in any way better the close connexion now existing between the Treasury and the Bank and the methods from time to time employed to control the credit position. We shall certainly never revert to the old aloofness, since that would be impossible in face of the daily need to deal with foreign exchange for the benefit of trade and industry, and the long-term view, which is so essential to establish and keep in being a definite money policy, with all its consequential reactions on the price level.

No credit position can be properly considered without relation to the methods employed for issuing capital and the working of our code of company law. In a limited measure these methods are not answering too well, and the problems of extended control over new issues of capital and some amendment of company law which will deal with the anomalies of 'introductions' and 'holding' companies are due for searching examination. The remedy may be found on a voluntary basis by the City itself; but if not, then *force majeure* is inevitable, and if invoked may well stretch beyond limits at present little contemplated.

So far, we can say with certainty, our credit system has worked well; and, while from time to time alterations may be necessary to meet changing national and international conditions, it still retains the confidence of our own people and of other nations. What reason is there in risking the loss of that confidence by throwing political grit into the wheels of the machine?

GEOFFREY ELLIS.

BELGIUM IN JUNE

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

LAST month, under the title 'Germany in May,' an attempt was made in this Review to assess the present tendencies of German policy in relation to other European Powers, and the opinion was expressed that France had overplayed her hand and had already lost the hegemony of Europe, which was now within reach of Germany. This essay, written in Brussels after a week spent in various parts of Belgium, is an attempt to present current events as they present themselves to an Englishman in the light of conversations with men of all classes, including several statesmen of the highest repute.

Belgium must always be of special interest to Englishmen. The Government, like ours, is a constitutional monarchy which has not only survived the stresses of war and economic strain but has emerged stronger than at any previous period in her annals. All Belgium bears witness to-day that a Latin race, though with a strong admixture of more phlegmatic blood, need not, in the twentieth century, be controlled by dictators, or suffer a change of policy at the turn of every season, but can maintain constitutional freedom under a hereditary monarch. The circumstances in which the present King came to the throne less than two years ago are fresh in our minds, as also the chain of events that brought Belgian independence to the surface as the first and best reason why Great Britain should play a man's part in the conflict which began in 1914, and has not yet finished. The Belgian people are the custodians of our war graves, mute witness to heroic episodes in the annals of both nations. Belgium is one of the four great colonial Powers: her population is predominantly industrial; her manufactures compete with ours in many markets, including our own. A few months ago she

took the plunge off gold sooner than her neighbours, with complete success. She is a neighbour of Germany, a territorial beneficiary of the Treaty of Versailles; yet she exhibits little nervousness in presence of the new Germany and no tendency whatever to follow the lead of the Third Reich. Her feet are more firmly set than before in the old ways. Her greatest problem is the linguistic problem, a sort of romantic nationalism, a spiritual irredentism that cuts strangely across social and territorial frontiers. Clearly Belgium is a country to see and to study.

Not for many years has a visit been so well worth making, for the International Exhibition at Brussels is in full swing, and a glorious sight it is, most pleasing to our self-esteem, for the British pavilion, erected by the Exhibitions Section of the Department of Overseas Trade, is by common consent an achievement which lends distinction to the whole. Of this side of life in Belgium some description will be found elsewhere in this issue, under the title 'Walks and Talks.'¹

France owes everything to Belgium; Belgium owes nothing to France. Had the Belgian troops not stood their ground so gloriously in 1914, there would perhaps have been no 'great' war, and perhaps, but for England, there would have been no Belgium. The end would have come swiftly. It is in the interests of France that Belgium has spent such great sums on fortifying her eastern boundary, whilst the German-Dutch frontier is as yet almost undefended and the Franco-Belgian frontier, an essential second line, relatively weak. The aim of French policy seems to be to bring Belgium, and every other small Power, into any future Franco-German quarrel, whereas the true interest of these small Powers lies in maintaining, if need be by force of arms, a real neutrality. Nor is this policy impossible. The Scandinavian Powers proved it in 1914: it should be extended to the Baltic States.

Yet French policy in Belgium is to-day, in practice, far from helpful. Alsace-Lorraine, in German hands, was the natural hinterland of Antwerp: it is so no longer, for the French have diverted the trade to Dunkirk. So far from being generous in her commercial or political relations with Belgium, France has manipulated railway rates and much else to the disadvantage of Belgian trade with Italy and other countries.

¹ See p. 114.

When England went off gold in 1931, Belgian statesmen were persuaded, against their better judgment, to remain on gold, as part of the '*bloc-or*,' instead of joining the sterling group. The result has been disastrous for Belgian trade. When M. Delacroix and Herr Hjalmar Schacht were on the point of concluding a comprehensive settlement of outstanding questions in 1926, France stepped in to prevent any modification, even by agreement, of the Treaty of Versailles. To-day the best elements in Belgium would fain lean on and be guided by England alone, provided only that England is strong enough to guarantee her frontiers.

Yet French administrative policy, inspired by an unenlightened selfishness, embarrasses Belgian administrations at every point. It is generally believed that all the principal Belgian newspapers in the French language are controlled from Paris; the name of the Comité des Forges is freely mentioned in this connexion. Belgian interests are injured and, in the words of a leading citizen, 'News is habitually poisoned at its source.' 'But,' I protested, *à l'anglaise*, 'the Russian, Italian and German newspapers, to mention only three countries, are equally under control.' 'In those countries,' replied my friend, 'control is exercised from within, by the Government of the nation and in the sincere belief that the interests of the nation are best served thus. . . . The control of which I speak is exercised from without, by financial or political interests which are not those of the nation. If there must be control, let it be that of the State. Yet,' he added, 'I who speak thus believe in freedom, and we practise it. Twenty years ago I would have given no German quarter. But they and we have survived, and we must live together.'

Belgium has a vast territory to administer in the Congo; but under the Congo Basin Treaties she is unable to accord to her nationals any preferential treatment—a condition reasonable enough when the treaties were concluded, but to-day contrary to the interest of the inhabitants and of Belgium, for nowhere is trade free, everywhere it is in chains, and other nations cannot be compelled to accept exports from the Congo. Belgium can never be economically self-sufficient; her prospects lie rather in the direction of free trade. She cannot indefinitely exist otherwise, unless within a customs union with France, or Germany, or Great Britain.

The tide of resentment against French policy in responsible quarters is beginning to rise. This is not to say that the Belgian people will forget, sooner than France, what they have suffered at German hands. To the French Germany had been a rival for nearly a century; but to Belgium Germany was a friendly Power, co-guarantor of her liberties. The invasion of 1914 was an act of treason by a friend, and the Belgian people have long memories: more than most European nations, they live in the past. Their Press does little to help them to keep step with the rest of the world. The present Duke of Alba would not be entirely welcome to-day in Belgium, though it is 400 years since the Low Countries suffered at his ancestors' hands. A century will elapse before the memories of the Occupation grow dim. Yet a generation is rising which is anxious to forget, and, though old wounds throb and bleed again, there are in authority in politics, and in commerce and industry, a few men who, though they risked all and suffered much during the war, wish to follow England's lead and to seek the road to recovery through an understanding with the nation of 70,000,000 souls at their door.

The Prince of Wales' speech to the British Legion in June was received in the Belgian Press with a certain reserve. Belgians cannot 'forget all about that,' but more far-sighted men were well content. At such moments there are bound to be misgivings in many breasts. But the alternatives are at last clear. 'We must,' said one great man to me, 'either accept Hitler's declaration at its face value with confidence in ourselves and our defences, or slip back into the morass—our feet in the mud of depression, our heads in a miasma of words, assurances, pacts in which no one really believes. I believe that Hitler means what he says; I know that he represents Germany, and am assured that he can execute his policy.' I met no one who had any belief in the policy of 'collective security': they were convinced that no nation in Europe could or would come to the assistance of another unless its own immediate interests were at stake, so great is the revulsion against another war for the maintenance of peace. The phrase meant nothing to them. The Belgians believe that enlightened self-interest binds Great Britain now, as in 1914, to preserve Belgium from becoming a battlefield again. They believe we recognise this

liability, and are anxious only that we should be sufficiently strong.

I spent some time in the Eupen and Malmédy districts which, with a population of 60,000, were transferred to Belgium by the Treaty of Versailles. The vast majority were German-speaking Catholics: the circumstances of the transfer were a travesty of the principles proclaimed by the authors of the Treaty; the methods adopted were discreditable to all concerned. The inhabitants have been treated by Belgium with a liberality accorded to no other minority in Europe. They have reciprocated by behaving as orderly citizens should. But on a free vote the decision would be as in the Saar. This is not the outcome of pressure or dictation from within Germany, but rather the consequence of the renaissance of *Deutschtum*, which makes the *Auslandsdeutsche*, or men and women of Germany resident abroad, race-conscious and race-proud. It is as much a fact to be reckoned with as armaments or finance, aeroplanes or big guns. Hitler has unconditionally recognised the Treaty of Locarno, which guarantees this boundary, but we should do well to accept the possibility that at some future time something like the old frontier may be restored as part of a comprehensive settlement.

The present frontier is twice as long in this region as the old: it is not, in a military sense, defensible and, as every inhabitant of Eupen, Malmédy and Saint Vith knows, lies far beyond the line of forts and military defences. This minority problem is, after all, a matter of minor importance—a domestic rather than an international issue; yet it is worth remembering as a partial answer to those who proclaim with Lord Cecil that the boundaries fixed at Versailles are, on the whole, the best possible, and not to be modified without grave danger.

The psychological factor is of first importance. The garrison of Senegalese troops in the Ministry of Marine in Paris, during the disturbances of a few months ago, the Moroccan troops on the French frontier, are looked on as a portent by many Belgians. They are first and foremost Europeans, and they look with distaste on the spectacle thus presented. It reminds them of the last days of the Roman Empire. If this is collective security, they feel safer and happier without it.

Second only in importance is the economic issue. Mr. W. H. Dawson has shown that the competition of Polish coal from which Durham has suffered so heavily is largely a consequence of frontiers drawn at Versailles with complete disregard of economic conditions. Belgium has suffered severely from the changes of frontier. Her trade and her prosperity, and in a less degree those of Holland, depend upon the future less of France than of Germany. But the first instinct of her statesmen is to seek a lead from Great Britain. As I conclude this article Ruskin's words in 1870, which so inspired Cecil Rhodes, come back to me as indicating the part this country may to-day play in Europe.

There is a destiny now set before us, the greatest ever set before a nation to be accepted or refused. We are still undegenerate in race, a race mingled of the best northern blood. We still have the firmness to govern, and the grace to obey.

Will you, youths of England, make your country again a temple of peace—still worshipped among the nations in her strange valour of good will towards men? . . . Determine what you would have and what you would be. I care not how restricted your purpose, so that it be fixed and unselfish.

Fortiter age et confortetur cor tuum et sustine dominum. 'Be strong and of a good courage.' With these words began the First Lesson of the Jubilee Service, and with them let there here be an end.

ARNOLD WILSON.

ITALY AND AFRICA

By SIGNOR ALESSANDRO LESSONA (*Italian Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies*)

THE first months of this year gave birth to events of great importance for the colonial destinies of Italy. Some problems have been solved, while others have arisen.

The Franco-Italian agreements of January 7 have removed long outstanding differences regarding the North African colonies to Italy's satisfaction, while her conflict with Ethiopia has brought the question of Italian East Africa once more to the fore.

Sir Charles Petrie has already written about the Rome Agreements in the February number of this Review, and to him gratitude is due for his understanding view of our position. The importance and value of these Agreements is rather moral than territorial. It is in this spirit that Italy accepted them, and in this spirit they were signed by the hand of her Leader. They were designed to put an end to a long period of friction and disagreement between the two Mediterranean nations, and to inaugurate another of peaceful and fruitful collaboration.

In order to eliminate ill-feeling it was necessary to go back to its source, and it is not without significance that the treaty opens by the settlement of the question of Tunis.

It has been said that the Tunis episode was one of Bismarck's diplomatic masterpieces, and, though it would be too much to say that it alone drove Italy into the alliance with the Central Empires, nevertheless the occupation of the Bey's territories, and the manner in which it took place, did much to estrange France and Italy. Up to that time the memory of Napoleonic aid during the struggle for national independence, democratic and revolutionary sympathies, and a

common Latin descent constituted strong ties of reciprocal friendship, not without a protective tinge on the part of the more powerful nation.

Tunis lies at a distance of less than 100 miles from the southern coast of Sicily; its territory offers similar physical conditions, and suggests a common geological origin. Moreover, the Italian people, for whom the past is very much alive, have not forgotten Carthage and Rome. In 1881 Italian colonists, both artisans and tradesmen, had for thirty years or more been going over to Tunis as to a natural offshoot of their own country, and the news of the French occupation gave a shock which many can still remember. A territorial occupation on our part had scarcely been thought of before, but when the opportunity for it was definitely lost it was lastingly regretted. The awakening of a colonial conscience among the people in this connexion is all the more striking because our first occupations on the coast of the Red Sea had aroused little enthusiasm, and public opinion made no objection when the British offer to act together in Egypt was refused.

But emigration to Tunis continued, for in those years our population was multiplying far more rapidly than was the power of the national territory to support it, and in the absence of Italian dependencies great numbers left Italy for alien lands. In 1881 there were more than 10,000 Italians as against a few hundred French citizens in Tunis. Sixty years later the Italian population was about 100,000. The French themselves admit that the great prosperity of the regency was due to Italian labour, especially since the immigration of Sicilian farmers had developed.

Up to the occupation, the status of the Italians in Tunis was ruled by a treaty of 1868 based on the principle of capitulations. The Treaty of the Bardo, by which the Bey accepted the French protectorate in 1881, and a complementary Treaty of Marsa in 1884, sanctioned the privileges that the Italians had hitherto enjoyed, excepting for the Consular Courts of Justice which Italy gave up, recognising the jurisdiction of the French courts for her subjects. When the Treaty of 1868 expired France and Italy in 1896 concluded—after very difficult negotiations—three Conventions dealing with the status of Italians in Tunis. These Conventions were renewed

by consent of both sides till September 1918 when, shortly before the end of the war, the French Government denounced them. Since then they have been renewed for successive periods of three months. This was an exceedingly precarious situation for the Italians of Tunis, now a powerful body counting 130,000 souls, whose acquired rights and status were thus threatened.

The Rome Agreements of January 7 last put an end to this situation by renewing until 1965 the Convention of 1896, so that for another thirty years no change in nationality can be imposed upon the Italians of Tunis. The royal Italian schools will continue to hold their present privileges for another twenty years—up to 1955, when they will become Italian private schools, subject to the local French scholastic legislation, on the understanding that this will be in no way less liberal towards them than it is towards similarly-placed schools at the present time. Italians admitted to practise the liberal professions in Tunis before March 1945 will have the right to continue to do so during their lifetime.

On these conditions, liberally interpreted, time will settle many things, and many necessary adjustments will be possible. They represent, above all, the recognition of an unsatisfactory situation, which has kept ill-feeling alive for half a century, together with the desire to put an end to it. Other articles of the treaty go far to heal a more recent element of dissatisfaction on the part of Italy, caused by omission to apply Article XIII., regarding colonial compensations, in the London Agreement, by which Italy pledged herself to come into the war on the side of the Allies.

Whatever we may think of the negotiations conducted at that time in London and later in Paris, it is certain that the hope of colonial expansion influenced us, on entering the war, as did our aspiration to gain possession of our natural frontiers—the right that England had recognised in 1925 by the transfer of Jubaland. The southern frontiers in Libya were corrected by a transfer of territory in Tibesti, completing the adjustment between Italy and France in Mediterranean Africa, while the transfer of territory in French Somaliland and the agreement about the Djibuti railway have smoothed a thorny situation in East Africa.

Here again, as is finely stated in the general Declaration

which concludes the Treaty,¹ the moral aspect is of importance rather than the material.

French Somaliland, Djibuti in particular, had developed in antagonism to the Italian expansion in the Red Sea. It had been from the first a centre of hostile activities, where Italy's relations to Abyssinia were concerned; it was the route by which arms and ammunitions were furnished to Italy's enemies. We are confident that the Rome Agreements will mark the end of such anti-Italian activities and the beginning of a loyal work in common for civilisation in this part of the African continent.

Italy first appeared on the Red Sea in 1881, when the Government took over the Bay of Assab, which had been bought by the Rubattino Navigation Company from the native chiefs of Dankalia. The colony of Assab was organised under a civil commissioner by a law of July 5, 1882. Massawa was occupied in February 1885, and the colony of Erithrea was founded in 1891 by means of the union of all the Italian possessions between Ras Kasar and Bab el Mandeb. England was keen on the settlement of Italy, in preference to other Powers along the coast of the Red Sea. When the Egyptian forces arrayed against the Mahdi were forced to retire, it was well to have good friends in adjoining territories. This co-operation led, on the Italian side, to a difficult struggle against the followers of the Mahdi (battle of Agordat in 1892; occupation of Kassala in 1894, etc.).

The first colony of the Red Sea was not popular in Italy; even Crispi, who impersonated the national and expansionist sentiment, felt no enthusiasm for it, nor did he think that it could make up for the exclusion from North Africa or for chances missed in Egypt. Yet, principally through him, this

¹ Art. 4. 'Le tracé suivant sera substitué à la délimitation établie entre l'Erytrée et la Côte Française des Somalis par les protocoles de Rome en date des 24 Janvier et 10 Juillet 1901.'

'De Der Eloma sur le détroit de Bab-El-Mandeb, une ligne droite rejoignant l'Oued Weima immédiatement en aval de Daadato.'

Art. 6. 'La France reconnaît la souveraineté de l'Italie sur l'île Doumeirah et les îlots sans noms adjacent cette île.'

'... the French Government has declared to the Italian Government that, wishing to facilitate a closer collaboration between Italian and French interests in connection with the railway (Djibuti-Addis Abeba), it has ensured that the French group of the Concessionary Society of the line will transfer 2500 shares of the above Society to an Italian group.' (From the report on the Bill presented by the Duce on the Treaty between France and Italy, January 7, 1935.)

possession was consolidated and spread gradually inland, forming the kernel of what was to become the present colony of Erythrea. Relations were established with Menelik II., King of Shoa, favouring his accession to the imperial throne, and the Treaty of Uchalli was conducted with the new Negus Neghesti on May 2, 1889. This was a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce which Italy understood to extend a protectorate over Ethiopia, entertaining no doubt as to its being understood in the same way on the other side. It has been confirmed by the visit made to Italy by Ras Makonnen (father of the present Negus), as representative of Menelik, to communicate the latter's accession to the throne. The Negus at that time obtained a loan of money and large supplies of arms, supposed to be for consolidating his position in the empire. The protectorate was communicated to the Powers in accordance with the 34th article of the Berlin Act, and the receipt of the communication was acknowledged by all but Russia, who was perhaps planning a religious protectorate of her own.

In article 17 of the Uchalli Treaty the Italian text stated that 'the King of Kings of Ethiopia consented to avail himself of the Government of the King of Italy for treating all affairs he might have with other Powers and Governments.' But while Makonnen's mission was in Italy, European advisers at the Court of Addis Abeba brought to the attention of the Negus a difference between the Amharic text and the Italian, insinuating that by accepting the latter he would lose all independence and become a vassal of Italy.

The term 'protectorate,' sanctioned by international law, varies greatly in its application according to the context of the treaty in question. The Negus's advisers artfully exaggerated the weight of its meaning in the particular case. Had other European nations not joined forces against Italy at that time, could she have brought her negotiations with Ethiopia to a successful conclusion? I think so; and my belief is that Europe made a grave mistake in crossing Italy's path at that juncture. The older and wealthier occupants of that colonial field might safely have let her try her hand in this corner. Had they done so, East Africa might by now be displaying the fruits of civilised collaboration instead of a bitter harvest of commotion and disagreement. This much is

certain, that, as a consequence of this treaty, the attitude towards Italy of the Negus changed from diffidence to aversion. He refused to recognise the treaty, or to apply it, and as soon as the terms expired he proceeded to denounce it.

Amply supplied with arms and ammunition through Djibuti, assisted by European officers in the training of his troops, he prepared for war, and succeeded in concentrating the forces of all the dependent Ras. Errors of local policy on our side between Tigré and Shoa had estranged them, and brought them into line against us.

The battle of Adowa proved that if on the Ethiopian side there was great progress in armaments and military knowledge, yet in the methods of warfare and the treatment of prisoners the old ferocity had remained unchanged. The wave of hostility to colonial enterprise that followed on this reverse, the weakness of the Government that it brought into power, and the pressure of foreign influences prevented the adoption of strong measures which, in the right hands, might have led to a favourable conclusion. The Treaty of Uchalli was annulled on October 26, 1896, and humiliating conditions of peace accepted. Italy retreated behind the provisional line, Mareb-Belesa-Muna, until more accurate frontiers should be traced, and, in 1897, yielded Kassala to the British.

The colony of Erythrea entered upon a period of internal consolidation and development, as did the other Italian possessions along the Somali coast. From commercial stations in the hands of private companies these were gradually transformed into direct dominions. Each colony had its separate and independent life, but Ethiopia, neighbour to both, while she separated them territorially, was destined to form for them that spiritual unity of Italian East Africa which exists at the present time.

We have had to review the relations between Italy and Abyssinia up to the end of last century in order that the present events should be understood. The succeeding situation is best made clear by a survey of the four Treaties that have since been drawn up, either in relation to Ethiopia or with her.

1. The Conventions of 1900, 1903 and 1908 concerning the delimitation of the boundary between Erythrea and Ethiopia.

2. The Tripartite Convention concerning Ethiopia, signed by England, France and Italy in London on December 13, 1906.

3. The Convention for the tracing of the frontier between Italian Somaliland and the neighbouring provinces of the Ethiopian Empire, signed at Addis Abeba on May 16, 1908.

4. The Treaty of Italo-Ethiopian friendship and Road Convention of August 2, 1928.

In the Tripartite Convention it was agreed (Article IV.) that if at any time events were to alter the *status quo* in Ethiopia, France, England and Italy would do all in their power to ensure the integrity of Ethiopia, and, whatever happened, they would take counsel together for the safeguarding of the following interests :

(a) Those of Great Britain and of Egypt in the valley of the Nile, with particular regard to the regulation of all waters of that river and its tributaries, taking, however, into account the local needs and interests, and making a reservation for the Italian interests mentioned in the following paragraph.

(b) The interests of Italy in Ethiopia in connexion with Erythrea, Italian Somaliland (Benadir included), and more especially in connexion with the hinterland of those possessions and the territorial union between them west of Addis Abeba.

(c) French interests in Ethiopia, in connexion with the French protectorate on the Somali coast and the zone needful for the construction and use of the Railway from Djibuti to Addis Abeba.²

This was in 1906. In 1908 we have the Italo-Ethiopian Convention of May 16, which aimed at defining the frontiers between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. A convention on this subject had become indispensable owing to serious incidents occurring in the frontier regions, where Italian officers had been killed while defending populations, living under our protection, who had been assailed by armed Abyssinian forces exacting tribute. This treaty did not, however, succeed in eliminating the vagueness and inaccuracy peculiar to the criteria on which it was based. These criteria, which were to 'determine the frontier line on the spot and within the briefest possible time,' were in small part geographical and in the greater part ethnical. Anyone with experience of

² The Italian and British spheres of influence in Ethiopia were delimited by the Protocols of March 24 and April 15, 1891 (usually quoted as 'Rudini-Dufferin Protocols'), and the Agreement of May 5, 1894 ('Crispi-Clareford Agreement'). In December 1925 the British and Italian Governments concluded an agreement concerning the question of the Lake Tana and the acknowledgment of the exclusive Italian influence in Western Ethiopia.

African localities where the nomadic life prevails can understand how many uncertainties may arise when speaking of territories in connexion with tribes. In most cases the tribes themselves cannot determine their territory as they have no fixed boundaries ; they can only make reference to wells, or to pastures, which also vary from time to time.

But between two States it was necessary that an accurate frontier should be determined, and the Italian Government wished to waste no time in reaching definite agreements. Two years, however, elapsed before it became possible to form a commission to delimit the boundary line on the spot.

After some months of useless work, owing to the attitude of the Abyssinian chiefs, orders came from Addis Abeba to suspend proceedings owing to the inability of the Government to insure the personal safety of the commissioners. Since then, though the Italian Government has not ceased to press for a resumption of the work of delimitation, no progress has been made. Issues were further confused in Northern Somaliland by the 'Mad Mullah' rebellion, when the British Government found once more that it could safely count upon Italian help in moments of difficulty and danger. Yet even after the rebellion was quelled the frontier remained undefined. The drawbacks to this situation have recently been evident.

Nevertheless, Italy continued her policy of friendliness towards Ethiopia. The conversations in Rome, when Ras Tafari came on an official visit in 1924, and the even more significant journey of the Duke of Abruzzi to Ethiopia, prepared the way for the Agreement of August 2, 1928, which is of Italo-Ethiopian instruments the most important. It consisted of a Treaty of Friendship and a Road Convention.

With article 3 of the treaty, the Italian and Abyssinian Governments pledge themselves to develop the existing commerce between the two countries and make it prosper. We know that this has never been done by the Abyssinian Government, in spite of their engagement.

The Road Convention had two aims. One was the construction of a motor road from Assab to Dessié and the other was the concession to the Ethiopian Government of a free zone in the port of Assab, thus satisfying Abyssinia's old aspiration to an outlet on the sea. These two obligations

were interdependent. What happened to this, the most friendly treaty that Ethiopia has ever signed with a European Power? Italy was undoubtedly anxious that her eastern colonies, and especially Erythrea, should play their natural economic part towards the neighbouring empire, peacefully and to the common advantage. Secure in her new order at home and strengthened in her prestige abroad, she felt able to bring the most valuable aid to Ethiopia for the development of her many unexplored resources and to assist her on the path of final progress towards higher forms of civilisation. Italy has been disappointed. None of her efforts to create a concrete collaboration with Abyssinia have succeeded. Every kind of obstacle has been raised to the construction of the motor road.

* Shortly after the Treaty of Friendship had been signed Abyssinia began to arm more intensively. The principal armament concerns of Europe have competed to supply her with armaments, ostensibly to establish the authority of the central Government, but in such proportions they could only have been inspired by that growing spirit of xenophobia of which England certainly has had sufficient proof through the raids and armed incursions across her own frontiers. France also, who for many years had reason to think herself the favourite among European nations with Abyssinia, will not soon forget the massacre of her own official, Bernard, and of his detachment. For Italy the attack on the consulate of Gondar was the first of a series of acts of armed violence culminating in the fight at Wal-Wal.

As to the last-named subject, something must here be said. The pastoral tribe of the Mijertin, Omar Mahmud, depend upon these wells for their supply of water during certain seasons of the year. Italy had every right and duty to protect populations that were under her direct rule. After the annexation of the Sultanate of Obbia to the Italian colony in 1925, Wal-Wal was occupied by the Italian troops, and no protest whatsoever had been presented by the Abyssinians until the fight of December 1934.

Much has been said and written about internal conditions of Abyssinia, the powerlessness of the central Government to maintain order in the outlying provinces, the general persistence of slavery and the slave trade, the feudal systems

of servitude, the barbarous methods for the exaction of tributes, and the misgovernment inflicted on populations conquered within the last decades and treated by the central Government in a manner and by methods long since repudiated by civilised nations. These conditions may interest the League of Nations. Civilised Europe is already judging them.

Meanwhile, Italy cannot remain indifferent to the hotbed of anarchy and disorder that is in contact with her most distant possessions; it is her duty to provide against the dangers that threaten these regions. She has recently given proof at Geneva that she means to follow the procedure to which she is pledged, and not evade reconciliation. But she is firmly decided not to fall again into those past errors that have cost her so dearly and weighed so heavily on her national life. She remembers not only her present responsibilities, but also her duty to future generations.

Another trust is laid on her beyond her own frontiers—that of reminding Europe that common duties fall on her in connexion with the African continent. There was a time when the European nations considered uncivilised races as an open field for their lower and fiercer instincts, or as an instrument for striking other rival nations. These methods have left traces not yet obliterated, and still susceptible of the most dangerous developments. It is necessary that they should be condemned, not only in text-books of colonial history, but in the spirit of the nations admitted to collaborate honestly in the tasks of civilisation.

Fascist Italy recognises this duty and she is ready to work in harmony with other nations for the defence and for the honour of Europe's civilisation.³

ALESSANDRO LESSONA.

³ Since the above was written, a brilliant article by Mr. Fitz-Gerald has appeared in the June issue of this Review. I can only confirm the quotation he is so kind as to make of the speech which I delivered before the Italian Senate on May 14 last (the contents are repeated in the present article). His version of the Wal-Wal engagement is taken from the Abyssinian notes to the League of Nations, and the errors of map-makers will be judged in good time. We shall now only mention two fundamental contradictions that seem to invalidate his arguments: (1) After fully recognising all the evils which we deprecate in the present condition of the lands which make up the Ethiopian Empire, he places Italy, as standing for ruthless might, against Ethiopia, representing right and justice. (2) He deprecates our preparations and armaments as excessive, and then fears that the difficulties before us may be greater than we are able to face. We can but beg him to trust the realism of our Duce, whom he so much admires, even for 'le tact des choses possibles.'—A. L.

THE GERMAN NAVAL RENAISSANCE

By HECTOR C. BYWATER

To many Britons of the pre-war generation the news that Germany is about to rearm at sea is probably more interesting, if perhaps less disturbing, than all the reports of her formidable military and air plans. The reason for this special interest is plain enough. During the fifteen years which preceded the war Anglo-German relations steadily deteriorated as the direct result of Germany's naval policy. There were, it is true, contributory causes, such as trade competition and the aggressive attitude of the Berlin Foreign Office; but the real apple of discord was the forced growth of the German fleet.

In two volumes of reminiscences published after the war the late Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz, creator of the Imperial German Navy, stoutly defended the political wisdom of his life's work. He tells us that from the day of his appointment, in 1897, as Secretary of State for the Navy his single aim was to implement the '*Risiko-Gedanke*.' This phrase, coined by himself, implied the possession by Germany of a fleet numerically inferior to the British, yet sufficiently powerful either to hold that fleet in check or even to defeat it in detail. In the preamble to the great Naval Act of 1900, which virtually doubled the strength of the German navy, the 'risk principle' was defined in the following passages:

Under existing circumstances, in order to protect Germany's sea trade and colonies, there is one means only, viz. Germany must have a fleet of such strength that, even for the mightiest naval Power, a war with her would involve such risks as to jeopardise its own supremacy. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, because, generally, the greatest naval Power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us. But even if it should succeed in confronting us in superior force, the enemy would be so considerably weakened in overcoming the resistance of a strong German fleet that, notwithstanding a

victory gained, the enemy's supremacy would not at first be secured any longer by a sufficient fleet.

This avowal of policy was naturally accepted as a challenge by British opinion. It certainly struck at the roots of our traditional system of maintaining a balance of naval supremacy adequate for all contingencies. It was met, first, by increased building, and, secondly, by the gradual concentration of force in home waters at the expense of our overseas squadrons. Luck was with us, for the conclusion of the Japanese alliance enabled us to bring home battleships and cruisers from the Far East, and by 1905 the annihilation of Russia's naval forces in the Pacific relieved us, for the time, of all anxiety in that quarter of the globe. Moreover, the *entente* with France, which developed at much the same period, so greatly eased the burden of our naval commitments at home and abroad that we were actually in the position to do what Herr von Tirpitz had considered to be impossible—that is, to concentrate all our major forces against Germany.

To that extent, therefore, the 'risk principle' had proved illusory, owing to the complete alteration in political relationships during the first five years of the century, an alteration largely brought about by German naval policy. But for the phenomenal expansion of the German fleet it is improbable that either the Japanese alliance or the *Entente Cordiale* would have come into being. And, one might add, but for the overt German challenge to our naval security, the World War might never have occurred.

In the interest of those good relations with Germany which the great majority of the British people desires to see established, it is very important that the causes which led to antagonism in the past should be viewed in their true perspective. It must, therefore, be repeated that the naval race which began with the first big German programme of 1898 and proceeded at ever-increasing speed for the next sixteen years, was unquestionably the root cause of British participation in the Great War. Apparently that truth is recognised by the statesmen of the Third Reich. On more than one occasion Herr Hitler has intimated his disapproval of the Tirpitz policy and his determination to avoid even the semblance of a naval challenge to Great Britain. If we can accept that as a fixed principle of modern German statecraft,

the most formidable obstacle to an Anglo-German understanding ceases to exist.

Tirpitz complains in his memoirs that his countrymen were never really sea-minded, never truly conscious of the vital importance of sea-power in peace no less than in war. After this admission it seems almost superfluous to add that the German nation, left to itself, would never have dreamed of building the great fleet which it actually possessed in 1914. The creation of that fleet was due much more to propaganda than to natural impulse. Only those who, like the writer, lived in Germany during the critical pre-war years can form any conception of the gigantic publicity machine which, day in day out, worked at high pressure to convert a non-maritime race of 60,000,000 souls to the new doctrine of navalism. Probably the conversion was no more than skin deep, but it was sufficient for the purpose. Funds were voted lavishly for ships and men, and had peace remained unbroken the German navy in 1920 would have been little inferior in fighting power to the British Grand Fleet of 1918—the mightiest armada the world has ever seen.

In actual fact the High Seas Fleet on the outbreak of war was, for its size, the most formidable armament afloat. For several years previously the writer had exceptional opportunities of studying German naval development at first hand, and he then formed a very high opinion of the quality of the fleet material. Germany was then producing ships, guns, torpedoes, mines and other fighting appurtenances superior in quality to our own. Such naval successes as she gained in the war were the result, not of superior strategy or seamanship, but of the pains she had taken to perfect her ships and their weapons.

It is, however, but fair to say that the very definite and localised plan of strategy to which the German fleet was built to conform simplified the task of its builders. To them the North Sea was always the decisive area. Unlike British constructors, they did not have to visualise the possibility of fleet actions being fought on the other side of the world. Fuel supply and berthing accommodation could therefore be subordinated to the purely combatant qualities of armament and protection. Further, the physical features of the German western seaboard favoured the evolution of the capital-ship

type which proved its value at Jutland. Shallow waters ordain light draught and a corresponding increase in beam, and a beamy ship can be given stronger armour and underwater protection than one of less breadth. To call the German capital ships of the war period floating batteries would hardly be an exaggeration, even though they were endowed with a high degree of mobility.

Tirpitz, whose views on man-of-war design were sounder than his concept of world politics, always maintained that the first requirement of a fighting ship was to keep afloat. And the ships that he caused to be built did fulfil this requirement to an extent almost incredible. Two classic instances may be cited, both from Jutland. The battle-cruiser *Lützow*, hit by twenty-four heavy projectiles and blasted out of recognition, remained stubbornly afloat for nearly twelve hours, refusing to sink until the *coup de grâce* was given by friendly torpedoes. The smaller battle-cruiser *Seydlitz* received twenty-one heavy shell hits and a torpedo hit in the bows; 8000 tons of water entered the ship, whose lofty forecastle was submerged. She proceeded stern first under her own power until off the mouth of the Jade, where she grounded, but was towed off and eventually brought into dock at Wilhelmshaven. Mention might also be made of the *Derfflinger*, a sister to the *Lützow*, which, in spite of a terrible hammering from the British 15-inch guns, came out of the action still seaworthy and under control.

None of the British ships underwent an ordeal comparable with those described above. It is estimated that the *Queen Mary* had been struck fifteen times, and the *Indefatigable* and *Invincible* only five times each, before blowing up. The destruction of all three ships was due to ammunition fires reaching the magazines; but here again there was a marked disparity between British and German methods of stowing and handling the powder charges for the guns. It was not genius, but meticulous attention to detail, that made the German vessels of the Jutland period better fighting machines, ship for ship, than their 'opposite numbers' in the Grand Fleet.

This statement, however, needs some qualification. For service outside the North Sea or the Baltic the German battleships and cruisers were definitely inferior to their British contemporaries. So cramped were the living quarters that a long ocean voyage or a cruise in tropical waters would have

inflicted grave hardship on the personnel. Especially in the early 'Dreadnoughts' and battle-cruisers—*Nassau*, *Helgoland*, *Von der Tann*, etc.—the mess decks were intolerably crowded and airless, while in the after-part of the ship junior officers were berthed four to a cabin. Spaces which in a British ship were devoted to living quarters or extra bunkers were monopolised in the German type by elaborate methods of protection.

Few Englishmen connected with the sea find cause for satisfaction in the naval penalties imposed on Germany after the collapse. They were dictated in a spirit of bitterness engendered by the horrors of the submarine campaign against merchant shipping. To demand the surrender of her entire submarine fleet was unquestionably right and proper in the circumstances, but the seizure of every modern surface man-of-war she possessed was an act more difficult to defend. Had Germany been permitted to retain, say, the eight early 'Dreadnoughts' of the *Nassau* and *Helgoland* group, not only would her national pride have been spared a needless affront, but she would have had no incentive to build those 'pocket battleships' which have since become a thorn in the side of the British naval staff. The millions she has spent on building these freakish if formidable ships—potentially the most dangerous commerce raiders ever designed—and six cruisers, of which five are endowed with a very wide radius of action by their auxiliary Diesel engines, would have been hypothecated more or less harmlessly to the upkeep of the pre-war 'Dreadnoughts' and cruisers which she might have been allowed to retain.

It has never been explained whether the naval clauses of the Peace Treaty were drafted for the express purpose of emasculating German sea-power for all time, or whether they were designed as a framework for the universal system of naval limitation to which the victorious no less than the vanquished Powers were eventually to conform. The latter supposition is difficult to reconcile with British Admiralty views on the dimensions of warships. In 1919 the Admiralty was as firmly committed to big-ship doctrines as it is to-day. For ships of the line the lowest limit it has ever proposed is one of 22,000 tons, with guns of 11-inch calibre, and for cruisers a displacement of 7000 tons, with guns of 6-inch calibre. Evidently, therefore, the restrictions placed on the

German navy were intended to be unilateral. If that be so, the wonder is, not that they are now being ignored, but that they should have remained operative for fifteen years.

Briefly recapitulated, the naval clauses inhibited Germany from building any armoured ship above 10,000 tons, any cruiser above 6000 tons, and any destroyer above 800 tons. Submarines of every description were denied to her. The naval personnel was not to exceed 1500 officers and 13,500 men, and all service was to be voluntary, officers engaging for twenty-five years and ratings for twelve years. Not without truth has it been said that these restrictions compelled Germany to create a new navy officered by specialists and manned by N.C.O.'s—a navy, therefore, ideally organised for rapid and almost infinite expansion at the chosen moment. That moment has now arrived. Volunteers are flocking to the recruiting bureaus; and if their numbers do not suffice, the revival of conscription places at the disposal of the naval authorities the sea-minded communities of the Baltic and the North Sea coastal districts.

From the technical and industrial points of view she is equally well equipped for the task. Before, during, and since the war German shipbuilders, marine engineers, and artillerymen have given ample proof of their skill. It is a fair assumption that the ships comprising the future German fleet will be second to none in all-round fighting power. The fleet itself promises to be a quality production as long as its dimensions are kept within fairly modest limits. The five armoured ships and six cruisers built since 1925 have cost on an average £380 per ton, as compared with £200 for contemporary British ships. In view of the known standard of German workmanship, this discrepancy may safely be interpreted in terms of material superiority. British naval officers who went over the 'pocket battleship' *Deutschland* and the cruisers *Königsberg* and *Leipzig* which visited this country last year were impressed by the excellence of their design and the quality of the workmanship put into them. The fire-control equipment of the 6000-ton *Leipzig* was described as being as elaborate as that of a British battle-cruiser. Further, the physique and general deportment of the German personnel made the best possible impression.

One has only to scan the official German Navy List¹ to perceive that the staff and administrative services are designed to meet the requirements of a fleet very much larger than that specified in the Peace Treaty. As the present system dates from 1923, it is evident that an eventual large expansion of the navy was envisaged twelve years ago. At that time, however, public opinion was not in the mood to embrace new naval ambitions. The events of October-November 1918, and in particular the excesses committed in many German districts by the mutinous bluejackets of the fleet, had left the navy under a cloud. It was widely regarded as having been either the dupe or the willing instrument of the 'Red' conspirators who were supposed to have stabbed the nation in the back. The first step, then, was to set in motion again the machinery of propaganda which had accomplished such wonders in the past. This was done, and, as before, all the arts of publicity were invoked to stimulate popular enthusiasm for sea-power. The number of books and pamphlets written to prove that Germany was never vanquished at sea runs into hundreds.

Before proceeding to discuss the development, actual and potential, of Germany's post-war fleet it will be desirable to examine the motives which have led her to embark once more on a definite naval policy. For the reasons explained above, the navy languished in neglect for several years after the peace. But all this time a group of devoted officers in the Naval Section of the Defence Ministry was working to restore to their service its former prestige and popularity. One of their most effective arguments was the necessity of maintaining touch with East Prussia, isolated from the Fatherland by the Polish Corridor. It was largely on this account that the Reichstag in 1927-28 voted funds for the first 'pocket battleship,' which was considered an ideal type for service in the Baltic. Further, the building of cruisers was urged as the only means of showing the flag in foreign waters and thus bringing encouragement and hope to the millions of Germans overseas, whose '*Deutschtum*' had been shaken by the *débâcle* of 1918. Upon her completion the first of the new cruisers, a namesake of the gallant *Emden*,

¹ Last published in 1932. The non-appearance of this publication for three years has naturally given rise to comment.

was despatched on a cruise round the world. This was in 1926, since when the *Emden* and later vessels have repeatedly circumnavigated the globe, combining patriotic propaganda with the practical training of cadets.

We may assume the command of the Baltic to be the immediate goal of German naval policy. As long as the Russian fleet dominated that sea there were grounds for serious misgiving on the part of Germany. To-day, in spite of the imposing Russian 'Dreadnoughts' which occasionally cruise in the Gulf of Finland, Germany has probably gained the upper hand in the Eastern Sea. The completion of the first twelve German submarines this summer will cancel out the last advantage enjoyed by Russia.

Having regained control of her most vulnerable maritime frontier, her eyes are turning, naturally enough, to a more distant horizon. Her merchant marine, which had virtually disappeared in 1919, has been so far rebuilt that it now approaches 4,000,000 gross tons. On every ocean route German express liners are competing successfully with the best foreign ships. By the autumn of this year the Norddeutscher Lloyd will have in service on the Far Eastern route the crack liners *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and *Potsdam*, superior in speed and luxury to all competitors. In the North Atlantic the *Bremen* and *Europa* have established a reputation for speed and punctuality which as yet does not appear to have been seriously affected by the spectacular exploits of the Italian *Rex* and the French *Normandie*. In South America—that region which, to the German mind, has superseded the United States as 'the land of unlimited possibilities'—German shipping and German trade in general are regaining, and improving upon, the position they held before 1914. In so far, then, as sea-power may be expressed in the peaceful terms of overseas transport and trade, Germany has already staged an amazing 'come back.' It is, therefore, in no sense surprising that her thoughts should now be turning to the more concrete symbols of this power—full-size warships in every category.

It is no reflection on the sincerity of Herr Hitler to suggest that his present comparatively modest claims in respect of naval strength may undergo upward revision when Germany has secured a greater measure of world trade, influence, and

prestige—when, in short, she has regained her pre-war status as a world Power of the first rank. Nor does such a conclusion necessarily point to Germany as a future candidate for the trident of Neptune. We must nevertheless reckon with the contingency of a German naval renaissance on a greater scale than she aspires to at the present time. In these circumstances it is very desirable that the growth of her fleet should be regulated by agreement for as long a period as may be practicable. This, indeed, is the object of the naval conversations which began in London last month and which, at the time of writing, promise a happy issue.

Germany is claiming 35 per cent. of the total tonnage of the British and Dominion navies, but is willing to accept this ratio in terms of ship categories. In other words, instead of demanding a lump sum of tonnage to be utilised according to her own choice, she has agreed to build no more than 35 per cent. of the British tonnage in each category of fighting ship. This reasonable attitude has paved the way to agreement by excluding the possibility that a disproportionate percentage of her tonnage allotment might be invested in, say, submarines or other craft peculiarly dangerous to merchant shipping.

Even so, an arrangement on the 35 per cent. basis will enable her to do more than double the strength of her navy. Omitting a number of very old ships long overdue for scrapping, the German navy to-day has an aggregate of about 135,000 tons displacement. This figure would be raised to 390,000 tons, so that she would be free to build 255,000 tons of new construction, including 110,000 tons of capital ships, 60,000 tons of heavy cruisers, and 15,000 tons of submarines. As the Versailles Treaty restrictions on tonnage and armament have been repudiated, it follows that every naval unit henceforth to be laid down in Germany will be more or less comparable in fighting power with the latest foreign vessels. The writer, however, does not believe that Germany will go to the length of building 35,000-ton battleships, as France and Italy are doing. She is more likely to develop modified types of somewhat reduced tonnage but exceptionally formidable armament. It is already claimed that the genius of Krupp in the manufacture of ordnance and armour-plate has endowed the 'pocket battleships' with a degree of combatant power equal to that of an older 'Dreadnought' of twice their

tonnage. One example will suffice. The new model 11-inch gun with which the *Deutschland* and her sisters are armed is officially listed as a 'quick-firing' gun, and can be discharged three times a minute. The volume of fire from these 10,000-ton ships within a given period is therefore superior to that of a pre-war 'Dreadnought' of 20,000 tons, mounting 12-inch guns.

Omitting obsolete ships of no war value, the German navy to-day comprises the following vessels completed and building: Five 'armoured ships,' six cruisers, sixteen destroyers, twelve submarines. Three of the armoured ships are definitely known to be of 10,000 tons, with an armament of six 11-inch and eight 5.9-inch guns. Their Diesel engines of 54,000 horse-power give them a full speed of 26 knots and, at lower speeds, a phenomenally wide range of action, claimed to be 50 per cent. greater than that of any other man-of-war now afloat. Their armour protection, while much inferior to that of a conventional battleship, would give them a marked advantage over any cruiser at medium range. Not one of our thirteen 10,000-ton cruisers, destitute of side armour and mounting 8-inch guns, could engage a German 'pocket battleship' with the slightest chance of success. This new German type has introduced into the naval '*Kriegspiel*' a factor as novel as it is formidable. Whether the fourth and fifth armoured ships are in the same category is not yet known, but one at least is believed to be of considerably heavier displacement and armament.

The six cruisers, excepting the *Emden*—5400 tons, 29 knots, eight 5.9-inch guns—have a uniform displacement of 6000 tons; a speed of 32 knots, and an armament of nine 5.9-inch guns. They are turbine-driven, but all save the *Emden* have an auxiliary Diesel cruising plant which confers a wide radius of action. The destroyers call for no special comment, but the twelve submarines are of interest because of their small size—250 tons. This tonnage corresponds to that of the early UB and UC submarines which Germany built during the war. Such small craft are not suitable for ocean service, but they would be dangerous enough in the narrow seas. It is a reasonable inference that their size has been dictated by the necessity of having a number of boats in service as quickly as possible to provide training facilities

for the newly-organised submarine personnel. It is an open secret that Germany in recent years has kept fully abreast of submarine design and is now in a position to build boats second to none in cruising range and offensive power.

In some quarters the German naval demands have had the effect of a cold douche, though by observers of normal vision they had long been foreseen as inevitable. Their influence on British naval policy may well be salutary. From now on we cannot, if we would, continue to acquiesce in the benevolent dictatorship of the United States on matters of naval policy—a dictatorship which has been accepted more or less willingly since the Washington Conference of 1921. Camouflage it as we may, the fact is evident that for fourteen years the size and strength of the naval forces to which the protection of our world-wide commonwealth is entrusted have been regulated from Washington rather than from Whitehall. Our battle fleet was cut to fifteen units, our cruiser force to fifty, and our anti-submarine flotillas to an equally absurd figure under pressure from Washington. At the London Conference of 1930 we carried abnegation to the length of ignoring the great Continental navies in determining our relative strength at sea for the next six years. In plain words, we discarded all the rules and formulas of relative strength which had served us well for three centuries in favour of an American 'yardstick' which, being designed purely to measure American naval requirements within a comparatively localised area, bore no relation whatever to the needs of a great maritime commonwealth.

The time has come to change all that. With Germany demanding a fleet which, even on the 35 per cent. basis, would give her something like parity in the North Sea, since more than half of our strength is tied down in far distant waters; with France and Italy adding steadily to the great armadas they now possess, and with Japan consolidating her hegemony of the Far Eastern seas where Britain has a stake of incalculable value, the hour has struck for decisive action. The treaties which have emasculated British sea-power since the war have a further eighteen months to run. There can be no question of their renewal in the existing form, or even on any basis involving retention of the ratio system, that system having been emphatically rejected by Japan. On the other hand,

it is to the interest of all countries to adhere to the principle and practice of limiting naval armaments by some reciprocal arrangement, since the alternative of unbridled competition would be as financially ruinous as politically dangerous.

A tabling of respective naval programmes over a term of years, and the consequential avoidance of sudden bursts of shipbuilding which upset the balance of power, would appear to be the rational solution. The whole problem of naval limitation is to be reviewed at the Conference which is due to meet in London this autumn, and it is virtually certain that Germany will be represented, if only by an observer.

Meanwhile the prospective Anglo-German agreement will be a diplomatic achievement of the first order, the effects of which may extend far beyond the purely naval sphere. The moderation exhibited by Herr Hitler in this specific aspect of German rearmament has created an excellent impression in British circles. The naval talks have been conducted in an atmosphere of frankness and friendliness which augurs well for the future relations of the two countries, whose sailors, at any rate, are only too anxious to revert to the old footing of mutual liking and esteem. In so far as the British Commonwealth is concerned, Germany's decision to rearm at sea on a strictly limited scale may prove to be a blessing in disguise.

HECTOR C. BYWATER.

NOTE.—Since the above was written an Anglo-German agreement on the lines predicted has been signed (June 18). It restricts German tonnage to 35 per cent. of that of the combined British and Dominion navies, such percentage to be applied by ship categories. In other words, Germany has agreed not to exceed 35 per cent. of the British Commonwealth's tonnage in capital ships, cruisers, aircraft-carriers, and destroyers, respectively. As regards submarines, Germany is conceded parity in principle, but in practice has agreed not to build above 45 per cent. of the British Commonwealth total in this category. It is emphasised in the Notes officially exchanged that 'the ratio of 35 : 100 is to be a permanent relationship, *i.e.*, the total tonnage of the German fleet shall never exceed a percentage of 35 of the aggregate tonnage of the [British Commonwealth] naval forces.'

THE SUGAR-BEET SUBSIDY

By DR. CLOUDESLEY BRERETON

IN April 1934 a Committee consisting of a K.C. (Mr. Wilfrid Green), a cotton spinner (Sir Kenneth Lee), and a banker (Mr. Cyril Lloyd) were appointed to inquire into the Sugar Industry of the United Kingdom. Nearly twelve months later they produced a Majority and Minority Report. Most departmental committees interpret their terms of reference in a strictly literal sense, but this one considered that the question of maintaining the subsidy came within their purview and decided by a majority of two to one to recommend its discontinuance.

The comprehensiveness of the earlier part of the Report is shown by the masterly fashion in which the Committee have succeeded in unravelling a very complicated situation. They trace the progressive increase in home-grown sugar, which in 1933 reached 400,000 odd tons, while the gross imports in the same year amounted to 2,040,000 tons in round figures, and the exports (no inconsiderable item) to 432,000 odd tons. At the same time the gross imports of Empire and foreign sugar were 15,576,613 cwts. and 25,208,592 cwts. They note the practical cessation of the imports of refined sugar after the differential duty of 1928 in favour of English refiners which actually led to a large export of refined sugar. The average yearly consumption in the United Kingdom is about 1,900,000 tons in terms of refined sugar. About 500,000 tons of this is home-grown, half of which was refined in the factories and the other half in the refineries; of the remaining 1,400,000 tons, about half has come in the form of raw sugar from the Empire and half from foreign countries—such as Cuba, Peru, Santo Domingo, though in past years Java, Brazil and Continental countries have sent a substantial proportion.

The protection to home-grown sugar is now 11s. 2d. a cwt., to Colonial 5s. 9d. (on the average), to Dominions 3s. 9d. Dominion sugar also receives protection at home, while English refiners are protected to the extent of 2s. 4d. a cwt. Protection is given in all countries except Java, Peru, and Santo Domingo. The United Kingdom is the principal free market for surplus sugar, which is mainly 'dumped.' It takes nearly 33 per cent. (970,000 tons). Heavy stocks at present militate against any substantial increase in price. Partial restriction has failed to prevent the continuous fall in sugar, though it was different before the war. The present low level reached is 4s. 6d. a cwt. An effective world restriction would certainly raise prices.

The sugar-beet subsidy was started in England in 1924. From a maximum figure of 25s. 8d. it has fallen to 12s. a cwt. The acreage this year was reduced from 400,000 to 375,000 acres. Most of the beet area is found in Norfolk, Suffolk, and the Isle of Ely, which accounts for five-eighths of the whole; if the areas served by the other factories in the east of England are added, the total amounts to four-fifths of the whole. The chief factories are the Anglo-Dutch group, which deals with nearly a third of the whole output, the Bury group, with well over one-fourth, and the Anglo-Scottish, with a little under.

The cost of sugar-beet production has been reduced from 42s. 4d. to 27s. 2d. a ton. The estimated price per ton at the factory was 41s. The sugar extracted reached the high figure of 97 per cent.; the average cost of manufacture was 11s. 11d., against 31s. 6d. a ton in 1924-25; while the factories' net profit had dropped from 13s. to 2s. 1d. a ton of the total receipts for the period (£66,940,381). Over 60 per cent. of these came from the State, owing to the continuous fall in the price of sugar. The total receipts for the whole period between farmers and factories are in the ratio of 3·2, but in the last three years it has been 2·1. The total State assistance for the whole period equals approximately the price paid for beet, but in the last period it has been less. Some of the factories have done very well, others have done badly.

Employment in the factories amounts to 4500 man-years; on the farms, to 28,000 man-years. In areas of concentrated production there has been an actual rise in employment, while

the total for England has fallen by 17·1 per cent. The value of the bye-products to the farm is very great. They include sugar-beet tops (which, 'weight for weight,' are more valuable than mangolds), molasses, pulp (300,000 tons bought by the farmers for feeding purposes), and lime, invaluable for improving the soil.

The advantages to the nation of the industry are classified under the headings—Substitution of Home-grown for Foreign Sugar, Value of the Industry in War-time, Stabilising Effect of Home-grown Sugar on the Market, Indirect Benefit to Subsidiary Industries (coal-mining, etc.), Special Assistance to Small-holders. The first point is described as 'obviously of great importance,' but no mention is made of the value of reducing imports from the trade balance point of view; on the second point the Committee merely note the importance of 'self-sufficiency' held by Continental Governments in time of war; on the third, they consider the danger of foreign cartels trying to force up prices as remote; on the fourth, they admit certain advantages. From 1924-33 the industry absorbed 2,600,000 tons of coal, 102,000 tons of coke, 928,000 tons of limestone, 52,286,000 bags, while rail and road transport carried about 30,000,000 tons of traffic; shipping, however, suffered a loss. The intensive culture required by sugar-beet, the heavy demand for manual labour, the advantage of a 'cash' return to small-holders are all enumerated, but no clear pronouncement given on their value to the State.

The advantages to agriculture, as urged by the Board of Agriculture, included the value of sugar-beet as a 'cleaning' crop and for its bye-products, as well as its beneficial effects on succeeding crops, amounting, owing to the use of 'artificial,' to from 12 to 25 per cent.; its value as a 'cash' crop, bringing in an immediate return and having a sure market; its educational value as stimulating better husbandry; and its value as a relief measure in keeping large areas under the plough and preventing farmers rushing into other markets and flooding them. Local tradesmen have also profited from the increased circulation of money.

The Committee consider the present output could not be maintained with any appreciable lower assistance unless the costs of growing beet and factory expenses could be

reduced, but a substantial acreage could be grown in more favourable districts, if such a reduction could be effected by easy stages. The substantial improvement in the efficiency of the grower since 1924 may continue; and again, the bargaining powers of the farmers might be increased. They suggest the exploration of a flat rate for the carriage of beet (which varies largely) and the unification of the factories, with the possible closing down of some of them.

They next outline a plan of organisation and assistance, which, in view of the fact that they subsequently advocate the abolition of the subsidy, it is not necessary to give here, except to state that they consider, without offering any reasons, that the present unwieldy form of the subsidy, consisting partly of remission of excise and a direct subsidy, if continued, should remain unchanged. Their principal reason for suggesting the abolition of the subsidy is that there is 'no reasonable prospect of the industry becoming permanently self-supporting.' Sugar-beet costs £12 to £14 per ton to produce. In Java, San Domingo, and Peru cane-sugar costs only £5 to £7 per ton. Cane-sugar in Cuba and the Colonies can be produced at a much lower cost; but, I would add, they say nothing about wages, which in Java are 5s. a week, as against 31s. 6d. here. It seems probable that if wages were as high in the West Indies, West Indian sugar would cost at least as much as British! They admit that no sugar-beet industry in the world is able to stand without support, but they are careful not to give any figures of existing subsidies abroad. They think that 'biologically' sugar-cane is a more efficient instrument for the production of sugar. They attach 'little importance' to the national advantages enumerated above, and then proceed to discount them in detail; they state that the 'primary' advantage to agriculture is the beneficial effect on succeeding crops, and that is not more than £3 per acre, while the subsidy for 1934-35 will be £17 per acre (it is now only £16), and that all advantages enumerated only amount to an argument that beet should be an assisted rather than an alternative crop.

They then turn to the argument of the subsidy as a relief measure, as the one important question to consider. They condemn it because, though the gross price, including transport costs, somewhat exceeds the cost of assistance, the net

cash price to the farmer is only slightly more. The assistance almost entirely creates the value of the crop. The same acreage of beet would be secured as cheaply by paying farmers to grow sugar-beet and keep them on the farm for use as they thought fit. Secondly, the relief is 'haphazard and inequitable.' It helps those farmers who can produce most cheaply; the variation in transport costs (2s. 6d. to 11s. 6d. per cwt.) favours those nearer the factory and excludes others too far away; it only helps one section of the industry, which in many of its branches is already assisted. It has even definite disadvantages (1) to agriculture, having displaced other crops as the pivot of the rotation of cultivation. I would suggest 'replaced' as the more correct term, even though it spoils the argument.

They do not even recommend their own scheme because of its complexities and need of public control. They find another disadvantage in the maintenance of the sugar-beet industry as a factor, even if a minor one, contributing to the disorganisation of the world market. So, to help the world market, the British farmer is to be jettisoned in order that other nations may flood us with their bounty-fed and sweated labour-produced sugar.

They recommend that the factories should be simply scrapped, with no compensation! Some, no doubt, have done themselves well, but even those who have paid no dividend are to share the common fate. There will be 'very considerable dislocation' in certain areas, but interim assistance should be given 'to assist farmers until they have been able to find alternative crops.'—What crops? Potatoes, of which last year there was a surplus of 1,500,000 tons, or mangolds, which can only be produced at a loss? They admit it would only be fair for home-produced sugar to receive the higher preference accorded to Colonial sugar at 6s. 9d. per cwt. And then 'if the world price of sugar recovered a little' (so there is hope after all!) a few factories might be able to carry on. But if the recovery is not immediate, what are these factories to do? Surely a cotton spinner has some idea how speedily an unused factory degenerates. During the period of 'very extensive dislocation' farmers are to be tided over by compensation for three years at a tapering rate of £3, £2, and £1 per acre. Nothing whatever

is to be done for the labourers in these areas. They lose at a stroke £4,000,000, or two-thirds of the present subsidy. But Agricultural Unemployment Insurance may have been brought in by that time, though, even if it is, there will not be enough work for these men to qualify for unemployment benefit. In a nutshell, they recommend the substitution of a subsidy for unemployment in place of a subsidy for work! No wonder the Agricultural Workers' Union is up in arms. Farmers' and landowners' unions have alike protested; so have the county councils specially affected, whose smallholders are faced with ruin. The Agricultural Committee of the Conservative Party have taken the matter up, and most of the leading newspapers, including even financial papers like the *Financial Times*, have added their chorus of vigorous disapproval. I will only add, without comment, that it has just been disclosed that the Committee did not visit a single factory or beet-growing area.

To turn to the Minority Report by Mr. Cyril Lloyd. He considers that in the present abnormal circumstances it is unsafe to be dogmatic on the *permanent* need of assistance. An improved world demand and a rise of wages (already demanded in Cuba) would make a great difference. He might have also cited the case of rubber, which at one time was quite as much depressed and has now revived. Moreover, restriction of output was successful before the war; it might well be again, however unpromising the outlook for the moment. Even though assistance, added Mr. Lloyd, will always be needed, it should be continued, if it can be justified by countervailing advantages. He pokes gentle fun at the argument that sugar-cane 'biologically' is a more efficient instrument for the production of sugar. For him 'the major consideration' is national, rather than biological: it is a question of Free Trade or Protection.

He points out the misleading, not to say disingenuous, nature of the figures given by his colleagues of the production cost of sugar-cane. They are the very lowest, and come from countries where production is cheapest (Peru, San Domingo, Java). He might have added that they are so below cost that Java is nearly ruined, her production having fallen from 2,939,000 to about 525,000 tons this year. The same witness who gave the figures emphasised the fact that the quantity

produced at these prices was strictly limited (the three countries in question only furnish 5 per cent. of the world's supply!), while many factories in Cuba (a country which has largely been kept going by United States preference) could not produce under £10 per ton. West Indian sugar could not be delivered here at much under £12. The price of £9 to £10 in the West Indies had only been reached by 'imprudent economies in labour.' The 'minimum costs quoted' have no relation to the actual cost of the 26,000,000 tons the world required.

As regards sugar-beet, Mr. Lloyd might also have stated that it is everywhere in receipt of State assistance, and everywhere, except in Holland, the assistance is greater than here, though labour conditions are far below English standards. The figures in shillings are: Holland 10.34, France 11.52, Great Britain 12.0 (now only 11.16), Italy 75.58, Spain 20.12, and Germany 21.78. That means that our sugar industry, which is only ten years old, is already doing with less assistance than almost all the Continental countries, in some of which sugar-beet has been grown for 100 years, and in all of which the home market is protected. If the actual amount of State aid is considered, ours now amounts to under £6,000,000, against France's £12,000,000, Germany's £34,000,000, and the United States' £43,340,000!

Mr. Lloyd also reveals that the adverse conclusion of the Majority as to the assistance to agriculture by the industry was based on the evidence of a single witness when all the others were of the contrary opinion (!) The Majority view that the assistance was 'extravagant' seems based on results of the early days of the subsidy when the growers received less than the total State assistance. To-day the position is reversed. 'This seems to prove neither the failure of the industry as a means of assistance nor a case of extravagance,' especially as the bye-products can be estimated at about £2,000,000 a year. The Majority call the method of assistance 'haphazard'; as a matter of fact, the factories have been erected in the most likely districts—no land east of a line from London to Derby and Leeds is more than 25 miles from a factory; and again, the Eastern Counties farmers were most in need of help, and it was in that area that the factories have come into existence. As for the inequalities

of the industry, these can be abolished without abolishing the industry. The reasons why the Majority regard the industry 'as an unsatisfactory means of providing agricultural assistance have either no substance in fact or can be remedied.'

Mr. Lloyd points out that Colonial cane-sugar is actually receiving from the British Exchequer, at its maximum, the equivalent of 7s. 9d. a cwt. of refined sugar. Yet to the poor British producer, who, he might have added, shares with the taxpayer in bearing the burden of remission, the Majority refused to give the extra 3s. 6d. a cwt. The 7s. 9d. a cwt.—which, willy-nilly, they cannot refuse him—cannot make the industry profitable either to farmers or factories, with our present labour costs fixed, as I have noted, by statute. The probability is that the English industry would have to close down, whatever the Majority may say to the contrary. We should then have the Gilbertian situation of the half-ruined British farmer subsidising the West Indies to grow sugar, but prevented from growing it himself; or, put in another way, the taxpayer would continue to give the West Indies £5,000,000 a year while refusing to the British farmer a slightly larger grant!

Passing to the cost of assisting the industry, Mr. Lloyd points to the progressive decline in the subsidy from 26s. a cwt. to 12s. last year and 11s. 3d. to-day as indicating that the reduction is likely to continue, as, indeed, his colleagues agree. As to future cost, all depends on the future price of sugar. The present price is admittedly artificial, fixed as it is by the price of 'dumped' sugar. The more artificial the price, the more unreasonable to make it a basis for a long-term policy, being now at its lowest and only a third of the pre-war price. This is due to the heavy stocks of sugar. On the other hand, world consumption does not exceed world's supply. All sugar produced at 4s. 5d. a cwt. means a considerable loss; almost everywhere that price is doubled or trebled by assistance to the producer. The price mentioned in the Majority Report of 10s. to 12s. a cwt. is the minimum price returning a profit to West Indian producers. A rise of 2s. would at once reduce the cost to the State by over £1,000,000. Everything suggests that the subsidy is now at its highest; part of it should therefore be regarded as being temporary, due to abnormal circumstances. It would

be an error of the first magnitude if it subsequently appeared that temporary market conditions had been permitted to dictate the abandonment of material assets, knowledge, and experience, built up at a cost to the State of over £45,000,000.

He forecasts a price of not less than 8s. to 9s. a cwt., which would still be $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. below pre-war prices. It is only since 1930 that the price has fallen below this figure, and he considers this estimate a conservative one. He agrees with his colleagues that a reduction is possible, if effected by easy stages. One might in the next few years make a reduction in the grant of 2s. to 3s. a cwt. of sugar; he forecasts 4s. 9d. a cwt. as sufficient protection in the long run. Before the war the Brussels Convention limited protection to 2s. 6d. a cwt. without injury to the sugar-beet industry. The present complicated system should be swept away and a simple tariff substituted which would obviate the presentation of an annual grant to Parliament.

Mr. Lloyd evaluates, very differently from his colleagues, the national advantages of the industry, and stresses the importance of four or five of these which they refused to 'recognise'—its combination with other crops as the keystone of the whole system, its substitution for less productive crops, the maintenance of the cultivation of land which would otherwise have gone derelict, and also of its higher productivity after sugar-beet. From this point of view the cumulative effect is very great—far greater than when the same facts are subjected to the 'diatomising' effect of his colleagues' logic. Again, home protection is a protection to consumers; it sets them, it might be added, beyond the machinations of trusts and cartels. If the price were put up only 1d. a lb., it would cost the consumer £20,000,000. From that point of view the assistance is an insurance.

Against the assumption that the road and rail traffic provided by the industry have been at the cost of British shipping, Mr. Lloyd points out that the cost of carriage at home is so much higher—35s. a ton as against 13s. 6d. (estimate for freights). So national transport is the gainer, as the loss of freights in shipping, even if all foreign sugar were carried in British bottoms (which is far from the case), equals only one-third of the gains of the road and rail transport, which has carried some 35,000,000 tons.

He might have added that the shipping industry has suffered far less. Shipowners earned £916,353 for sugar freights in 1923, £1,618,395 in 1926, and approximately £1,971,850 in 1934. Imports and exports (we now export sugar!) totalled in the same years 1,996,000, 1,842,000 and 2,323,000 tons; actually the amount exported was not far under the amount of home-grown sugar. Last year seaborne sugar was a record year for shipping companies and freights. Moreover, the sugar-beet industry has created a large demand for 'artificial,' especially potash, which cannot be produced in this country; this must have benefited shipping to the extent of many thousands of tons, and on the top of this the shipping companies received a subsidy of £2,000,000. On the other hand, they have been strangely dumb on the effects of the iron and steel duties, which have reduced imports from 2,000,000 tons to 450,000! The Majority evaluated an advantage of £3 an acre to the succeeding crops. They ignored the considerable loss on any alternative cleaning crop—which on mangolds, I would add, has been put at £5 an acre. The rest of the £17 (now £16) an acre is more than accounted for by foreign protection and the depressed price of sugar. Mr. Lloyd points out that a cash crop such as sugar-beet enables the farmer to turn over his capital in a shorter time; the certainty of price gives stability to the whole system, at a moment when some crops are 'literally unsaleable.' To drive the farmers into alternatives would simply produce a disastrous glut on the market. No alternative crop is in sight; and so long as agriculture requires assistance, 'sugar-beet is a satisfactory way of providing it.'

Even his colleagues find it impossible to deny that the assistance given to the industry has resulted in considerable relief to a large portion of the farmers. Sugar-beet is grown on at least half of the farms in five Eastern Counties, has kept thousands of acres under the plough, and has maintained a very high standard of farming. It probably provides additional employment for 30,000 rather than 20,000 man-years, as without sugar-beet unemployment would have been at a higher rate in arable areas than it was in the grass-lands. The factories account for 9000 men, or 4500 man-years. Adding the figures of those trades that supply coal, limestone, etc., it equals at least 30,000 man-years. If all these

persons were thrown out of employment—and this is a conservative estimate—it would involve the dismissal of at least as many more. As it is, the cost of providing relief at the rate of £250 per man-year—the figure given by the May Committee for direct and indirect employment—would be actually more for those directly thrown out of employment than the present cost of the subsidy to the State! In all 85,000 are permanently or casually employed by the industry; and this leaves out of consideration the thousands of persons (local tradesmen, etc.) who indirectly depend on agriculture for their living. I would add that, if the Majority conclusions are adopted, there will be such a crash in East Anglia that Durham and South Wales will seem flourishing areas in comparison. The result will be widespread unemployment, hundreds of thousands of acres put out of cultivation, absolute ruin for the majority of the farmers and small-holders, and tens of thousands of labourers on public assistance, and that at a time when the Government are contemplating putting hundreds, and even thousands, of men on the land, regardless of expense; evicting, in fact, the skilled and replacing them with the ignorant and untried!

Mr. Lloyd outlines a scheme for public control which is at variance with the intricate and detailed machinery of his colleagues. It includes the appointment of Sugar Commissioners and a price for beet on farms, and not at the factory. He points out that the greater part of the benefit of the low-priced sugar to the consumer has been at the expense of the producer, while some has been at that of the taxpayer. In place of the present cumbersome 'give-and-take system' he proposes an entire remission of the present excise, with a levy to meet the further marginal requirements of the industry, of 6*d.* a cwt. on all sugar consumed, similar to the levy of the Wheat Act. It would amount to one-twentieth of a penny per lb., and would seldom affect the retail price. Personally I believe a still more simple and effective method would be a direct addition to the present sugar duties, which would certainly not be so costly to the Exchequer, and which would help to keep the industry on its feet without raising the price to the consumer. It is all a matter of calculation. We are still the chief free market in the world; practically a third (970,000 tons) is sold here out of an estimated 3,000,000.

If we put up our market dues, it will still have to come here, to a very large extent. If it were properly calculated, I do not think the consumer would suffer, because when there is a glut—and in this case it is a considerable one—the producer pays the dues to keep the market. Even if the retail price were raised slightly, the English consumer would still be getting his sugar far cheaper than in any foreign country; in France the price is 3*d.* and in Germany 4½*d.* a lb. That duties can be substantially raised without affecting the consumer may be seen from the iron and steel duties. This would obviate any need of applying the vast machinery of the Marketing Acts; with the Wheat Act it is not needed. In any case, it would be wise to wait and see if the existing boards will make good before we embark on another full-blown marketing scheme, with its mass of costly regulations and restrictions. The expenses of the Wheat Commission are less than 1 per cent. A Sugar Commission would do all the things that might be found necessary (such as calculating the amount of the subsidy, etc.) infinitely cheaper and more effectively than a Marketing Board.

I have allowed the two Reports to speak for themselves by trying to give as adequately as I could, within the space at my command, a fair summary of their arguments and conclusions, while adding my own comments, where I thought they might be of help. It is for the reader to decide on which side the balance of evidence lies. I will only add that I hope they will come to the conclusion that in this duel of wits the Majority represent the theories of the past which are no longer applicable to present conditions, and that Mr. Lloyd represents the practical man in close contact with the realities of the world of to-day. The one side, as Mr. Elliot has said, bases its conclusions on things that can be weighed and measured; the other, while giving full consideration to figures, also gives weight to those numerous important facts which are recalcitrant to statistical treatment, and especially to those *Imponderabilia* which, as Bismarck has said, really decide fundamental issues.

CLOUDESLEY BRERETON.

THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE

By LORD MELCHETT

THE economic and political future of Palestine is in danger of being jeopardised through a number of misconceptions which have crept into discussion and writing concerning the trend of the development of the Jewish National Home. These misconceptions arise, I feel, chiefly through a failure to realise the changed aspect of Zionism during recent years. It is no longer possible to look upon the Jewish population of Palestine in terms only of Halutzim in blue shirts and shorts and patriarchs with long white beards. The colonisation of our National Home could not permanently be restricted to the activities of a small number of enthusiastic pioneers, who were prepared to sacrifice the well-being of their normal professions in order to eke out a precarious existence cultivating the land of their forefathers by simple pioneer methods.

What is developing in Palestine is a new modern life of tremendous force and energy, which is rapidly expanding so as to include all the normal attributes of modern civilised national existence. There is now for the first time for some 2000 years a great city life, teeming with social problems, but carrying with it, on the other hand, a high development of the fine arts, of the theatre, of music, and of all the other essential factors in a complete national culture. The extreme rapidity of this development, intensified as it has been as a result of the recrudescence of persecution, has created in some quarters the impression that immigration is proceeding more rapidly than the capacity of the leaders of Zionism to establish an adequate degree of social discipline and good behaviour. Necessarily, discipline is bound to be a little weak in the earlier stages of colonisation, but during the visit to Palestine from which I have just returned, it was exceed-

ingly gratifying to observe the development of an adequate technique for the mastering of this problem.

During my stay, there took place the second Maccabia, a great sports festival, in which 5000 Jews from thirty-five different countries took part, which provided a striking demonstration of the capacities of the Jewish people for dealing with problems of organisation and administration. In no other country could an entirely amateur organisation, in face of so many difficulties, have succeeded in carrying through such a project. The magnificent order and discipline, not only of the Maccabim themselves, but also of the vast crowds of spectators, was highly significant. Twice in one week 50,000 spectators attended this great function in an orderly and decent manner, with the assistance of a relatively insignificant body of police. This demonstration of capacity for improvisation and organisation could only successfully have been made by a people deeply imbued with a great ideal—that of rebuilding their nation and their land. In general, throughout the country, the behaviour of the people will compare favourably with that of similar bodies anywhere else in the world.

The second misconception to which I wish to draw attention concerns the financial situation in Palestine, in which a number of people see what they call excessive speculation. Yet the volume of speculation in the country in any objectionable sense is negligible, and such as there is arises almost of necessity from the circumstances of the country's development. The large amount of capital available for investment in a small country, combined with an acute shortage of labour, has given rise to a perfectly normal material increase in values, which will continue either regularly or spasmodically. Even, however, if some part of this rise is lost at a later stage, no great economic damage will be done, provided the financial situation and the banks do not become involved in a mass of indiscreet loans based on fictitious values. So far as I have been able to ascertain, such a condition does not exist and is unlikely to arise. The people of Palestine are far too shrewd and sensible to deposit their money in banks which will collapse at the first tremor of crisis. It would, however, be wise as soon as possible to promulgate laws for the prevention of the develop-

ment of a number of small weak banks which might be the cause of anxiety in face of any normal shocks of economic fluctuation.

The real economic danger in connexion with the rise in values is not wanton speculation, but an acute shortage of labour, which has given rise to an exceptionally high rate of wages. In itself this might not be an evil. In fact, it encourages the development of an invaluable class of high-grade workpeople. The danger is that the uneconomic cost level may encourage factory and agricultural development in neighbouring countries with lower wage levels, lower values and lower taxes, with the ultimately disastrous result that they would be competing in the Palestine market with Palestinian products produced on a non-competitive basis. Unfortunately, this situation cannot be met by permitting a higher rate of emigration, for the development work, in which housing is an important item, is a condition precedent to the absorption of additional immigrants and would intensify the shortage of labour and force a further rise in values.

This vicious circle is not peculiar to Palestine, but it is accentuated there because of the smallness of the area subject to such intensive development. The velocity and energy of Zionism is likely to increase for many years to come, owing to European and world anti-Semitism, so that one is forced to the conclusion that an increase in the area of development is vital not merely to the solution of the present economic problem but also to the whole future of Zionism. It has been suggested that the increase in the area of Zionist development should take place in Syria. This, in my view, would be disastrous. For centuries we have struggled under the disadvantage of multiple loyalties, and one of the benefits given to us by the new Palestine has been the elimination of this grave psychological problem. Its reintroduction to Eretz Israel would be a disservice, the effects of which cannot be exaggerated.

It is essential that the economic facts of the situation should be faced broadly, and if that is done it is obvious that ultimately the inevitable solution is the inclusion of Transjordan within the area of Zionist development. The Jordan cannot remain a permanent barrier between abounding

prosperity and the misery, penury and starvation with which Transjordan is afflicted. The political difficulties in the way of such a solution must not be minimised, but sooner or later economic necessity will compel us to deal with them. When such a solution becomes effective, the whole aspect of Zionism will change. There will be a much greater area of immigration, the millions of pounds still awaiting productive investment will find a wider outlet, there will be ample elbow room for both Jew and Arab, and, from the point of view of world economics, a greater area of barren land will be brought into fruitful cultivation, which will call for the outlay of the energies, the abilities, and the capital of one if not two generations.

It may not be amiss here to suggest that the political problem may prove more simple of solution than at first would appear. Both Jewry and the Arab population of Palestine and Transjordan owe much to the British nation, and the political future of these two areas is a matter of outstanding importance to the British Empire as a whole. Jewry has seen many empires come and go, and many great nations rise and fall, but, until the rise of the British Empire, has seen no system able to give freedom with protection, command loyalty without oppression, and prize honour based upon mutual respect. The British Empire is, in fact, the only organisation in the world capable of handling such a situation as I visualise in Palestine and Transjordan. It is natural that the conception of a greater Palestine within the generous embrace of the British Empire should be misunderstood and should be the subject of a certain amount of violent criticism. But we must remember that Zionism itself has been, and still is, misunderstood, its ideals misrepresented, and its creators maligned. Transjordan, as I have said, must ultimately, through sheer economic necessity, be included in the area of Eretz Israel; and the only way, in my view, of making the whole territory happy and free is as a self-governing institution within the British Empire. This policy could hardly meet with the disapproval of the League of Nations, for it is entirely in keeping with the spirit of the mandates, and it is to me inconceivable that any serious objection should be raised by other nations.

From the strategic point of view, quite apart from the

interests of the internal economic and political situation in Palestine, such a development is of tremendous importance to the British Empire. Palestine stands as a vital link in the chain of Imperial communications between the East and the West. It holds the key position for all air routes between this country and the East, and, in view of the Egyptian situation, must always be a vital factor in the development of air routes to East and South Africa.

The great new ports which have been opened have already become, and will continue to be, essential to the success of a large part of our seaborne trade, and in time of war offer exceptional facilities for transference of stores and the reconditioning of vessels. The whole area is, moreover, excellently protected from invasion by the air by the natural barrier of the desert.

Finally, the Imperial solution of the Palestine problem would provide the British Empire with a healthy and intelligent population in the Middle East, always ready in case of necessity to take up arms in an Imperial cause.

In thus broadly putting forward my conception of Palestine's destiny I am fully aware of the difficulties to be encountered before it will secure general acceptance. Such things are in any case not capable of sudden accomplishment, and it will take time to accustom people's minds to the idea, which is at the moment only a reality to a far-seeing few. In the end, however, I am convinced that it provides the only sensible and just way out of the present *impasse*.

MELCHETT.

ENGLAND AND AMERICA

By POULTNEY BIGELOW

It is an honour that I deeply recognise, this request that I, an octogenarian Yankee, make my valedictory on a theme so near to my heart. But I can speak only for *my* America; and England is to me only my corresponding class of the Nordic race and of scholarly, farming or soldiering occupation. The mass of Press-fed non-thinkers read no real history, nor do they profit by travel. They learn of other countries through caricature or newspapers that preach peace on one page and stimulate war feeling on another.

If it is true that we pardon much when we know all, then let me first explain why we differ in language. It is the climate that is largely to blame: we have not the soft winters that permit cows and sheep to browse the whole year on luscious grass. Our winters are fiercely cold, with perhaps a foot of snow underfoot. Our summers are fiercely hot and our lawns turn yellow in August or September. Our horses and other animals, to say nothing of men and women, run to leanness, hollow eyes, high cheek bones, and voices that soon lose the melodious cadence common in England.

Travellers in new England noticed this climatic effect within the second generation, and it persisted so long as new England maintained its character of transplanted east coast Englishmen leading an outdoor life as farmers, fishermen, trappers, and merchant adventurers. This period may be roughly taken as between 1620 and our horrible and futile Civil War (1860-65). Those two early centuries of new England made the Golden Age of my ancestors. We were more purely English then than England herself; we of Suffolk were wholly of Norman or Nordic or Anglo-Saxon descent. A Jew or a Catholic was a curiosity, as might be a Lama of Tibet or a Haji from Arabia to-day.

The Civil War closed that happy period by crushing the southern half of our country and turning loose the now helpless and leaderless African slaves. Sailing-ships soon gave place to steamers, railways were feverishly subsidised, and emigration became a trade almost as profitable as that of smuggling blacks from the Guinea coast in former times.

Factories flourished wherever water-power permitted, and Northern products were forced upon the Southern States in spite of their protests. It was the beginning of our foul financial operations that flourish under high protective tariffs and consequent monopolies or trusts. From being outdoor people of simple farmer habits, we became fat or flaccid stock exchange gamblers, real estate promoters, dwellers in steam-heated offices or factories.

The cry of the moneyed class was for cheap labour, and that meant Catholics from Canada, Ireland, Hungary, Bohemia—factory fodder. The farmer-bred Protestant soon discovered that machinery was destined to ruin the States on the Atlantic, because wheat could be sold in Boston, after a railway journey of 1000 miles from Chicago, more cheaply than it could be raised on the old farm.

To-day you may motor throughout new England amid abandoned homesteads in a wilderness of swamp and forest, finding civilisation only where hideous factories and their dependent cottages make one weep for what we once possessed. Yes, we became rich in money—in luxuries; yet in the things of real value we were a poorer people after the Civil War than before.

Consider the names of Bancroft and Prescott in history; Emerson and Lowell in *belles lettres*; Longfellow and Bryant in poesy; Webster, who made the first great Dictionary of the English Language; Washington Irving and Artemus Ward in delicate humour; Cooper and Hawthorne as novelists; Trumbull, Stewart, and Sully in portrait-painting. All these belong to England as to America—and they live to-day in our common language. And in the field of science, is Franklin forgotten—the author of 100 practical inventions; or Whitney, who made the first cotton-gin; or Fulton, who first applied steam to propel boats, and who also built and steered boats below water? Surely future historians will agree that the United States were more important cul-

turally during the 100 years preceding our Civil War than at any time since.

In such a sketch as this I have not referred to the services of America in the field of exploration—illustrated by such names as Fremont and Wilkes; nor to such pioneers in bird study as Audubon; nor to the many inventors of labour-saving farming implements—all prior to our war between the North and South. And now to another phase of American development. We have ever been successful as pirates, African slave-runners, and, more particularly, highly respectable smugglers.

The inducements were tempting, and we had every facility for building ships of any tonnage and usually more speedy than those of England. From the very start new England regarded the navigation laws of old England as unjust—nay, unconstitutional. We left England at our own expense and fought our way amidst forests and Red Indians without any help from home. We seceded from the mother nest in 1620, much as the Boers of the Cape seceded from the British tax-collector shortly after the Napoleonic Wars, or as Brigham Young seceded from the United States when he founded polygamy in Salt Lake City. But our secession was little noticed in Westminster until we began to send ships abroad and fetch rum from the West Indies and stuffs from France or Holland. The Mother Country did as other mothers did in the seventeenth century—compelled their offspring to work for *them*. In other words, Yankee ships were ordered to trade with England rather than with other countries, or even their sister Colonies. And thus did smuggling become confused with patriotism and American shipbuilding receive immense impetus.

When the Great War carried us irresistibly to the assistance of England there arose a furious attack upon Congress which mere man could not stem. A conspiracy of women lashed their weak-minded sisters into a frenzy of political fanaticism which resulted in the so-called 'Dry Law.' This piece of crazy legislation stirred the latent atavism of our Anglo-Saxon people, and once more the smuggler was rehabilitated as 'your only honest thief'! Once more was our Government forced to blockade some 10,000 miles of coast line and construct costly speed-boats to chase down the ubiquitous

rum-runners. Smuggling became a royal sport. The successful 'bootleggers,' as they were called, made fortunes by the aid of Providence and complaisant coastguardsmen: St. Pierre and Miquelon, Bermuda and the Bahamas, these were among the many points of departure for the swiftest craft that money could purchase.

Every prosperous member of high society had his family bootlegger, as he had his family physician or legal adviser. Dinner parties in Washington or Newport offered no external difference from what they were before the Dry Law cursed our land. Champagne and Scotch whisky were only a trifle more costly; the smuggler paid no tax and smuggled only the best. Indeed, only those of proved loyalty to their clients could build up a lucrative practice, for connoisseurs dealt only with smugglers of high character.

In matter of sport and fashion, let us recall that from earliest Colonial times to this day there has been cheerful subordination to England in matter of man's dress, and largely also of woman's. The American Press and the American Irish may ventilate vast volumes of spite against England, yet each year bears fresh witness to the spell that makes every good Yankee seek spiritual refreshment amid the ancient and honoured monuments of his ancestors.

Within our borders are millions of Germans, yet in two generations their language disappears and they follow the pilgrimage to the Strand and Trafalgar Square rather than enrich the 'main' streets of Iowa or Minnesota. America admires, but does not follow, Mussolini and Hitler; when, however, an English Sovereign or the Prince of Wales turns up his trousers or turns down a segment of his glove—presto! every American from the Rio Grande to Hudson's Bay ratifies the Royal whim by immediate imitation.

Of course, I include the Canadians as Americans—I cannot help it. Our paid parliamentarians treat one another unkindly in public, yet each summer we, the people, treat the St. Lawrence as a negligible *octroi*. Thousands of us have a second home on the other side of the border, and motoring between the two is no more an adventure than running from London to Edinburgh. Canadian and American universities mingle in sports—indeed, to one from an alien country, there would seem less difference between a New Englander and a

citizen of Toronto than between a planter in South Carolina and a farmer or mechanic in Michigan.

Since 1850, when the schooner yacht *America* made her triumphal tour amongst the regatta centres of Great Britain, there have been many yacht races—some across the Atlantic. Such races rouse but languid interest unless England be in the contest. Harvard and Yale—both founded by Englishmen over two centuries ago—have held annual boat races from about the same time as the first crossing of the *America*. These contests are of national interest—the counterpart of the Oxford *v.* Cambridge ones on the Thames.

We have copied England in our stroke and our methods of crew training. We also race on a *Thames*—at new London, over a four-mile course—tide water. Nor are we ever happy until we have a crew at Henley, or otherwise test our strength in England. The same is true of polo, tennis, or any sport congenial to both people. When the present Prince of Wales visited the United States on the occasion of the polo matches on Long Island in 1925 my friends, who came on their yachts from Newport and Bar Harbour, cheerfully paid \$100 for a seat. And the dollar then was an honest one—a golden one. The same friends would have deemed \$1 sufficient had the match been other than an Anglo-American contest.

I can add nothing new on this most important of themes. All wise men think alike on the duty, or the expediency, of loyalty to one's tribe, one's race, one's ideals—I had nearly said one's common flag. And what I have written finds echo, I venture to think, no less in Melbourne, Auckland, Cape Town, Jamaica or Toronto than in San Francisco, Chicago or New York. My travels have made me friends in many countries of Europe: I can scarce recall a capital where I have not enjoyed hospitality and stimulating conversation in military, diplomatic, and academic circles. Germany is dear to me, and so is France, but—but I know not how to indicate the subtle difference between the politeness we offer to a foreigner and the rude frankness of our intercourse with such as we love and trust. Let me illustrate.

G. A. Henty was a rough-bearded Briton who wrote splendid boys' books and who had been war correspondent on every battlefield, commencing with the Crimea. He was one

whom I dearly loved. Scarcely a week-end between Easter and Michaelmas that we did not cruise together aboard his beamy 80-ton schooner, the *Egret*—for he was a veritable sea dog. The worse the weather, the more happy did he feel and the more communicative. This happened in the Presidential reign of Theodore Roosevelt—famous for his much noise on war drums. He had just launched an offensive ultimatum in regard to Venezuela. Henty loved me as I loved him, for on meeting me at that period of my life he roared out: 'See here, Bigelow, what you "damned" Yankees are up to now!' To which I replied: 'How dare you call me a damn Yankee!' To which Henty answered: 'Oh, that's all right; you know what I mean!' Of course I did. We loved one another.

England and America have spent much of their time during the past three centuries in framing defamatory aphorisms for export—but we love one another. Dickens made spiteful caricatures. They made Americans wince, but we worshipped him as we did Thackeray.

Punch has been my weekly delight for the past eighty years, yet every week or so finds the typical American represented as a hopeless bounder—a booby with spectacles and ridiculous dress, puffing a huge cigar, cocked up at the corner of his mouth. But we love *Punch*—he is on every American club table, if not in every American home.

War between England and America is absurd—beyond even the power of the Sinn Fein Irish to bring about. Our Press, which is almost wholly under alien or Jewish influence, makes much of trifling incidents, but the great mass of reasoning people scout such efforts. How begin a war? How intern the Americans in Canada or the Canadians in the States? How deal with English settled and married in the western world? Even in our war of 1812 Canada could not, or would not, apply the law regarding aliens; we fought for three years and shook hands in 1815 without knowing for what we had fought—at least, it was not referred to in the Treaty of Peace. It is astonishing how much we love one another after a good, clean fight.

POULTNEY BIGELOW.

Malden on Hudson,
New York.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH GENIUS OVERSEAS¹

By A. WYATT TILBY

A HUNDRED years ago there were only 10,000,000 English-speaking people outside the British Isles—more than 9,000,000 of whom were in the United States—as against 20,000,000 English-speaking people at home. To-day the position is reversed. The population of the British Isles is close on 50,000,000; but the white population of the United States and the British Dominions is over 130,000,000. This astonishing transformation is not yet complete. It seems probable that population in the British Isles has now nearly reached its effective limit.

Overseas, however, the reverse is the case. The vast migratory movements of the nineteenth century have certainly not overcrowded the available territories. Economics apart, there is no reason in nature why the soil of the United States should not support 300,000,000 instead of 120,000,000 people, Canada 100,000,000 instead of 10,000,000, or the three antipodean territories—Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—another 100,000,000. Five hundred millions in all—that is to say, more than the present population of China or India, and practically the same as the present population of continental Europe.

The destiny and direction of this immense power, and the potential prospects of so vast a population, united by common ancestry and speech, is the most important problem of our day. Here is a new civilisation growing and expanding under our eyes. What is its present character and tendency, and what have been its outstanding achievements and deficiencies in the past century?

¹ The reader is referred to 'Regional Varieties of the English Genius,' *The Nineteenth Century*, June 1934.

The best way of answering that question, it seemed to me, was to take a list of the more eminent men produced by the United States and the British Dominions, to tabulate and analyse their careers, and to compare their interests, inventions, and discoveries with those of the English people at home and with other nations. Clearly no list that can be suspected of an *ex parte* or *ad hoc* bias will suffice, so I took the *Encyclopædia Britannica* and (with occasional surprise at the appearance of some particular name) accepted its criterion of eminence.

The list when complete totalled 1491 names, of whom 1291 came from the United States, 113 from the British Dominions, while 83 were born in foreign countries but were English-speaking either by ancestry or adoption.² Roughly speaking, then, the proportion of distinction between the British Dominions and the United States (1 to 11) is much the same as between their respective populations to-day—a surprising fact, seeing that the British Dominions are relatively younger and their accumulated ancestral populations therefore less numerous than those of the old American Colonies and their extensions. But of the British Dominion total the great majority—73 out of 113—came from Canada, the senior Dominion; and the majority of these 73 come from Quebec and Ontario, which are not only the oldest provinces of the Dominion, but also lie well within what we shall discover to be the most fertile intellectual belt of the new English-speaking people.

One secondary point may be cleared away before we come to the main problems. Seventy-six of my 1491 famous persons were women, or 1 in 19, which is close to the 1 in 18 ratio in the British Isles. A very high proportion of the famous oversea women came from the Atlantic States—28 from New England, 10 from New York, and 6 from Philadelphia—two-thirds of the entire American total. This figure indicates, clearly, what both the British and the British Dominion statistics confirm in detail, that women have little chance of distinction in a community until it has reached a certain level of leisure and comfort. In other words, men determine the type of a new civilisation; women merely influence its direction afterwards.

² The British list, compiled mainly from the same source, contained 1800 names.

To come now to the two main questions—the geographical distribution of genius among the new English-speaking peoples, and the variety, the specialisation, and limitation of its character and achievements. New England, of course, easily heads the local analysis, with 455 names out of the total of 1291—more than 1 in 3; and of these Massachusetts has produced exactly half—228. But when area and population are taken into account Connecticut and little Rhode Island, both smaller than the mother State, run it close for intellectual distinction, with 97 and 22 names respectively. New York, which is very nearly the area of England, and which has been since 1820 the most populous of the States, comes second to Massachusetts, with 214 eminent names—a considerable fall in the relative fertility of talent; and Pennsylvania, founded at much the same time, only a little smaller than New York, and never very far behind in population, shows another heavy falling off with only 114. After that the decline is rapid and progressive as we go further south.³ The Virginias have 78, Maryland 29, North and South Carolina 17 and 29; Delaware, Georgia, and Alabama 8 each. All these, except Alabama, are States of the old Colonial foundation, and the time-factor, therefore, operates in their favour.

When we go north-west we begin to pick up again. Ohio, smaller and younger than Virginia, just beats the intellectual record of its parent with 81 important names. Illinois, younger still, has 42 and Indiana 29—both creditable records on the weight-for-age basis. Wisconsin and Michigan have 14 and 13 respectively; but Iowa, a typical agricultural State, with the same size, population and age as Wisconsin and Michigan, no more than 10. The nine States of the Middle West have altogether 209 distinguished names; and when their youth is contrasted with the relative age of New England and New York, it can hardly be said that their record falls short of their elders. But when we go south again there is a falling off once more. Kentucky—a State which, incidentally, is distinguished for the quality as well as

³ American life is rural rather than urban, and the great city therefore appears less often as the birthplace of her great men than would be the case in Europe. Of her total of 1291, for example, 70 were born in New York city, 62 in Boston, and 50 in Philadelphia (no other American city approached these figures)—that is, 1 in 7; but in England London alone produced 293 out of 1222—nearly 1 in 4.

the quantity of its human product—leads with 26 out of 66; Missouri has only 13, and Tennessee 11. No other State reaches double figures till we cross the Rockies to California, which has 14 out of 25 prominent westerners—a quite exceptional proportion. Apart, however, from Utah—which stands surprisingly high with 6 distinguished names—no other western State has more than 1; and several of the newer States—Oklahoma, Arizona, Nevada, Wyoming, New Mexico, and (rather unexpectedly) Washington and both the Dakotas—are not represented at all. Their time, no doubt, will come.

It is much the same in Canada. The Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland have 21, Quebec 23, and Ontario 24 important names; whereas Manitoba has only 2, and British Columbia 1. Alberta and Saskatchewan, again (giants in size but striplings in age), are not represented at all. Here, however, an important point arises, for 16 of the 23 distinguished men of Quebec were French Canadians, and reference to the South African list shows that 13 of the 19 South Africans were of Dutch origin. What proportion of the rest of our great names were of non-British stock, and what effect is that factor likely to have on these new civilisations? Geography is environment; but what about heredity?

The population of the United States and Canada, as a whole, is imported, not indigenous. The majority, it is true, were born in America, but a considerable proportion is only one generation old in the new continent. As in Australia and New Zealand, the racial roots, the trunk of its tradition, and the sap of its culture have all come from Europe; but, unlike Australia and New Zealand, North America derives from more than one country of Europe. The oldest city in the United States—St. Augustine, Florida—is Spanish. Two of the main gateways of the New World—Quebec and New Orleans—were French by foundation, and French and Spanish place-names are scattered at large over the west and south of North America. In the east, New York was once Dutch; and Germans and Scandinavians, Catholic Pole, Orthodox Russian, and refugee Jew have followed English, Scots, and Irish settlers across the Atlantic and the Alleghenies to the great golden west, to the far frozen north, and even to

the sub-tropical south, where 10,000,000 negroes still remember something of the manners and the music of their old homes in Central Africa.

Here, then, is a mixture of sources far more varied than went to the making of England or France a thousand years before. Can we attempt to distinguish between them and evaluate their respective contributions to the new civilisation of America? Up to a point, yes. Family names, after all, generally persist, and names usually reveal national or racial origins. I scanned my lists carefully for such indications as presented themselves, and found that 69 out of the 1291—roughly speaking, 1 in 18—were of non-British stock. The actual proportion is probably a little higher, as some names have been Anglicised since immigration. Of these the Dutch led in the United States with 22, largely thanks to the original settlement in New York being in a key position; and the Germans (who came over in large numbers after the European revolution of 1848) were second with 16. The Scandinavians produced 4—a number that was not disproportionate in view of their smaller immigration; and there were also 3 Poles, 2 Hungarians, and 1 Croat. On the Latin side there were no eminent Italians, only 1 Spaniard, and 9 Frenchmen (or men of French descent) in the United States list, or, if we include Quebec, 25 Frenchmen in all. A curious but explicable disproportion.

The early tide of Spanish immigration receded from Florida and the Californias and flowed south to Mexico and the Brazils; the later Italian immigrants have a homing instinct which takes them back to Umbria and Sicily when things prosper. The French alone among the Latins had firmer roots, and for many a long year it looked as though France would play at least an equal part with Spain and Britain in the new American civilisation. It would be curious to speculate what the effect would be to-day had that happened, for the Spanish intellect has everywhere proved less fertile than the French. It is made for action, not thought; is quick to explore, not to explain; but it is reactionary rather than progressive, whereas the French is the reverse. The French intellect is clearly better suited to the new conditions of a new world, but it was not to be; the Spaniards held the south, whereas the French empire of the north shrank to an

enclave on the St. Lawrence and a pleasant memory on the Mississippi, and French influence has perceptibly declined in the United States for a century past.

Of the other non-British sources on my list, the Jews only numbered 9—a number whose smallness surprised me until I recollected that the great Jewish influx into the United States only dates from the late nineteenth century. There were 7 famous negroes, and in two cases a strain of Indian blood was recorded. (It may have been present in a few other instances.)

The figures as they stand, then, leave no doubt. For good or ill, the dominant heredity factor in the new civilisation of North America is British and, since the days of wholesale immigration are over, is likely to remain so. In Australia and New Zealand it is almost wholly British. In South Africa alone the basic mentality is more Dutch than English.⁴

But far more important than either the geographical distribution of genius or the ancestral source of a civilisation is its actual character, its disposition and outlook on life and the problems of life. Quality and direction, after all, are more than quantity and mass: 100,000,000 robots endlessly repeating the same set tasks may count for less in the scale than one inventive genius constructing a machine which renders all their labour superfluous. Let us try this new American civilisation by that test, and see what it has produced and omitted to produce. Here an analysis of the occupations and chosen pursuits of the more famous representatives of the new English-speaking people overseas, and a comparison with the older civilisation in the British Isles, will help us.

Of those whom it is possible to classify, public life claims 440, literature and the arts 457, the sciences (including inventions and engineering) 240, and religion 48. In comparison with the British Isles, the American list contains a substantially higher proportion of politicians; a similar proportion engaged in literature and the arts, but a somewhat different distribution from that of England within those categories; and a very considerably lower proportion of divines.

⁴ An attempt to distinguish between the quantitative proportions of English, Scots, Irish and Welsh contributions to oversea civilisation proved inconclusive.

But these large classifications are crude and in some respects misleading. Let us take them in more detail.

Politicians and lawyers—the term is largely interchangeable—come from every State, as befits a democratic republic; indeed, the very fact that America has a double system of government, State and Federal, multiplies political opportunities in comparison with a unitary constitution like Britain. The standard of achievement, possibly of ability, is not uniformly high—politics is, after all, the art of the possible, and of principles modified by practical expediency—but a country that has produced Jefferson, Madison and Henry Clay, Abraham Lincoln and the Roosevelts need not fear comparison with European standards. In one respect, however, the list on which these calculations were based seemed to me incomplete. It contained (and rightly so) the men who had reached high executive positions, but it omitted (and wrongly so) some of the men who merely had ideas; in other words, the administrators were too many, the reformers too few. And this in itself makes some considerable difference, especially in any attempt to compare east and west: for while the Presidents have so far all come from eastern or near-eastern States—mainly from Massachusetts, New York, the Virginias, and Ohio—the experimental and constructive ideas which make for political progress have mostly come from the west.

Soldiers. The very large number of soldiers (125) who followed the statesmen in the list of public men was certainly a surprise. It recalled the fact (which we are sometimes apt to forget) that the first hundred years of the Republic's life were very stormy, and that the cult of peace as an end rather than as a means to an end only dates from the close of the Civil War. For half a century the martial spirit has run below the surface, but I doubt if it would be hard to resurrect if any vital interest were involved.

Divines are far less conspicuous in the American list than the English, and this in spite of the fact that the pulpit has been at least as popular on the west as the east side of the Atlantic. There has been no lack of preachers, from the great Channing to the fervent Moody, but the United States has produced no great doctor of the Church,—neither an Anselm nor a Wiclif, neither a Francis nor a Loyola; and in

place of Butler, Berkeley and Paley, its chief thinker is Jonathan Edwards, who is no longer, I suppose, much read. This paucity of great divines is partly due, of course, to the increasing secularity of life during the nineteenth century, which diverted many intellects that would once have been dedicated to religion into educational or philanthropic work. But in America, at least, the change is less significant than it seems on the surface, for the Republic has not only followed the English tradition in producing a steady stream of missionaries and evangelists—it has also introduced (what England has never done) two new and original religious revelations. The heroic founders of the Latter Day Saints both came from Vermont when the Green Mountain was still a State of frontiersmen; Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of Christian Science, on the other hand, was a late product of the decaying puritan tradition of New Hampshire two generations after the pioneer Mormons.

To pass now to *literature* and the *arts* and their modern rivals the *sciences*. Many of the authors on my list, which numbered 256, were unknown to me even by name. This may have been ignorance, but I am more inclined to think that the collection in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* was too inclusive. There is always a tendency for men of letters to immortalise many of their own species.

America has produced several noted poets—Longfellow, Lowell, Whittier, Bryant and others—but only one, Walt Whitman, is near the first class. Compared with a similar English list, there is a deficiency both in the quality and quantity of American verse.⁵ There have been many admirable novelists, from Poe and Hawthorne to O. Henry and Sinclair Lewis, and the American novel succeeds in portraying and interpreting provincial atmosphere. Yet there is no great American drama, and the deficiency is at first sight puzzling. It is certainly not due to any puritan inhibition, for there are dozens of theatres, producers, and actors in the United States; and the quick action necessary to a drama in comparison with a novel should appeal to a people who value time and speed even in their pleasures.

⁵ This is true also of Australasia and South Africa. Macaulay's *dictum*, that poetry is the first of the arts to flourish in a young civilisation, seems not to apply in modern times.

The artists numbered altogether 200, exactly half of whom were painters, 33 sculptors, 19 architects, and 15 musicians. (The rest were connected with the theatre.) Undoubtedly the American painters, who include the splendid Sargent and the incomparable Whistler, are among the greatest of their craft; and success is as pronounced in this sphere as failure in the musical world, which is complete and absolute, both in quantity and quality. There is very little English music of the first class, but at least there is a little: there is no American music that matters at all. The English-speaking people, both in their old and new homes, have as keen a sense of beauty as any other. But the evidence shows that they perceive beauty more readily through eye than ear, and even with the ear they are more at ease with the spoken medium of verse than with the wordless medium of music. And this tendency betrays itself even in such music as we have, for some of our songs are exquisite and original, whereas our sonatas and symphonies are merely derivative.

The intellectual growth of America coincided in time with the great increase of interest all over Europe in science and scientific method; and the new educational endowments, which the United States support with an almost passionate faith that had no counterpart in England, spread over the whole vast field of experiment and inquiry. In the quantity of work produced biology came first, geology second, and astronomy third; but in point of quality the position should probably be reversed. There is, however, one curious deficiency in the list—a considerable shortage of mathematicians, in which America is definitely inferior to Europe.

This analysis in detail of intellectual interest and achievement in the new civilisation may well have seemed somewhat tedious to those who have followed it. But certain results emerge which could not otherwise have been obtained. It shows, in the first place, significant similarities and dissimilarities between the new English-speaking civilisations overseas and the older English civilisation of the British Isles. There is, for example, a common interest in politics which would, if examined further, be found to cover political theory and experiment as well as actual administration.⁶ The

⁶ The new English-speaking civilisations have produced no formal political philosophies like those of More, Harrington, Hobbes, Burke and Bentham, which are

new English people, like the old, has a strong political sense—in the main, practical and cautious, slow to innovate, but more ready to improvise; averse from extreme, though not from decisive, action; and, with all its practical attitude to the problems of life, yet with a sense of idealism that can be stirred to finer issues when occasion demands. There is, again, a very similar attitude to religion. America, unlike England and Scotland, has no Established Church, but the great Free Churches of England and the United States hold the same faith and are in equal communion with each other; and if the older country has planted her sects in the new, the new has in turn found no difficulty in obtaining adherents for her own religious revelations in the old.

The dissimilarities are at first sight more striking. As compared with England, America is deficient in poets and fertile in painters; but that is when we take the figures for England as a whole. If, on the other hand, we take the distribution of genius in England county by county, we find that two districts are deficient in poets and fertile in painters—East Anglia and Devonshire; and it was precisely from those districts that the New England States, which were the source and for long the headquarters of American culture, were chiefly colonised. That may be mere coincidence. But when we add to this that both East Anglia and Devonshire are extremely deficient, if not totally lacking, in music and the drama, and that America shows similar characteristics, the comparison begins to acquire more substance and probability. It seems that not only the sins but the sciences and arts of the fathers are visited on the children, and that even when the environment is changed heredity remains a potent characteristic, and we begin to suspect that the continuity of mental outlook through the generations is a more potent force than one had supposed.

If that is so, then the range of mental variety in any one stock is somewhat narrowly limited—at any rate, in the arts; and, if the record of the past is any guide to the future, the

among the great contributions of English thought to the world; we can hardly, I think, rank Bellamy's *Looking Backward* as being in the same class. But the introduction of the Referendum, Initiative, and Recall in the United States and the social experiments in Australia and New Zealand were not simply pragmatic expedients of practical politicians; they were introduced and supported (and opposed) by high argument which covered the whole nature of the State.

new English civilisations seem more likely to produce painters than poets, more likely to produce novelists than dramatists, and more likely to produce any of these (or even a new variety of religion) than great music. The arts are the pursuit of beauty through the emotions, the sciences are the pursuit of truth through the intellect. And here, so far as I can judge from the evidence before me, the limits of potential achievement are less strictly drawn. Possibly environment counts for more, and heredity for less, in the sciences than the arts: the large proportion of astronomers in the American list, for example, may reasonably be ascribed to the better opportunities provided by a clearer climate and to the higher elevation available for observatories.

But it is also the fact that taste and opinion count for more in the arts and less in the sciences, and this consideration is by no means without weight in this connexion. The new English-speaking civilisation obviously derives from the old, with no break in the continuity of cultural tradition—merely a change in its location. There are disadvantages as well as advantages in this, since a colonial civilisation is certain to be consciously or unconsciously imitative of the parent, and therefore less likely to do original work of the first class until it has established an independent attitude and outlook on life of its own. But it is less likely to do this in literature and the arts, which are matters of taste and tradition, than in discovery and invention, which are matters of direct experience. Hence the new civilisation is likely to be more utilitarian and mechanical than the old, and, in appearance at least, more materialist. But this appearance is in fact superficial and misleading. The younger culture may not be able to produce the finest flowers of the arts, but it can recognise them when it sees them, and admire them, as it were, at a distance. It hungers, in short, for the ideal world of the Utopians, and this probably explains the particular appetite of the Americans for crusades and revivals and uplift. This is the magic casement which gives a glimpse of the elusive land of promise.

This analysis has, however, brought out another and not less important point. It has certainly shown, what nobody doubted, that the new English-speaking civilisations overseas can produce eminent and distinguished men. But it has also

shown that these are more likely to be produced in certain geographical and climatic conditions than others. 'The early pioneers in Massachusetts sent word home that they wished 'only the best' that England could send over to join them. That condition has not been too strictly adhered to in the emigrants whom the British Isles have sent out all over the world in three centuries; but even if it had been, the conditions of pioneering life in a new country impose a stringent selection test for survival purposes. Many of the settlers and some of the settlements overseas failed; but even where they succeeded, we find very considerable differences both in the quantity and quality of the talent which they produced.

It can hardly, for example, be altogether coincidence that in America the provinces of New England have produced more distinguished men than New York, New York than Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania than the Virginias, Ohio than Kentucky, and Kentucky than Tennessee; or that Victoria, in Australia, has produced more distinguished men than New South Wales, an older and larger State, and that while New Zealand ranks high in the antipodean list, Queensland is not represented at all. The truth is that there are certain climatic conditions, and there is therefore a certain belt of latitude, in which the English type flourishes, and in which it reproduces itself physically and progresses mentally, so that it not only founds successful States, but also establishes great civilisations. But on either side of that belt there is a gradual falling off, which is accentuated as the temperate zone gives way to the extremes of heat and cold.

Those belts, in fact, are two. Across the North American continent the great stretch of country between the 37th and the 55th parallels of north latitude contains the bulk of the population of the United States and Canada. Almost all the great towns, at least of English foundation, are concentrated there, and almost all the eminent men whose work has moulded this new-world civilisation (and sometimes influenced the old-world civilisation of Europe) have been born in that particular belt. Its southern boundary runs in a straight line from Norfolk, in Virginia, along the southern limits of Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Kansas, Colorado and Nevada, and it ends a little way below San Francisco on the Pacific; in the north the boundary returns eastward

from a point above Prince Rupert by another straight line which runs south of the Lesser Slave Lake and north of Winnipeg and Winnipegosis, which includes the southern half of Ontario and Quebec, and finally enters the Atlantic in southern Labrador.

Its area of maximum human fertility lies between the 40th and 50th parallels, and, since this area is at present only populated heavily in its eastern section, we must look for large political and cultural developments in the coming century between the Great Lakes and the Pacific countries of British Columbia, Washington and Oregon, which are, climatically at least, as favourable to this type of civilisation as New England and the Maritime Provinces of Canada. But north of the 50th parallel there is a rapid diminution of population. Vast tracts of good country are still uncultivated, but whether the increasing cold of the district is actually inimical to the English type of civilisation is difficult to say. From the rapid growth of Edmonton and Saskatoon I should be inclined to doubt it, and to suggest that the English temperament is more likely to accommodate itself successfully to increasing cold than heat.⁷

But south of latitude 37 there is another falling off, and here the evidence is no longer negative, but positive. The English stock is still numerous and dominant: it has dispossessed the French in Louisiana, driven the Spaniards out of Oklahoma, reduced them to the position of a subject people in Texas and Arizona, and changed New Mexico, once 'the bulwark of New Spain,' into a frontier province of the United States. But the English type becomes steadily less vigorous and energetic as we go further south, and it now begins to prefer that other people should do the work—in other words, the form of society and the character of its accompanying civilisation changes. It no longer produces eminent men in any number, and the further south we go the fewer it produces; until below the 27th degree it definitely ceases to be successful, and gives way to other European stocks. The conclusion is irresistible. The heredity of the English people has been firmly moulded by its historical

⁷ It is not the cold, but the poverty of the soil, which renders the north of Scotland infertile in population and in the quantity of its eminent men. There is no deterioration in quality.

environment in the temperate zone, and within that area they have few equals and no superiors. But although they can administer and develop the tropics, experience shows that they cannot colonise them, or reproduce the best of which the stock is capable between Cancer and Capricorn ; and any civilisation which they establish there must either have its roots in sources native to the soil, or be recruited by continual importations from home.

There is a similar climatic belt in the southern hemisphere, which stretches from the 25th to the 47th degree of south latitude, and which produces similar results. It runs from a line north of Brisbane out to Sharks Bay, in Western Australia ; it includes Tasmania and the whole of New Zealand ; and in South Africa it runs through the northern Transvaal and the Kalahari Desert, and out through Namaqualand.⁸ These three districts contain the great bulk of the English-speaking population in the antipodes. They are the site of several great cities, and they have produced many distinguished men—far fewer, indeed, than America, as is natural in settlements that are a mere 100 years old instead of 300. But in the quality, if not the quantity, of their distinction the antipodes have nothing to reproach themselves with.

It is improbable, however, that the contribution of the southern hemisphere to the common civilisation of the English-speaking people can ever equal that of the northern. For one thing, its land area is only about a third of the northern belt ; for another, a smaller proportion of that third is fertile and favourable to close population. Genius may defeat all calculations ; an Isaac Newton may arise in Tasmania or Norfolk Island who will do more for humanity than all the Presidents of the United States and all the Popes of Rome. But, some incalculable accident of this kind apart, it remains the fact that the average intellectual level is higher, and the chances of talent fulfilling itself are greater, in a society than in a solitude, and, on the whole, in a great society rather than in a small, and in a society of continental dimensions rather than in some small and insignificant

⁸ The great territories of Rhodesia lie north of this belt, with Kenya-Tanganyika still further north. In each case the white population is increasing, but the tropical temperature is modified by the general elevation above sea level.

island.⁹ We must therefore assume that the larger population of the United States and Canada will become the main centre of the new English-speaking people overseas, with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa as smaller but still significant and substantial contributors on the circumference of this new civilisation.

This analysis has shown that, whatever limits there are to the abilities and achievements of these societies, there is no indication whatever of any physical depreciation or mental deterioration in the stock ; and, incidentally, it has also disproved the contention of Spengler that emigration is a sign of decay in the people concerned. All the accumulated evidence before me suggests, on the contrary, that these great settlements are a sure indication of vitality ; but whether the future development of these civilisations proves equal to the opportunities which lie before them appears to depend on factors which lie outside the existing economic order, and that problem involves so many considerations that it must be deferred to another article.

⁹ The point is, not that an island produces less able men than the mainland, but that it gives them fewer opportunities of distinction. Of 6 famous people born in New Zealand and Tasmania, 4 made their careers in England ; and much the same is true of the West Indian lists. Who would have heard of Alexander Hamilton had he remained on Nevis ?

A. WYATT TILBY.

THE MEANING OF MORRIS

By RODNEY GALLOP

THE forthcoming International Folk Dance Festival, which will bring together in London traditional dancers from almost every country in Europe, should furnish a unique opportunity for comparative study. Already the teams of peasants from France, Spain, Portugal, the Basque Country, Holland, and Scandinavia who have appeared at the Albert Hall in successive years as the guests of the English Folk Dance and Song Society have shown how closely our own dances are related to those of our neighbours, and it has become impossible to neglect the volume of new evidence thus made available in considering the problems raised by dances of the ritual or ceremonial order. Of these problems the most important as well as the most baffling is probably that of the origin of the Morris dance and the explanation of its name.

The modern practical interest in the Morris dance dates back no further than that historic day, thirty-six years ago, when the late Cecil Sharp first saw the traditional Morris men of Headington, near Oxford, and realised that here was a great national heritage of which our people were completely ignorant. Sharp's contribution to the lore of the subject was only incidental to the performance of his great self-imposed task, the dissemination and popularisation of English dance and song. The name Morris and its application to a certain type of dance had at a much earlier date been the object of speculation and inquiry.

During the Middle Ages and Renaissance the name Morris, or its synonym Morisco, was applied to a wide range of dances, some aristocratic and others popular, ranging from elaborate court masques to the 'waving morrice' of Milton's *Comus*.

A Moresco or Morisco [writes Sir E. K. Chambers in *The English Folk Play*] first appears in the fifteenth century among the dances used

as *intermedii* in the courtly *ludi* of Italy, Burgundy and France. It . . . is probably to be identified with the *choreae Sarracenicae* of an earlier Paris *ludus* in 1393. In England it is known from the sixteenth century onwards both as a court dance and as a widespread folk dance.

This passage might be taken to suggest that both name and dance were imported into England from across the Channel and, gradually sinking lower in the social scale, suffered no greater change than is usual when art-motives are assimilated by the folk. The reverse was certainly the case at a later period when the country (from *contre*) dances which were so fashionable at our Court in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were imitated abroad. They may still be recognised, having suffered a sea-change, in peasant dances from Norway to Portugal. So far as the Morris is concerned, however, internal evidence fails to furnish any link except the name between the ceremonial dance of our Oxfordshire villagers and the courtly *ludi* or the custom described in Thoinot Arbeau's sixteenth-century *Orchésographie* :

. . . in good societies, for a boy to come into the hall, when supper was finished, with his face blackened, his forehead bound with white or yellow taffeta and bells tied to his legs and dance the Morisco.

That the name is derived from the Spanish '*Morisco*' or some other word similarly meaning 'Moorish' can scarcely be gainsaid, and for several centuries the belief that the dance itself was of Moorish origin was accepted without question. The first to doubt this view was Strutt in his *Sports and Pastimes of the People of England* (1810) :

I cannot help considering this as a mistake, [he wrote] for it appears to me that the Morisco or Moor dance is exceedingly different from the morris-dance formerly practised in this country ; it being performed with the castanets or rattles, at the ends of the fingers, and not with bells attached to various parts of the dress.

His conclusion was that

the Morris dance originated from that part of the ancient ceremony of the feast of fools, in which certain persons habited like buffoons, with bells, etc., joined in a dance.

The dance of fools to which Strutt thus refers is probably that described as

the dance of fools or Matachins, who were habited in short jackets with gilt paper helmets, long streamers tied to their shoulders, and bells to

their legs. They carried in their hands a sword and buckler, with which they made a clashing noise, and performed various quick and sprightly evolutions.

This description is taken from Arbeau's sixteenth-century *Orchésographie*, and might with equal justice be applied to-day to a number of ceremonial dances still found in various parts of Europe.

Francis Douce, who appended a dissertation 'On the Ancient English Morris Dance' to his *Illustrations of Shakspeare and of Ancient Manners* (1839), criticised Strutt for saying that the Moor dance was performed 'not with bells attached to various parts of the dress,' and professed the more orthodox view that the dance was, in fact as well as in name, of Moorish origin.

The genuine Moorish or Morisco dance [he wrote] was, no doubt, very different from the European morris; but there is scarcely an instance in which a fashion or amusement that has been borrowed from a distant region has not in its progress through other countries undergone such alterations as have much obscured its origin.

There matters remained for the best part of a century. Cecil Sharp at first accepted the established view, not blindly but basing himself on the name, 'the custom observed by many Morris men of blackening their faces,' and the fact that the dance is found 'on both sides of the Franco-Spanish border and in a form remarkably like that with which we are familiar in England' (presumably Sharp was here referring at second hand to the Basque ceremonial dances).

Later, however, he modified his opinions. By 1912, when the second edition of the *First Morris Book* appeared, he had come to realise that 'wherever it is found the Morris is nearly always associated with certain strange customs which are apparently quite independent of the dance itself,' and therefore 'the Morris dance is a development of a pan-European or even more widely extended custom.' Of the name he opined that 'we can accept the received derivation without binding ourselves to deduce therefrom proof of Moorish origin,' since 'the faces were not blackened because the dancers represented Moors but rather the dancers were thought to represent Moors because their faces were blackened.'

Cecil Sharp was therefore the first to look beyond our

shores for new light on the Morris, and it was no doubt only lack of opportunity which prevented him from taking into consideration a ceremonial dance of a type widely distributed throughout Southern Europe, the name of which indicates how important is its bearing on our subject. This is the dance or battle of the Moors and Christians, first recorded in Catalonia in the twelfth century, which survives to this day in innumerable forms from Portugal in the west to Dalmatia in the east. In scope it ranges from a rustic mumming-play or a stylised dance incorporated in a religious procession to an elaborate piece of pageantry, as at Alcoy (Valencia) and Ainsa (Aragon) in Spain, where the whole town is the stage, or Souto das Neves in Portugal, where the annual festival of Our Lady of the Snows is made the occasion for the performance of a mediæval play called the *Auto de Floripes*, representing the warfare between Charlemagne and his twelve peers on the one hand and the Moors under 'Almirante Balão' on the other. In the Azores and the Basque Country the battle of Moors and Christians has so influenced rustic drama that in the Azores peasant comedies on any subject are called *Mouriscas*, and in the Basque Country the actors in the dramatic *pastorales* are divided into 'Christians' and 'Turks,' irrespective of whether, in fact, they represent Israelites and Philistines, Medes and Persians, or French and English.¹ The names which attach to these mimetic battles—*Morisca*, *Morisma*, *Moreska*, etc.—all testify to their connexion with the object of our investigations, as does the fact that in almost every case the battle is stylised into a sword dance.

In England we have become accustomed to regarding the sword dance of our North Country as radically distinct from the Morris of the Midlands. The former, of course, is the 'hilt-and-point' dance, in which the swords, or the long staves which have taken their place, serve as links in an unbroken chain of dancers, and are finally interwoven to form the 'lock' which is triumphantly waved aloft at the end of the figure. In point of fact, it shows on closer examination certain analogies with the Morris, with its fluttering handkerchiefs, jingling bells and stick-tapping.² The dis-

¹ Cf. Rodney Gallop, *A Book of the Basques*, ch. vi.

² See Violet Alford and Rodney Gallop, *The Traditional Dance* (Methuen: in the press).

inction disappears altogether in other European countries, where the transition from Morris or stick dance to 'hilt-and-point' sword dance is effected by innumerable gradations marked by dances exhibiting in varying proportions the characteristics of both forms. Thus the Basque sword dances are performed by teams of eight or sixteen (a Morris number) young men hung with bells and ribbons who perform figures and tapping movements, the English analogies of which, as Sharp recognised, are to be found exclusively in the Morris. At the same time, hilt-and-point figures are introduced in some districts, and in the province of Vizcaya the performance concludes with the hoisting of the captain into the air in a manner which corresponds closely with the similar hoisting on a lock of swords of the *Vortänzer* (leader) of the German and Austrian hilt-and-point sword dances. Again, the stick dancers of Miranda do Douro, in the Portuguese province of Tras-os-Montes, whom I had the good fortune to discover and bring to London in January 1934, are Morris men in their costume, figures, and elaborate stick-tapping, but sword dancers in some of their figures, which are clearly derived from the hilt-and-point dance.

The disappearance of this distinction is important, because it shows that in seeking the origins of the Morris or Morisco dance all dances of this general type must be taken into consideration, whether or not they bear the name. Returning now to those which represent a ceremonial combat, we find that while the antagonists are generally called Christians and Moors, this is by no means always the case. Sometimes the Moors become Turks, as at Crasto, near Ponte da Lima, in Portugal, where the Turks speak Spanish, and after their defeat are bundled into church and baptised by the Christians who speak Portuguese. Near Gouveia, in the same country, they have become Portuguese and Spaniards in name as well as in language. At Sobrado, not far from Oporto, in an extraordinarily elaborate *Mouriscada* done on Midsummer Day, the opposing armies consist of Moors and buffoons, the former resplendent Morris men with swords and the latter a disorderly crew of masked figures with streamers falling from their hats like our own Overton mummers. It is clear, therefore, that in such performances

it is the combat rather than the presence of Moors which is the essential feature. This conclusion is confirmed when we leave the Iberian peninsula. In Austrian sword dances at Hallstadt and Ried the dancers are divided into two groups dressed the one in red and white and the other in green and white, while their 'fool' is parti-coloured.

A still more curious distinction is made between the participants in the Styrian and Tyrolese Shrovetide runnings, who betray their pagan origin by the tradition which forbids them to pass a church and enjoins them to hide when church bells are heard. These are divided into *schöne* (beautiful) and *schiache* (hideous) *Perchten*. The former are as well conducted and brilliantly attired as the latter are untidy and disorderly. In this they recall the dancers, not only of the Portuguese *Mouriscada* already mentioned, but also of the Basque *Mascarades* from Soule, who are similarly divided into *les Rouges* (also known as *les Beaux*) and *les Noirs*.

Sword dances, Morris and the like, with their attendant fragments of mime and drama, are generally regarded as being relics of obsolete agricultural ceremonies and fertility cults. Dr. Wolfram, of Vienna, who has made a special study of the Austrian Shrovetide runners, is persuaded that they are to be identified with the 'Wild Hunt,' the army of the dead. I have already shown that the connexion between the spirits of the dead on the one hand and pre-Christian fertility cults and their personifications on the other may be closer than has hitherto been generally supposed,³ but it is difficult to pronounce with any certainty on the identity and significance of these two opposing bands. On this point, however, a century-old ceremony belonging to our own islands may throw some light.

In the Isle of Man up to about 100 years ago Queens of Summer and Winter were elected on May Day, each with her attendant maidens and a band of retainers. The latter engaged in a mock battle in which the forces of Summer were invariably victorious and those of Winter rendered homage to them. In this ceremony it is impossible to see anything but a rite of sympathetic magic intended to ensure the revival at the appropriate season of the forces of Nature. It is quite possible that a ceremony of this nature lies at the back of all

³ 'The Golden Bough in Portugal,' *The Nineteenth Century*, November 1934.
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the mock battles which we have been considering, and that the Moors or Turks, the traditional foes of half Europe for 500 years, were introduced into it only as an afterthought when its original purpose had perhaps already been half forgotten.

It may be objected, however, that no trace of a combat is to be found in the English Morris dances, and that this explanation is inadequate to account for the many European dances of the Morris type which are similarly lacking in so distinctive a feature. Throughout Southern Europe religious processions, particularly that of Corpus Christi, incorporated in the Middle Ages (as in some cases they still do to-day) a ceremonial dance often described as a sword dance or a *Morisca*. It is, of course, not impossible that this dance originally simulated a battle, but lost it in course of time, and with it the need for two antagonistic groups. There is, however, another line of inquiry. If it could be shown that an association had ever existed in the folk mind between the Moslem infidels and the pagan beliefs and practices which Christianity overlaid at a much earlier date, an acceptable explanation would be found for the designation of Moorish as applied to ceremonial dances not necessarily associated with a mock battle.

Traces of such a tradition do, in fact, survive to this day. The veteran ethnologist Leite de Vasconcelos records that in Portugal the name *mouro* (Moor) is applied to children until they have been baptised. Throughout the country the tutelary sprites of caves, rocks and springs, Nature divinities who in course of time have shrunk into something very like fairies, are universally known as *mouras* and conceived as enchanted Moorish princesses guarding hidden treasures. In the peasant mind all vestiges of pagan cults and of the long-dead generations who practised them are bound up with the Moors. Dolmens are called *antas de mouros* (Moors' caves) until some misguided archæologist enlightens the peasants and destroys the tradition, and all archæological remains are indiscriminately labelled as 'things of the Moors.'⁴ Further north in the Spanish Basque Country there is considerable confusion in oral tradition between *lamiñak*, *mairuak* (Moors), and *gentilek* (pagans), all of which are conceived as fairy-like beings. Further along the Pyrenees and on their northern

⁴ Cf. Sarsen (from 'Saracen') stones in England.

slopes, in Ariège and Aude, the tradition is preserved of *Sarraxinos*, 'little people' who, like the fairies of Wales and elsewhere, are remembered as metal-workers. Taking into account the views which prevail to-day in regard to the origin and nature of fairies, it becomes clear that the expressions 'Moorish' and 'pagan' are coterminous in the folk mind in an extensive part of Europe.

We have thus been able to put forward two possible and by no means mutually exclusive explanations of the name 'Morris.' It may be objected that the data on which they are based are drawn, not from the British Isles, but from Southern Europe, and more especially Spain and Portugal. On the other hand, the form 'Morris' is further removed from our own 'Moorish' than from the Spanish word 'Morisco,' with which, indeed, it is used in this country to be interchangeable—a fact which suggests that the name may well have been imported from the Peninsula, however indigenous the dance to which it was applied. The history of the Middle Ages offers countless opportunities for the exchange of cultural influences. Moreover, England is not entirely lacking in indications of the type which have here been followed up, although admittedly they are immeasurably rarer. Thus, some of the earliest references to the Morris show them to have been accompanied by characters called 'Mouren' (Moors), and it has been conjectured that this name survives through an amusing confusion of ideas in Maid Marian, the man-woman who goes out with the Morris to-day. Colour is lent to this view by the mention in Fetherston's *Dialogue agaynst Light, Lewde and Lascivious Dauncing* (1582) of 'May Marrion,' a transitional form which suggests that the 'maid' herself, no less than her name of 'Marion,' owes her existence to a popular corruption of speech.

In conclusion, it may be stated that neither the blackened faces nor the bells worn by Morris dancers need betoken an attempt to conform to the popular conception of Moors and their dancing. Both are adequately explained by their association with countless ritual survivals in Europe, the blackened faces being part of the disguise so often assumed by ritual hierophants and the bells being amulets of great apotropæic power.

RODNEY GALLOP.

IN PRAISE OF GEESE

By WILLIAM PALMER

As you go through into the cloisters of the great unfinished cathedral of Barcelona you will see them there waddling unsteadily about the small green square; very big, very well fed, very important-looking and proud. These are Saint Eulalia's geese, about whom there is a vague local legend (*Sancta Eulalia* being a local female saint, the same, according to Marcel Proust, as the man saint Eloi of Burgundy) which tells how geese were kind to the Catalans in old times, for which reason some of the anserine tribe have been set apart for ever afterwards to be well nourished and well cared for in these holy precincts. There is a great goose-house—in the Spanish Gothic manner built of wood, and not unlike a dog-kennel in shape and proportion—into which these quasi-sacred birds presumably retire for night. Strangers and casual visitors, and sometimes even the priests themselves, come deliberately to the stone cloister screens to watch them and to throw them scraps; and when the wind blows sharp through the north opening, eddying whirls of goose feathers ascend high above the foliated caps to the pillars and disappear into the sky above—suggesting, as the old story is read backwards, that it must shortly be about to snow in heaven.

Of all the web-footed members of the great family of *Anatidæ* (whose bills are rather high at the base and not longer than the head, whose beaks at the upper part are slightly hooked, and whose *lamellæ* are short and toothlike, with hind toes and other well-defined signs by which you may know them, called, for reasons of greater simplicity and brevity, geese), none in the world are quite so notable now perhaps as these cathedral geese of Barcelona; for, in a world of false values, misconceptions and ingratitude, they stand as a living symbol of virtue rewarded and merit given

where merit is due, receiving that care and reverence which is due to them, and which is denied them so often in the proverb and current idiom of our native English speech. The goose has a long and interesting pedigree to which she has not failed to add lustre and distinction; while her renowned fighting qualities, though prone to be frowned upon in these non-combative and alleged peaceful days, should endear her to the hearts of this nation, which is distinguished among all others both for the combativeness and longevity of its inhabitants. The Greeks knew her as *Chenalopex*, or Foxgoose, for reasons doubtfully ascribed to her burrowing habits and to the colour of parts of her plumage, which was supposed to be fox-like in tone. Her picture, easily recognisable, appears upon obelisks and other monuments of ancient Egypt as clearly as those of the kings and tax-gatherers, whose incised profiles suggest that they are staring, if not into eternity, at least into another world; and she played no unimportant part (as every school-boy ought to know) in the history of the Roman Empire.

As for her longevity, Francis Willughby, in his *Ornithologia libri tres* (1676), tells of a game old bird, who lived to be eighty years of age, who had to be destroyed at last for her mischievous behaviour; while about 200 years later W. H. Hudson also (*Afoot in England*) noticed this same streak of naughtiness in this interesting and historical bird. Her relationship with man, who has trained and domesticated her, is not to be compared with that of the cat or the dog, or even the parrot, neither of which, in this country at any rate, ever come to the table except by their own peculiar means of locomotion; but for all that, and gastronomic apart, the goose is not only a goodly creature, but one which has, perhaps more than any other bird or animal, enriched our language with proverb and idiom, folklore and fable.

Much of this brings her no glory and in no credit to her—witness the saying of the single and, so one might have supposed, quite unprovocative syllable *bo* or *boo* to one of them, a fear of so doing this indicating the very depths of pusillanimity; while the usual employment of the figure of chasing one of the wild variety would suggest that the wild goose, considered as game, is worth only powder and shot as opposed to heated and enthusiastic pursuit such as is meted out to the fox. *Æsthetically*, also, *anser* is disparagingly compared with

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the swan ; and when a man has properly cooked his goose he may be said to be as good as gone. In this connexion the grosser pig takes precedence over the goose, since, in many cases of great extremity when all seems lost, it is yet sometimes found possible to save one's bacon—though no pig, so far as is known, ever laid a golden egg ; while no other bird or beast at present alive in the Zoo or preserved in death in the great halls of South Kensington has been known to possess the deep religious scruples of the gander : that devout bird, it will be remembered, who wandered upstairs even into my lady's chamber, and there, according to some versions, encountered an impious old man, very lax in his devotions, whom Mother Goose took by the left leg and threw downstairs.

In 'Raggle Taggle Gypsies' (which has been authoritatively quoted as one of the most authentic specimens of the real and now almost extinct English folklore) the renunciation of a bed stuffed with the feathers of this bird is put forward as an act of self-denial, which reflects greatly to the honour and glory of the goose as a good bedmaker ; while Old Mother Goose will undoubtedly persist in the French no less than in the English mind as one of the great secular examples of maternal solicitude.

But to know of Old Mother Goose either as a name merely or as an entertaining legend to tell to the children at bedtime is not enough. Beneath the very name Mother Goose lies a great gesture—or so we believe—much deeper in intensity than that of the old woman who lived in a shoe, and very much more passionate in its conclusion than that, for example, of Old Mother Hubbard, whose efforts were little, though her intentions good, and whose sole sacrifices lay in the opening and shutting of a cupboard door. And it was a goose-girl, a real little goose-girl whom I met on the road to Carcassonne outside Toulouse (a place even as famous as Strasbourg for its geese), who told me all about the tremendous mother love of mother goose.

A very young child, or even an intelligent dog, may, so the authorities say, be confidently employed in the leading and rounding up of these celebrated birds as they perform that wandering in and about the stubble so necessary to their physical health and development ; but I never expected to

find such a very little girl in charge of such an enormous flock as that which I encountered that morning in the south of France.

Her and her flock I saw at the end of a long vista such as French roads usually have to give to those who travel painfully on foot along them—a patch of drab olive green against a low foreground of moving flecks of grey, all at a distance of about 2 kilometres, early on a still, misty morning, moving erratically from one side of the road to the other to meet me, the geese getting bigger every moment, and their guardian, by comparison, smaller and more insignificant. For she was a very little girl, not yet nine, as she was to tell me—no taller and, as it seemed, no fatter than the wand she carried. Her charges, sleek and glossy with scientific over-feeding, stopped as we stopped to converse, and surveyed nothing in particular, as is their habit, through their black boot-button eyes. And so, an under-nourished pair—the little goose-girl and I—we stood and talked : first of the best way to get to Odars, whither I was bound, then of the farm I was seeking, next of the priest at Montgiscard (whom both of us knew well), and then of geese.

She told me nothing of their livers (our talk went on no such epicurean plane), nor nothing whatever of their quills, with which so much of the world's work has been done. (The first draft of *Fidelio*, the press corrections of *Candide*, and Wren's first warrant design for St. Paul's Cathedral were all, we may believe, executed with this simple tool.) I, in my turn, forbade to ask her to consider how much wisdom, how much stupidity, how much of love and hate and anger, and almost permanent records of these emotions, had trickled on to parchment from off those milky spines which we call quills. In parts of Lincolnshire in England, I might have told her, such birds as she was now tending used regularly to be plucked five times a year to supply the scriveners and engrossers of Chancery Lane ; and it would on that account alone well become the Benchers of Lincoln's Inn or Gray's, no less than the cathedral clergy of Barcelona, to keep a flock in ease and plenty within their walls there out of grateful remembrance. In the Temple, of course, the geese so preserved would be *Plectropteri*—the spur-winged goose of Africa. (I forget just how many African members of the Middle Temple

plead in Accra alone ; but I have seen most of them there in the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast Colony openly despising the noble bird with their gold-mounted vulcanite fountain pens clipped into their breast pockets under their black gowns.)

Neither did we discuss varieties : those of America and Canada, of the Nile and the Orinoco, the semi-palmate variety of Australia (so like a crane), or the poor *Cnemidornis* of New Zealand, which, having long ago forgotten how to fly, has succumbed to man's progress in that progressive country ; nor yet of the Magellan or Chilian goose, the Sebastopol or Danubian, the bar-headed goose of India, the Chinese goose who will lay thirty or more eggs to a clutch, the *Careopsis* of New Holland (a great fighter this one) ; nor even the Italian goose—last to come to our English shores. As for the so-called Emden or Westphalian geese (conspicuous for their candid whiteness), or even the geese which she was tending (the geese of Toulouse, famous for their size ; indeed, the giants of the tribe, who will weigh as much as 60 lb. the pair), as species we completely ignored them in our conversation. Instead, she told me of their breeding and eating ; of the two broods which her father expects every year—ten or a dozen to a brood ; of the great importance water bears in their happiness and sweet development, and how difficult it was sometimes in the dry season to find this water to which to lead them so that they might drink ; and of the great love and devotion of mother goose—who lacerates her own smooth breast to provide a lining of soft down for the eggs which she comes to lay in the rough nest which father goose had earlier helped her to make.

And this was the piece of information which surprised me : that this beautiful and touching act of devotion and self-sacrifice should be ascribed, not to the Grey Lag goose of Britain (the wild forefather of all our domestic geese, who still breeds wild and whose mate yet performs this self-sacrificial act in the Celtic twilight of central Ireland and the grey solitudes of the Hebrides), but to the over-fed and over-civilised geese of Toulouse, who breed twice as fast and twice as much, and whose lives are ordered and carefully watched over to an extent unheard of and quite unimaginable by any Hebridean or inhabitant of the central counties of Ireland.

My farmer host was unable to enlighten me (he bred geese for profit, and there his interest in them ceased) ; my priestly friend was no ornithologist, but managed to explain it away, as he explained everything away that was seemingly unexplainable, in a manner peculiar to priests. But he added a rider, as it were, by suggesting that the story of the wild goose of Scotland—no doubt, since I had told him so, ornithologically correct—might very easily have been imported into France, just as the words *assiette* and *gigot* were imported into Scotland, and had so become a legend attached to a creature not by nature entitled to wear it.

What there is, then, of Old Mother Goose in the Midi of France appears to rest upon a none too scientific foundation. It all appears improbable—almost as improbable as the origin of Brer Rabbit among the native inhabitants of the West Coast of Africa, which is a fact in spite of its apparent improbability.

But it is unnecessary to delve so deeply into legendary origins and to sift so scrupulously the chaff of history in order to prove the essential worth and goodness of these birds ; it is better instead to remember, in any praise of geese, that just as Saint Eulalia has a male counterpart in Saint Eloi, so it should also be acknowledged that what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander.

WILLIAM PALMER.

SOME LESSONS OF THE QUETTA EARTHQUAKE

By SIR THOMAS HOLLAND, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., F.R.S.

AN earthquake is relatively a small incident among the phenomena which accompany the great secular movements of adjustment that are going on still in some parts of the crust of the earth. In some areas like the peninsula of India active movement ceased far back in the decipherable history of the planet; the old wounds are healed, but the scars left as rock folds and faults record the story. In other areas, like the Himalayan belt, new lines of weakness developed in quite late geological times, and there the folding, crumpling, and faulting of the rock masses have not yet ended.

The precise origin of the primordial inequalities of the earth's surface—the local variations in topography which give us the features that we admire as 'scenery'—are still unknown. But somewhen, away back in the ancient history of the earth, perhaps 500 to 1000 million years ago, it was determined that 'the waters under the heaven' should be 'gathered together unto one place,' and so the dry land appeared. Since then there has been a continual moulding of the surface outline, partly caused by a horizontal shifting of the superincumbent load, partly, perhaps mainly, by movements in the depths of the crust of which we know nothing by direct observation. That such movements have occurred is obvious from the fact that the strata which were originally laid down under water in horizontal sheets are now found to be folded over one another in great bundles, or broken across by fault planes that often indicate a horizontal shifting of the rocks over many miles and vertical displacements of some thousands of feet. Road and railway cuttings reveal these folds and faults to the most superficial observer; but they give only a partial indication of the

enormous movements which have occurred in the crust of the earth.

Movements of the sort and of such dimensions are not accomplished, naturally, without interruptions and the production of jerks and jars which manifest themselves at the surface as earthquakes. They may occur in uninhabited areas, resulting in small, generally quite unimportant, changes in the surface features of the land; or they may occur, with little or no warning, under areas densely populated—during the daytime when the inhabitants may have time to get out of their houses, as was the case with the Assam earthquake of June 1897; or at night when the sleepers are trapped and the destruction of life may be sufficient to appal the world. At Quetta, where the recent earthquake occurred at about three in the morning, more than half of the 45,000 inhabitants were killed. In the Kangra valley on April 4, 1905, the main shocks occurred at ten minutes to six in the morning; consequently, most of the people were caught still asleep, and the death roll exceeded 20,000.

The loss of life is thus no real index to the intensity of the earthquake; the time of day, the unsuitable nature of the dwelling-houses, and the thickness of the urban population may make the death roll appear to be formidable—even appalling—in earthquakes that are by no means of the most violent type. Yet safety measures, which are still far too rarely devised, depend for their efficiency on recognition of the fact that, rare as destructive earthquakes may be within a generation of the local inhabitants, they do occur, and will continue to recur, without warning, but with destructive effects, in certain areas that are clearly indicated by historic records to be liable. In a generation or so the memory of a destructive earthquake becomes locally blurred, and people rebuild their houses according to their old customs with a false feeling of security, like that which inhabitants show on the flanks of a dormant volcano.

A list of the recorded earthquakes of serious intensity which have occurred, for example, within the province of Baluchistan show why the people themselves generally fail to realise the dangers under which they live; for, whilst the general list for the whole province may indicate quiescent intervals less than a generation long, destructive effects have

not as a rule been repeated in precisely the same district at shorter intervals.

For Baluchistan there are published records of serious earthquakes since 1852. In that year one occurred in the Loralai district, but no further disturbance of the same order of magnitude occurred in that district until 1865, and then again not till 1890. In 1862 an earthquake occurred in the Sibi district, causing serious damage some 80 to 100 miles south-east of Quetta. Shocks of less but serious intensity occurred in Kalat in 1870, in Jhalawan in 1883 and again in 1889. At the end of 1892 an earthquake was felt throughout Baluchistan, and had its origin just west of the Khojak range near a fissure-depression which can be traced for some 120 miles. In 1897 a minor shock did small damage in the Zhob district; two years later there was another in the Mekran; and in 1900 a severe earthquake shook the Quetta-Pishin district. In the following year damage to houses occurred once more in the Loralai district, whilst the Kachhi district has been disturbed on various occasions during the last seventy years—very seriously in October 1909. From then there was a lull, comparatively speaking, in seismic activity, until August 1931, when two earthquakes, with centres to the east and south-east of Quetta, followed one another on the 25th and 27th of the month, the last being the more destructive.

It may be that these shocks were too infrequent to alarm the inhabitants themselves in any one district; but, taken together, they show that Baluchistan is in a region of seismic unrest, far too serious to justify the Government's neglect to take steps to introduce for the province measures that have been taken in other countries to prevent, so far as possible the danger of unsuitable buildings. Now at last the lesson has been enforced in a tragic manner by the complete destruction of the capital of the province, as well as of smaller towns, with the loss of some 40,000 lives.

After the two earthquakes of August 1931 Mr. W. D. West, an officer of the Geological Survey of India, reviewed the seismic history of Baluchistan,¹ and then devoted a chapter of his memoir to a summary of the building methods which have been developed as the result of experience in Japan,

¹ *Mem. Geol. Surv. Ind.*, vol. lxvii., pt. i.

California, New Zealand and other countries. The following very definite warning was issued—too late, unfortunately, for effective action to be taken to save the people of Quetta:

Such a badly constructed building as the Town Hall at Quetta should never have been put up in an area where earthquakes are not uncommon. As Quetta is an important military station, with a large population during part of the year, it should be the endeavour of the authorities to make it less susceptible to earthquake damage than it is at present. At present the majority of buildings in Quetta are about as unsoundly built, from an earthquake-proof point of view, as it is possible for them to be. It is absolutely essential to discard the use of mud mortar in buildings of more than one storey, and it would be advisable to do likewise in all buildings, especially those which from time to time house a large number of people, such as halls, cinemas, clubs and so on.

After the Kangra earthquake of 1905 measures of partial safety were taken by the Punjab Government in rebuilding post offices, official bungalows and other Government offices in that district; but these precautions have not been extended systematically to other areas in India, or revised in accordance with the experience since obtained in other countries similarly afflicted. The records compiled by the Geological Survey of India are sufficient to indicate the areas most likely to suffer, and the remarks made by Mr. West are not the first of the warnings uttered by that department regarding the region of Baluchistan in particular. Dr. A. M. Heron, in his account of the Kachhi earthquake of October 1909, drew attention to the fact that the mortality on that occasion was due to the unsuitable nature of the dwelling-houses, which were generally capped by heavy roofs, with beams built into incoherent walls of mud mortar.²

Dr. Heron, after calling attention to the kind of building that should be avoided, remarked (p. 35) that

recommendations as to styles to be adopted in rebuilding are generally useless, save in the case of public bodies. Among Mahommedans an earthquake is regarded as an act of God, to guard against which savours of irreverence; by all classes it soon comes to be looked upon as a disagreeable experience unlikely to happen again, and in time, custom and convenience overcome the dictates of prudence.

Maybe these remarks are correctly applied to the uneducated dweller in Baluchistan; but, do subsequent events show that

² Records, *Geol. Surv. Ind.*, vol. xli., pt. i., April 1911.

the 'public bodies' have sufficiently learnt the lessons to be derived from the seismic history of Baluchistan?

Remarks of the kind, buried in a memoir which is devoted mainly to a scientific discussion of earthquake phenomena, remain unknown to responsible public authorities, unless the head of the scientific department calls their attention to the lessons of practical value. There still remains too often a gap between conviction and action, which will not be crossed unless the same responsible scientific officer enforces on his Government definite proposals for action, as was done with some measure of success after the Kangra earthquake of 1905. The lessons to be learnt from the Quetta disaster can hardly, however, escape notice; for the military authorities have now to review the whole question of the strategic value of a site for cantonments in that area. If on these grounds the neighbourhood of Quetta is still to be regarded as necessary and the best suitable, it is to be hoped that earthquake-proof designs will be adopted not only for public buildings, but for the fringe of 'followers' that necessarily gravitate towards all military cantonments. For the health and safety of the general public the governing authorities are as much responsible as for their own officials.

As a science, seismology has not yet passed very far beyond the stage of compiling the essential fundamental data. A few inferences, mainly scientific in value, are just emerging; but to pass the real test of an exact science (which is reliability in prediction and usefulness in practical application) seismology is far from prepared: it is still some 'forms' below even meteorology, which members of the ignorant public still scoff at. No phenomena of a reliable nature have yet been detected as a warning against a coming earthquake; no rigid correlation between earthquakes and the phases of the moon or time of day has yet been established; possibly earthquakes are more frequent in years when sunspots are most numerous; but that does not help the dweller in unstable lands, for destructive shocks occur at other times, and one is quite enough for him.

We know that in areas where there is a rapid gradient from high to low levels earthquakes are noticeably frequent, as for example where the Andes slope down steeply to the deep Pacific, near the southern face of the Himalayas, and along

the east coast of Japan, the Kuriles and Kamchatka, where the Asiatic continental shelf dips down steeply to the Tuscarora trough, one of the deepest valleys in the ocean floor. But the danger of living in these regions of subterranean unrest does not add safety to those who live in Baluchistan or to the inhabitants of Messina, where such topographical contrasts on a large scale are not obvious.

Although the major inequalities on the earth's surface are partly compensated by the occurrence of lighter materials below the elevated areas, the compensation is far from complete, and stresses, due to unequal loads, find relief by earth movements which result in folding and faulting. The central mass of Asia has been pushed southwards against the rigid, apparently immovable, mass of the Indian peninsula; and thus along the foothills of the Himalayan arc, running for some 1400 miles from the North-West Frontier Province to Assam, there is a great band of boundary faults formed by fracture of the overfolds. On one side of this great fault one may find rocks of the latest geological era abutting abruptly against, and level with, those of a period that may be even pre-Palæozoic in age. Travellers from Kalka to Simla, after passing through the longest tunnel on the railway line, emerge suddenly into daylight at Barogh and halt there for lunch. The tunnel is through tertiary rocks, the refreshment-room, a few yards away, is on very ancient strata, and the little stream between has found a band of weakness in the rocks where the two widely different formations meet; there it has carved out a small ravine for itself exactly along the line of fault. Barogh offers a pretty lunch-time demonstration of the kind and size of movements which occur in a region where the folding of the rocks is still an active process and destructive earthquakes occur.

But this partial explanation of the cause of an earthquake does not help us to say when the next will happen. Generally, practically always, earthquakes occur in regions that are strongly faulted, but only occasionally a shock is accompanied by actual movement along a fault plane. A striking instance was the horizontal movement which occurred along the great San Andreas rift (which outlines the west coast of California) when the earthquake of 1906 nearly destroyed San Francisco. Faults, however, that are not affected occur

by the hundred in regions where earthquakes are frequent. After all, an earthquake is but a minor interruption in a great movement; and it is impossible to say when such interruptions will recur. A house may be condemned as unsafe by the municipal surveyor, but he does not know exactly when it will fall. A hill slope may be marked as dangerous by the geological engineer, but he cannot say when the impending landslide may occur. We can do no more at present than reduce the effect of earthquake damages by enforcing the construction of a more resistant type of building. There is an economic side to this question, too; with the use of safer buildings in areas of seismic liability, insurance against damage by earthquakes will come within the range of reasonable average risks for those companies that are worked on sound lines. On both humanitarian and economic grounds it is the duty of a Government in unstable areas to enforce a satisfactory standard of dwelling-house and factory.

In addition to the local duties of national authorities to protect their own peoples, the study of earthquakes, like the study of the weather, necessitates international co-operation. The elastic waves that spread from the focus of any large subterranean disturbance not only reach the surface and do damage immediately overhead, but they traverse the earth in all directions and record their story on seismographic instruments all over the world. The study of the waves so received and recorded is now opening up a new chapter in science; the light waves that reach us from the stars, when analysed by the spectroscope, tell us of the composition of the stellar atmosphere, of whether the stars are approaching or receding from the earth; so, too, the seismic waves are giving us by their speed and nature an indication of the physical and chemical constitution of the earth's interior. The elastic waves which penetrate the earth travel at far greater velocities than those that spread around the globe through the superficial crust. And those that go deep enough to reach half-way down to the centre are so affected that they reveal a sudden change in the nature of the core, probably a change from solid crystalline rock to a liquid metallic central core.

With the extension of seismological stations and with the standardisation of their records by international co-operation

we may soon be able to understand earth tremors sufficiently to obtain results of practical value. At the International Geophysical Conference which will assemble at Edinburgh next year, we shall hear more of the importance of working in collaboration with observers in other lands. So far the work done has been mainly that due to the efforts of isolated scientific workers or voluntary societies.

John Milne, when he was a professor at Tokyo, first worked independently as a private observer; then he founded the Seismological Society of Japan, and, when its work for twelve years showed that results of practical importance were emerging, the Government of Japan established its Imperial Earthquake Investigation Committee, with the object of attempting to predict earthquakes and to design earthquake-proof buildings. The object was practical, the outcome has been of immense scientific value, from which again will follow further lessons that will help to save life and prevent damage to property. India, through its Geological Survey, has taken a prominent share in the study of destructive earthquakes, but only after the event; it has also added seismographs to some of its meteorological stations, although the Government has not yet realised the necessity of a more organised and systematic study of the subject. But Assam in 1897, Kangra in 1905, Behar last year, and now Quetta may teach them that dilettante methods are far from sufficient; that the cost of a special Department of Seismology will cost far less than measures of relief; that funds obtained from a generous and sympathetic public will not recover lives that are lost.

THOMAS H. HOLLAND.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

CROYDON, depart 7 a.m.; Brussels, arrive 10.25 a.m.: £6 8s. return, or by rail and boat less than £4. At 11 a.m. I was entering the British pavilion, close to the Parc Royal gate of the Exhibition (the Royal Palace is only a few hundred yards away), some 3 miles outside the city. It is an impressive building, but it bears no name—*à bon vin point d'enseigne*. Above the great portico are the Royal Arms, and on either side three flag-staffs carrying Union Jacks 11 yards long. Within the circular entrance-hall stands a great glass globe, some 20 feet in diameter, showing the whole earth in high relief. It revolves slowly; the sun, shining from within, illuminates in turn every part of the British Empire on which it never sets—a fact left to the visitor to observe. The only other national boundaries shown are those of Belgium and the Belgian Congo.

On the blue dome above, the constellations are drawn in silver. Night follows day; the stars begin to peep—first the big ones, then the rest. It is a striking piece of symbolism, a League of Nations which really works, in a setting which shows it *sub specie æternitatis*. In the galleries round the hall are dioramas illustrating the production of raw materials for which the world depends mainly on the British Empire—jute, rubber, cocoa and gold, for example. The inner hall is devoted, as is proper in this year of Jubilee, and in Belgium, to the modern pageantry of monarchy. Coronation portraits of the King and Queen: the King's swords, as Admiral and Field-Marshal, and his bâton, and a glorious exhibition of royal plate. There are pictures of the King as a boy at Eton, with house-groups and scenes from school life. On either side of the door stand statuesque Lifeguardsmen on chargers finely modelled in plaster.

The use in this room and in the great hall of simple draperies, plain surfaces of black glass and chromium steel plate gives an impression of dignity which is enhanced by the avoidance of emphasis. The list of Dominions and Colonies is long: it can be seen incised on a great pillar within, but it is not prominent. There is nothing better in the Exhibition and, but for the fine Belgian pavilions which, as is proper, dominate the 300 acres over which the grounds extend, nothing so good.

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All this, and a finely laid out and beautifully kept English garden at the back, brilliant with flowers, presided over by a truly English gardener, is the work of the Exhibitions Branch of the Department of Overseas Trade, and is perfect of its kind. But it is intended as an introduction to the cultural or industrial exhibits of the British Commonwealth. These are, with few exceptions, unworthy of the occasion and quite unrepresentative. The chemical exhibit shows imagination, and has a unity of its own. The printing and publishing section has some fine things in it, and occupies about as much space as the British textile industry, which is content with six shop windows, dealing with a tiny fraction of the whole. A Lancashire mill-hand who was taking his little boy for his first trip abroad was staring at it as I passed, and I met him again on the return journey to Harwich. 'I've seen better than that i' the shop windows in Owdham,' he observed. That afternoon I read in *The Times* (June 14) an eloquent demand by the chairman of a cotton-spinning company for the cessation of economic warfare, the promotion of international good-will and the abandonment of economic nationalism. Yet our Board of Trade, with all its persuasive powers, could not induce the textile or any other great industry, by pooling resources, to stage an exhibit of interest or importance. There is no aircraft exhibit and no motor show. The railways of Great Britain exhibit a few hundred square yards of very familiar posters. This is not surprising; the arrangements made at Harwich for third-class visitors from Belgium and Holland to England are not to our credit. The British shipping section, but for one great silhouette of the *Queen Mary*, which was conceived and brought into being by other brains than those of the industry, is repre-

sented by a few model ships, obviously extruded from the booking-offices and waiting-rooms of shipping lines which have been so thoroughly amalgamated and rationalised that they are either bankrupt, or not anxious to please, or both. There is nothing that chairmen of shipping lines enjoy more than to lecture their shareholders on international affairs. They have, here, done remarkably little to encourage the world to look beyond its frontiers: their exhibit is a discourtesy to Belgium, for British shipping still predominates at Antwerp: £7500 would have been enough to stage and maintain for six months a first-class exhibit.

There is no pavilion representing President Roosevelt and the United States. The vacancy in the list is a proof to all visitors, and to all Europe, of the very policy of economic isolation which Mr. Cordell Hull (*The Times*, June 14) derides and deplores with ineffectual pathos. How foolish we Europeans appear to him; how distant the Americans have made themselves and their country appear to us! South America is far better represented.

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Of the large pavilions, the external appearance of the main Italian building has earned it the sobriquet of '*L'urinoir pour géants*.' Within is little but a vast expanse of enlarged photographs of regimented humanity, marching in masses past Mussolini to '*la victoire*,' and of baby *balilas* in bandoliers. It faces the Hungarian pavilion, marked by a delicate absence of propaganda, and much beauty. The Swedish and Danish pavilions are perfect examples of what can be done by the pooled resources of a few industries in a small country—beautiful exteriors, attractive restaurants, and ingenious displays. I left them feeling much more kindly disposed to imports from these countries; and that, after all, is precisely the impression that it is desired to create. This is not a trade exhibition, but a demonstration of world friendship, interdependence and progress.

The centre of the Exhibition is a great hall, with an arched roof of ferro-concrete covering a span of 90 metres, each arch resting on a steel cradle lying on a massive pedestal. The two halves of each arch have been cast independently and support each other.

The area covered is as big as the main-line station at

Paddington; it is occupied by specimens of the most modern railway vehicles and engines of Belgium, France, Denmark and Holland, but not of England. Yet a specimen of our best and worst, newest and oldest, third-class rolling-stock and engines would have done as much good as a replica of our average railway restaurant would have caused mirth. The whole is organised as a model railway station, with access to the trains for those who have purchased tickets, of which one in a hundred (or is it a thousand?) entitles the holder to a free ticket for a few hundred kilometres over the Belgian railways.

But the most striking view of the Exhibition is after dark. Flood lighting effects are freely used everywhere, the great fountains are lambent, the obelisks become pillars of fire. A Savage searchlight, the largest in the world, reaching 8 miles into the heavens, stands on top of the British pavilion. The Belgians do not suffer from *agents provocateurs* of the L.C.C. seeking to induce a shopkeeper to sell milk for a sick child, or a pat of butter or chocolate after 8 p.m., or cigarettes after 9 p.m., or beer after 10.30 or 11 p.m. They keep open shop till late hours. Yet they seem to have more leisure than we in England, and to enjoy it more. Few public-houses in England dare even apply for a licence for music, so literally do our laws, and our magistracy, take Solomon's injunction to 'use not much the company of a woman that is a singer'—or even a man. Here are musicians at every corner, and the cafés are in consequence crowded. Humanity likes a noise, but prefers pleasant noises made by someone they can see.

'Vieux Bruxelles' was crowded at 2 a.m. on Sunday morning. Dancing in a hundred cafés and cheerful groups of songsters without; but no drunkenness, for strong liquors are nowhere on sale. The Belgian law distinguishes very clearly between wine, that maketh glad the heart of man, or beer, and strong drink.

I visited the Exhibition on Sunday evening, and made my way to the 'Fun Fair,' where I met three young Manchester men and a girl who had cycled from Antwerp and were on their way to Germany. They were enthusiastic. 'This beats Wembley,' said one; 'all it wants is some first-class football in the stadium,' said the second. 'I'd

come all the way just to see the old pictures,' said the girl.

I doubt if Wembley had greater crowds. They were certainly being well catered for here. A paper plate piled with chip potatoes for 2d.; a hot sausage on top for another 2d. No monopoly—great variety alike of food and amusements. Midgets here, monsters there. Boats that swing full circle, captive aeroplanes whirling at speed. 'The Truth' (adults only), performing monkeys, pin tables and rifle ranges. The distinctive food and drink of every country, served by men and women in national costume. For the English 'Whitbread's Tavern'; for the world at large, a Zeiss *planetarium*, in a magnificent setting. How the Queen of Sheba would have enjoyed it! What a marvellous pick-me-up to counteract the fall of the belga! Brussels is within easy reach of every part of Belgium and of half a dozen different countries. I counted over 200 motor coaches outside the park, including many from Cologne and Düsseldorf, Lille, Amsterdam, Luxemburg, and even Denmark. In that sense the Exhibition is more truly international than is possible in any other European capital.

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I returned to London *viâ* Antwerp, a pleasant route, the steamer fairly but not uncomfortably full of third-class passengers—the butler of a mutual friend, some ex-navy men on holiday with their wives, some visitors to British war graves (which are nowhere more finely commemorated or guarded with more sympathetic care), some students, and some Belgians and Danes on a short visit to England. We reached Harwich at dawn: for half an hour we stood about on deck in the chilly air waiting for an immigration officer; for over three-quarters of an hour some of us awaited the inspection of baggage by a skeleton Customs staff. For half an hour longer we waited for the train to start. Third-class passengers sought the 'refreshment'-room. No ham sandwiches, no meat pies, no warm food: only stale buns and biscuits. They were expected to pay 3s. 6d. for a breakfast on the train, if they could get it, or go without. And so back to London and literary luncheons and daily life.

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The best epitaph on Lawrence of Arabia perhaps is from Pliny's letter to Tacitus (XVI., bk. 6):

Equidem beatos puto quibus deorum munere datum est aut facere scribenda aut scribere legenda; beatissimos vero quibus utrum que.

'Happy those who can do things worth writing of or write things worth reading; most happy those who can do both.' His reputation will rest on literature rather than on statesmanship. I saw, from the other side of Arabia, much of his work and admired much, but not all, that I saw. Later developments brought us into acute controversy in a clash of our respective loyalties, which were irreconcilable, and of me and the officers who served under me, all perforce dumb, he had very hard words to say in the columns of the *Daily Herald* and elsewhere, but they broke no bones or hearts. A few months later Mr. Winston Churchill, with his customary talent for securing the right kind of publicity for his policy, induced 'T. E. Shaw' to immure himself for a year in Downing Street as an adviser on Arab policy. He was not happy looking at the East from that awkward angle, and he gladly threw the mantle of office from his shoulders to assume, not long after, the monastic habit in the Royal Air Force. Now he has become a legend, very profitable to the evening papers and film producers: his books will be printed, we are assured, in an unexpurgated cheap edition. But there will be no French translation, judging from the venomous and slanderous references to him in the French Press. A sad end for a fine spirit—'*omnium consensu capacissimus imperii, nisi imperasset.*'

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Sir Thomas Holland's important article on the Quetta earthquake prompts the reflection that a fresh attempt should be made, within the British Empire to begin with, to create a fund, administered by the King-in-Council, to assist in the rehabilitation of areas devastated by these 'acts of God' which fall upon some of His Majesty's subjects almost annually, wrecking lives, upsetting budgets, and destroying hope. Against such events few individuals, and no Governments, can insure. Such a central fund might do much to give practical shape to the unity which is in our hearts. It

would transcend boundaries of nationality, race and colour; it should include Mandated Territories, such as Palestine, which has suffered from terrible earthquakes in the past. It might be the precursor, in some distant future, of a world-wide fund on similar lines. It is right that we should take the initiative, for we alone in these islands are almost completely immune—so safe that we omitted earthquakes from the deprecation in our Litany, which ran, according to the Roman use,

From lightning and tempest, from plague, pestilence and famine,
from the scourge of earthquake, from battle, murder and from sudden
and unforeseen death,

Good Lord deliver us.

At the next revision we should do well to restore the word, to remind us of the most terrible experiences that can befall the many communities which in times of distress look to us for succour.

ARNOLD WILSON.

EDITORIAL NOTE.—*In the August number will appear a further article from the pen of Dr. MacColl dealing with the current Exhibition at the Royal Academy, which, owing to pressure on our space, it has not been possible to print in this number.*

BOOKS RECEIVED

The New Unionism, by J. A. A. Porteous (Geo. Allen & Unwin, 16s. net). It may not be quite true that 'none of the old Parliamentary Parties represent the real feelings, the wishes, and the opinions, even of their own supporters, far less of the country at large.' Unfortunately it is true that no considerable party is so directly and vividly representative of the mass of its supporters as to be able to count upon them for activity and initiative and self-sacrifice; or rather, perhaps, this truth is fortunate, if there be reason enough for the widespread opinion that Britain's greatest need at present, for her own sake and for the world's, is to keep her political temperature low. But this opinion can hardly carry the hearts, even when it enters the heads, of those who have political interests, but whose situations are not so elevated and settled as to make them certain that every other candidature is factious and every new programme impertinent—those who are not serene in the possession of a footing on the moving staircase, nor maturely resigned to an evolution which, to the optimists among them, seems beneficent, and even to the pessimists not fast enough to be frightening. Those who do not so comfort themselves are apt to feel that our politics demand more thinking out and our political convictions might be carried further without risk of extremism. This impulse is salutary, and if it were resisted by all the sensible men a not very long run would deliver us over to cranks, crooks, moralists, and fanatics, separately or together.

Mr. Porteous is a sensible man; perhaps not very many will approve of everything in his attempt to outline 'a great constructive policy' which a specially organised body is to apply to 'every sphere of the State and industry.' But I do not think that many will read the attempt without some admiration, nor without a good deal of gratitude, if they start with a leaning to the Right and a desire that policy should be more constructive and opinion better organised.

To present a political programme that shall be comprehensive and radical can never be easy, and for one who treats nations and

persons as real it must always be more difficult than for those who attribute reality only to their own dogmas and desires. So that Mr. Porteous's undertaking in *The New Unionism* is bold, and complete success would be superhuman. But partial success in enterprises which are necessary and which need courage is more useful and praiseworthy than complete triumph over commonplace obstacles, and in the subsidiary enterprises into which his general task can be analysed Mr. Porteous has successes enough for his whole to be reckoned an effective success.

Some of Mr. Porteous's analysis seems, to at least one reader, to partake of current illusions. It is not certain, though it is almost always assumed, that we are experiencing more social unrest, or a more rapid movement of history, than earlier generations. But perhaps this illusion does not matter very much. The newly affianced may be mistaken in supposing that there has never been love like theirs, or that love like theirs can never die; but such suppositions are, after all, perhaps true enough for the purposes of conduct, and will create their own truth if they are kept alive long enough. Certainly 'our politicians have been half-hearted and apologetic in looking after national and imperial interests. They have shown undue sensitiveness to noisy sectional clamour but a strange insensitiveness to the deep currents of national feeling.' And certainly also, or at least certainly enough for me, 'Liberalism is already effete' and 'the so-called Labour Party permeated by a no less antiquated ideology. It is essentially Marxian and anti-national; and as such it must be ruled out.' Mr. Porteous's new system starts with a bias towards the Right. He says that 'it cannot represent either Right or Left, for it will neither lag behind nor run ahead of the times.' But it is rightward enough to aim at the union of all classes and the preservation of continuity and at 'unity in perhaps the most natural of social units the nation.' Accordingly, we should see 'that the vital principle of democracy is not that everybody should have a mathematically equal vote, although it aims at giving every citizen a free voice in determining the government of the country'; and we may wish to strengthen the second chamber. The method proposed is to reconstitute it 'to a substantial extent on a vocational or functional basis as opposed to the territorial representation of the House of Commons.' Some such method is no doubt the one best worth considering, though it may be doubted whether its claims to consideration are sufficiently strong to compel the attention of Cabinets always anxious to gain time and to minimise controversy. And one merit of the present House of Lords would, I think, be lost in the new second chamber—that is, that, on the whole, the average member of the House of Lords is more representative in one sense, nearer in feeling to the average Englishman, than is the average member of the House of Commons, if only because he is not unusual enough to cherish political ambitions, or to take political trouble.

More immediately important than the constitution of the second chamber is that of the first. 'It is urgently desirable still further, and drastically, to limit election expenditure. This is not merely in the

interest of economy, but is a matter of fundamental importance. For it is an essential means of weakening Party tyranny and securing the best, and not merely the wealthiest candidates.' Perhaps something may be done that way, but it is not easy; 'Party tyranny' is rather a question-begging phrase. What is desirable is that party should represent positive and active conviction and that candidates should represent their party: if we could prevent the candidates from spending their own money, so that the whole cost of party politics were borne by a rank and file subscribing to a party whose purpose they thought worth financial sacrifice, that might do more good than any mere limiting of the gross cost. We must be governed, either by bureaucrats or by politicians: few of us would prefer the bureaucrats, and at present our choice of politicians is absurdly restricted because they are recruited from such small sections of the population.

No less than the composition of Parliament its procedure needs improvement, but it is doubtful whether anyone without some years' experience can very helpfully draft procedural reform. 'How can Ministers possibly give efficient service if they must be engaged not only most of the day but half or all the night as well in largely superfluous wrangling?' But it is not at all clear how the superfluity is to be distinguished; and if some Ministers speak too long, not many listen too much. Perhaps it is not merely grotesque, perhaps it is even useful, that the 'physical process of recording votes when the House divides should occupy a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes of that body's valuable time': not all lobbying is pernicious, and there is debate in division lobbies, and there is a corporateness of feeling that comes from voting in herds instead of individually—a corporateness which is a factor towards that general consent which is the whole object of Parliaments.

One very acute observation of Mr. Porteous's, which if it is not new has certainly not yet been said nearly often enough, is that 'whereas, generally speaking, government formerly regulated relations between individuals, it now has to deal with relations between groups, between individuals and groups and between groups and the community at large.' It is curious how a human tendency almost always begins, just before it reaches its maximum, to be displaced in the order of effectiveness by another and more or less opposite tendency: thus, just as the tendency away from the mediæval, from the classification of governmental relations in terms of corporations—churches, orders, counties, boroughs, gilds, manors, townships—just as this tendency seemed to reach the absolute by fixing all political relations between one omniscient sovereignty and myriads of atomistic individuals, just at the same time the omniscience was being eroded by the 'conscientious' and by its own lapses into inferiority complex, and also the individuals were dissolving and recompounding into all sorts of relations with trade unions and limited liability companies and other associations.

Mr. Porteous is illuminating also on the limitations of Government action, on the varieties of Socialism, the character of monopoly, wages,

insurance, unemployment, supply and demand, and many other things. I think him heretical about family allowances, and about some things I do not follow him well enough to be sure whether I think him right or wrong. In general, he seems to me very well worth reading.

KENNETH PICKTHORN.

The New America: the New World, by H. G. Wells (The Cresset Press, 2s. 6d. net). 'We are in a period of uncertainty such as history has never witnessed. Science has said its say and has led nowhere; materialism has no hopes. In politics machinery has broken down; Liberalism is bankrupt. In international affairs no country has a clear idea of its line of progress. Statesmanship has almost ceased to exist; everyone is conscious of forces which he cannot control, of impulses and instincts generated in the past, not to be regulated by any reasoning which can be framed at present. How things are going to settle down no one can say.' Thus Bishop Creighton in 1896, and thus, less simply, Mr. H. G. Wells to-day.

'There is nobody quite like Mr. H. G. Wells for taking in the whole world,' says the *Manchester Guardian* in a review of this book, completing the phrase, it is true, by the words 'at a glance.' I suspect, however, that the last three words detract from the soundness of the judgment thus passed. The world is behaving very naughtily: everything is going wrong—in Europe, Asia, Africa and America; Russia is as bad as the rest of us, so also Italy, and Germany.

The art of politics is said to consist in arriving at what is practicable: Mr. Wells's aims are as little practicable and as vague as ever. He predicates, as a condition of survival for our civilisation, the development in each country of a 'vital social and economic philosophy' with the aid of 'real vigour of intellectual synthesis.' Mr. Roosevelt, he considers, has failed of late 'to sublimate, clarify and express the advancing thought of the community.' Bankers 'do not explain why money and credit play queer tricks.' Is Mr. Wells so busy writing that he has now no time to read? Professor Soddy and Father Coughlin say that everything is wrong: Mr. Wells complains that nobody disputes their statements. Surely the fact is that no one in America gets the chance to do so over the ether, whilst in print, for those who can and will read, there is no lack of popular expositions of professorial fallacies.

Mr. Wells has tried to view the American spectacle from 'an ecological standpoint' in order to ascertain whether 'the American animal has sufficient intelligence to preserve a disordered revolutionary collapse. He thinks not, and holds that the rest of the world is in no better case. Let us comfort ourselves by the reflection that of all Mr. Wells's prophecies those that have been fulfilled have been to the benefit and credit of humanity, whereas his apprehensions of doom and disaster have been falsified by events.

A Study of History, by Arnold J. Toynbee, 3 vols., second edition.

(Oxford University Press: London, Humphrey Milford, £2 12s. 6d. net). It is a relief to turn sometimes from anxious gazing through contemporary fog into a misty future across the choppy waves and dangerous undercurrents of contemporary politics and to read, from history, how everything came right in the end—for the survivors. A new school of historians has arisen to meet this popular need: they dramatise, they humanise, and they simplify events and characters, leaving the reader to form his own philosophy. That Professor Arnold Toynbee's three-volume *Study of History* should within a year have reached a second edition is a tribute to the taste of a growing public.

Juvenal's taunt, '*Quis daret historico quantum daret acta legenti*' ('Who will pay as much for a history as for a daily paper'), is clearly no longer true. Professor Toynbee is not of Juvenal's '*genus ignavum, quod lecto gaudet et umbra*.' His work is readable, but well, almost too well, documented. It covers the whole field of historical thought and study, and the origins and growth of civilisations; and we are promised a fourth volume shortly. His verdicts are reasoned, and supported by argument, but are not less provocative of thought and, on occasions, of disagreement. His presentation of the ideals of successive centuries is dispassionate—almost to the point of suspension of judgment; and he appears to attach less importance than some of his predecessors in this field to catastrophic factors and, in particular, to the part played by outstanding men. We may be sure that those who did most to support David when he was at Ziklag were (I. Chron. xii. 32) 'the children of Issachar, which were men that had understanding of the times, to know what Israel ought to do; the heads of them were two hundred, and all their brethren were at their commandment.' But what would they have accomplished without David?

As the reader draws to the close of the third volume—and it will take him six weeks or more of steady reading if he is to do so with profit—he may well ask whether the author's outlook on history is, on balance, one which citizens of any one country can wisely adopt in relations with their neighbours. What would happen were all statesmen philosophers? Would their subjects reject them in favour of 'practical' men? Can treaties be an enduring basis for friendly relations unless they correspond to the ever-changing needs of the day. Is there not discernible, in these pages, a force greater than human force? Our author leans towards the views which Spengler, in the moment of his country's defeat, presented so brilliantly, and has since, in common with his countrymen, recanted. Race, climate, the ebb and flow of human thought and knowledge, religion and medicine, all these and many other factors are here assessed with scrupulous honesty, and with impressive authority. I have sent my copy to the library of a university in Germany, for one of the tragedies of modern life is that English books are almost unobtainable, owing to difficulties of exchange, in Germany and in several other countries of Europe.

A. T. W.

Force, by Lord Davies (3s. 6d. net).

The Legal Process and International Order, by Hans Kelsen (2s. net).

A Plan for the Organization of a European Air Service, by Rear-Admiral R. N. Lawson, C.B. (2s. 6d. net).

The Power of an International Judge to give a decision ex æquo bono, by Max Habicht (4s. 6d. net).

William Ladd. *An Examination of an American Proposal for an International Equity Tribunal*, by Geog. Schwarzenberger (4s. 6d. net).

The Contribution of English Equity to the Idea of an International Equity Tribunal, by Dr. Wolfgang Friedmann (4s. 6d. net).

The New Commonwealth Institute, whose publishers are Messrs. Constable & Company, Limited, is sponsor of all these, and several other monographs, to the latest of which Sir William Holdsworth, Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford, contributes an enlightening and approving preface.

The first, by Lord Davies, is a bold study of the place and use of those forms of power which are popularly regarded to constitute force. The others are studies of the possible adaptation to disputes between nations of legal tribunals whose function is *jus dare* as well as *jus dicere*. Isaiah foresaw that the Prince of Peace would thus inaugurate his reign—'with justice and with judgement'—and for evil-doers the sword.

Lord Davies holds that we must choose between the experiment of an internationally organised world and the certainties of a pre-war nationally organised world. He holds one of these certainties to be another world war; he is convinced that we are at the moment of crisis in the evolution of the post-war world and that it cannot be solved by pacifism, which denies our right to judge and therefore enthrones force. We must decide how to use force as an instrument of justice: his doves of peace are aeroplanes, but controlled by *suprema lex* in the interest of the whole world and not of a particular State.

Lord Davies' mind is clear: his pen is as sharp as the sword which he would fain place in the hands of Justice.

His tones are urgent, as of a Moslem preacher—the apostle of a revived Islam whom twenty years ago I heard cry to his audience, 'Stone me if you will, but, for the love of God, listen to me and understand, for destruction will come on the mind, and death on the wings of the wind to those who shut their ears.'

Lord Davies' book should be read critically by all who profess to study international affairs; the other monographs by those who are oppressed with the futility of legalisms, and the inadequacy of the Hague Tribunal, and are seeking a wider scope for the reign of law.

We in this country should be in a stronger position in this part of the diplomatic position if the reign of law were complete in the domestic sphere. It is not easy for our Government to submit to the jurisdiction of external tribunals when access to English courts is denied to any subject who wishes to sue the Crown in tort. Justice is in this country habitually denied to those who have a claim against the Crown. Until this wrong is righted—as recommended by successive committees of Parliament, progress in the international sphere will be delayed, not by lack of good-will, but by failure to accept in its completeness the 'reign of law.' In this matter Lord Sankey's departure from the woolsack is a tragedy.

Notes for New Magistrates, by Cecil Leeson, Secretary of the Magistrates' Association, is a very useful little book. That it should have been left to private enterprise to supply it is a grave reflection on the Home Office, which is administratively responsible for these courts. Let us hope that it is the precursor of many much-needed reforms. There is, for example, no up-to-date collection of Home Office circulars, which seldom reach the hands of magistrates. *Stone's Justices' Manual* is too expensive for most of them, and an up-to-date copy is not to be found in every court, still less at the police station. The police themselves urgently require an official handbook, for their duties are incomparably more complicated, and indeed more important. The law as administered by magistrates needs to be codified, amended, and intelligently set forth. Till this is done it is idle to complain of the courts.

I note one omission of some importance—namely, the procedure that a magistrate should adopt when asked under

the Public Health Act to sign a warrant compelling a person to go to an isolation hospital because he is alleged by a single doctor to be suffering from a 'dangerous infectious disease.' If the man is a wage-earner, who will compensate him? If he undertakes to remain in his house, who will decide that he may not do so? A man was recently kept two months in a hospital for infectious diseases on a magistrate's warrant because he had hæmolytic streptococci in his throat—a condition common to literally scores of thousands of persons, including nurses and doctors. He was released eventually, as fit and healthy as when he went in, to return to his family, who had been told to go to the public assistance committee if they wanted money. Thank God there are many families in England too proud to act on such scornful advice! The question is a grievance: this manual does not touch on it.

Irish Literary Portraits, by John Eglinton (Macmillan, 5s. net). The wise Englishman who decides to spend part of his summer holidays trying to understand the Irish Free State will do well to take this delightful little book in his pocket. It is not a guide-book, but a good guide—to the spirit of W. B. Yeats and A. E. Russell, George Moore and James Joyce, which is alive to-day and unlike ours, though we hold them in greater honour than do their countrymen. The introduction helps the stranger to look deeper than the surface and is full of good things well said, the essays of ἔπεα πτερόεντα which stand out as one reads, but are so much a part of the pattern of the author's mind that they can never find their way into a commonplace book.

A. T. W.

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THE WORKING OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

By SIR BRYAN FELL, K.C.M.G., C.B.

IN some quarters it is fashionable to decry Parliament on the ground that it talks a lot and does nothing. This charge, which is based on a complete misunderstanding of the functions of Parliament, must, however, be met before a proper appreciation of the working of the House of Commons can be obtained. The important fact to realise is that Parliament is a deliberative, not an executive, body. Executive functions are performed by the Crown acting on the advice of its Ministers, who are themselves dependent on the support of Parliament in general, and on that of the House of Commons in particular, as representing the opinions of the electors. The primary function of the House of Commons is, then, to interpret the wishes of its electors, for if it fails to perform this, the political complexion of the House will be changed and a number of its members will not be re-elected at the next general election.

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In these circumstances members naturally desire to express their opinions on the subjects brought before them, particularly those which affect their constituents closely. This can only be done in debate, so it is not surprising to find that the House of Commons does do a lot of talking, because that is what it is there to do.

This brief introduction is only intended to remove the misconception that Parliament has any executive powers, and thus clear the way for a detailed consideration of the way the House of Commons works.

The three main functions of the House are legislation, finance, and criticism of the Executive; and, of course, the ideal arrangement would be for all these three classes of business to be given equal opportunities of being considered. But although about a hundred years ago this might have been possible, it certainly is not so now. And the reason for this is that the Government now largely controls the time of the House. It would not be possible within the scope of this article to trace in detail the process by which the Government acquired this power; it must suffice to say that since the Reform Bill new responsibilities have been continually assumed by the State towards its citizens demanding a never-ceasing flow of legislation, while at the same time there has been a great increase in the number of members desirous of speaking. These two factors have made the pressure on the time of the House of Commons very severe; but although between 1832 and 1880 the Government gained some control over the time of the House, further encroachments were stoutly resisted, and the Government was only completely successful in its oft-repeated attempts to get control of the time of the House when it was able to turn to its own advantage the changes in procedure rendered necessary by the complete breakdown of the old procedure under the obstructive tactics of the Irish members—changes which had been made for the protection of the House as a whole. The result is that in a normal session the Government controls the greater portion of the time of the House, and that, in a session like the present, Government business has precedence on every day. Naturally the Government is interested in passing its legislation and in getting through its necessary financial business, but it is not anxious to face criticism except when it

comes from the official Opposition on party lines in the shape of a vote of censure. The control over the time of the House thus acquired by the Executive, although it may have resulted in greater certainty of the business to be reached each day and in a more orderly conduct of that business, is not without dangers which might even threaten the very existence of our parliamentary institutions. There are signs that the Executive, supported by a powerful and extremely able bureaucracy, are growing more and more impatient of criticism which often appears to the expert as uninformed, but which nevertheless frequently represents the opinion of 'the man in the street.' Sometimes it is the plea of urgency that is used to stifle discussion, at others the forms of the House will be mercilessly exploited to the same end, while all the time the process of removing a number of subjects from the purview of Parliament is continuing. But the worst feature is that already the spirit of independence which in the past leagued the back benches of both sides of the House against the encroachments of the Executive (often supported by a front Opposition bench which hoped to profit in its turn) is nearly dead. The Government of the day can usually count so much on the subservience of its back benchers that the Speaker now stands almost alone as the protector of the House's rights—sometimes, it would seem, almost in spite of the House itself.

In this respect it is almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of the Speaker. During the last fifty years the position of the Chair has been completely altered. In some ways it has grown more autocratic—it has certainly become completely removed from party politics: it has been charged with the protection of minorities, since the closure requires its sanction; by the power to select amendments it has been entrusted with the regulation of debate so that all points of view may be reasonably heard, and as guardian of the Rules of the House it is one of the bulwarks of democracy. Freedom of speech, originally asserted against the Crown, has now to be asserted against the servants of the Crown, who threaten to exercise over the House a mastery such as no sovereign ever succeeded in obtaining. The party machine is now so strong that, at the crack of the Whip, members seldom fail to vote on strictly party lines, and the House

tends to become an automatic register of the Government's decrees. Suppress debate, and the reason for the existence of the House of Commons is gone. The Speaker is now the principal guardian of the freedom of debate, and as such is entitled to the fullest support of the House, and the House of Commons will have signed its death warrant on the day that it refuses to support its Speaker in defence of its rights and against the encroachments of the Executive.

The time of the House is thus principally occupied, even in a normal session, by the consideration of Government business, legislative and financial. So far as legislation is concerned, in a normal session a certain number of days are devoted to the discussion of the principles (second readings) of *non*-Government bills, which, if passed, proceed to a special standing committee for discussion in detail. At a later stage of the session a still more limited number of days is allotted for their further consideration by the House. The number of bills which get through the House in this way is very small—at most three or four a session. A certain number of bills of an entirely non-contentious character also get through the House by being taken after 11 p.m., but such bills, though frequently of great practical utility, are not of much parliamentary importance, nor are they at all numerous. By far the greater number of bills which reach the Statute-book originate in a Government department, and it is those which it is now proposed to consider.

Bills originate from a Minister either to carry out the programme of the party in power, or because there has been some inquiry or report from a Royal Commission or committee necessitating legislation, or because of an outcry on some particular subject in the House or in the country, or perhaps because of some devastating legal decision. Instructions are given by the Minister to the Parliamentary Counsel's office to carry out the particular object by drafting a bill. The Parliamentary Counsel and the department prepare a draft bill, which then goes to the Cabinet, who generally refer it to the Home Affairs Committee, a body consisting of certain Ministers and permanent officials, which arranges the legislative proposals for the session according to their importance or urgency—*e.g.*, those which are (1) absolutely necessary; (2) very desirable; (3) necessary annuals; (4) useful

departmental measures, and so on. There appears to be much competition between departments to get in first.

After the draft bill has passed the Home Affairs Committee it is brought down to the Public Bill Office of the House of Commons, before introduction, to see that it conforms with the Rules and Orders of the House. Adjustments are generally agreed upon between the House of Commons' officers and the draftsmen, but if doubtful points cannot be agreed the questions at issue are referred to the Speaker, who gives a ruling (private), and his decision is practically always accepted by the department. If it is not so accepted, then a special motion has to be made in the House itself, which is the final arbiter on all questions of its own practice, to exempt the bill from what the Speaker has ruled to be the constitutional practice of the House.

After its introduction the bill is printed and put down for second reading, at which stage the principles of the bill can best be discussed. In committee the bill is gone through clause by clause, line by line, and, if necessary, word by word, and afterwards the House reviews the bill as amended and can at that stage still move amendments in detail. Finally the bill is read the third time, when only the contents of the bill can be debated and no detailed amendments moved. If the House of Lords returns the bill with amendments, these are considered, but the bill is only open to reconsideration in so far as it is affected by the amendments made by the Lords. It will be remarked in the very brief sketch of the procedure given above that the bill is considered in detail by a committee. That committee may be the whole House under another name, or it may be a committee of some fifty members called a standing committee, and in any event the bill, as amended, is reviewed in detail by the House. So far the House of Commons has never made up its mind to delegate completely its powers of piece-meal examination of legislation, and even insists on keeping the committee stage of the more important bills on the floor of the House. It is almost impossible to imagine a body less well fitted to examine the details of a bill than a committee which may consist of 615 members. On the other hand, with all its disadvantages, the system does ensure that any member who wishes to move an amendment can put it on the paper with the reasonable

certainty that if it is of any importance it will be called. Recent changes in the Standing Orders were intended to strengthen the chairmen of standing committees, by giving them power to select amendments and to facilitate the conduct of business in those bodies with a view to inducing the House to part more willingly with the committee stages of bills, but it is too early yet to say whether the experiment has realised the hopes of its sponsors. The apparent duplication of the report and committee stages has in fact been largely got over in practice by the Speaker refusing as a general rule to select amendments which have been fully discussed in committee upstairs.

But the fact still remains that a disproportionate amount of time is used in considering legislative proposals, and this will continue to be the case until the House makes up its mind to devolve some of its responsibilities for detail either to a committee of its own to an extent which it has not yet seen fit to do, or to a Government department, by allowing the detail of a bill to be filled in by departmental orders, provided that all such orders are examined, line by line, by a committee of the House before they come into force. There is already a tendency to make the form of legislation more general, leaving the details of an Act to be filled in by orders and regulations made by the executive departments, which have to be confirmed by resolutions (affirmative or negative) passed by both Houses before they become operative. The question arises whether this confirmation leaves any real control over the Executive in these matters to the House of Commons. The affirmative resolution—the most common form of such resolutions—leaves no power to the House to amend the regulations; it can only approve or dissent. The discussion on such orders usually comes on after 11 at night, but, as such orders cannot come into force unless the House has agreed to them, the Government has to keep a House (see that there are sufficient members present to carry the closure). It is not so in the case of a negative resolution, when the House is often counted out but the regulations still come into force. This procedure leaves a certain indirect control to the House, for while it is unlikely that the House will reject such orders, the debate might compel the Government to withdraw the order and

reintroduce it in an amended form. In any case, a department will take more care over an order which has to run the gauntlet of parliamentary criticism than over one which it hopes to slip through unobserved.

But under a more extreme system of devolution the House would pass a skeleton bill, approving the principle of the measure, limiting the finance of the bill, and leaving the complicated details of the bill to be worked out by the department. These proposals would then be put before the House in the form of draft regulations requiring an affirmative resolution. A large committee would be set up to which all these regulations would be referred, having power to divide itself into sub-committees and to summon witnesses from the departments, and the draft regulations would not come into force until the committee had made a report on them to the House and the House had agreed to that report. Such a committee would also give valuable, interesting, and much needed work to the private member. This procedure should not apply to Finance Bills, Consolidated Fund Bills, or Bills to alter the Constitution.

But however much it might be found possible by devolution to ease the passage of legislation through the House of Commons, it would not be possible to abolish the right, and indeed the duty, of the House to criticise all proposals brought before it. Freedom of debate is essential to democracy, but it naturally follows that, as a rule (though urgent measures can be and have been passed through all stages in a single day), measures cannot be forced through the House of Commons with the same lightning rapidity with which they are passed in certain Continental countries. But if, in this country, the necessity of explaining their proposals and endeavouring to meet the arguments of their opponents by reason rather than by force is a handicap to a Government desirous of passing a large amount of legislation, it is also true to say that their own lack of planning may prove an equal handicap.

As a rule, all goes well for the first or even the first two sessions; then the legislation seems to become haphazard. By the third session there appears a lack of co-operation between the Government and their supporters. Ministers become more and more tied to their executive departments,

while the private member has been partially disillusioned and begins to look forward to the next general election. There is much to be said for Lord Eustace Percy's scheme for a five years' plan for parliamentary work. Although this plan would doubtless be interrupted by some urgent business arising, it could be adhered to in the main, and members would know where they were and competition between departments to get their measures in first would cease.

It is also open to question whether Ministers who are attempting to combine policy-framing in the Cabinet with the work in their departments and the conduct of their business in the House are not overstrained by the length of the session and worn out by the end of a Parliament.

Physical fitness and mental freshness are necessary conditions of an efficient democracy, and by the beginning of August the House of Commons, and particularly its Ministerial members, have neither. Under present conditions Parliament usually rises about the end of July; by September departmental Ministers are hard at work: the House meets again towards the end of October, and with brief intervals goes on till August of the next year. Ministers have no time to think or plan their time-table for the session. Unco-ordinated legislation is flung at Parliament to be got through somehow; and the outside world gets the impression that Parliament is an unbusinesslike assembly, while its procedure gets blamed for what is partly the fault and partly the misfortune of the Government of the day.

Better planning by the Executive (perhaps a change in the financial year), as well as better procedure in the House, is required before the sessions of Parliament can be shortened and Ministers be given an opportunity of retaining some freshness of mind, which in present circumstances is so liable to be sapped by the fatigues of office.

The legislative function of the House of Commons is so much the most important in the eyes of the general public, and occupies so much of members' time, that except at rare intervals it obscures the other functions of the House, which is often regarded as a machine for the output of legislation. Nevertheless, there are two other functions of the House of Commons—one financial, the other critical—which are as important as that of legislation.

In theory, the House—in a committee of the whole House called the Committee of Supply—annually examines and votes all the services of the State, which are financed out of moneys provided by Parliament—that is, for all the principal activities of the Government, with the exception of the interest on the debt and the salaries of judges and certain other individuals which are permanent charges upon the revenues of the State. Nowadays the Supply Services, as they are called, account for over 500 millions of expenditure, and forty years ago—although, of course, in those days the sums involved were very much smaller—the Committee of Supply did actually examine and vote the whole of the Supply Services in detail.

It is difficult to imagine how a body of 600 persons could hope to set about the detailed examination of the enormous sums involved in modern Supply Services, and in practice they do not try. Although twenty days are supposed to be devoted to the business of examining the Estimates in Committee of Supply, little or no detailed criticism is undertaken, but the opportunity is used by the Opposition, who have the right of calling for whichever of the Estimates they choose, to examine and criticise the policy of the Government reflected in the particular Estimate chosen for examination. This is a very happy outcome of a quite impossible situation, but it is doubtful if the best use is even yet made of the Committee of Supply.

The rules binding debate in that committee were evolved at a time when every Estimate came up for discussion, and are designed to limit debate as strictly as possible to the financial policy involved, and only one Estimate may be considered at a time. Legislation may not be mentioned. The result is that it is often impossible to have a full debate under these rules, and there is a great deal of force in the suggestion that they might well be modified in the interests of the House without any detriment to the progress of business, since twenty days have to be given; and if legislation could be mentioned and two or more cognate votes discussed together, the days might be more profitably employed than they are at present.

At the same time, some detailed criticism of the Estimates is necessary. This is provided in the first place by the

Treasury, and secondly by the Estimates Committee, which each year reviews the expenditure of a number of departments. The Government remains, and must remain, responsible for the policy embodied in the Estimates, and the Treasury is primarily responsible for seeing that that policy is carried out as cheaply as possible; the Estimates Committee reviews their efforts, and the knowledge that they are there is no doubt a restraining influence, because, since the days of Mr. Pepys himself, there is nothing the average civil servant dislikes more than being hauled up and criticised in person for extravagance by a Committee of the House of Commons. On the last two of the twenty allotted days hundreds of millions are passed without a word of discussion; but although this may appear silly, it is not quite so silly as it looks, because the policy behind the money has probably been covered in the course of the twenty days' debate.

Having voted the money, the House then proceeds in the Appropriation Act to ensure that it shall only be spent on the objects for which it has been granted; and to see that this is done the House has an officer called the Comptroller and Auditor-General, who audits the public accounts and reports to the House anything he thinks doubtful or wrong. These reports are considered by another very powerful committee called the Committee of Public Accounts, which examines witnesses each year from all the great departments of State and does not shrink from crossing swords on occasion with the Treasury itself.

So much for the spending aspect of the House's financial function. But having authorised the money to be spent, the House must then impose the taxation necessary to enable the revenue to balance that expenditure. Taxation originates in another committee of the whole House called the Committee of Ways and Means, and one of the big days of the session is when the Chancellor of the Exchequer opens his Budget in that committee and unfolds his proposals for taxation in the coming year. If the House approves of these proposals, they are embodied in the Finance Bill, in due course to become part of the law of the land. The House thus carries out its financial functions, if not in the manner originally intended, at least with reasonable efficiency.

It is quite another story with regard to the third, and in

some ways the most important, of its functions, that of criticism, which has in these days almost entirely fallen into neglect. As has already been indicated, the House of Commons, up to the date of the passing of the Reform Bill, spent a good deal of time criticising the actions of the Executive, and almost unlimited opportunities were afforded members, not only to ventilate the grievances of their constituents, but, by the discussion of motions, to endeavour to educate the House and public opinion in the way of thinking held by the particular member concerned. Between 1832 and 1935 these opportunities have been rigorously curtailed. In a normal session under the existing Rules and Orders of the House a private member, as apart from the official Opposition, can raise his constituents' grievances: (1) By asking a question, to which the Minister may make an evasive reply. (2) By moving the adjournment of the House on a matter of urgent public importance, a privilege which was intended to secure that the member making the motion had the support of at least a quorum of the House, but which has now been so whittled away by the rigid interpretation of the words 'urgent public importance' as to be almost impossible to secure, however many members may support it. (3) By putting on the order paper a notice of motion for an early day in the hope that the Government may dislike leaving unanswered a highly coloured exposition of their opponents' case. (4) On the motion for the adjournment, which is made at the conclusion of the daily business if that business concludes at any time before 11.30 p.m. This is an uncertain time; a member may sit for days with his speech ready and have no time to deliver it, while on the other hand the House may finish its business unexpectedly at 9 p.m. and no member who wants to move may happen to be present. (5) On first going into Committee of Supply. Once a session a ballot is held for notices of motions on going into Committee of Supply, as a result of which four members have a chance of moving an amendment to the question That Mr. Speaker do now leave the chair on either the Civil, Air, Army, or Navy Estimates. Amendments have to be relevant to the subject-matter of the Estimates concerned, so, except for the Civil Estimates, this opportunity makes only a limited appeal. (6) Adjournment motions for Easter, etc. Often

excellent debates take place on these occasions, but they are also frequently occupied by subjects chosen by the official Opposition. In addition, during a normal session private members at the beginning of a session have opportunities for moving motions on a certain number of Wednesdays, the selection being done by ballot. It will be seen, therefore, that, except for question time, the private member has at present very few opportunities of voicing the grievances of his constituents. This lack of opportunity to drive home a criticism leads to the constituent becoming confirmed in his opinion that the House of Commons never does anything useful, to the private member being regarded as an automatic voting machine, while the Executive loses because the private member is the natural link between the Government and the country. After about two years in office the former is apt to get completely out of touch with the latter, and some home truths from private members might be both useful and efficacious ; but no opportunity is given for this, and no Minister can humanly be expected to create opportunities for other people to slang him. The suggestion that there should be more frequent short debates similar to those on the Easter, etc., adjournments is an excellent one, and would, if adopted, enable subjects to be debated which, though perhaps primarily of local importance, may also involve some great principle and would stimulate local interest in Parliament, give opportunities to the private member to prove his worth in debate, and generally infuse some life into proceedings which at times, under the heavy detail of some bill, drag their slow, tedious way along. But much depends on the judicious selection of subjects to be debated by private members and on their attendance at such debates.

It is right that Parliament should sometimes work slowly, though that does not appeal to a generation whose standards are size or speed ; but the virtual suppression of the private member has sapped the virility of the House. Parliamentary procedure must not be allowed to stand still : in an age of rapid change our institutions must be adapted to suit the conditions that surround them ; that has been done before, and can and must be done again.

The procedure of the House of Commons is flexible ; no

member can judge it fairly who has not spent at least two sessions on the Opposition side of the House. The latest precedent, the 'voluntary guillotine' on the Government of India Bill, encourages the hope that much more may be done by agreement between parties, but the Chair remains the sole bulwark between freedom of speech and the complete control of the House of Commons by the Executive. Despite its imperfections, the forms of parliamentary government and procedure appeal to the British peoples. Wherever the flag has gone parliamentary institutions have followed, and there is a draft code of standing orders from which the Assemblies of the Crown Colonies can select according to their state of development. In all those many lands, in all those many races, men are being taught to settle their differences by discussion and the ballot-box rather than by force. It is unthinkable that a race which has carried the ideals of freedom and democracy throughout the world will suffer its own free institutions to decay.

BRYAN FELL.

SOME JURIDICAL ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY

By W. H. STOKER, K.C.

THE subject of mandates, protectorates, suzerainties, spheres of influence, and the acquirement and cession of territory, British, mandated or protected, has been much in the public eye of late. The extent, and possibly even the practical existence, of the Royal Prerogative, as affecting cession, has been brought into question. A Minister of the Crown has stated in the House of Commons so recently as July 4 that His Majesty's Prerogative 'does not hold to-day as it did in the fairly recent past,' and this according to 'advice from high authority.' To-day so many theories and principles have become so obscured that ventilation, if not clarification, so far as this can be attempted in the short space of an article, may be of use.

The nature and incidents of mandates, especially those created under the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, appear to be generally but vaguely understood. Reference to accepted dictionary authority—Murray's *New English Dictionary* (Clarendon Press, Oxford)—elicits that to 'mandate' means to 'enjoin, command, commit,' that in ancient Roman times a mandate was an imperial command sent to a governor of a province, and in Roman law a mandate was a 'Commission by which one (Mandator) requests another (Mandatory) to act for him gratuitously, undertaking to indemnify him against loss.'

The terms 'mandate' and 'mandatory' have their most recent employment in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as applying to the disposal of the colonies and territories of the Central Powers of Europe as a consequence of the late war. The material provisions of this Article are as follows :

To those Colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the

late war, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples forms a sacred trust of civilisation, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, undertake the responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the Mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

In every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

It will be seen that this position must be borne in mind when considering any demands or suggestions that the former German colonies under mandate should be handed back to Germany. Whatever considerations of equity or policy may underlie such suggestions, it is patent that great difficulties, to say the least, stand in the way of restoring to Germany the status which existed before the war in regard to her colonies. They do not belong to the mandatory Power, which holds them in trust under the terms of its mandate. Exactly for whom this mandatory Power is a trustee is a point on which there is a diversity of opinion and theory. According to one set of opinions (Albert Millet and Stoyomosky), the sovereignty ceded by the Central Powers to the victorious Allies was transferred immediately by the latter in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League to the people under mandate, who at present occupy the position of minors under tutelage, with the mandatory as trustee, responsible to the League of Nations. But the more generally accepted conception of mandatory sovereignty is that sovereignty belonged to the principal Allied and Associated Powers, which, under Article 22 of the Covenant, made a double delegation of it :

(1) To the Mandatory State as the administrator of a system defined as 'tutelage,' the tutelage being exercised by it as Mandatory on behalf

of the League, and (2) to the Council of the League as supervisor and guarantor of the observance of the mandate, defining the degree of authority and administration exercised by the Mandatory.

It seems to follow that no cession or disposition can be made by any mandatory Power, unless by the direction and with the concurrence of the Council of the League of Nations, which presumably would, as a preliminary, ascertain the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants of the country under mandate; and even then trusteeship and tutelage would, it is conceived, remain, unless indeed the League of Nations were to eat the terms of its own Covenant.

The description 'mandate' does not, of course, apply to what are called 'protectorates,' nor do its incidents unless under a self-imposed mandate by the protecting Power, but its underlying principle of trusteeship has *sometimes* been assumed and even proclaimed by Great Britain as regards countries under her protectorate. Its actual observance, whilst probably a matter of volition on the part of the protector, should depend also on the scope and terms of the original treaty or agreement between the protected State or people and the protecting State. The general terms of the Act of the Conference of Berlin of February 26, 1885, and of the Brussels Conference of July 1890, with its provisions for the progressive development and improvement of protected countries, have also to be considered in this connexion.

'Protectorate,' like 'mandate,' has a dictionary meaning, and, according to the same dictionary authority, means primarily the office of a protector or guardian, the relation of a strong to a weaker State to which it gives its protection, and as a later special definition, 'the relation of a European Power to a territory inhabited by native tribes not ranking amongst the nations as a State.' The position of a 'suzerain' has some analogy, and is defined in the same authority as 'a Sovereign or a State having supremacy over another State which possesses its own ruler or government but cannot act as an independent power.'

The term 'sphere of influence' has been dealt with very fully in Hall.¹ It is sufficient for our purposes to note that although Mr. Hall describes it as 'a term to which no very

definite meaning is as yet attached,' and adds that 'perhaps in its indefiniteness consists its international value,' yet he postulates that it

indicates the regions which geographically are adjacent to, or politically group themselves naturally with, possessions or protectorates, but which have not actually been so reduced into control that the minimum of the powers which are implied in a protectorate can be exercised with tolerable regularity. It represents an understanding which enables a state to reserve to itself a right of excluding other European powers from territories that are of importance to it politically as affording means of future expansion to its existing dominions or protectorates, or strategically as preventing civilized neighbours from occupying a dominant military position. . . .

To return to the subject of protectorates, so far as the British Crown is concerned it may be postulated that the relation of the protected country and peoples to the British Crown is one not of allegiance as subjects, but the deference of a weaker Power to a stronger and more enlightened neighbour, whose protection and counsel they desire or are willing to enjoy, and to whom they are bound by certain definite obligations, such as abstention from cessions to or agreements or treaties with other Powers, generally the suppression of the slave trade, and sometimes of barbarous or cruel or repugnant native practices. But there is one feature common to all treaties or agreements for protection, made between native States and their peoples with the British Crown. That is the personal relation between the Sovereign for the time being of Great Britain and the sovereign power of the country coming under protection. For instance, in the case of West Africa, and most, if not all other countries in Africa, it was the kings or native rulers, as representing their peoples, who have entered into treaty and agreement, and this with the British Crown, or its representative. In the case of the Gold Coast, the land and sovereign rights in the land are still in the sovereignty of the various kings and head chiefs, who are the sole grantors of mining rights and concessions over the Stool lands, which lands they hold for their people, and grant with the concurrence of their councillors and elders as representing the people. The constitution of these West African peoples is monarchical although democratic, and the Sovereign of England has always been regarded as the true party to agreements and pacts with these peoples and their rulers. 'The Great White Queen' is no empty word.

¹ *Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown*, 1894, pp. 228-230.

Coming now to the question of the administration by Great Britain of protected countries and States, it must be premised that the establishment of a protectorate by Great Britain has been preceded invariably by a bond, treaty, or agreement. These exhibit generally the common features of engagement not to cede land to or make treaty with other Powers without the consent of Great Britain, to give free trading rights and entry to ports, and safe conduct, and to suppress the slave trade, in exchange for which the gracious favour of the British Sovereign's protection is extended. In very few instances, such as the Bond of 1844 with the kings and rulers of Cape Coast in West Africa, do they include court or other jurisdiction over any but British subjects.

Space does not permit of a review of all the various treaties or agreements for protection, but in all cases since 1840, when the original Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1840 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 94), was passed, Orders in Council have been passed ostensibly made thereunder, and have in most instances progressively included not only court jurisdiction, but also legislation and administration, and even the setting up of Legislatures controlled by Official Members. In the case of Somaliland not one treaty or agreement gave any vestige of foundation for even court jurisdiction, except possibly in the case of the Warsangoli Agreement of January 27, 1886, by which in Article 6 the Warsangoli engaged to assist all British officers in the execution of such duties as might be assigned to them, and further to act upon their advice in matters relating to the administration of justice, the development of the resources of the country, the interests of commerce, or in any other matter in relation to peace, order, and good government, and the general progress of civilisation.

The question of the use of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1843, and succeeding Acts, consolidated into the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 37), for the purpose of making Orders in Council, purporting to be founded on it, is one of the greatest importance. On the lawfulness of its use depends the legality, not merely under English law, but also under international law, of an immense volume of legislation and administration. By Orders in Council, declared therein to be made under the provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, constitutions and legislatures have been set up, and

laws enacted. Under the provisions of section 11 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, every Order in Council made in pursuance thereof must be laid before both Houses of Parliament forthwith after it is made, if Parliament be then in session, and if not, forthwith after the commencement of the next session of Parliament, *and shall have effect as if it were enacted in the Act*. By these means Orders in Council have become part of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, and this without other legislation. The question may conceivably remain open whether such Orders in Council are in fact within the enabling powers of the Act and therefore lawful. The preamble to the Act runs :

Whereas by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage sufferance, and other lawful means, Her Majesty the Queen has jurisdiction within divers foreign countries, and it is expedient to consolidate the Acts relating to the exercise of Her Majesty's jurisdiction out of Her dominions :

Section 1 of the Act goes even further :

It is and shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen to hold, exercise, and enjoy any jurisdiction which Her Majesty now has or may at any time hereafter have within a foreign country in the same and as ample a manner as if Her Majesty had acquired that jurisdiction by the cession or conquest of territory.

Section 4 of the Act deals with the power to exercise jurisdiction in the following terms :

(1) If in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in a Court in Her Majesty's dominions or held under the authority of Her Majesty any question arises as to the existence or extent of any jurisdiction of Her Majesty in a foreign country, a Secretary of State shall, on the application of the court, send to the court within a reasonable time his decision on the question, and his decision shall for the purposes of the proceeding be final.

(2) The court shall send to the Secretary of State, in a document under the seal of the court, or signed by a judge of the court, questions framed so as properly to raise the question, and sufficient answers to those questions shall be returned by the Secretary of State to the court, and those answers shall, on production thereof, be conclusive evidence of the matters therein contained.

It will be seen, therefore, that the difficulties in the way of successfully challenging before any British court the legality of an Order in Council purporting to have been made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act are, to say the least,

formidable. 'Sufferance,' as indicating an origin of the jurisdiction of the British Crown in protected countries, is truly a useful term, and the deficiency in an original treaty or agreement in providing material for the exercise of jurisdiction is filled by acts of the 'protecting' Power, not objected to at the time, and therefore suffered, thus giving rise to consolidation of a power and jurisdiction not originally given. The exercise of these powers has been termed rightly by Anson² as based on 'a very liberal construction of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act.' And, as put by Sir Henry Jenkyns in his work on *British Rule and Jurisdiction beyond the Seas* at p. 194, the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 'does not confer jurisdiction on the Crown, but merely enables the Crown to exercise jurisdiction obtained *ab extra*.' There the matter must rest, but it may be explained that inhabitants of protected countries generally have the benefit of a right of appeal from the protectorate courts to His Majesty in Council, under the provisions of the various Orders in Council relating to Colonial appeals. In the case of Somaliland, for instance, this is so. They are in some Orders in Council termed 'British protected persons.'

In the case of protected territory it may well be doubted whether the protecting Power has, apart from cession or conquest, in which case the territory would be a British Colony or Dominion, any right of cession without the consent of the people concerned, who thus join in the cession. The same would seem to apply as regards any cession of or transfer of protection. This subject has been ventilated of late in the House of Commons by means of a question put on July 8 to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in regard to a 'tentative suggestion' to Italy that a portion of what is called 'British Somaliland' should be ceded by Great Britain to Abyssinia as an inducement to that country to make concessions to Italy; with the result that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald (the Secretary of State) had perforce to admit that 'British Somaliland' was not British territory, but a protectorate, but added that His Majesty possessed very full powers of administration and jurisdiction by virtue of usage and sufferance as well as under the treaties with the Somali chiefs of 1884 and 1886 (*sic*). And that these powers were at present exercised under the

² *The Law and Custom of the Constitution*, vol. ii., at p. 63.

'Somali Order in Council, 1929, made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. Further, had circumstances arisen which required further consideration to be given to such tentative suggestion, 'consultation would have taken place with the tribe affected with a view to the transfer to Ethiopia [Abyssinia] of the necessary rights in the area concerned.'

If by this is meant transfer of the rights of jurisdiction obtained by sufferance and exercised under Orders made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, then is it in accordance with a sacred trust that jurisdiction, or even protection, should be transferred from Great Britain to a semi-barbarous country like Ethiopia? The nature of the actual treaties between the Somaliland tribes and Great Britain from 1886 to 1888 has been referred to herein, and it may be repeated here that they nowhere confer any jurisdiction on Great Britain, and except in the possible instance of the Warsangoli tribe, already quoted, no basis for court jurisdiction.

The cession of territory belonging to the Crown of England stands upon a different footing. The general rule, as stated by Sir Henry Jenkyns in his work before cited, at pp. 2 and 3, is that the British Dominions cannot be added to or diminished without the consent of the Crown.

Whether the Crown can, except for the purpose of concluding a war, surrender British territory without the consent of Parliament is a moot constitutional question. . . . The modern tendency is to consider that the Crown could not do so important an act without the consent of Parliament.³

On the other hand, in the course of the debates on the Bill providing for the cession to Germany of Heligoland (then belonging to Great Britain)⁴ both Mr. Gladstone and Sir William Harcourt insisted that it was within the Prerogative of the Crown to cede British territory without the authority of Parliament. The debate on this occasion, in which some of the most eminent statesmen and parliamentarians took part, is very illuminating reading, as also the debate of June 1, 1904, on the Anglo-French Convention. But in neither instance was it suggested that the King's Pleasure had no real significance, nor since then, until July of this year, when a Minister of the Crown suggested that it was

³ Forsyth, *Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law*, p. 182.

⁴ *Hansard*, vol. cccxlvii., 3rd Series.

out of date and 'did not hold to-day, as it did in the fairly recent past.' It is conceived that the real position to-day is that although it is within the Royal Prerogative to acquire and cede territory, the usage is to obtain the consent of Parliament in each case, by an Act, enacted by the 'King, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons,' etc.

As regards the annexation of territory and the necessity for the consent of Parliament thereto, it was stated by Mr. Gladstone in the course of the debate on the Heligoland cession before referred to, that annexation, with its concomitant obligations and possible burdens, was as important as cession. If addition to and diminishment of territory are on identical footing as regards authority, as it is conceived they are, and if it has been of late years the usage, as in the case of Jubaland, to obtain the consent of Parliament to cession, then it would seem to follow that the annexation of territory with its responsibilities and burdens equally requires the consent of both Houses of Parliament, the House of Commons thus sharing its responsibility with the House of Lords, in which the Government of the day may not always have an assured majority. In this regard it may be noted that on September 26, 1901, King Edward, acting in Privy Council, and without the consent of Parliament, annexed to His Majesty's Dominions—and this without either conquest or cession, or the consent of its protected inhabitants—what had theretofore been the protectorate of the Gold Coast.

W. H. STOKER.

OUR COLONIAL COMPLACENCY

By FRANK MELLAND

'You are apt to forget that the principal person in a hospital is the patient,' said Lord Horder, addressing the Voluntary Hospitals' Conference last year. It is an easy mistake to fall into for those in charge to view a big organisation from the point of view of the managers rather than from that of the managed.

It would be unwise to press the analogy too far; but there remains a point to stress. The patient in a hospital is generally there of his own free will and because he has faith in the treatment he will receive. Even if he leaves the hospital minus a limb, he believes that, in losing it, he has saved his life. He likewise accepts with patience minor regulations, often evolved not so much for the patient's convenience as for that of the visiting and resident staff.

In many respects our great Colonial empire resembles a hospital. There is much that we want to put right, manifold ailments we wish to cure, the primary causes of many of which are still in doubt; but we have, so to speak, built the hospital round the patients—we have fenced them in, not at their request and often without their consent. We delight in experimental theorising. We dictate forms of government as experiments, we make laws and regulations, we order or cajole the inhabitants into economic excursions, formulate education policies, control marriage and other customs, and pat ourselves on the back because we are doing such noble work in assisting the evolution of native races and working for their uplift, presumably to that very civilisation of ours concerning which we suffer so many doubts. We forget that we are there, as the late Dr. Donald Fraser put it, 'for the people's sake and not for our own vindication.' This is a dangerous form of complacency, which we should make

haste to drop, remembering always that the principal persons are the men, women, and children whom we have placed under our control.

These ideas crystallised in my mind when I made a close and critical study of the Bushe Report on Criminal Law in East Africa,¹ but they cover a far wider field than that Report, for Mr. Bushe's Commission considered, in a limited area, the administration of criminal law in European-manned courts; he was not concerned with the legislation these courts administer, and did not touch on the native courts which we have set up. The wider aspects of our rule in Africa, which forms the larger part of our Colonial empire, such as indirect rule, education, economic policy and the like, were far beyond the terms of reference. Yet these are closely linked, part of one system, springing from one source, and leading largely in the same direction.

It is customary for the modern Englishman to look with horror on the old Spanish and Portuguese conquerors who gave their subject races the Marian or Elizabethan choice between the Cross and the stake. Although we still interfere with native religions, we never now make conversion to Christianity compulsory, but await its achievement by conviction. We have abandoned not only slavery but even compulsory labour, and complacently rejoice in our high-mindedness, forgetting that we are still as arrogantly dictating, still every whit as compelling. How does it strike 'the native'? In Africa, at all events, there is, in reality, no such person as 'the African native.' Every tribe differs from every other, and the tribal reaction, even among those which are neighbours, towards European impact varies greatly. With this warning let us take two examples, the one from the west coast, the other from the east, each calculated to shake our complacency. We have raised an outcry against maladministration in the Liberian Republic, in which oppression and corruption are admittedly prevalent. Contiguous with that Republic is our old Colony of Sierra Leone, where we have ruled since 1788. If the indigenous natives felt as we do, one would expect a steady migration from Liberia into Sierra Leone. But such migration as takes place is all the other way.

¹ Cmd. 4623.

Mr. L. M. Nesbitt recently accomplished a wonderful journey through the inhospitable country of the Danakil, a tribe nominally under the ægis of Ethiopia, or Abyssinia, which is the only African State to share with Liberia the proud title of independent. The Danakil admit of no outside interference whatsoever, even from Ethiopia. Three previous expeditions which attempted to penetrate peacefully into their country were annihilated, the Danakil fearing the advent of white men who would not so much take their land as interfere with their customs. Since the principal custom (occupation, ritual or sport) of the tribe consists in killing for the sake of trophies, and for the credit from such feats, very much as certain North American Indians used to indulge in scalping, the fear is undoubtedly justified, for no European overlords would sanction such customs. This is, however, instructive as showing how liberty of action is valued above all the benefits of civilisation, and explains why some neighbouring tribes who are under our control, such as the Samburu and the Lumbwa in Kenya, do not lightly forego their customary pursuits, or why throughout Africa, despite our prohibitions, a person who is convicted by native methods of practising witchcraft is still killed.

I do not advocate the legalisation of spear-blooding under the Union Jack, but only emphasise the tenacity with which tribes cling to old customs or privileges, which are as comprehensible as was winning one's spurs not so long ago in England, a custom for which we do not condemn our ancestors. Native races consider some of our killing still more inexcusable. Professor Malinowski relates how he was telling a Melanesian head-hunting cannibal about one of the biggest engagements on the Western Front, and the old cannibal said: 'But you cannot eat so many thousands.' When the position was further explained he was horrified at the idea of taking human life that was wanted neither for food nor for trophies.

We have little cause for complacency about our humanitarian progress and the higher levels to which we seek to raise native races. Though Governments make laws, it is the people who have to keep them, and it is the goodwill and support of the people in Africa, as in Europe and the United States, which gives life to the law. Without a change of

heart and of outlook the law has no life. We have uniformly done, not what the native peoples want, nor what they—poor, misguided ‘savages’!—think right, but what we consider is best for them; unless we modify our policy in this respect we are in for a very rude awakening, for we are deliberately teaching and emancipating native races everywhere, educating them to be articulate, and they are beginning to learn how to marshal their ideas, and to talk.

I will give one or two examples. In the mandated territory of Tanganyika a Native Liquor Ordinance has recently been passed, providing for the control of the manufacture and sale of native beer in townships. I am not condemning the new law, for, after experiments of other forms of control in a large industrial centre, I myself was forced to the conclusion that the brewing and sale of beer must be completely controlled by an outside body, the profits being devoted to native welfare. The Africans, however, protested against this Bill, in a well-reasoned and moderately worded memorandum, not claiming any licence for intemperance; it was, indeed, much better worded than some applications at home for ‘extensions,’ and the petitioners even said that if Government considered this beer harmful for them they would actually welcome total prohibition; but they based their protest on the grounds that an immemorial right was to be taken away and given to people of another race, and because the opinions of those most concerned (the natives) had neither been consulted nor taken into consideration. That really is the point. Africa is becoming alive to the fact that, with all our talk of liberty, she is subject to a racial dictatorship more rigorous than anything imposed on them by the old chief system, which never talked of freedom. Africa is also learning to express in words such ideas, of which it has for some time been semi-conscious.

To give another example—from Uganda, where more than anywhere else we pride ourselves on what we have done in the spread of civilisation, the march of Christianity, and the advance of education from the network of primary schools to the apex of an embryo university. Even here educated Baganda are saying openly that they are not satisfied with the education we are giving them. They were not consulted as to the form or shape which it has taken. In another area,

along the railway strip in Northern Rhodesia, the progressive Batonga are striving to find a path upwards towards the white man’s standards. (It should be remembered that we always boast of the civilising influence of white settlement as it furnishes practical examples of the higher life.) These natives are complaining that restrictions on the sale of their crops to Europeans, legislation for enforcing the continuance of big villages, and the like, are thwarting their natural aspirations and tending towards stagnation and repression. All these are, as yet, but murmurs: there is no thunderous roar of waves upon the shore of our complacency, but the tide is coming in.

Taking big things first. When we first occupied these native lands we started to control them by straightforward direct rule. Of course, we never consulted the native, we merely usurped and assumed powers; some we exercised ourselves, and others we delegated to native employees, selected and paid by us. It must have been most upsetting to the tribes to have a strange race assume control of their lives and actions, and sending, as minions of the State, alien natives and natives of their own tribe, but of no standing, to carry orders to their chiefs and elders—even to lay hands on their sacred persons and their property. Yet after a while they grew accustomed to it, while their old tribal fabric began to fall into decay from disuse.

Then ‘we’ decided that ‘direct rule’ would no longer fill the bill. It was not educative, it was disruptive; and it was far too expensive. So ‘we’ ordained that these native peoples must once more be ruled by their chiefs, whom we would guide along the path that we chose they should tread. This we called ‘indirect rule.’ Theoretically it was a marvellous idea: rarely has Imperial Britain been so proud of herself, or felt so superior to other races, as when she evolved this epoch-making (and money-saving) scheme. The native, however, once more was not consulted, and, curiously enough, he has not everywhere relished the fresh change that has been forced upon him. This does not imply that it was not, in the main, a good change; it is merely an assertion of fact. They had learned to appreciate some points in direct rule managed by white men, who, though ignorant as to their customs, were at any rate impartial. As regards the chiefs,

they did not relish the change, in many cases because they had lost the habit of ruling, and still more because they did not regain the right to rule in accordance with custom, but were forced to rule on lines laid down by their white overlords, to administer justice and to punish on those lines. It was a very hard task, savouring rather of puppetship, with little of the old dignity of chieftainship; it has met with varied degrees of success, according to the soundness of the fabric that remained—the personality of the chiefs, the vagaries of tribal aptitudes, and the knowledge, tact and sympathy of the white directors.

This change, as all else, was dictated by us; it is not, as we pretend, an evolution of the old rule. We broke up the old rule, substituting the direct rule of the old-fashioned district officer. The further change to indirect rule has been as drastic, as much of a novelty as was the earlier essay. It is also raising some very difficult problems, and it will raise many more; so that, while I am really inclined to side with those who think we have started something rather fine, I cannot look on it as an evolution of the old pre-European régime, nor do I view its future with complacency.

First of all there are among the well-wishers of Africa two distinct and conflicting schools of thought: first, that we must evolve a native culture from the relics—it is almost the wreck—of the old; and, secondly, that the only culture worth developing in Africa is our particular variety of 'Western' civilisation. There are, and have long been, eminent advocates of both policies; most educated natives belong to the second school, feeling that the former is but a veiled attempt to keep them under, for which reason some of them view anthropologists with distrust, thinking, quite incorrectly, that they must belong to the former school. The late Lord Cromer was among the earlier advocates of the second school, and wrote: 'The idea that native society can be reconstituted on an improved native model is a pure delusion.'² Modern anthropologists are perhaps the safest and the most level-headed guides, being less swayed by outside influences in forming their opinion than other interested parties. I wish educated Africans would realise that the anthropologist aims at learning as much as he can about the

² *Ancient and Modern Imperialism.*

stock on which it is proposed to work, so that we may graft, bit by bit, starting with elements that are most suitable, or most necessary, and only gradually introducing the rest. To take a parallel from cattle: native breeds of cattle are full of weak points, and, though suitable in many ways to the conditions under which they have to live, cannot compete in modern markets for milk or beef. Too rapid and ill-considered grading, however, only makes things worse, destroying the old immunities and failing to replace them by counterbalancing advantages. The process requires study and time and has to be accompanied by improvements in feeding, housing, and in other ways.

It can be emphatically stated that no Director of Animal Health would embark light-heartedly on changes as violent as we have introduced in East Africa among the human inhabitants, and he would not keep his job if he did. In this particular connexion I must specify East Africa, because although indirect rule, as we now know it, originated in West Africa, it was there an evolution of the old rule, and did not often follow an intermediate period of direct rule.

With regard to these divergent policies, the Colonial Office itself, so far as I am aware, could not say on which side it stands in any one locality. I wonder how much these great authorities realise all that this means, and how little the electorate knows about it. The change, for instance, in all economics, the introduction of cash (and credit), of wage-earning, of individual ownership, of the growing of cash crops. This last is now, apparently, the accepted inspiration of all Colonial Governments. Natives are being driven to grow more crops, so that by paying taxes, and by purchases of imported goods, which will swell the Customs revenue, they may help to provide the necessary funds for social services. It all seems so reasonable, and so ideal on paper, that one is reluctant to look deeply into it, though it seems to combine some of the practices of the Soviets in forced production for State welfare with the creation of individualist wealth (or capitalism), since the stimulus offered is the acquisition of personal property, where there was formerly nothing but community tenure, and tribal or group mutual dependence and assistance. Does this not mean a colossal and revolutionary change that some tribes, at any rate, cannot assimilate

without very serious risks? Are we not going too far? Whatever we may claim for indirect rule, there is nothing evolutionary about this introduction by force or 'moral suasion' of our economic creeds.

The religion which we have introduced is, of course, also revolutionary, as is practically everything taught in the schools; so too our laws, and the penalties for infraction. Yet complacently we talk of 'building upon the old,' or of 'making a better African and not an imitation European.' We have adopted optimistically what appears to us a noble idea, and we are persevering with it blindly, mouthing platitudes in approbation of our righteousness. There are, however, thinkers in Africa and in England who are far from feeling complacent, and who realise that, whatever we may think and say, the natives themselves are thinking that we are unjust, illogical, and above all tyrannical—ordering what they shall and shall not do, how they shall live, how they must behave or how they must be punished, because we are masters of their fates. We are everything but captains of their souls, and that is solely because it is our principle to leave to them the decision between Christianity and their old faith—mutilated, hedged about, but still their old faith, and theirs to adhere to so long as they prefer it. But we have broken much of their law and customs, tied by religious sanctions to their old belief. Native customs now are to have no place in the King's courts; the chief no longer gives religious sanction to cultivation, for that is directed by the Department of Agriculture; the bride-token, or insurance, has been decried. Native women will not only inevitably be condemned if they bury their twins alive, their sons if they consecrate their spears in human blood, but we stand aghast at the idea that theft can be made good by restitution, and hold up our hands in horror at the idea of collective family responsibility for ill-doing, which has, from time immemorial, been one of their chief factors in lawful living. Even our own introduction of court fines is deprecated because the innocent family will help the offending member to pay, according to their religious obligation, and as if fathers and brothers, mothers and sisters, never did the like in England.

It is a sad tangle in these native territories which we have

stirred to a great awakening, the extent of which we do not yet realise. General Smuts spoke recently of 'awakening Asia'; but he appears not yet to look so anxiously at the awakening races by his own homeside. His Government thinks that the time has come to take charge of the three native territories which are Imperial enclaves within the borders of the Union. Mr. Pirow actually alleges that the British-controlled native States all the way up the continent are 'linked to the Union by a common native policy,' when they are, in fact, poles asunder. Granted that those territories are the only British-ruled native areas of which many South Africans have any knowledge, and that we have less room for complacency there than in any area from Southern Rhodesia to the Sudan, yet local native opinion is both emphatic and articulate that it does not want to enter the Union, with its apparently perpetual 'colour bar.' In all honesty, however, unless we discharge our responsibilities more wisely in the future than in the past, their position and ours may become untenable. Casting stones at the Union alone will not suffice.

The Union Government would offer the inhabitants of these protectorates such economic advantages as are not incompatible with the 'colour bar,' advantages which we have failed to give them, partly because we have so rigorously protected them from 'exploitation'—a word often too loosely used. In a British African protectorate where mining has caused no discontent, cash payment has been substituted by us for the old customary forced labour for the chiefs, and consequently the natives in many cases refrain from growing all they can for fear that they will pay more in taxes—a pertinent example of the native view as against the English view. Exploitation of minerals is by no means the worst of our innovations. Real well-wishers of the natives like the Governors of Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya all welcome it. It has, of course, long been a fact in the Rhodesias, and a comparison between the prosperity and happiness of the Southern Rhodesian natives, whose land was conquered and whose minerals were grabbed, with their actual neighbours in unexploited Bechuanaland is all in favour of the former. It looks as if popular ideas need adjusting.

Africa is awakening—the demands of the inhabitants are

becoming more vociferous ; without some kind of exploitation and development, the demands of the younger generation cannot be met. The land must pay for its services. A generation is growing up amidst aeroplanes, wireless and the cinema, all of which are becoming commonplaces in their lives, as the train and the motor car have already become ; yet our leading statesmen remain complacent : the most reforming of our Socialists seem so ignorant of the problems to which they devote their militant zeal that they offer as a panacea the gift of equal rights. By this they mean equal rights for the natives to do what we say is best for them—not the right to live according to their own customs, but merely the right to follow our model (or the Socialist version thereof) instead of their own ; and this has, in some inexplicable way, to be compatible with giving this tremendously preponderating majority the franchise !

A franchise, of course, would bring to nought all schemes, whether Conservative, Liberal or Socialist in origin, and would, for many years to come, produce chaos, putting the native at the mercy of demagogues. These subject peoples need something better than the franchise if we would avert Nemesis, and something better than arrogant and complacent autocracy. We need to call them into co-operation, and get them to help us unravel the tangle and evolve something better than we have yet done. By this I mean we should keep at present the right (or the power) to rule, to legislate, to administer ; but we should act after consultation, act more as their agents than we do now. Since they must shed some things, like their ideas and customs concerning homicide, we, too, must shed some of our proud ideas, and for a start make every lawyer concerned realise the truth of the saying of the Lord Chief Justice (Lord Hewart) that ' it is not enough that you should do justice ; you must, if you can, be manifestly *observed* to be doing justice.' This is, I fear, very different from the statements by Mr. Bushe, as head of the Commission to which I referred at the beginning, for instance : ' To civilise, maintain peace and good order can only be done by the introduction of British concepts of wrong-doing.' We need to get native advice as to tempering our laws, and adapting their laws and customs and all else, not into a European mould, but into a native mould that has shed such

attributes as are particularly repugnant to our ideas, and subversive of ultimate welding into a progressive State. Some have only seemed repugnant because we have misunderstood them or their implications, as witness our indignant campaign against what we interpreted as bride price, by which we destroyed a fine insurance for the wife, and actually set up in its place a real selling. It is not too late to do this if we will only drop our insular arrogance and live up to our protestations : if we will shed our complacency that all is well, and try to see the other man's point of view.

At present we give the native ' justice ' according to our laws, fairness according to our standards, liberty to obey our rules and regulations ; but we have made next to no progress in giving him courtesy and consideration, a lapse on our part of which he is daily growing more and more conscious. We have enforced, rather than given, law and order, safety for life and property (so far as we can manage it), and in return for these mixed blessings we have imposed annual taxation—at a high rate. It makes one understand why the Danakil are prepared to fight to the death to keep their old customs and liberty, and why the subject races in Liberia prefer the irregularities of their American-negro rulers to the old-established English rule as demonstrated in Sierra Leone. We have got to do better to get them on our side. We must find an evolutionary method for their customs. The Masai now blood their spears in lions, some Sudanese have hectic camel races instead of raids ; forestry was helped forward among the Kikuyu by a blending of customary initiation ceremonies with Boy Scout ideas ; the Bishop of Masasi has adapted native ceremonies and dances : so it can be done, in almost any sphere, and it must be done. The natives, moreover, would enter into the spirit of it, and much truculence and obstinacy, born of kicking against the pricks, would disappear.

Finally, it is as well to point out a few material facts. Some critics of our occupation are apt to concentrate on such matters as the alienation of land to Europeans, the dislocation caused by mining operations and the like, but there are other and possibly deeper causes to which attention is hardly ever called. By the introduction of exotic breeds of cattle, for instance, we have introduced diseases to which native herds have fallen a ready prey. By stopping tribal raids we have

intensified in-breeding, to the rapid deterioration of native beasts, besides leading to overstocking, which, in its turn, has accelerated (as has the introduction of the plough) the greatest danger facing Africa—soil erosion. Even our anti-tsetse work carries the same danger in its wake, and this soil erosion is robbing the native of more land than European settlement has ever done. So it is not only by deeds of questionable morality that we have done harm, but by our good deeds also, so true it is that half the time of the wise is occupied in undoing the damage done by the good. Slavery and human sacrifices have been suppressed; but the generations which had experience of these have all but died out, and the present troubles attendant on our rule, and all its irksome restrictions, are everyday features in the lives of the present generation.

There is, indeed, no room for complacency. We need to call in the old to help us redress the balance upset by the new; only co-operative effort will pull us through. This means calling in not only the wisdom of the old men but the growing aspirations of the young, who, if we fail to enlist them, will take the lead in subversive activities. These two elements will often be in opposition to each other, but we must hearken to both. It will be no easy task, but we cannot use the old *régime* merely to repress the adolescents to whom we have given new life: they are the children of our rule, and, as such, have their rights. Neither can we allow the immature and misguided ideas of these half-educated men to prevail too much against the hereditary wisdom of the old. That would, at this stage, be equally fatal.

Here is work for statesmanship for years to come. Here is a task worthy of Britain, with its unrivalled schooling in governance. In all parts of the world, amongst proud old civilisations as among primitive and backward races, we have learned in the bitter school of experience, in failure and in success. Our past copy-books, marked India, America, Australasia, South Africa, or, nearer home, Cyprus, Ireland, are blotted with faults and scored over with corrections. We have not made too good a start with our new Colonial copy-book because we are still thinking too much of ourselves, and not enough of the persons principally concerned, our native subjects and protected races.

FRANK MELLAND.

MR. ROOSEVELT CHALLENGES THE CONSTITUTION

By W. G. FITZ-GERALD

As a President *en pantoufles* (with Woodrow Wilson replacing him), Theodore Roosevelt had a bright idea to enliven a leisure which had grown intolerable to a man of his restless and venturesome nature. He went down to the 'A.B.C.' Powers of South America, there to expound afresh the nebulous Monroe Doctrine, and with it the naval 'Big Stick' which he himself had appended as a suasive gesture that could yet 'speak softly' to those Lesser Sisters of the New World galaxy.

That famous doctrine—derived from George Canning's hint to John Quincy Adams, and by him wholly changed—was now restated as a purely protective ægis of high and selfless motive—although Latin-American statesmen and writers had for many years misconstrued it, so that quite a literature of protest had grown up against *El Monroismo*, all the way from Mexico to Argentina.

The exuberant 'Teddy' was nicely greeted, but his mission had slim success. Later on in Rio de Janeiro he met my gallant little friend General Candido da Silva Rondon, protector of Brazil's Indians, and the most fearless of South America's explorers: Rondon is half Indian himself, a man of singular charm who never goes armed, even in the 'tightest' place. To 'T.R.' and his son Kermit, the General proposed a most luring jaunt: 'Let us follow the "River of Doubt" which we call the Rio da Dúvida, since its course is as yet unmapped. And among us it shall figure in future as the "Rio Roosevelt"!'

Theirs was a lurid quest in dug-out canoes of the Stone Age—sniped at by savages with poisoned arrows as they turtled through sinuous and roaring rapids. In one crash,

young Kermit nearly perished. His father at last lay helpless and sick with fever on a diet of monkey-meat, turtle-eggs and palm-tops. He never got over that hail of jungle plagues, and they brought about Roosevelt's untimely death.

Strange to say, his cousin, Franklin, also cut loose on a 'River of Doubt' two and a half years ago. The way was unsure, with blind guides and endless perils in lurk where only aid and comfort were looked for. But let the President speak for himself: 'It is a new Untrodden Path,' he told an awed Congress as he took the plunge. 'But I will tell you with equal frankness that unprecedented conditions call for the trial of new means of rescue.' Just how much money has already been strewn on that Untrodden Path, no one can with certainty say. But as Ranking Member of the Appropriations Committee, Representative John Taber gives us some idea of a dollar-deluge which has in no way effaced the President's smile—for reasons which I shall later explain.

Said Mr. Taber: 'The money that the first and second sessions of the Seventy-Third Congress has made available to spend on New Deal experiments presents an unheard-of picture of extravagance. The total of the first session, ending June 16, 1933, was \$5,267,659,805. In the second session, \$17,486,508,287 was voted: the grand total for that Congress was \$22,719,188,092. Here, then, is a disregard of any sense of responsibility to the taxpayers of the United States which out-does the maddest of dreams. The Federal deficit for these two fiscal years 1934-5 runs to some \$16,000,000,000. And they have made these appropriations without having any money in the Treasury to meet them, or any prospects of such money, except such as may accrue from the sale of Government securities.'

Yet as candidate in 1932 Mr. Roosevelt had urged economy and a balanced budget in emphatic terms. And as President he solemnly warned his Congress that the Federal Government was 'on the road to bankruptcy'! What had happened to make him put a continent of all Europe's size upon what grim Wall Street bankers called 'a picnic basis'—with magical millions and billions now steam-shovelled to 130,000,000 people over an area of 3,000,000 square miles?

A giant gamble had collapsed in the autumn of 1929 with cash losses and economic havoc of lunar proportions: the figure has been fixed at \$50,000,000,000! Hence these six years of a depression more acute and obdurate than all the rest in America's mercurial history. President Coolidge,

elate and taciturn, never saw this avalanche impending. The luckless Hoover came in to announce Poverty for ever banished in his blue-sky Utopia: thenceforth, he purred, that perennial curse would be but an Old World wound, whilst Americans, one and all, would enjoy 'a chicken in every pot and two cars in every garage'!

One may well pause to ask: Is there any more fallible guide to the United States than a President? The Democratic Jefferson tried to abolish his navy and army—only to leave the foreign war that ensued to his successor, James Madison. And he was to see the Capitol and White House in flames, with himself and his Cabinet scuttling for safety across the Potomac into Virginia. Then the break-up of the Union under Lincoln was wholly unforeseen. And in our own time we have seen President Wilson cabling from Washington to his delegates at the Peace of Paris in 1919 that both Congress and people backed the Treaty and his own League of Nations 'with enthusiasm'!

In what condition did Mr. Roosevelt find the lavish America of his two predecessors, whom Prosperity seemed fairly to sate and choke with opulence? Hear his own dirge over the seismic scene 'on my induction into the Presidency':

Values have sunk to fantastic levels. Our factories are without orders. The means of exchange are frozen, the withered leaves of our industrial enterprise lie on every side. Farmers find no markets for their produce. The savings of many years in thousands of families are gone. Hosts of our unemployed face the grim problem of existence, an equally great number toil with little return. . . .

It was a lean and ghastly America on March 4, 1933. 'A stricken nation' Mr. Roosevelt found it, one shaken with dread: 'Nameless, unreasoning fear which paralyses the effort needed to convert retreat into triumph.' But now a new leader was come, 'ready to wage war against a critical emergency.' So he would ask Congress for powers 'such as would be given me if we were, in fact, invaded by a foreign foe. We must act, and act quickly'!

None knew better than the speaker that violent revolution was about to burst in a land where men carry 'guns' as we do watches or pocket-handkerchiefs. Were not the rich and the banks and Wall Street brokers just then ordering shot-

and bomb-proof steel shutters in view of the muttering terror? But Mr. Roosevelt had full faith in that curious tripod of 'checks and balances' which the Fathers had hammered out for the Thirteen States of 1789, whose jars and jealousies were even then on the verge of armed conflict.

Our Constitution [the President declared] is so simple, so practical, that it is always possible to meet extraordinary needs without any loss of essential form. That is why our Constitution has proved the most superbly enduring political mechanism the world has ever seen. It has met every stress, and is fully adequate to deal with the unprecedented issues before us.

Who would believe that so seemingly trivial a 'stress' as a coop-full of chickens, sold by four Jewish brothers in Brooklyn, would make the old 'mechanism' crush Roosevelt's main Recovery Act, after he had spent £18,000,000 on it and 5400 persons were at work in its central office alone? And therewith the rest of his eighty-one 'alphabetical' bureaux were left in the air as potentially illegal, in the same way as the N.I.R.A. (and with it a dozen more) was swept into the limbo of New Deal theories by the Supreme Court last May. Those nine black-robed augurs of the United States Constitution were unanimous in their decision. They had already rebuked Congress for resigning to the President powers which were vested in the Legislature alone. Now everything was in doubt. The Untrodden Path was seen to be a maze of thorny circles: its explorer, for all his feats, found himself back where he began, and so must needs try another tack—with more than half his term of office wasted in *ad captandum* efforts.

His smile was gone; he now viewed the Constitution with bitter contempt. And he spoke his mind on it at the Friday Press talk with 'the boys,' whom Pat McKenna, the White House usher, herds into the Executive Office twice a week, so that Mr. Roosevelt may instruct them (and through them the masses) in his short-cuts to the twin goals of Recovery and Reform which he refused to separate. This Supreme Court stroke (he told the Press) was in effect a throw-back to 'the horse-and-buggy days' of the eighteenth century. Was the Federal Government, then, to sit powerless amid the tremendous social and economic problems—'that came as a

by-product of our growth from a strip of sea-board colonies to a mighty world-Power'?

The Commerce Clause of 1789 now took out of the Federal jurisdiction all farming, manufacturing, mining and construction industries. And moreover, what of the liquor trades, the Wagner Labour-Relations Bill, the Guffey Coal Control, the Social Security, the A.A.A., the Public Utilities and a host of other New Deal nostrums? The President sat befogged and lost. He prayed for light on his darkling path so as 'to indicate with clarity the constitutional limits within which the Federal Government may act.' And again, like his ebullient cousin (of the 'River of Doubt') in a similar political plight, Mr. Roosevelt hinted at a referendum of People against 'the residual and inviolable sovereignty of the States': that was the fiat of James Madison, the original drafter of the United States Constitution.

Here the root problem is one that no American seems to apprehend; it is 'geo-political,' and therefore insoluble as things are at present. A continent can never be ruled as a country is: we see this in Australia, whose far western State has so recently pleaded for the right to secede from the Federation, situated as it is thousands of miles from Canberra, with wholly disparate aims and interests peculiar to itself. Said a Southern governor to Sir Josiah Stamp in the United States: 'It should never be possible for Washington to be able to lay down how you and I should buy and sell chickens 2000 miles away.'

America's immense distances, with her many climates, her mixed human stocks, and the utterly diverse clamour of her eight 'sections,' render such a phrase as 'the nation' a misnomer to lead even so acute an observer as Mr. H. G. Wells widely astray. He, also, had high hopes of this New Deal. But he forgets the 'Square Deal' that wilted in cousin Theodore's hands a generation ago, and those same Quixote tilts against the 'predatory rich' and 'the malefactors of great wealth,' whom Franklin Roosevelt to-day assails in the same crusading spirit.

Mr. Wells thought 'to find America a practical and constructive lead for the rest of the world.' He found only crude confusion in the 'More Abundant Life' that Roosevelt preached—with Father Coughlin and Huey Long vying with

him for mass favours, and Dr. Townsend, Upton Sinclair and the other Utopians shown as 'also rans' in a race of raw futility. Even Mr. Wells could waste his time in putting 'questions of the most elementary kind' to 'a group of Government administrators.' What sort of a New America were they trying to bring into being? He posed to them three ideals of this kind. 'It was astonishing,' he owns, 'to realise that even this primary decision has not yet been made. These three objectives were *all* in evidence; and in addition there were, so to speak, intercalary activities going two ways, east and west, at once'! So did Mr. H. G. Wells assess the progress made by amateurs on an 'untrodden path' in which Presidents have slogged for a hundred years without ever finding a 'national' clue to its labyrinth.

One of the ablest members of Mr. Roosevelt's Cabinet—Henry A Wallace, his Secretary of Agriculture—accounts for this baffling tangle in another way. 'The United States,' he finds, 'is like a boy eighteen years old, possessed of excellent health and a strong body—but so unsettled in his mind that he doesn't know what to do next'! Yet this is the ally to whom British statesmen like Stanley Baldwin and Anthony Eden can look with wistful yearning for joint governance of our wayward world!

The 'American Boy' could see sixty-six nations assembled in London two years ago endeavouring to restore economic health to us all. Our King and his Prime Minister opened that Conference in solemn state. But the wilful Boy threw a bomb into it, and sent the dazed delegates packing for their home ports, literally from China to Peru.

Surely no such language was ever yet used by a Chief of State as that which Mr. Roosevelt saw fit to use on that august occasion. His own Foreign Minister, the able and courtly Cordell Hull, could only repeat it with implied apology—'since the American Delegation has no jurisdiction in this matter.' His President declared the World Conference gone astray in 'a purely artificial experiment'; a 'diversion' that showed 'a singular lack of proportion, and a failure to remember the larger purposes for which it was called together. . . .' America's master could also scathe: 'An excuse for the continuance of basic errors, and the old fetishes of so-called international bankers.'

Nor could Mr. Roosevelt 'relish the thought' of economic heresies so far removed from 'our own broad purpose—a dollar which a generation hence will have the same purchasing and debt-paying power as the dollar value we hope to attain in the near future.' That slashing Message had a caustic sting in the tail of it: 'When the world works out concerted policies in the nations *to produce balanced budgets* and to live within their means, then we can properly discuss a better distribution of the gold and silver supplies as the base of national currencies.'

Our Prime Minister was aghast—as well he might be after all the hand-clasps and smiling talks (and 'Mickey Mouse' films) which had so cheered his White House visit only a few months before this explosion. 'I shall never forget the look on Ramsay MacDonald's face,' wrote James W. Warburg, the finance expert of Mr. Cordell Hull's much-rattled team. One of the notorious 'Brain Trust' (Raymond Moley) was sent over in haste to steer Mr. Hull out of the wreck and report results to Washington. And so irate was the Secretary of State over this intrusion that when he went home he at once sent in his resignation. Only by dismissing Moley (who now edits a New York weekly paper) was the President able to retain the sanest and wisest of his Ministers in the Cabinet.

But Mr. Roosevelt had assumed a dictator's powers during the historic 'Hundred Days' of 1933 when, in the name of 'Emergency,' he demanded of a lifeless and docile Congress the stupendous sum of \$10,953,000,000, by way of a start in 'priming the pump' of America's moribund business. Thenceforward he did as he pleased, imperious as Mussolini, though without any trace of that dictator's prescient statesmanship. He called from London Dr. Oliver Sprague, who was American adviser to the Bank of England. But that sound counsellor was ignored, and so went back to tamer duties at Harvard. Then Lewis Douglas of Arizona was dropped as Director of the Budget: 'to produce balanced budgets' was that man's strenuous aim. Yet the second year of the New Deal closed with a Treasury deficit of nearly £700,000,000! This, of course, takes no account of the forty-eight States, many of which have been forced to beg Federal funds, since their own cities were bankrupt, in many cases with their

police, firemen and school teachers on strike for long arrears of pay.

Then the bureaucracy of this vast land is on a quite monstrous scale, since votes must somehow be transmuted into jobs, whether high or low. Of these there are about a million 'Federals.' And in continental spaces beyond loom 175,000 further units of Government, with 3,250,000 persons drawing wages at the rate of £900,000,000 a year. How can any one man ever hope to impose his will upon so enormous and complex a polity as this? A witty *attaché* of the French Embassy in Washington put it thus to me last month: 'This ship of State is too roughly built and engined. She's like the gorgeous *Normandie*, which we now rechristen "*La Dette Flottante*"!'

But then no architect that lives can satisfy America's amateur captain. He loves his own designs as Henry Ford does, and, like him, looks for the praise due to a public benefactor. 'History is bunk,' said America's one and only Henry. And again: 'Knowledge don't amount to much.' And yet again: 'I never read books—they only muss up my mind.' Yet Colgate University could make Mr. Ford a Doctor of Laws, and the Public Orator declared: 'This man is of that select company which is assured the perpetuity of Fame'!

When the Supreme Court, as ultimate arbiter of the Constitution, gave its unanimous verdict that Mr. Roosevelt's National Recovery Act was illegal, its author feared that the whole house of cards his New Deal had built up would soon topple over in view of a host of further appeals, either impending or probable. Thus if his boon to the farmers (for ploughing-in crops and killing off live-stock) were to go, and the A.A.A. were to follow the N.R.A., then the President foresaw a fearsome slump to '36-cent wheat and 5-cent cotton.' In short, those nine champions of the 'horse-and-buggy' era, he opined, had raised a problem equal to the Dred Scott slavery decision which led straight to the Civil War. The problem was this: 'Is the Federal Government or the forty-eight States to have plenary power over our social and economic needs?'

Mr. Roosevelt insisted that the 'central' authority should rule America's loud roost. But just how this was to be

achieved he did not say, and silence settled down upon a bewildered Washington, while 4500 N.R.A. bureaucrats found themselves 'fired with zeal,' as the cynics said—meaning that these were now added to the 10,000,000 already unemployed. After that Supreme Court stroke came a sudden lull in the dictator's 'must' decrees to the Capitol. Both Houses began to reassert themselves. And when the fateful question was raised, 'Who is to pay?'—for a dollar debauch that actually ran the Press out of noughts in its composing-rooms, merely to mark its million-billion caravans day by day—then Franklin Roosevelt was ready with Cousin Theodore's remedy of thirty years ago. The 'rich' would pay, through new and penal taxes, which he suggested darkly and did not define. And 'Big Business' must pay, too. This action, Congress was told, was in line with 'the movement towards the progressive taxation of wealth and of income.' It was also a drive towards the President's main goal—the very sound policy of encouraging a wider distribution of wealth.

This took the wind out of Senator Long's sails. That buffoon already had millions of dupes cheering his 'minimum wage' of £500 a year for all Americans, with a free house and a car. Mr. Long, I may say, 'owns' the big State of Louisiana, lock, stock and barrel. His own bi-cameral Parliament in Baton Rouge he has in his own well-lined pocket. Louisiana's M.P.'s its own dictator calls 'as fine a body of legislators as money can buy'! The notorious Huey had opposed the President and tried to block his will in a Senate speech of fifteen hours on end, eked out with cooking recipes and the prowess of his uncle in mixing drinks. But now finding Mr. Roosevelt in favour of his own 'Share the Wealth Clubs,' Mr. Long rose to bless the new tax Message—'I just want to say "Amen!"'.

Meanwhile, business freezes up once more and the small investors are as shy as ever. 'They're scared stiff,' as one rueful broker put it to me; 'scared of what the Government may do to money and to the utility concerns, not to mention fresh imposts as yet unnamed.' Yet they did essay a few flutters on Mr. Roosevelt's new Silver game, which so demoralised China and Mexico. So with waning prestige among solid men, though still acclaimed by the masses as

their 'Santa Claus,' Mr. Roosevelt lays wary plans for the 1936 election. Already his patronage-man, James Farley, has resigned as P.M.G., and gone forth to sound the political deeps between the two oceans, and from the Great Lakes down to the Mexican Gulf.

His Chief's 'fireside chats' on the radio to 50,000,000 listeners are now dropped—as the outworn Brain Trust had been, and later on all the boards and codes set up for the steel, textile, automobile and other industries. The President himself may now go on a continental tour as 'Teddy' did of old, or as the hapless Wilson did when he also tried to renew a fickle people's zeal for theories which they so speedily decried. This was their way over the liquor prohibition they first craved and then cursed, only to abandon—after £7,000,000,000 had been wasted in an orgie of moral uplift unmatched in human history for its lawless folly and flaming aftermath of crime.

Is Mr. Roosevelt assured of a second term? I believe he is, because 'money talks,' and a whole continent has already been deafened and drugged by the fall of dollars from its 'great distributor.' On his tour the New Deal's creator will survey his public works for 3000 miles and find them good. For this item alone \$3,600,000,000 was to be spent among the States. Mighty rivers are to be harnessed for hydro-electric use. Yet how new millions of horse-power are to be brought into play without a further ousting of man-power (and a huge increase in doles and relief) is a question that nobody raises.

There remains the *crux* which stonewalled the Untrodden Path last May; I mean the President's open challenge to the United States Constitution. What are the prospects of securing by amendment plenary powers to the Chief Executive, as against those of the sovereign States which are still clearly defined, though in many ways they have been narrowed since the Civil War? If he commits himself to this issue, even the adroit Mr. Roosevelt must fail. Last June Senator Borah delivered a public protest against the President's hints, defending the early labours of Hamilton, Madison and Jefferson, and the strict limitation of Federal sway as the Supreme Court had defined it.

Only three times before has this 'third leg' of the

Constitution thrown itself across the currents of new urges and powerful interests. The first was in the case of Dred Scott, a runaway slave. Here, in 1857, the Court annulled the power of Congress to abolish 'the institution' (as the South termed chattel-slavery) in territories that were not as yet full States. After four years of a shattering civil war, three new amendments—the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth—profoundly modified the Federal system. Just after that war the Court wrote decisions of restraint upon both President and Congress. The result was to add to the existing bench of seven judges two others who were known to favour a reversal of the 'legal tender' opinion. Again in 1895, when the Supreme Court declared invalid much of the income tax law of the previous year, its ruling was made nugatory by yet another amendment.

But this process can be cumbrous and slow, with much cross-pulling from the 'forty-eight little empires' of Mr. Roosevelt's angry protest on the morrow of his recent defeat. In all, twenty-one 'patches' have thus far been fastened on the sacred constitutional vesture of 1789. The first ten of these made up the 'Bill of Rights,' and they went through unopposed. The eleventh amendment—which guards the States from being sued against their will—was blocked by Pennsylvania and New Jersey; so this one took nearly four years to be fully ratified. Eight amendments curb the Federal powers, eight more either limit both the Federal and State, or else concern flaws and requirements of the time.

Five amendments strengthen 'national' authority at the expense of the States. Of these five, three are the aftermath of secession, one gave the vote to women, another took liquor control away from the lesser 'empires'—only to be nullified in turn by the twenty-first amendment of 1934.

As for child labour control—which our own Press mistakenly supposes to be in full operation—this has been wrangled over for nine and a half years, and yet is still contested. In eighteen of the States one or both Houses of their own Parliaments have rejected this amendment—eight of them south of the Mason and Dixon Line; the other ten include New York, Kansas, Nebraska and the three New England 'sovereignties.' But I have said enough to endorse Colonel House's remarks to President Wilson on 'our negative

system of government.' Both Wilson and his famous little Texan boss had ample proof of this when, on April 6, 1917, the United States 'declared war' upon Germany—without having a single ship or a soldier wherewith to wage it overseas! Lord Reading was to witness the utter chaos in money and supplies which, when it cleared, left to Great Britain only the dismal legacy of war debts.

So Mr. Roosevelt may well have 'another think coming,' as they say over there, before he essays still further to whittle down States' Rights in his own favour by means of a Constitutional Amendment. Of course, the People have power in this regard, but they are a wholly incalculable People, whose whims and passions no President can foretell, howsoever close to the ground he may keep his political ear. None knows better than the present Chief that one-man rule of a sub-continent is as hopeless here as that of Chiang Kai-shek in China's floundering immensity. So Mr. Roosevelt's present concern is his own re-election in 1936. And for this he prepared by a cash coup of matchless audacity. He forced Congress to put in his sole power—without any 'strings' tied to it—the stupendous sum of \$4,800,000,000 (or, say, £1,000,000,000) for work-relief on a fitting scale.

This fund is to be 'distributed' within a year—which will take the wildest of all tacticians into the thick of the electoral fray—with a further (estimated) Treasury deficit of \$4,628,000,000 in 1936. The Republicans are as yet like sheep without a shepherd—murmurous, critical and confused. Herbert Hoover is marked as a 'hoodoo'—the very symbol of crash and catastrophe, though he was acclaimed in 1928 as 'Prosperity's Engineer.' It will be seen that eloquence of the purse remains with Roosevelt as a decisive factor in the fight. He warned the forty-eight governors that there must be 'no politics' in his vast scheme of work-relief spread over 3,000,000 square miles.

Yet one of Maine's representatives in Congress was told 'how to vote' on the President's policy, if a certain power scheme in his section was to draw millions for it. Then California's man, under the same pressure from the Administration, was promised an extra share of public works in *his* far-off State (which is farther from Washington than London is from New York) if he also would but toe the Roosevelt line.

In both Houses of Congress were heard protests over a White House form of lobbying never known before.

So goes the game of governance in a land which is utterly misconceived in this country—as the United States Ambassador himself remarked at the Independence Day dinner in London. But then, Anglo-American relations, from 'Mr. Madison's War' in 1812 to the threat of war which so amazed our own heroic envoy, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, in 1916—when Britain was battling for the whole world's liberty—must be nicely 'dolloed up' for presentation here. This is a rigid tradition. The bare facts of history are deemed inexpedient, if not tactless and improper to relate—as our Foreign Office has them in its own archives, from strong Castlereagh's day to that of sighful Sir Edward Grey.

Where America is concerned she must be deferred to and placated at any cost. The age-old prestige and pride of this England must needs be laid aside; for does not the Washington Navy League, in its *exposé des motifs* of strategy in the two oceans, refer to our own New World possessions as so many 'hostages,' geo-politically held in American waters?

Our people's ignorance of the United States is, indeed, the strangest of present-day portents, seeing that no other land is so written up in our Press, or so assiduously courted by British statesmen in their public speeches. Mr. MacDonald's heart-to-hearting in Washington survived each rebuff and shock. Mr. Baldwin's visit we associate with a dour deal in the 'War Debt,' not to mention naval parleys which have crippled our control of the Empire seaways unto this day, as our foremost Fleet spokesmen have again and again deplored.

Whether a radical change of Britain's policy as regards America's would be wise or unwise is outside my present scope. But Japan, I may note, is treated with quite extraordinary respect by the Federal Government. Those summer manœuvres in the Pacific covered 5,000,000 square miles; a huger armada than ever before flew the Stars and Stripes took part in them, with the air-arm used on a significant scale. So near an approach to the Kurile Islands was made that a Japanese admiral likened America's new war-game to 'a man drawing a sword on his neighbour's doorstep'!

So in order to soften this seeming threat, Rear-Admiral

Upham, United States Navy, was sent to Tokyo with a smart cruiser on a special 'mission of friendship'—while 160 American warships and 55,000 officers and men showed how Japan's aggression could be beaten off and then countered with every naval weapon afloat, in the skies and under water. To that awkward embassy of peace Mayor La Guardia of New York added two life-size dolls, 'Mr. and Mrs. America,' and to these grotesques all Tokyo was presently bowing with the exquisite courtesy of the race.

But he who would solve this baffling enigma of the United States should land on Bedloe's Island, where the Statue of Liberty, looking anxiously towards Europe, towers above the bay. That gift of France (by whose arms alone America's independence was gained) has just completed its fiftieth year of watch and greeting in this portal of the Land of Liberty. On a tablet on that bronze colossus is graven a poem which, I venture to submit, offers the key to an ethnical make-up unlike any other in human history. Has any British visitor ever seen it, I wonder? Its author was the Jewess, Emma Lazarus, who died in 1887; she counted among her friends such notables as Emerson and Whittier, and John Hay. Here are the lines :

Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
With conquering limbs astride from land to land,
Here at our sea-washed sunset gates shall stand
A mighty Woman with a torch whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
'Mother of Exiles!' From the beacon hand
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.
'Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp,' cries she,
With silent lips. 'Give me your tired, your poor.
Your huddled masses, yearning to be free:
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore—
—Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me—
I lift my lamp beside the Golden Door!

W. G. FITZ-GERALD.
(*Ignatius Phayre.*)

THE DRAMA OF ETHIOPIA

By HENRY DE MONFRIED

I HAVE spent twenty years of my life in Ethiopia in the province of Harrar. It is a country which I love for the skill with which it has contrived to preserve throughout the ages its ancient culture—a feudal, patriarchal system that seems properly to belong to the Biblical age rather than to our own. I learned to admire, too, the social equilibrium that has for 2000 years been maintained there, enabling time to pursue its even course and life to proceed unhastening and unchangeable in perfect harmony with Nature. The very earth breathes serenity in this land, where man must be content with what the earth chooses to yield him, without the harness or constraint of the machine—that monster which, once unleashed, will one day devour its master.

Ethiopia is in a sense an image of the ancient world that has remained unchanged throughout the centuries. But in order that this ancient edifice may remain standing, its elements must be kept intact. Together they form an attractive and harmonious whole in their barbaric simplicity: we recognise therein the crown of human endeavour, for the inhabitants have attained a static form of society in which life acquires a significance by its harmony with the rhythm of Nature.

Although their civilisation may seem to be little better than that of our cave-dwelling ancestors, their mentality cannot be compared to our own stage of development in those dark ages. The element of ambition, that essential source of instability which is foreign to black races, has always characterised the white. But it has nothing to do with intelligence. A Galla, a Sudanese, or a Somali may make a skilful doctor, geometrician, or engineer if he be put through the same course of education as a child of white

parents. He will learn, and learn to imitate too, just as well, if not better; but in his present stage of development it is an undertaking without a future.

To seek to set a people or a race on the same road of evolution as ourselves is absurd, if that people has no natural means of keeping there—that is, if it does not naturally possess the dynamic element of that evolutionary process. It will be guided by main force, as one pushes a trolley up a slope; the moment the guiding hand is withdrawn it will return, perhaps catastrophically, to the point from which it started. A world in which there are several free races should have several cultures; to seek to unify is to seek to destroy whatever cannot adapt itself, not to Nature, but to adjacent and momentarily predominant cultures.

The Abyssinian has discovered the secret of adapting the order of society to the natural requirements of his character, and he remains what he is because he *cannot* change. Neighbouring peoples whose lands he has conquered have also discovered the formula corresponding to their much simpler mentality and are equally incapable of rapid change. Wisely, therefore (guided in this, no doubt, by instinct), the Abyssinians have avoided tampering with a social structure which has brought them into equilibrium with their natural environment. I pointed this out almost three years ago in my book *Vers les Terres hostiles de l'Ethiopie*.

In order to remain as it is, this ancient country must be content to stand apart from every European influence, and to eschew economic expansion; it must be a kind of show-piece—a vignette of a pre-historic age. But this dream is impossible to-day, for Ethiopia wishes to take her place in the ranks of modern States. Her frontiers march with colonies where the 'progress' of our age has made its mark. Cultural differences must be eliminated to make contact possible. But now the elements which constitute the social equilibrium of Ethiopia are, in the eyes of the modern world, monstrous barbarisms. Do them away even partially, and the whole structure will collapse. Deprived as they are of all the necessary social equipment, it is absurd to require of this people to discharge so gigantic and dangerous a task. The King, their sovereign, however powerful he may be, cannot in a single generation sweep away the achieve-

ment of centuries. The people would not endure it. A dictator can always create—his position, indeed, demands that he should—but he does himself fatal injury in trying to destroy. And in Ethiopia there is everything in the world to destroy.

There are some mistaken ideas current in Europe about the Empire of the King of Kings. It is my duty to point out these errors and to expose the blunder for which France was responsible—in my view, a criminal blunder—when she cast Ethiopia to the League of Nations, thus forcing her to assimilate a culture which was in no way suited to her.

For this purpose I must lay aside my own feelings—the indelible impression which this corner of Africa has left upon my mind, as well as my affection for a grand and ancient country where poetic legendry still survives—and resign myself to see an ancient civilisation pass like a dream away. I cannot but look on sadly at the disappearance of all those fancies with which my imagination had clothed the primitive grandeur of the Abyssinian scene. Its noble simplicity would surely have had more chance of enlisting the sympathy of the world than the tawdry trappings of a specious culture.

In bringing Ethiopia into the League France did her the worst service imaginable, since it involved both a perversion of truth and the foisting upon that unhappy country in the fulness of innocence of charges and obligations which she could never hope to fulfil. Ethiopia may have as her sovereign a man who is capable of understanding European affairs or of grasping the significance of an assembly like that at Geneva, but that man has behind him a people (numbering perhaps 3,000,000 souls) which is unapproachable—proof against every external influence, for there is no way of bringing such influence to bear. With us public opinion is infinitely susceptible and plastic; in a few hours it can be moulded to take a different view. It is not for nothing indeed that we have the freedom of the Press. In Ethiopia there is no such thing: an illiterate people is still nurturing the stagnant ideas of 2000 years ago. There are, besides, the immense tracts of desolate country that were added by the conquests of Menelik, whose nomad inhabitants have never risen above an entirely primitive stage of development.

With such material it was no easy task for the Negus to carry out any of the reforms which he had promised his friends at Geneva. What was he to do? He staged scenery the length of the railway and in his capital of Addis—everywhere, in fact, where Europeans, journalists, men of letters, or official missions could come and observe it. The initiated who had lived some time in the country—and I was of their number—used fondly to imagine that on the strength of this temporary top-dressing Ethiopia had earned her membership of the League of Nations. But behind the scenes, as the facts have shown only too well, nothing had been changed and nothing could be.

A good illustration of the Ethiopian's attitude towards his colleagues at Geneva and his ideas on the subject of mutual obligation towards them is provided by the following regulation concerning property; to a European it is almost inconceivable: No European may own the barest acre of Ethiopian soil—it is against the law for him to buy land. In brief, as far as the present Ethiopian Government is concerned, the League of Nations involves rights but no responsibilities. There's the rub; there beneath the surface is the scandal that may one day bring discredit on the Assembly at Geneva. For it has been guilty of unrestricted recruiting—of admitting for the sake of numbers infant nations which must be educated before they can be taken into consultation.

Besides this intractability of the masses there are two other elements before which the Negus must bow—on the one hand, the clergy; on the other, the feudal system. The clergy, as guardians of all ancient traditions, will sanction no change of any kind, since their power, their fortune, and their life depend upon the country remaining as it is to-day. They rely on ignorance to maintain superstition and the practices of sorcery, which occupy a more important place in religion than the divine law. All this ties the hands of the Negus and forces him to present a lying face to Europe and at the same time to conceal from his people the obligations which he has undertaken in their name. He is no less afraid of displeasing his army, which consists exclusively of illiterate members of a barbaric race. The upshot of it all is that the country is to-day precisely where it was 2000 years ago.

What is the result of this situation? It is danger, and

a growing danger, for the neighbours of Abyssinia. At the time when European colonisation in this part of Africa had not begun, the savage state of Ethiopia was of no importance. She could live her own life according as she was by nature disposed. But since European nations have founded colonies alongside her and have developed them, the situation has altered. In French Somaliland, for example, the governor, Lagarde, who founded the colony of Djibouti, was quick to appreciate it. He was forced to leave a strip of over fifty miles of our territory outside any official control. The tribes could settle their differences between themselves as heretofore. He thus forestalled the danger which lay in proximity to these Ethiopian wastes, which are neither policed nor administered, and into which robber bands can at any moment disappear at will.

But after Lagarde these abandoned territories were desired for exploitation. The inevitable followed. Time after time robber bands fell upon our tribes, ending up with the bloody massacre of the official administrator, Bernard, and his escort. The culprits took refuge in the wide Ethiopian desert, where the frontier forbade further pursuit and precluded retribution.

This shows where lies the danger for all neighbours of Ethiopia—a danger especially great for Italy, who has so assiduously developed her colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland. Great lengths of her frontier border upon Abyssinia, and she has the right to demand that the country which is her neighbour should be as well policed and as efficiently administered as are the colonies for whose development she has been entirely responsible. That is the substance of Italy's demand for genuine reforms in Ethiopia to-day.

In 1928 the Duce made a treaty of friendship with the Negus. He gave him a respite of twenty years in which to make his reforms and to reach a stage of political development comparable to that of civilised peoples. He gave him an outlet to the sea (the port of Assab) on condition that Ethiopia should build on her territory a road to link up with the one which he was building on his side.

But Ethiopia did nothing at all. Italy realised, therefore, that it was useless to expect any improvement to come from Ethiopia itself. The task is beyond her power. Only a European nation with modern equipment can perform it,

and then only with the help of a throng of colonists to people those open spaces, and by their example to induce the nomad populations to settle down to cultivation of the soil. That can never be accomplished by the unaided efforts of a little country like Ethiopia. Not only does she lack constructive ability, but, owing to the feudal character of her constitution, her Government could never take the steps which Europe demands. The Government of Ethiopia is a feudal government. As such it has a contempt of toil. Toil is for slaves and serfs: feudal systems are blind to the value of effort and can brook no meddling with their organisation, which for them is a question of life and death. For this reason Ethiopia can never accept even a temporary protectorate.

Let me now turn and examine the real Ethiopia. People imagine a country populated by Ethiopians. That is an error. The real Ethiopia consists of a small nation of Jewish origin, speaking the language of Hamara, professing the Coptic faith, having their own separate manners and customs. This is the true Ethiopia—the Empire of the King of Kings. It is a land the size of Belgium and contains perhaps 3,000,000 inhabitants. Surrounding this core, but separated from it by well-defined ethnic frontiers, is the remainder of the territory. Its area is, as nearly as may be, double that of England, and its population 10,000,000. Less than fifty years ago Menelik conquered these districts, for he was quick to recognise the beginnings of European infiltration into Africa. He aimed thereby to surround his kingdom with a great buffer area and to insulate its fringes by means of wild, uncultivated stretches of desert. The peoples left in this way under Ethiopian protection are the Somalis, the Dankalis, the Gallas, the Walamos, the Ouragais, etc. Most of these tribes border French, Italian, or British colonies. Ensnared in Ethiopian territory, they enjoy neither the help nor the protection of the central Government; the single advantage which comes of their dependence is the fact that they are disarmed and thereby deprived of the opportunity of fighting one another. There is not a road in the whole country. Here and there you will come across toll-tracks for motor transport, whose revenues are the perquisite of the Negus. But it is not a speculation from which the tillers

of the soil derive any benefit. The fruits of their labour continue to be transported on mule-back.

The taxes which these peoples are required to pay are a crushing burden. Farmers owe, in theory, a third or a quarter of their harvest to the State, but, as this tithe is levied directly by tax-gatherers who are themselves responsible for the quota, nothing remains to the unfortunate tax-payer except the barest starvation allowance. Over and above this they are obliged to till, for no remuneration whatever, such land as their Abyssinian masters choose to have cultivated for their personal requirements.

Since the entry of Abyssinia into the League of Nations the Negus has found the obligations thereby devolving upon him a useful pretext for levying supplementary taxes in kind at a rate of 1 thaler per head of population. In the heart of these distant provinces the collection of taxes is the occasion of pitiful scenes of suffering and cruelty. In the province of Wallo, for instance, where families are numerous and ten or twelve children are no rarity, the wretched peasant simply cannot find so large a sum. He may sell his cattle, but his 10-thaler ox will fetch but 2' thalers, since all the world is selling. The consequent slump in the price is a godsend to tax-collectors, who hasten to take advantage of a profitable opportunity. Great herds are dispatched, and will continually change hands from official to official until they are finally brought in to fetch a much higher price at some port on the Red Sea. The whole process brings money to the coffers of the Negus, but the country is bled white.

When the sale of cattle is not enough to meet the demands of the Treasury the head of the family will be clapped into irons, and he will be haled off to die in prison; for the prisons of Ethiopia are the perpetual home of typhus fever, and no prisoner is kept waiting for long. Or, as more frequently happens, the wretched father, sooner than abandon his family, will offer a child or two as slaves. They are called servants, but they will never set eyes on their native village again. This, then, is the state of servitude in which for 10,000,000 inhabitants the benefits of Ethiopian government consists. It is for their sakes that Europe should strive to uproot a barbaric system in which the feudal minority of Ethiopia sucks dry those illimitable regions.

There has been much talk of slavery, and some complaint against Ethiopia for not having, in fact, suppressed it. One must, however, be careful to distinguish between slavery as it exists in Ethiopia to-day and the slavery that existed in America at the beginning of the last century—the vile image leaps at once to the mind at the mere mention of the word. There is no comparison between the two. The Ethiopian slave is a part of the family. He enjoys inviolable rights and, on the whole, humane treatment. The whole social system is built round slavery as a family institution: it is something which one cannot think away, and the Emperor's great mistake was not frankly to admit that slavery existed, that it must exist, and that it was not in his power to change it. Indeed, the race which provides the slaves is a race much too primitive to be left to its own devices. The problem is a tragic one, for it is of vital concern to over 2,000,000 human beings.

In the Ethiopian family the work which slaves do is insignificant. Seven or eight are there to do the normal work of one man. When the Negus gave the order for their liberation he knew well enough that it was an impossibility. The only difference was that they thereafter were to call their master 'father' and the master had to call them 'servants.' To pay wages to slaves seemed just as ridiculous as to pay the cow for her milk, the bee for her honey, or the sheep for her wool. So as a compromise it was agreed that a new kind of day of liberty—known to Europe as 'Sabbath rest'—should be granted each week to these servants, on which they should be at liberty to work for themselves. The only obvious result was a series of acts of brigandry and robbery, for the slave has no sense of personal property.

The following is a pointed illustration of the methods to which the Ethiopian Government must resort in order to give us naïve Europeans the impression of a work of humanitarianism. In the *Courrier d'Ethiopie*, a paper printed in Addis Ababa, there appeared on June 9, 1933, the following paragraph:

We recorded in our April number the impending departure of Ato Alamayon. The object of his mission is an investigation into the manner and methods of application of the Laws of Liberation. The decision to send a high official to the most distant parts of the country is proof of

the resolution with which the Government is addressing itself to the task of emancipation.

That is what is served up for the benefit of philanthropists in Europe, or recorded at the Assembly at Geneva. The reality is otherwise. The high official certainly liberated the slaves, but only to buy them back later. The profits of this splendid speculation were probably not reserved for him alone, as when the story reached the legations he was immediately sentenced by the Ethiopian Government to fifteen years' imprisonment, only to be set at liberty a month later. At the present moment this same Alamayon is the Emperor's trusted adviser and one of his favourite counsellors, which bears eloquent witness to the manner in which the Government is 'addressing itself to the task of emancipation.'

All this shows quite clearly that Ethiopia is not capable of modifying on her own initiative the order of her society. For the reasons given, both moral and material, she is in no position to make the assault on that ancient edifice. There is, indeed, nothing ready at hand to take its place.

The problem is how to reclaim and equip a whole area not less in size than France itself without for a long time receiving any return on the outlay. Who will undertake this task? Naturally enough, someone who is moved by the necessity of safeguarding what has already been gained and of providing a field of expansion for a surplus population which is being stifled at home. Of the three Powers whose colonies border upon Abyssinia—France, England, and Italy—the last-named fulfils the conditions. It is our duty to help her towards the attainment of a humanitarian aim which would bring us all a share of the profits. Under the moral pressure which a loyal understanding between these three countries might bring to bear, the Ethiopian Government could perhaps be induced to make such concessions as would forestall an armed intervention. But if, on the other hand, France or England give the impression of tacitly encouraging Ethiopian resistance, it will but hasten on for a people that knows nothing of modern warfare, a catastrophe in which the greatest heroism will be of little avail against the technical efficiency of modern armament.

HENRY DE MONFRIED.

THE BRITISH MIND AND WAR

By GUY HUNTER

Though the acts of Englishmen, and of Great Britain as a state, are frequently at variance with their profession, and though nothing is easier than to prove them on this account guilty of glaring inconsistency, nothing is less accurate than to term such inconsistencies hypocritical or perfidious. . . . A watertight bulkhead seems to divide their thinking and their doing, and to bring about an apparent inconsistency of which they themselves are usually unconscious. Yet this unconsciousness absolves them, ethically, of hypocrisy or perfidy; for perfidy presupposes consciousness in inconsistency. An Englishman's understanding is usually wider than his conscious mind. It is far more a matter of the heart than of the head. At their best, Englishmen come very near possessing the 'understanding heart' of Scripture.

(H. WICKHAM STEED: *Through Thirty Years*, vol. i., pp. 50-51.)

THE same thought was expressed more scientifically by Havelock Ellis, when he said that the limen of the unconscious was higher in England than elsewhere. The motive expressed by an Englishman for his actions is more often different from the real one. It is interesting to test this theory in relation to one particular set of motives, the expressed and the real motives for England's wars. To do this it is necessary to take a point in history where the two would be generally agreed as the same; and first, perhaps, to make a short list of what are, and have been, usually expressed as motives for war.

Increase of trade is one. This motive is usually applied to wars undertaken at least fifty to a hundred years ago. Those whose political opinions verge to the left will tend to shorten this period, while there is a corresponding increase on the right. Only the purblind Marxist will abolish it completely. Then, particularly with reference to Colonial wars, there is a group of motives which may be classified as the 'Spread Group.' The Spread of Civilisation, Culture,

Christianity, Law and Order, Morality, and even Decency, has always been considered in public a legitimate excuse for military expeditions. In company with these capital letters, trade is conscious of shabby clothing, and does not appear. It fares better in what may be called the 'Protection Group,' which includes Protection of Trade, National Honour, British Rights, Subject Peoples, National Interests, and (in great emergencies) Our Island Kingdom. To this group must be added a very important modern candidate, Protection of Security, including Sanctity of Treaties. Liberty, political and religious, forms a large heading of its own, and is capable of attracting members of other groups into a subordinate position in its hierarchy.

These, then, are the main groups; with these phrases in their mouths statesmen, firmly convinced of their own sincerity, have persuaded the Englishman to shoulder the burden of war. It is the purpose of this essay to trace historically the growth of this system of expressed motives, which appear to diverge further and further from their foundation in historical fact. It is the story of how the average Englishman has reacted to two opposing forces which for at least three centuries have been playing upon him. Those forces are the constant necessity for a trading (later, capitalist) nation to defend its markets, and to extend them by armed force; and the rise of a humanitarianism which demands something nobler than material and commercial advantages to justify the shedding of blood.

Let us take a time when nothing seemed nobler to a very average Englishman, Daniel Defoe: the time of the expansion of our wool trade. It is as well, first of all, to notice his great enthusiasm for the nobility of Trade:

We must also remove some Scandal out of the Way, as we go on, and that is another Difficulty. This Scandal relates to the Dignity, Antiquity, and other Honours due to Trade; concerning which we meet with much weak-headed strife in the World.¹

Then follow two pages of passionate vindication of the Honour of Trade. And now to the point—the connexion of War, Trade, and Civilisation:

That great Improvements might be made in Trade on the North Coast of Africa, I have shown past Contradiction; the only Objection,

¹ Defoe: *Plan of the English Commerce*, 1721, p. 4.

which as the Case stands I think no Objection at all,² is that it must be made by CONQUEST, a thing attended by Difficulty, Hazard, Expence, and the Possibility of Miscarriage.³

This brings me to a View of what is one of the greatest Scenes of Improvement in the World, which is in short this, (viz.)

THAT there needs little more than to instruct and inure barbarous Nations in all our Colonies, Factories, etc., in the Arts of living; clothing with Decency, not shameless and naked; feeding with Humanity and not in a Manner brutal; dwelling in Towns and Cities, with Oeconomy and Civil Government, and not like Savages.

It is the most unaccountable Mistake of its Kind that can be imagined that one should suppose civilizing Nations do not increase Commerce; the contrary is evident in all our Colonies;⁴

Here follow two pages of assorted articles sold to American Indians. Finally:

WHAT then have the people of England more to do, but to increase the Colonies of their own Nation, in all the remote Parts where it is proper and practicable, and to civilize and instruct the Nations of those Countries, so as to bring them, by the softest and gentlest Methods, to fall into the Customs and Usage of our own Country, and incorporate among our People as one Nation.

I say nothing of Christianizing the Savages, 'tis remote from my present Purpose, and I doubt much more remote from our Practice, at least in some Places; but I speak of an Incorporation of Customs and Usages, as may in Time bring them to live like Christians, whether they may turn Christians or not.⁵

It does not need a very discerning eye to see in these two passages an extraordinary richness of suggestions for what I have called the 'Spread' group. The 'Spread' of Civilisation, Christianity, Decency, Table Manners (an unfortunately feeble seedling which never matured), and Civil Government (Liberty). And already the modern mind is jumping forwards: 'What nice things to spread for themselves.'

But Defoe's mind was under no compulsion to make any such jump. He is concerned with that very ancient, honourable, and even Biblical, practice, Trade; which certainly does not require justification by the spread of Table Manners. Whether or no the savages believed in Jesus Christ was a matter of indifference to Defoe; but that they

² Defoe's italics.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 246.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 254.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 256.

should adopt the minor insignia of the Faith, products of our growing wool trade, was, on the contrary, a most practical end. Writing in the time of mercenary armies, when there was little necessity for those who disliked war to take part in it, Defoe was under no compulsion to formulate any idealistic excuses for war. He spoke as one business man to another.

There follows a century of trade struggle with the French. Clive in India (1744-1761), the Seven Years' War in America and Europe (1756-1763), the War of American Independence (Treaty of Versailles, 1783). Finally, the French Revolution, and Napoleon. Now what is said about war?

Take this time a middle-class intellectual, unlikely to profit directly by the war, likely, if humanitarianism is about, to be infected—the poet Coleridge. The following lines from *Fears in Solitude*. Written in April 1798 during the Alarm of an Invasion, show with crystal clearness how two forces, national necessity to conquer the French and humanitarianism, have torn his mind in half. First, a passionate denunciation of war:

. . . And forth

(Stuffed out with big preamble, holy names
And adjurations of the God in Heaven)
We send our mandates for the certain death
Of thousands, and ten thousands. Boys and girls
And women, that would groan to see a child
Pluck off an insect's leg, all read of war,
The best amusement for our morning meal.

.

As if the soldier died without a wound
As if the fibres of this godlike frame
Were gored without a pang; as if the wretch
Who fell in battle, doing bloody deeds,
Passed off to Heaven, translated and not killed;
As though he had no wife to pine for him
No God to judge him!

And then (reading straight on) suddenly comes the other force:

. . . Spare us yet awhile,

Father and God! O! Spare us yet awhile.
Oh! Let not English women drag their flight
Fainting beneath the burthen of their babes,

Of the sweet infants, that but yesterday
 Laughed at the breast! Sons, brothers, husbands, all
 Who ever gazed with fondness on the forms
 Which grew up with you round the same fireside,
 And all who ever heard the Sabbath bells
 Without the infidel's scorn, make yourselves pure!
 Stand forth! Be Men! Repel an impious foe

Render them back upon the insulted ocean
 And let them toss as idly on its waves
 As the vile sea weed, which some mountain blast
 Swept from our shores!

With what precision has Coleridge noted different instances of the English capacity for dissociation which Havelock Ellis remarked—the capacity to send thousands to their death with one hand, while the other props up the morning paper. He notices, too, the ‘big preamble, holy names’; he notices the ‘adjurations of the God in Heaven,’ and then, suddenly,

Father and God! O! Spare us yet awhile
 and

Without the infidel's scorn . . .
 He notices

As if the soldier died without a wound
 and then

And let them toss as idly on its waves . . .

It is as if, at the break of the verse, one wave had ebbed completely from Coleridge's consciousness and another had surged in.

Stand forth! Be men! Repel an impious foe

is the cry of a Kitchener recruiting poster.

The point at issue is this: Did Coleridge say, in so many words, ‘War is inhuman, un-Christian, immoral; but it is absolutely necessary to crush our main trade competitor, France’? He did not. He said, ‘Defend Christianity, defend Freedom, defend women and children and the Island Kingdom.’ Thus in 1731 ordinary men could talk of spreading Christianity (possibly by war), civil government, and *œconomy in order* to increase trade. During a century of trade wars humanitarianism had picked out from this complex of words (Christianity, war, trade, *œconomy*) the two most

eligible, Christianity and civil government, which turns quickly into ‘Freedom.’ By 1798 these had become the end itself, instead of the means. Later instances from the Victorian period will make this clear.

The ‘opening up’ of China to British trade gives perhaps the clearest example of the whole system at work during the Victorian Colonial wars. Protection of Nationals in Foreign Parts will be the watchword of the whole century of gradual British advance in China. It naturally did not occur to anyone to ask how or why these nationals got to China; once there, they must clearly be protected. Yet the story of how they did get there is worth looking into. In 1793 a trade mission under Lord Macartney was sent to China to obtain from the Emperor trading rights for the British. Here is an extract from the reply of the Chinese Emperor Chien Lung to George III.:

As to your entreaty to send one of your nationals to be accredited to my Celestial Court, and to be in control of your country's trade with China, this request is contrary to all usage of my dynasty and cannot possibly be entertained. . . . As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures.⁶

This was discouraging; and so was the rebuff which a similar mission by Lord Amherst in 1816 received. None the less, British nationals went to China, undeterred by any lack of formal agreement, and did a most profitable trade in opium smuggling, contrary to an existent Chinese law. So that when a large quantity of British-owned opium was suddenly impounded by an application of this law, Palmerston instantly realised that a situation had arisen in which British nationals in foreign parts were in need of protection. So a dispatch was sent by Palmerston to the Chinese Government, which, amongst other things, said:

Now as the distance is great which separates England from China, and as the matter is of urgent importance, the British Government cannot wait to know the answer which the Chinese Government may make to these demands, and thus postpone, until that answer shall have been received in England, the measures which may be necessary in order to vindicate the honour and dignity of the British Crown, in the event of that answer not being satisfactory.

⁶ *China and Foreign Powers*: Sir Frederick Whyte.

The British Government has therefore determined to send a Naval and Military Force to the coast of China, to act in support of these demands, . . .⁷

Notice that the honour and dignity of the British Crown were involved—a phrase which was to have hard use in the nineteenth century. The opium war and the succeeding war (1856–1860) firmly established the British in China. The relevant remarks are not lacking:

Those who desire to see the principles of Liberty thrive and extend through the world, should cherish with an almost religious veneration the prosperity and greatness of England. [Lord Palmerston, 1851.]

In China, which already employs beneficially between thirty and forty millions of our commercial capital, a gigantic Empire is crumbling away to give fuller and freer scope to Anglo-Saxon energy and enterprise. [Earl of Carnarvon, 1854.]

In face of Western artillery the old nations of the East found it easy to crumble.

It is worth notice that while the first Chinese War was a case of Protection of Nationals, in the later stages the Spread of Liberty is added. This idea, in a form very close to the original Defoe quotations, was extremely popular in the nineteenth century. Carlyle supplies a very useful definition of the 'rights of man':

Surely of all the 'rights of man' the right of the ignorant man to be guarded by the wiser, to be, *gently or forcibly*,⁸ held in the true course by him, is the indisputablest. If Freedom have any meaning, it means the enjoyment of this right, wherein all other rights are enjoyed.

Very clearly here the uses to which the word 'Freedom' had been put are seen reacting on the content of the word itself. Balfour, in the strictest accordance with this definition, spoke in 1899 of the Boer War:

Whatever this country has to go through, and whatever sacrifices are to be made, they will be made in the interests of the rights of men, and of civilisation.

Mr. Desmond MacCarthy has remarked on Balfour's 'intellectual integrity.' It is only too tempting to doubt this, to jump to the conclusion that the Victorians were

⁷ Extract from Palmerston's despatch, dated London, February 20, 1840. Quoted by Sir Frederick Whyte.

⁸ My italics.

hypocrites, that we in 1935 can see so many inches further through the brick wall of self-complacency. But Balfour knew his times as we know ours, and would have been no more capable of recommending, with Defoe, the advance of Christianity as a manœuvre to increase trade than are we of justifying a Colonial war by speeches on the 'rights of man.' New conditions bring a new sensibility; they do not alter the rules from which reactions to a given problem under given conditions can be deduced. Is it possible to deduce the reaction of the average Englishman to a given problem (war) under given conditions (the twentieth century) by means of the rule of English character laid down by Mr. Wickham Steed? This is the problem, quite unconnected with the relative sincerity of Balfour and Lloyd George. Assume, then, that both were sincere.

Coming to the position in 1900, the basic change in the situation is that England has already won all the Colonies which there is any immediate hope of obtaining. Accordingly the 'Spread Group' suffers an eclipse. 'Protection' remains of permanent value in cases of threatened invasion, and is, by a slight change of name, finding other uses. The object of England, now on the crest of the wave, was not to advance, but to maintain her position. 'Maintenance,' then, of the Balance of Power, Security, Independence of Nations, Sanctity of Treaties (in fact, the *status quo*)—this is clearly the coming word.

Secondly, civilisation is still available. Owing to the advanced state of material civilisation, it is to be expected that this word will take on a more spiritual content. It is no longer a question of giving savages decent trousers; it is a question of maintaining standards of something quite different—Culture.

Thirdly, Liberty is still there; but Carlyle's definition is certainly heavily against it. Nevertheless, because the word has such a high emotional appeal and remarkable elasticity of meaning, it may be confidently expected to reappear, though in a somewhat different guise from 'The right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser.' And naturally enough, in view of changed conditions, it does reappear; this time as the right of the weaker to guide itself—the duty of the stronger to keep his power at home.

Concrete examples of the development of these three groups as motives for the declaration of war in 1914 are abundant and most tempting, so tempting that I am going to examine the statements of one man only—a man with an unrivalled knowledge of European affairs, gifted with a high capacity for self-criticism, and uninfluenced by any desire for popularity or power: Mr. H. Wickham Steed, then foreign editor of *The Times*.

There are two aspects of Mr. Steed to consider. In so far as he was well aware of the workings of a particular psychological trait in the English character, it is possible to watch him deliberately adapting the tone of *The Times* to the mind of its readers; secondly, it is possible to examine the effect of this psychological law on Mr. Steed himself. First, then, what reasons could he see for a coming clash between England and Germany before the war, before there was any need for a possible transfiguration of these reasons into a form acceptable to the ordinary Englishman? Here is his explanation of German hatred of England in 1896:

In her quest for a 'place in the sun' Germany had found Great Britain already in possession of the most favoured regions of the habitable globe, with an industry highly developed, and a world-wide trade. It was uphill work to develop industries against the overwhelming priority enjoyed by British manufacturers. . . . Moreover British contempt for German efforts, *until the Briton awoke with anger and alarm to the threat of successful German competition*,⁹ caused Germans to gnash their teeth in silent rage while waiting the day when they should safely be able to rage aloud.¹⁰

Later, in 1912, an article by Mr. Steed in the *Daily Mail Year Book* gives a similar picture of the threat of Germany:

German discontent is the discontent of a speculative business man, who, having built beyond his means and mortgaged his buildings manufactured beyond the means of his market, and speculated beyond his own and his friends' resources, is fearful lest every pay day involve him in ruin. Such men are doomed to discontent until, through crisis or disaster, they are driven to place their enterprises on a sounder basis. . . . The aim of German policy will not change, cannot change, until Germany puts her affairs in order and lives, manufactures, trades, and arms within her own means. Until then it behoves England to take counsel of France and to keep her store of powder not only dry but large.¹¹

⁹ My italics.

¹⁰ *Through Thirty Years*, vol. i., p. 82.

¹¹ Quoted in *Through Thirty Years*, vol. i., pp. 352-353.

Here, then, in Mr. Steed's opinion (he is not speaking merely metaphorically, as the rest of the article shows), is a very commercial basis for Europe's troubles.

The storm broke, England wavered between war and peace, Mr. Steed was foreign editor of *The Times*. How was the question to be put to the public? Here is the problem in his own words:

But the practical problem, which, in immediate importance, transcended all others, was how to bring a people, unprepared for a fight of this quality, unmilitary of mind and ignorant of European affairs, to grasp what was at stake, and to throw its whole wealth and strength into the fray.¹²

How it was *not* solved:

At no time during the war did the feeling that they were fighting against a dangerous commercial rival seriously sway the minds of Englishmen. Had they been asked to suffer what they suffered, to pay what they paid, and to dare what they dared for any merely economic reason, they would have revolted against so mean an assessment of their ideals.¹³

So then, quite consciously as it seems, considerations other than commercial are going to be put before the public. The violation of Belgian neutrality, of course, made this task very easy—a clear case of 'Sanctity of Treaties' and 'Independence of Nations.' But it is interesting to note the nature of *The Times* campaign for intervention before this violation took place. As *Times* leaders, even in the ablest hands, have to fill considerable space, I can only quote three short extracts:

Peace, indeed, is the first interest of the Entente, and the first interest of England. Both will spare no efforts to preserve it. . . . But should there arise in any quarter a desire to test our adhesion to the principles which inform our friendships and that thereby guarantee the *balance of power*¹⁴ in Europe, we shall be found no less ready to vindicate them with the whole strength of the Empire, than we have been found ready whenever we have been tried in the past. That, we conceive, *interest, honour and duty* demand from us.¹⁵

The Napoleonic war lasted a quarter of a century, and for the whole of that time it killed for all practical purposes, not only faction but party

¹² *Through Thirty Years*, vol. ii., p. 37.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁴ My italics throughout.

¹⁵ *The Times*, July, 27, 1914.

amongst us. We knew then, and we know now, that when we strike for the *vital interest of the Crown and of the Nation*, we must strike as one man.¹⁶

We desire peace, and shall continue to do our utmost to preserve it. If we feel compelled to draw the sword, we shall do so with the utmost reluctance and without animosity. For us, whatever may befall, this cannot be a war of international hatred. In this vital issue we can only be guided by two considerations—the *duty we owe to our friends, and the instinct of self-preservation*. The armies now marshalling against our friends challenge, *in reality*, our own security not less than theirs.¹⁷

Though it is clear from these passages that the process of idealisation has gone some way, it has not gone far enough. The mention of 'interest' is barely covered by the additional capitals of the Crown and of the Nation, and how weak is that 'in reality' on August 1. Coleridge would have done better.

The invasion of Belgium provided a very necessary stimulus; and there is no need to produce quotations for 'Independence of Nations' and 'Sanctity of Treaties.' In Mr. Steed's words:

But for some time, they [*i.e.*, the English] thought, consciously and conscientiously, that they were fighting chiefly for Belgium in the first place, and for France in the second.¹⁸

So much for his treatment of the public. The fantastic growth of idealism (and worse) which less sedate papers than *The Times* planted and reared (war to end wars, etc.) are well known. But it is interesting to note that long before the horrors of a war which, unfortunately, it was quite impossible to wage 'with the utmost reluctance and without animosity' had forced Mr. Steed into a private idealism, as every other sensitive man who continued to support the war was forced—an idealism which grows more and more noticeable throughout his journal of the war—he was using, at the very outset, Civilisation, Religion, Culture, and Liberty as his own personal motives for support of the war.

Some saw, indeed, that behind the moral issue lay not only a question of life and death for England and the Empire, but a struggle between two incompatible conceptions of civilisation, between the Prusso-Napoleonic and the Christian, between the Militarist and the Liberal. Germany had become virtually pagan, worshipping a deity more nearly akin to Odin than to Christ. For many years I had revolted inwardly against the

¹⁶ *The Times*, July 30, 1914.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, August 1, 1914.

¹⁸ *Through Thirty Years*, vol. ii., p. 31.

doctrines which had come to be her effective creed. Far better, I felt that 'England,' that is to say, all the ideals of individual freedom and political liberty that had gone out from England through the centuries, should perish in a fight to the death with the evil thing represented by Prussia and her prophets, Treitschke, Nietzsche and Bernhardt, than that she should purchase a dubious respite by standing aside, or seeking an impossible compromise with it. Hence the almost joyous relief with which I, like other ardent spirits, learned that the die was cast, and the battle fairly joined.

Here, again, there is no implication that Mr. Steed's objections to Treitschke, Nietzsche and Bernhardt were not perfectly genuine. They found the conceptions proper to their time.

To-day, post-war conditions have brought forward a new word to justify a possible war—PEACE. It is easy to see how this has come about. With far larger territories to-day than in 1914, conscious of the envy of her rivals, England is more than ever anxious only to 'maintain'; and her statesmen realise that this may only be possible by war.

Is it then to be expected that we can go off with a wallet-full of German colonies gathered in the last war, and a world-wide collection of territories and trade interests gathered in the past, when all the time we should, in this vital matter of defence, be condemned to agonising inferiority? [Mr. Winston Churchill, House of Commons, May 2, 1935.]

Here is one force, clearly stated. The other is there too. Disillusionment and disgust at war are almost universal. It is doubtful if any modern Government could launch a war which really was a war: it would be possible only in the interests of Peace, and Collective Security. So how does Mr. Churchill continue his same speech?

In this august association for Collective Security, we must build up defence forces of all kinds, and combine our air action with those of friendly Powers so that we may retrieve the woeful miscalculations . . . of which we may some day be the victims.

Alas, other nations have learnt our tricks. I need quote only one of many headlines:

HITLER ON REARMAMENT TO PRESERVE PEACE.

Mr. Baldwin's Words Quoted.¹⁹

We live in the days of Security and Peace. Only the purblind Marxist will dare to doubt.

GUY HUNTER.

¹⁹ *Sunday Times*, March 24, 1935.

PLANNING FOR PARALYSIS

By IAN MACDONALD HOROBIN, M.P.

THE object of this article is to record and briefly to examine some of the features of the terrain over which the battle is now raging on the flank of the main Socialist advance. Here their allies the Planners are successfully outflanking and rendering untenable the already desperate defence of our few remaining liberties and property.

It is well known, but nevertheless remarkable, how the politics (like the morals) of one age carry over as an irrational instinct into another age which has abandoned everything with which they are really compatible. This is the point of junction, as it were, between our two opponents, and deserves special study. Most planners are very fond of the simpler electioneering cries of Victorian Liberalism. 'Self-Government in Industry' is now being given the same chance to show its millenarian potency in getting rid of poverty and unemployment, as self-determination was given when we at last successfully got rid of war and armaments some years ago. Planning and democracy desire to go hand in hand whistling through the churchyard, but the planners do not seem to have perceived that both history and economics are against them on this point, not to mention any issue of the daily Press.

It is no coincidence that a world headed like an express train away from every democratic ideal—from Moscow to Berlin, and from Rome to Washington—is also a world witnessing the progressive decay and abandonment of the religious conceptions of the Reformation. Readers of Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, for example, will have little doubt that the emphasis on individual liberty and responsibility which, for good or evil, broke up the mediæval economic mentality, was also a prime agent in

the rise of political democracy, which seems to be dying with it.

It is quite unnecessary to exaggerate the good or bad qualities of the nineteenth or sixteenth century to show that in those 300 years the people gained a huge increase in the total of consumable goods per head, at some expense of the unchallenged customary security of the poor in the lot to which it had pleased the *Zeitgeist* to call them; and gained the mixed blessings of liberty at the expense of the mixed blessings of status. Nor can it be seriously denied that as the Liberal economic structure is progressively destroyed, in whatever country whether Fascist or Communist which we watch to-day, we see a return, on the one hand, to a lower standard of living, and, on the other, a limitation of rights and a hardening of status. Planning derives intellectually from the mediæval guild system and will not thrive in the air that destroyed that system. Planned societies, therefore, in practice remove the air.

The same lesson is clear to read in the history of the Roosevelt Administration. Apologists for the N.R.A. and the A.A.A., and all the rest of Washington's fungus initialdom, have given up even pretending that recovery has been assisted by their efforts. They concentrate on demonstrating the value of their contribution to the reform of society: if Americans are still unable to buy what they want, at least they have the consolation of not being allowed to make what they like.

The exact ways in which the abandonment of democracy takes place are various and, fortunately, funny. In the first place, as a mere matter of political machinery, planning in practice brings to the front the two major weaknesses of democracy—stealing and lying—and thus destroys all respect for, and prestige of, that form of government.

As for the corruption, this is of two main kinds—direct and indirect. In the first, Smith gives Jones his own money and Jones gives Smith a quota or a licence or information about stocks of some commodity held by a pool, or 'influences' a council's development plans, or the allocation of public money to one area or another. In the second kind, Smith gives Jones our money, instead of his own, to build a sugar factory or a ship or a road; and Jones votes for Smith.

The equally fascinating subject of lying arises in this way: most of the important decisions in economic affairs are the unpleasant decisions. The same is indeed true in other fields, such as diplomacy—if the word ‘decision’ is there appropriate. Now no politician must be unpleasant, except to his colleagues. This is why finance is the Achilles heel of democracy, and also why most of the important economic decisions on which industry rests are exceptionally unsuitable for democratic methods. The real secret psychological root of planning is the desire to avoid unpleasant decisions. This is why they always hope to ‘raise prices,’ ‘stabilise industry,’ etc. The newcomer and the cheap producer are anathema to them—unquotable and unlicensed. The industrial world of planning thus becomes inevitably more and more a world of make-believe. Every industry in this world is always in a stage of transition—growth here, balancing decay elsewhere. ‘Change and decay in all around I see’ is all right as a hymn, but not in a plan: stop the change, therefore, if you can, but at any rate stop seeing it. Every source of changed production must be hindered in its development for the benefit of the existing producers. Every source of changed consumption must be hindered by tariff, by licence, and ultimately by prohibition. At every stage the price structure, which was the real basis of the Industrial Revolution and the capitalist system, becomes more and more artificial and demoralised. At every stage the resulting errors of production, brought about by the artificial prices, call for new administrative ‘pooh-bahs’ and ‘snicker-snees.’ And just as the great Goddess of Reparations, even with a scrap of Versailles paper in one hand and any amount of blood and iron in the other, nevertheless perished under the disintegrating forces of international exchange, so the Goddess Democracy is dying, in the midst of her worshippers, pressed to death under the weight of her own Acts, statutory Orders, provisional Orders, administrative decisions, and other miscellaneous mistakes.

Before dealing with the central attack of the planners, it may now be useful to clear up one point of possible confusion by eliminating what is frequently made a false issue. The attempts to preserve the amenities of the countryside by town and country planning are often stated to be at once a

proof that deliberate planning is necessary and also that it is obviously desirable. But surely there is here an obvious confusion. I, myself, have been in the past a keen advocate of town planning and regard the devastation of the English countryside as a far greater tragedy even than unemployment. I am bound to admit that my hopes of anything very useful emerging from these Acts have sunk practically to zero; and it is further obvious that they are, in any case, only a lame way of trying to minimise the iniquitous and callous destruction of the large estates (especially by death duties), which are the natural and only really effective forms of civilised land development. But the immediately important point is this: as far as I know, no one has ever denied, or would wish to deny, that, once we are agreed on some specific *non-economic* end having precedence over economic considerations, whether it be rural beauty, safety in war, Aryan bumptiousness, or success at a congressional election, then we can reasonably, indeed we must, call in regulation by force to modify the action of economic forces. Whether we think the game is worth the candle in any given case depends upon taste and upon who pays for it. The case for preserving rural amenities by planning is scarcely at all an economic case, except that we have allowed so much of England to fall into the hands of greedy, transient and embarrassed proprietors. It is simply that we do not like the economic values to which they wish to devote their assets.

But the people who are advocating general industrial planning have not got some one, clearly defined, agreed, specific, *non-economic* end to which they are prepared with open eyes to sacrifice economic advantage. They claim *economic* advantages for their distortions of the economic process; and that they have not established and cannot establish.

It will be as well at this point to mention another question on which there is really no conflict of principle. I believe most of the plausible, and indeed genuine, pressure for planned action derives from the belief that it is at once more effective and more equitable than bankruptcy or absorption or winding up, where a very large reduction in scale of an industry is called for. In theory there seems a real case for *ad hoc* action along these lines, once it is established that something more

drastic is required than the usual continuous rise and fall in capacity. But it is necessary to remind the planners sharply that their record is not encouraging! In actual fact the one thing these schemes hardly ever do is to shut up the people who should be shut up—more quickly and more fairly than a receiver. What they almost always do is, in fact, just the reverse: they tax the prosperous and hinder their development by quota, in order to keep alive the dear producers. The Coal Mines Act and the Tin Scheme are obvious cases in point. I have no special knowledge of the Shipyards Scheme, but, at first sight at any rate, it appears to be a shining exception—probably because it was largely a bankers' creation. As bankers are always unpopular anyway, they can sometimes be sensible. For it is particularly important to observe that this weakness is practically inevitable in any scheme calling itself 'Self-Government in Industry.' 'Self-government' for the purpose of orderly *hari-kari* is hardly conceivable except in Japan or Gilbert and Sullivan; which is why (as in the Coal Mines Act) either there is no reduction in scale or there is Government intervention and no self-government.

And there is an even more serious consideration. So soon as one of these machines is set up for an alleged temporary purpose, it immediately commences an evil and tenacious life of its own. We can no more eliminate a superfluous committee than we can abolish an indefensible subsidy. And if it is difficult to get rid of an individual firm, it is quite impossible to get rid of a body which has been set up for that very purpose. Indeed, the planners usually glory in their shame. They assert roundly that a body representative of existing producers is always the sort of body which is likely to be able to judge most dispassionately and accurately whether some newcomer is to be allowed to 'spoil the market which they have built up,' 'unbalance supply and demand,' 'cause unhealthy surplus capacity,' etc.! Is there really any sane man who believes that, ordinary and inevitable human selfishness, ignorance and inertia being what they are, anything like as good a result will on the average occur under such a system as under a system which allows people who think they can give the consumer what he wants, at a price he can pay and at a profit to themselves, risking their own private money and having a shot at it? No one pretends that

there is any perfect solution in a world where the future is necessarily uncertain. We shall make it less uncertain if we manage our currency affairs better—which, judging by Mr. Roosevelt's 'silver jubilee,' means 'managing' them less. But can the planners point to any managed commodity which has fared better in its adaptation of production to consumption than the unmanaged commodities have done? Why should it? It has all the same difficulties to contend with, as well as the special political and quasi-political ones created by management itself. All the factors necessary for making a judgment are the same. But the chief sanctions against making a false judgment are removed; for once there is a pool, a levy, semi-official corporate status, etc., the risks of individual loss are less immediate, though ultimately they are greater.

But, apart altogether from its incompatibility with democracy, intensive economic control by regulation suffers from fundamental objections considered purely as an ideal economic organisation: even if it were worked from above by pure mind divorced from all human frailty and political calculation—say by Mr. Montague Norman or one of the B.B.C. announcers. The whole object of the monetary system is to reduce economic ends to some common measure: in no other way can anyone know whether or not the world does or does not, when it comes to the point, prefer, shall we say? to educate some of its younger sons to go to Rhodesia with the prospect of eventually getting copper from Mulufira, or, on the contrary, to increase the rate of scrapping of its motor cars and thus increase the proportion of its copper which it gets from the scrap. Now the whole object of planning is to side-track the price system, and ultimately it must altogether replace it. It is nugatory unless it produces different quantities of goods or organises production in such a way as to call for different proportions of the agents of production. For example, it may lead to the substitution of aluminium for copper, or mutton for beef, or beet for cane sugar. If it does not do these, it achieves nothing; if it does do these things, then *ex hypothesi* it must compel consumers to spend their money to what they believe to be less advantage, and producers to make use of what they think less efficient methods of production. And to do either of these not only involves, as we

have seen, a progressive loss of liberty and elasticity, but also a diminution of the total national wealth.

There is, I repeat, no other common measure except money. The planners always seem to think some hedonistic calculus exists which will enable statesmen to decide how much to produce and what to produce, irrespective of the demands of the consumer and of the producers' calculations of the real expenses of production by any one of fifty competing possible ways of arriving at the required result.

Even within a system still kept partially rational by the remains of a free price system, how can the conscientious industrial clairvoyant see very far in a world where changes take place such as we see all around us? People's psychology changes so that the velocity of circulation of the deposits in the London clearing banks falls by 32 per cent. in three years and then rises 20 per cent. in twelve months; or so that the investors who were willing to invest \$2,365,000,000 in United States public utilities in 1930 invested less than \$50,000,000 four years later, and leave some \$2,000,000,000 excess reserves in the member banks of the Federal Reserve system. Psychology changes from the psychology of 1929 to a psychology where banks have over \$6,000,000,000 credit lines open, of which over \$4,000,000,000 remain unused. The conditions of industry change on a scale and at a rate indicated by such facts as that the very industries expected to contract out of our own Unemployment Insurance scheme when it was started, because their expectation of unemployment was so small (such as coal mining), are just those which in fact have made some of the largest claims upon it. Plans have to be made in conditions where one set of trades, such as the miscellaneous metal trades, now employs a third more people than it did ten years ago, while another, such as ship-building, only employs about half as many as it did; and where the South-Eastern division of the Ministry of Labour employs nearly half as many people more than it did ten years ago, while Wales employs 25 per cent. less; or, to take an American example, the average cotton acreage east of the Mississippi has fallen 12 per cent. in four years, while the acreage west of that river has risen by over 40 per cent. Conceive the damage done to the world's wealth by the deliberate distortion of production caused by hindering, as

all planning schemes always do, such transfers to cheaper areas of production, while carefully bleeding the taxpayer to subsidise the dearer sources (sugar, coal, wheat, etc.). As to the effect on individual countries, I will not be so tactless as to give examples from our own 'planning for employment'; but has America really benefited by the Cotton Stabilisation scheme of the Federal Farm Board, to take one example? This, by fixing (for a time!) cotton prices at 16½ cents a pound in 1929, increased foreign production to the extent of 1,250,000 bales in a single year and in two years lost their own farmers their foreign market to the tune of over 4,000,000 bales, and has now reached the stage where, for the first time in living memory, America is producing less than half the world's cotton. If the boll weevil could talk, its first word would be 'Planning.'

But let us ignore for a moment the ultimate difficulties of a society where free markets in money and commodities and securities (and labour?) have been progressively destroyed. Let us consider only the short-term disadvantages of cartelised industry in a rigid legislative framework of producers' rings. And let us ignore all the practical human and political difficulties touched on above. There are still two reasons in pure economics for avoiding, as long as and as far as possible, such a situation, rather than hurrying it along with enabling statutory midwifery. Any text-book of economics will demonstrate that, broadly speaking, it is always to the advantage of a monopoly or semi-monopoly to restrict production—not, of course, to an unlimited extent. But it always pays them to produce less than would be produced if free competition were possible. It hardly needs pointing out that it is obviously the avowed intention and practice of every one of them in real life. As a result, all self-government in industry must reduce the national dividend and thus either cause unemployment or lower wages. Secondly, monopolistic competition is, in its nature, indeterminate. That is to say, put crudely, two of these cartelised industrial empires either indulge in periodical and disastrous trade wars, or have to be still further controlled by the public to an extent that would rapidly reduce business to a sort of industrial parody of the stalemate of trench warfare. We can have Socialism or we can have private enterprise: the

present interventionist chaos simply will not work. For both these reasons it is clear that before planning has even abolished the freedom of the employer, it will reduce the employment available to the employee.

It is perhaps fair to the planners to point out that they admit the necessity of adding to all their other machinery lots and lots of nice consumers' committees, which in practice can be relied on to combine the maximum of irritation to the employer with the minimum of useful protection to the consumer.¹ On the other hand, I admit that they have usually a paid secretary.

Of course, I know this is all useless: if one mentions the theory of prices under monopoly, the function of prices in the control of production, the effect of interest rates on the profitability of indirect processes of production, and so on, then one is hustled out of court as an obscurantist academic anachronism knowing nothing of the modern world. The same is true if one endeavours to trace and profit by the history of the modern revolt against individualism. If one then falls back upon crudely contemporary events and offers to chat about tin and pepper and beet sugar, to float at ease upon the Canadian wheat pool and balance in delicate admiration of Rubber's stability under the Stevenson scheme, then one is at once told that these, like everything else in the world, are either proof that planning is necessary or proof that it has never been tried. There is nothing to be done about it—except laugh.

IAN HOROBIN.

¹ See as an example the evidence before the Sugar Marketing Enquiry printed in my book *The Pleasures of Planning*.

THE USES OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY

By D. S. MACCOLL

I RETURN, after an excursion in the June number, to my original intention—that, namely, of reviewing the present state and future possibilities of the Royal Academy. Near thirty years have passed since I was its regular critic, forty-five since I began to deal with its affairs in the *Spectator*. During that period many of the improvements for which I and others contended have been carried out, and for these a later generation gives little credit. But reforms more fundamental remain to be accomplished, and their desirability is my excuse for breaking silence.

I. WHAT THE ROYAL ACADEMY IS

To be clear about that it is necessary to put out of one's head the ideas called up by the words 'Academy' and 'academical.' France is the country where the grandiose and ridiculous attempt was made to constitute a real Academy, in the sense of a State institution controlling the arts and directing the artists. To such a conception the English spirit has hitherto been inimical, and whatever was in the mind of its founders, the English 'Academy' has been a very *un-academic* body, with only this authority given to its administration, that members are elected for life, unlike those of the House of Commons, but like them they are a collection of persons widely variable or opposite in ideas and temper.

An article in *The Times Literary Supplement* for March 14 of this year conveniently recalled what the *Académie française* set out to be and what it has been. Richelieu (whose present names are Stalin, Mussolini and Hitler), anxious to bring all national activities under direct control of the State, seized on a hole-and-corner group of literary theorists and gave them authority in form over the language and grammar of France,

but in practice the position of judge over her literature. Chapelain, pensioned later as 'the greatest poet who has ever lived,' was invited to judge *Le Cid* of Corneille, then (1637) by its popularity exciting the jealousy of Richelieu, himself a dramatic author. Through the mouth of Chapelain, *premier poète de la France*, but later the butt of the next literary umpire, Boileau, the Academy laid down the necessary corrections.

The heroine, it was urged, should not have married the man who killed her father. Her father, accordingly, should not have been killed, only wounded, and allowed to recover in time to be present at his daughter's wedding. . . . The most exciting episode was a fight between the hero and the father of his beloved. . . . The King should have sent guards to prevent it from taking place.

In a word, bowdlerised of its tragic elements, the play might pass: the heroine's deportment was wrong from start to finish and must be reconstituted according to the requirements of reason and good manners. With vicissitudes the *Académie* survived to be reconstituted in 1795 as one section of the *Institut*, to which Napoleon added a fourth, for the Fine Arts. The *Académie* of Letters did swallow so dangerous a ferment as Voltaire, but the first-rate comedic genius of Molière was too much for it, and in the nineteenth century the romantic and 'naturalist' authors were banned: Stendhal, Balzac, Flaubert, Zola, Gautier, Daudet, de Maupassant, the Goncourts were shut out. The tyranny of the Fine Arts Institute was heavier still, because it affected not only teaching but exhibition; David and Ingres, greatest of schoolmasters, were no less than Delacroix its fierce critics, and the action of its jury in the annual Salon issued in the effective counter-exhibition of the 'Rejected' in 1863, among whose leaders were Manet and Whistler, and in the subsequent displays of the 'Impressionists.' 'Discipline' had broken down, to be renewed elsewhere by the crusade of the Kaiser against 'impressionism,' of the Bolsheviks against all the past and the individual, finally by Hitler's 'Aryanism'; Liebermann, not a great painter, but a veteran 'Impressionist' and a Jew, was forbidden not merely to exhibit but even to paint in Germany. Lord Lee, who shares the despotic temper of the State-tyrants along with a good deal of their managing capacity, would like to see our Academy 'spank' peculiar painters,

as well as exclude them. With the absurdities of such a claim to 'discipline' of the arts by Sir William Llewellyn and his Council I have already dealt. What they call in Moscow 'rotten liberal habits' must, with whatever lapses, persist in Piccadilly.

The English so-called Academy is first of all a Shop for the sale of pictures, drawings, prints, and sculpture by living artists, with privileges for members, but open to all comers, with no commission deducted upon sales. It is also a display of commissioned work in portraits and monuments, and of designs for architecture. Besides keeping shop the Academy runs a school, pensions the widows of its members, administers various endowments of a charitable or educational character, and arranges a few courses of lectures. In the winter season its galleries have been used for collections of Old Masters in English ownership, retrospectives of work by deceased members, and more recently loan collections of deceased masters from abroad.

Finally, at a time when no National Gallery of British Art existed, Sir Francis Chantrey entrusted to the Academy the administration of a handsome endowment for the purchase, under carefully defined conditions, of paintings and sculpture for the nation.

This programme, as liberal as could be expected in a semi-State institution run by a limited number of interested and sometimes jealous life-members, has worked with varying success. In the late 'eighties the openness of the Shop was in question; the Academy was challenged by demands for reform by a group of painters, mainly trained or influenced by Paris; La Thangue was the loudest. Another group, mainly Scottish, formed itself about Whistler, whom the Academy had failed to include, as in the previous peculiarly English generation it had left out Rossetti, Madox Brown, Holman Hunt; Burne-Jones, elected but left in suspense as an Associate, withdrew. Out of this crisis sprang the New English Art Club, uniting at first all rebels; but leaders of the Bastien-Lepage group, La Thangue, Clausen, and the Newlynians, who already had their entry as exhibitors, were quickly absorbed as members of the Academy. The 'New English,' however, retained and retains certain stalwarts of less popular character, and for a generation was the nursery of

new and contested talent. It has also been the chief recruiting-ground for the Academy. From first to last forty members, including Sir William Llewellyn, have passed from one to the other, and what with this recruitment and the acceptance of works for exhibition by many of the existing members, the Academy of to-day is very largely the New English Art Club of yesterday. If one goes into Room I of the current exhibition its general effect and level are indistinguishable from that of a 'New English' collection except that the greatest painter of our time is represented only by disciples, and some others of eminence are also absent.

There were other heads of complaint against the Academy of my youth. One of these was the overcrowding of pictures, piled four or even five lines high. Against that the example of the 'New English' and 'International' has prevailed, if not so far as to accept the Whistlerian canon of the single line. Sculpture, also, is more reasonably arranged and distributed. More important is a complete revolution in the matter of drawings. The old rules of the Academy actually prevented a drawing from being properly a drawing. Now, in emulation with the 'New English,' an important room is devoted to the graphic art which is most alive among us, along with engraving and etching; a whole wall of Gallery VI is hung with examples from the field in which Muirhead Bone and Augustus John are the leading masters. Even watercolours have submitted to some abandonment of competition with oil, alike in respect of the medium and of mount and frame: the watercolour *drawing*, which we revived at the 'New English,' has invaded both the Academy and the 'old' Society.

Yet another reform is that of the School. In the old days there was little effective teaching beyond sporadic comment by 'visitors.' The development of the Slade School concurrently with the 'New English,' under two of its stalwarts, Professors Brown and Tonks, forced the Academy's hand; an assistant from the Slade, Mr. (now Sir Walter) Russell, controls the School as keeper and teacher, supported by the high competence of a Slade pupil, Mr. Monnington, on the side of drawing.

Finally, in the distribution of the Chantrey Bequest fund,

there have been remarkable changes. No longer is it automatically spent as a semi-charitable prize-fund upon exhibitors of the year, in defiance of Chantrey's expressed intentions, though something of the habit persists, as is inevitable while a committee of artists is the deciding tribunal. By consultation with the Board of the Tate Gallery a real effort has been made to enlarge the field of purchase, and to fill up glaring gaps in representation. But the fundamental weakness in Chantrey's scheme persists, and there is a wobble between a virtuous search for unrepresented, secondary artists, like last year's, and the attitude that So and So's 'turn' has come, visible in certain of this year's purchases. Chantrey was helpless, since the National Gallery he looked forward to did not exist and he had to trust to the discrimination of his brother-artists. No such body, in or out of the Academy, can be trusted, nor, indeed, a committee anywhere: the name for committee-purchase is compromise, and compromise, necessary in politics, is fatal in art. The first and the last word, after consultation with his Board, should be a Director's.

When the Tate Gallery was founded the Treasury was foolish enough to sign away the right of the Trustees to accept or reject the Academy's choice, and this right is not yet restored: there is merely the working compromise arrived at by negotiation after a separate Board and Directorship were given to the Tate Gallery. The matter may soon again become acute, because, in the absence of any Government grant for purchases, the Gallery has only one small endowment and the Chantrey fund as sources for new acquisition, apart from gifts.

That, as fairly as I can set it down, is the present state of affairs, and the real difficulty for both exhibition and Chantrey purchases is our poverty, at present, in outstanding talent, and even of picture-impulse, in the post-war generation. For that the Academy cannot be blamed. But it remains to ask whether the Academy, having, by a process which physiologists would call *osmosis*, drawn off what the older 'New English' had to give, is once again lagging behind the time by discouraging subsequent centres of germination or rebellion.

The Grosvenor Gallery, New Gallery, New English Art

Club were the first rallying-points in a period of dispersion. Mr. Francis Howard's 'International' followed, with Whistler and the Scottish artists as standard-bearers. Then came Mr. Frank Rutter's 'Allied Artists' of all sorts on the lines of the Parisian *Indépendants* in the Albert Hall, and after that various 'Groups,' culminating in 'The London Group.' More recently still an 'Abstract' section of the last formed up at Mr. Mayor's gallery as 'Unit One,' now disunited.

The heyday of independent groups has passed, for an economic reason—namely, the steep rise in rents, which has turned picture-galleries to other uses, or obliged their tenants to dilute exhibitions by including a greater number of outsiders on payment of a fee. The Royal Academy has therefore an opportunity to recover its old position as the focus of exhibition. Whether it has failed to rope in the later talents through mishandling or through their own reluctance to come in it is impossible for an outsider to say: rumour, not to speak of 'incidents,' accuses the jury for the current exhibition of strongly illiberal bias.

However that may be, we may conveniently group the later independents round two names, those of Mr. Duncan Grant and Mr. Paul Nash. Both have been acclaimed by some extravagance of championship. A very loud Bell has been periodically rung to declare Mr. Grant the greatest of living painters and those grouped with him as the only 'artists' among us; and certain organs of the Press have obediently joined in acclamation and boycott. Mr. Nash himself and Mr. Herbert Read have been no less vocal about the later group. We may discount those excessive claims and also allow for the advantage which talented outsiders enjoy by not entering for the National stakes in Burlington House. When they do come in they are apt, if not to disappear in the general concourse, at least to find their level more exactly. But it is absurd, if the Academy is to represent accepted talent, that neither of those 'group leaders' is an Associate, and they are not alone on the waiting-list. It is no less absurd, for example, that of the 'New English' exhibitors Miss Ethel Walker and Miss Beatrice Bland should be still upon the doorstep. These are mature artists, two in a group of women with the unteachable endowment of colour and design added to trained draughtsmanship.

The same argument applies to some unrecognised sculptors and architects. If the traditional limit in the number of Associates hampers this expansion, it is high time that it should be revised, and that of full members also: forty¹ is a superstition taken over from the French Academy. There never was anything like so large a number of 'immortals' at one time, but there have always been as good or better outside. In the exhibition, also, the net should be cast wide. The impulse which a few years back allotted a gallery for 'sports' appears to have been checked. At the Tate Gallery they have been surprisingly bolder: one of the Turner galleries was given up to a temporary exhibition of Picasso, who has retired, a good deal 'hurt' as a draughtsman, from the experience: the diagrammatists might be allowed to show what they can do, beside the picture-painters at Burlington House.

2. WHAT THE ROYAL ACADEMY MIGHT BE

In that last paragraph I take for granted the present constitution, with minor improvements. But I still maintain that the first fundamental reform called for is the abolition of Associateship. That half-way house is a trap, a corral in which wild elephants like the young La Thangue are penned and tamed till most of the mischief is out of them. The Associates have been accorded some hand in administration, but are still on good behaviour if they are to win the further step. Academicianship must remain, both because of its honorific attraction for those ambitious of a title, and as affording a stable body for the management of endowments and business generally, but should be increased in number to absorb Associates and to include designers in the crafts and industrial arts. Last winter's exhibition, though muddled in its carrying out, was a step in the right direction. Something of the sort might well be part of a yearly autumn or winter show, which could also embrace a retrospective section. Next year's Chinese exhibition will perhaps be the last of the huge, the fascinating but dangerous assemblies of foreign treasures, and the summer 'Shop' is too small to cover all the demands of a National Exhibition. Painting is no longer what it was, 'the Art,' as they called it, when one of a

¹ Increased by a reform which classes veterans as Senior Academicians.

small professional class might devote a year to the elaboration of a single picture and earn a modest income by its sale, and that of an engraved reproduction. The hypertrophy of painting among the arts is for many reasons passing, except as an easy exercise for amateurs, who form so large a part of our population. Except for the few really gifted and devoted poets of colour and design it tends to a sloppy diffuseness in landscape and still-life. The honest trade of portrait remains, of poster and fashion-plate and advertisement, and occupation for grave as well as light-hearted talent is more hopefully to be looked for in mural work than in the easel picture.

A second fundamental reform was that advocated by Clausen, Walter Crane, and Holman Hunt nearly fifty years ago—namely, that the Jury and Hanging Committee should not consist exclusively of Academicians, but should be elected by the votes of all exhibitors in the previous year, any such exhibitors from outside to be eligible, as well as members. This is the plan which has stood the test of that half-century in the New English Art Club, and no better has been thought of, to combine an influx of fresh blood along with a nucleus of the members who have won respect for judgment and fairness of mind; not always the same thing as artistic distinction.

These, I think, are the reforms to press for. They might well be the subject of a parliamentary inquiry, and if a more nearly national institution should be the outcome there would be a case, should it be necessary, for some subsidy from the State, such as, in the beginning, came from the King's private purse.

In the meantime a good deal might be done to pave the way for reconstruction. In the *Saturday Review* of January 30, 1904, under the title 'A National Exhibition,' I drew the moral of the then recent and representative English exhibition in the 'World Fair' at St. Louis. Originally this was to have been organised entirely by an Academy committee, but some of us rebelled, and without much difficulty the various Royal Societies and two of the 'Independent' groups ('New English' and 'Arts and Crafts') were allowed to appoint representatives. The result was the kind of exhibition which it was possible then to arrange abroad, or in the provinces, or even at Whitechapel under Mr. Aitken, but not at Burling-

ton House. Why, I argued, should this be impossible; why not, as an experiment, hold an autumn exhibition on the same lines? Here was my diagram:

I—THE ESTABLISHED AND ENDOWED GROUP

The Royal Academy

II—THE SEMI-INDEPENDENT GROUPS

The Royal Societies (Institute, Old Water-Colour Society, British Artists, Painter-Etchers)

III—THE INDEPENDENT GROUPS

New English
Art Club

Arts and Crafts
Society

The 'International'
Group

For the last two substitute their current equivalent or equivalents, and in the first or second group insert the Royal Scottish Academy, which I spoke of separately.

I venture to revive that suggestion as the programme for a winter show, the Academy making itself responsible for picked outsiders not belonging to the other societies, and, if space required such a restriction, its own members might be satisfied with their place in the summer exhibition. In that old scheme I proposed that each group should be allotted a space at Burlington House, to be filled and hung by its own committee. This suggestion might be bettered. The Academy is badly in want of a secretary for outside negotiations, like Mr. Eden: one whose business it would be to keep himself closely informed by visiting regularly all exhibitions, including 'one-man shows.' The President and existing Secretary probably have their hands too full to give all the time desirable for this task: indeed, it is doubtful whether any President since Leighton has been at all fully conversant with or interested in new developments. It is notorious that few Academicians are frequent visitors to exhibitions of native or foreign art. An *ad hoc* official would be in a position to consult with the secretaries of the groups in making a selection, and a general committee of nominees

might then hang the whole gathering. In this works of art already exhibited might figure, the idea being to obtain a picked review of total activity in the past year.

With the shift from an excessive preoccupation with painting, greater freedom in the appointment of the President of the Academy is desirable. He is expected to be personable, polite, apt in public speaking, a man of the world, something of a courtier, but also a man of business. What is equally or more important is that he should have animating force, detachment from cliques, and, when his knowledge is insufficient, that he should know where to supplement it. Since the presidency of Leighton, who was an admirable Crichton as well as a liberal-minded and learned worker in two arts, the most successful manager of the Academy's affairs has been Sir Aston Webb. He was more business manager than artist in his own profession, and modest in asserting any opinion outside of it; but singularly shrewd and diplomatic in affairs. It is perhaps among the architects that the model President is most likely to be found. Architecture has been variously called the Mother, the Mistress and the Stepmother of the Arts: she might, in the modern dispensation, serve as Moderator.

Scholarship, the valuable academic quality, has, among the present R.A.'s, run rather low. The Exhibition of British Art two winters ago had painful defects of knowledge and direction. In that affair the man who had built up the remarkable collection of British art at Millbank, and there and at Whitechapel organised retrospective exhibitions, Mr. Charles Aitken, was not so much as invited to lend a hand. Why should not the Academicians, if they are too much absorbed in their own work to study either the past or the present, call in as honorary consultants men who are bound to study both, the teachers in our leading schools, past and present, men like Professors Brown, Tonks, Schwabe, Sir William Rothenstein, Messrs. Walter Bayes and Jowett?

I have no illusions about the perfectibility of democratic institutions, but I dislike to see the Academy of Reynolds and Turner and Constable and of public-spirited men like Chantrey not doing all that it reasonably might.

D. S. MACCOLL.

THE ETHICS OF WILLIAM WOLLASTON

By RALPH E. STEDMAN, PH.D.

WILLIAM WOLLASTON (1659-1724) is not so considerable a moralist as his younger contemporary, Joseph Butler, but he is by no means negligible. His fate, however, has been to fall into total neglect. Granted that the early eighteenth century is of a temper generally repellent to our own time, this circumstance would not, it seems to me, fully account for the forgetfulness of Wollaston's countrymen. For a generation he was respectfully mentioned on all hands. The greatest of the Bishops of Durham wrote of his 'great and deserved reputation,' and Queen Caroline put up his bust beside that of Newton. At the beginning of the nineteenth century a German scholar wrote a book about him, and at the beginning of this century the 11th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* gave him three inches. But the 14th edition ignores him. Yet more surprising is the neglect of Hastings' generally admirable *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. His *Religion of Nature Delineated*, which in a few years ran to 10,000 copies, and which in its ethical portions is one of the subtlest treatises on morals in the language, is to-day no more than a literary curiosity.

I account for this neglect by the unhappy fact that Wollaston gives a handle to the caricaturist which interested utilitarians and 'evolutionary' moralists were not slow to seize. Jeremy Bentham (who may or may not have read him through) deemed him ridiculous and lampooned him out of the learned world. A man should not murder his father—Bentham interprets Wollaston as teaching—since this is to deny that he is his father. This tendentious account (against which, since his paradoxical method lays him open to it, Wollaston most explicitly guards himself) Sir Leslie Stephen describes as 'substantially true,' and in his brilliant, but

questionable, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* embroiders thus :

Thirty years' profound meditation had convinced Wollaston that the reason why a man should abstain from breaking his wife's head was, that it was a way of denying that she was his wife. All sin, in other words, was lying. The crochet was one of those which can only be obtained by a long course of solitary meditation.

This judgment has prevailed and is very probably the occasion of Wollaston's annihilation. Sidgwick's scornful sentence—which coincides with Stephen's—very likely speeded the process. Concluding a summary treatment of Samuel Clarke, he observes that 'the more *bizarre* attempt of Wollaston in the same direction was a more complete failure: the attempt to exhibit morality as a body of scientific truth fell into discredit. . . .'

Just what, then, does Wollaston claim for his method? It may at once be denied, by way of anticipation, that he holds patricide to be wrong because it denies paternity, but rather *because it denies all the truths involved in the relationship of common humanity and in the special situation of sonship*. This corrected statement may or may not be adequate, but it has at once lost all colour of absurdity. And as against Sidgwick Wollaston would reply unanswerably :

. . . A body of scientific truth? Certainly. But what is scientific truth? Excepting mathematics, scientific truth is a body of belief held to be highly probable by virtue of its elucidation of and coherence with our ordinary experience. In this I am at one with the late Mr. Locke. Our actual moral judgment, therefore, follows truth in just this sense: and what, Mr. Sidgwick, is *bizarre* about that? [He could go on:] Perhaps, Sir, you can show me a better way of arriving at one's duty than by reflecting upon one's situation and nature, the action projected, and its probable consequences so far as one can discern them? If you can, I desire above all to have you instruct me.

According to Wollaston, morality (which, in the habit of the time, he designates natural religion) consists in truthful acting, or in action which conforms to or is appropriate to the nature of things and to their relations. Moral evil, therefore, he calls, paradoxically enough, a contradiction. Just as a true proposition is true because it 'expresses' (Wollaston is a Cambridge man) things as they are, so action is true action, or is what action should be, when it similarly

expresses or accords with things as they are. Actions speak louder than words, and the acted falsehood (*not* the acted *lie*, as Stephen has it, for falsehood arises from negligence or thoughtlessness more often and more fatally than from deliberation) is of vastly greater consequence than that which is simply uttered. The force of this doctrine is not that acting is a special case of speaking (as his traducers have alleged), but that speaking is a special case of acting. Action, therefore, that conforms to things as they are is the *genus* of truth of which speech is a *species*. The primary sense of truth is moral.¹

I lay down then as a fundamental maxim, [Wollaston insists] *that whoever acts as if things were so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so*; as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwise, his acts contradict *those propositions*, which assert them to be as they are. [He adds, in a manner suggestive of Butler's famous phrase:] For nothing can be true, nothing does exist, *if things are not what they are*.

To talk to a *post*, [he continues] or otherwise treat it as if it were a *man*, would surely be reckoned an absurdity, if not *distraction*. Why? because this is to treat it *as being what it is not*. And why should not the converse be reckoned as bad; that is, to treat a man as a *post*; as if he had no sense, and felt not injuries, which he doth feel; as if to him pain and sorrow were not pain; happiness not happiness. This is what the cruel and unjust often do. [And] . . . to deny things to be as they are is the transgression of the great *law of our nature*, the law of reason.

At this stage of our exposition two conclusions are clear. The first of these concerns what Wollaston takes morality to be. It is action in conformity with the nature of things. There remains to be shown, of course, the means by which the nature of things, and what is appropriate thereto, is to be discovered. Secondly, we can see precisely how Wollaston answers the vexed question as the nature of *moral obligation*. Moral obligation is the obligation inherent in the reason of a rational being to express the truth and to reject a contradiction. It is because wrong action is formally unreasonable that a reasonable man is obliged as such to avoid it. The obligation is rational. Materially, an action may have bad consequences (not morally bad, for morality attaches to actions, not consequences), and the consideration of these,

¹ It should be observed that, for Wollaston, the *activity* of a creature incapable of choosing and distinguishing is not *action*.

as we shall see, is relevant to the inquiry as to what conduct suits a particular situation; but the moral obligation rests, not upon these consequences, but upon the formal character of the conduct as reasonable. Wollaston is fully aware that one may well be *obliged* to do what has *some* bad consequences; indeed, the contrary is scarcely conceivable.

These are points of high importance. That Wollaston's book sold very widely argues that his doctrine became virtually public property, and—while it cannot, so far as I know, be proved—it is not unlikely that Kant's reflection of these positions may be traced to their influence, direct or indirect. His doctrine of the primacy of the practical exercise of reason, and of the rational nature of moral obligation, may owe something to this forgotten author.

My manner of thinking [Wollaston continues] obliges me in the next place to say something concerning the means of knowing what is *true*, whether there are any that are sure, and which one may safely rely upon. For if there be not, all that I have written is an amusement to no purpose.

The question is now, not what is *right* and what *duty*?—but the ever-puzzling one, *what is here and now my duty*? At this point Wollaston's ethical 'rationalism' takes a turn toward 'empiricism.' So he falls in with what, in every walk, seems to belong to the pedestrian English genius. His rationalism concerns the *form* of morality. For its *content* he looks to a reason which might well be called the prudent use of experience. His affiliation here is rather with what is best in Aristotle than with the intuitionists, of whom the historians have taken him to be the most 'bizarre' example; it is chiefly to that *φρόνησις* which marks the life of the man of good character that Wollaston looks for practical guidance in the moral field. To be sure he stresses the dominance of reason, and expects perhaps more to issue fully proved from reason than it is now fashionable to look for, but a careful survey of his chapter 'Of Reason and the Ways of Discovering Truth' shows him to be very much closer to the cautious Locke than to the uncritically confident Clarke. On the principle he will not yield an inch. A reasonable being has no option but to trust his reason, for where it is present it must rule. This he learns from Plato, and will no forget. 'It is plain, that reason is of a commanding nature: it enjoins this, condemns that, only allows some other things,

and will be paramount (in an old word τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) if it is at all.' Like the rudder of a vessel, it would not be there were it not 'to steer by.' The theory that man's conduct is 'steered' by his 'subconscious' Wollaston could not, for obvious reasons, consider; but, had it been suggested to him, he would no doubt have replied that this hidden agency was on a level with those he already knew, and that the part of a *man* lay in mastering these. That men do in fact live on the impulse of the moment, as a moralist he had reason to know; but as soon as this was advanced as 'following nature' or as a theory of right, he could (and did) point out that for such a theory a reason must be given, in giving which the position is in principle vacated. And against the view of human nature he could also advance his own. The delicate analysis of Butler we do not find at this point, but we discover adumbrations which in shape, if not in force, suggest the conception which lies at the heart of the Bishop's moral theory.

The only matter at issue is the *scope*, not the *dominance*, of reason, and here Wollaston takes a very moderate view:

Not to subject one's *sensitive* inclinations and passions to reason is to *deny* either that he is rational, or that reason is the supreme and ruling faculty in his nature: and that is to desert mankind, and to *deny* himself to be what he knows himself by experience and in his own conscience upon examination to be, and what he would be very angry if any body should say that he was not. . . . His duty then, who is *conscious* to himself of the truth of those things recounted . . . is to examine everything carefully, and to see . . . that all his *affections*, concupiscible and irascible, be directed towards such *objects*, and in such *measure*, *time*, and *place*, as that [reason] allows. [And] The *springs*² of all human actions are in fact, either a sense of *duty*, or a prospect of some *pleasure* or *profit* to be obtained, some evil or danger avoided. . . . *Bodily* inclinations and passions, when they observe their due *subordination* to reason . . . are of admirable use in life, and tend *many times* to noble ends. . . . Certainly the *philosopher*, who pretends absolute *apathy*, maims nature, and sets up for a half-man, or I don't know what.

The foregoing are some general truths concerning man's nature in accordance with which man, so far as he is reasonable, will shape his action. But we must consider further the manner in which the truths essential to Wollaston's ethics are to be attained. In general they are to be gathered from

² Cf. Kant's usage of this term.

reflection upon experience, history, and the judgments of good and wise men. Certain truths which are of greatest importance and influence, and require more reasoning to discover, Wollaston undertakes to display, leaving the rest to the common ways of finding them. Notably he purports to prove the existence, and certain attributes, of God, and from these he infers the attitude proper for man to take up toward such a Being. We need not follow him in detail here. The most remarkable feature of this supposedly 'rationalist' ethics is the degree to which *probability* is taken to be the guide of life. Following an acute analysis of knowledge (in which he adopts the language of Locke, but shows a better appreciation of the function of universals), Wollaston seems to evince some surprise at the narrow compass of certainty. Hence, '*Where certainty is not to be had*' (and it is not to be had in any of the exigences of life), '*probability must be substituted into the place of it.*' Probability 'results from observation and reason working together,' and this we are as obliged to follow as we should be to follow truth itself. To act otherwise would be to argue that we should put out our *candle* because we cannot enjoy the *sun*.

Wollaston recognises that most conduct involves what has been called a 'conflict of duties.' Perhaps it may be best to quote *in extenso* his treatment of this conflict.

The case becomes more difficult [he points out] when a man (A) is under some *promise* or *compact* to assist another (B), and at the same time bound to consult his own happiness, provide for his family, etc., and he cannot do these, if he does that *effectually*. For what must A do? Here are not indeed opposite *truths*, but there are truths on opposite *sides*. I answer; tho there cannot be two incompatible duties, or tho two inconsistent acts cannot both be A's duty at the same time (for then his duty would be an impossibility); yet an obligation, which I will call *mixt*, may arise out of those differing considerations. A should assist B; but *so*, as not to neglect himself and family, etc., and *so* to take care of himself and family, as not to forget the other engagement, *as well and honestly as he can*. Here the *importance* of the truths on the one and the other side should be diligently compared: and there must in such cases be always some *exception* or *limitation* understood. It is not in man's power to promise *absolutely*. He can only promise as one, who may be *disabled* by the weight and incumbency of truths not then existing.

This very interesting passage suggests more lines of thought than can here be developed, but two may be barely

mentioned. First, we may note the divergence of this view from that of the Provost of Oriel, which, in a way, it anticipates. According to the latter, the conflict is between some few or more of a definite number of intuitively discerned '*primâ facie* duties,' whereas for Wollaston—who seems to me closer to actual moral experience—the conflict is between the demands of an indefinite number of elements in a complex situation, to each of which (could they be dis severed) taken alone the 'truthful' or 'appropriate' act would not be obscure, but which taken together offer a problem of well-nigh insurmountable difficulty. Wollaston is almost painfully aware of the hindrances in the way of the discovery of the 'just right' act in any really serious moral situation. It is enough for a man to act 'as well and honestly as he can,' which, in his terms, is to act in as close accord with the subtle demands of the different factors of the problem as his best judgment allows. He would agree with Professor Laird that the formula of actual morality is 'to do one's best.' What I have said on this score should show how mistaken are the historians who, almost parrot-fashion, have lumped Wollaston with Clarke as desirous of giving to prevalent customs the force of 'moral intuitions.' What he does hold is that by self-discipline and patient reflection, together with wise acceptance of good counsel, a well-disposed man can generally be tolerably sure of his duty. To this he adds a weighty list of the 'principal causes of *error*.' The chief of these are lack of retirement and reflection, absorption in business, lack of education coupled with unwillingness to be advised. But the utmost discipline and thought will not always secure a man in even a probable opinion of what it is right for him to do. Yet, with an acuteness which deserves remark, Wollaston turns this problem very nicely. Where a man is utterly in doubt as to the 'truth' of a situation, and hence of what he ought to do, one irrefragable truth emerges—namely, that he is in doubt. Upon this truth, which outweighs the force of any probability, a man must govern his conduct. In short, he must avoid all rash action; and if circumstances compel him to move at all, it must be 'moderately' and 'with toleration.'

Secondly, we may note Wollaston's frank admission (foreign to the real intuitionists) that every human under-

taking is 'subject to some exception or limitation.' Thus, contrary to some opinions, it may be right to break a promise: it may, indeed, be 'truthful' to *lie*. In citing the familiar example of the dangerous madman, Wollaston shows, I grant, some embarrassment, but does not finally evade the issue. Needless to say, he tries to show that not infrequently a lie can be avoided, but, all else failing, the lie becomes an obligation. This rules out the version of his ethics as an attempt to reduce all wrong action to lying, which, by the way, even so excellent a writer as Mr. Joseph has been led into repeating.

It remains to say something about the relation of moral goodness (rightness or duty) to other goods. On this matter Wollaston is not explicit, but his implied position is neither hard to find nor at all uncertain. That is good, he would say, which serves the 'nature' of man, and the nature of man is for Wollaston as for Butler—as has been shown—a system of desires and affections subject to the governance of reason. In detail the classification of goods is empirical, since it remains to be shown by experience just what 'satisfies' best any proper (*i.e.*, not contrary to reason) desire. Happiness, for example, is frankly admitted as a good of a very high order—so high, indeed, that for a man not to consider his own happiness along with the other factors of his situation would be, for Wollaston, morally wrong as treating himself as other than he is.

He further claims, as a convinced theist, that happiness and duty can never be radically sundered. That they are not wedded here he concedes, and makes of his concession (how justly it is not for me now to judge) an argument for immortality, in a fashion again anticipatory of Kant. It is sufficient on this score to say that his argument has force only on the assumption of God's existence, reasonableness and benevolence. This Wollaston seeks to prove by looking, not at the seamy side, but at the brighter side of life and nature. It must be allowed, however, that his arguments for immortality and for God's existence do not hang too well together.

Wollaston's estimate of particular truths, and of their several importance, is largely formed by the two beliefs just mentioned. This, of course, is as justified as it is inevit-

able, for unless belief in God and in a future life affect one's judgments about man's present condition, they could be of no more significance than belief in the phoenix. The point of importance for my purpose, however, is that his ethical theory, as distinguished from his private judgment on moral matters, is not dependent upon the theist hypothesis. Its central conception—namely, the paramountcy of reason—is argued by Wollaston in a quite independent manner. He looks to psychology, not to theology, for substantiation of his view of human nature. In this he anticipates the Bishop of Durham.

That many questions of great importance are raised by this exposition of Wollaston's ethics, and that these call for a more detailed handling than I have given them, I am well aware. My purpose is the limited one of showing that a thinker who could so effectively use the classical moralists (in whom he was deeply versed), and could so acutely analyse the ethical situation that on several of the crucial points he anticipates, in so far as he does not actually influence, the two greatest moralists of the eighteenth century, deserves a better fate than his countrymen have accorded him.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

'DE IMITATIONE CHRISTI'

By THE REV. D. MACFADYEN

To those who really hunger and thirst after righteousness, [wrote Charles Kingsley] and who therefore long to know what righteousness is, that they may copy it. . . . To those who cannot help seeing that the doctrine of Christ in every man, as the in-dwelling Word of God, the Light who lights every one who comes into the World, is no peculiar tenet of the Quakers but one which runs through the whole of the Old and New Testaments and without which they would both be unintelligible, just as the same doctrine runs through the whole history of the Early Church for the first two centuries and is the only explanation of them. To all these this noble little book will recommend itself and may God bless the reading of it to them and to all others no less.

CHARLES KINGSLEY—blessed be his memory—was a Don Quixote of Theology, and loved to have a tilt at something, even if it was only a windmill. He loved and hated generously, and could not tell us what he loved without also telling us what he hated, but the things he loved were, in the main, right things. The above words were written about a little book called *Theologia Germanica*—a strange name to those who read modern German theology. The *Theologia Germanica* was written about 1350, and was the outcome of a remarkable movement which in a few years ran through the Rhine provinces from Basle to Cologne; then eastwards to Swabia, Bavaria, and Franconia. Strasbourg, Nürnberg, and Nordlingen were among the main centres of influence. Those who came under its influence were known as the Friends of God, because they appealed to John xv. 15 as the watchword of their movement: 'Henceforth I call you not servants; for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth: but I have called you friends; for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you.' Their distinguishing doctrines were self-renunciation—the complete giving up of self to the Will of God, the continuous

activity of the Spirit of God in all believers, and the intimate union possible between God and man through Christ, the worthlessness of all religion based upon fear or the hope of reward, and the essential equality of laity and clergy; though, for the sake of order and discipline, the organisation of the Church was necessary.

That, by way of prelude, gives the temperature of the religious life into which Thomas of Kempen (Hammerlein was his name) was born in 1379 or 1380. His mother was a woman of the type of the Friends of God. His brother—much older than himself—was one of the brothers of the Common Life at Deventer, in Holland, and in 1392, as soon as Thomas was old enough, he went there for his education. In 1400 he became a member of the brotherhood known as the Community at Mount St. Agnes—the Little Gidding of the fifteenth century—and there he remained for seventy years till his death. These details have more than historic interest. They reply by anticipation to one of the most common criticisms of the *Imitatio*—that it is a book of self-centred piety. This was Thackeray's criticism and that of his time. 'The scheme of that book,' he wrote on Christmas Day, 1849, 'carried out would make the world the most wretched, useless, dreary, dotting place of sojourn and us a set of selfish beings, crawling about avoiding one another, and howling a perpetual miserere.' The truth is, of course, that the book was written in a community and for the members of a brotherhood. It is a guide to behaviour in a community. Its theme is selflessness, and its aim harmony. The Victorians scented a challenge in Thomas à Kempis to the comfortable view of religion they had adopted. Victorian self-complacency had to be worn as a complete armour lest any twinges of compunction should get inside and make deans like Dean Milman, who fulminated against Thomas, or novelists like Thackeray, uncomfortable. It was easier to criticise Thomas à Kempis than to digest him and act accordingly, so they took a line of least resistance which has biassed the views of people not worthy to hold a candle to the great little man. The book is a presentation of the finest strain of pure New Testament religion which ran through Europe before the Reformation. It is a book to live with and to live by. It is enough to make anyone nervous lest he should fail, in

speaking of it, to convey the charm which led the brethren of Thomas to describe it after his death as *musica ecclesiastica* (the music of the church). In Latin or in English it is purchasable for a few pence: one of the small books which has penetrated the world, partly by its compressed and balanced style, partly by its subject which is attractive yesterday, to-day, and possibly for ever. There are different ways of using it. It may be regarded as a treasure-chest of pearls—each beautiful and priceless by itself. Dip into it when and where you will, open it with your eyes shut and put your finger on any part of a page, you will get something juicy to turn over in your mind till you come again to get another.

But that is not the best way of using it. Although, as someone said of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, it is 'made up of quotations,' and was probably the outcome of Thomas Hammerlein's commonplace book, the selections were made from a wide area and with a purpose. The first words of the first of the three books give a clue to all that follows. 'He that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, saith the Lord. These are the words of Christ by which we are reminded that we must copy His life and conduct if we wish to be truly enlightened and to be delivered from all blindness of heart. To meditate on the Life of Jesus should therefore be our chief study.' This shows both discrimination and experience. The promise of enlightenment is given, not indiscriminately, but to those who are following a certain way of life. It is not a promise that the inner light will always be infallible on every subject, but that in the way of following Christ men shall never walk in darkness. The genius of the author consists in the inspired borrowing of phrases from all sources known to him, largely from the Bible, and in bringing these phrases into such organic union with one another as long meditation gives: inspired selection, inspired combination, and the touch of genius which eliminates all traces of art, all obtrusion of dogma and all traces of superstition, so that the book deals with the rugged realism of the spiritual life. It is as definite as Bradshaw's *Railway Guide*, though the terminus of all its journeys is eternal blessedness. He is setting forth a pathway to spiritual reality by which we may return to God the spirit which He gave; purified, chastened, sweetened,

perfected, by its sojourn in this world. The stages in the way are: First, the disentanglement of the spirit from the confusions, preoccupations, and pleasant dissipations of the flesh, so that the flesh may be subdued to the spirit. Next, we must offer ourselves willingly to endure all the troubles that come upon us from God or from our fellow-men. We get the impression from this section that Thomas was a keen observer of human nature, and encountered in his own community most of the troubles which worry us in ours. Next, we must impress upon ourselves the Passion of Christ crucified, fix in our minds His teachings, His sweet reasonableness in dealing with human nature in its needs and perplexities, His courageous and unconquered spirit, which we must share if we are to be like Him. Beyond that we must establish ourselves in a tranquil stillness of soul by an energetic resignation as if we were dead to self, and thought only of Christ and His Father. Lastly, we should be humble towards all men whether friends or foes.

There is another book, *De Sacramento Altaris*, in which à Kempis travels into another region, but instinctive taste has recognised from the first that this does not belong to the unity of the other three books. It raises questions of authorship which are curious but quite irrelevant. It is sometimes put second, sometimes third or fourth, in the manuscript. Omitting it, the other three are bound by internal cohesion in treating the Christian way as a way of moral striving and spiritual achievement. Christ and the human soul are *vis-à-vis*. The colloquy is direct, and has for its aim to bring the soul into the way by which the Captain of our salvation brought many sons to glory.

Matthew Arnold, with his infallible instinct for style, was drawn to the *Imitatio* and made it his companion for life. His note-books for thirty years¹ contain many quotations from *The Following of Christ*—he preferred the old English title. He must have read it again and again and found in it the particular guidance, admonition, or comfort which his circumstances required. When Matthew Arnold was not discussing theology he was generally right. The *Imitatio* was so satisfactory as a philosophy of the religious life that he

¹ This section was suggested by J. G. de Montmorency's book, *Thomas Kempen: His Age and his Book* (Methuen & Co.).

mistook it for a theology. He knew that 'style is the man,' that it is a window to the heart, that a man whose style is pruned, and therefore clear, whose words are balanced, whose delicate ear rejects the slightest false note, is a man to be trusted. It helps us to see how to use Thomas à Kempis to follow him in Arnold's note-books.

The key of this Christian philosophy he found in the phrase 'Life must always have a definite purpose' ('*Semper aliquid certi proponendum est*': i., 19). According to our purpose, the journey shapes its course to the goal. As a ship without a rudder is driven hither and thither by the waves, so a man who is negligent and inconstant is tempted in manifold directions (i., 13). The year 1868 was a year of searching experience and responsibility for Arnold. It brought the death first of his youngest son and later of his eldest. It was the year of his report on Continental Schools and Universities. He quotes:

A good and devout man arranges the work inwardly which afterwards he has to perform in the presence of others [i., 3]. Who strives more sternly than he who strives to conquer himself? This is our main affair: to overcome ourselves and daily to become stronger than ourselves and move toward better things. Never be entirely idle, but either reading, or writing, or praying, or meditating, or planning something for the good of the whole community.

The conquest of self is essential to the accomplishment of anything.

By resisting passions, not by obeying them, is found true peace of heart [i., 6]. A man should so rest in God that it would be needless for him to seek many consolations [i., 12]. If we were more dead to ourselves and less involved in earthly things we should then be able to taste divine things [ii., 21]. If in each year we were to root out one vice, quickly we should become perfect men. The good man envies no man since he loves no private joy [i., 15].

Resist at once: the physic comes too late
When maladies have grown inveterate.

Practices which are not general ought not to be paraded before others. Things which are singular are more safely carried out in secret [i., 19]. No one is safe in appearing before others unless he is willing also to be hidden [to lie low]. The spiritual life does not consist in outward manifestation and power. It must grow like the well-planted seed in secret. It is better to lie low and take some trouble with yourself than to perform wonders at the cost of neglecting yourself [i., 20]. Woe to us if we yearn for rest, as if peace and safety were already ours when as

yet no sign of true holiness appears in our living [i., 22]. The more a man dies to himself the more he begins to live to God [ii., 12]. Establish yourself first in peace and then you will be able to give peace to others [ii., 13]. Many a time I could have wished to have kept silence and not to be in the company of others [ii., 3]. If you wish to be carried carry someone else. There are people who so hold themselves in peace that they even have peace with others [ii., 13]. To help others is the way to spread the truce of God. Men may be loved because of Jesus [ii., 8].

These efforts at self-conquest lead inevitably to following Christ in the way of the Cross.

The only way that leads to life and a quiet conscience is the way of the Holy Cross where we die daily [ii., 12]. What then is the one thing needful for a man. It is to cast away all self-love and make himself of no account. As one rises higher in spiritual attainment he will always find heavier crosses to bear [ii., 12].

But these heights of experience have their dangers.

Beware of reaction and the temptation of the flesh. Don't go following your desires; turn yourself from the way of wilfulness; you will rest in peace if your own heart does not reproach you. Possess a good conscience and ever joyful thou shalt be [ii., 6]. It is a true and blessed comfort which is drawn from the truth within you [ii., i., 16].

The internal will must come into accord with the external will. Thy will—may it be mine and may mine follow Thine always as in perfect harmony [iii., 15].

This perception of the inner will and the inner fountain of Truth and their correspondence with a higher will and objective standard of Truth is now talked of as if it were a new discovery. It is there on record in *The Following of Christ* as the experience of the ages. A vernacular version of this truth was quoted recently in a book review in the *Observer*: 'Nothing is an adventure outside you unless it hooks on to something inside you.'

Then follow some of the sayings with which a man strengthens himself against the ups and downs of popular reputation.

Not the whole world will make a man proud when the truth has made him humble, nor will he be moved by the mouth of all who sing his praises if he has based all his hope in God [iii., 14]. If thy pathway is directed from within thou wilt not greatly heed words that fly past thee from without [iii., 28]. Manfully you must pass through all things and use a strong hand to clear the way [ii., 35]. To him that conquers is given the heavenly manna, but to the slothful there remain many miseries [iii., 35].

Matthew Arnold's way of using this great work—one of the world's greatest—is not, of course, the only way. Anyone who feels attracted may find his own way and like it better. It is a jewel with many facets—a guide to the spiritual life, an antidote to temptation and allurements, a path to self-mastery, a living commentary on the teaching of Jesus, a clue to the understanding of mediæval Christianity; but in the main it is in the terms used by Molinos to describe his *Spiritual Guide*—‘a pathfinder which disentangles the soul and brings it to the inward way, to the getting of perfect contemplation and the rich creature of Internal Peace.’ Its object is to disentangle the soul, to set it free from passions and distractions, so that it may live its own life so securely that death shall be but an incident in its progressive history. It offers the soul a victory over the world which no one can take from it. The spiritual kingdom is not only real, it is sufficient for the soul.

It is worth considering whether this old-time interpretation of the meaning of religion should not be resuscitated. The current fashion of regarding religion as an outlook on the true, the good, and the beautiful makes it essentially a handmaid to philosophy. The true, the good, and the beautiful are philosophic conceptions. The Christian virtues are faith, hope and charity, and the qualities which go with faith, hope and charity are courage, determination and grace. Faith goes before knowledge—‘I believe’ precedes ‘I know.’ Hope has a larger curve than goodness, and love is the parent of all perception of beauty. They are functions of virtue in the original sense of the word—strength. The specific Christian type is one which has, what appears to the ordinary man, supernatural strength. It is both much more necessary and much less popular than the type which spends life aspiring after the true, the good and beautiful. It is so rare that for the most part we neither know it nor value it when we see it. The Roman Church calls those who reveal this character *saints*. But though we are all ‘called to be saints,’ we do not regard it as a life vocation to respond to the call. If it were any use to indicate the fundamental cause of the futility of Church life, we should not be far wrong in saying that it lies in mistaking the meaning and the sources of Christian strength.

‘The Saints of God,’ writes Thomas, ‘ravished above self and drawn out of love of self, are plunged wholly into love of me [Christ] in whom they also rest in fruition.’ The dominant note in that type of life is ‘the love of Christ constraineth me.’ The difference between the mystical interpretation of the Christian life represented by Thomas à Kempis and the ‘rational’ represented by Dr. Inge is the difference between Luther and Erasmus—described by Erasmus himself when he said, ‘I can *write* but Luther can *burn*.’ The distinctive Christian type is the incandescent one. This is what lies behind the comment of an old Scot on the late Dean of St. Paul’s: ‘The Dean has offered us the rags of a pagan philosophy in place of the glorious Gospel of the living God.’ Both interpretations are legitimate, but the Christian mind has still to settle which it thinks the higher.

Thomas à Kempis did not mean by ‘Imitation’ what we mean by copying a person, or even what Francis of Assisi meant by imitation, involving a reproduction of the external acts and circumstances of the life of Jesus. He did not mean what the author of the book *What would Jesus do?* meant by imitation. In the first chapter of the first book is a sentence which lifts the process he had in mind to a higher plane. ‘It happens that many who often hear the Gospel experience but little desire for it *because they do not possess the Spirit of Christ*.’ The imitation which à Kempis had in mind was an effect of unity with the Spirit of Christ. Spiritual union was primary, and its fruit was the reproduction of the very victory of Jesus over the vexations, temptations, sufferings, sham successes, and real disappointments, the treacheries, perfidies, betrayals, accusations, condemnations which still make up the main part of life for us as they did for Jesus. We only get into the atmosphere of à Kempis when we see that all his troubles and all his victories are of the Spirit and can be reproduced in any circumstances or any life.

The relationship of the *Imitatio* to the Christian mystics is very interesting. It contains many ‘openings,’ as George Fox afterwards called them, but they are generally concerned with conduct rather than with abstract truth. When we analyse them they are concise and personal statements of truths familiar from reading the Bible, but put in a different

way. For example, he takes the familiar phrase in Hebrews xi. 13, 'having confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth,' personalises this idea and records it as a command from his unseen Lord. '*Ut migraturus habita*' ('Dwell as one about to depart'). The familiar truth gains by the transformation, and we get some insight into the way à Kempis's mind worked. Truths long familiar and hidden away in the depths of his mind suddenly precipitated themselves into his consciousness as categorical imperatives.

Pre-eminently he is a Christian mystic. He does not imply or suggest that any of the revelations given to him made him independent of Christ. He would have rejected them if they had done so. His interest lay in 'following Christ'—acquiring the mind of Christ and letting that mind shape his course in handling his difficulties and temptations.

A Kempis's method is the safe one for Christian mystics; it avoids pantheism and the metaphysical speculation to which non-Christian mysticism tends to run. Its aim is perfect *sonship*, not absorption into a Deity who has become a negation of all limits. And especially he is true to the fundamental characteristic of the Christian mystics. His truth is given him. It is revealed. It comes from a source above him—yet it is revealed in him. Its authority is not subjective; an output of his own consciousness; it derives from the supreme source of authority; it is an incident in the age-long history of God's revelation of Himself.

The *Imitatio* suggests an answer to one of the most pertinent and persistent questions often asked both by critics and believers. What is the aim, purpose, ideal of the Christian life? Is it a pursuit of absolute goodness, truth and beauty, such as has intrigued and deluded men for centuries, or has it an aim which an individual can make the goal of his own life both mundane and eternal? The answer of the *Imitatio* is that every Christian life is able to offer an interpretation of the Spirit of Christ in its own circumstances. It is a successful Christian life when the interpretation is recognisable as to its source and purpose. In that endeavour, honestly pursued, failure is impossible. In sharing His spirit we share His victory over the world. In following the Light of the World we cannot walk into darkness.

• This does not mean that our following of Christ can ever be perfect or adequate or satisfactory from the standpoint of wisdom or critics and observers. It is a common remark that Thomas à Kempis commits us to following an impossible ideal. The remark is as cheap as it is common. There is a following of Christ which is possible in all circumstances, and it is always imperfect because we ourselves are not saviours of the world as He was. We can keep the sublime proportions of His life and reproduce them according to scale. But Hindus, Chinese, Greeks, Romans, Europeans, whites, blacks, and all shades of colour in between, have courageously set out on the endeavour when once they have heard and understood His way of life. Rude sketches on the walls of caves in Southern France have now been accepted as the beginnings of art among our human ancestors. The men who did them are in the great company which includes Raphael and Leonardo da Vinci and Michael Angelo. By the same token the rudest efforts after the following of Christ have their value because they point a way to a perfection they can never attain. It may be that the greatest product of our imperfect lives may be just this, that they set someone on the way to a completer perfection in the following of Christ than we can hope to attain.

It was in the districts where the teaching of the Friends of God and the Brethren of the Common Life had taken deepest root that the Reformation when it came was hailed as the dayspring from on high. Luther could not have kindled the flame unless the fuel had been ready to his hand. The Reformation was a miracle when it came, but it could not have come at all if it had not been preceded by that other miracle, illustrated by the *Imitatio*, which kept alive, through long centuries of worldliness and moral degradation, a pure flame of Christian godliness going to the gospels for its sustenance, and associating every noble vision of human life, all unselfish service, all selfless character and realised reverence, with the name of Jesus Christ.

DUGALD MACFADYEN.

LEGENDS OF THE ISLE OF MULL

By SETON GORDON

SKYE and Mull are the two largest of the Inner Hebrides. None who is familiar with Oban is likely to forget the beauties of the Isle of Mull as seen across the ten miles of intervening sea, and when the sun dips behind the great hills of the island they rise up in beauty from the darkening floor of the ocean. The air is so clear above these western waters that it is often possible to see from Oban the castle of Duart, which stands on the rocky shore of Mull, unprotected from the winds and the sea spray. The history of Duart Castle is a romantic one. For centuries it was a ruin, but was restored by the present chief (Sir Fitzroy MacLean of Duart), who is now 100 years old, and makes the castle his home summer and winter.

About the time when the storm-battered Armada were driving before the gale along the Scottish coast there was at Duart Castle a celebrated gun, known as the *gunna cam* (the crooked gun). This gun commanded the channel between Mull and Morvern, and passing vessels were in the habit of signalling their friendly intentions by dipping a sail or flag in greeting to Duart Castle. If no signal were shown, the defenders on the castle presumed that the craft was hostile, and the *gunna cam* fired a cannon ball at her. One day when a fresh breeze was sweeping down Loch Linnhe and dark storm clouds were racing before the wind a vessel was seen to be sailing swiftly northward through the sound. She passed close to the castle, but gave no friendly greeting. She was fired on, but continued on her way. Shot after shot was fired, but the ship was untouched, and as she was sailing fast it looked as though she must escape. It happened that one of the gunners of Duart Castle had for some misdeed been committed to the dungeon. He said that if his liberty were given him he would guarantee the *gunna cam* should not miss

her mark at his hands. The chief of Duart gave orders for the gunner to be brought up from the dungeon. By this time the vessel was nearing Rudha an Ridire, on the Morvern coast—a promontory which in those days was considered to be quite out of range. All watched as the gunner trained the *gunna cam* upon the disappearing vessel, throwing the waves from her bow and heeling over as the strong gusts from Loch Linnhe drove her ever faster to the north. Surely she was now beyond reach of MacLean of Duart, Lord of Mull; surely before evening she would reach the shelter of friendly Skye. The gun was fired; the cannon ball sped over the turbulent sea; the vessel was seen to hesitate and flounder in the waves as her main mast crashed over the side. That story of the great feat of the *gunna cam* and her gunner has been handed down through the centuries, and was told me by one who had it from the old people, of which there are now few left on the island.

Mull is an island of many sea lochs. South of Duart is Loch Spelve, and above where the pier of Crogan now stands is a knoll with the name Cnoc nam Beannachdan (the Knoll of Blessings). The tradition is that St. Columba once preached there (perhaps on his way to or from Iona) to the people of the district. Loch Spelve is narrow at this point, and on its opposite shore is the old burial-ground known as Cill Eoin or Cill Eathain (the Church of St. John). Here is a ruined chapel, believed to be very ancient. There is a small stream close behind this old chapel, and at one place a small waterfall is present, the burn falling into a basin-shaped pool not much larger than a washing-tub. Here a curious ceremony sometimes took place. If a person were dangerously ill the relatives assembled at the chapel and approached the pool from the side of the church. The waterfall was diverted, and the pool at the foot of the fall was baled out. When the pool was dry a careful search was made in the gravel for any live creature that might be present. However insignificant the creature, if life were present in it, that was held to be a happy augury for the recovery of the sick person. But if the gravel of the pool were devoid of life, the hearts of the searchers were sorrowful, for they believed that their loved one would not recover.

On the shore of the open sea, rather to the north of the

entrance to Loch Spelve, is a name with an interesting history—Port nam Marbh (the Harbour of the Dead). The story is that a neighbouring clan—probably the MacDonalds of Islay—decided to land by stealth on Mull and make a raid on the cattle of Duart. The moon was full at the time, and it was the invaders' intention to land by night, drive the cattle to the shore before daybreak, and set sail before the clan MacLean could gather to give battle. But they were delayed by contrary winds on their sea passage, and before they reached the Mull coast day was breaking. They decided, therefore, to run in to a little bay immediately to the north of the entrance to Loch Spelve and remain there until nightfall. They landed, as they thought, unperceived, but, unfortunately for them, the MacLeans themselves had been preparing a raid, and a clansman, hurrying along that lonely shore, became aware of the invaders and brought the news to the castle of Duart. When the chief of Duart heard that a fleet of hostile galleys was anchored in that small bay behind Rudha na Faoilinn (Seagull Point) he and his clansmen made an attack on the enemy by sea and by land and put most of the invaders to the sword. From that day the place has been called Port nam Marbh (the Port of the Dead).

In those early times there were frequent raids on Mull by the MacDonalds of Islay, and on Islay by the MacLeans of Mull; and as the smaller island of Colonsay lay between the two, the raiders were in the habit of landing on Colonsay and plundering the isle. From this the proverbial Gaelic saying originated:

Chan 'eil àrd no ìosal nach faic sùil an Ìlich,
 Chan 'eil an cùil no cuilidh nach faic sùil a'Mhuilich,
 Muileach is Ìleach is Deamhan, an triuir as mìosa anns an domhan;
 Is mìosa am Muileach na an t-Ìleach;
 Is mìosa an t-Ìleach na an Deamhan.

The translation of this saying may be rendered as follows:

There is nothing high or low but the eye of the Islay-man will see,
 There is nothing in corner nor in storehouse but the eye of the Mull-man will observe,

Mull-man and Islay-man and Devil, the three worst in the universe.

The Mull-man is worse than the Islay-man,

The Islay-man is worse than the Devil.

Mull is a legend-haunted isle, but new people, and new

ways, have come to the island, and there is danger of many of the old traditions being lost. The story of Murchardh Gearr, one of the MacLaines of Loch Buie, is still told in Mull at the evening *cèilidh* by the glow of the peat fire. The mother of this chief was of the Duart family, and before she married MacLaine of Loch Buie she had a son, but after her marriage she had no children. She and the chief were not too happy in their married life, and in time it came to her knowledge that her husband was partial to the society of other women, with the probability of a natural son being born. The Lady of Loch Buie naturally wished her own son to succeed to the chiefship, and in the hope of putting an end to her husband's lovemaking she succeeded, with the assistance of the Duart family, in having him kidnapped and carried out to the lonely isle of Carnburg, between Mull and Coll. Since she did not wish to be responsible for his death, she engaged a woman of unprepossessing appearance, and supposed to be beyond the age of child-bearing, to look after his wants. Provisions were sent out to the couple on Carnburg from time to time, and on one of these visits it was noticed that the woman was likely to become a mother. She was at once removed to Loch Buie, where MacLaine's lady had a close watch kept on her, and gave the strictest orders that if the child the woman gave birth to was a male it was to be killed at once. But the infant son escaped with his life. The woman gave birth to twins (male and female), and while the female child was shown openly, the boy was hidden, and at the first opportunity was removed with great secrecy to a cave in the side of a rocky hill known as Beinn Fhada. An old man and his five sons in a shealing near supplied the baby and the foster-mother with food and drink. In time it became known to MacLaine of Loch Buie's lady that these poor people knew where the baby was concealed, and armed men were sent to the place. The old man was alone in the shealing¹ when they reached it, and, though threatened with death, he refused to betray his trust. One by one his five sons returned. Each one in turn was interrogated, and when each refused to speak he was beheaded in view of the father. When the five sons lay dead on the grass beside the

¹ Shealing is a small dwelling. The custom of the people of a township moving up, with their cattle, to the summer shealings in May of each year is a very old one.

shealing the father was again asked if he would say where the baby was hidden. In his reply he said he was thankful that his sons were faithful, and that he could now die happily. He was then killed, and from that day the shealing has been known as Airidh na Sliseig (the Shealing of the Slicing or Beheading). It is still marked on the map, on the south bank of the River Lussa, about three miles from the sea. This epic tale even to-day brings tears to the eyes in lonely bothies of Mull, and people listen breathlessly while the *seanachaidh*, or story-teller, narrates vividly how the foster-mother, cowering under a projecting rock, watched with terror each son in turn cut down and the heads placed in a row beside their father's eyes, while she endeavoured to stifle every sound from the infant. The six heads were taken down the Lussa to Ardura, where they were buried near the well which is seen on the roadside above Ardura House. The well is named to this day Tobar nan Ceann (the Well of the Heads).

The infant had miraculously escaped with its life, and was reared in secrecy. When the boy was approaching manhood his mother told him his history, and counselled him to flee to Ireland, where he remained for several years. He then returned to Mull, accompanied by twelve friends, to assert his claim to the title and lands of Loch Buie. Leaving his men in hiding in the woods of Duibh Leitir, the young man set out to spy the strong castle of Loch Buie. It was dusk when he arrived before the castle. How he had the good fortune to meet his foster-mother (now employed as a dairy-maid at the castle), and how with her help he and his men succeeded in surprising the garrison, has appeared in print more than once. But there are incidents told in oral tradition which make the story more graphic, and one is that during the absence of Murchardh Gearr his followers hidden in the wood were busily engaged in fashioning ladders out of the trees for scaling the castle walls. The dairymaid's ruse by which the party entered the castle (her husband was the doorkeeper, and this made the plan more easy to carry out) rendered these scaling ladders unnecessary, but the incident is commemorated in the name of the recess in the wood where they hid, and which to this day is called Glac na Fàraidh, or the Hollow of the Ladder.

Although Murchardh had now made himself master of

Loch Buie Castle, and had in his power the Lady of Loch Buie and her son, a number of the clan were still against him, and before he could make his position secure he had to fight his enemies. The contending parties faced one another on the sides of a precipitous hill stream which falls into Loch Spelve, and as Murchardh's men were suffering from hunger, and as it is proverbial that no man can fight on an empty stomach, one of the party before the fight crossed the burn and under cover of darkness entered the enemies' camp. Here he mixed with them at the camp fire while the supper was being cooked. Watching his opportunity, he suddenly grabbed a large rounded pot, or *coire*, filled with flesh, and, lifting this on to his shoulders, he made the best of his way in the darkness towards his friends. He was almost overtaken, and as he crossed the burn several arrows which had been fired at him struck the pot, the ring of their impact being clearly heard by the comrades who were hastening to his aid. The burn where this incident occurred was ever afterwards known as Amhuinn Coire na Feola (the River of the Cauldron of Flesh).

Like Skye, Mull is a large island, and each district has its own individual and strongly felt atmosphere. Along the shore of the Sound of Mull there are graceful birches near the eager tidal rivers, and above these trees are steep slopes which often reach the hurrying Atlantic mists. The chief of these high hills of the Sound of Mull is Dùn dà Ghaoithe (the Hill of the Two Winds). Here many hill torrents have their birthplace; here the red deer wander, and on the bare windy summit the ptarmigan croaks. The seeker after wild scenery should cross Gleann Mór (the Great Glen), which traverses Mull from Loch Spelve in the east to Loch Scridain in the west. During the twelve miles of the track he sees no more than two houses, and walks first beside the river Lussa. At a bend of the river about three miles from its mouth is the dark peaty pool where the dreaded supernatural *tarbh uisge*, or water-bull, lived. One evening long ago two men were walking through Gleann Mór, and as they walked they boasted one to another of their mighty deeds. Two of the hills which overlook the glen heard this vain talk, and warned the water-bull to teach them a lesson when they should come abreast of his pool. In time the two men reached the bend

in the track beside the haunted pool, and there, sure enough, was the *tarbh uisge*. When the monster saw the two men he began to bellow frightfully, while thin smoke and flames issued from his nostrils. Now it is well known that an ordinary bullet is ineffective against the water-bull, and so one of the men tremblingly loaded his gun with that charm against all ghostly creatures—a silver sixpence. The *tarbh uisge* charged them with awful bellowings, and when he was almost upon them the silver sixpence was fired. The effect was remarkable. The monster stopped short in his tracks, then, roaring mournfully, returned to his pool in the river and disappeared beneath the dark waters. The two men continued their way through Gleann Mór, but no further words of boasting passed their lips that night!

I think one of the most beautiful views in the Isle of Mull, famed for its beauty, is that from the watershed on the ridge of Gleann Mór looking west on to Loch Scridain. In the foreground on the right of the track Beinn Mhór, the highest hill of Mull, rises to a height of just over 3000 feet above the waters of the Atlantic, and down its steep flanks milk-white waterfalls race. Along the shore of Loch Scridain rises the Ross of Mull which leads down to the Sound of Iona, and a mile across the sound is the sacred island of Iona. If the day be very clear, the traveller would do well to leave the road through the glen and climb to the summit of Beinn Mhór, for the view from this hill-top in clear weather is remarkable. From Skye and Lewis in the north to the coast of Ireland in the south is a far cry, yet all that region of land and sea is visible in clear weather from Beinn Mhór. Far east, the autumn snow gleams on lofty Ben Nevis, and in that direction a multitude of hills form the horizon. To the south and the west many islands are seen. Here lie the Garvelloch Isles, with saintly associations, and near them the frowning heights of Scarba and the lofty peaks of Jura, which so often attract the wandering ocean clouds. The golden sands of Colonsay, the white sands of Iona, the low shores of Tiree and Coll, the rocky walls of Staffa—all are seen from Beinn Mhór. Near at hand, across the headwaters of Loch Scridain and to the south of them, is a hill of moderate size known as Beinn an Aonaidh, and beside it, at the top of a precipice which drops to the sea, is Gorrie's Leap, a place-

name which commemorates a tragedy of long ago. The story is that one Gorrie, a follower of MacLaine of Loch Buie, had orders from his chief to guard a certain defile during a great deer drive, and on no account to allow the deer to cross the pass. Gorrie failed to keep back the stags, and MacLaine of Loch Buie humiliated him to such an extent before the assembled clan that he decided on a terrible revenge. Snatching up the chief's infant son from the arms of his nurse, he fled with his human burden over moor and bog along the coast until he came to the highest point of the precipice. Here he leaped down on to a narrow ledge some yards below the top of the cliff and awaited his pursuers. When the chief arrived he long pleaded with Gorrie for the life of his only son, and it seemed as though he would be successful, when the light of madness suddenly shone out on Gorrie's face and, holding the infant aloft in one hand, he sprang with a cry to the abyss beneath.

But despite these hair-raising legends Mull is an isle of a serene and peaceful atmosphere. Perhaps the influence of St. Columba still lingers here—he who cared for the grey seals of the Torran Rocks which lie in the track of the storms and ocean currents off the coast of Muile nam Mor-bheann (Mull of the Great Hills).

SETON GORDON.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

ONE evening in July I joined a small party which spent from 8 to 11 p.m. on a launch on the Thames between Lambeth and the Tower. Packets ply regularly from Westminster Bridge and Greenwich; they are fully licensed, and in hot days are the coolest places in London. Yet I saw them leaving half empty. Not one in a thousand Londoners, I suppose, has been on these reaches of the Thames; I, to my shame, had never made the trip. A new world stood revealed—uglier between Blackfriars and the Tower than any tidal river I know, as shabby as the worst slums of Glasgow, with wharves apparently derelict, with no outward signs of planning by the Port of London Authority. Yet here is the ideal lung of London. It looks as if all the work of the port could with advantage be concentrated in half the space, leaving the rest for the two or three million souls who live within a mile of Thames-side, for many wharves are closed or seldom used and many of the buildings are a century old.

The tide was very strong, and we tied up for a time to a tug anchored in the fairway. The master and chief engineer, who were old friends of our host, came on board to take wine with us. They talked of bridges: from their point of view the Charing Cross Railway Bridge was the safest, for its rows of six stark pillars ran parallel with the stream, which was not pent up by bulky piers as at London Bridge, over whose fate they shed no tear; it was a hindrance to navigation and a danger to their craft.

The talk turned to the romance of the river, embodied, to them, in the men they had helped to rescue and the corpses they had fished up—one naked but for a wedding-ring and one boot, another drowned below the Tower and found six

weeks later near Westminster, notwithstanding the tides. They were cheerful fellows, full of the milk of human kindness, proud of their profession, and not a little resentful of the periodical invasion of foreign barges, grossly undermanned according to our laws, but allowed to ply between British ports freely, undercutting our own folk. Mr. Runciman should do something about it; standards of safety as well as of living were in peril. Who could compete with a motor barge manned with a crew consisting of the captain, his wife and four sons, of whom three were under sixteen?

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The manager of a meat shop—still known as a butcher's shop, though no one connected with it had ever bought a live beast—confided to me in the train one night, on my way back from the House, that the trade was, in his view, the best in the country to-day. He was in charge of one of six shops in North and East London. 'The guv'nor' came twice a week to check the books. The rent of the place was £130 per year, all paid by sub-tenants who lived on the floors above, so the lock-up shop below cost nothing. The trade in cooked meats was bigger than ever. Chickens could be bought in the market at 1s. 6d. or so; 'trussed up pretty' and cooked, they sold at 3s. 6d. to 4s. 6d. Many women bought the most expensive, though by weight there was not 3d. difference. It was the same with rump steak. He would mark two prices from the same joint 1s. 10d. and 2s. 2d. per lb.; he sold more at the higher price—to people who often could not really afford it. Lambs were on sale at Smithfield at 4½d. per lb.; he sold the legs and shoulders at a price which covered the whole carcase. The rest was profit. It did not matter if he sold the breast and neck; and few would buy it, anyway—even quite poor people were so particular. No home-killed meat for him—too much trouble. He never sold meat cheaply to anyone: better keep prices up and save labour. A big turnover meant more wages. No one in the meat trade believed in small profits and quick returns. Better sell at a large profit to a few customers than at a lower rate to many. It meant more assistants. He used to have three men under him: now

he had three boys and could do without one. The profits were wonderful: he knew, for he was paid a commission on sales.

The Co-operative shops 'did not harm anyone.' They were not keen buyers and they did not know how to cut up meat. There were, of course, traders who sold cheap meat on barrows—even at $3\frac{1}{2}d.$ per lb., and not bad stuff either; but they had to sell a lot to make it pay, and really nice people did not go to them. They ought really to be stopped from competing with honest shopkeepers: the L.C.C. and the medical officers of health worried them all they could, and the police pushed them about a bit. He would like to see all street tradesmen stopped and people made to go to the shops; that would be good for trade. Still, things were not so bad, and 'we must be grateful for small mercies.'

Was the guv'nor on the Council? I asked. Yes, he was. An instructive conversation.

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I spent one morning this month, not for the first time, visiting two Ministry of Labour training centres, both in the London area. These places—there are a dozen scattered over England—have been in existence for about ten years: the youths from eighteen to twenty-five who attend them are drawn only from areas where unemployment is heaviest. They are taught, over a period of six months, one of a dozen different trades in which there is, or seems likely to be, a shortage of skilled labour. Their tutors are all skilled tradesmen, with long experience as foremen and an aptitude for giving practical teaching—a gift which is not always developed in early life, and is probably commoner in the workshop than in the school. These young men get lodging allowance and live as part of the local community instead of being encouraged to herd together: one meal at midday is served at the centre; the rest they must get for themselves. The place is full of machinery which is such as men will have to use on the jobs to which they will go: the system is that of a good factory, and a boy who has been through a centre will find the routine of a large firm easy to understand.

Every year three or four thousand men pass out of these centres qualified—to earn a living. They go straight to jobs at rates of pay which will not undercut current standards: 30 per cent. are in the same firm and 70 per cent. in the same trade a year later. There is nothing better in England: it may be the beginnings of a system of State apprenticeship—a logical extension of organised practical instruction from fourteen upwards. Men are taught more here in six months than most apprentices in the ordinary way can pick up in three years. They start, most of them, at scratch, and many are earning $1s. 4d.$ an hour, few less than $1s. 1d.$ an hour, within six months of entering an industry which could take twice as many of them; for there is, in many places, a real dearth of skilled men, and these youths are the material of which, within a year, highly skilled craftsmen are made.

Mr. Percy Malcolm Stewart, the public-spirited son of a public-spirited father (Mr. Halley Stewart), has completed six months' service as an unpaid Commissioner, with £2,000,000 and the good-will of the Government at his back. His functions are described as the 'initiation, organisation, prosecution and assistance of measures designed to facilitate the economic development and social improvement' of parts of North-East and North-West England, and of parts of South Wales.

We pray in one of the Collects that we may 'perceive, and know, what things we ought to do,' as well as for 'grace, and power faithfully to fulfil the same.' There is no tautology here; each word has a distinct meaning of its own. Mr. Stewart can obtain knowledge from his staff.¹ This Report shows that he has perception: there is some evidence that he has grace, but it is clear that he lacks power—'the Act does not permit the application of fundamental remedies'; and 'the problem cannot be solved without recourse to some unconventional principles,' for some of his conclusions point to 'the imminence of increased difficulties.' Almost all his proposals are of general application, *e.g.*:

(1) A week's holiday with pay for all.

(2) Shorter working hours.

¹ First Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas (England and Wales): Stationery Office, dated July 4, 1935 (2s.).

- (3) Specialised practical and physical training for youths from fourteen to sixteen and, if unemployed, up to eighteen.
- (4) Contributory pensions at sixty-five on a scale which would make retirement possible, conditional on abstention from the labour market.
- (5) Industrial transference to be pressed further.
- (6) Production licence required before a new factory can start operations in specified areas.
- (7) State ownership of mining royalties.
- (8) A (very cautious) programme of public works.
- (9) An equally cautious scheme for land settlement.

His most serious criticism is directed obliquely at the banks and, by inference, though they are not specifically mentioned, at the great industrial and general insurance and assurance societies and companies, who have, in the past, invested abroad so trustingly and at home so sparingly. He pays a warm tribute to Mr. Wilson Jarvie, chairman and managing director of Credit for Industry, Limited, who, among others, has done in many cases what the supine banks have failed to do. He adds: 'It is understood that in some cases, when credit for industry has, after investigation, indicated its willingness to offer assistance, the banks have stepped in and offered a loan which they had previously refused.'

Let there be no misapprehension of Mr. Stewart's well-weighed words. They are a criticism—almost a condemnation—of the policy pursued by the joint-stock banks, since, by a process of amalgamation, they increased their size and strength, but, like prehistoric beasts, lost their mobility and much of their utility in the process. It is now for the chairmen of the banks and the great investing organisations to state their side of the case, and for us all to read afresh the Macmillan Report of 1930, which has never received proper attention.

The Conservative Party is not identified with the City, as the City will presently discover, should that issue be raised. It has indeed trusted 'the City': if their trust proves to have been misplaced, they will devise better machinery. They have the good-will of those who can do so. Mr.

Stewart's Report should be on the table of every man who cares for the future of his country; and on every bookstall in England. It is clear that legislation is necessary in order to give effect to most of his recommendations. Some will need modification—may prove too unpopular to be imposed forthwith. Departmental conversations will, if not checked, continue indefinitely. I almost wish we could have a Ministry of Reconstruction, on the lines laid down by Lord Haldane during the war. It did not last for many years; the first Minister, Dr. Addison, was also the last, but the conditions we have to face are not dissimilar. The Minister of Reconstruction should be regarded, with, but after, the Chancellor, as the Prime Minister's principal adviser and mouthpiece. With a first-class staff of his own choosing, and the Press and Parliament at his back, he might do much in twelve months.

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After a long evening spent in re-reading it and in writing these lines, I left London by a crowded night train for Newcastle with *Waiting for Nothing*, by Tom Kromer, in my pocket. It tells what happens in the United States to unemployed men and women. It is a terrible tale, because every word rings true, revolting in its revelation of cruelty suffered at the hands of authority, and of each other, by men and women of our race and blood in a country which has not had the grace or power to change its government to meet their conditions. I compared it with *The Means Test Man* and *The Submerged Tenth*—books which describe men in like straits in this country. In England few officials are unfriendly, and seldom, if ever, brutal. Penniless men and women have rights and a recognised claim; they are somebody's responsibility. I do not envy the man who can read these books without gaining fresh strength and making a new resolve to devote himself to the hard task of fashioning a better world.

I reached Newcastle at dawn, and before 6 o'clock crossed the river to Gateshead. I walked through Redheugh and Ravensworth and Lower Team; unemployment here is still very heavy. Then through Felling Hebburn and Jarrow—all looking a bit better than last year; the activities of the

Tyneside Council of Social Service have had visible results. Employment was better too: the shipyards were busier, and the men and women going to work thronged the streets in a way they never did a year ago. But the unemployment figure is still high, and will so remain, as long as people cling to an area from which the abnormal employment of war and post-war years has gone, never to return. The new housing estates which are springing up on all sides are an encouraging sign of local enterprise and confidence in the future, and are bound, provided the rates and rents payable are not too high, to have a good effect on public health.

Then to the market-square in Blyth to watch and listen, with 2000 others, to the Colliery Brass Bands contest. The uniforms were as gay as the banners. Every bandsman must be employed at a pit—a class distinction that is not very popular, nor even reasonable, in these days of changing industrial conditions. At half-past 2 the bands marched in procession to the meeting-place on the foreshore to hear speeches from two platforms. On one stood James Maxton, M.A., M.P., who spoke with his hat on, and Mr. Shinwell, once a Minister of Mines; on the other, the ubiquitous Herbert Morrison, making the first of three speeches in two days in this area, and Ebby Edwards, a veteran Northumberland miner and miner's official. His speech alone was suited to his audience and the occasion. He spoke of the toll of the traffic on roads below ground, of the deaths of boys and youths under twenty-one—hinting that careless and even callous owners existed and had some responsibility for the casualty list. As I heard him Kipling's *Queen's Men* came back to me:

Scarce had they lifted up
Life's full and fiery cup,
Than they had set it down untouched before them.
Before their day arose
They beckoned it to close—
Close in destruction and confusion o'er them.

But the figures, over forty years, show an immense improvement—greater, perhaps, than in any other industry.

He demanded nationalisation of the mines, and higher wages, but told his audience that the former demand was not

near at hand, and the latter was not easily accomplished to-day. He blamed the Government for not doing better in getting a shorter hours convention at Geneva. But shorter hours will not help to sell coal or recover lost markets. The price of Northumberland coal was no higher now than in 1914, said he—that is what keeps wages low. The same is true of agricultural produce, with the same result—that men are leaving the industry, which survives only because, thanks to mechanisation, the production per head is higher.

He scoffed at the efforts of Sir Ernest Gower, who is trying to concentrate work on the pits that can pay better wages. He agreed with Godfrey Nicholson that a Northumberland selling pool is necessary, but claimed that it was impossible unless the industry was nationalised. The Germans and Poles have got selling pools without nationalisation. So have the chemical, the petroleum, and several other industries. I felt as I listened that in this matter Mr. Edwards had not said his last word. He referred uneasily to the miners' claim for better wages; that must mean a higher price for coal, which is in competition with other fuels. Scientific research has done a little and will do more! Machinery may do more yet to increase output, even if it means fewer men employed: of this he said nothing. It was the speech of a man devoted to a great cause, but, as I thought, with little faith in his own remedies. Is there no possibility of both sides meeting, with nothing hidden and the gloves off, so as to make it easier to shake hands and to exchange notes, not blows, across the table.

He spoke courteously of 'his friend' Godfrey Nicholson, the sitting member, a supporter of the National Government, and who has been appealing for a move to take mining out of party politics and for a truce to the feud between masters and men as the only road to higher ground whence the economic problem may be surveyed. But he warned his hearers that such hopes were vain dreams: only by political strife could things be changed for the better. Yet the mayor had begun by saying that things had not improved since 1907. Thirty years of political strife has, then, availed little. Is not the time ripe for a change of tactics? There was little applause, little enthusiasm, until the winning band was announced and received the cup, amid much cheering.

Then back to Newcastle, the streets full of holiday-makers. At one corner was a dog market, where anyone may go to see a man about a dog. Each of a score of men held on a leash or in his arms a single dog. There were specimens of every age and size and parentage at very reasonable prices—all looking well cared for.

ARNOLD WILSON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Beecham and Pharaoh, by Ethel Smyth (Chapman & Hall, 6s.).

A Background for Domenico Scarlatti, by Sacheverell Sitwell (Faber & Faber, 5s.).

Gervase Elwes, by Winifrede Elwes and Richard Elwes (Grayson & Grayson, 15s.).

C. V. Stanford, by H. P. Greene (Arnold, 15s.).

Although the personality of Dame Ethel Smyth is better known to the British public than that of any other of our composers, it is almost true to say that her music is less known than that of other representative figures. The music, it seems to me, is overwhelmed by her strong, unique personality; it never gets a fair chance. This may appear a strange assertion to make of one who has never been shy of claiming the right of performance; but it cannot be denied that whenever a new work of hers has been produced with herself as conductor, public interest has been centred on the composer rather than the composition. Not that all are attracted by her personality. Some find her opinions and methods exasperating; many who admire the courage of her convictions heartily disagree with those convictions. Those who are exasperated would do well to recall the circumstances attending her early career. They were political circumstances. The intrusion of politics has never benefited the cause of music; and if Dame Ethel's compositions have never received their full meed of appreciation, it is due in some roundabout way to the fact that she was once a leading figure in the women's suffrage movement.

It is otherwise with her literary compositions, for they, in a more obvious way than her music, reveal her personality. In no other book of hers that I have read have her fearlessness, her unique turn of humour, and her power of description worked at higher pressure than in *Beecham and Pharaoh*. It is an oddly-made book—a suite (beginning with a long fantasia) rather than a sonata. “I like the idea,” said the publisher, “of a book in two parts; the first to be a study of one of the arresting personalities you have known; the second autobiographical, dealing with any portion

of your life that specially interested or amused you.”’ A characteristic opening. Is it fanciful to suggest that the publisher *had* to like the idea, or else have no Ethel Smyth book for his spring list? He was right, as it happened, to accept the manuscript, whatever doubts he may have had about its ‘form.’ The Beecham essay is a real contribution to the complete study of that enigma. It is full of illuminating observation, and contains the best summary of the man’s achievement I have yet read: ‘Not only has he raised the emotive standard throughout the country, but by degrees he has created a body of men who, as you watch them and listen to them, give you the feeling the best foreign orchestras induce, that music can be a matter of life and death even to a member of the band.’

After this fantasia in B sharp major the movements called ‘Egypt before England’s Exodus’ unavoidably leave the impression of being written in a flat and minor key. Still, however flat the key, however loose the form, the matter of Ethel Smyth’s writing is never dull.

In a number of respects *A Background for Domenico Scarlatti* is the antithesis of *Beecham and Pharaoh*. Its form is most carefully calculated—its style exquisite and, frequently in the best sense, precious. This, an anniversary book (Scarlatti was born in 1685), is an attempt to construct a picture of the composer’s period in the hope not so much that he will spring heroically to life as that he will become a recognisable figure in the crowd. We read of Neapolitan painters and architects of the period—Solimena, Franceschiello, Sebastiano Conca and Guiseppe Bonito among the former, the great Sanfelice among the latter; and the suggestion is made that ‘their handiwork is the only reasonable corollary to so much music.’ It may be reasonable, but not in every age and centre is it a foregone conclusion. Mr. Sitwell, it need hardly be remarked, relies as much upon his imaginative strength as upon facts in his reconstruction of Naples, and later of Venice (where the composer studied for a year), of Rome (where he lived for ten years), of Lisbon and of Spain.

An observation of Dr. Burney leads to a consideration of the extent to which Scarlatti was influenced by Spanish music. In his study of Manuel de Falla (1929) Mr. J. B. Trend draws attention to Falla’s affinity with Scarlatti, but he does not suggest that the present-day composer derives from Scarlatti, but rather that both owe their keyboard effects to Spanish guitar-music. The chop-stick method, the rapidly repeated notes, leaps from one extremity of the keyboard to the other and ‘internal pedals’; these are some of the incidents that are cited to support the contention. Above

all, the rhythms. ‘Further, the methods and even the material of Scarlatti’s music are curiously appropriate to contemporary musical thought.’ After that interesting remark, Mr. Trend goes on to express what many have felt about Scarlatti’s compositions—namely, that, although they have passion, they are never other than concise and clear. Those who avoid sentimentality like the plague can be quite safe with this composer. He may have resembled Liszt in being a great virtuoso; but how unlike the two are in their creative thought and fantasy, especially in this matter of facile emotion. Yet, as Mr. Sitwell states, ‘it is to Liszt that we must give the credit for reviving interest in the older composer and for heading the subscription for Czerny’s 1839 edition of two hundred of the sonatas.’ Mr. Sitwell leaves to the technician (he might have said ‘the mechanic’) the task of deciding which of the five hundred odd sonatas were written in Spain and which in Naples and Rome. His own pages he calls unprofessional. They are so in a welcome and stimulating way.

Unprofessional, too, is Lady Winifrede Elwes’ family book in which the central figure is her husband. But the narrative is the more charming and harmonious for its innocence of fine writing; certainly it is more in keeping with the nature of its subject, that most high-minded and passionately sincere of English singers. The even happiness of his youth, his Oxford days, his early marriage and life in the British Embassy at Vienna, his return to England to live as a country gentleman—there was little here to indicate that he would eventually become famous as a singer, and especially as the nearly ideal interpreter of Gerontius. Nor at any time of his career, happily, was there anything in keeping with his tragic end. After a life of such intense spirituality, that sudden cutting-off was of an incomprehensible harshness.

In his leisurely, sentimental study of Sir Charles Stanford, Mr. Plunket Greene refers to certain points in my biography of Elgar, and perhaps the reader will allow me to take this opportunity of correcting a misapprehension. Dr. Fuller-Maitland (in his *Music of Parry and Stanford*) and Mr. Plunket Greene both imply that I was unaware of Stanford’s (and Parry’s) good-will towards Elgar. A passage beginning on page 244 of vol. i. of my study will correct that impression; and as for my appreciation of Parry’s and Stanford’s outstanding accomplishments, it is clearly expressed on page 289 of vol. ii.

I cannot understand why Mr. Greene writes of the ‘supposed’ friction between Elgar and Stanford. It was fact, not supposition, as all English musicians know. Mr. Greene himself freely admits that Stanford was a born fighter, which, since he was no pugilist

in the physical sense (except once as a boy), can only mean that quarrelling was in his blood. Then again, after referring to a dramatic apology once made by Stanford's father, he adds the comment: 'If one changed the period and modernized the technique of repentance, that scene might have been played by his son not once but fifty times.' And in a later chapter he writes: 'I can only attribute Stanford's attitude to some instinctive, unnameable hostility of which he was probably secretly ashamed.'

Mr. Greene shows us this aspect of the composer's nature as clearly as he reveals the aspect of lovable, impetuous genius. Especially interesting are the chapters on Cambridge and the Royal College of Music, showing the two phases of Stanford's active life. One of the best chapters is that on Stanford as a songwriter. The peculiar flavour which made Mr. Greene's *Interpretation in Song* so gratifying an experience is there to be experienced again. The author confesses that he can only write of these compositions as a partisan, but he need not be apologetic in calling attention to such flowers of song as 'Corrymeela,' 'The Fairy Lough,' and 'Johnnen'; indeed, we prefer him to be a partisan in writing of these lovely things. Do we not recall from his performances in the past how deep and real is his understanding of them? Mr. Greene also makes plain Stanford's greatness as a teacher and, in general, does full justice to his other compositions; but surely the fresh inspiration of the church music deserves a better tribute than the casual chapter which has been thrown in by Sir Edward Bairstow.

BASIL MAINE.

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THE BALANCE OF PARTIES

By RAMSAY MUIR

THE only foundation for an estimate of the strength of the various political parties in this country is the voting in elections. It is not a very satisfactory foundation, for various reasons, some of which will emerge later in this article. But it is the only foundation we have. I propose, therefore, to begin by analysing the General Elections which have taken place since the fall of the war-time coalition in 1922, and then to analyse the by-elections of the last two and a half years.

Of the five elections which have taken place since 1922, three may be described as 'normal' and two as 'panic' elections. The normal elections were those of 1922, 1923, and 1929: each of them was followed by a short-lived Parliament. The panic elections were those of 1924 (Zinoviev letter) and 1931 (financial crisis); each of them was followed by a long Parliament.

Two parties only, Conservative and Labour, fought along the whole front in each of these elections, and were therefore able to poll their whole strength. In their cases alone do the election figures give a real indication of party strength. Indeed, it may be argued that the figures exaggerate the strength of both parties. They are regarded as the main competitors for power; and therefore thousands of electors vote for Conservative or Labour candidates, not because they are convinced adherents of the party to which their votes are given, but as the best way of keeping the other party out. This kind of negative voting, which is very unhealthy, is becoming more and more prevalent; and it imports an element of insecurity into all calculations of electoral strength.

The superficial observer is apt to measure the strength of the various parties by their numbers in the House of Commons. But this is wholly misleading, as will be shown by the following table, which gives the percentage of votes and of seats obtained by each of the principal parties in each of the first four elections—the election of 1931 being omitted because it was wholly abnormal:

THE REPRESENTATION OF PARTIES

	1922		1923		1924		1929	
	Percentage of Votes.	Percentage of Seats.	Percentage of Votes.	Percentage of Seats.	Percentage of Votes.	Percentage of Seats.	Percentage of Votes.	Percentage of Seats.
Conservative	39	56	38	41	47	67	38	42
Labour	30	23	30	31	33	24	37	47
Liberal	29	18	29	25	17	6	23	9

This interesting table shows that in every election the Conservatives obtained a larger, and in two cases a greatly larger, proportion of seats than would correspond with the proportion of votes actually cast for them. The Labour Party in two elections won fewer seats than its votes would have justified; in the other two it had more seats than it was entitled to, and in 1929 it obtained a larger proportion of

seats than the Conservatives on a smaller proportion of votes. In every election the Liberals have been grossly under-represented. And this under-representation was even more marked than the table shows, because the Liberals have always, and most notably in 1924, fought fewer seats than the other parties, and have therefore been unable to poll their full electoral strength.

In the election of 1931 the results were even more distorted than in the preceding elections. In the panic of the crisis there was an immense swing towards the support of the National Government. The Conservatives got almost the whole advantage of the swing. The Labour Party was disorganised; the Liberal Party was divided, some of its members binding themselves hand and foot to the Conservatives, while those who retained some degree of independence lacked the means to put up more than a handful of candidates. The majority of Liberals voted for Conservative candidates, having none of their own to vote for; a few voted for Labour candidates; but very large numbers abstained. Only 72 per cent. of the electorate voted in 1931, as against 75 per cent. in 1929; this difference of 3 per cent. represents nearly a million voters, most of whom were almost certainly Liberals. Owing to the exceptional circumstances of this election, the Conservatives obtained a definite majority of the votes cast. But even this was not a majority of the total electorate, only 39 per cent. of which voted for Conservatives. With this proportion of votes, the Conservatives obtained no less than 76 per cent. of the seats in the House of Commons. The Labour Party, on the other hand, with 30 per cent. of the votes, obtained only 8 per cent. of the seats.

Throughout this series of elections the Conservatives have invariably been the strongest single party. But, except in the abnormal election of 1931, they have never approached a majority of the votes cast, and still less a majority of the total electorate. Apart from panic elections, such as 1924 and 1931, the Conservative poll remains very steadily at about 38 per cent. of the votes cast, and 25 to 30 per cent. of the total electorate. The highest poll of the Labour Party was 37 per cent. of the votes cast, representing 27 per cent. of the electorate. Their normal poll seems to be about 33 per cent. of the votes cast, and 20 to 25 per cent. of the electorate.

The Liberals, who obtained 29 per cent. of the votes cast in 1922 and 1923, fell to 17 per cent. in 1924, mainly because they then contested only about half of the seats, and therefore could not poll their full vote; they rose to 23 per cent. in 1929, because they then fought almost as many seats as the other parties.

If we make a reasonable allowance for the number of votes given to the Conservative and Labour Parties by electors who do not support them from conviction, but only because they dislike the other party more, and who feel that they must vote for one or other of these two parties because they alone seem to have any chance of forming a Government, it would seem that the Conservatives can count upon the steady loyalty of rather more than a quarter of the electorate, and the Labour Party upon rather less than a quarter.

There remains about half of the electorate which owes no steady allegiance to either of these parties. More than a quarter of the electorate does not go to the poll at all. Even in 1931 only 72 per cent. of the electors voted. This large element consists partly of people who are wholly indifferent to politics, but it also includes a large number of people who definitely disapprove of both of the major parties, and will not give their votes to either. This category probably includes the Communists and the Fascists, who rarely have a chance of voting: how numerous they may be, nobody can tell. It includes also many Liberals in constituencies where there are no Liberal candidates; for where this is the case it may be estimated that on the average half of the Liberals do not vote, one-quarter vote Conservative, and one-quarter vote Labour. It is indeed impossible to estimate with any closeness the strength of the Liberal vote, not only because it is never fully polled, owing to the relatively small number of Liberal candidates, but also because, knowing themselves to be in a minority in most constituencies, many Liberals do not vote even when there is a Liberal to vote for, or give their votes to keep out that one of the other candidates to whom they have the strongest objection. But it may be estimated that even in these days of depression the Liberals number about 4,000,000, and constitute between one-seventh and one-eighth of the total electorate. At a guess, the steady Conservatives may be put down at 8,000,000, the followers

of the Labour Party at 7,000,000; and this leaves about 12,000,000 waverers, many of whom can be driven this way or that by panics, bribes or stunts. These proportions might be materially changed under a different electoral system.

Turn next to consider the light shed upon our problem by the by-elections. It will be best to consider only those by-elections which have taken place since the beginning of 1933, when the financial crisis was over, the main body of Liberals had terminated their ambiguous connexion with the Government, and the normal relations of parties had been more or less resumed. We shall include with the Conservatives all votes cast for Liberal National or National Labour candidates. It is impossible to differentiate these groups from the Conservatives, for they never fought one another; the Conservatives always voted for candidates drawn from these groups, and the voters of these groups (if there were any) always voted for Conservative candidates equally with those of their own complexion.

We shall compare the results of these elections, not with those of the abnormal election of 1931, but with the polls in the same constituencies in 1929. Between 1929 and the dates at which these by-elections were held the electorate in them had increased by about 90,000. The Conservative and the Labour Parties contested practically every seat both in 1929 and in the by-elections; the Liberals contested most of them in 1929, but less than half of them in the by-elections; other parties contested only a very few seats.

In these thirty-three elections the total vote of the Conservatives and their allies was 495,000. The Conservatives alone had obtained 485,000 votes in the same constituencies in 1929. This increase of 10,000 was only one-ninth of the increase in the electorate. It would appear, therefore, that the Conservatives had drawn little or no reinforcement from their Liberal National or National Labour allies, who seem to have practically no electoral strength. The Labour vote in the by-elections was 429,000, as against 425,000 in 1929—an increase of 4000, or less than one-twentieth of the increase in the electorate. In other words, both of these parties obtained a smaller proportion of the total electorate than they had done in 1929. Evidently there was an increased number of

electors who did not want to vote for either. This increase, however, did not inure to the advantage of the Liberals, whose total poll fell from 286,000 in 1929 to 103,000 in the by-elections. The main reason for this decline was that the Liberals fought less than half of the seats, and fought them on a very modest scale of expenditure: this, of course, inevitably involved a large decrease in their total poll. But the Liberal poll was also seriously reduced in the constituencies which were contested. Evidently the Liberals had lost heart. But it is clear that they did not, in any considerable numbers, give their votes to either of the other parties. They abstained. The figures make it quite clear that there is no foundation for the widespread belief that the Liberals are drifting, some to the right and some to the left. That process, which existed at one time, has now come to an end.

The conclusions to be drawn from the by-elections would seem to be that the violent swing of 1931 to the Conservative side has been nullified; that the Conservative and the Labour Parties are back in very much the same relative position as in 1929, though the Conservatives seem to be slightly stronger. Both parties have fallen back somewhat, as compared with 1929, in the proportions of the electorate upon whose support they can count; but the Conservative proportion has declined rather less than the Labour proportion.

If, on the basis of these figures, we endeavour to form an estimate of the probable results of the next election, it is necessary to remember that all such calculations are apt to be vitiated in the excitement of an election, especially if some new issue is introduced, like the Zinoviev letter in 1924 and the financial crisis in 1931. The figures seem to suggest that the conditions of 1929 will be nearly reproduced. In that election, with a smaller poll than the Conservatives, the Labour Party obtained a larger number of seats: this is an indication of the unpredictable gambling element of our electoral system. But this is not likely to happen again: first, because, on the series of by-elections taken as a whole (as compared with 1929), the Labour Party is relatively somewhat weaker and the Conservative Party slightly stronger; and secondly, because, in recent months, the stock of the National Government seems to have been rising. The great question is, what proportion of that half of the electorate

which is not wedded to either party will vote for each of them? If things go as they have been going, it seems likely that a larger proportion of the waverers will vote for the Conservatives than for the Labour Party.

Much will obviously depend upon the action taken by the Liberal Party, which forms by far the largest section of the unattached half of the electorate. If the Liberals put up a large number of candidates, as they have announced their intention of doing, will this weaken either of the larger parties? It is commonly asserted that an effective intervention of the Liberal Party will (on the one side) divide the anti-Socialist vote and ensure a Labour victory, and (on the other side) divide the anti-Government vote and ensure a Conservative victory. Both of these things obviously cannot happen; and the figures seem to show that neither will happen. The great majority of Liberals, it would appear, will only vote for Liberal candidates, and will abstain from voting if this opportunity is denied them. The appearance of a large number of Liberal candidates might prevent some Liberals from voting for Conservatives, and others from voting for Labour candidates. It might also divert from both parties some of the wavering votes. But these diversions would be about equal on either side: they might lead to the election of more Liberals, but they would not affect the relative strength of the two larger parties. One thing alone might produce this result. There is very strong resentment among the 4,000,000 Liberals at the way in which they are silenced or disfranchised by the existing electoral system. If either of the larger parties, recognising that Liberals hold the balance (as they undoubtedly do in a multitude of constituencies), were to give a definite pledge to support a measure of proportional representation, it is probable that the result would be to swing the Liberal vote to that side in all constituencies where there were no Liberal candidates, and even in some where there *were* Liberal candidates; and this might have a decisive effect.

It appears likely that in the next election the Conservatives will return to power, with a greatly reduced majority. The pendulum will continue to swing, as always, against the Government in power; and, since a small shift of votes,

under our electoral system, can produce quite disproportionate results, the Labour Party will gain a solid majority at the following election, unless the Liberal Party regains strength, and the electoral system is reformed.

RAMSAY MUIR.

JAPAN MOVES FORWARD

By O. M. GREEN

IN one month Japan has virtually established a protectorate over a province of North China containing 32,000,000 people, and just twice as large as England and Wales, and over another one much larger in Inner Mongolia : in neither will any Chinese official henceforward function, nor Chinese troops be stationed, without Japan's permission. No diplomatic casuistry can cover up this flagrant violation of the Nine-Power Treaty : you cannot bludgeon your way into another country to dictate how a large piece of it shall be administered, and maintain any pretence of respecting that country's 'sovereignty and territorial integrity.' Even those who held that Japan 'had a case' in Manchuria are shocked. But not a voice has been raised in protest.

To begin with a brief recapitulation of events. Towards the end of last January a sharp encounter between Chinese and Japanese forces took place on the borders of Jehol (the south-west province of Manchukuo) and Chahar, almost due north of Peking. Both sides, of course, accused the other, and the exact state of affairs has never been made known.

The outburst died down almost as quickly as it had flared up, and it was announced that negotiations would immediately be begun between Nanking and Tokyo for the adjustment of all outstanding differences. This announcement caused great uneasiness in China and abroad. Among other reports, it was asserted that Japan was aiming at turning out the thirty or forty technical advisers lent to China by the League, and all the German officers borrowed by General Chiang Kai-shek for the training of his armies, and replacing them by Japanese. Tokyo denied this, saying that Japan's only purpose was that China should stamp out the remnants of anti-Japanese propaganda and boycott, agree to repay the Nishihara loans

in default since 1918, and settle various commercial and tariff questions. Foreigners in the Far East, however, are convinced that Japan does desire to introduce a number of Japanese advisers in the Nanking Ministries and, most particularly, to get hold of the Inspector-Generalship of Customs, a post always held by a British subject. The counsels of a Japanese adviser, as Manchukuo has shown, are not lightly to be rejected.

On the other hand, Mr. Hirota, an exceptionally able and resolute Foreign Minister, realises, what the soldiers ignore or deride, that Japan cannot indefinitely go on flouting the world at large in pursuit of mediæval dreams of conquest in Asia. Speaking in the Diet on January 22, Mr. Hirota emphasised that it was far more important for Japan to convince Russia and China that she had no aggressive designs on them than to talk navies with America. In spite of frontier 'incidents' between the Soviet and Manchukuo, Mr. Hirota had already brought about a marked improvement in Russo-Japanese relations; and, as the spring advanced, the two capitals seemed to be moving towards a better understanding. In the middle of May the Japanese Minister in China was raised to the rank of ambassador; and it was further pointed out that this step had actually been decided on some years ago, its fulfilment merely being postponed for the propitious moment that had now arrived.

In a despatch of June 24 *The Times* Tokyo correspondent commented on the remarkable freedom with which Japanese generals, colonels, and majors dictate their demands to the Chinese authorities, entirely disregarding the usual diplomatic channels. Yet more extraordinary was the spectacle of a couple of colonels and a major going to Mr. Hirota to express their displeasure at the elevation of the Japanese Minister in China, even though the Minister of War had given it his approval. Translate this into the terms of Whitehall and Downing Street and imagine the uproar! But the complete independence of the army and navy in the Japanese Constitution, with responsibility to the Emperor and no one else, is well known. In February last the Chinese averred that the army had given Mr. Hirota a time limit until June in which to show definite results. That prophecy has been fulfilled with singular accuracy.

• A particularly intransigent part of the army is the Kuantung command, which since last October has virtually got the control of Manchukuo's affairs into its own hands, ousting the former civilian element. There was undoubtedly a great deal of anti-Japanese agitation in Hopei (formerly Chihli), a reaction against the Japanising tendencies of Nanking. Two pro-Japanese Chinese editors had been murdered at Tientsin, and it was alleged that the Kuomintang organisations and 'blue shirts' (the new Chinese Fascists) were stirring up the bandits in Manchukuo. On May 29 the Kuantung army suddenly launched fourteen demands at General Ho Ying-chin, Nanking's regent in Peking; on June 9, finding the answer to these demands unsatisfactory, they added another six; on June 12 they presented further demands extending the field of operations into Inner Mongolia, where it was alleged that the Chinese General Sung Che-yuan—the only one, be it observed, who had put up any real resistance to the Japanese invasion of Jehol in 1933—had been inciting anti-Japanese disorders in Jehol and in the demilitarised zone south of the Great Wall, and (still more heinous crime) had detained and insulted some Japanese officers, travelling in plain clothes, on some charge of irregularity in their passports.

No one but the few who saw them knows exactly what all the Japanese demands contained. The results have been plain to all. General Yu Hsueh-chung, Governor of Hopei—a most able official, much liked by both Chinese and foreigners—was removed, his three divisions were marched away from Tientsin to Shensi, the Mayor of Tientsin and several other officers resigned, all Kuomintang organisations and 'blue shirts' were suppressed; and in Chahar, General Sung Che-yuan was dismissed, his troops also removed, and Japanese were given freedom to travel about the province as they pleased. There were also apologies, and an undertaking that only officials acceptable to the Japanese should henceforward be appointed. But one notable feature must not be overlooked. The Japanese had always declared that they sought no extension of the demilitarised zone inside the Great Wall, the border of which runs diagonally from a few miles north-east of Peking to a few miles east of Tientsin. But on July 4 came the news that this zone was to be extended

seventy miles westward. The exact delimitation is not yet clear, but it looks uncommonly as if Peking and Tientsin would now come within the zone. Once more, as so often, the thing which Japan strenuously denies to-day is to-morrow the accomplished fact. Another significant event may be noted. On June 2 Mr. Hirota, accompanied by the Premier, obtained an audience with the Emperor, undoubtedly to protest against the army's ruthless upsetting of his policy of conciliation. On June 7 Prince Kan-in, Chief of the General Staff, was also received by the Emperor. Events have shown which counsels prevailed.

One item of news passed unnoticed; yet it gives us a guide to the real cause of the Kuantung army's outbreak and its most immediate purpose. On May 31 Prince Teh Wang, chief leader of the Inner Mongols, arrived in Peking to seek advice: three days before, a Japanese colonel had arrived at Prince Teh's palace by aeroplane to demand ground for an aerodrome, wireless station, site for a branch of the Kuantung army headquarters, and the removal of the Mongol Political Council to a point near Jehol, where it would be more immediately under the Japanese eye. Ten days later Prince Teh went home again, realising that there was no help to be had from either Peking or Nanking. Readers of the *Nineteenth Century and After* will recall the vivid and important description published last February of the revivalist fervour which is shaking all Mongolia.¹ Prince Teh, its leader, is an active, magnetic personality, now in the middle thirties, who speaks Chinese as fluently as Mongol and is well read in the Chinese classics, and drives a motor car as readily as he rides a horse over the Mongolian plains. The Japanese have been watching him closely for some time. The obstacle to reunion among the Mongols is that Outer Mongolia is completely sovietised—almost, indeed, a part of the U.S.S.R.; while not only do the Inner Mongols continue under the governance of their hereditary princes, but about 2,000,000 of them—that is, half the entire Mongol people—live inside the borders of Manchukuo.

When the Emperor Kang Tê was reinstated on the throne of Manchukuo it was generally thought to be only a question of time before the Inner Mongols would spor-

¹ 'Mongolia and Manchukuo,' by Geoffrey Hudson.

ad hoc join him. Their loyalty, as pointed out in the article mentioned above, was always to the Manchu emperors—whom they had helped to conquer China in 1644—never to the Chinese. But in recent months, as the Japanese grip on the administration of Manchukuo has been extended rather than relaxed, the Inner Mongols have tended to turn away from the Japanese connexion, and are now in an uncertain state of mind which the Japanese cannot tolerate.

In conjunction with these events must be noted the rapid advance of Russian influence in Central Asia. Outer Mongolia's condition has already been mentioned. In the past eleven years it has been penetrated through and through with Soviet ideology and material development. In June a telegram from Berlin stated that the Soviet had concluded a new agreement with Outer Mongolia under which it was to supply the Mongols with arms and munitions and be allowed to build a railway through their domains. It is generally allowed that the Russians have treated the Outer Mongols well and wisely, and that the pupils look to their masters for everything. In addition, the Russians have now gained an equal ascendancy in Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan, an extremely fertile region of much natural wealth, which lies at the end of the long horn which Kansu, the most north-westerly province of China, thrusts out between Outer Mongolia and Tibet. In the confused civil wars which rent Sinkiang during 1932–33 the Chinese governor called in the Russians to help him, and he has not been able to get rid of them.

The extreme north-west and west of China are still very much a 'no-man's land.' Here the Central Government's power is at its weakest. Motor roads are being driven through the wastes on which formerly the excruciating springless Peking cart and the mule litter were the only conveyances; and a service of aeroplanes flies regularly to Kansu's ancient frowning capital, Lanchow. But Kansu is an enormous province, riddled with jealous factions and petty generals. In Shensi to the east and Szechuan to the south the Chinese Communist hordes, driven out of Central China by General Chiang Kai-shek, are virulent. There is thus a very real danger that the Soviet's agents may work down through Kansu to join the Reds in Shensi and Szechuan, perhaps to set up a new Red State like that which in Kiangsi

defied Nanking for so many years and in 1930-31 dominated the best parts of the Yangtze Valley.

For Japan this situation has both political and economic importance. Her well-known dread of 'dangerous thoughts'—the Japanese euphemism for Communist propaganda—could never allow her to tolerate the too-near approach of Russian influence. All nationalist movements in Mongolia are preceded by civil war to decide which faction shall impose its will on the rest. There are signs that such a conflict may even now be brewing—for example, the invasion of Inner Mongolia around Lake Boir last January, when the Japanese, metaphorically, dropped everything and ran to drive out the invader. If a civil war did occur, the position of Russia and Japan as patrons of either party would be most delicate. The report of July 6 from Moscow that the Kuantung army was demanding the right to keep a military consul in Outer Mongolia, with a private telegraph wire of his own to Manchukuo and a staff of observers free to move about the country, was sufficiently corroborated by the Japanese Foreign Office on July 24 to show the extreme delicacy of the situation. One can hardly imagine that Japan seeks to dominate Outer Mongolia. That seems too vast a scheme, and the Russians are too firmly established there. It is enough for her to possess Inner Mongolia and to be able to keep watch on the doings of the Outer Mongols.

Economically, it is to be noted that both Chahar and the next province westwards, Suiyuan, are rich in coal and iron, spurs lying out from the fields of Shansi, and that the prairies of Inner Mongolia are ideal ground for sheep and cattle (as Japan and Manchukuo are not), which could thus provide Japan with the wool and hides she must now buy in Australia. Small items of news from the Far East often mean much more than the big. Twice in July it was reported from Hsinking that the South Manchuria Railway, backed by the Kuantung army, was planning a North China industrial development company to assist the northern Chinese authorities to develop the coal of Shansi, oil of Shensi, iron of Chahar, textiles of Tientsin, salt pans of the Gulf of Pechili, and cotton and wheat of Hopei and Shantung. That is looking some distance ahead, but it is quite likely to be true.

The raid on Hopei in early June thus appears as a

preliminary stage to a much more important and pressing undertaking—namely, to ensure a buffer State obedient to Japan's will on her left flank while she carries through her designs on Inner Mongolia. By those who know the Far East best it is not believed that Japan seeks to absorb Hopei into Manchukuo, still less to reinstate the Emperor Kang Tê on the throne of Peking. About a year ago there was some agitation among the young Manchu princes and some of the old Chinese imperialists for such a restoration. It would, of course, be gladly welcomed by the Peking populace for the wealth it would bring; and the northern Chinese have never had any enthusiasm for a republic. But Japan rejected the scheme and would almost certainly do so again. It would involve her in enormous expense and responsibilities, and might even at last arouse America in armed intervention against her. Once more to mention one of those little straws, which may herald the approach of a very great wind, there was a report in June that Marshal Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi was preparing to form a *bloc* of Shansi, Shensi, Hopei, Chahar and Suiyuan, under Japanese patronage. Yen was for many years known as 'the Model Tuchun' of China, administering his province conspicuously well. He helped the Nationalists to conquer Peking in 1928, then quarrelled with and fought against them in 1930, was defeated, and retired to his old province, which he has since governed really as his own kingdom. The scheme now attributed to him is not impossible—after all, he has to live near the Japanese and has no love for Nanking—and it would provide a very convenient 'handling company' for the Kuantung army.

To turn now to China—apparently as hypnotised and hopeless before Japan as a rabbit stalked by a weasel. It is true that the story of Manchukuo has taught China the uselessness of appealing to the League of Nations:

To raise your voice and call for nurse,
Can only make the matter worse.

But the Chinese are past masters in the art of falling back in order to come again with better effect. Was not their capital, in the days of the Sungs, pushed back to Kueilin in the far south? And, paradoxically, the readiness with which Japan's demands in Hopei could be accepted and executed is

the sign of a strong Government, able to enforce its will. Under a weak Government, like one of those of the past eighteen years, there would have been explosions all over China, 'punitive expeditions' against 'the traitors' in Nanking, formation of corps of amazons and 'dare-to-dies,' civil strife galore. None of these things has happened. Even the sentencing of the editor of a Chinese paper at Shanghai to fourteen months' imprisonment for offensive allusions to the Emperor of Japan caused no more than an uproar in court. And the Shanghai mob can be particularly fierce and unruly.

No understanding of recent events nor light on the future is possible unless it is realised that the Chinese Government is very different from what it was three or four years ago. Japanese propagandists are for ever repeating that there is no effective or responsible Government in China. But nothing could be further from the facts. It is true that large regions of the west and north are still outside Nanking's full control, and that in the five southern provinces the final say rests with Canton. Even within Nanking's special area—the nine central provinces—there remains much to be set right, contumacy of local officials to be overcome, illegal taxation to be suppressed, peasantry ruined by civil war and Communism to be set on their feet. The Chinese admit all this frankly; they merely reply by asking us to compare the prestige and achievements of the present Government with those of any of its predecessors. The reply is unanswerable.

The turning-point dates from May 1932, when Nanking made a formal declaration that henceforward it would fight no more civil wars (except against the Communists) but would concentrate on the restoration of its own special sphere and leave other areas temporarily to their own devices. This is in accordance with all the practice of Chinese history. No emperor, founding a new dynasty, ever conquered all China at once: he began in one province and gradually extended his authority. In 1931 Nanking had appointed a National Economic Council, to take charge of the whole work of restoration, and it obtained a large number of expert advisers from the League of Nations. It is not to be supposed that their work has been faultless. Some of them have had their heads too much in the air, their feet too little on the homely

soil of China. And there is always the inertia of local officials and the deadly custom of 'spoils of office' to hamper reform.

Nevertheless, in spite of repeated disappointments inevitable in so huge a task, the amount of solid work done is truly remarkable: some 30,000 miles of new roads made, along which motor omnibuses trundle, with many a breakdown—but who cares in patient China?—bringing light and a new sense of national community into dark corners; new railways built and old ones repaired; public works started; broad roads driven through ancient rabbit-warrens of cities; electric light installed; aeroplane services flying between north and south, east and west; hospitals built and hygienic campaigns eagerly prosecuted; and a real effort made to balance budgets and cut down the fatal practice of perpetually borrowing for current expenses. Best of all, perhaps, is the revival of Confucian teaching now seen in many places, even in radical Canton. Always in China's history a revival of Confucianism has coincided with national renaissance. It is not for nothing that the Sage's birthday has been put back among festivals to be kept nationally; and the famous 'New Life' movement, with a few additions borrowed from American Methodism, is fundamentally pure Confucianism.

The danger-point is that the whole system depends over-much on the genius and determination of General Chiang Kai-shek. Born in Chêkiang, at the mouth of the Yangtze, in 1886, he was trained as a soldier at Paotingfu and in Japan. He joined himself to Dr. Sun Yat-sen at an early stage, was eventually sent by him to study military tactics in Moscow, where he probably learnt also his detestation of Bolshevism, and returned to lead the Nationalist armies from Canton to the Yangtze in 1926. It was he who subsequently took the lead in driving out the Russians, and he has undoubtedly been largely responsible for ridding the Nanking Government of its early extravagances and clumsy complications. A soldier of very high order, he also has the makings of a real statesman. He has the rare gift of sticking to one purpose at a time, of keeping his own counsel; and what he promises to do he does to the utmost of his power. He has been repeatedly accused of being pro-Japanese, the truth being that he knows that China is powerless to fight Japan and that her real enemies are within. As he tells his fellow-country-

men, China cannot resist external aggression until she has set her own house in order. There can be no doubt that he gave way to Japan in Hopei and Chahar at once, because he knew that impotent resistance would only make things worse, and because he is primarily intent on the resuscitation of those parts of China which he can control.

It is the fixed belief of the Chinese that Japan will never let them alone to make an orderly and peaceful China. In all their civil wars, they say, there have been Japanese intriguers on both sides. These statements cannot altogether be rejected. When on June 28 some rebel troops, revolting against the surrender to Japan, unsuccessfully attacked Peking, Japanese were captured among them; and the rebel Chinese are stated to have been armed with Japanese rifles and machine-guns. Still more suspicious was the mutiny and flight from Canton, on June 15, of the cruisers *Haichi* and *Haisben*, which then took refuge in Hongkong and subsequently passed over to Nanking. The Chinese explanation is—Japanese intrigue, the purpose of the plot being to make strife between Canton and Nanking. It is certainly a curious coincidence that, only two or three days before the cruisers' flight, General Chan Chai-tong, the uncrowned King of Canton, had spontaneously made a public, fervent declaration of loyalty to Nanking, pledging himself to support her in the dark days that had befallen.

More than in most countries, the foreign policy of Japan has to be interpreted in the light of her internal conditions. Her industrial development and the immense wealth garnered by her merchants and financiers during the World War have brought her to a crisis at least as great as that of the Meiji revolution in 1868—on the one side the old samurai class of army and navy, on the other the *narikin* (the *nouveaux riches*). The struggle is complicated by the perpetually neglected and bankrupt state of the peasantry, the ineptitude (to use a mild word) of the Diet, the numbers of students who can find no work to repay the cost of their college training, the decay of family authority among youths and girls who flock to the factories of Osaka and Nagoya, the almost fanatic Japanese patriotism, which can even prompt the attempted assassination of an editor for daring to suggest the visit of an American baseball team to Japan, the popular resentment against the

West, which in Japanese eyes has ever been the oppressor and has no rightful place in Asia.

Finance causes anxiety. The current budget amounts to the huge total of 2,190,644,000 yen, of which 750,357,000 yen must be met by borrowing; and next year the navy is demanding an additional 170,000,000 yen. In June Mr. Takahashi, the Finance Minister, told the National Policy Council plainly that this could not go on; new loans are becoming more and more difficult to place.

A fact of great importance was the dismissal on July 16 of General Mazaki, one of the three biggest men in the Japanese army, followed by the supersession of hundreds of 'politically minded' officers who were the mainspring of the Chauvinist movement in North China. This purge has been wholeheartedly welcomed by the Japanese Press as a triumph for the moderates, which ought to affect Japan's foreign policy.

It may be that the mission to China of Sir Frederick Leith Ross, the British Treasury expert, may open up a solution of all the problems here noted. He goes ostensibly to see in what way China can be helped out of the financial troubles into which America's silver-buying has plunged her. But finance and politics can never be dis severed in China, and by wise diplomacy the mission might bring healing to many sores. The greatest obstacle to harmony in the Far East is suspicion—by Japan of the West, of the West and China of Japan. Till that is swept away there can be no peace. Sir Frederick Leith Ross's mission is meant to show that Great Britain intends to take that part in the Far East to which her great interests there entitle her, as also to put heart into the Chinese. But equally it will be his duty to convince the Japanese that we have no idea of bolstering up China against them or denying their legitimate interests. To bring Japan into peaceful co-operation for the general welfare of the Far East is the only practical course. China, given a fair chance, will 'make good.' And a united China will never be a bellicose China, but a friendly people in whose enormous markets there will be room for all.

O. M. GREEN.

KASHMIR : PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

By MRS. LORIMER

THE lovely valley of Kashmir, roughly 100 miles in length and 60 in width, contains some of the most fertile land on earth, and has long been famed for its unrivalled beauty. It forms an irregular ellipse lying over 5000 feet above sea level, ringed in by mighty mountain ranges. The great snow-clad barrier of the Pír Panjál, 10,000 to 15,000 feet, separates Kashmir from the plains of India, while on the north rise the wild and barren outliers of the Hindu Kush and Karakoram, over which peep the snows of such great peaks as Haramuk and Nanga Parhat. Through the valley meander the great Jhelum and its tributary waters, widening into the Wular and several minor lakes. The rich green fields of rice and wheat and maize are diversified in season by stretches of golden mustard or purple saffron, by rich orchards laden with blossom or with fruit, and, above all, by stately avenues of poplar, graceful groves of willow, and groups of spreading *chenárs*—those glorious plane trees which Kashmir owes to the bounty and foresight of the Mogul emperors of India who made Kashmir their favourite recreation ground. They had learnt from Persia a love of grass lawns and formal gardens, with flowers and playing fountains and summer-houses built over running streams. And still, after 300 years, the grounds of the Bāgh i Nishát and Shalimár keep green the memory of Jehángir and his immortal Núr Mahal.

In striking contrast to India, Kashmir has been jealous of her past and diligent in recording it, and the historian has stores of native material for the basis of his research. The early Hindu dynasties who held sway until the middle of the fourteenth century left their records not only on the written page but in magnificent stone temples, which not all the iconoclastic zeal of their Muhammadan successors was able

wholly to blot out. There remain lovely ruins of cut limestone, dating from the third to the eighth century, to demonstrate that the ancient Kashmiris fully deserved the name by which the Indians knew them—‘The Architects.’ Their architecture is their own, entirely distinct from the Buddhist and Hindu architecture of India, and to a Western eye equally impressive and incomparably more beautiful. It owes to Greek influence its pediments, its fluted columns with base and shaft and capital—learnt, probably, from the Bactrian Greeks of Kábul. The priceless possession of plentiful timber, as well as stone, permitted the Kashmiris to adapt Greek forms to Buddhist and Hindu ritual and to a climate of winter rain and snow. Their pillars were spaced further apart than the Greek, their pediments pitched higher and their temples crowned with pyramidal roofs tapering to a single lotus blossom, while the interior walls were enriched with deep reliefs. Here their multifarious deities were depicted : the three-faced eight-armed Vishnu, the river goddess Ganga, with her crocodile and the rest, along with many real-life figures of lovers in balconies, ascetics, huntsmen and dancing girls, many rich designs of bird and beast and flower, interwoven with geometric patterns of great intricacy and beauty. Much excavation and restoration has been done under the direction of Sir John Marshall and his worthy Kashmir disciple, Mr. Ram Chandra Kak, author of *The Ancient Monuments of Kashmir*. The best preserved of these stone temples are at Awantipura and Martand, both within easy distance of Srinagar.

Martand—vulgarly pronounced ‘Mutton’ by the Kashmiri of to-day—stands on a fine bluff 200 or 300 feet above the valley, commanding one of the most extensive and finest views in Kashmir. The full length of the rich valley is spread out below and the horizon closed by the serrated snows of the Pír Panjál. On this magnificent site, in the first half of the fifth century, King Ranaditya built his sacred Temple of the Sun—a massive rectangle 63 by 36 feet with blue limestone walls 9 feet thick. The walls are formed of gigantic finely-dressed blocks of stone, lightly mortared and held by iron clamps, the whole surface being covered with sculptured reliefs. No windows or skylights marred the stern solidity of the temple ; the light from the entrance door sufficed.

By a stately flight of steps the worshipper ascended to a highly decorated chamber with a trefoil-headed niche containing a bust of the Hindu triad, while on the flanks of the entrance and on each of the side doors similar niches enshrined statues of other deities. Some two centuries later the great Kashmir conqueror Lalataditya enclosed the temple with a great wall 90 by 56 yards, round the inside of which a lovely cloister ran, whose shallow-fluted columns separated rows of trefoil-headed shrines. The number of columns was carefully calculated: 84 is a sacred number to the Hindus, representing the seven days of the week multiplied by the twelve signs of the zodiac. Three immense gateways, nearly as massive as the temple itself, gave ingress and egress to and from the court.

The temple of Siva at Awantipura is in all essentials a smaller version of Martand, and much of its detail is better preserved; but while these are the two outstanding remains of early Kashmir architecture, there are a round dozen or more of smaller ruins which well repay attention and have many unique features of their own. Mr. Kak's excavations of the site of Herwán have brought to light another style of Buddhist architecture immensely more primitive and yet apparently contemporary with the dressed-stone buildings of Martand. These are temples whose mud walls are beautifully faced with a diaper of pebbles, or of smooth boulder slabs framed in a setting of pebbles and small stones, their floors paved with self-coloured baked tiles bearing interesting reliefs and arranged in ingenious mosaic designs. India has, as yet, shown no other examples of this primitive yet beautiful building.

With the inexhaustible supplies of water brought down by mountain torrents from the melting snows, the rich alluvial soil of the valley and its admirable climate, almost any crop will thrive; but the Kashmiri's heart is set on rice. Of this he grows no less than fifty-three varieties, and possesses an inherited genius for its cultivation that leaves him—as no less an authority than Sir Walter Lawrence has testified—nothing to learn in the matter. The rice fields are gently terraced and banked with low ridges of mud to retain the carefully-controlled flooding. After several ploughings, manure is carried in baskets from the byres, and then the

seed is sown either broadcast or in 'nurseries.' When the shoots are about 2 inches high the laborious process of *kbushāba* begins. The rice seedlings are gathered in bundles, all weeds removed (and none but the eagle eye of a Kashmiri, trained to the business almost from the cradle, could at this stage detect grass from grain or this year's rice from the self-sown shoots of last year's crop, reckoned the most deadly weed of all), and every inch of soil diligently kneaded with foot and hand. When the porridge-like soil is judged ready, the seedlings are gently replanted in groups of three or five with a cushion of well-worked mud round the roots. No less than three times—feet and hands working below water, back bent double under a pitiless sun—the rice-grower painstakingly repeats this weary process. At length, unless untimely rain or snow at harvest-time robs him of his reward, a rich crop is reaped—reaped by hand and carried high on head or shoulder to the threshing floor.

Meantime the orchard and garden claim attention. Enough fruit and vegetables are grown to serve for winter use as well as present need. The women help in field and garden, in carrying manure and harvest to and fro. In addition, they bear the ever-recurring burden of the annual baby, and the endless daily task of husking the rice that is the family's staple food. Standing near the door of every house is the great mortar, hollowed either from stone or tree stump. Gripping the trunk of a small hawthorn tree as pestle, the woman rises on her toes and brings all the weight of her body down upon the grain. Again and yet again, till that batch of rice can be scooped into the winnowing-tray, and presently the ground all round is carpeted with fresh, clean chaff. Not until this process has been thrice repeated is the rice considered ready for the pot. In the intervals there are the cows to be milked, the butter to be made, the ducks and hens and last couple of babies to be tended. The preceding children contentedly and proudly bear a hand in whatever is going forward, and it is a pleasant sight to see them wielding their tiny poles, turn and turn about, as they help with the rice-pounding, or to watch toddlers driving the cows out to graze, or little girls with baskets balanced on their heads following their father to the fields. There is no need for kindergartens or Montessori schools

to teach the Kashmiri infant the co-ordination of hand and eye.

The peasant's house stands picturesquely amidst its trees and gardens, with wild iris clothing every vacant space. It is a three-tier building. Below are the byres, where cattle, sheep and goats are kraaled in winter to provide the treasured manure. Above are the living quarters, pleasantly if unhygienically heated by the exhalations of the beasts below, and scrupulously unventilated. In the attic triangle of the roof, open at both ends to the air, the winter fodder of straw and dried leaves is stored, while the earthen roof, bearing a gay crop of grass and wild flowers, serves also to dry the vegetables and fruit. When winter comes to bring a welcome respite from field work it gives no opportunity for idleness; the home-grown cotton and wool are spun and woven into clothing and blankets, and osier withes are plaited into the innumerable baskets which, in the absence of carts and wheelbarrows, are the only means of conveyance. Strenuous and unending as is the peasant's work, however, it is not performed under the strain and duress of factory clockings in and out. Any spare moment that can be snatched is spent prostrate, sleeping in the shade. The happy faces of the people, young and old, their ready laughter, their willing co-operation, give the impression that they are nearer the secret of true happiness than many more sophisticated folk.

Another humble class whose lives seem to be extremely satisfying are the boat-dwellers. All day long, up and down the Jhelum and its adjacent waterways, ply the laden barges that do the internal carrying trade of Kashmir. Grain, timber, hay, bricks or stone or sand are loaded in the centre. Men and women pass to and fro along the sides poling the heavy craft along, and often keeping time with a rhythmic chant. At the rear is the little hutch where the family sleep and cook and shelter. Behind it sits an old man, a child, or a woman with her baby at the breast, skilfully manipulating the heavy paddle that serves as tiller. On the roof-tree of the hutch, on the top of the load, children and infants play about, avoiding death by drowning with hereditary skill. On the open end stands the family huddle-bubble, the inevitable mortar, the tea-pot or samovar, beside which one

or another will be stretched asleep till the turn for work has come again.

The idyllic life suggested by such sights and sounds has not been the Kashmiri's lot in the past. Until very recently he has been the helpless victim of flood and famine and pestilence, and the prey of human oppressors even more pitiless. In the bad old days it was assumed as an axiom that the cultivator existed only to be exploited. One of the early native Hindu kings laid it down in the eighth century that the country people must be oppressed and their style of living kept low lest the people of the town should suffer!

The city of Srinagar, with its large population of artists and craftsmen who ministered to the luxury of the great (not to mention its professional paupers), expected and received an ample supply of cheap grain, whatever might be the hardships of the peasantry. Hordes of insatiable officials and tax-collectors batted on the luckless tiller of the soil, though little enough of what they squeezed from him found its legitimate way into the coffers of the State. It is estimated that under the Sikh domination nine-tenths of all agricultural produce was extorted, and the peasant was left to rear his family in semi-starvation on the coarsest tenth of his own crops; while he was forbidden to store any reserves, forbidden even to reap his fields, without permission, however much they might be threatened by approaching rain. Things began to improve under the relatively enlightened rule of the latest of Kashmir's conquerors, the Dogras; and yet when two successive bad harvests occurred in 1878 and 1879 the famine that ensued was the worst in all the tragic history of Kashmir. True, as soon as he realised his subjects' plight (which was not at once), the Maharajah Ranbir Singh did all that one man could by importing rice from India, over 200 miles of roadless mountain country, at his own expense. But, like most Oriental despots, he had insufficient control over his underlings, who callously made their fortunes out of his relief measures and left the peasant to a hideous fate. This famine is believed to have cost the lives of three-fifths of the entire population, amid scenes of horror and misery better imagined than described.

A reasoned and organised attempt to save the cultivator from his oppressors was made by the late Maharajah Pratab

Singh when he authorised Sir William Lawrence, a humane and experienced administrator lent by the Government of India, to make a survey of the valley and introduce a lenient and equitable cash revenue payment instead of the payment in kind, which lent itself to every conceivable extortion. Lawrence spent six years studying every inch of the valley, and has left a work of permanent historic value and human interest in his *Valley of Kashmir*. He introduced for the first time the conception of honesty into the public services of Kashmir, and insisted on revenue officials receiving adequate pay instead of being turned loose to plunder. After the Land Settlement the peasant's burden was immensely lightened, and he enjoyed a great measure of security in spite of the intrusion of a new parasite—the money-lender. The post-war slump, however, and the general depression of world trade that followed, did not leave Kashmir unscathed, and the problem of maintaining cheap supplies for the city without the oppression of the cultivator became acute in 1921. Various experiments in co-operative credit, etc., were tried without success, and for a time the old, evil custom of collection in kind was resorted to. Again the Maharajah called an experienced Indian administrator to his aid, and to Sir Bertrand Glancy belongs the credit of devising, in consultation with the Kashmir Government, a new method. The experiment was unique and daring, and has proved as brilliantly successful as it deserved to be.

The Kashmir Valley Food Control Department was established in 1921 under the then heir-apparent, Sir Hari Singh, who four years later succeeded his uncle as Maharajah, and continues to give the department his whole-hearted support. Under the new system the collection of revenue in kind is completely and for ever abolished. In return all rice-growers are asked to part with one-eighth of their crops at a generous price—twice the rate at which the rice is valued for purposes of revenue assessment. They are not only paid for this, but paid in advance (free of interest) in two instalments—so timed that ready money is put into the cultivator's hand just at the moment when his revenue payments fall due, thus relieving him of any necessity to have recourse to the money-lender.

The department was happy in finding a modern Joseph

for its director in the person of Captain Wreford, a young officer trained in the Supply and Transport Department of the Government of India, who had already had experience of conditions in Kashmir. He has organised the collection and storage of the grain and its distribution by ration tickets to the householders of Srinagar with such minute care and wisdom, with so many checks and counter-checks, that speculation and profiteering are well-nigh impossible. Where any shadow of corruption is detected, the offender is immediately and ruthlessly dismissed. All employees of the department are generously paid, and receive in addition handsome bonuses, so that a position is not lightly forfeited. The ledgers and accounts are made up daily and continuously audited, with the result that the slightest discrepancy is at once manifest; and all transactions, weighings out or in, cash payments, etc., are made in the open in front of responsible witnesses.

A visit to the State granaries is a most refreshing experience. Forty great containers, each capable of holding close on 400 tons, are dotted about in an ex-royal garden with grass walks and stately trees and rows of willows. They are built of local wood, to a locally-evolved design, by local workmen, and fit into the landscape as no ferro-concrete silos could. So perfect are the arrangements for turnover of stocks, extermination of vermin, etc., that the total loss from all causes is less than two-thirds per cent. With further grain stores in the city, the department is able to hold stores of over 22,000 tons, which amply guarantee the valley against fear of famine, and help to stabilise general prices in times of scarcity. In spite of the liberal wages paid to its large army of employees, the department has been from the first entirely self-supporting, and has even made an average profit of 5 per cent. per annum over the twelve years of its existence. When due reserves have been built up to meet every possible emergency, the entire balance is expended on works of public utility, the substitution of metalled roads for muddy lanes, and the improvement of waterside approaches.

The peasant's lot has not only been lightened by such administrative improvements, but by an excellent State medical service, inaugurated by the late Maharajah and steadily advancing under the direction of its two successive British

directors, Colonel Hugo and Colonel Millar, both of the Indian Medical Service. The people prove intelligently responsive to the benefits of inoculation and vaccination, which have greatly lessened the virulence of the recurrent outbreaks of plague, cholera and small-pox which used to rage unchecked; while ideas of personal cleanliness and of sanitation are gradually, if slowly, penetrating a population notorious for its carelessness in such matters. The Church Missionary Hospital and Schools gave an honourable lead to the State in this form of education; and Kashmir's hope of producing native officials with high principles and standards of integrity rests mainly on the 'Biscoe Boys,' trained in the mission schools to Boy Scout ideals of hard work and disinterested public service. Under an autocracy, so relatively enlightened and benevolent, the Kashmiri's life is now anything but an unhappy one; and it is natural to inquire why the Maharajah's throne should have rocked under the political disturbances of 1931, which were appeased only by the promise that the ruler would 'endeavour in the near future to associate his people with himself in the legislative and administrative functions of the State.'

Jammu and Kashmir is in area the largest of the Indian States; its population is 3,500,000, 77 per cent. of whom are Muhammadans, engaged for the most part in agriculture. Since the middle of the fourteenth century, when its native Hindu princes were driven out by the Muhammadan sultans, Kashmir has been continuously subject to foreign, autocratic rule—Mogul, Pathan, Sikh succeeding each other down the centuries, each more oppressive than the last. Finally, nearly 100 years ago the great Guláb Singh, the Dogra monarch of Jammu, with the consent of the Government of India, made himself ruler of the joint State of Jammu and Kashmir. The present Hindu (Dogra) dynasty compares, as the above pages have indicated, most favourably with its predecessors, and has turned an increasingly sympathetic ear to the claims of its Muhammadan subjects.

This very security from oppression, however, the increase of education, the rise in the standard of living, all tended to promote political self-consciousness. This was fostered by the example of India's progress towards self-government, and unscrupulous agitators within and without the State

did not hesitate to exploit the situation for their own ends.

A contributory factor must not be ignored. As long as trade was booming the Muslims were prosperous and had no wish to exchange their own occupations for Government employment. Evil days came with the post-war slump, and they woke up to the fact that the Hindus had a practical monopoly of well-paid posts. It was not unnatural that they should demand a fair share of the spoils. Before approaching the thorny task of constitution-making the Maharajah wisely accepted the establishment of an impartial Commission to inquire into the genuine grievances of his Muhammadan subjects. The Commission, under the chairmanship of Sir Bertrand Glancy (the same distinguished and experienced Indian civil servant already mentioned), collected evidence and laid bare real hardships of many kinds, mainly relating to questions of land and revenue, the secularisation of mosques, and the methods of appointment and promotion in the State services. Promptly and generously these grievances were tackled, the Maharajah in many cases going beyond the findings of the Commission and satisfying all informed observers that the Muslim population is getting fair play.

The Constitution was the next thing to consider. The extremists demanded that since 77 per cent. of the population were Muhammadan, therefore 77 per cent. of all seats in the future Assembly and 77 per cent. of all Government posts should be immediately and at once allotted to their co-religionists. This was, of course, a *reductio ad absurdum* of the principle of counting heads without regard to their contents.

The great majority of the Muhammadan population are illiterate peasants, and the level of education among such Muhammadans as are not illiterate is far lower than that prevailing among the Hindus. If the request had been literally granted, it would have meant that 1 in every 32 literate Muslims would hold a Government post, as against 1 in every 450 literate Hindus. The root grievance of the Muhammadans is one which only they themselves can remedy—their own low educational standards. The State is giving every assistance in its power by founding new schools and encouraging education to enable them to qualify for a

larger measure of employment. Meantime the public services have been drastically overhauled and reorganised. Seniority and merit are now the sole qualifications for appointment and promotion, and (as far as it is humanly possibly to do so) 'influence' is ruled out. Far from discrimination being exercised against Muhammadans, the Muslim is now preferred—not, one fears, without some injustice to the Hindu—and in all fresh recruitment every effort is being made to enlist all available Muhammadans.

As soon as these urgent matters had been disposed of, a Conference was called (again under the presidency of Sir Bertrand Glancy) to study the question of constitutional reform. General lines were laid down and suggestions made for the framework of the new Constitution. The Maharajah then took the definite step of appointing a Franchise Committee, consisting of four able and representative members (one Hindu, one Muhammadan, one Sikh, and one Englishman). This is not the place to recapitulate the details of the Constitution which have already been before the public, but a few notes on important points which might escape the uninitiated reader may not be amiss.

Responsibility for government still rests—as for some time it clearly must—with His Highness the Maharajah and the Ministers appointed by him, but the creation of a Representative Assembly redeems the promise that his people should be associated with him in the government. The fact must not be forgotten that the Kashmiri is entirely devoid of political experience and tradition. The chief value of the Assembly will be that it provides him with the opportunity of acquiring these as a stepping-stone to enlarged powers. It will function first and foremost as a training-ground for the politicians and statesmen of the future. In British India it was considered prudent that the Legislative Assembly should have an official majority of thirty-seven to thirty-two, but the Maharajah and his advisers courageously decided in favour of an unofficial majority.

The Jammu and Kashmir Assembly is to consist of seventy-five members, only twelve of whom will be officials. Since, however, the majority of members will be wholly inexperienced, the powers of the Assembly will at first be administrative only. Executive power and the control of

finance will rest with the Council of Ministers. The influence of the Assembly on these matters, however, though indirect, will nevertheless be considerable. It is given the fullest powers of debate and discussion, of asking questions and passing resolutions. The full light of publicity will thus be turned on every action of the Ministers, and it is clear that no Government could stand out for long against wise and reasoned criticism.

Indian experience has shown that questions may easily be monopolised by insincere and windy question-mongers. A wise provision allots, therefore, to each member the right to ask one question only per day. If any member decides not to avail himself of his right, the 'vacant' question is to be balloted for; but in no circumstances may one member ask more than three questions in one day. Members of the Assembly are not to draw salaries, but will receive an allowance of so much for every day's attendance, plus their actual travelling expenses. To forestall the temptation—which Indian experience has shown to be irresistible—wilfully to prolong the session, a maximum total allowance is fixed, and excess days will not be paid for.

The practical questions confronting the Franchise Committee were many and intricate. The Hindu community is far from being homogeneous: it comprises the land-owning aristocrats; the Kashmir *pundits*; the Kashmir traders, non-Kashmiri by origin, and hence styled 'domiciled Hindus'; the Rajputs and Dogras of Jammu; the peasant Méghs, technically reckoned among the depressed classes, and very probably the survivors of an aboriginal race, some of whom account themselves Hindu and some not; finally, the inevitable vocationally-depressed classes.

The Muslim community is no less heterogeneous: the Sunnis, who fall into two hostile factions (whose differences at times provoke serious rioting); the Shiah, who love the Sunnis much as the Greek Catholic loves the Roman; the Chibs, a Dogra tribe converted to Islam; the Muslim tribes of Mirpur and Poonch, who are, again, curiously divided into two camps—first, the cultivators proper who have remained faithful to their husbandry, and secondly, the landless adventurers who have left their homes to take service in the British Army.

Further afield, amongst the mountain fringes of Kashmir proper, are the lamaistic Buddhists of Ladakh and the simple hillmen of the Gilgit Agency, who speak four or five distinct languages and, though all Muhammadans, are divided into Sunnis, Shiahhs and Maulais (or Ismailis, the followers of the Agha Khan).

It was clear from the first that, while certain groups and communities were sufficiently homogeneous and concentrated to be able to exercise a vote, some principle other than election must be brought into play if scattered and small minorities were to be at all fairly represented. Someone, in fact, must nominate a representative for them. The Assembly of seventy-five consists, therefore, of thirty-three elected members only (twenty-one Muslim, ten Hindu, and two Sikh); twelve official members; fourteen members nominated by the Maharajah to safeguard the rights and interests of the minorities indicated above; and, lastly, sixteen State councillors. These last (of whom eight will be Hindus, seven Mussulmans, and one a Sikh) will be members of the landed aristocracy, whose knowledge, influence and prestige will give stability and dignity to the Assembly, and who, instead of being segregated in an Upper House, will be brought into personal contact with their humbler fellow-countrymen and learn at first hand to understand and sympathise with the problems and conditions of their life. They will hold office for four and a half years, whereas the other members will hold office only for three, the lifetime of one Assembly. In this way they will supply an element of continuity which the inexperienced Assembly will greatly need.

The Franchise Committee had the responsible task of drawing up rules of procedure for the Council of Ministers, who will work as a team comparable to the British Cabinet, for the conduct of the Assembly and of the elections. In all this pioneer work it was fortunate in being able to avail itself of the knowledge and wisdom of its English member, Sir Ivo Elliott, who brought with him a wide experience acquired during ten years of working in Indian Councils both before and after the Reforms.

Every detail has been carefully worked out to meet the individual conditions of Kashmir and the needs of an elec-

torate the bulk of whom can neither read nor write. The first general basis of the right to vote is a property qualification. In rural areas every landowner who pays 30s. a year land tax is entitled to a vote, and in the towns every owner of a house worth £45—from which it may be deduced that house properties are cheaper and land taxes lower than in England. This is calculated to yield a relatively small number of voters in the scattered country districts and a relatively large number in urban areas where political consciousness is more developed. In Srinagar, for instance, there will be some 24,000 voters out of 40,000 adult males. That no small village may be shut out from a share in the elections, an *ex-officio* vote has, however, been awarded to every village headman and to every recognised religious teacher—whether the *pujāri* of the temple, the *qāzi* or *imām* of the mosque, or the Christian padre of whatever Church. Education is definitely encouraged by the award of a vote to every school-master, to every person who has passed the ‘middle school,’ to every practising lawyer and doctor, whether the latter is qualified on European lines or is a *vaid* working in the tradition of Sanskrit medicine or a *hakīm* faithful to the precepts of Greek therapy.

The first elections were held in September 1934, and the first session of the Assembly met in the following October. The smoothness with which the polling was carried out, the lack of political disturbance at the elections, the readiness of candidates to stand and the eagerness of voters to vote, the dignity of the subsequent debates in the Assembly, all were a surprise to the most optimistic, and bore eloquent testimony to Sir Ivo Elliott’s practical wisdom and constructive foresight. All lovers of Kashmir and of her industrious and gifted people will sincerely hope that the good omens of this first meeting of the Maharajah with his people in parliament assembled presage their joint success in government, which has hitherto been the hereditary and exclusive responsibility of the royal house.

E. O. LORIMER.

EDUCATION AT HOME

I. SOME VITAL PROBLEMS IN NATIONAL EDUCATION

By DR. CLOUDESLEY BRERETON

IN the June number ¹ of the *Nineteenth Century and After* Dr. Cyril Norwood raised the important question of breaking down the party-wall that at present debars the elementary pupil from entering the public schools. His supreme argument is the need of preserving national unity.

By proposing to bring the public schools more fully into organic connexion with our national system Dr. Norwood has incidentally raised some of the most pressing problems in education to-day. For there is urgent need in other directions of completing and consolidating our national system, and notably in strengthening and rounding off certain sides of our education, whether by supplying in the ordinary schools more facilities for vocational or technical instruction or by developing to the proper pitch of efficiency those which are already providing technical instruction. In this way alone can we ensure a regular flow through all our organs of education—elementary, secondary, technical, etc.—by completing every stage of the educational bifurcations that exist, and also by providing for the transference within the same stage of ‘misfits’ from one type of education to another, which our present scholarship system does not allow of at the intermediate stage.

Any truly comprehensive system of education must be based on the provision of an adequate number of types of education to suit the diverse talents of the different categories of pupils for which they are intended to cater, so that each individual child may receive the type of education best adapted to develop his innate capability and fit him for the life and calling he is going to follow. Such types, to use Huxley’s

¹ ‘Sons of the Poor and Schools of the Rich.’

arresting phrase, should serve as capacity-catching machines to sort out and select the *élite* of our child population above the termination of the elementary stage which has been fixed at the age of 11 +.

And here the latest theories of psychology should prove extremely helpful in making the selection, as they classify children, broadly speaking, into three main types. At one extremity is the child with what I would call the predominantly abstract type of mind, who can really profit from the ordinary education given in the secondary school and later in the university. This type of child is very common in France and explains the high intellectual level reached by the average *lycéen*. At the other extremity comes the child with a practical bent (far more common in England) who starts from the concrete and learns by doing—thinks, in fact, through his hands: a notable instance is the boy who does nothing in mathematics till he realises they are necessary in electricity or finds mechanics unattractive till he discovers how they arise out of concrete problems and help him to understand all sorts of mechanical contraptions, in which the average boy is normally interested. In both cases the pupil’s attitude to the subject is completely altered. These two types are rarely to be found in absolute purity—they shade off into one another. But, broadly speaking, their existence cannot, I think, be denied by anyone who has reflected on the subject.

Between the two comes a third type of boy, partaking to some extent of the strong points of the two, with outstanding capacity for what I would call social organisation and leadership, possessing, as he does, the imagination one connects with the abstract type and the grasp of reality we attribute to the second type—the boy who gets on with and manages his fellows and who can accept responsibility.² This seems to me precisely the type of boy to whom Dr. Norwood wishes to render the public schools accessible. It is, in fact, from this third type that the big businesses are anxious to recruit those who will later rise to posts of special responsibility.

In considering these three types, I propose to say little more about the third, which Dr. Norwood has already fully

² I am indebted for this information to Professor Hamley, of the British Institute of Education, who has played a considerable part in isolating and defining psychologically this third type.

dealt with. I shall recur later to the first. I propose to deal in this article with the importance of a fuller recognition of the second, or practical, type, which for historical reasons has not been so fully catered for as the other two types. What is needed for such pupils is a larger element of technical instruction, which is indispensable if they are fully to develop their particular talents and also find suitable jobs when they leave school.

The reasons for this comparative neglect are simple. The two dominant influences in English education, to speak in headlines, have been, first, the academic, which, if one goes far enough back, was religious, and indeed Continental, and led to the founding of our great public schools and ancient grammar schools, and in recent times of our secondary schools. The second dominant influence, which at the outset was mainly concerned with popular education, was that of the established Church, which led to the foundation of the charity schools in the eighteenth century and the growth of parish elementary schools in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, while, working alongside with the Church, though with somewhat different ideals, must be coupled the influence of certain lay enthusiasts for popular education largely inspired by the ideas of the French Revolution—Whitbread, Brougham and, later, Forster. The combined efforts of these two forces led to the passing of the Act of 1870. It imposed on the population a complete system of elementary education which, partly because it was rigidly compulsory, was for many years a matter of indifference, and in some cases of downright hostility, among a large portion of the population. It was only as a result of the war that the value of education was really accepted wholeheartedly by the mass of the English people.

The need for technical education only began to make itself felt later, partly through the decay of apprenticeship and still more under the stimulus of German competition. When technical education started in the nineties of the last century it was looked on coldly by the 'academics' and enthusiasts alike, being regarded with contempt by the one and with distrust by the other. Unhelped by either, it began in the crudest fashion. It was also held back in its preliminary stages by the vital necessity of organising our

secondary education. But it has made great strides since, especially in the higher stages of technology and in the evening schools. There is still, however, much to be done in the intermediate stages, in which its full development is threatened, the weak link in the chain being the so-called central schools. This is largely because its true function in this particular stage is still imperfectly apprehended by the public and because the further progress of these schools is directly threatened by a popular movement towards free secondary education, to which I will recur later.

But before dealing with the problem of the central school it is essential to get a clear idea of what technical instruction means in order to see the extent to which it should enter into education in its various stages from the elementary to the university. Complete education should be a preparation not only for life but for livelihood. It should aim not only at the development of the individual as a personality and a citizen, but also as a wage-earner. Technical instruction may mean, therefore, a more or less distinct bias to the ordinary subjects in the curricula—history, geography, etc.—or the study of the more distinctly technological subjects—the practical arts and crafts, business methods, shorthand, typewriting, and, on a higher level, engineering, economics, statistics, etc.

The necessity of some preparation for livelihood has been obscured by the ideal of general education as given in the elementary and secondary school. I am convinced that the vocational element in primary schools will have in the future to be accorded greater recognition if the school age is raised, particularly in the last year. And if the day continuation schools are re-established on a large scale, vocational training must have an important place. At the same time the general education of such pupils must be continued, and this applies with equal force to the trade and junior technical schools, in which the technical element is necessarily greater. We do not want an education that prepares mere hewers of wood and drawers of water.

The need of technical instruction in the secondary schools has been further masked by the fact that, leaving out those who proceed to the university, these schools do largely give to the bulk of the pupils who enter the vast army of black-

coated workers (typists, clerks, bank clerks, etc.) a substantial preparation in English (including spelling and grammar), mathematics and languages—the things, in fact, necessary to their future calling, especially as these pupils are able to complete their professional education in the evening schools, which provide instruction not only in business methods, shorthand and typewriting, and foreign correspondence, but also classes in preparation for the various examinations which give the right of entry to insurance, auctioneering, secretariats, the lower Civil Service, etc.

Yet even in the secondary schools themselves the need of commercial classes is being increasingly recognised, whether for pupils entering the lower walks of commerce or for those who have passed the school certificate and aspire to enter the higher grades. The secondary schools, however, remain predominantly abstract and academic in their outlook, owing to their close attachment to the university, as their teachers are largely imbued with its ideals, and their hands are largely tied by the requirements of the school certificate in its present form. No wonder, then, that they are still insufficiently interested in the vast field of applied science. In any case, for the pupil who learns by doing, and thinks through his hands, there is still too little scope for development in these schools. Such pupils are at a disadvantage from the outset; they are confronted at the beginning of their secondary career, as Mr. Hards, with the wide experience of a Board of Education inspector, has pointed out, with four or five absolutely new subjects, most of them more or less abstract—formal chemistry, physics, algebra, geometry, and a modern language. No wonder many of them fall by the way. Actually, a certain number of these scholarship children, as may be seen by an article in the *Education Outlook* under the suggestive title 'Forced Rhubarb,' have been put through so severe a training for the scholarship that they 'go off' in alarming fashion and never recover.³ Moreover, a third of the pupils in the schools never

³ Probably some deserving children fail to get scholarships. The largest group of candidates is naturally on the border-line between success and failure. But no examination machine is perfect; while as for 'intelligence tests,' as at present organised they do not sufficiently test the constructional ability of the pupil, whether abstract or practical—I mean in the reproduction or working out of a mental process, in the composition of an essay, or in the construction of a piece of handwork.

reach the school certificate, while a third of those who take the examination fail and many only succeed—as may be seen from the inquiry of the Board's inspectors into the working of the certificate—by the charity of the examiners. This, of course, is no reflection on the schools and their staffs; the fault lies with the examination and the material with which they have to deal. The secondary schools have clearly reached saturation point as far as the recruitment of pupils of the abstract type of mind are concerned; and I say this without minimising the great services these schools render in fostering the civic spirit as manifested by the *esprit de corps* they develop in their pupils. As one who is a graduate of two universities and a member of a third, I do not think I am likely to minimise this all-important part of their work. But it is only fair to state that *esprit de corps* is not the monopoly of the secondary schools. It has permeated to a considerable degree the central schools and also many of the elementary schools. Even in the universities this need for more direct preparation for livelihood is being felt, as instanced by Mr. Ramsbotham's recent plea to the universities to modernise, where necessary, their foreign language courses for those who are going into teaching; he might have also added those who are going into the higher walks of business, public life, or the Civil Service. The mediæval university, with its training for the Church, law, and medicine, provided a complete training for livelihood. The modern university, in spite of its technical developments, has not always sufficiently considered its responsibilities for the future career of its *alumni* on the arts side.

I now come to central schools, into which have hitherto been drafted the pupils from the elementary schools after the secondary scholarship children have been skimmed off, the age of entry being 11+. Their origins go back to the higher primary schools, which were declared illegal by the celebrated Cockerton judgment of 1900. But this did not abolish the need for such schools, and in 1908 an inquiry in London showed the urgent necessity of providing an intermediate type of education for those who left, or should leave, the elementary school at 11+ which would equip them partly with a wider culture and partly with a training of a pre-apprenticeship type which would be of advantage in

technical and commercial pursuits. According to the *London Education Service Handbook*, the curricula of these schools is admirably summed up in the Hadow Report :

All the central schools in the London area from their inception in 1911 have had a definite bias, commercial or industrial or both. . . . The general education provided for all pupils comprises English, mathematics, history, geography, art, practical science, music and physical exercises, together with handwork for boys and needlework and domestic science for girls. After two years a bias is introduced. In schools with a commercial bias, shorthand and bookkeeping are introduced in the third year and typewriting and office routine in the fourth. In boys' central schools with an industrial bias special attention is devoted to practical mathematics, practical science, and handwork. Stress is also laid on technical drawing. . . . In girls' central schools with an industrial bias more time is given in the last year to needlework, art, science and domestic subjects. A certain bias is also given to the instruction in the ordinary subjects of the curriculum.

The course of instruction normally extends over four years, but an increasing number of pupils remain for a fifth year. Junior exhibitions are given to assist poorer parents to keep on their children for the full course.

Unfortunately, the industrial sides have decreased in recent years, and in some of the schools their original aims have been obscured by the lack of a proper leaving examination. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the most enterprising schools, feeling the need for some sort of certificate as a recognition of their work, have sent in their pupils for the school certificate, with its predominantly academic bias, which finds no place for the practical subjects taught in these schools. Hence the immediate need for a full inquiry into the aims and status of the central schools. Such an inquiry would, I am certain, reveal that the function that these schools were originally intended to fulfil is more necessary to the nation than ever, and that it is imperative, in order that the schools may fulfil their original purpose in our national education, to place them on a better footing in the shape of staffing, salaries, and school amenities, in order to emphasise their utility to parents, employers of labour, and the public generally.

At present their well-being is also menaced by the action of the London County Council in creating a large scheme of additional scholarships to secondary schools,

costing ultimately £120,000 a year, which, if it is carried out, will gradually deprive the central schools of one-sixth of the best of their scholars, who will *ipso facto* be diverted into the secondary schools. Such a scheme cannot fail to inflict a deadly blow on the prestige and position of these schools, and on technical education in general. It will still further widen the gap in popular estimation between the secondary schools and the central, to the grievous detriment of the latter. Yet, with the growth of industry and the ever keener competition for jobs, there was never a greater need for giving the central school, which I would prefer to call intermediate-technical, its proper place in the sun. The first thing to do is frankly to recognise that intermediate secondary education (*i.e.*, the work of the secondary school up to the school certificate stage) and intermediate-technical have each a task of equal, if different, importance to perform. This could be easily done by raising the general leaving age in the central schools by more liberal maintenance grants, using the present money devoted to more or less superfluous secondary scholarships to equalise up the exhibitions already provided in central schools. At the same time the central school could be given a definite aim and objective by throwing open to it the school certificate, already taken by the secondary schools, in which the technical and commercial subjects they teach would be included. This would involve the drastic recasting of the certificate in its present form, which has long been overdue. Only English and arithmetic (the two basal subjects) should be compulsory for both types of school. Such a reorganisation alone can save the present certificate, with its over-emphasis on academic subjects and its niggardly recognition of the arts and crafts. What is needed is a more liberal choice for children with practical aptitudes in art, music, domestic economy and the like, together with papers to test a combined course in general science, in place of the full syllabus in chemistry or physics, and one in general mathematics in place of those in geometry and algebra, which would allow such pupils extra time to work at the subjects in which they have a real capacity. It is also essential that the teachers in each individual school should take an intimate part in the examination. The Report of the Board of Education inspectors shows that we cannot go on indefinitely with

the present large percentage of 'make-believe' passes, which have no par value.

It is idle to say that this would lower the standard of the school-leaving certificate. The 5 or 6 per cent. of secondary pupils who wish to enter the university would have to pass exactly in the same subjects as heretofore. So far from lowering the standard, it would allow the examiners to stiffen the examination in certain subjects for those who wanted to continue their studies at some higher institution and at the same time give the arts and crafts the adequate recognition they do not at present receive.

Again, the age could be gradually raised in the trade and junior technical schools, and they could also be ultimately brought into the orbit of the school certificate by their more technical subjects being also included. We should then have one single intermediate stage comprising the secondary school pupils up to the school certificate, the central school pupils, and those from the trade and junior technical schools.

The central school is largely at present a dead end. Scholarships should be established to take on selected pupils to the next stage in technical education, the day schools in the polytechnics and technical institutes in which the entrance age is 16 +. Means of transference should also be set up to allow scholars who seem to have missed their vocation to transfer to the central from the secondary school, or *vice versa*, taking their exhibitions or scholarships with them. We should then have, at long last, a complete and elastic system of national education—*i.e.*, education in the elementary school till 11 +, then an intermediate stage from 11 + to 16 + comprising the secondary school pupils who had not yet taken the certificate, the central school pupils, and ultimately the pupils from trade and junior technical schools. The preparatory schools would still send their pupils at 13 or 14 to the public schools, where in due course they would take the school certificate in the subjects appropriate to their curriculum. At a similar age the recruits from the elementary schools or with a preliminary two years in a secondary school would enter the public schools under the Norwood scheme. The intermediate stage would be followed by an advanced stage for pupils from 16 + to 18 + comprising the pupils in the advanced courses in secondary and public schools and

the pupils in the day technical schools for those over 16 +; above would come a tertiary stage or university stage for the ordinary academic university students or for students in technological institutes or departments of university rank. Above them would come the post-graduate students engaged in academic or technical research. Such a scheme would no doubt necessitate certain changes in the organisation of the Board of Education, but it should not be beyond the wit of men to make them. The Board has already undergone at least one drastic reorganisation; and, moreover, the Board exists for national education, and not national education for the Board.

Someone may object that the above classification cuts the secondary school in two. It does nothing of the sort. It leaves the school as a whole absolutely intact. It merely recognises that the secondary school comprises two sections—an intermediate and advanced. The fundamental, and I believe unanswerable, reason for this horizontal classification lies in the fact that the only satisfactory way to classify the various stages in education is *by the time that the pupil spends under instruction*. Five years spent in a technical school, if the instruction is suitable for the pupil, should rank of approximate value in the eyes of the State as five years spent in any other institution where the leaving age is similar.

Such a scheme of gradual levelling up, according as national finance will permit, will cost a good deal. But it is one which should specially commend itself to the business world, which, as it finds the bulk of the money, has a right to have a say in it.

The only alternative seems to be an ever-growing expansion of secondary education at the expense of the central school and of pupils of a practical bent. The public, with its ignorance of the fundamentals of education, will never rest content with the present instalment, but continue their demand for secondary education whether their children are suitable or not; such a demand can only be satisfied, in the long run, with free secondary education for all, with the result that there will be a vast expenditure of public money, of which a great deal will be wasted. And we shall be left to choose between adopting the American system, in which the wastage

is terrific and all standards have gone by the board, or the French system, in which, in spite of their national genius for abstract ideas, the authorities have already found it necessary to protect their secondary school standards by drastic yearly examinations, those pupils who fail to pass in any year having to remain another year in the class or else leave. One cannot believe that English parents, pupils, or teachers would accept such a Draconian régime.

We are, indeed, at the parting of the ways. The nation has an undoubted right to demand better education for its children. The thing to decide is whether the extra expenditure required should be spent, irrespective of the requirements of the practical-minded pupil and his prospects of subsequently getting a satisfactory job. One of the most potent catchwords of those who are clamouring for more free secondary education is the parrot-like shibboleth that all the children of the nation should have access to culture. One wonders, however, how many of these people, or indeed how many people, have made a study of culture or understand its origins. From all time the raw material of culture has come from the arts and crafts, including the greatest of all arts, the art of life. *Quid quid agunt homines*. Books are only one element of culture, and in some cases they are only potted culture. The man or woman who has first-hand knowledge of a craft can find in that craft a door to the whole field of culture. I have known more than one peasant who could neither read nor write, but who, thanks to his pride in his craft, was far more cultured than many bookish people to-day.

There is also another very important point. Those secondary teachers who have only had experience of secondary education naturally think one cannot have too much of a good thing. Assuming the present rush towards free secondary education succeeds, they will find, if the suggestion of multi-lateral sides is adopted, their schools swollen beyond all recognition. Such educational emporia cut right across one of the fundamental features of English education—the deep interest that a headmaster or headmistress takes in keeping in personal touch with each individual pupil. They will speedily find themselves in the same position as a French headmaster, who told me it took him all his time to know his own staff by sight and the only pupils he knew were those

who were reported to him more or less frequently for disciplinary purposes.

The Consultative Committee will shortly be reporting on the organisation and interrelation of schools, except those under the elementary code (*i.e.*, the central and other schools), with special regard to the framework and content of the education of pupils below about 16. I would venture to suggest that their labours cannot be effective unless they also fully take into consideration the status and aims of the central schools. We want to have done with piecemeal thinking in education and decide at least for a generation the place and function of every educational establishment of intermediate rank in order to complete and consolidate our present imperfect national system. The subjoined diagram should give a bird's-eye view of what I have tried to outline in this article.

SUGGESTED SCHEME OF NATIONAL EDUCATION (DAY)

(Based on the principle of classification by stages according to the age of the pupil)

Stage :			
Elementary to 11 +.	Elementary.	Secondary School Junior Department.	Preparatory School (up to 13-14).
Intermediate to 16 +.	Intermediate Technical : (a) Central School. (b) Junior Technical Trade School.	Secondary School up to school certificate.	Public School up to school certificate.
Advanced to 18 +.	Advanced Technical. (Polytechnic or Technical Institute Day School.)	Secondary School up to higher certificate.	Public School up to higher certificate.
University to 21 +.	Technological College or Department of University rank.	University.	
Research to 22-24 +.	Technological (M.Sc., etc.).	University (Ph.D., etc.).	

For simplification and clearness I have omitted nursery and kindergarten schools, which form the preliminary section of elementary education, as well as the important Hadow proposals for pupils over 14 and day continuation schools. The term 'technical' also includes schools of art, music, domestic science, etc., whether advanced or university. At every stage there should be a possibility of transference from one parallel course in the stage to another, for 'misfits,' as well as promotion for the clever pupils who have completed the course to the course above, whether technical or academic. I have also ignored the work of the evening schools, whether technical or academic, which is supplementary to the system as a whole, through all the stages.

CLAUDESLEY BRERETON.

EDUCATION AT HOME

II. FROM THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ONWARDS

By E. SHARWOOD SMITH

I WAS reading a short time ago with, be it confessed, somewhat languid interest Lord Esher's *Ionicus*, the biography of that fastidious scholar William Cory, the Eton master. Suddenly my attention was arrested by a phrase. It came from a letter of Cory's to—it matters not who it was. 'Boys,' he said, 'are not sent to Eton for the teaching, nor for the discipline, but for the society.' 'There,' I said to myself, 'is the case for the public schools in a nutshell.' That is absolutely true.

The great public schools attract their pupils precisely for the reason which Cory gives. A parent here and there may be interested in the teaching, but the number is remarkably small. The society given, the teaching and the discipline are taken for granted. The latter are by-products; it is the society that counts.

Such is the English way. You may call it snobbery. So it is in the sense that we are all snobs, even the humblest. Do not we all seek for our children the 'best' society? It is instinctive in our race—possibly in all races. And it would be very difficult to prove that the English instinct is wrong. It is, in the last analysis, the society which educates. Individual teachers may be the pioneers, but even they recognise that a society must gather round them to give effect to their teaching. But whether the education thus imbibed is for good or bad naturally depends on the quality, the spirit, the informing 'idea' of the society.

And, speaking broadly, we may say that the English people are satisfied with the society provided by the public schools. For I have noticed in a longish life that even those who have, at some time or other, criticised the public schools most severely have not been backward, when fortune's

wheel turns in their favour, to send their own offspring to the very schools which they have before denounced.

What has caused the large increase in the numbers of the big boarding schools of late years? Obviously they have been largely recruited from the children of those who had themselves no public school education. Those families which supplied the Eton of Warre, the Harrow of Butler, the Rugby of Arnold and Temple, are steadily decreasing in number. The public schools are not, as they were once, so to speak, secular convents for the children of the great territorial magnates, institutions designed for the purpose of licking into shape the son of the country squire. They may now be described as the educational habitats frequented by the children of the materially well-to-do. That, from one point of view, is an excellent thing. Such children must be educated, and, since possibly the struggle upward to a higher standard of life (materially speaking) had in some cases left its traces in a certain inelegance of manner, a hint—shall we say?—of unreserve, it is well that any tendency to undue self-exaltation on the part of the children should be ironed out at the public school.

Perhaps it is well to interpolate here that when I write of public schools I mean only those (there may be a dozen to eighteen altogether) which in the general understanding rank as such. There are many others listed in the *Public Schools Year Book* which to all intents and purposes are now practically, if not in the judgment of whatever authorities grant the brevet, on exactly the same footing, except for those that are entirely boarding schools, as the so-called secondary schools.

Now the obvious drawback to these great foundations is the fact mentioned that their portals are only open to the comparatively well-off. They divide, at the most plastic period of life, the rich from the poor. The sheep are separated from the goats.

Now this fact need only be stated to show that there is a grave danger here to that bigger society which is the English people in the bulk. It is a matter of wonder to me that it has escaped the notice of the vast majority of our citizens, for it will be intensified as time goes on and the educational net is spread wider and wider. Some remedy must be found.

One such remedy suggested by the more extreme spirits is to force the whole child population through the national elementary schools. Such a remedy would be far worse than the disease. No Englishman worthy of the name will ever submit, except in seasons of great peril, to compulsion. We are a free nation; it would be the negation of freedom to deny a parent the right to send his child to any school he desires. I should like to add, but dare not yet, the words 'provided it is educationally efficient and hygienically satisfactory.'

That solution, then, may unhesitatingly be ruled out. Another one has been tentatively put forward by those themselves connected with the public schools, and, in particular, of late, by Dr. Norwood, until recently Headmaster of Harrow. These propose that a certain number of scholars should be drafted, by methods as yet unspecified, into the big public schools. And this proposal is, I think, due not only to concern for the betterment of the elementary pupil, not only out of apprehension of future political danger, but for the advantage of the public schools themselves.

Such a fusion, if at all possible, would, as everyone will admit, advance the common weal. But it must be fusion, not confusion. That attained, the Socialist dream of a classless society would possibly be nearer its fulfilment, though I must confess that to one person the idea of a classless society irresistibly brings back the recollection of the weightless elephant—that monstrous abstraction of the mathematicians—which used to do wonderful things up an inclined plane in the days when he studied mechanics for his 'Little-go.'

But is the fusion possible? Let us consider the problem written large. Let us take, as we should take for the purposes of the argument, an extreme case. Let us imagine—though imagination rather boggles here—200 ex-elementary boys from the great cities admitted annually to leaven the proud society of Eton. Let us go further. Let us imagine also—though here, I fully admit, imagination not only boggles but fairly reels—that some good fairy, either in the shape of the State, or the local authorities, or the benevolent individual, has not only provided a preliminary assimilation in the select preparatory schools, but adequate means also to satisfy the instinctive but expensive cravings for personal adornment in

the shape of blazers and scarves and fancy waistcoats and other embellishments of youthful vanity. What is the reader's reaction to such an eventuality? Do not thick-coming fancies leap to the startled mind at once? But let us rein our fancies in. For the moment let imagination take the mortal leap over even this tremendous fence. There are still, if I may borrow a figure from Plato, three great waves that threaten to engulf the argument.

And the first is the question of numbers. Eton has already more than 1100 pupils. Add another 200 or so, and lo!—a horde. I know that the horde will be separated out into various houses each containing not unmanageable numbers. And I know also the admirable influence exercised over their inmates by the great housemasters whose splendid services Eton and other big boarding schools have undoubtedly secured. And I know something of the excellent tutorial system. Still a house is not a school; it is, after all, little better than a glorified dormitory. And even a tutor has far too many pupils to give great attention to each. It is the school that claims the homage, demands the allegiance, compels the service, sets the standard of conduct in work and play—in effect, claims for itself during the pupilage the consecration of the life.

And what can that great multitude produce but mass mentality? The individual is absorbed. Except in rare instances he acts and thinks and behaves as the vast majority of his fellows; he copies their habits, he imbibes their prejudices. The pressure is overwhelming. He loses himself—but not to find a greater self. No doubt there is some counterbalancing advantage in that he learns to respect his fellows, to live in a community, but at the cost of sinking his own individuality. He becomes a mere drop in a mighty ocean. The school is too much with him. He lays waste his own particular powers. He has little left of his own. And having little left, what will his own contribution to the general sum be worth? I am afraid that I cannot believe that the mass mentality of Eton even is very greatly to be preferred to that of an over-populated orphanage. There is no tributary treasure brought by the individual for the enrichment of the whole. Few have had a chance to reach to the full stretch of their own personality, to work out their own

salvation. Their salvation is worked out for them. Each has, at the end, been moulded after the fashion of the universal pattern. Can this be denied by anyone who has carefully observed the normal product of a large public school? Once more let it be freely admitted there are brilliant exceptions. But is not the conclusion of the whole matter that the individual has ceased or never known how to think for himself? It may be that this is the end which is desired. If so, there is no further need of argument. But let those who have this belief stop for a moment and consider.

There is a ready way. Let them study the history of the Great War. No unprejudiced student can fail to see that the real victor was that unknown warrior whom, with a wonderful realisation of the truth, we honour in our Abbey—the uncommon common soldier, sailor and airman. Has any new idea in education, their own particular province, sprung from the public schools since Arnold's time? One of the reasons, though only one, for their failure to supply the nation's needs comes from their mere size. The greater the mass, the greater its inertness. The surface of a mighty ocean is only disturbed by violent agitations—the small lake responds to the gentlest zephyr.

Here, then, we have encountered the first wave. Is it, or is it not, insurmountable? Even if it has left us breathless, but surviving, a worse one quickly follows. The public schools, be it remembered, as usually meant, are boarding schools. The school thus claims every waking minute of the pupil's life, and not a few of those that are—or should be—devoted to sleep. I will not stop here to discuss what is euphemistically called the 'moral' problem. I have dealt with that at some length in a book recently published.¹ Suffice it to say here that it is a far more serious matter than is usually believed, and that large numbers inevitably aggravate the evil. There is little privacy and less leisure. All action takes place in public, or if it is in private it is usually suspect. All deeds, almost all words, practically all thoughts, are organised. Organised, yes, but organised largely by the boys themselves, I shall be told. Is it? What share of the organisation falls to the lot of the average boy? Even the prefects, or præpostors, or whatever title they hold, are instruments

¹ *The Faith of a Schoolmaster*. Methuen.

selected from above, not to carry out their own ideas or ideals or those of their fellows, but to perpetuate a tradition.

But the tradition is a good one! So was the monastic tradition—quite as good. But the monasteries perished—the good as well as the bad. Why? Not, as I think an unbiassed reading of history will show, because they were corrupt, because the inmates as a whole were given over to laxity of conduct and spiritual laziness, but just because they were repositories of tradition. The time-spirit had no further use for them. The world had moved and passed them by.

And I fear very greatly that something like the dissolution of the monasteries, to which the public schools stand in lineal succession, may be the fate of the great public schools, unless they set their houses in order for themselves, and in particular reduce their numbers, for the *vis inertiae* cannot reign for ever.

If this is so, what will the elementary boy have gained, even if all the conditions which I outlined at the beginning of my article can be satisfied? He may, possibly will acquire what is called culture, but he will be perilously near losing his own soul. His mental growth will inevitably be arrested.

What struck me most when I went up to the university, a scholar from the day school of a town, was the childishness of the average public school boy. It is no exaggeration to say that he was in mentality a year behind the products of the great day schools. Is not this the case still? It is easy to see that it must be so. He has lived too long in a closed society behind prison bars, however gilded the walls may have been. And this will be peculiarly the case with the elementary boy. He will be dazzled by the splendid amenities which after the sordid surroundings to which he has hitherto been accustomed he will encounter. There is to the child of one of the wealthier members a way of escape provided in the holidays, particularly to him whose parents are playing a notable part in politics, or literature, or art, or who are members of the so-called great world. The scholar drawn from the elementary schools has no such escape. This consideration brings us to the third wave—the *τρικυμία*, which the fancy of many people has regarded, and still regards, as the greatest of all. The second wave was formidable enough, but it is as nothing to the one which is to come.

We have looked at the matter hitherto mainly from the point of view of the school and the schoolboy. That is too often the case with schoolmasters. But the school is only a means to an end. Those who teach must always keep steadily before their eyes the after-life when the pupil casts off his leading-strings. What will be the reaction of the ex-elementary pupil to his own home, his own surroundings, his own fellows, after all the external pomp and splendour of the school which has held him enthralled (in the literal sense) for four most formative years? There has been a clean cut. A great section of his life has been isolated from the rest. And is the cut always so clean—will there be no scar on his personality, no sepsis still latent within his system? The contrast between the two environments has been too glaring. He will be restless, discontented, unsettled. He will not have found himself. After a transplantation so violent he will be long in taking root again. The amenities of the public school will seem to him so far removed from the sterner Spartan life of his home that he will be apt to lose all sense of proportion. Is he likely to be a valuable member of society, to sympathise with those less 'fortunate' than himself, to cherish no resentment against the violent disturbance to his whole outlook on life? He has imbibed a certain superficial culture, possibly acquired a certain modicum of information, more probably learnt how to spend, how to get rather than how to give. There will surely be disharmony in the psyche—he has not moved forward surely and steadily. He is not at home in the universe. Those six precious years—what have they taught him? To count the possession of money the most valuable achievement in life, to regard the community which has uprooted him as morally bound to support him all his days?

How this will strike others I do not know. To me the third wave is fatal. The last state of this distracted individual will be far worse than the first.

The conclusion surely is inescapable. The proper place for the further education of the elementary boy is the secondary school of his native town. If he joins this at a comparatively early age (between eleven and twelve) the break is, after a term or two, hardly felt. He has passed into another atmosphere, it is true, but one not utterly different from that

which was familiar to him before. Many of his playfellows and his schoolfellows have crossed the dividing line with him. The school does not claim even the whole of his day. He does not grow up a stranger to his brothers and sisters, superior to his parents. The little tasks at home are still there for him to perform. He can help the family; he remains one with the rest. The latter life has not completely blotted out the former: the transition has been natural and easy. The better the school, the more 'human' its administration, the more quickly he will be absorbed. He will be at home in it very soon. But—and this is at this time a very big 'but'—he must not simply pass from one elementary school to a higher school pupilled entirely by those brought up as he has been brought up. The school must be such as attracts those whose earlier education has been in different surroundings—in preparatory schools of the normal type, in private academies, with the governess at home. There is a grave danger that out of the very zeal for education which the more enthusiastic local authorities exhibit they will by their policy defeat the exact end which they desire to achieve. There are rumours, which I, for one, view with grave concern, that some of the great day schools of former days, like Manchester Grammar School, King Edward's School, Birmingham, and others (at which have been educated in the past the sons of professional men and those eminent in commerce and industry), are now becoming more and more the schools of what is called by a hateful word—the proletariat. The fusion, it is maintained, must take place earlier—in the elementary school. That may be the case some day; it is far from being possible for a long time. No power will compel all people to send their children to the elementary school. There must be complete freedom of choice in the matter. It is in the secondary school that the various types and classes of children must meet and fuse, and the blend will be all the better the more varied has been the elementary preparation. I have no space to argue this now. It is a question of great importance, but it is perhaps a little irrelevant here.

As to the relative claims to superiority of the day and boarding school, from a wide and varied experience I, personally, have no hesitation whatever in preferring the day school, other things being equal. The chief arguments in

its favour are implicit in what I have said about the boarding schools. Indeed, the boarding school largely owes its existence to conditions which have now passed away—the lack of facilities of transport, the condition of the roads in winter. Omnibuses and motor cars have largely undermined the original reasons for the boarding school. But other things are by no means always equal. A good home is a prerequisite—a pleasant family life, interest in the scholar's education, sacrifice on the part of the parents. These conditions are, of course, not universal. There are some whose home life is—shall we say?—abnormal. For them a boarding school is the solution.

But why should that not be possible at the secondary school of the native town? Unfortunately, I think this is not usually the case. If I had any influence with the authorities I should strongly urge that a hostel be always attached to every secondary school except a very small one, but I would add a hostel, preferably run by someone not too closely connected with the school, not by an assistant-master, still less by the headmaster. It should have a life to some extent independent of the school. Such a hostel under wise management would entail no additional expense. It can, as I know by experience, be carried on on a thoroughly economic basis. Such a provision gets over the one objection to the secondary school. I know many persons have a prejudice against a school that is partly day and partly boarding. But I think this *is* prejudice and rests on no sound basis of reason. Surely the examples of Clifton and Cheltenham are enough. And when one thinks of these two great schools one remembers to have heard that Canon Wilson, the well-known headmaster of Clifton, expressed his opinion, more than once, that his best pupils were those who came to and fro every day from their homes—especially the homes of professional men in Bristol.

But I admit that in one respect the big boarding schools have one or two advantages over the secondary school—so great, indeed, that, unless they are altered, the secondary day school may prove to turn out alumni of an inferior type to those from the great boarding schools. For it has two serious drawbacks: the first that it does not command the services of men—for, of course, I cannot speak of girls' schools—on its

staff of quite the same standard as the big boarding schools. The latter have a prestige which usually attracts the more cultured type of man who wishes to take up a scholastic career. I hope this will not always be the case. I hope that some of these same individuals will, even at the cost of pecuniary loss and social prestige, determine to take up their careers in the new secondary schools. Their loss in one direction will be more than counterbalanced by a gain in another. The big boarding schools can look after themselves: they will always command devoted service. But those who choose to enter the secondary schools will have a better opportunity of doing service to the community. They must not, of course, come in a superior—no, not even in a missionary—spirit. They are not apostles to the heathen, still less bishops *in partibus infidelium*. Indeed, they will gain more than they will give. They will not lose contact, as too many may in the public schools lose contact, with reality. They will be themselves disimprisoned. Too long immurement in the claustral, if attractive, purlieu of a sheltered society creates an attitude to life a trifle remote, a little exotic. One cannot live, without detriment, behind an old-world abbey wall.

Banner, by turns, and bugles woo;
Ye shy recluses, follow too.

And I am not in the least afraid of being accused of snobbery, or class prejudice, when I urge that the best headmasters of the secondary schools will come from such as these. For they have, with many drawbacks, what weighs most heavily in the scale, a more educated background; and once they eschew the social prejudices, and slough off the meaningless conventions, they often, from the very shock of transplantation, prove more ready to take risks, to initiate experiment, to leave the beaten path, to strike out into uncertain country, to think out things for themselves—in a word, to be pioneers. For those from the public schools whom the teaching profession attracts are usually the more unselfish, and therefore more adventurous, spirits. They show this by the very choice they make. No material rewards can possibly be theirs. And I wish the local authorities could see this. The latter are, of course, new to their work, and, admirable as is the service they have rendered to education, they do not seem

able always to select the right men for the headmasters of their schools. Often they do not look below the paper qualifications; they are too obviously dazzled by a sort of awe of examination distinctions—they are not always apt in judging the man behind the parchment. And they must also pay somewhat higher salaries than is their wont. I know men cannot be measured by money, that salaries do not tempt the best; but a headmaster even of a secondary school has many expenses—and that, I think, for quite necessary purposes—which do not fall to the lot of an assistant-master. Moreover, he has given hostages to fortune; if he fails, he fails completely. He cannot, as a rule, become again an assistant. He has staked his all when he has accepted a headmastership.

Of the second and worse drawback to the secondary school I have written at such length elsewhere that I will only write a few words here. It is very unfortunate, though perhaps it was to be expected, that far too many secondary schools are worshipping false gods—the gods of examination successes. An assistant-master expressed the matter quite pithily, and, I am afraid, with complete truth, to me in a letter which I received not long since: ‘We have one god here, and his name is Matriculation.’

This is not entirely the fault of the headmaster. He is judged far too often, not only by that mysterious entity the man-in-the-street, but even by the local education authority, and even too often—or, at any rate, until recently it was far too often—by the inspectors of the Board, on the external side of education. The uniform examination system is the enemy to the real education, the enlightenment of the spirit. I will not stop to argue this point now; I have done it at great length elsewhere. I must put it dogmatically, for I have no stronger conviction than this. For the exorcism of this evil spirit I believe the ablest sorcerer will be found on the staff of the public schools. Once this spectre is laid, once the secondary schools have been inspired by the more liberal spirit of the public schools, while I hope they have managed to escape the more obvious faults, there will be no difficulty in finding headmasters from a less circumscribed area.

But in all our organisation of education let us remember that, in the last analysis, the problem of education is personal. It is the personality that tells all the time—personality, not

system. And the local education authorities must realise that if they are to get the best results from their schools—not the best examination results—once they have appointed their headmasters they must give them as free a hand as possible. Jealous interference in matters of internal control, however able and zealous the education secretary or other officials may be, will only engender friction and destroy what is most worthwhile in education. To me, in conclusion, the problem which immediately confronts those who desire whole-heartedly the advancement of our national education is, not how to take the elementary scholars to the public schools, but how to bring the public schools to the elementary scholars.

E. SHARWOOD SMITH.

THE POLITICAL OUTCOME OF ENGLISH EDUCATION IN INDIA

By T. I. MARDY JONES

THE Government of India Act, 1935, is a new landmark in the history of India, and it embodies the essence of a century of English education in India. For this Act is the direct political outcome of Macaulay's famous Education Minute endorsed by the then Governor-General on March 7, 1835, and adhered to ever since. This Minute enforced the policy of using English as the medium of instruction in all grades of teaching higher than primary. A momentous decision this, thus to fix by edict on English as the language best suited to meet the lingual needs of India for a universal tongue. For upon it was to be built up the educational edifice for this vast sub-continent, with its countless millions made up of many diverse peoples, all speaking distinct tongues and dialects, and isolated into a thousand castes.

In the seventeenth century the East India Company, in constant conflict with its foreign rivals, could do little for India. In the eighteenth century the Company was kept busy consolidating its position against France, and against the hordes of satraps who sought to carve out new kingdoms out of the remnants of the Moghul empire. By the end of the eighteenth century Britain was supreme in India and free to govern as she pleased. Yet all this time the Company ignored the educational needs of India, and on political grounds strongly opposed the efforts of the Christian missions to form schools. So in 1781 Warren Hastings, in response to a Moslem appeal, had a Moslem college founded in Calcutta and ran it for two years at his own expense before he could induce the Company to take it over.

Under the East India Act, 1813, one lakh of rupees a year was, for the first time, voted from public revenues for

educational purposes. In 1827 the East India Company issued instructions to discourage primary teaching and to 'limit all educational work to the superior and middle classes.' Such little education as was being attempted by the British was at a standstill from 1823 to 1835, due to an honest controversy over the language issue. Some favoured teaching in Sanscrit for the Hindus, and in Arabic for the Moslems: others wanted it imparted in English. Yet Hindus and Moslems alike in the main were keen on English. So the enthusiasm and erudition of Macaulay won the day. His Minute on the issue at stake was a memorable achievement and as brilliant and forceful a piece of special pleading as was ever penned.

Macaulay entered into his onerous and thankless task of education building with such zeal, tact and erudition that foes became friends, caught up by his faith in and love for his mission to lay the foundations of a sound system of English education as the necessary prelude to a later and wider Indian education in the vernaculars. Of Macaulay Trevelyan states:

He cared a great deal more for providing our Eastern Empire with an educational outfit that would work and wear than he ever cared for keeping his seat in Parliament or pushing his own fortunes in Downing Street.

A century of English educational progress in India bears eloquent testimony to his faith in his work. The volume and value of the output in the vernaculars produced by Indian scholars and scientists trained in English education is a great achievement. It provides a comprehensive content of modern Indian learning as the groundwork of a sound education. The failure to provide a nation-wide system of primary teaching for the peasantry does not detract one iota from the genius of Macaulay's prevision and preparation. He pointed the way.

He was right, too. For had the dead classics of India been adopted as the education media a century ago to cope with the science and industry of the modern world, India would probably have remained about as backward and undeveloped as China still remains. The use of English gave tremendous stimulus to higher education, and for several generations ample employment was available for those who

had passed through the many schools and colleges that arose in many parts of India. Yet within the present generation thousands of youths turned out annually, more or less graduated, remain unemployable, as the Government and other services in India do not now absorb them half as fast as they are turned out. The whole system of education is out of joint and has grown top-heavy. This is due to the failure to promote education as a comprehensive whole. Primary teaching was neglected in the vernaculars and English was used for all higher education. The slow spread of primary teaching for boys led to a demand for compulsion for boys, whilst girls were utterly ignored. This great wrong to the girlhood of India is a tragedy in this age when womanhood everywhere seeks and secures equality with manhood. It is obvious that boys from homes wherein the girls are utterly illiterate are at a serious disadvantage compared with boys whose sisters enjoy school life.

It is also noticeable that the educated youths of India nowadays grow dissatisfied with lifemates who are not schoolmates. The ancient ideals of marriage were destroyed by the later adoption of purdah. Modern education is breaking down the pride of purdah steadily, and is reviving the ancient ideals of Indian womanhood consonant with modern needs. For the girls of India, in the upper classes at least, now find the charms of purdah womanhood no longer attract the desirable youths. There is a growing demand in the marriage market in India for wives with a more modern outlook. The purdah goes as education comes. For at heart India is a land of meditation and intuition more responsive to the glamour of learning than most nations. Under wise direction and liberal usage, this inbred yearning for learning can be revived, restored and refashioned in accord with the modern aspirations of India. The first condition of success is a complete system of compulsory primary teaching in the vernaculars for both sexes as the basis of a national education. Once this is established all higher education can look after itself and its present top-heaviness be righted. This would necessitate the establishment of vernacular training centres all over India to train men and women to become efficient teachers at stipends and with conditions that will attract the best types. Moreover, enough

women teachers must be trained to take over all infant teaching for both sexes, as women are best fitted for it in all countries. At the outset these women can be recruited mainly from the trainable young widows in the upper and middle classes who now spend wasted lives. Their instinct of mother-love will prove a priceless asset to all infant teaching, and it will give them a new and a noble avocation in life.

Secondly, primary schools in rural India need to be planned in the main on the group system. A well-equipped central school with a trained headmaster who will also inspect and direct the small feeder schools in adjacent villages is needed. As a necessary adjunct, adult education must be fostered as a vital factor in the reconstruction of village life. Wireless broadcasting from amplifiers in the central villages can do much for the adults. Art, drama, music and sport can all play their part. Unless the social interests of the parents are aroused in these ways to destroy illiteracy, it will be impossible to overcome the huge wastage in school attendance now so prevalent. In their poverty and ignorance peasant parents are tempted to work their children on the land and in village pursuits in the school years. Most of the school-children drop out after the second year and less than 1 in 10 complete the primary period. Adult education would do much to stop this wastage, by consent, as it would strengthen community life under intelligent civic leadership.

At present about 8,250,000 boys out of a possible 18,000,000, and less than 1,500,000 girls out of a possible 18,000,000, now attend primary schools, staffed by about 320,000 teachers, of whom only 35,000 are women teachers. Half are untrained, all are grossly underpaid. The best in the towns get from Rs. 30 to Rs. 50 per month; and from Rs. 10 to Rs. 30 per month in the villages generally. The school buildings, too, in most parts of India are shockingly bad and meanly equipped. The total cost of primary education in India at present is 1s. 6d. a year per head of the population, or 12s. a year per pupil. If up to 80 per cent. of these forlorn children could be kept in the schools for the full primary period of five years, over 14,000,000 boys and over 14,000,000 girls would attend. This would involve the training of 1,000,000 teachers. In fact, a trebling of the teachers and a doubling of the schools. Gigantic as this task may appear,

it is neither impracticable nor very costly. In this connexion, it is worthy of note that one of the pioneer efforts to introduce primary teaching in Britain was brought from Madras in 1797 by Andrew Bell, who had tested in Madras his monitorial system of teaching based on the elder boys being put to teach the younger boys. Although the monitorial systems gave way in due time to more efficient English methods, the principle, if properly organised by the State, is sound and practicable in backward peasant countries. I have seen it at work recently in Soviet Russia. It works there with remarkable success, as there is an acute shortage of trained teachers and an acute desire among the rising generation for literacy. I found a similar keenness prevailing in many peasant areas in India eager to support a sound nation-wide system of primary education.

A monitorial system should work in India even better than in Russia; it should absorb the growing army of unemployable educated youth and also draw upon the numerous body of trainable young widows. These could be organised as the nucleus in an All-India drive against illiteracy, as ignorance is at the bottom of most of the social ills of India. Of the total population of some 360,000,000, about 4,000,000 are literate in English, less than 24,000,000 in the various vernaculars. Such is the fruit of a century of educational work under British rule. The teacher is the foundation of all education. There is a plenitude of excellent latent teaching talent to supply all requirements, once proper training facilities, adequate stipends and security are provided.

The cost of an efficient system of compulsory teaching would be manageable as an All-India charge. The initial capital outlay and the recurring extra charges could be met partly by higher local cesses, partly by grants from Government and the residue from an All-India Public Education Loan Fund (forty to sixty years) raised on the credit of Government. If adequate funds cannot be raised for up-to-date schools generally, recourse can be had to the general adoption of seasonal open-air schools in the rural areas. This would be a reversion to the ancient Indian custom of gathering the pupils for teaching during the cool hours, which would cut down capital costs greatly and also improve the health and efficiency of scholars and teachers alike.

An efficient system of primary teaching in the vernaculars for both sexes equally should lead in a single generation to a substantial rise in the standard of life of the entire population, which exists now, as in the past, on the margin of existence, just because Indian methods of cultivation in the main ever remain on the margin of economic production. That again is due to the immemorial illiteracy of the peasantry. Primary education is the only instrument that can cut through this vicious circle.

There is thus immense scope for a big uplift in the lot of the peasantry. India is a sub-continent of sub-poverty. To lift up these masses educationally is to lift them up economically at a still faster rate. A rise of 20 to 50 per cent. in the standard of life of India within twenty years is practical politics. What Soviet Russia has done in fifteen years India can do in twenty years backed by her British experiences and connexions.

The next big step forward in social endeavour will probably be the enforcement of primary teaching in British India directly the Provincial legislatures are set up. The Indian States will have to follow suit whether the rulers wish it or not. To help all India to provide adequate finance for the first generation of the compulsorily educated, the Government of Great Britain must be generously prepared to help with a pound for pound grant on the income that can be derived from the All-India Public Education Loan Fund herein suggested. It is the best way Great Britain can make amends for her share of the responsibility for the past neglect of primary education in India. A British contribution on this basis would stimulate all India to make supreme sacrifices for her own educational progress. The gift could be made with such goodwill as to make every taxpayer feel that he or she was a personal contributor to this humanitarian purpose. Thus ample provision could be made to provide primary teaching for all boys and girls of school age regardless of creed, caste or class.

Let this education be not a mere command of literacy in the 'three R's.' Let it also be a moral agent for the formation of personal character and rightness of life. As Ruskin has assured us, 'Education is the leading human souls to what is best and making what is best out of them.' This

ideal properly put may receive a truer response in India than it has ever had in the Western world. This would go far to wipe out all bad blood engendered by the mishaps and mistakes that have occurred under the British Raj in the past. Moreover, the Indian classics of Sanscrit and Arabic will remain as cultural studies for the coteries of erudite scholars with the leisure and fondness for Indian learning just as Latin and Greek are retained in European learning. In due time secondary as well as primary teaching will be conducted in the vernaculars, and English will be retained as the medium of instruction in university education. For English will probably hold its own there against any and every vernacular language for a very long time. It will repay India to devote her cultural genius to the task of developing the most suitable of her living languages to become the future mother tongue of all India. Hindi and Urdu, as the two variants of Hindustani, used by Hindus and Moslems respectively, are already spoken by over a third of the peoples, mainly in the north and in the Deccan. Under the direct influence of English education, Hindi and Urdu have grown into robust languages understood as a common speech, but written with different scripts. For Indian Army purposes, the Roman script is used for Hindi and Urdu with success. If it were adopted generally these two could be merged into one language and well become the *lingua franca* of India. Along this road a new vista opens out for Indian idealism under the influence of one mother tongue and the inspiration of one motherland. If no such common tongue is evolved, Indian genius is in the happy position of having at its command the use to perfection of English as Mahatma Gandhi so uses it, and as Tagore has so mastered it.

Educated Indians generally are alive to the fact that English is making rapid headway as the most practicable, the most acceptable, and the most culturable language for international intercourse in every respect. Modern science and industry have revolutionised world contacts since the days of Macaulay. The whole world is increasingly becoming one common habitation for the educated everywhere. Hence some living language must sooner or later become the accepted channel of international intercourse if the human race is ever to abolish war and establish peace as the normal

state of human progress. English during the past century has tended to become the world tongue for all the main purposes of world contacts. Already English is the mother tongue of 200,000,000 of the white race. Millions more use it in all parts of the world; whilst the use of Basic English in China and elsewhere also hastens its spread. English is also being adopted in higher education as the secondary language in most countries. It is destined to become the *lingua franca* of the world at large.

English is the one language understandable to all the educated classes in uneducated India, and they have a stronger mastery of English and all it connotes than they have of any Indian language. It is obvious that without the unifying influences of the long and persistent tutelage of British administration, over the last 100 years especially, India would have remained in the backwoods. India could never have forged of her own internal will, without external pressure, any central system of self-government to maintain law and order; civil and social administration; road, rail, sea and air transport services; mammoth irrigation schemes; famine, flood and plague relief schemes; defence against foreign invasion and conquest; and the invaluable link of a common tongue for her ruling, trading and educated classes. The more India becomes independent of British tutelage the more will she need English to express her needs and aspirations in the world at large. English has become part and parcel of the Indian intellectual make-up, and without it Indians would be helpless at the outset in ruling India, and powerless in their world contacts. English provides Indians with their political ammunition, their scientific equipment in the arts of government and industry, and their contact with the world. Indians are too astute to be obtuse in this matter. They will not throw away their rich inheritance of the priceless gift of their mastery of English and of their other valuable British connexions. These advantages they will retain and maintain as their main foreign assets, and they will rightly use them to suit their own needs and ends. Thus under this English urge India moves on with the world far faster over the last 100 years than she has done hitherto over many centuries. Yet when all due tribute has been paid to British administration in India, to the democratic spirit of the British

nation, and to the excellent manner the educated classes have assimilated our Western ways of government and industry, India may still reproach us for having left undone for so long the task of founding and maintaining popular primary education on behalf of her helpless peoples.

Happily, however, at long last the Government of India Act, 1935, is a signal proof that the British Parliament considers that the peoples of India have already graduated, through their mastery of English ideals of education and government, to be entrusted with the task of self-government. This Act also marks a new era in the relations of Britain and India. Henceforth they will co-operate as equal partners in all their future relations. Each master at home, both partners abroad; for the Government of India Act, 1935, embodies Dominion status in fact if not in form. No future British Government can go back on the declarations made on behalf of the Crown in and out of Parliament in Britain and in India, and made before and since the enactment of the Statute of Westminster.

For over 300 years Britain has maintained profitable contacts with India. For over 200 years Britain has won great renown in India and thereby enhanced her prestige in the world. Over the last 100 years Britain has rendered great services to and received great rewards from India in the fields of politics, industry and science. With India as an equal partner, the British Empire may outlast all previous empires in duration and in efficiency. Let Britain make her gift of millions sterling as a goodwill offering in the confident hope that it will help the new India to take her stand in due time as an equal partner in line with the rest of the British Empire and in line with the nations of the world.

T. I. MARDY JONES.

THE ARMY AND SOCIETY

By LIEUT.-COLONEL GRAHAM SETON HUTCHISON,
D.S.O., M.C.

THROUGHOUT the ages the peoples of the world have recognised a civic duty in National Defence. This implies not only, and indeed not so much, the defence of land and property against invasion and capture as it does the defence of national culture and institutions against the imposition of a lower alien standard. Deep-seated in every citizen is a regard and affection for his own national institutions. We live under the shadow of a great tradition. For centuries it has been slowly forming. Lives without number have been built into it. The years have crowned it with power and with beauty. It marks the rise and dominance of the human spirit. In defence of the cultural ideal in all its forms and of the liberty and institutions founded upon the frugality and genius of their forefathers, men will fight, even to the death.

The Army, together with the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, is the custodian of British culture and tradition. Nor is it always that the threat to the ideals and cultural inheritance of the race comes from beyond our shores. The danger, far more sinister and hideous, may be found within. The problem of national defence is, therefore, not only one to engage the attention and interest of experts; it is also the affair of every good citizen. Nor is it a super-expert matter, whose range, technique, and considerations are outside the comprehension of ordinary men. Our small professional Army, for reasons which we will examine, contains few men of genius. When expanded to the dimensions of a national force, unless the high command is to consist of mediocrity, there must be included men of outstanding ability, competent and experienced in comprehending major problems, gathered from the wider field of national life. It may be said that this

should not be so. But if officers are underpaid, with little opportunity for advancement, with no rewards in promotion for exceptional merit, they will and often do retire from the Service at an early age; or, alternatively, lose ambition and content themselves with a prescribed routine, awaiting the luck of promotion and a pension, in a life not without its compensations in leisure, travel and sport.

Society, by the very nature of its growth, is an aristocratic thing, and aristocracy is one of its ontogenetic principles. It originates in the sense of the State and civilisation when one or more persons accept the form and meaning which the true aristocrat—that is to say, the man gifted with the qualities of leadership and of human sympathy—knows by his genius to be the master-idea of the age. The rise of the British Empire and the astonishing record of British officers in the administration of vast territories, supported by a handful of men, is an eloquent testimony to this aristocratic leadership, continued generation after generation. For century after century men of wealth and position undertook the burdens of a developing Empire with a selfless devotion to duty. But in recent years economic pressures have often prevented such men from thus applying an inherited genius and the inborn feeling of service towards their fellow-men; and herein both the Army and the Empire have suffered. The spacious days for the officer have gone for ever; but this is no reason why he should be deterred from an increasing responsibility in a world which cries out for that kind of leadership for which his forefathers prescribed the pattern.

The British Empire is not only defended but is also held together by the Army, linked with the other Services. The islanders of Britain little realise the debt which they owe to the Army. Amazing as it appears to foreign observers, the British people are not interested in the Army: they know nothing of its functions, unless to applaud the pageants of the Aldershot Tattoo or of the Trooping of the Colour. Prior to the war the soldier was little esteemed. 'Pity the poor old soldier' was the echo of the Crimea; 'Pass the hat for your credit's sake' of the South African War carried along the idea that the soldier must be an object of public charity. And since the Great War charity for ex-Service men has become a national fetich, as if the State, being the peoples'

authority, had no kind of responsibility. As for the officer, I well remember how, proud and exhilarated with the spirit of adventure, I snorted with indignation when a connexion of my family, a day or two after I had been gazetted to a commission, remarked, 'The Army, a purely ornamental profession!' But as a youngster I did not find it so—in Egypt, the Sudan, in India, and in Rhodesia.

In these days no man can enlist in the Army without the feeling that after the few years of his service with the colours he will become an object of public charity. In such circumstances the Army cannot attract men worthy of the greatest Empire the world has ever known, men equipped mentally and physically to carry the great traditions of a proud and highly cultured people to the four corners of the earth; men of fine breed, of perfect physique and of vigorous courage; the custodians of national culture, the leaders, as are the *kshatriya* of India, of the national life. Of such men should the Army be composed.

The more we talk of peace, surely the more zealous should the nation be that the defenders of peace, its representatives among subordinate and defenceless peoples, should consist of the flower of the race. And if war clouds seem to threaten, then also the nation can ill afford to be possessed of an Army whose personnel consists of any but the cream of the nation. If the battles of the Great War taught no other lesson, they proved beyond dispute that the quality of troops outweighs any consideration of quantity. A few intelligent, resolute men, well trained and equipped, on both sides showed over and over again that they can out-wit and withstand the most formidable attack by great numbers. I sometimes doubt whether Governments fully realise the power and influence of the British people, as exemplified by the Army, in world affairs. The custodians of the cultural inheritance cannot be hired for a shilling a day. After seven years of service in the outposts of Empire, they will not tolerate being thrown back upon public charity with the worst possible chance of absorption within the industrial machine. There is a practical solution, one worthy of a great nation, worthy of the Army, so rich in those traditions which have founded and sustained the national and Imperial life.

The first duty of defence is the security of the British people in their homes. Factory and mine workers, those engaged in essential trades and industries, women and children, must not only be protected, but they must also be as free as possible, having regard to the necessary impositions of the Defence of the Realm—which, after all, are only details—to pursue their life in the ways characteristic of the nation in peace. Unless such conditions are ensured, the vitality of the nation will be lowered, its morale weakened and even depression and panic would ensue.

No shrill propaganda directed towards the building of a giant Air Force, nor the urgent and closer attention to the development of mechanical means in the Army (both of which are expert matters and subordinate to the consideration of national defence as a whole), should be permitted to become a smoke-screen obscuring the real issue. The Great War certainly taught us that there are at any given moment sufficient foodstuffs produced within Great Britain to keep our population alive at starvation level for six weeks, and no longer. To speak of invasion is to enter the realm of phantasia. But to speak of starvation is to speak of facts, in the realm of reality.

Of necessity, I have gone somewhat outside the text, with the object of showing that the true solution of the major problem of defence can be made also to serve the immediate needs of the personnel of the Army. Some commentators hold the view that the 'shortage of recruits lies in the exacting conditions of selection.' From a regimental dépôt I received the following the other day: 'Standard of recruits still pretty low, mentally and physically. Yet these are the successful 32 per cent. of those who apply for the "King's shilling." What must the other 68 per cent. rejections be like?' No youth of pride and ambition will enter any kind of profession unless he has a reasonable chance of being able to continue in its service. He seeks a permanent livelihood, and a salary on which he can marry and play his part as a good citizen. The fact is that the recruit has no such guarantee. Yet, for the most part taken from blind alleys in city life, introduced to a new comradeship, inured to the open air, the camp and the field, the youngster comes very much under the spell of Nature, and often would gladly

continue a life in the open air upon the soil. No country in the world can afford to destroy its yeoman and peasant community. The Army recruit should be offered the opportunity for continuance in a guaranteed State service, in village communities established for the purpose, trained in the last year of his service in dairy, fruit, poultry, vegetable farming, or in forestry or horticulture, these village communities being worked upon a co-operative basis, both as part of the first line of national defence—that is to say, food production—and as the just reward to the soldier for his service to the British people. There are great tracts of land upon which such colonies could be set up; and they would be a cause of pride to the soldier himself, to the Army and to the nation. The statistics show that hundreds of thousands of men, with their families, can be reabsorbed upon the land. In any such scheme, provision should be made for men leaving the colours year by year. There are no difficulties: it is merely a question of organisation, and thereafter of contributing to the defender of peace and of the cultural inheritance his right to live upon the land for which he has contributed his service. Thus the scheme would contribute directly to the main problem of national defence, as certainly also it would secure for the nation the finest type of man for the Army.

But there is also a lack of imagination in many of the Army proceedings which will deter both officer and man from accepting its obligations. The system of discipline and parade training must be brought up to date. The world of civilisation lives in its cities, divorced from those settings in which a man feels himself upon terms of intimacy with soil and with his fellow-men. The world of the Army lives in camps, upon the fields, on plains and among hills. The universe pursues its course as one rhythmic whole, of which man is part. Body and thought continue to spin throughout life as do the nebulae with which in the universe we have our harmony. This is inescapable. The whole of Army training is slowed down to the ceremonial rate, and this applies to the system of discipline by which it is hoped to secure fighting efficiency. 'Ours not to reason why, ours but to do and die' is an absurd slogan. A system of discipline based on such a concept may secure that men, in waves of assault, will present the breast to the lash of machine-gun bullets,

but it will win no battle of the future. The German tactics of infiltration, introduced in 1918, demonstrated the value of the training of individual initiative. In a mechanised age human determination must master the machine: it must correspond with the new rhythm of civilisation, but it must not be subordinate to the mechanism. Waterloo formations, bellowing at young men, supervising their most trivial occupations, not only destroys personal initiative, but in an age of universal education is irritating and may therefore be contrary to good discipline itself. Mutual confidence and respect is the foundation of morale. I doubt if any young man can respect the shouting drill-sergeant, though he may learn to have confidence in him 'off parade.' It will not be forgotten that everything consists of vibrations; and if the vibration rate changes as to the use of weapons and duties, the corresponding *tempo* of thought must also be changed if there is to be efficiency. In civilian life I can speak quietly into a loud speaker and command a multitude. I trained Indian boys to perform a series of highly complicated gymnastic exercises by the use of signs without a word being spoken. They were obliged to use their minds. This, surely, is what is wanted.

Certain critics of the new *tempo* which I have elsewhere suggested¹ as necessary to creating the Army into a 'National Movement' suggests that because the discipline and ceremonial training of the Brigade of Guards are traditional, and because 'they maintained their full peace-time discipline' during the war, there is no need for any kind of reform. Moreover, it is said that the Guards do not lack recruits; and in the war 'were in a class by themselves.'² The Brigade of Guards cannot, I suggest, be a test of comparison. There is a glamour about the Guards: they spend much of their time in London, an attraction to the countryman from whom the Guards largely recruit. Three years with the colours is a very different contract from seven. In the employment market there is not much to choose between a young man of eighteen and twenty-one, but all the factors change when a man has reached maturity, and should be skilled, at the age of twenty-six. It is agreed that during the war the

¹ The *Army Quarterly*, April 1935.

² Brigadier-General John Charteris.

Guards proved splendid fighting men. But I suggest it would be difficult indeed for any historian to assert that the Guards were better than, for example, was such a line battalion as the 2nd Worcestershires throughout the whole war, with such exploits to their credit as Gheluvelt, 1914, and, testifying to an unbroken fighting efficiency, the defence of Neuve Église in April 1918. For ceremonial a different kind of training is required: an intelligent man can perform a variety of functions. The point is that the whole of the training is slowed down to the ceremonial rate, and this applies to the system of discipline by which it is hoped to secure fighting efficiency.

Throughout British life we observe a breakaway by the most virile of our youth from the drab stuffiness of city life and their quest for the open spaces. This movement, exemplified by the Boy Scouts, hiking, camping, cycling, Youth Hostels and the like, is both natural and spontaneous. These youths are the very type who should represent the nation in the Army. The barrack square and cleaning buttons will not appeal to them. The young people who roam the downs and fells and moors as a protest against the clocked-in life of factories and cities have studied both the comfort and efficiency of their kit. This is in imitation of that worn by men accustomed to mountain and to rough going, and prescribes with unerring certainty the kind of uniform with which a practical army should be equipped. A Society of Tailors at their annual conference, as reported in the Press, condemned the new experiment in uniform as 'a hiker's dress.' That seems to be the best testimonial that it can require, if only the Army Council will not be intimidated by sartorial societies and will prescribe what is truly good to look upon and efficient.

Let the British race be physically perfect—in shape, in vigour, and in movement. To work to this end is the duty of all citizens, to themselves and to the race. It is in man himself that this increase and profit and exaltation of body and spirit is desirable. Let man be furnished in himself with health, safety, strength—the perfection of physical existence. These precepts apply to the nation as a whole. The Army, with its purposive physical training, wherein also men must move swiftly and must be possessed of the fullest freedom

of limb and muscle, cannot be equipped in a straitjacket, its knees encompassed with rolls of cloth, its middle tied round with a tight belt.

An Army correspondent in the Press, taking part in the recruiting controversy, recently asserted 'it is essential that the men should have an attractive uniform for ceremonial and walking out.' He favoured 'a scarlet tunic, cut on the Foot-Guards pattern, a white web Lancer belt, a pill-box hat and light walking-out boots.' It seems impossible to think of anything more humiliating to the kind of recruit that the modern Army requires than the suggestion that they should be attired as popinjays. Young women are to run helter-skelter after young men in red jackets! The soldiers are to walk delicately like Agag, softly to tread the streets, and to pirouette like chorus boys in musical comedy. Why not suggest a pouch on the 'white web Lancer belt,' in which to carry a 'manicure-set, Mark One,' and instruments with which to pluck the eyebrows, and 'Puff, powder, in box, gilt, soldiers, for the use of' with a set of jolly little jemima boots for the fireside after the day's parade? An Army possessed of possibilities for mobility, hitherto undreamed of, and yet in the experimental stage, must change beyond the recognition of those who knew it as a pre-war force.

Despite its scientific means, a mechanised Army will prove of less value in battle than did waves of over-laden infantry at the Battle of the Somme, if the soldier, physically and mentally, has not been schooled to be just as 'action fit' as is the automatic weapon, with the mind confident in its vehicle, as light as a hair-trigger. What uniform, then, serves the ethical, practical and ceremonial purpose? Survey the world of human activity. Freedom of knees is everywhere the condition—running, football, hiking, scouting, tennis, mountaineering. Give the Army 'shorts.' They are efficient and always smart, no rolls of serge around the knees. Plus-fours are absurd, serving neither efficiency nor 'smartness'; while in wet weather, dripping bags are impossible. Boys do not catch cold from bare knees, nor do men. There is no argument against shorts, except possibly the 'cold feet' of those who ought to take the decision.

If a smart uniform is in fact part of the incentive to recruiting, then it is clear that this uniform must appeal to the

mind of the best of our youth. They are not seen swaddled as 'softies,' nor at the best equipped for the Arctic, but wearing shorts and open necked shirts; and they have responded naturally to the call of the out-of-doors as the compensation for a machine-made life. The public sees its Army. The man-in-the-street should be able to observe in its spirit and deportment something to which he himself would attain. Tight tunics and even tighter trouserings served well the motionless ranks of Waterloo, where the roar of the colour-sergeant, before the age of the loud-speaker, produced the now useless volley. But these things ill serve an Army whose duties prescribe a speed equal to its weapons and an independence of action which necessitates the highest degree of individual freedom and movement. Moreover, true discipline consists in an instantaneous obedience to orders, anticipated and understood, mellowed in a comradeship, off parade, wherein is learned mutual confidence and respect. It is strange that in the Indian Army this relationship between officer and man is more fully experienced than in the British Army, where, with the sublimation of class distinction, the new comradeship, of which the war years were the great exemplar, should be paramount.

If recruiting requires some stimulus, it is to be found, not by a reversion to the peacock, but by assuming the *rôle* of the panther. The recruit must be made to realise with dramatic force that as he enters the training dépôt he throws off the older life of ease and sloth. He has become the leader of a 'movement.' He must first be made conscious of his own ignorance and incapacity. He is not a civilian in uniform, not the most highly decorated male, whose business is to capture female hearts by frisking in the parks and on the side-walks. But he must be taught to feel himself at one with the soil of his native land, a free man, physically free, in a uniform which expresses that freedom and in which he can move and appreciate his own strength and the benefit of his training. I postulate pride of body as a first essential to a true military morale. A high aspiration for the body is much more likely to keep a man immune from 'Curragh Wrens' than would the psychological results which would inevitably flow from making him their best walking advertisement. Nature has joined together brain and body. There is

still a tendency to put them asunder, the military instructor being content to have the body hygienically examined and then concentrating upon drill and mechanics. The best results are only attainable when the body participates with the mind from first to last. The body has first to be lifted in the respect of its owner to be something which is as much to be cared for as is the mechanism of the machine-gun, and which is something far more beautiful. The Army can readily be used as a citizen propaganda force. The man-in-the-street should be able to observe in the spirit and deportment of the Army something to which he himself would attain. The Service should be an enviable one. There should be something to excite envy; and that can only be an elevated state of mind.

Certain people claiming to be pacifists, though usually engaged in inciting others to war, and in the class war, weak-minded and vicious, apply to this high aspiration the term 'militarism.' There are other pacifists, high-minded men, who think of the patriot as the type which led Dr. Johnson to name 'patriotism' as 'the last refuge of the scoundrel.' Naked self-interest has too often donned the cloak of patriotism, but we are here concerned, not with the wicked, but with those of pure motive who are earnestly seeking to find the ways of peace and to use our national institutions to the best possible advantage. The British Army has never been militaristic. Its function for the future should be, can be, must be, the spear-point of a cultural movement both in Britain and throughout the Empire. But it cannot attain to such an ideal unless the *tempo* is changed. Men do not often realise that the same problem holds in the realm of ideas, facts and emotions. They imagine that by amassing facts, statistics, and theories they can solve problems. But facts, as such, are meaningless. Valuable truth is not knowledge of facts, but the relationship of facts. Where facts are directly related they fall under the law of cause and effect and can be explained by the intellect. But there are emotional relationships and instinctive relationships, where other principles than the directly causal hold good. It is here that the psychology of discipline and of training requires a complete overhaul, a reburnishing with ideals, a co-ordination of the whole realm of ideas, facts and emotions.

The necessary ingredients from which to procure such an Army, as a movement, are: First, to guarantee to the soldier his after-life. Secondly, to make him conscious that he is an exalted being, performing services of the most profound value to his race and to the Imperial charge. Thirdly, to infuse him with the spirit of comradeship; and here, except in the higher ranks, he should remain unmarried, marriage being part of that reward to which he will look forward, upon the completion of his service, when at the age of about twenty-seven he sets up a home and enters into his new community life. Fourthly, he must be equipped and trained as becomes a man of intelligence, virile and filled with the spirit of the countryside.

The officer must have opened up to him opportunities for the advancement of merit and of learning. It is the fact that very few officers are really interested in their profession and in the wider problems of Empire, for the simple reason that they are never encouraged to do so: the libraries are inadequate; studies are perfunctory; and in order to attain to the Staff College, almost universally, officers employ crammers and civilian postal courses in order that they may be equipped with military knowledge! Were the cultural breach not so wide between officers and men, officers would be far more interested in their charge, and would not merely perform perfunctory parades, but would also serve as leaders of the 'movement,' in the same way as in Europe and in the Orient those familiar with the facts can observe, both historically and recently, the implications of the real meaning of 'Aristos.'

These observations apply with equal force to the nation as a whole. The time must come when the unemployed middle-aged men long out of work and youths who have never done a day's labour in their lives must be incorporated into a 'movement,' in order that they shall be re-engaged in the national life. They must be both trained and led. They cannot be bullied or cajoled. They must be taught to value physical excellence for its own sake, to reassert pride of race, to be worthy of the cultural inheritance, to understand the meaning of service and of comradeship. Such a task within the governmental scheme is one of the largest and one of the grandest which can fire the imagination and enthusiasm of

man. In this the Army can play its part, with its trained leadership, its regimental bands, its physical training instructors and its traditions.

Though I advocate no slavish imitation of any Continental institutions, I commend the system of the German *Arbeitslager* as worthy of close attention. They carry into civilian life the spirit of service and of comradeship traditionally associated with war which so ardent a pacifist as is Mr. Delisle Burns advocated as one of the surest guarantees of peace. By some such system must our derelict population be led.

The way of salvation for Great Britain and for the world is for Britons to realise their internal strength by undertaking their own social regeneration. There is a need, an urgent need, in spiritual responsibility to the rest of the world, for Britain to exploit that strange reserve of noble power to which the faces of the common people bear witness. Great Britain has a crucial part to play in world affairs. British regeneration must be based upon a living faith, which owes its allegiance to a Power beyond and to a Power within, to the brightness of the sun and the invisibility of the blood. The Army as the spear-point, the nation as the whole, must be trained for the assumption of authority, and trained—mark it well—not only in material policies, but trained equally in the ideology which, in its very essence, shall determine real politics.

GRAHAM SETON HUTCHISON.

INSTITUTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES

By PROFESSOR W. BLAIR-BELL, LL.D., M.D., F.R.C.S.

THE British Hospitals Association at a recent conference discussed the position of the voluntary hospitals and the growing 'menace' to their welfare of State-controlled institutions, and appointed a Commission to report on the situation and on the best ways of meeting the problems created.

Whether the position should be regarded as dangerous or as an inevitable process of social evolution remains to be seen; much will depend on the wisdom of the voluntary-hospital authorities, for sociological experiments in the political field can be prevented only by the setting of a practical example so excellent that 'reform' is impossible as well as unnecessary. It cannot be denied that the lack of a definite policy, the absence of functional progressiveness and co-ordination, and inherent weaknesses in the voluntary-hospital system have been responsible for the present state of affairs: in other words, an unassailable example of economical efficiency has *not* been set.

Voluntary medical relief, dating from early mediæval times and associated almost entirely for a long period with the charity of religious orders, has been a cherished, and almost legendary, feature of the social life of Great Britain. The advantages of it have often been set forth, and they are once more stated in the Report of the Liverpool Commission in the usual manner. Strictly analysed, these advantages are largely sentimental, and the other side of the picture is rarely presented. It is, however, clear that the voluntary-hospital system is no longer 'voluntary' in the same sense as it was a generation ago. Most of us remember the time when no professional man connected with a voluntary hospital, not even the resident house-surgeons and house-

physicians, received payment of any kind, and when no patient was asked or expected to make a contribution to the cost of maintenance. It is well to remember this, for times have quickly changed and the financial expediencies of voluntary hospitals with them; and we must not forget that such changes affect deeply not only contemporary thought, but also tradition and latent sentiment.

The time has arrived, therefore, when it is necessary that an unbiassed and knowledgeable survey of the conditions of medical services in voluntary institutions should be made. If this is not done in a full and an impartial manner, and if the right conclusions are not reached and implemented, then complete State control is inevitable, whether it be 'desirable' or not.

Financial considerations in connexion with voluntary hospitals, formerly unembarrassing, are now creating concern for the following reasons :

(a) The cost of maintenance and of up-to-date medical methods of diagnosis and treatment has steadily increased, and the peak has by no means been reached.

(b) The prospects of substantial support from individuals are diminishing in the face of increased taxation, the falling of the larger incomes, and the wider distribution, or levelling, of wealth in the community.

(c) The uneconomic distribution of voluntary funds in general is producing vested interests, and foci of contentment or disappointment as the case may be.

(d) There is a growing feeling among the people that the State should provide all medical relief, and in this idea every political party appears to acquiesce.

(e) There has been a considerable increase in the demand for hospital beds for reasons which must be obvious to all, and this is not confined to the really poor for whom provision was originally made.

In the *Hospital Year-book* for 1935 it is stated that in 1933 the total amount received by voluntary hospitals in London, the Provinces (including Wales), Scotland and Ireland was about £16,000,000, the total expenditure (capital and maintenance) about £15,000,000, and the surplus £1,000,000.

The ordinary person reading this statement alone would probably say, 'Splendid! There is nothing about which to worry.' Let us see whether this is true or not.

Invested funds of over £42,000,000 provided an income of about £1,750,000—that is, a ninth of the total sum required for maintenance. Legacies in Scotland and the provinces yielded about £1,500,000 in this year. If figures had been forthcoming from London and Ireland the total sum received from this source might have reached £3,000,000.

The amount raised by various contributory schemes, including King Edward's Fund, was about £3,320,000. It is said¹ that certain of these pay on an average to local hospitals 70 per cent. of the cost of their maintenance.

Sweepstakes in Ireland for the year in question (1933) enabled disbursements to the amount of £1,500,000 to be made to fifty hospitals in the Irish Free State.

If we add together the sums accruing from investments, legacies, contributory schemes and sweepstakes (Dublin) we find that nearly £10,000,000 were collected from these sources—about two-thirds of the total of annual receipts.

In addition, large sums of public money were received by way of grants for special clinics, and even more from patients in payment for maintenance and treatment. The remainder—a small and rapidly-declining source of revenue—was raised by individual effort.

Collective figures of the sources of income of all hospitals are unobtainable at present. But of one large hospital with an annual expenditure of £52,000 the following details may be given in round figures :

Contributory Funds and Special-day Street Collections.	£16,000
Receipts (grants, and payments by patients) for services rendered	£20,000
Dividends, etc., from investments and property	£8,000
Legacies	£4,000
Voluntary gifts (money and kind)	£5,000

It will be seen that the voluntary contributions² yielded about one-tenth only of the income. This probably represents the general position, and shows how far hospitals have receded from their voluntary status in regard to support as well as in the other respects already mentioned.

¹ See paper by Sidney Lamb, *Bulletin American College of Surgeons*, March 1935, p. 26.

² Legacies are excluded, for they may be invested.

In an interesting article in this Review (May 1935) Sir Charles Harris calls attention to the danger of regarding the aggregate surplus for one year as an indication of continuing prosperity, although the total surplus has been rising a little since 1931, for one hospital in every three in London, and one in every four elsewhere, spent more than they received. Besides, a surplus in one year may be followed by a deficit in the next. Further, it is to be inferred that deficits may be repeated annually; but there are no figures to show what the accumulated deficits are. If the *accumulated deficits* of all hospitals were known the financial position would appear to be much worse than on the present showing.

A careful financial survey indicates:

(1) That almost every patient, either directly or indirectly, is now expected to contribute to his or her keep and hospital treatment, and increasingly fewer pay nothing; and that soon no one, save the destitute and aged infirm, will receive free medical relief.

(2) That individual voluntary support is becoming a negligible factor in the maintenance of hospitals.

(3) That the withdrawal of State grants, which even now is taking place as provision is made by local authorities to do the work themselves, and of the contributory funds, which will occur with the adoption of State insurance for hospital services—for the man in the street will not pay twice for the same thing—will leave the voluntary hospitals, conducted on the present lines, high and dry.

A generation ago the voluntary hospitals of this country consisted only of the teaching-schools in the large centres, county hospitals of moderate size, and the cottage hospitals, the functions of which will be discussed presently. In all, as we have seen, the medical services were without direct reward until recent times. Then, with the advancement of the modern inverted doctrine 'no pay, no work', and to some extent with the altered social type of doctor, it became the custom to pay salaries to young resident medical officers.

When, later, payments were expected from patients and grants were made from public funds, first for the treatment of tuberculosis, then for that of venereal diseases and for the upkeep of maternity beds and antenatal clinics, the British Medical Association demanded that hospital committees

should hand over some of the money so received to their medical staffs. In many cases the medical boards, it is true, allocated most of the sums paid in this way to hospital purposes, such as the salaries of registrars.

In relation to all this it should be stated that, whereas formerly there existed in the regulations of many, perhaps of most, teaching-hospitals a rule that members of the honorary staff were debarred from taking appointments in Poor Law institutions where salaries were, of course, paid, this rule was gradually relaxed; and the medical profession itself has gone a long way towards weakening the scientific status and prestige of voluntary hospitals and towards making the municipal general hospitals possible on a really efficient scale by accepting paid posts on the staffs of the latter.

Meanwhile, immediately following the war, the problem of an ample number of private rooms and wards in hospitals became a pressing question. This had long been a successful and paying proposition with the hospital committees and medical staffs in America, Canada and elsewhere, as on the continent of Europe. The idea had been taken up in this country, strangely enough but slowly. Still the possession of beds for private patients is now regarded as an important feature of many teaching-hospitals.

It must not be supposed from what has just been said that reference is made to teaching-schools only, for there is no doubt that the altered circumstances have played some part in causing the competition in medical services to which reference will be made later, and which has led general-practitioner surgeons and radiologists in the county and cottage hospitals to attempt to rival, to the serious disadvantage of the public, the work of experts in the teaching-schools. The shortage of beds in the university centres, which is partly responsible for this state of affairs, would automatically be made good if the scheme to be proposed were adopted.

In this country the term 'State-controlled institution' covers hospitals of many different kinds. No extended reference need be made to such organisations as those devoted to the care of tuberculous patients, nor need we consider institutions for the segregation of infectious diseases and for the care of the insane and feeble-minded, for they in no way enter into competition with voluntary hospitals. The

general hospitals, however, under county and municipal control (local authorities) by way of the Ministry of Health, and therefore with centralised administration and with practically unlimited resources, are thought to be a grave menace to the voluntary hospitals, which, it is said, will be 'frozen out' with the advent of a State Medical Service.

It is necessary, then, to examine the degree of efficiency and usefulness of these State institutions, and to discover, if possible, whether such a system, if well conducted, should be considered antagonistic or complementary to, or capable of co-ordination with, the voluntary system.

In coming to a conclusion it is advisable not to consider the system only in this country, in which it dates from a year so recent as 1929, but also to note what has happened over a long period in other places.

On the continent of Europe the preservation and repair of health has in modern times been almost entirely a matter of State control, although the earlier history of medical care in every country is exactly similar to that obtaining in Great Britain.

Still it cannot be denied that national psychology differs, and that what may suit Scandinavian, Latin, German, and other races may be distasteful to British ideas and feelings. This, indeed, explains the long-continued existence of the voluntary hospitals in this country. Nevertheless, even when regarded from the highest ideals of humanity and efficient service, it is not possible to get away from the fact that there is nothing better to be seen in this country than the State-controlled hospitals in many places on the Continent. In Sweden, for example, the arrangements are well-nigh perfect. Granted, Sweden has a small and remarkably healthy population, and in this respect, with other Scandinavian countries, it has an advantage over the more industrialised nations.

What impresses the visitor to Scandinavian hospitals, however, is not only the enthusiasm, progressiveness, judgment, manner and humanity of the whole-time staff from the professor downwards, and the entire freedom of action accorded to them, but also the extraordinary suitability and often beauty of the environment.

In addition to immediate treatment under central adminis-

tration, what is called a 'follow-up' organisation of an efficient character is possible to an extent which cannot be attained by the ordinary voluntary hospitals.

We must be cautious in asserting that such amenities and effective arrangements as those existing in Scandinavia would not be possible in State-controlled institutions in this country.

We are still, it seems, under the gloomy shadow of the old Poor Law institutions, with their autocratic relieving officers, and are scared by the rapid change that has come about since 1929, when it became officially recognised that to be poor is not a criminal offence. Nevertheless, the public is still prejudiced—although less so than formerly—against State institutions, and prefers the more home-like, kindly and personal atmosphere of voluntary institutions. Moreover, municipal hospitals are most ungenerously staffed both in regard to doctors and nurses. This is a serious flaw in the system, but it is one which is easily remedied.

Again, in this liberty-loving country we are very sensitive about the idealism of our charities so long connected with, and an aspect of, our religious beliefs. The voluntary system is said to be a tender plant which will not stand rude bureaucratic control. It is hard to discover how much of this is a true belief and how much it is merely a rhetorical point in argument. Humanitarianism may be national as well as individual, and is at any rate bound to become so in the course of time. During the last century we have witnessed, for example, an entire change of method in the care of criminals in our prisons. However, there can be no doubt that the delightful *milieu* of the voluntary hospitals is largely due to the management of them by committees composed of members both of the laity and of the medical profession.

A few words must be said here concerning medical teaching and research.

Formerly, all the universities were independent—autonomic they still are—but now for many years large grants have been received from Government sources. Up to the present time there has been little or no official interference, and the grants have proved essential to the continuance of the work of the universities. On the Continent the universi-

ties are entirely financed and controlled by the State, and the teaching-hospitals are attached to them.

The clinical teaching of medical students and the training of post-graduates has been conducted in voluntary teaching-hospitals in this country for the last 200 years at least. Yet, this very year, it is to be noted, there has been launched a large post-graduate organisation which to all intents and purposes, however well-concealed or little advertised, is State-controlled; and this with the concurrence and help of the University of London and the medical profession, for the staff has been enlisted on a whole-time salaried basis. The Hammersmith Hospital units concerned belong to the London County Council; the Government has made a large capital grant, and the London University has appointed the directors of departments to professorships, and their first assistants to readerships.

It is often stated—and Lord Cozens-Hardy has expressed the view very strongly—that research and the advancement of knowledge will be shattered by ‘the heavy hand of officialdom.’ This is hardly a fair statement, and it is unsupported by evidence. No better research work has been performed anywhere than in the State-controlled institutions on the Continent; and have we not our own National Research Council entirely subsidised by the State? It is the personal equation—ambition, scientific curiosity, or the thirst for knowledge and the desire to help suffering mankind—that drives men on and leads to results even in the face of difficulties from which the voluntary system itself is not free.

If it be decided that the voluntary system is too valuable to lose, or that before its disappearance it should set an inescapable example to that which may follow, then extensive reorganisation must be taken in hand *immediately*. The extraordinarily rapid march of State services in five years leaves us no doubt of the urgency of the matter; and the measures adopted must be national and thorough, as we shall now indicate, rather than local and limited.

Co-ordination.—At present each voluntary hospital is a self-contained autonomous unit, not only in regard to the details of medical organisation, but also in the related questions of administration and economics. In the larger teaching-hospitals, in which every branch of medicine is, or should be,

represented, and in which all forms of equipment for diagnosis and treatment are available in association with the university laboratories, very efficient service can be given. But in those cities in which there are more teaching-hospitals than one, competition may lead to economic difficulties. Moreover, complete isolation may cause them to become a prey to the superior and undivided forces of municipal enterprises.

To take the case of Liverpool, in which city the situation has become acute, there are four large general hospitals each forming a unit of the ‘clinical school.’ There are also special hospitals allied to the medical school—for example, a Women’s Hospital, a Maternity Hospital, each with more than 100 beds, a Children’s Hospital, and so on. In all about 2000 beds. In the midst of these have been rapidly developed the large municipal general and special hospitals containing about 5000 beds³ with a day and night, seven-day-a-week, ambulance service, compared with which there is for the use of the voluntary hospitals a day ambulance service for six days (not nights) of the week only. The result is that a large majority of all urgent cases now go to the municipal hospitals, which are also more readily able to ‘oblige’ general practitioners by admitting their patients immediately in response to a telephone message. With this may be contrasted the often unsatisfactory and difficult arrangements for admission to the voluntary hospitals.

To improve the state of affairs in Liverpool, it has been accepted in principle that the teaching-hospitals must amalgamate, and pool all resources.

In Birmingham the two large general hospitals, the General and the Queen’s, have joined to form a new United Hospital to be erected on the University site at Edgbaston.

At present the teaching-hospitals ‘allow’ the medical students to use their wards, and their staffs to teach. That position must be changed: the teaching-hospital wards must be regarded as the university laboratories for clinical work.

With the amalgamation of teaching-hospitals and the consequent enlargement of base hospitals in university centres

³ In England and Wales there were in 1933 approximately 63,000 beds in voluntary institutions (excluding those for tuberculosis), and about 56,000 in hospitals under local authorities, excluding those for tuberculosis, infectious diseases, insanity, and chronic infirmities of the old.

it will become necessary to reconsider the position of teachers. It seems likely that professors should be whole-time and have charge of large departments both in the universities and hospitals. This should be possible without the necessity of large salaries, if a considerable number of private beds were allotted to each professor, who would not engage in consultations or treatment outside, work of this kind being conducted by his assistants. All the fees so obtained could be shared *pro rata* among the 'team.'

Now, with regard to all other hospitals, it may be stated at once that the advances in medical practice and medical skill have led to an unfortunate state of affairs to which reference has already been made. Almost entirely, county hospitals and cottage hospitals are staffed by general practitioners who are rarely qualified by training and experience to exercise expert knowledge in diagnosis, and the judgment and skill necessary for treatment, especially surgical intervention, in difficult cases. Yet even in many cottage hospitals the X-ray diagnoses and surgical operations attempted are exactly the same *on paper* as those which are the routine work of expert specialists in teaching-hospitals. In the result the genuine general practitioner is often unable to obtain beds in which to place his serious medical conditions—for example, pneumonia—those requiring observation, and those needing obstetrical help, as well as accidents—for instance, burns—which require treatment on the spot, the very work for which these hospitals were founded.

From this it will be evident that in the matter of organisation, so far as the clinical work is concerned, some close co-ordination—linking-up—of all types of hospitals is imperative if the patient is to receive the best treatment possible in every case; and this should be a fundamental precept. Regional organisations on these lines were enunciated in the report of the Consultative Council of the Ministry of Health, of which Lord Dawson was chairman, in 1920, but unfortunately the report submitted received no attention, and the Council ceased to function. In 1931⁴ the present writer demanded a similar type of organisation in relation to a maternity service, then using the analogy of military hospital arrangements—casualty clearing-stations,

⁴ *Ingleby Lectures*, Birmingham University. (*Lancet*, May 30 and June 13, 1931.)

field hospitals and base hospitals. In connexion with this there should be a well-organised transport service.

So much, then, for what is required. Now for the administration necessary. This should consist of a Central Administrative Council, an *ad hoc* body working in close harmony with the Ministry of Health for reasons which will be clear directly. Under this there should be Regional Councils for considerable areas, which would be responsible for the finance *and functions* of all hospitals in each regional area, from cottage hospitals to teaching-hospitals at the base or bases. Private interests, whether lay or professional, must not be allowed to stand in the way of this reorganisation.

Economics.—Subject to confirmation by the Central Administrative Council, the Regional Councils should deal with the financial aspects—receipts and expenditure—each in its own district. They should control capital expenditure in regard to buildings, extensions, equipment and maintenance, and deal with almonry and the collection of voluntary contributions and contributory funds, the organisers of which should be represented on the local councils. Collective buying should also come within their purview. All expensive and scientifically unsatisfactory arrangements such as special hospitals for maternity and ophthalmology would disappear.

Material.—To bring buildings and equipment into line with the linking-up co-ordination to be practised could only be a gradual process. It would be economically disastrous in many cases to scrap modern buildings and their contents; but the controlling organisation mentioned would at least prevent the erection and equipment of new institutions which were not suitable or necessary to the general regional requirements, as from time to time determined in respect of increasing population, industrialisation, and the rest.

Since special hospitals have been mentioned, we may perhaps most appropriately in this place call attention to their disadvantages—excluding, of course, those for infective and mental disorders, as provided by local authorities.

Special hospitals have arisen owing to the want of proper provision for the specialities concerned—obstetrics and gynaecology, orthopaedics, ophthalmology, laryngology, children's diseases, skin diseases, and dentistry—in the large general hospitals, even in those of the teaching-schools.

This neglect has led to a waste of public money, for special hospitals are uneconomical in regard to capital outlay and are unduly expensive in upkeep—the cost per bed. There can be no doubt that if adequate special departments had been provided in the larger general hospitals—as they must be in the future—the distribution of administrative expenses and overhead charges would have greatly reduced the expense of the treatment of special diseases. Moreover, the provision of a good nursing staff is a difficult matter in special hospitals, for in them a probationer nurse cannot obtain the training rightly demanded by the General Nursing Council. Further, in special hospitals there cannot be the same facilities for teaching students and for consultation as those which obtain in general teaching-hospitals. With a full regionally linked-up system much that is found in cottage hospitals—elaborate operation theatres and radiological departments—would not be required, capital outlay and cost of maintenance being thereby greatly reduced.

Medical Personnel.—This would concern not only doctors, but also nurses; and in a properly conducted, regionally-co-operative system, greater facilities and opportunities would be offered to each in his or her own sphere of work, with the result that greater interest would be created and thereby more efficient service secured. First, with regard to the nurses, the existing difficulty of obtaining nurses of an educated type for the smaller hospitals and the special departments would be entirely overcome. Secondly, with regard to the medical service, it would be found that in the scheme enunciated the work of all practitioners would be facilitated and improved. The cottage hospitals and county hospitals would perform their proper functions; that is to say, the general practitioners attached to them would have adequate accommodation for their medical and obstetrical cases. Small clinical laboratories for simple and routine investigations would be established in different districts to serve several hospitals, and the more difficult pathological work would be sent to the university centre.

The question of full co-operation between voluntary and municipal hospitals, to which we now come, is most difficult, yet it is of primary importance and must be solved. In the Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry

of Health (Sir George Newman) for the year 1933, the following statement is made (p. 193):

The surveys clearly indicate that *at the present time* co-operation between the local authorities and the governing bodies and medical staffs of voluntary hospitals is not merely a desideratum but an imperative need, and that this is likely to continue in increasing degree in the future. [Italics not in original.]

In the following sentence the meaning of co-operation, which is a fundamental requirement, is evaded:

It is not necessary for the State to define the respective spheres of the voluntary hospitals and those of the local authorities, for these spheres require to be differently considered in different cases. What is necessary is to secure effective and continuous co-operation between them for the treatment and prevention of disease in all classes of the community.

What the chief medical officer may mean by 'co-operation' is that no definite and final unification between the two systems should be contemplated, for although *at the present time* the local authorities require medical and surgical brains, which can only be obtained from the voluntary hospitals, the time will come, as indeed it is rapidly coming, when the municipal hospitals will have *their own* whole-time paid staffs of consultants.

A critical examination of the whole position, then, points rather to the belief that much of the so-called co-operation is intended by the public authorities to be temporary and for their own advantage, and to be also of the nature of a diplomatic sedative to screen further developments. This, at any rate, is the view of those who regard the encroachments of the municipal system with suspicion.

It is clear, too, that until all the voluntary hospitals from teaching-schools to cottage hospitals have effected full co-operation and co-ordination among themselves, and can speak with one national voice, it will be difficult, if not impossible, authoritatively to define what co-ordination between the voluntary and municipal systems should imply.

We move therefore, in conclusion, on to hypothetical ground; for, in order to make suggestions in regard to co-operation between the two systems we must premise that the voluntary system has first been reorganised on the lines presented, and has an elected Central Council with statutory functions.

In these circumstances co-operation should be established between the following bodies: A. Ministry of Health. B. Voluntary Hospital Council. C. Medical Schools and Examining Colleges and Boards. To a considerable extent B and C are interconnected locally and generally through the teaching and examining requirements of the General Medical Council.

In drafting a synopsis of mutual co-operation and co-ordination in medical relief between the State enterprises and those of the voluntary hospitals, it must be admitted that each has its good points. The State should make *specified* grants in regard to general preclinical and to clinical teaching in universities, and for research. As regards the hospitals and convalescent homes, both the voluntary and State-controlled institutions (with the exceptions indicated), they should be regionally amalgamated under joint control for the diagnosis and treatment of injuries and medical, surgical and obstetrical disorders. The State, through the local authorities, should contribute to the regional pools to which voluntary contributions would be made.

In this way a most efficient service, free from complete bureaucratic control, would be created without friction. The amalgamation of municipal with teaching-hospitals would provide the requisite number of beds—now lacking in the voluntary hospitals—to form large base-centres. Those who could afford to pay, and who were not covered by contributory and insurance schemes, would do so and be entitled to make their own arrangements, as indeed would the poor to some extent. With the smaller urban and rural hospitals reserved for the use of general practitioners this most important branch of the profession would be preserved as now, but with increased facilities and opportunities for work of the right kind.

W. BLAIR-BELL.

GAS OR ELECTRICITY FOR DOMESTIC HEATING?

A REPLY

By PROFESSOR E. W. MARCHANT, D.Sc.

As the opinion of an expert in fuel economy, the article by Professor Bone in the June number of this Review on this subject is of interest, but his comparison is heavily biased in favour of gas. The following pages are an attempt to correct the balance.

It is true that the use of gas tends to reduce smoke; but the gas supplied to-day is a very poisonous compound containing a high percentage of carbon monoxide, and, if it is used, great care should be taken to prevent leakage. It must be remembered that the development of the use of electricity is also an effective instrument for smoke abatement, and provides a service which is economical both for light and power as well as for heating. One of the chief advantages of electricity, however, is its greater cleanliness. In a room using coal fires and gas lighting the wall-paper, ceiling, and paint-work become dirty after only two or three years' use, fittings tarnish and require renewal; whereas in a room using electricity the paint-work will last longer, the ceilings do not blacken, and the walls remain clean.

It is necessary to point out also that, although the electrical industry is barely fifty years old and, according to Professor Bone, 'has the attractiveness and the self-confidence of youth, and it inspires in uncritical minds the impression of superiority with which adolescence is sometimes imbued,' it may lay some claim to justifying its exuberance. The electrical industry is now the fifth largest industry in the country; it employs continuously over 250,000 people, and, as far as the electrical supply part of it is concerned, maximum dividends are now fixed and economies in the production of electricity are

automatically passed on to the consumer. The average cost of electricity to the consumer has been reduced by 50 per cent. in the last ten years.

Professor Bone has stated the two bases of comparison between gas and electricity as (1) the proper utilisation of our national coal, and (2) the cost to the family budget. He rightly describes the first as a national question, and seems to imply that, from the national point of view, it would be better for all coal to be gasified. The electrical industry can help in the better use of coal, by burning coal that would otherwise be unmarketable; and it seems doubtful whether the scheme suggested by Professor Bone is practicable, since it is doubtful whether, if all the coal now being burnt for generating electrical energy were gasified, the coke by-products could be sold at prices that would cover the cost of production. The second basis of comparison is the one which is of most interest to the ordinary householder; and, from this point of view, fuel economy is relatively unimportant. In making comparative estimates of cost it is necessary to take into account many other factors than the cost of the fuel consumed in producing a certain quantity of heat. The cost of any service such as that of electricity or gas is made up of many items, of which fuel forms a relatively small part. To make comparisons, therefore, between the cost of producing heat by gas and electricity on the basis of fuel consumption *only*, leads to erroneous conclusions. The true basis of comparison is between the costs of supplying a given quantity of heat to the consumer by the two agents.

The cost of supplying electricity depends very largely on the nature of the demand for it. If electricity is wanted at a time when the demand is small, it is evident that the cost of supplying it should be based on what may be called the 'working cost'—*i.e.*, on the cost of the fuel, water, oil, etc., used in producing it, because no plant has to be installed to meet the demand. But if it is wanted at a time of large demand, extra plant must be installed to provide it, and the amount charged should depend, not solely on 'working costs,' but on the capital charge payable by the undertaking in respect of the capital expended in the central station and the distributing network to enable it to meet the demand. It follows that the cost of supplying consumers (in equity

and in practice) should depend on the nature of their demand; it must be higher when electrical energy is used only at a time when the general demand is large, and lower when it is used over a considerable part of the day. That is the reason for the difference in charge to different types of consumer. The so-called 'all-in' system of charging was introduced by the supply undertakings to encourage consumers to use as much electrical energy as possible, and is based on the principle that a certain sum should be received from the consumer to meet the capital charge involved in giving him a supply, and a charge per unit which is enough to cover all 'working costs.' The advantage of the arrangement is that the consumer has only to pay at the 'cost per unit' rate (which in Liverpool and in many other places is 0.5d. per unit) for the energy used in any additional electrical apparatus he installs.

Gas companies have recently obtained authority from Parliament to introduce a system of charging for gas similar to that which is used by the electricity undertakings, but it would seem that this method of charging has been introduced because it has been found popular with electricity consumers. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. Gas, as Professor Bone points out, can be stored and used whenever it is wanted. It is a commodity, therefore, which should rightly be sold at a fixed rate, because the cost of producing it does not depend upon the period of time at which the gas is used. It makes no difference to a gasworks whether a consumer takes his gas in large quantities over a short period or in small quantities over a long period, except in so far as it may be necessary to fit a larger pipe to give the extra supply.

Professor Bone cannot have it both ways. He says, quite rightly, that gas has the great advantage of being cheaply stored in bulk in holders, whereas the storage of electricity is so cumbersome as to be impracticable, on a large scale, and then describes how the Gas Undertakings Act of 1934 has enabled gas companies to adopt a three-part tariff, and adds: 'gas undertakings are at last enabled to meet the competition of electricity on common ground as regards flexibility of tariffs as between small and large consumers.' The only reason for this change in the method of charging for gas would appear to be that the method authorised by Parliament in the case of electricity supply has proved so popular,

There is very little ground in equity for this differentiation, as the volume of gas used by the consumer is a measure of the cost to the undertaking of supplying it. Electricity is not used entirely for heating; it is used for other purposes, for which it provides a very much cheaper substitute than any other agent, and for which, therefore, it is quite reasonable to make a charge based partly on the actual cost of supplying the energy to the consumer concerned and partly on the value of the service given as compared with the cost of competitive methods of providing the same service. This enables the supplier of electrical energy to give a supply of electricity for heating at a much lower rate than would be possible if the consumer's capital charges were not already covered by the revenue he provides by the electricity he uses for lighting and power. The supplier of electricity is anxious to use his plant as efficiently as he can, and is able to give a supply of electricity for heating which is profitable to his undertaking and to the consumer at a cost which covers the actual works cost of producing the electricity. Bearing this fact in mind, it is evident that the figures given by Professor Bone, comparing the costs of supplying heat by gas and electricity, require substantial modification.

Another point which Professor Bone has failed to mention in his comparison is the fact that with coal and gas fires it is necessary to place the fire where there is a chimney or ventilating flue. With electricity it is possible to place the source of heat exactly where it will be most effective as a heating agent. For instance, in many rooms on a cold night the draughts which are so often troublesome are caused by closed windows, the cooling of the air inside the room by the window producing an effect similar to that given by cold air entering the room through an open window. The obvious way of avoiding this kind of draught is to heat the air inside the room just under the window. This can be done easily and effectively by using a tubular form of electric heater; down draughts, also, may be prevented by supplying heat at the point where they are likely to occur. It is the flexibility of electric heating for domestic purposes which makes it so advantageous. The coal fire and the gas fire may provide some ventilation, but it is seldom sufficient to keep rooms fresh and airy; the extent to which the air needs to be

changed in any room obviously depends on the number of people in it. The gas fire or coal fire provides a rate of ventilation depending on the size of the fire and the size of the chimney. If the room is effectively ventilated when a small number of people are in it, it must obviously be under-ventilated when there are many people in it. When the heat required for a room is supplied by electrical means it is a simple matter to introduce thermostatic control and to vary the amount of heat that is developed so as to keep the temperature of the room constant. In this way great economies may be effected; the adjustment is automatic, and, if necessary, the arrangements for ventilation can be made automatic also. The application of thermostatic control to electricity supply nowadays is a matter of everyday practice.

Professor Bone's comparisons, therefore, which are based on the heat developed by a gas fire and an electric radiator working at a constant rate, are misleading. But, even taking Professor Bone's figures as they stand, the case for electrical heating is a strong one. In Liverpool, in addition to a fixed charge depending on rateable value, which is covered by savings due to the use of electric light and power, the charge for the energy used is 0.5*d.* per unit. Taking this figure and the costs which Professor Bone has quoted in his article, with gas at 8.6*d.* per therm, the running cost for a given heating effect is rather less with an electric radiator using electricity at 0.5*d.* per unit than it is with a gas fire; according to Professor Bone's figure, it is 0.952 of the cost of a gas fire.

Professor Bone considers electricity unsuitable for the cooking of food. Many of those who have had experience of gas-cooked food have noticed a marked difference in the resulting product as compared with that cooked in an electric oven, the dishes that are cooked in a gas oven always having a definite inferiority of taste and quality as compared with those cooked in an electric oven. Professor Bone quotes some experiments made by the Good Housekeeping Institute at 49 Wellington Street, Strand, under the direction of Mrs. Cottingham-Taylor, and shows that to equal gas at 8.6*d.* per therm electricity would have to be supplied at 0.5*d.* per unit. I have found by experience that cooking by electricity is no more expensive than with a good coal range.

It may be of interest to give some comparative figures for

the total cost of lighting, heating, and cooking in my own house compared with those given by Professor Bone. We changed over from a coal cooking range to an electric oven and installed at the same time electric radiators in rooms which were constantly used when the rate of charge for electricity was reduced in Liverpool. We still have gas fires in some rooms that are used comparatively rarely. They were fitted many years ago when electricity charges were much higher than they are to-day, and so far it has not been thought worth while to scrap them, though to-day we should have no hesitation about installing electric radiators in place of them. The bills for the total expenditure on lighting, heating, and cooking for the years 1924 and 1934 were as follows :

1924	Coal and coke . . .	£26	} £60
	Gas and electricity . .	£34	
1934	Coal and coke . . .	£5	} £56 12s.
	Gas and electricity . .	£51 12s.	

Records have been kept of the total expenditure for lighting, heating, and cooking during a long period of years, and the average figures may be of some interest. Taking the years 1914 to 1924, when coal was used both for cooking and for heating some rooms, the average total expenditure per annum amounted to £61 13s. From 1929 to 1934 the average total expenditure over five years has amounted to £61 8s. It should, however, be pointed out that the cost of electricity has fallen during this later period and that the expenditure during the last year or two is less than it was during the previous years. There are always slight variations in expenditure in fuel, depending on the coldness of the season and the carefulness of the servants. The average number of people in the house, however, has remained the same, and conditions have been very similar over the whole period.

Although electric cooking is not used at present as universally as it is likely to be in the future, it is interesting to find that cooks who have not had experience with electric cooking find no difficulty in using it. Electricity is no more expensive to-day for cooking than gas. Dr. Margaret Fishenden, in a paper read before the World Power Conference, stated that 'the cost of cooking is about the same with electricity at 1d. per unit and gas at 10d. per therm'; in

general usage it has been found that, with the prevailing price for gas in London, electric cooking at $\frac{3}{4}$ d. per unit is slightly cheaper, and at $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per unit is definitely cheaper, than cooking by gas. Reference must also be made to the greater cleanliness of electricity for cooking. The gas cooker is a very potent factor in spoiling the decoration of kitchens, and there are very few cases of people who, having thoroughly tried electric cooking, have reverted to the use of gas. The bogey of cost has always been held up against the use of electricity, but, in fact, the bogey is non-existent.

It appears strange, in reading through the account of the heating and other services in Professor Bone's own house, that a professed fuel economist living in London should still be using oil lamps for lighting in his house. There may be some case for argument as to the relative advantages of gas and electricity for heating, but there can be none in favour of oil for lighting. Electricity is very definitely cheaper, cleaner and more convenient. The standard of illumination with electricity can be made much higher than is possible with gas or oil, and with the further great advantage that the room is not poisoned by the fumes of the burnt-up fuel, and the ventilation necessary is therefore reduced. As compared with oil the cost of electricity is relatively small. A small electric lamp can give a light equivalent to that of an oil lamp for a consumption of 5 watts. If two such lamps are used five hours a day for 330 days a year, with electricity at $4\frac{1}{2}$ d. per unit the cost of electricity is 6s. 3d., which is less than 50 per cent. of the cost of oil.

Professor Bone refers, in the last part of his article, to the relative costs of central heating of large buildings. In this connexion electricity has perhaps the hardest case to meet. But even here electricity is not so extravagant as Professor Bone's article would appear to suggest. Taking a typical office block heated alternatively with a coke-fired installation and a thermal storage installation, the question arises as to the efficiency of the utilisation of the heat put into the boiler in the form of coke or the form of electricity. Losses occur in the coke boiler through the chimney and by radiation. A. H. Barker, in a recent paper before the Institution of Electrical Engineers, gave the value of coke boiler efficiencies as 'Best' 75 per cent., 'Mean' 55 per cent., and 'Worst'

35 per cent. With coke at 38s. per ton with a calorific value of 12,500 B.Th.U.s. per pound, a gross heat value of 28,000,000 B.Th.U.s. per ton is obtained, or, say, 60,000 B.Th.U.s. for 1*d.* Taking Mr. Barker's mean figure for boiler efficiency, the heat leaving the boiler is 33,000 B.Th.U.s. per 1*d.* In the case of the electric boiler the only loss of efficiency that occurs is that of radiation, and a reasonable boiler efficiency figure is 98 per cent. The heat leaving the boiler has next to be transmitted to the radiators. The transmission efficiency of the coke boiler plant will be approximately 90 per cent., whilst that of the thermal storage plant, owing to the increased radiation losses of the storage vessels, will be rather less and can be taken as 88 per cent. At this stage with the coke boiler we have 29,600 B.Th.U.s. per 1*d.* available at the radiators, and with the thermal storage plant we have 2950 B.Th.U.s. per unit available.

One must also consider the question of temperature control. The mean external temperature for the heating season in London is 44° F. : the average temperature to be maintained in a building during the heating is usually between 65° F. for offices and 60° F. for staircases, halls, corridors, etc., or, say, a mean value of 63° F. The mean temperature rise to be maintained throughout the winter is 63° F. less 44° F., or 19° F. If, then, the indoor temperature is maintained high or low by one degree, this amounts to practically one-twentieth part of the mean temperature rise required throughout the whole of the heating season and represents 5 per cent. of the fuel bill. It is well known that it is possible to maintain far better room temperature control with the thermal storage system than with a coke-fired plant, and the relative efficiencies of the two systems can be assumed to be 75 per cent. for the coke-fired plant and 95 per cent. for the thermal storage plant. Taking these figures into account, we now have available as useful heat in the coke-fired installation 22,100 B.Th.U.s. per 1*d.* and 2800 B.Th.U.s. per unit.

The final factor to be taken into consideration is the loss of efficiency through banking the coke-fired boiler during hours when the building is not occupied. It is true that the thermal storage plant incurs radiation losses from the thermal storage tanks during this period, but these are very small compared with the losses in the case of the coke-fired boiler.

For the office block, which is occupied nine hours a day and five and a half days per week, the efficiency of occupation is about 60 per cent. for the coke-fired boiler and 75 per cent. for the thermal storage. When this final loss of efficiency is taken into account we then have available 13,300 B.Th.U.s. per 1*d.* for the coke-fired boiler and 2100 B.Th.U.s. per unit in the case of the electric boiler. If, therefore, electricity is sold at 0·157*d.* per unit, the fuel cost will be the same as with coke at 38s. per ton. This is very different from the statement made by Professor Bone that electricity would have to be supplied for 0·06*d.* per unit to compete with coke, even if all questions such as labour and stoking, the reduction in dirt, noise and nuisance, are omitted.

Coke-fired boilers have a relatively short life as compared with electrically-heated boilers. The metal is exposed to greater extremes of temperature, and the oxidation of the metal is much more rapid than it is in the case of either an enclosed heating element or an electrode boiler, in which the current is actually passed through the water. The actual works cost at the new Barking Station, which has a thermal efficiency of 28½ per cent., was given last December as 0·116*d.* per unit, and this represents the limiting value towards which the cost of electricity for heating at 'off-peak' times can be supplied. This figure shows very clearly that the use of electricity for central heating for large buildings has become an economic proposition apart from other considerations.

It may now be stated with confidence that there are relatively few cases, in areas where electricity charges have been reduced so as to correspond with the thermal efficiency obtained in a modern power station, in which it is not economical to supply all the heat that is needed for domestic purposes by its use.

E. W. MARCHANT.

THE PUBLIC LIBRARY SERVICE TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW

By LIONEL R. MCCOLVIN

THE outward and visible evidence of the existence of the public library service is not striking. A stranger, not interested in such things, might well pass through the country and see little that would tell him that it was widespread and important. He might notice, perhaps, a few schoolchildren running home with books in their hands, occasional buildings, not always very attractive, inscribed 'Public Library,' or some of the standardised but by no means artistic 'County Library' signs. Yet in England and Wales approximately 25,600,000 volumes are available for the free use of public library readers. There are 7,360,000 people who borrow them regularly, and altogether they read no fewer than 190,000,000 public library books each year. There are public library systems operating in all but two or three towns, while 92 per cent. of the population of county administrative areas are served by 18,000 centres. Since in addition to the registered borrowers many others use the reference libraries and reading-rooms, and as books borrowed on the tickets of one person are frequently read by other members of the family who are not themselves registered, it is reasonable to say that 25 per cent. of the total population make direct use of the public library service.

Of all the similar activities and influences operating to-day, the public library movement is probably the most individualistic. Each one of the millions of registered borrowers, for example, goes to the library for the books he desires for his own particular needs; he is not interested in what other readers require; he does not regard himself as a member of a large library-using public in the same way as one road-user identifies himself with other road-users, or in the sense that all thinking citizens realise that the public health, the educa-

tional level and the social behaviour of the community are matters of personal significance. He may realise that the library service which he finds good will probably be good for others, but that is usually all. Furthermore, the public library movement in this country has succeeded to a remarkable degree in holding itself apart from politics, religion and all types of propaganda. These things which prove rallying grounds for opinion and so often influence public services have, therefore, made little impression upon library development. All who understand the real value of the library service are happy that this is so, setting catholicity, independence and tolerance high among its qualities. Yet here is another reason why libraries are not more widely discussed. Thirdly, libraries in this country are organised entirely on a basis of local autonomy; the system is one of independent units linked only by voluntary co-operation. Consequently library affairs remain largely local, not national. Lastly, the library functions chiefly by serving the innumerable interests of the public rather than by performing a separable, independent purpose of its own. It is the handmaid, not the master; the guide and helper to other journeys' ends rather than to ends of its own. Thus the effect of library provision is often assessed in the record of other achievement.

Library work has increased steadily since its beginning ninety years ago, and especially during the last decade, both in mere quantity and in the range of its provisions. Between 1921 and 1932 the number of borrowers from the urban libraries of England and Wales increased from 1,985,000 to 4,320,731, the stock from 10,670,000 to 16,604,000 and the issues from 54,416,000 to 136,231,000. The latest available figures show that this development has been still greater in the last few years. In the London and Home Counties area, for example, borrowers have increased since 1929 by 56 per cent. (120 per cent. since 1924), issues by 52 per cent. (over 100 per cent. since 1924), and stock by 33 per cent. (76 per cent. since 1924). The amount expended per head of population has risen from 11·5*d.* in 1924 to 18·3*d.* in 1934. During the year 1934-35 the county libraries alone issued 48,541,000 books, where in 1924 they issued only 2,370,000. Then their expenditure was only £15,097; now it is £288,768.

There are two sets of factors responsible for this develop-

ment—internal and external. Until the 1919 Public Libraries Act, expenditure on libraries was limited, except in a very few large towns with special local Acts, to the product of a rate of one penny in the pound of rateable value. With expenditure thus rigidly restricted it was impossible to provide sufficient books, suitable and adequately equipped premises or staffs sufficiently numerous or well-trained. With the removal of the rate limit these handicaps were withdrawn. The 1919 Act also made it possible for the first time to provide a library service in rural districts.

Of the many influences which now determine the demands made upon libraries and which should govern largely the type of service provided, these are outstanding: Firstly, the nation has become more literate. This does not mean merely that all can read; it means that most, if not all, have acquired the habit of seeking information, ideas and recreation in the printed page, and not only the page of the newspaper. A very few years ago the proportion of the people, of all classes, who read books regularly was small. Probably a big majority never read them excepting under compulsion, as, for example, at school. Now, largely as a result of the activities of public libraries—and even of the much-despised twopenny libraries—book use is normal. This is a far bigger matter than appears on the surface. It indicates that the intellectual stamina of the people has to some degree, often slight, been strengthened. It represents a change of mental habit as vital as the physical change of the infant from crawling to walking. How many will practise walking and where they will go must depend upon numerous conditions, especially biological capabilities. But we have at least started. The doorway to everything that books can give has been, for most men, opened.

Secondly, the mental outlook of the people has changed. The war and the events of the post-war years have raised in the minds of many—and among them all the more active and effective elements—new doubts, questionings and uncertainties. There is a widespread desire for knowledge, for the understanding that may prevent future disaster, that can take advantage of opportunity, that can secure personal happiness and tolerant co-operation between men, between classes and between nations. These people, suspicious,

rightly or wrongly, of propaganda, of newspapers or political parties, of the mass-produced idea and the standardised habit, turn to books and to libraries. They form a class of reader which, if not new, is immeasurably larger than ever before. Thirdly, this intellectual curiosity has been stimulated by other agencies, such as organised adult education, broadcasting, better facilities for communication and the interchange of ideas, travel, the steady diminution in the size of the world and the rapidity of scientific invention. Fourthly, economic competition has become keener. More exact knowledge is needed, both by the individual and by the institution and the commercial undertaking. The library service plays its part here, too, by the provision of technical, scientific and commercial books and periodicals, and by the organisation of information bureaux and reference departments. Lastly, there is the converse to activity—inactivity, leisure, voluntary or enforced. Both shorter hours of labour and unemployment—especially the latter—are making more readers.

There has been no violent swing of the pendulum. The librarian recognises his duty to literature and to the claims of the past; he appreciates the importance of recreational reading. He seeks to stimulate the highest standards of literary appreciation and production, to keep available the literature and the history of other generations, and to preserve not merely the records of the locality, but also a sense of the worthiness of local pride and the value of local individuality.

The question of recreational reading has always loomed too largely in considerations of the public library service. All public libraries provide fiction; many, perhaps, provide too much. But just as nearly all those who have criticised the public library have directed their attacks against the provision of fiction, so have its defenders answered either by minimising the proportion of fiction issued or by claiming justification. Thus we have acquired a false sense of values. What matters is not whether we provide fiction, but whether we do so at the expense of other things and whether, in our particular localities, it is necessary or desirable to do so. There is a marked tendency to-day to reduce the provision of fiction, and to limit it to things of literary and intellectual worth. But there is a limit beyond which we must not go, or the library will cease to reflect completely the thought or

serve adequately the needs of the age. Nevertheless, it is no duty of the library to do anything which can be done better by other agencies. As cheap editions and commercial circulating libraries increase and as the habits of the people lead them more and more, when they desire recreation, to other, non-bookish, things, such as sport and cinemas and wireless listening, so must the desirability of providing fiction diminish. At the same time the circumstances of the public must be considered. We must not, by excessive zeal to be serious, encourage people to forget the legitimate place of reading among other pastimes; and we must not forget that many have the means and opportunities neither to turn to other recreations nor to find their light reading at the bookshops, or even the twopenny libraries. Consider, for example, those who are unemployed or suffering from hard economic conditions. To them recreational books are an obvious godsend.

Though the library should serve all sorts and conditions of men, some sections make more and some less use of the library. To a great extent this results from the kind of service provided. As will be shown later, there is a wide and disturbing variation in standards of library service. In some towns it is very good; in others deplorably bad. Unfortunately the library authorities of the backward places have failed to realise how closely the standard of results is related to the standard of provision. The point need not be laboured. Two facts should, however, be emphasised: where the library is good it is invariably well used by the public; and no librarian has ever wanted readers for good and well-chosen books of all kinds.

There can be no greater mistake than to underestimate the capacity of the general public. The phrase *Ubi mel ibi apes* figures on the book-plate of one library; it is true of all. Give a librarian the money to purchase sufficient useful, worthy books and to keep his stock in good condition and up to date, and give him an ample and qualified staff, and he has no need to go out into the highways and byways for readers.

Where stock and staff are sufficient most classes, ages and types of interest use the library regularly; where they are insufficient the best and not the worst elements stay away. Obviously it is much cheaper to cater for those who ask for

little but standardised fiction and popular travel, biography, and the like, often of little worth, than it is to cater for a purposive, individualised and intelligent public. There can be no question which work is better worth doing. It is at bottom a matter of finance.

Apart from book supply, which is all-important, what causes lead people to the public library? The development of work with schoolchildren, which first began seriously at the end of last century, must be a prime factor in present-day adult library use. Nowadays it is almost impossible for a child to pass through school without knowing about the public library. A very large percentage of youngsters between ten and sixteen—often as high as 80 or 90 per cent.—use either the children's departments of public libraries or school libraries organised either by the public library or the education authorities. On leaving school a large proportion may cease to use the library, but many return later. They do know about the library, whereas their parents and grandparents had to discover the library for themselves.

Organised adult education also works in close co-operation with the library and is undoubtedly partly responsible for one of the most striking facts to emerge from any examination of issues—that the interests of readers are only very partially governed by their material circumstances. Those, for example, who are engaged in the most monotonous, uninteresting occupations frequently display a wide range of intellectual sympathies.

What is the influence of wireless? At the beginning some thought that more listening would mean less reading. Such has not been the case. Wireless has proved an awakener, stimulating curiosity and widening the outlook, but it has not been a satisfier. This is not a criticism of broadcasting; it is praise. Indeed, one believes that the B.B.C. has deliberately recognised that if its educational and cultural activities could have achieved self-completeness it would have been a bad and not a good thing—that the more it could provoke thought and the desire for knowledge, wherever that knowledge might be found, the better for the race of listeners. This is shown in part by the close co-operation the B.B.C. has sought with librarians, who have, generally, taken steps to provide books on the subjects of talks, to distribute talks

programmes and book lists, and, occasionally, to organise listening groups.

The library system which would completely fulfil the criteria of a keen librarian does not yet exist. Though many libraries have reached a high standard, all are to some extent limited. We cannot expect ever to be without limitations; they are stimulating so long as they do not hinder essential development. When they are unreasonable, however, the true work of the library cannot be attempted.

Speaking in the broadest general terms the public library should be ready to provide practically any book, no matter how specialised, which any individual reader requires for his own particular needs, with a sufficiency of general literature to enable all the educational and cultural forces at work in the community to function fully, and to permit the people to keep abreast with current scientific, social and artistic progress, to inform themselves of the most significant aspects of the history, thought and achievement of all ages. The public library should be a short cut to all that is best and most interesting in the literature of their own and other countries; and at the same time provide sufficient less serious reading material, including fiction, to meet the needs of both those who are unable to obtain healthy recreation elsewhere and those who for various causes, such as lack of experience as readers, have not yet the ability to read books of fact and constructive ideas. It must have on its shelves an ample supply of books for children, especially those which will broaden their outlook and stimulate their imagination; a representative collection of the most important periodicals—technical, literary, artistic, and sociological; a well-organised information service for professional and business men, technicians, students and general inquirers; special collections dealing with the history and characteristics of the locality and with important local industries; sufficient well-equipped buildings to offer reasonably convenient access for borrowers and ample accommodation for readers; a qualified and experienced staff able to give expert assistance and friendly guidance to the public. These are the essential requirements.

The smaller the district the more difficult it becomes to provide a satisfactory service. The variety and richness of demand does not diminish proportionately with the size of the

population; on the contrary. Yet the funds available do so decrease. Co-operation is the only solution of the problem, and it is one which is being grasped by library authorities throughout the country. Libraries are organising themselves into regional groupings; the *National Central Library* is acting as a clearing-house and co-ordinator. Thus, by means of inter-library lending, it is becoming possible for the individual reader to have access to practically any book, no matter whether he lives in London or on an isolated island off the coast of Scotland. Even now all but a small percentage of the requests received by the *National Central Library*, for books coming within its scope, are met. Were the *National Central Library* to receive from the Government the support which its functions justify, the percentage of unsatisfied requests would be infinitesimal. As it is, however, that institution must rely upon voluntary contributions and a totally inadequate Government grant for information purposes. Were it properly financed, the *National Central Library* could ensure that no student, no matter what his field, need lack essential books. Preferential postal rates would also be of immense value.

Apart from the definitely specialised books and those which for various reasons are difficult to obtain, the responsibility for library provision should nevertheless rest with the local libraries. They must not rely either upon the *National Central Library* or upon other libraries for the books they should themselves possess. The success of co-operation depends upon the quality of the co-operating units. Co-operation must be mutual; those who take must be able to give. Unfortunately we are a long way from this ideal.

The remarkable progress made in towns where the value of the library has been understood throws into sharper contrast the inefficient services—so much so that there is a danger of turning to drastic schemes for treating the whole body for the sake of the unhealthy members, of thinking that a system which permits this inefficiency must be wrong, forgetting that it has also produced efficiency.

The obvious solution of the difficulty is some form of national control, inspection and financial aid from State funds. Recently this matter has been debated, partly because co-operation has been accepted as necessary, partly because a few

educationists mistakenly regard libraries solely as a corollary of organised education, and so believe that the system of semi-local semi-State educational control would prove equally suitable for libraries. If libraries, they ask, were to be placed under the general supervision of the Board of Education, if they were to be subject to inspection and awarded grants, might not the backward areas be induced or compelled to do better?

All those who are most intimately acquainted with the situation, however, have grave doubts whether any good would result from these proposals. They realise that the scope of the library service is different from and wider than that of organised education, and fear that anything closer than the closest voluntary co-operation with educational work would limit its field and stultify some of its most valuable activities. They know that the requirements of library users vary in a marked degree from town to town and that any national policy or standardisation of methods or provisions would inevitably reduce the individual and local value of the library. They ask whether grants would be made on the basis of achievement, whether those authorities which have done most will be given more or less assistance than authorities which have failed in their duty, for if less the grant system will degenerate into a method of encouraging local apathy and subsidising failure, and, if more, surely the relative positions of the good and the bad services will remain unchanged, and only a shifting of the incidence of support from rates to taxes will be achieved. They foresee, above all, the loss of that independence and freedom of thought and catholicity which are qualities of which, above all, libraries can to-day be proud.

In effect, those who are best able to judge are satisfied that the advantages of an efficient library service can best be provided, not by any dangerous alteration in the present system, but by removing the hindrances by which that system is deterred. These are threefold—economic, geographical and, for want of a better word, mental.

The economic hindrances arise in those places where, owing to industrial depression, low rateable value and the like, it is not possible adequately to support from local resources any service which is not necessary for the material

existence of the community. Here there may be a case for State grants. Nevertheless, the circumstances of these places do not justify a general revision. If a town cannot support its libraries, can it support any of the other services which are recognised as necessary or desirable? Whatever change is needed must affect not only libraries, but the whole system of local finance.

The geographical factor operates in two types of community. In the first place, there is a size below which it is impracticable to run an independent service. Secondly, there is the problem of outlying and fringe districts which are frequently populated by people all of whose contacts are with the near-by town. There is here a clear case for mutual agreement between authorities, and the only thing that stands in the way is the natural but undesirable reluctance of authorities to relinquish tasks which others could do better.

The real obstacle to improvement is, therefore, only lack of understanding and interest. When we examine the library situation dispassionately we are compelled to arrive at this conclusion. There is no reason whatever why the whole population should not be well served by public libraries if those responsible for local government provisions will realise their responsibilities, and if only the intelligent, active element in the community will exert its influence. Where the service is bad, ultimately those men and women are to blame who, because of their education and social status, should have extended, in this matter as in so many others, the help and encouragement of which all genuine, impartial general cultural forces are deserving. Their support would not be entirely disinterested, since they themselves form an important section of the public that the well-organised library can serve. Nevertheless, whatever the motive, it is the duty of everyone who values the heritage of the past, the literary and artistic traditions and progress of the nation, the material well-being of the people and the happiness of each individual, to pay more heed to the aims and conditions of this important influence in present-day life—the public library service.

LIONEL R. MCCOLVIN.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

A YOUNG constituent came to see me at the House of Commons just before the Recess with letters of introduction from a rural district councillor and the vicar of his parish. Twenty-one years of age, five years on the same farm, strong to labour, big-boned, well set-up, with a quick step and a sharp eye. Unmarried and 'no encumbrances.' He had been in trouble, but not with the police, in circumstances which Lord Herbert in his autobiography, speaking of himself, described as '*honesta factu, sed turpia dictu.*' He had an uncle in America who wanted him to go out there and start again. He could pay his own fare and leave a bit over; he could even buy a return ticket in case he could not settle there. He was willing to be 'nationalised' like some of his forbears who had gone to America in the latter half of the last century.

Could he get a visa? It seemed clear, from the forms sent him from the American Consulate-General, that able-bodied young men without capital, accustomed to work with their hands and to handle animals, were not wanted. 'Visas are invariably refused in cases of this kind.' The United States, in common with most other countries, apparently welcomes only those who promise to consume but not to create wealth.

I suggested Australia. He shook his head firmly. He had heard of the Victoria settlers, and a man who had come back thence to his village had said that all emigration was stopped at present. To Canada he was better disposed, but he had no friends or relations there, and it was hard for a stranger to find his way in life. Emigration has so slowed down that the personal ties of blood and friendship between men and women on either side of the Atlantic are growing thinner; I fancy that a Post Office census would reveal a great drop in personal correspondence between Canadian and British landworkers.

More men are still returning from Canada than are going thither from the United Kingdom.

The boy was resentful at the existence of these obstacles: he had heard a lot about the Empire, and about Anglo-American co-operation and the English-speaking races. 'It is all bunk,' he exclaimed indignantly. 'It is time we looked after ourselves.' I was inclined to agree with him, for the time being, and told him how to set about finding a steady job elsewhere in England on the land. I fancy he will have no difficulty in suiting himself, but it is sad to have to repress adventurous spirits. He was of the marrying sort, and, as Bacon said, '*Natura enim non nisi parendo vincitur.*' The right to become a parent is one which cannot be denied without danger to national survival. We are in danger of forgetting that it is equal if not superior to the right to live.

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I had half an hour to wait one evening at a small railway station distant nearly a mile from the nearest hamlet. The old railway porter, who combined in his own efficient hands all executive and administrative functions, was working on his allotment close by. He was tired and ready for a chat. From the weather we turned to crops, and especially to allotments. His view was that of Proverbs xiii. 23, which, heavily scored in the margin of my Great Bible of 1539 by some sixteenth-century preacher, reads:

There is plenteousnesse of fode in ye felde of the poore: but the felde not well ordered, is without frute.

He showed his bit of ground and compared it proudly with that of his neighbour. He grew nigh all he and his family could eat, and generally had some to give away to visiting friends and relations. 'It's wonderful how pleased folks are with a few bits of things out of a man's garden.' But he knew how to make things grow, and took trouble. Even in his village—and he allowed it was a good village—some men and women were so shiftless that, whatever wages they drew, they would be on the parish within a month if illness came their way. Some of the younger men wanted the dole—they took little interest even in the best and most varied jobs—content to draw wages with no ambition to make the most of life. Marriage bucked them up a bit, and when children

came along they often sobered down, but he deplored the low standard of comfort to which they aspired. A cinema once a week and a motor cycle was a poor exchange for a well-kept house and garden, with room to grow all the fruit and vegetables, chickens and eggs that a family could need. The squire had given enough land for everyone to have a big allotment, and it was good land. He was sixty-three and would soon be retiring : he would 'thole out' on his pension, though he and his wife had raised six children, of whom four were alive and married.

The life he led kept him healthy : he did not worry. He knew men—all in the local railway service—who had 'nerves' so badly that they were unfit for work. All were in regular employment, and not what a man would call hard work ; they just went 'queer'—absent-minded at one moment, frightened of themselves the next. The doctor could not explain it, but one thing was worth noting : they none of them did anything in a garden ; they none of them had any hobby ; none of them were companionable—they did not even take a glass of beer now and then.

His cure for the nation's ill was work : most people in the country who want to work can do so, even if there is no employment. For young men a year's military service would be the ideal thing. Keep them off the labour market and give them flesh and bone and tone by exercise and good food. He was an old soldier—twelve years in the Army : his son had followed him and had done him credit. 'It's no good,' he concluded, 'trying to get more out of the world than you put into it : the more you do for folk, the less they do for themselves.' The train came in and I parted from the fine old philosopher ; there are many like him, but we need more.

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One Sunday last month I met, not by chance, some of the drivers and conductors in the service of the London Passenger Transport Board who had withheld their labour for forty-eight hours at the week-end, to the extreme inconvenience of the public in some of the Home Counties, including Hertfordshire. The strike was unauthorised by the men's union, and was largely spontaneous, though not unpremeditated, for a small group of men had been quietly preparing the ground.

Hours, time-schedules, and rates of pay were the ostensible, but not the only, grounds.

They were admittedly in all these respects better off under the L.P.T.B. than before, and they enjoyed greater security of tenure. What seemed to irk them most was the deliberate policy of mechanising humanity pursued by the Board. Under private ownership they had regular runs on which they were known to passengers, and could bring business to the owner by helping to develop parcels delivery business and the like : they were individually known, and could get a day off, or even a week off, on full pay for family reasons, if the boss was in a good mood and business was not too brisk. If they had a 'grouse,' they were able to make it to the man who could decide things.

There was less formality and more personality in the day's work, and less liability to be transferred, at great discomfort and cost, to another centre, with the loss of friends that was entailed.

'I once asked the old man for a week off, as my wife was going to have a baby,' said one. '"She'll have to have it next week," said he ; "we're too busy this week to have babies."' On the very last day of the week, sure enough, I was wanted at home by the doctor, as I expected, and I let him know. "All right," he said, "I'll run the old bus myself" ; and he did, and didn't count those three days as days off. He was a hard old nut, but a man to work for, and he made money on the run, which is more than we are doing now.'

Receipts were down, they said, though population was going up. Fewer services, higher fares, fewer omnibuses, less employment : no one pleased ; more people to be seen on bicycles. A man who was dismissed by the L.P.T.B. was barred from similar employment anywhere within fifty miles of London ; he had no chance of getting back. The machine was so big that it was often cruelly unjust. If this was rationalisation, they had no use for it.

A week later—indeed, after I had recorded the foregoing note—I received a letter signed by the leading residents of a rather remote part of Hertfordshire, including the Archbishop of Westminster (not a man who puts his name lightly to a document), protesting against the discontinuance at a few days' notice of certain services by the L.P.T.B. The same

post brought me the Board's explanatory memorandum. The new co-ordinated programme had been under consideration for many months: twenty-two councils had been 'consulted'; a local transport committee was to be set up, apparently as a lightning-conductor or shock-absorber for the benefit of the Board. Fares were being standardised: this meant increases in some, decreases in other cases. Cheap workmen's tickets were being stopped: the new arrangement (less advantageous to workmen) would be universal, whereas the companies superseded by the L.P.T.B. did not give cheap tickets on all lines. New arrangements would be made for schoolchildren—not, apparently, so convenient or so cheap as the old and informal arrangements of the former private companies. The new dispositions were the best possible 'having regard to the financial obligations of the Board,' which has all the privileges and immunities of 'public authority.' The cream is theirs. They leave to private enterprise only skimmed milk.

Personal investigation indicated that the changes involved, on balance, an appreciable increase of fares—not, after all, a surprise, for that is the primary justification for a monopoly—and a decrease, compared with pre-monopoly days, of mileage run; services that paid small men, who ran them when there was a demand and stopped when there was none, do not pay these august bodies. Their predecessors were not philanthropists, but men anxious to make a living by serving their neighbours—an attitude of mind apparently uncongenial to the Traffic Commissioners. They took the old omnibus out twice in the morning to catch early trains, and again in the evenings: for the rest of the time they sometimes worked with their hands in smithy or garage.

Ill fares the land, to hast'ning ills a prey
Where Boards co-ordinate and men decay.

Thus Goldsmith would have written to-day of 'The Deserted Village.' Country life has, in fact, suffered severely from the centralisation of traffic authority, the ruthless elimination of small men by Acts of Parliament in favour of the strong, silent sort who manage 'combines,' who have easy access to authority and the City, and can pull the strings that make the marionettes dance so prettily that Parliament, Press, and prelates alike applaud, so long as dividends are safe.

* * * * *

One fine evening during August I met a group of young men, mostly from a great university, whose political views were strongly Marxist. They were, without exception, scions of well-to-do families. They had done fairly well in their studies, which seemed to be confined to that most gloomy of inconclusive subjects, Economics. They were as gay, as courteous, and as good-tempered as less politically-minded young men of their age. Their theoretical studies seemed to have been strangely one-sided. Of the practical work of administration they had heard little or nothing. They had not dipped into the steady stream of reports of Royal Commissions, departmental committees, and annual statements which flows unceasingly from the Stationery Office. They seemed, indeed, unaware for the most part that the topics on which they generalised with such confidence were to-day, and had been for many years, the concern of objectively-minded civil servants. They had no clear ideas as to the difference between 'control' and 'administration,' nor of the immense burden which the Government of an industrial country would have to assume were it to attempt to administer, by whatever means, the complicated machinery by which we are moved and fed, housed and amused, maintained in infancy and supported in old age. Most of them had a sturdy belief in the potentialities for good of the ordinary citizen and a democratic desire to see the butter of enjoyment spread more evenly over the bread of necessity, and they were confident that leaders in every walk of life could be found not less readily amongst the sons of the less well-to-do than amongst those of the hereditarily prosperous. But most of them seemed to regard production of commodities as the primary object of man, material welfare as the only goal worthy his seeking; they equated political power with the right to impose upon society a system which would ensure equality by preventing men from rising, except as servants of the State, above the ruck by the exercise of their faculties. Enjoying themselves, at the cost of their parents (for the time being, at least), security and freedom, they wish to see others enjoy these good things at the cost of society. To make it possible they would stop at nothing. The bogey-men of their youthful imaginations were international financiers, company directors and promoters, owners of great newspapers, chairmen of great

trusts, whom they visualised, not having seen them in the flesh, as very large men with top-hats and white waistcoats and spats, smoking large cigars, shooting grouse in their spare time upon moors hired from impoverished ancestral owners, who had at an earlier stage driven the inhabitants into the towns to make room for the birds. Such is the influence of cartoons upon the youthful mind. For the National Government they had little but contempt; it had done nothing, and it was part of their gospel that no Government could justify itself except by intense activity in every sphere of life simultaneously. The business of Government to them was, not to ensure justice between man and man, to maintain social services and to develop them when possible, but to take over very rapidly and to turn into public services the industrial and distributive machinery of the realm. The system under which we work to-day had, in their view, failed. They were not prepared to listen to arguments to the contrary; it was axiomatic for them that there was plenty for everybody in the world if only it could be distributed. For intellectual freedom as a thing desirable in itself, for the idea that the greatest of privileges in a civilised country was to be able to change one's employment (even at the risk of a period of unemployment), to move freely from one part of England and the Empire to another, they had little use. They would begin by harnessing the Press; they would not hesitate to regulate everything and everybody. There was no limit to the burdens that they would place upon the State.

They were engaging youths, and their views will probably change rapidly with experience. Meantime, I fear I made little impression upon them by my confident advocacy of the old-fashioned virtues of voluntarism and liberty. The mere fact that such views have been urged by authority for so long was enough to condemn them.

* * * * *

The Lord Chief Justice in a public lecture on May 24 said that he doubted whether prison was the right place of commitment for anyone under twenty-one. Nevertheless, in 1933 some 2250 youths in their teens went to prison—of whom, one-third for a first offence and one-quarter in default of fines. So far are lawyers ahead of the law.

The Lord Chief Justice is also the President of the Court

of Criminal Appeal. Three times this year, if memory serves me right, it has fallen to this Court to dismiss appeals against convictions for murder and sentences of death on men, also first offenders, under twenty-three years of age. When juries find a man guilty, the judge has no option but to pass sentence of death: we have not in this country, as we ourselves introduced into India, degrees of murder. The jury may make a recommendation to mercy, but neither the judge nor the Court of Criminal Appeal has discretion to pass any sentence but death. The prerogative of mercy is exercised on the advice of the Home Secretary, seldom a lawyer, who has not heard counsel or seen the prisoner. A recommendation to clemency is, as often as not, disregarded, though in reality it is an integral part of the verdict of the guilty man's peers.

I have in the East, for some years, exercised the same powers as the Home Secretary, but not until I had impressed upon myself the nature of my responsibility by witnessing executions. I do not favour the complete abolition of the death sentence; it should remain, as a last resort. Yet I hold, with many others, that it is wrong to exact a life for a life as a matter of course. In uncivilised parts of the East murder cases are settled, in nine cases out of ten, by blood money—restitution or compensation, for which the murderer and his relatives are responsible. Is this not more humane than our way? Should no legal distinction be made between murder for gain, or killing in cold blood, and the type of murder which is the outcome of infatuation, of anger and of jealousy? And should not the decision lie with a Court of Criminal Appeal rather than with an over-worked Home Secretary, however well-advised?

These reflections were suggested to me after attending the hearing in the Old Bailey of the trial of a youth of twenty-two—he looked much younger—for the murder of his wife by throwing a knife at her. There was no ground of appeal against the verdict—the evidence was conclusive and unchallenged—but there seemed to me, as I listened, every reason for an appeal for clemency, if only on grounds of youth. *Nemo repente fuit turpissimus.*

ARNOLD WILSON.

TO LESBIA

(A Translation of CATULLUS V.)

Sweet, Lesbia mine, oh, let us live to love,
 While live we may.
 What our grave elders say
 Heed not, 'tis nought,
 Dear at a penny bought.
 The immortal sun
 Sinks but to rise again ;
 But when our little day is done,
 And quenched our light,
 There will be only night.
 So kiss me, kiss :
 Kiss me a thousand times.
 Add thousands more—again—again.
 But spiteful jealousy
 Must never know their full delicious tale.
 We must confuse the count, and cheat
 The evil eye—
 And even ourselves, my sweet.

H. W. HOUSEHOLD.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Among the soldiers this is muttered,—
 That here you maintain several factions ;
 And, whilst a field should be despatch'd and fought,
 You are disputing of your generals.
 One would have ling'ring wars, with little cost ;
 Another would fly swift, but wanteth wings ;
 A third man thinks, without expence at all,
 By guileful fair words peace may be obtain'd.

King Henry VI., Part I., act i., scene 1.

ONE of the consequences of German rearmament has been a spate of books dealing with ' Air Menace.' The latest of these, *Our Future in the Air*, by Brig.-General P. R. C. Groves (Harrap, 2s. 6d. net), deserves more than casual notice. It was written before Hitler's speech of May 21, and ignores altogether his earlier offers to eliminate by treaty the dropping of gas incendiary and explosive shells outside the real battle zone, which he merely confirmed. It assumes that no nation will ever keep any engagement which is contrary to its interests, and that Germany's interest lies in breaking her word. The first assumption is extremely doubtful, for Germany can be attacked from all sides at once, and her industrial areas are near her main frontiers.

The author pleads for a stronger Air Force, to be built up by spending less on the Army and Navy, which together account for 85 per cent. of our defence budget. The demand is supported by much faulty argument—*e.g.*,

Hitherto the main object of war . . . has been gained by . . . the defeat of their land and sea forces [p. 66].

Can he have forgotten that we were all but beaten in the late war by the results of attacks on our merchant ships ?

On the other hand, as we shall see, defence of warships has made comparatively little progress [p. 87].

But we do not ' see ' the facts on which he relies. The

pendulum is slowly swinging in favour of defence against air attack.

At p. 120 he discusses difficulties of communication by sea through the Mediterranean, and avoids them by assuming that in the next war Italy and France would be with us. That is an assumption none of us have any right to make. If we are to discuss war—and I believe it has seldom been further off than to-day so far as we are concerned—let us not make assumptions of this sort. If we do so, let us have an Air Force which is complementary to that of France and Italy.

At p. 119 General Groves assumes that we have nothing to fear at sea because we have the strongest fleet. He does not allude to the length of our overseas communications, on which we are so deplorably dependent for oil fuel, for food and for raw materials, nor upon the fact that the defence of long lines of communication demands a naval strength far greater than that of the attacker. The 85,000 miles of sea routes are mostly out of range of attack, or defence, by air.

He describes (p. 86) the destruction of a German battleship, suggesting that four bombs sufficed to destroy it. The *Ostfriedland* was, in fact, attacked by aircraft on two successive days in July 1921. On the first day fifty bombs each of 600 lb. were dropped, of which thirteen hit the mark and did no serious damage. Next day five bombing aeroplanes each dropped a bomb of 1000 lb., of which three hit the mark. Finally, six charges of 2000 lb. each were dropped, and she sank.

What chance would the aeroplanes have had if anti-aircraft guns and/or smoke screens had been in use by the doomed ship or its companions? Some of us may remember that when Prince George left South Africa it was desired to send with him some films taken during his visit. They were to be dropped from the air on the deck of the ship. All conditions were favourable, yet of three packages only one reached the target. Perhaps the pilots were inexpert.

General Groves naïvely remarks (p. 85) that 'the distance to which the force of an explosion may be transmitted is remarkable.' The pressure so set up actually varies as the cube of the distance. He innocently tells of a ship's condenser which was damaged by the explosion of a 120-lb. bomb a

mile away—a quite apocryphal story, as anyone with war experience must, on reflexion, perceive.

Some data upon this subject were made known recently by the First Lord of the Admiralty,¹ from whose speech I extract the following :

An interesting experiment was carried out by the U.S.A. in 1925 with the *Washington*, which embodied the then latest ideas of under-water construction. The tests were conducted by placing bombs outside the ship, and at the most effective depth and distance to test the resistance of the hull. The Board which inquired into this and other experiments reported that after suffering the explosions of three under-water bombs of the largest size and two torpedo explosions, also of the largest size, directly against the hull, with no repair of leaks and no pumps going, the *Washington* remained afloat for four days and was finally sunk by gunfire. And as the result of the whole series of experiments the Board reported that the battleship had not been rendered obsolete by air attack.

I ask for a proper perspective in this matter. One of the inherent disadvantages of democracy is its susceptibility to mass suggestion, but it would be a tragedy if a question of the highest technicality involving, as we think, the very ability of the British Navy successfully to defend this our realm and Empire should be judged by irresponsible and inaccurate suggestion.

I am sure that the battleship—not necessarily big ones—will remain the pivot upon which all our ships will perform their historic function of supplying the factories of these islands with raw material, of feeding our inhabitants, of keeping open the communications and intercommunications of the Empire, and of making a tremendous contribution towards the general tranquillity of the world—by making a quarter of the globe safe and secure.

The case for strengthening the Royal Air Force is irrefutable, but it is not made stronger by ill-directed attacks on another service. The country needs for its defence the whole-hearted co-operation of all three fighting services.

Made in Japan, by Guenther Stein (Methuen, 7s. 6d. net). This is a valuable little book, well illustrated, based upon personal investigation of industrial conditions in Japan. The writer's arguments are supported by figures, set forth in a style which is refreshingly lucid, and free from the technical

¹ Institute of Naval Architects, April 10, 1935.

jargon of most 'economists of international repute.' Political and social conditions in Japan are discussed, and the probable effect of the development of Manchukuo upon Japanese import and export trade with the rest of the world is dealt with in some detail. The writer inclines to the view that Manchuria will absorb, and produce, less than the Japanese hope, that they must continue to export increasing quantities of goods against their growing need of raw materials for internal consumption, for Nature has not been kind to Japan. If Western Powers put barriers against them in Asia or Africa, or seek to limit, on whatever pretext, their supplies of raw material, the military caste, patriotic and wholly disinterested, will secure national support for a fresh expansion of territory; for man must live, and his right to do so is not limited by arbitrary frontiers.

Of the conditions under which Japanese labour produces goods—at prices with which no Western nation can compete—he writes with knowledge and sympathy. No nation is studying industrial psychology more closely, or is more careful to safeguard the health of the workers.

This book is a portent of not less importance to the Trade Union Congress than to the Federation of British Industries. It should be read carefully by Indian industrialists, who have almost everything yet to learn: in their treatment of labour they are half a century behind Japan.

The Nation at School, by F. S. Marvin (Oxford University Press, London: Humphrey Milford, 1935, 5s. net). It is two years since this book was published, but not a comment in its pages is inapplicable to 1935; the book does not date itself, nor its author, who is writing of his life's work. I review it here for the first time, because, as is rare in works of this kind, the author stresses the view that effective education must rely much more than common practice seems to imply on personal effort and criticism. To aid these the parents are called upon to be more active in the earlier stages and the community to encourage and assist, but only within narrow limits to lay down, later on, the educational course that a particular child should follow.

If the makers of administrative machinery and the pur-

veyors of words could have saved us, we should have been saved long ago. If the devotion of school masters and mistresses and of inspectors of schools was the principal ingredient in a successful curriculum, England would indeed be a most favoured nation. Is it because education is compulsory, and free, that we esteem it so little? That might be true of some parents, but of very few children. Yet few elementary school children willingly remain at school after fourteen, even in the rare cases when they have no job in prospect. They feel that the school has done all it can for them. Their intellectual curiosity is too often not aroused, but dead, when they leave.

Mr. Marvin points to the cause—'the thing most needed in all types of education is greater intellectual coherence.' The mass and variety of aims and subjects of all kinds are overwhelming. Unity is needed: it must be sought, not in machinery, but in inculcating a moral outlook—which is to-day for many a new idea, but is in reality very old. Through history, and local history above all—embodied in things that may be seen around us, in our speech, conventions and customs—children should be brought to realise that they are part of an immortal chain reaching back to dim pre-history. They are the essential link between past and future, and, in that sense at least, immortal. They will not learn this from books, but with eyes and ears trained to note memorable things. They will enter a friendly world, if they can learn to understand and enjoy whatever there is—and there was never more—of goodness and beauty around them.

In a useful appendix the writer's son, Mr. A. N. Marvin, deals with technical training, to which the revival of industry and the shortage of skilled workmen has drawn fresh attention in the last two years. It should be read in conjunction with Mr. C. T. Millis's fuller handbook,² which, though published in 1925, is by no means out of date.

I have been led by observation, including repeated visits to Ministry of Labour training centres all over England, to the conclusion that modern factory conditions preclude effective training of apprentices for most industries, and that in an industrial country this must be the duty of Government. Further, that from sixteen upwards it is best done, not by

² *Technical Education*: Millis (Edward Arnold & Co.).

educationists, but by men who have spent their lives in industry as craftsmen and have for this reason the right kind of prestige in the eyes of their pupils. The instructors in Ministry of Labour training centres are all men who have recently been foremen in various industries: they know the trade from the inside. The managers of the centres are likewise men in close touch with industry, with long experience of industrial practice. They know what is wanted, they know the limitations of their pupils: their success has been so notable that employers and trade unions alike have been converted to a belief in the value of these centres. The Board of Education has traditions and an outlook of its own; no one who reads Mr. Marvin's illuminating pages, in the light of Dr. Cloudesley Brereton's contribution to the subject in this number, would wish it to be narrowed or confined. Men do not serve two masters willingly or well. The solution may be to develop technical training after a certain age under the Ministry of Labour. Is not this conception of the ultimate functions of the Ministry worth pursuing?

The Army in My Time, by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller (Rich & Cowan, Ltd., 6s. net). The annual passage of the Army and Air Force Acts, with a preamble declaring it to be against law to raise or keep a standing army (but not a navy) within the United Kingdom in time of peace without consent of Parliament, is one of those relics of a dead past of which we are apt to be proud. We should do better to adopt a parliamentary procedure more in keeping with our duty to ourselves and to the League of Nations, for whether Lord Davies has his way or Lord Beaverbrook, we shall always need an army. It has done something to keep alive the prejudice against military service, which is strongest among those who clamour most loudly to-day for the exercise of 'sanctions,' forgetting, perhaps, that, in the words of old Hobbes, 'covenants without the sword are of no strength, and no use to avail a man at all.'

Major-General Fuller's first chapters remind us how strong popular prejudice has been in the past: the fact that when thousands of able-bodied youths are unemployed for long periods the Army is below strength shows how strong it is

to-day. The strength of political and parliamentary prejudice may be deduced from the fact that

to send anywhere the force we sent over to France in 1914 would, to-day, take six months at least. Should a Division of 18,000 men all told be needed overseas, the whole of these islands would have to be scoured in order to form it.

Lord Cecil, and those who think with him, wish us to be ready for drastic action against Italy. Supposing Mussolini were to accept the challenge, how should we stand to-day by land, by sea and by air, in Malta and in Egypt? Lord Cecil and the League of Nations Union, with the active assistance of nearly all our prelates and some other persons who should know better, have, by urging us all to rely on 'collective security,' which the urban multitude interpret as 'the other fellow,' undermined the national determination to rely upon our own efforts.

How deep the canker has eaten Major-General Fuller shows in chapter xi. Our existing Army is, in Captain Liddell Hart's words, 'not an insurance policy, but a petition in bankruptcy,' with little of its pre-war self-confidence. The standard of living accommodation in civil life is rising: abroad our soldiers often live in bug-ridden barracks, which would be condemned in this country as unfit for human habitation. How great the need for a new military outlook Colonel Hutchison shows elsewhere in this number. How much greater the need for a new outlook, on the part of civilians, upon the problems of peace and war Major-General Fuller's present book is witness.

A resolution dated February 4, 1932, published by the League of Nations Union, states that:

It is obvious that the interests and aims of the League, the Union and the Services, are interlocked, and that the policy they stand for should be a united policy and generally acceptable to all.

Generally acceptable as a policy it probably is, but in the methods by which it is to be upheld there is room for acute differences of opinion, and these differences have been most marked in the attitude of some of the members of the League of Nations Union and of the Services to each other.

In the months immediately before us we shall do well to ponder the problems suggested by this book in the light of this resolution. Viewed merely as an insurance policy, the

cost of the armed forces of the Crown represents an annual premium of 1*d.* or 2*d.* in the pound, not on the capital, but on the annual value of the assets it protects.

The present generation, and its successors, will be rightly critical of any case made for this country's entrance into a war; but war is possible, and honour as well as interest may compel us to take part. Is it not time that the League of Nations Union and other bodies began to educate English youth on the questions of nationality and patriotism? It has been faced abroad: it must be faced here. Are we to hold what we have, or to give something to the stronger man who claims a larger share? Are we prepared to do our duty as trustees for the populations of our Crown Colonies and for our kinsmen overseas, or shall we, under pressure, surrender our trusteeship to others? These questions must before long be put to the electorate: if wisely put and honourably answered, this book will help us to do both, and we may have good hopes for peace in our time. In the words again of Shakespeare (*King Henry VI.*),

Awake, awake, English nobility!
Let not sloth dim your honours, new-begot;
Cropp'd are the flower-de-luces in your arms;
Of England's coat one half is cut away.

ARNOLD WILSON.

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



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THE MEMEL PROBLEM

By SIR ALEXANDER LAWRENCE

THE unstable equilibrium of the Balkans was the curse of Europe, and in the end it brought about the Great War. At this moment Lithuania is a similar plague spot on the shores of the Baltic. When an Englishman reads in his paper that some Nazis have been prosecuted in Lithuania, he is likely to suppose that some aggressive German movement is being put down and that some other neighbour of Germany is being saved from disorders and crimes such as have occurred in Austria. If, however, he had an opportunity to look below the surface in Vienna and in Memel, he would find very little in common between the tragedies which have afflicted those two cities.

I have had special opportunities of seeing the Memel problem while watching the trial of some of the citizens of Memel who have recently been convicted on charges of sedition against the Lithuanian Republic. Nothing

would have induced me to undertake or to pursue this task if I had found that the Memel movement had anything in common with the conspiracy which culminated in the murder of Dr. Dollfuss in Vienna. The present article is an attempt to make known to the English-reading public the strange state of affairs which exists to-day on the eastern shores of the Baltic. I would ask those of my countrymen who, like myself, disapprove of Nazi Germany not to condemn the German inhabitants of Memel without first hearing something of their troubles.

Lithuania has a bitter quarrel with Poland over Vilna and a bitter quarrel with Germany over Memel, and it is the risk of being embroiled in these quarrels that has hitherto prevented the other three Baltic States joining with her to form an effective Baltic league. The root of the trouble is that the racial boundaries of the Lithuanians are ill-defined; and as a result of this uncertainty, Lithuania, which is about the size of Wales both in area and population, has for years been technically at war with her large neighbour Poland and conducts a campaign of forcible Lithuanisation against the great majority of the inhabitants of her most civilised province, the small territory of Memel, which is about the size of an English county.

The present internal boundary between Memelland and the rest of Lithuania was the frontier of East Prussia for five centuries prior to 1919, and even now one knows at once when the old 'Russian frontier' is crossed by the difference in the roads, the houses and the cultivation of the land. The Committee appointed by the Ambassadors' Conference in 1923, whose Report formed the basis of the Statute of Memel, described the frontier of the Memel territory as 'the boundary between Europe and Asia.'

In 1919, however, a new era began. Germany being disarmed and helpless, a French garrison occupied Memel, and remained there for four years while the map of Eastern Europe was being remodelled and the neighbouring nation of Lithuania was being reborn. The doctrine of self-determination had been adopted as the policy of the victorious Allies, and partly on principle, but even more by necessity, it was mainly left to the inhabitants of the liberated lands to decide by the power of the sword the vital question of

what should be the size of the self-determining units and how the wishes of each unit should be ascertained. The problems confronting the Allies were indeed formidable, and it remains to be shown that any other principle would have produced better results; but it must be conceded by the best friends of that doctrine that the difficulties of the problem were not always appreciated by the Allied statesmen.

If President Wilson had offered to go into the witness-box it would have been interesting to inquire how he would have applied the doctrine to North America. Would he have allowed the Southern States to self-determine themselves out of the Union? How would he have regarded a claim to independence by the negroes of South Carolina, or by an Indian tribe such as the Blackfeet, or by the German majority of a town in the Middle West, or by those parts of New York whose inhabitants are mainly not of Anglo-Saxon origin? Did he think that in 'bleeding Kansas' in the days before the Civil War a plebiscite had been a satisfactory way of deciding whether the new State should belong to the slave-holding or to the non-slave-holding *bloc*? If yes, did he desire to see repeated in other lands the methods by which in those days the two rival parties in the Middle Western territories tried to reduce the number of their opponents, and, incidentally, by murdering all save one of a family of 'abolitionists,' created in the surviving John Brown a fanatic determined to raise a revolt of the negro slaves?

Some of these questions may seem grotesque, but they do not differ much from the questions that had to be answered in Eastern Europe. It must be obvious to anyone who views the problem of self-determination at close quarters that, however it be applied, it must produce hardships and must in many cases put a part of the population under a government that it dislikes; also, that its success must depend on a wise selection of the units within which it is to be applied. To do this would require the wisdom of a Solomon with ample time and opportunity to study each area and power to enforce his decisions, but in the years following the Armistice it was in the very nature of things impossible to provide such machinery. In the first place, the victorious Allies were anxious above all things to make another great war impossible, and to many of them it seemed that for this purpose the

first requisite was the permanent weakening of Germany. In the second place, the statesmen of the Entente had to deal simultaneously with dozens of problems all over the world, any one of which would in normal times have demanded long and close attention. Last, but not least, they had no power to enforce their views in the inaccessible lands of Eastern Europe; for none of them could have called on its war-wearied armies to undertake another campaign unless very vital interests of its own were clearly in danger.

After having to yield to *force majeure* in Vilna, which the Poles had seized by a sudden *coup*, the Lithuanian Government applied the same method on their western frontier, and on the day when the French troops marched into the Ruhr, the Lithuanians staged an *émeute* in Memel of their own soldiers disguised as civilians, and the French garrison marched out after firing a few shots. It is true that Lithuania, like the other Baltic States, won its independence for itself, although the means of doing so arose from the military collapse of both Russia and Germany. It is not, however, true to say that it acquired Memel in the same way. Memel was taken from Germany by the Allies without Lithuania's help, and it only fell into the hands of Lithuania four years later because the Allies evacuated it at a time when Lithuania had an army and Memel had none. It was most unfortunate for the future peace of the world that, in the years following the Armistice, the victorious Allies, though all-powerful against their late enemies, had no force available to impose a reasonable settlement among the competing claimants to the less accessible regions of Europe.

Eventually in 1924 Lithuania made a treaty with Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan which recognised the Memel territory as belonging to Lithuania, but with a local Government of its own which was to possess very wide powers of Home Rule. This 'Statute of Memel' gave to the Memellanders a Parliament ('Land Tag') of their own, to be elected by secret ballot on a basis of universal suffrage. There was to be a local Government, or 'directorate,' responsible to this Parliament, which was to control all matters of local administration, including the police, the schools, and the judiciary. The German and Lithuanian languages were to have equal rights, and the judges and

civil servants were to have security of tenure as in England. The post office, the railways, the army, and the customs were to be under the administration of the Republic of Lithuania. Internal taxes were only to be levied by an Act of Parliament, and the directorate must retire, like a British Government, if Parliament passed a vote of no confidence in it.

For a long time past, however, the Lithuanian Governors of Memel have appointed and kept in office directorates detested by four-fifths of the deputies, and have prevented any vote of censure from being taken by the ingenious expedient of never allowing a quorum of members to be present, and in many other ways the provisions of the statute have been nullified by administrative action on the part of the Lithuanians, who claim that in the name of national security they can be overridden. But instead of openly denouncing the Statute of Memel they have quietly infringed it by administrative action, of which the effect can only be known by close acquaintance with the facts, while their ruthless control of the Press and the 'wireless' makes it no easy matter to ascertain what the facts are.

It is contended in Germany and in Memel that the autonomy granted by the statute was meant to resemble that of a Dominion of the British Empire, but the mysterious working of the British Constitution is seldom understood by foreign observers; and a far closer parallel could be found in the status of the province of Quebec, where a population alien from its neighbours in speech, in race, and in religion now forms a harmonious part of the Dominion of Canada. If Memel had been treated by Lithuania as Quebec was treated by Sir Guy Carlton after its original conquest and by the Canadian Government in later days, it might have become a loyal province of Lithuania while still retaining the language, culture, and religion of Northern Germany. If the framers of the statute could have foreseen its working, they would surely have provided for some resident international officer to supervise it, or have made Memel a free city on the lines of Danzig with an independent High Commissioner.

On economic grounds the project of an autonomous Memel united to Lithuania had much to recommend it. Lithuania urgently needs a good harbour and Memel needs

a *hinterland*. Under the less tense conditions and lower tariffs of pre-war Europe, Memel, though a German town, served as a port for the trade of a large area of what was then Russia, and the produce of the forests of what is now Lithuania or Poland was known in England as 'Memel timber.' Memel, standing on a kind of promontory projecting eastwards from East Prussia, could not compete for German traffic with the more central position of Königsberg. If, therefore, Memel were again united to Germany, it could not hope to enjoy its pre-war prosperity, unless by some miracle the intense economic nationalism and colossal tariffs of to-day were to disappear. The inhabitants of Memel cannot be blind to this obvious fact, and if they were to desire union with Germany it could only be in order to escape from an intolerable state of affairs under the present *régime*.

It was once remarked by a cynical and successful Continental statesman that he did not mind who made the law so long as he himself administered it. His own career confirmed this opinion, and all the inhabitants of Lithuania have reason to believe it. For the power to administer the law rests with the police, and he who has the army can, if he so chooses, select and control the police, whatever the Constitution may say. In the Memel territory the final power rests with the rifles of the Lithuanian army; this power has been freely used to supersede or intimidate the police force of Memel, who are helpless against the military commandant and liable to be themselves prosecuted if they obey the orders of their lawful chiefs. The governor himself has the support of the military commandant, whose power is very far-reaching under the state of martial law which was proclaimed all over Lithuania in 1926 and has remained in force ever since, although the Memel territory had not, in fact, been disturbed by the disorders of that year.

A few small incidents will give a picture of the helplessness of the constitutional officials of Memel in the face of this combination. For instance, during an election a Memel policeman attempted to prevent a Lithuanian from pulling down a Memelland election poster, but found himself in turn arrested by a Lithuanian policeman for anti-State activities. There have been wholesale expulsions of permanent civil servants on the ground that they had inadequate know-

ledge of Lithuanian, and they have been replaced by Lithuanians who have no knowledge of German. An attempt has been made to impose Lithuanian as the medium of instruction in almost all the schools of the Memel territory, which in many cases is against the express wish of the immense majority of the parents of the children. The language principally seen in the shop windows of Memel has always been German; but when a crowd of young Lithuanian students went down the main streets threatening all the shopkeepers that their windows would be broken if their names continued to appear in German on their shopfronts, the Lithuanian police made no attempt to protect the shopkeepers and the Memel police dared not do so. The Memel Statute provides that both languages shall have equal rights, but I have seen many letters returned undelivered through the post merely because the addresses, besides being written in Lithuanian, were also written in German.

In these circumstances it is not remarkable that the Memel directorate was in danger of receiving a vote of no confidence if the Memel Parliament was allowed to meet and pass a resolution. The means adopted for preventing this were peculiar and effective. The Constitution provides that twenty members are required to form a quorum out of a total of twenty-nine. Five of these members, who had polled less than 12,000 votes at the election, supported the Lithuanian policy, while all the others opposed it and polled in all nearly 54,000 votes. If the Parliament could meet and vote, there was no doubt that it would pass a vote of censure on the Government by an enormous majority. The method adopted for avoiding this catastrophe was as follows: The Parliament of twenty-nine members was summoned to meet on several occasions, but the five Lithuanian members never attended, so that the possible attendance was reduced to twenty-four members. Of the remaining twenty-four members, one was in exile, and therefore unable to attend; but although he was notoriously obnoxious to the Lithuanian authorities, they had not declared him incapable of sitting, because that would have enabled some other person to take his place. There were therefore only twenty-three members available to attend a meeting of the Parliament, and on each occasion on which

it was summoned the Lithuanians took steps to prevent the necessary quorum of twenty from being present. Sometimes the governor just before the meeting declared a few of the members incapable of sitting on the ground that they had been members of an unlawful association. By the proportional representation system of Lithuania, when a seat in Parliament becomes vacant it is not the subject of a bye-election, but is filled by the unelected candidate next on the list of candidates of the party which held the now vacant seat. On one occasion four persons who had been next on the candidates' list were in attendance to take the seats of four disqualified members, but the governor refused to allow them to do so on the ground that they could not take their seats in a house which had no quorum, though there would have been a full quorum had they been admitted. The candidates in question were arrested by the Lithuanian police, and the members were again dismissed after unanimously declaring their want of confidence in the directorate. The members who made this declaration amounted to a clear majority of the whole, so that the resolution would have been carried even if all the other members had voted against it in a full house.

There were in the Parliament five Socialist or Marxist members, but all of them heartily supported the National Socialist element in resisting the Lithuanian directorate. Three of these Socialists (a leader and two followers) constituted the extreme left wing of the chamber. On one occasion last winter both the followers received forged telegrams, purporting to come from their leader, advising them not to attend the meeting of Parliament next day. Both of them suspected a trick on the part of the Lithuanian Government and started for Memel to attend the session. One of them succeeded in arriving, but the other was hustled on the railway platform and prevented from catching his train on the ground that he did not ask for his ticket in good Lithuanian. No telegrams had, in fact, been sent by the leader.

When the present Nazi Government came into power in Germany in 1933, the speeches of its leaders about the recovery of the lost German lands very naturally caused alarm among its neighbours, and particularly among those

who had any considerable number of Germans among their subjects. They also caused a wave of enthusiasm among German communities outside Germany. The effect in Memel was at once comic and tragic. Two separate parties were formed among the Memellanders with ideals and organisations in many respects resembling those of the National Socialist Parties in Germany. The programmes of both parties were submitted to the Lithuanian authorities and formally sanctioned by them. These two parties were bitterly hostile to one another and differed on fundamental points (e.g., the Neumann Party rejected the Nazi racial doctrines), but both parties were equally pledged to the preservation of the Memel autonomy. They also did some very foolish things; for instance, they took a number of well-known German patriotic songs and sung them with the substitution of 'Memelland' for 'Germany' and 'Dr. Neumann' for 'Hitler.' They had a *Führer* and a deputy leader, and groups and group leaders and cells.

The Lithuanian authorities lay quiet for some time and then arrested all the prominent members of both parties. The indictment of their alleged offences occupied over 500 pages of print, and the trial took over three months before a military court. About two-thirds of the prisoners were convicted and received sentences of penal servitude ranging up to twelve years; in a very few cases life sentences were imposed. The sentences could only have been justified if there really had been a serious plot to carry out a Nazi *putsch*, such as had been attempted in Austria. For this purpose arms would have been necessary, and the prosecution claimed to have found them in large numbers. When, however, towards the end of the trial these finds of arms were produced in court and counted by the prosecution's own witnesses, the number of military weapons turned out to be so small that the prosecution practically abandoned their original story of preparations for an armed rising by the Memellanders. At the last minute they fell back upon an entirely fresh allegation that arms 'would be procured' from across the frontier, but they produced no shred of evidence in support of this.

This is in very striking contrast with the position in Austria at the time of the Dollfuss murder, where the con-

spirators were found to have large supplies of up-to-date munitions. In Memel the majority of the weapons were ordinary shot-guns, the possession of which had been licensed by the Lithuanian authorities in the usual way; but, quite apart from the question of what arms were available, there is an essential difference between Austria and Lithuania. In Austria to-day all the inhabitants speak German and are of the same race or blend of races. Any party which dominates the German-speakers in Austria may force the whole country to adopt a Constitution to its own liking. In Lithuania, on the other hand, the German-speaking element outside the Memel territory is negligible in numbers; and the population of the Memel territory is less than one-sixteenth of the whole, so that it would be quite impossible for any combination of Memellanders to change the Constitution of Lithuania, either by force or by constitutional means, against the wishes of the Lithuanians themselves, who could easily suppress any attempted revolution inside Memel unless supported by a German invasion.

The impression left, after careful consideration of the whole proceedings and of almost *verbatim* reports extending to over half a million words, is that the Lithuanian Government took advantage of some trifling incidents to strike a blow at the natural leaders of opinion in Memel, with a view to making it too dangerous for any Memellander to take part in public life unless he belonged to the very small Lithuanian *bloc*, which at the last election in 1932 gained only five seats out of a total of twenty-nine.

The ultimate question is whether the Memellanders as subjects of Lithuania are to be allowed to preserve the German language, which most of them speak, and the standards of government to which they have been accustomed, or are to be forcibly compelled to abandon these and become merged in a race which they regard as less civilised than themselves. The only third alternative is an attempt by Germany to recover Memel by force of arms.

The survival of an autonomous Memel joined to Lithuania is the solution which every wise observer must desire, but this cannot happen unless the Statute of Memel is allowed to operate as originally intended—that is to say, with a Parliament freely elected and allowed to function freely and to

control its own directorate; but the present policy of the Lithuanian Government is a great obstacle to such a solution.

Martial law and legislation by decree enable the Lithuanians to impose many hindrances to the expression of Memelland opinion at the polls. All who are known to oppose the official policy are liable to be persecuted by the police and expelled from any public employment which they may have, and many special measures have been taken to diminish the voting strength of the Memellanders. For instance, it has been decreed by the Lithuanian authorities that all members of any society which has been declared unlawful by the governor are disqualified both from sitting as members of the Parliament and from voting at elections. Both the principal Memelland parties have been declared unlawful, with the result that their members, amounting to several thousands, are disqualified from sitting and from voting. These members include a large proportion of the leading citizens of Memel.

The Lithuanians have also appointed an Elections Commission, consisting entirely of their own supporters, to decide all questions arising with regard to the elections and the qualification of electors. There is, therefore, little to prevent the wholesale importation of 'faggot voters' from Lithuania for the purpose of voting at the election. In the later days of the last Parliament this Elections Commission finally made it quite impossible to form a quorum without the five Lithuanian members, by arbitrarily reducing the total number of deputies from twenty-nine to twenty-four. The Memel Constitution contains a provision by which it can be altered with the consent of three-fifths of the members of the Land Tag. If by fair means or foul the Lithuanian Government can control that majority of votes, the whole Constitution may be so emasculated as to be no protection at all to the inhabitants. If that should happen, it will be no solution of the Memel problem, but a permanent challenge to the peace of Europe.

In 1899 we ourselves went to war with the Transvaal in order to secure protection for our countrymen beyond our borders from injustices less grave than those suffered by the Memellanders, and no country could be expected to remain for ever a passive spectator of such things if it had the power to interfere. It is true that, when we had beaten the Boers,

we gave them back complete control of their country after securing equal rights in it for Boer and Briton, and in due course surprised the world in the Great War by receiving help from our recent enemy; but in the circumstances of the present case a conflict with Germany might well result in the final extinction of Lithuania, unless, like Serbia in 1914, she could obtain the support of a world in arms. In the event of German intervention in Memel, Lithuania would no doubt appeal to the four other parties to the Memel Treaty to maintain it against Germany, but, unless her attitude to Memel is profoundly changed, there would be little moral force in that appeal.

The Lithuanians know that the Memel Convention might some day be of great value to themselves if they could invoke it against an attempted reconquest by Germany. They fear the result of a war with Germany, and desire to avoid it; but unfortunately they try to protect themselves against German domination by suppressing the German element in Memel instead of by allowing the Memellanders to preserve their own culture under Lithuanian sovereignty while enjoying the fruits of trade with the rest of Lithuania, their natural *binterland*. If this is done, the Memellanders need not desire to return to Germany; but so long as the present state of affairs continues, no one can be surprised if they are discontented with their lot, or if Germany refuses to sign a non-aggression pact with Lithuania. The Memel problem differs from other 'minority' problems in that its citizens are not merely entitled to the benefit of the general 'minority' clauses in the Peace Treaties, but they have a right to a wide measure of 'home rule' created by treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and four of the Great Powers. No sensible person would say that all treaties, once made, must stand for ever unaltered, but this particular treaty does provide for a need which is quite as urgent to-day as when it was first made. If the four signatory Powers do not see to its observance, it is not only a terrible hardship to the people of Memel, but a great discouragement to any other people from relying on international obligations rather than on physical force. Memel has become for the Germans a test case by which they will judge whether the League of Nations and the ideas which go with it are genuine or are merely a camouflaged method

for keeping Germany down. The Lithuanian Government has recently taken steps to place the counting of the votes entirely in the hands of its own nominees, to flood the register with imported Lithuanians, to disqualify many thousands of Memellanders and to strike their leaders off the list of candidates. The result of the elections, when published, will show how far these measures may have been successful.

ALEXANDER LAWRENCE.

GENEVA THROUGH ITALIAN EYES

By COMMENDATORE LUIGI VILLARI, M.C.

It is impossible for an Italian with some experience and a little understanding of British life and policy to read Sir Samuel Hoare's speech at Geneva without feeling that it is the embodiment less of British policy than of English Quaker sentiment. All these things have been said so often before that they have become, as it were, current coin, to be found in every Briton's pocket. They have acquired, like the pre-war gold standard, the factual validity of philosophic axioms. To question these principles is as heretical now as it then was to discuss the gold standard: to abandon some of these now is as distasteful, though perhaps as healthy and stimulating, as was the dethronement of gold in 1931. Sir Samuel Hoare claims, not for the first time, that the British people supported the League at the outset for unselfish motives, moved by a great ideal, with an earnest desire to find an effective instrument for peace, adding, by an abrupt *non sequitur*, that as practical people they believe that collective security, founded on international agreement, is the most effective safeguard of peace, the destruction of which would 'gravely disturb' them. (The same might have been said, *mutatis mutandis*, of the gold standard.) Yet neither Great Britain nor the British Empire has hitherto been willing to contribute to the pool of security a quota of armed strength in any way comparable to the value of the assets in their possession which now they look to other States to assist them in securing. If we are to believe British writers, the Navy is reduced to half its pre-war strength, the Air Force is sixth or seventh on the list; and military experts claim that Great Britain cannot without difficulty send more than a single division abroad at short notice. Her people, alone in Europe, refuse to accept compulsory military service (the social equivalent of collec-

tive security) and grumble when asked to pay for substitutes, voluntarily recruited—from one class only, and that the poorest.

Collective security is the keynote of Sir Samuel Hoare's speech. Has it ever been applied, or has the possibility of applying it been seriously discussed until the last few months? The attitude and policy of Italy in Ethiopia has never been hidden: nothing, indeed, has been concealed. The issue has been before the world since last January. Has Great Britain been equally frank in announcing what view she proposed to take; and if not, what could reasonably be inferred from her actions during the past few years? We in Italy find official explanations of her reticence unconvincing. The *status quo* embodied in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, to secure which was the object of the Covenant, was enormously to the advantage of Great Britain and the Dominions: the latter contribute not a man and not a penny to the pool of security, and have made it clear that in no circumstances will they commit themselves to any action beyond their own borders. They might impose embargoes; that is all.

Collective security as described by Sir Samuel Hoare, more particularly in its application to current developments of Italian policy, has the unswerving support of the representatives of the Free and Established Churches in Great Britain. This is not, to any foreign observer, a matter of surprise. The Churches have in the past invariably been solidly behind the British Government, whenever its interests have required it to embark on a campaign. Great Britain is, indeed, fortunate in having, not one, but half a dozen different religious denominations, whose leaders display a skill, so great as to be, perhaps, unconscious, in discovering a moral basis for British interests. (Some foreign observers find it hard to decide whether the League of Nations is a religion, an industry, a charity, or a conspiracy.) The war of 1914 had the unswerving support of every religious denomination; so, too, with insignificant exceptions, the South African war; thus also every successful war of conquest, in the name of civilisation, throughout the whole of Africa and Asia. But their understanding and tolerance of war, as the outcome of the policy of expansion pursued over two centuries by the United Kingdom, has seldom extended to the same policy

when practised by other countries. Where England has led, none may now follow. Yet surely it is possible that other nations may be equally capable of studying the needs of subject peoples and even better colonists, for the modern Briton is loath to emigrate and even less willing to work on the land. Italians have proved themselves good colonists: in Tunisia, where they have made notable progress, as also in Lybia, in face of immense difficulties. They are very well thought of in the United States, in Argentina and Brazil. In the United States, where they have maintained their identity, even whilst abandoning their language, Italian labourers created the greatest public works; the great tunnels under the Hudson River, the great railways, are the work, first and foremost, of sons of Italy. They have contrived to make a living in Egypt, where they represent the largest European community. What reason is there, then, to suppose that they cannot play a part as dignified and as valuable in Ethiopia as the British have done in Kenya and Uganda?

The strength of the League, says Sir Samuel Hoare, depends upon the support that it receives from the peoples of Member States. Let it be judged by this standard. What real support has it in public opinion in any countries in Europe except Great Britain and France. The membership of the various League of Nations societies outside Great Britain is trifling. The American continent, North and South, neither gives support to nor has confidence in the League. The continent of Africa has no voice, and when General Smuts raises his voice on behalf of the indigenous races of Africa it is time to remind him that the treatment of subject races by the Dutch for two centuries is a byword even in Great Britain, and a menace to the future of South Africa. Nowhere is this better recognised than in London, where the opposition to the transfer of the British Protectorates from Whitehall to the Dominion Government is fiercely opposed by men with colonial experience on the specific ground that the Afrikander cannot be trusted to treat the coloured population wisely. The exercise of the mandate by the Union in what was once German South-West Africa has been severely criticised at Geneva.

The late Sir Eyre Crowe, in a Memorandum published by Mr. Lloyd George in vol. iv. of his *Memoirs*, pointed out

in 1916 that no territorial settlement which might be reached at the end of the war could possibly be permanently just. A demand for a modification of territorial frontiers was bound to arise, and the Powers would then inevitably group themselves into two parties—revisionist and anti-revisionist. If revision was long deferred, or actively opposed, there was bound to be an explosion of pent-up forces. This is precisely what is happening to-day; but in Sir Samuel Hoare's speech there is no reference to a possible revision of treaties and modification of existing distribution of territories. It is true that he says that 'Some other means than the recourse to arms must be found for adjusting the natural play of international forces,' but he adds: 'not every demand for a change deserves to be listened to. As a Conservative I set myself against change that is premature or unnecessary.' It is not necessary to be a Conservative in order to hold such views. What serious political party has ever advocated changes which were admittedly premature or unnecessary?

'The justice of a claim,' continued the Foreign Secretary, 'is not necessarily in proportion to the national passions which are aroused in support of it by one of the most dangerous features of modern life—Government propaganda.' Does this refer to the incomparable skill with which President Roosevelt has marshalled American opinion in support of his New Deal? Does it refer to the rigid, unbending, merciless control of every instrument of national life by the rulers of Soviet Russia, who carry their principles to the point of refusing to allow Russians, except on the rarest possible occasions, to leave their country lest they should return, in the words of Heine, with contraband articles, not in their bags, but in their heads? The first Government to establish a Ministry of Propaganda during the war was that of Great Britain. It has had many imitators since, but few if any rivals. Were not Sir Samuel Hoare's words read with a certain emotion by Sir Kingsley Wood, who, as Minister of Health, is also in charge of propaganda in favour of the National Government? It is true that the one-sided posters which cover the advertisement boardings of England are not paid for directly by the taxpayer, but presumably from 'party funds' fed by great industrialists who have something to lose, and by *arrivistes* who have something to hope for. Does this

really alter the case? Is it not better that public enlightenment should be undertaken openly by responsible Ministers, without the furtive assistance of great financial houses and obscure vested interests?

But perhaps he was referring to Italy. If so, he will find during the past six months in the Press of Italy, imbued as it is to-day with a feeling of great responsibility towards the Government for what it says with regard to the national life, far less tendentious and, on balance, less inaccurate references to public opinion in Europe in relation to the problems of Africa than have appeared in the less expensive English papers.

Sir Samuel Hoare has proposed an investigation into the problem of raw materials. His reference to the subject ignores the fact that an inquiry on very similar lines was proposed by Signor Tittoni, leader of the Italian Delegation at the first Assembly of the League of Nations in 1920, at a time when Great Britain had placed a heavy export tax upon coal, a raw material of which she enjoyed at the moment, for various reasons, a virtual monopoly in the export market. It was almost impossible for coal to reach Italy by rail. The British miners demanded that the foreigner should pay, while an export tax seemed likely to replenish the British Exchequer. It was mercilessly applied forthwith, to the detriment of one of England's Allies, than which none was in greater need, at the moment, of the raw material of transport and of nearly all her industries. An Inquiry was indeed instituted, but nothing happened, and before long the export tax was removed, not because Great Britain repented the error of her ways, but because other nations, wiser in their generation, were ready to supply our needs. The lesson was not lost on Italy: the Italian coal trade was nearly lost to Britain. Discussions in the British Press, and in authoritative circles of possible unilateral mineral sanctions, deprive Sir Samuel Hoare's gesture of any hopeful significance to importing nations. The countries which possessed valuable minerals and essential raw materials in abundance have always declined to commit themselves on this matter. Indeed, a special department exists at Washington to ensure that adequate stocks are maintained of the few raw materials that America has to import.

With the worsening of the system of monetary exchange it is more than ever difficult for foreign countries who do not possess colonies of their own to purchase raw materials except with gold (a commodity of which almost the whole stock is held by those same countries which are most amply supplied with raw materials), or by exporting goods or services, which has been rendered increasingly difficult by the deliberate policy of every great Power. Migration to the New World—formerly an important economic factor in Italy's life—has come to an end. Tariffs, quotas, embargoes, and a patriotic desire to buy national goods has reduced Italian oversea exports still further. Scientific developments have made many nations less dependent than formerly upon an exchange of commodities. No international inquiry is needed in order to establish these facts. Italy can never hope to produce within her borders export goods sufficient to buy the commodities she so urgently requires. A policy of free export of raw materials is, in fact, no substitute for a redistribution, however modest, of territory or of population. But Sir Samuel Hoare goes further. The inquiry must be limited to raw materials from colonial areas, including protectorates and mandated territories. This will not remove 'once for all' the fear of exclusion or monopoly. There is no important product the world's supply of which is derived mainly from Crown Colonies or mandated territories. The world can do without cocoa; the supply of copra is more important, but it is subject, for the most part, to the Congo Basin Treaties, which have not been abrogated. But what chance would an Italian contractor have of supplying, say, the Gold Coast Government with motor cars, railway material or electrical apparatus? Would the Agents for the Crown Colonies accept Italian in lieu of the British specifications, to which the Gold Coast has for long been accustomed? He would not be asked to tender, and no one would blame them. But how otherwise can Italy purchase what she requires?

The attitude of His Majesty's Government, concludes Sir Samuel Hoare, has been one of 'unswerving fidelity to the League and all that it stands for.' A Continental observer cannot forbear to smile. How short are English memories! What was the attitude of Great Britain at the beginning of

this or in the previous year towards Germany? Or in the years before that towards Japan, or, for that matter, towards the acceptance of any responsibility, collective or otherwise, for the crimes and follies committed all over the globe by innumerable foreigners?

Conscious as is Great Britain to-day of the emergence, in Europe and in Asia, of new forces beyond her control, and indeed beyond collective guidance, she has hitherto sought, as most persons believe wisely, to exercise a moderating influence, without endeavouring to secure the hegemony of the world by a misuse of the limited obligations assumed under the Covenant in 1918. She has, in consequence, carried immense weight at the Council table in Geneva. Within the limits imposed by circumstances her statesmen have exercised a continuous and beneficent influence on every aspect of world policy. So far from being blamed by public opinion in Europe for her weakness, she deserves, and sometimes receives, praise for her steadfast advocacy of a policy of moderation. Where other nations have readily abandoned parliamentary democracy in the advance of their interests and of national unity, Great Britain has been able to maintain both.

But the League should stand for something greater than the Treaty of Versailles. It should stand for a human ideal, and if every nation does not interpret this ideal alike, that is no reason why the League should be written off as a failure, or why dissident Powers should be forced out of it or be induced to leave it with a gesture of disgust or violence. There can be no greater disaster for the future of Europe and the well-being of the world than for two Powers, Great Britain and France, to seek to constitute themselves arbiters of humanity, to seek to prescribe the limits within which other nations should live and move and have their being. The effective Franco-British hegemony of the League is indeed the chief reason why it has appeared suspect to other countries.

The task of Great Britain in the next ten years seems to us, not that of ruling the waves—as King Canute was careful to explain to his subjects that he could not do—but that of guiding the torrents of human activity derived from the glaciers in the hearts of men, melted by new and great

forces, into channels in which, when harnessed, they will serve the interests of humanity.

One of the means whereby Great Britain exercised in the past a valuable cultural influence over other countries has been the high repute in which English governesses have been held everywhere. To mention my own country alone, there are few great Italian families who have not at some time or other come under the influence of such women, of whose ministrations, like those of maiden aunts, they retain affectionate memories dating from childhood.

Yet the attitude of those who would teach and preach is not always equally welcome. T. E. Brown's *Pincian Woman* represents perfectly the impression created upon the average Italian by the speeches of some British statesmen and by leading articles in *The Times*.

I know your mechanism well-adjusted,
I see your mind and body have been trusted
To all the proper people :
I see you straight as is a steeple ;
I see you are not old. . . .

But morals—beautiful serenity, . . .
The patent recipes for saving souls,
And other things ; the chill dead sneer
Conventional, the abject fear
Of form-transgressing freedom—I admit
That you have these ; but love you not a whit
The more, nor ever can,
Alarming female on the Pincian !

It is with no disrespect to Sir Samuel Hoare, or to British statesmen generally, that I suggest that this attitude of mind is perhaps more often to be found among politicians and the high priests of the high-brow daily and weekly Press than among governesses, who have at least learnt something from Froebel. It is, indeed, more important to understand what other peoples think and feel than to read sermons to them, even from the tribune of the Assembly of the League.

Only twenty years have passed since Italy threw herself into the combat for freedom, finding the deepest satisfaction in the intimate relations with the Governments of France and Great Britain entailed by those heart-breaking days. What has happened, asks every Italian, that the honourable friendships of fifty years should be forgotten by Great Britain in the

hot pursuit of a noble but impracticable ideology headed by men with little knowledge of European history and less of the spirit that animates the nations to-day? May we not exclaim, with a great French historian, 'Faut-il donc abolir l'histoire pour faire de la politique?' 'Les longues mémoires,' wrote Montalembert, 'font les grands peuples.' Memories in Italy are long and are growing longer. English history records more than once the renascence of a nation. Let Englishmen look with sympathy and understanding at the new forces at work to-day which, if rightly handled, may yet bring to the world the modern equivalent of the 'Pax Romana,' to which men look forward with such longing.

LUIGI VILLARI.

ETHIOPIA

I. THEODORE II. AND THE BEGINNING OF MODERN ABYSSINIA

By GEORGE F.-H. BERKELEY

ON November 2, 1930, in the capital city of Addis Ababa, the Negûs Haila Selassié was crowned Emperor of Ethiopia,¹ and at the same time a statue was unveiled to his great predecessor Menelik, the victor of Adowa. At this ceremony there were present the Duke of Gloucester, representing King George, and the Prince of Udine, representing Italy; and also delegates from the United States, Greece, Germany, Japan, and other nations. This news attracted only a passing interest; but to those who had been watching the progress of Abyssinia undoubtedly it conveyed the feeling that she had passed through the most dangerous period of her history; that now she was on her way to become one of the chief influences in the destiny of Africa. She has indeed made immense strides since 1868, when, as some of us can remember, we sent an expeditionary force against the Emperor Theodore.

The Victorian era, we are rather apt to forget, was an era of wars waged by British troops in every continent. Perhaps the most remarkable of them all was the Abyssinian campaign. It was an effective gesture. Great Britain had nothing to gain by it (not even a frontier to defend), and her expedition had to be organised in India because the Suez Canal was not yet open to traffic. From India we sent overseas nearly 40,000 men to penetrate an unknown and mountainous country to a distance of some 379 miles. The actual fighting force was only about 14,600 strong, but within five months it had stormed the enemy's capital and, incidentally, had freed Abyssinia from the terror of Theodore, for by that time

¹ The true name of Abyssinia is Ethiopia.

the invincible conqueror had become little else but a maniac with a lust for blood. This great expedition was undertaken merely to release a few British prisoners and to restore British prestige in the East. It cost nine millions sterling, and achieved its object. Some twenty-five years later several Italian writers on Eritrea have recorded the fact that a deep impression had been left on the minds of those hardy populations by the march of an army which came and went all-powerful, but, unlike any other invaders, without thought of conquest or gain.² Incidentally, it brought us in conflict with the Emperor Theodore, a man of extraordinary character, whose previous history is so little known in England that it seems worth recording here.

The ancient realm of Ethiopia, as most people are aware, was old when the book of Genesis was written and powerful in the heyday of Nineveh.³ That was its pagan period, of which, in reality, very little is known. Undoubtedly the greatest event in the history of this people is its conversion to Christianity in the fourth century. Since then it has been an outpost of the Cross, and its proudest tradition is that, in spite of all invaders, it has remained 'an island of Christians amid a sea of pagans.'⁴ At times the struggle has been

² 'As soon as they [the English] felt themselves well-prepared and strong they went forward rapidly and with decision, without wasting their energies on useless talk or theatrical demonstrations. So great was the impression made on the Ethiopian despot that he lost all desire to maintain the struggle, and became a prey to the moral superiority of his adversary, before whom no choice remained but submission. And that impression exists even to-day. It is proved by the manner in which English missions are received, and the evident fear in Menelik's mind at the idea of finding himself in contact with England.' (*I nostri errori*, p. 31, by N. N., an Italian official who spent thirteen years in Eritrea. The book is well known.) *Vide also Fra gli Ascari d'Italia*, p. 15: some memoirs by Major Gamera, who fought at Adowa. He describes how one of his native soldiers had been in Magdala as a child 'a few months before the tragic death of Theodore. . . . In connexion with that drama he remembered with admiration the Anglo-Indian troops which invaded Abyssinia, and especially the British pounds sterling; and was never tired of repeating that it is best not to play the fool with the English.' They found various remnants of the expedition, including a half-English woman, and, most important, the English road.

³ 'Ethiopia and Egypt were her strength, and it was infinite.' (Nahum iii. 9.) The prophet is referring to the fall of No Amon, and he prophesies the destruction of Nineveh.

⁴ In 1891, when Africa was being divided up, the Emperor Menelik sent a circular note to the great European Powers. In it he used the words quoted in the text: 'I have no intention of being an indifferent spectator if far-distant Powers make their appearance with the idea of dividing Africa. For fourteen centuries Ethiopia has been an island of Christians amid a sea of pagans. As the Almighty has protected Ethiopia to this day, so, I am confident, He will protect and increase her in the future.'

terrible. In the sixteenth century Abyssinia was overrun by Muslims, and from that time onwards it became an isolated country, cut off from civilisation and forgotten, surrounded and almost overwhelmed by the flood-tide of Muslim invasion; nevertheless, the resistance of the Christians continued, and finally in the middle of the nineteenth century it prevailed.

In the year 1840, however, the conflict of races and religions was by no means at an end, and dominion seemed to be passing into Muslim hands. Abyssinia consisted of four states: Amhara (with the capital city Gondar), Tigré, Shoa, and Gojjam—about four or five million people in all, of whom nearly half were in Shoa and nearly one-quarter in Amhara. Harrar had not yet been included in the union. According to the ancient constitution of Ethiopia, each of these small states had a king of its own, and they were all under the rule of the emperor, who was called the Negûs Nagast, or King of the Kings of Ethiopia. Virtually, however, this ancient constitution was in abeyance. The Muslim Gallas had succeeded in establishing their chief, Ras Ali, as ruler of Amhara: there were wars and rivalries between all the small kingdoms, and rebellions within Amhara and Tigré. The southern kingdom, Shoa, was more united than the other two, and for that reason it was destined to prevail. Abyssinia was, in fact, still in the throes of a feudal system not altogether unlike our own during the Middle Ages, and this system was breaking down; in some districts almost any local chief could raise a following of bandits. In the midst of this impending chaos the central imperial court of the Negûs Nagast, the only emblem of national unity, had lost all authority.

At this moment there appeared on the scene the man whose name was to leave a deep mark on the history of his country—namely, Kasa, son of the Dedjazmatch Hailo, or Khaylu Maryam, and famous later on as the Emperor Theodore. National movements are usually connected with the name of a great man, and we know well how common a failing it is for historians to exaggerate his importance; but in the case of Theodore one may admit at once that it is what he attempted to do, rather than what he actually accomplished, which has borne fruit during the last seventy years. Thus, as a ruler, Theodore proved a failure; but

it was undoubtedly due to his victories that the authority of the emperors was revived after his death, and with it the idea of national unity. He restored the Christian ascendancy and thereby connected the future development of Abyssinia with Europe rather than with Asia. He was unable to check feudal lawlessness, but saw that the right way to deal with it was by introducing European ideas. He died with his hopes unfulfilled, but was the connecting link between the semi-barbarian period of his country and our own time.

Theodore was a wonderful leader in war; but far more interesting was his attempt to bring unity and civilisation to his own people. Undoubtedly there was genius in this untutored savage.⁵ The best description of him is that given by his friend Plowden, the British consul:

He is young in years, vigorous in all manly exercises, of a striking countenance, peculiarly polite and engaging when pleased, and mostly displaying great tact and delicacy. He is persuaded that he is destined to restore the glories of the Ethiopian Empire and to achieve great conquests; of untiring energy both mental and bodily, his personal and moral daring are boundless. . . . When aroused his wrath is terrible and all tremble; but at all moments he possesses perfect self-command. Indefatigable in business, he takes little repose night or day; his ideas and language are clear and precise; hesitation is not known to him. . . . His faith is signal: 'Without Christ,' he says, 'I am nothing; if He has destined me to purify and reform this distracted kingdom, with His aid who shall stay me?' . . . Married himself at the altar and strictly continent, he has ordered or persuaded all who love him to follow his example, and exacts the greatest decency of manners and conversation; this system he hopes to extend to all classes.

He has suppressed the slave-trade in all its phases.

The arduous task of breaking the power of the great feudal chiefs . . . he has commenced. . . .

Should he now or at any time fail in his design of unifying Abyssinia or fall in battle, the misrule and anarchy that must ensue will baffle all human calculation. . . .

⁵ He was called 'the only man of genius in Africa.' This was the opinion of the Swiss Münzinger, who was the ablest of the contemporary observers: his work is a classic. It was translated from German into Italian by the Italian War Office for the use of its officers in Eritrea. (*Vide Studi sull'Africa orientale*, p. 39.) I notice that Sir E. Wallis Budge, in his *History of Ethiopia*, also a standard work, is greatly impressed by Theodore and refers to him as 'this wonderful man.' (Vol. ii., p. 486.) Similar opinions are expressed by Sir Clements Markham, and, indeed, by almost every writer on the subject.

His methods of life were eminently practical. His approach would be preceded by a cavalcade of fine horsemen, after whom he himself would appear on his horse dressed in simple military fashion—namely, a cassock, full trousers, and a girdle in which to place his pistols and his English sword; over all he wore his *shamma*, or cloak, which he alone wore over the shoulders. His face was thin, dark-coloured, with a somewhat Semitic profile; a high forehead; a slightly hooked nose; a short upper lip, with a mouth compressed and denoting temper; a short but projecting chin. He was born, in the year 1818, in Quara, a small Amharic province of which his father Ailu, or Khaylu, was governor. He was therefore of good blood; indeed, Ailu claimed to be an offshoot of the royal line that traces its descent from Solomon. But Kasa was only his natural son by his mistress Atta Tabag. There were several legitimate brothers, so that it is evident that he could expect nothing but a subordinate position in his father's household. As if to place success still further from him, we next hear of his family being obliged to fly the country owing to a rebellion (according to one account) raised by Ailu against the Muslim ruler Ras Ali.⁶ For some years Kasa (still a little child) and his mother lived unnoticed and in extreme poverty, gathering a living as best they might in the streets of Gondar.

There are times, however, in the history of almost every people when it seems to call aloud for a leader; and in the period before 1840 Ethiopia had reached the moment of her deepest humiliation—the time that often foreshadows a reaction. So low had she been brought by civil strife that the Muslims had been able to establish their representative, Ras Ali, as ruler of Amhara. In the capital city of Gondar he and his ambitious mother, Menen, exercised the supreme authority; but, in spite of their many attempts to conciliate the people, a feeling was already strong among the chiefs, and above all among the clergy, that Christian Ethiopia must never be ruled by a Muslim. Meanwhile—so the tradition says—Kasa and his mother were reduced almost to the point of starvation; indeed, Kasa himself lived by begging, until a charitably-disposed tanner received him as an apprentice, a fact never forgotten by his enemies, who, deeming it a

⁶ As to the cause of Ailu's exile there are different versions.

disgrace, called him to his dying day 'Theodore the Tanner.' Nevertheless, among his own people this young lion is remembered with the same pride that surrounds the early life of every national hero, and stories are told of him very similar to those that once were told about Achilles or Cuchulain: that he was so active and strong that at the age of twelve he often matched himself in running or spear-throwing against young men of twenty, and was never known to be defeated.

After some years of this life he fled from his mother and entered a monastery. Here he learned to read and write—in a marvellously short time, it is said; and at this early achievement no one need smile, for the Abyssinian alphabet is a serious undertaking: the system of spelling is even worse than our own. Here too, with characteristic energy, he devoted himself to books and self-education; and in this connexion we may note that in after years he founded a library in Magdala. And, finally, here it was that he heard the old legend—a legend mentioned by the early European travellers who visited Abyssinia long before his time—that some day there would arise a great emperor called Theodore who would revive her ancient glories. It was Kasa's aim to identify himself with this prophecy.

Compelled to fly the monastery, as it was sacked by a rebel, he only just succeeded in making his escape to his uncle, Kenfu,⁷ who was governor of a western province, and for some years served him as a lieutenant; under his orders he learned the profession of arms and had his first experiences of fighting. His name began to be known as that of a daring and able young leader. In 1838 the ambitious ruler of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, sent a strong force to invade Abyssinia, but it was met by Kenfu and defeated—with a loss (according to Abyssinian accounts) of a thousand men: in this engagement Kasa, only nineteen years of age, won his first laurels.

In 1840, however, Kenfu died, and a year later Kasa took the decisive step of his life. There are various reasons given for it. According to Sapeto, who apparently was in Abyssinia at the time, his brother had been seized by Ras Ali and

⁷ Sapeto says that Kenfu was Kasa's brother; but by other authorities he is called his uncle.

imprisoned on an *amba*⁸ till he died, probably of hardship and want of food. Other writers give other accounts; but one thing is certain—namely, that it was during this year or the next that Kasa left his home and went out into the forests at the head of seventy fighting men, and henceforward became the scourge of the Muslims, and of Ras Ali in particular. He was an extraordinarily determined enemy—one who preferred death to failure. Although his actual following was so small, there were thousands all over Ethiopia who wished him well. Ras Ali was regarded by the Christian chiefs as a Muslim interloper: though professing complete impartiality, he and his mother Menen loved to install men of their own creed in the highest places. He kept a confessor to please his Christian subjects, but when the great missionary Cardinal Massaja came to see him he arranged matters so that his visitor found it impossible to talk to him 'about the interests of his soul.' However, the Cardinal naïvely consoled himself by reflecting that the presence of the confessor proved, at all events, that His Majesty was not a Protestant.

In 1841 Ali deposed the reigning Negûs Nagast. The old ruler made no resistance, but tradition says that he observed, referring to the rising fame of Kasa: 'In Quara there is a man who will avenge me.' Ali did not venture to seize the crown, but he married his mother, Menen, to the young Negûs Nagast, a useless boy of about seventeen years. In 1842 Menen sent out a strong force to kill or capture Kasa, but he met it in the open and drove it back to Gondar. Thenceforward his wild bands were received in triumph, and the clergy openly proclaimed him as 'the great one' who was fated to restore the glories of Ethiopia and of the Christian religion. In fact, so great had Kasa's prestige become that the Empress thought it safest to make peace; and, by way of conciliating the young outlaw, Ali gave him his daughter. The marriage, which did not take place until 1847, was a great success. This first wife was his 'good genius'; during her life he was ever abstemious, continent and capable of self-restraint, but unfortunately she died before many years were over; and the excesses and cruelty of Kasa's last years have been attributed to the

⁸ One of the high, precipitous hills of Abyssinia.

fact that by the year 1860 he had lost the three best influences of his life—his wife, Plowden, and Bell.

It was during the next year or two that there occurred an incident to which Kasa always attached great importance. The story told is that Menen tried to get rid of him by sending him on an expedition into Egyptian territory, and, as events turned out, she was very nearly successful. Near Metamma, Kasa, at the head of 16,000 men, came in contact with a body of Turks only about 800 strong, but accompanied by some artillery. He surrounded them, and then dashed forward headlong, confident of annihilating them. But he had not reckoned on the efficacy of European weapons. The Turks were posted behind palisades. In vain Kasa rode in front of his men, leading them forward to the attack. The Abyssinians came on with a reckless dash of which even their enemies afterwards spoke with enthusiasm. 'They came to the very mouth of our guns,' said Saleh Bey, 'like mosquitoes to a candle,' but all to no purpose. Finally, Kasa fell from his saddle wounded, and his whole force retired, after losing 12,000 of its 16,000 men.⁹

Kasa was in despair. Two days later he met a missionary, Father Biancheri, and entreated him to help him. The following conversation took place between them:

'The Turks,' said Kasa, 'are not braver than we are, but they have the discipline of the Franks. You are a Frank; will you teach my men?'

It was a pathetic appeal, but Father Biancheri could only reply: 'I am not a soldier; I am only a poor traveller for Christ.'

This failure against the Turks made a profound impression on Kasa. In after years he could hardly bear to think of it; but he fully realised its lesson, and during the rest of his life he devoted most of his intercourse with foreigners to trying to obtain European arms, European discipline, and

⁹ These figures appear to be exaggerated; but it is evident that Kasa suffered a defeat which he never forgot. It is impossible to be quite sure of any of the details of the engagement. Rassam says that in 1867 Theodore spoke about it: 'Had the cowardly Turks not been behind a wall,' he said, 'I would have annihilated them. They invoked their prophet "La ilah illah Allah wa-Muhammed Rasul-Allah." [There is no God but *The* God, and Mohammed is the Apostle of God.] I retorted by invoking the fountain-head of my faith and the faith of my forefathers . . . and [challenging them] to come out and fight like men.'

European ideas. At one time he tried to make guns of wood out of hollow tree-trunks bound round with bands of iron. These cannot have been as serviceable as the well-known 'Sandy's stoups' with which the Scottish Covenanters made their memorable passage of the Tyne in 1640. At another time he made himself a 'steamer,' of which the paddle-wheels were turned by slaves, but during a storm on the lake it nearly sank beneath his feet. Towards the end of his reign he used to order his European prisoners to cast him a gun, quite regardless of the fact that they had no knowledge whatever of metal-working; and when finally, under the direst threats, one of their number, a Pole, succeeded in producing a metal gun, at the sight of this success Kasa (by then the Emperor Theodore) for once in his life displayed evident signs of emotion.

In 1846 Kasa was again in arms against Menen; the story is that, on hearing of his defeat by the Turks, she had written him an insulting letter. Ras Ali advanced to attack him with greatly superior numbers,¹⁰ but was completely defeated in no less than three successive battles, after the last of which Kasa picked up 800 arquebuses, an invaluable prize. Then at length the Empress decided to lead an army in person against him. For this purpose she collected 20,000 pikemen and 3000 Galla cavalry—that is to say, horsemen belonging to the wild Muslim tribes, among whom are to be found some of the best riders in the world. It was by their lances that Ras Ali hoped to establish his dynasty. To neutralise the effect of the cavalry Kasa posted his men behind a deep morass and awaited the attack. His scheme was entirely successful. The Empress herself led the Gallas to the charge, but they refused to cross the marshy ground, and Menen, having by heroic efforts reached the other side, fell wounded into the hands of her enemies. After this battle Ras Ali again made peace in order to ransom his mother.

These victories are easy to write about, but the descriptions convey no idea of the murderous and loathsome nature of these wars. Little or no quarter was given; the dead and many of the wounded were mutilated according to the bar-

¹⁰ Sapeto says that Kasa, with 300 lancers, routed 4000 of Ali's men in the first battle, and a still larger number in the second; that in the third they took 800 arquebuses. Such figures sound incredible, but they were probably those believed throughout Abyssinia.

barous Abyssinian custom (emasculatation), and many of the prisoners were deprived of one hand and one foot so as to render them incapable of future service. As to the numbers killed and wounded, one finds, of course, no reliable figures ; but, if half the accounts are true, some of these battlefields must have resembled huge shambles and bred pestilence for months afterwards ; and there were no doctors. It is a strange fact that, in spite of their ceaseless wars, the Abyssinians never developed any surgical knowledge. So unskilful did they remain that, even in 1896, after the battle of Adowa, an Italian line officer, Major Gamera, has left it on record that he was ordered to carry out several extractions of bullets and other operations with a blunt knife, and, when he protested, was told that he was doing it far better than it would be done by any Abyssinian.

In 1851 begins the greatest phase in Kasa's life : although he was chief of only two small provinces, he defeated triumphantly the rulers of Amhara, Gojjam, Tigré, and eventually Shoa and the Wollo Gallas. Before the end of that year the three first-named kings, under the supreme direction of Ras Ali, initiated a combined movement against him. Kasa met it by an able retirement, and thus succeeded in dividing their forces. They left Ras Gosho of Gojjam alone in occupation of Kasa's province of Dembea. Kasa hurried back to oust the invaders, and on November 13, 1852, he fell upon Gosho in a desperate struggle known as the battle of Gur-Amba ; after a terrible deadlock, the old warrior and his superior numbers had achieved a smashing success, when Kasa's good fortune suddenly came to his rescue ; as Gosho galloped forward to lead the pursuit a well-aimed shot from an arquebuser stationed at Kasa's elbow laid him dead, and his victory was turned into a rout.

On April 5, 1853, Kasa, with 40,000 men, attacked the combined forces of Ras Ali and Ras Ubié, about 130,000 strong, at Gorgora, and completely defeated and divided their armies. This victory was due partly to his having introduced some European ideas of training, and partly to his extraordinary leadership. And he knew enough of tactics to follow up his success at once. He drove Ubié back into Tigré and then pursued Ali into Gojjam, where he again routed him on June 23. In this battle Ali showed courage

worthy of better success, but many of his soldiers refused to fight. So great a prestige had Kasa now gained that he was believed to be under the special protection of God. His enemies declared that as he rode into battle they saw a bright halo shining round his head. In May 1854 he conquered and killed Beru (son of Gosho and now chief of Gojjam), and then, turning on Ras Ubié in Tigré, overthrew him on February 3, 1855, at the great and murderous battle of Deraghié in Semien. After this supreme victory he took the name of Theodore and had himself crowned Negûs Nagast, or King of the Kings of Ethiopia. The Muslim dynasty of Ras Ali was at an end.

At this point it is perhaps well to inquire, what were the causes of Theodore's success ? Why should one man have been so rapidly and so completely victorious over all his enemies ? In the first place, he represented the national aspirations of the most patriotic among the Ethiopians, who hated the Islamic supremacy and longed for a revival of their old empire. Secondly, Theodore could count on the support of the clergy, who grieved to see the true Christian emperor, of the historic race of Solomon, now reduced to a mere cypher in the hands of the Muslims ; and he had taken the trouble to win over the Abuna, or head of the national Coptic Church. When Kasa—or Theodore, as we must now call him—took the place of Ras Ali he at once made overtures to the Abuna Salama. The result of this alliance with the Church was that the Abuna issued a solemn prophecy hailing Theodore as the prince predestined by God to restore to Ethiopia her ancient tradition ; and Theodore himself believed this to be his mission. He even formed a scheme for invading Palestine and reconquering Jerusalem from the Turks, so that Ethiopia should be honoured as the true champion of Christendom ; and among his own people this strange crusade was considered 'very natural and very feasible.' Apparently it was part of the prophecy.

The third cause of his wonderful successes was undoubtedly his own genius for war. As far as his knowledge permitted, he organised his armies on a European basis. His campaigns were always well planned and were carried out with extraordinary rapidity. A march that would take another commander five days, he often accomplished in two.

The Italian Cardinal Massaja characteristically describes one of these advances. 'He descended like a thunderbolt; we, who were in Gudru, . . . on hearing of all these sudden movements and daring operations, trembled with fear.' At the same time he preserved the most profound secrecy. His soldiers often had no idea against which of their numerous foes they were marching. A hundred thousand men would follow him without knowing their destination. When a defeat was announced to Theodore he would receive it with an absolutely impassive face and make no further reference to the matter; but in a short time the successful assailant would be suddenly overtaken and crushed. In the field, when necessary, he himself led the attack, and displayed a reckless courage that proved him to care less for life than for victory; and the clear ringing tone of his voice, in battle or when otherwise aroused, has been especially noticed by writers who knew him.

In estimating his character one is constantly torn in opposite directions: at one moment filled with sympathy for this poor semi-savage who was cursed with great ideas; at another, horrified by his brutalities. The truth is that he was only a half-civilised man in whom the Understanding and the Brute obtained alternate mastery. During his periods of anger he might descend to the most appalling cruelties. The stories told about him are fearful, 'almost incredible,' says Cardinal Massaja, 'in a man gifted by the Lord with such splendid and unusual talents.' At the same time there are several facts to be remembered in his favour. First, that the worst stories about him all relate to his last five years, when excessive work and rapidly approaching failure had led to frequent drinking-bouts; when twenty years of constant wars and rebellions had deadened, utterly and completely, his sense of compassion for suffering; when the impossibility of fulfilling his mission had turned ambition into bitter hatred and ferocious disappointment, so that he attacked everything round him like a wild animal caught in a trap. Of course, it must be remembered that his natural standards had always been entirely different from those of the modern world, for Abyssinia was still as mediæval as England in the days of Edward II.; tortures were part of the civil code, and prisoners of war were mutilated. In view

of these considerations, one can make some allowance for him up to the year 1860. But soon after that there came a complete change in his character: he disregarded rights and laws; his record was that of a cruel, reckless tyrant, and during his last three or four years it became almost unimaginable.

Theodore's true difficulties did not begin until he became Negûs Nagast. He had set himself the gigantic task of reuniting Ethiopia and civilising her as far as possible on European lines. It was more than any one man could accomplish. Even to-day, with the assistance of telegraphs, telephones, railways, etc., it is still doubtful whether the unification is perfect, because difficulties geographical, historical racial, and religious prevent its completion. But nothing could daunt him. 'If God continues me in life,' he said to the British consul Plowden, 'I shall eradicate all that is bad among my people and introduce all that is good.'

From the first his position was almost desperate. Unity was what he wanted; and there was no unity. Now that Ras Ali was gone Theodore was no longer the champion of the Christians; he was merely a ruthless usurper. In spite of all Ethiopian prophecies, the first loyalty of the people went out to their own hereditary sovereigns in the four rival kingdoms, and in each state there were thousands of men who had sworn a blood-feud against Theodore. During the long wars all trade had ceased, and in many districts diligence was a lost virtue. Throughout that wild country there were thousands of brigands and rebels, and to reach them in their far-off strongholds was almost hopeless. Even his own soldiers were a constant source of disquietude; for though proud to serve under Theodore's banner, they expected, in return, to be allowed to plunder at will. In reality Theodore's successes were now at an end. He had destroyed the Muslim dynasty: he had given fresh dignity to the office of Negûs Nagast, but failed to create a central authority, and the empire actually stood in danger of falling to pieces. Unity was not for him to accomplish; indeed, it never became a reality until the days of the struggle against Italy.

His first attempt at organisation was to appoint his own faithful lieutenants to govern in each of the provinces; but before a year had passed, several of them had been signally

defeated by the local chiefs. What he required was European arms and organisation. From whom were they to be got? The best chance seemed to be the English, who would be glad to see some order restored, and consequently to be able to sell their goods to the people. And there is little doubt that personally Theodore liked Plowden and Bell better than his other Europeans; they were more enterprising, more sporting and more fighting. Bell became his bodyguard.¹¹

He began, perhaps unwisely, by attacking his external difficulties. In the years 1856 and 1857 he conquered the southern kingdom of Shoa and the powerful Muslim tribe of Wollo Gallas. The Shoans were unable to make any long resistance as their Negûs was ill, and Theodore foolishly allowed his army to sack their rich country as well as that of the Wollo Gallas. But neither of these nations could be permanently subdued. They were simply added to the number of his enemies; and while he was away in the south, the northern country had risen in arms. From Shoa he brought back among his prisoners Menelik, the future victor of Adowa, then a child. Theodore treated him kindly and eventually gave him his daughter in marriage, but, after a captivity of ten years, Menelik made his escape and returned to Shoa, where the people received him in triumph—for love of his grandfather Sella-Sellasié. This is a small but very striking episode in Theodore's life. Here we have the two men who have done more than any others to create a modern Abyssinia; it has been the work of Theodore the fighting man completed by that of Menelik the man of peace; for Menelik rightly described himself as 'a man of peace who several times has been compelled to fight.' Some of his contemporaries indeed, thought that he was afraid of war, but they were mistaken. He never hesitated to face it and, when necessary, to ride at the head of his own troops in battle. One wonders whether his deep appreciation of the value of European civilisation—a feeling in which he surpassed almost every other man in his kingdom—was not originally inspired by the example of Theodore.

Theodore intended to create a paid standing army on the

¹¹ Sir Clements Markham says (in *The Abyssinian Expedition*, p. 66): 'Theodore must have possessed some nobility of character to have acquired the admiration and friendship of such noble fellows as Plowden and Bell.' Elsewhere he expresses the highest opinions of Theodore.

European model, and to disarm the whole civilian population. He declared 'that he would convert their swords and lances into plough-shares and reaping-hooks, and cause a plough-ox to be sold dearer than the noblest war-horse.'¹² This was a fine ideal; but to create a standing army one must first have an organised system of rations and pay.

He determined to put an end to the swarms of parasite priests, ordained merely because they desired to live in idleness. He therefore appointed two priests and three deacons to each church, and assigned them lands to cultivate for their living. He tried, on British advice, and with some good results, to suppress the slave-trade. He also endeavoured to abolish polygamy, but with small success. He abolished the Supreme Court of Justice, which was then completely corrupt, and he undertook its functions himself. Under his rule so well was justice administered that within reach of his capital 'the highways became open and safe,' says Lejean, 'as good as those of France or Germany.' He constructed new roads,¹³ and in 1856 he issued a proclamation commanding everyone to return to the profession of his fathers—the shopkeeper to his shop and the peasant to his plough. Most probably some of these ideas were due to the British influence, judiciously guided by Plowden and Bell. These two were genuinely attached to him, and as long as they were alive the successive French consuls, who foregathered with his rivals Ubié and Negussié, had no chance whatever of success. But, unfortunately, in 1860 Bell was killed, pistol in hand, defending Theodore in battle; and soon afterwards Plowden was mortally wounded during a raid, and from that date onwards their master was left without his best friends, with dangers thickening round him on every side.

The last eight years of Theodore's life are simply a record of murders, raids, sackings and bloodshed. From one place to another he hastened, carrying fire and sword, always successful and yet never able to make an end of his enemies. It could not last. The strain was beginning to tell on his

¹² Quoted by Plowden, the British consul at Massowah. Those who accept all the statements in Mr. Rassam's book will consider the picture drawn of Theodore in this essay too favourable. But Mr. Rassam only knew him during the three terrible years at the end of his reign, throughout which time Theodore kept him a prisoner in chains.

¹³ It is related that he removed the first stone with his own hands because his soldiers considered it beneath their dignity.

mind, and there is little doubt that towards the end he was hardly responsible for his actions. His outbursts of fury became so savage that, for no cause whatever, he would have men beaten to death before him. At times, as if to forget his difficulties, he drank deeply. Yet no man dared to face him openly in arms; he was still the invincible Kasa. In 1860 a French embassy arrived from Napoleon III. to conclude an alliance with his rival Negussié (for Tigré was always the centre of French and Catholic influence as opposed to the British circle with Theodore); but Theodore, with all his old energy, sent up 1000 lancers under an officer named Zarai, who intercepted the mission and turned it back to the coasts of the Red Sea. In the following year Negussié ventured to offer him battle, and, like all the others, was defeated and killed.

Unfortunately it required more than victories to accomplish his task, and during this last period Theodore appears to have realised that he was destined to failure. He often wandered by himself, silent and morose; or sometimes he would go disguised among his subjects and afterwards face the terrified courtiers with information thus obtained, so that many of them believed him to be in communication with the infernal spirits.¹⁴ Before each battle he prophesied victory, and his prophecy invariably came true. In 1863 he still had an army of 50,000 cavalry and 70,000 pikemen; but when his executions began to increase, when each rebel province was turned into a desert studded with putrid corpses, and when, finally, being in want of money, he recklessly sacked the most sacred monasteries and burned the monks alive, then, at length, his soldiers and friends began to flee from him in mortal fear.

Yet he retained a wonderful power over those to whom he could show his better side. Even his most infamous cruelties did not prevent Europeans from liking him, though now, when the idea of a united Abyssinia had become a mania, no torture was thought bad enough for a rebel. During this period Cardinal Massaja was made prisoner by the royal troops and brought before him. The Cardinal's account is very interesting, and characteristic of those years. He relates how he was led through the streets of Derita, a village near which the Emperor had placed his camp.

¹⁴ Münzinger. *op. cit.*

The Abyssinian [he tells us] is by nature talkative, ready to pick a quarrel, or to answer questions, prone to exaggeration, frivolous and even immoral in conversation; if he is born a Muslim, or educated among those less civilised people, he is beyond all other men in vivacity and quick temper. Now on entering Derita I remained thunderstruck at seeing all these people walking with bowed head, pensive, sad and silent—it was as if I were in a retreat of monks. On leaving Derita, and proceeding by the road that led to Theodore's camp, along all that way there were many people coming and going, but in dead silence and with the same sad bearing. If a man meeting a friend wished to greet him or to discuss their affairs, they retired to one side, and after talking in a low voice, soon parted and went their separate ways. And yet they knew that Theodore was far from his camp; that nobody could have heard their conversations; that neither officers nor spies of the Emperor were to be found amongst them. Nevertheless, everyone walked along the road as if occupied in examining his conscience; and all of them, on seeing a white man led in chains, a prisoner, to the camp, looked at me with compassionate eyes. But no one was bold enough to ask who I was, or dared to address a word to me.

While waiting to be brought before Theodore, the Cardinal heard the sound of blows and of cries, and after an hour three men accused of treachery were carried out, beaten to death; and then six others were taken out to die by the *mancor* torture, which is inflicted by fastening a flat platform round the prisoner's neck. His head protrudes, as it were, through a hole made in the centre of a table. He therefore cannot reach his mouth, nor place his hand within reach of any food. He dies of thirst, hunger and madness. The people, through fear of Theodore, enthusiastically applauded this sentence, but the Cardinal and his unfortunate fellow-prisoners had no longer the courage to eat a mouthful, or to take even a sip of their beer. At length they were brought before the Emperor, who had about 200 nobles, Ras and lesser chiefs around him, and in the background a multitude of soldiers.

Truly, [says the Cardinal] in the presence of this conqueror, who, some said, stood always surrounded by tame lions, even the most courageous man could not but tremble. For he looked with so proud a glance and such an air of contemptuous disdain, that he seemed to think little more of men than of beasts.

He questioned Cardinal Massaja, and was evidently pleased with his answers. After some conversation he made an observation that showed plainly his opinion of the ignorant Abyssinian clergy, and also displayed his well-known tact.

Truly, [he said] there is a great difference between these white priests and those whom Ethiopia produces, or those who come from Egypt. Here we have a bishop travelling barefoot like a poor hermit; one who, though in chains, forgets his affliction for the sake of the man next him; who does not complain and shows no rancour against anyone. It is certainly a new thing in our country.

This and other speeches show how solitary Theodore felt his own position to be, and how glad he was to welcome Europeans. He soon won Massaja's friendship. He showed kindness not only to the white man but to his attendant. On being informed that this youth was in love with a cousin of his own, he seized the opportunity to bring them together and eventually gave her to him. He then appointed the young man to a post in the army, in which he would find some opportunity of rising. Massaja seems to have been charmed with him; just as Plowden and Bell had been. More than once Theodore let fall observations that showed how deeply his failure preyed upon him. One day, for instance, he said: 'If, instead of Salama, I had had with me this man of God I should certainly have learnt to conquer the minds of men, as well as their bodies, and not one fragment of Ethiopia would have slipped from me.' At another time he said to the Cardinal: 'I must confess that though Theodore was never defeated by an external enemy, yet his internal foes have conquered him': a singular appreciation of his own weakness. He was obliged to send Cardinal Massaja away, for his native clergy were jealous; and moreover, the Cardinal's own purposes compelled him to go. Their last interview was curious. After Massaja had departed he was suddenly caught up by a message from the Emperor. His attendants were very much alarmed; all feared a storm.

I found Theodore in his tent, [he says] greatly moved; and having bowed to him, he said to me: 'Forgive my making you return. Before you go I wish you to bless me and this country, for I have a presentiment that we shall not see each other again.' I too was so much moved that I could scarcely speak. But I raised my hand to bless him, and again bowing, I went away almost weeping.

The details of Theodore's quarrel with Great Britain and his final downfall are too well known and too lengthy to be dealt with here. He had long shown his irritation against the British, because, though professedly his friends, since

Plowden's death they had done nothing to assist him in introducing civilisation or reducing Abyssinia. The story has often been told. In 1862 he wrote to Queen Victoria a letter asking for her friendship; the most pregnant sentence in it is the following:

Mr. Plowden, my late Grand Chamberlain, and the Englishman Bell used to tell me that there is a great Christian Queen who loves all Christians. When they said to me this, 'We are able to make you known to her, and establish friendship between you,' then in those times I was very glad. I gave them my love, thinking that I had found your Majesty's good will.

To this letter no answer was returned. The omission was regarded as an insult by Theodore, and no doubt was responsible for the imprisonment of the British subjects.

Throughout the last two years of his reign his actions were those of a wild animal. The descriptions make one sick. During three months of 1866 he is said to have murdered or mutilated over 10,000 persons, amongst whom were some of his most faithful friends and servitors. All Ethiopia stood aghast, waiting to be liberated from this madman. Although while at the zenith of his career, he had raised armies 150,000 strong, yet when the British finally landed at Zeila he could only find some 8000 or 10,000 followers. Nevertheless, with this handful of men and all his artillery, he started for Magdala. With the prospect of war his old genius seemed to revive, and a desperate struggle was expected. But the end was very near, and no one knew it better than Theodore. He recalled the former days of greatness. 'Were I as powerful as I once was,' he said to Rassam, 'I would certainly have gone down to the coast to meet your people on landing (probably recalling how he had sent Zarai to intercept the French mission). As it is, I have lost all Abyssinia but this rock, and therefore it would be absurd in me to say anything.' He spoke also of his own downfall and of the possibility of his being killed.

On April 13, 1868, after a brief struggle, the British scaled the heights of Magdala. On entering the stronghold they crossed the body of Theodore, who had blown out his brains; he preferred death to humiliation.

GEORGE F.-H. BERKELEY.

ETHIOPIA

II. THE FASCIST EMPIRE

By EDWARD HUTTON

'The Fascist Empire.' That phrase has occurred continually in Signor Mussolini's speeches to his departing legions on their way to Africa. It constantly appears in the Italian Press, all of which is official. It is a new phrase. What does it mean?

In the year 1916, when Italy had joined the Allies for more than twelve months and was at war with the Central Empires, there appeared in Italy a book which, amid the confusion of arms, sought to examine, quietly and in order, the Italian position in the world and to put forward a number of claims, in the political and economic conditions of the time, in anticipation of the victory of the Allies.

This book,¹ published at a cheap price and in a popular series, was written by a young Italian civil servant, Signor G. A. Rosso, and was within reach of all. I came upon it in the course of my duties, noted it and sent an abstract to my chief in the Foreign Office, where it doubtless reposes. It is an interesting book, and Fascism, though not then born, seems to have inherited the ideas there expressed with so much earnestness and to be about to carry them into practice and reality—one at a time.

My sympathies, then as now, were largely Italian. Half a lifetime spent in that exquisite country, among the most lovable people in Europe, does not go for nothing, nor the fact that my culture, such as it is, is wholly classical—Greek, Latin and Italian. This book, written in July–August 1916, concerning problems posed by the Great War for the future of Italy in the Mediterranean, in Asia and Africa, of Italy's

¹ *I Diritti D'Italia Oltremare* (Enciclopedia Nazionale): Rome, 1916.

'necessities' oversea, interested me much and alarmed me a little. In fact, the book dealt with many interesting possibilities, and not least with the destiny of Ethiopia, after the deposition of Lij Yasu, which seemed to offer a chance of re-establishing Italian claims there, lost with the defeat at Adowa; and not on Ethiopia alone.

Why, Rosso asks, is it necessary to begin an examination of the 'rights of Italy' oversea? Not altogether, or indeed chiefly, for reasons of imperialism so called, but because Italy, in spite of herself, is a colonising Power on account of her vast emigration, lost to the motherland, and now, owing to new restrictive laws, almost at a standstill. And he sees with some chagrin England and France conquer and seize the whole of the vast colonial empire of Germany in Africa east and west. And not only in Africa. What remains for Italy? Well, what are Italy's Rights oversea? She has rights, according to Rosso, and these not new, but of ancient origin, and she must proclaim these rights if she is to survive as 'a Mediterranean and colonising Power.' Indeed, Italy's claims, as one of the great Powers making the Alliance, are more than ever pressing, since England and France have added practically the whole of the German possessions oversea to their own empires, already so vast; and more besides—Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia.

Rosso thus begins his examination and puts forward Italy's claims:

1. An enlargement of the confines of Libya. (This need not detain us here.)
2. The Yemen, which he claims as an exclusive Italian sphere of influence, divided as it is from Eritrea, he points out, by a sea scarcely wider than the Adriatic. Not a good reference, we may think, seeing that the Adriatic is still, as it has ever been, the fault between East and West.

Rosso thinks of the Yemen as the necessary complement of Eritrea, and incidentally, owing to climate and soil, potentially richer than all the other Arab territories put together. He goes further—and let us note it well: he claims that the history of two millenniums has consecrated indissoluble bonds between Eritrea, the Yemen and Abyssinia—not merely commercial connexions, but real connexions of dominion.

Abyssinia was colonised before the Christian era by

Semitic tribes from the Yemen, who brought her their Sabæan civilisation, so that even the Ethiopian alphabet derives from the Sabæan. From this beginning have developed the relations, vast and continuous, between the two countries; and these relations were already old and well established when in A.D. 525 the kings of Axum, the Ethiopian capital, invaded in their turn the Yemen and reduced it to an Abyssinian province, which it remained for fifty years, till the Persian intervention. It is true that the Red Sea, despite its desert shores, has maintained the influence of its inter-continental position and linked the neighbouring elements of Africa and Asia. The identical climatic conditions on both sides of this long rift valley have facilitated ethnic exchanges and made it the centre of what Ratzel calls 'the Red Sea group of peoples,' related in race and culture. The ethnic solvent has been Semitic. The merchants of the Yemen coast, like the Oman Arabs to the north, were always middlemen in the trade with Eastern Africa, and the Sabæans had their trading stations scattered along the east coast of Africa as far south as Zanzibar. The trading stations of Madisha and Barawa were established on the Somali coast in 908, and Kilwa, 750 miles further south, was established in 925. This endured through all the Middle Ages into modern times, and still the commerce of Massowah and of all Eritrea turns to the opposite shore of the Red Sea. And, indeed, the passing of the Yemen into the hands of a Power that is not Italian would probably, as Rosso affirms, mean the death of the economic life of the Eritrean ports.

The Yemen, then, Rosso maintains, must not fall to the influence of any Power but Italy. More, it must remain connected as it is with Eritrea, and Rosso thinks that for this purpose an absolute conquest by Italy would not perhaps be necessary. Does Signor Mussolini think so to-day? It is doubtful, since even Rosso, before 'the Fascist Empire' rose like a mirage over the Italian horizon, points out how marvellous would be the fruits to reward a colonising Power, especially in cotton and coffee. Short of conquest, he declares it to be absolutely necessary that the Yemen should be secured to the influence, both political and economic, of Italy. And, indeed, he demands this for Italy, as a small set-off against the acquisitions of England in Irak and the Persian

Gulf and along the Arabian coast, and the gains of France, not only in Syria. And thus, and for such 'reasons of equilibrium,' he demands the recognition of Italy's 'historic right' to the Yemen.

3. Thence Rosso passes to the consideration of the 'new equilibrium in East Africa.' What this means is the enlargement of Italian Somali-land at the expense of British and French territory: a claim England has largely, though by no means wholly, satisfied.

For Rosso goes much further than the most generous rectification of frontier when he asks and answers how Italy can be compensated in the African continent, though without explaining why she should be compensated at all. After all, why?—except, of course, that Italy suggests she will make herself disagreeable and dangerous if her desires, reasonable or otherwise, are not satisfied. To this question how can Italy be compensated in the African continent the answer is Abyssinia.

Rosso turns first to the Anglo-Italian accord of 1891, which recognised the Italian rights over all Abyssinia. The original basis for the Anglo-Italian agreement concerning Ethiopia goes back as far as the protocols signed in Rome in March-April 1891, which recognised the Italian zone of influence as including practically all modern Abyssinia including Lake Tana. But this treaty and that of 1894, though cited in subsequent agreements, had been, in fact, superseded by them. Rosso asks for a reintegration of the 1891 accord, though he realises that actual reality depends on the Tripartite Treaty of 1906. Now, in regard to the accord of 1891, two decisive events have happened since it was signed: (1) the Italian defeat at the hands of Abyssinia at Adowa in 1896, and (2) the British victory, under Lord Kitchener, at Omdurman in 1898. Both these famous events as well as the Treaty of Addis Ababa which Italy signed with Abyssinia in the year of her defeat, and by which she recognised the absolute independence of Abyssinia and excluded the possibility of an Italian sphere of influence over the whole country, determined the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty of 1906. This new basis, recognised in the 1906 treaty, was maintained in 1925. In both, the head waters of the Nile are recognised as a British zone of interest. Neither the 1906 nor the 1925 treaty was signed by Abyssinia; but, of course, that of 1896,

which recognised the absolute independence of Abyssinia, was an Italo-Abyssinian treaty.

Nevertheless, Rosso proceeds to consider, 'How Ethiopia might return to our influence.'

He claims that Abyssinia is the only possible compensation ('*il solo compenso*') in the new African equilibrium. How, then, can this compensation be made effective? He turns to the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 as a starting-point. Even in that treaty he claims that the greater part of Abyssinia is recognised as a zone of Italian influence—the regions west, south and east. But, he says, the only railway (from Jibuti and the coast), being in the hands of France, is destined to absorb the greater volume of the trade with Shoa, and the caravan route from Zeila and Berbera, continuing in spite of the railway, canalises the commercial movement of the Harar—perhaps the richest province of Ethiopia. This is why he says even if a railway were accorded to Italy between her two colonies Eritrea and Somaliland, it would be a costly and useless undertaking. This situation, he continues, profoundly unjust to Italy, must be altered to her benefit. It must be solved by England and France foregoing their shares of influence in Ethiopia under the 1906 treaty, and by the complete sacrifice of their territories in Somaliland, which divide Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. In other words, France and England must clear out of this part of Africa on the Gulf of Aden and at the mouth of the Red Sea, the Straits of Bab el Mandeb, altogether.

He then turns to the western frontier of Abyssinia, and recognises that this directly interests the basin of the Nile, and is too closely connected with the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan for any such accommodation to be thinkable. Though why this should be so after he has cleared us out of Somaliland is not obvious. He maintains, however, that the natural direction of Ethiopian traffic is towards the Red Sea and perpetuates the millennial relations between Abyssinia and the Yemen. Enough, he says (surprisingly), for Italy to hold the keys of the eastern declivity, and to possess the confines in the south, *vis-à-vis* Somaliland.

Such, in 1916, in the mind of a most intelligent young Italian official and patriot are the claims of Italy in this corner of the world. Her claims, according to the same protagonist,

in the Mediterranean were at least as startling, involving as they did the larger and southern part of Asia Minor, including Smyrna. That is neither here nor there to-day. But it may be amusing if I recall for a moment an interview I had with the highest Italian authority on such matters, before entering the Italian service, as, on loan, I did during the last year of the war.

In the course of discussing Italian claims, for my instructions, I ventured to point out the uselessness of enlarging Italian possessions on the far side of the Suez Canal, when, if Italy and England should ever fundamentally disagree, such 'colonies' would inevitably fall into English hands. Indeed, they could not even be approached, except by permission of England; for war is war, as we had all seen during those three years. And, since we were then at war with the Turks, I ventured to suggest Anatolia rather than Somaliland (for 'Abyssinia' was an unlucky word in Italy) as a more promising field for Italian enterprise, a better climate (Herodotus, not a bad judge, calls it the best in the world), and, in all probability, a rich instead of a poor country. My suggestion was kindly received, but his Excellency seemed to think he would rather trust in the perpetual benevolence of England and her traditional affection for Italy than face the Turks at home.

Perhaps he was right. I like to think he was. For, with most other English people, and with even more reason, I still believe that the present cloud between England and Italy is a passing one. I owe Italy too much, and love her too well, to wish to think otherwise. We are paying for the mistakes of Versailles. It may have been a mistake of Italy to leave the Council table there in tears and return to Rome. On that occasion the late Lord Balfour is said to have remarked, with mild surprise, that Italy seemed to have ceased to be the country of Machiavelli. But it was an even greater mistake on our part to allow the oldest colonising power in the world, to whom we owe our very civilisation, to leave that table ashamed and hungry. More especially was it an outrage when the rest of the Allies were filled to repletion and talking like the gods of the earth. She had, as I know, borne the heavy burden of the day—a young nation without any traditional experience of a great European war. She had borne

herself with honour and even with splendour. Caporetto—we all suffered a Caporetto—did not cool her courage, much less break her spirit. She was with us to the end, and valiantly. Her position should have been understood and her claims considered and met. If not then, why not now?

Only one thing is, or ought to be, beyond question. Much, as the Paris conversations showed, can be arranged between comrades and friends, but we are bound to 'resist aggression.' Abyssinia, through no contrivance of ours, is a member of the League of Nations, and as such, if only as such, she can claim justice; that claim must, as the Pope has declared, be acknowledged, or the comity of nations is at an end. In that case we must all stand to arms.

EDWARD HUTTON.

WHITHER ROOSEVELT?

By KÁLMÁN DE BUDAY, LL.D.

THE emphasis on the American drama has shifted from the almost purely economic scenes of the first two years of the Roosevelt Administration to scenes where the problems of polity predominate. The United States has long held the record among republics in avoiding major political disturbances. Now the constitutional issue threatens to become all-important. Prior to this there was only the domestic struggle of the Civil War, fought neither for nor against the Constitution, but on questions of interpretation. America has now reached a sign-post bearing the legend 'right for reconstitution, left for revolution.' The present chaos created by the invalidation of the New Deal may involve a drastic amendment of the Constitution; if Roosevelt demands this he may win, or he may lose, the battle for his New Deal. He is not as yet forcing the issue against the Constitution. He may even have felt gratified by the judgment on the National Industrial Recovery Act, so far as it enabled him to get rid of the deadweight of the unsuccessful organs of his alphabetocracy, but there is no doubt that he was disappointed, and perhaps disheartened, by the judgments given by Federal judges in regard to the Agricultural Adjustment Act. His genius must now undergo perhaps the severest test an American President since Lincoln has ever had to submit. After the judgment of the Supreme Court in the famous Dred Scott case concerning slavery just prior to the Civil War, Lincoln declared: 'I do not resist it, but I refuse to obey it as a political rule.' Roosevelt appears determined to follow the attitude of Lincoln:

With public sentiment nothing can fail, without it nothing can succeed. Consequently he who moulds public opinion goes deeper

than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed.

It remains to be seen whether Roosevelt can achieve this without a revolutionary change of the Constitution.

But can it be established whether the majority of the American people really want the reconstitution of the United States; and, if so, for what purpose? Or can it be expected that sectional interests and organised minorities would and could resist any attempt to change the Constitution and that their conflict with the Federal authority will lead to civil war? Such grave issues will not have to be faced in the immediate future. On the one hand the disappearance of the various organs of the New Deal is not likely to aggravate the depression and so make the people ready to struggle for political power to solve a major economic crisis. On the other hand, the Federal Treasury is sufficiently strong to carry on the national government and to provide work or to secure relief to the unemployed for about another two years. If Roosevelt is playing for time he can do so, as far as the Government finances and the 'daily bread' of the people are concerned, since the next Presidential elections come in the autumn of 1936. Thus the atmosphere in which the political problems will be decided upon may be kept largely immune from the dangerous counsel of individual economic distress. It remains to be seen, however, whether the American or any other people are capable, in the absence of hardship, of carrying through reforms which were recognised during the depression as being necessary. President Roosevelt insisted upon the 'time element' when he declared that

over the next five or ten years the nation must decide whether it would relegate to the States control over the national economic and social conditions regardless of whether these had a definite bearing on conditions outside of the different States. The other side of the picture is whether we should restore to the Government the right, held by all other national Governments in the world, to legislate and administer laws having bearing on and control over national economic problems. That was the biggest question ever faced by this country outside of war itself.

This, of course, implies amendment of the Constitution, but Roosevelt has not made any specific proposals. He

wisely awaits the reaction of public opinion both upon the judgment of the Supreme Court and the questions formulated by him.

There has as yet been no clearly formulated response. On the contrary, the question *quemadmodum* emerges. 'For what purpose is the nation to decide upon decentralisation or concentration of power in the Federal Government?' The question is important, because the judgment of the Supreme Court seemed to many to carry the death warrant of the New Deal and to oblige the President to turn to a new programme involving a swing to the left or to the right. After a few weeks, in his Message to Congress of June 20 he gave a clear-cut answer, stating that the purpose was the New Deal and only the New Deal, defined as 'social justice and security through just distribution of national income.' He pointed to the ways and means by which he intended to pursue the realisation of the ultimate aims of the New Deal. The new method is taxation. The power to tax incomes is undisputedly within the authority of Congress and the most powerful instrument in the hands of the Federal Government. Its potentialities are clearly illustrated by the fact that it was only through the income tax laws that the American Federal authorities succeeded in eliminating a few of the greatest gangsters like Al Capone from society.

When considering the second New Deal we have to bear in mind the obvious fact that a 'just distribution of national income' unaccompanied by a rise in the national income does not mean much, if anything, except 'soak the rich.' It was a serious defect of President Roosevelt's tax manifesto that he did not refer to this aspect of the problem unless by the implicit assumption that the national income of the American people would be substantial enough to be 'justly divided' with advantage. This is very doubtful. There is no doubt that, through credit inflation, the national income can be increased up to a certain limit and within an uncertain limit of time, but the danger is obvious. But it is well to remember that the great depression in America was produced chiefly by this means and that the national income produced in 1929 dropped from \$83,750,000,000 to not more than \$38,300,000,000 in 1932, while it was about \$30,000,000,000 before the war.

What are the wider aspects of the tax manifesto? Has the United States reached the phase of political economic development of which Gladstone spoke in the Budget debate of 1876?

Of all the taxes on the Statute-book the income tax is the only tax through which it is possible that Socialism or Communism, or anything like them, can, in the nature of things, find an entrance into our system; . . . the unlimited acceptance of the doctrine is full of danger to the State.

It is clear that what is considered a danger to a capitalistic state may be the remedy for a socialistic community. It appears that in America there is a tendency now towards socialisation of national income without Socialism 'proper.'

The new taxes have a more important social than budgetary significance: the proposed rates are still far from reaching European levels and the yield will not exceed 8 per cent. of present Federal revenues. Pending the decision of public opinion upon the concentration of power and control of economic life there is in prospect a new transition period—the re-establishment of the system of *laissez-faire* subjected to the brakes of taxation. Development during this period will, naturally, greatly influence the formation of public opinion. This is not to say, however, that the Republican Opposition will not make use of the fact that the Democratic Administration and Congress wasted an enormous amount of money and time in building up the machinery of the New Deal, of which many parts would appear to be not only unconstitutional but unnecessary. The abolition of the N.I.R.A. as a consequence of the judgment of the Supreme Court had two political consequences: it disarmed opposition, and at the same time relieved Government from the dangers and difficulties of control. Owing to the lack of experienced and efficient personnel the National Recovery Administration was heading towards a serious administrative crisis and possible breakdown, which might have done much harm to the New Deal. Many of the administrative agencies set up under the National Industrial Recovery Act have disappeared. Those constituting a deadweight are allowed to go overboard; but with regard to the Federal Alcohol Control Administration, the Petroleum Administrative Board, and the Central Statistical

Board new legislation is being prepared. The National Emergency Council and the National Resources Board, both relating to planning and execution of work relief, will continue their function under the Work Relief Act, while the different labour boards will be substituted by the agencies to be set up under the Wagner Labour Disputes Bill. The function of the Stock Exchanges Commission and the Securities Act and of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act are also taken now under the microscope furnished by the Supreme Court, but little if anything can safely be established with regard to 'constitutionality' as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The year 1934 opened with a favourable decision upholding the validity of emergency powers. Inspired by this, the Administration felt able to go ahead with emergency legislation. But in January 1935 the first serious blow was received from the Supreme Court, rejecting the power given to the Federal Government to control petroleum production. After a few minor setbacks suffered from State Supreme Courts, the Railway Pensions Act was invalidated, and finally the N.I.R.A. was declared unconstitutional. The future of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the second most important organ of the New Deal, is now also very uncertain. Federal judges have declared unconstitutional both the so-called processing taxes instituted under the A.A.A. and the penalty taxes of the Bankhead Cotton Control Act. If these decisions are upheld by the Supreme Court, the clamour for the reform of the Constitution will be joined by powerful agrarian interests.

For the time being it seems that Roosevelt II. leans more and more towards the principle of the Square Deal of Roosevelt I. This was the 'potential big stick' to be held over the heads of 'big business' in order to make moral suasion effective. The pessimism of President Roosevelt with regard to the self-discipline capacity of the American business world is in realistic though tragic contrast to the faith of his Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, in the 'social discipline' upon which to build a bridge leading to a better balanced social and economic system of regulated individualism. Whenever the development of a people and of their country reaches the stage which was reached by the United States recently of 'becoming of age' the main and

fundamental problem is a political problem in the Greek, not the American, sense of that word. Still, in spite of the heterogeneous character of the American people, there is in them an inherent trend: the zeal for improvement. 'An American always feels guilty whether he does something or doesn't,' says Sinclair Lewis's classic figure, Dodsworth. This spirit is the moral side of the 'bigger, better and more.' The Americans want to reform themselves; they even want to reform the whole world. They have achieved more harm with the latter ambition than good with the former, but it is a spiritual asset which, if correctly handled, can be a great power in the hands of a creative leader.

Is Franklin D. Roosevelt such a leader, or is he merely a great tactician? His personality contains both qualities; only in the coming difficult years will his genius be assessed. His position is still unshaken, and he enters the second Presidential campaign in a strong position. In 1932 almost any Democratic candidate would have been elected President. The congressional elections last year proved that the great victory of the Democratic Party was due to the personal prestige of President Roosevelt. Now the majority of both the Presidency and the Democratic Party in Congress depends more than ever upon his ability to understand, interpret, and adjust to each other both American public opinion and the real interests of his country. 'The American is even less a responsible voter than the voter in other countries, and his moods are subject to highly emotional waves such as those which swept away the "New Liberty" of Wilson as well as Prohibition and the New Era of Coolidge and Hoover. The lack of feeling of responsibility and of individual and collective response thereto, and the lack of understanding of national interests in domestic and foreign politics, is a fundamental cause of the American crisis.

At this juncture the 'Crusades'—rarely has this word been so much abused as in America—of the Radio priest, Father Coughlin, of the followers of the Louisiana dictator, Senator Huey Long, and other economic cranks are of greater danger to Roosevelt's position than the opposition of the Republicans. He will have to show great statesmanship in restraining himself from outbidding these arch-opportunists who would make the heterogeneous American people believe that now

the real chance had arrived to make the United States permanently 'God's own country' with an annual income of \$5,000 for every adult American citizen. Huey Long is dead but his spirit like that of John Brown goes marching along. Secretary Henry Wallace and Senator Carter Glass are telling home truths to the American public about necessary sacrifices and social discipline, the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, preaching tariff reduction and international political understanding. Possible Republican Presidential candidates such as Senator Van der Bergh or Ogden Mills argue about the adequacy of constitutional institutions to cope with the crisis. There we see the triangle around which American public opinion oscillates. There is however, a fourth element which may bring either of the three to victory or may secure its own decisive influence in the exercise of political power—namely, Labour.

For the first time in American history about 8 per cent. of the total population has been out of work for over four years—*i.e.*, the number of unemployed has fluctuated since 1931 around the 10,000,000 mark, which means that for about 30,000,000 to 35,000,000 people 'individual liberty' no longer means 'individual prosperity.' It does not even mean earning one's daily bread. But on the whole, although there is no unemployment insurance as yet, the absence of serious rioting indicates that relief work has satisfactorily served its purpose and can continue to do so for the time being. Labour organisations have been surprisingly calm since the abolition of the N.I.R.A. Labour is confident that the Wagner Labour Disputes Bill, which passed Congress shortly after the Supreme Court decision, will not only be a substitute but a permanent improvement upon the lost clauses. The Supreme Court deemed only the provisions relating to minimum wages and maximum hours unconstitutional, but did not attack the collective bargaining clause of the N.I.R.A. Prevailing legal opinion is confident with regard to the Labour Disputes Bill. The strike of 400,000 soft-coal miners has been averted for the time being by the personal intervention of the President and the introduction of a special Code-Bill for the soft-coal industry. But there is great uncertainty concerning the legal solution of labour problems, and this is a serious potential danger

to the Constitution. Should the economic crisis persist in the United States, a change of the Constitution either by peaceful or by revolutionary means is inevitable. The forces of change will be focussed simultaneously upon the problem of the Federal power, the irresponsibility of Congress, and the omnipotence of the Supreme Court.

It is possible that a third party may emerge under the leadership of Roosevelt as a Labour Party in the British sense, combining the progressive elements of the Democratic and the Republican Parties; or the radical elements may form a third party while the Republicans will go on fighting against the Democratic flag. More remote possibilities are that the American forms of Fascism may provoke, or be provoked, by communistic tendencies; but here again the character of the American people, which is fundamentally democratic, and the vastness of their country, would probably prove to be an insurmountable hindrance. But all these dangerous elements are in the great American crucible, which has not yet produced the metal from which could have been moulded 'an American nation.' Had such existed, the American Constitution would not be so rigid.

Now, if ever, there is a possibility that the reconstitution of the United States can be carried through in peace. The need for constitutional reform is understood, but the crisis is not so acute as to make reform perilous. But when discussing these probabilities we always have to bear in mind that 'in America everything is possible.'

KÁLMÁN DE BUDAY.

RUSSIANS IN PARAGUAY

By MALCOLM BURR, D.Sc.

It is a strange turn of fortune, in which the sentimental may see the finger of Providence, that some of the best Muscovites should be doomed to the fate of the Hebrews. For, like the Jew, the Russian emigrant or refugee is to-day a man without a home or nationality, existing on sufferance in strange lands so long as it suits the authorities to tolerate him. If expelled by the whim of some politician, he has nowhere to go, like the gipsies in the Middle Ages. He has not even, like the German Jew to-day, the hope of entry into Palestine. Indeed, it almost looks as though it will soon be illegal to be born of these refugee parents, just as in mediæval Germany it was a crime to be a Romany. And for the vast mass of them the land of their fathers has become a tomb.

The modern Russian refugee is not to be compared with the French *émigré* of 150 years ago, who fled from the Terror of the Revolution in France. Of those it is estimated that some 25,000 left their country, but of the Russians it is more likely that nearly a hundred times as many dare not return to their homes. Besides, the Frenchmen were of the nobility only, while these Russians represent all classes of the nation.

On the outbreak of the revolution in Petrograd in 1917, there was a Russian force operating with us against the Germans in France, and a division with our allied army in Macedonia. These suddenly found their roots cut away from beneath their feet, and so it was that the nucleus of the Russian diaspora was military. It had the sense of discipline. Then came the army of General Denikin and General Wrangel—about 200,000 more Russian soldiers—landing at Constantinople. What a temptation it must have been to General Wrangel to have seized the city for which his Tsars had longed for so many years! In view of subsequent

events he lived, perhaps, to regret his moderation. At the same time civilians were evacuated in swarms from the Black Sea ports, so that Russians of all sorts flooded into the Balkans and spread thence into Central Europe. In Yugoslavia they were recognised as brother Slavs, and treated with generosity and dignity. Others found refuge in Czechoslovakia, and some in Poland, while a substantial colony settled in Germany, especially in Berlin. Others found their escape in different directions, and just as battalions of Serbs and an army of Czechs worked their way to the Far East, so, too, went the Russians in their thousands, with the result that to-day their colony in Shanghai is a big one, and Harbin is almost a Russian city.

The Russians are a people of great intellectual potentiality, and before long we find them occupying high positions in the lands of their adoption. In the United States a Russian aristocrat worked his way within five years from the pavement to the headship of a great museum; in a South American State we find a Russian colonel as chief of staff of the army; in France we see one occupying a professorial chair at the Sorbonne, and even in England we read their names in the Honours List. But those who have thus made good and settled down to a career are clearly a minority, and the majority form a petty commercial *bourgeoisie* with no roots, or a floating technical and general proletariat. Some had saved their jewels. One had the lining of his overcoat padded with English £500 notes. Some had only their brains, some women only their charm. A few of these married for the sake of a foreign passport, by which means was formed many an ill-assorted *attelage*. Skilled men with knowledge and experience were usually able to find employment, but it was not long before the majority found themselves facing destitution, so that we saw colonels managing bathing-pools and generals mending shoes. The overwhelming number of these Russians are still refugees, still without a home after fifteen years of exile, discontented, nervous, anxiously peering into a dim and uncertain future. In this world, they ask pathetically, cannot we find *somebody* who will be glad to have us?

For a time it looked indeed as though France would prove to be the fairy godmother. When she was rebuilding

her shattered provinces there was an eager demand for labour, and her farmers welcomed the hands that came rushing in from Italy, from Bohemia, from Poland; and also the Russians. But she turned out before long to be rather the stepmother of the story-book, and with the rise of unemployment, consequent upon depression, the Russians saw with dismay the spectre of xenophobia. To-day it is rampant in France. The Italians can go home, and the Poles and the Czechs; but where is a home for the Russians? To the U.S.S.R.? What welcome would the Soviets give them? For most, probably, concentration camps, a living death, and, to the privileged few, a shooting party. Thus we have in Europe an element capable of much good, which may yet be allowed to degenerate into a serious source of danger. Of this element, it is believed by many that there are at large in the world something like 2,000,000 souls—a number almost equal to the population of Norway, and double that of Paraguay.

The mysticism and superstition of the *âme russe* have rendered the Russian as liable to the formation of eccentric religions as the Anglo-Saxon, and the illiteracy of the masses has exposed them to the wiles of the charlatan. The Holy Orthodox Church had no tolerance for dissent, which she crushed, or at least expelled from her bosom. But now we find colonies of queer faiths along the marches and in the newly acquired and only partly digested districts, and even across the frontiers, while others maintain their creeds in secret, such as the *Hlysty* or Flagellants, with their eroto-mysticism. There are the *Skoptsy*, or Cutters, who castrate themselves after the second child, and provide most of the cabmen of Bucarest, and the *Molokany*, or Drinkers of Milk, who live in the Caucasus, and the *Dubobory*, or Strugglers in the Spirit, who are now wearying the Canadian Government by their manifestation of the contest that is going on within their souls. There are also the more familiar denominations, as the Moravians, even Baptists, and the Mennonites. Although many excesses are associated with the beginnings of some of these sects, whose founders seem often to have been torn between the call of the spirit and the urge of the flesh, they are mostly characterised by a decent meekness and a sincerity bordering on fanaticism. They are, in fact, excellent citizens, provided their special tenets can be tolerated,

such as community of goods within the group, of the view that marriage and also the use of weapons are deadly sins.

In the eighteenth century a colony of the sect of the Mennonites—ardent pacifists—emigrated from West Prussia into Russia, at the invitation of the Empress Catharine II., who settled them in colonies in the newly acquired districts of her empire, glad to welcome these sober, industrious farmers. But her successors were not so wise, and so, about 100 years later, many of them emigrated to the New World and found a home in Canada. They must, however, be difficult to please, for about fifty years ago they decided that in Canada they were 'affected in their liberties and independence,' and sought yet another home. This they eventually discovered in a country as big as France with but one-fortieth of her population—wide, rich in resources, tolerant of eccentricity, and friendly. So they settled in Paraguay.

It is not without irony that even in the distant Chaco Paraguayano these ardent pacifists could not escape the scourge of war, though the Government wisely made no attempt to interfere with their precepts. And here we may be permitted to remark that these Mennonites do not seem to have found their part, at least, of the Chaco to be that green hell which so many travel writers picture for us. They tell us that they can make economic use of every kind of plant in the flora, including even the cacti, and under their industrious farming the soil yields its fruits abundantly. In the Chaco Paraguayano they have retained the names of the districts in Canada from which they moved—the Saskatchewan and the West and East Reserves. These three groups are divided into several small villages, with such names as Bergthal, Neuenlage, and Waldheim, for all through their secular sojourn in Russia and Canada they have retained not only their German consciousness, but even the West Prussian speech that their forbears took to Russia two centuries ago. Many of them can speak correct German, and a good few English, but they do not appear to be inclined to learn Spanish. They number a little over 6000 souls. Their religious discipline is strict, their behaviour good, and in hygiene and industry they set an example to all. They are engaged practically exclusively in farming, in small

holdings, with the family as unit. The Paraguayan Government welcomes and helps them. In 1921 and 1927 privileges were granted to them by special legislation, and an official has been appointed to act as liaison officer between them and the Administration.

In 1930, hearing of the happiness of their co-religionists, a party of genuine Russian Mennonites, who had been refugees in Manchuria from the Bolsheviks, arrived in Paraguay, bringing with them the soya bean. They are now established in a colony called Fernheim. Here there are nearly 2000 souls, and another contingent is expected shortly. They show the characteristic Russian faculty of co-operation, and are considered cheerful and hospitable, which is not the reputation of the German colonies in Old Russia. The total Mennonite community in Paraguay, reinforced from Germany, Austria and other countries, has established its local industries, churches, schools and a newspaper called the *Menno Blatt*, and operates its own co-operative store, financed by the Central Mennonite Committee. They have their own general assembly, which imposes, *inter alia*, compulsory labour upon its free citizens for such tasks, for instance, as the building of their own hospital. They have their own insurance, fire-fighting organisation, and education committee. They seem all to be prosperous, but the richest of them are the Germans. One of the most remarkable features about this successful colonising movement is the surprising fact that in the Chaco—that dreadful green hell—there are 250 primary schools with over 5000 pupils. Mennonites also conduct several technical schools from their own resources. The sinews of war for their removal were provided chiefly by Mennonites in the United States, while the American and German Red Cross organisations helped the transfer of the refugees from Manchuria in 1930. It is instructive that the German Government still occupies itself with the welfare of these remote representatives, which they decline to regard as lost to *Deutschtum*, even after two centuries. We may also note with interest that a name to conjure with among them is that of a man reputed to be an Englishman, Fred Engen, who was a pioneer of the Chaco. Seized in America by an incurable illness, he returned to his beloved Chaco to end his days, and devoted the rest of his life and the whole of his

fortune to good work on behalf of these colonists and of the native Indians.

Immediately after the revolution in 1917, many Russian officers, stranded abroad owing to the break-up of their oversea expeditionary forces, began to drift to South America. Many hoped to find in the Argentine the boundless steppes to which they were accustomed, or elsewhere the forests in which those from the north would feel at home. From time immemorial the Russian has been a colonist, and their Siberian empire grew out of the infiltration of individual pioneers following upon the enterprise of Yermak, their prototype of Cecil Rhodes. That infiltration continues to this day, and the ramshackle hovel of a new arrival, or perhaps of a *bodok*, is no uncommon sight along the Trans-Siberian Railway. A *bodok*, or 'walker,' is a pioneer, sent ahead to spy out the land and report upon its possibilities for colonisation. The first of the refugees began to trickle into Paraguay in 1925, and a few specialists found employment and made good. They were soon followed by some *bodoki* from Volynia, who, after having a look at most of the other South American States, chose Paraguay. They reported that there was a vast land with a population of not much more than a million, of whom many more than half were women, that the climate was warm and dry, frosts almost unknown, and much of the soil rich and fertile.

And so it is that to-day, apart from the old-established Mennonites in the Chaco, there are already seven colonies of Russian refugees firmly established in old Paraguay, between the river of that name and the Paraná, in the neighbourhood of the railway. They are called Fram, Nueva Volyn and Uru-Sapucay, Baltica, Yendova, Esperanta, etc. At Fram, 10 kilometres from the station of Carmen, there is a mixed community of Poles, Czechs and Russians, with some 600 families of the last. The land was bought for from 50 to 60 pesos per hectare. They discovered that the climate and water supply were good, and quickly cleared small holdings in the virgin forest. Near the railway, the river, and the Argentine frontier they found a market for their crops, which consist chiefly of maize and cotton. At Nueva Volyn, 16 kilometres from the town of Encarnacion, there are sixty families from the government of Volynia, living happily in neat

little houses of the Malo-Russian type. Half of them have bought their lots at from 50 to 60 Argentine pesos per hectare, paying a deposit of 20 per cent. in cash and the balance on easy terms. Those on the other half lease the land at a rent of 100 Paraguayan pesos per hectare per annum, but a few have been able to buy small holdings of 15 to 20 acres, complete with homestead, at prices ranging from 1200 to 1800 Argentine pesos.

At Uru-Sapucay, which extends along the railway for 35 kilometres, there are ninety families of Cossacks, small yeoman farmers, on holdings about 10 or 12 kilometres apart. Thus these sturdy individuals are able to carry on the free life of the wild that has been their tradition for centuries. Over 55,000 hectares (about 120,000 acres) of virgin forest were granted to them free of charge, according to their individual tastes. The soil can be worked for two or three years without manure. With a little experience a family can clear 5 or 6 acres of forest in a year. The procedure is to fell in the summer and then about three weeks later, when the trunks are dry, to burn them. As soon as the ground is clear it is ready for cultivation, but must be fenced. The chief crops are maize, manioc, potatoes, with considerable quantities of ground-nuts, tobacco, cotton, oranges, bananas, pines, rice and grapes. Poultry and animals are kept for consumption and use, and recently spring wheat has been introduced with such success that it has attracted the attention of the Government, who hope to solve thus the problem of *el pan nacional*. New arrivals must bring their own implements and tools, both domestic and farming, and must have a little capital, say the equivalent of £50 to £100. The chief thing is that with 2 or 3 hectares of land the Cossacks say they can live better in Paraguay than in the old days they were able to do in Russia with five times as much land.

And so the harassed Russian refugees, outcasts scattered throughout the world, are turning their eyes towards this promised land, the only country in the world where they are not merely tolerated, but welcome for their own sake. It seems that Paraguay is almost the only country in the world that is not suffering from exaggerated nationalism. The Government is delighted with the success of the first experiment, and will welcome more, of the same type, in unlimited

numbers. The news has spread, and the current set in, from Shanghai, from the Baltic, from France; and now the Duhobory in Canada are contemplating following the example of their Mennonite colleagues, for the Canadian Government is not sympathetic towards their firm conviction that in order to be saved it is above all things necessary to go about naked. There are 15,000 of them, owning between them a capital of £2,000,000, and they have opened negotiations with the Paraguayan Minister in Washington. Organising committees have sprung up in the chief centres, which are chiefly important as sources of information. One office reports that it has on its books 4000 members anxious to emigrate to Paraguay, from all over Europe, from North Africa, from Syria, Persia—in fact, from almost every country in the world.

For settlers on the land who bring a little capital there is unlimited scope. Merchants and many types of manufacturers can also find some opening for their activities. Specialists, such as doctors, surveyors, engineers, have less chance, while mere labourers have practically none at all. The immigration is not promiscuous.

The type that has the brightest outlook is the agriculturist from those States that have been created from former Russian territory — Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, parts of Poland, and Bessarabia. There are families living on the land where they were born, yet no longer members of the dominant race, but a minority, alien in faith and tradition from their rulers, exposed to political hardship and even persecution. They still have their properties, however, which they can hope to realise, and thus provide the capital for their emigration and establishment in the new Land of Promise. The organisers, the colonists, and the Paraguayan Government are equally resolved that this shall be no Darien.

MALCOLM BURR.

SOME ASPECTS OF CANADA TO-DAY

By T. KERR RITCHIE

CANADA is usually extolled as a land of immense natural wealth, where the inhabitants are more prosperous than elsewhere, with room for millions of immigrants. The natural resources of the Dominion are not in dispute, but with the adoption of wholesale 'scientific' methods of exploitation many natural advantages will not, in the opinion of thoroughly competent authorities, last longer than another lifetime. Northern Quebec and Ontario are outstanding examples of the ruthless exhaustion of marketable timber in recent years; British Columbia is suffering in like manner. The chief forestry official of British Columbia recently stated that the first-class timber in that province will be entirely wiped out in the next thirty years; yet almost nothing is done to control exploitation or ensure reafforestation. A few hundred men, with modern methods and power, deplete millions of feet of Vancouver Island timber in a month. Such a brutal massacre of virgin forest helps export trade, but, thanks to the 'improved scientific' methods of extraction, fewer workers are employed every year, and genuine secondary industries dependent on timber scarcely exist. The scrubby oak forests in the Ardennes furnish employment for more workers than all the forests of the Dominion; and in Belgium they do not build wooden houses. A close study of a small European area such as the French communes in the Jura Mountains, where inhabitants of each municipality draw annual dividends ranging from 100 to 200 francs from municipally owned forests, suggests that the true arts of forestry are unknown in Canada. Such places have a large population in close proximity, able to utilise timber in a hundred different ways. Lack of population necessitates exportation of raw material to distant markets, involving

the ultimate loss of forestal wealth and, at no distant date, the diminution of local employment.

The same is true of Canadian mineral resources; the subsoil of the Dominion hardly provides work for as many people as the coal-mining industry of Great Britain, with its numerous ramifications. Canada lavishly exports wheat, apples, nickel, or salmon; but what Canadian pauses to think how much he is ruining his own environment, depleting his present population, and burdening his immediate descendants? In Vancouver Island, in 1934, 400 tons of herrings were boiled for oil for export to Japan at a derisory price. These herrings in ordinary times would furnish a year's livelihood for several scores of families on the west coast of Scotland; in Vancouver Island they did not provide wages for seven families for seven weeks. Woeful waste may profit some and be called scientific by others, but it does not help to provide the only crop worth growing—a sturdy, independent population. The material prosperity of the greater part of the small population of Canada is mainly an illusion created by false advertisement and based on lack of knowledge. The real basis of a country's prosperity is a numerous and healthy working population, imbued with other than purely material ideals.

The following observations may serve to open the eyes of some readers as to the capacity of our 'vast open spaces' to absorb immigrants and employ capital. Last spring in central Alberta I met a farmer whose huge hay-loft was full of bales of raw wool. He had kept sheep for several years, but could not sell the fleeces for enough to repay the haul to the nearest market town 10 miles away, where he paid 12s. for a woollen undervest (70 per cent. cotton) and 30s. for a sweater. On Vancouver Island, near Duncan, another farmer showed me bundles of wool collected over a period of two years; he could only sell a few pounds from time to time to local Indians for 1d. or 2d. per pound. Yet Canada exports practically no raw wool, and woollen manufactured goods cost more and are poorer in quality than in Great Britain.

Throughout Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia the tobacco-grower disposes of his crop at an average price of 7d. or less per pound, whereas half a pound of Imperial Tobacco Company's ordinary smoking mixtures costs (in-

cluding tax) over 4s. Forty per cent. of the cheese produced in Canada is consumed locally, and, though the Canadian consumer pays from 1s. 6d. to 2s. per pound for the ordinary varieties, the farmer claims he cannot afford to manufacture any quantity. More than 320,000,000 lb. of butter are consumed in the Dominion and only 4,000,000 lb. exported. The farmer gets from 2½d. to 7d. per pound for his butter; the consumer pays from 1s. 4d. to 2s. 8d. per pound. The Canadian farmer lets cowhides rot in his farmyard, though the cheapest pair of ordinary working boots he can buy costs him 30s. Wheat floods the silos; the average farmer receives less for his product than the cost of the manufactured binder-twine which he uses to tie the sheaves; the pound loaf costs from 4d. to 8d. in Canada, while 98 lb. of flour cost £1 from Halifax to Esquimaux. Beef is sold on hoof by the prairie farmer at 1½ cents per pound; in the neighbouring towns of Regina, Calgary, or Saskatoon it is retailed at from 25 to 70 cents per pound. The same is true of fruit, beet, flax, honey, and most agricultural products; the actual producer, if he can dispose of his goods, gets a sum which hardly ever covers the cost of production, while the local consumer pays a wholly disproportionate price.

The western prairies of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta are plagued by dust storms and prolonged droughts. The former are a direct consequence of soil erosion resulting from the annual wheat cropping. No pasture being laid down, the loose black vegetable mould soil is deprived of all fibrous matter, and the least squall of wind is sufficient to raise the dust into storms more disastrous than winter blizzards. Both dust storms and drought are increased by the destruction in the search for 'good export timber' of well-wooded watersheds.

Wheat does not pay a farmer in the western States of Canada, but hopeful estimates by wheat pools and the promise of Government action keep the farmer optimistic. Why the world should pay more for Canadian than for other wheat does not seem to worry successive Canadian Governments. What we really need is more mouths to eat up the surplus wheat, and to use on the spot raw materials now exported. With every pair of hands God sends a mouth. Canada's troubles are due to scarcity of population, but Canada has

completely failed to provide the conditions in which a large population can live and thrive.

The western prairie regions of the Dominion are supposed to be among the best agricultural areas, yet 70 per cent. of the land is in the hands of mortgage companies who rent it to, or allow, the former owner to work it under conditions reminiscent of serfdom. When a farmer's mortgage becomes almost due, the company begins to dictate to him what he shall grow, and how, with results which inevitably drive him further into debt. He knows full well he cannot grow barley at a profit, and summer fallowing is expensive, but the mortgage company insists 'If you wish us to carry on you must plant barley on 40 acres and fallow the rest.' The farmer at the end of the year generally finds himself more indebted than ever to the mortgage company. These western farm mortgages carry no rate of interest lower than 7 per cent. Moreover, most farmers are paying for their land by instalments at the usual 8 per cent. per annum. Banks charge 8 per cent., compounded quarterly, for any loan or advance. It was shown in evidence before a recent Royal Commission that the Canadian farmer pays as much as 30 per cent. per annum in buying agricultural machinery by instalments. In such conditions, who can honestly urge migration and land-settlement schemes?

Having viewed the Canadian agriculturist, who forms the main body of the Dominion's working population, let us now study the industrial section. High wages, or adequate living wages, are supposed to be common in Canada; we are told that the Canadian has a higher standard of living than the worker in the British Isles. It is untrue. Minimum-wage regulations exist on paper, but are easily and habitually evaded. The British Columbia scale of minimum wages for the lumber industry looks well, but it fails to take account of local conditions; if it is too high, the lumber companies cease operating, or call for a Government subsidy in the shape of a protected British market or a new trade treaty with Japan. Does a minimum wage help a leading worker who receives 12s. per day in a logging-camp or saw-mill, but has to pay 50 per cent. more for his groceries and clothing in the company's store, or else take an expensive holiday in the nearest city to purchase such necessities? There are innum-

able ways of evading Canadian minimum-wage laws. Moreover, most consumable goods cost more and are of far lower quality than in Great Britain. The Canadian farmer's boots at 30s. may last him six months, but the English farmer's boots at 16s. may last him over a year.

There are boot, clothing, furniture, and other factory operatives in Ontario and Quebec who receive less real wages than did a Lancashire worker in 1840. In these two provinces there are, according to the Dominion Department of Trade and Commerce, at least 40,000 needle garment workers who receive wages of from 10s. to 18s. per week. Employees in departmental stores or retail shops earn from 18s. to 37s. per week—not high wages by English standards, and very low if measured by the cost to the Canadian consumer or worker of Canadian goods. Whether one considers salmon-cannery workers in British Columbia or carpenters in Nova Scotia, the fact remains that the worker in industry is miserably remunerated in comparison with the local costs of living in Canada. The low purchasing power of agriculture and industry, coupled with the incidence of unemployment, has resulted, in most of the larger towns in the Dominion, in slum conditions worse than any in Great Britain. From Vancouver to Montreal evidence of the great poverty of the main body of the working population is overwhelming. Any individual who has helped, as I have, in one of these city relief offices for a period becomes acutely aware of the presence of dire poverty and starvation.

Canadian Governments accept the fallacious axiom that a large export trade, obtained by the scientific spoliation of excellent raw material and a minimum of importations, enhancing the workers' cost of living, is the ideal to be aimed at. As a result of constant tariff manipulation foreign goods are incredibly expensive to the consumer. Tariffs are intended to help local industries and to provide a wider field of employment. The Canadian manufacturer invariably charges the same price as the foreign importer for his products to the Canadian consumer, who, as far as Government is concerned, does not enter into the picture. Whether it be sewing-cotton, buttons, woollens, sock-suspenders, machinery, or pots and pans, the home product is generally much inferior to foreign makes—though occasionally, thanks to poor quality,

cheaper. The Canadian cheerfully pays £240 for an imported or 'Made in Canada' motor car which sells in the United States for £140, and the same applies to most things, from farm implements to shirts—all for the benefit of motor corporations, farm implement companies, or shirt manufacturers. The unemployment problem remains just as acute as elsewhere.

Not long ago one could buy ordinary British goods at reasonable prices in Canada. Nowadays, thanks to tariffs, most British imports are practically prohibitive in price. Similar goods made in the Dominion are of poor quality. But tariffs provide the Federal Government with most of its revenue, and on that account alone a reduction is not favoured by any political party. Quality is at a discount; wheat is dirt cheap, but in most cities bread is seldom unadulterated. Sugar is dear and of the lowest quality. The same is true of tea, coffee, rice, tapioca, or a thousand and one household necessities, including clothing, which must be imported. These unwholesome conditions are not favourable to the working class or the growth of future population. Excited by the insane mania for exportation and devastation of raw materials, the best qualities of timber, fruit, minerals, and other products go abroad at cut-throat prices; the Canadian has to be content with the rubbish, or pay a higher local price than the British, Belgian, or Japanese consumer of the same products.

Bargaining over Imperial tariffs is at best a cheap-jack method of promoting the unison and harmony of a great Empire. The decisions of the Ottawa Conference are calculated to keep a believer in the British Empire awake at night. The dollar is worshipped as in the United States, with the same dreadful consequences. In trying to explain why the prairie farmer's cowhides should be unsaleable while his boots cost him 30s., many Canadians fail to realise that their life and livelihood are controlled by unscrupulous groups far more powerful than the Federal Government. The merger of many shoe companies, followed by an issue of several millions of dollars of unnecessary stock backed by 'financial' houses, is followed by high prices (for dividends must be earned), sweated labour (for the same reason), and no market for raw hides, for there is only one local buyer—the shoe

company. Let England, then, beware of amalgamations and rationalisation and 'self-government in industry.'

The history of one of the leading beef buying and selling industries, as unfolded before a Select Committee of the Canadian House of Commons, is worth quoting. Prior to 1927 a certain company had an immense business all over Western Canada in the buying and retailing of beef. It was quite a good organisation, but the founder of the firm wished to retire, and a financial group was formed by a consortium of financiers. They apparently induced the owner to reconstruct the company. This group hired a firm who appraised the assets at \$19,000,000, though it is believed the owner valued his property at only \$9,000,000 and would have sold out at that price. They next made an issue of securities for about \$17,000,000. The owner bought back for himself personal assets—the ranch house and property. In the meantime the group advertised to the world that they had bought the owner's company and issued their prospectus showing a financial analysis with their name under it and with the old owner's name adjacent. The investment world all knew him and his concern. They put their money in it, and lost it. A healthy, sound, economic institution was needlessly overburdened with debt and now carries an immense overhead of fixed charges. The total amount taken out of the business has been estimated at \$5,000,000. But dividends have to be paid on the huge over-capitalisation, and that is one of the reasons why the prairie farmer in many cases gets 1 cent a pound for his beef. Again, finding cattle or livestock-raising unremunerative, the prairie farmer is compelled to neglect pasture or grass culture, and returns naturally to Government-subsidised wheat and dust storms.

One of the greatest Canadian industries, in connexion with the natural resources of timber, is the manufacture of pulp and paper, largely for exportation. Incidentally, I pay at least one-third more for my typing paper than in Great Britain, and the quality is inferior. In regard to this commerce the Canadian Minister of Trade stated lately:

I made calculations two years ago, and I state now, from memory, that something like \$30,000,000 had been taken out of that industry by financiers. They look a healthy, prosperous, wealthy community, made up of different groups of the pulp and paper industry, which,

had they been left alone, would, in most cases, have gone through the depression without difficulty. They took them and brought them into mergers, not for the purpose of making institutions which would be more free from debt, not for the purpose of putting more capital into them which would produce earnings. Bond issues were made through the name and influence of personal leaders in finance, which issues the promoters induced the public to buy. And with what results? I am satisfied that in the various mergers now operating, and which have come into existence between 1922 and 1929, there was made out of that industrial manipulation \$30,000,000 (my calculations were \$34,000,000), taken out of that industry and put into the pockets of those who promoted these mergers. The industry has been left with an added weight of debt as a consequence of this added financial exploitation.

To earn impossible dividends the pulp, or beef, or wheat, or shoe industry has to adopt all the latest 'scientific' modes of production and advertisement. Through over-capitalisation they are compelled to displace man-power by cheaper mechanical aids. This tends to make the human element negligible, and continually lowers its morale. Quality in production suffers equally with the human factor, since cheapness of adulteration is necessary if interest is to be paid on watered capital. By sheer force of monopoly these huge organisations crush all independent competition, and influence the executive and the law in many directions contrary to the public interest.

The growth of monopoly, now so strongly advocated in England by publicists and prelates, is, of course, not peculiar to Canada, but the menace to public liberty or individual initiative is greater in sparsely settled regions than in thickly populated European countries with more diversified interests. Governmental interference in railways, wheat, or other avenues of private endeavour has cost us dear. Railroads need population to make them economically efficient; excess wheat or beef needs population to consume or industrialise agricultural products; exported timber, minerals, or other valuable natural resources, supported and buttressed at present by governmental subsidies or tariffs, need a population engaged in local subsidiary industries. Canada is over-governed. She must reduce her administrative and executive expenditures to a measure commensurate with her paltry 10,000,000 people, and realise that that population is of more value to her than broad acres or machines.

She may develop, as the United States of America at the present moment, into a community wherein two sections—the competitive and non-competitive groups—are emerging side by side under their own system of law and organisation, and constitutional government is superseded. Alternatively, through more energetic operation of the existing basis of law in favour of the ordinary citizen and future immigrants, her present Constitution may be preserved. Drastic remedies are required if the country is to support its present population in any degree of comfort and make the progress rendered possible by its undoubtedly great resources.

T. KERR RITCHIE.

THE POLITICAL SCENE

By THE RT. HON. LORD STRABOLGI

THE year of the quinquennial election in the United States is called the Presidential Year. This present year might be called the Election Year of British politics. If it is decided not to have a General Election in November, which would clash with the local elections, it is expected that it will take place next January or February. In any event, this Parliament is nearing its close, and all the political parties are active in electoral preparations. What are their prospects? What are the issues on which the forthcoming election will be fought? What are likely to be the results?

In the September issue of the *Nineteenth Century and After* Mr. Ramsay Muir¹ predicted the return of the National Government with a reduced majority; but this prophecy was based, admittedly, on an analysis of voting strengths as shown by the General Elections of the last thirteen years and the bye-elections of the last two years. With the greatest respect to my former parliamentary colleague, I suggest that more than a mathematical analysis is required. Bye-election results as guides are notoriously unreliable. Much will depend on the events between now and the actual date of the election, and, perhaps still more, on the actual course of that election itself.

I have participated in three General Elections which gave altogether unexpected results. Anything might have happened in the 1918 election; and then the newly enlarged electorate was suddenly swept by a gust of passion expressing itself in the twin cries of 'Hang the Kaiser' and 'Make the Germans Pay for the War.' The leaders of the Coalition then had to trim their sails hurriedly to the popular winds, and even the late Lord Oxford could not ignore the prevailing breeze. In the 1924 election the Conservatives would have won in

¹ 'The Balance of Parties.'

any event; but the sudden scare of the Zinovieff letter immensely increased their majority.

In the 1931 election the Labour Party started well. No doubt we should have lost our position as the largest single party in Parliament to the Conservatives; but the unprecedented majority which followed Messrs. MacDonald and Baldwin was the result of a quite sudden change of opinion brought about by the Savings Bank scare. Now, in all these three elections the party or parties of the Right benefited. It is curious to notice that the younger, the more raw, and supposedly the more revolutionary, Labour Party did best in the comparatively humdrum elections of 1922, 1923, and 1929. But it has not always been so. When the Liberals and Radicals were the party of the Left they won, in 1906, what was a record majority at that time on the transient scandal of indentured Chinese labour in the South African mines, aided by the skilful anti-protectionist propaganda of the 'Big' and 'Little' loaves. If the parties of the Right have been lucky in British politics since the great extension of the franchise by the inclusion of women voters, who is to say whether the parties of the Left will not benefit by the next electoral landslide? In this huge present-day electorate at least 60 per cent. of the electors are not identified with any party. Also, be it noted, in the elections of 1924 and 1931 it was the out-going Governments which suffered. The emotional storm caused the pendulum to swing further. There are opportunists in the Labour Party as in other parties. A good deal is hoped for from this traditional swing of the pendulum, as well as from the fortuitous arousing of political emotions. But the more far-sighted leaders of the Labour Party, and, still more, of the rank and file (who have no hope of any individual advantage apart from the general benefit which they hope the successful application of their policy will bring about), dislike a 'swing of the pendulum' success, and fear and distrust a victory brought about by some revulsion of feeling or emotional wave. For if and when the Labour Party again attains office, a very difficult and complicated programme will have to be put into operation against a great deal of well-organised and powerful opposition inside and outside Parliament. For this programme to be successfully implemented the support of a convinced and faithful majority in the country is neces-

sary. This is the very essence of democracy, and the Labour Party is more firmly wedded to the democratic idea than ever before.

It is interesting to remind ourselves, in this connexion, that the Labour Party is pledged not to take office again without a clear parliamentary majority. If unforeseen circumstances make the taking of office as a minority desirable, a special conference of the whole party must be summoned and leave be obtained from the party as a whole.

The best-known of the Conservative leaders are strong in support of the whole theory and practice of democracy. The results of the 1931 election were looked at askance by many of the more sober exponents of Conservative policy. If the parliamentary machine is to work, there must be an effective Opposition and an alternative Government; and freak election results are recognised as unhealthy in the long run. I write in no disrespect of Conservative principles when I make the observation that the task of defending the existing order, of patching and underpinning where such repair work is necessary, is not only less exacting, but is less dependent on a firm and convinced majority support in the country. Nevertheless, both of what we may now call the two governing parties will enter upon the coming contest with every determination to win it, and the reassembly of Parliament will see the beginnings of the contest within the walls of the Palace of Westminster as a preliminary to the struggle in the country. I propose to examine the issues on which, barring some unexpected subject of controversy, the election will be fought.

The stock of the National Government is higher than it was a year ago. There has been time for a recovery from the discredit of the withdrawn Unemployment Insurance Regulations. There has been a judicious change in the Premiership. (The Labour Party had hoped that the National Government would go to the country with Mr. MacDonald still as its leader.) There has also been a judicious change in the Foreign Secretaryship. The strong non-party 'peace vote' in the country is less hostile to the present Government. The Prime Minister's personal predilections in favour of the League of Nations and a system of collective security are believed to be sincere. The India Act controversy is out of the way for the time being. The promised split in the Conservative Party,

which threatened to disrupt it, as the Irish Home Rule question disrupted the Liberal Party, has not materialised. The leader of the 'die-hards,' Mr. Churchill, has publicly returned to the fold. Mr. Lloyd George, who appeared dangerous at one time, has faded out of the picture. His Council of Action may have some political value in certain parts of the country—notably North Wales—but little elsewhere. The farmers themselves, apart from their labourers, are not dissatisfied with 'Elliotism.' They have many millions of golden reasons. In the Home Counties, the Midlands, and certain centres such as Sheffield, new industries, aided by tariffs and the oldest of man's industries—weapon making—have brought a certain degree of prosperity. Foreign trade is still in a bad way; but the cheapened pound has given some aid even here, and the mutual laundering business has caused money to circulate. There is plenty of money about in the places where money is spent. All these factors, combined with some degree of world economic recovery, have helped the National Government.

The Silver Jubilee celebrations are not likely to have a great political effect; but, indirectly, they helped to give the impression of a solidly founded society which the electors will be admonished not to upset by rash experiments.

These are some of the items on the asset side of the national balance-sheet, which the National Government spokesmen will keep well to the fore; but the debit side makes grim reading. And to the items on that side of the page the Government's opponents will direct the attention of the electors.

If 1,000,000 new houses have been erected, they have, for the most part, been for sale to lower middle-class families. A start has been made with slum clearance, but it has been late in coming, and the problem is terrific.

I well remember, during the worsening of the world depression in the years 1930 and 1931, when the figures of the unemployed were approaching the 2,000,000 mark, the supporters of the Government declaring that, if once unemployment reached 2,000,000, it was the end. The election will take place with the unemployment figures round about this tragic 2,000,000 mark.

The depressed areas and their problems will be described

as a frightful indictment of the whole of the present system. Stress will be laid on the apparent absence of any plans for relieving these great pools of misery and distress commensurate with their extent and depth. The very tariffs which have helped the new industrial centres around Greater London have damaged the seaports and their shipping. We are a seafaring nation, and injury to our seaborne trade can never be disregarded. The anomaly of poverty and want inflicted on a large section of the community in every industrialised State on the one hand, and of abundance, and even glut, of all essential commodities on the other hand, puzzles and angers the thinking section of the public, irrespective of party. A no-change programme is difficult to support with argument nowadays.

On foreign policy there is much to be said, and it will be said. Whoever has been primarily at fault, the failure of the Disarmament Conference, the weakening of the League of Nations, and the general increase in the feeling of insecurity will be saddled on the present Government, as the Government in office. The Italian defiance of the League will be traced to the British Government's failure to act more decisively and swiftly when the Japanese army in Manchuria took the initial steps which began the Japanese advance in North China. After four and a half difficult years, the Government is certainly vulnerable.

But beyond and above this balance-sheet of achievements and failures, wise policies and foolish policies, activities and neglects which represent the record in office of any British Government, there are far greater issues. They will be the fighting-ground for many more elections to come. Three outstanding subjects are likely to dominate British politics for some years ahead. They are War and Peace, Fascism and Democracy, Capitalism and Socialism.

That there is an intellectual revolt against the institution of war is undoubted. It is everywhere. Silenced in Japan, Italy and Germany, it nevertheless exists even in those countries; and it is vocal and active in every State where any freedom of expression is allowed.

In England the results of what was called the 'Peace Ballot' were certainly remarkable. I was behind the scenes when the idea of this ballot was born, and I know the inade-

quate resources and organisation with which it was begun. Organisation sprang out of the ground, however, in nearly every part of the country. A belief in the Collective Peace system has taken a deep hold on men's minds, here and in other countries. Thus, the public response to the policing of the Saar Valley prior to the plebiscite was as remarkable as it was unexpected in some quarters.

The British electorate is probably better informed on foreign questions now than at any time since Gladstone's great Midlothian campaign. The reaction to the Italian dispute with Abyssinia is an example. There is some excuse for Signor Mussolini's surprise at the strength of world opinion, and of British opinion in particular, against what he no doubt genuinely regards as a colonial expedition. What the Duce proposes to do in Abyssinia is, on the surface, little different from what Italy did in Libya in 1911, what the French have been doing in Morocco for a generation, and what the English have been doing all over the world for 200 years—most recently in South Africa at the end of last century. The real difference, as British public opinion has been quick to realise, is that we are all now bound by the Covenant and the Pact of Paris. Fifteen years' steady education in this fact has borne fruit. No British Government dare embark on Imperialist adventures to-day.

Not only is British opinion informed; the conclusions reached approach unanimity. A minority consider future results: the weakening of the League of Nations, the temptation to Germany to invade Austria, the general opening of the floodgates. But the majority have reacted with an immediate and instinctive revulsion against the use of force for the attainment of national ends. Nor is this strong and active pacifist instinct merely a reaction from the disillusionment and sufferings of the last great war. It is something more permanent. What are likely to be its electoral effects?

The predominant partner in the present National Government is the Conservative Party. I shall refer to the Liberals presently; but it is known and recognised and admitted that the Labourist and Liberal allies of the present Government have, despite the eminence of their leaders, little voting strength in the country. Now, the Conservative Party has, for the last fifty years, stood, above all things, for strong

national defence. It has been the Conservative rank and file, even more than their leaders, who have insisted on a strong Navy in the past and a strong Navy and a strong Air Force in the present. A section of the party supported the late Lord Roberts' plan for conscription before the last war. The Conservative Party has become identified, therefore, and not unwillingly, in the public mind with arms, armaments, war preparations, and now, in the public temper, with war itself. The Labour Party has as consistently claimed the title of the party of disarmament, internationalism, and, in the present state of the public mind, these things stand for peace.

Thus, to take one concrete example, there are strong arguments which may be put forward in favour of preparing the civil population to defend itself against air attack. If these preparations are to be in any way effective, they must be very far-reaching. To put it bluntly, the civil population, which means all the men, women and children of the country, must be drilled and prepared for their part in war. Such drillings and preparations and rehearsals will be represented, and not inaccurately, as preparations for war. Every time a warship exercises general quarters or a battalion engages in field exercises, it is, in effect, a preparation for war. Apply this to a whole nation, not to its younger men of military age who might be conscripted into the Army, as on the Continent, but to everyone, no matter of what age, profession, politics or creed: the immediate counter-charge is that the nation as a whole is being prepared for war and that, therefore, war is regarded as inevitable and the policy of the Government, or, if one pleases, these and all preceding Governments, has led up to this situation. There is bound to be revulsion, resistance, and hostility to such war preparations. So, whatever the outcome of the attempts of the States Members of the League of Nations to restrain Italian aggression in North-East Africa, whatever the prospects of the next Conference on Naval Armaments, whatever the amount in money of the next Defence Budgets, the accusation will be made that the present Government is a war Government; and the advice given to all those who want peace will be to vote for their opponents.

The counter-charge will be made that the real war-mongers are those who support the collective system of security; that

the advocates of sanctions against aggressors are hastening on a world war. But this argument may be a boomerang; for the people at large, as the Peace Ballot showed, are beginning to understand that the old system of security, based on national armaments, has been proving itself ineffective ever since the modern system of State Governments replaced the feudal system; and although it would be considered dishonest to pretend that the supporters of the Conservative Party, apart from a minority of genuine fire-eaters, love war for its own sake, as the children in the dictatorship countries are taught to love war, it is nevertheless true that both the older parties, Liberals and Conservatives alike, are part of a society that has been built up on the old system of defence and that both are sensitive to the pressure of the vested interests in armaments.

As regards the Labour Party's political propaganda against war, it should be noted that there is an increasing tendency to argue that war is inherent in the capitalist system itself, and that the dangers of war can only be abolished by replacing that system by some other. This line of argument is not used universally, but it links up Socialist propaganda with Pacifist propaganda. The argument that war results from the capitalist system has been used by that section of the Labour Party which opposes support of the League of Nations, partly on the ground that it is bound to fail as a means of keeping the peace. Less has been heard of this point of view since Russia joined the League; but whatever may be the views of various sections of the Labour Party as to the best means of keeping the peace and preventing war, all are united in representing their party as the real peace party and their opponents as the war-mongers. It will be quite impossible to keep the 'Peace and War' question outside the political arena. The proposal made from time to time in recent years to 'keep foreign policy outside party politics' is obviously impossible of realisation. I submit it is far better to be honest about these matters. Differences on foreign policy have divided parties in England ever since political parties have existed; and foreign policy to-day means the degree of support to be given to the League of Nations, or whether Britain should adhere to the League or leave it.

The 'Peace and War' issue will obviously, therefore, be

in the very forefront of British politics, and especially at the time of a General Election, for as long as we can foresee.

In passing, it should be noted that there are three distinct sections of opinion on the ways and means to peace in the Labour Party itself. Of the two smaller sections, one, led in his personal capacity by Mr. Lansbury, argues that the way to peace is by immediate, general, or, if necessary, unilateral disarmament. The other, on the extreme left of the party, opposes the League of Nations, and the whole collective system, as a capitalistic device and therefore against the interests of the proletariat. A third and larger section, which dominates the party machine, and especially its trade union constituents, supports the League, the Covenant, Collective Security, and therefore favours the maintenance of the armed force necessary to assist in applying a system of collective security. The majority rule will prevail here, and the official Labour policy at the forthcoming election will be 100 per cent. for the League.

There are corresponding sections among the supporters of the present National Government—League of Nations ‘whole-hoggers,’ League of Nations ‘moderates,’ League of Nations agnostics, and out-and-out isolationists. Yet the policy of the Cabinet is support of the League of Nations. The main controversy at the forthcoming election will rage round the question of whether this support has been genuine and effective, or insincere, cowardly and opportunist. The Conservative Party, in view of its past history and present make-up, will engage in this controversy at a disadvantage. It is always at its strongest when its appeal is frankly nationalistic. And such appeal is obviously impossible to-day. On the other hand, if the election is fought under an actual threat of war, the parties of the Right, those supporting the National Government, will stand a better chance of strong support from the electorate.

The Liberal Party—and here I mean the section opposed to the National Government, led by Sir Herbert Samuel—competes with Labour for the peace vote. Both attack the Government on its record. What will be the answer of the supporters of the National Government? The arguments which apparently will be used are that they have done their best; that they have given a lead in reducing armaments

which the ‘wicked foreigners’ have not followed; that the same ‘wicked foreigners’ rendered the Disarmament Conference abortive; that the United States of America, in particular, weakened the League of Nations by withholding themselves both from membership and support; and that a prudent policy generally has been pursued.

Here Mr. Anthony Eden is the Government’s strong card. Mr. Baldwin’s somewhat confused nautical metaphors describing the League of Nations as ‘Britain’s sheet-anchor’ can be quoted, together with such achievements as the ending of the war in the Grand Chaco, and the policing of the Saar Valley during the plebiscite. The famous White Paper may well have been forgotten by the time the election takes place, and that, in any case, was, like its phraseology, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald’s responsibility.

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement is stoutly defended by the Admiralty as a step towards a limitation of armaments; and it has been praised by Earl Beatty. The electors can be reminded of the resolute action taken to prevent the supply of arms to Abyssinia from British sources. And then there is always the other argument: that Labour and Liberal Governments in Britain have neglected the national armaments in the past and will do so in the future. In short, the ‘War and Peace’ issue will play an important part in the election of the next Parliament, and of many future Parliaments.

So, also, will the issue of Fascism *versus* Democracy. All three political parties claim to be the great bulwark against Fascism. The Conservatives and the lesser elements forming the National Government maintain that only by their alliance has the danger been staved off in Britain; and, further, that the Labour Party, if opposed to a Black dictatorship, is favourable to a Red one.

The Shavian thesis that the parliamentary system was created, and exists, for the defence of private property against collectivist legislation has made some impression on the Labour Party. Elaborations of this theme by members of that party and a whole series of proposals for ‘reforming Parliament,’ in the exposition of which Sir Stafford Cripps has been the most voluble, are quoted as evidence that the Labour Party desires to abolish the parliamentary system.

I sat in the House of Commons in five Parliaments, and

reached the conclusion, long before the end of my House of Commons career, that our procedure was in great need of radical revision ; but such revision is far removed from the abolition of Parliament and the establishment of a dictatorship, which supporters of the present Government declare is the aim of the Labour Party. The Fascist revolutions on the Continent have brought about a revulsion of feeling in favour of the democratic system, even among the supporters of the extreme Left in British politics.

I find the opinion increasingly held that Britain is in danger of passing through the same stages which have led to Fascism in certain Continental countries. Fascism is regarded, amongst an increasing number of observers of all parties, as an economic manifestation following on an economic breakdown. The conviction is growing, certainly in the Labour Party, that Fascism is a device of a decaying capitalist system to postpone or ward off the introduction of Collectivism.

The opponents of Fascism have been particularly fortunate in the fact that the British movement has been led by Sir Oswald Mosley. Brilliant platform speaker as our former colleague is, he has certain defects in his political make-up of which those who have worked with him in all the political parties which he has adorned are well aware. And the movement he leads has lost ground. The view I find expressed is that the corresponding British version of Fascism, if and when it becomes important, will be typically British and very different from the Continental models.

From the electoral point of view, however, all three major parties will seek to pose as the defenders of democracy and to stigmatise their opponents as the harbourers of dark designs against the parliamentary system. The parties of the Right will not fail to declare that the Labour programme can only be applied by means of a dictatorship ; and the parties of the Left will maintain that their opponents are only prepared to work the parliamentary system as long as it ensures them power.

What will be the effect of the emergence of the Fascist ideology on the British political scene ?

On balance, it should benefit the Labour Party by rallying doubting members of the working classes, and of the trade unions in particular, in support. The Liberal Party may

benefit also, though to a lesser degree. Anti-Fascism is strongest in Britain among the workers, and the appeal of the Labour Party, though addressed to all sections of society, is primarily a working-class appeal.

The third great issue of Capitalism or Socialism has been kept well before the electors for a generation and more.

In recent years the economic conditions in two foreign countries have had considerable effect on political opinion in Britain. I refer to Russia and the United States of America. The influence of the Russian example has not advantaged the British Communist Party ; indeed, that party is in a weaker position than it has been at any other time since its foundation. The confusions and sufferings during the revolutions and civil wars in Russia were a discouragement to the Socialist intellectuals, but the achievements of the Russian planning have acted as a stimulus. As the atrocities, real or alleged, of the early years of the Bolshevik *régime* in Russia are forgotten, or submerged by more recent happenings under other dictatorships, the progress of the economic reconstruction in Russia is having a greater and greater effect on opinion everywhere. Politically, Russia is now considered respectable. Economically she is still in a transitional period. It is the next five years which will count. My personal opinion is that the real issue of Socialism *versus* Capitalism will not be fought out in this forthcoming election, but in the one following. It will then be seen more clearly to what extent the modified capitalist system under which we live is capable of rejuvenation, and also to what extent the planned Socialism of Russia, taking into account all the advantages and disadvantages under which that country suffers, has succeeded.

The influence of the American example will be, I suggest, more immediate in its political effects in Britain.

Under President Coolidge, American capitalism was capable of providing a higher standard of life for the skilled and organised workers than in any country in the world with the one exception of Australia. Under President Hoover, the United States presented the greater contrast of unemployment, misery, and distress. Then has come the great Recovery programme of President Roosevelt, which, from the Labour point of view, has been a failure. One immediate result has been the cold-shouldering, by practically the whole Labour

movement in Britain, of Mr. Lloyd George's New Deal. The same failure has provided powerful arguments for that section of the Cabinet which opposes a public works and expansionist policy. Curiously enough, both the *laissez-faire* and collectivist schools of thought in British politics have been encouraged by the American example; but on balance I suggest that before the electors the upholders of capitalism are weakened.

In our usual British fashion, the longest steps towards a collectivist system in Britain have been taken by Governments avowedly anti-Socialist. I cite the Railway Amalgamation Act, the Electricity Act, and Major Elliot's agricultural plannings and marketing boards. At one time it seemed that an anti-Socialist Government in Britain would nationalise the minerals, just as the oil deposits have already been brought under national ownership and control. The Bill which became an Act passed by the National Government setting up the London Passenger Transport Board was actually drafted under Mr. Morrison's administration.

The arguments for the next steps in the State ownership of railways and electrical distribution and supply, the control of all transport, and the nationalisation of the mines can now be put more strongly than they could even ten years ago. The subsidies to shipowners, shipbuilders, beet-sugar manufacturers and agriculturists are, if properly presented, powerful arguments against the upholders of the present system and in favour of those who would reorganise and replan it on Socialist lines.

The above picture would seem to represent the array of the two main armies about to join in electoral battle with their banners and slogans, alarums and excursions, both appealing to prejudices and fears, as political parties do, and each with 500 or more candidates in the field.

What of the Liberals? They have suffered from the embraces of two coalitions. The political power of the Free Churches, though still great, is now divided. The great rallying cry of Free Trade sounds hollow in a world in which foreign commerce, thanks to tariffs plus currency restrictions, becomes every day more difficult. Peace and Reform are claimed as the special planks of the Labour Party programme.

What of Retrenchment? I suggest that even now, if the

Liberal Party concentrated on the one main issue of economy and reduction of taxation they might gather a considerable following. This is ground unoccupied by either of the other parties. The Conservatives are committed to rearmament, and that is a costly business nowadays. The Labour Party promises no reduction of taxation, nor of expenditure on the social services, claiming that what is called ambulance work—that is to say, the relief of destitution—is the first and immediate need. A public works programme, despite its success in Sweden and, to a certain extent, in Germany, is less in favour than when Mr. Lloyd George made his last attempt at power in 1929 with his 'We Can Conquer Unemployment' programme. In any case, those who want an expansionist policy are likely to vote Labour or to support Mr. Lloyd George's Council of Action. The need of temperance reform is not so urgent, thanks to changing habits and the high cost of liquor. The great feudal landowners have been wiped out by one of our typically British silent revolutions and the incidence of the death duties. Yet all classes consider themselves over-taxed. Retrenchment, therefore, aimed at the lowering of taxes, might be the rallying programme for this historic party. Furthermore, if the electors really become alarmed by the anti-democratic utterances of the 'die-hards' on the extreme Right and the extreme Left, the Liberals might once more gain support as the traditional defenders of personal liberty and of the individual against the State.

It is difficult to suppose, from past experience, that Liberal revival will be brought about by the search of the electors, frightened of Labour, for an alternative Government to a Conservative Administration. All British experience shows that the voters support the party of the Left or the party of the Right and ignore the Centre party. The survival value of the Liberal Party will depend on the separate and distinct character of its political programme. Proportional representation would save the Liberal Party from extinction; but, for this very reason, neither of the other two parties will adopt it if they can possibly avoid doing so.

This, then, is the political scene. We appear to be approaching a period of 'real' politics fought on questions of the greatest significance. Nor, unhappily, does it appear

likely that we can avoid the bitterness that has characterised the political struggles in other countries. The aim of His Majesty's present Opposition is to dethrone privilege. Privilege will resist this process to the uttermost. There will be consent, in the end, to the transference of certain semi-public services into public utilities. The landowning system having broken down, something must be put in its place whatever party holds power. The holders of or dealers in real estate will give way in the end when threatened by such measures as the Ribbon Development Act or the need for reorganising the water supplies of the country. All that is plain sailing; even the Peers have practically abolished themselves by non-attendance. But if a Government of the Left attempts to control the financial system in, for instance, the way in which Dr. Schacht has been forced to control it in Germany, then I fear there will be an end to the gentlemanly British system of ins and outs in politics, and less will be heard of the sanctity of majority rule.

That, however, is for the future. The present political scene shows the National Government seeking the precarious favour of gratitude for past achievements from the electors, and its principal opponents inviting support for a gradualistic programme suited to a complicated society, and a people who, in many respects, are the most conservative-minded in the world.

STRABOLG.

ALLEN LEEPER

By HAROLD NICOLSON

ALLEN LEEPER was in some sense the prototype, as he will remain a model, of the new diplomatist. Although his direct connexion with the Foreign Service covered a period of only seventeen years, yet his example was so pervading, and his influence so intense, that he gave to the transition between oligarchic and democratic diplomacy a tone and character which, but for him, might well have been less intelligent and more embittered. He was able to reconcile the older diplomatists to the disappearance, and even to the reversal, of many of their cherished traditions; and he inspired the younger diplomatists with the belief that their profession was one of hard seriousness, entailing constant adjustment between reason and imagination, between faith and credulity, between the scholarly and the humane.

His premature death has added the glamour of legend to the force of his living example; and the intensity of his meticulous idealism stands out in retrospect as something formative and almost formidable. It is thus of interest to examine the origins and training of this remarkable man.

The Leeper family originated in Ayrshire, from where they crossed to Northern Ireland, settling for several generations at Strabane, in County Tyrone, and moving southwards finally to Dublin. Alexander Leeper (1815-1893), grandfather of Allen Leeper, after graduating from Trinity College with high honours in classics, Hebrew and modern languages, entered the Church, became a canon of St. Partrick's Cathedral, and devoted his energies to Hebrew scholarship and the restoration of the cathedral edifice. A daguerreotype which has been preserved portrays a man of the Savonarola type, and it was from Canon Leeper that his grandson inherited those ardent and ascetic features, those straight and

imperturbable eyes, which gave to his physical appearance a spiritual impressiveness—authoritative, challenging and mild.

Of the ten children born to Canon Leeper, his son Alexander (1848–1934) was the most gifted and the most determined. After winning in his freshman year the first classical scholarship at Trinity College, he was obliged by lung trouble to interrupt what was presaged as a brilliant academic career. At the age of twenty-one he embarked under doctor's orders upon a sailing-vessel bound for Australia. Four months later he landed at Sydney and obtained employment as classical master in the school of the Rev. J. Pendrill. Within a year his health had sufficiently improved to allow of his return to Dublin. He completed his course at Trinity College, and, after a short interval of Mediterranean travel in the company of Sir Reginald Beauchamp, obtained a scholarship at St. John's College, Oxford. After taking a brilliant first in Honours Moderations he sailed again for Australia. For a year he taught classics in the Melbourne Church of England Grammar School, and in 1876 he was offered, and accepted, the post of Warden of Trinity College, Melbourne. He retained this appointment for forty-two years.

During his first visit to Sydney in 1869, Alexander Leeper had become intimate with the family of Sir Wigram Allen, and it may well be supposed that his return to Australia in 1875 was enlivened, if not actually caused, by the fact that he had already fallen in love with Sir Wigram's daughter Adeline. They were married in December 1879, and established themselves in the warden's lodge at Trinity College, Melbourne. It was here, on January 4, 1887, that Allen Leeper was born.

The Melbourne of that late Victorian epoch was rectilinear yet ramshackle, young yet old-fashionable, progressive yet a trifle forlorn. The hot, dry streets were flanked by office buildings designed on the Birmingham pattern, interspersed with small one-storied shacks roofed with corrugated iron. The university buildings, including Trinity College and the warden's lodge, were situated about a mile from the centre of the city. The gaunt ungainliness of their architecture is to-day screened by trees and creepers; in the

early 'nineties this protective vegetation was too young to mitigate, even for a little boy, an impression of bleak crudity. There was but slight æsthetic background to Allen Leeper's boyhood.

His mother died when he was six years old, and it was thus his father's personality and influence which became predominant. Dr. Leeper was a Victorian imperialist, 'whose imperialism was fortified by the comforting conviction that English Protestantism was the best possible form of religion practised by the best possible race.' Although he lived for sixty-six years in Australia, watching with affection not unmixed with anxiety the emergence of a distinct Australian nationality, Dr. Leeper never lost his love for England and his veneration for Oxford University. He did not desire these children of his first marriage to become un-English in feeling, and he would to the end of his days use the word 'home' when referring to the dim antipodean islands of his origin. So traditional were his loyalties that he retained his old Dublin brogue, his old Irish humour, and, what was most important, his old Orange convictions in philosophy and religion. These convictions were so strong that they became almost rigid. Although by temperament and quickness of intellect a man of great charm and overflowing humour, the narrowness of his Puritan upbringing laid an iron hand on the liberties he would allow himself or others; as his children grew up his sense of evangelical responsibility would lead him to condemn the innocent relaxations in which they wished to indulge. To his sons this narrow outlook on life seemed as unnatural to their father as it was uncongenial to themselves.

Allen Leeper was too loyal and intelligent to allow the narrowness of his early upbringing to cloud his feelings towards his father; he concentrated his attention upon the latter's virtues, finding it easy to admire his rectitude, his unsparing truthfulness and his insatiable scholarship. When in 1897 his father married again, there was the sympathy of his stepmother as well as the wider horizon of Sydney and the Allen home to soften and enlarge the asperities of the warden's lodge. He thus extracted from his father's teaching all that it had to offer of most value; and it was as a reaction to the rigid certainties of his father's convictions that

he acquired that gentle tolerance which became so marked a constituent of his intellectual charm.

His scholastic career at Melbourne was brilliantly successful. At the age of eight he entered the preparatory school of the Church of England Grammar School, and at the age of twelve he won a scholarship at the Church of England Grammar School itself. By 1901 he had risen to be head of the school and passed out with first-class honours and a formidable array of prizes and scholarships. His four years at Trinity College were interrupted in his second year by the threat of consumption. After several months in a sanatorium outside Melbourne he recovered sufficiently to resume his university studies, and obtained his degree in 1908 with first-class honours in Greek and Latin and head of the list for the year.

In the spring of 1908 Allen Leeper left Melbourne for Europe, and in October of that year he matriculated at Balliol. The effortless superiority of that institution, the fastidiousness with which they differentiate between knowledge and learning, were at first disconcerting to one trained in the less elastic precisions of the warden's lodge. During his first term at Balliol Allen Leeper was a trifle alarmed by the gulf which separated Melbourne from Oxford, and by the impression that his fellow-undergraduates were either more elegant or more humanistic than himself. This false impression did not, however, last for long. It was not many months before his tutors, Mr. J. A. Smith and Mr. A. L. Smith, realised that here was a certain first in Greats. Mr. A. L. Smith, the most potent influence in college, was doubly delighted to find that this young Australian was adept at the game of hockey. By the end of his first year his position in college was firmly established. Already he had formed enduring friendships with such men as Rhys Carpenter, Michael Sadleir, and Roland Bryce. And in 1911, as was expected, he obtained a first in Greats.

On the advice of A. L. Smith he remained on at Oxford in the expectation that in June of 1912 he would obtain a first in History. In February 1912, however, he was offered a post in the Egyptian and Assyrian Department of the British Museum. The opportunity was one which might not recur. He thus abandoned his prospects of a double first and left Oxford for Bloomsbury. 'I rather like the

Museum,' he wrote to Roland Bryce shortly after his induction; 'fossilisation is a painless and agreeable sensation.' He plunged into a study of cuneiform texts and even published a monograph on the subject. He was contented and happy. 'Still loving London,' he wrote again to Roland Bryce, 'as *the* place on earth. Work is very interesting and pleasure still more so. I read every spare moment and seem to have been out every night last week,—Wagner accounting for two.' And then suddenly this egg-shell of detached scholarship was shattered by the war.

He strove obstinately towards enlistment. No medical board would pass him as fit for active service. In March 1915 he was rejected by two doctors even for home defence. He imagined that he might qualify for Red Cross employment either on the Western or Near Eastern front. He approached Mr. Bertram Christian and Dr. Seton Watson in the hope that he might be allowed to join Roland Bryce upon the Relief Fund in Serbia. He was again rejected.

Meanwhile the Museum authorities, with accustomed generosity, had allowed him to become detached for service with the Press Bureau which had been established, under the ultimate supervision of the Home Office and the immediate direction of George Mair, in a small office in Whitehall. It was at this stage that his ebullient interest in foreign languages returned a dividend. At Melbourne he had already become adept in Greek, Latin and Hebrew. During his Oxford vacations he had studied French, German and Italian. Yet his appetite for foreign languages was more than ordinarily voracious. During a reading party in northern England he had, within a week, mastered the elements of Icelandic grammar. Since then he had studied intensively the Romance, Teutonic and Slavonic languages.

His linguistic attainments always remained quantitative rather than qualitative. He came to possess a varied acquaintance with Greek, Latin, Hebrew, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, Flemish, Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, Russian, Czech, Serbo-Croat, Bulgarian, Romaic, Rumanian and Ladin. Yet even in the more accustomed languages, such as French, German and Italian, his delivery was fluent and accurate rather than cosmopolitan. The Melbourne accent, which persisted even in his handling of English,

never surrendered to the Latin, the Slav, or even the Teutonic intonation. He could read fifteen languages with ease and could converse with varying degrees of proficiency in seven or eight. It would be a mistake, however, to represent Allen Leeper as a philologist. To him the study of foreign languages was primarily a hobby, contributive, but not essential, to his central interest in history, politics, ecclesiastical controversies and foreign, or, as he preferred to express it, 'human' affairs.

As the war progressed, the Press Bureau, which had originally been organised for information, propaganda and censorship, split into several different branches. Mr. Mair's office, which concentrated upon preparing a daily survey of the foreign and, above all, the neutral Press, was transferred from Whitehall to Victoria Street and placed under the supervision of the Foreign Office. In 1917 the scope of this organisation was further enlarged. Mr. John Buchan was appointed to take charge of a general information service, and the examination of the neutral Press (which had become of such vital importance for estimating internal conditions in Germany and the effect of the blockade) was entrusted to a special Intelligence Bureau under Lord Edward Gleichen. The staff of this bureau was composed of such eminent figures as Dr. Seton Watson, Mr. Headlam Morley, Mr. John Bailey, Professor Toynbee, Professor Namier, and Rex and Allen Leeper. In 1918 this formidable cohort of scholars was transferred integrally to the Foreign Office and housed, under the general supervision of Sir William Tyrrell, upon the top floor of the Foreign Office building. Their absorption into the central machinery of the Foreign Office was emphasised by a change of nomenclature. Henceforward they were known as the 'Political Intelligence Department,' or 'P.I.D.' It was not long before their influence permeated to the executive departments on the floors below.

The devotion with which the British civil servant fulfils his duties is equalled only by the obstinacy with which he defends his rights. The permanent staff of the Foreign Office might well have resented the intrusion of this extraneous academic body within their own organism. That no such resentment was expressed, or even felt, is indicative,

not only of the public spirit traditional with the permanent staff of the Foreign Office, but also of the tact and forbearance shown by the P.I.D. A very valuable fusion was thus secured between the experience and caution of the civil servants and the wider, but more experimental, knowledge of the academic experts. Sir William Tyrrell, with his genius for lubricating incongruous machinery, was able to secure that no friction arose. The new wine was poured into the old bottle with inestimable benefit to both.

Upon those who for four dispiriting years had been working in the executive departments of the Foreign Office the influx of these scholarly idealists produced an effect which was almost rejuvenating. The actual over-work to which they had been exposed since July 1914, the constant succession of failure and defeat, the deterioration of ethical standards (which is the saddest effect of prolonged belligerency), had induced in the permanent officials of the Foreign Office a mood of pyrrhonism which was so discouraging as to become almost cynical. The members of the P.I.D. had for years been concentrating their great abilities, not so much upon the conduct of war, as upon the theories of peace. Their advent brought a fresh sea-wind into the sullen airlessness of Downing Street. They gave a renewed sense of purpose to what had become but the iteration of overwhelming but wholly unprofitable tasks.

To this change of atmosphere Allen Leeper contributed more than any other of his colleagues. His amazing modesty rendered palatable to the exhausted civil servant the superiority of his knowledge. The gay confidence of his charm, his untrifling simplicity, disarmed all jealousy or resentment. The rapidity of his intellect and the soundness of his judgment compelled admiration. The utter outrightness of those level eyes affirmed confidence and enhanced hope. For him there glimmered, beyond the dark horror and duplicity of war, a cloudless empyrean in which the high peaks of endeavour still glittered sunlit and eternal. His faith in the righteousness of our ultimate purposes remained undimmed. He gave to the dark confusion of those days a sense of aim and justification.

More specifically he conceived the war in terms of liberation. He had been deeply influenced by the New

Europe group, and he looked forward with unwavering confidence to a victory which would unite the Poles, the Czechs, the Yugo-Slavs, the Rumanians, the Arabs and the Greeks into compact national States, each one of which would become a focus of future culture and civilisation. He believed that with the creation of these strong and self-confident entities an end would eventually be put to the Great Power system and the way opened for the gradual emergence of international reason foreshadowed by President Wilson and already concentrating around the conception of the League of Nations. The frailty of human intellect and the force of human passion have since then confirmed those who regarded such a scheme as visionary. At the time it appeared to be no Utopian justification of our suffering ; to many of us it still remains the most valid of all our visions.

During his earlier months at the Foreign Office Allen Leeper's influence was confined to the junior officials with whom he happened to work. It was from these months that date his friendships with Robert Vansittart and Eric Forbes Adam. In December 1918, however, he crossed to Paris as a member of that section of the P.I.D. which had been attached to the British Delegation to the Peace Conference. He was then absorbed directly into the executive branch and appointed in the early stages of the Conference as the British expert upon the committees dealing with the frontiers of Rumania and Yugo-Slavia. It was in this capacity that he was brought into contact with Lord Balfour, President Wilson and Lloyd George, and acquired the esteem and affection of such varied figures as Benesh, Titulescu, Venizelos, Politis, and Také Jonescu. In April 1919 he accompanied General Smuts on his mission to Bela Kun and on his visit to President Masaryk. He returned to Paris to find that the Adriatic controversy between Italy and Yugo-Slavia had reached the first of many ruptures. It was his courageous, resourceful, and unflinching handling of this controversy which won him the esteem of Sir Eyre Crowe, who thereafter remained the most constant and the most influential of his admirers. It was Crowe and Tyrrell who in 1920 insisted that Allen Leeper and his brother should be admitted as regular members of the Foreign Service under the provisions of the Order in Council of 1910. On his return from

Paris early in 1920 he thus found himself an accredited member of the permanent staff, and in December of that same year he was appointed assistant private secretary to Lord Curzon.

It might be supposed that an association between two such different characters would prove antagonistic. Lord Curzon, in many ways, was haughty, self-opinionated and conservative. He was not always grateful, or even averagely considerate, to his subordinates. Yet he possessed a wholesome respect for Balliol and a first in Greats ; he liked people whom he could neither intimidate nor offend ; and all that was most neurotic in him derived solace from the unflinching modesty of Leeper, from the forcefulness of those undeterred eyes. The latter was able even (though not with ease) to educate his chief into some slight conception of the importance of the Press in international affairs. Lord Curzon was under the impression that it was unpatriotic for any British newspaper to publish anything which was not an eulogy of Lord Curzon. Leeper was able, by persistent outrightness, to convince him that a Cabinet Minister, in the long run, obtains the Press he deserves. The change in Lord Curzon's attitude, which so startled and charmed the journalists from the Lausanne period onwards, is attributable almost wholly to the influence which Leeper was able to acquire.

Those three years in the private secretaries' room were in truth years of activity, usefulness, success and great happiness. With his immediate colleagues, Robert Vansittart and Lord Chilton, he established relations of close affection, and by the whole Foreign Office staff he was regarded with respect and pride. In April 1921 he married Janet Hamilton, and established himself in a tiny regency house in Alexander Place. Life seemed at that moment to have given him all that he most desired : the perfection of domestic companionship, the society of intimate though varied friends, public service in its most creative and exciting form, books, music, cricket matches, and that stimulating sense of being at the centre of world affairs at a moment of vital transition in human history. Apart from his deep domestic happiness, inspiring his incessant public activity, was his religious faith—essential, constant and absorbing. As a reaction, almost, against the evangelicism of his early home he had become an Anglo-Catholic, finding in that persuasion an outlet for

his mysticism and a scope for his interest in ecclesiastical controversy and his passion for ecclesiastical history. Yet Leeper was too humane to become a sectarian. His devotion to his Church increased rather than diminished his tolerant gaiety, his avid love of the humanities.

In January 1924 the Conservative Government was succeeded by the Administration of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, and Allen Leeper felt that the time had come for him to leave the Foreign Office and to gain further experience by working in some mission abroad. At that moment a cable was received from the Prime Minister of Australia requesting that Allen Leeper might be sent to Melbourne, still the temporary capital, in order to assist in the organisation of a Foreign Affairs section. Mr. MacDonald displayed little enthusiasm for Mr. Bruce's proposal. He seemed unaware that, unless some effective system of liaison in foreign affairs were created between Downing Street and the Dominion Governments, the Empire might again be faced by the misunderstandings and recriminations of a Chanak incident. Leeper was much discouraged by the cold water which the Prime Minister poured on his enthusiasm.

He left for Australia in March of 1924 and returned the following October. He was able to see again his now aged father and to find him much mellowed by the years that had intervened. He was able to renew Melbourne and Sydney associations and to convince himself that since his departure Australia had become a new and unfamiliar nation. And above all, he was able to arrange with Mr. Bruce a system whereby information could regularly be exchanged between London and the Australian capital, and whereby an official of the Commonwealth Government could be attached as liaison officer to the Cabinet Offices in Whitehall. In this way the first foundations of a sensible interchange were laid.

On his return to London in December 1924 he was appointed first secretary to the Legation in Vienna. He remained there four happy years. Apart from the interest of the work itself, apart from the charm of the Austrian capital, apart from many holidays with his wife and little daughter in the Tyrol, apart from more extended expeditions to Dalmatia, Hungary, Transylvania and Greece, he was able to plunge himself into a study of pre-Hapsburg Austria and

eventually to write a solid history of that period which is as yet unpublished.

In the autumn of 1928 he returned to the Foreign Office and was appointed to the Western Department. He varied the routine work of the office by an extended study of tariffs and Imperial Preference, emerging from this study with the loss of his former faith in free trade. In August 1931, with the formation of the National Government, the problem of disarmament became one of the central preoccupations of the foreign Office. To that problem Allen Leeper devoted the whole energies of his mind and soul.

The last chapter of Allen Leeper's life is the story of an impassioned struggle to induce the National Government to assume immediate, outspoken and determined leadership in the disarmament controversy. In memorandum after memorandum he urged upon them the dangers of compromise and the uselessness of belated concessions. It would be invidious and premature to recount the details of this heart-rending crusade. For thirty long months he steeped himself in intricate and depressing statistics, and endured the strain of endless conferences in Geneva, in Paris and in London. To those who saw him during this period, who marked the emaciation of his features and the sombre burning of his eyes, it was evident that the intensity of his effort, the slow fires of devotion and disappointment, were destroying a frame too weak for such ordeals. He minded too much.

In July of 1934 a respite seemed at last to have come. 'I am tired,' he wrote to Rhys Carpenter, 'having worked hard and unsuccessfully on the disarmament question (if I may call it so) for two and a half years. Now for some leave in Skye!!'

After a fortnight in the Voralberg he left on July 16 to visit his friends the Seton Watsons at Kyleakin. Ten days later he developed internal pains and was hurried to Inverness, where an operation was performed. In August he was removed to London and in September a second operation was found necessary. For three further months he fought for his life with patient cheerfulness. In December a third operation was attempted. He died on January 24, 1935.

HAROLD NICOLSON.

TWO DISCOURSES ON HORACE¹

I. By THE RIGHT HON. SIR JOHN SIMON

It is perhaps significant, on the occasion of a meeting to celebrate the passage of 2000 years since Horace's birth—for we will leave it to some modern Orbilius to castigate the miscalculation and point out that it is really only 1999—that two politicians should have been selected to express our sentiments and to record our gratitude. For Horace is the politician's poet, and in times past has provided more classical tags to point a political allusion or to adorn a parliamentary peroration than anyone else—with the possible exception of Virgil. Neither Mr. Amery nor I, with the shadow of a General Election coming nearer, would dare to repeat '*Odi profanum vulgus et arceo*,' but Horace provides an exquisitely turned expression for almost all moods and situations. Every Belisha beacon, for example, might display Horace's warning against the scorching motorist in his sports car:

*Sunt quos curriculo pulverem Olympicum
Collegisse juvat.*

It is indeed delightful to think how widely and sincerely the pleasure which his poetry gives is spread in this busy and matter-of-fact world.

Let me first say something about what we know of the poet's life. What sort of a man to meet was Quintus Horatius Flaccus? His contemporaries had singularly little to say about him, and almost every detail comes from himself. Rather short and rather fat, with hair that soon turned grey; rather short-tempered too, but quickly appeased, and a confirmed sun-bather:

*Corporis exigui, praecanum, solibus aptum,
Irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem.*

¹ Delivered at a bi-millenary dinner given in the Cordwainers' Hall, in the City of London, on July 19, 1935, before the Horatian Society.

He must have been a talkative, companionable little man, a born bachelor, with many love affairs none of which left a deep mark, fond of telling stories about his own experience—how he was nearly killed by a falling tree, how a huge wolf ran away from him in the forest, how as a child he had slept in the uplands of Apulia secure from bears, and how at the age of twenty-one he was made colonel of a republican regiment in Greece by Brutus without any qualifications for the post; at one time claiming some credit for his bit of soldiering, at another time recalling how he threw away his shield at Philippi and fled from the field, when Mercury mercifully cast a mist about him and saved him, as Apollo afterwards saved him at Rome from the bore (who, one commentator suggests, may have been his fellow-poet Propertius himself!).

But there was sterling stuff in Horace, too. Nothing is finer or more touching than Horace's declaration of his debt to his father, the ex-slave and petty revenue officer, who sacrificed himself to give his son an education better than the village school could afford, accompanied him at Rome to his lessons, and even sent him to the University of Athens. That Horace should avow that this was the real origin of his opportunities when his patron was the wealthy knight Maecenas, 'sprung from a line of ancestral kings,' shows his real character. (One may contrast it with the contemptible behaviour of Tito in George Eliot's *Romola*.) Though Horace owed so much to his patron, and lived in an age when authors could make their living by no other means, he was never a toady. When he travels with Maecenas, most uncomfortably, on the road to Brundisium, his account of the journey is about his own experiences; when Augustus invites him to join the imperial household, he is wise enough to decline; when Maecenas wants him to come back to Rome from the country, he says he would sooner stay in his little Sabine farm, and he does so.

Was Horace's delight in the country genuine, or was he a townsman at heart? He did not, I think, love the country as some poets have done—Wordsworth, for instance; and we must remember that when he was extolling existence at the Sabine farm he was paying a compliment to his patron who gave it him. *Rus in urbe* was his fancy, and, though he

denounced luxury and despised expensive meals, he liked good cooking and good wine.

And what about his true place in the starry firmament of poets? By an astonishing exhibition of ingenuity and industry he naturalised the difficult Greek meters and produced lyrics in Latin which no one has been able ever since adequately either to imitate or to translate. You will remember that he had thought of writing his poems in Greek, but reflected that this would be carrying coals to Newcastle—in *silvam ligna ferre*. These Sapphics and Alcaics give one the pleasure of some exquisitely carved gem—‘jewels five words long sparkling for ever on the forefinger of time.’ It was the cleverness of the proceeding rather than the depth of the thought which struck his earliest critics, and Petronius’ well-known phrase about the ‘painstaking aptness’ of Horace remains a true comment. He was not of those who

On honeydew had fed
And drunk the dew of Paradise

and his poetry does not touch the depths which Wordsworth described as ‘emotion recollected in tranquillity.’ But apart from amazing verbal facility, apart from the power of coining phrases which stick in the mind as the perfect expression of a thought, Horace showed his deeper feelings in his pride in the greatness of his country, in his respect for order and serenity and courage, and in his sense of the inevitableness of destiny and the oblivion of death.

And yet this old pagan declared with conviction ‘*non omnis moriar*’—and certainly no one would find more satisfaction in this evening’s proceedings than Horace himself. He has some reason to be grateful to the English, for it was in the eighteenth century that his brilliance and his neatness made an irresistible appeal to every cultivated Englishman. The same thing had happened, though I think to a lesser degree, in the seventeenth century in France, and it was fortunate for Horace that throughout the eighteenth century and for three-quarters of the nineteenth Parliament was filled with men who not only quoted Horace, but, what is more, understood the quotations they heard, and capped one quotation by another. Even when the tradition died, this pleasant practice has remained as a private exercise in a

smaller circle. When Austen Chamberlain introduced his first Budget and announced an increase in the tax on cigars, his father was observed to open his cigar-case and sigh deeply; and instantly an M.P., who was at once a wit and a scholar, murmured the phrase from the *Ars Poetica* about the unnatural son who defiled his father’s ashes. And when the spokesman of Kentish hop-growers a few years back complained of competition, declaring that it was a case of ‘’ops from ’ere and ’ops from there but never a ’op from Kent,’ F. E. Smith whispered to his fellow-Ministers the line ‘*Magnas inter opes inops*.’

But a hundred years ago nearly everybody in public life was doing it, and there is a story that when Mrs. Gladstone and her sister Lady Lyttelton were married on the same day, on the honeymoon each husband produced from his pocket his copy of Horace to while away a tedious hour.

Horace was sure of his immortality. A man may safely prophesy that his achievements will not be forgotten, for if the prophecy is not fulfilled, that very fact destroys the record of the boast. I will not quote the famous lines in which he claimed that his Odes were a monument more lasting than bronze and loftier than the Pyramid’s royal pile, but there is an earlier phrase in that same book of the Odes which has a curiously prophetic ring to-night. The Muses, he says, furnish a safe passport even to the wildest and most uncivilised parts of the earth, and under their auspices ‘*Visam Britannos hospitibus feros*’ (‘I will visit the British who are so unfriendly to strangers’).

Well, Horace is visiting the British to-night, and we are entertaining him as well as we can. We salute this honoured and cheerful ghost in good Falernian, and we thank him for many a pleasant hour.

JOHN SIMON.

TWO DISCOURSES ON HORACE

II. BY THE RIGHT HON. L. S. AMERY

My old friend of far-off days, John Simon, '*meorum prime sodalium*,' has spoken to us in felicitous terms, illustrated by many a happy quotation, of the many-sidedness of Horace's art and of his personality—if, indeed, these two aspects can be separated in the most human and self-revealing of all poets. He has brought back to us all our memories of Horace: the witty critic of social foibles; the easily consoled lover of a long line of dainty and elusive ladies, from dear, short-lived Cinara, his first queen, to Phyllis of the lovely voice, '*meorum finis amorum*'; the kindly philosopher of good sense, moderation and fortitude; the patriot singer of Roman glory and of Roman character. A man of many friends while he lived, Horace has remained '*carum caput*' to countless friends since—not least, as Sir John Simon has reminded us, among statesmen, who have turned to him to keep their balance and their courage in face of the flattery or disfavour of the fickle crowd. What I should like to suggest to you is that Horace was also himself a great servant of the State, a partner—and an indispensable partner—in perhaps the mightiest, certainly the most enduring, task of constructive statesmanship ever achieved, the establishment of the Roman Empire. No great political structure can live except as the expression of a body of ideas and of an ideal; nor is it easy for ideas to spread and to remain alive unless expressed in a form which captures the imagination and sinks deep in the mind. Horace and Virgil gave a moral and historic justification, and a conscious soul to the scheme of government established by the triumph of Augustus's arms. They must rank with him and with Maecenas, his unobtrusive 'Minister without Portfolio,' as the founders of a system which, whether as a mighty fact or as an overshadowing memory, dominated the history of Europe for over 1000 years.

Horace would have us believe that he was destined from infancy to the service of the Muses. But I strongly suspect that his nobly ambitious father sent him to be educated with the sons of senators and knights at Rome and Athens with other ideas than that of a purely literary career. What an unknown provincial from Arpinum had achieved not so long since might well be within the reach of the eager and gifted lad, the '*animosus infans*,' from Venusium. In any case—and I say it despite Sir John Simon—Brutus must have discerned some quality of action and leadership in the boy of twenty-one to whom he assigned the command of a legion—in our terms, of a brigade. It would be idle to speculate how far so young a commander might have gone if the tide of victory had flowed with him. But the ambition of gallant youth—and I see no reason, except his own humorous echo of Homer and Archilochus, to doubt his gallantry—was wrecked on the stricken field of Philippi. With clipped wings—'*decisus humilis pennis*'—he began again in a humble clerkship, glad to owe his life to the victor's clemency. Times were hard, and the costly education which was to have led to the triumphs of the Forum and the Senate House might serve at any rate to earn an honest penny. So began Satires and Epodes, flung wittily and insolently at the fools and follies of the day. On politics he only touched to deplore the folly and guilt of endless civil war, from which at one time he saw no escape except flight, for a sane remnant, from a distracted world to some happier land still 'on Ocean's bosom unespied':

*Nos manet Oceanus circumvagus; arva, beata
Petamus arva, divites et insulas.*

His friendship with Virgil and growing intimacy with Macenas made it easier to accept the new *régime* in Rome. But he retained his independence, and never apologised for his old convictions or old friendships. It was no time-server who could so enthusiastically welcome home an old republican comrade in arms, or pay so eloquent a tribute to Pollio's daringly independent history of the Civil Wars, the unholy wars that began with Metellus' consulship, and that had left no sea unstained, no field unbedewed, with Rome's best blood.

Then came the breach with Antony. For Horace, as for Virgil, all that Rome stood for was now imperilled by the reckless and infatuated Roman soldier turned into an Oriental despot, prepared to hand over even Rome itself to his Egyptian queen and to the worship of the grotesque divinities of the Nile—*omnigenumque deum monstra et latrator Anubis*.

Nunc est bibendum—the song of triumph in which Horace summed up the issues of the whole campaign and the tragic defiance of Cleopatra's death marked his final whole-hearted adherence to the Caesarian side. It was clear now that Augustus alone could secure peace within the Roman world and assert the might of Rome outside. With every day, too, Augustus made it clearer that he wished not only, so far as possible, to preserve the outward forms of the Roman Constitution, but to revive its ancient spirit, to restore order and decency in private and public life, to renew old ritual and old reverence—in fact, to bridge the gulf that, across the years of waste and shame, separated Rome's great past from a new and greater future.

Here, for Horace, was the same public cause for which he had fought at Philippi, and to which, now at last, he could whole-heartedly devote gifts which by then had taken their own peculiar shape. If Virgil dedicated a great epic on Homeric lines to linking the new system and its ruler with the legendary origins of Rome and with a prophetic vision of her eternal destiny, Horace, no less daring, essayed by an astounding combination of genius and industry to adapt the heroic rhythm of old Alcaeus to the task of inspiring Roman youth with the ideals of their forefathers in order to uphold the new State. The six great 'Roman Odes' of the third book stand by themselves as a masterpiece of deliberate political propaganda, as the teaching of an old way of life in the service of that new way in politics which had become the only way that the time allowed. They were addressed '*virginibus puerisque*'—to the new generation. The Second Ode, with its appeal to simplicity of life, patriotic valour and noble ambition, still remains the finest address ever penned to boys. The tremendous story of the unflinching self-sacrifice of Regulus is its fitting sequel. In *Delicta majorum* he sets out the ideal of the Roman matron, honoured and obeyed by sons who, whether farmers or warriors, are above all Romans. These

are the qualities to uphold a State in which the cultured and wise leadership, '*vis temperata*,' of Augustus had put an end to the furious strife of insensate individual ambition, as the rule of Jove and of the Gods of Light put an end to the revolt of the giant hosts of Tartarus.

Horace took up the same theme again in later years. The Fourth Ode of Book iv., with its story of the Metaurus, the turning-point of the Punic Wars, and with Hannibal's tribute to Rome's unconquerable persistence, belongs to his greatest. Others, like the Fifth and the *Carmen Saeculare*, dwell more on the blessings of peace: the cattle grazing peacefully in the fields; the virtuous, happy homes; the removal of all danger from without. But in the main his work was done. It is work that has endured, and endured in more than one sense. It has endured in the heart of every lover of wit and fancy, of happy phrase and noble rhythm. But it has endured no less in the whole structure of our civilised world, and more and more are we trying to grope our way back to its lost ideal of world-wide peace, sane leadership, and public service. No man ever could more rightly utter the proud words, which, more daring than my colleague, I shall venture to quote:

*Exegi monumentum aere perennius
Regalique situ pyramidum altius;
Quod non imber edax, non Aquilo impotens
Possit diruere, aut innumerabilis
Annorum series et fuga temporum.
Non omnis moriar . . .*

L. S. AMERY.

TO CALVUS MOURNING HIS DEAD QUINTILIA
(A Translation of CATULLUS XCVI.)

If ever aching heart can speed across the years
 Its word of love ;
 Or, Calvus, if our tears
 For friend or heart's beloved may pierce the gloom,
 And move
 Its load of sadness from the silent tomb ;
 Why then, to know your faithful love for her,
 Shall surely stir
 Quintilia's heart to joy ; she will forget
 Grief that death came so soon because you love her yet.

H. W. HOUSEHOLD.

WALKS AND TALKS

I.

TEN DAYS IN KERRY

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON

- To have passed fifty years, to have fought alongside of many, and opposed a few, Irishmen, yet never to have visited Ireland, is proof of a lack of enterprise to which I plead guilty. A first visit, in August of this year, spent in a remote village on the western shores of Kerry, has served to show me a little of what I had missed *in tenebris in partibus oricuttalium*.

I reached Dublin on a Sunday morning and took a crowded excursion train to Killarney. The *Sunday Independent* that morning carried a great headline declaring that Irish doctors were wanted to volunteer for service in Abyssinia. 'I'd sooner see them go to Belfast and have a whack at the English,' said a fellow-passenger to an assenting friend. We fell to talking of current events. One man quoted to me, with approval, a recent saying : 'Bring religion into politics, but keep politics out of religion ; when the Irish understand what that means and act on it there will be peace and unity in Ireland.'

Politics, alas, are, as ever, a live issue here. They enter, inevitably, into every conversation before long. The Belfast riots have made old wounds throb and bleed again. The Irish cattle tax, a reprisal for the repudiation of land annuity payments, has brought distress to the farmers, small and large. The relative merits of Cosgrave's and de Valera's Governments are warmly debated. There are many who do not believe in the latter, but support it ; but all agree that we, 'the English,' have done no good to ourselves, or the Empire, or to Ireland, by our handling of current issues. In fact, as

a Persian proverb puts it, 'When a wise man quarrels with a fool, the greater blame is on the wise man.' It is not, however, a casual English visitor's business to-day to criticise what he sees in Ireland, but to try to understand.

With Horace Plunkett in Ireland, by R. A. Anderson,¹ was sent to me by post the day after I arrived, and helped me to do so, though I paid 3s. 10d. in customs duty—a heavy tax on intellectual links between Ireland and the world. Mr. Anderson tells the story of forty-five years' work with Horace Plunkett and of his ideas of agricultural co-operation—a pedestrian epic enlivened by scores of flashes of genius and pen portraits of men in all walks of life.

The audience was sharply divided—the 'Papists' on one side 'Prasbyterians' on the other. The air had to be cleared. Father Finlay began quietly: '... it seemed strange that men who desired a creamery should concern themselves about a quarrel, more than two centuries ago, between a Dutchman and a Scotsman. Can we not leave that old quarrel to be settled between them, *that is to say, if too great a gulf do not now divide them?*'

The plea was successful. Would that it could be made afresh and with equal effect in a wider sphere.

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I went round the Lakes at Killarney in an outside car driven by a young Irishman with a fine high-stepping mare between the shafts. No cars are allowed in the road, most of which passes through what once was a private domain but is now a National Park. The owner, an American, gave it to the Free State: it had cost him £14,000 a year in taxes and £9000 a year to keep up. He retained the right during his life when he visited Ireland to reside in the mansion which he gave with the grounds. This and much else was told me by the driver, who knew the history of the estate for 300 years. I saw no deer and no birds. 'I am surprised to see no gulls about,' said I. 'They'll be at the races, most of them, with the boys,' he replied. I did not attempt to explain myself; his thoughts were clearly elsewhere. After a time we caught up the Dublin tourists in a score of horse-drawn vehicles. My driver began to speak of the glory of the tourist traffic—the making of Killarney: what a pity that the season was no longer! The English were coming back—

¹ Macmillan, 10s. 6d.

paying less attention to 'the boys' (by which, I gather, he referred to the supporters of political parties) than to the scenery. Americans were fewer in number and not so free with the cash as of old. On the walls in villages and in Killarney itself I saw stencilled notices: 'Boycott English goods' (old), 'Up the Republic,' 'Join the I.R.A.' and 'To hell with the new force,' 'Death to traitors,' 'Cut the connection with England and Wear an Easter lily,' 'Shun the new force.' But everyone was, as in Germany, polite and friendly to strangers. I heard children talking Erse to each other: 'They'll be practising for scholars,' said the driver. Then to Tralee by another crowded train full of local trippers, of all ages. My fellow-passengers were of the exuberant sort I had met in North Wales, with English popular songs on their lips, but so clearly different in race that I felt that they should be singing in Erse. I visited the local cinema in Tralee: it was less well attended that night than the church, to which hundreds of men and women, young and old, resorted between 7 and 10 p.m., as in Spanish-American countries, to spend ten minutes or so on their knees. On the outskirts a great housing scheme had just been completed, some 200 sorry cabins in the centre of the town demolished, and the inhabitants moved to their new quarters. The town looked poor: few looked 'well-to-do' in the matter of dress or amusements. The liquor shops were dark and comfortless, the streets ill-paved. Only half a score of motor cars passed down the main street. Many shops had put up their shutters, not to re-open. The general appearance was that of a street in a town in a distressed area of England. The cost of food is 25 per cent. higher than in England, but the cost of living is no higher, for the scale of expenditure on amusements, new clothes and fripperies is far lower. One-price shops and chain stores do not flourish. Yet the young men and women looked cheerful and healthy, and, taken as a whole, were strikingly good looking.

Visitors are apt to regard 'the natives' as rooted to the spot where they live at the moment. There are in every corner of the Free State, as of the United Kingdom, men who have lived abroad and know their own worth in open competition with the world. Thousands have come back with a free ticket from the United States or have been 'deported'—

shameful expression—from Canada or Australia. They are the unlucky ones : there are just as many men who would willingly take their chance if the ports of the Dominions and the United States were open to them.

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At 6 a.m. on Monday morning I woke to hear hundreds of carts passing under my window, each holding three or four pigs destined for the two local bacon factories, and by occasional squealing droves driven by handsome bare-footed boys and girls. I left by car soon after for Castlegregory, 12 miles westward, at the end of a spit which divides the bays of Brandon and Tralee. Not a fishing-boat was in sight. I asked the reason. 'The mackerel went away eight years back—no one knows why ; no one fishes for anything but lobsters now. Time was when food and boots were no object in Brandon—nor drink either ; those were good days, but they're gone now, and the fisher-folk with them.' 'Food and boots no object'—a phrase full of meaning.

Castlegregory is as good a place as I have ever seen : two great beaches for use according to the weather ; a fresh-water lough with free fishing ; lofty sandhills—the home of innumerable rabbits, an ideal site for a fine golf links ; and, towering above the bays, a series of peaks of 2700 feet with many tarns at their skirts. The view on every side from the summit of Stradbally mountain, or Beanoskee, can have few equals throughout what was once the United Kingdom. Every available acre within sight in the plains below is cultivated, mostly in small fields—far smaller than in England, and well fenced. This part of Kerry is a land of small holders : they make a living by growing barley and oats and beet and potatoes in patches of four or five acres with a fair head of cattle, but it must be a hard life, though they are only paying half their instalments of annuities.

I saw a creamery van at work in one village : it comes three times a week at stated hours, strips the milk of its cream, returning the skim milk to the owners, who feed it to their pigs—a new and welcome development. The cream is taken to the factory and turned into butter or cheese. There is no 'co-operation' here ; the van was a private venture, and was meeting a public need.

One evening a strolling musician arrived by bicycle to enliven a village street with his accordion. He spoke Irish as well as English, and told me he had roamed thus all over Ireland. He claimed, proudly, that he was 'pure Irish,' and looked it : he had no praise for the 'quare Government we have these days,' but no liking for those which came before. He knew England well enough to know how backward was his country by English standards after 300 years of rule from Whitehall. Whose fault was that ? Emigration was barred these days—England alone would take Irishmen and treat them as British subjects, though the present Government of Ireland wished to 'cut the connexion.' He thought it was time for a new settlement between England and Ireland. Ireland was to forgive us, I gathered ; and we were to forget our debts, and then all would be well. Ireland was poor and getting poorer, for all the fine talk in the Dail : the taxes heavier, and things dearer.

A local resident took up the tale. Hard work brought good wages in England, but nowhere else could a man earn money and bring it home to spend or invest. At least 20,000 Irishmen, on balance, left Ireland for England every year, and there would be more going soon. They did well as a rule, for they were country lads and not work-shy, like town corner-boys the world over. Yet the population was increasing—nearly 1 per cent. per annum—although the marriage rate was 'down entirely' : young men dare not obey Nature and marry. Girls would not marry young farmers. The land might hold more, but the girls expected more out of life than husbands could give. There was nothing for the young men to do but mischief.

It was true that Ireland had 8,000,000 souls a century ago, but it cost five times as much to keep an Irishman to-day. There was next to no drink then, and no tobacco except home-grown : that cost money and ate up food grown on broad acres. They thanked God if they had meat once a week, and they did not travel. The Irish would not go back to that standard of life without a bloody struggle.

'Would de Valera win the next election ?' I asked.

'I believe so entirely,' he replied. 'There's pensions for the old, and pensions for the blind, and pensions for officials, and there's the dole for the young people, and the bread line,

and free meat and what not. It's all bribery, but it works, so that the worse things get, the stronger becomes de Valera and his people.' 'There's ruin ahead, but it's a long way off yet, and there's something in the air that's better than old times,' concluded the musician; a cheery philosopher, for all his prophecies of woe. He departed the better for a Guinness, and I for his 'blessing.'

On Sunday the village was early astir with men and women, young and old, coming to mass by cart, bicycle, and on foot, all dressed in their best, and not less attractively because the material was of the simplest and the poorest; they had no reason to feel ashamed of their attire. At 10 o'clock was a second service, also well attended. Sports were advertised for the afternoon, at 3 o'clock, on Candeehy Strand, a little harbour 5 miles away at the end of a sandy spit between the two bays. We arrived punctually to find ourselves an hour early, for in these parts the post office alone keeps 'new time'; the rest of the world sticks to 'old time,' winter and summer. Daylight-saving has no value to hard-working farmers, who learned centuries ago how to make the most of it.

The first event was a canoe race round the bay—five canoes, locally made of tarred canvas stretched over laths of lance-wood, by men whose skill has passed from father to son for generations. It was a perfect setting for a race, with Atlantic rollers bursting in clouds of spray on the Seven Hogs—a row of islands outside: on each side of the bay lay a hamlet, and one at the centre, known as the Magharees, or Maharees. It was a fine exhibition of strength and skill, by men in perfect condition. Items followed in close succession on the beach—a cycle race, races for boys, and finally a dancing competition. The umpire, whose decision was very clearly final, was the parish priest, in black coat and top hat—a commanding figure in great demand, I gathered, at all such festivities. A small English boy took the second prize, amid loud regrets that he had not taken first prize, 'seeing that he was a visitor and ran barefoot like the rest'—a spontaneous exhibition of courtesy that one would not always meet in England. The organisation—of which, I gather, the parish priest was the moving spirit—was as good as the temper of all present. Beer and spirits could be purchased throughout the day close by. The licensing laws in

Ireland assume adults to be reasonable beings, and only stipulate for early closing (10 p.m.); and I gather that drunkenness is no commoner than in England—perhaps because money is scarce and liquor of all kinds costs as much as in England. The taxes, put up by 'the English' during the war, have not been lowered by subsequent Governments.

The water supply of the Magharees is bad; when rain-water fails they rely on shallow wells, yielding water of such poor quality that horses will go thirsty for days before touching it. They will soon have a better supply from the mainland. But for the war, it would have come twenty years ago: the plans were ready, but work was deferred in 1915 as a war economy. Yet the inhabitants—so the doctor told me—are as healthy and strong as any in Kerry; and in no part of Ireland is the general level of health better. The birth rate, indeed, was but one-third that of what it was thirty years ago; the marriage rate was far lower and the average age of marriage higher. The people are poorer now than they had been since the war, but honourable and law-abiding.

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In the centre of the village stands a memorial cross officially erected, two years ago, to two men killed in 1922, fighting, not against 'the English,' but 'the Cosgrave' Government: 'fine young men they were—big and strong, and well liked all round here.' Before it lay, not flowers, but a single rosary. Close by was the headquarters of the 'Garda,' as the police are called in Ireland—a fine-looking body of men. Every fourth house in the village was a shop—the counter at one end of the main living-room—or a tavern. 'One good shop would do for all and be cheaper'—thus our exotic planners of P.E.P. The comment of a local friend was noteworthy. 'Anyone can open a shop—everyone knows how much and how little profit there is in it. It prevents discontent and helps to keep the old people happy: it's little enough they make, and most things they sell are standard goods at a fixed price, and are just as cheap and of as good quality as in any great town.' Indeed, my own small purchases were, item for item, no more costly than at any great chain store in London.

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Between rainstorms three men who had competed in Sunday's racing took us from the Magharees, over a choppy sea, to an island—one of the Seven Hogs—3 miles off the coast, in a canoe so light that two men could carry it with ease in and out of the water. On the central island stands the ruins of an ancient church: perhaps a thousand years old, for it is surrounded by *clocháns*—circular bee-hive structures with solid stone roofs, some 9 feet in diameter, one with a cellar. Just outside the church stands an ancient cross made of a single slab of limestone roughly shaped without a chisel; near by are a group of houses inhabited for generations by families who cultivate a dozen or so fields on the island (the crops of sugar-beet and barley seemed to be above the average), run a few sheep on the western island, and keep a single horse for ploughing.

To the west Brandon Head, and Brandon Point beside it, stood stark on the sky-line; behind them Mount Brandon, crowned by an ancient oratory sacred to St. Brendan, who was born on the opposite side of the bay at Fenit in 483, and was buried in 576 in the monastery he founded at Clonfert. He was a Christian 'Ulysses,' and the story of his seven years' voyage in prose and verse was a mediæval classic. He is not forgotten in these parts. 'The Way of the Saints' leads to the summit of his peak, and on it 20,000 persons assembled in 1868. I saw at the foot a very perfect *clochán*, now used to shelter ducks and geese, and near Castlegregory I found in a pasture a fine stone axe of a type not uncommon in palæolithic England. Here, too, I saw, in a shop, a fine pair of horns—of the long extinct Irish elk, dug out of the Magharee sandhills some years ago. The Irish wolf has gone: the Irish deer will soon follow the elk.

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Of the castle from which the village takes its name no trace remains. But it has a romantic history. It was built, or rebuilt, by one Gregory Hoare, an Irish chief of the sixteenth century. Lord Grey's army, on its way to attack the Spanish insurgents at Smerwick, was quartered here: with them were the poet Spenser and Sir Walter Raleigh. Cromwell's troops destroyed the fort later: all the good

deeds of the Congested Districts Board have not sufficed to efface the memory of that black day.

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The first persons to be called on by anyone who would see more than the natural beauties of sea and land in Ireland are the parish priest, the doctor, and the schoolmaster. All helped to enlighten me from a fresh angle. The only guide-book was written by the schoolmaster—himself a native of Stradbally; the doctor's experience covered twenty-seven years. Governments come and go, but these men individually, and as parts of a body corporate, are the repositories both of authority and of tradition.

To record their conversations would be an impertinence: they did their best to help me to understand. For the rest, never did we meet anything but the most kindly courtesy. This is a country where people—even children—graciously decline to take money in payment for small errands; where greetings to strangers on the road are a matter of course; and where, as in the East, passing travellers are welcome to milk and bread 'without price.'

One day I got into conversation with some young farmers who had been reading in the papers the claims of Italy and Germany for 'more room.' At last the fire kindled, and they spoke their thoughts, of which the following is a summary: 'What is wrong with the world is that young men cannot do as their fathers did and go abroad to earn a living where they can. One of the rights of man that the League of Nations forgot is his right to move, to settle where he likes and to marry and make a home. That is what we Irish have done all along: now we are up against it like them. Australia won't take us, Canada does not want us, the United States as good as bar us, New Zealand has no need for us, even Argentina turns us down. There's only England left; and even there we are up against trade unions and Unemployment Insurance and "green cards," though good men may still work there and save a bit. It's a pity they disbanded the old Irish regiments. They say the Royal Air Force won't take Free Staters; will that spread?'

'There's more men coming back to the old country than are going to the Dominions,' I observed.

'That may be,' retorted one; 'but they are being pushed out, mostly, and the young ones cannot get in and take their chance.'

'If another war should come the cause will not be armaments, nor dictators, nor tariffs, nor even Parliaments and all their talk, but the closing of the ports of the world against able-bodied men and women whose labour would bring wealth and make employment for others. We have all of us brothers and sisters and cousins abroad: we cannot join them. There's 1500 ex-service men in Tralee alone who have seen the world. They and their sons are all cooped up here. It's the same in European countries, and those folk are as good as we are on the job, good citizens, not afraid of hard work, but there's no return on any amount of work on a few acres. If America and the Dominions would open their gates to good men and women, and if Great Britain would forget de Valera and this money business and let us go as far afield as we will and find our level, with or without settlement loans and all the rest, the world would settle down soon enough.' They were, of course, putting only one side of the case, and from only one point of view; but their views—Kerry farmers do not write to *The Times*—deserve attention.

Tout comprendre, wrote Madame de Staël, '*rend très indulgent.*' The path on which the Irish of the Free State have been set by their elected rulers is stony: none can yet say whither it will lead them. It is easy to see the attractions of separatism to a people so different from us; yet the Irish are greater travellers even than ourselves, and may ask with us, '*Quæ regio in orbis terrarum non plena cruore nostro?*' One can but sympathise with the desire to establish the Irish language, even at great sacrifice, as firmly as Welsh is established in Wales, and French in Quebec. Yet, for good or ill, their future is bound up with that of the English-speaking races. Ireland will never be well governed: nowhere is there less prospect for a dictator, however benevolent. Nowhere are the systems grouped under the name of Tammany more firmly entrenched. Few of the postulates of democratic government in England can be applied to Ireland. But personal bonds are strong and can be strengthened, and Ireland is, and will remain, a Christian land.

II.

A WEEK IN ITALY AND
AN INTERVIEW WITH SIGNOR MUSSOLINI

THERE was never less excuse for Englishmen who avoid Europe to-day, so well organised are the air services, so many the facilities for visiting the capital cities. I had long wished to hear for myself something of what was being said in Italy; mid-September seemed to be the right moment, so I left London for Paris on the night of September 11, having first opened a bazaar and given a brief address on foreign policy to some of my constituents.

From Dunkirk to Lyons I shared a carriage with a young Jew—'German by nationality but not by race, a Jew by race but not by religion,' he presently explained. His parents were Protestants, but both their fathers had married Jewesses. His German passport would soon expire. Would it be renewed? His brother was earning his living in Lyons. His permit, too, expired in October. Would it be renewed, or would he be expelled from France? If so, where could he go? Not to Germany; not to Palestine—no room there for Protestants. Almost all doors were closed. He had worked for two years in Italy, of which he had much to say of interest: he had spent two glorious months in England. If only he could be allowed to earn a pittance there—but the law did not permit. In South America?—perhaps. In South Africa?—possibly. 'The worst of it is that I feel, as do my parents, that I am a German,' he explained. 'My father played his part in the war, my mother was a nurse. I could fight for no other country. So strong in me is *Deutschtum*, that when I read attacks on Germany in the English papers I resent them. Yet I am proscribed as a Jew. Very well—I accept the label, I will make good somewhere. Is it a weakness to care still for the name "German"?' Perhaps it is; if so, I am very weak.'

I lunched in Paris with some French business men in close touch with England, France and Germany. Sir Samuel Hoare had spoken the day before at Geneva, and the French

papers were full of searching comments, which were reflected in the conversation of my hosts. We in London were sounding our moral trumpets in typically English fashion, the churches sounding the call to arms to defend the League as loudly as they called the nation in 1914 to defend Belgium. What other nation listened so willingly—if the Press were to be believed—to the voice of an aged episcopate? Where else in Europe would clerical views be given such prominence? But the sound of their trumpets would bring no one to the windows nor into the street: the walls of new Jericho would not fall. We did not really mean business. In French eyes the fighting Ministries in the British Cabinet were clearly weaker than their predecessors: the departure of Lord Hailsham from the War Office was an indication of policy. (I tried in vain to explain the error of this opinion.)

Would we fight for the Covenant in Europe as in Africa? If our policy was to be pooled security, what could we offer to the pool? What would our foreign policy be after the next election? The Socialists had been demanding further reduction in armaments. We had broken the Stresa front by the Anglo-German Naval Treaty within a month. Would we do it again?

The proposed inquiry into the control of raw materials was an irrelevant diversion, an echo of a proposal made by Dr. Schacht in 1926; but things were very different now. Talk of mineral sanctions, with hints at unilateral action by certain Powers, compelled each nation to seek self-sufficiency and to accumulate stocks. Raw materials could be bought by colonial Powers with paper, by others only with gold. England sent engines, iron and steel to the Colonies, and took their products in exchange, lent the Colonies money or gave them credit, and received goods in payment of interest. France did the same. Powers without colonies found the markets closed. Redistribution of territory was the only remedy—that meant Treaty revision. Would anyone consent? Would England surrender a mandate? No. Would the Dominions or America open their doors to Italian or German colonists? No. Would Australia allocate some of that vast empty continent to an Italian or German chartered company? No. These ideas were beyond the range of

practical politics, but only thus could we secure peaceful progress. Article 19 of the Covenant, which provided for the modification of treaties, had not even been mentioned at Geneva; France and the Little Entente would of course never consent. But Italy and Germany—‘the have nots’—were bent upon securing it. The elements of international co-operation were absent. Revision means war, says Benesh; Sanctions mean war, says Mussolini. Litvinoff alone could derive satisfaction from the scene at Geneva.

* * * * *

A man who entered the train at Dijon began to talk to the young Jew who joined me at the P.L.M. station. His father was Italian, his mother French: he was born in France, whither his father had migrated to find work and escape starvation. Many of his age in Italy had been called to the colours: some were in Eritrea. One set of French officials had tried to eject him from France because he was a foreigner, another to enrol him in the army; he had just finished his service. ‘If you had had a choice,’ said I, ‘which country would you have chosen—Italy or France?’ ‘Neither,’ he said firmly. ‘There’s no unity in France, too much in Italy: on one side no authority, on the other too much’; and he gave examples. He was mortally afraid that another war was brewing at Geneva: he would fight no country but Germany, and then only if invaded. The war-wounded of Europe—he was one himself—were not so generously treated to-day as to encourage soldiers to trust to posterity. But he saw light from afar. People could not be kept keyed up to patriotic concert-pitch for ever. The most intelligent nation—Italy—would be the first to make a change, not abandoning but humanising Fascism. It included much that was good; but until it took more into account the desire of the average man for personal freedom, would lack roots.

I reached Marseilles at midnight, and went to an obscure inn close to the station. The little waiter looked at the label on my bag. ‘Ah! Rome,’ he said. ‘You are going to my country. *Aie, aie*, I am afraid: the papers talk of war. My class is next to be called up. I wish I could go to England and live with my uncle there, or be a waiter in an English ship. But Abyssinia, no! It is hot and full of savages. Why should we trouble our heads?’

He was heard by another waiter, an older man, who rebuked him. 'Every man must fight one war in his life,' he said. 'You envy the English their riches, you wish to live in England, to work in an English ship. Did the English say "Aie, aie, I am afraid" when they went to war to conquer Africa? Did the English say "It is hot, and there are many savages," when they brought half Asia under their rule? No, they went to do their duty to their own race and to the world. Shame on you for talking thus to an Englishman. Why should they want such as you in their country to enjoy the comforts their fathers have procured for them. Military discipline is what you need.'

'No one wants war,' wailed the first speaker; 'the Press is controlled by Government and can say nothing; in Rome the very dogs are muzzled.'

'Yes,' returned the older man, 'when there is madness about it is well to muzzle those who can transmit infection. If the Press of Europe was muzzled there might be less madness.'

* * * * *

Next morning I took the Ala Littoria air line to Rome, a journey of three hours, straight over the Gulf of Genoa, over the northern-pointing finger of Corsica, and the islands of Elba and Monte Cristo, which enshrine so many romantic memories, touching the Italian coast near Civita Vecchia, and thus to Rome and the Seven Hills. The Alps were just visible at 2000 metres on the far horizon. We passed over an ocean liner and a cruiser.

It is difficult, even for one who knew Rome fairly well before the war, to recognise old landmarks amongst the wilderness of lofty buildings that have sprung up on every side of the majestic city, but it is impossible not to recognise in the faces of the people a new and more hopeful, if more militant, spirit. I spent the rest of the day sight-seeing and paying my respects to persons with expert knowledge who might be willing to help me to understand what was going on.

On Saturday, September 14, I had, in my capacity as editor of the *Nineteenth Century and After*, the honour to be received by Signor Mussolini at the Palazzo Venezia. It was the first time I had seen him. Sitting at his table, not in uniform, speaking in French, softly and without emphasis,

he outlined the change that had come over the Italian people since 1914, when the movement in favour of intervention on the side of the Allies in the Great War awoke ambitions long dormant but never dead, and hopes that an earlier generation had long cherished, of which the Treaty of Versailles brought no realisation. He spoke of the new Risorgimento, the fruits of which would be reaped by the sons and daughters of its creators. 'We look on life—the good life—as a struggle; we must force ourselves to confront difficulties, not to avoid them by diplomatic formulæ. There is no easy path. That is true of the life of a nation; it is not less true of the life of an individual.'

I commented upon the growth of Rome, remarking that Italy and Germany seem to be almost alone in Europe to-day in encouraging and initiating expenditure on public works of every sort. 'Capitalism, as Europe knew it,' he replied, 'is dead in Italy,' yet individual initiative was never more alive, the sense of individual responsibility never stronger; but the financial responsibility of a man to-day, in the eyes of the law, was not only to his banker or to his heirs, but to the society of which he forms a part. The agricultural production of Italy was slowly rising, thanks to the labours of private owners, and tenants, of land, who had been cajoled, educated and, where need be, hustled to improve their methods. Private ownership was a good, indeed far the best, system of management of land, provided that the owners performed their functions.

There was room in the Fascist State for traditionalists, room for men and women content to pursue the daily round and common task. They gave beauty to life and stability to society, and best of all to the family. But in Italy to-day they were no longer exploited by the clever few. They were now guided by men who had no object in view but the public welfare.

I mentioned our own record of housing, road construction and the like in England. 'At heart I really care less for these material advances than to see a change in the spirit of men,' he answered. 'If economic changes are to do good, there must be a change of spirit, to give significance and permanent value to any improved standard of living. A nation would not in the long run be happier or better for an extra pair of

boots and a little more butter all round. In Italy, as perhaps nowhere else, a spiritual change has occurred. Is it not overdue elsewhere?'

Two school mottoes from the *Æneid* came to my mind as he spoke :

*Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, magnoque se corpore miscet.*

He went on, by a natural transition, to describe how Italy now desired 'a little place in the tropical sun' hitherto denied her by those Powers who had secured such a place for themselves in most ample measure before the war, and had taken for themselves, by the ingenious device of mandates, the outlying provinces of Turkey and all the German colonies. England and France between them had taken over all Arabia except the Empty Quarter, and, jointly with the Dominions, had become residuary legatees of all German colonies. To Italy fell only a few islands. The prior claims of Italy in Ethiopia had never been in doubt since the days of Massowah. They had been recognised in successive treaties. The inhabitants of Abyssinia consisted of 3,000,000 Semitic (not negro) Amharas, holding the mountains. Their occupation was war, their culture based on the servitude of the 9,000,000 negroes who inhabit the skirts of the plateau. They were in, but not of, Ethiopia, having endured, under the rule of Addis Ababa, in the past half-century, miseries comparable to those which descended on the Sudan in the days of the Mahdi. Here was 'Darkest Africa,' as H. M. Stanley had described it. To bring light to that continent Stanley had laboured unselfishly, and he was one of the first men in England actively to encourage the Italian desire to play her part in the opening up of that continent. England had encouraged Italy to go to Massowah to co-operate against the Mahdi, who in a decade had reduced the population of the Sudan by a third. The Treaties of 1906 and of 1925 must be read in the light of current events at the time they were written, but also of subsequent happenings. England might forget the past history of this part of the world, but Italians could not do so.

Abyssinia had no place in the League and, except under European control, could only be a menace to Italy. All the regions which Menelik and his predecessors had conquered,

mere colonies of predatory warriors, must come under direct Italian administration. He had on January 29 assured Great Britain that her interests would be fully and amply safeguarded 'up to 100 per cent.' He had asked Great Britain on that date to enter into direct discussion on the subject of Ethiopia. He had been told that the question required long and careful consideration and had heard no more. All he now asked was what Europe had never failed in the past to accord to Great Britain—freedom of action, *laissez faire*—and if the reply was given that the outlook of the peoples of Europe as to rights of nations to live and to grow had been changed by the Treaty of Versailles, and by the League of Nations, he was bound to reply that many historical events had occurred since 1918, including the birth of Fascism. The Treaty of Versailles was an instrument of territorial expansion—the greatest that the world had known—but it was not the last. It was now Italy's turn. Were there really serious statesmen in England who were willing to convert a colonial quarrel into a European war? He did not profess to know their innermost thoughts, but he knew his own mind. Would the attitude of the Great Powers be decided ultimately by considerations of internal politics, and the balance of parties in the next election? There seemed some indications that these factors carried weight. When a decision was taken at Geneva, would England and France take refuge behind one or two small dissenting Powers in order to shield themselves from the consequences of dangerous gestures, or, alternatively, would the small Powers decide on Sanctions but place the responsibility for action squarely upon the proper shoulders? There was no room for compromise. Italy would do no less in Ethiopia than other Powers had done elsewhere; she could learn from their experience as well as her own. She would use her own funds, raise her own internal loans, and with her own hands make a worthy contribution to the work of civilisation.

* * * * *

I left Rome at 4 o'clock on Sunday morning for Naples—of the great cities of Italy the fairest. There at 8 o'clock I saw hundreds of mules being taken on board a transport. In the afternoon I saw a regiment march through the streets

to the quay. The sun was hot, the men looked tired. There was no attempt at organised rejoicings, no flags or flowers. The men had not been tuned up round the corner and given rest and refreshment before making their farewell appearance. They must have been six or eight hours under arms in their heavy kit. There was no display of popular enthusiasm, any more than there would be at Southampton, for this was not a local regiment, and the people of Naples are no more likely to applaud a regiment from Turin than the population of Liverpool would welcome a regiment from the home counties.

It is, of course, arguable that this was proof of bad management, but, on the other hand, it suggests to a soldier complete confidence in the public. But in Germany how different things would have been, how well organised the decorations, how spontaneous the applause! Spectacular effects have, of course, been secured by organisation in Italy as in every other country, and they have had their place on occasions at Naples recently. But it seemed clear that the local military authorities did not regard it necessary on this occasion.

The outstanding feature of Naples, to an English visitor, is children swarming in the streets. I was reminded of the Prophet Zechariah's delightful vision of 'the streets of the city full of boys and girls playing' whilst 'old men and women dwell in the streets, and every man with his staff in his hand for very age' (viii. 4, 5). There is, mercifully, but little motor traffic in these narrow, shady lanes. The children looked healthy; they were certainly happy, their needs as simple as their garments.

Vegetarians lead a happy life in Naples. I have seldom seen greater abundance of the fruits of the earth—or the sea—on sale. Women in the upper storeys were letting down baskets to be filled by the vendors below, to save the long climb up the narrow stairs. There must be many thousands of families each occupying a single room. I passed scores of tenements consisting of one room containing six or eight beds. The living-room and the kitchen seemed to be the street. I wonder how Professor E. H. A. Marshall, of Christ's College, Cambridge would propose, in Naples, to arrange 'a controlled reduction of national birth rates by mutual consent' (*The Times*, September 12, 1935). Whose consent?

Sir Samuel Hoare and Signor Mussolini, or Signor and Signora del Vicolo! Dr. Marshall, who claims that his views are 'in accordance with facts,' quotes with approval a statement by T. H. Huxley that the time will come when man will have to forego the right to multiply with as good a grace as the right to murder or to steal. We have done so in this country and in France with a very good grace. But not in Russia, Italy, Poland and Germany, where, particularly in the first two countries, the population continues to multiply.

In Naples, too, I had a few words with two discontented Italians who had followed the sea, or had been to England, and hoped, I think, that my pocket contained the ideal remedy for their grievances. That war is widely dreaded is clear: but they will march, as did their fathers.

Very different was the optimism of a soldier in colonial uniform, complete with helmet and sun-glasses, with features so English that he would have passed anywhere as a British infantryman. I met him in the train: 'Questa è la guerra della povera gente-degli emigranti. Noi siamo per questa guerra a qualunque costo perchè darà mo lavoro e tierras ai nostri figli.' (This is a poor man's war—a war for emigrants. We are for it at all costs, for it may bring to our children work and land.)

Mussolini, like the other dictators of Europe, has risen from the people: he works for them and they look to him. Rich men—and they are very few—and the middle class (which is very small) stand to lose much if not all, but their influence on events is negligible at the moment.

On Monday I was received by a Cabinet Minister whose responsibilities to-day are of the heaviest. He was as frank as he was courteous. 'If certain Powers,' he said, 'use their position—geographical, economic, financial, or military—to take Italy by the throat we know what to do. Europe will pay the price, whatever be the outcome for us.' I have heard even stronger views expressed in quarters scarcely less authoritative, but perhaps intended only for foreign consumption.

Fascism is as deeply rooted in Italy as Communism in Russia, Hitlerism in Germany, and Parliamentary Democracy in England. To fight it is to oppose a nation, and most Italians believe that hatred of Fascism, not love of the Covenant or care for Ethiopia, is dominant at Geneva.

All these creeds embody conceptions which conflict with the philosophy of the Covenant; yet they are changing slowly, and with the lessening of external pressure and internal tension some of the features which we like least will disappear first. Time is the best doctor and patience a great virtue.

The Italian people have read in the Press all that the representatives of France and Great Britain have said. They know what the Press of Paris and London are saying. They and their rulers remain outwardly unmoved, calm and courteous to their critics. Their course is set. The captain is on the bridge. Were he to die the course would be changed to-morrow. On the ethics of Italian policy I offer no comment—the time for doing so is past. But I am concerned to emphasise the perils that the application of Sanctions may bring upon the world.

The conceptions embodied in the Covenant are new, firmly rooted only in England, as yet acceptable only to small Powers. We assume that there will be no need for Sanctions if we put our foot down firmly. I fear lest the assumption be proved false. It is taken for granted that we shall not have to deal simultaneously with more than one breach of the Covenant; we may well have to deal with two or three. That the application of Sanctions of any sort may be fatal to the League is the least of dangers to be faced. I hold, therefore, that, having done our best, we should now stand aside and not seek, with the aid of France, to judge the world. That is the task of a higher Power, not mentioned in the Covenant. *Potestas Dei est et tibi, Domine, misericordia.* Meanwhile we are sitting on every safety valve.

The sole residuary legatee of whatever remains of Europe after the war to which the corporate mind of the League seems to be resigned may well be M. Litvinoff.

Sept. 21.

ARNOLD WILSON.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER



No. DCCV—NOVEMBER 1935

BRITISH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICY

By SIR GEORGE SCHUSTER, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G.,
C.B.E., M.C.

A GENERAL Election will shortly be upon us in which the natural desire of the great mass of British voters would be to concentrate their attention on economic issues. Writing in October 1935, one can only be too conscious that external disturbances may distract that attention. But no apology is needed for treating economic issues as of paramount importance, nor for reviewing the situation as it exists independently of the special reactions which these disturbances may have.

The main object of this article is to present a background against which the various economic programmes, which have been or will be before the country, can be judged by the plain man who seeks an answer to the question: 'Precisely what programme should the *Government* of this country adopt at *the present juncture*?' In the treatment of the subject no

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attempt will be made to argue out the fundamental issue between State Socialism and private enterprise. While the writer is in strong sympathy with the moral and social considerations which influence those who support the former for the sake of obtaining a more even distribution of wealth, the practical consideration which underlies all that is here written is that the *size* of the cake is a matter of joint importance with its *distribution*, and that at the moment the most pressing part of the joint problem is to maintain, and if possible increase, the size.

There is no lack of economic doctors to-day ready to prescribe remedies, and the basis on which most of them claim our attention is that something is desperately wrong with our general position.

We have great derelict areas in town and country [writes Mr. Lloyd George in the introduction to his recent pamphlet on *Organising Prosperity*]. With factories standing idle, land going to waste, and a considerable decrease in our output, we have a large part of the nation under-fed, ill-clad, badly housed and over-crowded.

And he claims that his programme is written for

the great mass of the nation, which is eager to work out its salvation if only it can be shown a sensible practical method of *rebuilding our prosperity*.

Attention is particularly invited to the last words, for the basis of this and many other cases is that we have lost a healthy condition which we once had, and that desperate remedies are necessary to restore it. Another typical line of thought, illustrated in Mr. John Strachey's book *The Capitalist Crisis*, is that present conditions afford the final proof of the hopeless inadequacy of the capitalist system to provide a reasonable standard of existence for the human race. Such appreciations are common and may lead to dangerously wrong conclusions—either because in condemning systems they ignore the abnormal external shocks (chiefly due to the war) to which these systems have in recent years been subjected, or because in deploring present conditions they fail to make true comparisons with the past and thus to appreciate the movements towards improvement which are taking place. To ignore these things may lead to false pessimism and wrong prescriptions. What we need is a careful study of the particular causes which are at work and

carefully adjusted action to meet them—not wholesale changes of system or general measures which, by giving a temporary stimulus, may mask the true causes of trouble and lead disastrously to their neglect. Above all it is important to study the readjustments which have already been made, for from them one may learn the way to natural and enduring health as opposed to synthetic or 'organised' prosperity. There is no occasion for complacency, but it is essential to preserve a sense of proportion and not to take exaggerated views of our condition which lead to desperate remedies.

As a simple way of illustrating the possibility of a different appreciation one may put the following question: supposing that a prophet in 1913 had cast his vision forward and given us a picture of our Public Finance and Foreign Trade twenty years later, what conclusion would we all have reached? Let us consider a few of the main points that he would have had to tell us: *as regards Public Finance*, that our National Debt would rise from £700 to £8,000 million and the annual charges for its service from £24½ to £220 million (having passed a peak of £378 million), and that the cost of public social services would rise from about £63 million to over £490 million¹; *as regards Foreign Trade* (which before the war was the basis for one-third of our industrial activity), that the exports of our main staple products would suffer such a decline as practically to wipe out large sections of the industries, as illustrated in the following comparisons between 1913 and 1933:

Coal: a reduction of exports from 73½ to 39 million tons and values from £51 to £31 million. *Cotton*: a reduction in piece-goods exports from over 7,000 to about 3,000 million yards, and in values of all cotton manufactures exported from £122½ to £58½ million. *Ships*: a reduction of values of exports from £11 to £2½ million. *Railway materials and locomotives*: a reduction of values of exports from £13 to about £2 million. *Iron and steel products* (other than railway materials and sheets and tubes): from £37 to £16 million.

If such a picture had been presented in 1913, could anyone have ventured to maintain that the country could avoid irretrievable ruin? And yet what is the reality? As regards Public Finance, our credit stands higher than it did

¹ These figures include expenditure from parliamentary votes, local rates and other sources. The first is for 1910 and the second for 1932-33. (*Vide*, for a convenient analysis, a special article in the *Westminster Bank Review* for June 1935.)

in 1913, not only absolutely, but far more markedly in relation to the credit of other nations; while as to the general condition of the country, on the basis of common observation it seems clear that the standard of living, both as regards necessities and also amusements and amenities, is far higher to-day than it was in 1913. And this superficial observation can be verified from many statistics. A few samples will suffice. Thus vital statistics all indicate an improving standard of health. Taking the average experience of the three years about each census, the infantile mortality figures for England and Wales per 1000 have been—1910-2, 110; 1920-2, 80; 1930-2, 64; and for the same periods the death rates for all ages have been for males 14.8, 12.9, 11, and for females 12.3, 10.5, 8.8.

The following table of *food consumption* shows a steadily rising standard of living:

PROPORTIONATE CHANGES IN PER CAPUT CONSUMPTION OF CERTAIN FOODS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM³
Base, 1909-13 = 100.

	1909-13	1924-8	1934
Wheat flour	100	94	93
Meat	100	99	106
Butter	100	100	157
Margarine	100	200	133
Fruit	100	149	188
Vegetables (other than potatoes)	100	130	164
Eggs	100	115	146
Sugar	100	115	123
Tea	100	146	138

The statistics as regards Post Office Savings Bank deposits, Building Societies, Industrial and Provident Societies, and Co-operative Societies indicate a most remarkable growth in the savings and investments of the less wealthy classes, as is shown in the following table (all figures in millions):

	1913	1929	1933
Post Office Savings Bank deposits	£ 187	£ 285	£ 327
Industrial and Provident Societies	78	222	271
Building Societies (share capital and deposits)	60	297	477
All Co-operative Societies (share and loan capital, reserve and insurance funds)	60	195	243

³ The first two columns are based on the Presidential address of Sir Alfred Flux to the Royal Statistical Society in 1930; and the third column on information obtained from the Market Supply Committee.

It is to be noted from these figures that the increase from 1929 to 1933—the period of most sensational depression in economic history—is at a greater rate than in the period from 1913 to 1929, the figures as regards Building Societies being especially remarkable.

One may next consider the statistics as regards *Housing*—a most important index of the general standard of living. These are extremely impressive. The following table brings out the main facts:

HOUSES IN ENGLAND AND WALES ⁸			
Average annual increase in ten years ending—	1861	49,300	
" " "	1871	59,600	
" " "	1881	69,200	
" " "	1891	60,500	
" " "	1901	88,600	
" " "	1911	84,100	
" " "	1921	47,900	
" " "	1931	137,000	
Total number of houses built in year ending March 31—	1932	200,812	
" " "	1933	200,496	
" " "	1934	266,622	
" " "	1935	328,000	

Again, one may take the simple test of *industrial production*. Comparisons with pre-war conditions are difficult owing to lack of comparable statistics; but as regards the last ten years the information published by the Board of Trade indicates that the total industrial production has during the first half of 1935 attained a level about 21 per cent. higher than that of 1924. If the comparison is limited to manufacturing industries, and the great drop in coal-mining excluded, the increase is over 25 per cent.⁴

Finally, the two inquiries which have been made on a comparable basis for the pre-war and post-war periods, those of Professor Bowley in 1913 and 1924 in five provincial centres, and the London Survey, which repeated Charles Booth's investigation in the 'nineties, both point to the conclusion that, whereas a third of the urban population was below the defined poverty line a generation ago, less than a tenth is in that condition to-day.

⁸ The figures for annual increase from 1861 to 1931 are not, of course, on a strictly comparable basis with the figures for new houses actually built in the years since 1931, for the former represent net increases after allowing for houses demolished. But this difference does not substantially affect the comparison.

⁴ This figure is arrived at by applying the new (1930) Index of production to an initial figure of 108, which is taken as the figure for 1930 in comparison with 1924. (*Vide Board of Trade Journal*, March 28, 1935.)

The above examples—which, as regards the nature of the phenomena and the figures selected for comparison, have been chosen so as to illustrate general conditions and tendencies rather than the special recovery in the last two years from the depths of depression in 1931—surely must lead the unprejudiced observer to the conclusion that the *general* material condition of the country at least shows signs of sufficient health to make one hesitate to accept the case for a change of the whole system or for desperate remedies.

‘But,’ it may be said, ‘these general dry statistics miss the human significance of what is happening, and the account so far given entirely ignores the tragic facts revealed in the unemployment figures.’ There is no more instructive way of tracing out the recent economic history of this country than to follow the employment figures. To do this properly involves a study of the detailed returns published by the Ministry of Labour; but as space will not permit their reproduction, the table on p. 519 (based on the latest available complete compilation) has been prepared to bring out the main points.

There is much to be learned from these figures.

The first point to note is the substantial increase in total employment over the period covered. Allowing for the difference made by the exclusion from the 1934 figures of persons over 64, the increase between 1923 and 1934 may be put at about 1,000,000, while up to August 1935 there had been a further increase of about 250,000. In June 1935 the ‘employed’ figures passed the highest total ever recorded, and it has been rising steadily since then. Apart from this, the figures reveal that we have been going through a period of seismic disturbance in the economic field producing an abnormal shifting of the channels of employment. The main causes for this have arisen outside the economic system and can be traced to the war—its direct disturbances and the legacies which it left, changed boundaries, changed balances of payments, changed national conditions and policies. At the same time there have been important supplementary causes, such as changes in the rate of growth of the world’s population and an abnormal acceleration (itself stimulated by the war) in mechanical inventions for the displacement of manual labour. In this country we had both to correct the

TOTAL NUMBERS IN EMPLOYMENT⁵ (All figures in thousands)

	Total Number Insured		Total Number Employed		Increase or Decrease
	July 1923 (over 16)	July 1934 (16 to 64)	July 1923 (over 16)	July 1934 (16 to 64)	
I. SERVICES.					
Distributive Trades	1,254	2,005	1,181	1,801	+ 620
Transport ⁶	702	868	675	712	+ 37
Entertainments and Sports	60	113	52	92	+ 40
Hotels, Restaurants, etc.	259	410	233	359	+ 126
Laundries, Dyeing and Cleaning	107	153	101	143	+ 42
Professional Services	109	148	104	141	+ 37
Commerce, Banking, Insurance and Finance	227	257	217	246	+ 29
National and Local Government Services	423	470	388	392	+ 14
Gas, Water and Electricity	173	195	160	178	+ 18
Total I.	3,404	4,620	3,111	4,064	+ 953
II. MINING, MANUFACTURING AND BUILDING:					
(a) Main Expanding Heads ⁷ :					
Electrical Industries ⁸	145	238	132	234	+ 102
Motor Vehicles, Cycles, and Aircraft	102	272	174	246	+ 72
Household Equipment, Building and Works ⁹	1,167	1,651	1,047	1,366	+ 319
Expanding Textile Industries (Art. Silk, Hosiery, etc.)	170	241	156	190	+ 34
Remainder of Expanding Heads (33 heads)			1,699	2,000	+ 301
Total Expanding Heads			3,208	4,036	+ 828
(b) Main Contracting Heads ¹⁰ :					
Coal-mining	1,244	982	1,212	623	- 589
Ship-building and Marine Engineering	336	206	202	113	- 89
General Engineering	667	523	525	443	- 82
Steel-melting, Iron-puddling, and Pig Iron	240	184	193	140	- 53
Contracting Textile Industries (Cotton, Bleaching and Dyeing, Lace, Woollens)	973	822	815	639	- 176
Remainder of Contracting Heads (24 heads)			922	777	- 145
Total Contracting Heads			3,869	2,735	- 1,134
Total II., Mining, Manufacturing, and Building	8,082	8,340	7,077	6,771	- 306
GRAND TOTAL, I. and II.	11,486	12,960	10,188	10,835	+ 647

⁵ The figures for 1923 are for the ages of 16 and over, while those for 1934 are for 16 to 64 inclusive. This means that the increased employment is somewhat greater than the difference shown; but for present purposes the comparison is accurate enough.

⁶ The net increase of 37,000 shown under Transport covers a decrease under Railways and Docks, Harbours, Canals, etc., of 85,000, and an increase of 122,000 under Tramway and Omnibus Services and other forms of road transport. This is an interesting illustration of the shifting of employment following new mechanical developments.

⁷ Electrical Wiring and Contracting; Electrical Cables, Apparatus, Lamps; Electrical Engineering.

⁸ This heading covers Building and Public Works Contracting, together with the following manufacturing industries: Furniture, Artificial Stone and Concrete Heating and Ventilating Apparatus; Paint, Varnish, etc.; Bricks, Tiles, Pipes, etc.; Wallpaper; Constructional Engineering; Carpets; Stoves, Grates and Pipes.

distortion of our economic machine produced by the war, which especially affected the metal and engineering industries, and also to readjust ourselves to a world in which many of our former export markets had either lost their purchasing power or developed their own machinery of production. A point to be made at the outset is that the mere fact that readjustments in employment on such a scale have been necessary has in itself a special significance because it is only to be expected that in such periods the percentage of unemployment is likely to be above normal. The difficulty of obtaining an exact adjustment between available labour and employment, which must always exist under any system of large-scale production engaging in international trade, is obviously increased in periods of exceptional oscillation when the demands for labour are shifting as between one industry and another.

The next point to note is the nature of the redistribution which has occurred, the main feature of which is a steady flow away from 'Production' to 'Services.'

Between 1923 and 1934 the total employed in mining and manufacturing dropped by 523,000, and, from representing 62 per cent. of the total employed, fell to 53½ per cent. On the other hand, the total employed in services, as shown in the table (omitting transport, and gas, water, and electricity), rose by 898,000 (from 22½ to 29½ per cent. of the total). The gain in entertainments, sports, and hotels, etc., practically balanced the loss in textiles; distributive trades gained more than the whole loss in coal-mining. Taking into account that, as already noted, total industrial output has substantially increased, one may sum up the net result by saying that labour-saving machinery has reduced the number of manual workers, and the normal hours of work per worker, without reducing the goods produced, and made it possible for the nation to spend more on efficient distribution of the product, and on its amenities and leisure. In these figures may be found an indication of the practical answer to those who argue that increasing mechanical efficiency is so reducing human employment that manufacturing industry fails to distribute sufficient purchasing power to absorb its own products.

Apart from this wide change in the character of employment there has been a complex shifting within the sphere of manufacturing industry itself, old forms of employment dwindling away and new forms taking their place. To follow this requires a more detailed investigation than is afforded even by the full Ministry of Labour tables. Part of this

process is revealed in the *Annual Surveys of Industrial Development* now published by the Board of Trade, which record that 463 new factories employing 29,500 persons were established in 1933 and 478 employing 37,200 in 1934.

The main heads of expansion in major industries are shown separately in the table; but in order to convey some idea of the complexity and variety of industrial activity, one may supplement it with the following record of important cases of expansion taken from a recent bulletin of the Federation of British Industries: Aircraft, Motor Cars, Radio, Neon Signs, Photo-electric Apparatus, Electric Cables, Lamps, Motors and Apparatus, Rayon, Pharmaceutical Chemicals, Detergents, Synthetic Resins and other plastic materials, Solid Carbon Dioxide, Chromium Plating, Cinematograph Films, Refrigerators, Cellulose products, and Canned Foods.

Three major impressions emerge from a consideration of these facts—first, of healthy reaction in the economic organism of this country (signs that we are alive and moving with the times); secondly, of the immense amount of adjustment which is going on through private agencies beneath the surface and quite independently of Government action; thirdly, of a machine so complex, vast and intricate as to make centralised State control a task of quite appalling difficulty.

The last and most important point to be mentioned is one which is demonstrated by the five main heads of contracted employment shown separately in the table. It is these industries (especially coal-mining, textiles, and ship-building) that have chiefly felt the effects of the contraction in the demand of our external customers, and it is here that the real cases of disease or atrophy (the real hard core of unemployment) are to be found. In the limited but important area covered by this list we have the explanation of a fall in employment as between 1923 and 1934 of no less than 989,000. It is true that since June 1934 there has been some recovery, but, even allowing for this, the drop remains about 820,000. And it must be remembered that this drop has been from an already very depressed level, for in 1923 these industries accounted for 510,000 out of a total of the 1,298,000 insured workers then unemployed. Actually, therefore, the number employed to-day is about 1,330,000 less than the number who in 1923 looked for employment in these industries. It is this figure rather than

actual numbers unemployed to-day that conveys the true significance of the decline in these trades, because that gives the measure of the dislocation—of the numbers that either remain unemployed or have gone to swell the demand for absorption in other industries. In considering the abnormal strain of absorption placed upon other industries there is another factor of a different kind which may be mentioned here—the change during recent years in the course of emigration. It is estimated that in the three depression years 1931–34 about 150,000 more persons returned to this country than emigrated overseas, whereas in the four decades before the war (1871–1911) the average net emigration in each decade was 384,000. If the effect of this change is added to a loss of employment amounting to 1,330,000 in a few industries affected by special and mainly external causes, the wonder is, not that the total unemployment figure is so high, but rather that it is now something under 2,000,000, and that out of this total the number that has been continuously unemployed for twelve months and over is no more than 370,000.

That these industries are the real centre of disease is borne out by the fact that it is they that are mainly centred in the 'special areas'—the black spots; and their condition is made all the worse by the fact that in these areas they have provided the main or sole activity, so that absorption in other employment means breaking up of homes and wholesale shifting of the population. Those conditions are so well known that the point need not be further laboured; but the main thesis of this article is that here are the really diseased parts of our economic organism, which is otherwise mainly healthy, and that these parts require special treatment according to the special features of each case. In the main it may be said that they have been the victims of failure in our export markets and that any broad revival for them must depend on a general revival of international trade.⁹ But this will not

⁹ In the foregoing paragraphs the course of recent economic history has been followed through the employment figures. If space permitted, it would be desirable to supplement this by an analysis of changes in the export trade and of the relative importance of production for home and foreign markets, for the changes in the external demand for our goods have had so important a bearing on employment and all other conditions. It is difficult to obtain exact statistical indices of these changes, but a careful recent estimate (London and Cambridge Economic Service Bulletin 41, August 1935) is that the proportion of exports to total national production on the basis of net

provide the whole solution, for in certain cases trade is irretrievably gone, while in others specific measures, quite apart from any general trade revival, might help. Thus coal-mining has suffered both from the general depression in our export markets and also from special new developments leading to substitution of oil for coal and greater economy in the use of coal. Greater employment might be provided in two ways—by a general revival of trade and by scientific developments leading to new uses. The maximum concerted national effort for the latter is needed, but even so it appears that a large part of the loss is irretrievable and must be treated as a casualty. Ship-building and marine engineering have suffered from new competition (largely stimulated by the war), but more from the general fall in the movement of goods in international trade. Efficiency on our own part and a revival of international trade will help, and the case is by no means hopeless. Textiles, especially cotton, have suffered mainly from development of new competition—partly from new home industries in countries like India, partly from invasion of our markets by Japan. So far as the latter factor is concerned, efficiency shown in higher quality and lower prices may recapture some share, but the former factor is of far greater importance, and that is permanent. It is necessary to face the fact that the larger part of this trade is irretrievably gone, and that there is no chance of re-employment of the workers and machinery in the same way. This is a casualty which must be faced. General engineering and iron and steel have been selected in the list as illustrating a different condition. These form part of a group of manufacturing industries which, abnormally swollen by the war, had to recover from a tremendous maladjustment between war and peace economy. They still show the marks of that, but it is not unreasonable to hope that they will prove sufficiently healthy to complete a natural process of re-adjustment.¹⁰

output has been roughly as follows: 1913, 27 per cent.; 1924, 25 per cent.; 1930, 20 per cent.; 1934, 16 per cent.

¹⁰ In this group—engineering, iron and steel, ship-building, vehicles and metal trades—the numbers enrolled increased between 1911 and 1922 by 575,000. This meant a 36 per cent. increase, and the numbers were equivalent to 75 per cent. of the total increase in the male population (15 to 65 years) during the period (780,000). A full analysis of the position may be found in *The Third Winter of Unemployment* (P. S. King & Son, 1922).

It is against the background thus roughly sketched that one must attempt to answer the question first put in this article. But the picture given has been based mainly on a comparison between widely separated dates without tracing the intervening movements, and, before considering particular Government measures for the future, it is necessary to make a more precise and up-to-date appreciation of our present state, and especially of the effects of the National Government's policy since the crisis of 1931. The nature of that crisis is instructive.

The combination of an open door for imports with the attempt to keep sterling fixed on its over-valued gold parity, in a world of depreciated currencies and of severe restrictions on imports, had placed our manufacturers in an impossible position. We were faced with excessive imports of manufactured goods, failure of exports, and external distrust of our position which led to the withdrawal of foreign balances. The attempts then made to stimulate internal activity by a large programme of public expenditure, though they may have mitigated the severity of unemployment, only added to the difficulties of the exchange situation. The manner in which the crisis was overcome is well known and need not be described. Since then we have had three years under the full influence of the new policy, of which the chief features have been :

- (a) Balanced budgets and sound finance as a foundation for confidence in the country ;
- (b) Cheap money and freedom to maintain that condition regardless of the external value of sterling ;
- (c) A tariff for the protection of industry ;
- (d) The stimulation of exports by inter-Imperial agreements and bilateral arrangements with other countries ;
- (e) A plan for the rehabilitation of British agriculture by internal reorganisation (marketing) and the regulation of imports.

To these special features of the new policy must be added the continuance of what has been a fundamental point in the policy of all British Governments since the war—a recognition that the nation has an obligation to maintain at a reasonable standard of living the masses of workers who have had the ground of their employment cut from under their feet.

Broadly speaking, it can be said without hesitation that the policy has been successful, but it is extremely important to avoid exaggeration of this success, to examine its foundations and consider how far it can continue.

Measuring the success by the employment figures, unemployment has fallen by 1,000,000 from a peak of

2,947,000 in August 1932 to 1,949,000 in August 1935, while employment has increased by more than this difference owing to the increase in the number of insured workers. But, in assessing the significance of the recovery, and more especially in estimating the chances of its continued progress, its two main characteristics, each dependent on one of the main features in the National Government's policy, must be appreciated. These are, first, that it represents largely a recovery of lost ground in the home market as a result of the protective tariff ; secondly, that a great part of the home activity is either directly or indirectly dependent on the abnormal construction of dwelling-houses, which is just *the* form of activity which is most easily stimulated by 'cheap money.' It is necessary to test both these points.

As regards the effects of the tariff, perhaps the simplest way of getting a rough measure is to compare the progress of manufacturing production according to the Board of Trade Index with that of the import and export of manufactured goods, as is done in the following table ¹¹ :

BASE, 1924 = 100

	Industrial Production (Manufactures)	Quantum of Imports of Manufactures	Quantum of Exports of Manufactures
1931	96.7	133.0	63.5
1932	97.2	85.1	65.5
1933	103.9	87.6	67.6
1934	117.4	101.7	73.1

This table shows clearly how the position had become distorted by the unnatural conditions in 1931, and how it has since then been corrected. The quantum of manufactured imports had in fact fallen in 1934 from the 1931 level by nearly 24 per cent., while industrial production had risen by almost 21½ per cent. and exports of manufactures by 16 per cent. On the other hand, one may point out, in the face of the complaints of Free Traders, that our record as regards maintenance of imports is still far better than the world average. The following table (based on the latest League of Nations *Review of World Trade*) brings this out :

¹¹ The old Board of Trade Index of Industrial Production has been used in this case, as that gives a chance of continuous comparison up to 1934, which is late enough for the present purpose. It is to be noted, however, that this does not record building activity. It may also be noted that the first two quarters of 1935 show an increase of about 7 per cent. over 1934. The figures in columns 2 and 3 have been obtained by recalculating the Board of Trade (1930 basis) Index of quantum of imports and exports on the basis that the 1924 figure in terms of 1930 was 76.6 and 116.7 for Class III. imports and exports respectively (*Board of Trade Journal*, January 21, 1932).

QUANTUM OF TRADE (1929 = 100)

	Imports			Exports		
	1932	1933	1934	1932	1933	1934
U.K. (manufactures).	65.3	67.3	78.0	61.3	63.4	68.4
U.K. (all goods)	88.2	89.6	94.9	62.9	64.4	69.1
World (all goods)	73.0	74.5	76.5	74.5	76.5	78.0
Total world trade in manufactured goods (imports and exports combined)				58	59.5	64

This table shows that we are still more sinned against than sinning in this matter. We are actually still taking 95 per cent. of the imports taken in the boom year of 1929, although the general world average is down to 76. We can still find markets for only 69 per cent. of our 1929 exports against a general average of 78 for all countries. The most encouraging indication from this table is the rate of improvement in British exports of manufactured goods in these three years. This improvement is 11½ per cent., while the average rate of improvement for the whole world in all classes of exports is under 5 per cent.

While these facts illustrate the main features in the position, they do not answer the question of how much our general improvement since 1932 has been based on factors which have now spent their force, such as—(a) recovery of lost ground, which is now practically all rewon; (b) ‘filling up our own shelves,’ which are now pretty well full; (c) the benefit of our exchange depreciation in 1931, the effect of which is now worn off.

There are many careful observers who hold that these particular stimuli are now exhausted, and one gets calculations, for example, that the total labour employed in making those manufactured goods that we still import is no more than about 370,000, and that it would not pay us to take this business at the risk of losing customers for goods which we can make better and export. They argue, accordingly, that any hope that we can continue reducing our unemployment at a substantial rate must depend on a revival of foreign trade, and they plead for international co-operation to that end.

The truth seems to be that we are at the end of a definite phase, in the sense that the effect of the *easy* factors for internal recovery have been exhausted, and that, if we are to continue improvement, we must rely chiefly on hard-won developments in efficiency of production. That alone can provide a sure basis both for continued internal progress and the extension of our export trade, though the latter may be helped by other measures to which reference will be made below. The submission of this article is that to maintain a

healthy condition we need both internal progress and the maintenance and expansion of external trade, and that, even in present conditions, there is still scope for substantial advance on both lines provided that we develop our own efficiency and do not increase our difficulties by short-sighted measures. For the future we shall have to rely proportionately less on expansion of export markets and more on internal progress; but our export trade still remains of vital importance, and in framing policy we must keep the *whole* picture in mind.

Opinions on the validity of this appreciation must depend on one's general conception of the whole basis for economic advance. This is not the place for an economic thesis, but conceptions on this point so fundamentally affect one's conclusions that a short explanatory digression is necessary. The points are elementary, but they are so often forgotten.

The bed-rock foundation for any gain to humanity in wealth, leisure, culture, and amenities must be an increase in the product per worker. This increase may be partly based on increased efficiency of the worker, but in our present age must rest mainly on scientific or mechanical advance in some form or other. There are two broadly different ways in which the process may be seen at work. It may rest mainly on the extension of transport and other facilities to new areas of primary production, thus increasing their output on the one hand, and, on the other, enabling a central manufacturing country to concentrate on the production on a larger scale of universally needed staple manufactures, widening its markets for them in exchange for food and raw materials from the new areas. Or again, it may rest mainly on a country's improving the methods of manufacture within its own area, thus releasing energy which can be turned to working out higher refinements in material comfort or for the employment of leisure. The former may be described as a method of ‘expansion,’ the latter of ‘intensification.’ In practice, of course, both methods are everywhere intermingled, but, as an illustration of the distinction, it may perhaps be said that in this country we have tended to rely rather on expansion, and the United States rather on intensification. Certainly we have tended to think in terms of our external trade as an index of our prosperity, and consequently, when, as in recent years, we have been brought sharply up against the loss of existing markets and a check to expansion, pessimistic conclusions are drawn. There is, however, no need for ultimate pessimism, but rather for facing the immediate difficulties and adjusting ourselves to them. That means turning more to intensification both as regards home and external trade, and that, again, means concentrating on efficiency both in methods of manufacture and in the adaptation of our products to the changed needs of our external markets, recognising that they are becoming self-supporting for the old simple staple products and that we must be

pioneers in supplying new needs. Of the possibilities of progress by 'intensification' in the form of developing new products and new needs many illustrations could be given.¹² One very striking case may suffice. In 1899 the automobile was hardly known as more than a curiosity. Within the space of thirty years the trade had so grown that in the United States in 1929 the expenditure on the purchase and running of cars was greater than the whole national income of France. Who would have dared to predict such a development in 1899, and who can say that similar unpredictable developments may not occur in the future? Mechanisation, with its displacement of workers, does, of course, have immediate results of dislocation and hardship to individuals, and it has been feared by manual workers since its earliest days. It also has a continuous reflex in problems of distributing purchasing power and leisure, so that the advantages of increased efficiency in production may be realised, for, unless spread, these advantages may turn to evil.

To offset the effects of these intermediate dislocations and to solve these problems there needs to be a parallel advance in social consciousness and standards which may have to be supported by State regulations (e.g., as regards unemployment relief, hours of work, school-leaving age, etc.) The conclusion suggested (p. 521) from the figures of employment is that in this country the necessary adjustments are being made reasonably well.

We must next turn to consider the second of the two main characteristics of our recent recovery mentioned above, namely the activity in dwelling-house construction. A study of the statistical data seems to point inevitably to the conclusion that the present rate of house building cannot be maintained. The table on page 519 has already shown how abnormal in comparison with previous standards that rate has been during the last four years. That it is also abnormal in relation to any reasonable estimate of future effective demand is confirmed by the Registrar-General's Report on Housing in the 1931 Census. Starting from the position that by 1931 a normal equilibrium (disturbed by the war shortage) had been restored (except to the extent that 'the reservoir of vacants hitherto associated with a state of housing equilibrium' was below its normal level), he estimates the requirements for the decade 1931-41 as follows:

¹² Very instructive statistical measurements of long-range progress are those made by Mr. Carl Snyder, of the Federal Reserve Bank, New York. One of the most interesting of these studies is contained in a recently published essay, *The Relations of Capital Supply to Industrial Growth, Real Wages, Unemployment and General Welfare* (published in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv.*, September 1935: Gustav Fischer, Jena). Without necessarily accepting all his conclusions, one may yet find in his studies a most valuable corrective to short-range pessimism.

(a) Normal increase, deduced from population increase	800,000
(b) To make good demolitions and losses	100,000
(c) To make good slum clearance ¹³	300,000
(d) Margin to diminish overcrowding ('two or three hundred thousand'), say	300,000
(e) Balance to restore the reservoir of vacant houses to the normal pre-war percentage	200,000
Total	1,700,000

Against this estimate the realised facts are that within a period of less than four years about 1,000,000 houses had been completed, and that construction is proceeding at the rate of about 330,000 houses per annum. At this rate the whole of the Registrar-General's estimate will have been completed in 1937, and, even if he has underestimated heading (d), it seems hardly reasonable to allow for more than doubling this item. Even with that allowance the whole ten years' requirements will, at the present rate of construction, have been satisfied by 1938. And when that stage is reached, what will happen? It is not suggested that house construction will stop altogether, but it may well be reduced to the annual rate necessary to cover items (a) and (b) in the above table—namely, 90,000. Such a drop would mean a tremendous displacement of labour, on a scale, indeed, sufficient to upset the whole basis of the present recovery.

Now it may perhaps be said that these conclusions are exaggerated, and that, in any case, an extension and intensification of slum clearance schemes might help to preserve equilibrium. And that leads straight to one of the most important practical points which seem to emerge from the present survey—a point which, although it involves anticipating part of the final conclusions, may be mentioned now. Slum clearance schemes involve Government finance, for they cannot be undertaken on a commercial basis; they are, therefore, to be considered together with all that class of works which lies within the sphere of the Government as *entrepreneur*. If policy is to be governed by considerations of the general economic well-being of the country, then the Government (including in that term all public authorities) ought to time an intensive period for its own activities to coincide with the falling off in the private dwelling-house building boom which is inevitable round about 1937 or 1938. That is one practical answer to those like Mr.

¹³ I.e., 'to make good, houses condemned as unfit for future habitation under slum clearance or other schemes.'

Lloyd George, who are clamouring for an immediate intensive campaign of public works construction. If it were possible to develop the maximum activity of such a campaign immediately so that it coincided with the peak of the private building boom, the result might be disastrous. For there would be a distortion of demand in certain industries based on requirements at a supernormal level which cannot be permanently maintained and which must inevitably be followed by a collapse to a subnormal level.

There could not be a worse mistake. Programmes of this kind are pleaded for on the basis of sentimental pictures drawn from the conditions of those who are hopelessly seeking employment in the textile industries, ship-building, or coal-mining. If carried out, they would provide a feverish and non-permanent stimulus to quite different occupations which are already in a highly stimulated condition. The Government as an *entrepreneur* has a very important function to perform, but not the least important of its responsibilities in that regard is to regulate its performance according to the general economic state. Whenever it is proposed to intensify this form of activity beyond the *normal average rate* which the country can support, the question must be asked what is to happen when the intensification is finished? In the long run such intensification can only be justified as a means for bridging a temporary gap, and this, it is submitted, really means that the only sound ground for intensification can be that, if timed to balance abnormal depression in private economic enterprise, it may help to smooth out the cyclical fluctuations which are such a curse to all. It is easy to advocate this levelling-out policy; it is much more difficult to know in advance when to act. But the present seems to be one of the occasions when the right policy is exceptionally clear. We have no right to expect that within the next three years manufacturing industry, either as a result of home development or the revival of foreign trade, can increase its activity sufficiently to offset the probable drop in house-building activity. If there are no offsetting features, the Government may have to contend with a period of serious depression. It is essential that it should be ready to meet it, and that means that it must not in the interval overdraw its reserves of credit, or exhaust its potentiality to stimulate

work by public undertakings. That does not mean mere inaction and procrastination. If public works plans are to be available as a source of employment in 1938, there is no room for delay in starting to work out plans, for one of the clearest practical lessons learned from past experience, both in this country and the United States, is the length of the period necessary for preliminary preparation before such plans become effective as sources of employment.

There is one special new feature in the position on which something must be said in conclusion. External events have combined to force the Government to abandon its honest attempts at setting an example of disarmament, and to face the need for making up arrears with a large programme of equipment. Such a programme must have important reactions on certain branches of industry. No account has been taken of this in making the foregoing review, because the deliberate purpose was to give a picture of the more permanent underlying conditions. It is difficult to forecast the precise effects on employment over the next few years. But one thing must be strongly emphasised. We must guard against being misled by the effects of a temporary spurt of this kind. From the very nature of its objects it can provide no lasting benefit to the economic position of the country, and in its temporary results there lie definite dangers—dangers of easy profits in certain sections, leading to complacency and a slackening in the effort for efficiency, dangers of distortion of demands for labour which will have subsequently to be corrected by painful adjustment. Moreover, the underlying permanent problems will remain, and may even be intensified by the disturbance. Not the least among the immediate tasks of the Government will be to see that an intensive armament programme is fitted in to the best advantage of the general economy of the country, and, above all, that this regrettable public need is not made the occasion for undue private profit.

We may now attempt a definite answer to the original question, 'Precisely what programme should the Government of this country adopt at the present juncture?'

The facts assembled have given a picture of the country adjusting itself gradually and with difficulty, but on the whole successfully except only in a few 'black spots,' to seismic dislocations and changes, and accompanying such adjustment

with a continuous and marked improvement in the standard of living of the poorer classes. The vividness of the impression is increased if comparison is made with conditions prevailing in other countries—although no country has had to face more difficult problems of readjustment than our own. The conclusion, surely, must be that the case for desperate remedies or wholesale changes in system is not established, and that there could hardly be a more dangerous time to make wild experiments. Therefore the first answer to be given to our question—an answer which overrides and governs all the rest—is that we want a Government which will maintain conditions in which the vast complex machine of business can operate favourably, and that means conditions which are conducive to confidence and enterprise and consistent with a healthy and balanced general economic state. That is the paramount duty of Government so long as a system of individualistic enterprise is maintained.

Proceeding from this general overriding condition, specific points may be conveniently considered in relation to the main heads of the National Government's policy as stated on page 524. The limitations of space must be pleaded in advance as an excuse for inadequacy of the treatment, which aims at being suggestive rather than exhaustive.

(a) *Balanced budgets and sound finance as a foundation for confidence.*

Do we want these to continue? Yes; they are the most important part of the foundation.

There is, of course, a close connexion between this policy and that of cheap money, mentioned later. Balanced budgets tend to create confidence and raise security prices, while the possibility of conversions and new borrowings at low interest rates makes easier the task of balancing budgets. But what of the possible criticism that 'sound finance' may be overdone—that in times of acute depression the patient cannot stand such drastic treatment, and that attempts to balance all current expenditure by current taxation involve such a strain and such deflationary effects that they defeat their own ends and aggravate the condition which they seek to cure? The best answer to this type of criticism lies in the surrounding world. And, indeed, many seem to have read it there. The outstanding success of our own policy, the disappointing results of President Roosevelt's attempts to 'borrow his way to prosperity' or 'prime the pump' of economic recovery by Government expenditure, the demonstration in France of the necessity for a final day of reckoning and the aggravation of her difficulties by delay in facing it, have served

as object-lessons to the world and tended to swing opinion, not only here, but in other countries, back to a belief in the old-fashioned methods of sound finance. Nor can it be said that our present Chancellor has pressed these methods too far. A simple way of testing the position is to examine from year to year the figures of the *Net Total Debt*. The plain man may well be confused over the various Sinking Funds, but the figure of net indebtedness tells with fair accuracy the final story, and, if we read that as shown in the following table, we learn that we have since 1931 just paid our way and no more.

	MARCH 31	NET TOTAL DEBT ¹⁴	(millions)
1931	.	.	£7,375.0
1932	.	.	7,393.5
1933	.	.	7,440.6
1934	.	.	7,409.7
1935	.	.	7,385.3

This reveals a reasonably sound position, but it certainly cannot be accused of erring on the side of over-soundness.

(b) *Cheap money and freedom to maintain that condition regardless of the external value of sterling.*

Do we want these conditions to continue? Yes; and it may be urged that the Government should have more courage in its own virtues. Even now it is to be doubted whether sufficient appreciation has been given to the magnitude of the National Government's achievement in creating, mainly by mere confidence, conditions which supported the conversion of the War Loan and made everyone suddenly change almost overnight to thinking in terms of $3\frac{1}{2}$ instead of 5 per cent. as a reasonable return on money. One must remember that the British Government gave the lead to the world. It was the first step that counted. It effected a revolution in investment psychology which spread to other countries and has made the task of other Governments much easier.¹⁵ There is some tendency nowadays to speak rather slightly of cheap money as a means for promoting recovery, to hint that the process may have been overdone, and that, in any case, it has reached its limit both in its degree and its effect. It is submitted that this is an erroneous and unfortunate view; that the reduction of the normal expectation of earnings on 'rentier' capital is an economic change of major importance—to say nothing of its social significance—and that there is no reason to conclude that the process has spent its force or that the ultimate limits for reduction have been reached.

The space available permits only the briefest comments on a few aspects of this question. As points of economic

¹⁴ I.e., total deadweight debt (home and foreign) and other capital liabilities, less (a) Funding Loans and Victory Bonds held by the National Debt Commissioners, and (b) estimated value of sundry assets, including Exchequer balances.

¹⁵ One who was at the time carrying similar though much smaller responsibilities in another country (as Finance Member to the Government of India) may be allowed to testify how immensely his task was lightened by the change, both material and psychological, effected by the British Government.

significance one may mention, first, the effect that a reduction in the normal return on mere '*rentier*' capital has in increasing the share of industrial income available for the manual labourer and the pioneer investor; secondly, the effect of lower interest charges in reducing costs and increasing the competitive power of our industry; thirdly, the stimulus to capital expenditure given by the power to raise capital cheaply. In the case of the last point it is important to appreciate that the full effect can only come slowly. There is an immediate reaction on dwelling-house construction, and this we have seen remarkably illustrated; but in the case of industry, before *new* capital expenditure can be notably stimulated, a condition of profit-earning must be established. This condition is, in our case, only recently becoming surely founded, and we have yet to see the full effects of a combination of cheap money and profitable operation. It would be a mistake, therefore, to conclude that the effects of cheap money are exhausted, and, as the re-equipment and extension of industrial plant is so essential to our general progress and the enhancement of our competitive efficiency, it is most important that the stimulus should remain.

But can the present security level be maintained? Some say 'No' because this is abnormal, others because they foresee large new demands for capital for armament loans or industrial expansion. As to the first ground, it may be pointed out that for eighty years prior to 1914 the yield on Consols averaged only a shade over £3 2s. (equivalent running yield basis for $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. War Loan, 112½), and that for thirty years of this period (1880-1910) the average yield was only £2 17s. 3d. (equivalent running yield basis for War Loan, 121½). An answer often made to this kind of comparison is that in pre-war days income tax was much lower; but surely this imports totally different considerations. In any case, however, it is not sought to place too much weight on these comparisons with pre-war yields, for the essence of the present argument is that the general yield on capital is a matter of psychological expectation and that it is quite possible to vary the standard of expectation. As to the possible effects of forthcoming armament loans or new capital needs for industry, the assertion may be ventured with some confidence that (given freedom from serious international trouble), if the National Government is returned to power after a General Election, and if they make it clear that they propose to continue and reinforce their policy of cheap money, they can create a psychological state among investors which will carry Government securities even to higher levels and maintain them there.

One point, however, must be strongly emphasised. Cheap money must fail in its power to promote really

beneficial results unless it operates on a foundation of confidence in the continuity of sound Government policy. The first stage of the method must doubtless be to pump money into the system and create a glut in the short-term market. But if it stops at that, it merely embarrasses bankers and does nobody much good. For the method to do real good the first stage must be followed by a second stage in which—with confidence as a support to long-term investment—money flows freely into long-term securities in all fields of investment. Our transition from the first to the second stage would have been much more definitely made if there had not been the shadow of a General Election obscuring the prospects of continuity in the present Government's policy—to which shadow external disturbances and dangers have now been added.

So much for 'cheap money.' What about the complementary portion of this heading of policy—'Freedom to maintain this condition regardless of the external value of sterling.' This brings up the whole vexed question of exchange stabilisation, a subject which might well fill a separate article. It must suffice here to express complete agreement with the position taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Mansion House speech of October 2. We need freedom to operate our own domestic policy, and particularly to maintain that policy of cheap money which has just been advocated. We cannot yet afford to tie ourselves to run a three-legged race with any external standard or country. That is the position in a nutshell; but the view may be added that those who place exchange stabilisation in the forefront of their plans for recovery tend to mistake symptoms for causes. Nothing would be a greater blessing for the world than to find that within each country, and as between all countries of the world, economic health and equilibrium had been so re-established as to provide an underlying foundation for exchange stability. But the greater part of the blessing would lie in the foundation. We are as yet very far from having that, and till then there can be no sure basis for general stabilisation. But, on the other hand, one must not belittle what has been done. The 'Sterling Area' is a wide one,¹⁶

¹⁶ It may be said to include not only all the British countries (though Canada is a special case), but also Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Siam and the Argentine.

and for a long time we have had at least *de facto* stabilisation within it. For a long time, also, the exchange rate with New York has been so steady as to create a reasonable expectation of finally coming to rest around the old parity. The immediate hope seems to lie in the gradual establishment of *de facto* parities with a somewhat greater margin for variation on either side than existed between the old gold parities. On this basis the world could carry on fairly comfortably until a new phase is reached. Perhaps one tentative suggestion may be ventured. Good relations between ourselves and the United States in the economic field are of paramount importance. There is much misunderstanding by the public on these matters, and some suspicion exists on each side of the Atlantic that the other may use its freedom in currency policy to obtain some unfair advantage. These suspicions, however unfounded, are definitely harmful. Would it not be possible for the two Governments to establish an '*entente*,' that they would keep in touch with one another confidentially, and then, without any fetter on complete liberty of action on either side, each would at least take note of the reactions of its policy on the other?

(c) *A tariff for the protection of industry.*

This, again, is a subject which requires a whole volume.

Only a few points can be touched upon. One may accept the present policy as having been absolutely necessary in the circumstances, but it is a policy fraught with dangers, and must be carefully watched. The greatest danger is that Protection may be invoked as a shelter for inefficiency. Protection must be balanced by increased efficiency—otherwise it means economic loss and general retrogression. Increased efficiency is a matter primarily for the heads of industry. Can Government do anything to stimulate it? The answer is not easy, but it may be asked, has the Government done all that is possible to insist on the fulfilment of those conditions of reorganisation which in the case of certain industries governed the grant of Protection? In the case of the steel industry, for example, where such a condition was imposed, the following quotation from a recent financial journal may be taken as a typical view :

So far, although individual firms have done much to increase efficiency,

the essential degree of national co-operation seems lacking. After three years all we have is a loosely constructed Iron and Steel Federation, the decisions and progress of which have been kept strictly private.

Is this a fair criticism? Could it be applied to other industries? Has the Government used all its powers? These are questions which the public must press.

A constructive suggestion may also be ventured. As internal progress and the maintenance of our position in export markets depend on constant pressure to develop new improvements, public money can be legitimately devoted to finance research work on industrial processes.¹⁷ This is a matter of national importance in which co-ordination and stimulation of work in the public interest is desirable. A substantial grant might well be made from the revenues derived from protective import duties.

Another important stipulation to be made as regards a protective policy is that, in framing measures to secure the home market for our own industry, the reaction of such measures on our export trade must never be forgotten. Although changes in external conditions are tending to limit the proportionate importance of our external markets, nevertheless manufacture for export still remains such an important part of our activity that it cannot be sacrificed without disaster. Even to-day, when we are constantly being told of the 'drying up of the channels of international trade,' it is well to remind ourselves that the total volume of world trade remains about two-thirds of what it was in the boom year of 1929, and that for ourselves it is still the basis of about one-sixth of our economic activity. In deploring what has been lost we must not lose sight of the magnitude that remains. The essential point to remember is that it adds to our *internal* difficulties, if we adopt measures for stimulating home supplies which increase the handicaps on exports, and therefore affect severely just those industries which are most depressed, as well as shipping and other sources which depend on international trade. These considerations point the connexion with the next heading in our catalogue of the National Government's policy.

¹⁷ The development of new uses for coal is a case of vital importance. The Government's encouragement to the new hydrogenation plant of Imperial Chemical Industries is an example which might well be extended, possibly on different lines.

(d) *The stimulation of exports by inter-Imperial agreements, and bilateral arrangements with other countries.*

In this matter of external trade we must face realities over which we have no control and adjust ourselves to them. To plead for a general abandonment of all the policies that are characterised as 'Economic Nationalism' is crying for the moon. Many of these measures—first adopted by other countries as the only possible means of meeting critical difficulties—have been permanently built into their economic systems. Others are features of national policies which are held to override economic considerations and will not be changed. Steps taken in one country have reacted on others and forced them also to readjust their economy. Tariff barriers and exchange restrictions are in most cases merely symptoms of underlying conditions which cannot be altered by their removal. It is not sought to defend these measures or to deprecate efforts at greater international co-operation, but rather to insist that we must, in the meanwhile, look for opportunities where our position can be improved by our own action, while, as regards international co-operation, we should seek it for policies which have some chance of acceptance by the political leaders of other countries. Within the scope of our own action there are only two *sure* foundations for an improvement in our export trade:

- (1) To increase our efficiency in supplying external customers with the right goods at the right prices; and
- (2) To increase the purchasing power of our customers by increasing our own intake of their goods.

As to (1), we have to adjust ourselves everywhere to new conditions, and if we are to keep our place, as we originally gained it, we must be pioneers in advance of the rest of the world. Even now opportunities are not lacking, and lost opportunities could be quoted. All that has been said under the last heading as regards the vital importance of increasing industrial efficiency applies here also. This, as already noted, is a matter for individuals rather than Government. This whole subject, together with another important connected issue—the relations between our foreign investment and our export trade—requires separate and fuller treatment.

As to (2), our power in the field for action lies mainly in

our trade with 'complementary' countries—*i.e.*, the producers of primary agricultural products, chiefly food. That the surest basis for a restoration in world prosperity lies in increasing the purchasing power of such producers has been a matter of agreement in all recent economic conferences. It was the subject of one of the only practical resolutions passed at the World Conference of 1933, but the action contemplated in that resolution and all the measures actually taken for this purpose have been on the lines of restricting production so as to raise prices. This may have been necessary in certain cases to avoid an immediate crisis, but in the long run the attempt to correct a state of 'Poverty in the midst of Plenty' by removing Plenty (to adopt a phrase used by Lord de la Warr at Geneva) is no solution. Moreover, it is a line of action which suits us in this country particularly badly. The recent revival in our own home trade has been definitely helped by the increased margin for expenditure available to the wage-earner resulting from the fact that while money wages have, since the crisis, only fallen 5 per cent., the cost of food has fallen by 20 per cent.¹⁸ We do not want to disturb this position, but hitherto our only positive measures—quotas, etc.—have tended to do so. (The rise during the last few weeks in foodstuffs is from our point of view a danger signal.) It would be far better, not only for us, but for the whole world, if means could be found for improving the position of agricultural producers by increasing consumption, and in this respect the most hopeful and constructive line of policy which has recently emerged is that discussed in September at Geneva on the motion of Mr. Bruce, representing Australia, and supported by Lord de la Warr for the United Kingdom, urging that a general move should be made in all countries to improve standards of nutrition; and that in this way a joint attack should be made on the two problems of public health and so-called agricul-

¹⁸ The position of a wage-earner who in 1929 was spending half his income on food is compared with his position to-day in the following table:

	1929	1935
Wages	100	95
Food	50	40
Rent	20	20
Balance for other items .	30	35

tural over-production. Viewed in its latter aspect, this idea is fraught with great possibilities. There have been no more harmful interferences with trade than those involved in European agricultural protectionism.¹⁹ It is probably futile to expect a complete reversal of these measures, for that might mean sacrificing interests which have been built up behind them, but there is a hope that, if policies for increasing consumption could be adopted, some relaxation of import restrictions would come within the sphere of practical politics. In this country we have, of course, been among the least of offenders in restricting food imports and, in comparison with most countries, have a much smaller margin of deficiency in nutrition to make good. Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement, while a lead and example from us might have a great effect on the policies of other countries.

The administrative and financial difficulties in the way of practical measures to correct these deficiencies will be considerable; but the matter is one of supreme importance, and a great effort is justified. An extension of the idea of providing milk for school-children and some plan for differential prices are possible lines of action. No attempt can be made here fully to examine these possibilities; but it is encouraging to note that the Government has appointed an expert committee on nutrition, and that Mr. Chamberlain in his speech at the Mansion House on October 2 definitely stated that it was the policy of the Government to increase consumption.

Trade Agreements.—While we must look to efficiency in production and an increase in our own imports as the only sure foundation for an increase in our exports, we must also take steps to see that we get the full advantages of these policies in the form of fair treatment from external countries; and this brings us into the field of Trade Agreements. For the present the briefest summary must suffice so as to complete the picture—at least, in outline.

Inter-Imperial Agreements.—It is not easy to write on the Ottawa Agreements. On the one hand, it is too early yet to pronounce a final judgment on their effects; on the other, they must be regarded in themselves, not as a final plan, but rather as the first tentative efforts—imperfect in many of their

¹⁹ *Vide* as to this the annex by Sir F. Leith-Ross to the Report of the Economic Committee of the League of Nations on Agricultural Protectionism.

details—at giving practical embodiment to a new conception. Everything depends on how that conception is interpreted and in the future developed. The next Imperial Conference (probably to take place in 1937) will be a critical point in the history of the Empire. We cannot stand just where Ottawa left us. We must either go forward or back. That we should go back is unthinkable for all those who see in the British Commonwealth of Nations the embodiment of an idea which has a significance and value far beyond mere economic advantage. But this does not mean that we must necessarily follow exactly the lines on which the first tentative steps at Ottawa were taken. The point to be chiefly emphasised now is that we and all the Empire countries must be well prepared for the next Conference, and that the delegates and the public of each country should have clearly before them a picture of the *position as a whole*. Isolated sectional interests will always be to some extent in conflict with each other; but if the whole position of each country is kept in view, then a general dovetailing is possible. That may mean for each the sacrifice of certain sectional interests, but these must be claimed and accepted, not as sacrifices to others based on mere sentimental grounds, but because, viewing the whole position of the country that makes them, they can be demonstrated to be in its own wider interests the right policy. As to the broad conception and ideal there can be no doubt. In a world such as exists to-day, where most countries are pursuing arbitrary and uncertain policies in restriction of trade, there is unanswerable justification for an attempt at co-operation and a common policy between a group of nations, whose economic activities are mainly complementary, who can talk frankly together, using in the widest sense 'the same language,' between whom war is unthinkable, and who are united not only in sentiment, but in all their political ideals.

Bilateral Trade Agreements.—Although in principle the policy embodied in such agreements must be regarded as a retrogression from one of free multilateral exchange, nevertheless in the world as it is to-day it has strong practical justification. If two countries can be got into a new relation based on the simple principle—so simple, indeed, that it can be understood by the politicians and public in each country—

of 'The more you buy from us the more we will buy from you,' that does at least contain the seed of virtuous growth, and may offer the only exit from the vicious circle of increasing economic nationalism.

(e) *A plan for the rehabilitation of British agriculture.*

To many readers it will seem that this review has been lamentably incomplete in that no mention has been made of agricultural conditions and policy. The criticism must be accepted, for a short survey of this kind must obviously have its limitations. For the present purpose the important point to make is that we cannot afford to have agricultural policy worked out in isolation. Burdens on the taxpayer and economic sacrifices for the sake of maintaining British agriculture may quite well be justifiable for the sake of objects wider than mere economic advantage; but the public have a right to demand that the full economic and financial cost should be carefully weighed before policies are adopted. If we reduce our imports of food for the sake of encouraging home products, that not only tends to increase the cost of food to our own consumers, thereby either diminishing their margin for purchase of manufactured commodities or necessitating rises in wages which will react unfavourably on our external competitive efficiency, but also reduces the purchasing power of our external customers for our manufactured exports. These and other elementary points giving the measure of the economic cost must never be forgotten. As to the financial burden, we may find food for thought in the calculation made by Mr. J. A. Venn in his presidential address this year to the Agricultural Section of the British Association that the total value of the concessions made to agricultural producers amounts to £33,000,000 annually. Against this figure we may balance the fact that the total number gainfully employed in agriculture in the United Kingdom amounts to less than 1,000,000 out of about 20,000,000 'normally working for gain.' It is not suggested that this 'balance-sheet' gives an exactly true picture, but it affords one way of raising questions to which the plain man may demand an answer. He might also inquire whether the expenditure of a smaller sum on the subsidising of consumption of protective foods (mainly perishable foods, and therefore necessarily home produce) might not produce results more valuable to the nation and more helpful to the farmer. This brings us back again to Mr. Bruce's proposal, already mentioned.

The 'Special Areas.'—While the preceding paragraphs have discussed the main heads of post-1931 policy as a means of promoting the health of the general economic organism, there may still exist parts of that organism which will not be affected by this improvement, because they have become atrophied as a result of changes in surrounding conditions so great as to make natural readjustment impossible. This points to the essential problem of the 'special areas.' What we really want to know is the extent to which this diagnosis is true—that is to say, what is the extent of cases which must really be regarded as *casualties* and treated as such. In such cases we must be prepared to give treat-

ment on a humane and generous basis to the individuals affected, at the same time concentrating attention on measures to remove the rising generation from these conditions. The nation can much better afford to make direct financial sacrifices for this purpose than to have its general economic policy distorted for the sake of abnormal conditions in a limited area. Admittedly general phrases of this kind do not carry us very far in formulating practical measures, but they indicate a line of treatment, and the main plea here made is that the problem should be analysed in greater detail and broken up into its component parts, so that we may know precisely where generous treatment of 'casualties' on a relief basis is necessary and where healthy recovery is possible and therefore worth while to stimulate. In that way each problem may be reduced to manageable dimensions and the country can be asked with more confidence to make the necessary financial provision.

The Government as Entrepreneur.—Even if one rejects, at the present juncture, grandiose ideas of using Public Works as a means of 'priming the pump' of general recovery, one must recognise that the sphere of normal enterprise by the Government and public authorities is so important that their operations within it may profoundly affect general conditions. The familiar recommendation that they should use their own activities as a sort of 'equalisation fund' of enterprise is a conclusion which has emerged in the foregoing survey, and it has been given point with reference to the need for having some programme to counter-balance the prospective decline in house-building activity in 1937 or 1938. This is a point of real practical importance. Another point to make is that the Government and public authorities as *entrepreneurs* must take all steps to carry out policies which they enjoin on private enterprise. The policy of directing activity to the 'special areas' is a case in point. Has the Government itself taken every opportunity to encourage this policy in regard to its own enterprises or the orders which it has to place? The plain man may well ask to be satisfied on this.

Unemployment Relief and Social Policy.—Finally, brief mention must be made of what is perhaps the most important point of all—the economic reactions of social policies. It has already been noted that a distinctive feature of British policy²⁰ since the war has been the recognition of an obligation to maintain the unemployed at a reasonable standard of living. This has been a key point of vital importance. Not only has it been socially right, but it has paid economically in saving us from sinking lower into the vicious conditions in which declining demand and declining production multiply each other. Attempts to put this policy on to a more regularised basis may be justifiable, but not at the cost of altering its substantial effect. All this is closely connected with the wider issue of the distribution of purchasing power generally.²¹

²⁰ It is worth noting that it is in this respect that British policy has most notably differed from that of the United States.

²¹ In order to avoid misunderstanding it must be made clear that nothing said here is intended to imply support for policies of financial juggling which are sometimes advocated, such as 'reinforcing consumers' income out of Budget deficits.'

If mechanical advance is to be truly beneficial, it must be accompanied by a parallel social advance which ensures that the mass of workers obtain an adequate share of the benefits in shorter hours, rising wages, and provision for unemployment, sickness and old age. Here, again, social and economic benefits coincide. Merely as a matter of hard business, it is good policy to ensure sufficient distribution of purchasing power to provide markets for the increased product. The social justification is still clearer. Government has an important function in this matter in settling and enforcing standards, and in deciding how far the method of taxation is to be used as an instrument for redistribution. All this raises complex and difficult issues—as, for example, the limits to which taxation can go without unduly discouraging capital investment; the proper balance between expenditure on ‘capital’ and ‘consumption’ goods; the effect of high wages and high taxes on our competitive efficiency; the point at which generosity in unemployment relief runs too dangerously near the legitimate or possible reward of employment, etc. Space forbids the discussion of these issues; but the assertions may be ventured in conclusion, first, that the facts assembled in the opening paragraphs may be interpreted as evidence that in this country there has been achieved a fairly satisfactory balance in all these matters; secondly, that on this general result, and more particularly on the various social policies which have had the effect of maintaining the purchasing power of the masses (unemployment relief, pensions, health insurance, etc.), the political stability and economic well-being of this country—notable at least in comparison with others—have largely depended.

What has been said above covers heads of policy. A word must be added as regards methods of execution. Emphasis has been laid throughout on the need for individual efficiency and enterprise rather than on any ambitious form of Government control of planning; but the mere enumeration of the heads of Government policy has made clear at how many points Government is now forced to intervene. Action at all these points must be co-ordinated and Government must have proper machinery for this purpose and a definite plan on which to work. Plans can only be formulated on the basis of knowledge, and such knowledge is necessary not only for Ministers, but for the public on whose votes they depend. One of the greatest needs at present is for better statistical records and better interpretation of statistics—a better ‘map of the economic country’ over which we have to find our way.²²

The limits of space now force a conclusion. Obviously what has been said above is not exhaustive. Many important subjects which might be influenced by Government policy have been omitted. But the matters touched upon cover a great part of the scope for Government action on economic matters in this country at the present juncture. The limitations involved in all these expressions must be remembered.

GEORGE SCHUSTER.

²² See ‘The Statistical Twilight,’ *Economist*, May 25, 1935.

THE LEAGUE, ITALY AND THE FUTURE

By THE RIGHT HON. SIR HERBERT SAMUEL

AGAIN and again in the course of human history efforts have been made to establish some system of guidance and control which would save mankind from the violent and bloody conflicts that have been its bane. The Roman Empire created such a system, which for some centuries worked with a large measure of success. The Catholic Church aimed at the same purpose; the Holy Roman Empire also; and again, after the Napoleonic Wars, the so-called Holy Alliance. Later, during the nineteenth century, the Great Powers tried intermittently to reconcile conflicting interests through ‘the Concert of Europe.’ There came, nevertheless, the World War; and then, in the establishment of the League of Nations, was made the greatest of all the attempts that history records—the broadest and most constructive—to end the anarchy that was so plainly disastrous.

Three great countries were not members of the League at the outset—the United States, Russia, and Germany. Germany came in and left again. Japan went out and Russia came in. The United States remained aloof, but not opposed. Almost all the other nations of the world have been from the beginning, and are now, members of the League and loyal to it.

We are watching in these days the second grave test to which the League has been subjected. It failed in the first—in the Far East—because the non-membership of two of the Great Powers with influence there, and the defection of a third, prevented even the existence of any real system of collective control in the Pacific. But now in the Mediterranean and East Africa, where the second test has come, there is such a system. When it is suggested that Manchuria should be a precedent for Abyssinia, and that action now is an unfair

discrimination against Italy as compared with Japan, the obvious answer is that inability to fulfil a duty in one case does not involve an abandonment of duty in every other. On the contrary, failure in the first instance makes success in the second all the more imperative. Everyone sees that a collapse of the League in the present issue would imperil the whole effort. The smaller States would not be likely to maintain a very active interest in an institution which proved impotent whenever defied. The larger States, if they still remained members, would be obliged to make their own arrangements among themselves outside it. History might have to record that yet another attempt to redeem mankind had come to nought.

This second crisis has come because the Italy of to-day is indifferent to the essential purposes of the League, and is indeed pursuing a directly opposite aim. The ideas at the root of Signor Mussolini's actions are in flat contradiction to the ideas on which the League is based.

Fascism [he has said] does not believe in the possibility, or the utility, of perpetual peace. . . . War alone brings to their maximum tension all human energies and stamps the seal of nobility on those peoples which have the virtue to face it. . . . We are becoming, and shall become so increasingly because this is our desire, a military nation; a militaristic nation, I will add. . . . There is too much talk altogether about Peace. When there are crises, it is arms and war which solve them. . . . Though words are very beautiful things, rifles, machine-guns, ships, aeroplanes and cannons are more beautiful things. . . . The judges of our necessities and the guarantors of our future are we; only we, exclusively we, and nobody else. . . . The Italo-Abyssinian problem admits—with Geneva, without Geneva, against Geneva—but one solution.

These declarations by Signor Mussolini reverberate round the world. They are the frank creed of international anarchy.

In pursuance of those ideas he sends a quarter of a million men to conquer and annex Abyssinia. If Italy had grievances against Abyssinia, her duty was to present them formally to the League at the beginning, and to demand redress. The indictment of Abyssinia's faults, whatever they may be, cannot be allowed to obscure the essential issue—the deliberate resort to war in an international dispute, in direct contravention of the Covenant of the League and of the Kellogg Pact. The mass of the British people, with that political instinct which has rarely been at fault, sees this very

plainly. A few voices are raised here and there in favour of a policy of acquiescence, of an ignominious desertion of a small and primitive country whose integrity had been guaranteed by the Covenant of the League. A few Englishmen may be found to plead that international engagements should be regarded as invalid if they involve difficulty, and that to tolerate violence now is the best means of avoiding wars later. But these voices do not speak for the British nation. The country as a whole holds other views as to the value of its own pledges, and as to the need of making head against the philosophy of force in world affairs. It sees the vital importance of upholding the League as the only possible safeguard of future peace.

I do not propose in this article to discuss the immediate situation, changing as it is from day to day. What form the sanctions should properly have taken at the outset; how they can be enforced and reinforced; how to avoid the possibility that, while the League is doing a little, Mussolini does much—the possibility that, in a few months from now, Abyssinia may be found to have been conquered, the Italian methods triumphant and aims achieved—these are great and urgent questions. But I wish here to deal with other matters. I would invite attention to an issue which affects the very existence of the League, more perhaps than even this present conflict; an issue which has long been perceived—formidable in the background—by political observers, but which the questions of Manchuria, of Abyssinia, and the rearmament of Germany have brought right into the foreground for all men to see. It is the problem of what have been called 'the dissatisfied Powers.'

Individuals and nations are led by motives that may be spiritual or may be material. The spiritual motive may inspire sentiments of religion, morality, peace; or it may inspire sentiments of patriotic emotion, passing easily into aggressive nationalism, into militarism and war. The material motive also may either lead to a desire for tranquillity and peaceful trade, bringing active industry and greater general wealth; or to the pressing of national economic interests, leading to the acquisition of colonies, their exploitation for the benefit of the central power, and again, perhaps, to aggression and war.

The reasons for the dissatisfaction of Japan, Germany, Italy, and other countries as well, with the existing world order are plainly both spiritual and material. There is a sense of wounded national pride, of exclusion from the foremost rank, of lower prestige. And there is at the same time an anxiety for the material welfare of great and growing populations, a sense of cramped space, a knowledge that the standard of comfort of the people is lower than elsewhere and lower than it might be. The two motives combine in a resentment against conditions which, in the event of another great conflict, would make the supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials, needed in war, insecure. It is essential that the rest of the world should take account of the existence of these feelings. It is essential that they should examine with impartial minds in what degree they are justified. It is, I submit, vital to the success, and even to the continued existence, of the League of Nations, that whatever is practicable should be done to find a remedy for so much of the grievances of the dissatisfied Powers as are well-founded. Otherwise the League can never become complete, and unless it is complete it can never be fully effective.

We are accustomed to say that the common interests of mankind require the substitution of Law for War; that methods have now been provided by which disputes between nations can be settled peacefully; that no State, therefore, has a right to decide its own cause, or to use violence to enforce its own claims. Just as quarrels between persons are settled by the awards of courts of law, and the awards enforced by the public police, so, we say, disputes between States should be settled by the judicial decisions of international courts, or by arbitration or conciliation; and private force should be superseded by the combined power of the whole human society. All this is true and sound, and these doctrines cannot be too firmly held or too often declared. But they are not enough.

When we use the analogy of disputes among citizens, and point to the courts and the police as the usual means of redress and protection, we sometimes forget that the judiciary and the executive are not the only organs of the State; there is also the legislature. If groups or classes, who are keenly dissatisfied with some feature in the existing state of things,

were merely to be told that the law courts were at their disposal and that the police force would enforce the judgments, they could not be content with that. They would naturally say that their grievances were not against the interpretation of the existing laws or their enforcement, but against the laws themselves. They would demand action by the legislature to change the laws which they denounced—relating to property, conditions of employment, taxation, whatever it might be. If then they were told that no authority existed with the power and the will to change the laws, the social system would no longer be stable. The discontented would know that, if they were in earnest about their grievances, revolution was the only recourse left to them.

So now in international affairs. The Judicial Tribunal at the Hague is a means of determining what is the present law. The awards of arbitrators are intended merely to effect adjustments in the *status quo*. There is no machinery, generally accepted and working continuously, for making larger changes. There is nothing corresponding to a legislature. The discontented cannot feel that they have any normal and effective means of redress.

People in the democratic, peace-loving countries have taken the lead in building up, by long and intense effort, this vast organisation to enable impartial awards to be given in international disputes and to supply some means, even though only partially effective, of enforcing them. And now they see, to their surprise and dismay, that the whole system is in danger of becoming little more than a machine for stereotyping existing conditions, whatever they may be. At all events, the dissatisfied Powers look upon it in that light. Hence the incompleteness of the League and its consequent weakness: and the weakness of the League is the peril of the world.

Recognising that position, when we go forward to find a remedy we find ourselves faced at once by a whole series of problems, obviously of great difficulty and complexity. These problems have hardly as yet been even superficially examined. For two generations we have been climbing an arduous slope, endeavouring to reach a new international order, in which there shall be common action for the application of law and the stoppage of violence; and now that we have reached the top,

we see opening out before us a vast tableland, unknown and unexplored. To explore it and to occupy it is the task that lies before the statesmen of the world in the coming years.

Let me recall the basic facts of the present situation. The globe has a land area of 55 million square miles. Of this, $13\frac{1}{4}$ millions are included in the British Empire, $8\frac{1}{4}$ in Soviet Russia, $4\frac{1}{2}$ in the French Empire, $3\frac{3}{4}$ in the United States, and $4\frac{1}{2}$ in China (including Manchuria). Those five units comprise nearly 34 million square miles out of the 55, or just over three-fifths. The colonies of Belgium and Holland and Portugal include another $2\frac{1}{2}$ million square miles, bringing the total to two-thirds of the land surface of the globe.

'It is all very well,' say the dissatisfied Powers, 'for the European States which were strong and energetic in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and took full advantage of their opportunities, now to declare that the twentieth century is different, that a new order has been established by the foundation of the League of Nations, and that the age of expansion is over. Does this mean that the map of the world as it happened to be in 1920 is to remain stereotyped for ever—that it is to be the same in every particular, 100 years hence, 500 years hence? We note,' they say, 'how you, who hold two-thirds of the earth, have been seeking more and more to confine the interchange of your products within your own boundaries. And you discourage our immigration. How, then, are our 90 millions of Japanese, our 70 millions of Germans, our 40 millions of Italians, our 30 millions of Poles, to live and prosper? How can they secure their just share in the good things of the earth? Your denunciation of the barbarism of war may be quite sincere, but it is also a convenient moral fortification round the vast possessions which you have gained in the past by waging wars yourselves.'

It is impossible to close our eyes to those facts. It is impossible to ignore such contentions. If we claim that in the present age 'Power politics' are to cease, then we are under an obligation to find other methods of redress for grievances that are real. But how far are those grievances real?—that is the next question. We are not obliged to accept those claims without examination. And there are some factors on the other side.

In the first place, it is not true that the Powers which control the two-thirds of the earth monopolise its products to the disadvantage of the other countries. There is nothing in the nature of a Chinese Wall round their possessions. On the contrary, there is a vast commerce between the two-thirds and the one-third. Also, all the colonial territories transferred after the war have been placed under mandates, which provide for their being open to the commerce of all countries on equal terms. The Belgian Congo, and some other colonies, are under a similar *régime*. If there are discriminatory restrictions upon imports in a great number of other countries, let it be remembered that this is no new thing, and that some of the States which now complain were among the first and the most active in reserving their own markets to their own producers. When it is urged that the present distribution of land prevents Germany or Italy or Japan from being assured of adequate supplies of the materials needed for the manufacture of armaments, it must be answered that the rest of the world is not called upon to smooth the way for militarist States. If new dispositions are to be made, they must be part of a great policy for assuring peace, and not merely a rearrangement of the world for the waging of war on a basis of greater economic equality.

Secondly, with regard to migration, if the normal movement from the crowded countries of Europe has stopped, that may be only temporary. It is known to be due largely to the great depression, which compelled the newer countries to close their ports, so as not to increase their own heavy unemployment. The stoppage of migration affects Great Britain, with all her overseas connexions, fully as much as Italy or Germany. As for the Japanese surplus of population, they seem disinclined to emigrate even to the countries which are open to them.

Thirdly, it is not correct that there is no provision for changing the *status quo*. The Treaty of Versailles embodies a provision for its own amendment. With regard to Manchuria, the League of Nations was ready to secure the large changes recommended in the Lytton Report; and with regard to Abyssinia, the large changes proposed by the Committee of Five.

These contentions are true; but they, in turn, are open to reply. It cannot be denied that there has been, in fact, a growing tendency in recent years to canalise the trade of the two-thirds of the world, or at least of large parts of it, within frontiers. The Ottawa Agreements were the most conspicuous example. Although their actual effects have not been very great, those Agreements are regarded by the rest of the world as the first step in a new policy. The French Empire and the United States have long been, in a large degree, 'closed systems.' Ottawa was looked upon everywhere as a sign that the British Empire was tending the same way. As to the right of equal access to the supplies and the

markets of the Mandated Territories, it is answered that this exists rather in theory than in reality. Ways have been found to give considerable advantages to citizens of the States holding the mandates, both in the allocation of contracts and in the fostering of trade. With respect to the provision for modifying the *status quo*, the article in the Treaty of Versailles has never been used, and there has been no indication that it will be. The Reports of the Lytton Commission and the Committee of Five were the outcome of threats of armed action, and not of the normal working of the League procedure; in any case, they were regarded by Japan and by Italy as inadequate.

We cannot pursue these arguments and counter-arguments into their ramifications. On the whole, I believe that the impression which must be left on the mind of any man, who approaches this great issue in a spirit of impartiality, is that, when all deductions have been made, there are, in fact, undeniable grievances. There is here a problem—or rather, a series of problems—real and urgent. The lasting peace of the world depends upon their solution.

Let us come to closer quarters. Let us see the conditions that surround this issue.

In the first place, there exists no 'legislature' with power to order changes. Each nation retains its own sovereignty in full degree. If there are to be alterations they must be made by consent and won by persuasion. The League has no authority to transfer control, to move frontiers or to open ports. And there seems no probability that this will be altered, within any period that we can at present foresee.

Secondly, the past is not to be ignored. History must count. Most of the half-empty countries of the world have come into the possession of peoples who would in no circumstances surrender their sovereignty. No one would seriously propose to displace the present owners of the lands of South America or of the British Dominions. Even in the case of Abyssinia, events show that replacement could be effected, if at all, only by the method of aggressive and destructive war. With regard to other lands which are colonial possessions of European States, the interests of their populations cannot be treated as negligible. What those interests truly are it may not be easy to say. Each imperial Power is convinced that

its own native peoples could desire, and do desire, nothing better than to remain as they are. That may be true; or it may not. In our own case, we are sincerely convinced that the populations of the British Colonies would prefer the British connexion to any other, and that the same holds good in the cases of India and of the Mandated Territories, and of Egypt and Iraq as well. It may be, of course, that this conviction springs from natural self-complacency, or because any facts that may point to a different conclusion do not come to our notice. Or we may not trouble whether the belief is true or not, but profess it because it squares with our interest. All that may be so. But, on the other hand, it may in fact be true that the populations of the British Empire, and of countries associated with it, do really prefer the British connexion to any other. It may be true, in spite of the fact that it is we ourselves who say it. Certainly we need not assume that it is false merely because it squares with our interest. And if it should in fact be true, then the transfer of great populations, which may be backward but which are entitled to be considered, from our own rule to that of other people, without their consent and to their detriment, would be an abandonment of duty. The French, no doubt, would say the same about their own possessions; the Dutch and the Belgians also.

Further, the case of Italy is not the only one. She is aggrieved because she did not obtain more colonies after the war. But if that grievance were to be removed now, by an expansion of her colonial empire with the sanction of the rest of the world and through the exercise of force, would not the grievance of Germany be greatly intensified, who, after the war, was deprived of those colonies which she already had? What an object-lesson it would be as to the method for recovering them! And if first Japan, then Italy, and afterwards Germany did secure an expansion of territory and of economic strength through war or the threat of war, there are other countries, that have neither practised nor threatened such methods, which would have a right to complain, and with greater justice, of unfairness. Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Scandinavian countries and many more—it would then be their turn to say that, after all, militarism pays; that it is true, after all, that only by elbowing out your neighbour can you

get a place in the sun. The way to world tranquillity is not along those lines.

In any event, that part of the case of the dissatisfied Powers in Europe which relates to room for expansion for the crowded millions of their populations cannot be met by any redistribution of colonies or of mandates, of a kind that would be practicable in the world of to-day. The total number who could emigrate to Abyssinia, or to Tanganyika, or the Cameroons, or to many such, would hardly equal a five years' normal increment in their populations.

It has been suggested that the States with colonial empires should transfer them, if not to other European States, then to the League of Nations, and that the League should administer them directly itself. Lord Lugard, with his unrivalled experience both of colonial administration and of the working of the Mandates Commission of the League from its beginning, has pointed out the objections to this course. Efficient administration of the territories concerned is of primary importance; the League would have no body of experienced officials to draw upon; its staffs would have to be of various nationalities, and the harmonious team work, which is of the essence of a good administration, would be harder to secure. Everyone would agree that the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva is quite unsuited to exercise the functions of actual government, and it would not be easy to constitute any other composite body that would be better suited. And from what source would the League draw the funds to meet the costs, sometimes considerable, of colonial administration?

Such are some of the conditions which surround the vast new problems that confront us. Their implications have not yet been thought out. No Government, no party, perhaps no individual statesman, has yet arrived at fixed and definite conclusions. The whole question is still in a state of flux. I would offer, very tentatively, these suggestions for consideration.

The League cannot escape the duty of giving an opportunity for a review of certain of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles relating to boundaries in Europe. Doubtless an attempt should be made, through the diplomatic channels, to secure some measure of agreement in advance.

For the rest, although some readjustments of mandates

might be found practicable here and there, the chief solution of the problems must be sought rather in the economic sphere than in the territorial. It is a question of assuring sufficient supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials to enable the populations of the dissatisfied States, not merely to live, but to prosper. A notable passage in Sir Samuel Hoare's speech at Geneva on September 11 was the first recognition of the importance of this matter. But what he said touched only its fringe. There is not, and never has been, any difficulty in finding for Germany, Italy, or Japan all the foodstuffs needed to keep their people at a high standard of physical comfort, and all the raw materials needed to manufacture every article they would be able to consume. The world is already glutted with foodstuffs and raw materials, and the potential increase of supplies in the future is enormous. The difficulty is that the foodstuffs and materials will not be sent unless they are paid for; that they cannot be paid for in currency without expanding the currencies until their value is destroyed; that they can obviously be paid for only by goods and services, and that the outlet for goods and services is deliberately restricted by the world-wide prevalence of the doctrine of economic nationalism. There is the essence of the whole matter. The conclusion is clear. The principal object of our effort should be to remove, or at least to lessen, those restrictions.

If that were done, the dissatisfied countries would be better able to sell their products, and then to buy the things of which, they complain, they are unjustly deprived. The half-empty countries, with this increase in the demand for their products, would find their unemployment problem solved, and would then be glad to open their ports again to the immigration which had been in the past the principal agent in their own development. Both these consequences would relieve the economic pressure on the crowded populations of Europe and Asia. With less economic discontent there would be less political bitterness. The world would be on its way to tranquillity again. (An incidental point would be the proper enforcement, through the Mandates Commission of the League, of the provision for the open door in matters of trade in the Mandated Territories. Some consideration on the other side, however, should perhaps be

given to any special expenses that have devolved upon the mandatory Powers.)

It would be just that these new arrangements should be conditional upon reciprocity. They would involve some consequences that might be detrimental at the outset to the 'satisfied' Powers. The advantages of the greater facilities should be enjoyed by everyone. And at the same time, if the changes are to operate without friction, it is essential that they should be accompanied by an abandonment of all forms of artificial stimulus of exports (very harmful to the orderly course of commerce), the attempts to overreach competitors by means of subsidies, dumping at prices below the cost of production, and the deliberate depreciation of currencies in order to obtain an exchange advantage.

We are proud of the initiative taken at Geneva by the Government of the United Kingdom in the handling of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. There were special reasons which made it incumbent upon this country to take that initiative. It could not devolve upon one of the smaller Powers, and there were deterrents in the way of France. So now, in dealing with these other, even greater and more difficult, problems, does not the duty of taking an initiative, in the same spirit and with the same energy, again lie here? The figures that I gave of the distribution of the land surface of the globe furnish the strongest reason. Of all the nations, we have the greatest possessions. And we gained larger territorial acquisitions after the war than anyone else. We have been, too, the most active in urging that, in this age, war should cease and other methods be taken for remedying grievances; it is a clear corollary from that policy that the other methods shall, in fact and not merely in aspiration, be made available to the aggrieved. Our championship of the one cause is not compatible with an indifference to the other.

Of course there will be many among us who will repeat the old shibboleths: 'What we have we hold.' 'British markets for British workers.' 'The home producer first; the Empire second; the foreigner nowhere.' That this simple faith has given us the depressed areas, has impoverished our northern ports and half-ruined our shipping trade, might perhaps give rise to some doubts, even if our own direct interests were alone taken into account. But when we con-

sider the present perilous state of the world at large; the vastness of the disaster looming ahead for us all unless the League can save us; the present weakness of the League; the certainty that it will fail in the long run, if not immediately, unless the dissatisfied Powers are dealt with fairly, we see how grave is the responsibility that would rest upon those who took up an attitude of mere negation. There is need here for some hard thinking. And perhaps for some sacrifices as well.

These are considerations for the future—the immediate future. But at this moment the first task before the world is to insist upon the simple rule that claims must not be judged merely by the claimant himself, nor be enforced merely by his own violent action; that international pledges must not be treated as of little account; and that changes, when necessary, are to be made in orderly fashion, and with collective assent.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

ABYSSINIA TO-DAY

By MAJOR E. W. POLSON NEWMAN

WHEN I reached London from Abyssinia, a few hours before the outbreak of hostilities, I was still more bewildered than I had been when I first regained touch with the British newspapers. I had spent a month in Addis Ababa, a few days in the neighbourhood of Diredawa and Harar, ten days at Jibuti, a day at Zeila, two weeks in Egypt, and ten days in Rome, with a short stop in Paris on the return journey. I had discussed the political situation with H.I.M. the Emperor of Ethiopia on two occasions, as well as with members of the Diplomatic Corps in the Abyssinian capital. I had talked over the matter at some length with the Governor of French Somaliland and with the French naval and military commanders at Jibuti. I had exchanged views with high authorities in Egypt—Egyptian, British, and foreign. In Rome I had been received by Signor Mussolini, whose conversation with me was confined to Abyssinia; and I had also discussed the matter with the British and French Ambassadors. In Paris I had heard what the French at the Quai d'Orsay had to say. Soon after reaching London I realised to the full extent the truth of what I had read and heard—that the British Government and people were being carried forward on a wave of righteous idealism which had little relation to the deeper currents of reality. I state in this article the facts as I saw them, the conclusions reached, and the prospects for the future, in the hope of in some measure dispelling the widespread ignorance which prevails in this country.

Although Addis Ababa possesses a modern hotel, an up-to-date cinema, and luxurious taxis, the inhabitants live in round wattle huts with thatched roofs and no windows or in ramshackle houses roofed with corrugated iron. Except for a few macadamised streets, the thoroughfares consist of rocks

and stones, with mud or dust according to the season of the year. There is no sanitary system except that administered by the hyenas, and water has for the most part to be drawn from wells. Courts of justice are held by the roadside, and the judge is usually a passer-by casually summoned to deal with the case in point. The prisons are for the most part indescribably filthy, with the death rate among prisoners very high. Prisoners are in many cases chained together, brutally flogged and mutilated. Such hospitals, schools, and similar institutions as exist are mostly in the hands of foreigners. The capital is connected by telegraph and telephone with some of the principal centres, and the French railway runs from Addis Ababa to Jibuti; otherwise the only means of communication—and that intermittent—is by mule caravan. In Harar, on the other hand, there is no veneer of European civilisation; the town is entirely composed of flat-roofed Arab houses, and the people live under the most primitive conditions. In Diredawa, the principal centre on the railway, there are a considerable proportion of foreign residents of French and Greek nationality, but within a few miles are districts inhabited by savage tribes. The road from here to Harar is one of the very few possible for motor traffic. In the north, where operations are now taking place, the mountainous country can be compared with the North-West Frontier of India. In this neighbourhood there are centres such as Adowa, Aksum, Makale and Gondar, in all of which the conditions of life are almost untouched by civilisation.

Government in the European sense of the term does not exist; machinery for the prevention of crime only exists in or near the capital. The village has its headman, and the district its sub-governor, an official whose remuneration depends on forced labour and the extent to which he can extract taxes from the inhabitants. Governmental force, on the other hand, is dependent on a system by which peasants, trained in the use of arms, give military service in return for the holding of land. The religion of the State is Christian, but upon the lowest possible plane. The Church upholds slavery, and its influence is paramount. Slaves, who comprise approximately one-fifth of the population, are employed in practically every Abyssinian household, including those of

priests and court officials, and many are employed on the land, as the Abyssinians usually consider menial tasks lowering to their dignity. Slave-raiding and slave-trading are rife, in spite of official edicts. Not only are adults enslaved for sale in Abyssinia or across the Red Sea, but caravans of children are snatched from their homes and transported to the coast for embarkation in dhows. Another evil system is that of the *gabars*, or serfs, who, though nominally free, have to submit to the most deplorable and degrading conditions of life. This is particularly applicable to some of the Galla and other conquered races whose lands are governed and policed by Abyssinian officials and soldiers. These wretched people live on their own land, but practically become the property of their overlords in numbers varying from two to a hundred, according to the importance of the individual official who has thrust himself upon them. They then have to supply their master's needs in labour, food, etc., to the utmost limit of their resources, with the result that after years of extortion the cultivators of the land have no incentive to grow more than is absolutely necessary to meet their daily requirements. The Abyssinians possess a fertile country rich in raw materials, which they cannot develop themselves; and they have steadfastly refused to allow any European Power to develop it for them. They cannot, or they do not want to, see the benefits which would be derived from European help. And, what is more, they refuse to recognise the fact that, by shutting their door against an over-populated Europe craving for expansion and sources of raw materials, they are practically committing national suicide. The country most in need of an outlet is Italy, and it is therefore with the Italians that the inevitable clash has taken place.

Judging from what I have seen of Italian development and colonisation in Libya under the most difficult conditions, there is no doubt in my mind that the Italians could transform Abyssinia in course of time into a wealthy and prosperous country. There are few cereals, vegetables or fruits which cannot be grown somewhere in Abyssinia, where the soil is one of the richest in the world. Almost every grain does well, with two to three crops a year, while cattle and other stock can be raised under favourable conditions. It is estimated—this is not an Italian estimate—that the agricultural areas of

Abyssinia, cultivated under modern conditions, would make Italy self-supporting in ten years and also produce a surplus for export to, for example, India, which on balance is an importer of cereals. Moreover, the Abyssinian climate is suitable for the settlement of a European population under healthy conditions, and it is estimated that at least one million Italians could be settled on the land in ten years. It is contended in some quarters that with native labour this is a fantastic figure. The reply, however, is that if the Italians can work side by side with native labour in Libya, they can do so equally well in Abyssinia. During an audience at the New Palace in Addis Ababa the Emperor told me that he had no objection in principle to European influence in Abyssinia, provided that it was purely economic and unaccompanied by any form of political inspiration or control. This, however, would neither satisfy the Italians on the one side, nor the Abyssinian chiefs and people on the other. In the first case European development would be impossible under the present system of misgovernment, while in the second case it would be opposed by the Abyssinians, whose dislike of Europeans is based on a fear of interference with their traditional independence.

As the Emperor himself is one of the very few enlightened Abyssinians, it is as well to say something about his character and position in relation to his people. The Emperor, Haila Selassié, is a man of sincerity, who has a mentality not usually associated with an Eastern country, whose traditions are those of violence, disruption, and lack of government. Surrounded as the Emperor is by conditions comparable with those of the Ottoman Empire forty years ago, it is surprising that he should be so advanced in his ideas. He is clever and calculating, and has a fair knowledge of European thought, chiefly due to the education which he received from a Catholic missionary, the Bishop of Harar, and from his father. He is a hard worker, often keeping his Ministers fully occupied from five or six in the morning until midnight. These Ministers, however, are so untrustworthy that the Emperor finds it necessary to keep practically everything in his own hands down to the smallest details. The consequence is that Ministers have acquired a habit of going to foreign legations for information about their own country. As in his audience-room hangs a

portrait of Abraham Lincoln, the Emperor evidently regards himself as a believer in the ideas which we in the West think to be right. Haila Selassié has a certain moral ascendancy over most of the great Rases, which is remarkable in view of the striking personality and dominating position of some of these chiefs. But, owing to the scarcity of communications in general and absence of roads, the outlying districts are virtually independent of the central authority. Although the Emperor can see the realities of the situation in the present crisis, his ideas are so much in advance of those of the country over which he rules that he dare not put these ideas into practice through fear of internal revolt and the formidable opposition of the Church, which offers a stubborn resistance to change of any kind.

It has long been the custom in Abyssinia for every man to carry firearms, with the result that raiding into neighbouring territories by frontier tribes has been a common form of aggression, ignored, if not encouraged, by the central Government. In many cases these raids are carried out for the purpose of obtaining slaves, while in others the motive seems to have been plunder. This applies to the frontiers of Kenya and the Sudan, as well as to the Italian colonies of Somaliland and Eritrea. For many years it has been increasingly obvious that an armed and warlike Abyssinia can but be a source of danger to her neighbours on all sides. Taking into consideration the lack of government, slavery, the feudal system, and the cruel oppression and depopulation of the conquered territories in the outlying districts, it will be seen that, whatever happens, things cannot be allowed to continue as they are. Abyssinia cannot remain the plague spot of Africa, even as a member of the League of Nations. The people are backward, stubborn and proud; their worst customs and traditions are supported by their barbaric Church. No form of control or guidance by the League of Nations or any foreign Power would be possible without previous conquest, irrespective of treaties or agreements made, for Abyssinian opposition would take the form of murder and violence to such Europeans as were entrusted with the task. (The success of our mandates in Iraq and Palestine arises from the effective conquest of these regions during the war.)

This is abundantly evident from the following facts :

Between 1930 and 1934 armed attacks were made on Italian consulates at Harar, Dessié and Gondar, besides numerous attacks on the consular personnel. A long, uninterrupted series of raids, robberies, and incursions over the frontiers has been carried on, in which bands of Abyssinians numbering up to 750 armed men have been involved. While in 1931 10,000 men armed with rifles and machine-guns threatened the Italian frontier in the Ogaden, last year the plunder from one single raid consisted of 3656 oxen, 546 goats, seventeen camels, and four donkeys. In Kenya and the Sudan, also, the raiding parties are frequently several hundred strong, and large numbers of live-stock are carried off. From the time of the now familiar Wal Wal episode up to the end of May 1935 ten raids took place into Italian territory, in some of which machine-guns were used. In a raid into the Assab zone last May 300 armed Abyssinians took part, this raid resulting in the killing of four men and ten women, Italian subjects, while six men and six women were wounded, five children castrated, and three women and four men carried off as slaves. During the same period there were nine attacks on Italian consular and legation staffs. If these raids and attacks were not actually encouraged by the central Government, no adequate steps were taken to prevent them.

In these circumstances the Italian Government has found it necessary to take steps to protect its East African colonies and to undertake the task of forcing civilisation upon a country for which a radical reformation is long overdue.

In recent years the Abyssinians have been arming themselves at an ever-increasing rate, and Italian arms supplied to the Emperor as a means of establishing order in the country are now being used against those who gave them. There is, however, another reason why Italy has embarked on this hazardous enterprise. Most other Great Powers have colonies. Great Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Holland, and Portugal have all the colonial possessions they want, but Italy, which was the last to achieve her national unity, was late in the general scramble for African possessions, and has hitherto had to content herself with what was left over as circumstances permitted. While Libya can only be colonised in the coastal oases, the value of Eritrea is confined to a comparatively small district, and Italian Somaliland is quite one of the most forbidding places on earth. With the exception of a few localities, the Italian colonies consist of sand and palm trees, and in a great many cases only sand. Yet Italy urgently needs fertile territory for the settlement of her surplus population and as a source of raw materials and foodstuffs, much of which she has to import from foreign

countries. No satisfaction could have been obtained by an appeal to the League of Nations, dominated as it is by those who have all they want and are opposed to any change. The League of Nations is striving for peace, but no one is willing to make any sacrifices in order to secure it. Once it is realised that Italy's attempt to make use of the last remaining African territory suitable for European colonisation is compatible with the future interests of the peoples of Abyssinia, as well as with the establishment of public security in the whole Abyssinian zone, it will appear in an aspect very different from that generally accepted in this country. The task is one which would in any case have to be undertaken sooner or later by other of the Great Powers. When Italy is accused of breaking the Covenant of the League of Nations it should not be forgotten that Abyssinia has not only failed to carry out her obligations to the League in respect of slavery, but has also made no attempt to fulfil the terms of her treaties with Italy concerning frontier questions, road construction, administrative and economic co-operation, and the status of foreigners in the country. Further, she has violated her agreement with Great Britain, France, and Italy regarding the import and use of arms and ammunition.

Having reviewed the position up to the outbreak of hostilities, let us now turn to the situation confronting us to-day and the prospects of the future. It is of supreme importance that hostilities should come to an end as soon as possible, and that an agreement should be reached giving satisfaction as far as possible to Italy, and at the same time giving some form of compensation to Abyssinia. Besides jeopardising the prospects of European security, Italy is expending vast sums of money in East Africa, thereby endangering her financial stability, apart altogether from the loss of human life and material. Abyssinia is being raised to a frenzy of anti-European feeling, with possible repercussions in other parts of Africa, and the amount of arms and ammunition in the country is steadily increasing. The conflict affects British interests in the region of Lake Tana and the Blue Nile as well as with regard to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. French interests are affected by the threat to the Jibuti-Addis Ababa Railway, as well as by the very difficult

position in which the French Government is placed *vis-à-vis* Great Britain on one side and Italy on the other. The conflict also has an unsettling influence in Egypt, where political ties with Great Britain and economic interests with Italy are mixed up with a natural sympathy with Abyssinia, particularly among the Copts, whose religion is closely akin to that of the Abyssinian Church. Although the contribution which Lake Tana can make to the waters of the Nile has been somewhat exaggerated, it is obviously in the interests of both Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan that this potential source of supply should be safeguarded. Moreover, a conflict between black and white races within the frontiers of Abyssinia and Eritrea may well have a disturbing effect on the native population of the Sudan. The worst effects, however, will be felt in Europe.

While it is impossible at the time of writing to predict how soon an opportunity for negotiations will occur, there will certainly be a lull in hostilities when the rains start in the spring. As a result of investigations made in Addis Ababa, Rome, Paris, and London, where I collected the different opinions of high authorities, it seems that at present terms on the following lines are those most likely to find favour generally :

(1) The dispute to be dealt with by a Three-Power Conference within the League of Nations and attended by Signor Mussolini, M. Laval, and Mr. Baldwin, assuming both to be in office at the time.

(2) Italy to agree not to advance into Abyssinia beyond a given line well to the south of Aksum, Adowa and Adigrat, on the condition that Great Britain and France hand over to Italy fertile territories with reasonable climatic conditions elsewhere in Africa.

(3) The Ogaden to go to Italy to give her satisfaction for Wal Wal and for protective reasons.

(4) An international mandate (on which Italy would be well represented) to be established in Abyssinia ; possibly the High Commissioner could be an Italian of high standing, such as the Duke of Genoa.

(5) Disarmament of Abyssinia to reasonable and safe limits.

(6) Some form of compensation to Abyssinia to be agreed upon.

These proposals are based on the principle of satisfying Italian prestige and expenditure of men, money and material, as well as the limitation of Italy's ambitions in Abyssinia in exchange for territories elsewhere suitable for Italian colonisation. The possibility of withdrawal by Italy without

compensation is not one which any responsible Italian is willing even to consider. The French favour a Three-Power Conference. Signor Mussolini is the only man who can really negotiate for Italy. With him it is essential to have M. Laval and Mr. Baldwin. By occupying a northern part of Abyssinia, including Aksum, Adowa and Adigrat, the Italians would be in possession of an area of fertile territory, though small in relation to the size of Abyssinia. At the same time, they would have the satisfaction of having recaptured the scene of their former defeat at Adowa and of being in possession of the ancient capital of Aksum, which is the traditional home of the Queen of Sheba. It has been suggested that Great Britain might hand over to Italy a part of Kenya adjacent to Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia, and that France should hand over a part of Tunis. As, however, all the districts of Tunis bordering on Italian Libya consist of nothing but sand and palm trees, of which Italy has plenty—and the same applies to all other parts of Tunis not yet already colonised by the French or Italians—this proposal is not practicable. It has therefore been suggested that possibly Great Britain might exchange with France a further section of Kenya for French territory in West Africa or elsewhere, and that France might give this to Italy as her contribution. This proposal is considered in Paris a means of solution worthy of consideration.

The reason why the Ogaden would have to go to Italy is in order to settle the Wal Wal incident, which, I was informed by a reliable native authority on the spot, had been engineered by one of the local Abyssinian chiefs not under the Emperor's control. It is also essential that Italian Somaliland should be protected from constant raiding from this direction. The Ogaden in itself is quite useless to either country from the point of view of cultivation, as it is entirely composed of sand and umbrella trees. But whoever holds the line of wells, of which Wal Wal is one, *ipso facto* controls the whole of that district. As Abyssinia has no civilised form of government outside the capital and one or two other centres, and in view of the barbarous application of an antique feudal system to the conquered negro races involving slavery in its worst forms, it has to be admitted that a League of Nations mandate is essential. I was told that the Emperor would readily accept

a British or French mandate, but neither Great Britain nor France is willing to undertake this task involving at least fifty years' work and heavy expenditure of human life, money and material. Italy is, therefore, the only Great Power available and suitable to carry out the work. The Abyssinian authorities, however, though they refuse at present to consider an Italian mandate, are prepared to consider an international mandate with adequate representation of Italy among other Powers. By this means the Emperor of Ethiopia would to some extent be able to choose his advisers; the country would be policed by a strong mixed force, thereby avoiding Italian military domination. In order to bring about a solution on these lines it is essential that Great Britain and France should co-operate to the fullest extent in bringing their influence to bear on the Emperor, with assurances that his position will be supported against any local attempts to depose him for accepting European influence.

It is said that Italy's aims in Abyssinia include full control over the depopulated territories occupied by the conquered negro races, with a protectorate over the Amhara peoples of Semitic origin, which would mean virtual domination by Italy over the whole of Abyssinia. While Italy would reap the benefits already mentioned, it is as well to mention how it would affect others. As far as the conquered races are concerned, it goes without saying that they would heartily welcome release from the cruel oppression to which they are at present subjected. The Amharas, on the other hand, would resist with all the power at their disposal Italian political influence in any form, and it is estimated by the Italians themselves that it would take fifty years to pacify the country completely and to abolish slavery. The argument that an Abyssinia under Italian control would be a danger to British communications with the Far East and to the water supply of Egypt and the Sudan is rather off-set by the position of Italy in the Mediterranean in relation to her Red Sea possessions. France, on the other hand, might be only too pleased to see Italy fully occupied for a considerable time at some distance from North Africa.

To one who has recently returned from East Africa the attitude of the League of Nations in general, and the British Government in particular, is incomprehensible. As Com-

mendatore Villari pointed out in these pages last month, the League is far from being an impartial body. Geneva is a stronghold of the territorial rich supported by hangers-on, and there is little or no consideration for the territorial poor. Strongly supported by the British Government, the League's attitude towards Italy is of a highly discriminating character, in view of the attitude adopted towards other members in similar circumstances. If nothing useful can be expected of the League, the same cannot be said of the British Government. Yet our Government is guilty of urging the League to adopt measures against Italy which not only endanger European peace, but encourage the black races of Africa to resist the civilising influence of Europe. What does His Majesty's Government think will be achieved by sanctions? Does it think that Signor Mussolini will withdraw his forces from East Africa, or maintain in the Italian colonies a force just small enough to be massacred? Does Mr. Eden realise that to lift the embargo on the import of arms to Abyssinia is actually to strengthen black forces of insecurity and disruption, of slavery and barbarous oppression, and to place in their hands weapons with which to fight European civilisation and culture? Does he realise that the defeat or peaceful humiliation of Italy would lead to the gravest dangers for the British Empire wherever native races come under British rule? Does he realise that the same applies to all other European nations with colonies in Africa and Asia, as well as to the United States of America? In the words of Mr. Baldwin on May 13, 1934, 'There is no such thing as a sanction that will work that does not mean war,' and not only with Italy. Weak sanctions cause irritation, and greatly increase the difficulties of a settlement, while at the same time encouraging economic groupings of Powers as a forerunner of later political groupings and war. War is therefore sooner or later, the ultimate end of sanctions. A policy much more likely to be effective is to prepare the way for mediation at a favourable opportunity. In this respect we should be wise to be guided by the French, who are compelled by their position to take a more impartial view of the matter.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

THE BRITISH EXPEDITION TO ABYSSINIA,
1867-8

By LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACMUNN,
K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.

WITH the large Italian forces encountering the difficulties of the Red Sea littoral, and deployed on the plateaux of Eritrea and with a future that is hard to foresee, it is of more than passing interest to study the British adventure into Abyssinia of 1867-8 under Sir Robert Napier.¹ That campaign, one of the most remarkable and successful that the British Army has ever been called on to make, is at all times worthy of study, but at this period especially so, since Italy has had, and may have, similar problems to face. It had an historic parallel undertaken, in not dissimilar circumstances, in 1541, when da Gama, grandson of that Vasco who first rounded the Cape, had to teach Abyssinia a lesson in humanity. But the lesson had been forgotten 300 years later.

It was not till 1848 that Britain first opened diplomatic relations of any kind with the rulers of Abyssinia, when Mr. Plowden was appointed consul on the small island of Massowa, in Annesley Bay, to foster British trade relations. There had occurred in Abyssinia one of those phenomena which are common enough in Eastern states. There was a new King of Kings in Ethiopia, one Theodore, who from a lawless soldier had risen through the ranks to seize the proudest position of all. Consul Plowden, having heard in 1855 of the new accession to the throne, proceeded to join his camp and pay his respects. He was at first treated civilly enough, but before long the despotic and unreasoning monarch tired of his presence and directed him to return to the coast. King Theodore had already started a correspondence with our Foreign Office regarding scientific improve-

¹ Lord Napier of Magdala.

ments in his state, and especially modern military equipment. The British Government had some reason, therefore, for desiring a consul at his capital, and now sent Captain Cameron.

Theodore, a savage soldier of fortune, fancying that Britain had slighted him, at once imprisoned Cameron with some sixty other Europeans. Negotiations for their release proved fruitless, and another mission was despatched consisting of Mr. Rassam, Dr. Blanc, and Lieutenant Prideaux, of the Bombay Army. They were fairly well received, and succeeded in obtaining the release of Captain Cameron and others on parole from their dungeons. Then just as all were about to depart, Theodore in an access of rage, for no apparent reason, seized the lot and threw them all into prison again. And the last state was worse than the first, for they were now confined in the dungeons of the distant mountain fortress and capital of Magdala.

It was some months more before the news reached the British Government that its subjects were thus unjustly imprisoned at a distance of 400 miles from the sea, through most difficult country. Their release would need a well-equipped army of great size. There was no way of bringing political pressure to bear and no way of bringing a madman to reason—and Theodore was by this time more than half-insane.

It was at last decided that the Bombay Army, then commanded by the famous Sir Robert Napier, the Bengal Engineer, should do the work: 12,000 men were to go, including a brigade from the Bengal Army, and some troops from England. The force eventually detailed was as follows, which were grouped and regrouped, as circumstances demanded, by brigades and divisions:

Cavalry.—3rd Dragoon Guards; 10th Bengal Cavalry; 12th Bengal Cavalry; 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry; 3rd Scinde Horse.

Artillery.—Naval Rocket Brigade; G/14th R.A.—12 pr. (Armstrong) R.B.L.; A/21st R.A.—7 pr. R.M.L. of 150 lb.; B/21st R.A.—7 pr. R.M.L. of 150 lb.; 5/25th R.A.—9 pr. R.B.L. and 8 inch mortars.

Engineers.—10th Company Royal Engineers; K Company Madras Sappers and Miners; 2nd and 3rd Companies Bombay Sappers and Miners.

Infantry.—1/4th Foot—23rd Punjab Infantry (Pioneers); 26th Foot—1st, 2nd, 3rd, 10th Bombay Infantry; 33rd Foot—21st Punjab and 25th Bombay Infantry; 45th Foot—27th and 30th Baluchis.

The nationals of several countries, traders and missionaries, were included among the victims of King Theodore, and the whole civilised world was keenly aware of the difficulties of the venture. To traverse 400 miles of inhospitable and difficult country would be no simple matter, even with the best staff organisation. Good and organised pack transport had to be collected, and transport and remount officers were despatched to bring animals of many kinds from many countries.²

It was a march into a country concerning which little information had been collected, even as to the nature and fighting power or intent of the tribes through whose territory the marching road would pass. Behind it all was the whole romance of Abyssinia—the old Christian Church half lost to the outside world, the ancient stories of Prester John, of pomp and wealth, and the hidden secrets of the stolen Ark of the Covenant. The part of the coast on which the expedition was to land was by the island of Massowa, at the fishing village of Zula, in Annesley Bay. Here Colonel Merewether, of the Bombay Army, Resident at Aden, had gone ahead to establish a base and reconnoitre.

Annesley Bay was chosen, since it provided good anchorage and was very much like Tahlianwan Bay, in China, then fresh in everyone's mind. From the sea a plain of green scrub seemed to stretch away to the mountain 20 miles inland. It was really sandy flats intersected by dry water-courses, with a shelving beach that would prevent the transports getting close in to shore. Water was found to be terribly scarce, though the force was to have the famous 23rd Sikh Pioneers (now disbanded), and Merewether had only his sappers to begin with. Leaving his two companies of Bombay Sappers to sink wells, Merewether pushed on to find out something about the road to Magdala,³ which seemed to be far set within vast mountains which led to a series of plateaux

² Unfortunately, those from other places than India were very badly equipped with ill-fitting saddles, and the drivers ill-organised.

³ Lying about 100 miles west-south-west of Lake Tsana and 400 miles south of Zula.

like a giant staircase. One practicable pass, the Senafe, 50 miles ahead up the first stairway, was found, and Staveley's brigade from Bombay, which arrived in December 1867, set to work to make a road up the pass. The water difficulties at the base were acute. The wells first sunk ran dry, and it was necessary to erect distilling plant, which consumed great quantities of coal. Thousands of transport animals began to arrive before any landing-stages were ready. Unfortunately, ports and bases were, and still are, a little-understood subject. These same troubles, but on a scale ten times larger, have harried the Italians. Want of alongside jetties, port craft, port tugs, port labour, all impinge on each other, in a mathematical progression. More railways mean thousands of rails and sleepers, more labour, more water, and so on in exasperating series. All wars in undeveloped terrain are 75 per cent. engineering and sanitary problems.

By January 3 Sir Robert Napier was on the scene, and shortly afterwards the 23rd Pioneers, who had brought well-sinkers. Zula, despite its dirt and heat and flies, was a wonderful sight, and a vast town of mat huts of sutlers grew up. Not only were there men of many races, but there was a gang of women, engaged as corn-grinders, from Bombay.

Magdala and the prisoners lay some 400 miles ahead. Senafe, beyond the pass 50 miles from the sea, had been established, and Sir Robert was now planning an advance beyond Senafe for early March. From the terminus of the Pioneers' light railway, the road ascended through a steep boulder-strewn watercourse to Ibwer Suru, and then entered a fissure known to the army as 'The Devil's Staircase.' It took the Pioneers six weeks of hard work to carry a gun road through the 2 miles to Upper Suru, Staveley's advanced brigade having made a bridle-path up it. For 3 more miles the road, somewhat wider, went on to Undul Wells, where the well-sinkers were set to work. This form of advance was now systematised; the advance column pushed ahead with its Sappers and a company of Pioneers, while the main body of the Pioneers, and such labour as could be obtained, followed, making a more substantial road behind. Above the wells was a small plateau named Guinea Fowl Plain, from the wealth of birds thereon; 8 miles beyond Underta was reached, and then Ragha Gedi. Thence passing through the Senafe Ghat, the

troops found themselves on the Abyssinian plain 8000 feet above sea level, and some 50 miles from the sea.

Back on the flats a wing of the 23rd was hard at work on the railway, on the broad Indian gauge of 5 feet 6 inches, furnished with light rolling-stock. As the way began to ascend the work became more difficult, and involved eight bridges and twenty-eight drains. Wells at many places along the line had been dug, and at Kumayli so successful was the search for water that it is recorded that 7300 animals were watered from troughs in three hours. The Pioneers' name as water-finders was indeed blessed.

The systematic advance now brought the advance column to Adigrat, whence on February 10 the advance column of two companies of Infantry and two of Pioneers, with 200 Cavalry, marched 70 miles to Dolo, a squadron of the Scinde Horse keeping up communication and a supporting brigade coming up behind as water facilities were developed. The inhabitants, with whom the political officers—paying freely and promptly for supplies—maintained excellent relations, were friendly. Behind, wherever water permitted, were grouped the troops of the main force. The road was now soon pushed to Antolo, which was to become the third large post on the road. Brigadier Field was now in command of the 1st Brigade and Pioneer Force, the whole being called the 'Advance Brigade,' with orders to keep the Pioneer Force two marches ahead of the actual brigade. By March 1 the troops for the main advance were being collected at Antolo.

Advance Force.		Main Advance.	
200 Scinde Horse.		3rd Dragoon Guards.	
Forty companies 3rd Bombay		10th and 12th Bengal	
Light Cavalry.		Cavalry.	
Two companies 33rd Foot.		5/25th R.A. with forty ele-	
Two companies Baluchis.		phants (9 pr. Arm-	
Two companies 23rd Pioneers.		strong and mortars).	
Two companies Sappers.		B/21st R.A. with 7 prs. of	
		150 lb.	
		45th Foot.	
		Naval Brigade.	
		23rd Pioneers (less two	
		companies.)	

The order of battle was now finally arranged, and consisted of the 1st Division for the advance, the 2nd Division for the

long line of communication, and a force at the base, known as the Zula Brigade, to relieve this 2nd Division if that was needed on the front.

The real march to Magdala was now about to begin, still a distance of over 100 miles, the Commander-in-Chief marching with the leading brigade, General Staveley with the second. Theodore and his army were reported to be some marches away from Magdala on the British flank, and the alternatives before Sir Robert were a possible dash of light troops in hope of separating Theodore from his prisoners, or a systematic advance on Magdala, making good every step of the way.

Napier considered the first alternative too dangerous, given the difficult country, the great distance, and the problematical attitude of the Abyssinian tribes *en route, vis-à-vis* a small force. The slow advance involved considerable danger to the prisoners, but might lead to the destruction of Theodore and their providential release at the same time. Events were to prove that Napier's judgment was right.

The force now set forth from Antalo on the penultimate stage of its great road-making march. From there Sir Robert Napier himself led the advance column—over the Alaji Pass, down *viâ* Asala to Bulago and Makan, amid wild, jagged peaks and upright seams of rock, over plateaux covered in long grass with hidden ravines hundreds of feet deep, till it arrived at the duck-infested lake of Ashangi, 300 miles from the sea, and 100 more still to Magdala. Terrible blocks of half-fed transport on steep descents hampered progress. On the 20th the advance column was at Lat, the 1st and 2nd Brigades a march behind. The way now led up over the Dajat mountains to Didli by a terrible road, with vast precipices below the narrow mule track. It was a pass of 12,000 feet, to temperatures of 110 degrees by day and 10 degrees of frost by night, till at last the force entered Santara on the last and true plateau, 10,000 feet above the sea.

All intelligence now pointed to the fact that Theodore had marched back from his flank position at Dehra Tabor to get between his capital and his foe. During the halt at Santara the war correspondent wrote :

Of an evening, if we have a halt, Jack Tar (of the Naval Rocket Battery) sometimes dances. The band of the Punjab Pioneers—between

whom and the sailors there is a great friendship, although, of course, they do not understand a word of each other's language—comes over to the sailors' camp, and plays dance music; and half a dozen couples of sailors stand up and execute quadrilles, waltzes and polkas. The scene is a very amusing one. . . .

Again we have him writing of the 33rd Foot :

The 33rd marched in at 9.30 p.m. singing 'Here we are again,' followed by the band and H.Q. Wing of the Punjab Pioneers, and the Naval Rocket Brigade under Captain Fellowes. The Blue Jackets were beyond dispute the *élite* of the force.

The troops had marched 118 miles of terrific ascent and descent in seventeen days, which included six of halting. On April 1 Sir Robert re-arranged his force to advance across the great plateau in fighting array, as follows, Pioneers of course in the leading brigade :—

1ST DIVISION (Forward Troops)

The Headquarters of the force with the 1st Brigade at Abdikum :

3rd Regiment Scinde Horse . . .	208
H.Q. Wing 12th Bengal Cavalry . . .	150
Naval Brigade Rocket Batteries . . .	83
H.Q. 10th Company R.E. . . .	32
4th King's Own . . .	530
23rd Regiment Punjab Pioneers . . .	671
H.Q. Wing 27th N.I. Baluchis . . .	27
	1701

The Headquarters of the 1st Division with the 2nd Brigade at Ghaso (one march in rear of the 1st Brigade) consisted of :

H.Q. and four troops 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry . . .	171
G/14th Brigade R.A., four 12 pr. Armstrong guns . . .	92 ⁴
Det. 5th/25th Brigade R.A., two 8 in. mortars . . .	35 ⁴
B/21st Brigade R.A., steel 7 pr. guns . . .	109
H.Q. and K Company Madras Sappers and Miners . . .	131
H.Q. and 2nd, 3rd, 4th Companies Bombay Sappers and Miners . . .	294
33rd Duke of Wellington's Regiment . . .	700
H.Q. Wing 10th Regiment Bombay N.I. . .	217
	1749

⁴ Guns, carriages, etc., carried on elephants.

The troops comprising the 2nd Division of the force were stationed on the line of communication as a reserve at Antalo, Adigrat, and Senafe.

On April 1 and 2 the two brigades followed the advance column down into the valley of the Jedda river and then up the rugged series of stairways to Aterkut and on to the Delanta plateau. That was the end of it; the Mecca of their pilgrimage was in sight. It was possible to reconnoitre the hill-tops of Magdala.

A magnificent panorama met the gaze. Below was the steep scarped ravine of the Bachilo river, down which a single spur alone carried the King's road to Magdala. On the far side, ravine and spur ran up to a series of small plateaux. Far at the back was a lofty mass of mountain, in front of it the lofty scarped plateau on which stood the very Magdala. From Magdala forward sloped the Islamgié spur, to the ridge of Selassié, which faced the way the invaders were coming, protected by many scarps. On the right stood a higher, compact plateau, that of Fahla, the key of the position. On Selassié were the masses of Theodore's army, on Fahla and on Islamgié his guns.

The situation, as it presented itself to Sir Robert Napier, was not an easy one. The eyes of the civilised world were on him and his pioneering troops. In Magdala were the European prisoners—men, women, and children—to the number of close on sixty, and between him and them, fierce, cruel, mad Theodore, with several thousand of his troops—troops whose temper might be as fierce as the tribesmen of Umbeyla, or might not. What of the prisoners? A cruel trial had just been put on them, crueller still for many Abyssinian fellow-prisoners. Theodore had summoned them before him, heavily chained, had them on their knees, and in their presence had slaughtered 340 political prisoners from the same gaol. A score or so he killed with his own sword, and then bade his musketeers continue, while he, still brandishing his sword, went among the Europeans. Then he ordered them to their dungeons, with what intentions no man knows. Abyssinian public opinion was divided, some saying that he had never yet been defeated, others that the hour of their deliverance from a madman had come.

What would the coming battle be like? No man could

tell. Sir Robert Napier lost no time in coming to a decision. He would send his artillery and baggage by the King's road, and the 1st Brigade, the infantry thereof, up the Goombaji spur, to Affijo. Colonel Phayre would take all the engineers, one British and four Indian companies, and precede the guns and their escort and see that the road was right. On arriving at the first flat he would secure and hold the debouchment from the ravine, so that in due course his artillery should have room to deploy. At 5.30 a.m. on April 10 the whole force moved down to the Bachilo river, which, 3 feet deep, was passable, yet so thick with foul mud was it that the parched troops could hardly touch it. After crossing the river the two columns separated: Colonel Phayre and the guns up the ravine by the King's road; General Staveley up the precipitous Goombaji spur.

It was with the greatest difficulty that the infantry proceeded. The heat was intense, and the troops rested half an hour on the first level—all save the Pioneers, who arrived at Affijo an hour before the rest of the brigade. A message came from Phayre that he held the debouchment to the Arogee ravine and that the road was good. Sir Robert, who was following the 1st Brigade, now ordered the artillery with their escort, who were waiting in the Bachilo bed, to move up to Colonel Phayre. But when General Staveley and his brigade arrived at the top of Affijo, to his horror he found that Phayre, with 800 sappers, was not waiting, as ordered, at the debouchment, but was up on the col joining the Affijo and upper Arogee flats. Below him, where the King's road debouched on the lower Arogee flat, the artillery and baggage were coming up, almost unguarded, not many hundred yards from the Abyssinian hordes on the Selassié ridge above. Sir Robert had now arrived, and to him Staveley pointed out the mistake that had been made.

The Commander-in-Chief at once saw the danger and ordered the nearest corps, the Pioneers, to descend and cover the head of the pass, the Naval Rocket Brigade to get into action and the 1st Brigade to close up to its front. Distressed though they were by the heat and the want of water, Chamberlain turned his Pioneers down to the lower flat. Just as he got to the road the tactical acumen of the Abyssinians proved equal to the occasion. Thousands of

them proceeded to rush down to the Arogee flats and round the slope of the Arogee ravine. By now the rushing Abyssinians had broken into two advances—3000 towards the guns, a smaller body towards the Affijo col and the advancing 1st Brigade.

It was now 3.30 p.m., and Chamberlain, who had received Napier's order, got his men into line and joined Major Penn's battery. The Abyssinians swarmed on, led by gaily caparisoned mounted chiefs. When they were within 300 yards the 'Steel Penns'⁵ opened fire, as did the Pioneers. The latter, armed only with the M.L. rifle, could not deliver the fire that the escort of the 4th Foot with their Sniders could do, and instead brought their rifles to the charge and met the Abyssinian spearmen with the bayonet. Many of the latter had swept on to attack the baggage column, but the baggage-master had parked his animals on the flat, and Captain Patterson's company of Pioneers were waiting. Abyssinian courage and fighting power could not stand up to the discipline of the Mazbhi Sikhs or the breech-loading rifles of the 4th, and they were beaten off with very heavy loss. Up on the higher plateau the brigade from Affijo was now advancing with rifle and bayonet against the smaller body of the enemy, who were also driven back with heavy loss. That was the end. One body disappeared down the ravine to the left, the other swerved round our right, to be driven off by the Rocket Battery in action on the col between the two flats. It was now nearing dusk, and the force went into bivouac to the accompaniment of a violent thunderstorm. The elation of the troops carried them through a very unpleasant night, standing to arms at 2 a.m. lest Theodore's spear and sword men should come on again. The losses amongst these, however, had been so great—close on 400 bodies on the field—that they were not to appear again. The British losses had been under thirty, mostly among the Pioneers.

Next morning it looked like another fight for Magdala itself, as the brigades advanced unmolested to secure the whole of the upper Arogee plateau. This was carried out by the 2nd Brigade, who were to storm the fortress on the 12th. That morning, however, to everyone's surprise, convoys arrived bringing the unfortunate prisoners. The Abys-

⁵ These were the light 7 prs. of 150 lbs.

sinian forces had suffered more even than was apparent.⁶ Theodore was deserted, but as he had not handed over his fortress the 2nd Brigade now advanced to secure it, expecting only a few guards to be within. So it transpired. Two British soldiers, who had climbed up with great danger and difficulty, and forced an entrance through the cactus hedge at the top of the precipice,⁷ were awarded the Victoria Cross. There was no resistance, and Theodore, to everyone's relief, had committed suicide within. While the 2nd Brigade advanced, the 33rd leading, to plant their colours in the fortress, the 1st Brigade moved to Arogee lest the Abyssinians should return, while the released prisoners were sent off, by pony and palanquin, under escort to the sea amid the cheers of the troops—a dramatic and stirring scene. There was now little to be done. Theodore the tyrant was dead. The people of the countryside were not hostile, and it was no part of our policy to arrange the administration; it but remained to withdraw as efficiently as we had come, and this the organisation of the line of communications, under the guidance of Major Fred (later Field-Marshal Lord) Roberts, V.C., was quite able to accomplish.

GEORGE MACMUNN.

⁶ It transpired that 700 to 800 were killed and 1500 wounded, and all of the survivors of the 5000 who attacked fled without returning to Magdala.

⁷ Private Bergin and Drummer Magner, of the 33rd Foot.

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN ENGLAND

By THE RIGHT HON. EARL WINTERTON

PEOPLE from the North of England, and especially from what are called, with modern distaste for true but unpleasant connotations, 'special areas,' are apt to make the following statements to those who live in the South, and particularly those of us who represent southern constituencies in Parliament. They say :

(1) 'It is all very well to speak of the new industries and increasing trade of the South and southern Midlands, but it is hopeless to expect real trade prosperity until the northern Midlands and North recover, because there lies the home of the main export trade by which Britain exists.'

(2) 'You in the South have no real knowledge of, and consequently no adequate sympathy with, the terrible evils of unemployment and depression in the North. You understand neither its causes nor its gravity.'

How far are these allegations true? In this article I shall try to answer this question from the standpoint of one who, in thirty years of membership of the House of Commons, has travelled on business and pleasure into every quarter of England and addressed audiences in most industrial districts in England. I am not an economist; and if I were, it would be impossible for me to state views with which other economists would agree, since there is, unfortunately, a most complete dissonance of opinion in that distinguished profession in regard to present-day difficulties and tendencies. Thus my answers will not be dogmatic; nor, because of exigencies of space, can I hope to do more than give a brief sketch of the why and the wherefore, as I see it, of the depression in the old industrial areas and the comparative prosperity of the new industrial ones.

England had reached an important position as a trading

and exporting country by Tudor times. Then her manufacturing inland towns were places like Guildford, Norwich and Ipswich; her shipbuilding ports, Yarmouth, Bristol, Shoreham-by-Sea, Plymouth and others. The Wealds of Sussex, Surrey and Kent were black with the wood smoke of the local iron furnaces; many a small town flourished, by reason of its local industries, to a degree which astonished foreign visitors. Elizabethan England hardly existed north of a certain line; Elizabeth, in all her journeyings, never visited her realms beyond it. The land was parcelled out in great estates among feudal lords, not too friendly to the Crown and London, and loth to accept the fact that their ideas of local rule were out of date. The major part of the statesmen, sailors, poets, writers, and merchant adventurers in the era of the great Queen came from districts south of the line to which I have referred. So far as business and manufacture were concerned, the eighteenth century, and especially the industrial revolution, altered all this. By it many southern, eastern, and western towns were sucked dry, alike of their industries and most enterprising men. Some of them did not recover until the spill of residential population from London overtook them in the late Victorian era. Ironically enough, many of the newer industries, or new forms of old industries, have in the last fifteen years, to the annoyance and jealousy of the North, been started in towns and districts in the South, East, and southern Midlands, from which the North filched the existing industries a century and a half, or more, ago.

Where, I can hear a critical reader from the North say, does all this argument lead the writer? England in Tudor times was a self-dependent country in the matter of foodstuffs, with a small population. She was only able to build up her huge population and great wealth in the nineteenth century by the unrivalled resources and admirable geographical and climatic conditions, from an export and production point of view, of the North, both east and west. That is true enough. But if there is no longer so large a market for the products which resulted from this favourable combination of circumstances, then common sense demands that attempts should be made to employ the capital and labour involved elsewhere.

Incidentally, I have never been able to support the universal and respectful applause in the House of Commons

which invariably greets the statement 'Emigration is no remedy for unemployment.'

Owing to the fact that statistical information about emigration from these islands before the war was not collected or tabulated in the detail which it is to-day, it is difficult to find a comparable basis. But inquiry of more than one Government department has convinced me that it is safe to put the number of persons leaving England alone in 1913, who intended to reside permanently abroad, at about 200,000, of whom some 157,900 went to Empire countries.

In 1933 there was an astonishing contrast, for more persons returned from foreign countries and the Empire, intending to remain here, than left our shores for residence elsewhere. It is true that, as a result of a much higher birth rate, the net increase of population was probably slightly higher in England, Scotland, and Wales for the year 1913 than it was in 1933. Nevertheless, a migration from these islands on anything like the 1913 scale would have greatly simplified our unemployment problem.

No doubt the truth about this factor in the situation is unpalatable for three reasons :

- (a) The Dominions are suspicious of a statement that migration is a partial remedy, or a cure, for unemployment, because they read into it a belief that we wish to rid ourselves of unemployables, as well as depress their labour rates by an influx of workers.
- (b) The people in the 'special areas' do not like to be reminded, especially those of them who are retailers, owners of houses, and professional men, that the best hope of their district lies in a drastic reduction of the population in it.
- (c) Few politicians care to face the unpleasant task of telling their constituents in a 'special area' that there is little hope for them, or at least their children, at home, and that they must travel to strange lands to find work.

This question does not arise in a practical form whilst the doors of emigration are closed, as they are now, but may constitute a delicate and difficult one for some future Government when the primary producing countries again want migrants. No doubt a majority of people in the 'special

areas' of those suitable for migration would gladly take the opportunity to do so. But a considerable minority would not, to judge from the disquieting proportion of young people who have left them to take up work in other parts of England, and who return to idleness because they are homesick. An ethical question of great importance would then arise. How far is it justifiable to pay even what some call the pittance which an unemployed person receives to any individual when there is work elsewhere, albeit overseas, so long as that person prefers to remain at home, in the vain hope of work on the spot?

In the absence of migration overseas, what hope remains, by reason of the expansion of an existing industry, or the creation of a new one, for surplus labour in Great Britain? Surely the general answer is by an increased production from the soil, resulting (which is not always the case) in an increase of labour, by an enlarged purchasing power among the public generally, resulting in more 'services' labour (*i.e.*, in shops, hotels, cinemas, restaurants and the like), and by the creation and extension of industries serving modern needs.

In fact, all these tendencies are in progress, though, as regards the first, the new agricultural policy has not yet brought increased employment, except in regard to horticulture.¹

There is, as my right hon. friend George Lambert has consistently pointed out in the House of Commons, need for thousands of more men to work on existing farms. Though machinery has displaced labour, the inability of farmers to employ enough men to keep their ditches clean, their hedges cut, and their thistles destroyed has displaced far more. Better prices will alter this. The redistribution of wealth in various ways and the discovery of London and other places as tourists' resorts for foreign and overseas visitors have immensely increased the demand for 'services' labour. The excess of 'incoming' tourist money over that spent by residents of the United Kingdom who take their holidays abroad is an invisible export increasing in value each year. Here I may remark that I have no patience with statements often made in some quarters as follows: 'It isn't

¹ A recent return shows an increase of 90,000 acres in vegetable, flower, and hard-fruit production over four or five years, with a resultant increase in labour.

fair to expect a miner to encourage his son, who wants to work in a pit like his father, to be a waiter in London, or his daughter, who wants to get work in a neighbouring factory, to be a servant in the South.' Why not? On the continent of Europe, and not merely in the dictatorship countries, men and women, boys and girls, take any honest work that they can get, even though it means a lowering of the social status to which they have been accustomed. They do so because the State either pays nothing at all to those out of work, or so little that the workless are always hungry. Thus, however hard and unaccustomed a particular task may be, it is preferred to unemployment. Luckily, the sort of reasoning which I have quoted is only accepted by a comparatively small number of people, mostly with extreme political views; for its widespread acceptance would spell degeneration and decadence.

In regard to what may be termed generally the provision of goods to serve modern needs, such as cheap motor cars, gramophones, imitation jewellery, cosmetics, and, above all, radio apparatus, it is difficult to find sound economic reasons for objecting to their establishment in the South of England, or regret that they are increasing so rapidly in importance, when the heavy industries are stationary or declining. These modern manufacturing enterprises, being mainly concerned with internal sales, naturally concentrate near the greatest distributing centres.

It is not true to say that the unfair predominance of London in finance and business direction is the sole reason for the great increase of population in London and the home counties. An ever-increasing residential population lives in London because of the amenities to be found there, and in the South because of the climate.

Incidentally, I may remark that every time a northern town vetoes, as it almost invariably does, Sunday amusements of any kind, and every time that temperance societies or chief constables in the North of England successfully oppose additional facilities, however reasonable, in restaurants or hotels, they are aiding to drive those who can afford it from residence in the North to London and the South where less rigid ideas prevail.

Their answer will probably be that it is a good thing to suffer for conscience' sake. Certainly we in the South

do not quarrel with their attitude. We have no reason to do so.

Is it economically a bad thing that these so-called luxury trades are flourishing? I have spoken of internal consumption, but not all of them are dependent upon such consumption. By it, however, concerns like the Austin and Morris Motor Companies are able to indulge in a mass production which, by reason of its cheapness, has enabled them to capture a substantial amount of foreign trade. Moreover, it would be a bold statement to make that the possession of a cheap car by a person of moderate means is necessarily a luxury. In many professions and trades it is an adjunct to business; it can, and often does, improve the health of the owner.

It seems to me that the growing relative importance of these trades could only be condemned or deprecated if they offered no chance of a prosperous or growing export trade, or if they prevented the investment of money or energy in the heavy industries.

In fact, there is a vast undeveloped market among native peoples in Africa and Asia for gramophones, cheap jewellery and cosmetics, radio sets and the like. That market will not be available until primary prices increase and the purchasing power of millions of peasant cultivators increases with them. Moreover, Japan or some other nation may get the lion's share; but the potential market is there. There is little chance of a greatly increased sale of our coal and cotton, even when world trade improves. Even without the dislocation caused by the war, there would have been a lessened demand for British coal, in its raw state, because of the cheapness and growing use of oil, and the exploitation of the natural resources of water-power in countries like Italy. Whatever propitious results may come from the present partially experimental manufacture of oil from coal, there is little prospect of the export of raw British coal ever reaching pre-war dimensions.

Equally, nothing can arrest the growth of the manufacture of cotton in Asiatic countries near where the raw material grows. For Lancashire's sake—and, indeed, for the whole country's sake—it is earnestly to be hoped that British cotton production will not suffer a further decline; but what it certainly will not do is expand its labour demand each year,

and thus absorb the natural increase of the working population in the cotton districts as it once did. In fact, one of the heavy industries—steel—is up to pre-war production, and recently, for the first time for more than a generation, we led in steel export. We can hardly look for much expansion there, because we have our full share of world trade already.

It is said that it is a bad thing that so great and growing a proportion of the wealth, population, and modern industrial power of Britain should be concentrated within twenty miles or so of St. Paul's. It certainly has its strategic dangers. However, future growth and development in the county of London and the home counties will be directed and controlled as the result of zoning, town-planning, and the Ribbon Development Bill.

There is, however, another side to this question. Before the war an astounding proportion of the total inhabitants of Great Britain lived within sixteen miles of Manchester Town-hall. To-day that proportion is declining, and will do so further. Is this not all to the good? Modern medical opinion, so divided on many issues, is united in believing that sunshine, real or artificial, is essential for a healthy race. It will be a long time before Lancashire operatives will be able to afford artificial sunshine, even if it be a good substitute (which some doubt) for the real thing. In all the world there is no industrial area where natural conditions of climate and man's handiwork have so effectively combined to rob men and women of their birthright—the sun—as in Manchester and other Lancashire and Yorkshire towns. London's air shows a tendency to become less smoke-ridden. The old 'London particular' is a thing of the past. The smoke and grime in Manchester, which is far worse than London, remain as heavy as ever. Industrial workers in France, Belgium and Germany, when they leave the mills and furnaces, go out into pure air. In Lancashire and the West Riding the workers too often leave the enervating atmosphere of a mill, only to find filthy smoke-laden air to breathe outside.

To those optimists who say that these conditions have not affected the physique of Lancashire and West Riding operatives, the answer is that it has certainly lowered their stature. Yorkshire and Lancashire people, because of their racial origin, are naturally taller than southerners, as may be

realised by looking at the country people in those counties and the South respectively. But the cotton operatives are well below the average stature of the English. The evil effects on racial stocks of crowded industrialism in a foggy, sunless land have been mitigated by the healthy peasant origin three or four generations ago of the mill workers, and by an influx from country districts. But there is no question that most of the new factories in the South and in the southern Midlands are not only better constructed from a health point of view, but are situated in cleaner air and pleasanter surroundings than those in the old industrial districts. Slough which is full of workers from the 'special areas,' is a case in point.

One of the impediments to industrial recovery in many of the special and other areas in the North is the evil legacy of ill feeling and harsh dealing, on both sides, of employers and employed. A friend of mine, a distinguished statesman, once paid a visit to one of these areas, and travelled about talking to people whom he met in the street, in omnibuses, and in third-class railway carriages. One of these casual acquaintances, an intelligent middle-aged workman, said to him:

I have no quarrel with Tories of your type, but I could never vote Tory because of [here he mentioned a family whose name is connected with the district, though, in fact, they have never been Tories, but Liberals]. They lived here for a hundred years, or more, in the past, and they got every penny out of the workers which they could. Still they lived among us. But they became too grand for the likes of us, and went away and became lords and ladies. Now, when the whole district is utterly depressed, they care nothing for our distress. We never see members of a family who drew untold millions from these hills and valleys.

The speaker was neither quite logical nor quite accurate, since the family in question has long ceased to control the great company which once dominated the district. It is doubtful if they own any shares in it. Still, it is difficult not to sympathise, to some extent, with the point of view expressed. It seems an echo of the kind of argument used by our political ancestors of the Tory Party against the manufacturers in the great controversies of Reform Bill and Corn Law days. It ran something like this, as a perusal of old *Hansards* will show:

You think that you are the saviours of our country, and that we, the ancient landowners, are a hindrance to progress. But what have you done, and what are you trying to do? You have defaced our beautiful countryside with mills and factories that men, and women and little children too, induced to leave their happy peasant homes in quiet villages, may be herded together in dirty hovels, amid smoke and grime, and sweated to death. You want to ruin agriculture and to make you and yours lords of this land. And all this is done in the name of progress! What will England be like a hundred years hence?

Of course, the balance of right and wrong in the age-long controversy about the relations of capital and labour, and the origins of the hard-fisted ill feeling on both sides, is difficult to determine. What is easy to see is its present-day result in the areas to which I have referred.

In one or two county and in many urban and rural district councils, the whole covering a large proportion of the 'special areas,' the Socialist Party is in power—in some cases, with an overwhelming majority. Now it is the custom for apologists for the fearful rate burdens imposed by these councils to say: 'We live in an impoverished area; we have a low rateable value. Can you wonder that the rates are high?' That is only half the truth. In many of these councils there is scandalous misuse of public money. I do not mean that there is personal corruption on the part of the councillors. That sort of graft, so frequent in France and the United States, is very uncommon in Great Britain. Men of the most extreme Left views are, in the vast majority of cases, scrupulously honest and honourable about making a personal gain out of public funds. The maladministration to which I refer is of a different character.

One form which it takes is to pay wages to manual workers which are absurdly above their economic value, and greatly in excess of what private employers can afford to pay. Another is to show a bias in giving contracts towards the local Co-operative stores. No doubt councillors who vote for such a policy believe, quite honestly, that they are doing the right thing, because their creed is that private profit and trading is immoral. Creating unnecessary offices, and filling them with persons sympathetic to the council's policy (in other words, Socialists), is another form which it takes. Though it is doubtful if any Government would be prepared to incur the great unpopularity which such a step would

involve, it is certain that these counties and areas would be infinitely better off if their local authority were to be superseded by expert commissioners.

In these same districts, mainly because of the terrible traditions of industrial strife, the trades unions are mostly controlled by extremists—many too extreme, indeed, even for the official Socialist Party. Is it any wonder that industrialists will not start fresh works there, and sometimes transfer existing ones? That is the true explanation of the polite negative recently returned to the Special Commissioner's inquiries.

No one who has visited, as I have in recent years, one of the most depressed areas—the county of Durham, which contains a population as virile, patient and courageous as any in the Empire—can fail to feel sick at heart with sorrow for its huge workless population. That is why I am so glad to see the drift, already noticeable, of population to where chances of work are better. By leaving, they get out of an environment in which, for reasons that are understandable and by no means dishonourable to them, their natural leaders lull them with false hope. 'The Government,' say the members of Parliament and of local bodies, trades union leaders, traders, and professional men, 'must help us to re-establish industries, or provide work in other ways, which will absorb our surplus labour.' The answer is that they cannot do so to an extent which would make a real inroad upon unemployment, except at a cost which would be ruinous and grossly unfair to the general body of taxpayers.

I cannot close this article without making a further reference, however brief, to an element which an impartial analysis of the problem discussed in this article will show to be part of it.

In a recent debate I used the phrase, as applicable to the Empire, 'Independence with Interdependence.' By this I meant that the major component parts would increasingly enjoy autonomy, as do virtually the Dominions to-day, coupled with a growing dependence upon each other and Great Britain in commerce and defence. It is no mere *façon de parler* to say that the British Empire is the only real League of Nations existing. The importance of the Empire's markets to us, and of our market to the Empire, grows each year. Yet

the maldistribution of population as between Great Britain and the Dominions is a strategic danger of the first magnitude.

With two or three powerful foreign countries avid for new territory on which to settle their home population, and completely devoid even of the slender scruples which to some extent informed the policy of the pre-war Great Powers, this fact should be realised and constantly stated. Except in the case of Canada, who is sheltered by the Monroe Doctrine and her proximity to the United States, the British Navy alone stands between the Dominions and absorption by those Powers. Yet it is impossible to avoid sympathising with their spokesmen who say: 'We sent our men and treasure to defend you and ourselves in the last war. But in peacetime, with our small populations and need of every penny of capital for internal development, we simply cannot afford to have adequate naval forces of our own, or give a substantial contribution to the British Navy.'

For these reasons it seems to me that movements of population and capital within the Empire, with a view to a more even distribution of both, is not only natural, but essential. Holding these views, I cannot but doubt both the ethical and economic validity of many views concerning, and remedies for, the plight of the North of England.

WINTERTON.

CORRUPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

By CLOUGH WILLIAMS-ELLIS

THOSE of us—and we are not a few—who during post-war years have viewed with growing anxiety the vast and unceasing extension of the scope, the jurisdiction, and the powers of the Ministry of Health, have in the past found some comfort in the reflection that in proportion as its responsibility for local government grew and was exercised, so would unjust stewardship among the custodians of the ratepayers' purse diminish.

A watchdog of more than average vigilance and ferocity was badly needed. Morals in 1919 were at a low ebb. Contracts and corruption during the war had been as inseparable as August and grouse-shooting. It was still fresh in the public mind that in a case in which a retired civil servant had been found guilty on twelve counts of making corrupt gifts to a lieutenant-colonel (C.M.G. in the Birthday Honours) the officer himself had been awarded a new honour by the Crown in the shape of a *nolle prosequi*, in extenuation of which counsel observed blandly:

At present the officer is doing invaluable work at the Admiralty and the Admiralty is most anxious to retain his services. All the money which has been paid him, *with the exception of £10,000 which has been disposed of*, remains in his possession, and the balance (£38,000) will be handed over to the representatives of the authorities.

Some felt that war had reserved a special palm-leaf for masters of the art and mystery of corruption; that venality had been hallowed by its sojournings in high places. Moreover, as a nation whose best men had been mostly under arms, we had emerged from the war with a changed sense of money values: with a lessened sense of personal responsibility and a fine contempt for economy. The belief that the Golden Age had arrived with the departure of the golden coin was

widespread. Trade boomed; money came like magic and like magic went; excess profits were anybody's for the taking.

Local authorities vied with each other in the orgy of spending. Homes fit for heroes had been promised, and roads fit for heroes (as well as hogs) to traverse must be made. Municipal expenditure in England and Wales *out of loans*—to take only that part of it which mortgaged posterity—leapt from a pre-war level of less than £40,000,000 per annum to over £126,000,000 in 1920–21. Expenditure on roads leapt from under £14,000,000 to over £39,000,000, and was rising. In every department of local government contracts were being given out with feverish haste on a vast scale. Bribery and corruption rose with expenditure. Friendships ripened rapidly in municipal business—as in other walks of life—where the responsible agent of the buyer had helped to hold the Hohenzollern redoubt and the representative of the seller had been in the relieving battalion. To gifts given and received between such men there could cling no odour of illicit commerce; where everyone was giving and getting, integrity became a jewel that only the very selfish could wish to retain.

In this crisis, when corruption might be anybody's bed-fellow and the secret be Polichinelle's, the Ministry of Health fulfilled its function with vigour and with skill. It was not wholly because expenditure began to fall that bribery and corruption fell with much greater rapidity. It was not wholly because the Bribery and Secret Commissions Prevention League was gathering strength that corruption of an indictable nature began to be hazardous. Results in the cleansing of municipal life were being visibly attained by a bureaucracy that one regarded with apprehension: and much, one felt, could be forgiven where much was being achieved. Bureaucracy, however, became more and more bureaucratic. The Ministry of Health as watchdog on the lawn of local government was efficient. It scared the timid burglar, and when bolder thieves broke in it seemed, more often than not, to seize them so soon as they had secured their plunder. The Ministry of Health as lawmaker and dictator was not so good. Preoccupied with its thousand and one schemes for the betterment of social conditions and its determination to

impose its will on the people, it lost its terrors for the municipal would-be malefactor.

Corruption in local government administration became safer, and, becoming safer, ceased once more to be rare. To how marked a degree it *has* become safe, to how marked a degree it *has* ceased to be rare, the number and the gravity of scandals involving corruption and affecting local government administrators reported at length in the London Press during the last three years bear witness. Nor are these more than a small proportion of the cases of corruption and misappropriation that are brought to trial; nor these, in turn, more than a tiny proportion of the cases in which corruption has been manifest, though various causes have conspired to prevent their coming to actual trial.

To say this is not to imply that local government administration is wholly corrupt. In proportion to opportunity the percentage of corruption among local authorities may be little higher than it is in ordinary business. What matters—and this is knowledge that would long ago have sounded the death-knell of any other institution that made claims to being efficient—is that opportunities for indictable corruption in a local authority are as 10 to 1 compared with those in a business having an equivalent turnover, and opportunities for non-indictable corruption as 50 to 1. What seems clearly to emerge from the evidence is:

- (1) That corruption is rife in local government, and is increasing rather than diminishing.
- (2) That the Ministry of Health has failed to maintain its control of either the ethical or the business side of local government.
- (3) That our system of local government as at present existing is inadequate, inefficient and effete, and ought to be scrapped.

A grave indictment—leading, if the charges can be substantiated, to the conclusion that a complete reorganisation of the whole machinery of local government designed to place it upon a proper business basis, instead of on a basis of sentiment and exploded theories, is imperative if local government is to take its proper place in the national economy.

In examining the evidence upon which these charges are framed it may be wise first to deal with that available in the

reports issued by tribunals of inquiry into charges of municipal corruption, in the reports issued as a result of special or extraordinary audits, and in the ordinary reports of the Ministry of Health itself.

Here the mere statistical record that in the five years ending in 1934 special inquiries and audits by the Ministry of Health were called for on no fewer than 276 separate occasions; that as a result 458 local government officers 'ceased [to use a convenient phrase] to hold office'; and that of the 458 officers over 170 were actually prosecuted, is of something more than mere statistical interest.

Of these special inquiries the majority concerned discreditable episodes directly affecting paid officers only. To what extent the unpaid elected representatives of rate-payers were indirectly involved it is impossible to say. Turning, however, to cases which attained the notoriety of public report, we can gain a fairly clear idea of the nature and gravity of detected instances of major corruption involving paid officers or unpaid elected local government representatives in which evidence was in the majority of cases of such a nature as to make prosecution inescapable save by death.

To take a representative baker's dozen :¹

(1) As a result of an inquiry held in 1932 by Mr. J. H. Thorpe, Recorder of Blackburn, into rumours that certain members of the Hull Corporation had derived pecuniary advantage from transactions in land which the corporation had acquired or proposed to acquire, it was found that, trading upon his foreknowledge of the corporation's intentions and his ability as chairman of the Housing and Town Planning Committee to direct policy, a former Lord Mayor of Hull had netted over £1000 in a single month, and that a Hull alderman had been privy to this and other transactions of a similar nature and had derived profit from them.

Prosecution was deferred too long. Before the inquiry opened the ex-lord mayor was found dead in a gas-filled room in Dumbartonshire—where they do not hold coroners' inquests.

(2) A special audit in 1932 disclosed that in respect of the Poplar electrical engineer's car—for which he had originally been granted an allowance of 20s. a week—the council had paid, in the year 1930–31, £35 licence duty (he was in that year driving a 35 horse-power car!), £97 15s. for cleaning, and £200 as 'allowance'—a total of £332 15s.

¹ I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Major Arthur Skey for preparing the précis of 'cases' here cited in support of my general thesis.—C. W-E.

in twelve months. Later, an extraordinary audit revealed—(a) a loss of no less than £50,000 to the council between September 1927 and March 1933 (with a corresponding gain to the contractor), as a result of the supply of coal to the Electricity Department of a quality inferior to that specified and charged for; (b) that the electrical engineer had been taking professional fees from firms consuming electricity supplied by the council, and had been drawing royalties on patents of his own used by the Poplar undertaking. Bearing dates between December 24 and 31—covering the Christmas preceding the special audit—the auditor found copies of no fewer than sixteen letters from the electrical engineer acknowledging gifts from persons connected with firms trading with the electrical undertaking.

The electrical engineer, whose salary was over £2000, was suspended, and died later in the year. The assistant manager of the undertaking retired on superannuation allowance. Prosecuted after a further lapse of rather more than twelve months, the contractor pleaded that the contracts had been made by his son, who had since gone abroad, and that this son had been allowed the benefits of such contracts as he obtained. The contractor was acquitted.

Six months later, in reply to a question in the House, the Minister of Health stated that neither the Director of Public Prosecutions nor the Poplar Borough Council contemplated further criminal proceedings. The district auditor reported that, 'although the latitude allowed to the chief officers of the undertaking in the purchase of supplies may excite criticism,' there had not come to his knowledge 'any matter—apart from one exception—[a job for an out-of-work councillor] which in any way tended to implicate the council as a whole, or any committee or member.' Would, one wonders, the shareholders of a public company have been equally kind?

(3) In the same year a Newcastle alderman who held office in the Co-operative Society as well as in the corporation was sent to prison for conspiracy and frauds involving some 108 cases in which he passed as correct bills for goods which had never been supplied to the Co-operative Society at all.

This case, although not involving corruption in local government administration, demands notice in that it does involve a local government administrator holding high office in the council—a potential mayor.

(4) In February 1932 a Glasgow magistrate was fined £50 and deprived of holding office for three years (why three years?) for soliciting

bribes to show favour. This baillie was convenor of the sub-committee which allocated stances in the corporation Dead Meat Market. Changes were being made. Rumour whispering that a local firm of meat salesmen was likely to be allotted a less favourable stance than it had hitherto occupied, the director sent a representative to interview the convenor. The convenor's response was an inquiry as to what it would be worth to the firm to secure a much more favourable stance, a suggestion that it should be 'worth fifty quid' and an offer to accept £35 'to arrange the matter.' Paying over the £35, the firm had him arrested.

Highly significant comments upon the far-reaching implications in this case were made at the subsequent tribunal of inquiry into allegations of bribery and corruption against the Glasgow Corporation, to which reference will be made later.

(5) Two months later an ex-alderman of the Eastbourne Corporation, who had been for some time chairman of the Electricity Committee, a deputy-electrical engineer formerly in the service of the corporation, and one of the largest manufacturers of electrical machinery in the country were charged and convicted of bribery and corruption—the first two for accepting gifts to show favour, and the third for making gifts to obtain favour. All were convicted, the company being fined the maximum penalty of £555 and £650 costs.

The gravity of this case lay in the evidence it afforded of the light-heartedness with which a course of corruption extending over a period of two years was embarked upon. Shortly before the first date on which corruption was alleged and proved the company established an office in Eastbourne for the purpose of securing additional contracts. Its representative was given an entertainment allowance, and at first spent money 'mostly upon theatres, chocolates, liquid refreshments,' and 'other such forms of hospitality.' He spent, however, between October 1930 and May 1932 £153 on 'general entertainment' and £436 in cash payments and in the 'cost of going to theatres and to dances.'

With disbursements by a single representative on a scale such as this to secure business from a single local authority, it would be interesting to know the cost to the company of securing business from local authorities as a whole in the eighteen months covered. Reckoned upon this scale, what, too, in the same period must have been the cost to all contractors in this country of soliciting business from all

municipal authorities? Surely a sum equal to an appreciable proportion of the annual interest on the National Debt?

(6) In September of the same year a Glasgow municipal official was sent to prison for accepting money to show favour in the letting of corporation houses.

Rents charged by the corporation were roughly half a million sterling below what would have been economic rents; and this was not the only official to realise that he had a good thing to sell.

(7) A few months later two county councillors, both members of the Licensing Committee, were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment for soliciting bribes to show favour to an applicant for a licence.

This is one of a curiously limited number of prosecutions during the past few years in what is one of the most fertile fields for non-indictable, if not for indictable, corruption.

(8) In the same year an employee of the Sunderland Corporation two master builders, and a director of a sand and gravel company were convicted for stealing and receiving building material, the property of the corporation.

Before passing sentence, Mr. Justice du Parcq asked the jury not to concern itself, in its deliberations, with the question of whether anybody else should be in the dock. 'You are not,' he said, 'trying any other officials, nor are you investigating—though somebody else will, some day—the methods by which the affairs of the Sunderland Corporation are conducted.' Somebody else did; and in the upshot the borough engineer was asked to retire on a pension of £500, and the housing architect and the roads surveyor were given notice to terminate their appointments—the 'requisite notice,' despite the fact that the housing architect was declared 'no longer fit to hold the position of architect.' With him into his retirement the borough engineer took this touching tribute from the chairman of the committee of investigation: 'No one doubts the honour and integrity of the engineer, but he has been proved inefficient.' He had been a local government officer for forty years before this was charged against him. Not without justice did an alderman remark that members of the corporation 'were not altogether free from responsibility in the matter.'

(9) In 1934, as a result of a special audit by the Ministry of Health, the Battersea borough electrical engineer and the borough assistant electrical engineer were found (apparently to the surprise of the corporation) to have received from the Corporation considerable sums in royalties on inventions of the assistant engineer. At about this time the council accepted the resignation of its solicitor and assistant-solicitor. At a joint conference of two committees of the council it was divulged that application for the payment of £200 had been made to these two officers.

The rest of this story is more 'wropt in mistry' than the birth of the notorious Jeames; but the Minister of Health, 'while sharing the council's anxiety and appreciating the seriousness of what has happened,' reluctantly decided that he 'could not press the council to take further action.'

(10) During this year a West Riding county councillor, who was also a magistrate, was convicted of two charges under the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act—(a) as a member of a district isolation hospital committee, corruptly accepting from a woollen merchant a sum of money as a reward for authorising him to charge up certain sheets supplied to the committee at a higher price than had been decided upon; (b) corruptly soliciting from a woollen merchant a gift of money by similar means.

This magistrate, who had been a member of a board of guardians for forty years, an urban district councillor for twenty years, a county councillor for seven years, and had sat on the bench for four years, pleaded that 'as other councillors did this sort of thing' he did not see why he should not.

(11) In February 1935 a member of the Sunderland Town Council was convicted on three charges of attempting to obtain bribes. He was a member of the General Purposes Committee, which dealt with the appointment of a new borough engineer. Obtaining, in this capacity, the names of candidates placed on the short list, he wrote to three offering to assist them to obtain the appointment. 'This committee,' he confided to one, 'is a sub from the General Purposes Committee, of which I am a member, and they will pick a shorter list for final selection by the full committee. I might be able to pull a few members if I had them in some of the little "buffets" we generally adjourn to after the meetings. Any little gratuity sent will be drunk in wishing you success.' He enumerated the members of the committee whom it would be most important to impress. In two cases he asked for cheques.

Hope that this is an isolated instance of defection in a local government appointments committee is a little dimmed by Mr. Justice Goddard's remarks in passing sentence: 'I am

afraid,' he said, 'that there is much of this conduct among members of public bodies in this circuit, and it is necessary to pass sentence which will show to other members of public bodies, councillors or aldermen, that the law takes a grave view of this class of offence.'

(12) In May 1935 the architect to the Ely Rural District Council was charged with accepting gifts of money as an inducement to procure the payment to building contractors by the rural district council of sums of money to which they were not entitled, and also with issuing false certificates in respect of work alleged to have been carried out by them. He was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.

In explanation of the acquittal of contractors charged with conspiring with the architect, it should be added that the method adopted by accused was to obtain from the contractors blank billheads, and on them to make overcharges on prime costs. He adopted this practice immediately after his appointment as architect to the council in 1933.

(13) A month later a Liverpool city councillor was indicted on two charges of soliciting secret commissions. In the first case he called on a firm of wholesale grocers, reminded them that he was a city councillor, invited them to submit tenders to the corporation on forms he produced, and added: 'If you quote on behalf of Mr. — [a friend] you can take it from me you will get the business.' Later he suggested that the firm should give him an appointment, paying him commission on any business he got. Asked what he meant, he explained: 'Just putting me on the books. There are thousands worth of business to be got in this way, and it is being done by everyone. Why should you not be in it? It would mean about £50,000 a year, because the corporation is the largest single buyer in the city.' In the second case he made use of his position as a councillor to ascertain from the electrical engineer the price the corporation would accept for water tubes and boilers it wished to dispose of; invited an iron company to tender; and later wrote: 'The engineer has passed the selling of these goods on to me. I could have taken your £700 as indicated on the 'phone on Wednesday, but you have complicated the matter by getting on to the corporation direct. The consequence is that the price this morning is £850. If you care to cover me for £50 and wire your best offer I will close the deal for you if it is possible. I am a member of the city council and it is no use trying to deal direct.'

For these two very flagrant offences the city councillor was fined £50, the judge remarking that he considered him a blundering fool rather than a wilfully dishonest person. Accused was emphatic that he was merely expecting to get

an ordinary commission as a business man, and had done no wrong.

It will be noted that no reference has been made to notorious scandals involving corruption in the police force, whose duty it is to punish corruption; to the recent prosecution of an immigration officer; to the Salvage Corps scandal, which shocked those business men who did not realise, as many did, that such things were common. Nor do I refer to the episode in which the secretary to the Superintendent of Supplies of the Metropolitan Water Board was shown to have made a practice of abusing his power to decide appointments by obtaining considerable sums of money from applicants for those appointments. These are national or public utility rather than local government scandals.

Compressed, of necessity, each within a brief paragraph, our baker's dozen of cases provides not only a vast amount of suggestive material, but proof that municipal corruption is not confined to municipal paid officers. What they fail to convey is more than a hint of the surprise and bewilderment of most of the malefactors at finding themselves in the dock, of their feeling that they were scapegoats, or of the extent to which their feelings were shared alike by witnesses on both sides and by those who had sat and worked with them on public bodies.

This surprise, however extraordinary it may at the first blush appear to the average citizen, is not difficult for anyone familiar with local politics to understand. It arises not merely from the 'ordinariness' of their offendings, but also from the extreme thinness of the line that divides the very considerable volume of *indictable* corruption existing in local government from the vastly more considerable volume of *non-indictable corruption* which is a distinguishing feature of municipal life. Indictable corruption is fairly clearly defined in the Public Health Act, 1875, the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916, and the Local Government Act, 1933. These Acts leave outside the law a vast number of corrupt practices not less discreditable than many that they bring within it.

And this of necessity. Not all the wit of all legal pundits could devise a judicial net adequate to cover more than a

small percentage of the discreditable and disreputable forms of jobbery for which local government provides both temptation and safe opportunity. To take a few examples at random:

(a) Messrs. A., B. and C., large and responsible contractors, wish to secure a £100,000 contract for new roads (or new houses, or a new sewerage scheme, or a new waterworks scheme). The wish brings to mind the responsible council surveyor, Mr. Y. Z.—an excellent man, presentable, efficient, a man whose word 'goes' with his committee and his council, the kind of man the company has, it suddenly realises, been seeking for years. Salary? The council is paying him £1200. Not good enough for a man of this type, who would be a gift to the company at £2500—even on a five years' contract—if its tender for the £100,000 job is accepted. In municipal circles big contracts breed big contracts by the confidence they inspire. . . . The company *does* get the contract, and Mr. Y. Z. *is* a gift at £2500 a year. The understanding is between gentlemen—no documents pass. Here is a perfectly innocent business transaction. Even the minutes of the board go to show that no thought of engaging Mr. Y. Z. arose until the contract was partially completed, and Mr. Y. Z.'s letter was found among the responses to a skilfully worded and certainly tempting advertisement.

(b) Mr. W. X., chairman of the Housing Committee, comes of a prolific race. His family has 'married into the council.' He has relations on neighbouring councils—county, city, borough, rural and urban—some of them as zealous as they are important: born leaders of men. He has recently purchased (with the aid of a substantial mortgage, for he is both shrewd and poor) a terrace of cottages for £4000. He receives—not a little to his astonishment—a series of nibbles. His selling price goes up. Finally he closes with an offer of £11,500. . . . The purchaser is a distant relation by marriage of a large shareholder in the firm of contractors whose £70,000 tender the chairman and his friends and relations so enthusiastically recommend for acceptance for the new council housing estate. Not improbably the large shareholder and his genealogically and territorially distant relation are not even on speaking terms. One may hazard a guess, however, that the £70,000 contract will—given suitable opportunity—be as prolific as Mr. W. X.'s family.

(c) Alderman Sir U. V.—that very shrewd ex-grocer, knighted for his services to his party and to his city, and now a county councillor holding what amounts to a life chairmanship of the Highways Committee—has a grandson who has failed to profit by his grandsire's precepts. After one of those rather remarkable champagne luncheons to which municipal officials and their wives (and sometimes their sons and daughters) are periodically invited by manufacturers who wish them to share their natural pride in the opening of, say, a new welfare centre for their workers, the managing director seeks the alderman's good offices. The company is in a difficulty. There is a £1500 job—which will later

carry a directorship to the right man, for which they cannot find the right man. Does Sir U. V. think that his grandson (who emphatically is the right man for the job) could be persuaded to consider the appointment? The commencing salary is small, of course; but the alderman's grandson is young, and——. The alderman is doubtful. Only the success with which the company carries out the first of the series of contracts for which its tender is shortly afterwards accepted dissipates his doubt. . . . He is relieved to feel that at last he can look forward to his grandson's future not merely with hope but with confidence.

(d) Mr. S. T. is the town clerk, and the real power in the P. Q. City Corporation. His council consists largely of elected members who are new to municipal affairs (there has been what is called 'a clean sweep' at the polls): the city surveyor has only recently been appointed, and is still moderately tame because he has not yet found his feet; the city treasurer is due to retire and has been unable to endure any considerable mental strain for some twenty years. The corporation is about to place on the market a new loan—the biggest it has so far put out. The Finance Committee, with one exception, is out of its depth, and that exception owes much of his rise to power to the astute and universally honoured clerk. Who shall handle the loan? Who but Mr. (surely he will be Sir when the Birthday Honours are announced?) N. O.? He is now a financial expert; his prophecies as to probable meteoric rises in Throgmorton Street have always been fulfilled in a manner that has given the utmost satisfaction, not only to his old friend the clerk, but to the clerk's bank and that of the one member of the Finance Committee who matters. Clearly N. O. is the man. It is true that there are rumours that he has more than an onlooker's interest in the business of the financial wizard whose unerring instinct and indomitable courage have made him England's most noteworthy financial octopus; it is true that there have been hints——. But in fields into which other local authorities have adventured no blame can be attached to the clerk for adventuring also. The loan goes to N. O., to be passed to the financial octopus. Not only the Corporation of P. Q. is involved in the downfall of the financial octopus that follows, with its unbelievable aftermath: its amazing disclosure of forged certificates and what not. Could a hint of unjust or even careless stewardship be urged against anyone without the involving the Ministry of Health? After the least perceptible of tremors the municipal barometer again reads 'set fair.'

Adequately to deal with this kind of jobbery—which, as in case (d), may so often be held to be unconscious, or at worst to be innocent—would take a volume of the *Nineteenth Century and After* and still leave the half untold. The examples chosen take only those liberties with the truth that the law of libel unfortunately demands. The machinery varies little: in corrupt practices arising out of the giving and getting of contracts the principals vary only according to

whether in actual fact—no matter what the rules of the Ministry of Health or the rules of procedure may decree—the deciding voice is that of the paid officer or of one or more of the unpaid representatives of the ratepayers. The risks to clever men are small; the stakes high. The annual expenditure budgeted for by a single corporation may be anything from £10,000,000 to £20,000,000, of which from £2,000,000 to £5,000,000 may be spent on materials, goods and work done. And these figures leave out of account, of course, expenditure on roads.

Corrupt acts arising from the actual giving and getting of direct contracts with the local authority form, however, numerically but a small proportion of corrupt acts arising out of local government administration as a whole. Under the Local Government Act, 1933, a member of the council having any pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in any contract, proposed contract, or other matter under discussion by a council must withdraw from the meeting unless the Minister of Health shall have removed this disability, or the council invite him to remain; and must disclose his interest. Members of the council may not solicit for any person any appointment under the council, or recommend any person for such appointment or for promotion (though they may give applicants testimonials in writing). Applicants for appointments under a council must disclose relationship to any member of, or the holder of any senior office under, the council. The Act, however, does not prevent a councillor from entering into contracts with the council, or his relations from doing so; disclosure of relationship may improve rather than prejudice an applicant's chances; written testimonials may, when a 'big-wig' member's heart is known to be behind them, do at least as much to secure an appointment for his nominee as direct verbal solicitation. Where the will is, there the way lies open.

'Jobs' continue to be 'worked'; 'understandings' continue to bring profit to contractors and to council officers and members; relations of members and officers, in spite—perhaps sometimes because of—disclosure of relationship, continue to find jobs under the council; aldermen and councillors continue to obtain contracts with their councils; the Minister of Health grants a special dispensation to coun-

cillor members of a Co-operative Society to vote on contracts, and in the upshot the contracts are placed with the Co-operative Society; the borough surveyor, engineer, or housing officer, charged with the duty of checking the work and materials of contractors, is 'kind' to the contractors; the building contractor whose tender happens to be most frequently acceptable to the Housing Committee puts in a tender £1000 lower than his competitor for a new residence for the chairman of the committee or his rich son-in-law, and 'misgivings' in the mind of the chairman's architect do not warrant a breach of professional etiquette; 20 per cent. of the council (*vide* Earl Winterton in the debate on the second reading of the new Housing Bill) are successful in getting council houses to live in, to the benefit of their household budgets; a very long-sighted councillor makes an investment in land that the council must need when it builds that new arterial road that nobody, save the councillor himself (and the surveyor who was not quite quick enough in reshuffling his maps), knows must come; the cleansing superintendent buys for an old song a (very slightly) second-hand car, and the firm whose representative broke it in gets the order for new refuse-removing vehicles; a councillor goes racing and meets a contractor who 'knows a good thing,' but is a little vague about the name of the horse till it has won and he hands the councillor the odds to a 'tenner' with a casual 'knew you wouldn't like to be left out in the cold, old man.' A hundred similar cases could be cited.

That corruption is widespread is well known: ask any intelligent working foreman, and, if he trusts you, he will tell you so, giving, not chapter and verse, but

*Fama malum quod non velocius allum
Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo.*

Yet references to the subject in Parliament are met with dignified remonstrances and sanctimonious assurances that such cases as receive publicity are as rare as cases of proved insanity among legislators.

CLOUGH WILLIAMS-ELLIS.

[A second article by Mr. Clough Williams-Ellis will appear in a subsequent issue.]

POVERTY IN PLENTY: A MISTAKEN INFERENCE

By E. H. PHELPS BROWN

THE last six years have led many people to believe that we are confronted by a new problem. Modern industry has from its earliest days been afflicted by recurrent depression, and each depression in its turn has seen the two scourges of wants unsatisfied and goods unsold visit the world in strange alliance, each augmenting with the increased fierceness of the other; but in recent years it seems that the unused potentialities of industry are not merely the index of privation, but its very cause. The failure of demand in the past has been intelligible as the accompaniment of disappointed hope and shaken confidence, following upon a time of excitement, speculation, and over-trading. The remedy has accordingly been sought in such regulation of the machinery of banking and investment as would prevent the recurrence of the boom. The slump of 1929, however, has seemed to be due to something more than the reaction from excess of enterprise. There was, we know, a boom in Wall Street, but in Great Britain we do not remember 1928 and 1929 as years of inflated values and feverish activity. The world-wide incidence of the depression, again, and its extreme severity, point likewise to the presence of a new problem. Of this problem an essential imprint is seen in the general adoption of schemes for the restriction of output, and even for the destruction of what has already been produced, side by side with the continued introduction of improvements in organisation and technique, such as in many striking instances enforce the increase in the productive powers of human labour. The task of recovery is therefore seen no longer as the choice of measures to prevent enterprise passing into gambling, and advance of credits into inflation, but appears now as the devising of a

scheme of distribution that will make available to man as consumer those plentiful supplies that science yields him as producer.

Human society [said Mr. Lansbury at the opening of the last session] has developed so far in scientific discovery and in methods for the production of goods that production has tremendously outstripped consumption. We have learned how to produce, but we have not yet learned how to distribute.¹

The same opinion has been expressed by Mr. Churchill in a broadcast address :

The cause of this world depression is not famine or scarcity ! It is our very power to supply our wants more abundantly that has upset the old arrangements. Man is conquering Nature, and the problem now is to spread the plenty which science can bestow.²

Thus appears the problem of plenty. It seems a problem deeper-going and more significant than the old problem of the slump : deeper-going, because it depends, not on the commercial conditions of one or two years alone, but on the continuing advance of science ; more significant, because it bears with it the promise of general well-being.

If we suffer want to-day, [the Dean of Canterbury has written] it is in face of the incalculable unappropriated gifts which God, through science, solar power, and skilled organisation, waits to bestow on us. Physical facts warrant abundance for all. . . . Half the miracle is wrought. Production is solved. Distribution and exchange await solution.³

Such is the conclusion which it is the purpose of this paper to consider.

We have already suggested that the conclusion has been commended by two principal groups of facts. The first of these consists in the destruction of foodstuffs for which no sufficient market could be found : we hear of fish thrown back into the sea, milk poured into the rivers, sound grain consumed in fire. The deliberate destruction of food is profoundly shocking, affronting, as it does, those feelings that find expression in the harvest festival ; even perhaps in a world where none went hungry, we should feel it was wicked waste ; but in a world where want is widespread, it seems no less mad than wicked. The second group of facts is found

¹ House of Commons (*The Times*, November 20, 1934).

² *The Listener*, January 17, 1934.

³ *The Times*, July 18, 1934.

in numerous instances of technical improvement : the replacement of hand by machine, the rationalisation of organisation, the applications of science to agriculture. When a machine whose function it is to increase the return to human effort throws into idleness those who are anxious to labour, the paradox of plenty is seen in one form ; when increased powers of production result in a resort to collective restriction of output, it is seen in another. To test the conclusion, let us, then, study these two groups of facts more closely.

In the discussion of economic questions it is often well to begin by stating some platitudes, whose familiarity is apt to hide them from our notice, when there is so much that is perplexing to unravel. The destruction of food takes place, we know, because the full available supply is expected to bring in too small a return ; and the attention which in the United States is paid to the relative movements of the prices the farmer pays and those he receives reminds us that what matters to the farmer is not the money he collects, but what he can get with the money when he comes to spend it. A price that is satisfactory in one year may be unsatisfactory in the next, and may induce a restriction of output, if meanwhile the prices of the goods the farmer buys have risen. While, therefore, the typical transaction of commerce is one in which goods change hands against money, such a transaction is useless to the seller, until he in turn has exchanged the money for what he wants ; and when he considers how much he can afford to take, he must think, not of money only, but of what money can buy. At times when prices are steady, the second consideration scarcely enters explicitly ; but let them be disturbed, and it makes its force felt at once. We realise in such a case that the transaction in which goods are sold for money is for each of the parties to it only one half of the real exchange by which he lives : that exchange consists in the barter of goods for goods. When, therefore, some group of producers finds the proceeds of its sales disappointing, this means that the other groups of producers do not offer it enough of the goods that they make.

Such a state of affairs may arise from three types of cause : the amount offered may have so increased that the price is driven down very low ; the other groups may have lost their taste for what is offered them ; or their own outputs may have

diminished, so that they cannot afford to offer so much as before. It is essential to observe that in the first two cases some reduction of output is not a refusal of potential plenty, but marks acceptance of the rule that a balance must be kept between the outputs of different trades. When an improvement in technique enables the productive forces now engaged in a trade to produce more than before, consumers can choose whether they will keep those productive forces unreduced and absorb all the increase in output, or take something less than the full increase and move some of the productive forces away to other employments. This choice they exert in the way they lay out their expenditure. If the commodity of which more is offered to them is one of which they are very willing to have more, the increase in output will be marketed without requiring a great fall in price, and little, if any, of the productive forces will have to seek other employment; but if it be one like wheat or potatoes, of which a certain amount is very necessary but more is not much wanted, then the price will fall sharply, and this is the way in which consumers make known their virtual choice that rather than have more wheat they would sooner have some other product of the forces they now dismiss. A curtailment of output is therefore not always to be regarded as a deliberate invocation of murrain and drought. If the same proportion of our population were engaged in agriculture to-day as in the Middle Ages, the output of agricultural produce would be very much greater than it now is; but we should be worse off, for we should be going without the things which are now made by the forces which technical advances have released, and consumers have chosen to transfer, from agriculture to other occupations. True, it too often happens that a man who is released does not find other work, and then the loss of his output is an unmitigated loss. Yet the importance of this fact, and the suffering it entails, must not blind us to the function of the process at work. The problem is, not how to create the demand that will maintain full employment for all the forces now attached to any trade, but how to carry through a needed transference with the least enforced idleness and suffering. The advocates of the planned economy may reasonably claim that where such adjustments can be foreseen they can be made with less difficulty: instead of having to

move men of middle age out of the trade in 1950, you will refuse to admit youths to it in 1940, and a needed contraction will then be effected by the normal process of retirement. Yet though a prescient control may ease adjustments, it cannot avoid them. The necessity for them does not depend on the conditions of private enterprise alone, but must follow upon changes of taste and technique in any form of the division of labour.

These considerations, which have been worked out with reference to an increase in potential supply, will found be to apply equally to the second of the three causes of over-production which were distinguished above—namely, to the case in which the impulse to contraction arises from an aversion of consumers' taste. They will moreover be confirmed if we make a more particular study of some of the trades which have most attracted notice by restriction of output or destruction of stocks. Let us consider rubber, coffee, and wheat.

In 1910 1 lb. of rubber could at one time have been sold for more than 12s.; by the end of 1920—a year in which wholesale prices generally in Great Britain were three times as high as before the war—it could not be sold for 1s. It was in face of this collapse that the first attempt was made to maintain price by restricting output: let us, then, take our stand in 1920, and ask how the situation of that year had come about. The first factor to record is that a vast increase in output had been induced by a swift extension of demand. With the rise of the motor trade the supply of rubber from the trees of the uncultivated forest became wholly inadequate to the demand for tyres, and under the stimulus of rising prices European capital poured into the plantations of south-eastern Asia: it is estimated that between 1906 and 1910 some million acres were planted. Yet rapidly as planting went on, it did not at first check the rise in price, for—and this is a second important factor—it is usually not until seven years after the tree has been planted that it can be tapped. High prices could, therefore, continue their apparent inducement to expand, even though so much capacity had already been provided as made a sharp fall in price inevitable in the next five years. From 1910 onwards the price did, in fact, decline, and this fall, together with the outbreak of war,

put an end to the investment of European capital. Yet at this point a third factor appears, for when the European company stopped, the native planter rose and went on. He was to prove an obstacle to adjustment, for, having himself little or no monetary costs, he is under no compulsion to reduce his output when price falls, and may, indeed, seek to maintain his income by producing, not less, but more. So it came about that the exports of cultivated rubber, which in 1910 had been no more than 11,000 tons, emerged after the war at more than 300,000. The consequent fall in price introduces us to a fourth factor. Rubber is not sold to the consumer as it leaves the planter, but enters into highly fabricated products, of whose final cost it makes up a quite small part. Even, therefore, though the price of raw rubber is halved, the cost of a tyre will be reduced in very small proportion: the planters cannot hope that a fall in price will greatly increase consumption. Such were the difficulties of adjustment, in supply and in demand, which induced attempts to organise restriction of the output of rubber.

In the troubles of Brazilian coffee we meet similar conditions. An undue extension of plantation was effected under cover of the lag between the planting of the tree and its first bearing fruit; for the coffee tree this interval is of four to five years. Satisfactory prices in the years 1922 to 1926 had already induced some extension in São Paulo, and the number of trees increased by about one-sixth. In the next year came a bumper crop, nearly twice the export of the year before; but the Coffee Institute held two-fifths of it off the market and maintained the price; what is more, on what was stored it advanced to the farmer more than half the current price. Rejoicing in greatly increased receipts, the farmers set to planting new trees and rejuvenating the old. For the crop of 1929 the trees of 1926 were increased by an eighth; at that point, contrary to all expectation, came another bumper yield, more bounteous even than that of two years before; and then the scheme of the Institute broke down. It broke down, in the first place, because the Institute was unable to raise further loans in London or New York; but even had these funds been available, it still would have had to face a productive capacity too great to be fully employed at the price of coffee which it had maintained in 1928. Meanwhile,

a difficulty had arisen on the side of demand. The good prices of preceding years had stimulated the use and output of the 'mild' coffees grown in other regions; and consumers became accustomed, and attached, to the qualities of the 'mild' growths, until, indeed, these came to take preference over the Brazilian. Such is the background of the destruction of coffee. The policy of the Institute apart, the difficulties it reveals are the lagging adjustment of supply, ending in the overshooting of the mark, the rise of new sources of supply, and a change in consumers' tastes.

Let us finally examine the causes of the collapse of the wheat market in 1929. That collapse broke off a trend of expansion which must have prevailed ever since North America and the southern hemisphere first entered the world market. In the twenty years before the war the wheat crop of the world increased by nearly half, and so did the amount entering into international trade; and demand must have advanced with more than equal stride, for meanwhile the price at Liverpool was tending upwards. The expansive influences which the newer fields thus steadily experienced were suddenly intensified by the war: the European crop was diminished, and the exports of those eastern European regions, especially Russia, from which the west of Europe had formerly drawn much of its supplies, all but completely disappeared. The new world came in to redress the balance of the old. In the five years beginning with 1921 the exports of North America were nearly two and one half times as great as in the last five years before the war; those of South America were increased by one-third, those of Oceania nearly doubled. European recovery did not check the advance: though the harvest of the world, Russia apart, reached a total greater than in the years before the war, the price in the international market remained remunerative to the farmer in the newer fields. Meanwhile his costs were being lowered by technical improvements. There were improvements in the seed, enabling cultivation to extend to the 16-inch, even to the 12-inch, rain belt of Canada. There were improvements also in machinery: cultivators that enabled a single man to till as much as 1600 acres, and the combine, halving the costs of harvesting and threshing, and ending the turbulent migrations of harvest labour to the prairie. The

tractor, meanwhile, by displacing the horse, both decreased the demand for the crops and increased the supply; it is estimated that in the United States between 1918 and 1928 some 18,000,000 acres were released from feeding the horse, and were engaged to increase the output of wheat, live-stock, or cotton. Under such stimulus, in 1927 the wheat crop of the world, Russia apart, reached a record size; in 1928 the acreage was greater still, and Nature proved unusually bountiful; then came the break. Large stocks had been carried forward from 1927, and again from 1928. In 1929, though the harvest was poor in America, it was good in the principal export market, Europe. A sharp fall in price was inevitable, and the financial crisis made it sharper still. Yet this fall, instead of widening the market, contracted it, for some of the principal European importers hastened to place a tariff between their peasantry and ruin. Italy and Germany between them nearly halved their imports, and those of France were reduced to vanishing point. By August 1931 the price of wheat, which was 63 cents in Liverpool, was \$1.62 in Germany, and \$1.71 in France. Then in 1930 Russia returned in force to the export market, and her shipments made up more than one-fifth of the amount internationally traded in that year.

It is not hard to draw together the factors which this story reveals in common with those already told. In all three, the principal difficulty lies in the orderly adjustment of capacity, when a world market is served by innumerable producers. In such a situation foresight is difficult, contraction painful. For wheat, it is true, there is no lengthy interval between planting and harvesting, to allow of an unnoticed cumulation of productive powers; but the place of this difficulty is taken by the fact that the principal importing countries are themselves producers, and will dam cheap wheat out. As in rubber and coffee, the dangers inherent in the structure of supply have been precipitated by the disturbances of demand, for which the war bears chief responsibility, and by the development of new regions.

Such a diagnosis does not encourage us to seek a remedy in a new plan of distribution. Though the financial crisis has worsened these producers' difficulties, it has not initiated them. Had every man and machine within the trading world

been fully employed in the years since the war, these producers would still have had their problem of adjustment. That problem is to keep the output of one product in balance with all other kinds of output in the markets of the world. The task is still to organise, not distribution, but production.

This conclusion serves to define the relevance of the third of the possible causes of over-production that were suggested above: namely, that the rest of the trading community, though as willing as before to take a certain product, may be unable to offer so much because their own output, the real purse with which they buy, has contracted. In the world depression this possibility has certainly been realised, but we have seen that it has only aggravated an existing difficulty. Over-production, as we have seen it, is one problem, general depression is another. They interact, but are distinct in origin.

The fusing together of these two problems has no doubt fostered the belief that we can have abundance for the asking. It is true to say that if all the productive forces now engaged in certain trades were fully utilised, their products would become available in unparalleled cheapness and profusion. It is also true to say that in a time of general depression there are few trades in which all the productive forces engaged are fully utilised. How tempting is it to put the two statements together, and conclude that plenty waits on us at every turn! Evidence is not lacking to suggest the same conclusion. Striking figures can be cited to show what has been done to increase the output per head of workers employed, as when we learn that the reorganisation of the Ford works in 1921 reduced the number of workers employed for each car built daily from sixteen to nine. When we go on from particular cases to estimate an average, we have such a finding as that reached by Professor F. C. Mills, of the National Bureau of Economic Research.⁴

The decade 1919-29 witnessed one of the greatest advances ever recorded in industrial productivity in American manufacturing industries. Output per worker employed increased no less than 41 per cent.

Again, it has been pointed out that for some reason industrial equipment is now rarely worked to its full capacity. The United States Census of Manufactures records the ratio

⁴ Bulletin 53.

which in 1921 and 1923 the actual output in American manufactures bore to the maximum possible output; if we take an average which gives due weight to the sizes of the different trades, the figure comes to just over 57 per cent. in 1921, just over 72 per cent. in 1923.⁵ The first of these years was one of depression, but the second is regarded as a time of good trade and full employment. It is plausible to infer that, if the consumers' undoubted needs could have been steadily exerted in effective demand, the output of American manufactures would have been increased, even in a year of good trade, by something like one-third. Such kinds of evidence make up the case for plenty, which we must now consider.

Unhappily for mankind, the case breaks down under examination: not because the witnesses do not in general accurately report the facts, but because those facts are not enough. Technical progress, in the first place, may be rapid and striking in particular trades; it may be substantial even on an average of trades; and yet, spread over the whole economic effort of the community, it may make up only a small advance. We must not reckon the economy of effort achieved by using a new machine without bringing into account the effort needed to construct and maintain that machine. We must further remember that manufacture, in which technical progress has been most marked, still in this machine age makes up only one part of our total income. According to Mr. Flux's estimate, the total home-consumed product of industry, excluding transport, valued as it leaves the works, amounted in Great Britain in 1924 to some £1,619,000,000. The remainder, some three-fifths of the national income, is made up by transport, distribution, personal services, agriculture and fisheries, by goods imported in exchange for exports, and by income drawn from overseas. It is therefore roughly true to say that if technical improvements enabled the workers now engaged in manufactures to double their output of goods, the national income would be increased by no more than two-fifths.

The evidence of unused capacity is equally inadequate. A plant may have an annual output much less than it could provide were it fully used throughout the working year, and yet be no bigger than the output actually produced

⁵ Willard Thorp, *Economic Essays in Honour of Wesley Mitchell*.

requires; just as an hotel is not shown to be too big for its custom if every room is not occupied every night. Wherever demand is seasonally variable, as it is for electricity, or supply can be carried on only at certain times of the year, as in brickmaking or canning fruit, the nominal annual capacity of a plant will always exceed its actual output. Much more important than these difficulties, however, is the objection that we cannot add together figures which have been obtained for each plant separately, without regard to the effect which an increased use of raw materials and labour in one plant will take upon the availability of these productive forces to the others. A necessary check upon these calculations, therefore, is to ask by how much our national income would be increased if every person now unemployed were brought back to work. Let us assume that the output per head of the workers re-employed would be the same as that of the labour force already working, so that the home-produced national income would be increased in the same proportion as the number of workers: unless this assumption be a great under-estimate, its roughness will not impair the significance of the result. Now, according to the last census of population, there were in Great Britain in April 1931 rather more than 21,000,000 persons 'gainfully occupied.' At the same date the returns of unemployment showed 1,848,170 persons 'out of a situation,' and a further 556,978 'temporarily stopped'—that is, 2,405,148 potential workers were out of action. If, then, these had been brought back, the active labour force would have been increased by rather more than one-eighth. Those, therefore, who believe that the full utilisation of our present productive powers would bring in a reign of plenty must rest their case on some other evidence than the present unemployment of men and plant. Were that unemployment overcome, the national income would be increased; but in terms of goods and services the change would not be revolutionary.

If these considerations are just, the belief that we are faced by a new problem is illusory. The evidence on which it rests is striking, significant, and sometimes tragic; but it does not suffice to establish the conclusion. As we have studied it, we have seen the picture of a general surplus divide into two parts: on the one side is the over-expansion of certain single trades, on the other is the cyclical recurrence

of depression. Technical advances have affected both these problems, but have not brought about a general outstripping of demand by supply; we may hope for a continuing, and through the century a revolutionary, rise in the standard of living, but we have no reason to believe that present disorders mark the stormy onset of a new era. These disorders spring rather from the dislocation wrought by war; from maladjustments in the supply of raw materials from world-wide sources to international markets; and from the endemic fluctuations of enterprise, investment, and expenditure.

It is in the last factor alone that the task can be said to be to make demand effective to the full extent of our productive powers: only here can the remedy be sought in an improved control of monetary circulation. The orthodox economist is sometimes thought to neglect this problem; but in fact some of his chief efforts have in recent years been concentrated on it, and a great advance has been achieved in understanding. If the contrary impression arises, it is because the layman who comes to the works of the economists finds in them no such direct prescription as his burning consciousness of the need for remedies leads him to demand. The economist seems to agree that in the depression not enough is being spent, and yet refuses to conclude in simple terms that all we need provide is the means of spending more. The argument we have conducted may perhaps make this refusal more intelligible. As in the world market for raw materials, so in the monetary system of a country, the task is, not to make one quantity equal to another, but to ease and steady the adjustment of a complex system of strains and thrusts, through which impulses are imparted not only by the rods and wheels of goods and money, but also along the threads of human nerves. It is an insidious excuse for complacent inactivity to urge (however truly) that the issues are technical, and point out the difficulties in the way of betterment; we may also beware of a hasty conception of the problem, such as kindles the imagination, but deflects the judgment.

E. H. PHELPS BROWN.

A MINISTRY OF JUSTICE?

By HIS HONOUR JOHN D. CRAWFORD

Until the whole subject of Justice, a subject with immense variety, is systematically reviewed and dealt with, I shall not think that the organisation of this Department of the State can be satisfactory.—LORD HALDANE'S *Autobiography*, p. 253.

There is no functionary at present who can properly be called a Minister responsible for the subject of Justice.—*Report of the Machinery of Government Committee*, chap. x.: 'Justice.'

THE struggle for legal reform is almost as sad reading as the warfare of science. It may be that it has no martyrs to mark its progress and to point its moral of the evil done by blind bigotry and senseless resistance to change.

In progressive communities, social necessities and social opinion are almost always more or less in advance of law. Law is stable. The societies are progressive. The greater or less happiness of a people depends on the promptitude with which the gulf is narrowed.

So wrote Sir Henry Maine, one of the greatest thinkers and jurists of the second half of the nineteenth century.

How can the gulf mentioned by Sir Henry Maine best be narrowed? That is the question of questions for the statesman, and upon the success with which it is dealt depends not a little the happiness and welfare of the community. The administration of justice is so vital to the whole community that no pains ought to be spared to make it as complete and perfect as possible. A distinguished American once said that 'Justice is the great interest of man on earth.' In substance this is true. Ought there not to be a Minister whose functions are solely concerned with the administration of justice—'a Minister of Justice'? It is probably due to the fact that the Machinery of Government Committee, over which Lord Haldane presided, sat during the war (the Report was made shortly after the Armistice was signed) that chap. x.—'Jus-

tice'—of this Report is so little known; yet few who have read it will dispute its value. Lord Haldane has stated in his *Autobiography* (see p. 253) that this chapter was written by him. Lord Haldane was not only a great lawyer; he was also a great administrator, a philosopher, and a man of affairs—a combination not often found. Clause 2 of the chapter entitled 'Justice' is as follows:

We think a strong case is made out for the appointment of a Minister of Justice—we are impressed by the representations made by men of great experience . . . as to the difficulty of getting the attention of the Government to legal reform and as to the want of Contact between those who are responsible for the administration of the work of the Commercial Courts and the Mercantile Community and by the evidence adduced that the latter are in consequence progressively withdrawing their disputes from the jurisdiction of the Courts. We are not less impressed with the total inadequacy of the organisation which controls the general administration of the very large staffs . . . one of the chief reasons for this inadequacy is the magnitude and variety of the duties with which the Lord Chancellor is charged without being allowed either the time or the machinery requisite for their performance. It is one thing to hold the position of Chief legal adviser to the Government and quite another to possess the powers which a Minister of Justice ought to have.

It is most unfortunate that this Report appeared at a time when public attention was being given to the innumerable and pressing problems created by the terrible strain and stress of over four years of war. Mr. Sam Garrett, a well-known solicitor and a man of great ability, was President of the Law Society in 1918. He advocated the creation of a Ministry of Justice, and I gather he was supported by the majority of the Council of the Law Society, but, unfortunately, when Mr. Garrett's year of office ended nothing further was done.

The tremendous upheaval of the Great War and the changes which have followed in its train have shown the need of a critical and dispassionate examination of old methods. The war, like an earthquake or a deluge, has obliterated ancient landmarks and has called into existence new conditions to which old methods are inapplicable. Our business men have not been slow to meet the new conditions. New processes and new procedures for conducting business have been devised. New combinations have been called into being to meet new commercial rivalries and to maintain the supremacy of British commerce. The manner in which our

business men have been able to weather the storm, to survive in a period of terrible depression, which has brought disaster to so many other countries, is the best testimony to their ability, their foresight and their courage. It is fatuous to allege that any institution or department of State is so venerable that it is permanent and immovable or that it is not subject to the inevitable law of change. The demands on the time of Parliament are so great that no measure, certainly no measure which is likely to arouse opposition from vested interests, has any chance of being carried, unless it is proposed by the Government of the day.

The Attorney-General, who would presumably have the conduct of such a measure in the House of Commons, may not be a member of the Cabinet. The present Attorney-General is not a member of the Cabinet. During the last seventy years comparatively few Attorney-Generals have had a seat in the Cabinet.¹ Although men of great distinction held the office of Attorney-General in the Ministries of Gladstone, Disraeli, and Lord Salisbury, they were not in the Cabinet. Coleridge, James, Holker, Russell, and Webster were men of outstanding ability and of great eminence not only in the legal profession, but in public life; yet none of them was in the Cabinet while holding the office of Attorney-General. This means that any measure of legal reform, which is a Government measure, must to some, and probably to a very large, extent be the work of the Lord Chancellor, upon whose initiative and driving power legal reform depends. That great office dates back to the reign of Edward the Confessor, the first English king to use the Norman practice of sealing instead of signing documents. From the Norman Conquest onwards the succession of Chancellors is continuous. The Chancellor was originally, and for centuries continued to be, an ecclesiastic, who combined the functions of the most eminent of the Royal chaplains with those of the King's secretary in secular matters and the Keeper of the Great Seal. It is interesting to note that it was as the King's chaplain that the Chancellor was Keeper of the King's Conscience, a function which, in theory, the Lord Chancellor is still supposed to perform.

¹ It is well known that Gladstone disapproved of the Attorney-General being a member of the Cabinet.

Under Henry II. the Chancellor was already largely employed in judicial work, either in attendance on the King, or in visiting the provinces with the King. The judicial duties of the Chancellor grew out of the fact that all petitions addressed to the King passed through his hands. By the reign of Edward I. the number of these petitions had grown to such an extent that all those requiring the Great Seal were referred to the Chancellor. In the reign of Edward III. the tribunal and the duties of the Chancellor had acquired a more definite character. Petitions for grace and favour were addressed direct to the Chancellor, instead of being merely examined by him and passed on to the King. Later in the reign of Edward III., matters of grace were definitely committed to the Chancellor for his decision. The reference of petitions and matters to the Chancery led to the Chancellor's office becoming a separate court of law. This was the commencement of the equitable jurisdiction of the Chancellor—a jurisdiction of immense importance in the history of English law.

Before the Reformation the office of Chancellor was held by an ecclesiastic, but after the Reformation the office gradually became secular. After Sir Thomas More the Chancellors were sometimes ecclesiastics and sometimes laymen. Since 1592, with one exception, the Chancellors have always been lawyers. By the Judicature Act of 1873, the Lord Chancellor is *ex-officio* a member of the Court of Appeal, and when he sits there it is as President. He also sits in the House of Lords when appeals are being heard there. These appeals are of great importance. The House of Lords is the final Court of Appeal for Great Britain and novel and difficult questions come up for decision. It is a great mistake to measure the work of the House of Lords on its appellate side by the number of days the House sits hearing these appeals. The vast importance of the questions raised, not only to the parties directly interested, but to the whole community, involves long and anxious consideration. A perusal of the judgments of the noble and learned Lords, as reported in the Appeal Cases volumes of the *Law Reports*, will convince the reader of the time and thought which must have been devoted to the decision of these appeals. Although the Lord Chancellor's presence is not essential when appeals are heard in

the House of Lords, he frequently presides, especially when issues of great importance are raised; this part of his many duties is often either overlooked or insufficient attention is paid to it; if he did nothing else, his time would be as fully occupied as that of many men who are accounted busy.

In addition to his work of hearing appeals in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor is *ex-officio* a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Final Court of Appeal for the whole of the British Empire, for India as well as for all our great self-governing Dependencies and our Colonies. Constitutional causes of the greatest importance and of far-reaching consequences come before this body—the greatest judicial tribunal in the world. The work which the Lord Chancellor has to do in hearing appeals in the House of Lords and the Privy Council is quite as much as any judge ought to be called upon to perform. The duty of sitting on the appellate side of the House of Lords and of the Privy Council is only a part, and probably by no means the largest part, of the work which falls to his lot. His position with regard to the House of Lords is certainly anomalous, differing as it does from the Speakership of the House of Commons, and probably from every other legislative assembly in the British Empire. He is Speaker of the House of Lords by prescription, and not by election, and takes part in debates in the House of Lords just as any other peer. He may, and from time to time he does, introduce Government bills, and as such he may, and he sometimes does, become their chief spokesman. In no sense is his right to take part in debate in the House of Lords less or more restricted than any other peer.

Religious tests have long since been abolished. Religion is no longer a bar to holding any office in England under the Crown, except the office of Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor must not be a Roman Catholic. The bar of religion in this case is absolute. It does not appear that he is by law required to take the Sacrament of the Church of England. The ban of religion would therefore appear to be confined to the Roman Catholic Church. Lord Russell of Killowen was a great advocate and a great judge. If he had not been a Roman Catholic, he might, and he probably would, have been Lord Chancellor.

Such an anomalous condition of affairs as I have outlined could not exist but for the excellent good sense and good taste of the House of Lords and of the distinguished men who from time to time have held the office of Lord Chancellor. When Parliament is sitting the performance of the duties I have mentioned must severely tax his energies, even if his work were limited to the matters already dealt with in this paper, for he is always a member of the Cabinet, and as such he takes part in the deliberations and decisions of the Cabinet.

A sketch of the office of the Lord High Chancellor, however brief, would be sadly incomplete if it did not deal with his administrative duties and the patronage which he has to exercise. Practically the whole of the administration of justice in England and Wales on its civil side, whether in the High Court of Justice or in the county courts, is under his cognisance. Although the King appoints the judges of the High Court of Justice, such appointment is on his nomination. The judges of the county courts are appointed by him. His legal patronage is enormous, including as it does nearly all High Court and county court officials. He also appoints justices of the peace and has power to remove them.

The Lord Chancellor is not only the titular head of the law, but he is in no small degree responsible for the efficient working of our legal system. Surely this is enough for any man, however able and industrious he may be, without being burdened with the important duties outlined above.

In addition to his legal patronage, the Lord Chancellor has very extensive ecclesiastical patronage. It would ill become a lawyer, who happens to be a Presbyterian, to deal with this part of the Chancellor's 'multitude of responsible duties.' It is sufficient to state that the patronage is very extensive, and that the exercise of it must be delicate, difficult and exacting.

From this outline of his duties it will appear that the Lord Chancellor exercises both judicial and administrative functions. The liberty of the subject is best secured by the Judiciary being entirely separate and distinct from the Executive. No part of our Constitution is more valuable than that which ensures the independence of our judges from any interference by the Executive. In no time in our history,

certainly in no recent time, has this independence been more important to the community than at present. The tyranny of the bureaucrat may be more dangerous, because it is more subtle, than the tyranny of the despot. It is certainly anomalous that the head of the Judiciary should be a prominent member of the Executive.

It is now necessary to mention the part played by the Home Secretary in the administration of justice. In the first place, it is important to note that he need not be either a barrister or a solicitor. Want of legal knowledge or legal training is no bar to that high office. Recorders and stipendiary magistrates are appointed by and are under his jurisdiction. Again, in making legal appointments the patronage of the Lord Chancellor and of the Home Secretary may well, from time to time, overlap. As the judges, whether of the High Court of Justice or of the county courts, are nominated or appointed by the Lord Chancellor, and the recorders and stipendiary magistrates by the Home Secretary, and in every case the judge or recorder or stipendiary magistrate is selected from the ranks of the Bar, the overlapping which I have mentioned must from time to time take place. The duties of the Home Secretary are so extensive, so diversified, and of such extreme importance to the whole community, that it would be well if he were relieved of that part of them which relates to the administration of justice.

The creation of a Ministry of Justice would bring under one department of State the administration of justice in all its aspects, civil and criminal. It would prevent any divergency of views between the Lord Chancellor and his department and the Home Secretary and his department. The affairs of the nation are now dealt with so largely in and by the House of Commons that it is most desirable that the Minister who is charged with the administration of justice should be a member of that House.

In England to-day every intelligent man and woman takes an interest in the proceedings of our courts. How eagerly cases of public interest, and often those which could scarcely be described as being of public interest, are read and discussed! The destiny of the country is in the hands of the men and women compendiously described as 'the man in the street.' I have profound belief in the good sense and good

judgment of the people of England. The interest taken in the administration of justice is all to the good. No Minister or Judge is infallible. The fact that he has to do his work in the full light of day is, on the whole, beneficent.

Long and careful consideration of the subject has convinced me that a Ministry of Justice would be popular in the best sense of that word. The ordinary citizen would then know that there was a Minister, who would probably be in the House of Commons, whose sole business was carefully to watch the administration of justice, and to introduce those reforms, both in the substantive law and in procedure, which the ever-changing conditions of modern society require. It is idle to contend that the ordinary citizen is satisfied with the law as it stands, or with its administration. Amendments of the law dealing with social phases, which are in no sense party questions, are of great importance to the people; but such changes, if they require legislation, have small chance of becoming law, unless the proposed legislation has been introduced by the Government of the day through the Minister whose department is concerned with the matter in question.

The cost of litigation, the delay in the trial of actions, the multiplicity and expense of appeals are perennial causes of complaint. The business man will have nothing to do with the courts of law, if he can help it; the ordinary citizen, whose dispute is not of a commercial character, is equally dissatisfied. The costs incurred are often out of all proportion either to the amount involved or the issue at stake in the action.

Although it is easier to point out the causes of complaint than to find a remedy which will be effective, it ought not to be beyond the wit of man to improve the existing conditions. There has been no determined and whole-hearted effort to reform our legal system since the Judicature Act was passed over sixty years ago. There has been a good deal of tinkering, but little else. If there was a Minister of Justice, who was resolute in putting the good of the whole community above any vested interests; who, in dealing with the circuit system, would not allow any vested interests, however deeply entrenched they might be, to impede the carrying out of such reforms as are necessary for securing the trial of actions at such places and times as are most convenient; who,

in dealing with our procedure, would insist upon its being changed to meet present-day conditions, much valuable work would be done. If these and other reforms which are necessary were carried out, I do not suggest the millennium would be reached, but some of the obstructions which clog the administration of justice would be removed.

One of the disadvantages of the dual control is that certain important matters outside the criminal courts and the administration of the criminal law are vested in the Home Secretary. With the possible exception of the statutes dealing with trades unions, their rights and privileges, no legislation has been of greater importance to the industrial classes than the Workmen's Compensation Acts, which give an injured workman the right to compensation for an injury sustained while working for his employer. By this legislation, which might, not inaptly, be described as the Workman's Charter, a workman who has been incapacitated by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment is entitled to claim compensation from his employer.

The trial of the actions, or arbitrations as they are called, takes place in the county courts. County court rules and practice therefore regulate the trial of these cases. The tribunal is under the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, but there are a number of matters connected with this branch of jurisprudence which are under the jurisdiction of the Home Secretary. The ambit of the employer's liability to compensate his workman is so wide that a very large, probably the largest, part of the disputes which arise are of a quasi-medical character—*i.e.*, whether the workman has recovered from the effects of the accident or whether his incapacity is due to the accident or to other causes. In such cases medical evidence is essential and medical referees are appointed to assist the judge. Any party, upon giving the required security, is entitled to summon the medical referee to sit with the judge as assessor, to advise the judge on medical matters. When the medical referee sits with the judge the tribunal might fairly—though, perhaps, not with meticulous accuracy—be described as consisting of the judge and the medical referee. The judge is appointed by and is under the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, but the medical referee is appointed by and is under the jurisdiction of the Home Secretary. I do

not suggest that the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act should be taken from the Home Secretary and vested in the Minister of Justice, but only those parts of it which partake of a legal rather than an administrative character. All that is concerned, or connected, with the trial of workmen's arbitrations, or with the administration of the funds in court, are matters for the lawyer rather than the layman, and they ought, I think, to be transferred to the new Ministry.

A Minister of Justice with a seat in the House of Commons would be more in touch with public opinion as to the needs of the whole community than the Lord Chancellor who must be in the House of Lords. It is idle to contend that our business men are satisfied with our present system. Arbitration has to a large extent ousted the law courts for the decision of business disputes. The antiquated and cumbersome circuit system is ill adapted to the speedy trial of civil actions where delay may amount to a denial of justice. The needs of the commercial community are paramount; no vested interests ought to be permitted to prevent satisfaction being given to them. Business men are the best judges of what the commercial community requires. Sufficient attention has not been paid to the views of business men. They are more likely to reach a Minister of Justice in the House of Commons than an overworked and over-burdened Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords.

The trial of actions is so costly and dilatory that justice is often denied to those who have not got a long purse. It is little short of mockery to pride ourselves upon the administration of justice if the cost and delay are such as to deter the citizen from resorting to the courts. It is not enough for the Temple of Justice to be open to all if the avenues to it are difficult of access. Although it may be impossible for cases to be decided at the cost and with the celerity litigants desire, much might be done if a resolute and determined effort was made to carry the necessary reforms. Such an effort stands a better chance of being made by a Minister of Justice than by a Lord Chancellor.

As a nation we value, and we are slow to break with, tradition; herein we show our wisdom. Evolution is essential to human progress. In the creation of a Ministry of

Justice the change would be evolutionary, and not revolutionary. There is no valid reason for supposing that a Minister of Justice would not be actuated by the high sense of duty which has characterised, and characterises, the distinguished men who have held the office of Lord Chancellor.

'There is no functionary at present who can properly be called a Minister responsible for the subject of justice.' So wrote Lord Haldane nearly seventeen years ago.

Has not the time arrived when there ought to be such a Minister?

JOHN D. CRAWFORD.

'THE VOLUNTARYIST CREED'

By the late AUBERON HERBERT

[Almost thirty years ago, on June 7, 1906, Auberon Herbert delivered, a few months before his untimely death, the Herbert Spencer Lecture which was posthumously published, under the above title, together with a further paper entitled 'A Plea for Voluntaryism,' intended for signature by those who shared his views.

Both have long been out of print; yet his words—*ἔπεα πτερόεντα*—can scarcely fail to appeal to a larger public now than when they were uttered. The following is a shortened summary (in exactly his own words) of Auberon Herbert's plea.]

WE, who call ourselves Voluntaryists, appeal to the nation to free itself from the many systems of State force, which are rendering impossible the true and the happy life of nations. This ceaseless effort to compel each other in turn for each new object clamoured for by politicians is preventing real progress, peace and brotherhood, and is turning the men of the same nation, who ought to labour happily and freely together for common ends, into enemies, conspiring against and dreading each other.

Look at Europe. Nations are divided into two or three parties, again divided into several groups, each intent on humbling and conquering its rivals. Why should we desire to take from men or women their own will, their free choice, their inalienable rights over themselves? Why should we desire to compel them to serve and follow our opinions; why deny in them the soul—that suffers so deeply from all constraint—and treat them as a sheet of blank paper upon which we may write our own desires, whatever they may be?

Let us not think that a change in the mere form—without

change in spirit—can make a new world. A voting majority, that still believes in force, can be just as tyrannous, selfish and blind, as any of the old rulers. Happy the nation that escapes from autocrat, from emperor, and from bureaucratic tyrants. But that is only the beginning of the new good life; the great lesson still remains to be learned. The old curse, the old sorrow, did not simply lie in the heart of autocrat and emperor, but in the common desire of men to rule and possess for their own advantage the minds and bodies of each other. We have to learn that our systems of force destroy all great human hopes and possibilities; that so long as we believe in force there can be no abiding peace; that a half-disguised civil war will for ever smoulder in our midst; that each half of the nation must live, sword in hand, given up to suspicion and dread and hatred.

Power is one of the most fatal and demoralising of all gifts. He who has power, limited by his own desires, misunderstands both himself and the world in which he lives. For those who suffer in subjection there is some hope, some glimmering of light, some teachings that come from the passionate desire for the liberty denied to them. For those who cling to power there is only darkness of soul. Look at the great military empires: their steady perseverance in the roads that lead to ruin; their dread of liberty in all its forms; the sharp repressions, the love of secrecy, the attempt to drill a whole nation into obedience, and to use the drilled and subject thing for every passing vanity of those who govern. Look also at the great administrative systems. See how men become under them helpless and dispirited, incapable of free thought and self-protection, at one moment sunk in apathy, at another ready for revolution . . . ever loud in their complaints that enough does not fall to their share.

Once we plunge into this all-absorbing strife for power, we must go where the strong tide carries us; we must put away conscience, and play the game relentlessly, with the unflinching determination to win. There is no room for scruples. Seeking for power not only means strife and hatred, the splitting of a nation into hostile factions, but for ever breeds intrigue and falsehood, buying of men, the offering of unworthy bribes.

If the power of some and the subjection of others are

right, Socialists, perhaps even Anarchists, would find their own justification ; and we should live in a world of perpetual warfare. To those of us who believe in the soul, the freedom of the individual is a religious question of the deepest meaning. The soul to us is by its own nature a free thing, living its life here in order that it may learn to distinguish and choose between the good and the evil, to find its own way towards perfection. A religion not based on freedom is to us an empty word, for religion means following our own sense of right and duty with a free heart.

We cannot divide men up into social, political and religious beings. All parts of our nature are one. We cannot, therefore, make men politically subject without injuring their souls. Either the religious conscience and sense of right must stand first, and the commands of government second ; or the State machine must stand first, and the religious and moral conscience of men must follow, and do what the State orders. If we make the State supreme, why should it pay heed to conscience, or the individual sense of right ; why should the master listen to the servant ?

To place unlimited power in the hands of the State is to degrade men, to narrow the intelligence, to encourage intolerance, contempt, bitter strife and the evil arts of flattery. It involves self-abasement in order to conciliate votes and possess power, toleration of the dangerous power of a very able Press, which too often thinks for most of us, and the repression of all those healthy individual differences that make the life of a nation. It means also the piling up of intolerable burdens of debt, the mean endeavour to place the heaviest of these burdens on others—whoever they be, the insolence of those who spend money compulsorily taken, the deep poisonous corruption . . . already sporadically existing amongst us ; and at the end of it all the setting up of some absolute form of government, to which men fly in despair.

The vote of a majority is less evil than the edict of an autocrat, for one can appeal to a majority to undo its mistakes, but numbers cannot take away the rights of a single individual, cannot overrule the great principles which mark out our relations to each other. Because one can collect three men on one side, that is no reason why the three men should dispose of the lives and the property of the two men, should

settle for them what they are to do, and what they are to be. The mere rule of numbers can never justify the turning of the two men into slaves, and the three men into slave-owners. Deny human rights, and we shall find ourselves kneeling at the feet of the god Force.

Do not believe in suppressing evil by force—always excepting direct attacks upon persons and property. An evil suppressed by force is only driven under the surface—there to take new and more dangerous forms.

We may have made the outside of things more respectable to the careless eye, we may have taught men to believe in the things that seem, and in reality are not ; but the poisonous sore remains below to work undisturbed. The evil, whatever it was, was the result of perverted intelligence ; our systems of force have left that intelligence unchanged. We have done that most dangerous of all things—we have strengthened the general belief in the rightfulness of force. Do we not see that of all weapons that men can take into their hands force is the vainest ? What persecution has in the end altered the course of belief ? What army, used for aggressive purposes, has not at last become as a broken tool ? Is it not the same to-day as it has been in the past ? Has not the real happiness of a nation increased in proportion as it has broken the bonds that impeded its life, and has let liberty replace force ?

'But'—some of our friends may say—'see how many good things come to us by taking money out of the pockets of others. Think well of what the vote can do. There lies the true magician's wand. We want pensions, provisions for old age and sickness, land, houses, a minimum wage, education, breakfast and dinner for the children who go to school, scholarships, libraries, museums, public halls, national operas, amusements and recreations and many another good thing which we shall easily enough discover when we once begin to help ourselves.'

We answer—that all such language is the language of passionate unthinking children who, with no questionings of conscience, no perception of consequences, snatch at the first glittering thing that they see before them. That those who once listen to these counsels of violence would be changed in their nature from the reasonable man to the unreasonable beast ; that all such counsels mean revolt against great

principles, against the honest and true methods that alone can redeem this world of ours, that, if faithfully followed, will in the end make a society happy, and progressive, ever levelling up, ever peacefully redistributing wealth, ever turning the waste places of life into the fruitful garden. In violence and force is no redemption.

Let us make the truer, the nobler choice. Let us resist the sordid appeal to our interests of the moment, and take our place on the side of true liberty, that calls out the best in us, and knows no difference between rulers and ruled, majorities and minorities, rich and poor. Let us declare once and for good that all men and women are the only true owners of their faculties, of their mind and body, of the property that belongs to them; that we will only build the new society on the one true foundation of self-ownership, self-rule, and self-guidance. Force never yet made a nation prosperous. It has destroyed nations, but never yet built up an enduring prosperity. It is through our own free efforts, not through the gifts of those who have no right to give them, that these good things can come to us. What power lies in a government that does not lie also in us? They are only men like us—men, overweighted by the burdens they have taken on themselves, seldom able to give concentrated attention to any one subject, much under the influence of subordinates, from whom they must gather the information on which they have to act; often turned from their own course by the dissensions of their followers. We cannot throw the wants and the hopes of a whole people on a score of over-burdened workers. A handful of men cannot either think or act for us. If they try to do so, they can only be blind guides. It all ends in scramble and confusion, in something being done in order to have something to show, in great expectations and woeful disappointments, in rash action and grievous mistakes. We are the children of the men who did so much for themselves, the men who broke the absolute power; who planted the colonies of our race in distant lands, who created our manufactures, and carried our trade to every part of the world; who established co-operative societies, and trade unions, who built and supported our Free Churches. In you is the same power as was in them.

Refuse all the glittering gifts and bribes which politicians

of all parties eagerly press upon us, if we will but accept them as leaders, and lend them the power which numbers give. Great things are possible only for those who keep their hearts pure and their hands clean, who are true to themselves, who serve the fixed principles that are above us all, and are our only true guide, who never sell themselves into the hands of others. 'What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?' If we lose our own sense of right and fairness, if we lose our belief in liberty, what can all the gifts of politicians give us in return?

Picture also the horde of officials, a bureaucratic, all-powerful army, vast as that which exists in Russia. Picture also, imprisoned under the bureaucratic caste, a nation of dispirited cyphers, and the pitiful necessities to which we must stoop, when once we construct these great State machines and take upon ourselves, in ignorant presumption, to interfere with the natural activities of human existence.

There are few greater injuries that can be inflicted on us than taking out of our hands the great services that supply our wants. Why? Because the healing virtue that belongs to all these great services lies in the winning of these things for ourselves by our own exertions, through our own skill, our own courage, friendly co-operation and integrity in our common dealings, in our unconquerable self-reliance, and confidence in our own powers. These efforts are the great lessons in an education that lasts from childhood to the grave. They are learned, not for ourselves alone, but for our children. They are but steps to the higher levels, to which we cannot be carried on the shoulders of others. The more of his ready-made institutions the politician thrusts upon us, the more incapable we become, just because the great qualities are not called out and exercised. There is no need for them; they lie idle, rusting, and at last cease to be. Tie up your right hand for three months, and what happens? The muscles will have wasted, and your hand will have lost its cunning. So it is with mental and moral qualities.

Refuse, then, to put your faith in machinery, in organisations, in Acts of Parliament, in unwieldy systems, which treat good and bad, the careful and the careless, on the same plane; and which, on account of their vast size and complexity, pass entirely out of your control. If the world could be saved by

the men of words and the machine-makers, it would have been saved long ago. Nothing is easier than to make machinery.

Property is the great and good inducement that will call out your efforts for the remaking of society. Deprive property of its full value and attractiveness, and we shall all become stuff only fit to make the helpless crowd that the Socialist hopes so easily to control. The 'magic of property' has power to call out the qualities of industry and saving; we cannot weaken the rights of property without diminishing the greatest of all possessions—human liberty. For that supreme reason we must resist every attempt of the politician to buy votes by giving away the property that does not belong to him. If we destroy property we shall also destroy the material and the moral foundations of liberty. To all men and women, rich or poor, belong their own faculties and, as a consequence, all that they can honestly gain in open competition, through the exercise of those faculties.

For the moment the larger part of existing property belongs to the richer classes; but it will not be so as soon as the workers take out of the hands of politicians, and into their own hands, the task of carving out their own fortunes. The working body of the people must no longer be content to be propertyless. In every city and town and village they must form their associations for the gaining of property; they must put their irresistible pence and shillings together, so that, step by step, effort upon effort, they may become the owners of land, of farms, of houses, of shops, of mills, and trading ships. Let them take shares in the great well-managed trading companies and railways, until they shall be able to become the owners at first of small trading concerns, established by themselves, and then later of larger and more important concerns. They must become the owners of property. Without property no class can take its true place in the nation. As they become possessed of property, they will see a definite goal lying before themselves—one good and useful ambition ever succeeding to another. The old dreary hopelessness will disappear, they will gain in power and influence; the difference between classes will disappear. And with property, the workers will also acquire the quality that the management of property brings with it; whilst they add a new meaning to their lives. All is possible to us if we

resolutely resist the incitements to strife, the tamperings with liberty and individual property, and pile up the pence and the shillings for the acquiring of property. Let us resist, therefore, all reckless, unthinking appeals to deprive the great prize of its attractions. If we surround property with State restrictions, interfere with free contract, and make compulsory arrangements for tenant and landowner, if we allow the present burdens of rate and tax to discourage ownership and penalise improvements, we shall weaken the motives for acquiring property, and blunt the edge of the most powerful material instrument that exists for our own advancement. They take the name of liberty in vain who would allow the State to play with property.

Keep clear of both political parties, until one of them seriously and with deep conviction pledges itself to the cause of personal liberty. At present both are opportunist, seeking power, rejecting fixed principles. We owe much to the Liberal Party in the past, but to-day it is deserting its own best traditions. One or other of the two parties may mean to us some of the things that we ourselves mean, but also many things that we do not mean. Both believe in subjecting some men to the will of others, in using the State as the instrument of force, and we cannot rightly take our place in their ranks. The more resolutely we stand on our own ground, the more men of both parties, who begin to see the worthlessness and the mischief of party, and the growing danger of force, will come to us and join our small army. Confer no form of authority or monopoly on any profession; give to none the power to force their services upon us. Let every profession organise itself and make rules for its own members; but we, the public, must remain free to take or to leave what they offer. The monopolies that they dearly love are fatal to efficiency, and to the higher qualities, and of danger to the public. Never hand over any question to be decided by those who are called experts. Their knowledge is very valuable, but wisdom and judgment are different from knowledge, and they do not always keep company. Knowledge is great, but prejudice is greater. The experts are excellent advisers, but not as judges. The real service that experts can perform is to place their knowledge in the clearest and simplest form before us, and to give reasons for advising

a certain course. There is no limit to the mistakes that the most learned men may make behind closed doors, without open discussion.

Strive also to make this great Empire an instrument of help for the whole world. It is a great world-trust that we must interpret in no narrow spirit. Let it rest on the one true foundation of peace and friendship and, as far as lies with us, of free intercourse between all nations—an Empire of equal rights, with no privileges reserved for any of us. So, and only so, shall this great Empire endure. Have nothing to do with this pitiful war against aliens. Even if our interests should seem to suffer for awhile, let us make this sacrifice for the sake of the liberty of all, even the poorest, and for the sake of the proud traditions of our race. Unswerving devotion to the principle of universal liberty, and to those noble traditions that have always opened the gates of this country to the oppressed, will far outbalance any hurt that may for a time result.

Lastly, let us all work together to soften and improve the relations of capital and labour. War between capital and labour is only too like war between nations, or between parties in a nation. Capital and labour, like the rest of us, must obey the great moral law and tread in the path of peace and friendship. It is their duty, as it is the duty of us all in the other relations of life: worthy of every effort, of all patience and sacrifice on our part. Only with peace can prosperity come. With peace, trade and enterprise would develop a more vigorous life, and find new directions. Nothing limits enterprise and employment so fatally as quarrels between capital and labour. With peace and friendship not only does capital flow, but new enterprises are confidently undertaken in every direction, and wages rise with the security that peace brings. All insecurity must be paid for by the worker.

Form associations in which both the workers and the capitalists would be represented; where they could meet and take common action, as friends, working together to make the conditions of labour better, and using every peaceful expedient to remove difficulties as they arise. If times of depression come, and wages fall, use the common fund to draft away some of the workers, find temporary employment for

them on the land, start workshops of your own, which in some cases might provide articles of home use and comfort for your members; and let the unemployed in turn receive a grant to enable them to spend their unoccupied time usefully in study and education. At present an unoccupied workman wastes time and temper during a slack time. Like his own tools, he rusts and deteriorates with them. Why should that be so? Let us have our own classes and day schools, and let the unoccupied men turn the time to golden use. But through it all, even if men strike, let them refuse, as a matter of principle, as faithful followers of liberty in everything, to use methods of force. We must never deny or fight against a human right for the sake of what seems to be our interest of the moment.

Keep a free and open market in everything. Only so again can we get the fullest return from our labour. High wages are of little profit when prices rule high, and production becomes a dull monopoly, benumbing the best energies of the producers. Under a monopoly we all grow apathetic, given up to routine. The harassing interferences with trade, the rings and corners, the extravagance, the domineering attitude of the State-made monopolists, the ever-growing power of the governments to go their own way, where they can gather vast sums of money so easily through their unseen tax collectors, all these things are preaching their eloquent lesson. In order that the good may prevail there must be life and vigour in the people, and this can only be where freedom exists. If freedom does not exist, if life and vigour have died, then protection—whatever its form—cannot prevent, it can only put off for a short time, inevitable ruin and disaster. Nations only continue to exist as long as they keep in themselves the great simple virtues. If we wish for a practical example, let us look carefully at the poisonous mixture of politics and trade influences, the use of the State power to watch over and favour great money monopolies.

We must multiply those differences of method, those experiments made from new points of view upon which all progress depends, replacing the great clumsy universal systems which treat good and bad alike, which are mere developments of the official mind, and escape entirely from the control of those in whose interest they are supposed to

exist. We must call into life again the proud feeling of self-help and independence which belongs to our nation.

The great choice lies before us. Either the State must grow in power, imposing new burdens and compulsions, and the nation sink lower and lower into a helpless quarrelling crowd, or the individual must gain his own rightful freedom, become master of himself, creature of none, confident in himself and in his own qualities, confident in his power to plan and to do, and determined to end this profitless and worn-out system of restrictions and compulsions, which is not good or healthy even for children.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON

ON my way north to speak at a political meeting I found myself at lunch opposite an apprentice on his way home after two years' absence on the seven seas in merchant vessels. He had just done his four years, and now, at twenty-one, was starting to study for his 'ticket.' I envied him his knowledge of practical geography and international trade. Rio and the River Plate, Hong Kong and Yokohama, Sydney and the Straits, Basrah and Bombay, Suez and Panama, he had seen them all. His cargoes had been as various as the countries he had visited. He had an eye for ships—his father had followed the sea and his grandfather too—and also for scenery. His outlook was tolerant, though he had seen enough in Russian ports to put that country at the bottom of the list. He had been on shore every spare moment, by night and by day : he studied memorial-stones and antiquities when they were near at hand, but also living men—and women. He went back to his seat to get his diary and album, both a credit to him.

The hours were long at sea : longer still in port—checking cargo in and out was a laborious and responsible task with many snags. It was hard lying in the old ship ; the new craft were better by far, but he was too full of life to have time for grouching. He took things as they came ; his stomach could hold anything except foreign liquor. Of Board of Trade inquiries into ships lost in the Atlantic he spoke with justified warmth. He was on his way to Goole, and we parted at Doncaster. I hope my son will grow up as lively and as open-eyed to what the world offers.

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A motor-van driver, still in his teens, came one day this

month to air his grievance on the strength of a casual acquaintance since his van-boy days. It was his job to drive into London daily from the country to collect pig-swill. His employer—it was a one-man show—allowed him only four hours for the round trip: when traffic was heavy he was delayed and ‘the old man’ cursed him for loitering. The police had caught him exceeding the speed limit and summoned him before ‘the beaks.’ They had fined him £2 on his first offence, and talked at him too. His employer had told him to pay the fine himself, or find another job. He was married and could not kick up his heels and say what he thought. He had heard the bench deal with a similar case just before his came on—a richly dressed young woman driving a two-seater sports car: her excuse was that she was in a hurry to get to a party. The bench beamed on her, joked with her, and fined her 20s., which she laughingly paid, throwing a five-pound note on the clerk’s table. He, too, smiled on her as he gave her the change.

When his turn came he asked for time to pay: the clerk frowned and asked the police, who looked doubtful. The magistrate said ‘I suppose we must,’ and threatened him with prison if he did not pay on due date. The seeming injustice rankled. My preference for stipendiary courts for motoring offences is strengthened by such tales.

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As I was travelling up to town one evening a youth leapt breathlessly into the carriage and, sitting opposite to me, produced from a suit-case full of books the poems of Pierre Ronsard. I recognised him as the booking clerk of a suburban station, and we began to talk. He was twenty-two and had done four years with the railway and was beginning to feel the shadows closing round him. He would be a railway clerk for the rest of his life unless he moved soon. He had been to Germany as an exchange student, and had walked for a fortnight in the Ardennes. He had tried the Auvergne Mountains, but they were nothing compared with Scotland. He was one of the great tribe of London-Scottish; though bred a Cockney, his spiritual home was in the Highlands. It was something to be on a railway which gave him a free holiday ticket to Cape Wrath. Once up there he walked and

slept on the heather. He lived ‘on the air,’ with little in his pack but a few books, chiefly poetry. ‘That’s what gets me.’ In six years he had acquired, second-hand, some hundreds of books, which filled his father’s house and overflowed into the lodgings in which he spent most nights. We talked of books and of the joys of walking, and his eyes grew bright; for a bicycle he had no use.

He was wondering whether it was not time to ‘chance his arm’—to live dangerously and seek his fortune in other fields. ‘If I go on like this,’ he declared, ‘I shall get tired of life. Perhaps I have been too well educated. There’s things I can do. I don’t care how hard I work, but where’s the opportunity?’ He had thought of the Army and of the Navy, but he would never feel happy with his comrades in the ranks. ‘More’s the pity, for there’s nothing wrong with them.’ The sea offered no career to-day, even as a steward, for there were long spells adrift on shore. Still, he had his books and his visions. We discussed evening classes, and the ways and means of finding sufficient scope and new associative loyalties. Of this side of young England all of us are dimly aware, but the reality is poignant.

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A few hours later, after presiding at a concert, I was again on my way north to Newcastle by the night train—sharing a compartment with a Darlington man who had been seeing for the first time the sights of London since 5 a.m. with his father and brother, who lay prone on the seats next door. He was full of what he had seen; his father knew London and they had not wasted a moment. It was his first trip south—he had never gone further north than Jedburgh or further afield than Blackpool. He was twenty-three and had just finished five years’ steady employment as a saw-sharpener. ‘That’s a skilled trade,’ I observed; ‘it takes all of five years to get into, and another five years to learn all there is to know.’ ‘More’n that,’ he responded; ‘I reckon to learn something fresh every month: new temperings and new alloys; new uses for saws. Unless you know all about the job, something will go wrong, and they’ll surely blame it on you. Set the teeth too wide and the saw

will break; set them too fine and the saw will jam. It all depends on the metal it's made of and what it's cutting. It's harder than ever just now, with business getting better and so few men who know the trade that the foremen are always pushing me to finish the job; and a saw-sharpener cannot afford to hurry.'

He was fond of walking on Sundays and he played football; watched matches in the winter. The label on my bag caught his eye: 'Arnold Wilson.' 'Do you know him?' he said eagerly. 'He's great—a man to watch—as quick on his legs as any man I ever saw. Is that his bag? Is he on this train?' I had to confess the bag was mine and that I did not know Darlington's centre-forward, but I joined in hoping that his marriage, only the week before, would not spoil a promising career. An idea occurred to him. 'Are you Major Arnold Wilson, Carpentier's trainer?' he asked hopefully. I again had to disclaim the distinction. 'You'll not mind my asking. I thought perhaps you might be somebody.' He relegated me to decent obscurity and we fell to talking of moors and climbs—he knew and loved Cumberland and the Roman Wall—till sleep came upon us.

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The return journey the following night was less luxurious: the train was crowded. My fellow-passengers were a batch of men going south to take up work with the Government Small Arms Factory at Enfield. They were all, as they proudly put it, 'from Elswick, out of Armstrong's,' a good mechanic's pedigree; but, as one of them remarked, apologising for 'a bit of rough house,' which had heralded their arrival on the platform, 'free and easy with each other, but meaning no offence to passengers.' Cigarettes all round helped them to settle down, and they began to talk.

'Yes,' I knew Enfield; 'lodgings would be all right,' but dearer than in the North: a sixpenny-return omnibus ride would take them to the Arsenal football ground, and to other places of pilgrimage. 'Were there plenty of cinemas?' 'Yes, indeed; and what films have you been seeing?' They mentioned four which were summarised in a Newcastle paper as follows:

The Sacred Flame.

... The murderer-mother is relieved of the task, and the bed-ridden airman husband, who forms the barrier between the love of his wife and brother, commits suicide. This is strong meat. . . .

The Devil is a Woman.

Lovely Marlene Dietrich rises from a cigarette factory to be a power among men. Shows how easy it is to break hearts.

Bright Eyes.

A Shirley Temple confection of sweetness and appeal, in which she sings 'On the Good Ship Lollipop.' She is the pet of an airport, and James Dunn is her special protector.

After Office Hours.

Another reporter-and-society girl melodrama, attractively conventional and swift in action.

I thought of Milton's sheep 'Swollen with wind and the rank mist they draw, rot inwardly and foul contagion spread.' But these men were not rotting inwardly. The effect was, as far as I could gather, simply negative. They did not regard anything they saw as having any relation to life. It was, in their own vernacular, 'tripe,' 'soft slush,' but 'something to see and hear.'

One of them, the eldest, who had been a foreman in the busy days of old, was resentful at the need for Newcastle men to go south—in hundreds—to make small arms at Enfield for the War Office: he knew that London was already overcrowded; and so was Enfield. They were promised regular work for six months or more. Why not place the orders in Newcastle? Why not transfer the machinery instead of the men? Three hundred men had been taken, for Enfield alone, in one month; 45s. a week in lodgings was worth to a man only half as much as when it was earned by men who had their own homes close by. Families were broken up: sons could no longer help to keep the home fires burning. Young men were going, placing an extra burden on their fathers and mothers. 'Place orders in the North!' he repeated. 'What's the good of all this talk about "distressed areas" when Government departments are the worst offenders?'

The other men listened, but only one—a fine-looking young man, neatly dressed and well-spoken—made any comment. 'It's a case of take the job or get struck off at the "labour",' he observed without bitterness. 'When a man's been laid off for six months he cannot pick and choose.' The rest murmured assent, but said nothing.

We reached King's Cross before dawn, and I wished them good luck in their new jobs. The young man followed me to the refreshment-room and asked me to 'have a cup' with him. I had said I knew Enfield. Could I say if he had a chance to get a house? The employment exchange had told him that if he got a house within three months they would pay for bringing his furniture and his wife and child down. He was a married man, with a young wife and a baby boy just born. She had 'cried something cruel' when he left her on Sunday night; she could not bear to see him off. He dared not lose a chance of a good job; he could not leave her alone for long. Everything depended on finding a house at a rental which would leave enough to live on; they only paid 5s. 6d. at present—poor quarters—but the important thing was, how much was left to live on after the rent was paid? He hated the idea of having to put her and the baby into one room in lodgings, and if that was all he could get the exchange would not pay to move his bits of furniture. I told him how to set about putting his name down for a house.

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October has been an uneasy month for the chosen representatives of the people who have, after five years, to face the ordeal of a General Election. In most urban constituencies rowdiness at political meetings is uncommon, except at election times, when it is apt to take whatever form is best calculated to prevent the speaker from being heard. This is nothing new; it is, indeed, a tradition almost as old as parliamentary democracy itself, but with universal suffrage it is more widespread, and in many districts it tends to keep women and other quiet folk away from the meetings. The difficulty of reaching electors is thus increased.

In 1924 the electorate numbered 21 $\frac{3}{4}$ million, of whom 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ million recorded their vote: in 1931, 29 $\frac{1}{2}$ million, of whom 21 $\frac{1}{2}$ million voted. Twelve million then declared for the Unionist cause, 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ million for the Liberal, 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ million for Labour, and $\frac{3}{4}$ million for other parties—not counting the voters of sixty-seven constituencies where there was no contest. Including them, about 16 million persons voted for and 7 million against the National Government. The

present election will be contested on a new register, including a record number of young persons who have never before been qualified to vote. They, and the great silent mass of 'floating' voters who own no political allegiance, will decide the issue in many constituencies. The outcome will be heralded as the voice of the nation: yet it is unlikely that as many as half the total electorate will cast their votes in favour of the winning side. The science of politics is empiric, and those who seek its aid must be content with very rough approximations.

What are the people, as apart from the papers, thinking of the electoral prospects? After visits within the space of a week to Wales and Yorkshire, the Midlands and Newcastle, it seems to me that people are less anxious about the future of the National Government than about the possibility of even a short coal strike. Coal-using industries are doing better, but the 'ascertained' profits of coal companies have never been worse: miners are getting rather better 'real' wages, but there are fewer at work and they have not shared any of the sweets of returning prosperity. Socially as well as geographically less isolated than they were even ten years ago, thanks to cheaper transport and pit-head baths, they are more prone to 'economic nationalism' than the workers in any other industry. Their leaders speak scornfully of Hitler and Mussolini, who might envy the dumb loyalty that miners display towards those who speak for them.

Unification, in some form, of mining royalties will no doubt be part of the Government's electoral programme, though the Samuel Commission regarded it with scant favour: it will not affect the strike issue. The public at large will suffer in silence and decline, unintelligently but perhaps wisely, to take sides: our overseas markets will suffer once more from 'economic sanctions' at home. No Government can ensure what the miners desire.

Yet a strike entails severe physical and mental strains on five or six persons for every man who withholds his labour. It poisons alike the atmosphere of good-will and the wells of charity, in the proper sense of that word. The decision will be by secret ballot: the settlement will be a matter of public concern. Let us learn from recent events at Geneva at least one lesson—open diplomacy is less well

adapted than anyone imagined sixteen years ago for the adjustment of important questions. With a discreet Press without, and wisdom and moderation within the council-room, much may be accomplished.

ARNOLD WILSON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

THE MAN HAIG

Haig, by Duff Cooper (Faber & Faber, 25s. net). Those who look to this volume for the loudly trumpeted sensations which Haig's Diaries were to reveal will be disappointed. There is little here which was not already known to those who have taken a reasonably intelligent interest in the history of the Great War. We knew that Haig had no confidence in the capacity of French to direct our armies as Commander-in-Chief, though we did not know that he communicated his doubts to the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener. We knew that the prime object of the battle of the Somme was the relief of Verdun, that the general plan of the battle and the time of its start were fixed by Joffre, that the strain of Verdun steadily reduced the extent of the help Joffre could give Haig, and as steadily increased Haig's responsibilities. We knew also that Haig, from his first contact with Mr. Lloyd George, disliked that statesman. Indeed, there are some of Haig's actions in the first year of the war on which a little more light would have been welcome, while some of Mr. Duff Cooper's ventures into strategy are inept. He would have been well advised to have asked General Edmonds or one of Haig's associates, who knows the facts, to read his proofs. Perhaps the unhappy controversy between Lady Haig and her co-trustees caused the publication to be hurried on, for signs of haste are not wanting. It is hoped that this course may be adopted in the second volume, which will be concerned with the chief controversies in which Haig was involved.

The merit of this volume is that it gives us a picture of the man as he was known only to a few intimates. Haig's congenital incapacity to express himself in words has led many to believe that, while he had great strength of character and an iron will, he was dull of mind and lacking in imagina-

tion. The story of his early life which Mr. Duff Cooper here tells will dispose of this fiction. Life in the Army to-day, as in society generally, is so different from life before the war that it is not easy to remember how surprising it was to find a handsome young officer in a crack cavalry regiment, who had ruffled it at Oxford with the best in the Bullingdon, taking at once to the serious study of his profession. At Sandhurst he passed out first, at the Staff College he was recognised as the best man of his year, and was marked down by his teacher, Henderson, as a future commander-in-chief. In his first campaign, Omdurman, as a young cavalry captain, he made privately some shrewd and just criticisms of Kitchener's tactics; in his second, the South African War, he provided a model of staff work in the field. After South Africa, as Inspector-General of Cavalry, he reformed drastically the system of mounted training in India and was brought thence by Haldane to the War Office to assist him in his work of reforming and reorganising the Army.

Here, for the first time, is set out the story of Haig's work in that position. It was he who produced, in face of much opposition from his military superiors, a volume of Regulations clearly setting out a system of organisation for a British army in the field, a system which not only stood the test of the Great War but, with few modifications, remains to-day. It was Haig who conceived the idea of an Imperial General Staff, to which he gave effect, and it was due to him that, before the Great War came, the forces of our Dominions were organised on a system uniform with our own. It was he who formulated a scheme for a naval war staff, which, rejected at the time, was adopted during the war. When he went to India as Chief of the General Staff Haig drew up a plan for the employment of a part of our Army in India beyond its shores in a major national emergency. Lord Morley, then Secretary of State, ordered it to be destroyed, but happily it survived unofficially, to be used in 1914.

When war came upon us Haig, in agreement with Kitchener, but without consulting him, declared, contrary to the general opinion, military and civilian, that it would be a war of years. He urged the immediate expansion of our Army by a million men and the retention of a sufficient nucleus of officers and non-commissioned officers to train

the new levies. This was vetoed by French and Wilson, who had no belief in the possibility of making new armies during a war. With such a record only malice will maintain that Haig owed his advancement to his friendship with King Edward VII. and to the fact that he had married one of Queen Alexandra's ladies-in-waiting.

Mr. Duff Cooper also disposes effectively of the fiction that Haig was opposed to new weapons and new methods and, in particular, to the use of tanks. We find the French generals coming to him to study the methods which he had used at Neuve Chapelle, we find him urging new methods in the employment of Lewis guns and of artillery, welcoming a conference with French Ministers at Versailles because they 'can do good by pressing the possibilities of some new discovery,' and when Sir Ernest Swinton found his way with difficulty to Haig's room he tells us 'these were the first words of appreciation given to the tanks to my knowledge since the King saw them at Elvedon.'

But that which stands out most clearly in this volume is that the background of Haig's life, the key to his character, was his religion. A lowland Scot, he appears to have inherited something of the spirit of the Covenanters, and as his mind developed he acquired a lively faith in the guidance of God and in predestination. As his experience of our military problems grew, he became convinced that we were destined for a life-and-death struggle with Germany and that he himself was destined for the leadership in that struggle. He told Sir Hubert Gough at Loos that we should win 'not by might, nor by power, but by My Spirit, saith the Lord of Hosts.'

On the eve of the battle of the Somme Haig wrote in his diary: 'The weather report is favourable for to-morrow. With God's help I feel hopeful'; and a few days before he had written to Lady Haig: 'Now you must know that I feel that every step in my plan has been taken with the Divine help—and I ask daily for aid, not merely in making the plan, but in carrying it out, and this I hope I shall continue to do until the end of all things which concern me on earth. I think it is this Divine help which gives me tranquillity of mind and enables me to carry on without feeling the strain of responsibility to be too excessive.'

Now we know the man we are to meet amidst the greater struggles of the second volume.

F. MAURICE.

Sing Sing Doctor, by Amos Squire (Rich & Cowan, 10s. 6d. net). This is a book of real sociological importance. The writer has spent twenty-five years in America's largest prison: he has seen 138 men before, during, and after their execution. He has studied and watched every one. He is no sentimentalist: he has encountered depths of bestiality and of blood-lust, and of cynical indifference to killing, such as are almost unknown in the United Kingdom or in Europe. Crime as he knows it is mainly the product of city life in America: the worst offenders are not foreign immigrants, but 100 per cent. Americans. Not hardened criminals, as of old, but young men predominate to-day in the prisons of the United States, as in Great Britain: the average age of the gaol population is falling steadily.

The causes of crime, and especially of murder, are many. There is, as Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise showed many years ago, no criminal type. Bad home conditions are a main cause—one or both parents dead, or separated from each other—and life in slums. Love of notoriety is even stronger, and it is fostered by the insistence of newspaper proprietors, intent on great circulations, on the publication of detailed accounts of murders.

I believe [writes Dr. Squire] firmly in a free press, but I am convinced that they [certain newspapers] must share to a large extent the blame for the increase of crime. No amount of adroit editorial rationalization . . . can hide the fact that the sensational Press is interested primarily in increasing its circulation at any cost to genuine civic welfare and at any sacrifice to truth.

Publishers who revel in the riotous, melodramatic presentation of crime news have a poor apology in their claim that their methods serve as a deterrent. A vivid portrayal of the career of a young criminal invariably stimulates other anti-social youths to emulate his example. [pp. 68-69.]

It is of interest to note that Mr. Pink, in *The Defence of Freedom*,¹ reaches the conclusion that the daily Press must be curbed if the foundations of free institutions and, indeed, of our culture

¹ Macmillan, 1935, 6s. net.

are to be preserved. That the repute of a certain section of our daily Press has fallen is not disputed; that its political influence has diminished is equally certain. Dr. Squire suggests that it is largely responsible for the increase of serious crime among young men. There can be little doubt that he is right.

The value of Dr. Squire's views is enhanced by the fact that he has been an official for twenty-five years, and he is almost silent regarding, or is prone to take a favourable view of, certain aspects of American prison life which have elsewhere been condemned. He refers to the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (p. 96), which reported that the use of torture to procure confessions was widespread in the United States. That Commission revealed, a few years ago, conditions in American prisons so horrible as to explain the inevitable growth of recidivism and of criminality in that country. But he does not indicate what, if any, action has been taken to remedy a state of affairs rivalling the worst features of the mediæval east.

Should capital punishment be abolished, or at least suspended? That must for most readers be the question on their lips as they read this book. Dr. Squire offers no definite reply. It is not a deterrent. There is no more crime in those States where it has been abolished than in those where it is maintained. But, on the other hand, long terms of imprisonment are not remedial. A youth of eighteen sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment will never become a useful citizen. 'There is,' says Dr. Squire, 'no place in the modern scheme of life for vindictiveness towards criminals. . . . The primary object should be to correct the social maladjustment of the inmates'; but 'penal systems are determined and controlled by public opinion and will be improved only so far as enlightened public opinion will permit.'

Those who read this book will do well to remember that public opinion in England urgently needs educating, and that the law to-day is far behind enlightened judicial, legal, and public opinion both as to the infliction of the penalty of death, particularly on young men, and in respect of long terms of imprisonment for certain offences, e.g., on a medical man for terminating pregnancy at the request of a woman and her husband, and for certain crimes which are in reality manifestations of psychopathic tendencies or physical aberrations, the proper treatment of which is a matter for skilled physicians, not gaolers.

Miners' Welfare Fund, 1934: *Thirteenth Annual Report of Committee* (Stationery Office, 1935, 1s. 6d. net). Few people outside the industry realise that since its institution in 1920 this fund has

received £11,750,000 from a levy on output, £1,500,000 from a levy on royalties, and £1,250,000 by way of interest on balances—a total of £14,500,000. It is required by statute to spend £20,000 a year on health and safety research, and £375,000 a year on pithead baths. The annual incomings are a little short of £400,000 a year at the present rates of levy, which were reduced last year, but extended by statute for eight years from 1934. This makes it possible for the Committee, which represents miners (three), owners (two), as well as the public (two), under an independent chairman (Sir F. Sykes), to plan ahead.

The Report shows what magnificent results are being achieved. Architecturally the pithead baths and swimming-baths, canteens and cycle-stores, would attract notice and elicit praise in any country in the world except England, whose Government (party interests apart) seems unable to advertise itself except, as in the case of the Post Office, when there is money to be made. The inclusion of cycle-stores at thirty-seven centres is a fresh development of great interest. This is the working man's reply to the growing transport monopolies which are raising fares and reducing services in the sacred name of co-ordination and standardisation. Good employers would do well to follow suit, and, in fact, the Committee emphasise that it should be regarded as a normal responsibility of the employer. Sixty-seven canteens have been provided to date in connexion with the pithead baths, the profits going to reduce the workers' weekly levy towards upkeep; £2,000,000 has been spent on homes for aged miners, £400,000 has been allocated to hospitals, over £1,000,000 for educational purposes—and these are but random selections from a long list. Those who are never weary of claiming that 'nothing is being done' in any particular direction would do well to study this outstanding example of steady co-operation between Ministries, managements, and men.

Midland Sessions Records, New Series, vol. i., 1612-1614, edited by William le Hardy, M.C., F.S.A. (London: published by Sir Ernest Hart, M.B.E., clerk of the peace, the Guild Hall, Westminster, 10s. 6d. net, 1935). This book makes available to students at a cost of one penny for every four pages of well-printed royal octavo (excluding a full and indispensable index of 130 pages), unrivalled material for a new and genuine *Cavalcade* covering nineteen months in the life of Stuart England. Here is material for an authentic pageant of real life, of greater value by far than any attempt to compress the drama of a thousand years—or fifty—into an hour or two. The moral is that of Proverbs xxvii. 22: 'Though

thou shouldest bray a foole with a pestel in a mortar like frumenty corn, yet wil not his foolishnesse gooe from hym.' ²

It was an age of much government and many laws, administered less by the King's courts or officers than by the justices at one end of the scale and by Privy Councillors at the other. Parliament is nowhere referred to. The Church of England was established, but not in men's hearts, for many men and women were brought to court for not accepting its ministrations. The toll of the roads seems to have been as grievous as it is to-day, and the victims mainly children: instead of motor cars, youths took other men's horses for a joy ride, and draymen were prosecuted for disregarding parking regulations at Charing Cross. The confidence trick was being played as successfully as ever in Cheapside and Fenchurch Street. Men were selling mutton for lamb and over-charging their customers, women were making a living by telling fortunes and cozening other women by selling mascots, tobacco and ale were being sold and firearms held without licence, money was lent 'at extreme usury' by pawnbrokers, and coiners were busy.

Young men sought the company of loose women, and some parish constables—laymen, elected from year to year—made the most of the opportunities the law afforded, for they had the right to enter without warrant any house or room on suspicion of adultery or fornication and to take the offenders into custody.

Penalties were cruel: a burglar was transported to Greenland by order of the Lord Mayor; scores of men and women were hanged for stealing as little as one shilling, and a dozen or so for murder, including pregnant women—respited only till the child was delivered. For lesser crimes the whipping-post, the branding-iron, and the stocks were ready; the unlucky ones died in Newgate before trial of 'pining sickness.'

On the other hand, we have records of the amazing courage and loyalty of men who, to save their companions in crime, 'stood mute.' For this the invariable punishment was *peine forte et dure*: the prisoner was stretched naked on a stone floor in a dark room with weights placed on his back—'as many as he can bear and more.' There he lay till he died, fed on alternate days with sour bread and 'the worst water.' Such cruelties had no parallel at that time in Islamic law or in savage parts. There was, however, little imprisonment in default of money payments or for debt (for which in England and Wales 20,000 persons went to gaol last year), and few long sentences of imprisonment.

² The quotation is from the 1539 Bible, which had, at the period covered by these Records, not yet been generally displaced by that of 1611: it was doubtless this version which (p. 329) was stolen from the church of Saint Faith.

Such was one aspect of London life and of 'Merrie England' in Jacobean times. The law was not behind public opinion, and it was impartially administered. 'Gentlemen' and 'rogues' paid the penalty alike. The record is a warning to those who equate law with order, and drastic punishments with the prevention of crime.

Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms: Minutes of Evidence, first to eighth days, June 15 to July 18, 1935 (Stationery Office, 5s. net). The carefully drafted terms of reference of this Royal Commission are:

(1) To consider and report upon the practicability and desirability (both from the national and international point of view) of the adoption (a) by the United Kingdom alone, (b) by the United Kingdom in conjunction with the other countries of the world, of a prohibition of private manufacture of and trade in arms and munitions of war, and the institution of a State monopoly of such manufacture and trade.

(2) To consider and report whether there are any steps which can usefully be taken to remove or minimize the kinds of objections to which private manufacture is stated in Article 8 (5) of the Covenant of the League of Nations to be open.

(3) To examine the present arrangements in force in the United Kingdom relative to the control of the export trade in arms and munitions of war, and to report whether these arrangements require revision, and, if so, in what directions.

The breadth of these instructions is perhaps without precedent, for they cover the whole world, and involve less administrative or commercial than political issues, and those of the first magnitude.

The Commissioners on whom this heavy responsibility is placed are Sir John Eldon Bankes (chairman), Sir Thomas Allen, Dame Rachel Crowdy, Sir Philip Gibbs, K.B.E., Professor H. C. Gutteridge, K.C., Sir Kenneth Lee, and Mr. J. A. Spender. They have already received evidence from and examined many witnesses. The most important document hitherto placed before them on July 17 is the case of the Union of Democratic Control, represented by Mr. R. McKinnon Wood, O.B.E. (for twenty years employed in the Air Ministry's Research Department at Farnborough), Mr. John Bernard (an Assistant Director of Research in Cambridge University), and Lord Marley, D.S.C. Sir William Jowitt appeared on behalf of the Union, and presented to the Commissioners an exceedingly comprehensive and detailed statement of evidence, which runs to fifty pages of closely-printed foolscap in double column and comprises charts purporting to show the ramifications of the Imperial Chemical Industries and Vickers-Armstrong. This evi-

dence, which has passed almost unnoticed in the Press,³ is clearly of quite exceptional importance. I can recollect no precedent for the submission to any Royal Commission of a document so comprehensive and so challenging. It is, of course, frankly socialistic in outlook and in its approach to the whole problem. It is highly controversial both in presentation of data (I hesitate to refer to 'facts') and in imputing motives and deducing consequences. It is *sub judice*, not only because the Commissioners have not yet reported, but because the parties principally concerned have not yet tendered evidence to the Commission on the subject before it, or in rebuttal of this and other statements. It is, however, well that the Union of Democratic Control should have put forward the whole of their case, so far as it falls within the terms of reference of the Commission, in such detail. Their action has cleared the air, and helped to define the issues. To the inquiring layman the first lesson to be drawn from their statement is that amalgamations such as the Imperial Chemical Industries and Vickers-Armstrong, and combines and cartels with which they are involved, are too big to be efficiently managed by any one man or group of men. It is an open question whether, far from favouring further groupings of the same size, by remitting stamp duties (*vide* section 24 of the Finance Act, 1934) the State would not be well advised, in its own interests, to discourage them.

A Scientific Survey of Norwich and District.—Prepared for the Norwich Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science by various authors (1935).

This unpretentious pamphlet of 120 octavo pages is not on public sale. It has been prepared as a labour of love by many hands for the use of members of the British Association. It should have a far wider public. It should be in the hands of every member of Parliament and of every local authority in Norfolk. It should be given to teachers in every elementary and secondary school in Norfolk, and might well be a text-book for many years to come in local schools.

The thirteen chapters are an epitome of the life and history of a typically English county from the earliest times. Mr. R. H. Mottram, in a brief preface, describes Norwich as a cross-section of English life, with strong and honourable traditions and a notable series of industries which have been successively established by the enterprise of local men who, faced with the decay of one branch of

³ The price at which it is issued by the Stationery Office is prohibitive, and requests for review copies are refused—a most effective way of preventing publicity.

trade, have contrived to maintain the city's prosperity by establishing another. Alien *émigrés* were welcomed, and rejuvenated skilled trades. When between 1830 and 1840 the whole textile industry left the district, Norwich became a distressed area. The local magnates did not fly the county, nor appeal to Whitehall. They themselves initiated fresh industries: boots and shoes were made by those who had formerly been weavers; the firm of J. & J. Colman made Norwich its centre and established large packing and hardware industries. Two great insurance societies made it their headquarters. The municipality controls one of the largest of provincial museums, with an Art Gallery, and four branch establishments which specialise in crafts, in folk and domestic collections, and an ecclesiastical museum. Here, for those who have eyes to see, is the key to future progress in England—not centralisation in, nor even control from, London; not 'plans' made by men who have nothing to gain or to lose and no personal bond with the locality, but 'ventures' by men like the founders of J. & J. Colman, who, as Mr. H. P. Gower records, shared the feelings and outlook of their staff, and took their Christmas dinner with their 'hands' in the mill. It may be mentioned, parenthetically, that chairmen of provincial chambers of commerce who, like Mr. Gower, can write so attractively and with such authority of the industries of the district are rare treasures, wherever found.

Other chapters deal authoritatively with local Zoology, Botany. Climate and Geology, and Geography, Prehistory, Agriculture, and Afforestation, Education, Municipal Life and Norfolk Scientists. The British Association deserves the thanks of the whole county for having inspired such a publication, the writers the earnest gratitude of all local residents, as well as visitors. Let us hope that those in authority will see to it that their labours receive the fullest publicity—that is the only tribute they would desire.

ARNOLD WILSON.

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THE LEAGUE AND THE FUTURE

A COMMENTARY

By DOUGLAS JERROLD

SIR HERBERT SAMUEL's article on the future of the League in the November number of this Review ¹ was in form a defence of, in substance an attack on, that organisation. This paper is a commentary thereon rather than a reply. With great force and fairness, Sir Herbert states the case for the 'dissatisfied Powers.' He points out that two-thirds of the land surface of the world is under the control of eight Powers, while the three dominant Powers at Geneva control almost half the world. Immigration is universally restricted. Economic nationalism (or imperialism) is closing the trade routes, and great and growing Powers, such as Japan, Germany, Italy and Poland, feel that they have no sufficient outlet either for their population or their goods. Further, the League, while

¹ 'The League, Italy and the Future,' by the Right Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L.

claiming to be supreme arbiter in international affairs, has in fact no power whatever to alter the *status quo* in the interests of the 'dissatisfied Powers,' and has only in practice ever recommended alterations (in its reports on Manchuria and Abyssinia) under the urgent threat of war.

Sir Herbert proceeds to make some suggestions for remedying to some extent the plight of the 'dissatisfied Powers' by the reduction of tariff barriers, by the abolition of subsidies, and by the stimulation of international trade—pious aspirations which will command much sympathy on political platforms. But he begins his article by describing the League as 'the greatest of all the attempts that history records—the broadest and most constructive—to end the [world] anarchy that was so plainly disastrous,' and goes on to stress 'the vital importance of upholding the League as the only possible safeguard of future peace.'

What does this mean? Apparently this. The League has failed to be constructive, or even to be, except at the point of the bayonet, suggestive. The difficulties and grievances of the 'dissatisfied Powers' are genuine and have not been remedied, and can only be remedied (if at all) by economic developments over which the League has no control. But the League is nevertheless the indispensable agent of peaceful progress.

The argument is powerful. The conclusion, at first sight, inept. What is the explanation?

The explanation, as so often in politics, is that Sir Herbert is handicapped by having assumed what he should have proved. His first assumption is that there was a state of anarchy from which the world emerged by means of the League, and to which it will return if the League fails. His second assumption is that the League is the greatest of all attempts at world government; and his third, that it stands for the rule of law in place of force ('the substitution of Law for War'). His fourth assumption is that in asserting the rule of law it is asserting the sovereignty of morality in politics.

Now, it is quite obvious that if the League is the greatest constructive effort ever made to end a state of anarchy which in fact existed and is now at an end, and if it does in fact stand for the rule of just law in place of the rule of undisciplined force, there is no more to be said. The action of Japan

and Italy in seeking to remedy economic grievances at the price of destroying such an institution would be nothing less than criminal. It would be as if a man set out on a campaign of wholesale assassination as a protest against his income tax assessment.

The short answer to Sir Herbert Samuel is, however, this. It is precisely the assumptions which he makes about the League which are challenged; and not only by the Italian, the Japanese and the German peoples, but by very many all over the world. It is the profound doubt whether the League in its present form is an organisation making for either peace or justice which makes even those countries which support it refuse to go to the length of fighting for it, and it is the same profound doubt which has united the Italian people, previously indifferent if not actually hostile to the Abyssinian venture, behind their Government. The Italians are not saying 'We like justice and peace, but we prefer colonies, and so we will destroy the peace and defy justice.' They are not saying 'The intolerable anarchy of the nineteenth century (which lasted till 1914) has been followed by eighteen years of unparalleled peace and prosperity for the whole world, but because we have a small private grievance we will destroy this peace and this prosperity.' They are not saying 'For the first time since the birth of Christ moral principles have been, for the last eighteen years, consistently and courageously applied to the problems of world government, but we are colonisers first and Christians afterwards, and have therefore decided to apostatise.' Nor did Germany say these things in flouting the League, nor did Japan. Still less does the overwhelming majority of the British people, which follows Sir Samuel Hoare in repudiating the use of military sanctions by the League, do so because we prefer peace to justice.

The attitude of the British people is, on the whole, quite simple and sensible. They feel no great confidence in anything but the good intentions of their own Government. They know as well as anyone in Italy or Japan that the League has so far failed either to secure peace or to dispense justice, but they feel that the Italian Government took, under somewhat exaggerated provocation, an intolerably high hand, and that if Italy had combined firmness with conciliation and a

regard for appearances, she could probably have effected a just settlement of her grievances without war. They feel that it is right and proper for us to express, through the League, our emphatic disapproval of Italy's methods, which we detest, though, on the whole, we sympathise with her aims. We want the League to survive the present crisis honourably, which means throwing its weight on the side of Abyssinia. But the last thing in the world that we want to see is 'a triumph for the League' won at the point of the bayonet, and riveting on the world by brute force for another generation the policies and methods which have already engendered profound unrest. Such an issue, we feel, would bring, not peace, nor even the technical appearance of peace, but the grim prospect of a world war.

With all respect for Sir Herbert Samuel's distinguished record of public service, I fancy that this League question is one which politicians find it, in the nature of things, almost impossible to regard dispassionately and clearly.

After all, Geneva is the politician's paradise.

I remember a few years ago being at a dinner party where the then Foreign Secretary, his predecessor, and, as it turned out, his immediate successor were also guests. Naturally, I should not repeat their conversation even if I could remember it. But I am certainly breaking no confidence if I record one dominant impression. The inestimable value of the League to all these eminent statesmen was that it provided a common and convenient meeting-ground for the world's diplomatists. It meant an immense extension of the range of their interests and activities, personal contacts with all the most distinguished politicians in Europe, and a world platform for their eloquent and statesmanlike orations. They could learn at first hand about men and events of which, under the pre-war system, even the Foreign Secretary himself would know only through his Ambassadors' despatches. This they considered immensely valuable, but it was still more clear that they found it immensely stimulating. But were they, I wondered then—and I still wonder—alive to the very great risks involved in the new methods? Politicians are inevitably peculiarly liable to a kind of auto-intoxication which mistakes the word for the

deed, the label for the thing, a politician's prestige for the victory of a cause. In domestic politics the necessary purgatives are administered by the electorate. Politicians can be forced either to retract their words or to implement them. They can even, in accordance with the latest medical fashions, be submitted to periodical starvation by being deprived of their seats in the House of Commons. They are regularly submitted to prolonged periods of enforced moderate dieting, when they are transferred from the Treasury to the Opposition front bench. They may even, like one of Sir Herbert Samuel's most brilliant colleagues in Mr. Asquith's second Administration, be sentenced to perpetual silence by some inscrutable whim of the electorate.

But there is no legislature at Geneva to control the executive, and its acts, which can alter the whole world's future for good or ill, are, sometimes juridically, and almost always in practice, irreversible, without a major political crisis. Even if we do not go the whole way with Sir John Simon in his doctrine that the unilateral denunciation of treaties is intolerable, it is clear that it may lead to situations as grave as those which such denunciations are intended to ease. Above all, the acts of Geneva are public. Policies once expounded cannot be modified without political consequences. The personal contacts behind the scenes may, and usually do, ensure that an agreement is reached before any public pronouncement is made. But such an agreement, hurriedly concluded after a long process of bargaining, is only too often a face-saving compromise based on a formula capable of different interpretations. This is a necessity in a political organisation where differences of opinion cannot be expressed because there is no sovereign electorate to decide between the rival views.

Considering the defects of its machinery and the irresponsible character of its collective personnel, the League Council and Assembly have done far better than they might have done. But it is political auto-intoxication, and nothing else, which leads a politician to describe the League as a constructive attempt to end anarchy, or a great, let alone the greatest, experiment in world government. The League provides machinery for personal discussions between politicians about international affairs, but that, on the constructive side, is all.

There is nothing that the League has done constructively which could not have been done if it had not existed. There are very many things it has left undone which could have been done had it not existed.

It is the commonest political error to create a piece of organisation and then give it credit for the activities which it is organising. As Mr. Runciman recently remarked, 'organisation by itself produces nothing.' That sentence ought to be branded on the forehead of every politician. Every war in history has been ended by a peace treaty, which is a peace organisation. The anarchy of 1914-18 would have been ended just the same by the Peace Treaties if these treaties had not set up a League of Nations. It is mere rhetoric to talk of the years of the League's existence and contrast them with the four years of the World War. The only point to be considered is the comparison between the ninety-nine years from 1815 to 1914 with the seventeen years from 1918 to 1935. Was the first period one of anarchy, and has the second been one of peace? That is the assumption made by Sir Herbert Samuel, and it is unjustified in both respects. There was no anarchy before 1914, and there has been no peace since 1918. The blood has never ceased to flow; the doors of the temple of Janus have never been closed. As for the piling up of armaments by the Great Powers and the tension between them, both have proceeded, with unparalleled speed, during the seventeen years of the League's life. The change from the peace mentality engendered by every great war back to the war mentality has been more rapid than ever before in history. And what of the claim that the League, with all its shortcomings and failures, would at any rate, by its machinery, ensure that when a crisis arose it would not be exacerbated by panic mobilisations of third parties and threatening military and naval concentrations inviting hotheads to counter-measures? Every part of this important and plausible claim is to-day proven false. Look at Europe to-day, and look at the Mediterranean Sea! The case for preserving the League as a defence against 'anarchy' is, in fact, wholly misconceived, and does a great deal of harm by blinding people to realities. Given a will to peace, the League will assist it; given a will to war, the League will be an equally apt servant. In neither case will it be master. It is

an organisation which can only organise what is there already. It has the merits of all such organisations—our own Ministry of Health is as good an example as any—of directing public attention to the problems with which it is concerned. It has also the defects of all such organisations, that it tends to become an end in itself, and thus the maintenance of its prestige tends to get confused both in its own and in the public mind with the achievement of its aims. We must save the League even at the cost of war; we must save the prestige of the Ministry of Health even at the cost of a nation-wide epidemic. My country, right or wrong; my mother, drunk or sober!

But perhaps we have spent too long dissecting what may have been intended, after all, as a harmless piece of rhetoric about the anarchy of a League-less world and the greatest experiment in world government. Let us go on to the much more important assumption that the League represents the rule of law as opposed to the rule of force, and that the law it administers is just and is administered justly. For all these assumptions are made, not only by Sir Herbert Samuel, but by every responsible public speaker supporting the League.

Now the first error underlying these assumptions is the confusion of the rule of a court of law with the rule of law. In a revolutionary crisis, every Government is forced to suspend the rule of law and to give, either to the ordinary or to specially created courts, emergency powers to deal with sedition, disaffection and civil disturbance, and often with other matters as well. That used to be called martial law, and is now, in our more verbose age, known as the proclamation of a state of emergency. We have, fortunately, been spared such a drastic experience in England, but we have seen emergency courts at work in Ireland, and, more recently, in Spain; while in Russia political offences are invariably dealt with under a procedure even less favourable to the course of justice than that of courts-martial. Now, if we analyse the legal provisions of the League's constitution, we shall see that what it provides is, in fact, an emergency court with plenary powers to act in a crisis. That may be a good thing or a bad thing, but it is not the rule of law. There are no principles which that court is called upon to apply, and

its action in the matter under dispute is determined, not by the requirements of a code of law with defined penalties, but by political considerations.

The rule of law requires and expresses the determination of people to order their social relations to each other, *uniformly and always*, in accordance with defined principles to be modified only by prior agreement. The court of law is an important instrument for carrying out this determination, but its powers are strictly limited, and it has no powers whatever which are not expressly conferred by the people over whom it exercises jurisdiction by request. When courts are set up with wider powers than these, the rule of law is suspended to that extent. The League, in so far as it deals with justiciable disputes—the interpretation of treaties, for instance—does not add to or fortify the pre-existing law, but merely provides a permanent channel for regulating the submission of disputes of this kind to arbitration or judicial decision. It does not even impose on its members an obligation to submit such disputes to judicial or quasi-judicial settlement. It provides the alternative of a reference to the Council of the League. In that event, all that the constitution of the League provides is that the Council shall draw up a report on the dispute. There is not a hint of any principles, not even of the most general kind, which should guide the Council in framing its recommendations for a settlement. It is as if the whole law of contract were to be blotted out from the *corpus* of English law and a simple direction substituted that all disputes over contracts were to be referred to a body of laymen, representing, let us say, the county councils. That would be the suspension, not the assertion, of the rule of law. But let us assume that such a revolutionary inroad on the structure of British justice had been made, and let us further assume that severe penalties were imposed on any party to a dispute which, except after a prescribed interval and in certain circumstances, failed to accept the decision of such an anomalous body. That would, in a sense, be a legal provision, and a breach of it would be a breach of the law. It would not, however, mean that anyone committing such a breach would be overthrowing the rule of law. He would, on the contrary, be challenging, in the only way open to him, a procedure objectionable for the precise reason that it had

placed him, not under the rule of law, but under the rule of an arbitrary court administering no known code, sworn to no recognised moral or legal principles. And let us carry the analogy a stage further and assume that such a breach of the law were sometimes punished and sometimes wholly ignored, and that the defence of the court was that in some cases the party which defied its decision was rich, powerful and inaccessible, but in other cases poor and relatively defenceless. Should we at all readily accept this answer? And should we, in any circumstances whatever, accept the plea that the occasional enforcement of the court's decision in cases where circumstances were favourable was necessary to preserve the rule of law?

At this point I would particularly emphasise that nothing written here is intended in defence of Italy's clear breach of the political engagement which she entered into when she signed the Covenant of the League. There may be a little to be said in justification for her action; there is certainly much to be said in condemnation of it. The argument here, however, is addressed solely to the claim that the League system sets up the rule of law in international affairs. It does nothing of the kind. If we wish to establish the rule of law in international relations we have got to redraft the League Covenant from the first paragraph to the last. The League Covenant as drafted does not even make aggressive war illegal except within six months of the Council's report on the dispute. It is only under the Covenant as read in conjunction with the Briand-Kellogg Pact that an aggressive war is declared to be in all circumstances illegal. Even this, however, though a positive and politically valuable provision, is not in any sense the assertion of the rule of law and will never be accepted as such.

I accept the law which forbids me to break into my debtor's house and take by force the money which he owes me because there is a code of law which enables me, if my case is just, to recover it otherwise. In no state of society has a man's right to take action himself ever been denied without just alternative methods of redress being provided. The reason, of course, is that, except in countries under the rule of law, men will never give up the right of private action. So far, however, from the League Covenant and

other pacts and treaties which form the peace organisation providing for the rule of law and asserting principles for the just and prompt removal of grievances leading to disputes, there is not even any obligation on the League to consider such grievances at all. They may consider them (under Article 19). They never have done so. That, as Sir Herbert Samuel truly says, is a grave defect of the League's practice. It is, however, much more than that. It is the constructive and positive denial of the only condition—namely, the effective rule of law—on which the denial of the right of private action will ever be regarded as morally binding by any Power, or could even be regarded as politically desirable. In other words, no adjustment of particular grievances will enable the League Covenant to be properly described as substituting Law for War. The root of the matter is not in it. It does not assert, and its basic principles do not allow it to assert, the rule of law.

Let us, however, dismiss 'the substitution of law for war,' like the 'anarchy' of a League-less world, as a mere rhetorical flourish, and let us consider on its merits the one isolated and, as we have seen, unenforceable law which the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact has provided—namely, the veto on aggressive war. Is not this at least a clear step forward? And must we not hold on this one clear gain, this one clear assertion of the principles of morality? In other words, is not the fourth, at least, of Sir Herbert Samuel's underlying assumptions correct? Is it not true that, little as the League has done, and completely though it has failed even to lay the foundations of the rule of law, it has, at least, asserted moral principles in international affairs?

Unfortunately, there is little more virtue in this assumption than in the others which we have examined. War is normally the last resort, not of the aggressor, but of the party against whom the aggression has been directed. No generalisation is watertight, but if one was forced to generalise, it would be far safer to say that the presumption of justice is on the side of those who attack than of those who defend the *status quo*. The strongest force in politics is the *vis inertiae*. For the sake of peace and quiet, nations, like individuals and classes, will endure really grave injustices for years, and sometimes for generations. A man may have a grievance against

a neighbour who plays the gramophone at all hours of the night, but he does not, in practice, immediately rush to law about it. He probably does nothing for months, except grumble, until some particularly prolonged and unpleasant noise leads him to write a letter of protest. Then, for a week or two, the nuisance abates. Presently it starts again. He writes another letter in a few weeks, and so the business drags on. Finally, his wife gets ill, and what was merely annoying becomes intolerable. The man goes round to his neighbour and tells him angrily to stop the thing at once. The neighbour refuses, and the man knocks him down. Who is the aggressor?

Who is the aggressor in a strike or a lock-out? Almost invariably, the masters in the case of a strike and the men in the case of a lock-out. People do not, in fact, do these things except as the result of intolerable provocation over a long period.

Who was the aggressor in the case of Germany's breach of the armament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles? Undoubtedly the former Allies, who used the technicalities of the Treaty to keep Germany in a state of political and moral inferiority, which was never intended when the Treaty was signed.

As I have written elsewhere, 'under the League machinery a premium was placed on aggression, because it was inevitable that the creation of an international organisation for peace, without any prior agreement as to the principles to be applied in the disputes which might arise, would result in the doctrine that the preservation of peace was the predominating necessity. Even in the League's early days it quickly became evident that the aggressor, freed from the fear of instant retaliation, would come to the League in a stronger position if he could face the Council with a *fait accompli*. The natural desire of the League to preserve its own life would, as the aggressors have realised, make it unlikely that they would be asked to abandon all the fruits of their aggression. As the price of "peace" they would almost certainly be able to retain half of them.'

The League has thus encouraged aggression instead of sitting in judgment on it. The result has been a steady accumulation of 'intolerable situations' which, as General

Smuts foretold and warned the League in 1919, would inevitably tend to an explosion. The explosion has since taken place in three areas, and is imminent in a fourth.

Peace, as the Archbishop of Canterbury wisely remarked on October 22, is not an ideal in itself. It is what results from the achievement of ideals. The League jurists, by defining aggression in a purely technical manner and ignoring in their definition most of the circumstances antecedent to military action, have given the Council and Assembly far too easy a task. The result has been a real or imagined conflict between law and morality in every case where aggression as the lawyers define it has taken place. And in this connexion it must be noted that an imagined conflict between law and morality is as fatal to the acceptance of the law as a real conflict. The Passive Resisters, the Ulster Loyalists, the Irish Rebels, the Spanish Socialists in the recent rebellion, were all people who saw a conflict between their moral rights and the laws under which they lived or might be asked to live. Where such conflict exists, the law can never stand. The issue will be decided either by a change in the law or by a breach of the law leading usually to the arbitrament of force. No law can ever be enforced in the teeth of a strong public opinion animated by moral principles, however misconceived these principles may be.

Obviously no body of moral principles which might have informed the League's definition of aggression would have been sure of acceptance by all nations in all circumstances, but it is easy to imagine certain principles which might be applied and which could be sure of enjoying really convinced and enthusiastic support by the majority of civilised peoples. The League cut itself off from this indisputable source of strength by framing a purely mechanical test of aggression. There will always be occasions—and the Italo-Abyssinian dispute may well be one—where even a badly framed question will produce the right reply. But at the root of the League's weakness lies the knowledge that it is not morality, nor even political expediency, which informs its decisions, but a barren legalism devoid of moral content. This fact does not, of course, justify the breach of political engagements (most of which are devoid of moral content), but it explains why such breaches occur, why they cannot be

held in check by moral precepts, and why the world is not prepared to punish them by force. It also provides the answer to the argument that the League in its present form must be preserved—if not for the assertion of the rule of law, then for the assertion of moral principles in international affairs.

We can now see how really powerful is the case which Sir Herbert Samuel brought against the League. The grave deficiencies in its policy and proceedings to which he draws attention are in no sense accidental. On the contrary, they derive directly from certain false assumptions and principles on which the League is based. The League is not a moral agent which has been guilty of unaccountable errors of judgment. It is a body seeking to secure acceptance of its own arbitrary recommendations (hurriedly made in the heat of a crisis) as the only alternative to the continued acceptance of the *status quo*. It is not a body which constricts the sovereignty of its member States, but a body which inserts itself as a third party to every dispute, and demands, like the original disputants, satisfaction as the price of peace. This satisfaction it does not derive, nor profess to derive, from the harmonisation of the terms of settlement with any body of moral principles, nor even with the canons of mere political expediency. It is, like every similar institution, from the committee of a women's institute to a great trade union, concerned above all for its prestige. When, as in the case of Japan and Manchukuo, positive action would have weakened its prestige, it takes no action. When, as in the recent crisis, it sees a chance of acting effectively, it acts. But to what end? What are the moral issues involved in the present Abyssinian dispute? What are the conditions of a moral settlement? First and foremost, the abolition of slavery; secondly, the creation of conditions permitting of ordered progress for Abyssinia, and the security of life and liberty for the native tribes; thirdly, the restoration and preservation of order on the frontiers; fourthly, a quick settlement to avoid fruitless loss of life. Compared with these four requirements, the question whether the negotiations are conducted under the ægis of the League or whether the mandate shall be in Italian or British hands is, from any moral standpoint whatever, secondary. And it would be secondary

from the League's standpoint also if the League stood for moral principles and if its prestige was bound up with their supremacy. As it is, we have seen that the League stands for a barren legalism: the law has been broken (not the moral law, but the politicians' law), and the law-breaker must be made to accept the authority of the court.

In existing circumstances the League can do nothing else. We, as members of the League, cannot do otherwise than we have done. But that is a thousand times removed from saying that we wish this tragic and anarchic muddle to become stereotyped and canonised as the permanent and best possible peace organisation. It has neither sought peace nor preserved peace. The main force behind the League, and the only politically effective force, has been the determination not to order peace and 'to establish it with judgment and with justice,' but to preserve the *status quo* created by the post-war treaties. Fortified as it was by the bayonets of France, the League achieved not a little, but almost from the beginning it has bitterly disappointed all genuine lovers of peace. Sir Herbert Samuel himself has been second to none in his championship of the League, but he, like everyone else, realises that, whatever may be said of the foundations of the peace organisation, the foundations of peace are yet to be laid.

It is essential, if the world is to proceed to this urgent task, that it should not be handicapped by the emotional loyalties evoked by the league idea, but that it should proceed to analyse with the utmost ruthlessness the weakness of the present League structure. It is no good saying, in the midst of anarchy, that we have saved the world from anarchy, or saying that we have set up the rule of law in international affairs when we have plainly and obviously done nothing of the kind. Nor can we pretend that we are asserting the supremacy of moral principles when we are merely asserting a barren and eclectic legalism. If we persist in doing these things, from however good a motive, we shall end in saving the League at the price of peace. It is the first task of statesmen to put first things first, and in foreign policy the cause of justice comes first and the cause of peace second, and the cause of the League nowhere at all, unless and until it ceases to be an organisation for asserting a sterile legalism and

becomes an organisation for promoting justice. Only then shall the other things be added unto it.

Now, what answer do practical men give to this argument? It is invariably the same. They say that the ideal of a League of Nations devoted to the promotion of justice is Utopian. I do not believe it; but if it is, *cædit questio*. It is the height of folly to promote and work for a League which does not seek to promote justice merely because a lot of sentiment has grown round it in the erroneous belief that it does.

Rather let us work on the old maxim that to state the problem fairly is to advance more than half way towards a solution of it.

The first thing to remember—the whole world knows it to-day, but it will soon try to forget it—is that it is not a question of war or law, but of substituting, for the right of private action by sovereign States in dealing with their neighbours' affairs, an effective system of public action. In both cases the use of force is exceptional; in both cases it will sometimes be required. The right of private action when it existed, and in so far as, in law, it survives, is limited only by the morality of the State which exercises that right, just as a man's rights in most of his personal relations are limited only by the dictates of his own conscience. No nation will ever surrender the right of action except when it knows in advance the principles that will be applied by the third party in settling its disputes, and when these principles are in general conformity with its own morality. It will also require to be satisfied, as Englishmen are in the English law courts but as no one is in the Chinese or Abyssinian law courts, that the principles will be honestly applied in the light of a real knowledge of the facts. You cannot invest with the sanctions of morality and wisdom the hurried conclusions of committees of politicians with no previous knowledge of the matter in dispute. Nations do not prepare to go to war out of fun or cynicism. Statesmen might occasionally wish to do so, but their peoples will not allow them to. The war mentality under modern conditions is, in fact, only engendered by a long accumulation of genuine grievances bitterly felt. The possibility of a deliberate recital, over a long period of time, of fictitious incidents made

notorious by Government propaganda cannot, perhaps, be altogether discounted, but the possibilities are very much against it. It may be noted that neither in the Manchurian nor in the Abyssinian dispute has any responsible person denied the genuineness of the grievances alleged.

One conclusion at least emerges from these considerations. If the League is to be revitalised in the cause of peace, its membership must be limited to nations subscribing to a common morality, and its range of action must be limited to those matters to which that common morality applies. If there is a world-wide agreement on the solution of the problems created by anarchic conditions in uncivilised border States—as to the proper solution of colonial problems, in other words—let these principles be declared and acted upon. But if there is not, it is much worse than futile for any League of Nations to attempt to regulate such matters. Such an attempt, in the absence of a common morality touching on the point, can only mean the enforcement of their own morality by one group of Powers upon another group which holds a different morality. However much more powerful one of the two groups might be, the attempt to impose its morality would be nothing more nor less than the use of force as an instrument of policy. The same considerations apply to questions arising out of the breakdown of government in an ordinarily or formerly civilised country, and to the still commoner question of the right of civilised countries to close their gates against imports or immigrants, or to refuse to allow the development of sources of raw materials which they do not themselves require. Whatever may be the right answers to these questions, it is perfectly obvious that they are questions to which a number of different answers are conscientiously given by conscientious people. To say, as we are saying to-day, that these are not questions which nations may answer for themselves, but which they must agree to allow other nations to settle on their behalf, is merely futile when the nations raising the questions know that they are going to be judged by the very nations whose actions are responsible for the questions arising.

The League, if it is to be anything more than the diplomatic instrument of the pre-war Triple Entente, must either secure agreement among all the Powers in advance on

the principles on which these ever-recurring problems—which have been thrown up everywhere from the first dawn of history—are to be solved, or it must be less ambitious in its aims. Actually, the line of possible progress for a reconstituted League is clear. Instead of starting with the preservation of the *status quo* as its object, and seeking to express its growth in the rapid strengthening of its powers of coercion, the League of the future must set out with the clear realisation that if the rule of law is to be substituted for the unrestricted right of private action it must first secure an agreement as to the law to be enforced. This may mean in the beginning a great restriction of the sphere of its activity. It may be possible to make only a very small beginning, and almost all the graver international problems might have to be left outside its province. But it would at least be setting out on a path which leads somewhere, and which could and would be extended a little further in each decade. At present, every so-called forward step taken by the League is a step towards a crisis, and the only discernible policy inspiring its action is the desire to make sure that the crisis will be so grave that even the most aggrieved nations will hesitate to assert their rights.

This way lies disaster. If the so-called 'sanctity of treaties' becomes a dogma of Geneva, the only possible result would be a coalition of the 'dissatisfied Powers' against the League. Italy would be thrown, like Poland, into the arms of Germany; Spain would probably follow suit, and Belgium almost certainly. The concert of Europe would be destroyed, and a world war would be inevitable in a generation. Spain in such an event would probably hold the balance; a Socialist Spain would stand by France; a Monarchist Spain by the Central Powers. England would become an adjunct to the policies of Moscow, with France as the honest broker. Not even a reconstituted British Fleet (which, incidentally, may be no more adequate numerically to the defence of our trade routes than the present one) can preserve the *status quo* of 1935 any more than it could preserve that of 1713 or 1815. No one but a fool imagines that the map of the world in 2030 will resemble in any substantial degree the map of the world as it was four years ago. If these changes are to be made peaceably it can only be because

and in so far as the world can reach a real agreement in advance as to the lines and conditions of change.

It is not impossible that even to-day substantial agreement could be reached on some important questions of principle, but the vital matter is that the prestige of the League of the future shall only be engaged in disputes where such agreement has been reached. If this is not so, then the League must either become the champion of the *status quo* (thus committing itself to a losing battle at the start), or must commit itself to enforcing *ad hoc* solutions representing merely a majority point of view. Such a policy opens up nothing but a long vista of desolating war. Along other lines, the possibility of progress towards the rule of law does at least exist, and the ground as it is gained can probably be held. However small at the start the range of such a League's activities, the fact that within that sphere it really stood as the defender of clearly defined principles would enable it to mobilise a real public opinion on its side. If, as is to be hoped, the first principles laid down concerned the essential liberties of conscience and opinion, and if, as a second principle, member States were bound to give clear economic and fiscal advantages to each other at the expense of non-member States, the new League would at least, and within a very few years, have ended the vilest evil of present times—the persecution of civil and religious opinion.

Until the League acquires a conscience, it has no future as an agent of peaceful progress. The most discreditable feature of the League to-day is its personnel. It is not a club, nor even a good hotel, but an hotel where all are welcomed and no questions are asked. That people still continue to stay in it is a sign that the world is ready for a real experiment in world government. To see that that experiment does not perish amid a welter of political rhetoric is the first duty of all decent people. But the experiment in world government is not yet begun. The rule of law has not yet been attempted, nor have we even begun to see the first beginnings of an attempt to apply moral principles to political problems. Given good will, all these things can be attempted and some of them can be achieved. But first of all we must clear our minds of humbug and conceit.

DOUGLAS JERROLD.

FRANCE AND THE PRESENT CONFLICT OF IDEALS

By RANDOLPH HUGHES

It is important to have a just idea of French opinion on its various sides respecting what is popularly known as the Italo-Abyssinian dispute; for in this matter, which, so far from being of merely local or ephemeral interest, is sure in its ultimate consequences to act with decisive effect and for a long time to come upon the destinies of Europe, and hence upon those of the world at large, France, together with England—whether in collaboration with or in opposition to England—is the chief protagonist, the most determinative of all the agents engaged. What the French are thinking cannot be said to be adequately conveyed through the ordinary channels of the English daily Press: certain newspapers, by garbling and other processes of distortion, deliberately falsify French opinion; others omit to take any notice of considerable sections of it; and, at the best, day-to-day reporting, however accurate it is, hardly allows of anything like a comprehensive survey of the whole field. In what follows I shall try to give a conspectus of this opinion, as representative, as objective, and as little tendentious as possible. If at times I seem to be bringing into prominence facts which many Frenchmen would doubtless prefer to see passed over in discreet or charitable silence, I would plead that I am only doing so because my subject demands it; and at the outset I should like to be permitted to say that from first to last I speak as one who loves France (not merely as a woman, as, according to his own confession, does one of the most notable of our elder statesmen), with a large love based upon a fairly intimate acquaintance with her land, her people and her literature. It also may not be altogether impertinent to add that if here and there, constrained by a regard for truth

and common sense, I refer with a lack of reverence to pronouncements of certain gentlemen on the extreme Right, my political views in general accord very largely with theirs.

In the first part of this paper I shall deal with the judgments of those who in the present conflict take the part of Italy against Abyssinia, or at least are opposed to the application of sanctions against Italy. But with this, in nearly all cases, is implicated the much bigger question of the League of Nations: the soundness of its underlying principles, its desirability, and its practical efficacy; for the majority of those who espouse the Italian cause are, in varying degrees, very severe critics of the League. With this paramount question I shall begin, and I shall summarise the chief charges formulated against the League; then I shall pass on to the subsidiary question of sanctions, and give the reasons for which they are condemned; and then to special difficulties which France has to encounter, and which perhaps are imperfectly appreciated by other nations to whom they are not incidental.

Most of the views presented in this section proceed very largely if not exclusively from critics situated at some point on the Right, from the moderates to the extremists. In this connexion I shall not hesitate to quote freely from the *Action Française*, a paper that is all too little known in England. *The Times* and other English newspapers affect to disregard it as being of little or no account; but its influence in France (and in Belgium and French Switzerland), particularly in the universities and in a by no means negligible part of the *intelligentsia* in general, is unquestionably profound, if it is not so extensive as the *Action Française* itself would like its readers to believe. It is not too much to say that M. Charles Maurras, the philosopher from whom it takes its lessons, is one of the most potent forces shaping political thought in Europe to-day. We may disagree *toto celo* with his doctrines, but, whether we are practitioners or theorists in the business of politics, we cannot afford to ignore them.

Secondly, I shall recapitulate the views of those who oppose the more crucial if not all of these foregoing arguments, and who therefore believe in the League of Nations, and are in favour of some measure of sanctions being brought into play against Italy. In general, these views emanate from persons,

journals or parties who ordinarily occupy some position on the Left in politics.

I shall give much more space to the former set of opinions, for they have received very little circulation in England. The latter set, on the contrary, have been much and successfully canvassed in England, and it will be sufficient therefore to sum them up rapidly.

The cardinal charge made against the League by its out-and-out enemies is that it is excessively ideological; and, what is worse, that the assumptions upon which it reposes are not only ideological, but fallacious and illusory in the extreme—in other words, that it is out of touch with and at variance with realities, and hence that of its nature it is a force making, not for peace and order, but for disorder and war.

This cry, with many variations, but usually on a note of angry impatience and alarm, has gone up frequently of late in a fairly large section of the French Press. Thus, according to M. Stéphane Lauzanne, the chief document of the League is 'an ideological pact which has always refused to face realities'¹; the League, says M. Léon Daudet, seeks to 'control and regulate everything from a position outside and above reality'²; dreams of this kind, affirms another writer of the *Action Française*, 'are an obstacle to life,' and he bids us 'shake off the yoke of the absurd Genevan Cloudland' and 'get back to a sense of realities.'³ The most thoroughgoing of these realists, and the master of most of them, is M. Charles Maurras, who is perhaps the most cogent (his opponents would say the most plausible) of all the European critics of the League. For many years past—from its inception, in fact—he has denounced it insistently and consistently; being a true philosopher, he has sought to reach straight through to its fundamental premisses; and, more fully than anyone, he has explained why it should be regarded as an extravagant ideological blunder and one of the most serious menaces to civilisation. It is based, he maintains, upon a radically false conception, that of the essential friendliness, benevolence or

¹ *Matin*, October 3, 1935.

² *Action Française*, October 15, 1935.

³ *Action Française*, 'La Politique,' October 12, 1935.

goodness of the various members of the human race, whereas in truth this particular animal can only be understood if studied in the light of the two ancient principles: man is to man a wolf, man is to man a god.⁴ The League is a negation of history; it takes no account of 'the stream of ideas, the movement of peoples, the experience of the ages, and the main directions in which life and time are flowing,' and thus it is the most reactionary of all institutions.⁵ It does not see that the development of the modern world is from unity to differentiation, and not, as it presupposes, from differentiation to unity; mediæval Christendom was less of a unity than the Roman Empire, eighteenth century Europe was less of a unity than mediæval Europe, but far more of a unity than the Europe of the nineteenth century and that in which we are living to-day.⁶ (The student of political ideas will contrast with these affirmations Voltaire's thesis that since the Renaissance and the great geographical discoveries the nations of the world are, by the ties of commerce alone, increasingly related to one another in a unifying solidarity.⁷) In short, the League is only another and a more disquieting expression of the democratic idea, the rise of which marked a decline of the human spirit; reaffirming and amplifying all the wildest errors of democracy—equality, fraternity, etc.—it is a sign of still further moral and intellectual decadence; it is 'the quintessence of democratic stupidity.'⁸ M. Daudet (among many others), restating this indictment, says that the League derives from the same basic fallacies, invented or popularised by ideologues or Utopians like J. J. Rousseau, as the French Revolution, one of the most pernicious events of modern times, which has wrought incalculable harm to France and to civilisation in general.⁹ Many of its sponsors, M. Maurras observes,¹⁰ think of it in their ignorance as something new in the world; but ancient history contains more than one example of the idea and the experiment—and the failure in which it ended.

⁴ *Action Française*, September 5, 1922.

⁵ *Action Française*, September 5, 1922.

⁶ *Action Française*, May 20, 1932.

⁷ See *Essai sur les Mœurs*, xxiv, 28, and elsewhere.

⁸ *Action Française*, September 25, 1924.

⁹ *Action Française*, October 15, 1935.

¹⁰ *Action Française*, October 26, 1935.

Such an institution, by its very essence in conflict with realities, cannot but be a disturbing force; so far from helping to establish and consolidate peace, it can only aggravate and increase the causes tending to produce a state of war. There issues from it 'an intolerable odour of dead bodies and blood.'¹¹

One of the great dangers of the League is that it tends to enlarge, to universalise, an event or action that otherwise would rest local in its scope. Thus M. Jean Thouvenin, in *l'Homme libre*,¹² urges that a simple colonial conflict is being so handled by the League that it is on the way to taking on the proportions of a European war. M. C.-J. Gignoux, in *la Journée industrielle*,¹³ desires France to be wary of identifying herself too readily with the League to-day, lest she help to compromise the peace of to-morrow. Signor Mussolini himself, in an interview which *Paris-Soir*¹⁴ records with apparent approval, gives expression to the same idea: 'It would be strange,' he says, 'that the League, whose aim is to avert war, should turn out to be only a sort of loud-speaker which amplifies it.' Even certain Left-Wing provincial papers, such as *le Petit Provençal*, are at one on this point with the most extreme organs of the Right; the League, says this journal, in its zeal to suppress a war in a corner of the globe, threatens to bring about an explosion that will involve the whole world.¹⁵ M. Léon Bailby, in *le Jour*,¹⁶ draws an horripilant picture of the way in which, little by little, the unsuspecting citizen is caught up in the terrible machine of war. 'Oh, of course, things will advance *piano, piano*. You won't be thrown bodily into the war-machine. Only the flap of your coat will be caught at first, and then your sleeve, and soon your finger, and then it won't be long before the whole of you is crushed, flesh and bone, without hope of escape. . . .' This metaphor of the machinery of war, with the finger or the hand inextricably fixed in it, has been used by a large number of papers: it is well calculated to impress the popular imagination.

¹¹ *Action Française*, September 15, 1921, and *passim*.

¹² October 3, 1935.

¹³ October 3, 1935.

¹⁴ October 7, 1935.

¹⁵ October 14, 1935.

¹⁶ October 9, 1935.

Le Journal of October 20, 1935,¹⁷ brings another serious criticism against the League: in this new diplomacy, the undertakings entered into by the constituent members are so vast and vague that they easily lend themselves to wide differences of interpretation and hence are a fertile source of misunderstanding. When, in a particular case, the time comes to give effect to them, the party directly concerned always finds itself at variance respecting their implications with other Powers whose interests do not appear to be immediately involved; thus, France cannot see eye to eye with England in the matter of Ethiopia, where much of capital concern to England is at stake, and England has not been able to adopt France's attitude towards certain actions on the part of Germany which France cannot help regarding as being of vital importance to herself. *Candide*,¹⁸ dwelling on the same drawback, says it will be a very long time before the requisite unanimity, of deed as well as of word, obtains among members of the League, and it further observes that a mutual assistance society such as the League, in order to realise its designs, would have to dispose of unlimited resources, which is very far from being the case.

One of the weightiest charges levelled against the League is that it consecrates the thoroughly unsound principle of the equality of nations, of the absolute respect of nationalities, without regard to their qualities, their achievements, and the responsibilities they have to meet. This principle, of course, is a corollary of the central article of faith of democracy, of which M. Maurras rightly declares the League to be a supreme expression, and it is all of a piece with the belief in the equality of men merely as men, and with the consequent inculcation of an absolute respect for the individual as such, for personality in whatever form it may be found. The resulting situation strikes a number of critics as being insupportably grotesque. What right, asks M. Pierre Dominique in *la République*,¹⁹ have small nationalities, some of them with a population no bigger than that of a French department, and with wealth, traditions and culture to match, to a voice in the deliberations of the

¹⁷ And, of course, other organs; all the examples of opinion adduced in the course of this article could be multiplied.

¹⁸ October 10, 1935.

¹⁹ September 25, 1935.

League? In other words, to help to form a decision which is going to control the destinies of Europe? Imagine (he goes on) Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein combining together with such a purpose in view! But this is the sort of thing that happens when a couple of dozen Lilliputian States think they are at liberty to govern the world and have the handling of a corresponding number of boxes of dynamite. Once for all, he proclaims, the rights of nations should be proportioned to the duties they are called upon to assume. Once upon a time there was a Europe where 300 princes, bishops or Germanic towns made a merry show in the middle of the continent, but when the Bishop of Munster, or the free town of Bremen, or the Prince of Anhalt flew into a temper, Europe, which then had a sense of measure, measured this action at its true worth. But alas! we have departed from certain wise diplomatic and even political traditions, and it is high time we returned to them.²⁰ M. Pierre Gaxotte emphasises the same absurdity in *Candide*²¹: no doubt, he says, Honduras and the Aleutian Islands are all in favour of war; they will encourage us—who have to do the fighting—with voice and gesture; Denmark will give us a good testimonial, and the inhabitants of Melbourne will continue to go about their small concerns with the remark that these Frenchmen, after all, have only done their duty. . . .

Even when all due allowance has been made for any qualifications of detail that may be called for, and particularly for the fact that in the League Council the smaller States have a position more or less commensurate with their intrinsic importance, it would seem that this objection retains much of its validity.

A further grievance in connexion with this question of small nationalities is that the latter are often likely, owing to commercial considerations, to be subservient to the wishes of one of the great Powers, and thus it is never sure that their votes will have even the virtue of honest independence. In this case, humanitarianism becomes a hypocritical cloak for selfish materialistic ends. This grievance is tersely put by M. André Vincent in *l'Eclair du Midi*,²² and he, in common with many

²⁰ Perhaps it should be mentioned that *la République*, in which these views are published, is a Radical journal—a fact from which they gain an additional weight.

²¹ October 10, 1935.

²² October 11, 1935.

other publicists, maintains that the Power which much more than any other actually does control the votes of small countries is England, owing to the prestige of her Fleet and the financial pressure she can bring to bear. This constitutes a very serious complaint for very many (and probably the vast majority of) Frenchmen, especially when it is conjoined to the following consideration. Why should the several British Dominions, and India and Irak, all have separate representation at Geneva? England has seven votes in the Assembly, while France has only one, and Russia, with her forty republics, also has no more than one.²³ This leads to a whole series of charges concerning England's place and influence and motives as a member of the League, and with these we shall now proceed to deal.

England's position in the League is preponderant, so much so that the League without her is nothing: one of the most authoritative of those who have raised this complaint is M. Jacques Bainville, a highly reputed historian (recently elected to the Academy), and one of the pillars of the *Action Française*; in cases where England's voice is not listened to (he says in *Capital*), or in cases where she does not choose to make it heard, the League is no more than a body without strength and without a soul; so that it is always upon England in the end that everything depends. M. Léon Bailby speaks of 'the power wielded by the League of Nations in the name of Great Britain.'²⁴ The writer in *Je suis partout* who answers to the name of *Le gardien de la valise* assures his readers that the bureau of the League is devoted to the English, and his readers are no doubt duly edified by the sermon he builds on this text. M. Léon Daudet, who never believes in mincing matters, avers that the League is nothing but an instrument of England, and that its experts are simply a set of lackeys, in the service not only of Ethiopian slave-drivers and burners of men, but of the financiers, oil merchants and Quakers of London.²⁵ Certain Swiss and Belgian critics express or re-echo the same complaint. The worst of it is, according to many of these censors, that if England does not get what she wants she at once begins to sulk, and threatens to withhold her

²³ See, e.g., *la République*, September 25, 1935.

²⁴ *Le Jour*, October 23, 1935.

²⁵ *Action Française*, October 13, 1935.

co-operation when it is needed on future occasions, or to leave the League altogether.²⁶

Naturally, England, in practically all cases, uses her predominant position in the League uniquely to further her own interests, not, as many of her admirers believe, and as she would like everyone to believe, to the greater glory of the Good, the Beautiful and the True. On this point an adequately representative purview, or even anthology, of incrimination, invective, and vituperation would demand the compass of a fair-sized volume. (I am not here suggesting that these charges and the accompanying overflow of emotion are not justified: I am simply recording them.) Let us for the present do no more than note the accusation reduced to its lowest terms: 'England only follows her own interests,' asserts M. Maurras with a Rhadamanthine severity unrelieved by anything in the way of qualification; she has always so behaved in the past, and if she remembers services we may render her now, it will only be just when it best suits her to do so.²⁷ All that Great Britain considers and defends are interests—her own interests, pronounces M. Marcel Chaminade in *Je suis partout*²⁸; and a number of other voices enlarge this cry into a chorus.

What are these interests that Great Britain pursues with such tenacious selfishness? The primary one, of course, of which most of the others are merely a function, has to do with international politics on the largest scale.²⁹ In the last quarter of the nineteenth century England sought Italy's friendship and collaboration in the Near East, and even in 1925 she was anxious that Italy should help her to acquire concessions in Abyssinia (who by that time had become a member of the League). Over all this time she had no fear of Italy—on the contrary, she looked upon her as a nation

²⁶ *Capital*, October 9, 1935; *Journal*, October 20, 1935.

²⁷ *Action Française*, October 16, 1935.

²⁸ October 12, 1935.

²⁹ On this matter see particularly: J. Delebecque, 'A propos du conflit italo-éthiopien,' *Action Française*, September 23, 1935; M. de Kerillis, *Echo de Paris*, October 5, 1935; Marcel Chaminade, 'Les Aspects ignorés de l'affaire d'Abyssinie,' *Je suis partout*, October 12, 1935; le Dr. A. Legendre, *Capital*, October 14, 1935; *le Temps*, editorial, October 18, 1935; Pierre Varillon, 'L'Equilibre des forces en Méditerranée,' *Revue de l'Universelle*, October 15, 1935; Henri Bérenger, 'Les Sessions de Genève,' *Revue de Paris*, October 15, 1935; André Chaumeix, 'l'Europe et le drame éthiopien,' *Revue des Deux Mondes*, October 15, 1935. These two latter articles touch very competently on some of the major issues of the present crisis.

whom she had in tow; France, however, she thought was becoming too strong, and, true to her traditional Continental policy, she set about playing Italy off against France, flattered the maritime ambitions of Italy, and did all she could to intensify Franco-Italian naval rivalry, all to the end of maintaining and consolidating her own supremacy in the Mediterranean basin. But her plans were thwarted, for there supervened an unexpected Franco-Italian *rapprochement*, and Italy's naval strength—especially in the matter of submarines and aircraft—was increased to an extent which was never anticipated, and this dangerously upset the balance of forces in the Mediterranean. Among other ensuing inconveniences, Malta, hitherto an admirable centre from which to radiate in maritime warfare, could no longer be regarded as in normal circumstances impregnable. And the all-important route to India was henceforth in jeopardy. Besides, owing to other causes, England had ceased to be undisputed mistress of the seas: all things considered, then, it might well seem that the very existence of the British Empire was threatened. Again, it would not do to have a powerful Italy installed in Abyssinia, for this would not suit England's colossal hydraulic projects in Egypt and the Soudan (destined to double the area of the arable land along the Nile valley), which required a very extensive control of Abyssinian territory. Not to mention the disturbing consequences of an advance of Italian authority into Arabia and elsewhere, and possibly as far as Singapore. Facts such as these, certain French papers³⁰ have observed, were insisted upon by Mr. Winston Churchill at a Navy League banquet: they cannot be dismissed as a French invention.

There is no need to enter into the various specific commercial and financial considerations diligently elaborated by a number of French papers³¹: they are merely a subsidiary detail of the major political consideration which has been outlined above. In this latter connexion, it is worth mentioning a related reason formulated by M. Maurras³²: that English action in the present crisis is very largely dictated by pride. England's prestige has been declining for some

³⁰ E.g., *Paris-Midi*, October 18, 1935; *Action Française*, October 19, 1935.

³¹ E.g., *le Journal du Commerce*, October 21, 1935.

³² *Action Française*, October 17, 1935.

time, owing chiefly to all too facile concessions—almost amounting to surrenders—she has made to America, to her Dominions and to Germany, and she is anxious to prove to herself and to the world that she is still in possession of the qualities that gave her her supremacy. Many Frenchmen—many Europeans—share the view that England has yielded far too much of late years, and in this they see a sign of national decadence. Some, even while apprehensive of the consequences, have not been able to suppress a cry of admiration at what they take to be a return of England to her old self; they have been puzzled, they say, by the England of the last fifteen years, the faltering England of Mr. MacDonald, the England which consented to disarm, which gave over the proud maxim that she must keep command of the seas, and which paid excessive deference to the wishes of Germany and the United States.³³

But the essential thing remains British interests, the threat to them, and measures taken to counteract that threat. When England's fundamental interests are at stake she will stick at nothing, says M. Raoul de Nolva in *la Liberté*,³⁴ and this is a very widespread opinion. Thus we are brought back to a point upon which we have already touched: the belief that England is merely using the League to serve her own ends, and more specifically to organise a coalition against Italy. There are not wanting critics who are convinced, in spite of all assurances to the contrary, that she actually wants war, and that she dispatched her Fleet to the Mediterranean with this incendiary design. M. Léon Daudet³⁵ says that he *knows* this to be the case, that he has been told so by a person of official standing (and he prints this information in capitals, a thing he always does when verbal resources fail him). He further suggests that England, having practically no army of her own, desires to send the sons of French mothers to do her fighting, and that in order to secure this military help she is dangling a very tempting loan before a highly embarrassed French Government.³⁶ 'She is taking steps to buy the blood of Frenchmen [capitals again], at a time when the French birth-rate is decreasing.' Not a few other writers have

³³ *Journal des Débats*, October 18, 1935.

³⁴ September 23, 1935.

³⁵ *Action Française*, October 11, 1935.

³⁶ *Action Française*, October 10 and 11, 1935.

developed this theme of England's sickness in getting other countries to do her fighting on land (sea fighting involves the loss of a comparatively insignificant number of lives).³⁷

Whether her aims be strictly bellicose or not, her enthusiasm for the League is very suspect, especially as it seems to be a thing of recent growth.³⁸ If the British Government makes idealistic professions of belief in the League it is (in addition to its general device to get control of the League for its own ends) in order to capture votes, for a recent referendum revealed that a large section of the population had developed a liking for the League.³⁹ There are no limits to English trickery, cunning, deceit, suppleness and all species of tortuous dealing. Resort is had to the wile of a campaign of false news.⁴⁰ A sinister system of bribery has been instituted on a mirific scale. The English have paid the election expenses of French Left-Wing parties; English gold will be found in the pockets of M. Herriot and many another man who has spoken in favour of sanctions. M. Jèze, the French barrister who defended the Abyssinian cause at Geneva, had received a princely fee from England. And so the entertaining story goes on; in this connexion many French papers have recently made great play with a phrase that is too recent to have a place in the dictionary: '*La Cavalerie de Saint-Georges*,' which means English money, or, by extension, English bribery and corruption; it certainly looks well, and it lends itself nicely to such supplementary comment as 'the crack corps of British idealism.'⁴¹ This skilful campaign to safeguard English interests is supported by the most exalted and the most august powers of the State, from the peerage to the dignitaries of the various Churches—Anglican, Nonconformist and Roman Catholic; and even the forces of Labour are occupying themselves busily in its service.⁴²

England (according to certain French observers), intent on securing only her own ends, and at the same time pro-

³⁷ *Le Journal*, October 19, 1935; *Action Française*, October 24, 1935; *Figaro*, October 29, 1925; *Candida*, October 31, 1935.

³⁸ *Journal des Débats*, September 25—and, of course, elsewhere *passim*.

³⁹ *Action Française*, October 22, 1935; *Candida*, October 31, 1935.

⁴⁰ M. Léon Daudet, lecture at *Les Ambassadeurs*, October 13, 1935.

⁴¹ *Action Française*, *Candida*, etc.

⁴² *Action Française*, October 19 and 22, 1935; *Je suis partout*, October 26, 1935.

fessing adherence to League principles, is inevitably led to adopt a certain duality of procedure, which unkind critics call double-dealing, and this reacts with vitiating effect upon the League itself. If the League has, in Baron Aloisi's words, been given to practising 'a policy of two weights and two measures' (a phrase that has become very popular in France), and therefore inspires distrust in French and other circles, this is very largely because of the vagaries of British policy, of which the League is to a considerable degree the instrument. For example, England has viewed German rearmament (in contravention of League principles) with a remarkable complaisance, and she may even be said to have encouraged it. A thing that Frenchmen find it very hard to understand, and still harder to forgive, is England's concluding a naval agreement with Germany practically behind France's back, and, as some believe, to the detriment of France.⁴³ Again, England has stood for the revision of certain clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and yet her action in the present crisis amounts to an intervention in favour of the *status quo*.⁴⁴

This brings us back to another weakness of the League already touched upon: the Pact demands acquiescence in general obligations, but members demand the right to exercise their individual judgment in particular cases, and this is true of England in an eminent degree. She has candidly said that she cannot give undertakings with respect to hypothetical cases in the future: that being so, it would be folly for France to count upon the League for that security which must always be her primary concern.

The difficulty of arriving at agreement even regarding not distant eventualities is well seen in the present situation: England has asked France whether she will come to her aid in case of unprovoked aggression in the Mediterranean, and this seems to be a very simple question susceptible of an answer equally simple. Not at all, as numerous French papers have pointed out; it may be extremely difficult to prove that an aggression is unprovoked; history is full of examples of acts of aggression cleverly disguised as measures of defence. In the present case it must not be forgotten that England sent her Fleet to the Mediterranean before Italy had been declared

⁴³ French Press, *passim*.

⁴⁴ *Je suis partout*, October 26, 1935.

guilty of infringing the Pact, and before the League had decided to apply sanctions against her. Might not this, notwithstanding all English protest to the contrary, be interpreted as a hostile act by Italy, and thus not implausibly be held to have provoked any aggression with which she may be charged? ⁴⁵

This has led us to the question of sanctions, which need not detain us long, for it has received a large amount of attention in the English Press. It will be enough to summarise briefly the main French reasons urged against them. On this point there is more unity among French journals not definitely of the Left than on any other: although this is a League question, even democratic papers like *le Temps*, which are not inimical to the idea of the League, are on the whole extremely critical regarding the imposition of sanctions. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to draw a hard-and-fast distinction between economic and military sanctions, and no one will dispute that military sanctions mean war; therefore many French newspapers proclaim energetically that economic sanctions will very probably, and some say surely, result in war. Take a simple case: supposing, now that the embargo on arms for Abyssinia has been lifted, a ship carrying such arms is seized and perhaps sunk by an Italian vessel. What will happen in that case? ⁴⁶

Then the effects of sanctions on large sections of French industry and commerce will be ruinous; and no less ruinous will be their effects on the trade of Europe and of the whole world; thus the League of Nations will only have succeeded in aggravating the international economic crisis, which is the source of most of the calamities from which the world is suffering to-day. ⁴⁷

Such questions as compensation of the consenting members for losses entailed raise ludicrous considerations: is France to be called upon to help reimburse Honduras, Liberia and—for you never know—the Aga Khan? ⁴⁸

⁴⁵ *Action Française*, *passim*; *Petit Parisien*, October 15, 1935; *Temps*, October 25, 1935.

⁴⁶ *Le Matin*, *le Jour*, *le Journal*, *la Journée industrielle*, *le Journal des Débats*, *la Liberté*, *l'Intransigeant*, *l'Ami du Peuple*, *Candide*, etc.: the list is legion, and the dates include practically every day for many weeks.

⁴⁷ All of the above-mentioned papers, and most particularly *le Matin*.

⁴⁸ *Le Journal*, October 16, 1935; *Action Française*, October 17, 1935.

Moreover, it is highly doubtful if economic sanctions can be successfully applied. There are various loopholes of evasion, various channels through which Italy can receive the resources of which she is supposed to be deprived. There are the neutral countries (and decisions such as those of America not to allow certain exports to Italy are commented upon with much shrewd scepticism).⁴⁹ There are the League members who refuse outright to be a party to sanctions, and there is the inertia of those members who suffer badly from their consequences. Many French newspapers give a prominent place to quotations from Admiral Consett's *The Triumph of Unarmed Forces*, which shows that, in spite of what appeared to be a rigorous blockade, Germany, in the Great War, received, through the agency of neutral States, vast quantities of different commodities from firms in England and the Dominions and other of the Allied Powers. Finally, there are avenues through which Italy may have access to financial replenishment.⁵⁰

Again, account must be taken of the fact that Italy is a totalitarian nation, and that a State-controlled economic system is much less liable to suffer from sanctions than one run on ordinary lines.⁵¹ Then it is questionable whether Italy has been legally condemned. What are these committees—the Committee of Six, etc.—which have been so active in this direction? What is their standing? How are they to be reconciled with the constitution of the League? One thing is certain: they are not mentioned in the Pact. What member of the Council expressed an opinion on Italian and Abyssinian action? None: can the Council, then, be said to have condemned Italy? ⁵² Again, there is Article XI., according to which any member of the League has the right to call the attention of the Assembly or the Council to any circumstance likely to affect international relations and thus disturb the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends; but no one, in virtue of this article, brought to the League's notice Italy's proceedings in Abyssinia; this

⁴⁹ E.g., J. Delebecque, 'l'Amérique et la neutralité,' *Action Française*, November 7, 1935.

⁵⁰ See especially Georges Dovime, 'Les Lézardes du blocus financier,' *Action Française*, October 23rd, 1935.

⁵¹ 'Mobilisation économique,' *le Temps*, October 16, 1935.

⁵² See particularly, 'Une illégalité aux graves conséquences,' J. Le Boucher, *Action Française*, October 8th, 1935.

omission gave Italy a false impression, and thus was unfair to her.⁵³ Italy, moreover, has the grievance that she was accorded very scant justice by those who drew up the Treaty of Versailles⁵⁴; and also that she was not notified until too late by England of the latter's disapproval of her Abyssinian adventure (most French newspapers, since Sir Samuel Hoare's speech in the House of Commons, have recognised, some very grudgingly, that this charge is ill-founded).

Much of the French sympathy for Italy proceeds from the belief that she is the victim of a vast highly organised conspiracy bent on the destruction of Fascism.⁵⁵ This conspiracy is the creation of two forces in particular: Freemasonry and Bolshevism. The Second and the Third International, and all that is financed by Moscow, have resolved to overthrow Mussolini and the government he has succeeded in elaborating.⁵⁶ Here British parliamentarianism, of which England is so proud, joins hands with the leaders, the agents and the minions of Russia.⁵⁷ But perhaps even more deadly in its hatred than Bolshevism, and more terrible in its multiple world-wide ramifications, is Freemasonry, which Mussolini has expelled from Italy. The accounts of this dark power in the French Press would furnish the materials for many shocker novels. Particularly enlivening is the extent to which England is represented as being at the mercy of this power; British public life, from the Royal Family down, is permeated by this influence; British Masonry, obedient to some fell edict, has, for the prosecution of nefarious ends, resumed relations with *La Grande Loge de France* and even with the more sinister *Grand Orient* (English Masons—of whom I am not one—will no doubt be vastly amused at this).⁵⁸

And so poor Italy is beset by Bolshevism, world Masonry, and British parliamentarianism, imperialism and finance, all more or less mixed up in varying degrees of conspiracy. There may be—there no doubt is—a certain amount of truth in the assertion that Freemasonry and Bolshevism have no

⁵³ Jacques Bainville, *Action Française*, October 19, 1935.

⁵⁴ *L'Homme Libre*, October 14, 1935. This is a Radical paper.

⁵⁵ *Action Française*, *le Jour*, *l'Ordre*, *le Petit Bleu*, etc.

⁵⁶ *Candide*, October 10, 1935; *Je suis partout*, October 26, 1935; *Gazette de Lausanne*, October 9, 1935, etc.

⁵⁷ L. Daudet, lecture at *La Salle Wagram*, October 5, 1935; *Petit Bleu*, September 25, 1935, etc.

⁵⁸ *Action Française*, *Je suis partout*, *Candide*, *Paris-Midi*.

love for Fascism; but of this truth the French have made a gigantic fable. Then there is the Latin affinity between France and Italy: for the one to advance against the other would be fratricide (this was not the feeling a few years ago—but it would be uncharitable to insist). And Italy is a highly cultivated country, the native-land of the Arts, the mother of Western intellectual progress, and to attack her is to attack civilisation.⁵⁹ It is monstrous to think of siding against her with a race of barbarous and savage men, who enslave and burn and mutilate their fellows, and wear round their necks and their middles anatomical trophies which cannot be mentioned in the presence of ladies. This is the burden of the now famous manifesto signed by numerous French intellectuals on the Right.⁶⁰

Certain of Italy's French friends are not very happy about the way she has conducted things; they deplore what they call her imprudence, and urge counsels of moderation upon her⁶¹; this discomfort at her proceedings is sometimes betrayed by amusing apologetic contortions; thus M. Thierry Maulnier,⁶² a writer of superficial cleverness which has imposed upon a number of people, constructs a pretty piece of sophistry on this theme. We must not, he says, judge nations by the moral standards we apply to individuals; Italy's deeds must be measured, not by the motives which actuate them now, but by the effects they will have in the future (as if it were perfectly certain that these effects were in any case bound to be good!) Even the most hardened realists would hesitate to concur in moral acrobatics of this sort. It will be a sad day for the *Action Française* when thinkers of the calibre of M. Maulnier take the place of M. Maurras and others of his generation.

But, whatever reserves have to be made, Italy has a perfect right, say her apologists, to engage in her present campaign of expansion; and England, too, the same or others admit, has a perfect right to take precautionary

⁵⁹ French Press of the Right, *passim*.

⁶⁰ *Manifeste d'intellectuels français pour la défense de l'Occident*; this document, initiated by M. Henri Massis at the beginning of October, had within four or five days received 800 signatures, many of them of persons of impressive distinction. It was followed by other manifestoes in the same sense, emanating from various professional bodies, ex-service groups, chambers of commerce, etc.

⁶¹ E.g., M. Henry Lémery, *la Liberté*, October 10, 1935.

⁶² 'Les Intellectuels juges de la civilisation,' *Action Française*, October 24, 1935.

measures; but, they add, the quarrel is not ours, and we have every reason for keeping out of it, especially as at the moment we are faced with very serious internal difficulties. France's rôle, in their eyes, must be that of a mediator, doing her best to prevent the conflict from growing into a European war.

France is conscious of a particular debt towards Italy, in that during the past few years she has arrived at undertakings with the latter which have eased certain frontier problems for her, and allowed her to concentrate her attention on the danger which menaces her from the North. This is a constant and heavy preoccupation with the great majority of Frenchman, and it is not at all sufficiently appreciated in England. France has been invaded no less than six times in the course of the past century and a half, and that creates a memory that takes on the proportions of a racial obsession. The English, who know nothing of such an experience, are hardly to be expected to realise what it means; and so whenever this question (which dominates French politics) arises, they approach it entirely *ab extra*, with a lack of intimate and realistic understanding.⁶³ I think the French are for the most part quite right in their complaint regarding the English attitude in this capital matter, and it were to be wished that the English would bring to bear a little more sympathetic imagination when this problem comes up for discussion.

This consideration, then, is at the back of most Frenchmen's minds when they envisage the present crisis, and it plays a large—the greatest—part in deciding what value they are to attach to the League. They fear that as a result of the present dispute Germany's position will be strengthened, and that Hitler will ultimately become the arbiter of Europe.⁶⁴ We have mentioned many reasons advanced by the French for believing that the League is a terribly imperfect institution, even if it is not an error in its fundamental conception, and that it could never be relied upon in any crisis in the future. Let us add one more to these: the League began to take the present affair in hand only after Italy had launched her attack, and some weeks elapsed before sanctions were applied: had

⁶³ *Action Française*, October 12, 1935; *l'Intransigeant*, October 4, 1935, etc.

⁶⁴ See especially *Capital*, October 9; *Journal des Débats*, October 29, 1935; *l'Intransigeant*, October 4, 1935; *l'Homme Libre* (Radical), October 4, 1935; *Action Française*, *passim*.

such a thing happened in 1914 the Germans would have been in possession of Paris.⁶⁵

A cumbersome machine of this sort may be a positive danger to a country which subjects itself to its operation. To conclude with the question which embraces all others: what then, in the name of French security, should be the French attitude towards the League and the obligations which membership imposes? Certain papers, such as *le Temps*, have no desire to do away with the League as it stands to-day, but recommend a spirit of empirical caution, which of course will not please extremists of either persuasion; others⁶⁶ advocate a reform of the constitution of the League and an overhauling of the articles of the Pact; but that is a problem for the future, and the immediate urgent question is that concerning the honouring of one's signature. To some minds the opposition between reason and what the Pact demands is so flagrant that it is better to scrap the Pact, even if it involves the imputation of dishonour. 'Our obligation to take measures against Italy,' says M. Henry Lémery, 'is a fiction, and it is an idiotic fiction.'⁶⁷ 'After all,' says M. C. J. Gignoux, 'we didn't sign a pact with absurdity.'⁶⁸ M. Maurras draws a dangerous distinction between the 'legal country' and the 'real country,' and holds that in the present case the latter need not consider itself bound by the signature of the former. The English, he observes, with their political traditions, will be incapable of appreciating the distinction; which is no doubt true.⁶⁹ One wonders what M. Maurras would say—and do—if he found himself identified with the legal country (under a restored monarchy), and his present opponents set themselves against it in the name of what they took to be the real country. M. Daudet is, if that be possible, more positive on this point than M. Maurras. He is convinced that the League must go. It is a bloody (both senses) thing, an abscess, a cancer, a Society of Saliva, a set of knaves, fools, scallywags and cannibals, an assembly of judicial brutes masquerading as men.⁷⁰ It is many other dread things before

⁶⁵ *Echo de Paris*, September 25, 1935; *Journée industrielle*, October 10, 1935; *Candida*, October 25, 1935.

⁶⁶ E.g., *Journée industrielle*, October 11, 1935.

⁶⁷ *La Liberté*, October 10, 1935.

⁶⁸ *Journée industrielle*, October 17, 1935.

⁶⁹ *Action Française*, October 10, 1935, and *passim*.

⁷⁰ *Action Française* every two or three days.

M. Daudet splutters into capitals. If modern politics is a circus, M. Daudet is its undisputed Barnum. Which is not to say that his sentiments respecting the League, conveyed in the speech of a caveman, are not in very large part true.

Such, in brief, are the typical views of those who are opposed to anything in the way of drastic or effective action being taken against Italy. Before passing to the contrary set of opinions, I should like to register a protest against the campaign of calumny to which England has been subjected in what must be regarded as an important section of the French Press. I do this simply because I am anxious to see France and England united in the closest and most cordial association possible, for I believe that such an association would more than anything else contribute to ensure the peace of Europe. Now if there is anything calculated to militate against this desirable and indispensable partnership, it is precisely these intemperate outbursts of for the most part wholly gratuitous slander—far more bitter than anything that has been published in Italy. It is no use making light of these Press attacks, or thinking the silence of contempt is the most effective weapon to employ against them. For they penetrate to a considerable portion of the population of France, and they go to form a body of opinion or prejudice which has not a little to do with the determination of international relationships; against such public feeling silent disdain is of no avail, for it does not even reach the consciousness of those concerned; the only thing to do is as much as possible to show up malice and misrepresentation in their own unamiable colours, and to leave a sense of fair play and of the grotesque to do the rest. I would also say that my protest does not arise from any antipathy to perfectly plain and even mercilessly trenchant speaking; on the contrary, I regret that such speaking, which for many centuries was not judged to be out of conformity with what is best in the English genius, and in its more impressive achievements constitutes one of the greatest English titles to respect, has in the past few decades been discouraged, until it has finally fallen into what it is much to be trusted is no more than abeyance; but the plainness and the trenchancy must be justified, they must be in the service of real truth against real error or real enormity of whatever kind.

If the assaults in question were all of the same order as that launched in a particular number of *Guingoire*—a *cacata charta*⁷¹ if ever there were—there would be no necessity to accord them the slightest attention. For such productions at once alienate the sympathies of by far the greater part of the audience they were meant to impress. It is well known that most educated Frenchmen were ashamed that such an article as that of *Guingoire* should have been printed in France, and that being so we need say no more about it. The remarks to which we shall refer appear in papers which have incurred no such measure of general if not universal reprobation.

In the first place, Frenchmen should realise that many profoundly patriotic Englishmen would not disagree with certain of the charges which we have noticed in preceding sections. For instance, with that concerning the Anglo-German Naval Agreement; not a few of his fellow-countrymen were glad that in this connexion Lord Lloyd should have spoken as he did in the House of Lords: his language was as strong as that of any French writer who has criticised England's action in this matter; even many of those who would accept Lord Londonderry's plea that Europe in general and France in particular stood to gain by this Agreement would still consider that France had been treated in a way that was so little friendly as to be positively discourteous.

As for interests, well, we all have our interests, and it would be suicidal folly not to keep an eye on them; those French writers who are England's most censorious critics in this respect happen at the same time to be the stoutest guardians of French interests in every department. It also cannot legitimately be objected that England's attitude towards the League of Nations is dictated by practical considerations; the French themselves, as I have shown, almost exclusively measure the League of Nations in terms of French security. And this, of course, is perfectly right. Many Englishmen believe that if the League can establish international order, that will be the best thing for English interests (and for French interests too). But there are also many other Englishmen—a much greater number, I believe—who think of the League in purely idealistic terms, apart from any considerations of

⁷¹ Catullus, *carm.* xxxvi.

interest. And this brings us to the gravamen of the French charge: that the English professions of faith in the League are insincere and hypocritical. This, I think, is a very large and a very serious error of judgment. There are no doubt English hypocrites of the kind imagined by the French (as there are equally no doubt French hypocrites), but in this case their number is so small as to be quite negligible. This point must be got right: the English enthusiasm for the League of Nations is sincere, and it has something of the quality of a religion. I would add that I, who record it, am little disposed to share it. Certain French papers recognise this sincerity, but a large number do not, or only pay facile lip service to it.

The remarks on British bribery are so absurd on the face of it that they call for no refutation; almost as absurd are the stories about the association of English Masonry with the great grim plot of Masonry in general, but there is more plausibility here, for Fascism has undoubtedly aroused the hostility of Masonry in certain quarters. Everything becomes funny, however, when M. Maurras quotes a letter from a correspondent inveighing against the misdeeds of English Masonry and other English institutions (including the Cavalry of St. George); this correspondent, you expect, accorded the honour of citation by M. Maurras, is a person of education, of mature judgment, and otherwise qualified to pronounce on the forces at work in one of the greatest crises of history? You are mistaken; his age is twenty, and he is a baker's (or is it a butcher's?) assistant. Which does not prevent M. Maurras from adding the rhapsodic commentary '*Est-ce beau!*'

We only laugh when we read that Mr. Eden is bellicose, ferocious and sinister⁷²; but we cease to laugh when we are told that he is a gentleman only in respect of his coat and his trousers,⁷³ and when we come upon comments in the lowest of taste on the personal appearance of Sir Samuel Hoare.⁷⁴ It is difficult to qualify in measured terms our feelings when we find the Archbishop of Canterbury accused of 'hypocritical naïveté,' and when we are informed that for him the Kingdom of God and the United Kingdom are one

⁷² *Action Française*, *passim*.

⁷³ M. Xavier de Magallon in *l'Avenir de Loir-et-Cher*: article gleefully reproduced in Paris. M. Magallon has acquired some reputation as a poeticle.

⁷⁴ *Action Française*, October 8, 1935.

and the same thing.⁷⁵ As for the Archbishop of Westminster, his actions, we learn, arouse in France feelings of rancour, distrust and horror.⁷⁶

M. Daudet accuses us (without giving any proofs) of engaging in a campaign of false news. He himself is guilty of something similar when he says that in the *Bandar-log* Mr. Kipling intended to represent the French⁷⁷; whereas it is well known—or should be well known—that in these creatures the author of the *Jungle Book* meant to convey a picture of the American people. (But M. Daudet knows very little of English literature, and he usually commits some gross blunder whenever he mentions it. His signal ignorance of this literature does not prevent him from expatiating upon it with heavy dogmatism and an air of omniscience at regular intervals in his *ex cathedra* pronouncements in the *Action Française*.) Again, certain French papers translate the revelations of Admiral Consett into terms of English dishonour; they dwell in particular upon quantities of cement exported from England and used by Germany to build structures on the battlefield from which English and French soldiers were shot down. But they omit to mention any of the considerable qualifications with which Admiral Consett accompanies his revelations; and of course they take good care not to give the information (recorded by Admiral Consett himself) that upon analysis the cement in question was found not to be British.

Perhaps the most detestable of all the accusations made is that England is reluctant to send soldiers into the field, and manœuvres to get other people to do her fighting for her. After the achievement of the English Expeditionary Force in the late war, such an accusation is one of the monstrosities of our time.

Another charge little calculated to increase the understanding between the two countries is that the English always have, whether they express it or not, a smug or insolent feeling of superiority over other nations, and that they make no exception in favour of the French. M. Jean Fayard, for instance,⁷⁸ says that for them anything that is not British is

⁷⁵ Ch. Maurras, *Action Française*, October 19, 1935.

⁷⁶ Ch. Maurras, *Action Française*, October 22, 1935.

⁷⁷ *Action Française*, October 4, 1935.

⁷⁸ *Je suis partout*, October 19, 1935.

inferior and more or less contemptible; and that they make no distinction between the French and the natives of New Guinea. M. Jean Fayard was at Oxford, and he himself will probably admit that he was treated there with nothing but kindness and consideration. Obviously, his sojourn there, so far as acquiring a knowledge of England is concerned, was a waste of time. As for his manners, Frenchmen of real breeding may be safely left to pass an opinion on them. It is pleasing to be able to mention the fact that certain French journals⁷⁹ have protested against this campaign of vilification. In passing from a paper such as the *Action Française* to a paper such as *le Temps*, one frequently has the sensation of leaving the company of a set of desperadoes for that of an assembly of gentlemen.

It would be inequitable to conclude this protest without admitting that there are English papers which are sometimes guilty of conduct just as reprehensible as that to which we have drawn attention. Lord Castlerosse, for example, in the *Sunday Express* of November 3, delivers himself of much mischievous nonsense regarding the constant attitude of the French towards England. They hate us, he tells us, and all one can say is that he had better speak for himself. He also says that Englishmen are insulted in the streets of Paris, and that it is 'positively dangerous to speak English in a public Paris place.' Talking as one who knows Paris probably better than Lord Castlerosse, I have no hesitation in saying that this is untrue. Frenchmen perhaps do not know that Lord Castlerosse's unlettered and almost illiterate vacuity is accorded no attention by educated Englishmen. The same paper, on October 29, published another equally ludicrous and contemptible article by Mr. Stephen Graham, purporting to be a study of the French nation. This article tells us that 'the French are a small people, with little heads, little bodies, small feet'—in fact, in every respect they are petty. The rest of the article is to match. Do the French need to be assured that such ill-bred and malicious ignorance only obtains credence among the ignorant? Unfortunately, as they might reply, the ignorant are the master forces of a modern democracy.

We come now to those who have a large faith in the

⁷⁹ E.g., *le Journal des Débats*, *le Temps*.

League of Nations, and are prepared to go to the full extent of the consequences of that belief, and therefore, incidentally, believe that sanctions ought to be applied to Italy. With almost all their arguments English readers are already familiar, for they happen to coincide with the views of the majority of the people of Great Britain, to which very full expression has been given in the Press. It will be enough, therefore, to sum them up succinctly; and the relatively small amount of space given to them will not be taken as indicating that I consider them any less important than those which I have tried to summarise in what precedes. On the contrary, I would emphasise that they are highly important, for they are shared by a very large number of Frenchmen.

Those of this persuasion⁸⁰ believe in the League of Nations as an institution capable of establishing a new world order, in which war (and other of the chief evils of humanity) will have no place. They contend that they are not merely idealists striving for some happier state of things to be realised in a more or less distant future, but that they are serving the best interests of present-day France. France, according to them, will find her greatest security as a member of a strong League of Nations, and she should associate herself as closely as possible with England in the latter's efforts to make the League an effective reality. If she does not do this, she will run the risk of finding herself isolated in Europe, and this is the greatest danger she can know. As M. Jules Romains says,⁸¹ not only honour, but also interest, dictate that she must adhere to the League. The fact of honour (as well as of interest) is insisted on by many of these writers; France must respect her signature in all cases, and not only when she judges it will best serve her immediate purposes to do so.

These writers' robust faith in the League is not disturbed by any of the inconsistencies or other faults with which that institution has been charged. They view with equanimity

⁸⁰ See especially numerous articles in *l'Humanité* (Communist), *le Populaire* (Socialist), *l'Ère nouvelle* (Socialist-Radical), *l'Œuvre* (moderate Radical), *l'Aube* (Catholic Left), *la Croix* (semi-official Catholic). Some of these articles, and in particular those of Jules Romains and Jean-Richard Bloch, are very eloquent; and on the whole there is more eloquence, if less mordant asperity, in the writings of this side than in those of the opposite party.

⁸¹ Interview in *Candida*, October 10, 1935. *Candida*, of course, does not agree with M. Romains.

even what others would call her palterings with regard to Germany's violations of the Treaty of Versailles. Those violations, they say, are not to be compared with Italy's present action; they were merely negative, while this is something dreadfully positive.⁸² Of England's sincerity they have not the shadow of a doubt; even if idealism did not drive the English to support the League whole-heartedly (and they believe it does), considerations of interest alone would be sufficient to do so.⁸³

Even Abyssinia is, according to them, not the black sheep which she has been represented as being. M. Cachin, in *l'Humanité*, paints a very flattering picture of the Ethiopians, in which he shows them to be a nice likeable people, of idyllic sterling virtues.⁸⁴ A distinguished novelist, M. Mauriac, makes an energetic and impassioned protest, *à propos* of a caricature by Sennep, against the contumelious way in which the Ethiopians have been treated in many French journals, and speaks of the unfortunate reaction which such treatment is likely to provoke among the various coloured races of the world.⁸⁵ He enters his remonstrance in the name of essentially Christian principles, and argues that, all things considered, the Abyssinians cannot be regarded as being less civilised than the Italians.

The Italians, indeed—and Signor Mussolini in especial—meet with the most stern disapproval from all the writers on this side. Some of them go as far as to say that the Italy of 1935 is more guilty than the Germany of 1914.⁸⁶ Many draw a distinction between the Italian people (including the Monarchy) and the Duce, and regret that the former should be ruthlessly sacrificed to the overreaching ambition and vanity of the latter.⁸⁷ The central motive of the Duce's enterprise is not economic or any other practical interest, it is that itch for fame which turns glory into vainglory; he is a dangerous megalomaniac, and it is this megalomania that the League of

⁸² Jules Romains, Interview, *loc. cit.*

⁸³ See especially M. Jean Piot's excellent remarks in *l'Œuvre*, October 29, 1935.

⁸⁴ This plea in favour of Abyssinia is at least in part supported by certain English witnesses. E.g., letters to *The Times* from Mrs. Rosita Forbes (October 30, 1935) and Mr. L. I. Athill (October 26, 1935); and passages of Mr. G. F.-H. Berkeley's *The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik*.

⁸⁵ *Figaro*, September 25, 1935.

⁸⁶ *Le Populaire*, October 4, 1935.

⁸⁷ E.g., Gaston-Martin, 'Superpatriotisme,' *l'Œuvre*, October 18, 1935.

Nations has got to crush at all costs.⁸⁸ It is not to the point to say that France and England have frequently in the past, in their colonial expansion, done precisely what Signor Mussolini is doing to-day. There is advance, progress, evolution in history, and, with the advent of a new law, a more sensitive conscience, what was permissible in one century becomes a crime in the next. The nations have voluntarily agreed to act in accordance with a higher conception of morality.⁸⁹ As for the argument that the opposition to Italy is an opposition of various forces to the Fascistic principle, that is a revised version of an old story, frequently resorted to by reactionaries in the past, and it may be dismissed as having no value.⁹⁰ Apart from the question of France's best interests, it is absurd to talk of France remaining neutral in this struggle. You cannot be neutral before a crime.⁹¹ In the name of Law and Order, Italy must be taught that she cannot act thus with impunity, and so sanctions must be applied against her with all rigour. Yes, whatever be their consequences—even if they lead to war. But there is little probability that they will lead to war: that is a gross exaggeration of the people who are interested to take Italy's part.⁹²

It is impossible to conclude this section without mentioning M. Jules Romains' celebration of what has taken place in the late deliberations at Geneva. A rite was in process of coming to birth, a rite more charged with meaning than any event in past history. Here for the first time a tribunal of humanity was successfully established, and a decree of justice was sent forth such as the world has never heard before. All the League's previous failures, falterings and crimes were suddenly transcended, and the League became the strong reality which many had thought it never would become. This was the moral and judicial organisation of mankind, the substitution once for all of law for violence in the relations between the nations.⁹³ All of this long article should be read. It is the most eloquent of all the pronouncements that this controversy has called forth; it is the most eloquent of all

⁸⁸ Jean-Richard Bloch, 'La gloire déshonorée,' *l'Œuvre*, October 11, 1935.


⁸⁹ Jules Romains, Interview, *loc. cit.*

⁹⁰ Gaston-Martin, *loc. cit.*

⁹¹ Jean-Richard Bloch, *loc. cit.*

⁹² Press of the Left, *passim*.

⁹³ *L'Œuvre*, October 28, 1935.



the apologies yet made for the League of Nations. It is all the more striking in that M. Romain has frequently been a very severe critic of the League in the past.

On this side, too, there are manifestoes; M. Romain has launched one in opposition to that of M. Massis, and it has been signed by men of the standing of M. André Gide. M. Mauriac has launched another, a manifesto of the French Catholic intellectuals, and it, too, can boast of distinguished signatures.⁹⁴ And so this question has divided the French nation into two camps, which have very nearly become armed camps. M. Maurras has issued a list containing the names of 140 and more deputies who are in favour of sanctions, and he has solemnly promised that in the event of France being dragged into the war all these deputies will be killed immediately. And there is no doubt, given the temper of adherents of the *Action Française*, that this threat would be carried out. It is highly amusing to read M. Maurras's exhortations to his followers to get ready for these 140 and more murders, to see to it that their pistols and revolvers are in working order, and that their kitchen-knives are bright and sharp. But the situation has been, and perhaps still is, really serious; to a degree that is not appreciated in England, it contains all the elements of a civil war.

What then is the conclusion at the end of a review of the opinions and forces in play? Many of the arguments of those opposed to sanctions lose much if not all of their validity because they would not, and could not, be invoked in the case of a war against Germany, say. There, most of the same consequences—dislocation of industry, loss of French lives, etc.—would necessarily ensue, and they would be met in a spirit of acceptance. But they are not faced in this spirit in the case of a war waged in the name of the League of Nations, and there lies the crux of the matter. In the last analysis, then, it all comes down to the question whose primary importance we began by asserting: a belief or a disbelief in the principles and the efficacy of the League of Nations.

And this, too, is the ultimate question for England. If you have faith in the League, then you are going to risk

⁹⁴ It is a misrepresentation to say, as does M. Jean Fayard (*Candidé*, October 19), that the *élite* of the nation are ranged on the other side.

everything for it. But if you have not faith in it, what then? As I have already said, I consider that the peace of Europe will be best ensured by co-operation with France. It is a mistake to think that there is any serious fundamental difference between the minds of the two countries; as Marshal Pétain said the other day, they are complementary, and each one needs the other. Most Englishmen, who understand the French language, feel much more at home, I believe, in the company of educated Frenchmen than they do in that, say, of Americans of whatever class. What is certain in any case is that France and England are to-day the principal makers and trustees of civilisation, and that alone makes their collaboration absolutely imperative and a duty. But that is not enough; the old enmity between France and Germany must be composed, otherwise there will always be danger of disturbance in Europe. This composition should not be difficult, especially when it is remembered that Germany too is a creator and a sponsor of civilisation; she, France, and England between them furnish to culture all the elements that are of prime importance. A close union of the three nations would be the best means of guaranteeing civilisation—the only sort of civilisation which we can find it worth while talking about. Another consideration is that such a union would very probably be invincible from a military point of view, and that more than anything else would help to establish peace in the world.

One thing is certain, and that is that England cannot fall back on any isolationist policy. To inculcate such a policy is to show a strange ignorance or disregard of the lessons of modern history. Owing to recent economic and other developments, England, whether she likes it or not, belongs to Europe. Sheer interest, as well as honour, demands that she should take her place—and it will necessarily be a high place—among the family of European nations. In any case she cannot depend upon her Empire, which becomes less and less of a Greater England. There is another alternative: General Smuts has advised that if we ever have to choose between attaching ourselves to Europe or to America, we should take the latter direction. But civilisation in the sense that means most to us does not lie that way. It is natural, perhaps, that General Smuts should not realise

that. Anyhow, that must be our final question: what is best—and not chimerically best—for civilisation?

It is interesting to note that the friction between France and England which I have deprecated is, even in its present form, by no means a new thing. A most remarkable parallel to the situation of the past few months is to be found, almost exactly 100 years ago, in a series of forty-one epistolary articles entitled *France et l'Etranger* contributed by Balzac to *La Chronique de Paris* from February to July in the year 1836. These articles, which have never received the attention they deserve, show great political grasp and acumen, and are another of the many things which justify Balzac's proud boast that he was one of the four master minds of the century in which he lived. They have to do mainly with the relations between England, France and Russia, and the control of the Mediterranean and of the approach to India—a matter which Balzac considered to be 'the most immense in the annals of European history.' As a military power (according to Balzac) England was of no account: her one arm was her Fleet, and this Fleet had won a supremacy which was embarrassing other nations more and more. If English diplomacy had been candid, it would have admitted that its real objective was domination in the Mediterranean and command of the trans-African route to India; this for England was and must continue to be the most vital of all considerations, much more than any concerned simply with the Continent; whereas France's continental position made other interests supreme for her. Therefore England would always be interested in the destruction or subordination of some fleet or other; and in the present case she was doing her best to play off the Russian against the French Navy. Her sole concern was her interest, and to further it she would resort to all kinds of hypocrisy and perfidy; so true was this that she must be reckoned to be the greatest enemy of France, to whose interests she would always be detrimental.

It is this spirit which the two countries must labour to eliminate at all costs. Europe is wise, concludes Balzac, it will always resist any invasion of the old world by the new: which shows that he had a vision of Europe as a unity; and realised that Europe and true civilisation are inseparable.

RANDOLPH HUGHES.

THE ELECTION—AND AFTER

By A. WYATT TILBY

BROADLY speaking, the result of the General Election is a vote of confidence in the Government: a verdict which is at first sight more satisfactory than spectacular, but which—as I shall hope to show later—has more significance than is immediately apparent from the almost monotonous sequence of constituencies in which there is 'No change.'

True, the Government have lost ninety seats. But owing to their enormous (and admittedly excessive) majority in 1931, they stood to lose everywhere. Actually their losses were mostly in single spies up and down the country, not in big blocks in any particular district. And those losses were in any case far fewer than were predicted from the mere swing of the pendulum by their own and the Socialist sooth-sayers.

There was nothing, for instance, to compare with the clean sweep of the recent Canadian or the previous American election; the Baldwin Government stood to lose more, and practically lost less, than the Salisbury Government of 1900 and the Asquith Government of 1910 when appealing for a similar vote of confidence after five and four years in office. A Cabinet with a working majority of some 240 need not anticipate any change in Downing Street until the autumn of 1940. That means stability in government, and presumably in policy, with all that it implies at home and abroad. But also it means something more.

The Opposition, presumably, did the best they could, and actually they put up more candidates than the Government—725 against the official 595. But though they did better than in the disaster of 1931, they have not recovered anything like the position of 1929. That means, and can only mean, that something has happened to disturb the

traditional theories of parties and pendulums since the war.¹

But by way of clearing the ground, let us first examine certain other aspects of the case.

By common consent the 1935 election was the quietest and most orderly ever held. There were no riots, hardly any broken heads, and the election egg is no longer a marketable commodity. It will soon cease to be even a music-hall joke, for the spirit of Eatanswill is in decline.

But Eatanswill, and even a Mid-Lothian Campaign, could hardly survive into an age in which every candidate complains that people will no longer go to indoor political meetings. Labour still pins its faith to the open air, the soap-box, and the casual passer-by; and, so far as my own observation goes, Labour is right—that is the only way you can get people to listen in public. A political faith that defies the British climate has given sufficient proof of sincerity.

The truth, probably, is that in these days most people listen to the broadcasts by political leaders, which they can hear by their own fireside and switch off at will, instead of going out to see their local member at some 'grand rally' or 'mass demonstration' that turns out to be a mere travesty of enthusiasm. On the whole the new method is an improvement. True, you miss the life and colour of the old political meetings, and, unfortunately, you cannot heckle a loud-speaker. But there is ample evidence that people do listen carefully to these political broadcasts—at any rate, at election times, for I doubt if they would tolerate them as a regular feature—and some evidence that they discuss and compare the respective apologies afterwards.

No doubt this is sometimes hard on the local candidate, who may feel less important than before. But in fact a good

¹ The actual number of votes cast for the two leading parties in the last three elections was as follows:

	Conservative.	Labour.
1929	8,636,473	8,389,512
1931 (Con. Nat.)	11,905,925	6,649,630
1935 (Con. Nat.)	10,455,017	8,314,469

But these particular totals are always subject to the large qualification that the number of uncontested constituencies varies at every election.

candidate usually gets the attention he deserves, and, although we no longer 'chuck him in the river first and hear what he has to say about it afterwards,' the polling figures are conclusive.

Take first the last three pre-war elections:

1906. January	88.4 per cent. voted.
1910. January	91.0 " "
1910. December	86.0 " "
Average	88.4 " "

The polling, on the old limited franchise, was quite extraordinarily high.

There have been seven post-war elections—on the large new registers. Omit the first, in 1918, at which the percentage of votes cast was only 58.9; but the conditions were then completely abnormal with so many voters abroad or living at long distances from home. In the subsequent five elections the figures were:

1922	75.4 per cent. voted.
1923	74.1 " "
1924	80.6 " "
1929	79.5 " "
1931	79.8 " "
Average	77.8 " "

The gross figures for 1935 are not finally complete at the moment of writing, since a petition for a new election may possibly be presented at Kelvingrove (where voting papers are alleged to have been inadvertently spoiled). But the total proportion of votes cast last month was 71 per cent.—a considerable falling-off from previous elections.

It is to be noted, however, that the decline is far larger in the South than the North. Taking ten constituencies at random, we find the following results:

North.			South.		
Carlisle	90 per cent. voted		Epsom	66 per cent. voted	
Durham	85 " "		Harrow	64 " "	
Barnsley	82 " "		Harwich	64 " "	
Huddersfield	73 " "		Hampstead	59 " "	
Ripon	68 " "		Westminster	50 " "	

It is, incidentally, rather amusing that the constituency which has the honour of housing Parliament appears to be

the one which takes the least interest in its representation; but that by the way. Allowing for the admittedly greater attention paid to politics north of the Trent, the decline in the polling percentage is probably accounted for by three distinct factors.

First, a considerable number of voters (mostly Conservatives but with a sprinkling of Liberals) remembered the enormous majorities of 1931, concluded that the seat was reasonably safe in 1935, and did not trouble to vote. Secondly, a number of strong party men, who voted reluctantly for a political opponent in 1931, decided that twice was once too many, and abstained. And, thirdly, a small number of Socialists and Liberals stated openly that while in the national interest they could not bring themselves to vote against the Government at this juncture, nevertheless as sound party men they had no intention of voting for it, and these also stayed away.

But, taken as a whole, over the long series of General Elections, the proportion of votes cast is not only high, but remarkably steady. Compare it, for example, with the 33 per cent. that is not unusual in county council and local elections, and the contrast is too clear to be missed. Allow for the aged, the sick, the absent and (on the new registers) the electors who are registered in two constituencies but can only vote in one, and it will be seen that at least three voters out of four exercise the franchise.

That disposes of the politician's bugbear of apathy. We may demonstrate less than in the old days. But it is at least possible that we think more.

One major difference between pre-war and post-war Parliaments is that women now elect and are eligible for election to the House of Commons. (The barrier of sex still operates in the House of Lords.) It happens that there are some two million more women than men in the country, and we are therefore, in theory at least, under petticoat government. How far is that true in practice, and, if true, in what way does it operate?

There are no statistics to show whether the percentage of women who go to the poll is larger or smaller than that of

men; and the only indirect method of comparison available—between constituencies where women are in a large majority and those where the male vote is preponderant—suggests that, taken by and large, there is little difference between the sexes in this respect. The smaller amount of interest which women are presumed to take in politics may be counteracted by the larger proportion of women in the home. It is usually easier for a woman than for a man to leave her work for a few minutes.

But the way in which women vote is obviously of more importance than the actual number who go to the polls. Here again, owing to the secrecy of the ballot, there are no available statistics. But difficult positions sometimes fall to a flank attack when they are impregnable to direct assault, and the problem is not wholly insoluble.

An analysis of the electoral rolls shows that the proportion of the sexes varies very considerably in different parts of the country. In some two-thirds of the constituencies the average is 52 women voters to every 48 men, but in 134 constituencies the female vote is 55 per cent. or more, and in twelve constituencies it is over 60 per cent.

Women congregate especially in watering-places, such as Bournemouth, Hastings, and Southport (62, 61, and 60 per cent. respectively), and in the more prosperous inner suburbs, such as Hampstead, Chelsea, Paddington, and Marylebone (63, 62, 61, and 61 per cent. respectively). The nearest approach to an Adamless Eden is South Kensington, which actually achieves 68 per cent., or rather more than the 'two women to every man' of the old music-hall song.

On the other hand, there are fifty-three constituencies where women are in a minority. These are mostly in mining and heavy industrial districts in Durham, Yorkshire, and South Wales, where male labour has practically a monopoly of the wage market, and the surplus young women who want work outside the home usually have to migrate to a town some distance away.

I made a comparison between these 187 constituencies with an abnormal sex ratio, to see if they furnished any key to the controversial question of the feminine mind in politics. The ballot prevents any record being made of the way women vote, but it occurred to me that an analysis of the

political colour of those places where women are in a large majority and a small minority might provide some indirect indication of their allegiance. Here are the results.

Taken as a whole, the newly-elected House of Commons has $2\frac{1}{2}$ supporters of the Government to every member of the Opposition. But in the 134 constituencies where women form 55 per cent. of the electorate or over, the ratio is no less than 14 to 1; they elected, in fact, 132 supporters of the Government to nine members of the Opposition. And in the twelve constituencies where women are 60 per cent. of the electorate or over, there are twelve supporters of the Government and not one single member of the Opposition in the new Parliament.

Now for the other side of the shield. There are fifty-three constituencies where women are in a minority on the register. Those constituencies return seven supporters of the Government and forty-seven opponents—forty-six Socialists and one Communist.

These figures seem to me conclusive. Make every allowance for social and industrial factors, for old-time political allegiance and masculine advice to inexperienced womenfolk (which may or may not be accepted or acceptable), and the fact remains that Conservative preponderance is greatest where women most outnumber the men, and that the parties of the Left score most heavily where the men outnumber the women.

Explain it how you will—a woman's belief in authority, stability, and the existing order or, if you wish, her lack of imagination and her intellectual failure to see the promised land—but the result remains the same. The individual woman may be anything from a die-hard Tory to a Red Communist, but women in the mass are more inclined to Conservatism than men.

This is a new factor, but probably a permanent factor of some considerable importance in our political life.

As to the aspects of the women's vote, there are no indications that women prefer to vote for women, but some slight indications that they do not. In none of the constituencies where women greatly outnumber the men, for example, has it been thought worth while to run a woman candidate. Had women had any particular desire to be represented by a

member of their own sex, I take it that in one of these districts where their vote is in effect decisive their preference for a woman member would have been effective had it been expressed to the party managers.

On the other hand, it is useless to analyse the votes cast for women candidates against the votes cast for men, because women get the worst chances in the constituencies. The innate chivalry of all political parties sees to it that women have every opportunity of fighting the forlorn hopes. If there is a safe seat, a man gets it. If there is a lost cause, a woman has the privilege of expounding it.

The truth is that women do not get fair play as candidates, probably because they are considered a liability rather than an asset by practical party organisers and agents—who are, after all, interested in results and not in genders. If, then, we are to have women in Parliament at all (and even the complete male admits their uses on subjects of which they have special knowledge), it would probably be worth while to arrange that in certain selected constituencies women should oppose women.

A possible alternative would be the creation of a few special constituencies for which only women were eligible as members. The scheme might be difficult to work out, but it would be worth taking trouble to remedy the present anomalous position of the unfortunate woman candidate.

These preliminary points being disposed of, let us now look into the matter of the swing of the pendulum, and its apparent interruption in 1935.

There was a time when 'ins-and-outs' succeeded each other with monotonous regularity at Westminster every five or six years, and the thirty or forty years of the late Victorian period during which this sequence lasted made it seem almost a law of Nature. A longer survey shows that its very regularity was abnormal and probably fortuitous.

The party system in British politics goes back to the Cavaliers and Roundheads, but it really began to flourish with Robert Walpole. It has now functioned in recognisable form for two centuries, but during the first fifty years of that period the Whigs were in office without a break. And

during the second fifty years the Tories were in office with not more than one or two insignificant interruptions. The party pendulum had a very leisurely swing in those days.

There followed the great Victorian age of port, piety, and party. Our concern is only with the third, but a simple computation shows that party politics did not function with perfect regularity even in the golden days.

From 1832 to 1874—a period of forty-two years—the Liberals hardly lost an election. There was one great Conservative Administration (the famous Peel Government of 1841), but that was quite exceptional. The Liberals held office altogether thirty-two years to the Conservatives' ten.

Then came a change. In the thirty years after 1874 the Liberals only held office for eight years to the Conservatives' twenty-two; and though they came back in 1906 apparently stronger than ever, and won three elections running, the last Liberal Government came to an end in 1915. Since then the Liberal Party has come more and more to resemble the asteroids—a collection of minor bodies with eccentric orbits and small attractive power which are only occasionally visible in the darkness of outer space.

It looks, then, as if the real swing of the pendulum functioned to a longer and slower rhythm than is commonly supposed. But politics does not move to a merely mechanical beat; and this computation by the calendar, though a convenient ready-reckoner, leaves the imponderables out of account. We can approach those issues best by examining the collapse of the Liberal Party and the new preference for a Coalition or National Government.

Liberalism as a creed stands for liberty and the redress of grievances. So do we all. But it happens that Liberalism came to stand emphatically for political rather than social liberty, and for the solution of political rather than social problems; with the result that its working philosophy was found, in the long run, to be inadequate as a basis of life.

The first indication that that inadequacy was making itself felt is in an *obiter dictum* of Mr. Gladstone towards the end of his long life. After the usual lament at the degeneracy of the age and the rising school of politicians, the old statesman remarked that 'Interest has moved away from politics and theology towards the vague something which they call social

reform; and they won't make much out of that in the way of permanent results.'

Social reform in those days meant old age pensions, factory legislation, the minimum wage, compensation for accidents, municipal enterprise in better housing, a little experimental municipal trading, and a host of other things. Now, Gladstone was a humane man, and no doubt he would have agreed that all or many of these things might be desirable or productive of desirable results. He would merely have denied that it was the function of the State to tackle such matters. And that was the common feeling among the Liberals (and many of the Conservatives) of the time.

Hence the rise of Labour as a new political force—for it seems to me mere pedantry to derive Keir Hardie and his associates from the Chartists of forty years before. The Chartists were essentially political reformers; the new Labour men of the 1890's cared little for politics, or at least for the political issues that were agitated under the old dispensation, but were consumed with a burning zeal for better homes, better conditions of work and play, and a higher standard of living for the workers. The Chartists were political doctrinaires. The new Labour movement was not a doctrine, but a gospel.

The pioneers were inexperienced, they were extreme, but they were sincere. And they felt—and said so with refreshing frankness—that there was something insincere about the old party fights and the old party doctrines. To them there was no economic man; there were only human beings concerned with economics, but with many other things as well. One might almost say that they had no political principles, only personal loyalties.

At the start this reform movement was instinctively more antagonistic to the Conservatives, as the party of authority, than to the Liberals, as the party of liberty. But that particular alignment gradually changed. The Tory who abominated Socialism when it attacked property had real sympathy for Labour when it treated society and the State as a living organism that must expand and change with changing circumstances; this might be bad Burke as expounded at the pithead, but at least it touched the Tory heart where Bright and Cobden had only offended the Tory head.

This silent sympathy was no doubt reinforced by the practical consideration that Labour was winning votes at the expense of the Liberals, not the Tories. Had it been possible for the two Left wings to coalesce, as W. T. Stead and many others hoped thirty years ago, the situation would have been extremely dangerous for the Conservatives. But, so far from coalescing, it became more and more difficult for Liberals and Labour even to co-operate.

True, a Liberal Government introduced Old Age Pensions and Health and Unemployment Assurance with Labour approval. But as a whole the Liberal Party still believed in the political and economic State of Victorian times, which Labour had rejected at the start; and in that sense Liberalism only offered a *fait accompli* to an electorate that was beginning to want a constructive social policy.

Liberalism was not killed by its internal feuds—it had suffered these before, and survived—but by its internal inhibitions. It could not think in new terms in a new age. Labour offered a social hope where Liberalism had merely an individualist creed that time had made reactionary. Can we wonder that Gladstone's prophecy turned against his own party, and that Labour won the day against Liberalism?

There remains the recent emergence of the Coalition or National type of Government as a second factor which still further disturbs the normal or abnormal swing of the political pendulum.

England, said Disraeli once, does not love Coalitions. But that good party man said it in a moment of exasperation when a Coalition was about to vote him out of office. We may reasonably require better evidence.

Better evidence exists. Broad-Bottom Ministries and Cabinets of All the Talents have from time to time been brought into the world by the midwives of Downing Street, but until the war these piebald political litters had been neither long-lived nor successful. Queen Victoria thought more highly of Lord Aberdeen's capacity than anybody else in the country, but no amount of Court favour could make the nation believe that the Coalition which 'drifted into the Crimean War' was anything but incompetent.

Thirty years later the now ageing Queen, alarmed at the pother over the Franchise and Redistribution Bills of 1884, hoped to replace Gladstone by Goschen or some other neutral-tinted politician at the head of a Centre Party. But this alarming project was quickly strangled by a compromise between the Whig and Tory chiefs, and Tweedledum and Tweedledee resumed their customary warfare.

Another thirty years elapsed, and the Asquith Coalition began to function uneasily under the stress of war. Nothing looked less like permanence than the party truce; yet of the last twenty years, eleven and a half have been passed under a Coalition. And the present Coalition looks like lasting five years more. Obviously something has happened to change the mind of the country on this issue.

It is well known, of course, that Mr. MacDonald hankered after a Coalition in 1930: a minority Prime Minister, whose life hangs by a thread, would not be human if he did not. It is less well remembered that Mr. Baldwin expressed something of the same thought when he became Prime Minister of a party Government in 1924:

We know that we have received support from many of those who at ordinary times might have given their support to other parties. They have attempted to put into power a National Government, and it is in the exercise of that trust that we shall hope to deserve their confidence.

But two swallows do not make a political summer if the rest of the flock refuse to follow; and though the actual difference between the votes cast for Government and Opposition may seem narrow—54 to 46 per cent.—it argues active support rather than passive toleration.

The country has come to that conclusion, I think, on more than one ground. The older men remember the futilities of party strife—which nearly became civil war—before 1914, and will pay a high price to avoid that negation of statecraft again. From the mere fact that it has to accommodate more parties than one, a National Government may sometimes give the appearance of weakness. But almost anything is better than a party Government which gives the appearance of strength and is actually impotent.

To the younger men, who have grown up since the war, Ulster is little more than a name. To them the case for a National Government is largely that it is stronger and more

effective in foreign affairs than a party Government. Dictators do not grow on English soil. But in dealing with dictators who have suppressed their own parties, it is better to speak with the voice of a nation than a party.²

These arguments are effective, though certainly not conclusive. There are, after all, other departments of State than foreign affairs. Is a National Government more efficient than a party Government in conducting the business of home and Empire, economics and finance?

It depends, of course, on what you want. History shows that for the remedying of political grievances there is nothing like a Liberal Government. But there are no longer any political grievances; only questions of government and economic problems. History suggests that the peculiar virtue of the Conservatives, and their abiding instinct for order, shines more steadily in administration than adventure. Now, administration is always the large part of government, but there are times when it is not the greatest. And a Cabinet which merely runs the administrative machine efficiently to-day will not be doing all that the country expects of it.

There is no reason to doubt that the Government will attend to Rearmament, which has become necessary through the world's increasing preoccupation with war. There is some reason to fear that it will be insufficiently active in Reconstruction. This may seem a hard saying to those who recall the steady restoration of credit and industry in the past four years—the Conversion Loan, the Ottawa Agreements, the Agricultural Marketing Boards, the Quotas and Tariffs. The MacDonald-Baldwin Government did extraordinarily well in this direction, and the nation has recognised the fact by preferring it to those whom it displaced in 1931. But for all that, the work of reconstruction has merely begun.

The truth is that we are living through a revolution—an economic, not a political, revolution which affects every citizen and every State, every price and every product, producer and consumer alike. We hardly know how to face the situation which science and invention have created, and

² It is significant of the English dislike of dictators and dictatorships that there were no Blackshirt or Fascist candidates in 1935. In 1931 they secured 36,377 votes, but no candidate was elected, and twenty-two forfeited their deposits.

which may be briefly summarised as over-production—too many men, too much money, too many goods.

The coincidence of a centenary may make the importance of the present crisis more clear. Exactly 100 years ago—in 1835—there was a glut of English wheat. (This sounds like a fairy story, but it is true.) The price fell below cost, the farmers complained, the economists explained, the Government appointed a Committee. But nothing whatever was done, with the result that the farmers took matters into their own hands, grew less wheat, and the price went up. The politicians and economists, having failed to solve the problem of a surplus, then repealed the Corn Laws on the ground that there was a shortage; and that travesty of history, the legend of the 'Hungry Forties' has persisted to this day.

The decisive point in that issue was the refusal or inability of the Government to face the economic problem of a surplus of wheat. There is now a surplus in many other commodities, including capital and labour; and the standard of living and the very future of civilisation largely depend on a successful solution of that problem.

The economists, as usual, are useless; it is for the statesmen to find the key. Mere inaction will get us no further in 1935 than in 1835. A policy of Reconstruction may make many mistakes, but at least it is better than a dreary negation.

The Government have now held office for four years, and have already turned their backs on those supposedly immutable laws of economics which a mere shift in the incidence of production costs has changed into academic shibboleths. If they now show vision and courage in development of resources at home—if, in short, they think out new issues in new terms of life and action—the next five years may prove the turning-point of modern civilisation.

A. WYATT TILBY.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN POST-WAR BRITAIN

By the late SIR BASIL BLACKETT, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.

Sir Basil Blackett, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., was accidentally killed in Germany on August 15 last. In him England lost a great public servant who advanced every great cause which he espoused, a skilled administrator, an accomplished scholar, and a courageous and far-seeing thinker. We are privileged to print below a summary of the address that he was to have delivered in the University of Heidelberg on August 16.

WHEN the history of the twentieth century comes to be written its historian will probably select some date still in the future as the end of the post-war transition period. The war is still too recent an event to permit of a philosophic view being taken either of the period from 1914 to 1918 or of the period of less than twenty years since the Armistice. It is clear now, though it was not in 1918, that the war marked the final breakdown of the economic doctrines of *laissez-faire* and the end of what has been described as 'The anarchic social code of the century of scramble.' It remains still to be discovered whether mankind is clever enough to manage the machine which applied science has lately built up; nor, granted an affirmative answer to this question, can it yet be foreseen what form will be assumed by the body of political and economic doctrines on which the new order will be founded. You will observe that I speak of political and economic doctrines. The subject of this address is an economic one, and I shall try as far as I can to confine what I have to say to economic questions. I must, however, at the outset, ask your indulgence if I seem at times to stray into what may seem to be political matters. It has been said that the task of economics is simply to analyse and set forth the facts regarding

the economic life of a nation, or of a civilisation, at any particular stage of its development. Without necessarily accepting this narrowing view of the sphere of economics, I agree that ethical and political questions are of fundamental importance in shaping the background of any possible science of economics, and still more the economic history of any particular period.

The period under review is too short and too recent for clear and exact analysis, yet it is possible to distinguish certain definite tendencies gradually emerging in Britain's economic life. At first the universal cry was for a return to the normal—conceived of as the conditions of 1913, only somehow better. In aspiration, if not in execution, the idealism of the first months of the war was revived in the first months after the Armistice in the cry for 'Homes for Heroes' and the dream of a nation of individuals competing on 'normal' *laissez-faire* principles and yet, at the same time, combining in overwhelming force to overcome abuses at home. War-time restrictions of all sorts were swept away as soon as possible, with the idea of restoring individual initiative. In some instances such action was undoubtedly premature and ill-advised; but the nation had the advantage of having its eyes directed to an easily understood goal, and the individual could attend to business as usual without harassing doubts. Subconsciously perhaps this determination to return to the normal was influenced by a desire to show the Russian Bolsheviks how empty was their talk of the collapse of the capitalist system.

For two years after the Armistice the post-war trade boom served to harden the general belief in returning normality. Its collapse in 1920-21 did not immediately shake that belief. Catastrophic as the fall in prices was, it nevertheless brought them down much nearer the pre-war figure, and most men saw in the report of the Geddes Economy Committee and the drastic cuts in public expenditure on the social services which followed the slump only a further necessary step on the journey back to pre-war conditions. When in 1925 the gold standard was restored with the pound sterling at its pre-war parity it seemed to many that the goal of normality had been achieved and that it only remained to clear out of the way vexatious problems, such as those of

Reparations and Allied debts, and discover a *modus vivendi* by which Britain's restored financial strength could work harmoniously in a world in which London, instead of being the pre-eminent financial centre, had to share the leadership with New York, and take account of the sudden emergence of the United States as a great world lender. Few saw in the short-lived General Strike and the Coal Trade Dispute of 1926 a clear warning that the return to normality and the old gold standard was an illusion. The majority felt, and with justice, that the outcome of the General Strike was a triumph of British common-sense. It was in the years following 1926 that the conviction gradually took shape in Britain that the idea of restoring pre-war conditions was misconceived and was now becoming a positive impediment to recovery of prosperity. First 'rationalisation' and then 'reconstruction' and 'planning' came into favour in place of 'return to normality' as expressing the goal of endeavour. The history of the last eight years is the history of the rapid spread in every branch of political and economic thought of the idea of Planning.

The change in outlook began slowly enough. It seemed at the time a very big advance when official statisticians began to use the year 1924 in place of 1913 as the standard year of comparison, the choice being dictated largely by the fact that 1924 was the first post-war year in which one of Britain's infrequent Censuses of Production took place. Even in 1929 a Conservative Government went to the country at a General Election on the cry 'Safety First,' which showed a hankering after the old normal rather than a forward outlook. In the same year came the collapse of the boom on the New York Stock Exchange, followed in 1930 and 1931 by the unprecedented world-wide depression of trade. Finally in September 1931 the great event in the post-war economic history of Britain occurred—the pound sterling was driven off the gold standard. At the General Election of 1931 a National Government was put in power with an overwhelming majority and entrusted with a 'Doctor's Mandate.'

There are still in Britain ardent advocates of a return to *laissez-faire*. There is no general enthusiasm for planning for its own sake and no unanimity among the advocates of more planning, either as to details or even as to principles.

The restoration of an international gold standard seems to some an essential to national reconstruction; others regard it as an atavistic negation of any possibility of national reconstruction. Nevertheless, the main division of opinion is between those who believe in the necessity for planning and the dwindling majority who oppose it. Planning has without question won the day, but on one condition, which is an over-riding condition, that British planning must be compatible with British freedom. The swiftness of the conversion of British opinion to the idea of planning can be attributed to a number of interconnected causes: the decline in the export of British manufactured goods, depression in the old staple industries, such as cotton, coal, shipbuilding, anxiety as to the plight of agriculture, widespread unemployment, the sudden shrinkage after 1929 in Britain's invisible exports and in her income from shipping, insurance, and interest on capital placed abroad. All these culminated in the dramatic collapse in 1931 of the gold standard.

The events of 1931 were final and decisive. Britain's picture of the pre-war economic world was of a world in which finance and commerce were international, leaping over, and all but ignoring, national and territorial boundaries—a world which, in spite of the unaccountable refusal of most other nations to adopt the British panacea of Free Trade, welcomed British ships and British goods and British capital everywhere, and in return found in Britain a ready market for anything they might have to sell and investors ready to supply money for encouraging new enterprise in any part of the world. She had, so she believed, developed her world-wide trade and commerce strictly on business lines and not from political motives. In seeking a return to conditions of pre-war normality Britain was therefore of necessity internationally minded. She desired to see the world become once again peaceable and orderly as soon as might be, and thereby once again a world good for British trade.

All through the 1920's Britain looked on with increasing dismay at the obvious increase in the strength of economic nationalism. She herself was not unaffected, and by 1929 was beginning to take steps to prevent undue penetration of British industry by American capital. But economic nationalism was a negation of all her preconceived and

cherished beliefs, and all through the 1920's she clung to her international hopes and did her best to stem the contrary tide.

The events of 1931 were decisive in that they forced Britain to make terms with economic nationalism, and to turn her eyes at last inward. The picture which her eyes then saw was that of a country crying out for internal reconstruction—for tariffs and quotas to revive agriculture neglected for nearly a century; for protection and rehabilitation of old-established productive industries threatened by more up-to-date factories elsewhere or by imports produced by under-paid labour—a country marred by ugliness and congestion and slums, in need of developmental expenditure of all kinds and able to absorb much of the annual flow of new capital, which up to the war and in the decade after the war had looked abroad, and not at home, for profitable outlets. Nineteenth-century *laissez-faire* had made Britain rich, but had left terrible legacies which could be dealt with only by orderly and planned reconstruction.

INDUSTRY

Industry may be considered under three main headings—Manufactures, Mining, and Agriculture.

(a) *Manufactures*.—The war dealt a serious blow to Britain's old staple industries. The temporary closing and diversion of avenues of trade, particularly with South America, was in itself harmful, but with the return of peace Britain was at first in a better position than most countries, other than the United States and Japan, to regain old markets for her products. During the post-war boom the demand, both external and internal, for cotton goods, and even for iron and steel products, was more than equal to the supply, and difficulties in securing payment were not yet as prominent as they perhaps should have been. In the cotton industry especially the post-war boom was itself a potent cause of later trouble, owing to the way in which one mill after another was re-financed on an over-capitalised basis at the moment when prices had soared to extravagant heights.

When the slump came at the end of 1920, it began to be evident that the deeper cause of trouble was to be found in

the fact that the war had not only led to over-expansion of plant, often on wasteful lines, in Britain itself, but had taught other countries, inside the Empire and foreign, how to decrease their dependence upon the British manufacturer. World capacity for the output of steel had been enormously expanded, and, with the idea of possible future wars in mind, every important country was obsessed with the idea of defending its key industries.

Even before the war Britain had fallen far behind Germany and the United States in steel production, and her early lead secured at the time of the Industrial Revolution had begun to prove a definite disadvantage. Her plant and her methods tended to be out of date and her manufacturers were slow to learn the value of scrapping the old in favour of the new. With the continual shrinkage of such overseas markets as remained, and with her own home market unprotected, conditions became ever more unfavourable to British steel manufacturers. The combination of Free Trade principles with sturdy individualism made efforts at reconstruction on a co-operative basis unfruitful.

The following comparative figures tell their own tale :

STEEL PRODUCTION (thousands of metric tons)

	United States.	Germany	Great Britain
1900	10,352	6,646	4,980
1913	31,803	18,935	7,789
1920	42,809	9,278	9,213
1924	38,540	9,835	8,333
1930	41,352	11,539	7,443
1934	25,855	11,882	9,002

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF STEEL (Great Britain)

	Imports	Exports
1900	547	2,052
1913	1,832	3,524
1920	793	2,553
1924	1,869	3,175
1930	2,777	2,751
1934	1,222	2,054

The need for action in 1931 is self-evident. I shall return later to the significance of the change between 1930 and 1934.

The figures of the Cotton Industry are indicative of even worse troubles.

RAW COTTON DELIVERED TO MILLS IN GREAT BRITAIN
(millions of lbs.)

1900	1,624	1924	1,399
1913	2,171	1930	1,226
1920	1,862	1934	1,246

MILL CONSUMPTION OF COTTON IN GREAT BRITAIN (thousands
of bales)

1913	4,274	1931	1,964
1925	3,235	1934	2,470

For a long period the British cotton industry had been accustomed to maintain its lead over other countries and increase the volume of its exports by gradually improving the quality of its products. Lost ground in the cheaper classes of goods was continually made up in the higher classes. With the end of the post-war boom, however, began a process of steady decline. Even more than in the iron and steel trade the individualist spirit, the special pride of Lancashire, resisted one attempt after another to bring about a comprehensive reorganisation and to modify consecrated traditions which were in need of adaptation to the new conditions. The development of electric power, in which Britain was for long far behind her competitors, applied science in its many manifestations (particularly in teaching how the humidity of atmosphere required in cotton mills could be artificially produced), the relative decrease in the importance of inherited skill that comes with mechanisation, the gradual increase in the skill of labour in competing countries, the conservative individualism of British labour which matched that of the employers—all these and similar causes were dethroning Lancashire from her pre-eminence in the production of textiles.

It is true that the new artificial silk industry enabled Britain to some extent to continue her old practice of improv-

ing the quality of output as a means of meeting competition in cheaper lines. The figures are interesting:

OUTPUT OF ARTIFICIAL SILK IN GREAT BRITAIN (thousands
of lbs.)

1913	11,475	1930	46,030
1924	22,023	1934	88,323

Artificial silk production has thus become a very important item in the British textile industry. But in artificial silk Britain had no advantages of an early lead such as she had in cotton production, and, for all its importance, this branch of textiles has not compensated her for the decline in cotton. Nor can it be hoped that, so far as textiles are concerned, a protected home market will materially assist in meeting the troubles of lost exports.

British shipbuilding and shipping have suffered even more disastrously than cotton from war and post-war changes.

SHIPS UNDER CONSTRUCTION (tons)				REGISTERED TONNAGE
1900	1,386,367			13,241,446
1913	2,003,241			18,696,237
1920	3,394,425			18,330,424
1924	1,516,746			19,105,838
1930	1,392,063			20,438,444
1934	587,142			17,734,912

The plight of these staple industries, together with the difficulties of the coal industry, to be referred to later, aggravated from 1925 to 1931 by the over-valuation of the pound sterling, made the years 1925-30 for Britain a period of hesitating prosperity. In the United States and elsewhere it is looked back to as a golden age. In this country it was prosperous only in comparison with the years that succeeded it.

Nevertheless, the picture of the 1920's in Britain is by no means one of unrelieved decline. The troubles of the big staple industries and the consequent unemployment masked, perhaps unduly, the tremendous activity in other directions which was already at work to build up new production to replace the old.

REGISTERED UNEMPLOYED in December 1920, 1924, 1930, 1934

	Thousands	Insured Workers. Per cent.
1920	858	7.8
1924	1,263	11.5
1930	2,500	20.4
1934	2,086	16.1

It would take too long to examine the growth of the newer industries in detail, but the following figures will illustrate what was happening :

BRITISH OUTPUT OF MOTOR CARS, ETC.

1922	73,000	1930	236,500
1924	146,600	1934	354,800

ELECTRICITY GENERATED (millions of units)

1920	5,167	1930	12,333
1924	7,415	1934	16,895

Thus, as against the depressing figures of unemployment, the numbers of insured workers actually employed tell a different story :

1924	9,656,000	1930	9,861,000
1934	10,173,000		

(b) *Mining*.—These last figures are all the more striking in view of the fact that, not less than in her old staple manufactures, Britain had had to face in the period since the war a tremendous fall in the world demand for her coal, the one raw material in which geological and geographical conditions have specially favoured her.

The figures for British Coal Production are as follows :

	Million tons		Million tons
1900	225,057	1924	267,118
1913	287,348	1930	243,882
1920	229,532	1934	220,726

The development of oil and electricity as power producers has profoundly affected the balance of British trade and industry. In South Wales and Durham, which have been the worst sufferers so far as coal is concerned, whole areas have become almost derelict owing to the closing of once prosperous mines.

The reorganisation of the coal industry was recognised as a national necessity very soon after the war and has been reported upon by more than one Special Commission. It was the conditions in the coal-fields which brought on the General Strike of 1926 in sympathy with the much longer drawn-out dispute between coal-owners and miners.

Much has been done by legislation and otherwise to bring about amalgamation of the far too large numbers of individual mines and to regulate output by quotas and export agreements. But the resistance to combination and co-operation has been very powerful, and coal problems seem likely to be a cause of deep anxiety to British Governments for many years to come. The best hope of progress lies in the development of new scientific processes still in their infancy for low-temperature carbonisation, the extraction of oil from coal, and the production of electricity at pit-head.

(c) *Agriculture*.—From the adoption of Free Trade by Great Britain in 1846 down to the war agriculture had suffered a slow but almost continuous decline. Britain's policy was to obtain food and raw materials in the cheapest market and to pay for these imports from abroad by means of her exports of manufactured goods and coal, and by banking, insurance and shipping services. This policy undoubtedly served British industry and commerce well, and in a rapidly developing world she grew ever richer and more prosperous.

All this growth was, however, partly at the expense of British agriculture, in spite of compensating advantages to more specialised activities, such as dairying and market gardening. Even in these the rapid urbanisation of fruitful regions round London and other big towns and the competition of Continental neighbours, such as France, Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Germany, prevented British agriculture from making as much progress as might have been expected. Moreover, more distant lands—New Zealand, for example—began to invade the market with butter and cheese.

After the war there was at first an apparent determination on the part of the British Government to offer some safeguards to agriculture against unlimited competition from abroad. The war had emphasised in startling manner the

risks of Britain's complete dependence on imported food-stuffs, and at the same time had led, owing to the natural protection afforded by war conditions, to a temporary revival in British agricultural production, especially in wheat and meat.

Accordingly a Wheat Subsidy was introduced, designed to maintain the increase in the acreage under wheat, and the cultivation of sugar-beet was encouraged, also by a subsidy. The Wheat Subsidy proved short-lived, its expensiveness making it untenable in face of the demand for reduction of Government expenditure. The Beet-sugar Subsidy has survived hitherto in spite of violent attacks from many quarters: recently, after being in special peril following a most unfavourable report from a weighty Committee of Enquiry, it has been rearranged on lines involving the amalgamation of all the beet factories into one public concern and close co-ordination with the sugar refiners.

While it is unsafe to single out a particular cause as an explanation of the revolution in outlook which the events of 1931 signalled, the plight of British agriculture may be regarded as specially significant. Agriculture could be ignored—had been ignored for nearly a century—so long as industry and commerce were prospering. Now both were in a state of deep depression. Urbanisation, slums, spoliation of the country-side, ugliness (and increasing impoverishment in town and country alike)—these seemed to be the final harvest of a century and a half of the Industrial Revolution. The search for an agricultural policy was bound to lead directly to the search for a general plan bringing into due relation each section of the country's economic and social programmes.

Owing to the wide range within which prices have moved, money figures of export and import trade are so misleading as to be useless, and accurate figures of volume are not available. There can be no doubt, however, that a steady process has been at work to increase the relative importance of Britain's internal trade, and simultaneously there have been interesting changes in the nature of the internal demand for goods. Here the effects of demographic changes begin to be clearly visible. On the one hand, public expenditure on the social services—education, public health, old age pensions,

health and unemployment insurance—has vastly increased. In spite of the misery due to unemployment, the standard of living among the low-paid classes of workers has markedly improved. On the other hand, the trend of industry southward, owing to distress in Lancashire and the north-east coast areas, has further complicated problems arising from the slowing down of the birth rate, the fall in emigration, and the rapid increase in the proportion of elderly adults to children in the aggregate of the population.

The influence of these changes on the economic history of Britain is important. London's preponderant position has become much more definite than before the war, and many newer industries, as well as big retail business catering for comforts and luxuries, have gravitated to London and its environs. With the decline in heavy exports and in shipping there has been a marked fall in *entrepôt* business. Re-exports have fallen, a process naturally accelerated by the growth of a protective tariff.

The currency history of Britain from the date of the Armistice can be shortly summarised. Before the end of 1918 the decision was taken in principle that policy should be directed to the restoration of the gold standard at the pre-war parity with as little delay as possible. The belief in the return to the normal was so strong that this decision seemed inevitable, and no alternative was seriously considered. It was vaguely realised that the burden of debt, internal and external, was likely to cause some difficulty. To reduce the size of the internal debt a capital levy, under the name of a War Wealth Levy, came very near to being imposed in 1920, but the delays inevitable in preparing and enforcing such a levy led to its final consideration being postponed till the post-war boom was ending, and the opportunity had passed. The melancholy history of the external debt—that is, of Reparations and Inter-Allied debts—cannot find a place here. It is perhaps insufficiently realised, especially in Germany, that the astronomical figures of the Reparations debt were directly related to the astronomical figures reached at the date of the Armistice by the Inter-Allied debts due to Great Britain, and the debts due by all the Allies, including Great Britain, to the United States. False analogies drawn from the pre-war experience of external lending led to further mistakes.

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British observers were aware almost from the first that these huge inter-governmental debts must ultimately be written off and that the economic restoration of the world, particularly in Europe, depended on a solution of the political problems involved. The political difficulties proved, however, insoluble. Successive British Governments were compelled to pursue a currency policy which was incompatible with a solution of the international debts question, other than by ultimate extinction of those debts, but succeeded in 1925 in restoring the pound sterling to the old gold parity, and greatly helped the rest of the world to return to the gold standard in spite of the continued maintenance of enormous inter-governmental claims for War Debts. The United States, by pursuing a policy of deflation which halved wholesale prices during the years from 1920 onwards, had in fact, by this means alone, rendered any reasonable settlement involving effective payment of these debts an impossibility. These inter-governmental debts continued to cloud the issue right up to 1931, and were an important factor in the breakdown of currencies in that year. They were not, however, the main cause of the failure of the world-wide attempt, mainly inspired by Britain, to restore the international gold standard. This must be sought rather in the world-wide trend towards economic nationalism and the impossibility of adapting the old gold standard of the nineteenth century to the new economic and financial conditions of the twentieth-century world.

So far as Britain was concerned, the attempt to restore the old gold standard was merely one feature of Britain's general policy of trying to revert to the pre-war normal and to re-establish a world where international commerce and finance could have free play. The attempt broke down in Britain itself, quite apart from the external obstacles it had to encounter, because the level of prices and costs in Britain in 1925 was such that the pound sterling was considerably over-valued at the moment when the old gold standard was restored, and the deflation necessary to remedy this defect was too difficult to achieve in the face of the inflexibility of Britain's economic structure. The Coal Dispute and General Strike of 1926 were the natural sequel of the return to the old gold parity, and from that time onward no serious

attempt drastically to restore the absent equilibrium was or could be made.

It would be a mistake, however, to regard the post-war financial history of Britain up to 1931 as made up entirely, or even mainly, of the abortive attempt to restore the pre-war international gold standard. In every part of Britain's financial structure re-adaptation to new conditions was actively proceeding. The rule of thumb methods of controlling the exchanges which had been practised by the Bank of England in pre-war days were being consciously and effectively developed and codified into a science and art of central banking and the foundations laid for active co-operation between Central Banks all over the world, more especially within the British Empire and the wider area which was within the orbit of the pound sterling—later known as the Sterling Area. The joint-stock banks were being rapidly decreased in number and increased in strength, with very valuable results. British banking stood the strain of 1931 in remarkable fashion, and emerged triumphant to win great prestige for its integrity and its technical efficiency. Slowly and unobtrusively, and, to some extent, unwillingly, the financial organisation of the City of London was beginning to fit itself for the task of financing internal development and to get away from its too exclusive interest in overseas and external finance and investment. When it is remembered how complete was the revolution away from the traditional outlook of the City of London and in its technical organisation, its achievement in weathering the storm of 1931, without any spectacular collapse of particular institutions, and with all its machinery intact, must be recognised as a very great one.

To the people of Britain the crisis of the summer of 1931 came as an internal political crisis. Clear as the evidence may now seem of the need for a revolutionary change of outlook, the British people, with its characteristic habit of concentrating on immediate tasks, had its eyes fixed on the pressing problem of restoring equilibrium to the national budget and maintaining British credit. The actual occasion of the formation of a National Government, representing all parties and none, was, not the departure of the pound sterling from gold, but the threat of departure. The first National

Government was formed nearly a month before the collapse of the gold standard, and the specific purpose of its formation was to maintain that standard.

In the middle of September 1931 the world was subjected to two violent shocks coming from Great Britain. Within a week came news of a mutiny (so called) in the British Navy and the bankruptcy (so called) of the Bank of England. All over the world men felt that the foundations of civilisation were crumbling. Two of the most stable institutions, the British Navy and the Bank of England, had collapsed! What might not happen next?

Seldom had the world been more egregiously misled by British idiosyncrasies. The naval mutiny proved to be nothing but a sober and dignified but resolute protest, entirely non-political, by a body of very loyal seamen against an ill-considered document embodying decisions regarding cuts in their pay and, what was more important, cuts in the provision for their wives and children ashore, which they rightly regarded as intolerable. The savings in public expenditure involved were reasonable enough, and it required only a few minor adjustments and a reasonable explanation to restore good feeling all round. Nevertheless, the report of a mutiny was decisive in finally pushing the pound sterling off gold. There were not wanting those to whom this consequence of the alleged mutiny appeared as not the least of the great services rendered through the ages by the British Navy to the British nation. The so-called bankruptcy of the Bank of England seemed for the moment a more serious blow to Britain's credit, all the more because the Bank of England had taken the lead in urging the restoration both in Britain and elsewhere of the international gold standard. It was, to say the least, uncomfortable to British pride to know that departure from the gold standard had brought heavy monetary losses upon the Bank of France and the Bank of the Netherlands, who had trusted part of their gold reserves to the Bank of England, at the latter's instigation, and now learned too late that gold and sterling were not identical.

The public reaction in Britain to these events was characteristically British. So far from condemning the newly formed National Government for failing to maintain the

gold standard which it had been created to preserve, the people of Britain at the General Election in October 1931, a month after the collapse of the gold standard, returned the same Government to power with an unprecedented majority.

The vast majority of its supporters in Parliament belong to the Conservative Party, but to a non-British observer the actions of that Government have been very far from being conservative. Here we come up against a truth which is very difficult for people outside Great Britain to appreciate. It has been well said that the Conservatives in Britain are not a party of the Right Wing, as on the Continent. This is largely the outcome of old history. For the greater part of the eighteenth century the Tory Party, the predecessor in title of the Conservative Party, represented a minority in opposition to the then dominant Whig Party. It looked askance at the progress of the Industrial Revolution from 1780 to 1840, and the newly enriched industrialists of that era invariably belonged to the Whig or Liberal Party. It was Disraeli, a leader of the Conservative Party, who, as a young member, first drew public attention to the 'Two Nations'—the employing class and the class of oppressed workmen—which the Industrial Revolution was creating in Britain. Only with great reluctance did the Conservatives in 1846 make terms with the doctrines of Adam Smith and the principles of Free Trade and *laissez-faire*.

The Liberal Party in Britain had for some years before 1931 been in a decline, submerged by its almost fanatical adherence to doctrinaire principles, and in particular to its fetish of Free Trade. Cynics have said that the Conservative Party, so far from being the slave of principles, is always ready to adopt any measure, however radical, provided that it is out of date. The cynics are wrong. The Conservative Party never swerves from its ideal of service to King and country. It has persistently shown its disbelief in the virtues of maximum production at all costs which led in the nineteenth century to the fatal neglect of agricultural production. It is true that it has allowed itself to be misled into competition with the other parties for popular favour in trying to combine maximum production with a system of distribution that relies on doles and pensions and largesse. It has, however, never completely lost sight of its historical opposition to plutocracy

in every form; and its economic aim has always been, not maximum production, but optimum production—that volume of production that can be steadily and evenly distributed, in an economic system which maintains an even balance between town and country, by means of wages, salaries and profits. This economic aim is by no means an easy one, and it demands a disciplined subordination to a national purpose quite incompatible with *laissez-faire* principles.

If the Labour Party had been a Left Wing Socialist Party aiming at a sudden transformation of Britain to the complete Socialist State, the formation of a National Government including or headed by the Labour Prime Minister would have been unthinkable. But this was far from being the case. There is a natural compatibility between the progressive Conservative and the moderate Labour man, and the most remarkable characteristic of the trade union leaders is their excessive conservatism. This remains true of the Labour Party in general, in spite of its refusal in 1931 to follow its leaders in joining the National Government. The British revolution of 1931 thus took the political form of a National Government transcending party divisions, charged with the national task of meeting and defeating the threat to the stability of Britain's social and financial structure. At the time there was little consciousness of the need for thorough-going reconstruction. So far as its public utterances went, the Cabinet itself was curiously reluctant to admit that it was engaged on a task of reconstruction. The introduction of a protective tariff was represented, not as a reversal of an eighty-year-old Free Trade policy, but as a means, possibly temporary, of rectifying Britain's balance of trade. The abandonment of the gold standard was regarded first as a very unfortunate necessity and then as a temporary means of re-enforcing the protective tariff. The remarkable springing into being of a Sterling Area covering more than a quarter of the globe centred upon sterling has not as yet converted the monetary authorities of the country to the support of a Managed Currency. Lip-service is still paid to the international gold standard as an ultimate ideal, though more and more advantage is being taken of the 'managed currency' system into which Britain has happily stumbled.

The task that faced the National Government in 1931

was nothing less than the overhaul and reconstruction of the entire social and economic framework of Britain's life. To those who saw clearly at an early date the need for an orderly and planned attack all along the line based on a new and carefully thought-out machinery of government, what has actually been achieved seems to fall very far short of the opportunity and the need. Yet no British Government in the short space of four years has to its credit a tithe of what the National Government has accomplished. Budgetary equilibrium has been restored, the internal debt has been converted to much lower rates of interest, direct taxation, which had to be raised at the beginning of the period, has been again reduced; the balance of trade and payment, which was seriously out of gear, has been brought into order and industry protected by a reasonable tariff, so controlled as to avoid political wire-pulling; agriculture is well on the way to rehabilitation; an agreement was reached at Ottawa which seems likely to prove the beginning of Empire economic collaboration; unemployment has been reduced by 1,000,000 below the peak of nearly 3,000,000 reached at the worst phase of the depression, and is now well under 2,000,000.

The record of achievement is a very fine one. Britain has definitely passed out of the period of deep depression into a period of moderate recovery. Britain and the Sterling Area are relatively in a better position than any other parts of the globe. And the National Government has not merely staged recovery—it has laid foundations for major reforms and for a new Britain. Just because the foundations have been firmly laid, the Government now incurs growing criticism for its slowness in building on them.

Outside the sphere of direct Government action the growing change in the scale of economic and social values is seen in the increasing public support and interest given to the work of such bodies as the National Trust and the Council for the Preservation of Rural England. With new opportunities for leisure there is emerging a new demand for beautiful surroundings and a realisation of the claims of beauty to override those of industrial development, even in the realm of economic value. The change in the orientation of public opinion in Britain is still in process. It is too soon yet to foresee the outcome. As always, the British habit of concen-

trating on the immediate next step and keeping silent about the longer views which it may subconsciously hold, but does not express, dominates the scene. There are many unsolved problems, such as the relations between the new Britain and the British Empire, which make any idea of a self-sufficient Britain unthinkable, and the international relations of the new Britain and the Empire with the rest of the world, especially with the United States of America and the continent of Europe, which geography and history alike compel Britain to keep in the forefront of her attention.

What form will national planning take in Britain? Amid much that is obscure, one prophecy can be made with certainty. British planning will at all costs be made to conform to British ideals of freedom. One of the reasons for the reluctance shown by the National Government to talk about planning, or to speak of planned reconstruction, is that the word has had to live down its associations with compulsion and dictatorship. The British people has already admitted the intervention by the State in its economic life to an extent that would have been unthinkable a few years ago, and is likely to acquiesce in—and even to demand—further intervention in an increasing degree and over an increasing area. It is determined no longer to tolerate all-round frustration owing to anarchic competition among the individuals of which it is made up. But it is not prepared on any terms to worship the State as a god, or to regard the State as something more than the sum of the individual citizen. Its service to the State must be free and self-disciplined, not compulsory. Before, therefore, it accepts planning, it asks 'For what is one planning? For the efficiency of the nation, or for the highest interests of the individual?' The two may well be compatible. The British people is very willing to subordinate itself to a national purpose, but nothing will persuade it that efficiency for its own sake is the goal of its aspiration.

Planning, for all its modernity, is the offspring of its nineteenth-century parentage. It is a revolt against the individualism of nineteenth-century economics, which exalted the individual only to end by forgetting his humanity and depressing him to the status of the economic man. It is 'out of Marxianism, by the theory of evolution.' Those two currents of thought interrupted the flow of the stream

which had its source in the Christian and Platonic doctrine of the unique value of the individual soul. Planning must go back to that source before it can do its full service to the twentieth-century world.

The nineteenth century has bequeathed to us a universe all too mechanistic in which the value of the individual man tends to be simply his cellular value in the structure of the whole. To the Briton the Communist doctrine seems to be the logical outcome of the idea of a mechanistic universe, and he is bound to challenge the premises. Man is not solely an economic entity, and the Philosophy of Planning, if Britain is to accept it, must get beyond economic values to human values. Or, to put it in another way, planning must be an economic means to an end which goes beyond economics and cannot be an end in itself.

To the Briton freedom is an ultimate value—freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, free institutions. He is willing to accept planning as a means of providing for the individual an environment in which he can live and move and have his being with the best scope for the manifestation of his individual genius. British planning must mean such an organisation of material resources as will offer the freest possible environment for the development of the individual. It must mean the removal of disabilities because they lead to the frustration of the individual, not for the sake of deifying the State. It must be a self-imposed discipline, not a trampling down of the individual by the deified State.

In his economic aspect the individual Briton is read — indeed eager—to submit to planning for the general good. He is ready, if need be, to sacrifice a large part of what he has hitherto regarded as his essential economic individuality. But the goal in view must be—and he must be fully convinced that this is indeed the goal—more freedom for the spiritual and intellectual individuality of all. Planning is valid only if it brings freedom to that part of man which lives in the realm of mind and spirit.

BASIL P. BLACKETT.

FREEDOM TO TRADE

A REMINISCENCE

By SIR EDWARD PENTON, K.B.E.

LOOKING back on my early life in commerce—I started working in the family business in the year of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee—I cannot help feeling that the present generation is the poorer for the rejection of those ideals of freedom which guided my father and his contemporaries in all their actions. The manufacturers of Cobden's day were perhaps influenced to support his campaign by the prospect of cheap food for their cheap labour (political victories often owe something to an appeal to self-interest), but it is an injustice to succeeding generations to attribute their passionate belief in Free Trade solely to a desire for cheapness; they, at least, must be credited with higher ideals. Freedom to import became freedom to trade. Manufacturers by accident, the English, true to the traditions of the Elizabethans, remained traders at heart and scoured the world for merchandise. The factories of Europe, the bazaars of Asia, the prairies and pampas of the Americas, and the heart of Africa yielded their wealth to our enterprising fathers. What they bought in one market they sold in another, either as they bought it or as components of their own productions, and rejoiced in the conviction that they were spreading the blessings of civilisation in the process. Small blame to them! To the less fortunate foreigners, slowly emerging from a century of external wars or internal strife, they may have appeared to be arrogant and patronising, but wherever the British opened a market traders of all nations were made welcome. Having prospered themselves, our fathers, like the rich men of the English towns, who added banking to industry, let the newcomers do the work and reaped a profit by providing the finance. This worship of freedom

dominated my early life, and neither wars nor slumps have ever shaken my devotion.

The progress of my boyhood was punctuated by my father's frequent departures for the Continent and the arrival of foreigners in England. I knew those goings and comings were somehow connected with the business. Probably I owe the remembrance of them more to their tangible results than to the events themselves. Sometimes a toy from Paris was the first evidence of my father's return; a liberal supply of French gloves was invariably my mother's share of the spoil. These she would display with pride to her friends, for they gave her a sense that through the family business the whole world was at her disposal, and she liked other people to know it.

I vividly remember my introduction to these international dealings. Our firm held a valuable agency for a manufacturer at Nancy. It had been arranged by my father, who was very proud of his achievement. But the manager charged with the subsequent handling of the business was not so pleased, for he regarded the purchase of goods for his department by anyone but himself as an unwarrantable interference with his prerogative. Nor did my father's constant anxiety about the progress of the agency help to sooth his injured feelings, and when late one summer the factory at Nancy was destroyed by fire during his employer's holiday, the jealous manager suppressed the letter that announced the disaster. I have seldom seen anyone quite so angry as the old man when at last the news reached him. He telegraphed a lengthy message of sympathy, and, feeling that this was scanty atonement for his accidental discourtesy, he decided immediately to visit Nancy himself, and, though I had not yet entered the business, he took me with him as an additional token of goodwill. The gesture succeeded. Our friends welcomed us with a royal banquet. They produced their best wines—I was told impressively that the red wine was older than I and the white older than my father. The owner of the factory was consoled by the adequacy of his insurance and the prospect of modernising his plant. Before we left next day he asked my father to receive his son into our own firm for a period to learn the language and study English methods. My father gladly consented, and from that time onwards the two

families were on terms of affectionate friendship, frequently visiting each other in their own homes. Alas! the war and all that followed has severed our business relations, and to my grief this happy friendship lies buried with so much else we loved and cherished in those pleasant bygone days.

My father was so delighted with the outcome of the Nancy expedition and the modest *rôle* I had played in it that he began to look forward to the day when I should take an active part in the business. Though the family firm had always been rather perfunctorily regarded as my ultimate destination, it was, I think, the first time he had considered my early entry either seriously or hopefully. Certainly he had hitherto scarcely given a thought to the method of my starting or to the need for any special preparation. But now, either influenced by my evident pleasure and interest in my surroundings during the journey or else excited to emulation by the arrival of his French friend's son in London, he decided that I, too, ought to learn a foreign language, and thenceforth I spent the greater part of my holidays in Germany. It was a country that my father secretly disliked. Though, mainly for my benefit, he constantly praised the hard-working, simple-living, music-loving *Deutschers*, he could never forget his visit to Paris during the Commune, when the horrors of the siege were still fresh in his French friends' minds, and he was pleased with the prospect of handing over our German business, which was daily increasing, to someone he could trust to do it for him. Two years later I entered the firm, and for the next decade foreign trade was my chief occupation.

Though this article is mainly concerned with the search for merchandise, I should not like to leave my readers with the impression that imports were my sole consideration. On the contrary, the greater part of my time was devoted to the study of exports. When I joined him, my father had already built up an excellent business in the home market, but the firm was doing very little export trade; and what it did, it did badly. To attribute this either to ignorance or lack of enterprise on the old man's part would be to do him a grave injustice. He knew that many of his competitors were enjoying a good and profitable trade in countries where, so far, he had only lost money, but the men who had helped him

through his early struggles had reached the stage when, content with their success, they were disinclined to risk their reputations in strange markets, and he hesitated to plunge unaided into new adventures. The firm's need of an active export department was my opportunity.

At first my path was strewn with obstacles. As a newcomer with definite prospects I was unpopular. As a reformer I was resisted yard by yard, and in a crisis I could never rely on the old man's avowed support. In secret he encouraged me, but when he was called upon to declare for a young and untried man against the collected opposition of his old associates he invariably compromised.

An incident soon occurred which showed me that success would depend on my own efforts. Within a week or so of my arrival a customer 7000 miles away wrote complaining bitterly that the firm had sent him goods of a different colour from what he had ordered. The writer was the hero of the suppressed letter and the Nancy fiasco, and had already shown himself to be my unrelenting opponent. I took him the complaint and asked for an explanation. Unabashed, he admitted his responsibility, but as the colour he had sent had proved to be unsaleable at home, he said, he had seized what he thought was an admirable opportunity of getting rid of it. I was furious and marched off to my father, confident that here at last was a chance of getting rid of a man who, however valuable his services had been in the past, was becoming a menace to the business. But I was disappointed. All the old man cared about was getting out of the blunder with the least cost to himself. He sent for the manager, and after he had heard his tale turned to me and said: 'Well, my boy, the goods were in stock and Mr. ——— has got rid of them. You'd better offer the customer a small allowance. He'll be glad to take it.' I murmured something about the firm's reputation, but he waved my protest aside, and from that moment I realised I had to fight my battle alone. Later, journeys to South Africa, India, Burmah, and the Middle East gave me a first-hand knowledge of the markets, and when I returned the grumblers and the obstructionists, knowing that they could no longer challenge my authority, gradually ceased from their petty annoyances, acquiesced somewhat grudgingly in the new conditions, and accepted their share of the firm's

increasing export trade, which grew and grew till it far exceeded the value of its imports.

Those were happy days. My own small staff knew its work and did it enthusiastically. Our routine was varied by the frequent arrivals of customers from overseas, whose conversations familiarised us with their conditions, and I eagerly seized the opportunity of renewing my interest in their countries, which during my travels I had allowed to range far beyond my immediate business. But it was too good to last. The Boer War left in its trail a change of thought that was eventually to destroy our faith in Freedom, hitherto the keystone of the British Empire. It is true that Imperial Preference, when first advocated by Mr. Chamberlain, was defeated by sweeping majorities. But the seeds of doubt had been sown. Manufacturers struggling against competition saw a short cut to prosperity: Imperialists awoke from their dreams of empire to plead passionately for the reality, and the mass of the people, without realising what they were sacrificing, saw no harm in trying a little of that protection to which the advocates of Preference ascribed the foreigner's prosperity. Little by little our liberties were whittled away. Customs officers in many of the importing countries, not content with levying a duty, also required a certificate of origin, or a statement concerning the cost of production, and thus with a stroke of the pen demanded the disclosure of the work of a lifetime; while elaborate regulations, wearisome delays, and disdainful treatment at Consulates made the exporter feel more like a criminal arraigned by the law than a trader in pursuit of his lawful avocations. In England itself the public was supposed to need protection, and, though the Government dared not as yet suggest duties, imported goods were not allowed to be sold unless they bore the name of the country of their manufacture. Thus the poison began to circulate till the war made restrictions of all kinds not only possible but necessary and claimed me for other duties.

During those troublous years I knew vaguely that my cherished export trade was suffering, but I was not prepared for the ruin I found when I returned in the May of 1919. Nevertheless, encouraged by the Government's constant exhortations that recovery of the export business was the one thing needed to complete our prosperity, I set to work to

restore it. My confidence betrayed me. Reparations, I knew, would be a hindrance, but I never reckoned on the burst of economic nationalism that followed. My two best markets, India and South Africa, were practically closed; but for a short while I enjoyed a certain success in America, which, in truth, was our obvious market, if we were to pay our debt. In 1924 I found New York and some of the bigger cities enthusiastic importers, and an American friend who boasted that the States were consuming 50 per cent. of the world's manufactured goods reminded me of the days when London rejoiced in its pre-eminence as a market. But this phase soon passed. The American manufacturers began to squeal: the transition from a debtor to a creditor country was too quick for them. The Hoover tariff followed, and the last hope of a speedy recovery vanished.

But to return to the imports. My training qualified me to search the German-speaking markets, and Austria soon became my chief European objective. Vienna was then renowned for its pocket-books, wallets and the like, generally designated as leather goods, and ladies' fancy shoes—mostly made of satin. The latter were my firm's particular interest. All our English customers, and some of our Colonial as well, bought Vienna shoes for their Christmas trade. It was before Mr. Bata had electrified the world with his large organisation at Zlinn and there was scarcely a shoemaker's shop in all Austria that could be classed as a factory. The Vienna makers worked in their tenement dwellings in the outer 'ring.' They bought their materials from such merchants as would give them credit. They cut them up in their own dwellings into uppers and soles for issue to the out-workers, who called for them, and received them again in the form of half-made shoes, which they finished and packed either with the assistance of a son, if they had one old enough, or else of a journeyman employed on the premises. My negotiations with my suppliers were usually conducted in the rooms that served them as workshops by day and bedrooms by night, and I often sat balanced precariously on the edge of the family bedstead, fearful of tumbling backwards and being swallowed by the huge swollen feather quilt that surmounted it. Except for the shoes strewn over the floor, these rooms were spotlessly clean and tidy, though I confess

I was sometimes oppressed by the smell of leather mingled with that of the soup cooking for '*mittagsessen*' that percolated through the kitchen doors.

My firm had been in the habit of buying its Austrian goods from foreign agents—generally Bohemian Jews, who had established themselves in small offices in London. These men seldom represented any particular maker. They often worked in pairs—one in London, the other in Vienna. The latter collected samples from the small makers, sent them to his colleague in London, who secured the orders and transmitted them to Vienna. The man on the spot bought the goods on account of himself and his partner, either advancing a part of the cash or else guaranteeing the maker's credit for his materials, watched the shoes during their manufacture, and when they were finished arranged for their shipment to England. It was a convenient way of doing business, and when I first suggested that what these agents were doing we could do better for ourselves, my father was inclined to be sceptical and discouraging. He urged several reasons against my proposals, but, summed up, they amounted to this: 'Why take risks that other people are taking for you?' This reasoning was sound as long as the agents restricted their business to the wholesale distributors, but as their knowledge grew the same argument about the English market struck them as had occurred to me about the Viennese, and they coveted the wholesaler's profit for themselves. Surreptitiously at first, because they did not want to alarm their regular buyers, they began to approach the larger retailers in London and the provinces. My own suspicions were aroused when our travellers reported that some of our best customers had refused them orders because they said 'They were buying direct.' Then news reached me that foreign agents, who were supplying us, were visiting the provincial towns and bragging that they were taking our orders and leaving us to sell the goods they had sold us, pair by pair, at the height of the season. Not only our profit but our reputation was endangered, and at last I persuaded the old man to let me pay them in their own coin. In spite of his forebodings, I think he was pleased that I refused to take their competition lying down.

Unaware of the difficulties I had to encounter, I set off

full of enthusiasm for Vienna. I was accompanied by the manager of our shoe department. Perhaps my companion had also boasted of our projected journey, for, to my chagrin, we found one of our regular suppliers on the platform of '*Nordwest Bahn*' to meet us. He escorted us to our hotel and arranged a round of sightseeing for the following day. It was the Emperor's jubilee and a public holiday. There was a procession round the Ring Strasse. The importunate agent insisted on our joining his family and accommodating us with seats. I saw the unpopular and ill-fated Franz Ferdinand riding by, while the crowd preserved a stony silence broken only by an occasional hiss. I began to fear that the only escape from my self-appointed host lay in retreat, and that I should have to return to England empty-handed. But I anxiously bided my time, and at last discovered an enterprising shoe retailer, with whose assistance I established a collecting office in Vienna. The arrangement proved successful and continued happily till a year before the outbreak of war, when the improvement in the home production, stimulated by foreign competition, put an end to the imports.

Not content with having tapped Austria for one line of suppliers, I was seized with a determination to explore the country for others. I became like the fisherman who believes that the pool where he has once taken a big fish will always yield him another whenever he fishes it. During my frequent visits to Austria I met men anxious to show me epoch-making inventions. I visited small towns in Bohemia, where the hotels, though primitive, were scrupulously clean; the beer excellent; the '*Wienerschnitzel mit Gurken*' perfect; and my friendly hosts ready to do everything they could for the stranger except address him in any other language than their national Czech. I dived into the Austrian forests to see what the village workshops could offer me, and because there was no other accommodation I slept in the stationmaster's spare room and fed in the station restaurant with the civil servant in charge of the locality. These journeys seldom paid me except in fun and expectation, for too often the samples I proudly produced on my return to London proved to be inferior or dearer than the goods that already held the market.

But one of them was memorable in its joy and its results. It was in the days when leggings were a popular article of wear among English sportsmen, and my firm manufactured them in one of its factories. The best were made of pigskin, and the right pigskins were hard to find. This may sound strange, but the explanation is simple; for though there are plenty of pigs in England, it is not our practice to skin them. We were then buying our skins through a London merchant, who jealously guarded the secret of their origin. I thought I had discovered it in Germany, and dashed off to Hamburg, only to find another merchant. Further inquiries led me to Vienna and thence over the Semmering to Graz, where the tanners were mainly engaged in dressing hogskins for the Viennese leather workers. There I discovered the source of our supplies, but the tanners refused to sell to me. They were delighted to show me their tannery, but our London supplier was their agent, and they told me that if I wanted their leather I must buy it from him. Disappointment stared me in the face. I had only one more tannery on my list, and from all accounts it was hardly worth visiting. But I went and was rewarded, for I not only found the leather I was seeking, but I also learned the secret of the pigskins and the reason for their scarcity.

Old B—— was a working tanner, a bulky man with a short neck, and a round, smiling face on top of his big square body. Having learnt his business with the firm who refused to supply me, he had established a tannery of his own. Left to himself, he was not a very good tanner, but he knew the secret, and I hoped to make something of him, especially as he had a clever young son studying tanning chemistry preparatory to entering his father's business. He told me that the pigs lived on each bank of the Mohr, a mountain river that ran along one side of the town. But—and here was the rub—the peasants on the left bank skinned their pigs and those on the right did not, and so there was fierce competition among the tanners for a limited number of skins. The misdemeanours of the peasants and the avarice and rapacity of the big tanner in the town and another lower down the river were the usual topics of conversation. How one peasant who had hitherto refused all offers but my friend's had been lured away. How the big tannery in Graz

had determined to corner the market, no matter what the price. He was sure this news was authentic, for his book-keeper, a mild, bespectacled young man, had heard two of the opponent's clerks bragging about it in a '*Kneipe*.' I had to listen to all those tales before we settled down to business, but I always suspected that this was my friend's way of breaking the news that he was going to ask for an advance in price. The arguments on this crucial point usually occupied a whole day, for tanners are born bargainers and, as their process is slow, brevity has no attractions for them.

But when the deal was concluded and the heated protestations forgotten, all was friendship. I would stroll slowly back to my hotel, lingering by the way to admire the great houses, built like Florentine palaces, that lay at the foot of the Schlossberg, the hill in the centre of the town, where in bygone days the inhabitants were marshalled to resist the invading Turk, who, till Eugene finally drove him off, was constantly hammering at their gates. Next morning I would bid goodbye to my friends at the station, where the family had assembled to see me depart, either to retrace my steps to Vienna, or else to go by Trieste to Venice and on to the Plain of Lombardy, to find out whether the rapidly developing Italian industry had anything to offer me. For those were the days when an Englishman still gloried in his liberty to search the world's markets.

But I can hear some of my readers, who have deigned to come thus far with me, complaining that I was taking the bread out of our workers' mouths and giving it to the foreigner. To this I retort that England cannot be the greatest trading nation in the world, lending money, developing unexplored territories and exporting its goods to the four quarters of the globe, and then refuse payment. It is all so simple if you will only strip it of the verbiage and realise that trade, however complicated its method, is only barter—that what is bought must be paid for; and payment can only be made in three ways—goods, services, or gold. Actually I was a benefactor, and in buying goods abroad I was either stimulating trade for some other manufacturer, or else—and this is more probable—collecting interest for the bankers.

Did British industry really suffer from the free entry of those commodities? It is always easy to find some particular

industry that has suffered from foreign competition, just as some old-established firm, confident of its prestige and too cautious to recognise the influence of progress, suddenly finds itself outstripped by a younger rival more alert to the uses of modern machinery. No industry can remain stationary; methods are constantly changing, and those who cannot keep pace with them will then drop out of the race.

Of this the English boot trade offers a notable example. At the end of last century British bootmaking was under a cloud. For several decades its manufacturers had reaped a harvest in the new countries, who owed their rising prosperity to British enterprise and finance. But their development aroused in them a desire to become self-supplying and establish factories of their own. I remember how during one of my early visits to Northampton I saw several large factories standing empty and derelict. It was a disturbing sight. I inquired to whom they belonged. I was told. 'Why are they shut?' I asked. They had been in the Australian business was the reply. 'Well,' I said, 'why are they not working?' Because, I was told, the Australians preferred the American article, and had even gone so far as to import American machinery and make their own footwear. And my informant's tone implied that he at least thought that the Australians had not played the game.

But a greater shock was in store. The bootmakers of Massachusetts had with the aid of their newly invented machinery developed a new technique and were seeking fresh markets for their increasing output. They swept Britain and the Continent. Wholesale firms in England eagerly sought agencies for American factories. American manufacturers opened retail shops in all the big cities of Europe. London was full of them, and the public began to talk enthusiastically about the comfort and elegance of American footwear. The British industry wilted under the shadow of their competition and many respected firms were forced out of existence.

Then the trade took a pull at itself. Enterprising young men studied American methods. They imported the new machinery. They learnt that their rivals bought many of their component parts ready made instead of cutting them in their own factories. Merchants scoured America for these gadgets. My own firm sent one of its ablest men to join in

the quest. As soon as they had overcome their prejudices the British manufacturers quickly learnt to use them. They beat the invader with his own weapons. Towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century not only had most of the American shops disappeared from London, but there was scarcely a manufacturer in Northampton who had not either an agent or retail shops in all the capitals on the Continent, and the wearing of British footwear became the hallmark of a well-dressed man. When the great test came the British War Office found over 80,000,000 pairs of footwear to equip its own and the Allied armies, including the Americans, and the whole of that huge quantity, except 9000 pairs, was made in English and Scottish factories.

In August 1914 war shattered the delicate mechanism of international exchange. Five years later the peacemakers of Versailles preferred a vain demand for reparations, which misguided electorates regarded as justice, to the restoration of the economic equilibrium. Though the mistakes of the Treaty have long since been acknowledged, nations still struggling to preserve an outworn economic system seek salvation in the restriction of the free flow of commerce till, distracted by poverty and unemployment, they join in the race for markets in defiance of the rights and protests of their neighbours. Along this road we are marching straight towards a disaster, beside which the horrors of the last war fade into insignificance.

Is it too late to throw off the shackles, and to regain the freedom for which we fought, so that all men can enjoy without strife the blessings and the bounties the world is patiently offering them?

EDWARD PENTON.

CHILDREN AT THE CINEMA

A PSYCHOLOGIST'S VIEW

By C. STANFORD READ, M.D.

So popular have cinemas become, so increasingly a part are they playing in the lives of the masses of the people, that the individual and sociological aspects involved are urgently in need of psychological study in order that we may arrive at some definite understanding of their good or bad effects on the community.

Dogmatic statements on these points are expressed which, even on superficial examination, are found to have no validity. It is, therefore, the more needful to gain some enlightenment on the many problems that present themselves in order that any future organisation of the industry may be directed on rational and healthy lines. We want to know wherein the great attraction of films lies and why, therefore, the great bulk of the public so frequently falls a victim to this allure-ment. Are the emotional effects harmful or not? How are the young influenced? Is crime thus in any way instigated? Should gangster films be banned? In what way, if any, is change needed in the film world? Frequently enough in the daily Press we note that some well-meaning individuals, judging from the slightest data, make categorical assertions concerning the widespread harm resulting from undue sex appeal, and point out with no uncertain voice how the morality of youth is being undermined through the glorification of the gangster and racketeer and that overt crime is being thus encouraged. In the face of these dubious and problematical allegations, it would be well to look more deeply into the subject and on psychological examination note whether current opinion is founded upon fact.

In our survey of the cinema world the allurements of the

pictures requires first consideration. It should not, however, be difficult to understand. This attraction can only exist because the screen presents in pictorial form emotional food for which the public unconsciously yearns. To the great majority of mankind life is drab, and what is lacking in reality is hereby compensated for in the land of imagination. More primitive man had a life full of adventure, but the modern individual is so largely the victim of an automatic, machine-like existence, and lives such a protected life, that he finds little opportunity for venting his innate instinctive urges. Is it any wonder, then, that he is so liable to find outlets for them in a make-believe world?

Though to some extent pictures differ, they all deal in varied ways with the portrayal of love, hate, envy, jealousy, power, etc., and in these basic emotions the audience takes its share by unconsciously identifying itself with the characters depicted. By such means, for the time being, the monotony of life is banished. It is now highly eventful. Foreign countries are visited, dangers risked, pity felt, and all the gamut of feelings run through while sitting in a comfortable and restful atmosphere which costs but little to enter. So easily in such circumstances can the self find escape into phantasy. Not only does the cinema satisfy an emotional void, but it temporarily narcotises the petty personal mental conflicts and worries to which few of us can be strangers. In this respect it is a refuge, a sedative that, like alcohol, may almost be regarded as a psychological necessity in our present social system of civilisation. As Iris Barry points out in her interesting little book *Let's go to the Pictures*, this is the strength of the cinema.

It caters for day-dreams—surface sentiment, riches, splendour, travel, and wild excitement—more thoroughly, more generously, more convincingly than any other form of known entertainment, and offers it in the most effortless way, in the best circumstances, to music, in a twilight solitude, with no mental effort demanded of those for whom it caters.

Apart from satisfying emotional needs, which commonly are only but dimly realised, the pictures to many have an appeal with a lesser feeling value. With them they are more a simple means of mental relaxation and thought diversion. For the time being, the banalities of life are thus forgotten.

In some shape or form we can be fairly sure that there is some loosening of the bond between self and reality. Of course, a few are interested in the cinema from a more or less academic angle. Such individuals have their intellect, not their emotions, stirred. Their enjoyment lies more in their analysis of the technique, the acting, the production as a whole. In discussing the psychological aspects of films this small, almost negligible group need not be considered. After a survey of the main psychological factors related to cinema attendance and its attractions, consideration can be given to the questions so commonly expressed concerning the possible good and bad effects upon both the adult and juvenile population. Is it really a fact that the long queues outside picture-houses point to a poor, degraded, and vitiated appetite for sensationalism? Is it true that the frequent seeing of films tends to the arousal of sex passion and acts as a stimulus to put into practice anything of a questionable or dishonourable nature? Is anti-social conduct or crime in any way thus furthered? Can any harmful effects be laid at all at the door of the cinema? It must be admitted that the pictures tend to induce an imaginative life and cater for the lover of day-dreams. Such an influence is a subtle one, and may so easily be translated into a refuge which becomes so alluring that, like a narcotic drug, we crave for its repetition. Childhood and adolescence are the periods in which phantastic imagination is liable to hold great sway. In his matured years, however, the adult is apt, when he encounters life's stresses and barriers, to regress in some degree into a make-believe world which for the time being, at any rate, acts as a substitutive gratification for what was otherwise denied him. Whether we adopt a hedonistic philosophy or not, it is a fact that at such times the tendency exists for us to take the path of least resistance and seek some mental haven which seems to offer peace and sunshine, however illusory it may be. Iris Barry tells us that

Humanity has almost forgotten how to wonder, to dream for itself: it ought to thank heaven for providing the constant sedative, the escape from the self, which it so direly needs, in the cheap shadowy picture-houses. The cinema provides us with the safe dream we want: and if our dreams are often not worth having, it is because we demand no better.

• Though there is much truth in this, this dreaming may become a danger. As a temporary indulgence, not too often repeated, it would seem to constitute a highly needed and harmless process. In an ideal form of civilisation the need to evade the facts of reality, the call to live, even temporarily, in an illusory world, would have but little incentive. In such an existence there would not be that yawning abyss between what we are instinctively urged to reach out for and the fulfilment thereof. We know only too well that undue encouragement of the human tendency to retreat from the realities of life is fraught with danger. There are already in the world too many who only accomplish anything and reach their goal in day-dreams. In fact the commonest form of mental disease has as its central mechanism the weaving of a visionary existence which renders its victims of little or no use to society. Life, of course, is a conflict from the cradle to the grave, and though the sphere of action, as opposed to reverie, must be in the forefront in order to succeed in life's adaptations, it is likely that many will still have emotional voids that crave for satisfaction.

In the same way as some may regard alcohol as a psychological necessity in the struggle for mental peace, so the modern cinema supplies another form of refuge which helps mankind to find a measure of content, however temporary it may be. It has been said by a noted critic that it is the function of the arts to make life more tolerable. Nevertheless, as Edgar Dale in his study of *The Content of Motion Pictures* points out, in relation to the pictures several facts ought to be remembered:

First, drugs are of value when nothing can be done for the patient except to relieve him of mental pain. Drugs, then, make life more tolerable. But we must remember that illness and unhappiness do respond to therapeutic treatment and drugs should not be resorted to as a substitute for a surgical operation. The good life is no longer a dream which can only be wished for. We now have at hand the machinery for making it a reality. This machinery for changing our current civilisation is not commonly shown in the movies.

These are reflections which it is well to have in our minds, but it may be seriously questioned whether we now have at hand machinery for bringing about that 'good life' in any

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adequate way, though some advances may have been made in this direction.

It would be natural enough to discourse on the lack of cultural value of the average film and the rather blatant tendency to pander to mere sensuality and the elemental passions, but any such criticism would take us too far afield and away from our central theme of the emotional reactions that the pictures of to-day have upon the cinema frequenters, be they adults or children. Though one cannot agree with Mr. St. John Ervine's exaggerated and extravagant conclusions that 'the overwhelming majority of moving pictures are rubbish, unforgivable insults to the mind and the spirit, and suitable only for the entertainment of exhausted or worn-out brains,' it could hardly be intelligently confuted that there is all too commonly a box-office appeal to the cruder feelings of mankind. One cannot ignore the fact that sex appeal is flagrantly prominent. So gratuitously are we presented with the view of the film star having her bath or shown scenes in which she dresses or undresses and gives a fine exhibition of her figure and undergarments. Yet, have we any scientific right to assume that adult audiences are thereby demoralised or debased?

In any community there will always be some individuals who will view these possibilities with a warped outlook. One of our Press critics tended to betray such an undercurrent of feeling when, in criticising a film, he raised the objection that the main characters kissed too much, and tells us that personally he does not like prolonged bouts of kissing, and that they are not at all interesting to the spectators! It has to be realised that in modern society the suppression and repression of the biological sex urge has reached such a degree that the depths of the mind, either consciously or unconsciously, are impelled to seek some gratificatory path which may be direct or indirect, healthy or unhealthy. We have to note the fact that in so many devious ways the erotic instincts are ever apt to find outlets in directions that are not only socially deleterious, but in the main not recognised as emanating from this source. The prevalence of neurotic disease alone, apart from many other forms of mental disharmony, should amply bring this home to us.

We are not here discussing whether or no the cinema

should not be more uplifting and cultural in its presentations. There is, indeed, much evidence that slowly but surely, as the interest in this form of entertainment is reaching a much wider social circle, it is attaining a much more cultivated level. The main point of the thesis here is that any harmful mental effects of the sex element in pictures are grossly exaggerated, if they exist at all. We can go further and say that the demand or and liberal supply of pictures which present the varied emotions related to the erotic life are natural and fulfil what practically amounts to a psychological necessity. It is thus that countless members of the audience in imagination find a vent for feelings which bring solace and content. In the absence of such a simple outlet such feelings might, indeed, find unhealthy channels for their discharge.

The other diatribe which is so often hurled at the cinema entertainment is the supposed corruptive and morbid effects of gangster films. It is certainly true that a large percentage of pictures depict violence, murder, crime, and sadistic aggression. Yet are there really any scientific reasons for thinking that harm results thereby? In the same way as we have deep sex urges that cry out for satisfaction, so, whether we approve or not, it has to be recognised that all of us have deeply-seated aggressive instincts which, though lying fallow in our unconscious minds, need subtle gratification. We are only too well aware of the fact that both individually, socially, and nationally it is so important that the emotions they engender should not be destructively aroused, but be led into constructive and useful sublimated channels. It is because the unconscious mind has such an affinity for what appertains to aggression that everyone finds some attraction in murder, crime, and the manifestations of brute force in general. Revolvers and weapons of offence have a universal allurements. The picture-goer, therefore, cannot help but be interested in the murder mystery, the crook, the gangster stories, with their attendant horrors and blood-curdling episodes.

Mr. St. John Ervine recently, in discussing the subject of what makes a theatrical play successful, points out how trial scenes tend in this direction. My arguments are well confirmed by what he says on the subject. He writes:

Is the success of such plays due to the sadism that is latent in us all? I suspect that it is. We probably get pleasure from the spectacle of a

man or a woman on the end of a pin. Why do people of every class throng to murder trials? To see justice done? Do not believe it. They go because they enjoy a bit of cruelty. To see some person being put through it, that's why. They like the thrill of hearing a man, and especially a woman, sentenced to be hanged by the neck until he or she is dead, and they do not trouble much to listen to the prayer that the Lord shall have mercy on the soul of the condemned. It is the same impulse which makes apparently decent men and women congregate outside a prison on the morning of an execution. They want to get as near to the throttling as they can!

How much of our interest in crime and criminals springs from old race habits and sentiments left in us by the rough and less civilised life of man? The early literature of many peoples glorifies bloodshed and rapine. Naturally people are more interested in a daring crime than in matters of high culture. Until recently men's lives have been subject to danger. In the criminal, people vicariously experience the thrill of danger. There is just enough of the rebel in us to respond with interest to the anti-social activities of the gangster.

Those ingenuous souls who bewail the licensing of these types of films, deplore their exhibition, and suggest their being banned, grievously suffer from mental myopia and psychological ignorance. Such people wrongly believe that the mere viewing of murder, violence, and crime at the cinema will directly or indirectly stimulate passions to such an extent that onlookers will be liable to go and do likewise. First, it has to be noted that in the adult—the subject of children will be dealt with later—the character is fully formed and the personality is not thus swayed. We may have our strong aggressive instincts, but we have also many acquired contrary inhibiting and controlling forces that obviate our being anti-social in our thought and conduct. We may be murderers and criminals at heart, but in fact we remain law-abiding citizens. Secondly, we are the less likely to imitate the screen villain because unwittingly he relieves us of our deep-seated impulses, because we project our aggression into his actions and thus find an outlet for our kindred emotions, and as a scapegoat we glory in his final undoing. Much the same may be said concerning the flood of crime and murder novels that the modern publisher puts upon the market. It is true, of course, that those who have a basic anti-social character, or who, for any reason, possess a morbid lack of

inhibition, may find in the gangster film an added stimulus to wrong-doing, as they may in many other environmental circumstances. This, however, is beside the point, as we are not examining the screen effects on abnormal types, but only upon the average picture-goer.

Our educationalists, nevertheless, quite rightly, in the main leave their animadversions directed to the baneful effects of the pictures upon children and those in the adolescent stage. There can be nothing more important than character formation, and all modern psychological research points to the fact that it is the manifold influences during the formative years that really matter. The adult is but the product of his past. Given a healthy and a rightly directed emotional environment during the youthful period, there will tend to be such a stability of the mental make-up that subsequent noxious or warping agencies are more or less impotent to have ill-effects.

Amidst the myriad and one factors that must enter into any consideration of the wide subject of mental hygiene, an inquiry into the influence that the modern film may have upon the younger generation is assuredly of paramount importance. So many well-meaning individuals with but a limited mental horizon not infrequently in this respect vilify the cinema, dogmatically taking it for granted that any juvenile delinquency or deviation from the normal has its source in prevalent picture-going. Jumping to conclusions superficially is an all-prevailing tendency of mankind. The average adult is only too apt to presume that the child's reactions are on a par with his own, but the child is not merely a vest-pocket edition of his elders.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the subject with a more critical eye and endeavour to discover the true facts relating to the effects of cinema attendance on the young as revealed by psychological investigation. In this way we may determine whether pictures really influence children in any direction; whether their conduct, ideals, and attitudes are thus affected; whether their emotions are harmfully excited. A study of these questions has been pursued by more than one educational authority in this country, but in America it has been carried out on highly scientific practical lines. The former study has not the same value as the latter, since the deductions were made only by questioning the

children in order to form some estimate of their taste in pictures and the intellectual and moral consequences of their cinema attendance. Nevertheless, on the whole, the resulting judgments are fairly in agreement.

At the outset, it would be idle to deny that children are in some way profoundly affected by what they see on the films. Such effects may only be very temporary or more permanent, depending upon the individual mental soil and the frequency of the cinema visits. It has been a matter of surprise how much of the details of a picture can be recalled by them six weeks or three months afterwards, and the slow curve of forgetting is very striking. This was especially so where there were scenes of conflict, danger, or tragedy. This evidence of the mental impression made is most marked between the ages of six and twelve years, it is decidedly less between the ages of thirteen and eighteen, and in adolescents of older growth it is noted much less, probably because there is in them some tendency to be conscious of the unreality of what is seen. It is, however, instructive and interesting to find that when the pictures have mainly dealt with romantic and erotic themes, those of the younger group are least emotionally affected and the response only becomes prominent when puberty is well established. In those of tender years fright is not infrequently engendered by certain types of films, and, though commonly this result is short-lived and would only materially affect a nervous child, there would be universal agreement that such pictures were unsuitable for the very young. It has been said, and with a large element of truth, that children are prone to accept as true and proper what they see on the screen, and that in this way good or bad ambitions may be powerfully stirred and permanent high or low ideals formed. Very frequent cinema attendance would undoubtedly constitute a potent factor in these directions. Yet it must be realised that the attitudes and character-building of children are the products of many influences—temperament, early environment, past experiences, family ideals, the school, and the community, and that one may modify or neutralise the other. According to the varying mental soil, the same picture may influence different children in directly opposite ways.

The presumed dangers of youthful picture-going are in the

main related to unhealthy sex stimulation, the incitement to delinquency and anti-social conduct and the more general one of the setting up of false ideals in life. Though children are very suggestible, these apprehensions partly arise from the lack of appreciation that children live in a children's, not an adult's world, and what is seen is not viewed with a matured mind. What they do not understand means little or nothing to them. The banning of films dealing with erotic life is more or less needless to those under sixteen. The school-child is frankly bored by them, and the unanimous response of the members of a large school to the question as to what pictures they disliked was, 'I hate love films.' Grown-up embracing and kissing was regarded as 'silly.' There is no evidence that there could be any deleterious effects on them by attending this type of adult picture.

With the adolescent over sixteen it is quite a different matter. From the theoretical point of view, the budding man or woman may be somewhat temporarily excited by frequent sex appeal, and adolescence must be recognised as likely to be a stage of emotional instability. Nevertheless, this need not cause any anxiety in the case of a normally constituted youth; and in no way are we taking the unstable or abnormal into consideration. In fact, as Edgar Dale in his study of motion pictures truly says:

In the case of adolescents the pictures seem a logical place in which to become acquainted with some of the problems which they have to face as an adult. If these problems are realistically and truthfully presented they may aid in the solution of life's problems to come.

The presentation of the art of love-making upon the screen may thus serve a healthy and useful purpose, for it may be asked with some reason whether divorce might not be lessened if before marriage youth knew more of the love problems they would encounter.

Thus, it is seen that when we discuss the psychological effects of erotically tinged films upon the younger generation, the reaction upon the immature child and the adolescent must be distinctly differentiated. As the films have a very high educative value for the young and constitute one source of fixing and further establishing their behaviour patterns, it is naturally desirable that a higher cultural level of presentation

should be aimed at. It is in connexion with the possible harm that may accrue to the young from witnessing pictures dealing with vice and crime that most apprehension has arisen. On the surface such an assumption would seem valid and would account for the modern increase in juvenile delinquency and crime. The gangster type of film, of course, has an enormous appeal. What was said when we were dealing with the adult interest in such pictures applies here also. The deep aggressive instincts of the mind thus find some satisfaction, but in the average child there is only the gratificatory outlet in imagination and not in action or incentive to action. Apart from this, if, from an educative point of view, life is to be portrayed, crime must be considered. In fact, it might even be said that if in such pictures there was presented a truthful and accurate account of happenings which showed causes and consequences in a large social sense, it might aid the solution of juvenile crime problems. On the other hand, if a youth already has a delinquent taint through early warping influences, crime pictures may have a deleterious effect in aggravating the impulses to minor anti-social conduct and in the tendency to adapt the cues to criminal action. The 'easy money' and luxury so often shown can leave potent memories which may have an evil influence. In America young gangsters have stated that when business was dull they went to see crime pictures to be 'pepped up' and get inspiration and encouragement and to learn new methods for their work. In this country, however, such considerations need carry little weight in dealing with our own youthful population.

When we come to the practical findings of educational authorities and psychological students of delinquency who have carefully investigated the effects of cinema attendance upon children, it is seen that the supposed evils and harm to character development are mainly non-existent, or at the most of small significance. A recent report of the London County Council Education Committee, founded upon an inquiry into the emotional reactions of 21,280 children, goes to show that this is true. It was regarded as well established that morally questionable elements in films reserved for adults were ignored by those of school age, and that the element which the adult would most deprecate to be put before

children only bored them and that no widespread mischief was noted. Apart from some temporary fright caused by fearful incidents on the screen, there was no evidence of any resulting harm or any of imitative misconduct. Some teachers have even spoken of picture attendance as increasing the children's store of knowledge and making them more alert.

Dr. Cyril Burt, whose psychological studies of children and their delinquencies are well known, states that

the influence of the cinema is one of the most popular explanations for the mischievous exploits of the young. Thirty years ago it was the penny dreadful that was blamed. The notion that the young may be tempted to imitate any crime he sees upon the screen is seldom borne out by the actual facts. More frequently theft is undertaken to get money to go to the cinema.

Apart from the possible influences of sex and crime, it is likely enough true, as Dr. Burt continues, that

the most serious danger of the cinema lies in its more subtle and elusive influences. The usual picture house programme presents to the child a grossly perverted view of human life and false but cheaply fascinating ideals. Existence is depicted as an almost unceasing round of excitement, frivolity, and fun. Intrigue, flirtation, lawless enterprise, and adroit deceit, are set before him surrounded with a halo of fictitious glamour. Still there is a good side. The cinema is an alternative to mischievous amusement and it has reduced hooliganism.

There seems little doubt but that, from the psychological point of view, one should adversely criticise the fact that there tends to be too great a divorce from reality and an over- and an under-emphasis of certain elements in the majority of pictures. In a large measure the characters, problems, and settings are remote from the persons who view them. Stress on wealth and luxury is not an ideal, though one can well understand that to escape in imagination from the drabness of life the average audience finds compensatory gratification in this atmosphere.

The cinema of the future has a very definite and serious rôle to play in the political, economic, and artistic education of the people. There are already indications that a higher level of cultural film is being aimed at. For a large section of the community the pictures will always, to some extent, constitute a refuge into a dream-world, but, nevertheless, as

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Mr. Lambert in *For Filmgoers only* says, 'instead of trying to prevent people seeing harmful films, employ the energy in trying to help them to see better ones.' A general raising of the intellectual and artistic standards of the cinema will assuredly be a mentally hygienic step. The pictures can render satisfying social service as art only when they come to be created for differentiated audiences. As children's literature has been provided, so the problem of children's pictures should be faced. At present they are only made for adults, and during the past three years the proportion of 'A' films has increased 20 per cent. It does not come within one's purview here to criticise the censorial duties involved in differentiating the pictures which shall have an 'A' or 'U' certificate, but it may be remarked that it has been clearly shown that, apart from the not very common frightening films, any unhealthy mental effect is much more likely to accrue after the age of sixteen than before. Steps have already been taken to organise special film shows for children, and in the future a growing demand should call forth the supply.

C. STANFORD READ.

CHEESE AND BEER AND WINE

By OSBERT BURDETT

MR. C. LOUIS LEIPHOLDT, F.R.C.S., whose concise, learned, and wise *Common Sense Dietetics*, published in 1911, is long overdue for reprinting, is remarkable in his profession for never being deceived about the limits of our knowledge of dietetics: a pseudo-science so soon as it oversteps the humble ground of prescribing, or forbidding, certain specified foods for certain specified physical conditions. He knows that our 'little learning' of the chemistry of food, of its metabolism, of the mystery of assimilation, is really 'a dangerous thing' once we are tempted to generalise for the healthy, and therefore that 'dietetics' become the happy hunting-ground of those cheerfully assertive persons whom Dr. Leipholdt divided into the 'systematists' and the 'faddists.' In sum, on the subject of diet we know extremely little, but on the art—and medicine is as much an art as a science—of dining we have inherited the wisdom of centuries. It may even be urged that the poverty of our memories of this real knowledge explains the eagerness of many to follow the dictates of the 'faddists' or the 'systematists,' and that a return to good sense requires the recovery of the 'art' of dining with its guidance, based upon a very ancient tradition, of the proper choice and combination of the foods we drink and eat.

How many of those who use the word 'sophistication,' for example, know that this word once meant to cheese-factors 'mixed or rendered impure by a foreign substance'? Though cheese has become a staple article of food, and has hundreds of varieties, of which at least 150 are available in England, this field for prudent choice, and the beverages to be enjoyed with its very many kinds, are both neglected.

For all our laboratories, their expensive equipment, their

investigation of calories, their researches into diets appropriate to such diseases as gout or diabetes, we have perhaps fallen behind the wisdom of the *Complete Housewife or Accomplished Gentlewoman's Companion* (1736), which affirms: 'For two thousand years and upwards food and physick were one and the same thing.' We have even forgotten that right food and appropriate drink are also the preventive medicine of the well, and that it is by the study of this agreeable medicine that health is maintained and the help of the doctor uncalled for.

If we go wrong in this alphabet, we start off-the-rails, as anyone can see who pays attention to the sights to be seen in our shops. Who that observes his fellow-shoppers, for example, fails to be astonished at the extra pence grudged in the butchers' shops for English meat by, especially, women that think nothing of spending upon patent medicines an equivalent number of shillings at the chemist's, next door, every week? Again, those who spend eighteenpence on half a bottle of honest French *vin ordinaire* are proclaimed extravagant and luxurious, while the exclaimer himself will cheerfully disburse the same sum upon petrol for every unnecessary twenty miles. The addict of petrol has his reward, which is constipation—a state very profitable to vendors of patent medicines, whose enormously expensive concoctions are largely rendered superfluous by those who eat and drink with wisdom and enjoy exercise (not merely movement on wheels) in the open air. The wine-drinker is likewise rewarded, by good health and good fellowship, and by that daily communion with reality which is as present, though as much beyond chemical analysis, in wine as it is in poetry. (One would like to put in a good word for water; but pure water is unknown in urban areas, where, by the time of its reaching the tap, it has been doctored, I am told, by such things as sulphate of copper and ammonia, submitted to the chemical influence of miles of lead or other pipes, and been the victim of a plumber's change so extensive that those responsible for urban water supply speak unashamedly of pure water as 'raw water.' Urban water, in short, has become a 'mineral beverage.' It is wiser and more wholesome to drink honest beer and honest wine.) One of the implied lessons of Dr. Leipholdt's fascinating book, which

as surely deserves immortality as Thomas Walker's *Art of Dining*, is that good sense and fitness are found more frequently upon the wine- than the water-drinker's side.

But food is the spouse for whom drink is the lover; and England is no longer, in the strict sense, a country of the vine. There were, once, vineyards in Gloucestershire. More than one old house in Chelsea has a grape-bearing vine, the lovely little berries of which make excellent dessert usually in the month of November. In England, whose vines now are the aromatic bitters called hops, we are more interested in food of the two partners, as the popular idiom testifies with a cheer, not yet dying, for 'the roast beef of Old England.'

The cheaper staple, English cheese, poor man's blessing and connoisseur's delight, is, however, in danger of perishing. Virtually every county had, and many fortunately still have, one famous and other worthy local cheeses: Somerset (Cheddar), Dorset (Blue Vinny), Wiltshire (Wilts), Lancashire (so known), Cheshire (the red and the white-turning-blue), Derbyshire (Farmers' Derby), Leicestershire (Stilton and Leicester), Yorkshire (Wensleydale and Cotherstone), Gloucestershire (Double Gloucester, white there but red in London, and Single Gloucester, which is white), and Wales (with its Caerphilly) are the chief. And these are only our hard and semi-hard cheeses: the little cream cheeses, and some more local still¹ to be found at Brechin, and near Holyhead, or in Charnwood Forest, are fortunately still putting up a struggle against the milk combines. These necessarily destroy local cheeses by purchasing, for the use of their own factories, the local milk from which (after curdling by rennet) cheese is made.

Thus, now is the time to rally to one of the most tasty and nourishing of English foods, to help local industries by asking for local cheeses, and, in the interests of health and enjoyment, by considering the liquor best suited to each cheese.

In discussing them summarily here, the reader must remember that the genuine local cheeses are alone considered (unless otherwise stated), and the way to distinguish the local from the inferior factory products cannot be repeated from

¹ See *Here's England*, by Dorothy Hartley (Rich and Cowan, 1934, 9s.).

A Little Book of Cheese, to which inquirers are referred.² The general preliminary caution is to beware of midget morsels wrapped in foil; for, with the exception of cream cheeses that are usually small, and never, I think, exceed 1 lb. in weight, English cheeses are noble fellows—a Stilton weighing usually 15 lb., a Cheddar or a Cheshire up to 40 lb.; while a Gruyère often reaches 1½ cwt.

Except for a few unfortunates who find cheese indigestible, the old adage remains true—that ‘Cheese digests everything except itself, and bread digests cheese.’ Good bread, though uncommon in our towns—because the odd effect of Government inspection has been to safeguard weight, but not proper baking, so that much inspected bread is really a semi-sodden mass of under-cooked dough—can be found with a little trouble even in London. With the fourteen English cheeses here named off-hand, and with beer—that, despite taxation and interference descending from that which, about a century ago, turned the Scots into spirit drinkers through the excise imposed upon home-brewed ale, to the righteous indignation of Robert Burns—the elements of a wholesome, cheap, and nourishing diet are at our elbows.

But how do these combine, and which goes best with which? Bread and cheese and bitter, if worthy of their noble ancestry, which is beyond all record, are a simple feast for any man in his senses. Dr. Leipholdt confirmed the traditional verdict on cheese and beer in combination by two self-experiments still worth recording. Of cheese he wrote:

Cheese is a form of food in which fat is combined with a relatively high percentage of proteid. It is one of the foods that has the highest nutritive value, but it is very questionable whether the proteid of Cheese is easily assimilated, even though some of the cream cheeses are readily digested.

Toasted cheese [Lancashire is ideal for toasting], and the addition of grated cheese to soups and vegetables served *au gratin*, are excellent ways of varying this form of food; but served in this manner Cheese is not readily digested, and the cook must therefore be sparing in the use of this article. On the other hand, Cheese served as a *fondue* or *soufflé* is easily dealt with by the stomach.

And how deliciously it ‘melts without mushiness’ in the mouth.

Because, then, some people cannot digest cheese in bulk,

² *A Little Book of Cheese*, by Osbert Burdett (Gerald Howe, 1935, 3s. 6d.).

for other than those who live and work in the open air there may be good reason for reserving cheese until the end of a meal. The place at which cheese is served at a meal largely determines, of course, the liquor that should be drunk with it.

For a whole meal of bread and cheese, bitter is perfection. A luncheon on bread and cheese and beer alone is presumably hungry, thirsty, and with little to spend. Consequently, he wants the most satisfying, nourishing, and tasty of foods, and the pleasantest and most wholesome of thirst-quenchers. The edge to the flavour of true Cheddar or Cheshire marries the beer that, as the word bitter implies, has the complementary edge in the tankard. True Cheddar means a cheese that has matured *after* ripening for a year in a good cheeseman’s cellar; and for true Cheshire—a more crumbly, drier, but excellent alternative—beer, too, is the destined mate. Though beer is a ‘long drink,’ not intended to be sipped as wine is, a mouthful is called for by each morsel of cheese.

But when cheese is not the staple dish in a meal, it is served as a single course at the end, occasionally at the very beginning, of luncheon or dinner. (Last week a hostess treated us to a tiny cheese *soufflé* as the opening course to a luncheon. With this a glass of her Graves went very pleasantly indeed, for the Graves, of course, was a dry wine, since the sweet wines are fit only for the more mild cream cheeses. This departure from English custom could be imitated with advantage, and everyone present responded to it.)

Cheese, however, is usually served at or near the end of dinner, either virtually as a sweet (the cream cheeses), or as a hot savoury (toasted cheese), or as the most fitting mate for the finest of the wines (Stilton or Wensleydale). We should, in fact, protest against the banishment of cheese from most public dinners, and refuse to sit silent under the ices that in most large hotels and restaurants have ousted it—as Mr. J. Lewis May very sensibly argued in the *Observer* two months ago (October 20).

In autumn, with Christmas at hand, toasted cheese, a more savoury and richer dish than uncooked cheese, ought to be served more often than it is. Toasted cheese is right for this season, when, in Shakespeare’s phrase, ‘it is an eager and a nipping air,’ and when the sound of roasting

crabs 'hissing' in the bowl cheered him so famously. For toasted cheese is hot when we are cold, is rich when we are hungry, and for it something weightier than bitter is required. Burton,³ the name for beer stronger than bitter, or that which is termed 'old ale' or 'strong ale,' is the right partner.

The effect, however, of drinking beer with food is sometimes debated. Dr. Leipholdt writes:

Medical men are perfectly well aware of the fact that under- and improper feeding are accountable for far more misery and suffering than drink causes. [Secondly,] Good beer, of a light alcoholic strength, is almost an ideal beverage with a simple meal for those who like its taste. The slight amount of bitter that it contains is a direct digestive stimulant, and the small percentage of carbohydrate that it possesses has a real food and fuel value . . . essentially a thirst-quencher, and as such far preferable to the majority of aerated temperance drinks flavoured with essences and sweetened with saccharine. [Thirdly,] The writer carried out some experiments to test the relative digestion time of a simple meal consumed, in the one case with milk, and in the other with beer. . . .⁴

The tests were made on different days and under identical conditions, the stomach contents being examined four hours after the meal had been eaten. In the first case it was found that the meal was not yet digested; in the second digestion was almost complete. . . . A similar series of experiments carried on with milk and fruit diet, in comparison with a plain diet with light wines, showed clearly that, under certain conditions, the addition of a moderate quantity of alcohol appears to aid digestion.

But, we must qualify, the word 'alcohol' should never be used in a gastronomic context; for 'alcohol' would not produce this beneficial effect, and to call either wine or beer 'alcohol' is as foolish as it would be to invite one's aunt to come at five o'clock to-morrow afternoon and take a cup of tannin. Dr. Leipholdt knows this as well as anybody, but, his book having evidently been intended primarily for those who do not know it, he tactfully preferred to use the idiom cherished by them. From these experiments we may pass to the humaner learning.

The English cheeses that go best at the end of dinner are the majestic—Stilton or Wensleydale, or Double Gloucester, since these marry most fitly with fine vintage wines, with (not to be too ambitious) a Burgundy of 1915, a Bordeaux of 1920; the claret, being less full-bodied, seems to reach its

³ *A Book about Beer*, by A Drinker (Cape, 1934, 3s. 6d.).

⁴ *Op cit.*, pp. 140-141.

stature sooner than a Burgundy of corresponding virtue—at least, this is so with those imported here and not drunk upon the spot. And a mature Blue Cheshire can be mentioned in the same august company as the preceding English three. Gruyère, an acquired taste, though one very well worth acquiring, does not, I think, go so well with red wine as with white, and its ascetic flavour, perfect in its own kind, is better set off by a crisper wine—for example, a fine Moselle—but not one of the more scented. It might mate with one of the less luscious Madeiras; and Madeira is the benediction to a good dinner—the last grace and graciousness of farewell.

Perfect as is Camembert, if you get the genuine, with the label '*Syndicat des Fabricants de véritable Camembert de Normandie*' (which, I rejoice to add, is stocked by the Civil Service Stores in the Strand), and find it in the right condition of semi-ooziness—an even more difficult matter—and pluperfect as is Brie, when this, too, is a whole cheese (not a miserable section) and also *coulant*, I still do not think that they surpass our great English blue cheeses in communion with the great vintage wines. With port—a Taylor's 1896, if you can get it, or a 1908—I cannot believe that there is anything finer than Stilton. Wensleydale has just that difference which indicates a claret for its spouse. The distinction is, I think, comparable to that which distinguishes claret from Burgundy.

But we must not forget the ladies. If we would wean them from an addiction to sweets without denying them their pleasure, the cream cheeses providentially exist to form the bridge. These cream cheeses of England range in flavour from that of a transfigured butter to that of the mysterious sweetness in the sour. For example, the Victoria—exclusive, I think, to Messrs. Cadbury Pratt, though the now vanished New Forest, half a Victoria, used to be upon the general market—is superlative, and the Guildford supplied by Messrs. Paxton & Whitfield is admirable. These, gentle both, would be enhanced by a good Moselle, or by one of those excellent hocks, the '29's, that are within the reach of everybody. Ladies generally prefer the milder flavoured cheeses, and Mrs. Pennell recommends for the conclusion of a meal 'Port Salut, with its soothing suggestion of monastic peace'—it was first made by the Trappists; and my only

demur is that those imported here often seem to have lost their subtlety and to possess a flavour at the vanishing point. A convenient variant to Port Salut is Pont-L'Évêque among French cheeses, and Bel Paese among Italian. Both have a somewhat elastic texture and both have pin-holes therein, and are so mild that no one could be afraid of their flavour. Being such, they would quail before a great wine, but they go excellently with Italian, an Est Est Est or a good white Orvieto for example, though only the latter seems to be exported to this country.

For those—and what cheese-lover would quarrel with them?—who set most store by a fully matured Cheddar I can recommend as an alternative the excellent Italian mare's milk cheese, Cacciocavallo. This is like a good, though not a great, Cheddar, but with an edge to it. It would go well with an 'old ale'; and let us remember that there are old ales of a quality comparable to liqueurs, as those know well who have had the privilege of sipping 'All Souls' Audit' in the original silver tumblers—real tumblers, weighted at the bottom, so that, in the words of the collect, they always, after rocking, 'stand upright'—or the marvellously potent 'Ten Guinea' ale made by Usher, of Wiltshire.

The potency of these ales and the pungency of Cacciocavallo lead us to the flavours of certain German cheeses, to be had in Charlotte Street, W., at which, I fear, an insular nose might be in great indignation, as Shakespeare says. Nevertheless, believing we should be Good Europeans and transcend a too insular view of all good creatures, I would venture a word on a cheese very strange to us: Feiner Harzer. This is small and cushion-shaped (like an English cream cheese in this one thing only), the colour of a grey jelly, and with a savour of decay both in its aroma and in its taste. It would, I think, crown the right type of German meal, with *sauerkraut* and *schweinefleisch* perhaps, but could not be imported into an English or a French repast. I found it go best with Bath Oliver biscuits, and cannot think it could mate with anything but a beer exceptionally full of courage; or lager.

It is mentioned here merely to suggest the opportunities for variety and experiment that we too often ignore; but there is a modest innovation that could perhaps be found acceptable. This is to serve a cream cheese in place of a

sweet, and to follow this with a very savoury cheese, of which none meets the purpose better than Double Gloucester. Its tiniest morsel is pregnant with savour; and in days when housewives have difficulties with servants, and naturally do not wish to cook the meal that they are to grace themselves, surely two cheeses requiring no preparation, and themselves honest and delicious, are infinitely preferable to two horrors from a tin? With the cream cheese a Sauterne would go charmingly, and with the succeeding savoury Double Gloucester a claret, a Madeira, or a port. If only the ladies would realise the charms and variety of cheese—and none has here been mentioned which is not readily accessible in London—and would set their faces against anything from a tin and against most food or fruit that is imported, our luncheons and dinners would be far more wholesome, far more tasty, far more enjoyable, and far easier to prepare. But is not this combination of qualities precisely that which nowadays they seek? The women who aver that they 'do not like cheese' forget the variety at their doors, ignore the cream cheeses that are virtually sweets, and deprive themselves and the disgruntled men—who have to rely on their clubs for any cheeses worth eating—of a common pleasure that can be had for next to nothing at home and causes nobody the smallest trouble. The best savoury is cheese straws.

Cheese also solves the question of an original present for weddings, for Christmas, for the sick, and for the well. If I may confide a secret that has been welcomed by its recipients, I always give the same wedding present: a parcel of wine, usually a château-bottled '24, and, alas—for this should not be—it is usually unique among the gifts. Similarly, a really good cream cheese, or a portion of one of those named above, is found to be appreciated on less formal occasions. It is also the boast of a friend that a relative of his sends him every Christmas a whole Stilton, and, whether on patriotic or on gastronomic grounds, that relative has long set a noble example. The thoughtless resort to hampers chosen by some shop. The discriminating prefer to choose themselves and to give their present the personal *cachet* of their own taste and experience.

There is no doubt whatever that Quality does not survive mass production, machinery excepted; that to import, to

refrigerate, and to preserve affects quality, not of flavour only, but of nutriment ; that there is no more expensive 'economy' than to economise in food ; that those who so 'economise' pay heavily in chemist's bills and obscure ills in middle life ; and that to eat English meat, English fruit, and English cheese is a counsel of health, beside being the proper encouragement of that persecuted Cinderella, English agriculture. The maintenance of this, both as against imports from abroad and soulless combines at home, is perhaps the most urgent need of the present day. The old Cheshire saying 'Cheat and the Cheese will show' is still a warning that we cannot afford to disregard.

Certain cautions may be welcome. Cheddar, Wensleydale, Stilton, Blue Cheshire, all the big cheeses, are now being made also in diminutive sizes. None of these are worthy of the great names they have assumed, for size has a vital relation to quality, and these midgets are both very inferior themselves and will not mature or improve by keeping. The grocers may deny this, but experience is decisive against them. All cheeses, even Stiltons, can now be bought by the pound, so that the purchaser in want of a small quantity can get a cut from a real cheese without difficulty. Stiltons are not improved by doses of port. If eaten with zest, there is no danger of them drying. Thirdly, Camemberts and Bries, if hard when bought, can be nursed into semi-ooziness by being kept in a damp cloth in a relatively warm temperature. Fourthly, to make a good cheese *soufflé*, a mixture of Gruyère and Parmesan is better than the latter alone.

OSBERT BURDETT.

WALKS AND TALKS

By SIR ARNOLD WILSON, M.P.

FOR some months past there has been much talk of, and some protests against, the declared intention of the London County Council to build a housing estate on 30 acres of playing-fields on the outskirts of North London—a very dangerous precedent. I was anxious to find out what those who use these open spaces thought. One Saturday afternoon the opportunity came. Half a dozen young men in football kit on their way back to Stratford entered my compartment at Lea Bridge. I asked them what they thought about it all. 'All politics,' said one. 'If anyone would come and look at the ground, they would see that nearly half of it is no good for anything as it stands. An open space is no good as a lung of London if you can't play on it in the winter and lie down on it in the summer. Look at Walthamstow Marshes, opposite the old "Hope and Anchor"! Nothing has been done to it since the Flood.' 'Which flood?' I asked, for the fields are notoriously subject to floods most years. 'Adam's Flood,' said the youth. 'Noah's Flood you mean,' interjected a better informed youth. 'Adam didn't make the Ark.' 'That's all very well,' remarked the first speaker; 'you need an ark to get about these playing-fields in winter. Ditches which date from before the railway, which cut up the ground and spoil it for everything, and a lot of coarse grass which no one bothers to cut, and no one ever thought of dressing the top with a few tons of lime to give the turf a chance.'

'And there's no shelters,' said a third. 'Nowhere where you can hang up a coat or park your best girl while playing. And as for children and babies—they don't get a look in.'

I pointed out that the London County Council did not control the Walthamstow Marshes. 'It is time they did,' came back the chorus, 'or let somebody take it over and run

it properly. See how hard it is to get to the fields! Only one foot-bridge over the Lea in a couple of miles. We ought to have a foot-bridge that cyclists can use—running along the railway from Clapton Station. It would all be done soon enough if town councillors played football. But they don't; they go about in motor cars at week-ends, and keep their job by writing to the papers about playing-fields.'

A few days later, between trains, I walked over the ground myself and reached conclusions substantially identical with those expressed by the young statesmen in shorts. I commend their ideas to the councillors, of whom they spoke with such scant respect. But they will not find it easy to reach the spot in their motor cars, and they will get their feet wet more than once.

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Of the many *clichés* which pass, like false coins, among the thoughtless, none is less true than the reference to our age as 'materialistic.' Armistice Day observances prove the contrary. The now customary symbolism is our very own, and it has been spontaneously enriched. In no village is it forgotten: no church is without its service of remembrance. Outside Westminster Abbey the ordered field of tiny crosses placed by loving hands, each bearing the name of one who was loved and is not forgotten, arouses feelings deeper than the most majestic ceremonial. Here, and at the grave of the Unknown Soldier, we reach the heights; yet it is well that on November 11 the stone itself is hidden by the poppies cast thereon. The inscription of a committee is not inspired. It is tautological and verbose. In place of the four texts from Holy Writ that overcrowd the margins, one would have sufficed:

And they buried him . . . among the kings, because he had done good toward God, and toward his house. (II. Chron. xxiv. 16.)

As I left the Abbey through the cloisters on the morning of November 12 a couplet from Milton's Ode to Shakespeare rose to my lips:

And so sepulchred in such pomp dost lie,
That kings for such a tomb would wish to die.

* * * * *

It is quite impossible to-day for a member of Parliament between the date of his adoption and the polls—in the case of

the last election nine days, of which one was a Sunday—to show himself to more than 5 per cent. of the electors in any ordinary urban or rural constituency. Take a typical electorate of nearly 60,000, resident in six towns and some fifty small villages covering eighty-seven parishes. If the candidates begin their rounds a week before they are formally adopted and hold three meetings a night; if the weather is good and they address crowded audiences on every occasion (which is almost never the case), they may each be seen in the flesh by not more than 3000 electors. The wireless is not open to a candidate: he cannot attempt to solicit votes in person from door to door; for that he must rely upon his supporters. Faced with this uphill task he can only, in the language of the 126th psalm, 'go forth on his way weeping and bearing forth good seed,' and hope for the best. The local Press will give prominence to his speeches as well as to those of his opponent and can be relied upon not to distort the arguments of either side. The candidate who is already known has, of course, an immense advantage over the new arrival. In a rural constituency the side that has most cars to carry voters to the polling-stations—some sixty in number over an area of 200 square miles in my case—doubtless has a certain advantage, though no voter would hesitate, I hope, to use a car bearing the colours of one candidate in order to take him to the polls to vote for the other, and drivers of cars had, in my case, instructions to make this plain.

Such are some of the reflections of a candidate as he speeds through the night down dark lanes to a succession of brightly lighted schools and village-halls to address small groups of men and women. Should he take their silence for consent to his policies? Should he cut short his speech—which cannot in all last more than twenty minutes, for he has other meetings before him—in order to give time for questions? The meeting has been in progress for some time before he arrives. What has the chairman said? There is no time to ask. The rural voter, for all his good manners, is as good a judge as any townsman of any domestic issue, and often better able to formulate a plain question. Here are some specimens culled between November 1 to 14:

If there is to be an armaments race, will the second or even the first in the race be better off than the last?

If land-workers are to be insured against unemployment, will not farmers, under stress of competition with each other, stand men off whenever the weather is bad, or work slack, instead of keeping them on, as most of them do now, all the year round?

Will there be a different rate of benefit and contribution for the higher paid cowman and shepherd, who has a real steady job, and for the lower paid farmhand, who cannot rely upon steady employment.

(From a Tynesider.) No Government can do anything for the place where I come from till it gets rid of the moth-eaten lot of laggards [he used another word which rhymes with it] who run the local councils. [Loud cheers from his fellows.] What do you say about that?

(At the village of Lilley, near Luton.) How is it that they make laws in this country for everybody but the Crown lands? Why should they bring an agreement along and say 'Put your name to this,' and put the rents up? What is the good of laws which apply to some and not to others? Can you tell me why the Housing Acts don't apply to the Crown lands?

What will happen when Italy leaves the League?

I snatched an hour between meetings to call upon a Durham miner, married, with two children, who had found employment in the South just outside my constituency. He was just back from work and was sitting in the warm kitchen beside a fire with one child on his knee, the teapot on the hob close by, and his wife washing the baby in a tub by the fire. But we were old friends, and I was welcomed with real cordiality. They had settled down well. He was on piece-work with a good mate from his own northern village. Work was steady and he was saving a bit, but would take a week off at Christmas to go home. He was thinking of bringing his brother down. A Tynesider was worth two of his neighbours. These southerners were not to his liking. Good workers, but unfriendly, and gossip—'you would not believe how unkind are their tongues!' The district nurse was a jewel. The parson was friendly. The landlord was a bit difficult and did not want him to keep a dog, because, in a row of seven cottages, neighbours complained of noise. He was going to buy a tandem bicycle with a side-car. Could I tell her, asked the wife, how to get yeast in these parts, as she had always baked her own bread and did not think soft baker's bread was good for 'the childer.' I was able to give her the information.

This is industrial transference in practice. I foresee a great future for local societies of Tynesiders, Yorkshiremen,

and other expatriated tribesmen. This family had found many friends, but every one of them was an immigrant from the North. So strong, in spite of all levelling tendencies, is the force of environment and home.

* * * * *

It was a quiet election. My opponent and I often left by the same train and compared notes. It was clear that not more than 1 per cent. of the electors, say 600 in all, were likely to have heard us both. 'Like going to church,' observed a supporter; 'people only go to listen to the man who preaches what they think they believe in.' We were heard with courtesy everywhere, cross-examined almost always with good humour, and harried alike by *questionnaires* from earnest societies in London, or by their members in the constituency. We, and our respective wives, addressed circular letters to all electors, who also received accurate instructions as to where to poll, how to mark a polling-paper, and when a car would call for them. One set of devoted helpers made a door-to-door pilgrimage to ask for votes. Another, at the polling-booth, checked the lists to make sure that all the sheep entered the fold, and rounded up, as the day wore on, the wanton creatures who remained outside, though unable, of course, to say how they would vote.

* * * * *

Now that the election is over public interest necessarily centres upon the constitution of the new Cabinet. Mr. Baldwin's recommendations will have been approved by the King before this Review is published. Some will hope that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald will find a place again at the Prime Minister's right hand. His courage in contesting Seaham did much to hearten supporters of the National Government in the North-East of England and elsewhere, and as the author of the first National Government it is felt by some that he is in justice entitled to a place in the counsels of his successor.

He is unwilling to go to the Upper House—a man who accepts a hereditary peerage places a heavy burden upon his heirs—and custom and most, but not all, constitutional lawyers have conspired to prevent the grant of life peerages to any but judges. It is time to extend the system at least to Cabinet Ministers.

To find a safe seat in the Lower House for him would

be more difficult than for his son Malcolm (who is not his heir), and, in any case, there are those who feel that in justice to himself and Mr. Baldwin he should now retire. He can do so with honour to himself, and with a pension.

By common consent a change is necessary in the Dominions Office; Lord Halifax is anxious to be free of departmental burdens. The War Office badly needs a first-class brain to overhaul the Service from top to bottom. Co-ordination with the other Fighting Services is necessary, unless most of the money we are to spend shortly is to be wasted. And we must decide the purpose for which the Fighting Forces exist. That is not at present clear. Few will desire any change at the Ministry of Agriculture. Mr. Walter Elliot, F.R.S., will not be unseated. The present First Lord is likely to continue at the Admiralty. National Labour will be adequately represented in Mr. Baldwin's counsels by two Ministers. Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, however, cannot remain in the new Cabinet for long, unless a seat in Parliament is found for him. He is young; he has a career before him, but also a duty. That duty, I suggest, is to devote himself, for the next year or two, to making the National Labour Party a political reality. At present it is only a homogeneous fragment of a larger body, itself very liable to split again.

The outstanding feature of the election returns is the failure of National Labour to secure anything remotely approaching the representation to which it might be entitled if the mass of electors could be made to realise how closely its ambitions correspond to their aims. I have in the past two years addressed as many political meetings all over England as most private members. Nothing has impressed me more profoundly than the sound patriotism and good sense of the masses of electors—whatever the colour of the member they may elect. We must see to it that there is during the next four years no growth of party strife or bitterness. The 8,500,000 who voted against the National Government are as good Englishmen as the 11,500,000 who voted for it. They are patriotic, public-spirited, and good citizens and parents. The *intelligentsia* who have attached themselves to the Labour Opposition have done it little good. Like the flies in Æsop's fable, they buzz round the head of the oxen who draw the cart, and imagine that they are providing motive power.

• What, then, divides us? Not character, nor religion; not race, class, or occupation, nor, except in a limited degree, the position we occupy in society. What divides the two great parties can only be described as divergent and often blind loyalties and, less often, blind prejudices and blind passions. For the next four years our business must be to open each other's eyes to the great stretch of country before us which we must travel together.

The Labour Party includes the Socialist League, the Trade Unions, and the Co-operative Societies and Union. The Trade Unions have a powerful organisation: they provide most of the funds. The 'Co-ops.' have 7,000,000 members. To the fathers of the movement at Rochdale political neutrality was a vital principle: only lately have they joined forces with the Labour Party. It is an easy and natural partnership so far as the Trade Unions are concerned. With the Socialist League it is unnatural and unreal. The National Labour Party could claim with reason and logic the allegiance of all except the Socialist League. The Co-operative Societies are in reality a conservative force: they desire to own and control property for the benefit of their members. They cannot logically or in practice be in favour of 'nationalisation' as a principle. They and their followers wish to compete with the great monopolies and vested interests in the supply to the public of public needs. In this battle we should wish them well. When, however, they seek to drive the smaller shopkeeper out of business, and to obtain immunities from taxation which private business has to pay, many part company with them. If I had to choose between getting my meat or wheat or meal, my butter and bacon, or anything else from a chain store or a multiple shop, with its management and financial roots in the City and its tentacles all over the world, or to go to the 'Co-op.' shop, I would choose the latter. But if I can go to a private trader, one who runs his own business at his own risk, I will deal with him, and in fact always do so, because I believe the small shopkeeper and individual business man is one of the greatest assets the country can have. Let us not blind ourselves, then, to the place which the 'Co-ops.' can fill. They may be a bulwark against Socialism of the Communist colour: they are certainly a bulwark against 'big business' of the kind which I

fear because it is too big, and because it saps the individuality and independence of all.

The 'Co-ops.' arose as a product of the spirit of the old Friendly Societies. The Trade Unions are a much older manifestation of the same spirit. They have developed, inevitably, into a political force, but they are normally a conservative force. On balance, like other folk, they have done good—when they might have done better. The loyalty of their members has sometimes been worthy of better leaders; but let us realise that leaders and rank and file alike would revolt against Socialism of the type that is preached by the *intelligentsia* of the movement, the careerists, the dreamers, the professors, and the young people whose experience of life comes from books, not men. The 'Co-ops.' and Trade Unions alike gain in numbers, but suffer in quality, because they profess and claim to be representative of a particular set of people. They are always on the defensive or on the attack. They do not take kindly to active co-operation with other parts of our society. We must show them a better way.

Let the National Labour Party purge itself of its association with 'political and economic planning' of the sort of schemes which Lord Allen of Hurtwood and the Archbishop of York, with more enthusiasm than knowledge or experience, espouse in *The Next Five Years*, and pledge itself to a policy, not of nationalisation, but of far more widespread ownership of property; not to fewer aggregations of capital and savings, but to far more of them; not to a propertyless society, but one in which all men can own property and pass it on to their heirs without legal fuss and administrative worry with the Inland Revenue Department, which drive executors of small men to despair.

The National Government arose out of a great national movement. If it is to endure, it must have a yet wider and deeper basis. I should like to see National Labour clubs established all over England as centres of real activity, both social and political. We must once again show the world that we know how to live—in freedom, and with a unity of the spirit beneath the diversity of opinion and expression: in the words of Milton, 'Let not England forget her precedence of teaching nations how to live.'

November 21.

ARNOLD WILSON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

ARCHBISHOP DAVIDSON

Randall Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury, by G. K. A. Bell, Bishop of Chichester (Oxford University Press: 2 vols., 36s. net, 1935).

The Bishop of Chichester's Life of Archbishop Davidson is, as might be expected, a competent piece of work. It consists of more than 1400 pages; it is carefully written, abounds with information, is well arranged and excellently documented—altogether, a remarkable production by a very busy diocesan bishop.

Dr. Bell has had two great advantages in his undertaking. He was the Archbishop's domestic chaplain for many years, and he is in entire sympathy with the subject of his biography. It cannot be said that this biography, ample as it is, contributes anything of importance which is either unknown or unexpected. Davidson appears in this biography exactly as he appeared to well-informed and interested Churchmen during the last five and thirty years. But if the biography does not surprise us at any point, at least it stresses firmly and clearly the determining characteristics of Davidson's personality and the guiding principles of his policy. What, however, the biography fails to do is to decide for its reader the real significance and rank of Davidson in the line of our English Primates.

Some forty years ago I was scrutinising an engraved portrait of Archbishop Tait in Bishop's Court, Auckland, New Zealand. The then Primate of New Zealand, who had been consecrated by Tait, remarked with deep conviction: 'The greatest statesman who has ever sat on the chair of Augustine.'

Ought that proud eminence to be assigned to his son-in-law, Davidson? He has been called the heir of Tait. Was

he as great a Primate? Dr. Bell relates that on one occasion Davidson was present with A. J. Balfour, Lord Rosebery and others, when what constitutes the real difference between a statesman and a politician was discussed. Balfour said a statesman is one who is 'ready to go out in rough weather.' Was Davidson ready to go out in rough weather, or ought the verdict to be passed on him which was passed on Lord Rosebery: 'Charming man, clever man, but always flinches at the critical moment'? It is extremely difficult to decide this point with conviction. Davidson's ecclesiastical position forbade him to do anything spectacular: he was a diplomatist by nature and training: he was as humble-minded as he was responsible, and dramatic actions and heroic remedies are impossible to such persons.

When the present condition of the Church of England is compared with what it was in prestige and power in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there will be a strong temptation to give the verdict against Davidson—possibly even with the mordant sentence with which Tacitus dismisses Galba: '*Omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset.*'

Davidson possessed remarkable gifts and graces. As the private chaplain and son-in-law of an Archbishop of Canterbury he rose with unexampled rapidity. As Dean of Windsor (1883) and chief ecclesiastical adviser of Queen Victoria, and successively Bishop of Rochester (1891), Bishop of Winchester (1895), Archbishop of Canterbury (1903)—a post which he held for twenty-five years—he was granted extraordinary opportunities for the use of his gifts. From the age of thirty-five to eighty—a period of nearly half a century—he had unrivalled opportunities of influencing all important ecclesiastical appointments and of assisting influentially in the shaping of Church policy. Yet what was the result? During that period the Church of England has become a declining force both in England and in the Dominions beyond the seas. It is true that during that period the Anglican Communion has developed greatly its organisation, and has improved its administrative system, but as an intellectual, moral, and spiritual force it has declined throughout the Empire. Ought not a really great Primate to have prevented this? The answer is one of profound difficulty.

Others, realising the immense difficulties he had to face

in an age of transition—intellectual, political, social, ecclesiastical—will regard him as a model of clear-headed, cautious, and capable administration. They will declare, when the Church of England, in the course of what Mr. Birrell has called 'its troublesome history,' has passed into more spacious and peaceful times and is exercising, if she ever does, a more profound and far-reaching influence on our national life, that Davidson was the pilot who weathered the storm. If it had not been for his adroit steersmanship, the ship of the Church would certainly have foundered beneath the seas of scientific agnosticism and communistic materialism, or have been shattered upon the rocks of Romanism and Fundamentalist Evangelicalism. Like the great Fabius Cunctator, he was the man who saved the situation by refusing to be hurried. It is certainly abundantly clear that he refused to be hurried, and this refusal to be hurried often allowed itself to be interpreted as weakness and lack of moral courage. An American, so the story went, said to Dean Inge on the occasion of his visit to the United States: 'I guess your Primate has taken a season ticket on the line of least resistance.' That was the impression which the Primate's policy, in the face of extreme Anglo-Catholic 'lawlessness,' gave to many. I doubt, however, whether a careful perusal of Dr. Bell's volumes will bear out this conclusion.

The Primate realised two things: first, the value of the services which the great leaders of the Anglo-Catholic movement were rendering to the Church of England; and secondly, that if the Church was to be truly and influentially comprehensive, the Oxford Movement must not be allowed to become sectarian and disloyal—it must feel that the national Church was its spiritual home. As a result, Davidson stood by the Anglo-Catholics as against the Protestant Evangelicals; and I believe history will decide that he was right there.

On more than one occasion he gave the impression that he intended to take stern disciplinary action for the suppression of liturgical lawlessness, but he never took it. The unfortunate incident which led to the resignation of that remarkable man Fr. Dolling was more of a misunderstanding than a disciplinary action. Apparently Davidson's interpretation of the interview with Fr. Dolling was as mistaken

as was Davidson's interpretation of Sir Thomas Inskip's proposal in another crucial interview. But if Davidson was weak and vacillating in his treatment of the problem of liturgical lawlessness and was eventually defeated by it, yet he showed no little courage and strength in the more difficult and dangerous Modernist controversy which followed it.

When the Anglo-Catholics, under the leadership of Dr. Gore, Lord Halifax and many others, wished the Primate to condemn and suppress the Modernists, he firmly and tactfully refused to do so. He was not a great scholar nor a profound theologian, but he recognised that the Modernist leaders were not only loyal to the Church of England, but that they had come into existence because the Church's dogmatic system presented problems which must be faced, and if possible solved, in the light of modern knowledge and modern thought. So, instead of condemning the Modernists, he judiciously set up a widely representative Commission on Doctrine which would probably have to sit for years before it issued a report, and yet, until that report was issued, Modernist teaching could not be officially condemned.

Modernists have good reason for feeling grateful to Davidson, and we believe that the Anglican Communion of the future will be no less grateful. His courage and wisdom in his treatment of this matter were of the highest order, with but one exception. I am convinced that he took the wrong line in his public reply to the Bishop of Birmingham's Open Letter in which Dr. Barnes inquired :

What steps can be taken to help . . . to fit the Church to be in the future the spiritual guide of an educated nation ? (P. 1321.)

The Primate's unfriendly reply inadvertently assisted the rejection of the Deposited Book by the House of Commons. Yet, it must be allowed that it was the Bishop's presentation of his sacramental teaching rather than his Modernism which the Primate criticised.

Here I venture to criticise, for once, Dr. Bell's impartiality. He writes that Dr. Barnes 'derided the doctrine of the Real Presence.' (P. 1320.) Dr. Barnes did nothing of the sort. He himself holds the doctrine of the Real Presence. What the Bishop condemned was materialist sacramental superstition as untrue, sub-Christian, and alien to the reformed

doctrine of the Church of England, and to the rightly spiritual interpretation of the Holy Communion.

The Primate's Modernist policy was thus summarised by himself when dealing with the conflict between himself and Bishop Gore in 1914 which could so easily have led to his resignation or that of Bishop Gore :

This specific instance is only an example of what has been a continuous and deliberate endeavour on my own part to avert putting forth by authority 'cocksure' definitions and boundary lines at a time when scientific thought and the growth of historical criticism render such action not dangerous only, but unreasonable. Under this head, therefore, I believe that I have contributed something to the maintenance and assertion of what I believe to be the true principles of thought within the Church of England and English Christianity generally. (P. 796.)

He stood manfully and consistently for the comprehensiveness of the Church of England :

This comprehensiveness, as I understand and value it, is assertible in three directions, affecting severally our boundaries of legitimate doctrinal belief, our boundaries of would-be denominational differences, our boundaries of legitimate ritual and devotional variety. (P. 795 f.)

In the matter of Prayer Book revision the Primate, while recognising the need for it, partly as a means for enriching our Church services, partly as a means for enlarging the comprehensiveness of our national Church by securing authorised departure from liturgical uniformity, does not appear to have been a real enthusiast for Prayer Book revision. He probably felt, but was too wise to say it, that the finished products of our liturgical revisers as seen in the Deposited Book could have little permanent value, and fell far below the quality of Cranmer's masterpiece. The prolongation of the process of revision he viewed with complacency, declaring that 'the longer it takes the better it will be.'

At last, when the fulness of time had come, he determined to secure its authorisation. He sought support for the measure by every conceivable device. His adroitness and diplomatic ability were never more in evidence, but he misjudged the strength of the opposition and the real feeling of the country ; his ecclesiastical entourage misled him. The Anglo-Catholics might be strong in the Church, but they were weak in the country : the verdict of the House of Commons expressed the convictions of a great mass of disgruntled

Church people whose enforced silence was misinterpreted as either helplessness or acquiescence. Many people were personally sorry for the Primate while recognising the justice of the defeat of his measure. No one now sheds any tears for its rejection, and probably the Primate accepted his double defeat with equanimity. He had done the best he could do in the circumstances. He had tried to provide what others had demanded, and their demands had been rejected. He probably felt that there had been too much haste. He certainly was not one of those 'weak men' described by John Milton who 'are for hastening things.' Slow and sure is sure to do well was his motto. Many would have said he was too slow. He would, I think, have said the opposite, and would have complained, if he had not felt it better to be silent, that those who wished to drive the machine fast were not aware either of the roughness of the roads, the steepness of the gradient, the greatness of the load, and the actual power of the machine.

Of his personal qualities there can be no controversy. He possessed in a very high degree what he claimed for Queen Victoria—'the best sort of common sense.' He was a devoted servant of the Church; delightfully simple in his manner, gentle and sympathetic in his nature—a humble and holy man of God.

The Emperor Augustus, in his old age, saw one of his grandsons reading a roll which he hastily concealed at his grandfather's approach. Augustus took it from the trembling boy. It was one of Cicero's orations. He looked at it long, and as he handed it back said: 'He was a great patriot and loved his country well.' Of Davidson all will agree. He was a great Churchman and loved and understood his Church.

He viewed the Church of England, not as a static entity, but as a dynamic process, slowly evolving and in need of the most cautious guidance. Above all things, unity and vitality must be maintained, and before advance is directed we must be quite sure of the objective, and the time spent in reconnaissance is never lost.

H. D. A. MAJOR.

ACADEMY AND ANTI-ACADEMY

The Royal Academy. A Short History of its Foundation and Development to the Present Day. By W. R. M. Lamb, C.V.O., Secretary of the Royal Academy. Illustrated. (London: Alexander MacLehose & Co., 1935, 6s. net.)

Fifty Years of the New English Art Club. With complete list of members from the beginning and three illustrations. By Alfred Thornton, Hon. Secretary. (Offices of the Club, 2, Burlington Gardens, W.1, 1935, 2s. net.)

Painters have always predominated, partly because they are really more numerous in any country than sculptors or architects, but chiefly for the reason I gave at the last meeting, namely that such a system is necessary for the receipts of the exhibition. I still think that the Academy has done great good, as far as its funds and powers permit, to the other arts also; but I take the fact as it stands; *it never was and is not now a complete representative institution of the three arts.*—SIR CHARLES EASTLAKE, P.R.A., before the Royal Academy Commission, 1863.

By the word 'Anti-Academy' I mean supplementary rather than hostile, over-against rather than against, as *antistrophe* is used in the Greek chorus, or better, as 'antibody' is used in physiology for substances in the blood called out to restore the balance of healthy functioning. Eastlake, as President of the Academy, frankly admitted that such bodies were necessary; that sculptors and architects must set up their own institutions. His evidence went further than that; a good half of English painting, the watercolour art, was originally excluded from the exhibitions, and when this rule was relaxed the watercolourists had formed their own societies, but the Academy still effectively barred the leaders by a provision in the 'Instrument'¹ (which defined R.A. functions), to the effect that no member of a society exhibiting in London could be elected an Academician. This provision had fallen somewhat into desuetude, but was prized, as self-protective, by the supplementary societies. Original black-and-white art again was left out, and Millais instanced John Leech as an example of men who ought to be admitted. Add to these branches art metal-work and other crafts,

¹ See an appendix to Mr. Lamb's book for text of this foundation document of the Royal Academy.

and it is evident how one-sided, how unrepresentative of the whole field had been the Academy's development.

Sir Charles Eastlake put his finger on the reason for this. If we read the 'Instrument' in the light of its intentions, we should expect to find an institution authoritatively directing education and appreciation in the three arts, with the additional feature of an exhibition. If such an institution had been possible, it was ruled out by the determination of the Academy not to submit to the dead-hand of the State, even 'bearing gifts'; the royal subsidy itself was outlived. But this freedom from mechanical regulation carried with it a radical distortion of the original dream. The Royal Academy, except in the memorable 'Discourses' of Reynolds, ceased to be an Academy. The Schools were a hugger-mugger affair; the students left to shift for themselves, with sporadic 'visitings'; no training for architects, and sculptors treated as 'poor relations,' with at first a restricted and congested share in the exhibition. Nor could the exhibition afford to be exemplary even for the oilpainters. The turnstiles became its regulating force; shillings and sixpences must be accumulated, and popularity, to that end, maintained. The would-be Academy became in essence a Shop, with the prestige of royal patronage, the advantage of a splendid site and in part of buildings, which sprang from that patronage, and the inclusion, always, of a considerable number of our leading painters, attracted by the R.A. title, a privileged place in the exhibition, pensions for their widows, and charitable grants for members and exhibitors.

These root-facts have to be reckoned with when the possibility of moulding the Academy into a fuller and more national institution is discussed. If popularity is an awkward guarantee of freedom, a State subsidy, giving greater independence of the turnstile and a wider range, might result in a machine-control, in the deplorable cramps and vested interests with which the system of art-teaching under the Board of Education has mortified the country.

The advantages of membership held the Academy together in its early years, but not without disruptive threats and breaks. Reynolds resigned his presidency and membership for a time; Gainsborough became disaffected and ceased to exhibit; Romney never belonged, holding by an older

society; Barry was expelled; Stubbs and Wright of Derby were elected but refused to join; Crome and Cotman were ignored. From first to last some of the greatest names have been missing from the roll: Blake in one period, most original of our artists; Alfred Stevens in another, most universal, and in the proper sense academic; Madox Brown, Rossetti, Holman Hunt of the Pre-Raphaelite moment,² Whistler and others of the next, Havard Thomas, our most learned sculptor, and Steer, our chief contemporary painter, to name no more. The architects formed their schools and their own Institute for professional regulation and defence, in emulation of Science, Medicine and Law; sculptors have twice essayed the like; painters themselves have had to join the Imperial Arts League to secure a defence of their professional interests which the Academy does not provide—witness an incident of last summer. Schools for drawing and painting grew up outside.

In the land of Protestant sects Antibodies were bound to spring up; nor was there room at Burlington House for the huge multiplication of painters. Of specialist societies the Watercolourists have been already mentioned; the 'Old' (1804), a society of members only and with a bias towards elaborate 'painting'; the 'Institute' (1831), open to outsiders, with a core of illustrators; add to these 'Painter-Etchers,' the Art-Workers Guild, the Arts and Crafts Society and various others. But two painter societies of a general sort have been successively the rivals and the feeders of the Academy. The first of these was the 'British Artists' (1823), incorporated, 1847, 'Royal,' 1882.³ With remarkable energy this body built an excellent gallery in Suffolk Street and held successful exhibitions, rousing intense jealousy in the Academy, which enforced its rule against election from among those upstarts. The new Society retorted by imposing

² Sir Francis Grant, a future P.R.A., declared at the Commission that Pre-Raphaelitism had been most injurious to art and that election of the P.R.B.s would have been 'a great misfortune.' It came out that even Leighton was unpopular in the Academy and badly hung.

³ The best account of the early years is still the Redgraves' in *A Century of Painters*. If Mr. P. F. Millard has the ambition of writing a full history (see the *Journal* of the R.B.A. and its Art Club, 1931-2) he must guard against inaccuracy. Hoffland, not 'Hoyland,' was first Vice-President, and Alfred Stevens, the Englishman, did not join the society ten years after his death: the Belgian painter, possibly. The first requisite is a careful, dated list of members.

a fine of £100 on members joining the Royal Academy, a fine paid by David Roberts and Clarkson Stanfield. The first President was Thomas Heaphy, a rebel born. He quarrelled in turn with the Royal Academy, the 'Old' Watercolourists and the British Artists, whose golden period was under the long presidency (1835-69) of F. Y. Hurlstone, the remarkable author of *Gil Blas* in the Tate. But a drain away to the Academy sucked the life out of the Society in its second phase; twenty-nine members in a decade. In the 'eighties its fortunes had heavily slumped. There was a brilliant revival when Whistler joined and in 1886 became President. But King Stork was too much for the generality of his subjects, and his reign was brief. Since then there has been a motley of Presidents, and a sober level of merit; since the war what had been a society of members only, rising from thirty to two hundred by 1907, has had recourse to recruiting from outside for its exhibitions.

Coincidentally with Whistler's presidency and withdrawal a fresh group of Paris-inspired painters formed the New English Art Club, open to outsiders and with a suffrage of exhibitors as well as members to form its juries. It thus attracted the pick of young talent from the 'nineties onwards, and its service in that respect is not exhausted. But in its turn it has had to suffer a double drain. The Academy, grown wise, has looked to it as a nursery, and recruited over forty members from its ranks; on the other side there has been hiving-off to form later 'independent' groups. A staunch nucleus has maintained continuity for fifty years.

The organic history which I have summarised finds little place in Mr. Lamb's useful annals, and was hardly to be expected in an official account; but, as I have briefly noted elsewhere, there is a surprising omission of any reference to an important chapter in the Academy's domestic history, that of conflicting views among members themselves about the constitution and possible reform of their body. The document for this, which no one interested in the subject should neglect to study, is the evidence and Report of the Parliamentary Commission in 1863, already mentioned. Lord Stanhope, Lord Elcho (afterwards Lord Wemyss) and the other Commissioners had an axe of their own to grind; they wished to introduce a lay element into the government of the

Royal Academy as a mediator between Public and Artists, a doubtful expedient which had seen a trial run in the exhibitions of the 'British Institution.' That liberal artist of our time, Sir David Cameron, has favoured the idea, so far as the presidency is concerned; Watts, in 1863 an outsider, favoured the Commissioners' scheme. But many other points were debated, with a wide divergence of opinion. Eastlake was examined for five days, and twenty Academicians and Associates were in the witness-box, beside non-member artists like Holman Hunt and critics like Ruskin. On the question of the School Millais was all for an absence of teachers; the students, he thought, could best teach one another. Watts, on the other hand, was for something like a University of the Arts, with examination and degrees. But the debate which I wish to stress here was that upon the Associateship. In the favourable discussion which my recent article⁴ has met with in the daily, Sunday, weekly and monthly Press there has been a tendency to pessimism about the prospect of some of its proposals being accepted, including the abolition of the Associate class, which involves now a *double* period of probation, first in outside bodies and afterwards in the Royal Academy. It is not generally known that Associates formed no part of the original constitution, as defined in the 'Instrument,' and at the Commission the general sense among Academicians was against this painful period of suspense and inaction. Eastlake himself had prepared an alternative scheme, but with reluctance had not pressed it, by which a large body of 'Honorary Professional Members' should be formed, including all eminent outsiders, from whom academicians should be elected, unlimited in number, but not less than fifty.

The Commission recommended that there should be fifty R.A.'s, fifty Associates, ten laymen, and a class of 'Art Workmen,' regular teaching, and, along with the grant of new accommodation, a Royal Charter, giving Parliament a say in the conduct of a national institution.

The Academy was hostile to the Report and it was dismissed by the House of Lords. Moreover, as I pointed out in my article, many modifications and improvements have taken place since 1863. The Academy is malleable. But the

⁴ 'The Uses of the Royal Academy,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1935.

Exhibition may have to face in the near future a very landslide of its popular foundations. Mr. Lamb speaks of the Academy as the 'national guardian of good creative design in an age of restless mechanisation. . . .' Alas, the machine is at work within as well as without. The photograph is taking the place of drawing among academicians, and the cinema has invaded and taken over the old field of popular 'deceptions,' as some of the exhibits were called in the old Incorporated Society's catalogues. The machine, the photograph, the servant, which made possible the outburst of fine pen-drawing reproduction in the 'nineties, quickly cut the throat of its master, and 'the pictures' are throttling a vast deal of painting. There are other causes of change for what I have called 'The Flight from the Picture,' and the Director of the National Gallery itself has joined the 'too-quick despairers' who think that painting may be doomed. That is an attitude natural to those who think in schools and categories and write off forever some temporarily checked or exhausted line of adventure. Drawing and painting spring from a resurgent human impulse, even in the absence of the great religious and heroic inspirations. Unfortunately we suffer from the tendency of ingenious critical gentlemen to judge, not whether a particular picture is good or bad, but whether it falls into some crazy classification of 'kinds,' often entirely theoretic. Such labelling into 'impressionism' and all the 'posts' is a useful peg for article-making and a convenient battle-cry, but a poor substitute for estimating the actual work. Great and wholesome restriction of the old-fashioned trash there will be and temporary magnification of current trash there is, and what part Academy and Antibodies will play in a new situation remains to be seen. It is a minor, but not unimportant, question. The real trouble is a discouragement among our painters, who do not stay the course, are incapable of sustained effort and deteriorate into slop or arid geometry. So far as the Academy is concerned the same spirit shows in a lack, among the juniors, of devotion to the work and interests of the institution, such as Turner was proud to feel. A new and a strong leadership is called for.

D. S. MACCOLL.

The Pursuit of Music, by Sir Walford Davies (Nelson, 7s. 6d. net). It is difficult to read this book with the patience which it possibly deserves. The author in a short preface advises those who feel themselves to have come of age 'musically' to close the book because they will be annoyed to hear well-known facts restated for beginners. But what is annoying is the loose use of words, poured forth as in a broadcast talk without the possibility of being pulled up and cross-questioned. Why should the author on p. 14 advise the listener, if he finds Beethoven's quartets difficult to grasp, to listen to them again and yet a third time, while on the next page he says that he expressly does *not* advise any time to be spent on listening to 'the seemingly inscrutable experiments of seemingly arrogant minds.' Here, says Sir Walford, 'gumption will tell you what is worth listening to. Cherish the music that lies nearest your comprehension, repeat it, and it will lead you to the next delight.' Sir Walford's 'gumption' has led the ordinary man to reject with scorn and laughter every kind of music that ever ventured off the well-beaten track, and yet he feels himself able to reject what he does not yet understand as 'arrogant.' The boot might fit his own leg.

'We certainly move upon a harmonic circle or sphere,' says Sir Walford on p. 284, and adds this obscure footnote: 'Or is it some heavenly purgatorial spiral of the mind?' This seems as intelligible as his suggestion on p. 63 that 'Beings higher than man hear far more than he does, even of his lowly music.' What has that got to do with it? He makes some interesting diagrams from p. 308 onward of various scales whose component notes are arranged round a circle like the figures on a clock face, with lines drawn from the notes of the scale to their 'relations,' with dotted lines joining the 'forbidden relations' of the Tritone. Whatever 'scale' he adopts—Dorian, Nine, Eleven, Thirteen or Fifteen note, up to the Bach 'Well-Tempered' scale—the diagrams all look like circles with a multiplicity of 'chords' drawn from the various points on the circumference to other points. But in every diagram the dotted lines alone—which indicate 'forbidden relations'—all pass directly through the centre as diameters. Are we not justified from this, in claiming that this interval of three whole tones—C to F#—which so horrified the mediæval mind that it was called 'Diabolus in Musica' is the only satisfactory interval in music, and that we should so retune our ears as to get the fullest possible delight from this progression that passes through the central core of our emotional experiences? Is not that just as sensible as Sir Walford's advice given on p. 42 to play the black notes of the keyboard 'in any orderly rhythm according to any *loveable* plan of action or reverie' (the italics are not his)?

It is a real pity that so much loose talk should pass for serious enlightenment, and so much vagueness be received as æsthetic philosophy. There may be important truths concealed in the book in the jungle of verbiage which the distinguished author 'gets away with' over the air.

Frederick Delius, by Clare Delius (Nicholson and Watson, 15s. net). This book is admittedly written under some provocation. The authoress

is the sister of the composer, and therefore writes of his early years and of the American sojourn with as much authority as can be possible. Her portraits of the martinet father who loved, but was himself feared, and of the inflexible mother who to her last days would never accept the congratulations of her friends at the successes of her son in a career of which she disapproved, are both convincing. It was aggravating to her as a good Yorkshire woman to listen to the oft-repeated statement that Delius hated the arid north and was unhappy there. He hated the wool business, but he hated the orange business no less; for Bradford itself, *dura vivum nutrix*, he had no hatred. His life at Grez-sur-Loing became legendary before he died, but the interest in him as a British musician was rising on the flood tide of our national feeling, and Yorkshire was not to be left behind in this tardy race of appreciation. Both the surviving members of his family and the interested musicians in Bradford felt naturally somewhat aggrieved that the Delius 'syndicate' in the South of England should not only appropriate him, but should actually claim that his own people had never appreciated him.

There is not much original matter in the book, but one quotation may be made from one of his American friends who knew him in the 'eighties: 'That man has music in his mind, and when he sets it down it is almost impossible to play it.'

STEUART WILSON.

CORRESPONDENCE

'CORRUPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—To an Indian official, accustomed to hear corruption in Indian municipalities cited as proof of the unfitness of Indians for self-government, it is a shock to learn that similar dishonesty is prevalent in English local government. A shock, but not wholly a surprise, for the absence of expert inspection, the slackness of budget control, and the limited use made of audit notes, in some of the English local authorities, are entirely opposed to Indian tradition.

More than two thousand years ago, in the *Arthashastra*, one of the earliest known works on political science, Kautilya, Prime Minister to King Megasthenes, wrote¹:—

Superintendents of government departments while engaged in work shall daily be examined; for men are naturally fickle-minded, and, like horses at work, exhibit constant change in their temper. Hence the agency and tools that they make use of, the place and time of the work they are engaged in, as well as the precise form of the work, the outlay and results, shall always be ascertained. . . . The chief officer of each department shall scrutinise the amount of work done, the receipts from and the expenditure incurred in it, both in detail and in the aggregate. . . . Those who attend upon military officers and are noted for their honesty and good conduct shall be spies to watch the conduct of accountants and other clerks.

Each department shall be officered by several temporary clerks.

Kautilya believed that 'just as it is impossible not to taste the honey or the poison that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a Government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the King's revenue'; but he relied on spies, on accounting, and on transfers of officials, to keep speculation within bounds. Changing only 'spies' to 'inspectors,' these two thousand-year-old principles governed

¹ *Arthashastra*, book ii., cap. 9.

recent British-Indian administration. Its local authorities were subjected to a vexatious, if necessary, stream of inspection. District officers and commissioners examined every branch of municipal work, and with their wide experience were in a position to recognise the signs of dishonesty and inefficiency. The several branches of the work were inspected also by departmental officers; education by an inspector of schools, public works by a Government engineer, the sanitary side by the health officer.

The object of all these inspections was rather friendly guidance than detection of irregularities, but they served both purposes.

The budget, too, provided a valuable check. It had to be prepared in great detail, with full explanations of all variations from the figures of previous years, and the correspondence of actuals with the estimates was carefully watched.

Municipal accounts were audited much as in England, but the auditors' notes were reviewed in a publication which dealt not only with irregularities but with all instances of extravagance or laxity brought to light by the audit. All this supervision failed to stop corruption, but kept it within bounds.

In England I have come across nothing corresponding to the Indian 'inspection.' I have known budgets passed with hardly any explanation or criticism, and not referred to again. I have met with no publication that fills the place of the examiner's review of the audit reports. There may be different conditions in the great boroughs; I write only of lesser authorities.

In India we used to be told that the high level of English honesty and ability warranted greater freedom from supervision; but human nature has not changed much since the time of Kautilya, and one of the sad legacies from the Great War is a lowered standard of commercial honesty, exemplified in the general acquiescence in the giving and taking of unauthorised commission.

Public servants can hardly be expected to regard as shameful practices which their brethren in business consider allowable, and if corruption in local government is to be stopped the national standard of commercial honesty must be raised. In the meantime, if the Civil Service would direct its activities to the personal supervision and guidance of local authorities it might check the grosser forms of corruption.

Yours faithfully,

J. E. WEBSTER.

Handley Cross, Pittville Park, Cheltenham,

November 20, 1895

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